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The changing norms of civil and military

and civil-military relations theory
a
Jan Angstrom
a
Department of Peace and Conflict Research , Uppsala University ,
Uppsala , Sweden
Published online: 30 Apr 2013.

To cite this article: Jan Angstrom (2013) The changing norms of civil and military and civil-military
relations theory, Small Wars & Insurgencies, 24:2, 224-236, DOI: 10.1080/09592318.2013.778014

To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09592318.2013.778014

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 Small Wars & Insurgencies, 2013
Vol. 24, No. 2, 224236, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09592318.2013.778014

The changing norms of civil and military and civil-military

relations theory
Jan Angstrom*

Department of Peace and Conflict Research, Uppsala University, Uppsala, Sweden

The dichotomy between civil and military is well-established in international

political practice. International law, international order, and war are but some
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of the institutions that rely upon making a distinction between civil and
military. The distinction, arguably, is also central for analyses of conflicts
worldwide. Almost daily, we are fed stories of atrocities against civilians in
conflict-ridden parts of the world. In academic discourse, similarly, several
fields of study including most of the debate centering on interpreting modern
war relies upon a distinction between civil and military. Both research and
practice, however, tend to treat these categories as fixed and global. In this
article, I argue to the contrary that what constitutes civil and military are
malleable norms. This forms a particular challenge to analyses of civil
military relations and it calls for a different categorization of civil military
relations in Weberian ideal types.
Keywords: Afghanistan; civil military relations; civilian domain; Giap;
ideal-type categorization; Iraq; Mazar-e-Sharif; Vietnam War

Introduction
The norms of civil and military that have been embedded in and underpinned
Western political thought and international political order over the past few
centuries are increasingly challenged.1 Rather than only being understood as
innocent victims and by-standers, twentieth-century mass warfare made civilians
part of the war effort, thus making them perpetrators and targets. Rebel forces
increasingly rely upon guerrilla warfare and terrorism as strategies, thus blurring
the distinction between civil and military. In Western interventions, armed forces
and aid organizations struggle to make a unified effort and have instead reverted
to new tasks where the military conducts humanitarian aid, but in so trying, have
militarized the humanitarian space.2 Moreover, modern states monopoly of
legitimate violence is increasingly dissolved as private contractors assume roles
that for the past century have been the domain of the armed forces of states.3
In a recent book Johanne Hildebrandt, a journalist embedded with the
Swedish Armed Forces in Afghanistan, highlighted the lack of coordination
among civilian agencies and the armed forces in the Swedish Provincial

*Email: jan.angstrom@pcr.uu.se

q 2013 Taylor & Francis

 Small Wars & Insurgencies 225
4
Reconstruction Team (PRT) in Mazar-e-Sharif. Lack of government directives
of how coordination should occur caused frustration and consternation among
those in Afghanistan. As such, she perceptively tapped into a more general debate
of how civilians and militaries are supposed to interact. This issue has lately
begun to attract wider scholarly interest. Although the relation between civil and
military is often framed in terms of democratic accountability since the entire
field developed around the central puzzle of civilian control of the military, it is
also an issue at the very heart of strategic thought. Like all strategic questions, it
suffers from an interactive component which, in hindsight, can lead perfectly
rational decisions to utterly irrational outcomes and it entails grappling with
scarce resources. Most importantly, civil military relations and civil military
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coordination directly tap into the formation of ends and means in strategy.
Despite its obvious importance, there are several shortcomings in our
knowledge of how civil and military are constituted and relate to each other. Far
too often relations between civil and military are treated by scholars as well as
policymakers as a technical matter of more or less coordination. Instead, it relates
to fundamental political norms of how societies should be organized. Similarly,
the recent literature on security sector reform far too often treats democratic
control of the military as a binary dichotomy (either there is control or there isnt),
thus failing to recognize the great diversity of democratic orders. Furthermore, the
study of civil military relations has, with few exceptions,5 been dominated by
case studies of the contemporary US, Great Britain, or after the Cold War
post-Communist states in Eastern Europe.6 The selection of empirical cases is
thus quite limited. Surely, if for example Peter Feaver is right in suggesting that
civil military relations has been an issue since Antiquity, we should be able to
include a wider range of cases in our studies.7 Similarly, the way we currently
understand the distinction of civil and military in the West is often taken for
granted and assumed to be of universal validity. The latter tendency is abundant in
the burgeoning literature on civil victimization in war.8 Modern strategic thought,
moreover, seems not only to think of civil and military as important, but also
presumes the existence of such categories and the boundaries between them.9
What if civil and military can be understood differently?
An empirical strategy to research civil military relations, however, is
hampered by the lack of categorizations that cover the full width of diversity of
potential civil military relations. Instead, the typical theories of civil military
relations focus on the more narrow control of the military and devise different
strategies and theories for this control.10 Not even huge data gathering programs
on democracy such as POLITY include measures for civil military relations.
The aim of this article, therefore, is to take a first stab at developing such a
categorization. The challenge for fruitful categorizations, of course, is to make
them logically exhaustive, mutually exclusive, semantically consistent, and
neutral.11 If categorizations do not meet these essential criteria, our analyses run
the risk of being biased and flawed. For example, if we cannot tell who is civilian
and military, analyzing civil victimization becomes nothing more than
 226 J. Angstrom
guesswork. Categorizations should be neutral and avoid politically laden
categories such as terrorists. If categories are not mutually exclusive, moreover,
the empirical phenomena we observe end up as several categories. It goes without
saying that it is an analytical problem a flawed categorization if what we
observe can be, for example, both peace and war. I will develop a Weberian ideal-
type categorization. Plenty of arguments suggest that a typology of civil military
relations is important. First, scholarly analysis is hampered due to the prevailing
more narrow conceptual focus. Grasping the entire range of civil and military
relations would enable us to better analyze civil military relations and its effects.
Second, for policymakers, it is critical to understand the full range of potential
civil military relations when developing strategies for interventions, peace-
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building efforts, or security sector reform in post-conflict societies.

The article proceeds as follows. In the first section, I will start from the
assumption that civil and military can be understood as norms rather than fixed
and natural categories. Through understanding the distinction between civil and
military as norms, it is possible to uncover the degree to which this distinction is
foundational for our current understanding of the state, international order, and
war. Understanding civil and military as norms also provides an explanation to
variation and changes in the civil military relations. Second, I will develop a
categorization of civil military relations in Weberian ideal types. The advantage
of this approach is that ideal types can help to cover the entire range of possible
civil military relations. In the conclusions, I point to further developments that
need to be made in order to develop these into a broader research agenda.

Changing norms of civil and military

Rather than understanding civil and military as fixed categories, I suggest that
they should be understood as norms. Norms, following Peter Katzenstein, include
both regulative and constitutive elements. Norms describe collective
expectations for the proper behavior of actors with a given identity.12 Critically,
the norms of civil and military are inherently linked to political order and
hierarchy. In order to wage war, Martin van Creveld argues, the polity needs to
legitimize killing.13 The problem, of course, is that killing cannot be legitimate in
other social domains since that would constitute legitimizing murder. What needs
to be created, therefore, is a separate body within the state that is allowed to wield
deadly force. This is the essential functional explanation as to why a polity would
create an organization the military with power to overthrow government.
What tends to be forgotten, however, is that both civil and military tend to be
heterogeneous categories. States frequently use multiple security organizations
and the distinction between police and military often thought to correspond
strictly to internal and external security threats is not necessarily as rigid as
often thought.14
Although van Creveld connects the distinction between the military and
civilians to the creation of any hierarchical polity, the norms of civil military
 Small Wars & Insurgencies 227
relations as we understand them today are intimately linked to the emergence of the
modern territorial state. Civil and military is a very strong normative dichotomy
that has been embedded both in practice and scholarly discourse. In a very
fundamental way, to be civil is not to be a member of the regularly constituted
armed forces of a state.15 Obviously, military refers to those that are members of
the armed forces of a state. Although quite straightforward, this minimalist
definition still encounters some problems. One is obviously related to time. Can I
be a civilian during daytime and military by night? This is not far-fetched. During
the Vietnam War, North Vietnamese General Vo Nguyen Giap organized the
resistance against South Vietnamese and US forces in three cadres; the regular
North Vietnamese Army, main-force Vietcong units, and local Vietcong units. The
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latter group comprised of part-time soldiers gathering intelligence locally and

conducting smaller operations at nighttime, while being ordinary farmers
cultivating their soil during daytime.16 The phenomenon is relevant today in
Afghanistan too with warfare clearly having a seasonal dimension with increasing
levels of violence during the spring and summer.17 In the context of civil wars,
moreover, Adam Roberts has suggested that there is an understanding that the
criterion of armed forces of the state has to be softened and replaced with armed
groups of non-state parties.18 However, hardly surprisingly, this has not been
endorsed by any state so far, since this would potentially undermine their political
leeway in naming their internal armed opponents terrorists.
This shows that what it means to be civilian and military is a political choice.
It is a choice that is inherently linked to a particular form of international and
domestic political order. For the polity, creating and maintaining a distinction
between civil and military is crucial. If we did not have civil and military, the
elites would not be able to uphold the distinction between war and peace. And the
reason, of course, is that the state needs to be able to sanction some deadly
violence but ban other forms as crime. The state therefore encourages and
authorizes a segment of society the military to use deadly force legally.
By the act of authorizing deadly violence through the military, the distinction
between civil and military upholds a particular form of domestic order: the state.
Although the categories of civil and military are fundamental to a series of
domestic and international orders, as norms they are also contextual and varying.
An obvious indicator of the variation in these norms is the fact that not all
societies have institutionalized separate bodies of jurisprudence for military law
and civil law. Even in Rome, where the division of separate bodies of law
emerged, there was a great deal of variation throughout the 1000 years of the
Roman Empire.19 The separation of public and private as well as civil and
military is an inherent norm that made the Westphalian state possible (see also
Rosen and Halden in this issue). This distinction is, however, far from self-
evident in the developing world today. Richard Ned Lebow argues that the
distinction between public and private is a specifically Western norm and one
which is not shared by many rulers in the developing world, where in many cases
the revenues of state is considered to be the rulers private property.20
 228 J. Angstrom
Accordingly, it is also feasible that it may be better to understand current politics
in Somalia or Afghanistan through the spectacles of late medieval European
political order than through those provided by modern European states.
Other practices and policy suggestions also challenge the distinction between
public and private. The ensuing debates illustrate how uneasy we become with
actions that undermine the separation of public and private. The intended killing
of political leaders of our opponents is clear example as illustrated by the
different fates of Saddam Hussein and Osama bin Laden. US forces captured
Hussein and handed him over to the Iraqi authorities for prosecution and later
conviction and execution. Although there was some criticism, it was primarily
leveled at the new Iraqi government for keeping the death penalty. However, in
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the case of Osama bin Laden, US soldiers seemingly were forced to kill him on
the spot, rather than capturing him for a US court to decide his fate. Suddenly, an
ethical and legal debate about the legitimacy of killing political leaders
emerged.21 Killing your political opponents also implied a strategic paradox.
Before their interventions over the last decades, Western leaders have stressed
that the use of force is directed not at the people, but at the dictators (e.g. Saddam
Hussein, Slobodan Milosevic, Muammar Gaddafi) that allegedly conduct
atrocities. While understandable, the consequence of this narrative is that the
leader is personalized, rather than made a holder of an office. Public office is thus
turned into a private matter, and the distinction between private and public that
we want to maintain and that underpins the state is undermined.
Another example is how the separation of civil and military would challenge
and risk changing us in ways we are not necessarily comfortable with. This
problem, again, is partly driven by our own strategies and is therefore a prime
example of how war is a process of adjustment and copying. And that war may not
necessarily leave us in a position where our opponents adjust to our will, but we may
end up copying the Taliban to a further extent than we originally thought. Recently,
it has been argued that military force has become primarily a tactical tool.22
Because it is mainly of tactical utility, the West struggles to reach its strategic aims.
If you fight an opponent that does not distinguish between civilian and military in
the Westphalian way, it will be difficult to pursue any reasonable targeting strategy
with kinetic or non-kinetic means. More importantly, though, the way we prepare
for war makes a sharp distinction between civil and military and therefore also
between war and peace in which different judicial systems are meant to operate.
This Western zone of comfort, however, is increasingly challenged when faced with
war in the developing world. The result has been an increased focus on tactics. If we
only kill enough, or kill the right individuals, the tactical victories would be
translatable into strategic effects. The shortcomings of this strategy are evident from
operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. Instead of the Western Surge causing victory, it
rather led to side effects unforeseen changes in the local dynamics of Iraqi politics
and local strategy that in turn ended the Iraq War.23
What if, to reach strategic ends, there is need to adapt not only militarily, but
also politically? Are we prepared to weaken the distinction between civil and
 Small Wars & Insurgencies 229
military that so much of our political and legal frameworks hinges upon?
Traditionally, civilian in the Western context has meant an individual that is not
a member of a militia or the armed forces. If we face an opponent that does not
understand civilian in this way instead using part-timers our forces will
struggle with whom to target, but also with whom to protect.
Over the course of the last century and increasingly the last decades a series of
partly unrelated, but coinciding, trends have put the existing Western categories
of civil and military under severe strain.24 One of the more telling signs of this is
the increased interaction between Western armed forces and strategic elites with
rebel movements conducting their war in a completely different manner. The
tactics and strategy of insurgency and counter-insurgency challenge a clear
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distinction between military and civil since it incorporates the civilians in the war
effort. A similar development, of course, is also clear in how the West
understands humanitarian interventions and how terrorists understand democ-
racy, i.e. Western civilians are considered responsible for the wars in Iraq and
Afghanistan since they voted for the political leaders they did. The object of study
for this special issue civil military coordination in the operational space
moreover is also a sign of changing conceptions of civil and military. If as
Egnell suggests we have a militarization of the humanitarian aid and a converse
humanization of the military, it would constitute a significant challenge to how
we understand civil and military.25

Categories of civil military relations

In this section, I will develop five ideal types of civil military relations. Taken
together, they contribute to recognizing the full range of the empirical variety of
civil and military relations. This is important since it can form the basis for
developing a more empirical systematical approach to the study of civil military
relations. It should be pointed out that the categorization is equally applicable to
civil military relations in general as well as the more operational and limited
civil military coordination. Ideal types are heuristic devices that never quite
match empirical phenomena since they stress certain aspects of an empirical
phenomenon, while necessarily downplaying others. However, they are a
particularly apt starting point for categorizations as they, through the detachment
from the empirical, can avoid being overly reliant on context.

Type 1: Civilian supremacy over the military

This represents the inherent norm in the literature on civil military relations. The
military should be held accountable to, and be subordinate to, democratic,
civilian leadership. This ideal type shares the essential tenets of Samuel
Huntingtons theory of objective control.26 He famously understood the ideal
system to be one where there was a sharp border between civil and military in
which the former would have a clearly elevated position. In this way, military
 230 J. Angstrom
involvement in politics can be minimized. The military, meanwhile, should be
controlled through allowing it to be professionalized. Unaffected by civilian
norms, it could develop its own professional standards and measures of success.
Decisions to go war clearly belonged to the civilian domain, but once war had
begun, the military would be given the freedom to choose how the war should be
fought since knowledge of war-fighting was restricted to the military. After war,
civilian leadership could be restored. Hence, according to this model, the military
is clearly subordinate to civilian leadership, but in the case of war, the military
drawing upon its professional knowledge enjoy substantial independence
insofar as choosing strategy. Even during peacetime, the military can enjoy
substantial freedom and have an impact on the wider society in case of setting the
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standards for wartime preparations. After having served the political civilian
leadership the war results on a tray, it has not a say in the negotiations of a new
peace. Although examples, by definition, are problematic for ideal-type
reasoning, objective control to some extent existed in Wilhelmine Germany,
where the military was allowed to develop its professional standards without
civilian intervention. Similarly, some of the aspects of objective control have
developed in post-Vietnam US armed forces, which has its own legal system, a
professionalized officers corps as well as employed soldiers. One can also
illustrate the logic of the ideal type in civil military cooperation (CIMIC)
circumstances. The Swedish PRT in Mazar-e-Sharif in Afghanistan is, for
example, led by a civilian. This command, however, does not extend to include
the tactical level of the Swedish military mission. The Swedish military in
Afghanistan, therefore, can maintain its professional standards, while still being
under civilian leadership.

Type 2: Military supremacy over the civilians

This is a traditional military dictatorship. This type of civil military relations is
hardly touched upon the literature on civil military relations since it goes against
the inherent norm of the literature. Forms of military rule have been
commonplace throughout history, however, and in an attempt to devise a
strategy for empirical, systematic knowledge, it surely needs to be taken into
account. As an ideal type, it suggests that the military dominates societal relations
regardless of the state of peace or war. It leads the executive, legislative, and
judicial branches of power. In order to qualify as a category of civil military
relations, though, we should not be mistaken and think of this type as a
completely militarized society. In understanding civilians as subordinate to the
military, the ideal type still recognizes that there are two clear categories: civilian
and military. Still, in terms of authority, the military decides upon wartime
preparations as well as decisions to go to war. It decides upon the strategies
during war and negotiates the postwar peace. The military-led juntas in parts of
Latin America during the past 50 years share several aspects of this ideal type.
In terms of CIMIC, this ideal type implies that the military leads humanitarian
 Small Wars & Insurgencies 231
efforts and thus can direct aid or other developmental projects to support the
military main effort. However, it could also include slightly more subtle forms of
influence. Consider, for example, if civilian aid agencies have to adapt to military
planning structures when operating in the same territory. In such cases, the power
over the agenda as well as initiatives remains with the military.

Type 3: Civil and military parity

The category of civilian and military parity suggests a more nuanced picture of
decision-making before and during war, where the military takes part in the
decision-making process before war for example, by interacting with the
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political leadership in suggesting goals of the war while the civilians also have
a significant impact on choice of military strategy with which to conduct the war.
This suggests that neither military, nor civilians have exclusive spheres of
knowledge and neither can set their own standards. As Eliot Cohen suggests, it
was precisely the continuous interventions and attempts to micromanage military
strategy by Churchill and Lincoln that led to success in war.27 For Churchills
chief-of-staff Lord Alan Brooke and Lincolns numerously replaced chiefs-of-
staff, it represented a continuous interaction between civil and military needs and
incentives. As an ideal type, it draws therefore not upon the separation of
knowledge and exclusive expertise and exclusive domains of decision-making,
but rather the opposite, i.e. the collision between such knowledge domains.

Type 4: Intertwining of civil and military

In this type, there is a distinction of civil and military, and the decision-making
process allots different roles to civilian or military bureaucracies. This is very
much what Huntington had in mind as subjective control, where the military is
controlled through a set of institutions, decision-making processes, and legal
frameworks. As an ideal type, you would expect to find in an institutionalized
way civilian positions within the armed forces and vice versa. Rather than parity,
this ideal type still relies on exclusive expertise, but organizes in such a way as to
maximize the likelihood that respective competence can be utilized in the right
steps of the strategic decision-making process to produce the optimal decisions.
Ideally, this harmonizes the decision-making and it institutionalizes a degree of
interaction between civil and military so that the strategic process from setting
goals to considering alternative strategies to reach the goals consistently is a
field of debate.

Type 5: Dissolution of civil and military

In contrast with the others, civil and military become meaningless terms in
this final category. If we consider that the distinction of civil and military was
created in order to separate war from murder and as such underpin not only
 232 J. Angstrom
military, but also political order, we need to stretch our imagination to other
forms of social and political order. As an ideal type, it relies upon a society where
killing is legitimate. Any boundaries between civil and military would be
dissolved or not created in the first place. They are rendered meaningless. Such a
society ought to be short-lived and resemble a Hobbesian state of nature.
However, there are social practices that can stabilize such forms of order.
Consider a system where killing is legitimate, but if there were a duty to avenge
killed relatives, friends, and family, there would be a system of checks and
balances so that this society, too, would be relatively stable in terms of
reproducing the core values of the society. It would be a society where you could
not meaningfully talk about civilians or militaries in any of the stages in the
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decision-making process, but it would still reproduce itself. Although this

understanding of society may seem alien to many Westerners, there are forms of
sub-state social orders in the West that seem to follow parts of these normative
frameworks. Note also, that this is not society without norms, but it is society with
different norms than Westerners usually consider. Another example is traditional
Pashtu law Pashtunwali that holds that: women, children, and above all,
guests, must be protected and spared violence, but men are almost always fair
game.28 Hence, any offences are considered legitimate to kill for, but the right
and duty of vengeance is also part of the law, thus maintaining order.

Conclusions or the start of a new research agenda?

This article is a first attempt to develop a more inclusive understanding of
potential civil military relations. It advances the notion that the distinction
between, and contents of, civil military relations are shaped by norms. It also
suggests that these norms are currently challenged. They are increasingly
challenged from a number of angles, many of which are under scrutiny in the
following articles. Understanding civil military relations as contextual implies
that there is a great deal of variety. Instead of focusing on predominantly a few
Western cases, I have developed an ideal-type categorization of civil military
relations that tries to capture more of the empirical variety of civil military
relations. Such a categorization, however, does not necessarily have a value in
and of itself. Hence, rather than an endpoint, creating such a categorization opens
up a new agenda for more research. Several aspects of such a research agenda
need lengthier elaboration than is allowed here, but short comments are still
necessary.
First, categorizing the entire range of potential civil military relations allows
for developing a systematic empirical research strategy. As such, we can start to
investigate whether variation in civil military relations is related to patterns of
conflict and collaboration in world politics. By mapping variation in types and
expressions of civil military relations, it is possible to test quantitatively some of
the key propositions of standard civil military relations theory that so far have
only been exposed to case studies. Critically, we can also start to question some
 Small Wars & Insurgencies 233
of the key propositions on the creation and pursuit of strategy. How is the way we
organize our civil military relations related to formation of revisionist or status
quo-ambitions? How are democracy and civil military relations related? Are
certain forms of civil military relations associated with increased risk of military
coups or government-run repression?
Second, before doing this, there is also a need for further work to create
operational indicators of the five ideal types of civil military relations identified
above. How do we, for example, separate the intertwined model of civil military
relations from the parity-model? Should we focus only on constitutional or
legal features to empirically distinguish between the types?
Third, being able to respond to these questions and develop a theory sufficient
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to be able to explain how civil military relations is related to the causes,

dynamics, and resolution of armed conflicts will also be of great policy
importance. Knowing how civil military relations is related to the causes of war
and conditions for durable peace would imply that more empirically grounded
strategies for peacebuilding and security sector reform can be designed and
implemented. This would constitute important practical knowledge for
international organizations, non-governmental organizations, and states alike.
It opens up the opportunity to identify when the practice of international
interventions and increasing civil military coordination becomes self-defeating,
when our values are compromised, and when peace and war are changing
meaning. And it opens up the opportunity for self-reflection. Is success in
Afghanistan worth becoming Taliban?

Notes
1. Roberts, The Civilian in Modern War, 358 361.
2. Egnell Between Reluctance and Necessity, 231 257.
3. Singer, Corporate Warriors; Avant, The Market for Force; Carafano, Private Sector,
Public Wars.
4. Hildebrandt, Krigare, 337 338.
5. See e.g. Barany, The Soldier and the Changing State.
6. See e.g. Huntington, The Soldier and the State; Janowitz, The Professional Soldier;
Nielsen and Snider, American Civil-Military Relations; Bebler, Civil-Military
Relations in Post-Communist States; Kummel The Winds of Change; Strachan,
The Civil-Military Gap in Britain; Vennesson, Civil-Military Relations in France.
7. Feaver, Armed Servants.
8. See e.g. Kaldor, New and Old Wars; Valentino, Final Solutions; Kalyvas, Logic of
Violence in Civil Wars; Eck and Hultman, One-Sided Violence against Civilians;
Downes, Targeting Civilians in War; Slim, Killing Civilians; Melander et al., Are
New Wars More Atrocious?
9. See e.g. Egnell, Complex Peace Operations; Stone, Military Strategy; Betts,
American Force.
10. See e.g. Born, Democratic Control of Armed Forces, 151165; Burk, Theories of
Democratic Civil-Military Relations.
11. Van de Goor et al., Introduction, 1 6.
12. Katzenstein, Introduction, 5.
 234 J. Angstrom
13. Van Creveld, The Culture of War, 158.
14. Lutterbeck, Between Police and Military; Weiss, The Blurring Border.
15. Roberts, The Civilian in Modern War, 358.
16. Larsdotter, New Wars, Old Warfare?, 139.
17. This is documented in a host of books by embedded journalists. See e.g. Steele,
Ghosts of Afghanistan; Junger, War.
18. Roberts The Civilian in Modern War, 358.
19. Brand, Roman Military Law.
20. Lebow, Tragic Vision of Politics.
21. See e.g. Johnston Does Decapitation Work?; Price Targeting Top Terrorists.
22. Smith, The Utility of Force; Angstrom and Duyesteyn, Modern War.
23. Biddle et al., Testing the Surge.
24. Roberts, The Civilian in Modern War.
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25. Egnell, Between Reluctance and Necessity, 231 257; cf. Spear and Williams,
Security and Development.
26. Huntington, The Soldier and the State.
27. Cohen, Supreme Command.
28. Margolis, War at the Top of the World, 12.

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