Académique Documents
Professionnel Documents
Culture Documents
Topicality
1NC T-13%
A substantial curtailment is at least 13% -- the court case Shell Oil v.
Brooks established a precedent on this issue heres is Justice Utter
delivering the opinion of the Court.
J. Utter, concurring judges: C.J. Wright, Hamilton Rosellini, Brachtenbach Stafford,
Dolliver Horowitz, JJ Hicks, 88 Wn.2d 909, 567 P.2d 1132, SHELL OIL v. BROOKS
[3] The act specifies the particular circumstances in which one who leaves employment due to a labor dispute may qualify for compensation,
despite the voluntary character of such a termination. "An individual shall be disqualified for benefits for any week with respect to which the
commissioner finds that his unemployment is due to a stoppage of work which exists because of a labor dispute at the factory, establishment,
or other premises at which he is or was last employed . . ." RCW 50.20.090. The parties concede each claimant was unemployed because of the
labor dispute. The next issue presented then is whether there was a "stoppage of work" which raises the ancillary issues of how that term is to
be defined and whether the record supports the findings of the commissioner. The term "stoppage of work" refers to the operation of the
employer's plant or business rather than the activity of individual employees. LAWRENCE BAKING CO. v. UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION
COMM'N, 308 Mich. 198, 13 N.W.2d 260, 154 A.L.R. 660 (1944), CERT. DENIED, 323 U.S. 738, 89 L. Ed. 591, 65 S. Ct. 43 (1944). SEE
CONSTRUCTION OF PHRASE "STOPPAGE OF WORK" IN STATUTORY PROVISION DENYING UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION BENEFITS DURING
STOPPAGE RESULTING FROM LABOR DISPUTE, Annot., 61 A.L.R.3d 693 (1975); Shadur, UNEMPLOYMENT BENEFITS AND THE "LABOR DISPUTE"
DISQUALIFICATION, 17 U. Chi. L. Rev. 294 (1950). Cases from other jurisdictions interpreting statutes similar to RCW 50.20.090 are in general
agreement that the term "stoppage of work" is most often defined in terms of a substantial curtailment of the employer's overall operations at
the particular situs in question. MOUNTAIN STATES TEL. & TEL. CO. v. SAKRISON, 71 Ariz. 219, 225 P.2d 707 (1950); INTER-ISLAND RESORTS,
LTD. v. AKAHANE, 46 Hawaii 140, 377 P.2d 715 (1962); GENERAL ELEC. CO. v. DIRECTOR OF EMPLOYMENT SECURITY, 349 Mass. 358, 208 N.E.2d
234 (1965); TRAVIS v. GRABIEC, 52 Ill. 2d 175, 287 N.E.2d 468 (1972). SEE Annot., SUPRA, 61 A.L.R.3d 693, 5, at 705. Whether there is a
substantial curtailment is resolved by application of a number of established criteria to the facts of the particular case.
There are a few fixed boundaries for the meaning of the term "substantial" in
this context. The attempts by other courts to devise a formula based upon a
percentage of reduction in normal production or operations by which a line delineating substantial
from nonsubstantial could be established have varied from 50 percent of normal
production in early decisions to as low as a 20 percent decline in business activity in subsequent
decisions. More recently, the difficulty of applying a fixed percentage concept to define "substantial" has resulted in courts assessing a number
of factors.
"Since the mid-fifties, there has been a new emphasis placed upon the term "operations." As production increasingly represents less than
totality of the employing unit's performance, decreases in business revenue, services rendered, marketing, research, and maintenance,
transportation, and construction activities have come to the fore as indicia of substantialness.
(Footnote omitted.) Lewis, THE "STOPPAGE OF WORK" CONCEPT IN LABOR DISPUTE DISQUALIFICATION JURISPRUDENCE, 45 J. Urban Law 319,
332 (1967).
The specific criteria accented by the commissioner in this case were whether there was a diminution in
production and whether there was a substantial curtailment of other normal nonproduction "operations." The parties
concede and the court found there was no curtailment of production. The parties then focused on whether there was a substantial curtailment
of other, nonproduction related, operations. Appellant placed its primary emphasis upon disruptions resulting from the necessity to reassign
nonproduction personnel. Of the nonproduction staff, a total of 64 employees out of the total employment complement of 381 employees,
were reassigned. Because these individuals were not replaced, there was at least a 16 percent reduction in the overall personnel within the
substantial curtailment of normal employer operations. Jurisdictions outside the state of Washington
considering the same question have varied in their conclusions, ranging from a
low of perhaps 13 percent to a high of over 50 percent in personnel reduction asbeing
indicative of "substantial curtailment" of employer operations. COMPARE MOUNTAIN STATES TEL. & TEL. CO. v.
SAKRISON, SUPRA, AND GENERAL ELEC. CO. v. DIRECTOR OF EMPLOYMENT SECURITY, SUPRA. Appellant asserts first the commissioner's
decision was fundamentally wrong as a matter of law in that he failed to consider the nature of the work that was not being performed in
relation to the total operation of the refinery, and that he should have considered factors other than simply the reduction in overall personnel.
We do not read the record as limiting the commissioner's determination solely to that factor. In this context, in his decision the commissioner
discussed at length another case involving a strike at a refinery which is in many respects factually similar to this situation. TRAVIS v. GRABIEC,
SUPRA. He emphasized the strike in TRAVIS had caused a severe curtailment in overall operations, including the destroying of work in the
treatment and research department and the suspension of construction and maintenance work, as well as truck and barge transportation. He
recognized that these factors had led the court in that case to find significant evidence of a stoppage of work despite the fact that for a period
of time full production of barrels of oil per day was carried on by a skeleton force working abnormal hours and performing abnormal functions.
Later in his opinion the commissioner made it clear that he believed the impact on normal operations caused by the reduction in personnel was
not as severe as that in the TRAVIS case.
You, as the judge, do not have the jurisdiction to vote for their team
our definition makes the topic more limited in order to have better
and fairer discussions and research practicesabout the resolution.
Terror DA
1NC Terror Turn
The risk of homegrown terrorism is increasing now the best solution
is increased domestic surveillance.
Brian Michael Jenkins, a senior adviser to the president of the RAND
Corporation, writes in 2015:
Brian Michael Jenkins, senior adviser to the president of the RAND Corporation,
The Continuing Lure of Violent Jihad, March 24, Testimony given Before the
Committee on Homeland Security, House of Representatives, p. 4-5, fwang
Both al Qaeda and ISIL believe that communications are as important as the armed struggle. Both have effectively exploited the Internet, al
al
Qaeda in a more controlled manner and ISIL using social media. We have never really abated the power of the message coming from
Qaeda, and now ISIL, through its actions and communications, has amplified that
message to inspire a broader audience. That message will continue to spread and fuel instability in regional
conflicts.
There is, nonetheless, good newsin that neither al Qaeda nor ISIL has achieved more than limited success in persuading
Americans to join their version of jihad. The terrorist organizations have not been able to build a deep reservoir of support
here; there have been few terrorist plots, and thus far there is no exodus of U.S. volunteers going to Syria.
The most likely threat to U.S. homeland security therefore comes from
homegrown terrorists carrying out unsophisticated, but lethal, attacks. As we have seen in
the terrorist assaults at Fort Hood, Paris, and Tunis, or numerous non-terrorist shootings in the United States, a pair of gunmen,
or even just one, can cause serious casualties. Over the long term, we cannot exclude the
possibility of more ambitious plots, although domestic intelligence efforts have
been remarkably successful.
Curtailing surveillance as per the plan runs the risk of more jihad
attacks in the United States terrorists will try to use even more
dangerous weapons once surveillance is more lax.
Gary Ackerman and Laura Pinson described this development in 2014:
Gary A. Ackerman and Laura E. Pinson, *Director of the Special Projects Division at
the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism at
the University of Maryland, **Senior Research/Project Manager at START, An
Army of One: Assessing CBRN Pursuit and Use by Lone Wolves and Autonomous
Cells, Terrorism and Political Violence, Vol. 26, Iss. 1,p. 227-30, fwang
The first question to answer is whence the concerns about the nexus between CBRN weapons and isolated actors come and whether these are
overblown. The general threat of mass violence posed by lone wolves and small
autonomous cells has been detailed in accompanying issue contributions, but the potential use of
CBRN weapons by such perpetrators presents some singular features that either amplify or supplement the
attributes of the more general case and so are deserving of particular attention.
Chief among these is the impact of rapid technological development. Recent and emerging
This process often entails an increase in the availability and safety of the
technology, with a concurrent diminution in the cost, volume, and technical
knowledge required to operate it. Thus, for example, whereas fifty years ago producing large
quantities of certain chemical weapons might have been a dangerous and inefficient affair requiring a large plant,
expensive equipment, and several chemical engineers, with the advent of chemical microreactors, the same processes might be
broader political entity could kill with a single action has increased from single
digits to thousands. Indeed, it has even been asserted that over time ... as the leverage provided by technology increases, this
threshold will finally reach its culminationwith the ability of one man to declare
war on the world and win. Nowhere is this trend more perceptible in the current
age than in the area of unconventional weapons.
Globalization and the expansion of
These new technologies do not simply empower users on a purely technical level.
individual who can shock the entire system (whether national, regional, or global) by relying only
on their own resources. Their core characteristics are that they have superior intelligence, the capacity to use complex
communications or technology systems, and act as an individual or a lone-wolf. The end result, according to the pessimists,
With the exception of the largest truck or aircraft bombs, the most likely means by which to accomplish this level of system perturbation is
cells may ironically be more likely to select CBRN weapons than more established
terrorist groupswho are usually more conservative in their tactical orientationbecause the
extreme asymmetry of these weapons may provide the only subjectively feasible
option for such actors to achieve their grandiose aims of deeply affecting the
system. The inherent technical challenges presented by CBRN weapons may also
make them attractive to self-assured individuals who may have a very different
risk tolerance than larger, traditional terrorist organizations that might have to be concerned with a variety of
constituencies, from state patrons to prospective recruits. Many other factors beyond a perceived potential to achieve mass casualties might
play into the decision to pursue CBRN weapons in lieu of conventional explosives, including a fetishistic fascination with these weapons or the
perception of direct referents in the would-be perpetrators belief system.
Others are far more sanguine about the capabilities of lone actors (or indeed non-state actors in general) with respect to their potential for
using CBRN agents to cause mass fatalities, arguing that the barriers to a successful large-scale CBRN attack remain high, even in todays
networked, tech-savvy environment. Dolnik, for example, argues that even though homegrown cells are less constrained in motivations,
more challenging plots generally have an inverse relationship with capability, while Michael Kenney cautions against making presumptions
about the ease with which individuals can learn to produce viable weapons using only the Internet. However, even most of these pundits
concede that low-levelCBR attacksemanating from this quarter will probably lead to
political, social, and economic disruption that extends well beyond the areas
immediately affected by the attack. This raises an essential point with respect to CBRN terrorism:
irrespective of the harm potential of CBRN weapons or an actors capability (or lack
thereof) to successfully employ them on a catastrophic scale, these weapons invariably exert a stronger
psychological impact on audiencesthe essence of terrorismthan the traditional gun and bomb. This is surely not
lost on those lone actors or autonomous cells who are as interested in getting noticed as in causing casualties.
actors
possibly the best argument for engaging in a substantive examination of the issue is the most concrete one of allthat these
have already demonstrated the motivation and capability to pursue and use
CBRN weapons, in some cases even close to the point of constituting a genuine WMD
threat. In the context of bioterrorism, perhaps the most cogent illustration of this is the case of Dr. Bruce Ivins, the perpetrator behind one
of the most serious episodes of bioterrorism in living memory, the 2001 anthrax letters, which employed a highly
virulent and sophisticated form of the agent and not only killed five and seriously sickened 17 people, but led to widespread
Thomas Lavy was caught at the Alaska-Canada border in 1993 with 130 grams of 7% pure ricin. It is unclear how
Lavy obtained the ricin, what he planned to do with it, and what motivated him.
100 razor blades dipped in rat poison to individuals involved in the fur industry.
In 2000, Tsiugio Uchinshi was arrested for mailing samples of the mineral
organizations in Belgium including the Royal Palace, NATO headquarters, and the U.S. embassy in Brussels. No injuries
were reported.
federal agents arrested four elderly men in Georgia who were plotting to
In 2011,
use ricin and explosives to target federal buildings, Justice Department officials, federal judges, and
Internal Revenue Service agents.
Two recent events may signal an even greater interest in CBRN by lone
malefactors. First, based on one assessment of Norways Anders Breiviks treatise, his references to CBRN weapons a) suggest that
CBRN weapons could be used on a tactical level and b) reveal (to perhaps previously uninformed
audiences) that even low-level CBRN weapons could achieve far-reaching impacts driven
by fear.18 Whether or not Breivik would actually have sought or been able to pursue CBRN, he has garnered a following in several (often
far-right) extremist circles and his treatise might inspire other lone actors. Second, Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula
(AQAP) released two issues of Inspire magazine in 2012. Articles, on the one hand, call for
lone wolf jihad attacks to target non-combatant populations and, on the other,
permit the use of chemical and biological weapons. The combination of such directives
may very well influence the weapon selection of lone actor jihadists in Western
nations.19
2NC Muslims Link
Counterterrorism policies that target Muslims are not racist; they are
a legitimate response there is a difference between saying all
Muslims are bad and radical Islam is dangerous.
The Financial Times had an article about this earlier last year:
Tanjil Rashid, freelance writer, The Muslims are Coming!, by Arun Kundnani
Review by Tanjil Rashid, 3-16, Financial Times,
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/2/af5ef4c6-aa15-11e3-8bd6-00144feab7de.html,
fwang
counterterrorism policies targeting Muslims are a legitimate response to
In truth,
homegrown extremism, from the murder of Fusilier Lee Rigby to the 366 (by one count)
British citizens waging jihad in Syria. Furthermore, the victims of the 2005 London
bombings bear witness to the reality of radicalism bred at home.
At best, Kundnanis argument is compelling in its dissection of governments disproportional responses. He estimates the FBI has one
counter-terrorism agent per 94 Muslims in the US, which approaches a Stasi-esque ratio of spies to citizens. He shows that authorities keep
drawing spurious lists of suspected radicals; one in the UK included almost 300 children under 15.
A commonplace at the core of Kundnanis critique is that radicalism is mainly the byproduct of western
foreign policy. Religion had nothing to do with this, according to Kundnani, citing a conspirator in the London bombings. This view
is undermined by the existence of two generations of British Muslims predating
the war on terror men who fought in Afghanistan in the 1980s and in Bosnia in
the 1990s. The diminution of religions role in stoking radicalism is as inaccurate
as UK Labour politicians denial that wars in Iraq and Afghanistan acted even as recruiting
sergeants.
This
nability to differentiate between discourse and practiceat the level of discourse not everything can or should be called Islamophobia.
implies veiled criticism of how the term Islamophobia has grouped such a variety
of forms of discourse and acts, aiming to show that any act marked as
Islamophobic proceeds from a same ideological core23, which has distorted and/or lost its original
meaning. This criticism aims to show that indiscriminate use of this terminology is
not positive and that not all Islamophobic acts or incidents are Islamophobia. To
avoid this generalization, it holds that all the observable and related nuances of
acts marked as Islamophobic must be studied in depth, as it would be wrong to
have to choose between Islamophobia or nothing. To that end, it proposes distinguishing, per national
specificity, between academic discussions about Islam and modernity; public debates about whether Islam recognizes the principle of
separation of church and state; the public clamour which essentializes Islam; and the forms of inciting hatred, such as discourse associated to
the death of Theo van Gogh, etc.
--- XT: Impact Exaggerated