ELECTION LAWS REVIEW
ELECTION LAW PRE-BAR REVIEW
Atty. Jocelyn Arro-Valencia
2014 BAR Examination Coverage for Election Laws
A. Suffrage
B. Qualification and disqualification of voters
C. Registration of Voters
D. Inclusion and Exclusion Proceedings
E. Political Parties
a. Jurisdiction of the COMELEC over political
parties
b. Registration
F. Candidacy
a. Qualification of candidates
b. Filing of certificates of candidacy
i. Effect of filing
ii. Substitution of candidates
iii. Ministerial duty of COMELEC to
receive certificate
iv. Nuisance candidates
v. Petition to deny due course to or
cancel certificates of candidacy
vi. Effect of disqualification
vii. Withdrawal of candidates
G. Campaign
a. Premature campaigning
b. Prohibited contributions
c. Lawful and prohibited election propaganda
d. Limitations on expenses
e. Statement of contributions and expenses
H. Board of Election Inspectors and Board of
Canvassers
a. Composition
b. Powers
I. Remedies and jurisdiction in election law
a. Petition to deny due course to or cancel a
certificate of candidacy
b. Petition for disqualification
c. Petition to declare failure of elections
d. Pre-proclamation controversy
e. Election Protest
f. Quo Warranto
J. Prosecution of election offenses
A. SUFFRAGE
THEORY OF POPULAR SOVEREIGNTY -Section 1, Article 11
of the Constitution: The Philippines is a democratic and
republican state. Sovereignty resides in the people and all
government authority emanates from them. A democratic and
republic government derives all its powers, directly or indirectly,
from the people who represents the sovereign power of the
state.
SUFFRAGE
Is the right to vote in the election of officers chosen
by the people and in the determination of questions
submitted to the people. (Nachura, Outline Reviewer
in Political Law 2009 edition)
Suffrage applies not only to elections, but may also
extend to initiatives, referenda, plebiscite and recall.
Means by which people express their sovereign
judgment. (Nolasco v. Comelec 275 SCRA 763).
Right and obligation of qualified citizens to vote in the
election of certain national and local officers of the
government and in the decision of public questions
submitted to the people.
It is both a right and a privilege. Right being the
expression of the sovereign will of the people.
Privilege because its exercise is conferred only to
such persons or class of persons as are most likely
to exercise it for the purpose of the public good.
Suffrage as a duty is in the nature of a public trust
and constitutes a voter a representative of the whole
people. This duty requires that the privileged
bestowed should be exercised not exclusively for the
benefit of the citizen or citizens proferring it but in
good faith and with intelligent zeal for the general
benefit and welfare of the State. (Cipriano Abanil v.
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Justice of the Peace Court of Bacolod, Negros
Occidental et. al. 70 Phil. 28 (1940)).
Sec. 1, Art. V of 1987 the Constitution provides, Suffrage
may be exercised by all citizens of the Philippines, not
otherwise disqualified by law, who are at least 18 years of age,
and who shall have resided in the Philippines for at least one
year and in the place wherein they propose to vote, for at least
6 months immediately preceding the election. No literacy,
property, or other substantive requirements shall be imposed on
the exercise of suffrage.
Suffrage may also be exercised by qualified Filipinos
abroad. Article V, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution further
provides that, The Congress shall provide a system for
securing the secrecy and sanctity of the ballot as well as a
system for absentee voting by qualified Filipinos abroad.
Congress enacted R.A. 9189 Overseas Absenting Voting Act
of 2003 now amended by the Overseas Absenting Voting Act
of 2013.
SCOPE OF SUFFRAGE: FORMS OF POPULAR
INTERVENTION
Sec. 2(1) of Article IX-C of the Constitution, the
Comelec is vested with the power to enforce and administer all
laws and regulations relative to the conduct of election,
plebiscite, initiative, referendum and recall.
1) Election is the means by which the people
choose, through the use of the ballot, their officials
for definite and fixed periods and to whom they
entrust, for the time being as their representatives,
the exercise of powers of government
(Garchitorena v. Crsecini 39 Phil. 258 (1918)). In
ordinary dialect or understanding, the Court in
Carlos v. Angeles, 346 SCRA 571 (2000) held that
elections refers to the conduct of the poles
listing of votes, holding of electoral campaign, act
of casting and receiving the ballots from the
voters, counting them, and making the election
returns and proclaiming the candidates. . .it refers
to the entire and complete electoral process.
a. Kinds of Election
1 Regular election refers to an election
participated in by those who possess the right of suffrage
and not disqualified by law and who are registered voters.
2. Special elections election not regularly held
but which is conducted
to supply a vacancy in a particular office
before the expiration of the full term for which
the incumbent was elected. Sec. 4 of RA
7166 provides that, in case a permanent
vacancy shall occur in the Senate or House of
Representative at least one (1) year before
the expiration of the term, the Comelec shall
call and hold a special elections to fill the
vacancy not earlier than 60 days nor longer
than 90 days after the occurrence of the
vacancy.
Article VI, Section 9, Constitution provides
that case such vacancy in the Senate, the
special elections shall be held simultaneously
with the next succeeding regular elections.
Article VII, Sec. 10 of the Constitution, in
case a vacancy occurs in the offices of the
President and Vice-President, a special
election cannot be called if the vacancy
occurs within 18 months before the date of
the next presidential elections.
In cases were a postponement and failure of
elections are declared by the Comelec in
accordance with Sections 5,6,7 of BP 881).
Lucero v. Comelec 234 SCRA 280 (1994);
Borja v. Comelec 260 SCRA 604 (1996).
In fixing the date for special elections the Comelec
should to see to it that:
1) it should not be later than thirty (30) days after the
cessation of the cause of the postponement or
suspension of the election or the failure to elect;
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2) it should be reasonably close to the date of the
election not held, suspended or which resulted in the
failure to elect. (Lucero v. Comelec 234 SCRA 280).
3. Manual Elections Manual/mechanical casting/voting,
counting, and canvassing stages which involves the following
a. Use of paper write-in ballots during the casting
stage;
b.The direct reading and manual tallying of votes in
multiple copies of election returns (ER); and
c. The manual addition of results in Statement of Votes
(SOVs) and the Certificates of Canvass (COCCs)
4. Automated Election System (AES) a system using
appropriate technology which has been demonstrated in the
voting, counting, consolidating, canvassing, and transmission of
election result, and other electoral process. (Sec. 2, RA 9369,
The Automated Election System Law, As Amended)
2) Plebiscite an electoral process by which an
initiative on the Constitution is approved or
rejected by the people (Sec. 3 R.A. 6735 The
Initiative and Referendum Act). Generally
associated with the ratification process.
Plebiscite is required
a. Section 4, Article XVII of the Constitution,
with reference to the voting to determine
whether the voters in the country are in favor
of or against the ratification of the Constitution
or an amendment thereto and
b. Sec. 10, Art. X, in connection with the voting
to determine whether the voters in the political
units affected agree to a proposed creation,
division, merger, abolition or boundary
change of a political unit.
Padilla Jr. v. Comelec 214 SCRA 735, the Comelec resolved
to approve the conduct of the plebiscite in the area or units
affected for the proposed Municipality of Tulay-na-Lupa and the
remaining areas of the mother Municipality of Labo, Camarines
Norte, Majority of the electorates in the units affected rejected
the creation of Tulay-na-Lupa.
Petitioner Gov. of Camarines Norte in a Special Civil Action for
Certiorari, seek to set aside the Plebiscite asserting that it was a
complete failure and that the results obtained were invalid and
illegal because the Plebiscite as mandated by Comelec Res.
No. 2312 should have been conducted only in the political unit
or units affected (which is the 12 barangays and should not
have included the mother unit of the Municipality of Labo.)
HELD: With the approval and ratification of the 1987
Constitution, more specifically, Art. X, Section 10, the creation,
division, merger, abolition or alteration of the boundaries of any
political unit shall be subject to the approval by a majority of the
votes cast in a Plebiscite in the POLITICAL UNITS
AFFECTED was held to mean that residents of the political
entity who would be economically dislocated by the separation
of a portion thereof have a right to vote in the said Plebiscite or
the plurality of political units which would participate in the
Plebiscite. The Court reiterated its ruling in Tan v. Comelec
142 SCRA 727 (1986), that in the conduct of a Plebiscite, it is
imperative that all the constituents of the mother and daughter
units affected shall be included.
Sanidad v. Comelec 181 SCRA 529, the Supreme Court
declared as unconstitutional the restriction imposed by Comelec
on media relative to discussing on air and print the features of
the plebiscite issues in the creation of the autonomous region
for the Cordilleras and held that plebiscite are matters of public
concern and importance and the peoples right to be informed
and to be able to freely and intelligently make a decision would
be best served by access to an unabridged discussion of the
issues.
City of Pasig v. Comelec/Municipality of Cainta Province of
Rizal, Sept. 10, 1999, the issue raised was the propriety of the
suspension of the plebiscite proceedings pending the decision
of the boundary dispute between the Municipality of Cainta
and the City of Pasig. The City of Pasig passed an Ordinance
creating barangays Karangalan and Napico. The Municipality
of Cainta moved to suspend or cancel the respective
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plebiscitedue to the pending case before the RTC of Antipolo
for the settlement of the boundary dispute and that the said
activities await the decision of the RTC on the matter.
That Comelec suspended the holding of the plebiscite
for the creation of Brgy. Karangalan but rendered the creation of
Napico as moot as the same has already been ratified in the
plebiscite held for the purpose. The SC held that the creation of
Napico cannot be considered as moot and it is most proper that
the plebiscite be declared null and void in view of the pending
boundary dispute between Pasig and Cainta which presents a
prejudicial question and must be decided first before the
plebiscite for the proposed barangays be conducted.
Jurisdiction over controversies involving Plebiscite Issues
- Ma. Salvacion Buac/Antonio Bautista v. Comelec/Alan
Peter Cayetano and some Intervenors, G.R. No. 155855,
January 26, 2004, a petition for certiorari and mandamus was
filed by petitioners Buac and Bautista assailing the October 28,
2002 en banc resolution of the Comelec which held that it has
no jurisdiction over controversies involving the conduct of
plebiscite and the annulment of its results.
The facts show that in April 1988, a plebiscite was held
in Taguig for the ratification of the Taguig Cityhood Law (RA No.
8487) proposing the conversion of Taguig from a municipality
into a city. Without completing the canvass of 64 other election
returns, the Plebiscite Board of Canvassers (PBOC) declared
that the NO votes won and that the people rejected the
conversion of Taguig to a city. The PBOC was however
ordered by the Comelec en banc to reconvene and complete
the canvass which the board did and in due time issued an
Order proclaiming that the negative votes prevailed.
Petitioners filed with the Comelec a petition to annul the results
of the plebiscite with a prayer for revision and recount of the
ballots. Cayetano intervened and moved to dismiss the petition
on the ground of lack of jurisdiction of the Comelec. He claimed
that a plebiscite cannot be the subject of an election protest and
that the jurisdiction to hear a complaint involving the conduct of
a plebiscite is lodged with the RTC.
Comelec 2nd division initially gave due course to the petition
ruling that it has jurisdiction over the case. It treated the petition
as akin to an election protest considering that the same
allegations of fraud and irregularities in the casting and counting
of ballots and preparation of returns are the same grounds for
assailing the results of an election. It then ordered the Taguig
ballot boxes to be brought to its Manila Office and created
revision committees to revise and recount the plebiscite ballots.
Intervenor Cayetano, in an unverified motion, moved for
reconsideration of the Comelec Order insisting that it has no
jurisdiction to hear and decide a petition contesting the results
of a plebiscite.
In a complete turnaround, the Comelec 2nd division issued an
Order granting the Motion for Reconsideration. It dismissed the
petition to annul the results of the plebiscite and ruled that
Comelec has no jurisdiction over said case as it involves an
exercise of QJ powers not contemplated under Section 2(2),
Article IX-C of the Constitution.
On appeal, the Comelec en banc affirmed the ruling of its 2 nd
division. It held that the Comelec cannot use its power to
enforce and administer all laws relative to plebiscites as this
power is purely administrative or executive and not QJ in
nature. It concluded that the jurisdiction over the petition to
annul the Taguig plebiscite results is lodged with the RTC under
Section 19(6) of BP 129 which provides that the RTC shall have
exclusive original jurisdiction in cases not within the exclusive
jurisdiction of any court or body exercising judicial or QJ
functions. Hence, the petition before the SC.
The SC held that the key to the case is its nature, which
involves the determination of whether the electorate of
Taguig voted in favor of or against the conversion of the
municipality of Taguig. The invocation of judicial power to
settle disputes involving the conduct of a plebiscite is
misplaced. Judicial power as defined under Section 1, Article
VIII of the Constitution as the duty of the court of justice to settle
actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable and to determine whether or not
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there has been grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the government.
This case assailing the regularity of the conduct of the Taguig
plebiscite does not fit the kind of a case calling for the exercise
of judicial power. There is no plaintiff or defendant in the case
for it merely involves the ascertainment of the vote of the
electorate on whether they approve or disapprove the
conversion of their municipality into a highly urbanized city.
In referring to Article IX-C, Section 2(1), the SC said that the
said provision is explicit that Comelec has power to enforce
and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct
of an election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum and recall. To
enforce means to cause to take effect or to cause the
performance of such act or acts necessary to bring into actual
effect or operation, a plan or measure which entails all the
necessary and incidental power for it to achieve the holding of
honest, orderly, peaceful, free and credible elections (HOPE
FRECRE). The SC was surprised that for the first time,
Comelec yielded its historic jurisdiction over a motion for
reconsideration which was even filed out of time, thus rendering
it without jurisdiction to entertain the same.
INITIATIVE are lawmaking powers that belong to the people
and have been described as the people power features of our
Constitution (Asked in the 2000 BAR). Initiative under RA 6735
is defined as the power of the people to propose amendments
to the Constitution or to propose and enact legislation through
an election called for the purpose.
REFERENDUMpower of the electorate to approve or reject a
piece of legislation through an election called for the purpose.
(Sec. 2, R.A. 6735).
Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution provides that
Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly
proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition of at
least 12% of the total number of registered voters, of which
every legislative district must be represented by at least 3% of
the registered voters therein.
Section 32, Article VI of the Constitution provides that
Congress shall, as early as possible, provide for a system of
initiative and referendum and the exceptions therefrom, where
the people can directly propose and enact laws or approve or
reject any act or law or part thereof passed by Congress or local
legislative body after the registration of a petition thereof signed
by at least 10% of the total number of registered voters, of
which every legislative district must be represented by at least
3% of the registered voters thereof.
RA 7160 or the Local Government Code of 1991 also
provides for a local initiative defined as the legal process
whereby the registered voters of a local government unit may
directly propose, enact, or amend any ordinance. Sec. 126
thereof provides for a local referendum defined as the legal
process whereby the RV of the local government units may
approve, amend or reject any ordinance enacted by the
sanggunian.
Classes of Initiative 1) On the Constitution; 2) On Statutes;
3) On Local Legislation.Indirect Initiative is exercised by the
people through a proposition sent to Congress or the local
legislative body for action.
Classes of Referendum 1) On Statutes; 2) On Local Laws.
Santiago, et. al. v. Comelec, et. al., 270 SCRA 106 (336
SCRA 843), the controversy brought to the Supreme Court by
way of a petition for prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court is the right of the people to directly propose amendments
to the Constitution through the system of Initiative under Section
2 of Article XVII of the 1987 Constitution.
Atty. Jesus Delfin filed a petition with the Comelec to amend the
constitution, specifically to lift the term limits of elective officials,
by peoples initiative. Atty. Delfin asked the Comelec for an
order: (1) to fix the time and dates for signature gathering all
over the country (2) to cause the necessary publications of said
Order and the said petition in newspapers of general and local
circulation and (3) instruct the municipal election registrars in all
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regions in the Philippines to assist petitioners and volunteers in
establishing signing station at the time and on the dates
designated for the purpose.
The Comelec issued an Order granting the petition. Santiago
filed this special civil action for prohibition raising among other
grounds that RA 6735 does not provide for peoples initiative to
amend the constitution considering that the same is still pending
with the Senate of which she is the author. The petition of Atty.
Delfin was not validly initiated as it failed to comply with the
signature requirement for initiating an initiative. The Comelec
never acquired jurisdiction over the petition as jurisdiction
is acquired only after its filing the petition being the
initiatory pleading.
The SC gave due course to the Petition on the legal
premise that the Constitution recognizes only two (2) methods
of proposing amendments to the Constitution, viz (1) by
Congress upon a vote of of all its members and (2) by
constitutional convention.
The SC interpreted Sec. 2 of RA 6735 which
provides that the power of the people under a system of
initiative and referendum to directly propose, enact, approved or
reject, in whole or in part the Constitution, laws, ordinance or
resolutions passed by any legislative body upon compliance
with the requirements of this Act, is hereby affirmed, recognized
and guaranteed. It held that the inclusion of the word
constitution here is neither germane nor relevant to said action
which exclusively relates to initiative and referendum on
national and local laws, ordinances and resolution. Therefore,
the people are not accorded the power to directly propose,
enact, approved or reject, in whole or in part the Constitution,
through the system of initiative.
The SC further declared that Comelec cannot validly
promulgate rules and regulations to implement the exercise of
the right of the people to directly propose amendments to the
Constitution through the system of initiative. The power of
Comelec to issue rules and regulations (QJ power) is limited
only to what is provided under
(a) Section 2 of Article IX-C of the Constitution and
(b) by a law where subordinate legislation is authorized
and which satisfied the completeness and the
sufficient standard tests.
Raul Lambino, et. al. vs. Comelec G.R. No. 174153, October
25, 2006 the issue on initiative to propose amendments to the
1987 Constitution was again at issue. FACTS: Raul Lambino of
Sigaw ng Bayan and Erico Aumentado of the Union of Local
Authorities of the Philippines (ULAP) filed a petition for peoples
initiative before the Commission on Elections on August 26,
2006, after months of gathering signatures all over the country.
Lambino claimed that the petition is backed by 6.3M registered
voters.constituting at least 12% of all registered voters, with
each legislative district represented by at least 3% of the
registered voters. They further claimed that the provincial and
city Comelec officials had already verified the 6.3M signatures
The Comelec denied the petition, reasoning that a lack of
enabling law keeps them from entertaining such petitions. It
invoked the 1997 Supreme Court ruling in Santiago vs.
Comelec (336 SCRA 843), where it declared RA 6735
inadequate to implement the initiative clause on proposals to
amend the Constitution. The Comelec ruling prompted
Lambino and Aumentado to bring their case before the
Supreme Court on the following issues -
(1) Whether the initiative petition of the Lambino group complied
with the provisions of Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution.
(2)Whether the Court should revisit its ruling in Santiago vs.
Comelec declaring RA 6735 incomplete and inadequate or
wanting in essential terms and conditions to implement the
initiative clause to amend the Constitution.
The Supreme Court upheld the Comelecs ruling on the petition
for peoples initiative on October 25, 2006 with a close 8-7
vote.As ruled:
The Lambino Group miserably failed to comply with
the basic requirement of the Constitution for the
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conductof peoples initiative. The Constitution require
that the amendment must be directly proposed by
the people through initiative upon a petition.
Lambinos group failed to include the full text of the
proposed changes in the signature sheets a fatal
omission, according to the Supreme Court ruling,
because it means a majority of the 6.3M people who
signed the signature sheets could not have known the
nature and effect of the proposed changes. For the
petition to be valid, two essential requisites must be
complied with, namely: (a) the people must author, and
thus sign, the entire proposal; no agent or
representative can sign on their behalf; and (b) as an
initiative upon a petition, the proposed amendments
must be embodied in the petition itself.
A peoples initiative to change the Constitution applies
only to an amendment of the Constitution and not to its
revision. Only Congress or a constitutional convention
may propose revisions to the Constitution. A peoples
initiative may propose only amendments to the
Constitution.
The SC declared that A popular clamor, even one
backed by 6.3M signatures, cannot justify a deviation
from the specific modes prescribed in the Constitution
itself.
The rationale for the second requisite is that the signature
requirement would be rendered meaningless if the person
affixing his signature has not first seen and understood what it
is that he is signing. Further, and more importantly, loose
interpretation of the subscription requirement can pose a
significant potential for fraud. On-compliance with the above
mentioned requirement is fatal to the initiative petition. For
sure, the great majority of the 6.3M people who signed the
signature sheets did not see the full text of the proposed
changes before signing, as the proposed amendments were not
stated in the signature sheets. They were not apprised of the
nature and effect of the proposed amendments, among which
are substantial changes as follows:
1) the term limits on members of the legislature will
be lifted and thus member of the Parliament may
be re-elected indefinitely;
2) The Interim Parliament whose membership
comprised of present members of Congress can
decide when to call the parliamentary elections.
Thus, leaving them the absolute discretion to
determine their term limits.
3) That within 45 days from the ratification of
proposed changes, the interim Parliament may
further propose revision or amendments to the
Constitution.
Furthermore, a peoples initiative to change the
Constitution applies only to an amendment to the Constitution
and not revision. Article XVII of the Constitution speaks of three
modes of proposing amendments to the Constitution: a) by
direct congressional action (3/4 votes of all its members), b)
through a constitutional convention, and c) through a peoples
initiative.
The first and second modes, as provided in Section 1 of Article
XVII, apply to both amendment and revision, but the 3rd mode
applies only to amendments. The distinction between the first
two modes and the third was intentional as shown by the
deliberations of the Constitutional Commission.
There can be no dispute that a peoples initiative can only
propose amendments to the Constitution since the Constitution
itself limits initiatives to amendments. There can be no
deviation from the constitutionally prescribed modes of revising
the Constitution. A popular clamor, even one backed by 6.3M
signatures, cannot justify a deviation from the specific modes
prescribed in the Constitution itself. The Lambinos group
proposed changes constituted not just an amendment but a
revision, because of the change in the form of government from
Presidential to Parliamentary, and the shift from a bicameral to
a unicameral legislature.
DISTINCTION BETWEEN REVISION AND AMENDMENT.
Revision broadly implies a change that alters a basic principle in
the constitution, like altering the principle of separation of power
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or the system of checks and balances. There is also revision if
the change alters the substantial entirety of the Constitution.
On the other hand, amendment broadly refers to a change that
adds, reduces, deletes, without altering the basic principle
involved. Revision generally affects several provisions of the
constitution, while amendment generally affects only the
specific provision being amended.
On the second pivotal issue of revisiting the ruling of the Court
in Santiago vs. Comelec, the Court held that an affirmation or
reversal of the same will not change the outcome of the case.
The Court must avoid revisiting a ruling involving the
constitutionality of a statute if the case before the Court can be
resolved on some grounds.
In the resolution on the motion for reconsideration, the Court
maintaining its 8-7 vote, denied with finality the motions for
reconsideration of its October 25, 2006 decision dismissing the
said petition to amend the 1987 Constitution through a peoples
initiative. . Ten justices however reiterated their earlier opinions
that RA 6735 is sufficient and adequate as an enabling law to
amend the Constitution through a peoples initiative, effectively
abandoning Santiago v. Comelec.
Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority v. Comelec 252 SCRA
492 (1996), an action for certiorari and prohibition was brought
to the SC seeking to nullify the ruling of the Comelec and
Resolution No. 2848 denying petitioners plea to stop the
holding of a local initiative and referendum on the proposition to
recall Pambayang Kapasyahan Blg. 10, Serye 1993 of the SB
of Morong Bataan.
In this case, the Sangguniang Bayan of Morong,
Bataan on April 1993, passed Pambayang Kapasyahan Blg. 10,
Serye 1993, expressing therein its absolute concurrence to join
the Subic Special Economic Zone (SSEZ) as required by Sec.
12 of RA 7227 (Bases Conversion and Development Act of
1992). On September 5, 1993, the SB submitted the
Kapasyahan to the Office of the President. On May 24, 1993,
respondent Garcia, et. al. filed a petition with the SB of Morong
to annul PK Blg. 10, Serye 1993 and therein proposed for
amendments to the said law. The SB acted upon the petition
and promulgated PK Blg. 18, requesting Congress to amend
certain provisions of RA 7227 and informed respondents that
the other matters in the proposed amendments were already
submitted to the Office of the President.
Not satisfied and within 30 days from submission of their
petition, respondent resorted to their power of initiative under
the LGC of 1991. On June 18, 1996 Comelec issued
Resolution No. 2845 adopting a calendar of activities for local
referendum to annul or repeal Kapasyahan Bldg. 10.
Petitioner SBMA seeks to nullify the Order of Comelec denying
petitioners plea to stop the holding of a local initiative and
referendum on the proposition to recall the Kapasyahan as it
was proceeding with a local initiative that proposes an
amendment of a national law. ISSUE:
whether Comelec committed grave abuse of
discretion in promulgating and implementing
its Res. No. 2842 which govern the conduct
of the referendum proposing to annul or
repeal PK Blg. 10 and
whether the questioned local initiative covers
a subject within the powers of the people of
Morong to enact (whether such initiative
seeks the amendment of a national law.
In this case, the SC was compelled to distinguish Initiative from
Referendum. To begin with, the process started by Garcia et.
al., was an Initiative but respondent Comelec made
preparations for a referendum. In the body of the Comelec
Resolution No. 2842, the wordreferendum is repeated at least
27 times, but initiative is not mentioned at all. The Comelec
labeled the exercise as a referendum, the counting of votes was
entrusted to a referendum committee, the documents were
called referendum returns and so forth. As distinguished,
initiative is a process of law making by the people themselves
without the participation and against the wishes of their elected
representatives while referendum consists merely with the
electorate approving or rejecting what has been drawn up or
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enacted by the legislative body by simply indicating yes or no in
the ballot.
In initiative, there is a need for the Comelec to supervise
the process closely, its authority therein extending not
only to the counting and canvassing of votes but also to
seeing to it that the matter or act submitted to the people is
in the proper form and language so it may be easily
understood and voted upon by the electorate. Care in this
activity must be exercise that no petition embracing more
than one subject shall be submitted to the electorate,
although two or more propositions may be submitted in an
initiative.
As to the second issue, SBMA insists that the creation of the
SSEZ is now a fait accompli for the benefit of the entire nation
and Morong cannot unilaterally withdraw its concurrence or
impose new conditions for such concurrence as this would
effectively render nugatory the creation of the SSEZ. The SC
agreed with the contention of Garcia that the position of SBMA
is premature and conjectural because at this point the resolution
is just a proposal. If the people should reject it during the
referendum, then there is nothing to declare as illegal. A writ of
prohibition cannot issue upon a mere conjecture or possibility
as courts may decide only actual controversies and not
hypothetical questions or cases.
3) RECALL is the termination of official relationship of a
local elective public official for loss of confidence by the people
prior to the end of his term of office (Sec. 69, R.A. 7160 LGC).
In Angobung v. Comelec 269 SCRA 246 (1997), the Supreme
Court ruled that recall is the mode of removal of a public officer
by the people before the end of his term of office which shall be
exercised by the registered voters of a local government unit to
which the local elective official subject of such recall belongs.
The mode of initiating recall against a public elective official is
now limited to a petition commenced only by the registered
voters in the local unit concerned. Section 70 and 71 of RA
7160 is now amended by RA 9244, otherwise known as An
Act Eliminating the Preparatory Recall Assembly as a Mode
of Instituting Recall of Elective Local Government Officials.
Section 70 of RA 7160 now reads as follows: The recall of
any elective provincial, city, municipal or barangay official shall
be commenced by a petition of a registered voter in the LGU
concerned and supported by the registered voters in the LGU
concerned during the election in which the local official sought
to be recalled was elected subject to the following percentage
requirements:
At least 25% in the case of an LGU with a voting
population of not more than 20,000
At least 20% in the case of LGUs with a voting
population of at least 20,000 but not more than 75,000:
Provided, that in no case shall the required petitioners
be less than 5,000.
At least 15% in the case of local government units with
a voting population of at least 75,000 but not more
than 300,000: Provided however, that in no case shall
the required number of petitioners be less than 15,000;
and
At least 10% in the case of local government units with
a voting population of over 300,000 thousand:
Provided however, that in no case shall the required
petitioners be less than 45,000.
DATE OF RECALL Upon the filing of a valid petition for recall
with the appropriate local office of the Comelec, the Comelec or
its duly authorized representative shall set the date of the
election or recall, which shall not be later than 30 days upon the
completion of the procedure outlined in the preceding article, in
the case of the barangay, city or municipal officials, and 45 days
in the case of provincial officials.
The official sought to be recalled shall automatically be
considered as duly registered candidate or candidates to the
pertinent positions and like other candidates, shall be entitled to
be voted upon. (Sec. 71)
EFFECTIVITY OF RECALL recall shall become effective only
upon the election and proclamation of a successor in the person
of the candidate who received the highest number of votes cast
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during the election in recall. Should the official sought to be
recalled receive the highest number of votes, confidence in him
is thereby affirmed and he shall continue in office. (Sec. 72).
LIMITATIONS ON RECALL an elective official may be
subject of recall elections only ONCE during his term of office
exclusively on the ground of LACK OF CONFIDENCE. The
recall cannot be undertaken within one (1) year from the date of
the officials assumption of office or within one (1) immediately
preceding a regular election. (Sec. 74)
In Paras v. Comelec 264 SCRA 49, Paras, incumbent punong
brgy sought to bar the recall proceedings against him citing
Sec. 74 (B) of RA 7160 that it was barred by the scheduled SK
elections. The SC settled the issue and held that the SK
elections is not considered a regular local elections for
purposes of recall under Sec. 74. The term regular local
elections is construed as one referring to an election where the
office held by the local elective official sought to be recalled will
be contested and be filled up by the electorate. It is confined to
the regular elections of elective national and local officials.
REGISTRATION OF VOTERS
Article V Section 1.Suffrage may be exercised by all citizens of
the Philippines NOT otherwise disqualified by law, who are at
least 18 years of age who shall have resided in the Philippines
for at least one (1) year and in the place wherein they propose
to vote for at least six (6) months in the immediately preceding
the elections.No literacy, property or other substantive
requirements shall be imposed on the exercise of suffrage.
Section 2. The Congress shall provide for a system of securing
the secrecy and sanctity of the ballot as well as a system of
absentee voting by qualified Filipinos abroad.
The Congress shall also design a procedure for the
disabled and illiterates to vote without the assistance of other
persons. Until then, they shall be allowed to vote under existing
laws and such rules as the Commission on Elections may
promulgate to protect the secrecy of the ballot.
WHO MAY REGISTER (RA 8189, (An Act Providing for the
General Registration of Voters providing for a System of
Continuing Registration which took effect on June 11,
1996)
Registration of voters is a means of determining who possess
the qualifications asa voter and regulating the exercise of the
right of suffrage.
Registration does not confer the right to vote; it is but a
condition precedent to the exercise of the right.
How is Registrationdone Registration refers to the ACTof
accomplishing and filing of a sworn application for registration
(Voters Registration Record VRR) by a qualified voter before
the election officer of the city or municipality wherein he resides
and including the VRR in the book of RV upon approval by the
Election Registration Board (Sec. 3(a)).
REGISTRATION IS EXTENDED TO: DOMESTIC AND
OVERSEAS VOTERS
FOR DOMESTIC VOTERS GOVERNED BY RA 8189 The
Voters Registration Act
(Sec. 9 (repealed Sections 116 and 117 of the OEC). Sec. 9
clarified when the residency and age requirements should be
attained) Salient amendments:
Section 9 Who may Register All citizens of the
Philippines NOT otherwise disqualified by law who are at least
18 years of age, who shall have resided in the Philippines for
at least one (1) year, and in the place wherein they propose
to vote, for at least six (6) months immediately preceding the
elections.
Any person who temporarily resides in another city,
municipality or country solely by reason of his occupation,
profession, employment in private or public service, educational
activities, work in the military or naval reservations, within the
Philippines, service in the AFP, or confinement or detention in
government institution in accordance with law, shall NOT be
deemed to have lost his original residence.
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Any person who, on the day of registration may not have
reached the required age or period of residence but, who
on the day of election shall possess such qualifications,
may register as a voter.
Meynard Sabili v. Comelec/Florencio Librea 670 SCRA 670
(2012) The Court have held that absence from residence to
pursue studies or practice a profession or registration as a voter
other than the place where one is elected, does not constitute
loss of residence. Section 117 of the OEC provides that
transfer of residence to any other place by reason of ones
occupation, profession employment in private and public
service, educational activities work force, the constabulary or
national police force, or confinement or detention in government
institutions in accordance with law is not deemed as loss of
residence.
The Court ruled that there is nothing wrong in an individual
changing residences so he could run for an elective post, for as
long as he is able to prove with reasonable certainty that he has
effected a change of residence for election law purposes for the
period required by law.
Sec. 11 Disqualifications: (Section 11 of R.A. 8189 repealed
Sec. 118 of the OEC)
Any person who has been sentenced by final judgment
to suffer imprisonment for not less than one (1) year.
Any person who has been adjudged by final judgment
by competent court or tribunal of having committed any
crime involving disloyalty to the duly constituted
government such as rebellion, sedition, violation of the
anti-subversion and firearms law, or any crime against
national security in accordance with law.
Insane or incompetent as declared by a competent
authority.
WHEN DISABILITY REMOVED
Plenary pardon or amnesty those sentenced by final
judgment. Article IX-C, Section 5 provides that the
President cannot, without the favorable
recommendation of the Comelec grant pardon,
amnesty, parole or suspension of sentence in cases
involving violation of election laws and violation of
election rules and regulations.
Expiration of five (5) years after service of sentence
Official declaration by the proper authority that the
insanity or incompetency no longer exist.
Double Registrants In all cases where registrants are found
to be registered in two (2) or more
districts/cities/municipalities, the latest registration shall
prevail which is deemed to be more in consonance with the
intent of the concerned registered votes. Accordingly, they shall
be allowed to vote only in the district/city/municipality of their
latest registration.
This is distinguished from the policy on double/multiple
registrants found within the same district/city/municipality
where original registration shall prevail over subsequent
registrations. (Comelec Res. 7893, 07 May 2007. See also Sec.
261 (y(5)) of the OEC (Prohibited Acts) which provides Any
person who, being a registered voter, registers anew without
filing an application for cancellation of his previous registration
shall be guilty of an election offense).
Residency Requirement:
Romeo A. Jalosjos v. Comelec Dan Erasmo, Sr. 670 SCRA
572 (2012)
Residence The Local Government Code requires a candidate
seeking the position of provincial governor to be a resident of
the province for at least (1) year before the election. For
purposes of the election laws, the requirement of residence is
synonymous with domicile, meaning that a person must not only
intend to reside in a particular place but must also have
personal presence in such place coupled with conduct
indicative of such intention. There is no hard and fast rule to
determine a candidates compliance with residency requirement
since the question of residence is a question of intention. Still,
jurisprudence had laid down the following guidelines:
(a) every person has a domicile or residence somewhere;
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(b) where once established, that domicile remains until he
acquires a new one; and
(c) a person can have but one domicile at a time.
The Comelec concluded that Jalosjos has not come to settle his
domicile in Ipil since he has merely been staying at his brothers
house. But this circumstance alone cannot support such
conclusion. Indeed, the Court has repeatedly held that a
candidate is not required to have a house in a community to
establish his residence or domicile in a particular place. It is
sufficient that he should live there even if it be in a rented house
or in the house of a friend or relative. To insist that the
candidate own the house where he lives would make property a
qualification for public office. What matters is that Jalosjos has
proved two things: actual physical presence in Ipil and an
intention of making it his domicile.
Mitra vs. Commission on Elections, Antonio Gonzales and
Orlando Balbon, Jr. 622 SCRA 744 (July 2010). In this case,
following the conversion of Puerto Princesa (Mitras domicile of
origin) from a component city to a highly urbanized city whose
residents can no longer vote for provincial officials, Mitra
abandoned his domicile in Puerto Princesa and acquired a new
one in Aborlan which is within the LGU where he intended to
run. Mitra bought the old Maligaya Feedmill and used the
second floor as his residence.
In considering the residency issue, the dwelling where
a person permanently intends to return to and to remain his or
her capacity or inclination to decorate the place, or the lack of it,
IS IMMATERIAL. Comelec gravely abused its discretion when
it determined the fitness of a dwellingas a persons
residence based solely on very personal and subjective
assessment standards when the law is replete with
standards that can be used. Comelec used wrong
considerations in arriving at the conclusion that Mitras
residence is not the residence contemplated by law.
Assitio vs. Aguirre 619 SCRA 518 Residence as used in the
law prescribing the qualifications for suffrage and for elective
office, is DOCTRINALLY SETTLED to mean domicile,
importing not only an intention to reside in a fixed place but also
personal presence in that place, coupled with conduct indicative
of such intention inferable from a persons acts, utterances and
activities. Domicile is not easily lost. To successfully effect a
transfer, one must demonstrate: (1) an actual removal or
change of domicile; (2) bonafide intention of abandoning the
former place of residence and establishing a new one; and (3)
acts which correspond to said purpose.Same ruling in earlier
case of Romualdez-Marcos v. Comelec, 248 SCRA
300.Requisites when new domicile is acquired by choice.
ILLITIERATE AND DISABLED VOTERS Illiterates or disabled
are referred to as a persons who cannot by themselves prepare
an application for registration because of their physical disability
and/or inability to read and write. (Section 3 (e))
Section 14.Procedure for illiterate applicants (those who
cannot read and write) assisted by the election officer or
any member of an accredited citizens arm. The election
officer shall place such illiterate person under oath, ask him the
questions and record the answers given in order to accomplish
the application form in the presence of the majority of the
members of the Board. The accomplished form shall be
subscribed by the applicant in the presence of the Board by
means of thumbmark or some other customary mark and it shall
be subscribed and attested by the majority of the members of
the Board.
Procedure for disabled voters the application for
registration of a physically disabled person (ex. blind, no
hands, senior citizen, mute) may be prepared by any
relative within the 4th civil degree of consanguinityor
affinity or by the election officer or any member of an
accredited citizens arm using the data supplied by the
applicant.
NOTE: Common to both procedures, the fact of illiteracy and
disability shall be so indicated in the application.
RA 10366 now provides accessible Polling Places for Persons
with Disabilities (PWDS and Senior Citizens and also provides
for, among others, assistance in the accomplishment of
 ELECTION LAWS REVIEW
registration forms. The law was in line with the objective of Sec.
29 of the Magna Carta for Persons with Disability (RA No.
7277) which provides that polling places should be made
accessible to disabled persons during national and local
elections.
The Comelec shall likewise keep an updated record of
PWDs and SC registered voters, indicating the types of
disability and the assistance they need. (Sec. 6, RA 10366). In
designing the ballot, Comelec shall ensure reasonable
accommodation to PWDs and SC to enable them to accomplish
the ballots by themselves (Sec. 10)
Comelec, in coordination with the National Council on
Disability Affairs (NCDA), the Commission on Human Rights
(CHR), and PWD and Senior Citizens organization shall
organize, design, and implement sensitivity training programs
for person performing electoral duties to familiarize them the
needs of the PWDs and SC. (Sec. 12)
HOW TO REGISTER
Section 8 System of Continuing Registration of
Voters/Creation of Election Registration Boards
A qualified voter personally files an application for
registration DAILY with the office of the election officer
during regular office hours. The ERB are authorized to
act on all applications for registration .
LIMITATION: No registration shall be conducted during the
period starting 120 days before a regular elections and 90 days
before a special elections.
Sec. 15 Election Registration Board There shall be in
each city and municipality as many as ERBs as there are
election officers therein.
Composition Election Officer (EO) as chairman and as
members, the public school official most senior in rank and the
local civil registrar (LCR), or in his absence, the city or municipal
treasurer (MT).
In case of disqualification of the EO, the Commission
shall designate as acting EO who shall serve as chairman of the
ERB. In cases of the non-availability of the LCR or the MT,
Comelec shall designate any other appointive civil service
official from the same locality as substitute.
Restrictions to appointment No member of the board shall
be related to each other or to any incumbent city or municipal
elective official within the 4th civil degree of consanguinity or
affinity. If in succeeding elections, any of the newly elected city
or municipal officials is related to a member of the board within
the same degree, such member is automatically disqualified to
preserve the integrity of the ERB.
Every registered party and such organizations as may
be authorized by the Comelec shall be entitled to a watcher in
every registration board.
Sec. 17 Procedure for hearing of applications.
Date of hearing posted in the city or municipal bulletin
board and EO office at least 1 week before date of
hearing
If objected to, EO shall receive evidence. Physical
presence of applicant in this case is mandatory to
rebut evidence presented in opposition thereto
If no objection to application, physical appearance not
required and will be duly informed in writing
Applications for registration shall be heard and
processed on a quarterly basis. Board shall convene
on the 3rd day of Monday of April, July, October and
January of every calendar year except in an election
year to conform with the 120 days prohibitive period
before election day.
Section. 21 Publication of Action on Application for
Registration
SECTION 12.Change of Residence to another City or
Municipality Any registered voter who has transferred
residence to another city or municipality may apply with the EO
of his new residence for the transfer of his registration records.
The application for transfer of registration shall be subject to the
requirements of notice and hearing and the approval of the ERB
in accordance with this Act. Upon approval of the application
for transfer, and after notice of such approval to the EO of the
former residence of the voter, said EO shall transmit by
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registered mail the voters registration record to the EO of the
voters new residence.
Section 13.Change of Address in the Same City or
Municipality Any voter who has changed his address in the
same city or municipality shall immediately notify the EO in
writing. If the change of address involves a change in precinct,
the Board shall transfer his registration record to the precinct
book of voters of his new precinct and notify the voter of his
new precinct. All changes of address shall be reported to the
office of the provincial election supervisor and the Commission
in Manila.
Sec. 27 DEACTIVATION is a process wherein the
registration record of a voter is removed by the ERB from the
corresponding precinct book of voters and places the same
in an inactive file properly marked and dated in indelible ink
and after entering the cause for deactivation which are as
follows:
Those who are disqualified by virtue of a final
judgment, insane and incompetent persons as
officially declared.
Any person who failed to vote in the two (2)
successive preceding regular elections as shown by
his voting records.
Any person whose registration has been ordered
excluded by the court.
Any person who has lost his Filipino citizenship.
For purposes of the above the Clerks of Court of the
MTC, MTCC, RTC and SB shall furnish the EO of the city or
municipality concerned at the end of each month a certified list
of persons who are disqualified by virtue of a final judgment,
with their addresses.
For those who lost their citizenship, insanity and
incompetency, the Comelec may request a certified list of such
persons from the government agencies concerned.
Sec. 28 REACTIVATION is a process whereby a voter
whose registration records has been deactivated files with the
election officer a sworn application for reactivation of his
registration in the form of an affidavit by stating therein that the
grounds for the deactivation no longer exist.
PERIOD TO FILE Any time but not later than 120 days before
a regular election and 90 days before a special election. Upon
approval, the Board, shall retrieve the registration records from
the inactive file and include the same in the corresponding
precinct book of voters.
REQUIREMENT: Local heads or representatives of political
parties shall be properly notified of the approved applications.
Sec.29 CANCELLATION is a process wherein the Board
cancels the registration records of those who have died as
certified by the local civil registrar who shall submit each month
a certified list of persons who died during the previous month to
the election officer of the place where the deceased is
registered.
PETITION FOR INCLUSION OR EXCLUSION. Remedies of
persons whose application for reactivation, inclusion or
correction has been disapproved or those who intend to exclude
a voter from the list of voters.
Panlaqui v. Comelec 613 SCRA 573 Voters
inclusion/exclusion proceedings essentially involve the issue of
whether a voter shall be included in or excluded from the list of
voters based on the qualifications required by law and the facts
presented to show possession of these qualifications. As
distinguished from the procedure in certificate of candidacies
(petition to deny due course or cancel a certificate of candidacy)
on the other hand, the denial/cancellation proceedings involve
the issue of whether there is a false representation of a material
fact (Sec. 78).
Sec. 33 JURISDICTION The Municipal and Metropolitan Trial
Courts shall have original jurisdiction over all cases of inclusion
and exclusion of voters in their respective cities or
municipalities.(By express provision of Article IX-C, Section 2
(3) of the Constitution, the Comelec shall decide all questions
affecting elections, except the right to vote. This question is a
justiciable issue which finds redress in the judiciary.(Pungutan
v. Comelec 43 SCRA 1 (1972).
 ELECTION LAWS REVIEW
Again in Panlaqui vs. Comelec 613 SCRA 573 - It is not
within the province of the RTC in a voters
inclusion/exclusion proceedings to take cognizance of and
determine the presence of a false representation of a
material fact. It has no jurisdiction to try the issues of whether
the misrepresentation relates to material fact and whether there
was an intension to deceive the electorate in terms of ones
qualifications for public office. The finding that Velasco was
not qualified to vote due to lack of residency requirement
does not translate into a finding of a deliberate attempt to
mislead, misinform or hide a fact which would otherwise
render him ineligible.
Canicosa v. Comelec 282 SCRA 512 (1997). The question of
inclusion or exclusion from the list of voters involves the right to
vote which is not within the power and authority of the Comelec
to rule upon. The determination of whether one has the right to
vote is a justiciable issue properly cognizable by our regular
courts.
WHERE TO APPEAL Decisions of the Municipal or
Metropolitan Trial Courts may be appealed by the aggrieved
party to the Regional Trial Court within five (5) from receipt of
notice thereof. Otherwise, said decision shall become final and
executory. Regional Trial Court shall decide the appeal within
ten (10) days from the time it is received and the Regional Trial
Court decision shall immediately become final and executory.
No motion for reconsideration shall be entertained.
Domino v. Comelec 310 546 (1999). Except for the right to
remain in the list of voters or for being excluded thereform for
the particular election in relation to which the proceedings had
been held, a decision in an exclusion proceeding, even if final
and unappealable does not acquire the nature of res
judicata. Thus, a decision in an exclusion proceeding
would neither be conclusive on the voters political status,
nor bar subsequent proceedings on his right to be
registered as a voter in any other election.
Sec. 34 Petition for Inclusion of Voters in the list WHO
MAY FILE: any person whose application for registration
Has been disapproved by the Board; or
Whose name has been stricken out from the list;
Whose name was not included in the precinct list of
voters
Who has been included therein with a wrong or
misspelled name (after the Board disapproves its
application for reinstatement or correction of name)
may file with the court.
PERIOD TO FILE: Any time except 105 days prior to a regular
election or 75 days prior to a special election. The petition
should be supported by a certificate of disapproval of his
application and proof of service of notice upon the Board. MTC
shall decide within fifteen (15) days after its filing.
If the decision is for the inclusion of voters in the permanent list
of voters, the Board shall place the application for registration
previously disapproved in the corresponding BV and indicate in
the application for registration the date of the order of inclusion
and the court which issued the same.
Section 35 Petition for Exclusion of Voters from the list
WHO MAY FILE: any registered voter, representative of a
political party or the Election Officer.
PERIOD TO FILE: Any time except 100 days prior to a regular
election or 65 days prior to a special election. Supporting
documents shall be proof of notice to the Board and to the
challenged voter. MTC shall decide within ten (10) days.
If the decision is for exclusion, the Board, shall remove
the voters registration record from the corresponding BV, enter
the order of exclusion therein.
Akbayan v. Comelec March 26, 2001 The petition for
exclusion is a necessary component to registration since it is a
safety mechanism that gives a measure of protection against
flying voters, non-qualified registrants, and the like. The
prohibitive period, on the other hand, serves as the purpose of
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securing the voters substantive right to be included in the list of
voters.
The bone of contention of petitioners in this case in praying for
a 2-day special registration of new voters for the May 14, 2001
elections which was denied by the Comelec on account of
operational impossibility, undermined their constitutional right to
vote and caused the disenfranchisement of around 4M Filipinos
of voting age who failed to register before the registration
deadline set by the Comelec.
As ruled, the right of suffrage is not absolute, as in the
enjoyment of all other rights, it is subject to existing substantive
and procedural requirements embodied in our Constitution,
statute and other repositories of law.
Procedural limitation must undergo the process of
registration, in addition to the maximum requirements set by the
Constitution under Section 1, Article V, the act of registration
being an indispensable precondition and essential to the right of
suffrage and election process. Referring to Section 8 of RA
8189, the law is explicit that no registration shall however
be conducted during the period starting 120 days before a
regular election and 90 days before a special election.
Sec. 35 of RA 8189 on the hand speaks of the prohibitive
period within which to file a sworn petition for the exclusion of
voters from the permanent list of voters. Thus if the special
registration of voters will be conducted, then the prohibitive
period for filing petitions for exclusion must likewise be adjusted
to a later date, if not, then no one can challenge the voters list
which is violative of the principles of due process and would
open the registration process to abuse and seriously
compromise the integrity of the voters list and that of the entire
election.
ABSENTEE VOTING
Local Absentee Voting In local absentee voting, public
officials and employees, in the performance of their election
duties, stationed in places other than the place where they are
registered voters of (e.g. members of the PNP, AFP, offices of
the Comelec, school teachers, among others) are allowed to
vote in their respective place of work (Sec. 12, RA 7166).
RA No.10380, otherwise known as the Local Absentee Voting
for Media Act, now allow media practitioners to vote on
specified days earlier than Election Day so that that even if on
Election Day, they are assigned to cover election events away
from their place of registration as voters, they would
nonetheless have the opportunity to cast their votes.
Limitation: Those entitled to avail of local absentee voting
shall only be allowed to vote for President, VP, Senators, and
Party-List Representative
Grounds for disapproval of the Application for Local
Absentee Voting
1) The applicant is not a RV or his registration records
have been deactivated.
2) It was filed out of time;
3) It was not sworn to or otherwise not under oath by any
person authorized to administer oath;
4) It was only photocopied/faxed;
5) The Certification portion of the application form is not
duly accomplished.
OVERSEAS ABSENTEE VOTING (OAV) RA 9189 Absentee
Voters Act of 2003
Under RA 9189, Filipino citizens who are overseas workers,
immigrants or permanent residents in other countries may vote
in Philippine national elections when they are away from the
country on the day of the elections; Provided, That in the case
of immigrants or permanent residents, they file a sworn
statement that they will resume actual physical permanent
residence within three (3) years from approval of their
registration. (Sec. 5(d))
A. Scope of OAV Definition: Absentee voting refers to
the process by which qualified citizens of the
Philippines abroad exercise their right to vote. (Sec.
3(a))
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B. Coverage All citizens of the Philippines abroad
who are not disqualified by law, at least 18 years of
age on election day, may vote for President, VP,
Senators and Party List Representatives (Sec. 4)
Section 5 Disqualification:
(a) Those who have lost their Filipino citizenship in
accordance with Philippine laws;
(b) Those who have expressly renounced their
Philippine citizenship and who have pledged
allegiance to a foreign country;
(c) Those who have committed and are convicted by
a final judgment by a court or tribunal of an
offense punishable by imprisonment of not less
than one (1) year, including those who have
committed and been found guilty of Disloyalty as
defined under Article 137 of the Revised Penal
Code, such as disability not having removed by
plenary pardon or amnesty; Provided, however,
That any person disqualified to vote upon the
expiration of five (5) years after service of
sentence; Provided further, That the Commission
may take cognizance of final judgments issued by
foreign courts or tribunals only on the basis of
reciprocity and subject to the formalities and
processes prescribed by the Rules of Court on
execution of judgments;
(d) An immigrant or a permanent resident who is
recognized as such in the host country, unless
he/she executes, upon registration, an affidavit
prepared for the purpose by the Commission
declaring that he/she shall resume actual physical
permanent residence in the Philippines not later
than three (3) years from approval of his/her
registration under this Act.
a. Such affidavit shall also state that he/she
has not applied for citizenship in another
country.
b. Failure to return shall be cause for the
removal of the name of the immigrant or
permanent resident from the National
Registry of Absentee Voters and his/her
permanent disqualification to vote in
absentia;
(e) Any citizen of the Philippines abroad previously
declared insane or incompetent by competent
authority in the Philippines or abroad, as verified
by the Philippine embassies, consulates or
foreign service establishments concerned, unless
such competent authority subsequently certifies
that such person is no longer insane or
incompetent.
Macalintal v. Comelec 405 SCRA 614 (2003) The execution
of the affidavit itself is not the enabling or enfranchising act.
The affidavit required in Section 5(d) is not only proof of the
intention of the immigrant or permanent resident to go back and
resume residency in the Philippines, but more significantly, it
serves as an explicit expression that he had not in fact
abandoned his domicile of origin. The affidavit is required of
immigrants and permanent residents abroad because by
their status in the host countries, they are presumed to
have relinquished their intent to return to this country;
thus, without the affidavit, the presumption of
abandonment of Philippine domicile shall remain.
3. Casting of Ballots in OAV The overseas voter
shall cast his ballot within 30 days before election day or 60
days before election day in the case of seafarers. (Sec. 16.3)
4. Counting of Ballots of OAV a) Only ballots cast
and mailed ballots received by embassies, consulates and other
foreign establishments before the closing of voting on election
day shall be counted (Sec. 16.7 and Sec. 18.3).
b) The counting shall be conducted on site and shall
be synchronized with the start of counting in the Philippines
(Sec. 18.1).
c. The Special Board of Election Inspectors (SBEI)
shall composed of a chairman and two (2) members
The ambassador, consul general or
career public officer designated by
the Comelec shall be the chairman.
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In the absence of government
officers, two Filipino citizens qualified
to vote under this Act shall be
deputized as members (Sec. 18.3)
Immediately after the counting, the
SBEI shall transmit by facsimile or
electronic mail the result to the
Comelec and the accredited major
political parties.
5. Canvassing of OAV A Special Board of
Canvassers (SBOC) composed of a lawyer preferably
of the Comelec as chairman, a senior career officers
from any government agency maintaining a post
abroad and, in the absence of another government
officer, a citizen of the Philippines qualified to vote
under this Act, shall be constituted to canvass the
election returns.
The SBOC shall transmit by facsimile,
electronic mail or any other safe and reliable means of
transmission, the certificate of canvass and the
statements of votes to the Comelec and the major
accredited parties.
The certificates of canvass and the
statements of votes shall be the primary basis for the
national canvass. (Sec. 18.4)
Overseas Voting Act of 2013 The President on May 27,
2013 signed into lawRA 10590, OAV 2013, amending the
Overseas Voting Act of 2003. With the passage of the law,
Filipino immigrants abroad will no longer need to execute an
affidavit stating that they will return to the Philippines within 3
years before they are allowed in absentia.
In the landmark case of Nicolas-Lewis vs. Comelec, dual
citizens were refused by Comelec to register and vote in the
2004 Philippine elections, the Supreme Court ruled in 2006 that
there is no provision in the dual citizenship law, RA 9225
(Citizenship Retention and Reacquisition Act of 2003 requiring
duals to actually establish residence and physically stay in the
Philippines first before they can exercise their right to vote.
The ruling established a precedent that dual citizens can
register and vote without establishing residence in the
Philippines. A provision in the amended law is inserted to
emphasize that dual citizens who reacquired or retained their
Philippine citizenship under RA 9225 can exercise their right of
suffrage.
The amended law also mandates the creation of the Resident
Election Registration Boards (RERB). The specific provision is
a new insertion institutionalizing the overseas voting system by
creating an office within the Comelec exclusively for overseas
voting.
The amendments also empowers the Comelec to attain the
most effective and innovative way of using advance technology
in enfranchising Filipinos overseas without compromising the
secrecy and sanctity of the electoral process.
Loida Nicolas-Lewis, et. al. vs. Comelec G.R. No. 162759,
August 6, 2006. - Petitioners are dual citizens having retained
or reacquired Philippine Citizenship under RA 9225 or the
Citizenship Retention and Reacquisition Act of 2003. As
such, they sought registration and certification as overseas
absentee voters under RA 9189 or the Overseas Absentee
Voting Act of 2003, in order to vote in the May 2004 elections.
However, the Philippine embassy in the US advised them that
per Comelec letter dated September 23, 2003, they have yet no
residence requirement as prescribed by the Constitution.
Petitioners sought a clarification from the Comelec which
thereafter, expressed the opinion that dual citizens under
RA 9225 cannot exercise the right of suffrage under the
Overseas Absentee Voting Law because said law was not
enacted for them, hence, they are considered regular
voters who have to meet requirements of residency, among
others.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners and others who might have
meanwhile retained and/or reacquired Philippine citizenship
pursuant to RA 9225 may vote as absentee voter under RA
9189.
 ELECTION LAWS REVIEW
HELD: Section 1 of Article V of the Philippine Constitution
prescribed residency requirement as a general eligibility
factor for the right to vote. On the other hand, Section 2
thereof, authorizes congress to devise a system wherein an
absentee may vote, implying that a non-resident may, as an
exception to the residency prescription in the preceding section,
be allowed to vote.
There is no provision in the dual citizenship law (RA 9225),
requiring duals to actually establish residence and physically
stay in the Philippines first before they can exercise their right to
vote. On the contrary, RA 9225, in implicit acknowledgement
that duals are most likely non-residents, grants under Section
5(1) the same right of suffrage as granted to an absentee voter
under RA 9189 which aims to enfranchise as much as possible
all overseas Filipinos, who, save for the residency requirement
exacted of an ordinary conditions, are qualified to vote as ruled
in Makalintal vs. Comelec 405 SCRA 614.
POLITICAL PARTIES, PARTY LIST AND CITIZENS ARM
Article IX-C, Sec. 1 (5), authorizes the Comelec under
the Constitution to Register, after sufficient publication,
political parties, organizations, or coalitions which, in
addition to other requirements, must present their platform
or program of government; and accredit citizens arms of
the Commission on Elections.
Section 60 of the OEC/Section 1, Rule 32 of the Comelec
Rules of Procedure provides that any group pursuing the
same political ideals may register with the Comelec. HOW?by
filing a verified petition with its Law Department duly verified by
its President and Secretary-General, or any official duly
authorized to do so under its Constitutions and by-laws.
Before Comelec takes action, the Comelec shall first verify,
through its field offices, the status and capacity of the petitioner
and the veracity of the allegations in the petition. (Sec. 4, Rule
32). After the verification process, the Petition will be published
with the Notice of Hearing.
Once registered the political party is issued a Certificate of
Registration (Sec. 7) (1) acquires juridical personality (2) public
is informed of the partys existence and ideals (3) it identifies
the party and its officers for purposes of regulation by the
Comelec.For purposes of the electoral process that an
organization need not be a political party.
Limitations on Registration
It is a religious sect or denomination or association,
organized for religious purposes. Registration of
religious sects are prohibited for the purpose of the
electoral process which is made in the spirit of
separation of church and state and intended to
prevent churches from wielding political power.Does
not extend to organizations with religious affiliations
or to political parties which derive their principles
from religious beliefs.
Those who seek to achieve their goals through
unlawful means
Those which refuse to adhere to the Constitution
Those which are supported by any foreign
government (Sec. 2(5) Article IX-C)
Cancellation of Registration (Sec. 8) Upon verified
complaint of any interested party, or motu propio by the
Commission, the registration of any political party, coalition of
political parties or organizations under the party-list system may
be cancelled after due notice and hearing on the following
grounds:
(a) Acceptance by the political party, coalition of
political parties, or organizations or any of its
candidates, of financial contributions from foreign
governments and/or their agencies for activities related
to elections.
(b) Violation of laws, rules or regulations relating to
elections, plebiscites, referenda or initiative.
Untruthful statements in its petition for registration
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(d) The said political party, coalition of political parties
or organization has become a religious sect or
denomination, is pursuing its goals thru violence or
other unlawful means, is refusing to adhere to or
uphold the Constitution of the Philippines, or is
receiving support from any foreign government;
(e) Failure to comply with applicable laws, rules or
regulations of the Commission
(f) Failure to field official candidates in the last two
preceding elections or failure of their candidates to
obtain at least five (5) per centum of the votes cast in
the last two preceding elections.
Jurisdiction of Comelec over Inter-Party Disputes/Power to
Register Political Parties
Samson Alcantara, et. al. vs. Comelec 696 SCRA 547 (2013)
Under the Constitution, the Comelec is empowered to register
political parties. In the exercise of its power to register political
parties, the Comelec necessarily possesses the power to pass
upon the question of who, among the legitimate officers of the
part-list group, are entitled to exercise the right and privileges
granted to a party-list group under the law. The Comelecs
jurisdiction on this point is well-settled and is not here disputed.
Luis LokinJr./Teresita Planas v. Comelec/CIBAC 674 SCRA
538 (2012)
In Atienza v. Comelec (612 SCRA 961 (2010), it was expressly
settled that the Comelec possessed the authority to resolve
intra-party disputes as a necessary tributary of its
constitutionally mandated power to enforce election laws and
register political parties. The Court, therein cited Kalaw v.
Comelec and Palmares v. Comelec which uniformly upheld the
Comelecs jurisdiction over intra-party disputes: As ruled in
Kalaw v. Comelec, the Comelecs powers and functions under
Section 2, Article IX-C of the Constitution, include the
ascertainment of the identity of the political party and its
legitimate officers responsible for the acts. The Court also
declared in another case that the Comelecs power to register
political parties necessarily involved the determination of the
persons who must act on its behalf. Thus, the Comelec may
resolve an intra-party leadership dispute, in a proper case
brought before it, as an incident of its power to register political
parties.
Liberal Party vs. Commission on Elections 620 SCRA 393
(May 6, 2010), the SC distinguished REGISTRATION
andACCREDITATION of a political party. The root of this
petition before the SC is the Nationalista Party-Nationalista
Party Coalition (NP-NPC) petition before the COMELEC for
registration as a coalition and accreditation as the dominant
minority party. While the Comelec En Banc claimed jurisdiction
over the registration of coalitions and has in fact decreed NP-
NPCs registration, the Comelec however did NOT rule on
the accreditation aspect. The registration of a coalition and
the accreditation of a dominant minority party are two
separate matters that are substantively distinct from each
other.
Section 2(5), Article IX-C and Rule 32 of the
CRPregulate the registration of political parties,
organizations or coalition of political
parties.Accreditation as a dominant party is governed
by Comelec Resolution No. 8752, Section 1 of which
states that the petition for accreditation shall be filed
with the Clerk of the Commission who shall docket it as
an SPP (means Special Proceedings (DM) case. This
was the manner the NP-NPC was docketed.
Registration of political parties is a special
proceeding assigned to a Division for handling
under the CRP. No similar clear cut rules is available
to a petition for accreditation as a dominant party.
Registration must first take place before a request for
accreditation can be made. Accreditation is the next
natural step to follow after registration.
When the Comelec En Banc, resolved the registration of the
NP- NPC the case is terminated and ripe for review by the SC
via a Petition for Certiorari. The issue with respect to
accreditation is a separate issue which is treated in a separate
proceedings. As ruled, a Motion for Reconsideration of a
Resolution of the Comelec En Banc is a prohibited pleading
(Sec. 1(d) Rule 13). The remedy available to a party is a
 ELECTION LAWS REVIEW
petition for certiorari with the SC pursuant to Article IX-A, Sec. 7
and Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino, represented by its
Chairman Edgardo J. Angara v. Comelec, et. al. 423 SCRA
665, (the Comelec misapplied equity in this case). LDP
informed the Comelec by way of Manifestation that only the
Party Chairman or his authorized representative may endorse
the COC of the partys official candidates; that Rep. Butch
Aquino was on indefinite force leave and in the meantime
Ambassador Enrique Zaldivar was designated Acting Secretary
General.
Aquino in a comment alleged that the Party Chairman
does not have the authority to impose disciplinary sanctions on
the Secretary General and that the Manifestation filed has no
basis praying that Comelec disregards the same. Comelec
issued an order requiring the parties to file verified petition.
Pending resolution, a Certificate of Nomination of Sen. Panfilo
Lacson as LDP candidate for President was filed with the
Comelec which was signed by Rep. Aquino as LDP Secretary
General
Comelec issued a Resolution granting the petition with
LEGAL EQUITY for both Petitioner and Oppositor (Angara Wind
and Aquino Wing). ISSUE: Whether or not Comelec gravely
abused its discretion in issuing the subject Resolution. RULING
the only issue is simply Who as between the Party
Chairman and the Secretary General has the authority to
sign certificates of candidacy of the official candidates of
the party. Yes Comelec acted with grave abuse of discretion.
While it has jurisdiction to rule upon questions of party identity
and leadership as an incident to its enforcement powers.It well
within its competence to inquire into which party officer has
authority to sign and endorse certificate of candidacy of partys
nominees. And to resolve the issue raised, the Comelec need
only to turn to the Party Constitution and election laws. The
Comelec Resolution is INDECISION in the guise of equity. It
chose not to because of its irrational fear of treading, as Aquino
contends, on unchartered territories but which have long been
chartered by jurisprudence.
Comelec divided the LDP into wings both having
authority to nominate candidates for every elective position.
Consequently, Comelec planted seeds of confusion among the
electorate who are apt to be confounded by two candidates
from a single political party. This was not only a disservice to
the opposition but to the voting public as well as its Resolution
facilitated, rather than forestalled, the division of the minority
party.
Agapay ng Indigenous Peoples Rights Alliance (A-IPRA) v.
Comelec 696 SCRA 563 the Supreme Courtreiterated its
ruling in Laban that the ascertainment of the identity of a
political party and its legitimate officers is a matter that is well
within its authority. The source of this authority is not other than
the fundamental law itself, which vests upon the Comelec the
power and function to enforce and administer all laws and
regulations relative to the conduct of election.
Damasen vs. Tumamao 613 SCRA 49 (2010) the discretion
of accepting members to a political party is a right and a
privilege, a purely internal matter, which the Court cannot
meddle in. The reason behind the right given to a political party
to nominate a replacement where a permanent vacancy occurs
in the Sanggunian is to maintain the party representation as
willed by the people in the election (Sec. 45 (b) of RA 7160 Rule
on Succession and as held in Navarro v. CA 672 SCRA 355
(2010). Damasen was not a bonafide member. Tumamao was
husband of the VM who died).
PARTY LIST
R.A. 7941, otherwise known as An Act Providing for the
Election of Party-List Representatives through the Part-List
System. The party-list system is a mechanism of the
proportional representation in the election of representatives to
the HR from national, regional and sectoral parties or
organizations or coalitions thereof, registered with the Comelec,
to enable Filipinos belonging to the marginalized and
underrepresented sectors to contribute legislation that would
benefit them. (Sec. 2)
Party-list representation shall constitute 20% of the total number
of representatives by selection or election from the labor,
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peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural minorities, women,
youth and such other sectors as may be provided by law,
except the religious sector (Sec. 11 and Art. V, Sec. 5(2) 1987
Constitution)
NOTE: The party-list system is composed of three (3) different
groups: (1) national parties or organizations; (2) regional parties
or organizations; and (3) sectoral parties or organization.
National and regional parties or organization are different from
sectoral parties or organizations. The former need not be
organized along sectoral lines and not represent any particular
sectoral nor should they be marginalized and underrepresented.
Atong Paglaum, Inc. vs. Comelec G.R. Nos._______, 02
April 2013, the Supreme Court ruled Sec. 5(1), Art. VI of the
Constitution is crystal clear that there shall be a party-list
system of registered national, regional and sectoral parties or
organization. The commas after the words national, and
regional, separate national and regional parties from sectoral
parties. Had the framers of the 1987 Constitution intended
national and regional parties to be at the same time sectoral,
they would have stated national and regional sectoral parties.
They did not, precisely because it was never their intention to
make the party-list system exclusively sectoral.
What the framers intended, and what they expressly
wrote in Section 5(1), could not be any clearer: the party-list
system is composed of 3-different groups, and the sectoral
parties belong to only one of the 3 groups.
COCOFED v. Commission on Elections 703 SCRA 165
Section 4 and 5 of RA 7941 distinguished. Section 4 of RA
7941, a party-list group already registered need not register
anew for purposes of every subsequent election, but only
needs to file a manifestation of intent to participate with the
Comelec. Section 5 on the other hand provides, that an
applicant for registration has to file with the Comelec, not later
than 90 days before the election, a verified petition stating its
desire to participate in the party-list system as a national,
regional or sectoral party or organization or a coalition of such
parties or organization. The applicant is required to submit its
constitution, by-laws, platform of government, list of officers,
coalition agreement and other relevant information as the
Comelec may required. Aside from these, the law requires the
publication of the applicants petition in at least 2 national
newspapers of general circulation. The Comelec then resolves
the petition, determining whether the applicant has complied
with all the necessary requirements.
Lokin, Jr. vs. Commission on elections 621 SCRA 385
(June 22, 2010), the SC ruled that Comelec cannot issue rules
and regulations that provide a ground for the substitution of a
party-list nominee NOT written in R.A.7941.
Sec. 8 provides Nomination of Party-List Representatives.
Each registered party, organization or coalition shall
submit to the Comelec not later than 45 days before the
election a list of names, not less than five (5), from which
party-list representatives shall be chosen in case it obtains
the required number of votes.
A person may be nominated in one (1) list only.
Only persons who have given their consent in writing may be
named in the list. The list shall not include any candidate for any
elective office or a person who has lost his bid for an elective
office in the immediately preceding election. NO change of
names or alteration of the order of nominees shall be
allowed after the same shall have been submitted to the
Comelec except in cases (1) where the nominee dies, or (2)
withdraws in writing his nomination, (3) becomes
incapacitated in which case the name of the substitute
nominee shall be placed last in the list. Incumbent sectoral
representatives in the HR who are nominated in the party-
list system shall not be considered resigned.
CIBAC (Citizens Battle Against Corruption) thru its
President Emmanuel Villanueva manifested their intent to
participate in the May 14, 2007 synchronized national and local
elections and submitted their list of 5 nominees (Villanueva,
Lokin (herein petitioner), Cruz-Gonzales, Tugna and Galang).
The list was later published in the newspapers of general
circulation. Before the elections, Villanueva filed a certificate of
nomination, substitution and amendment of the list of nominees
whereby it withdrew the nominations of Lokin, Tugna and
Galang and substituted Borje. The amended list included
Villanueva, Cruz-Gonzales and Borje. Subsequently,
Villanueva transmitted to Comelec the signed petitions of more
 ELECTION LAWS REVIEW
than 81% if the CIBAC members in order to confirm the
withdrawal of the nominations of Lokin, Tugna and Galang.
Based on the Party-List Canvas Report, it showed that
CIBAC was entitled to a second seat, hence, the counsel of
CIBAC filed with the Comelec sitting as National Board of
Canvassers, a request to proclaim Lokin as the 2 nd nominee
which was opposed by Villanueva and Cruz-Gonzales. Since
Comelec failed to act on the filing of the certificate of
nomination, substitution and amendment of the list of nominees
and the petitions of the more than 81% of CIBAC members,
Villanueva filed a petition to confirm the said certificate with the
Comelec which was docketed as E.M. No. 07-054. In the
meantime, Comelec as NBC partially proclaimed several party
lists as having won which included Cibac.
The Secretary General of CIBAC informed the
Secretary General of the HR to formally swear Lokin into office
but which was denied in view of the pendency of E.M. No. 07-
054 which approved the withdrawal of the nominations of Lokin
et. al. and the substitution of Borje. Cruz-Gonzales was
proclaimed as the official second nominee.
Lokin brought before the SC via Mandamus to compel
respondent Comelec to proclaim him as the official second
nominee of CIBAC. Also, in another petition, Lokin assailed
Sec. 13 of Resolution No. 7804 (Rules and Regulations
Governing the filing of Manifestation of Intent to Participate and
submission of Names of Nominees under the Party-List) and its
resolution in E.M. No. 07-054.
The Comelec asserts that a petition for certiorari is an
inappropriate recourse in law due to the proclamation of Cruz-
Gonzales as representative and her assumption of that office;
that Lokins proper recourse was an electoral protest filed in the
HRET, therefore, the Court has no jurisdiction over the matter
being raised by Lokin. CIBAC posits that Lokin is guilty of
forum shopping for filing a petition for mandamus and a petition
for certiorari, considering that both petitions ultimately seek to
have him proclaimed as the second nominee of CIBAC.
ISSUES: a) Whether or not the Court has jurisdiction
over the controversy. The Court has jurisdiction. The
controversy involving Lokin is neither an EP nor an action for
QW, for it concerns a very peculiar situation in which Lokin is
seeking to be seated as second nominee of CIBAC. Although
an EP may properly be available to one part-list organization
seeking to unseat another party-list organization to determine
which between the defeated and the winning party-list
organizations actually obtained the majority of the legal votes,
Lokins case is not one in which a nominee of a particular party-
list organization thereby wants to unseat another nominee of
the same party list. Neither does an action for QW lie,
considering that the case does not involve the ineligibility and
disloyalty of Cruz-Gonzales to the RP, or some other case of
disqualification.
Lokin has correctly brought this special civil action for
certiorari against the Comelec to seek the review of its
resolution in accordance with Section 7 of Article IX-A of the
1987 Constitution, notwithstanding the oath and assumption of
office by Cruz-Gonzales. The constitutional mandate is now
implemented by Rule 64 of the 1997 Rules of Procedure, which
provides for the review of the judgments, final orders or
resolution of the Comelec and the Commission on Audit. As
Rule 64 states, the mode of review is by a petition for certiorari
in accordance with Rule 65 to be filed in the SC within the
limited period of 30 days. The Court has original and exclusive
jurisdiction over Lokins certiorari and for mandamus.
(b) Both actions, certiorari and mandamus did not
violate the rule against forum shopping even if the actions
involved the same parties, because they were based on
different causes of action and the reliefs they sought were
different.
Comelec gravely abused its discretion in
promulgating Section 13 of Res. No. 7804 as it expanded the
exceptions under Sec. 8 of RA 7941 Section 8 enumerates
only 3 instances in which the party-list organization can
substitute another person in place of the nominee. The
enumeration is exclusive.
Cocofed Case As early as February 8, 2012, Comelec had
informed, through its Resolution No. 9359, all registered parties
who wished to participate in the May 2013 party-list elections
that they shall file with the Comelec a Manifestation of Intent to
Participate in the party list election together with its list of at
least 5 nominees, no later than May 31, 2012. Under Sec. 6(5)
of RA 7941, violation of or failure to comply with laws, rules and
regulations relating to elections is a ground for the cancellation
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of registration. Cocofed failed to submit a list of 5 nominees
(submitted only 2 nominees) despite ample opportunity to do so
before the elections, which is a violation imputable to the party
under said provision.
Pursuant to Section 8 of RA 7941, the Court cannot
leave to the party the discretion to determine the number of
nominees it would submit. The submission of the list is a
statutory requirement for the registration of party-list groups and
the submission of this list is part of a registered partys
continuing compliance with the law to maintain its registration.
A party-list groups previous registration with the
Comelec confers no vested right to the maintenance of its
registration. In order to maintain a party in a continuing
compliance status, the party must prove not only its continued
possession of the requisite qualifications but, equally, must
show its compliance with the basic requirements of the law.
Alliance for Nationalism and Democracy (ANAD) v.
Comelec 705 SCRA 340 (2013) the Supreme Court
reiterated. . compliance with Section 8 of RA 7941 is essential
as the said provision is a safeguard against arbitrariness.
Section 8 rids a party-list organization of the prerogative to
substitute and replace its nominees, or even to swotch the order
of the nominees, after submission of the list to Comelec.
Abayhon vs. HRET et. al 612 SCRA 375/Palparan Jr. vs.
HRET et. al. These two cases were consolidated and jointly
resolved as it both concerns the authority of the HRET to pass
upon the eligibilities of the nominees of the party-list groups that
won seats in the lower house of Congress.
Abayhon is the 1st nominee of the Aangat Tayo party-
list that won a seat in the HR during the 2007 elections.
Palparan on the other hand was the 1 st nominee of Bantay
party-list. A petition for QW was filed with HRET against the
party-list groups and its nominee claiming that it was not eligible
for a party-list since it did not represent the marginalized and
underrepresented sectors. Abayhon is the spouse of an
incumbent congressional district representative and likewise
does not belong to the UR and marginalized. Petitioners also
claim that Abayhon lost her bid as party-list rep called An Waray
in the immediately preceding elections of May 10, 2004.
Palparan also was alleged to have committed various human
rights violations against the marginalized sectors (Bantay
represents the victims of communist rebels, CAFGU, security
guards and former rebels.)
Abayhon and Palparan postures that the Comelec
already confirmed the status of the party list as a national multi-
sectoral party-list organization, that HRET had no jurisdiction
over the petitioner for QW since the petitioners collaterally
attacked the registration of the party-list organization, a matter
that fell within the jurisdiction of the Comelec. That it was the
party-list that was taking a seat in the HR and not them, being
only its nominees. All questions involving their eligibility as
nominee, were internal concerns of the organization. The
HRET dismissed the petition against party-list but upheld its
jurisdiction over nominees who both filed an MR which was
denied. Hence, this special civil action for certiorari alleging
that the HRET gravely abused its discretion.
The Court made reference to Sec. 5(1) of Article VI
(which identifies who the members of that House are.
The HR shall be composed of not more than 250 members,
unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from
legislative districts apportioned among the provinces, cities,
and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the
number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a
uniform and progressive ration, and those who, as provided
by law, shall be elected through a party-list system of
registered national, regional and sectoral parties or
organizations.
Clearly the members of the HR are two kinds. .
.1)those who shall be elected from legislative districts and 2)
those who shall be elected through a party-list system. From
the point of view of the Constitution, it is the party-list rep who
are elected into office, NOT their parties or organizations.
These representatives are elected, however, through that
peculiar party-list system that the Constitution authorized and
that Congress by law established where the voters cast their
votes for the organizations or parties to which such party-list
reps belong.
Once elected, both the district reps and the party-list
reps are treated in like manners. They have the same
deliberative rights, salaries, and emoluments. They can
participate in the making of laws that will directly benefit their
 ELECTION LAWS REVIEW
legislative districts or sectors. They are also subject to the
same term limitations of 3 years for a max of 3 consecutive
terms. The party list system act itself recognizes party list
nominees as members of the HR (Sec. 2, RA 7941 Declaration
of Policy The State shall promote proportional representation
in the election of reps in the HR through a party-list system of
registered national, regional and sectoral parties or
organizations or coalitions thereof, which will enable Filipino
citizens belonging to the marginalized and UR sectors x x x
x to become members of the HR .
The Court held that initially, the authority to determine
the qualifications of a party-list nominee belongs to the
organization and to choose five from among the aspiring
nominees to comply with the law. But where an allegation is
made that the party or organization had chosen and allowed a
disqualified nominee to become its party-list rep in the lower
house and enjoy the secured tenure that goes with the position,
the resolution of the dispute is taken out of its hand. Hence,
pursuant to Section 17 of Article VI, the HRET being the sole
judge of all contests relating to, among other things, the
qualifications of the members of the HR, the HRET has
jurisdiction to hear and pass upon their qualifications. The
HRET was correct in dismissing the QW and retaining authority
to rule on the qualifications.
Philippine Guardians Brotherhood, Inc. (PGBI) v. Comelec
619 SCRA 585(DELISTING) The Comelec may motu propio
OR upon verified complaint of any interested party, remove, or
cancel, after due notice and hearing, the registration of any
national, regional or sectoral party, organization or coalition IF
It: (a) fails to participate in the last 2 preceding elections;
OR (b) fails to obtain at least 2% of the votes casts under
the party-list system in the 2 preceding elections for the
constituency in which it was registered (Section 6 RA
7941). The word OR is a disjunctive term signifying
disassociation and independence of one thing from the other
things enumerated. A party list group or organization that failed
to garner 2% in a prior election and immediately thereafter did
not participate in the preceding election is something that is
not covered by Section 6(8) of RA 7941. From this perspective,
it may be an unintended gap in the law and as such is a matter
for Congress to address. This case abandoned the Minero vs.
Comelec G.R. No. 177548 May 10, 2007.
Philippine Guardians Brotherhood, Inc. v. Comelec 646
SCRA 63 (2011)
Comelec removed PGBT in the list of qualified parties vying
for a seat under the party-list system of representation in
violation of the status quo order of the Supreme Court. An
equally important aspect of a democratic electoral exercise is
the right of free choice of the electorates on who shall govern
them the party-list system affords them this choice, as it gives
the marginalized and underrepresented sectors the opportunity
to participate in governance. Comelec was cited for contempt
by the Court.
Effect of removal by Comelec of PGBI in the list: As it was
the Comelec itself which prevented PGBI from participating in
the 10 May 2010 party-list elections when it deleted PGBI, with
grave abuse of discretion, from the list of accredited party-list
groups or organizations and, thereafter, refused to return it to
the list despite the Courts directive, PGBI should, at the very
least, be deemed to have participated in the 10 May 2010
Amores vs. HRET et. al 622 SCRA 593 (2010) Amores via a
petition for QW with the HRET questioned the legality of the
assumption of office of Emmanuel Joel Villanueva as rep of
CIBAC. It was alleged among other things, that Villanueva
assumed office without a formal proclamation by the Comelec,
disqualified to be a nominee of the youth sector of CIBAC since
at the time of the filing of his certificates of nomination and
acceptance, he was already 31 years old or beyond the age
limit of 30 pursuant to Section 9 of RA 7941 and that his change
of affiliation from CIBACs youth sector to its overseas Filipino
workers and their families sector was not effected at least 6
months prior to the May 14, 2007 elections so as to be qualified
to represent the new sector under Section 15 of RA 7941.
The HRET dismissed the petition as it found the
petition to be filed beyond the 10 days reglementary period, that
the age qualification for youth sectoral nominees under Section
9 of RA 7941 applied only to those nominated as such during
the first 3 congressional terms after the ratification of the
Constitution or until 1998, unless a sectoral party is thereafter
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registered exclusively as representing the youth sector, which
CIBAC, a multi sectoral organization, is not. As regards the
shift of affiliation, it was held that Section 15 did not apply as
there was no resultant change in party list affiliation.
ISSUES: (1) whether the petition for QW was dismissible for
having been filed unseasonably; and (2) whether Section 9 and
15 of RA 7941 apply to Villanueva. As to the first issue, the SC
found grave abuse of discretion on the part of HRET. The Court
overlooked the technicality of timeliness and rules on the merits
since the challenge goes into Villanuevas qualifications, it may
be filed at anytime during his term. Also date of proclamation
was not clear. As to the second and more substantial issue,
the Court made reference to Section 9 of RA 7941 which
provides that in case of a nominee of the youth sector, he
must at least be 25 but not more than 30 years of age on
the day of the election. The youth sectoral rep who attains
the age of 30 during his term shall be allowed to continue
in office until the expiration of his term.
The Court did not find any textual support on the
interpretation of HRET that Section 9 applied only to those
nominated during the first 3 congressional terms after the
ratification of the Constitution or until 1998. A cardinal rule in
statutory construction is that when the law is clear and free from
any doubt or ambiguity, there is no room for construction or
interpretation. Only room for application. The distinction is
nowhere found in the law. When the law does not distinguish,
we must not distinguish.
Respecting Section 15 of RA 7941, the Court likewise
found no textual support for HRETs ratiocination that the
provision did not apply to Villanuevas shift of affiliation from
CIBACs youth sector to its overseas Filipino workers and their
families sector as there was no resultant change in party list
affiliation. Section 15 reads Change of Affiliation: Effect
Any elected party list rep who changes his political party or
sectoral affiliation during his term of office shall forfeit his
seat; Provided, That if he changes his political party or
sectoral affiliation within 6 months before an election, he
shall not be eligible for nomination as party-list rep under
his new party or organization.
The wordings of Section 15 is clear as it covers
changes in both political party and sectoral affiliation and which
may occur within the same party since multi-sectoral party-list
org are qualified to participate in the Philippine party-list system.
A nominee who changes his sectoral affiliation within the same
party will only be eligible for nomination under the new sectoral
affiliation if the change has been effected at least 6 months
before the elections. Sec. 9 and 15 apply to Villanueva.
As regards the contention that Villanueva is the 1st
nominee of CIBAC, whose victory was later upheld, is NO
moment. A party-list orgs ranking of its nominees is a mere
indication of preference , their qualifications according to law
are a different matter.
Ang Ladlad LGBT Party v. Comelec 618 SCRA 32 Ladlad is
an organization composed of men and women who identify
themselves as lesbians, gays, bisexuals or transgendered
individuals. They applied for registration with Comelec in 2006
and its accreditation was denied on the ground that the
organization had no substantial membership. Ladlad in 2009
again filed a petition for registration which was dismissed by
Comelec on moral grounds (Bible and Koran).
The SC ruled that moral disapproval is not a sufficient
governmental interest to justify exclusion of homosexuals from
participation to the party list system. The Constitution provides
in Sec. 5, Art. III that No law shall be made respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof. At bottom, what our non-establishment clause calls for
is government neutrality in religious matters. Clearly,
governmental reliance on religious justification is inconsistent
with this policy of neutrality. Hence, the Court finds that it was
grave violation of the non-establishment clause for the Comelec
to utilize the Bible and the Koran to justify the exclusion of ang
Ladlad.
In sum, the crucial element is not whether a sector is
specifically enumerated, but whether a particular organization
complies with the requirements of the Constitution and RA
7941. The SC found that Ladlad has sufficiently demonstrated
its compliance with the legal requirements for accreditation.
 ELECTION LAWS REVIEW
Veterans Federation Party v. Comelec 342 SCRA 244, the
SC provided for the four unique parameters of the Filipino
Party-list System which are as follows
The 20% allocation the combined number of all
party-list congressmen shall not exceed 20% of the
total membership of the HR, including those under the
party-list;
The 2% threshold only those parties garnering a
minimum of 2% of the total valid votes cast for the
party-list system are qualified to have a seat in the
HR;
The 3-seat limit each qualified party, regardless of
the number of votes it actually obtained, is entitled to a
maximum three seats, that is, one qualifying and two
additional seats;
The proportional representation the additional seats
which a qualified party is entitled to shall be computed
in proportion to their total number of votes..
In this case, following the May11, 1998 national elections
which is the first election for party-list representation, the
Comelec en banc proclaimed 14 parties and organizations
which had obtained at least 2% of the total number of votes cast
for the party-list system which constitute a total of 25 nominees
short of the 52 party-list representatives who should actually sit
in the house. The PAG-ASA files with the Comelec a Petition to
proclaim the full number of party-list representative provided by
the Constitution. They alleged that the filling up of the 20%
membership of party list representative in the House, as
provided under the Constitution, was mandatory. Nine other
party list organizations filed their respective motions to
intervene seeking the same relief as that sought by PAG-ASA
on substantially the same grounds.
The Comelec, contrary to its rules and regulations
governing the said elections, instead proclaimed the other 38
party-list organization notwithstanding its not having garnered
the required 2% votes. RULING: Sec. 5(2) of Article VI which
states that the sectoral representation shall constitute the 20%
is not mandatory as it merely provides a ceiling for party-list in
congress. And, obtaining absolute proportional representation is
restricted by the 3-seat per party limit to a maximum of two
additional slots. Comelec was held to have abused its
discretion in disregarding an act of Congress.
The 8-point guidelines for screening party-list participants
In Bagong Bayani Labor Party v. Comelec 359
SCRA 698 (2001) (also reiterated the ruling in Veterans), at
issue is the Omnibus Resolution of the Comelec which
approved the participation of 154 organizations and parties and
which the SC remanded to the Comelec for the latter to
determine evidentiary hearings, whether the 154 parties and
organizations allowed to participate in the party-list elections
complied with the requirements of the law. The SC ruled that
the party-list organizations or parties must factually and truly
represent the marginalized and underrepresented
constituencies mentioned in Section 5 of RA 7941 and the
persons nominated by the party-list candidate-organization
must be Filipino citizens belonging to the marginalized and
underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties.
In remanding the case to Comelec the SC laid down
the following guidelines
First, the PP, sector or organization must represent
the marginalized and underrepresented groups
identified in Section 5 of RA 7941. In other words,
it must show through the Constitution, articles of
incorporation, by-laws, history, platform of
government and track record that it represents and
seeks to uplift marginalized and underrepresented
sectors.
Second, while major political parties are expressly
allowed by RA 7941 and the Constitution to
participate, they must comply with the declared
statutory policy enabling Filipino citizens
belonging to the M and U to be elected to the HR.
Third, religious sector may not be represented in the
party-list system. In view of the objections directed
against the registration of Ang Buhay Hayaang
Humabong, which is allegedly a religious group, the
Court notes the express constitutional provision that
the religious sector may not be represented in
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the party-list system. Furthermore, the
Constitution provides that religious denominations
and sects shall not be registered. The prohibition
was explained by a member of the Constitutional
Commission in this wise The prohibition is on any
religious organization registering as a political party.
I do not see any prohibition here against a priest
running as a candidate. This is not prohibited here; it
is the registration of a religious sect as a political
party.
Fourth, it must not be disqualified under the
ground enumerated under Section 6 of RA 7941
(not a religious sect or denomination or association
organized for religious purposes, advocates violence
or unlawful means to seek its goal; a foreign party or
organization; receives support from any foreign
government, fails to comply with laws rules or
regulations relating to elections, declared untruthful
statement in its petition, it has ceased to exist for at
least one (1) year, it fails to participate in the last 2
preceding elections or failed to obtain at least 2% of
the votes cast under the party list system in the 2
preceding elections for the constituency in which it
was registered)
Fifth, the party or organization must not be an
adjunct of, or a project organized or an entity
funded or assisted by the government (referring
to MAD of Richard Gomez). It must be independent
of the government. The participants of the
government or it officials in the affairs of a party-list
candidate is not only illegal and unfair to other
parties, but also deleterious to the objective of the
law; to enable citizens belonging to marginalized and
underrepresented sectors and organizations to be
elected to the House of Representatives.
Sixth, the party must not only comply with the
requirements of the law, its nominees must
likewise do so.Section 9 of RA 7941 reads
qualifications of Party-List Nominees No person
shall be nominated as party-list representative
unless he is a natural born citizen of the Philippines,
a RV, a resident of the Philippines for a period of not
less than 1 year immediately preceding the day of
the election, able to read and write, a bona-fide
member of the party or organization which he seeks
to represent for at least 90 days preceding the day of
the elections and is at least 25 years of age on the
day of the election.
Seventh and Eight not only the candidate party
must represent the M and U sectors, so also
must its nominees must likewise be able to
contribute to the formulation and enactment of
appropriate legislation that will benefit the nation as
a whole.
AKLAT (Assosasyon Para sa Kaunlaran Ng Lipunan at
Adhikain Para sa Tao, Inc.) vs. Comelec, G.R. No. 162203,
14 April 2004, came up with a ruling on the Window-Dressing
of party-list participant. In this case, Comelec found that
significantly, Aklat and A.K.L.A.T. have substantially the same
incorporators. In fact 4 of Aklats 6 incorporators are also
incorporators of A.K.L.A.T.. This substantial similarity is hard to
ignore and bolsters the conclusion that the supposed re-
organization undertaken by Aklat is plain window-dressing as it
has not really changed its character as a business interest of
persons in the book publishing industry.
The Court observed that Aklats articles of
incorporation and document entitled The Facts About Aklat
which were attached to its petition for re-qualification contain
general averments that it supposedly represents marginalized
groups such as the youth, indigenous communities, urban poor
and farmers/fisherfolks. These general statements do not
measure up to the first guideline set by the Bagon Bayani case
for screening party-list participants. Sec. 5 of RA 7941 provides
that it must show through its constitution, articles of
incorporation, bylaws, history, platform of government and track
record that it represents and seeks to uplift marginalized and
underrepresented sectors. Verily, majority of its membership
should belong to the marginalized and underrepresented.
 ELECTION LAWS REVIEW
Bantay Republic Act or BA-RA 7941 vs. G.R. No. 177271,
May 4, 2007, 523 SCRA 1 - Petitioners reacting on an
emerging public perception that the individuals behind the party-
list groups do not, as they should, actually represent the poor
and marginalized sectors. Petitioners, wrote a letter to the
Comelec requesting that the complete list of the nominees of all
parties who have been accredited pursuant to Comelec
Resolution No. 7804 prescribing rules and regulations to
govern the filing of manifestation of intent to participate and
submission of names of nominees under the party-list system of
representation in connection with the May 14, 2007 elections be
published. The Comelec vehemently did not accede to the
request of the petitioners, it based its refusal to disclose the
names of the nominees of subject party-list groups on Section 7
of RA 7941 (more specifically the last sentence which states:
the names of the party-list nominees shall not be shown on the
certified list..
The Comelec believe that the party list elections must not be
personality oriented. Abalos said under RA 7941, the people
are to vote for sectoral parties, organizations, or coalitions not
for their nominees.
ISSUE: whether or not the disclosure of the names of the
nominees are covered by the Right of Public to information.
HELD: The Comelec has a constitutional duty to disclose and
release the names of the nominees of the party list groups. No
national security or like concerns is involved in the disclosure of
the names of the nominees of the party-list groups in question.
The last sentence of Section 7 is limited in scope and duration,
meaning, that it extends only to the certified list which the same
provision requires to be posted in the polling places on election
day. To stretch the coverage of the prohibition to the absolute
nothing in RA 7941 that prohibits the Comelec from disclosing
or even publishing through mediums other than the Certified
list the names of the party-list nominees. The Comelec
obviously misread the limited non-disclosure aspect of the
provision as an absolute bar to public disclosure before the May
2007 elections. The need for voters to be informed about
matters that have a bearing on their choice. The ideal cannot
be achieved in a system of blind voting, as veritably advocated
in the assailed resolution of the Comelec.
New Formula in the Allocation of Seats for Party-List
Representatives
Banat et. al. vs. Comelec G.R. 178271/12972 21 April 2009
After the VFP v. Comelec, G.R. No. 136781, 136786 and
136795, 06 October 2000, ruling of the Supreme Court and the
controversial application of the Panganiban Formula by the
Abalos Commission, Party-list participants in Banat et al., filed
separate complaints against the Comelec on the proper
allocation of seats in the party-list system. On 23 April 2009,
the Supreme Court declared the 2% threshold clause in relation
to the distribution of the additional seats of RA 7941
unconstitutional.
Following Section 5, Article VI, par. 2 of the 1987
Constitution, 20% of all seats in the HR is reserved for sectoral
representatives elected in the party list system. This formula is
now called the Carpio formula.
Under the Banat and Bayan Muna cases (G.R. No.
179271 and G.R. No. 179295, 21 April 2009), the SC laid down
the latest formula in the allocation of seats for party-list
participants:
1) The parties, organizations and coalitions shall be ranked
from the highest to the lowest based on the number of votes
they garnered during the elections.
2) The parties, organizations and coalitions receiving at least
2% of the total votes cast for the party-list system shall be
entitled to one guaranteed seat each.
3) Those garnering sufficient number of votes, according to the
ranking above-mentioned in paragraph no. 1 hereof, shall be
entitled to additional seats in proportion to their total number
of votes until all the additional seats are allocated.
4) Each party, organization, or coalition shall be entitled to not
more than 3 seats.
Banat abandoned the matter of computation held in the
Veterans Party case considering that the intention was to fill the
20% seats in the HR.
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ELIGIBILITY OF CANDIDATES
Candidate defined: The term candidate refers to any person
aspiring or seeking an elective public office, who has filed a
certificate of candidacy by himself or through an accredited
political party, aggroupment, or coalition of parties. (Sec. 79,
OEC)
The terms candidate under the Automated Election System
(AES) in 2010, refers to any person aspiring for or seeking an
elective public office who has filed his COC and who has not
dies or withdrawn or otherwise disqualified before the start of
the campaign period for which he filed his COC. Provided, that,
unlawful acts or omissions applicable to a candidate shall take
effect only upon the start of the aforesaid campaign period.
(Comelec Reso. No. 8678).
As regards a Party-List system, a candidate also refers to any
registered national, regional, or sectoral party, organization or
coalition thereof that has filed a manifestation to participate
under the part-list system which has not withdrawn or which has
not be disqualified before the start of the campaign period. (RA
7941).
Comelec Reso. No. 9615 adopted a broader definition of the
term candidate for the 13 May 2013 Elections to include party-
list in include all the above-definitions.
Qualifications
For President and Vice-President No person may be
elected President unless he is a natural-born citizen of the
Philippines, a registered voter, able to read and write, at least
40 years of age on the day of the election, and a resident of
the Philippines for at least 10 years immediately preceding such
election.
There shall be a Vice-President who shall have the
same qualifications and term of office and be elected with, and
in the same manner, as the President. He may be removed
from office in the same manner as the President (Article VII,
Section 2 and 3, Constitution)
For Senator No person shall be a Senator unless he is a
natural-born citizen of the Philippines and, on the day of
election, is at least 35 years of age, able to read and write, a
registered voter, and a resident of the Philippines for not less
than 2 years immediately preceding the elections. (Article VI,
Section 3, Constitution)
For Members of the House of Representatives No person
shall be a Member of the HR unless he is natural-born citizen of
the Philippines, and, on the day of election, is at least 25 years
of age, able to read and write, and except the party list
representatives, a registered voter in the district in which he
shall elected, and a resident thereof for a period of not less than
on year immediately preceding the election. (Article VI,
Section 6, Constitution)
For Party-List Nominees No person shall be nominated as
party-list representative unless he is a natural born-citizen of the
Philippines, a registered voter, a resident of the Philippines for a
period of not less than one (1) year immediately preceding the
day of the election, able to read to read and write, a bona fide
member of the party or organization which he seeks to
represent for at least 90 days preceding the day of the election
and is at least 25 years of age on the day of the election.
In case of a nominee of the youth sector, he must at
least be 25 but not more than 30 years of age on the day of the
election. Any youth sectoral representative who attains the age
of 30 during his term shall be allowed to continue in office until
the expiration of his term. (RA 7941).
Bengzon III v. HRET 357 SCRA 545 (2001) Repatriation
results in the recovery of the original nationality. This means
that a naturalized Filipino who lost his citizenship will be
restored to his prior status as a naturalized Filipino citizen.. On
the other hand, if he was originally a natural-born citizen before
he lost his Philippine citizenship, he will be restored to his
former status as a natural-born Filipino.
Local Government Officials An elective local official must be
a citizen of the Philippines; a registered voter in the barangay,
municipality, city or province or, in the case of a member of the
 ELECTION LAWS REVIEW
sangguniang panlalawigan, sangguniang panlungsod or
sangguniang bayan, the district where he intends to be elected;
a resident therein for at least one (1) year immediately
preceding the day of the election; able to read and write Filipino
or any other local language or dialect.
Common to All Offices - Voluntary renunciation of the office
for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption
in the continuity of the service for the full term for which they
were elected.
RA No. 9165 (Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of
2002) Section 36(g) provides that all candidates for public
office whether appointed or elected both in the national and
local government shall undergo mandatory drug tests. Comelec
issued Resolution No. 6486 on 23 December 2003
implementing 9165. Publication of the results will be published.
But the resolution does not indicate whether or not candidates
who test positive for drugs will be allowed to assume office if
they win.)
Social Justice Society v. Dangerous Drugs Board, G.R. No.
157870, 03 November 2008 Sec. 36(g) of RA 965 and
Comelec Resolution No. 6486 was challenged as the same
illegally impose an additional qualification on candidates for
senator. Senator Pimentel point out that, subject to the
provision on nuisance candidates, a candidate for senator
needs only to meet the qualification laid down in Section 3, Art.
VI of the Constitution, to wit: (1) citizenship; (2) voter
registration; (3) literacy; (4) age and (5) residency. Beyond
these stated qualification requirements, candidates for senator
need not possess any other qualification to run for senator and
be voted upon and elected as member of the Senate.
As ruled, Sec. 36(h) of RA 9165, as sought to be
implemented by Comelec assailed Resolution, effectively
enlarges the qualification requirements enumerated in Sec. 3,
Art. VI of the Constitution. As couched, said Sec. 36(g)
unmistakably requires a candidate for senator to be certified
illegal drug-clean, obviously a pre-condition to the validity of a
certificate of candidacy for senator or, with like effect, a
condition sine qua non to be voted upon and, if proper, be
proclaimed as senator-elect. Viewed in its proper context, the
implementing Comelec Resolution add another qualification
layer to what the 1987 Constitution, as the minimum, required
for membership in the Senate. Sec. 36(h) infringed the
constitutional provision defining the qualification or eligibility
requirements for one aspiring to run for and serve as senator.
Getting elected would be of little value if one cannot assume
office for non-compliance with the drug-testing requirement.
CERTIFICATE OF CANDIDACY
1. Under the Manual Elections The COC of candidacy shall
be filed on any day from the commencement of the election
period but not later than the day before the beginning of the
campaign period; Provided, that in cases of postponement or
failure of election under Section 5 and 6 of the OEC, no
additional COC shall be accepted except in cases of
substitution of candidates as provided un Section 77. (Section
75, OEC)
COC must be filed not later than the day before the
date for the beginning of the campaign period. (Sec. 7, RA
7166)
2. Under the AES Section 11 of RA 8436 provides for this
purpose, the deadline for filing of COC/petition for
registration/manifestation to participate in the election shall not
be later than 120 days before the elections.
The period has already been amended by RA 9369
which now reads For this purpose, the Commission shall
set the deadline for the filing of COC/petition of
registration/manifestation to participate in the election. Any
person who files his COC within this period shall only be
considered as a candidate at the start of the campaign period
for which he filed his COC; Provided that, unlawful acts or
omissions applicable to a candidate shall effect only upon the
start of the aforesaid campaign period. Xxxx .
Section 73, BP 881/Omnibus Elections Code (OEC) , par. (1)
Certificate of Candidacy No person shall be eligible for
any elective office unless he files a sworn certificate of
candidacy within the period fixed therein.Sinaca v. Mula 315
SCRA 266, it is the nature of a formal manifestation to the
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whole world of the candidates political creed or lack of political
creed.
Coquilla v. Comelec G.R. No. 139801, 31 May 2000 A
certificate which did not indicate the position for which the
candidate is running may be corrected. The SC ruling on the
effectiveness of the amended COC filed to correct the defect
declared that the filing of an amended COC even after the
deadline but before the election was substantial compliance
with the law which cured the defect.
Section 73 (3) BP 881 (Effect of filing multiple certificates of
candidacy)No person shall be eligible for more than one office
to be filed in the same election(requirement to run for elective
office), and if he files his certificate of candidacy for more than
one office, he shall not be eligible for any of them.
Withdrawal of Certificate of Candidacy - However, before the
expiration of the period for the filing of the certificates of
candidacy, the person who has filed more than one certificate of
candidacy may submit a written declaration under oath the
office for which he desires to be eligible and cancel the
certificate of candidacy for the other office or offices.
Pilar v. Comelec 245 SCRA 759 (1995) The withdrawal of a
certificate of candidacy does not extinguish ones liability for the
administrative fine imposed by Section 14 of R.A. No. 7166,
which requires every candidate to file a true statement of all
contributions and expenditures in connection with the elections.
Villanueva v. Comelec 122 SCRA 636 (1983) the withdrawal
of a certificate of candidacy not made under oath produces no
legal effect; for all intents and purposes, the withdrawing
candidate remains a candidate.
Go v. Comelec 357 SCRA 739 (2001) Where affidavit of
withdrawal filed. There is nothing that mandates that the
affidavit of withdrawal must be filed with the same office where
the certificate of candidacy to be withdrawn was filed. Thus, it
can be filed directly with the main office of the Comelec, the
office of the regional election supervisor concerned, the office of
the provincial election supervisor of the province to which the
municipality involved belongs, or the office of the municipal
election officer of the said municipality.
EFFECTS: FILING OF CERTIFICATE OF CANDIDACY
In Talaga v. Comelec/Alcala 683 SCRA 197 (2012) The High
Court provided for the rationale for the filing of CoC within a
prescribed period The evident purposes of the requirement
for the filing of CoCs and in fixing the time limit for filing them
are, namely; (a) to enable the voters to know, at least 60 days
prior to the regular election, the candidates from among whom
they are to make the choice; and (b) to avoid confusion and
inconvenience in the tabulation of the votes cast. If the law
does not confine to the duly-registered candidates the choice of
the voters, there may be as many persons voted for as there
are voters, and votes may be cast even for unknown or
factitious persons as a mark to identify the votes in favor of a
candidate for another office in the same election.
Sec. 66 BP 881/OEC.An appointive official is considered
resigned upon the filing of his/her certificate of candidacy. The
forfeiture is automatic and the operative act is the moment of
filing which shall render the appointive official resigned
(Nicolasora v. CSC 1990 case and PNOC v. NLRC, May 31,
1993), where the provision of Sec. 66 is applicable also to
GOCC and can constitute as a just cause for termination of
employment in addition to those set forth in the Labor Code.
Section 66 has already been repealed by RA 9369 to
wit Section 13. Section 11 of RA 8436 is hereby amended to
read as follows: Any person holding a public office or position,
including active members of the AFP, and officers and
employees in GOCC, shall be considered ipso facto
resigned from his/her office and must vacate the same at
the start of the day of the filing of his/her certificate of
candidacy.
Sec. 67 OEC An elective official running for a position other
than the one he is holding in a permanent capacity, except for
President and Vice-President, is deemed resigned upon the
filing of his certificate of candidacy. Section 67 has been
 ELECTION LAWS REVIEW
repealed by Section 14 of RA 9006 (The Fair Elections Law),
a candidate holding an elective position whether national or
local running for office other than the one he is holding in a
permanent capaci is considered resigned only upon the
expiration of his term..
Sinaca v. Mula 315 SCRA 266 (1999) The provision of the
election law regarding certificates of candidacy, such as signing
and swearing on the same, as well as the information required
to be stated therein, are considered mandatory prior to the
elections. Thereafter, they are regarded as merely directory.
Quinto v. Comelec G.R. No. 189698, 22 February 2010 the
Court ruled that substantial distinctions exists between elective
official and appointive officials. The former occupy their office
by virtue of the mandate of the electorate. They are elected to
an office for a definite term and may be removed therefrom only
upon stringent conditions. On the other hand, appointive
officials hold their office by virtue of their designation thereto by
an appointing authority. Some appointive officials hold their
tenure while other serve at the pleasure of the appointing
authority.
SUBSTITUTION OF CANDIDACY
Section 77 BP 881. Candidates in case of death,
disqualification or withdrawal of another.After the last day for
the filing of certificates of candidacy, an official candidate of a
registered or accredited political party dies, withdraws or is
disqualified for any cause, only a person belonging to, and
certified by, the same political party may file a certificate of
candidacy to replace the candidate who died, withdrew or
was disqualified. The substitute candidate nominated by the
political party concerned may file his certificate of candidacy
for the office affected in accordance with the preceding sections
not later than mid-day of the date of the election. If the
death, withdrawal or disqualification should occur between the
day before the election and mid-day of election day, said
certificate may be filed with the board of election inspectors in
the political subdivisions where he is a candidate or, in the case
of candidates to be voted for by the entire electorate of the
country, with the Commission.
A valid certificate of candidacy is an indispensable
requisite in case of substitution of a disqualified candidate
under Sec. 77. Under said provision, the candidate who dies,
withdraws or is disqualified must be an official candidate of a
registered or accredited political party and the substitute
candidate must be of the same political party as the original
candidate and must be duly nominated as such by the political
party.
Rulloda vs. Comelec G.R. No. 154198 January 20, 2003
The absence of a specific provision governing substitution of
candidates in barangay elections cannot be inferred as a
prohibition against said substitution. Such a restrictive
construction cannot be read into the law where the same is not
written. Indeed, there is more reason to allow substitution of
candidates where no political parties are involved than when
political considerations or party affiliations reign, a fact that must
have been subsumed by law.
Miranda v. Abaya, G.R. No. 136351 July 28, 1999
Substitution is not allowed if certificate of the candidate to be
substituted was cancelled, because he was running for the 4 th
consecutive term. A person without a valid COC cannot be
considered a candidate in much the same way as any person
who has not filed any COC at all cannot, by any stretch of the
imagination, be a candidate at all.
Talaga v. Comelec & Castillo and Castillo v. Comelec &
Talaga, 683 SCRA 197 (2012)In this case, Ramon was
disqualified having been found to be ineligible for the position of
Mayor of Lucena City which disqualification became final prior
to the May 10, 2010 elections. Barbara Ruby filed her CoC in
substitution of Ramon. Castillo was the opponent who filed a
disqualification case against Barbara Ruby on the ground that
the substitution was not valid in view of the ineligibility of
Ramon, Ramon did not voluntarily withdraw his CoC before the
elections in accordance with Section 73 and that she was not
an additional candidate for the position of Mayor because her
filing of her CoC was beyong the period fixed by law. Comelec
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declared the substitution of Barbara Ruby as invalid on May 20,
2011
Barbary Ruby garnered the highest number of votes
while Castillo garnered second. Castillo contends that since the
disqualification of Ramon was final prior to the election he
should be declared winner. Castillo made reference to case of
Cayat. In this case, Rev. Fr. Nardo B. Cayat, the petitioner in
Cayat, was disqualified and his disqualification became final
before the May 10, 20014 elections. Considering that no
substitution of Cayat was made, Thomas R. Pelileng, Sr. his
rival remained the only candidate for the mayoralty post in
Buguias, Benguet.(Cayat v. Comelec 522 SCRA 23 (2007)).
In contrast, after Barbara Ruby substituted Ramon, the
May 10, 2010 elections proceeded with her being regarded by
the electorate of Lucena City as a bona fide candidate. To the
electorate, she became a contender for the same position vied
for by Castillo, such that she stood on the same footing as
Castillo. Such standing as a candidate negated Castillos claim
of being the candidate who obtained the highest number of
votes, and being consequently entitled to assume the office of
Mayor.The Court stressed that the existence of a valid CoC
is a condition sine qua non for a valid substitution.
Effect of Substitution of Candidates after Official Ballots
Have Been Printed in AES- in case of valid substitution after
the official ballots have been printed, the votes cast for the
substituted candidates shall be considered votes for the
substitutes. (Sec. 12 RA 8436, 22 December 1997)
Under Section 12 of RA 9006, 12 February 2001 it
provides in case of valid substitutions after the official ballot
have been printed, the votes cast for the substituted candidates
shall be considered as stray votes but shall not invalidate the
whole ballot. For this purpose, the official ballot shall provide
spaces where the voters may write the name of the substitute
candidates if they are voting for the latter; Provided, however,
that if the substitute candidate has the same family name, this
provision shall not apply.
Since Section 12 of RA 8436 has not been amended
nor repealed by RA 9369, it can be assumed that the votes cast
for the substituted candidates shall be considered votes for the
substitutes in an AES for the reason that the counting machine
will not read any unwarranted marks on the official ballot such
as writing the name of the substitute candidate.
RESIDENCY REQUIREMENT
Svetlana P. Jalosjos vs. Comelec/Tupag/Estrellada 699
SCRA 507 (2013) The SC stressed that to be an actual and
physical resident of a locality, one must have a dwelling place
where one resides no matter how modest and regardless of
ownership. The fact that the residential structure where
petitioner intends to reside was still under construction on the
lot she purchased means that she has not yet established
actual and physical residence in the barangay, contrary to the
declaration of her witnesses that she has been an actual and
physical resident of Brgy. Tugas since 2008.
Meynard Sabili v. Comelec/Florencio Librea 670 SCRA 664
(2012).It is not required that a candidate should have his own
house in order to establish his residence or domicile in a place.
It is enough that he should live in the locality even in a rented
house or that of a friend or relative. What is of central concern
then is that the person identified and established a place in the
said City where he intended to live in and return to for an
indefinite period of time.
Jalosjos v. Comelec 683 SCRA 1 24 April 2012 Jalosjos
came to the Philippines in November 2008 to live with his
brother in Zamboanga Sibugay. It is evident that Jalosjos did so
with intent to change his domicile for good. He left Australia,
give up his Australian citizenship, and renounced his allegiance
to that country. In addition, he reacquired his old itizenship by
taking an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines,
resulting in his being issued a Certificate of Reacquisition of
Philippine Citizenship by the BID. By his acts, Jalosjos forfeited
his legal right to live in Australia, clearly proving that he gave up
his domicile there. And he has since lived nowhere else except
in Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay.
 ELECTION LAWS REVIEW
Mitra vs. Commission on Elections, Antonio Gonzales and
Orlando Balbon, Jr. 622 SCRA 744 (July 2010). In
considering the residency issue, the dwelling where a person
permanently intends to return to and to remain his or her
capacity or inclination to decorate the place, or the lack of it, IS
IMMATERIAL. Comelec gravely abused its discretion when it
determined the fitness of a dwellingas a persons residence
based solely on very personal and subjective assessment
standards when the law is replete with standards that can
be used. Comelec used wrong considerations in arriving at the
conclusion that Mitras residence is not the residence
contemplated by law.
Asistio v. Trindad Pe-Aguirre, G.R. No. 191124, 27 April
2010the High Court said Domicile is not easily lost. To
successfully effect a transfer thereof, one must demonstrate: (1)
an actual removal or change of domicile; (2) a bona fide
intention of abandoning the former place of residence and
establishing a new one; and (3) acts which corresponding with
that purpose. There must be animus manendi coupled with
animus non revetendi. This purpose to remain in or at the
domicile of choice must for for an indefinite period of time; the
change of residence must be voluntary; and the residence at
the place chosen for the new domicile must be actual.
Limbona v. Comelec, G.r. No. 181970, June 25, 2008 There
is no hard and fast rule to determine a candidates compliance
with residency requirement since the question of residence is a
question of intention.
Coquilla vs. Comelec 385 SCRA 607 A former Filipino
citizen cannot be considered a resident of the Philippines and
in the locality he intends to be elected prior to his reacquisition
of Philippine citizenship.
The term residence is to be understood NOT in its
common acceptation as referring to dwelling or habitation,
but rather to domicile or legal residence, that is, the place
where the party actually or constructively has his permanent
home, where he, no matter where he may be found at any given
time, eventually intends to return and remain (animus
manendi). A domicile of origin is acquired by every person at
birth. It is usually the place where the childs parents reside and
continues until the same is abandoned by acquisition of a new
domicile (by choice.)
Romualdez-Marcos v. Comelec 248 SCRA 30 (1995). it is the
fact of residence, not a statement in the certificate of candidacy
which ought to be decisive in determining whether or not an
individual has satisfied the constitutions residency qualification
requirement. The said statement becomes material only when
there is or appears to be a deliberate attempt to mislead,
misinform or hide a fact which would otherwise render the
candidate ineligible.
Perez v. Comelec 317 SCRA 640, the qualifications of Rodolfo
Aguinaldo former governor of Cagayan was at issue when he
filed his certificate of candidacy as member of the HR for the 3 rd
district of Cagayan in the 11 May 1998 elections. The Court
reiterated the meaning of residence as the place where the
party actually or constructively has his permanent home where
he, no matter where he may be found at any given time,
eventually intends to return and remain, while domicile, is that
to which the Constitution refers when it speaks of residence for
the purpose of election law. And, the fact that a person is a RV
in one district is not proof that he is not domiciled in another
district.
Torayno Sr., vs. Comelec 337 SCRA 574, the issue in this
case is the residence qualification of Vicente Emano who filed
his certificate of candidacy for Mayor of Cagayan de Oro.Court
explained that the purpose of the residence as required by
Constitution and the law as a qualification for seeking and
holding public office, is to give candidates the opportunity to be
familiar with the needs, difficulties and aspiration, potentials for
growth and all matters vital to the welfare of their
constituencies. On the part of the electorate, to evaluate the
candidates qualification s and fitness for the job they aspire for.
In this case Emano, cannot be deemed to be a stranger or
newcomer when he ran for and was overwhelmingly voted as
city mayor having garnered a margin of 30K votes.
Papandayan, Jr. vs. Comelec 381 SCRA 133. Domicile
connotes a fixed permanent residence to which when absent for
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business or pleasure, or for like reasons, one intends to return.
The requirements in order to acquire a new domicile by choice
are: (a) an intention to remain there; (b) residence or bodily
presence in the new locality; and (c) an intention to abandon the
old domicile.
ACTIONS TO CHALLENGE CANDIDACY OF A CANDIDATE
OR DISQUALIFY CANDIDATE
1) Sec. 12 of the 0EC
any person who has been declared by competent
authority insane or incompetent (when we say
incompetence, the same may refer not only to
mental illness, disease or physical disability but
also to other causes which may include minority or
lack of residence requirement)
any person who has been sentenced by final
judgment for subversion, insurrection, rebellion
for any offense for which carries a penalty of more
than 18 months
for a crime involving moral turpitude
The disqualification is removed by
plenary pardon or granted amnesty
upon declaration by a competent authority
that said insanity or incompetence had been
removed
expiration of a period of 5 years from his
service of sentence unless of course within
the same period he again becomes
disqualified.
2) Sec. 68 of the OEC
those guilty of giving money or material consideration
to influence, induce or corrupt voters or public official
performing electoral functions;
those who have committed terrorism to enhance his
candidacy
those who have spend in the election campaign more
than that required by law (Php10/RV/Php5.00)
NOTE: Section 68 deals with a petition to disqualify a
candidate for other violations of the election code as specified in
said section, and against a candidate who is a permanent
resident or immigrant of a foreign country. That section does
not specify a period within which to file the petition.
In Codilla vs. De Venecia 393 SCRA 634, it was held that the
power of Comelec to disqualify candidates is limited to the
enumerations mentioned in Section 68 of the OEC. Elements
to be proved are as follows:
the candidate, personally or through his instructions,
must have given money or other material consideration
and
the act of giving material consideration or money
should be for the purpose of influencing, inducing or
corrupting the voters or public officials performing
electoral functions.
3) Sec. 69 Petition to Abate a Nuisance Candidate the
Comelec, may motu propio or upon verified petition of an
interested party, refuse to give due course to or cancel a
certificate of candidacy if it is shown that it is filed in
contemplation of a nuisance candidate or cancel the same if
already filed. This is an exception to the ministerial duty of
the Comelec and its officers to receive a certificate of
candidacy under Section 76 of the OEC.
WHO IS A NUISANCE CANDIDATE
one who files his certificate to put the election process
in mockery or disrepute
contemplates the likelihood of confusion which the
similarity of surnames of two (2) candidates may
generate. (in the appreciation of ballots, when two
candidates with the same name or surname and only
the name or surname is written, will be considered
stray vote and will not be counted for either of the
candidate unless one of the candidate with the same
name or surname is an incumbent equity of the
incumbent rule)
 ELECTION LAWS REVIEW
by other circumstances or acts which clearly
demonstrate that the candidate has no bonafide
intention to run for office, thus would prevent the
faithful determination of the true will of the people.
(Bautista vs. Comelec 298 SCRA 480)
Who can file a petition to declare a candidate a nuisance
candidate shall be filed by any registered candidate for the
same officewithin 5 days from the last day of the filing of
the certificate of candidacy. (As amended by Section 5 of RA
6646
Rev. Elly Chavez Pumatong v. Comelec, G.R. No. 161872 13
April 2004 The rationale behind the prohibition against
nuisance candidates and the disqualification of candidates who
have not evinced a bona fide intention to run for office is easy to
divine. The State has a compelling interest to ensure that its
electoral exercises are rational;, objective and orderly. Towards
this end, the State takes into account the practical
considerations in conducting elections. Inevitably, the greater
the number of candidates, the greater the opportunities for
logistical confusion, not to mention the increased allocation of
time and resources in preparation for the election. These
practical difficulties should, of course, never attempt the State
from the conduct of a mandated electoral exercise. At the same
time, remedial actions should be available to alleviate these
logistical hardships, whenever necessary and proper.
Ultimately, a disorderly election is not merely a textbook
example of inefficiency, but a rot that erodes faith in our
democratic institutions.
Martinez III vs. HRET 610 SCRA 53 (January 2010)
Proceedings in cases of nuisance candidates require prompt
disposition. The declaration of a duly registered candidate as
nuisance candidate results in the cancellation of his COC.
Dela Cruz v. Comelec G.R. No. 192221, 13 November 2012 -
(Should the votes cast for such nuisance candidate be
considered stray or counted in favor of the bona fide
candidate?) In an automated election, the Supreme Court,
likewise ruled not to consider the votes cast for a nuisance
candidate as stray but to count them in favor of the bona fide
candidate.
As far as Comelec is concerned, the confusion
caused by similarity of surnames of candidates for the same
position and putting the electoral process in mockery or
disrepute, had already been rectified by the new voting system
where the voter simply shades the oval corresponding to the
name of their chosen candidate. However, as shown in this
case, Comelec issued Resolution No. 8844 on May 1, 2010, 9
days before the elections, with sufficient time to delete the
names of disqualified candidates not just from the Certified List
of Candidates, but also from the Official Ballot. Indeed, what
use will it serve if Comelec orders the names of disqualified
candidates to be deleted from list of official candidates if the
official ballots still carry their name?
The Court holds that the rule in Resolution No. 4116
considering the votes cast for a nuisance candidate declared as
such in a final judgment, particularly where such nuisance
candidate has the same surname as that of the legitimate
candidate, not stray but counted in favor of the latter, remains a
good law. As earlier discuss, a petition to cancel or deny a CoC
under Section 69 of the OEC should be distinguished from a
petition to disqualify under Section 68. Hence, the legal effect
of such cancellation of a CoC of a nuisance candidate cannot
be equated with a candidate disqualified on grounds provided in
the OEC and the Local Government Code.
The possibility of confusion in names of candidates if
the names of nuisance candidates remained in the ballot on
election day, cannot be discounted or eliminated, even under
the automated voting system especially considering that voters
who mistakenly shaded the oval beside the name of the
nuisance candidate instead of the bonafide candidate they
intended to vote for could no longer ask for replacement ballots
to correct the same.
4) Sec. 78 OEC Petition to Deny due Course or to Cancel
a Certificate of Candidacy. A verified petition seeking to
deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy may be
filed by the person exclusively on the ground that any
material representation contained therein as required under
Section 74 (contents of the COC) of the OEC is false. The
petition may be filed at any time not later than 25 days from the
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time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy and shall be
decided, after due notice and hearing, not later than 15 days
before election.
Who may file by any person through a verified petition
On What Grounds the candidate made material
misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy. Section 78
deals exclusively with a petition to deny due course to a
COC on the ground that a material representation in the
contents of the certificate under Sec. 74, is false. (pertains to a
candidates eligibility or qualification such as citizenship,
residence or status as a registered voter Maruhom vs.
Comelec 594 SCRA 108)
Period to File Within 25 days from the last day for the filing of
the certificate of candidacy.
Jurisdiction Comelec sitting in a division.
Sergio G. Amora, Jr. vs. Comelec and Arnielo S. Olandria
640 SCRA 473 (2011) - To emphasize, a petition for
disqualification on the one hand, can be premised on Section
12 and 68 of the OEC, or Section 40 of the LGC. On the other
hand, a petition to deny due course to or cancel a CoC can only
be grounded on a statement of a material representation in the
said certificate that is false. The petitions also have different
effects. While a person who is disqualified under Section 68 is
merely prohibited to continue as a candidate, the person whose
certificate is cancelled or denied due course under Section 78 is
not treated as a candidate at all, as if he/she never filed a CoC.
Thus in Miranda v. Abaya, this Court made the distinction that a
candidate who is disqualified under Section 68 can validly be
substituted under Section 77, but a person whose CoC has
been denied due course or cancelled under Section 78 cannot
be substituted because he/she is never considered a
candidate. (also ruled in Fermin v. Comelec 574 SCRA 782)
Mayor Barbara Ruby Talaga vs. Comele/Alcala 683 SCRA
197 (2012) The High Court reiterated, that a Section 78
petition should not be interchanged or confused with a Section
68 petition. The remedies under the two sections are different
eventualities. A person who is disqualified under Sectin 68 is
prohibited to continue as a candidate, but a person whose CoC
is cancelled or denied due course under Section 78 is not
considered as a candidate at all because his status is that of a
person who has not filed a CoC. Miranda v. Abaya 311 SCRA
617 (1999), has clarified that candidate who is disqualified
under Section 68 can be validly substituted pursuant to Section
77 because he remains a candidate until disqualified; but a
person whose CoC has been denied due course or cancelled
under Section 78cannot be substituted because he is not
considered a candidate.
Munder vs. Comelec 659 SCRA 254 (2011) - Jurisprudence
has clearly established the doctrine that a petition for
disqualification and a petition to deny due course to or to cancel
a certificate of candidacy, are two distinct remedies to prevent a
candidate from entering an electoral race. Both remedies
prescribe distinct period to file the corresponding petition, on
which the jurisdiction of the Commission on Elections over the
case is dependent.
Fernando V. Gonzalez vs. Comelec, et. al. 644 SCRA 761
(2011) - In order to justify the cancellation of CoC, it is
essential that the false representation mentioned therein pertain
to a material matter for the sanction imposed by Section 78
would affect the substantive rights of the candidate the right to
run for the elective post for which he filed the CoC. Material
representation refers to qualifications for elective office
(interpreted to refer to statements regarding age, residence and
citizenship or non-possession of natural-born Filipino status);
Aside from the requirement of materiality, the false
representation must consist of a deliberate attempt to mislead,
misinform or hide a fact which would otherwise render a
candidate ineligible; it must be made with the intention to
deceive the electorate as to ones qualification for public office.
(also ruled in Salcedo II v. Comelec 312 SCRA 447 (1999))
Two remedies available for questioning the
qualifications of the candidate: Distinction between the two
proceedings under Section 78 and Section 253 under B.P.
881, thereof (1) Before elections under Section 78 and (2)
After elections under Section 253. The only difference
between the two proceedings is that, under Section 78, the
 ELECTION LAWS REVIEW
qualifications for elective office are misrepresented in the
certificate of candidacy and the proceedings must be initiated
before the elections, whereas a petition for QW under Section
253 may be brought on the basis of two grounds (1)
ineligibility or (2) disloyalty to the Republic of the Philippines,
and must be initiated within 10 days after proclamation of the
election results. Under Section 253, a candidate is ineligible if
he is disqualified to be elected to office, and he is disqualified if
he lacks any of the qualification for election office.
Clearly, the ONLY INSTANCE where a petition
questioning the qualifications of a candidate for elective office
can be filed before election is when the petition is filed under
Section 78 of the OEC.
Period for filing a petition under Section 78 In Loong
v. Comelec 216 SCRA 760 (1992), the Court categorically
declared that the period for filing a petition for cancellation of
candidacy based on false representation is covered by Rule 23
and NOT Rule 25 allowing the filing of a petition at any time
after the last day for filing of CoCs but not later than the date of
proclamation, is merely a procedural rule that cannot supercede
Section 78 of the OEC.
A petition filed under Section 78 must not be
interchanged or confused with one filed under Section 68 In
Fermin v. Comelec 574 SCRA 782 (2008), the Court stressed
that a petition which is properly a Section 78 petition must
therefore be filed within the period prescribed therein, and a
procedural rules subsequently issue by Comelec cannot
supplant this statutory period under Section 78.
Jurisdiction Once a winning candidate has been proclaimed,
taken his oath and assumed office as a member of the House of
Representatives, the jurisdiction of the Comelec over election
contests relating to his election, returns and qualifications
ENDS and the HRET own jurisdiction BEGINS.
In Perez v. Comelec 317 SCRA 641 (1999) the Court does not
have jurisdiction to pass upon the eligibility of the private
respondent who was already a Member of the HR at the time of
the filing of the petition for certiorari considering that by
statutory provision (Article VI, Section 17 of the 1987
Constitution, the HRET is the sole judge of all contests relating
to the election, returns and qualifications of the members of the
HR.
Procedure in filing Motion to Suspend Proclamation: The
suspension of proclamation of a winning candidate is not a
matter which theComelec Second Division can dispose of
motu propio. Section 6 of RA No. 6646 requires that the
suspension must be upon motion by the complainant or any
intervenor.
Second Placer Rule- It is well-settled that the ineligibility of a
candidate receiving majority votes does not entitle the eligible
candidate receiving the next highest number of votes to be
declared elected.
Exceptions to the Second Placer Rule The exception to the
second placer rule is predicated on the concurrence of the
following (1) the one who obtained the highest number of votes
is disqualified; and (2) the electorate is FULLY AWARE in fact
and in law of a candidates disqualification so as to bring such
awareness within the realm of notoriety but would nonetheless
case their votes in favor of the ineligible candidate. These facts
warranting the exception to the rules are not present in the case
at bar.
Ashary M. Alauya (Clerk of Court, Sharia District Court,
Marawi City vs. Judge Casan Ali L. Limbona 646 SCRA 1
(2011) - Partisan political activity The filing of a certificate of
candidacy is a partisan political activity as the candidate thereby
offers himself to the electorate for an elective post. No officer
or employee in the civil service shall engage directly or
indirectly, in any electioneering or partisan political campaign.
The act of the Judge in filing a certificate of candidacy as a
party-list representative in the May 1998 elections without giving
up his judicial post violated not only the law, but also the
constitutional mandate.
Teodora Sobejana-Condon v. Comelec/Luis
Bautista/Robelito Picar/Wilma Pagaduan 678 SCRA 267
(2012) - Remedy of a person who fails to file the petition to
disqualify a certain candidate within the twenty-five (25)-day
period prescribed by Section 78 of the OEC is to file a petition
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for QW within 10 days from proclamation of the results of the
election as provided under Section 253 of the OEC.
Renunciation of foreign citizenship to be valid under Section
5(2) of RA 9225 The language of Section 5(2) of RA 9225 is
free from any ambiguity. In Lopez v. Comelec 559 SCRA 696
(2008), the Court declared it s categorical and single meaning:
a Filipino American or any dual citizen cannot run fo any
elective public position in the Philippines unless he or she
personally swears to a renunciation of all foreign citizenship at
the time of filing the CoC. The Court also expounded on the
form of the renunciation and held that to be valid, the
renunciation must be contained in an affidavit duly executed
before an officer of the law who is authorized to administer an
oath stating in clear and unequivocal terms that affiant is
renouncing foreign citizenship.
Casan Macode Maquiling v. Comelec et. al. 700 SCRA 367
(2013) the declared policy of RA 9225 is that all Philippine
citizens who become citizens of another country shall be
deemed not to have lost their Philippine citizenship under the
conditions of this Act. This policy pertains to the reacquisition
of Philippine citizenship. Section 5(2) requires those who have
re-acquired Philippine citizenship and who seek elective public
office, to renounce any and all foreign citizenship. This
requirement of renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship,
when read together with Section 40(d) of the Local Government
Code which disqualifies those with dual citizenship from running
for any elective local position, indicates a policy that anyone
who seeks to run for public office must be solely and exclusively
a Filipino citizen. To allow a former Filipino who reacquires
Philippine citizenship to continue using a foreign passport
which indicates the recognition of a foreign state of the
individual as its national even after the Filipino has renounced
his foreign citizenship, is to allow a complete disregard of this
policy.
Panlaqui v. Comelec 613 SCRA 573 Voters
inclusion/exclusion proceedings essentially involve the issue of
whether a petition shall be included in or excluded from the list
of voters based on the qualifications required by law and the
facts presented to show possession of these qualifications. On
the other hand, the COC denial/cancellation proceedings
involve the issue of whether there is a false representation of a
material fact. The false representation must necessarily pertain
not to a mere innocuous mistake but to a material fact or those
that refer to a candidates qualification for elective office.
NOTE: In Fermin v. Comelec G.R. No. 179695 and G.R. No.
182369, December 18, 2008, the SC clarified that Section 5
(Procedure in cases of Nuisance candidates) and Section 7
(Petition to Deny Due Course To or Cancel a Certificate of
Candidacy under RA 6646, did not in any way amend the
period for filing Section 78 petitions. While Section 7 of the
said law makes reference to Section 5 on the procedure in the
conduct of cases for the denial of due course to the COCs of
nuisance candidates (then chief Justice Davide in his dissenting
opinion in Aquino v. Comelec, G.R. No. 120265, September
18, 1995 248 SCRA 400, explains that the procedure
hereinabove provided mentioned in Section 7 cannot be
construed to refer to Section 6 which does not provide for a
procedure but to the effects of disqualification cases, (but) can
only refer to the procedure provided in Section 5 of the said Act
on nuisance candidates, the same cannot be taken to
mean that the25-day period for filing Section 78 petitions is
changed to 5 days counted from the last day for the filing
of COCs.
The clear language of Section 78 cannot be amended
or modified b y a mere reference in a subsequent statute to the
use of a procedure specifically intended for another type of
action. Cardinal is the rule in statutory construction that repeals
by implication are disfavored and will not be so declared by the
Court unless the intent of the legislators is manifest.
Noteworthy in Loong v. Comelec 216 SCRA 760 (1992),which
upheld the 25-day period for filing Section 78 petitions, was
decided long after the enactment of RA 6646. Hence, Section
23, Section 2 of the Comelec Rules of Procedure is contrary
to the unequivocal mandate of the law. Following the ruling in
Fermin, the Court declared that as the law stands, the petition
to deny due course to or cancel a COC may be filed at
anytime not later than 25-days from the time of the filing of
the COC.
 ELECTION LAWS REVIEW
In Justimbaste v. Comelec 572 SCRA 736 (2008) Material
misrepresentation as a ground to deny due course or cancel a
certificate of candidacy refers to the falsity of a statement
required to be entered therein as enumerated in Section 74 of
the OEC. Concurrent with materiality is a deliberate intention to
deceive the electorate as to one qualification making reference
to Salcedo II that in order to justify the cancellation of the COC
under Section 78, it is essential that the false representation
mentioned therein pertained to a material matter for the
sanction imposed by this provision would affect the substantive
rights of a candidate the right to run for the elective post for
which he filed the COC. There is also no showing that there
was an intent to deceive the electorate as to the identity of the
private respondent, nor that by using his Filipino name the
voting public was thereby deceived.
DISQUALIFICATION UNDER THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT
CODE R.A. 7160
A candidate for an elective office may likewise be
disqualified on the following grounds
those sentenced by final judgment for an offense
involving moral turpitude or for an offense
punishable by one (1) year or more imprisonment,
within 2 years after serving sentence. (Sec. 40)
(Qualifications of local elective candidates under
the LGC was asked
in the 1999 Bar)
NOTE:The 1st ground for disqualification consists of two (2)
parts, namely: (1) those sentenced by final judgment for an
offense involving moral turpitude, regardless of the period of
imprisonment; and (2) those sentenced by final judgment for an
offense, OTHER THAN one involving moral turpitude,
punishable by one (1) year or more imprisonment, within 2
years after serving sentence.
Sec. 40 of RA 7160 limits the disqualification to two (2) years
after service of sentence. This should now be read in relation to
Sec. 11 of RA 8189 which enumerates those who are
disqualified to register as a voter. The 2 year disqualification
period under Sec. 40 is now deemed amended to last 5 years
from service of sentence after which period the voter will be
eligible to register as a voter and to run for an elective public
office.
Those convicted by final judgment for violating the
oath of allegiance to the Republic
Fugitives from justice in criminal and non-political
cases.
In Marquez, jr. vs. Comelec and Rodriguez 259 SCRA, it was
held that fugitives from justice refer to a person who has been
convicted by final judgment. The SC ruled that when a person
leaves the territory of a state not his own, homeward bound and
subsequently learns of the charges filed against him while he is
in his own country, does not outrightly qualify him as a fugitive
from justice if he does not subject himself to the jurisdiction of
the former state. When Rodriguez left the US, there was yet no
complaint filed and warrant of arrest, hence there is no basis in
saying that he is running away from any prosecution or
punishment.
Those removed from office as a result of an
administrative charge
In Rodolfo Aguinaldo vs. Comelec, it was held that a public
elective official cannot be removed for administrative conduct
committed during a prior term as his re-election to office
operates as a condonation of the officers previous misconduct
to the extent of cutting of the right to remove him therefore.
Grego v. Comelec 274 SCRA 481, the Court ruled that Sec. 40
of RA 7160 does not have any retroactive effect. In this case a
Deputy Sheriff was removed for serious misconduct in 1981.
He run in 1992 & 1995. His removal in 1981 cannot serve as
basis for his disqualification. Laws have prospective effect.
Those with dual citizenship. The relevant cases under this
provision are the cases of
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Mercado v. Manzano & Comelec G.R.
No. 135083 May 25, 1999
Aznar v. Comelec 185 SCRA 703
Cirilo Valles v. Comelec & Lopez G.R.
#138000 August 9, 2000
In Aznar, it was ruled that the mere fact that respondent
Osmea was holder of a certificate stating that he is an
American citizen did not mean that he is no longer a Filipino &
that an application for an ACR was not tantamount to
renunciation of his Philippine Citizenship.
Mercado v. Manzano & Comelec, it was held that the fact that
respondent Manzano was registered as an American citizen in
the BID & was holding an American passport on April 22, 1997,
only a year before he filed a certificate of candidacy for Vice-
Mayor of Makati, were just assertions of his nationality before
the termination of his American citizenship.
Valles v. Lopez, the Court held that the mere fact that Lopez
was a holder of an Australian passport and had an ACR are not
act constituting an effective renunciation of citizenship and do
not militate against her claim of Filipino citizenship. For
renunciation to effectively result in the lost of citizenship, the
same must be express (Com. Act 63, Sec. 1). Referring to the
case of Aznar, an ACR does not amount to an express
renunciation or repudiation of ones citizenship. Similarly, her
holding of an Australian passport as in the Manzano case, were
likewise mere acts of assertions before she effectively
renounced the same. Thus, at the most, Lopez had dual
citizenship she was an Australian and a Filipino, as well.
In reconciling the disqualification under Sec. 40 of RA 7160.
The Court clarified and as ruled in the Manzano case dual
citizenship as used in the LGC and reconciled with Article IV
Section 5 of the 1987 Constitution on dual allegiance (Dual
allegiance of citizens is inimical to the national interest and
shall be dealt with by law.) In recognizing situation in which a
Filipino citizen may, without performing any act, as an
involuntary consequence of the conflicting laws of different
countries, be also a citizen of another state (jus sanguinis for
the Philippines where the child follows the nationality or
citizenship of the parents regardless of his/her place of birth as
opposed to jus soli which determines nationality or citizenship
on the basis of place of birth), the Court explained that dual
citizenship as a disqualification must refer to citizens with dual
allegiance.
The fact that Lopez had dual citizenship did not automatically
disqualify her from running for public office. For candidates with
dual citizenship, it is enough that they elect Phil. Citizenship
upon the filing of their certificate of candidacy, to terminate their
status as persons with dual citizenship. The filing of the
certificate of candidacy sufficed to renounce foreign citizenship
effectively removing any disqualification as a dual citizen.
In the Certificate of Candidacy, one declare that he/she is a
Filipino citizen and that he/she will support and defend the
Constitution of the Philippines and will maintain true faith and
allegiance thereto. Such declaration, which is under oath,
operates as an effective renunciation of foreign citizenship.
Lopez v. Comelec 559 SCRA 696 (2008)The ruling in Valles
in 2000 has been superseded by the enactment of RA 9225
in 2003. RA 9225 expressly provides for the condition before
those who re-acquired Filipino citizenship may run for a public
office in the Philippines. Section 5 of the said law states: Civil
and Political Rights and Liabilities. Those who retain or re-
acquire Philippine Citizenship under this Act shall enjoy full civil
and political rights and be subject to all attendant liabilities and
responsibilities under existing laws of the Philippines and the
following conditions xxx (2) Those seeking elective public office
in the Philippines shall meet the qualifications for holding such
public office as required by the Constitution and existing laws
and, at the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy, make
a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign
citizenship before any public officer authorized to administer an
oath.
AASJS Member-hector G. Calilung vs. Secretary of Justice
G.R. No. 160869, may 11, 2007, the SC took the opportunity to
set parameters of what constitutes dual allegiance considering
 ELECTION LAWS REVIEW
that it only made a distinction between dual allegiance and dual
citizenship in Mercado vs. Manzano.
FACTS: Following the implementation of RA 9225 An Act
Making the Citizenship of Philippine Citizens Who Acquire
foreign Citizenship Permanent, amending for the purpose CA
63, as amended, petitioner filed a petition against respondent
DOJ Secretary Simeon Datumanong who was tasked to
implement laws governing citizenship. He prayed for a writ of
prohibition to stop respondent from implementing RA 9225. he
avers that RA 9225 is unconstitutional as it violates Section 5,
Article IV of the 1987 Constitution that states Dual
allegiance of citizens is inimical to the national interest and
shall be dealt with by law. He contends that the Act
cheapens the Philippine citizenship since the Act allows all
Filipinos, either natural-born or naturalized, who become foreign
citizens, to retain their Philippine citizenship without losing their
foreign citizenship. Section 3 permits dual allegiance because
said law allows natural-born citizens to regain their Philippine by
simply taking an oath of allegiance without forfeiting their
foreign allegiance. The Constitution however, is categorical that
dual allegiance is inimical to the national interest.
HELD: The intent of the legislature in drafting RA 9225 is to do
away with the provision in CA 63, which takes away Philippine
citizenship from natural-born Filipinos who become naturalized
citizens of other countries. RA 9225 allows dual citizenship to
natural-born Filipino citizens who have lost Philippine
citizenship by reason of their naturalization as citizens of a
foreign country. On its face, it does not recognize dual
allegiance. By swearing to the supreme authority of the
Republic, the person implicitly renounces his foreign citizenship.
Plainly,Section 3, RA 9225 stayed clear out of the problem of
dual allegiance and shifted the burden of confronting the issue
of whether or not there is dual allegiance to the concerned
foreign country. What happens to the other citizenship was not
made a concern of RA 9225. (Note: Section 5, Article IV of
the Constitution is a declaration of a policy and it is not a
self-executing provision. The legislature still has to enact
the law on dual allegiance.)
In De Guzman v. Comelec, G.R. No. 180048 June 19, 2009, it
was held that where the Oath of allegiance and certificate of
candidacy did not comply with Section 5(2) of RA 9225 which
further requires those seeking elective public office in the
Philippines to make a personal and sworn renunciation of
foreign citizenship as where the candidate for VM of Guimba,
Nueva Ecija failed to renounce his American citizenship, it was
held that he was disqualified from running for VM in the May 14,
2007 elections.
Teodora Sobejana-Condon v. Comelec/Luis Bautista et. al.
678 SCRA 267 (2012) - Renunciation of foreign citizenship to
be valid under Section 5(2) of RA 9225 The language of
Section 5(2) of RA 9225 is free from any ambiguity. In Lopez v.
Comelec 559 SCRA 696 (2008), the Court declared it s
categorical and single meaning: a Filipino American or any dual
citizen cannot run fo any elective public position in the
Philippines unless he or she personally swears to a
renunciation of all foreign citizenship at the time of filing the
CoC. The Court also expounded on the form of the
renunciation and held that to be valid, the renunciation must be
contained in an affidavit duly executed before an officer of the
law who is authorized to administer an oath stating in clear and
unequivocal terms that affiant is renouncing foreign citizenship.
Maquiling vs. Comelec 700 SCRA 367 (2013) If we allow
dual citizens who wish to run for public office to renounce their
foreign citizenship and afterwards continue using their foreign
passports, we are creating a special privilege for these dual
citizens, thereby effectively junking the prohibition in Section
40(d) of the Local Government Code. It must be stressed that
what is at stake here is the principle that only those who are
exclusively Filipinos are qualified to run for public office.
Frivaldo v. Comelec 174 SCRA 245 (1989). Frivaldo was
proclaimed governor elect of the Province of Sorsogon and
subsequently assumed office. A disqualification was filed
against him by the League of Municipalities, Sorsogon Chapter
on the ground that he was not a Filipino citizen, having been
naturalized in the US in 1983, which he admitted but which he
undertook only to protect himself against then President
Marcos. The SC found Frivaldo disqualified for not having
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possessed the requirement of citizenship which cannot be
cured by the electorate, especially if they mistakenly believed,
as in this case, that the candidate was qualified.
Republic v. dela Rosa 232 SCRA 785. The disqualification of
Frivaldo was again at issue. Frivaldo opted to reacquire his
Philippine citizenship thru naturalization but however failed to
comply with the jurisdictional requirement of publication, thus,
the Court never acquired jurisdiction to hear the naturalization
of Frivaldo. He was again disqualified.
In Frivaldo v. Comelec 257 SCRA 72 (1996), Frivaldo later
reacquired Philippines citizenship and obtained the highest
number of votes in 3 consecutive elections but was twice
declared by the SC to be unqualified to hold office due to his
lack of citizenship requirement. He claimed to have re-acquired
his Filipino citizenship thru repatriation. It was established that
he took his oath of allegiance under the provision of PD 725 at
2pm on 30 June 1995, much later than the time he filed his
certificate of candidacy.
The Court held that the the law does not specify any particular
date or time when the candidate must possess citizenship
unlike that of residence and age, as Sec. 39 of RA 7160
specifically speaks of qualification of elective officials, not
candidates thus, the citizenship requirement in the local
government code to be possessed by an elective official at the
latest as of the time he is proclaimed and at the start of the term
of office to which he has been elected. But to remove all
doubts on this important issue, the Court held that the
repatriation of Frivaldo retroacted to the date of the filing of
his application on 17 August 1994 and being a former
Filipino who has served the people repeatedly and at the
age of 81, Frivaldo deserves liberal interpretation of the
Philippine laws and whatever defects there were in his
nationality should now be deemed mooted by his
repatriation.
3 term limit or having served 3 consecutive terms.
Article X, Section 8, 1987 Constitution and Section
43(b) of RA 7160provides No local elective official shall serve
for more than 3 consecutive terms in the same position.
Voluntary renunciation of office for any length of time shall not
be considered as an interruption in the continuity of service for
the full term for which the elective official concerned was
elected.
In Laceda Sr., vs. Limena & Comelec 571 SCRA 603 the
Court held that the rationale behind Section 2 of RA 9164, like
Section 43 of RA 7190 (Local Government Code) from which
the 3-term rule was taken, is primarily intended to broaden the
choices of the electorate of the candidates who will run for
office, and to infuse new blood in the political arena by
disqualifying officials from running for the same office after a
term of 9 years.
The case of Laceda Sr. involved a similar question in Latasa
vs. Comelec 417 SCRA 601 where the Court held that where a
person has been elected for 3 consecutive terms as municipal
mayor and prior to the end or termination of such 3-year term
the municipality has been converted by law into a city, without
the city charter interrupting his term until the end of the 3-year
term, the prohibition applied to prevent him from running for the
4th time as city mayor thereof, there being no break in the
continuity of the terms. Comelec did not err nor commit any
abuse of discretion when it declared Laceda disqualified and
cancelled his COC.
Adormeo v. Comelec & Talaga, Jr. G.R. No. 147927 04
February 2002 and citing Borja v. Comelec 295 SCRA 157
and Lonzanida v. Comelec 311 SCRA 602, it was ruled that
the term limit for elective local officals must be taken to refer to
the right to be elected as well as the right to serve in the
same elective position. Thus, two (2) conditions for the
application of the disqualification must concur:
that the official concerned has been elected for three
(3) consecutive terms in the same local government
post; and
that the has fully served the three (3) consecutive
terms.
 ELECTION LAWS REVIEW
In this case, respondent Talaga, Jr., was elected mayor of
Lucena City in May 1992. He served the full term, was re-
elected in 1995-98 but lost in the 1998 election to Tagarao. In
the recall elections of May 2000, Talaga, Jr. won and served the
unexpired term of Tagarao until 30 June 2001. Talaga Jr. filed
his certificate of candidacy for the same position in the 2001
elections which candidacy was challenged by petition Adormeo
on the ground that Talaga, Jr. is already barred by the 3-term
limit rule.
Adormeo contends that Talagas candidacy violated Section 8,
Article X of the Constitution which states that the term of office
of local elective officials shall be three (3) years and no such
official shall serve for more than three (3) consecutive terms
citing the case of Lonzanida v. Comelec To further support his
case, he adverts to the comment of Fr. Joaquin Bernas who
stated that in interpreting said provision that if one is elected
representative to serve the unexpired term of another, that
unexpired term, no matter how short, will be considered one
term for the purpose of computing the number of successive
terms allowed.
The Comelec en banc ruled in favor of Talaga which reversed
the ruling of the 1st division and held that 1) Talaga was not
elected for 3 consecutive terms because he did not win the 11
May 1998 elections; 2) that he was installed only as mayor by
reason of his victory in the recall elections; 3) that his victory in
the recall elections was not considered a term of office and is
not included in the 3-term disqualification rule and finally 4) that
he did not fully serve the 3 consecutive term. His loss in the 11
May 1998 elections is considered an interruption in the
continuity of his service as Mayor of Lucena City. ISSUE: Was
Talaga disqualified to run for Mayor of Lucena City in the 14
May 2001 elections?
In holding the qualifications of Talaga, the Court reiterated its
ruling in Borja that the term limit for elective local officials must
be taken to refer to the right to be elected as well as the right to
serve in the same elective position considering that the
continuity of his mayorship was disrupted by the defeat in the
1998 elections which is considered as an interruption in the
continuity of service. The Court further held that the
comment of Fr. Bernas is pertinent only to member of the
HR there being no recall elections provided for members of
Congress.
In Lonzanida v. Comelec and Lu 28 311 SCRA 602 (July
1998), Lonzanida was elected and served 2 consecutive terms
as municipal mayor of San Antonio, Zambales, prior to the 08
May 1995 elections. In the May 1995 elections, Lonzanida ran
for the same elective post and was again proclaimed winner.
He assumed office and discharged the duties thereof. His
proclamation in 1995 was contested by his then opponent Juan
Alvez who filed an election protest before the RTC of Zambales
which rendered a decision declaring a failure of elections
rendering the result for the office as null and void. The office of
the mayor was then declared vacant. Both parties appealed to
the Comelec and on 13 Nov. 1997, it resolved the election
protest filed by Alvez in his favor after determining that Alvez
garnered the plurality of votes. The Comelec issued a writ of
execution ordering Lonzanida to vacate the post to which he
obeyed and Alvez assumed for the remainder of the term.
Lonzanida again filed his certificate of candidacy for Mayor in
the 11 May 1998 and his opponent timely filed a petition to
disqualify him for the same post. ISSUE: Whether Lonzanidas
assumption of office from May 1995 to March 1998 may be
considered as service of one full term for the purpose of
applying the 3-term limit for elective local government officials.
It was held that Lonzanida is still qualified to run for mayor and
held that the 2-rquisites for the application of the 3-term limit is
wanting. First, petitioner cannot be considered as having been
elected to the post in the May 1995 elections, and second, the
petitioner did not fully serve the 1995-1998 mayoralty term by
reason of involuntary relinquishment of office.
As repeatedly ruled by the SC, a proclamation subsequently
declared void is no proclamation at all and while a
proclaimed candidate may assume office on the strength of
the proclamation of the BOC, he is only a presumptive
winner who assumes the office subject of the final outcome
of the election protest.
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Another issue raised in Lonzanida is that the Comelec
already lost jurisdiction over the disqualification case when
he was proclaimed as winner and that jurisdiction is
already with the RTC for QW. The SC reiterated its ruling in
Trinidad v. Comelec 288 SCRA 76 (1998) that pursuant to Sec.
6 of RA 6646, the proclamation nor assumption of office of a
candidate against whom a petition for disqualification is pending
before the Comelec does not divest the Comelec of jurisdiction
to continue hearing the case and resolve it on the merits.(Also
ruling in Dizon v. Comelec 577 SCRA 589).
Borja v. Comelec 295 SCRA 157 (1998), the SC ruled on the
issue on whether a VM who succeeds to the office of mayor by
operation of law and serves the remainder of the term is
considered to have served a term in that office for the purpose
of the 3-term limit. The SC upheld the decision of the Comelec
that succession for the expired term is not the service
contemplated as would disqualify the elective official from
running for the same elective post. The purpose of this
provision is to prevent a circumvention of the limitation on the
number of terms an elective local official may serve.
Conversely, if he is not serving a term for which he was elected
as he was simply continuing the service of the official he
succeeds, such official cannot be considered to have fully
served the term notwithstanding his voluntary renunciation of
office prior to his expiration. (Asked in the 2001 BAR)
In applying said policy, the following situations (tenures in
office) are NOT considered service of term for purpose of
applying the 3-term limit
officer fills up a higher office by succession/operation
of law
officer is suspended from office (failed to serve full
term/involuntary)
officer unseated, ordered to vacate by reason of an
election protest case
officer serving unexpired term after winning in the
recall elections;
In Ong vs. Alegre 479 SCRA 473 A petition for
disqualification was filed against Francis Ong for having
violated the 3-term limit rule for having served as mayor of San
Vicente Camarines Norte in the May 1995, 1998 & 2001
elections. The controversy revolves around the 1998-2001
mayoral term wherein the election protest filed by Alegre was
promulgated after the term of the contested office has
expired.
The question for consideration is whether or not the assumption
of Francis Ong as Mayor from July 1, 1998 to June 30, 2001,
may be considered as one full term service in the context of the
consecutive term limit rule. The Court declared that such
assumption of office constitutes, for Francis, service for the full
term and should be counted as a full term served in
contemplation of the 3-term limit prescribed by the constitutional
and statutory provisions, barring elective officials from being
elected and serving for more than 3-consecutive terms.
The Court debunked the claim of Francis Ong that he was only
a presumptive winner in view of the ruling of the RTC that
Alegre was the real winning candidate in the light of his being
proclaimed by the MBOC coupled by his assumption of office
and his continuous exercise of the functions thereof from start
to finish of the term, should legally be taken as service for a full
term in contemplation of the 3-term rule. Lonzanida from which
Ong sought refuge is not applicable in view of the involuntary
relinquishment of office before the expiration of his term. (Same
ruling in Rivera III vs. Comelec 523 SCRA )
Aldovino Jr., vs. Comelec 609 SCRA 234 (2009) Article X,
Section 8 both by structure and substance fixes an elective
officials term of office and limits his stay in office to 3
consecutive terms as an inflexible rule that is stressed, no less,
by citing voluntary renunciation as an example of a
circumvention. The provision should be read in the context of
interruption of term, NOT in the context of interrupting the full
continuity of the exercise of the power of the elective
position. The voluntary renunciation it speaks of refers only
to the elective officials involuntary relinquishment of office and
loss of title to this office. It does not speak of the temporary
cessation of the exercise of power or authority that may
 ELECTION LAWS REVIEW
occur for various reasons, with preventive suspension
being only one of them. Quoting Latasa the law
contemplates a rest period during which the local elective
official steps down from office and ceases to exercise
power or authority over the inhabitants of the territorial
jurisdiction of a particular government unit.
DISQUALIFICATION CASES (EFFECTS)
Sec. 72 of the OEC and Section 6 of 6646 states: any
candidate who been declared by final judgment to be
disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him
shall not be counted. If for any reason a candidate is not
declared by final judgment before an election to be disqualified
and is voted for and received the winning number of votes in
such election, the Comelec shall continue with the trial and
hearing of the action, inquiry or protest and, upon motion of the
complainant or any intervenor, may during the pendency thereof
order the suspension of the proclamation of such candidate
whenever the evidence of guilt is strong.
CAMPAIGN AND ELECTION PROPAGANDA
Election period is 120 days- 90 days before the date of the
election and 30 days thereafter. Campaign period for Pres., VP
and Senators starts 90 days before the date of the election, 45
days for members of the HR and local candidate and 15 days
for barangay official, which excludes the day before and the day
of the elections.
Prohibited Activities Section 80 BP881 Election
campaign or partisan political activity outside campaign period.
It shall be unlawful for any person whether or not a voter or
candidate, or for any party or association of persons, to engage
in an election campaign or partisan political activity except
during the campaign period: Provided, That political parties may
hold political convention or meetings to nominate their official
candidates within 30 days before the commencement of the
campaign period and 45 days for President and Vice-President.
RA 9006 (Fair Election Law), Section 3.Election propaganda
whether on television, cable television, radio, newspapers or
any other medium is hereby allowed for all registered political
parties, national, regional, sectoral parties or organizations
participating under the party-list elections and for all bona fide
candidates seeking national and local positions subject to the
limitation on authorized expenses of candidates and political
parties, observance of truth in advertising and to the supervision
and regulation by the Comelec.
Requirements for Published or Printed Broadcast Election
Propaganda.RA 9006 now allows paid political advertisements
for print and broadcast media provided the said advertisement
shall bear and be identified by reasonably legible or audible
words Political advertisement paid for followed by the
true and correct name and address of the candidate or
party for whose benefit the election propaganda was
printed or aired.
Free of charge if broadcast is given free of charge the radio
and television station, it shall be identified by the words airtime
for this broadcast was provided free of charge by followed by
the true and correct name and address of the broadcast entity.
Provided that said print, broadcast donated shall not be
published or printed without the written acceptance of the
candidate or political party which acceptance shall be attached
to the advertising contract and submitted to the Comelec.
Guidelines whether by purchase or donation Print
advertisements shall not exceed page in broadsheet and
page in tabloids 3 x a week per newspaper, magazine or other
publications during the campaign period. (Section 6, RA 9006).
Television/Radio Advertisements nation
candidates/registered political party shall be entitled to not more
than 120 minutes of TV advertisement and 180 minutes of
radio. Local candidates not more than 60 minutes of TV
advertisement and 90 minutes of radio.
Comelec Time and space print space, Comelec shall pay
just compensation (PPI ruling) in at least 3 newspapers of
general circulation which Comelec shall allocate free of charge
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to the national candidates. Broadcast network (radio and TV)
free of charge to Comelec.(Section 8, RA 9006)
Limitations In Broadcasting of Election Accounts
Comelec shall ensure that radio and television or cable
television broadcasting entities shall not allow the scheduling of
any program or permit any sponsor to manifestly favor or
oppose any candidate or political party or unduly or repeatedly
referring to or including said candidate and/or political party in
such program respecting, however, in all instances the right of
said broadcast entities to air accounts of significant news or
news worthy events and views on matter of public interest.
Restrictions on Media Practitioners any mass media
columnist, commentator, reporter or non-air correspondent or
personality who is a candidate for any elective office or is a
campaign volunteer for or employed or retained in any capacity
by any candidate or political party shall be deemed resigned, if
so required by their employer, or shall take a leave of absence
from his/her work as such during the campaign period. Any
media practitioner who is an official of a political party or
member of the campaign staff of a candidate or political party
shall not use his/her time or space to favor any candidate or
political party
No movie, cinematography or documentary portraying
the life or biography of a candidate shall be publicly exhibited in
a theater, television stations or any public forum during the
campaign period or those portrayed by an actor or media
personality who is himself a candidate.
RA 9006, Section 5 Election surveys refers to the
measurements of opinions and perceptions of the voters as
regards a candidates popularity, qualifications, platforms or
matter of public discussion in relation the election, including
voters preference or candidates or publicly discussed issues
during the campaign period. The person or entity who
publishes a survey is required to include the following
information:
Name of the person, candidate, party or organization
who commissioned or paid the survey;
Name and address of the person or polling firm from
who conducted the survey
Period during which the survey was conducted,
methodology used, including the number or individual
respondents and the areas from which they were
selected and the specific questions asked
Margin of error of the survey.
The survey together with the raw data gathered to support
the conclusions shall be available for inspection, copying and
verification by the Comelec, or by the registered political party
or any Comelec accredited citizen arm.
Posting of Campaign Materials political parties and party-list
groups may be authorized by the Comelec common poster
areas for their candidates in not more than 10 public places
such as plazas, markets, barangay centers and the like,
wherein, candidates can post, display or exhibit election
propaganda. The size of the poster areas shall not exceed 12 x
16 feet or it equivalent. With respect to independent
candidates, may likewise avail of this but the difference is
merely on the size which shall not exceed 4 x 6 feet or its
equivalent.(Section 9, RA 9006)
RA 9189, Section 15 Regulation of Campaign Abroad The
use of campaign materials, as well as the limits on campaign
spending shall be governed b the laws and regulations
applicable to the Philippines.
BP881, Section 95 Prohibited Contributions. No contribution
for purposes of partisan political activity shall be made directly
or indirectly by any of the following:
(a) Public or private financial institutions: Provided,
however, That nothing herein shall prevent the
making of any loan to a candidate or political
party by any such public or private financial
institutions legally in the business of lending
money, and that the loan is made in accordance
with laws and regulations and in the ordinary
course of the business;
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(b) Natural and juridical persons operating a public
utility or in possession of or exploiting any natural
resources of the nation;
(c) Natural and juridical persons who hold contract or
sub-contract to supply the government or any of
its divisions, subdivisions or instrumentalities,
with goods or services or to perform construction
or other works;
(d) Natural and juridical persons who have been
granted franchises, incentives, exemptions,
allocations or similar privileges or concessions by
the government or any of its divisions,
subdivisions or instrumentalities, including
government-owned or controlled corporations.
(e) Natural and juridical persons who, within the one
year prior to the date of the election, have been
granted loans or other accommodations in
excess of 100K by the government or any of its
divisions, subdivisions or instrumentalities
including government owned or controlled
corporations.
(f) Educational institutions which have received
grants of public funds to no less than 100K;
(g) Officials or employees in the Civil Service, or
members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines;
(h) Foreigners and foreign corporations.
It shall be unlawful for any person to solicit or receive
any contribution from any of the persons or entities enumerated
herein.
ABS-CBN 323 SCRA 811, the SC defined exit polls as a specie
of electoral survey conducted by qualified individuals or groups
of individuals for the purpose of determining the probable result
of an election by confidentially asking randomly selected voters
whom they have voted for, immediately after they have officially
cast their ballots. An absolute prohibition is unreasonably
restrictive because it effectively prevents the use of exit poll
data not only for election days of the elections, but also for long
term research. The concern of Comelec of a non-
communicative effect of the exit polls which is disorder and
confusion in the voting centers does not justify a total ban of the
exist polls. Comelec should instead set safeguards in place for
those who intends to conduct exit polls.
Section 5.5 of RA 9006 (Fair Elections Law)
provides for the requirements for the taking of an exit polls:
pollsters shall not conduct their survey within 50
meters from the polling place whether said survey is
taken in a home, dwelling place and other places;
pollsters shall wear distinctive clothing;
pollsters shall inform the voters that they may refuse to
answer; and
the result of the exit polls may be announced after the
closing of the polls on election day, and must clearly
identify the total number of respondents, and the
places where they were taken.. Said announcement
shall state that the same is unofficial and does not
represent a trend.
SOCIAL WEATHER STATION vs. COMELEC 357 SCRA 496
This case involved the issue on election surveys. SWS is a
private non-stock, non-profit social research institution
conducting surveys in various fields, including economics,
politics, demography and social development, and thereafter,
processing, analyzing and publicly reporting the results thereof.
On the other hand, Kamahalan Publishing Corporation
publishes the Manila Standard, a newspaper of general
circulation, which features newsworthy items of information
including election surveys.
Petitioners brought this action for prohibition to enjoin
the Comelec from enforcing par. 5.4 of RA 9006 which
provides, Surveys affecting national candidates shall not be
published fifteen (15) days before an election and surveys
affecting local candidates shall not be published seven (7) days
before an election.
The term election surveys is defined in par. 5.1 of the
law as follows Election surveys refer to the measurement of
opinions and perception of the voters as regards a candidates
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popularity, qualification, platforms or a matter of public
discussion in relation to the election, including voters
preference for candidates or publicly discussed issues during
the campaign period.
Petitioner SWS states that it wishes to conduct an
election survey throughout the period of the elections both at
the national and local levels and release to the media the
results of such survey as well as publish them directly.
Kamahalan also states that it intends to publish election survey
results up to the last day of the elections on May 14, 2001.
HELD: Par. 5.4 constitutes an unconstitutional abridgement of
freedom of speech, expression and the press. It is invalid
because it imposes a prior restraint on the freedom of
expression and it is a direct and total suppression of a category
of expression even though such suppression is only for a limited
period, and the governmental interest sought to be promoted
can be achieved by means other than the suppression of
freedom of expression.
PREMATURE CAMPAIGNING
In Francisco Chavez v. Comelec et. al. G.R. No. 162777 31
August 2004, Chavez brought before the SC a Petition for
Prohibition with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction as taxpayer and citizen asking the Court to enjoin the
Comelec from enforcing Section 21 of its Resolution No. 6520
dated 06 January 2004. (Sec. 32 provides: All propaganda
materials such as posters, streamers, stickers or paintings on
walls and other materials showing the picture or name of a
person and all advertisements on print, in radio or on television
showing the image or mentioning the name of a person, who
subsequent to the placement or display thereof becomes a
candidate for public office shall be immediately removed by said
candidate and radio station, print media or television station
within 3 days after the effectivity of these implementing rules;
otherwise, he and the said radio station, print media or
television station shall be presumed to have conducted
premature campaigning in violation of Sec. 80 of the OEC)
Chavez on various dates entered in formal agreement
with certain establishment to endorse their products and
pursuant thereto, 3 bill boards were set up on some strategic
areas in Metro Manila. Subsequently on 30 December 2003,
Chavez filed his certificate of candidacy for the position of
Senator. On 06 January 2004, Comelec issued Resolution No.
6520 which contained Section 32. Comelec directed Chavez to
comply with the said provision and replied how he may have
violated the assailed provision. Another letter was sent seeking
exemption from the application of Section 32, considering that
the billboard adverted to are mere product endorsements and
cannot be construed as paraphernalia for premature
campaigning under the rules.
Comelec replied by informing him to remove or cover
the said billboards pending the resolution of the Comelec on his
request for exemption. Aggrieved, Chavez sent to the SC via a
petition for prohibition seeking the said provision as
unconstitutional based on the following grounds
It was a gross violation of the non-impairment clause
An invalid exercise of police power
In the nature of an ex post facto law
Contrary to the Fair Elections Act
Invalid due to overbreadth
As to the 1st issue is Section 32 of Comelec Resolution No.
6520 an invalid exercise of police power? Petitioner argues: the
billboards (even if it bears his name) do not at all announce his
candidacy for any public office nor solicit for such candidacy
from the electorate; they are mere product endorsements and
not election propaganda. Prohibition is not within the scope of
power of the Comelec.
RULING police power is an inherent attribute of sovereignty,
is the power to prescribe regulations to promote the health,
morale, peace, education, good order or safety of the general
welfare of the people. The primary objective of the provision
is to prohibit premature campaigning and to level the
playing field for candidates of public office, to equalize the
situation between popular or rich candidates, on one hand
and lesser-known or poorer candidates, on the other, by
preventing the former from enjoying undue advantage in
 ELECTION LAWS REVIEW
exposure and publicity on account of their resources and
popularity. This is a valid reason for the exercise of police
power as held in the Philippines Press Institute v. Comelec
case.
It is true that when petitioner entered into the contract or
agreements to endorse certain products, he acted as a private
individual and had all the right to lend his name and image to
these products. However, when he filed his COC for senator,
the billboards featuring his name and image assumed partisan
political character because the same directly promoted his
candidacy. If subject billboards were to be allowed, candidates
for public office whose name and image are used to advertise
commercial products would have more opportunity to make
themselves known to the electorate, to the disadvantage of
other candidates who do not have the same chance of lending
their faces and names to endorse popular commercial products
as image models. Similarly, an individual intending to run for
public office within the next few months, could pay private
corporations to use him as their image model with the intention
of familiarizing the public with his name and image even before
the start of the campaign period. This, without doubt, would be
a circumvention of the rule against premature campaigning..
Section 32 neither violated the non-impairment clause as this
must yield to the loftier purposes targeted by the Government.
Equal opportunity to proffer oneself for public office, without
regard to the level of financial resources one may have at his
disposal, is a vital interest to the public. The SC has stressed
that contracts affecting public interest contain an implied
reservation of the police power as a postulate of the existing
legal order. This power can be activated at anytime to change
the provisions of the contract, or even abrogate it entirely, for
the promotion or protection of the genera; welfare. Such an act
will not militate against the impairment clause. Which is subject
to and limited by the paramount police power.
On the issue that Sec. 32 of the Comelec Resolution is in the
nature of an ex post facto law. Not ex post facto the offense
as expressly prescribed in Section 32, is the non-removal of the
described propaganda materials three (3) days after the
effectivity of the said Resolution. If the candidate for public
office fails to remove such propaganda materials after the given
period, he shall be liable under Section 80 of the OEC for
premature campaigning. Nowhere is it indicated in the said
provision that it shall operate retroactively.
On the issue that the provision was a violation of the Fair
Elections Act as billboards are already permitted as lawful
election propaganda. It was ruled that the provision does not
prohibit billboards as lawful election propaganda. It only
regulates their use to prevent premature campaigning and to
equalize, as much as practicable, the situation of all candidates
by preventing popular and rich candidates from gaining undue
advantage in exposure and publicity on account of their
resources and popularity. Comelec was only doing its duty
under the law (Sec. 3 and 13 of the Fair Elections Act on
lawful propaganda)
Section 80 of the OEC provides it shall be unlawful for any
person, whether or not a voter or candidate or for any
party, or association of persons, to engage in an election
campaign or partisan political activity, except during the
campaign period.
Penera v. Comelec 599 SCRA 609. The issue on
premature campaigning was raised. Facts show that Penera
and Andanar were mayoralty candidates in Sta. Monica in the
last May 14, 2007 elections. Andanar filed before the Office of
the Regional Election Director, Caraga Region, Region XIII, a
petition for disqualification against Penera for unlawfully
engaging in election campaigning and partisan political activity
prior to the commencement of the campaign period.
The Petition alleged that on 29 March 2007, a day before the
start of the authorized campaign period on 30 March 2007,
Penera and her partymates went around the different
barangays in Sta. Monica, announcing their candidacies and
requesting the people to vote for them on the day of the
elections. Penera alleged that the charge was not true although
having admitted that a motorcade did take place which was
simply in accordance with the usual practice in nearby cities
and provinces, where the filing of COC was preceded by a
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motorcade, which dispersed soon after the completion of such
filing. Penera in her defense cited Barroso v. Ampig (385 Phil
2237; 328 SCRA 530) wherein the Court ruled that a motorcade
held by candidates during the filing of their COCs was not a
form of political campaigning. Pending the disqualification case,
Penera was proclaimed as winner and assumed office.
Comelec ruled that Penera engaged in premature campaigning
in violation of Section 80 and disqualified Penera from
continuing as a mayoralty candidate. The SC ruled no abuse of
discretion on the part of the Comelec and held that the conduct
of a motorcade is a form of election campaign or partisan
political activity which fall squarely under of Section 79 of the
OEC.
Penera moved for reconsideration arguing that she was not
yet a candidate at the time of the supposed premature
campaigning, since under Section 15 of RA 8436 (the law
authorizing the Comelec to use an automated election system
for the process of voting, counting of votes, and
canvasing/consolidating the results of the national and local
elections), as amended by RA 9369, is not officially a candidate
until the start of the campaign period.
In granting Peneras MR, the SC En Banc held that Penera did
not engage in premature campaigning and should thus, not be
disqualified as a mayoralty candidate. The Court said-
(a) The Courts 11 September 2009 Decision (or
the assailed Decision) considered a person who files a
certificate of candidacy already a candidate even before the
start of the campaign period. This is contrary to the clear intent
and letter of Section 15 of RA 8436, as amended, which stated
that a person who files his certificate of candidacy will only
be considered a candidate at the start of the campaign
period, and unlawful acts or omission applicable to a
candidate shall take effect only upon the start of such
campaign period. In applying the said law
(1) The effective date when partisan
political acts become unlawful
as to a candidate is when the campaign
period starts. Before the start of the
campaign period, the same partisan
political acts are lawful.
(2) Accordingly, a candidate is liable
for an election offense only
for acts done during the campaign period,
not before. In other words, election offenses
can be committed by a candidate only upon
the start of the campaign period. Before the
start of the campaign period, such election
offenses cannot be committed.
Since the law is clear, the Court has no recourse but to
apply it. The forum for examining the wisdom of the law, and
enacting remedial measures, is not the Court but the
Legislature.
(b) Contrary to the assailed Decision, Section 15,
of RA 8436, as amended, does not provide that partisan
political acts done by a candidate before the campaign period
are unlawful, but may be prosecuted only upon the start of the
campaign period. Neither does the law state that partisan
political acts done by a candidate before the campaign period
are temporarily lawful, but becomes unlawful upon the start of
the campaign period. Besides, such a law as envisioned in the
Decision, which defines a criminal act and curtails freedom of
expression and speech, would be void for vagueness.
That Section 15 of RA 8436 does not
expressly state that campaigning before the start of the
campaign period is lawful, as the assailed decision asserted, is
no moment. It is a basic principle of law that any act is lawful
unless expressly declared unlawful by law. The mere fact that
the law does not declare an act unlawful ipso facto means that
the act is lawful. Thus, there is no need for Congress to declare
in Section 15 of RA 8436 that partisan political activities before
the start of the campaign period is lawful. It is sufficient for
Congress to state that any unlawful act or omission applicable
to a candidate shall take effect only upon the start of the
campaign period. The only inescapable and logical result is
 ELECTION LAWS REVIEW
that the same acts, if done before the start of the campaign
period, are lawful.
(d) The Courts 11 September 2009 Decision
also reversed Lanot v. Comelec (G.R. No. 164858, 16
November 2006). Lanot was decided on the ground that one
who files a certificate of candidacy is not a candidate until the
start of the campaign period. This ground was based on the
deliberations of the legislators who explained that the early
deadline for filing COC under RA 8436 was set only to afford
time to prepare the machine readable ballots, and they intended
to preserve the existing election period, such that one who files
his COC to meet the early deadline will still not be considered
as a candidate.
When Congress amended RA 8436, Congress decided to
expressly incorporate the Lanot doctrine into law, thus, the
provision in Section 15, of RA 8436 that a person who files his
certificate of candidacy shall be considered a candidate only
at the start of the campaign period. Congress wanted to
insure that no person filing a certificate of candidacy under the
early deadline required by the automated election system would
be disqualified or penalized for any partisan political act done
before the start of the campaign period. This provision cannot
be annulled by the Court except on the sole ground of its
unconstitutionality. The assailed Decision, however, did not
claim that this provision is unconstitutional. In fact, the assailed
Decision considered the entire Section 15 good law. Thus, the
Decision was self-contradictory reversing Lanot but
maintaining the constitutionality of the said provision.
In Lanot vs. Comelec 507 SCRA 114, the Court ruled that
there are two aspects of a disqualification case:
1) Electoral aspect determines whether the offender
should be disqualified from being a candidate or from
holding office. Proceedings are summary in character
and require only clear preponderance of evidence. An
erring candidate may be disqualified even without prior
determination of probable cause in a PI. The electoral
aspect may proceed independently of the criminal
aspect and vice-versa.
2) Criminal aspect determines whether there is probable
cause to charge a candidate for an election offense. If
there is probable cause, the Comelec through its Law
Department, files the criminal information before the
proper court. Proceedings before the proper court
demand a full-blown hearing and require proof beyond
reasonable doubt to convict. A criminal conviction
shall result in the disqualification of the offender, which
may even include disqualification from holding a future
public office.
CANVASSING BODIES
Section 221, BP 881/RA 6646, Section 20 - Boards of
Canvassers (Local Boards). There shall be a board of
canvassers for each province, city and municipality as follows:
(a) Provincial Board of Canvassers The provincial
board of canvassers shall be composed of the
provincial election supervisor or a lawyer in the
regional office of the Commission, as chairman,
the provincial fiscal, as vice-chairman, and the
provincial superintendent of schools as member.
(b) City Board of Canvassers The city board of
canvassers shall be composed of the city election
registrar or a lawyer of the Commission, as
chairman, the city fiscal, as vice-chairman, and the
city superintendent of schools, as member. In
cities with more than one election registrar, the
Commission shall designate the election registrar
as chairman.
(c) Municipal Board of Canvassers. The municipal
board of canvassers shall be composed of the
election registrar or a representative of the
Commission, as chairman, the municipal
treasurer, as vice-chairman and the most senior
district school supervisor or in his absence a
principal of the school district or the elementary
school, as member.
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The proceedings of the board of canvassers shall be open
and public.
BP881, Section 222. Relationship with Candidates and other
members of the Board.The chairman and the members of the
boards of canvassers shall not be related within the 4 th civil
degree of consanguinity or affinity to any of the candidates
whose votes will be canvassed by the said board, or to any
member of the same board.
BP881, Section 224. Feigned Illness. Any member of the
board of canvassers feigning illness in order to be substituted
on election day until the proclamation of the winning candidates
shall be guilty of an election offense.
RA 8436, Section 23 National Board of Canvassers for
Senators The chairman and members of the Commission on
Elections sitting en banc, shall compose the national board of
canvassers for senators. It shall canvass the results for
senators by consolidating the results contained in the data
storage devices submitted by the district, provincial and city
boards of canvassers, of those cities which comprise one or
more legislative districts. Thereafter, the national board shall
proclaim the winning candidates.
Section 30, RA 7166 Congress as the National Board of
Canvassers for the election of President and Vice-President:
Determination of Authenticity and Due Execution of Certificates
of Canvass.
1) Congress for Pres. & VP (Sec. 4, Article VII)
2) Comelec Senators and Regional Officials
3) PBC Members of the HR and provincial officials
(composed of the PES, Provincial Prosecutor and
provincial official of the DepEd
4) District BOC in each legislative district in MM
members of the HR and municipal officials
5) City and MBOC member of the HR, city and
municipal officials composed of the city or municipal
EO, City Prosecutor and DepEd Superintendent
RA 9189, Section 18(4) A Special Board of Canvassers
composed of a lawyer preferably of the Commission as
chairman, a senior career office from any of the government
agencies maintaining a post abroad and, in the absence of
another government officer, a citizen of the Philippines qualified
to vote under this Act deputized by the Commission, as vice-
chairman and member secretary, respectively, shall be
constituted to canvass election returns submitted to it by the
Special Boards of Elections Inspectors. Xxx xxx The
Certificates of Canvass and the accompanying Statements of
Votes as transmitted via facsimile, electronic mail and any other
means of transmission equally safe, secure and reliable shall be
the primary basis for the national canvass.
CERTIFICATE OF VOTES, STATEMENT OF VOTES,
ELECTION RETURNS AND DISTRIBUTION
Certificate of Votes is an election document issued by the
BEIs after the counting and announcement of the results and
before leaving the polling place upon request of the accredited
watcher. It shall contain the number of votes obtain by each
candidate written in words and figures, precinct #, name of the
city or municipality signed and thumb marked by each member
of the board.
Typoco vs. Comelec 614 SCRA 391 In Garay v. Comelec
261 SCRA 222 (1996) the Court held that (a) certificate of
votes does not constitute sufficient evidence of the true and
genuine results of the election; only election returns are,
pursuant to Sections 231, 233-236 and 238 of BP881. Again in
De Guzman v. Comelec 426 SCRA 698 (2004) the Court stated
that, in an election contest where the correctness of the number
of votes is involved, the best and most conclusive evidence are
the ballots themselves; where the ballots can nor be produced
or are not available, the election returns would be the best
evidence.
Doromal vs. Biron/Comelec 613 SCRA 160 (2010) the
certificate of votes, which contains the number of votes
obtained by each candidate, is issued by the BEI upon the
request of the duly accredited watcher pursuant to Section 16 of
RA 6646. Relative to its evidentiary value, Section 17 of RA
 ELECTION LAWS REVIEW
6646 provides that Sections 235 and 236 of BP 881
notwithstanding, the Certificate of Votes shall be admissible in
evidence to prove tampering, alteration, falsification or any
anomaly committed in the preparation of the election returns
concerned, when duly authenticated by at least two members
of the BEI who issued the certificate. Failure to present the CV
shall however not bar the presentation of other evidence to
impugn the authenticity of the ER. It cannot be a valid basis of
canvass.
Purpose of requiring authentication of at least 2 members of the
BOC to safeguard the integrity of the certificate from the time
it is issued by the BEI to the watcher after the counting of votes
at the precinct level up to the time that it is presented to the
board of canvassers to proved tampering.
FUNCTIONS OF THE CERTIFICATE OF VOTES
Prevent or deter the members of the BEI or other
official from altering the statement because they know
of the existence of such certificate
To advise the candidate definitely of the number of his
votes so that in case the election statement submitted
to the BOC does not tally with the certificate in his
hands, he may ask that the other authentic copies of
the same be used for the canvass
To serve as evidence of fraud in election protest cases
and in subsequent prosecution of the election offenses
against those liable therefore.
Statement of Votes is a tabulation per precinct of the votes
obtained by the candidates or reflected in the ER.
Certificate of Canvass is based on the SV and which serves
as basis for proclamation.
DISPOSITION OF ELECTION RETURNS
Election Returns and Distribution RA 8173 amending Section
27 of RA 7166, provides that in the election for Pres., VP,
Senators and members of the HR, the ER shall be distributed
as follows -
1st CBO or MBOC
2nd congress, directed to the Pres. of the Senate
3rd Comelec
4th Dominant majority party as may be determined by
the Comelec in accordance with law
5th Dominant minority party as may be determined by
Comelec in accordance with law
6th Citizens Arms authorized by the Comelec to
conduct an unofficial count to be deposited inside the
ballot box.
For Local officials (1) CBOB or MBOC (2) Comelec (3) PBOC
(4) DMP (5) DMP (6) Citizens Arms for unofficial count (7)
inside ballot box.
Petition to Declare a postponement, failure or annulment of
elections and call for a special elections in accordance with
Sections 5,6, & 7 of the OEC as amended by Sec. 4 of RA
7166.
Sec. 5 of the OEC provides for the grounds for
declaring a postponement of elections that is when for -
any serious cause such as violence,
terrorism,
loss or destruction of election paraphernalia or
records,
FM and other analoguous circumstances of such a
nature that the holding of a HOPE-FRECRE should
become impossible in any political subdivision.
Jurisdiction - the Commission en banc may motu propio or
upon a verified petition by any interested party, and after due
notice and hearing, whereby all interested parties are afforded
equal opportunity to be heard, shall postpone the election to a
date which is reasonably close to the date of the election not
held, suspended or which resulted to a failure to elect but not
later than 30 days after the cessation of the cause for such
postponement or suspension of the election or failure to elect.
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Sec. 6 on the other hand, prescribes the conditions for
the exercise of the power to declare a Failure of Elections. As
reiterated in Dibaratun vs. Comelec 611 SCRA 367, citing
Banaga Jr. v. Comelec 336 SCRA 701 (2000) also in
Canicosa v. Comelec 282 SCRA 517- to declare a failure of
elections, either of these three (3) instances should be
present conformably with Section 6 of the OEC
the election in any polling place has not been held on
the date fixed on account of force majeure, violence,
terrorism, fraud or other analogous causes;
the election in any polling place has been suspended
before the hour fixed by law for the closing of voting on
account of FM, terrorism, fraud or other analogous
causes
after the voting and during the preparation and
transmission of the ER or in the custody of canvass
thereof, such election results in a failure to elect on the
same grounds.
Based on the foregoing provisions, two (2) conditions must
concur to declare a failure of elections
no voting has taken place in the precincts concerned
on the date fixed by law or, even if there was voting
the election nevertheless resulted in a failure to elect
and
the votes not cast would affect the results of the
elections (Carlos. V. Angeles)
In the same case of Coquilla v. Comelec, the SC stressed
that what is common in these three instances is the resulting
failure to elect. In the first instance, no election was held, while
in the second, the election is suspended. In the third instance,
circumstances attending the preparation, transmission, custody
or canvas of the election returns cause a failure to elect. And,
the term failure to elect means nobody emerged as a winner.
Procedural Rules - On the basis of a verified petition by any
interested party and after due notice and hearing, the Comelec
may call for the holding or continuation of the election not held,
suspended or which resulted in a failure to elect on a date
reasonably close to the date of the election not held, suspended
or which resulted in a failure to elect but not later than 30 days
after the cessation of the cause of such postponement or
suspension of the election or failure to elect.
Sec. 4 of RA 7166 (An Act Providing for the Synchronized
National and Local Elections) provides that any declaration of
postponement, failure of election and calling for a special
elections as provided in Section 5,6, & 7 shall be decided by the
Commission sitting en banc by a majority vote of its members.
This power is exclusively vested in the Comelec as ruled in the
case of Sanchez v. Comelec 193 SCRA 849.
Loong v. Comelec 257 SCRA 1, a petition to declare failure of
elections/annulment of elections on the ground of massive fraud
in some municipalities was filed before proclamation.. Comelec
dismissed the petition for having been filed out of time since it
was filed only after petitioners realized that the annulment of
election will wipe out their lead. HELD: It was ruled that the
Comelec Resolution dismissing the petition was arbitrary as no
law provided for a reglementary period within which to file a
petition for annulment of elections if there is no proclamation
yet.
Canicosa v. Comelec 282 SCRA 512, Canicosa filed with the
Comelec a Petition to declare failure of elections and to declare
null and void the canvass and proclamation based on the
following grounds (names of the RV did not appear on the list,
padlocks were not self locking among other) which was
dismissed by the Comelec en banc on the ground that the
allegations therein did not justify the declaration of failure of
elections.
Canicosa insists that itswas error on the part of
Comelec sitting en banc to rule on his petition as it should have
first been heard by a division. The SC held that the matter
relating to the declaration of failure of elections or the
allegations raised by Canicosa did not involve an exercise of QJ
or adjudicatory functions. It involves an administrative function
 ELECTION LAWS REVIEW
which pertains to the enforcement and administration of all laws
and regulations relative to the conduct of elections.
Pasandalan vs. Comelec, et. al., G.R. No. 150312 July 18,
2002, the SC held that a petition for declaration of failure of
elections is an extraordinary remedy and therefore the
petition must specifically allege the essential grounds that
would justify the same. Otherwise, the Comelec can
dismiss the petition outright for lack of merit and no grave
abuse of discretion can be attributed to it. The Comelec is
mandated to exercise this power with utmost circumspect to
prevent disenfranchising voters and frustrating the electorates
well.
In this case, Pasandalan filed a petition for declaration
of failure of election on the ground that while voting was going
on Cafgus indiscriminately fired their firearms causing the
voters to panic and leave the polling places without casting their
votes and taking advantage of the situation, the supporters of
his opponent took the official ballots and filled them up with his
name, the BEIs failed to affix their initials at the back of several
official ballots. Pasandalan , on the basis of the affidavits of
his own poll watchers, insists that a technical examination
of the official ballots in the contested precincts be made
which would show that only a few persons wrote the
entries, citing the case ofTypoco v. Comelec 319 SCRA 498
and Basher v. Comelec 330 SCRA 736.
The SC held that the Comelec is not mandated to conduct a
technical examination before it dismisses a petition for
nullification of election when the petition is, on its face, without
merit. In the case of Typoco, petitioner buttressed his petition
with independent evidence that compelled the Comelec to
conduct a technical examination of the questioned returns.
Typoco filed a Motion to Admit Evidence to prove that a
substantial number of election returns were manufactured and
claimed that the returns were prepared by only one person
based on the report of a licensed examiner of questioned
documents who examined copies of the election returns.
Pasandalan failed to attach independent and objective evidence
other than the self-serving affidavits of his own poll watchers.
In Basher, the fact that an election is actually held prevents
as a rule, a declaration of failure of elections, the Court,
however, can annul an election if it finds that the election is
attended with patent and massive irregularities and
illegalities.In this case, after a series of failed elections in Brgy.
Maidan, Municipality of Tugaya, Lanao del Sur during the 1997
Brgy. Elections, the election was reset to 30 August 1997. Due
to the prevailing tension in the locality, the voting started only at
around 9 p.m. and lasted until the early morning of the following
day. Basher filed a petition for the nullification of the election
which was dismissed by the Comelec on the ground that actual
voting had taken place. The SC overturned the Comelec
ruling because the election was unauthorized and invalid.
The electorate was not given sufficient notice that the
election would push through after 9pm of the same day.
Moreover, the voting did not comply with the procedure laid
down by the Comelec in its Resolution.
Banaga Jr. vs. Comelec 336 SCRA 701, the fact that a verified
petition has been filed does not mean that a hearing on the
case should first be held before Comelec can act on it. The
petition must show on its face that the conditions necessary to
declare a failure of elections are present.
Ampatuan et. al. v. Comelec/Candao, et. al., G.R. No.
149803, January 31, 2002, private respondents filed a petition
for declaration of failure of elections in several municipalities in
Maguindanao. During the pendency of the hearing of said
petition, the Comelec proclaimed petitioners as winners for the
position of governor, vice-governor and board members.
Thereafter, the Comelec issued an order directing the
continuation of the hearing on the failure of elections and issued
an order outlining the procedure to be followed in the technical
examination. Petitioners, relying on the case of Typoco, Jr. v.
Comelec, contended that by virtue of their proclamation, the
only remedy left for private respondents is to file an election
protest, in which case, original jurisdiction lies with the regular
courts and that Comelec no longer has jurisdiction to conduct a
technical examination as it would defeat the summary nature of
a petition for declaration of failure of elections citing several
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rulings that an election protest is the proper remedy for a losing
candidate after the proclamation of the winning candidates.
ISSUE: whether the Comelec was divested of its
jurisdiction to hear and decide a petition for declaration of
failure of elections after the winners have already been
proclaimed. HELD: It was ruled that the fact that the a
candidate proclaimed has assumed office does not deprive the
Comelec of its authority to annul any canvass and illegal
proclamation. In this case, it cannot be assumed that the
proclamation of petitioners was legal precisely because the
conduct by which the elections were held was put in issue by
respondents in their petition for annulment of election results
and/or declaration of failure of elections. The cases relied upon
by petitioners that an election protest is the proper remedy for a
losing candidate after proclamation of the winning candidate
involved pre-proclamation controversies.
The SC made reference to its ruling in Loong v. Comelec that
a pre-proclamation controversy is not the same as an
action for annulment of election results, or failure of
elections. In pre-proclamation cases, the Comelec is
restricted to an examination of the election returns on their face
and is without jurisdiction to go beyond or behind them and
investigate election irregularities. The Comelec is duty-bound
to investigate allegations of fraud, terrorism, violence and other
analogous causes in actions for annulment of election results or
for declaration of failure of elections conformably with the OEC.
Accordingly, the Comelec, in the case of actions for annulment
of election results or declaration of failure of elections, may
conduct technical examination of election documents and
compare and analyze voters signatures and thumbprints in
order to determine whether or not the elections had indeed
been free, honest and clean.
Borja, Jr. v. Comelec 260 SCRA 604, a petition for
declaration of failure of elections and to nullify the canvass and
proclamation was filed by Borja wherein he alleged that there
was lack of notice of the date and time of canvass, there was
fraud in the conduct of the elections as several voters were
disenfranchised, presence of flying voters and unqualified
members of the BEI. The Comelec dismissed the petition ruling
that the grounds relied upon by Borja were ground proper only
in an election contest. SC upheld the decision of the Comelec.
PRE-PROCLAMATION CONTROVERSY
BP 881, Section 242 The Commission shall have exclusive
jurisdiction of all pre=proclamation controversies. It may motu
propio and after due notice and hearing, order the partial or total
suspension of the proclamation of any candidate-elect or annual
partially or totally any proclamation, if one has been made, as
the evidence shall warrant in accordance with the succeeding
sections.
Matalam v. Comelec 271 SCRA 733/BP 881 a pre-
proclamation controversy is defined, as a general rule, any
question pertaining to or affecting the proceedings of the BOC
which may be raised by any candidate or any registered political
party or coalition of political before the board or directly with the
Comelec, on any matter raised under Sections 233 (when ER
are delayed, lost or destroyed), 234 (material defects in the
ER), 235 (when ER appear to be tampered with or falsified)
and 236 (discrepancies in the ER) of the OEC in relation to
the preparation, transmission, receipt, custody and
appreciation of the ER and Certificate of Canvass.
Section 17, RA 6646, questions affecting the composition or
proceedings of the BOC may be initiated with the board or
directly with the Comelec. However, matters raised under Sec.
233 to 236 shall be brought in the first instance before the BOC
only.
EXCEPTIONS: Section 15 of RA 7166 provides that for
purposes of the elections for Pres. and VP, Senators and
members of the HR, no Ppcases shall be allowed on matters
relating the P,T,R,C, and A of the ER or the certificate of
canvass, as the case may be. HOWEVER, this does not
preclude the authority of the appropriate canvassing body motu
proprio or upon written complaint of an interested person to
correct manifest error in the certificate of canvass or ER before
it.
 ELECTION LAWS REVIEW
Sano Jr. vs. Comelec 611 SCRA 475 It is settled that a pre-
proclamation controversy is summary in character; indeed, it is
a policy of the law that pre-proclamation be promptly decided,
so as not to delay canvass and proclamation. The board of
canvassers will not look into allegations of irregularity that are
not apparent on the face of ERs that appear otherwise
authentic and duly accomplished.
Authority of the Comelec in PPC the Commission exercises
authority to decide PPC in two instances
in appeals from the ruling of the BOC which is
generally of two types first type are n questions
contesting its composition or proceedings and appeal
therefrom must be taken by the contestant adversely
affected within 3 days from such ruling .and the
second type refers to ruling on questions contesting
ER. The party adversely affected must immediately
inform the board that he intends to appeal from the
ruling and the board shall enter said information in the
minutes of the canvass and within 48 hours from the
ruling, the adverse party must file with the board a
written and verified notice of appeal, and within an
unextendible period of 5 days thereafter, he has to
take the appeal to the Comelec
in petitions directly filed with it.
Macabago v. Comelec 392 SCRA 178 it was held that issues
in a PPC is properly limited to challenges aimed against the
BOC and proceedings before said board relative to particular
ER to which respondent should have made particular verbal
objections subsequently reduced in writing.
BP 881 Section 243.Comelec Rules of Procedure Rule 27 (4)
- SCOPE/ISSUES that may be raised in a PRE-
PROCLAMATION CONTROVERSY
Illegal composition or proceedings of the BOC
The canvassed ER are incomplete, contain material
defects, appear to be tampered with, or falsified or
contain discrepancies in the same returns or in other
authentic copies as mentioned in Sec. 233-236
The ER were prepared under duress, threats, coercion
or intimidation or they are obviously manufactures or
not authentic in Ocampo v. Comelec 235 SCRA 436,
it was held that this fact must be evident from the face
of the said document. In the absence of a strong
evidence establishing spuriousness of the returns, the
basic rule is that the ER shall be accorded prima facie
status as bona fide reports of the results of the count
of the votes which shall prevail for purposes of
canvassing and proclamation.
When substitute or fraudulent returns in controverted
polling places are canvassed, the result of which
materially affect the standing of the aggrieved
candidate. (Sec. 243)
PROCEDURAL REQUIREMENTS IN A Pre-PROCLAMATION
CONTROVERSY
Sec. 20 of RA 7166 (repealing Sec. 245 OEC)
provides for the mandatory two-step rule or requirement of
verbal objection to the inclusion of the ER and to be formalized
in writing within 24 hours. Failure to observe such rule is fatal
to a candidates cause, leaving him with no other remedy
except an EP. This cannot be cured by instituting a petition
directly filed with the Comelec under Sec. 241
Sandoval v. Comelec 323 SCRA 407, it was stressed that
Comelec exercises exclusive jurisdiction and may motu propio
or upon verified petition, and after due notice and hearing, order
the partial or total suspension of the proclamation of the
candidate elect or annul partially or totally any proclamation, if
one has been made, as the evidence shall warrant in
accordance with Sec. 242 of the OEC.
Velayo v. Comelec 327 SCRA 713 a PPC is summary in
nature, administrative in character and which is filed before the
BOC. It was ruled that while it is true that RA 7166 provides for
summary proceedings in PP cases and does not require a trial
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type hearing, nevertheless, summary proceedings cannot be
stretched as to mean ex-parte proceedings.
In Velayo case, respondent objected to the inclusion of two
(2)ERs which did not contain a vote for respondent being
statistically improbable which was overruled by the BOC. It was
ruled that it is possible for a candidate to get zero votes in one
or few precincts. The bare fact that a candidate receive zero
votes in 1 or 2 precincts can not support a finding that the ER
are statistically improbable. (Exception to the Lagumbay
Doctrine)
Lagumbay v. Comelec 16 SCRA 175 (1966) - The
Lagumbay doctrine isthe prevailing case on statistical
improbability which states that where there exists uniformity of
tallies in favor of candidates belonging to one party and the
systematic blanking out of the opposing candidates as when all
the candidates of one party received all the votes, each of
whom exactly the same number, and the opposing candidates
got zero votes, the election returns are obviously manufactures,
contrary to al statistical improbabilities and utterly improbable
and clearly incredible.
In Ocampo v. Comelec 325 SCRA 636, it was reiterated that if
only one candidate obtained all the votes in some precincts, this
is not sufficient to make the election returns statistically
improbable.
Imelda Dimaporo vs. Comelec/Vicente Belmonte 544 SCRA
381- (Sec. 15 of RA 7166)provides that for the purpose of the
elections for president, VP, senator & member of the HR, no
pre-proclamation cases shall be allowed on matters relating to
the preparation, transmission, receipt, custody and appreciation
of ER or the certificate of canvass, as the case may be, except
as provided for in Sec. 30 hereof. However, this does not
preclude the authority of the appropriate canvassing body motu
propio or upon written complaint of an interested person to
correct manifest errors in the certificate of canvass or ER before
it).
Rommel Munoz vs. Comelec, Carlos Balido Jr. 495 SCRA
407 - Results of the Elections Defined the phrase results of
the election is not statutorily defined. However, as explained
in Lucero v. Comelec it means the net result of the election the
rest of the precincts in a given constituency, such that if the
margin of a leading candidate over that of his closest rival in the
latter precincts is less than the total number of votes in the
precinct where there was failure of election, than such failure
would certainly affect the results of the elections.
EFFECT OF ASSUMPTION OF OFFICE OF CANDIDATE
ELECT/WHEN PPC IS NOT DEEMED TERMINATED A pre-
proclamation controversy is no longer viable after the
proclamation of the winning candidates as the issues raised
therein may be more closely examined and better resolved in
an EP.(RA 7166, Section 16 (2)).
However, this is only true where the proclamation is based on a
complete canvass and on the assumption that the proclamation
is valid where a proclamation is null and void, the proclamation
is no proclamation at all and the proclaimed candidates
assumption of office cannot deprive the Comelec of the power
to declare such nullity and annul the proclamation.
Section 16 of RA 7166 provides that all-pre-
proclamation cases pending before the Commission shall be
deemed terminated at the beginning of the term of office
involved and the rulings of the boards of canvassers concerned
shall be deemed affirmed, without prejudice to the filing of a
regular election protest by the aggrieved party. HOWEVER,
proceedings may continue when on the basis of the evidence
thus far presented, the Commission determines that the petition
appears meritorious and accordingly issued an order for the
proceedings to continue or when appropriate order has been
issued by the SC in a petition for certiorari
ELECTION PROTEST
An EP is a special statutory proceedings designed to
contest the right of a person, declared elected to enter upon
and hold office. It is strictly a contest between the defeated and
winning candidates as to who actually obtained the majority of
the legal votes and therefore, is entitled to hold office.
 ELECTION LAWS REVIEW
NATURE OF PROCEEDING - It is a formal judicial proceedings
that goes into the correctness of the counting and appreciation
of ballots at the precinct level were the parties are allowed to
present and examine evidence in detail.
WHO CAN FILE can only be filed by a candidate who has
duly filed a certificate of candidacy and has been voted for.
PERIOD TO FILE within 10 days from proclamation
GROUNDS fraud, vote-buying, terrorism, presence of flying
voters, misreading and misappreciation of the ballots,
disenfranchisement of voters, other election irregularities.
Lucy Marie Torres-Gomez v. Eufrocino C. Codilla/ 668
SCRA 600 (2012)
Verification (Defective verification) The verification of a
pleading is only a formal, not jurisdictional requirement. The
purpose of requiring the verification is to secure an assurance
that the allegations in the petition are true and correct, not
merely speculative. This requirements is simply a condition
affecting the form of pleadings, and non compliance therewith
does not necessarily render the pleading fatally defective.
Nature of Election controversy An election controversy, by
its nature, touches upon the ascertainment of the peoples
choice as gleaned from the medium of the ballot. For this
reason, an election protest should jibe resolved with utmost
dispatch, precedence and regard of due process. Obstacles
and technicalities that fetter the peoples will should not stand in
the way of a prompt determination of election contests. Thus,
rules on the verification of protests should be liberally
construed.
Court upheld the jurisdiction of HRET as the sole judge of all
contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the
member of the HRET.
Salvador D. Viologo, Sr., v. Comelec 658 SCRA 516 (2011)
Facts: Motion for reconsideration was denied by Comelec en
banc for lack of verification as required by Section 3, Rule 20 of
the Comelec Rules of Procedure on Disputes in an Automated
Election System and Section 3, Rule 19 of CRP.
Comelec Rules of Procedure are subject liberal
construction. In Quintos v. Comelec (440 Phil. 1045; 392
SCRA 489 (2002)), this Court held that the lack of verification
of private respondents Manifestation and Motion for Partial
Reconsideration is merely a technicality that should not defeat
the will of the electorate. The Comelec may liberally construe
or even suspend its rules of procedure in the interest of justice,
including obtaining a speedy disposition of all matter pending
before the Comelec.
Nature of Election Protest: In Pacanan v. Comelec 597
SCRA 189 (2009), the Court, in clarifying the mandated liberal
construction of election laws held: An election contest, unlike
an ordinary civil action, is clothed with a public interest. The
purpose of an election protest is to ascertain that the candidate
proclaimed by the board of canvassers is the lawful choice of
the people. What is sought is the correction of the canvass of
votes, which was the basis of proclamation of the winning
candidate. An election contest therefore involves not only the
adjudication of private and pecuniary interests of rival
candidates but paramount to their claims is the deep public
concern involved and the need of dispelling the uncertainty over
the real choice of the electorate. And the court has the
corresponding duty to ascertain, by all means within its
command, who is the real candidate elected by the people.
Moreover, the CRP are subject to a liberal construction. This
liberality is for the purpose of promoting the effective and
efficient implementation of the objectives of ensuring the
holding of free, orderly, honest, peaceful and credible elections
and for achieving just, expeditious and inexpensive
determination and disposition of every action and proceeding
brought before the Comelec.
This principle was reiterated in the more recent consolidated
cases of Tolentino v. Comelec 617 SCRA 575 (2010) and De
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Castro vs. Comelec 617 SCRA 575, where the Court held that
in exercising its powers and jurisdiction, as defined by its
mandate to ptoetect the integrity of elections, the Comelec
must not be straijackedted by procedural rules in resolving
election disputes.
Douglas R. Cagas v. Comelec/Bautista 663 SCRA 644
(2012) - The Court has no power to review on certiorari an
interlocutory order or even a final resolution issued by a
Division of the Comelec. The governing provision is Section
7, Article IX of the 1987 Constitution, which provides: Section
7. Each Commission shall decide by a majority vote of all its
Members any case or matter brought before it within sixty days
from the date of its submission for decision or resolution. A case
or matter is deemed submitted for decision or resolution upon
the filing of the last pleading, brief, or memorandum required by
the rules of the Commission or by the Commission itself.
Unless otherwise provided by this Constitution or by law, any
decision, order, or ruling of each Commission may be brought
to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party within
30 days from receipt of a copy thereof. This provision, although
it confers on the Court the power to review any decision, order
or ruling of the Comelec, limits such power to a final decision or
resolution of the Comelec en banc and does not extend to an
interlocutory order issued by a Division of the Comelec.
Otherwise stated, the Court has no power to review on certiorari
an interlocutory order or even a final resolution issued by a
Division of the Comelec.
Maria Laarni L. Cayetano v. Comelec/Dante Tinga 648
SCRA 561 (2011) The Supreme Court has no jurisdiction
to review an order, whether final or interlocutory even a
final resolution of a division of the Comelec the Court can
only review via certiorari a decision, order, or ruling of the
Comelec en banc in accordance with Section 7, Article IX-A of
the Constitution, a rule which admits of exceptions as when the
issuance of the assailed interlocutory order is a patent nullity
because of the absence of jurisdiction to issue the same. (Court
made reference to the case of Repol v. Comelec 428 SCRA
321 (2004) which was affirmed in Soriano Jr. v. Comelec 520
SCRA 88 (2007) and Blanco v. Comelec 554 SCRA 755.
Ruling in Soriano. . .In the 2004 case of Repol v. Comelec,
the Court cited Ambil and held that this Court has no power to
review via certiorari an interlocutory order or even a final
resolution of a division of the Comelec. However, the Court
held that an exception to this rule applies where the commission
of grave abuse of discretion is apparent on its face. In Repol,
what was assailed was a status quo ante Order without any
time limit, and more than 20 days had lapsed since its issuance
without the Comelec First Division issuing a writ of preliminary
injunction. The Court held that the status quo ante Order of the
Comelec First Division was actually a temporary restraining
order because it ordered Repol to cease and desist from
assuming the position of municipal mayor of Pagsanghan,
Samar and directed Ceracas to assume the post in the
meantime. Since the status quo ante Order, which was
qualified by the phrase until further orders from this
Commission. Had a lifespan of more than 20 days, this Order
clearly violates the rule that a temporary restraining Order has
an effective period of only 20 days and automatically expires
upon the Comelecs denial of preliminary injunction.
Ceriaco Bulilis v. Victorino Nuez, Presiding Judge of MCTC,
Ubay Bohol, Presiding Judge of RTC Branch 52, Talibon,
Bohol 655 SCRA 241 (2011) -Facts: Bulilis was proclaimed
winner for the elections for punong barangay. Opponent
Victorino Nuez filed an EP (for judicial recount and annulment of
proclamation) with MCTC. The counsel of Bulilis filed his brief
at 1:45pm on the date of preliminary conference and when the
case was heard at 2pm, Nuez moved in open court to be
allowed to present evidence ex parte since Bulilis only filed his
brief on the date of the preliminary conference which is contrary
to Section 4, Rule 9 of A.M. No. 08-4-15-SC which provides that
the brief should be filed at least one (1) day before the date of
the preliminary conference. Judge Garces granted the motion.
Bulilis filed MR which was denied by MCTC. Bulilis filed
certiorari with RTC which was dismissed on the ground that it is
Comelec that has exclusive jurisdiction in election cases
involving municipal and barangay officials. Hence, the petition
for certiorari with the SC.
 ELECTION LAWS REVIEW
(Rule 28, Sections 1 and 2 of CRP/Section 12 Amendments to
Rules 41, 45, 58 and 65 of the Rules of Court/Section 8, Rule
14 of Comelec CRP ). Based on these rules, the Court
recognizes the Comelecs appellate jurisdiction over petitions
for certiorari against all acts or omissions of courts in election
cases. Indeed, in the recent case of Galang, Jr. v. Geronimo
643 SCRA 631 (2011), the Court had the opportunity to rule
that a petition for certiorari questioning an interlocutory order of
a trial court in an electoral protest was within the appellate
jurisdiction of the Comelec.
Since it is the Comelec which has jurisdiction to take
cognizance of an appeal from the decision of the RTC in
election contests involving elective municipal officials (Sec. 8
Rule 14 CRP), then it is also the Comelec which has jurisdiction
to issue a writ of certiorari in aid of its appellate jurisdiction.
Although Galang involved a petition for certiorari of an
interlocutory order of the RTC in a municipal election contest,
the rationale for the above ruling applied to an interlocutory
order issued by a municipal trial court in a barangay election
case. Under Rule 14, Section 8 of A.M. No. 07-4-15-SC,
decisions of municipal trial courts in election contests involving
barangay officials are appealed to the Comelec. Following the
Galang doctrine, it is the Comelec which has jurisdiction
over petitions for certiorari involving acts of the municipal
trial courts in such election contests.
ROMEO M. JALOSJOS, JR v. COMELEC AND DAN
ERASMO, SR. 674 SCRA 530 (2012)
Demarcation line between the jurisdiction of the Comelec
and the House of Representatives:Facts: In May 2007
Jalosjos ran for Mayor of Tampilisan, Zamboanga del Norte and
won. While serving as Tampilisan Mayor, he bought a
residential house and lot in Barangay Veterans Village, Ipil,
Zamboanga Sibugay and occupied it in September 2008. Eight
months after, he applied with the ERB of Ipil, Zamboanga
Sibugay for the transfer of his voters registration record which
application was opposed by Erasmo in a petition for exclusion
before the MCTC of Ipil-Tungawan. RTC ruled to exclude
Jalosjos on the ground that Jalosjos did not abandon his
domicile im Tampilisan since he continue even then to serve as
its Mayor. Jalosjos appealed his case to the RTC of Pagadian
City which affirmed the MCTC decision on September 11, 2009.
Jalosjos elevated the matter to the CA through a petition for
certiorari with an application for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction which was granted and enjoined the
courts below from enforcing their decisions, with the result that
his name was reinstated in the Barangay Veterans Villages list
pending the resolution of the petition.
On November 28, 2009, Jalosjos filed his CoC for the position
of representative of the Second District of Zamboanga Sibugay
for the May 10, 2010 elections. Erasmo filed a Petition to deny
due course to or cancel his CoC before the Comelec, claiming
that Jalosjos made material misrepresentations in his CoC
when he indicated in it that he resided in Ipil, Zamboanga
Sibugay. The Second Division of the Comelec issued a joint
reso dismissing the petition of Erasmo for insufficiency in form
and substance. While Erasmos MR was pending before the
Comelec En Banc, the May 10, 2010 elections took place
resulting in Jalosjos winning the elections and was proclaimed
on May 13, 2010.
In June 2, 2010, the CA rendered judgment in the voters
exclusion case before it holding that the lower courts erred in
excluding Jalosjos since he was qualified under the Constitution
and RA 8189. Erasmo filed a petition for review of the CA
decision before the SC. On the other hand, Comelec en banc
granted the MR of Erasmo and declared Jalosjos ineligible as
he did not satisfy the residency requirement since, by
continuing to hold the position of Mayor in Tampilisan, he
should be deemed not to have transferred his residence form
that place to Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay.
While the Constitution vests in the Comelec the power to decide
all questions affecting elections, such power is not without
limitation. It does not extend to contests relating to the election,
returns, and qualifications of members of the HR and the
Senate. The Constitution vests the resolution of these contests
solely upon the appropriate Electoral Tribunal of the Senate or
the HR.
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The Court has already settled the question of when the
jurisdiction of the Comelec ends and when that of the HRET
begins. The proclamation of a congressional candidates
following the election divests Comelec of jurisdiction over
disputes relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the
proclaimed Representative in favor of HRET.
QUO WARRANTO
A petition for Quo Warranto refers to questions of disloyalty or
ineligibility of the winning candidate. It has the effect of
disqualifying a candidate to hold office towhich he is elected. Its
primordial objective is to prevent an elective official from
assuming office grounded on ineligibility. (Sec. 253 OEC)
NATURE OF PROCEEDING it is a proceeding to unseat the
ineligible person from office, but not to install the protestant in
his place.
WHO CAN FILE any voter.
PERIOD TO FILE- within 10 days from proclamation
Republic v. dela Rosa 232 SCRA 785, a QW assailing the
public officials title and seeking to prevent him from holding
office for alienage is not covered by the 10-days period for
appeal prescribed in Section 253 of the OEC.
The distinction been an EP and QW as a remedy is not
the label given to it but the allegations therein stated. If a
petition alleges fraud and irregularity which vitiated the conduct
of the election, although entitled QW, is an EP and vice versa.
In view of these fundamental differences, an EP and QW
cannot be availed of jointly in the same proceeding. They may
be filed separately with the second and later case suspended
until the earlier is resolved. An action for QW cannot be
converted into an EP.
Penera vs. Comelec 599 SCRA 609, is the well-established
principle that the ineligibility of a candidate receiving majority
votes does not entitle the candidate receiving the next highest
number of votes to be declared elected. In this case, the rules
on succession under Section 44 of the Local Government Code
shall apply which states that if a permanent vacancy occurs in
the office of the Mayor, the Vice-Mayor concerned shall become
the mayor. A permanent vacancy arises when an elective local
official fills a higher vacant office, refuses to assume office, fails
to qualify or is removed from office, voluntarily resigned, or is
otherwise permanently incapacitated to discharge the functions
of his office.
(Virgnio Villamor vs. Comelec & Amytis de Dios-Batao 496
SCRA 334) As a general rule, the proper remedy after the
proclamation of the winning candidate for the position contested
would be to file a regular election protest or a petition for QW.
The filing of an EP or a petition for QW precludes the
subsequent filing of a pre-proclamation controversy or amounts
to the abandonment of one earlier filed, thus, depriving the
Comelec of the authority to inquire into and pass upon the title
of the protestee or the validity of his proclamation. The reason
is that once the competent tribunal has acquired jurisdiction of
an EP or a petition for QW, all questions relative thereto will
have to be decided in the case itself and not in another
proceedings. This procedure is to prevent confusion and
conflict of authority.
Basarte vs. Comelec 523 SCRA 76 The prevailing rule that
as long as the returns appear to be authentic and duly
accomplished on their face, the BOC cannot look beyond or
behind them to verify allegations of irregularities in the casting
or the counting of the votes as it presupposes that the returns
appear to be authentic and duly accomplished on their face.
This principle does not apply in cases like the one at bar where
there is a prima facie showing that the return is not genuine,
several entries having been omitted in the assailed return.
JURSIDCITON OVER ELECTION PROTESTS AND QUO
WARRANTO
1) SUPREME COURT sitting en banc as Presidential
Electoral Tribunal as sole judge of all contests relating to the
election, returns and qualification of Pres. and VP. Protest to
be filed 30 days from proclamation. Not subject to judicial
review (1987 Constitution). Joke on Supreme Court body.
 ELECTION LAWS REVIEW
2) SENATE ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL for members of
senate as sole judge over all contest relating to the election,
returns and qualifications of its own members. Filed within 15
days from date of proclamation. Not subject to judicial review
except on grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction. (1987 Constitution)
3) HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL
TRIBUNAL for members of HR to be filed within 10 days from
proclamation.
Composition - Each electoral tribunal shall be composed of nine
members, three of whom shall be justices of the SC to be
designated by the CJ and the remaining 6 members of the
senate or HR, as the case may be, who shall be chosen on the
basis of their proportional representation from the political
parties and the parties or organizations registered under the
party list system,. Senior justice shall be chairman (Art. VI,
Sec. 17, 1987 Constitution) .
4) COMELEC for regional, provincial and city officials filed in
10 days. Subject to judicial review within 30 days from date of
receipt of decision by aggrieved party.
Article IX-C, Section 2(2) 1987 Constitution, Comelec
shall Exercise exclusive jurisdiction over all contests relating
to the elections, returns and qualifications of all elective,
regional, provincial and city officials, and appellate jurisdiction
over all contests involving municipal officials decided by trial
courts of general jurisdiction, or involving elective barangay
officials decided by courts of limited jurisdictions. Decisions,
final order, or rulings of the Commission, on election contests
involving elective municipal and barangay offices shall be final,
executory and not appealable.
Mendoza v. Comelec 616 SCRA 443 There is a difference in
the result of the exercise of jurisdiction by the Comelec over
election contests. The difference inheres in the kind of
jurisdiction invoked, which in turn, is determined by the case
brought before the Comelec. When a decision of a trial court is
brought before the Comelec for it to exercise appellate
jurisdiction, the division decides the appeal but, if there is a
motion for reconsideration, the appeal proceeds to the banc
where the majority is needed for a decision. If the process ends
without the required majority at the banc, the appealed decision
stands affirmed.
Upon the other hand, and this is what happened in the instant
case, if what is brought before the Comelec is an original
protest involving the original jurisdiction of the Commission, the
protest, as one whole process, is first decided by the division,
which process is continued in the banc if there is a motion for
reconsideration of the division ruling. If no majority decision is
reach in the banc, the protest, which is an original, shall be
dismissed. There is no first instance decision that can be
deemed affirmed.
Hence, if no decision is reached after the case is reheard, there
are two different remedies available to the Comelec, to wit (1)
dismiss the action or proceeding, if the case was originally
commenced in the Comelec; or (2) consider as affirmed the
judgment or order appealed from, in appealed cases. This rule
adheres to the constitutional provision that the Comelec must
decide by a majority of all its members.
Relampagos v. Cumba 243 SCRA 690 (1995) and in Carlos
v. Angeles 346 SCRA 571 (2000), Comelec is vested with the
power to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus
only in aid of its appellate jurisdiction consistent with Section 50
of BP 881 and Article 2(1) of the Constitution. These ruling
abandoned the earlier ruling in Garcia vs. de Jesus 206 SCRA
779. It was also declared that both the SC and Comelec has
concurrent jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition and
mandamus over decision of trial courts of general jurisdiction
(RTC) in election cases involving elective municipal officials.
The Court that takes jurisdiction first shall exercise exclusive
jurisdiction over the case. (Art. VIII 5(1) 1987 Constitution,
Rule 65, Sec. 1)
Section 7, Article IX-A and Rule 3 of the Comelec Rules of
Procedure.The Comelec in the exercise of its QJ functions to
transact business may sit en banc or in two divisions, and
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shall promulgate rules and procedures in order to expedite
the disposition of elections cases, including pre-proclamation
controversies and summon parties to a controversy pending
before it.
The authority to hear and decide election cases, including pre-
proclamations controversies is vested with a division and the
Comelec sitting en banc does not have the authority over it in
the first instance. The Comelec en banc can exercise
jurisdiction only on Motions for Reconsideration of the
resolution or decision of the Comelec in division as a
requirement for the filing of a petition for certiorari by the
aggrieved party with the SC within 30 days from receipt of a
copy thereof (Sec. 3 Art. IX-C).
Sec. 2 Rule 19 of the Comelec Rules of Procedure a motion
to reconsider a decision, resolution, order or ruling of a Division
shall be filed within five (5) days from the promulgation thereof.
Such motion, if not pro-forma, suspends the execution for
implementation of the decision, resolution, order or ruling and
would in effect, suspend the running of the period to elevate the
matter to the SC (Sec.4).
5) REGIONAL TRIAL COURT exclusive jurisdiction over all
contests relating to the election, qualifications and returns for
municipal officials. Protest to be filed 10 days from date of
proclamation. Subject to appeal with Comelec within five (5)
days from receipt of decision. Decisions of the Comeledc en
banc on contest on appeal involving municipal and barangay
officials are final and executory except on grounds of grave
abuse of discretion within 30 days.
6) MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT exclusive jurisdiction over all
contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications for
barangay officials. Protest to be filed within 10 days from
proclamation. Appeal to the Comelec within 5 days from receipt
of the decision.
Calo v. Comelec 610 SCRA 342/Pecson v. Comelec 575
SCRA 634 decisions of the courts in election protest cases,
resulting as they do from a judicial evaluation of the ballots and
afull blown adversarial proceedings. Should at least be given
similar worth and recognition as decisions of the board of
canvassers. This is especially true when attended by other
equally weighty circumstances of the case, such as the
shortness of the term of the contested elective office, of the
case.
Mananzala vs. Comelec and Julie Monton 523 SCRA 31. -
Decisions, final orders or rulings of the Commission on Election
contests involving elective municipal and barangay offices shall
be final, executory and not appealable; All such election cases
shall be heard and decided in division, provided that motions for
reconsideration of decisions shall be decided by the
Commission en banc.
A decision of the RTC was raised on appeal which was heard
by the 2nd division which reversed the decision of the RTC. In
his MR petitioner argues that the MR filed with the former 2 nd
division has thrown the whole case wide open for review as
in a trial de novo in a criminal case yet Comelec en banc
failed to conduct a thorough review of the contested ballots.
Election cases cannot be treated in a similar manner as criminal
cases where, upon appeal from a conviction by the trial court,
the whole case is thrown open for review and the appellate
court can resolve issues which are not even set forth in the
pleadings.
Coquilla vs. Comelec, et. al. G.R. No. 151914, July 31, 2002,
the SC resolved the issue on whether the 30-day period for
appealing the resolution of the Comelec was suspended by the
filing of a motion for reconsideration by petitioner. Private
respondent in this case contends that the petition should be
dismissed because it was filed late considering that the
Comelec en banc denied petitioners motion for reconsideration
for being pro-forma and conformably with Sec. 4 of Rule 19 of
the CRP, the said motion did not suspend the running of the 30-
day period for the filing of the petition for certiorari under Sec. 7
Art. IX-A of the Constitution.
The Comelec en banc ruled that the motion for reconsideration
was pro-forma on the ground that the motion was a mere
 ELECTION LAWS REVIEW
rehash of petitioners averments contained in his Verified
Answer and Memorandum, neither were new matters raised
that would sufficiently warrant a reversal of the assailed
resolution of the Second Division.
The SC ruled however that the mere reiteration in a motion for
reconsideration of the issues raised by the parties and passed
upon by the court does not make a motion pro-forma;
otherwise, the movants remedy would not be a
reconsideration of the decision but a new trial or some
other remedy.
In explaining the purpose/objective of a motion for
reconsideration , the SC referred to its decision in Guerra
Enterprises Company Inc., v. CFI of Lanao del Sur 32 SCRA
314 (1970), where it held that the ends sought to be achieved in
the filing of a motion for reconsideration is precisely to
convince the court that its ruling is erroneous and improper,
contrary to the law or the evidence, and in doing so, the movant
has to dwell of necessity upon the issues passed upon by the
court. If a motion for reconsideration may not discuss these
issues, the consequence would be that after a decision is
rendered, the losing party would be confined to filing only
motions for reopening and new trial.
The SC further enumerated cases where a motion for
reconsideration was held to be pro forma:
it was a second motion for reconsideration;
it did not comply with the rule that the motion must
specify the findings and conclusions alleged to be
contrary to law or not supported by the evidence;
it failed to substantiate the alleged errors;
it merely alleged that the decision in question was
contrary to law
or the adverse party was not given due notice thereof.
Under Rule 13, (1) of the Comelec Rules of
Procedure, a Motion for Reconsideration of an En Banc
Resolution is a prohibited pleading, except in election
offense cases (Sec. 261 of the OEC).
Angelia v. Comelec 332 SCRA 757, the SC addressed the
issue on whether a party can go to the SC via a Petition on
Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court during the
pendency of the MR filed with the Comelec en banc. Angelia
filed before the SC a Petition for Certiorari to set aside the
resolution of the Comelec en banc annulling his proclamation
alleging that he was not given due notice and hearing. Without
waiting for the resolution on his motion, Angelia filed the
instant petition on the sole assignment of error that Comelec
violated his constitutional right to due process. Comelec raised
that the petition should be dismissed for being premature
considering that the MR of petitioner was still pending with the
Comelec en banc and that he should have first withdrawn the
MR before raising the said resolution with the SC.
SC held that petitioner acted correctly in filing the petition
because the resolution of the Comelec en banc is not subject to
reconsideration, and therefore, any party who disagrees with it
had only one recourse, that was to file a petition for certiorari
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Civil Procedure. The filing of the
petition would in effect constitute as an abandonment of his MR
with the Comelec.
What is contemplated by the term final orders, rulings and
decisions of the Comelec that may be reviewable by the SC
on Certiorari? The SC in Garces v. Court of Appeals 259
SCRA 99 (1996) and Filipinas Engineering & Machine Shop v.
Ferrer 135 SCRA 25 (1985), the interpreted the term final
orders, rulings and decisions of the Comelec reviewable by the
SC on certiorari as provided by law are those rendered in
actions or proceedings before the Comelec and taken
cognizance of by the said body in the exercise of its quasi-
judicial powers.
PRINCIPLES COMMON TO ALL ELECTION CONTESTS
1) WHO MAY FILE a candidate who has duly filed a
COC and has been voted for.
2) Jurisdiction Allegations (1) protestant was a
candidate who had duly filed a COC and had been
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voted for the same office (2) that the protestee has
been proclaimed (3) that the petition was filed within
10 days after proclamation (4) that fraud and election
irregularities vitiated the conduct of the elections and
affected the legality thereof.
Miguel v. Comelec 335 SCRA 172, the SC ruled that it is the
ministerial duty of the trial court to order the opening of the
ballot boxes, examination and counting of ballots deposited
thereunder whenever there is averment in an election protest
that requires the examination, scrutiny or counting of ballots as
evidence. The purpose of opening the BB is to determine, with
the minimum amount of protracted delay, the truthfulness of the
allegations of fraud and anomalies in the conduct of electoral
exercise.
CERTIFICATE OF FORUM SHOPPING
The SC in Loyola v. CA 245 SCRA 477 (1995) and Lomarong
v. Dubguban 269 SCRA 624 (1997), it was ruled that the SC
Circular requiring that any complaint, petition or other initiatory
pleading must contain a non-forum certification applies to
election cases. The requirement is mandatory, not
jurisdictional, non-compliance therewith may warrant the
dismissal of the election case.
PAYMENT OF APPEAL/FILING FEES
Pacanan, Jr. vs. Commission on Elections, 597 SCRA 189
Aguilar v. Comelec 591 SCRA 491 - Petitioner Pacanan, Jr.
and private respondent Langi Sr., were candidates for mayor in
the municipality of Motiong, Samar during the May 14, 2007
elections. Petitioner was proclaimed having garnered a total of
3,069 votes against private respondents 3,066 votes.
On May 25, 2007, private respondent filed an election
protest with the RTC which rendered a Decision on January 7,
2008 RTC declaring private respondent as winner with a
plurality of 6 votes. 3 days after or on January 10, 2008
petitioner filed a notice of appeal and paid 3K appeal fee before
the RTC and also appealed the RTC decision to the Comelec.
Out of the 3K appeal fee required under Sec. 3, Rule 40 of the
Comelec Rules of Procedure, petitioner only paid 1K plus 200
to cover the legal research/bailiff fees. On March 17, 2008
Comelec 1st division issued on Order dismissing the appeal on
the ground that petitioner failed to pay the correct appeal fee
within the 5-days reglementary period which is a ground for the
dismissal of the appeal under Section 9(a), Rule 22 of the
CRP. On March 28, 2008 petitioner filed a MR with the
Comelec En Banc which denied the resolution declaring that the
appeal was not perfected on time for non-payment of the
complete amount of appeal and for late payment as well, hence,
did not acquire jurisdiction over the appeal.
Before the SC is a petition for Certiorari raising that 1)
Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction in holding that the correct appeal
fee was not paid on time; 2) In failing to consider, that assuming
that the correct appeal fee was not paid on time, the alleged
non-payment is not in anyway attributable to petitioner; 3) that
assuming the correct appeal fee was not paid on time, there are
highly justifiable and compelling reasons to resolve the subject
case on the merit in the interest of justice and public interest.
The SC noted that two (2) different tribunals earlier
require the payment of two different appeal fees for the
perfection of the appeals of election cases.
Sec. 3, Rule 22 of the CRP ( Appeals form
decisions of Courts in election Protest Cases), mandates
that the notice of appeal must be filed with 5-days after the
promulgation of the decision. On the other hand, Section 3 & 4
Rule 40 of the CRP amended the amount of the appeal fees to
3.2K which should be paid with the cash division of the
Comelec.
On the other hand, Section 8 & 9, Rule 14 of A.M.
No. 07-4-15 SC (Rules of procedure in Election Contests
before the Court Involving Elective Municipal and Barangay
Officials effective May 15, 2007) also provide the procedure of
instituting an appeal and the required appeal fees to be paid for
the appeal to be given due course.
 ELECTION LAWS REVIEW
This requirement in the payment of appeal fees had
caused much confusion, which the Comelec addressed through
the issuance of Comelec Res. No. 8486 on July 15, 2008.
The salient feature of the said resolution provide that the
appeal to the Comelec of the trial courts decision in
election contests involving municipal and barangay
officials is perfected upon the filing of the notice of appeal
and payment of the 1K appeal fee to the court that rendered
the decision within the 5-day reglementary period. The non-
payment or the insufficient payment of the addition appeal fee
of 3.2K to the Comelec Cash Division in accordance with Rule
40, Section 3 of the CRP, as amended, does not affect the
perfection of the appeal and does not result in outright or
ipso facto dismissal of the appeal.
Comelec 1st division gravely abused its discretion in
issuing the order dismissing the appeal taking notice that the
notice of appeal and the 1K appeal fee were, respectively filed
and paid with the MTC on April 21, 2008 which date the appeal
was perfected. Comelec Res. 8486 clarifying the rule on the
payment of appeal fees was issued only on July 15, 2008, or
almost 3-months after the appeal was perfected. Yet on July
31, 2008 or barely two weeks after the issuance of Comelec
Res. 8486, the Comelec 1st division dismissed the appeal for
non-payment of the 3.2K appeal fee.
Considering that petitioner filed his appeal months
before the clarificatory resolution on appeal fees, the
appeal should not be unjustly prejudiced by Comelec Res.
No. 8486. Fairness and prudence dictate the 1st division
should have first directed petitioner to pay the additional appeal
fee in accordance with the clarificatory resolution. Instead it
hastily dismissed the appeal on the strength of the clarificatory
resolution which had taken effect only a few days earlier. (This
unseemly haste is an invitation to outrage.) Court further
stressed the liberal construction policy.
Villagracia v. Comelec 513 SCRA 655 (2007), while it is true
that a court acquires jurisdiction over a case upon complete
payment of the prescribed filing fee, the rule admits of
exceptions, as when a party never raised the issue of
jurisdiction in the trial court.
Gomez-Castillo v. Comelec 621 SCRA 499 The period of
appeal and the perfection of appeal are not mere technicalities
to be so lightly regarded, for they are essential to the finality of
judgments, a notion underlying the stability of our judicial
system. The short period of 5-days as the period to appeal
recognizes the essentiality of time in election protests, in order
that the will of the electorate is ascertained as soon as possible
so that the winning candidate is not deprived of the right to
assume office, and so that any doubt that can cloud the
incumbent of the truly deserving winning candidate is quickly
removed.
Zanoras v. Comelec G.R. No. 158610 November 12, 2004,
the mere filing of the notice of appeal was not enough. It should
be accompanied by the payment of the correct amount of
appeal fee. The payment of the full amount of the docket fee is
an indispensable step for the perfection of an appeal. (Rulloda
v. Comelec 245 SCRA 702)
Loyola v. Comelec 337 SCRA 134 (1997), the Court stressed
that there is no longer any excuse for shortcoming in the
payment of filing fees. The Court held that in the case at bar
any claim of good faith, excusable negligence or mistake in any
failure to pay the full amount of filing fees in election cases
which may be filed after the promulgation of this decision is no
longer acceptable (March 25, 1977). The Loyola doctrine was
reiterated in the subsequent cases of Miranda v. Castillo 274
SCRA 503, Soller v. Comelec 339 SCRA 684 hold that a court
acquires jurisdiction over any case only upon the payment of
the prescribed docket fees and errors in the payment of the
filing fee is no longer allowed.
EXECUTIONS PENDING APPEAL
TEODORA SOBEJANA-CONDON V. COMELEC/LUIS
BAUTISTA/ROBELITO V. PICAR/WILMA P. PAGADUAN 678
SCRA 267 (2012)
Executions Pending Appeal - There is no reason to dispute
the Comelecs authority to order discretionary execution of
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judgment in view of the fact that the suppletory application of
the Rules of Court is expressly sanctioned by Section 1, Rule
41 of the Comelec Rules of Procedure. Under Section 2, Rule
39 of the Rules of Court, execution pending appeal may be
issued by an appellate court after the trial court has lost
jurisdiction. In Batul v. Bayron 424 SCRA 26 (2004), the Court
stressed the import of the provision vis--vis election cases
when we held that judgments in election cases which may be
executed pending appeal includes those decided by trial courts
and those rendered by the Comelec whether in the exercise of
its original or appellate jurisdiction.
Saludaga vs. Comelec 617 SCRA 601 The discretion to
allow execution pending reconsideration belongs to the division
that rendered the assailed decision, order or resolution, or the
Comelec en banc, as the case may be not to the presiding
Commissioner. A writ of execution pending resolution of the MR
of a decision of the division is not granted as a matter of right
such that its issuance becomes a ministerial duty that may be
dispensed even just by the Presiding Commission.
Calo v. Comelec 610 SCRA 342 The relevant rule provides
that a motion for execution pending appeal filed by the
prevailing party shall contain a 3-day notice to the adverse party
and execution pending appeal shall not issue without prior
notice and hearing. The purpose of these requirements is to
avoid surprises that may sprung upon the adverse party who
must be given time to study and meet the arguments in the
motion before a resolution by the court. Where a party had the
opportunity to be heard, then the purpose has been served and
the requirement substantially complied with. In this case, even
the Comelec admitted that respondent was heard and afforded
his day in court; hence, it should not have annulled the RTC
special order on said ground.
San Miguel vs. Comelec 609 SCRA 424 The law provides
that the court may issue execution pending appeal. Evident
from the usage of the word may, the language of the subject
provision denotes that it is merely directory, not mandatory, for
the trial court to issue the special order before the expiration of
the period to appeal. The trial court may still thereafter resolve
a motion for execution pending appeal, provided: (i) the motion
is filed within the 5-day reglementary period; and (ii) the special
order is issued prior to the transmittal of the records of the
Comelec.
Malaluan v. Comelec 254 SCRA 397, this was the first case
where a judge, acting without a precedent, granted the motion
for execution of its decision in an election protest case, pending
appeal. It was ruled that Sec. 2 Rule 39 of the Rules of Court
which allowed the RTC to order execution pending appeal upon
good reasons stated in a special order, may be made to apply
by analogy or suppletorily to election contest decided by it. The
posting of the supersedeas bond was considered good reasons
by the judge.
Camlian v. Comelec 271 SCRA, executions pending appeal
must be strictly construed against the movant as it is an
exception to the general rule on execution of judgments.
Ramas v. Comelec 286 SCRA 189, what may constitute good
reasons for execution pending appeal
The public interest involved or the will of the
electorate
The shortness of the remaining period of the term of
the contested office
The length of time that the election contest has been
pending.
The filing of a bond alone does not constitute good
reasons. Nevertheless, the trial court may require the filing of a
bond as condition for the issuance of the corresponding writ of
execution to answer for the payment of damages which the
aggrieved party may suffer by reason of the execution pending
appeal.
Fernando U. Batul v. Lucilo Bayron, et. al. 424 SCRA 26,
execution pending appeal in the discretion of the courts applies
suppletorily in election cases including those involving city and
provincial officials to obviate a hollow victory for the duly elected
candidate as determined either by the Court or by Comelec.
 ELECTION LAWS REVIEW
The Comelec resolution granting execution pending appeal (by
virtue of its original exclusive jurisdiction over all contest relating
to the E, R and Q of provincial and city officials) was raised
before the SC arguing that Sec. 2 Rule 39 cannot be applied
and the only ground that will validly sustain execution of a
decision by a Comelec division pending reconsideration is when
the MR is not pro forma.
Case of Ramas did not declare that such remedy is exclusive
only to election contests involving elective municipal and
barangay officials. Sec. 1 of Rule 41of the Comelec Rules of
Procedure expressly provides that pertinent provisions of the
Rules of Court shall be applicable by analogy or in a suppletory
character.
Navarosa v. Comelec 411 SCRA, the RTC in an election
protest case granted execution pending appeal by Esto after
finding that Esto won in the said election. In the same order the
judge allowed protestee Navaroza to stay the execution of the
decision pending appeal by filing a supersedeas bond in double
the amount posted by the protestant.. A Petition for Ceriorari
was filed by Esto with the Comelec where the Comelec 2 nd
division affirmed the trial courts order granting execution
pending appeal and nullified the stay of the execution. The
Comelec did not gravely abuse its discretion as it is for Comelec
in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction to issue the
extraordinary writs of certiorari, prohibition mandamus and
injunction over all contest involving elective municipal officials
decided by the trial court of general jurisdiction elevate on
appeal, and NOT the trial court, that may order the stay or
restrain the immediate execution of the decision pending appeal
granted by the trail court of general jurisdiction in an election
contest.
Except when the trial court reversed itself in a MR of its
order granting immediate execution, it cannot later on stay or
restrain the execution thereof in the guise of allowing the losing
party to file a supersedeas bond. The issue before the trial
court where a motion for execution pending appeal is filed is to
determine whether or not there are good reasons to justify the
immediate execution pending appeal. The issue is not whether
there are good reasons to stay the immediate execution of the
decision pending appeal.
LIM VS.COMELEC ET.AL. G.R. NO. 171952 March 08, 2007;
Torres vs. Abundo, Sr. 512 SCRA 556; - Before granting a
motion for execution pending appeal in election cases, the SC
laid down the following requisites
(1) there must be motion by the prevailing party with
notice to the adverse party
(2) there must be good reasons for the execution pending
appeal
(3) the order granting execution pending appeal must
state the good reasons.
Good reasons (Fermo v. Comelec)
1) public interest involved or will of the electorate
2) shortness of the remaining term of the contested office
3) length of time that the election contest has been
pending
Istarul vs. Comelec 491 SCRA 300 (2006) the length of time
that the election protest has been pending, thus, leaving
petitioner only 21 months as the remaining portion of the term to
serve as mayor, does not constitute good reasons to justify
execution pending appeal. Referring to Fermo, the SC held that
shortness of term: alone and by itself cannot justify premature
execution. It must be manifest in the decision sought to be
executed that the defeat of the protestee and the victory of the
protestant has been clearly established.
Trillanes IV. Vs. Pimentel, Sr. 556 SCRA 471 (relate to
Rodolfo Aguinaldo on the condonation issue) The case
against Trillanes is not administrative in nature. And there is no
prior term to speak of. In a plethora of cases, the Court
categorically held that the doctrine of condonation does not
apply to criminal cases. Election, or more precisely, election to
office, does not obliterate a criminal charge. Petitioners
electoral victory only signifies pertinently that when the voters
elected him to the Senate, they did so with full awareness of
the limitations on his freedom of action and with the knowledge
that he could achieve only such legislative results which he
could accomplish within the confines of prison.
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CAN DAMAGES BE AWARDED IN ELECTION PROTEST
CASES
Malaluan vs. Comelec, the Court ruled that damages cannot
be granted in an election protest case ratiocinating that the
provision of law allowing damages under specific
circumstances, more particularly compensatory and actual
damages is provided under Article 2176 of the Civil Code which
is appropriate only in breaches of obligations in contracts and
QC and on the occasion of crimes and QD where the defendant
may be held liable for damages the proximate cause of which is
the act or omission complained of.
Therefore, the monetary claim of a party in an election case
must necessarily be anchored in contract, QC, or a tortiuos act
or omission of a crime in order to effectively recover actual or
compensatory damages. In the absence of any or all of these,
the claimant must be able to point out a specific provision of law
authorizing a money claim for election protest expenses against
the losing party.
The bonds or cash deposits required by the Comelec
Rules of Procedure are in the nature of filing fees not damages
SUBSTITUTION OF PARTIES IN AN ELECTION
PROTESTCASE
Fernando Poe v. Arroyo March 29, 2005, the Court resolved the
issue on whether the widow may substitute/intervene for the
protestant who die during the pendency of the latters protest
case.
The fundamental rule applicable in a presidential
election protest is Rule 14 of the PET Rules which provides
only the registered candidate for Pres. or VP of the Philippines
who received the 2nd and 3rd highest number of votes may
contest the election of the P and VP, as the case may be, by
filing a verified petition with the Clerk of the PET within 30 days
after the proclamation of the winner.
The Court made reference in its ruling in Vda de Mesa
v. Mencias where it rejected substitution by the widow or the
heirs in election contest where the protestant dies during the
pendency of the protest on the grounds that the heirs are not
real parties in interest and that a public office is personal to the
public officer and not a property transmissible to the heirs upon
death. The Court pursuant to Rule 3, Section 15 of the rules of
Court, however, allowed substitution and intervention upon the
death of the protestee but by a real party in interest, one who
would be benefited or injured by the judgment and entitled to
avail of the suit. In the Mencias and Lumogdnag v. Javier
cases, the Court permitted substitution by the VM since the VM
is the real party in interest considering that if the protest
succeeds and the protestee is unseated, the VM succeeds to
the office of the mayor that becomes vacant if the one duly
elected cannot assume office.
The Court further held, that nobility of intentions is not the point
in reference in determining whether a person may intervene in
an election protest case.
PROSECUTION OF ELECTION CASES
Article IX-C Section 2(6) of the Constitution vests in the
Comelec the power and function to investigate and where
appropriate, prosecute cases of violations of election laws,
including acts or omissions constituting election frauds,
offenses and malpractices. This prosecutorial power of the
Comelec is reflected in Section 265 of BP 881. It is well settled
that the finding of probable cause in the prosecution of election
offenses rests in the Comelecs sound discretion. (Garcia v.
Comelec 611 SCRA 55 Jan. 2010)
Comelec v. Noynay, July 9, 1998, the Comelec resolved to file
an Information for violation of Section 261(i) of the OEC against
certain public school officials for having engaged in partisan
political activities which was filed by its Regional Director with
Branch 23 of RTC of Allen Northern Samar presided by Judge
Tomas B. Noynay. The judge ordered the records of the cases
to be withdrawn and directed the Comelec to file the cases with
the MTC on the ground that pursuant to Section 32 of BP 129
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as amended by RA 7691, the RTC has no jurisdiction over the
cases since the maximum imposable penalty in each of the
cases does not exceed 6 years imprisonment. The SC ruled
that RA 7691 did not divest the RTC of jurisdiction over election
offenses which are punishable with imprisonment of not
exceeding 6 years. The opening sentence of Section 32,
provides that the exclusive original jurisdiction of Metropolitan
Trial Courts, MTC and MCTC does not cover those criminal
cases which by specific provisions of law fall within the
exclusive jurisdiction of the RTC and of the SB, regardless of
the penalty prescribed therefore.
Comelec vs. Espanol 417 SCRA 554, it was ruled that the
Comelec, thru its duly authorized legal officers, under Section
265 of the OEC, has the exclusive power to conduct preliminary
investigation of all election offenses punishable under the OEC
and to prosecute the same. The acts of these deputies within
the lawful scope of their delegated authority are the acts of the
Comelec.
Garcia v. Commission on Elections 611 SCRA 55
Generally, the Court will not interfere with the finding of
probable cause by the Comelec absent a clear showing of
grave abuse of discretion.
Pp. v. Inting July 25, 1990, Comelec is given exclusive
authority to investigate and conduct preliminary investigations
relative to commission of election offenses and prosecute the
same. A preliminary investigation conducted by the Provincial
Election Supervisor involving an election offense does not have
to be coursed through the Provincial Prosecutor before the RTC
may take cognizance of the investigation and determine
whether or not probable cause exist to issue a warrant of arrest.
If the Provincial Prosecutor performs any role at all as regards
the prosecution of an election case, it is by delegation or that he
was deputized by the Comelec.
Faelnar v. People 331 SCRA 429, (a) where the State
Prosecutor, or Provincial or City Prosecutor exercises the power
to conduct preliminary investigation of election offense cases
and after the investigation submits its recommendation to the
Comelec, the issue of probable cause is already resolved. The
proper remedy to question the said resolution is to file an
appeal with the COMELEC and the ruling of the Comelec on
the appeal would be immediately final and executory.
(b) If the preliminary investigation of the complaint for an
election offence is conducted by the Comelec, the investigation
officer prepares its recommendation to the Law Department
which department in turn makes its recommendation to the
Comelec en banc on whether there is probable cause to
prosecute. It is the Comelec en banc which determines the
existence of probable cause. The proper remedy of the
aggrieved party is to file a Motion for Reconsideration of such
resolution. This effectively allows for a review of the original
resolution, in the same manner that the Comelec on appeal, or
motu propio, may review the resolution of the State prosecutor,
or Provincial or city fiscal. (Take note that since this is an
election offense a Motion for Reconsideration of an En Banc
resolution is allowed.)
Herman Tiu Laurel vs. RTC Judge of Manila Br. 10 and
Comelec, the SC upheld the power of Comelec to prosecute
cases of violations of election laws and further explained that
there are two (2) ways through which a complaint for
election offenses may be initiated.
(1) it may be filed by the Comelec motu propio or
(2) it may be filed via written complaint by any citizen
of the Philippines, candidate, registered political party, coalition
of political parties or organizations under the party-list system or
any accredited citizen arms of the commission.
Motu propio complaints may be signed by the
Chairman of the Comelec and need not be verified. But those
complaints filed by parties other than the Comelec must be
verified and supported by affidavits and other evidence.
The complaint shall be filed with the Comelec Law
Department or with the offices of the EO, PES or RED, or the
State Prosecutors, provincial or city prosecutors. Whether
initiated motu propio or filed with the Comelec by any party, the
complaint shall be referred to the Comelec Law Department for
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investigation. Upon the direction of the Chairman, the PI may
be delegated to any lawyer of the Department, any RED or
PES, or any Comelec lawyer.
Comelec v. Silva Feb. 10, 1998, the SC settled the issue as to
whether the Chief State Prosecutor, who was designated by the
Comelec to prosecute election cases, has the authority to
decide whether or not to appeal from the orders of dismissal of
the RTC. It was held that the authority belongs to the Comelec
and not the prosecutor as the latter derive its authority from the
Comelec and not from their offices. Propriety dictates, that if
the prosecutor believes, after the conduct of the PI, that no
probable cause warrants the prosecution of the accused who
have allegedly violated Sec. 27 of RA 6646 (tampering of
certificate of canvass), the matter would have been discussed
with the Comelec and if the latter disagrees, seek permission to
withdraw from the case.
Dino vs. Olivares 607 SCRA 251 (2009). The SC held that
being mere deputies or agents of the Comelec (with continuing
authority), provincial or city prosecutors deputized by it are
expected to act in accord with and NOT contrary to or in
derogation of its resolutions, directives or orders in relation to
election cases that such prosecutors are deputized to
investigate and prosecute. They must proceed within the lawful
scope of their delegated authority.
Such authority may be revoked or withdrawn anytime by the
Comelec, either expressly or impliedly, when in its judgment
such revocation or withdrawal is necessary to protect the
integrity of the process to promote the common good, or where
it believes that successful prosecution of the case can be done
by the Comelec.
When the Comelec en banc directed the City Prosecutor of
Paranaque to transmit the entire records of the election offense
case, it had the effect of SUSPENDING THE AUTHORITY of
the City Prosecutor. Hence, the filing of the amended
information and the amended information themselves, is
declared void and of no effect.
Kilosbayan vs. Comelec 280 SCRA 892, Kilosbayan filed a
letter-complaint with the Comelec against incumbent officials
running for public elective office for violation of Sec. 261 of the
OEC alleging illegal disbursement of public funds and
submitting as evidence to support the complaint, published
writings in newspapers without any additional evidence to
support the newspaper articles on the argument that it was the
Comelecs constitutional duty to prosecute election offenses
upon any information of alleged commission of election
offenses. The Comelec dismissed the complaint there being on
probable cause found. The SC rued that it is not the duty of
the Comelec to search for evidence to prove an election
complaint filed before it. The task of Comelec as
investigator and prosecutor is not the physical searching
and gathering of proof in support of the alleged
commission of an election offense. The complainant still
has the burden to prove his complaint.
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