Commissioner of Internal Revenue vs. Court of Appeals, 298 SCRA 83, G.R. No.
124043 October 14, Constitutional Law; State immunity from suit; Waiver.The State is, of course, immune from suit in the sense
1998
Same; Same; Distinction between a question of law and a question of fact.The distinction between a
question of law and a question of fact is clear-cut. It has been held that [t]here is a question of law in a given
case when the doubt or difference arises as to what the law is on a certain state of facts; there is a question of
fact when the doubt or difference arises as to the truth or falsehood of alleged facts.
Villanueva vs. Court of Appeals, 294 SCRA 90, G.R. No. 127997 August 7, 1998
Actions; Pleadings and Practice; Appeals; Finality of Findings of Fact; Jurisdiction of this Court in cases
brought to it from the Court of Appeals is limited to the review and revision of errors of law allegedly committed
by the appellate court, as its findings of fact are deemed conclusive.Time and again it has been ruled that
the jurisdiction of this Court in cases brought to it from the Court of Appeals is limited to the review and
revision of errors of law allegedly committed by the appellate court, as its findings of fact are deemed
conclusive.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Exceptions.Court is not dutybound to analyze and weigh all over again the
evidence already considered in the proceedings below. The rule, however, admits of the following exceptions:
(1) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (2) when there is a grave abuse of
discretion; (3) when the finding is grounded entirely on speculations, surmises or conjectures; (4) when the
judgment of the Court of Appeals is based on misapprehension of facts; (5) when the findings are conflicting;
(6) when the Court of Appeals, in making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case and the same is
contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee; (7) when the findings of the Court of Appeals are
contrary to those of the trial court; (8) when the findings of fact are conclusions without citation of specific
evidence on which they are based; (9) when the Court of Appeals manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts
not disputed by the parties and which, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion; and (10)
when the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are premised on the absence of evidence and are
contradicted by the evidence on record.
Republic vs. Sandiganbayan, 204 SCRA 212, G.R. No. 90478 November 21, 1991
Civil Procedure; Modes of discovery.The various modes or instruments of discovery are meant to serve (1)
as a device, along with the pre-trial hearing under Rule 20, to narrow and clarify the basic issues between the
parties, and (2) as a device for ascertaining the facts relative to those issues. The evident purpose is, to repeat,
to enable the parties, consistent with recognized privileges, to obtain the fullest possible knowledge of the
issues and facts before civil trials and thus prevent that said trials are carried on in the dark. To this end, the
field of inquiry that may be covered by depositions or interrogatories is as broad as when the interrogated
party is called as a witness to testify orally at trial. The inquiry extends to all facts which are relevant, whether
they be ultimate or evidentiary, excepting only those matters which are privileged. The objective is as much to
give every party the fullest possible information of all the relevant facts before the trial as to obtain evidence
for use upon said trial.
Same; Same; Leave of court not necessary.In line with this principle of according liberal treatment to the
deposition-discovery mechanism, such modes of discovery as (a) depositions (whether by oral examination or
written interrogatories) under Rule 24, (b) interrogatories to parties under Rule 25, and (c) requests for
admissions under Rule 26, may be availed of without leave of court, and generally, without court intervention.
The Rules of Court explicitly provide that leave of court is not necessary to avail of said modes of discovery
after an answer to the complaint has been served. It is only when an answer has not yet been filed (but after
jurisdiction has been obtained over the defendant or property subject of the action) that prior leave of court is
needed to avail of these modes of discovery, the reason being that at that time the issues are not yet joined
and the disputed facts are not clear.
Same; Same; Leave of court, when required.On the other hand, leave of court is required as regards
discovery by (a) production or inspection of documents or things in accordance with Rule 27, or (b) physical
and mental examination of persons under Rule ,28, which may be granted upon due application and a
showing of due, cause.
that it cannot, as a rule, be sued without its consent. But it is axiomatic that in filing an action, it divests itself of
its sovereign character and sheds its immunity from suit, descending to the level of an ordinary litigant. The
PCGG cannot claim a superior or preferred status to the State, even while assuming to represent or act for the
State. The suggestion that the State makes no implied waiver of immunity by filing suit except when in so
doing it acts in, or in matters concerning, its proprietary or non-governmental capacity, is unacceptable; it
attempts a distinction without support in principle or precedent. On the contrary-"The consent of the State to
be sued may be given expressly or impliedly. Express consent may be manifested either through a general
law or a special law. Implied consent is given when the State itself commences litigation or when it enters into
a contract.
Fortune Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, 229 SCRA 355, G.R. No. 108119 January 19, 1994
Remedial Law; Deposition; Rules providing for pre-trial discovery of testimony, inspection of documentary
evidence and other tangible things and the examination of property and person were an important innovation
in the rules of procedure.The rules providing for pre-trial discovery of testimony, pre-trial inspection of
documentary evidence and other tangible things, and the examination of property and person, were an
important innovation in the rules of procedure. The promulgation of this group of rules satisfied the long-felt
need for a legal machinery in the courts to supplement the pleadings, for the purpose of disclosing the real
points of dispute between the parties and of affording an adequate factual basis in preparation for trial. The
rules are not grounded on the supposition that the pleadings are the only or chief basis of preparation for trial.
On the contrary, the limitations of the pleadings in this respect are recognized.
Same; Same; Same; Experience had shown that the most effective legal machinery for reducing and clarifying
the issues was a preliminary examination.Thus the rules provide for simplicity and brevity in pleadings,
which in most cases will terminate with the answer; and at the same time adapt the old and familiar deposition
procedure to serve as a device for ascertaining before trial what facts are really in dispute and need to be tried.
Experience had shown that the most effective legal machinery for reducing and clarifying the issues was a
preliminary examination, as broad in scope as the trial itself, of the evidence of both parties.
Same; Same; Section 16 of Rule 24 explicitly vests in the court the power to order that the deposition shall not
be taken and this grant connotes the authority to exercise discretion in connection therewith.This provision
explicitly vests in the court the power to order that the deposition shall not be taken and this grant connotes
the authority to exercise discretion in connection therewith. It is well settled, however, that the discretion
conferred by law is not unlimited; that it must be exercised, not arbitrarily, capriciously, or oppressively, but in
a reasonable manner and in consonance with the spirit of the law, to the end that its purpose may be attained.
Same; Same; Same; Certiorari will not lie to review or correct discovery orders made prior to trial.The rule is
that certiorari will generally not lie to review a discretionary action of any tribunal. Also, as a general
proposition, a writ of certiorari is available only to review final judgments or decrees, and will be refused where
there has been no final judgment or order and the proceeding for which the writ is sought is still pending and
undetermined in the lower tribunal. Pursuant to this rule, it has been held that certiorari will not lie to review or
correct discovery orders made prior to trial. This is because, like other discovery orders, orders made under
Section 16, Rule 24 are interlocutory and not appealable, considering that they do not finally dispose of the
proceeding or of any independent offshoot of it.
and other tangible things, and the examination of property and person, were an important innovation in the
rules of procedure. The promulgation of this group of rules satisfied the long-felt need for a legal machinery in
the courts to supplement the pleadings, for the purpose of disclosing the real points of dispute between the
parties and of affording an adequate factual basis in preparation for trial. The rules are not grounded on the
supposition that the pleadings are the only or chief basis of preparation for trial. On the contrary, the limitations
of the pleadings in this respect are recognized.
Same; Same; Same; Experience had shown that the most effective legal machinery for reducing and clarifying
the issues was a preliminary examination.Thus the rules provide for simplicity and brevity in pleadings,
which in most cases will terminate with the answer; and at the same time adapt the old and familiar deposition
procedure to serve as a device for ascertaining before trial what facts are really in dispute and need to be tried.
Experience had shown that the most effective legal machinery for reducing and clarifying the issues was a
preliminary examination, as broad in scope as the trial itself, of the evidence of both parties.
Same; Same; Section 16 of Rule 24 explicitly vests in the court the power to order that the deposition shall not
be taken and this grant connotes the authority to exercise discretion in connection therewith.This provision
explicitly vests in the court the power to order that the deposition shall not be taken and this grant connotes
the authority to exercise discretion in connection therewith. It is well settled, however, that the discretion
conferred by law is not unlimited; that it must be exercised, not arbitrarily, capriciously, or oppressively, but in
a reasonable manner and in consonance with the spirit of the law, to the end that its purpose may be attained.
Same; Same; Same; Certiorari will not lie to review or correct discovery orders made prior to trial.The rule is
that certiorari will generally not lie to review a discretionary action of any tribunal. Also, as a general
proposition, a writ of certiorari is available only to review final judgments or decrees, and will be refused where
there has been no final judgment or order and the proceeding for which the writ is sought is still pending and
undetermined in the lower tribunal. Pursuant to this rule, it has been held that certiorari will not lie to review or
correct discovery orders made prior to trial. This is because, like other discovery orders, orders made under
Section 16, Rule 24 are interlocutory and not appealable, considering that they do not finally dispose of the
proceeding or of any independent offshoot of it.
People vs. Parungao, 265 SCRA 140, G.R. No. 125812 November 28, 1996
Criminal Law; Evidence; Witnesses; Hearsay Evidence; The testimony of witnesses who testified and
conveyed to the court matters not of their own personal knowledge but matters only narrated to them by other
persons is not sufficient to prove the fact sought to be established.Plainly the foregoing testimony of Quito,
Pilapil, and Aldana that accused-appellant was the mastermind of the jailbreak is not sufficient to prove such
fact, such evidence being merely hearsay because said witnesses testified and conveyed to the court matters
not of their own personal knowledge but matters only narrated to them by other detainees. There is nothing in
their testimony pointing to accused-appellant as the very source of their information that he planned the
jailbreak. However, it must be noted that neither accused-appellant nor his counsel objected to the admission
of the testimony of Quito, Pilapil, and Aldana.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Admissibility of evidence should not be equated with weight of evidence
hearsay evidence whether objected to or not can not be given credence for it has no probative value.The
general rule is that hearsay evidence is not admissible. However, the lack of objection to hearsay testimony
may result in its being admitted as evidence. But one should not be misled into thinking that such declarations
are thereby impressed with probative value. Admissibility of evidence should not be equated with weight of
evidence. Hearsay evidence whether objected to or not be given credence for it has no probative value.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Constitutional Law; Right of Confrontation; Cross-Examination; To give weight to
the hearsay testimony of witnesses and to make the same the basis for finding the accused a co-conspirator
and for imposing the penalty of life imprisonment gravely violates the hearsay rule and the constitutional right
of the accused to meet the witnesses face-to-face and to subject the source of the information to the rigid test
of cross-examination, the only effective means to test their truthfulness, memory, and intelligence.To give
weight to the hearsay testimony of Quito, Pilapil, and Aldana, and to make the same the basis for finding
accused-appellant a coconspirator and for imposing the penalty of life imprisonment, gravely violates the
hearsay rule and the constitutional right of the accused-appellant to meet the witnesses face-to-face and to
subject the source of the information to the rigid test of cross-examination, the only effective means to test
their truthfulness, memory, and intelligence. In case of conflict between a provision of the Constitution giving
the accused a substantive right and mere technical rules of evidence, we have no choice but to give effect to
the Constitution. (People vs. Valero, 112 SCRA 661 [1982]).
Same; Same; Robbery with Homicide; Conspiracy; Principals; For utterances of an accused to make him a
principal by inducement, the same must be of such a nature and uttered in such a manner as to become the
determining cause of the crime to serve such purpose, and that such inducement was uttered with the
intention of producing the result.This Court has held that for utterances of an accused to make him a
principal by inducement, the same must be of such a nature and uttered in such a manner as to become the
determining cause of the crime to serve such purpose, and that such inducement was uttered with the
intention of producing the result (People vs. Caimbre, et al., G.R. No. L-12087, Dec. 29, 1960; People vs.
Castillo, 17 SCRA 721 [1966]; People vs. Canial, 46 SCRA 634 [1972]). In other words, the inciting words
must have great dominance and influence over the person who acts; they ought to be direct and as efficacious,
or powerful as physical or moral coercion or violence itself. Thus, where the alleged inducement to commit the
crime was no longer necessary to incite the assailant, the utterer can not be held accountable for the crime as
a principal by inducement (People us, Canial, 46 SCRA 634, [1972]; People vs. Indanan, 24 Phil. 203).
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Although there is no direct evidence of prior agreement to commit the
crime, conspiracy may be inferred from the acts of the accused before, during and after the crime which are
indicative of a joint purpose, concerted action, and concurrence of sentiments.Conspiracy has not been
established beyond reasonable doubt. It is a rule that although there is no direct evidence of prior agreement
to commit the crime, conspiracy may be inferred from the acts of the accused before, during, and after the
crime which are indicative of a joint purpose, concerted action, and concurrence of sentiments (People vs. de
Leon, et al., 245 SCRA 538 [1995]). The record is bereft of any evidence indicating a prior plan or agreement
between accused-appellant and the other inmates in the implementation of a common design to bolt jail, kill
the guards, and rob the prison armory. There is no evidence that accused-appellant participated in the killing
of the two guards, Basa and Velencia, nor in inflicting injuries on Aldana. In fact, accusedappellant before,
during, and after the incident never left his cell.
Prats & Co. vs. Phoenix Insurance Co., 54 Phil. 491, No. 31984 February 25, 1930
1.WHEN DELAY WILL BE CONSTRUED AS AN ABANDONMENT.Where it appears that the process of
garnishment of the intervenors was served on the insurance companies on December 11, 1924, and it does
not appear that the intervenors did anything more until they filed their motion to intervene on May 6, 1929, and
that beyond serving the notice of garnishee that the intervenors did nothing more to prosecute or perfect their
garnishee proceedings, or that they ever claimed or asserted any right, title or interest in the money in dispute
until the 6th of May, 1929, such a delay of nearly four and a half years will be construed as an abandonment of
any legal rights the intervenors may have had by reason of their garnishee. (28 C. J., p. 359.)
2.CREDITOR SHOULD PROSECUTE GARNISHEE PROCEEDINGS WITH REASONABLE DILIGENCE.A
creditor with reasonable diligence should prosecute his proceedings against the garnishee, and a delay of four
years or more after service of the garnishee notice before citing the garnishee to appear and answer is fatal to
the garnishee proceedings.
People vs. Precioso, 221 SCRA 748, G.R. No. 95890 May 12, 1993
Criminal Law; Defense of Alibi; The alibi of accused Precioso that he was sleeping in the house of his
grandmother, admittedly only around 150 meters away from the house of the complainants, cannot be
sustained considering that it will not suffice to prove that he was somewhere else when the crime was
committed but that it was physically impossible for him to have been at the scene of the crime.Precioso
claimed that when the crime was committed, he was sleeping in the house of his grandmother, but said house
is admittedly only around 150 meters away from the house of the Galvadores spouses. His pretension,
therefore, cannot be sustained in the face of the settled rule that it is not enough to prove that he was
somewhere else when the crime was committed but he must likewise show that it was physically impossible
for him to have been at the scene of the crime.
Same; Same; The alibi of accused Monforte that he was working at the time of the commission of the crime
was negated by the rebuttal evidence showing a certification to the effect that the Cortes bandsaw was not
operational at the time thereof because of the disconnection of its electrical power by ASELCO.Monforte, on
the other hand, would like to convince the trial court that he was working at the time. However, the lower court
correctly made short shrift of said defense with this terse documented observation: Gerardo Monforte also
negated the accusation, giving as a reason thereof that they had an overtime at the bandsaw of Lucio Cortes
that fateful evening. Nonetheless, the prosecution on rebuttal, presented a (c)ertification that at the time of the
incident, there was no operation at the Cortes bandsaw because their electrical power was disconnected by
ASELCO on July 25, 1985 (Exhs. H and H-1) and reconnected only on August 12, 1985 (Exhs. I and I-1
for non-payment of electric bills. (TSN, p. 4 & 5, x x x August 8, 1989).
Same; Same; Flight; Absence of flight from scene of the crime by the accused is not indicative of clear
conscience or a conclusive proof of innocence and does not hold weight against the definite and inarguable
identification of the author of the crime by prosecution witnesses.Furthermore, we have ruled that an
accused may not have fled from the scene of the crime, but this is not necessarily indicative of a clear
conscience. The crime may have been committed with impunity and the accused may have thought that the
victim or his heirs would not complain, or that eyewitnesses will not be able to identify him. Appellants
pretended innocence is clearly non-sequitur to his decision not to flee. Apart from the fact that there is no case
law holding that non-flight is a conclusive proof of innocence, the argument does not hold weight in the light of
definite and inarguable identification of appellant. The material factor here is that there is positive identification
of him as the author of the crime.
Same; Robbery with Rape; There exists no composite crime of robbery in band with multiple rape but that it
must be denominated as robbery with rape, with band as a more aggravating circumstance.However, the
crime charged in the case at bar cannot be correctly categorized or denominated as robbery in band with
multiple rape as there is no such composite crime. This is not a controversial problem nor one of first
impression since this question has long been laid to rest, yet we continue to be confronted with this
terminological faux pas in cases brought to us on appeal. In fact, neither the prosecution, the defense, the trial
court nor the Solicitor General took note of that mistake in this case. Accordingly, it behooves the prosecuting
agencies and the lower courts to review the case of People vs. Apduhan, Jr., wherein this Court exhaustively
explained the nature of the crime and how the aggravating circumstance of band may be properly appreciated.
xxx Therefore, following the aforementioned ruling which applies with equal force to paragraph 2 of Article 294,
the offense in the case at bar is the special complex crime of robbery with rape. Cuadrilla, in this instance, is
merely a generic aggravating circumstance.
Same; Same; Reclusion Perpetua is the proper penalty imposable in the Special Complex Crime of Robbery
with Rape, with the Indeterminate Sentence Law finding no application therein.Withal, the lower court did
not err in imposing the penalty of reclusion perpetua, wherein it also took note of the proscription against the
death penalty, and in thereafter holding that when a penalty is single (and) indivisible, it shall be applied
regardless of any mitigating or aggravating circumstances (Art. 63, Revised Penal Code). Such being the case,
(the) Indeterminate Sentence Law could not be invoked (Sec. 2, [Act] 4103, as amended).
Expertravel & Tours, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 459 SCRA 147, G.R. No. 152392 May 26, 2005
Actions; Pleadings and Practice; Certificate of Non-Forum Shopping; Corporations; The requirement to file a
certificate of non-forum shopping is mandatory and the failure to comply with this requirement cannot be
excused; Where the plaintiff is a private corporation, the certification may be signed, for and on behalf of the
said corporation, by a specifically authorized person, including its retained counsel, who has personal
knowledge of the facts required to be established by the documents.It is settled that the requirement to file a
certificate of non-forum shopping is mandatory and that the failure to comply with this requirement cannot be
excused. The certification is a peculiar and personal responsibility of the party, an assurance given to the court
or other tribunal that there are no other pending cases involving basically the same parties, issues and causes
of action.
Hence, the certification must be accomplished by the party himself because he has actual knowledge of
whether or not he has initiated similar actions or proceedings in different courts or tribunals. Even his counsel
may be unaware of such facts. Hence, the requisite certification executed by the plaintiffs counsel will not
suffice. In a case where the plaintiff is a private corporation, the certification may be signed, for and on behalf
of the said corporation, by a specifically authorized person, including its retained counsel, who has personal
knowledge of the facts required to be established by the documents.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Attorneys; The certificate of non-forum shopping may be incorporated in the
complaint or appended thereto as an integral part of the complaint; If the authority of a partys counsel to
execute a certificate of non-forum shopping is disputed by the adverse party, the former is required to show
proof of such authority or representation.The certificate of non-forum shopping may be incorporated in the
complaint or appended thereto as an integral part of the complaint. The rule is that compliance with the rule
after the filing of the complaint, or the dismissal of a complaint based on its non-compliance with the rule, is
impermissible. However, in exceptional circumstances, the court may allow subsequent compliance with the
rule. If the authority of a partys counsel to execute a certificate of non-forum shopping is disputed by the
adverse party, the former is required to show proof of such authority or representation. In this case, the
petitioner, as the defendant in the RTC, assailed the authority of Atty. Aguinaldo to execute the requisite
verification and certificate of non-forum shopping as the resident agent and counsel of the respondent. It was,
thus, incumbent upon the respondent, as the plaintiff, to allege and establish that Atty. Aguinaldo had such
authority to execute the requisite verification and certification for and in its behalf. The respondent, however,
failed to do so.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Foreign Corporations; Resident Agents; Being a resident agent of a
foreign corporation does not mean that he is authorized to execute the requisite certification against forum
shoppingwhile a resident agent may be aware of actions filed against his principal (a foreign corporation
doing business in the Philippines), he may not be aware of actions initiated by its principal, whether in the
Philippines against a domestic corporation or private individual, or in the country where such corporation was
organized and registered, against a Philippine registered corporation or a Filipino citizen.While Atty.
Aguinaldo is the resident agent of the respondent in the Philippines, this does not mean that he is authorized
to execute the requisite certification against forum shopping. Under Section 127, in relation to Section 128 of
the Corporation Code, the authority of the resident agent of a foreign corporation with license to do business in
the Philippines is to receive, for and in behalf of the foreign corporation, services and other legal processes in
all actions and other legal proceedings against such corporation, thus: * * * Under the law, Atty. Aguinaldo was
not specifically authorized to execute a certificate of non-forum shopping as required by Section 5, Rule 7 of
the Rules of Court. This is because while a resident agent may be aware of actions filed against his principal
(a foreign corporation doing business in the Philippines), such resident may not be aware of actions initiated
by its principal, whether in the Philippines against a domestic corporation or private individual, or in the country
where such corporation was organized and registered, against a Philippine registered corporation or a Filipino
citizen.
Same; Evidence; Judicial Notice; The principal guide in determining what facts may be assumed to be
judicially known is that of notoriety.Generally speaking, matters of judicial notice have three
material requisites: (1) the matter must be one of common and general knowledge; (2) it must be well
and authoritatively settled and not doubtful or uncertain; and (3) it must be known to be within the
limits of the jurisdiction of the court. The principal guide in determining what facts may be assumed to
be judicially known is that of notoriety. Hence, it can be said that judicial notice is limited to facts
evidenced by public records and facts of general notoriety. Moreover, a judicially noticed fact must be
one not subject to a reasonable dispute in that it is either: (1) generally known within the territorial
jurisdiction of the trial court; or (2) capable of accurate and ready determination by resorting to
sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questionable.
Same; Same; Same; A court cannot take judicial notice of any fact which, in part, is dependent on the
existence or non-existence of a fact which the court has no constructive knowledge.Things of common
knowledge, of which courts take judicial matters coming to the knowledge of men generally in the course of
the ordinary experiences of life, or they may be matters which are generally accepted by mankind as true and
are capable of ready and unquestioned demonstration. Thus, facts which are universally known, and which
may be found in encyclopedias, dictionaries or other publications, are judicially noticed, provided, they are of
such universal notoriety and so generally understood that they may be regarded as forming part of the
common knowledge of every person. As the common knowledge of man ranges far and wide, a wide variety of
particular facts have been judicially noticed as being matters of common knowledge. But a court cannot take
judicial notice of any fact which, in part, is dependent on the existence or non-existence of a fact of which the
court has no constructive knowledge.
Same; Same; Same; Telecommunications; Teleconferencing; Types; Words and Phrases; In this age of
modern technology, the courts may take judicial notice that business transactions may be made by individuals
through teleconferencing; Teleconferencing is interactive group communication (three or more people in two or
more locations) through an electronic medium, bringing people together under one roof even though they are
separated by hundreds of miles.In this age of modern technology, the courts may take judicial notice that
business transactions may be made by individuals through teleconferencing. Teleconferencing is interactive
group communication (three or more people in two or more locations) through an electronic medium. In
general terms, teleconferencing can bring people together under one roof even though they are separated by
hundreds of miles. This type of group communication may be used in a number of ways, and have three basic
types: (1) video conferencingtelevision-like communication augmented with sound; (2) computer
conferencingprinted communication through keyboard terminals, and (3) audio-conferencingverbal
communication via the telephone with optional capacity for telewriting or telecopying. A teleconference
represents a unique alternative to face-to-face (FTF) meetings. It was first introduced in the 1960s with
American Telephone and Telegraphs Picturephone. At that time, however, no demand existed for the new
technology. Travel costs were reasonable and consumers were unwilling to pay the monthly service charge for
using the picturephone, which was regarded as more of a novelty than as an actual means for everyday
communication. In time, people found it advantageous to hold teleconferencing in the course of business and
corporate governance, because of the money saved, among other advantages.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Corporation Law; In the Philippines, teleconferencing and
videoconferencing of members of the board of directors of private corporations is a reality in light of R.A. No.
8792.In the Philippines, teleconferencing and videoconferencing of members of board of directors of private
corporations is a reality, in light of Republic Act No. 8792. The Securities and Exchange Commission issued
SEC Memorandum Circular No. 15, on November 30, 2001, providing the guide-lines to be complied with
related to such conferences. Thus, the Court agrees with the RTC that persons in the Philippines may have a
teleconference with a group of persons in South Korea relating to business transactions or corporate
governance.
Estrada vs. Desierto, 353 SCRA 452, G.R. Nos. 146710-15, G.R. No. 146738 March 2, 2001
Political Law; Constitutional Law; Judicial Review; Separation of Powers; Political Question Doctrine;
Developed by the courts in the 20th century, the political question doctrine which rests on the principle of
separation of powers and on prudential considerations, continue to be refined in the mills of constitutional
law.To be sure, courts here and abroad, have tried to lift the shroud on political question but its exact
latitude still splits the best of legal minds. Developed by the courts in the 20th century, the political question
doctrine which rests on the principle of separation of powers and on prudential considerations, continue to be
refined in the mills of constitutional law. In the United States, the most authoritative guidelines to determine
whether a question is political were spelled out by Mr. Justice Brennan in the 1962 case of Baker v. Carr, viz.:
x x x Prominent on the surface of any case held to involve a political question is found a textually
demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department or a lack of judicially
discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it, or the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy
determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretions; or the impossibility of a courts undertaking
independent resolution without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of government; or an
unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made; or the potentiality of
embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various departments on question. Unless one of these
formulations, is inextricable from the case at bar, there should be no dismissal for non justiciability on the
ground of a political questions presence. The doctrine of which we treat is one of political questions, not of grievance which are the cutting edge of EDSA People Power II is not inappropriate.
political cases.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; To a great degree, the 1987 Constitution has narrowed the reach of the
political question doctrine when it expanded the power of judicial review of the Supreme Court not only to
settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable but also to
determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of government.In the Philippine setting, this Court
has been continuously confronted with cases calling for a firmer delineation of the inner and outer perimeters
of a political question. Our leading case is Taada v. Cuenco, where this Court, through former Chief Justice
Roberto Concepcion, held that political questions refer to those questions which, under the Constitution, are
to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has
been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the government. It is concerned with issues
dependent upon the wisdom, not legality of a particular measure. To a great degree, the 1987 Constitution
has narrowed the reach of the political question doctrine when it expanded the power of judicial review of this
court not only to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable but
also to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of government. Heretofore, the judiciary has focused
on the thou shalt nots of the Constitution directed against the exercise of its jurisdiction. With the new
provision, however, courts are given a greater prerogative to determine what it can do to prevent grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of
government. Clearly, the new provision did not just grant the Court power of doing nothing. In sync and
symmetry with this intent are other provisions of the 1987 Constitution trimming the so called political thicket.
Prominent of these provisions is section 18 of Article VII which empowers this Court in limpid language to x x
x review, in an appropriate proceeding filed by any citizen, the sufficiency of the factual basis of the
proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ (of habeas corpus) or the extension
thereof x x x.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; People Power; Revolutionary Governments; It is familiar learning that the
legitimacy of a government sired by a successful revolution by people power is beyond judicial scrutiny for that
government automatically orbits out of the constitutional loop.Respondents rely on the case of Lawyers
League for a Better Philippines and/or Oliver A. Lozano v. President Corazon C. Aquino, et al. and related
cases to support their thesis that since the cases at bar involve the legitimacy of the government of
respondent Arroyo, ergo, they present a political question. A more cerebral reading of the cited cases will
show that they are inapplicable. In the cited cases, we held that the government of former President Aquino
was the result of a successful revolution by the sovereign people, albeit a peaceful one. No less than the
Freedom Constitution declared that the Aquino government was installed through a direct exercise of the
power of the Filipino people in defiance of the provisions of the 1973 Constitution, as amended. It is familiar
learning that the legitimacy of a government sired by a successful revolution by people power is beyond
judicial scrutiny for that government automatically orbits out of the constitutional loop. In checkered contrast,
the government of respondent Arroyo is not revolutionary in character. The oath that she took at the EDSA
Shrine is the oath under the 1987 Constitution. In her oath, she categorically swore to preserve and defend the
1987 Constitution. Indeed, she has stressed that she is discharging the powers of the presidency under the
authority of the 1987 Constitution.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Freedom of Expression; EDSA I involves the exercise of the
people power of revolution which overthrew the whole government while EDSA II is an exercise of people
power of freedom of speech and freedom of assembly to petition the government for redress of grievances
which only affected the office of the PresidentEDSA I is extra constitutional but EDSA II is intra constitutional,
the former presenting a political question and the latter involving legal questions.In fine, the legal distinction
between EDSA People Power I and EDSA People Power II is clear. EDSA I involves the exercise of the
people power of revolution which overthrew the whole government. EDSA II is an exercise of people power of
freedom of speech and freedom of assembly to petition the government for redress of grievances which only
affected the office of the President. EDSA I is extra constitutional and the legitimacy of the new government
that resulted from it cannot be the subject of judicial review, but EDSA II is intra constitutional and the
resignation of the sitting President that it caused and the succession of the Vice President as President are
subject to judicial review. EDSA I presented a political question; EDSA II involves legal questions. A brief
discourse on freedom of speech and of the freedom of assembly to petition the government for redress of
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Freedom of speech and of assembly provides a
framework in which the conflict necessary to the progress of a society can take place without destroying the
society.The indispensability of the peoples freedom of speech and of assembly to democracy is now self-
evident. The reasons are well put by Emerson: first, freedom of expression is essential as a means of assuring
individual fulfillment; second, it is an essential process for advancing knowledge and discovering truth; third, it
is essential to provide for participation in decision-making by all members of society; and fourth, it is a method
of achieving a more adaptable and hence, a more stable community of maintaining the precarious balance
between healthy cleavage and necessary consensus. In this sense, freedom of speech and of assembly
provides a framework in which the conflict necessary to the progress of a society can take place without
destroying the society. In Hague v. Committee for Industrial Organization, this function of free speech and
assembly was echoed in the amicus curiae brief filed by the Bill of Rights Committee of the American Bar
Association which emphasized that the basis of the right of assembly is the substitution of the expression of
opinion and belief by talk rather than force; and this means talk for all and by all. In the relatively recent case
of Subayco v. Sandiganbayan, this Court similarly stressed that . . . it should be clear even to those with
intellectual deficits that when the sovereign people assemble to petition for redress of grievances, all should
listen. For in a democracy, it is the people who count; those who are deaf to their grievances are ciphers.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say
what the law is.Needless to state, the cases at bar pose legal and not political questions. The principal
issues for resolution require the proper interpretation of certain provisions in the 1987 Constitution, notably
section 1 of Article II, and section 8 of Article VII, and the allocation of governmental powers under section II of
Article VII. The issues likewise call for a ruling on the scope of presidential immunity from suit. They also
involve the correct calibration of the right of petitioner against prejudicial publicity. As early as the 1803 case of
Mar-bury v. Madison, the doctrine has been laid down that it is emphatically the province and duty of the
judicial department to say what the law is . . . Thus, respondents invocation of the doctrine of political
question is but a foray in the dark.
Public Officers; Presidency; Resignation; Resignation is not a high level legal abstractionit is a factual
question and its elements are beyond quibble: there must be an intent to resign and the intent must be
coupled by acts of relinquishment.The issue then is whether the petitioner resigned as President or should
be considered resigned as of January 20, 2001 when respondent took her oath as the 14th President of the
Republic. Resignation is not a high level legal abstraction. It is a factual question and its elements are beyond
quibble: there must be an intent to resign and the intent must be coupled by acts of relinquishment. The
validity of a resignation is not governed by any formal requirement as to form. It can be oral. It can be written.
It can be express. It can be implied. As long as the resignation is clear, it must be given legal effect.
Same; Same; Same; Totality Test; Whether erstwhile President Estrada resigned has to be determined from
his acts and omissions before, during and after January 20, 2001 or by the totality of prior, contemporaneous
and posterior facts and circumstantial evidence bearing a material relevance on the issue.In the cases at
bar, the facts show that petitioner did not write any formal letter of resignation before he evacuated
Malacanang Palace in the afternoon of January 20, 2001 after the oath-taking of respondent Arroyo.
Consequently, whether or not petitioner resigned has to be determined from his acts and omissions before,
during and after January 20, 2001 or by the totality of prior, contemporaneous and posterior facts and
circumstantial evidence bearing a material relevance on the issue. Using this totality test, we hold that
petitioner resigned as President.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The Court holds that, the resignation of former President Estrada cannot be
doubtedit was confirmed by his leaving Malacaang.In sum, we hold that the resignation of the petitioner
cannot be doubted. It was confirmed by his leaving Malacaang. In the press release containing his final
statement, (1) he acknowledged the oath-taking of the respondent as President of the Republic albeit with
reservation about its legality; (2) he emphasized he was leaving the Palace, the seat of the presidency, for the
sake of peace and in order to begin the healing process of our nation. He did not say he was leaving the
Palace due to any kind of inability and that he was going to re-assume the presidency as soon as the disability
disappears; (3) he expressed his gratitude to the people for the opportunity to serve them. Without doubt, he
was referring to the past opportunity given him to serve the people as President; (4) he assured that he will
not shirk from any future challenge that may come ahead in the same service of our country. Petitioners
reference is to a future challenge after occupying the office of the president which he has given up; and (5) he
called on his supporters to join him in the promotion of a constructive national spirit of reconciliation and
solidarity. Certainly, the national spirit of reconciliation and solidarity could not be attained if he did not give up
the presidency. The press release was petitioners valedictory, his final act of farewell. His presidency is now
in the past tense.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Former President Estradas resignation from the presidency cannot be the subject
of changing caprice nor of a whimsical will, especially if the resignation is the result of his repudiation by the
people.To say the least, the above letter is wrapped in mystery. The pleadings filed by the petitioner in the
cases at bar did not discuss, nay even intimate, the circumstances that led to its preparation. Neither did the
counsel of the petitioner reveal to the Court these circumstances during the oral argument. It strikes the Court
as strange that the letter, despite its legal value, was never referred to by the petitioner during the week-long
crisis. To be sure, there was not the slightest hint of its existence when he issued his final press release. It
was all too easy for him to tell the Filipino people in his press release that he was temporarily unable to govern
and that he was leaving the reins of government to respondent Arroyo for the time being. Under any
circumstance, however, the mysterious letter cannot negate the resignation of the petitioner. If it was prepared
before the press release of the petitioner clearly showing his resignation from the presidency, then the
resignation must prevail as a later act. If, however, it was prepared after the press release, still, it commands
scant legal significance. Petitioners resignation from the presidency cannot be the subject of a changing
caprice nor of a whimsical will, especially if the resignation is the result of his repudiation by the people. There
is another reason why this Court cannot give any legal significance to petitioners letter and this shall be
discussed in issue number III of this Decision.
Same; Same; Same; Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (R.A. No. 3019); A public official has the right not to
serve if he really wants to retire or resign, but if at the time he resigns or retires, a public official is facing
administrative or criminal investigation or prosecution, such resignation or retirement will not cause the
dismissal of the criminal or administrative proceedings against him.Be that as it may, the intent of the law
ought to be obvious. It is to prevent the act of resignation or retirement from being used by a public official as a
protective shield to stop the investigation of a pending criminal or administrative case against him and to
prevent his prosecution under the Anti-Graft Law or prosecution for bribery under the Revised Penal Code. To
be sure, no person can be compelled to render service for that would be a violation of his constitutional right. A
public official has the right not to serve if he really wants to retire or resign. Nevertheless, if at the time he
resigns or retires, a public official is facing administrative or criminal investigation or prosecution, such
resignation or retirement will not cause the dismissal of the criminal or administrative proceedings against him.
He cannot use his resignation or retirement to avoid prosecution.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Section 12 of R.A. No. 3019 contemplates of cases whose investigation or
prosecution do not suffer from any insuperable legal obstacle like the immunity from suit of a sitting
President.There is another reason why petitioners contention should be rejected. In the cases at bar, the
records show that when petitioner resigned on January 20, 2001, the cases filed against him before the
Ombudsman were OMB Case Nos. 0-00-1629, 0-00-1755, 0-00-1756, 0-00-1757 and 0-00-1758. While these
cases have been filed, the respondent Ombudsman refrained from conducting the preliminary investigation of
the petitioner for the reason that as the sitting President then, petitioner was immune from suit. Technically,
the said cases cannot be considered as pending for the Ombudsman lacked jurisdiction to act on them.
Section 12 of RA No. 3019 cannot therefore be invoked by the petitioner for it contemplates of cases whose
investigation or prosecution do not suffer from any insuperable legal obstacle like the immunity from suit of a
sitting President.
Same; Same; Same; Impeachment; The exact nature of an impeachment proceeding is debatable, but even
assuming arguendo that it is an administrative proceeding, it can not be considered pending at the time when
then President Estrada resigned because the process already broke down when a majority of the senator-
judges voted against the opening of the second envelope, the public and private prosecutors walked out, the
public prosecutors filed their Manifestation of Withdrawal of Appearance, and the proceedings were postponed
indefinitely.Petitioner contends that the impeachment proceeding is an administrative investigation that,
under section 12 of RA 3019, bars him from resigning. We hold otherwise. The exact nature of an
impeachment proceeding is debatable. But even assuming arguendo that it is an administrative proceeding, it
can not be considered pending at the time petitioner resigned because the process already broke down when
a majority of the senator-judges voted against the opening of the second envelope, the public and private
prosecutors walked out, the public prosecutors filed their Manifestation of Withdrawal of Appearance, and the
proceedings were postponed indefinitely. There was, in effect, no impeachment case pending against
petitioner when he resigned.
Presidency; Separation of Powers; Judicial Review; Political Question Doctrine; Implicitly clear in the
recognition by both houses of Congress of Arroyo as President is the premise that the inability of former
President Estrada is no longer temporary.What leaps to the eye from these irrefutable facts is that both
houses of Congress have recognized respondent Arroyo as the President. Implicitly clear in that recognition is
the premise that the inability of petitioner Estrada is no longer temporary. Congress has clearly rejected
petitioners claim of inability.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The issue whether the Supreme Court has jurisdiction to review the claim of
temporary inability of former President Estrada and thereafter revise the decision of both Houses of Congress
recognizing Arroyo as President is political in nature and addressed solely to Congress by constitutional fiat
it is a political issue which cannot be decided by the Supreme Court without transgressing the principle of
separation of powers.The question is whether this Court has jurisdiction to review the claim of temporary
inability of petitioner Estrada and thereafter revise the decision of both Houses of Congress recognizing
respondent Arroyo as President of the Philippines. Following Taada v. Cuenco, we hold that this Court
cannot exercise its judicial power for this is an issue in regard to which full discretionary authority has been
delegated to the Legislative x x x branch of the government. Or to use the language in Baker vs. Carr, there is
a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department or a lack
of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it. Clearly, the Court cannot pass upon
petitioners claim of inability to discharge the powers and duties of the presidency. The question is political in
nature and addressed solely to Congress by constitutional fiat. It is a political issue which cannot be decided
by this Court without transgressing the principle of separation of powers.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Former President Estrada cannot successfully claim that he is a President on
leave on the ground that he is merely unable to govern temporarily since such claim has been laid to rest by
Congress and the decision that President Arroyo is the de jure President made by a co-equal branch of
government cannot be reviewed by the Supreme Court.In fine, even if the petitioner can prove that he did
not resign, still, he cannot successfully claim that he is a President on leave on the ground that he is merely
unable to govern temporarily. That claim has been laid to rest by Congress and the decision that respondent
Arroyo is the de jure President made by a co-equal branch of government cannot be reviewed by this Court.
Same; Presidential Immunity; Impeachment; Since the Impeachment Court is now functus officio, it is
untenable for former President Estrada to demand that he should first be impeached and then convicted
before he can be prosecuted.We shall now rule on the contentions of petitioner in the light of this history.
We reject his argument that he cannot be prosecuted for the reason that he must first be convicted in the
impeachment proceedings. The impeachment trial of petitioner Estrada was aborted by the walkout of the
prosecutors and by the events that led to his loss of the presidency. Indeed, on February 7, 2001, the Senate
passed Senate Resolution No. 83 Recognizing that the Impeachment Court is Functus Officio. Since the
Impeachment Court is now functus officio, it is untenable for petitioner to demand that he should first be
impeached and then convicted before he can be prosecuted. The plea if granted, would put a perpetual bar
against his prosecution. Such a submission has nothing to commend itself for it will place him in a better
situation than a non-sitting President who has not been subjected to impeachment proceedings and yet can be
the object of a criminal prosecution. To be sure, the debates in the Constitutional Commission make it clear
that when impeachment proceedings have become moot due to the resignation of the President, the proper
criminal and civil cases may already be filed against him.
Same; Same; Incumbent Presidents are immune from suit or from being brought to court during the period of
their incumbency and tenure but not beyond.This is in accord with our ruling in In Re: Saturnino Bermudez
that incumbent Presidents are immune from suit or from being brought to court during the period of their
incumbency and tenure but not beyond. Considering the peculiar circumstance that the impeachment process
against the petitioner has been aborted and thereafter he lost the presidency, petitioner Estrada cannot
demand as a condition sine qua non to his criminal prosecution before the Ombudsman that he be convicted
in the impeachment proceedings. His reliance on the case of Lecaroz vs. Sandiganbayan and related cases
are inapropos for they have a different factual milieu.
Same; Same; By no stretch of the imagination can the crimes of plunder, bribery and graft and corruption,
especially plunder which carries the death penalty, be covered by the alleged mantle of immunity of a non-
sitting president.We now come to the scope of immunity that can be claimed by petitioner as a non-sitting
President. The cases filed against petitioner Estrada are criminal in character. They involve plunder, bribery
and graft and corruption. By no stretch of the imagination can these crimes, especially plunder which carries
the death penalty, be covered by the alleged mantle of immunity of a non-sitting president. Petitioner cannot
cite any decision of this Court licensing the President to commit criminal acts and wrapping him with post-
tenure immunity from liability. It will be anomalous to hold that immunity is an inoculation from liability for
unlawful acts and omissions. The rule is that unlawful acts of public officials are not acts of the State and the
officer who acts illegally is not acting as such but stands in the same footing as any other trespasser.
Same; Same; A critical reading of current literature on executive immunity will reveal a judicial disinclination to
expand the privilege, especially when it impedes the search for truth or impairs the vindication of a right.
Indeed, a critical reading of current literature on executive immunity will reveal a judicial disinclination to
expand the privilege, especially when it impedes the search for truth or impairs the vindication of a right. In the
1974 case of US v. Nixon, US President Richard Nixon, a sitting President, was subpoenaed to produce
certain recordings and documents relating to his conversations with aids and advisers. Seven advisers of
President Nixons associates were facing charges of conspiracy to obstruct justice and other offenses which
were committed in a burglary of the Democratic National Headquarters in Washingtons Watergate Hotel
during the 1972 presidential campaign. President Nixon himself was named an unindicted co-conspirator.
President Nixon moved to quash the subpoena on the ground, among others, that the President was not
subject to judicial process and that he should first be impeached and removed from office before he could be
made amenable to judicial proceedings. The claim was rejected by the US Supreme Court. It concluded that
when the ground for asserting privilege as to subpoenaed materials sought for use in a criminal trial is based
only on the generalized interest in confidentiality, it cannot prevail over the fundamental demands of due
process of law in the fair administration of criminal justice. In the 1982 case of Nixon v. Fitzgerald, the US
Supreme Court further held that the immunity of the President from civil damages covers only official acts.
Recently, the US Supreme Court had the occasion to reiterate this doctrine in the case of Clinton v. Jones
where it held that the US Presidents immunity from suits for money damages arising out of their official acts is
inapplicable to unofficial conduct.
Same; Same; Public Officers; The constitutional polices on accountability of public officersof public office
being of public trustwill be devalued if the Court sustains the claim that a non-sitting president enjoys
immunity from suit for criminal acts committed during his incumbency.There are more reasons not to be
sympathetic to appeals to stretch the scope of executive immunity in our jurisdiction. One of the great themes
of the 1987 Constitution is that a public office is a public trust. It declared as a state policy that (t)he State
shall maintain honesty and integrity in the public service and take positive and effective measures against graft
and corruption. It ordained that (p)ublic officers and employees must at all times be accountable to the
people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency, act with patriotism and justice,
and lead modest lives. It set the rule that (t)he right of the State to recover properties unlawfully acquired by
public officials or employees, from them or from their nominees or transferees, shall not be barred by
prescription, laches or estoppel. It maintained the Sandiganbayan as an anti-graft court. It created the office
of the Ombudsman and endowed it with enormous powers, among which is to (investigate on its own, or on
complaint by any person, any act or omission of any public official, employee, office or agency, when such act
or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper, or inefficient. The Office of the Ombudsman was also
given fiscal autonomy. These constitutional policies will be devalued if we sustain petitioners claim that a non-
sitting president enjoys immunity from suit for criminal acts committed during his incumbency.
Due Process; Prejudicial Publicity; Words and Phrases; Two (2) Principal Legal and Philosophical Schools of
Thought on Dealing with Unrestrained Publicity of High Profile Cases; The British school of thought
approaches the problem with the presumption that publicity will prejudice a jury, while the American school of
thought assumes a skeptical approach about the potential effect of pervasive publicity on the right of an
accused to a fair trial.There are two (2) principal legal and philosophical schools of thought on how to deal
with the rain of unrestrained publicity during the investigation and trial of high profile cases. The British
approach the problem with the presumption that publicity will prejudice a jury. Thus, English courts readily stay
and stop criminal trials when the right of an accused to fair trial suffers a threat. The American approach is
different. US courts assume a skeptical approach about the potential effect of pervasive publicity on the right
of an accused to a fair trial. They have developed different strains of tests to resolve this issue, i.e.,
substantial probability of irreparable harm, strong likelihood, clear and present danger, etc.
Same; Same; There is not enough evidence to warrant the Court to enjoin the preliminary investigation of
former President Estrada by the Ombudsmanthe former President needs to offer more than hostile
headlines to discharge his burden of proof, more weighty social evidence to successfully prove the impaired
capacity of a judge to render a bias-free decision.Applying the above ruling, we hold that there is not enough
evidence to warrant this Court to enjoin the preliminary investigation of the petitioner by the respondent
Ombudsman. Petitioner needs to offer more than hostile headlines to discharge his burden of proof. He needs
to show more weighty social science evidence to successfully prove the impaired capacity of a judge to render
a bias-free decision. Well to note, the cases against the petitioner are still undergoing preliminary investigation
by a special panel of prosecutors in the office of the respondent Ombudsman. No allegation whatsoever has
been made by the petitioner that the minds of the members of this special panel have already been infected by
bias because of the pervasive prejudicial publicity against him. Indeed, the special panel has yet to come out
with its findings and the Court cannot second guess whether its recommendation will be unfavorable to the
petitioner.
Same; Same; Words and Phrases; Theory of Derivative Prejudice; The Court can not adopt former President
Estradas theory of derivative prejudice, i.e., that the prejudice of the Ombudsman flows to his subordinates
the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure gives investigating prosecutors the independence to make their own
findings and recommendations albeit they are reviewable by their superiors.Again, we hold that the
evidence proffered by the petitioner is insubstantial. The accuracy of the news reports referred to by the
petitioner cannot be the subject of judicial notice by this Court especially in light of the denials of the
respondent Ombudsman as to his alleged prejudice and the presumption of good faith and regularity in the
performance of official duty to which he is entitled. Nor can we adopt the theory of derivative prejudice of
petitioner, i.e., that the prejudice of respondent Ombudsman flows to his subordinates. In truth, our Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure, give investigating prosecutors the independence to make their own findings and
recommendations albeit they are reviewable by their superiors. They can be reversed but they can not be
compelled to change their recommendations nor can they be compelled to prosecute cases which they believe
deserve dismissal. In other words, investigating prosecutors should not be treated like unthinking slot
machines. Moreover, if the respondent Ombudsman resolves to file the cases against the petitioner and the
latter believes that the finding of probable cause against him is the result of bias, he still has the remedy of
assailing it before the proper court.
Constitutional Law; Republicanism; Rule of Law; Rights in a democracy are not decided by the mob whose
judgment is dictated by rage and not by reason, nor are rights necessarily resolved by the power of number for
in a democracy, the dogmatism of the majority is not and should never be the definition of the rule of law.A
word of caution to the hooting throng. The cases against the petitioner will now acquire a different dimension
and then move to a new stagethe Office of the Ombudsman. Predictably, the call from the majority for
instant justice will hit a higher decibel while the gnashing of teeth of the minority will be more threatening. It is
the sacred duty of the respondent Ombudsman to balance the right of the State to prosecute the guilty and the
right of an accused to a fair investigation and trial which has been categorized as the most fundamental of all
freedoms. To be sure, the duty of a prosecutor is more to do justice and less to prosecute. His is the
obligation to insure that the preliminary investigation of the petitioner shall have a circus-free atmosphere. He
has to provide the restraint against what Lord Bryce calls the impatient vehemence of the majority. Rights in
a democracy are not decided by the mob whose judgment is dictated by rage and not by reason. Nor are
rights necessarily resolved by the power of number for in a democracy, the dogmatism of the majority is not
and should never be the definition of the rule of law. If democracy has proved to be the best form of
government, it is because it has respected the right of the minority to convince the majority that it is wrong.
Tolerance of multiformity of thoughts, however offensive they may be, is the key to mans progress from the
cave to civilization. Let us not throw away that key just to pander to some peoples prejudice.
BELLOSILLO, J., Concurring Opinion:
Presidency; Presidential Succession; Statutory Construction; Words and Phrases; It is admitted that the term
permanent disability used in Sec. 8, Art. VII of the Constitution, is a fair example of words which have one
meaning that is commonly accepted, and a materially different or modified one in its legal sense.It is
admitted that the term permanent disability used in Sec. 8, Art. VII, is a fair example of words which have one
meaning that is commonly accepted, and a materially different or modified one in its legal sense. It is
axiomatic that the primary task in constitutional construction is to ascertain and assure the realization of the
purpose of the framers, hence of the people, in adopting the Constitution. The language of the Charter should
perforce be construed in a manner that promotes its objectives more effectively. A strained construction which
impairs its own meaning and efficiency to meet the responsibilities brought about by the changing times and
conditions of society should not be adopted. Constitutions are designed to meet not only the vagaries of
contemporary events but should be interpreted to cover even future and unknown circumstances. It must
withstand the assaults of bigots and infidels at the same time bend with the refreshing winds of change
necessitated by unfolding events. As it is oft repeated, constitutional provisions are interpreted by the spirit
which vivifies and not by the letter which killeth.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Under the pertinent constitutional provision governing the rules of succession by
the Vice-President in the event of permanent disability of the President, the term must be reasonably
construed, and as so construed means all kinds of incapacities which render the President perpetually
powerless to discharge the functions and prerogatives of the office.Thus, under the pertinent constitutional
provision governing the rules of succession by the Vice-President in the event of permanent disability of the
President, the term must be reasonably construed, and as so construed means all kinds of incapacities which
render the President perpetually powerless to discharge the functions and prerogatives of the office. This is
what appears to have been in the minds of the framers of the 1987 Constitution.
Constitutional Law; In every critical undertaking by the state the most powerful agent for success or failure is
the Constitution, for from this, as from a fountainhead, all conceptions and plans of action not only emanate
but also attain their consummation.A final word. In every critical undertaking by the state the most powerful
agent for success or failure is the Constitution, for from this, as from a fountainhead, all conceptions and plans
of action not only emanate but also attain their consummation. It is the Constitution, as the repository of the
sovereign will, that charts the future of our fledging Republic. The measure of our adherence thereto is the
ultimate gauge of our insignificance or greatness.
VITUG, J., Concurring Opinion:
Presidency; Resignation; Abandonment; Words and Phrases; Resignation, Defined; The contemporary acts
of Estrada during those four critical days of January are evident of his intention to relinquish his office.
Resignation is an act of giving up or the act of an officer by which he renounces his office indefinitely. In order
to constitute a complete and operative act of resignation, the officer or employee must show a clear intention
to relinquish or surrender his position accompanied by an act of relinquishment. Resignation implies an
expression of an incumbent in some form, express or implied, of the intention to surrender, renounce,
relinquish the office. Mr. Estrada imports that he did not resign from the
Presidency because the word resignation has not once been embodied in his letters or said in his statements.
I am unable to oblige. The contemporary acts of Estrada during those four critical days of January are evident
of his intention to relinquish his office. Scarcity of words may not easily cloak reality and hide true intentions.
Crippled to discharge his duties, the embattled President acceded to have negotiations conducted for a
smooth transition of power.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Abandonment of office is a species of resignation.Abandonment of office is a
species of resignation, and it connotes the giving up of the office although not attended by the formalities
normally observed in resignation. Abandonment may be effected by a positive act or can be the result of an
omission, whether deliberate or not.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The temporary incapacity contemplated under Section 11, Article VII of the
Constitution clearly envisions those that are personal, either physical or mental in nature, and innate to the
individual.Mr. Joseph Estrada invokes temporary incapacity under Section 11, Article VII of the
Constitution. This assertion is difficult to sustain since the temporary incapacity contemplated clearly envisions
those that are personal, either by physical or mental in nature, and innate to the individual. If it were otherwise,
when then would the disability last? Would it be when the confluent causes which have brought about that
disability are completely set in reverse? Surely, the idea fails to register well to the simple mind.
Political Law; Revolutionary Governments; Words and Phrases; A revolutionary government is one which has
taken the seat of power by force or in defiance of the legal processes within the political context, a revolution is
a complete overthrow of the established government.Neither can it be implied that the takeover has installed
a revolutionary government. A revolutionary government is one which has taken the seat of power by force or
in defiance of the legal processes. Within the political context, a revolution is a complete overthrow of the
established government. In its delimited concept, it is characterized often, albeit not always, by violence as a
means and specificable range of goals as ends. In contrast, EDSA 2 did not envision radical changes. The
government structure has remained intact. Succession to the Presidency has been by the duly-elected Vice-
President of the Republic. The military and the police, down the line, have felt to be so acting in obedience to
their mandate as the protector of the people.
Same; Same; Same; Constitutional Political Action, and Revolutionary Political Action, Distinguished.Any
revolution, whether it is violent or not, involves a radical change. Huntington sees revolution as being a rapid,
fundamental and violent domestic change in the dominant values and myths of society in its political institution,
social structure, leadership, government activity and policies. The distinguished A.J. Milne makes a
differentiation between constitutional political action and a revolutionary political action. A constitutional
political action, according to him, is a political action within a legal framework and rests upon a moral
commitment to uphold the authority of law. A revolutionary political action, on the other hand, acknowledges
no such moral commitment. The latter is directed towards overthrowing the existing legal order and replacing it
with something else. And what, one might ask, is the legal order referred to? It is an authoritative code of a
polity comprising enacted rules, along with those in the Constitution and concerns itself with structures rather
than personalities in the establishment. Accordingly, structure would refer to the different branches of the
government and personalities would be the power-holders. If determination would be made whether a specific
legal order is intact or not, what can be vital is not the change in the personalities but a change in the structure.
Same; Constitutional Law; More than just an eloquent piece of frozen document, the Constitution should be
deemed to be a living testament and memorial of the sovereign will of the people from whom all government
authority emanates.More than just an eloquent piece of frozen document, the Constitution should be
deemed to be a living testament and memorial of the sovereign will of the people from whom all government
authority emanates. Certainly, this fundamental statement is not without meaning. Nourished by time, it grows
and copes with the changing milieu. The framers of the Constitution could not have anticipated all conditions
that might arise in the aftermath of events. A constitution does not deal in details, but enunciates the general
tenets that are intended to apply to all facts that may come about but which can be brought within its directions.
Behind its conciseness is its inclusiveness and its apertures overridingly lie, not fragmented but integrated and
encompassing, its spirit and its intent. The Constitution cannot be permitted to deteriorate into just a petrified
code of legal maxims and hand-tied to its restrictive letters and wordings, rather than be the pulsating law that
it is. Designed to be an enduring instrument, its interpretation is not to be confined to the conditions and
outlook which prevail at the time of its adoption; instead, it must be given flexibility to bring it in accord with the
vicissitudes of changing and advancing affairs of men. Technicalities and play of words cannot frustrate the
inevitable because there is an immense difference between legalism and justice. If only to secure our
democracy and to keep the social ordertechnicalities must give way. It has been said that the real essence
of justice does not emanate from quibblings over patchwork legal technicality but proceeds from the spirits gut
consciousness of the dynamic role as a brick in the ultimate development of social edifice. Anything else
defeats the spirit and intent of the Constitution for which it is formulated and reduces its mandate to
irrelevance and obscurity.
Same; Same; People Power; The country must not grow oblivious to the innate perils of people power for no
bond can be stretched far too much to its breaking point.A reminder of an elder to the youth. After two non-
violent civilian uprising within just a short span of years between them, it might be said that popular mass
action is fast becoming an institutionalized enterprise. Should the streets now be the venue for the exercise of
popular democracy? Where does one draw the line between the rule of law and the rule of the mob, or
between People Power and Anarchy? If, as the sole justification for its being, the basis of the Arroyo
presidency lies alone on those who were at EDSA, then it does rest on loose and shifting sands and might
tragically open a Pandoras box more potent than the malaise it seeks to address. Conventional wisdom
dictates the indispensable need for great sobriety and extreme circumspection on our part. In this kind of
arena, let us be assured that we are not overcome by senseless adventurism and opportunism. The country
must not grow oblivious to the innate perils of people power for no bond can be stretched far too much to its
breaking point. To abuse is to destroy that which we may hold dear.
MENDOZA, J., Concurring:
Political Law; Constitutional Law; Judicial Review; Revolutionary Governments; The legitimacy of a
revolutionary government cannot be the subject of judicial review.But the Aquino government was a
revolutionary government which was established following the overthrow of the 1973 Constitution. The
legitimacy of a revolutionary government cannot be the subject of judicial review. If a court decides the
question at all qua court, it must necessarily affirm the existence and authority of such government under
which it is exercising judicial power. As Melville Weston long ago put it, the men who were judges under the
old regime and the men who are called to be judges under the new have each to decide as individuals what
they are to do; and it may be that they choose at grave peril with the factional outcome still uncertain. This is
what the Court did in Javellana v. Executive Secretary when it held that the question of validity of the 1973
Constitution was political and affirmed that it was itself part of the new government. As the Court said in
Occena v. COMELEC and Mitra v. COMELEC, [P]etitioners have come to the wrong forum. We sit as a
Court duty-bound to uphold and apply that Constitution . . . . It is much too late in the day to deny the force and
applicability of the 1973 Constitution.
Same; Same; Same; Political Question Doctrine; As Jar as the political question argument is anchored on the
difficulty or impossibility of devising effective judicial remedies, this defense should not bar inquiry into the
legitimacy of the Macapagal-Arroyo administration.Both literally and figuratively, the argument is untenable.
The toothpaste can be put back into the tube. Literally, it can be put back by opening the bottom of the tube
that is how toothpaste is put in tubes at manufacture in the first place. Metaphorically, the toothpaste can also
be put back. In G.R. No. 146738, a writ can be issued ordering respondent Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo to vacate
the Office of the President so that petitioner Joseph E. Estrada can be reinstated should the judgment in these
cases be in his favor. Whether such writ will be obeyed will be a test of our commitment to the rule of law. In
election cases, people accept the decisions of courts even if they be against the results as proclaimed.
Recognition given by foreign governments to the presidency poses no problem. So, as far as the political
question argument of respondents is anchored on the difficulty or impossibility of devising effective judicial
remedies, this defense should not bar inquiry into the legitimacy of the Macapagal-Arroyo administration.
Same; Presidency; The permanent disability referred to in the Constitution can be physical, mental, or moral,
rendering the President unable to exercise the powers and functions of his office.This is the confession of
one who is beaten. After all, the permanent disability referred to in the Constitution can be physical, mental, or
moral, rendering the President unable to exercise the powers and functions of his office. As his close adviser
wrote in his diary of the final hours of petitioners presidency. The President says: Pagod na pagod na ako.
Ayoko namasyado nang masakit Pagod na ako sa red tape, bureaucracy, intriga. (I am very tired. I dont
want any more of thisits too painful. Im tired of the red tape, the bureaucracy, the intrigue.)
Same; Same; Political Law; Republicanism; Ours is a representative democracyas distinguished from a
direct democracyin which the sovereign will of the people is expressed through the ballot, whether in an
election, referendum, initiative, recall (in the case of local officials) or plebiscite.From this judgment that
petitioner became permanently disabled because he had lost the publics trust, I except extravagant claims of
the right of the people to change their government. While Art. II, 1 of the Constitution says that sovereignty
resides in the people and all government authority emanates from them, it also says that the Philippines is a
democratic and republican state. This means that ours is a representative democracyas distinguished from
a direct democracyin which the sovereign will of the people is expressed through the ballot, whether in an
election, referendum, initiative, recall (in the case of local officials) or plebiscite. Any exercise of the powers of
sovereignty in any other way is unconstitutional.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The right to revolt cannot be recognized as a constitutional principle.Indeed, the
right to revolt cannot be recognized as a constitutional principle. A constitution to provide for the right of the
people to revolt will carry with it the seeds of its own destruction. Rather, the right to revolt is affirmed as a
natural right. Even then, it must be exercised only for weighty and serious reasons.
Same; Same; Same; Same; What took place at EDSA from January 16 to 20, 2001 was not a revolution but
the peaceful expression of popular will.Here, as I have already indicated, what took place at EDSA from
January 16 to 20, 2001 was not a revolution but the peaceful expression of popular will. The operative fact
which enabled Vice-President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo to assume the presidency was the fact that there was
a crisis, nay a vacuum, in the executive leadership which made the government rife for seizure by lawless
elements. The presidency was up for grabs, and it was imperative that the rule of succession in the
Constitution be enforced.
KAPUNAN, J., Separate Opinion:
Presidency; Resignation; Requisites; If intention to resign is a requirement sine qua non for a valid resignation,
then forced resignation or involuntary resignation, or resignation under duress, is no resignation at all.To
constitute a complete operative resignation of a public official, there must be: (1) the intention to relinquish part
of the term and (2) an act of relinquishment. Intent connotes voluntariness and freedom of choice. With the
impassioned crowd marching towards Malacaang Palace and with the military and police no longer obeying
petitioner, he was reduced to abject powerlessness. In this sense, he was virtually forced out of the
Presidency. If intention to resign is a requirement sine qua non for a valid resignation, then forced resignation
or involuntary resignation, or resignation under duress, is no resignation at all. The use of people power and
the withdrawal of military support mainly brought about petitioners ouster from power. This completely
negates any pretentions that he voluntarily stepped down from the presidency. More importantly, people
power is not one of the modes prescribed by the Constitution to create a vacancy in the office of the President.
Same; Same; Political Sovereignty; Right of Assembly; While the doctrine that sovereignty resides in the
people is without doubt enshrined in our Constitution, this does not mean, however, that all forms of direct
action by the people in matters affecting government are sanctioned thereunder; To be sure, the people have
the right to assemble and to petition the government for redress of their grievances but this right does not go
to the extent of directly acting to remove the President from office by means outside the framework of the
Constitution.The doctrine that sovereignty resides in the people is without doubt enshrined in our
Constitution. This does not mean, however, that all forms of direct action by the people in matters affecting
government are sanctioned thereunder. To begin with, the concept of people power is vague and ambiguous.
It is incapable of exact definition. What number would suffice for a mass action by irate citizens to be
considered as a valid exercise of people power? What feetors should be considered to determine whether
such mass action is representative of the sovereign will? In what instances would people power be justified?
There are no judicial standards to address these questions. To be sure, the people have the right to assemble
and to petition the government for redress of their grievances. But this right does not go to the extent of
directly acting to remove the President from office by means outside the framework of the Constitution.
Same; Same; Same; The withdrawal of support by the military and police forces cannot legitimately set the
stage for the removal of the head of state; The designation by the Constitution of the armed forces as
protector of the people and of the State requires it to staunchly uphold the rule of law but does not authorize
the armed forces to determine, by itself, when it should cease to recognize the authority of the commander-in-
chief simply because it believes that the latter no longer has the full support of the people.For the same
reason, the withdrawal of support by the military and police forces cannot legitimately set the stage for the
removal of the head of state. The fundamental law expressly mandates the supremacy of civilian authority
over the military at all limes, and installs the President, the highest-ranking civilian government official, as
commander-in-chief of the Armed Forces of the Philippines. The designation by the Constitution of the armed
forces as protector of the people and of the State requires it to staunchly uphold the rule of law. Such role
does not authorize the armed forces to determine, by itself, when it should cease to recognize the authority of
the commander-in-chief simply because it believes that the latter no longer has the full support of the people.
the appellate court, are accorded the highest degree of respect and are considered conclusive between the
parties. A review of such findings by this Court is not warranted except upon a showing of highly meritorious
circumstances, such as: (1) when the findings of a trial court are grounded entirely on speculation, surmises or
conjectures; (2) when a lower courts inference from its factual findings is manifestly mistaken, absurd or
impossible; (3) when there is grave abuse of discretion in the appreciation of facts; (4) when the findings of the
appellate court go beyond the issues of the case, or fail to notice certain relevant facts which, if properly
considered, will justify a different conclusion; (5) when there is a misappreciation of facts; (6) when the findings
of fact are conclusions without mention of the specific evidence on which they are based, are premised on the
absence of evidence, or are contradicted by evidence on record. None of the foregoing exceptions which
would warrant a reversal of the assailed decision obtains in this instance.
Civil Law; Agencies; Brokers; Definition of a Broker as Distinguished from an Agent.In Tan v. Gullas, 393
SCRA 334 (2002), we had occasion to define a broker and distinguish it from an agent, thus: [O]ne who is
engaged, for others, on a commission, negotiating contracts relative to property with the custody of which he
has no concern; the negotiator between the other parties, never acting in his own name but in the name of
those who employed him. [A] broker is one whose occupation is to bring the parties together, in matter of trade,
commerce or navigation. An agent receives a commission upon the successful conclusion of a sale. On the
other hand, a broker earns his pay merely by bringing the buyer and the seller together, even if no sale is
eventually made.
Same; Same; Same; To be regarded as the procuring cause of a sale as to be entitled to a commission, a
brokers efforts must have been the foundation on which the negotiations resulting in a sale began.We have
held that the term procuring cause in describing a brokers activity, refers to a cause originating a series of
events which, without break in their continuity, result in the accomplishment of the prime objective of the
employment of the brokerproducing a purchaser ready, willing and able to buy on the owners terms. To be
regarded as the procuring cause of a sale as to be entitled to a commission, a brokers efforts must have
been the foundation on which the negotiations resulting in a sale began. Verily, Estrada was instrumental in
the sale of the Maxicare health plans to Meralco. Without her intervention, no sale could have been
consummated.
Universal Food Corp. vs. Court of Appeals, 33 SCRA 1, No. L-29155 May 13, 1970

Same; Evidence; Hearsay Rule; Reliance on the Angara Diary to establish the intent or state of mind of the
former President is improper since the contents thereof have not been duly established as facts and are
therefore hearsay.Reliance on the Angara Diary to establish the intent or state of mind of petitioner is
improper since the contents thereof have not been duly established as facts and are therefore hearsay. In any
case, the circumstances under which petitioner allegedly manifested his intention to resign were, at best,
equivocal.
Same; It can be argued just as persuasively that the former President left Malacaang Palace to avert
violence but that he did not intend to give up his office.The hasty departure of petitioner from Malacaang
Palace and the issuance of the subject press statement cannot likewise conclusively establish the intent to
relinquish the Presidency. Indeed, it can be argued just as persuasively that petitioner merely left the Palace
to avert violence but that he did not intend to give up his office. He said that he was leaving Malacaang, the
seat of the presidency. He did not say he was resigning. Note that in his press statement, petitioner expressed
strong and serious doubts about the legality and constitutionality of Ms. Arroyos proclamation as President.
There are other factual considerations that negate petitioners intent to relinquish permanently, particularly,
petitioners letters, both dated 20 January 2001, to the Senate President and the Speaker of the House of
Representatives informing them that he was unable to exercise the powers and duties of his office and
recognizing Ms. Arroyo as the Acting President.
Philippine Health-Care Providers, Inc. (Maxicare) vs. Estrada, 542 SCRA 616, G.R. No. 171052 January
28, 2008
Remedial Law; Appeals; Factual findings of the trial court, especially when affirmed by the appellate court, are
accorded the highest degree of respect and are considered conclusive between the parties; Exceptions.
Well-entrenched in jurisprudence is the rule that factual findings of the trial court, especially when affirmed by
Contracts; Interpretation; Where bill of assignment of trademark and formula interpreted to have been
intended by the parties to refer only to assignment of use of trademark and formula.While the literal reading
of the Bill of Assignment seem to support the view that the formula itself was ceded by the patentee, yet the
language employed in the entire instrument would lead one to the conclusion that what was actually ceded
and transferred was only the use of the formula as the precise intention of the parties,
Same; Same; Same; Meaning of "royalty".Royalty, when used in connection with a license under a patent,
means the compensation paid by the licensee to the licensor for the use of the licensor's patented invention.
Civil actions; Pleadings; Effect of pleadings; Admissions in pleadings do not require proof.Where a fact is
admitted without equivocation by a party in his pleading, it does "not require proof and cannot be
contradicted."
Contracts; Interpretation: Least transmission of rights favored.The Civil Code lays down the rule that a
conveyance should be interpreted to effect "the least transmission of rights."
Contracts; Rescissible contracts; When contract may be rescinded.The general rule is that rescission of a
contract will not be permitted for a slight or casual breach, but only for such substantial and fundamental
breach as would defeat the very object of the parties in making the agreement. The question of whether a
breach of a contract is substantial depends upon' the attendant circumstances.
Reyes, J.B.L., J., concurring:
Contracts; Rescissible contracts; Rescission for breach of contract and rescission by reason of lesion or
economic prejudice, distinguished.A rescission for breach of contract under Article 1191 of the Civil Code is
not predicated on injury to economic interests of the party plaintiff but on the breach of faith by the defendant,
that violates the reciprocity between the parties. It is not a subsidiary action, and Article 1191 may be scanned
without disclosing anywhere that the action for rescission thereunder is subordinated to anything other than
the culpable breach of his obligations by the defendant. This rescission is a principal action retaliatory in
character, it being unjust that a party be held bound to fulfill his promises when the other violates his. As
expressed in the old Latin aphorism: "Non servanti fidem, non est fides servanda." Hence, the reparation of
damages for the breach is purely secondary. On the contrary, in a rescission by reason of lesion or economic
prejudice under Article 1381, et seq. of the Civil Code, the cause of action is subordinated to the existence of
that prejudice, because it is the raison d'etre as well as the measure of the right to rescind. Hence, where the
defendant makes good the damage caused, the action cannot be maintained or continued, as expressly
provided in Articles 1383 and 1384. But the operation of these two articles is limited to the cases of rescission
for lesion enumerated in Article 1381 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, and does not apply to cases under
Article 1191.

Same; Same; Same; "Rescission" under Civil Code.The two instances of rescission are defectively termed
"rescission" without distinction between them under the new Civil Code unlike the previous Spanish Civil Code
of 1889, that differentiated "resolution" for breach of stipulations from "rescission" by reareason of lesion or
damage.

People vs. Abalos, 30 SCRA 599, No. L-29039 November 28, 1969

Remedial law; Criminal procedure; Trial; Rebuttal; Where prosecution was allowed to introduce rebuttal
evidence on new matter not covered directly by evidence of prosecution; Case at bar.The prosecution
presented evidence to show that the accused killed the persons mentioned in the information, as well as
wounded several other specified persons. The accused presented evidence to establish the contrarythat he
did not kill or wound said persons. He, however, went further, by testifying that it was AH who killed and
wounded the persons abovemetioned. May the prosecution present the testimony of MA as rebuttal evidence
to show that it was the accused, not AH who committed the crime alleged in the Information? HELD: Yes The
evidence of the accused that it was AH who killed and wounded the persons mentioned in the information was
a new matter not covered directly by the evidence for the prosecution It is true that if it was the accused who
caused the deaths and the injuries alleged, it would follow that AH was ot the author thereof. The prosecution
was entitled, however. as a matter of strict legal right, to introduce positive evidence Carrillo v. Allied Worker's
Asso. of the Phil., 24 SCRA 566, 573 (1968). The above excerpt was cited with approval in Teodoro v.
Macaraeg, 27 CSRA 7 (1969). to this effect, instead of relying upon a mere inference from its evidence in
chief.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Discretion of trial court to determine whether or not parties should be allowed to
introduce rebuttal evidence.Trial courts have ample discretion to determine whether or not the parties
should be allowed to introduce evidence in rebuttal. Moreover, its resolutions on these matters are
interlocutory in nature and will not generally be reviewed, except on appeal taken from a decision rendered on
the merits. Judicial discretion, however, is not unlimited. It must be exercised reasonably, with a view to
promoting the ends of justice, one of which is to ascertain the truth.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Criminal cases.As a matter of general practice, it is deemed best to
resolve doubts in favor of the admission of the contested evidence, without prejudice to such action as the
court may deem fit to take in deciding the case on the merits. This practice has added importance as regards
the evidence for the prosecution in criminal cases, for, once the accused has been acquitted, there is no
means to secure a review by appeal, no matter how erroneous the action of the lower court may have been.