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, petitioners,
IV, respondents.
Issue: Are lands already classified for residential, commercial or industrial use, as approved by the Housing and Land Use
Regulatory Board and its precursor agencies 1 prior to 15 June 1988, 2 covered by R.A. 6657, otherwise known as the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988 ?
On 18 April 1979, Presidential Proclamation No. 1637 set aside 20,312 hectares of land located in the Municipalities of
Antipolo, San Mateo and Montalban as townsite areas to absorb the population overspill in the metropolis which were
designated as the Lungsod Silangan Townsite. The NATALIA properties are situated within the areas proclaimed as
townsite reservation.
Since private landowners were allowed to develop their properties into lowcost housing subdivisions within the
reservation, petitioner Estate Developers and Investors Corporation (EDIC, for brevity), as developer of NATALIA
properties, applied for and was granted preliminary approval and locational clearances by the Human Settlements
Regulatory Commission. The necessary permit for Phase I of the subdivision project, which consisted of 13.2371
hectares, was issued sometime in 1982; 4 for Phase II, with an area of 80,000 hectares, on 13 October 1983; 5 and for
Phase III, which consisted of the remaining 31.7707 hectares, on 25 April 1986. 6 Petitioner were likewise issued
development permits 7 after complying with the requirements. Thus the NATALIA properties later became the Antipolo
Hills Subdivision.

CARL took effect. DAR issued a notice on the undeveloped portion of the subdivision.

Argument of NATALIA and EDIC: that NATALIA properties already ceased to be agricultural lands when they were
included in the areas reserved by presidential fiat for the townsite reservation.

Argument of SOLGEN: they maintain that the permits granted petitioners were not valid and binding because they did
not comply with the implementing Standards, Rules and Regulations of P.D. 957, otherwise known as "The Subdivision
and Condominium Buyers Protective Decree," in that no application for conversion of the NATALIA lands from agricultural
residential was ever filed with the DAR. In other words, there was no valid conversion. Moreover, public respondents
allege that the instant petition was prematurely filed because the case instituted by SAMBA against petitioners before the
DAR Regional Adjudicator has not yet terminated. Respondents conclude, as a consequence, that petitioners failed to
fully exhaust administrative remedies available to them before coming to court.

Ruling: NATALIA and EDIC did in fact comply with all the requirements of law.

There was even no need for petitioners to secure a clearance or prior approval from DAR. The NATALIA properties were
within the areas set aside for the Lungsod Silangan Reservation. Since Presidential Proclamation No. 1637 created the
townsite reservation for the purpose of providing additional housing to the burgeoning population of Metro Manila, it in
effect converted for residential use what were erstwhile agricultural lands provided all requisites were met.
The implementing Standards, Rules and Regulations of P.D. 957 applied to all subdivisions and condominiums in
general. On the other hand, Presidential Proclamation No. 1637 referred only to the Lungsod Silangan
Reservation, which makes it a special law.

Based on the foregoing, it is clear that the undeveloped portions of the Antipolo Hills Subdivision cannot in any language
be considered as "agricultural lands." These lots were intended for residential use. They ceased to be agricultural lands
upon approval of their inclusion in the Lungsod Silangan Reservation.
Since the NATALIA lands were converted prior to 15 June 1988, respondent DAR is bound by such conversion. It was
therefore error to include the undeveloped portions of the Antipolo Hills Subdivision within the coverage of CARL.

Luz farms is a corporation engaged in the livestock and poultry business and together with others in the same business
allegedly stands to be adversely affected by the enforcement following provisions of R.A. 6657, insofar as they are made
to apply to it:
(a) Section 3(b) which includes the "raising of livestock (and poultry)" in the definition of "Agricultural, Agricultural
Enterprise or Agricultural Activity."
(b) Section 11 which defines "commercial farms" as "private agricultural lands devoted to commercial, livestock, poultry
and swine raising . . ."
(c) Section 13 which calls upon petitioner to execute a production sharing plan.
(d) Section 16(d) and 17 which vest on the Department of Agrarian Reform the authority to summarily determine the just
compensation to be paid for lands covered by the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law.
(e) Section 32 which spells out the production sharing plan mentioned in Section 13
". . . (W)hereby three percent (3%) of the gross sales from the production of such lands are distributed within sixty (60)
days of the end of the fiscal year as compensation to regular and other farmworkers in such lands over and above the
compensation they currently receive: Provided, That these individuals or entities realize gross sales in excess of five
million pesos per annum unless the DAR, upon proper application, determine a lower ceiling.
In the event that the individual or entity realizes a profit, an additional ten (10%) of the net profit after tax shall be
distributed to said regular and other farmworkers within ninety (90) days of the end of the fiscal year . . ."
Luz Farms Argument: It, however, argued that Congress in enacting the said law has transcended the mandate of the
Constitution, in including land devoted to the raising of livestock, poultry and swine in its coverage (Rollo, p. 131).
Livestock or poultry raising is not similar to crop or tree farming. Land is not the primary resource in this undertaking and
represents no more than five percent (5%) of the total investment of commercial livestock and poultry raisers. Indeed,
there are many owners of residential lands all over the country who use available space in their residence for commercial
livestock and raising purposes, under "contractgrowing arrangements," whereby processing corporations and other
commercial livestock and poultry raisers (Rollo, p. 10). Lands support the buildings and other amenities attendant to the
raising of animals and birds. The use of land is incidental to but not the principal factor or consideration in productivity in
this industry. Including backyard raisers, about 80% of those in commercial livestock and poultry production occupy five
hectares or less. The remaining 20% are mostly corporate farms

Respondent Argument: the public respondent argued that livestock and poultry raising is embraced in the term
"agriculture" and the inclusion of such enterprise under Section 3(b) of R.A. 6657 is proper. He cited that Webster's
International Dictionary, Second Edition (1954), defines the following words: "Agriculture the art or science of cultivating
the ground and raising and harvesting crops, often, including also, feeding, breeding and management of livestock, tillage,
husbandry, farming
the transcripts of the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission of 1986 on the meaning of the word "agricultural,"
clearly show that it was never the intention of the framers of the Constitution to include livestock and poultry
industry in the coverage of the constitutionally mandated agrarian reform program of the Government.
It is evident from the foregoing discussion that Section II of R.A. 6657 which includes "private agricultural lands
devoted to commercial livestock, poultry and swine raising" in the definition of "commercial farms" is invalid, to
the extent that the aforecited agroindustrial activities are made to be covered by the agrarian reform program of the State.
There is simply no reason to include livestock and poultry lands in the coverage of agrarian reform. (Rollo, p. 21).
Hence, there is merit in Luz Farms' argument that the requirement in Sections 13 and 32 of R.A. 6657 directing
"corporate farms" which include livestock and poultry raisers to execute and implement "productionsharing
plans" (pending final redistribution of their landholdings) whereby they are called upon to distribute from three
percent (3%) of their gross sales and ten percent (10%) of their net profits to their workers as additional
compensation is unreasonable for being confiscatory, and therefore violative of due process (Rollo, p. 21).
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED. Sections 3(b), 11, 13 and 32 of R.A. No. 6657
insofar as the inclusion of the raising of livestock, poultry and swine in its coverage as well as the Implementing Rules and
Guidelines promulgated in accordance therewith, are hereby DECLARED null and void for being unconstitutional and the
writ of preliminary injunction issued is hereby MADE permanent.

ROXAS & co. vs CA

FACTS: This case involves three (3) haciendas in Nasugbu, Batangas owned by petitioner and the validity of the
acquisition of these haciendas by the government under Republic Act No. 6657, the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law
of 1988.
Petitioner Roxas & Co. is a domestic corporation and is the registered owner of three haciendas, namely,
Haciendas Palico, Banilad and Caylaway, all located in the Municipality of Nasugbu, Batangas. On July 27, 1987, the
Congress of the Philippines formally convened and took over legislative power from the President. 2 This Congress
passed Republic Act No. 6657, the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL) of 1988. The Act was signed by
the President on June 10, 1988 and took effect on June 15, 1988.
Before the law's effectivity, on May 6, 1988, petitioner filed with respondent DAR a voluntary offer to sell
Hacienda Caylaway pursuant to the provisions of E.O. No. 229. Haciendas Palico and Banilad were later placed
under compulsory acquisition by respondent DAR in accordance with the CARL.
petitioner applied with the DAR for conversion of Haciendas Palico and Banilad from agricultural to non-
agricultural lands under the provisions of the CARL. 13 On July 14, 1993, petitioner sent a letter to the DAR
Regional Director reiterating its request for conversion of the two haciendas. 14
Despite petitioner's application for conversion, respondent DAR proceeded with the acquisition of the two
Haciendas. The LBP trust accounts as compensation for Hacienda Palico were replaced by respondent DAR with cash
and LBP bonds. 15 On October 22, 1993, from the mother title of TCT No. 985 of the Hacienda, respondent DAR
registered Certificate of Land Ownership Award (CLOA) No. 6654. On October 30, 1993, CLOA's were distributed to
farmer beneficiaries. 16
On August 6, 1992, petitioner, through its President, Eduardo J. Roxas, sent a letter to the Secretary of
respondent DAR withdrawing its VOS (voluntary offer to sell) of Hacienda Caylaway. The Sangguniang Bayan of
Nasugbu, Batangas allegedly authorized the reclassification of Hacienda Caylaway from agricultural to non-agricultural.
As a result, petitioner informed respondent DAR that it was applying for conversion of Hacienda Caylaway from
agricultural to other uses. 34
In a letter dated September 28, 1992, respondent DAR Secretary informed petitioner that a reclassification of
the land would not exempt it from agrarian reform. Respondent Secretary also denied petitioner's withdrawal of
the VOS on the ground that withdrawal could only be based on specific grounds such as unsuitability of the soil
for agriculture, or if the slope of the land is over 18 degrees and that the land is undeveloped. 35
Despite the denial of the Voluntary Offer to sell withdrawal of Hacienda Caylaway, on May 11, 1993, petitioner filed its
application for conversion of both Haciendas Palico and Banilad. , through its President, Eduardo Roxas, reiterated its
request to withdraw the VOS over Hacienda Caylaway in light of the following:
1) Certification issued by Conrado I. Gonzales, Officer-in-Charge, Department of Agriculture, Region 4, 4th Floor, ATI (BA)
Bldg., Diliman, Quezon City dated March 1, 1993 stating that the lands subject of referenced titles "are not feasible and
economically sound for further agricultural development.
2) Resolution No. 19 of the Sangguniang Bayan of Nasugbu, Batangas approving the Zoning Ordinance reclassifying
areas covered by the referenced titles to non-agricultural which was enacted after extensive consultation with government
agencies, including [the Department of Agrarian Reform], and the requisite public hearings.
3) Resolution No. 106 of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Batangas dated March 8, 1993 approving the Zoning
Ordinance enacted by the Municipality of Nasugbu.
4) Letter dated December 15, 1992 issued by Reynaldo U. Garcia of the Municipal Planning & Development, Coordinator
and Deputized Zoning Administrator addressed to Mrs. Alicia P. Logarta advising that the Municipality of Nasugbu,
Batangas has no objection to the conversion of the lands subject of referenced titles to non-agricultural. 37
Petitioner alleged that the Municipality of Nasugbu, where the haciendas are located, had been declared a tourist
zone, that the land is not suitable for agricultural production, and that the Sangguniang Bayan of Nasugbu had
reclassified the land to non-agricultural. . Petitioner urges the Court to take cognizance of the conversion proceedings
and rule accordingly

ISSUE: WON the courts are in a better position to resolve petitioner's application for conversion of land.

HELD : NO. 91 Respondent DAR is in a better position to resolve petitioner's application for conversion, being
primarily the agency possessing the necessary expertise on the matter
The DAR's mandate over applications for conversion was first laid down in Section 4 (j) and Section 5 (l) of Executive
Order No. 129-A, Series of 1987 and reiterated in the CARL and Memorandum Circular No. 54, Series of 1993 of the
Office of the President. The DAR's jurisdiction over applications for conversion is provided as follows:
A. The Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) is mandated to "approve or disapprove applications for conversion,
restructuring or readjustment of agricultural lands into non-agricultural uses," pursuant to Section 4 (j) of
Executive Order No. 129-A, Series of 1987.
B. Sec. 5 (l) of E.O. 129-A, Series of 1987, vests in the DAR, exclusive authority to approve or disapprove applications for
conversion of agricultural lands for residential, commercial, industrial and other land uses.
C. Sec. 65 of R.A. No. 6657, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988, likewise empowers
the DAR to authorize under certain conditions, the conversion of agricultural lands.
D. Sec. 4 of Memorandum Circular No. 54, Series of 1993 of the Office of the President, provides that "action on
applications for land use conversion on individual landholdings shall remain as the responsibility of the DAR, which shall
utilize as its primary reference, documents on the comprehensive land use plans and accompanying ordinances passed
upon and approved by the local government units concerned, together with the National Land Use Policy, pursuant to R.A.
No. 6657 and E.O. No. 129-A. 87

Applications for conversion were initially governed by DAR A.O. No. 1, Series of 1990 entitled "Revised Rules and
Regulations Governing Conversion of Private Agricultural Lands and Non-Agricultural Uses," and DAR A.O. No. 2, Series
of 1990 entitled "Rules of Procedure Governing the Processing and Approval of Applications for Land Use Conversion."
These A.O.'s and other implementing guidelines, including Presidential issuances and national policies related to land use
conversion have been consolidated in DAR A.O. No. 07, Series of 1997. Under this recent issuance, the guiding
principle in land use conversion is:
to preserve prime agricultural lands for food production while, at the same time, recognizing the need of the
other sectors of society (housing, industry and commerce) for land, when coinciding with the objectives of the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law to promote social justice, industrialization and the optimum use of land as
a national resource for public welfare. 88
"Land Use" refers to the manner of utilization of land, including its allocation, development and management. "Land Use
Conversion" refers to the act or process of changing the current use of a piece of agricultural land into some other use as
approved by the DAR. 89 The conversion of agricultural land to uses other than agricultural requires field
investigation and conferences with the occupants of the land. They involve factual findings and highly technical
matters within the special training and expertise of the DAR. DAR A.O. No. 7, Series of 1997 lays down with
specificity how the DAR must go about its task. This time, the field investigation is not conducted by the MARO but by a
special task force, known as the Center for Land Use Policy Planning and Implementation (CLUPPI-DAR Central Office).
The procedure is that once an application for conversion is filed, the CLUPPI prepares the Notice of Posting. The
MARO only posts the notice and thereafter issues a certificate to the fact of posting. The CLUPPI conducts the
field investigation and dialogues with the applicants and the farmer beneficiaries to ascertain the information
necessary for the processing of the application. The Chairman of the CLUPPI deliberates on the merits of the
investigation report and recommends the appropriate action. This recommendation is transmitted to the Regional
Director, thru the Undersecretary, or Secretary of Agrarian Reform. Applications involving more than fifty
hectares are approved or disapproved by the Secretary. The procedure does not end with the Secretary, however.
The Order provides that the decision of the Secretary may be appealed to the Office of the President or the Court
of Appeals, as the case may be, viz:
Appeal from the decision of the Undersecretary shall be made to the Secretary, and from the Secretary to the Office of the
President or the Court of Appeals as the case may be. The mode of appeal/motion for reconsideration, and the appeal
fee, from Undersecretary to the Office of the Secretary shall be the same as that of the Regional Director to the Office of
the Secretary. 90
Indeed, the doctrine of primary jurisdiction does not warrant a court to arrogate unto itself authority to resolve a
controversy the jurisdiction over which is initially lodged with an administrative body of special competence. 91
Respondent DAR is in a better position to resolve petitioner's application for conversion, being primarily the
agency possessing the necessary expertise on the matter. The power to determine whether Haciendas Palico,
Banilad and Caylaway are non-agricultural, hence, exempt from the coverage of the CARL lies with the DAR, not
with this Court.

St. Rosa Realty Dev Corp vs CA.

The case before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of Appeals[1] affirming the
decision of the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board[2](hereafter DARAB) ordering the compulsory
acquisition of petitioners property under the CARP.
According to petitioner, the parcels of land are watersheds, which provide clean potable water to the Canlubang
community, and that ninety (90) light industries are now located in the area.
Pet allege respondent usurped and destroyed the property.

After the filing of the ejectment cases, respondents petitioned the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) for the
compulsory acquisition of the SRRDC property under the CARP.
Petitioner filed with the Municipal Agrarian Reform Office (MARO), a Protest and Objection to the compulsory acquisition
of the property on the ground that the area was not appropriate for agricultural purposes.

Farmer beneficiaries together with the BARC chairman answered the protest and objection stating that the slope of the
land is not 18% but only 5-10% and that the land is suitable and economically viable for agricultural purposes
Secretary of Agrarian Reform Miriam Defensor Santiago sent two (2) notices of acquisition[11] to petitioner and had been
placed under CARP.
ISSUE: (1) whether the subject parcels of land fall within the coverage of the Compulsory Acquisition Program of the
CARP; and (2) whether the petition for land conversion of the parcels of land may be granted.
DARAB ruling:The dismissal for lack of merit of the protest against the compulsory coverage of the landholdings of Sta.
Rosa Realty Development Corporation
CA: Affirm
Ruling SC
Under Republic Act No. 6657, there are two modes of acquisition of private land: compulsory and voluntary. In the case at
bar, the Department of Agrarian Reform sought the compulsory acquisition of subject property under R. A. No. 6657,
Section 16

For a valid implementation of the CARP Program, two notices are required: (1) the notice of coverage and letter of
invitation to a preliminary conference sent to the landowner, the representative of the BARC, LBP, farmer beneficiaries
and other interested parties pursuant to DAR A. O. No. 12, series of 1989; and (2) the notice of acquisition sent to the
landowner under Section 16 of the CARL.

In the case at bar, DAR has executed the taking of the property in question. However, payment of just compensation was
not in accordance with the procedural requirement. The law required payment in cash or LBP bonds, not by trust account
as was done by DAR.
Consequently, petitioner questioned before the Court of Appeals DARABs decision ordering the compulsory
acquisition of petitioners property.[25] Here, petitioner pressed the question of whether the property was a watershed, not
covered by CARP.
Court Ruling: 1. Art. 67 of the Water Code: Any watershed or any area of land adjacent to any surface water or overlying
any ground water may be declared by DENR as a protected area. In this case, the DENR did not declare the land as a
protected area, In the past the municipality issued a resolution that the said land is an agricultural land.

Watersheds generally are outside the commerce of man, so why was the Casile property titled in the name of
SRRDC? The answer is simple. At the time of the titling, the Department of Agriculture and Natural Resources had not
declared the property as watershed area. The parcels of land in Barangay Casile were declared as PARK by a Zoning
Ordinance adopted by the municipality of Cabuyao in 1979, as certified by the Housing and Land Use Regulatory
Board. On January 5, 1994, the Sangguniang Bayan of Cabuyao, Laguna issued a Resolution[26] voiding the zoning
classification of the land at Barangay Casile as Park and declaring that the land is now classified as agricultural land.
2. Although evidence of petitioners is strong, the Supreme Court opines that the area must be maintained for watershed
purposes for ecological and environmental considerations despite the 88 families who are beneficiaries of the CARP. It is
important that a larger view of the situation be taken because of the thousands of residents downstream if the watershed
will not be protected and maintained for its natural purpose.
3. Despite Supreme Court s strong opinion of protection of watersheds as an intergenerational responsibility, they,
however ordered to DARAB to conduct a re-evaluation of the case since the said land falls under exception.

Heirs of Nicolas Jugalbot vs CA

Facts:an Emancipation Patent (EP) was issued to Nicolas Jugalbot based on the latters claim that he was the tenant of
the property at the case at bar.
Nicolas Jugalbot alleged that he was a tenant of the property continuously since the 1950s.
the subject property was declared to be tenanted as of October 21, 1972 and primarily devoted to rice and corn.
Virginia A. Roa, herein private respondents Complaint for Cancellation of Title (TCT No. E-103), Recovery of Possession
and Damages against Nicolas Jugalbot
Decision was rendered by the DARAB Provincial Adjudicator dismissing private respondents complaint and upholding the
validity of the Emancipation Patent.

On appeal, the DARAB Central Office affirmed the Provincial Adjudicators decision on the ground of prescription

The appellate court reversed the Decision and Resolution of the DARAB Central Office on four grounds: (1) the absence
of a tenancy relationship; (2) lack of notice to Virginia Roa by the DAR; (3) the area of the property which was less than
one hectare and deemed swampy, rainfed and kangkong-producing; and (4) the classification of the subject property as
residential, which is outside the coverage of Presidential Decree No. 27.

Issue:The sole issue for determination is whether a tenancy relationship exists between petitioners Heirs of Nicolas
Jugalbot, and private respondents, Heirs of Virginia A. Roa, under Presidential Decree No. 27. Simply stated, are
petitioners de jure tenants of private respondents?
Petitoners Allegation
Petitioners allege that they are bona fide tenants of private respondents under Presidential Decree No. 27. Private
respondents deny this, citing inter alia, that Virginia A. Roa was not given a notice of coverage of the property subject
matter of this case; that Virginia A. Roa and the private respondents did not have any tenant on the same property; that
the property allegedly covered by Presidential Decree No. 27 was residential land; that the lot was paraphernal property of
Virginia A. Roa; and the landholding was less than seven (7) hectares.
The petitioners are not de jure tenants of private respondents under Presidential Decree No. 27 due to the absence of the
essential requisites that establish a tenancy relationship between them.
Firstly, the taking of subject property was done in violation of constitutional due process. The Court of Appeals was correct
in pointing out that Virginia A. Roa was denied due process because the DAR failed to send notice of the impending land
reform coverage to the proper party. The records show that notices were erroneously addressed and sent in the name of
Pedro N. Roa who was not the owner

In addition, the defective notice sent to Pedro N. Roa was followed by a DAR certification signed by team leader Eduardo
Maandig on January 8, 1988 stating that the subject property was tenanted as of October 21, 1972 and primarily devoted
to rice and corn despite the fact that there was no ocular inspection or any on-site fact-finding investigation and report to
verify the truth of the allegations of Nicolas Jugalbot that he was a tenant of the property. The absence of such ocular
inspection or on-site fact-finding investigation and report likewise deprives Virginia A. Roa of her right to
property through the denial of due process.
Secondly, there is no concrete evidence on record sufficient to establish that Nicolas Jugalbot or the petitioners personally
cultivated the property under question or that there was sharing of harvests, except for their self-serving statements.

the fact alone of working on anothers landholding does not raise a presumption of the existence of agricultural
tenancy. Other factors must be taken into consideration like compensation in the form of lease rentals or a share
in the produce of the landholding involved.

Without the essential elements of consent and sharing, no tenancy relationship can exist between the petitioner
and the private respondents.

Finally, it is readily apparent in this case that the property under dispute is residential property and not agricultural

the doctrine is well-settled that the allegation that an agricultural tenant tilled the land in question does not automatically
make the case an agrarian dispute. It is necessary to first establish the existence of a tenancy relationship between the
party litigants. The following essential requisites must concur in order to establish a tenancy relationship: (a) the parties
are the landowner and the tenant; (b) the subject matter is agricultural land; (c) there is consent; (d) the purpose is
agricultural production; (e) there is personal cultivation by the tenant; and (f) there is a sharing of harvests between the
Chapter 5, 07-11
SECTION 21.VOS Conditions. LOs may voluntarily oer their private agricultural lands for coverage underR.A. No.
6657, as amended, by submitting a notarized Letter-Oer, in a form that shall be provided by the DAR, to the PARO
where the oered landholding is located.

Upon its acceptance by the DAR, the Letter-Oer for coverage under VOS can no longer be withdrawn. A VOS is
deemed accepted by the DAR upon receipt by the LO of the Letter of Acceptance of the PARO. The Letter of
Acceptance shall be served to the LO in the same manner as the NOC, as provided by Sections 16 and 18 of this A.O.

SECTION 22.Landholding Under Five (5) Hectares Voluntarily Oered. The DAR shall not accept the VOS of any LO
who owns one or more agricultural landholdings which, combined, has an aggregate size of five (5) hectares or less.

To ensure this, it is incumbent upon the PARO to verify the extent of the landholdings owned by the LO prior to executing
and issuing the letter of acceptance.

SECTION 23. VOS to Cover the Entire Area of the Land Oered. An LO who wishes to oer his/her/its land under
VOS must oer the entire area of the same parcel of land, subject, however, to the last paragraph of Section 27 of this

SECTION 24.Landholding Owned by a Corporation or Co-Owned. In case the agricultural landholding is owned by a
corporation, the Letter-Oer for coverage under VOS must be filed together with a Resolution by the Corporation's
Board of Directors giving specific authority to the person who executed the Letter-Oer to voluntarily oer the

In case the agricultural landholding is co-owned by several persons or is owned by an unsettled estate of a deceased
person, the Letter-Oer must be executed by all the co-owners/heirs, except if the person(s) executing the Letter-Oer
has/have been specifically authorized in a public instrument by all the co-owners/heirs to execute the same on behalf of

SECTION 25. When Shifting from CA to VOS Allowed. LOs who received NOCs for their landholdings under
Compulsory Acquisition (CA) may be allowed to shift to VOS, provided that the Claim Folder (CF) for the subject
landholding has not yet been received by the Claims Processing, Valuation and Payment Division (CPVPD) of the Land
Bank of the Philippines (LBP) for valuation.

The LO may shift to VOS from CA by filing a written Letter-Oer received by the PARO of the area where the land is

An LO who shifts to VOS who fails to nominate a preferred beneficiary and to submit his/her duly attested list of tenants,
lessees and/or regular farmworkers, if any, during the thirty (30) day period from receipt of NOC is disqualified to
nominate one and/or is deemed to have waived his right to attest.DaScAI

SECTION 26.Voluntary Land Transfer/Direct Payment Scheme. Only VLT/DPS applications duly submitted to DAR on
or before 30 June 2009 shall be allowed.

Alita v. CA
-pe$$on seeking the reversal Court of Appeals decision: 1)Declaring Presiden$al Decree No. 27 inapplicable to lands obtained thru
the homestead law; 2) Declaring that the 4 registered co-owners will cul$vate and operate the farmholding themselves as owners; &
3) Ejec$ng tenants, namely; Gabino Alita, Jesus Julian, Sr., Jesus Julian, Jr., Pedro Ricalde, Vicente Ricalde and Rolando Salamar, as the
owners would want to cul$vate the farmholding themselves.
-2 parcels of land at Guilinan, Tungawan, Zamboanga del Sur acquired by respondents Reyes through homestead patent under
Commonwealth Act No. 141
- Reyes wants to personally cul$vate these lands, but Alita refuse to vacate, relying on the provisions of P.D. 27 and P.D. 316 and
-June 18, 1981: Respondents Reyes (Plain$) ins$tuted a complaint against Minister of Agrarian Reform Estrella, Regional Director of
MAR Region IX P.D. Macarambon, and Alita et.al for the declara$on of P.D. 27 and all other Decrees, Leeers of Instruc$ons and
General Orders inapplicable to homestead lands. Defendants Alita led their answer with special and arma$ve defenses.
-July 19, 1982: Reyes led urgent mo$on to enjoin the defendants from declaring the lands in li$ga$on under Opera$on Land
Transfer and from being issued land transfer cer$cates
-November 5, 1982: Court of Agrarian Rela$ons 16th Regional District, Branch IV, Pagadian City (Regional Trial Court, 9th Judicial
Region, Branch XVIII) rendered its decision dismissing complaint and the mo$on to enjoin
On January 4, 1983, plain$s moved to reconsider the Order of dismissal, to which defendants led their opposi$on on January 10,
RTC: issued decision promp$ng defendants Alita et al to move for reconsidera$on but was denied
CA: the same was sustained
ISSUE: whether or not lands obtained through homestead patent are covered by the Agrarian Reform under P.D. 27.-
We agree with the pe$$oners Alita et.al in saying that P.D. 27 decreeing the emancipa$on of tenants from the bondage of the soil
and transferring to them ownership of the land they $ll is a sweeping social legisla$on, a remedial measure promulgated pursuant to
the social jus$ce precepts of the Cons$tu$on. However, such conten$on cannot be invoked to defeat the purpose of the enactment
of the Public Land Act or Commonwealth Act No. 141 to protect ones right to life itself by give a needy ci$zen a land wherein they
could build a house and plant for necessary subsistence.

Art XIII, Sec 6 of the Cons$tu$on likewise respects the superiority of the homesteaders' rights over the rights of the tenants
guaranteed by the Agrarian Reform statute.
Sec$on 6. The State shall apply the principles of agrarian reform or stewardshipin the disposi$on or u$liza$on of other
natural resources, including lands of public domain under lease or concession suitable to agriculture, subject to prior rights,
homestead rights of small seelers, and the rights of indigenous communi$es to their ancestral lands.

Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988 or Republic Act No. 6657 likewise supports the inapplicability of P.D. 27 to lands
covered by homestead patents like those of the property in ques$on,
Sec$on 6. Reten$on Limits. ...
... Provided further, That original homestead grantees or their direct compulsory heirs who s$ll own the original homestead at
the $me of the approval of this Act shall retain the same areas as long as they con$nue to cul$vate said homestead.'
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision of the respondent Court of Appeals sustaining the decision of the Regional Trial
Court is hereby AFFIRMED.

Republic Vs CA

-The ve parcels of land in issue has a combined area of approximately 112.0577 hectares. The tax declara$ons classied the
proper$es as agricultural.pe$$oner DAR issued a No$ce of Coverage of the subject parcels of land under compulsory acquisi$on
pursuant to Sec$on 7, Chapter II of R.A. 6657 or the Comprehensive Land Reform Law of 1998 (CARL).
-private respondent filed with the DAR Regional Office an application for exemption of the land from agrarian reform,
pursuant to DAR Administrative Order No. 6, series of 1994[2] and DOJ Opinion No. 44, series of 1990.
-DAR Regional Director recommended a denial of the said petition, on the ground that private respondent failed to
substantiate their (sic) allegation that the properties are indeed in the municipalitys residential and forest conservation
zone and that portions of the properties are not irrigated nor irrigable.
-Amended Petition for Exemption/Exclusion from CARP coverage. This time, private respondent alleged that the property
should be exempted since it is within the residential and forest conservation zones of the town plan/zoning ordinance of
-DAR Secretary issued an Order denying the application for exemption of private respondent, on the grounds that the land
use plan of Jala-Jala, which differs from its land use map, intends to develop 73% of Barangay Punta into an agricultural
zone; that the certification issued by the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) is not definite and specific;
and that the certification issued by the National Irrigation Authority (NIA) that the area is not irrigated nor programmed for
irrigation, is not conclusive on the DAR, since big areas in the municipality are recipients of JICA-funded Integrated Jala-
Jala Rural Development Projects.
Court of Appeals issued its Decision that reversed the assailed DAR orders

Issue: WON CA committed an error in exempting the parcels of land of private respondent Green City Estate and
Development Corporation (private respondent) from agrarian reform.

Ruling:The petition has no merit.

Republic Act No. 6657 otherwise known as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL) of 1998 covers all public
and private agricultural lands. The same law defines agricultural as land devoted to agricultural activity as defined in this
Act and not classified as mineral, forest, residential, commercial or industrial land.
We are unable to sustain petitioners contention. There is no law or jurisprudence that holds that the land classification
embodied in the tax declarations is conclusive and final nor would proscribe any further inquiry. Furthermore, the tax
declarations are clearly not the sole basis of the classification of a land.
In fact, DAR Administrative Order No. 6 lists other documents, aside from tax declarations, that must be submitted when
applying for exemption from CARP
we sustained the trial court when it ruled that the classification made by the Land Regulatory Board of the land in
question outweighed the classification stated in the tax declaration.
the Court of Appeals was constrained to resort to an ocular inspection of said properties through the commission it
created considering that the opinion of petitioner DAR conflicted with the land use map submitted in evidence by private
respondent. Respondent court also noted that even from the beginning the properties of private respondent had no
definite delineation and classification.[11] Hence, the survey of the properties through the court appointed commissioners
was the judicious and equitable solution to finally resolve the issue of land classification and delineation.
he determination of the classification and physical condition of the lands is therefore material in the disposition of this
case, for which purpose the Court of Appeals constituted the commission to inspect and survey said properties. Petitioner
DAR did not object to the creation of a team of commissioners[21] when it very well knew that the survey and ocular
inspection would eventually involve the determination of the slope of the subject parcels of land. It is the protestation of
petitioner that comes at a belated hour. The team of commissioners appointed by respondent court was composed
persons who were mutually acceptable to the parties.[22] Thus, in the absence of any irregularity in the survey and
inspection of the subject properties, and none is alleged, the report of the commissioners deserves full faith and credit and
we find no reversible error in the reliance by the appellate court upon said report.

Heirs of Dr. Jose vs Land Bank

The spouses Gregorio Nanaman (Gregorio) and Hilaria Tabuclin (Hilaria) were the owners of a parcel of agricultural land
located in Tambo, Iligan City. Said spouses were childless, but Gregorio had a son named Virgilio Nanaman (Virgilio) by another
When Gregorio died in 1945, Hilaria and Virgilio administered the subject property and sold the subject property to Dr. Jose
Deleste (Deleste) for PhP 16,000. The deed of sale was notarized on February 17, 1954 and registered on March 2, 1954. Also, the tax
declaration in the name of Virgilio was canceled and a new tax declaration was issued in the name of Deleste.
On May 15, 1954, Hilaria died. Gregorios brother, Juan Nanaman, was appointed as special administrator of the estate of the
deceased spouses. Subsequently, Edilberto Noel (Noel) was appointed as the regular administrator of the joint estate. Noel, as the
administrator of the intestate estate of the deceased spouses, filed an action against Deleste for the reversion of title over the subject
property. The decision stated that the subject property was the conjugal property of the late spouses Gregorio and Hilaria and that the
latter could only sell her one-half (1/2) share of the subject property to Deleste. As a result, Deleste, who died in 1992, and the
intestate estate of Gregorio were held to be the co-owners of the subject property, each with a one-half (1/2) interest in it.
Thereafter, Presidential Decree No. (PD) 27 was issued. This law mandates that tenanted rice and corn lands be brought under
the Operation Land Transfer (OLT) Program and awarded to farmer-beneficiaries. Thus, the subject property was placed under the said
However, only the heirs of Gregorio were identified by the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) as the landowners.
Petitioners contend that DAR failed to notify them that it is subjecting the subject property under the coverage of the agrarian reform
program; hence, their right to due process of law was violated
Eventually, on February 12, 1984, DAR issued Certificates of Land Transfer (CLTs) in favor of private respondents who were
tenants and actual cultivators of the subject property.

2.Whether or not the e failure of the administrative body to give written notice that the property bought by the ascendant of the
petitioner is subject to PD 27 a violation of the heirs due process.
Since the subject property had been reclassified as residential/commercial land with the enactment of City Ordinance No. 1313 in
1975, it can no longer be considered as an agricultural land within the ambit of RA 6657. It should be clarified that even if under PD
27, tenant-farmers are deemed owners as of October 21, 1972, this is not to be construed as automatically vesting upon these tenant-
farmers absolute ownership over the land they were tilling. Certain requirements must also be complied with, such as payment of just
compensation, before full ownership is vested upon the tenant-farmers
We explained that land transfer under PD 27 is effected in two (2) stages. The first stage is the issuance of a CLT to a farmer-
beneficiary as soon as the DAR transfers the landholding to the farmer-beneficiary in recognition that said person is its deemed owner.
And the second stage is the issuance of an EP as proof of full ownership of the landholding upon full payment of the annual
amortizations or lease rentals by the farmer-beneficiary
In the case at bar, the CLTs were issued in 1984. Therefore, for all intents and purposes, it was only in 1984 that private respondents,
as farmer-beneciaries, were recognized to have an inchoate right over the subject property prior to compliance with the prescribed
requirements. Considering that the local zoning ordinance was enacted in 1975, and subsequently approved by the HSRC in 1978,
private respondents s$ll had no vested rights to speak of during this period, as it was only in 1984 that private respondents were
issued the CLTs and were deemed owners.
The same holds true even if EPs and OCTs were issued in 2001, since reclassification had taken place twenty-six (26) years
prior to their issuance. Undeniably, no vested rights accrued prior to reclassification and its approval. Consequently, the subject
property, particularly Lot No. 1407, is outside the coverage of the agrarian reform program.

2. YES. PD 27 is a statutory notice to all owners of agricultural lands devoted to rice and/or corn production, implying that there was
no need for an actual notice. The importance of an actual notice in subjecting a property under the agrarian reform program cannot be
underrated, as non-compliance with it trods roughshod with the essential requirements of administrative due process of law.
Since land acquisition under either Presidential Decree No. 27 and the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law govern the
extraordinary method of expropriating private property, the law must be strictly construed. Faithful compliance with legal provisions,
especially those which relate to the procedure for acquisition of expropriated lands should therefore be observed. In the instant case,
no proper notice was given to Virginia A. Roa by the DAR. Neither did the DAR conduct an ocular inspection and investigation.
Hence, any act committed by the DAR or any of its agencies that results from its failure to comply with the proper procedure for
expropriation of land is a violation of constitutional due process and should be deemed arbitrary, capricious, whimsical and tainted
with grave abuse of discretion.
In addition, DAR must have notified Deleste, being the landowner of the subject property. It should be noted that the deed of
sale executed by Hilaria in favor of Deleste was registered on March 2, 1954, and such registration serves as a constructive notice to
the whole world that the subject property was already owned by Deleste by virtue of the said deed of sale. DAR does not have the
reason to feign ignorance of the transfer of ownership over the subject property.
Moreover, DAR should have sent the notice to Deleste, and not to the Nanamans, since the tax declaration in the name of
Virgilio was already canceled and a new one issued in the name of Deleste. Although tax declarations are not conclusive evidence of
ownership, they are nonetheless good indicia of possession in the concept of an owner, for no one in his right mind would be paying
taxes for a property that is not in his actual or, at least, constructive possession.

Petitioners right to due process of law was, indeed, violated when the DAR failed to notify them that it is subjecting the
subject property under the coverage of the agrarian reform program.

Central Mindanao University vs. Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board

215 SCRA 86 (1992)
On 16 January 1958, President Carlos Garcia issued Proclamation No. 467 reserving for the Mindanao Agricultural
College, now the CMU, a piece of land to be used as its future campus. In 1984, CMU embarked on a project titled
"Kilusang Sariling Sikap" wherein parcels of land were leased to its faculty members and employees. Under the
terms of the program, CMU will assist faculty members and employee groups through the extension of technical
know-how, training and other kinds of assistance. In turn, they paid the CMU a service fee for use of the land. The
agreement explicitly provided that there will be no tenancy relationship between the lessees and the CMU.
When the program was terminated, a case was filed by the participants of the "Kilusang Sariling Sikap" for
declaration of status as tenants under the CARP. In its resolution, DARAB, ordered, among others, the segregation
of 400 hectares of the land for distribution under CARP. The land was subjected to coverage on the basis of DAR's
determination that the lands do not meet the condition for exemption, that is, it is not "actually, directly, and
exclusively used" for educational purposes.
Is the CMU land covered by CARP? Who determines whether lands reserved for public use by presidential
proclamation is no longer actually, directly and exclusively used and necessary for the purpose for which they are
The land is exempted from CARP. CMU is in the best position to resolve and answer the question of when and what
lands are found necessary for its use. The Court also chided the DARAB for resolving this issue of exemption on the
basis of "CMU's present needs." The Court stated that the DARAB decision stating that for the land to be exempt it
must be "presently, actively exploited and utilized by the university in carrying out its present educational program
with its present student population and academic faculty" overlooked the very significant factor of growth of the
university in the years to come.SHECcT
TheCMUcase is unique as it involves land transferred by the state to CMU throughPD 467which provided for its
commitment to a specific use and purpose. Thus, the said land was already set aside for a specific purpose and, in effect,
was taken outside the coverage of agrarian reform by law. It is submitted that a more accurate basis for the exemption
should have been that the exclusive use of the land both present and future has been determined by law, and not
because of the determination of the CMU of what it needs and how it intends to use it.
In ruling that the CMU is in the best position to determine the use of the land and not DAR, the Supreme Court seems
to have overlookedEO 407(1990), as amended byEO 448(1991), which provides that DAR is vested with the power to
determine whether lands reserved for public uses by presidential proclamation is no longer actually, directly and
exclusively used and necessary for the purpose for which they are reserved. Said EO provides that:
Sec. 1-A. All lands or portions thereof reserved by virtue of Presidential proclamations for specific public uses by
the government, its agencies and instrumentalities, including government-owned or controlled corporations suitable
for agriculture and no longer actually, directly and exclusively used or necessary for the purposes for which they
have been reserved, as determined by the Department of Agrarian Reform in coordination with the government
agency or instrumentality concerned in whose favor the reservation was established, shall be segregated from the
reservation and transferred to the Department of Agrarian Reform for distribution to qualified beneficiaries under the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program.
Thus, DAR in coordination with the agency or department involved, can determine whether the purpose or use for
which the lands reserved continues to exist and therefore establish if they continue to be exempt from CARP coverage.
The Supreme Court's statement that lands of universities and academic institutions need not be actually, directly and
exclusively used for educational or research purposes at the time of the effectivity of theRA 6657to be exempt from
CARP also fails to consider Sec. 10 ofRA 6657. Sec. 10 is explicit that only those lands that are "actually, directly, and
exclusively" used and found necessary for the uses enumerated therein are exempt from CARP coverage. A literal
interpretation of the provision implies that the exemption applies only to those lands already committed for the
enumerated purposes at the date of the effectivity of law on 15 June 1988. Thus, agricultural land acquired by academic
institutions for academic, educational, or research purposes after 15 June 1988, or those owned by them but not
committed exclusively, actually, and directly to the abovementioned uses before or on such date, are covered by CARP.
For its exclusion from acquisition and distribution, and for its commitment to said purposes, the institution may file before
DAR for clearance to convert these lands into non-agricultural use.
Buklod nang Mangbubukid vs EM Ramos
Doctrine: A state may not impair vested rights by legisla6ve enactment, by the enactment or by the subsequent repeal of a municipal
ordinance, or by a change in the cons6tu6on of the State, except in a legi6mate exercise of the police power.

Facts: (WARNING: Its a lengthy case.)

- Nature: Consolidated Pe$$ons for Review on Cer6orari led by the Buklod ng Magbubukid Sa Lupaing Ramos, Inc. (Buklod)
and the Department of Agrarian Regorm (DAR), assailing a decision of the Court of Appeals in which it declared the parcels of
land owned by E.M. Ramos and Sons, Inc. (EMRASON) in Cavite exempt from the coverage of the Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Program (CARP), thus, nullifying and seqng aside the Decision of the Oce of the President.
- Several parcels of unirrigated land which form part of a larger expanse originally owned by the Manila Golf and Country Club
was aquired by EMRASON for the purpose of developing the same into a residen$al subdivision known as "Traveller's Life
- The Municipal Council of Dasmarias, Cavite, ac$ng pursuant to Republic Act No. 2264, otherwise known as the "Local
Autonomy Act", enacted Municipal Ordinance No. 1 en$tled "An Ordinance Providing Subdivision Regula$on and Providing
Penal$es for Viola$on Thereof." EMRASON applied for an authority to convert and development its property into a residen$al
subdivision. Them Municipal Council of Dasmarias, Cavite passed Municipal Ordinance No. 29-A approving EMRASON's
- The actual implementa$on of the subdivision project suered delay because the property was mortgaged to, and the $tles
thereto were in the possession of, the Overseas Bank of Manila, which during the period material was under liquida$on.
- On June 15. 1988, Republic Act No. 6657, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law or CARL, took eect,
ushering in a new process of land classica$on, acquisi$on and distribu$on. Then came the Aquino government's plan to
convert the tenanted neighboring property of the Na$onal Development Company (NDC) into an industrial estate to be
managed through a joint venture scheme by NDC and the Marubeni Corpora$on. Part of the overall conversion package
called for providing the tenant-farmers, op$ng to remain at the NDC property, with three hectares each. However, the size of
the NDC property turned out to be insucient for both the demands of the proposed industrial project as well as the
government's commitment to the tenant-farmers. To address this commitment, the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR)
was thus tasked with acquiring addi$onal lands from the nearby areas. The DAR earmarked for this purpose the subject
property of EMRASON. DAR Secretary Benjamin Leong sent out the rst of four batches of no$ces of acquisi$on, each of
which drew protest from EMRASON.
- EMRASON led with the DARAB separate pe$$ons to nullify the no$ces. The Legal Division of DAR rendered a decision
declaring as null and void all the no$ces of acquisi$ons, observing that the property covered thereby is, pursuant to
Department of Jus$ce (DOJ) Opinion No. 44, series of 1990, exempt from CARP. Supposedly, this was pursuant to a DOJ
Opinion rendered by then Jus$ce Secretary Franklin Drilon, clarifying that lands already converted to non-agricultural uses
before June 15, 1988 were no longer covered by CARP.
- Region IV DAR Regional Director motu propio elevated the case to the Oce of the Agrarian Reform Secretary. DAR Secretary
Ernesto Garilao issued an order arming the No$ces of Acquisi$on MR denied -> Appeal to the Oce of the President
- Appeal dismissed by OP because EMRASONs property has supposedly remained agricultural in classica$on and thus within
the coverage of the CARP because it failed to comply with the mandatory requirements and condi$ons of Municipal
Ordinance Nos. 1 and 29-A, specically, among others, the need for approval of the Na$onal Planning Commission through
the Highway District Engineer, and the Bureau of Lands before nal submission to the Municipal Council and Municipal
Mayor, and there was a cer$ca$on of the Human Seelements Regulatory Commission (HSRC) in 1981 and the Housing
and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLRB) in 1992 that the property is agricultural MR denied Pe$$on for Review with the
- DAR had already prepared Cer$cates of Land Ownership Award (CLOAs) to distribute the subject property to farmer-
beneciaries. However, a writ of preliminary injunc$on issued by the Court of Appeals enjoined the release of the CLOAs.
Buklod, on behalf of the alleged 300 farmer-beneciaries of the subject property, led a Manifesta$on and Omnibus Mo$on,
wherein it moved that it be allowed to intervene as an indispensable party.
- Court of Appeals ruled in favor of EMRASON because the subject property was already converted/classied as residen$al by
the Municipality of Dasmarias prior to the eec$vity of the CARL. The appellate court reasoned mainly that the
municipality, conformably with its statutory-conferred local autonomy, had passed a subdivision measure, I.e., Ordinance No.
1, and had approved in line thereto, through the medium of Ordinance No. 29-A, [EMRASON's] applica$on for subdivision, or
with like eect approved the conversion/classica$on of the lands in dispute as residen$al. Signicantly, the Municipal Mayor
of Dasmarias, Cavite, in his leeer of September 23, 1988 to [EMRASON], claried that such conversion conforms with the
approved development plan of the municipality. (If interested in the discussion at CA level, please read the case)

PeOOoners arguments:
- DAR:
o The subject property could be compulsorily acquired by the State from EMRASON and distributed to qualied farmer-
beneciaries under the CARP since it was s$ll agricultural land when the CARP became eec$ve on June 15, 1988.
Ordinance Nos. 1 and 29-A, approved by the Municipality of Dasmarias on July 13, 1971 and July 9, 1972,
respec$vely, did not reclassify the subject property from agricultural to non-agricultural. The power to reclassify lands
is an inherent power of the Na$onal Legislature under SecOon 9 of Commonwealth Act No. 141, otherwise known as
the Public Land Act, as amended, which, absent a specic delega$on, could not be exercised by any local government
unit (LGU). The Local Autonomy Act of 1959 - in eect when the Municipality of Dasmarias approved Ordinance Nos.
1 and 29-A - merely delegated to ci$es and municipali$es zoning authority, to be understood as the regula$on of the
uses of property in accordance with the exis$ng character of the land and structures. It was only SecOon 20 of
Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991, which extended to ci$es and
municipali$es limited authority to reclassify agricultural lands.
o Even conceding that ci$es and municipali$es were already authorized in 1972 to issue an ordinance reclassifying lands
from agricultural to non-agricultural, Ordinance No. 29-A of the Municipality of Dasmarias was not valid since it
failed to comply with SecOon 3 of the Local Autonomy Act of 1959, SecOon 16(a) of Ordinance No. 1 of the
Municipality of Dasmarinas, and AdministraOve Order No. 152, which all required review and approval of such an
ordinance by the Na$onal Planning Commission (NPC). Subsequent developments further necessitated review and
approval of Ordinance No. 29-A by the Human Seelements Regulatory Commission (HSRC), which later became the
Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB).
o Reliance by the Court of Appeals on Natalia Realty, Inc. v. Department of Agrarian Reform is misplaced because the
lands involved therein were converted from agricultural to residen$al use by Presiden$al Proclama$on No. 1637,
issued pursuant to the authority delegated to the President under Sec$on 71, et seq., of the Public Land Act.
- Buklod:
o Prior to Ordinance Nos. 1 and 29-A, there were already laws implemen$ng agrarian reform, par$cularly: (1) Republic
Act No. 3844, otherwise known as the Agricultural Land Reform Code, in eect since August 8, 1963, and
subsequently amended by Republic Act No. 6389 on September 10, 1971, awer which it became known as the Code
of Agrarian Reforms; and (2) PresidenOal Decree No. 27, otherwise known as the Tenants EmancipaOon Decree,
which took eect on November 19, 1972. Agricultural land could not be converted for the purpose of evading land
reform for there were already laws gran$ng farmer-tenants security of tenure, protec$on from ejectment without just
cause, and vested rights to the land they work on.
o EMRASON failed to comply with SecOon 36 of the Code of Agrarian Reforms, which provided that the conversion of
land should be implemented within one year, otherwise, the conversion is deemed in bad faith. Given the failure of
EMRASON to comply with many other requirements for a valid conversion, the subject property has remained
agricultural. Simply put, no compliance means no conversion. In fact, Buklod points out, the subject property is s$ll
declared as "agricultural" for real estate tax purposes. Consequently, EMRASON is now estopped from insis$ng that
the subject property is actually "residen$al."
o Land reform is a consOtuOonal mandate which should be given paramount consideraOon. Pursuant to said
cons$tu$onal mandate, the Legislature enacted the CARP. It is a basic legal principle that a legisla$ve statute prevails
over a mere municipal ordinance. ARGUMENT MOST RELEVANT TO THE TOPIC

Respondents arguments:
o The subject property is exempt from CARP because it had already been reclassied as residen$al with the approval of
Ordinance No. 29-A by the Municipality. EMRASON cites Or9gas & Co., Ltd. Partnership v. Fea9 Bank and Trust Co
where this Court ruled that a municipal council is empowered to adopt zoning and subdivision ordinances or
regula$ons under SecOon 3 of the Local Autonomy Act of 1959. EMRASON avows that the Municipality of
Dasmarias, taking into account the condi$ons prevailing in the area, could validly zone and reclassify the subject
property in the exercise of its police power in order to safeguard the health, safety, peace, good order, and general
welfare of the people in the locality. EMRASON describes the whole area surrounding the subject property as
residen$al subdivisions (i.e., Don Gregorio, Metro Gate, Vine Village, and Cityland Greenbreeze 1 and 2 Subdivisions)
and industrial estates (i.e., Reynolds Aluminum Philippines, Inc. factory; NDC-Marubeni industrial complex, San Miguel
Corpora$on-Monterey caele and piggery farm and slaughterhouse), traversed by na$onal highways (i.e., Emilio
Aguinaldo Na$onal Highway, Trece Mar$rez, Puerto Azul Road, and Governor's Drive). EMRASON men$ons that on
March 25, 1988, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the Province of Cavite passed ResoluOon No. 105 which declared
the area where subject property is located as "industrial-residen$al-ins$tu$onal mix."
o Ordinance No. 29-A of the Municipality of Dasmarias is valid. Ordinance No. 29-A is complete in itself, and there is no
more need to comply with the alleged requisites which DAR and Buklod are insis$ng upon. EMRASON quotes from
Patalinghug v. Court of Appeals that "once a local government has reclassied an area as commercial, that
determina$on for zoning purposes must prevail."
o Ordinance No. 29-A, reclassifying the subject property, was approved by the Municipality of Dasmarias on July 9,
1972. ExecuOve Order No. 648, otherwise known as the Charter of the Human Se_lements Regulatory Commission
(HSRC Charter) - which conferred upon the HSRC the power and duty to review, evaluate, and approve or disapprove
comprehensive land use and development plans and zoning ordinances of LGUs - was issued only on February 7, 1981.
The exercise by HSRC of such power could not be applied retroac$vely to this case without impairing vested rights of
o There is no absolute necessity of submiqng Ordinance No. 29-A to the NPC for approval. Based on the language of
SecOon 3 of the Local Autonomy Act of 1959, which used the word "may," review by the NPC of the local planning
and zoning ordinances was merely permissive. EMRASON addi$onally posits that Ordinance No. 1 of the Municipality
of Dasmarias simply required approval by the NPC of the nal plat or plan, map, or chart of the subdivision, and not
of the reclassica$on and/or conversion by the Municipality of the subject property from agricultural to residen$al.
As for AdministraOve Order No. 152 dated December 16, 1968, it was directed to and should have been complied
with by the city and municipal boards and councils. Thus, EMRASON should not be made to suer for the non-
compliance by the Municipal Council of Dasmarinas with said administra$ve order.
o Since the subject property was already reclassied as residen$al with the mere approval of Ordinance No. 29-A by the
Municipality of Dasmarinas, EMRASON did not have to immediately undertake actual development of the subject
property. Reclassica$on and/or conversion of a parcel of land are dierent from the implementa$on of the
o Buklod members are not farmer-tenants of the subject property. The subject property has no farmer-tenants because,
as the Court of Appeals observed, the property is unirrigated and not devoted to any agricultural ac$vity. The subject
property was placed under the CARP only to accommodate the farmer-tenants of the NDC property who were
displaced by the NDC-Marubeni Industrial Project. Moreover, the Buklod members are s$ll undergoing a screening
process before the DAR-Region IV, and are yet to be declared as qualied farmer-beneciaries of the subject property.
Hence, Buklod members tailed to establish they already have vested right over the subject property.

Issue/s: Whether the subject property could be placed under the CARP

Held/RaOo: SC arms the Court of Appeals and rules in favor of EMRASON.
- CARP coverage limited to agricultural land
o Sec$on 4, Chapter II of the CARL, as amended,24 par$cularly denes the coverage of the CARP, to wit: SEC. 4. Scope. -
The Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988 shall cover, regardless of tenurial arrangement and commodity
produced, all public and private agricultural lands as provided in Proclama$on No. 131 and Execu$ve Order No. 229,
including other lands of the public domain suitable for agriculture: Provided, That landholdings of landowners with a
total area of ve (5) hectares and below shall not be covered for acquisi$on and distribu$on to qualied beneciaries.
More specically, the following lands are covered by the CARL: (d) All private lands devoted to or suitable for
agriculture regardless of the agricultural products raised or that can be raised thereon. Sec$on 3(c), Chapter I of the
CARL further narrows down the deni$on of agricultural land that is subject to CARL to "land devoted to agricultural
ac$vity as dened in this Act and not classied as mineral, forest, residen$al, commercial or industrial land." The CARL
took eect on June 15, 1988. To be exempt from the CARL, the subject property should have already been reclassied
as residen$al prior to said date.
- The Local Autonomy Act of 1959
o The Local Autonomy Act of 1959, precursor of the Local Government Code of 1991, provided: SEC. 3. Addi6onal
powers of provincial boards, municipal boards or city councils and municipal and regularly organized municipal district
councils. - x x x Power to adopt zoning and planning ordinances. Any provision of law to the contrary
notwithstanding, Municipal Boards or City Councils in ci$es, and Municipal Councils in municipali$es are hereby
authorized to adopt zoning and subdivision ordinances or regulaOons for their respec$ve ci$es and municipali$es
subject to the approval of the City Mayor or Municipal Mayor, as the case may be. Ci$es and municipali$es may,
however, consult the NaOonal Planning Commission on maeers pertaining to planning and zoning.
o The Court observes that the OP, the Court of Appeals, and even the par$es themselves referred to Resolu$on No. 29-
A as an ordinance. Although it may not be its ocial designa$on, calling Resolu$on No. 29-A as Ordinance No. 29-A is
not completely inaccurate.
Or$gas & Co. case, the Court found it immaterial that the then Municipal Council of Mandaluyong declared
certain lots as part of the commercial and industrial zone through a resolu$on, rather than an ordinance,
because:Sec$on 3 of R.A. No. 2264, otherwise known as the Local Autonomy Act, empowers a Municipal
Council "to adopt zoning and subdivision ordinances or regula6ons" for the municipality. Clearly, the law docs
not restrict the exercise of the power through an ordinance. Therefore, gran$ng that Resolu$on No. 27 is not
an ordinance, it certainly is a regulatory measure within the intendment or ambit of the word "regulaOon"
under the provision. As a maeer oi' fact the same sec$on declares that the power exists "(A)ny provision of law
to the contrary notwithstanding x x x."
- While the subject property may be physically located within an agricultural zone under the 1981 Comprehensive Zoning
Ordinance of Dasmarinas, said property retained its residen$al classica$on. According to Sec$on 17, the Repealing Clause,
of the 1981 Comprehensive Zoning Ordinance of Dasmarinas: "AH other ordinances, rules or regula$ons in conict with the
provision of this Ordinance are hereby repealed: Provided, that rights that have vested before the eecOvity of this
Ordinance shall not be impaired."
o Ayog v. Cusi, Jr.: That vested right has to be respected. It could not be abrogated by the new Cons$tu$on. Sec$on 2,
Ar$cle XIII of the 1935 Cons$tu$on allows private corpora$ons to purchase public agricultural lands not exceeding
one thousand and twenty-four hectares. Pe$$oners' prohibi$on ac$on is barred by the doctrine of vested rights in
cons$tu$onal law.
o The due process clause prohibits the annihila$on of vested rights. "A state may not impair vested rights by legislaOve
enactment, by the enactment or by the subsequent repeal of a municipal ordinance, or by a change in the
consOtuOon of the State, except in a legiOmate exercise of the police power"
- A law enacted in the exercise of police power to regulate or govern certain ac$vi$es or transac$ons could be given retroac$ve
eect and may reasonably impair vested rights or contracts. Police power legisla$on is applicable not only to future contracts,
but equally to Ihose already in existence. Non-impairment of contracts or vested rights clauses will have to yield to the
superior and legi$mate exercise by the State of police power to promote the health, morals, peace, educa$on, good order,
safety, and general welfare of the people, x x x.
- EMRASON men$ons Resolu$on No. 105, Dening and Declaring the Boundaries of Industrial and Residen$al Land Use Plan in
the Municipali$es of Imus and Parts of Dasmarias, Carmona, Gen. Mariano Alvarez, Gen. Trias, Silang, Tanza, Naic, Rosario,
and Trece Mar$res City, Province o[ Cavite, approved by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Cavite on March 25, 1988. The
Sangguniang Panlalawigan determined that "the lands extending from the said designated industrial areas would have
greater economic value for residen$al and ins$tu$onal uses, and would serve the interest and welfare for the greatest good
of the greatest number of people."50 Resolu$on No. 105, approved by the HLURB in 1990, partly reads: Tracts of land in the
Municipality of Carmona from the People's Technology Complex to parts of the Municipality of Silang, parts of the
MunicipaliOes of Dasmarias, General Trias, Trece Mar$res City, Municipali$es of Tanza and Naic forming the strip of land
traversed by the Puerto Azul Road extending two kilometers more or less from each side of the road which are hereby
declared as industrial-residenOal-insOtuOonal mix. (Emphases supplied.)
o There is no ques$on that the subject property is located within the afore-described area. And even though Resolu$on
No. 105 has no direct bearing on the classica$on of the subject property prior to the CARL - it taking eect only in
1990 awer being approved by the HLURB - it is a conrma$on that at present, the subject property and its surrounding
areas are deemed by the Province of Cavite beeer suited and priori$zed for industrial and residen$al development,
than agricultural purposes.
- CARP exempOon:
o Sec$on 4 of R.A. 6657 provides that the CARL shall "cover, regardless of tenurial arrangement and commodity
produced, all public and private agricultural lands." As to what cons$tutes "agricultural land," it is referred to as "land
devoted to agricultural ac$vity as dened in this Act and not classied as mineral, forest, residen6al, commercial or
industrial land." The delibera$ons of the Cons$tu$onal Commission conrm this limita$on. "Agricultural lands" arc
only those lands which are "arable and suitable agricultural lands" and "do not include commercial, industrial and
residen6al lands."
o Based on the foregoing, it is clear that the undeveloped por$ons of the An$polo Hills Subdivision cannot in any
language be considered as "agricultural lands." These lots were intended for residenOal use. They ceased to be
agricultural lands upon approval of their inclusion in the Lungsod Silangan ReservaOon. Even today, the areas in
ques$on con$nue to be developed as a low-cost housing subdivision, albeit at a snail's pace, x x x The enormity of the
resources needed for developing a subdivision may have delayed its compleOon but this does not detract from the
fact that these lands are sOll residenOal lands and outside the ambit of the CARL.

G.R. No. 158228 March 23, 2004
FACTS: Lot No. 2509 and Lot No. 817-D which were donated by the late Esteban Jalandoni to respondent DECS (formerly Bureau of
Educa$on). Consequently, $tles thereto were transferred in the name of respondent DECS .
Respondent DECS leased the lands to Anglo Agricultural Corpora$on for 10 agricultural crop years, commencing from 1984-1994. The
contract of lease was subsequently renewed for another 10 agricultural crop years or un$l 2005. On June 10, 1993, Eugenio Alpar
and several others, claiming to be permanent and regular farm workers of the subject lands, led a pe$$on for Compulsory Agrarian
Reform Program (CARP) coverage with the Municipal Agrarian Reform Oce (MARO) of Escalante.
Awer inves$ga$on, MARO Jacinto R. Piosa, sent a "No$ce of Coverage" to respondent DECS, sta$ng that the subject lands are now
covered by CARP and invi$ng its representa$ves for a conference with the farmer beneciaries. The recommenda$on for coverage
was approved by DAR Regional Director Dominador B. Andres approved the r, the disposi$ve por$on of which reads:
Respondent DECS appealed the case to the Secretary of Agrarian Reform which armed the Order of the Regional
Director. Respondent DECS led a pe$$on for cer6orari with the Court of Appeals, which set aside the decision of the Secretary of
Agrarian Reform. Hence, the instant pe$$on for review.
ISSUE: Whether or not the subject proper$es are exempt from the coverage of Republic Act No. 6657, otherwise known as the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1998 (CARL).
While respondent DECS sought exemp$on from CARP coverage on the ground that all the income derived from its contract of lease
with Anglo Agricultural Corpora$on were actually, directly and exclusively used for educa$onal purposes, such as for the repairs and
renova$ons of schools in the nearby locality, the court is inclined with the pe$$oners argument that the lands subject hereof are not
exempt from the CARP coverage because the same are not actually, directly and exclusively used as school sites or campuses, as they
are in fact leased to Anglo Agricultural Corpora$on. Further, to be exempt from the coverage, it is the land per se, not the income
derived therefrom, that must be actually, directly and exclusively used for educa$onal purposes.
Sec$on 10 of R.A. No. 6657 enumerates the types of lands which are exempted from the coverage of CARP as well as the purposes of
their exemp$on specifying those lands actually, directly and exclusively used and found to be necessary for na$onal defense, school
sites and campuses, including experimental farm sta6ons operated by public or private schools for educa6onal purposes, , shall be
exempt from the coverage of this Act.
Clearly, a reading of the paragraph shows that, in order to be exempt from the coverage: 1) the land must be "actually, directly, and
exclusively used and found to be necessary;" and 2) the purpose is "for school sites and campuses, including experimental farm
sta6ons operated by public or private schools for educa6onal purposes."

Milestone Farms vs Office of the President

Among the pertinent secondary purposes of Milestone Farms are 1) to engage in the raising of cattle, pigs, and
other livestock; 2) to breed, raise, and sell poultry; and 3) to import cattle, pigs, and other livestock, and animal food
necessary for the raising of said cattle, pigs, and other livestock
On June 10, 1988, CARL took effect
In May 1993, petitioner applied for the exemption/exclusion of its 316.0422-hectare property pursuant to the
aforementioned ruling of this Court in Luz Farms.
Meanwhile, on December 27, 1993, DAR issued AO No. 9, Series of 1993, setting forth rules and regulations to
govern the exclusion of agricultural lands used for livestock, poultry, and swine raising from CARP coverage.
Milestone re-documented its application pursuant to said AO.
DARs Land Use Conversion and Exemption Committee (LUCEC) conducted an ocular inspection on petitioners
property and recommended the exemption of petitioners 316.0422-hectare property from the coverage of CARP.
DAR Regional Director Dalugdug adopted LUCECs recommendation
The Pinugay Farmers, represented by Balajadia, moved for the reconsideration of the said Order, but the same
was denied by Director Dalugdug. Hence, they filed an appeal with DAR Secretary
Subsequently, Milestone filed a complaint for Forcible Entry against Balajadia and company before the MCTC.
MCTC ruled in favor of Milestone
RTC reversed the decision of MCTC
CA ruled in favor of Milestone
DAR Secretary Garilao issued an Order exempting from CARP only 240.9776 hectares of the 316.0422 hectares
previously exempted by Director Dalugdug, and declaring 75.0646 hectares of the property to be covered by
Office of the President primarily reinstated the decision of Director Dalugdug but when the farmers filed a motion
for reconsideration, Office of the President reinstated the decision of Director Garilao.
CA primarily ruled in favor of Milestone in exempting the entire property from the coverage of CARP. However, six
months earlier, without the knowledge of the CA as the parties did not inform the appellate court then DAR
Secretary Villa issued DAR conversion order granting petitioners application to convert portions of the 316.0422-
hectare property from agricultural to residential and golf courses use. The portions converted was with a total area
of 153.3049 hectares. With this Conversion Order, the area of the property subject of the controversy was
effectively reduced to 162.7373 hectares.
With the CA now made aware of these developments, particularly Secretary Villas Conversion Order, CA had to
acknowledge that the property subject of the controversy would now be limited to the remaining 162.7373 hectares.
CA, in its amended decision, states that the subject landholding from the coverage of CARP is hereby lifted, and
the 162.7373 hectare-agricultural portion thereof is hereby declared covered by the CARP.

ISSUE: Whether or not Milestones property should be exempted from the coverage of CARP


When CA made its decision, DAR AO No. 9 was not yet declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court. Thus, it
could not be said that the CA erred or gravely abused its discretion in respecting the mandate of DAR A.O. No. 9,
which was then subsisting and in full force and effect.
As correctly held by respondent OP, the CA correctly held that the subject property is not exempt from the coverage
of the CARP, as substantial pieces of evidence show that the said property is not exclusively devoted to livestock,
swine, and/or poultry raising.



Respondent inherited a land in Aroroy, Masbate devoted exclusively to cow and calf breeding. On October 26,
1987, pursuant to the existing agrarian reform program of the government, respondent made a voluntary offer
to sell (VOS) their landholdings to petitioner DAR to avail incentives under the law.

On June 10, 1988, a new agrarian law, RA 6657 known as Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL) of
1988 took effect. It included in its coverage farms used for raising livestock, poultry and swine.

An en banc decision in the case of Luz Farms vs. Secretary of DAR, ruled that land devoted to livestock and
poultry-raising are not included in the definition of agricultural land.

In view of the Luz Farm ruling, respondent filed with petitioner DAR a formal request to withdraw their VOS as
their landholding was exclusively to cattle-raising and thus exempted from the coverage of the CARL.
Petitioner ignored their request.

DAR issue A.O No. 9, series of 1993, which provided that only portion of private agricultural lands used for the
raising of livestock, poultry and swine as of June 15, 1988 shall be excluded from the coverage of the CARL.
In determining the area of land to be excluded the A.O fixed the following retention limits, viz 1:1 animal-land
ratio and the ration of 1.7815 hectares for livestock infrastructure for every 21 heads of cattle shall likewise be
excluded from the operation of the CARL.
DAR Secretary Garilao issue an Order partially granting the application of respondents for exemption from the
coverage of CARL applying the retention limit outlined in the DAR A.O No. 9. Petitioner ordered the rest of
respondents landholding to be segregated and placed under Compulsory Acquisition.

On October 2001, the Office of the President affirmed the impugned Order of petitioner DAR. It ruled that DAR
A.O. no. 9 does not run counter to the Luz Farm case as the A.O provided the guidelines to determine whether
a certain parcel of land is being used for cattle-raising.

Whether of not DAR A.O No.9 is unconstitutional?


Administrative agencies are endowed with powers legislative in nature. They have been granted by Congress
with the authority to issue rules to regulate the implementation of a law entrusted to them. Delegated rule-
making has become a practical necessity in modern governance due to the increasing complexity and variety
of public functions. However, while administrative rules and regulations have the force and effect of law, they
are not immune from judicial review. They may be properly challenged before the courts to ensure that they
do not violate the Constitution and no grave abuse of administrative discretion is committed by the
administrative body concerned.

The fundamental rule in administrative law is that, to be valid, administrative rules and regulations must
be issued by authority of a law and must not contravene the provisions of the Constitution. The rule-making
power of an administrative agency may not be used to abridge the authority given to it by Congress or by the
Constitution. Nor can it be used to enlarge the power of the administrative agency beyond the scope intended.
Constitutional and statutory provisions control with respect to what rules and regulations may be promulgated
by administrative agencies and the scope of their regulations.
In the case at bar, SC find that the impugned A.O. is invalid as it contravenes the Constitution. The A.O.
sought to regulate livestock farms by including them in the coverage of agrarian reform and prescribing a
maximum retention limit for their ownership. However, the deliberations of the 1987 Constitutional
Commission show a clear intent to exclude, inter alia, all lands exclusively devoted to livestock, swine and
poultry- raising. The Court clarified in the Luz Farms case that livestock, swine and poultry-raising are
industrial activities and do not fall within the definition of agriculture or agricultural activity. The raising of
livestock, swine and poultry is different from crop or tree farming. It is an industrial, not an agricultural, activity.

Petitioner DAR has no power to regulate livestock farms which have been exempted by the Constitution from
the coverage of agrarian reform. It has exceeded its power in issuing the assailed A.O.

Respondents family acquired their landholdings as early as 1948. They have long been in the business of
breeding cattle in Masbate which is popularly known as the cattle-breeding capital of the Philippines. Petitioner
DAR does not dispute this fact. Indeed, there is no evidence on record that respondents have just recently
engaged in or converted to the business of breeding cattle after the enactment of the CARL that may lead one
to suspect that respondents intended to evade its coverage. It must be stressed that what the CARL prohibits
is the conversion of agricultural lands for non-agricultural purposes after the effectivity of the CARL. There has
been no change of business interest in the case of respondents.

It is a fundamental rule of statutory construction that the reenactment of a statute by Congress without
substantial change is an implied legislative approval and adoption of the previous law. On the other hand, by
making a new law, Congress seeks to supersede an earlier one. In the case at bar, after the passage of the
1988 CARL, Congress enacted R.A. No. 7881 which amended certain provisions of the CARL. Specifically,
the new law changed the definition of the terms agricultural activity and commercial farming by dropping
from its coverage lands that are devoted to commercial livestock, poultry and swine-raising. With this
significant modification, Congress clearly sought to align the provisions of our agrarian laws with the intent of
the 1987 Constitutional Commission to exclude livestock farms from the coverage of agrarian reform.