REMEDIAL LAW

UST Civil Law

MUST READ CASES (REMEDIAL LAW)

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CIVIL PROCEDURE

Panay Railways Inc., Vs. Heva Management And Development Corporation, Pamplona Agro-Industrial
Corporation, And Spouses Candelaria Dayot And Edmundo Dayot, G. R. No. 154061, January 25, 2012)

Statutes and rules regulating the procedure of courts are considered applicable to actions pending and unresolved
at the time of their passage. Procedural laws and rules are retroactive in that sense and to that extent. The effect of
procedural statutes and rules on the rights of a litigant may not preclude their retroactive application to pending
actions. This retroactive application does not violate any right of a person adversely affected. Neither is it
constitutionally objectionable. The reason is that, as a general rule, no vested right may attach to or arise from
procedural laws and rules. It has been held that a person has no vested right in any particular remedy, and a litigant
cannot insist on the application to the trial of his case, whether civil or criminal, of any other than the existing rules of
procedure. More so when, as in this case, petitioner admits that it was not able to pay the docket fees on time.
Clearly, there were no substantive rights to speak of when the RTC dismissed the Notice of Appeal.

SM Land, Inc. (Formerly Shoemart, Inc.) and Watsons Personal Care Store, Phils., Inc. Vs. City of Manila,
Liberty Toledo, in her official capacity as the City Treasurer of Manila, et al. G.R. No. 197151. October 22,
2012

In fact, this Court has held that even if there was complete non-compliance with the rule on certification against
forum shopping, the Court may still proceed to decide the case on the merits, pursuant to its inherent power to
suspend its own rules on grounds, as stated above, of substantial justice and apparent merit of the case.

Audi AG v. Mejia, G.R. No. 167533, July 27, 2007; De los Reyes v. People, G.R. No. 138297, January 27, 2006

Hierarchy of courts meant that while the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals and the Regional Trial Courts have
concurrent jurisdiction to issue original writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto and habeas corpus,
such concurrence does not accord litigants unrestrained freedom of choice of court to which filing thereof may be
directed. Petitions should be filed with the court of lower level unless the importance of the issue involved deserves
the action of a higher court.

Omictin vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 148004, January 22, 2007

The court cannot or will not determine a controversy involving a question which is within the jurisdiction of an
administrative tribunal prior to resolving the same, where the question demands the exercise of sound administrative
discretion requiring special knowledge, experience and services in determining technical or intricate matters of fact.
Abad, et. al. v. RTC of Manila, et. al. G.R. No. L-65505, October 12, 1987

Jurisdiction, once it attaches, cannot be ousted by the happening of subsequent events even of such character
which should have prevented jurisdiction from attaching in the first instance. The rule of adherence of jurisdiction
(exists) until a cause is finally resolved or adjudicated.

Fe V. Rapsing, Tita C. Villanueva and Annie F. Aparejado, represented by Edgar Aparejado Vs. Hon. Judge
Maximino R. Ables, of RTC-Branch 47, Masbate City; SSGT. Edison Rural, et al. G.R. No. 171855. October 15,
2012

It is an elementary rule of procedural law that jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case is conferred by
law and is determined by the allegations of the complaint irrespective of whether the plaintiff is entitled to
recover upon all or some of the claims asserted therein. As a necessary consequence, the jurisdiction of the court
cannot be made to depend upon the defenses set up in the answer or upon the motion to dismiss, for otherwise, the
question of jurisdiction would almost entirely depend upon the defendant. What determines the jurisdiction of the
court is the nature of the action pleaded as appearing from the allegations in the complaint. The averments in the
complaint and the character of the relief sought are the matters to be consulted.

Tijam v. Sibonghanoy, G.R. No. L-21450, April 15, 1968

A party may be barred from raising the defense of lack of jurisdiction or jurisdiction may be waived on the ground of
estoppel by laches. A party cannot invoke the jurisdiction of a court to secure affirmative relief against his opponent
and, after obtaining or failing to obtain such relief, repudiate or question that same jurisdiction.

Concha v. Lumocso, G.R. No. 158121, December 12, 2007

In a number of cases, we have held that actions for reconveyance of, or for cancellation of title, to or to quiet title
over real property are actions that fall under the classification of cases that involve title to, or possession of, real
property, or any interest therein.

Heirs of Telesforo Julao v. Spouses De Jesus, G.R. No. 176020, September 29, 2014

The assessed value must be alleged in the complaint to determine which court has jurisdiction over the action.
Jurisdiction is conferred by law and is determined by the allegations in the complaint, which contains the concise
statement of the ultimate facts of a plaintiffs cause of action.

Flores v. Mallare-Philips, L-66620, September 24, 1986

Where there are several claims or causes of action between the same or different parties embodied in the same
complaint, the amount of the demand shall be the totality of the claims in all causes of action, irrespective of whether
the causes of action arose out of the same or different transactions.

The causes of action in favor of two or more plaintiffs or against two or more defendants should arise out of the
same transaction or series of transactions and there should be a common question of law or fact as provided in Sec.
6, Rule 3
SPOUSES TEODORO and ROSATIO SARAZA and FERNANDO SARAZA v. WILLIAM FRANCISCO. G.R. No.
198718, November 27, 2013

Although the end result of the respondents claim was the transfer of the subject property to his name, the suit was
still essentially for specific performance, a personal action, because it sought Fernandos execution of a deed of
absolute sale based on a contract which he had previously made. Section 2, Rule 4 of the Rules of Court then
governs the venue for the respondents action. It provides that personal actions may be commenced and tried
where the plaintiff or any of the principal plaintiffs resides, or where the defendant or any of the principal defendants
resides, or in the case of a non-resident defendant where he may be found, at the election of the plaintiff.
Considering the respondents statement in his complaint that he resides in Imus, Cavite, the filing of his case with
the RTC of Imus was proper.

SURVIVING HEIRS OF ALFREDO R. BAUTISTA v. FRANCISCO LINDO AND WELHILMINIA LINDO, et al. G.R.
NO. 208232. MARCH 10, 2014

In determining whether an action is one the subject matter of which is not capable of pecuniary estimation this Court
has adopted the criterion of first ascertaining the nature of the principal action or remedy sought. If it is primarily for
the recovery of a sum of money, the claim is considered capable of pecuniary estimation, and whether jurisdiction is
in the municipal courts or in the RTCs would depend on the amount of the claim. But where the basic issue is
something other than the right to recover a sum of money, where the money claim is purely incidental to, or a
consequence of, the principal relief sought, this Court has considered such actions as cases where the subject of
the litigation may not be estimated in terms of money, and, hence, are incapable of pecuniary estimation. These
cases are cognizable exclusively by RTCs.

LZK HOLDINGS AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION v. PLANTERS DEVELOPMENT BANK. G.R. NO.
187973, January 20, 2014

By its very nature, an ex parte petition for issuance of a writ of possession is a non-litigious proceeding. It is a
judicial proceeding for the enforcement of ones right of possession as purchaser in a foreclosure sale. It is not an
ordinary suit filed in court, by which one party sues another for the enforcement of a wrong or protection of a right, or
the prevention or redress of a wrong.

Paglaum Management & Development Corp. And Health Marketing Technologies, Inc., Vs. Union Bank Of
The Philippines, Notary Public John Doe, And Register Of Deeds Of Cebu City And Cebu Province, $J. King
& Sons Co., Inc. Intervenor, G.R. No. 179018, June 18, 2012

Civil Case No. 01-1567, being an action for Annulment of Sale and Titles resulting from the extrajudicial foreclosure
by Union Bank of the mortgaged real properties, is classified as a real action. In Fortune Motors v. Court of Appeals,
this Court held that a case seeking to annul a foreclosure of a real estate mortgage is a real action, viz: An action to
annul a real estate mortgage foreclosure sale is no different from an action to annul a private sale of real property.
(Muoz v. Llamas, 87 Phil. 737, 1950). While it is true that petitioner does not directly seek the recovery of title or
possession of the property in question, his action for annulment of sale and his claim for damages are closely
intertwined with the issue of ownership of the building which, under the law, is considered immovable property, the
recovery of which is petitioners primary objective. The prevalent doctrine is that an action for the annulment or
rescission of a sale of real property does not operate to efface the fundamental and prime objective and nature of
the case, which is to recover said real property. It is a real action.
Juana Complex I Homeowners Association, Inc., et al. vs. Fil-Estate Land, Inc., G.R. No. 152272, March 5,
2012

The test of sufficiency of facts alleged in the complaint as constituting a cause of action is whether or not admitting
the facts alleged, the court could render a valid verdict in accordance with the prayer of said complaint. Stated
differently, if the allegations in the complaint furnish sufficient basis by which the complaint can be maintained, the
same should not be dismissed regardless of the defense that may be asserted by the defendant.

SPOUSES BILL AND VICTORIA HING v. ALEXANDER CHOACHUY, SR. and ALLAN CHOACHUY. G.R. No.
179736, June 26, 2013.

The allegation of petitioners that they are not the owners of the
subject property, thus making them unable to remove the installed
surveillance cameras on the corporations building, cannot be upheld
especially when the corporation who is managed by the family of
petitioners. They are thus considered parties-in-interest in the
present case.

HEIRS OF FAUSTINO MESINA and GENOVEVA S. MESINA, rep. by NORMAN MESINA v. HEIRS OF DOMINGO
FIAN, SR., rep. by THERESA FIAN YRAY, et al. G.R. No. 201816, April 8, 2013

The non-joinder of indispensable parties is not a ground for the dismissal of an action. At any stage of a judicial
proceeding and/or at such times as are just, parties may be added on the motion of a party or on the initiative of the
tribunal concerned. If the plaintiff refuses to implead an indispensable party despite the order of the court, that court
may dismiss the complaint for the plaintiffs failure to comply with the order. The remedy is to implead the non-party
claimed to be indispensable.

Living @ Sense, Inc. vs. Malayan Insurance Company, Inc. G.R. No. 193753. September 26, 2012

The nature of the solidary obligation under the surety does not make one an indispensable party. An indispensable
party is a party-in-interest without whom no final determination can be had of an action, and who shall be joined
mandatorily either as plaintiffs or defendants. The presence of indispensable parties is necessary to vest the court
with jurisdiction, thus, without their presence to a suit or proceeding, the judgment of a court cannot attain real
finality. The absence of an indispensable party renders all subsequent actions of the court null and void for want of
authority to act, not only as to the absent parties but even as to those present.

Theodore And Nancy Ang, Represented By Eldrige Marvin B. Ceron, Vs. Spouses Alan And Em Ang,
Respondents. G.R. No. 186993, August 22, 2012

Applying the foregoing rule, it is clear that Atty. Aceron is not a real party in interest in the case below as he does not
stand to be benefited or injured by any judgment therein. He was merely appointed by the petitioners as their
attorney-in-fact for the limited purpose of filing and prosecuting the complaint against the respondents. Such
appointment, however, does not mean that he is subrogated into the rights of petitioners and ought to be considered
as a real party in interest.
El Hogar Filipino v. Seva, No. 36627, November 19, 1932

Where said parcels are the objects of one and the same transaction, the venue is in the court where ANY of the
provinces (places) where a parcel of land is situated.

Mijares, et al. v. Piccio, et al., L-10458 April 22,1957

If parcels of land are subject of separate and distinct transactions where there is no common venue, separate
actions should be laid in the court of the province where each parcel of land is situated

Polytrade Corp. v. Blanco, G.R. No. L-27033, 1969

In the absence of qualifying or restrictive words (e.g. only, solely, exclusively in this court, in no other court save,
particularly, nowhere else but/except) venue stipulation is merely permissive and not exclusive which means that the
stipulated venue is in addition to the venue provided for in the rules

Calo v. Ajax, L-20865, March 13, 1968

A counterclaim, even if otherwise compulsory, but the amount exceeds the jurisdiction of the inferior court, will only
be considered permissive. Hence, the fact that it is not set-up in the inferior court will not bar plaintiff from instituting
a separate action to prosecute it.

UNION BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. BIGNAY EX-IM PHILIPPINES, INC. G.R. NO. 171590, February 12,
2014

Non-payment of docket fees on ones counterclaim is a jurisdictional defect. Anent the counterclaims interposed by
defendant for the collection of certain sum of money adverted earlier hereof, this Court could not exercise jurisdiction
over the same as defendant did not pay the docket fees therefor. Although the counterclaims were denominated as
compulsory in the answer, the matters therein alleged were not connected with the plaintiffs complaint. The
counterclaims could stand independently from the plaintiffs complaint hence they are a sic permissive
counterclaims.

Georgia T. Estel, vs. Recaredo P. Diego, Sr. and Recaredo R. Diego, Jr., G.R. No. 174082, January 16, 2012

Verification is deemed substantially complied with when, as in the instant case, one who has ample knowledge to
swear to the truth of the allegations in the complaint or petition signs the verification, and when matters alleged in
the petition have been made in good faith or are true and correct.

Tantuico, Jr. v. Republic, G.R. No. 89114, December 2, 1991

Ultimate Facts are those important and substantial facts which form the basis of the primary right of the plaintiff and
which make up the wrongful acts or omissions of the defendant. They are the principal, determinate, constitutive
facts, upon the existence of which, the entire cause of action rests.

Sun Insurance Office, Ltd., v. Asuncion, G.R. Nos. 79937-38, February 13, 1989
Where the trial court acquires jurisdiction over a claim by the filing of the appropriate pleading and payment of the
prescribed filing fee but, subsequently, the judgment awards a claim not specified in the pleading, or if specified, the
same has been left for determination by the court, the additional filing fee therefor shall constitute a lien on the
judgment

Sps. Go v. Tong, G.R. 151942, Nov. 27, 2003

Plainly, while the payment of the prescribed docket fee is a jurisdictional requirement, nonpayment of which at the
time of filing does not automatically cause the dismissal of the case for as long as the fee is paid within the
applicable prescriptive or reglementary period; more so when the party involved demonstrates a willingness to abide
by the rules prescribing such payment.

Re: In The Matter of Clarification of Exemption From Payment of All Court And Sheriffs Fees of
Cooperatives Duly Registered in Accordance with Republic Act No. 9520 Otherwise Known as the Philippine
Cooperative Code Of 2008, Perpetual Help Community Cooperative (Phcci), A.M. No. 12-2-03-0 , March 13,
2012

With the foregoing categorical pronouncements of the Supreme Court (Supreme Court En Banc Resolution in A.M.
No. 08-2-01-0, which denied the petition of the GSIS for recognition of its exemption from payment of legal fees
imposed under Section 22 of Rule 141 of the Rules of Court, 11 February 2010; Baguio Market Vendors Multi-
Purpose Cooperative (BAMARVEMPCO) v. Cabato-Cortes, 26 February 2010), it is evident that the exemption of
cooperatives from payment of court and sheriffs fees no longer stands. Cooperatives can no longer invoke Republic
Act No. 6938, as amended by Republic Act No. 9520, as basis for exemption from the payment of legal fees.

Rosario v. Carangdang, G.R. No. L-7076, April 28, 1955

If the purpose of the amendment is to confer jurisdiction upon the court then the court cannot admit the amended
complaint. Not having acquired jurisdiction over the case by the filing of the original complaint, the lower court has
neither the power nor the jurisdiction to act on the motion for the admission of the amended complaint, much less to
allow such amendment, since it is elementary that the court must first acquire jurisdiction over the case in order to
act validly therein.

Surigao Mine Exploration Co. v. Harris, G.R. No. L-45543, May 17, 1939

The cause of action must exist at the time the action was begun, and the plaintiff will not be allowed by an
amendment to introduce a cause of action which had no existence when the action was commenced.

OAMINAL v. CASTILLO, G.R. No. 152776, October 8, 2003

The filing of Motions seeking affirmative relief to admit answer, for additional time to file answer, for
reconsideration of a default judgment, and to lift order of default with motion for reconsideration are considered
voluntary submission to the jurisdiction of the court. Having invoked the trial courts jurisdiction to secure affirmative
relief, respondents cannot after failing to obtain the relief prayed for repudiate the very same authority they
have invoked

REINIER PACIFIC INTERNATIONAL SHIPPING, INC. and NEPTUNE SHIP MANAGEMENT SVCS, PTE., LTD. v.
CAPTAIN FRANCISCO B.GUEVARRA. G.R. No. 157020, June 19, 2013.

The clarification provided in A.M. 00-2-14-SC actually covers a situation where the due date falls on a Saturday,
Sunday, or holiday. Precisely, what such clarification wanted to address is the erroneous claim that the period of
extension in such a case is to be reckoned from the next working day and not from the original expiration of the
period. The correct rule, according to the clarification, is that any extension of time to file the required pleading
should x x x be counted from the expiration of the period regardless of the fact that said due date is a Saturday,
Sunday or legal holiday.

SPOUSES BENEDICT and SANDRA MANUE vs. RAMON ONG G.R. No. 205249, October 15, 2014

Personal service of summons has nothing to do with the location where summons is served. A defendants address
is inconsequential. Rule 14, Section 6 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is clear in what it requires: personally
handing the summons to the defendant. What is determinative of the validity of personal service is, therefore, the
person of the defendant, not the locus of service.

Planters Development Bank, Vs. Julie Chandumal, G.R. No. 19561905 September 2012

In this case, the sheriff resorted to substituted service of summons due to his failure to serve it personally. In
Manotoc v. Court of Appeals, the Court detailed the requisites for a valid substituted service of summons, summed
up as follows: (1) impossibility of prompt personal service the party relying on substituted service or the sheriff
must show that the defendant cannot be served promptly or there is impossibility of prompt service; (2) specific
details in the return the sheriff must describe in the Return of Summons the facts and circumstances surrounding
the attempted personal service; (3) a person of suitable age and discretion the sheriff must determine if the person
found in the alleged dwelling or residence of defendant is of legal age, what the recipients relationship with the
defendant is, and whether said person comprehends the significance of the receipt of the summons and his duty to
immediately deliver it to the defendant or at least notify the defendant of said receipt of summons, which matters
must be clearly and specifically described in the Return of Summons; and (4) a competent person in charge, who
must have sufficient knowledge to understand the obligation of the defendant in the summons, its importance, and
the prejudicial effects arising from inaction on the summons.

GEORGE PIDLIP P. PALILEO and JOSE DE LA CRUZ vs. PLANTERS DEVELOPMENT BANK G.R. No. 193650,
October 8, 2014

The service and filing of pleadings by courier service, as made by the respondent to the petitioners, is a mode not
provided in the Rules. Realizing its mistake, PDB re-filed and re-sent the omnibus motion by registered mail, which
is the proper mode of service under the circumstances. By then, however, the 15-day period had expired. PDBs
Notice of Appeal, which was filed only on September 7, 2006, was tardy; it had only up to August 1, 2006 within
which to file the same. The trial court therefore acted regularly in denying PDBs notice of appeal.

Heirs of Dr. Mariano Favis, Sr., represented by their co-heirs and attorneys-in-fact, Mercedes A. Favis and
Nelly Favis-Villafuente v. Juana Gonzales, her son Mariano Favis, all minors represented herein by their
parents, Sps. Mariano Favis and Larcelita D. Favis,G.R. No. 185922, January 15, 2014
Significantly, the Rule requires that such a motion should be filed within the time for but before filing the answer to
the complaint or pleading asserting a claim. The time frame indicates that thereafter, the motion to dismiss based
on the absence of the condition precedent is barred. It is so inferable from the opening sentence of Section 1 of Rule
9 stating that defense and objections not pleaded either in a motion to dismiss or in the answer are deemed waived.
There are, as just noted, only four exceptions to this Rule, namely, lack of jurisdiction over the subject
matter; litis pendentia; res judicata; and prescription of action. Failure to allege in the complaint that earnest
efforts at a compromise has been made but had failed is not one of the exceptions.

Go v. Cruz, et al., G.R. No. 58986, April 17, 1983

What causes the loss by a plaintiff of the right to effect dismissal of the action by mere notice is not the filing of the
defendants answer with the court but the service on the plaintiff of said answer or of a motion for summary
judgment. Where the plaintiff filed the notice of dismissal of his action in the court after the filing of defendants
answer but before service thereof, the plaintiffs notice to that effect ipso facto brought about the dismissal of the
pending action without need of any order from the trial court

VIRGINIA S. DIO and H.S. EQUITIES, LTD vs. SUBIC BAY MARINE EXPLORATORIUM, INC., represented by
its Chairman and Chief Executive Officer, TIMOTHY DESMOND G.R. No. 189532, June 11, 2014

Petitioners filed counterclaim against respondents. However, the latter alleged that the dismissal of the main action
results to the dismissal of the counterclaims. The Court ruled that as the rule now stands, the nature of the
counterclaim notwithstanding, the dismissal of the complaint does not ipso jure result in the dismissal of the
counterclaim, and the latter may remain for independent adjudication of the court, provided that such counterclaim,
states a sufficient cause of action and does not labor under any infirmity that may warrant its outright dismissal.
Stated differently, the jurisdiction of the court over the counterclaim that appears to be valid on its face, including the
grant of any relief thereunder, is not abated by the dismissal of the main action. The courts authority to proceed with
the disposition of the counterclaim independent of the main action is premised on the fact that the counterclaim, on
its own, raises a novel question which may be aptly adjudicated by the court based on its own merits and evidentiary
support.

Natividad Lim vs. National Power Corporation, Sps. Roberto Ll. Arcinue and Arabela Arcinue, G.R. No.
178789. November 14, 2012

Lim points out that an answer-in-intervention cannot give rise to default since the filing of such an answer is only
permissive. But Section 4, Rule 19 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure requires the original parties to file an answer
to the complaint-in-intervention within 15 days from notice of the order admitting the same, unless a different period
is fixed by the court. This changes the procedure under the former rule where such an answer was regarded as
optional. Thus, Lims failure to file the required answer can give rise to default.

1. STA. RITA & CO., INC. AND ARLENE STA. RITA KANAPI v. ANGELINE M. GUECO. G.R.
No.193078, August 28, 2013

Persons who are not parties to a case, either as petitioners, defendants or intervenors, they cannot participate in the
proceedings of the same. Consequently, they also cannot be adversely affected by the outcome of such proceeding.
A complaint-in-intervention cannot be treated as an independent action as it is merely an ancillary to and a
supplement of the principal action. The complaint-in-intervention essentially latches on the complaint for its legal
efficacy so much so that the dismissal of the complaint leads to its concomitant dismissal.

Eloisa Merchandising, Inc. And Trebel International, Inc., Vs. Banco De Oro Universal Bank And Engracio M.
Escasinas, Jr., In His Capacity As Ex-Officio Sheriff Of The Rtc Of Makati City, G.R. No. 192716, June 13,
2012
While under the present Rules, it is now the duty of the clerk of court to set the case for pre-trial if the plaintiff fails to
do so within the prescribed period, this does not relieve the plaintiff of his own duty to prosecute the case diligently.
This case had been at the pre-trial stage for more than two years and petitioners have not shown special
circumstances or compelling reasons to convince us that the dismissal of their complaint for failure to prosecute was
unjustified.

Republic vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 112710, May 30, 2001

Deposition is a written testimony of a witness given in the course of a judicial proceeding in advance of the trial or
hearing upon oral examination or in response to written interrogatories and where an opportunity is given for cross-
examination.

EAGLE RIDGE DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, MARCELO N. NAVAL and CRISPIN I. OBEN vs. CAMERON
GRANVILLE 3 ASSET MANAGEMENT, INC. G.R. No. 204700, November 24, 2014

Cameron Granville filed a motion for reconsideration of the Courts April 10, 2013 decision. Cameron Granville
posited that the motion for production was filed out of time and that the rule on parole evidence is applicable.
However, the Court ruled that the availment of a motion for production, as one of the modes of discovery, is not
limited to the pre-trial stage. Rule 27 does not provide for any time frame within which the discovery mode of
production or inspection of documents can be utilized. The rule only requires leave of court upon due application
and a showing of due cause.

Nenita Gonzales, Et. Al. Vs. Mariano Bugaay And Lucy Bugaay, G.R. No. 173008, February 22, 2012

In passing upon the sufficiency of the evidence raised in a demurrer, the court is merely required to ascertain
whether there is competent or sufficient proof to sustain the judgment. Being considered a motion to dismiss, thus, a
demurrer to evidence must clearly be filed before the court renders its judgment. Accordingly, the CA committed
reversible error in granting the demurrer and dismissing the Amended Complaint a quo for insufficiency of evidence.
The demurrer to evidence was clearly no longer an available remedy to respondents and should not have been
granted, as the RTC had correctly done.

TEOFILO B. ADOLFO vs. FE T. ADOLFO G.R. No. 201427, March 18, 2015

Judgment on the pleadings is proper where an answer fails to tender an issue, or otherwise admits the material
allegations of the adverse partys pleading. An answer would fail to tender an issue if it does not deny the material
allegations in the complaint or admits said material allegations of the adverse partys pleadings by confessing the
truthfulness thereof and/or omitting to deal with them at all. Now, if an answer does in fact specifically deny the
material averments of the complaint and/or asserts affirmative defenses (allegations of new matter which, while
admitting the material allegations of the complaint expressly or impliedly, would nevertheless prevent or bar recovery
by the plaintiff), a judgment on the pleadings would naturally be improper.

Spouses Ramon Villuga And Mercedita Villuga, Vs. Kelly Hardware And Construction Supply Inc.,
Represented By Ernesto V. Yu, Executive Vice-President And General Manager, G.R. No. 176570, July 18,
2012

A summary judgment is permitted only if there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and a moving party is
entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. A summary judgment is proper if, while the pleadings on their face appear
to raise issues, the affidavits, depositions, and admissions presented by the moving party show that such issues are
not genuine.
Philippine Business Bank vs. Chua, 15 November 2010

A partial summary judgment as a rule is not appealable sepearately from the judgment in the entire case, unless
allowed by the court under Sec.1(f) Rule 41. Hence, the failure to appeal separately from a partial summary
judgment or to challenge it by a special civil action for certiorari does not make the same final and executory.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. ANDY ZULIETA a.k.a. Bogarts, G.R. No. 192183, November 11, 2013.
GRECO ANTONIOUS BEDA B. BELGICA v. HONORABLE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO N. OCHOA
JR.G.R. No. 208566, November 19, 2013

The focal point of res judicata is the judgment. The principle states that a judgment on the merits in a previous case
rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction would bind a subsequent case if, between the first and second actions,
there exists an identity of parties, of subject matter, and of causes of action. On the other hand, the focal point of
stare decisis is the doctrine created. The principle, entrenched under Article 8 of the Civil Code, evokes the general
rule that, for the sake of certainty, a conclusion reached in one case should be doctrinally applied to those that follow
if the facts are substantially the same, even though the parties may be different. It proceeds from the first principle of
justice that, absent any powerful countervailing considerations, like cases ought to be decided alike.

CECILIA PAGADUAN vs. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION et al G.R. No. 206379, November 19, 2014

The principle of res judicata is applicable either by way of bar by prior judgment or by conclusiveness of
judgment. Here, Salvadors defense was res judicata by conclusiveness of judgment. Contrary to Salvadors
contention , however, there appears to be no identity of issues and facts in the two administrative cases. The first
case involved facts necessary to resolve the issue of whether or not Salvador falsified her PDS. The second one
involved facts necessary to resolve the issue of whether or not Salvador was convicted of a crime involving moral
turpitude. Falsification was the main issue in the first case, while it was no longer an issue in the second case. The
only fact to consider in the second administrative complaint is the fact of conviction of a crime involving moral
turpitude. It must be borne in mind that both administrative complaints were based on different grounds. The
grounds were separate and distinct from each other and entailed different sets of facts.

LZK Holdings and Development Corporation v. Planters Development Bank, G.R. No. 187973, January 20,
2014

All the elements of the doctrine are present in this case. The final judgment in G.R. No. 167998 was rendered by the
Court pursuant to its jurisdiction over the review of decisions and rulings of the CA. It was a judgment on the merits
of Planters Banks right to apply for and be issued a writ of possession. Lastly, the parties in G.R. No. 167998 are
the same parties involved in the present case.

Neypes v. CA, GR 141524, September 14, 2005

The aggrieved party has a fresh period of 15 days from the denial of motion for reconsideration or new trial within
which to file his appeal. This applies to Rules 40, 41, 42, 43 and 45.

Yu v. Samson Tatad, G.R. No. 170979, February 9, 2011

While Neypes involved the period to appeal in civil cases, the Courts pronouncement of a fresh period to appeal
should equally apply to the period for appeal in criminal cases under Section 6 of Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure. First, BP 129, as amended, the substantive law on which the Rules of Court is based, makes no
distinction between the periods to appeal in a civil case and in a criminal case. Section 39 of BP 129 categorically
states that [t]he period for appeal from final orders, resolutions, awards, judgments, or decisions of any court in all
cases shall be fifteen (15) days counted from the notice of the final order, resolution, award, judgment, or decision
appealed from. Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguere debemos. When the law makes no distinction, we (this
Court) also ought not to recognize any distinction.

SAN LORENZO RUIZ BUILDERS AND DEVELOPERS GROUP, INC. AND OSCAR VIOLAGO, PETITIONERS,
vs. MA. CRISTINA F. BAYANG G.R. No. 194702, April 20, 2015

It is settled that the fresh period rule in Neypes applies only to judicial appeals and not to administrative
appeals. The fresh period rule shall apply to Rule 40 (appeals from the Municipal Trial Courts to the Regional Trial
Courts); Rule 41 (appeals from the Regional Trial Courts to the Court of Appeals or Supreme Court); Rule 42
(appeals from the Regional Trial Courts to the Court of Appeals); Rule 43 (appeals from quasi-judicial agencies to
the Court of Appeals); and Rule 45 (appeals by certiorari to the Supreme Court). Obviously, these Rules
cover judicial proceedings under the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.

Fortune Life Insurance Co., Inc. v. COA, G.R. No. 213525, January 27, 2015

The reglementary periods under Rule 42 and Rule 64 are different. In the former, the aggrieved party is allowed 15
days to file the petition for review from receipt of the assailed decision or final order, or from receipt of the denial of a
motion for new trial or reconsideration. In the latter, the petition is filed within 30 days from notice of the judgment or
final order or resolution sought to be reviewed. The filing of a motion for new trial or reconsideration, if allowed under
the procedural rules of the Commission concerned, interrupts the period; hence, should the motion be denied, the
aggrieved party may file the petition within the remaining period, which shall not be less than five days in any event,
reckoned from the notice of denial. We ruled in Pates v. Commission on Elections that the belated filing of the
petition for certiorari under Rule 64 on the belief that the fresh period rule should apply was fatal to the recourse. As
such, the petitioner herein should suffer the same fate for having wrongly assumed that the fresh period rule under
Neypes applied.

GREGORIO DE LEON, DOING BUSINESS AS G.D.L. MARKETING vs. HERCULES AGRO INDUSTRIAL
CORPORATION AND/OR JESUS CHUA AND RUMI RUNGIS MILK G.R. No. 183239, June 02, 2014

The CA correctly ordered that De Leons appellants brief be stricken off the records. De Leons motion for time
praying for an additional 10 days to file his motion for partial reconsideration is validly denied by the RTC, since such
motion is a transgression of the mandatory prohibition on the filing of a motion for extension to file a motion for
reconsideration. Doctrinally-entrenched is that the right to appeal is a statutory right and the one who seeks to avail
that right must comply with the statute or rules. The perfection of appeal in the manner and within the period set by
law is not only mandatory but jurisdictional as well, hence, failure to perfect the same renders the judgment final and
executory.

Priscilla Alma Jose, Vs. Ramon C. Javellana, Et Al., G.R. No. 158239

The remedy against an interlocutory order not subject of an appeal is an appropriate special civil action under Rule
65, provided that the interlocutory order is rendered without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
discretion. Then is certiorari under Rule 65 allowed to be resorted to.
Casupanan vs. Laroya, G.R. No. 145391, 26 August 2002

A dismissal for forum-shopping under Sec. 5 Rule 7 is without prejudice unless otherwise stated in the dismissal
order. Under Sec. 1 Rule 41, no appeal lies from an order dismissing a case without prejudice and hence a party
may file an appropriate civil action under Rule 65.

LIGHT RAIL TRANSIT AUTHORITY, represented by its Administrator MELQUIADES A. ROBLES vs. AURORA
A. SALVAA G.R. No. 192074, June 10, 2014

The present rule is that a government party is a party adversely affected for purposes of appeal provided that the
government party that has a right to appeal must be the office or agency prosecuting the case. The grant of the right
to appeal in administrative cases is not new. In Republic Act No. 2260 or the Civil Service Law of 1959, appeals by
the respondent were allowed on the decision of the Commissioner of Civil Service rendered in an administrative
case involving discipline of subordinate officers and employees. Thus, LRTA had standing to appeal the
modification by the Civil Service Commission of its decision.

Perez v. Ombudsman, GR. No. 131445, May 27, 2004

Appeals from the decision of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases are no longer
appealable to the SC but to the CA via a petition for review (Rule 43) (Fabian v. Desierto, GR. No. 129742, Sept. 16,
1998). However, the remedy of an aggrieved party from a decision or order of the Office of the Ombudsman in a
criminal case is to file a petition for certiorari before the SC.

JULIET VITUG MADARANG and ROMEO BARTOLOME, represented by his attorneys-in-fact and acting in
their personal capacities, RODOLFO and RUBY BARTOLOME vs. SPOUSES JESUS D. MORALES and
CAROLINA N. MORALES G.R. No. 199283, June 9, 2014

A petition for relief from judgment must be filed within 60 days after petitioner learns of the judgment, final order, or
proceeding and within six (6) months from entry of judgment or final order. The double period required under Section
3, Rule 38 is jurisdictional and should be strictly complied with. A petition for relief of judgment filed beyond the
reglementary period is dismissed outright. Under Section 1, Rule 38 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, a petition
for relief from judgment may be filed on the ground of fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence. A motion
for reconsideration is required before a petition for certiorari is filed to grant the court which rendered the assailed
judgment or order an opportunity to correct any actual or perceived error attributed to it by the re-examination of the
legal and factual circumstances of the case. In this case, petitioners had until July 9, 2010 to file a notice of appeal,
considering that their former counsel received a copy of the order denying their motion for reconsideration of the trial
courts decision on June 24, 2010. Since petitioners filed their notice of appeal only on August 11, 2010, the trial
court correctly denied the notice of appeal for having been filed out of time. Even if we assume that petitioners filed
their petition for relief from judgment within the reglementary period, petitioners failed to prove that their former
counsels failure to file a timely notice of appeal was due to a mistake or excusable negligence.

Dare Adventure Farm Corporation Vs. Spouses Felix and Nenita Ng, Spouses Martin and Azucena Ng and
Agripina R. Goc-ong, et al. G.R. No. 161122. September 24, 2012

A petition for annulment of judgment is a remedy in equity so exceptional in nature that it may be availed of only
when other remedies are wanting, and only if the judgment, final order or final resolution sought to be annulled was
rendered by a court lacking jurisdiction or through extrinsic fraud. Yet, the remedy, being exceptional in character, is
not allowed to be so easily and readily abused by parties aggrieved by the final judgments, orders or resolutions.

Leticia Diona, rep. by her attorney-in-fact, Marcelina Diona Vs. Romeo A. Balangue, Sonny A. Balangue,
Reynaldo A. Balangue, and Esteban A. Balangue, Jr. G.R. No. 173559. January 7, 2013

While under Section 2, Rule 47 of the Rules of Court a Petition for Annulment of Judgment may be based only on
the grounds of extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction, jurisprudence recognizes lack of due process as
additional ground to annul a judgment. In Arcelona v. Court of Appeals, this Court declared that a final and
executory judgment may still be set aside if, upon mere inspection thereof, its patent nullity can be shown for having
been issued without jurisdiction or for lack of due process of law.

HEIRS OF RETERTA VS MORES & LOPEZ, G.R. No. 159941, August 17, 2011

The concept of final judgment, as distinguished from one which has become final (or executory as of right [final
and executory]), is definite and settled. A final judgment or order is one that finally disposes of a case, leaving
nothing more to be done by the Court in respect thereto, e.g., an adjudication on the merits which, on the basis of
the evidence presented at the trial declares categorically what the rights and obligations of the parties are and which
party is in the right; or a judgment or order that dismisses an action on the ground, for instance, of res judicata or
prescription. Once rendered, the task of the Court is ended, as far as deciding the controversy or determining the
rights and liabilities of the litigants is concerned. Nothing more remains to be done by the Court except to await the
parties next move (which among others, may consist of the filing of a motion for new trial or reconsideration, or the
taking of an appeal), this is what is referred to as the final judgment for purposes of appeal.

Ultimately, of course, to cause the execution of the judgment once it becomes final or, to use the established and
more distinctive term, final and executory.

MAGDALENA T. VILLASI v. FILOMENO GARCIA G.R. NO. 190106, January 15, 2014

Indeed, the power of the court in executing judgments extends only to properties unquestionably belonging to the
judgment debtor alone. An execution can be issued only against a party and not against one who did not have his
day in court. The right of a third-party claimant to file a terceria is founded on his title or right of possession.
Corollary thereto, before the court can exercise its supervisory power to direct the release of the property mistakenly
levied and the restoration thereof to its rightful owner, the claimant must first unmistakably establish his ownership or
right of possession thereon. However, the Spouses Garcia failed to prove that they have a bona fide title to the
building as they were unable to present credible evidence to prove their ownership. All that the Spouses raised were
their postulation as title holders of the land and the presumption of ownership over improvements built thereon;
whereas Villasi, on the other hand, was able to show documentary proof of ownership.

Department of Environment and Natural Resources v. United Planners Consultants, Inc., G.R. No. 212081,
February 23, 2015

Execution is fittingly called the fruit and end of suit and the life of the law. A judgment, if left unexecuted, would be
nothing but an empty victory for the prevailing party. While it appears that the Special ADR Rules remain silent on
the procedure for the execution of a confirmed arbitral award, it is the Courts considered view that the Rules
procedural mechanisms cover not only aspects of confirmation but necessarily extend to a confirmed awards
execution in light of the doctrine of necessary implication which states that every statutory grant of power, right or
privilege is deemed to include all incidental power, right or privilege.

CORONA INTERNATIONAL VS CA, G.R. No. 127851. October 18, 2000

In upholding the disallowance of the execution pending appeal ordered by the trial court, albeit on different grounds,
we are guided by the rule that execution pending appeal must be strictly construed being an exception to the
general rule. So, too, execution pending appeal is not to be availed of and applied routinely, but only in extraordinary
circumstances. Here, with the alleged collapse of petitioners business operations rendered doubtful, we find no
good reason to order execution pending appeal.

INFANTE VS. ARAN BUILDERS, INC., G.R. NO.156596, 24 AUGUST 2007

If the action affects title to or possession of real property or any interest therein, the action for revival must be filed
with the court having jurisdiction over the place where the real property or any portion thereof is situated. Otherwise,
the action for revival of judgment is a personal action wherein the venue lies with the residence of either the plaintiff
or defendant, at the option of the plaintiff.

VILLARIN VS MUNASQUE, G.R. No. 169444, September 17, 2008

Based on the foregoing, the sheriff is required to first demand of the judgment obligor the immediate payment of the
full amount stated in the writ of execution before a levy can be made. The sheriff shall demand such payment either
in cash, certified bank check or any other mode of payment acceptable to the judgment obligee. If the judgment
obligor cannot pay by these methods immediately or at once, he can exercise his option to choose which of his
properties can be levied upon. If he does not exercise this option immediately or when he is absent or cannot be
located, he waives such right, and the sheriff can now first levy his personal properties, if any, and then the real
properties if the personal properties are insufficient to answer for the judgment.

CALUAG VS PECSON, October 29, 1948, G.R. No. L-1403

Judgment for Specific acts pertains to a judgment directs a party to execute a conveyance of land or to deliver
deeds or other documents or to perform any specific act which may be performed by some other person, or in some
other way provided by law with the same effect, as in the present case, section 10, and not said section 9 of Rule 39
applies; and under the provision of said section 10, the court may direct the act to be done at the cost of the
disobedient party, by some other person appointed or designated by the court, and the act when so done shall have
like effect as if done by the party himself.

SPOUSES VERSOLA VS. CA, G.R. NO. 164740,31 JULY 2006

It is not sufficient that the person claiming exemption merely alleges that such property is a family home. This claim
for exemption must be set and proved to the sheriff. Failure to do so would estop the party from later claiming the
exemption.

CHING vs. CA, G.R. NO. 124642, FEBRUARY 23, 2004)

Upon application of the third person through a motion to set aside the levy on attachment, the court shall order a
summary hearing for the purpose of determining whether the sheriff has acted rightly or wrongly in the performance
of his duties in the execution of the writ of attachment. The court may order the sheriff to release the property from
the erroneous levy and to return the same to the third person. In resolving the application, the court cannot pass
upon the question of title to the property with any character of finality but only insofar as may be necessary to decide
if the sheriff has acted correctly or not.

HELEN CABLING assisted by her husband ARIEL CABLING vs. JOSELIN TAN LUMAPAS as represented by
NORY ABELLANES, G.R. No. 196950, June 18, 2014
Under Section 33, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, which is made applicable to extrajudicial foreclosures of real estate
mortgages, the possession of the property shall be given to the purchaser or last redemptioner unless a third party is
actually holding the property in a capacity adverse to the judgment obligor. It contemplates a situation in which a
third party holds the property by adverse title or right, such as that of a co-owner, tenant or usufructuary, who
possesses the property in his own right, and is not merely the successor or transferee of the right of possession of
another co-owner or the owner of the property.

BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS SECURITIES CORPORATION vs. EDGARDO V. GUEVARA G.R. No.
167052, March 11, 2015

In an action for enforcement of foreign judgment, the Court has limited review over the decision rendered by the
foreign tribunal. The Philippine courts cannot pass upon the merits of the case pursuant to the incorporation clause
of the Constitution, unless there is proof of want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear
mistake of law or fact.

Calo v. Roldan, G.R. No. L-252, March 30, 1946

The provisional remedies denominated attachment, preliminary injunction, receivership, and delivery of personal
property, provided in Rules 59, 60, 61, and 62 of the Rules of Court, respectively, are remedies to which parties
litigant may resort for the preservation or protection of their rights or interest, and for no other purpose, during the
pendency of the principal action. If an action, by its nature, does not require such protection or preservation, said
remedies can not be applied for and granted.

Davao Light v. Court of Appeals, 204 SCRA 343

A preliminary attachment may be defined, paraphrasing the Rules of Court, as the provisional remedy in virtue of
which a plaintiff or other party may, at the commencement of the action or at any time thereafter, have the property
of the adverse party taken into the custody of the court as security for the satisfaction of any judgment that may be
recovered.

Equitable v. Special Steel, G.R. No. 175350, June 13, 2012

A writ of preliminary attachment is too harsh a provisional remedy to be issued based on mere abstractions of fraud.
Rather, the rules require that for the writ to issue, there must be a recitation of clear and concrete factual
circumstances manifesting that the debtor practiced fraud upon the creditor at the time of the execution of their
agreement in that said debtor had a preconceived plan or intention not to pay the creditor.

Executive Secretary, et al. Vs. Forerunner Multi Resources, Inc., G.R. No. 199324. January 7, 2013

It is a deeply ingrained doctrine in Philippine remedial law that a preliminary injunctive writ under Rule 58 issues only
upon a showing of the applicants clear legal right being violated or under threat of violation by the defendant.
Clear legal right, within the meaning of Rule 58, contemplates a right clearly founded in or granted by law. Any
hint of doubt or dispute on the asserted legal right precludes the grant of preliminary injunctive relief. For suits
attacking the validity of laws or issuances with the force and effect of law, as here, the applicant for preliminary
injunctive relief bears the added burden of overcoming the presumption of validity inhering in such laws or
issuances. These procedural barriers to the issuance of a preliminary injunctive writ are rooted on the equitable
nature of such relief, preserving the status quo while, at the same time, restricting the course of action of the
defendants even before adverse judgment is rendered against them.

FLORD NICSON CALAWAG v. UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES VISAYAS, ET AL./ MICAH P. ESPIA, ET AL.
v. DR. CARLOS BAYLON, ET AL. G.R. No. 207412/207542, August 07, 2013

Accordingly, the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction presents a fourth requirement: it is justified
only in a clear case, free from doubt or dispute. When the complainants right is thus doubtful or disputed, he does
not have a clear legal right and, therefore, the issuance of injunctive relief is improper.

SPOUSES SILVESTRE O. PLAZA AND ELENA Y. PLAZA v. GUILLERMO LUSTIVA, ELEODORA VDA. DE
MARTINEZ AND VICKY SAYSON GOLOSENO. G.R. NO. 172909, MARCH 5, 2014

A writ of preliminary injunction is a provisional remedy; it is auxiliary, an adjunct of, and subject to the determination
of the main action. It is deemed lifted upon the dismissal of the main case, any appeal therefrom notwithstanding.
Upon the dismissal of the main case by the RTC, the question of issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction has
become moot and academic. Upon the dismissal of the main action, the question of the non-issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction automatically died with it.

Bacolod City Water District v. Labayen, G.R. No. 157494, December 10, 2004

A restraining order, on the other hand, is issued to preserve the status quo until the hearing of the application for
preliminary injunction which cannot be issued ex parte. Under Rule 58 of the Rules of Court, a judge may issue a
temporary restraining order with a limited life of twenty (20) days from date of issue. If before the expiration of the
twenty (20)-day period the application for preliminary injunction is denied, the temporary restraining order would be
deemed automatically vacated.

SPOUSES DEO AGNER and MARICON AGNER vs. BPI FAMILY SAVINGS BANK, INC. G.R. No. 182963, June
3, 2013.

Prior demand is not a condition precedent to an action for a writ of replevin, since there is nothing in Section 2, Rule
60 of the Rules of Court that requires the applicant to make a demand on the possessor of the property before an
action for a writ of replevin could be filed.

BA Finance Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 258 SCRA 102

The action is primarily possessory in nature and generally determines nothing more than the right of possession.
Replevin is so usually described as a mixed action, being partly in rem and partly in personam-in rem insofar as the
recovery of specific property is concerned, and in personam as regards to damages involved. As an action in rem,
the gist of the replevin action is the right of the plaintiff to obtain possession of specific personal property by reason
of his being the owner or of his having a special interest therein.

Hao v. Andres, A.M. No. P-07-2384, June 18, 2008

The rules provide that property seized under a writ of replevin is not to be delivered immediately to the plaintiff.
Under Section 6, Rule 60, the Sheriff should have waited no less than 5 days in order to give the complainant an
opportunity to object to the sufficiency of the bond.
Ocampo v. Tirona, G.R. No. 147382, April 6, 2005

Interpleader is a remedy whereby a person who has property whether personal or real, in his possession, or an
obligation to render wholly or partially, without claiming any right in both, or claims an interest which in whole or in
part is not disputed by the conflicting claimants, comes to court and asks that the persons who claim the said
property or who consider themselves entitled to demand compliance with the obligation, be required to litigate
among themselves, in order to determine finally who is entitled to one or the other thing. The remedy is afforded not
to protect a person against a double liability but to protect him against a double vexation in respect of one liability.

Wack-Wack Golf v. Won 70 SCRA 165

It must be noted that a stockholder should use reasonable diligence, that is, by filing the interpleader suit within a
reasonable time after a dispute has arisen without waiting to be sued by either of the contending claimants.
Otherwise, he may be barred by laches or undue delay.

Almeda v. Bathala Marketing Industries, 542 SCRA 470

Respondent instituted an action for declaratory relief for purposes of determining the correct interpretation of
condition Nos. 6 and 7 of the lease contract to prevent damage and prejudice. The court took cognizance on the
case, despite the fact that a separate action was pending in another court because in the instant case no breach
was committed.

Jumamil v. Caf, G.R. No. 144570, September 21, 2005

The requisites of an action for declaratory relief are:1) the subject matter of the controversy must be a deed, will,
contract or other written instrument, statute, executive order or regulation, or ordinance; 2) the terms of said
documents and the validity thereof are doubtful and require judicial construction; 3) there must have been no breach
of the documents in question; 4) there must be an actual justiciable controversy or the ripening seeds of one
between persons whose interests are adverse; 5) the issue must be ripe for judicial determination; and 6) adequate
relief is not available through other means or other forms of action or proceeding.

Lokin v. COMELEC, 621 SCA 385

Lokin has correctly brought this special civil action for certiorari against the COMELEC to seek the review of the
resolution of the COMELEC in approving the withdrawal of his nomination. The constitutional mandate is now
implemented by Rule 64 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides for the review of the judgments, final
orders or resolutions of the COMELEC and the Commission on Audit.

Vergara v. Rugue, G.R. No. L-32984, August 25, 1977

The function of prohibition is to prevent the unlawful and oppressive exercise of legal authority and to provide for a
fair and orderly administration of justice. It is directed against proceedings that are done without or in excess of
jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion, there being no appeal or other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in
the ordinary course of law.
Angchangco v. Ombudsman, G.R. No. 122728, February 13, 1997

Mandamus is a writ commanding a tribunal, corporation, board, or person to do the act required to be done when it
or he unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an
office, trust, or station, or unlawfully excludes another from the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which such
other is entitled, there being no other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.

Special People, Inc. Foundation, represented by its Chairman, Roberti P. Cericos v. Nestor M. Canda, et al.,
G.R. No. 160932. January 14, 2013

A key principle to be observed in dealing with petitions for mandamus is that such extraordinary remedy lies to
compel the performance of duties that are purely ministerial in nature, not those that are discretionary. A purely
ministerial act or duty is one that an officer or tribunal performs in a given state of facts, in a prescribed manner, in
obedience to the mandate of a legal authority, without regard to or the exercise of its own judgment upon the
propriety or impropriety of the act done. The duty is ministerial only when its discharge requires neither the exercise
of official discretion or judgment.

Galang v. Geronimo, G.R. No. 192793, February 22, 2011

A petition for certiorari was filed questioning an interlocutory order of a trial court in an electoral protest was within
the appellate jurisdiction of the COMELEC. Since it is the COMELEC which has jurisdiction to take cognizance of an
appeal from the decision of the regional trial court in election contests involving elective municipal officials, then it is
also the COMELEC which has jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari in aid of its appellate jurisdiction.

RET. LT. GEN. JACINTO C. LIGOT, et al. v. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES REPRESENTED BY THE ANTI-
MONEY LAUNDERING COUNCIL G.R. No. 176944, March 6, 2013.

Lt. Gen. Ligot, et al. filed a petition for certiorari when the CA extended the freeze order against their properties.
Ligot, et al. should have filed a petition for review on certiorari, and not a petition for certiorari, to assail the CA
resolution which extended the effectivity period of the freeze order over their properties.

THE CITY OF MANILA vs. HON. CARIDAD H. GRECIA-CUERDO. G.R. NO. 175723 , February 4, 2014

The prevailing doctrine is that the authority to issue writs of certiorari involves the exercise of original jurisdiction
which must be expressly conferred by the Constitution or by law and cannot be implied from the mere existence of
appellate jurisdiction. On the strength of the constitutional provisions under Article VIII, it can be fairly interpreted
that the power of the CTA includes that of determining whether or not there has been grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the RTC in issuing an interlocutory order in cases falling
within the exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the tax court. It, thus, follows that the CTA, by constitutional mandate, is
vested with jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari in these cases.

Land Bank of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, 456 Phil. 755

The proper recourse of the aggrieved party from a decision of the CA is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule
45 of the Revised Rules of Court. On the other hand, if the error subject of the recourse is one of jurisdiction, or the
act complained of was perpetrated by a quasi-judicial officer or agency with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction, the proper remedy available to the aggrieved party is a petition for certiorari under Rule
65 of the said Rules.
Fermin v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 179695, December 18, 2008

The Court has already likened a proceeding under Section 78 to a quo warranto proceeding since they both deal
with the eligibility or qualification of a candidate. The distinction mainly in the fact that a Section 78 under Section
253 of the OEC, petition is filed before proclamation, while a petition for quo warranto is filed after proclamation of
the winning candidate

Spouses Rosales v. Spouses Alfonso, G.R. No. 137792, August 12, 2003

This is the mortgagors equity (not right) of redemption which, as above stated, may be exercised by him even
beyond the 90-day period from the date of service of the order, and even after the foreclosure sale itself, provided it
be before the order of confirmation of the sale. After such order of confirmation, no redemption can be effected any
longer.

Sepulveda v. Pelaez, G.R. No. 152195, January 31, 2005

Thus, all the co-heirs and persons having an interest in the property are indispensable parties; as such, an action for
partition will not lie without the joinder of the said parties. The mere fact that Pedro Sepulveda, Sr. has repudiated
the co-ownership between him and the respondent does not deprive the trial court of jurisdiction to take cognizance
of the action for partition, for, in a complaint for partition, the plaintiff seeks, first, a declaration that he is a co- owner
of the subject property; and, second, the conveyance of his lawful shares.

Sarmiento v. Manalite Home Owners Association, G.R. No. 182953, October 11, 2010

In forcible entry, the plaintiff must allege in the complaint, and prove, that he was in prior physical possession of the
property in dispute until he was deprived thereof by the defendant by any of the means provided in Section 1, Rule
70 of the Rules either by force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth. In unlawful detainer, there must be an
allegation in the complaint of how the possession of defendant started or continued, that is, by virtue of lease or any
contract, and that defendant holds possession of the land or building after the expiration or termination of the right
to hold possession by virtue of any contract, express or implied.

Reyes v. Sta. Maria, G.R. No. L- 33213 June 29, 1979

There are three kinds of actions for the recovery of possession of real pro. property, namely, (1) the summary action
for forcible entry or detainer (denominatedaccion interdictal under the former law of procedure, Ley de
Enjuiciamiento Civil) which seeks the recovery of physical possession only and is brought within one year in the
justice of the peace court; (2) the accion publiciana which is for the recovery of the right to possess and is a plenary
action in an ordinary civil proceeding in a Court of First Instance; and (3) accion de reivindicacion which seeks the
recovery of ownership (which of course includes the jus utendi and the jus fruendi) also brought in the Court of First
Instance.

Arquelada v. Philippine Veterans Bank, G.R. No. 139137, March 31, 2000

The action for unlawful detainer was based on the expiration of the contract of lease, a demand to vacate was not
necessary for judicial action after the expiration of the terms of the lease. There being no need for any demand or
notice, there was likewise no necessity to wait for five (5) days upon notice or demand before an action for unlawful
detainer may be filed.
CHARLIE LIM vs. SPOUSES DANILO LIGON and GENEROSA VITUG-LIGON G.R. No. 183589, June 25, 2014

As a result of the finality of the judgment in the ejectment case, Spouses Ligon were evicted from the subject
property. They filed a complaint against defendant Lim for Quieting of Title and Recovery of Possession to restore
them to their possession of the subject property. The legal limitation, despite the finality of the ruling in the ejectment
case, is that the concept of possession or prior possession which was established in favor of defendants
predecessors-in-interest in the ejectment case pertained merely to possession de facto, and not possession de jure.
The favorable judgment in favor of defendants predecessors-in-interest cannot therefore bar an action between the
same parties with respect to who has title to the land in question.

Juanita Ermitano, represented by her Attorney-in-fact, Isabelo Ermitano v. Lailanie M. Paglas; G.R. No.
174436. January 23, 2013

At the outset, it bears to reiterate the settled rule that the only question that the courts resolve in ejectment
proceedings is: who is entitled to the physical possession of the premises, that is, to the possession de facto and not
to the possession de jure. It does not even matter if a partys title to the property is questionable. In an unlawful
detainer case, the sole issue for resolution is the physical or material possession of the property involved,
independent of any claim of ownership by any of the party litigants. Where the issue of ownership is raised by any of
the parties, the courts may pass upon the same in order to determine who has the right to possess the property. The
adjudication is, however, merely provisional and would not bar or prejudice an action between the same parties
involving title to the property.

Rivulet Agro-Industrial Corporation v. Anthony Parungao, Narciso B. Nieto, in their capacity as

Undersecretaries of Legal Affairs and Field Operations of the Department of Agrarian Reform, et al., G.R. No.
197507. January 14, 2013

Contempt of court is defined as a disobedience to the court by acting in opposition to its authority, justice and dignity,
and signifies not only a willful disregard of the courts order, but such conduct which tends to bring the authority of
the court and the administration of law into disrepute or, in some manner, to impede the due administration of
justice. To be considered contemptuous, an act must be clearly contrary to or prohibited by the order of the court.
Thus, a person cannot be punished for contempt for disobedience of an order of the Court, unless the act which is
forbidden or required to be done is clearly and exactly defined, so that there can be no reasonable doubt or
uncertainty as to what specific act or thing is forbidden or required.

Inoturan v. Limsiaco, Jr. 458 SCRA 48

It is only the judge, who orders the confinement of a person for contempt of court, who can issue the order of
release.

CASTILLEJOS CONSUMNERS ASSOCIATION, INC. (CASCONA) vs. JOSE S. DOMINGUEZ, ET AL. G.R. No.
189949, March 25, 2015

A criminal contempt involves a conduct that is directed against the dignity and authority of the court or a judge acting
judicially; it is an act obstructing the administration of justice which tends to bring the court into disrepute or
disrespect. Civil contempt on the other hand, consists in failing to do something ordered to be done by a court in a
civil action for the benefit of the opposing party therein and is, therefore, an offense against the party in whose
behalf the violated order is made.
SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS

Montaner vc CA, G.R. No. 174975, January 20, 2009

A special proceeding, by which a party seeks to establish a status, right, or a particular fact, has one definite party,
who petitions or applies for a declaration of a status, right, or particular fact, but no definite adverse party.

THELMA M. ARANAS v. TERESITA V. MERCADO. G.R. NO. 156407, JANUARY 15, 2014

There is no dispute that the jurisdiction of the trial court as an intestate court is special and limited. The trial court
cannot adjudicate title to properties claimed to be a part of the estate but are claimed to belong to third parties by
title adverse to that of the decedent and the estate, not by virtue of any right of inheritance from the decedent. All
that the trial court can do regarding said properties is to determine whether or not they should be included in the
inventory of properties to be administered by the administrator.

Uriarte vs CFI Of Negros, G.R. Nos. L-21938-39 May 29, 1970

The matter of venue, or the particular Court of First Instance where the special proceeding should be commenced, is
regulated by former Rule 75, Section 1 of the Rules of Court, now Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court,
which provides that the estate of a decedent inhabitant of the Philippines at the time of his death, whether a citizen
or an alien, shall be in the court of first instance in the province in which he resided at the time of his death, and if he
is an inhabitant of a foreign country, the court of first instance of any province in which he had estate.

Leo C. Romero and David Amando C. Romero vs. Hon. Court of Appeals, Aurora C. Romero and Vittorio C.
Romero, G.R. No. 188921, April 18, 2012

In the case now before us, the matter in controversy is the question of ownership of certain of the properties
involved whether they belong to the conjugal partnership or to the husband exclusively. This is a matter properly
within the jurisdiction of the probate court which necessarily has to liquidate the conjugal partnership in order to
determine the estate of the decedent which is to be distributed among his heirs who are all parties to the
proceedings.

Romero vs CA, G.R. No. 188921, April 18, 2012

In testament to this, it has been held that it is within the jurisdiction of the probate court to (1) approve the sale of
properties of a deceased person by his prospective heirs before final adjudication; (2) to determine who are the heirs
of the decedent; (3) the recognition of a natural child; (4) the status of a woman claiming to be the legal wife of the
decedent; the legality of disinheritance of an heir by the testator; and (5)to pass upon the validity of a waiver of
hereditary rights.

Pereira vs CA, G.R. No. L-81147 June 20, 1989

When a person dies leaving property, the same should be JUDICIALLY ADMINISTERED and the competent court
should appoint a qualified administrator, in the order established in Section 6, Rule 78, in case the deceased left no
will, or in case he had left one, should he fail to name an executor therein.

Neri, at al. vs. Heirs of Hadji Yusop Uy and Julpha Ibrahim Uy., G.R. No. 194366, October 10, 2012

Hence, in the execution of the Extra-Judicial Settlement of the Estate with Absolute Deed of Sale in favor of spouses
Uy, all the heirs of Anunciacion should have participated. Considering that Eutropia and Victoria were admittedly
excluded and that then minors Rosa and Douglas were not properly represented therein, the settlement was not
valid and binding upon them and consequently, a total nullity.

Nufable vs Nufable, G.R. No. 126950 July 2, 1999

As a general rule, courts in probate proceedings are limited only to passing upon the extrinsic validity of the will
sought to be probated, the due execution thereof, the testators testamentary capacity and the compliance with the
requisites or solemnities prescribes by law. The question of the intrinsic validity of a will normally comes only after
the court has declared that the will has been duly authenticated.

Ajerovs.CA, G.R.No.106720 September 15, 1994

Thus, in a petition to admit a holographic will to probate, the only issues to be resolved are: (1) whether the
instrument submitted is, indeed, the decedents last will and testament; (2) whether said will was executed in
accordance with the formalities prescribed by law; (3) whether the decedent had the necessary testamentary
capacity at the time the will was executed; and, (4) whether the execution of the will and its signing were the
voluntary acts of the decedent.

Emilio A.M. Suntay III vs. Isabel Cojuangco-Suntay., G.R. No. 183053, October 10, 2012

The paramount consideration in the appointment of an administrator over the estate of a decedent is the prospective
administrators interest in the estate. This is the same consideration which Section 6, Rule 78 takes into account in
establishing the order of preference in the appointment of administrator for the estate. The rationale behind the rule
is that those who will reap the benefit of a wise, speedy and economical administration of the estate, or, in the
alternative, suffer the consequences of waste, improvidence or mismanagement, have the highest interest and most
influential motive to administer the estate correctly. In all, given that the rule speaks of an order of preference, the
person to be appointed administrator of a decedents estate must demonstrate not only an interest in the estate, but
an interest therein greater than any other candidate.

Ocampo vs. Ocampo, G.R. No. 187879, July 5, 2010

The principal object of the appointment of a temporary administrator is to preserve the estate until it can pass to the
hands of a person fully authorized to administer it for the benefit of creditors and heirs, pursuant to Section 2 of Rule
80 of the Rules of Court.

Estate of Olave vs. Reyes, G.R. No. L-29407 July 29, 1983

The purpose of presentation of claims against decedents of the estate in the probate court is to protect the estate of
deceased persons to enable the executor or administrator will be able to examine each claim and determine
whether it is a proper one which should be allowed. Further, the primary object of the provisions requiring
presentation is to apprise the administrator and the probate court of the existence of the claim so that a proper and
timely arrangement may be made for its payment in full or by pro-rata portion in the due course of the administration.

Gutierrez vs. Baretto-Datu, G.R. No. L-17175, July 31, 1962

The word claims as used in statutes requiring the presentation of claims against a decedents estate is generally
construed to mean debts or demands of a pecuniary nature which could have been enforced against the deceased
in his lifetime and could have been reduced to simple money judgments; and among these are those founded upon
contract.
Stronghold Insurance vs. Republic-Asahi, G.R. No. 147561, June 22, 2006

Generally, death of either the creditor or the debtor does not extinguish the obligation and only obligations that are
personal or are identified with the persons themselves are extinguished by death. Section 5 of Rule 86 of the Rules
of Court expressly allows the prosecution of money claims arising from a contract against the estate of a deceased
debtor as these claims are not actually extinguished.

Metropolitan Bank & Trust Company v. Absolute Management Corporation, G.R. No. 170498. January 9, 2013

A distinctive character of Metrobanks fourth-party complaint is its contingent nature the claim depends on the
possibility that Metrobank would be adjudged liable to AMC, a future event that may or may not happen. This
characteristic unmistakably marks the complaint as a contingent one that must be included in the claims falling
under the terms of Section 5, Rule 86 of the Rules of Court.

De Bautista v. De Guzman, G.R. No. L-28298, November 25, 1983

The only instance wherein a creditor can file an action against a distributee of the debtors asset is under Sec. 5,
Rule 88 of the Rules of Court. The contingent claims must first have been established and allowed in the probate
court before the creditors can file an action directly, against the distributes, such is not the situation in the case at
bar.

Natcher vs. CA, G.R. No. 133000, October 2, 2001

Before any conclusion about the legal share due to a compulsory heir may be reached, it is necessary that the net
estate of the decedent must be ascertained, by deducting all payable obligations and charges from the value of the
property owned by the deceased at the time of his death; then, all donations subject to collation would be added to
it, form there, the legitime of the compulsory heir or heirs can be established; and it is only then can it be ascertained
whether or not a donation had prejudiced the legitimes.

Solivio vs. CA, G.R. No. 83484, February 12, 1990

As a general rule, the better practice, however, for the heir who has not received his share, is to demand his share
through a proper motion in the same probate or administration proceedings, or for reopening of the probate or
administrative proceedings if it had already been closed, and not through an independent action.

Torbela vs. Rosario, G.R. No. 140528 G.R. No. 140553, December 7, 2011

It is true that in express trusts and resulting trusts, a trustee cannot acquire by prescription a property entrusted to
him unless he repudiates the trust. Acquisitive prescription may bar the action of the beneficiary against the trustee
in an express trust for the recovery of the property held in trust where (a) the trustee has performed unequivocal
acts of repudiation amounting to an ouster of the cestui que trust; (b) such positive acts of repudiation have been
made known to the cestui que trust, and (c) the evidence thereon is clear and conclusive.

Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation vs. Hi-Tri Development Corporation and Luz R. Bakunawa., G.R. No.
192413, June 13, 2012

Accordingly, the CA committed reversible error when it ruled that the issuance of individual notices upon
respondents was a jurisdictional requirement, and that failure to effect personal service on them rendered the
Decision and the Order of the RTC void for want of jurisdiction. Escheat proceedings are actions in rem, whereby an
action is brought against the thing itself instead of the person. Thus, an action may be instituted and carried to
judgment without personal service upon the depositors or other claimants . Jurisdiction is secured by the power of
the court over the res.]Consequently, a judgment of escheat is conclusive upon persons notified by advertisement,
as publication is considered a general and constructive notice to all persons interested.

Repubic vs. CA & Solano, G.R. No. 143483, January 31, 2002

The 5-year period is not a device capriciously conjured by the state to defraud any claimant; on the contrary, it is
decidedly prescribed to encourage would-be claimants to be punctilious in asserting their claims, otherwise they
may lose them forever in a final judgment.

Oropesa vs. Oropesa, G.R. No. 184528, April 25, 2012

A guardianship is designed to further the wards well-being, not that of the guardian. It is intended to preserve the
wards property, as well as to render any assistance that the ward may personally require. It has been stated that
while custody involves immediate care and control, guardianship indicates not only those responsibilities, but those
of one in loco parentis as well.

Napoleon D. Neri, Alicia D. Neri-Mondejar, Visminda D. Neri-Chambers, Rosa D. Neri-Millan, Douglas D. Neri,
Eutropia D. Illut-Cockinos and Victoria D. Illut- Piala vs. Heirs of Hadji Yusop Uy and Julpha Ibrahim Uy.,
G.R. No. 194366, October 10, 2012

Thus, a father or mother, as the natural guardian of the minor under parental authority, does not have the power to
dispose or encumber the property of the latter. Such power is granted by law only to a judicial guardian of the wards
property and even then only with courts prior approval secured in accordance with the proceedings set forth by the
Rules of Court.

IN RE: Stephanie Garcia, GR 148311, March 31, 2005

Adoption is defined as the process of making a child, whether related or not to the adopter, possess in general, the
rights accorded to a legitimate child. It is a juridical act, a proceeding in rem which creates between two persons a
relationship similar to that which results from legitimate paternity and filiation.

Suarez vs.. Republic, L-20914 December 24, 1965

The adoptee may use the surname of the adopter. The minor cannot bear adopters surname as a married woman,
for her husband has not joined in the petition for adoption and cannot join it, because he has children by a previous
marriage and to allow the minor to adopt the surname of the husband of the adopter (where the husband had not),
would mislead the public into believing that she (adoptee) has also been adopted by the husband, which is not the
case.

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF MINOR SHANG KO VINGSON YU SHIRLY
VINGSON SHIRLY VINGSON DEMAISIP v. JOVY CABCABAN. UDK no. 14817, January 13, 2014
Under Section 1, Rule 102 of the Rules of Court, the writ of habeas corpus is available, not only in cases of illegal
confinement or detention by which any person is deprived of his liberty, but also in cases involving the rightful
custody over a minor. The general rule is that parents should have custody over their minor children. But the State
has the right to intervene where the parents, rather than care for such children, treat them cruelly and abusively,
impairing their growth and well-being and leaving them emotional scars that they carry throughout their lives unless
they are liberated from such parents and properly counselled.

Feria vs. CA, G.R. No. 122954, February 15, 2000

Consequently, the writ of habeas corpus may also be availed of where, as a consequence of a judicial proceeding,
(a) there has been a deprivation of a constitutional right resulting in the restraint of a person, (b) the court had no
jurisdiction to impose the sentence, or (c) an excessive penalty has been imposed, as such sentence is void as to
such excess.

Lee Yick Hon vs. Insular Collector Of Customs, G.R. No. L-16799, March 30, 1991

Peremptory writ of habeas corpus, is one which unconditionally commands the respondent to have the body of the
detained person before the court at a time and place therein specified. The order served in the case before us was
merely a preliminary citation or one which merely requires the respondent to appear and show cause why the
peremptory writ should not be granted.

Velasco vs.CA G.R.No.118644 July 7,1995

It must be kept in mind that in both habeas corpus and certiorari proceedings is whether an inferior court has
exceeded its jurisdiction, the former involves a collateral attack on the judgment and reaches the body but not the
record, while the latter assails directly the judgment and reaches the record but not the body.

RODOLFO NOEL LOZADA, JR., VIOLETA LOZADA and ARTURO LOZADA, vs. PRESIDENT GLORIA
MACAPAGAL ARROYO, EDUARDO ERMITA, AVELINO RAZON, ANGEL ATUTUBO and SPO4 ROGER
VALEROSO,* G.R. Nos. 184379-80, April 24, 2012

The privilege of the writ of amparo is envisioned basically to protect and guarantee the rights to life, liberty, and
security of persons, free from fears and threats that vitiate the quality of this life. It is an extraordinary writ
conceptualized and adopted in light of and in response to the prevalence of extra-legal killings and enforced
disappearances. Accordingly, the remedy ought to be resorted to and granted judiciously, lest the ideal sought by the
Amparo Rule be diluted and undermined by the indiscriminate filing of amparo petitions for purposes less than the
desire to secure Amparo reliefs and protection and/or on the basis of unsubstantiated allegations.

Secretary Leila M. De Lima, Director Nonnatus R. Rojas and Deputy Director Reynaldo O. Esmeralda v.
Magtanggol B. Gatdula; G.R. No. 204528. February 19, 2013

It is clear from this rule that this type of summary procedure only applies to MTC/MTCC/MCTCs. It is mind-boggling
how this rule could possibly apply to proceedings in an RTC. Aside from that, this Court limited the application of
summary procedure to certain civil and criminal cases. A writ of Amparo is a special proceeding. It is a remedy by
which a party seeks to establish a status, a right or particular fact. It is not a civil nor a criminal action, hence, the
application of the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure is seriously misplaced.

Secretary of Defense vs. Manalo, G.R. No. 180906, October 7, 2008

The writ applies to extralegal/extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances or threats thereof while a search
warrant is an order in writing issued in the name of the People of the Philippines, signed by a judge and directed to a
peace officer, commanding him to search for personal property described therein and bring it before the court.

Secretary Leila M. De Lima, Director Nonnatus R. Rojas and Deputy Director Reynaldo O. Esmeralda v.
Magtanggol B. Gatdula; G.R. No. 204528. February 19, 2013

If the allegations are proven with substantial evidence, the court shall grant the privilege of the writ and such reliefs
as may be proper and appropriate. The judgment should contain measures which the judge views as essential for
the continued protection of the petitioner in the Amparo case. These measures must be detailed enough o that the
judge may be able to verify and monitor the actions taken by the respondents. It is this judgment that could be
subject to appeal to the Supreme Court via Rule 45. After the measures have served their purpose, the judgment will
be satisfied. In Amparo cases, this is when the threats to the petitioners life, liberty and security cease to exist as
evaluated by the court that renders the judgment. Parenthetically, the case may also be terminated through
consolidation should a subsequent case be filed either criminal or civil. Until the full satisfaction of the judgment,
the extraordinary remedy of Amparo allows vigilant judicial monitoring to ensure the protection of constitutional
rights.

Canlas vs. Napico, G.R. No. 182795, June 5, 2008

The threatened demolition of a dwelling by virtue of a final judgment of the court, which in this case was affirmed
with finality, is not included among the enumeration of rights as stated in the above-quoted Section 1 for which the
remedy of a writ of amparo is made available.

Egardo Navia, Ruben Dio and Andrew Buising vs. Virginia Pardico, for and in behalf in representation of
Benhur Pardico., G.R. No. 184467, June 19, 2012

For the protective writ of amparo to issue, allegation and proof that the persons subject thereof are missing are not
enough. It must also be shown and proved by substantial evidence that the disappearance was carried out by, or
with the authorization, support or acquiescence of, the State or a political organization, followed by a refusal to
acknowledge the same or give information on the fate or whereabouts of said missing persons, with the intention of
removing them from the protection of the law for a prolonged period of time. Simply put, the petitioner in an amparo
case has the burden of proving by substantial evidence the indispensable element of government participation. x x x

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR THE WRIT OF AMPARO AND HABEAS DATA IN FAVOR OF NORIEL
RODRIGUEZ, petitioner vs. GLORIA MACAPAGALARROYO, GEN. VICTOR S. IBRADO, PDG JESUS AME
VERSOZA, LT. GEN. DELFIN BANGIT, MAJ. GEN. NESTOR Z. OCHOA, P/CSUPT. AMETO G. TOLENTINO,
P/SSUPT. JUDE W. SANTOS, COL. REMIGIO M. DE VERA, an officer named MATUTINA, LT. COL. MINA,
CALOG, GEORGE PALACPAC under the name HARRY, ANTONIO CRUZ, ALDWIN BONG PASICOLAN
and VINCENT CALLAGAN, G.R. No. 191805

The writ of amparo partakes of a summary proceeding that requires only substantial evidence to make the
appropriate interim and permanent reliefs available to the petitioner. As explained in the Decision, it is not an action
to determine criminal guilt requiring proof beyond reasonable doubt, or liability for damages requiring preponderance
of evidence, or even administrative responsibility requiring substantial evidence. The totality of evidence as a
standard for the grant of the writ was correctly applied by this Court. x x x

In the matter of the petition for the writ of Amparo and the writ of Habeas Data in favor of Francis Saez,
petitioner vs. GLORIA MACAPAGAL ARROYO, GEN. HERMOGENES ESPERON, P/DIR. GEN. AVELINO
RAZON, 22Nn MICO, CAPT. LAWRENCE BANAAG, SGT. CASTILLO, CAPT. ROMMEL GUTIERREZ, CAPT.
JAKE OBLIGADO, CPL. ROMAN ITO QUINT ANA, PVT. JERICO DUQUIL, CPL. ARIEL FONTANILLA, A
CERTAIN CAPT. ALCA YDO, A CERTAIN FIRST SERGEANT, PVT. ZALDY OSlO, A CERTAIN PFC. SONNY, A
CERTAIN CPL. JAMES, A CERTAIN JOEL, RODERICK CLANZA and JEFFREY GOMEZ, respondents, G.R. No.
183533, September 25, 2012

Given that the totality of the evidence presented by the petitioner failed to support his claims, the reliefs prayed for,
therefore, cannot be granted. The liberality accorded to amparo and habeas data cases does not mean that a
claimant is dispensed with the onus of proving his case. Indeed, even the liberal standard of substantial evidence
demands some adequate evidence.

1. JOY MARGATE LEE vs. P/SUPT. NERI A. ILAGA G.R. No. 203254, October 08, 2014

A Habeas Data Petition is dismissible if it fails to adequately show that there exists a nexus between the right to
privacy on the one hand, and the right to life, liberty or security on the other. Moreover, it is equally dismissible if it is
not supported by substantial evidence showing an actual or threatened violation of the right to privacy in life, liberty
or security of the victim.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. MERLINDA L. OLAYBAR. G.R. NO. 189538, February 10, 2014

While we maintain that Rule 108 cannot be availed of to determine the validity of marriage, we cannot nullify the
proceedings before the trial court where all the parties had been given the opportunity to contest the allegations of
respondent; the procedures were followed, and all the evidence of the parties had already been admitted and
examined. Respondent indeed sought, not the nullification of marriage as there was no marriage to speak of, but the
correction of the record of such marriage to reflect the truth as set forth by the evidence. Otherwise stated, in
allowing the correction of the subject certificate of marriage by cancelling the wife portion thereof, the trial court did
not, in any way, declare the marriage void as there was no marriage to speak of.

Silverio vs. CA G.R. No. 174689, October 22, 2007

However, a change of name does not alter ones legal capacity or civil status. RA 9048 does not sanction a change
of first name on the ground of sex reassignment. Rather than avoiding confusion, changing petitioners first name for
his declared purpose may only create grave complications in the civil registry and the public interest.

People vs. Cagandahan, G.R. No. 166676, September 12, 2008

Where the person is biologically or naturally intersex the determining factor in his gender classification would be
what the individual, like respondent, having reached the age of majority, with good reason thinks of his/her sex.
Respondent here has simply let nature take its course and has not taken unnatural steps to arrest or interfere with
what he was born with.

Lee v. CA, G.R. No. 118387, October 11, 2001

Clerical or typographical errors in entries of the civil register are now to be corrected and changed without need of a
judicial order and by the city or municipal civil registrar or consul general. What is left for the scope of operation of
Rule 108 are substantial changes and corrections in entries of the civil register.
SPOUSES ARACELI OLIVA-DE MESA and ERNESTO S. DE MESA, vs. SPOUSES CLAUDIO D. ACERO, JR.
and MA. RUFINA D. ACERO,SHERIFF FELIXBERTO L. SAMONTE and REGISTRAR ALFREDO SANTOS., G.R.
No. 185064, January 16, 2012

Here, the subject property became a family residence sometime in January 1987. There was no showing, however,
that the same was judicially or extrajudicially constituted as a family home in accordance with the provisions of the
Civil Code. Still, when the Family Code took effect on August 3, 1988, the subject property became a family home by
operation of law and was thus prospectively exempt from execution. The petitioners were thus correct in asserting
that the subject property was a family home.

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

RAMONCITA O. SENADOR v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES. G.R. No. 201620, March 6, 2013

If the subject matter of the offense is generic and not identifiable, an error in the designation of the offended party is
fatal and would result in the acquittal of the accused. However, if the subject matter of the offense is specific and
identifiable, an error in the designation of the offended party is immaterial.

Mary Rose A. Boto vs. Senior Assistant City Prosecutor Villena, A.C. No. 9684, September 18, 2013

The criminal and civil action for damages in cases of written defamations shall be filed simultaneous or separately
with the Regional Trial Court of the province or city where the libellous article is printed and first published or where
any of the offended parties actually resides at the time of the commission of the offense.

Bureau of Customs v. Peter Sherman, et al, G.R. No. 190487, April 13, 2011.

It is well-settled that prosecution of crimes pertains to the executive department of the government whose principal
power and responsibility is to insure that laws are faithfully executed. Corollary to this power is the right to prosecute
violators. Thus, all criminal actions commenced by complaint or information are prosecuted under the direction and
control of public prosecutors. In the prosecution of special laws, however, the exigencies of public service
sometimes require the designation of special prosecutors from different government agencies to assist the public
prosecutor; but this designation does not detract from the public prosecutor having control and supervision over the
case.

LETICIA I. KUMMER v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES. G.R. No. 174461, September 11, 2013

Section 14, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court permits a formal amendment of a complaint even after the plea but only if
it is made with leave of court and provided that it can be done without causing prejudice to the rights of the accused.
It is clear that consistent with the rule on amendments and the jurisprudence, the change in the date of the
commission of the crime of homicide is a formal amendment it does not change the nature of the crime, does not
affect the essence of the offense nor deprive the accused of an opportunity to meet the new averment, and is not
prejudicial to the accused.

1. JOEL C. MENDEZ vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and COURT OF TAX APPEALS G.R. No.
179962, June 11, 2014
Dr. Joel Mendez was charged with tax evasion. However, the prosecutor filed amended complaint which changed
the date of the commission of the offense. The court ruled that amendments that do not charge another offense
different from that charged in the original one; or do not alter the prosecutions theory of the case so as to cause
surprise to the accused and affect the form of defense he has or will assume are considered merely as formal
amendments.

People of the Philippines vs. Danilo Feliciano Jr., et. al, G.R. No. 196735, May 5, 2014

It should be remembered that every aggravating circumstance being alleged must be stated in the information.
Failure to state an aggravating circumstance, even if duly proven at trial, will not be appreciated as such. It was,
therefore, incumbent on the prosecution to state the aggravating circumstance of wearing masks and/or other forms
of disguise in the information in order for all the evidence, introduced to that effect, to be admissible by the trial
court.

People v. Oso, 62 Phil 271

In case of variance between the complaint filed by the offended party and the information in crimes against chastity,
the complaint controls

PEOPLE vs. GULLERMO LOMAQUE, GR 189297, June 5, 2013

A variance in the mode of commission of the offense is binding upon the accused if he fails to object to evidence
showing that the crime was committed in a different manner than what was alleged. While the information clearly
states that the crime was committed by appellants insertion of his penis inside AAAs vagina, the latter solemnly
testified on the witness stand that appellant merely put his penis in her mouth. Nevertheless, appellant failed to
register any objection that the Information alleged a different mode of the commission of the crime of rape. Thus,
appellants conviction for rape by sexual assault must be sustained, the variance notwithstanding.

Honesto General vs. Hon. Graduacion Reyes Claravall, et al., 195 SCRA 623

In any event, the Court now makes that intent plainer, and in the interest of clarity and certainty, categorically
declares for the guidance of all concerned that when the civil action is deemed impliedly instituted with the criminal
in accordance with Section 1, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court because the offended party has not waived the civil
action, or reserved the right to institute it separately, or instituted the civil action prior to the criminal action the
rule is as follows: (1) when the amount of the damages, other than actual, is alleged in the complaint or information
filed in court, then the corresponding filing fees shall be paid by the offended party upon filing thereof in court for
trial; and (2) in any other case, however i.e., when the amount of damages is not so alleged in the complaint or
information filed in court the corresponding filing fees need not be paid and shall simply constitute a first lien on the
judgment, except in an award for actual damages.

RAFAEL JOSE CONSING, JR. v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES G.R. NO. 161075. JULY 15, 2013

An independent civil action based on fraud initiated by the defrauded party does not raise a prejudicial question to
stop the proceedings in a pending criminal prosecution of the defendant for estafa through falsification. This is
because the result of the independent civil action is irrelevant to the issue of guilt or innocence of the accused.

SAN MIGUEL PROPERTIES, INC. v. SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, ET AL. G.R. No. 166836, September 4, 2013

The pendency of an administrative case for specific performance brought by the buyer of residential subdivision lots
in the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) to compel the seller to deliver the transfer certificates of
title (TCTs) of the fully paid lots is properly considered a ground to suspend a criminal prosecution for violation of
Section 25 of Presidential Decree No. 957 on the ground of a prejudicial question. The administrative determination
is a logical antecedent of the resolution of the criminal charges based on non-delivery of the TCTs.

Rafael Jose Consing, Jr. vs. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 161075, July 15, 2013

It is well settled that a civil action based on defamation, fraud and physical injuries may be independently instituted
pursuant to Article 33 of the Civil Code, and does not operate as a prejudicial question that will justify the suspension
of a criminal case. This was precisely the Courts thrust in G.R. No. 148193, thus: Moreover, neither is there a
prejudicial question of the civil and the criminal action can, according to law, proceed independently of each other.
Under Rule 111, Section 3 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, iun the cases provided in Articles 32, 33, 34
and 2176 of the Civil Code, the independent civil action may be brought by the offended party. It shall proceed
independently of the criminal action and shall require only a preponderance of evidence. In no case, however, may
the offended party recover damages twice for the same act or omission charged in the criminal action. xxx In the
instant case, Civil Case No. 99-95381, for Damages and Attachment on account of alleged fraud committed by
respondent and his mother in selling the disputed lot to PBI is an independent civil action under Article 33 of the Civil
Code. As such, it will not operate as a prejudicial question that will justify the suspension of the criminal case at bar.

GODOFREDO ENRILE AND DR. FREDERICK ENRILE, vs. HON. DANILO A. MANALASTAS G.R. No. 166414,
October 22, 2014

The preliminary investigation is not yet a trial on the merits, for its only purpose is to determine whether a crime has
been committed and whether there is probable cause to believe that the accused is guilty thereof. The scope of the
investigation does not approximate that of a trial before the court; hence, what is required is only that the evidence
be sufficient to establish probable cause that the accused committed the crime charged, not that all reasonable
doubt of the guilt of the accused be removed. As the MTC and RTC rightly held, the presentation of the medical
certificates to prove the duration of the victims need for medical attendance or of their incapacity should take place
only at the trial, not before or during the preliminary investigation.

P/Insp. Ariel S. Artillero v. Orlando C. Casimiro, etc., et al, G.R. No. 190569, April 25, 2012

There is no provision in Rule 112 of the Rules of Court that gives the Complainant or requires the prosecutor to
observe the right to file a Reply to the accuseds counter-affidavit. To illustrate the non-mandatory nature of filing a
Reply in preliminary investigations, Section 3 (d) of Rule 112 gives the prosecutor, in certain instances, the right to
resolve the Complaint even without a counter-affidavit, viz: (d) If the respondent cannot be subpoenaed, of if
subpoenaed, does not submit counter-affidavits within the ten (10) day period, the investigating officer shall resolve
the complaint based on the evidence presented by the complainant. On the other hand, petitioner was entitled to
receive a copy of the Counter- affidavit filed by Aguillon.

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ENGR. RODOLFO YECYEC ET AL. G.R. No. 183551, November 12,
2014

It must be stressed that in our criminal justice system, the public prosecutor exercises a wide latitude of discretion in
determining whether a criminal case should be filed in court, and the courts must respect the exercise of such
discretion when the information filed against the person charged is valid on its face, and that no manifest error or
grave abuse of discretion can be imputed to the public prosecutor. In this case, there is no question that the
Information filed against the respondents was sufficient to hold them liable for the crime of Theft because it was
compliant with Section 6, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court. Moreover, a review of the resolutions of the MCTC, the
Provincial Prosecutor, the RTC, and the CA shows that there is substantial basis to support finding of probable
cause against the respondents. Hence, as the Information was valid on its face and there was no manifest error or
arbitrariness on the part of the MCTC and the Provincial Prosecutor, the RTC and the CA erred when they
overturned the finding of probable cause against the respondents.

Iris Kristine Balois Alberto vs. CA, GR No. 182130, June 19, 2013

Probable cause, for the purpose of filing a criminal information, exists when the facts are sufficient to engender a
well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and that the respondent is probably guilty thereof. It does not
mean actual and positive cause nor does it import absolute certainty. Rather, it is based merely on opinion and
reasonable belief. Accordingly, probable cause does not require an inquiry whether there is sufficient evidence to
procure a conviction; it is enough that it is believed that the act or omission complained of constitutes the offense
charged.

Manila Electric Company, represented by Manolo C. Fernando v. Vicente Atilano, et al., G.R. No. 166758,
June 27, 2012

The determination of probable cause for the filing of an information in court is an executive function which pertains at
the first instance to the public prosecutor and then to the Secretary of Justice. As a rule, in the absence of any grave
abuse of discretion, courts are not empowered to substitute their own judgment for that of the executive branch; the
public prosecutor alone determines the sufficiency of evidence that will establish probable cause in filing a criminal
information and courts will not interfere with his findings unless grave abuse of discretion can be shown. In this case,
the Supreme Court found no error in the public prosecutors determination that no probable cause existed to justify
the filing of a criminal complaint.

Alfredo Romulo A. Busuego vs. Office of the Ombudsman, GR No. 196842, October 9, 2013

The Ombudsmans primary jurisdiction, albeit concurrent with the DOJ, to conduct preliminary investigation of
crimes involving public officers, without regard to its commission in relation to office, had long been settled in Sen.
Honasan II vs. The Panel of Investigating Prosecutors of DOJ, and affirmed in subsequent cases: The Constitution,
Section 15 of the Ombudsman Act of 1989 and Section 4 of the Sandiganbayan Law, as amended, do not give the
Ombudsman exclusive jurisdiction to investigate offenses committed by public officers and employees. The authority
of the Ombudsman to investigate offenses involving public officers or employees is concurrent with other
government investigating agencies such as provincial, city and state prosecutors, however, the Ombudsman, in the
exercise of its primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan may take over, at any stage, from
any investigating agency of the government, the investigation of such cases.

People vs. Mabuyo, 63 SCRA 532; People vs. Lazo; 198 SCRA 274

The accused who is denied the mandatory preliminary investigation may refuse to enter a plea upon arraignment
and to object to the continuation of further proceedings based on lack of preliminary investigation. If he pleads
without objection, he cannot raise the issue on appeal.

Imelda S. Enriquez vs. Olegario R. Sarmiento, Jr., A.M. No. RTJ-06-2011, August 7, 2006
A preliminary investigation is a proceeding distinct from an inquest. A preliminary investigation is an inquiry or
proceeding to determine whether there is sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been
committed and the respondent is probably guilty thereof, and should be held for trial. An inquest is a summary
inquiry conducted by a prosecutor for the purpose of determining whether the warrantless arrest of a person was
based on probable cause.

Office of the Court Administrator vs. Hon, Rosabella M. Tormis, AM No. MTJ-12-1817, March 12, 2013

Whenever a criminal case falls under the Summary Procedure, the general rule is that the court shall not order the
arrest of the accused unless he fails to appear whenever required. In this case, Judge Tormis claimed that the
issuance of the warrant of arrest against the accused in the Librando case was justified because of the accuseds
failure to appear during her arraignment despite notice. However, as clearly found by the OCA, Judge Tormis order
requiring the accused to appear and submit her counter-affidavit and those of her witnesses within ten days from
receipt of the order was not yet served upon the accused when she issued the warrant. In doing so, Judge Tormis
issued the warrant of arrest in violation of the Rule on Summary Procedure that the accused should first be notified
of the charges against him and given the opportunity to file his counter-affidavits and other countervailing evidence.

People of the Philippines vs. Ng Yik bun, et al, G.R. No. 180452. January 10, 2010.

An arrest made during the commission of a crime does not require a warrant. Such warrantless arrest is considered
reasonable and valid under Rule 113, section 5(a) of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure. In the instant case,
contrary to accused-appellants contention, there was indeed a valid warrantless arrest in flagrante delicto. Consider
the circumstances immediately prior to and surrounding the arrest of accused-appellants: (1) the police officers
received information from an operative about an ongoing shipment of contraband; (2) the police officers, with the
operative, proceeded to Villa Vicenta Resort in Barangay Bignay II, Sariaya, Quezon; (3) they observed the goings-
on at the resort from a distance of around 50 meters; and (4) they spotted the six accused-appellants loading
transparent bags containing a white substance into a white L-300 van. Evidently, the arresting police officers had
probable cause to suspect that accused-appellants were loading and transporting contraband, more so when Hwan,
upon being accosted, readily mentioned that they were loading shabu and pointed to Tan as their leader. Thus, the
arrest of accused- appellants who were caught in flagrante delicto of possessing, and in the act of loading into a
white L-300 van, shabu, a prohibited drug under RA 6425, as amended is valid.

People of the Philippines vs. Roberto Velasco, G.R. No. 190318, November 27, 2013

Jurisprudence tells us that an accused is estopped from assailing any irregularity of his arrest if he fails to raise this
issue or to move for the quashal of the information against him on this ground before arraignment, thus, any
objection involving a warrant of arrest or the procedure by which the court acquired jurisdiction of the person of the
accused must be made before he enters his plea; otherwise, the objection is deemed waived. Nevertheless, even if
appellants warrantless arrest were proven to be indeed invalid, such a scenario would still not provide salvation to
appellants cause because jurisprudence also instructs us that the illegal arrest of an accused is not sufficient cause
for setting aside a valid judgment rendered upon a sufficient complaint after a trial free from error.

LEVISTE v. CA
A finding that none of the bail negating circumstances is present will not automatically result in the grant of bail.
Such finding will simply authorize the court to use the less stringent sound discretion approach. However, if the
appellate court determines the existence of any of the bail negating circumstances, it has no other option except to
deny or revoke bail pending appeal. Conversely, if the appellate court grants bail pending appeal, grave abuse of
discretion will thereby be committed

TRINIDAD LACHICA v. JUDGE ROSABELLATORMIS

It is undisputed that respondent judge personally received the cash bail bond for the accused. For this act alone,
respondent is already administratively liable. Section 14, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure
specifies the persons with whom a cash bail bond may be deposited, namely: the collector of internal revenue or the
provincial, city or municipal treasurer. A judge is not authorized to receive the deposit of cash as bail nor should such
cash be kept in his office.

Yap v. CA and the People, G.R. No. 141529 (2001)

Although an increase in the amount of bail while the case is on appeal may be meritorious, the SC found that the
setting of the amount at P5.5M is unreasonable, excessive, and constitutes an effective denial of As right to bail.

People v. Ortega, 276 SCRA 166 (2003)

An accused may not be convicted of an offense unless it is clearly charged in the complaint or information. To
convict him of an offense other than that charged in the complaint or information would be a violation of this
constitutional right.

WILLIAM CO a.k.a. XU QUING HE vs. NEW PROSPERITY PLASTIC PRODUCTS, represented by ELIZABETH
UY G.R. No. 183994, June 30, 2014

Speedy trial is a relative term and necessarily a flexible concept. In determining whether the accuseds right to
speedy trial was violated, the delay should be considered in view of the entirety of the proceedings. The factors to
balance are the following: (a) duration of the delay; (b) reason therefor; (c) assertion of the right or failure to assert it;
and (d) prejudice caused by such delay. Surely, mere mathematical reckoning of the time involved would not suffice
as the realities of everyday life must be regarded in judicial proceedings which, after all, do not exist in a vacuum,
and that particular regard must be given to the facts and circumstances peculiar to each case. While the Court
recognizes the accuseds right to speedy trial and adheres to a policy of speedy administration of justice, we cannot
deprive the State of a reasonable opportunity to fairly prosecute criminals. Unjustified postponements which prolong
the trial for an unreasonable length of time are what offend the right of the accused to speedy trial.

Anna Lerima Patula vs. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 164457, April 11, 2012

Sec. 36, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court is understandably not the only rule that explains why testimony that is
hearsay should be excluded from consideration. Excluding hearsay also aims to preserve the right of the opposing
party to cross-examine the original declarant claiming to have a direct knowledge of the transaction or occurrence. If
hearsay is allowed, the right stands to be denied because the declarant is not in court. It is then to be stressed that
the right to cross-examine the adverse partys witness, being the only means of testing the credibility of the
witnesses and their testimonies, is essential to the administration of justice.

People v. Cogaed, G.R. No. 200334, July 30, 2014

There are instances when searches are reasonable even when warrantless. In the Rules of Court, searches
incidental to lawful arrests are allowed even without a separate warrant. This court has taken into account the
uniqueness of circumstances involved including the purpose of the search or seizure, the presence or absence of
probable cause, the manner in which the search and seizure was made, the place or thing searched, and the
character of the articles procured.

RETIRED SP04 BIENVENIDO LAUD vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES et al, G.R. No. 199032, November 19,
2014

Section 12, Chapter V of A.M. No. 03-8-02-SC allows the Manila and Quezon City RTCs to issue warrants to be
served in places outside their territorial jurisdiction for as long as the parameters under the said section have been
complied with, as in this case. As in ordinary search warrant applications, they shall particularly describe therein the
places to be searched and/or the property or things to be seized as prescribed in the Rules of Court. The
Executive Judges of these RTCs and, whenever they are on official leave of absence or are not physically present in
the station, the Vice-Executive Judges are authorized to act on such applications and shall issue the warrants, if
justified, which may be served in places outside the territorial jurisdiction of the said courts. The Court observes that
all the above-stated requirements were complied with in this case. As the records would show, the search warrant
application was filed before the Manila-RTC by the PNP and was endorsed by its head, PNP Chief Jesus Ame
Versosa, particularly describing the place to be searched and the things to be seized in connection with the heinous
crime of Murder. Finding probable cause therefor, Judge Peralta, in his capacity as 2nd Vice-Executive Judge,
issued Search Warrant which, as the rules state, may be served in places outside the territorial jurisdiction of the
said RTC.

FELILIBETH AGUINALDO and BENJAMIN PEREZ vs. REYNALDO P. VENTUS and JOJO B. JOSON, G.R. No.
176033, March 11, 2015

Arraignment was suspended pending the resolution of the Motion for Reconsideration before the DOJ. However, the
lapse of almost 1 year and 7 months warranted the application of the limitation of the period for suspending
arraignment. While the pendency of a petition for review is a ground for suspension of the arraignment, the
aforecited provision limits the deferment of the arraignment to a period of 60 days reckoned from the filing of the
petition with the reviewing office. It follows, therefore, that after the expiration of said period, the trial court is bound
to arraign the accused or to deny the motion to defer arraignment.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. HALIL GAMBAO y ESMAIL, EDDIEKARIM y USO, EDWIN DUKILMAN y
SUBOH, TONY ABAO y SULA, RAUL UDAL y KAGUI, THENG DILANGALEN y NANDING, JAMAN
MACALINBOL y KATOL, MONETTE RONAS y AMPIL, NORA EVAD y MULOK, THIAN PERPENIAN y RAFON
a.k.a LARINA PERPENIAN and JOHNDOES, G.R. No. 172707, October 1, 2013

The manner by which the plea of guilty is made, whether improvidently or not, loses legal significance where the
conviction can be based on independent evidence proving the commission of the crime by the accused.

People v. Lacson, G.R. No. 149453. April 1, 2003

In the new rule in question, as now construed by the Court, it has fixed a time-bar of one year or two years for the
revival of criminal cases provisionally dismissed with the express consent of the accused and with a priori notice to
the offended party. The time-bar may appear, on first impression, unreasonable compared to the periods under
Article 90 of the Revised Penal Code. However, in fixing the time-bar, the Court balanced the societal interests and
those of the accused for the orderly and speedy disposition of criminal cases with minimum prejudice to the State
and the accused. It took into account the substantial rights of both the State and of the accused to due process. The
Court believed that the time limit is a reasonable period for the State to revive provisionally dismissed cases with the
consent of the accused and notice to the offended parties. The time-bar fixed by the Court must be respected unless
it is shown that the period is manifestly short or insufficient that the rule becomes a denial of justice. The petitioners
failed to show a manifest shortness or insufficiency of the time-bar.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. PABLO L. ESTACIO, JR. and MARITESS ANG

The conditions for the discharge of an accused as a state witness are as follows:

(a) There is absolute necessity for the testimony of the accused whose discharge is requested;

(b) There is no other direct evidence available for the proper prosecution of the offense committed, except the
testimony of said accused;

(c) The testimony of said accused can be substantially corroborated in its material points;

(d) Said accused does not appear to be the most guilty; and (e) Said accused has not at any time been convicted of
any offense involving moral turpitude.

ESTHER P. MAGLEO vs. PRESIDING JUDGE ROWENA DE JUAN-QUINAGORAN and BRANCH CLERK OF
COURT ATTY. ADONIS LAURE, BOTH OF BRANCH 166, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, PASIG CITY, A.M. No.
RTJ-12-2336, November 12, 2014

Accuseds Demurrer to Evidence, the ruling is an adjudication on the merits of the case which is tantamount to an
acquittal and may no longer be appealed. The current scenario, however, is an exception to the general rule. The
demurrer to evidence was premature because it was filed before the prosecution rested its case. The RTC had not
yet ruled on the admissibility of the formal offer of evidence of the prosecution when Magleo filed her demurrer to
evidence. Hence, Judge Quinagoran had legal basis to overturn the order granting the demurrer to evidence as
there was no proper acquittal.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. JUDGE RAFAEL R. LAGOS, et al. G.R. No. 184658, March 6, 2013.

A motion to file a demurrer was granted after the prosecutions presentation of the testimonies of the apprehending
officers because the prosecution failed to present the testimony of the confidential informant. It has long been settled
that the grant of a demurrer is tantamount to an acquittal. An acquitted defendant is entitled to the right of repose as
a direct consequence of the finality of his acquittal. This rule, however, is not without exception. The rule on double
jeopardy is subject to the exercise of judicial review by way of the extraordinary writ of certiorari under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court. The Supreme Court finds and so holds that the grant of the demurrer for this reason alone was not
supported by prevailing jurisprudence and constituted grave abuse of discretion.

MERENCILLO V. PEOPLE (2007)

Minor discrepancies or inconsistencies do not impair the essential integrity of the prosecutions evidence as a whole
or reflect on the witnesses honesty. The test is whether the testimonies agree on essential facts and whether the
respective versions corroborate and substantially coincide with each other so as to make a consistent and coherent
whole. Thus, inconsistencies and discrepancies in details which are irrelevant to the elements of the crime cannot
be successfully invoked as grounds for acquittal.

Marino B. Icdang v. Sandiganbayan, et al, G.R. No. 185960, January 25, 2012

Petitioner claims that his right to due process was violated when his counsel failed to assist him during the
promulgation of the judgment. He faults the Sandiganbayan for proceeding with the promulgation despite the
petitioner not then being assisted by his counsel, and being a layman he is not familiar with court processes and
procedure. Section 6, Rule 120 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, as amended, provides: The judgment is
promulgated by reading it in the presence of the accused and any judge of the court in which it was
rendered.However, if the conviction is for a light offense, the judgment may be pronounced in the presence of his
counsel or representative. There is nothing in the rules that requires the presence of counsel for the promulgation of
the judgment of conviction to be valid. While notice must be served on accused and his counsel, the latters absence
during the promulgation of judgment would not affect the validity of the promulgation. Indeed, no substantial right of
the accused on the merits was prejudiced by such absence of his counsel when the sentence was pronounced.

People of the Philippines vs. Val Delos Reyes, G.R. No. 130714 & 139634, October 16, 2012

At the outset, the Court notes that these cases were elevated to Us on automatic review in view of the RTCs
imposition of the death penalty upon appellant in its June 25, 1997 Decision. However, with the Courts
pronouncement in the 2004 case of People vs. Mateo, providing for and making mandatory the intermediate review
by the CA of cases involving the death penalty, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, the proper course of action
would be to remand these cases to the appellate court for the conduct of an intermediate review.

DENNIS T. VILLAREAL v. CONSUELO C. ALIGA. G.R. NO 166995, JANUARY 13, 2014

A judgment of acquittal may be assailed by the People in a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court
without placing the accused in double jeopardy. However, in such case, the People is burdened to establish that the
court a quo, acted without jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction. No
grave abuse of discretion may be attributed to a court simply because of its alleged misapplication of facts and
evidence, and erroneous conclusions based on said evidence. Certiorari will issue only to correct errors of
jurisdiction, and not errors or mistakes in the findings and conclusions of the trial court.

CHAN v. HONDA MOTORS

The validity of the issuance of a search warrant rests upon the following factors: (1) it must issued upon probable
cause; (2) the probable cause must be determined by the judge himself and not by the applicant or any other
person; (3) in the determination of probable cause, the judge must examine, under oath or affirmation, the
complainant and such witnesses as the latter may produce; and (4) the warrant issued must particularly describe the
place to be searched and persons or things to be seized.

Roan vs. Gonzales, 145 SCRA 686

The probable cause must be determined personally by the judge himself in the form of searching questions and
answers, in writing and under oath of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, on facts personally known
to them.

Luz vs. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 197788, February 29, 2012

It is the State that has the burden of proving, by clear and positive testimony, that the necessary consent was
obtained, and was freely and voluntarily given. In this case, all that was alleged was that petitioner was alone at the
police station at three in the morning, accompanied by several police officers. These circumstances weigh heavily
against a finding of valid consent to a warrantless search.

Elenita C. Fajardo vs. People of the Philippines., G.R. No. 190889, January 10, 2011

Under the plain view doctrine, objects falling in the plain view of an officer, who has a right to be in the position to
have that view, are subject to seizure and may be presented as evidence. It applies when the following requisites
concur: (a) the law enforcement officer in search of the evidence has a prior justification for an intrusion or is in a
position from which he can view a particular area; (b) the discovery of the evidence in plain view is inadvertent; and
(c) it is immediately apparent to the officer that the item he observes may be evidence of a crime, contraband, or
otherwise subject to seizure. The law enforcement officer must lawfully make an initial intrusion or properly be in a
position from which he can particularly view the area. In the course of such lawful intrusion, he came inadvertently
across a piece of evidence incriminating the accused. The object must be open to eye and hand, and its discovery
inadvertent.

EVIDENCE

El Greco Ship Maning and Management Corporation vs. Commissioner of Customs, G.R. No. 177188,
December 4, 2008

It does not apply to administrative or quasi-judicial proceedings as administrative bodies are not bound by the
technical niceties of the rules obtaining in the court of law.

People vs. Marti (193 SCRA 57)

The forwarder, who discovered leaves from a box sent to it by Marti, sent a request to the NBI to subject the leaves
to a laboratory testing which later turned out to be marijuana leaves. The Court held that there was no violation of
constitutional rights because the rights granted by the Constitution are protection from arbitrary exercise of power by
the government, and not by third parties, in this case, the forwarder.

Salcedo-Ortanez vs. Court of Appeals, 235 SCRA 111

Ortanez presented three (3) cassette tapes of alleged telephone conversations between his wife and unidentified
persons. The Court held that the cassette tapes are not admissible since absent a clear showing that both parties to
the telephone conversations allowed the recording of the same, the inadmissibility of the subject tapes is mandatory
under Rep. Act No. 4200.

Ogawa v. Menigishi, 676 SCRA 14, 21, July 9, 2012

The burden of proof lies with the party who asserts his/her right. In a counterclaim, the burden of proving the
existence of the claim lies with the defendant.

Morales v. Harbour Centre Port Terminal, Inc., 664 SCRA 110

In administrative or quasi-judicial proceedings like those conducted before the NLRC, the standard of proof is
substantial evidence which is understood to be more than just a scintilla or such amount of relevant evidence which
a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion.

Calamba Steel Center, Inc. vs. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, G.R. No. 151857, April 28, 2005

Court of Appeals ignored the existence of the tax return extant on the record. As a general rule, courts are not
authorized to take judicial notice of the contents of records in other cases tried or pending in the same court, even
when those cases were heard or are actually pending before the same judge. However, an exception is when
reference to such records is sufficiently made without objection from the opposing parties.

People vs. Tundag, G.R. Nos. 135695-96. October 12, 2000

In this case, judicial notice of the age of the victim is improper, despite the defense counsels admission. As required
by Section 3 of Rule 129, as to any other matters such as age, a hearing is required before courts can take judicial
notice of such fact.

Latip v. Chua, G.R. No. 177809, October 16, 2009

Generally speaking, matters of judicial notice have three material requisites: (1) the matter must be one of common
and general knowledge; (2) it must be well and authoritatively settled and not doubtful or uncertain; and (3) it must
be known to be within the limits of the jurisdiction of the court. The principal guide in determining what facts may be
assumed to be judicially known is that of notoriety.

Philippine Charter Insurance Corporation v. Central Colleges of the Philippines, 666 SCRA 540

It is an established principle that judicial admissions cannot be contradicted by the admitter who is the party himself
and binds the person who makes the same, absent any showing that this was made through palpable mistake, no
amount of rationalization can offset it.

CIR vs. Petron Corporation, G.R. No. 185568, 21 March 2012

CIR and Petron jointly stipulated before the CTA that Petron did not participate in the procurement and issuance of
the Tax Credit Certificates. This stipulation of fact by the CIR amounts to an admission and, having been made by
the parties in a stipulation of facts at pretrial, is treated as a judicial admission.

NEDLLOYD LIJNEN B.V. ROTTERDAM AND THE EAST ASIATIC CO., LTD. vs. GLOW LAKS ENTERPRISES,
LTD. G.R. No. 156330, November 19, 2014

It is well settled that foreign laws do not prove themselves in our jurisdiction and our courts are not authorized to
take judicial notice of them. To prove a foreign law, the party invoking it must present a copy thereof and comply with
Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132 of the Revised Rules of Court. Under the rules of private international law, a foreign
law must be properly pleaded and proved as a fact. In the absence of pleading and proof, the laws of the foreign
country or state will be presumed to be the same as our local or domestic law. This is known as processual
presumption. While the foreign law was properly pleaded in the case at bar, it was, however, proven not in the
manner provided by Section 24, Rule 132 of the Revised Rules of Court. While a photocopy of the foreign statute
relied upon by the court a quo to relieve the common carrier from liability, was presented as evidence during the
trial, the same however was not accompanied by the required attestation and certification.

ALBERTO ALMOJUELA y VILLANUEVA vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES G.R. No. 183202, June 2, 2014

Although based on the evidence adduced by both parties, no direct evidence points to Almojuela as the one who
stabbed Quejong. A finding of guilt is still possible despite the absence of direct evidence. Conviction based on
circumstantial evidence may result if sufficient circumstances, proven and taken together, create an unbroken chain
leading to the reasonable conclusion that the accused, to the exclusion of all others, was the author of the crime.

People v. Yau, G.R. No. 208170, August 20, 2014

It has been an established rule in appellate review that the trial courts factual findings, such as its assessment of
the credibility of the witnesses, the probative weight of their testimonies, and the conclusions drawn from the factual
findings, are accorded great respect and have even conclusive effect. Such factual findings and conclusions assume
even greater weight when they are affirmed by the CA. In the case at bench, the RTC gave more weight and
credence to the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses compared to those of the accused appellants. After a
judicious review of the evidence on record, the Court finds no cogent reason to deviate from the factual findings of
the RTC and the CA, and their respective assessment and calibration of the credibility of the prosecution witnesses.

People v. Larrahaga, G.R. Nos. 138874-75, July 21, 2005

An object evidence, when offered in accordance with the requisites for its admissibility, becomes evidence of the
highest order and speaks more eloquently than witnesses put together. The presence of the victims ravished body
in a deep ravine with handcuffs on her wrist is a physical evidence that bolsters the testimony of the witness.

People v. Vallejo, 382 SCRA 192

A rape-slay case of a 9-year old girl, admitted in evidence the DNA samples of the victim which were found in the
bloodstained garments of the accused. Vaginal swabs taken from the victim were also admitted and were found to
show the DNA profile of the accused who was subsequently convicted.

People vs. Cardenas, G.R. No. 190342. March 21, 2012

Non-compliance with the procedural requirements under RA 9165 and its IRR relative to the custody, photographing,
and drug-testing of the apprehended persons, is not a serious flaw that can render void the seizures and custody of
drugs in a buy-bust operation. What is essential is the preservation of the integrity and the evidentiary value of the
seized items, as the same would be utilized in the determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused.

People vs. Tan, 105 Phil. 1242 (1959)

When carbon sheets are inserted between two or more sheets of writing paper so that the writing of a contract upon
the outside sheet, including the signature of the party to be charged thereby, produces facsimile upon the sheets
beneath, such signature being thus reproduced by the same stroke of the pen which made the surface or exposed
impression, all of the sheets so written on are regarded as duplicate originals and either of them may be introduced
in evidence as such without accounting for the nonproduction of the others.
Pacasum vs. People, G.R. No. 180314, April 16, 2009

Only a photocopy of the Employee Clearance was presented in evidence. The Court held that the photocopy is
admissible as evidence since an exception to the best evidence rule is when the document sought to be presented
is in the possession of the person against whom it is to be offered and such party fails to present it even after
reasonable notice.

National Power Corporation vs. Codilla, G.R. No. 170491. April 3, 2007

The evidence offered by NAPOCOR were photocopies. The Court held that the photocopies were not equivalent to
the original documents based on the Rules on Electronic Evidence. The information contained in the photocopies
submitted by NAPOCOR will reveal that not all of the contents therein, such as the signatures of the persons who
purportedly signed the documents, may be recorded or produced electronically.

MCC Industrial Sales Corporation vs. Ssangyong Corporation, G.R. No. 170633. October 17, 2007

The Court held that the print-out and/or photocopies of facsimile transmissions are not electronic evidence. Thus, it
is consequential that the same may not be considered as the functional equivalent of their original as decreed in the
law.

Cruz vs. CA, 192 SCRA 209

The parol evidence rule is predicated on the existence of a document embodying the terms of an agreement. A
receipt is not such a document as it merely attests to the receipt of money and it is not and could have not been
intended by the parties to be the sole memorial of their agreement.

Maulini vs. Serrano, 28 Phil 640

Serrano introduced parol evidence to prove that he was merely acting as an agent without any consideration. The
Court held that Serrano can introduce such parole evidence because the case at bar is not one where the evidence
offered varies, alters, modifies, or contradicts the terms of indorsement admittedly existing.

Heirs of Lacsa vs. Court of Appeals, 197 SCRA 234 (1991)

The ancient document rule applies to the two Spanish documents and should thus be admitted without the need for
evidence on its authenticity and execution. They meet the 3 requisites of the ancient document rule, namely: (1) be
at least thirty (30) years old (2) found in the proper custody and is unblemished by alterations and is otherwise free
from suspicion and (3) that it is produced from a custody in which it would naturally be found if genuine.

Pacific Asia Overseas Shipping Corp. vs. NLRC, 161 SCRA 122 (1988)

Respondent Rances failed to submit any attestation issued by the proper Dubai official having legal custody of the
original of the decision of the Dubai Court that the copy presented by said respondent is a faithful copy of the
original decision, which attestation must furthermore be authenticated by a Philippine Consular Officer having
jurisdiction in Dubai. The transmittal letter, signed by Mohd Bin Saleh, Honorary Consul for Philippines does not
comply with the requirements of either the attestation under Section 26 nor the authentication envisaged by Section
25.

People vs. Burgos, 200 SCRA 67 (1991)

The Order disallowing the printing of the material encoded in the diskettes is void. There was neither testimonial
evidence nor any physical evidence on the diskettes that might indicate they had actually been tampered or their
contents altered in order to secure the conviction of the accused. The mere fact that the diskettes had been in the
possession of the prosecution does not necessarily imply that it had tampered with the evidence to suit its
prosecutorial objectives.

People vs. Solomon, 229 SCRA 402

The acceptance of a witness depends on the quality of his perceptions and the manner he can make them known to
the court. The testimony of Soria was positive, clear, plain, coherent and credible despite her slurred speech and the
use of leading questions.

People vs. Mendoza, 254 SCRA 18

Paul, a five-year-old boy, testified that Rolando boxed his wife then burned her. The testimony of Paul shows that he
is of above average intelligence, that he is capable of giving responsive answers, of recalling events, and of relating
his recollections. For a child witness to be competent, it must be shown that he has the capacity of (1) observation,
(2) of recollection, and (3) of communication.

Ordono vs. Saquigan, 62 SCRA 270

When an offense directly attacks or directly and vitally impairs, the conjugal relation, it comes within the exception to
the statute that one shall not be a witness against the other except in a criminal prosecution for a crime committed
(by) one against the other. Using the criterion, it can be concluded that in the law of evidence the rape perpetrated
by the father against his daughter is a crime committed by him against his wife (the victims mother).

People vs. Francisco, 78 Phil. 694

By his testimony imputing the commission of the crime against his wife, the husband is considered to have waived
all his objections to the testimony of his wife. It is to be expected that after giving such a testimony, it is but normal
for his wife to rebut the allegation.

APOLONIO GARCIA, in substitution of his deceased mother, Modesta Garcia, and CRISTINA SALAMAT v.
DOMINGA ROBLES vda de CAPARAS. G.R. No. 180843, April 17, 2013.

Under the Dead Mans Statute Rule, if one party to the alleged transaction is precluded from testifying by death,
insanity, or other mental disabilities, the other party is not entitled to the undue advantage of giving his own
uncontradicted and unexplained account of the transaction. Thus, the alleged admission of the deceased Pedro
Caparas that he entered into a sharing of leasehold rights with Modesta Garcia and Cristina Salamat cannot be
used as evidence against Dominga Caparas as the latter would be unable to contradict or disprove the same.

Lichauco vs. Atlantic Gulf, 84 Phil. 330

The Dead Mans Statute disqualifies only parties or assignors of parties; officers and/or stockholders of a
corporation, therefore, are not disqualified from testifying for or against the corporation which is a party to an action
upon a claim or demand against the estate of a deceased person, as to any matter of fact occurring before the death
of such person.
People vs. Carlos 47 Phil. 626 (1925)

Where a privileged communication from one spouse to another comes into the hands of a third party, whether legally
or not, without collusion and voluntary disclosure on the part of either of the spouses, the privilege is thereby
extinguished and the communication, if otherwise competent, becomes admissible.

Uy Chico vs. Union Life, 29 Phil. 163 (1915)

It will be noted that the evidence in question concerned the dealings of the plaintiffs attorney with a third person. A
communication made by a client to his attorney for the express purpose of its being communicated to a third person
is essentially inconsistent with the confidential relation. Such communication is between the third person and the
client, the attorney being merely an agent.

People vs. Sandiganbayan, 275 SCRA 505 (1997)

The period to be considered is the date when the privileged communication was made by the client to the attorney in
relation to either a crime committed in the past or with respect to a crime intended to be committed in the future. in
other words, If the client seeks his lawyers advice with respect to a crime that the former has theretofore committed,
he is given the protection of a virtual confessional seal which the attorney-client privilege declares cannot be broken
by the attorney without the clients consent.

Lim vs. Court of Appeals, 214 SCRA 273 (1992)

In order that the disqualification by reason of physician-patient privilege be successfully claimed, the following
requisites should concur: (1) the privilege is claimed in a civil case; (2) the person against whom the privilege is
claimed is one duly authorized to practice medicine, surgery or obstetrics; (3) such person acquired the information
while he was attending to the patient in his professional capacity; (4) the information was necessary to enable him to
act in that capacity; (5) the information was confidential and if disclosed, would blacken the reputation of the patient.

Krohn vs. Court of Appeals, 233 SCRA 146 (1994)

Where the person against whom the privilege is claimed is the patients husband who testifies on a document
executed by medical practitioners, his testimony does not have the force and effect of the testimony of the physician
who examined the patient and executed the report. Plainly, this does not fall within the prohibition.

Banco Filipino vs. Monetary Board, 142 SCRA 523 (1986)

The privilege under Section 21, Rule 130 is intended not for the protection of public officers but for the protection of
public interest. Where there is no public interest that would be prejudiced, this rule will not be applicable. The rule
that a public officer cannot be examined as to communications made to him in official confidence does not apply
when there is nothing to show that the public interest would suffer by the disclosure question.

Dela Paz vs. IAC, 154 SCRA 65 (1987)

The mere fact that the witness died after giving his direct testimony is no ground in itself for excluding his testimony
from the record so long as the adverse party was afforded an adequate opportunity for cross- examination but
through fault of his own failed to cross-examine the witness. The right to cross-examine Loreto was waived by
Petitioners through their repeated absence and motions to postpone the cross- examination.

People vs. Del Castillo, 25 SCRA

Section 14, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court explicitly provides that the court may grant or withhold leave to recall a
witness, in its discretion, as the interests of justice may require; and We believe that it was the better part of
discretion and caution on the part of the trial court to have denied as it did, the request of the defense to recall
Ceribo. The record is loaded with circumstances tending to show insidious attempts, too obvious to be overlooked,
to tamper with the witnesses for the prosecution.

Under the circumstances, to allow such a procedure would only encourage the perversion of truth and make a
mockery of court proceedings.

Viacrusis vs. Court of Appeals, 44 SCRA 176(1972)

The testimony and the public document are declarations adverse to the interest of the Costelos which is admissible
in evidence. The previous recognition by a party in physical possession of the property in dispute of the ownership in
another constitutes a declaration against the interest of the former and ay be received in evidence not only against
such party who made the declaration or his successors in interest but also against 3rd persons.

People vs. Alegre, 94 SCRA 109 (1979)

The silence of an accused (or in this case, the three appellants) under custody, or his failure to deny statements by
another implicating him in a crime, especially when such accused is neither asked to comment or reply to such
implications or accusations, cannot be considered as a tacit confession of his participation in the commission of the
crime.

People vs. Alegre, 94 Phil. 109 (1979)

As a general rule, the extrajudicial declaration of an accused, although deliberately made, is not admissible and
does not have probative value against his co- accused. It is merely hearsay evidence as far as the other accused
are concerned.

People vs. Yatco, 97 Phil. 941 (1955)

The rule regarding statements made by a co-conspirator refers to statements made by one conspirator during the
pendency of the unlawful enterprises and in furtherance of its object and not to a confession made long after the
conspiracy had been brought to an end. Under the rule on multiple admissibility of evidence, the confession of a co-
accused may be inadmissible against his co-accused for being hearsay but may nevertheless be admissible against
the declarants own guilt.

People vs. Wong Chuen Ming, 256 SCRA 182 (1996)

The fact that all accused are foreign nationals does not preclude application of the exclusionary rule because the
constitutional guarantees embodied in the Bill of Rights are given and extend to all persons, both aliens and citizens.
The accused cannot be made to affix their signatures on evidence without complying with the Bill of Rights. By
affixing their signatures on the evidence, the accused are in effect made to tacitly admit the crime charged for, in this
case, mere possession of prohibited drugs is a crime. These signatures amount to uncounseled extra-judicial
confession prohibited by the Bill of Rights and therefore inadmissible as evidence.

People vs. Irang, 64 Phil. 285 (1937)

While evidence of another crime is, as a rule, not admissible in a prosecution for robbery, it is admissible when it is
otherwise relevant, as where it tends to identify defendant as the perpetrator of the robbery charged, or tends to
show his presence at the scene or in the vicinity of the crime at the time charged, or when it is evidence of a
circumstance connected with the crime.

People vs. Soliman, 53 O.G. 8083 (1957)

While good or bad character may be availed of as an aid to determine the probability or improbability of the
commission of an offense, such is not necessary in the crime of murder through TREACHERY or EVIDENT
PREMEDITATION (remember that the character of the wounds show that the deceased was killed in a lying
position). The proof of such character may only be allowed in homicide cases to show that it has produced a
reasonable belief of imminent danger in the mind of the accused and a justifiable conviction that a prompt defensive
action was necessary.

U.S. Vs. Mercado, 26 Phil. 127 (1913)

Generally, a witness cannot be impeached by the party against whom he has been called, except by showing: 1.
that he has made contradictory statements; or2. by showing that his general reputation for truth, honesty, or integrity
is bad. The question to which the defendant objected neither attempted to show that the witness had made
contradictory statements nor that his general reputation for truth, honesty, or integrity was bad.

U.S. Vs. Zenni, 492 F. Supp. 464 (1980)

A statement is not prohibited by the hearsay rule if it is merely offered for proving the fact that the statement was
made, and not as a means of proving the truth of the fact asserted therein. Implied assertions, which are inferences
that can be drawn from the conduct of persons, are not covered by the hearsay rule unless they are intended to be
an assertion concerning the matter in inquiry. (Ex. Testimony that a person pointed to a person in a police line up)

Estrada vs. Desierto, 356 SCRA (2001)

The ban on hearsay does not cover independently relevant statements, which consist of statements that are
independently relevant of the truth asserted therein. They belong to two classes: 1. Those statements which are the
very facts in issue, 2. Those statements which are circumstantial evidence of the facts in issue. The second class
includes the following: Statement of a person showing his state of mind; Statement of a person showing his physical
condition; Statement of a person to infer a state of mind of another person; Statements which may identify the date,
place and person in question; Statements to show a lack of credibility of a witness.
People vs. Laquinon, 135 SCRA 91 (1985)

The declaration of the deceased is not admissible as an ante-mortem declaration since the deceased was in doubt
as to whether he would die or not. The declaration fails to show that the deceased believed himself in extremist, at
the point of death when every hope of recovery is extinct, which is the sole basis for admitting this kind of
declarations as an exception to the hearsay rule. It may be admitted, however, as part of the res gestae since the
statement was made immediately after the incident and the deceased had no sufficient time to concoct a charge
against the accused.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ANECITO ESTIBAL Y CALUNGSAG G.R. No. 208749, November 26, 2014

Res gestae means the things done. It refers to those exclamations and statements made by either the participants,
victims, or spectators to a crime immediately before, during, or immediately after the commission of the crime, when
the circumstances are such that the statements were made as a spontaneous reaction or utterance inspired by the
excitement of the occasion and there was no opportunity for the declarant to deliberate and to fabricate a false
statement. There are then three essential requisites to admit evidence as part of the res gestae, namely: (1) that
the principal act, the res gestae, be a startling occurrence; (2) the statements were made before the declarant had
the time to contrive or devise a falsehood; and (3) that the statements must concern the occurrence in question and
its immediate attending circumstances.

Tison vs. Court of Appeals, 276 SCRA 582 (1997)

Where a party claims a right to the part of the estate of the declarant, the declaration of the latter that the former is
her niece is admissible and constitutes sufficient proof of such relationship, notwithstanding the fact that there was
no other preliminary evidence thereof, the reason that such declaration is rendered competent by virtue of the
necessity of receiving such evidence to avoid a failure of justice.

Fuentes vs. CA, 253 SCRA 430 (1996)

To admit declarations against interest as exceptions to the hearsay rule: (a) the declarant must not be able to testify
due to death, mental incapacity or physical incompetence rather than mere absence from the courts;; (b) the
declaration must concern a matter of fact cognizable by the declarant;; (c) the circumstances render it improbable
that a motive to falsify exists.

People vs. Cabuang, 217 SCRA 675 (1993)

Entries in a police blotter, though regularly done in the course of performance of official duty, are not
conclusive proof of the truth of such entries. They are only prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated
since they would be incomplete or inaccurate.

THERESITA, JUAN, ASUNCION, PATROCINIA, RICARDO, and GLORIA, ALL SURNAMED DIMAGUILA v. JOSE
AND SONIA A. MONTEIRO. G.R. NO. 201011, January 27, 2014

As to the hearsay rule, Section 44 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court similarly provides that entries in official records
are an exception to the rule. The rule provides that entries in official records made in the performance of the duty of
a public officer of the Philippines, or by a person in the performance of a duty specially enjoined by law, are prima
facie evidence of the facts therein stated. The documents trustworthiness consists in the presumption of regularity
of performance of official duty. Cadastral maps are the output of cadastral surveys. The DENR is the department
tasked to execute, supervise and manage the conduct of cadastral surveys. As such, they are exceptions to the
hearsay rule and are prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein.

People v. Lee, 382 SCRA 596

The rule is that the character or reputation of a party is regarded as legally irrelevant in determining a controversy,
so that evidence relating thereto is not admissible. Ordinarily, if the issues in the case were allowed to be influenced
by evidence of the character or reputation of the parties, the trial would be apt to have the aspects of a popularity
contest rather than a factual inquiry into the merits of the case.

Interpacific Transit vs. Aviles, 186 SCRA 385 (1990)

Objection to documentary evidence must be made at the time it was formally offered, and not when the particular
document is marked is identified and marked as an exhibit.

Vda. de Onate vs. Court of Appeals, 250 SCRA 283 (1995)

Evidence not formally offered may be admitted and considered by the trial court provided the following requirements
are present, first, the same must have been duly identified by testimony duly recorded and, second, the same must
have been incorporated in the records of the case.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. EDWIN IBANEZ Y ALBANTE, ET AL. G.R. No. 197813, September 25, 2013

The Rule on Examination of a Child Witness specifies that every child is presumed qualified to be a witness. To
rebut this presumption, the burden of proof lies on the party challenging the childs competence. Petitioners flimsy
objections on Rachels lack of education and inability to read and tell time carry no weight and cannot overcome the
clear and convincing testimony of Rachel as to who killed her father.

On the other hand, Section 36 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court explicitly provided that a witness can testify only to
those facts which he knows of his personal knowledge; that is, which are derived from his own perception, except as
otherwise provided in these rules. Anicetas testimony is mainly hearsay, especially on the purported fight between
Wilfredo and Jesus that ended in Wilfredos death. Anicetas testimony as such carries no probative weight. At best,
Anicetas testimony is an independent relevant statement: offered only as to the fact of its declaration and the
substance of what had been relayed to Aniceta by Marilou, not as to the truth thereof.

EAGLERIDGE DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, MARCELO N. NAVAL and CRISPIN I. OBEN v. CAMERON

GRANVILLE 3 ASSET MANAGEMENT, INC. G.R. No. 204700, April 10, 2013.
Under Section 17, Rule 132 of the 1997 Rules of Court, when part of a writing or record is given in evidence by one
party, the whole of the same subject may be inquired into by the other, and when a detached writing or record is
given in evidence, any other writing or record necessary to its understanding may also be given in evidence.

FEDERICO SABAY vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES G.R. No. 192150, October 01, 2014

Section 34 of Rule 132 of our Rules on Evidence provides that the court cannot consider any evidence that has not
been formally offered. This rule, however, admits of an exception. The Court, in the appropriate cases, has relaxed
the formal-offer rule and allowed evidence not formally offered to be admitted. Jurisprudence enumerated the
requirements so that evidence, not previously offered, can be admitted, namely: first, the evidence must have been
duly identified by testimony duly recorded and, second, the evidence must have been incorporated in the records of
the case. In the present case, we find that the requisites for the relaxation of the formal-offer rule are present. As it is
correctly observed, Godofredo identified the Certification to File an Action during his cross-examination. Although the
Certification was not formally offered in evidence, it was marked as Exhibit 1 and attached to the records of the
case.