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RepublicofthePhilippines
SUPREMECOURT
Manila

THIRDDIVISION

G.R.No.192531November12,2014

BERNARDINAP.BARTOLOME,Petitioner,
vs.
SOCIALSECURITYSYSTEMandSCANMARMARITIMESERVICES,INC.,Respondents.

DECISION

VELASCO,JR.,J.:

NatureoftheCase

This Appeal, filed under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court, seeks to annul the March 17, 2010 Decision1 of the
Employees Compensation Commission (ECC) in ECC Case No. SL18483021810, entitled Bernardina P.
Bartolome v. Social Security System (SSS) [Scanmar Maritime Services, Inc.}, declaring that petitioner is not a
beneficiary of the deceased employee under Presidential Decree No. (PD) 442, otherwise known as the Labor
CodeofthePhilippines,asamendedbyPD626.2

TheFacts

JohnColcol(John),bornonJune9,1983,wasemployedaselectricianbyScanmarMaritimeServices,Inc.,on
board the vessel Maersk Danville, since February 2008. As such, he was enrolled under the government's
Employees'CompensationProgram(ECP).3Unfortunately,onJune2,2008,anaccidentoccurredonboardthe
vesselwherebysteelplatesfellonJohn,whichledtohisuntimelydeaththefollowingday.4

John was, at the time of his death, childless and unmarried. Thus, petitioner Bernardina P. Bartolome, Johns
biologicalmotherand,allegedly,soleremainingbeneficiary,filedaclaimfordeathbenefitsunderPD626withthe
SocialSecuritySystem(SSS)atSanFernandoCity,LaUnion.However,theSSSLaUnionoffice,inaletterdated
June10,20095addressedtopetitioner,deniedtheclaim,stating:

Weregrettoinformyouthatwecannotgiveduecoursetoyourclaimbecauseyouarenolongerconsideredas
the parent of JOHN COLCOL as he was legally adopted by CORNELIO COLCOL based on documents you
submittedtous.

The denial was appealed tothe Employees Compensation Commission (ECC), which affirmed the ruling of the
SSSLaUnionBranchthroughtheassailedDecision,thedispositiveportionofwhichreads:

WHEREFORE,theappealeddecisionisAFFIRMEDandtheclaimisherebydismissedforlackofmerit.

SOORDERED.6

In denying the claim, both the SSS La Union branch and the ECC ruled against petitioners entitlement to the
death benefits sought after under PD 626 on the ground she can no longer be considered Johns primary
beneficiary. As culled from the records, John and his sister Elizabeth were adopted by their great grandfather,
petitioners grandfather, Cornelio Colcol (Cornelio), by virtue of the Decision7inSpec.Proc.No.8220XIIofthe
Regional Trial Court in Laoag City dated February 4, 1985, which decree of adoption attained finality.8
Consequently,asarguedbytheagencies,itisCorneliowhoqualifiesasJohnsprimarybeneficiary,notpetitioner.
Neither, the ECC reasoned, would petitioner qualify as Johns secondary beneficiary even if it wereproven that
Corneliohasalreadypassedaway.AstheECCratiocinated:

UnderArticle167(j)ofP.D.626,asamended,provides(sic)thatbeneficiariesarethe"dependentspouseuntilhe
remarriesanddependentchildren,whoaretheprimarybeneficiaries.Intheirabsence,thedependentparentsand
subject to the restrictions imposed on dependent children, the illegitimate children and legitimate descendants
who are the secondary beneficiaries Provided that the dependent acknowledged natural child shall be
consideredasaprimarybeneficiarywhentherearenootherdependentchildrenwhoarequalifiedandeligiblefor
monthlyincomebenefit."

Thedependentparentreferredtobytheaboveprovisionrelatestothelegitimateparentofthecoveredmember,
as provided for by Rule XV, Section 1 (c) (1) of the Amended Rules on Employees Compensation. This
Commissionbelievesthattheappellantisnotconsideredalegitimateparentofthedeceased,havinggivenupthe
latter for adoption to Mr. Cornelio C. Colcol. Thus, in effect, the adoption divested her of the statusas the
legitimateparentofthedeceased.

xxxx

Ineffect,therightswhichpreviouslybelong[sic]tothebiologicalparentoftheadoptedchildshallnowbeupon
theadoptingparent.Hence,inthiscase,thelegalparentreferredtobyP.D.626,asamended,asthebeneficiary,
who has the right to file the claim, is the adoptive father of the deceased and not herein appellant.9 (Emphasis
supplied)

Aggrieved, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was likewise denied by the ECC.10 Hence, the
instantpetition.

TheIssues

Petitionerraisesthefollowingissuesinthepetition:

ASSIGNMENTOFERRORS

I.TheHonorableECCsDecisioniscontrarytoevidenceonrecord.

II.TheHonorableECCcommittedgraveabuseindenyingthejust,dueandlawfulclaimsofthepetitioner
asalawfulbeneficiaryofherdeceasedbiologicalson.

III.TheHonorableECCcommittedgraveabuseofdiscretioninnotgivingduecourse/denyingpetitioners
otherwisemeritoriousmotionforreconsideration.11

In resolving the case, the pivotal issue is this: Are the biological parents of the covered, but legally adopted,
employee considered secondary beneficiaries and, thus, entitled, in appropriate cases, to receive the benefits
undertheECP?

TheCourt'sRuling

Thepetitionismeritorious.

TheECCsfactualfindingsarenotconsistentwiththeevidenceonrecord

Torecall,oneoftheprimaryreasonswhytheECCdeniedpetitionersclaimfordeathbenefitsisthateventhough
sheisJohnsbiologicalmother,itwasallegedlynotproventhathisadoptiveparent,Cornelio,wasnolongeralive.
AsintimatedbytheECC:

Moreover, there had been no allegation in the records as to whether the legally adoptive parent, Mr. Colcol, is
dead,whichwouldimmediatelyqualifytheappellant[petitioner]forSocialSecuritybenefits.Hence,absentsuch
proofofdeathoftheadoptivefather,thisCommissionwillpresumehimtobealiveandwell,andassuch,isthe
oneentitledtoclaimthebenefitbeingtheprimarybeneficiaryofthedeaceased.Thus,assumingthatappellantis
indeedaqualifiedbeneficiaryundertheSocialSecuritylaw,inviewofherstatusasotherbeneficiary,shecannot
claimthebenefitlegallyprovidedbylawtotheprimarybeneficiary,inthiscasetheadoptivefathersinceheisstill
alive.

WedisagreewiththefactualfindingoftheECConthispoint.

Generally, findings of fact by administrative agencies are generally accorded great respect, if not finality, by the
courtsbyreasonofthespecialknowledgeandexpertiseofsaidadministrativeagenciesovermattersfallingunder
theirjurisdiction.12However,intheextantcase,theECChadoverlookedacrucialpieceofevidenceofferedbythe
petitionerCorneliosdeathcertificate.13

BasedonCorneliosdeathcertificate,itappearsthatJohnsadoptivefatherdiedonOctober26,1987,14oronly
lessthanthree(3)yearssincethedecreeofadoptiononFebruary4,1985,whichattainedfinality.15 As such, it
was error for the ECC to have ruled that it was not duly proven that the adoptive parent, Cornelio, has already
passedaway.

Therulelimitingdeathbenefitsclaimstothelegitimateparentsiscontrarytolaw
ThisbringsustothequestionofwhetherornotpetitionerisentitledtothedeathbenefitsclaiminviewofJohns
workrelated demise. The pertinent provision, in this regard, is Article 167 (j) of the Labor Code, as amended,
whichreads:

ART.167.Definitionofterms.AsusedinthisTitleunlessthecontextindicatesotherwise:

xxxx

(j)'Beneficiaries'meansthedependentspouseuntilheremarriesanddependentchildren,whoaretheprimary
beneficiaries. In their absence, the dependent parents and subject to the restrictions imposed on dependent
children,theillegitimatechildrenandlegitimatedescendantswhoarethesecondarybeneficiariesProvided,that
thedependentacknowledgednaturalchildshallbeconsideredasaprimarybeneficiarywhentherearenoother
dependentchildrenwhoarequalifiedandeligibleformonthlyincomebenefit.(Emphasissupplied)

Concurrently,pursuanttothesucceedingArticle177(c)supervisingtheECC"[T]oapproverulesandregulations
governingtheprocessingofclaimsandthesettlementofdisputesarisingtherefromasprescribedbytheSystem,"
theECChasissuedtheAmendedRulesonEmployeesCompensation,interpretingtheabovecitedprovisionas
follows:

RULEXVBENEFICIARIES

SECTION1.Definition.(a)Beneficiariesshallbeeitherprimaryorsecondary,anddeterminedatthe
timeofemployeesdeath.

(b)Thefollowingbeneficiariesshallbeconsideredprimary:

(1)Thelegitimatespouselivingwiththeemployeeatthetimeoftheemployeesdeath
untilheremarriesand

(2) Legitimate, legitimated, legally adopted or acknowledged natural children, who are
unmarried not gainfully employed, not over 21 years of age, or over 21 years of age
providedthatheisincapacitatedandincapableofselfsupportduetophysicalormental
defect which is congenital or acquired during minority Provided, further, that a
dependentacknowledgednaturalchildshallbeconsideredasaprimarybeneficiaryonly
when there are no other dependent children who are qualified and eligible for monthly
income benefit provided finally, that if there are two or more acknowledged natural
children, they shall be counted from the youngest and without substitution, but not
exceedingfive.

(c)Thefollowingbeneficiariesshallbeconsideredsecondary:

(1)Thelegitimateparentswhollydependentupontheemployeeforregularsupport

(2)Thelegitimatedescendantsandillegitimatechildrenwhoareunmarried,notgainfully
employed, and not over 21 years of age, or over 21 years of age providedthat he is
incapacitated and incapable of self support dueto physical or mental defect which is
congenitaloracquiredduringminority.(Emphasissupplied)

Guilty of reiteration, the ECC denied petitioners claim on the ground that she is no longer the deceaseds
legitimate parent, as required by the implementing rules. As held by the ECC, the adoption decree severed the
relation between John and petitioner, effectively divesting her of the status of a legitimate parent, and,
consequently,thatofbeingasecondarybeneficiary.

Wedisagree.

a.RuleXV,Sec.1(c)(1)oftheAmendedRulesonEmployeesCompensationdeviatesfromtheclearlanguageof
Art.167(j)oftheLaborCode,asamended

ExaminingtheAmendedRulesonEmployeesCompensationinlightoftheLaborCode,asamended,itisatonce
apparentthattheECCindulgedinanunauthorizedadministrativelegislation.Inneteffect,theECCreadintoArt.
167oftheCodeaninterpretationnotcontemplatedbytheprovision.PertinentinelucidatingonthispointisArticle
7oftheCivilCodeofthePhilippines,whichreads:

Article7.Lawsarerepealedonlybysubsequentones,andtheirviolationornonobservanceshallnotbeexcused
bydisuse,orcustomorpracticetothecontrary.

When the courts declared a law to be inconsistent with the Constitution, the former shall be void and the latter
shallgovern.
Administrativeorexecutiveacts,ordersandregulationsshallbevalidonlywhentheyarenotcontrarytothelaws
ortheConstitution.(Emphasissupplied)

Asapplied,thisCourtheldinCommissionerofInternalRevenuev.FortuneTobaccoCorporation16that:

As we have previously declared, rulemaking power must be confined to details for regulating the mode or
proceedingsinordertocarryintoeffectthelawasithasbeenenacted,anditcannotbeextendedtoamendor
expandthestatutoryrequirementsortoembracemattersnotcoveredbythestatute.Administrativeregulations
mustalwaysbeinharmonywiththeprovisionsofthelawbecauseanyresultingdiscrepancybetweenthetwowill
alwaysberesolvedinfavorofthebasiclaw.(Emphasissupplied)

Guidedbythisdoctrine,WefindthatRuleXVoftheAmendedRulesonEmployeesCompensationispatentlya
waywardrestrictionofandasubstantialdeviationfromArticle167(j)oftheLaborCodewhenitinterpretedthe
phrase"dependentparents"toreferto"legitimateparents."

ItbearsstressingthatasimilarissueinstatutoryconstructionwasresolvedbythisCourtinDiazv.Intermediate
AppellateCourt17inthiswise:

ItisOursharedviewthattheword"relatives"shouldbeconstruedinitsgeneralacceptation.AmicuscuriaeProf.
RubenBalanehasthistosay:

Thetermrelatives,althoughusedmanytimesintheCode,isnotdefinedbyit.Inaccordancethereforewiththe
canonsofstatutoryinterpretation,itshouldbeunderstoodtohaveageneralandinclusivescope,inasmuchasthe
term is a general one. Generalia verba sunt generaliter intelligenda. That the law does not make a distinction
preventsusfrommakingone:Ubilexnondistinguit,necnosdistingueradebemus.xxx

AccordingtoProf.Balane,tointerpretthetermrelativesinArticle992inamorerestrictivesensethanitisused
andintendedisnotwarrantedbyanyruleofinterpretation.Besides,hefurtherstatesthatwhenthelawintendsto
usetheterminamorerestrictivesense,itqualifiesthetermwiththewordcollateral,asinArticles1003and1009
oftheNewCivilCode.

Thus,theword"relatives"isageneraltermandwhenusedinastatuteitembracesnotonlycollateralrelatives
butalsoallthekindredofthepersonspokenof,unlessthecontextindicatesthatitwasusedinamorerestrictive
orlimitedsensewhichasalreadydiscussedearlier,isnotsointhecaseatbar.(Emphasissupplied)

Inthesamevein,theterm"parents"inthephrase"dependentparents"intheaforequotedArticle167(j)ofthe
LaborCodeisusedandoughttobetakeninitsgeneralsenseandcannotbeundulylimitedto"legitimateparents"
aswhattheECCdid.Thephrase"dependentparents"should,therefore,includeallparents,whetherlegitimateor
illegitimateandwhetherbynatureorbyadoption.Whenthelawdoesnotdistinguish,oneshouldnotdistinguish.
Plainly, "dependent parents" are parents, whether legitimate or illegitimate, biological or by adoption,who are in
needofsupportorassistance.

Moreover, the same Article 167 (j),as couched, clearly shows that Congress did not intend to limit the phrase
"dependentparents"tosolelylegitimateparents.Attheriskofbeingrepetitive,Article167providesthat"intheir
absence, the dependent parents and subject to the restrictions imposed on dependent children, the illegitimate
children and legitimate descendants who are secondary beneficiaries." Had the lawmakers contemplated
"dependentparents"tomeanlegitimateparents,thenitwouldhavesimplysaiddescendantsandnot"legitimate
descendants." The manner by which the provision in question was crafted undeniably show that the phrase
"dependentparents"wasintendedtocoverallparentslegitimate,illegitimateorparentsbynatureoradoption.

b.RuleXV,Section1(c)(1)oftheAmendedRulesonEmployeesCompensationisincontraventionoftheequal
protectionclause

ToinsistthattheECCvalidlyinterpretedtheLaborCodeprovisionisanaffronttotheConstitutionalguaranteeof
equalprotectionunderthelawsfortherule,asworded,preventstheparentsofanillegitimatechildfromclaiming
benefitsunderArt.167(j)oftheLaborCode,asamendedbyPD626.ToOurmind,suchpostulationcannotbe
countenanced.

Asjurisprudenceelucidates,equalprotectionsimplyrequiresthatallpersonsorthingssimilarlysituatedshouldbe
treatedalike,bothastorightsconferredandresponsibilitiesimposed.Itrequirespublicbodiesandinstitutionsto
treatsimilarlysituatedindividualsinasimilarmanner.18Inotherwords,theconceptofequaljusticeunderthelaw
requiresthestatetogovernimpartially,anditmaynotdrawdistinctionsbetweenindividualssolelyondifferences
thatareirrelevanttoalegitimategovernmentalobjective.19

Theconceptofequalprotection,however,doesnotrequiretheuniversalapplicationofthelawstoallpersonsor
things without distinction. What it simply requires isequality among equals as determined according to a valid
classification.Indeed,theequalprotectionclausepermitsclassification.Suchclassification,however,tobevalid
must pass the test of reasonableness. The test has four requisites: (1) The classification rests on substantial
distinctions(2)Itisgermanetothepurposeofthelaw(3)Itisnotlimitedtoexistingconditionsonlyand(4)It
appliesequallytoallmembersofthesameclass."Superficialdifferencesdonotmakeforavalidclassification."20

In the instant case, there is no compelling reasonable basis to discriminate against illegitimate parents. Simply
put, the abovecited rule promulgated by the ECC that limits the claim of benefits to the legitimate parents
miserablyfailedthetestofreasonablenesssincetheclassificationisnotgermanetothelawbeingimplemented.
Weseenopressinggovernmentconcernorinterestthatrequiresprotectionsoastowarrantbalancingtherights
ofunmarriedparentsononehandandtherationalebehindthelawontheother.Onthecontrary,theSSScan
betterfulfillitsmandate,andthepolicyofPD626thatemployeesandtheirdependentsmaypromptlysecure
adequatebenefitsintheeventofworkconnecteddisabilityordeathwillbebetterservedifArticle167(j)ofthe
LaborCodeisnotsonarrowlyinterpreted.

There being no justification for limiting secondary parent beneficiaries to the legitimate ones, there can be no
othercourseofactiontotakeotherthantostrikedownasunconstitutionalthephrase"illegitimate"asappearingin
RuleXV,Section1(c)(1)oftheAmendedRulesonEmployeesCompensation.

PetitionerqualifiesasJohnsdependentparent

Inattemptingtocuretheglaringconstitutionalviolationoftheadvertedrule,theECCextendedillegitimateparents
anopportunitytofileclaimsforandreceivedeathbenefitsbyequatingdependencyandlegitimacytotheexercise
ofparentalauthority.Thus,asinsinuatedbytheECCinitsassailedDecision,hadpetitionernotgivenupJohnfor
adoption,shecouldhavestillclaimeddeathbenefitsunderthelaw.

To begin with, nowhere in the law nor in the rules does it say that "legitimate parents" pertain to those who
exerciseparentalauthorityovertheemployeeenrolledundertheECP.ItwasonlyintheassailedDecisionwherein
such qualification was made. In addition, assuming arguendothat the ECC did not overstep its boundaries in
limitingtheadvertedLaborCodeprovisiontothedeceasedslegitimateparents,andthatthecommissionproperly
equatedlegitimacytoparentalauthority,petitionercanstillqualifyasJohnssecondarybeneficiary.

True,whenCornelio,in1985,adoptedJohn,thenabouttwo(2)yearsold,petitionersparentalauthorityoverJohn
was severed. However, lest it be overlooked, one key detail the ECC missed, aside from Cornelios death, was
thatwhentheadoptiveparentdiedlessthanthree(3)yearsaftertheadoptiondecree,Johnwasstillaminor,at
aboutfour(4)yearsofage.

Johns minority at the time of his adopters death is a significant factor in the case at bar. Under such
circumstance,parentalauthorityshouldbedeemedtohaverevertedinfavorofthebiologicalparents.Otherwise,
takingintoaccountOurconsistentrulingthatadoptionisapersonalrelationshipandthattherearenocollateral
relativesbyvirtueofadoption,21whowasthenlefttocarefortheminoradoptedchildiftheadopterpassedaway?

To be sure, reversion of parental authority and legal custody in favor of the biological parents is not a novel
concept. Section 20 of Republic Act No. 855222 (RA 8552), otherwise known as the Domestic Adoption Act,
provides:

Section20.EffectsofRescission.Ifthepetition[forrescissionofadoption]isgranted,theparentalauthorityof
the adoptee's biological parent(s), if known, or the legal custody of the Department shall be restored if the
adopteeisstillaminororincapacitated.Thereciprocalrightsandobligationsoftheadopter(s)andtheadopteeto
eachothershallbeextinguished.(emphasisadded)

Theprovisionadvertedtoisapplicablehereinbyanalogyinsofarastherestorationofcustodyisconcerned. The 1 w p h i1

manner herein of terminating the adopters parental authority, unlike the grounds for rescission,23 justifies the
retentionofvestedrightsandobligationsbetweentheadopterandtheadoptee,whiletheconsequentrestoration
of parental authority in favor of the biological parents, simultaneously, ensures that the adoptee, who is still a
minor,isnotlefttofendforhimselfatsuchatenderage.

To emphasize, We can only apply the rule by analogy, especially since RA 8552 was enacted after Cornelios
death.Truthbetold,thereisalacunainthelawastowhichprovisionshallgoverncontingenciesinallfourswith
thefactualmilieuoftheinstantpetition.Nevertheless,Weareguidedbythecatenaofcasesandthestatepolicies
behindRA855224whereintheparamountconsiderationisthebestinterestofthechild,whichWeinvoketojustify
this disposition. It is, after all, for the best interest of the child that someone will remain charged for his welfare
andupbringingshouldhisorheradopterfailorisrenderedincapacitatedtoperformhisdutiesasaparentata
timetheadopteeisstillinhisformativeyears,and,toOurmind,intheabsenceor,asinthiscase,deathofthe
adopter, no one else could reasonably be expected to perform the role of a parent other than the adoptees
biologicalone.

Moreover,thisrulingfindssupportonthefactthateventhoughparentalauthorityisseveredbyvirtueofadoption,
thetiesbetweentheadopteeandthebiologicalparentsarenotentirelyeliminated.Todemonstrate,thebiological
parents,insomeinstances,areabletoinheritfromtheadopted,ascanbegleanedfromArt.190oftheFamily
Code:

Art.190.Legalorintestatesuccessiontotheestateoftheadoptedshallbegovernedbythefollowingrules:

xxx

(2) When the parents, legitimate or illegitimate, or the legitimate ascendants of the adopted concur withthe
adopter, they shall divide the entire estate, onehalf tobe inherited by the parents or ascendants and the other
half,bytheadopters

xxx

(6) When only collateral blood relatives of the adopted survive, then the ordinary rules of legal or intestate
successionshallapply.

Similarly, at the time of Cornelio Colcols death, which was prior to the effectivity of the Family Code, the
governingprovisionisArt.984oftheNewCivilCode,whichprovides:

Art.984.Incaseofthedeathofanadoptedchild,leavingnochildrenordescendants,hisparentsandrelativesby
consanguinityandnotbyadoption,shallbehislegalheirs.

Fromtheforegoing,itisapparentthatthebiologicalparentsretaintheirrightsofsuccessiontotheestateoftheir
childwhowasthesubjectofadoption.WhilethebenefitsarisingfromthedeathofanSSScoveredemployeedo
not form part of the estateof the adopted child, the pertinent provision on legal or intestate succession at least
reveals the policy on the rights of the biological parents and those by adoption visvis the right to receive
benefits from the adopted. In the same way that certain rights still attach by virtue of the blood relation, so too
shouldcertainobligations,which,Werule,includetheexerciseofparentalauthority,intheeventoftheuntimely
passingoftheirminoroffspringsadoptiveparent.Wecannotleaveundeterminedthefateofaminorchildwhose
second chance ata better life under the care of the adoptive parents was snatched from him by deaths cruel
grasp.Otherwise,theadoptedchildsqualityoflifemighthavebeenbetteroffnotbeingadoptedatallifhewould
onlyfindhimselforphanedintheend.Thus,WeholdthatCorneliosdeathatthetimeofJohnsminorityresulted
intherestorationofpetitionersparentalauthorityovertheadoptedchild.

On top of this restoration of parental authority, the fact of petitioners dependence on John can be established
from the documentary evidence submitted to the ECC. As it appears in the records, petitioner, prior to Johns
adoption,wasahousekeeper.Herlatehusbanddiedin1984,leavinghertocarefortheirseven(7)children.But
since she was unable to "give a bright future to her growing children" as a housekeeper, she consented to
CorneliosadoptionofJohnandElizabethin1985.

Following Cornelios death in 1987, so records reveal, both petitioner and John repeatedly reported "Brgy.
Capurictan, Solsona, Ilocos Norte" as their residence. In fact, this veryaddress was used in Johns Death
Certificate25executedinBrazil,andintheReportofPersonalInjuryorLossofLifeaccomplishedbythemasterof
the vessel boarded by John.26 Likewise, this is Johns known address as per the ECCs assailed Decision.27
Similarly, this same address was used by petitioner in filing her claim before the SSS La Union branch and,
thereafter,inherappealwiththeECC.Hence,itcanbeassumedthatasidefromhavingbeenrestoredparental
authorityoverJohn,petitionerindeedactuallyexecisedthesame,andthattheylivedtogetherunderoneroof.

Moreover,John,inhisSSSapplication,28namedpetitionerasoneofhisbeneficiariesforhisbenefitsunderRA
8282, otherwise known as the "Social Security Law." While RA 8282 does not cover compensation for work
relateddeathsorinjuryandexpresslyallowsthedesignationofbeneficiarieswhoarenotrelatedbybloodtothe
memberunlikeinPD626,Johnsdeliberateactofindicatingpetitionerashisbeneficiaryatleastevincesthathe,
in a way, considered petitioner as his dependent. Consequently, the confluence of circumstances from
Cornelios death during Johns minority, the restoration ofpetitioners parental authority, the documents showing
singularity of address, and Johns clear intention to designate petitioner as a beneficiary effectively made
petitioner,toOurmind,entitledtodeathbenefitclaimsasasecondarybeneficiaryunderPD626asadependent
parent.

All told, the Decision of the ECC dated March 17, 2010 is bereft of legal basis. Cornelios adoption of John,
without more, does not deprive petitioner of the right to receive the benefits stemming from Johns death as a
dependentparentgivenCorneliosuntimelydemiseduringJohnsminority.Sincetheparentbyadoptionalready
died, then the death benefits under the Employees' Compensation Program shall accrue solely to herein
petitioner,John'ssoleremainingbeneficiary.

WHEREFORE,thepetitionisherebyGRANTED.TheMarch17,2010DecisionoftheEmployees'Compensation
Commission,inECCCaseNo.SL18483021810,isREVERSEDandSETASIDE.TheECCisherebydirectedto
releasethebenefitsduetoasecondarybeneficiaryofthedeceasedcoveredemployeeJohnColcoltopetitioner
BernardinaP.Bartolome.

Nocosts.

SOORDERED.

PRESBITEROJ.VELASCO,JR.
AssociateJustice

MARTINS.VILLARAMA,JR.
AssociateJustice

BIENVENIDOL.REYES ESTELAM.PERLASBERNABE*
AssociateJustice AssociateJustice

FRANCISF.JARDELEZA
AssociateJustice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was
assignedtothewriteroftheopinionoftheCourt'sDivision.

PRESBITEROJ.VELASCO,JR.
AssociateJustice
Chairperson

CERTIFICATION

PursuanttoSection13,ArticleVIIIoftheConstitutionandtheDivisionChairperson'sAttestation,Icertifythatthe
conclusionsintheaboveDecisionhadbeenreachedinconsultationbeforethecasewasassignedtothewriterof
theopinionoftheCourt'sDivision.

ANTONIOT.CARPIO
ActingChiefJustice

Footnotes
*
ActingMemberperSpecialOrderNo.1866datedNovember4,2014.
1
Rollo,pp.5964.
2
FurtheramendingcertainarticlesofPresidentialDecreeNo.442entitled"LaborCodeofthePhilippines"
3
Rollo,p.59.
4
Id.at60.
5
Id.at53.
6
Id.at64.
7
Id.at31.
8
Id.at34.
9
Id.at6264.
10
Id.at73.
11
Id.at1516.
12
Hipolito,Jr.vs.Cinco,G.R.No.174143,November28,2011,661SCRA211,326327.
13
Rollo,p.74.
 14
Id.at37.
15
Id.at34.
16
G.R.Nos.16727475,July21,2008,559SCRA160,179.
17
G.R.No.L66574,February21,1990,182SCRA427,435.
18
Biraogov.ThePhilippineTruthCommissionof2010,G.R.Nos.192935and193036,December7,2010,
637SCRA78,167.
19
Id.
20
Id.at168.
21
Johnstonvs.Republic,No.L18284,April30,1963,7SCRA1040,1042.
22
An act establishing the rules and policies on the domestic adoption of Filipino children and for other
purposes
23
Sec.19,RA8552
24
Section2.DeclarationofPolicies.(a)ItisherebydeclaredthepolicyoftheStatetoensurethatevery
child remains under the care and custody of his/her parent(s) and be provided with love, care,
understandingandsecuritytowardsthefullandharmoniousdevelopmentofhis/herpersonality.Onlywhen
sucheffortsproveinsufficientandnoappropriateplacementoradoptionwithinthechild'sextendedfamily
isavailableshalladoptionbyanunrelatedpersonbeconsidered.

(b) In all matters relating to the care, custody and adoption of a child, his/her interest shall be the
paramount consideration in accordance with the tenets set forth in the United Nations (UN)
ConventionontheRightsoftheChildUNDeclarationonSocialandLegalPrinciplesRelatingtothe
Protection and Welfare of Children with Special Reference to Foster Placement and Adoption,
Nationally and Internationally and the Hague Convention on the Protection of Children and
CooperationinRespectofIntercountryAdoption.Towardthisend,theStateshallprovidealternative
protectionandassistancethroughfostercareoradoptionforeverychildwhoisneglected,orphaned,
orabandoned.

(c)ItshallalsobeaStatepolicyto:

xxx

(ii)Preventthechildfromunnecessaryseparationfromhis/herbiologicalparent(s)
25
Rollo,p.41.
26
Idat44.
27
Idat59.
28
Idat40.

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