ENBANC

ELENAP.DYCAICO,G.R.No.161357
Petitioner,
Present:

DAVIDE,JR.,C.J.,
PUNO,
PANGANIBAN,
QUISUMBING,
YNARESSANTIAGO,
SANDOVALGUTIERREZ,
versusCARPIO,
AUSTRIAMARTINEZ,
CORONA,
CARPIOMORALES,
CALLEJO,SR.,
AZCUNA,
TINGA,
SOCIALSECURITYSYSTEMCHICONAZARIOand
andSOCIALSECURITYGARCIA,JJ.
COMMISSION,
Respondents.Promulgated:

November30,2005
xx

DECISION


CALLEJO,SR.,J.:

Before the Court is the petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court filed by Elena P.
[1]
DycaicowhichseekstoreverseandsetasidetheDecision datedApril15,2003oftheCourtof
Appeals(CA)inCAG.R.SP

No. 69632. The assailed decision affirmed the Resolution dated February 6, 2002 of the Social
SecurityCommission(SSC),denyingthepetitionersclaimforsurvivorspensionaccruingfromthe

death of her husband Bonifacio S. Dycaico, a Social Security System (SSS) memberpensioner.
LikewisesoughttobereversedandsetasideistheappellatecourtsResolutiondatedDecember15,
2003,denyingthepetitionersmotionforreconsideration.

Thecasearosefromthefollowingundisputedfacts:

BonifacioS.DycaicobecameamemberoftheSSSonJanuary24,1980.Inhisselfemployeddata
record(SSSFormRS1),henamedthepetitioner,ElenaP.Dycaico,andtheireightchildrenashis
beneficiaries. At that time, Bonifacio and Elena lived together as husband and wife without the
benefitofmarriage.

InJune1989,Bonifaciowasconsideredretiredandbeganreceivinghismonthlypensionfromthe
SSS.HecontinuedtoreceivethemonthlypensionuntilhepassedawayonJune 19, 1997. A few
monthspriortohisdeath,however,BonifaciomarriedthepetitioneronJanuary6,1997.

ShortlyafterBonifaciosdeath,thepetitionerfiledwiththeSSSanapplicationforsurvivors
pension.Herapplication,however,wasdeniedonthegroundthatunderSection12B(d)ofRepublic
[2]
Act (Rep. Act) No. 8282 or the Social Security Law she could not be considered a primary
beneficiaryofBonifacioasofthedateofhisretirement.Thesaidprovisoreads:
Sec.12B.RetirementBenefits.


(d) Upon the death of the retired member, his primary beneficiaries as of the date of his
retirementshallbeentitledtoreceivethemonthlypension.

Applyingthisproviso,thepetitionerwasinformedthatthe

Recordsshowthatthemember[referringtoBonifacio]wasconsideredretiredonJune5,1989
andmonthlypensionwascancelleduponourreceiptofareportonhisdeathonJune19,1997.Inyour
deathclaimapplication,submittedmarriagecontractwiththedeceasedmembershowsthatyouwere
married in 1997 or after his retirement date hence, you could not be considered his primary
beneficiary.

In view of this, we regret that there is no other benefit due you. However, if you do not
conform with us, you may file a formal petition with our Social Security Commission to determine
[3]
yourbenefiteligibility.

OnJuly9,2001,thepetitionerfiledwiththeSSCapetitionallegingthatthedenialofhersurvivors
pensionwasunjustified.ShecontendedthatBonifaciodesignatedherandtheirchildrenasprimary
pensionwasunjustified.ShecontendedthatBonifaciodesignatedherandtheirchildrenasprimary
beneficiariesinhisSSSFormRS1andthatitwasnotindicatedthereinthatonlylegitimatefamily
members could be made beneficiaries. Section 12B(d) of Rep. Act No. 8282 does not, likewise,
require that the primary beneficiaries be legitimate relatives of the member to be entitled to the
survivorspension.TheSSSislegallyboundtorespectBonifaciosdesignationofthemashis
beneficiaries.Further,Rep.ActNo.8282shouldbeinterpretedtopromotesocialjustice.

On February 6, 2002, the SSC promulgated its Resolution affirming the denial of the
petitionersclaim.TheSSCrefutedthepetitionerscontentionthatprimarybeneficiariesneednotbe
legitimate family members by citing the definitions of primary beneficiaries and dependents in
Section8ofRep.ActNo.8282.Underparagraph(k)ofthesaidprovision,primarybeneficiariesare
[t]he dependent spouse until he or she remarries, the dependent legitimate, legitimated or legally
adopted, and illegitimate children Paragraph (e) of the same provision, on the other hand, defines
dependents as the following: (1) [t]he legal spouse entitled by law to receive support from the
member(2)[t]helegitimate,legitimatedorlegallyadopted,andillegitimatechildwhoisunmarried,
notgainfullyemployedandhasnotreachedtwentyone(21)yearsofage,orifovertwentyone(21)
years of age, he is congenitally or while still a minor has been permanently incapacitated and
incapable of selfsupport, physically or mentally and (3) [t]he parent who is receiving regular
support from the member. Based on the foregoing, according to the SSC, it has consistently ruled
thatentitlementtothesurvivorspensioninonescapacityasprimarybeneficiaryispremisedonthe
legitimacyofrelationshipwithanddependencyforsupportuponthedeceasedSSSmemberduring
hislifetime.

Under Section 12B(d) of Rep. Act No. 8282, the primary beneficiaries who are entitled to
survivorspensionarethosewhoqualifyas
suchasofthedateofretirementofthedeceasedmember.Hence,thepetitioner,whowasnotthen

the legitimate spouse of Bonifacio as of the date of his retirement, could not be considered his
primarybeneficiary.TheSSCfurtheropinedthatBonifaciosdesignationofthepetitionerasoneof
hisprimarybeneficiariesinhisSSSFormRS1isvoid,notonlyonmoralconsiderationsbutalsofor
misrepresentation. Accordingly, the petitioner is not entitled to claim the survivors pension under
misrepresentation. Accordingly, the petitioner is not entitled to claim the survivors pension under
Section12B(d)ofRep.ActNo.8282.

Aggrieved,thepetitionerfiledwiththeCAapetitionforreviewoftheSSCsFebruary6,2002
Resolution.IntheassailedDecision,datedApril15,2003,theappellatecourtdismissedthepetition.
Citing the same provisions in Rep. Act No. 8282 as those cited by the SSC, the CA declared that
sincethepetitionerwasmerelythecommonlawwifeofBonifacioatthetimeofhisretirementin
1989,hisdesignationofthepetitionerasoneofhisbeneficiariesintheSSSFormRS1in1980is
void.TheCAfurtherobservedthatBonifacioschildrenwiththepetitionercouldnolongerqualifyas
primary beneficiaries because they have all reached twentyone (21) years of age. The decretal
portionoftheassaileddecisionreads:

WHEREFORE,premisesconsidered,thePetitionisDISMISSEDandtheassailed06February
2002ResolutionofrespondentCommissionisherebyAFFIRMEDintoto.Nocosts.

[4]
SOORDERED.

The petitioner sought reconsideration of the said decision but in the assailed Resolution dated
December 15, 2003, the appellate court denied her motion. Hence, the petitioners recourse to this
Court.

The petitioner points out that the term primary beneficiaries as used in Section 12B(d) of
Rep.ActNo.8282doesnothaveanyqualification.Shethustheorizesthatregardlessofwhetherthe
primarybeneficiarydesignatedbythememberassuchislegitimateornot,heorsheisentitledtothe
survivors pension. Reliance by the appellate court and the SSC on the definitions of primary
beneficiaries and dependents in Section 8 of Rep. Act No. 8282 is allegedly unwarranted because
thesedefinitionscannotmodifySection12B(d)thereof.

The petitioner maintains that when she and Bonifacio got married in January 1997, a few
months before he passed away, they merely intended to legalize their relationship and had no
intentiontocommitanyfraud.Further,sinceRep.ActNo.8282isasociallegislation,itshouldbe
construedliberallyinfavorofclaimantslikethepetitioner.ShecitestheCourtspronouncementthat
thesympathyofthelawonsocialsecurityistowarditsbeneficiaries,andthelaw,byitsownterms,
thesympathyofthelawonsocialsecurityistowarditsbeneficiaries,andthelaw,byitsownterms,
[5]
requiresaconstructionofutmostliberalityintheirfavor.

TheSSS,ontheotherhand,contendsthatSection12B(d)ofRep.ActNo.8282shouldbe
readinconjunctionwiththedefinitionofthetermsdependentsandprimarybeneficiariesinSection
8 thereof. Since the petitioner was not as yet the legal spouse of Bonifacio at the time of his
retirement in 1989, she is not entitled to claim the survivors pension accruing at the time of his
death. The SSS insists that the designation by Bonifacio of the petitioner and their illegitimate
childreninhisSSSFormRS1isvoid.

AccordingtotheSSS,thereisnothinginRep.ActNo.8282whichprovidesthatshouldthere
benoprimaryorsecondarybeneficiaries,thebenefitaccruingfromthedeathofamembershouldgo
to his designated commonlaw spouse and that to rule otherwise would be to condone the
designationofcommonlawspousesasbeneficiaries,aclearcaseofcircumventingtheSSLawand
[6]
aviolationofpublicpolicyandmorals. Finally,theSSSisoftheopinionthatSection12B(d)of
Rep. Act No. 8282 is clear and explicit hence, there is no room for its interpretation, only for
application.

IntheResolutiondatedJuly19,2005,theCourtrequiredtheparties,aswellastheOfficeof
theSolicitorGeneral,tofiletheirrespectivecommentsontheissueofwhetherornottheprovisoas
ofthedateofhisretirementinSection12B(d)ofRep.ActNo.8282violatestheequalprotection
and due process clauses of the Constitution. The Court believes that this issue is intertwined with
andindispensabletotheresolutionofthemeritsofthepetition.

Incompliancetherewith,initscomment,theSSCarguesthattheprovisoasofthedateofhis
retirementinSection12B(d)ofRep.ActNo.8282doesnotrunafouloftheequalprotectionclause
of the Constitution as it merely determines the reckoning date of qualification and entitlement of
beneficiariestothesurvivorshippension.Itassertsthatthisclassificationofbeneficiariesisbasedon
validandsubstantialdistinctionsthataregermanetothelegislativepurposeofRep.ActNo.8282.

 TheSSCalsoimpugnsthemarriageofthepetitionertoBonifacioafterhisretirementstating
thatitwascontractedasanafterthoughttoenablehertoqualifyforthesurvivorshippensionupon
thelattersdeath.Itfurtherallegesthatthereisnoviolationofthedueprocessclauseasthepetitioner
wasgivenherdayincourtandwasabletopresentherside.

The SSS filed its separate comment and therein insists that the petitioner was not the
legitimate spouse of the deceased member at the time when the contingency occurred (his
retirement) and, therefore, she could not be considered a primary beneficiary within the
contemplationofRep.ActNo.8282.TheSSSpositsthatthestatutesintentistogivesurvivorship
pensiononlytoprimarybeneficiariesatthetimeoftheretirementofthedeceasedmember.Rep.Act
No.8282itselfordainsthepersonsentitledtheretoandcannotbesubjectofchangebytheSSS.

TheSolicitorGeneralagreeswiththestancetakenbytheSSSthattheprovisoasofthedateof
hisretirementmerelymarkstheperiodwhentheprimarybeneficiarymustbesotobeentitledtothe
benefits.Itdoesnotviolatetheequalprotectionclausebecausetheclassificationresultingtherefrom
restsonsubstantialdistinctions.Moreover,theconditionastotheperiodforentitlement,i.e.,asof
the date of the members retirement, is relevant as it set the parameters for those availing of the
benefitsanditappliestoallthosesimilarlysituated.TheSolicitorGeneralisalsooftheviewthatthe
saidprovisodoesnotoffendthedueprocessclausebecauseclaimantsaregiventheopportunityto
filetheirclaimsandtoprovetheircasebeforetheCommission.

Forclarity,Section12B(d)ofRep.ActNo.8282isquotedanewbelow:

Sec.12B.RetirementBenefits.


(d) Upon the death of the retired member, his primary beneficiaries as of the date of his
retirementshallbeentitledtoreceivethemonthlypension.

UnderSection8(k)ofthesamelaw,theprimarybeneficiariesare:

1.Thedependentspouseuntilheorsheremarriesand

2.Thedependentlegitimate,legitimatedorlegallyadopted,andillegitimatechildren.

 Further,thedependentspouseanddependentchildrenarequalifiedunderparagraph(e)ofthe
samesectionasfollows:

1.Thelegalspouseentitledbylawtoreceivesupportuntilheorsheremarriesand

2.Thedependentlegitimate,legitimatedorlegallyadopted,andillegitimatechildwhoisunmarried,
notgainfullyemployedandhasnotreachedtwentyone(21)yearsofage,orifovertwentyone
years of age, he is congenitally or while still a minor has been permanently incapacitated and
incapableofselfsupport,physicallyormentally.

TheSSSdeniedthepetitionersapplicationforsurvivorspensiononthesolegroundthatshe
was not the legal spouse of Bonifacio as of the date of his retirement hence, she could not be
consideredashisprimarybeneficiaryunderSection12B(d)ofRep.ActNo.8282.

TheCourtholdsthattheprovisoasofthedateofhisretirementinSection12B(d)ofRep.ActNo.
8282, which qualifies the term primary beneficiaries, is unconstitutional for it violates the due
[7]
processandequalprotectionclausesoftheConstitution.

[8]
In an analogous case, Government Service Insurance System v. Montesclaros, the Court
[9]
invalidated the proviso in Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1146 which stated that the dependent
spouseshallnotbeentitledtosaidpensionifhismarriagewiththepensioneriscontractedwithin
threeyearsbeforethepensionerqualifiedforthepension.Inthesaidcase,theCourtcharacterized
retirementbenefitsaspropertyinterestofthepensioneraswellashisorhersurvivingspouse.The
proviso,whichdeniedadependentspousesclaimforsurvivorshippensionifthedependentspouse

contractedmarriagetothepensionerwithinthethreeyearprohibitedperiod,wasdeclaredoffensive
to the due process clause. There was outright confiscation of benefits due the surviving spouse
withoutgivinghimorheranopportunitytobeheard.Theprovisowasalsoheldtoinfringetheequal
protection clause as it discriminated against dependent spouses who contracted their respective
marriagestopensionerswithinthreeyearsbeforetheyqualifiedfortheirpension.

Forreasonswhichshallbediscussedshortly,theprovisoasofthedateofhisretirementinSection
12B(d)ofRep.ActNo.8282similarlyviolatesthedueprocessandequalprotectionclausesofthe
Constitution.
Constitution.

Theprovisoinfringestheequalprotectionclause

Asillustratedbythepetitionerscase,theprovisoasofthedateofhisretirementinSection12
B(d)ofRep.ActNo.8282whichqualifiesthetermprimarybeneficiariesresultsintheclassification
ofdependentspousesasprimarybeneficiariesintotwogroups:

(1) Those dependent spouses whose respective marriages to SSS members were
contractedpriortothelattersretirementand
(2) Those dependent spouses whose respective marriages to SSS members were
contractedafterthelattersretirement.

Underlying these two classifications of dependent spouses is that their respective marriages
arevalid.Inotherwords,bothgroupsarelegitimateorlegalspouses.Thedistinctionbetweenthem
lies solely on the date the marriage was contracted. The petitioner belongs to the second group of
dependentspouses,i.e.,hermarriagetoBonifaciowascontractedafterhisretirement.Assuch,she
andthosesimilarlysituateddonotqualifyasprimarybeneficiariesunderSection12B(d)ofRep.
Act No. 8282 and, therefore, are not entitled to survivors pension under the same provision by
reasonofthesubjectproviso.

Itisnotedthattheeligibilityofdependentchildrenwhoarebiologicaloffspringsofaretired
SSSmembertobeconsideredashisprimarybeneficiariesunderSection12B(d)ofRep.ActNo.
8282isnotsubstantiallyaffectedbytheprovisoasofthedateofhisretirement.Abiologicalchild,
whetherlegitimate,legitimatedorillegitimate,isentitledtosurvivorspensionuponthedeathofa
retired SSS member so long as the said child is unmarried, not gainfully employed and has not
reached twentyone (21) years of age, or if over twentyone (21) years of age, he or she is
congenitallyorwhilestillaminorhasbeenpermanentlyincapacitatedandincapableofselfsupport,
physicallyormentally.

On the other hand, the eligibility of legally adopted children to be considered primary
 On the other hand, the eligibility of legally adopted children to be considered primary
beneficiariesunderSection12B(d)ofRep.ActNo.8282isaffectedbytheprovisoasofthedateof
hisretirementinthesamemannerasthedependentspouses.Alegallyadoptedchildwhosatisfies
[10]
therequirementsinSection8(e)(2) thereofisconsideredaprimarybeneficiaryofaretiredSSS
memberuponthelattersdeathonlyifthesaidchildhadbeenlegallyadoptedpriortothemembers
retirement. One who was legally adopted by the SSS member after his or her retirement does not
qualifyasaprimarybeneficiaryforthepurposeofentitlementtosurvivorspensionunderSection
12B(d)ofRep.ActNo.8282.

Inanycase,theissuethatnowconfrontstheCourtinvolvesadependentspousewhoclaimsto
havebeenunjustlydeprivedofhersurvivorspensionunderSection12B(d)ofRep.ActNo.8282.
Hence,thesubsequentdiscussionwillfocusontheresultantclassificationofthedependentspouses
asprimarybeneficiariesunderthesaidprovision.

As earlier stated, the petitioner belongs to the second group of dependent spouses, i.e., her
marriage to Bonifacio was contracted after his retirement. She and those similarly situated are
undoubtedlydiscriminatedagainstastheprovisoasofthedateofhisretirementdisqualifiesthem
frombeingconsideredprimarybeneficiariesforthepurposeofentitlementtosurvivorspension.

Generally, a statute based on reasonable classification does not violate the constitutional
[11]
guaranty of the equal protection clause of the law. With respect to Rep. Act No. 8282, in
particular, as a social security law, it is recognized that it is permeated with provisions that draw
lines in classifying those who are to receive benefits. Congressional decisions in this regard are
entitled to deference as those of the institution charged under our scheme of government with the
[12]
primaryresponsibilityformakingsuchjudgmentsinlightofcompetingpoliciesandinterests.

However, as in other statutes, the classification in Rep. Act No. 8282 with respect to
entitlement to benefits, to be valid and reasonable, must satisfy the following requirements: (1) it
mustrestonsubstantialdistinctions(2)itmustbegermanetothepurposeofthelaw(3)itmustnot
be limited to existing conditions only and (4) it must apply equally to all members of the same
[13]
class.

The legislative history of Rep. Act No. 8282 does not bear out the purpose of Congress in
inserting the proviso as of the date of his retirement to qualify the term primary beneficiaries in
Section 12B(d) thereof. To the Courts mind, however, it reflects congressional concern with the
possibility of relationships entered after retirement for the purpose of obtaining benefits. In
particular, the proviso was apparently intended to prevent sham marriages or those contracted by
personssolelytoenableonespousetoclaimbenefitsupontheanticipateddeathoftheotherspouse.

This concern is concededly valid. However, classifying dependent spouses and determining
theirentitlementtosurvivorspensionbasedonwhetherthemarriagewascontractedbeforeorafter
theretirementoftheotherspouse,regardlessofthedurationofthesaidmarriage,bearsnorelation
totheachievementofthepolicyobjectiveofthelaw,i.e.,providemeaningfulprotectiontomembers
andtheirbeneficiariesagainstthehazardofdisability,sickness,maternity,oldage,deathandother
contingencies
[14]
resulting in loss of income or financial burden." The nexus of the classification to the policy

objective is vague and flimsy. Put differently, such classification of dependent spouses is not
germanetotheaforesaidpolicyobjective.

For if it were the intention of Congress to prevent sham marriages or those entered in
contemplationofimminentdeath,thenitshouldhaveprescribedadefinitedurationofrelationship
ordurationalperiodofrelationshipasoneoftherequirementsforentitlementtosurvivorspension.
Forexample,intheUnitedStates,aprovisionintheirsocialsecuritylawwhichexcludesfromsocial
securitybenefitsthesurvivingwifeandstepchildofadeceasedwageearnerwhohadtheirrespective
[15]
relationshipstothewageearnerforlessthanninemonthspriortohisdeath,wasdeclaredvalid.
Thus, nine months is recognized in the United States as the minimum duration of a marriage to
consider it as having been contracted in good faith for the purpose of entitlement to survivorship
pension.
pension.

In contrast, the proviso as of the date of his retirement in Section 12B(d) in Rep. Act No.
8282 effectively disqualifies from entitlement to survivors pension all those dependent spouses
whoserespectivemarriagestoretiredSSSmemberswerecontractedafterthelattersretirement.The
duration of the marriage is not even considered. It is observed that, in certain instances, the
retirementageunderRep.ActNo.8282issixty(60)
[16]
yearsold. A marriage contracted by a retired SSS member after the said age may still last for
morethantenyears,assumingthememberlivesuptooverseventy(70)yearsold.Insuchacase,it
cannotbesaidthatthemarriagewasashamorwasenteredintosolelyforthepurposeofenabling
onespousetoobtainthefinancialbenefitsdueuponthedeathoftheotherspouse.Nonetheless,the
said surviving spouse is not entitled to survivors pension because he or she is not a primary
beneficiaryasofthedateofretirementoftheSSSmemberfollowingSection12B(d)ofRep.Act
No.8282.

Further, the classification of dependent spouses on the basis of whether their respective
marriagestotheSSSmemberwerecontractedpriortoorafterthelattersretirementforthepurpose

ofentitlementtosurvivorspensiondoesnotrestonrealandsubstantialdistinctions.Itisarbitrary
and discriminatory. It is too sweeping because the proviso as of the date of his retirement, which
effectivelydisqualifiesthedependentspouseswhoserespectivemarriagestotheretiredSSSmember
were contracted after the latters retirement as primary beneficiaries, unfairly lumps all these
marriages as sham relationships or were contracted solely for the purpose of acquiring benefits
accruing upon the death of the other spouse. The proviso thus unduly prejudices the rights of the
legal surviving spouse, like the petitioner, and defeats the avowed policy of the law to provide
meaningfulprotectiontomembersandtheirbeneficiariesagainstthehazardsofdisability,sickness,
maternity, old age, death, and other contingencies resulting in loss of income or financial burden.
[17]

Theprovisoinfringesthedueprocessclause

[18]
 [18]
As earlier opined, in Government Service Insurance System v. Montesclaros, the Court
characterized retirement benefits as a property interest of a retiree. We held therein that [i]n a
pensionplanwhereemployeeparticipationismandatory,theprevailingviewisthatemployeeshave
[19]
contractualorvestedrightsinthepensionwherethepensionispartofthetermsofemployment.
Thus, it was ruled that, where the employee retires and meets the eligibility requirements, he
acquiresavestedrighttobenefitsthatisprotectedbythedueprocessclauseand[r]etireesenjoya
protectedpropertyinterestwhenevertheyacquirearighttoimmediatepaymentunderpreexisting
[20]
law. Further, since pursuant to the pertinent law therein, the dependent spouse is entitled to
survivorshippension,awidowsrighttoreceivepensionfollowingthedemiseofherhusbandisalso
[21]
partofthehusbandscontractualcompensation.

AlthoughthesubjectmatterintheabovecitedcaseinvolvedtheretirementbenefitsunderP.D.No.
[22]
1146 or the Revised Government Service Insurance Act of 1977 covering government

employees, the pronouncement therein that retirees enjoy a protected property interest in their
retirementbenefitsappliessquarelytothoseintheprivatesectorunderRep.ActNo.8282.Thisisso
[23] [24]
becausethemandatorycontributionsofboththeemployers andtheemployees totheSSSdo
not,likewise,maketheretirementbenefitsunderRep.ActNo.8282meregratuitybutformpartof
thelatterscompensation.Eventheretirementbenefitsofselfemployedindividuals,likeBonifacio,
[25]
whohavebeenincludedinthecompulsorycoverageofRep.ActNo.8282 arenotmeregratuity
[26]
becausetheyarerequiredtopayboththeemployerandemployeecontributions. Further,under
Rep.ActNo.8282,thesurvivingspouseisentitledtosurvivorspensionaccruingonthedeathofthe
memberhence,thesurvivingspousesrighttoreceivesuchbenefitfollowingthedemiseofthewife
orhusband,asthecasemaybe,isalsopartofthelatterscontractualcompensation.

TheprovisoasofthedateofhisretirementinSection12B(d)ofRep.ActNo.8282runsafoulof
thedueprocessclauseasitoutrightlydeprivesthesurvivingspouseswhoserespectivemarriagesto
the retired SSS members were contracted after the latters retirement of their survivors benefits.
There is outright confiscation of benefits due such surviving spouses without giving them an
opportunitytobeheard.

By this outright disqualification of the surviving spouses whose respective marriages to SSS
members were contracted after the latters retirement, the proviso as of the date of his retirement
qualifying the term primary beneficiaries for the purpose of entitlement to survivors pension has
created the presumption that marriages contracted after the retirement date of SSS members were
entered into for the purpose of securing the benefits under Rep.Act No. 8282. This presumption,
moreover, is conclusive because the said surviving spouses are not afforded any opportunity to
disprovethepresenceoftheillicitpurpose.Theproviso,asitcreatesthisconclusivepresumption,is
unconstitutionalbecauseitpresumesafactwhichisnotnecessarilyoruniversallytrue.IntheUnited
States,thiskindofpresumptionischaracterizedasanirrebuttablepresumptionandstatutescreating

permanent and irrebutable presumptions have long been disfavored under the due process clause.
[27]

Inthepetitionerscase,forexample,sheassertedthatwhensheandBonifaciogotmarriedin
1997, it was merely to legalize their relationship and not to commit fraud. This claim is quite
believable. After all, they had been living together since 1980 and, in fact, during that time their
eldest child was already twentyfour (24) years old. However, the petitioner was not given any
opportunity to prove her claim that she was Bonifacios bona fide legal spouse as she was
automaticallydisqualifiedfrombeingconsideredashisprimarybeneficiary.Ineffect,thepetitioner
was deprived of the survivors benefits, a property interest, accruing from the death of Bonifacio
withoutanyopportunitytobeheard.Standardsofdueprocessrequirethatthepetitionerbeallowed
topresentevidencetoprovethathermarriagetoBonifaciowascontractedingoodfaithandashis
[28]
bona fide spouse she is entitled to the survivors pension accruing upon his death. Hence, the
provisoasofthedateofhisretirementinSection12B(d)whichdeprivesthepetitionerandthose
similarlysituateddependentspousesofretiredSSSmembersthisopportunitytobeheardmustbe
struckdown.

Conclusion

Even as the proviso as of the date of his retirement in Section 12B(d) is nullified, the
enumeration of primary beneficiaries for the purpose of entitlement to survivors pension is not
substantiallyaffectedsincethefollowingpersonsareconsideredassuchunderSection8(k)ofRep.
ActNo.8282:

(1)Thedependentspouseuntilheorsheremarriesand

(2)Thedependentlegitimate,legitimatedorlegallyadopted,andillegitimatechildren.

In relation thereto, Section 8(e) thereof qualifies the dependent spouse and dependent children as
follows:
(1)Thelegalspouseentitledbylawtoreceivesupportfromthemember
(2) The legitimate, legitimated or legally adopted, and illegitimate child who is unmarried, not
gainfullyemployedandhasnotreachedtwentyoneyears(21)ofage,orifovertwentyone(21)
years of age, he is congenitally or while still a minor has been permanently incapacitated and
incapableofselfsupport,physicallyormentally.

Finally, the Court concedes that the petitioner did not raise the issue of the validity of the
provisoasofthedateofhisretirementinSection12B(d)ofRep.ActNo.8282.Theruleisthatthe
Courtdoesnotdecidequestionsofaconstitutionalnatureunlessabsolutelynecessarytoadecision
[29]
ofthecase. However,thequestionoftheconstitutionalityoftheprovisoisabsolutelynecessary
fortheproperresolutionofthepresentcase.Accordingly,theCourtrequiredthepartiestopresent
their arguments on this issue and proceeded to pass upon the same in the exercise of its equity
jurisdiction and in order to render substantial justice to the petitioner who, presumably in her
advancedagebynow,deservestoreceiveforthwiththesurvivorspensionaccruinguponthedeathof
herhusband.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated April 15, 2003 and
 WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated April 15, 2003 and
Resolution dated December 15, 2003 of the Court of Appeals in CAG.R. SP No. 69632 are
REVERSEDandSETASIDE.TheprovisoasofthedateofhisretirementinSection12B(d)of
Rep. Act No. 8282 is declared VOID for being contrary to the due process and equal protection
clausesoftheConstitution.TheSocialSecuritySystemcannotdenytheclaimofpetitionerElenaP.
Dycaicoforsurvivorspensiononthebasisofthisinvalidproviso.

SOORDERED.

ROMEOJ.CALLEJO,SR.
AssociateJustice

HILARIOG.DAVIDE,JR.
ChiefJustice

REYNATOS.PUNOARTEMIOV.PANGANIBAN
AssociateJusticeAssociateJustice

LEONARDOA.QUISUMBINGCONSUELOYNARESSANTIAGO
AssociateJusticeAssociateJustice

ANGELINASANDOVALGUTIERREZANTONIOT.CARPIO
AssociateJusticeAssociateJustice

MA.ALICIAAUSTRIAMARTINEZRENATOC.CORONA
AssociateJusticeAssociateJustice

CONCHITACARPIOMORALESADOLFOS.AZCUNA
AssociateJusticeAssociateJustice

Onleave
DANTEO.TINGAMINITACHICONAZARIO
AssociateJusticeAssociateJustice


CANCIOC.GARCIA
AssociateJustice

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that the
conclusionsintheabovedecisionwerereachedinconsultationbeforethecasewasassignedtothe
writeroftheopinionoftheCourt.

HILARIOG.DAVIDE,JR.
ChiefJustice

Onleave.
[1]
Penned by Associate Justice Rebecca De GuiaSalvador, with Associate Justices Marina L. Buzon and Rosmari D. Carandang,
concurringRollo,pp.2228.
[2]
AnActFurtherStrengtheningtheSocialSecuritySystemTherebyAmendingforthisPurposeRepublicActNo.1161,asAmended,
OtherwiseKnownastheSocialSecurityLaw.ThelawtookeffectonMay23,1997.
[3]
CARollo,p.26.
[4]
Rollo,p.28.
[5]
EmployeesCompensationCommissionv.CourtofAppeals,G.R.No.115858,28July1996,257SCRA717.
[6]
Comment,p.5Rollo,p.37.
[7]
SECTION1,ARTICLEIII,CONSTITUTIONreads:
Sec.1.Nopersonshallbedeprivedoflife,libertyorpropertywithoutdueprocessoflaw,norshallanypersonbedeniedthe
equalprotectionofthelaws.
[8]
G.R.No.146494,14July2004,434SCRA441.
[9]
Entitled The Revised Government Service Insurance Act of 1977. This law has been superseded by Republic Act No. 8291 of the
GovernmentServiceInsuranceActof1997.
[10]
Supra.
[11]
Fariasv.TheExecutiveSecretary,G.R.No.147387,10December2003,417SCRA503.
[12]
Califano,Jr.v.Goldfarb,430US199,51L.Ed.2d270(1977).
[13]
GovernmentServiceInsuranceSystemv.Montesclaros,supra.
[14]
Section2ofRep.ActNo.1161,asamendedbyRep.ActNo.8282.
[15]
Weinbergerv.Salfi,422US749,45L.Ed.2d522.
[16]
Section12Breadsinpart:
Sec.12B.RetirementBenefits.(a)Amemberwhohaspaidatleastonehundredtwenty(120)monthlycontributionspriortothe
semesterofretirementandwho(1)hasreachedtheageofsixty(60)yearsandisalreadyseparatedfromemploymentorhasceasedto
beselfemployedor(2)hasreachedtheageofsixtyfive(65)years,shallbeentitledforaslongashelivestothemonthlypension:
Provided,Thatheshallhavetheoptiontoreceivehisfirsteighteen(18)monthlypensionsinlumpsumdiscountedatapreferential
rateofinteresttobedeterminedbytheSSS.
[17]
Supra.
[18]
Supra.
[18]
Supra.
[19]
Id.at448.
[20]
Id.at449.
[21]
Id.
[22]
ThishasbeensupersededbyRep.ActNo.8291otherwiseknownasTheGovernmentServiceInsuranceActof1997.
[23]
Section19readsinpart:
Sec.19.EmployersContributions.(a)Beginningasofthelastdayofthemonthwhenanemployeescompulsorycoveragetakes
effect and every month thereafter during his employment, his employer shall pay, with respect to such covered employee, the
employerscontributioninaccordancewiththescheduleindicatedinSectionEighteenofthisAct.Notwithstandinganycontractto
thecontrary,anemployershallnotdeduct,directlyorindirectly,fromthecompensationofhisemployeescoveredbytheSSSor
otherwiserecoverfromthemtheemployerscontributionswithrespecttosuchemployees.
[24]
Section18readsinpart:
Sec.18.EmployeesContribution.(a)Beginningasofthelastdayofthecalendarmonthwhenanemployeescompulsorycoverage
takes effect and every month thereafter during his employment, the employer shall deduct and withhold from such employees
monthly salary, wage, compensation or earnings, the employees contribution in an amount corresponding to his salary, wage,
compensationorearningsduringthemonthinaccordancewiththefollowingschedule.
[25]
Section9Areads:
Sec.9A.CompulsoryCoverageoftheSelfemployed.CoverageintheSSSshallbecompulsoryuponsuchselfemployedpersonsas
may be determined by the Commission under such rules and regulations as it may prescribe, including but not limited to the
following:
1.Allselfemployedprofessionals
2.Partnersandsingleproprietorsofbusinesses
3. Actorsandactresses,directors,scriptwritersandnewscorrespondentswhodonotfallwithinthedefinitionoftheterm
employeeinSec.8(d)ofthisAct
4.Professionalathletes,coaches,trainersandjockeysand
5.Individualfarmersandfishermen.
Unlessotherwisespecifiedherein,allprovisionsofthisActapplicabletocoveredemployeesshallalsobeapplicabletothecovered
selfemployedpersons.
[26]
Section19Areads:
Sec. 19A. Contribution of the Selfemployed Member. The contributions to the SSS of the selfemployed member shall be
determinedinaccordancewithSectionEighteenofthisActProvided,Thatthemonthlyearningsdeclaredbytheselfemployed
memberatthetimeofhisregistrationwiththeSSSshallbeconsideredashismonthlycompensationandheshallpayboththe
employerandemployeecontributions:Provided,further,ThatthecontributionsofselfemployedpersonsearningOneThousand
Pesos(P1,000.00)monthlyorbelowmaybereducedbytheCommission.
Themonthlyearningsdeclaredbytheselfemployedmemberatthetimeofhisregistrationshallremainthebasisofhismonthly
salarycredit,unlesshemakesanotherdeclarationofhismonthlyearnings,inwhichcasesuchlatestdeclarationbecomesthenew
basisofhismonthlysalarycredit.
[27]
See,forexample,Jimenezv.Weinberger, 417 US 628, 41 L.Ed.2d 363 U.S. Department of Agriculture v. Murry, 413 US 508, 37
L.Ed.2d767Vlandisv.Kline,412US441,37L.Ed.2d63.
[28]
Inthisconnection,itiswelltonotethat,asdiscussedinGovernmentServiceInsuranceSystemv.Montesclaros,supra,underSection
10.4.1oftheImplementingRulesandRegulationsofRep.ActNo.8291(thepresentGSISLaw),thesurvivingspousewhomarriedthe
memberimmediatelybeforethemembersdeathisstillqualifiedtoreceivesurvivorshippensionunlesstheGSISprovesthatthesurviving
spousecontractedthemarriagesolelytoreceivethebenefit.ThesaidRulesacknowledgethatwhetherthesurvivingspousecontractedthe
marriagemainlytoreceivesurvivorshipbenefitsisamatterofevidence.ThesaidSectionreads:
Sec.10.4.AllocationoftheSurvivorshipPensionAmongBeneficiaries.Thesurvivorshippensionshallbepaidasfollows:
10.4.1.Whenthedependentspouseistheonlysurvivor,he/sheshallreceivethebasicsurvivorshippensionforlifeor
untilhe/sheremarries.Forpurposesofthissection,themarriageofthesurvivingspouseimmediatelypriortothe
deathofthememberorpensionershallbeacceptable,unlessitisproventhatthemarriagewassolemnizedsolelyfor
purposesofreceivingthebenefit.
[29]
AlgerElectric,Inc.v.CourtofAppeals,G.R.No.L34298,28February1985,135SCRA37.