Ang Ladlad LGBT Party, An Organization Composed of Lesbians, Gays, Bisexuals, and

Ang Ladlad LGBT Party, an organization composed of lesbians, gays, bisexuals, and
transgender, applied for accreditation as sectoral party in a party-list system before the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC). The COMELEC denied the application, stating that the
LGBT sector is neither enumerated in the Constitution and Republic Act No. 7941, nor is it
associated with or related to any of the sectors allowed to be formed under said law. The
COMELEC further argued that Ang Ladlad lied when it stated that it has nationwide existence
through its members and affiliate organizations. Did the COMELEC err in denying the application
of Ang Ladlad for registration as a party-list?
Yes. Respondent mistakenly opines that our ruling in Ang Bagong Bayani stands for the
proposition that only those sectors specifically enumerated in the law or related to said sectors (labor,
peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, elderly, handicapped, women, youth,
veterans, overseas workers, and professionals) may be registered under the party-list system. As we
explicitly ruled in Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party v. Commission on Elections, the enumeration
of marginalized and under-represented sectors is not exclusive. The crucial element is not whether a
sector is specifically enumerated, but whether a particular organization complies with the requirements of
the Constitution and RA 7941.
This argument that petitioner made untruthful statements in its petition when it alleged its
national existence is a new one; previously, the COMELEC claimed that petitioner was not being
truthful when it said that it or any of its nominees/party-list representatives have not violated or failed to
comply with laws, rules, or regulations relating to the elections. Nowhere was this ground for denial of
petitioners accreditation mentioned or even alluded to in the Assailed Resolutions. This, in itself, is quite
curious, considering that the reports of petitioners alleged non-existence were already available to the
COMELEC prior to the issuance of the First Assailed Resolution. At best, this is irregular procedure; at
worst, a belated afterthought, a change in respondents theory, and a serious violation of petitioners right
to procedural due process.
Nonetheless, we find that there has been no misrepresentation. A cursory perusal of Ang Ladlads
initial petition shows that it never claimed to exist in each province of the Philippines. Rather, petitioner
alleged that the LGBT community in the Philippines was estimated to constitute at least 670,000 persons;
that it had 16,100 affiliates and members around the country, and 4,044 members in its electronic
discussion group. Ang Ladlad also represented itself to be a national LGBT umbrella organization with
affiliates around the Philippines composed of LGBT networks.
Since the COMELEC only searched for the names ANG LADLAD LGBT or LADLAD LGBT, it is
no surprise that they found that petitioner had no presence in any of these regions. In fact, if COMELECs
findings are to be believed, petitioner does not even exist in Quezon City, which is registered as Ang
Ladlads principal place of business.
Against this backdrop, we find that Ang Ladlad has sufficiently demonstrated its compliance with
the legal requirements for accreditation. Indeed, aside from COMELECs moral objection and the belated
allegation of non-existence, nowhere in the records has the respondent ever found/ruled that Ang Ladlad
is not qualified to register as a party-list organization under any of the requisites under RA 7941 or the
guidelines in Ang Bagong Bayani. The difference, COMELEC claims, lies in Ang Ladlads morality, or
lack thereof. (ANG LADLAD LGBT PARTY vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, 618 SCRA 32, G.R. No.
190582, April 8, 2010)
Melanio Mauricio, Jr. filed a petition for the cancellation of registration and accreditation
ABC Party-List before the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) on the ground that it is a
religious organization, but it was later on dismissed; thus, Mauricio filed a motion for
reconsideration. Thereafter, ABC argued that the petition should be dismissed for lack of
jurisdiction, since the Secretary General of the House of Representatives had already recognized
ABC as a proclaimed party-list group by asking its first nominee to attend the Orientation Program
for the new members of the House of Representatives. ABC also averred that it was already
proclaimed as one of the winners according to the National Board of Canvassers Resolution No. 10-
009; thus, the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal has the jurisdiction over the petition,
and not the COMELEC. Does the COMELEC still have jurisdiction over the petition?
Yes. The jurisdiction of the COMELEC over petitions for cancellation of registration of any
political party, organization or coalition is derived from Section 2 (5), Article IX-C of the Constitution,
which states:
Sec.2.The Commission on Elections shall exercise the following powers and functions:
xxxx
(5)Register, after sufficient publication, political parties, organizations, or coalitions which, in

addition to other requirements, must present their platform or program of government; and accredit
citizens arms of the Commission on Elections. Religious denominations and sects shall not be registered.
Those which seek to achieve their goals through violence or unlawful means, or refuse to uphold and
adhere to this Constitution, or which are supported by any foreign government shall likewise be refused
registration.
Financial contributions from foreign governments and their agencies to political parties,
organizations, coalitions, or candidates related to elections constitute interference in national affairs, and
when accepted, shall be an additional ground for the cancellation of their registration with the Commission,
in addition to other penalties that may be prescribed by law.
Based on the provision above, the Constitution grants the COMELEC the authority to register
political parties, organizations or coalitions, and the authority to cancel the registration of the same on
legal grounds. The said authority of the COMELEC is reflected in Section 6 of R.A. No. 7941, which
provides:
Section6.Refusal and/or Cancellation of Registration.The Comelec may motu proprio or

upon verified complaint of any interested party, refuse or cancel, after due notice and hearing, the
registration of any national, regional or sectoral party, organization or coalition on any of the following
grounds:
(1)It is a religious sect or denomination, organization or association organized for religious

purposes;
x x x
It is, therefore, clear that the COMELEC has jurisdiction over the instant petition for cancellation
of the registration of the ABC Party-List.
In the case of the party-list nominees/representatives, it is the HRET that has jurisdiction over
contests relating to their qualifications. Although it is the party-list organization that is voted for in the
elections, it is not the organization that sits as and becomes a member of the House of Representatives,
but it is the party-list nominee/representative who sits as a member of the House of Representatives.
The members of the House of Representatives are provided for in Section 5, Article VI of the
Constitution:
Sec.5.(1). The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred and
fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from legislative districts apportioned
among the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of their
respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and those who, as provided by
law, shall be elected through a party-list system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or
organizations.
Thus, the members of the House of Representatives are composed of the members who shall be
elected from legislative districts and those who shall be elected through a party-list system of registered
national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations.
Abayon v. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal held:
x x x x [F]rom the Constitutions point of view, it is the party-list representatives who are
elected into office, not their parties or organizations. These representatives are elected, however, through
that peculiar party-list system that the Constitution authorized and that Congress by law established where
the voters cast their votes for the organizations or parties to which such party-list representatives belong.
Once elected, both the district representatives and the party-list representatives are treated in like
manner. They have the same deliberative rights, salaries, and emoluments. They can participate in the
making of laws that will directly benefit their legislative districts or sectors. They are also subject to the
same term limitation of three years for a maximum of three consecutive terms.
It may not be amiss to point out that the Party-List System Act itself recognizes party-list
nominees as members of the House of Representatives, thus:
Sec.2.Declaration of Policy.The State shall promote proportional representation in

the election of representatives to the House of Representatives through a party-list system of
registered national, regional and sectoral parties or organizations or coalitions thereof, which will
enable Filipino citizens belonging to the marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations
and parties, and who lack well-defined political constituencies but who could contribute to the
formulation and enactment of appropriate legislation that will benefit the nation as a whole, to
become members of the House of Representatives. Towards this end, the State shall develop and
guarantee a full, free and open party system in order to attain the broadest possible representation
of party, sectoral or group interests in the House of Representatives by enhancing their chances to
compete for and win seats in the legislature, and shall provide the simplest scheme possible.
Since the representative of the elected party-list organization becomes a member of the House of
Representatives, contests relating to the qualifications of the said party-list representative is within the
jurisdiction of the HRET, as Section 17, Article VI of the Constitution provides:
Sec.17.The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an Electoral Tribunal
which shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of their
respective Members.
Abayon held:
x x x [P]arty-list nominees are elected members of the House of Representatives no less than
the district representatives are, the HRET has jurisdiction to hear and pass upon their qualifications. By
analogy with the cases of district representatives, once the party or organization of the party-list nominee
has been proclaimed and the nominee has taken his oath and assumed office as member of the House of
Representatives, the COMELECs jurisdiction over election contests relating to his qualifications ends and
the HRETs own jurisdiction begins.
Therefore, the jurisdiction of the HRET over contests relating to the qualifications of a party-list
nominee or representative is derived from Section 17, Article VI of the Constitution, while the jurisdiction
of the COMELEC over petitions for cancellation of registration of any national, regional or sectoral party,
organization or coalition is derived from Section 2 (5), Article IX-C of the Constitution.
In sum, the COMELEC en banc had jurisdiction over the petition for cancellation of the
registration and accreditation of petitioner ABC Party-List for alleged violation of Section 6 (1) of R.A.
No. 7941. (ABC (ALLIANCE FOR BARANGAY CONCERNS) PARTY LIST vs. COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS, 646 SCRA 93, G.R. No. 193256 March 22, 2011)
The Commission on Elections (COMELEC) issued a resolution, disqualifying 59 party-list

groups from participating in the party-list elections, either by denial of their new petitions for
registration under the party-list system, or by cancellation of their existing registration and
accreditation as party-list organizations. The COMELEC used the criteria laid down in Ang
Bagong Bayani in disqualifying the party-list groups. Thus, all those that did not satisfy these two
criteria: (1) all national, regional, and sectoral groups or organizations must represent the
marginalized and underrepresented sectors, and (2) all nominees must belong to the
marginalized and underrepresented sector they represent, at the discretion of the COMELEC,
were disqualified from participating in the elections. Did the COMELEC err in disqualifying the
party-list groups by relying in the criteria laid down in Ang Bagong Bayani?
No. The 1987 Constitution provides the basis for the party-list system of representation. Simply
put, the party-list system is intended to democratize political power by giving political parties that cannot
win in legislative district elections a chance to win seats in the House of Representatives. The voter elects
two representatives in the House of Representatives: one for his or her legislative district, and another for
his or her party-list group or organization of choice. The 1987 Constitution provides:
Section 5, Article VI
(1)The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred and fifty
members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from legislative districts apportioned among
the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of their respective
inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and those who, as provided by law, shall be
elected through a party-list system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations.
(2)The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per centum of the total number of
representatives including those under the party list. For three consecutive terms after the ratification of this
Constitution, one-half of the seats allocated to party-list representatives shall be filled, as provided by law,
by selection or election from the labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, women,
youth, and such other sectors as may be provided by law, except the religious sector.
Sections 7 and 8, Article IX-C
Sec.7.No votes cast in favor of a political party, organization, or coalition shall be valid, except
for those registered under the party-list system as provided in this Constitution.
Sec.8.Political parties, or organizations or coalitions registered under the party-list system,

shall not be represented in the voters registration boards, boards of election inspectors, boards of
canvassers, or other similar bodies. However, they shall be entitled to appoint poll watchers in accordance
with law.
Indisputably, the framers of the 1987 Constitution intended the party-list system to include not
only sectoral parties but also non-sectoral parties. The framers intended the sectoral parties to constitute a
part, but not the entirety, of the party-list system. As explained by Commissioner Wilfredo Villacorta,
political parties can participate in the party-list system [F]or as long as they field candidates who come
from the different marginalized sectors that we shall designate in this Constitution.
Thus, in the end, the proposal to give permanent reserved seats to certain sectors was outvoted.
Instead, the reservation of seats to sectoral representatives was only allowed for the first three consecutive
terms. There can be no doubt whatsoever that the framers of the 1987 Constitution expressly rejected the
proposal to make the party-list system exclusively for sectoral parties only, and that they clearly intended
the party-list system to include both sectoral and non-sectoral parties.
The common denominator between sectoral and non-sectoral parties is that they cannot expect to
win in legislative district elections but they can garner, in nationwide elections, at least the same number
of votes that winning candidates can garner in legislative district elections. The party-list system will be
the entry point to membership in the House of Representatives for both these non-traditional parties that
could not compete in legislative district elections.
The indisputable intent of the framers of the 1987 Constitution to include in the party-list system
both sectoral and non-sectoral parties is clearly written in Section 5(1), Article VI of the Constitution,
which states:
Section5.(1) The House of Representative shall be composed of not more that two hundred
and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from legislative districts
apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number
of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and those who, as
provided by law, shall be elected through a party-list system of registered national, regional, and sectoral
parties or organizations.
Section 5(1), Article VI of the Constitution is crystal-clear that there shall be a party-list system
of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations. The commas after the words
national[,] and regional[,] separate national and regional parties from sectoral parties. Had the
framers of the 1987 Constitution intended national and regional parties to be at the same time sectoral,
they would have stated national and regional sectoral parties. They did not, precisely because it was
never their intention to make the party-list system exclusively sectoral.
What the framers intended, and what they expressly wrote in Section 5(1), could not be any
clearer: the party-list system is composed of three different groups, and the sectoral parties belong to only
one of the three groups. The text of Section 5(1) leaves no room for any doubt that national and regional
parties are separate from sectoral parties.
Thus, the party-list system is composed of three different groups: (1) national parties or
organizations; (2) regional parties or organizations; and (3) sectoral parties or organizations. National and
regional parties or organizations are different from sectoral parties or organizations. National and regional
parties or organizations need not be organized along sectoral lines and need not represent any particular
sector.
Moreover, Section 5(2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution mandates that, during the first three
consecutive terms of Congress after the ratification of the 1987 Constitution, one-half of the seats
allocated to party-list representatives shall be filled, as provided by law, by selection or election from the
labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, women, youth, and such other sectors as
may be provided by law, except the religious sector. This provision clearly shows again that the party-list
system is not exclusively for sectoral parties for two obvious reasons.
First, the other one-half of the seats allocated to party-list representatives would naturally be open
to non-sectoral party-list representatives, clearly negating the idea that the party-list system is exclusively
for sectoral parties representing the marginalized and underrepresented. Second, the reservation of one-
half of the party-list seats to sectoral parties applies only for the first three consecutive terms after the
ratification of this Constitution, clearly making the party-list system fully open after the end of the first
three congressional terms. This means that, after this period, there will be no seats reserved for any class
or type of party that qualifies under the three groups constituting the party-list system.
Hence, the clear intent, express wording, and party-list structure ordained in Section 5(1) and (2),
Article VI of the 1987 Constitution cannot be disputed: the party-list system is not for sectoral parties
only, but also for non-sectoral parties.
Republic Act No. 7941 or the Party-List System Act, which is the law that implements the party-
list system prescribed in the Constitution, provides:
Section3.Definition of Terms.(a) The party-list system is a mechanism of proportional

representation in the election of representatives to the House of Representatives from national, regional and
sectoral parties or organizations or coalitions thereof registered with the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC). Component parties or organizations of a coalition may participate independently provided
the coalition of which they form part does not participate in the party-list system.
(b)A party means either a political party or a sectoral party or a coalition of parties.
(c) A political party refers to an organized group of citizens advocating an ideology or platform,
principles and policies for the general conduct of government and which, as the most immediate means of
securing their adoption, regularly nominates and supports certain of its leaders and members as candidates
for public office.
It is a national party when its constituency is spread over the geographical territory of at least a
majority of the regions. It is a regional party when its constituency is spread over the geographical territory
of at least a majority of the cities and provinces comprising the region.
(d)A sectoral party refers to an organized group of citizens belonging to any of the sectors
enumerated in Section 5 hereof whose principal advocacy pertains to the special interest and concerns of
their sector.
(e) A sectoral organization refers to a group of citizens or a coalition of groups of citizens who
share similar physical attributes or characteristics, employment, interests or concerns.
(f) A coalition refers to an aggrupation of duly registered national, regional, sectoral parties or
organizations for political and/or election purposes.
Section 3(a) of R.A. No. 7941 defines a party as either a political party or a sectoral party or a
coalition of parties. Clearly, a political party is different from a sectoral party. Section 3(c) of R.A. No.
7941 further provides that a political party refers to an organized group of citizens advocating an
ideology or platform, principles and policies for the general conduct of government. On the other hand,
Section 3(d) of R.A. No. 7941 provides that a sectoral party refers to an organized group of citizens
belonging to any of the sectors enumerated in Section 5 hereof whose principal advocacy pertains to the
special interest and concerns of their sector. R.A. No. 7941 provides different definitions for a political
and a sectoral party. Obviously, they are separate and distinct from each other.
R.A. No. 7941 does not require national and regional parties or organizations to represent the
marginalized and underrepresented sectors. To require all national and regional parties under the party-
list system to represent the marginalized and underrepresented is to deprive and exclude, by judicial
fiat, ideology-based and cause-oriented parties from the party-list system. How will these ideology-based
and cause-oriented parties, who cannot win in legislative district elections, participate in the electoral
process if they are excluded from the party-list system? To exclude them from the party-list system is to
prevent them from joining the parliamentary struggle, leaving as their only option the armed struggle. To
exclude them from the party-list system is, apart from being obviously senseless, patently contrary to the
clear intent and express wording of the 1987 Constitution and R.A. No. 7941.
Under the party-list system, an ideology-based or cause-oriented political party is clearly different
from a sectoral party. A political party need not be organized as a sectoral party and need not represent
any particular sector. There is no requirement in R.A. No. 7941 that a national or regional political party
must represent a marginalized and underrepresented sector. It is sufficient that the political party
consists of citizens who advocate the same ideology or platform, or the same governance principles and
policies, regardless of their economic status as citizens.
Section 5 of R.A. No. 7941 states that the sectors shall include labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban
poor, indigenous cultural communities, elderly, handicapped, women, youth, veterans, overseas workers,
and professionals. The sectors mentioned in Section 5 are not all necessarily marginalized and
underrepresented. For sure, professionals are not by definition marginalized and underrepresented,
not even the elderly, women, and the youth. However, professionals, the elderly, women, and the youth
may lack well-defined political constituencies, and can thus organize themselves into sectoral parties in
advocacy of the special interests and concerns of their respective sectors.
Section 6 of R.A. No. 7941 provides another compelling reason for holding that the law does not
require national or regional parties, as well as certain sectoral parties in Section 5 of R.A. No. 7941, to
represent the marginalized and underrepresented. Section 6 provides the grounds for the COMELEC to
refuse or cancel the registration of parties or organizations after due notice and hearing.
Section6.Refusal and/or Cancellation of Registration.The COMELEC may, motu proprio

or upon verified complaint of any interested party, refuse or cancel, after due notice and hearing, the
registration of any national, regional or sectoral party, organization or coalition on any of the following
grounds:
(1)It is a religious sect or denomination, organization or association organized for religious

purposes;
(2)It advocates violence or unlawful means to seek its goal;
(3)It is a foreign party or organization;
(4)It is receiving support from any foreign government, foreign political party, foundation,
organization, whether directly or through any of its officers or members or indirectly through third parties
for partisan election purposes;
(5)It violates or fails to comply with laws, rules or regulations relating to elections;
(6)It declares untruthful statements in its petition;
(7)It has ceased to exist for at least one (1) year; or
(8)It fails to participate in the last two (2) preceding elections or fails to obtain at least two per
centum (2%) of the votes cast under the party-list system in the two (2) preceding elections for the
constituency in which it has registered.
None of the 8 grounds to refuse or cancel registration refers to non-representation of the

marginalized and underrepresented.
The phrase marginalized and underrepresented appears only once in R.A. No. 7941, in Section
2 on Declaration of Policy. Section 2 seeks to promote proportional representation in the election of
representatives to the House of Representatives through the party-list system, which will enable
Filipinos belonging to the marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties, and who
lack well-defined political constituencies, to become members of the House of Representatives. While
the policy declaration in Section 2 of R.A. No. 7941 broadly refers to marginalized and underrepresented
sectors, organizations and parties, the specific implementing provisions of R.A. No. 7941 do not define
or require that the sectors, organizations or parties must be marginalized and underrepresented. On the
contrary, to even interpret that all the sectors mentioned in Section 5 are marginalized and
underrepresented would lead to absurdities.
The phrase marginalized and underrepresented should refer only to the sectors in Section 5 that
are, by their nature, economically marginalized and underrepresented. These sectors are: labor, peasant,
fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, handicapped, veterans, overseas workers, and
other similar sectors. For these sectors, a majority of the members of the sectoral party must belong to the
marginalized and underrepresented. The nominees of the sectoral party either must belong to the sector,
or must have a track record of advocacy for the sector represented. Belonging to the marginalized and
underrepresented sector does not mean one must wallow in poverty, destitution or infirmity. It is
sufficient that one, or his or her sector, is below the middle class. More specifically, the economically
marginalized and underrepresented are those who fall in the low income group as classified by the
National Statistical Coordination Board.
The recognition that national and regional parties, as well as sectoral parties of professionals, the
elderly, women and the youth, need not be marginalized and underrepresented will allow small
ideology-based and cause-oriented parties who lack well-defined political constituencies a chance to
win seats in the House of Representatives. On the other hand, limiting to the marginalized and
underrepresented the sectoral parties for labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural
communities, handicapped, veterans, overseas workers, and other sectors that by their nature are
economically at the margins of society, will give the marginalized and underrepresented an opportunity
to likewise win seats in the House of Representatives.
This interpretation will harmonize the 1987 Constitution and R.A. No. 7941 and will give rise to
a multi-party system where those marginalized and underrepresented, both in economic and ideological
status, will have the opportunity to send their own members to the House of Representatives. This
interpretation will also make the party-list system honest and transparent, eliminating the need for
relatively well-off party-list representatives to masquerade as wallowing in poverty, destitution and
infirmity, even as they attend sessions in Congress riding in SUVs.
The major political parties are those that field candidates in the legislative district elections.
Major political parties cannot participate in the party-list elections since they neither lack well-defined
political constituencies nor represent marginalized and underrepresented sectors. Thus, the national or
regional parties under the party-list system are necessarily those that do not belong to major political
parties. This automatically reserves the national and regional parties under the party-list system to those
who lack well-defined political constituencies, giving them the opportunity to have members in the
House of Representatives.
To recall, Ang Bagong Bayani expressly declared, in its second guideline for the accreditation of
parties under the party-list system, that while even major political parties are expressly allowed by RA
7941 and the Constitution to participate in the party-list system, they must comply with the declared
statutory policy of enabling Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and underrepresented sectors
x x x to be elected to the House of Representatives. However, the requirement in Ang Bagong Bayani, in
its second guideline, that the political party x x x must represent the marginalized and underrepresented,
automatically disqualified major political parties from participating in the party-list system. This inherent
inconsistency in Ang Bagong Bayani has been compounded by the COMELECs refusal to register
sectoral wings officially organized by major political parties. BANAT merely formalized the prevailing
practice when it expressly prohibited major political parties from participating in the party-list system,
even through their sectoral wings.
Section 11 of R.A. No. 7941 expressly prohibited the first five (5) major political parties on the
basis of party representation in the House of Representatives at the start of the Tenth Congress from
participating in the May 1988 party-list elections. Thus, major political parties can participate in
subsequent party-list elections since the prohibition is expressly limited only to the 1988 party-list
elections. However, major political parties should participate in party-list elections only through their
sectoral wings. The participation of major political parties through their sectoral wings, a majority of
whose members are marginalized and underrepresented or lacking in well-defined political
constituencies, will facilitate the entry of the marginalized and underrepresented and those who lack
well-defined political constituencies as members of the House of Representatives.
The 1987 Constitution and R.A. No. 7941 allow major political parties to participate in party-list
elections so as to encourage them to work assiduously in extending their constituencies to the
marginalized and underrepresented and to those who lack well-defined political constituencies. The
participation of major political parties in party-list elections must be geared towards the entry, as members
of the House of Representatives, of the marginalized and underrepresented and those who lack well-
defined political constituencies, giving them a voice in lawmaking. Thus, to participate in party-list
elections, a major political party that fields candidates in the legislative district elections must organize a
sectoral wing, like a labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, professional, women or youth wing, that can
register under the party-list system.
Such sectoral wing of a major political party must have its own constitution, by-laws, platform or
program of government, officers and members, a majority of whom must belong to the sector represented.
The sectoral wing is in itself an independent sectoral party, and is linked to a major political party through
a coalition. This linkage is allowed by Section 3 of R.A. No. 7941, which provides that component
parties or organizations of a coalition may participate independently (in party-list elections) provided the
coalition of which they form part does not participate in the party-list system.
Section 9 of R.A. No. 7941 prescribes the qualifications of party-list nominees. This provision
prescribes a special qualification only for the nominee from the youth sector.
Section9.Qualifications of Party-List Nominees.No person shall be nominated as party-list

representative unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, a registered voter, a resident of the
Philippines for a period of not less than one (1) year immediately preceding the day of the election, able to
read and write, a bona fide member of the party or organization which he seeks to represent for at least
ninety (90) days preceding the day of the election, and is at least twenty-five (25) years of age on the day of
the election.
In case of a nominee of the youth sector, he must at least be twentyfive (25) but not more than
thirty (30) years of age on the day of the election. Any youth sectoral representative who attains the age of
thirty (30) during his term shall be allowed to continue in office until the expiration of his term.
A party-list nominee must be a bona fide member of the party or organization which he or she
seeks to represent. In the case of sectoral parties, to be a bona fide party-list nominee one must either
belong to the sector represented, or have a track record of advocacy for such sector.
In disqualifying petitioners, the COMELEC used the criteria prescribed in Ang Bagong Bayani
and BANAT. Ang Bagong Bayani laid down the guidelines for qualifying those who desire to participate
in the party-list system:
First, the political party, sector, organization or coalition must represent the marginalized and
underrepresented groups identified in Section 5 of RA 7941. x x x
Second, while even major political parties are expressly allowed by RA 7941 and the Constitution
to participate in the party-list system, they must comply with the declared statutory policy of enabling
Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and underrepresented sectors x x x to be elected to the House
of Representatives. x x x.
xxxx
Third, x x x the religious sector may not be represented in the party-list system. x x x.
xxxx
Fourth, a party or an organization must not be disqualified under Section 6 of RA 7941, which
enumerates the grounds for disqualification as follows:
(1)It is a religious sect or denomination, organization or association, organized for

religious purposes;
(2)It advocates violence or unlawful means to seek its goal;
(3)It is a foreign party or organization;
(4) It is receiving support from any foreign government, foreign political party,
foundation, organization, whether directly or through any of its officers or members or indirectly
through third parties for partisan election purposes;
(5)It violates or fails to comply with laws, rules or regulations relating to elections;
(6)It declares untruthful statements in its petition;
(7)It has ceased to exist for at least one (1) year; or
(8) It fails to participate in the last two (2) preceding elections or fails to obtain at least
two per centum (2%) of the votes cast under the party-list system in the two (2) preceding
elections for the constituency in which it has registered.
Fifth, the party or organization must not be an adjunct of, or a project organized or an entity
funded or assisted by, the government. x x x.
xxxx
Sixth, the party must not only comply with the requirements of the law; its nominees must
likewise do so. Section 9 of RA 7941 reads as follows:
SEC. 9.Qualifications of Party-List Nominees.No person shall be nominated as

party-list representative unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, a registered voter, a
resident of the Philippines for a period of not less than one (1) year immediately preceding the day
of the election, able to read and write, a bona fide member of the party or organization which he
seeks to represent for at least ninety (90) days preceding the day of the election, and is at least
twenty-five (25) years of age on the day of the election.
In case of a nominee of the youth sector, he must at least be twenty-five (25) but not more
than thirty (30) years of age on the day of the election. Any youth sectoral representative who
attains the age of thirty (30) during his term shall be allowed to continue in office until the
expiration of his term.
Seventh, not only the candidate party or organization must represent marginalized and
underrepresented sectors; so also must its nominees. x x x.
Eighth, x x x the nominee must likewise be able to contribute to the formulation and enactment of
appropriate legislation that will benefit the nation as a whole.
In 2009, by a vote of 8-7 in BANAT, this Court stretched the Ang Bagong Bayani ruling further. In
BANAT, the majority officially excluded major political parties from participating in party-list elections,
abandoning even the lip-service that Ang Bagong Bayani accorded to the 1987 Constitution and R.A. No.
7941 that major political parties can participate in party-list elections.
The minority in BANAT, however, believed that major political parties can participate in the
party-list system through their sectoral wings. The minority expressed that [e]xcluding the major
political parties in party-list elections is manifestly against the Constitution, the intent of the
Constitutional Commission, and R.A. No. 7941. This Court cannot engage in socio-political engineering
and judicially legislate the exclusion of major political parties from the party-list elections in patent
violation of the Constitution and the law. The experimentations in socio-political engineering have only
resulted in confusion and absurdity in the party-list system. Such experimentations, in clear contravention
of the 1987 Constitution and R.A. No. 7941, must now come to an end.
We cannot, however, fault the COMELEC for following prevailing jurisprudence in disqualifying
petitioners. In following prevailing jurisprudence, the COMELEC could not have committed grave abuse
of discretion. However, for the coming 13 May 2013 party-list elections, we must now impose and
mandate the party-list system actually envisioned and authorized under the 1987 Constitution and R.A.
No. 7941. In BANAT, this Court devised a new formula in the allocation of party-list seats, reversing the
COMELECs allocation which followed the then prevailing formula in Ang Bagong Bayani. In BANAT,
however, the Court did not declare that the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion. Similarly,
even as we acknowledge here that the COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion, we declare
that it would not be in accord with the 1987 Constitution and R.A. No. 7941 to apply the criteria in Ang
Bagong Bayani and BANAT in determining who are qualified to participate in the coming 13 May 2013
party-list elections. For this purpose, we suspend our rule62 that a party may appeal to this Court from
decisions or orders of the COMELEC only if the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion.
Thus, we remand all the present petitions to the COMELEC. In determining who may participate
in the coming 13 May 2013 and subsequent party-list elections, the COMELEC shall adhere to the
following parameters:
1.Three different groups may participate in the party-list system: (1) national parties or
organizations, (2) regional parties or organizations, and (3) sectoral parties or organizations.
2.National parties or organizations and regional parties or organizations do not need to

organize along sectoral lines and do not need to represent any marginalized and underrepresented
sector.
3.Political parties can participate in party-list elections provided they register under the party-
list system and do not field candidates in legislative district elections. A political party, whether major or
not, that fields candidates in legislative district elections can participate in party-list elections only
through its sectoral wing that can separately register under the party-list system. The sectoral wing is by
itself an independent sectoral party, and is linked to a political party through a coalition.
4.Sectoral parties or organizations may either be marginalized and underrepresented or

lacking in well-defined political constituencies. It is enough that their principal advocacy pertains to the
special interest and concerns of their sector. The sectors that are marginalized and underrepresented
include labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, handicapped, veterans,
and overseas workers. The sectors that lack well-defined political constituencies include professionals,
the elderly, women, and the youth.
5.A majority of the members of sectoral parties or organizations that represent the
marginalized and underrepresented must belong to the marginalized and underrepresented sector they
represent. Similarly, a majority of the members of sectoral parties or organizations that lack well-defined
political constituencies must belong to the sector they represent. The nominees of sectoral parties or
organizations that represent the marginalized and underrepresented, or that represent those who lack
well-defined political constituencies, either must belong to their respective sectors, or must have a track
record of advocacy for their respective sectors. The nominees of national and regional parties or
organizations must be bona fide members of such parties or organizations.
6.National, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations shall not be disqualified if some of
their nominees are disqualified, provided that they have at least one nominee who remains qualified.
This Court is sworn to uphold the 1987 Constitution, apply its provisions faithfully, and desist
from engaging in socio-economic or political experimentations contrary to what the Constitution has
ordained. Judicial power does not include the power to re-write the Constitution. Thus, the present
petitions should be remanded to the COMELEC not because the COMELEC committed grave abuse of
discretion in disqualifying petitioners, but because petitioners may now possibly qualify to participate in
the coming 13 May 2013 party-list elections under the new parameters prescribed by this Court. (ATONG
PAGLAUM, INC. vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, 694 SCRA 477, G.R. No. 203766 April 2, 2013)
The Senate Committee on Banks, Financial Institutions and Currencies invited Standard
Chartered Bank and several of its officers to submit position papers, because the former would
conduct an inquiry against the latter, in aid of legislation, with regard to the allegations that the
bank violated the Securities Regulation Code by selling unregistered foreign securities. The bank
argued that there were already pending criminal and civil cases filed before the trial court and the
Court of Appeals against them involving the same issues, which were subject of the legislative
inquiry, thereby, challenging the jurisdiction of the senate committee to proceed with the inquiry.
Nevertheless, the senate committee continued with the investigation and issued the officers, who did
not attend, subpoenae ad testficandum and duces tecum to compel them to attend and testify in the
next hearing. Does the senate committee have jurisdiction to conduct legislative inquiry, in aid of
legislation, about issues which are also the subject matter in pending criminal and civil cases before
the trial court and the Court of Appeals?
Yes. Indeed, the mere filing of a criminal or an administrative complaint before a court or a quasi-
judicial body should not automatically bar the conduct of legislative investigation. Otherwise, it would be
extremely easy to subvert any intended inquiry by Congress through the convenient ploy of instituting a
criminal or an administrative complaint. Surely, the exercise of sovereign legislative authority, of which
the power of legislative inquiry is an essential component, cannot be made subordinate to a criminal or an
administrative investigation. As succinctly stated in the landmark case Arnault v. Nazareno: [T]he power
of inquirywith process to enforce itis an essential and appropriate auxiliary to the legislative
function. A legislative body cannot legislate wisely or effectively in the absence of information respecting
the conditions which the legislation is intended to affect or change; and where the legislative body does
not itself possess the requisite informationwhich is not infrequently truerecourse must be had to
others who possess it. (STANDARD CHARTERED BANK (PHILIPPINE BRANCH) vs. SENATE
COMMITTEE ON BANKS, FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS AND CURRENCIES, 541 SCRA 456, G.R. No.
167173 December 27, 2007)
National Budget Circular (NBC) No. 541 was issued to implement the Disbursement
Acceleration Program (DAP), a program designed by the Department of Budget and Management
(DBM) to ramp up spending to accelerate economic growth. The DBM alleged that the DAP
releases had been sourced from savings generated by the Government, and from unprogrammed
funds; and that the savings had been derived from (1) the pooling of unreleased appropriations, like
unreleased Personnel Services appropriations that would lapse at the end of the year, unreleased
appropriations of slow-moving projects and discontinued projects per zero-based budgeting
findings; and (2) the withdrawal of unobligated allotments also for slow-moving programs and
projects that had been earlier released to the agencies of the National Government. Concerned
citizens filed various petitions before the Supreme Court, arguing that the DAP violates Section
29(1), Article VI of the Constitution, which states [n]o money shall be paid out of the Treasury
except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law. They averred that through the DAP, the
Executive was allowed to allocate public money pooled from programmed and unprogrammed
funds of its various agencies in the guise of the President exercising his constitutional authority
under Section 25(5) of the 1987 Constitution to transfer funds out of savings to augment the
appropriations of offices within the Executive Branch of the Government; thus contravening the
constitutional provision.
Does the DAP violate Section 29(1), Article VI of the Constitution? No. The DAP was a
government policy or strategy designed to stimulate the economy through accelerated spending. In the
context of the DAPs adoption and implementation being a function pertaining to the Executive as the
main actor during the Budget Execution Stage under its constitutional mandate to faithfully execute the
laws, including the GAAs, Congress did not need to legislate to adopt or to implement the DAP. Congress
could appropriate but would have nothing more to do during the Budget Execution Stage. Indeed,
appropriation was the act by which Congress designates a particular fund, or sets apart a specified
portion of the public revenue or of the money in the public treasury, to be applied to some general object
of governmental expenditure, or to some individual purchase or expense. As pointed out in Gonzales v.
Raquiza: In a strict sense, appropriation has been defined as nothing more than the legislative
authorization prescribed by the Constitution that money may be paid out of the Treasury, while
appropriation made by law refers to the act of the legislature setting apart or assigning to a particular use
a certain sum to be used in the payment of debt or dues from the State to its creditors.
On the other hand, the President, in keeping with his duty to faithfully execute the laws, had
sufficient discretion during the execution of the budget to adapt the budget to changes in the countrys
economic situation. He could adopt a plan like the DAP for the purpose. He could pool the savings and
identify the PAPs to be funded under the DAP. The pooling of savings pursuant to the DAP, and the
identification of the PAPs to be funded under the DAP did not involve appropriation in the strict sense
because the money had been already set apart from the public treasury by Congress through the GAAs. In
such actions, the Executive did not usurp the power vested in Congress under Section 29(1), Article VI of
the Constitution.
Does the DAP, NBC No. 541, and all other executive issuances implementing the DAP
violate Section 25(5), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution? Yes. The transfer of appropriated funds, to
be valid under Section 25(5), must be made upon a concurrence of the following requisites, namely:
(1) There is a law authorizing the President, the President of the Senate, the Speaker of the
House of Representatives, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and the heads of the
Constitutional Commissions to transfer funds within their respective offices;
(2) The funds to be transferred are savings generated from the appropriations for their
respective offices; and
(3) The purpose of the transfer is to augment an item in the general appropriations law for their
respective offices.
b.1. First Requisite GAAs of 2011 and 2012 lacked valid provisions to authorize transfers of
funds under the DAP; hence, transfers under the DAP were unconstitutional.
Section 25(5), not being a self-executing provision of the Constitution, must have an
implementing law for it to be operative. That law, generally, is the GAA of a given fiscal year. To comply
with the first requisite, the GAAs should expressly authorize the transfer of funds.
In the 2011 GAA, the provision that gave the President and the other high officials the authority
to transfer funds was Section 59, as follows:
Section59.Use of Savings.The President of the Philippines, the Senate President, the

Speaker of the House of Representatives, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, the Heads of
Constitutional Commissions enjoying fiscal autonomy, and the Ombudsman are hereby authorized to
augment any item in this Act from savings in other items of their respective appropriations.
In the 2012 GAA, the empowering provision was Section 53, to wit:

Constitutional Commissions enjoying fiscal autonomy, and the Ombudsman are hereby authorized to
augment any item in this Act from savings in other items of their respective appropriations.
In fact, the foregoing provisions of the 2011 and 2012 GAAs were cited by the DBM as
justification for the use of savings under the DAP.
A reading shows, however, that the aforequoted provisions of the GAAs of 2011 and 2012 were
textually unfaithful to the Constitution for not carrying the phrase for their respective offices contained
in Section 25(5), supra. The impact of the phrase for their respective offices was to authorize only
transfers of funds within their offices (i.e., in the case of the President, the transfer was to an item of
appropriation within the Executive). The provisions carried a different phrase (to augment any item in
this Act), and the effect was that the 2011 and 2012 GAAs thereby literally allowed the transfer of funds
from savings to augment any item in the GAAs even if the item belonged to an office outside the
Executive. To that extent did the 2011 and 2012 GAAs contravene the Constitution. At the very least, the
aforequoted provisions cannot be used to claim authority to transfer appropriations from the Executive to
another branch, or to a constitutional commission.
Apparently realizing the problem, Congress inserted the omitted phrase in the counterpart
provision in the 2013 GAA, to wit:

Constitutional Commissions enjoying fiscal autonomy, and the Ombudsman are hereby authorized to use
savings in their respective appropriations to augment actual deficiencies incurred for the current year in any
item of their respective appropriations.
Even had a valid law authorizing the transfer of funds pursuant to Section 25(5), supra, existed,
there still remained two other requisites to be met, namely: that the source of funds to be transferred were
savings from appropriations within the respective offices; and that the transfer must be for the purpose of
augmenting an item of appropriation within the respective offices.
b.2. Second Requisite There were no savings from which funds could be sourced for the DAP.
In ascertaining the meaning of savings, certain principles should be borne in mind. The first
principle is that Congress wields the power of the purse. Congress decides how the budget will be spent;
what PAPs to fund; and the amounts of money to be spent for each PAP. The second principle is that the
Executive, as the department of the Government tasked to enforce the laws, is expected to faithfully
execute the GAA and to spend the budget in accordance with the provisions of the GAA. The Executive is
expected to faithfully implement the PAPs for which Congress allocated funds, and to limit the
expenditures within the allocations, unless exigencies result to deficiencies for which augmentation is
authorized, subject to the conditions provided by law. The third principle is that in making the Presidents
power to augment operative under the GAA, Congress recognizes the need for flexibility in budget
execution. In so doing, Congress diminishes its own power of the purse, for it delegates a fraction of its
power to the Executive. But Congress does not thereby allow the Executive to override its authority over
the purse as to let the Executive exceed its delegated authority. And the fourth principle is that savings
should be actual. Actual denotes something that is real or substantial, or something that exists presently
in fact, as opposed to something that is merely theoretical, possible, potential or hypothetical.
The foregoing principles caution us to construe savings strictly against expanding the scope of the
power to augment. It is then indubitable that the power to augment was to be used only when the purpose
for which the funds had been allocated were already satisfied, or the need for such funds had ceased to
exist, for only then could savings be properly realized. This interpretation prevents the Executive from
unduly transgressing Congress power of the purse.
The definition of savings in the GAAs, particularly for 2011, 2012 and 2013, reflected this
interpretation and made it operational, viz.:
Savings refer to portions or balances of any programmed appropriation in this Act free from any
obligation or encumbrance which are: (i) still available after the completion or final discontinuance or
abandonment of the work, activity or purpose for which the appropriation is authorized; (ii) from
appropriations balances arising from unpaid compensation and related costs pertaining to vacant positions
and leaves of absence without pay; and (iii) from appropriations balances realized from the implementation
of measures resulting in improved systems and efficiencies and thus enabled agencies to meet and deliver
the required or planned targets, programs and services approved in this Act at a lesser cost.
The three instances listed in the GAAs aforequoted definition were a sure indication that savings
could be generated only upon the purpose of the appropriation being fulfilled, or upon the need for the
appropriation being no longer existent.
The phrase free from any obligation or encumbrance in the definition of savings in the GAAs
conveyed the notion that the appropriation was at that stage when the appropriation was already obligated
and the appropriation was already released. This interpretation was reinforced by the enumeration of the
three instances for savings to arise, which showed that the appropriation referred to had reached the
agency level. It could not be otherwise, considering that only when the appropriation had reached the
agency level could it be determined whether (a) the PAP for which the appropriation had been authorized
was completed, finally discontinued, or abandoned; or (b) there were vacant positions and leaves of
absence without pay; or (c) the required or planned targets, programs and services were realized at a
lesser cost because of the implementation of measures resulting in improved systems and efficiencies.
The DBM declares that part of the savings brought under the DAP came from pooling of
unreleased appropriations such as unreleased Personnel Services appropriations which will lapse at the
end of the year, unreleased appropriations of slow moving projects and discontinued projects per Zero-
Based Budgeting findings.
The declaration of the DBM by itself does not state the clear legal basis for the treatment of
unreleased or unalloted appropriations as savings. The fact alone that the appropriations are unreleased or
unalloted is a mere description of the status of the items as unalloted or unreleased. They have not yet
ripened into categories of items from which savings can be generated. Appropriations have been
considered released if there has already been an allotment or authorization to incur obligations and
disbursement authority. This means that the DBM has issued either an ABM (for those not needing
clearance), or a SARO (for those needing clearance), and consequently an NCA, NCAA or CDC, as the
case may be. Appropriations remain unreleased, for instance, because of noncompliance with
documentary requirements (like the Special Budget Request), or simply because of the unavailability of
funds. But the appropriations do not actually reach the agencies to which they were allocated under the
GAAs, and have remained with the DBM technically speaking. Ergo, unreleased appropriations refer to
appropriations with allotments but without disbursement authority.
For us to consider unreleased appropriations as savings, unless these met the statutory definition
of savings, would seriously undercut the congressional power of the purse, because such appropriations
had not even reached and been used by the agency concerned vis--vis the PAPs for which Congress had
allocated them. However, if an agency has unfilled positions in its plantilla and did not receive an
allotment and NCA for such vacancies, appropriations for such positions, although unreleased, may
already constitute savings for that agency under the second instance.
Unobligated allotments, on the other hand, were encompassed by the first part of the definition of
savings in the GAA, that is, as portions or balances of any programmed appropriation in this Act free
from any obligation or encumbrance. But the first part of the definition was further qualified by the three
enumerated instances of when savings would be realized. As such, unobligated allotments could not be
indiscriminately declared as savings without first determining whether any of the three instances existed.
This signified that the DBMs withdrawal of unobligated allotments had disregarded the definition of
savings under the GAAs.
Justice Carpio has validly observed in his Separate Concurring Opinion that MOOE
appropriations are deemed divided into twelve monthly allocations within the fiscal year; hence, savings
could be generated monthly from the excess or unused MOOE appropriations other than the Mandatory
Expenditures and Expenditures for Business-type Activities because of the physical impossibility to
obligate and spend such funds as MOOE for a period that already lapsed. Following this observation,
MOOE for future months are not savings and cannot be transferred.
A perusal of various provisions reveals that NBC No. 541 targeted the withdrawal of
unobligated allotments of agencies with low levels of obligations to fund priority and/or fast-moving
programs/projects. But the fact that the withdrawn allotments could be [r]eissued for the original
programs and projects of the agencies/OUs concerned, from which the allotments were withdrawn
supported the conclusion that the PAPs had not yet been finally discontinued or abandoned. Thus, the
purpose for which the withdrawn funds had been appropriated was not yet fulfilled, or did not yet cease to
exist, rendering the declaration of the funds as savings impossible.
Worse, NBC No. 541 immediately considered for withdrawal all released allotments in 2011
charged against the 2011 GAA that had remained unobligated based on the following considerations, to
wit:
5.4.1 The departments/agencies approved priority programs and projects are assumed to be
implementation-ready and doable during the given fiscal year; and
5.4.2 The practice of having substantial carryover appropriations may imply that the agency has
a slower-than-programmed implementation capacity or agency tends to implement projects within a two-
year timeframe.
Such withdrawals pursuant to NBC No. 541, the circular that affected the unobligated allotments
for continuing and current appropriations as of June 30, 2012, disregarded the 2-year period of
availability of the appropriations for MOOE and capital outlay extended under Section 65, General
Provisions of the 2011 GAA, viz.:
Section65.Availability of Appropriations.Appropriations for MOOE and capital outlays

authorized in this Act shall be available for release and obligation for the purpose specified, and under the
same special provisions applicable thereto, for a period extending to one fiscal year after the end of the year
in which such items were appropriated: PROVIDED, That appropriations for MOOE and capital outlays
under R.A. No. 9970 shall be made available up to the end of FY 2011: PROVIDED, FURTHER, That a
report on these releases and obligations shall be submitted to the Senate Committee on Finance and the
House Committee on Appropriations.
and Section 63 General Provisions of the 2012 GAA, viz.:
Section63.Availability of Appropriations.Appropriations for MOOE and capital outlays

authorized in this Act shall be available for release and obligation for the purpose specified, and under the
same special provisions applicable thereto, for a period extending to one fiscal year after the end of the year
in which such items were appropriated: PROVIDED, That a report on these releases and obligations shall
be submitted to the Senate Committee on Finance and the House Committee on Appropriations, either in
printed form or by way of electronic document.
Thus, another alleged area of constitutional infirmity was that the DAP and its relevant issuances
shortened the period of availability of the appropriations for MOOE and capital outlays.
Congress provided a one-year period of availability of the funds for all allotment classes in the
2013 GAA (R.A. No. 10352), to wit:
Section63.Availability of Appropriations.All appropriations authorized in this Act shall be

available for release and obligation for the purposes specified, and under the same special provisions
applicable thereto, until the end of FY 2013: PROVIDED, That a report on these releases and obligations
shall be submitted to the Senate Committee on Finance and House Committee on Appropriations, either in
printed form or by way of electronic document.
Yet, in his memorandum for the President dated May 20, 2013, Sec. Abad sought omnibus
authority to consolidate savings and unutilized balances to fund the DAP on a quarterly basis, viz.:
7.0 If the level of financial performance of some department will register below program, even
with the availability of funds at their disposal, the targeted obligations/disbursements for each quarter will
not be met. It is important to note that these funds will lapse at the end of the fiscal year if these remain
unobligated.
8.0 To maximize the use of the available allotment, all unobligated balances at the end of every
quarter, both for continuing and current allotments shall be withdrawn and pooled to fund fast moving
programs/projects.
9.0 It may be emphasized that the allotments to be withdrawn will be based on the list of slow
moving projects to be identified by the agencies and their catch up plans to be evaluated by the DBM.
The validity period of the affected appropriations, already given the brief lifespan of one year,
was further shortened to only a quarter of a year under the DBMs memorandum dated May 20, 2013.
The petitioners accuse the respondents of forcing the generation of savings in order to have a
larger fund available for discretionary spending. They aver that the respondents, by withdrawing
unobligated allotments in the middle of the fiscal year, in effect deprived funding for PAPs with existing
appropriations under the GAAs.
The respondents belie the accusation, insisting that the unobligated allotments were being
withdrawn upon the instance of the implementing agencies based on their own assessment that they could
not obligate those allotments pursuant to the Presidents directive for them to spend their appropriations
as quickly as they could in order to ramp up the economy.
We agree with the petitioners.
Contrary to the respondents insistence, the withdrawals were upon the initiative of the DBM
itself. The text of NBC No. 541 bears this out, to wit:
5.2 For the purpose of determining the amount of unobligated allotments that shall be
withdrawn, all departments/agencies/operating units (OUs) shall submit to DBM not later than July 30,
2012, the following budget accountability reports as of June 30, 2012;
Statement of Allotments, Obligation and Balances (SAOB);

Financial Report of Operations (FRO); and
Physical Report of Operations.
5.3 In the absence of the June 30, 2012 reports cited under item 5.2 of this Circular, the
agencys latest report available shall be used by DBM as basis for withdrawal of allotment. The DBM shall
compute/approximate the agencys obligation level as of June 30 to derive its unobligated allotments as of
same period. Example: If the March 31 SAOB or FRO reflects actual obligations of P800M then the June
30 obligation level shall approximate to P1,600 M (i.e., P800 M x 2 quarters).
The petitioners assert that no law had authorized the withdrawal and transfer of unobligated
allotments and the pooling of unreleased appropriations; and that the unbridled withdrawal of unobligated
allotments and the retention of appropriated funds were akin to the impoundment of appropriations that
could be allowed only in case of unmanageable national government budget deficit under the GAAs,
thus violating the provisions of the GAAs of 2011, 2012 and 2013 prohibiting the retention or deduction
of allotments.
In contrast, the respondents emphasize that NBC No. 541 adopted a spending, not saving, policy
as a last-ditch effort of the Executive to push agencies into actually spending their appropriations; that
such policy did not amount to an impoundment scheme, because impoundment referred to the decision of
the Executive to refuse to spend funds for political or ideological reasons; and that the withdrawal of
allotments under NBC No. 541 was made pursuant to Section 38, Chapter 5, Book VI of the
Administrative Code, by which the President was granted the authority to suspend or otherwise stop
further expenditure of funds allotted to any agency whenever in his judgment the public interest so
required.
The assertions of the petitioners are upheld. The withdrawal and transfer of unobligated
allotments and the pooling of unreleased appropriations were invalid for being bereft of legal support.
Nonetheless, such withdrawal of unobligated allotments and the retention of appropriated funds cannot be
considered as impoundment.
According to Philippine Constitution Association v. Enriquez: Impoundment refers to a refusal

by the President, for whatever reason, to spend funds made available by Congress. It is the failure to
spend or obligate budget authority of any type. Impoundment under the GAA is understood to mean the
retention or deduction of appropriations. The 2011 GAA authorized impoundment only in case of
unmanageable National Government budget deficit, to wit:
Section 66.Prohibition Against Impoundment of Appropriations.No appropriations

authorized under this Act shall be impounded through retention or deduction, unless in
accordance with the rules and regulations to be issued by the DBM: PROVIDED, That all the
funds appropriated for the purposes, programs, projects and activities authorized under this Act,
except those covered under the Unprogrammed Fund, shall be released pursuant to Section 33(3),
Chapter 5, Book VI of E.O. No. 292.
Section 67.Unmanageable National Government Budget Deficit.Retention or

deduction of appropriations authorized in this Act shall be effected only in cases where there is an
unmanageable national government budget deficit.
Unmanageable national government budget deficit as used in this section shall be construed to
mean that (i) the actual national government budget deficit has exceeded the quarterly budget deficit
targets consistent with the full-year target deficit as indicated in the FY 2011 Budget of Expenditures and
Sources of Financing submitted by the President and approved by Congress pursuant to Section 22,
Article VII of the Constitution, or (ii) there are clear economic indications of an impending occurrence of
such condition, as determined by the Development Budget Coordinating Committee and approved by the
President.
The 2012 and 2013 GAAs contained similar provisions.
The withdrawal of unobligated allotments under the DAP should not be regarded as impoundment
because it entailed only the transfer of funds, not the retention or deduction of appropriations.
Nor could Section 68 of the 2011 GAA (and the similar provisions of the 2012 and 2013 GAAs)
be applicable. They uniformly stated:
Section68.Prohibition Against Retention/Deduction of Allotment.Fund releases from

appropriations provided in this Act shall be transmitted intact or in full to the office or agency concerned.
No retention or deduction as reserves or overhead shall be made, except as authorized by law, or upon
direction of the President of the Philippines. The COA shall ensure compliance with this provision to the
extent that sub-allotments by agencies to their subordinate offices are in conformity with the release
documents issued by the DBM.
The provision obviously pertained to the retention or deduction of allotments upon their release
from the DBM, which was a different matter altogether. The Court should not expand the meaning of the
provision by applying it to the withdrawal of allotments.
The respondents rely on Section 38, Chapter 5, Book VI of the Administrative Code of 1987 to
justify the withdrawal of unobligated allotments. But the provision authorized only the suspension or
stoppage of further expenditures, not the withdrawal of unobligated allotments, to wit:
Section38.Suspension of Expenditure of Appropriations.Except as otherwise provided in

the General Appropriations Act and whenever in his judgment the public interest so requires, the President,
upon notice to the head of office concerned, is authorized to suspend or otherwise stop further expenditure
of funds allotted for any agency, or any other expenditure authorized in the General Appropriations Act,
except for personal services appropriations used for permanent officials and employees.
Moreover, the DBM did not suspend or stop further expenditures in accordance with Section 38,
supra, but instead transferred the funds to other PAPs.
It is relevant to remind at this juncture that the balances of appropriations that remained
unexpended at the end of the fiscal year were to be reverted to the General Fund. This was the mandate of
Section 28, Chapter IV, Book VI of the Administrative Code, to wit:
Section28.Reversion of Unexpended Balances of Appropriations, Continuing Appropriations.

Unexpended balances of appropriations authorized in the General Appropriation Act shall revert to the
unappropriated surplus of the General Fund at the end of the fiscal year and shall not thereafter be available
for expenditure except by subsequent legislative enactment: Provided, that appropriations for capital
outlays shall remain valid until fully spent or reverted: provided, further, that continuing appropriations for
current operating expenditures may be specifically recommended and approved as such in support of
projects whose effective implementation calls for multi-year expenditure commitments: provided, finally,
that the President may authorize the use of savings realized by an agency during given year to meet
nonrecurring expenditures in a subsequent year.
The balances of continuing appropriations shall be reviewed as part of the annual budget
preparation process and the preparation process and the President may approve upon recommendation of
the Secretary, the reversion of funds no longer needed in connection with the activities funded by said
continuing appropriations.
The Executive could not circumvent this provision by declaring unreleased appropriations and
unobligated allotments as savings prior to the end of the fiscal year.
b.3. Third Requisite No funds from savings could be transferred under the DAP to augment deficient
items not provided in the GAA
The third requisite for a valid transfer of funds is that the purpose of the transfer should be to
augment an item in the general appropriations law for the respective offices. The term augment means
to enlarge or increase in size, amount, or degree.
The GAAs for 2011, 2012 and 2013 set as a condition for augmentation that the appropriation for
the PAP item to be augmented must be deficient, to wit:
x x x Augmentation implies the existence in this Act of a program, activity, or project with an
appropriation, which upon implementation, or subsequent evaluation of needed resources, is determined to
be deficient. In no case shall a nonexistent program, activity, or project, be funded by augmentation from
savings or by the use of appropriations otherwise authorized in this Act.
In other words, an appropriation for any PAP must first be determined to be deficient before it
could be augmented from savings. Note is taken of the fact that the 2013 GAA already made this quite
clear, thus:
Section 52.Use of Savings.The President of the Philippines, the Senate President, the
Constitutional Commissions enjoying fiscal autonomy, and the Ombudsman are hereby authorized to use
savings in their respective appropriations to augment actual deficiencies incurred for the current year in any
item of their respective appropriations.
As of 2013, a total of P144.4 billion worth of PAPs were implemented through the DAP. Of this
amount P82.5 billion were released in 2011 and P54.8 billion in 2012. Sec. Abad has reported that 9% of
the total DAP releases were applied to the PAPs identified by the legislators.
Upon careful review of the documents contained in the seven evidence packets, we conclude that
the savings pooled under the DAP were allocated to PAPs that were not covered by any appropriations
in the pertinent GAAs.
Although the OSG rightly contends that the Executive was authorized to spend in line with its
mandate to faithfully execute the laws (which included the GAAs), such authority did not translate to
unfettered discretion that allowed the President to substitute his own will for that of Congress. He was
still required to remain faithful to the provisions of the GAAs, given that his power to spend pursuant to
the GAAs was but a delegation to him from Congress. Verily, the power to spend the public wealth
resided in Congress, not in the Executive. Moreover, leaving the spending power of the Executive
unrestricted would threaten to undo the principle of separation of powers.
Congress acts as the guardian of the public treasury in faithful discharge of its power of the purse
whenever it deliberates and acts on the budget proposal submitted by the Executive. Its power of the
purse is touted as the very foundation of its institutional strength, and underpins all other legislative
decisions and regulating the balance of influence between the legislative and executive branches of
government. Such enormous power encompasses the capacity to generate money for the Government, to
appropriate public funds, and to spend the money. Pertinently, when it exercises its power of the purse,
Congress wields control by specifying the PAPs for which public money should be spent.
It is the President who proposes the budget but it is Congress that has the final say on matters of
appropriations. For this purpose, appropriation involves two governing principles, namely: (1) a
Principle of the Public Fisc, asserting that all monies received from whatever source by any part of the
government are public funds; and (2) a Principle of Appropriations Control, prohibiting expenditure of
any public money without legislative authorization. To conform with the governing principles, the
Executive cannot circumvent the prohibition by Congress of an expenditure for a PAP by resorting to
either public or private funds. Nor could the Executive transfer appropriated funds resulting in an increase
in the budget for one PAP, for by so doing the appropriation for another PAP is necessarily decreased. The
terms of both appropriations will thereby be violated.
b.4. Third Requisite Cross-border augmentations from savings were prohibited by the
Constitution
By providing that the President, the President of the Senate, the Speaker of the House of
Representatives, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and the Heads of the Constitutional
Commissions may be authorized to augment any item in the GAA for their respective offices, Section
25(5), supra, has delineated borders between their offices, such that funds appropriated for one office are
prohibited from crossing over to another office even in the guise of augmentation of a deficient item or
items. Thus, we call such transfers of funds cross-border transfers or cross-border augmentations.
To be sure, the phrase respective offices used in Section 25(5), supra, refers to the entire
Executive, with respect to the President; the Senate, with respect to the Senate President; the House of
Representatives, with respect to the Speaker; the Judiciary, with respect to the Chief Justice; the
Constitutional Commissions, with respect to their respective Chairpersons.
During the oral arguments on January 28, 2014, Sec. Abad admitted making some cross-border
augmentations.
The records show, indeed, that funds amounting to P143,700,000.00 and P250,000,000.00 were
transferred under the DAP respectively to the COA and the House of Representatives.
Regardless of the variant characterizations of the cross-border transfers of funds, the plain text of
Section 25(5), supra, disallowing cross-border transfers was disobeyed. Cross-border transfers, whether as
augmentation, or as aid, were prohibited under Section 25(5), supra. (ARAULLO vs. AQUINO III, 728
SCRA 1, G.R. No. 209569 July 1, 2014)
Lourdes Rubrico and her daughters filed a petition for the issuance of a writ of Amparo
against, among others, then President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, to desist from threatening the
security of Lourdes and her daughters. The Court of Appeals removed then President Arroyo as
one of the respondents in the Amparo proceeding. Lourdes and her daughters argued that the
president does not enjoy immunity from suit since it was already removed from the 1987
Constitution. Can the president avail immunity from suit?
Yes. Petitioners are mistaken. The presidential immunity from suit remains preserved under our
system of government, albeit not expressly reserved in the present constitution. Addressing a concern of
his co-members in the 1986 Constitutional Commission on the absence of an express provision on the
matter, Fr. Joaquin Bernas, S.J. observed that it was already understood in jurisprudence that the President
may not be sued during his or her tenure. The Court subsequently made it abundantly clear in David v.
Macapagal-Arroyo, a case likewise resolved under the umbrella of the 1987 Constitution, that indeed the
President enjoys immunity during her incumbency, and why this must be so: Settled is the doctrine that
the President, during his tenure of office or actual incumbency, may not be sued in any civil or criminal
case, and there is no need to provide for it in the Constitution or law. It will degrade the dignity of the
high office of the President, the Head of State, if he can be dragged into court litigations while serving as
such. Furthermore, it is important that he be freed from any form of harassment, hindrance or distraction
to enable him to fully attend to the performance of his official duties and functions. Unlike the legislative
and judicial branch, only one constitutes the executive branch and anything which impairs his usefulness
in the discharge of the many great and important duties imposed upon him by the Constitution necessarily
impairs the operation of the Government. x x x
And lest it be overlooked, the petition is simply bereft of any allegation as to what specific
presidential act or omission violated or threatened to violate petitioners protected rights. (RUBRICO vs.
MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, 613 SCRA 233, G.R. No. 183871 February 18, 2010)
The newly-elected President executed Executive Order No. 1, creating an ad hoc body,
known as the Philippine Truth Commission (PTC), to be funded by the Office of the President, with
the primary task to investigate reports of graft and corruption during the previous administration,
and thereafter to submit its finding and recommendations to the President, Congress and the
Ombudsman. Several representatives of the Congress filed a petition before the Supreme Court,
arguing that E.O. No. 1 usurps the powers of the Congress to create a public office and to
appropriate funds. The Solicitor General averred that E.O. No. 1 does not violate the separation of
powers, because the Presidents executive power and power of control include the inherent power to
conduct investigations in ensuring that laws are executed, thus, granting them the power to create
or form such bodies. The SG further stressed that the Office of the President would not appropriate
funds, but would only allocate funds already appropriated by the Congress. Does Executive Order
No. 1 usurp the powers of the Congress to create a public office and to appropriate funds?
No. The creation of the PTC is not justified by the Presidents power of control. Control is
essentially the power to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the
performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former with that of the latter. Clearly, the
power of control is entirely different from the power to create public offices. The former is inherent in the
Executive, while the latter finds basis from either a valid delegation from Congress, or his inherent duty
to faithfully execute the laws.
The creation of the PTC finds justification under Section 17, Article VII of the Constitution,
imposing upon the President the duty to ensure that the laws are faithfully executed. Section 17 reads:
Section17.The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus, and
offices. He shall ensure that the laws be faithfully executed.
As correctly pointed out by the respondents, the allocation of power in the three principal
branches of government is a grant of all powers inherent in them. The Presidents power to conduct
investigations to aid him in ensuring the faithful execution of lawsin this case, fundamental laws on
public accountability and transparencyis inherent in the Presidents powers as the Chief Executive. That
the authority of the President to conduct investigations and to create bodies to execute this power is not
explicitly mentioned in the Constitution or in statutes does not mean that he is bereft of such authority. As
explained in the landmark case of Marcos v. Manglapus:
x x x. The 1987 Constitution, however, brought back the presidential system of government and
restored the separation of legislative, executive and judicial powers by their actual distribution among three
distinct branches of government with provision for checks and balances.
It would not be accurate, however, to state that executive power is the power to enforce the
laws, for the President is head of state as well as head of government and whatever powers inhere in such
positions pertain to the office unless the Constitution itself withholds it. Furthermore, the Constitution itself
provides that the execution of the laws is only one of the powers of the President. It also grants the
President other powers that do not involve the execution of any provision of law, e.g., his power over the
countrys foreign relations.
On these premises, we hold the view that although the 1987 Constitution imposes limitations on
the exercise of specific powers of the President, it maintains intact what is traditionally considered as
within the scope of executive power. Corollarily, the powers of the President cannot be said to be limited
only to the specific powers enumerated in the Constitution. In other words, executive power is more than
the sum of specific powers so enumerated.
It has been advanced that whatever power inherent in the government that is neither legislative nor
judicial has to be executive. x x x.
Indeed, the Executive is given much leeway in ensuring that our laws are faithfully executed. As
stated above, the powers of the President are not limited to those specific powers under the Constitution.
One of the recognized powers of the President granted pursuant to this constitutionally-mandated duty is
the power to create ad hoc committees. This flows from the obvious need to ascertain facts and determine
if laws have been faithfully executed.
It should be stressed that the purpose of allowing ad hoc investigating bodies to exist is to allow
an inquiry into matters which the President is entitled to know so that he can be properly advised and
guided in the performance of his duties relative to the execution and enforcement of the laws of the land.
And if history is to be revisited, this was also the objective of the investigative bodies created in the past
like the PCAC, PCAPE, PARGO, the Feliciano Commission, the Melo Commission and the Zearosa
Commission. There being no changes in the government structure, the Court is not inclined to declare
such executive power as non-existent just because the direction of the political winds have changed.
On the charge that Executive Order No. 1 transgresses the power of Congress to appropriate
funds for the operation of a public office, suffice it to say that there will be no appropriation but only an
allotment or allocations of existing funds already appropriated. Accordingly, there is no usurpation on the
part of the Executive of the power of Congress to appropriate funds. Further, there is no need to specify
the amount to be earmarked for the operation of the commission because, in the words of the Solicitor
General, whatever funds the Congress has provided for the Office of the President will be the very
source of the funds for the commission. Moreover, since the amount that would be allocated to the PTC
shall be subject to existing auditing rules and regulations, there is no impropriety in the funding.
(BIRAOGO vs. PHILIPPINE TRUTH COMMISSION OF 2010, 637 SCRA 78, G.R. No. 192935
December 7, 2010)
The siblings of James Balao filed a petition for the issuance of a Writ of Amparo before the
trial court in favor of James against, among others, then President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo.
Former president Arroyo argued that she should be dropped as a party-respondent since she enjoys
immunity from suit. The trial court, however, ruled otherwise, stating that in a petition for a writ of
Amparo, the president is not immune from suit, for a writ of Amparo is considered as his tool in
upholding laws on human rights. Can the president claim immunity from suit in an Amparo
proceeding?
Yes. As to the matter of dropping President Arroyo as party-respondent, though not raised in the
petitions, we hold that the trial court clearly erred in holding that presidential immunity cannot be
properly invoked in an Amparo proceeding. As president, then President Arroyo was enjoying immunity
from suit when the petition for a writ of Amparo was filed. Moreover, the petition is bereft of any
allegation as to what specific presidential act or omission violated or threatened to violate petitioners
protected rights. (BALAO vs. MACAGAGAL-ARROYO, 662 SCRA 312, G.R. No. 186050 December 13,
2011)

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Ang Ladlad LGBT Party, an organization composed of lesbians, gays, bisexuals, and

(5)Register, after sufficient publication, political parties, organizations, or coalitions which, in

Section6.Refusal and/or Cancellation of Registration.The Comelec may motu proprio or

(1)It is a religious sect or denomination, organization or association organized for religious

Abayon v. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal held:

Sec.2.Declaration of Policy.The State shall promote proportional representation in

The Commission on Elections (COMELEC) issued a resolution, disqualifying 59 party-list

Sections 7 and 8, Article IX-C

Sec.8.Political parties, or organizations or coalitions registered under the party-list system,

Section3.Definition of Terms.(a) The party-list system is a mechanism of proportional

Section6.Refusal and/or Cancellation of Registration.The COMELEC may, motu proprio

(1)It is a religious sect or denomination, organization or association organized for religious

None of the 8 grounds to refuse or cancel registration refers to non-representation of the

Section9.Qualifications of Party-List Nominees.No person shall be nominated as party-list

(1)It is a religious sect or denomination, organization or association, organized for

SEC. 9.Qualifications of Party-List Nominees.No person shall be nominated as

2.National parties or organizations and regional parties or organizations do not need to

4.Sectoral parties or organizations may either be marginalized and underrepresented or

Section59.Use of Savings.The President of the Philippines, the Senate President, the

Section53.Use of Savings.The President of the Philippines, the Senate President, the

Section52.Use of Savings.The President of the Philippines, the Senate President, the

Section65.Availability of Appropriations.Appropriations for MOOE and capital outlays

and Section 63 General Provisions of the 2012 GAA, viz.:

Section63.Availability of Appropriations.Appropriations for MOOE and capital outlays

Section63.Availability of Appropriations.All appropriations authorized in this Act shall be

We agree with the petitioners.

Statement of Allotments, Obligation and Balances (SAOB);

According to Philippine Constitution Association v. Enriquez: Impoundment refers to a refusal

Section 66.Prohibition Against Impoundment of Appropriations.No appropriations

Section 67.Unmanageable National Government Budget Deficit.Retention or

The 2012 and 2013 GAAs contained similar provisions.

Section68.Prohibition Against Retention/Deduction of Allotment.Fund releases from

Section38.Suspension of Expenditure of Appropriations.Except as otherwise provided in

Section28.Reversion of Unexpended Balances of Appropriations, Continuing Appropriations.

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