Nicanor Jimenez vs Bartolome Cabangbang

17 SCRA 876 Political Law Freedom of Speech and Debate

Bartolome Cabangbang was a member of the House of Representatives and
Chairman of its Committee on National Defense. In November 1958, Cabangbang
caused the publication of an open letter addressed to the Philippines. Said letter
alleged that there have been allegedly three operational plans under serious study
by some ambitious AFP officers, with the aid of some civilian political strategists.
That such strategists have had collusions with communists and that the Secretary
of Defense, Jesus Vargas, was planning a coup dtat to place him as the president.
The planners allegedly have Nicanor Jimenez, among others, under their guise
and that Jimenez et al may or may not be aware that they are being used as a tool
to meet such an end. The letter was said to have been published in newspapers of
general circulation. Jimenez then filed a case against Cabangbang to collect a sum
of damages against Cabangbang alleging that Cabangbangs statement is libelous.
Cabangbang petitioned for the case to be dismissed because he said that as a
member of the lower house, he is immune from suit and that he is covered by the
privileged communication rule and that the said letter is not even libelous.

ISSUE: Whether or not the open letter is covered by privilege communication

endowed to members of Congress.

HELD: No. Article VI, Section 15 of the Constitution provides The Senators and
Members of the House of Representatives shall in all cases except treason, felony,
and breach of the peace. Be privileged from arrest during their attendance at the
sessions of the Congress, and in going to and returning from the same; and for any
speech or debate therein, they shall not be questioned in any other place.
The publication of the said letter is not covered by said expression which refers to
utterances made by Congressmen in the performance of their official functions,
such as speeches delivered, statements made, or votes cast in the halls of
Congress, while the same is in session as well as bills introduced in Congress,
whether the same is in session or not, and other acts performed by Congressmen,
either in Congress or outside the premises housing its offices, in the official
discharge of their duties as members of Congress and of Congressional
Committees duly authorized to perform its functions as such at the time of the
performance of the acts in question. Congress was not in session when the letter
was published and at the same time he, himself, caused the publication of the said
letter. It is obvious that, in thus causing the communication to be so published, he
was not performing his official duty, either as a member of Congress or as officer
of any Committee thereof. Hence, contrary to the finding made by the lower court
the said communication is not absolutely privileged.
PEOPLE VS FERRER

FACTS:
Co-respondents herein were charged in violation of RA 1700 or Anti Subversion
Law by instigating, recruiting, inciting others to rise up and take arms against the
Government with the purpose of overthrowing the Government of the Philippines.

Respondents, who were charged in violations of RA 1700 (Anti Subversion Law)

moved to quash the charged and alleged that the said law is Bill of Attainder.

The Law punishes any person who "knowingly, wilfully and by overt acts affiliates
himself with, becomes or remains a member of the Party or of any other similar
"subversive organization.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the law in question or the RA 1700/ Anti Subversion Law is a bill of
attainder.

HELD:
No.Article 3 Section 22 of the Constitution provides:
No ex post facto law or bill of attainder shall be enacted.

A Bill of Attainder is a legislative act which inflicts punishment without trial. Its
essence is the substitution of a legislative for a judicial determination of guilt. The
constitutional ban against bill of attainders serves to implement the principle of
separation of powers by confining the legislatures to rule-making and thereby
forestalling legislative usurpation of the judicial function.

The singling our of a definite class, the imposition of burden on it, and a legislative
intent to stigmatise statute as a bill of attainder.

1. The Supreme Court held that when the act is viewed in its actual operation, it
will be seen that it does not specify the Communist Party of the Philippines or the
member thereof for the purpose of punishment. What it does is simple to declare
the party to be an organized conspiracy for the overthrow of the Government for
the purposes of the prohibition.
The term "Communist Part of the Philippines" issues solely for definitional
purposes. In fact the act applies not only to the Communist Party of the Philippines
but also to "any organisation having the same purpose and their successors." Its
focus is not on individuals but on conduct.
PEOPLE V JALOSJOS
Feb. 3, 2000

Facts: The accused-appellant, Romeo Jalosjos, is a full-fledged member of Congress

who is confined at the national penitentiary while his conviction for statutory rape
and acts of lasciviousness is pending appeal. The accused-appellant filed a motion
asking that he be allowed to fully discharge the duties of a Congressman, including
attendance at legislative sessions and committee meetings despite his having been
convicted in the first instance of a non-bailable offense on the basis of popular
sovereignty and the need for his constituents to be represented

Issue: Whether or not accused-appellant should be allowed to discharge mandate

as member of House of Representatives

Held: Election is the expression of the sovereign power of the people. However,
inspite of its importance, the privileges and rights arising from having been elected
may be enlarged or restricted by law.

The immunity from arrest or detention of Senators and members of the House of
Representatives arises from a provision of the Constitution. The privilege has
always been granted in a restrictive sense. The provision granting an exemption as
a special privilege cannot be extended beyond the ordinary meaning of its terms. It
may not be extended by intendment, implication or equitable considerations.
The accused-appellant has not given any reason why he should be exempted from
the operation of Sec. 11, Art. VI of the Constitution. The members of Congress
cannot compel absent members to attend sessions if the reason for the absence is
a legitimate one. The confinement of a Congressman charged with a crime
punishable by imprisonment of more than six years is not merely authorized by
law, it has constitutional foundations. To allow accused-appellant to attend
congressional sessions and committee meetings for 5 days or more in a week will
virtually make him a free man with all the privileges appurtenant to his position.
Such an aberrant situation not only elevates accused-appellants status to that of a
special class, it also would be a mockery of the purposes of the correction system.
Osmena v Pendatun G.R. No. L-17144 October 28, 1960
J. Bengzon

Facts:
On July 14, 1960, Congressman Sergio Osmea, Jr., submitted to the Supreme
Court a verified petition for "declaratory relief, certiorari and prohibition with
preliminary injunction" against Congressman Salapida K. Pendatun and fourteen
other congressmen in their capacity as members of the Special Committee created
by House Resolution No. 59.

He asked for annulment of such Resolution on the ground of infringenment of his

parliamentary immunity; he also asked, principally, that said members of the
special committee be enjoined from proceeding in accordance with it, particularly
the portion authorizing them to require him to substantiate his charges against the
President with the admonition that if he failed to do so, he must show cause why
the House should not punish him.

The petition attached a copy of House Resolution No. 59, where it was stated that
Sergio Osmea, Jr., made a privilege speech entitled a Message to Garcia. There,
he claimed to have been hearing of ugly reports that the government has been
selling free things at premium prices. He also claimed that even pardons are for
sale regardless of the gravity of the case.

The resolution stated that these charges, if made maliciously or recklessly and
without basis in truth, would constitute a serious assault upon the dignity of the
presidential office and would expose it to contempt and disrepute.

The resolution formed a special committee of fifteen Members to investigate the

truth of the charges against the President of the Philippines made by Osmea, Jr. It
was authorized to summon him to appear before it to substantiate his charges, as
well as to require the attendance of witnesses and/or the production of pertinent
papers before it, and if he fails to do so he would be required to show cause why
he should not be punished by the House. The special committee shall submit to
the House a report of its findings before the adjournment of the present special
session of the Congress of the Philippines.
In support of his request, Osmea alleged that the Resolution violated his
constitutional absolute parliamentary immunity for speeches delivered in the
House; second, his words constituted no actionable conduct; and third, after his
allegedly objectionable speech and words, the House took up other business,
and Rule XVII, sec. 7 of the Rules of House provides that if other business has
intervened after the member had uttered obnoxious words in debate, he shall not
be held to answer therefor nor be subject to censure by the House.

The Supreme Court decided to hear the matter further, and required respondents
to answer, without issuing any preliminary injunction.

The special committee continued to perform its task, and after giving Congressman
Osmea a chance to defend himself, found him guilty of serious disorderly
behavior and acting on such report, the House approved on the same day House
Resolution No. 175, declaring him guilty as recommended, and suspending him
from office for fifteen months.

The respondents filed their answer where they challenged the jurisdiction of this
Court to entertain the petition, defended the power of Congress to discipline its
members with suspension and then invited attention to the fact that Congress
having ended its session, the Committee had thereby ceased to exist.

After the new resolution, Osmena added that the House has no power under the
Constitution, to suspend one of its members.

Issue:
Can Osmena be held liable for his speech?

Held: Yes. Petition dismissed.

Ratio:
Section 15, Article VI of our Constitution provides that "for any speech or debate"
in Congress, the Senators or Members of the House of Representative "shall not be
questioned in any other place." The provision has always been understood to
mean that although exempt from prosecution or civil actions for their words
uttered in Congress, the members of Congress may, nevertheless, be questioned in
Congress itself.
Furthermore, the Rules of the House which petitioner himself has invoked (Rule
XVII, sec. 7), recognize the House's power to hold a member responsible "for
words spoken in debate."

Our Constitution enshrines parliamentary immunity whose purpose "is to enable

and encourage a representative of the public to discharge his public trust with
firmness and success" for "it is indispensably necessary that he should enjoy the
fullest liberty of speech, and that he should be protected from the resentment of
every one it may offend."

It guarantees the legislator complete freedom of expression without fear of being

made responsible in criminal or civil actions before the courts or any other forum
outside of the Congressional Hall. But it does not protect him from responsibility
before the legislative body itself whenever his words and conduct are considered
by the latter disorderly or unbecoming a member.

For unparliamentary conduct, members of Parliament or of Congress have been

censured, committed to prison, and even expelled by the votes of their colleagues.
This was the traditional power of legislative assemblies to take disciplinary action
against its members, including imprisonment, suspension or expulsion. For
instance, the Philippine Senate, in April 1949, suspended a senator for one year.
Needless to add, the Rules of Philippine House of Representatives provide that the
parliamentary practices of the Congress of the United States shall apply in a
supplementary manner to its proceedings.

This brings up the third point of petitioner: the House may no longer take action
against him, because after his speech it had taken up other business. Respondents
answer that Resolution No. 59 was unanimously approved by the House, that such
approval amounted to a suspension of the House Rules, which according to
standard parliamentary practice may done by unanimous consent.
Granted that the House may suspended the operation of its Rules, it may not,
however, affect past acts or renew its rights to take action which had already
lapsed.

The situation might thus be compared to laws extending the period of limitation of
actions and making them applicable to actions that had lapsed. At any rate, courts
are subject to revocation modification or waiver at the pleasure of the body
adopting them. Mere failure to conform to parliamentary usage will not invalidate
the action taken by a deliberative body when the required number of members
have agreed to a particular measure.

The following is quoted from a reported decision of the Supreme court of

Tennessee:

The rule here invoked is one of parliamentary procedure, and it is uniformly held
that it is within the power of all deliberative bodies to abolish, modify, or waive
their own rules of procedure, adopted for the orderly con duct of business, and as
security against hasty action. (Certain American cases)
In the case of Congressman Stanbery of Ohio, who insulted the Speaker, was
censured by the House, despite the argument that other business had intervened
after the objectionable remarks.

On the question whether delivery of speeches attacking the Chief Executive

constitutes disorderly conduct for which Osmea may be disciplined, the court
believed that the House is the judge of what constitutes disorderly behaviour, not
only because the Constitution has conferred jurisdiction upon it, but also because
the matter depends mainly on factual circumstances of which the House knows
best but which can not be depicted in black and white for presentation to, and
adjudication by the Courts. For one thing, if this Court assumed the power to
determine whether Osmea conduct constituted disorderly behaviour, it would
thereby have assumed appellate jurisdiction, which the Constitution never
intended to confer upon a coordinate branch of the Government. This was due to
the theory of separation of powers fastidiously observed by this. Each department,
it has been said, had exclusive cognizance of matters within its jurisdiction and is
supreme within its own sphere. (Angara vs. Electoral Commission.)

The general rule has been applied in other cases to cause the courts to refuse to
intervene in what are exclusively legislative functions. Thus, where the stated
Senate is given the power to example a member, the court will not review its
action or revise even a most arbitrary or unfair decision.

Clifford vs. French- several senators who had been expelled by the State Senate of
California for having taken a bribe, filed mandamus proceeding to compel
reinstatement, alleging the Senate had given them no hearing, nor a chance to
make defense, besides falsity of the charges of bribery. The Supreme Court of
California declined to interfere:

Under our form of government, the judicial department has no power to revise
even the most arbitrary and unfair action of the legislative department, due to the
Constitution. Every legislative body in which is vested the general legislative power
of the state has the implied power to expel a member for any cause which it may
deem sufficient.

In Hiss. vs. Barlett, it was said that this power is inherent in every legislative body;
that it is necessary to the to enable the body 'to perform its high functions, and is
necessary to the safety of the state; That it is a power of self-protection, and that
the legislative body must necessarily be the sole judge of the exigency which may
justify and require its exercise. Given the exercise of the power committed to it,
the senate is supreme. An attempt by this court to direct or control the legislature,
or either house, in the exercise of the power, would be an attempt to exercise
legislative functions, which it is expressly forbidden to do.

The Court merely refuses to disregard the allocation of constitutional functions

which it is our special duty to maintain. Indeed, in the interest of comity, we found
the House of Representatives of the United States taking the position upon at least
two occasions.

Petitioner's principal argument against the House's power to suspend is the

Alejandrino precedent. In 1924, Senator Alejandrino was, by resolution of Senate,
suspended from office for 12 months because he had assaulted another member
of that Body. The Senator challenged the validity of the resolution. Although this
Court held that in view of the separation of powers, it had no jurisdiction to
compel the Senate to reinstate petitioner, it nevertheless went on to say the
Senate had no power to adopt the resolution because suspension for 12 months
amounted to removal, and the Jones Law gave the Senate no power to remove an
appointive member, like Senator Alejandrino. The Jones Law specifically provided
that "each house may punish its members for disorderly behaviour, and, with the
concurrence of two-thirds votes, expel an elective member. The Jones Law
empowered the Governor General to appoint Senators. Alejandrino was one.
The opinion in that case stated that "suspension deprives the electoral district of
representation without that district being afforded any means by which to fill that
vacancy." But that remark should be understood to refer particularly to the
appointive senator who was then the affected party.

Now the Congress has the full legislative powers and prerogatives of a sovereign
nation, except as restricted by the Constitution. In the Alejandrino case, the Court
reached the conclusion that the Jones Law did not give the Senate the power it
then exercisedthe power of suspension for one year. Now. the Congress has the
inherent legislative prerogative of suspension which the Constitution did not
impair.

The Legislative power of the Philippine Congress is plenary, limited by the

Republic's Constitution. So that any power deemed to be legislative by usage or
tradition, is necessarily possessed by the Philippine Congress, unless the
Constitution provides otherwise.
In any event, petitioner's argument as to the deprivation of the district's
representation can not be weighty, becuase deliberative bodies have the power in
proper cases, to commit one of their members to jail.

Now come questions of procedure and jurisdiction. The petition intended to

prevent the Special Committee from acting tin pursuance of House Resolution No.
59. Because no preliminary injunction had been issued, the Committee performed
its task, reported to the House, and the latter approved the suspension order. The
House had closed it session, and the Committee has ceased to exist as such. It
would seem, therefore, the case should be dismissed for having become moot or
academic.

Of course, there is nothing to prevent petitioner from filing new pleadings. But the
most probable outcome of such reformed suit, however, will be a pronouncement
of lack of jurisdiction.
Miriam Defensor Santiago vs Sandiganbayan (2001)

In October 1988, Miriam Defensor Santiago, who was the then Commissioner of
the Commission of Immigration and Deportation (CID), approved the application
for legalization of the stay of about 32 aliens. Her act was said to be illegal and was
tainted with bad faith and it ran counter against Republic Act No. 3019 (Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act). The legalization of such is also a violation of Executive
Order No. 324 which prohibits the legalization of disqualified aliens. The aliens
legalized by Santiago were allegedly known by her to be disqualified. Two other
criminal cases were filed against Santiago. Pursuant to this information, Francis
Garchitorena, a presiding Justice of the Sandiganbayan, issued a warrant of arrest
against Santiago. Santiago petitioned for provisional liberty since she was just
recovering from a car accident which was approved. In 1995, a motion was filed
with the Sandiganbayan for the suspension of Santiago, who was already a senator
by then. The Sandiganbayan ordered the Senate President (Maceda) to suspend
Santiago from office for 90 days.

ISSUE: Whether or not Sandiganbayan can order suspension of a member of the

Senate without violating the Constitution.

HELD: Yes. it is true that the Constitution provides that each house may
determine the rules of its proceedings, punish its Members for disorderly behavior,
and, with the concurrence of two-thirds of all its Members, suspend or expel a
Member. A penalty of suspension, when imposed, shall not exceed sixty days.
But on the other hand, Section 13 of RA 3019 provides:

Suspension and loss of benefits. any incumbent public officer against whom any
criminal prosecution under a valid information under this Act or under Title 7, Book
II of the Revised Penal Code or for any offense involving fraud upon government or
public funds or property whether as a simple or as a complex offense and in
whatever stage of execution and mode of participation, is pending in court, shall
be suspended from office. Should he be convicted by final judgment, he shall lose
all retirement or gratuity benefits under any law, but if he is acquitted, he shall be
entitled to reinstatement and to the salaries and benefits which he failed to
receive during suspension, unless in the meantime administrative proceedings
have been filed against him.
In here, the order of suspension prescribed by RA. 3019 is distinct from the power
of Congress to discipline its own ranks under the Constitution. The suspension
contemplated in the above constitutional provision is a punitive measure that is
imposed upon determination by the Senate or the Lower House, as the case may
be, upon an erring member. This is quite distinct from the suspension spoken of in
Section 13 of RA 3019, which is not a penalty but a preliminary, preventive
measure, prescinding from the fact that the latter is not being imposed on
petitioner for misbehavior as a Member of the Senate.

Republic Act No. 3019 does not exclude from its coverage the members of
Congress and that, therefore, the Sandiganbayan did not err in thus decreeing the
assailed preventive suspension order.

But Santiago committed the said act when she was still the CID commissioner, can
she still be suspended as a senator?

Section 13 of Republic Act No. 3019 does not state that the public officer
concerned must be suspended only in the office where he is alleged to have
committed the acts with which he has been charged. Thus, it has been held that
the use of the word office would indicate that it applies to any office which the
officer charged may be holding, and not only the particular office under which he
stands accused.

Santiago has not yet been convicted of the alleged crime, can she still be
suspended?

The law does not require that the guilt of the accused must be established in a pre-
suspension proceeding before trial on the merits proceeds. Neither does it
contemplate a proceeding to determine (1) the strength of the evidence of
culpability against him, (2) the gravity of the offense charged, or (3) whether or not
his continuance in office could influence the witnesses or pose a threat to the
safety and integrity of the records another evidence before the court could have a
valid basis in decreeing preventive suspension pending the trial of the case. All it
secures to the accused is adequate opportunity to challenge the validity or
regularity of the proceedings against him, such as, that he has not been afforded
the right to due preliminary investigation, that the acts imputed to him do not
constitute a specific crime warranting his mandatory suspension from office under
Section 13 of Republic Act No. 3019, or that the information is subject to quashal
on any of the grounds set out in Section 3, Rule 117, of the Revised Rules on
Criminal procedure.
Bondoc v Pineda

FACTS:
- Pineda, member of Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP) and Bondoc,
member of Nacionalista Party (NP) were rival candidates for Representative for
4TH district of Pampanga. Pineda was proclaimed winner. Bondoc filed a protest
at the House of Rep Electoral Tribunal (HRET)
- After review, HRET decided that Bondoc won by 107 votes.
- Cong. Camasura revealed to Cong. Cojuangco (LDP Sec. Gen) that he voted
for Bondoc because he was consistent with truth, justice and self-respect and
that they would abide by the results of the recounted votes where Bondoc was
leading.
- Cong. Camasura was then expelled from his party (LDP) because it was a
complete betrayal to his party when he decided for Bondoc.
- HRET then ordered Camasura to withdraw and rescind his nomination from
the tribunal.
- Bondoc filed for petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus to HRET
from its resolution.

ISSUE:
W/N THE HOUSE OF REP. EMPOWERED TO INTERFERE WITH THE DISPOSITION OF
AN ELECTION CONTEST IN THE HRET BY REORGANIZING THE REPRESENTATION IN
THE TRIBUNAL OF THE MAJORITY PARTY?
W/N HRET RESOLUTION TO ORDER CAMASURA TO WITHDRAW AND RESCIND HIS
NOMINATION IS VALID

HELD:
NO! COURT SAID THAT IT IS IMPOSSIBLE FOR ANY POLITICAL PARTY TO CONTROL
VOTING IN THE TRIBUNAL . THE TRIBUNAL HAS THE EXCLUSIVE JURISDICTION AS
JUDGE TO CONTESTS RELATING TO ELECTION, RETURNS AND QUALIFICATIONS OF
THE MEMS OF THE HOUSE OF REP.
HRET RESOLUTION IS NULL AND VOID. ACTION OF HRET IS VIOLATIVE OF
CONSTITUTIONAL MANDATE BECAUSE:
1. IT IS A CLEAR IMPAIRMENT OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL PREROGATIVE OF THE
HRET TO BE THE SOLE JUDGE OF THE ELECTION CONTEST BET. PINEDA AND
BONDOC. TO SANCTION INTERFERENCE BY THE HOUSE OF REP. WOULD REDUCE
TRIBUNAL AS TOOL FOR THE AGGRANDIZEMENT OF THE PARTY IN POWER (LDP)
2. MEMBERS OF THE TRIBUNAL MUST BE NON-PARTISAN. CAMASURA WAS
DISCHARGING HIS FUNCTIONS WITH COMPLETE DETACHMENT, IMPARTIALITY AND
INDEPENDENCE. DISLOYALTY TO PARTY AND BREACH OF PARTY DISCIPLINE -> NOT
VALID GROUND FOR EXPULSION OF MEMBER OF THE TRIBUNAL
3. IT VIOLATES CAMASURAS RIGHT TO SECURITY OF TENURE. MEMBERS OF
HRET ARE ENTITLED TO SECURITY OF TENURE. MEMBERSHIP MAY NOT BE
TERMINATED W/O UNDUE CAUSE SUCH AS: EXPIRATION OF TERM OF OFFICE,
DEATH, PERMANENT DISABILITY, RESIGNATION FROM POLITICAL PARTY, FORMAL
AFFILIATION WITH ANOTHER PARTY. DISLOYALTY IS NOT A VALID CAUSE!
Aquino v COMELEC (1995)

Aquino vs. Comelec

Agapito A. Aquino, petitioner vs. Commission on Election, Move Makati, Mateo
Bedon, and Juanito Icaro, respondents
Sept, 18, 1995
Special Civil Action in the Supreme Court. Certiorari.

Relevant Provisions:
Section 6, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution
No person shall be a Member of the House of Representatives unless he is a
natural-born citizen of the Philippines and, on the day of the election, is at least
twenty-five years of age, able to read and write, and, except the party-list
representatives, a registered voter in the district in which he shall be elected, and a
resident thereof for a period of not less than one year immediately preceding the
day of the election.

Facts:
On 20 March 1995, Agapito A. Aquino, the petitioner, filed his Certificate of
Candidacy for the position of Representative for the new (remember: newly
created) Second Legislative District of Makati City. In his certificate of candidacy,
Aquino stated that he was a resident of the aforementioned district (284 Amapola
Cor. Adalla Sts., Palm Village, Makati) for 10 months.
Move Makati, a registered political party, and Mateo Bedon, Chairman of LAKAS-
NUCD-UMDP of Barangay Cembo, Makati City, filed a petition to disqualify Aquino
on the ground that the latter lacked the residence qualification as a candidate for
congressman which under Section 6, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, should be
for a period not less than one year preceding the (May 8, 1995) day of the
election.

Faced with a petition for disqualification, Aquino amended the entry on his
residency in his certificate of candidacy to 1 year and 13 days. The Commission on
Elections passed a resolution that dismissed the petition on May 6 and allowed
Aquino to run in the election of 8 May. Aquino, with 38,547 votes, won against
Augusto Syjuco with 35,910 votes.

Move Makati filed a motion of reconsideration with the Comelec, to which, on May
15, the latter acted with an order suspending the proclamation of Aquino until the
Commission resolved the issue.

On 2 June, the Commission on Elections found Aquino ineligible and disqualified

for the elective office for lack of constitutional qualification of residence.

Aquino then filed a Petition of Certiorari assailing the May 15 and June 2 orders.

Issue:
1. Whether residency in the certificate of candidacy actually connotes domicile
to warrant the disqualification of Aquino from the position in the electoral district.
2. WON it is proven that Aquino has established domicile of choice and not just
residence (not in the sense of the COC)in the district he was running in.

Held:
1. Yes, The term residence has always been understood as synonymous with
domicile not only under the previous constitutions but also under the 1987
Constitution. The Court cited the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission
wherein this principle was applied.
Mr. Nolledo:

I remember that in the 1971 Constitutional Convention, there was an attempt to

require residence in the place not less than one year immediately preceding the
day of elections.

What is the Committees concept of residence for the legislature? Is it actual

residence or is it the concept of domicile or constructive residence?
Mr. Davide:
This is in the district, for a period of not less than one year preceding the day of
election. This was in effect lifted from the 1973 constituition, the interpretation
given to it was domicile.

Mrs. Braid:
On section 7, page2, Noledo has raised the same point that resident has been
interpreted at times as a matter of intention rather than actual residence.

Mr. De los Reyes

So we have to stick to the original concept that it should be by domicile and not
physical and actual residence.

Therefore, the framers intended the word residence to have the same meaning
of domicile.
The place where a party actually or constructively has his permanent home,
where he, no matter where he may be found at any given time, eventually intends
to return and remain, i.e., his domicile, is that to which the Constitution refers
when it speaks of residence for the purposes of election law.
The purpose is to exclude strangers or newcomers unfamiliar with the conditions
and needs of the community from taking advantage of favorable circumstances
existing in that community for electoral gain.

While there is nothing wrong with the purpose of establishing residence in a given
area for meeting election law requirements, this defeats the essence of
representation, which is to place through assent of voters those
most cognizantand sensitive to the needs of a particular district, if a candidate falls
short of the period of residency mandated by law for him to qualify.
Which brings us to the second issue.

2. No, Aquino has not established domicile of choice in the district he was running
in.
The SC agreed with the Comelecs contention that Aquino should prove that he
established a domicile of choice and not just residence.

The Constitution requires a person running for a post in the HR one year of
residency prior to the elections in the district in which he seeks election to .
Aquinos certificate of candidacy in a previous (May 11, 1992) election indicates
that he was a resident and a registered voter of San Jose, Concepcion, Tarlac for
more than 52 years prior to that election. His birth certificate indicated that
Conception as his birthplace and his COC also showed him to be a registered voter
of the same district. Thus his domicile of origin (obviously, choice as well) up to the
filing of his COC was in Conception, Tarlac.

Aquinos connection to the new Second District of Makati City is an alleged

lease agreement of a condominium unit in the area. The intention not to establish
a permanent home in Makati City is evident in his leasing a condominium unit
instead of buying one. The short length of time he claims to be a resident of Makati
(and the fact of his stated domicile in Tarlac and his claims of other residences in
Metro Manila) indicate that his sole purpose in transferring his physical residence
is not to acquire a new, residence or domicile but only to qualify as a candidate for
Representative of the Second District of Makati City.

Aquinos assertion that he has transferred his domicile from Tarlac to Makati is a
bare assertion which is hardly supported by the facts in the case at bench. To
successfully effect a change of domicile, petitioner must prove an actual removal
or an actual change of domicile, a bona fide intention of abandoning the former
place of residence and establishing a new one and definite acts which correspond
with the purpose.

Aquino was thus rightfully disqualified by the Commission on Elections due to his
lack of one year residence in the district.

Decision
Instant petition dismissed. Order restraining respondent Comelec from proclaiming
the candidate garnering the next highest number of votes in
the congressional elections of Second district of Makati City made permanent.
Dicta:

I. Aquinos petition of certiorari contents were:

A. The Comelecs lack of jurisdiction to determine the disqualification issue
involving congressional candidates after the May 8, 1995 elections, such
determination reserved with the house of representatives electional tribunal

B. Even if the Comelec has jurisdiction, the jurisdiction ceased in the instant case
after the elections and the remedy to the adverse parties lies in another forum
which is the HR Electoral Tribunal consistent with Section 17, Article VI of the 1987
Constitution.

C. The COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion when it proceeded to

promulagate its questioned decision despite its own recognition that a threshold
issue of jurisdiction has to be judiciously reviewed again, assuming arguendo that
the Comelec has jurisdiction

D. The Comelecs finding of non-compliance with the residency requirement of one

year against the petitioner is contrary to evidence and to applicable laws and
jurisprudence.

E. The Comelec erred in failing to appreciate the legal impossibility of enforcing the
one year residency requirement of Congressional candidates in newly created
political districts which were only existing for less than a year at the time of the
election and barely four months in the case of petitioners district in Makati.

F. The Comelec committed serious error amounting to lack of jurisdiction when it

ordered the board of canvassers to determine and proclaim the winner out of the
remaining qualified candidates after the erroneous disqualification of the
petitioner in disregard of the doctrine that a second place candidate or a person
who was repudiated by the electorate is a loser and cannot be proclaimed as
substitute winner.

II. Modern day carpetbaggers cant be allowed to take advantage of the creation of
new political districts by suddenly transplanting themselves in such new districts,
prejudicing their genuine residents in the process of taking advantage of existing
conditions in these areas.

III. according to COMELEC: The lease agreement was executed mainly to support
the one year residence requirement as a qualification for a candidate of the HR, by
establishing a commencement date of his residence. If a oerfectly valid lease
agreement cannot, by itself establish a domicile of choice, this particular lease
agreement cannot be better.
MELANIO D. SAMPAYAN et al vs. RAUL A. DAZA et al
G.R. No. 103903. September 11, 1992

Facts:
On February 18, 1992, petitioners, filed the instant petition for prohibition seeking
to disqualify respondent RaulDaza, then incumbent congressman, from continuing
to exercise the functions of his office, on the ground that the latter is a greencard
holder and a lawful permanent resident of the United States since October 16,
1974.Petitioners allege that Mr.Daza has not renounced his status as permanent
resident.Petitioners manifested that on April 2, 1992, they filed a petition before
the COMELEC to disqualify respondent Daza from running in the recent May 11,
1992 elections on the basis of Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code and that
the instant petition is concerned with the unlawful assumption of office by
respondent Daza from June 30, 1987 until June 30, 1992.

Issue:
Whether or not respondent Daza should be disqualified as a member of the House
of Representatives for violation of Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code?

Held:

No. The prohibition case should be dismissed because this case is already moot
and academic for the reason that petitioners seek to unseat respondent from his
position forthe duration of his term of office commencing June 30, 1987 and
ending June 30, 1992. Moreover the jurisdiction of this case rightfully pertains to
the House Electoral Tribunal and a writ of prohibition can no longer be issued
against respondent since his term has already expired. Furthermore as
a de facto public officer, respondent cannot be made to reimburse funds disbursed
during his term of office becaus e his acts are as valid as those of
a dejure officer. Moreover, as a de facto officer, he is entitled to emoluments for
actual services rendered.
Guingona v. Gonzales
G.R. No. 106971 March 1, 1993
Campos, Jr., J.

Facts:

After the May 11, 1992 elections, the senate was composed of 15 LDP
senators, 5 NPC senators, 3 LAKAS-NUCD senators, and 1 LP-PDP-LABAN senator.
To suffice the requirement that each house must have 12 representatives in the
CoA, the parties agreed to use the traditional formula: (No. of Senators of a
political party) x 12 seats) Total No. of Senators elected. The results of such a
formula would produce 7.5 members for LDP, 2.5 members for NPC, 1.5 members
for LAKAS-NUCD, and 0.5 member for LP-PDP-LABAN. Romulo, as the majority floor
leader, nominated 8 senators from their party because he rounded off 7.5 to 8 and
that Taada from LP-PDP-LABAN should represent the same party to the CoA. This
is also pursuant to the proposition compromise by Sen Tolentino who proposed
that the elected members of the CoA should consist of eight LDP, one LP-PDP-
LABAN, two NPC and one LAKAS-NUCD. Guingona, a member of LAKAS-NUCD,
opposed the said compromise. He alleged that the compromise is against
proportional representation.

Issue:

whether or not rounding off is allowed in determining a partys

representation in the Commission on Appointments

Held:

It is a fact accepted by all such parties that each of them is entitled to a

fractional membership on the basis of the rule on proportional representation of
each of the political parties. A literal interpretation of Section 18 of Article VI of the
Constitution leads to no other manner of application. The problem is what to do
with the fraction of .5 or 1/2 to which each of the parties is entitled. The LDP
majority in the Senate converted a fractional half membership into a whole
membership of one senator by adding one half or .5 to 7.5 to be able to elect
Romulo. In so doing one other partys fractional membership was correspondingly
reduced leaving the latters representation in the Commission on Appointments to
less than their proportional representation in the Senate. This is clearly a violation
of Section 18 because it is no longer in compliance with its mandate that
membership in the Commission be based on the proportional representation of
the political parties. The election of Senator Romulo gave more representation to
the LDP and reduced the representation of one political party either the
LAKAS NUCD or the NPC. A party should have at least 1 seat for every 2 duly
elected senators-members in the CoA. Where there are more than 2 parties in
Senate, a party which has only one member senator cannot constitutionally claim a
seat. In order to resolve such, the parties may coalesce with each other in order to
come up with proportional representation especially since one party may have
affiliations with the other party.
SARMIENTO III VS MISON AND CARAGUE
Posted by kaye lee on 11:13 PM
156 SCRA 549 G.R. No. 79974 December 17 1987 [Appointing Power]

FACTS:
Mison was appointed as the Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs and Carague
as the Secretary of the Department of Budget, without the confirmation of the
Commission on Appointments. Sarmiento assailed the appointments as
unconstitutional by reason of its not having been confirmed by CoA.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the appointment is valid.

RULING:
Yes. The President acted within her constitutional authority and power in
appointing Salvador Mison, without submitting his nomination to the CoA for
confirmation. He is thus entitled to exercise the full authority and functions of the
office and to receive all the salaries and emoluments pertaining thereto.

Under Sec 16 Art. VII of the 1987 Constitution, there are 4 groups of officers whom
the President shall appoint:

1st, appointment of executive departments and bureaus heads, ambassadors,

other public ministers, consuls, officers of the armed forces from the rank of
colonel or naval captain, and other officers with the consent and confirmation of
the CoA.

2nd, all other Government officers whose appointments are not otherwise
provided by law;

3rd those whom the President may be authorized by the law to appoint;
4th, low-ranking officers whose appointments the Congress may by law vest in the
President alone.

First group of officers is clearly appointed with the consent of the Commission on
Appointments. Appointments of such officers are initiated by nomination and, if
the nomination is confirmed by the Commission on Appointments, the President
appoints.

2nd, 3rd and 4th group of officers are the present bone of contention. By following
the accepted rule in constitutional and statutory construction that an express
enumeration of subjects excludes others not enumerated, it would follow that only
those appointments to positions expressly stated in the first group require the
consent (confirmation) of the Commission on Appointments.

It is evident that the position of Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs (a bureau

head) is not one of those within the first group of appointments where the consent
of the Commission on Appointments is required. The 1987 Constitution
deliberately excluded the position of "heads of bureaus" from appointments that
need the consent (confirmation) of the Commission on Appointments.