Tan v Director of Forestry
Petitioners timber license was signed and released
FACTS: Sometime in April 1961, the Bureau of Forestry
issued notice advertising for public bidding a certain
tract of public forest land situated in Olongapo,
Zambales consisting of 6,420 hectares, within the
former U.S. Naval Reservation comprising 7,252
hectares of timberland, which was turned over by the
US Government to the Philippine Government.
Wenceslao Tan with nine others submitted their
application in due form.
The area was granted to the petitioner. On May
30, 1963, Secretary Gozon of Agriculture and Natural
Resources issued a general memorandum order
authorizing Dir. Of Forestry to grant new Ordinary
Timber Licenses (OTL) subject to some conditions stated
therein (not exceeding 3000 hectares for new OTL and
not exceeding 5000 hectares for extension)
Thereafter, Acting Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources Feliciano (replacing Gozon)
promulgated on December 19, 1963 a memorandum
revoking the authority delegated to the Director of
Forestry to grant ordinary timber licenses. On the same
date, OTL in the name of Tan, was signed by then Acting
Director of Forestry, without the approval of the
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources. On
January 6, 1964, the license was released by the
Director of Forestry .
Ravago Commercial Company wrote a letter to
the Secretary of ANR praying that the OTL of Tan be
revoked. On March 9, 1964, The Secretary of ANR
declared Tans OTL null and void (but the same was not
granted to Ravago). Petitioner-appellant moved for a
reconsideration of the order, but the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources denied the motion.
ISSUES:
I. Whether or not petitioners timber license is valid
(No)
II. Whether or not petitioner had exhausted
administrative remedies available (No)
RULING:
I.
without authority and is therefore void ab initio. In the
first place, in the general memorandum dated May 30,
1963, the Director of Forestry was authorized to grant a
new ordinary timber license only where the area
covered thereby was not more than 3,000 hectares; the
tract of public forest awarded to the petitioner
contained 6,420 hectares In the second place, at the
time it was released to the petitioner, the Acting
Director of Forestry had no more authority to grant any
license. (The license was released to the petitioner on
January 6, 1964 while on the other hand, the authority
of the Director of Forestry to issue license was revoked
on December 19, 1963). In view thereof, the Director of
Forestry had no longer any authority to release the
license on January 6, 1964, and said license is therefore
void ab initio. What is of greatest importance is the date
of the release or issuance. Before its release, no right is
acquired by the licensee.
Granting arguendo, that petitioner-appellant's timber
license is valid, still respondents-appellees can validly
revoke his timber license. "A license is merely a permit
or privilege to do what otherwise would be unlawful,
and is not a contract between the authority, federal,
state, or municipal, granting it and the person to whom
it is granted; neither is it property or a property right,
nor does it create a vested right; nor is it taxation
The welfare of the people is the supreme law.
Thus, no franchise or right can be availed of to defeat
the proper exercise of police power.
II
Petitioner did not exhaust administrative
remedy in this case. He did not appeal the order of the
respondent Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources to the President of the Philippines.
Considering that the President has the power to review
on appeal the orders or acts of the respondents, the
failure of the petitioner-appellant to take that appeal is
failure on his part to exhaust his administrative
remedies.
Manila Electric Company v. Province of Laguna
FACTS: MERALCO was granted a franchise by several
municipal councils and the National Electrification
Administration to operate an electric light and power
service in the Laguna. Upon enactment of Local
Government Code, the provincial government issued
ordinance imposing franchise tax. MERALCO paid under
protest and later claims for refund because of the
duplicity with Section 1 of P.D. No. 551. This was denied
by the governor (Joey Lina) relying on a more recent law
(LGC). MERALCO filed with the RTC a complaint for
refund, but was dismissed. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not the imposition of franchise tax
under the provincial ordinance is violative of the non-
impairment clause of the Constitution and of P.D. 551.
HELD: No. There is no violation of the non-impairment
clause for the same must yield to the inherent power of
the state (taxation). The provincial ordinance is valid and
constitutional.
RATIO: The Local Government Code of 1991 has
incorporated and adopted, by and large, the provisions
of the now repealed Local Tax Code. The 1991 Code
explicitly authorizes provincial governments,
notwithstanding any exemption granted by any law or
other special law, . . . (to) impose a tax on businesses
enjoying a franchise. A franchise partakes the nature of
a grant which is beyond the purview of the non-
impairment clause of the Constitution. Article XII,
Section 11, of the 1987 Constitution, like its precursor
provisions in the 1935 and the 1973 Constitutions, is
explicit that no franchise for the operation of a public
utility shall be granted except under the condition that
such privilege shall be subject to amendment, alteration
or repeal by Congress as and when the common good
so requires.
National Development Corporation vs Philippine
Veterans Bank
Facts: The particular enactment in question is
Presidential Decree No. 1717, which ordered the
rehabilitation of the Agrix Group of Companies to be
administered mainly by the National Development
Company. The law outlined the procedure for filling
claims against the Agrix Companies and created a claims
committee to process these claims. Especially relevant
to this case, and noted at the outset, is section 4(1)
thereof providing that all mortgages and other liens
presently attaching to any of the assets of the dissolved
corporations are hereby extinguished. Earlier, the Agrix
Marketing Inc. had executed in favor of private
respondent Philippine Veterans Bank a real estate
mortgage dated July 7, 1978 over three parcels of land
situated in Los Baos, Laguna. During the existence of
the mortgage, Agrix went bankrupt. It was the
expressed purpose of salvaging this and the other Agrix
companies that the aforementioned decree was issued
by President Marcos. A claim for the payment of its loan
credit was filed by PNB against herein petitioner,
however the latter alleged and invoked that the same
was extinguished by PD 1717.
Issue: Whether or not Philippine Veterans Bank as
creditor of Agrix is still entitled for payment without
prejudice to PD 1717.
Held: Yes. A mortgage lien is a property right derived
from contract and so comes under the protection of Bill
of rights so do interests on loans, as well s penalties and
charges, which are also vested rights once they accrue.
Private property cannot simply be taken by law from
one person and given to another without just
compensation and any known public purpose. This is
plain arbitrariness and is not permitted under the
constitution.
The court also feels that the decree impairs the
obligation of the contract between Agrix and the private
respondent without justification. While it is true that
the police power is superior to the impairment clause,
the principle will apply only where the contract is so
related to the public welfare that it will be considered
congenitally susceptible to change by the legislature in
the interest of greater number.
Our finding in sum, is that PD 1717 is an invalid
exercise of the police power, not being in conformity
with the traditional requirements of a lawful subject
and a lawful method. The extinction of the mortgage
and other liens and of the interest and other charges
pertaining to the legitimate creditors of Agrix
constitutes taking without due process of law, and this is
compounded by the reduction of the secured creditors
to the category of unsecured creditors in violation of the
equal protection clause. Moreover, the new corporation
being neither owned nor controlled by the government,
should have been created only by general and not
special law. And in so far as the decree also interferes
with purely private agreements without any
demonstrated connection with the public interest, there
is likewise an impairment of the obligation of the
contract.
Miranda vs Arizona
Brief Fact Summary. The defendants offered
incriminating evidence during police interrogations
without prior notification of their rights under the Fifth
Amendment of the United States Constitution (the
Constitution).
Synopsis of Rule of Law. Government authorities need
to inform individuals of their Fifth Amendment
constitutional rights prior to an interrogation following
an arrest.
Facts. The Supreme Court of the United States
(Supreme Court) consolidated four separate cases
with issues regarding the admissibility of evidence
obtained during police interrogations.
The first Defendant, Ernesto Miranda (Mr.
Miranda), was arrested for kidnapping and rape. Mr.
Miranda was an immigrant, and although the officers
did not notify Mr. Miranda of his rights, he signed a
confession after two hours of investigation. The signed
statement included a statement that Mr. Miranda was
aware of his rights.
The second Defendant, Michael Vignera (Mr.
Vignera), was arrested for robbery. Mr. Vignera orally
admitted to the robbery to the first officer after the
arrest, and he was held in detention for eight hours
before he made an admission to an assistant district
attorney. There was no evidence that he was notified of
his Fifth Amendment constitutional rights.
The third Defendant, Carl Calvin Westover (Mr.
Westover), was arrested for two robberies. Mr.
Westover was questioned over fourteen hours by local
police, and then was handed to Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI) agents, who were able to get
signed confessions from Mr. Westover. The authorities
did not notify Mr. Westover of his Fifth Amendment
constitutional rights.
The fourth Defendant, Roy Allen Stewart (Mr.
Stewart), was arrested, along with members of his
family (although there was no evidence of any
wrongdoing by his family) for a series of purse snatches.
There was no evidence that Mr. Stewart was notified of
his rights. After nine interrogations, Mr. Stewart
admitted to the crimes.
Issue. Whether the government is required to notify the
arrested defendants of their Fifth Amendment
constitutional rights against self-incrimination before
they interrogate the defendants?
Held. The government needs to notify arrested
individuals of their Fifth Amendment constitutional
rights, specifically: their right to remain silent; an
explanation that anything they say could be used
against them in court; their right to counsel; and their
right to have counsel appointed to represent them if
necessary. Without this notification, anything admitted
by an arrestee in an interrogation will not be admissible
in court.
Dissent. Justice Tom Clark (J. Clark) argued that the
Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments of the Constitution would apply to
interrogations. There is not enough evidence to
demonstrate a need to apply a new rule as the majority
finds here.
The second dissent written by Justice John Harlan (J.
Harlan) also argues that the Due Process Clauses
should apply. J. Harlan further argues that the Fifth
Amendment rule against self-incrimination was never
intended to forbid any and all pressures against self-
incrimination.
Justice Byron White (J. White) argued that there is no
historical support for broadening the Fifth Amendment
of the Constitution to include the rights that the
majority extends in their decision. The majority is
making new law with their holding.
Discussion. The majority notes that once an individual
chooses to remain silent or asks to first see an attorney,
any interrogation should cease. Further, the individual
has the right to stop the interrogation at any time, and
the government will not be allowed to argue for an
exception to the notification rule.
PEOPLE VS. MAQUEDA [242 SCRA 565; G.R.
NO.112983; 22 MAR 1994]
Facts: British Horace William Barker (consultant of WB)
was slain inside his house in Tuba, Benguet while his
Filipino wife, Teresita Mendoza was badly battered with
lead pipes on the occasion of a robbery. Two household
helpers of the victims identified Salvamante (a former
houseboy of the victims) and Maqueda as the robbers.
Mike Tabayan and his friend also saw the two accused a
kilometer away from the house of the victims that same
morning, when the two accused asked them for
directions.
Maqueda was then arrested in Guinyangan,
Quezon. He was taken to Calauag, Quezon where he
signed a Sinumpaang Salaysay wherein he narrated his
participation in the crime. According to SPO3 Molleno,
he informed Maqueda of his constitutional rights before
he signed such document. Afterwards he was brought to
the Benguet Provincial Jail. While he was under
detention, Maqueda filed a Motion to Grant Bail. He
stated therein that "he is willing and volunteering to be
a State witness in the above entitled case, it appearing
that he is the least guilty among the accused in this
case."
Maqueda also admitted his involvement in the
commission of the robbery to Prosecutor Zarate and to
Salvosa.
Issue: Whether or Not the trial court was correct in
holding that the Sinumpaan Salaysay is admissible as
evidence.
Held: No. The Sinumpaang Salaysay is inadmissible
because it was in clear violation of the constitutional
rights of the accused. First, he was not informed of his
right to remain silent and his right to counsel. Second,
he cannot be compelled to be a witness against himself.
At the time of the confession, the accused was already
facing charges in court. He no longer had the right to
remain silent and to counsel but he had the right to
refuse to be a witness and not to have any prejudice
whatsoever result to him by such refusal. And yet,
despite his knowing fully well that a case had already
been filed in court, he still confessed when he did not
have to do so.
The contention of the trial court that the
accused is not entitled to such rights anymore because
the information has been filed and a warrant of arrest
has been issued already, is untenable. The exercise of
the rights to remain silent and to counsel and to be
informed thereof under Section 12(1) of the Bill of
Rights are not confined to that period prior to the filing
of a criminal complaint or information but are available
at that stage when a person is "under investigation for
the commission of an offense."
Pursuant to Section 12(3) of the Bill of Rights
therefore, such extra-judicial admission is inadmissible
as evidence.
As to the admissions made by Maqueda to
Prosecutor Zarate and Ray Dean Salvosa, the trial court
admitted their testimony thereon only to prove the
tenor of their conversation but not to prove the truth of
the admission because such testimony was objected to
as hearsay. Maqueda voluntarily and freely made them
to Prosecutor Zarate not in the course of an
investigation, but in connection with Maqueda's plea to
be utilized as a state witness; and as to the other
admission (Salvosa), it was given to a private person
therefore admissible.
Note: a distinction between a confession and admission
has been made by the SC:
Admission of a party. The act, declaration or
omission of party as to a relevant fact may be given in
evidence against him.
Confession. The declaration of an accused
acknowledging his guilt of the offense charged, or of any
offense necessarily included therein, may be given in
evidence against him.
People vs Mahinay
Facts: Appellant Larry Mahinay worked as a houseboy
with Maria Isip, one of his tasks was to take care of Isips
house which was under construction adjacent to the
latters residence. The victim was a 12-year old girl who
used to frequent the residence of Isip.

On the late evening of 25 June 1995, the victim

was reported missing by her mother. The following
morning, the Appellant boarded a passenger jeepney
and disappeared.
The victims body was found, lifeless, at around
7:30 am that same day. She was found in the septic tank
wearing her blouse and no underwear. The autopsy
showed that the victim was raped and was strangled to
death.
Upon re-examining the crime scene, policemen
found a pair of dirty white short pants, a brown belt and
a yellow hair ribbon which was identified by the victims
mother to belong to her daughter. Also, they found a
pair of blue slippers which Isip identified as that of the
appellant. Also found in the yard, three armslength
away from the septic tank were an underwear, a leather
wallet, a pair of dirty long pants and a pliers positively
identified by Isip as appellants belongings.
The appellant was soon arrested and executed
an extra-judicial confession wherein he narrated how
the crime was committed. The trial ensued and the
lower court convicted him of the crime of Rape and was
sentenced to death. The case was forwarded to the
Supreme Court for automatic review.
Issues
WON the appellants extra-judicial confession
was validly taken and in accordance with his rights
under Section 12 of the Bill of Rights; and
WON the circumstantial evidence presented by
the prosecution sufficient to prove his guilt beyond
reasonable doubt
Ruling: The conviction of the appellant is affirmed. The
Court ruled that the appellants extrajudicial confession
was taken within the ambit of the law as evinced by the
records and testimony of the lawyer who assisted,
warned and explained to him his constitutionally
guaranteed pre-interrogatory and custodial rights.
As to the second issue, the appellant argues that the
circumstantial evidence presented by the prosecution is
insufficient to warrant a conviction of his guilt. However,
the Court ruled otherwise.
The Court recalled the Rule on Evidence and
settled jurisprudence. Absence of direct proof does not
absolve the appellant because conviction may be had
with the concurrence of the following requisites as
stated in the Rules of Court:
1. there is more than one circumstance;
the facts from which the inferences are derived are
proven; and
the combination of all the circumstances is such as to
produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.
The Court recalled the ruling in People v. De
Guia, 280 SCRA 141, all circumstances must be
consistent with each other, consistent with the
hypothesis that the accused is guilty, and at the same
time inconsistent with the hypothesis that he is
innocent and with every other rational hypothesis
except that of guilt.
And also in People v. Alberca, 257 SCRA 613
citing People v. Abitona, 240 SCRA 335, that facts and
circumstances consistent with guilt and inconsistent
with innocence, constitute evidence which, in weight
and probative force, may surpass even direct evidence
in its effect upon the court.
The Court agreed with the trial courts decision
in giving credence to several circumstantial evidence,
which is more than enough to prove appellants guilt
beyond the shadow of reasonable doubt.
The Court also updated the Miranda rights with the
developments in law that provided the rights of
suspects under custodial investigation in detail.
A person under custodial investigation should be
informed:
1. In a language known to and understood by him of the
reason for the arrest and he must be shown the warrant
of arrest, if any; Every other warnings, information or
communication must be in a language known to and
understood by said person;
2. That he has a right to remain silent and that any
statement he makes may be used as evidence against
him;
3. That he has the right to be assisted at all times and
have the presence of an independent and competent
lawyer, preferably of his own choice;
4. That if he has no lawyer or cannot afford the services
of a lawyer, one will be provided for him; and that a
lawyer may also be engaged by any person in his behalf,
or may be appointed by the court upon petition of the
person arrested or one acting in his behalf;
5. That no custodial investigation in any form shall be
conducted except in the presence of his counsel or after
a valid waiver has been made;
6. That, at any time, he has the right to communicate or
confer by the most expedient means telephone, radio,
letter or messenger with his lawyer (either retained or
appointed), any member of his immediate family, or any
medical doctor, priest or minister chosen by him or by
any one from his immediate family or by his counsel, or
be visited by/confer with duly accredited national or
international non-government organization. It shall be
the responsibility of the officer to ensure that this is
accomplished;
7. That he has the right to waive any of said rights
provided it is made voluntarily, knowingly and
intelligently and ensure that he understood the same;
8. That the waiver must be done in writing AND in the
presence of counsel, otherwise, he must be warned that
the waiver is void even if he insist on his waiver and
chooses to speak;
9. That he may indicate in any manner at any time or
stage of the process that he does not wish to be
questioned with warning that once he makes such
indication, the police may not interrogate him if the
same had not yet commenced, or the interrogation
must ceased if it has already begun;
10. That his initial waiver of his right to remain silent,
the right to counsel or any of his rights does not bar him
from invoking it at any time during the process,
regardless of whether he may have answered some
questions or volunteered some statements;
11. That any statement or evidence, as the case may be,
obtained in violation of any of the foregoing, whether
inculpatory or exculpatory, in whole or in part, shall be
inadmissible in evidence.
People vs Camat
FACTS: On September 1, 1985 at about 9:00 oclock in
the evening, Nelson Sinoy anD Gonzalo Penalver, both
members of the Philippine Marine(s) stationed at Fort
Bonifacio, Makati, Metro Manila, were walking along
Quirino Avenue, Paranaque, Metro Manila Were
followed by two men, one of them, Wilfredo del Rosario
rushed to Nelson Sinoy, kicked the latter. Armando
Camat followed del Rosario and pulled out a knife and
stabbed Nelson Sinoy. Gonzalo Penalver kicked Camat
who in turn stabbed the former, hitting him at the right
rib. When Penalver kicked Camat he became
outbalanced. Wilfredo del Rosario then grabbed the
clutch bag from him (Penalver).
Realizing they were at the losing end, Sinoy and
Penalver ran away. With the aid Of somebody who
identified himself as a policeman, they were brought to
the San JuaN de Dios Hospital. Nelson Sinoy died at the
San Juan de Dios Hospital.Gonzalo Penalver was
transferred to the AFP Medical Center on September 2,
1985. The patient was discharged from the hospital only
on March 15, 1986. In traversing the criminal charge,
appellants interposed the defense of alibi and denied
any participation in the commission of the felony.
Patrolman Odeo Cario, to whom the case was
assigned for investigation on September 2, 1985, stated
based on the testimony of the unidentified witness and
since Camat fitted the description of the murdere
given. Prior to the incident, he was arrested by the
police officers due to act of lasciviousness. Carino
directly said that appellant Camat orally admitted to him
his participation in the killing of the soldier during
interrogation at the police precinct. In addition, Camat
also allegedly gave the names of Wilfredo del Rosario
and one Roland as his co-conspirators in the crime
charged, and alluded to appellant Del Rosario as the one
who actually stabbed Sinoy.
ISSUEs:
1)Whether or Not the the extrajudicial confession of
accused violates his rights under custodial
investigation.
2) Is the testimony of a single witness is given much
weight and sufficient enough to convict?
RULING: In the absence of the appellants duly advised
of the mandatory guarantees under the Bill of Rights,
their confessions made before Patrolman Cario are
inadmissible against them and cannot be used in
support of their conviction.
Trial courts should further keep in mind that
even if the confession of the accused is gospel truth, if it
was made without the assistance of counsel, it is
inadmissible in evidence regardless of the absence of
coercion or even if it had been voluntarily given.
However, even disregarding the extrajudicial
confessions of appellants, the judgment of conviction
rendered by the lower court stands and can be
sustained. Worthy of consideration It is well settled that
the testimony of a single eyewitness, if found
convincing, sufficient and trustworthy by the trial court
and the prosecution has satisfactorily proved the guilt of
both accused beyond reasonable boubt.
WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is
hereby AFFIRMED, with the modifications that
appellants are declared guilty of the crime of robbery
with homicide, and the civil indemnity for the death of
Nelson Sinoy is hereby increased to P50,000.00 in
consonance with the present jurisprudential policy.
People v. Caguioa, 95 SCRA 2 , No. L-38975, January 17,
1980
Syllabi Class : Constitutional Law|Evidence|Criminal
Procedure
Syllabi:
1. Constitutional Law; Evidence; Procedure that must be
followed by the officer during custodial interrogations.-
In the language of Chief Justice Warren: Our
holding will be spelled out with some specificity in the
pages which follow, but briefly stated, it is this: the
prosecution may not use statements, whether
exculpatory or inculpatory, stemming from custodial
interrogation of the defendant unless it demonstrates
the use of procedural safeguards effective to secure the
privilege against self-incrimination. By custodial
interrogation, we mean questioning initiated by law
enforcement officers after a person has been taken into
custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action
in any significant way. As for the procedural safeguards
to be employed, unless other fully effective means are
devised to inform accused persons of their right of
silence and to assure a continuous opportunity to
exercuse it, the following measures are quired. Prior to
any questioning, the person must be warned that he has
a right to remain silent, that any statement he does
make may be used as evidence against him, and that he
has right to the presence of an attorney, either retained
or appointed. The defendant may waive effectuation of
those rights, provided the waiver is made voluntarily,
knowingly and intelligently. If, however, he indicates in
any manner and at any stage of the process that he
wishes to consult with an attorney before speaking,
there can be no questioning. Likewise, if the individual is
alone and indicates in any manner that he does not wish
to be interrogated, the police may not question him.
The mere fact that he may have answered some
questions or volunteered some statements on his own
does not deprive him of the right to refrain from
answering any further inquiries until he has consulted
with an attorney and thereafter consents to be
questioned.
2. Constitutional Law; Evidence; There is no bar to
waiver of ones right to counsel if made intelligently and
voluntarily, with full understanding of its consequences.
No such waiver was made in this case.-
Testated by such a clear unequivocal standard, the
alleged waiver falls far short. It is ed by a certain
Corporal Conrado B. Roca of the Police Force of
Meycauayan, worded thus: Ipinaaalam ko sa iyo na
ikaw ay sinisiyasat tungkol sa isang paglabag sa batas na
iyong ginawa, bago ko ipagpatuloy ang pagtatanong sa
iyo, ikaw may karapatan na huwag magsalita kung ayaw
mo at may karapatan ka rin na magkaroon ng abogado
na iyong gusto, at dapat mo ring mabatid na anuman
ang sabihin mo dito ay maaaring gamitin ng ayon o
laban sa iyo, magsasalaysay ka pa rin ba? Then came the
monosyllabic answer Opo. That was all. Even the very
annex submitted to the petition merely stated that
there were signatures of private respondent Yupo, the
aforesaid Roca, and a certain Roberto Sales. The day
when it was subscribed and sworn to, allegedly before
Municipal Judge Mariano Mendieta, was not even
specified. Again, there was a statement that it was a
certified true copy by a certain Teresita M. Tecson,
whose connection with the case or with the court was
not even shown. There was no signature. There were
only illegible letters, perhaps indicating that they were
the initials. The doubt that must have occurred to the
police officials of Meycauayan is evident from their
submitting a one-page statement, presumably signed by
the same people and certified by the same Tecson,
reading in full as follows: [Sa sinumang Kinauukulan]:
lpinabasa, ipinaalam at naintindihan ni [Paquito Yupo y
Gonzales], 19 na taong gulang, binata tubo sa San
Policarpio, Eastern Samar ang nasa ibaba nito: [Ikaw ay
sinisiyasat ngayon dahilan sa paglabag sa batas.
Karapatan mo ang huwag magsalita. Anumang iyong
sasabihin ay maaaring gamiting katibayan laban sa iyo.
At ikaw ay may karapatan sa tulong at sa pagharap ng
abogado na iyong napipisil]. Sa kabila ng kabatiran ni
[Paquito Yupo] ng mga nilalaman ng nasa itaas nito, siya
ay nagbigay pa rin ng salaysay. Could it be their way of
trying to impress on a court the fact that there was an
intelligent waiver? If so, it did not cure the fatal
infirmity. Rather the contrary.
3. Constitutional Law; Evidence; Care must be exercised
in propounding questions in Tagalog to a Visayan during
custodial interrogations.-
In this case, the private respondent, a Visayan, was
asked a kilometric question in Tagalog, and the
interrogator was satisfied with the monosyllabic Opo.
Also, the failure to submit to this Court the alleged
signature of private respondent may be indicative of the
fear on the part of counsel for petitioner that the
absence of education of the nineteen year old private
respondent would be apparent. At any rate, it cannot be
denied that to predicate a waiver under the
circumstances disclosed would be to nullify the plain
command of the constitutional provision requiring that
a confession to be admissible must be given only if the
accused were informed of his right to remain silent and
to counsel; otherwise, it is inadmissible in character.
The lower court, therefore, acted in accordance with the
plain dictate of the Constitution. To quote from that
eminent civil libertarian, Justice Douglas: Formulas of
respect for constitutional safeguards cannot prevail over
the facts of life which contradict them. They may not
become a cloak for inquisitorial practices and make an
empty form of [constitutional rights].
4. Constitutional Law; Evidence; Merely informing the
accused of his constitutional rights and then taking his
statements do not suffice to safeguard the
constitutional rights of the accused.-
On my part, I agree with the Chief Justice that merely
informing a person under custody of his constitutional
rights under the circumstances hereinunder to be stated
and thereafter taking down his statement does not
sufficiently safeguard those rights.
5. Constitutional Law; Evidence; The accused must not
only be told of his rights, he must be asked whether or
not he wants to exercise them.-
It is thus emphasized that any person under
investigation for the commission of an offense does not
only have the right to remain silent and to have
assistance of counsel, he must in addition be informed
of such rights. And it is my considered view that it is not
enough that he be told he has those rights. To give
meaning and substance to the manifest spirit and intent
of the constitutional mandate, he must perforce be
asked pointedly and unequivocally whether or not he
wants to exercise them. Not every ordinary person,
particularly the unschooled or one who is addressed in a
language or dialect he does not sufficiently command,
would readily comprehend to the extent intended by
the fundamental law of the land the exact import of the
bare information that he owns a right. To dispel any
doubt, which is what I am certain the Constitution
contemplates, and to best serve the ends of justice as it
is understood by the common man, it is imperative that
the investigator should go one step further, as I have
just indicated. What would be lost doing it anyway? I
may have a right and may be reminded thereof, but if in
my inadequate circumstances of education and means
of intelligent communication, and because of the
obvious anxiety and apprehension usually felt by one
under questioning about his possible participation in a
criminal offense, I am not made clearly aware when and
how I can avail of such right, of what use would such
right reminder be to me? In my humble opinion, it
behooves every police investigator who conducts a
custodial investigation to possess definite knowledge of
the constitutional rights of all persons being subjected
by him to any inquiry relative to the commission of any
offense, and what is more, he must see to it that the
person being interrogated by him is not only informed
of such rights but that he is specifically asked in the
language the latter adequately understands whether or
not he desires to exercise them, and only when such
person definitely, categorically and freely answers
affirmatively may the investigator proceed to conduct
his inquiry and take the statement of the person
detained, with the implicit understanding yet that even
such initial waiver is not definitely final, for the person
under investigation may still invoke at his option the
same rights at any further stage of the interrogation.
6. Constitutional Law; Evidence; Criminal Procedure;
Before any confession is marked, the court must hold a
separate solely to satisfy itself that due regard was
accorded the accused relative to the exercise of his
rights.-
Accordingly, it is my view that before any confession is
ever marked or identified, upon timely objection of the
accused, the court must first hold a separate proceeding
solely for the purpose of satisfying itself that the same
was taken with due regard to the constitutional rights of
the accused discussed earlier in this opinion. The
advantage of this procedure is that the court may not
even see the incriminatory parts, if any, of the
purported confession until after it is satisfied of the
legality of its taking, hence any possible danger of the
mind of the court being poisoned factually by illegal
evidence, human as the judge is, is thereby eliminated,
should the confession be denied entry into the records.
But, of course, what has just been stated does not mean
that failure to timely object at the stage just indicated
already precludes the accused from questioning the
legality of the confession in any other later stage of the
proceeding.
7. Constitutional Law; Evidence; Respondent judge
made a premature ruling on the admissibility of the
confession which was only being worked in evidence.-
Respondent Judge made a premature ruling on the
admissibility of the confession. It was merely being
identified. It was not yet being formally offered in
evidence. The time to object to the admissibility of the
confession. Exhibit C, is when it is formally offered in
evidence and that is when the prosecution is at the
stage of closing its case. That is the well-known practice.
8. Constitutional Law; Evidence; The defense may yet
rebut the testimony of the police that the confession
was taken properly. Moreover, the police interrogation
endeavored to adhere strictly to the guidelines laid
down in the Miranda case.-
Corporal Roca was placed on the witness stand to testify
on the voluntariness of the confession and to show that
a sufficient notice was given to the accused as to his
constitutional rights and that he waived those rights
voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently. Roca would
declare that the requisites of Section 20, Article VI of
the Constitution were complied with or that the
confession is admissible in evidence. His testimony
should be allowed. To reject his testimony outright
would prevent the prosecution from showing that the
confession is admissible. The accused may rebut Rocas
testimony. On the basis of Rocas testimony and the
testimony of the accused, when the confession is
offered in evidence, that it is inadmissible because there
was no compliance with the constitutional provisions. I
believe that Roca is taking the confession and waiver of
Yupo endeavored to adhere strictly to the guidelines laid
down in the Miranda case.
People v. Tampus
FACTS: At around ten o'clock in the morning of January
14, 1976, Celso Saminado, a prisoner in the national
penitentiary at Muntinlupa, went to the toilet to answer
a call of nature and to fetch water.
The accused, Jose Tampus and Rodolfo Avila,
prisoners in the same penal institution, followed
Saminado to the toilet and, by means of their bladed
weapons, assaulted him. Saminado died upon arrival in
the prison hospital. After emerging from the toilet,
Tampus and Avila surrendered to a prison guard with
their knives. They told the guard: "Surrender po kami,
sir. Gumanti lang po kami."
The officer of the day investigated the incident
right away. In his written report submitted on the same
day when the tragic occurrence transpired, he stated
that, according to his on-the-spot investigation, Avila
stabbed Saminado when the latter was armed in the
comfort room and his back was turned to Avila, while
Tampus stabbed the victim on the chest and neck
Two days after the killing, or on January 16,
another prison guard investigated Tampus and Avila and
obtained their extrajudicial confessions wherein they
admitted that they assaulted Saminado.
The trial was held at the state penitentiary at
the insistence of the Avila. The court found Tampus and
Avila guilty for the murder of Saminado. In this review
of the death sentence, the counsel de oficio of appellant
raises the following issues:
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the confession of Tampus was taken
in violation of Section 20, Article IV of the Constitution
(now Sec. 12, Art. IV of the 1987 Const)
2. W/N the trial court should have advised defendant
Tampus of his right to remain silent after the fiscal had
presented the prosecution's evidence and when counsel
de oficio called upon Tampus to testify
3. W/N defendant Tampus was denied to his right to
public trial because the arraignment and hearing were
held at the state penitentiary
HELD:
1. No. Even before the investigation for the killing was
inititated, Tampus and Avila had already admitted it
when, after coming out of the scene of the crime, they
surrendered to the first guard whom they encountered,
and they revealed to him that they had committed an
act of revenge. That spontaneous statement, elicited
without any interrogation, was part of the res gestae
and at the same time was a voluntary confession of
guilt.
Not only that. The two accused, by means of
that statement given freely on the spur of the moment
without any urging or suggestion, waived their right to
remain silent and to have the right to counsel. That
admission was confirmed by their extrajudicial
confession, plea of guilty and testimony in court.
Under the circumstances, it is not appropriate
for counsel de oficio to rely on the rulings in Escobedo
vs. Illinois and Miranda vs. Arizona regarding the rights
of the accused to be assisted by counsel and to remain
silent during custodial interrogation.
It should be stressed that, even without taking
into account Tampus' admission of guilt, confession,
plea of guilty and testimony, the crime was proven
beyond reasonable doubt by the evidence of the
prosecution.
2. No, considering that Tampus pleaded guilty and had
executed an extrajudicial confession.
The court during the trial is not duty-bound to apprise
the accused that he has the right to remain silent. It is
his counsel who should claim that right for him. If he
does not claim it and he calls the accused to the witness
stand, then he waives that right
3. No. The record does not show that the public was
actually excluded from the place where the trial was
held or that the accused was prejudiced by the holding
of the trial in the national penitentiary.
Besides, there is a ruling that the fact that for
the convenience of the witnesses a case is tried in
Bilibid Prison without any objection on the part of the
accused is not a ground for reversal of the judgment of
conviction (U.S. vs. Mercado, 4 Phil. 304).
 The accused may waive his right to have a public
trial as shown in the rule that the trial court may motu
propio exclude the public from the courtroom when the
evidence to be offered is offensive to decency or public
morals. The court may also, upon request of the
defendant, exclude from the trial every person except
the officers of the court and the attorneys for the
prosecution and defense.
TEEHANKEE, J., dissenting:
The extra-judicial confession of the accused is
manifestly barred from admission under the Bill of
Rights.
I have grave doubts as to the alleged waiver by
the accused of his constitutional right to counsel and to
remain silent given in the middle of his "voluntary"
extrajudicial confession during his custodial
interrogation by the prison investigator, who at such late
stage (in propounding question No. 6, not at the
beginning of the interrogation) purportedly took time
out to admonish and inform the accused of his rights to
counsel and to silence. The fundamental rights of such
unfortunate disadvantaged persons as the accused
should all the more be clearly protected and observed.
At the very least, such alleged waiver must be witnessed
by a responsible official of the penitentiary, if not by the
municipal judge of the locality.
Counsel for the accused's second assigned error
is also well taken. After the prosecutor had presented
the State's evidence at the hearing for the purpose, and
when counsel de oficio then called upon the accused to
testify, it became the trial court's duty (contrary to the
majority's ruling) to apprise and admonish him of his
constitutional rights to remain silent and against self-
incrimination, i.e. the right not to be compelled to be a
witness against himself.
Under the above-cited section 20 of the Bill of
Rights, any confession or incriminatory statement
obtained in violation thereof is expressly declared
"inadmissible in evidence."
Gamboa v Cruz 162 SCRA 642 (1988)
Facts: Petitioner was arrested for vagrancy without a
warrant. During a line-up of 5 detainees including
petitioner, he was identified by a complainant to be a
companion in a robbery, thereafter he was charged.
Petitioner filed a Motion to Acquit on the ground that
the conduct of the line-up, without notice and in the
absence of his counsel violated his constitutional rights
to counsel and to due process. The court denied said
motion. Hearing was set, hence the petition.
Issue: Whether or Not petitioners right to counsel and
due process violated.
Held: No. The police line-up was not part of the
custodial inquest, hence, petitioner was not yet entitled,
at such stage, to counsel. He had not been held yet to
answer for a criminal offense. The moment there is a
move or even an urge of said investigators to elicit
admissions or confessions or even plain information
which may appear innocent or innocuous at the time,
from said suspect, he should then and there be assisted
by counsel, unless he waives the right, but the waiver
shall be made in writing and in the presence of counsel.
On the right to due process, petitioner was not,
in any way, deprived of this substantive and
constitutional right, as he was duly represented by a
counsel. He was accorded all the opportunities to be
heard and to present evidence to substantiate his
defense; only that he chose not to, and instead opted to
file a Motion to Acquit after the prosecution had rested
its case. What due process abhors is the absolute lack of
opportunity to be heard.
PEOPLE VS. BANDULA [232 SCRA 566; G.R. NO. 89223;
27 MAY 1994]
Facts: Six armed men barged into the compound of Polo
Coconut Plantation in Tanjay, Negros Oriental. The
armed men were identified by Security Guard, including
accused. Salva and Pastrano, security guards were
hogtied and accused proceeded to the Atty. Garay,
counsel of plantation. They ransacked the place and
took with them money and other valuables. Atty. Garay
was killed. Accused-appellant is charged with robbery
with homicide along with 3 others who were acquitted
for insufficiency of evidence. Appellant was convicted.
Now, appellant argues that the extrajudicial
confessions he and accused Dionanao executed suffer
from constitutional infirmities, hence, inadmissible in
evidence considering that they were extracted under
duress and intimidation, and were merely countersigned
later by the municipal attorney who, by the nature of his
position, was not entirely an independent counsel nor
counsel of their choice. Consequently, without the
extrajudicial confessions, the prosecution is left without
sufficient evidence to convict him of the crime charged.
Issue: Whether or Not extrajudicial confessions of
appellant is admissible as evidence against him.
Held: No. When accused-appellant Bandula and accused
Dionanao were investigated immediately after their
arrest, they had no counsel present. If at all, counsel
came in only a day after the custodial investigation with
respect to accused Dionanao, and two weeks later with
respect to appellant Bandula. And, counsel who
supposedly assisted both accused was Atty. Ruben
Zerna, the Municipal Attorney of Tanjay. On top of this,
there are telltale signs that violence was used against
the accused. Certainly, these are blatant violations of
the Constitution which mandates in
Sec. 12, Art. III. Irregularities present include:
1. The investigators did not inform the accused of their
right to remain silent and to have competent and
independent counsel, preferably of their own choice,
even before attempting to elicit statements that would
incriminate them.
2. Investigators continuously disregard the repeated
requests of the accused for medical assistance. Reason
for Accused Sedigos "black eye" which even
Pat. Baldejera admitted is not established, as well as
Bandulas fractured rib.
3. Counsel must be independent. He cannot be a special
counsel, public or private prosecutor, counsel of the
police, or a municipal attorney whose interest is
admittedly adverse to the accused.
PEOPLE VS. LUCERO [244 SCRA 425; G.R. NO.97936; 29
MAY 1995]
Facts: Alejandro Lucero, Bienvenido Echavez, Balbino
Echavez, Peter Doe, Richard Doe and John Doe were
charged with the crime of robbery with homicide.
The prosecution:
Accused-appellant (alighted from a gray-reddish
car), armed with handgun, blocked the way of the said
complainant who was on board a Mercedes Benz
passing along Road 14, Mindanao Avenue, Pag-asa, QC,
rob and carry away cash money; one gold necklace with
cross pendant, 7 karat; one gold Rolex watch; one 3
karat gold ring; one 2 karat gold ring, domino style; one
solid gold bracelet; all worth P363,600.00, belonging to
DR. DEMETRIO Z. MADRID. Accused shot LORENZO
BERNALES y ALERIA, a driver of the said offended party,
thus inflicting upon him mortal wounds, which resulted
to the instantaneous death of ALERIA.
Only the accused Echavez brothers and Alejandro
Lucero were apprehended.
When Lucero told him that he had no lawyer, in
due time, Atty. Diosdado Peralta conferred with Lucero.
He apprised Lucero of his constitutional rights. He
observed no reaction from Lucero. Nonetheless, Atty.
Peralta gathered the impression that Lucero understood
his advice.
When the investigator started asking the
preliminary questions, Atty. Peralta left to attend the
wake of his friend. The next morning, Lucero was
accompanied by CIS agents to Atty. Peralta's house. The
extrajudicial statement of Lucero was presented to Atty.
Peralta. It was already signed by Lucero.
The three accused denied complicity in the crime
charged.
Appellant Lucero's defense is alibi. He testified that he
was at his house in Caloocan City.
He said he was surprised when several
unidentified men accosted him while he was walking
towards his house. They chased him, handcuffed and
blindfolded him and pushed him into a jeep. He was
blindfolded the whole night and did not know where he
was taken. The men turned out to be police officers.
The next day, he learned he was in Camp
Crame. He claimed that he was tortured. He was not
informed of the offense for which he was being
investigated. Neither did they reveal the identity of the
complainant.
Lucero denied knowing Dr. Madrid, the Echavez
brothers and the other accused in this case. He said he
only met Dr. Madrid at the CIS Office during the police
line-up. He was made to line-up four (4) times before Dr.
Madrid finally identified him on the fourth time.
Lucero also claimed he signed the extrajudicial
confession under duress. He denied engaging the
services of Atty, Peralta. He likewise confirmed that Atty.
Peralta was not present during his actual custodial
interrogation.
After trial, the court a quo acquitted the Echavez
brothers for insufficient evidence. The trial court,
however, convicted accused Lucero GUILTY as principal
by direct participation of Robbery with Homicide and
sentenced to suffer an imprisonment term of
RECLUSION PERPETUA.
Issue: Whether or Not the lower court erred in
convicting accused-appellant.
Held: Appellant's conviction cannot be based on his
extrajudicial confession.
Constitution requires that a person under
investigation for the commission of a crime should be
provided with counsel. The Court have
constitutionalized the right to counsel because of
hostility against the use of duress and other undue
influence in extracting confessions from a suspect. Force
and fraud tarnish confessions can render them
inadmissible.
The records show that Atty. Peralta, who was
not the counsel of choice of appellant. Atty. Peralta
himself admitted he received no reaction from appellant
although his impression was that appellant understood
him. More so, it was during his absence that appellant
gave an uncounselled confession.
Constitution requires the right to counsel, it did
not mean any kind of counsel but effective and vigilant
counsel. The circumstances clearly demonstrate that
appellant received no effective counseling from Atty.
Peralta. Whereof, Decision convicting appellant
Alejandro Lucero y Cortel is hereby reversed.
Amion v Chiongson 301 SCRA 614 (January 22, 1999)
Facts: This is an administrative matter filed before the
court charging the respondent judge for ignorance of
the law and oppression for vehemently insisting of
appointing the accused-appellant counsel de officio
despite the appellants opposition because he has his
own counsel of choice in the person of Atty. Depasucat.
However, many instances that Atty. Depasucat did not
appear in court which prompted respondent judge to
assign Atty. Lao Ong from the PAO to represent the
accused stating on record that his representation is
without prejudice to the appearance of the accused
own counsel. This was done in order to avoid delay of
the trial since the complainant already expressed
frustration on the so many postponement of the
hearing.
Issue: Whether or not there is merit of invoking the
right to counsel of his own choice as asserted by the
accused in the case at bar.
Held: The court finds the administrative complaint
against respondent judge devoid of merit. An
examination of related provisions in the Constitution
concerning the right to counsel, will show that the
"preference in the choice of counsel" pertains more
aptly and specifically to a person under investigation
rather than one who is the accused in a criminal
prosecution. Accused-complainant was not, in any way,
deprived of his substantive and constitutional right to
due process as he was duly accorded all the
opportunities to be heard and to present evidence to
substantiate his defense but he forfeited this right, for
not appearing in court together with his counsel at the
scheduled hearings. It was the strategic machination of
delaying the proceeding by the accused that gave rise to
the need of appointing him counsel de officio by the
court as delaying further the hearing is prejudicial to
speedy disposition of a case and causes delay in the
administration of justice.
People vs Linsangan
Facts: Ambrosio Linsangan was prosecuted for
nonpayment of the cedula or poll tax under section
1439, in connection with section 2718, of the Revised
Administrative Code. After due trial, he was sentenced
to suffer imprisonment for 5 days, and to pay the costs.
The case was tried and decided before the Constitution
of the Philippines took effect but while the appeal was
pending, the said Constitution became effective, and,
section 1, clause 12, of Article III thereof provides that
"no person shall be imprisoned for debt or nonpayment
of a poll tax." Linsangan appealed, alleging that the trial
court erred in not declaring said sections of the Revised
Administrative Code unconstitutional and void.
Issue: Whether, in view of section 1, clause 12, of
Article III of the Constitution, the judgment of conviction
against Linsangan can stand
Held: Section 2 of Article XV of the Constitution,
provides:
All laws of the Philippine Islands shall continue
in force until the inauguration of the Commonwealth of
the Philippines; thereafter, such laws shall remain
operative, unless inconsistent with this Constitution,
until amended, altered, modified, or repealed by the
National Assembly, and all references in such laws to the
Government or officials of the Philippine Islands shall be
construed, in so far as applicable, to refer to the
Government and corresponding officials under this
Constitution.
It seems too clear to require demonstration that
section 2718 of the Revised Administrative Code is
inconsistent with section 1, clause 12, of Article III of the
Constitution, in that, while the former authorizes
imprisonment for nonpayment of the poll or cedula tax,
the latter forbids it. It follows that upon the
inauguration of the Government of the Commonwealth,
said section 2718 of the Revised Administrative Code
became inoperative, and no judgment of conviction can
be based thereon. (People vs. Ambrosio Linsangan, G.R.
No. L-43290, December 21, 1935)
People v Alicando GR No. 117487 (December 2, 1995)
Facts: Accused was convicted with a crime of rape with
homicide of a 4 year old girl. He was arrested and during
the interrogation he made a confession of the crime
without the assistance of a counsel. By virtue of his
uncounseled confession the police came to know where
to find the evidences consisting of the victims personal
things like clothes stained with blood which was
admitted to court as evidences. The victim pleaded
guilty during the arraignment and was convicted with
the death penalty. The case was forwarded to the SC for
automatic review.
Issue: Whether or not due process during the custodial
investigation was accorded to the accused.
Held: Due process was not observed in the conduct of
custodial investigation for the accused. He was not
informed of his right to a counsel upon making his
extrajudicial confession and the information against him
was written in a language he could not understand and
was not explained to him. This is in violation of section
1(a) of Rule 116, the rule implementing the
constitutional right of the appellant to be informed of
the nature and cause of the accusation against him. The
lower court also violated section 3 of Rule 116 when it
accepted the plea of guilt of the appellant without
conducting a search inquiry on the voluntariness and
full understanding of the accused of the consequences
of his plea. Moreover the evidences admitted by the
court that warranted his convicted were inadmissible
because they were due to an invalid custodial
investigation that did not provide the accused with due
process of the law. Thus the SC annulled the decision of
the imposition of the death penalty and remanded the
case back to the lower for further proceeding.
PEOPLE VS FORTES
Facts: Agripino Gine of Barangay Naburacan,
Municipality of Matnog, Province of Sorsogon,
accompanied his 13-year old daughter, Merelyn, to the
police station of the said municipality to report a rape
committed against the latter by the accused. Following
this, the accused was apprehended and charged. A bond
of P25000 was granted for accuseds provisional release.
The MCTC found him guilty. An appeal to RTC was filed,
the request for the fixing of bond was denied. Now
accused assails denial of bail on the ground that the
same amounted to an undue denial of his constitutional
right to bail.
Issue: Whether or Not the accuseds right to bail
violated.
Held: No. It is clear from Section 13, Article III of the
1987 Constitution and Section 3, Rule 114 of the
Revised Rules of Court, as amended, that before
conviction bail is either a matter of right or of discretion.
It is a matter of right when the offense charged is
punishable by any penalty lower than reclusion
perpetua. To that extent the right is absolute. If the
offense charged is punishable by reclusion perpetua bail
becomes a matter of discretion. It shall be denied if the
evidence of guilt is strong. The court's discretion is
limited to determining whether or not evidence of guilt
is strong. But once it is determined that the evidence of
guilt is not strong, bail also becomes a matter of right. If
an accused who is charged with a crime punishable by
reclusion perpetua is convicted by the trial court and
sentenced to suffer such a penalty, bail is neither a
matter of right on the part of the accused nor of
discretion on the part of the court.
COMMENDADOR VS. DE VILLA [200 SCRA 80; G.R. NO.
93177; 2 AUG 1991]
Facts: The petitioners in G.R. Nos. 93177 and 96948
who are officers of the AFP were directed to appear in
person before the Pre-Trial Investigating Officers for the
alleged participation the failed coup on December 1 to
9, 1989. Petitioners now claim that there was no pre-
trial investigation of the charges as mandated by Article
of War 71. A motion for dismissal was denied. Now,
their motion for reconsideration. Alleging denial of due
process
In G.R. No. 95020, Ltc Jacinto Ligot applied for
bail on June 5, 1990, but the application was denied by
GCM No.14. He filed with the RTC a petition for
certiorari and mandamus with prayer for provisional
liberty and a writ of preliminary injunction. Judge of
GCM then granted the provisional liberty. However he
was not released immediately. The RTC now declared
that even military men facing court martial proceedings
can avail the right to bail.
The private respondents in G.R. No. 97454 filed
with SC a petition for habeas corpus on the ground that
they were being detained in Camp Crame without
charges. The petition was referred to RTC. Finding after
hearing that no formal charges had been filed against
the petitioners after more than a year after their arrest,
the trial court ordered their release.
Issues:
(1) Whether or Not there was a denial of due process.
(2) Whether or not there was a violation of the accused
right to bail.
(3) Whether or not military men are exempted from the
Constitutional guarantee on the right to bail.
Held: NO denial of due process. Petitioners were given
several opportunities to present their side at the pre-
trial investigation, first at the scheduled hearing of
February 12, 1990, and then again after the denial of
their motion of February 21, 1990, when they were
given until March 7, 1990, to submit their counter-
affidavits. On that date, they filed instead a verbal
motion for reconsideration which they were again asked
to submit in writing. They had been expressly warned in
the subpoena that "failure to submit counter-affidavits
on the date specified shall be deemed a waiver of their
right to submit controverting evidence." Petitioners
have a right to pre-emptory challenge. (Right to
challenge validity of members of G/SCM)
It is argued that since the private respondents
are officers of the Armed Forces accused of violations of
the Articles of War, the respondent courts have no
authority to order their release and otherwise interfere
with the court-martial proceedings. This is without
merit. * The Regional Trial Court has concurrent
jurisdiction with the Court of Appeals and the Supreme
Court over petitions for certiorari, prohibition or
mandamus against inferior courts and other bodies and
on petitions for habeas corpus and quo warranto.
 The right to bail invoked by the private
respondents has traditionally not been recognized and
is not available in the military, as an exception to the
general rule embodied in the Bill of Rights. The right to a
speedy trial is given more emphasis in the military
where the right to bail does not exist.
On the contention that they had not been
charged after more than one year from their arrest,
there was substantial compliance with the requirements
of due process and the right to a speedy trial. The AFP
Special Investigating Committee was able to complete
the pre-charge investigation only after one year because
hundreds of officers and thousands of enlisted men
were involved in the failed coup.
Accordingly, in G.R. No. 93177, the petition is
dismissed for lack of merit. In G.R. No. 96948, the
petition is granted, and the respondents are directed to
allow the petitioners to exercise the right of peremptory
challenge under article 18 of the articles of war. In G.R.
Nos. 95020 and 97454, the petitions are also granted,
and the orders of the respondent courts for the release
of the private respondents are hereby reversed and set
aside. No costs.
Held: The SC ruled that the bail invoked by petitioners is
not available in the military as an exception to the
general rule embodied in the Bill of Rights. Thus the
right to a speedy trial is given more emphasis in the
military where the right to bail does not exist.
Justification to this rule involves the unique structure of
the military and national security considerations which
may result to damaging precedents that mutinous
soldiers will be released on provisional liberty giving
them the chance to continue their plot in overthrowing
the government. Therefore the decision of the lower
court granting bail to the petitioners was reversed.
Manotoc vs. CA | May 30, 1986
FACTS: Ricardo Manotoc Jr. was one of the two principal
stockholders of Trans-Insular Management Inc. and the
Manotoc Securities Inc. (stock brokerage house). He
was in US for a certain time, went home to file a petition
with SEC for appointment of a management committee
for both businesses. Such was granted. However,
pending disposition of a case filed with SEC, the latter
requested the Commissioner of Immigration not to clear
him for departure. Consequently, a memorandum to
this effect was issued.
There was a torrens title submitted to and
accepted by Manotoc Securities Inc which was
suspected to be fake. 6 of its clients filed separate
criminal complaints against the petitioner and Leveriza,
President and VP respectively. He was charged with
estafa and was allowed by the Court to post bail.
Petitioner filed before each trial court motion
for permission to leave the country stating his desire to
go to US relative to his business transactions and
opportunities. Such was opposed by the prosecution
and was also denied by the judges. He filed petition for
certiorari with CA seeking to annul the prior orders and
the SEC communication request denying his leave to
travel abroad.
According to the petitioner, having been
admitted to bail as a matter of right, neither the courts
that granted him bail nor SEC, which has no jurisdiction
over his liberty, could prevent him from exercising his
constitutional right to travel.
ISSUE: WON petitioners constitutional right to travel
was violated.
HELD: NO. The court has power to prohibit person
admitted to bail from leaving the country because this is
a necessary consequence of the nature and function of
a bail bond. The condition imposed upon petitioner to
make himself available at all times whenever the court
requires his presence operates as a valid restriction on
his constitutional right to travel. In case he will be
allowed to leave the country without sufficient reason,
he may be placed beyond the reach of courts.
Furthermore, petitioner failed to satisfy trial
court and CA of the urgency of his travel, duration
thereof, as well as consent of his surety to the proposed
travel. He was not able to show the necessity of his
travel abroad. He never indicated that no other person
in his behalf could undertake such business transaction.
Article 3 Sec6: The liberty of abode and of
changing the same shall not be impaired except upon
lawful order of the court. According to SC, the order
of trial court in releasing petitioner on bail constitutes
such lawful order as contemplated by the provision on
right to travel.