Republic of the Philippines

Supreme Court
Manila
SECOND DIVISION

RUBEN C. CORPUZ, represented by G.R. No. 183822

Attorney-in-Fact Wenifreda C. Agullana,
Petitioner,

-versus-
Present:

CARPIO, J.,
Sps. HILARION AGUSTIN and Chairperson,
JUSTA AGUSTIN, PEREZ,
Respondents. SERENO,
REYES, and
PERLAS-BERNABE, JJ.

Promulgated:

January 18, 2012

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DECISION

SERENO, J.:

This Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assails the
Decision[1] dated 08 January 2008 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 90645, which
affirmed the Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Laoag City and its Resolution[2] dated
15 July 2008 denying the Motion for Reconsideration. The RTC, in the exercise of its appellate
jurisdiction, affirmed the Decision of the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Laoag City, which had
dismissed the unlawful detainer case filed by herein petitioner.

The Factual Antecedents

The Court adopts the findings of fact of the CA as follows:
Ruben C. Corpuz (Ruben) filed a complaint for ejectment against Spouses
Hilarion and Justa Agustin on the allegation that he is the registered owner of
two parcels of land located in Santa Joaquina, Laoag City covered by TCT No.
12980 issued on October 29, 1976 by the Laoag City Register of Deeds and with
technical descriptions as follows:

1) A parcel of land (Lot No. 20 of the Cadastral Survey of Laoag),

with improvements thereon, situated in the barrio of Santa
Joaquina, Municipality of Laoag. Bounded x x x containing an area
of five thousand seven hundred and fifty nine (5,759) square meters
more or less x x x.
 2) A parcel of land (Lot No. 11711 of the Cadastral Survey of Laoag),
with the improvements thereon, situated in the barrio of Santa
Joaquina, Municipality of Laoag. Bounded x x x, containing an area
of twenty thousand seven hundred and forty five (20,745) square
meters, more or less x x x.

Aforesaid parcels of land were formerly owned by Elias Duldulao in whose

name Original Certificate of Title No. O-1717 was issued. Duldulao sold said
properties on August 27, 1951 to Francisco D. Corpuz, father of Ruben C.
Corpuz. The elder Corpuz allowed spouses Agustin to occupy subject
properties, the latter being relatives.

Despite demand to vacate, the Agustins refused to leave the premises.

Ruben alleged further that he has the better right to possess subject property
having acquired the same from his father, Francisco, who executed a Deed of
Quitclaim in his favor on March 15, 1971.

Spouses Agustin, in their Answer, interposed the defense that on June 5, 1971
Francisco Corpuz, Ruben's father, disposed of subject property by executing a
Deed of Absolute Sale in their favor for a consideration of Eleven Thousand
One Hundred Fifty Pesos (P11,150.00).

The Municipal Trial Court found for the spouses Agustin and dismissed the
complaint.

In sum, considering the evidence of the defendants which shows that

they entered into and occupied Lot No. 20 and the 9,657 sq. m.
portion of Lot No. 11711 as buyers or owners, disproving the
allegation of the plaintiff that defendants were merely allowed by
Francisco Corpuz to occupy the subject properties, being his
relatives, and considering further the length of time that the
defendants have been in possession, as owners, of Lot No. 20 and
the 9,657 sq. m. portion of Lot No. 11711, and have been
continuously exercising their rights of ownership thereon, this court
is of the view and holds, in so far as this case is concerned, that the
defendants are the ones entitled to the possession of Lot No. 20 and
the 9,657 sq. m. portion of Lot No. 11711.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, this case, is hereby

dismissed.

SO ORDERED.

On appeal, Branch XVI, Regional Trial Court of Laoag City affirmed said
dismissal, the dispositive portion of said decision states:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Appeal is hereby

DISMISSED for lack of merit and the JUDGMENT of the
Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Branch 01, Laoag City is hereby
AFFIRMED, with costs against the plaintiff-appellant.

SO ORDERED.[3]

Petitioner assailed the Decision of the RTC, affirming the earlier dismissal of the case by the
MTC, by instituting an appeal with the CA. On 08 January 2008, the appellate court through its
Fourteenth Division dismissed his appeal.[4] It noted that his father engaged in a double sale when
he conveyed the disputed properties to petitioner and respondents. The Quitclaim executed by the
elder Corpuz in favor of petitioner was dated 15 March 1971, while the Deed of Sale with
respondents was later, on 15 June 1971; both documents were notarized shortly after their
execution.[5] The Quitclaim, which was subsequently inscribed at the back of Original Certificate
of Title (OCT) No. O-1717 on 29 October 1976,[6] resulted in the issuance of Transfer Certificate
of Title (TCT) No. T-12980 in the name of petitioner. The Deed of Sale executed with respondents
was, however, not annotated at the back of OCT No. O-1717 and remained unregistered.[7]

Based on the above findings, the CA ruled that petitioner had knowledge of the sale of the
disputed real property executed between Francisco Corpuz, petitioner's father, and respondents.
Due to this conveyance by the elder Corpuz to respondents, the latter's possession thereof was in
the nature of ownership. Thus, in the context of an unlawful detainer case instituted by petitioner
against respondents, the appellate court concluded that respondents possession of the property was
not by mere tolerance of its former owner petitioner's father but was in the exercise of ownership.[8]

The CA noted that petitioner had knowledge of his fathers sale of the properties to respondents as
early as 1973. However, despite knowledge of the sale, petitioner failed to initiate any action to
annul it and oust respondents from the subject properties.[9] The appellate court rejected his
contention that, as registered owner of the disputed properties, he had a better right to possession
thereof, compared to the unregistered Deed of Sale relied upon by respondents in their defense of
the same properties. The CA ruled that the inaction on his part despite knowledge of the sale in
1973 was equivalent to registration of respondents unregistered deed.[10] In dismissing his appeal,
the CA concluded that respondents possession was not ... anchored on mere tolerance nor on any
of the grounds for forcible entry or unlawful detainer; hence the complaint for ejectment must
fail.[11]The dispositive portion of the assailed Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant petition is hereby

DISMISSED. The decision of Branch XVI, Regional Trial Court of Laoag City in
Civil Case No. 13293-16 is hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.[12]

The Issues
Petitioner assigns the following errors in this Petition for Review on Certiorari:

I. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED

IN FAILING TO CONSIDER THE LEGAL OWNERSHIP OF PETITIONER
ON THE DISPUTED PROPERTY TO CLAIM BETTER RIGHT TO
POSSESSION.

II. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED

IN THE APPRECIATION OF THE ALLEGED SALE IN FAVOR OF
RESPONDENTS TO RULE THAT THEY HAVE BETTER RIGHT TO
POSSESSION.
 III. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN
FAILING TO CONSIDER THE CASE OF JACINTO CO VS. MILITAR, ET
AL. (421 SCRA 455) WHICH IS SIMILAR TO THE INSTANT CASE.

IV. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN

DENYING THE PETITION FOR REVIEW RAISED BEFORE IT.[13]

Petitioner presents to this Court for resolution the core issue of his Petition: who between the
parties has the right to possession of the disputed properties -- petitioner, who is the registered
owner under TCT No. T-12980; or respondents, who have a notarized yet unregistered Deed of
Absolute Sale over the same properties?

The Court's Ruling

We DENY the Petition.

Although this case does not present a novel question of law, there is a need to discuss the nature
of an ejectment case for the recovery of physical possession in relation to the Torrens system. A
resolution of the issue would be relevant to the determination of who has the better right to
possession in this unlawful detainer case.

One of the three kinds of action for the recovery of possession of real property is accion
interdictal, or an ejectment proceeding ... which may be either that for forcible entry (detentacion)
or unlawful detainer (desahucio), which is a summary action for the recovery of physical
possession where the dispossession has not lasted for more than one year, and should be brought
in the proper inferior court.[14] In ejectment proceedings, the courts resolve the basic question
of who is entitled to physical possession of the premises, possession referring to possession de
facto, and not possession de jure.[15]

Where the parties to an ejectment case raise the issue of ownership, the courts may pass
upon that issue to determine who between the parties has the better right to possess the property.
However, where the issue of ownership is inseparably linked to that of possession, adjudication of
the ownership issue is not final and binding, but only for the purpose of resolving the issue of
possession. The adjudication of the issue of ownership is only provisional, and not a bar to an
action between the same parties involving title to the property.[16]

In the instant case, the position of respondents is that they are occupying the disputed properties
as owners, having acquired these from petitioner's father through a Deed of Absolute Sale executed
in 1971. Respondents believe that they cannot be dispossessed of the disputed properties, since
they are the owners and are in actual possession thereof up to this date. Petitioner, however, rebuts
this claim of ownership, contending that he has registered the disputed properties in his name and
has been issued a land title under the Torrens system. He asserts that, having registered the
properties in his name, he is the recognized owner and consequently has the better right to
possession.

Indeed, a title issued under the Torrens system is entitled to all the attributes of property
ownership, which necessarily includes possession.[17] Petitioner is correct that as a Torrens title
holder over the subject properties, he is the rightful owner and is entitled to possession thereof.
However, the lower courts and the appellate court consistently found that possession of the
disputed properties by respondents was in the nature of ownership, and not by mere tolerance of
the elder Corpuz. In fact, they have been in continuous, open and notorious possession of the
property for more than 30 years up to this day.

Petitioner cites Jacinto Co v. Rizal Militar, et al.,[18] which has facts and legal issues
identical to those of the instant case. The petitioner therein filed an unlawful detainer case against
the respondents over a disputed property. He had a Torrens title thereto, while the respondents as
actual occupants of the property claimed ownership thereof based on their unregistered Deeds of
Sale. The principal issue was who between the two parties had the better right to possess the
subject property.

This Court resolved the issue by upholding the title holder as the one who had the better
right to possession of the disputed property based on the following justification:
We have, time and again, held that the only issue for resolution in an unlawful
detainer case is physical or material possession of the property involved,
independent of any claim of ownership by any of the party litigants. Moreover, an
ejectment suit is summary in nature and is not susceptible to circumvention by the
simple expedient of asserting ownership over the property.

In forcible entry and unlawful detainer cases, even if the defendant raises
the question of ownership in his pleadings and the question of possession cannot
be resolved without deciding the issue of ownership, the lower courts and the Court
of Appeals, nonetheless, have the undoubted competence to provisionally resolve
the issue of ownership for the sole purpose of determining the issue of Possession.

Such decision, however, does not bind the title or affect the ownership of
the land nor is conclusive of the facts therein found in a case between the same
parties upon a different cause of action involving possession.

In the instant case, the evidence showed that as between the parties, it is the
petitioner who has a Torrens Title to the property. Respondents merely showed
their unregistered deeds of sale in support of their claims. The Metropolitan Trial
Court correctly relied on the transfer certificate of title in the name of petitioner.

In Tenio-Obsequio v. Court of Appeals, it was held that the Torrens System

was adopted in this country because it was believed to be the most effective
measure to guarantee the integrity of land titles and to protect their indefeasibility
once the claim of ownership is established and recognized.

It is settled that a Torrens Certificate of title is indefeasible and binding

upon the whole world unless and until it has been nullified by a court of competent
jurisdiction. Under existing statutory and decisional law, the power to pass upon
the validity of such certificate of title at the first instance properly belongs to the
Regional Trial Courts in a direct proceeding for cancellation of title.

As the registered owner, petitioner had a right to the possession of the

property, which is one of the attributes of his ownership. Respondents' argument
that petitioner is not an innocent purchaser for value and was guilty of bad faith in
having the subject land registered in his name is a collateral attack on the title of
petitioner, which is not allowed. A certificate of title cannot be subject to a
collateral attack and can be altered, modified or cancelled only in a direct
proceeding in accordance with law. [19]
 The pronouncement in Co v. Militar was later reiterated in Spouses Pascual v. Spouses
Coronel[20] and in Spouses Barias v. Heirs of Bartolome Boneo, et al.,[21] wherein we consistently
held the age-old rule that the person who has a Torrens Title over a land is entitled to possession
thereof.[22]

However, we cannot lose sight of the fact that the present petitioner has instituted an unlawful
detainer case against respondents. It is an established fact that for more than three decades, the
latter have been in continuous possession of the subject property, which, as such, is in the concept
of ownership and not by mere tolerance of petitioners father. Under these circumstances, petitioner
cannot simply oust respondents from possession through the summary procedure of an ejectment
proceeding.

Instructive on this matter is Carbonilla v. Abiera,[23] which reads thus:

Without a doubt, the registered owner of real property is entitled to its
possession. However, the owner cannot simply wrest possession thereof from
whoever is in actual occupation of the property. To recover possession, he must
resort to the proper judicial remedy and, once he chooses what action to file, he is
required to satisfy the conditions necessary for such action to prosper.
In the present case, petitioner opted to file an ejectment case against
respondents. Ejectment casesforcible entry and unlawful detainerare summary
proceedings designed to provide expeditious means to protect actual possession or
the right to possession of the property involved. The only question that the courts
resolve in ejectment proceedings is: who is entitled to the physical possession of
the premises, that is, to the possession de facto and not to the possession de jure. It
does not even matter if a partys title to the property is questionable. For this
reason, an ejectment case will not necessarily be decided in favor of one who
has presented proof of ownership of the subject property. Key jurisdictional
facts constitutive of the particular ejectment case filed must be averred in the
complaint and sufficiently proven.
The statements in the complaint that respondents possession of the building
was by mere tolerance of petitioner clearly make out a case for unlawful detainer.
Unlawful detainer involves the persons withholding from another of the possession
of the real property to which the latter is entitled, after the expiration or termination
of the formers right to hold possession under the contract, either expressed or
implied.
A requisite for a valid cause of action in an unlawful detainer case is that
possession must be originally lawful, and such possession must have turned
unlawful only upon the expiration of the right to possess. It must be shown that the
possession was initially lawful; hence, the basis of such lawful possession must be
established. If, as in this case, the claim is that such possession is by mere tolerance
of the plaintiff, the acts of tolerance must be proved. (Emphasis supplied.)

In this case, petitioner has not proven that respondents continued possession of the subject
properties was by mere tolerance of his father, except by a mere allegation thereof. In fact,
petitioner has not established when respondents possession of the properties became unlawful a
requisite for a valid cause of action in an unlawful detainer case.

In Canlas v. Tubil,[24] we enumerated the elements that constitute the sufficiency of a

complaint for unlawful detainer, as follows:
 Well-settled is the rule that what determines the nature of the action as well as the
court which has jurisdiction over the case are the allegations in the complaint. In
ejectment cases, the complaint should embody such statement of facts as to bring
the party clearly within the class of cases for which the statutes provide a remedy,
as these proceedings are summary in nature. The complaint must show enough on
its face to give the court jurisdiction without resort to parol evidence.

Unlawful detainer is an action to recover possession of real property from

one who illegally withholds possession after the expiration or termination of his
right to hold possession under any contract, express or implied. The possession of
the defendant in unlawful detainer is originally legal but became illegal due to the
expiration or termination of the right to possess.

An unlawful detainer proceeding is summary in nature, jurisdiction of

which lies in the proper municipal trial court or metropolitan trial court. The action
must be brought within one year from the date of last demand and the issue in said
case is the right to physical possession.
... ... ...
In Cabrera v. Getaruela, the Court held that a complaint sufficiently alleges a cause
of action for unlawful detainer if it recites the following:

(1) initially, possession of property by the defendant was by contract

with or by tolerance of the plaintiff;

(2) eventually, such possession became illegal upon notice by plaintiff to

defendant of the termination of the latters right of possession;

(3) thereafter, the defendant remained in possession of the property and

deprived the plaintiff of the enjoyment thereof; and

(4) within one year from the last demand on defendant to vacate the
property, the plaintiff instituted the complaint for ejectment.

Based on the above, it is obvious that petitioner has not complied with the requirements
sufficient to warrant the success of his unlawful detainer Complaint against respondents. The
lower courts and the CA have consistently upheld the entitlement of respondents to continued
possession of the subject properties, since their possession has been established as one in the
concept of ownership. Thus, the courts correctly dismissed the unlawful detainer case of
petitioner.

We concur in the appellate courts findings that petitioners father engaged in a double sale
of the disputed properties. The records of the case show that it took petitioner more or less five
years from 1971 when he acquired the property from his father to 1976 when petitioner registered
the conveyance and caused the issuance of the land title registered in his name under the Torrens
system. Respondents, on the other hand, continued their possession of the properties, but without
bothering to register them or to initiate any action to fortify their ownership.

We cannot, however, sustain the appellate courts conclusion that petitioner's failure to
initiate any action to annul the sale to respondents and oust them from the disputed properties had
the effect of registration of respondents unregistered Deed of Absolute Sale. We held thus in Ruiz,
Sr. v. Court of Appeals [25]:
 (But) where a party has knowledge of a prior existing interest which is
unregistered at that time he acquired a right to the same land, his knowledge of
that prior unregistered interest has the effect of registration as to
him. Knowledge of an unregistered sale is equivalent to registration. As held
in Fernandez v. Court of Appeals [189 SCRA 780 (1990)],

Section 50 of Act No. 496 (now Sec. 51 of P.D. 1529),

provides that the registration of the deed is the operative act to bind
or affect the land insofar as third persons are concerned. But where
the party has knowledge of a prior existing interest which is
unregistered at the time he acquired a right to the same land, his
knowledge of that prior unregistered interest has the effect of
registration as to him. The Torrens system cannot be used as a shield
for the commission of fraud (Gustillo v. Maravilla, 48 Phil. 442).
[Emphasis supplied.]

In this case, the Quitclaim executed by the elder Corpuz in favor of petitioner was executed
ahead of the Deed of Sale of respondents. Thus, the sale of the subject properties by petitioners
father to respondents cannot be considered as a prior interest at the time that petitioner came to
know of the transaction.

We also note that, based on the records, respondents do not dispute the existence of TCT No. T-
12980 registered in the name of petitioner. They allege, though, that the land title issued to him
was an act of fraud [26] on his part. We find this argument to be equivalent to a collateral attack
against the Torrens title of petitioner an attack we cannot allow in the instant unlawful detainer
case.

It is settled in jurisprudence that a Torrens certificate of title cannot be the subject of

collateral attack.[27] Such attack must be direct and not by a collateral proceeding.[28] It is a well-
established doctrine that the title represented by the certificate cannot be changed, altered,
modified, enlarged, or diminished in a collateral proceeding.[29]Considering that this is an unlawful
detainer case wherein the sole issue to be decided is possession de facto rather than possession de
jure, a collateral attack by herein respondents on petitioner's title is proscribed.

Our ruling in the present case is only to resolve the issue of who has the better right to
possession in relation to the issue of disputed ownership of the subject properties. Questions as to
the validity of petitioner's Torrens title can be ventilated in a proper suit instituted to directly attack
its validity, an issue that we cannot resolve definitively in this unlawful detainer case.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, we deny the instant Petition for lack of merit.
The Decisions of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 90645 (dated January 08, 2008), of the
Regional Trial Court of Laoag City in Civil Case No. 3111-13293-65, as well as of the Municipal
Trial Court of Laoag City in Civil Case No. 3111 -- all dismissing the unlawful detainer case of
petitioner are AFFIRMED.

We make no pronouncements as to attorney's fees for lack of evidence.

SO ORDERED.
 MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson

JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ BIENVENIDO L. REYES

Associate Justice Associate Justice

ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the
case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Second Division

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairpersons
Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.

RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
 Republic of the Philippines
Supreme Court
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

RICARDO RIZAL, POTENCIANA G.R. No. 151898

RIZAL, SATURNINA RIZAL, ELENA
Present:
RIZAL, and BENJAMIN RIZAL,
Petitioners,
CARPIO, J.,
- versus -
Chairperson,
BRION,
LEONCIA NAREDO, ANASTACIO
PEREZ,
LIRIO, EDILBERTO CANTAVIEJA,
SERENO, and
GLORIA CANTAVIEJA,
REYES, JJ.
CELSO CANTAVIEJA, and
the HEIRS of MELANIE CANTAVIEJA,
Promulgated:
Respondents.

March 14, 2012

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DECISION

REYES, J.:

Before this Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Decision[1] of the Court
of Appeals (CA) dated July 13, 2001 in CA-G.R. CV No. 26109, affirming the decision of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 36, Calamba, Laguna which dismissed the
Complaint,[2] docketed as Civil Case No. 1153-87-C[3] for partition, recovery of shares with
damages of Lot No. 252 on res judicata.

Factual Antecedents

Herein petitioners Ricardo, Potenciana, Elena, Saturnina and Benjamin, all surnamed
Rizal, commenced Civil Case No. 7836 against Matias Naredo (Matias), Valentin Naredo
(Valentin) and Juana de Leon (Juana) before the then Court of First Instance (CFI) of Laguna
involving the accretion of two (2) hectares of land to Lot No. 454 of the Calamba Estate. In a
decision rendered on May 22, 1947, the CFI ruled in favor of the petitioners. The CFI awarded the
ownership of the two-hectare accretion to the petitioners and ordered the defendants therein to
vacate the said land and to pay P500.00 a year from 1943 as reasonable rent for their occupancy
thereof. Both the CA and the Supreme Court upheld the decision.

To satisfy the money judgment in Civil Case No. 7836, the provincial sheriff of Laguna
levied upon Lots Nos. 252 and 269 of the Calamba Estate, together with the house erected on Lot
No. 252. This Lot No. 252, which is the subject of the controversy, was registered under Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. RT-488 (RT-3377 No. 12206) in the name of the Legal Heirs of
Gervacia Cantillano, of Parian, Calamba, Laguna. Several third-party claims were filed, to wit: (a)
by Leoncia Naredo (Leoncia) and Marcela Naredo (Marcela), who are also heirs of Gervacia
Cantillano over Lot No. 252; (b) by Pedro Cantavieja, husband of Marcela over Lot No. 269; and
(c) by Teodoro Armesto over the house of mixed materials standing on Lot No. 252. After the
petitioners posted the required bond, the provincial sheriff proceeded with the auction sale on April
7, 1951. The petitioners were declared the highest bidders. A final deed of sale was issued to them
on April 15, 1952.

On May 9, 1955, Marcela, Leoncia, Matias, Valentin, and Juana instituted Civil Case No.
9908 before the CFI Branch 1, Laguna, questioning the validity of the execution sale of Lots Nos.
252 and 269 and the house of mixed materials on Lot No. 252. They claimed that these properties
were exempt from execution.

On December 8, 1955, the CFI declared valid the execution sale of Lots Nos. 252 and 269
of the Calamba Estate in favor of the petitioners, with a qualification that the petitioners only
acquired whatever rights, title or interests Matias, Valentin and Juana had in Lot No. 252. The sale
of the house of mixed materials in Lot No. 252 was set aside considering that a waiver was
executed by the petitioners in favor of Juana. Although the CFI ordered that the petitioners be
placed in possession of Lots Nos. 252 and 269 and Matias and Valentin be ejected therefrom, it
did not evict Marcela and Leoncia from Lot No. 252 since they were not parties to Civil Case No.
7836.[4]

After the aforesaid judgment in Civil Case No. 9908, the petitioners filed Civil Case No.
36-C against Marcela and Leoncia for partition, accounting and recovery of possession of Lot No.
252. The parties then entered into a Compromise Agreement whereby the parties acknowledged
that they owned Lot No. 252 in common, with 3/5 thereof as the interest of the petitioners and the
other 2/5 belonging to therein defendants Marcela and Leoncia. Said Compromise Agreement was
approved by the CFI Branch VI, Laguna, in an Order dated December 1, 1971.[5] The pertinent
portions of the agreement read as follows:

5. That the plaintiffs (herein petitioners) and the defendants (herein respondents)
agree that said parcel of land (Lot 252) embraced in Transfer Certificate of Title
12206, and registered in the names of the Legal Heirs of Gervacia Cantillano, is
 now owned in common and in undivided shares of TWO-FIFTHS (2/5) for the
defendants and THREE-FIFTHS (3/5) for the plaintiffs;

6. That the plaintiffs and the defendants agree that the subject parcel of land be
actually partitioned as they have so caused the survey and partition of the same per
the hereto attached copy of the pertinent subdivision survey plan, marked as Annex
A hereof and made integral part of this compromise agreement;

7. That the plaintiffs and the defendants do hereby express their unqualified
conformity to the said partition and they hereby accept to their full and entire
satisfaction their respective determined shares in the subject parcel of land, and they
agree to have their respective determined portions, Two-Fifths (2/5) for defendants
and Three-Fifths (3/5) for plaintiffs, to be covered by independent and separate
certificates of title in their respective names.

8. That the plaintiffs agree to shoulder all the expenses incurred in the partition
and to pay all expenses and fees which may be entailed in the issuance of the
independent certificates of title in favor of the respective parties by the proper
Registry of Deeds;[6]

Ten years after or on August 11, 1981, Marcela and Leoncia, assisted by their husbands,
instituted Civil Case No. 299-83-C assailing the Compromise Agreement. They claimed that said
agreement was a forgery and that their lawyer was not duly authorized for the purpose. In an Order
dated July 6, 1984, the trial court dismissed the case without prejudice to the plaintiffs failure to
prosecute.

Thereafter, on September 26, 1984, Marcela and Leoncia instituted Civil Case No. 792-84-
C, for enforcement of judgment, partition and segregation of shares with damages over Lot No.
252. On July 6, 1985, the trial court dismissed the complaint on the ground of prescription. No
appeal was taken therefrom.

On September 21, 1987, the petitioners filed a Complaint before the RTC for the immediate
segregation, partition and recovery of shares and ownership of Lot No. 252, with damages. This
was docketed as Civil Case No. 1153-87-C. However, on April 3, 1990, on the basis of the
pleadings and exhibits, the court a quo dismissed the complaint because of res judicata. The trial
court stated thus:

A perusal of this instant case and Civil Case No. 792-84-C, (Exh. 1) will readily
show that between these causes of actions, there are (a) identity of parties; (b)
identity of subject matter; and (c) identity of cause of action. As admitted by the
parties, the judgment in Civil Case No. 792-84-C is now final and executory. While
there may appear a difference in the forms of action, the same is irrelevant for
purposes of determining res judicata. It is a firmly established rule that a different
remedy sought or a diverse form of action does not prevent the estoppel of the
formeradjudication.

x x x.[7]
Aggrieved, the petitioners appealed to the CA, docketed as CA-G.R. CV No.
26109. Unfortunately, the original records of the case were misplaced. After earnest efforts were
made for the reconstitution of the records of the case, the parties agreed to have the case submitted
for decision based on the documents submitted.[8]

In the now assailed decision,[9] the CA dismissed the appeal. The CA found that the
appellants brief neither contained the required page references to the records, as provided in
Section 13 of Rule 44 of the Rules of Court; nor was it specified, both in the prayer and in the
body of the complaint, the specific amounts of the petitioners claim for actual, moral, exemplary
and compensatory damages, as enunciated in Manchester Development Corporation v. Court of
Appeals.[10]

As to the substantive issues raised in the complaint, the CA ruled that the action for
partition has been barred by res judicata. It also held that the petitioners no longer had any cause
of action for partition because the co-ownership of the parties over Lot No. 252 had ceased to exist
by the Order of the CFI Branch VI, Laguna on December 1, 1971.

Issues

In the case at bar, the petitioners submit the following issues for this Courts consideration,
to wit:

A.

THE CA ERRED IN DISMISSING THE APPEAL ON THE GROUND THAT

THE PETITIONERS' APPEAL BRIEF FAILED TO MAKE PAGE
REFERENCES TO THE RECORD.

B.

THE CA ERRED IN APPLYING THE RULING IN THE MANCHESTER CASE

REGARDING DOCKET FEES.

C.

THE CA ERRED IN DISMISSING THE APPEAL ON THE GROUND OF

PRESCRIPTION AND RES JUDICATA.

D.

THE RTC ERRED IN DISMISSING THE ENTIRE CASE.[11]

 Ruling and Discussions

We find no merit in the petition.

Failure to observe the requirements under

Section 13(a), Rule 44 of the 1997 Rules of Court
and to pay the correct docket fees is fatal to the
appeal.

The petitioners argue that the CA erred in dismissing their appeal for their failure to indicate the
page references to the records of the case pursuant to Section 13(a), Rule 44[12]of the Rules of
Court. They invoke Section 6, Rule 1 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure which states that
technical rules shall be liberally construed in order to promote a just, speedy and inexpensive
disposition of every action and proceeding. They cite the case of Pacific Life Assurance
Corporation v. Sison,[13] where it was held that an appeal should not be dismissed on mere
technicality.

It is settled that technical rules of procedure are mere tools designed to facilitate the attainment of
justice. Their strict and rigid application should be relaxed when they hinder rather than promote
substantial justice. Cases should as much as possible be resolved on the merits, and not on mere
technicalities. The failure of the petitioners' appeal brief to contain page references to the records
is a formal defect which may be considered as minor, if not negligible.[14]

However, while this Court may be lenient in some instances on formal defects of pleadings filed
with the court, it could not close its eyes when a litigant continuously ignores technical rules, to
the point of wanton disregard of the rationale behind those rules. In fact, this Court has consistently
affirmed the importance of complying with the requirements in Section 13(a), Rule 44[15] of the
Rules of Court in many of its decisions, particularly in Mendoza v. United Coconut Planters Bank,
Inc.,[16] where the Court explicitly stated that:

Rule 44 and 50 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure are designed for the proper
and prompt disposition of cases before the Court of Appeals Rules of Procedure
exist for a noble purpose, and to disregard such rules in the guise of liberal
construction would be to defeat such purpose. The Court of Appeals noted in its
Resolution denying petitioners motion for reconsideration that despite ample
opportunity, petitioners never attempted to file an amended appellants brief
correcting the deficiencies of their brief, but obstinately clung to their argument
that their Appellants Brief substantially complied with the rules. Such obstinacy is
incongruous with their plea for liberality in construing the rules on appeal.

De Liano v. Court of Appeals held:

Some may argue that adherence to these formal requirements serves but a
meaningless purpose, that these may be ignored with little risk in the smug certainty
that liberality in the application of procedural rules can always be relied upon to
 remedy the infirmities. This misses the point. We are not martinets; in appropriate
instances, we are prepared to listen to reason, and to give relief as the circumstances
may warrant. However, when the error relates to something so elementary as to be
inexcusable, our discretion becomes nothing more than an exercise in frustration. It
comes as an unpleasant shock to us that the contents of an appellants brief should
still be raised as an issue now. There is nothing arcane or novel about the provisions
of Section 13, Rule 44.The rule governing the contents of appellants briefs has
existed since the old Rules of Court, which took effect on July 1, 1940, as well as
the Revised Rules of Court, which took effect on January 1, 1964, until they were
superseded by the present 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. The provisions were
substantially preserved, with few revisions.[17]

Moreover, the petitioners also failed to pay the correct docket fees; in which case, jurisdiction did
not vest in the trial court. In Siapno v. Manalo,[18] this Court has made it abundantly clear that any
complaint, petition, answer and other similar pleading, which does not specify both in its body and
prayer the amount of damages being claimed, should not be accepted or admitted, or should be
expunged from the records, as may be the case.[19]

The petitioners alleged in their complaint in Civil Case No. 1153-87-C[20] that they suffered actual
loss from the time they had been deprived of their share of 3/5 on Lot No. 252 by the respondents,
as well as moral and exemplary damages, attorney's fees and litigation expenses. However, the
only claims they specified in their prayer were for the attorney's fees in the amount of P30,000.00
and P500.00 for every court appearance of the counsel.

In Siapno,[21] the complaint alleged in its body the aggregate sum of P4,500,000 in moral
and exemplary damages and attorney's fees, but the prayer portion did not mention these claims,
nor did it even pray for the payment of damages. This Court held that such a complaint should be
dismissed outright; or if already admitted, should be expunged from the records. The Court
explained that the rule requiring the amount of damages claimed to be specified not only in the
body of the pleading but also in its prayer portion was intended to put an end to the then prevailing
practice of lawyers where the damages prayed for were recited only in the body of the complaint,
but not in the prayer, in order to evade payment of the correct filing fees. As held by the Court
in Manchester:[22]

To put a stop to this irregularity, henceforth all complaints, petitions, answers and
other similar pleadings should specify the amount of damages being prayed for not
only in the body of the pleading but also in the prayer, and said damages shall be
considered in the assessment of the filing fees in any case. Any pleading that fails
to comply with this requirement shall not be accepted nor admitted, or shall
otherwise be expunged from the record.[23]

In Sun Insurance Office Ltd. v. Judge Asuncion,[24] the Court laid down the following rules as
regards the payment of filing fees:

1. It is not simply the filing of the complaint or appropriate

initiatory pleading, but the payment of the prescribed docket fee that vests a trial
court with jurisdiction over the subject matter or nature of the action. Where the
 filing of the initiatory pleading is not accompanied by payment of the docket fee,
the court may allow payment of the fee within a reasonable time but in no case
beyond the applicable prescriptive or reglementary period.

2. The same rule applies to permissive counterclaims, third-party

claims and similar pleadings, which shall not be considered filed until and unless
the filing fee prescribed therefor is paid. The court may also allow payment of said
fee within a reasonable time but also in no case beyond its applicable prescriptive
or reglementary period.

3. Where the trial court acquires jurisdiction over a claim by the

filing of the appropriate pleading and payment of the prescribed filing fee but,
subsequently, the judgment awards a claim not specified in the pleading, or if
specified the same has been left for determination by the court, the additional filing
fee therefor shall constitute a lien on the judgment. It shall be the responsibility of
the Clerk of Court or his duly authorized deputy to enforce said lien and assess and
collect the additional fee.[25]

It cannot be gainsaid from the above guidelines that, with the exception of pauper
litigants,[26] without the payment of the correct docket or filing fees within the reglementary period,
jurisdiction over the subject-matter or nature of the action will not vest in the trial court. In fact, a
pauper litigant may still have to pay the docket fees later, by way of a lien on the monetary or
property judgment that may accrue to him. Clearly, the flexibility or liberality of the rules sought
by the petitioners cannot apply in the instant case.

Action is dismissible for res judicata and lack of

cause of action.

The petitioners vehemently deny that the partition of Lot No. 252 has already been settled in Civil
Case No. 36-C. They insist that the mere determination of the proportionate shares of the parties,
as well as their respective portions of the aforesaid lot in the Compromise Agreement is not
enough. They allege that Lot No. 252 is still covered by the old title, TCT No. 12206, in the name
of the heirs of Gervacia Cantillano. The finality of the decision in Civil Case No. 36-C did not
cause Lot No. 252 to divide itself in accordance with the subdivision plan. They assert that there
must be an actual and exclusive possession of their respective portions in the plan and titles issued
to each of them accordingly.[27]

The petitioners contentions are untenable.

Article 484 of the New Civil Code provides that there is co-ownership whenever the
ownership of an undivided thing or right belongs to different persons. Thus, on the one hand, a co-
owner of an undivided parcel of land is an owner of the whole, and over the whole he exercises
the right of dominion, but he is at the same time the owner of a portion which is truly abstract. On
the other hand, there is no co-ownership when the different portions owned by different people are
already concretely determined and separately identifiable, even if not yet technically described.[28]
Pursuant to Article 494 of the Civil Code, no co-owner is obliged to remain in the co-ownership,
and his proper remedy is an action for partition under Rule 69 of the Rules of Court, which he may
bring at anytime in so far as his share is concerned. Article 1079 of the Civil Code defines partition
as the separation, division and assignment of a thing held in common among those to whom it may
belong. It has been held that the fact that the agreement of partition lacks the technical description
of the parties' respective portions or that the subject property was then still embraced by the same
certificate of title could not legally prevent a partition, where the different portions allotted to each
were determined and became separately identifiable.[29]

The partition of Lot No. 252 was the result of the approved Compromise Agreement in Civil Case
No. 36-C, which was immediately final and executory. Absent any showing that said Compromise
Agreement was vitiated by fraud, mistake or duress, the court cannot set aside a judgment based
on compromise.[30] It is axiomatic that a compromise agreement once approved by the court settles
the rights of the parties and has the force of res judicata. It cannot be disturbed except on the
ground of vice of consent or forgery.[31]

Of equal significance is the fact that the compromise judgment in Civil Case No. 36-C
settled as well the question of which specific portions of Lot No. 252 accrued to the parties
separately as their proportionate shares therein. Through their subdivision survey plan, marked as
Annex A[32] of the Compromise Agreement and made an integral part thereof, the
parties segregated and separately assigned to themselves distinct portions of Lot No. 252. The
partition was immediately executory,[33] having been accomplished and completed on December
1, 1971 when judgment was rendered approving the same. The CA was correct when it stated that
no co-ownership exist when the different portions owned by different people are already
concretely determined and separately identifiable, even if not yet technically described.[34]

It bears to note that the parties even acknowledged in Paragraph 7 of the Compromise
Agreement that they had accepted their respective determined shares in the subject parcel of land,
and they agree to have their respective determined portions, Two-Fifths (2/5) for defendants and
Three-Fifths (3/5) for plaintiffs, to be covered by independent and separate certificates of title in
their respective names.[35]

The petitioners slept on their rights under the

partition agreement.

To recall, the petitioners obtained part ownership of Lot No. 252 as the highest bidders at the
execution sale of Lots Nos. 252 and 269 in Civil Case No. 7836, whereas respondents Marcela and
Leoncia as heirs of Gervacia Cantillano retained their 2/5 interest in Lot No. 252 since they were
not impleaded in the said case. As buyers of land, the petitioners had the right to pursue their share
therein all the way to the issuance of their separate title and recovery of possession of their portion,
beginning with the filing of Civil Case No. 36-C.
 Concerning the registration with the Registry of Deeds of a judgment of partition of
land, Section 81 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1529 provides that after the entry of the final
judgment of partition, a copy of such final judgment shall be filed and registered. If the land is set
off to the owner in severalty, each owner shall be entitled to have his certificate entered showing
the share set off to him in severalty, and to receive an owner's duplicate thereof.[36]

Accordingly, Paragraph 8 of the Compromise Agreement

provided that the petitioners shall shoulder all the expenses incurred in the partition and to pay all
expenses and fees which may be incurred in the issuance of the independent certificates of title in
favor of the respective parties by the proper Registry of Deeds.[37] Unfortunately, the records do
not disclose that the petitioners neither filed and registered with the Register of Deeds a certified
copy of the final judgment of partition in Civil Case No. 36-C, nor did they perform or cause to be
performed all further acts requisite for the cancellation of TCT No. 12206 and the issuance of the
parties' separate titles over their assigned portions in Lot No. 252. The only entry in TCT No.
12206,[38] prior to the recording on June 13, 1979 of the issuance to the petitioners of a second
duplicate copy of TCT No. 12206, is the annotation in April 1952 of the execution sale of Lot No.
252 to the petitioners.

Section 6, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court provides:

Sec. 6. Execution by motion or by independent action. A final and executory

judgment or order may be executed on motion within five
(5) years from the date of its entry. After the lapse of such time, and before it is
barred by the statute of limitations, a judgment may be
enforced by action. The revived judgment may also be enforced by motion within
five (5) years from the date of its entry and thereafter by action before it is barred
by the statute of limitations.

A final and executory judgment may be executed by the prevailing party as a matter of right by
mere motion within five (5) years from the entry of judgment, failing which the judgment is
reduced to a mere right of action which must be enforced by the institution of a complaint in a
regular court within ten (10) years from finality of the judgment.[39]In the instant case, there is no
showing that after the judgment in Civil Case No. 36-C, the petitioners filed a motion to execute
the same during the first five (5) years after its finality, or within the succeeding five (5) years, by
a civil action to revive the judgment, before it would have been barred by the statute of
limitations.[40] An action for revival of judgment is governed by Articles 1144(3) and 1152 of the
Civil Code, and Section 6, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court. Articles 1144(3) and 1152 of the Code
state:

Art. 1144. The following actions must be brought within ten years from the time
the right of action accrues:

xxxx

(3) Upon a judgment

 Art. 1152. The period for prescription of actions to demand the fulfillment of
obligations declared by a judgment commences from the time the judgment became
final.

When the petitioners filed Civil Case No. 1153-87-C on September 21, 1987, it was not
purportedly to revive the judgment in Civil Case No. 36-C. It was apparently an action
for Partition, Recovery of Shares with Damages, but nonetheless citing as basis of the Compromise
Agreement in Civil Case No. 36-C. The petitioners wanted to accomplish through an entirely new
action what was already adjudicated in Civil Case No. 36-C, rendered 17 years earlier, but which
they inexplicably failed to enforce. The petitioners do not allege that they tried to execute the
compromise judgment in Civil Case No. 36-C either by motion or by action to revive judgment
within the prescriptive period. Absent any proof that the respondents resorted to dilatory schemes
and maneuvers to prevent the execution of the Compromise Agreement,[41] and contrary to the
petitioners gratuitous assertion in paragraph VIII of their complaint in Civil Case No. 1153-87-C,
we fail to see how the mere filing by the respondents of Civil Case No. 299-83-C on August 11,
1981 could have in any way prevented or impeded the petitioners from executing the judgment in
Civil Case No. 36-C.

We thus sustain the respondents' affirmative defenses of res judicata and lack of cause of action,
and uphold the appellate and trial courts' rejection of the petitioners' ostensible attempt to revive
the already stale judgment in Civil Case No. 36-C through an entirely new action for partition. The
Court agrees with the CA when it explained:

a. The judgment that effected res judicata is not so much the dismissal of the
case due to prescription in Civil Case No. 792-84-C. What more appropriately
leads to res judicata to this case is the final Compromise Judgment in Civil Case
No. 36-C. All the elements of res judicata are present, a final decision on the
merits, between the same parties, on the same subject matter and cause of
action. x x x.

b. The present complaint states no cause of action. There is no doubt that

appellants prayer for partition is anchored on their supposed co-ownership of
Lot No. 252 plus the added fact that it is still covered by Transfer Certificate of
Title No. 12206. However, appellants must have lost track of the fact that at
the time the present action was commenced, partition was no longer an
available remedy in their favor simply because their pretended co-ownership
had already ceased to exist. Their 3/5 shares had already been segregated and
determined in the subdivision plan mentioned in the Compromise Judgment
and have, in fact, accepted their share to their satisfaction. In De la Cruz vs.
Cruz, 32 SCRA 307 [1970], the Supreme Court, through Justice J.B.L. Reyes, said
that co-ownership no longer exists over the whole parcel of land where the
portions owned by the parties are already determined and identifiable. That
 said respective portions are not technically described, or that said portions are
still embraced in one and the same certificate of title, does not make said
portions less determinable, or identifiable, or distinguishable, one from the
other, nor that dominion over its portions rest exclusively in their respective
owners.[42]

Nonetheless, it must be made clear that nothing in this decision shall be understood to mean that
the petitioners have lost their title or interest in the subject property. The final (definite) deed of
sale executed by the sheriff in favor of the petitioners pursuant to the execution sale in Civil Case
No. 7836, which was duly registered in TCT No. 12206 on April 15, 1952, constituted an effective
conveyance to the petitioners of the property sold therein and entitled them to possession
thereof,[43] although in the subsequent decision in 1955 in Civil Case No. 9908, the respondents
2/5 interest in the property was recognized, thereby amending the extent of the petitioners
title. The said judgment has not been registered, and neither was the compromise judgment of
partition in Civil Case No. 36-C dated December 1, 1971, which established the parties respective
specific portions in Lot No. 252. Thus, as a prerequisite to the issuance of a new title in the name
of the petitioners over their 3/5 allocated portion, we believe that Section 81[44] of P.D. No. 1529
does not bar the belated registration of the compromise judgment in Civil Case No. 36-C.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court
of Appeals dated July 13, 2001 in CA-G.R. CV No. 26109 is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

BIENVENIDO L. REYES
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice

ARTURO D. BRION JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ

Associate Justice Associate Justice

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

Associate Justice
 ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the
case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Second Division

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairperson's Attestation,
I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the
case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.

RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice