Compilation of Digested Cases in Agrarian Law and Social Legislation

COMPILATION OF DIGESTED CASES IN AGRARIAN LAW AND SOCIAL LEGISLATION
CENEZE VS. RAMOS

GR No. 172287; January 15, 2010
Nature of the case

Petition for review on certiorari of the CA Decision and Resolution, which dismissed petitioners
complaint before the Provincial Adjudicator.
Facts:
1. Ceneze filed an action for declaration as bona fide tenant-lessee of two parcels of agricultural
land owned by respondent Feliciana Ramos, alleging that in 1981, Julian Ceneze, Sr. (Julian,
Sr.), petitioners father, transferred his tenurial rights over the landholding to him with the
consent and approval of respondent and that, since then, petitioner had been in actual and
peaceful possession of the landholding until April 12, 1991, when respondent forcibly
entered and cultivated the land for the purpose of dispossessing petitioner of his right as
tenant.
2. Respondent denied that a tenancy relationship existed, arguing that she had never instituted
petitioner as a tenant in any of her landholdings. She averred that petitioner had never been in
possession of the landholding, but admitted that it was Julian, Sr. who was the tenant of the
landholding. When Julian, Sr. migrated to USA in 1985, respondent allowed Julian, Sr.s
wife to cultivate the land, but she herself migrated to the USA in June 1988. Respondent later
allowed Julian, Sr.s son, Julian Ceneze, Jr. (Julian, Jr.), to cultivate the landholding, but he
likewise migrated to the USA in 1991 without informing respondent. From then on, she took
possession of the landholding, cultivated it and appropriated for herself the harvest
therefrom.
Provincial Adjudicator Ruling

Decision in favor of petitioner, declaring Ceneze a bona fide tenant of the subject landholding.
DARAB Ruling
Affirmed the Provincial Adjudicators ruling
CA Ruling
Resolved the petition in favor of respondent landowner and dismissed petitioners complaint. MR
denied.
Issue
Whether or not petitioner failed to establish that he had a tenancy relationship with respondent
SC Ruling
Yes.
Tenancy is not purely a factual relationship dependent on what the alleged tenant does upon the
land; it is also a legal relationship. A tenancy relationship cannot be presumed. There must be
Contributors: Abegail Guardian, Joy Rosal Fe Nicha, Tiffany Chan, Micah Delos Santos,
Carol Vicmudo, Edgardo Balbin II, Mark Ong, Glenn Nino Sartillo
Compiled by: Abegail Guardian
evidence to prove the presence of all its indispensable elements, to wit: (1) the parties are the
landowner and the tenant; (2) the subject is agricultural land; (3) there is consent by the
landowner; (4) the purpose is agricultural production; (5) there is personal cultivation; and (6)
there is sharing of the harvest.[12] The absence of one element does not make an occupant of a
parcel of land, its cultivator or planter, a de jure tenant.[13]
Petitioner submitted a Certification issued by the BARC Chairman attesting that the former is a
tenant of the landholding, but such certification is not binding on this Court. The certification or
findings of the Secretary of Agrarian Reform (or of an authorized representative) concerning the
presence or the absence of a tenancy relationship between the contending parties are merely
preliminary or provisional in character.
To prove a tenancy relationship, the requisite quantum of evidence is substantial evidence, or

such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion.The Certification of the BARC Chairman and the affidavits of Julian, Sr. and of the
tenants of the adjacent landholdings certainly do not suffice. By themselves, they do not show
that the elements of consent of the landowner and of sharing of harvests are present.
To establish consent, petitioner presented the Affidavit executed by Julian, Sr.However, the
affidavit which was not notarized cannot be given credence considering that it was not
authenticated.
The other tenants Joint Affidavit, likewise, fails to prove that petitioner is a tenant, more
particularly, that there was personal cultivation and sharing of the harvest. In this affidavit, the
affiants stated that they helped hand in hand with [petitioner] in harvesting and threshing our
palay products and helped him in delivering the share of [respondent] every year. The affidavit is
ambiguously worded, considering that the affiants are also tenant-lessees of respondent and they
could be referring to their own harvest.
The fact alone of working on a landholding does not give rise to a presumption of the existence
of agricultural tenancy.
To prove sharing of harvests, a receipt or any other evidence must be presented, because self-
serving statements are inadequate. In this case, petitioner failed to present a receipt for
respondents share in the harvest, or any other solid evidence proving that there was a sharing of
harvest.
CORNES VS. LEAL REALTY

GR No. 172146; July 30, 2008
Nature of the case

For review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court are the Decision] and Resolution of the CA,
which reversed the Decision of the DARAB, and reinstated the Decision of the Provincial
Adjudicator in DARAB Cases No. 6489-6492 (Reg. Case Nos. 234-T91, 396-T93, 397-T93 and
827-T95).
Facts:
1. DARAB Case No. 234-T91: Filed by petitioners and their predecessors-in interest against
respondents for maintenance of peaceful possession and for issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction. Petitioners contended that they had been farmers and full-fledged tenants for
more than 30 years of an agricultural landholding which was previously owned and
registered in the name of Josefina Roxas Omaa (JOSEFINA). Petitioners alleged that subject
landholding is covered by RA 6657, but was sold by JOSEFINA to respondents in
contravention of the law. Meanwhile, LEAL HAVEN converted a portion of the subject
landholding into a memorial park. It is petitioners stance that when respondents entered into
a contract of sale with JOSEFINA, they were aware of the tenancy relationship which existed
between petitioners and JOSEFINA.
2. DARAB Case No. 396-T93: Filed by petitioners against respondent LEAL REALTY and
SPS. TUGADI for violation of RA 6657, annulment of documents, title and damages. In
addition, petitioners posited that LEAL REALTY executed a Deed of Absolute Sale in favor
of the SPS. TUGADI without proper conversion of the lot from agricultural to non-
agricultural in breach of the CARL.
3. DARAB Case No. 397-T93: Filed by petitioners against respondent LEAL REALTY and
SPS. ALCAZAREN for violation of Republic Act No. 6657, annulment of documents, title
and damages. Petitioners questioned the subdivision of the subject landholding into smaller
lots as contrary to law.
4. DARAB Case No. 329-T95: Filed by LEAL REALTY, with the PARAB (Tarlac) against
petitioner Nita Cornes-Valenzuela (VALENZUELA), for injunction with prayer for TRO and
PI. LEAL REALTY alleged that despite its objection, VALENZUELA constructed a
residential house within the premises of the subject landholding; hence, it prayed for the
removal of the construction at VALENZUELAs expense.
Provincial Adjudicator Ruling

Dismissed Cases No. 234-T91, No. 396-T93, and No. 397-T93; Granted DARAB Case No. 329-
T95. There was no tenancy relationship which existed between the parties.
DARAB Ruling
Vacated the appealed Decision, declaring petitioners as bona fide tenants of the subject
landholding. Right to security of tenure does not only apply to bona fide tenants; but also to
actual tillers of the land. It also declared that there was an implied tenancy between the parties.
The DARAB ruled that for more than 30 years, the petitioners were deemed tenants of the
subject landholding.
CA Ruling
Granted respondents Petition for Review. The fact that petitioners had worked on the subject
landholding did not give rise to the existence of a tenancy relationship. MR denied.
Issue
Whether or not petitioners and their predecessors-in-interest are tenants de jure of the subject
landholding
SC Ruling
No.
In order for a tenancy agreement to arise, it is essential to establish all its indispensable elements,
viz: 1) the parties are the landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee; 2) the subject matter of
the relationship is an agricultural land; 3) there is consent between the parties to the relationship;
4) the purpose of the relationship is to bring about agricultural production; 5) there is personal
cultivation on the part of the tenant or agricultural lessee; and 6) the harvest is shared between
the landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee.
Petitioners failed to adduce substantial evidence to show the existence of all the indispensable
requisites for the constitution of a tenancy relationship.
While it might have been shown and not contested that petitioners predecessors-in-interest,
namely JACINTO, PABLO, JUANITO and FRANCISCO occupied the subject landholding as
tillers thereof, the records support the fact that their occupancy was in the nature of hired
laborers of JOSEFINA. As can be gleaned from the Entry No. E-17-7182 covering the subject
landholding in the name of JOSEFINA, the same was not tenanted. Moreover, Entry No. E-22-
4361, also annotated on the aforesaid certificate of title, is explicit that the subject landholding is
not tenanted. Further, the records reveal that petitioners predecesssors-in-interest executed an
affidavit attesting that they were working on the subject landholding as hired laborers only. The
fact alone of working on anothers landholding does not raise a presumption of the existence of
agricultural tenancy.
Neither was it shown to the satisfaction of this Court that there existed a sharing of harvests in
the context of a tenancy relationship between petitioners and/or their predecessors-in-interest and
JOSEFINA. Jurisprudence is illuminating to the effect that to prove such sharing of harvests, a
receipt or any other evidence must be presented. None was shown, except the testimony of
petitioner Rodolfo Cornes, which is self-serving and is without evidentiary value.
The testimony of Araceli Pascua, an employee of the DAR in Victoria, Tarlac, that the subject
landholding was tenanted cannot overcome substantial evidence to the contrary. What cannot be
ignored is the precedent ruling of this Court that the findings of or certifications issued by the
Secretary of Agrarian Reform, or his authorized representative, in a given locality concerning the
presence or absence of a tenancy relationship between the contending parties, are merely
preliminary or provisional and are not binding upon the courts.
The element of consent in the creation of the tenancy relationship was sorely missing. As was
seen earlier, even petitioners predecessors-in-interest were unequivocal in their admission that
they worked as hired laborers on the subject landholding. The intent, if any, to institute them as
tenants of the landholdings was debunked by their very admission.
One glaring factor that strikes the mind of this Court is the fact that petitioners did not implead
JOSEFINA, who is an indispensable party.
ENDAYA vs. CA
G.R. No. 88113; October 23, 1992
NATURE OF THE CASE: Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing the decision of the Court
of Appeals reversing the judgment of the RTC.
FACTS:
1. Spouses Trinidad and San Diego owned a piece of agricultural land consisting of 20,200
square meters situated at Batangas, devoted for rice and corn. It is undisputed that as far back as
1934, private respondent Fideli has been cultivating the land as a tenant of the Spouses under a
50-50 sharing agreement.
2. On 1974, a lease contract was executed between the Spouses San Diego and one Regino
Cassanova for a period of 4 years from 1974-1978. The lease contract obliged Cassanova to pay
P400 per hectare per annum and gave him authority to oversee the planting of crops of the land.
Private respondent signed the lease contract as one of 2 witnesses.
3. The lease contract was subsequently renewed to last until 1980 but the rental was raised to
P600. Again, private respondent signed the contract as witness.
4. During the entire duration of the lease contract between the Spouses San Diego and
Cassanova, private respondent continuously cultivated the land, sharing equally with Cassanova
the net produce of the harvests.
5. On 1980, the Spouses San Diego sold the land to petitioners. The sale was registered with the
Register of deeds of Batangas and a TCT was issued. Private respondent continued to farm the
land although petitioners claim that private respondent was told immediately after the sale to
vacate the land. In any case, it is undisputed that private respondent deposited with the Luzon
Development Bank a partial payment of the landowners share in the harvest for the years 1980
until 1985.
6. Due to petitioners persistent demand for private respondent to vacate the land, private
respondent filed a complaint with the RTC praying that he be declared the agricultural tenant of
petitioners.
RTC Ruling: After the trial, the trial court decided in favor of the petitioners by holding that
private respondent is not an agricultural lessee of the land now owned by the petitioners.
CA Ruling: The Court of Appeals rendered the judgment, reversed the RTC decision, and
declared private respondent to be the agricultural lessee of the subject landholding.
Hence, this petition wherein private respondents status as an agricultural lessee and his security
of tenure as such are being disputed by petitioners.
ISSUE/S:
1. WON the lease contract entered into by the original landowners with Cassanova terminates
the agricultural leasehold relationship between the Spouses and the private respondent.
2. WON the private respondent can no longer be considered as an agricultural lessee because
after they purchased the land from the Spouses, the private respondent did not secure their
permission to cultivate the land as an agricultural lessee.
Case for Petitioner: Petitioner contends that when the original landowners, the Spouses San
Diego, entered into a lease contract with Cassanova, the agricultural leasehold relationship
between Spouses San Diego and private respondent was thereby terminated. Petitioners argue
that a landowner cannot have a civil law lease contract with one person and at the same time
have an agricultural leasehold agreement with another over the same land. It is further argued
that because private respondent consented to the lease contract between the Spouses San Diego
and Cassanova, signing as he did the lease agreement and the renewal contract as witness,
private respondent has waived his rights as an agricultural lessee. Petitioner also contends that
after they purchased the land from the Spouses, private respondent did not secure their
permission to cultivate the land as an agricultural lessee.
Case for Private Respondent: Private respondent has been cultivating the subject farm
landholding with a 50-50 sharing arrangement with the Spouses San Diego, petitioners
predecessors-in-interest
SC RULING with RATIO:

1. NO. R.A. No. 3844 (1963), as amended By R.A. No. 6839 (1971), which is the relevant law
governing the events at hand, abolished share tenancy throughout the Philippines from 1971 and
established the agricultural leasehold system by operation of law. Section 7 of the said law gave
agricultural lessees security of tenure by providing the following: "The agricultural leasehold
relation once established shall confer upon the agricultural lessee the right to continue working
on the landholding until such leasehold relation is extinguished. The agricultural lessee shall be
entitled to security of tenure on his landholding and cannot be ejected therefrom unless
authorized by the Court for causes herein provided." The fact that the landowner entered into
a civil lease contract over the subject landholding and gave the lessee the authority to
oversee the farming of the land, as was done in this case, is not among the causes provided
by law for the extinguishment of the agricultural leasehold relation. Section 10 of the law
provides:
Sec. 10. Agricultural Leasehold Relation Not Extinguished by Expiration of Period, etc.
The agricultural leasehold relation under this code shall not be extinguished by mere expiration
of the term or period in a leasehold contract nor by the sale, alienation or transfer of the legal
possession of the landholding. In case the agricultural lessor sells, alienates or transfers the legal
possession of the landholding, the purchaser or transferee thereof shall be subrogated to the
rights and substituted to the obligations of the agricultural lessor.
Hence, transactions involving the agricultural land over which an agricultural leasehold
subsists resulting in change of ownership, e.g., sale, or transfer of legal possession, such as
lease, will not terminate the right of the agricultural lessee who is given protection by the
law by making such rights enforceable against the transferee or the landowner's successor in
interest.
2. NO. It is true that the Court has ruled that agricultural tenancy is not created where the consent
the true and lawful owners is absent. But this doctrine contemplates a situation where an
untenanted farm land is cultivated without the landowner's knowledge or against her will or
although permission to work on the farm was given, there was no intention to constitute the
worker as the agricultural lessee of the farm land. The rule finds no application in the case at
bar where the petitioners are successors-in-interest to a tenanted land over which an
agricultural leasehold has long been established. The consent given by the original owners
to constitute private respondent as the agricultural lessee of the subject landholding binds
private respondents whom as successors-in-interest of the Spouses San Diego, step into the
latter's shoes, acquiring not only their rights but also their obligations.
Contradicting their position that no agricultural leasehold exists over the land they acquired from
the Spouses San Diego, petitioners also pray for the termination of the tenancy of private
respondent allegedly due to: (a) non-payment of the agricultural lease rental; and (b) animosity
between the landowners and the agricultural lessee. The Court, however, observes that nowhere
in the petitioners' Answer to private respondent's Complaint or in the other pleadings filed
before the trial court did petitioners allege grounds for the termination of the agricultural
leasehold. Well-settled is the rule that issues not raised in the trial court cannot be raised for the
first time on appeal.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition is DISMISSED and the decision of the Court
of Appeals AFFIRMED. Private respondent is hereby ordered to pay the back rentals from 1980
until 1992 plus interest at the legal rate. An accounting of the production of the subject
landholding is to be made by private respondent to the Regional Trial Court of Tanauan,
Batangas which shall determine the amount due to petitioners based on the rate ordered above.
POLICARPIO and ERLINDA NISNISAN vs. CA, Spouses MANCERA

GR 126425 | August 12, 1998
NATURE OF THE CASE: Petition for review on certiorari (Rule45) assailing the CA decision
affirming the RTC. The RTC dismissed the Petition for reinstatement of tenancy holding filed by
Policarpio and Erlinda Nisnisan.
FACTS:
Spouses Gavino and Florencia Nisnisan own a 4.9 hectare piece of land in Davao del Sur.
They are the parents of Policarpio Nisnisan (petitioner).
Since 1961, Policarpio has been cultivating one hectare of the land.
In April 1976, the father Gavino Nisnisan entered into a leasehold tenancy agreement
with Policarpio Nisnisan, with a 1/3:2/3 sharing (the bigger share going to the son).
In December 1978, the father sold the whole 4.9 hectare land to the Spouses Mancera. As
a result of the share, the spouses were ousted from the land.
In 1982, Policarpio and Erlinda filed a petition with the RTC (CAR) for reinstatement of
the tenancy holding. The Mancera spouses countered that they had already voluntarily
surrendered their landholding.
RTC Ruling dismissed. It held that the affidavit of Gavino Nisnisan that the land was
untenanted. Said affidavit was filed with the RD and annotated on the TCT. Thus,
this affidavit "shattered the claim of tenancy of Policarpio"
CA Ruling affirmed. It affirmed the RTC adding that aside from the affidavit that was
annotated, there was an earlier annotated Affidavit of NonTenancy per Justice
Circular 31. Furthermore, the CA gave weight to the assertion of the father Gavino
in an Affidavit that the alleged tenancy was fictitious and done only so that
Policarpio can borrow from the Government's Masagana 99 program, which
Policarpio didnt repay.
ISSUE:
WON the spouses Policarpio and Erlinda have voluntarily surrendered their landholding.
Case for Petitioner: They have a contract of the tenancy agreement (in the dialect of Davao).
Even assuming the land was sold, the vendee should still respect and security of
tenure of the tenants thereon, and thus they cannot be evicted except on lawful
grounds and causes.
Case for Respondent: It was fictitious. There are affidavits of NonTenancy annotated on the
Titles. Further, it was voluntarily surrendered.
SC RULING:
NO. There is no proof that the spouses Policarpio and Erlinda Nisnisan have voluntarily
surrendered their landholding.
AS held in Cuao vs CA, even an annotation of the Certification by a representative of the

Ministry of Agrarian Reform is not conclusive of the legal nature and incidents of the tenancy
relations between the parties. It neither adds to the validity or correctness of that certification nor
converts a defective and invalid instrument into a valid one as between the parties. These
certifications are merely provisional and not binding upon the courts.
Further, the spouses Policarpio have a document of the tenancy relationship. It clearly shows
that the subject land is agricultural; that petitioner Policarpio Nisnisan is obligated to cultivate
the same by planting rice thereon; and, that there is sharing of the harvests between the said
parties. It is of particular note that this evidence was never controverted by the father Gavino
Nisnisan. Hence, this strong piece of evidence cannot be overcome by a mere selfserving
affidavit of Gavino Nisnisan, even if it is annotated on the title.
Furthermore, the respondents practically admitted the tenancy relationship when they averred
that the petitioners voluntarily surrendered the landholding. On this score, they did not present
any proof that Policarpio voluntarily surrendered the landholding, other than their bare
assertions. Moreover, the filing of the complaint for reinstatement of leasehold tenancy by
petitioners-spouses against private respondents before the CAR militates against the private
respondents claim that petitioners-spouses voluntarily surrendered their landholding to them.
Thus, the agricultural leasehold relation cannot be extinguished by the mere expiration of the
term or period in an agricultural leasehold contract nor by the sale, alienation or transfer of the
legal possession of the landholding. He can only be ejected for cause, which, however, is absent
in the case at bar.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION: CA decision is modified in that the petitioners are declared

tenants and AFFIRMED in all other respects.
FELISA R. FERRER, petitioner, vs. DOMINGO

CARGANILLO, SERGIO CARGANILLO, SOLEDAD
AGUSTIN and MARCELINA SOLIS, respondents
G.R. No. 170956. May 12, 2010.*
NATURE OF THE CASE: Petition for review on Certiorari of a decision of the CA
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT EJECTMENT WILL PROSPER

FIRST DARAB Case No.7862. YES
Domingo Carganillo apparently sublet the subject landholding to his brother because he
was applying for work abroad without the knowledge and consent of the Complainant.
PARAD Ruling -> in favor of Carganillo because Complainant failed to prove by
convincing evidence the truth of her allegations.
DARAB Ruling -> Affirmed Parad
CA -> Affirmed
SC -> Reversed, Petitioner has sufficiently proven by clear and convincing evidence the
fact of subleasing. The evidence presented were: 1) Photocopy of an Investigation
Report saying that there was a sublease; 2) Affidavit of Clarion saying that she knew for
a fact that Carganillo mortgaged his tenancy rights to his brother.
In view thereof, Domingo and Sergio should be dispossessed of the agricultural
landholding in violation of RA 3844 Sec 36. xxx Except when his dispossession has
been authorized by the Court in a judgment that is final and executor if after due hearing
it is shown that: xxx (7) the lessee employed a sub-lessee on his landholding in violation
of the term of paragraph 2 of Section twenty seven.
SECOND DARAB CASE NO. 7863. NO

Tenant Isabelo died. During his lifetime, he subleased the said landholding to Soledad
without the knowledge and consent of the complainant.
PARAD Ruling -> Dismissed complaint.
DARAB Ruling -> Dismissed the appeal
CA -> Affirming DARAB
SC -> Petitioner has not established her claim of sublease. No evidence was presented
pointing Soledad or even stating the name Soledad in any of the pleadings. As the
agricultural lessor(Ferrer), she has the burden of proof to show the existence of a lawful
cause for the ejectment of an agricultural lessee. The evidence presented were
uncorroborated and unsubstantial.
THIRD DARAB CASE NO. 7864 and 7865. NO

For 7864, Tenant Marcelina is the successor of Pedro(first tenant). When Pedro died
Marcelina took over the cultivation of the 14k m2 without the knowledge and consent of
the complainant. During the lifetime of Pedro, he failed to pay the lease rentals for 3
consecutive years. Hence the case for ejectment against Marcelina.
For 7865, Irene Aguinaldo and Ferrer(complainant) co-owned a 6.8k m2 landholding
tenanted by Marcelina. Ferrer averred that Marcelina has not fully paid the rental for the
use of the land on the third cropping season. Hence this other case of ejectment against
Marcelina.
PARAD RULING -> Dismissed both for lack of merit and evidence
DARAB and CA Ruling -> Darab dismissed, which was confirmed by CA
SC -> With respect to 7864, dismissed the appeal of Ferrer because the petition stated
that she was the landowner even in the certification of non-forum shopping, However, it
appears in the PARAD records that the owners of the subject 14k m2 agricultural land are
Pajarito, Madolora, Lagado. Felisa is only the representative of the said landowners with
respect to the first case against Marcelina. Thus for failure of Felisa to indicate the
appealing party with respect to the said case, the appeal must be dismissed. Such failure
however does not affect the appeal in the 3 other cases Felisa filed as owner/co-owner of
the landholdings subject of the said 3 other cases.
SC -> With respect to 7865, Ferrer alleged that the landholding in question is principally
devoted to the planting of palay three times a year. However, Marcelina did not deliver
her share in the third cropping. Ferrer did not present any evidence to establish her claim
that the subject agricultural land can regularly support a third cropping. Neither did she
present evidence to establish that their leasehold agreement includes a provision on third
cropping. Hence, her allegation of non-payment of the leasehold rentals for the third
cropping likewise finds no support in evidence.
WHEREFORE, we partially GRANT the petition.

1. In DARAB Case No. 7862, we hereby AUTHORIZE THE DISPOSSESSION of respondents
Domingo and Sergio Carganillo from the subject landholding.
2. In DARAB Case No. 7863, we AFFIRM the dismissal of the complaint against respondent
Soledad Agustin for failure of the petition to establish her claim.
Marcelina
Solis for failure of the petitioner to establish her claim and to properly indicate the appealing
party in violation of Section 4 in relation to Section 5 Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
Marcelina Solis for failure of the petitioner to establish her claim.
SO ORDERED.
MILESTONE REALTY AND CO., INC. v. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 135999. April 19, 2002.
PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals
FACTS:
1. Spouses Alfonso Olympia and Carolina Zacarias and spouses Claro and Cristina were co-
owners of an agricultural land, Lot 616 of the Malinta Estate, with an area of 23,703 square
meters. In 1976, Carolina Zacarias
became the owner by virtue of a Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement.
2. Anacleto Pea was a tenant of the property, a holder of a Certificate of Agricultural
Leasehold issued on Feb. 23, 1982, and had a house constructed on the lot.
Anacleto had several children on his first marriage, among whom are Emilio Pea and Celia
Segovia. On Feb. 17, 1990, Anacleto died intestate and
he was survived by his second wife, Delia Razon, and his children in his first marriage,
including Emilio.
3. Emilio and Delia, with the help of her son-in-law Raymundo, continued tilling and
cultivating the property.
4. In 1992, Emilio signed a handwritten declaration that he was the tenant in the land and he
was returning the landholding to Carolina Zacarias in consideration of the sum of P1,500,000
as disturbance compensation. He
executed Katibayang Paglilipat ng Pagmamay-ari.
5. In 1992, Carolina Zacarias executed a deed of sale transferring Lot 616 to Milestone Realty
for P7,110,000.
6. Milestone became the owner of Lots 616 and 617 of the Malinta Estate with a total area of 3
hectares.
7. Delia and Raymundo filed a complaint against Emilio with the PARAD to declare null and
void the sale and to respect their tenancy.
8. Carolina argued that she chose Emilio Pea as her tenant beneficiary on the property within
30 days after the death of Anacleto, conformably with Sec. 9 of R.A. 3844.
Section 9. Agricultural Leasehold Relation Not Extinguished by Death or Incapacity of the

Parties - In case of death or permanent incapacity of the agricultural lessee to work his
landholding, the leasehold shall continue between the agricultural lessor and the person who
can cultivate the landholding personally, chosen by the agricultural lessor within one month
from such death or permanent incapacity, from among the following: (a) the surviving spouse;
(b) the eldest direct descendant by consanguinity; or (c) the next eldest descendant or
descendants in the order of their age: Provided, That in case the death or permanent incapacity
of the agricultural lessee occurs during the agricultural year, such choice shall be exercised at
the end of that agricultural year: Provided, further, That in the event the agricultural lessor fails
to exercise his choice within the periods herein provided, the priority shall be in accordance with
the order herein established.
Procedural:
9. PARAD decision:
It dismissed the complaint and ruled that Sec. 9 of R.A. 3844 is not absolute and may be
disregarded for valid cause and noted that Emilios 2 siblings openly recognised Emilio as the
legitimate successor to Anacletos tenancy rights.
10. DARAB:
It reversed the decision and declared Delia Razon as the bona fide tenant over the land-holding
in question. It noted that Carolinas affidavit did not show any categorical admission that she
made her choice within the 1 month period except to state that when Anacleto died, the right
of the deceased was inherited by Emilio which could only mean that she recognised Emilio by
force of circumstance under a nebulous time frame.
11. COURT F APPEALS
It affirmed DARABs decision. CA noted that Carolina failed to choose within the statutory
period and without prior or simultaneous notice to Delia, Carolina made her choice of Emilio as
substitute tenant only after they had agreed to sell the property.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Delia Razon Pea has a right of first priority over Emilio Pea in succeeding to
the tenancy rights of Anacleto over the subject landholding.
Case for Petitioner:

Sec. 9 does not require any form or manner in which choice should be made. Petitioners assail
the findings that there was no convincing proof that Carolina exercise her right to choose from
among the qualified heirs, when in fact a choice was made in Carolinas affidavit when she
recognised Emilio as the successor to Anacletos tenancy rights.
Delia could not have qualified as successor-tenant to Anacleto due to lack of personal cultivation
and she had not been paying rent on the land.
Case for Defendant:

Carolina did not choose the successor to Anacletos tenancy rights within one month from the
death of Anacleto. It was only after 2 years that Carolina and Emilio claimed in their affidavits
that Emilio inherited the rights of Anacleto as a tenant. Such inaction is equivalent to waiver on
Carolinas part to choose a substitute tenant and Carolina made the choice in favour of Emilio
only by force of circumstance when she was in the process of negotiating the sale to Milestone.
SC RULING WITH RATIO:

Delia Razon is first in the order of preference.
Ratio:
Carolina had failed to exercise her right to choose a substitute for the deceased tenant, from
among those qualified, within the statutory period.
In Sec. 9 of RA 3844, in case of death or permanent incapacity of the agricultural lessee to work
his landholding, the leasehold shall continue and the agricultural lessor is mandated by law to
choose a successor-tenant within one month from the death or incapacity of the agricultural
lessee from among the following:
(1) the surviving spouse
(2) eldest direct descendant by consanguinity
(3) next eldest direct descendant or descendants in the order of their age
Should the lessor fail to exercise his choice within one month from the death of the tenant, the
priority shall be in accordance with the aforementioned order.
Thus, applying Sec. 9 of RA 3844, Delia Razon Pea is the first in the order of preference to
succeed the tenancy rights of her husband because the lessor, Carolina, failed to exercise her
right of choice within one month period from the time of Anacletos death.
DISPOSITIVE:
Partially granted.
Delia Razon is the successor of Anacleto Pea as the tenant, thereby allowing her right of
redemption over the land within the prescribed period granted by law.
Sale of landholding valid, subject to the tenancy rights and right of redemption by the tenant-
lessee.
VILLALIZA V. JUDGE PANGANIBAN, et. al.

G.R. No. L-19760 (April 30, 1964)
NATURE OF THE CASE: A review of the decision of the Court of Agrarian Relations
FACTS
1. The private respondents were tenants since 1944 in a riceland situated in Aliaga, Nueva
Ecija, and owned by Domingo Fajardo. Fajardo gave out the land for lease (civil lease) to
the petitioner, Quirino Capalad, starting with the crop year 1955-56.
2. The said lessee, in June, 1955, plowed the land by machinery, and installed petitioners as
his own tenants so that when the private respondents (original tenants) went back to their
respective landholdings to prepare them for planting they found the land already
cultivated.
3. The private respondents-tenants demanded their reinstatement. Quirino Capalad promised
to do so but never fulfilled, to reinstate them for the agricultural year following said
demands.
4. The respondents filed a complaint before the Court of Agrarian Relations.
COURT OF AGRARIAN RELATIONS: The tenancy court ordered the tenants installed by
Quirino Capalad to vacate their respective landholdings in favor of the private respondents
subject to the provisions of pars. 3 and 4, Sec. 22, R.A. No. 1199, as amended, and the indemnity
in the aforestated paragraphs, supra, shall be paid by private respondent Quirino Capalad.
As to the basis of the indemnity, the tenancy court found that the ejected tenants-respondents
have engaged in gainful occupations since their illegal ejectment and had delayed the filing of
the case, and for these reasons the court made an award for damages against Quirino Capalad
equivalent to only two harvests based on the landholder's share for the crop year 1954-1955.
1wph
ISSUE: Is the conclusion of the lower court supported by substantive evidence?
Case for Petitioner: As grounds for the petition for review, the petitioners claim grave abuse of
discretion by the Agrarian Court and a lack of substantive evidence to support its findings
Case for Defendant: (The private respondents did not file an appeal to the Supreme Court.)

The above claim is wild and reckless and definitely without merit, since the decision itself
contains the recitals of the testimonies of the witnesses upon which the court based its findings,
and the petitioners do not question the existence and adequacy of these testimonies. That the
court believed the evidence for the respondents rather than those for the petitioners is the tenancy
court's prerogative, and, as a reviewing court, the Supreme Court will not weigh anew the
evidence.
SC affirmed CAR decision, but it pointed out that the premises for the award are erroneous.
Under section 27(1) of Republic Act 1199, as amended, a tenant's earnings may not be
deducted from the damages because the said section positively provides that the tenant's
freedom to earn elsewhere is to be added ("in addition") to his right to damages in case of
illegal ejectment (Lustre, et al. vs. CAR, et al., L-19654, March 21, 1964).
Nor can it be said that the respondents-tenants are guilty of laches for having unnecessarily
delayed to Capalad's promises to reinstate them. The action prescribes in ten years. The
respondents were ousted from their landholdings in June, 1955, they filed the present action on
31 March 1960; therefore, the period of limitation had not expired.
The amount of the award to each respondent should not, however, be disturbed because the
respondents' non-appeal from the decision indicates their satisfaction therewith and a waiver of
any amounts other than those indicated in the decision.
DISPOSITIVE: The decision under review is hereby AFFIRMED with costs against the
petitioners.
GERARDO RUPA vs. CA, SALIPOT

GR 80129 | January 25, 2000
affirming the RTC. The RTC dismissed the complaint for Redemption w/Damages filed by
Gerardo Rupa.
FACTS:
Spouses Lim own a coconut plantation. Allegedly, Rupa has been cultivating the same as
a share tenant for 20 years prior to the controversy (since 1963). The sharing was 5050
on the copra he makes from the coconuts.
Rupa also alleges that he was the overseer for 4 other parcels of coconut land situated in
Masbate.
In January 1980, the Spouses Lim apparently sold one piece of the coconut land to
Salipot.
Rupa came to know of the sale only on February 16 1981 after the spouses Lim wrote
him a letter regarding the sale. He manifested his intent to exercise his right to redeem the
property and sought the assistance of local DAR at Masbate.
He also consigned the redemption price with the RTC on March 26 1981.
The buyer Salipot, for his part, denied that Rupa was a tenant. He averred that Rupa was
merely hired from time to time to oversee the copramaking of the laborers of Lim, and
having a share on the resulting copra [in short, no personal cultivation]. Also he averred
that more than 180 days had lapsed since petitioner had actual knowledge of the sale.
RTC Ruling dismissed. It held that Rupa was not a tenant of the property, and hence had no
right of redemption to speak of. The court also held that his admission under oath
in the subsequently filed criminal case (on Sep 1981) that he was an overseer for
the five coconut lands.
CA Ruling affirmed. It affirmed the RTC essentially focusing on the fact that Rupa admitted
in the criminal case (for malicious mischief filed by Rupa against the bayaw of
Salipot) that he did not personally cultivate the land. It also gave weight to the
testimony of the prosecution witnesses in the corresponding criminal case, where
the witnesses stated they were laborers of Rupa, and the Certification of the
Municipal Treasurer that Rupa was a copra buyer of Masbate from 1978 to 1979.
ISSUE:
WON Rupa is entitled to the right of redemption.
Case for Petitioner: The facts and testimonies of a separate case should not have any bearing on
the present controversy. He presents multiple witnesses from the people who were
on the land supporting his version.
Case for Respondent: the admissions by Rupa in the course of a judicial proceeding is a
substitute for and a reason to dispense with the actual proof of facts. Further,
Salipot claims the real tenant is Mahinay, and has testimonies to back this up.
SC RULING:
YES. There is overwhelming proof of the tenancy relationship and hence he is entitled to the
right of redemption.
Generally findings of fact by the RTC, especially if affirmed by the CA, are entitled to great
respect and nondisturbance. If supported by minimal evidence, it can be final and conclusive on
the appellate courts. However, an exception exists (which is present in the instant case) if the
findings of fact are premised on the absence of evidence but is in actuality contradicted by the
evidence on record.
The right of redemption can be exercised if the circumstances have the ff requirements:
a. the redemptioner must be an agricultural lessee or share tenant;
b. the land must have been sold by the owner to a third party without prior written notice
of the sale given to the lessee or lessees and the DAR in accordance with sec. 11, RA
3844, as amended; [the preemptive right]
c. only the area cultivated by the agricultural lessee may be redeemed;
d. the right of redemption must be exercised within 180 days from notice; and
e. there must be an actual tender or valid consignation of the entire amount which is
reasonable price of the land sought to be redeemed.
It is believed that the statements in the CA decision are not sufficient basis to overcome the
rights of RUPA as provided in the Constitution and agrarian statutes and upheld by this Court.
The essence of agricultural tenancy lies in the establishment of owner-cultivatorship and the
economic family-size farm as the basis of Philippine agriculture, and as a consequence, divert
landlord capital in agriculture to industrial development.
Firstly, the context of the statement that Rupa was an administrator of the coconut lands
was to establish Rupa's standing to file the complaint and how he could have witnessed
the destruction of the banana trees and cassava plants by the bayaw of Salipot.
Second, in claiming that he was administrator of the property, RUPA, a farmer of limited
education must have used the word "administrator" in a loose sense to mean one taking
care of a certain piece of property by clearing and planting on the same. As aptly pointed
out by counsel for RUPA during the trial, with no objection from the counsel of
SALIPOT, "under common usage in the locality, the term administrator is used
interchangeably with tenancy.
Third, the CA did not explain its finding on the inherent incompatibility of being an
administrator and a tenantfarmer. It was entirely possible that Rupa might be an
overseer for the 4 cocolands, but a tenantfarmer in the land in question.
Fourth, the CA shouldnt have given due weight to the testimony of the prosecution
witnesses. Under the Rules, a litigant cannot be prejudiced by the declaration, act or
omission of another, EXCEPT if the admission was made by a copartner, agent,

conspirator, and privies. None of which are applicable to Rupa.
Fifth, the Certification by the Municipal Treasurer does not necessarily rule out Rupa's
claim. Rupa himself had satisfactorily explained that it is not unusual for tenantfarmers
to pursue other lines of work in the interim, given the long harvest seasons in between
coconut trees. Furthermore, the date in the Certification is only 1978 1979, whereas
Rupa claims to be a tenantfarmer since 1963.
Therefore, the basis of the CA is not enough, especially in view of the testimonies of the
principal wtinesses of Rupa, consisting of the testimonies of: Seraspi, Mortal, Mahinay, and
Patotoy. These were testimonies of the people who were actually on the land in question. From
their declarations, it is clear that Rupa was physically possessing the land since 1963 until he was
ejected. He lives in a house next to the copra kiln. The fact that RUPA has been planting coconut
seedlings and minor crops in the vacant portions of the subject land as well as cleaning and
gathering coconuts to process them into copra is borne out by the records.
Further indicating the tenancy relationship between the landlord and RUPA is their agreement to
share 50/50. The sharing arrangement taken together with other factors characteristic of tenancy
shown to be present in the case at bar, strengthens the claim of RUPA that indeed, he is a tenant
ON THE OTHER HAND, Salipot's evidence (consisting of 5 testimonies) is inherently weak.

Two of the testimonies claim that Rupa was never seen in the land (which was weird considering
he was an administrator), One testimony was essentially rehearsed (on crossexamination, the
witness admitted he was rehearsing the testimony taught by Salipot). Only one testimony
effectively agreed with Salipot's version. Furthermore, EVEN MAHINAY HIMSELF admitted
in his testimony that he was never the tenant of the land, and that Rupa was the tenant. Mahinay's
categorical answer clearly destroys the version of Salipot.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION: CA decision is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Petition is

GRANTED.
FRANCISCO ESTOLAS, petitioner, vs. ADOLFO MABALOT, respondent.
[G.R. No. 133706. May 7, 2002]
NATURE: Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing the decision of the Court of Appeals.
FACTS:
1. A Certificate of Land Transfer (CLT) was issued in favor of Mabalot over a certain parcel of
land.
2. Later, needing money for medical treatment, Mabalot passed on the land to Estolas for a
certain amount of money and rice.
3. According to Mabalot, there was only a verbal mortgage; while according to Estolas, a sale
had taken place. Acting on the transfer, the DAR officials authorized the survey and
issuance of an Emancipation Patent, leading to the issuance of a Transfer Certificate of Title
in favor of the Estolas.
4. Mabalot later filed a complaint before the Barangay Lupon to redeem the land. No amicable
settlement was reached, the case was referred to the DAR regional office.
5. Estolas insists that the subject land had been sold to him by Mabalot and requested the DAR
to cancel the CLT in Mabalots name.
PROCEDURAL:
DAR District Office Investigation Report:

Mabalot merely gave the land to Estolas as guarantee for the payment of a loan he had incurred
from the latter; and recommended that the CLT remain in the name of Mabalot and that the
money loan be returned to Estolas.
(Estolas elevated the case to the regional director).
DAR Regional Director Order:

The act of Mabalot in surrendering the subject land in favor of Estolas constituted abandonment,
Mabalots prayer for redemption of the subject land is denied.
(Mabalot appealed to the DAR Central Office)
DAR Central Office Order:

Regional Director Order reversed. Estolas is ordered to return the land to Mabalot.
(Estolas appealed to the Office of the President, his appeal was dismissed. Estolas appealed to
the CA)
Court of Appeals decision:

The transfer by Mabalot to Estolas is void, the land should be returned to Mabalot. The land was
acquired by Mabalot through PD 27, which prohibits the transfer of land except by hereditary
succession to the heirs or by other legal modes to the government. Mabalot had not effectively
abandoned the property, because he tried to redeem it in two occasions. The effort failed because
Estolas had demanded a considerable amount of money for it. Mabalot continued to hold on to
the CLT covering the land, and that he would not have even thought of bringing an action for the
recovery of the same if he honestly believed that he had already given it up in favor of Estolas.
Issue:
Whether or not Mabalot abandoned the subject property, thereby making it available to other
qualified farmer-grantees?

Estolas avers that Mabalot neither protested when the former had the subject land surveyed and
planted with 40 mango trees, nor attempted to return the money he had borrowed from petitioner.
Because the lot has been abandoned by respondent, the beneficiary, and because PD 27 does not
prohibit the transfer of properties acquired under it, Estolas theorizes that the DAR may award
the land to another qualified farmer-grantee.

NO. Title acquired pursuant to PD 27 shall not be transferable except to the grantees heirs by
hereditary succession, or back to the government by other legal means.
For abandonment to exist, the following requisites must be proven:

(a) a clear and absolute intention to renounce a right or claim or to desert a right or property and
(b) an external act by which that intention is expressed or carried into effect.
Administrative Order No. 2 defines abandonment or neglect as a willful failure of the agrarian
reform beneficiary, together with his farm household, to cultivate, till or develop his land to
produce any crop, or to use the land for any specific economic purpose continuously for a period
of two calendar years. In the present case, no such willful failure has been demonstrated. Quite
the contrary, Mabalot has continued to claim dominion over the land.
Even if Mabalot did indeed abandon his right to possess and cultivate the subject land, any
transfer of the property may only be made in favor of the government. In the present case, there
was no valid transfer in favor of the government. It was Estolas himself who requested the DAR
to cancel Mabalots CLT and to issue another one in his favor. Estolas cannot, by himself, take
over a farmer-beneficiarys landholding, allegedly on the ground that it was abandoned. The
proper procedure for reallocation when a tenant-farmer refuses to be a beneficiary of PD 27 must
be followed to ensure that there was indeed an abandonment, and that the subsequent beneficiary
is a qualified farmer-tenant as provided by law.
DISPOSITIVE:
WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DENIED and the assailed Decision AFFIRMED.
PABLO BASBAS, plaintiff-appellant, vs. RUFINO ENTENA, FLAVIANO TIBAY and

ANGELINA ENTENA (Spouses), and R. M. RESURRECCION as acting Registrar of
Deeds of the Province of Laguna, defendants-appellees.
G.R. No. L-26255 June 30, 1969
NATURE: Appeal from the decision of the CAR.
FACTS:
1. Basbas is the leasehold tenant of a riceland owned by Rufino.

2. Rufino executed a Deed of Sale covering the riceland in favor of Sps. Flaviano and Angelina.
3. Rufino sent a letter to Basbas informing the latter that the land was for sale and that Basbas
was given a certain period to communicate his intention to purchase it.
4. Basbas sent a reply accepting the offer, although disagreeing with the price. Basbas also
mentioned that he was enlisting the aid of the government in purchasing the land.
5. Basbas sent a letter to the Land Authority asking for help to acquire the land. The Land
Authority replied that his request is being processed and action will be taken thereon once the
Land Bank has been fully organized.
6. Rufino and his wife executed an affidavit stating that Basbas was notified of the sale before
its conveyance, that Basbas refused or failed to exercise the right of pre-emption granted
under the Agricultural Land Reform Code.
7. The submission of the affidavit enabled the registration of the Deed of Sale in favor of Sps.
Flaviano and Angelina.
8. Basbas filed a case before the CAR seeking to compel Rufino to sell the land to him.
PROCEDURAL:
CAR decision:
Case dismissed. Basbas failed to make tender of payment and consignation of the purchase price
hence the landowner cannot be compelled to sell the land to him.
Issue:
Whether or not tender of payment and judicial consignation of the purchase price are necessary
before a tenant-lessee may avail himself of the right of pre-emption or of redemption provided in
Sections 11 and 12 of the Agricultural Land Reform Code.
Case for Plaintiff:

The CAR erred in dismissing the action for non-tender of the redemption price, since the law
does not require such tender, and the tenant is not bound to redeem his land at the price for which
it was sold, but only at a reasonable price and consideration. The SC also ruled in two past cases
that previous tender of the redemption money is not indispensable.

The CAR did not err.
Basbass claim to preference in purchasing the land, in case the said land is to be sold, or to his
right to redeem it in 2 years should the land be sold without his knowledge, is predicated upon
Sections 11 and 12 of the Agricultural Land Reform Code (Republic Act 3844):
SEC. 11. Lessee's Right of Pre-emption. In case the agricultural lessor decides to sell
the landholding, the agricultural lessee shall have the preferential right to buy the same
under reasonable terms and conditions x x x
SEC. 12. Lessee's Right of Redemption. In case the landholding is sold to a third
person without the knowledge of the agricultural lessee, the latter shall have the right to
redeem the same at a reasonable price and consideration: Provided, That the entire
landholding sold must be redeemed: x x x The right of redemption under this Section
may be exercised within two years from the registration of the sale, and shall have
priority over any other right of legal redemption.
There is no showing that the Land Reform Council has proclaimed that the government
machineries and agencies in the region are already operating, as required by section 4 of
Republic Act 3844.
Granting that Sections 11 and 12 are operative, yet this Court has ruled in a past case that the
timely exercise of the right of legal redemption requires either tender of the price or valid
consignation thereof. The redemption price should either be fully offered in legal tender or else
validly consigned in court. Only by such means can the buyer become certain that the offer to
redeem is one made seriously and in good faith. A buyer can not be expected to entertain an offer
of redemption without attendant evidence that the redemptioner can, and is willing to accomplish
the repurchase immediately. A different rule would leave the buyer open to harassment by
speculators or crackpots, as well as to unnecessary prolongation of the redemption period,
contrary to the policy of the law.
The right of a redemptioner to pay a reasonable price does not excuse him from the duty to make
proper tender of the price that can be honestly deemed reasonable under the circumstances,
without prejudice to final arbitration by the courts.
As shown by the evidence in this case, the redemptioner has no funds and must apply for them to
the Land Authority, which, in turn, must depend on the availability of funds from the Land Bank.
It then becomes practically certain that the landowner will not be able to realize the value of his
property for an indefinite time beyond the two years redemption period.
The cases pointed out by Basbas in support of his argument involve redemptioners who had
consigned or deposited in court the redemption price when action was filed, for which reason
prior tender was held excused. In this case, there was neither prior tender nor did judicial
consignation accompany the filing of the suit.
Unless tender or consignation is made requisite to the valid exercise of the tenant's right to
redeem, everytime a redemption is attempted, a case must be filed in court to ascertain the
reasonable price. On the other hand, a prior tender by the tenant of the price that he considers
reasonable affords an opportunity to avoid litigation, for the landowner may well decide to
accept a really reasonable offer, considering that he would thereby save the attorney's fees and
the expense of protracted litigation.
Section 74 of the Land Reform Act (RA 3844) establishes a "Land Bank of the Philippines"
intended "to finance the acquisition by the Government of landed estates for division and resale
to small landholders, as well as the purchase of the landholding by the agricultural lessee from
the landowner." No expression in this part of the law, however, indicates, or even hints, that the
2-year redemption period will not commence to ran until the tenant obtains financing from the
Land Bank, or stops the tenant from securing redemption funds from some other source.
DISPOSITIVE:
WHEREFORE, the appealed order granting the motion to dismiss the complaint is affirmed.
BIENVENIDO T. BUADA, ISAIAS B. QUINTO, NEMESIO BAUTISTA, ORLANDO R.

BAUTISTA, FREDDIE R. BAUTISTA, CARLITO O. BUADA, GERARDO O. BUADA,
ARMANDO M. OLIVA, ROGELIO F. RAPAJON, EUGENIO F. FLORES, Petitioners,
vs. CEMENT CENTER,INC., Respondent.
G.R. No. 180374 January 22, 2010
NATURE: Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing the decision of the CA which granted Cement
Centers Petition for Review and nullified and set aside the decisions of the Regional Adjudicator and of
the DAR Adjudication Board (DARAB) dismissing the Complaint for Confirmation of Voluntary
Surrender and Damages filed by Cement Center.
FACTS:
1. Petitioners were tenant-farmers cultivating three parcels of agricultural land owned by
Cement Center.
2. Cement Center filed a Complaint for Confirmation of Voluntary Surrender and Damages
against petitioners with the DARAB. It claimed that petitioners entered into a Compromise
Agreement with Cement Center whereby the former, for and in consideration of P3,000 each,
voluntarily surrendered their respective landholdings. However, despite Cement Centers
repeated demands, petitioners refused to vacate subject landholdings.
3. Petitioners alleged that their consent to the Compromise Agreement was obtained through
fraud, deceit, and misrepresentation. They claimed that:
a. Cement Center induced them to sign a Compromise Agreement by representing that the
subject landholdings are no longer viable for agricultural purposes.
b. Cement Center assured them that they would only apply for the conversion of the land
and that they would have to surrender the land only upon the approval of said application
and that thereafter, they will each be paid a disturbance compensation.
c. Cement Center promised to hire them to work on the project that was planned for the
converted land. But, should the application for conversion be denied, petitioners will
continue to be tenants and could later become beneficiaries under the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Law.
PROCEDURAL:
Regional Adjudicator Ruling:

Case dismissed. The Compromise Agreement was not enforceable because it violated the
provisions of Administrative Order No. 12, which requires the payment of disturbance
compensation which should not be less than five times the average of the annual gross value of
the harvest on their actual landholdings during the last five preceding calendar years. The
disturbance compensation of P3,000 being offered by Cement Center to each of the petitioners is
grossly inadequate. Cement Center likewise did not offer homelots to the petitioners as required
under the aforesaid order. Since Cement Centers application for conversion was denied, then
the purpose for the execution of the Compromise Agreement was rendered nugatory. As a
consequence of the denial of the application, the subject landholdings shall be placed under the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) compulsory coverage, as provided under the
Administrative Order No. 12.
(Cement Center appealed to the DARAB).
DARAB Ruling:
Appeal denied. Cement Center failed to prove that petitioners voluntarily surrendered their
tenancy rights over the subject landholdings. Since the application for conversion was denied,
then the Compromise Agreement is not a perfected obligation; it is as if the petitioners
voluntary surrender never existed.
(Cement Center filed a Petition for Review before the CA)
CA Ruling:
Petition granted. The Compromise Agreement executed by the parties is valid. Its enforceability
is not subject to the approval by the DARAB of Cement Centers application for conversion.
Likewise, the deficiency in consideration is not a ground to annul an otherwise valid and
enforceable agreement. Petitioners are found to be literate on the ground that they were able to
affix their signatures to the agreement.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioners as tenants-farmers intended to absolutely and voluntarily surrender
their tenancy rights over the subject landholdings.
Case for Petitioners:

They did not execute the Compromise Agreement with a view to absolutely sell and surrender
their tenancy rights in exchange for P3,000.00 for each of them. The agreement was subject to
suspensive conditions, i.e., the approval of Cement Centers application for conversion of the
land to non-agricultural and their subsequent absorption as laborers in the business that Cement
Center will put up on said land, or, if the application will not be approved, petitioners will
continue to be tenants of the land and could later on qualify as beneficiaries of the CARP. They
were not aware that these conditions were not incorporated in the Compromise Agreement
because they were not literate in the English language used. Neither were they represented by
counsel nor were the contents of the agreement explained to them. The Compromise Agreement
should be interpreted in accordance with the real intention of the parties pursuant to Articles
1370 and 1371 of the Civil Code. Since they are illiterate in the English language, they could not
have given their valid consent to the Compromise Agreement. The disturbance fee of P3,000.00
for each tenant violates Administrative Order No. 12.
Case for Cement Center:

Petitioners voluntarily surrendered their landholdings. The Compromise Agreement does not
reflect the conditions alleged by petitioners. Parol evidence should not be allowed to prove such
conditions; that petitioners cannot claim that they are illiterate in the English language and that
the contents of the agreement were not explained to them as it is incumbent upon every
contracting party to learn and know the contents of an instrument before signing and agreeing to
it; and, that it was not necessary for petitioners to be assisted by counsel in signing the agreement
as the execution thereof is not akin to a custodial investigation or criminal proceedings wherein
the right to be represented by counsel is indispensable. As to the disturbance fee, the sum of
P3,000.00 for each tenant is fair and sufficient because apart from said amount, petitioners were
allowed to cultivate the lands for a single cropping without any obligation to pay any lease rental
in the form of palay or cotton harvest or any other mode of payment.

NO. The Compromise Agreement did not constitute the "voluntary surrender" contemplated by
law.
Cement Center failed to present evidence to show that the disturbance compensation package
corresponds with the compensation required by the said Administrative Order. Neither was there
any showing that said disturbance compensation is not less than five times the average annual
gross value of the harvest on petitioners actual landholdings during the preceding five calendar
years.
Moreover, it was not shown why petitioners as tenant-farmers would voluntarily give up their
sole source of livelihood. There was likewise no showing that the money was indeed
advantageous to petitioners families as to allow them to pursue other sources of livelihood. To
stress, tenancy relations cannot be bargained away except for the strong reasons provided by law
which must be convincingly shown by evidence in line with the State's policy of achieving a
dignified existence for the small farmers free from pernicious institutional restraints and
practices.
The evidence on record and Cement Center's arguments are insufficient to overcome the rights of
petitioners as provided in the Constitution and agrarian statutes.
DISPOSITIVE:
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals and its
Resolution are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decisions of the Regional Adjudicator and
the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board dismissing respondents Complaint for
Confirmation of Voluntary Surrender and Damages are REINSTATED and AFFIRMED.
VERDE vs. MACAPAGAL

G.R. No. 151342; June 23, 2005
NATURE OF THE CASE: Petitioner brought this case before the Court via petition for
certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure whereas the proper remedy for
him was to file an appeal from the adverse decision of the Court of Appeals under Rule 45 since
the issue raised deals purely with a question of law. Nevertheless, as the subject petition was
filed within the prescribed fifteen-day period, and in view of the substantial issue raised therein,
the Court gave due course to the same and treated it as a petition for review on certiorari.
FACTS:
1. Macapagal and Estrella were the owners of 2.5 hectares of agricultural land, subject of this
dispute, situated in Bulacan. After their demise, said piece of land passed on to their children
(respondents herein) who are now the pro-indiviso owners of the same. On the other hand,
petitioner is the leasehold tenant of the subject land having succeeded his father, Francisco
Verde, in the tenancy thereof.
2. Respondents initiated an action for ejectment against petitioner before the Provincial Agrarian
Reform Adjudication Board in Bulacan. Respondents alleged in their complaint that sometime in
1993, without their knowledge and consent, petitioner mortgaged the subject land to dela Cruz
upon the condition that the latter would be the one to work on 1/2 of said property. When
confronted regarding this matter, petitioner not only admitted that he had, indeed, mortgaged the
subject land to dela Cruz but also asked for forgiveness from respondents and assured the latter
that he would pay them the agreed amount of rental. In addition, petitioner purportedly
guaranteed that he would redeem the mortgage immediately after the 1993 planting season and
would never mortgage the property again. Apparently, petitioner failed to fulfill his promise to
respondents as dela Cruz still farmed the subject land in 1994. Respondents went on to argue that
petitioners mortgaging the property to dela Cruz constituted abandonment which is a ground for
termination of agricultural leasehold relation under Section 8, Republic Act No. 3844, as
amended.
3. Respondent then brought the matter before the BARC of Bulacan for conciliation. However,
proceedings before the BARC were ineffective as the parties failed to reach an amicable
settlement. Attached to the complaint was the joint sworn statement executed by Sanciangco and
Cruz who declared that in 1993, de la Cruz was the one who attended to of the subject land by
virtue of the contract of mortgage between him and petitioner and that de la Cruz was still the
one who cultivated the subject land in 1994.
4. Petitioner filed his Anwer denying the material allegations of the complaint and claimed that
he only hired the services of de la Cruz and the latters carabao because from 1993-1994, he did
not have the means to own a beast of burden. He also stated that from 1975 up to the filing of
this action, he continues to occupy, possess and cultivate the subject land as a bona fide tenant.
However, Dela Cruz maintained that in 1993 to 1994, he was hired to work on the land tenanted
by petitioner because during those years, the latter did not have a carabao. For their part, Sayco
and Cruz alleged that ever since the tenancy over the subject land was transferred to petitioner by
the death of his father, he had continuously farmed and possessed said property.
DARAB Ruling: After filing a Motion for Reconsideration which was denied by the Provincial
Adjudicator, respondents then filed an appeal before the DARAB, which affirmed the earlier
ruling of the Provincial Adjudicator that petitioner did not give up actually and absolutely his
tenancy right over the subject land as the complaint itself stated that petitioner was supposed to
cultivate the property during the 1993-1994 agricultural seasons and that the alleged mortgage
must not be mistaken from personal loan, the latter referring to borrowed money where
defendant then was in dire need of financial help.
CA Ruling: Respondents filed an Appeal with the Court of Appeals. In the decision assailed, the
appellate court reversed and set aside the decision of the DARAB. According to CA, Section 24
of Rep. Act No. 1199 prohibits a share-tenant from employing a subtenant to work or furnish
labor on the land subject of a tenancy agreement. Moreover, jurisprudence dictates that there
should be personal cultivation by the tenant or by his immediate farm household or members of
the family of the lessee or other persons who are dependent upon him for support or who usually
help him in his activities. In the present case, as dela Cruz is clearly not a member of petitioners
immediate farm household nor did he depend upon petitioner for support or helps the latter in
operating the farm enterprise, the requirement of personal cultivation is obviously lacking.
Hence, the recourse was raised by the petitioner.
ISSUE:
WON because of the hiring by the petitioner of Dela Cruzs services and that of his carabao, the
agricultural lease relationship between the parties in this case ceased to exist.
Case for Petitioner: Petitioner argues that (a)being a bona fide tenant of the subject land, he is
entitled to security of tenure such that he cannot be dispossessed of the land he had been tilling
for around twenty years on the basis of mere conjecture and hypothesis; (2) that the CA erred in
reliance on the joint sworn statement of Sayco and Cruz; (3) that dela Cruzs own affidavit
sufficiently refuted the allegations of the said joint sworn statement; (4) that as dela Cruz was
supposedly a party to the alleged contract of mortgage, the appellate court should have given
credit to his affidavit instead of depending on the statements of Sanciangco and Cruz; (5) that an
agreement involving mortgage of real rights of a leasehold tenant must be reduced into writing
pursuant to the statute of frauds, otherwise, said agreement cannot bind third parties; (6) that
respondents were not able to substantiate their claim that he had abandoned the subject land
more so since he continues to till the same; and (7) that under RA No. 3844, the agricultural
lessee is required to notify the agricultural lessor of his intention to abandon the leaseholding;
wherein this case, he claims that said notification is lacking.
Case for Private Respondent: Respondents contend that Petitioners intent to abandon the
subject property was manifested when he mortgaged the landholding to dela Cruz and allowed
the latter to till said property from 1993 up to 1994 in contravention of Rep. Act No. 1199 which
limits personal cultivation of a tenanted land to the tenant himself and to his immediate
household. Also, respondents argue that Rep. Act No. 3844, as amended, requires the
agricultural lessee to provide the agricultural lessor with a notice only in case of voluntary
abandonment. However, as this case involves involuntary abandonment, the prescribed notice
under the law does not apply.
SC RULING with RATIO: NO. Under Section 38 of Rep. Act No. 1199, a tenant is required to
perform the following tasks: (1)The preparation of the seedbed which shall include plowing,
harrowing, and watering of the seedbed, the scattering of seeds, and the care of the seedlings; (2)
The plowing, harrowing, and watering of the area he is cultivating, except final harrowing of the
field as an item of contribution specified in Section thirty-two of this Act; (3) The maintenance,
repair and weeding of dikes, paddies, and irrigation canals in his holdings; (4) The pulling and
bundling of the seedlings preparatory to their transplanting; (5) Care of the growing plants; (6)
Gathering and bundling of the reaped harvest; (7) The piling of the bundles into small stacks;
(8)The preparation of the place where the harvest is to be stacked; (9) Gathering of the small
stacks and their transportation to the place where they are to be stacked; and (10)Piling into a big
stack preparatory to threshing. As can be gleaned from the foregoing, the use of a carabao, for
which petitioner hired the services of dela Cruz, is only one phase of farm labor which is
supposed to be rendered by a tenant. Cultivation does not refer solely to the plowing and
harrowing of the land. The fact that a tenant or an agricultural lessee for that matter employs
farm laborers to perform some aspects of farm work does not preclude the existence of an
agricultural leasehold relationship provided an agricultural lessee does not leave the entire
process of cultivation in the hands of hired helpers. Section 27(2) of Rep. Act No. 3844 permits
the agricultural lessee, in case of illness or temporary incapacity, to avail himself of the services
of laborers, incapacity being any cause or circumstance which prevents the lessee from fulfilling
his contractual and other obligations under the Code.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 18 December
2001 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the Decision of the DARAB dated 30 October
2000 is REINSTATED. No costs.
TOPIC: Termination of Tenancy Relation:

Abandonment
DELA CRUZ v. QUIAZON

G.R. No. 171961. November 28. 2008.
PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals
FACTS:
1. Estela Dizon-Garcia, mother of respondent Amelia G. Quiazon, was the registered owner of a
parcel of land covered by TCT No. 107576, situated in Capas, Tarlac.
The property was brought under the coverage of Operation Land Transfer pursuant to
Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 27.
2. On June 8, 1981, Feliciano dela Cruz, a tenant-farmer, was issued CLT No. 0-0362073 over
a 3.7200-hectare portion of the said property.
3. On March 9, 1992, the heirs of Estela Dizon-Garcia executed a Deed of Extrajudicial
Admission and Partition with Waiver adjudicating among themselves all the properties left
by both of their parents, except for the subject property, which was adjudicated solely in
favor of Amelia Quiazon.
4. On May 15, 1993, Amelia Quaizon filed a Complaint with the Provincial Adjudication Board
of the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) against petitioner Ferdinand dela Cruz,
alleging that in 1991, he entered into a leasehold contract with her, by virtue of which he
bound himself to deliver 28 cavans of palay as rental. Since 1991, Ferdinand dela Cruz
allegedly failed to deliver the stipulated rental because he had already abandoned the
landholding.
5. For this reason, Amelia Quiazon prayed for his ejectment from the property and the
termination of their tenancy relationship
Procedural:
6. Provincial Adjudicators decision:
Provincial Adjudicator Romeo Bello dismissed the complaint based on his finding that the
landholding had not been abandoned by Feliciano considering that petitioner Renato dele Cruz, a
member of Felicianos immediate family, was in actual and physical possession thereof.
7. Amelia and her siblings filed an Application for Retention before DAR Regional Office
Region 3.
DAR granted the application with an order to maintain in peaceful possession the tenants of the
subject landholding.
8. DARAB:
It dismissed Amelias appeal from the decision of the Provincial Adjudicator.
9. DARABs resolution:
DARAB set aside its first decision primarily based on the DAR Order granting granting the
application for retention, as well as its finding that Ferdinand and Feliciano dela Cruz abandoned
the subject landholding when they went to the U.S.A.
10. COURT OF APPEALS

It denied petition and motion for reconsideration.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Ferdinand dela Cruz abandoned the landholding.

They argued they have continuously cultivated the property.
Renato dele Cruz, a member of Felicianos immediate family, was in actual and physical
possession and continued cultivating the land.
Case for Defendant:

Ferdinand and Feliciano dela Cruz were already immigrants to the United States of America and
that petitioner Renato dela Cruz, the actual tiller of the land, was a usurper because his
possession of the land was without the consent of the landowner. Amelia Quiazon argued that by
migrating to the U.S.A., Feliciano was deemed to have abandoned the landholding, for which
reason his CLT should now be canceled.
SC RULING WITH RATIO:

Ferdinand dela Cruz did not abandon the landholding.
Ratio:
Abandonment requires
(a) a clear and absolute intention to renounce a right or claim or to desert a right or property; and
(b) (b) an external act by which that intention is expressed or carried into effect.
The intention to abandon implies a departure, with the avowed intent of never returning,
resuming or claiming the right and the interest that have been abandoned.
In the case, the immigration of the original farmer-beneficiary to the U.S.A. did not necessarily
result in the abandonment of the landholding, considering that one of his sons, petitioner Renato
dela Cruz, continued cultivating the land.
Personal cultivation, as required by law, includes cultivation of the land by the tenant (lessee)
himself or with the aid of the immediate farm household, which refers to the members of the
family of the tenant and other persons who are dependent upon him for support and who usually
help him in the [agricultural] activities
DISPOSITIVE:
Petition granted.
CLEMENTE DEQUITO V. VICTORIA LLAMAS

G.R. No. L-28090 (SEPT 4, 1975)
NATURE OF THE CASE: Petition to review by certiorari the order of the Court of Agrarian
Relations, Branch I, Bacolod City, in C.A.R. Case No. 3469, Neg. Occ.-'67, entitled "Clemente
Dequito vs. Victoria Llamas", which dismissed petitioner's complaint for "Reliquidation and
Damages".
FACTS
1. On July 3, 1962, petitioner filed a complaint for "Reliquidation and Damages" (CAR
Case No. 3469) against private respondent Victoria Llamas in the Court of Agrarian
Relations, Branch 1, Bacolod City.
2. Plaintiff Dequito alleged that

he was an agricultural share tenant for a period of nine (9) years of a one-hectare
piece of land, and in the crop year 1959-1960, an additional landholding of one-half
() hectare was given him by defendant Llamas;
that the produce of the same land was divided 50-50, tenant- plaintiff furnishing all
items of production and his labor, while defendant contributed only her land;
that plaintiff cultivated 500 clumps of bamboos planted along his tenancy landholding
on the agreement that plaintiff gets as his share 10% of the gross sale of said
bamboos; and that from crop year 1964, plaintiff was not paid 10%
that after the crop year 1961-62 defendant dispossessed tenant-plaintiff from the
hectare landholding that for many times plaintiff had demanded from defendant a
change in the illegal sharing basis of 50-50 to 70-30 and his 10% share of the gross
sales of bamboos, but defendant did not heed said demands;
that plaintiff obtained cash loans from defendant in the crop year 1961 to 1967, and
that he had to pay usurious interests for said loans in the form of palay;
that he suffered "mental anguish, serious anxiety, wounded feelings and social
humiliation", thus entitling him to moral damages;
The plaintiff prayed that the defendant be ordered to pay plaintiff short sharing," due
him for 6 years; to order defendant to pay him the cost of 120 cavans of palay
representing plaintiff's failure to plant during crop years 1962-63 to 1966-67; to order
defendant to pay plaintiff 10% of the gross sale of bamboos; to order defendant to
return the excess of one (1) cavan of palay as overpayment of cash loan from crop
year 1966-67,1963-64 to 1965-66,1961-62 to 1962-63, All amount plus "8% legal
interest computed from the time the amount became due; to order defendant to pay
plaintiff P5,000.00 as corrective or exemplary damages and P5,000.00 as moral
damages, plus P1,000.00 as attorney's fees;
3. Defendant Llamas filed a motion to dismiss on the principal ground that plaintiff had
already voluntarily surrendered his landholding to defendant; that he admitted in his
sworn affidavit dated June 1, 1967, "that the liquidation and the sharing basis was in
accordance with law; that all the improvements, rights and interest were sold by the
plaintiff to the defendant in the amount of P700.00"
COURT OF AGRARIAN RELATIONS: The Court of Agrarian Relations dismissed the

Petition for Reliquidation and Damages. The defendants Motion to Dismiss was as held
"tenable and meritorious" on the following grounds: (1) that plaintiff (petitioner Dequito) already
voluntarily surrendered his landholding to the defendant (private respondent Llamas) which is a
lawful ground for termination of tenancy relationship under Sec. 9, of Republic Act No. 1199;
(2) that plaintiff Dequito had sworn under oath in an affidavit that the liquidation and the sharing
basis was in accordance with law; and (3) that all the improvements, rights and interests were
sold by the plaintiff to the defendant in the amount of P700.00.
1wph
ISSUE: Did the petitioner voluntarily surrender the landholding to the defendant?
Case for Petitioner: Petitioner claims that the respondent Court of Agrarian Relations acted in
grave abuse of discretion and/or in excess of its jurisdiction by dismissing the complaint because
plaintiff Dequito could not have in his affidavit dated June 1, 1967, waived his rights to his claim
as tenant, contrary to Article 6 of the New Civil Code, which provides: Rights may be waived,
unless the waiver is contrary to law public order, public policy, morals, or good customs, or
prejudicial to a third person with a right recognized by law.
Case for Defendant: Plaintiff had already voluntarily surrendered his landholding to defendant;
that he admitted in his sworn affidavit dated June 1, 1967, "that the liquidation and the sharing
basis was in accordance with law; that all the improvements, rights and interest were sold by the
plaintiff to the defendant in the amount of P700.00"
SC RULING with RATIO: We are firmly convinced that petitioner never waived any of his
rights as a tenant contrary to law, but rather he declared under oath that the "sharing basis was in
accordance with law", a plain and clear declaration of facts made in a public document.
Petitioner never questioned the authenticity of his affidavit of June 1, 1967, and did not
for a moment raise any question on the voluntariness of its execution.
The respondent Court observed the petitioner to be a literate person and one who could
not have been deceived by the contents of the affidavit which was written in a dialect he
knows and understands and it could safely be presumed that when petitioner signed the
sworn statement he knew the meaning and import of all its contents.
What clearly appear in the affidavit are admissions or declarations against his own
interest made by the petitioner when he stated under oath.
Petitioner himself, in his voluntary executed sworn statement, the contents of which he
fully understood, stated as a fact that the sharing basis was in accordance with law. If
petitioner now contends that it was not so, thus reneging on his own sworn admission of
the existence of a fact, then he must have perjured himself when he voluntarily and
knowingly stated under oath that the sharing basis was in accordance with law. We will
not allow such perfidy to prevail because a party to a litigation must always come to court
in good faith and with clean hands.
If the petitioner miscalculated on the advantages and disadvantages of voluntary
surrender of his landholding for an agreed consideration, he must assume the
consequences of his error. After executing the affidavit voluntarily wherein he made
admissions and declarations against his own interest under the solemnity of an oath,
he cannot be allowed to spurn them and undo what he has done. He cannot, even
"with great repentance, retrieve the body he forsook and now wishes to live."
He ought to know that if he has rights to protect as a tenant, the landowner has also
rights under the law. The protective mantle of social justice cannot be utilized as an
instrument to hoodwink courts of justice and undermine the rights of landowners

on the plea of helplessness and heartless exploitation of the tenant by the landowner.
False pretenses cannot arouse the sentiment of charity in a compassionate society.
The matter of loans with alleged usurious interest mentioned in petitioners' complaint, the
same could be the subject matter of a separate action if the claim is supported by signed
memorandum or receipt of the loans as required by Sec. 20 of Act 3844 and the
provisions of the Usury Law.
DISPOSITIVE: Petition is dismissed, and the Orders dated July 24, 1967, and September 1,
1967, of the respondent court dismissing petitioner's complaint are AFFIRMED.
ALMUETE V. ANDRES AND CA

G.R. No. 122276. (November 20, 2001)
FACTS:
1. The subject parcel of land was awarded by the then National Resettlement and
Rehabilitation Administration (NARRA) to petitioner Rodrigo Almuete. Since then,
Rodrigo Almuete exercised exclusive possession of the property, cultivating it and
planting thereon narra, fruit trees, rice, corn and legumes. For some twenty-two (22)
years, Rodrigo Almuete and his family farmed the subject property peacefully and
exclusively.
2. Unknown to Amluete, an Agrarian Reform Technologist by the name of Leticia Gragasin
filed a field investigation and inspection report stating that the whereabouts of the
Almuete was unknown and the had waived all his rights as a NARRA settler due to his
poor health and that the actual occupant is Marcelo Andres since 1967 to date. She
recommended to the Ministry of Agrarian Reform (MAR) that the award to Almuete be
cancelled and be awarded to Marcelo Andres.
3. Based on the representations of Gragasin and Andres, the NARRA award in favor of
Almuete was cancelled and a homestead patent issued to Marcelo Andres. Eventually,
Marcelo Andres acquired an Original Certificate of Title (OCT) in his name.
4. Shortly thereafter, Marcelo Andres, accompanied by 10 other persons armed with bolo
and other bladed weapons entered the property claiming exclusive right of ownership and
possession. They felled the narra trees converting them to lumber and destroyed the
mongos planted by the Almuetes. Marcelos Andres gained control/took possession of half
of the property.
5. Almuete wasted no time complaining to the DAR Authorities and it was only then that he
discovered that the award in his favor had been cancelled because he had allegedly
abandoned the property.
6. Consequently, Almuete and his daughter, Ana Almuete, filed an action for reconveyance
and recovery of possession against Marcelo Andres with the RTC.
RTC: rendered a judgment in favor of the Almuetes. RTC ordered Andres to reconvey at his
expense the OCT to Almuetes, and to vacate the land and deliver possession to Almuete.
7. Marcelo Andres failed to appeal, and so the RTC decision became final and executor. He
filed a petition for certioriari with CA. He argued that since the subject property was
agricultural land covered by a homestead patent, exclusive jurisdiction was with
DARAB, not with the regular courts. Respondent Andres also stressed that the original
action was for ejectment, which was cognizable by the municipal trial courts, not by the
Regional Trial Courts.
CA: declared the RTC decision null and void and ordered to restore the status quo before the
complaint.
ISSUE: Did CA gravely err when it granted the petition for certiorari and held that the RTC had
no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action between the litigants?
Case for petitioners: RTC had jurisdiction, and CA erred in giving due course to the Petition for
Certiorari of Marcelo Andres.
Case for respondent: DARAB, not RTC had jurisdiction over the subject matter. Therefore
RTC decision was null and void.
Held: YES, the CA erred. The action filed by petitioners before the trial court was for recovery
of possession and reconveyance of title. The issue to be resolved was who between petitioner
Rodrigo Almuete and respondent Marcelo Andres has a better right to the subject property
considering that both of them are awardees of the same property. It was thus a controversy
relating to ownership of the farmland, which is beyond the ambit of the phrase "agrarian
dispute." No juridical tie of landowner and tenant was alleged between petitioners and
respondent, let alone that which would so characterize the relationship as an agrarian dispute. In
fact, petitioner and respondent were contending parties for the ownership of the same parcel of
land.
Rule II, Section 1 of the Revised Rules of Procedure of the DARAB, provides:
Section 1. Primary, Original and Appellate Jurisdiction. --- The Agrarian Reform Adjudication
Board shall have primary jurisdiction, both original and appellate, to determine and adjudicate all
agrarian disputes, cases, controversies, and matters or incidents involving the implementation of
the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program under Republic Act No. 6657, Executive Order
Nos. 229, 228 and 129-A, Republic Act No. 3844 as amended by Republic Act No. 6389, P.D.
No. 27 and other agrarian laws and their implementing rules and regulations.
Agrarian dispute is defined under Section 3(d) of Republic Act No. 6657, as:
(d) Agrarian Dispute refers to any controversy relating to tenurial arrangements, whether
leasehold, tenancy, stewardship or otherwise, over lands devoted to agriculture, including
disputes concerning farmworkers associations or representation of persons in negotiating,
fixing, maintaining, changing or seeking to arrange terms or conditions of such tenurial
arrangements.
It includes any controversy relating to compensation of lands acquired under this Act and other
terms and conditions of transfer of ownership from landowners to farmworkers, tenants and other
agrarian reform beneficiaries, whether the disputants stand in the proximate relation of farm
operator and beneficiary, landowner and tenant, or lessor and lessee.
From the foregoing, it is clear that the jurisdiction of the DARAB is limited to cases involving a
tenancy relationship between the parties.
The Court of Appeals, therefore, gravely erred when it granted the petition for certiorari and held
that the trial court had no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action between petitioners
and respondent. The action filed by petitioners was cognizable by the regular courts.
Consequently, the Regional Trial Court was competent to try and decide Civil Case No. 20-530.
Its decision was, thus, valid and can no longer be disturbed, after having attained finality.
Nothing more can be done with the decision except to enforce it.
DISPOSITIVE: WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the instant petition for review is
GRANTED. The assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals are REVERSED and
SET ASIDE.
Lope MACHETE, JUMAWID, et al. vs. CA, Celestino VILLALON*

GR 109093 | Novmeber 20, 1995
*the citation in the case outline appears to be wrong, as it is the citation for Nuesa vs CA.
reversing the RTC. The RTC dismissed the complaint for lack of jurisdiction holding it was an
agrarian dispute, which should be filed with the DAR.
FACTS:
21 July 1989, Celestino Villalon (owner) filed a complaint for collection of back rentals
and damages against the petitioners with the RTC. The parties entered into a leasehold
tenancy relationship with respect to Celestino's land at Poblacion Norte in Bohol. It turns
out that the tenants were not paying the rentals and shares of the harvests.
Petitioners moved to dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction, arguing that the
dispute arose out of or is connected with agrarian relations and hence cognizable by the
DAR.
In April 1976, the father Gavino Nisnisan entered into a leasehold tenancy agreement
with Policarpio Nisnisan, with a 1/3:2/3 sharing (the bigger share going to the son).
The RTC granted the motion to dismiss. MR denied.
RTC Ruling dismissed.
CA Ruling reversed the RTC. It held that CARL cannot be seen to encompass a case of
simple collection of back rentals by virtue of an agreement, and that there is no
agrarian dispute to speak of, nor is the application, implementation, enforcement or
interpretation of these agrarian laws in issue.
ISSUE:
WON the RTC has jurisdiction over the collection suit of back rentals arising from an agrarian
relations.
Case for Petitioner: The alleged cause of action of private respondent arose from an agrarian
relation and that the agreement involved is an agricultural leasehold contract,
hence, the dispute is agrarian in nature. The laws governing its execution and the
rights and obligations of the parties thereto are necessarily R.A. 3844, 6 R.A. 6657
and other pertinent agrarian laws. Considering that the application,
implementation, enforcement or interpretation of said laws are matters which have
been vested in the DAR, this case is outside the jurisdiction of the trial court.
Case for Respondent: It was a mere collection suit, and the issue of nonpayment of rentals was
not even disputed by the petitioners.
SC RULING:
NO. The DAR is clearly vested with jurisdiction over the same, the dispute being agrarian in
nature.
Section 17 of E.O. 229 vested the DAR with quasi-judicial powers to determine and adjudicate
agrarian reform matters as well as exclusive original jurisdiction over all matters involving
implementation of agrarian reform except those falling under the exclusive original jurisdiction
of the Department of Agriculture and the Department of Environment and Natural Resources in
accordance with law.
RA 6657 further evinced the intent to give the DAR the exclusive original jurisdiction over
agrarian disputes, as held in Quismundo vs CA. Section 3, par. (d) of RA 6657 defines the term
"agrarian dispute" as referring to any controversy relating to tenurial arrangements,
whether leasehold, tenancy, stewardship or otherwise, over lands devoted to agriculture,
including disputes concerning farm workers' associations or representation of persons in
negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing or seeking to arrange terms or conditions of such
tenurial arrangements.
As further held in Quismundo vs CA, Regional Trial Courts have not been completely divested
of jurisdiction over agrarian reform matters. Section 56 of R.A. 6657 confers "special
jurisdiction" on "Special Agrarian Courts," which are Regional Trial Courts designated by this
Court at least one (1) branch within each province to act as such. These Regional Trial
Courts designated as Special Agrarian Courts have, according to Sec. 57 of the same law,
original and exclusive jurisdiction over: (a) all petitions for the determination of just
compensation to landowners, and (b) the prosecution of all criminal offenses under the Act.
Consequently, there exists an agrarian dispute in the case at bench which is exclusively
cognizable by the DARAB. The failure of petitioners to pay back rentals pursuant to the
leasehold contract with private respondent is an issue which is clearly beyond the legal
competence of the trial court to resolve. The doctrine of primary jurisdiction does not warrant
a court to arrogate unto itself the authority to resolve a controversy the jurisdiction over which is
initially lodged with an administrative body of special competence.
Thus, respondent appellate court erred in directing the trial court to assume jurisdiction over this
case. At any rate, the present legal battle is "not altogether lost" on the part of private respondent
because as this Court was quite emphatic in Quismundo v. Court of Appeals, the resolution by
the DAR is to the best advantage of the parties since it is in a better position to resolve agrarian
disputes, being the administrative agency presumably possessing the necessary expertise on the
matter. Further, the proceedings therein are summary in nature and the department is not bound
by the technical rules of procedure and evidence, to the end that agrarian reform disputes and
other issues will be adjudicated in a just, expeditious and inexpensive proceeding.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION: CA decision is REVERSED and set aside. The RTC's orders
are reinstated. Let the records be transmitted to the DARAB for proper adjudication.
HON. ANTONIO M. NUESA vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 132048 March 6, 2002
NATURE: Petition for review that seeks to reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals which
upheld the ruling of the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board or DARAB
FACTS:
1. The Secretary of Agrarian Reform issued an order of award in favor of Jose Verdillo covering
a certain area of two parcels of land
2. The award was subject to certain conditions. i.e. cultivate or develop one fourth of the area,
occupancy and construction of his house and payment of the first installment.
3. After 23 years, Verdillo applied for the purchase of the lands with the DAR claiming that he
fulfilled the conditions.
4. Restituto Rivera filed his own application in opposition claiming that he has been occupying
and cultivating the same lands.
5. It was found by an investigation by the DAR that other tenants have been
possessing/cultivating the lands exclusive of Verdillo. Rivera was still in possession and
Verdillo said that Rivera paid annual rentals.
PROCEDURAL:
1. The Director of the DAR issued an order against Verdillo and in favor of Rivera.
2. Verdillo filed a petiton to the DARAB, which reversed the DAR Director.
3. Rivera appealed to the CA, which dismissed his appeal, denied it due course.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA erred in dismissing Rivera's appeal
Case for Rivera:

This case involves the conflicting applications to purchase lots, which is under the administration
and disposition of the DAR pursuant to the mandate of C.A. No. 539, as amended by R.A. No.
1400. This case involves the disposition of the lots subject of the controversy between Rivera
and Verdillo. Hence, the matter falls under the exclusive jurisdiction and administrative
competence of the DAR (Regional Director and Department Secretary) and not of the DARAB
(including the Provincial Adjudicator and the Provincial Adjudication Board itself).
The Order of the DAR Director is in keeping with the mandate of the governing agrarian reform
law, i.e., C.A. No. 539, as amended by R.A. No. 1400, which requires that the subject lots shall
be strictly awarded and/or disposed of to qualified tenant-beneficiaries.
They also assert that private petitioner Rivera is the one in peaceful, adverse, open, continuous
and exclusive possession, occupation and cultivation of said lots for the last twenty-one (21)
years, while private respondent Verdillo had culpably violated the terms and conditions set forth
in the Order of Award
RULING: NO.
RATIO:
P.D. 94624 provides that matters involving the administrative implementation of the transfer of
the land to the tenant-farmer under P.D. No. 27 25 and amendatory and related decrees, orders,
instructions, rules and regulations, shall be exclusively cognizable by the Secretary of Agrarian
Reform, including: xxx (5) issuance, recall or cancellation of certificates of land transfer in cases
outside the purview of P.D. No. 816. 26
The revocation by the Regional Director of DAR of the earlier Order of Award by the Secretary
of Agriculture falls under the administrative functions of the DAR. The DARAB and its
provincial adjudicator or board of adjudicators acted erroneously and with grave abuse of
discretion in taking cognizance of the case, then overturning the decision of the DAR Regional
Director and deciding the case on the merits without affording the petitioner opportunity to
present his case.
the DAR is vested with the primary jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate agrarian reform
matters and shall have the exclusive jurisdiction over all matters involving the implementation of
the agrarian reform program." The DARAB has primary, original and appellate jurisdiction "to
determine and adjudicate all agrarian disputes , cases, controversies, and matters or incidents
involving the implementation of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program under R.A. 6657,
E.O. Nos. 229, 228 and 129-A, R.A. 3844 as amended by R.A. 6389, P.D. No. 27 and other
agrarian laws and their implementing rules and regulations." 28
Under Section 3(d) of R.A. 6657 (CARP Law), "agrarian dispute" is defined to include "(d)
...any controversy relating to tenurial arrangements, whether leasehold, tenancy, stewardship or
otherwise over lands devoted to agriculture, including disputes concerning farmworkers
associations or representation of persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing or seeking
to arrange terms or conditions of such tenurial arrangements. It includes any controversy relating
to compensation of lands acquired under this Act and other terms and conditions of transfer of
ownership from landowners to farmworkers, tenants and other agrarian reform beneficiaries,
whether the disputants stand in the proximate relation of farm operator and beneficiary,
landowner and tenant, or lessor and lessee."
In the case at bar, petitioner and private respondent had no tenurial, leasehold, or any agrarian
relations whatsoever that could have brought this controversy between them within the ambit of
the abovecited provision. Consequently, the DARAB had no jurisdiction over the controversy
and should not have taken cognizance of private respondents petition in the first place.29
Note that Administrative Order No. 3, Series of 1990, governs the distribution and titling of lots
in landed estates administered by the DAR. This Order explicitly provides that "since land has a
social function, there is a concomitant social responsibility in its ownership and should,
therefore, be distributed to the actual occupant/tillers" thereof. In the investigation on December
27, 1993, conducted by the Regional Officer of DAR, it was established that the subject lots
were in the possession and cultivation of persons other than the awardee Verdillo. Clearly, this
constituted a violation of the terms of the Order of Award issued in favor of private respondent
as an awardee, aside from contravening the underlying principles of agrarian reform as a social
justice measure. Given these circumstances, we find petitioner Restituto Riveras plea to
overturn the ruling of the Court of Appeals meritorious.
DISPOSITIVE:
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED . The decision of the Court of Appeals dated
December 19, 1997, is REVERSED , and the order of DAR Appellate Adjudication Board on
May 2, 1996, and of the DARAB Provincial Adjudication Officer and Board dated October 14,
1994, and February 22, 1995, are declared NULL and VOID and SET ASIDE . The order of
DAR Regional Director for Region III dated January 24, 1994, in favor of petitioner Restituto
Rivera is REINSTATED .
PHILIPPINE VETERANS BANK, petitioner, vs. THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HON.
SECRETARY OF THE DEPT. OF AGRARIAN REFORM, DEPT. OF AGRARIAN REFORM
ADJUDICATION BOARD
G.R. No. 132767 January 18, 2000
NATURE: Petition for Review on the Decision of the CA.
FACTS:
1. Petitioner Philippine Veterans Bank (PVB) owned four parcels of land.
2. The lands were taken by the DAR for distribution to landless farmers pursuant to RA 6657
(CARL).
3. Dissatisfied with the valuation made by the and Bank and the DARAB, PVB filed a petition
for a determination of the just compensation for its property before the RTC.
PROCEDURAL:
1. The RTC dismissed the petition on the ground that it was filed beyond the 15 day
reglementary period for filing appeals from the orders of the DARAB.
2. On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC. The CA found that the PVB neither gave information
regarding their receipt of the order of the DAR adjudicator nor disputes the conclusion of the
RTC as to the lapse of the reglementary period.
ISSUE: Whether or not there is a conflict between the jurisdiction of the DAR and the RTC in
RA 6657
Case for PVB:

DAR adjudicators have no jurisdiction to determine the just compensation for the taking of lands
under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program, because such jurisdiction is vested in
Regional Trial Courts designated as Special Agrarian Courts and, therefore, a petition for the
fixing of just compensation can be filed beyond the 15-day period of appeal provided from the
decision of the DAR adjudicator..
Case for DAR:
Actions for the fixing of just compensation must be filed in the appropriate courts within 15 days
from receipt of the decision of the DAR adjudicator, otherwise such decision becomes final and
executory, pursuant to Sec. 51 of R.A. No. 6657.
RULING: No conflict.
RATIO: R.A. No. 6657 provides:

Sec. 50 Quasi-Judicial Power of the DAR. The DAR is hereby vested with primary
jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate agrarian reform matters involving the implementation of
agrarian reform, except those falling under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Department of
Agriculture (DA) and the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR). . . .
Sec. 57 Special Jurisdiction. The Special Agrarian Courts shall have original and exclusive
jurisdiction over all petitions for the determination of just compensation to landowners, and the
prosecution of all criminal offenses under this Act. The Rules of Court shall apply to all
proceedings before the Special Agrarian Courts, unless modified by this Act.
The Special Agrarian Courts shall decide all appropriate cases under their special jurisdiction
within thirty (30) days from submission of the case for decision.
There is nothing contradictory between the provision of 50 granting the DAR primary
jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate "agrarian reform matters" and exclusive original
jurisdiction over "all matters involving the implementation of agrarian reform," which includes
the determination of questions of just compensation, and the provision of 57 granting Regional
Trial Courts "original and exclusive jurisdiction" over (1) all petitions for the determination of
just compensation to landowner, and (2) prosecutions of criminal offenses under R.A. No.
6657.4 The first refers to administrative proceedings, while the second refers to judicial
proceedings. Under R.A. No. 6657, the Land Bank of the Philippines is charged with the
preliminary determination of the value of lands placed under land reform program and the
compensation to be paid for their taking. It initiates the acquisition of agricultural lands by
notifying the landowner of the government's intention to acquire his land and the valuation of the
same as determined by the Land Bank. 5 Within 30 days from receipt of notice, the landowner
shall inform the DAR of his acceptance or rejection of the offer. 6 In the event the landowner
rejects the offer, a summary administrative proceeding is held by the provincial (PARAD), the
regional (RARAD) or the central (DARAB) adjudicator, as the case may be, depending on the
value of the land, for the purpose of determining the compensation for the land. The landowner,
the Land Bank, and other interested parties are then required to submit evidence as to the just
compensation for the land. The DAR adjudicator decides the case within 30 days after it is
submitted for decision. 7 If the landowner finds the price unsatisfactory, he may bring the
matter directly to the appropriate Regional Trial Court. 8
To implement the provisions of R.A. No. 6657, particularly 50 thereof, Rule XIII, 11 of the
DARAB Rules of Procedure provides:
Land Valuation Determination and Payment of Just Compensation. The decision of the
Adjudicator on land valuation and preliminary determination and payment of just compensation
shall not be appealable to the Board but shall be brought directly to the Regional Trial Courts
designated as Special Agrarian Courts within fifteen (15) days from receipt of the notice thereof.
Any party shall be entitled to only one motion for reconsideration.
This rule is an acknowledgment by the DARAB that the power to decide just compensation cases
for the taking of lands under R.A. No. 6657 is vested in the courts. It is error to think that,
because of Rule XIII, 11, the original and exclusive jurisdiction given to the courts to decide
petitions for determination of just compensation has thereby been transformed into an appellate
jurisdiction. It only means that, in accordance with settled principles of administrative law,
primary jurisdiction is vested in the DAR as an administrative agency to determine in a
preliminary manner the reasonable compensation to be paid for the lands taken under the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program, but such determination is subject to challenge in the
courts.
The jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Courts is not any less "original and exclusive" because the
question is first passed upon by the DAR, as the judicial proceedings are not a continuation of
the administrative determination. For that matter, the law may provide that the decision of the
DAR is final and unappealable. Nevertheless, resort to the courts cannot be foreclosed on the
theory that courts are the guarantors of the legality of administrative action.10
Accordingly, as the petition in the Regional Trial Court was filed beyond the 15-day period
provided in Rule XIII, 11 of the Rules of Procedure of the DARAB, the trial court correctly
dismissed the case and the Court of Appeals correctly affirmed the order of dismissal.
DISPOSITIVE:
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED.
LBP vs. SUNTAY

G.R. No. 157903; October 11, 2007
NATURE OF THE CASE: PETITION for review on certiorari of the amended decision and
resolution of the Court of Appeals.
FACTS:
1. Federico Suntay herein respondent, represented by his assignee, Josefina Lubrica, is the
registered owner of a parcel of land with a total area of 3,682.0285 hectares situated in
Sta. Lucia, Sablayan, Occidental Mindoro, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-
31 of the Registry of Deeds of Mamburao, same province.
2. Sometime in 1972, the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR), pursuant to the
governments land reform program under Presidential Decree No. 27, expropriated
948.1911 hectares of respondents property. The portion expropriated consisted mostly of
lowland and non-irrigated riceland.
3. The Land Bank of the Philippines (Land Bank), herein petitioner, and the DAR fixed the
value of the expropriated land at P4,251,141.68 or P4,497.50 per hectare.
4. Respondent rejected petitioners valuation as being unconscionably low and tantamount
to taking his property without due process. He then filed with the Office of the Regional
Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (RARAD), Region IV, Department of Agrarian Reform
Adjudication Board (DARAB), a petition for the determination of just compensation
against petitioner and the DAR, docketed as DARAB Case No. V-0405-0001-00
PROCEDURAL:
Ruling of the RARAD: The RARAD rendered a Decision4 fixing the just compensation for the
expropriated land at P157,541,951.30 and directing petitioner to pay respondent the said amount.
Ruling of the RTC, sitting as a Special Agrarian Court: Executive Judge Ernesto P.
Pagayatan issued an Order dated August 6, 2001, dismissing the Land Banks petition for being
late. Petitioner promptly filed a motion for reconsideration maintaining that its petition is a
separate action and did not emanate from the case before the RARAD. In an Order dated August
31, 2001, the RTC denied the motion. Thus, on September 10, 2001, petitioner filed with the
RTC a Notice of Appeal.
On January 18, 2002, the RTC issued an Order dismissing the Notice of Appeal on the ground
that the proper mode of appeal is a petition for review, pursuant to Section 60 of Republic Act
(R.A.) No. 6657 (The Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law). Petitioners motion for
reconsideration was likewise denied by the RTC in its Order dated March 8, 2002.
Ruling of the CA:

The Court of Appeals rendered its Decision8 (1) granting the petition for certiorari; (2) nullifying
the RTC Orders dated January 18, 2002 and March 08, 2002 dismissing petitioners Notice of
Appeal; (3) entering a new judgment giving due course to petitioners notice of appeal; and (4)
enjoining permanently the RTC from enforcing its twin Orders, as well as the RARAD from
enforcing the writ of execution issued in DARAB Case No. V-0405-0001-00.
Respondent filed a motion for reconsideration maintaining that petitioner resorted to a wrong
mode of appeal; hence, the RTC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in dismissing its
notice of appeal. Respondent cited this Courts Decision dated September 10, 2002 in G.R. No.
143275, entitled Land Bank of the Philippines v. Arlene De Leon and Bernardo De Leon,9
holding that the proper mode of appeal from a Decision of the RTC acting as a Special Agrarian
Court shall be by way of a petition for review.
Finding merit in respondents motion for reconsideration, the Court of Appeals rendered an
Amended Decision dated February 5, 2003 dismissing the petition for certiorari in CA-G.R. SP
No. 70015.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the RTC erred in dismissing the Land Banks petition for the determination of
just compensation.
Case for Respondent:

Respondent filed a motion to dismiss the petition mainly on the ground that it was filed beyond
the 15-day reglementary period as required by Section 11,5 Rule XIII of the New Rules of
Procedure of DARAB. Hence, the RARAD Decision had attained finality.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration contending that the Decision did not attain finality because
it is the RTC that finally determines the just compensation of the expropriated property; and that
when it filed with the RTC its petition for determination of just compensation, the RARAD had
no more jurisdiction over the DARAB case.

YES.
The RTC erred in dismissing the Land Banks petition. It bears stressing that the petition is not
an appeal from the RARAD final Decision but an original action for the determination of the just
compensation for respondents expropriated property, over which the RTC has original and
exclusive jurisdiction. This is clear from Section 57 of R.A. No. 6657 which provides:
Section 57. Special Jurisdiction.The Special Agrarian Courts [the designated Regional Trial
Courts] shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction over all petitions for the determination of
just compensation to landowners, and the prosecution of all criminal offenses under this Act. The
Rules of Court shall apply to all proceedings before the Special Agrarian Courts, unless modified
by this Act.
The Special Agrarian Courts shall decide all appropriate cases under their special jurisdiction
within thirty (30) days from submission of the case for decision.
Parenthetically, the above provision is not in conflict with Section 50 of the same R.A. No. 6657
which states:
Section 50. Quasi-judicial Powers of the DAR.The DAR is hereby vested with primary
jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate agrarian reform matters and shall have exclusive original
jurisdiction over all matters involving the implementation of agrarian reform, except those
falling under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Department of Agriculture (DA) and the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) x x x.
In Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, the Court held that Section 50 must be
construed in harmony with Section 57 by considering cases involving the determination of just
compensation and criminal cases for violations of R.A. No. 6657 as excepted from the plenitude
of power conferred upon the DAR. Indeed, there is a reason for this distinction. The DAR is an
administrative agency which cannot be granted jurisdiction over cases of eminent domain (such
as taking of land under R.A. No. 6657) and over criminal cases.
In the instant case, the Land Bank properly instituted its petition for the determination of just
compensation before the RTC in accordance with R.A. No. 6657. The RTC erred in dismissing
the petition. To repeat, Section 57 of R.A. No. 6657 is explicit in vesting the RTC, acting as a
Special Agrarian Court, original and exclusive jurisdiction over all petitions for the
determination of just compensation to landowners. Any effort to transfer such jurisdiction to
the adjudicators and to convert the original jurisdiction of the RTCs into appellate jurisdiction
would be contrary to Section 57 and therefore would be void.
DISPOSITIVE:
WHEREFORE, the Court GRANT the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari. The assailed
Amended Decision dated February 5, 2003 and Resolution dated April 10, 2003 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 70015 are REVERSED. The Orders dated January 18, 2002 and
March 8, 2002 issued by the RTC in Agrarian Case No. R-1241 are NULLIFIED. The RTC is
ORDERED to conduct further proceedings to determine the just compensation of respondents
expropriated property in accordance with the guidelines set by this Court in Landbank of the
Philippines v. Banal.
LBP VS. MARTINEZ

GR No. 169008; 31 July 2008
FACTS:
After compulsory acquisition by the DAR of respondent Martinezs 62.5369-hectare land
pursuant to the CARL, LBP offered P1,955,485.60 as just compensation. Respondent
rejected it.
The PARAD, finding some marked inconsistencies in the figures and factors made as bases
by LBP in its computation, rendered a judgment ordering the LBP to pay Martinez
Php12,179,492.50.
A petition for the fixing of just compensation was then filed by LBPs counsel before the
Special Agrarian Court (SAC), the Regional Trial Court of Odiongan, Romblon.
Respondent, contending that the orders, rulings and decisions of the DARAB become final
after the lapse of 15 days from their receipt, moved for the dismissal of the petition for being
filed out of time. Petitioner opposed the motion.
Meanwhile, respondent, still asserting the finality of PARAD Soritas decision, filed before
the Office of the PARAD a motion for the issuance of a writ of execution, which was
eventually grantedwhich was eventually granted on November 11, 2003.
Ascertaining that the petition before the SAC was filed by LBP 26 days after it received a
copy of PARAD Soritas decision, the Office of the PARAD denied LBPs motion for
reconsideration and ordered the issuance of a writ of execution on February 23, 2004. LBP,
moved to quash the said February 23, 2004 PARAD resolution.
Even as the motion to quash was yet unresolved, LBP instituted a petition for certiorari
before the CA. LBP primarily contended that the Office of the PARAD gravely abused its
discretion when it issued the writ of execution despite the pendency with the SAC of a
petition for the fixing of just compensation.
The CA, finding LBP guilty of forum-shopping for not disclosing the pendency of the
Motion to Quash dated March 12, 2004, dismissed the petition. MR denied.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petition for the fixing of just compensation is filed out of time.
HELD:
Yes.
The Court reiterates its ruling in this case that the agrarian reform adjudicators decision on land
valuation attains finality after the lapse of the 15-day period stated in the DARAB Rules. The
petition for the fixing of just compensation should therefore, following the law and settled
jurisprudence, be filed with the SAC within the said period. This conclusion, as already
explained in the assailed decision, is based on the doctrines laid down in Philippine Veterans
Bank v. Court of Appeals and Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board v. Lubrica.
In Philippine Veterans Bank, the Court ruled that the trial court correctly dismissed the petition
for the fixing of just compensation because it was filed beyond the 15-day period provided in the
DARAB Rules.
In Lubrica, decided in 2005, the Court ruled that the adjudicators decision had already attained
finality because LBP filed the petition for just compensation beyond the 15-day reglementary
period.
Following settled doctrine, we ruled in this case that the PARADs decision had already attained
finality because of LBPs failure to file the petition for the fixing of just compensation within the
15-day period.
This ruling, however, as correctly pointed out by petitioner, runs counter to the Courts recent
decision in Suntay, in which the Court ruled that the trial court erred in dismissing the petition
for determination of just compensation on the ground that it was filed out of time. The Court in
that case stressed that the petition was not an appeal from the adjudicators final decision but an
original action for the determination of just compensation.
We, however, promulgated our decision in this case ahead of Suntay. To reiterate, this case was
decided on August 14, 2007, while Suntay was decided two months later, or on October 11,
2007. Suntay should have then remained consistent with our ruling, and with the doctrines
enunciated in Philippine Veterans Bank and in Lubrica, especially considering that Lubrica was
the representative of Suntay in the Suntay case.
The Court notes that the Suntay ruling is based on Republic of the Philippines v. Court of
Appeals,11 decided in 1996. In that case, the Court emphasized that the jurisdiction of the SAC
is original and exclusive, not appellate. Republic, however, was decided at a time when Rule
XIII, Section 11 was not yet present in the DARAB Rules. Further, Republic did not discuss
whether the petition filed therein for the fixing of just compensation was filed out of time or not.
The Court merely decided the issue of whether cases involving just compensation should first be
appealed to the DARAB before the landowner can resort to the SAC under Section 57 of R.A.
No. 6657.
To resolve the conflict in the rulings of the Court, we now declare herein, for the guidance of the
bench and the bar, that the better rule is that stated in Philippine Veterans Bank, reiterated in
Lubrica and in the August 14, 2007 Decision in this case. Thus, while a petition for the fixing of
just compensation with the SAC is not an appeal from the agrarian reform adjudicators decision
but an original action, the same has to be filed within the 15-day period stated in the DARAB
Rules; otherwise, the adjudicators decision will attain finality. This rule is not only in accord
with law and settled jurisprudence but also with the principles of justice and equity. Verily, a
belated petition before the SAC, e.g., one filed a month, or a year, or even a decade after the land
valuation of the DAR adjudicator, must not leave the dispossessed landowner in a state of
uncertainty as to the true value of his property.
LBP vs Heirs of Eleuterio Cruz

G.R. No. 175175 September 29, 2008
Nature of the case:

Review on certiorari assailing the decision of the CA.
Facts:
Petitioner Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) is a government banking institution
designated under Section 64 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6654 as the financial
intermediary of the agrarian reform program of the government.
Eleuterio Cruz is the registered owner of an unirrigated riceland situated in Lakambini,
Tuao, Cagayan which was placed by the government under the coverage of the operation
land transfer program under Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 27.
Petitioner pegged the value of the acquired landholding at P106,935.76 based on the
guidelines set forth under P.D. No. 27 and Executive Order (E.O.) No. 228. Respondents
rejected petitioners valuation and instituted an action for a summary proceeding for the
preliminary determination of just compensation before the PARAD. On 23 November
1999, the PARAD rendered a decision fixing the just compensation in the amount of
P80,000.00 per hectare. Petitioner sought reconsideration but was unsuccessful.
Petitioner filed a petition for the determination of just compensation before the RTC
ofTuguegarao City.
Ruling of RTC:
The RTC, sitting as an Special Agrarian Court (SAC), rendered a decision, the dispositive
portion.
The SAC held that the value of P80,000.00 per hectare fixed by the PARAD should be
accorded weight and probative value and that the SAC is guided by the various factors
enumerated in Section 17of R.A. No. 6657 in determining just compensation. It
disregarded respondents claim that the valuation should be based on the current market
value of the landholding since no evidence was adduced in support of the claim. The
SAC also did not accept petitioners valuation as it was based on P.D. No. 27, in which
just compensation was determined at the time of the taking of the property.
Ruling of CA:
The CA rendered the assailed decision partly granting petitioners appeal. The appellate
court ruled that the total area covered by the agrarian reform program as was duly
established before the PARAD and expressly stated in the pre-trial order was only
13.5550 hectares and not 13.7320 hectares as was stated in the dispositive portion of the
decision of the SAC. However, the appellate court affirmed the SAC decision fixing just
compensation at P80,000.00 per hectare.
Issue:
WON the formula used by SAC to determine just compensation is correct.
Ruling:
The general rule is that factual findings of the trial court, especially when affirmed by the CA,
are binding and conclusive on the Court. However, the rule admits of exceptions, as when the
factual findings are grounded entirely on speculation, surmises, or conjectures or when the
findings are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based.
A perusal of the PARAD decision, which was adopted by both the SAC and the CA, shows that
its valuation ofP80,000.00 per hectare is sorely lacking in any evidentiary or legal basis. While
the Court wants to fix just compensation due to respondents if only to write finis to the
controversy, the evidence on record is not sufficient for the Court to do so in accordance with
DAR A.O. No. 5, series of 1998.
The instant petition for review on certiorari is DENIED and the decision and resolution of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 93207 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Agrarian Case
No. 0058 is REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court, Branch 1, Tuguegarao City, Cagayan,
which is directed to determine with dispatch the just compensation due respondents strictly in
accordance with DAR A.O. No. 5, series of 1998.
LBP vs Leonila Celada

G.R. No. 164876 January 23, 2006
Facts:
Respondent owns 22.3167 hectares of agricultural land situated in Calatrava, Carmen,
Bohol of which 14.1939 hectares was identified in 1998 by the Department of Agrarian
Reform (DAR) as suitable for compulsory acquisition under the Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Program (CARP). The matter was then indorsed to petitioner Land Bank of the
Philippines (LBP) for field investigation and land valuation.
LBP valued respondents land at P2.1105517 per square meter for an aggregate value of
P299,569.61. The DAR offered the same amount to respondent as just compensation, but
it was rejected. Nonetheless, LBP deposited the said sum in cash and bonds in the name
of respondent.
Pursuant to Section 16(d) of Republic Act (RA) No. 6657 or the Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Law of 1988, the matter was referred to the DAR Adjudication Board (DARAB),
Region VII-Cebu City, for summary administrative hearing on determination of just
compensation.
While the DARAB case was pending, respondent filed a petition for judicial
determination of just compensation against LBP, the DAR and the Municipal Agrarian
Reform Officer (MARO) before the Regional Trial Court of Tagbilaran City.
LBP filed its Answer, that respondent must first await the outcome of the DARAB case
before taking any judicial recourse; that its valuation was arrived at by applying the
formula prescribed by law whereas respondents was based only on the current value of
like properties.
The DAR and the MARO likewise filed an Answer averring that the determination of just
compensation rests exclusively with the LBP. Thus, they are not liable to respondent and
are merely nominal parties in the case.
Issue:
WON SAC erred in assuming jurisdiction over the petition for determination of just
compensation while administrative proceedings are ongoing before the DARAB.
Ruling:
No. The Supreme Court cited the below case.
In Land Bank of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, the landowner filed an action for
determination of just compensation without waiting for the completion of the DARABs re-
evaluation of the land. The Court nonetheless held therein that the SAC acquired jurisdiction
over the action for the following reason:
It is clear from Sec. 57 that the RTC, sitting as a Special Agrarian Court, has
original and exclusive jurisdiction over all petitions for the determination of just
compensation to landowners. This original and exclusive jurisdiction of the RTC
would be undermined if the DAR would vest in administrative officials original
jurisdiction in compensation cases and make the RTC an appellate court for the
review of administrative decision. Thus, although the new rules speak of directly
appealing the decision of adjudicators to the RTCs sitting as Special Agrarian
Courts, it is clear from Sec. 57 that the original and exclusive jurisdiction to
determine such cases is in the RTCs. Any effort to transfer such jurisdiction to the
adjudicators and to convert the original jurisdiction of the RTCs into appellate
jurisdiction would be contrary to Sec. 57 and therefore would be void. Thus,
direct resort to the SAC by private respondent is valid.
It would be well to emphasize that the taking of property under RA No. 6657 is an
exercise of the power of eminent domain by the State. The valuation of property or
determination of just compensation in eminent domain proceedings is essentially a
judicial function which is vested with the courts and not with administrative agencies.
Consequently, the SAC properly took cognizance of respondents petition for
determination of just compensation.
Dela Cruz (Ferdinand and Renato) v. Quizon (Amelia)

G.R. No. 171961 (Nov. 28, 2008)
NATURE: Petitioners seek the review of CA decision affirming DARAB resolution canceling
the CLT in the name of the petitioners and directing petitioners to vacate the property.
FACTS:
1. Estela Dizon-Garcia, mother of respondent Amelia G. Quiazon, was the registered owner
of a parcel of land covered by a TCT, brought under the coverage of Operation Land
Transfer pursuant to Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 27.
2. In 1981, Feliciano dela Cruz was issued a CLT over a 3.7 hectares portion of said land.
3. In 1992, the Heirs of Estela executed a Deed of Extrajudicial Admission and Partition
with Waiver adjudicating among themselves all properties left by both parents, except
subject property which was solely in favor of Amelia Quiazon.
4. In 1993, Quaizon filed a complaint with DAR Provincial Adjudication Board against
Ferdinand dela Cruz (son of Feliciano) alleging that there existed a leasehold tenancy
relation with the him and the latter failed to deliver 28 cavans of palay as rental because
Ferdinand (together with his father) migrated to the US abandoning the landholding. For
this reason, respondent prayed for the ejectment of petitioner and the termination of the
tenancy relation.
5. Petitioners contention was that the CLT made them owners of the landholding without
any obligation to pay rentals but only amortization to Land Bank.
6. Respondent later amended the complaint to implead the father, Feliciano, and the brother
Renato dela Cruz. She alleged that Ferdinand and Feliciano abandoned the landholding
when they migrated to the US and Renato dela Cruz was an usurper because he took over
the landholding without the consent of the owner as the landowner.
Provincial Adjudicator: Dismissed the complaint. The landholding had not been abandoned by
Feliciano because petitioner Renato dela Cruz, a member of Felicianos immediate family, was in
actual and physical possession thereof.
DARAB: Dismissed respondents appeal.
7. Unknown to petitioners, respondent and her siblings, as heirs of Estela Dizon-Garcia, had
filed an Application for Retention which was decided upon favorably by DAR.
Petitioners tried to have it set aside, but failed.
8. Respondent filed a Petition for Relief from Judgment claiming that she just arrived from
the US and it was only then that she found out about the DARAB decision and her
counsel had died.
DARAB: granted the petition for relief from judgment primarily based on the DAR Order
granting the application for retention and its finding that Ferdinand and Feliciano dela Cruz
abandoned the landholding when they went to the USA. DARAB declared the tenancy
relationship between the litigants dissolved and the CLT in favor of Feliciano canceled.
CA: denied the petition for review.
ISSUE: Was the cancellation of the CLT valid?
HELD: No. The cancellation of a CLT over the subject landholding as a necessary consequence
of the landowners exercise of his right of retention is within the jurisdiction of the DAR
Secretary, not the DARAB, as it does not involve an agrarian dispute.
Under Section 1(g), Rule II of the then DARAB Rules of Procedure, matters involving strictly
the administrative implementation of agrarian laws shall be the exclusive prerogative of and
cognizable by the Secretary of the DAR. Although Section 1(f) of the said Rules provides that
the DARAB shall have jurisdiction over cases involving the issuance of a CLT and the
administrative correction thereof, it should be understood that for the DARAB to exercise
jurisdiction in such cases, there must be an agrarian dispute between the landowner and the
tenant.
To conclude, respondents remedy is to raise before the DAR Secretary the matter of cancellation
of petitioners CLT as an incident of the order granting the landowners application for retention
over the said landholding. In the same forum, petitioners can raise the issue of the validity of the
DAR order granting the application for retention based on their claim of denial of due process, or
in a separate action specifically filed to assail the validity of the judgment. A collateral attack
against a judgment is generally not allowed, unless the judgment is void upon its face or its
nullity is apparent by virtue of its own recitals.
But as a reminder to respondent, this tack can achieve only the cancellation of petitioners CLT.
Under Sec. 6 of R.A. No. 6657, if the area retained is tenanted, the tenant shall have the option to
choose whether to remain therein or be a beneficiary in the same or another agricultural land
with similar or comparable features. Petitioners may not be ejected from the subject landholding
even if their CLT is canceled, unless they choose to be beneficiaries of another agricultural land.
DISPOSITIVE: WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is GRANTED. Court of

Appeals orders are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. DARAB Decision granting the petition for
relief from judgment is SET ASIDE and the DARAB Decision dismissing the appeal from the
provincial adjudicator's decision is REINSTATED.
QUISMUNDO vs. CA
GR 95664 | September 13, 1991
affirming the RTC's jurisdiction over the dispute.
FACTS:
Feb 13, 1988, respondents Daway et al. filed a complaint with the trial court praying that
their tenancy relationship wtih Quismundo be changed from share tenancy to leasehold
tenancy pursuant to RA 3844.
Quismundo filed a Motion to Dismiss arguing that the law which should govern the
relationship is Act. 4115, as amended by CA 271, and not RA 3844. The RTC denied the
same.
Quismundo filed an MR, invoking as additional ground the lack of jurisdiction of the trial
court over the dispute due to the CARP (specifically EO 229 and RA 6657).
RTC Ruling denied the MR.
CA Ruling upheld the jurisdiction of the trial court. It held that the right of the tenants to
adopt a leasehold system under RA 3844 is separate and distinct and not affected
by the enactment of EO 229, and thus the judicial recourse provided under RA
3844 should be upheld.
ISSUE:
WON the RTC has jurisdiction over the dispute despite the DAR being vested with exclusive
original jurisdiction to adjudicate agrarian cases per EO 229 as amended by RA 6657.
SC RULING:
YES. The DAR has exclusive original jurisdiction over agrarian disputes.
Executive Order No. 229, which provides for the mechanism for the implementation of the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program instituted by Proclamation No. 131, dated July 22,
1987, vests in the Department of Agrarian Reform quasi-judicial powers to determine and
adjudicate agrarian reform matters in Section 17 thereof. This provision should be deemed to
have repealed Section 12 (a) and (b) of Presidential Decree No. 946 which invested the then
courts of agrarian relations with original exclusive jurisdiction over cases and questions
involving rights granted and obligations imposed by presidential issuances promulgated in
relation to the agrarian reform program.
In 1980, BP 129 (Judiciary Reorganization Act) integrated the courts of agrarian relations with
the RTCs of general jurisdiction. However, upon the effective date of EO 229 (August 29,
1987), the RTCs were divested of their general jurisdiction to try agrarian reform matters. The
said jurisdiction is now vested in the Department of Agrarian Reform. This is further supported
by the enactment of RA 6657 which reaffirmed the jurisdiction of the DAR, which vested it with
primary jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate agrarian reform matters and exclusive original
jurisdiction over all matters involving the implementation of agrarian reform, except those
falling under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Department of Agriculture (DA) and the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR).
Clearly, when the respondents filed their complaint, EO 229 had already taken effect.
In addition, Sections 56 and 57 thereof provide for the designation by the Supreme Court of at
least one (1) branch of the regional trial court within each province to act as a special agrarian
court. The said special court shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction only over
petitions for the determination of just compensation to landowners and the prosecution of
criminal offenses under said Act. Said provisions thus delimit the jurisdiction of the regional
trial court in agrarian cases only to these two instances.
It is also worth noting at this juncture that the resolution of this case by the Department of
Agrarian Reform is to the best advantage of private respondents since it is in a better position to
resolve agrarian disputes, being the administrative agency possessing the necessary expertise on
the matter. Further, the proceedings therein are summary in nature and the department is not
bound by technical rules of procedure and evidence, to the end that agrarian reform disputes and
other issues will be adjudicated in a just, expeditious and inexpensive action or proceeding.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION: CA decision is REVERSED and set aside. The RTC's orders
are declared VOID and is ordered to cease and desist from hearing the AGRA case,
without prejudice to its refiling with the DAR.
RUFINA VDA. DE TANGUB, Petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS

[UDK No. 9864 : December 3, 1990.]
NATURE: Not mentioned.
FACTS:
1. Rufina and her husband Andres (Sps Tangub) filed with the RTC an agrarian case for damages
by reason of their disposession as tenants from the land owned by Sps Martil.
2. The land was foreclosed by the PNB, sold at auction and then resold to the National Steel
Corp.
PROCEDURAL:
1. The RTC judge dismissed the complaint on the ground that jurisdiction of the RTC over
agrarian cases had been transferred to the DAR by virtue of EO 229 and the rules of the
DARAB.
2. Sps Tangub filed a petition for certiorari before the SC, which referred the same to the CA.
3. The CA dismissed the petition and affirmed the RTC ruling.
ISSUE: Whether or not the RTC erred in dismissing the complaint
Case for Sps Tangub:

The Trial Court's "order of dismissal of August 26, 1988, and the decision of the Honorable
Court of Appeals affirming it, are patently illegal and unconstitutional" because they deprive "a
poor tenant access to courts and directly violate R.A. 6657, PD 946, and Batas Bilang 129
RULING: NO.
RATIO:
RA 6657 echoes the provisions of Section 17 of EO 229, supra, investing the Department of
Agrarian Reform with original jurisdiction, generally, over all cases involving agrarian laws
Section 50 reads as follows:
"SEC. 50. Quasi-Judicial Powers of the DAR. The DAR is hereby vested with primary
jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate agrarian reform matters and shall have exclusive original
jurisdiction over all matters involving the implementation of agrarian reform
Regional Trial Courts have not, however, been completely divested of jurisdiction over agrarian
reform matters. Section 56 of RA 6657, on the other hand, confers "special jurisdiction" on
"Special Agrarian Courts," which are Regional Trial Courts designated by the Supreme Court
at least one (1) branch within each province to act as such. These Regional Trial Courts qua
Special Agrarian Courts have, according to Section 57 of the same law, original and exclusive
jurisdiction over:
1) "all petitions for the determination of just compensation to land-owners," and
2) "the prosecution of all criminal offenses under . . [the] Act."
The RTC was therefore correct in dismissing Agrarian Case No. 1094. It being a case
concerning the rights of the plaintiffs as tenants on agricultural land, not involving the "special
jurisdiction" of said Trial Court acting as a Special Agrarian Court, it clearly came within the
exclusive original jurisdiction of the Department of Agrarian Reform, or more particularly, the
Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board, established precisely to wield the adjudicatory powers of
the Department
The law strives to make resolution of controversies therein more expeditious and inexpensive, by
providing not only that the Board "shall not be bound by technical rules of procedure and
evidence," supra, but also that, as explicitly stated by the penultimate paragraph of Section 50 of
the Act:
"Responsible farmer leaders shall be allowed to represent themselves, their fellow farmers, or
their organizations in any proceedings before the DAR: Provided, however, That when there are
two or more representatives for any individual or group, the representatives should choose only
one among themselves to represent such party or group before any DAR proceedings."
DISPOSITIVE: WHEREFORE, for lack of merit, the petition is DISMISSED, and the Decision
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP. No. 16725 dated October 23, 1989, AFFIRMED
DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM, vs. ROBERTO J. CUENCA

G.R. No. 154112 September 23, 2004
NATURE:
Petition for Review assailing the decision and tesolution of the CA.
FACTS:
1. Cuenca is the owner of an 81 hectare land devoted to sugar cane planting.
2. The Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer (MARO) sent a Notice of Coverage to Cuenca
placing the latter's land under the coverage of RA 6657 or the CARP. The notice stated that the
Land Bank (LBP) will determine the value of the land pursuant to EO 405.
3. Cuenca filed a complaint against the MARO and the LBP before the RTC for the annulment of
notice of coverage, declaration of unconstitutionality of EO 405, preliminary injunction and
restraining order.
PROCEDURAL:
1. The MARO filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the RTC has no jurisdiction over the
action pursuant to RA 6657.
2. The judge denied the motion to dismiss and issued a Writ of Preliminary Injunction directing
the MARO and all persons acting in his behalf to cease and desist from implementing the Notice
of Coverage, and the LBP from proceeding with the determination of the value of the subject
land.
3. The DAR filed a petition for certiorari before the CA assailing the writ issued
4. The CA ruled that the RTC had jurisdiction because the issue was mainly the
unconstitutionality of EO 405; that the case is not purely an agrarian matter.
Case for DAR:

The issue involves the implementation of agrarian reform, a matter over which the DAR has
original and exclusive jurisdiction, pursuant to Section 50 of the Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Law (RA 6657).
ISSUE: Whether or not the RTC has jurisdiction
RULING:
NO.
RATIO:
A careful perusal of Cuencas Complaint shows that the principal averments and reliefs prayed
for refer -- not to the "pure question of law" spawned by the alleged unconstitutionality of EO
405 -- but to the annulment of the DARs Notice of Coverage. The 14-page Complaint touches
on the alleged unconstitutionality of EO 405 by merely making two allegations. the issuance of
the Notice of Coverage 29 constitutes the first necessary step towards the acquisition of private
land under the CARP. Plainly then, the propriety of the Notice relates to the implementation of
the CARP, which is under the quasi-judicial jurisdiction of the DAR. Thus, the DAR could not
be ousted from its authority by the simple expediency of appending an allegedly constitutional or
legal dimension to an issue that is clearly agrarian.
DISPOSITIVE:
WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby GRANTED , and the challenged Decision and
Resolution REVERSED AND SET ASIDE . Accordingly, the February 16, 2000 Order of the
Regional Trial Court of La Carlota City (Branch 63) is ANNULLED and a new one entered,
DISMISSING the Complaint in Civil Case 713. The Writ of Preliminary Injunction issued
therein is also expressly VOIDED .
UALAT VS. RAMOS

Adm. Mat. No. MTJ-91-567; December 6, 1996
NATURE OF THE CASE: ADMINISTRATIVE MATTERS in the Supreme Court.

Knowingly Rendering Unjust Judgment, Ignorance of the Law, and Serious Misconduct.
FACTS:
1. Complainant Sabio claims that he is an agricultural lessee of an agricultural land
consisting of 4.7 hectares owned by Leonardo Coma. Complainant Ualat, on the other
hand, alleges that he is Sabio's caretaker. It appears from the two complaints that on
August 6, 1990, complainant Sabio filed with the Department of Agrarian Reform
Adjudication Board (DARAB) a complaint for Recovery of Possession against the
landowner and Raymundo Sabio, brother of complainant Sabio.
2. On August 30, 1990, the landowner filed against herein complainants a case for Illegal
Detainer with respondent's sala. On July 23, 1990, the DARAB ruled in favor of
complainant Sabio declaring that the right of the complainant as the tenant-tiller to
peaceful possession and cultivation should not be disturbed, On November 5, 1990,
however, respondent Judge rendered a decision in favor of the landowner ordering the
complainants, among others, to vacate the property.
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent Judge erred in rendering judgment in the issue involving agricultural
tenancy among the parties with respect to the subject property
Case for Complainants:

Complainants now contend that, notwithstanding knowledge of the Department of Agrarian
Reform (DAR) resolution, and the fact that Civil Case No. 827 falls within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the DAR, respondent Judge, using his "power and authority," took cognizance of
the case because of personal interest and motive. They claim that during the pendency of the
case, respondent Judge, thru his son and brother, cultivated a portion of the land subject matter of
the case. Complainant Ualat, on the other hand, alleges that as the result of the unjust decision,
his residential house which is not the subject of the lease was levied upon by the sheriff, and
argued that as mere caretaker, he could not be held "jointly and severally" liable to pay the
obligations of Quirino Sabio as agricultural tenant.
Case for Respondent Judge:
In denying the charges, respondent Judge alleged that he was without knowledge or information
about the complaint with the DAR, nor was he made aware of the DAR resolution because
nothing of this sort was stated by the parties in their pleadings, nor were these brought out during
the proceedings. Thus, on the basis of the evidence presented, he ruled that the relationship
between the landowner and herein complainants is that of "civil lease." Respondent judge denied
that he had any personal interest in the agricultural land subject matter of the case, arguing that
he did not have a hand in the "civil lease" contract entered into by his son and the landowner and
that if he had prior knowledge of it, he could have dissuaded his son from entering into the lease
contract to avoid any suspicions. His brother and his son allegedly entered the land in dispute
with the consent of the owner. Respondent Judge explained that complainant Ualat was held
jointly and severally liable to pay the rentals in arrears because he was a co-defendant in the
"civil lease," and that execution of the decision had long been implemented but this complaint is
being filed only to harass him because of the contempt proceedings instituted by the landowner
against herein complainants.

YES.
The Court agreed with the Court Administrator in stating their disagreement with Judge
Eduarte's recommendation to dismiss the case, reasoning that "the mere fact that respondent
lacks prior knowledge or notice of the previous case before the Department of Agrarian Reform
Adjudication Board and its resolution of July 23, 1990 does not entirely absolved (sic) him of
any administrative liability. It should be noted that in the civil case for Illegal Detainer with
Damages pending before him, the separate affidavits of herein complainants contained allegation
of landlord-tenant relationship and this information could have cautioned respondent in taking
cognizance of the case at once. Prudence dictates that the proper thing to do under the
circumstances is to refer first the case to the DAR for certification to determine the existence of
the agricultural tenancy relationship in accordance with existing agrarian laws. His act of
precipitately acting on the case without coursing the latter to the DAR has put into question his
real motive especially so that his personal interest on the lot is what is concerned in this case.
Additionally, the Court Administrator cited P.D. 31611 and P.D. 103812 which enjoin a fiscal or
judge of any tribunal from taking cognizance of an ejectment case or any other case designed to
harass or remove a tenant of an agricultural land primarily devoted to rice and/or corn unless the
Secretary of Agrarian Reform certifies that the case is one proper for such tribunal to hear and
decide.
To support his recommendations, the Court Administrator cited the case of Puertollano vs.
Intermediate Appellate Court, where this Court ruled that "it is mandatory for the trial court to
refer the case to the Secretary of Agrarian Reform or his authorized representative for a
preliminary determination of the relationship between the contending parties if it is a case of
ejectment or attempt to harass or remove a tenant in agricultural land primarily devoted to rice
and corn. Even without a motion, the trial court may motu proprio order such referral.
It is a pressing responsibility of judges to keep abreast with the law and changes therein, as well
as with the latest decisions of this Court. One cannot seek refuge in having a mere cursory
acquaintance with statutes and procedural rules. Ignorance of the law, which everyone is bound
to know, excuses no one, certainly not judges.
DISPOSITIVE:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, respondent judge is hereby FOUND LIABLE for gross
ignorance of the law and is hereby imposed a fine in the sum of Twenty Thousand Pesos
(P20,000.00).
Respondent is further ADMONISHED that commission of the same or similar act in the future
will be dealt with more severely.
MAGNO VS. FRANCISCO

GR No. 168959; 25 March 2010
FACTS:
Petitioner is the owner of a 5.3 hectare lot, which is part of the 13 parcels of land registered
in the name of petitioners mother, Maria Talens. Talens landholding totals 61 hectares, more
or less.
Petitioner acquired the lot through a Deed of Sale dated 28 July 1972. At the time of the sale,
Gonzalo Francisco and Manuel Lazaro tenanted the land and their separate areas of tillage
were 2.8 and 2.5 hectares, respectively.
Petitioner entered into a written contract of agricultural leasehold with Manuel Lazaro on 5
October 1972 and with Gonzalo Francisco on 7 August 1980.
Gonzalo Francisco and Manuel Lazaro (who was succeeded by his surviving spouse Regina
Vda. De Lazaro upon his death) complied with the conditions of the agricultural leasehold
until the regular season of April 1991 when they stopped paying rentals despite petitioners
repeated demands.
On 10 January 1990, Gonzalo Francisco and Manuel Lazaro were issued Emancipation
Patents (EPs).
Petitioner filed with PARAD of Cabanatuan City a complaint for ejectment and collection of
lease rentals against respondents. Respondents sought the dismissal of the complaint
alleging, among others, that the leasehold contracts are without force and effect since the lot
was under the Operation Land Transfer (OLT) program pursuant to Presidential Decree No.
27. The sale executed by Talens was merely designed to exclude the land from OLT
coverage.
The PARAD of Cabanatuan City dismissed the case for lack of merit. The PARAD stated
that Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer (MARO) Rogelio C. Palomo found out that the lot is
covered by the OLT program and the DAR-Central Office had not received any petition for
OLT exemption.
On appeal, the DARAB rendered a Decision setting aside the PARADs decision.
The DARAB found a different state of facts. The DARAB re-examined the pleadings filed
and evidence submitted by the parties and found that petitioner, together with his siblings,
wrote then Ministry of Agrarian Reform (MAR) Minister Conrado F. Estrella (Minister
Estrella) for exemption of their properties from OLT coverage by way of a letter-protest
The DARAB stated that petitioner wrote another letter to Minister Estrella seeking to
exercise his right of retention. The DARAB ruled that these letters belie the PARADs finding
that petitioner is estopped from claiming that respondents are still his tenants.
Respondents filed a petition for review with the CA, which REVERSED and SET ASIDE the
DARABs decision, and reinstated PARADs decision. The CA held that the matter of OLT
coverage of petitioners lot has been settled.
ISSUE:
Whether unregistered EPs issued to agricultural lessees which appear to be irregular on their
face can defeat the landowners rights to agricultural leasehold rentals.
HELD:
No.
Re OLT Coverage (relevant to the topic)
In Department of Agrarian Reform v. Abdulwahid, the Court, quoting Centeno v. Centeno, held:
[T]he DAR is vested with the primary jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate
agrarian reform matters and shall have the exclusive jurisdiction over all matters
involving the implementation of the agrarian reform program. The DARAB has
primary, original and appellate jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate all
agrarian disputes, cases, controversies, and matters or incidents involving the
implementation of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program under RA No.
6657, E.O. Nos. 229, 228 and 129-A, R.A. No. 3844 as amended by R.A. No.
6389, P.D. No. 27 and other agrarian laws and their implementing rules and
regulations.
Agrarian dispute refers to any controversy relating to tenurial arrangements, whether leasehold,
tenancy, stewardship or otherwise, over lands devoted to agriculture, including disputes
concerning farmworkers associations or representation of persons in negotiating, fixing,
maintaining, changing or seeking to arrange terms or conditions of such tenurial arrangements.
Section 3, Rule II of the 2003 DARAB Rules of Procedure provides:
SECTION 3. Agrarian Law Implementation Cases.
The Adjudicator or the Board shall have no jurisdiction over matters involving the
administrative implementation of RA No. 6657, otherwise known as the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL) of 1988 and other agrarian laws
as enunciated by pertinent rules and administrative orders, which shall be under
the exclusive prerogative of and cognizable by the Office of the Secretary of the
DAR in accordance with his issuances, to wit:
3.1 Classification and identification of landholdings for coverage under the

agrarian reform program and the initial issuance of CLOAs and EPs, including
protests or oppositions thereto and petitions for lifting of such coverage; xxx
It is undisputed that petitioner and respondents have an established tenancy relationship, such
that the complaint for collection of back rentals and ejectment is classified as an agrarian dispute
and under the jurisdiction of the PARAD and thereafter by the DARAB. However, in view of the
conflicting claims where petitioner asserted ownership over the lot and respondents emphasized
that the lot is subject to OLT coverage, there is a need to ascertain if the lot is under the agrarian
reform program. Since the classification and identification of landholdings for coverage under
the agrarian reform program are Agrarian Law Implementation cases, the DAR Secretary should
first resolve this issue.
In Sta. Ana v. Carpo, we held:
Verily, there is an established tenancy relationship between petitioner and

respondents in this case. An action for Ejectment for Non-Payment of lease
rentals is clearly an agrarian dispute, cognizable at the initial stage by the PARAD
and thereafter by the DARAB. But issues with respect to the retention rights of
the respondents as landowners and the exclusion/exemption of the subject land
from the coverage of agrarian reform are issues not cognizable by the PARAD
and the DARAB, but by the DAR Secretary because, as aforementioned, the same
are Agrarian Law Implementation (ALI) Cases.
Therefore, the PARAD of Cabanatuan City had no authority to render a decision declaring the lot
under OLT coverage. In fact, when the case was appealed, the DARAB acknowledged that it had
no jurisdiction on the OLT coverage. In an Order dated 10 October 2002, the DARAB suspended
the case proceedings until the submission of the result of the administrative determination of the
lot and thus submitted the entire records to the DAR Secretary. Respondents themselves admitted
in their Memorandum that the DAR has not submitted the result of its administrative
determination of the lot to the DARAB. It is therefore essential that the DAR Secretary should
first resolve the issue on the lots inclusion or exclusion from OLT coverage before a final
determination of this case can be had.
JAIME P. CORPIN, petitioner, vs. AMOR S. VIVAR and the HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS, respondents.
333 SCRA 540 (2000)
Nature of the case:

This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 seeking the reversal of the Decision of
the Court of Appeals, Fifteenth Division, dated September 23, 1998 in CA-G.R. SP No. 46881[1]
and its Resolution dated January 20, 1999[2] denying petitioner Jaime P. Corpins motion for
reconsideration.
Facts:
Corpin is the registered owner of a parcel of land located at Tabang, Guiguinto, Bulacan.
Private respondent Amor S. Vivar is in possession of said parcel of land.
Petitioner filed with the Municipal Trial Court of Guiguinto, Bulacan a complaint for
ejectment against private respondent. Respondent refused to vacate the said lot, claiming
that he is a tenant of petitioner. In his Answer with Motion to Dismiss, private respondent
averred that the municipal trial court had no jurisdiction over the case since it involved a
landlord-tenant relationship. Hence, the same should have been filed with the Department
of Agrarian Reform instead.
However, since the Answer was filed out of time, the municipal trial court issued an
Order, declaring that the case was deemed submitted for judgment as may be warranted
by the allegations in the complaint.
Ruling of MTC:
The municipal trial court rendered a Decision, ordering private respondent to vacate the
land in dispute.
Private respondent appealed the aforementioned decision to the Regional Trial Court of
Guiguinto, Bulacan. He submitted some documents to support his claim that he is a
tenant in petitioner's lot.
Ruling of RTC:
The Regional Trial Court of Guiguinto, Bulacan, Branch 13, rendered its Decision
reversing the judgment of the municipal trial court and dismissing petitioner's complaint
for lack of jurisdiction.
Petitioner filed a petition for review of the Regional Trial Court's Decision with the Court
of Appeals. He asserted that the Regional Trial Court erred in finding that a landlord-
tenant relationship exists between him and private respondent because, among others, the
Regional Trial Court considered the memorandum and the documents attached thereto
submitted by private respondent even though these were not presented before the
municipal trial court.
Issue:
WON the Court of Appeals erred in its interpretation of Section 7, Rule 40 of the Revised Rules
of Court as it considered all the documents submitted by the Private Respondent for the first time
together with the memorandum.
Ruling:
The Court of Appeals was correct in holding that the municipal trial court should not have
disregarded private respondents Answer but should have proceeded to determine whether or not
it had jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case.
It was error for the municipal trial court to disregard the answer of respondent on the sole
premise that it was belatedly filed. The answer raised the issue of jurisdiction which the court
could not just gloss over because, if, after hearing, it turned out that it really did not have
jurisdiction over the case because it involved an agrarian dispute, then its decision excluding and
ejecting respondent from the premises would have been a complete nullity.
Heirs of Herman Rey Santos vs CA

327 SCRA 293 (2000)
Nature of the case:

Petition for review on certiorari assailing the decision of the Court of Appeals which affirmed
the two orders of the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) dated April
3, 1992 and November 18, 1992.
Facts:
The subject land was sold at public auction on September 20, 1990 with Herman Rey
Santos, now substituted by his heirs represented by his widow Arsenia Garcia Vda. de
Santos, as the sole bidder for P34,532.50.
Santos registered the Deed of Sale with the Register of Deeds of Bulacan after private
respondent Exequiel Garcia failed to exercise his right of redemption within the
reglementary period. As a result, Ex-Officio Sheriff Carmelita Itapo executed a Final
Deed of Sale in favor of Santos which was registered with the Registry of Deeds of
Bulacan.
Respondent filed a Petition for Injunction and Damages with an application for the
issuance of a preliminary injunction with the Department of Agrarian Reform
Adjudication Board (DARAB), praying that petitioner be enjoined from preventing
private respondent from gathering the mango fruits lest they "over-mature and become
useless." DARAB issued an order allowing the gathering of the mango fruits and
directing that the proceeds thereof be deposited with the Adjudication Board.
Meanwhile, one Pantaleon Antonio filed on May 18, 1992 a motion to intervene[5] with
the DARAB claiming that "he is affected in his rights and interests as the party who
tended and had the mango trees bear fruits this season."
Private respondent filed a complaint for Annulment/Cancellation of Sale and Document,
Redemption with Damages and Preliminary Writ of Injunction against Herman Rey
Santos, the Deputy Sheriff of Bulacan and the Register of Deeds of Bulacan.
Adjudication Board suspended the hearing on Pantaleon Antonios motion for
intervention. Then intervenor Pantaleon Antonio filed with the DARAB a Motion to
Withdraw Intervenors deposited share.The motion was granted and DARAB recognized
Pantaleon Antonio as the duly constituted agricultural tenant of the subject land.
CA affirmed the orders of DARAB.
Issue:
WON PARAD has jurisdiction over the matters raised by the intervener Pantaleon.
Ruling:
No. PARAD has no jurisdiction.
Rule II, Section 1 of the Revised Rules of Procedure of the DARAB, provides:
Section 1. Primary, Original and Appellate Jurisdiction. The Agrarian Reform
Adjudication Board shall have primary jurisdiction, both original and appellate, to
determine and adjudicate all agrarian disputes, cases, controversies, and matters
or incidents involving the implementation of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Program under Republic Act No. 6657, Executive Order Nos. 229, 228 and 129-
A, Republic Act No. 3844 as amended by Republic Act No. 6389, P.D. No. 27 and
other agrarian laws and their implementing rules and regulations.
"Agrarian dispute" is defined under Section 3(d) of Republic Act No. 6657 (CARP Law), as:
(d) Agrarian Dispute refers to any controversy relating to tenurial arrangements,
whether leasehold, tenancy, stewardship or otherwise, over lands devoted to
agriculture, including disputes concerning farmworkers associations or
representation of persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing or seeking
to arrange terms or conditions of such tenurial arrangements.
It includes any controversy relating to compensation of lands acquired under this
Act and other terms and conditions of transfer of ownership from landowners to
farmworkers, tenants and other agrarian reform beneficiaries, whether the
disputants stand in the proximate relation of farm operator and beneficiary,
landowner and tenant, or lessor and lessee.
Clearly, no agrarian dispute is involved in this case. In fact, both are contending parties for the
ownership of the subject property.
SSS v. AGUAS
G.R. No. 165546 February 27, 2006.
FACTS:
1) Pablo Aguas, a member and pensioner of the SSS, died.
2) Pablos surviving spouse, Rosanna H. Aguas, filed a claim with the SSS for death benefits on
indicating in her claim that Pablo was survived by his minor child, Jeylnn
3) Her claim for monthly pension was settled.
4) SSS received a sworn from Leticia Aguas-Macapinlac, Pablos sister, contesting Rosannas
claim for death benefits. She alleged that Rosanna abandoned the family abode
approximately more than 6 years before, and lived with another man on whom she has been
dependent for support. She further averred that Pablo had no legal children with Rosanna and
Jeylyn was a daughter of Rosanna with another man.
5) Janet Aguas, adopted daughter of Pablo and Rosanna Aguas joined Rosanna and Jeylnn as
claimants.
6) The SSC ruled that Rosanna and Jeylynn were not qualified as primary beneficiary and
ordered Rosanna to refund the amount erroneously paid to her. SSC was adopted without
papers and were likewise not qualified.
7) CA reversed the SSC deicision and favored the respondents.
ISSUE: W/N Rosanna, Jeylnn and Janet are entitled to the SSS death benefits accruing from the
death of Pablo, as primary beneficiaries?
HELD: Petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED.

At the time of Pablos death, the prevailing law was Republic Act No. 1161, as amended by
Presidential Decree No. 735. Section 13 of the law enumerates those who are entitled to death
benefits:
Sec.13. Death benefits. Effective July 1, 1975, upon the covered employees death, (a)
his primary beneficiaries shall be entitled to the basic monthly pension, and his
dependents to the dependents pension
Section 8(k) and (e), in turn, defines dependents and primary beneficiaries of an SSS
member as follows:
SECTION 8. Terms defined. For the purposes of this Act the following terms shall,
unless the context indicates otherwise, have the following meanings:
(e) Dependent. The legitimate, legitimated, or legally adopted child who is unmarried,
not gainfully employed, and not over twenty-one years of age provided that he is
congenitally incapacitated and incapable of self-support physically or mentally; the
legitimate spouse dependent for support upon the employee; and the legitimate parents
wholly dependent upon the covered employee for regular support.
xxxx
(k) Beneficiaries. The dependent spouse until he remarries and dependent children,
who shall be the primary beneficiaries. In their absence, the dependent parents and,
subject to the restrictions imposed on dependent children, the legitimate descendants and
illegitimate children who shall be the secondary beneficiaries. In the absence of any of
the foregoing, any other person designated by the covered employee as secondary
beneficiary.
Jeylnn is presumed legitimate and qualifies as primary beneficiary.

1) It bears stressing that under Article 164 of the Family Code, children conceived or born
during the marriage of the parents are legitimate.
2) Jeylnns claim is justified by the photocopy of her birth certificate which bears the signature
of Pablo. Petitioner was able to authenticate the certification from the Civil Registry showing
that she was born on October 29, 1991. The records also show that Rosanna and Pablo were
married on December 4, 1977 and the marriage subsisted until the latters death on December
8, 1996. It is therefore evident that Jeylnn was born during Rosanna and Pablos marriage.
3) Impugning the legitimacy of a child is a strictly personal right of the husband or, in
exceptional cases, his heirs. In this case, there is no showing that Pablo challenged the
legitimacy of Jeylnn during his lifetime.
4) The presumption that Jeylnn is a legitimate child is buttressed by her birth certificate bearing
Pablos signature, which was verified from his specimen signature on file with petitioner. A
birth certificate signed by the father is a competent evidence of paternity.
Rosanna, separated de facto from her deceased husband, does not qualify as primary
beneficiary.
5) For Rosanna, to qualify as a primary beneficiary, she must establish 2 qualifying factors: (1)
that she is the legitimate spouse, and (2) that she is dependent upon the member for
support.
6) A wife who is already separated de facto from her husband cannot be said to be
"dependent for support" upon the husband, absent any showing to the contrary. If it is
proved that the were till living together at the time of his death, it is presumed that she was
dependent on the husband for support, unless it is shown that she is capable of providing for
herself.
7) Rosanna failed to present any proof to show that at the time of his death, she was still
dependent on him for support even if they were already living separately.
Janet has no legal papers to prove she was legally adopted. Hence, she does not qualify as
primary beneficiary.
8) Only Jeylnn is entitled to the SSS death benefits as it was established that she is his
legitimate child. Records show that Janet was merely "adopted" by the spouses, but there are
no legal papers to prove it. NOTE: Legitimacy cannot be extended to other siblings.
Dispositive: The Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals are AFFIRMED WITH
MODIFICATION. Only Jeylnn H. Aguas is declared entitled to the SSS death benefits accruing
from the death of Pablo Aguas.
GSIS v. Jum Angel (2011)
FACTS:
1) The respondent, Jum Angel, is the widow of a deceased soldier, Sgt. Angel. She filed a
claim for death benefits with GSIS but GSIS, affirmed by the Employee Compensation
Commission (ECC), rejected the claim on the ground that Sgt. Angels death did not
arise out of and in the course of employment.
2) Background:
Sgt. Angel was in active service from 1974 until his death in March 3, 1998. St.
Angel was in his post in the Army Support Command when an officer from the
Intelligence Service Group invited him to shed light in his alleged involvement in
a pilferage /gunrunning (gun trafficking) case.
In the same day he was placed in a detention cell to await investigation.
The following day, he was found dead, hanging inside his cell with an electric
cord tied around his neck.
The autopsy report showed the cause of death was asphysia by strangulation.
Eventually, the Philippine Army issued a general order that declared Sgt. Angels
death to be one in the line of duty.
After the denial from GSIS and ECC, the respondent elevated the case to the CA, and finally to
SC.
ECC: affirmed GSIS. CA noted that GSIS was being investigated for a pilferage case at the
time of his death which is a foreign function to him employment as soldier.
CA: reversed ECC. The judge pointed out that Sgt. Angel was manning his post in the Army
Support Command when he was invited to undergo an investigation.
Issue: Did Sgt. Angels death arise out of in the course of employment?
Held: NO. Sgt. Angel did not die from accidental death and is therefore not entitled to the
death benefits under PD 626.
For the injury and the resulting death to be compensable, the law provides:
Implementing Rules of P.D. 626, RULE III COMPENSABILITY, Section 1. Grounds.
For the injury and the resulting disability or death to be compensable, the injury must
be the result of accident arising out of and in the course of the employment.
Pertinent jurisprudence outline that the injury must be the result of an employment accident
satisfying all of the following: 1) the employee must have been injured at the place where his
work requires him to be; 2) the employee must have been performing his official functions;
and 3) if the injury is sustained elsewhere, the employee must have been executing an order
for the employer.
It is unexpected that the discussion below by the GSIS, the ECC and the Court of Appeals,
veered away from the indispensible antecedent that the death must be caused by accident
and, instead, focused on the requirement that the death must arise out of or in the course of
employment.
It is important to note that the requirement that the injury must arise out of and in the course of
employment proceeds from the limiting premise that the injury must be the result of an accident.
From what is extant in the records, though, we rule in favor of the positive finding that there is
no evidence of foul play over the inference that foul play may have been committed. The
circumstances of Sgt. Angels death his lifeless body was found hanging inside his cell with an
electric cord tied around his neck taken together with the unrebutted finding that there is no
evidence of foul play negate respondents claim of murder of her husband and of compensability
of such death. It was not accidental death that is covered by Presidential Decree No. 626.
Death in line of duty is not equivalent to a finding that the death resulted from an accident
and was not occasioned by the sergeants willful intention to kill himself.
the proceedings before the PNP Board and the ECC are separate and distinct, treating of
two (2) totally different subjects; moreover, the PNP Boards conclusions here may not be used
as basis to find that private respondent is entitled to compensation under P.D. No. 626, as
amended.
It is not enough, as erroneously pointed out by the Court of Appeals, that there is evidence to
support the conclusion that the sergeant died while in the performance of his duties since he was
not arrested but was merely invited to shed light on the investigation which was part of xxx
official duties to cooperate with the inquiry being conducted by the Philippine Army. There must
be evidence that the sergeant did not take his own life considering the fact that he was found
hanging inside his cell with an electric cord tied around his neck.
Dispositive: Appeal is granted and CA is reversed.
CHUA VS. CA
G.R. No. 125837; October 6, 2004
NATURE OF THE CASE: Petition for Review of the Decision of CA
FACTS:
1. Private respondents filed a Petition with the SSC for SSS coverage and contributions against
petitioner Reynaldo Chua, owner of Prime Mover Construction Development, claiming that they
were all regular employees of the petitioner in his construction business.
2. Private respondents claimed that they were assigned by petitioner in his various construction
projects.
3. Private respondents alleged that petitioner dismissed all of them without justifiable grounds
and without notice to them and to the then Ministry of Labor and Employment. They further
alleged that petitioner did not report them to the SSS for compulsory coverage in flagrant
violation of the Social Security Act.
SSS- Ruled in favor of Private respondents who according to them were regular employees of
the petitioner and ordered petitioner to pay the Social Security System (SSS) for its unpaid
contributions, as well as penalty for the delayed remittance thereof.
CA- Denied petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration, affirmed the Order of the Social Security
Commission (SSC).
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not private respondents were regular employees of petitioner.
2. Whether or not their causes of action as such are barred by prescription or laches; if so,
whether petitioner is now liable to pay the SSS contributions and penalties during the period of
employment.

Petitioner claimed that private respondents had no cause of action against him, and assuming
there was any, the same was barred by prescription and laches. In addition, he claimed that
private respondents were not regular employees, but project employees whose work had been
fixed for a specific project or undertaking the completion of which was determined at the time of
their engagement. This being the case, he concluded that said employees were not entitled to
coverage under the Social Security Act.
Case for SSS:

The SSS filed a Petition in Intervention alleging that it has an interest in the petition filed by
private respondents as it is charged with the implementation and enforcement of the provisions
of the Social Security Act. The SSS stated that it is the mandatory obligation of every employer
to report its employees to the SSS for coverage and to remit the required contribution, including
the penalty imposed for late premium remittances.

1. YES.
There is no dispute that private respondents were employees of petitioner. Petitioner himself
admitted that they worked in his construction projects, although the period of their employment
was allegedly co-terminus with their phase of work. Even without such admission from
petitioner, the existence of an employer-employee relationship between the parties can easily be
determined by the application of the "control test, the elements of which are (a) selection and
engagement of the employee; (b) payment of wages; (c) the power of dismissal; and (d) the
power of control with regard to the means and methods by which the work is to be accomplished,
with the power of control being the most determinative factor. It is clear that private respondents
are employees of petitioner, the latter having control over the results of the work done, as well as
the means and methods by which the same were accomplished. Suffice it to say that regardless of
the nature of their employment, whether it is regular or project, private respondents are subject of
the compulsory coverage under the SSS Law, their employment not falling under the exceptions
provided by the law. This rule is in accord with the Court's ruling in Luzon Stevedoring Corp. v.
SSS to the effect that all employees, regardless of tenure, would qualify for compulsory
membership in the SSS, except those classes of employees contemplated in Section 8(j) of the
Social Security Act.
The Court also finds no reason to deviate from the finding of the Court of Appeals regarding the
nature of employment of private respondents. Despite the insistence of petitioner that they were
project employees, the facts show that as masons, carpenters and fine graders in petitioner's
various construction projects, they performed work which was usually necessary and desirable to
petitioner's business which involves construction of roads and bridges. In Violeta v. NLRC, this
Court ruled that to be exempted from the presumption of regularity of employment, the
agreement between a project employee and his employer must strictly conform to the
requirements and conditions under Article 280 of the Labor Code. It is not enough that an
employee is hired for a specific project or phase of work. There must also be a determination of,
or a clear agreement on, the completion or termination of the project at the time the employee
was engaged if the objectives of Article 280 are to be achieved. This second requirement was not
met in this case.
Moreover, while it may be true that private respondents were initially hired for specific projects
or undertakings, the repeated re-hiring and continuing need for their services over a long span of
time the shortest being two years and the longest being eight have undeniably made them
regular employees. The Court has held that an employment ceases to be co-terminus with
specific projects when the employee is continuously rehired due to the demands of the
employer's business and re-engaged for many more projects without interruption. The Court
likewise takes note of the fact that, as cited by the SSC, even the National Labor Relations
Commission in a labor case involving the same parties, found that private respondents were
regular employees of the petitioner.
2. Not barred by Prescription. Petitioner is liable to pay.
The Court rules that private respondents' right to file their claim had not yet prescribed at the
time of the filing of their petition, considering that a mere eight (8) years had passed from the
time delinquency was discovered or the proper assessment was made. Republic Act No. 1161, as
amended, prescribes a period of twenty (20) years, from the time the delinquency is known or
assessment is made by the SSS, within which to file a claim for non-remittance against
employers.|||
The Court is in full accord with the findings of the Court of Appeals that private respondents are
not guilty of laches. The principle of laches or "stale demands" ordains that the failure or neglect,
for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that which by exercising due diligence
could or should have been done earlier, or the negligence or omission to assert a right within a
reasonable time, warrants a presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned it
or declined to assert it. In the instant case, this Court finds no proof that private respondents had
failed or neglected to assert their right, considering that they filed their claim within the period
prescribed by law.||
DISPOSITIVE:
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals
promulgated on 6 March 1996 and 30 July 1996 respectively, are AFFIRMED. Costs against
petitioner.||
GSIS v. Jean Raoet

GR No. 157038 | December 23, 2009
NATURE OF THE CASE: Petition for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of
Appeals.
FACTS:
1. Francisco Raoet was a government employee from 1974 as engineer trainee and gradually rose
up the ranks to the position of Engineer A (on Aug. 1, 1998) until his death in May 5, 2001.
2. In 2000, he was diagnosed with Hypertension, Severe, Stage III, Coronary Artery Disease.
The GSIS considered this as work-related and awareded 30 days Temporary Total Disability
benefits plus reimbursement of medical expenses during his treatment. Francisco returned to
work after his treatment. On May 5, 2001, about a year after, he died.
3. According to the death certificate, the immediate cause of death was cardiac arrest, antecedent
cause was acute massive hemorrhage and the underlying cause was bleeding peptic ulcer disease.
GSIS: The GSIS rejected the widows claim stating that the respondent did not submit any
supporting documents to show that the cause of death was peptic ulcer.
ECC: On appeal, the ECC affirmed since the medical records did not indicate that Francisco had
ever consulted for peptic ulcer. Furthermore, there was no autopsy performed to ascertain the
cause of death.
CA: The CA reversed in favor of the widow. Although peptic ulcer is not a listed occupational
disease, the immediate cause of death was cardiac arrest.
Case for GSIS: The GSIS submitted the following:

1. Since peptic ulcer is not an occupational disease, PD 626 provides that proof must be
shown that the risk of contracting the disease was increased by his working
conditions.
2. Medical records did not show that he consulted regarding peptic ulcer.
3. No autopsy to ascertain whether peptic ulcer was the cause of death.
4. GSIS already awarded benefits for hypertension.
5. Trust fund was empty and payments were being advanced by the GSIS.
Case for Respondents: It is a question of fact which the Court is barred from resolving on
petition for review on certiorari.
ISSUE:
Whether or not peptic ulcer is a compensable illness?
Whether Franciscos occupation involved prolonged emotional or physical stress to make his
death due to peptic ulcer compensable?
SC RULING:
Yes. Peptic ulcer itself, under specific conditions is a compensable illness. Pursuant to ECC
Resolution 1676: peptic ulcer is a compensable disease listed under Annex A, provided the
claimant is in an occupation that involves prolonged emotional or physical stress, as among
professional people, transport workers and the like.
According to the cited dictionary: Peptic ulcer is most common among persons who are
chronically anxious or irritated, or who otherwise suffer from mental tension. Worry and anxiety
can contribute to the development of an ulcer and prevent it from healing. If emotional tensions
persist, an ulcer that has been healed by medical treatment can return. Therefore, every effort is
made to help the patient relax. Sometimes counseling or psychotherapy is helpful in relieving
emotional strain.
Before his death, the GSIS considered Hypertension, Severe, Stage III, Coronary Artery Disease
as work-related. The Court found that similarly, the underlying causes of that disease was the
stress nature and pressures inherent in an occupation. When Francisco returned from work after
his treatment, his responsibilities did not change. Thus, he continued to become exposed to
prolonged emotional stress, which qualified peptic ulcer as a stress-driven ailment. According to
the Court, it is enough that the employment contributed, even to a small degree, to the
development of a disease. The chain of causation led to the development of peptic ulcer which
the court considered as a silent killer.
Purpose of PD 626:
The character of social legislation is to liberally construe in favor of the worker. In employee
compensation, persons charged by law to carry out the Constitutions social justice objectives
should adopt a liberal attitude in deciding compensability claims and should not hesitate to grant
compensability where a reasonable measure of work connection can be inferred.
Article 4 of the Labor Code: all doubts in the implementation and interpretation of the provisions
of the Labor Code, including their implementing rules and regulations, should be resolved in
favor of labor.
The GSIS cannot use the lack of solvency or financial capacity of the State Insurance Fund to
refuse or avoid payment of compensation. Article 184 of the Labor Code provides that the State
guarantees and accepts general responsibility over the solvency of the State Insurance Fund.
As a welfare state, the social justice guarantee assumes such risk.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION: WHEREFORE, premises considered, we hereby DENY the petition

for lack of merit.
Government Service Insurance System vs. Montesclaros

G.R. No. 146494. July 14, 2004.
FACTS:
1. On 10 July 1983, Sangguniang Bayan member Nicolas Montesclaros married Milagros.
2. On 4 January 1985, Nicolas filed with the Government Service Insurance System an
application for retirement benefits effective 18 February 1985 under Presidential Decree
No. 1146 or the Revised Government Service Insurance Act of 1977 (PD 1146).
Nicolas designated his wife Milagros as his sole beneficiary. Nicolas last day of actual
service was on 17 February 1985.
3. On 31 January 1986, GSIS approved Nicolas application for retirement effective 17

February 1984, granting a lump sum payment of annuity for the first five years and a
monthly annuity thereafter.
4. On 22 April 1992 Nicolas died and Milagros filed with GSIS a claim for survivorship
pension under PD 1146.
PROCEDURAL
GSIS:
5. On 8 June 1992, GSIS denied the claim because under Section 18 of PD 1146, the
surviving spouse has no right to survivorship pension if the surviving spouse contracted the
marriage with the pensioner within three years before the pensioner qualified for the
pension.
6. According to GSIS, Nicolas wed Milagros on 10 July 1983, less than one year from his date of
retirement on 17 February 1984.
7. On 2 October 1992, Milagros filed with the trial court a special civil action for declaratory
relief questioning the validity of Section 18 of PD 1146 disqualifying her from receiving
survivorship pension.
TRIAL COURT:
8. On 9 November 1994, the trial court rendered judgment declaring Milagros eligible for
survivorship pension. The trial court ordered GSIS to pay Milagros the benefits due including
interest.
The trial court cited Articles 115 and 117 of the Family Code, and held that retirement benefits,
which the pensioner has earned for services rendered and for which the pensioner has contributed
through monthly salary deductions, are onerous acquisitions.
Since retirement benefits are property the pensioner acquired through labor, such benefits are
conjugal property. The trial court held that the prohibition in Section 18 of PD 1146 is deemed
repealed for being inconsistent with the Family Code, a later law. The Family Code has
retroactive effect if it does not prejudice or impair vested rights.
9. GSIS appealed to CA.
COURT OF APPEALS:
10. CA affirmed trial courts decision.
It held that the pension is not gratuitous since it is a deferred compensation for services
rendered.
ISSUE:
Whether or not (Section 16 of) PD 1146 entitles Milagros to survivorship pension;
CASE FOR PETITIONER:

Under Section 18 of PD 1146, the surviving spouse has no right to survivorship pension if the
surviving spouse contracted the marriage with the pensioner within three years before the
pensioner qualified for the pension.
According to GSIS, Nicolas wed Milagros on 10 July 1983, less than one year from his date of
retirement on 17 February 1984.
CASE FOR DEFENDANT:

The prohibition in Section 18 of PD 1146 is deemed repealed for being inconsistent with the
Family Code, a later law.
HELD: Yes.
RATIO:
(The main question for resolution is the validity of the proviso in Section 18 of PD 1146, which
proviso prohibits the dependent spouse from receiving survivorship pension if such dependent
spouse married the pensioner within three years before the pensioner qualified for the pension
(the proviso).)
The proviso, which was the sole basis for the rejection by GSIS of Milagros claim, is
unconstitutional because it violates the due process clause. The proviso is also
discriminatory and denies equal protection of the law.
A statute based on reasonable classification does not violate the constitutional guaranty of the
equal protection of the law. The requirements for a valid and reasonable classification are:
(1) it must rest on substantial distinctions;
(2) t must be germane to the purpose of the law;
(3) it must not be limited to existing conditions only; and
(4) it must apply equally to all members of the same class.
Thus, the law may treat and regulate one class differently from another class provided there are
real and substantial differences to distinguish one class from another.
The proviso in question does not satisfy these requirements. The proviso discriminates
against the dependent spouse who contracts marriage to the pensioner within three years before
the pensioner qualified for the pension. Under the proviso, even if the dependent spouse married
the pensioner more than three years before the pensioners death, the dependent spouse would
still not receive survivorship pension if the marriage took place within three years before the
pensioner qualified for pension. The object of the prohibition is vague. There is no
reasonable connection between the means employed and the purpose intended. The law
itself does not provide any reason or purpose for such a prohibition. If the purpose of the
proviso is to prevent deathbed marriages, then the court does not see why the proviso reckons
the three-year prohibition from the date the pensioner qualified for pension and not from the date
the pensioner died.
DISPOSITIVE:
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for want of merit.
We declare VOID for being violative of the constitutional guarantees of due process and equal
protection of the law the proviso in Section 18 of Presidential Decree No. 1146, which proviso
states that the dependent spouse shall not be entitled to said pension if his marriage with the
pensioner is contracted within three years before the pensioner qualified for the pension. The
Government Service Insurance System cannot deny the claim of Milagros O. Montesclaros for
survivorship benefits based on this invalid proviso.
NOTES:
1. In a pension plan where employee participation is mandatory, the prevailing view is that the
employees have contractual or vested rights in the pension where the pension is part of the
terms of employment.
The reason for providing retirement benefits is to compensate service to the government.
Retirement benefits to government employees are part of emolument to encourage and retain
qualified employees in the government service.
2. Where the employee retires and meets the eligibility requirements, he acquires a vested right
to benefits that is protected by the due process clause; No law can deprive such person of his
pension rights without due process of law that is without notice and opportunity to be heard.
A pensioner acquires a vested right to benefits that have become due as provided under the terms
of the public employees pension statute. No law can deprive such person of his pension rights
without due process of law, that is, without notice and opportunity to be heard.
3. A widows right to receive pension following the demise of her husband is also part of the
husbands contractual compensation.
In addition to retirement and disability benefits, PD 1146 also provides for benefits to survivors
of deceased government employees and pensioners. Under PD 1146, the dependent spouse is one
of the beneficiaries of survivorship benefits. A widows right to receive pension following the
demise of her husband is also part of the husbands contractual compensation.
CAYO GAMOGAMO vs PNOC SHIPPING

GR 141707 | 7 May 2002
FACTS:
Since 23 January 1963, Gamogamo was employed as a Dental Aide with the DOH for 14
years. He resigned 2 November 1977, with the position of Dentist 1.
On 9 November 1977, he was hired as a company dentist by LUSTEVECO, a private
domestic corporation. Subsequently, PNOC Shipping acquired the business of
LUSTEVECO. PNOC Shipping is a GOCC without an original charter. He remained
working as a company dentist.
On August 1 1979, PNOC Shipping assumed without interruption Gamogamos service
credits with LUSTEVECO, but did not reference the service credits with DOH.
ON 10 June 1993, PNOC was privatized, and thus PNOC implemented a Manpower
Reduction Program. Under this program, retrenched employees will get a two month pay
for every year of service for at least 31v years of service.
In 1995, Gamogamo requested to be included in the retrenchment, but it was denied by
PNOC, since he was already holding a permanent position, and that he was already due
for retirement by March 1995.
He eventually retired, and was given a lumpsum of 1 month for every year of service, for
17 years of service with LUSTEVECO and PNOC.
August 1995, the President of PNOC died, and a new one was hired. The new president
allowed certain permanent employees (a company doctor, and telephone operator) who
expressed interest in availing of voluntary retrenchment. They were given two months
per year of service since they were credited with around 31 or more years of service.
Gamogamo filed a complaint with NLRC for full payment of retirement benefits, wanting
the two months per year of service, and asking that his service record at the DOH be
tacked onto his service record with LUSTEVECO and PNOC.
The Labor Arbiter dismissed the complaint. The NLRC reversed and ordered the
crediting of his service record with DOH. Upon a Rule 65 petition with the CA, the CA
reversed the NLRC but held that Gamogamo can still recover the benefits he may be
entitled to under GSIS for his 14 years of service with DOH.
Hence this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether his service record with DOH should be tacked onto his service record with
LUSTEVECO/PNOC for purposes of computing for his retirement benefits.
HELD:
NO.
In the Manpower Reduction Program of PNOC, the retirement benefits contemplated thereon is
the retirees continuous years of service with PNOC. Gamogamo was absorbed by PNOC from
LUSTEVECO on 1 August 1979. Ordinarily, his creditable service shall be reckoned from such
date. However, since Respondent took over the shipping business of LUSTEVECO and agreed
to assume without interruption all the service credits of petitioner with LUSTEVECO,
petitioners creditable service must start from 9 November 1977 when he started working with
LUSTEVECO22 until his day of retirement on 1 April 1995. Thus, petitioners creditable service
is 17.3333 years.
The SC cannot uphold petitioners contention that his 14 years of service with the DOH should
be considered because his last two employers were government-owned and controlled
corporations, and fall under the Civil Service Law. The Constitution explicitly provides that the
civil service embraces all branches, subdivision, instrumentalities, agencies of the Government,
including GOCCs with original charters. PNOC is a GOCC, but without an original charter,
hence it cannot be deemed to be within the scope of the civil service law.
Anent the contention that the Portability Law should apply, the law provides that totalization of
service credits is only resorted to when the retiree does not qualify for benefits in either or both
of the Systems. Here, by his mere service record with LUSTEVECO/PNOC, he is already
qualified under GSIS. Gamogamo is qualified to receive the benefits granted by the GSIS, if
such right has not yet been exercised.
In any case, petitioners fourteen years of service with the DOH may not remain uncompensated
because it may be recognized by the GSIS pursuant to Section 12, as may be determined by the
GSIS. Since petitioner may be entitled to some benefits from the GSIS, he cannot avail of the
benefits under R.A. No. 7699.
WHEREFORE, no reversible error on the part of the Respondent Court of Appeals having
been shown, the petition in this case is DENIED and the appealed decision in CA-G.R. SP
No. 51152 is hereby AFFIRMED.
Dycaico vs SSS
G.R. No. 161357 November 30, 2005
Nature of the case:

Petition for review which seeks to set aside the decision of CA in April 15, 2003.
Facts:
Bonifacio S. Dycaico became a member of the SSS on January 24, 1980. He named the
petitioner, Elena P. Dycaico, and their eight children as his beneficiaries. At that time,
Bonifacio and Elena lived together as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage.
In June 1989, Bonifacio was considered retired and began receiving his monthly pension
from the SSS. He continued to receive the monthly pension until he passed away on June
19, 1997. A few months prior to his death, however, Bonifacio married the petitioner on
January 6, 1997.
Shortly after Bonifacios death, the petitioner filed with the SSS an application for
survivors pension. Her application, however, was denied on the ground that under
Section 12-B(d) of Republic Act (Rep. Act) No. 8282 or the Social Security Law she
could not be considered a primary beneficiary of Bonifacio as of the date of his
retirement. The said proviso reads:
Sec. 12-B. Retirement Benefits.
(d) Upon the death of the retired member, his primary beneficiaries as of
the date of his retirement shall be entitled to receive the monthly pension.
However, according to the SSC, it has consistently ruled that entitlement to the
survivors pension in ones capacity as primary beneficiary is premised on the
legitimacy of relationship with the dependency for support upon the deceased SSS
member during his lifetime. Under Section 12-B(d) of Rep. Act No. 8282, the
primary beneficiaries who are entitled to survivors pension are those who qualify
as such as of the date of retirement of the deceased member. Hence, the petitioner,
who was not then the legitimate spouse of Bonifacio as of the date of his
retirement, could not be considered his primary beneficiary.
Ruling of CA:
The appellate court dismissed the petition of Elena Dycaico. Citing the same provisions
in Rep. Act No. 8282 as those cited by the SSC, the CA declared that since the petitioner
was merely the common-law wife of Bonifacio at the time of his retirement in 1989, his
designation of the petitioner as one of his beneficiaries in the SSS Form RS-1 in 1980 is
void.
Issue:
WON there is a violation to equal protection clause of the Constitution.
Ruling:
The proviso as of the date of his retirement in Section 12-B(d) of Rep. Act No. 8282 is declared
VOID for being contrary to the due process and equal protection clauses of the Constitution.
Even as the proviso as of the date of his retirement in Section 12-B(d) is nullified, the
enumeration of primary beneficiaries for the purpose of entitlement to survivors pension is not
substantially affected since the following persons are considered as such under Section 8(k) of
Rep. Act No. 8282:
(1) The dependent spouse until he or she remarries; and
(2) The dependent legitimate, legitimated or legally adopted, and illegitimate

children.
In relation thereto, Section 8(e) thereof qualifies the dependent spouse and dependent children as
follows:
(1) The legal spouse entitled by law to receive support from the member;
(2) The legitimate, legitimated or legally adopted, and illegitimate child who is
unmarried, not gainfully employed and has not reached twenty-one years (21)
of age, or if over twenty-one (21) years of age, he is congenitally or while still
a minor has been permanently incapacitated and incapable of self-support,
physically or mentally.
GATUS VS. SSS

GR NO. 174725
Nature of the Case: Petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of Appeals.
Facts:
1. Petitioner Alexander B. Gatus worked at the Central Azucarera de Tarlac beginning on
Jan. 1, 1972.
2. He was a covered member of the SSS and he optionally retired from the company upon
reaching 30 years of service on Jan. 31, 2002 at the age of 62.
3. By the time of his retirement, he held the position of Tender assigned at the Distillery
Cooling Tower.
4. In the course of his employment in Central Azucarera, he was certified fit to work on Oc.
21, 1975 and was accordingly promoted to a year-round employment.
5. He suffered chest pains and was confined on Aug. 12, 1995. Upon discharge on Aug.
17,1995, he was diagnosed to be suffering from Coronary Artery Disease: Triple Vessel
and Unstable Angina. His medical records showed him to be hypertensive for 10 years
and a smoker.
6. On account of his CAD, he was given by the SSS the following EC/SSS permanent
Partial Disability benefits: (a) 8 monthly pensions effective Sep. 1, 1994 and (b) 4
monthly pensions effective Jan. 3, 1997. He became an SSS retirement pensioner on Feb.
1, 2002.
7. In 2003, an SSS audit revealed that need to recover the EC benefits already paid to him
on the ground that his CAD, being attributed to his chronic smoking, was not work-
related.
8. He was notified thereof through a letter dated July 31, 2003.
9. He filed for a Motion for consideration but was denied by the SSS.
10. He elevated the matter to the ECC, which denied his appeal on Dec. 10, 2004, essentially
ruling that although hi CAD was a cardiovascular disease listed as an occupational
disease under Annex A of the Implementing Rules on Employees Compensation, nothing
on the record established the presence of the qualifying circumstances for responsibility;
that it was incumbent upon him to prove that the nature of his previous employment and
the conditions prevailing therein had increased the risk of contracting his CAD; and that
he had failed to prove this requisite.
11. The ECC concluded that appellant had been documented to be a chronic smoker and such
factor which is not in any way related to any form of employment increased his risk of
contracting heart disease.
12. He contended that he had contracted the disease due to the presence of harmful fuel
smoke emission of methane gas from a nearby biological waste digester and a railway
terminal where diesel-fed locomotive engines had spewed black smoke: and that he had
been exposed for 30 years to various smoke emissions that had contained carbon
monoxide, carbon dioxide, sulfur, oxide of nitrogen and unburned carbon.
13. The CA held that the petitioner is not entitled to compensation benefits under PD 626, as
amended, affirming the Decision of the Employees Compensation Commission (ECC),
which was likewise a confirmation of the audit conducted by the SSS.
Issue: Whether or not Gatus is entitled for ECC?
Held: No. Petitioner failed to show substantial evidence, that the development of his disease
was work-related; that petitioners heart ailment had no casual relation with his employment
and that as viewed from by his lifestyle; he was a chain smoker, a habit which had
contributed to the development of his heart ailment.
The degree of proof required under PD 626 is merely substantial evidence, which means such
relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.
Accordingly, the claimant must show, at least by substantial evidence, that the development
of the disease was brought about largely by the conditions present in the nature of the job.
What the law requires is a reasonable work connection, not a direct casual relation.
Gatus was diagnosed to have suffered from CAD; Triple Vessel and Unstable
Angina, diseases or conditions falling under the category of Cardiovascular Diseases
which are not considered occupational diseases under the Amended Rules on Employees
Compensation. His disease not being listed as an occupational disease, he was expected
to show that the illness or the fatal disease was caused by his employment and the risk of
contracting the disease was increased or aggravated by the working conditions. His proof
would constitute a reasonable basis for arriving at a conclusion that the conditions of his
employment had caused the disease or that such working conditions had aggravated the
risk of contracting the illness or the fatal disease.
Under ECC Resolution No. 432 dated July 20, 1977, cardiovascular disease is
deemed compensable under any of the following conditions, viz:
(a) If the heart disease was known to have been present during
employment, there must be proof that an acute exacerbation was clearly
precipitated by the unusual strain by reasons of the nature of his work.
(b) The strain of work that brings about an acute attack must be of
sufficient severity and must be followed within 28 hours of the clinical signs of
cardiac insult to constitute causal relationship.
Gatus did not discharge the burden of proof imposed under the Labor Code to
show that his ailment was work-related. While he might have been exposed to various
smoke emissions at work for 30 years, he did not submit satisfactory evidence proving
that the exposure had contributed to the development of his disease or had increased the
risk of contracting the illness. Neither did he show that the disease had progressed due to
conditions in his job as a factory worker. In fact, he did not present any physicians report
in order to substantiate his allegation that the working conditions had increased the risk of
acquiring the cardiovascular disease.
Verily, his mere contention of exposure to various smoke emissions in the

working environment for a period of time does not ipso facto make the resulting
disability compensable. Awards of compensation cannot rest on speculations or
presumptions, for the claimant must prove a positive proposition. As pronounced in Sante
v. Employees Compensation Commission:
x x x What kind and quantum of evidence would constitute an adequate

basis for a reasonable man (not necessarily a medical scientist) to reach one or the
other conclusion, can obviously be determined only on a case-to-case basis. That
evidence must, however, be real and substantial, and not merely apparent; for the
duty to prove work-causation or work-aggravation imposed by existing law is real
not merely apparent
Moreover, he failed to show the presence of any of the conditions imposed for
cardio-vascular diseases by Sec. 18. Hence, the affirmance of the SSS decision was
properly made.
The petitioners plight might call for sympathy, particularly in the light of his 30
years of service to the company, but his petition cannot be granted on that basis alone.
The policy of extending the applicability of P.D. 626 as many qualified employees as
possible should be balanced by the equally vital interest of denying undeserving claims
for compensation.
There is no doubt that petitioner deserves sympathy because even the benefits already given
to him were questioned after the SSS found that he was a chronic cigarette smoker. For
humanitarian reasons, as he pursued his claim all the way to the Court as an indigent litigant,
and due to his advancing age, we would like to clarify that what had already been given him
should no longer be taken away from him. But he is not entitled to further compensation for
his condition.
BUNAO vs. SSS

GR NO. 159606
Nature of the Case: Petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
assailing the Resolution of the CA, which dismissed outright Marilyn Bunaos petition for review
for having been belatedly filed, and its Resolution which denied the motion for reconsideration.
Facts:
1. Artus E. Bunao, husband of petitioner, was employed by Ocean Tanker Corporation as an
acting Second Marine Engineer from July 20,1995 until August 6, 1999.
2. On Sept. 23, 1999, Artus was rushed to the Mary Johnson Hospital, Tondo Manila,
because of body weakness. The diagnostic procedures revealed an impression of Renal
Cell Cancer with Liver metastasis. He was later discharged from the hospital on Sept. 25,
1999.
3. On Oct 15, 1999, the occurrence of Artus sickness was reported to the SSS.
4. On Oct 14, 1999, Artus again was admitted at the same hospital due to loose bowel
movement and body weakness but was discharged after 2 days of confinement with the
same findings.
5. Artus died on November 29, 1999 and according to the death certificate, the cause of
death was Hepatic Encephalopathy, Renal Cell Cancer.
6. Petitioner (the wife) claim for death benefits under PD 626 as amended, before SSS. The
SSS, however, denied the claim on the ground that her husbands ailment, which caused
his death, is not included in the list of occupational diseases, and that the same has no
causal relationship with the nature of her husbands work.
7. Petitioner appealed to the ECC but the ECC affirmed the decision of the SSS for lack of
merit.
8. Petitioner appealed to CA but the same was dismissed for filling out of time.
Case for the petitioner: Petitioner that that the risk of contracting the fatal ailment that resulted
in Artus death was increased by the working environs to which the latter was exposed as 2nd
Marine Engineer in Ocean Tanker Corporation from 20 July 1995 to 06 August 1999. In which
she alleged that her husband was exposed to leaded petrol and petroleum products that contain
various chemicals like hydrogen, benzene and lead which are health hazards because of their
carcinogenicity. She claimed that most of these chemicals precipitate kidney cancer and liver
cancer.
Case for defendant: The SSS, however, denied the claim on the ground that her husbands
ailment, which caused his death, is not included in the list of occupational diseases, and that the
same has no causal relationship with the nature of her husbands work.
Issue: Whether or not the ailment of Artus which cause his death is considered as an
occupational disease?
Held: No. The claimant must prove a positive proposition or a quantum of evidence that would
constitute an adequate basis for a reasonable man to reach one of the other conclusions. The
evidence must be real and substantial, and not merely apparent; for the duty to prove work-causal
or work-aggravation imposed by the existing law is realnot merely apparent.
Cancer is a disease that strikes people in general. The nature of a persons employment appears to
have no relevance. Cancer can strike a lowly paid laborer or a highly paid executive or one who
works on land, in water, or in the deep bowels of the earth. It makes no difference whether the
victim is employed or unemployed, a white collar employee or a blue collar worker, a
housekeeper, an urban dweller or a resident of a rural area.
While there are certain cancers which are reasonably considered as strongly induced by specific
causes like heavy doses of radiation as in Chernobyl, USSR; cigarette smoke over a long period
for lung cancer; certain chemicals for specific cancers, and asbestos dust, are generally accepted
as increasing the risks of contracting specific cancers, what the law requires for others is proof.
This was not satisfied in the instant case.
Dispositive: WHEREFORE, the resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP UDK No.
4525 dated 27 May 2003 denying outright petitioners petition for review, and its resolution dated
11 August 2003, which denied the motion for reconsideration, are REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
However, resolving the case on the merits, and as sufficiently revealed by the records, the
decision of the Employees Compensation Commission in ECC CASE NO. MS-11664-800,
dismissing petitioners claim for compensation benefits under Presidential Decree No. 626, as
amended, is AFFIRMED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
LORENZO, vs. GSIS

G.R. No. 188385 October 2, 2013
NATURE: Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45
FACTS:
1. Rosario was a GSIS member and served as an elementary teacher at the Dep Ed.
2. Rosario was diagnosed with Chronic Myelogenous Leukemia.
3. Rosario was admitted at the Medical City Hospital due to Pneumonia which was a result of
immuno-compromise secondary to leukemia. She died.
4. Benito, her surviving spouse, filed a claim for Employees Compensation death benefits
from the GSIS.
PROCEDURAL:
1. The GSIS Medical Evaluation and Underwriting Department (MEUD) denied the claim
on the ground that it found that Rosarios ailments and cause of death, Cardio-respiratory Arrest
Secondary to Terminal Leukemia, are non-occupational diseases contemplated under P.D. No.
626, as amended.
2. The Employees Compensation Commission (ECC) found the denial to be in order, stating
that although Leukemia is listed as an occupational disease under P.D. 626, however, under
Annex "A," Item No. 15 of the Amended Rules on Employees Compensation, Leukemia is
considered compensable among operating room personnel due to exposure to anesthetics. It
also stated that the nature of the deceaseds occupation does not increase the risk of developing
Chronic Myelogenous Leukemia because the work does not show frequent and sufficient
exposure to substances established as occupational risk factors of the disease. Further,
several non-occupational factors can also increase the risk of this disease.
3. The CA affirmed the decision of ECC. The CA ruled that under the present law,
leukemia, while listed as an occupational disease, is compensable only among operating
room personnel due to exposure to anesthetics. Petitioner also failed to prove that his
wifes risk of contracting the disease was increased by the latters working conditions as a
school teacher who is not exposed to anesthetics (Petitioner has not presented any medical
information on the cause of his wifes illness, which could help in determining the causal
connection between Rosarios ailment and her alleged exposure to muriatic acid, floor wax and
paint - hardly considered as radiation exposure which may cause chronic myeloid leukemia.).
ISSUE: Whether or not the ailment of the late Rosario Lorenzo is compensable under the present
law on employees compensation
RULING: NO.
RATIO:
Sickness, as defined under the Labor Code of the Philippines refers to "any illness definitely
accepted as an occupational disease listed by the Employees Compensation Commission, or any
illness caused by employment, subject to proof that the risk of contracting the same is increased
by working conditions.
In cases of death, such as in this case, the Rules Implementing P.D. No. 626, as amended,
requires that for the sickness and the resulting disability or death to be compensable, the claimant
must show: (1) that it is the result of an occupational disease listed under Annex "A" of the
Amended Rules on Employees Compensation with the conditions set therein satisfied; or (2)
that the risk of contracting the disease is increased by the working conditions.
Section 2(a), Rule III of the said Implementing Rules, on the other hand, defines occupational
diseases as those listed in Annex "A" when the nature of employment is as described therein.
The listed diseases are therefore qualified by the conditions as set forth in the said Annex "A,"
hereto quoted:
OCCUPATIONAL DISEASES
For an occupational disease and the resulting disability or death to be compensable, all of the
following conditions must be satisfied:
(1) The employees work must involve the risks described herein;
(2) The disease was contracted as a result of the employees exposure to the described risks;
(3) The disease was contracted within a period of exposure and under such other factors
necessary to contract it;
(4) There was no notorious negligence on the part of the employee.
xxx
Occupational Disease Nature of Employment
xxx
15. Leukemia and Lymphoma among operating room personnel due to anesthetics
The ECC was correct in stating that, contrary to the earlier finding of the MEUD of the GSIS,
Rosarios disease is occupational, which fact, however, does not thereby result in
compensability in view of the fact that petitioners wife was not an operating room
personnel. As correctly pointed out by the ECC, the coverage of leukemia as an occupational
disease relates to ones employment as an operating room personnel ordinarily exposed to
anesthetics. In the case of petitioners wife, the nature of her occupation does not indicate
exposure to anesthetics nor does it increase the risk of developing Chronic Myelogenous
Leukemia. There was no showing that her work involved frequent and sufficient exposure
to substances established as occupational risk factors of the disease. Thus, the need for the
petitioner to sufficiently establish that his wifes job as a teacher exposed her to substances
similar to anesthetics in an environment similar to an "operating room." This leans on the
precept that the awards for compensation cannot rest on speculations and presumptions.
Indeed, following the specific mandate of P.D. No. 626, as amended, and its Implementing
Rules, the petitioner must have at least provided sufficient basis, if not medical information
which could help determine the causal connection between Rosarios ailment and her
exposure to muriatic acid, floor wax and paint as well as the rigors of her work. Instead,
petitioner merely insists on the supposition that the disease might have been brought about by the
harmful chemicals of floor wax and paint aggravated by the fact that the Manggahan Elementary
School is just along the highway which exposed Rosario to smoke belched by vehicles, all
contributing to her acquisition of the disease. We find such factors insufficient to
demonstrate the probability that the risk of contracting the disease is increased by the
working conditions of Rosario as a public school teacher; enough to support the claim of
petitioner that his wife is entitled to employees compensation. Petitioner failed to show that
the progression of the disease was brought about largely by the conditions in Rosarios
work. Not even a medical history or records was presented to support petitioners claim. At
most, petitioner solely relies on a possibility that the demands and rigors of Rosarios job
coupled with exposure to chemicals in paint or floor wax could result or contribute to contracting
leukemia. This is but a bare allegation no different from a mere speculation.
The Court has held that a claimant must submit such proof as would constitute a Reasonable
basis for concluding either that the conditions of employment of the claimant caused the
ailment or that such working conditions had aggravated the risk of contracting that ailment.
What kind and quantum of evidence would constitute an adequate basis for a reasonable man
x x x to reach one or the other conclusion, can obviously be determined only on a case-to-case
basis. That evidence must, however, be real and substantial, and not merely apparent, for the
duty to prove work-causation or work-aggravation imposed by existing law is real x x x not
merely apparent. The law, as it now stands requires the claimant to prove a positive thing
the illness was caused by employment and the risk of contracting the disease is increased by
the working conditions. To say that since the proof is not available, therefore, the trust fund has
the obligation to pay is contrary to the legal requirement that proof must be adduced. The
existence of otherwise non-existent proof cannot be presumed. It is well to stress that the
principles of "presumption of compensability" and "aggravation" found in the old
Workmens Compensation Act is expressly discarded under the present compensation
scheme.
The new principle being applied is a system based on social security principle; thus, the
introduction of "proof of increased risk." As held by the Court: The present system is also
administered by social insurance agencies the Government Service Insurance System and
Social Security System under the Employees Compensation Commission. The intent was to
restore a sensible equilibrium between the employers obligation to pay workmens
compensation and the employees right to receive reparation for work-connected death or
disability.
The new law establishes a state insurance fund built up by the contributions of employers based
on the salaries of their employees. The injured worker does not have to litigate his right to
compensation. No employer opposes his claim. There is no notice of injury nor requirement of
controversion. The sick worker simply files a claim with a new neutral Employees
Compensation Commission which then determines on the basis of the employees supporting
papers and medical evidence whether or not compensation may be paid. The payment of benefits
is more prompt. The cost of administration is low. The amount of death benefits has also been
doubled.
On the other hand, the employers duty is only to pay the regular monthly premiums to the
scheme. It does not look for insurance companies to meet sudden demands for compensation
payments or set up its own fund to meet these contingencies. It does not have to defend itself
from spuriously documented or long past claims.
The new law applies the social security principle in the handling of workmens
compensation. The Commission administers and settles claims from a fired under its exclusive
control. The employer does not intervene in the compensation process and it has no control, as in
the past, over payment of benefits. The open ended Table of Occupational Diseases requires no
proof of causation. A covered claimant suffering from an occupational disease is automatically
paid benefits.
Since there is no employer opposing or fighting a claim for compensation, the rules on
presumption of compensability and controversion cease to have importance.
The lopsided situation of an employer versus one employee, which called for equalization
through the various rules and concepts favoring the claimant, is now absent. (Emphasis
supplied).
All told, this is not to say, however, that this Court is unmindful of the claimants predicament.
While we sympathize with the petitioner, it is important to note that such sympathy must be
balanced by the equally vital interest of denying undeserving claims for compensation.
Compassion for the victims of diseases not covered by the law ignores the need to show a greater
concern for the trust fund to which the tens of millions of workers and their families look to for
compensation whenever covered accidents, diseases and deaths occur.
DISPOSITIVE: WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. The 24 February 2009

Decision and 11 June 2009 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in C A- G.R. SP No. 104853 are
AFFIRMED.
GSIS vs. FERNANDO P. DE LEON

G.R. No. 186560 November 17, 2010
NATURE: Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45
FACTS:
1. Fernando P. de Leon retired as Chief State Prosecutor of the DOJ after 44 years of service.
2. He applied for retirement under RA 910, invoking R.A. 3783, as amended by R.A. 4140,
which provides that chief state prosecutors hold the same rank as judges.
3. The application was approved by GSIS. Thereafter, and for more than nine years, De Leon
continuously received his retirement benefits.
4. GSIS later cancelled the payment of his pension because the Department of Budget and
Management (DBM) informed GSIS that De Leon was not qualified to retire under R.A. No.
910; that the law was meant to apply only to justices and judges; and that having the same rank
and qualification as a judge did not entitle De Leon to the retirement benefits provided
thereunder.
5. De Leon wrote the GSIS requesting for resumption of his pension benefit under RA 660
or any other applicable GSIS law.
6. The GSIS replied saying that:
- De Leon already chose to retire under RA 910.
- There is nothing in the GSIS law which sanctions double retirement unless the retiree is
first re-employed and qualifies once again to retire under GSIS law.
- RA 8291 provides for exclusivity of benefits which means that a retiree may choose only
one retirement scheme available to him to the exclusion of all others.
7. De Leon filed a Petition for Mandamus before the CA.
PROCEDURAL:
1. The CA ruled in favor of De Leon: He is entitled to a monthly pension under the GSIS
Act. This is a case of a continuation of the payment of pension benefit (not double retirement) to
which he was clearly entitled. The error in the award of retirement benefits under R.A. 910 was
not attributable to De Leon. It was unjust for GSIS to entirely stop the payment of monthly
pension without providing any alternative sustenance. De Leon is still entitled to a monthly
pension under R.A. No. 660, P.D. No. 1146, and R.A. No. 8291.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not De Leon is entitled to continuance of monthly pension
2. What is/are the applicable law/s
RULING:
1. YES
2. Prior to the effectivity of R.A. No. 8291, retiring government employees who were not
entitled to the benefits under R.A. No. 910 had the option to retire under either of two laws:
Commonwealth Act No. 186, as amended by R.A. No. 660, or P.D. No. 1146. However, while
this case was pending, RA 10071 was passed making RA 910 applicable also to De Leon.
RATIO:
RA 8291 became a law after De Leon retired thus it does not apply to him. P.D. No. 1146
specifically mandates that a retiree is entitled to monthly pension for life. The GSIS itself
allowed De Leon to retire under R.A. No. 910, following jurisprudence laid down by the
Court. One could hardly fault De Leon, though a seasoned lawyer, for relying on the GSISs
interpretation of the pertinent retirement laws, considering that the latter is tasked to administer
the governments retirement system. He had the right to assume that GSIS personnel knew what
they were doing. Since the change in circumstances was through no fault of De Leon, he cannot
be prejudiced by the same. His right to receive monthly pension from the government cannot be
jeopardized by a new interpretation of the law. This is also not a case of conversion within the
contemplation of the law which is prohibited under R.A. No. 8291. The conversion under the law
is one that is voluntary, a choice to be made by the retiree. Here, De Leon had no choice but to
look for another law under which to claim his pension benefits because the DBM had decided
not to release the funds needed to continue payment of his monthly pension. De Leon himself
admitted that, if the DBM had not suspended the payment of his pension, he would not have
sought any other law under which to receive his benefits. The necessity to "convert" was not a
voluntary choice of De Leon but a circumstance forced upon him by the government itself. Even
if the GSIS had erroneously refunded De Leons premium contributions, it can demand its return
or it may opt to deduct the amount earlier received by De Leon from the benefits which he will
receive in the future. Considering its expertise on the matter, the GSIS can device a scheme that
will facilitate either the reimbursement or the deduction in the most cost-efficient and beneficial
manner.
While this case was pending, the Congress enacted RA No. 10071: the Prosecution Service Act
of 2010. It provides that The benefits x x x shall be granted to all those who retired prior to the
effectivity of this Act. De Leon is thus covered by this law and entitled to the benefits specified
therein. De Leon as former Chief State Prosecutor, albeit the position has been renamed
"Prosecutor General," should enjoy the same retirement benefits as the Presiding Justice of the
CA, pursuant to Section 14 of R.A. No. 10071.
De Leon should also benefit from the application of Section 16 of the law, which states: Any
increase after the approval of this Act in the salaries, allowances or retirement benefits or any
upgrading of the grades or levels thereof of any or all of the Justices or Judges referred to herein
to whom said emoluments are assimilated shall apply to the corresponding prosecutors.
Lastly, and most importantly, by explicit fiat of R.A. No. 10071, members of the National
Prosecution Service have been granted the retirement benefits under R.A. No. 910, to wit:
Section 25. Applicability. - All benefits heretofore extended under Republic Act No. 910, as
amended, and all other benefits that may be extended by the way of amendment thereto shall
likewise be given to the prosecutors covered by this Act..
Hence, from the time of the effectivity of R.A. No. 10071, De Leon should be entitled to receive
retirement benefits granted under R.A. No. 910.
DISPOSITIVE:
WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered, the Decision dated October 28, 2008 and the
Resolution dated February 18, 2009 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 101811 are
hereby AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION. Government Service Insurance System is
ORDERED to (1) pay De Leons retirement benefits in accordance with P.D. No. 1146, subject
to deductions, if any, computed from the time the same were withheld until April 7, 2010; and
(2) pay De Leons retirement benefits in accordance with R.A. No. 910, computed from April 8,
2010 onwards.
In order that De Leon may not be further deprived of his monthly pension benefits, this Decision
is IMMEDIATELY EXECUTORY.
This only serves as a quick reference. Please do not rely solely on digested cases. Remember,
there is no substitute for good reading. Goodluck!

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COMPILATION OF DIGESTED CASES IN AGRARIAN LAW AND SOCIAL LEGISLATION

CENEZE VS. RAMOS

Nature of the case

Provincial Adjudicator Ruling

To prove a tenancy relationship, the requisite quantum of evidence is substantial evidence, or

CORNES VS. LEAL REALTY

Nature of the case

Provincial Adjudicator Ruling

SC RULING with RATIO:

POLICARPIO and ERLINDA NISNISAN vs. CA, Spouses MANCERA

AS held in Cuao vs CA, even an annotation of the Certification by a representative of the

DISPOSITIVE PORTION: CA decision is modified in that the petitioners are declared

FELISA R. FERRER, petitioner, vs. DOMINGO

G.R. No. 170956. May 12, 2010.*

NATURE OF THE CASE: Petition for review on Certiorari of a decision of the CA

ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT EJECTMENT WILL PROSPER

SECOND DARAB CASE NO. 7863. NO

THIRD DARAB CASE NO. 7864 and 7865. NO

WHEREFORE, we partially GRANT the petition.

MILESTONE REALTY AND CO., INC. v. COURT OF APPEALS

Section 9. Agricultural Leasehold Relation Not Extinguished by Death or Incapacity of the

11. COURT F APPEALS

Case for Petitioner:

Case for Defendant:

SC RULING WITH RATIO:

VILLALIZA V. JUDGE PANGANIBAN, et. al.

SC RULING with RATIO:

GERARDO RUPA vs. CA, SALIPOT

omission of another, EXCEPT if the admission was made by a copartner, agent,

ON THE OTHER HAND, Salipot's evidence (consisting of 5 testimonies) is inherently weak.

DISPOSITIVE PORTION: CA decision is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Petition is

FRANCISCO ESTOLAS, petitioner, vs. ADOLFO MABALOT, respondent.

[G.R. No. 133706. May 7, 2002]

DAR District Office Investigation Report:

(Estolas elevated the case to the regional director).

DAR Regional Director Order:

(Mabalot appealed to the DAR Central Office)

DAR Central Office Order:

Court of Appeals decision:

Case for Petitioner:

SC RULING with RATIO:

For abandonment to exist, the following requisites must be proven:

PABLO BASBAS, plaintiff-appellant, vs. RUFINO ENTENA, FLAVIANO TIBAY and

G.R. No. L-26255 June 30, 1969

NATURE: Appeal from the decision of the CAR.

1. Basbas is the leasehold tenant of a riceland owned by Rufino.

Case for Plaintiff:

SC RULING with RATIO:

BIENVENIDO T. BUADA, ISAIAS B. QUINTO, NEMESIO BAUTISTA, ORLANDO R.

G.R. No. 180374 January 22, 2010

Regional Adjudicator Ruling:

(Cement Center appealed to the DARAB).

(Cement Center filed a Petition for Review before the CA)

Case for Petitioners:

Case for Cement Center:

SC RULING with RATIO:

VERDE vs. MACAPAGAL

TOPIC: Termination of Tenancy Relation:

DELA CRUZ v. QUIAZON

10. COURT OF APPEALS

Case for Petitioner:

Case for Defendant:

SC RULING WITH RATIO:

CLEMENTE DEQUITO V. VICTORIA LLAMAS