CADALIN ET AL VS. POEA ET AL
Hence, these petitions filed by the
FACTS:
This is a consolidation of 3 cases of SPECIAL CIVIL
ACTIONS in the Supreme Court for Certiorari.
On June 6, 1984, Cadalin, Amul and Evangelista, in their
own behalf and on behalf of 728 other OCWs instituted a
class suit by filing an Amended Complaint with the
POEA for money claims arising from their recruitment by
ASIA INTERNATIONAL BUILDERS
CORPORATION (AIBC) and employment by BROWN
& ROOT INTERNATIONAL, INC (BRI) which is a
foreign corporation with headquarters in Houston, Texas,
and is engaged in construction; while AIBC is a domestic
corporation licensed as a service contractor to recruit,
mobilize and deploy Filipino workers for overseas
employment on behalf of its foreign principals.
The amended complaint sought the payment of the
unexpired portion of the employment contracts, which
was terminated prematurely, and secondarily, the
payment of the interest of the earnings of the Travel and
Reserved Fund; interest on all the unpaid benefits; area
wage and salary differential pay; fringe benefits;
reimbursement of SSS and premium not remitted to the
SSS; refund of withholding tax not remitted to the BIR;
penalties for committing prohibited practices; as well as
the suspension of the license of AIBC and the
accreditation of BRII
On October 2, 1984, the POEA Administrator denied the
Motion to Strike Out of the Records filed by AIBC but
required the claimants to correct the deficiencies in the
complaint pointed out.
AIB and BRII kept on filing Motion for Extension of
Time to file their answer. The POEA kept on granting
such motions.
On November 14, 1984, claimants filed an opposition to
the motions for extension of time and asked that AIBC
and BRII declared in default for failure to file their
answers.
On December 27, 1984, the POEA Administrator issued
an order directing AIBC and BRII to file their answers
within ten days from receipt of the order.
(at madami pang motions ang na-file, new complainants
joined the case, ang daming inavail na remedies ng both
parties)
On June 19, 1987, AIBC finally submitted its answer to
the complaint. At the same hearing, the parties were given
a period of 15 days from said date within which to submit
their respective position papers. On February 24, 1988,
AIBC and BRII submitted position paper. On October 27,
1988, AIBC and BRII filed a Consolidated Reply,
POEA Adminitartor rendered his decision which awarded
the amount of $824, 652.44 in favor of only 324
complainants. Claimants submitted their Appeal
Memorandum For Partial Appeal from the decision of
the POEA. AIBC also filed its MR and/or appeal in
addition to the Notice of Appeal filed earlier.
NLRC promulgated its Resolution, modifying the
decision of the POEA. The resolution removed some of
the benefits awarded in favor of the claimants. NLRC
denied all the MRs.
claimants and by AlBC and BRII.
The case rooted from the Labor Law enacted by Bahrain
where most of the complainants were deployed. His
Majesty Ise Bin Selman Al Kaifa, Amir of Bahrain, issued
his Amiri Decree No. 23 on June 16, 1176, otherwise
known re the Labour Law for the Private Sector. Some of
the provision of Amiri Decree No. 23 that are relevant to
the claims of the complainants-appellants are as follows:
Art. 79: x x x A worker shall receive payment for each
extra hour equivalent to his wage entitlement increased by
a minimum of twenty-rive per centurn thereof for hours
worked during the day; and by a minimum off fifty per
centurn thereof for hours worked during the night which
shall be deemed to being from seven oclock in the
evening until seven oclock in the morning .
Art. 80: Friday shall be deemed to be a weekly day of rest
on full pay.
If employee worked, 150% of his normal wage shall be
paid to him x x x.
Art. 81; x x x When conditions of work require the worker
to work on any official holiday, he shall be paid an
additional sum equivalent to 150% of his normal wage.
Art. 84: Every worker who has completed one years
continuous service with his employer shall be entitled to
Laos on full pay for a period of not less than 21 days for
each year increased to a period not less than 28 days after
five continuous years of service.
A worker shall be entitled to such leave upon a quantum
meruit in respect of the proportion of his service in that
year.
Art. 107: A contract of employment made for a period of
indefinite duration may be terminated by either party
thereto after giving the other party prior notice before
such termination, in writing, in respect of monthly paid
workers and fifteen days notice in respect of other
workers. The party terminating a contract without the
required notice shall pay to the other party compensation
equivalent to the amount of wages payable to the worker
for the period of such notice or the unexpired portion
thereof.
Art. Ill: x x x the employer concerned shall pay to such
worker, upon termination of employment, a leaving
indemnity for the period of his employment calculated on
the basis of fifteen days wages for each year of the first
three years of service and of one months wages for each
year of service thereafter. Such worker shall be entitled to
payment of leaving indemnity upon a quantum meruit in
proportion to the period of his service completed within a
year.
ISSUE:
1. WON the foreign law should govern or the
contract of the parties.(WON the complainants who have
worked in Bahrain are entitled to the above-mentioned
benefits provided by Amiri Decree No. 23 of Bahrain).
2. WON the Bahrain Law should apply in the case.
(Assuming it is applicable WON complainants claim for
the benefits provided therein have prescribed.)
RULING:
1. NLRC set aside Section 1, Rule 129 of the 1989
Revised Rules on Evidence governing the pleading and
proof of a foreign law and admitted in evidence a simple
copy of the Bahrains Amiri Decree No. 23 of 1976
(Labour Law for the Private Sector).
NLRC applied the Amiri Deere, No. 23 of 1976, which
provides for greater benefits than those stipulated in the
overseas-employment contracts of the claimants. It was of
the belief that where the laws of the host country are more
favorable and beneficial to the workers, then the laws of
the host country shall form part of the overseas
employment contract. It approved the observation of the
POEA Administrator that in labor proceedings, all doubts
in the implementation of the provisions of the Labor Code
and its implementing regulations shall be resolved in
favor of labor.
The overseas-employment contracts, which were
prepared by AIBC and BRII themselves, provided that the
laws of the host country became applicable to said
contracts if they offer terms and conditions more
favorable than those stipulated therein. However there
was a part of the employment contract which provides that
the compensation of the employee may be adjusted
downward so that the total computation plus the non-
waivable benefits shall be equivalent to the
compensation therein agree, another part of the same
provision categorically states that total remuneration and
benefits do not fall below that of the host country
regulation and custom.
Any ambiguity in the overseas-employment contracts
should be interpreted against AIBC and BRII, the parties
that drafted it. Article 1377 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines provides:
The interpretation of obscure words or stipulations in a
contract shall not favor the party who caused the
obscurity.
Said rule of interpretation is applicable to contracts of
adhesion where there is already a prepared form
containing the stipulations of the employment contract
and the employees merely take it or leave it. The
presumption is that there was an imposition by one party
against the other and that the employees signed the
contracts out of necessity that reduced their bargaining
power.
We read the overseas employment contracts in question
as adopting the provisions of the Amiri Decree No. 23 of
1976 as part and parcel thereof. The parties to a contract
may select the law by which it is to be governed. In such
a case, the foreign law is adopted as a system to regulate
the relations of the parties, including questions of their
capacity to enter into the contract, the formalities to be
observed by them, matters of performance, and so forth.
Instead of adopting the entire mass of the foreign law, the
parties may just agree that specific provisions of a foreign
statute shall be deemed incorporated into their contract
as a set of terms. By such reference to the provisions of
the foreign law, the contract does not become a foreign
contract to be governed by the foreign law. The said law
does not operate as a statute but as a set of contractual
terms deemed written in the contract.
A basic policy of contract is to protect the expectation of
the parties. Such party expectation is protected by giving
effect to the parties own choice of the applicable law. The
choice of law must, however, bear some relationship the
parties or their transaction. There is no question that the
contracts sought to be enforced by claimants have a direct
connection with the Bahrain law because the services
were rendered in that country.
2. NLRC ruled that the prescriptive period for the
filing of the claims of the complainants was 3 years, as
provided in Article 291 of the Labor Code of the
Philippines, and not ten years as provided in Article 1144
of the Civil Code of the Philippines nor one year as
provided in the Amiri Decree No. 23 of 1976.
Article 156 of the Amiri Decree No. 23 of 1976 provides:
A claim arising out of a contract of employment shall not
actionable after the lapse of one year from the date of the
expiry of the Contract.
As a general rule, a foreign procedural law will not be
applied in the forum (local court), Procedural matters,
such as service of process, joinder of actions, period and
requisites for appeal, and so forth, are governed by the
laws of the forum. This is true even if the action is based
upon a foreign substantive law.
A law on prescription of actions is sui generis in Conflict
of Laws in the sense that it may be viewed either as
procedural or substantive, depending on the
characterization given such a law. In Bournias v. Atlantic
Maritime Company (220 F. 2d. 152, 2d Cir. [1955]),
where the issue was the applicability of the Panama Labor
Code in a case filed in the State of New York for claims
arising from said Code, the claims would have prescribed
under the Panamanian Law but not under the Statute of
Limitations of New York. The U.S. Circuit Court of
Appeals held that the Panamanian Law was procedural as
it was not specifically intended to be substantive, hence,
the prescriptive period provided in the law of the forum
should apply. The Court observed: . . . we are dealing
with a statute of limitations of a foreign country, and it is
not clear on the face of the statute that its purpose was to
limit the enforceability, outside as well as within the
foreign country concerned, of the substantive rights to
which the statute pertains. We think that as a yardstick for
determining whether that was the purpose, this test is the
most satisfactory one.
The Court further noted: Applying that test here it
appears to us that the libellant is entitled to succeed, for
the respondents have failed to satisfy us that the
Panamanian period of limitation in question was
specifically aimed against the particular rights which the
libellant seeks to enforce. The Panama Labor Code is a
statute having broad objectives. The American court
applied the statute of limitations of New York, instead of
the Panamanian law, after finding that there was no
showing that the Panamanian law on prescription was
intended to be substantive. Being considered merely a
procedural law even in Panama, it has to give way to the
law of the forum (local Court) on prescription of actions.
However the characterization of a statute into a
procedural or substantive law becomes irrelevant when
the country of the forum (local Court) has a borrowing
statute. Said statute has the practical effect of treating the
foreign statute of limitation as one of substance. A
borrowing statute directs the state of the forum (local
Court) to apply the foreign statute of limitations to the
pending claims based on a foreign law. While there are
several kinds of borrowing statutes, one form provides
that an action barred by the laws of the place where it
accrued will not be enforced in the forum even though the
local statute was not run against it.
Section 48 of Code of Civil Procedure is of this kind. It
provides: If by the laws of the state or country where the
cause of action arose, the action is barred, it is also barred
in the Philippine Islands.
Section 48 has not been repealed or amended by the Civil
Code of the Philippines. In the light of the 1987
Constitution, however, Section 48 cannot be enforced ex
proprio vigore insofar as it ordains the application in this
jurisdiction of Section 156 of the Amiri Decree No. 23 of
1976.
The courts of the forum (local Court) will not enforce any
foreign claim obnoxious to the forums public policy. To
enforce the one-year prescriptive period of the Amiri
Decree No. 23 of 1976 as regards the claims in question
would contravene the public policy on the protection to
labor.
In the Declaration of Principles and State Policies, the
1987 Constitution emphasized that:The state shall
promote social justice in all phases of national
development (Sec. 10).
The state affirms labor as a primary social economic
force. It shall protect the rights of workers and promote
their welfare (Sec. 18).
In Article XIII on Social Justice and Human Rights, the
1987 Constitution provides:
Sec. 3. The State shall afford full protection to labor,
local and overseas, organized and unorganized, and
promote full employment and equality of employment
opportunities for all.
Thus, the applicable law on prescription is the Philippine
law.
The next question is whether the prescriptive period
governing the filing of the claims is 3 years, as provided
by the Labor Code or 10 years, as provided by the Civil
Code of the Philippines.
Article 1144 of the Civil Code of the Philippines provides:
The following actions must be brought within ten years
from the time the right of action accross:
(1) Upon a written contract; (2) Upon an obligation
created by law; (3) Upon a judgment
In this case, the claim for pay differentials is primarily
anchored on the written contracts between the litigants,
the ten-year prescriptive period provided by Art. 1144(l)
of the New Civil Code should govern.
3. NO. A class suit is proper where the subject matter of
the controversy is one of common or general interest to
many and the parties are so numerous that it is
impracticable to bring them all before the court. When all
the claims are for benefits granted under the Bahrain law
many of the claimants worked outside Bahrain. Some of
the claimants were deployed in Indonesia under different
terms and condition of employment.
Inasmuch as the First requirement of a class suit is not
present (common or general interest based on the Amiri
Decree of the State of Bahrain), it is only logical that only
those who worked in Bahrain shall be entitled to rile their
claims in a class suit.
While there are common defendants (AIBC and BRII)
and the nature of the claims is the same (for employees
benefits), there is no common question of law or fact.
While some claims are based on the Amiri Law of
Bahrain, many of the claimants never worked in that
country, but were deployed elsewhere. Thus, each
claimant is interested only in his own demand and not in
the claims of the other employees of defendants. A
claimant has no concern in protecting the interests of the
other claimants as shown by the fact, that hundreds of
them have abandoned their co-claimants and have entered
into separate compromise settlements of their respective
claims. The claimants who worked in Bahrain can not be
allowed to sue in a class suit in a judicial proceeding.
WHEREFORE, all the three petitioners are DISMISSED.
2. HSBC VS. SHERMAN
FACTS: It appears that sometime in 1981, Eastern Book
Supply Service PTE, Ltd. (COMPANY), a company
incorporated in Singapore applied with and was granted
by HSBC Singapore branch an overdraft facility in the
maximum amount of Singapore dollars 200,000 with
interest at 3% over HSBC prime rate, payable monthly,
on amounts due under said overdraft facility.
As a security for the repayment by the COMPANY of
sums advanced by HSBC to it through the aforesaid
overdraft facility, in 1982, both private respondents and a
certain Lowe, all of whom were directors of the
COMPANY at such time, executed a Joint and Several
Guarantee in favor of HSBC whereby private respondents
and Lowe agreed to pay, jointly and severally, on demand
all sums owed by the COMPANY to petitioner BANK
under the aforestated overdraft facility.
The Joint and Several Guarantee provides, inter alia, that:
This guarantee and all rights, obligations and liabilities
arising hereunder shall be construed and determined
under and may be enforced in accordance with the laws
of the Republic of Singapore. We hereby agree that the
Courts of Singapore shall have jurisdiction over all
disputes arising under this guarantee.
The COMPANY failed to pay its obligation. Thus, HSBC
demanded payment and inasmuch as the private
respondents still failed to pay, HSBC filed A complaint
for collection of a sum of money against private
respondents Sherman and Reloj before RTC of Quezon
City.
Private respondents filed an MTD on the ground of lack
of jurisdiction over the subject matter. The trial court
denied the motion. They then filed before the respondent
IAC a petition for prohibition with preliminary injunction
and/or prayer for a restraining order. The IAC rendered a
decision enjoining the RTC Quezon City from taking
further cognizance of the case and to dismiss the same for
filing with the proper court of Singapore which is the
proper forum. MR denied, hence this petition.
ISSUE: Do Philippine courts have jurisdiction over the
suit, vis-a-vis the Guarantee stipulation regarding
jurisdiction?
HELD: YES
One basic principle underlies all rules of jurisdiction in
International Law: a State does not have jurisdiction in the
absence of some reasonable basis for exercising it,
whether the proceedings are in rem quasi in rem or in
personam. To be reasonable, the jurisdiction must be
based on some minimum contacts that will not offend
traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice
The defense of private respondents that the complaint
should have been filed in Singapore is based merely on
technicality. They did not even claim, much less prove,
that the filing of the action here will cause them any
unnecessary trouble, damage, or expense. On the other
hand, there is no showing that petitioner BANK filed the
action here just to harass private respondents.
**
In the case of Neville Y. Lamis Ents., et al. v. Lagamon,
etc., where the stipulation was [i]n case of litigation,
jurisdiction shall be vested in the Court of Davao City.
We held:
Anent the claim that Davao City had been stipulated as
the venue, suffice it to say that a stipulation as to venue
does not preclude the filing of suits in the residence of
plaintiff or defendant under Section 2 (b), Rule 4, ROC,
in the absence of qualifying or restrictive words in the
agreement which would indicate that the place named is
the only venue agreed upon by the parties.
Applying the foregoing to the case at bar, the parties did
not thereby stipulate that only the courts of Singapore, to
the exclusion of all the rest, has jurisdiction. Neither did
the clause in question operate to divest Philippine courts
of jurisdiction. In International Law, jurisdiction is often
defined as the light of a State to exercise authority over
persons and things within its boundaries subject to certain
exceptions. Thus, a State does not assume jurisdiction
over travelling sovereigns, ambassadors and diplomatic
representatives of other States, and foreign military units
stationed in or marching through State territory with the
permission of the latters authorities. This authority,
which finds its source in the concept of sovereignty, is
exclusive within and throughout the domain of the State.
A State is competent to take hold of any judicial matter it
sees fit by making its courts and agencies assume
jurisdiction over all kinds of cases brought before them
3. LAUREL VS GARCIA
Facts:
Petitioners seek to stop the Philippine Government to sell
the Roppongi Property, which is located in Japan. It is one
of the properties given by the Japanese Government as
reparations for damage done by the latter to the former
during the war.
Petitioner argues that under Philippine Law, the subject
property is property of public dominion. As such, it is
outside the commerce of men. Therefore, it cannot be
alienated.
Respondents aver that Japanese Law, and not Philippine
Law, shall apply to the case because the property is
located in Japan. They posit that the principle of lex situs
applies.
Issues and Held:
1. WON the subject property cannot be alienated.
The answer is in the affirmative.
Under Philippine Law, there can be no doubt that it is of
public dominion unless it is convincingly shown that the
property has become patrimonial. This, the respondents
have failed to do. As property of public dominion, the
Roppongi lot is outside the commerce of man. It cannot
be alienated.
2. WON Philippine Law applies to the case at bar.
The answer is in the affirmative.
We see no reason why a conflict of law rule should apply
when no conflict of law situation exists. A conflict of law
situation arises only when: (1) There is a dispute over the
title or ownership of an immovable, such that the capacity
to take and transfer immovables, the formalities of
conveyance, the essential validity and effect of the
transfer, or the interpretation and effect of a conveyance,
are to be determined; and (2) A foreign law on land
ownership and its conveyance is asserted to conflict with
a domestic law on the same matters. Hence, the need to
determine which law should apply.
In the instant case, none of the above elements exists.
The issues are not concerned with validity of ownership
or title. There is no question that the property belongs to
the Philippines. The issue is the authority of the
respondent officials to validly dispose of property
belonging to the State. And the validity of the procedures
adopted to effect its sale. This is governed by Philippine
Law. The rule of lex situs does not apply.
The assertion that the opinion of the Secretary of Justice
sheds light on the relevance of the lex situs rule is
misplaced. The opinion does not tackle the alienability of
the real properties procured through reparations nor the
existence in what body of the authority to sell them. In
discussing who are capable of acquiring the lots, the
Secretary merely explains that it is the foreign law which
should determine who can acquire the properties so that
the constitutional limitation on acquisition of lands of the
public domain to Filipino citizens and entities wholly
owned by Filipinos is inapplicable.
Facts: The subject property in this case is one of the 4
properties in Japan acquired by the Philippine
government under the Reparations Agreement entered
into with Japan, the Roppongi property. The said property
was acquired from the Japanese government through
Reparations Contract No. 300. It consists of the land and
building for the Chancery of the Philippine Embassy. As
intended, it became the site of the Philippine Embassy
until the latter was transferred to Nampeidai when the
Roppongi building needed major repairs. President
Aquino created a committee to study the
disposition/utilization of Philippine government
properties in Tokyo and Kobe, Japan. The President
issued EO 296 entitling non-Filipino citizens or entities to
avail of separations' capital goods and services in the
event of sale, lease or disposition.

Issues: Whether or not the Chief Executive, her officers
and agents, have the authority and jurisdiction, to sell the
Roppongi property.
Ruling: It is not for the President to convey valuable real
property of the government on his or her own sole will.
Any such conveyance must be authorized and approved
by a law enacted by the Congress. It requires executive
and legislative concurrence. It is indeed true that the
Roppongi property is valuable not so much because of the
inflated prices fetched by real property in Tokyo but more
so because of its symbolic value to all Filipinos, veterans
and civilians alike. Whether or not the Roppongi and
related properties will eventually be sold is a policy
determination where both the President and Congress
must concur. Considering the properties' importance and
value, the laws on conversion and disposition of property
of public dominion must be faithfully followed.
4. Aznar v. Garcia
Facts
Edward E. Christensen, an American citizen from
California and domiciled in the Philippines, left a will
executed in the Philippines in which he bequeathed Php
3,600.00 to Maria Helen Christensen ("Helen") and the
remainder of his estate to his daughter, Maria Lucy
Christensen Daney. The laws of California allows the
testator to dispose of his estate in any manner he pleases.
However, California law also provides that the personal
property of a person is governed by the laws of his
domicile. The executor, Adolfo C. Aznar, drew a project
of partition in conformity with the will. Helen opposed
the project of partition arguing that Philippine laws
govern the distribution of the estate and manner proposed
in the project deprived her of her legitime.
Issue
Whether or not the succession is governed by Philippine
laws.
Held
Yes. Philippine law governs.
Ratio
Article 16 of the Civil Code provides that the intrinsic
validity of testamentary dispositions are governed by the
national law of the decedent, in this case, California law.
The provision in the laws of California giving a testator
absolute freedom in disposing of his estate is the internal
law which applies only to persons domiciled within the
said estate. On the other hand, the provision in the laws of
California stating that personal property is governed by
the laws of the domicile of its owner is the conflict of laws
rule that applies to persons not domicile in the said state.
Accordingly, the laws of the Philippines, in which the
testator is domiciled governs the succession and the
regime of legitimes must be respected.
5. SALVACION VS. CENTRAL BANK
FACTS: Greg Bartelli, an American tourist, was arrested
for committing four counts of rape and serious illegal
detention against Karen Salvacion. Police recovered from
him several dollar checks and a dollar account in the
China Banking Corp. He was, however, able to escape
from prison. In a civil case filed against him, the trial court
awarded Salvacion moral, exemplary and attorneys fees
amounting to almost P1,000,000.00.
Salvacion tried to execute the judgment on the dollar
deposit of Bartelli with the China Banking Corp. but the
latter refused arguing that Section 11 of Central Bank
Circular No. 960 exempts foreign currency deposits from
attachment, garnishment, or any other order or process of
any court, legislative body, government agency or any
administrative body whatsoever. Salvacion therefore filed
this action for declaratory relief in the Supreme Court.
ISSUE: Should Section 113 of Central Bank Circular No.
960 and Section 8 of Republic Act No. 6426, as amended
by PD 1246, otherwise known as the Foreign Currency
Deposit Act be made applicable to a foreign transient?
HELD: NO.
The provisions of Section 113 of Central Bank Circular
No. 960 and PD No. 1246, insofar as it amends Section 8
of Republic Act No. 6426, are hereby held to be
INAPPLICABLE to this case because of its peculiar
circumstances. Respondents are hereby required to
comply with the writ of execution issued in the civil case
and to release to petitioners the dollar deposit of Bartelli
in such amount as would satisfy the judgment.
Supreme Court ruled that the questioned law makes futile
the favorable judgment and award of damages that
Salvacion and her parents fully deserve. It then proceeded
to show that the economic basis for the enactment of RA
No. 6426 is not anymore present; and even if it still exists,
the questioned law still denies those entitled to due
process of law for being unreasonable and oppressive.
The intention of the law may be good when enacted. The
law failed to anticipate the iniquitous effects producing
outright injustice and inequality such as the case before
us.
The SC adopted the comment of the Solicitor General
who argued that the Offshore Banking System and the
Foreign Currency Deposit System were designed to draw
deposits from foreign lenders and investors and,
subsequently, to give the latter protection. However, the
foreign currency deposit made by a transient or a tourist
is not the kind of deposit encouraged by PD Nos. 1034
and 1035 and given incentives and protection by said laws
because such depositor stays only for a few days in the
country and, therefore, will maintain his deposit in the
bank only for a short time. Considering that Bartelli is just
a tourist or a transient, he is not entitled to the protection
of Section 113 of Central Bank Circular No. 960 and PD
No. 1246 against attachment, garnishment or other court
processes.
Further, the SC said: In fine, the application of the law
depends on the extent of its justice. Eventually, if we rule
that the questioned Section 113 of Central Bank Circular
No. 960 which exempts from attachment, garnishment, or
any other order or process of any court, legislative body,
government agency or any administrative body
whatsoever, is applicable to a foreign transient, injustice
would result especially to a citizen aggrieved by a foreign
guest like accused Greg Bartelli. This would negate
Article 10 of the New Civil Code which provides that in
case of doubt in the interpretation or application of laws,
it is presumed that the lawmaking body intended right and
justice to prevail.