Vous êtes sur la page 1sur 7

BRYAN B.

FERNANDEZ
RULE 112, Section 3

Case 1:

G.R. Nos. 212140-41, January 21, 2015

SENATOR JINGGOY EJERCITO ESTRADA, Petitioner, v. BERSAMIN, OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, FIELD
INVESTIGATION OFFICE, OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, NATIONAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION AND
ATTY. LEVITO D. BALIGOD, Respondents.

Facts:
On 25 November 2013, the Ombudsman served upon Sen. Estrada a copy of the complaint in OMB-
C-C-13-0313, filed by the NBI and Atty. Baligod, which prayed, among others, that criminal proceedings for
Plunder as defined in RA No. 7080 be conducted against Sen. Estrada. Sen. Estrada filed his counter-affidavit
in OMB-C-C-13-0313 on 9 January 2014.

On 3 December 2013, the Ombudsman served upon Sen. Estrada a copy of the complaint in OMB-C-
C-13-0397, filed by the FIO of the Ombudsman, which prayed, among others, that criminal proceedings for
Plunder, as defined in RA No. 7080, and for violation of Section 3(e) of RA No. 3019, be conducted against
Sen. Estrada. Sen. Estrada filed his counter-affidavit in OMB-C-C-13-0397 on 16 January 2014.

On 20 March 2014, Sen. Estrada filed his Request to be Furnished with Copies of Counter-Affidavits of
the Other Respondents, Affidavits of New Witnesses and Other Filings (Request) in OMB-C-C-13-0313Sen.
Estradas request was made pursuant to the right of a respondent to examine the evidence submitted by
the complainant which he may not have been furnished (Section 3[b], Rule 112 of the Rules of Court) and to
have access to the evidence on record (Section 4[c], Rule II of the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the
Ombudsman).

On 16 June 2014, Sen. Estrada filed his Reply to the public respondents Comment. Sen. Estrada
insisted that he was denied due process in violation of Rule 112, Section 3. Although Sen. Estrada received
copies of the counter-affidavits of Cunanan, Amata, Relampagos, Buenaventura, Figura, Sevidal, as well as
one of Tuasons counter-affidavits, he claimed that he was not given the other documents.

Issue:
Whether or not petitioner Estrada was denied due process of law for failure to cross examine
witnesses against him.

Ruling:
No. A preliminary investigation is not the occasion for the full and exhaustive display of the parties
evidence; it is for the presentation of such evidence only as may engender a well-grounded belief that an
offense has been committed and that the accused is probably guilty thereof. We are in accord with the state
prosecutors findings in the case at bar that there exists prima facie evidence of petitioners involvement in
the commission of the crime, it being sufficiently supported by the evidence presented and the facts obtaining
therein. Likewise devoid of cogency is petitioners argument that the testimonies of Galarion and Hanopol
are inadmissible as to him since he was not granted the opportunity of cross-examination. It is a fundamental
principle that the accused in a preliminary investigation has no right to cross-examine the witnesses which
the complainant may present. Section 3, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court expressly provides that the
respondent shall only have the right to submit a counter-affidavit, to examine all other evidence submitted
by the complainant and, where the fiscal sets a hearing to propound clarificatory questions to the parties or
their witnesses, to be afforded an opportunity to be present but without the right to examine or cross-
examine. Thus, even if petitioner was not given the opportunity to cross-examine Galarion and Hanopol at
the time they were presented to testify during the separate trial of the case against Galarion and Roxas, he
cannot assert any legal right to cross-examine them at the preliminary investigation precisely because such
right was never available to him. The admissibility or inadmissibility of said testimonies should be ventilated
before the trial court during the trial proper and not in the preliminary investigation. Furthermore, the
technical rules on evidence are not binding on the fiscal who has jurisdiction and control over the conduct of
a preliminary investigation. If by its very nature a preliminary investigation could be waived by the accused,
we find no compelling justification for a strict application of the evidentiary rules.
BRYAN B. FERNANDEZ
RULE 112, Section 3
Case 2:
G.R. No. 190569 April 25, 2012

P/INSP. ARIEL S. ARTILLERO, Petitioner,


vs.
ORLANDO C. CASIMIRO, Overall Deputy Ombudsman, Office of the Deputy Ombudsman; BERNABE D.
DUSABAN, Provincial Prosecutor, Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Iloilo; EDITO AGUILLON,
Brgy. Capt., Brgy. Lanjagan, Ajuy, Iloilo, Respondents.

Facts:
This case pertains to the criminal charge filed by Private Inspector Ariel S. Artillero (petitioner)
against Barangay Captain Edito Aguillon (Aguillon) for violation of Presidential Decree No. (P.D.) 1866 as
amended by Republic Act No. (R.A.) 8249.

According to petitioner, although Aguillon was able to present his Firearm License Card, he was not
able to present a Permit to Carry Firearm Outside Residence (PTCFOR).

In a Resolution dated 10 September 2008, the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Iloilo City
recommended the dismissal of the case for insufficiency of evidence.Petitioner claims that he never received
a copy of this Resolution.

Thereafter, Provincial Prosecutor forwarded to the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman the Resolution
recommending the approval thereof.

The Office of the Ombudsman, approved the recommendation of Provincial Prosecutor Dusaban to
dismiss the case. It ruled that the evidence on record proved that Aguillon did not commit the crime of illegal
possession of firearm since he has a license for his rifle.
On 22 June 2009, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration (MR) of the 17 February 2009 Resolution, but
it was denied. Thus, he filed the present Petition for Certiorari via Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.

Issue:
Whether or not petitioner was denied his right to due process when he was not given a copy of
Aguillons Counter-affidavit, the Asst. Prosecutors 10 September 2008 Resolution, and the 17 February 2009
Resolution of the Office of the Ombudsman.

Ruling:

No. A complainant in a preliminary investigation does not have a vested right to file a Replythis
right should be granted to him by law. There is no provision in Rule 112 of the Rules of Court that gives the
Complainant or requires the prosecutor to observe the right to file a Reply to the accuseds counter-affidavit.
The essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard. "What the law prohibits is not the
absence of previous notice but the absolute absence thereof and lack of opportunity to be heard." We have
said that where a party has been given a chance to be heard with respect to the latters motion for
reconsideration there is sufficient compliance with the requirements of due process.

At this point, this Court finds it important to stress that even though the filing of the MR cured
whatever procedural defect may have been present in this case, this does not change the fact that Provincial
Prosecutor Dusaban had the duty to send petitioner a copy of Aguillons Counter-affidavit. Section 3(c), Rule
112 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, grants a complainant this right, and the Provincial
Prosecutor has the duty to observe the fundamental and essential requirements of due process in the cases
presented before it. That the requirements of due process are deemed complied with in the present case
because of the filing of an MR by Complainant was simply a fortunate turn of events for the Office of the
Provincial Prosecutor.
BRYAN B. FERNANDEZ
RULE 112, Section 3
Case 3: G.R. No. 152429. March 18, 2005
ELIZABETH ED. LIM, Petitioners,
vs.
EDILBERTO D. ANG, Respondents.
Facts:
On December 12, 2000, Edilberto D. Ang filed a criminal complaint for violation of Batas Pambansa
(B.P.) Blg. 22, otherwise known as the Bouncing Checks Law, against Elizabeth Lim before the Municipal Trial
Court in Cities (MTCC) of Cauayan City, Isabela.

On December 13, 2000, the MTCC issued an Order stating that there was sufficient ground to hold the
accused for trial. Lim filed a motion to quash the complaint on the following grounds: (a) the facts charged
do not constitute a violation of B.P. Blg. 22 as the notice of dishonor was not sent to her as the drawer of the
check; (b) the supporting affidavit attached to the criminal complaint lacked the required certification by the
public prosecutor; (c) the December 13, 2000 Order violated her right to be informed of the nature and cause
of the accusation against her; and (d) there was no probable cause to charge her with any crime.

The public prosecutor opposed the motion and, at the same time, filed an amended criminal
complaint which included the affidavit of Ang containing the certification of the assistant provincial
prosecutor that he personally examined the affiant and was satisfied that the latter voluntarily executed and
understood the contents of the criminal complaint.

The petitioner contends that conformably with Section 3(b), in relation to Section 3(a), of Rule 112
of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, it behooved the MTCC to first determine the presence or absence
of probable cause by personally examining the complainant and his witnesses in writing and under oath.
Until then, the second amended criminal complaint cannot be considered filed; hence, it was premature for
the RTC to dismiss her petition for certiorari.

Issue:
Whether or not the dismissal of petition was premature since MTCC had not yet determined the
presence of probable cause under the second amended criminal complaint in violation of Rule 112, Section
3(b) in relation to Section 3(a) of the Rules of Criminal Procedure.

Ruling:
The petition is denied for lack of merit. The second amended criminal complaint was deemed filed
with the MTCC on December 12, 2001. It is of no moment that it had not yet determined the presence of
probable cause to hold the accused for trial and issue a warrant of arrest or summons or to dismiss the case.
What was before the MTCC was the second amended criminal complaint which contained all the essential
elements of violation of B.P. Blg. 22 and the certification of the public prosecutor under Section 3(a), Rule
112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. The public prosecutor appears to have personally examined
the private complainant on his affidavit and was satisfied that the latter voluntarily executed and understood
the same.
BRYAN B. FERNANDEZ
RULE 112, Section 3
Case 4:
HEIDE M. ESTANDARTE
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. Nos. 156851-55 February 18, 2008
FACTS:
Petitioner was the school principal of the Ramon Torres National High School (RTNHS) in Bago City,
Negros Occidental. Sometime in 1998, a group of concerned RTNHS teachers (private complainants), sent an
undated letter to the Schools Division of Bago City (Schools Division)5 attaching a list of 15 irregularities
allegedly committed by the petitioner, which the private complainants requested to be investigated. Two
complaints were eventually filed by private complainants against petitioner with the Office of the
Ombudsman-Visayas.

The Ombudsman-Visayas forwarded the complaint docketed as OMB-VIS-Crim-99-1094 to the Office


of the City Prosecutor of Bago City for preliminary investigation, instead of filing a counter-affidavit,
petitioner filed before the City Prosecutor a Motion for Bill of Particulars with Motion for Extension of Time
to File Counter-Affidavit. In the Motion for Bill of Particulars, petitioner alleged that there were no specific
criminal charges that were stated in the subpoenas. Thus, petitioner insisted that she cannot intelligently
prepare her counter-affidavit unless the criminal charges and the laws she violated are specified.

On March 10, 2000, the City Prosecutor issued an Order attaching the private complainants Bill of
Particulars, and directing the petitioner to file her counter-affidavit. Petitioner filed her counter-affidavit
limiting herself only to the charges specified in the Bill of Particulars. Petitioner claims that her right to due
process was violated when the Ombudsman-Visayas filed the Informations charging her with violations of
R.A. No. 3019, which went beyond the charges specified in the Bill of Particulars. Petitioner further argues
that since there were no criminal charges stated in the subpoenas served on her on August 28,
2000 and August 30, 2000, she was not properly informed of the nature of the crime which she was supposed
to answer in her counter-affidavit.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioner was denied due process.

RULING:

The petition was partially granted. In resolving the question whether petitioner was denied due
process, the RTC or this Court cannot rely on the disputable presumption that official duties have been
regularly performed. The RTC should have required the petitioner to submit the subpoenas and the attached
documents served on her to enable it to examine the same and resolve whether the petitioners right to be
informed was violated. It was only upon ascertaining this fact that the RTC could have validly determined
whether petitioner was denied due process.
While the Bill of Particulars is not allowed under the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the
Ombudsman and therefore should not be the basis for determining what specific criminal charges should be
filed against herein petitioner, it behooves the Ombudsman to accord the petitioner her basic rights to due
process in the conduct of the preliminary investigation.

In a preliminary investigation, Section 3, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court guarantees the petitioners
basic due process rights, such as the right to be furnished a copy of the complaint, the affidavits, and
other supporting documents, and the right to submit counter-affidavits and other supporting documents
in her defense.

It must be stressed that the primordial issue in the present petition is not whether the Ombudsman-
Visayas had correctly found a probable cause to justify the filing of the five Informations against herein
petitioner, but whether she was not accorded due process in the conduct of the preliminary investigation as
to entitle her to a reinvestigation. A valid and just determination of whether there is a probable cause on the
part of the Ombudsman to bring the cases to court against petitioner would ensue only when the petitioner
has been fully accorded due process in the conduct of the preliminary investigation.

The case is remanded to the trial court for determination whether petitioner was denied due process
in the conduct of the preliminary investigation.