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PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS.

NORIEL LACERNA Y
CORDERO & MARLON LACERNA Y ARANADOR, ACCUSED. MARLON LACERNA
Y ARANADOR, ACCUSED-APPELLANT. \

FACTS:

On September 12, 1992, Police Officer 3 (PO3) Carlito P. Valenzuela was assigned to
man the checkpoint and patrol the area somewhere along the sidestreets of Radial
Road near Moriones Street. At about 2:00 p.m., appellant and co-accused, who were
aboard a taxicab, passed by PO3 Valenzuelas place of assignment, looking suspicious.
Feeling that something was amiss, Valenzuela and his companion stopped the vehicle,
signaling the driver to park by the side of the road. Only after appellant agreed to have
his person and baggage checked did the actual search commence. PO3 Valenzuela
made a hole in the bag and peeped inside and he found several blocks wrapped in
newspaper, with the distinct smell of marijuana emanating from it. PO3 Valenzuela
opened one of the boxes and saw dried marijuana leaves. He told appellant and co-
accused that the contents of the bag were marijuana, which co-accused readily
affirmed.
Regional Trial Court of Manila convicted appellant Marlon Lacerna y Aranador of
violation of Section 4 of Republic Act No. 6425 while accused Noriel Lacerna, on the
other hand, was acquitted for insufficiency of evidence. Hence, only Marlon Lacerna (his
co-accused having been acquitted) interposed this appeal direct to the Supreme Court
in view of the life penalty imposed.
ISSUE:
1. Does appellants acts constitute the crime of giving away prohibited drugs
penalized by Section 4 of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended?
RULING:
The Court held NO. The phrase give away is commonly defined as to make a present
of; to donate, or to make a sacrifice.[31] As used in a statute making it an offense to
sell, give away, or otherwise dispose of liquor without a license, this phrase was
construed as extending only to a disposition in ejusdem generis with a sale or a gift. [32] It
is synonymous with to furnish, a broad term embracing the acts of selling and giving
away with the intent of transferring ownership. Selling by itself is one distinct mode of
committing the offense, and furnishing is intended only to include other modes of
affording something to others besides selling it.[33]

According to appellant, he gave the plastic bag and the knapsack to Noriel because the
latter got into the taxicab first and because there was more room in the backseat than in
the front. By handing the plastic bag to Noriel, appellant cannot be punished for giving
away marijuana as a gift or premium to another. In Cuison,[34] this Court acquitted an
accused of carrying and transporting prohibited drugs because the act per se of handing
over a baggage at the airport cannot in any way be considered criminal.
Appellants exoneration from giving away a prohibited drug to another under Section 4
of the Dangerous Drugs Act does not, however, spell freedom from all criminal liability.
A conviction for illegal possession of prohibited drugs, punishable under Section 8 of the
same Act, is clearly evident.
In the case at bar, appellant was found to have in his possession a plastic bag
containing 18 kg of marijuana formed into 18 bricks which were separately wrapped. His
possession thereof gives rise to a disputable presumption under Section 3[j], Rule 131
of the Rules of Court,[47] that he is the owner of such bag and its contents. His bare,
unpersuasive, feeble and uncorroborated disavowal -- that the plastic bag was allegedly
given to him by his uncle without his knowing the contents -- amounts to a denial which
by itself is insufficient to overcome this presumption.[48] Besides, this defense, unless
substantiated by clear evidence, is invariably viewed with disfavor by courts, for it can
just as easily be concocted. Verily, it is a common and standard defense ploy in most
prosecutions involving dangerous drugs.[49]

Further, the trial court did not give credence to appellants denial. It is axiomatic that
appellate courts accord the highest respect to the assessment of witnesses credibility
by the trial court, because the latter was in a better position to observe their demeanor
and deportment on the witness stand.[50] The defense failed to present sufficient
reasons showing that the trial court had overlooked or misconstrued any evidence of
substance that would justify the reversal of its rejection of appellants defense of denial.

Appellant is, therefore, liable for illegal possession of prohibited drugs under Section 8
of the Dangerous Drugs Act.[51]

Decision is hereby MODIFIED.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE VS. AARON BIONAT,


ACCUSED-APPELLANT.
FACTS:

The RTC rendered a decision and accused was guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder and
sentenced him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. Records show that ERNESTO ROMAY
sustained various kinds of wounds caused by some bladed and sharp pointed instruments The accused
interposed alibi and denial as his defense but The trial court rejected it for his failure to
overcome the positive identification made by and the affirmative testimony of the
prosecutions witnesses. Accused seasonably appealed to the SC which was
accepted.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the honourable Trial Court erred in finding the accused guilty
nothwithstanding absence of evidence as to the actual participation of the accused in
the alleged killing of the victim?

Ruling:

The Court affirmed the challenged decision.

Firstly, accused claims that it was error for the court to convict him of murder
absent an eyewitness detailing his actual participation in the killing of the victim.
While it is true that there was no eyewitness to the actual killing of Ernesto Romay,
this does not preclude accuseds conviction based on circumstantial evidence.

The following circumstances, duly established by the evidence for the prosecution
which the accuseds defense of alibi could not surmount, proved that the accused
was one of those who participated in the killing of Ernesto Romay and is therefore
guilty beyond reasonable doubt:

1. Accused was positively identified by both Myrna and Joseph Romay, the wife
and son of the victim, as one of the five armed men who called on their home and
invited her husband to come down as their commander was waiting for him
downstairs.

2. Her husband was tied-up upon going downstairs.

3. Accused was pinpointed by Myrna Romay as the one who pointed a gun at
her and told her to go upstairs and not cry or shout or else her family would be
killed as his other companions searched the house for guns prior to taking her
husband away..

4. The five men, one of whom was the accused, brought the victim out of the
house. That was the last time Myrna and her family saw the victim alive.

5. Ernesto Romay was found dead the next day, 50 meters from the road and
20 meters from his house, bearing stab wounds on different part of his body.[24]

It is thus apparent that accused was one of the last identified persons seen with the
victim before the discovery of the victims corpse the next day not far from where
he was picked up by the accused and his companions. Accuseds identity was
unmistakably confirmed by the victims wife and son when the accused had
occasion to escort one Escovidal, who happened to be the victims adversary in a
land dispute, to the victims farm only a couple of months after the victims violent
death.

Moreover, it is not indispensable that accused kill the victim himself. His actions
more than evince the fact that he conspired with his four companions to kill the
victim. For conspiracy to exist, it is not required that there be an agreement for an
appreciable period prior to the occurrence, it is insufficient that at the time of the
commission of the offense, the accused had the same purpose and were united in
its execution. Direct proof of a previous agreement to commit a crime is not
necessary; it may be deduced from the mode and manner in which the offense was
perpetrated, or inferred from the acts of the accused which point to a joint purpose
and design, concerted action and community of interest.[25] From the time accused
and his companions entered the victims house up to when they left taking the
victim with them, Bionat acted in unison with his companions.

the instant appeal is DISMISSED and the challenged decision the Regional Trial
Court is AFFIRMED .

SO ORDERED.

LOURDES A. VALMONTE AND ALFREDO D. VALMONTE, PETITIONERS,

VS.

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DIVISION AND ROSITA


DIMALANTA, RESPONDENTS.

FACTS:

Petitioners spouses Lourdes A. Valmonte and Alfredo D. Valmonte are all residents of
U.S.A. Petitioner Alfredo D. Valmonte, who is a member of the Philippine bar, however,
practices his profession in Manila, Philippines. Private respondent Rosita Dimalanta,
who is the sister of petitioner Lourdes, filed a complaint for partition of real property and
accounting of rentals against petitioners before the Regional Trial Court of Manila.
Petitioner Lourdes wrote private respondent s attorney that "all communications"
intended for her should be addressed to her husband who is also her lawyer at the
latters address in Manila. Service of summons was then made upon petitioner Alfredo,
who at the time, was at his office in Manila. He accepted the summons, in so far as he
was concerned, but refused to accept the summons for his wife on the ground that he
was not authorized to accept the process on her behalf. He thereafter filed his Answer
with Counterclaim. Petitioner Lourdes, however, did not file her Answer. For this reason
private respondent moved to declare the latter in default. Petitioner Alfredo entered a
special appearance in behalf of his wife and opposed the private respondents motion.
The trial court denied the motion which was granted by the Court of Appeals. Hence,
this petition.

VALMONTE vs. CA and ROSITA DIMALANTA. Facts: Petitioners Spouses Valmontes and
Respondent Dimalanta are all residents of the U.S.A. Petitioner Alfredo D. Valmonte, who is a
member of the Philippine bar, however, practices his profession in an office in Manila, Philippines.
Private respondent Rosita Dimalanta, sister of Lourdes A. Valmonte, filed a complaint for partition of
real property and accounting of rentals against the spouses before the Regional Trial Court of
Manila. The subject of the action is a three-door apartment located in Paco, Manila. In her
Complaint, private respondent alleged that the complaint may be served with summons at Ermita,
Manila where defendant Alfredo D. Valmonte as defendant Lourdes Valmonte s spouse holds
office and where he can be found. The foregoing averments were made on the basis of a letter sent
by petitioner Lourdes A. Valmonte to private respondent s counsel in which, in regard to the
partition of the property in question, she referred private respondent s counsel to her husband as
the party to whom all communications intended for her should be sent. Service of summons was
then made upon petitioner Alfredo, who was at his office in Manila. Petitioner Alfredo D. Valmonte
accepted the summons, insofar as he was concerned, but refused to accept the summons for his
wife, on the ground that he was not authorized to accept the process on her behalf. Accordingly the
process server left without leaving a copy of the summons and complaint for petitioner Lourdes A.
Valmonte. Petitioner Alfredo D. Valmonte thereafter filed his Answer with Counterclaim. Petitioner
Lourdes A. Valmonte, however, did not file her Answer. For this reason private respondent moved to
declare her in default. Petitioner Alfredo D. Valmonte entered a special appearance in behalf of his
wife and opposed the private respondent s motion. The trial court, denied private
respondent s motion to declare petitioner Lourdes in default. A motion for reconsideration was
similarly denied. Whereupon, private respondent filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition and
mandamus with the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals rendered a decision granting the petition
and declaring Lourdes A. Valmonte in default. Hence, this petition

ISSUE:

Whether or not petitioner Lourdes A. Valmonte was validly served with summons?
HELD:

The Court held that there was no valid service of process on Lourdes A. Valmonte. Rule
14, 17 of the Revised Rules of Court provides:

17. Extraterritorial service. - When the defendant does not


reside and is not found in the Philippines and the action affects
the personal status of the plaintiff or relates to, or the subject of
which is, property within the Philippines, in which the defendant
has or claims a lien or interest, actual or contingent, or in which
the relief demanded consists, wholly or in part, in excluding the
defendant from any interest therein, or the property of the
defendant has been attached within the Philippines, service may,
by leave of court, be effected out of the Philippines by personal
service as under Section 7; or by publication in a newspaper of
general circulation in such places and for such time as the court
may order, in which case a copy of the summons and order of
the court shall be sent by registered mail to the last known
address of the defendant, or in any other manner the court may
deem sufficient. Any order granting such leave shall specify a
reasonable time, which shall not be less than sixty (60) days after
notice, within which the defendant must answer.

Since in the case at bar, the service of summons upon petitioner Lourdes A. Valmonte
was not done by means of any of the first three modes. Furthermore, petitioner Lourdes
A. Valmonte did not appoint her husband as her attorney-in-fact. Although she wrote
private respondent s attorney that "all communications" intended for her should be
addressed to her husband who is also her lawyer at the latters address in Manila, no
power of attorney to receive summons for her can be inferred therefrom. In fact the
letter was written seven months before the filing of this case below, and it appears that it
was written in connection with the negotiations between her and her sister, respondent
Rosita Dimalanta, concerning the partition of the property in question. As is usual in
negotiations of this kind, the exchange of correspondence was carried on by counsel for
the parties. But the authority given to petitioners husband in these negotiations certainly
cannot be construed as also including an authority to represent her in any litigation.

The decision appealed from is REVERSED.

FIDEL C. CABARDO, PETITIONER, VS. THE COURT OF APPEALS AND JUANITO


C. RODIL, RESPONDENTS.

FACTS:
On October 26, 1987, Jose Peralta, a driver of the Consolidated Industrial Gases
Incorporated (CIGI) with his helper and pump operator, petitioner Fidel Cabardo while
driving the companys truck-tanker on the southbound lane of the South Luzon
Expressway, met an accident. Moments later, private respondent Juanito Rodil with his
wife Leveminda came along in a Toyota Corolla car, crashed into the underside of the
truck-tanker. As a result, petitioner Cabardo suffered a fractured left leg. He and the
Rodil spouses were taken to the hospital by passing motorists.

Petitioner Cabardo filed a complaint for damages against private respondent Juanito
Rodil in the Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan. Petitioner claimed that he and
Peralta were able to get out of the vehicle unhurt after the truck tanker fell on its right
side in the middle portion of the center island of the [South Luzon] Expressway; that, as
he was about to put up the early warning device, however, private respondent, driving a
Toyota Corolla in a reckless and negligent manner. . . , bumped the truck-tanker and hit
[him] on his left leg, causing him to be thrown off balance and lose consciousness and
that as a result, he suffered a fractured left leg and other injuries.

The RTC rendered judgment against private respondent Juanito Rodil. Private
respondent then appealed to the Court of Appeals which rendered its now questioned
decision reversing the RTCs decision. Petitioner Cabardo filed a motion for
reconsideration but his motion was denied by the Court of Appeals.

ISSUE:

whether petitioners injuries were caused by private respondents car

HELD :

After reviewing the evidence in this case, the Court are inclined to agree with the
trial courts finding that petitioners injuries were caused by private respondents
car. The Court of Appeals reversed the trial courts decision on the ground that
petitioner, as plaintiff below, failed to prove that he sustained injuries as a result of
having been hit by private respondents car and not as a result of the truck-tanker
having veered and rolled over its side. The appellate courts decision is based
mainly on alleged inconsistencies in the testimonies of petitioner and his witness
Jose Peralta.

Though, there are indeed inconsistencies but these are minor and inconsequential.
What is important is that the statements dovetail in essential details with the
testimonies given in court: Petitioner claimed that he was unhurt after their vehicle
turned turtle and fell on its side; that he and Jose Peralta, who was driving the
vehicle, got out of the truck-tanker; that he was asked by Peralta to put up the
EWD; and that petitioner was hurt because he was hit by private respondents car.
Petitioner said in court that he was hit while checking the pressure gauge. It is
possible that this happened before he could put up the EWD.

Indeed, it is more probable that petitioners injuries were caused by private


respondents car hitting him. First, as the Court of Appeals itself found, petitioner
was taken to a hospital in Bian, Laguna together with the Rodils. Had he been
injured earlier when the truck-tanker turned turtle, he would, in all probability,
have been taken for treatment much earlier.

Second, as the trial court observed:[31]

The plaintiff, as passenger of the truck-tanker was seated at the right side of the
driver. The driver did not sustain any injury. On the other hand, the plaintiff
sustained and was treated of the following injuries.

Fracture, closed, complete,


lateral tebial condyle, knee.

If the plaintiff sustained his injuries when the truck-tanker he was riding turned
turtle and landed on its right side in the center island of the expressway, it would
not have been on his left knee but in some parts of the body, more especially on
the right side that must have came in contact with the door. This is the law of
gravity, and testimony to the contrary should not be given credence. The plaintiff
was categorical in his testimony that after the car fell on its right side the driver
and he came out of the truck and he was already looking at the guage [sic] carrying
the EWD when the car hit him. The defendant, in contrast, did not state
categorically that his car did not hit the plaintiff. What defendant testified was that
he did not see a person hit by the car. Moreover, defendant admitted that
immediately before the accident he was driving on the left lane at the rate of 60 to
70 kilometers per hour and he could hardly see an object at a distance of ten (10)
meters because of the heavy rain.

The decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby REVERSED and that of the Regional
Trial Court is REINSTATED.

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