Appendix

C Screenshots from the experiment

Belowarescreenshotsfromtheexperiment.TheexperimentwasconductedinGerman,hence,
everythingshownbelowwastranslatedintoEnglish.

Figure3:Informationstage

Figure4:Contributionentry

Figure5:Auditstage(Noinformationtreatment)

25

Figure6:Auditstage(Partialandfullinformationtreatment)18

Figure7:ProfitDisplay

Thescreenshotshownreflectsthesituationinthenoinformationtreatment,wherenoindividual
informationisavailable.Inboththepartialandthefullinformationtreatmentindividualtaxesof
everysubjectarevisible.

18
In the partial information treatment only the left side of the screen was shown. In the full information
treatment the empty boxes on the outer right side of the screen were filled with subjects pictures.
26

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Impressum:
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