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UNCLASSIFIED

FOR TRAINING PURPOSES ONLY

United States Intelligence Command

J2 / Joint Intelligence Center


Atropia Monthly Intelligence Digest
January 2017

Executive Summary

(U) Intelligence confirms that after the withdrawal of Ariana conventional military forces, they
increased their support for an insurgency campaign with their SAPA counterparts. This is an
attempt to control and limit coalition force interactions with the local population, setting the
conditions for resumption of offensive operations with the 1st Ariana Mechanized Army.

(U) Increased attacks throughout Atropia signify that SAPA insurgents are not operating
autonomously. Intelligence confirms through classified sources that Ariana Military forces have
implanted a Battalion sized Special Purpose Forces unit from the 1st Bn 3251st Ariana Military in
Hardin Province, Atropia. Along with SAPA insurgents they will attempt to restrict Coalition
Forces / Host Nation Security Forces freedom of movement, gain control of key terrain,
personnel, and equipment, gain information, and disrupt CF/HNSF.

(U) Arianan forces have been conducting several attacks across Atropia, primarily targeting
Coalition Forces and HNSF. Arianan Forces have established successful resupply operations
within the region, with the support of the SAPA insurgency.

Discussion

1. (U) Area of Responsibility.

(U) Hardin Province, Atropia.

1) (U) 06 January 2017 intelligence confirms Arianan


Forces (AF) working with SAPA disabled a tank and killed two
Atropian soldiers with a large IED in Hardin Province, Atropia.
Media reported a day prior that an Atropian Armor unit
travelling north near Boyat clashed with AF receiving six
RPGs, and also fired at soldiers with small arms. Analyst
Comment: 1st Bn 3251st SPF are among the most experienced
and competent of Ariana Military elements in Atropia. The
recent ambush on an armor unit demonstrates their will and
capabilities. Sensitive intelligence indicates that Atropia is moving a small armor task force
south IOT push out remaining AF and secure southern Atropia. In addition to the armor,
UNCLASSIFIED
FOR TRAINING PURPOSES ONLY

extensive air defense and artillery packages will be co-located with them. This task force fills a
much needed void of military presence in the region. The presence of such a capable resistance
in the area it can be expected that the task force will ultimately be consumed in a
counterinsurgency battle full time.

2) (U) On 10 January 2017, SAPA insurgents attacked government, military, and


personnel. Armed insurgents assaulted facilities, vehicles, personnel, and homes in Boyat,
Cheyildagh, Aranli, Dunyamilar, Ashaghi, Dagdagan Ozla, Choobar Gavlan, and Carter Poladi.
According to an official Atropian statement the aforementioned attacks resulted in zero civilian
casualties and have been increasing weekly, resulting in several villages being abandoned. They
claim the SAPA Insurgents have been conducting the attacks to secure the southern communities
while destroying critical governmental infrastructure. Analyst Comment: The attacks
demonstrate that SAPA Insurgents are attempting to control the area and possibly set the
conditions to make Hardin Province the staging area for a 1st Ariana Mech Army attack. The
coordinated assaults demonstrate an advanced capability, not seen previously with SAPA
Insurgents. It is believed that SAPA Insurgents are receiving training and guidance from AF. In
return SAPA will supply AF with sustainment resources, and stock and defend local caches.

3) (U) On 28 January 2017, AF accompanied by SAPA Insurgents conducted raids in the


villages of Dunyamilar, Ashaghi, Dagdagan Ozla, Choobar Gavlan, and Carter Poladi. The raids
appear to be in coordination with the ongoing campaign attempting to restrict and control
government, military, and civilian freedom of movement throughout Hardin Province. The
villages that were attacked had a very small population still residing. Defeated elements were
reportedly not equipped to handle an attack of that magnitude initiated by AF and SAPA
Insurgents. Analyst Comment: The raids appear to have been conducted IOT minimize the
civilian population within Hardin Province, thus limiting the presence of HNSF, and
opportunities for CF/HNSF to gain intelligence. With only the larger villages still inhabited, this
allows AF and SAPA Insurgents to better control the population and use desolate villages for
their benefit.

2. (U) Tactics Techniques and Procedures (TTPs)

1) (U) Arianan forces have been conducting well-coordinated attacks against CF/HNSF.
These attacks primarily consist of an IED initiated device along with RPG, heavy machine gun,
and light machine gun fire. The attacks last for roughly an hour and intensify sporadically.

3. (U) Weapons
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FOR TRAINING PURPOSES ONLY

1) (U) The primary small weapon system SAPA Insurgents is the AK-47 assault rifle.
The AK-47 is a selective fire 7.62x39 mm assault rifle, with the max effective range
of 350 meters. Although there are several different variants of the AK-47 such as the
AK-47 type 1A and 1B, AK-74, and AKM, they all have the same general
capabilities with most of the variants being cosmetic. In addition to their primary
weapons SAPA forces possess various hand grenades. Smoke, fragment, and RKG-3
anti-tank grenades.

(U) Sharing POC: Regional Branch, Joint Intelligence Center, J2.

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