FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 208404, February 24, 2016

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. VICENTE LUGNASIN AND DEVINCIO

GUERRERO, Accused-Appellants.

DECISION

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:

For review is the January 23, 2013 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 02971, which
affirmed with modification the March 24, 2003 Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 76,
Quezon City, in Criminal Case No. Q-99-87600, entitled "People of the Philippines v. Vicente Lugnasin, Tito
Lugnasin, Excelso Lugnasin, Elmer Madrid, Rogelio Baldaba and Devincio Guerrero"wherein accused-
appellants Vicente Lugnasin (Vicente) and Devincio Guerrero (Devincio) were found guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of kidnapping for ransom.

On October 15, 1999, the Department of Justice filed an Information against Vicente, Devincio and four
other individuals, namely, Tito E. Lugnasin (Tito), Excelso B. Lugnasin (Excelso), Elmer A. Madrid (Elmer),
Rogelio D. Baldaba (Rogelio), and five other unidentified individuals: John Doe, Peter Doe, Richard Doe,
George Doe, and James Doe, for the crime of kidnapping for ransom defined and penalized under Article 267
of the Revised Penal Code. The Information reads:

That on or about April 20, 1999 in Quezon City and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court accused
VICENTE LUGNASIN, TITO LUGNASIN, EXCELSO LUGNASIN, ELMER MADRID, ROGELIO BALDABA, DEVINCIO
GUERRERO, and other persons whose identities ha[ve] not yet been ascertained, while conspiring, conniving
and confederating with one another, did then and there with criminal and malicious intent, with the use of
force, threat and intimidation, with firearms, take and carry away the person of Nicassius Cordero, to the
Municipality of Tanauan, Province of Batangas, detaining him thereat, depriving Nicassius Cordero of his
liberty, against his free will and consent, for the purpose of extorting ransom money for his safe release
from detention said demand for the payment of ransom money was made on the relatives of Nicassius
Cordero, and the same was release[d] in the evening of April 24, 1999 along the South Luzon Expressway.3

When arraigned on November 5, 2001, accused-appellant Vicente pleaded not guilty to the crime charged.
Accused-appellant Devincio likewise pleaded not guilty when he was arraigned on March 6, 2002. Both
accused-appellants made no stipulation during their respective pre-trial conferences except for their
identities and the jurisdiction of the court.

The nine other accused remain at large.

The facts succinctly synthesized by the RTC are as follows:

The prosecution's lone witness, Nicassius Cordero narrated in court how he was abducted while opening the
garage door of his residence in Mindanao Avenue in the late evening of April 20, 1999 by three armed men.
He identified Devincio Guerrero as the man with a 38 cal. revolver who came from his left side and pushed
him inside the car. The man who came from his right side and identified later as Tito Lugnasin drove the car
with Elmer Madrid riding at the back. After divesting him of his P5,000.00 cash and asking some questions,
he realized he was being kidnapped for ransom. Repeatedly, he declared that he was not a rich man. Along
Libis, another cohort, Celso Lugnasin, rode with them until they reached the South Superhi[gh]way and
after paying the toll fee, they drove on for about fifteen minutes and stopped just behind an owner type
jeepney before they switched places. The jcepney driver introduced himself as Commander and drove the
car. [Cordero] saw Commander's face. He was later identified as Vicente Lugnasin. After driving for some
minutes more, they alighted, [Cordero's] abductors placed the car's sunvisor around his face and ordered
him to walk barefooted towards a small house. [Cordero] was kept there for four days, while they
negotiated with Saleena, his sister-in-law for the ransom money. On the fourth day, Commander was
already angry and threatened to finish him off. He was eventually released, without ransom money being
paid.

Vicente Lugnasin, a resident of Luzviminda I, Dasmarifias Quezon City denied the accusation, saying he only
saw Cordero for the first time at the Department of Justice and Cordero could not even identify him. He
recounted that on May 14, 1999[,] while preparing for the town fiesta celebration, policemen came to his
residence and arrested him and his brother Tito [and] cousin Excelsio for alleged involvement in a robbery
case. They were tortured, then put on display for media men to feast on and for alleged victims to identify.
After posting bail, he was later arrested for illegal possession of firearms. He was also charged with two
other cases, a bank robbery and the Mercury Bank robbery, both pending before the sala of Judge Jose
Mendoza.

Devincio Guerrero, a fish vendor at the Pasig Market, likewise denies any involvement in the kindnap[ping]
of Cordero. He swears he saw him for the first time only in the courtroom. He recalled that nearing Holy
Week in 2002 [,] five uniformed policemen arrested him without a warrant in Lucena City, where he used to
buy smoked fish to sell. He was transferred to Camp Karingal before being detained at the QC Jail, where he
is detained up to the present. On May 14, 1999[,] he was a sponsor at a baptism of the child of
his kumpadre in Bgy. Luzviminda, Dasmarinas, Cavite. On his way home, he was accosted by police officers
while urinating along the roadside. He was detained first at the Cavite City Jail then at the Trece Martires
jail. He saw Vicente Lugnasin only at the Quezon City Jail.4

The Court of Appeals also made a finding that accused-appellant Vicente made known their intentions when
he asked Cordero about his work, family, and a contact person, and told him that they would be demanding
30 Million Pesos as ransom for his release.5

Ruling of the RTC

On March 24, 2003, the RTC, resolving the lone issue of "whether [or not] Cordero's identification of Vicente
Lugnasin and Devincio Guerrero as among his kidnappers is reliable"6 promulgated its Decision, finding both
accused-appellants guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged, to wit:

WHEREFORE, finding the accused Vicente Lugnasin and Devincio Guerrero guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of kidnapping for ransom described and penalized under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended by Republic Act No. 7659 in conspiracy with each other and other Does, the Court hereby
sentences them to each suffer the penalty of Death and to indemnify jointly and severally the private
complainant Nicassius Cordero the amount of P50,000.00 as moral damages.

The warrants of arrest issued against the other accused remain.7ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

In convicting the accused-appellants, the RTC found Cordero to be a careful, truthful, and candid witness,
whose story was supported by the evidence submitted. It added that this was in contrast to the accused-
appellants' bare denial of their participation in the kidnapping. The RTC also pointed out that Cordero was
able to identify both accused-appellants as he saw their faces before he was blindfolded.

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

On January 23, 2013, the Court of Appeals affirmed the accused-appellants' conviction with modification as
to the penalty. The fallo of the Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeals are hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.

The Decision dated March 24, 2003 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 76, Quezon City, in Criminal Case No.
Q-99-87600, is MODIFIED in that the penalty of death imposed upon appellants
is AMENDED to Reclusion Perpetua, without the possibility of parole.8ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

The Court of Appeals held that the elements of the crime of kidnapping for ransom were established by the
prosecution through its lone witness, Cordero, whose credible testimony should be accorded great weight. It
also ruled that Cordero's identification of his abductors conformed to the stringent guidelines of out-of court
identification, contrary to accused-appellant Devincio's assertion that it was marked with suggestiveness.9

As regards accused-appellant Devincio's argument that his warrantless arrest was illegal since it did not fall
under Section 6, Rule 109 of the Rules of Procedure, as amended, the Court of Appeals held that accused-
appellant Devincio's right to question his arrest and subsequent inquest/preliminary investigation is deemed
waived due to his failure to raise such argument before his arraignment.10

Addressing accused-appellant Devincio's claim that his rights under Republic Act No. 7438, entitled "An Act
Defining Certain Rights of Person Arrested, Detained or Under Custodial Investigation as well as the Duties
of the Arresting, Detaining and Investigating Officers and Providing Penalties for Violations Thereof were
violated, the Court of Appeals pointed out that he neither offered any evidence nor executed an extrajudicial
confession or admission for such allegation.11

Finally, in light of Republic Act No. 9346, which prohibits the imposition of the death penalty, the Court of
Appeals modified the penalty from Death to reclusion perpetua without the possibility of parole.12

Both accused-appellants are now before this Court praying for a reversal of their conviction on the same
arguments upon which their appeal to the Court of Appeals were anchored.13

Issues

Accused-appellant Devincio assigned the following errors in his Appellant's Brief:

THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING FULL WEIGHT AND CREDENCE TO THE TESTIMONY OF THE
LONE PROSECUTION WITNESS.

II

THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING [DEVINCIO] GUILTY NOTWITHSTANDING THE PRESENCE
OF SUGGESTIVENESS IN [THE] IDENTIFICATION BY THE PRIVATE COMPLAINANT OF THE APPELLANT AS
ONE OF HIS ABDUCTORS.

III

THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT FINDING [DEVINCIO] 'S WARRANTLESS ARREST AS ILLEGAL.

IV

THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT [DEVINCIO]'S RIGHTS UNDER REPUBLIC ACT
NO. 7438 (AN ACT DEFINING CERTAIN RIGHTS OF PERSONS ARRESTED, DETAINED OR UNDER CUSTODIAL
INVESTIGATION AS WELL AS THE DUTIES OF THE ARRESTING, DETAINING AND INVESTIGATING
OFFICERS, AND PROVIDING PENALTIES FOR VIOLATIONS THEREOF) WERE VIOLATED.14

Accused-appellant Vicente, for his part, posed a lone error:

THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING [VICENTE] DESPITE THE PROSECUTION'S FAILURE TO
PROVE HIS GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.15ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

Ruling of this Court

This Court finds no compelling reason to overturn the assailed judgment of conviction.

Elements of Kidnapping for Ransom

established.

The accused-appellants were charged and convicted under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code as
amended by Republic Act No. 7659,16viz.:

ART. 267. Kidnapping and serious illegal detention. Any private individual who shall kidnap or detain
another, or in any other manner deprive him of his liberty, shall suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua to
death:

1. If the kidnapping or detention shall have lasted more than three days.
2. If it shall have been committed simulating public authority.

3. If any serious physical injuries shall have been inflicted upon the person kidnapped or detained; or
if threats to kill him shall have been made.
 4. If the person kidnapped or detained shall be a minor, except when the accused is any of the
parents, female, or a public officer.

The penalty shall be death where the kidnapping or detention was committed for the purpose of extorting
ransom from the victim or any other person, even if none of the circumstances above-mentioned were
present in the commission of the offense.

When the victim is killed or dies as a consequence of the detention or is raped, or is subjected to torture or
dehumanizing acts, the maximum penalty shall be imposed.

From the aforequoted provision, in prosecuting a case involving the crime of Kidnapping for Ransom, the
prosecution must establish the following elements: (i) the accused was a private person; (ii) he kidnapped
or detained or in any manner deprived another of his or her liberty; (iii) the kidnapping or detention was
illegal; and (iv) the victim was kidnapped or detained for ransom.17

A painstaking review of the present case clearly shows that all the aforestated elements were proven in the
criminal case on review.

The testimony of Cordero sufficiently established the commission of the crime and both the accused-
appellants' culpability. He positively identified in and out of court accused-appellants Vicente and Devincio as
two of his abductors. As the kidnap victim, a private individual, Cordero's positive identification of both
accused-appellants - as two of several men who abducted him from the gate of his house, who brought him
to a hut somewhere in the south, who chained him to a bed, who essentially deprived him of liberty without
lawful cause for four days, and, which deprivation of his liberty was for the purpose of extorting ransom
from his family -collectively establish the crime of kidnapping for ransom as the actions of both the accused-
appellants were certain and clear, and their intent was explicit and made known to Cordero himself.

Identification of the
Accused-Appellants.

This Court cannot sustain both accused-appellants' arguments casting doubt on Cordero's positive
identification of their participation in the commission of the crime. As oft-explained, when the credibility of a
witness is in issue, the findings of fact of the trial court, its calibration of the testimonies of the witnesses
and its assessment of the probative weight thereof, as well as its conclusions anchored on said findings are
accorded high respect if not conclusive effect. This holds truer if such findings are affirmed by the appellate
court. Without any clear showing that the trial court and the appellate court overlooked, misunderstood or
misapplied some facts or circumstances of weight and substance, the rule should not be disturbed.18

Herein, there is nothing farfetched or incredible in Cordero's testimony. Both accused-appellants failed to
show that it was physically impossible for Cordero to recognize them, as in fact, Cordero had the unhindered
view of his captors' faces before he was even blindfolded. Therefore, Cordero's eyewitness account deserves
full faith and credit.

But accused-appellant Devincio avers that the length of time, which has elapsed from the time Cordero was
released, up to the time he identified his abductors would have already affected his memory, such that the
possibility of error in his identification of the abductors could not be discounted. He also insists that
Cordero's "subsequent identification of [him],in open court should be disregarded since the initial
identification was seriously flawed, i.e., it was characterized by suggestiveness."19

On the other hand, accused-appellant Vicente argues that although denial is an inherently weak defense, it
assumes importance and acquires commensurate strength when the prosecution's evidence, particularly as
to the identity of the accused as the author of the crime, is feeble, doubtful, inconclusive, or unreliable. He
says that Cordero's identification of his abductors was questionable due to the circumstances during his
abduction and detention, i.e., it was dark when he was abducted, he was instructed to go down on the floor
of the vehicle and not to look at his kidnappers, he was blindfolded, and his eyeglasses were removed.20

With the foregoing, both accused-appellants claim that the RTC erred in relying on Cordero's identification of
them as two of his abductors as it was doubtful and unreliable.

This Court disagrees.

The trial court and the Court of Appeals correctly found the out-of-court identification made by Cordero to
have satisfied the totality of circumstances test.

People v. Teehankee, Jr.21 is instructive on the rules and test for a valid out-of-court identification:

Out-of-court identification is conducted by the police in various ways. It is done thru show-ups where the
suspect alone is brought face to face with the witness for identification. It is done thru mug shots where
photographs are shown to the witness to identify the suspect. It is also done thru line-ups where a witness
identifies the suspect from a group of persons lined up for the purpose. Since corruption of out-of-court
identification contaminates the integrity of in-court identification during the trial of the case, courts have
fashioned out rules to assure its fairness and its compliance with the requirements of constitutional due
process. In resolving the admissibility of and relying on out-of-court identification of suspects, courts have
adopted the totality of circumstances test where they consider the following factors, viz.: (1) the witness'
opportunity to view the criminal at the time of the crime; (2) the witness' degree of attention at that time;
(3) the accuracy of any prior description given by the witness; (4) the level of certainty demonstrated by the
witness at the identification; (5) the length of time between the crime and the identification; and, (6) the
suggestiveness of the identification procedure. (Citation omitted.)

Cordero was able to see the faces of the men who abducted him from his house due to the light emanating
from the pedestrian gate. He was also able to describe how these men approached him, the kind of firearms
they were carrying, how the men acted where they passed, where he was taken, and even the sounds he
heard. Cordero's testimonies were replete with detailed descriptions of how he was abducted and who
abducted him. To top it all, he was confident that he could identify his abductors, as he did at the Criminal
Investigation and Detection Group (CIDG), Camp Pantaleon Garcia, Imus, Cavite,22 and in open court.

This Court notes with approval the observation of the RTC, viz.:

Cordero gave a detailed narration of his abduction that fateful night of April 20, 1999. We observed his
demeanor, his reactions to questions asked of him. He was a careful witness, truthful and candid. At times,
we noted that he was in tears at the painful recollection of the horror he went through. His story was
supported by the evidence submitted.23

And as the Court of Appeals said, "Cordero was endeavoring to remember faces and incidents and etch
these in his memory."24 In People v. Martinez25 we held:

Common human experience tells us that when extraordinary circumstances take place, it is natural for
persons to remember many of the important details. This Court has held that the most natural reaction of
victims of criminal violence is to strive to see the features and faces of their assailants and observe the
manner in which the crime is committed, xxx. All too often, the face of the assailant and his body
movements create a lasting impression on the victim's mind and cannot thus be easily erased from his
memory.

Cordero positively identified both accused-appellants Devincio and Vicente as two of his kidnappers. He saw
both accused-appellants' faces before he was blindfolded. Thus, it cannot be said that the length of time
between the crime and the identification of the accused-appellants, which was only 26 days, had any effect
on Cordero's memory, to render his positive identification flawed.

Accused-appellant Devincio's contention that Cordero's out-of-court identification was marked by

suggestiveness must similarly fail for his failure to support it by solid evidence. The only reason he gave for
such argument was Cordero's knowledge that the persons who were being investigated in connection with a
robbery case were included in the police or photographic line-up. However, that is not enough to strike down
Cordero's identification for being tainted. The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) was on point when it
quoted this Court's ruling in People v. Villena26 as follows:

Eyewitness identification is often decisive of the conviction or acquittal of an accused. Identification of an

accused through mug shots is one of the established procedures in pinning down criminals. However, to
avoid charges of impermissible suggestion, there should be nothing in the photograph that would
focus attention on a single person, x x x. (Citation omitted.)

As the OSG averred, the photographs shown to Cordero contained nothing to suggest whom he should pick
and identify as his abductors. Cordero testified as follows:
Cordero They asked me to see a lineup and I said I was still very afraid of them so they showed me different
photographs and asked if I co[u]ld identify who my abductors were and from a series of photos, I was able
to identify Vicente Lugnasin, Celso Lugnasin, Elmer Madrid, Guerrero and I could not yet identify de Chaves
but I saw him there walking around.28

But assuming for the sake of argument that Cordero's out-of-court identification was improper, it will have
no bearing on the conviction of the accused-appellants. We have ruled as follows:

[I]t is settled that an out-of-court identification does not necessarily foreclose the admissibility of an
independent in-court identification and that, even assuming that an out-of-court identification was tainted
with irregularity, the subsequent identification in court cured any flaw that may have attended it.
xxx.29 (Citation omitted.)

Cordero's in-court identification was made with certainty when he pointed to both accused-appellants in
court when he was asked to identify them from among the people inside the courtroom.

It is apparent in the case at bar that Cordero was able to categorically, candidly, and positively identify both
accused-appellants as two of his abductors both outside and inside the court. Thus, his identification of the
accused is worthy of credence and weight. This Court, in People v. Cenahonon30said:

An affirmative testimony merits greater weight than a negative one, especially when the former comes from
a credible witness. Categorical and positive identification of an accused, without any showing of ill motive on
the part of the witness testifying on the matter, prevails over alibi and denial, which are negative and self-
serving evidence undeserving of real weight in law unless substantiated by clear and convincing evidence.
(Citation omitted.)

As to the Alleged Illegality of Accused-

appellant Devincio Guerrero's
Warrantless Arrest and the Violation
of His Rights Under Republic Act
No. 7438.

Accused-appellant Devincio insists that his warrantless arrest was illegal for not falling under the permissible
warrantless arrests enumerated in Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court.31 This being the case, accused-
appellant Devincio says, the RTC had no jurisdiction to render judgement over his person. He also claims
that there was no showing that he was informed of his Constitutional rights at the time of his arrest and his
rights under Sections 2 and 3 of Republic Act No. 7438 during investigation.32

As the Court of Appeals has already pointed out, that accused-appellant Devincio raised none of these issues
anytime during the course of his trial. These issues were raised for the first time on appeal before the Court
of Appeals. We affirm the ruling of the Court of Appeals and quote below Miclat, Jr. v. People33on this Court's
treatment of an accused's belated allegation of the illegality of his warrantless arrest:

At the outset, it is apparent that petitioner raised no objection to the irregularity of his arrest before his
arraignment. Considering this and his active participation in the trial of the case, jurisprudence dictates that
petitioner is deemed to have submitted to the jurisdiction of the trial court, thereby curing any defect in his
arrest. An accused is estopped from assailing any irregularity of his arrest if he fails to raise this issue or to
move for the quashal of the information against him on this ground before arraignment. Any objection
involving a warrant of arrest or the procedure by which the court acquired jurisdiction over the person of the
accused must be made before he enters his plea; otherwise, the objection is deemed waived.

In the present case, at the time of petitioner's arraignment, there was no objection raised as to the
irregularity of his arrest. Thereafter, he actively participated in the proceedings before the trial court. In
effect, he is deemed to have waived any perceived defect in his arrest and effectively submitted himself to
the jurisdiction of the court trying his case. At any rate, the illegal arrest of an accused is not sufficient
cause for setting aside a valid judgment rendered upon a sufficient complaint after a trial free from error. It
will not even negate the validity of the conviction of the accused. (Citations omitted.)

The foregoing ruling squarely applies to accused-appellants Devincio and Vicente who failed to raise their
allegations before their arraignment. They actively participated in the trial and posited their defenses
without mentioning the alleged illegality of their warrantless arrests. They are deemed to have waived their
right to question their arrests.
As regards accused-appellant Devincio's argument that his rights under Republic Act No. 7438 were
violated, we likewise uphold the following ruling of the Court of Appeals:

With respect to appellant Devincio's argument that his rights under RA 7438 were violated while he was
under custodial investigation, aside from his bare-faced claim, he has offered no evidence to sustain such
claim; and appellant Devincio (or appellant Vicente, for that matter) has not executed an extrajudicial
confession or admission for, as stated in People vs. Buluran and Valenzuela:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
There is no violation of the constitutional rights of the accused during custodial investigation since neither
one executed an extrajudicial confession or admission. In fact, the records show that appellant Cielito
Buluran opted to remain silent during custodial investigation. Any allegation of violation of rights during
custodial investigation is relevant and material only to cases in which an extrajudicial admission or
confession extracted from the accused becomes the basis of their conviction.34 (Citation omitted.)

Damages Awarded.

The RTC awarded Cordero Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) as moral damages. However, pursuant to
prevailing jurisprudence, the Court finds it proper to modify such award as follows:

1. P100,000.00 as civil indemnity;

2. P100,000.00 as moral damages; and
3. P100,000.00 as exemplary damages to set an example for the public good.35

"The award of exemplary damages is justified, the lowering of the penalty to reclusion perpetua in view of
the prohibition of the imposition of the death penalty notwithstanding, it not being dependent on the actual
imposition of the death penalty but on the fact that a qualifying circumstance warranting the imposition of
the death penalty attended the kidnapping."36

The accused-appellants shall be jointly and severally liable for these amounts awarded in favor of Cordero.
In addition, these amounts shall accrue interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum, to earn from the
date of the finality of this Court's Decision until fully paid.37

WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated January 23, 2013 in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 02971
finding accused-appellants Vicente Lugnasin and Devincio Guerrero GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of kidnapping for ransom under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 8 of
Republic Act No. 7659, and sentencing them to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetuawithout eligibility of
parole is AFFIRMED with modification. Accused-appellants Vicente Lugnasin and Devincio Guerrero are
ordered to pay Nicassius Cordero the following:

1. P100,000.00 as civil indemnity;

2. P100,000.00 as moral damages; and
3. P100,000.00 as exemplary damages.

The foregoing amounts shall accrue interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum, to earn from the
date of the finality of this Decision until fully paid.

SO ORDERED.cralawlawlibrary

Sereno, C.J, (Chairperson), Bersamin, Perlas-Bernabe, and Caguioa, JJ., concur.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

EN BANC

G.R. No. 174471, January 12, 2016

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, v. JERRY PEPINO Y RUERAS AND PRECIOSA GOMEZ Y
CAMPOS, Respondents.

DECISION

BRION, J.:

This is an appeal filed by Jerry Pepino (Pepino) and Preciosa Gomez (Gomez) assailing the June 16, 2006
decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 02026.

ANTECEDENTS

The prosecution evidence showed that at 1:00 p.m., on June 28, 1997, two men and a woman entered the
office of Edward Tan at Kilton Motors Corporation in Sucat, Paranaque City, and pretended to be customers.
When Edward was about to receive them, one of the men, eventually identified as Pepino, pulled out a gun.
Thinking that it was a holdup, Edward told Pepino that the money was inside the cashier's box. Pepino and
the other man looted the cashier's box, handcuffed Edward, and forced him to go with them.2 From the
hallway, Jocelyn Tan (mentioned as "Joselyn" in some parts of the record), Edward's wife, saw Pepino take
her husband. She went to the adjoining room upon Edward's instructions.3chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Pepino brought Edward to a metallic green Toyota Corolla where three other men were waiting inside. The
woman (later identified as Gomez) sat on the front passenger seat.4 The abductors then placed surgical tape
over Edward's eyes and made him wear sunglasses. After travelling for two and a half hours, they arrived at
an apartment in Quezon City. The abductors removed the tape from Edward's eyes, placed him in a room,
and then chained his legs. Pepino approached Edward and asked for the phone number of his father so that
he could ask for ransom for his (Edward's) liberty. Edward told Pepino to negotiate with his wife, but the
latter insisted on talking to his father.5chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

At around 5:00 p.m. of the same day, the kidnappers called Edward's father and demanded a P40 million
ransom for his release. Edward's father told the kidnappers that he did not have that amount. The abductors
negotiated with Jocelyn who eventually agreed to a P700,000.00 ransom. The kidnappers told Jocelyn to
pack the money into two packages and to drop these at a convenience store in front of McDonald's at
Mindanao Avenue. They further demanded that Edward's vehicle be used to bring the
money.6chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

After four days, or on July 1, 1997, Antonio Gepiga (the family driver) brought the agreed amount to the 7-
Eleven convenience store at Mindanao Avenue as instructed.7 That evening, three men and Gomez
blindfolded Edward, made him board a car, and drove around for 30 minutes. Upon stopping, they told
Edward that he could remove his blindfold after five minutes. When Edward removed his blindfold, he found
himself inside his own car parked at the UP Diliman Campus. He drove home and reported his kidnapping to
Teresita Ang See, a known anti-crime crusader.8chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

After five months, the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) informed Edward that they had apprehended
some suspects, and invited him to identify them from a lineup consisting of seven persons: five males and
two females. Edward positively identified Pepino, Gomez, and one Mario Galgo.9 Jocelyn likewise identified
Pepino.10chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Pepino and Gomez did not testify for their defense. The defense instead presented Zeny Pepino, Reynaldo
Pepino, NBI Special Investigator Marcelo Jadloc and P/Sr. Insp. Narciso Quano (mentioned as "Qano" in
some parts of the record).

Zeny testified that she and her husband, Jerry Pepino, were inside their house in Cebu City on December 7,
1997, when about 20 heavily armed men entered their house looking for Jerry. When Jerry asked them if
they had a warrant of arrest, one of the men pointed a gun at him and handcuffed him; the armed men then
hit him with the butt of an armalite and punched him. The men also took Pepino's wristwatch and wallet, as
well as Zeny's bag and watch. Some of the armed men searched the second floor of the house, and found a
.45 caliber gun. The armed men brought Zeny and Pepino outside their house where Zeny saw Renato
Pepino and Larex Pepino already handcuffed. The armed men brought them to the Cebu City Police
Headquarters before bringing them to the NBI Headquarters in Manila. The following day, Jerry, Renato, and
Larex were brought to the Department of Justice (DOJ). Zeny, on the other hand, was released after being
detained at the NBI for three (3) days.11chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Reynaldo's testimony was summarized by the CA as follows:

x x x On December 6, 1997, he accompanied accused-appellant Gomez to his brother's sister-in-law who

happens to work in a recruitment agency. While they were inside the latter's house at Lot 2, Block 15,
Marikina Heights, Marikina City, they heard a noise at the gate. When he peeped through the window, he
saw two (2) motorcycles and two (2) Vannette vans. Shortly thereafter, someone kicked the back door and
several armed men emerged therefrom and announced their arrest. When he asked them if they had any
warrant, they replied: "Walang warrant, warrant. Walang search, search." They were then hogtied and made
to lie face down. Five (5) of them then went upstairs and seized his personal belongings together with his
briefcase which contained P45,000.00, documents of accused-appellant Gomez, and his .45 caliber pistol as
well as his license and permit to carry the same. No receipts were issued for their personal effects which
were confiscated. They were subsequently brought to Camp Crame and subjected to torture. The following
day, they were brought to the Department of Justice and a case for kidnapping was filed against him. Upon
reinvestigation, however, he was discharged from the Information and the court dismissed the case against
him.12chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

SI Jadloc and Police Senior Inspector Quano, Jr. were presented as hostile witnesses.

Jadloc declared on the witness stand that NBI Assistant Director Edmundo Arugay dispatched a team to
Cebu City to investigate a kidnap-for-ransom case. The team immediately conducted surveillance operations
when they arrived at Calle Rojo, Lahug, Cebu City. One of the team members saw Renato and Larex Pepino
with guns tucked in their waists. When the team approached them, the two men ran inside their house. The
team went after them and on entering the house, they saw Jerry in possession of a .45 caliber gun. The
team arrested Jerry, Renato and Larex, and then brought them to the NBI Headquarters in
Manila.13chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Quano testified that he was designated as the leader of a team tasked to arrest members of a kidnap-for-
ransom group at their safe house in Lot 2, Block 50, Marikina Heights, Marikina City. When they arrived
there, they introduced themselves as police officers. The police forcibly opened the door after the occupants
of the house refused to open the ground floor door. During their search at the second floor, the operatives
found an armalite and a .45 caliber gun. The members of the team handcuffed Gomez and Reynaldo, and
then brought them to Camp Crame.14chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

The prosecution charged Preciosa Gomez, Jerry Pepino, Reynaldo Pepino, Jessie Pepino, George Curvera,
Boy Lanyujan, Luisito "Tata" Adulfo, Henriso Batijon (a.k.a. Dodoy Batijon), Nerio Alameda, and an alias
Wilan Tan with kidnapping for ransom and serious illegal detention before the Regional Trial Court {RTC),
Branch 259, Paranaque City.15 Reynaldo was subsequently discharged after reinvestigation. Only Pepino,
Gomez, and Batijon were arraigned; their other co-accused remained at large.

In its May 15, 2000 decision, the RTC convicted Pepino and Gomez of kidnapping and serious illegal
detention under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code (as amended) and sentenced them to suffer the death
penalty. The RTC also ordered them to pay Edward P700,000.00 representing the amount extorted from
him; P50,000.00 as moral damages; and P50,000 as exemplary damages. The trial court acquitted Batijon
for insufficiency of evidence.

The RTC held that Edward positively identified Pepino and Gomez as two of the persons who forcibly
abducted him at gunpoint inside Kilton Motors, and who consequently detained him somewhere in Quezon
City for four (4) days until he was released inside the UP Diliman Campus after the payment of ransom. The
RTC added that Jocelyn corroborated Edward's testimony on material points. It also pointed out that Edward
identified both Pepino and Gomez at the lineup conducted inside the NBI compound, although Jocelyn only
recognized Gomez.

The RTC further ruled that the accused were already estopped from questioning the validity of their arrest
after they entered their respective pleas.

The case was automatically elevated to this Court in view of the death penalty that the RTC imposed. We
referred the case to the CA for intermediate review pursuant to our ruling in People v.
Mateo.16chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

In its decision dated June 16, 2006, the Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC decision with the modification
that the amounts of moral and exemplary damages were increased from P300,000.00 and P100,000.00,
respectively.

The CA held that Pepino and Gomez were deemed to have waived any objection to the illegality of their
arrests when they did not move to quash the information before entering their plea, and when they
participated at the trial.

The CA further ruled that Pepino and Gomez conspired with each other to attain a common objective, i.e., to
kidnap Edward in exchange for ransom.

While the case was under review by the Supreme Court, Pepino filed an urgent motion to withdraw his
appeal, which the Court granted.17] Only Gomez's appeal is now pending before us.

In her brief18 and supplemental brief,19 Gomez maintained that it was impossible for Edward to have seen
her in the front seat of the getaway car because he (Edward) was blindfolded. She also alleged that the
prosecution failed to prove that she had conspired with the other accused.

Gomez further claimed that Edward's identification of her during trial "may have been preconditioned x x x
by suggestive identification"20 made at the police lineup. She further argued that the death penalty imposed
on her is no longer proper due to the enactment of Republic Act No. 9346.

THE COURT'S RULING

We affirm Gomez's conviction, but we modify the penalty imposed and the awarded indemnities.

Illegality of the Arrest

We point out at the outset that Gomez did not question before arraignment the legality of her warrantless
arrest or the acquisition of RTC's jurisdiction over her person. Thus, Gomez is deemed to have waived any
objection to her warrantless arrest.

It is settled that [a]ny objection to the procedure followed in the matter of the acquisition by a court of
jurisdiction over the person of the accused must be opportunely raised before he enters his plea; otherwise,
the objection is deemed waived.21 As we held in People v. Samson:22chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

[A]ppellant is now estopped from questioning any defect in the manner of his arrest as he failed to move for
the quashing of the information before the trial court. Consequently, any irregularity attendant to his arrest
was cured when he voluntarily submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the trial court by entering a plea of
"not guilty" and by participating in the trial.23chanrobleslaw

At any rate, the illegal arrest of an accused is not sufficient cause for setting aside a valid judgment
rendered upon a sufficient complaint after a trial free from error. Simply put, the illegality of the warrantless
arrest cannot deprive the State of its right to prosecute the guilty when all other facts on record point to
their culpability. It is much too late in the day to complain about the warrantless arrest after a valid
information had been filed, the accused had been arraigned, the trial had commenced and had been
completed, and a judgment of conviction had been rendered against her.24chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Sufficiency of the Prosecution Evidence

a. Elements of kidnapping proved

The elements of kidnapping and serious illegal detention under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended, are: (1) the offender is a private individual; (2) he kidnaps or detains another or in any other
manner deprives the latter of his liberty; (3) the act of detention or kidnapping must be illegal; and (4) in
the commission of the offense, any of the following circumstances is present: (a) the kidnapping or
detention lasts for more than three (3) days; or (b) it is committed by simulating public authority; or (c)
serious physical injuries are inflicted upon the person kidnapped or detained or threats to kill him are made;
or (d) the person kidnapped or detained is a minor, female, or a public officer. If the victim of kidnapping
and serious illegal detention is a minor, the duration of his detention is immaterial. Likewise, if the victim is
kidnapped and illegally detained for the purpose of extorting ransom, the duration of his detention is also of
no moment and the crime is qualified and becomes punishable by death even if none of the circumstances
mentioned in paragraphs 1 to 4 of Article 267 is present.25cralawred
All these elements have been established by the prosecution. Edward positively identified Gomez and Pepino
- both private individuals - as among the three persons who entered his office and pretended to be Kilton
Motors' customers. He further declared that Pepino pointed a gun at him, and forcibly took him against his
will. To directly quote from the records:

ATTY. WILLIAM CHUA:

Q: Can you tell us if anything unusual happened to you on June 28, 1997?

EDWARD TAN:

A: I was kidnapped.

xxxx

Q: Can you tell this Court how the kidnapping was initiated?

A: At around 1:00 o'clock in the afternoon, there were three persons who entered the office of
Kilton Motors and pretended to be customers.

Q: What was the gender of these three persons that you are referring to?

A: Two men and a woman.

Q: After they pretended to be customers, tell us what happened?

A: They told me they were going to pay but instead of pulling out money, they pulled out a gun.

Q: How many people pulled out guns as you said?

A: Only one, sir.

Q: Will you look around this courtroom now and tell us if the person who pulled out a gun is in
court?

A: (WITNESS POINTED TO A PERSON AT THE RIGHT SECTION, SECOND ROW WHO, WHEN
ASKED HIS NAME, ANSWERED JERRY PEPINO)

Q: Now, you said that there were two men and a woman who went up the Kilton Motors Office and
you pointed to one of the men as Jerry Pepino, can you look around the courtroom and tell us if
any of the two others are in court?

A: (WITNESS POINTED TO A WOMAN INSIDE THE COURTROOM WHO, WHEN ASKED HER
NAME, ANSWERED AS PRECIOSA GOMEZ)

xxxx

Q: You said Mr. Pepino pulled out his gun, what happened after he pulled out his gun?

A: He told me just to be quiet and go with him.

Q: What was your reaction when he pointed a gun to you and he stated those words?

A: I thought it was only a holdup and so I told him there was money with the cashier and told him
to get it.

Q: What happened after you told him the money was in the cashier's box?
A: His companion took the money and told me to still go with them.

Q: When they told you to go with them, what happened next?

A: I told them why should I still go with them and then, I was handcuffed and was forced to go
down.

xxxx

Q: As they were bringing you down, what happened next, Mr. Witness?

A: When we went down nearing his car, I was boarded on [in] his car.

xxxx

Q: When they boarded you inside that car, what did they do to you, Mr. Witness?

A: They put surgical tape on my eyes and also sunglasses.

xxxx

Q: Who was at the passenger's front seat of the car?

A: It was Preciosa Gomez.26chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

xxxx
Edward further declared on the witness stand that Pepino, Gomez, and their other co-accused brought him
to a safe house in Quezon City; detained him there for four (4) days; and demanded ransom from his
(Edward's) family.

It is settled that the crime of serious illegal detention consists not only of placing a person in an enclosure,
but also in detaining him or depriving him of his liberty in any manner. For there to be kidnapping, it is
enough that the victim is restrained from going home. Its essence is the actual deprivation of the victim's
liberty, coupled with indubitable proof of the intent of the accused to effect such
deprivation.27chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Notably, Jocelyn corroborated Edward's testimony on the following points: Pepino poked a handgun at
Edward while they were on the second floor of Kilton; Pepino and his companion brought him downstairs and
out of the building, and made him board a car; and the kidnappers demanded ransom in exchange for
Edward's release.

Both the RTC and the CA found the respective testimonies of Edward and Jocelyn credible and convincing.
We affirm the credibility accorded by the trial court (and affirmed by the CA) to these prosecution witnesses,
in the absence of any showing that this factual finding had been arbitrarily arrived at. There is nothing in the
records that would put the testimonies of Edward and Jocelyn under suspicion. We recall that Edward had
close contacts with Pepino at Kilton Motors and at the safe house. He also saw Gomez (a) seated at the front
seat of the getaway Toyota Corolla vehicle; (b) at the safe house in Quezon City; and (c) inside the car
before the kidnappers released him.

Jocelyn, for her part, stated that she was very near Pepino while he was taking away her husband.

In People v. Pavillare,28 the Court found the testimonies of the private complainant Sukhjinder Singh and his
cousin, Lakhvir Singh, to be credible and convincing, and reasoned out as follows:

Both witnesses had ample opportunity to observe the kidnappers and to remember their faces. The
complainant had close contact with the kidnappers when he was abducted and beaten up, and later when
the kidnappers haggled on the amount of the ransom money. His cousin met Pavillare face to face and
actually dealt with him when he paid the ransom money. The two-hour period that the complainant was in
close contact with his abductors was sufficient for him to have a recollection of their physical appearance.
Complainant admitted in court that he would recognize his abductors if he sees them again and upon seeing
Pavillare he immediately recognized him as one of the malefactors as he remembers him as the one who
blocked his way, beat him up, haggled with the complainant's cousin and received the ransom money, x x x
It bears repeating that the finding of the trial court as to the credibility of witnesses is given utmost respect
and as a rule will not be disturbed on appeal because it had the opportunity to closely observe the demeanor
of the witness in court.29chanrobleslaw

b. Admissibility of Identification

We find no merit in Gomez's claim that Edward's identification of her during trial might have been
preconditioned by the "suggestive identification" made during the police lineup.

In People v. Teehankee, Jr.,30 the Court explained the procedure for out-of-court identification and the test
to determine the admissibility of such identifications in this manner:

Out-of-court identification is conducted by the police in various ways. It is done thru show-ups where the
suspect alone is brought face to face with the witness for identification. It is done thru mug shots where
photographs are shown to the witness to identify the suspect. It is also done thru lineups where a witness
identifies the suspect from a group of persons lined up for the purpose x x x In resolving the admissibility of
and relying on out-of-court identification of suspects, courts have adopted the totality of
circumstances test where they consider the following factors, viz: (1) the witness' opportunity to view the
criminal at the time of the crime; (2) the witness' degree of attention at that time; (3) the accuracy of any
prior description given by the witness; (4) the level of certainty demonstrated by the witness at the
identification; (5) the length of time between the crime and the identification; and (6) the suggestiveness of
the identification procedure.31chanrobleslaw

Applying the totality-of-circumstances test, we find Edward's out-of-court identification to be reliable and
thus admissible. To recall, when the three individuals entered Edward's office, they initially pretended -to be
customers,32 and even asked about the products that were for sale.33 The three had told Edward that they
were going to pay, but Pepino "pulled out a gun" instead.34 After Pepino's companion had taken the money
from the cashier's box, the malefactors handcuffed Edward and forced him to go down to the parked car.
From this sequence of events, there was thus ample opportunity for Edward - before and after the gun had
been pointed at him -to view the faces of the three persons who entered his office. In addition, Edward
stated that Pepino had talked to him "[a]t least once a day"35 during the four days that he was detained.

Edward also saw Gomez seated at the front seat of the getaway metallic green Toyota Corolla vehicle. In
addition, the abductors removed the tape from Edward's eyes when they arrived at the apartment, and
among those whom he saw there was Gomez. According to Edward, he was able to take a good look at the
occupants of the car when he was about to be released.

On the part of Jocelyn, she was firm and unyielding in her identification of Pepino as the person who pointed
a gun at her husband while going down the stairs, and who brought him outside the premises of Kilton
Motors. She maintained that she was very near when Pepino was taking away her husband; and that she
could not forget Pepino's face. For accuracy, we quote from the records:

ATTY. CORONEL:

Q: You stated that you were able to see one of the persons who kidnapped your husband, if you see
this person again, would you be able to identify him?

JOCELYN SY TAN:

A: Yes, sir.

Q: Can you look around the courtroom and see if the person you are referring to is here today?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: Can you point to him?

A: (WITNESS POINTED TO A MALE PERSON INSIDE THE COURTROOM WHO WHEN ASKED HIS
 NAME ANSWERED AS JERRY PEPINO).

Q: Ms. Witness, what role did this person whom you identified and gave his name as Jerry Pepino,
what role did he play in the kidnapping of your husband?

A: Siya po bale 'yong nakayakap sa husband ko tapos nakatutok ng baril.

xxxx

ATTY. ESTRUCO:

Q: When Jerry Pepino was at Kilton Motors, he embraced your husband?

JOCELYN SY TAN:

A: Yes, sir. And pointed a gun at my husband.

Q: And he was not blindfolded at that time?

A: No, he was not blindfolded, he was only wearing a cap.

Q: You are very sure that he is Jerry Pepino?

A: Yes, I am very, very sure. I could not forget his face.

Q: You are very sure?

A: Yes, sir. Kahit sa nightmare ko, kasama siya.

x x x x36

We add that no competing event took place to draw Edward's and Jocelyn's attention from the incident.
Nothing in the records shows the presence of any distraction that could have disrupted the witnesses'
attention at the time of the incident.37chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Jurisprudence holds that the natural reaction of victims of criminal violence is to strive to see the
appearance of their assailants and observe the manner the crime was committed. As the Court held
in People v. Esoy:38chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

It is known that the most natural reaction of a witness to a crime is to strive to look at the appearance of
the perpetrator and to observe the manner in which the offense is perpetrated. Most often the face of the
assailant and body movements thereof, create a lasting impression which cannot be easily erased from a
witness's memory. Experience dictates that precisely because of the unusual acts of violence committed
right before their eyes, eyewitnesses can remember with a high degree of reliability the identity of criminals
at any given time.39chanrobleslaw

While this pronouncement should be applied with great caution, there is no compelling circumstance in this
case that would warrant its non-application.

Contrary to what Gomez claimed, the police lineup conducted at the NBI was not suggestive. We note that
there were seven people in the lineup; Edward was not compelled to focus his attention on any specific
person or persons. While it might have been ideal if there had been more women included in the lineup
instead of only two, or if there had been a separate lineup for Pepino and for Gomez, the fact alone that
there were five males and two females in the lineup did not render the procedure irregular. There was no
evidence that the police had supplied or even suggested to Edward that the appellants were the suspected
perpetrators.

The following exchanges at the trial 'during Edward's cross-examination prove this point:
ATTY. ESTURCO:

Q: When they were lined up at the NBI, where were they placed, in a certain room?

EDWARD TAN:

A: Yes, sir.

Q: With a glass window? One way?

A: No, sir.

Q: You mean to say you were face to face with the alleged kidnappers?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: And before you were asked to pinpoint the persons who allegedly kidnapped you, you conferred
with the NBI agents?

A: The NBI agents told me not to be afraid.

Q: No, my question is, you conferred with the NBI agents?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: What is the name of the NBI agent?

A: I cannot remember, sir.

Q: And how many were lined up?

A: Seven, sir.

Q: And the NBI agent gave the names of each of the seven?

A: No, sir.<SUP STYLE="COLOR: RGB(255, 0, 0);">[40]</SUP>

We also note that Jocelyn's and Edward's out-of-court identifications were made on the same day. While
Jocelyn only identified Pepino, the circumstances surrounding this out-of-court identification showed that the
whole identification process at the NBI was not suggestive. To directly quote from the records:

ATTY. ESTURCO:

Q: How about the alleged kidnappers, where were they placed during that time?

JOCELYN TAN:

A: They were in front of us.

Q: Without any cover?

A: None, sir.

Q: Without any glass cover?

A: See-through glass window.

Q: One-way mirror?

A: Not one way, see-through.

Q: And before you were asked to pinpoint the alleged kidnappers, you were already instructed by
the NBI what to do and was told who are the persons to be lined up?

A: No, sir.

xxxx

Q: And between the alleged length of time, you were still very positive that it was Gerry (sic)
Pepino inside the NBI cell?

A: At first, I did not know that he was Jerry Pepino but we know his face.

Q: At first, you did not know that it was Jerry Pepino?

A: Yes, sir.

xxxx

Q: It was the NBI officer who told you that the person is Jerry Pepino, am I correct?

A: They identified that the person we identified was Jerry Pepino. We first pinpointed na heto ang
mukha at saka sinabi na 'yan si Jerry Pepino.

xxxx 41

These exchanges show that the lineup had not been attended by any suggestiveness on the part of the
police or the NBI agents; there was no evidence that they had supplied or even suggested to either Edward
or Jocelyn that the appellants were the kidnappers.

We are not unaware that the Court, in several instances, has acquitted an accused when the out-of-court
identification is fatally flawed. In these cases, however, it had been clearly shown that the identification
procedure was suggestive.

In People v. Pineda,42 the Court acquitted Rolando Pineda because the police suggested the identity of the
accused by showing only the photographs of Pineda and his co-accused Celso Sison to witnesses Canilo
Ferrer and Jimmy Ramos. According to the Court, "there was impermissible suggestion because the
photographs were only of appellant and Sison, focusing attention on the two
accused."43chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Similarly, the Court in People v. Rodrigo44 acquitted appellant Lee Rodrigo since only a lone photograph was
shown to the witness at the police station. We thus held that the appellant's in-court identification
proceeded from, and was influenced by, impermissible suggestions in the earlier photographic identification.

The lack of a prior description of the kidnappers in the present case should not lead to a conclusion that
witnesses' identification was erroneous. The lack of a prior description of the kidnappers was due to the fact
that Jocelyn (together with other members of Edward's family), for reasons not made known in the records,
opted to negotiate with the kidnappers, instead of immediately seeking police assistance. If members of
Edward's family had refused to cooperate with the police, their refusal could have been due to their desire
not to compromise Edward's safety.45 In the same manner, Edward, after he was freed, chose to report the
matter to Teresita Ang See, and not to the police.

Given these circumstances, the lack of prior description of the malefactors in this case should not in any way
taint the identification that Edward and Jocelyn made.

c. The Right to Counsel

The right to counsel is a fundamental right and is intended to preclude the slightest coercion that would lead
the accused to admit something false. The right to counsel attaches upon the start of the investigation, i.e.,
when the investigating officer starts to ask questions to elicit information and/or confessions or admissions
from the accused.46chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Custodial investigation commences when a person is taken into custody and is singled out as a suspect in
the commission of the crime under investigation.47 As a rule, a police lineup is not part of the custodial
investigation; hence, the right to counsel guaranteed by the Constitution cannot yet be invoked at this
stage. The right to be assisted by counsel attaches only during custodial investigation and cannot be claimed
by the accused during identification in a police lineup.

Our ruling on this point in People v. Lara48 is instructive:

x x x The guarantees of Sec. 12(1), Art. Ill of the 1987 Constitution, or the so-called Miranda rights, may be
invoked only by a person while he is under custodial investigation. Custodial investigation starts when the
police investigation is no longer a general inquiry into an unsolved crime but has begun to focus on a
particular suspect taken into custody by the police who starts the interrogation and propounds questions to
the person to elicit incriminating statements. Police line-up is not part of the custodial investigation; hence,
the right to counsel guaranteed by the Constitution cannot yet be invoked at this stage.49chanrobleslaw

Defense witness Reynaldo, however, maintained that Pepino and Gomez were among those already
presented to the media as kidnapping suspects by the DOJ a day before the police lineup was made. In
this sense, the appellants were already the focus of the police and were thus deemed to be already under
custodial investigation when the out-of-court identification was conducted.

Nonetheless, the defense did not object to the in-court identification for having been tainted by an
irregular out-of-court identification in a police lineup. They focused, instead, on the legality of the
appellants' arrests.

Whether Edward and Jocelyn could have seen Pepino and Gomez in various media fora that reported the
presentation of the kidnapping suspects to the media is not for the Court to speculate on. The records
merely show that when defense counsel, Atty. Caesar Esturco, asked Jocelyn during cross-examination
whether she was aware that there were several kidnap-for-ransom incidents in Metro Manila, the latter
answered that she "can read in the newspapers."50 At no time did Jocelyn or Edward ever mention that they
saw the appellants from the news reports in print or on television.

At any rate, the appellants' respective convictions in this case were based on an independent in-court
identification made by Edward and Jocelyn, and not on the out-of-court identification during the
police lineup. We reiterate that the RTC and the CA found the court testimonies of these witnesses to be
positive and credible, and that there was no showing that their factual findings had been arrived at
arbitrarily. The in-court identification thus cured whatever irregularity might have attended the police lineup.

As the Court ruled in People v. Algarme:51chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Even assuming arguendo the appellants' out-of-court identification was defective, their subsequent
identification in court cured any flaw that may have initially attended it. We emphasize that the
"inadmissibility of a police lineup identification x x x should not necessarily foreclose the admissibility of an
independent in-court identification." We also stress that all the accused-appellants were positively identified
by the prosecution eyewitnesses during the trial.

It is also significant to note that despite the overwhelming evidence adduced by the prosecution, Pepino and
Gomez did not even testify for their respective defenses.

d. The Presence of Conspiracy

Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a crime
and decide to commit it. It may be proved by direct or circumstantial evidence consisting of acts, words, or
conduct of the alleged conspirators before, during and after the commission of the felony to achieve a
common design or purpose.

Proof of the agreement does not need to rest on direct evidence, as the agreement may be inferred from the
conduct of the parties indicating a common understanding among them with respect to the commission of
the offense. Corollarily, it is not necessary to show that two or more persons met together and entered into
an explicit agreement setting out the details of an unlawful scheme or the details by which an illegal
objective is to be carried out.52chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

In the present case, the records establish the following facts: Pepino, Gomez, and another man entered
Edward's office, and initially pretended to be customers; the three told Edward that they were going to pay,
but Pepino pulled out a gun. After Pepino's companion took the money from the cashier's box, the
malefactors handcuffed him and forced him to go down to the parked car; Gomez sat at the front passenger
seat of the car which brought Edward to a safe house in Quezon City; the abductors removed the tape from
Edward's eyes, placed him in a room, and then chained his legs upon arrival at the safe house; the
abductors negotiated with Edward's family who eventually agreed to a P700,000.00 ransom to be delivered
by the family driver using Edward's own car; and after four days, three men and Gomez blindfolded Edward,
made him board a car, drove around for 30 minutes, and left him inside his own car at the UP Diliman
campus.

The collective, concerted, and synchronized acts of the accused before, during, and after the kidnapping
constitute undoubted proof that Gomez and her co-accused conspired with each other to attain a common
objective, i.e., to kidnap Edward and detain him illegally in order to demand ransom for his release.

The Proper Penalty:

Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, mandates the imposition of the death penalty when the
kidnapping or detention is committed for the purpose of extorting ransom from the victim or any other
person. Ransom, as employed in the law, is so used in its common or ordinary sense; meaning, a sum of
money or other thing of value, price, or consideration paid or demanded for redemption of a kidnapped or
detained person, a payment that releases one from captivity.53chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

In the present case, the malefactors not only demanded but received ransom for Edward's release. The CA
thus correctly affirmed the RTC's imposition of the death penalty on Pepino and Gomez.

With the passage of Republic Act No. 9346, entitled "An Act Prohibiting the Imposition of Death Penalty in
the Philippines" (signed into law on June 24, 2006), the death penalty may no longer be imposed. We thus
sentence Gomez to the penalty of reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole pursuant to A.M. No. 15-
08-02-SC.54chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

The reduced penalty shall likewise apply to the non-appealing party, Pepino, since it is more favorable to
him.

The Awarded Indemnities:

In the case of People v. Gambao55 (also for kidnapping for ransom), the Court set the minimum indemnity
and damages where facts warranted the imposition of the death penalty if not for prohibition thereof by R.A.
No. 9346, as follows: (1) P100,000.00 as civil indemnity; (2) P100,000.00 as moral damages which the
victim is assumed to have suffered and thus needs no proof; and (3) PI00,000.00 as exemplary damages to
set an example for the public good. These amounts shall earn interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per
annum from the date of the finality of the Court's Resolution until fully paid.

We thus reduce the moral damages imposed by the CA from P300,000.00 to P100,000.00 to conform to
prevailing jurisprudence on kidnapping cases. This reduced penalty shall apply to Pepino for being more
favorable to him. However, the additional monetary award (i.e., P100,000.00 civil indemnity) imposed on
Gomez shall not be applied to Pepino.56chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

We affirm the P700,000.00 imposed by the courts below as restitution of the amount of ransom demanded
and received by the kidnappers. We also affirm the CA's award of P100,000.00 as exemplary damages
based on Gambao.

WHEREFORE, in the light of all the foregoing, we AFFIRM the challenged June 16, 2006 decision of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 02026 with the following MODIFICATIONS:

(1) the penalty imposed on Gomez and Pepino shall be reduced from death to reclusion perpetua without
eligibility for parole;
(2) they are jointly and severally ordered to pay the reduced amount of PI 00,000.00 as moral damages;

(3) Gomez is further ordered to pay the victim PI 00,000.00 as civil indemnity; and

(4) the awarded amounts shall earn interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum from the date of the
finality of the Court's Decision until fully paid.

SO ORDERED.cralawlawlibrary

Sereno, C.J., Carpio, Velasco, Jr., Leonardo-De Castro, Brion, Peralta, Del Castillo, Perez, Mendoza
Reyes, and Perlas-Bernabe, JJ., concur.
Bersamin and Villarama, Jr., JJ., no part.
Leonen, J., see dissenting opinion.
Jardeleza, J., no part, prior OSG action

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. DOMINGO R. MULETA, accused-appellant.

DECISION

PANGANIBAN, J.:

An extra-judicial confession extracted in violation of constitutionally enshrined rights is

inadmissible in evidence. During custodial investigation, suspects have the rights, among others,
(1) to remain silent, (2) to have an independent and competent counsel, (3) to be provided with
such counsel, if unable to secure one, (4) to be assisted by one in case of waiver, which should
be in writing, of the foregoing; and (5) to be informed of all such rights and of the fact that
anything he says can and will be used against him. Where the remaining pieces of evidence are
insufficient to determine guilt with moral certainty, the appellant is entitled to an acquittal. A
conviction must rest on the strength of the admissible evidence of the prosecution, not on the
weakness or insufficiency of the defense.

The Case

Domingo R. Muleta appeals the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan, Branch 14, in
Criminal Case No. 3264-M-93, finding him guilty of the complex crime of rape with homicide and sentencing
him to reclusion perpetua.

The Information, dated October 1, 1993 and signed by Prosecution Attorney Emmanuel Y. Velasco,
charged appellant as follows:

That on April 30, 1993, between the hours of 12:05 past midnight to 2:00 in the morning, at a house in
Malolos, Bulacan and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused DOMINGO MULETA y ROCERO
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously had carnal knowledge of a woman in the person of Charito M. Delgado
without her consent, by using force and intimidation and while the latter was unconscious; and thereafter
accused Domingo Muleta y Rocero by reason or on occasion of the said rape incident, taking advantage of
his superior strength, stab[bed] Charito M. Delgado in the neck and at the back causing the instantaneous
death of the latter.[1]

Upon arraignment on December 10, 1993, the appellant[2] pleaded not guilty to the charge.[3]

After trial, the lower court rendered its assailed August 15, 1997 Judgment,[4] the dispositive portion of
which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the court finds accused Domingo R. Muleta guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the complex crime of [r]ape with [h]omicide and hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty of
RECLUSION PERPETUA.

The accused is hereby ordered to pay the heirs of the deceased victim Charito Delgado death indemnity of
P50,000.00, actual damages of P44,000.00, exemplary damages of P20,000.00 and moral damages of
P20,000.00.

No pronouncement as to costs. [5]

Hence, this appeal.[6]

The Facts

Version of the Prosecution

The facts, as viewed by the prosecution, are summarized in the Appellees Brief[7] thus:

On April 15, 1993, nineteen-year-old Charito Delgado, a native of Oriental Mindoro, went to Manila to find
work. Once in Manila, Charito proceeded to 1347 Banaba Street, Moriones, Tondo, Manila, where her uncle,
Ruben Delgado lived. There, she stayed with her sister Marissa. Shortly thereafter, Charito landed a job as a
saleslady at the Ali Mall, in Cubao, Quezon City.

In the afternoon of April 29, 1993, Charito left Tondo, Manila and moved to Valenzuela, Metro Manila,
bringing with her some of her sisters baggage. She, however, returned to Tondo, Manila to pick up their
remaining baggage. It was the last time she was seen alive by her relatives.

"On April 30, 1993, Charitos lifeless body was found naked in Mojon, Malolos, Bulacan, tied to a post with
the use of a pair of pants and both her hands were tied with a bra. Charitos body bore five (5) stab wounds,
three (3) in the left side of her neck and two (2) at her back.

The initial investigation on Charitos death was conducted by the police in Malolos, Bulacan but the National
Bureau of Investigation (NBI), Manila, later took over and the case was assigned to NBI Agent Ely Tolentino
on May 19, 1993.

Based on Tolentinos investigation, appellant is Charitos uncle, [appellant] being the brother of Charitos
mother, Milagros Delgado; that on April 29 and 30, 1993, appellant was working at the Loadstar Shipping
Lines located at Pier 16, North Harbor, Tondo, Manila; that on April 29, 1993, appellant left his work at 9:30
in the evening; that appellant reported for work on April 30, 1993 at 8:00 in the evening; that according to
appellants wife, he left for work on April 29,1993 but returned only in the morning of April 30, 1993.

On September 19, 1993, Tolentino went to appellants house in Oriental Mindoro and requested appellant to
go with him to the NBI, Manila for investigation. Appellant readily obliged. Danilo Delgado, Charitos paternal
uncle, accompanied Tolentino and appellant to Manila.

During his custodial investigation on September 19, 1993, appellant was assisted by counsel, Atty. Deborah
[D]aquis[8], with address at Room 401, D & D Building, Pedro Gil and San Marcelino Street, Manila. There,
he admitted having raped and later killed Charito Delgado.

Another prosecution witness, Danilo Delgado, testified that during the wake of Charito Delgado on May 13,
1993 in Valenzuela, Metro Manila, appellant became hysterical, crying, shaking his head and muttering:
Patawarin mo ako Charito, ikaw kasi lumaban pa, nakakahiya, mabuti pang mamatay na.
Delgado saw appellant drink a bottle of chlorux, after which he fell to the ground. Appellant was brought to
the Fatima Hospital.[9] (citations omitted)

Version of the Defense

The appellant, on the other hand, submits the following as the facts of the case:

xxx [T]he defense presented the accused himself [Domingo Muleta] who testified that he was not the one
who committed the crime [he was] being charged [with]; that he was just unscrupulously picked up by the
NBI and forced to admit the crime in question; that on April 30, 1993, he was in their rented house at
Camias St., Magsaysay, Tondo, Manila; that on that day, he left the house at 5:30 in the afternoon and
went to the house where Charito Delgado was then residing; that he learned from his sister Milagros
Delgado that the latters daughter Charito transferred to another house and she was then missing; that he
reported the matter to the police authorities; first, to the PNP Headquarters in Tondo; second, to the PNP
Headquarters at U.N. Avenue; and third, to the PNP Headquarters situated at Caloocan; that on May 8,
1993, he found the body of Charito Delgado already lying in state at Valenzuela, Metro, Manila; that he
learned from his sister Milagros that her body was found somewhere in Malolos; that he was working in the
Load Star shipping as a welder on a contractual basis; that from April to May, 1993, he was applying to
another company because Load Star Shipping closed shop; that on September 19, 1993, he was picked up
by the NBI at Banos Gloria, Oriental Mindoro; that he was brought at Taft Avenue; that he was tortured;
that aside from boxing and kicking him, [they] brought [him] to a secluded place; that he was blindfolded;
that he was told to lie down on his back, his feet were tied and water was poured on his nose; that he was
forced to sign a document which he was not able to read, that he was forced to sign the document because
he [could] no longer bear the torture; that he did not have a lawyer at that time; that the NBI agents name
is Ely Tolentino who testified earlier in this case; that he knows that the reason why he was accused of
raping his niece is that he gave an information about a woman he saw in the room of his brother-in-law
Rolando Delgado.

xxx [T]hat the last time he [accused] visited his niece in her residence in Moriones was April 26, 1993; that
Marissa was present when he visited Charito Delgado; that he used to work at Lawang Bato, Bagbaguin,
Valenzuela, Bulacan; that he did not work in Malolos; that when he saw the cadaver of Charito, he was so
sad about her condition, that he [could] no longer recall what he did because of his anger.

xxx Emelinda Muleta testified that her husband, the accused-appellant, never left the house in Tondo, Manila
in the evening of April 29, 1993.[10]

Ruling of the Trial Court

Despite the absence of an eyewitness, the trial court held that the circumstantial evidence in this case
was enough to establish the guilt of the appellant. In so holding, it referred to the following as sufficient
circumstantial evidence to convict:

First, the accused is familiar with the place VOP Compound, Bo. Mojon, Malolos, Bulacan, where the crime
was committed and where the body of the victim was found;

Second, the accused left his place of work at around 9:30 in the evening of April 29, 1993;

Third, the accused did not go home in the evening of April 29, 1993 but went home only in the morning of
April 30, 1993;

Fourth, that during the wake of Charito, the accused went wild and hysterical and uttered these
words: Patawarin mo ako Charito, ikaw kasi lumaban pa, nakakahiya ako, mabuti pang mamatay na.;

Fifth, the accused admitted in his sworn statement, that he uttered these words;
Sixth, the accused admitted that he drank chlorox and was brought to the Fatima Hospital for treatment;
and

Seventh, the sworn statement executed by the accused contains details of the manner in which the crime
was committed which only he could have known.[11]

In upholding the validity of the extrajudicial confession, the lower court further ruled:

The contention of the accused that his extra-judicial confession [was] inadmissible because it was obtained
through force and without the assistance of counsel is untenable. Well-settled is the rule that a confession is
presumed to be voluntary until the contrary is proved. In th[is] case, the presumption has not been
overcome. The narration contained in the sworn statement bespeaks spontan[ei]ty and truth.Not only is the
[confession of the accused] replete with details only he could have supplied, but the circumstances
surrounding its execution belie his claim. Indubitably established is the fact that accused was assisted by
Atty. Deborah Daquis who even signed the statement; that before accused made his extrajudicial confession
he was first asked if he was amenable to the services of Atty. Daquis to which query he answered
affirmatively. Finally, while accused recited a litany of alleged acts of maltreatment, no medical certificate
had been shown to prove that he did suffer inhuman treatment. Nor was there any proof that he even
initiated the filing of an administrative or criminal complaint against his alleged tormentors. Neither did
accused present any eyewitness to the alleged torture. In short, his allegation, obviously self-serving, hardly
deserves consideration. Noteworthy too, is the fact that he did not repudiate said confession at the earliest
opportunity and did so only during trial, thus indicating that his repudiation [was] only a last-ditch effort to
avoid the consequences of the crime.

The court upholds the admissibility of accuseds extrajudicial confession which, by itself, is sufficient basis for
his conviction.

The rule is, a confession constitutes evidence of high order since it is supported by the strong presumption
that no person of normal mind would deliberately and knowingly confess to a crime unless prompted by
truth and his conscience.

Finally, accuseds defense of denial and alibi cannot negate his culpability because these are not supported
by any credible evidence other than his bare assertion. Additionally, there was no evidence of any ulterior or
evil motive on the part of the prosecution witnesses that might have led them to give fabricated
testimony against the accused.[12] (citations omitted)

Assignment of Error

Appellant presents this lone assignment of error:

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GIVING WEIGHT AND CREDENCE TO THE EVIDENCE FOR THE PROSECUTION
AND IN THE PROCESS DISREGARDING THE DEFENSE OF ALIBI OF THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT.[13]

A reading of the Appellants Brief, however, yields the following issues to be resolved: (1) the validity
and admissibility of the extrajudicial confession of the appellant, (2) the sufficiency of the prosecutions
evidence to prove appellants guilt beyond reasonable doubt, and (3) alibi as a defense.

This Courts Ruling

The appeal is meritorious. The extrajudicial confession of appellant is inadmissible, and the remaining
circumstantial evidence presented by the prosecution is sorely insufficient to prove his guilt beyond
reasonable doubt.
First Issue:

Validity of Extrajudicial Confession

The appellant claims that it is not true that [he] had executed an extra-judicial confession[14]. As
correctly pointed out by the solicitor general, however, the appellant actually admits to the execution of the
said confession, albeit without the assistance of counsel. But unlike the solicitor general, we are not ready to
declare that such ambivalence only indicates the unreliability of [appellants] claim.[15] Indeed, confessions
extracted without the assistance of counsel are taboo and useless in a court of law.

To be acceptable, extrajudicial confessions must conform to constitutional requirements. A confession is

not valid and not admissible in evidence when it is obtained in violation of any of the following rights of
persons under custodial investigation: to remain silent, to have independent and competent counsel
preferably of their own choice, to be provided with counsel if they are unable to secure one, to be assisted
by such counsel during the investigation, to have such counsel present when they decide to waive these
rights, and to be informed of all these rights and of the fact that anything they say can and will be used
against them in court. In People v. Santos,[16] we held:

A confession is not admissible unless the prosecution satisfactorily shows that it was obtained within the
limits imposed by the 1987 Constitution. Section 12, Article III thereof, provides:

(1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to be informed of
his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If
the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be
waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel.

xxx xxx xxx

(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or section 17 hereof shall be inadmissible in
evidence against him.

"If the extrajudicial confession satisfies these constitutional standards, it is subsequently tested for
voluntariness, i.e., if it was given freely -- without coercion, intimidation, inducement, or false promises;
and credibility, i.e., if it was consistent with the normal experience of mankind.

"A confession that meets all the foregoing requisites constitutes evidence of a high order because no person
of normal mind will knowingly and deliberately confess to be the perpetrator of a crime unless prompted by
truth and conscience.[17] Otherwise, it is disregarded in accordance with the cold objectivity of the
exclusionary rule.[18] (citations omitted)

Flagrantly violated in the present case were the appellants right to be informed of his rights under
custodial investigation, his right to counsel, as well as this right to have said counsel present during the
waiver of his rights under custodial investigation.

The Right to Be Apprised of Constitutional Rights

The right to be informed of ones constitutional rights during custodial investigation refers to
an effective communication between the investigating officer and the suspected individual, with the purpose
of making the latter understand these rights. Understanding would mean that the information transmitted
was effectively received and comprehended. Hence, the Constitution does not merely require the
investigating officers to inform the person under investigation; rather, it requires that the latter
be informed. [19]

The prosecution's purported compliance with this requisite appears in the following portion of the
extrajudicial confession:
SINUMPAANG SALAYSAY NI DOMINGO MULETA y ROCERO NA IBINIGAY KAY NBI AGENT ELY T. TOLENTINO
DITO SA TANGGAPAN NG NBI, ANTI-ORGANIZED CRIME DIVISION NGAYONG IKA-19 NG SETYEMBRE,
1993 SA HARAP NG ILANG SAKSI.

x--------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

01. TANONG: Bago kita tanungin hinggil sa pagkamatay ni CHARITO DELGADO y MULETA ay nais ipabatid
sa iyo ang iyong mga karapatan na itinatadhana ng ating saligang batas, at ito ay ang mga sumusunod:

01. Ikaw ay may karapatang manahimik at huwag sumagot sa mga katanungan sa iyo sa imbestigasyong
ito[.] Nauunawaan mo ba ito? (Sgd. Domingo Muleta)

02. Ikaw ay may karapatan na kumuha ng abogado na sarili mong pili, pero kung wala kang ikakaya ay
bibigyan ka namin ng abogado para matulungan ka sa imbestigasyong ito[.] Nauunawaan mo ba ang
karapatan mong ito? (Sgd. Domingo Muleta)

03. Ang lahat ng bagay na sasabihin mo sa imbestigasyong ito ay maaaring gamitin laban sa iyo sa
alinmang hukuman[.] Nauunawaan mo ba ito? (Sgd. Domingo Muleta)

Matapos na malaman mo ang iyong mga karapatan ikaw ay nakahanda pa ring magbigay ng pahayag?

SAGOT: Nakahanda po akong sabihin lahat ng totoo.

02. Ikaw ba ay may abogado na matatawagan ngayon na sarili mong pili?

S: Wala po.

03. T: Nais mo bang bigyan ka namin ng abogado?

S: Opo.

04. T: Gusto naming ipakilala sa iyo si Atty. Deborah Z. Daquiz isang abogada na pribado na handang
asistihan at tulungan ka sa imbestigasyong ito. Gusto mo bang tawagin natin siya bago natin ituloy ang
pagbibigay mo ng pahayag?

S: Opo. (At this juncture, Atty. Daquiz was called first and the statement taking was temporarily stopped
until after her arrival).

05. T: Ngayong naririto na si Atty. DEBORAH DAQUIZ, ikaw ba ay nais pa ring magbigay ng salaysay na
bukal sa iyong kalooban?

S: Opo.

06. T: Atty. Daquiz: Gusto mo bang talikdan ang iyong mga karapatan na ibinibigay sa iyo ng ating
Konstitusyon?

S: Tinatalikdan ko na po iyon dahil gusto ko nang ipagtapat ang pangyayari kay CHARITO DELGADO na
pamangkin ko. (Sgd. Domingo Muleta)

xxx xxx xxx

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 19th day of September, 1993 at the Office of the NBI Anti-
Organized Crime Division, NBI Building, Taft Avenue, Manila and I hereby certify that I have personally
examined the herein Affiant and found him to have fully read and understood the contents of his statement
containing three (3) pages and that he executed the same out of his own volition.
(Sgd.) Atty. ARTEMIO M. SACAGUING

Chief AOCD

(By Authority of Rep. Act 157)

xxx xxx xxx[20] (emphasis ours)

The questions propounded to the appellant did not satisfy the strict requirements mandated by the
Constitution.[21] Such terse and perfunctory statements[22] implied a superficial reading of the rights of the
accused, without the slightest consideration of whether he understood what was read to him. This Court will
not subscribe to such manner of informing the accused of his constitutional rights. We have stated this
then,[23] and we reiterate it now:

[The] stereotyped advice appearing in practically all extrajudicial confessions which are later repudiated has
assumed the nature of legal form or model. Police investigators either automatically type it together with the
curt Opo as the answer or ask the accused to sign it or even copy it in their handwriting. Its tired,
punctilious, fixed and artificially stately style does not create an impression of voluntariness or even
understanding on the part of the accused. The showing of a spontaneous, free and unconstrained giving up
of a right is missing. (emphasis supplied)

The Right to Counsel

The prosecution contends that this constitutional requirement was satisfied because appellant executed
the confession with the assistance and in the presence of Atty. Deborah Daquiz.[24] The participation of the
counsel was described in the confession in this manner:

xxx xxx xxx

04. T: Gusto naming ipakilala sa iyo si Atty. Deborah Z. Daquiz, isang abogada na pribado na handang
asistihan at tulungan ka sa imbestigasyong ito. Gusto mo bang tawagin natin siya bago natin ituloy
ang pagbibigay mo ng pahayag?

S: Opo. (At this juncture, Atty. Daquiz was called first and the statement taking was temporarily stopped
until after her arrival).

xxx xxx xxx

However, the testimony of Tolentino, the investigating NBI agent, clearly contradicts the claim of the
prosecution. The agent testified:

xxx xxx xxx

Q Did you inform her [Atty. Deborah Daquiz] x x x thr[ough] the phone x x x why you were soliciting her
assistance?

A Yes [,] sir. We told her that we have a subject to confess what he [did,] will you kindly assist him in
this investigation[?]

Q What was the response of Atty. Daquis?

A She [asked] me [if it] could xxx be made the following day.

Q What was you[r] answer?

A It is up to you, I said.

Q If the request of Atty. Daquis was the following day[,] meaning September 20, are you saying that the
statement of Muleta was given the following day[,] on September 20?

A September 19, I started taking the statement. I think I just finished the question the following day I
continued. [sic]
xxx xxx xxx[25] [Emphasis ours]

Atty. Quintana amplified this point on cross-examination:

xxx xxx xxx

Q In the direct examination, you claimed that the accused Domingo Muleta gave his statement and made
a confession?

A Yes, madam.

Q You also claimed that you started taking the statement of Domingo Muleta, the accused, without the
presence of counsel?

A No, madam. I took his statement in the presence of Atty. Daquis.

Q In the direct examination on May 27, 1994, page 81, last paragraph and I quote: A. September 19, I
started taking the statement. I think I just finished the question the following day I continued. Now,
do you want to change now your answer that you took the accused [sic] statement with the
presence of counsel?

A No, madam. Although I started to take his statement on the night of September 19, I continued it
when Atty. Daquiz arrived xxx the following morning wherein the accused conferred with the
accused, madam. [sic]

Q But, [is it] not true that on the night of September 19, 1993 you started taking the statement of the
accused without the presence of Atty. Daquiz and only continued the same on the early morning of
September 20, 1993 when Atty. Daquiz arrived?

A Yes, madam.

Q Dont you know that as a police officer NBI a[t] that, that before a suspected person can give his
statement, a counsel must be present at all times?

A Yes, madam.

xxx xxx xxx[26] (emphasis ours)

Despite Agent Tolentinos claim that the confession of the accused started to be taken on September
19, 1993 and continued the next day, the sworn statement itself clearly showed that what began on the
19th of September ended on the same day. According to the jurat, the extrajudicial confession was
subscribed and sworn to on September 19, 1993. The importance of the jurat must be
stressed. [27]. In People v. Relucio,[28] we observed:

At this point, it must be noted that Exhibit 2-A, the statement which Padrones claimed above to have been
admittedly taken by Viloria on October 5, 1972 but, supposedly signed by him later and not on the same
day before Judge Vicencio as he had previously stated, bears the following heading:

SINUMPAANG SALAYSAY NI MIGUEL PADRONES y ESPEJO SA PAGTATANONG NI P/CPL J. S. VILORIA DITO

SA HIMPILAN NG PULISYA NG KABANATUAN NGAYONG IKA-19 NG OKTUBRE 1972 SA GANAP NA IKA 5:15
NG HAPON ...

and ends with the following jurat:

NILAGDAAN AT PINANUMPAAN sa aking harap ngayong ika 20 ng Oktubre 1972, dito sa Lunsod ng
Kabanatuan.

With the dates October 19 and 20 thus appearing in this statements, how could there be any proximity to
the truth in the assertion of Padrones that his statement was first taken by Viloria on October 5, 1972 and
that it was signed by him before Fiscal del Rosario on October 9, 1972 and that it was the very statement he
had been referring to earlier as having been signed by him before Judge Vicencio? (emphasis in the original)

We note that the heading of the sworn statement refers to the same date: September 19, 1993. It is
thus daylight clear that the purported sworn statement of the appellant was prepared prior to the arrival of
his NBI-procured counsel.[29] In other words, the sworn statement was executed and completed on
September 19, 1993, while Atty. Daquiz arrived only the following day, September 20, 1993. Thus, when
the appellant executed and completed his purported extrajudicial confession on September 19, 1993, he
was not assisted by counsel.

As observed by this Court in People v. Lucero,[30] [w]e have constitutionalized the right to counsel
because of our hostility against the use of duress and other undue influence in extracting confessions from a
suspect. Force and fraud tarnish confessions and render them inadmissible. This Court has consistently held,
without equivocation, that no custodial investigation shall be conducted unless it is done in the presence of
counsel.[31] The failure of the prosecution[32] to present Atty. Daquiz to testify on the validity of the
confession substantiates the conclusion that the sworn statement is constitutionally suspect and invalid. In
relation to this, we stress that the right to counsel refers to competent and independent lawyers preferably
chosen by the accused persons themselves.[33] This Court, as well as the court a quo, did not have the
opportunity to determine the competence and the independence of the NBI-procured lawyer because,
despite the denial of the accused that he was assisted by counsel, the prosecution failed to present Atty.
Daquiz.[34]

Based on the prosecutions own evidence, the accused was already singled out as the perpetrator of the
crime. The supposed invitation by NBI Agent Ely Tolentino was in reality a custodial investigation targeting
the accused for the purpose of procuring a confession. Republic Act 7438 includes as an integral part of
custodial investigation the practice of issuing invitations to persons being investigated in connection with an
offense they are suspected to have committed.[35] Under the present factual milieu, Domingo Muleta should
have been accorded the right to counsel (and all the constitutional rights of the accused), from the time that
he was brought to the NBI office in Manila.

No Valid Waiver

The illegality of the alleged confession is further demonstrated by the fact that appellant exercised no
satisfactory waiver of his rights. As stated in our earlier discussions, since he was not assisted by a lawyer
when the waiver was made, there was no valid waiver to speak of.[36]

Furthermore, even if we were to assume that the appellant was assisted by counsel when he waived his
rights, the waiver itself was lamentably insufficient. After Atty. Daquiz was allegedly called to assist the
appellant, she posited this question: Gusto mo bang talikdan ang iyong mga karapatan na ibinibigay sa iyo
ng ating Konstitusyon?[37] To this, the appellant replied: Tinatalikdan ko na po iyon dahil gusto ko nang
ipagtapat ang pangyayari kay CHARITO DELGADO na pamangkin ko.[38]

To the Court, this was not the waiver that the Constitution clearly and strictly required. Such waiver
failed to show his understanding of his rights, his waiver of those rights, and the implications of his
waiver. The waiver, in order to be valid, should have been in a language that clearly manifested his desire to
do so.[39] The part of the sworn statement in which the accused waived his rights referred to them as mga
karapatan na ibinibigay sa iyo ng ating Konstitusyon and iyon words that were utterly vague and insufficient
to satisfy the Constitutional requirements.[40] As presented, the prosecution would have us refer to the first
part of the sworn statement for guidance, as if it were a footnote saying Please see first part. Such
stratagem is woefully insufficient to constitute a waiver of rights cherished and enshrined in our basic law.

Moreover, Atty. Daquiz raised only one question: whether appellant would like to waive his rights. This
was odd, because she had been called to assist appellant in making his confession, not his waiver.Atty.
Daquiz made no effort to determine whether the accused was treated well, or if he understood his
rights. Such perfunctory, even cavalier, attempt falls short of constitutional requirements.

Second Issue:

Sufficiency of Evidence for the Prosecution

 Having ruled the alleged confession as unconstitutional and inadmissible, we now determine whether
the other pieces of evidence all circumstantial in nature would be sufficient to overturn yet another
constitutional right: to be presumed innocent unless otherwise proven.

The rule is that x x x in the absence of direct proof, conviction may be based on circumstantial
evidence, but to warrant such conviction, the following requisites must concur: (1) there is more than one
circumstance; (2) the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and (3) the combination of all
the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.[41]

Here, the solicitor general, as well as the trial court, posits that the conviction of the appellant was
sufficiently warranted by the aggregate of the following circumstantial evidence:

1. The appellant was familiar with the place where the crime was perpetrated.

2. The appellant left work around 9:30 on the evening of April 29, 1993 and did not return home
until the morning of April 30, 1993.

3. The appellant, during the victims wake, became hysterical and allegedly uttered: Patawarin mo
ako Charito, ikaw kasi lumaban pa, nakakahiya ako, mabuti pang mamatay na, after which he
drank chlorox.

We do not agree. At the outset, we stress that a careful review of the records of this case reveals that
these pieces of circumstantial evidence were controverted by the defense and, even more important, they
were not sufficiently established.[42]

Despite the efforts of the fiscal during cross-examination,[43] the appellant consistently denied that he
worked in the place where the victims body was found. Also, the prosecution failed to prove that he was at
work around 9:30 p.m. on April 29, 1993 and that he went home on April 30, 1993.[44] All it could present
was the testimony of NBI Agent Ely Tolentino, who merely testified on what appellants co-workers related to
him: that appellant left work earlier.[45] This is clearly hearsay. The affidavits of these co-workers do not
help the prosecutions case, since they themselves were not presented during the trial. An affidavit is
hearsay if the affiant is not presented in court and subjected to cross-examination.[46] Besides, the
appellant's wife, Emelinda Muleta, stated categorically that her husband was with her at home on April 29
and 30, 1993.[47] The appellant himself steadfastly affirmed this during his cross-examination.[48]

The appellants rather strange behavior during the wake was, according to his testimony, due to his
perceived failure to take care of his niece.[49] This was corroborated by the testimony of Danilo
Delgado.[50] Moreover, the defense claims that the words he said during the wake were
ambiguous. Patawarin mo ako Charito could have meant that the appellant was blaming himself for being
unable to protect the victim. Ikaw kasi lumaban pa could have connoted frustration with what he imagined
could have saved the life of his niece. Nakakahiya ako, mabuting mamatay na also shows the appellants for
blaming himself inutile, indicating his desire to take his own worthless life. If these words merit anything, it
is this: it places the appellant under suspicion. But suspicion or accusation is not synonymous with guilt.[51]

Most importantly, even if we were to assume that all the foregoing were proven, they are still not
enough to establish an unbroken chain leading inexorably to the guilt of the appellant. That the appellant
could have been familiar with the place where the body was found did not legally prove anything. That he
left work at 9:30 p.m. on April 29 1993 did not necessarily mean he was at the scene of the crime. So many
other possible conclusions could be made regarding this circumstance. As for his statements during the
wake, they are ambiguous.

We have said that [i]n the absence of an eyewitness, the guilt of an accused may be established by
circumstantial evidence. Such evidence, however, must still pass the test of moral certainty. When
inadequate and uncorroborated, circumstantial evidence cannot sustain a conviction. Specifically, where the
states evidence does not constitute an unbroken chain leading beyond reasonable doubt to the guilt of the
accused, the constitutional presumption of innocence prevails and the accused is entitled to an
acquittal.[52] Thus, in People v. Bato,[53] the pieces of circumstantial evidence presented there those showing
that the accused brothers invited the victim (and his son) for a drink, suddenly tied his hands and took him
away; after which his body was recovered from the river the next day -- were ruled to be inadequate to
sustain a conviction based on guilt beyond reasonable doubt.[54]

In this case, the circumstantial evidence presented acquires significance only when taken together with
the appellants confession. The pattern of the tapestry,[55] which the prosecution would want us to see, is
bound by only a single thread -- the confession of the appellant. Due to constitutional infirmity, that one
strand has been cut, and thus the pattern disintegrates. The tapestry becomes an unreadable puzzle.
Third Issue:

Alibi as a Defense

True, we have always considered alibi inherently weak,[56] because it can be either easily fabricated or
difficult to disprove.[57] However, we have consistently held that the prosecution must convict the accused
based on the strength of its own case, not on the weakness of the defense:

True, alibi is a weak defense. But then, so also is the prosecutions evidence in this case. x x x Indeed, it is
when the evidence is purely circumstantial that the prosecution is much more obligated to rely on the
strength of its own case and not on the weakness of the defense, and that conviction must rest on nothing
less than moral certainty.[58] (emphasis supplied)

Presumption of Innocence

Where the state fails to meet the quantum of proof required to overcome the constitutional
presumption, the accused is entitled to acquittal, regardless of the weakness or even the absence of his
defense, for any conviction must rest on the strength of the prosecutions case and not on the weakness of
the defense.[59] Here, without the confession of the appellant, the presumption of innocence prevails.

This principle is well-articulated in People v. Mejia.[60] In our jurisdiction accusation is not synonymous
with guilt. The freedom of the accused is forfeit[ed] only if the requisite quantum of proof necessary for
conviction be in existence. This, of course, requires the most careful scrutiny of the evidence for the State,
both oral and documentary, independent of whatever defense is offered by the accused.Every circumstance
favoring the accuseds innocence must be duly taken into account. The proof against the accused must
survive the test of reason. Strongest suspicion must not be permitted to sway judgment. The conscience
must be satisfied that on the accused could be laid the responsibility for the offense charged. If the
prosecution fails to discharge the burden, then it is not only the accuseds right to be freed; it is, even more,
the courts constitutional duty to acquit him.

One final note. In acquitting appellant, the Court is not saying that he did not commit the offense
charged. We are only saying that the prosecution failed to present credible and admissible evidence of
appellants guilt. The strongest evidence of the prosecution is the extrajudicial confession of appellant. But
the Constitution is clear -- a confession obtained in violation of the rights of an accused cannot be used as
evidence. Without Muletas confession, the other pieces of circumstantial evidence lose their
significance. Had the National Bureau of Investigation followed the law in extracting appellants admission of
guilt, perhaps just perhaps the result of this case would have been different. The Court is saddened that law
enforcement agents transgress the law which they have sworn to defend and uphold. A mockery of the law
which was manifestly perpetrated in this case -- must not be allowed to sully the countrys quest for peace
and order.

WHEREFORE, the appeal is hereby GRANTED. The assailed Decision is

hereby REVERSED and VACATED. Appellant Domingo R. Muleta is hereby ACQUITTED for insufficiency of
evidence. The director of the Bureau of Corrections is hereby directed to cause the release of appellant
forthwith, unless the latter is being lawfully held for another cause; and to inform the Court of his release, or
the reasons for his continued confinement, within ten days from notice. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Vitug, Purisima, and Gonzaga-Reyes, JJ., concur.

Romero, (Chairman), J., abroad on official business.

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 205412, September 09, 2015

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ADRIAN GUTING Y TOMAS, Accused-Appellant.

DECISION

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:

For Our consideration is an appeal from the Decision1 dated May 23, 2012 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CR.-H.C. No. 04596, which affirmed the Decision2 dated June 24, 2010 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Camiling, Tarlac, Branch 68, in Criminal Case No. 06-93, finding accused-appellant Adrian Guting y Tomas
guilty of the crime of Parricide under Article 246 of the Revised Penal Code.

In an Information3 dated August 1, 2006, docketed as Criminal Case No. 06-93, accused-appellant was
charged before the RTC with Parricide, allegedly committed as follows:

That on or about 4:50 in the rainy afternoon of July 30, 2006 at Plaridel St., Poblacion B. Camiling, Tarlac,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously, and with evident premeditation, that is, having conceived and deliberated to kill
his own father Jose Guting y Ibarra, 67 years old, married, while inside their residential house, and armed
with a bladed weapon, suddenly and unexpectedly stabbed several times the victim, employing means,
manner and form in the execution thereof which tender directly and specially to insure its commission
without danger to the person of said accused, the result of which attack was that said victim received
multiple stab wounds on his body which directly caused his instantaneous death.
When arraigned on September 19, 2006, accused-appellant pleaded not guilty to the crime
charged.4Thereafter, pre-trial and trial on the merits ensued.

Below is a summary of the prosecution witnesses' testimonies.

Police Officer (PO1) Fidel Torre (Torre) testified that on the rainy afternoon of July 30, 2005, at around 5:00
o'clock, he and PO1 Alexis Macusi (Macusi) were standing in front of the Camiling Police Station when
accused-appellant, all wet from the rain and with a bladed weapon in his hand, suddenly approached them
and told them that he had stabbed his father. Hearing accused-appellant's statement, PO1 Torre
immediately got the bladed weapon from accused-appellant and turned it over to PO1 Macusi for proper
disposition.5

PO1 Macusi corroborated PO1 Torre's testimony. PO1 Macusi narrated that accused-appellant suddenly
appeared before them at the Police Station, all wet and holding a knife. Accused-appellant proclaimed that
his father was already dead. Unsuspecting, PO1 Macusi asked who killed accused-appellant's father.
Accused-appellant answered, "Sinaksak ko po yong tatay ko! Napatay ko na po!" PO1 Torre then got the
knife from accused-appellant and gave it to PO1 Macusi. PO1 Macusi placed the knife in the custodian
cabinet in the Police Station. Thereafter, PO1 Macusi, Senior Police Officer (SPO) 2 Eliseo Hermosado
(Hermosado), and SPO2 Noli Felipe (Felipe) went to the residence of Jose Guting (Jose), accused-appellant's
father, to verify the reported crime, while other police officers informed Flora Guting (Flora), Jose's wife
(also accused-appellant's mother), who was still in the market with Emerlito Guting (Emerlito), Jose and
Flora's other son (accused-appellant's brother), who was then driving a tricycle for hire. While waiting for
Flora and Emerlito, PO1 Macusi, SPO2 Hermosado, and SPO2 Felipe inquired from the neighbors if anybody
had witnessed the crime, but no one did. When Flora and Emerlito arrived, they entered the house and saw
Jose's lifeless body with blood still oozing from his wounds. Immediately, Flora and Emerlito brought Jose to
the hospital where he was pronounced dead on arrival. Subsequently, Flora and Emerlito executed their
respective Sinumpaang Salaysay and filed a case for Parricide against accused-appellant.6

On cross-examination, PO1 Macusi divulged that when the knife was given to him by PO1 Torre for
safekeeping, he did not ask accused-appellant if it was the knife he used to kill his father. Neither did
accused-appellant mention to PO1 Macusi that it was the knife he used in stabbing Jose. All that accused-
appellant said was, "Sinaksak ko po yong tatay ko! Napatay ko na po!" PO1 Macusi also admitted that he did
not request for the examination of the knife because it was clean; any trace or stain of blood on it would
have been washed away by the rains at that time. PO1 Macusi was further questioned as to why he did not
put into writing accused-appellant's admission that he killed his father, and PO1 Macusi explained that it
escaped his mind as he was still new at the job then and he was carried away by the fast flow of events.7

Flora conceded that she was not present when Jose, her husband, was killed by accused-appellant, their
son. Flora only learned of the stabbing incident and accused-appellant's surrender from the police officers of
the Camiling Police Station. Flora declared that she spent for the wake and burial of Jose and that Jose, who
was a tricycle driver, had been earning around P200.00 a day at the time of his death. 8

Doctor Valentin Theodore Lomibao (Dr. Lomibao) conducted the autopsy of Jose's body. Dr. Lomibao
reported that Jose suffered around 39 stab wounds on the head, neck, thorax, abdomen, and extremities.
Jose's internal organs were heavily damaged by the stab wounds, resulting in his instantaneous death. Dr.
Lomibao also showed several pictures of Jose's body which were taken before he conducted the autopsy.9

Accused-appellant opted not to present any evidence in his defense.

The RTC promulgated its Decision on June 24, 2010 finding accused-appellant guilty of Parricide based on
his verbal admission that he killed his father, Jose. Even assuming that accused-appellant's admission was
inadmissible in evidence, the RTC adjudged that the prosecution was still able to establish sufficient
circumstantial evidence which, taken collectively, pointed to accused-appellant as the perpetrator of the
brutal killing of his father. The dispositive portion of the RTC judgment reads:
WHEREFORE, accused Adrian Guting y Tomas is hereby found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense
of Parricide punishable under Article 246 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended and hereby sentences him
to a penalty of Reclusion Perpetua.

Accused is likewise ordered to pay the heirs of the victim the amount of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity,
another amount of P50,000.00 as moral damages, and still another amount of P30,000.00 as temperate
damages.10
Accused-appellant appealed his conviction before the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No.
04596. The appellate court promulgated its Decision on May 23, 2012, decreeing thus:
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED. The Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Camiling, Tarlac, Branch
68 convicting herein accused-appellant Adrian Guting y Tomas for the crime of Parricide under Article 246 of
the Revised Penal Code is AFFIRMED.11
Hence, accused-appellant comes before us via the instant appeal with the same assignment of errors he
raised before the Court of Appeals, to wit:
I

THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT ON THE BASIS OF HIS
EXTRAJUDICIAL ADMISSION.

II

THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT ON THE BASIS OF
INSUFFICIENT CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE.

III

THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE
DOUBT OF THE CRIME CHARGED DESPITE THE PROSECUTION'S FAILURE TO OVERTHROW THE
CONSTITUTIONAL PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE IN HIS FAVOR.12
We find no merit in accused-appellant's appeal.

Accused-appellant argues that his oral confession to PO1 Torre and PO1 Macusi, without the assistance of
counsel, is inadmissible in evidence for having been made in blatant violation of his constitutional right
under Article III, Section 12 of the 1987 Constitution.

Section 12, paragraphs 1 and 3, Article III (Bill of Rights) of the 1987 Constitution mandate that:
SEC. 12. (1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to be
informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own
choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights
cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel.

x x x x

(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or Section 17 hereof shall be inadmissible in
evidence against him.13
The "investigation" in Section 12, paragraph 1, Article III of the 1987 Constitution pertains to "custodial
investigation." Custodial investigation commences when a person is taken into custody and is singled out as
a suspect in the commission of a crime under investigation and the police officers begin to ask questions on
the suspect's participation therein and which tend to elicit an admission.14 As we expounded in People v.
Marra15:
Custodial investigation involves any questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has
been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way. It is only after
the investigation ceases to be a general inquiry into an unsolved crime and begins to focus on a particular
suspect, the suspect is taken into custody, and the police carries out a process of interrogations that lends
itself to eliciting incriminating statements that the rule begins to operate. (Citation omitted.)
Applying the foregoing definitions, accused-appellant was not under custodial investigation when he
admitted, without assistance of counsel, to PO1 Torre and PO1 Macusi that he stabbed his father to death.
Accused-appellant's verbal confession was so spontaneously and voluntarily given and was not elicited
through questioning by the police authorities. It may be true that PO1 Macusi asked accused-appellant who
killed his father, but PO1 Macusi only did so in response to accused-appellant's initial declaration that his
father was already dead. At that point, PO1 Macusi still had no idea who actually committed the crime and
did not consider accused-appellant as the suspect in his father's killing. Accused-appellant was also merely
standing before PO1 Torre and PO1 Macusi in front of the Camiling Police Station and was not yet in police
custody.

Accused-appellant cites in support of his argument People v. Cabintoy,16 where we held that an uncounselled
extrajudicial confession without a valid waiver of the right to counsel - that is, in writing and in the presence
of counsel - is inadmissible in evidence. The situation of accused-appellants in Cabintoy is not similar to that
of accused-appellant herein. The accused-appellants in Cabintoy, when they executed their extrajudicial
confessions without assistance of counsel, were already suspects under custodial investigation by the San
Mateo Police for robbery with homicide committed against a taxi driver. Accused-appellant in the instant
case, on his own volition, approached unsuspecting police officers standing in front of the police station with
a knife in his hand and readily confessed to stabbing his father to death. Accused-appellant was arrested
and subjected to custodial investigation by the police officers only after his confession.

Hence, herein accused-appellant's confession, even if done without the assistance of a lawyer, is not in
violation of his constitutional right under Section 12, paragraph 1, Article III of the 1987 Constitution. The
present case is more akin to People v. Andan17 wherein we allowed into evidence the uncounselled
confession of therein accused-appellant given under the following circumstances:
Under these circumstances, it cannot be successfully claimed that appellant's confession before the mayor is
inadmissible. It is true that a municipal mayor has "operational supervision and control" over the local police
and may arguably be- deemed a law enforcement officer for purposes of applying Section 12 (1) and (3) of
Article III of the Constitution. However, appellant's confession to the mayor was not made in response to
any interrogation by the latter. In fact, the mayor did not question appellant at all. No police authority
ordered appellant to talk to the mayor. It was appellant himself who spontaneously, freely and voluntarily
sought the mayor for a private meeting. The mayor did not know that appellant was going to confess his
guilt to him. When appellant talked with the mayor as a confidant and not as a law enforcement officer, his
uncounselled confession to him did not violate his constitutional rights. Thus, it has been held that the
constitutional procedures on custodial investigation do not apply to a spontaneous statement, not elicited
through questioning by the authorities, but given in an ordinary manner whereby appellant orally admitted
having committed the crime. What the Constitution bars is the compulsory disclosure of incriminating facts
or confessions. The rights under Section 12 are guaranteed to preclude the slightest use of coercion by the
state as would lead the accused to admit something false, not to prevent him from freely and voluntarily
telling the truth. Hence, we hold that appellant's confession to the mayor was correctly admitted by the trial
court.
Moreover, accused-appellant's verbal confession that he stabbed his father to death made to PO1 Torre and
PO1 Macusi, established through the testimonies of said police officers, falls under Rule 130, Section 26 of
the Rules of Court, which provides that "[t]he act, declaration or omission of a party as to a relevant fact
may be given in evidence against him." This rule is based upon the notion that no man would make any
declaration against himself, unless it is true.18 Accused-appellant's declaration is admissible for being part of
the res gestae. A declaration is deemed part of the res gestae and admissible in evidence as an exception to
the hearsay rule when these three requisites concur: (1) the principal act, the res gestae, is a startling
occurrence; (2) the statements were made before the declarant had time to contrive or devise; and (3) the
statements concern the occurrence in question and its immediately attending circumstances.19 All the
requisites are present in this case. Accused-appellant had just been through a startling and gruesome
occurrence, that is, his father's death. Accused-appellant made the confession to PO1 Torre and PO1 Macusi
only a few minutes after and while he was still under the influence of said startling occurrence, before he
had the opportunity to concoct or contrive a story. In fact, accused-appellant seemed to still be in shock
when he walked to the Police Station completely unmindful of the rain and the knife in his hand, and headed
directly to PO1 Torre and PO1 Macusi, who were standing in front of the Police Station, to confess to
stabbing his father to death. The police officers who immediately went to the house of Jose, accused-
appellant's father, found Jose's lifeless body with blood still oozing from his stab wounds. As res gestae,
accused-appellant's spontaneous statement is admissible in evidence against him.

Accused-appellant's confession was further corroborated by the circumstantial evidence.

To justify a conviction upon circumstantial evidence, the combination of circumstances must be such as to
leave no reasonable doubt in the mind as to the criminal liability of the accused.20 Rule 133, Section 4 of the
Rules of Court enumerates the conditions when circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction, thus:
SEC. 4. Circumstantial Evidence, when sufficient. - Circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction
if:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

(a) There is more than one circumstance;ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

(b) The facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and

(c) The combination of all circumstances is such as to produce conviction beyond reasonable doubt.
The RTC, affirmed by the Court of Appeals, found that the aforequoted requisites have been satisfied in this
case given the following circumstantial evidence:
1. On or about 4:50 o'clock in the afternoon of July 30, 2006, the victim was stabbed to death.

2. Thirty minutes later, [accused-appellant] personally went to Camiling Police Station and surrendered
himself and the bladed weapon he used in killing his father to the police authorities of the said police station.

3. When his mother learned about the incident, [accused-appellant] did nothing to appease his responding
mother. "It has always been said that criminal case are primarily about human nature." Here is a case of a
son doing nothing to explain the death of his father to his grieving mother. Such inaction is contrary to
human nature.

4. When he was detained after police investigation, [accused-appellant] did not object to his continued
detention.
These circumstances constitute an unbroken chain which leads to one fair and reasonable conclusion that
points to accused-appellant, to the exclusion of all others, as the guilty person.21 The incriminating collage of
facts against accused-appellant was created by circumstantial evidence anchored on the credible and
unbiased testimony of the prosecution's witnesses. We will not disturb but shall accord the highest respect
to the findings of the RTC on the issue of credibility of the witnesses and their testimonies, it having had the
opportunity to observe their deportment and manner of testifying during the trial.22

Article 246 of the Revised Penal Code defines Parricide as follows:

Art. 246. Parricide. - Any person who shall kill his father, mother, or child, whether legitimate or illegitimate,
or any of his ascendants, or descendants, or his spouse, shall be guilty of parricide and shall be punished by
the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death.
Parricide is committed when: (1) a person is killed; (2) the deceased is killed by the accused; and (3) the
deceased is the father, mother, or child, whether legitimate or illegitimate, or a legitimate other ascendant
or other descendant, or the legitimate spouse of the accused. The key element in Parricide - other than the
fact of killing - is the relationship of the offender to the victim.23 All the elements are present in this case.
Jose, the victim, was killed by accused-appellant, his own son. Accused-appellant's birth certificate, which
was presented before the RTC, establishes that accused-appellant was the legitimate son of Jose and Flora.

The crime of Parricide is punishable by the indivisible penalties of reclusion perpetua to death. With one
mitigating circumstance, namely, voluntary surrender, and no aggravating circumstance, the imposition of
the lesser penalty of reclusion perpetua on accused-appellant was proper.

We modify though the monetary awards imposed by the RTC and affirmed by the Court of Appeals. When
death occurs due to a crime, the following damages may be awarded: (1) civil indemnity ex delicto for the
death of the victim; (2) actual or compensatory damages; (3) moral damages; (4) exemplary damages; and
(5) temperate damages.24

Prevailing jurisprudence pegs the amount of civil indemnity and moral damages awarded to the heirs of the
victim of Parricide at P75,000.00 each.25 The temperate damages awarded by the RTC in the amount of
P30,000.00 should be decreased to P25,000.00 to also conform with the latest jurisprudence.26 It is fitting to
additionally award exemplary damages in the sum of P30,000.00 considering the presence of the qualifying
circumstance of relationship.

Damages for the loss of earning capacity of Jose should be awarded as well given the testimony of his wife,
Flora, on this particular fact. We refer to our pronouncements in People v. Verde27 that:
The heirs are also entitled to damages for the loss of earning capacity of the deceased Francisco Gealon. The
fact that the prosecution did not present documentary evidence to support its claim for damages for loss of
earning capacity of the deceased does not preclude recovery of said damages. The testimony of the victim's
wife, Delia Gealon, as to the earning capacity of her husband Francisco Gealon sufficiently establishes the
basis for making such an award. It was established that Francisco Gealon was 48 years old at the time of his
death in 1991. His average income was P200.00 a day. Hence, in accordance with the American Expectancy
Table of Mortality adopted in several cases decided by this Court, the loss of his earning capacity is to be
calculated as follows:
To be able to claim damages for loss of earning capacity despite the non-availability of documentary
evidence, there must be oral testimony that: (a) the victim was self-employed earning less than the
minimum wage under current labor laws and judicial notice was taken of the fact that in the victim's line of
work, no documentary evidence is available; or (b) the victim was employed as a daily wage worker earning
less than the minimum wage under current labor laws.28

In the case at bar, Jose was 67 years old at the time of his death and was earning a daily wage of P200.00
as a tricycle driver, which was below the P252.00 to P263.50 minimum wage rate for non-agriculture under
Wage Order No. 11 dated June 16, 2005 for Region III. We take judicial notice that there is no documentary
evidence available to establish the daily earning capacity of a tricycle driver. We thus compute the award of
damages for the loss of Jose's earning capacity as follows:
Gross
Net earning life
= x annual - less living expenses (50% of gross annual income)
capacity (x) expectancy
income

x = 2(80-67) x [73,000.00-36,500.00]
3

= 8.67 x 36,500.00

= P316,455.00
Finally, in conformity with current policy, we impose interest on all monetary awards for damages at the rate
of six percent (6%) per annum from the date of finality of this Decision until fully paid.

WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 04596, finding accused-
appellant, Adrian Guting y Tomas, GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Parricide, is
hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS. Accused-appellant is sentenced to suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua and to pay the heirs of the victim the amounts of P75,000.00 as civil indemnity,
P75,000.00 as moral damages, P25,000.00 as temperate damages, P30,000.00 as exemplary damages, and
P316,455.00 as compensation for loss of earning capacity. All monetary awards for damages shall be subject
to interest of six percent (6%) per annum from date of finality of this Decision until they are fully paid.

SO ORDERED.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Sereno, C.J., (Chairperson), Bersamin, Perez, and Perlas-Bernabe, JJ., concur.

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 182601, November 10, 2014

JOEY M. PESTILOS, DWIGHT MACAPANAS, MIGUEL GACES, JERRY FERNANDEZ AND RONALD
MUNOZ, Petitioners, v. MORENO GENEROSO AND PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
DECISION

BRION, J.:

We resolve the petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court challenging the
decision1 dated January 21, 2008 and the resolution2 dated April 17, 2008 of the Court of Appeals (CA)in CA
G.R. SP No. 91541.

The appealed decision affirmed the Order dated March 16, 2005 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch
96, Quezon City, denying Joey M. Pestilos, Dwight Macapanas, Miguel Gaces, Jerry Fernandez, and Ronald
Munoz's (petitioners) Urgent Motion for Regular Preliminary Investigation, as well as their subsequent
motion for reconsideration.cralawred

The Antecedent Facts

The records of the case reveal that on February 20, 2005, at around 3:15 in the morning, an altercation
ensued between the petitioners and Atty. Moreno Generoso (Atty. Generoso) at Kasiyahan Street,
Barangay Holy Spirit, Quezon City where the petitioners and Atty. Generoso
reside.3chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Atty. Generoso called the Central Police District, Station 6 (Batasan Hills Police Station) to report the
incident.4 Acting on this report, Desk Officer SPOI Primitivo Monsalve (SPO1 Monsalve) dispatched SP02
Dominador Javier (SP02 Javier) to go to the scene of the crime and to render assistance.5 SP02 Javier,
together with augmentation personnel from the Airforce, A2C Alano Sayson and Airman Ruel Galvez, arrived
at the scene of the crime less than one hour after the alleged altercation6 and they saw Atty. Generoso
badly beaten.7chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Atty. Generoso then pointed to the petitioners as those who mauled him. This prompted the police officers
to "invite" the petitioners to go to Batasan Hills Police Station for investigation.8chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

The petitioners went with the police officers to Batasan Hills Police Station.9 At the inquest proceeding, the
City Prosecutor of Quezon City found that the petitioners stabbed Atty. Generoso with a bladed weapon.
Atty. Generoso fortunately survived the attack.10chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

In an Information dated February 22, 2005, the petitioners were indicted for attempted murder allegedly
committed as follows:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

That on or about the 20th day of February, 2005, in Quezon City, Philippines, the said accused, conspiring
together, confederating with and mutually helping one another, with intent to kill, qualified with evident
premeditation, treachery and taking advantage of superior strength, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously commence the commission of the crime of Murder directly by overt acts, by then and there
stabbing one Atty. MORENO GENEROSO y FRANCO, with a bladed weapon, but said accused were not able to
perform all the acts of execution which would produce the crime of Murder by reason of some cause/s or
accident other than their own spontaneous desistance, that is, said complainant was able to parry the
attack, to his damage and prejudice.

CONTRARY TO LAW.11

On March 7, 2005, the petitioners filed an Urgent Motion for Regular Preliminary Investigation12 on the
ground that they had not been lawfully arrested. They alleged that no valid warrantless arrest took place
since the police officers had no personal knowledge that they were the perpetrators of the crime. They also
claimed that they were just "invited" to the police station. Thus, the inquest proceeding was improper, and a
regular procedure for preliminary investigation should have been performed pursuant to Rule 112 of the
Rules of Court.13chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

On March 16, 2005, the RTC issued its order denying the petitioners' Urgent Motion for Regular Preliminary
Investigation.14 The court likewise denied the petitioners' motion for
reconsideration.15chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

The petitioners challenged the lower court's ruling before the CA on a Rule 65 petition for certiorari.They
attributed grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, on the RTC for the denial of
their motion for preliminary investigation.16chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

The Assailed CA Decision

On January 21, 2008, the CA issued its decision dismissing the petition for lack of merit.17 The CA ruled that
the word "invited" in the Affidavit of Arrest executed by SP02 Javier carried the meaning of a command. The
arresting officer clearly meant to arrest the petitioners to answer for the mauling of Atty. Generoso. The CA
also recognized that the arrest was pursuant to a valid warrantless arrest so that an inquest proceeding was
called for as a consequence. Thus, the RTC did not commit any grave abuse of discretion in denying the
Urgent Motion for Regular Preliminary Investigation.

The CA saw no merit in the petitioners' argument that the order denying the Urgent Motion for Regular
Preliminary Investigation is void for failure to clearly state the facts and the law upon which it was based,
pursuant to Rule 16, Section 3 of the Revised Rules of Court. The CA found that the RTC had sufficiently
explained the grounds for the denial of the motion.

The petitioners moved for reconsideration, but the CA denied the motion in its Resolution of April 17,
2008;18 hence, the present petition.cralawred

The Issues

The petitioners cited the following assignment of errors:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

I.

WHETHER OR NOT THE PETITIONERS WERE VALIDLY ARRESTED WITHOUT A WARRANT.cralawred

II.

WHETHER OR NOT THE PETITIONERS WERE LAWFULLY ARRESTED WHEN THEY WERE MERELY INVITED TO
THE POLICE PRECINCT.cralawred

III.

WHETHER OR NOT THE ORDER DENYING THE MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION IS VOID FOR
FAILURE TO STATE THE FACTS AND THE LAW UPON WHICH IT WAS BASED.

The petitioners primarily argue that they were not lawfully arrested. No arrest warrant was ever issued; they
went to the police station only as a response to the arresting officers' invitation. They even cited the
Affidavit of Arrest, which actually used the word "invited."

The petitioners also claim that no valid warrantless arrest took place under the terms of Rule 112, Section 7
of the Revised Rules of Court. The incident happened two (2) hours before the police officers actually arrived
at the crime scene. The police officers could not have undertaken a valid warrantless arrest as they had no
personal knowledge that the petitioners were the authors of the crime.

The petitioners additionally argue that the RTC's Order denying the Urgent Motion for Regular Preliminary
Investigation is void because it was not properly issued.cralawred

The Court's Ruling

We find the petition unmeritorious and thus uphold the RTC Order. The criminal proceedings
against the petitioners should now proceed.

It is unfortunate that the kind of motion that the petitioners filed has to reach this Court for its resolution.
The thought is very tempting that the motion was employed simply to delay the proceedings and that the
use of Rule 65 petition has been abused.

But accepting things as they are, this delay can be more than compensated by fully examining in this case
the legalities surrounding warrantless warrants and establishing the proper interpretation of the Rules for
the guidance of the bench and the bar. These Rules have evolved over time, and the present case presents
to us the opportunity to re-trace their origins, development and the current applicable interpretation.

I. Brief history on warrantless arrests

The organic laws of the Philippines, specifically, the Philippine Bill of 190219 and the 1935,20 197321 and
198722 Constitutions all protect the right of the people to be secure in their persons against unreasonable
searches and seizures. Arrest falls under the term "seizure."23chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

This constitutional mandate is identical with the Fourth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States.
The Fourth Amendment traces its origins to the writings of Sir Edward Coke24 and The Great Charter of the
Liberties of England (Magna Carta Libertatum), sealed under oath by King John on the bank of the River
Thames near Windsor, England on June 15, 1215.25 The Magna Carta Libertatum limited the King of
England's powers and required the Crown to proclaim certain liberties26 under the feudal vassals' threat of
civil war.27 The declarations in Chapter 29 of the Magna Carta Libertatum later became the foundational
component of the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution.28 It
provides:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

No freeman shall be taken, or imprisoned, or be disseised29 of his Freehold, or Liberties, or free Customs, or
be outlawed, or exiled, or any otherwise destroyed; nor will we not pass upon him, nor condemn him, but
by lawful Judgment of his Peers, or by the Law of the Land, We will sell to no man, we will not deny
or defer to any man either Justice or Right.30 [Emphasis supplied]

In United States v. Snyder,31 the United States Supreme Court held that this constitutional provision does
not prohibit arrests, searches and seizures without judicial warrant, but only those that are
unreasonable.32 With regard to an arrest, it is considered a seizure, which must also satisfy the test of
reasonableness.33chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

In our jurisdiction, early rulings of the Court have acknowledged the validity of warrantless arrests. The
Court based these rulings on the common law of America and England that, according to the Court, were not
different from the Spanish laws.34 These court rulings likewise justified warrantless arrests based on the
provisions of separate laws then existing in the Philippines.35chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

In 1905, the Court held in The United States v. Wilson36 that Section 3737 of Act No. 183, or the Charter of
Manila, defined the arresting officer's power to arrest without a warrant, at least insofar as the City of Manila
was concerned.

In The United States v. Vallejo, et al.,38 the Court held that in the absence of any provisions under statutes
or local ordinances, a police officer who held similar functions as those of the officers established under the
common law of England and America, also had the power to arrest without a warrant in the Philippines.

The Court also ruled in The United States v. Santos39 that the rules on warrantless arrest were based on
common sense and reason.40 It further held that warrantless arrest found support under the then
Administrative Code41 which directed municipal policemen to exercise vigilance in the prevention of public
offenses.

In The United States v. Fortaleza,42 the Court applied Rules 27, 28, 29 and 3043 of the Provisional Law for
the Application of the Penal Code which were provisions taken from the Spanish Law.

These rules were subsequently established and incorporated in our Rules of Court and jurisprudence.
Presently, the requirements of a warrantless arrest are now summarized in Rule 113, Section 5 which states
that:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Section 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. -A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant,
arrest a person:

(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has just been committed, and he has probable cause to believe based on personal
knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place
where he is serving final judgment or is temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped
while being transferred from one confinement to another.

In cases falling under paragraph (a) and (b) above, the person arrested without a warrant shall be forthwith
delivered to the nearest police station or jail and shall be proceeded against in accordance with section 7 of
Rule 112.

A warrantless arrest under the circumstances contemplated under Section 5(a) above has been
denominated as one "in flagrante delicto," while that under Section S(b) has been described as a "hot
pursuit" arrest.44chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

For purposes of this case, we shall focus on Section 5(b) - the provision applicable in the present case. This
provision has undergone changes through the years not just in its phraseology but also in its interpretation
in our jurisprudence.

We shall first trace the evolution of Section 5(b) and examine the applicable American and Philippine
jurisprudence to fully understand its roots and its appropriate present application.

II. Evolution of Section 5(b), Rule 113

A. Prior to the 1940 Rules of Court
Prior to 1940, the Court based its rulings not just on American and English common law principle on
warrantless arrests but also on laws then existing in the Philippines. In Fortaleza,45 the Court cited Rule 28
of the Provisional Law for the Application of the Penal Code which provided that:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Judicial and administrative authorities have power to detain, or to cause to be detained, persons whom
there is reasonable ground to believe guilty of some offense. It will be the duty of the authorities, as
well as of their agents, to arrest:

First. Such persons as may be arrested under the provisions of rule 27. Second. A person charged with a
crime for which the code provides a penalty greater than that of confinamiento.

Third. A person charged with a crime for which the code provides a penalty less than that of conjinamiento,
if his antecedents or the circumstances of the case would warrant the presumption that he would fail to
appear when summoned by the judicial authorities.

The provisions of the preceding paragraph shall not apply, however, to a defendant who gives sufficient
bond, to the satisfaction of the authority or agent who may arrest him, and who it may reasonably be
presumed will appear whenever summoned by the judge or court competent to try him.

Fourth. A person coining under the provisions of the preceding paragraph may be arrested,
although no formal complaint has been filed against him, provided the following circumstances
are present:
First. That the authority or agent had reasonable cause to believe that an unlawful act,
amounting to a crime had been committed.

Second. That the authority or agent had sufficient reason to believe that the person arrested
participated in the commission of such unlawful act or crime." [Emphasis and underscoring supplied]

In the same decision, the Court likewise cited Section 37 of the Charter of Manila, which provided that
certain officials, including police officers may, within the territory defined in the law, pursue and
arrest without warrant, any person found in suspicious places or under suspicious circumstances,
reasonably tending to show that such person has committed, or is about to commit any crime or
breach of the peace.

In Santos,46 the Court cited Miles v. Weston,47 which ruled that a peace. officer may arrest persons walking
in the street at night when there is reasonable ground to suspect the commission of a crime,
although there is no proof of a felony having been committed.

The Court ruled in Santos that the arresting officer must justify that there was a probable cause for an
arrest without a warrant. The Court defined probable cause as a reasonable ground of suspicion,
supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves as to warrant a reasonable man in believing
that the accused is guilty. Besides reasonable ground of suspicion, action in good faith is another
requirement. Once these conditions are complied with, the peace officer is not liable even if the arrested
person turned out to be innocent.

Based on these discussions, it appears clear that prior to the 1940 Rules of Court, it was not necessary for
the arresting officer to first have knowledge that a crime was actually committed. What was necessary was
the presence of reasonably sufficient grounds to believe the existence of an act having the characteristics of
a crime; and that the same grounds exist to believe that the person sought to be detained participated in it.
In addition, it was also established under the old court rulings that the phrase "reasonable suspicion" was
tantamount to probable cause without which, the warrantless arrest would be invalid and the arresting
officer may be held liable for its breach.48chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

In The U.S. v. Hachaw,49 the Court invalidated the warrantless arrest of a Chinaman because the arresting
person did not state in what way the Chinaman was acting suspiciously or the particular act or circumstance
which aroused the arresting person's curiosity.

It appears, therefore, that prior to the establishment in our Rules of Court of the rules on
warrantless arrests, the gauge for a valid warrantless arrest was the arresting officer's reasonable
suspicion (probable cause) that a crime was committed and the person sought to be arrested has
participated in its commission. This principle left so much discretion and leeway on the part of the arresting
officer. However, the 1940 Rules of Court has limited this discretion.

B. The 1940 Rules of Court

(Restricting the arresting officer's
determination of probable cause)

Rules 27 and 28 of the Provisional Law for the Application of the Penal Code were substantially incorporated
in Section 6, Rule 109 of the 1940 Rules of Court as follows:50chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

SEC. 6. Arrest without warrant -When lawful. - A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant,
arrest a person:

(a) When the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is about to commit an offense
in his presence;

(b) When an offense has in fact been committed, and he has reasonable ground to believe that
the person to be arrested has committed it;

(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place
where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while
being transferred from one confinement to another. [Emphasis and underscoring supplied]

These provisions were adopted in toto in Section 6, Rule 113 of the 1964 Rules of Court.

Notably, the 1940 and 1964 Rules have deviated from the old rulings of the Court. Prior to the 1940 Rules,
the actual commission of the offense was not necessary in determining the validity of the warrantless arrest.
Too, the arresting officer's determination of probable cause (or reasonable suspicion) applied both as to
whether a crime has been committed and whether the person to be arrested has committed it.

However, under the 1940 and the 1964 Rules of Court, the Rules required that there should be actual
commission of an offense, thus, removing the element of the arresting officer's "reasonable
suspicion of the commission of an offense." Additionally, the determination of probable cause, or
reasonable suspicion, was limited only to the determination of whether the person to be arrested has
committed the offense. In other words, the 1940 and 1964 Rules of Court restricted the arresting officer's
discretion in warrantless arrests under Section 6(b), Rule 113 of the 1964 Rules of Court.

C. The more restrictive 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure

Section 6, Rule 113 of the 1964 Rules of Court again underwent substantial changes and was re-worded and
re-numbered when it became Section 5, Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure, to
wit:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when. lawful. A peace officer or a private person may, without a
warrant, arrest a person:

(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting
to commit an offense;

(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts
indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it; and

(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place
where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while
being transferred from one confinement to another.

In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) hereof, the person arrested without a warrant shall be
forthwith delivered to the nearest police station or jail, and he shall be proceeded against in accordance with
Rule 112, Section 7. [Emphasis and underscoring supplied]

As amended, Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules of Court retained the restrictions introduced under
the 1964 Rules of Court. More importantly, however, it added a qualification that the commission of the
offense should not only have been "committed" but should have been "just committed." This limited the
arresting officer's time frame for conducting an investigation for purposes of gathering information indicating
that the person sought to be arrested has committed the crime.

D. The Present Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure

Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure was further amended with the incorporation
of the word "probable cause" as the basis of the arresting officer's determination on whether the person to
be arrested has committed the crime.

Hence, as presently worded, Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides
that:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

When an offense has just been committed, and he has probable cause to believe based on personal
knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it.

From the current phraseology of the rules on warrantless arrest, it appears that for purposes of Section
S(b), the following are the notable changes: first, the contemplated offense was qualified by the word
"just," connoting immediacy; and second, the warrantless arrest of a person sought to be arrested should
be based on probable cause to be determined by the arresting officer based on his personal knowledge of
facts and circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it.

It is clear that the present rules have objectified" the previously subjective determination of the arresting
officer as to the (1) commission of the crime; and (2) whether the person sought to be arrested committed
the crime. According to Feria, these changes were adopted to minimize arrests based on mere suspicion or
hearsay.51chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

As presently worded, the elements under Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure are: first, an offense has just been committed; and second, the arresting officer has probable
cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has
committed it.

For purposes of this case, we shall discuss these elements separately below, starting with the element of
probable cause, followed by the elements that the offense has just been committed, and the arresting
officer's personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed the
crime.
i) First Element of Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure: Probable cause
The existence of ''probable cause" is now the "objectifier" or the determinant on how the arresting officer
shall proceed on the facts and circumstances, within his personal knowledge, for purposes of determining
whether the person to be arrested has committed the crime.
i.a) U.S. jurisprudence on probable
cause in warrantless arrests
In Payton v. New York,52 the U.S. Supreme Court held that the Fourth Amendment of the Federal
Constitution does not prohibit arrests without a warrant although such arrests must be reasonable.
According to State v. Quinn,53 the warrantless arrest of a person who was discovered in the act of violating
the law is not a violation of due process.

The U.S. Supreme Court, however indicated in Henry v. United States54 that the Fourth Amendment limited
the circumstances under which warrantless arrests may be made. The necessary inquiry is not whether
there was a warrant or whether there was time to get one, but whether at the time of the arrest
probable cause existed. The term probable cause is synonymous to "reasonable cause" and "reasonable
grounds."55chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

In determining the existence of probable cause, the arresting officer should make a thorough investigation
and exercise reasonable judgment. The standards for evaluating the factual basis supporting a
probable cause assessment are not less stringent in warrantless arrest situation than in a case
where a warrant is sought from a judicial officer. The probable cause determination of a warrantless
arrest is based on information that the arresting officer possesses at the time of the arrest and not on the
information acquired later.56chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

In evaluating probable cause, probability and not certainty is the determinant of reasonableness under the
Fourth Amendment. Probable cause involves probabilities similar to the factual and practical questions of
everyday life upon which reasonable and prudent persons act. It is a pragmatic question to be
determined in each case in light of the particular circumstances and the particular offense
involved. 57chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

In determining probable cause, the arresting officer may rely on all the information in his possession, his fair
inferences therefrom, including his observations. Mere suspicion does not meet the requirements of showing
probable cause to arrest without warrant especially if it is a mere general suspicion. Probable cause may
rest on reasonably trustworthy information as well as personal knowledge. Thus, the arresting
officer may rely on information supplied by a witness or a victim of a crime; and under the circumstances,
the arresting officer need not verify such information.58chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

In our jurisdiction, the Court has likewise defined probable cause in the context of Section 5(b), Rule 113 of
the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.

In Abelita III v. Doria et al.,59 the Court held that personal knowledge of facts must be based on probable
cause, which means an actual belief or reasonable grounds of suspicion. The grounds of suspicion are
reasonable when, in the absence of actual belief of the arresting officers, the suspicion that the person to be
arrested is probably guilty of committing the offense is based on actual facts, i.e., supported by
circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to create the probable cause of guilt of the person to be
arrested. A reasonable suspicion, therefore, must be founded on probable cause, coupled with good faith on
the part of the peace officers making the arrest.

i.b) Probable cause under Section 5(b), Rule 113

of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure,
distinguished from probable cause in preliminary
investigations and the judicial proceeding for the
issuance of a warrant of arrest

The purpose of a preliminary investigation is to determine whether a crime has been committed
and whether there is probable cause to believe that the accused is guilty of the crime and should
be held for trial.60 In Buchanan v. Viuda de Esteban,61 we defined probable cause as the existence of facts
and circumstances as would excite the belief in a reasonable mind, acting on the facts within the
knowledge of the prosecutor, that the person charged was guilty of the crime for which he was
prosecuted.

In this particular proceeding, the finding of the existence of probable cause as to the guilt of the
respondent was based on the submitted documents of the complainant, the respondent and his
witnesses.62chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

On the other hand, probable cause in judicial proceedings for the issuance of a warrant of arrestis
defined as the existence of such facts and circumstances that would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent
person to believe that an offense has been committed by the person sought to be arrested.
Hence, before i suing a warrant of arrest, the judge must be satisfied that based on the evidence
submitted, there is sufficient proof that a crime has been committed and that the person to be
arrested is probably guilty thereof. At this stage of the criminal proceeding, the judge is not yet tasked
to review in detail the evidence submitted during the preliminary investigation. It is sufficient that he
personally evaluates the evidence in determining probable cause63 to issue a warrant of arrest.

In contrast, the arresting officer's determination of probable cause under Section 5(b), Rule 113 of
the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure is based on his personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that
the person sought to be arrested has committed the crime. These facts or circumstances pertain to actual
facts or raw evidence, i.e., supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to create the
probable cause of guilt of the person to be arrested. A reasonable suspicion therefore must be founded on
probable cause, coupled with good faith on the part of the peace officers making the arrest

The probable cause to justify warrantless arrest ordinarily signifies a reasonable ground of
suspicionsupported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a cautious man to
believe that the person accused is guilty of the offense with which he is charged,64 or an actual belief or
reasonable ground of suspicion, based on actual facts.65chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

It is clear therefore that the standard for determining "probable cause" is invariable for the officer arresting
without a warrant, the public prosecutor, and the judge issuing a warrant of arrest. It is the existence of
such facts and circumstances that would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent person to
believe that an offense has been committed by the person sought to be arrested or held for trial,
as the case may be.

However, while the arresting officer, the public prosecutor and the judge all determine "probable cause,"
within the spheres of their respective functions, its existence is influenced heavily by the available facts and
circumstance within their possession. In short, although these officers use the same standard of a
reasonable man, they possess dissimilar quantity of facts or circumstances, as set by the rules, upon
which they must determine probable cause.

Thus, under the present rules and jurisprudence, the arresting officer should base his determination of
probable cause on his personal knowledge of facts and circumstances that the person sought to be arrested
has committed the crime; the public prosecutor and the judge must base their determination on the
evidence submitted by the parties.

In other words, the arresting officer operates on the basis of more limited facts, evidence or available
information that he must personally gather within a limited time frame.

Hence, in Santos,66 the Court acknowledged the inherent limitations of determining probable cause in
warrantless arrests due to the urgency of its determination in these instances. The Court held that one
should not expect too much of an ordinary policeman. He is not presumed to exercise the subtle reasoning
of a judicial officer. Oftentimes, he has no opportunity to make proper investigation but must act in haste
on his own belief to prevent the escape of the criminal.67chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

ii) Second and Third Elements of Section 5(b), Rule 113:

The crime has just been committed/personal

knowledge of facts or circumstances that the
person to be arrested has committed it

We deem it necessary to combine the discussions of these two elements as our jurisprudence shows that
these were usually taken together in the Court's determination of the validity of the warrantless arrests that
were made pursuant to Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.

In Posadas v. Ombudsman,68 the killing of Dennis Venturina happened on December 8, 1994. It was only on
December 11, 1994 that Chancellor Posadas requested the NBI's assistance. On the basis of the supposed
identification of two (2) witnesses, the NBI attempted to arrest Francis Carlo Taparan and Raymundo
Narag three (3) days after the commission of the crime. With this set of facts, it cannot be said that
the officers have personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the persons sought to be arrested
committed the crime. Hence, the Court invalidated the warrantless arrest.
Similarly, in People v. Burgos,69 one Cesar Masamlok personally and voluntarily surrendered to the
authorities, stating that Ruben Burgos forcibly recruited him to become a member of the NPA, with a threat
of physical harm. Upon receipt of this information, a joint team of PC-INP units was dispatched to arrest
Burgos who was then plowing the field. Indeed, the arrest was invalid considering that the only information
that the police officers had in effecting the arrest was the information from a third person. It cannot be also
said in this case that there was certainty as regards the commission of a crime.

In People v. del Rosario,70 the Court held that the requirement that an offense has just been committed
means that there must be a large measure of immediacy between the time the offense was committed and
the time of the arrest. If there was an appreciable lapse of time between the arrest and the commission of
the crime, a warrant of arrest must be secured.

The Court held that the arrest of del Rosario did not comply with these requirements because he was
arrested only a day after the commission of the crime and not immediately thereafter. Additionally, the
arresting officers were not present and were not actual eyewitnesses to the crime. Hence, they had no
personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested had committed the offense. They
became aware of del Rosario's identity as the driver of the getaway tricycle only during the custodial
investigation.

In People v. Cendana,71 the accused was arrested one (1) day after the killing of the victim and only on the
basis of information obtained from unnamed sources. The unlawful arrest was held invalid.

In Rolito Go v. CA,72 the arrest of the accused six (6) days after the commission of the crime was held
invalid because the crime had not just been committed. Moreover, the "arresting" officers had no "personal
knowledge" of facts indicating that the accused was the gunman who had shot the victim. The information
upon which the police acted came from statements made by alleged eyewitnesses to the shooting; one
stated that the accused was the gunman; another was able to take down the alleged gunman's car's plate
number which turned out to be registered in the name of the accused's wife. That information did not
constitute "personal knowledge."

In People v. Tonog, Jr.,73 the warrantless arrest which was done on the same day was held valid. In this
case, the arresting officer had knowledge of facts which he personally gathered in the course of his
investigation, indicating that the accused was one of the perpetrators.

In People v. Gerente,74 the policemen arrested Gerente only about three (3) hours after Gerente and his
companions had killed the victim. The Court held that the policemen had personal knowledge of the violent
death of the victim and of facts indicating that Gerente and two others had killed him. The warrantless
arrest was held valid.

In People v. Alvario,75 the warrantless arrest came immediately after the arresting officers received
information from the victim of the crime. The Court held that the personal knowledge of the arresting
officers was derived from the information supplied by the victim herself who pointed to Alvario as the man
who raped her at the time of his arrest. The Court upheld the warrantless arrest.

In People v. Jayson,76 there was a shooting incident. The policemen who were summoned to the scene of
the crime found the victim. The informants pointed to the accused as the assailant only moments after the
shooting. The Court held that the arresting officers acted on the basis of personal knowledge of the death of
the victim and of facts indicating that the accused was the assailant. Thus, the warrantless arrest was held
valid.

In People v. Acol,77 a group held up the passengers in a jeepney and the policemen immediately responded
to the report of the crime. One of the victims saw four persons walking towards Fort Bonifacio, one of whom
was wearing his jacket. The victim pointed them to the policemen. When the group saw the policemen
coming, they ran in different directions. The Court held that the arrest was valid.

In Cadua v. CA,78 there was an initial report to the police concerning a robbery. A radio dispatch was then
given to the arresting officers, who proceeded to Alden Street to verify the authenticity of the radio
message. When they reached the place, they met with the complainants who initiated the report about the
robbery. Upon the officers' invitation, the victims joined them in conducting a search of the nearby area
where the accused was spotted in the vicinity. Based on the reported statements of the complainants, he
was identified as a logical suspect in the offense just committed. Hence, the arrest was held valid.
In Doria,79 the Court held that Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure does not
require the arresting officers to personally witness the commission of the offense.

In this case, P/Supt. Doria alleged that his office received a telephone call from a relative of Rosa Sia about
a shooting incident. He dispatched a team headed by SP03 Ramirez to investigate the incident. SP03
Ramirez later reported that a certain William Sia was wounded while Judge Abelita III, who was implicated
in the incident, and his wife just left the place of the incident. P/Supt. Doria looked for Abelita III and when
he found him, he informed him of the incident report. P/Supt. Doria requested Abelita III to go with him to
the police headquarters as he had been reported to be involved in the incident. Abelita III agreed but
suddenly sped up his vehicle and proceeded to his residence where P/Supt. Doria caught him up as he was
about to run towards his house.

The police officers saw a gun in the front seat of the vehicle beside the driver's seat as Abelita III opened
the door. They also saw a shotgun at the back of the driver's seat. The police officers confiscated the
firearms and arrested Abelita III. The Court held that the petitioner's act of trying to get away, coupled with
the incident report which they investigated, were enough to raise a reasonable suspicion on the part of the
police authorities as to the existence of probable cause.

Based on these discussions, it appears that the Court's appreciation of the elements that "the offense has
just been committed" and ''personal knowledge of facts and circumstances that the person to be arrested
committed it" depended on the particular circumstances of the case.

However, we note that the element of ''personal knowledge of facts or circumstances" under Section 5(b),
Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure requires clarification.

The phrase covers facts or, in the alternative, circumstances. According to the Black's Law
Dictionary,80 "circumstances are attendant or accompanying facts, events or conditions." Circumstances may
pertain to events or actions within the actual perception, personal evaluation or observation of the police
officer at the scene of the crime. Thus, even though the police officer has not seen someone actually fleeing,
he could still make a warrantless arrest if, based on his personal evaluation of the circumstances at the
scene of the crime, he could determine the existence of probable cause that the person sought to be
arrested has committed the crime. However, the determination of probable cause and the gathering of facts
or circumstances should be made immediately after the commission of the crime in order to comply with the
element of immediacy.

In other words, the clincher in the element of "personal knowledge of facts or circumstances" is the required
element of immediacy within which these facts or circumstances should be gathered. This required time
element acts as a safeguard to ensure that the police officers have gathered the facts or perceived the
circumstances within a very limited time frame. This guarantees that the police officers would have no time
to base their probable cause finding on facts or circumstances obtained after an exhaustive investigation.

The reason for the element of the immediacy is this - as the time gap from the commission of the crime to
the arrest widens, the pieces of information gathered are prone to become contaminated and subjected to
external factors, interpretations and hearsay. On the other hand, with the element of immediacy imposed
under Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, the police officer's determination of
probable cause would necessarily be limited to raw or uncontaminated facts or circumstances, gathered
as they were within a very limited period of time. The same provision adds another safeguard with the
requirement of probable cause as the standard for evaluating these facts of circumstances before the police
officer could effect a valid warrantless arrest.

In light of the discussion above on the developments of Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure and our jurisprudence on the matter, we hold that the following must be present for
a valid warrantless arrest: 1) the crime should have been just committed; and 2) the arresting officer's
exercise of discretion is limited by the standard of probable cause to be determined from the facts and
circumstances within his personal knowledge. The requirement of the existence of probable
cause objectifies the reasonableness of the warrantless arrest for purposes of compliance with the
Constitutional mandate against unreasonable arrests.

Hence, for purposes of resolving the issue on the validity of the warrantless arrest of the present petitioners,
the question to be resolved is whether the requirements for a valid warrantless arrest under Section 5(b),
Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure were complied with, namely: 1) has the crime just been
committed when they were arrested? 2) did the arresting officer have personal knowledge of facts and
circumstances that the petitioners committed the crime? and 3) based on these facts and circumstances that
the arresting officer possessed at the time of the petitioners' arrest, would a reasonably discreet and
prudent person believe that the attempted murder of Atty. Generoso was committed by the petitioners?

We rule in the affirmative.

III. Application of Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the

Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure in the
present case: there was a valid warrantless arrest

We deem it necessary to review the records of the CA because it has misapprehended the facts in its
decision.81 From a review of the records, we conclude that the police officers had personal knowledge of
facts or circumstances upon which they had properly determined probable cause in effecting a warrantless
arrest against the petitioners. We note, however, that the determination of the facts in the present case is
purely limited to the resolution of the issue on the validity of the warrantless arrests of the petitioners.

Based on the police blotter82 entry taken at 4:15a.m. on February 20, 2005, the date that the alleged crime
was committed, the petitioners were brought in for investigation at the Batasan Hills Police Station. The
police blotter stated that the alleged crime was committed at 3:15 a.m. on February 20, 2005, along
Kasiyahan St., Brgy. Holy Spirit, Quezon City.

The time of the entry of the complaint in the police blotter at 4:15 a.m., with Atty. Generoso and the
petitioners already inside the police station, would connote that the arrest took place less than one
hour from the time of the occurrence of the crime. Hence, . the CA finding that the arrest took place two (2)
hours after the commission of the crime is unfounded.

The arresting officers' personal observation of Atty. Generoso's bruises when they arrived at the scene of
the crime is corroborated by the petitioners' admissions that Atty: Generoso indeed suffered blows from
petitioner Macapanas and his brother Joseph Macapanas,83 although they asserted that they did it in self-
defense against Atty. Generoso.

Atty. Generoso's bruises were also corroborated by the Medico-Legal Certificate84 that was issued by East
Avenue Medical Center on the same date of the alleged mauling. The medical check-up of Atty. Generoso
that was made about 8:10 a.m. on the date of the incident, showed the following findings: "Contusion
Hematoma, Left Frontal Area; Abrasion, T6 area, right midclavicular line periorbital hematoma, left eye;
Abrasion, distal 3rd posterolateral aspect of right forearm; Abrasion, 4th and fifth digit, right hand; Abrasion
on area of 7th rib (L ant. Chest wall), tenderness on L peripheral area, no visible abrasion. In addition, the
attending physician, Dr. Eva P. Javier, diagnosed Atty. Generoso of contusion hematoma, periorbital L., and
traumatic conjunctivitis, o.s.

To summarize, the arresting officers went to the scene of the crime upon the complaint of Atty. Generoso of
his alleged mauling; the police officers responded to the scene of the crime less than one (1) hour after
the alleged mauling; the alleged crime transpired in a community where Atty. Generoso and the petitioners
reside; Atty. Generoso positively identified the petitioners as those responsible for his mauling and, notably,
the petitioners85 and Atty. Generoso86 lived almost in the same neighborhood; more importantly, when the
petitioners were confronted by the arresting officers, they did not deny their participation in the incident
with Atty. Generoso, although they narrated a different version of what
transpired.87chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

With these facts and circumstances that the police officers gathered and which they have personally
observed less than one hour from the time that they have arrived at the scene of the crime until the time
of the arrest of the petitioners, we deem it reasonable to conclude that the police officers had personal
knowledge of facts or circumstances justifying the petitioners' warrantless arrests. These circumstances
were well within the police officers' observation, perception and evaluation at the time of the arrest. These
circumstances qualify as the police officers' personal observation, which are within their personal
knowledge, prompting them to make the warrantless arrests.

Similar to the factual antecedents in Jayson,88 the police officers in the present case saw Atty. Generoso in
his sorry bloodied state. As the victim, he positively identified the petitioners as the persons who mauled
him; however, instead of fleeing like what happened in Jayson, the petitioners agreed to go with the police
officers.
This is also similar to what happened in People v. Tonog, Jr.89 where Tonog did not flee but voluntarily went
with the police officers. More than this, the petitioners in the present case even admitted to have been
involved in the incident with Atty. Generoso, although they had another version of what transpired.

In determining the reasonableness of the warrantless arrests, it is incumbent upon the courts to consider if
the police officers have complied with the requirements set under Section S(b), Rule 113 of the Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure, specifically, the requirement of immediacy; the police officer's personal
knowledge of facts or circumstances; and lastly, the propriety of the determination of probable cause that
the person sought to be arrested committed the crime.

The records show that soon after the report of the incident occurred, SPOl Monsalve immediately dispatched
the arresting officer, SP02 Javier, to render personal assistance to the victim.90 This fact alone negates the
petitioners' argument that the police officers did not have personal knowledge that a crime had been
committed the police immediately responded and had personal knowledge that a crime had been
committed.

To reiterate, personal knowledge of a crime just committed under the terms of the above-cited provision,
does not require actual presence at the scene while a crime was being committed; it is enough that evidence
of the recent commission of the crime is patent (as in this case) and the police officer has probable cause to
believe based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances, that the person to be arrested has recently
committed the crime.

Considering the circumstances of the stabbing, particularly the locality where it took place, its occasion, the
personal circumstances of the parties, and the immediate on-the-spot investigation that took place, the
immediate and warrantless arrests of the perpetrators were proper. Consequently, the inquest proceeding
that the City Prosecutor conducted was appropriate under the circumstances.

IV. The term "invited" in the Affidavit of Arrest is

construed to mean as an authoritative command

After the resolution of the validity of the warrantless arrest, the discussion of the petitioners' second issue is
largely academic. Arrest is defined as the taking of a person into custody in order that he may be bound to
answer for the commission of an offense. An arrest is made by an actual restraint of the person to be
arrested, or by his submission to the custody of the person making the arrest.91 Thus, application of actual
force, manual touching of the body, physical restraint or a formal declaration of arrest is not required. It is
enough that there be an intention on the part of one of the parties to arrest the other and the intent of the
other to submit, under the belief and impression that submission is necessary.92chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Notwithstanding the term "invited" in the Affidavit of Arrest,93 SP02 Javier could not but have the intention
of arresting the petitioners following Atty. Generoso's account. SP02 Javier did not need to apply violent
physical restraint when a simple directive to the petitioners to follow him to the police station would produce
a similar effect. In other words, the application of actual force would only be an alternative if the petitioners
had exhibited resistance.

To be sure, after a crime had just been committed and the attending policemen have acquired personal
knowledge of the incidents of the crime, including the alleged perpetrators, the arrest of the petitioners as
the perpetrators pointed to by the victim, was not a mere random act but was in connection with a
particular offense. Furthermore, SP02 Javier had informed the petitioners, at the time of their arrest, of the
charges against them before taking them to Batasan Hills Police Station for
investigation.94chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

V. The Order denying the motion for

preliminary investigation is valid

In their last ditch attempt at avoidance, the petitioners attack the RTC Order denying the petitioners' urgent
motion for regular preliminary investigation for allegedly having been issued in violation of Article VIII,
Section 14 of the 1987 Constitution95 and Rule 16, Section 3 of the Revised Rules of
Court.96chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

The RTC, in its Order dismissing the motion, clearly states that the Court is not persuaded by the evidentiary
nature of the allegations in the said motion of the accused. Aside from lack of clear and convincing proof,
the Court, in the exercise of its sound discretion on the matter, is legally bound to pursue and hereby gives
preference to the speedy disposition of the case."

We do not see any taint of impropriety or grave abuse of discretion in this Order. The RTC, in resolving the
motion, is not required to state all the facts found in the record of the case. Detailed evidentiary matters, as
the RTC decreed, is best reserved for the full-blown trial of the case, not in the preliminary incidents leading
up to the triaL

Additionally, no less than the Constitution itself provides that it is the decision that should state clearly and
distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based. In resolving a motion, the court is only required to
state clearly and distinctly the reasons therefor. A contrary system would only prolong the proceedings,
which was precisely what happened to this case. Hence, we uphold the validity of the RTC's order as it
correctly stated the reason for its denial of the petitioners' Urgent Motion for Regular Preliminary
Investigation.chanrobleslaw

WHEREFORE, premises considered, we hereby DENY the petition, and hereby AFFIRM the decision dated
January 21, 2008 and the resolution dated April 17, 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 91541.
The City Prosecutor of Quezon City is hereby ORDERED to proceed with the criminal proceedings against
the petitioners.

SO ORDERED.cralawlawlibrary

Carpio, (Chairperson), Del Castillo, and Mendoza, JJ., concur.

Leonen, J., I dissent, see separate opinion.

Republic Act No. 7438 April 27, 1992

AN ACT DEFINING CERTAIN RIGHTS OF PERSON ARRESTED, DETAINED OR UNDER CUSTODIAL

INVESTIGATION AS WELL AS THE DUTIES OF THE ARRESTING, DETAINING AND INVESTIGATING
OFFICERS, AND PROVIDING PENALTIES FOR VIOLATIONS THEREOF

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in Congress assembled::

Section 1. Statement of Policy. It is the policy of the Senate to value the dignity of every human being
and guarantee full respect for human rights.

Section 2. Rights of Persons Arrested, Detained or Under Custodial Investigation; Duties of Public
Officers.

(a) Any person arrested detained or under custodial investigation shall at all times be assisted by
counsel.

(b) Any public officer or employee, or anyone acting under his order or his place, who arrests,
detains or investigates any person for the commission of an offense shall inform the latter, in a
language known to and understood by him, of his rights to remain silent and to have competent and
independent counsel, preferably of his own choice, who shall at all times be allowed to confer
privately with the person arrested, detained or under custodial investigation. If such person cannot
afford the services of his own counsel, he must be provided with a competent and independent
counsel by the investigating officer.lawphi1

(c) The custodial investigation report shall be reduced to writing by the investigating officer,
provided that before such report is signed, or thumbmarked if the person arrested or detained does
not know how to read and write, it shall be read and adequately explained to him by his counsel or
by the assisting counsel provided by the investigating officer in the language or dialect known to
such arrested or detained person, otherwise, such investigation report shall be null and void and of
no effect whatsoever.
 (d) Any extrajudicial confession made by a person arrested, detained or under custodial
investigation shall be in writing and signed by such person in the presence of his counsel or in the
latter's absence, upon a valid waiver, and in the presence of any of the parents, elder brothers and
sisters, his spouse, the municipal mayor, the municipal judge, district school supervisor, or priest or
minister of the gospel as chosen by him; otherwise, such extrajudicial confession shall be
inadmissible as evidence in any proceeding.

(e) Any waiver by a person arrested or detained under the provisions of Article 125 of the Revised
Penal Code, or under custodial investigation, shall be in writing and signed by such person in the
presence of his counsel; otherwise the waiver shall be null and void and of no effect.

(f) Any person arrested or detained or under custodial investigation shall be allowed visits by or
conferences with any member of his immediate family, or any medical doctor or priest or religious
minister chosen by him or by any member of his immediate family or by his counsel, or by any
national non-governmental organization duly accredited by the Commission on Human Rights of by
any international non-governmental organization duly accredited by the Office of the President. The
person's "immediate family" shall include his or her spouse, fianc or fiance, parent or child,
brother or sister, grandparent or grandchild, uncle or aunt, nephew or niece, and guardian or ward.

As used in this Act, "custodial investigation" shall include the practice of issuing an "invitation" to a person
who is investigated in connection with an offense he is suspected to have committed, without prejudice to
the liability of the "inviting" officer for any violation of law.

Section 3. Assisting Counsel. Assisting counsel is any lawyer, except those directly affected by the
case, those charged with conducting preliminary investigation or those charged with the prosecution of
crimes.

The assisting counsel other than the government lawyers shall be entitled to the following fees;

(a) The amount of One hundred fifty pesos (P150.00) if the suspected person is chargeable with
light felonies;lawphi1alf

(b) The amount of Two hundred fifty pesos (P250.00) if the suspected person is chargeable with
less grave or grave felonies;

(c) The amount of Three hundred fifty pesos (P350.00) if the suspected person is chargeable with a
capital offense.

The fee for the assisting counsel shall be paid by the city or municipality where the custodial
investigation is conducted, provided that if the municipality of city cannot pay such fee, the province
comprising such municipality or city shall pay the fee: Provided, That the Municipal or City Treasurer
must certify that no funds are available to pay the fees of assisting counsel before the province pays
said fees.

In the absence of any lawyer, no custodial investigation shall be conducted and the suspected person can
only be detained by the investigating officer in accordance with the provisions of Article 125 of the Revised
Penal Code.

Section 4. Penalty Clause. (a) Any arresting public officer or employee, or any investigating officer, who
fails to inform any person arrested, detained or under custodial investigation of his right to remain silent and
to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice, shall suffer a fine of Six thousand
pesos (P6,000.00) or a penalty of imprisonment of not less than eight (8) years but not more than ten (10)
years, or both. The penalty of perpetual absolute disqualification shall also be imposed upon the
investigating officer who has been previously convicted of a similar offense.

The same penalties shall be imposed upon a public officer or employee, or anyone acting upon
orders of such investigating officer or in his place, who fails to provide a competent and
 independent counsel to a person arrested, detained or under custodial investigation for the
commission of an offense if the latter cannot afford the services of his own counsel.

(b) Any person who obstructs, prevents or prohibits any lawyer, any member of the immediate
family of a person arrested, detained or under custodial investigation, or any medical doctor or
priest or religious minister chosen by him or by any member of his immediate family or by his
counsel, from visiting and conferring privately with him, or from examining and treating him, or
from ministering to his spiritual needs, at any hour of the day or, in urgent cases, of the night shall
suffer the penalty of imprisonment of not less than four (4) years nor more than six (6) years, and
a fine of four thousand pesos (P4,000.00).lawphi1

The provisions of the above Section notwithstanding, any security officer with custodial responsibility over
any detainee or prisoner may undertake such reasonable measures as may be necessary to secure his
safety and prevent his escape.

Section 5. Repealing Clause. Republic Act No. No. 857, as amended, is hereby repealed. Other laws,
presidential decrees, executive orders or rules and regulations, or parts thereof inconsistent with the
provisions of this Act are repealed or modified accordingly.

Section 6. Effectivity. This Act shall take effect fifteen (15) days following its publication in the Official
Gazette or in any daily newspapers of general circulation in the Philippines.

Approved: April 27, 1992.lawphi1