RCBC v. METRO CONTAINER CORP.
PAGKALINAWANvsRODAS
An interpleader may be move to be dismissed
by a party when one of the party litigants has
obtained a final and executory decision against
the said party filing the interpleader requiring
him to pay the rentals to the said party litigant.
CDC v. TAN
that conflicting claims upon the same subject
matter are or may be made against the plaintiff-
in-interpleader who claims no interest whatever
in the subject matter or an interest which in
whole or in part is not disputed by the
claimants
that there be two or more claimants to the
fund or thing in dispute through separate and
different interests. The claims must be adverse
before relief can be granted and the parties
sought to be interpleaded must be in a position
to make effective claims. Additionally, the fund,
thing, or duty over which the parties assert
adverse claims must be one and the same and
derived from the same source
SY-QUIAvsTHE SHERIFF OF ILOCOS SUR
Though it, perhaps, would have been better
practice for the sheriff to sell the property and
hold the proceeds of the sale subject to the
outcome of the action of interpleader, we,
nevertheless, are of the opinion that the facts
shown do not justify our interference by
mandamus. The sheriff might lay himself open
to an action for damages if he sold the goods
without the consent of the holder of the last
mortgage, and it does not appear that the
petitioner offered to give bond to hold him
harmless in such an event. In these
circumstances, his action in suspending the sale
pending the determination of the action of
interpleader seems justified.
deposit to the clerk of court of the debtor is
bona fide compliance with the decision of the
respondent judge to pay a sum of money
pending the existence of an interpleader suit by
the debtor against the creditor.
UCPB v IAC
withdrawal of a complaint in interpleader will
also lead to the withdrawal of the compulsory
counterclaim arising from the said suit.
DEL CARMENv.SPOUSES RESTITUTO SABORDO
consignation [is] the act of depositing the
thing due with the court or judicial authorities
whenever the creditor cannot accept or refuses
to accept payment, and it generally requires a
prior tender of payment. It should be
distinguished from tender of payment which is
the manifestation by the debtor to the creditor
of his desire to comply with his obligation, with
the offer of immediate performance. Tender of
payment may be extrajudicial, while
consignation is necessarily judicial, and the
priority of the first is the attempt to make a
private settlement before proceeding to the
solemnities of consignation. Tender and
consignation, where validly made, produces the
effect of payment and extinguishes the
obligation
Under Article 1256, the only instances where
prior tender of payment is excused are: (1)
when the creditor is absent or unknown, or
does not appear at the place of payment; (2)
when the creditor is incapacitated to receive
the payment at the time it is due; (3) when,
without just cause, the creditor refuses to give a
receipt; (4) when two or more persons claim
the same right to collect; and (5) when the title
of the obligation has been lost.
1

PASRICHA vs. DON LUIS DISON REALTY, INC.,
consignation alone would have produced the
effect of payment of the rentals. The rationale
for consignation is to avoid the performance of
an obligation becoming more onerous to the
debtor by reason of causes not imputable to
him. Petitioners claim that they made a written
tender of payment and actually prepared
vouchers for their monthly rentals. But that was
insufficient to constitute a valid tender of
payment. Even assuming that it was valid
tender, still, it would not constitute payment for
want of consignation of the amount. Well-
settled is the rule that tender of payment must
be accompanied by consignation in order that
the effects of payment may be produced.
ARREZA vs DIAZ
Although the alternative defense of being
builders in good faith is only permissive, the
counterclaim for reimbursement of the value of
the improvements is in the nature of a
compulsory counterclaim. Thus, the failure by
the private respondents to set it up bars their
right to raise it in a subsequent litigation
BACLAYON vs. CA
The rule is well established that once a
decision has become final and executory the
only jurisdiction left with the trial court is to
order its execution. To require now the trial
court in a hearing supplementary to execution,
to receive private respondents' evidence to
prove that they are builders in good faith of the
improvements and the value of said
Improvements, is to disturb a final executory
decision; which may even cause its substantial
amendment. It appears that the private
respondent's opposition to the motion for the
execution of the judgment, possession and
demolition is their last straw to prevent the
satisfaction of the judgment. Sad to say, We
have to cut this straw.
We disagree with the respondent court that
any counterclaim for reimbursement of the
value of the improvements thereon by reason
of private respondents' being builders in good
faith, which presupposes that they are not the
owners of the land, would run counter to the
defense of ownership and therefore could not
have been set up before the trial court. It
should be emphasized that Rule 8, Section 2 of
the Rules of Court allows a party to set forth
two or more statements of a claim or defense
alternatively or hypothetically, either in one
cause of action or defense or in separate causes
of action or defenses. This Court, in Castle Bros.,
Wolf and Sons v. Go-Juno, 7 Phil. 144, even held
that inconsistent defenses may be pleaded
alternatively or hypothetically provided that
each defense is consistent with itself.
Although the alternative defense of being
builders in good faith is only permissive, the
counterclaim for reimbursement of the value of
the improvements is in the nature of a
compulsory counterclaim. Thus, the failure by
the private respondents to set it up bars their
right to raise it in a subsequent litigation
BELTRAN vs PHHC
no conflicting claims have been made with
regard to such issues upon plaintiffs by
defendant corporations, who both bound
themselves to recognize and respect the rights
of plaintiffs-tenants. The resolution of such
issues affecting the defendant corporations
exclusively may not properly be sought through
the special civil action of interpleader. Should
there be a breach of the PHHC undertakings
towards plaintiffs, plaintiffs' recourse would be
an ordinary action of specific performance or
other appropriate suit against either the PHHC
or GSIS or both, as the circumstances warrant.
2

WACK WACK GOLF & COUNTRY CLUB, INC. v.
WON
It is also the general rule that a bill of
interpleader comes too late when it is filed after
judgment has been rendered in favor of one of
the claimants of the fund, this being especially
true when the holder of the funds had notice of
the conflicting claims prior to the rendition of
the judgment and had an opportunity to
implead the adverse claimants in the suit in
which the judgment was rendered.
, a successful litigant cannot later be
impleaded by his defeated adversary in an
interpleader suit and compelled to prove his
claim anew against other adverse claimants, as
that would in effect be a collateral attack upon
the judgment.
MALANA et. al. v TAPPA
It is important to note that Section 1, Rule 63
of the Rules of Court does not categorically
require that an action to quiet title be filed
before the RTC. It repeatedly uses the word
"may" that an action for quieting of title "may
be brought under [the] Rule" on petitions for
declaratory relief, and a person desiring to file a
petition for declaratory relief "may x xx bring an
action in the appropriate Regional Trial Court."
The use of the word "may" in a statute denotes
that the provision is merely permissive and
indicates a mere possibility, an opportunity or
an option.
In contrast, the mandatory provision of the
Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, as
amended, uses the word "shall" and explicitly
requires the MTC to exercise exclusive original
jurisdiction over all civil actions which involve
title to or possession of real property where the
assessed value does not exceed P20,000.00
Where the law or contract has already been
contravened prior to the filing of an action for
declaratory relief, the courts can no longer
assume jurisdiction over the action. In other
words, a court has no more jurisdiction over an
action for declaratory relief if its subject has
already been infringed or transgressed before
the institution of the action
VELARDE and CARDINAL SIN v SOCIAL JUSTICE
SOCIETY
Indeed, the Court finds in the Petition for
Declaratory Relief no single allegation of fact
upon which SJS could base a right of relief from
the named respondents. In any event, even
granting that it sufficiently asserted a legal right
it sought to protect, there was nevertheless no
certainty that such right would be invaded by
the said respondents. Not even the alleged
proximity of the elections to the time the
Petition was filed below (January 28, 2003)
would have provided the certainty that it had a
legal right that would be jeopardized or violated
by any of those respondents
TAMBUNTING JR. v. SPS. SUMABAT
Here, an infraction of the mortgage terms had
already taken place before the filing of Civil
Case No. C-7496. Thus, the CFI lacked
jurisdiction when it took cognizance of the case
in 1979. And in the absence of jurisdiction, its
decision was void and without legal effect.
An action to enforce a right arising from a
mortgage should be enforced within ten years
from the time the right of action accrues.6
Otherwise, it will be barred by prescription and
the mortgage creditor will lose his rights under
the mortgage. A void proceeding does not
interrupt the prescriptive period
MANGAHAS v. HON. PAREDES
Rule 63 of the Rules of Court which deals with
actions for declaratory relief, enumerates the
subject matter thereof, i.e., deed, will, contract
or other written instrument, the construction or
3
validity of statute or ordinance. Inasmuch as
this enumeration is exclusive, petitioners
action to declare the RTC order denying their
motion to suspend execution, not being one of
those enumerated, should warrant the outright
dismissal of this case.
the extent of the enforceability of an
injunction writ issued by the Regional Trial
Court is defined by the territorial region where
the magistrate presides.
PROVINCE OF BATAAN v. PHILIPPINE
ECONOMIC ZONE AUTHORITY
An action for declaratory relief based on
theoretical or hypothetical questions cannot be
filed for our courts are not advisory courts.
F]irst, the subject matter of the controversy
must be a deed, will, contract or other written
instrument, statute, executive order or
regulation, or ordinance; second, the terms of
said documents and the validity thereof are
doubtful and require judicial construction; third,
there must have been no breach of the
documents in question; fourth, there must be
an actual justiciable controversy or the
"ripening seeds" of one between persons
whose interests are adverse; fifth, the issue
must be ripe for judicial determination; and
sixth, adequate relief is not available through
other means or other forms of action or
proceeding.
On the other hand, an assessment is illegal if it
was made without authority under the law. In
case of an illegal assessment, the taxpayer may
directly resort to judicial action without paying
under protest the assessed tax and filing an
appeal with the Local and Central Board of
Assessment Appeals
. A petition for declaratory relief is not the
proper remedy once a notice of assessment was
already issued. Instead of a petition for
declaratory relief, the PEZA should have directly
resorted to a judicial action. The PEZA should
have filed a complaint for injunction, the
appropriate ordinary civil action to enjoin the
City from enforcing its demand and collecting
the assessed taxes from the PEZA
A DR is unavailable when a notice of assessment
was already issued. PEZA should file an OCA
with an injunction
There was already a breach since the City has
issued demand letters and RP tax assessment in
violation of PEZAs tax exempt status.
CJH DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION v. BIR
Moreover, the proper subject matter of a
declaratory relief is a deed, will, contract, or
other written instrument, or the construction or
validity of statute or ordinance.23 CJH hinges its
petition on the demand letter or assessment
sent to it by the BOC. However, it is really not
the demand letter which is the subject matter
of the petition. Ultimately, this Court is asked to
determine whether the decision of the Court en
banc in G.R. No. 119775 has a retroactive effect.
This approach cannot be countenanced. A
petition for declaratory relief cannot properly
have a court decision as its subject matter.
OLLADA v. CENTRAL BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES
we have already held that the complaint for
declaratory relief will not prosper if filed after a
contract, statute or right has been breached or
violated. In the present case such is precisely
the situation arising from the facts alleged in
the petition for declaratory relief. As vigorously
claimed by petitioner himself, respondent had
already invaded or violated his right and caused
him injury all these giving him a complete
cause of action enforceable in an appropriate
ordinary civil action or proceeding.
REPUBLIC v. ROQUE
Lacks 4th, 5th and 6th requisite. Their fear is
based on the remarks of some government
4
officials but they failed to prove that such
prosecution is directed against them. Lastly,
they failed to prove the 5th requisite as to the
question is ripe for adjudication when the act
being challenged has had a direct adverse effect
on the individual challenging it, since the
petition is highly speculative.
TANDA v. ALDAYA
a court decision cannot be interpreted as
included within the purview of the words other
written instrument, as contended by
Appellant, for the simple reason that the Rules
of Court already provide for the ways by which
an ambiguous or doubtful decision may be
corrected or clarified without need of resorting
to the expedient prescribed by Rule 66. Thus, if
a party is not agreeable to a decision either on
questions of law or of fact, he may file with the
trial court a motion for reconsideration or a
new trial in order that the defect may be
corrected. Also res adjudicata will apply.
PDIC v. CA
Since respondent Jose Abad was at MBC soon
after it opened at 9:00 a.m. of that day,
petitioner should not presume that MBC had no
cash to cover the new GTDs of respondents and
conclude that there was no consideration for
said GTDs. Petitioner having failed to overcome
the presumption that the ordinary course of
business was followed
a petition for declaratory relief does not
essentially entail an executory process. There is
nothing in its nature, however, that proscribes
the filing of a counterclaim based on the same
transaction, deed or contract subject of the
complaint.
Petitioner ascribes bad faith to respondent
Jose Abad in transacting the questioned
deposits, and seeks to disqualify him from
availing the benefits under the law. Good faith
is presumed. This, petitioner failed to overcome
since it offered mere presumptions as evidence
of bad faith.
MATALIN COCONUT CO., INC v. THE
MUNICIPAL COUNCIL OF MALABANG et. al.
Under Sec. 6 of Rule 64, the action for
declaratory relief may be converted into an
ordinary action and the parties allowed to file
such pleadings as may be necessary or proper, if
before the final termination of the case "a
breach or violation of an...ordinance, should
take place." In the present case, no breach or
violation of the ordinance occurred. The
petitioner decided to pay "under protest" the
fees imposed by the ordinance. Such payment
did not affect the case; the declaratory relief
action was still proper because the applicability
of the ordinance to future transactions still
remained to be resolved, although the matter
could also be threshed out in an ordinary suit
for the recovery of taxes paid
DBM v. MANILAS FINEST RETIREES
ASSOCIATION, INC.
Execution of judgments in a petition for
declaratory relief is not necessarily indefensible
as rules on civil action can apply suppletorily to
special actions.
Here, petitioners in the RTC, pleaded for the
immediate adjustment of their retirement
benefits which, significantly, the herein
petitioners, as respondents in the same court,
did not object to. Being aware of said prayer,
the petitioners then already knew the logical
consequence if, as it turned out, a declaratory
judgment is rendered in the respondents favor.
CRISOLOGO v CENTENO
the vendor a retro must be named
respondent in the caption and title of the
petition for consolidation of ownership and has
been duly heard in compliance with Art. 1607 of
5
the Civil Code. In the instant case, the caption
and title of the petition for consolidation of
ownership named the vendees as petitioners,
but did not name the vendors as respondents,
and said vendors were not duly summoned and
heard. In view thereof, the Order of January 28,
1955, was a patent nullity having been issued
contrary to the contentious proceeding
contemplated in Article 1607 of the Civil Code,
and the lower court not having acquired
jurisdiction over the persons of the vendors.
RAMOS v CA
nullifying the orders of approval and
consolidation of ownership in favor of
petitioners in Special Proceedings No. 5174 and
G.L.R.O. Cadastral Record No. 395, is the
correlative vesting of proportionate dominion
over the lots in question in favor of private
respondents, includes the right to the
possession thereof. Where title to real property
is adjudicated in favor of a party, the judgment
must be enforced by giving the enjoyment
thereof to that party, as an inevitable
consequence of that judgment.
The nunc pro tunc is valid for the clarificatory
judgement only explicitly articulates what was
already implicitly assumed.
REPUBLIC v BATUIGAS
derivative naturalization where foreign
women who are married to Philippine citizens
may be deemed ipso facto Philippine citizens
and it is neither necessary for them to prove
that they possess other qualifications for
naturalization at the time of their marriage nor
do they have to submit themselves to judicial
naturalization.
Also, the main objective of extending the
citizenship privilege to an alien wife is to
maintain a unity of allegiance among family
members. Thus, the husbands interests in
property and business activities for part of the
conjugal property thus allowing her to reach the
income requirement.
The choice of what option to take in order to
acquire Philippine citizenship rests with the
applicant. In this case, Azucena has chosen to
file a Petition for judicial naturalization under
CA 473. The fact that her application for
derivative naturalization under Section 15 of CA
473 was denied should not prevent her from
seeking judicial naturalization under the same
law.
TAN v REPUBLIC
this Court has already held that there is no
proceeding established by law or the rules by
which any person claiming to be a citizen may
get a declaration in a court of justice to that
effect or in regard to his citizenship. Thus, for
instance, no action or proceeding may be
instituted for a declaration to the effect that
plaintiff or petitioner is married, or single or a
legitimate child, although a finding thereon may
be made as a necessary premise to justify a
given relief available only to one enjoying said
status.
PATES v COMELEC
Rule 64, however, cannot simply be equated
to Rule 65 even if it expressly refers to the latter
rule. They exist as separate rules for substantive
reasons as discussed below. Procedurally, the
most patent difference between the two i.e.,
the exception that Section 2, Rule 64 refers to
is Section 3 which provides for a special period
for the filing of petitions for certiorari from
decisions or rulings of the COMELEC en banc.
The period is 30 days from notice of the
decision or ruling (instead of the 60 days that
Rule 65 provides), with the intervening period
used for the filing of any motion for
reconsideration deductible from the originally-
6
granted 30 days (instead of the fresh period of
60 days that Rule 65 provides).
PAA v. CA
R.A. No. 7902 vesting upon the Court of
Appeals appellate jurisdiction over cases
decided or resolved by the Civil Service
Commission, but not the other two
Constitutional Commissions treated under
Article IX. Pursuant to Revised Administrative
Circular No. 1-95, the mode of appeal from a
decision of the Civil Service Commission, to
bring it within the appellate jurisdiction of the
Court of Appeals, is a petition for review to be
filed within the period therein fixed.
a petition for review as a mode of appeal to
the Court of Appeals from decisions, final
orders or resolutions of the Court of Tax
Appeals and quasi-judicial bodies, including the
Civil Service Commission, is governed by Rule 43
thereof.
LOKIN v COMELEC
the fresh-period rule used in Rule 65 does not
similarly apply to the timeliness of petitions
under Rule 64.
COMELEC possessed the authority to resolve
intra-party disputes as a necessary tributary of
its constitutionally mandated power to enforce
election laws and register political parties.
FORTUNE LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY vs.COA
The reglementary periods under Rule42 and
Rule 64 are different. In the former, the
aggrieved party is allowed 15 days to file the
petition for review from receipt of the assailed
decision or final order, or from receipt of the
denial of a motion for new trial or
reconsideration.19 In the latter, the petition is
filed within 30 days from notice of the
judgment or final order or resolution sought to
be reviewed. The filing of a motion for new trial
or reconsideration, if allowed under the
procedural rules of the Commission concerned,
interrupts the period; hence, should the motion
be denied, the aggrieved party may file the
petition within the remaining period, which
shall not be less than five days in any event,
reckoned from the notice of denial
. Section 13 thus requires that if the service is
done by registered mail, proof of service shall
consist of the affidavit of the person effecting
the mailing and the registry receipt, both of
which must be appended to the paper being
served. A compliance withthe rule is mandatory
OSMEA vs. COA
Although the service of the June 8, 2009
Resolution of the COA was validly made on June
29, 2009 through the notice sent to the Office
of the Mayor of Cebu City,16 we consider July
15, 2009 the date he reported back to office
as the effective date when he was actually
notified of the resolution, and the reckoning
date of the period to appeal. Here, the
justification of medical treatment stood.
Moreover, a certiorari petition filed under
Rule 64 of the Rules of Court must be verified,
and a verification requires the petitioner to
state under oath before an authorized officer
that he has read the petition and that the
allegations therein are true and correct of his
personal knowledge. Given that Osmea was
out of the country to attend to his medical
needs, he could not comply with the
requirements to perfect his appeal of the
Decision of the COA
PORMENTO vs.ESTRADA
Private respondent was not elected President
the second time he ran. Since the issue on the
proper interpretation of the phrase "any
7
reelection" will be premised on a persons
second (whether immediate or not) election as
President, there is no case or controversy to be
resolved in this case. No live conflict of legal
rights exists.6 There is in this case no definite,
concrete, real or substantial controversy that
touches on the legal relations of parties having
adverse legal interests. No specific relief may
conclusively be decreed upon by this Court in
this case that will benefit any of the parties
herein.8 As such, one of the essential requisites
for the exercise of the power of judicial review,
the existence of an actual case or controversy,
is sorely lacking in this case.
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS
CORPUS OF DATUKAN MALANG SALIBO
It ruled that when a superior court issues a
writ of habeas corpus, the superior court only
resolves whether the respondent should be
ordered to show cause why the petitioner or
the person in whose behalf the petition was
filed was being detained or deprived of his or
her liberty. However, once the superior court
makes the writ returnable to a lower court as
allowed by the Rules of Court, the lower court
designated "does not thereby become merely a
recommendatory body, whose findings and
conclusion[s] are devoid of effect." The decision
on the petition for habeas corpus is a decision
of the lower court, not of the superior court.
The writ of habeas corpus is different from the
final decision on the petition for the issuance of
the writ. It is the writ that commands the
production of the body of the person allegedly
restrained of his or her liberty. On the other
hand, it is in the final decision where a court
determines the legality of the restraint.
It is true that a writ of habeas corpus may no
longer be issued if the person allegedly
deprived of liberty is restrained under a lawful
process or order of the court. The restraint then
has become legal, and the remedy of habeas
corpus is rendered moot and academic.
It is to be noted that, in all the petitions here
considered, criminal charges have been filed in
the proper courts against the petitioners. The
rule is, that if a person alleged to be restrained
of his liberty is in the custody of an officer
under process issued by a court or judge, and
that the court or judge had jurisdiction to issue
the process or make the order, or if such person
is charged before any court, the writ of habeas
corpus will not be allowed. (Emphasis in the
original) In such cases, instead of availing
themselves of the extraordinary remedy of a
petition for habeas corpus, persons restrained
under a lawful process or order of the court
must pursue the orderly course of trial and
exhaust the usual remedies. This ordinary
remedy is to file a motion to quash the
information or the warrant of arrest.
"If the motion to quash is based on an alleged
defect of the complaint or information which
can be cured by amendment, the court shall
order [the] amendment [of the complaint or
information]." If the motion to quash is based
on the ground that the facts alleged in the
complaint or information do not constitute an
offense, the trial court shall give the
prosecution "an opportunity to correct the
defect by amendment." If after amendment,
the complaint or information still suffers from
the same defect, the trial court shall quash the
complaint or information.
An information with an incorrect name cannot
be cured by an amendment of the information,
a motion to quash, a motion to reinvestigation
nor the filing of a warrant of arrest. Here there
was no preliminary investigation and an illegal
deprivation of his liberty
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS
CORPUS ENGR. ASHRAF KUNTING
once the person detained is duly charged in
court or is detained under process by the RTC
such as an alias order of arrest, he may no
8
longer question his detention by a petition for
the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus."
IN RE: PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF
DAVID CRUZ y GONZAGA
service of the maximum penalty of a law
whose penalty was amended to be lower after
conviction is a ground for a writ of habeas
corpus
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS
CORPUS OF PETE C. LAGRAN
In applying the provisions of this rule the
duration of perpetual penalties (penal
perpetua) shall be computed at thirty years."
Article 70 of the Revised Penal Code allows
simultaneous service of two or more penalties
only if the nature of the penalties so permit.
The penalties that can be simultaneously served
are:
(1) perpetual absolute disqualification,
(2) perpetual special disqualification,
(3) temporary absolute disqualification,
(4) temporary special disqualification,
(5) suspension,
(6) destierro,
(7) public censure,
(8) fine and bond to keep the peace,
(9) civil interdiction, and
(10)confiscation and payment of costs.
These penalties, exceptdestierro, can be served
simultaneously with imprisonment. The
penalties consisting in deprivation of liberty
cannot be served simultaneously by reason of
the nature of such penalties. Where the
accused is sentenced to two or more terms of
imprisonment, the terms should be served
successively.
In the case at bar, petitioner was sentenced to
suffer one year imprisonment for every count of
the offense committed. The nature of the
sentence does not allow petitioner to serve all
the prison terms simultaneously.
In the matter of the Petition for Habeas Corpus
of CEZARI GONZALES and JULIUS MESA
Filing a Petition for Habeas Corpus despite the
pendency of the Petition for Certiorari that
questioned the validity of the order granting
bail, which order is precisely the very basis of
the Petition for Habeas Corpus, petitioner is
guilty of forum shopping.
AMPATUAN vs. JUDGE VIRGILIO V. MACARAIG
the contention of the petitioner that the letter
resignation of PO1 Ampatuan has rendered the
administrative case moot and academic, the
same could not be accepted by this Court. It
must be stressed that the resignation has not
been acted by the appropriate police officials of
the PNP, and that the administrative case was
filed while PO1 Ampatuan is still in the active
status of the PNP
a restrictive custody and monitoring of
movements or whereabouts of police officers
under investigation by their superiors is not a
form of illegal detention or restraint of liberty,
at best, nominal restraint which is beyond the
ambit of habeas corpus. It is neither actual nor
effective restraint that would call for the grant
of the remedy prayed for. It is a permissible
precautionary measure to assure the PNP
authorities that the police officers concerned
are always accounted for. Also the remedy in
this case, is within the same administrative
process.
IN RE: THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS FOR
REYNALDO DE VILLA
This is already irrelevant in consideration of
the rules provided by the SC regarding
admissibility of DNA evidence for post-
conviction remedy
REPUBLICvsCAPOTE
9
 an illegitimate child whose filiation is not
recognized by the father bears only a given
name and his mother surname, and does not
have a middle name. The name of the
unrecognized illegitimate child therefore
identifies him as such. It is only when the
illegitimate child is legitimated by the
subsequent marriage of his parents or
acknowledged by the father in a public
document or private handwritten instrument
that he bears both his mothers surname as his
middle name and his fathers surname as his
surname, reflecting his status as a legitimated
child or an acknowledged child.
Capote complied with the requirement for an
adversarial proceeding by posting in a
newspaper of general circulation notice of the
filing of the petition. The lower court also
furnished the OSG a copy thereof. Despite the
notice, no one came forward to oppose the
petition including the OSG. The fact that no one
opposed the petition did not deprive the court
of its jurisdiction to hear the same nor does it
make the proceeding less adversarial in nature.
A proceeding is adversarial where the party
seeking relief has given legal warning to the
other party and afforded the latter an
opportunity to contest it
REPUBLICvsBOLANTE
Respondent's open court testimony, given
under pain of perjury and for which she was
cross-examined, that she had not been accused
of any crime under her registered name or
under her present name is sufficient to show
that the requested name is not sought for any
illegal purpose and/or in avoidance of any
entanglement with the law there is no need for
the issuance of a police and NBI clearance or
like certification.
the declaration and affirmation of the
petitioner in open court that the petition is not
to further fraud but for a legitimate purpose,
coupled by the absence of any oppositor to the
petition is enough.
Not lost on the Court is the fact that during
the September 25, 2001 initial hearing which, to
reiterate is already outside the 4-month
limitation prescribed by the Rules, the
provincial prosecutor of Abra interposed no
objection as to the genuineness, authenticity,
relevancy or sufficiency of the exhibits
presented to prove the jurisdictional
requirements exacted by the Rules. In a very
real sense, therefore, the petitioner Republic
fully and knowingly acquiesced in the
jurisdiction of the trial court. The peculiar
circumstances obtaining in this case and the
requirements of fair dealing demand that we
accord validity to the proceedings a quo.
GAN v REPUBLIC
A change of name is a privilege and not a
matter of right; a proper and reasonable cause
must exist before a person may be authorized
to change his name
she did not state whether her parents, at the
time of her birth, were not disqualified by any
impediment to marry each other, .which would
make her a natural child pursuant to Article 269
of the Civil Code. If, at the time of the
petitioner's birth, either of her parents had an
impediment to marry the other, she may only
bear the surname of her mother pursuant to
Article 368 of the Civil Code. Otherwise, she
may use the surname of her father provided
that she was acknowledged by her father.
the change sought by the respondent therein
involves his civil status as a legitimate child; it
may only be given due course through an
adversarial proceedings under Rule 108 of the
Rules of Court not Rule 103
Also in Lim, although he is an illegitimate child,
It bears stressing that the birth certificate of the
respondent therein indicated that her surname
was the same as her father albeit misspelled.
Thus, a correction of entry in her birth
certificate is appropriate.
10
 , Articles 366 and 368 of the Civil Code do not
give to an illegitimate child or a natural child
not acknowledged by the father the option to
use the surname of the father
REPUBLICvsMERCADERA
Under R.A. No. 9048, jurisdiction over
applications for change of first name is now
primarily lodged with administrative officers.
The law now excludes the change of first name
from the coverage of Rules 103 until and unless
an administrative petition for change of name is
first filed and subsequently denied"56t and
removes "correction or changing of clerical
errors in entries of the civil register from the
ambit of Rule 108." Hence, what is left for the
scope
of operation of the rules are substantial
changes and corrections in entries of the civil
register.
Republic v. Valencia is the authority for
allowing substantial errors in other entries like
citizenship, civil status, and paternity, to be
corrected using Rule 108 provided there is an
adversary proceeding.
The fact that one has been known and used
such name ever since and no opposition was
filed against it is badge that it might be question
of correction
ruled that the error was plainly clerical, such
that, "changing the name of the child from
Midael C. Mazon to Michael C. Mazon cannot
possibly cause any confusion, because both
names can be read and pronounced with the
same rhyme (tugma) and tone (tono, tunog,
himig)
There was a petition for adoption that must
not have led to a corresponding change in the
adoptees given name because "it would be
procedurally erroneous to employ a petition for
adoption to effect a change of name in the
absence of a corresponding petition for the
latter relief at law."
REPUBLIC vs.COSETENG-MAGPAYO
In Alfon, the court allowed her to use her
mothers maiden name to avoid confusion but
she did not deny her legitimacy unlike in this
case
Rule 108 clearly directs that a petition which
concerns ones civil status should be filed in the
civil registry in which the entry is sought to be
cancelled or corrected that of Makati in the
present case, and "all persons who have or
claim any interest which would be affected
thereby" should be made parties to the
proceeding such as ones parents
A reading of these related provisions readily
shows that Rule 108 clearly mandates two sets
of notices to different "potential oppositors."
The first notice is that given to the "persons
named in the petition" and the second (which is
through publication) is that given to other
persons who are not named in the petition but
nonetheless may be considered interested or
affected parties, such as creditors. That two
sets of notices are mandated
when all the procedural requirements under
Rule 108 are followed, the publication of the
notice of hearing cures the failure to implead an
indispensable party
the mandatory directive under Section 3 of
Rule 108 to implead the civil registrar and the
parties who would naturally and legally be
affected by the grant of a petition for correction
or cancellation of entries. Non-impleading,
however, as party-respondent of one who is
inadvertently left out or is not established to be
known by the petitioner to be affected by the
11
grant of the petition or actually participates in
the proceeding is notified through publication.
GRANDE vs.ANTONIO
the general rule is that an illegitimate child
shall use the surname of his or her mother. The
exception provided by RA 9255 is, in case his or
her filiation is expressly recognized by the
father through the record of birth appearing in
the civil register or when an admission in a
public document or private handwritten
instrument is made by the father. In such a
situation, the illegitimate child may use the
surname of the father.
in Calderon v. Republic,19 this Court,
upholding the best interest of the child
concerned, even allowed the use of a surname
different from the surnames of the childs
father or mother. Indeed, the rule regarding the
use of a childs surname is second only to the
rule requiring that the child be placed in the
best possible situation considering his
circumstances.
the use of the word "shall" in the IRR of RA
9255 is of no moment. The clear, unambiguous,
and unequivocal use of "may" in Art. 176
rendering the use of an illegitimate fathers
surname discretionary controls, and illegitimate
children are given the choice on the surnames
by which they will be known.
REPUBLICvsHON. JOSE R. HERNANDEZ
, the law allows the adoptee, as a matter of
right and obligation, to bear the surname of the
adopter, upon issuance of the decree of
adoption. It is the change of the adoptee's
surname to follow that of the adopter which is
the natural and necessary consequence of a
grant of adoption and must specifically be
contained in the order of the court, in fact, even
if not prayed for by petitioner.
However, the given or proper name, also known
as the first or Christian name, of the adoptee
must remain as it was originally registered in
the civil register. The creation of an adoptive
relationship does not confer upon the adopter a
license to change the adoptee's registered
Christian or first name. To effect the change of
the adoptees first name, the adopters must
file a proper petition.
The name of the adoptee as recorded in the
civil register should be used in the adoption
proceedings in order to vest the court with
jurisdiction to hear and determine the same
Contrarily, a petition for change of name
grounded on the fact that one was baptized by
another name, under which he has been known
and which he used, has been denied inasmuch
as the use of baptismal names is not
sanctioned. For, in truth, baptism is not a
condition sine qua non to a change of name.
Neither does the fact that the petitioner has
been using a different name and has become
known by it constitute proper and reasonable
cause to legally authorize a change of name. A
name given to a person in the church records or
elsewhere or by which be is known in the
community - when at variance with that
entered in the civil register - is unofficial and
cannot be recognized as his real name.
Upon reaching the age of majority, he filed a
petition in court to change his surname from
Wong to Alcala, which was his surname prior to
the adoption. He adduced proof that the use of
the surname Wong caused him embarrassment
and isolation from friends and relatives in view
of a suggested Chinese ancestry when in reality
he is a Muslim Filipino residing in a Muslim
community, thereby hampering his business
and social life, and that his surviving adoptive
mother consented to the change of name
12
sought. This Court granted the petition and
regarded the change of the surname as a mere
incident in, rather than the object of, the
adoption.
WANG vs.CEBU CITY CIVIL REGISTRAR
In Oshita, The Court granted her petition
based on the following considerations: she had
elected Philippine citizenship upon reaching the
age of majority; her other siblings who had also
elected Philippine citizenship have been using
their mothers surname; she was embarrassed
to bear a Japanese surname there still being ill
feeling against the Japanese due to the last
World War; and there was no showing that the
change of name was motivated by a fraudulent
purpose or that it will prejudice public interest.
In Calderon, a petition for change of name of
an infant should be granted where to do is
clearly for the best interest of the child. The
Court took into consideration the opportunity
provided for the minor petitioner to eliminate
the stigma of illegitimacy which she would carry
if she continued to use the surname of her
illegitimate father. The Court pronounced that
justice dictates that every person be allowed to
avail of any opportunity to improve his social
standing as long as doing so he does not cause
prejudice or injury to the interests of the State
or of other people.
Article 364 of the Civil Code states that she, as
a legitimate child, should principally use the
surname of her father, there is no legal obstacle
for her to choose to use the surname of her
mother to which she is entitled
NOTE: that in Alfon and Oshita, the petitioners
were already of age when they filed the petition
in comparison to this case where the petitioner
is a minor. Also convenience is not an allowable
ground to justify a change of name under R103
REPUBLICvsUY
While there may be cases where the Court
held that the failure to implead and notify the
affected or interested parties may be cured by
the publication of the notice of hearing,
1. earnest efforts were made by
petitioners in bringing to court all
possible interested parties.
2. Such failure was likewise excused
where the interested parties
themselves initiated the corrections
proceedings;
3. when there is no actual or presumptive
awareness of the existence of the
interested parties; or
4. when a party is inadvertently left out
ALMOJUELA v REPUBLIC
,the CA correctly found that petitioner failed
to implead both the Local Civil Registrar and his
half-siblings. 42 Although he claims that his
half-siblings have acknowledged and accepted
him, the procedural rules nonetheless mandate
compliance with the requirements in the
interest of fair play and due process and to
afford the person concerned the opportunity to
protect his interest if he so chooses.
REPUBLICvsOLAYBAR
The testimonial and documentary evidence
clearly established that the only "evidence" of
marriage which is the marriage certificate was a
forgery. While we maintain that Rule 108
cannot be availed of to determine the validity of
marriage, we cannot nullify the proceedings
before the trial court where all the parties had
been given the opportunity to contest the
allegations of respondent; the procedures were
followed, and all the evidence of the parties had
already been admitted and examined.
Respondent indeed sought, not the nullification
13
of marriage as there was no marriage to speak
of, but the correction of the record of such
marriage to reflect the truth as set forth by the
evidence.
CORPUZvsSTO. TOMAS
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen
and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a
divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by
the alien spouse capacitating him or her to
remarry, the Filipino spouse shall likewise have
capacity to remarry under Philippine law.
the registration of the foreign divorce decree
without the requisite judicial recognition is
patently void and cannot produce any legal
effect.
The recognition of the foreign divorce decree
may be made in a Rule 108 proceeding itself, as
the object of special proceedings (such as that
in Rule 108 of the Rules of Court) is precisely to
establish the status or right of a party or a
particular fact. Moreover, Rule 108 of the Rules
of Court can serve as the appropriate
adversarial proceeding by which the
applicability of the foreign judgment can be
measured and tested in terms of jurisdictional
infirmities, want of notice to the party,
collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.
FUJIKI vs.MARINAY
The Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of
Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable
Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC) does not
apply in a petition to recognize a foreign
judgment relating to the status of a marriage
where one of the parties is a citizen of a foreign
country. Moreover, in Juliano-Llave v. Republic,
this Court held that the rule in A.M. No. 02-11-
10-SC that only the husband or wife can file a
declaration of nullity or annulment of marriage
"does not apply if the reason behind the
petition is bigamy."
the petition for recognition of foreign
judgment as a collateral attack applicable
because Braza does not involve a recognition of
a foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous
marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of
the foreign country
The Filipino spouse has the option to undergo
full trial by filing a petition for declaration of
nullity of marriage under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC,
but this is not the only remedy available to him
or her. Philippine courts have jurisdiction to
recognize a foreign judgment nullifying a
bigamous marriage, without prejudice to a
criminal prosecution for bigamy.
Philippine courts will only determine (1)
whether the foreign judgment is inconsistent
with an overriding public policy in the
Philippines; and (2) whether any alleging party
is able to prove an extrinsic ground to repel the
foreign judgment, i.e. want of jurisdiction, want
of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear
mistake of law or fact. If there is neither
inconsistency with public policy nor adequate
proof to repel the judgment, Philippine courts
should, by default, recognize the foreign
judgment as part of the comity of nations.
Section 48(b), Rule 39 of the Rules of Court
states that the foreign judgment is already
"presumptive evidence of a right between the
parties
CANLAS vs.NAPICO HOMEOWNERS ASSN
No writ of amparo may be issued unless there
is a clear allegation of the supposed factual and
legal basis of the right sought to be protected.
Their claim to their dwelling, assuming they
still have any despite the final and executory
judgment adverse to them, does not constitute
14
right to life, liberty and security. There is,
therefore, no legal basis for the issuance of the
writ of amparo.
TAPUZ vs.HONORABLE JUDGE ELMO DEL
ROSARIO
The Notice to Vacate and for Demolition is not
an order that exists independently from the RTC
orders assailed in this petition and in the
previously filed CA petition. It is merely a
notice, made in compliance with one of the
assailed orders, and is thus an administrative
enforcement medium that has no life of its own
separately from the assailed order on which it is
based. It cannot therefore be the appropriate
subject of an independent petition for certiorari
under Rule 65 in the context of this case.
The writ of amparo cannot be used to protect
concerns that are purely property or
commercial. Neither is it a writ that we shall
issue on amorphous and uncertain grounds. The
threat must also be imminent or continuing.
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR THE
WRIT OF AMPARO AND THE WRIT OF HABEAS
DATA IN FAVOR OF MELISSA C. ROXAS
Since the application of command
responsibility presupposes an imputation of
individual liability, it is more aptly invoked in a
full-blown criminal or administrative case rather
than in a summary amparo proceeding.
It must be clarified, however, that the
inapplicability of the doctrine of command
responsibility in an amparo proceeding does
not, by any measure, preclude impleading
military or police commanders on the ground
that the complained acts in the petition were
committed with their direct or indirect
acquiescence. In which case, commanders may
be impleadednot actually on the basis of
command responsibilitybut rather on the
ground of their responsibility, or at least
accountability.
The similarity between the circumstances
attending a particular case of abduction with
those surrounding previous instances of
enforced disappearances does not, necessarily,
carry sufficient weight to prove that the
government orchestrated such abduction.
Inamparo proceedings, the weight that may
be accorded to parallel circumstances as
evidence of military involvement depends
largely on the availability or non-availability of
other pieces of evidence that has the potential
of directly proving the identity and affiliation of
the perpetrators. Direct evidence of identity,
when obtainable, must be preferred over mere
circumstantial evidence based on patterns and
similarity, because the former indubitably offers
greater certainty as to the true identity and
affiliation of the perpetrators
cartographic sketches when unidentified,
much less have been shown to be that of any
military or police personnel fails to satisfy the
bar of substantial evidence required to issue
amparo
The fact that one is a soujourner in an area
affects the viability of her estimate as to her
familiarity of the said area or the required travel
time to go there.
Return of ones personal belongings is not a
relief granted by amparo as it is a property right
A basic requirement before an amparo court
may grant an inspection order is that the place
to be inspected is reasonably determinable
from the allegations of the party seeking the
order. While the Amparo Rule does not require
that the place to be inspected be identified with
clarity and precision, it is, nevertheless, a
minimum for the issuance of an inspection
order that the supporting allegations of a party
15
be sufficient in itself, so as to make a prima
facie case.
Writ of habeas data fails as keeping records of
investigations and other reports about the
petitioners ties with the CPP-NPA, was not
adequately provenconsidering that the origin
of such records were virtually unexplained and
its existence, clearly, only inferred by the
appellate court from the video and photograph
released by Representatives Palparan and
Alcover in their press conference. No evidence
on record even shows that any of the public
respondents had access to such video or
photograph.
Responsibility refers to the extent the actors
have been established by substantial evidence
to have participated in whatever way, by action
or omission, in an enforced disappearance, as a
measure of the remedies this Court shall craft,
among them, the directive to file the
appropriate criminal and civil cases against the
responsible parties in the proper courts.
Accountability, on the other hand, refers to the
measure of remedies that should be addressed
to those who exhibited involvement in the
enforced disappearance without bringing the
level of their complicity to the level of
responsibility defined above; or who are
imputed with knowledge relating to the
enforced disappearance and who carry the
burden of disclosure; or those who carry, but
have failed to discharge, the burden of
extraordinary diligence in the investigation of
the enforced disappearance.
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR THE
WRIT OF AMPARO AND HABEAS DATA IN
FAVOR OF NORIEL RODRIGUEZ
theyviolated and threatened the formers right
to security when they made a visual recording
of his house, as well as the photos of his
relatives.
There is no reasonable justification for this
violation of the right to privacy and security of
petitioners abode, which strikes at the very
heart and rationale of the Rule on the Writ of
Amparo. More importantly, respondents also
neglect to address our ruling that the failure to
conduct a fair and effective investigation
similarly amounted to a violation of, or threat to
Rodriguezs rights to life, liberty, and security.
The writs curative role is an acknowledgment
that the violation of the right to life, liberty, and
security may be caused not only by a public
officials act, but also by his omission.
Accountability may attach to respondents who
are imputed with knowledge relating to the
enforced disappearance and who carry the
burden of disclosure; or those who carry, but
have failed to discharge, the burden of
extraordinary diligence in the investigation of
the enforced disappearance. The CA correctly
held that the investigation was superficial, one-
sided, and depended entirely on the report
prepared by 1st Lt. Johnny Calub. No efforts
were undertaken to solicit petitioners version
of the incident, and no witnesses were
questioned regarding it.
The purported unwillingness of the petitioner
to appear or participate at this stage of the
proceedings due to security reasons does not
affect the rationale of the writ granted by the
CA
BALAO v. MACAPAGAL-ARROYO
identities of the abductors, their links to the
military or police and the fact that the alleged
victim is being held upon orders or
aquisescence of government agents must be
established for amparo to fly.
16
 to qualify for a good faith investigation, the
authorities must have investigated the officials
alleged to be involved and the place where the
abduction was said to have been done. Non-
cooperation of the the alleged victims is not a
excuse for an incomplete investigation
The seeming reluctance on the part of the
Rubricos or their witnesses to cooperate ought
not to pose a hindrance to the police in
pursuing, on its own initiative, the investigation
in question to its natural end. To repeat what
the Court said in Manalo, the right to security of
persons is a guarantee of the protection of ones
right by the government. And this protection
includes conducting effective investigations of
extra-legal killings, enforced disappearances, or
threats of the same kind.
A basic requirement before an amparo court
may grant an inspection order is that the place
to be inspected is reasonably determinable
from the allegations of the party seeking the
order 49, In this case, the issuance of inspection
order was properly denied since the petitioners
specified several military and police
establishments based merely on the allegation
that the testimonies of victims and witnesses in
previous incidents of similar abductions
involving activists disclosed that those premises
were used as detention centers.
the prayer for issuance of a production order
fails as it was predicated on petitioners bare
allegation that it obtained confidential
information from an unidentified military
source, that the name of James was included in
the so-called Order of Battle.
Reverend Father REYES vs.GONZALEZ
Here, the restriction on petitioners right to
travel as a consequence of the pendency of the
criminal case filed against him was not
unlawful. Petitioner has also failed to establish
that his right to travel was impaired in the
manner and to the extent that it amounted to a
serious violation of his right to life, liberty and
security, for which there exists no readily
available legal recourse or remedy.
LOZADA v. MACAPAGAL ARROYO
the President enjoys immunity from suit
during his or her tenure of office or actual
incumbency, Conversely, this presidential
privilege of immunity cannot be invoked by a
non-sitting president even for acts committed
during his or her tenure
An Amparo situation subsisted in Manalo,
however, because of the continuing threat to
the brothers right to security; the brothers
claimed that since the persons responsible for
their enforced disappearance were still at large
and had not been held accountable, the former
were still under the threat of being once again
abducted, kept captive or even killed, which
threat constituted a direct violation of their
right to security of person
Sec. 22 of the Amparo Rule proscribes the
filing of an amparo petition should a criminal
action have, in the meanwhile, been
commenced. The succeeding Sec. 23, on the
other hand, provides that when the criminal
suit is filed subsequent to a petition for amparo,
the petition shall be consolidated with the
criminal action where the Amparo Rule shall
nonetheless govern the disposition of the relief
under the Rule. Under the terms of said Sec. 22,
the present petition ought to have been
dismissed at the outset
if the Complaint filed before the DOJ had
already progressed into a criminal case, then
the latter action can more adequately dispose
of the allegations made by petitioners. After all,
one of the ultimate objectives of the writ of
amparo as a curative remedy is to facilitate the
17
subsequent punishment of perpetrators, On the
other hand, if there is no actual criminal case
lodged before the courts, then the denial of the
Petition is without prejudice to the filing of the
appropriate administrative, civil or criminal
case, if applicable, against those individuals
whom Lozada deems to have unduly restrained
his liberty.
RUBRICO vs.MACAPAGAL-ARROYO
If command responsibility were to be invoked
and applied to these proceedings, it should, at
most, be only to determine the author who, at
the first instance, is accountable for, and has
the duty to address, the disappearance and
harassments complained of, so as to enable the
Court to devise remedial measures that may be
appropriate under the premises to protect
rights covered by the writ of amparo.
THE SECRETARY OF NATIONAL
DEFENSEvsMANALO
With the secret nature of an enforced
disappearance and the torture perpetrated on
the victim during detention, it logically holds
that much of the information and evidence of
the ordeal will come from the victims
themselves, and the veracity of their account
will depend on their credibility and candidness
in their written and/or oral statements. Their
statements can be corroborated by other
evidence such as physical evidence left by the
torture they suffered or landmarks they can
identify in the places where they were
detained. Where powerful military officers are
implicated, the hesitation of witnesses to
surface and testify against them comes as no
surprise.
the right to liberty may be made more
meaningful only if there is no undue restraint by
the State on the exercise of that liberty" such as
a requirement to "report under unreasonable
restrictions that amounted to a deprivation of
liberty" or being put under "monitoring and
surveillance."
Third, the right to security of person is a
guarantee of protection of one's rights by the
government. Protection includes conducting
effective investigations, organization of the
government apparatus to extend protection to
victims of extralegal killings or enforced
disappearances (or threats thereof) and/or their
families, and bringing offenders to the bar of
justice. For example a one day investigation or
the failure to propound questions by
investigative officers to check the veracity of
the statements are evidence of the failure to
protect.
the Amparo production order may be likened
to the production of documents or things under
Section 1, Rule 27 of the Rules of Civil
Procedure not that of a search warrant. Thus, it
does not need of fulfill the requisites of the
latter.
MISON vs GALLEGOS
It is to be emphasized that the fundamental
function of the writ of amparo is to cause the
disclosure of details concerning the extrajudicial
killing or the enforced disappearance of an
aggrieved party. As Ku and his whereabouts
were never hidden, there was no need for the
issuance of the privilege of the writ of amparo
in the case at bar.
a party aggrieved by a Deportation Order
issued by the BOC is proscribed from assailing
said Order in the RTC even via a petition for a
writ of habeas corpus . Conformably with ruling
of the Court in Domingo v. Scheer , such party
may file a motion for the reconsideration
thereof before the BOC
18
SANTIAGOv.TULFO
In this case, it is undisputed that petitioners'
amparo petition before the RTC does not allege
any case of extrajudicial killing and/or enforced
disappearance, or any threats thereof, in the
senses above-described. Their petition is merely
anchored on a broad invocation of respondents'
purported violation of their right to life and
security, carried out by private individuals
without any showing of direct or indirect
government participation. Thus, it is apparent
that their amparo petition falls outside the
purview of A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC and, perforce,
must fail.
NAVIAvsPARDICO
for the protective writ of amparo to issue,
allegation and proof that the persons subject
thereof are missing are not enough. It must also
be shown and proved by substantial evidence
that the disappearance was carried out by, or
with the authorization, support or acquiescence
of, the State or a political organization, followed
by a refusal to acknowledge the same or give
information on the fate or whereabouts of said
missing persons, with the intention of removing
them from the protection of the law for a
prolonged period of time. Simply put, the
petitioner in an amparo case has the burden of
proving by substantial evidence the
indispensable element of government
participation.
under Section 1 of A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC a writ
of amparo may lie against a private individual or
entity. But even if the person sought to be held
accountable or responsible in an amparo
petition is a private individual or entity, still,
government involvement in the disappearance
remains an indispensable element.
LEEv.ILAGAN
the writ of habeas data will not issue to
protect purely property or commercial concerns
nor when the grounds invoked in support of the
petitions therefor are vague and doubtful.
self-serving testimony which hardly meets the
substantial evidence requirement as prescribed
by the Habeas Data Rule
nothing therein would indicate that Lee
actually proceeded to commit any overt act
towards the end of violating Ilagans right to
privacy in life, liberty or security. Nor would
anything on record even lead a reasonable mind
to conclude that Lee was going to use the
subject video in order to achieve unlawful ends
say for instance, to spread it to the public so
as to ruin Ilagans reputation. Contrastingly,
Lee even made it clear in her testimony that the
only reason why she reproduced the subject
video was to legitimately utilize the same as
evidence in the criminal and administrative
cases that she filed against Ilagan
MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY vs.GOPEZ LIM
Employment constitutes a property right
under the context of the due process clause of
the Constitution. It is evident that respondents
reservations on the real reasons for her transfer
- a legitimate concern respecting the terms and
conditions of ones employment - are what
prompted her to adopt the extraordinary
remedy of habeas data. Jurisdiction over such
concerns is inarguably lodged by law with the
NLRC and the Labor Arbiters.
VIVARES vs. STC
Habeas Data is designed to safeguard
individual freedom from abuse in the
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information age."13 The writ, however, will not
issue on the basis merely of an alleged
unauthorized access to information about a
person. Thus, the existence of a persons right
to informational privacy and a showing, at least
by substantial evidence, of an actual or
threatened violation of the right to privacy in
life, liberty or security of the victim are
indispensable before the privilege of the writ
may be extended.
The writ of habeas data, however, can be
availed of as an independent remedy to enforce
ones right to privacy, more specifically the right
to informational privacy. The remedies against
the violation of such right can include the
updating, rectification, suppression or
destruction of the database or information or
files in possession or in control of respondents,
the privilege of the Writ of Habeas Data may
also be availed of in cases outside of extralegal
killings and enforced disappearances.
To "engage" in something is different from
undertaking a business endeavour. To "engage"
means "to do or take part in something." It does
not necessarily mean that the activity must be
done in pursuit of a business. What matters is
that the person or entity must be gathering,
collecting or storing said data or information
about the aggrieved party or his or her family.
Whether such undertaking carries the element
of regularity, as when one pursues a business,
and is in the nature of a personal endeavour,
for any other reason or even for no reason at
all, is immaterial and such will not prevent the
writ from getting to said person or entity.
Before one can have an expectation of privacy
in his or her OSN activity, it is first necessary
that said user, in this case the children of
petitioners,manifest the intention to keep
certain posts private, through the employment
of measures to prevent access thereto or to
limit its visibility. And this intention can
materialize in cyberspace through the utilization
of the OSNs privacy tools. In other words,
utilization of these privacy tools is the
manifestation,in cyber world, of the users
invocation of his or her right to informational
privacy such as where the setting was only me
or was for a custom list.
As applied, even assuming that the photos in
issue are visible only to the sanctioned
students Facebook friends, respondent STC can
hardly be taken to task for the perceived
privacy invasion since it was the minors
Facebook friends who showed the pictures to
Tigol. Respondents were mere recipients of
what were posted. They did not resort to any
unlawful means of gathering the information as
it was voluntarily given to them by persons who
had legitimate access to the said posts.
GAMBOAvsCHAN
when the right to privacy finds tension with a
competing state objective, the courts are
required to weigh both notions. In these cases,
although considered a fundamental right, the
right to privacy may nevertheless succumb to
an opposing or overriding state interest
deemed legitimate and compelling.
The ECHR ruled that the storage in the secret
police register of information relating to the
private life of Leander, coupled with the refusal
to allow him the opportunity to refute the
same, amounted to an interference in his right
to respect for private life. However, the ECHR
held that the interference was justified on the
following grounds: (a) the personnel control
system had a legitimate aim, which was the
protection of national security, and (b) the
Personnel Control Ordinance gave the citizens
adequate indication as to the scope and the
manner of exercising discretion in the
collection, recording and release of information
by the authorities.
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 the forwarding of information by the PNP to
the Zearosa Commission was not an unlawful
act that violated or threatened her right to
privacy in life, liberty or security. The PNP was
rationally expected to forward and share
intelligence regarding PAGs with the body
specifically created for the purpose of
investigating the existence of these notorious
groups. Moreover, the Zearosa Commission
was explicitly authorized to deputize the police
force in the fulfillment of the formers mandate,
and thus had the power to request assistance
from the latter.

this Court nonetheless deems it necessary to

caution these investigating entities that
information-sharing must observe strict
confidentiality. Intelligence gathered must be
released exclusively to the authorities
empowered to receive the relevant
information. After all, inherent to the right to
privacy is the freedom from "unwarranted
exploitation of ones person or from intrusion
into ones private activities in such a way as to
cause humiliation to a persons ordinary
sensibilities." Unintended disclosure does not
give ground to habeas data as the probable
damage to reputation can be claimed from a
civil case.

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