Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-29646 November 10, 1978
MAYOR ANTONIO J. VILLEGAS, petitioner,
vs.
HIU CHIONG TSAI PAO HO and JUDGE
FRANCISCO ARCA, respondents.
Angel C. Cruz, Gregorio A. Ejercito, Felix C. Chaves
& Jose Laureta for petitioner.
Sotero H. Laurel for respondents.
FERNANDEZ, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari to review tile decision
dated September 17, 1968 of respondent Judge
Francisco Arca of the Court of First Instance of
Manila, Branch I, in Civil Case No. 72797, the
dispositive portion of winch reads.
Wherefore, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of
the petitioner and against the respondents, declaring
Ordinance No. 6 37 of the City of Manila null and
void. The preliminary injunction is made permanent.
No pronouncement as to cost.
SO ORDERED.
Manila, Philippines, September 17, 1968.
(SGD.) FRANCISCO ARCA
Judge1
The controverted Ordinance No. 6537 was passed
by the Municipal Board of Manila on February 22,
1968 and signed by the herein petitioner Mayor
Antonio J. Villegas of Manila on March 27, 1968. 2
City Ordinance No. 6537 is entitled:
AN ORDINANCE MAKING IT UNLAWFUL FOR
ANY PERSON NOT A CITIZEN OF THE
PHILIPPINES TO BE EMPLOYED IN ANY PLACE
OF EMPLOYMENT OR TO BE ENGAGED IN ANY
KIND OF TRADE, BUSINESS OR OCCUPATION
WITHIN THE CITY OF MANILA WITHOUT FIRST
SECURING AN EMPLOYMENT PERMIT FROM
THE MAYOR OF MANILA; AND FOR OTHER
PURPOSES. 3
Section 1 of said Ordinance No. 6537 4 prohibits
aliens from being employed or to engage or
participate in any position or occupation or business
enumerated therein, whether permanent, temporary
or casual, without first securing an employment
permit from the Mayor of Manila and paying the
permit fee of P50.00 except persons employed in
the diplomatic or consular missions of foreign
countries, or in the technical assistance programs of
both the Philippine Government and any foreign
government, and those working in their respective
households, and members of religious orders or
congregations, sect or denomination, who are not
paid monetarily or in kind.
Violations of this ordinance is punishable by an
imprisonment of not less than three (3) months to six
(6) months or fine of not less than P100.00 but not
more than P200.00 or both such fine and
imprisonment, upon conviction. 5
On May 4, 1968, private respondent Hiu Chiong Tsai
Pao Ho who was employed in Manila, filed a petition
with the Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch I,
denominated as Civil Case No. 72797, praying for
the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction and
restraining order to stop the enforcement of
Ordinance No. 6537 as well as for a judgment
declaring said Ordinance No. 6537 null and void. 6
In this petition, Hiu Chiong Tsai Pao Ho assigned
the following as his grounds for wanting the
ordinance declared null and void:
1) As a revenue measure imposed on aliens
employed in the City of Manila, Ordinance No. 6537
is discriminatory and violative of the rule of the
uniformity in taxation;
2) As a police power measure, it makes no
distinction between useful and non-useful
occupations, imposing a fixed P50.00 employment
permit, which is out of proportion to the cost of
registration and that it fails to prescribe any standard
to guide and/or limit the action of the Mayor, thus,
violating the fundamental principle on illegal
delegation of legislative powers:
3) It is arbitrary, oppressive and unreasonable,
being applied only to aliens who are thus, deprived
of their rights to life, liberty and property and
therefore, violates the due process and equal
protection clauses of the Constitution.7
On May 24, 1968, respondent Judge issued the writ
of preliminary injunction and on September 17, 1968
rendered judgment declaring Ordinance No. 6537
null and void and making permanent the writ of
preliminary injunction. 8
Contesting the aforecited decision of respondent
Judge, then Mayor Antonio J. Villegas filed the
present petition on March 27, 1969. Petitioner
assigned the following as errors allegedly committed
by respondent Judge in the latter's decision of
September 17,1968: 9
I executive
THE RESPONDENT JUDGE COMMITTED A
SERIOUS AND PATENT ERROR OF LAW IN
RULING THAT ORDINANCE NO. 6537 VIOLATED
THE CARDINAL RULE OF UNIFORMITY OF
TAXATION.
II
RESPONDENT JUDGE LIKEWISE COMMITTED A
GRAVE AND PATENT ERROR OF LAW IN
RULING THAT ORDINANCE NO. 6537 VIOLATED
THE PRINCIPLE AGAINST UNDUE DESIGNATION
OF LEGISLATIVE POWER.
III
RESPONDENT JUDGE FURTHER COMMITTED A
SERIOUS AND PATENT ERROR OF LAW IN
RULING THAT ORDINANCE NO. 6537 VIOLATED
THE DUE PROCESS AND EQUAL PROTECTION
CLAUSES OF THE CONSTITUTION.
Petitioner Mayor Villegas argues that Ordinance No.
6537 cannot be declared null and void on the ground
that it violated the rule on uniformity of taxation
because the rule on uniformity of taxation applies
only to purely tax or revenue measures and that
Ordinance No. 6537 is not a tax or revenue measure
but is an exercise of the police power of the state, it
being principally a regulatory measure in nature.
The contention that Ordinance No. 6537 is not a
purely tax or revenue measure because its principal
purpose is regulatory in nature has no merit. While it
is true that the first part which requires that the alien
shall secure an employment permit from the Mayor
involves the exercise of discretion and judgment in
the processing and approval or disapproval of
applications for employment permits and therefore is
regulatory in character the second part which
requires the payment of P50.00 as employee's fee is
not regulatory but a revenue measure. There is no
logic or justification in exacting P50.00 from aliens
who have been cleared for employment. It is obvious
that the purpose of the ordinance is to raise money
under the guise of regulation.
The P50.00 fee is unreasonable not only because it
is excessive but because it fails to consider valid
substantial differences in situation among individual
aliens who are required to pay it. Although the equal
protection clause of the Constitution does not forbid
classification, it is imperative that the classification
should be based on real and substantial differences
having a reasonable relation to the subject of the
particular legislation. The same amount of P50.00 is
being collected from every employed alien whether
he is casual or permanent, part time or full time or
whether he is a lowly employee or a highly paid
Ordinance No. 6537 does not lay down any criterion
or standard to guide the Mayor in the exercise of his
discretion. It has been held that where an ordinance
of a municipality fails to state any policy or to set up
any standard to guide or limit the mayor's action,
expresses no purpose to be attained by requiring a
permit, enumerates no conditions for its grant or
refusal, and entirely lacks standard, thus conferring
upon the Mayor arbitrary and unrestricted power to
grant or deny the issuance of building permits, such
ordinance is invalid, being an undefined and
unlimited delegation of power to allow or prevent an
activity per se lawful. 10
In Chinese Flour Importers Association vs. Price
Stabilization Board, 11 where a law granted a
government agency power to determine the
allocation of wheat flour among importers, the
Supreme Court ruled against the interpretation of
uncontrolled power as it vested in the administrative
officer an arbitrary discretion to be exercised without
a policy, rule, or standard from which it can be
measured or controlled.
It was also held in Primicias vs. Fugoso 12 that the
authority and discretion to grant and refuse permits
of all classes conferred upon the Mayor of Manila by
the Revised Charter of Manila is not uncontrolled
discretion but legal discretion to be exercised within
the limits of the law.
Ordinance No. 6537 is void because it does not
contain or suggest any standard or criterion to guide
the mayor in the exercise of the power which has
been granted to him by the ordinance.
The ordinance in question violates the due process
of law and equal protection rule of the Constitution.
Requiring a person before he can be employed to
get a permit from the City Mayor of Manila who may
withhold or refuse it at will is tantamount to denying
him the basic right of the people in the Philippines to
engage in a means of livelihood. While it is true that
the Philippines as a State is not obliged to admit
aliens within its territory, once an alien is admitted,
he cannot be deprived of life without due process of
law. This guarantee includes the means of
livelihood. The shelter of protection under the due
process and equal protection clause is given to all
persons, both aliens and citizens. 13
The trial court did not commit the errors assigned.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby
affirmed, without pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.
Barredo, Makasiar, Muoz Palma, Santos and
Guerrero, JJ., concur.
Castro, C.J., Antonio and Aquino, Fernando, JJ.,
concur in the result.
Concepcion, Jr., J., took no part.
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-14078 March 7, 1919
RUBI, ET AL. (manguianes), plaintiffs,
vs.
THE PROVINCIAL BOARD OF MINDORO,
defendant.
D. R. Williams & Filemon Sotto for plaintiff.
Office of the Solicitor-General Paredes for
defendant.
MALCOLM, J.:
In one of the cases which denote a landmark in
American Constitutional History (Worcester vs.
Georgia [1832], 6 Pet., 515), Chief Justice Marshall,
the first luminary of American jurisprudence, began
his opinion (relating to the status of an Indian) with
words which, with a slight change in phraseology,
can be made to introduce the present opinion
This cause, in every point of view in which it can be
placed, is of the deepest interest. The legislative
power of state, the controlling power of the
constitution and laws, the rights if they have any, the
political existence of a people, the personal liberty of
a citizen, are all involved in the subject now to be
considered.
To imitate still further the opinion of the Chief
Justice, we adopt his outline and proceed first, to
introduce the facts and the issues, next to give a
history of the so called "non-Christians," next to
compare the status of the "non-Christians" with that
of the American Indians, and, lastly, to resolve the
constitutional questions presented.
I. INTRODUCTION.
This is an application for habeas corpus in favor of
Rubi and other Manguianes of the Province of
Mindoro. It is alleged that the Maguianes are being
illegally deprived of their liberty by the provincial
officials of that province. Rubi and his companions
are said to be held on the reservation established at
Tigbao, Mindoro, against their will, and one Dabalos
is said to be held under the custody of the provincial
sheriff in the prison at Calapan for having run away
form the reservation.
The return of the Solicitor-General alleges:
1. That on February 1, 1917, the provincial
board of Mindoro adopted resolution No. 25 which is
as follows:
The provincial governor, Hon. Juan Morente, Jr.,
presented the following resolution:
"Whereas several attempts and schemes have been
made for the advancement of the non-Christian
people of Mindoro, which were all a failure,
"Whereas it has been found out and proved that
unless some other measure is taken for the
Mangyan work of this province, no successful result
will be obtained toward educating these people.
"Whereas it is deemed necessary to obliged them to
live in one place in order to make a permanent
settlement,
"Whereas the provincial governor of any province in
which non-Christian inhabitants are found is
authorized, when such a course is deemed
necessary in the interest of law and order, to direct
such inhabitants to take up their habitation on sites
on unoccupied public lands to be selected by him
and approved by the provincial board.
"Whereas the provincial governor is of the opinion
that the sitio of Tigbao on Lake Naujan is a place
most convenient for the Mangyanes to live on, Now,
therefore be it
"Resolved, that under section 2077 of the
Administrative Code, 800 hectares of public land in
the sitio of Tigbao on Naujan Lake be selected as a
site for the permanent settlement of Mangyanes in
Mindoro subject to the approval of the Honorable
Secretary of the Interior, and
"Resolved further, That Mangyans may only solicit
homesteads on this reservation providing that said
homestead applications are previously
recommended by the provincial governor."
2. That said resolution No. 25 (series 1917) of
the provincial board of Mindoro was approved by the
Secretary of the Interior of February 21, 1917.
3. That on December 4, 1917, the provincial
governor of Mindoro issued executive order No. 2
which says:
"Whereas the provincial board, by Resolution No.
25, current series, has selected a site in the sitio of
Tigbao on Naujan Lake for the permanent
settlement of Mangyanes in Mindoro.
"Whereas said resolution has been duly approve by
the Honorable, the Secretary of the Interior, on
February 21, 1917.
"Now, therefore, I, Juan Morente, jr., provincial
governor of Mindoro, pursuant to the provisions of
section 2145 of the revised Administrative Code, do
hereby direct that all the Mangyans in the townships
of Naujan and Pola and the Mangyans east of the
Baco River including those in the districts of
Dulangan and Rubi's place in Calapan, to take up
their habitation on the site of Tigbao, Naujan Lake,
not later than December 31, 1917.
"Any Mangyan who shall refuse to comply with this
order shall upon conviction be imprisoned not
exceed in sixty days, in accordance with section
2759 of the revised Administrative Code."
4. That the resolution of the provincial board of
Mindoro copied in paragraph 1 and the executive
order of the governor of the same province copied in
paragraph 3, were necessary measures for the
protection of the Mangyanes of Mindoro as well as
the protection of public forests in which they roam,
and to introduce civilized customs among them.
5. That Rubi and those living in his rancheria
have not fixed their dwelling within the reservation of
Tigbao and are liable to be punished in accordance
with section 2759 of Act No. 2711.
6. That the undersigned has not information
that Doroteo Dabalos is being detained by the sheriff
of Mindoro but if he is so detained it must be by
virtue of the provisions of articles Nos. 2145 and
2759 of Act No. 2711.
It thus appears that the provincial governor of
Mindoro and the provincial board thereof directed
the Manguianes in question to take up their
habitation in Tigbao, a site on the shore of Lake
Naujan, selected by the provincial governor and
approved by the provincial board. The action was
taken in accordance with section 2145 of the
Administrative Code of 1917, and was duly
approved by the Secretary of the Interior as required
by said action. Petitioners, however, challenge the
validity of this section of the Administrative Code.
This, therefore, becomes the paramount question
which the court is called upon the decide.
Section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917
reads as follows:
SEC. 2145. Establishment of non-Christina upon
sites selected by provincial governor. With the
prior approval of the Department Head, the
provincial governor of any province in which non-
Christian inhabitants are found is authorized, when
such a course is deemed necessary in the interest of
law and order, to direct such inhabitants to take up
their habitation on sites on unoccupied public lands
to be selected by him an approved by the provincial
board.
In connection with the above-quoted provisions,
there should be noted section 2759 of the same
Code, which read as follows:
SEC. 2759. Refusal of a non-Christian to take
up appointed habitation. Any non-Christian who
shall refuse to comply with the directions lawfully
given by a provincial governor, pursuant to section
two thousand one hundred and forty-five of this
Code, to take up habitation upon a site designated
by said governor shall upon conviction be
imprisonment for a period not exceeding sixty days.
The substance of what is now found in said section
2145 is not new to Philippine law. The genealogical
tree of this section, if we may be permitted to use
such terminology, would read: Section 2077,
Administrative Code of 1916; section 62, Act No.
1397; section 2 of various special provincial laws,
notably of Act No. 547, specifically relating to the
Manguianes; section 69, Act No. 387.
Section 2145 and its antecedent laws make use of
the term "non-Christians." This word, as will later be
disclosed, is also found in varying forms in other
laws of the Philippine Islands. In order to put the
phrase in its proper category, and in order to
understand the policy of the Government of the
Philippine Islands with reference to the uncivilized
elements of the Islands, it is well first of all to set
down a skeleton history of the attitude assumed by
the authorities towards these "non-Christians," with
particular regard for the legislation on the subject.
II. HISTORY.
A. BEFORE ACQUISITION OF THE
PHILIPPINE BY THE UNITED STATES.
The most important of the laws of the Indies having
reference to the subject at hand are compiled in
Book VI, Title III, in the following language.
LAW I.
The Emperor Charles and the Prince, the governor,
at Cigales, on March 21, 1551. Philip II at Toledo, on
February 19, 1560. In the forest of Segovia on
September 13, 1565. In the Escorial on November
10, 1568. Ordinance 149 of the poblaciones of 1573.
In San Lorenzo, on May 20, 1578,
THAT THE "INDIOS" BE REDUCED INTO
"POBLACIONES" COMMUNITIES).
In order that the indios may be instructed in the
Sacred Catholic Faith and the evangelical law, and
in order that they may forget the blunders of their
ancient rites and ceremonies to the end that they
may live in harmony and in a civilized manner, it has
always been endeavored, with great care and
special attention, to use all the means most
convenient to the attainment of these purposes. To
carry out this work with success, our Council of the
Indies and other religious persons met at various
times; the prelates of new Spain assembled by order
of Emperor Charles V of glorious memory in the year
one thousand five hundred and forty-six all of
which meetings were actuated with a desire to serve
God an our Kingdom. At these meetings it was
resolved that indios be made to live in communities,
and not to live in places divided and separated from
one another by sierras and mountains, wherein they
are deprived of all spiritual and temporal benefits
and wherein they cannot profit from the aid of our
ministers and from that which gives rise to those
human necessities which men are obliged to give
one another. Having realized that convenience of
this resolution, our kings, our predecessors, by
different orders, have entrusted and ordered the
viceroys, presidents, and governors to execute with
great care and moderation the concentration of the
indios into reducciones; and to deal with their
doctrine with such forbearance and gentleness,
without causing inconveniences, so that those who
would not presently settle and who would see the
good treatment and the protection of those already
in settlements would, of their own accord, present
themselves, and it is ordained that they be not
required to pay taxes more than what is ordered.
Because the above has been executed in the
greater part of our Indies, we hereby order and
decree that the same be complied with in all the
remaining parts of the Indies, and the encomederos
shall entreat compliance thereof in the manner and
form prescribed by the laws of this title.
xxx xxx xxx
LAW VIII.
Philip II at the Pardo, on December 1, 1573. Philip III
at Madrid, October 10, 1618.
THE "REDUCCTIONES" BE MADE IN
ACCORDANCE WITH THE CONDITIONS OF THIS
LAW.
The places wherein the pueblos and reducciones
shall be formed should have the facilities of waters.
lands, and mountains, ingress and egress,
husbandry and passageway of one league long,
wherein the indios can have their live stock that they
may not be mixed with those of the Spaniards.
LAW IX.
Philip II at Toledo, on February 19, 1956.
THAT THE "INDIOS" IN "REDUCCIONES" BE NOT
DEPRIVED OF THE LANDS PREVIOUSLY HELD
BY THEM.
With more good-will and promptness, the indios shall
be concentrated in reducciones. Provided they shall
not be deprived of the lands and granaries which
they may have in the places left by them. We hereby
order that no change shall be made in this respect,
and that they be allowed to retain the lands held by
them previously so that they may cultivate them and
profit therefrom.
xxx xxx xxx
LAW XIII.
THE SAME AS ABOVE.
THAT THE "REDUCCIONES" BE NOT REMOVED
WITHOUT ORDER OF THE KING, VICEROY, OR
COURT.
No governor, or magistrate, or alcalde mayor, or any
other court, has the right to alter or to remove the
pueblos or the reducciones once constituted and
founded, without our express order or that of the
viceroy, president, or the royal district court,
provided, however, that the encomenderos, priests,
or indios request such a change or consent to it by
offering or giving information to that en. And,
because these claims are often made for private
interests and not for those of the indios, we hereby
order that this law be always complied with,
otherwise the change will be considered fraudulently
obtained. The penalty of one thousand pesos shall
be imposed upon the judge or encomendero who
should violate this law.
LAW XV.
Philip III at Madrid, on October 10, 1618.
THAT THERE BE MAYORS AND ALDERMEN IN
THE "REDUCTIONES," WHO SHALL BE "INDIOS."
We order that in each town and reduccion there be a
mayor, who should be an indio of the same
reduccion; if there be more than eighty houses,
there should be two mayors and two aldermen, also
indios; and, even if the town be a big one, there
should, nevertheless, be more than two mayors and
four aldermen, If there be less than eighty indios but
not less than forty, there should be not more than
one mayor and one alderman, who should annually
elect nine others, in the presence of the priests , as
is the practice in town inhabited by Spaniards and
indios.
LAW XXI.
Philip II, in Madrid, On May 2, 1563, and on
November 25, 1578. At Tomar, on May 8, 1581. At
Madrid, on January 10, 1589. Philip III, at Todesillas,
on July 12, 1600. Philip IV, at Madrid, on October 1
and December 17, 1646. For this law and the one
following, see Law I, Tit. 4, Book 7.
THAT IN THE TOWNS OF THE "INDIOS," THERE
SHALL LIVE NO SPANIARDS, NEGROES,
"MESTIZOS," AND MULATTOES.
We hereby prohibit and forbid Spaniards, negroes,
mulattores, or mestizos to live to live in the
reducciones and towns and towns of the indios,
because it has been found that some Spaniards who
deal, trade, live, and associate with the indios are
men of troublesome nature, of dirty ways of living;
robbers, gamblers, and vicious and useless men;
and, to avoid the wrongs done them, the indios
would leave their towns and provinces; and the
negroes, mestizos, and mulattoes, besides
maltreating them and utilizing their services,
contaminate them with their bad customs, idleness,
and also some of their blunders and vices which
may corrupt and pervert the goal which we desire to
reach with regard to their salvation, increase, and
tranquillity. We hereby order the imposition of grave
penalties upon the commission of the acts above-
mentioned which should not be tolerated in the
towns, and that the viceroys, presidents, governors,
and courts take great care in executing the law
within their powers and avail themselves of the
cooperation of the ministers who are truly honest. As
regards the mestizos and Indian and Chinese half-
breeds (zambaigos), who are children of indias and
born among them, and who are to inherit their
houses and haciendas, they all not be affected by
this law, it appearing to be a harsh thing to separate
them from their parents. (Law of the Indies, vol. 2,
pp. 228, 229, 230, 231.)
A clear exposition of the purposes of the Spanish
government, in its efforts to improve the condition of
the less advanced inhabitants of the Islands by
concentrating them in "reducciones," is found in the
Decree of the Governor-General of the Philippine
Islands of January 14, 1881, reading as follows:
It is a legal principle as well as a national right that
every inhabitant of a territory recognized as an
integral part of a nation should respect and obey the
laws in force therein; while, on other hand, it is the
duty to conscience and to humanity for all
governments to civilize those backward races that
might exist in the nation, and which living in the
obscurity of ignorance, lack of all the nations which
enable them to grasp the moral and material
advantages that may be acquired in those towns
under the protection and vigilance afforded them by
the same laws.
It is equally highly depressive to our national honor
to tolerate any longer the separation and isolation of
the non-Christian races from the social life of the
civilized and Christian towns; to allow any longer the
commission of depredations, precisely in the Island
of Luzon wherein is located the seat of the
representative of the Government of the, metropolis.
It is but just to admit the fact that all the
governments have occupied themselves with this
most important question, and that much has been
heretofore accomplished with the help and self-
denial of the missionary fathers who have even
sacrificed their lives to the end that those
degenerate races might be brought to the principles
of Christianity, but the means and the preaching
employed to allure them have been insufficient to
complete the work undertaken. Neither have the
punishments imposed been sufficient in certain
cases and in those which have not been guarded
against, thus giving and customs of isolation.
As it is impossible to consent to the continuation of
such a lamentable state of things, taking into
account the prestige which the country demands
and the inevitable duty which every government has
in enforcing respect and obedience to the national
laws on the part of all who reside within the territory
under its control, I have proceeded in the premises
by giving the most careful study of this serious
question which involves important interests for
civilization, from the moral and material as well as
the political standpoints. After hearing the illustrious
opinions of all the local authorities, ecclesiastics,
and missionaries of the provinces of Northern
Luzon, and also after finding the unanimous
conformity of the meeting held with the Archbishop
of Manila, the Bishops of Jaro and Cebu, and the
provincial prelates of the orders of the Dominicans,
Agustinians, Recoletos, Franciscans, and Jesuits as
also of the meeting of the Council of Authorities,
held for the object so indicated, I have arrived at an
intimate conviction of the inevitable necessity of
proceeding in a practical manner for the submission
of the said pagan and isolated races, as well as of
the manner and the only form of accomplishing such
a task.
For the reasons above stated and for the purpose of
carrying out these objects, I hereby promulgate the
following:
DECREE.
1. All the indian inhabitants (indios) of the
Islands of Luzon are, from this date, to be governed
by the common law, save those exceptions
prescribed in this decree which are bases upon the
differences of instructions, of the customs, and of
the necessities of the different pagan races which
occupy a part of its territory.
2. The diverse rules which should be
promulgated for each of these races which may
be divided into three classes; one, which comprises
those which live isolated and roaming about without
forming a town nor a home; another, made up of
those subdued pagans who have not as yet entered
completely the social life; and the third, of those
mountain and rebellious pagans shall be
published in their respective dialects, and the
officials, priests, and missionaries of the provinces
wherein they are found are hereby entrusted in the
work of having these races learn these rules. These
rules shall have executive character, beginning with
the first day of next April, and, as to their
compliance, they must be observed in the manner
prescribed below.
3. The provincial authorities in conjunction with
the priests shall proceed, from now on, with all the
means which their zeal may suggest to them, to the
taking of the census of the inhabitants of the towns
or settlement already subdued, and shall adopt the
necessary regulations for the appointment of local
authorities, if there be none as yet; for the
construction of courts and schools, and for the
opening or fixing up of means of communication,
endeavoring, as regards the administrative
organization of the said towns or settlements, that
this be finished before the first day of next July, so
that at the beginning of the fiscal year they shall
have the same rights and obligations which affect
the remaining towns of the archipelago, with the only
exception that in the first two years they shall not be
obliged to render personal services other than those
previously indicated.
4. So long as these subdued towns or
settlements are located infertile lands appropriate for
cultivation, the inhabitants thereof shall not be
obliged to move their dwelling-houses; and only in
case of absolute necessity shall a new residence be
fixed for them, choosing for this purpose the place
most convenient for them and which prejudices the
least their interest; and, in either of these cases, an
effort must be made to establish their homes with
the reach of the sound of the bell.
5. For the protection and defense of these new
towns, there shall be established an armed force
composed precisely of native Christian, the
organization and service of which shall be
determined in a regulations based upon that of the
abolished Tercios de Policia (division of the Guardia
Civil).
6. The authorities shall see to it that the
inhabitants of the new towns understand all the
rights and duties affecting them and the liberty which
they have as to where and now they shall till their
lands and sell the products thereof, with the only
exception of the tobacco which shall be bought by
the Hacienda at the same price and conditions
allowed other producers, and with the prohibition
against these new towns as well as the others from
engaging in commerce of any other transaction with
the rebellious indios, the violation of which shall be
punished with deportation.
7. In order to properly carry out this express
prohibition, the limits of the territory of the rebellious
indios shall be fixed; and whoever should go beyond
the said limits shall be detained and assigned
governmentally wherever convenient.
8. For the purpose of assisting in the
conversion of the pagans into the fraternity of the
Catholic Church, all by this fact along be exempt for
eight years from rendering personal labor.
9. The authorities shall offer in the name of the
State to the races not subdued (aetas and
mountains igorrots the following advantages in
returns for their voluntary submission: to live in
towns; unity among their families; concession of
good lands and the right to cultivate them in the
manner they wish and in the way them deem most
productive; support during a year, and clothes upon
effecting submission; respect for their habits and
customs in so far as the same are not opposed to
natural law; freedom to decide of their own accord
as to whether they want to be Christians or not; the
establishment of missions and families of recognized
honesty who shall teach, direct, protect, and give
them security and trust them; the purchase or facility
of the sale of their harvests; the exemption from
contributions and tributes for ten years and from the
quintas (a kind of tax) for twenty years; and lastly,
that those who are governed by the local authorities
as the ones who elect such officials under the direct
charge of the authorities of the province or district.
10. The races indicated in the preceding article,
who voluntarily admit the advantages offered, shall,
in return, have the obligation of constituting their
new towns, of constructing their town hall, schools,
and country roads which place them in
communication with one another and with the
Christians; provided, the location of these towns be
distant from their actual residences, when the latter
do not have the good conditions of location and
cultivations, and provided further the putting of
families in a place so selected by them be
authorized in the towns already constituted.
11. The armed force shall proceed to the
prosecution and punishment of the tribes, that,
disregarding the peace, protection, and advantages
offered them, continue in their rebellious attitude on
the first of next April, committing from now on the
crimes and vexations against the Christian towns;
and for the this purposes, the Captain General's
Office shall proceed with the organization of the
divisions of the Army which, in conjunction with the
rural guards (cuadrilleros), shall have to enter the
territory of such tribes. On the expiration of the term,
they shall destroy their dwelling-houses, labors, and
implements, and confiscate their products and cattle.
Such a punishment shall necessarily be repeated
twice a year, and for this purpose the military
headquarters shall immediately order a detachment
of the military staff to study the zones where such
operations shall take place and everything
conducive to the successful accomplishment of the
same.
12. The chiefs of provinces, priests, and
missioners, local authorities, and other subordinates
to my authorities, local authorities, and other
subordinates to may authority, civil as well as
military authorities, shall give the most effective aid
and cooperation to the said forces in all that is within
the attributes and the scope of the authority of each.
13. With respect to the reduccion of the pagan
races found in some of the provinces in the southern
part of the Archipelago, which I intend to visit, the
preceding provisions shall conveniently be applied to
them.
14. There shall be created, under my presidency
as Governor-General, Vice-Royal Patron, a council
or permanent commission which shall attend to and
decide all the questions relative to the application of
the foregoing regulations that may be brought to it
for consultations by the chiefs of provinces and
priests and missionaries.
15. The secondary provisions which may be
necessary, as a complement to the foregoing, in
brining about due compliance with this decree, shall
be promulgated by the respective official centers
within their respective jurisdictions. (Gaceta de
Manila, No. 15) (Diccionario de la Administracion,
vol. 7, pp. 128-134.)
B. AFTER ACQUISITON OF THE
PHILIPPINES BY THE UNITED STATES.
Ever since the acquisition of the Philippine Islands
by the United States, the question as to the best
method for dealing with the primitive inhabitants has
been a perplexing one.
1. Organic law.
The first order of an organic character after the
inauguration of the American Government in the
Philippines was President McKinley's Instructions to
the Commission of April 7, 1900, later expressly
approved and ratified by section 1 of the Philippine
Bill, the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902. Portions of
these instructions have remained undisturbed by
subsequent congressional legislation. One
paragraph of particular interest should here be
quoted, namely:
In dealing with the uncivilized tribes of the Islands,
the Commission should adopt the same course
followed by Congress in permitting the tribes of our
North American Indians to maintain their tribal
organization and government and under which many
of these tribes are now living in peace and
contentment, surrounded by civilization to which
they are unable or unwilling to conform. Such tribal
governments should, however, be subjected to wise
and firm regulation; and, without undue or petty
interference, constant and active effort should be
exercised to prevent barbarous practices and
introduce civilized customs.
Next comes the Philippine Bill, the Act of Congress
of July 1, 1902, in the nature of an Organic Act for
the Philippines. The purpose of section 7 of the
Philippine Bill was to provide for a legislative body
and, with this end in view, to name the prerequisites
for the organization of the Philippine Assembly. The
Philippine Legislature, composed of the Philippine
Commission and the Philippine Assembly, was to
have jurisdiction over the Christian portion of the
Islands. The Philippine Commission was to retain
exclusive jurisdiction of that part of said Islands
inhabited by Moros or other non-Christian tribes.
The latest Act of Congress, nearest to a Constitution
for the Philippines, is the Act of Congress of August
29, 1916, commonly known as the Jones Law. This
transferred the exclusive legislative jurisdiction and
authority theretofore exercised by the Philippine
Commission, to the Philippine Legislature (sec. 12).
It divided the Philippine Islands into twelve senatorial
districts, the twelfth district to be composed of the
Mountain Province, Baguio, Nueva Vizcaya, and the
Department of Mindanao and Sulu. The Governor-
General of the Philippine Islands was authorized to
appoint senators and representatives for the territory
which, at the time of the passage of the Jones Law,
was not represented in the Philippine Assembly, that
is, for the twelfth district (sec. 16). The law establish
a bureau to be known as the "Bureau of non-
Christian Tribes" which shall have general
supervision over the public affairs of the inhabitants
which are represented in the Legislature by
appointed senators and representatives( sec. 22).
Philippine organic law may, therefore, be said to
recognized a dividing line between the territory not
inhabited by Moros or other non-Christian tribes, and
the territory which Moros or other non-Christian
tribes, and the territory which is inhabited by Moros
or other non-Christian tribes.
2. Statute law.
Local governments in the Philippines have been
provided for by various acts of the Philippine
Commission and Legislature. The most notable are
Acts Nos. 48 and 49 concerning the Province of
Benguet and the Igorots; Act NO. 82, the Municipal
Code; ;Act no. 83, the Provincial Government Act;
Act No. 183, the Character of the city of Manila; Act
No. 7887, providing for the organization and
government of the Moro Province; Act No. 1396, the
Special Provincial Government Act; Act No. 1397,
the Township Government Act; Act No. 1667,
relating to the organization of settlements; Act No.
1963, the Baguio charger; and Act No. 2408, the
Organic Act of the Department of Mindanao and
Sulu. The major portion of these laws have been
carried forward into the Administrative Codes of
1916 an d1917.
Of more particular interest are certain special laws
concerning the government of the primitive peoples.
Beginning with Act No. 387, sections 68-71, enacted
on April 9, 1902, by the United States Philippine
Commission, having reference to the Province of
Nueva Vizcaya, Acts Nos. 4111, 422, 445, 500, 547,
548, 549, 550, 579, 753, 855, 1113, 1145, 4568,
1306 were enacted for the provinces of Abra,
Antique, Bataan, Ilocos Norte, Ilocos Sur, Isabela.
Lepanto-Bontoc, Mindoro, Misamis, Nueva Vizcaya,
Pangasinan, Paragua (Palawan), Tarlac, Tayabas,
and Zambales. As an example of these laws,
because referring to the Manguianes, we insert Act
No. 547:
No. 547. AN ACT PROVIDING FOR THE
ESTABLISHMENT OF LOCAL CIVIL
GOVERNMENTS FOR THE MANGUIANES IN THE
PROVINCE OF MINDORO.
By authority of the United States, be it enacted by
the Philippine Commission, that:
SECTION 1. Whereas the Manguianes of the
Provinces of Mindoro have not progressed
sufficiently in civilization to make it practicable to
bring them under any form of municipal government,
the provincial governor is authorized, subject to the
approval of the Secretary of the Interior, in dealing
with these Manguianes to appoint officers from
among them, to fix their designations and badges of
office, and to prescribe their powers and duties:
Provided, That the powers and duties thus
prescribed shall not be in excess of those conferred
upon township officers by Act Numbered Three
hundred and eighty-seven entitled "An Act providing
for the establishment of local civil Governments in
the townships and settlements of Nueva Vizcaya."
SEC. 2. Subject to the approval of the Secretary of
the Interior, the provincial governor is further
authorized, when he deems such a course
necessary in the interest of law and order, to direct
such Manguianes to take up their habitation on sites
on unoccupied public lands to be selected by him
and approved by the provincial board. Manguianes
who refuse to comply with such directions shall upon
conviction be imprisonment for a period not
exceeding sixty days.
SEC. 3. The constant aim of the governor shall be to
aid the Manguianes of his province to acquire the
knowledge and experience necessary for successful
local popular government, and his supervision and
control over them shall be exercised to this end, an
to the end that law and order and individual freedom
shall be maintained.
SEC. 4. When in the opinion of the provincial board
of Mindoro any settlement of Manguianes has
advanced sufficiently to make such a course
practicable, it may be organized under the
provisions of sections one to sixty-seven, inclusive,
of Act Numbered three hundred and eighty-seven,
as a township, and the geographical limits of such
township shall be fixed by the provincial board.
SEC. 5. The public good requiring the speedy
enactment of this bill, the passage of the same is
hereby expedited in accordance with section two of
'An Act prescribing the order of procedure by the
Commission in the enactment of laws,' passed
September twenty-sixth, nineteen hundred.
SEC. 6. This Act shall take effect on its passage.
Enacted, December 4, 1902.
All of these special laws, with the exception of Act
No. 1306, were repealed by Act No. 1396 and 1397.
The last named Act incorporated and embodied the
provisions in general language. In turn, Act No. 1397
was repealed by the Administrative Code of 1916.
The two Administrative Codes retained the
provisions in questions.
These different laws, if they of the non-Christian
inhabitants of the Philippines and a settled and
consistent practice with reference to the methods to
be followed for their advancement.
C. TERMINOLOGY.
The terms made use of by these laws, organic and
statutory, are found in varying forms.

"Uncivilized tribes" is the denomination in President
McKinley's instruction to the Commission.
The most commonly accepted usage has sanctioned
the term "non-Christian tribes." These words are to
be found in section 7 of the Philippine Bill and in
section 22 of the Jones Law. They are also to be
found in Act No. 253 of the Philippines Commission,
establishing a Bureau of non-Christian Tribes and in
Act No. 2674 of the Philippine Legislature, carried
forward into sections 701-705 of the Administrative
Code of 1917, reestablishing this Bureau. Among
other laws which contain the phrase, there can be
mentioned Acts Nos. 127, 128, 387, 547, 548, 549,
550, 1397, 1639, and 2551.
"Non-Christian people," "non-Christian inhabitants,"
and "non-Christian Filipinos" have been the favorite
nomenclature, in lieu of the unpopular word "tribes,"
since the coming into being of a Filipinized
legislature. These terms can be found in sections
2076, 2077, 2390, 2394, Administrative Code of
1916; sections 701-705, 2145, 2422, 2426,
Administrative Code of 1917; and in Acts Nos. 2404,
2435, 2444, 2674 of the Philippine Legislatures, as
well as in Act No. 1667 of the Philippine
Commission.
The Administrative Code specifically provides that
the term "non-Christian" shall include
Mohammedans and pagans. (Sec. 2576,
Administrative Code of 1917; sec. 2561,
Administrative Code of 1916, taken from Act No.
2408, sec. 3.)
D. MEANING OF TERM "NON-CHRISTIAN."
If we were to follow the literal meaning of the word
"non-Christian," it would of course result in giving to
it a religious signification. Obviously, Christian would
be those who profess the Christian religion, and
non-Christians, would be those who do not profess
the Christian religion. In partial corroboration of this
view, there could also be cited section 2576 of the
last Administrative Code and certain well-known
authorities, as Zuiga, "Estadismo de las Islas
Filipinas," Professor Ferdinand Blumentritt,
"Philippine Tribes and Languages," and Dr. N. M.
Saleeby, "The Origin of Malayan Filipinos." (See
Blair & Robertson, "The Philippine Islands," 1493-
1898, vol. III, p. 300, note; Craig-Benitez, "Philippine
Progress prior to 1898," vol. I. p. 107.)
Not content with the apparent definition of the word,
we shall investigate further to ascertain what is its
true meaning.
In one sense, the word can have a geographical
signification. This is plainly to be seen by the
provisions of many laws. Thus, according to the
Philippine Bill, the authority of the Philippine
Assembly was recognized in the "territory" of the
Islands not inhabited by Moros or other non-
Christian tribes. Again, the Jones Law confers
similar recognition in the authorization of the twelfth
senatorial district for the "territory not now
represented in the Philippine Assembly." The
Philippines Legislature has, time and again, adopted
acts making certain other acts applicable to that
"part" of the Philippine Islands inhabited by Moros or
other non-Christian tribes.
Section 2145, is found in article XII of the Provincial
Law of the Administrative Code. The first section of
this article, preceding section 2145, makes the
provisions of the article applicable only in specially
organized provinces. The specially organized
provinces are the Mountain Province, Nueva
Vizcaya, Mindoro, Batanes, and Palawan. These are
the provinces to which the Philippine Legislature has
never seen fit to give all the powers of local self-
government. They do not, however, exactly coincide
with the portion of the Philippines which is not
granted popular representation. Nevertheless, it is
still a geographical description.
It is well-known that within the specially organized
provinces, there live persons some of who are
Christians and some of whom are not Christians. In
fact, the law specifically recognizes this. ( Sec. 2422,
Administrative Code of 1917, etc.)
If the religious conception is not satisfactory, so
against the geographical conception is likewise
inadquate. The reason it that the motive of the law
relates not to a particular people, because of their
religion, or to a particular province because of its
location, but the whole intent of the law is predicated
n the civilization or lack of civilization of the
inhabitants.
At most, "non-Christian" is an awkward and
unsatisfactory word. Apologetic words usually
introduce the term. "The so-called non-Christian" is a
favorite expression. The Secretary of the Interior
who for so many years had these people under his
jurisdiction, recognizing the difficulty of selecting an
exact designation, speaks of the "backward
Philippine peoples, commonly known as the 'non-
Christian tribes."' (See Hearings before the
Committee on the Philippines, United States Senate,
Sixty-third Congress, third session on H.R. 18459,
An Act to declare the purpose of the People of the
United States as to the future political status of the
Philippine Islands and to provide a more
autonomous government for the Islands, pp. 346,
351; letter of the Secretary of the Interior of June 30,
1906, circulated by the Executive Secretary.)
The idea that the term "non-Christian" is intended to
relate to degree of civilization, is substantiated by
reference to legislative, judicial, and executive
authority.
The legislative intent is borne out by Acts Nos. 48,
253, 387, 1667, and 2674, and sections 701 et seq,
and sections 2422 et seq, of the Administrative
Code of 1917. For instance, Act No. 253 charged
the Bureau of non-Christian tribes to conduct
"systematic investigations with reference to non-
Christian tribes . . . with special view to determining
the most practicable means for bringing about their
advancement in civilization and material property
prosperity."
As authority of a judicial nature is the decision of the
Supreme Court in the case of United States vs.
Tubban [Kalinga] ([1915], 29, Phil., 434). The
question here arose as to the effect of a tribal
marriage in connection with article 423 of the Penal
code concerning the husband who surprises his wife
in the act of adultery. In discussing the point, the
court makes use of the following language:
. . . we are not advised of any provision of law which
recognizes as legal a tribal marriage of so-called
non-Christians or members of uncivilized tribes,
celebrated within that province without compliance
with the requisites prescribed by General Orders no.
68. . . . We hold also that the fact that the accused is
shown to be a member of an uncivilized tribe, of a
low order of intelligence, uncultured and
uneducated, should be taken into consideration as a
second marked extenuating circumstance.
Of much more moment is the uniform construction of
execution officials who have been called upon to
interpret and enforce the law. The official who, as a
member of the Philippine Commission, drafted much
of the legislation relating to the so-called Christians
and who had these people under his authority, was
the former Secretary of the Interior. Under date of
June 30, 1906, this official addressed a letter to all
governor of provinces, organized under the Special
Provincial Government Act, a letter which later
received recognition by the Governor-General and
was circulated by the Executive Secretary, reading
as follows:
Sir: Within the past few months, the question has
arisen as to whether people who were originally non-
Christian but have recently been baptized or who
are children of persons who have been recently
baptized are, for the purposes of Act 1396 and 1397,
to be considered Christian or non-Christians.
It has been extremely difficult, in framing legislation
for the tribes in these islands which are not
advanced far in civilization, to hit upon any suitable
designation which will fit all cases. The number of
individual tribes is so great that it is almost out of the
question to enumerate all of them in an Act. It was
finally decided to adopt the designation 'non-
Christians' as the one most satisfactory, but the real
purpose of the Commission was not so much to
legislate for people having any particular religious
belief as for those lacking sufficient advancement so
that they could, to their own advantage, be brought
under the Provincial Government Act and the
Municipal Code.
The mere act of baptism does not, of course, in itself
change the degree of civilization to which the person
baptized has attained at the time the act of baptism
is performed. For practical purposes, therefore, you
will give the member of so-called "wild tribes" of your
province the benefit of the doubt even though they
may recently have embraced Christianity.
The determining factor in deciding whether they are
to be allowed to remain under the jurisdiction of
regularly organized municipalities or what form of
government shall be afforded to them should be the
degree of civilization to which they have attained
and you are requested to govern yourself
accordingly.
I have discussed this matter with the Honorable, the
Governor-General, who concurs in the opinion
above expressed and who will have the necessary
instructions given to the governors of the provinces
organized under the Provincial Government Act.
(Internal Revenue Manual, p. 214.)
The present Secretary of the Interior, in a
memorandum furnished a member of this court, has
the following to say on the subject:
As far as names are concerned the classification is
indeed unfortunate, but while no other better
classification has as yet been made the present
classification should be allowed to stand . . . I
believe the term carries the same meaning as the
expressed in the letter of the Secretary of the Interior
(of June 30, 1906, herein quoted). It is indicative of
the degree of civilization rather than of religious
denomination, for the hold that it is indicative of
religious denomination will make the law invalid as
against that Constitutional guaranty of religious
freedom.
Another official who was concerned with the status
of the non-Christians, was the Collector of Internal
Revenue. The question arose for ruling relatives to
the cedula taxation of the Manobos and the Aetas.
Thereupon, the view of the Secretary of the Interior
was requested on the point, who, by return
indorsement, agreed with the interpretation of the
Collector of Internal Revenue. This Construction of
the Collector of Internal Revenue can be found in
circular letter No. 188 of the Bureau of Internal
Revenue, dated June 11, 1907, reading as follows
(Internal Revenue Manual, p. 214):

The internal revenue law exempts "members of non-
Christian tribes" from the payment of cedula taxes.
The Collector of Internal Revenue has interpreted
this provision of law to mean not that persons who
profess some form of Christian worship are alone
subject to the cedula tax, and that all other person
are exempt; he has interpreted it to mean that all
persons preserving tribal relations with the so-called
non-Christian tribes are exempt from the cedula tax,
and that all others, including Jews, Mohammedans,
Confucians, Buddists, etc., are subject to said tax so
long as they live in cities or towns, or in the country
in a civilized condition. In other words, it is not so
much a matter of a man's form of religious worship
or profession that decides whether or not he is
subject to the cedula tax; it is more dependent on
whether he is living in a civilized manner or is
associated with the mountain tribes, either as a
member thereof or as a recruit. So far, this question
has not come up as to whether a Christian,
maintaining his religious belief, but throwing his lot
and living with a non-Christian tribe, would or would
not be subject to the cedula tax. On one occasion a
prominent Hebrew of Manila claimed to this office
that he was exempt from the cedula tax, inasmuch
as he was not a Christian. This Office, however,
continued to collect cedula taxes from all the Jews,
East Indians, Arabs, Chinamen, etc., residing in
Manila. Quite a large proportion of the cedula taxes
paid in this city are paid by men belonging to the
nationalities mentioned. Chinamen, Arabs and other
s are quite widely scattered throughout the Islands,
and a condition similar to that which exist in Manila
also exists in most of the large provincial towns.
Cedula taxes are therefore being collected by this
Office in all parts of these Islands on the broad
ground that civilized people are subject to such
taxes, and non-civilized people preserving their tribal
relations are not subject thereto.
(Sgd.) JNO. S. HORD,
Collector of Internal Revenue.
On September 17, 1910, the Collector of Internal
Revenue addressed circular letter No. 327,
approved by the Secretary of Finance and Justice,
to all provincial treasurers. This letter in part reads:
In view of the many questions that have been raised
by provincial treasurers regarding cedula taxes due
from members of non-Christian tribes when they
come in from the hills for the purposes of settling
down and becoming members of the body politic of
the Philippine Islands, the following clarification of
the laws governing such questions and digest of
rulings thereunder is hereby published for the
information of all concerned:
Non-Christian inhabitants of the Philippine Islands
are so classed, not by reason of the fact that they do
not profess Christianity, but because of their
uncivilized mode of life and low state of
development. All inhabitants of the Philippine Islands
classed as members of non-Christian tribes may be
divided into three classes in so far as the cedula tax
law is concerned . . .
Whenever any member of an non-Christian tribe
leaves his wild and uncivilized mode of life, severs
whatever tribal relations he may have had and
attaches himself civilized community, belonging a
member of the body politic, he thereby makes
himself subject to precisely the same law that
governs the other members of that community and
from and after the date when he so attaches himself
to the community the same cedula and other taxes
are due from him as from other members thereof. If
he comes in after the expiration of the delinquency
period the same rule should apply to him as to
persons arriving from foreign countries or reaching
the age of eighteen subsequent to the expiration of
such period, and a regular class A, D, F, or H
cedula, as the case may be, should be furnished him
without penalty and without requiring him to pay the
tax for former years.
In conclusion, it should be borne in mind that the
prime factors in determining whether or not a man is
subject to the regular cedula tax is not the
circumstance that he does or does not profess
Christianity, nor even his maintenance of or failure to
maintain tribal relations with some of the well known
wild tribes, but his mode of life, degree of
advancement in civilization and connection or lack of
connection with some civilized community. For this
reason so called "Remontados" and "Montescos" will
be classed by this office as members of non-
Christian tribes in so far as the application of the
Internal Revenue Law is concerned, since, even
though they belong to no well recognized tribe, their
mode of life, degree of advancement and so forth
are practically the same as those of the Igorrots and
members of other recognized non-Christina tribes.
Very respectfully,
(Sgd.) ELLIS CROMWELL,
Collector of Internal Revenue,
Approved:
(Sgd.) GREGORIO ARANETA,
Secretary of Finance and Justice.
The two circular above quoted have since been
repealed by Bureau of Internal Revenue Regulations
No. 1, promulgated by Venancio Concepcion, Acting
Collector of Internal Revenue, and approved on April
16, 1915, by Honorable Victorino Mapa, Secretary of
Finance and Justice. Section 30 of the regulations is
practically a transcript of Circular Letter No. 327.
The subject has come before the Attorney-General
for consideration. The Chief of Constabulary request
the opinion of the Attorney-General as to the status
of a non-Christian who has been baptized by a
minister of the Gospel. The precise questions were
these: "Does he remain non-Christian or is he
entitled to the privileges of a Christian? By
purchasing intoxicating liquors, does he commit an
infraction of the law and does the person selling
same lay himself liable under the provision of Act
No. 1639?" The opinion of Attorney-General
Avancea, after quoting the same authorities
hereinbefore set out, concludes:
In conformity with the above quoted constructions, it
is probable that is probable that the person in
question remains a non-Christian, so that, in
purchasing intoxicating liquors both he and the
person selling the same make themselves liable to
prosecution under the provisions of Act No. 1639. At
least, I advise you that these should be the
constructions place upon the law until a court shall
hold otherwise.
Solicitor-General Paredes in his brief in this case
says:
With respect to the meaning which the phrase non-
Christian inhabitants has in the provisions of the
Administrative code which we are studying, we
submit that said phrase does not have its natural
meaning which would include all non-Christian
inhabitants of the Islands, whether Filipino or
strangers, civilized or uncivilized, but simply refers to
those uncivilized members of the non-Christian
tribes of the Philippines who, living without home or
fixed residence, roam in the mountains, beyond the
reach of law and order . . .
The Philippine Commission in denominating in its
laws that portion of the inhabitants of the Philippines
which live in tribes as non-Christian tribes, as
distinguished from the common Filipinos which carry
on a social and civilized life, did not intended to
establish a distinction based on the religious beliefs
of the individual, but, without dwelling on the
difficulties which later would be occasioned by the
phrase, adopted the expression which the Spanish
legislation employed to designate the uncivilized
portion of the inhabitants of the Philippines.
The phrase 'non-Christian inhabitants' used in the
provisions of articles 2077 and 2741 of Act No. 2657
(articles 2145 and 2759) should be understood as
equivalent to members of uncivilized tribes of the
Philippines, not only because this is the evident
intention of the law, but because to give it its lateral
meaning would make the law null and
unconstitutional as making distinctions base the
religion of the individual.
The Official Census of 1903, in the portion written by
no less an authority than De. David P. Barrows, then
"Chief of the Bureau of non-Christian Tribes," divides
the population in the Christian or Civilized Tribes,
and non-Christian or Wild Tribes. (Census of the
Philippine Islands [1903], vol. 1, pp. 411 et seq). The
present Director of the Census, Hon. Ignacio
Villamor, writes that the classification likely to be
used in the Census now being taken is: "Filipinos
and Primitive Filipinos." In a Pronouncing Gazetteer
and Geographical Dictionary of the Philippine
Islands, prepared in the Bureau of Insular Affairs,
War Department, a sub-division under the title non-
Christian tribes is, "Physical and Political
Characteristics of the non-Christian Tribes," which
sufficiently shows that the terms refers to culture and
not to religion.
In resume, therefore, the Legislature and the
Judiciary, inferentially, and different executive
officials, specifically, join in the proposition that the
term "non-Christian" refers, not to religious belief,
but, in a way , to geographical area, and, more
directly, to natives of the Philippine Islands of a law
grade of civilization, usually living in tribal
relationship apart from settled communities.
E. THE MANGUIANES.
The so-called non-Christians are in various state
approaching civilization. The Philippine Census of
1903 divided them into four classes. Of the third
class, are the Manguianes (or Mangyans) of
Mindoro.
Of the derivation of the name "Manguian" Dr. T. H.
Pardo de Tavera in his Etimilogia de los nombres de
Rozas de Filipinas, says:
In Tagalog, Bicol, and Visaya, Manguian signifies
"savage," "mountainer," "pagan," "negro." It may be
that the use of this word is applicable to a great
number of Filipinos, but nevertheless it has been
applied only to certain inhabitants of Mindoro. Even
in primitive times without doubt this name was given
to those of that island who bear it to-day, but its
employed in three Filipino languages shows that the
radical ngian had in all these languages a sense to-
day forgotten. In Pampango this ending still exists
and signifies "ancient," from which we can deduce
that the name was applied to men considered to be
the ancient inhabitants, and that these men were
pushed back into the interior by the modern
invaders, in whose language they were called the
"ancients."
The Manguianes are very low in culture. They have
considerable Negrito blood and have not advanced
beyond the Negritos in civilization. They are a
peaceful, timid, primitive, semi-nomadic people.
They number approximately 15,000. The
manguianes have shown no desire for community
life, and, as indicated in the preamble to Act No.
547, have not progressed sufficiently in civilization to
make it practicable to bring them under any form of
municipal government. (See Census of the
Philippine (Islands [1903], vol. I, pp. 22, 23, 460.)
III. COMPARATIVE THE AMERICAN
INDIANS.
Reference was made in the Presidents' instructions
to the Commission to the policy adopted by the
United States for the Indian Tribes. The methods
followed by the Government of the Philippines
Islands in its dealings with the so-called non-
Christian people is said, on argument, to be
practically identical with that followed by the United
States Government in its dealings with the Indian
tribes. Valuable lessons, it is insisted, can be
derived by an investigation of the American-Indian
policy.
From the beginning of the United States, and even
before, the Indians have been treated as "in a state
of pupilage." The recognized relation between the
Government of the United States and the Indians
may be described as that of guardian and ward. It is
for the Congress to determine when and how the
guardianship shall be terminated. The Indians are
always subject to the plenary authority of the United
States.
Chief Justice Marshall in his opinion in Worcester vs.
Georgia, hereinbefore mentioned, tells how the
Congress passed an Act in 1819 "for promoting
those humane designs of civilizing the neighboring
Indians." After quoting the Act, the opinion goes on
"This act avowedly contemplates the preservation
of the Indian nations as an object sought by the
United States, and proposes to effect this object by
civilizing and converting them from hunters into
agriculturists."
A leading case which discusses the status of the
Indians is that of the United States vs. Kagama
([1886], 118 U.S., 375). Reference is herein made to
the clause of the United States Constitution which
gives Congress "power to regulate commerce with
foreign nations, and among the several States, and
with the Indian tribes." The court then proceeds to
indicate a brief history of the position of the Indians
in the United States (a more extended account of
which can be found in Marshall's opinion in
Worcester vs. Georgia, supra), as follows:
The relation of the Indian tribes living within the
borders of the United States, both before and since
the Revolution, to the people of the United States,
has always been an anomalous one and of a
complex character.
Following the policy of the European Governments
in the discovery of American towards the Indians
who were found here, the colonies before the
Revolution and the States and the United States
since, have recognized in the Indians a possessory
right to the soil over which they roamed and hunted
and established occasional villages. But they
asserted an ultimate title in the land itself, by which
the Indian tribes were forbidden to sell or transfer it
to other nations or peoples without the consent of
this paramount authority. When a tribe wished to
dispose of its lands, or any part of it, or the State or
the United States wished to purchase it, a treaty with
the tribe was the only mode in which this could be
done. The United States recognized no right in
private persons, or in other nations, to make such a
purchase by treaty or otherwise. With the Indians
themselves these relation are equally difficult to
define. They were, and always have been, regarded
as having a semi-independent position when they
preserved their tribal relations; not as States, not as
nation not a possessed of the fall attributes of
sovereignty, but as a separate people, with the
power of regulating their internal and social
relations, and thus far not brought under the laws of
the Union or of the State within whose limits they
resided.
The opinion then continues:
It seems to us that this (effect of the law) is within
the competency of Congress. These Indian tribes
are the wards of the nation. The are communities
dependent on the United States. dependent largely
for their daily food. Dependent for their political
rights. They owe no allegiance to the States, and
receive from the no protection. Because of the local
ill feeling, the people of the States where they are
found are often their deadliest enemies. From their
very weakness and helplessness, so largely due to
the course of dealing of the Federal Government
with them and the treaties in which it has been
promised, there arise the duty of protection, and with
it the power. This has always been recognized by
the Executive and by Congress, and by this court,
whenever the question has arisen . . . The power of
the General Government over these remnants of
race once powerful, now weak and diminished in
numbers, is necessary to their protection, as well as
to the safety of those among whom they dwell. it
must exist in that government, because it never has
existed anywhere else, because the theater of its
exercise is within the geographical limits of the
United States, because it has never been denied,
and because it alone can enforce its laws on all the
tribes.
In the later case of United States vs. Sandoval
([1913], 231 U.S., 28) the question to be considered
was whether the status of the Pueblo Indians and
their lands was such that Congress could prohibit
the introduction of intoxicating liquor into those lands
notwithstanding the admission of New Mexico to
statehood. The court looked to the reports of the
different superintendent charged with guarding their
interests and founds that these Indians are
dependent upon the fostering care and protection of
the government "like reservation Indians in general."
Continuing, the court said "that during the Spanish
dominion, the Indians of the pueblos were treated as
wards requiring special protection, where subjected
to restraints and official supervisions in the
alienation of their property." And finally, we not the
following: "Not only does the Constitution expressly
authorize Congress to regulate commerce with the
Indians tribes, but long-continued legislative and
executive usage and an unbroken current of judicial
decisions have attributed to the United States as a
superior and civilized nation the power and the duty
of exercising a fostering care and protection over all
dependent Indian communities within its borders,
whether within its original territory or territory
subsequently acquired, and whether within or
without the limits of a state."
With reference to laws affecting the Indians, it has
been held that it is not within the power of the courts
to overrule the judgment of Congress. For very good
reason, the subject has always been deemed
political in nature, not subject to the jurisdiction of
the judicial department of the government. (Matter of
Heff [1905], 197 U.S., 488; U.S. vs. Celestine
[1909], 215 U.S., 278; U.S. vs. Sandoval, supra;
Worcester vs. Georgia, supra; U.S. vs. Rogers
[1846], 4 How., 567; the Cherokee Tobacco [1871],
11 Wall, 616; Roff vs. Burney [1897], 168 U.S., 218;
Thomas vs. Gay [1898], 169 U.S.., 264; Lone Wolf
vs. Hitchcock[1903], 187 U.S., 553; Wallace vs.
Adams [1907], 204 U.S., 415; Conley vs. Bollinger
[1910], 216 U.S., 84; Tiger vs. Western Invest. Co.
[1911], 221 U.S., 286; U.S. vs. Lane [1913], 232
U.S.., 598; Cyr vs. Walker (1911], 29 Okla, 281; 35
L.R.A. [N. S.], 795.) Whenever, therefore, the United
States sets apart any public land as an Indian
reservation, it has full authority to pass such laws
and authorize such measures as may be necessary
to give to the Indians thereon full protection in their
persons and property. (U.S. vs. Thomas [1894], 151
U.S., 577.)
All this borne out by long-continued legislative and
executive usage, and an unbroken line of judicial
decisions.
The only case which is even remotely in point and
which, if followed literally, might result in the
issuance of habeas corpus, is that of United States
vs. Crook ([1879], Fed. Cas. No. 14891). This was a
hearing upon return to a writ of habeas corpus
issued against Brigadier General George Crook at
the relation of Standing Bear and other Indians,
formerly belonging to the Ponca Tribe of Indians.
The petition alleged in substance that the relators
are Indians who have formerly belonged to the
Ponca tribe of Indians, now located in the Indian
Territory; that they had some time previously
withdrawn from the tribe, and completely severed
their tribal relations therewith, and had adopted the
general habits of the whites, and were then
endeavoring to maintain themselves by their own
exertions, and without aid or assistance from the
general government; that whilst they were thus
engaged, and without being guilty of violating any of
the laws of the United States, they were arrested
and restrained of their liberty by order of the
respondent, George Crook. The substance of the
return to the writ was that the relators are individual
members of, and connected with, the Ponca tribe of
Indians; that they had fled or escaped form a
reservation situated some place within the limits of
the Indian Territory had departed therefrom
without permission from the Government; and, at the
request of the Secretary of the Interior, the General
of the Army had issued an order which required the
respondent to arrest and return the relators to their
tribe in the Indian Territory, and that, pursuant to the
said order, he had caused the relators to be arrested
on the Omaha Indian Territory.
The first question was whether an Indian can test
the validity of an illegal imprisonment by habeas
corpus. The second question, of much greater
importance, related to the right of the Government to
arrest and hold the relators for a time, for the
purpose of being returned to the Indian Territory
from which it was alleged the Indian escaped. In
discussing this question, the court reviewed the
policy the Government had adopted in its dealing
with the friendly tribe of Poncase. Then, continuing,
the court said: "Laws passed for the government of
the Indian country, and for the purpose of regulating
trade and intercourse with the Indian tribes, confer
upon certain officers of the Government almost
unlimited power over the persons who go upon the
reservations without lawful authority . . . Whether
such an extensive discretionary power is wisely
vested in the commissioner of Indian affairs or not ,
need not be questioned. It is enough to know that
the power rightfully exists, and, where existing, the
exercise of the power must be upheld." The decision
concluded as follows:
The reasoning advanced in support of my views,
leads me to conclude:
1. that an Indian is a 'person' within the
meaning of the laws of the United States, and has,
therefore, the right to sue out a writ of habeas
corpus in a federal court, or before a federal judge,
in all cases where he may be confined or in custody
under color of authority of the United States or
where he is restrained of liberty in violation of the
constitution or laws of the United States.
2. That General George Crook, the
respondent, being commander of the military
department of the Platte, has the custody of the
relators, under color of authority of the United
States, and in violation of the laws therefore.
3. That n rightful authority exists for removing
by force any of the relators to the Indian Territory, as
the respondent has been directed to do.
4. that the Indians possess the inherent right of
expatriation, as well as the more fortunate white
race, and have the inalienable right to "life, liberty,
and the pursuit of happiness," so long as they obey
the laws and do not trespass on forbidden ground.
And,
5. Being restrained of liberty under color of
authority of the United States, and in violation of the
laws thereof, the relators must be discharged from
custody, and it is so ordered.
As far as the first point is concerned, the decision
just quoted could be used as authority to determine
that Rubi, the Manguian petitioner, a Filipino, and a
citizen of the Philippine Islands, is a "person" within
the meaning of the Habeas Corpus Act, and as
such, entitled to sue out a writ in the Philippine
courts. (See also In re Race Horse [1895], 70 Fed.,
598.) We so decide.
As to the second point the facts in the Standing Bear
case an the Rubi case are not exactly identical. But
even admitting similarity of facts, yet it is known to all
that Indian reservations do exist in the United
States, that Indians have been taken from different
parts of the country and placed on these reservation,
without any previous consultation as to their own
wishes, and that, when once so located, they have
been made to remain on the reservation for their
own good and for the general good of the country. If
any lesson can be drawn form the Indian policy of
the United States, it is that the determination of this
policy is for the legislative and executive branches of
the government and that when once so decided
upon, the courts should not interfere to upset a
carefully planned governmental system. Perhaps,
just as may forceful reasons exists for the
segregation as existed for the segregation of the
different Indian tribes in the United States.
IV. CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTIONS.
A. DELEGATION OF LEGISLATIVE POWER.
The first constitutional objection which confronts us
is that the Legislature could not delegate this power
to provincial authorities. In so attempting, it is
contended, the Philippine Legislature has abdicated
its authority and avoided its full responsibility.
That the maxim of Constitutional Law forbidding the
delegation of legislative power should be zealously
protected, we agree. An understanding of the rule
will, however, disclose that it has not bee violated in
his instance.
The rule has nowhere been better stated than in the
early Ohio case decided by Judge Ranney, and
since followed in a multitude of case, namely: "The
true distinction therefore is between the delegation
of power to make the law, which necessarily involves
a discretion as to what it shall be, and conferring an
authority or discretion as to its execution, to be
exercised under and in pursuance of the law. The
first cannot be done; to the later no valid objection
can be made." (Cincinnati, W. & Z. R. Co. vs.
Comm'rs. Clinton County [1852], 1 Ohio S.t, 88.)
Discretion, as held by Chief Justice Marshall in
Wayman vs. Southard ([1825], 10 Wheat., 1) may be
committed by the Legislature to an executive
department or official. The Legislature may make
decisions of executive departments of subordinate
official thereof, to whom t has committed the
execution of certain acts, final on questions of fact.
(U.S. vs. Kinkead [1918], 248 Fed., 141.) The
growing tendency in the decision is to give
prominence to the "necessity" of the case.
Is not all this exactly what the Legislature has
attempted to accomplish by the enactment of section
21454 of the Administrative Code? Has not the
Legislature merely conferred upon the provincial
governor, with the approval of the provincial board
and the Department Head, discretionary authority as
to the execution of the law? Is not this "necessary"?
The case of West vs. Hitchock, ([1906], 205 U.S.,
80) was a petition for mandamus to require the
Secretary of the Interior to approve the selection and
taking of one hundred and sixty acres by the relator
out of the lands ceded to the United States by the
Wichita and affiliated bands of Indians. Section 463
of the United States Revised Statutes provided: "The
Commissioner of Indian Affairs shall, under the
direction of the Secretary of the Interior, and
agreeably to such regulations as the President may
prescribe, have the management of all Indian affairs,
and of all matters arising out to the Indian relations."
Justice Holmes said: "We should hesitate a good
deal, especially in view of the long established
practice of the Department, before saying that this
language was not broad enough to warrant a
regulation obviously made for the welfare of the
rather helpless people concerned. The power of
Congress is not doubted. The Indians have been
treated as wards of the nation. Some such
supervision was necessary, and has been
exercised. In the absence of special provisions
naturally it would be exercised by the Indian
Department." (See also as corroborative authority, it
any is needed, Union Bridge Co. vs. U.S. [1907],
204 U.S.., 364, reviewing the previous decisions of
the United States Supreme Court: U.S. vs. Lane
[1914], 232 U.S., 598.)
There is another aspect of the question, which once
accepted, is decisive. An exception to the general
rule. sanctioned by immemorial practice, permits the
central legislative body to delegate legislative
powers to local authorities. The Philippine
Legislature has here conferred authority upon the
Province of Mindoro, to be exercised by the
provincial governor and the provincial board.
Who but the provincial governor and the provincial
board, as the official representatives of the province,
are better qualified to judge "when such as course is
deemed necessary in the interest of law and order?"
As officials charged with the administration of the
province and the protection of its inhabitants, who
but they are better fitted to select sites which have
the conditions most favorable for improving the
people who have the misfortune of being in a
backward state?
Section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917 is
not an unlawful delegation of legislative power by
the Philippine Legislature to provincial official and a
department head.
B. RELIGIOUS DISCRIMINATION
The attorney de officio, for petitioners, in a truly
remarkable brief, submitted on behalf of his
unknown clients, says that "The statute is
perfectly clear and unambiguous. In limpid English,
and in words as plain and unequivocal as language
can express, it provides for the segregation of 'non-
Christians' and none other." The inevitable result,
them, is that the law "constitutes an attempt by the
Legislature to discriminate between individuals
because of their religious beliefs, and is,
consequently, unconstitutional."
Counsel's premise once being conceded, his
arguments is answerable the Legislature must be
understood to mean what it has plainly expressed;
judicial construction is then excluded; religious
equality is demanded by the Organic Law; the
statute has violated this constitutional guaranty, and
Q. E. D. is invalid. But, as hereinbefore stated, we
do not feel free to discard the long continued
meaning given to a common expression, especially
as classification of inhabitants according to religious
belief leads the court to what it should avoid, the
nullification of legislative action. We hold that the
term "non-Christian" refers to natives of the
Philippines Islands of a low grade of civilization, and
that section 2145 of the Administrative Code of
1917, does not discriminate between individuals an
account of religious differences.
C. LIBERTY; DUE PROCESS OF LAW;
EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAWS.
The third constitutional argument is grounded on
those portions of the President's instructions of to
the Commission, the Philippine Bill, and the Jones
Law, providing "That no law shall be enacted in said
Islands which shall deprive any person of life, liberty,
or property without due process of law, or deny to
any person therein the equal protection of the laws."
This constitutional limitation is derived from the
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution and these provisions, it has been
said "are universal in their application, to all persons
within the territorial jurisdiction, without regard to any
differences of race, of color, or of nationality." (Yick
Wo vs. Hopkins [1886], 118 U.S., 356.) The
protection afforded the individual is then as much for
the non-Christian as for the Christian.
The conception of civil liberty has been variously
expressed thus:
Every man may claim the fullest liberty to exercise
his faculties, compatible with the possession of like
liberty by every other. (Spencer, Social Statistics, p.
94.)
Liberty is the creature of law, essentially different
from that authorized licentiousness that trespasses
on right. That authorized licentiousness that
trespasses on right. It is a legal and a refined idea,
the offspring of high civilization, which the savage
never understood, and never can understand.
Liberty exists in proportion to wholesome restraint;
the more restraint on others to keep off from us, the
more liberty we have . . . that man is free who is
protected from injury. (II Webster's Works, p. 393.)
Liberty consists in the ability to do what one caught
to desire and in not being forced to do what one
ought not do desire. (Montesque, spirit of the Laws.)
Even liberty itself, the greatest of all rights, is no
unrestricted license to ac according to one's own
will. It is only freedom from restraint under conditions
essential to the equal enjoyment of the same right
by others. (Field, J., in Crowley vs. Christensen
[1890], 137 U.S., 86.)
Liberty does not import "an absolute right in each
person to be, at all times and in all circumstances,
wholly freed from restraint. There are manifold
restraints to which every person is necessarily
subject for the common good. On any other basis,
organized society could not exist with safety to its
members. Society based on the rule that each one is
a law unto himself would soon be confronted with
disorder and anarchy. Real liberty for all could not
exist under the operation of a principle which
recognizes the right of each individual person to use
his own, whether in respect of his person or his
property, regardless of the injury that may be done
to others . . . There is, of course, a sphere with
which the individual may asserts the supremacy of
his own will, and rightfully dispute the authority of
any human government especially of any free
government existing under a written Constitution
to interfere with the exercise of that will. But it is
equally true that in very well-ordered society
charged with the duty of conserving the safety of its
members, the rights of the individual in respect of his
liberty may at times, under the pressure of great
dangers, be subjected to such restraint to be
enforced by reasonable regulations, as the safety of
the general public may demand." (Harlan, J., In
Jacobson vs. Massachusetts [1905] 197 U.S., 11.)
Liberty is freedom to do right and never wrong; it is
ever guided by reason and the upright and
honorable conscience of the individual. (Apolinario
Mabini.)
Civil Liberty may be said to mean that measure of
freedom which may be enjoyed in a civilized
community, consistently with the peaceful enjoyment
of like freedom in others. The right to Liberty
guaranteed by the Constitution includes the right to
exist and the right to be free from arbitrary personal
restraint or servitude. The term cannot be dwarfed
into mere freedom from physical restraint of the
person of the citizen, but is deemed to embrace the
right of man to enjoy the faculties with which he has
been endowed by this Creator, subject only to such
restraints as are necessary for the common welfare.
As enunciated in a long array of authorities including
epoch-making decisions of the United States
Supreme Court, Liberty includes the right of the
citizens to be free to use his faculties in all lawful
ways; to live an work where he will; to earn his
livelihood by an lawful calling; to pursue any
avocations, an for that purpose. to enter into all
contracts which may be proper, necessary, and
essential to his carrying out these purposes to a
successful conclusion. The chief elements of the
guaranty are the right to contract, the right to choose
one's employment, the right to labor, and the right of
locomotion.
In general, it may be said that Liberty means the
opportunity to do those things which are ordinarily
done by free men. (There can be noted Cummings
vs. Missouri [1866], 4 Wall, 277; Wilkinson vs.
Leland [1829], 2 Pet., 627; Williams vs. Fears
[1900], 179 U.S., 274; Allgeyer vs. Louisiana [1896],
165, U.S., 578; State vs. Kreutzberg [1902], 114
Wis., 530. See 6 R.C.L., 258, 261.)
One thought which runs through all these different
conceptions of Liberty is plainly apparent. It is this:
"Liberty" as understood in democracies, is not
license; it is "Liberty regulated by law." Implied in the
term is restraint by law for the good of the individual
and for the greater good of the peace and order of
society and the general well-being. No man can do
exactly as he pleases. Every man must renounce
unbridled license. The right of the individual is
necessarily subject to reasonable restraint by
general law for the common good. Whenever and
wherever the natural rights of citizen would, if
exercises without restraint, deprive other citizens of
rights which are also and equally natural, such
assumed rights must yield to the regulation of law.
The Liberty of the citizens may be restrained in the
interest of the public health, or of the public order
and safety, or otherwise within the proper scope of
the police power. (See Hall vs. Geiger-Jones [1916],
242 U.S., 539; Hardie-Tynes Manufacturing Co. vs.
Cruz [1914], 189 Al., 66.)
None of the rights of the citizen can be taken away
except by due process of law. Daniel Webster, in the
course of the argument in the Dartmouth College
Case before the United States Supreme Court, since
a classic in forensic literature, said that the meaning
of "due process of law" is, that "every citizen shall
hold his life, liberty, property, an immunities under
the protection of the general rules which govern
society." To constitute "due process of law," as has
been often held, a judicial proceeding is not always
necessary. In some instances, even a hearing and
notice are not requisite a rule which is especially
true where much must be left to the discretion of the
administrative officers in applying a law to particular
cases. (See McGehee, Due Process of Law, p. 371.)
Neither is due process a stationary and blind
sentinel of liberty. "Any legal proceeding enforced by
public authority, whether sanctioned by age and
customs, or newly devised in the discretion of the
legislative power, in furtherance of the public good,
which regards and preserves these principles of
liberty and justice, must be held to be due process of
law." (Hurtado vs. California [1883], 110, U.S., 516.)
"Due process of law" means simply . . . "first, that
there shall be a law prescribed in harmony with the
general powers of the legislative department of the
Government; second, that this law shall be
reasonable in its operation; third, that it shall be
enforced according to the regular methods of
procedure prescribed; and fourth, that it shall be
applicable alike to all the citizens of the state or to all
of a class." (U.S. vs. Ling Su Fan [1908], 10 Phil.,
104, affirmed on appeal to the United States
Supreme Court. 1) "What is due process of law
depends on circumstances. It varies with the
subject-matter and necessities of the situation."
(Moyer vs. Peablody [1909], 212 U. S., 82.)
The pledge that no person shall be denied the equal
protection of the laws is not infringed by a statute
which is applicable to all of a class. The
classification must have a reasonable basis and
cannot be purely arbitrary in nature.
We break off with the foregoing statement, leaving
the logical deductions to be made later on.
D. SLAVERY AND INVOLUNTARY
SERVITUDE.
The fourth constitutional contention of petitioner
relates to the Thirteen Amendment to the United
States Constitution particularly as found in those
portions of Philippine Organic Law providing "That
slavery shall not exist in said Islands; nor shall
involuntary servitude exist except as a punishment
for crime whereof the party shall have been duly
convicted." It is quite possible that the Thirteenth
Amendment, since reaching to "any place subject to"
the "jurisdiction" of the United States, has force in
the Philippine. However this may be, the Philippine
Legislature has, by adoption, with necessary
modifications, of sections 268 to 271 inclusive of the
United States Criminal Code, prescribed the
punishment for these crimes. Slavery and
involuntary servitude, together wit their corollary,
peonage, all denote "a condition of enforced,
compulsory service of one to another." (Hodges vs.
U.S. [1906], 203 U.S., 1.) The term of broadest
scope is possibly involuntary servitude. It has been
applied to any servitude in fact involuntary, no
matter under what form such servitude may have
been disguised. (Bailey vs. Alabama [1910], 219
U.S., 219.)
So much for an analysis of those constitutional
provisions on which petitioners rely for their freedom.
Next must come a description of the police power
under which the State must act if section 2145 is to
be held valid.
E. THE POLICE POWER.
Not attempting to phrase a definition of police power,
all that it is necessary to note at this moment is the
farreaching scope of the power, that it has become
almost possible to limit its weep, and that among its
purposes is the power to prescribe regulations to
promote the health, peace, morals, education, and
good order of the people, and to legislate so as to
increase the industries of the State, develop its
resources and add to is wealth and prosperity. (See
Barbier vs. Connolly [1884], 113 U.S., 27.) What we
are not interested in is the right of the government to
restrain liberty by the exercise of the police power.
"The police power of the State," one court has said, .
. . "is a power coextensive with self-protection, and
is not inaptly termed the 'law of overruling necessity.'
It may be said to be that inherent and plenary power
in the State which enables it to prohibit all things
hurtful to the comfort, safety and welfare of society."
(Lake View vs. Rose Hill Cemetery Co. [1873], 70
Ill., 191.) Carried onward by the current of
legislation, the judiciary rarely attempt to dam the on
rushing power of legislative discretion, provided the
purposes of the law do not go beyond the great
principles that mean security for the public welfare or
do not arbitrarily interfere with the right of the
individual.
The Government of the Philippine Islands has both
on reason and authority the right to exercise the
sovereign police power in the promotion of the
general welfare and the public interest. "There can
be not doubt that the exercise of the police power of
the Philippine Government belongs to the
Legislature and that this power is limited only by the
Acts of Congress and those fundamental principles
which lie at the foundation of all republican forms of
government." (Churchill and Tait vs. Rafferty [1915],
32 Phil., 580; U.S. vs. Pompeya [1915], 31 Phil.,
245.)
With the foregoing approximation of the applicable
basic principles before us, before finally deciding
whether any constitutional provision has indeed
been violated by section 2145 of the Administrative
Code, we should endeavor to ascertain the intention
of the Legislature in enacting this section. If legally
possible, such legislative intention should be
effectuated.
F. LEGISLATIVE INTENT.
The preamble of the resolution of the provincial
board of Mindoro which set apart the Tigbao
reservation, it will be remembered, assigned as
reasons fort the action, the following: (1) The failure
of former attempts for the advancement of the non-
Christian people of the province; and (2) the only
successfully method for educating the Manguianes
was to oblige them to live in a permanent settlement.
The Solicitor-General adds the following; (3) The
protection of the Manguianes; (4) the protection of
the public forests in which they roam; (5) the
necessity of introducing civilized customs among the
Manguianes.
The present Secretary of the Interior says of the
Tigbao reservation and of the motives for its
selection, the following:
To inform himself of the conditions of those
Manguianes who were taken together to Tigbao, the
Secretary of the Interior on June 10 to 13, 1918,
made a trip to the place. There he found that the site
selected is a good one; that creditable progress has
been made in the clearing of forests, construction of
buildings, etc., that there appears to be encouraging
reaction by the boys to the work of the school the
requirements of which they appear to meet with
enthusiastic interest after the first weeks which are
necessarily a somewhat trying period for children
wholly unaccustomed to orderly behaviour and habit
of life. He also gathered the impression that the
results obtained during the period of less than one
year since the beginning of the institution definitely
justify its continuance and development.
Of course, there were many who were protesting
against that segregation. Such was naturally to be
expected. But the Secretary of the Interior, upon his
return to Manila, made the following statement to the
press:
"It is not deemed wise to abandon the present policy
over those who prefer to live a nomadic life and
evade the influence of civilization. The Government
will follow its policy to organize them into political
communities and to educate their children with the
object of making them useful citizens of this country.
To permit them to live a wayfaring life will ultimately
result in a burden to the state and on account of
their ignorance, they will commit crimes and make
depredation, or if not they will be subject to
involuntary servitude by those who may want to
abuse them."
The Secretary of the Interior, who is the official
charged with the supervision of all the non-Christian
people, has adopted as the polaris of his
administration "the advancement of the non-
Christian elements of our population to equality and
unification with the highly civilized Christian
inhabitants." This is carried on by the adoption of the
following measures:
(a) Pursuance of the closer settlement policy
whereby people of seminomadic race are induced to
leave their wild habitat and settle in organized
communities.
(b) The extension of the public school system
and the system of public health throughout the
regions inhabited by the non-Christian people.
(c) The extention of public works throughout the
Mohammedan regions to facilitate their development
and the extention of government control.
(d) Construction of roads and trials between
one place and another among non-Christians, to
promote social and commercial intercourse and
maintain amicable relations among them and with
the Christian people.
(e) Pursuance of the development of natural
economic resources, especially agriculture.
(f) The encouragement of immigration into, and
of the investment of private capital in, the fertile
regions of Mindanao and Sulu.
The Secretary adds:
To attain the end desired, work of a civilizing
influence have been continued among the non-
Christian people. These people are being taught and
guided to improve their living conditions in order that
they may fully appreciate the benefits of civilization.
Those of them who are still given to nomadic habits
are being persuaded to abandon their wild habitat
and settle in organized settlements. They are being
made to understand that it is the purpose of the
Government to organize them politically into fixed
and per manent communities, thus bringing them
under the control of the Government, to aid them to
live and work, protect them from involuntary
servitude and abuse, educate their children, and
show them the advantages of leading a civilized life
with their civilized brothers. In short, they are being
impressed with the purposes and objectives of the
Government of leading them to economic, social,
and political equality, and unification with the more
highly civilized inhabitants of the country. (See
Report of the Department for 1917.)
The fundamental objective of governmental policy is
to establish friendly relations with the so-called non-
Christians, and to promote their educational,
agricultural, industrial, and economic development
and advancement in civilization. (Note Acts Nos.
2208, 2404, 2444.) Act No. 2674 in reestablishing
the Bureau of non-Christian Tribes, defines the aim
of the Government towards the non-Christian people
in the following unequivocal terms:
It shall be the duty of the Bureau of non-Christian
Tribes to continue the work for advancement and
liberty in favor of the region inhabited by non-
Christian Filipinos and foster by all adequate means
and in a systematical, rapid, and complete manner
the moral, material, economic, social, and political
development of those regions, always having in view
the aim of rendering permanent the mutual
intelligence between, and complete fusion of, all the
Christian and non-Christian elements populating the
provinces of the Archipelago. (Sec. 3.)
May the Manguianes not be considered, as are the
Indians in the United States, proper wards of the
Filipino people? By the fostering care of a wise
Government, may not these unfortunates advance in
the "habits and arts of civilization?" Would it be
advisable for the courts to intrude upon a plan,
carefully formulated, and apparently working out for
the ultimate good of these people?
In so far as the Manguianes themselves are
concerned, the purpose of the Government is
evident. Here, we have on the Island of Mindoro, the
Manguianes, leading a nomadic life, making
depredations on their more fortunate neighbors,
uneducated in the ways of civilization, and doing
nothing for the advancement of the Philippine
Islands. What the Government wished to do by
bringing than into a reservation was to gather
together the children for educational purposes, and
to improve the health and morals was in fine, to
begin the process of civilization. this method was
termed in Spanish times, "bringing under the bells."
The same idea adapted to the existing situation, has
been followed with reference to the Manguianes and
other peoples of the same class, because it
required, if they are to be improved, that they be
gathered together. On these few reservations there
live under restraint in some cases, and in other
instances voluntarily, a few thousands of the
uncivilized people. Segregation really constitutes
protection for the manguianes.
Theoretically, one may assert that all men are
created free and equal. Practically, we know that the
axiom is not precisely accurate. The Manguianes, for
instance, are not free, as civilized men are free, and
they are not the equals of their more fortunate
brothers. True, indeed, they are citizens, with many
but not all the rights which citizenship implies. And
true, indeed, they are Filipinos. But just as surely,
the Manguianes are citizens of a low degree of
intelligence, and Filipinos who are a drag upon the
progress of the State.
In so far as the relation of the Manguianes to the
State is concerned, the purposes of the Legislature
in enacting the law, and of the executive branch in
enforcing it, are again plain. Settlers in Mindoro must
have their crops and persons protected from
predatory men, or they will leave the country. It is no
argument to say that such crimes are punished by
the Penal Code, because these penalties are
imposed after commission of the offense and not
before. If immigrants are to be encouraged to
develop the resources of the great Islands of
Mindoro, and its, as yet, unproductive regions, the
Government must be in a position to guarantee
peace and order.
Waste lands do not produce wealth. Waste people
do not advance the interest of the State. Illiteracy
and thriftlessness are not conducive to homogeneity.
The State to protect itself from destruction must prod
on the laggard and the sluggard. The great law of
overwhelming necessity is all convincing.
To quote again from the instructive memorandum of
the Secretary of the Interior:
Living a nomadic and a wayfaring life and evading
the influence of civilization, they (the manguianes)
are engaged in the works of destruction burning
and destroying the forests and making illegal
caigins thereon. Not bringing any benefit to the
State but instead injuring and damaging its interests,
what will ultimately become of these people with the
sort of liberty they wish to preserve and for which
they are now fighting in court? They will ultimately
become a heavy burden to the State and on account
of their ignorance they will commit crimes and make
depredations, or if not they will be subjected to
involuntary servitude by those who may want to
abuse them.
There is no doubt in my mind that this people a right
conception of liberty and does not practice liberty in
a rightful way. They understand liberty as the right to
do anything they will going from one place to
another in the mountains, burning and destroying
forests and making illegal caigins thereon.
Not knowing what true liberty is and not practising
the same rightfully, how can they allege that they are
being deprived thereof without due process of law?
xxx xxx xxx
But does the Constitutional guaranty that 'no person
shall be deprived of his liberty without due process
of law' apply to a class of persons who do not have a
correct idea of what liberty is and do not practise
liberty in a rightful way?
To say that it does will mean to sanction and defend
an erroneous idea of such class of persons as to
what liberty is. It will mean, in the case at bar, that
the Government should not adopt any measures
looking to the welfare and advancement of the class
of persons in question. It will mean that this people
should be let along in the mountains and in a
permanent state of savagery without even the
remotest hope of coming to understand liberty in its
true and noble sense.
In dealing with the backward population, like the
Manguianes, the Government has been placed in
the alternative of either letting them alone or guiding
them in the path of civilization. The latter measure
was adopted as the one more in accord with
humanity and with national conscience.
xxx xxx xxx
The national legislation on the subject of non-
Christian people has tended more and more towards
the education and civilization of such people and
fitting them to be citizens. The progress of those
people under the tutelage of the Government is
indeed encouraging and the signs of the times point
to a day which is not far distant when they will
become useful citizens. In the light of what has
already been accomplished which has been winning
the gratitude of most of the backward people, shall
we give up the noble work simply because a certain
element, believing that their personal interests would
be injured by such a measure has come forward and
challenged the authority of the Government to lead
this people in the pat of civilization? Shall we, after
expending sweat, treasure, and even blood only to
redeem this people from the claws of ignorance and
superstition, now willingly retire because there has
been erroneously invoked in their favor that
Constitutional guaranty that no person shall be
deprived of his liberty without due process of law?
To allow them to successfully invoke that
Constitutional guaranty at this time will leave the
Government without recourse to pursue the works of
civilizing them and making them useful citizens.
They will thus left in a permanent state of savagery
and become a vulnerable point to attack by those
who doubt, nay challenge, the ability of the nation to
deal with our backward brothers.
The manguianes in question have been directed to
live together at Tigbao. There they are being taught
and guided to improve their living conditions. They
are being made to understand that they object of the
government is to organize them politically into fixed
and permanent communities. They are being aided
to live and work. Their children are being educated
in a school especially established for them. In short,
everything is being done from them in order that
their advancement in civilization and material
prosperity may be assured. Certainly their living
together in Tigbao does not make them slaves or put
them in a condition compelled to do services for
another. They do not work for anybody but for
themselves. There is, therefore, no involuntary
servitude.
But they are compelled to live there and prohibited
from emigrating to some other places under penalty
of imprisonment. Attention in this connection is
invited to the fact that this people, living a nomadic
and wayfaring life, do not have permanent individual
property. They move from one place to another as
the conditions of living warrants, and the entire
space where they are roving about is the property of
the nation, the greater part being lands of public
domain. Wandering from one place to another on
the public lands, why can not the government adopt
a measure to concentrate them in a certain fixed
place on the public lands, instead of permitting them
to roam all over the entire territory? This measure is
necessary both in the interest of the public as owner
of the lands about which they are roving and for the
proper accomplishment of the purposes and
objectives of the government. For as people
accustomed to nomadic habit, they will always long
to return to the mountains and follow a wayfaring
life, and unless a penalty is provinced for, you can
not make them live together and the noble intention
of the Government of organizing them politically will
come to naught.
G. APPLICATION AND CONCLUSION.
Our exhaustive study should have left us in a
position to answer specific objections and to reach a
general conclusion.
In the first place, it is argued that the citizen has the
right, generally speaking, to go where he pleases.
Could be not, however, be kept away from certain
localities ? To furnish an example from the Indian
legislation. The early Act of Congress of 1802 (2
U.S. Stat. at L., p. 141) Indian reservation. Those
citizens certainly did not possess absolute freedom
of locomotion. Again the same law provided for the
apprehension of marauding Indians. Without any
doubt, this law and other similar were accepted and
followed time and again without question.
It is said that, if we hold this section to be
constitutional, we leave this weak and defenseless
people confined as in a prison at the mercy of
unscrupulous official. What, it is asked, would be the
remedy of any oppressed Manguian? The answer
would naturally be that the official into whose hands
are given the enforcement of the law would have
little or not motive to oppress these people; on the
contrary, the presumption would all be that they
would endeavor to carry out the purposes of the law
intelligently and patriotically. If, indeed, they did ill-
treat any person thus confined, there always exists
the power of removal in the hands of superior
officers, and the courts are always open for a
redress of grievances. When, however, only the
validity of the law is generally challenged and no
particular case of oppression is called to the
attention of the courts, it would seems that the
Judiciary should not unnecessarily hamper the
Government in the accomplishment of its laudable
purpose.
The question is above all one of sociology. How far,
consistently with freedom, may the right and liberties
of the individual members of society be subordinated
to the will of the Government? It is a question which
has assailed the very existence of government from
the beginning of time. Now purely an ethical or
philosophical subject, nor now to be decided by
force, it has been transferred to the peaceful forum
of the Judiciary. In resolving such an issue, the
Judiciary must realize that the very existence of
government renders imperatives a power to restrain
the individual to some extent, dependent, of course,
on the necessities of the class attempted to be
benefited. As to the particular degree to which the
Legislature and the Executive can go in interfering
with the rights of the citizen, this is, and for a along
time to come will be, impossible for the courts to
determine.
The doctrines of laissez faire and of unrestricted
freedom of the individual, as axioms of economics
and political theory, are of the past. The modern
period has shown as widespread belief in the
amplest possible demonstration of governmental
activity. The courts unfortunately have sometimes
seemed to trial after the other two branches of the
government in this progressive march.
Considered, therefore, purely as an exercise of the
police power, the courts cannot fairly say that the
Legislature has exceeded its rightful authority. it is,
indeed, an unusual exercise of that power. But a
great malady requires an equally drastic remedy.
Further, one cannot hold that the liberty of the citizen
is unduly interfered without when the degree of
civilization of the Manguianes is considered. They
are restrained for their own good and the general
good of the Philippines. Nor can one say that due
process of law has not been followed. To go back to
our definition of due process of law and equal
protection of the law, there exists a law ; the law
seems to be reasonable; it is enforced according to
the regular methods of procedure prescribed; and it
applies alike to all of a class.
As a point which has been left for the end of this
decision and which, in case of doubt, would lead to
the determination that section 2145 is valid. it the
attitude which the courts should assume towards the
settled policy of the Government. In a late decision
with which we are in full accord, Gambles vs.
Vanderbilt University (200 Southwestern Reporter,
510) the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of
Tennessee writes:
We can seen objection to the application of public
policy as a ratio decidendi. Every really new
question that comes before the courts is, in the last
analysis, determined on that theory, when not
determined by differentiation of the principle of a
prior case or line of cases, or by the aid of analogies
furnished by such prior case. In balancing conflicting
solutions, that one is perceived to tip the scales
which the court believes will best promote the public
welfare in its probable operation as a general rule or
principle. But public policy is not a thing inflexible.
No court is wise enough to forecast its influence in
all possible contingencies. Distinctions must be
made from time to time as sound reason and a true
sense of justice may dictate."
Our attempt at giving a brief history of the
Philippines with reference to the so-called non-
Christians has been in vain, if we fail to realize that a
consistent governmental policy has been effective in
the Philippines from early days to the present. The
idea to unify the people of the Philippines so that
they may approach the highest conception of
nationality. If all are to be equal before the law, all
must be approximately equal in intelligence. If the
Philippines is to be a rich and powerful country,
Mindoro must be populated, and its fertile regions
must be developed. The public policy of the
Government of the Philippine Islands is shaped with
a view to benefit the Filipino people as a whole. The
Manguianes, in order to fulfill this governmental
policy, must be confined for a time, as we have said,
for their own good and the good of the country.
Most cautiously should the power of this court to
overrule the judgment of the Philippine Legislature, a
coordinate branch, be exercised. The whole
tendency of the best considered case is toward non-
interference on the part of the courts whenever
political ideas are the moving consideration. Justice
Holmes, in one of the aphorisms for which he is
justly famous, said that "constitutional law, like other
mortal contrivances, has to take some chances."
(Blinn vs. Nelson [1911], 222 U.S., 1.) If in the final
decision of the many grave questions which this
case presents, the courts must take "a chance," it
should be with a view to upholding the law, with a
view to the effectuation of the general governmental
policy, and with a view to the court's performing its
duty in no narrow and bigoted sense, but with that
broad conception which will make the courts as
progressive and effective a force as are the other
departments of the Government.
We are of the opinion that action pursuant to section
2145 of the Administrative Code does not deprive a
person of his liberty without due process of law and
does not deny to him the equal protection of the
laws, and that confinement in reservations in
accordance with said section does not constitute
slavery and involuntary servitude. We are further of
the opinion that section 2145 of the Administrative
Code is a legitimate exertion of the police power,
somewhat analogous to the Indian policy of the
United States. Section 2145 of the Administrative
Code of 1917 is constitutional.
Petitioners are not unlawfully imprisoned or
restrained of their liberty. Habeas corpus can,
therefore, not issue. This is the true ruling of the
court. Costs shall be taxes against petitioners. So
ordered.
Arellano, C.J., Torres and Avancea, JJ., concur.
EN BANC
G.R. No. 86899-903 May 15, 1989
GOVERNOR AMOR D. DELOSO, petitioner,
vs.
THE SANDIGANBAYAN, THE PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, and THE SECRETARY OF THE
DEPARTMENT OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT AND
COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT, respondents.
Angara, Abello, Concepcion, Regala & Cruz for
petitioner.
The Office of the Solicitor General for public
respondent.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
This petition for certiorari seeks to annul and set
aside the resolution of the Sandiganbayan dated
February 10, 1989 in Criminal Cases Nos. 9200 to
9204 which preventively suspended petitioner Amor
D. Deloso (accused in the criminal cases) pendente
lite from his position as provincial governor of
Zambales and from any office that he may be
holding.
The petitioner was the duly elected mayor of
Botolan, Zambales in the local elections of
November 1971. While he occupied the position of
mayor, a certain Juan Villanueva filed a letter
complaint with the Tanodbayan accusing him of
having committed acts in violation of the Anti-Graft
Law (Republic Act 3019) in relation to the award of
licenses to operate fish corrals in the municipal
waters of Botolan, Zambales during the period 1976
to 1978 and the issuance of five (5) tractors of the
municipality to certain individuals allegedly without
any agreement as to the payment of rentals.
The complaint with respect to the award of licenses
to operate fish corrals was dismissed. As regards
the other complaint, the Tanodbayan filed five (5)
separate informations, all dated May 30, 1984
accusing the petitioner of violation of Section 3(e), of
the Anti-Graft Law with the Sandiganbayan. The
cases were docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 9200-
9204. Except for the names of the individuals who
were allegedly favored by the petitioner and the
dates when these favors were made, the
informations uniformly alleged:
That on or about 3 February 1978 in the Municipality
of Botolan, Zambales, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused AMOR
D. DELOSO, a public officer being then the
Municipal Mayor of the Municipality of Botolan,
Zambales, taking advantage of his public and official
position, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously give unwarranted benefits to Daniel
Ferrer thru manifest partiality and evident bad faith
in the discharge of his official functions by issuing to
him a tractor purchased by the Municipality of
Botolan thru a loan financed by the Land Bank of the
Philippines for lease to local farmers at reasonable
cost, without any agreement as to the payment of
rentals for the use of tractor by Daniel Ferrer thereby
causing undue injury to the Municipality of Botolan.
(Rollo, p. 30)
A motion to quash the informations was denied by
the Sandiganbayan. A motion for reconsideration
was likewise denied.
The petitioner then filed a petition before us (G.R.
Nos. 69963-67) to annul the Sandiganbayan's
resolutions denying the petitioner's motion to quash
and motion for reconsideration.
In a resolution dated July 28,1988, we dismissed the
petition for lack of merit. The resolution became final
and executory on October 17, 1988.
The petitioner was arraigned on January 6, 1989
before the Sandiganbayan. He pleaded NOT
GUILTY to the charges against him.
The Office of the Special Prosecutor then filed a
motion to suspend the petitioner pendente lite
pursuant to Section 13 of Republic Act No. 3019.
On February 10, 1989, the Sandiganbayan issued
the questioned resolution, the dispositive portion of
which reads:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the accused Amor
D. Deloso is suspended pendente lite from his
position as Provincial Governor of Zambales and
from any other office that he may now be holding.
Let a copy of this Resolution be furnished to the
Secretary of the Department of Local Government
for implementation and for him to inform this Court of
the action he has taken thereon within five (5) days
from receipt hereof. (Rollo, p. 94)
The day following his receipt of the resolution, or on
February 16, 1989, the petitioner filed the instant
petition.
On February 17, 1989, the petitioner filed an urgent
motion with the Sandiganbayan requesting that the
execution and implementation of the February 10,
1989 suspension order be held in abeyance pending
determination of the merits of the petition. The
motion was denied prompting the petitioner to ask
the Court for an earlier setting of the trial of the
cases which was denied in an order dated February
22, 1989.
In denying the plea for an earlier schedule of the trial
of the cases, the Sandiganbayan said:
The Court notes that these cases have already been
set for May 15, 16 and 17 as well as June 5, 6 and
7, 1989 at 8:00 o'clock in the morning and 2:00
o'clock in the afternoon. While the accused claims
that this period is ordinately far, the Court must also
be contend with its own calendar. It will be easy
enough for this Court to give the accused an earlier
setting. However, such a setting will be best a
pretence since other cases have already been set
between now and May 15 where in many instances
the accused themselves are also under suspension
by reason of the same provision of law. Under the
above circumstances, no other earlier setting can be
granted to the accused without making that setting
merely a sham since other cases which have been
set earlier will naturally have a right to expect
priority. (Rollo, p. 135)
In view of this development, the petitioner filed an
urgent supplemental application for temporary
restraining order and/ or writ of preliminary injunction
to enjoin the Sandiganbayan, the Secretary of Local
Government and Community Development, and all
those acting in their behalf from executing and
implementing the February 10, 1989 resolution of
the Sandiganbayan.
We treat the respondent's Comment as an answer
and decide this petition on its merits.
The petitioner questions the constitutionality of the
suspension provision of Section 13 of the Anti-Graft
Law (Republic Act No. 3019).
This same issue was raised in the case of Layno v.
Sandiganbayan (136 SCRA 536 [1985]). After
considering the facts as well as the merits of the
case, the Court ruled that the petition need not be
resolved through a ruling on the validity of the
provision on mandatory suspension. We instead,
decided the case in relation to the principles of due
process and equal protection of the law.
Faced with similar factual circumstances in the
instant petition, we apply anew the ruling in the
Layno case and decide the instant petition in relation
to the principles of due process and equal protection
without having to declare categorically whether or
not the suspension provision of Republic Act 3019
should be struck down as invalid. We limit ourselves
to ascertaining whether or not, under the
circumstances of this case, an indefinite suspension
becomes unreasonable.
As early as 1974, then Justice Fred Ruiz Castro
expressed in a separate opinion the mischief which
would result if the Court allows the indefinite
suspension of elective local officials charged with
violations of the Anti Graft and Corrupt Practices Act:
The central point of Senator Padilla's position is that
the penalty of suspension is definitely much lower
than that of removal and it would be incongruous if
we give to the penalty of suspension more serious
consequences than are attached to the penalty of
removal. Senator Padilla opted for the immediate
restoration of the respondent to his position once the
favorable result of the election is known.
Parenthetically, it must be stated that while there
was an exchange of views between Senator Ganzon
and Senator Manglapus on the Anti-Graft Law, the
exchange was limited to the matter of the
commencement of the investigation of the charges,
which, according to Senator Ganzon, cannot be
made within one year prior to an election.
And so it is that, on the basis of my discussion
above, I bewail the apathy of the majority of the
Court toward efforts to seek enlightenment on legal
issues of grave importance from the deliberations of
Congress upon the said issues. It is not quite
becoming of judicial magistrates to shunt aside a
suggestion that the interplay of legal provisions be
carefully studied and analyzed.
In the deliberations of the Court on this case, I
suggested that we examine the possible delimiting
effects of the provisions of the first sentence of
section 5 of the Decentralization Act on the
provisions of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act insofar as the suspension from office of an
elective local official is concerned. In no uncertain
words did I focus the attention of the Court on the
serious ever-present possibility of harassment of an
elective local official taking the form of the filing of a
valid information against him under the provisions of
the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act after his
exoneration in an administrative case involving the
same offense.
I also pointedly brought out the matter of the
notorious delay in the courts of justice which could
effectively frustrate an elected or re-elected local
official from discharging the duties of his office for
the entire term of his office, and thus nullify the will
of the people who elected him. I likewise asked the
Court to consider the situation where an elective
local official runs for the National Assembly and is
elected despite the fact that he is under suspension
under the authority of the provisions of the Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act, and sought a definitive
answer to the question. What then would happen to
the suspension meted out to him since it is the
National Assembly that determines whether he
should assume and continue in office?
All these and other germane questions were
brushed aside by the majority of the Court with the
sweeping statement that the provisions of the
Decentralization Act apply only to administrative
cases. It is the ex cathedra attitude, this kind of
slothful thinking, that I find abhorrent and therefore
deplore " (Oliveros v. Villaluz, 57 SCRA 163, 197-
198 [1974])
Petitioner Deloso was elected governor of the
Province of Zambales in the January 18, 1988 local
elections. The regular term of a governor is only 3
years although he shall serve until noon of June 30,
1992 by special provision of the Constitution.
(Section 8, Article X, Section 2, Article XVIII,
Constitution). He was, however, ordered suspended
from performing his duties as governor by the
Sandiganbayan pursuant to Section 13 of Republic
Act No. 3019 by virtue of the criminal charges filed
against him. The order of suspension does not have
a definite period so that the petitioner may be
suspended for the rest of his term of office unless
his case is terminated sooner. An extended
suspension is a distinct possibility considering that
the Sandiganbayan denied the petitioner's plea for
earlier dates of trial of his cases on the ground that
there are other cases set earlier which have a right
to expect priority.
Under these circumstances the preventive
suspension which initially may be justified becomes
unreasonable thus raising a due process question.
As we ruled in Layno, Sr. v. Sandiganbayan,
(supra):
Petitioner is a duly elected municipal mayor of
Lianga, Surigao del Sur. His term of office does not
expire until 1986. Were it not for this information and
the suspension decreed by the Sandiganbayan
according to the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act, he would have been all this while in the full
discharge of his functions as such municipal mayor.
He was elected precisely to do so. As of October 26,
1983, he has been unable to. It is a basic
assumption of the electoral process implicit in the
right of suffrage that the people are entitled to the
services of elective officials of their choice. For
misfeasance or malfeasance, any of them could, of
course, be proceeded against administratively or, as
in this instance, criminally. In either case, his
culpability must be established. Moreover, if there be
a criminal action, he is entitled to the constitutional
presumption of innocence. A preventive suspension
may be justified. Its continuance, however, for an
unreasonable length of time raises a due process
question. For even if thereafter he were acquitted, in
the meanwhile his right to hold office had been
nullified. Clearly, there would be in such a case an
injustice suffered by him. Nor is he the only victim.
There is injustice inflicted likewise on the people of
Lianga. They were deprived of the services of the
man they had elected to serve as mayor. In that
sense, to paraphrase Justice Cardozo, the
protracted continuance of this preventive suspension
had outrun the bounds of reason and resulted in
sheer oppression. A denial of due process is thus
quite manifest. It is to avoid such an unconstitutional
application that the order of suspension should be
lifted.
Moreover, in the earlier case of Garcia v. The
Executive Secretary, (6 SCRA 1 [1962]) we ruled on
the issue as to whether the preventive suspension
beyond the maximum period of 60 days, provided in
Section 35 of the Civil Service Act of 1959 (Republic
Act 2260) is illegal and void. Paulino Garcia, the
petitioner in the cited case was the Chairman of the
National Science Development Board appointed by
the President of the Philippines. He was charged
with electioneering and dishonesty in office. Pending
investigation of the administrative charges against
him, he was suspended by the Executive Secretary
by authority of the President. In view of his indefinite
suspension, he filed a petition praying in effect that
the 60-day period prescribed in the Civil Service Law
for preventive suspension having already expired,
he be reinstated in the service pursuant to Section
35 of the said Act. The respondents opposed the
petition on the ground that the petitioner was a
presidential appointee and therefore not covered by
the 60-day preventive suspension limit under
Section 35 of the then Civil Service Act. The
respondents maintained that the petitioner could be
indefinitely suspended. In ruling in favor of the
petitioner, the Court stated:
To adopt the theory of respondents that an officer
appointed by the President, facing administrative
charges can be preventively suspended indefinitely,
would be to countenance a situation where the
preventive suspension can, in effect, be the penalty
itself without a finding of guilt after due hearing,
contrary to the express mandate of the Constitution
(No officer or employee in the Civil Service shall be
removed or suspended except for cause as provided
by law. [Art. XII, Sec. 4, Constitution of the
Philippines]) and the Civil Service Law (No officer or
employee in the Civil Service shall be removed or
suspended except for cause as provided by law and
after due process). ... In the guise of a preventive
suspension, his term of office could be shortened
and he could, in effect, be removed without a finding
of a cause duly established after due hearing, in
violation of the Constitution ... (at pp. 8-9)
The question that now arises is whether or not the
ruling in the Garcia case where the suspension was
ordered by no less than the President of the
Philippines is applicable to an elective official facing
criminal charges under the Anti-Graft Law and
suspended under Section 13, thereof.
The guarantee to an equal protection of the law
necessitates the application of the ruling in the
Garcia v. Executive Secretary. Thus, we explained in
the Layno case, to wit:
... If the case against petitioner Layno were
administrative in character the Local Government
Code would be applicable. It is therein clearly
provided that while preventive suspension is
allowable for the causes therein enumerated, there
is this emphatic limitation on the duration thereof; 'In
all cases, preventive suspension shall not extend
beyond sixty days after the start of said suspension.'
(Batas Pambansa Blg. 337, Section 63 (2), last
sentence. The first sentence reads as follows:
'Preventive suspension may be imposed at any time
after the issues are joined, when there is reasonable
ground to believe that the respondent has committed
the act or acts complained of, when the evidence of
culpability is strong, when the gravity of the offense
so warrants, or when the continuance in office of the
respondent influence the witnesses or pose a threat
to the safety and integrity of the records and other
evidence'). It may be recalled that the principle
against indefinite suspension applies equally to
national government officials. So it was held in the
leading case of Garcia v. Hon. Secretary (116 Phil.
348 [1962]). According to the opinion of Justice
Barrera: 'To adopt the theory of respondents that an
officer appointed by the President, facing
administrative charges, can be preventively
suspended indefinitely, would be to countenance a
situation where the preventive suspension can, in
effect, be the penalty itself without a finding of guilt
after due hearing, contrary to the express mandate
of the Constitution and the Civil Service Law.' (Ibid.
351-352) Further: 'In the guise of a preventive
suspension, his term of office could be shortened
and he could in effect, be removed without a finding
of a cause duly established after due hearing, in
violation of the Constitution.' (Ibid. 352) Clearly then,
the policy of the law mandated by the Constitution
frowns at a suspension of indefinite duration. In this
particular case, the mere fact that petitioner is facing
a charge under the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act does not justify a different rule of law. To do so
would be to negate the safeguard of the equal
protection guarantee. (at p. 542)
The application of the Garcia injunction against
preventive suspensions for an unreasonable period
of time applies with greater force to elective officials
and especially to the petitioner whose term is a
relatively short one. The interests of the sovereign
electorate and the province of Zambales cannot be
subordinated to the heavy case load of the
Sandiganbayan and of this Court.
It would be most unfair to the people of Zambales
who elected the petitioner to the highest provincial
office in their command if they are deprived of his
services for an indefinite period with the termination
of his case possibly extending beyond his entire
term simply because the big number of
sequestration, ill-gotten wealth, murder,
malversation of public finds and other more serious
offenses plus incidents and resolutions that may be
brought to the Supreme Court prevents the
expedited determination of his innocence or guilt.
The order dated February 10, 1989 suspending the
petitioner without a definite period can not be
sanctioned. We rule that henceforth a preventive
suspension of an elective public officer under
Section 13 of Republic Act 3019 should be limited to
the ninety (90) days under Section 42 of Presidential
Decree No. 807, the Civil Service Decree, which
period also appears reasonable and appropriate
under the circumstances of this case.
The petitioner also questions the applicability of
Section 13 of Republic Act 3019 as amended by
Batasan Pambansa Blg. 192 to him. He opines that
the suspension provision as amended which
qualifies the public officer as incumbent does not
apply to him since he is now occupying the position
of governor and not mayor, the position wherein he
was charged under the Anti-Graft Law.
This argument is untenable. The issue was settled in
the case of Bayot v. Sandiganbayan (128 SCRA 383
(1984), in this wise:
... Further, the claim of petitioner that he cannot be
suspended because he is presently occupying a
position different from that under which he is
charged is untenable. The amendatory provision
clearly states that any incumbent public officer
against whom any criminal prosecution under a valid
information under Republic Act 3019 or for any
offense involving fraud upon the government or
public funds or property whether as a simple or as a
complex offense and in whatever stage or execution
and mode of participation, is pending in court, shall
be suspended from office. Thus, by the use of the
word office the same applies to any office which the
officer charged may be holding, and not only the
particular office under which he was charged.
One last point. Should the purposes behind
preventive suspensions such as preventing the
abuse of the prerogatives of the office, intimidation
of witnesses, etc., become manifest, the respondent
court is not bereft of remedies or sanctions. The
petitioner may still be suspended but for specifically
expressed reasons and not from an automatic
application of Section 13 of the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED.
The preventive suspension imposed on petitioner
Amor D. Deloso by virtue of the February 10, 1989
resolution of the Sandiganbayan should be limited to
only ninety (90) days after which Deloso will assume
once again the functions of governor of Zambales,
without prejudice to the continuation of the trial of
the pending cases against him in the
Sandiganbayan. This decision is immediately
executory. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
EN BANC
G.R. Nos. 111624-25 March 9, 1995
ALFONSO C. BINCE, JR., petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, PROVINCIAL
BOARD OF CANVASSERS OF PANGASINAN,
MUNICIPAL BOARDS OF CANVASSERS OF
TAYUG AND SAN MANUEL, PANGASINAN AND
EMILIANO MICU, respondents.
KAPUNAN, J.:
Petitioner Alfonso C. Bince, Jr. and private
respondent Emiliano S. Micu were among the
candidates in the synchronized elections of May 11,
1992 for a seat in the Sanguniang Panlalawigan of
the Province of Pangasinan allotted to its Sixth
Legislative District.
Ten (10) municipalities, including San Quintin,
Tayug and San Manuel, comprise the said district.
During the canvassing of the Certificates of Canvass
(COC's) for these ten (10) municipalities by
respondent Provincial Board of Canvassers (PBC)
on May 20, 1992, private respondent Micu objected
to the inclusion of the COC for San Quintin on the
ground that it contained false statements.
Accordingly, the COCs for the remaining nine (9)
municipalities were included in the canvass. On May
21, 1992, the PBC rules against the objection of
private respondent.1 From the said ruling, private
respondent Micu appealed to the Commission on
Elections (COMELEC), which docketed the case as
SPC No. 92-208.
On June 6, 1992, the COMELEC en banc
promulgated a resolution which reads:
Acting on the appeal filed by petitioner-appellant
Atty. Emiliano S. Micu to the ruling of the Provincial
Board of Canvassers of Pangasinan, dated May 21,
1992, the Commission en banc tabulated the votes
obtained by candidates Atty. Emiliano S. Micu and
Atty. Alfonso C. Bince for the position of
Sangguniang Panlalawigan member of the province
of Pangasinan, using as basis thereof the statement
of votes by precinct submitted by the municipality of
San Quintin, Pangasinan, as (sic) a result of said
examination, the Commission rules, as follows:
1. That the actual number of votes obtained by
candidate Alfonso C. Bince in the municipality of
San Quintin, Pangasinan is 1,055 votes whereas
petitioner/appellant Atty. Emiliano S. Micu obtained
1,535 votes for the same municipality.
Accordingly, the Provincial Board of Canvassers for
the province of Pangasinan is directed to CREDIT in
favor of petitioner/appellant Atty. Emiliano S. Micu
with 1,535 votes and candidate Alfonso C. Bince
with 1,055 votes in the municipality of San Quintin,
Pangasinan.2
Twenty-one (21) days after the canvass of the COCs
for the nine (9) municipalities was completed on May
20, 1992, private respondent Micu together with the
Municipal Boards of Canvassers (MBCs) of Tayug
and San Manuel filed with the PBC petitions for
correction of the Statements of Votes (SOVs) earlier
prepared for alledged manifest errors committed in
the computation thereof.
In view of the motion of herein petitioner to
implement the Resolution of June 6, 1992 which was
alleged to have become final, the PBC, on June 18,
1992, credited in favor of the petitioner and private
respondent the votes for each as indicated in the
said resolution and on the basis of the COCs for San
Quintin and the other nine (9) municipalities,
petitioner had a total of 27,370 votes while the
private respondent had 27,369 votes. Petitioner who
won by a margin of 1 vote was not, however,
proclaimed winner because of the absence of
authority from the COMELEC.
Accordingly, petitioner filed a formal motion for such
authority.
On June 29, 1992, the COMELEC en banc
promulgated a Supplemental Order3 directing the
PBC "to reconvene, continue with the provincial
canvass and proclaim the winning candidates for
Sangguniang Panlalawigan for the Province of
Pangasinan, and other candidates for provincial
offices who have not been proclaimed4 as of that
date.
In the meantime, on June 24, 1992, the PBC, acting
on the petitions for correction of the SOVs of Tayug
and San Manuel filed by private respondent and the
MBCs of the said municipalities, rules "to allow the
Municipal Boards of Canvassers of the municipalities
of Tayug and San Manuel, Pangasinan to correct
the Statement of Votes and Certificates of Canvass
and on the basis of the corrected documents, the
Board (PBC) will continue the canvass and
thereafter proclaim the winning candidate.5
On June 25, 1992, petitioner Bince appealed from
the above ruling allowing the correction alleging that
the PBC had no jurisdiction to entertain the petition.
The appeal was docketed as SPC No. 92-384.
On July 8, 1992, private respondent Micu filed
before the COMELEC an urgent motion for the
issuance of an order directing the PBC to reconvene
and proceed with the canvass. He alleged that the
promulgation of COMELEC Resolution No. 2489 on
June 29, 1992 affirmed the ruling of the PBC dated
June 24, 1992. Similarly, petitioner Bince filed an
urgent petition to cite Atty. Felimon Asperin and
Supt. Primo. A. Mina, Chairman and Member,
respectively, of the PBC, for Contempt with
alternative prayer for proclamation as winner and
Injunction with prayer for the issuance of Temporary
Restraining Order (TRO).
On July 9, 1992, the PBC Chairman, Atty. Felimon
Asperin, filed a petition with the COMELEC seeking
a "definitive ruling and a clear directive or order as to
who of the two (2) contending parties should be
proclaimed"6 averring that "there were corrections
already made in a separate sheet of paper of the
Statements of Votes and Certificates of Canvass of
Tayug and San Manuel, Pangasinan which
corrections if to be considered by the Board in its
canvass and proclamation, candidate Emiliano will
win by 72 votes. On the other hand, if these
corrections will not be considered, candidate Alfonso
Bince, Jr. will win by one (1) vote.7 On even date,
the COMELEC promulgated its resolution, the
dispositive portion of which reads:
(1) To RECONVENE immediately and complete
the canvass of the Certificates of Votes, as
corrected, of the municipalities comprising the 6th
District of Pangasinan;
(2) To PROCLAIM the winning candidate for
Member of the provincial Board, 6th District of
Pangasinan, on the basis of the completed and
corrected Certificates of Canvass, aforesaid; in
accordance with the law, the rules and guidelines on
canvassing and proclamation.8
As directed therein, the PBC on July 21, 1992, by a
vote of 2-1 with its Chairman Atty. Felimon Asperin
dissenting, proclaimed candidate Bince as the duly
elected member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan
of Pangasinan. Assailing the proclamation of Bince,
private respondent Micu filed an Urgent Motion for
Contempt and to Annul Proclamation and Amended
Urgent Petition for Contempt and Annul
Proclamation on July 22 and 29, 1992, respectively,
alleging that the PBC defied the directive of the
COMELEC in its resolution of July 9, 1992. Acting
thereon, the COMELEC promulgated a resolution on
July 29, 1992, the decretal portion of which reads:
The Commission RESOLVED, as it hereby
RESOLVES:
1. To direct Prosecutor Jose Antonio Guillermo
and Supt. Primo Mina, vice-chairman and secretayr,
respectively, of the Provincial Board of Canvassers
of Pangasinan, to show cause why they should not
be declared in contempt of defying and disobeying
the Resolution of this Commission dated 09 July
1992, directing them to RECOVENE immediately
and complete the canvass of the Certificates of
Votes as corrected, of the Municipal Boards of
Canvassers of the Municipalities comprising the 6th
District of Pangasinan; and to PROCLAIM the
winning candidate of the Provincial Board, 6th
District of Pangasinan, on the basis of the completed
and corrected Certificates of Canvass, aforesaid;
instead they excluded the corrected Certificated of
Canvass of the Municipal Boards of Canvassers of
Tayug and San Manuel, Pangasinan;
2. To ANNUL the proclamation dated 21 July
1992, by the said Provincial Board of Canvassers
(dissented by Chairman Felimon Asperin), of
candidate Alfonso Bince;
3. To DIRECT the Provincial Board of
Canvassers to recovene immediately and proclaim
the winning candidate for the second position of the
Provincial Board, 6th District of Pangasinan, on the
basis of the completed and corrected Certificates of
Canvass submitted by the Municipal Boards of
Canvassers of all the municipalities in the 6th District
of Pangasinan, in accordance with law.9
Consequently, petitioner filed a special civil action
for certiorari before this Court seeking to set aside
the foregoing resolution of the COMELEC,
contending that the same was promulgated without
prior notice and hearing with respect to SPC No. 92-
208 and SPC No. 92-384. The case was docketed
as G.R. No. 106291.
On February 9, 1993, the Court en banc 10 granted
the petition ratiocinating that:
Respondent COMELEC acted without jurisdiction or
with grave abuse of discretion in annulling the
petitioner's proclamation without the requisite due
notice and hearing, thereby depriving the latter of
due process. Moreover, there was no valid
correction of the SOVs and COCs for the
municipalities of Tayug and San Manuel to warrant
the annullment of the petitioner's proclamation.
1. Petitioner had been proclaimed, had taken
his oath of office and had assumed the position of
the second elected member of the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan of the Province of Pangasinan for its
Sixth Legislative District. Such proclamation enjoys
the presumption of regularly and validity. The ruling
of the majority of the PBC to proclaim the petitioner
is based on its interpretation of the 9 July 1992
Resolution of respondent COMELEC which does not
expressly single out the corrected COCs of Tayug
and San Manuel; since, as of that time, the only
corrected COC which existed was that for San
Quintin, which was made by the PBC on 18 June
1992, the majority of the PBC cannot be faulted for
ruling the way it did. the 9 July 1992 Resolution
(Rollo, p. 51) merely directed it:
(1) To RECOVENE immediately and complete
the canvass of the Certificates of Votes, as
corrected, of the Municipal Boards of Canvassers of
the municipalities comprising the 6th District of
Pangasinan;
(2) To PROCLAIM the winning candidate for
Member of the Provincial Board, 6th District of
Pangasinan, on the basis of the completed and
corrected Certificates of Canvass, aforesaid; in
accordance with the law, the rules and guideline on
canvassing and proclamation. (Emphasis supplied)
The PBC thus had every reason to believe that the
phrase "completed and corrected" COCs could only
refer to the nine 99) COCs for the nine
municipalities, canvass for which was completed on
21 May 1992, and that of San Quintin, respectively.
Verily, the above resolution is vague and
ambiguous.
Petitioner cannot be deprived of his office without
due process of law. Although public office is not
property under Section 1 of the Bill of Rights of the
Constitution (Article III, 1987 Constitution), and one
cannot acquire a vested right to public office (CRUZ,
I.A., Constitutional Law, 1991 ed., 101), it is,
nevertheless, a protected right (BERNAS J., The
Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines, vol. I,
1987 ed., 40, citing Segovia vs. Noel, 47 Phil. 543
[1925] and Borja vs. Agoncillo, 46 Phil. 432 [1924]).
Due process in proceedings before the respondent
COMELEC, exercising its quasi-judicial functions,
requires due notice and hearing, among others.
Thus, although the COMELEC possesses, in
appropriate cases, the power to annul or suspend
the proclamation of any candidate (Section 248,
Omnibus Election Code [B.P. Blg. 881]), We had
ruled in Farinas vs. Commission on Elections (G.R.
No. 81763, 3 March 1988), Reyes vs. Commission
on Elections G.R. No. 81856, 3 March 1988) and
Gallardo vs. Commission on Elections (G.R. No.
85974, 2 May 1989) that the COMELEC is without
power to partially or totally annul a proclamation or
suspend the effects of a proclamation without notice
and hearing.
xxx xxx xxx
Furthermore, the said motion to annul proclamation
was treated by the respondent COMELEC as a
Special Case (SPC) because its ruling therein was
made in connection with SPC No. 92-208 and SPC
No. 92-384. Special Cases under the COMELEC
RULES OF PROCEDURE involve the pre-
proclamation controversies (Rule 27 in relation to
Section 4(h)l Rule 1, and Section 4, Rule 7). We
have categorically declared in Sarmiento vs.
Commission on Elections (G.R. No. 105628, and
companion cases, 6 August 1992) that pursuant to
Section 3, Article IX-C of the 1987 Constitution, . . .
the commission en banc does not have jurisdiction
to hear and decide pre-proclamation cases at the
first instance. Such cases should first be referred to
a division
Hence, the COMELEC en banc had no jurisdiction to
decide on the aforesaid to annul the proclamation;
consequently, its 29 July 1992 Resolution is motion
is null and void. For this reason too, the COMELEC
en banc Resolution of 6 June 1992 in SPC No. 92-
2()8 resolving the private respondent's appeal from
the ruling of the PBC with respect to the COC of San
Quintin is similarly void.
2. It is to be noted, as correctly stressed by the
petitioner, that there are no valid corrected
Statements of Votes and Certificates of Canvass for
Tayug and San Manuel; thus, any reference to such
would be clearly unfounded. While it may be true
that on 24 June 1992, the PBC, acting on
simultaneous petitions to correct the SOVs and
COCs for Tayug and San Manuel ordered the MBCs
for these two (2) municipalities to make the
appropriate corrections in the said SOVs and their
corresponding COCs, none of said Boards
convened to the members of actually implement the
order. Such failure could have been due to the
appeal seasonably interposed by the petitioner to
the COMELEC or the fact that said members simply
chose not to act thereon. As already adverted to the
so-called "corrected" Statements of Votes and
Certificates of Canvass consist of sheets of paper
signed by the respective Election Registrars of
Tayug (Annex "F-l" of Comment of private
respondent; Annex "A" of Consolidated Reply of
petitioner) and San Manuel (Annex "F-2, Id.; Annex
"B", Id.). These are not valid corrections because the
Election Registrars, as Chairmen of the MBCs
cannot, by themselves, act for their Section 225 of
the respective Board. Section 225 of the Omnibus
Election Code (B.P. Blg. 881) provides that "[A]
majority vote of all the members of the board of
canvassers shall be necessary to render a decision."
That majority means at least two (2) of the three (3)
members constituting the Board (Section 20(c) of
the Electoral Reforms Law of 1987 (R.A. No. 6646)
provides that the "municipal board of canvassers
shall be composed of the election registrar or a
representative of the Commission, as chairman, the
municipal treasurer, as vice-chairman, and the most
senior district school supervisor or in his absence a
principal of the school district or the elementary
school, as members"). As to why the Election
Registrars, in their capacities as Chairmen, were 7th
only ones who prepared the so-called correction
sheets, is beyond Us. There is no showing that the
other members of the Boards were no longer
available. Since they are from the Province of
Pangasinan, they could have been easily
summoned by the PBC to appear before it and effect
the corrections on the Statements of Votes and
Certificates of Canvass.
Besides, by no stretch of the imagination can these
sheets of paper be considered as the corrected
SOVs and COCs. Corrections in a Statement of Vote
and a Certificate of Canvass could only be
accomplished either by inserting the authorized
corrections into the SOV and COC which were
originally prepared and submitted by the MBC or by
preparing a new SOV and COC incorporating
therein the authorized corrections. Thus, the
statement in the 29 July 1992 Resolution of the
COMELEC referring to "the Certificates of Canvass
of the municipal Boards of Canvassers of Tayug and
San Manuel" (Last clause, paragraph 1 of the
dispositive portion, Annex "A" of Petition: Rollo 15),
is palpably unfounded. The Commission could have
7 been misled by Atty. Asperin's ambiguous
reference to "corrections already made in separate
sheets of paper of the Statements of Votes and
Certificate of Canvass of Tayug and San Manuel,
Pangasinan" (Quoted in the Resolution of 9 July
1992; Id., 50-51), in his petition asking the
COMELEC to rule on who shall be proclaimed.
However, if it only took the trouble to carefully
examine what was held out to be as the corrected
documents, respondent COMELEC should not have
been misled.
Even if We are to assume for the sake of argument
that these sheets of paper constitute sufficient
corrections, they are, nevertheless, void and of no
effect. At the time the Election Registrars prepared
them on 6 July 1992 respondent COMELEC
had not yet acted on the petitioner's appeal (SPC
No. 92-384) from the 24 June 1992 ruling of the
PBC authorizing the corrections. Petitioner
maintains that until now, his appeal has not been
resolved. The public respondent, on the other hand,
through the Office of the Solicitor General, claims
that the same had been:
. . . resolved in the questioned resolution of July 29,
1992, where COMELEC affirmed respondents (sic)
Board's correction that petitioner only received 2,415
votes in Tayug and 2,179 in San Manuel (see p. 2,
Annex "A", Petition) (Rollo, p. 71)
On the same matter, the private respondent asserts
that:
This SPC-92-384, is however, deemed terminated
and the ruling of the PBC is likewise deemed
affirmed by virtue of the 2nd par., Sec. 16, R.A. No.
7166, supra and Comelec en banc Resolution No.
2489, supra, dated June 29, 1992 (Id., 36);
If We follow the respondent COMELEC's contention
to its logical conclusion, it was only on 29 July 1992
that SPC No. 92-384 was resolved; consequently,
the so-called "correction sheets" were still
prematurely prepared. In any event, the COMELEC
could not have validly ruled on such appeal in its 29
July 1992 Resolution because the same was
promulgated to resolve the Urgent Motion For
Contempt and to Annul Proclamation filed by the
private respondent. Furthermore, before the
resolution of SPC No. 92-384 on the
abovementioned date, no hearing was set or
conducted to resolve the pending motion. Therefore,
on this ground alone, the 29 July 1992 Resolution,
even if it was meant to resolve the appeal, is a
patent nullity for having been issued in gross
violation of the requirement of notice and hearing
mandated by Section 246 of the Omnibus Election
Code, in relation to Section 18 of R.A. No. 7166 and
Section 6, Rule 27 of the COMELEC Rules of
Procedure, and for having been resolved by the
COMELEC en banc at the first instance. The case
should have been referred first to a division pursuant
to Section 3, Article IX-C of the 1987 constitution
and Our ruling in Sarmiento vs. Commission on
Elections. Moreover, the COMELEC's claim that the
questioned resolution affirmed the correction made
by the Board is totally baseless. The PBC did not
make any corrections. It merely ordered the
Municipal Boards of Canvassers of Tayug and San
Manuel to make such corrections. As earlier stated,
however, the said MBCs did not convene to make
these corrections. It was the Chairmen alone who
signed the sheets of paper purporting to be
corrections.
For being clearly inconsistent with the intention and
official stand of respondent COMELEC, private
respondent COMELEC private respondent's theory
of termination under the second paragraph of
Section 16 of R.A. No. 7166, and the consequent
affirmance of the ruling of the PBC ordering the
correction of the number of votes, must necessarily
fail.
The foregoing considered, the proclamation of the
private respondent on, 13 August 1992 by the
Provincial Board of Canvassers of Pangasinan is
null and void.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED.
The challenged resolution of the respondent
Commission on Elections of 29 July 1992 and the
proclamation of the private respondent on 13 August
1992 as the second Member of the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan of the Province of Pangasinan,
representing its Sixth Legislative District ANNULLED
and SET ASIDE and respondent Commission on
Elections is DIRECTED to resolve the pending
incidents conformably with the foregoing
disquisitions and pronouncements.

No costs.
SO ORDERED.11
On February 23, 1993, private respondent Micu filed
an Urgent Omnibus Motion before the COMELEC
praying that the latter hear and resolve the pending
incidents referred to by this Court. Private
respondent was obviously referring to SPC No. 92-
208 and SPC No. 92-384, both cases left unresolved
by the COMELEC.
Consequently, the First Division of the COMELEC
set the cases for hearing on March 8, 1993. During
the hearing, both Micu and Bince orally manifested
the withdrawal of their respective appeals. Also
withdrawn were the petitions to disqualify Atty.
Asperin and to cite the Board for contempt. The
parties agreed to file their respective
memoranda/position papers by March 15, 1993.
Petitioner Bince filed his Position Paper on March
12, 1993 arguing that the withdrawal of SPC No. 92-
208 affirmed the ruling of the PBC dated May 21,
1992 and even if it were not withdrawn, Section 16
of R.A. 7166 would have worked to terminate the
appeal. Bince likewise asserts that his appeal in
SPC No. 92-384 became moot and academic in
view of this Court's ruling nullifying the June 24,
1992 order of the PBC granting the petitions for
correction of the SOVs and COCs of Tayug and San
Manuel aside from being superseded by the PBC
ruling proclaiming him on July 21, 1992.
On the other hand, private respondent Micu, in his
Position Paper filed on March 15, 1993 postulated
that the petitions filed on June 11, 1992 for the
correction of the SOVs and COCs of Tayug and San
Manuel under Section 6 of Rule 27 of the Comelec
Rules of Procedure, as well as the ruling of the PBC
of June 24, 1992 granting the same were valid so
that the withdrawal of Bince's appeal in SPC No. 92-
384 firmly affirmed the PBC ruling of June 24, 1992
allowing the corrections.
On July 15, 1993, the First Division of the
COMELEC promulgated a Resolution, the
dispositive portion of which reads:
Viewed from the foregoing considerations, the
Commission (First Division) holds that the petitioner
Alfonso C. Bince Jr. is entitled to sit as member of
the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, Sixth District of
Pangasinan.
ACCORDINGLY, the Commission (First Division)
RESOLVED, as it hereby RESOLVES, to AFFIRM
the proclamation of petitioner Alfonso C. Bince, Jr.
by the Provincial Board of Canvassers of
Pangasinan on 21 July 1992 as the duly elected
member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the
Sixth District of the Province of Pangasinan.12
On July 20, 1993, private respondent Micu filed a
Motion for reconsideration of the above-quoted
resolution.
On September 9, 1993, the COMELEC en banc
granted the private respondentls motion for
reconsideration in a resolution which dispositively
reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Motion for
Reconsideration filed by respondent Emiliano S.
Micu is granted. The Resolution of the Commission
First Division is hereby SET ASIDE. The
proclamation of petitioner Alfonso Bince, Jr. on July
21, 1992 is hereby declared null and void.
Accordingly, the Provincial Board of Canvassers is
hereby directed to reconvene, with proper notices,
and to order the Municipal Board of Canvassers of
San Manuel and Tayug to make the necessary
corrections in the SOVs and COCs in the said
municipalities. Thereafter, the Provincial Board of
Canvassers is directed to include the results in the
said municipalities in its canvass.
The PBC is likewise ordered to proclaim the second
elected member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan
of the Sixth Legislative District of Pangasinan.
SO ORDERED. 13
This is the resolution assailed in the instant petition
for certiorari.
We do not find merit in this petition and accordingly
rule against petitioner.
Respondent COMELEC did not act without
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in
annulling the proclamation of petitioner Alfonso
Bince, Jr. and in directing the Provincial Board of
Canvassers of Pangasinan to order the Municipal
Boards of Canvassers of Tayug and San Manuel to
make the necessary corrections in the SOVs and
COCs in said municipalities and to proclaim the
winner in the sixth legislative district of Pangasinan.
At the outset, it is worthy to observe that no error
was committed by respondent COMELEC when it
resolved the "pending incidents" of the instant case
pursuant to the decision of this Court in the
aforesaid case of Bince, Jr. v. COMELEC on
February 9, 1993 Petitioner's contention that his
proclamation has long been affirmed and confirmed
by this Court in the aforesaid case is baseless. In
Bince, we nullified the proclamation of private
respondent because the same was done without the
requisite due notice and hearing, thereby depriving
the petitioner of his right to due process. In so doing,
however, we did not affirm nor confirm the
proclamation of petitioner, hence, our directive to
respondent COMELEC to resolve the pending
incidents of the case so as to ascertain the true and
lawful winner of the said elections. In effect,
petitioner's proclamation only enjoyed the
presumption of regularity and validity of an official
act. It was not categorically declared valid.
Neither can the COMELEC be faulted for
subsequently annulling the proclamation of petitioner
Bince on account of a mathematical error in addition
committed by respondent MBCs in the computation
of the votes received by both petitioner and private
respondent.
The petitions to correct manifest errors were filed on
time, that is, before the petitioner's proclamation on
July 21, 1992. The petition of the MBC of San
Manuel was filed on June 4, 1992 while that of still,
the MBC of Tayug was filed on June 5, 1992. Still,
private respondent's petition was filed with the MBCs
of Tayug and San Manuel on June 10, 1992 and
June 11, 1992, respectively, definitely well within the
period required by Section 6 (now Section 7), Rule
27 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure. Section 6
clearly provides that the petition for correction may
be filed at any time before proclamation of a winner,
thus:
Sec. 6. Correction of errors in tabulation or tallying
of results by the board of canvassers. (a) Where it
is clearly shown before proclamation that manifest
errors were committed in the tabulation or tallying of
election returns, or certificates of canvass, during
the canvassing as where (1) a copy of the election
returns of one precinct or two or more copies of a
certificate of canvass was tabulated more than once,
(2) two copies of the election returns or certificate of
canvass were tabulated separately, (3) there had
been a mistake in the adding or copying of the
figures into the certificate of canvass or into the
statement of votes, or (4) so-called election returns
from non-existent precincts were included in the
canvass, the board may, motu propio, or upon
verified petition by any candidate, political party,
organization or coalition of political parties, after due
notice and hearing, correct the errors committed.
(b) The order for correction must be in writing
and must be promulgated.
(c) Any candidate, political party, organization
or coalition of political parties aggrieved by said
order may appeal therefrom to the Commission
within twenty-four (24) hours from the promulgation.
(d) Once an appeal is made, the board of
canvassers shall not proclaim the winning
candidates, unless their votes are not affected by
the appeal.
(e) The appeal must implead as respondents all
parties who may be adversely affected thereby.
(f) Upon receipt of the appeal, the Clerk of
Court concerned shall forthwith issue summons,
together with a copy of the appeal, to the
respondents.
(g) The Clerk of Court concerned shall
immediately set the appeal for hearing.
(h) The appeal shall be heard an decided by he
Commission en banc (Emphasis ours).
The rule is plain and simple. It needs no other
interpretation contrary to petitioner's protestation.
Assuming for the sake of argument that the petition
was filed out of time, this incident alone will not
thwart the proper determination and resolution of the
instant case on substantial grounds. Adherence to a
technicality that would put a stamp of validity on a
palpably void proclamation, with the inevitable result
of frustrating the people's will cannot be
countenanced. In Benito v. COMELEC, 14
categorically declared that:
. . . Adjudication of cases on substantive merits and
not on technicalities has been consistently observed
by this Court. In the case of Juliano vs. Court of
Appeals (20 SCRA 808) cited in Duremdes vs.
Commission on Elections (178 SCRA 746), this
Court had the occasion to declare that:
Well-settled is the doctrine that election contests
involve public interest, and technicalities and
procedural barriers should not be allowed to stand if
they constitute an obstacle to the determination of
the true will of the electorate in the choice of their
elective officials. And also settled is the rule that
laws governing election contests must be liberally
construed to the end that the will of the people in the
choice of public officials may not be defeated by
mere technical objections (Gardiner v. Romulo, 26
Phil. 521; Galang v. Miranda, 35 Phil. 269; Jalandoni
v. Sarcon, G.R. No.
L-6496, January 27, 1962; Macasunding v.
Macalanang, G.R. No.
L-22779, March 31, 1965; Cauton v. Commission on
Elections, G.R. No. L-25467, April 27, 1967). In an
election case the court has an imperative duty to
ascertain all means within its command who is the
real candidate elected by the electorate (Ibasco v.
Ilao, G.R. No. L-17512, December 29, 1960). . . .
(Juliano vs. Court of Appeals, supra, pp. 818-819).
(Emphasis ours)
In the later case of Rodriguez vs. Commission on
Elections (119 SCRA 465), this doctrine was
reiterated and the Court went on to state that:

Since the early case of Gardiner v. Romulo (26 Phil.
521), this Court has made it clear that it frowns upon
any interpretation of the law or the rules that would
hinder in any way not only the free and intelligent
casting of the votes in an election but also the
correct ascertainment of the results, This bent or
disposition continues to the present. (Id., at p. 474).
The same principle still holds true today.
Technicalities of the legal rules enunciated in the
election laws should not frustrate the determination
of the popular will.
Undoubtedly therefore, the only issue that remains
unresolved is the allowance of the correction of what
are purely mathematical and/or mechanical errors in
the addition of the votes received by both
candidates. It does not involve the opening of ballot
boxes; neither does it involve the examination and/or
appreciation of ballots. The correction sought by
private respondent and respondent MBCs of Tayug
and San Manuel is correction of manifest mistakes in
mathematical addition. Certainly, this only calls for a
mere clerical act of reflecting the true and correct
votes received by the candidates by the MBCs
involved. In this case, the manifest errors sought to
be corrected involve the proper and diligent addition
of the votes in the municipalities of Tayug and San
Manuel, Pangasinan.
In Tayug, the total votes received by petitioner Bince
was erroneously recorded as 2,486 when it should
only have been 2,415. Petitioner Bince, in effect,
was credited by 71 votes more.
In San Manuel, petitioner Bince received 2,179
votes but was credited with 6 votes more, hence, the
SOV reflected the total number of votes as 2,185.
On the other hand, the same SOV indicated that
private respondent Micu garnered 2,892 votes but
he actually received only 2,888, hence was credited
in excess of 4 votes.
Consequently, by margin of 72 votes, private
respondent indisputably won the challenged seat in
the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the sixth district of
Pangasinan. Petitioner's proclamation and
assumption into public office was therefore flawed
from the beginning, the same having been based on
a faulty tabulation. Hence, respondent COMELEC
did not commit grave abuse of discretion in setting
aside the illegal proclamation.
As a parting note, we reiterate' our concern with
respect to insignificant disputes plaguing this Court.
Trifles such as the one at issue should not, as much
as possible, reach this Court, clog its docket,
demand precious judicial time and waste valuable
taxpayers' money, if they can be settled below
without prejudice to any party or to the ends of
justice.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby
DISMISSED with costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-63915 April 24, 1985
LORENZO M. TAADA, ABRAHAM F.
SARMIENTO, and MOVEMENT OF ATTORNEYS
FOR BROTHERHOOD, INTEGRITY AND
NATIONALISM, INC. [MABINI], petitioners,
vs.
HON. JUAN C. TUVERA, in his capacity as
Executive Assistant to the President, HON.
JOAQUIN VENUS, in his capacity as Deputy
Executive Assistant to the President , MELQUIADES
P. DE LA CRUZ, in his capacity as Director,
Malacaang Records Office, and FLORENDO S.
PABLO, in his capacity as Director, Bureau of
Printing, respondents.
ESCOLIN, J.:
Invoking the people's right to be informed on matters
of public concern, a right recognized in Section 6,
Article IV of the 1973 Philippine Constitution, 1 as
well as the principle that laws to be valid and
enforceable must be published in the Official
Gazette or otherwise effectively promulgated,
petitioners seek a writ of mandamus to compel
respondent public officials to publish, and/or cause
the publication in the Official Gazette of various
presidential decrees, letters of instructions, general
orders, proclamations, executive orders, letter of
implementation and administrative orders.
Specifically, the publication of the following
presidential issuances is sought:
a] Presidential Decrees Nos. 12, 22, 37, 38,
59, 64, 103, 171, 179, 184, 197, 200, 234, 265, 286,
298, 303, 312, 324, 325, 326, 337, 355, 358, 359,
360, 361, 368, 404, 406, 415, 427, 429, 445, 447,
473, 486, 491, 503, 504, 521, 528, 551, 566, 573,
574, 594, 599, 644, 658, 661, 718, 731, 733, 793,
800, 802, 835, 836, 923, 935, 961, 1017-1030,
1050, 1060-1061, 1085, 1143, 1165, 1166, 1242,
1246, 1250, 1278, 1279, 1300, 1644, 1772, 1808,
1810, 1813-1817, 1819-1826, 1829-1840, 1842-
1847.
b] Letter of Instructions Nos.: 10, 39, 49, 72,
107, 108, 116, 130, 136, 141, 150, 153, 155, 161,
173, 180, 187, 188, 192, 193, 199, 202, 204, 205,
209, 211-213, 215-224, 226-228, 231-239, 241-245,
248, 251, 253-261, 263-269, 271-273, 275-283, 285-
289, 291, 293, 297-299, 301-303, 309, 312-315,
325, 327, 343, 346, 349, 357, 358, 362, 367, 370,
382, 385, 386, 396-397, 405, 438-440, 444- 445,
473, 486, 488, 498, 501, 399, 527, 561, 576, 587,
594, 599, 600, 602, 609, 610, 611, 612, 615, 641,
642, 665, 702, 712-713, 726, 837-839, 878-879,
881, 882, 939-940, 964,997,1149-1178,1180-1278.
c] General Orders Nos.: 14, 52, 58, 59, 60, 62,
63, 64 & 65.
d] Proclamation Nos.: 1126, 1144, 1147, 1151,
1196, 1270, 1281, 1319-1526, 1529, 1532, 1535,
1538, 1540-1547, 1550-1558, 1561-1588, 1590-
1595, 1594-1600, 1606-1609, 1612-1628, 1630-
1649, 1694-1695, 1697-1701, 1705-1723, 1731-
1734, 1737-1742, 1744, 1746-1751, 1752, 1754,
1762, 1764-1787, 1789-1795, 1797, 1800, 1802-
1804, 1806-1807, 1812-1814, 1816, 1825-1826,
1829, 1831-1832, 1835-1836, 1839-1840, 1843-
1844, 1846-1847, 1849, 1853-1858, 1860, 1866,
1868, 1870, 1876-1889, 1892, 1900, 1918, 1923,
1933, 1952, 1963, 1965-1966, 1968-1984, 1986-
2028, 2030-2044, 2046-2145, 2147-2161, 2163-
2244.
e] Executive Orders Nos.: 411, 413, 414, 427,
429-454, 457- 471, 474-492, 494-507, 509-510, 522,
524-528, 531-532, 536, 538, 543-544, 549, 551-553,
560, 563, 567-568, 570, 574, 593, 594, 598-604,
609, 611- 647, 649-677, 679-703, 705-707, 712-786,
788-852, 854-857.
f] Letters of Implementation Nos.: 7, 8, 9, 10,
11-22, 25-27, 39, 50, 51, 59, 76, 80-81, 92, 94, 95,
107, 120, 122, 123.
g] Administrative Orders Nos.: 347, 348, 352-
354, 360- 378, 380-433, 436-439.
The respondents, through the Solicitor General,
would have this case dismissed outright on the
ground that petitioners have no legal personality or
standing to bring the instant petition. The view is
submitted that in the absence of any showing that
petitioners are personally and directly affected or
prejudiced by the alleged non-publication of the
presidential issuances in question 2 said petitioners
are without the requisite legal personality to institute
this mandamus proceeding, they are not being
"aggrieved parties" within the meaning of Section 3,
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, which we quote:
SEC. 3. Petition for Mandamus.When any tribunal,
corporation, board or person unlawfully neglects the
performance of an act which the law specifically
enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or
station, or unlawfully excludes another from the use
a rd enjoyment of a right or office to which such
other is entitled, and there is no other plain, speedy
and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law,
the person aggrieved thereby may file a verified
petition in the proper court alleging the facts with
certainty and praying that judgment be rendered
commanding the defendant, immediately or at some
other specified time, to do the act required to be
done to Protect the rights of the petitioner, and to
pay the damages sustained by the petitioner by
reason of the wrongful acts of the defendant.
Upon the other hand, petitioners maintain that since
the subject of the petition concerns a public right and
its object is to compel the performance of a public
duty, they need not show any specific interest for
their petition to be given due course.
The issue posed is not one of first impression. As
early as the 1910 case of Severino vs. Governor
General, 3 this Court held that while the general rule
is that "a writ of mandamus would be granted to a
private individual only in those cases where he has
some private or particular interest to be subserved,
or some particular right to be protected, independent
of that which he holds with the public at large," and
"it is for the public officers exclusively to apply for the
writ when public rights are to be subserved
[Mithchell vs. Boardmen, 79 M.e., 469],"
nevertheless, "when the question is one of public
right and the object of the mandamus is to procure
the enforcement of a public duty, the people are
regarded as the real party in interest and the relator
at whose instigation the proceedings are instituted
need not show that he has any legal or special
interest in the result, it being sufficient to show that
he is a citizen and as such interested in the
execution of the laws [High, Extraordinary Legal
Remedies, 3rd ed., sec. 431].
Thus, in said case, this Court recognized the relator
Lope Severino, a private individual, as a proper
party to the mandamus proceedings brought to
compel the Governor General to call a special
election for the position of municipal president in the
town of Silay, Negros Occidental. Speaking for this
Court, Mr. Justice Grant T. Trent said:
We are therefore of the opinion that the weight of
authority supports the proposition that the relator is a
proper party to proceedings of this character when a
public right is sought to be enforced. If the general
rule in America were otherwise, we think that it
would not be applicable to the case at bar for the
reason 'that it is always dangerous to apply a
general rule to a particular case without keeping in
mind the reason for the rule, because, if under the
particular circumstances the reason for the rule does
not exist, the rule itself is not applicable and reliance
upon the rule may well lead to error'
No reason exists in the case at bar for applying the
general rule insisted upon by counsel for the
respondent. The circumstances which surround this
case are different from those in the United States,
inasmuch as if the relator is not a proper party to
these proceedings no other person could be, as we
have seen that it is not the duty of the law officer of
the Government to appear and represent the people
in cases of this character.
The reasons given by the Court in recognizing a
private citizen's legal personality in the
aforementioned case apply squarely to the present
petition. Clearly, the right sought to be enforced by
petitioners herein is a public right recognized by no
less than the fundamental law of the land. If
petitioners were not allowed to institute this
proceeding, it would indeed be difficult to conceive
of any other person to initiate the same, considering
that the Solicitor General, the government officer
generally empowered to represent the people, has
entered his appearance for respondents in this case.
Respondents further contend that publication in the
Official Gazette is not a sine qua non requirement
for the effectivity of laws where the laws themselves
provide for their own effectivity dates. It is thus
submitted that since the presidential issuances in
question contain special provisions as to the date
they are to take effect, publication in the Official
Gazette is not indispensable for their effectivity. The
point stressed is anchored on Article 2 of the Civil
Code:
Art. 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days
following the completion of their publication in the
Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided, ...
The interpretation given by respondent is in accord
with this Court's construction of said article. In a long
line of decisions,4 this Court has ruled that
publication in the Official Gazette is necessary in
those cases where the legislation itself does not
provide for its effectivity date-for then the date of
publication is material for determining its date of
effectivity, which is the fifteenth day following its
publication-but not when the law itself provides for
the date when it goes into effect.
Respondents' argument, however, is logically correct
only insofar as it equates the effectivity of laws with
the fact of publication. Considered in the light of
other statutes applicable to the issue at hand, the
conclusion is easily reached that said Article 2 does
not preclude the requirement of publication in the
Official Gazette, even if the law itself provides for the
date of its effectivity. Thus, Section 1 of
Commonwealth Act 638 provides as follows:
Section 1. There shall be published in the
Official Gazette [1] all important legisiative acts and
resolutions of a public nature of the, Congress of the
Philippines; [2] all executive and administrative
orders and proclamations, except such as have no
general applicability; [3] decisions or abstracts of
decisions of the Supreme Court and the Court of
Appeals as may be deemed by said courts of
sufficient importance to be so published; [4] such
documents or classes of documents as may be
required so to be published by law; and [5] such
documents or classes of documents as the
President of the Philippines shall determine from
time to time to have general applicability and legal
effect, or which he may authorize so to be published.
...
The clear object of the above-quoted provision is to
give the general public adequate notice of the
various laws which are to regulate their actions and
conduct as citizens. Without such notice and
publication, there would be no basis for the
application of the maxim "ignorantia legis non
excusat." It would be the height of injustice to punish
or otherwise burden a citizen for the transgression of
a law of which he had no notice whatsoever, not
even a constructive one.
Perhaps at no time since the establishment of the
Philippine Republic has the publication of laws taken
so vital significance that at this time when the people
have bestowed upon the President a power
heretofore enjoyed solely by the legislature. While
the people are kept abreast by the mass media of
the debates and deliberations in the Batasan
Pambansaand for the diligent ones, ready access
to the legislative recordsno such publicity
accompanies the law-making process of the
President. Thus, without publication, the people
have no means of knowing what presidential
decrees have actually been promulgated, much less
a definite way of informing themselves of the specific
contents and texts of such decrees. As the Supreme
Court of Spain ruled: "Bajo la denominacion
generica de leyes, se comprenden tambien los
reglamentos, Reales decretos, Instrucciones,
Circulares y Reales ordines dictadas de
conformidad con las mismas por el Gobierno en uso
de su potestad.5
The very first clause of Section I of Commonwealth
Act 638 reads: "There shall be published in the
Official Gazette ... ." The word "shall" used therein
imposes upon respondent officials an imperative
duty. That duty must be enforced if the
Constitutional right of the people to be informed on
matters of public concern is to be given substance
and reality. The law itself makes a list of what should
be published in the Official Gazette. Such listing, to
our mind, leaves respondents with no discretion
whatsoever as to what must be included or excluded
from such publication.
The publication of all presidential issuances "of a
public nature" or "of general applicability" is
mandated by law. Obviously, presidential decrees
that provide for fines, forfeitures or penalties for their
violation or otherwise impose a burden or. the
people, such as tax and revenue measures, fall
within this category. Other presidential issuances
which apply only to particular persons or class of
persons such as administrative and executive orders
need not be published on the assumption that they
have been circularized to all concerned. 6
It is needless to add that the publication of
presidential issuances "of a public nature" or "of
general applicability" is a requirement of due
process. It is a rule of law that before a person may
be bound by law, he must first be officially and
specifically informed of its contents. As Justice
Claudio Teehankee said in Peralta vs. COMELEC 7:
In a time of proliferating decrees, orders and letters
of instructions which all form part of the law of the
land, the requirement of due process and the Rule of
Law demand that the Official Gazette as the official
government repository promulgate and publish the
texts of all such decrees, orders and instructions so
that the people may know where to obtain their
official and specific contents.
The Court therefore declares that presidential
issuances of general application, which have not
been published, shall have no force and effect.
Some members of the Court, quite apprehensive
about the possible unsettling effect this decision
might have on acts done in reliance of the validity of
those presidential decrees which were published
only during the pendency of this petition, have put
the question as to whether the Court's declaration of
invalidity apply to P.D.s which had been enforced or
implemented prior to their publication. The answer is
all too familiar. In similar situations in the past this
Court had taken the pragmatic and realistic course
set forth in Chicot County Drainage District vs.
Baxter Bank 8 to wit:
The courts below have proceeded on the theory that
the Act of Congress, having been found to be
unconstitutional, was not a law; that it was
inoperative, conferring no rights and imposing no
duties, and hence affording no basis for the
challenged decree. Norton v. Shelby County, 118
U.S. 425, 442; Chicago, 1. & L. Ry. Co. v. Hackett,
228 U.S. 559, 566. It is quite clear, however, that
such broad statements as to the effect of a
determination of unconstitutionality must be taken
with qualifications. The actual existence of a statute,
prior to such a determination, is an operative fact
and may have consequences which cannot justly be
ignored. The past cannot always be erased by a
new judicial declaration. The effect of the
subsequent ruling as to invalidity may have to be
considered in various aspects-with respect to
particular conduct, private and official. Questions of
rights claimed to have become vested, of status, of
prior determinations deemed to have finality and
acted upon accordingly, of public policy in the light of
the nature both of the statute and of its previous
application, demand examination. These questions
are among the most difficult of those which have
engaged the attention of courts, state and federal
and it is manifest from numerous decisions that an
all-inclusive statement of a principle of absolute
retroactive invalidity cannot be justified.
Consistently with the above principle, this Court in
Rutter vs. Esteban 9 sustained the right of a party
under the Moratorium Law, albeit said right had
accrued in his favor before said law was declared
unconstitutional by this Court.
Similarly, the implementation/enforcement of
presidential decrees prior to their publication in the
Official Gazette is "an operative fact which may have
consequences which cannot be justly ignored. The
past cannot always be erased by a new judicial
declaration ... that an all-inclusive statement of a
principle of absolute retroactive invalidity cannot be
justified."
From the report submitted to the Court by the Clerk
of Court, it appears that of the presidential decrees
sought by petitioners to be published in the Official
Gazette, only Presidential Decrees Nos. 1019 to
1030, inclusive, 1278, and 1937 to 1939, inclusive,
have not been so published. 10 Neither the subject
matters nor the texts of these PDs can be
ascertained since no copies thereof are available.
But whatever their subject matter may be, it is
undisputed that none of these unpublished PDs has
ever been implemented or enforced by the
government. In Pesigan vs. Angeles, 11 the Court,
through Justice Ramon Aquino, ruled that
"publication is necessary to apprise the public of the
contents of [penal] regulations and make the said
penalties binding on the persons affected thereby. "
The cogency of this holding is apparently recognized
by respondent officials considering the manifestation
in their comment that "the government, as a matter
of policy, refrains from prosecuting violations of
criminal laws until the same shall have been
published in the Official Gazette or in some other
publication, even though some criminal laws provide
that they shall take effect immediately.
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby orders respondents
to publish in the Official Gazette all unpublished
presidential issuances which are of general
application, and unless so published, they shall have
no binding force and effect.
SO ORDERED.
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 121234 August 23, 1995
HUBERT J. P. WEBB, petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE RAUL E. DE LEON, the Presiding
Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Paraaque,
Branch 258, HONORABLE ZOSIMO V. ESCANO,
the Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of
Paraaque, Branch 259, PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, ZENON L. DE GUIA, JOVENCITO
ZUO, LEONARDO GUIYAB, JR., ROBERTO LAO,
PABLO FORMARAN, and NATIONAL BUREAU OF
INVESTIGATION, and HONORABLE AMELITA G.
TOLENTINO, the Presiding Judge of the Regional
Trial Court of Paraaque, Branch 274, respondents,
LAURO VIZCONDE, intervenor.
G.R. No. 121245 August 23, 1995
MICHAEL A. GATCHALIAN, petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE RAUL E. DE LEON, the Presiding
Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Paraaque,
Branch 258, HONORABLE ZOSIMO V. ESCANO,
the Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of
Paraaque, Branch 259, PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, ZENON L. DE GUIYAB, JR.,
ROBERTO LAO, PABLO FORMARAN, and
NATIONAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, and
HONORABLE AMELITA G. TOLENTINO, the
Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of
Paraaque, Branch 274, respondents.
G.R. No. 121297 August 23, 1995
ANTONIO L. LEJANO, petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE RAUL E. DE LEON, the Presiding
Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Paraaque,
Branch 258, HONORABLE ZOSIMO V. ESCANO,
the Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of
Paraaque, Branch 259, PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, ZENON L. DE GUIA, JOVENCITO
ZUO, LEONARDO GUIYAB, JR., ROBERTO LAO,
PABLO FORMARAN, and NATIONAL BUREAU OF
INVESTIGATION, and HONORABLE AMELITA G.
TOLENTINO, the Presiding Judge of the Regional
Trial Court of Paraaque, Branch 274, respondents.
PUNO, J.:
Before the Court are petitions for the issuance of the
extraordinary writs of certiorari, prohibition and
mandamus with application for temporary restraining
order and preliminary injunction to: (1) annul and set
aside the Warrants of Arrest issued against
petitioners by respondent Judges Raul E. de Leon
and Amelita Tolentino in Criminal Case No. 95-404;
(2) enjoin the respondents from conducting any
proceeding in the aforementioned criminal case; and
(3) dismiss said criminal case or include Jessica
Alfaro as one of the accused therein.1
From the records of the case, it appears that on
June 19, 1994, the National Bureau of Investigation
(NBI) filed with the Department of Justice a letter-
complaint charging petitioners Hubert Webb,
Michael Gatchalian, Antonio J. Lejano and six (6)
other persons,2 with the crime of Rape with
Homicide. Forthwith, the Department of Justice
formed a panel of prosecutors headed by Assistant
Chief State Prosecutor Jovencio R. Zuo to conduct
the preliminary investigation3 of those charged with
the rape and killing on June 30, 1991 of Carmela N.
Vizconde;4 her mother Estrellita Nicolas-Vizconde,5
and her sister Anne Marie Jennifer6 in their home at
Number 80 W. Vinzons, St., BF Homes, Paraaque,
Metro Manila.
During the preliminary investigation, the NBI
presented the following: (1) the sworn statement
dated May 22, 1995 of their principal witness, Maria
Jessica M. Alfaro who allegedly saw the commission
of the crime;7 (2) the sworn statements of two (2) of
the former housemaids of the Webb family in the
persons of Nerissa E. Rosales and Mila S. Gaviola;8
(3) the sworn-statement of Carlos J. Cristobal who
alleged that on March 9, 1991 he was a passenger
of United Airlines Flight No. 808 bound for New York
and who expressed doubt on whether petitioner
Webb was his co-passenger in the trip; (4) the sworn
statement of Lolita Birrer, a former live-in partner of
Gerardo Biong, who narrated the manner of how
Biong investigated and tried to cover up the crime at
bar;9 (5) the sworn statements of Belen Dometita
and Teofilo Minoza, two of the Vizconde maids, and
the sworn statements of Normal White, a security
guard and Manciano Gatmaitan, an engineer. The
autopsy reports of the victims were also submitted
and they showed that Carmela had nine (9) stab
wounds, Estrellita twelve (12) and Jennifer nineteen
(19).10 The genital examination of Carmela
confirmed the presence of spermatozoa.11
Before submitting his counter-affidavit, petitioner
Webb filed with the DOJ Panel a Motion for
Production And Examination of Evidence and
Documents for the NBI to produce the following:
(a) Certification issued by the U.S. Federal
Bureau of Investigation on the admission to and stay
of Hubert Webb in the United States from March 9,
1991 to October 22, 1992;
(b) Laboratory Report No. SN-91-17 of the
Medico Legal Officer, Dr. Prospero A. Cabanayan,
M.D.;

(c) Sworn Statements of Gerardo C. Biong
(other than his Sworn Statement dated October 7,
1991);
(d) Photographs of fingerprints lifted from the
Vizconde residence taken during the investigation;
(e) Investigation records of NBI on Engr. Danilo
Aguas, et al.;
(f) List of names of 135 suspects/persons
investigated by the NBI per Progress Report dated
September 2, 1991 submitted by Atty. Arlis Vela,
Supervising Agent;
(g) Records of arrest, interview, investigation
and other written statements of Jessica Alfaro (other
than the May 22, 1995 Sworn Statement) conducted
by the NBI and other police agencies;
(h) transmittal letter to the NBI, including the
report of the investigation conducted by
Superintendent Rodolfo C. Sison, Regional Deputy
Director, NCRC;
(i) The names of NBI officials/agents
composing the Task Force Jecares, including their
respective positions and duties;
(j) Statements made by other persons in
connection with the crime charged.
The motion was granted by the DOJ Panel and the
NBI submitted photocopies of the documents. It
alleged it lost the original of the April 28, 1995 sworn
statement of Alfaro. This compelled petitioner Webb
to file Civil Case No. 951099 in the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Makati, Br. 63, for the purpose,
among others, of obtaining the original of said sworn
statement. He succeeded, for in the course of its
proceedings, Atty. Arturo L. Mercader, Jr., produced
a copy of said original in compliance with a
subpoena duces tecum. The original was then
submitted by petitioner Webb to the DOJ Panel
together with his other evidence. It appears,
however, that petitioner Webb failed to obtain from
the NBI the copy of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI) Report despite his request for its
production.
Petitioner Webb claimed during the preliminary
investigation that he did not commit the crime at bar
as he went to the United States on March 1, 1991
and returned to the Philippines on October 27, 1992.
12 His alibi was corroborated by Honesto Aragon,
Lecinia Edrosolano, Sylvia Climaco, Gina Roque,
Sonia Rodriguez, Edgardo Venture and Pamela
Francisco.13 To further support his defense, he
submitted documentary evidence that he bought a
bicycle and a 1986 Toyota car while in the United
States on said dates14 and that he was issued by
the State of California Driver's License No.
A8818707 on June 14, 1991.15 Petitioner Webb
likewise submitted the letter dated July 25, 1995 of
Mr. Robert Heafner, Legal Attache of the US
Embassy, citing certain records tending to confirm,
among others, his arrival at San Francisco,
California on March 9, 1991 as a passenger in
United Airlines Flight No. 808.
The other respondents Hospicio "Pyke"
Fernandez, Michael Gatchalian, Antonio "Tony Boy"
Lejano, Peter Estrada, Miguel Rodriguez and
Gerardo Biong submitted sworn statements,
responses, and a motion to dismiss denying their
complicity in the rape-killing of the Vizcondes.16
Only the respondents Joey Filart and Artemio
"Dong" Ventura failed to file their counter-affidavits
though they were served with subpoena in their last
known address.17 In his sworn statement, petitioner
Gatchalian alleged that from 11 o'clock in the
evening of June 29, 1991 until 3 o'clock in the
morning of the following day, he was at the
residence of his friends, Carlos and Andrew Syyap,
at New Alabang Village, Muntinlupa watching video
tapes. He claimed that his co-petitioner Lejano was
with him.
On August 8, 1995, the DOJ Panel issued a 26-page
Resolution "finding probable cause to hold
respondents for trial" and recommending that an
Information for rape with homicide be filed against
petitioners and their co-respondents,18 On the same
date, it filed the corresponding Information19 against
petitioners and their co-accused with the Regional
Trial Court of Paraaque. The case was docketed as
Criminal Case No. 95-404 and raffled to Branch 258
presided by respondent judge Zosimo V. Escano. It
was, however, the respondent judge Raul de Leon,
pairing judge of Judge Escano, who issued the
warrants of arrest against the petitioners. On August
11, 1995, Judge Escano voluntarily inhibited himself
from the case to avoid any suspicion about his
impartiality considering his employment with the NBI
before his appointment to the bench. The case was
re-raffled to Branch 274, presided by Judge Amelita
Tolentino who issued new warrants of arrest against
the petitioners and their co-accused. On August 11,
1995, petitioner Webb voluntarily surrendered to the
police authorities at Camp Ricardo Papa Sr., in
Bicutan, Taguig. Petitioners Gatchalian and Lejano
likewise gave themselves up to the authorities after
filing their petitions before us.
In their petitions at bar, petitioners contend: (1)
respondent Judges de Leon and Tolentino gravely
abused their discretion when they failed to conduct a
preliminary examination before issuing warrants of
arrest against them: (2) the DOJ Panel likewise
gravely abused its discretion in holding that there is
probable cause to charge them with the crime of
rape with homicide; (3) the DOJ Panel denied them
their constitutional right to due process during their
preliminary investigation; and (4) the DOJ Panel
unlawfully intruded into judicial prerogative when it
failed to charge Jessica Alfaro in the Information as
an accused.
We find the petitions bereft of merit.
I to the complainant.
Petitioners fault the DOJ Panel for its finding of
probable cause. They insist that the May 22, 1995
sworn statement of Jessica Alfaro is inherently weak
and uncorroborated. They hammer on alleged
material inconsistencies between her April 28, 1995
and May 22, 1995 sworn statements. They assail
her credibility for her misdescription of petitioner
Webb's hair as semi-blonde. They also criticize the
procedure followed by the DOJ Panel when it did not
examine witnesses to clarify the alleged incredulities
and inconsistencies in the sworn statements of the
witnesses for the NBI.
We start with a restatement of the purpose of a
preliminary investigation. Section 1 of Rule 112
provides that a preliminary investigation should
determine " . . . whether there is a sufficient ground
to engender a well-grounded belief that a crime
cognizable by the Regional Trial Court has been
committed and that the respondent is probably guilty
thereof, and should be held for trial." Section 3 of the
same Rule outlines the procedure in conducting a
preliminary investigation, thus:
Sec. 3. Procedure. Except as provided for in
Section 7 hereof, no complaint or information for an
offense cognizable by the Regional Trial Court shall
be filed without a preliminary investigation having
been first conducted in the following manner:
(a) The complaint shall state the known address
of the respondent and be accompanied by affidavits
of the complainant and his witnesses as well as
other supporting documents, in such number of
copies as there are respondents, plus two (2) copies
for the official file. The said affidavits shall be sworn
to before any fiscal, state prosecutor or government
official authorized to administer oath, or, in their
absence or unavailability, a notary public, who must
certify that he personally examined the affiants and
that he is satisfied that they voluntarily executed and
understood their affidavits.
(b) Within ten (10) days after the filing of the
complaint, the investigating officer shall either
dismiss the same if he finds no ground to continue
with the inquiry, or issue a subpoena to the
respondent, attaching thereto a copy of the
complaint, affidavits and other supporting
documents. Within ten (10) days from receipt
thereof, the respondent shall submit counter-
affidavits and other supporting documents. He shall
have the right to examine all other evidence
submitted by the complainant.
(c) Such counter-affidavits and other supporting
evidence submitted by the respondent shall also be
sworn to and certified as prescribed in paragraph (a)
hereof and copies thereof shall be furnished by him
(d) If the respondent cannot be subpoenaed, or
if subpoenaed, does not submit counter-affidavits
within the ten (10) day period, the investigating
officer shall base his resolution on the evidence
presented by the complainant.
(e) If the investigating officer believes that there
are matters to be clarified, he may set a hearing to
propound clarificatory questions to the parties or
their witnesses, during which the parties shall be
afforded an opportunity to be present but without the
right to examine or cross-examine. If the parties so
desire, they may submit questions to the
investigating officer which the latter may propound to
the parties or witnesses concerned.
(f) Thereafter, the investigation shall be
deemed concluded, and the investigating officer
shall resolve the case within ten (10) days therefrom.
Upon the evidence thus adduced, the investigating
officer shall determine whether or not there is
sufficient ground to hold the respondent for trial.
Section 4 of Rule 112 then directs that "if the
investigating fiscal finds cause to hold the
respondent for trial, he shall prepare the resolution
and corresponding information. He shall certify
under oath that he, or as shown by the record, an
authorized officer, has personally examined the
complainant and his witnesses, that there is
reasonable ground to believe that a crime has been
committed and that the accused is probably guilty
thereof . . ."
The need to find probable cause is dictated by the
Bill of Rights which protects "the right of the people
to be secure in their persons . . . against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever
nature . . ."20 An arrest without a probable cause is
an unreasonable seizure of a person, and violates
the privacy of persons which ought not to be
intruded by the State.21 Probable cause to warrant
arrest is not an opaque concept in our jurisdiction.
Continuing accretions of case law reiterate that they
are facts and circumstances which would lead a
reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that
an offense has been committed by the person
sought to be arrested.22 Other jurisdictions utilize
the term man of reasonable caution 23 or the term
ordinarily prudent and cautious man.24 The terms
are legally synonymous and their reference is not to
a person with training in the law such as a
prosecutor or a judge but to the average man on the
street.25 It ought to be emphasized that in
determining probable cause, the average man
weighs facts and circumstances without resorting to
the calibrations of our technical rules of evidence of
which his knowledge is nil. Rather, he relies on the
calculus of common sense of which all reasonable
men have an abundance.
Applying these basic norms, we are not prepared to
rule that the DOJ Panel gravely abused its discretion
when it found probable cause against the
petitioners. Petitioners belittle the truthfulness of
Alfaro on two (2) grounds: (a) she allegedly
erroneously described petitioner Webb's hair as
semi-blond and (b) she committed material
inconsistencies in her two (2) sworn statement,
thus:26
xxx xxx xxx
To illustrate, the following are some examples of
inconsistencies in the two sworn statements of
Alfaro:
On whether Alfaro knew Carmela before the incident
in question
First Affidavit: She had NOT met Carmela before
June 29, 1991.
Second Affidavit: "I met her in a party
sometime in February, 1991."
On whether Alfaro saw the dead bodies
First Affidavit: She did not see the three dead
persons on that night. She just said "on the following
day I read in the newspaper that there were three
persons who were killed . . ."
Second Affidavit: "I peeped through the first
door on the left. I saw two bodies on top of the bed,
bloodied, and in the floor, I saw Hubert on top of
Carmela."
On the alleged rape of Carmela Vizconde
First Affidavit: She did not see the act of rape.
Second Affidavit: She saw Hubert Webb "with
bare buttocks, on top of Carmela and pumping, her
mouth gagged and she was moaning and I saw
tears on her eyes."
On how Webb, Lejano, and Ventura entered the
Vizconde house
First Affidavit: "by jumping over the fence, which
was only a little more than a meter high."
Second Affidavit: They "entered the gate
which was already open."
On whether Alfaro entered the Vizconde house
First Affidavit: She never entered the house.
Second Affidavit: "I proceeded to the iron grill
gate leading to the dirty kitchen."
In its Resolution, the DOJ Panel ruled that these
alleged misdescription and inconsistencies did not
erode the credibility of Alfaro. We quote the pertinent
ruling, viz.:27
xxx xxx xxx
As regards the admissibility of Alfaro's statements,
granting for purposes of argument merely that she is
a co-conspirator, it is well to note that confessions of
a co-conspirator may be taken as evidence to show
the probability of the co-conspirator's participation in
the commission of the crime (see People vs.
Lumahang, 94 Phil. 1084).
Furthermore, it is a well-established doctrine that
conspiracy need not be proved by direct evidence of
prior agreement to commit the crime. Indeed, "only
rarely would such a prior agreement be
demonstrable since, in the nature of things, criminal
undertakings are only rarely documented by
agreements in writing. Thus, conspiracy may be
inferred from the conduct of the accused before,
during and after the commission of the crime,
showing that the several accused had acted in
concert or in unison with each other, evincing a
common purpose or design." (Angelo vs. Court of
Appeals, 210 SCRA 402 [1992], citations omitted;
People vs. Molleda, 86 SCRA 699).
Neither can we discredit Alfaro merely because of
the inconsistencies in her two sworn statements. In
Angelo, the Court refused to discredit the testimony
of a witness accusing therein petitioner for the
slaying of one Gaviano Samaniego even though
said witness failed to name Angelo in his affidavit
which was executed five (5) months earlier.
Granting, the Court continued, that a part of the
witness' testimony is untrue, such circumstance is
not sufficient to discredit the entire testimony of the
witness.
On August 7, 1995, another counsel for respondent
Webb submitted his memorandum suggesting that
the instant complaint "should not be decided within
the month to give time to the NBI to coordinate with
the FBI on the latter's inquiry into the whereabouts of
Hubert Webb . . . and to check on our U.S.-based
witnesses."
In said memorandum, counsel for respondent Webb
calls for the application of the maxim falsus in uno,
falsus in omnibus arising from the inconsistencies of
Alfaro's statements, among others. This is
untenable. As held in Angelo:
There is no rule of law which prohibits a court from
crediting part of the testimony of a witness as worthy
of belief and from simultaneously rejecting other
parts which the court may find incredible or dubious.
The maxim falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus is not a
rule of law, let alone a general rule of law which is
universally applicable. It is not a legal presumption
either. It is merely a latinism describing the
conclusion reached by a court in a particular case
after ascribing to the evidence such weight or lack of
weight that the court deemed proper.
In the case before us, complainant reasoned out that
Alfaro was then having reservations when she first
executed the first statement and held back vital
information due to her natural reaction of mistrust.
This being so, the panel believes that the
inconsistencies in Alfaro's two sworn statements
have been sufficiently explained especially specially
so where there is no showing that the
inconsistencies were deliberately made to distort the
truth. Consequently, the probative value of Alfaro's
testimony deserves full faith and credit. As it has
been often noted, ex parte statements are generally
incomplete because they are usually executed when
the affiant's state of mind does not give her sufficient
and fair opportunity to comprehend the import of her
statement and to narrate in full the incidents which
transpired (People vs. Sarellana, 233 SCRA 31
[1994]; Angelo vs. Court of Appeals, supra). In the
case at bar, there is no dispute that a crime has
been committed and what is clear before us is that
the totality of the evidence submitted by the
complainant indicate a prima facie case that
respondents conspired in the perpetration of the
imputed offense.
We note that the May 22, 1995 sworn statement of
Alfaro was given with the assistance of counsel28
and consists of six (6) pages, in single space reciting
in rich details how the crime was planned and then
executed by the petitioners. In addition, the DOJ
Panel evaluated the supporting sworn statements of
Nerissa Rosales and Mila Gaviola, former
housemaids of the Webbs, Carlos J. Cristobal, a
passenger in United Airlines Flight No. 808 and
Lolita Birrer, a paramour of Gerardo Biong. The
Panel assayed their statements as follows:29
xxx xxx xxx
According to Nerissa E. Rosales, a former
housemaid of the Webb family, on June 29, 1991,
between 7:00 o'clock and 8:00 o'clock in the
evening, Hubert was at home inside his room with
two male visitors. She knew it because she and her
co-housemaid, Loany, were instructed by Hubert to
bring them three glasses of juice. It was the last time
she saw Hubert and was later told by then
Congressman Webb that Hubert was in the United
States.
While Mila S. Gaviola, another former housemaid of
the Webb family and who served as a laundry
woman, claims, aside from corroborating the
statement of Nerissa Rosales, that on June 30,
1991, she woke up at around 4:00 in the morning
and as what she used to do, she entered the rooms
of the Webbs to get their clothes to be washed. As a
matter of fact, in that early morning, she entered
Hubert's room and saw Hubert, who was only
wearing his pants, already awake and smoking while
he was sitting on his bed. She picked up Hubert's
scattered clothes and brought them together with the
clothes of the other members of the family to the
laundry area. After taking her breakfast, she began
washing the clothes of the Webbs. As she was
washing the clothes of Hubert Webb, she noticed
fresh bloodstains in his shirt. After she finished the
laundry, she went to the servant's quarters. But
feeling uneasy, she decided to go up to the
stockroom near Hubert's room to see what he was
doing. In the said stockroom, there is a small door
going to Hubert's room and in that door there is a
small opening where she used to see Hubert and his
friends sniffing on something. She observed Hubert
was quite irritated, uneasy, and walked to and from
inside his room.
On that day, she noticed Hubert left the house at
around 1:00 in the afternoon and came back at
around 4:00 in the same afternoon and went inside
his room using the secret door of the house. It was
the last time that she saw Hubert until she left the
Webb family.
On the other hand, Carlos J. Cristobal alleged that
on March 9, 1991, at about 10:00 in the morning, he
was at the Ninoy Aquino International Airport as he
was then scheduled to take the United Airlines Flight
No. 808 at 2:00 in the afternoon for New York. At the
airport's lobby, he saw then Congressman Freddie
Webb with a male companion. He greeted him and
Webb answered: "Mabuti naman, at ito, ihahatid ko
ang anak ko papuntang Florida." He knew Freddie
Webb because he often watched him then in a
television show "Chicks to Chicks." He observed that
the man whom Freddie Webb referred to as his son,
was of the same height as Freddie. The son referred
to has fair complexion with no distinguishing marks
on his face. He (son of Webb) was then wearing a
striped white jacket. When he and his children were
already inside the plane, he did not see Freddie
anymore, but he noticed his son was seated at the
front portion of the economy class. He never noticed
Freddie Webb's son upon their arrival in San
Francisco. He claims that, while watching the
television program "DONG PUNO LIVE" lately, he
saw the wife of Freddie Webb with her lawyer being
interviewed, and when she described Hubert as
"moreno" and small built, with a height of five feet
and seven inches tall, and who was the one who left
for United States on March 9, 1991, he nurtured
doubts because such description does not fit the
physical traits of the son of Freddie, who left with
him for United States on the same flight and date.
Lolita Birrer, alleged that she know Gerardo Biong
because she had an affair with him for almost three
(3) years and in fact, she had a child with him who is
now four (4) years old. Their relationship started in
February, 1991 until she broke up with him in
September 1993. She recalls that on June 29, 1991,
at around 6:00 p.m., Biong invited her to play
mahjong at the canteen of a certain Aling Glo
located at the back of the Paraaque Municipal Hall.
At about 2:30, in the early morning of January 30,
1991, the radio operator of the Paraaque police
told Biong that he has a phone call. Before Biong
went to the radio room, she was instructed to take
him over and after somebody won the game, she
followed Biong at the radio room where she
overheard him uttering, "Ano?, Saan? Mahirap yan,
Paano, o sige, aantayin kita, O ano?, dilaw na taxi, o
sige." When he put the phone down, Biong told her,
"Mayroon lang akong rerespondehan, ikaw muna
ang maupo" and then, he went outside the canteen
apparently waiting for somebody. Twenty minutes
later, a taxi, colored yellow, arrived with a male
passenger sitting at the backseat and parked near
the canteen. After it made some signals by blinking
its headlight, Biong rode thereat at the front seat
beside the driver and then, they left. She was not
able to recognize the male passenger because the
window of the taxi was tinted. Biong came back at
around 7:00 of the same morning and when he
arrived, he immediately washed his hands and face,
and took his handkerchief from his pocket which he
threw at the trash can. She asked him why he threw
his handkerchief and he answered, "Hmp . . . amoy
tae." She inquired what happened in BF Homes and
he replied, "Putang inang mga batang iyon,
pinahirapan nila ako."
Biong later invited her for breakfast, but they first
went to his office where she observed him doing
something in his steel cabinet while he appeared to
be uneasy. Moments later, Galvan, another
policeman of Paraaque, arrived and said, "Oy
Biong, may tatlong patay sa BF, imbestigahan mo"
to which Biong answered, "Oo susunod na ako."
Biong went to the office of Capt. Don Bartolome who
offered to accompany him and with whom she asked
permission to go with them. Before they proceeded
to the place where the killings happened, she asked
Biong if he knew the exact address and the latter
immediately responded, "Alam ko na yon." She was
surprised because Galvan never told him the place
of the incident.
As soon as they arrived at the Vizconde's residence,
Biong instructed the housemaids to contact the
victim's relatives, while the security guard fetched
the barangay chairman and the president of the
Homeowners Association. When all these persons
were already in the house, Biong started recording
the wounds of the victim. Inside the master's
bedroom, she saw Biong took a watch from the
jewelry box. Because she could not tolerate the foul
odor, she and Capt. Bartolome went out of the room
and proceeded to the dining area. On top of the
dining table, she saw the scattered contents of a
shoulder bag. Moments later, Biong came out from
the room and proceeded to the front door to remove
the chain lock; asked the keys from the housemaid
and it was only then that the main door was opened.
Biong noticed a stone in front of the broken glass of
the door and requested Capt. Bartolome to go inside
the servant's quarters as he doubted the
housemaids' claim that they heard nothing unusual.
Using the handle of his gun, Biong broke the
remaining glass of the door panel. Bartolome then
came out of the room and told Biong that he can
hear the sound of the glass being broken. At the
garage, Biong also noticed same marks on the hood
of the car.
On the following day, at around 12:00 noon, Biong
arrived in her house together with the Vizconde
housemaids. When Biong was preparing to take a
bath, she saw him remove from his pocket the things
she also saw from Vizconde's residence, to wit:
calling cards, driver's license, ATM card, a crossed
check worth P80,000.00, earrings, a ring, bracelet,
necklace, and the watch he took from the jewelry
box inside the room of the Vizcondes. These jewelry
items were later pawned by Biong for P20,000.00 at
a pawnshop in front of Chow-Chow restaurant in
Santos Avenue, Paraaque. The next day, she saw
Biong took from his locker at the Paraaque Police
Station an imported brown leather jacket, which the
latter claimed to have been given to him by the
person who called him up in the early morning of
June 30, 1991.
Since then, Biong has been wearing said jacket until
they broke up sometime in 1993. She observed that
Biong seemed not interested in pursuing the
investigation of the Vizconde case. In fact, when
Biong and this group picked up Mike Gatchalian and
brought him to the Paraaque Police Station, she
was surprised that Biong halted the investigation
when Gatchalian was profusely sweating while being
interrogated. After the father of Gatchalian talked to
Colonel Pureza, the latter called up and instructed
Biong to bring Gatchalian to him (Colonel Pureza)
and that was the last thing she remembered
regarding this case.
The DOJ Panel then weighed these inculpatory
evidence against the exculpatory evidence of
petitioners. It ruled: 30
xxx xxx xxx
The voluminous number of exhibits submitted by
respondent Webb to support his defense of denial
and alibi notwithstanding, the panel, after a careful
and thorough evaluation of the records, believes that
they cannot outweigh the evidence submitted by the
complainant. Alibi cannot prevail over the positive
identification made by a prosecution witness. Verily,
alibi deserves scant consideration in the face of
positive identification especially so where the claim
of alibi is supported mainly by friends and relatives
(People vs. Apolonia, 235 SCRA 124 [1994]; People
vs. Lucas, 181 SCRA 316 and a long line of cases).
Similarly, denial is a self-serving negative which
cannot be given greater evidentiary weight than the
declaration of a credible witness who testified on
affirmative matters (People vs. Carizo, 233 SCRA
687 [1994]). Indeed, denial, like alibi, is weak and
becomes even more weaker when arrayed against
the positive identification by the witness for the
prosecution (People vs. Onpaid, 233 SCRA 62
[1994]).
Surprisingly, Gatchalian's defense of alibi was not
corroborated by Lejano, whom he claimed was with
him watching video tapes at the Syyap residence.
Other than claiming that he "was not and could not
have been at or near the area of the Vizconde
residence at the time of the alleged commission of
the crime," respondent Lejano proffered no evidence
to substantiate his claim of alibi.
xxx xxx xxx
On the other hand, respondent Webb seeks to
enhance the acceptability of his alibi in the form of
documents tending to show that he was thousands
of miles away when the incident occurred. We have
carefully deliberated and argued on the evidence
submitted by respondent Webb in support of his
absence from the country since March 9, 1991 to
October 26, 1992 and found the same wanting to
exonerate him of the offense charged. The material
dates in this case are June 29 and 30, 1991. While
respondent Webb may have submitted proof tending
to show that he was issued a California driver's
license on June 14, 1991, there is no showing that
he could not have been in the country on the dates
above mentioned. Neither do we find merit in the
allegation that respondent Webb personally bought
a bicycle on June 30, 1991 in California in view of
his positive identification by Alfaro and the two (2)
househelps of the Webb family who testified that he
was here in the country on said dates. Additionally,
the issuance of receipt evidencing the purchase of a
bicycle in California is no conclusive proof that the
name appearing thereon was the actual buyer of the
merchandise.
Given these conflicting pieces of evidence of the NBI
and the petitioners, we hold that the DOJ Panel did
not gravely abuse its discretion when it found
probable cause against the petitioners. A finding of
probable cause needs only to rest on evidence
showing that more likely than not a crime has been
committed and was committed by the suspects.
Probable cause need not be based on clear and
convincing evidence of guilt, neither on evidence
establishing guilt beyond reasonable doubt and
definitely, not on evidence establishing absolute
certainty of guilt. As well put in Brinegar v. United
States,31 while probable cause demands more than
"bare suspicion," it requires "less than evidence
which would justify . . . conviction." A finding of
probable cause merely binds over the suspect to
stand trial. It is not a pronouncement of guilt.
Considering the low quantum and quality of
evidence needed to support a finding of probable
cause, we also hold that the DOJ Panel did not,
gravely abuse its discretion in refusing to call the
NBI witnesses for clarificatory questions. The
decision to call witnesses for clarificatory questions
is addressed to the sound discretion of the
investigator and the investigator alone. If the
evidence on hand already yields a probable cause,
the investigator need not hold a clarificatory hearing.
To repeat, probable cause merely implies probability
of guilt and should be determined in a summary
manner. Preliminary investigation is not a part of trial
and it is only in a trial where an accused can
demand the full exercise of his rights, such as the
right to confront and cross-examine his accusers to
establish his innocence. In the case at bar, the DOJ
Panel correctly adjudged that enough evidence had
been adduced to establish probable cause and
clarificatory hearing was unnecessary.
II
We now come to the charge of petitioners that
respondent Judge Raul de Leon and, later,
respondent Judge Amelita Tolentino issued warrants
of arrest against them without conducting the
required preliminary examination. Petitioners
support their stance by highlighting the following
facts: (1) the issuance of warrants of arrest in a
matter of few hours; (2) the failure of said judges to
issue orders of arrest; (3) the records submitted to
the trial court were incomplete and insufficient from
which to base a finding of probable cause; and (4)
that even Gerardo Biong who was included in the
Information as a mere accessory had a "NO BAIL"
recommendation by the DOJ Panel. Petitioners
postulate that it was impossible to conduct a
"searching examination of witnesses and evaluation
of the documents" on the part of said judges.
The issuance of a warrant of arrest interferes with
individual liberty and is regulated by no less than the
fundamental law of the land. Section 2 of Article III of
the Constitution provides:
Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever
nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and
no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue
except upon probable cause to be determined
personally by the judge after examination under oath
or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses
he may produce and particularly describing the
place to be searched and the persons or things to be
seized.
The aforequoted provision deals with the
requirements of probable cause both with respect to
issuance of warrants of arrest or search warrants.
The similarities and differences of their requirements
ought to be educational. Some of them are pointed
out by Professors LaFave and Israel, thus:32 "It is
generally assumed that the same quantum of
evidence is required whether one is concerned with
probable cause to arrest or probable cause to
search. But each requires a showing of probabilities
as to somewhat different facts and circumstances,
and thus one can exist without the other. In search
cases, two conclusions must be supported by
substantial evidence: that the items sought are in
fact seizable by virtue of being connected with
criminal activity, and that the items will be found in
the place to be searched. It is not also necessary
that a particular person be implicated. By
comparison, in arrest cases there must be probable
cause that a crime has been committed and that the
person to be arrested committed it, which of course
can exist without any showing that evidence of the
crime will be found at premises under that person's
control." Worthy to note, our Rules of Court do not
provide for a similar procedure to be followed in the
issuance of warrants of arrest and search warrants.
With respect to warrants of arrest, section 6 of Rule
112 simply provides that "upon filing of an
information, the Regional Trial Court may issue a
warrant for the arrest of the accused." In contrast,
the procedure to be followed in issuing search
warrants is more defined. Thus, Sections 3, 4 and 5
of Rule 126 provide:
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 3. Requisites for issuing search warrant. A
search warrant shall not issue but upon probable
cause in connection with one specific offense to be
determined personally by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be searched and
the things to be seized.
Sec. 4. Examination of complainant; record. The
judge must, before issuing the warrant, personally
examine in the form of searching questions and
answers, in writing and under oath the complainant
and any witnesses he may produce on facts
personally known to them and attach to the record
their sworn statements together with any affidavits
submitted.
Sec. 5. Issuance and form of search warrant. If
the judge is thereupon satisfied of the facts upon
which the application is based, or that there is
probable cause to believe that they exist, he must
issue the warrant, which must be substantially in the
form prescribed by these Rules.
We discussed the difference in the Procedure of
issuing warrants of arrest and search warrants in
Soliven vs. Makasiar,33 thus:
xxx xxx xxx
The second issue, raised by Beltran, calls for an
interpretation of the constitutional provision on the
issuance of warrants of arrest. The pertinent
provision reads:
Art. III, Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure
in their persons, houses, papers and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever
nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and
no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue
except upon probable cause to be determined
personally by the judge after examination under oath
or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses
he may produce, and particularly describing the
place to be searched and the persons or things to be
seized.
The addition of the word "personally" after the word
"determined" and the deletion of the grant of
authority by the 1973 Constitution to issue warrants
to "other responsible officers as may be authorized
by law," has apparently convinced petitioner Beltran
that the Constitution now requires the judge to
personally examine the complainant and his
witnesses in his determination of probable cause for
the issuance of warrants of arrest. This is not an
accurate interpretation.
What the Constitution underscores is the exclusive
and personal responsibility of the issuing judge to
satisfy himself of the existence of probable cause. In
satisfying himself of the existence of probable cause
for the issuance of a warrant of arrest, the judge is
not required to personally examine the complainant
and his witnesses. Following established doctrine
and procedure, he shall: (1) personally evaluate the
report and the documents submitted by the fiscal
regarding the existence of probable cause and, on
the basis thereof, issue a warrant; or (2) if on the
basis thereof he finds no probable cause, he may
disregard the fiscal's report and require the
submission of supporting affidavits of witnesses to
aid him in arriving at a conclusions as to the
existence of probable cause.
Sound policy dictates this procedure, otherwise
judges would be unduly laden with the preliminary
examination and investigation of criminal complaints
instead of concentrating on hearing and deciding
cases filed before their courts.
Clearly then, the Constitution, the Rules of Court,
and our case law34 repudiate the submission of
petitioners that respondent judges should have
conducted "searching examination of witnesses"
before issuing warrants of arrest against them. They
also reject petitioners' contention that a judge must
first issue an order of arrest before issuing a warrant
of arrest. There is no law or rule requiring the
issuance of an Order of Arrest prior to a warrant of
arrest.
In the case at bar, the DOJ Panel submitted to the
trial court its 26-page report, the two (2) sworn
statements of Alfaro and the sworn statements of
Carlos Cristobal and Lolita Birrer35 as well as the
counter-affidavits of the petitioners. Apparently, the
painstaking recital and analysis of the parties'
evidence made in the DOJ Panel Report satisfied
both judges that there is probable cause to issue
warrants of arrest against petitioners. Again, we
stress that before issuing warrants of arrest, judges
merely determine personally the probability, not the
certainty of guilt of an accused. In doing so, judges
do not conduct a de novo hearing to determine the
existence of probable cause. They just personally
review the initial determination of the prosecutor
finding a probable cause to see if it is supported by
substantial evidence. The sufficiency of the review
process cannot be measured by merely counting
minutes and hours. The fact that it took the
respondent judges a few hours to review and affirm
the probable cause determination of the DOJ Panel
does not mean they made no personal evaluation of
the evidence attached to the records of the case.36
Petitioners' reliance on the case of Allado vs.
Diokno37 is misplaced. Our Allado ruling is
predicated on the utter failure of the evidence to
show the existence of probable cause. Not even the
corpus delicti of the crime was established by the
evidence of the prosecution in that case. Given the
clear insufficiency of the evidence on record, we
stressed the necessity for the trial judge to make a
further personal examination of the complainant and
his witnesses to reach a correct assessment of the
existence or non-existence of probable cause before
issuing warrants of arrest against the accused. The
case at bar, however, rests on a different factual
setting. As priorly discussed, the various types of
evidence extant in the records of the case provide
substantial basis for a finding of probable cause
against the petitioner. The corpus delicti of the crime
is a given fact. There is an eyewitness account of
the imputed crime given by Alfaro. The alibi defense
of petitioner Webb is also disputed by sworn
statements of their former maids. It was therefore
unnecessary for the respondent judges to take the
further step of examining ex parte the complainant
and their witnesses with searching questions.
III
Petitioners also complain about the denial of their
constitutional right to due process and violation of
their right to an impartial investigation. They decry
their alleged hasty and malicious prosecution by the
NBI and the DOJ Panel. They also assail the
prejudicial publicity that attended their preliminary
investigation.
We reject these contentions. The records will show
that the DOJ Panel did not conduct the preliminary
investigation with indecent haste. Petitioners were
given fair opportunity to prove lack of probable
cause against them. The fairness of this opportunity
is well stressed in the Consolidated Comment of the
Solicitor General, viz.:
Again, there is no merit in this contention. Petitioners
were afforded all the opportunities to be heard.
Petitioner Webb actively participated in the
preliminary investigation by appearing in the initial
hearing held on June 30, 1995 and in the second
hearing on July 14, 1995; and by filing a "Motion for
Production and Examination of Evidence and
Documents" on June 27, 1995 (p. 4, Petition), a
"Reply to the compliance and
Comment/Manifestation to the Motion for Production
and Examination of Evidence" on July 5, 1995 (p. 6,
Petition), a "Comment and Manifestation" on July 7,
1995 (p. 6, Petition), his "Counter-Affidavit" on July
14, 1995 (pp. 6-7, Petition) and a "Motion to
Resolve" on August 1, 1995. Numerous letter-
requests were also sent by the petitioner Webb's
counsel to the DOJ Panel requesting the latter to
furnish him a copy of the reports prepared by the
FBI concerning the petitioner's whereabouts during
the material period (Annexes "L", "L-1" and "L-2" of
the Supplemental Petition dated August 14, 1995).
In fact, not satisfied with the decision of the DOJ
Panel not to issue subpoena duces tecum to Atty.
Arturo L. Mercader, Jr., petitioner Webb filed a
"Petition for Injunction, Certiorari, Prohibition and
Mandamus" with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 63
of Makati in order to compel said Atty. Mercader, Jr.
to produce the first sworn statement of Alfaro for
submission to the DOJ Panel. (p. 4, Petition) The
said court dismissed the petition after Mercader
produced and submitted to the DOJ Panel the first
sworn statement of Alfaro, without ruling on the
admissibility and credence of the two (2) conflicting
and inconsistent sworn statements of the principal
witness, Alfaro. (Attached hereto is a copy of the
order of Judge Ruben A. Mendiola, RTC-Makati,
Branch 63 dated July 28, 1995) marked as Annex
"F."
It must also be pointed out that despite the
declaration by the DOJ Panel that the preliminary
investigation was to be terminated after the hearing
held on July 14, 1995, the panel continued to
conduct further proceedings, e.g. comparison of the
photo-copies of the submitted documents with the
originals on July 17, 1995. (p. 7, Petition) The panel
even entertained the "Response" submitted by
accused Miguel Rodriguez on July 18, 1995. (p. 17
Resolution) In addition to these, the panel even
announced that any party may submit additional
evidence before the resolution of the case. (p. 8,
Petition) From the time the panel declared the
termination of the preliminary investigation on July
14, 1995, twenty-seven (27) days elapsed before the
resolution was promulgated, and the information
eventually filed in the Regional Trial Court of
Paraaque on August 10, 1995. This
notwithstanding the directive of Section 3(f) Rule
112 of the Revised Rules of Court that the
investigating officer shall resolve the case within ten
(10) days from the termination of the preliminary
investigation. The DOJ Panel precisely allowed the
parties to adduce more evidence in their behalf and
for the panel to study the evidence submitted more
fully. This directly disputes the allegation of the
petitioners that the resolution was done with
indecent haste in violation of the rights of the
petitioners. During the period of twenty-seven (27)
days, the petitioners were free to adduce and
present additional evidence before the DOJ Panel.
Verily, petitioners cannot now assert that they were
denied due process during the conduct of the
preliminary investigation simply because the DOJ
Panel promulgated the adverse resolution and filed
the Information in court against them.
Petitioners cannot also assail as premature the filing
of the Information in court against them for rape with
homicide on the ground that they still have the right
to appeal the adverse resolution of the DOJ Panel to
the Secretary of Justice. The filing of said
Information is in accord with Department of Justice
Order No. 223, series of 1993, dated June 25, 1993.
We quote its pertinent sections, viz.:
Sec. 4. Non-Appealable Cases; Exceptions. No
appeal may be taken from a resolution of the Chief
State Prosecutor/Regional State
Prosecutor/Provincial or City Prosecutor finding
probable cause except upon showing of manifest
error or grave abuse of discretion. Notwithstanding
the showing of manifest error or grave abuse of
discretion, no appeal shall be entertained where the
appellant had already been arraigned. If the
appellant is arraigned during the pendency of the
appeal, said appeal shall be dismissed motu propio
by the Secretary of Justice.
An appeal/motion for reinvestigation from a
resolution finding probable cause, however, shall not
hold the filing of the information in court.
Sec. 2. When to appeal. The appeal must be filed
within a period of fifteen (15) days from receipt of the
questioned resolution by the party or his counsel.
The period shall be interrupted only by the filing of a
motion for reconsideration within ten (10) days from
receipt of the resolution and shall continue to run
from the time the resolution denying the motion shall
have been received by the movant or his counsel.
(Emphasis supplied)
Without doubt then, the said DOJ Order No. 223
allows the filing of an Information in court after the
consummation of the preliminary investigation even
if the accused can still exercise the right to seek a
review of the prosecutor's recommendation with the
Secretary of Justice.
Next, petitioners fault the DOJ Panel for not
including Alfaro in the Information considering her
alleged conspiratorial participation in the crime of
rape with homicide. The non-inclusion of Alfaro is
anchored on Republic Act
No. 6981, entitled "An Act Providing For A Witness
Protection, Security And Benefit Program And For
Other Purposes" enacted on April 24, 1991. Alfaro
qualified under its Section 10, which provides:
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 10. State Witness. Any person who
has participated in the commission of a crime and
desires to a witness for the State, can apply and, if
qualified as determined in this Act and by the
Department, shall be admitted into the Program
whenever the following circumstances are present:
(a) the offense in which his testimony will be
used is a grave felony as defined under the R.P.C.
or its equivalent under special laws;
(b) there is absolute necessity for his testimony;

(c) there is no other direct evidence available
for the proper prosecution of the offense committed;
(d) his testimony can be substantially
corroborated on its material points;
(e) he does not appear to be most guilty; and
(f) he has not at anytime been convicted of any
crime involving moral turpitude.
An accused discharged from an information or
criminal complaint by the court in order that he may
be a State Witness pursuant to Sections 9 and 10 of
Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Court may upon
his petition be admitted to the Program if he
complies with the other requirements of this Act.
Nothing in this Act shall prevent the discharge of an
accused so that he can be used as a Witness under
Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Court.
Upon qualification of Alfaro to the program, Section
12 of the said law mandates her non-inclusion in the
criminal Complaint or Information, thus:
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 12. Effect of Admission of a State
Witness into the Program. The certification of
admission into the Program by the Department shall
be given full faith and credit by the provincial or city
prosecutor who is required NOT TO INCLUDE THE
WITNESS IN THE CRIMINAL COMPLAINT OR
INFORMATION and if included therein, to petition
the court for his discharge in order that he can be
utilized as a State Witness. The court shall order the
discharge and exclusion of the said accused from
the information.
Admission into the Program shall entitle such State
Witness to immunity from criminal prosecution for
the offense or offenses in which his testimony will be
given or used and all the rights and benefits
provided under Section 8 hereof.
The validity of these provisions is challenged by
petitioner Webb. It is urged that they constitute ". . .
an intrusion into judicial prerogative for it is only the
court which has the power under the Rules on
Criminal Procedure to discharge an accused as a
state witness." The argument is based on Section 9,
Rule 11938 which gives the court the prerogative to
approve the discharge of an accused to be a state
witness. Petitioner's argument lacks appeal for it lies
on the faulty assumption that the decision whom to
prosecute is a judicial function, the sole prerogative
of courts and beyond executive and legislative
interference. In truth, the prosecution of crimes
appertains to the executive department of
government whose principal power and
responsibility is to see that our laws are faithfully
executed. A necessary component of this power to
execute our laws is the right to prosecute their
violators. The right to prosecute vests the prosecutor
with a wide range of discretion the discretion of
whether, what and whom to charge, the exercise of
which depends on a smorgasbord of factors which
are best appreciated by prosecutors. We thus hold
that it is not constitutionally impermissible for
Congress to enact R.A. No. 6981 vesting in the
Department of Justice the power to determine who
can qualify as a witness in the program and who
shall be granted immunity from prosecution.39
Section 9 of Rule 119 does not support the
proposition that the power to choose who shall be a
state witness is an inherent judicial prerogative.
Under this provision, the court, is given the power to
discharge a state witness only because it has
already acquired jurisdiction over the crime and the
accused. The discharge of an accused is part of the
exercise of jurisdiction but is not a recognition of an
inherent judicial function. Moreover, the Rules of
Court have never been interpreted to be beyond
change by legislation designed to improve the
administration of our justice system. R.A. No. 6981
is one of the much sought penal reform laws to help
government in its uphill fight against crime, one
certain cause of which is the reticence of witnesses
to testify. The rationale for the law is well put by the
Department of Justice, viz.: "Witnesses, for fear of
reprisal and economic dislocation, usually refuse to
appear and testify in the investigation/prosecution of
criminal complaints/cases. Because of such refusal,
criminal complaints/cases have been dismissed for
insufficiency and/or lack of evidence. For a more
effective administration of criminal justice, there was
a necessity to pass a law protecting witnesses and
granting them certain rights and benefits to ensure
their appearance in investigative bodies/courts."40
Petitioner Webb's challenge to the validity of R.A.
No. 6981 cannot therefore succeed.
Further, petitioners charge the NBI with violating
their right to discovery proceedings during their
preliminary investigation by suppressing the April 28,
1995 original copy of the sworn statement of Alfaro
and the FBI Report. The argument is novel in this
jurisdiction and as it urges an expansive reading of
the rights of persons under preliminary investigation
it deserves serious consideration. To start with, our
Rules on Criminal Procedure do not expressly
provide for discovery proceedings during the
preliminary investigation stage of a criminal
proceeding.41 Sections 10 and 11 of Rule 117 do
provide an accused the right to move for a bill of
particulars and for production or inspection of
material evidence in possession of the
prosecution.42 But these provisions apply after the
filing of the Complaint or Information in court and the
rights are accorded to the accused to assist them to
make an intelligent plea at arraignment and to
prepare for trial.43
This failure to provide discovery procedure during
preliminary investigation does not, however, negate
its use by a person under investigation when
indispensable to protect his constitutional right to
life, liberty and property. Preliminary investigation is
not too early a stage to guard against any significant
erosion of the constitutional right to due process of a
potential accused. As aforediscussed, the object of a
preliminary investigation is to determine the
probability that the suspect committed a crime. We
hold that the finding of a probable cause by itself
subjects the suspect's life, liberty and property to
real risk of loss or diminution. In the case at bar, the
risk to the liberty of petitioners cannot be
understated for they are charged with the crime of
rape with homicide, a non-bailable offense when the
evidence of guilt is strong.
Attuned to the times, our Rules have discarded the
pure inquisitorial system of preliminary investigation.
Instead, Rule 112 installed a quasi-judicial type of
preliminary investigation conducted by one whose
high duty is to be fair and impartial.44 As this Court
emphasized in Rolito Go vs. Court of Appeals,45
"the right to have a preliminary investigation
conducted before being bound over for trial for a
criminal offense, and hence formally at risk of
incarceration or some other penalty, is not a mere
formal or technical right; it is a substantive right." A
preliminary investigation should therefore be
scrupulously conducted so that the constitutional
right to liberty of a potential accused can be
protected from any material damage. We uphold the
legal basis of the right of petitioners to demand from
their prosecutor, the NBI, the original copy of the
April 28, 1995 sworn statement of Alfaro and the FBI
Report during their preliminary investigation
considering their exculpatory character, and hence,
unquestionable materiality to the issue of their
probable guilt. The right is rooted on the
constitutional protection of due process which we
rule to be operational even during the preliminary
investigation of a potential accused. It is also implicit
in section (3) (a) of Rule 112 which requires during
the preliminary investigation the filing of a sworn
complaint, which shall ". . . state the known address
of the respondent and be accompanied by affidavits
of the complainant and his witnesses as well as
other supporting documents . . ."
In laying down this rule, the Court is not without
enlightened precedents from other jurisdictions. In
the 1963 watershed case of Brady v. Maryland 46
the United States Supreme Court held that
"suppression of evidence favorable to an accused
upon request violates due process where the
evidence is material to guilt or punishment,
irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the
prosecution." Its progeny is the 1935 case of
Mooney v. Holohan 47 which laid down the
proposition that a prosecutor's intentional use of
perjured testimony to procure conviction violates due
process. Thus, evolved jurisprudence firming up the
prosecutor's duty to disclose to the defense
exculpatory evidence in its possession.48 The
rationale is well put by Justice Brennan in Brady49
"society wins not only when the guilty are
convicted but when criminal trials are fair." Indeed,
prosecutors should not treat litigation like a game of
poker where surprises can be sprung and where
gain by guile is not punished.
But given the right of petitioners to compel the NBI
to disclose exculpatory evidence in their favor, we
are not prepared to rule that the initial non-
production of the original sworn statement of Alfaro
dated April 28, 1995 could have resulted in the
reasonable likelihood that the DOJ Panel would not
have found probable cause. To be sure, the NBI, on
July 4, 1995, upon request of petitioners, submitted
a photocopy of Alfaro's April 28, 1995 sworn
statement. It explained it cannot produce the original
as it had been lost. Fortunately, petitioners, on July
28, 1995, were able to obtain a copy of the original
from Atty. Arturo Mercader in the course of the
proceedings in Civil Case No. 951099.50 As
petitioners admit, the DOJ Panel accepted the
original of Alfaro's April 28, 1995 sworn statement as
a part of their evidence.51 Petitioners thus had the
fair chance to explain to the DOJ Panel then still
conducting their preliminary investigation the
exculpatory aspects of this sworn statement.
Unfortunately for petitioners, the DOJ Panel still
found probable cause to charge them despite the
alleged material discrepancies between the first and
second sworn statements of Alfaro. For reasons we
have expounded, this finding of probable cause
cannot be struck down as done with grave abuse of
discretion.52 On the other hand, the FBI Report
while corroborative of the alibi of petitioner Webb
cannot by itself reverse the probable cause finding
of the DOJ Panel in light of the totality of evidence
presented by the NBI.
Finally, we come to the argument of petitioner that
the DOJ Panel lost its impartiality due to the
prejudicial publicity waged in the press and
broadcast media by the NBI.
Again, petitioners raise the effect of prejudicial
publicity on their right to due process while
undergoing preliminary investigation. We find no
procedural impediment to its early invocation
considering the substantial risk to their liberty while
undergoing a preliminary investigation.
In floating this issue, petitioners touch on some of
the most problematic areas in constitutional law
where the conflicting demands of freedom of speech
and of the press, the public's right to information,
and an accused's right to a fair and impartial trial
collide and compete for prioritization. The process of
pinpointing where the balance should be struck has
divided men of learning as the balance keeps
moving either on the side of liberty or on the side of
order as the tumult of the time and the welfare of the
people dictate. The dance of balance is a difficult act
to follow.
In democratic settings, media coverage of trials of
sensational cases cannot be avoided and
oftentimes, its excessiveness has been aggravated
by kinetic developments in the telecommunications
industry. For sure, few cases can match the high
volume and high velocity of publicity that attended
the preliminary investigation of the case at bar. Our
daily diet of facts and fiction about the case
continues unabated even today. Commentators still
bombard the public with views not too many of which
are sober and sublime. Indeed, even the principal
actors in the case the NBI, the respondents, their
lawyers and their sympathizers have participated
in this media blitz. The possibility of media abuses
and their threat to a fair trial notwithstanding,
criminal trials cannot be completely closed to the
press and the public. In the seminal case of
Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia,53 it was
wisely held:
xxx xxx xxx
(a) The historical evidence of the evolution of
the criminal trial in Anglo-American justice
demonstrates conclusively that at the time this
Nation's organic laws were adopted, criminal trials
both here and in England had long been
presumptively open, thus giving assurance that the
proceedings were conducted fairly to all concerned
and discouraging perjury, the misconduct of
participants, or decisions based on secret bias or
partiality. In addition, the significant community
therapeutic value of public trials was recognized:
when a shocking crime occurs, a community
reaction of outrage and public protest often follows,
and thereafter the open processes of justice serve
an important prophylactic purpose, providing an
outlet for community concern, hostility, and emotion.
To work effectively, it is important that society's
criminal process "satisfy the appearance of justice,"
Offutt v. United States, 348 US 11, 14, 99 L Ed 11,
75 S Ct 11, which can best be provided by allowing
people to observe such process. From this
unbroken, uncontradicted history, supported by
reasons as valid today as in centuries past, it must
be concluded that a presumption of openness
inheres in the very nature of a criminal trial under
this Nation's system of justice, Cf., e.g., Levine v.
United States, 362 US 610, 4 L Ed 2d 989, 80 S Ct
1038.
(b) The freedoms of speech, press, and
assembly, expressly guaranteed by the First
Amendment, share a common core purpose of
assuring freedom of communication on matters
relating to the functioning of government. In
guaranteeing freedoms such as those of speech and
press, the First Amendment can be read as
protecting the right of everyone to attend trials so as
to give meaning to those explicit guarantees; the
First Amendment right to receive information and
ideas means, in the context of trials, that the
guarantees of speech and press, standing alone,
prohibit government from summarily closing
courtroom doors which had long been open to the
public at the time the First Amendment was adopted.
Moreover, the right of assembly is also relevant,
having been regarded not only as an independent
right but also as a catalyst to augment the free
exercise of the other First Amendment rights with
which it was deliberately linked by
the draftsmen. A trial courtroom is a public place
where the people generally and representatives
of the media have a right to be present, and
where their presence historically has been thought
to enhance the integrity and quality of what takes
place.
(c) Even though the Constitution contains no
provision which by its terms guarantees to the public
the right to attend criminal trials, various
fundamental rights, not expressly guaranteed, have
been recognized as indispensable to the enjoyment
of enumerated rights. The right to attend criminal
trials is implicit in the guarantees of the First
Amendment; without the freedom to attend such
trials, which people have exercised for centuries,
important aspects of freedom of speech and of the
press could be eviscerated.
Be that as it may, we recognize that pervasive and
prejudicial publicity under certain circumstances can
deprive an accused of his due process right to fair
trial. Thus, in Martelino, et al. vs. Alejandro, et al.,54
we held that to warrant a finding of prejudicial
publicity there must be allegation and proof that the
judges have been unduly influenced, not simply that
they might be, by the barrage of publicity. In the
case at bar, we find nothing in the records that will
prove that the tone and content, of the publicity that
attended the investigation of petitioners fatally
infected the fairness and impartiality of the DOJ
Panel. Petitioners cannot just rely on the subliminal
effects of publicity on the sense of fairness of the
DOJ Panel, for these are basically unbeknown and
beyond knowing. To be sure, the DOJ Panel is
composed of an Assistant Chief State Prosecutor
and Senior State Prosecutors. Their long experience
in criminal investigation is a factor to consider in
determining whether they can easily be blinded by
the klieg lights of publicity. Indeed, their 26-page
Resolution carries no indubitable indicia of bias for it
does not appear that they considered any extra-
record evidence except evidence properly adduced
by the parties. The length of time the investigation
was conducted despite its summary nature and the
generosity with which they accommodated the
discovery motions of petitioners speak well of their
fairness. At no instance, we note, did petitioners
seek the disqualification of any member of the DOJ
Panel on the ground of bias resulting from their
bombardment of prejudicial publicity.
It all remains to state that the Vizconde case will
move to a more critical stage as petitioners will now
have to undergo trial on the merits. We stress that
probable cause is not synonymous with guilt and
while the light of publicity may be a good disinfectant
of unfairness, too much of its heat can bring to flame
an accused's right to fair trial. Without imposing on
the trial judge the difficult task of supervising every
specie of speech relating to the case at bar, it
behooves her to be reminded of the duty of a trial
judge in high profile criminal cases to control
publicity prejudicial to the fair administration of
justice.55 The Court reminds judges that our ability
to dispense impartial justice is an issue in every trial
and in every criminal prosecution, the judiciary
always stands as a silent accused. More than
convicting the guilty and acquitting the innocent, the
business of the judiciary is to assure fulfillment of the
promise that justice shall be done and is done
and that is the only way for the judiciary to get an
acquittal from the bar of public opinion.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petitions are dismissed for
lack of showing of grave abuse of discretion on the
part of the respondents. Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. L-54597 December 15, 1982
FELICIDAD ANZALDO, petitioner,
vs.
JACOBO C. CLAVE as Chairman of the Civil
Service Commission and as Presidential Executive
Assistant; JOSE A. R. MELO, as Commissioner of
the Civil Service Commission, and EULALIA L.
VENZON, respondents.
Antonio P. Amistad for petitioner.
Artemio E. Valenton for private respondent.
Madamba, Deza & Almario Law Offices for
respondent .
Demegildo Laborte & Lazano Law Offices for
respondent public officials.
AQUINO, J.:
This is a controversy over the position of Science
Research Supervisor II, whose occupant heads the
Medical Research Department in the Biological
Research Center of the National Institute of Science
and Technology (NIST).
Doctor Felicidad Estores-Anzaldo 55, seeks to annul
the decision of Presidential Executive Assistant
Jacobo C. Clave dated March 20, 1980, revoking
her appointment dated January 5, 1978 as Science
Research Supervisor II and directing the
appointment to that position of Doctor Eulalia L.
Venzon, 48.
The contested position became vacant in 1974 when
its incumbent, Doctor Quintin Kintanar, became
Director of the Biological Research Center. Doctor
Kintanar recommended that Doctor Venzon be
appointed to that position. Doctor Anzaldo protested
against that recommendation. The NIST
Reorganization Committee found her protest to be
valid and meritorious (p. 34, Rollo). Because of that
impasse, which the NIST Commissioner did not
resolve, the position was not filled up.
At the time the vacancy occurred, or on June 30,
1974, both Doctors Anzaldo and Venzon were
holding similar positions in the Medical Research
Department: that of Scientist Research Associate IV
with an annual compensation of P12,013 per
annum. Both were next-in-rank to the vacant
position.
Later, Doctor Pedro G. Afable, Vice-Chairman,
became the Officer-in-Charge of the NIST. Effective
January 5, 1978, he appointed Doctor Anzaldo to
the contested position with compensation at
P18,384 per annum. The appointment was approved
by the Civil Service Commission.
Doctor Afable, in his letter dated January 20, 1978,
explained that the appointment was made after a
thorough study and screening of the qualifications of
Doctors Anzaldo and Venzon and upon the
recommendation of the NIST Staff Evaluation
Committee that gave 88 points to Doctor Anzaldo
and 61 points to Doctor Venzon (p. 78, Rollo).
Doctor Venzon in a letter dated January 23, 1978,
addressed to Jacobo C. Clave, appealed to the
Office of the President of the Philippines (pp. 139-
40). The appeal was forwarded to the NIST Anzaldo
to the contested position (p. 63, Rollo). The appeal-
protest was later sent to the Civil Service
Commission.
Chairman Clave of the Civil Service Commission
and Commissioner Jose A. R. Melo recommended in
Resolution No. 1178 dated August 23, 1979 that
Doctor Venzon be appointed to the contested
position, a recommendation which is in conflict with
the 1978 appointment of Doctor Anzaldo which was
duly attested and approved by the Civil Service
Commission (pp. 30 and 48, Rollo).
The resolution was made pursuant to section 19(6)
of the Civil Service Decree of the Philippines,
Presidential Decree No. 807 (which took effect on
October 6, 1975) and which provides that "before
deciding a contested appointment, the Office of the
President shall consult the Civil Service
Commission."
After the denial of her motion for the reconsideration
of that resolution, or on January 5, 1980, Doctor
Anzaldo appealed to the Office of the President of
the Philippines. As stated earlier, Presidential
Executive Assistant Clave (who was concurrently
Chairman of the Civil Service Commission) in his
decision of March 20, 1980 revoked Doctor
Anzaldo's appointment and ruled that, "as
recommended by the Civil Service Commission"
(meaning Chairman Clave himself and
Commissioner Melo), Doctor Venzon should be
appointed to the contested position but that Doctor
Anzaldo's appointment to the said position should be
considered "valid and effective during the pendency"
of Doctor Venzon's protest (p. 36, Rollo).
In a resolution dated August 14, 1980, Presidential
Executive Assistant Clave denied Doctor Anzaldo's
motion for reconsideration. On August 25, 1980, she
filed in this Court the instant special civil action of
certiorari.
What is manifestly anomalous and questionable
about that decision of Presidential Executive
Assistant Clave is that it is an implementation of
Resolution No. 1178 dated August 23, 1979 signed
by Jacobo C. Clave, as Chairman of the Civil
Service Commission and concurred in by
Commissioner Jose A. Melo.
In that resolution, Commissioner Clave and Melo,
acting for the Civil Service Commission,
recommended that Doctor Venzon be appointed
Science Research Supervisor II in place of Doctor
Anzaldo.
When Presidential Executive Assistant Clave said in
his decision that he was "inclined to concur in the
recommendation of the Civil Service Commission",
what he meant was that he was concurring with
Chairman Clave's recommendation: he was
concurring with himself (p. 35, Rollo).
It is evident that Doctor Anzaldo was denied due
process of law when Presidential Executive
Assistant Clave concurred with the recommendation
of Chairman Clave of the Civil Service Commission.
The case is analogous to Zambales Chromite Mining
Co. vs. Court of Appeals, L-49711, November 7,
1979, 94 SCRA 261, where it was held that the
decision of Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources Benjamin M. Gozon, affirming his own
decision in a mining case as Director of Mines was
void because it was rendered with grave abuse of
discretion and was a mockery of administrative
justice.
Due process of law means fundamental fairness. It
is not fair to Doctor Anzaldo that Presidential
Executive Assistant Clave should decide whether his
own recommendation as Chairman of the Civil
Service Commission, as to who between Doctor
Anzaldo and Doctor Venzon should be appointed
Science Research Supervisor II, should be adopted
by the President of the Philippines.
Common sense and propriety dictate that the
commissioner in the Civil Service Commission, who
should be consulted by the Office of the President,
should be a person different from the person in the
Office of the President who would decide the appeal
of the protestant in a contested appointment.
In this case, the person who acted for the Office of
the President is the same person in the Civil Service
Commission who was consulted by the Office of the
President: Jacobo C. Clave. The Civil Service
Decree could not have contemplated that absurd
situation for, as held in the Zambales Chromite case,
that would not be fair to the appellant.
We hold that respondent Clave committed a grave
abuse of discretion in deciding the appeal in favor of
Doctor Venzon. The appointing authority, Doctor
Afable, acted in accordance with law and properly
exercised his discretion in appointing Doctor
Anzaldo to the contested position.
Doctor Anzaldo finished the pharmacy course in
1950 in the College of Pharmacy, University of the
Philippines. She obtained from the Centro Escolar
University the degree of Master of Science in
Pharmacy in 1962 and in 1965 the degree of Doctor
of Pharmacy.
Aside from her civil service eligibility as a
pharmacist, she is a registered medical technologist
and supervisor (unassembled).
She started working in the NIST in 1954 and has
served in that agency for about twenty-eight (28)
years now. As already stated, in January, 1978, she
was appointed to the contested Position of Science
Research Supervisor II. Her present salary as
Science Research Supervisor II, now known as
Senior Science Research Specialist, is P 30,624 per
annum after she was given a merit increase by
Doctor Kintanar, effective July 1, 1981 (p. 259,
Rollo).
On the other hand, Doctor Venzon finished the
medical course in the University of Santo Tomas in
1957. She started working in the NIST in 1960. She
has been working in that agency for more than
twenty-one (21) years. Doctor Anzaldo is senior to
her in point of service.
Considering that Doctor Anzaldo has competently
and satisfactorily discharged the duties of the
contested position for more than four (4) years now
and that she is qualified for that position, her
appointment should be upheld. Doctor Venzon's
protest should be dismissed.
WHEREFORE, the decision of respondent Clave
dated March 20, 1980 is set aside, and petitioner
Anzaldo's promotional appointment to the contested
position is declared valid. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
EN BANC
G.R. No. 126995 October 6, 1998
IMELDA R. MARCOS, petitioner,
vs.
The Honorable SANDIGANBAYAN (First Division),
and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPINES,
respondents.
RESOLUTION
PURISIMA, J.:
This scenic Philippine archipelago is a citadel of
justice, due process and rule of law. Succinst and
clear is the provision of the constitution of this great
Republic that every accused is presumed innocent
until the contrary is proved. [Art. 111, Sec. 14(2)]. As
held in People of the Philippines vs. Ellizabeth
Ganguso y Decena (G.R. No. 115430, November
23, 1995, 250 SCRA 268, 274-275):
An accused has in his favor the presumption of
innocence which the Bill of Rights guarantees.
Unless his guilt is shown beyond reasonable doubt,
he must be acquitted. This reasonable doubt
standard is demanded by the due process clause of
the Constitution which protects the accused from
conviction except upon proof beyond reasonable
doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime
with which he is charged. The burden of proof is on
the prosecution, and unless it discharges that
burden the accused need not even offer evidence in
his behalf, and he would be entitled to an acquittal.
Proof beyond reasonable doubt does not, of course,
mean such degree of proof as, excluding the
possibility of error, produce absolute certainty. Moral
certainty only is required, or that degree of proof
which produces conviction in an unprejudiced mind.
The conscience must be satisfied that the accused
is responsible for the offense charged.
So also, well settled, to the point of being
elementary, is the doctrine that when inculpatory
facts are susceptible to two or more interpretations,
one of which is consistent with the innocence of the
accused, the evidence does not fulfill or hurdle the
test of moral certainty required for conviction.
(People of the Philippines vs. Eric F. Timtiman, G.R.
No. 101663, November 4, 1992, 215 SCRA 364,
373 citing People vs. Remorosa, 200 SCRA 350,
360 [1991]; People vs. Raquel, 265 SCRA 248;
People vs. Aranda, 226 SCRA 562; People vs.
Maongco, 230 SCRA 562; People vs. Salangga, 234
SCRA 407).
Mindful of and guided by the aforecited constitutional
and legal precepts, doctrines and principles
prevailing in this jurisdiction, should petitioner's
Motion for Reconsideration be granted?
Docketed as Criminal Case No. 17450 before the
Sandiganbayan, the Information indicting Imelda R.
Marcos and Jose P. Dans, Jr. for a violation of
Section 3(9) of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended,
otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act, alleges:
That on or about June 8, 1984, and for sometime
prior or subsequent thereto, in Makati, Metro-Manila,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the accused IMELDA R. MARCOS
and JOSE P. DANS, JR., public officers, being then
Chairman and Vice-Chairman, respectively, of the
Light Rail Transit Authority (LRTA), a government
corporate entity created under Executive Order No.
603 of the former President Ferdinand Marcos, while
in the performance of their official functions, taking
advantage of their positions and committing the
crime in relation to their offices, did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully and criminally conspiring with one
another, enter on behalf of the aforesaid government
corporation into a Lease Agreement covering LRTA
property located in Pasay City, with the Philippines
General Hospital Foundation, Inc. (PGHFI), a private
enterprise, under terms and conditions manifestly
and grossly disadvantageous to the government.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
The case was raffled off to the First Division of the
Sandiganbayan, with Presiding Justice Francis E.
Garchitorena, as Chairman and Justices Jose S.
Balajadia and Narciso T. Atienza, as members. On
September 15, 1993, when the First Division failed
to comply with the legal requirement of unanimity of
its three members due to the dissent of Justice
Narciso T. Atienza, Presiding Justice Garchitorena
issued Administrative Order No. 288-93 constituting
a Special Division of five and designating Justices
Augusto M. Amores and Cipriano A. Del Rosario, as
additional members.
On September 21, 1993, Justice Amores wrote
Presiding Justice Garchitorena requesting that he be
given fifteen (15) days to send in his Manifestation.
However, on the same day, September 21, 1993,
when Justice Balajadia and Presiding Justice
Garchitorena agreed with the opinion of Justice Del
Rosario, Presiding Justice Garchitorena issued
Administrative Order No. 293-93, dissolving the
Special Division of Five, without waiting for Justice
Amores' manifestation. Justice Garchitorena
considered the said request of Justice Amores as
"pointless because of the agreement of Justice
Balajadia and the undersigned to the conclusion
reached by Justice Atienza". Thus, on September
24, 1993, the now assailed decision was handed
down by the First Division of the Sandiganbayan.
Under the aforequoted Information charging
accused Imelda R. Marcos and Jose P. Dans, Jr.
with a violation of Section 3(g) of RA 3019, the
following elements of the offense charged must be
proved beyond reasonable doubt, to wit: 1] that the
accused acted as a public officer; 2] that subject
Contract or transaction entered into by the latter is
manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the
government.
There is no dispute that sometime in the year 1984,
the herein petitioner, Imelda R. Marcos, was Minister
of Human Settlement while Jose P. Dans, Jr. was
the Minister of Transportation and Communication.
The two served as ex oficio Chairman and Vice-
Chairman, respectively, of the Light Rail Transport
Authority (LRTA). Petitioner Marcos was also
Chairman of the Board of Trustees of the Philippine
General Hospital Foundation, Inc. (PGHFI).
On June 8, 1984, petitioner, in her capacity as
Chairman of PGHFI, and Jose P. Dans, Jr. as Vice
Chairman of LRTA, signed the Lease Agreement
(Exhibit "B") by virtue of which LRTA leased to
PGHFI subject lot with an area of 7.340 square
meters, at a monthly rental of P102,760.00 for a
period of twenty-five (25) years.
On June 27, 1984, the PGHFI, represented by its
Chairman Imelda R. Marcos, and Transnational
Construction Corporation, represented by its
President Ignacio B. Gimenez, signed the Sublease
Agreement (Exhibit "D"), wherein said lessee rented
the same area of 7.340 square meters for
P734,000.00 a month, for a period of twenty-five
(25) years.
For executing the aforesaid Lease Agreement
(Exhibit "B"), petitioner and Jose P. Dans, Jr. were
indicted in the said Information, for conspiring and
confederating with each other in entering into
subject Lease Agreement alleged to be manifestly
and grossly disadvantageous to the government.
After trial, as earlier alluded to, the Sandiganbayan
convicted the petitioner and Jose P. Dans, Jr. of the
offense charged.
On June 29, 1998, the Third Division of this court
came out with its decision affirming the judgment, as
against petitioner Imelda R. Marcos in G.R. No.
126995, but reversing the same judgment, as
against Joe P. Dans, Jr., in G.R. No. 127073.
In affirming the judgment of conviction against
petitioner, the Third Division found the rental price
stipulated in the Lease Agreement, (Exhibit "B")
unfair and unreasonably low, upon a comparison
with the rental rate in the Sub-lease Agreement
(Exhibit "D"), which contract petitioner subsequently
signed on behalf of PGHFI, with TNCC. Undaunted,
the petitioner interposed the present Motion for
Reconsideration.
The pivot of inquiry here is whether all the elements
of the offense charged have been duly
substantiated. As regards the first element, did
petitioner Imelda R. Marcos enter into the Lease
Agreement marked Exhibit "B" as a public officer?
As clearly stated on the face of the subject contract
under scrutiny, it petitioner signed the same in her
capacity as Chairman of PGHFI and not as Human
Settlement Minister nor as ex-officio Chairman of
LRTA. It was Jose P. Dans, Jr. who signed said
Contract, as ex-officio Vice Chairman of LRTA.
Although petitioner was the ex-officio Chairman of
LRTA, at the time, there is no evidence to show that
she was present when the Board of Directors of
LRTA authorized and approved the Lease
Agreement sued upon.
In light of the foregoing antecedent facts and
circumstances, the irresistible conclusion is that
petitioner did not sign subject Lease Agreement as a
public officer, within the contemplation of RA 3019
and, therefore, the first element of the offense
charged is wanting.
It bears stressing, in this connection, that Jose P.
Cans, Jr., the public officer who signed the said
Lease Agreement (Exhibit "B") for LRTA, was
acquitted.

As regards the second element of the offense
that such Lease Agreement is grossly and
manifestly disadvantageous to the government, the
respondent court based its finding thereon against
the petitioner and Jose P. Dans, Jr., on a
ratiocination that while the rental price under the
Lease Agreement is only P102,760.00 a month, the
monthly rental rate under the Sub-lease Agreement
is P734,000.00. After comparing the two rental rates
aforementioned, the respondent court concluded
that the rental price of P102,760.00 a month is
unfair, unreasonable and disadvantageous to the
government.
But Exhibit "B" does not prove that the said contract
entered into by petitioner is "manifestly and grossly
disadvantageous to the government." There is no
established standard by which Exhibit "B"'s rental
provisions could be adjudged prejudicial to LRTA or
the entire government. Exhibit "B" standing alone
does not prove any offense. Neither does Exhibit "B"
together with the Sub-lease Agreement (Exhibit "D")
prove the offense charged.
At most, it creates only a doubt in the mind of the
objective readers as to which (between the lease
and sub-lease rental rates) is the fair and
reasonable one, considering the different
circumstances as well as parties involved. It could
happen that in both contracts, neither the LRTA nor
the Government suffered any injury. There is,
therefore, insufficient evidence to prove petitioner's
guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
Verily, it is too obvious to require an extended
disquisition that the only basis of the respondent
court for condemning the Lease Agreement (Exhibit
"B") as "manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to
the government" was a comparison of the rental rate
in the Lease Agreement, with the very much higher
rental price under the Sub-lease Agreement (Exhibit
"D"). Certainly, such a comparison is purely
speculative and violative of due process. The mere
fact that the Sub-lease Agreement provides a
monthly rental of P734,000.00 does not necessarily
mean that the rental price of P102,760.00 per month
under the Lease Agreement (Exhibit "B") is very low,
unreasonable and manifestly and grossly
disadvantageous to the government. There are
many factors to consider in the determination of
what is a reasonable rate of rental.
What is more, as stressed by Jose P. Dans Jr.,
when subject Lease Agreement was inked, the
rental rate therein provided was based on a study
conducted in accordance with generally accepted
rules of rental computation. On this score, Mr.
Ramon F. Cuervo, Jr., the real estate appraiser who
testified in the case as an expert witness and whose
impartiality and competence were never impugned,
assured the court that the rental price stipulated in
the Lease Agreement under scrutiny was fair and
adequate. According to him, witness, the reasonable
rental for subject property at the time of execution of
Exhibit "B" was only P73,000.00 per month.
That the Sub-lease Agreement (Exhibit "D") was for
a very much higher rental rate of P734,000.00 a
month is of no moment. This circumstance did not
necessarily render the monthly rental rate of
P102,760.00 manifestly and grossly
disadvantageous to the lessor. Evidently, the
prosecution failed to prove that the rental rate of
P102,760.00 per month was manifestly and grossly
disadvantageous to the government. Not even a
single lease contract covering a property within the
vicinity of the said leased premises was offered in
evidence The disparity between the rental price of
the Lease Agreement and that of the Sublease
Agreement is no evidence at all to buttress the
theory of the prosecution, "that the Lease
Agreement in question is manifestly and grossly
disadvantageous to the government". "Gross" is a
comparative term. Before it can be considered
"gross", there must be a standard by which the same
is weighed and measured.
All things viewed in proper perspective, it is
decisively clear that there is a glaring absence of
substantiation that the Lease Agreement under
controversy is grossly and manifestly
disadvantageous to the government, as theorized
upon by the prosecution.
Furthermore, that the lessee, PGHFI, succeeded in
obtaining a high rental rate of P734,000.00 a month,
did not result in any disadvantage to the government
because obviously, the rental income realized by
PGHFI from the Sub-lease Agreement (Exhibit "D"),
augmented the financial support for and improved
the management and operation of the Philippine
General Hospital, which is, after all, a government
hospital of the people and for the people.
Another sustainable ground for the granting of
petitioner's motion for reconsideration is the failure
and inability of the prosecution to prove that
petitioner was present when the Board of Directors
of LRTA authorized and approved the Lease
Agreement complained of. Albeit, petitioner was ex
oficio chairman of the Board of Directors of LRTA
when the said Lease Agreement was entered into,
there is no evidence whatsoever to show that she
attended the board meeting of LRTA which
deliberated and acted upon subject Lease
Agreement (Exhibit "B"). It is thus beyond cavil that
petitioner signed the said Lease Agreement as
Chairman of the PGH Foundation, Inc., a private
charitable foundation, and not as a public officer.
Neither can petitioner be considered as in
conspiracy with Jose P. Dans, Jr., who has been
found without any criminal liability for signing the
same Lease Agreement. Absent any conspiracy of
petitioner with Dans, the act of the latter cannot be
viewed as an act of the former. Petitioner is only
answerable for her own individual act.
Consequently, petitioner not having signed Exhibit
"B" as a Public officer, there is neither legal nor
factual basis for her conviction under Section 3(g) of
Rep Act 3019.
It beers repeating that apart from the Lease
Agreement and Sub-lease Agreement marked
Exhibits "B" and "D", respectively, the prosecution
offered no other evidence to prove the accusation at
bar.
What makes petitioner's stance the more meritorious
and impregnable is the patent violation of her right to
due process, substantive and procedural, by the
respondent court. Records disclose that: (a) the First
Division of the Sandiganbayan composed of
Presiding Justice Garchitorena and Associate
Justices Balajadia and Atienza could not agree on
whether to convict or acquit the petitioner in the five
(5) criminal cases pending against her. Justice
Atienza was in favor of exonerating petitioner in
Criminal Case Nos. 17449, 17451 and 17452.
Justices Garchitorena and Balajadia wanted to
convict her in Criminal Case Nos. 17450, 17451,
17452 and 17453. As there was no unanimity of
votes in Criminal Case Nos. 17451 and 17452; (b)
on September 15, 1993, in accordance with Sec. 5
of P.D. No. 1606, Presiding Justice Garchitorena
issued Adm. Order No. 288-93 constituting a Special
Division of five (5) justices, and naming thereto,
Justices Augusto M. Amores and Cipriano A. del
Rosario; (c) on September 21, 1993, Justice Amores
sent a written request to Presiding Justice
Garchitorena asking that he be given fifteen (15)
days to submit his Manifestation; (d) on the same
day, September 21, 1993, however, Presiding
Justice Garchitorena and Justices Balajadia and del
Rosario, after attending a hearing of the Committee
of Justice of the House of Representatives, lunched
together in a Quezon City restaurant where they
discussed petitioner's cases in the absence of
Justices Atienza and Amores and in the presence of
a non-member of the Special Division. Thereat,
Presiding Justice Garchitorena, and Justices,
Balajadia and del Rosario agreed with the position of
Justice Atienza to acquit petitioner in Criminal Case
Nos. 17449, 17451 and 17452 and to convict her in
the other cases; and (e) when the Justices returned
to the official workplace of Sandiganbayan,
Presiding Justice Garchitorena issued Adm. Order
No. 293-93 dissolving the Special Division.
Such prodedural flaws committed by respondent
Sandiganbayan are fatal to the validity of its
"decision" convicting petitioner for the following
reasons, viz:
First. Section 4, Rule VI categorically provides
that "sessions of the Sandiganbayan, whether en
banc or division, shall be held in its principal office in
the Metropolitan Manila where it shall try and
determine all cases filed with it . . .." This rule
reiterates Sec. 2 of P.D. No. 1606, as amended,
creating the Sandiganbayan.
Second. The rules of Sandiganbayan do not
allow unscheduled discussion of cases. We take
judicial notice of the procedure that cases in all
courts are carefully calendared and advance notices
are given to judges and justices to enable them to
study and prepare for deliberation. The calendaring
cases cannot be the subject of anybody's whims and
caprices.
Third. The rules of Sandiganbayan do not also
allow informal discussion of cases. The deliberations
in case at bar did not appear on record. The informal
discussion of the three justices came to light only
when petitioner moved to inhibit Presiding Justice
Garchitorena after her conviction by the resuscitated
First Division. Presiding Justice Garchitorena, in a
paper entitled "Response," revealed for the first time
the informal discussion of petitioner's cases at an
unnamed restaurant in Quezon City. There is no
way to know how the discussion was conducted as it
was not minuted.
Fourth. The rules of the Sandiganbayan do not allow
the presence of a non-member in the deliberation of
cases. In the case at bar a certain justice was
present when Presiding Justice Garchitorena,
Justice Balajadia, and Justice del Rosario discussed
petitioner's cases while taking their lunch in a
Quezon City restaurant.
Fifth. The rules of the Sandiganbayan do not allow
the exclusion of a member of a Division, whether
regular or special, in the deliberation of cases.
Justices Atienza and Amores were members of the
Special Division but were not present when
petitioner's cases were discussed over lunch in a
Quezon City restaurant. They ware not notified of
the informal, unscheduled meeting. In fact, Justice
Amores had a pending request for 15 days to study
petitioner's cases. In effect, Atienza and Amores
were disenfranchised. They were denied their right
to vote for the conviction or acquittal of petitioner.
These irregularities violated the right of petitioner to
be tried by a collegial court. Under PD No. 1606, as
amended, and pursuant to the rules of
Sandiganbayan, petitioner cannot be convicted
except upon the vote of three justices, regardless of
whether her cases are before a regular division of
three (3) justices or a Special Division of five (5)
justices. But more important than the vote of three
(3) justices is the process by which they arrive at
their vote. It is indispensable that their vote be
preceded by discussion and deliberation by all the
members of the division. Before the deliberation by
all, any opinion of a justice is but tentative and could
be changed. It is only after all the justices have been
heard should the justices reach a judgment. No one
opinion can be denigrated in importance for
experience shows that an opinion that starts as a
minority opinion could become the majority opinion
after the collision of views of the justices. The right of
the petitioner, therefore, is the right to be heard by
all the five justices of the Special Division. She is
entitled to be afforded the opinion of all its members.
In the case at bar, Presiding Justice Garchitorena
had already created the Special Division of five (5)
justices in view of the lack of unanimity of the three
(3) justices in the First Division. At that stage,
petitioner had a vested right to be heard by the five
(5) justices, especially the new justices in the
persons of Justices Amores and del Rosario who
may have a different view of the cases against her.
At that point, Presiding Justice Garchitorena and
Justice Balajadia may change their mind and agree
with the original opinion of Justice Atienza but the
turnaround cannot deprive petitioner of her vested
right to the opinion of justices Amores and del
Rosario. It may be true that Justice del Rosario had
already expressed his opinion during an informal,
unscheduled meeting in the unnamed restaurant but
as aforestated, that opinion is not the opinion
contemplated by law. But what is more, petitioner
was denied the opinion of Justice Amores for before
it could be given, Presiding Justice Garchitorena
dissolved the Special Division.
We reject the rationalization that the opinion of
Justice Amores was of de minimis importance as it
cannot overturn the votes of the three justices
convicting the petitioner. This is a mere guesswork.
The more reasonable supposition is that said
opinion could have changed the opinions of the
other justices if it is based on an unbiased
appreciation of facts and an undistorted
interpretation of pertinent laws. For we cannot
unreasonably suppose that Presiding Justice
Garchitorena and Justices Balajadia and Atienza are
bigots who will never change their opinions about
the guilt of the petitioner despite a better opinion.
Yet, that is not all the value of the aborted opinion of
Justice Amores. If it were an opinion for the acquittal
of the petitioner, that opinion will have an added
value when petitioner appeals her conviction to this
Court. Again, depending on its scholarship, that
minority opinion could sway the opinion of this Court
towards the acquittal of petitioner.
Prescinding from those premises, it is indisputable
that the decision of the First Division of the
respondent Sandiganbayan convicting the petitioner
is void for violating her right to substantive and
procedural due process of law.
It is opined, however, that this case should be
remanded to the respondent Sandiganbayan for re-
decision by a Special Division of 5. As a general
rule, a void decision will not result in the acquittal of
an accused. The case ought to be remanded to the
court of origin for further proceedings for a void
judgment does not expose an accused to double
jeopardy. But the present case deserves a different
treatment considering the great length of time it has
been pending with our courts. Records reveal that
petitioner was first indicted in Criminal Case No.
17450 in January 1992. More than six (6) years
passed but petitioner's prosecution is far from over.
To remand the case to the Sandiganbayan will not
sit well with her constitutional right to its speedy
disposition. Section 16, Article III of the Constitution
assures "all persons shall have the right to a speedy
disposition of their cases before all judicial, quasi-
judicial, or administrative bodies." This right expands
the right of an accused "to have a speedy, impartial,
and public trial . . ." in criminal case guaranteed by
Section 14(2) of Article III of the Constitution. It has
a broadening effect because Section 16 covers the
periods before, during and after trial whereas
Section 14(2) covers only the trial period.1
Heretofore, we have held that an accused should be
acquitted when his right to speedy trial has been
violated. Thus, in the early 1936 case of People vs.
Castaeda, et al., 63 Phil 480, 485, 486, a ponencia
of Mr. Justice Laurel, we held:
A strict regard for the constitutional rights of the
accused would demand, therefore, that the case be
remanded to the court below for new trial before an
impartial judge. There are vital considerations,
however, which in the opinion of this court render
this step unnecessary. In the first place, the
Constitution, Article III, section 1, paragraph 17,
guarantees to every accused person the right to a
speedy trial. This criminal proceeding has been
dragging on for almost five (5) years now. The
accused have twice appealed to this court for
redress from the wrong that they have suffered at
the hands of the trial court. At least one of them,
namely, Pedro Fernandez (alias Piro), had been
confined in prison from July 20, 1932 to November
27, 1934 for inability to post the required bond of
P3,000 which was finally reduced to P300. The
Government should be the last to set an example of
delay and oppresson in the administration of justice
and it is the moral and legal obligation of this court to
see that the criminal proceedings against the
accused to come to an end and that they be
immediately discharged from the custody of the law.
(Conde vs. Rivera and Unson, 45 Phil., 650).

We reiterated this rule in Acebedo vs. Sarmiento,
viz: 2
2. More specifically, this Court has consistently
adhered to the view thatb a dismissal based on the
denial of the right to a speedy trial amounts to an
acquittal. Necessarily, any further attempt at
continuing the prosecution or starting a new one
would fall within the prohibition against an accused
being twice put in jeopardy. The extensive opinion of
Justice Castro in People vs. Obsania noted earlier
made reference to four Philippine decisions. People
vs. Diaz, People vs. Abao, People vs. Robles, and
People vs. Cloribel. In all of the above case, this
Court left no doubt that a dismissal of the case,
though at the instance of the defendant grounded on
the disregard of his right to a speedy trial was
tantamount to an acquittal. In People vs. Diaz, it was
shown that the case was set for hearing twice and
the prosecution without asking for postponement or
giving any explanation failed to appear. In People
vs. Abao, the facts disclosed that there were three
postponements. Thereafter, at the time the
resumption of the trial was scheduled, the
complaining witness as in this case was absent, this
Court held that respondent Judge was justified in
dismissing the case upon motion of the defense and
that the annulment or setting aside of the order of
dismissal would place the accused twice in jeopardy
of punishment for the same offense. People vs.
Robles likewise presented a picture of witnesses for
the prosecution not being available, with the lower
court after having transferred the hearings on
several occasions denying the last plea for
postponement and dismissing the case. Such order
of dismissal, accordirig to this Court "is not
provisional in character but one which is tantamount
to acquittal that would bar further prosecution of the
accused for the same offense." This is a summary of
the Cloribel case as set forth in the above opinion of
Justice Castro. "In Cloribel, the case dragged for
three years and eleven months, that is, from
September 27, 1958 when the information was filed
to August 15, 1962 when it was called for trial, after
numerous postponements, mostly at the instance of
the prosecution. On the latter date, the prosecution
failed to appear for trial, and upon motion of
defendants, the case was dismissed. This Court
held, "that the dismissal here complained of was not
truly a "dismissal" but an acquittal. For it was
entered upon the defendants" insistence on their
constitutional right to speedy trial and by reason of
the prosecution's failure to appear on the date of
trial." (Emphasis supplied)" There is no escaping the
conclusion then that petitioner here has clearly
made out a case of an acquittal arising from the
order of dismissal given in open court.
The rationale for both Section 14(2) and section 16
of Article III of the Constitution is the same, "justice
delayed is justice denied." Violation of either section
should therefore result in the acquittal of the
accused.
There are other reasons why the case should not be
remanded to the court a quo. Three justices of the
Special Division, namely Justice Atienza, Balajadia
and Amores have already retired. Presiding Justice
Garchitorena is still with the respondent court but his
impartiality has been vigorously assailed by the
petitioner. Mr. Justice Francisco of the Third Division
of this Court noted that Presiding Justice
Garchitorena's undue interference in the
examination of witness Cuervo relealed his bias and
prejudice against petitioner. 3 As Mr. Justice
Francisco observed "the court questions were so
numerous which as per petitioner Dans count totaled
179 compared to prosecutor Querubin's questions
which numbered merely 73. More noteworthy,
however, is that the court propounded leading,
misleading, and baseless hypothetical questions
rolled into one."4 Mr. Justice Francisco's opinion
was concurred by Mr. Justice Melo. Truly, even Mr.
Chief Justice Narvasa, Madam Justice Romero and
Mr. Justice Panganiban who voted to convict
petitioner did not refute Mr. Justice Francisco's
observations on the lack of impartiality of Presiding
Justice Garchitorena. They disregarded Mr. Ramon
F. Cuervo's testimony and based the conviction of
petitioner purely on the documentary evidence
submitted by the People. Moreover, all the evidence
in the case at bar are now before this Court and to
avoid further delay, we can evaluate the evidence. In
fact, the same evidence has been passed upon by
the Third Division of this Court in formulating its
judgment of affirmance sought to be reconsidered.
Certainly, it will be sheer rigmarole for this Court to
still remand the case for a Special Division of five of
the Sandiganbayan to render another decision in the
case, with respect to the herein petitioner.
I consider this opinion incomplete without quoting
herein the following portion of the concurring and
dissenting opinion of former Associate Justice
Ricardo J. Francisco dated January 29, 1998:
Thus, purely from the legal standpoint, with the
evident weakness of the prosecution's case and the
procedural aberrations that marred the trial, it is
simply unsound and impossible to treat differently
each petitioner who found themselves in one and
the same situation. Indeed, our regained democracy,
creditably, is successfully bailing us out from the
ruins of the authoritarian regime, and it expects that
government efforts in going after the plunderers of
that dark past remain unrelenting and decisive. But
let us not, in our anxiety to carry out this duty, for a
moment forget that our criminal justice system is not
a popularity contest where freedom and punishment
are determined merely by the fame or infamy of the
litigants. "The scales of justice", it has been aptly
said,5 "must hang equal and, in fact, should even be
tipped in favor of the accused because of the
constitutional presumption of innocence. Needless
to stress, this right is available to every accused,
whatever his present circumstance and no matter
how dark and repellent his past." Culpability for
crimes Must always take its bearing from evidence
and universal precepts of due process lest we
sacrifice in mocking shame once again the very
liberties we are defending.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Motion for
Reconsideration under consideration is hereby
GRANTED and petitioner Imelda R. Marcos is
hereby ACQUITTED of the offense charged. Costs
de oficio.
THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 156168. December 14, 2004]
EQUITABLE BANKING CORPORATION, petitioner,
vs. JOSE T. CALDERON, respondent.
DECISION
GARCIA, J.:
Thru this petition for review on certiorari under Rule
45 of the Rules of Court, petitioner Equitable
Banking Corporation (EBC), seeks the reversal and
setting aside of the decision dated November 25,
2002[1] of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
60016, which partially affirmed an earlier decision of
the Regional Trial Court at Makati City, Branch 61,
insofar as it grants moral damages and costs of suit
to herein respondent, Jose T. Calderon.
The decision under review recites the factual
background of the case, as follows:
Plaintiff-appellee [now respondent] Jose T. Calderon
(Calderon for brevity), is a businessman engaged in
several business activities here and abroad, either in
his capacity as President or Chairman of the Board
thereon. In addition thereto, he is a stockholder of
PLDT and a member of the Manila Polo Club,
among others. He is a seasoned traveler, who
travels at least seven times a year in the U.S.,
Europe and Asia. On the other hand, the defendant-
appellant [now petitioner] Equitable Banking
Corporation (EBC for brevity), is one of the leading
commercial banking institutions in the Philippines,
engaged in commercial banking, such as
acceptance of deposits, extension of loans and
credit card facilities, among others.
xxx xxx xxx
Sometime in September 1984, Calderon applied and
was issued an Equitable International Visa card
(Visa card for brevity). The said Visa card can be
used for both peso and dollar transactions within
and outside the Philippines. The credit limit for the
peso transaction is TWENTY THOUSAND
(P20,000.00) PESOS; while in the dollar
transactions, Calderon is required to maintain a
dollar account with a minimum deposit of $3,000.00,
the balance of dollar account shall serve as the
credit limit.
In April 1986, Calderon together with some
reputable business friends and associates, went to
Hongkong for business and pleasure trips.
Specifically on 30 April 1986, Calderon
accompanied by his friend, Ed De Leon went to
Gucci Department Store located at the basement of
the Peninsula Hotel (Hongkong). There and then,
Calderon purchased several Gucci items (t-shirts,
jackets, a pair of shoes, etc.). The cost of his total
purchase amounted to HK$4,030.00 or equivalent to
US$523.00. Instead of paying the said items in cash,
he used his Visa card (No. 4921 6400 0001 9373) to
effect payment thereof on credit. He then presented
and gave his credit card to the saleslady who
promptly referred it to the store cashier for
verification. Shortly thereafter, the saleslady, in the
presence of his friend, Ed De Leon and other
shoppers of different nationalities, informed him that
his Visa card was blacklisted. Calderon sought the
reconfirmation of the status of his Visa card from the
saleslady, but the latter simply did not honor it and
even threatened to cut it into pieces with the use of a
pair of scissors.
Deeply embarrassed and humiliated, and in order to
avoid further indignities, Calderon paid cash for the
Gucci goods and items that he bought.
Upon his return to the Philippines, and claiming that
he suffered much torment and embarrassment on
account of EBCs wrongful act of
blacklisting/suspending his VISA credit card while at
the Gucci store in Hongkong, Calderon filed with the
Regional Trial Court at Makati City a complaint for
damages[2] against EBC.
In its Answer,[3] EBC denied any liability to
Calderon, alleging that the latters credit card
privileges for dollar transactions were earlier placed
under suspension on account of Calderons prior use
of the same card in excess of his credit limit, adding
that Calderon failed to settle said prior credit
purchase on due date, thereby causing his
obligation to become past due. Corollarily, EBC
asserts that Calderon also failed to maintain the
required minimum deposit of $3,000.00.
To expedite the direct examination of witnesses, the
trial court required the parties to submit affidavits, in
question-and-answer form, of their respective
witnesses, to be sworn to in court, with cross
examination to be made in open court.
Eventually, in a decision dated October 10, 1997,[4]
the trial court, concluding that defendant bank was
negligent if not in bad faith, in suspending, or
blacklisting plaintiffs credit card without notice or
basis, rendered judgment in favor of Calderon, thus:
WHEREFORE PREMISES ABOVE CONSIDERED,
judgment is hereby rendered in favor of plaintiff as
against defendant EQUITABLE BANKING
CORPORATION, which is hereby ORDERED to pay
plaintiff as follows:
1. the sum of US$150.00 as actual damages;
2. the sum of P200,000.00 as and by way of moral
damages;
3. the amount of P100,000.00 as exemplary
damages;
4. the sum of P100,000.00 as attorneys fees plus
P500.00 per court hearing and
5. costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
Therefrom, EBC went to the Court of Appeals (CA),
whereat its recourse was docketed as CA G.R. CV
No. 60016.
After due proceedings, the CA, in a decision dated
November 25, 2002,[5] affirmed that of the trial court
but only insofar as the awards of moral damages,
the amount of which was even reduced, and the
costs of suits are concerned. More specifically, the
CA decision dispositively reads:[6]
WHEREFORE, in consideration of the foregoing
disquisitions, the decision of the court a quo dated
10 October 1997 is AFFIRMED insofar as the
awards of moral damages and costs of suit are
concerned. However, anent the award of moral
damages, the same is reduced to One Hundred
Thousand (P100,000.00) Pesos.
The rest of the awards are deleted.
SO ORDERED.
Evidently unwilling to accept a judgment short of
complete exemption from any liability to Calderon,
EBC is now with us via the instant petition on its lone
submission that THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED
IN HOLDING THAT THE RESPONDENT IS
ENTITLED TO MORAL DAMAGES
NOTWITHSTANDING ITS FINDING THAT
PETITIONERS ACTIONS HAVE NOT BEEN
ATTENDED WITH ANY MALICE OR BAD FAITH.[7]
The petition is impressed with merit.
In law, moral damages include physical suffering,
mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched
reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social
humiliation and similar injury.[8]However, to be
entitled to the award thereof, it is not enough that
one merely suffered sleepless nights, mental
anguish or serious anxiety as a result of the
actuations of the other party.[9] In Philippine
Telegraph & Telephone Corporation vs. Court of
Appeals,[10] we have had the occasion to reiterate
the conditions to be met in order that moral
damages may be recovered, viz:
An award of moral damages would require, firstly,
evidence of besmirched reputation, or physical,
mental or psychological suffering sustained by the
claimant; secondly, a culpable act or omission
factually established; thirdly, proof that the wrongful
act or omission of the defendant is the proximate
cause of the damages sustained by the
claimant; and fourthly, that the case is predicated on
any of the instances expressed or envisioned by
Articles 2219 and 2220 of the Civil Code.
Particularly, in culpa contractual or breach of
contract, as here, moral damages are recoverable
only if the defendant has acted fraudulently or in bad
faith,[11] or is found guilty of gross negligence
amounting to bad faith, or in wanton disregard of his
contractual obligations.[12] Verily, the breach must
be wanton, reckless, malicious or in bad faith,
oppressive or abusive.[13]
Here, the CA ruled, and rightly so, that no malice or
bad faith attended petitioners dishonor of
respondents credit card. For, as found no less by the
same court, petitioner was justified in doing so under
the provisions of its Credit Card Agreement[14] with
respondent, paragraph 3 of which states:
xxx the CARDHOLDER agrees not to exceed his/her
approved credit limit, otherwise, all charges incurred
including charges incurred through the use of the
extension CARD/S, if any in excess of credit limit
shall become due and demandable and the credit
privileges shall be automatically suspended without
notice to the CARDHOLDER in accordance with
Section 11 hereof.
We are thus at a loss to understand why, despite its
very own finding of absence of bad faith or malice on
the part of the petitioner, the CA nonetheless
adjudged it liable for moral damages to respondent.
Quite evidently, in holding petitioner liable for moral
damages, the CA justified the award on its
assessment that EBC was negligent in not informing
Calderon that his credit card was already suspended
even before he left for Hongkong, ratiocinating that
petitioners right to automatically suspend a
cardholders privileges without notice should not
have been indiscriminately used in the case of
respondent because the latter has already paid his
past obligations and has an existing dollar deposit in
an amount more than the required minimum for
credit card at the time he made his purchases in
Hongkong. But, as explained by the petitioner in the
memorandum it filed with this Court,[15] which
explanations were never controverted by
respondent:
xxx prior to the incident in question (i.e., April 30,
1986 when the purchases at the Gucci store in
Hongkong were made), respondent made credit
purchases in Japan and Hongkong from August to
September 1985 amounting to US$14,226.12, while
only having a deposit of US$3,639.00 in his dollar
account as evidenced by the pertinent monthly
statement of respondents credit card transactions
and his bank passbook, thus exceeding his credit
limit; these purchases were accommodated by the
petitioner on the condition that the amount needed
to cover the same will be deposited in a few days as
represented by respondents secretary and his
companys general manager a certain Mrs. Zamora
and Mr. F.R. Oliquiano; respondent however failed
to make good on his commitment; later, respondent
likewise failed to make the required deposit on the
due date of the purchases as stated in the pertinent
monthly statement of account;
as a consequence thereof, his card privileges for
dollar transactions were suspended; it was only four
months later on 31 January 1986, that respondent
deposited the sum of P14,501.89 in his dollar
account to cover his purchases; the said amount
however was not sufficient to maintain the required
minimum dollar deposit of $3,000.00 as the
respondents dollar deposit stood at only
US$2,704.94 after satisfaction of his outstanding
accounts; a day before he left for Hongkong,
respondent made another deposit of US$14,000.00
in his dollar account but did not bother to request the
petitioner for the reinstatement of his credit card
privileges for dollar transactions, thus the same
remained under suspension.[16]
The foregoing are based on the sworn affidavit of
petitioners Collection Manager, a certain Lourdes
Canlas, who was never cross examined by the
respondent nor did the latter present any evidence
to refute its veracity.
Given the above, and with the express provision on
automatic suspension without notice under
paragraph 3, supra, of the parties Credit Card
Agreement, there is simply no basis for holding
petitioner negligent for not notifying respondent of
the suspended status of his credit card privileges.
It may be so that respondent, a day before he left for
Hongkong, made a deposit of US$14,000.00 to his
dollar account with petitioner. The sad reality,
however, is that he never verified the status of his
card before departing for Hongkong, much less
requested petitioner to reinstate the same.[17]
And, certainly, respondent could not have justifiably
assumed that petitioner must have reinstated his
card by reason alone of his having deposited
US$14,000.00 a day before he left for Hongkong. As
issuer of the card, petitioner has the option to decide
whether to reinstate or altogether terminate a credit
card previously suspended on considerations which
the petitioner deemed proper, not the least of which
are the cardholders payment record, capacity to pay
and compliance with any additional requirements
imposed by it. That option, after all, is expressly
embodied in the same Credit Card Agreement,
paragraph 12 of which unmistakably states:
The issuer shall likewise have the option of
reinstating the card holders privileges which have
been terminated for any reason whatsoever upon
submission of a new accomplished application form
if required by the issuer and upon payment of an
additional processing fee equivalent to annual
fee.[18]
Even on the aspect of negligence, therefore,
petitioner could not have been properly adjudged
liable for moral damages.
Unquestionably, respondent suffered damages as a
result of the dishonor of his card. There is, however,
a material distinction between damages and injury.
To quote from our decision in BPI Express Card
Corporation vs. Court of Appeals:[19]
Injury is the illegal invasion of a legal right; damage
is the loss, hurt or harm which results from the injury;
and damages are the recompense or compensation
awarded for the damage suffered. Thus, there can
be damage without injury in those instances in which
the loss or harm was not the result of a violation of a
legal duty. In such cases the consequences must be
borne by the injured person alone, the law affords no
remedy for damages resulting from an act which
does not amount to a legal injury or wrong. These
situations are often called damnum absque injuria.
In other words, in order that a plaintiff may maintain
an action for the injuries of which he complains, he
must establish that such injuries resulted from a
breach of duty which the defendant owed to the
plaintiff- a concurrence of injury to the plaintiff and
legal responsibility by the person causing it. The
underlying basis for the award of tort damages is the
premise that an individual was injured in
contemplation of law. Thus, there must first be a
breach of some duty and the imposition of liability for
that breach before damages may be awarded; and
the breach of such duty should be the proximate
cause of the injury. (Emphasis supplied).
In the situation in which respondent finds himself, his
is a case of damnum absque injuria.
We do not take issue with the appellate court in its
observation that the Credit Card Agreement herein
involved is a contract of adhesion, with the
stipulations therein contained unilaterally prepared
and imposed by the petitioner to prospective credit
card holders on a take-it-or-leave-it basis. As said by
us in Polotan, Sr. vs. Court of Appeals:[20]
A contract of adhesion is one in which one of the
contracting parties imposes a ready-made form of
contract which the other party may accept or reject,
but cannot modify. One party prepares the
stipulation in the contract, while the other party
merely affixes his signature or his adhesion thereto
giving no room for negotiation and depriving the
latter of the opportunity to bargain on equal footing.
On the same breath, however, we have equally
ruled that such a contract is as binding as ordinary
contracts, the reason being that the party who
adheres to the contract is free to reject it entirely.[21]
Moreover, the provision on automatic suspension
without notice embodied in the same Credit Card
Agreement is couched in clear and unambiguous
term, not to say that the agreement itself was
entered into by respondent who, by his own account,
is a reputable businessman engaged in business
activities here and abroad.
On a final note, we emphasize that moral damages
are in the category of an award designed to
compensate the claim for actual injury suffered and
not to impose a penalty on the wrongdoer.[22]
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby
GRANTED and the decision under review
REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
SO ORDERED.
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. Nos. 131638-39. March 26, 2001]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs. LORETA MEDENILLA y DORIA, accused-
appellant.
DECISION
KAPUNAN, J.:
This is an appeal from a joint decision of the
Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Branch 262,
promulgated on November 26, 1997, in Criminal
Case Nos. 3618-D and 3619-D finding accused-
appellant Loreto Medenilla y Doria guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of violating Sections 15 and 16 of
Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, otherwise
known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972.[1]
Accused-appellant was charged in Criminal Case
No. 3618-D for violating Section 15,[2] Article III of
R.A. No. 6425. The information reads as follows:
That on or about the 16th day of April, 1996 in the
City of Mandaluyong, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable court, the above-
named accused, not being lawfully authorized to
possess any regulated drug, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously sell, deliver and
give away to another 5.08 grams of white crystalline
substance positive to the test for methampetamine
hydrochloride (shabu) which is regulated drug, in
violation of the above cited law.[3]
Accused-appellant was also charged in Criminal
Case No. 3619-D for violating Section 16,[4] Article
III of R.A. No. 6425 with an information which reads
as follows:
That on or about the 16th day of April, 1996 in the
City of Mandaluyong, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, not being lawfully authorized to
possess any regulated drug, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and knowingly have in his
possession and/or (sic) under his custody and
control four (4) transparent plastic bags containing
white crystalline substance with a total weight of
200.45 grams, which were found positive to the test
for methampetamine hydrochloride (shabu) which is
regulated drug, in violation of the above cited law.[5]
Arraigned on June 25, 1996, accused-appellant
pleaded not guilty to both charges.[6] Joint trial
ensued thereafter.
The prosecutions version, as gathered from the
testimonies of SPO2 Bonifacio Cabral, SPO1
Neowille De Castro and P/Sr. Insp. Julita T. De Villa,
is as follows:
On April 14, 1996, a confidential informant arrived at
the office of the Narcotics Command (NARCOM) in
camp Crame and reported to SPO2 Bonifacio Cabral
that there is a certain person engaged in illegal drug
pushing activities in Caloocan, Malabon and
Mandaluyong. SPO2 Cabral reported the matter to
his superior, Police Senior Inspector Manzanas.[7]
Accordingly, Sr. Insp. Manzanas directed SPO2
Cabral to confirm the veracity of the report. Thus,
SPO2 Cabral requested the confidential informant to
contact the suspected drug pusher to introduce him
as a possible buyer.[8]
On April 15, 1996, the informant returned to the
NARCOM office and told SPO2 Cabral that he had
arranged a meeting with the suspected drug pusher.
The two then proceeded to the pre-arranged
meeting place at a Seven Eleven Store along Boni
Avenue, Mandaluyong City. At around 5:30 p.m.,
accused-appellant arrived on board a Toyota
Corolla.[9] Without alighting from his car, accused-
appellant spoke with the informant.[10] The
informant introduced SPO2 Cabral to accused-
appellant as a prospective buyer of shabu. Accused-
appellant inquired how many grams of shabu he
wanted to buy and SPO2 Cabral replied that he
needed five (5) grams. The suspect then offered the
shabu at the price of One Thousand Pesos
(P1,000.00) per gram to which SPO2 Cabral
agreed.[11] Accused-appellant told SPO2 Cabral to
return the following day. They agreed that the pick
up point would be at the United Coconut Planters
Bank (UCPB) Building also along Boni Avenue.
Upon their return to Camp Crame, SPO2 Cabral and
the informant reported the results of their meeting to
Sr. Insp. Manzanas. Based on their information, a
buy-bust operation was planned. SPO2 Cabral was
designated to act as the poseur-buyer with SPO2 de
Castro as his back-up. Sr. Insp. Manzanas was
assigned to stay in the car and await the signal to be
given by SPO2 Cabral, through his pager, before
apprehending accused-appellant.
At around 3:30 in the early morning of April 16,
1996, the buy-bust team proceeded to the agreed
meeting place at the UCPB Building in Boni
Avenue.[12] Upon reaching the area, SPO2 Cabral
alighted from the car while the other operatives
positioned themselves in strategic areas.[13] After
thirty (30) minutes, accused-appellant arrived.[14]
after talking for a short time with SPO2 Cabral,
accused-appellant asked the former if he had the
money.[15] SPO2 Cabral showed the bundle of
money[16] and accused-appellant told him to wait.
When he returned, SPO2 Cabral gave him the
money and, in exchange, accused-appellant handed
a pack containing a white crystalline substance.[17]
As planned, SPO2 Cabral turned on his pager which
prompted the backup operatives to close in and
apprehend accused-appellant.[18] SPO2 Cabral
asked accused-appellant if he could search the
latters car. Accused-appellant acceded
to the request and, as a result, SPO2 Cabral found a
brown clutch bag at the drivers seat of the car.Inside
the clutch bag, they found therein four plastic bags
containing a white crystalline substance which they
suspected was shabu.[19]
Accused-appellant was brought to Camp Crame for
booking. SPO2 Cabral and SPO1 de Castro then
submitted the substance they confiscated to the
PNP Crime Laboratory for examination.[20] They
thereafter brought accused-appellant to the PNP
General Hospital for a medical and physical
examination.[21]
The laboratory report on the white crystalline
substance showed that the same tested positive for
methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu[22] and
that the contents of the substance sold weighed 5.08
grams while those taken from the bag had a total
weight of 200.45 grams. The report reads:
PHYSICAL SCIENCES REPORT NO. D-448-96
CASE: Alleged Viol of RA 6425 SUSPECT/S:
LORETO MEDENILLA
TIME AND DATE RECEIVED: 2145H 16 April 1996
REQUESTING PARTY/UNIT: C, SOU-HQS-
PNPNARCOM
Camp Crame, Quezon City
SPECIMEN SUBMITTED:
Exh A One (1) brown MARUDINI CLUTCH BAG
containing the following specimens:
1. One (1) heat sealed transparent plastic bag
marked as Exh A-1 with 5.08 grams of white
crystalline substance:
2. Four (4) transparent plastic bags marked as Exhs.
A-2 through A-5 each with white crystalline
substance and having a total weight of 200.45
grams. xxx
PURPOSE OF LABORATORY EXAMINATION:
To determine the presence of prohibited and/or
regulated drug. xxx
FINDINGS:
Qualitative examination conducted on the above-
stated specimens gave positive result to the tests for
Methamphetamine Hydrochloride, a regulated drug.
xxx
CONCLUSION:
Exhs. A-1, A-2 through A-5 contain
methamphetamine hydrochloride, a regulated drug.
REMARKS:
TIME AND DATE COMPLETED: 0740H 17 April
1996[23]
For his defense, accused-appellant presented a
different version of the events leading to his arrest.
On or about April 12, 1996, accused-appellant
rented a car, a Toyota Corolla, from a certain Jess
Hipolito. It was to be used by his brother for a trip to
Pangasinan.[24] On April 15, 1996, his brother
turned over the car to accused-appellant with the
instruction to return the car to Jess Hipolito.[25]
However, before returning the car, accused-
appellant decided to use the same for a night out
with his friends.Accused-appellant, along with four
(4) of his friends, namely, Joy, Tess, Willy and Jong-
jong, went to Bakahan in Quezon City for dinner
and, thereafter, transferred to Music Box Lounge
located in front of the said restaurant,. After having
some drinks, accused-appellant decided to return
the car to Jess Hipolito and just take a taxicab with
his friends in going back to their place in Caloocan
City.[26] They all proceeded to the condominium unit
of Jess Hipolito located along Boni Avenue in
Mandaluyong City.[27] they reached the place at
around 2:30 a.m.[28] Accused-appellant told the
guard of the condominium building that he wanted to
see Jess Hipolito to retun the car he rented. The
guard instructed him to park the car in front of
UCPB. After doing so, accused-appellant, together
with Jong-jong and Joy went up to the unit of Jess
Hipolito while their two companions, Willy and Tess,
stayed in the lobby.[29] While inside the unit of Jess
Hipolito, accused-appellant was introduced to
Alvin.[30] Accused-appellant told Jess Hipolito that
he wanted to return the car. However, Jess Hipolito
requested accused-appellant to drive Alvin, using
the rented car, to quezon City since the latter was
carrying a large amount of money.[31]Accused-
appellant acceded to the request of Jess Hipolito.
They then all went down and, along with Willy and
Tess who were then at the lobby, boarded the
vehicle.[32] However, when accused-appellant was
about to back out the vehicle, a white car blocked
the rear portion of the car.[33] The passengers of
the white car then stepped out of their vehicle and
approached them. One of the passengers of the
white car, SPO1 de Castro, asked accused-
appellant to roll down his window and, after doing
so, SPO2 Cabral introduced himself and his
companions as police officers.[34] Accused-
appellant then asked: Bakit po, sir?[35] In response,
one of the police officers said: May titingnan lang
muna kami, baba muna kayo.[36] after alighting from
the vehicle, accused-appellant and his companions
were frisked.[37] Thereafter, SPO2 Cabral noticed a
brown clutch bag being held by Alvin and
confiscated the same. SPO2
Cabral then asked accused-appellant if he can
search the car. The latter agreed. SPO2 Cabral
searched the car for about 15 minutes but found
nothing.[38] SPO2 Cabral then opened the brown
clutch bag he confiscated from Alvin and found
plastic sachets containing a white crystalline
substance. The police officers then instructed
accused-appellant and his companions to board
their vehicle. They were all brought to Camp
Crame.[39] When they reached the said camp, they
were instructed to alight from the vehicle one by
one. The first one to step out of the vehicle and go
inside the office was Alvin. After 20 minutes, the two
women, Tess and Joy, were brought inside the office
and, after 30 minutes, accused-appellant, along with
the two remaining passengers, Willy and Jong-jong,
followed.[40]
]When they were all inside the NARCOM office, their
personal circumstances were taken down.
Thereafter, Jong-jong, Willy and accused-appellant
were separated from the group and placed inside
the detention cell. Alvin and the two women were left
behind in the office and were later on released.[41]
After a few hours, Jong-jong and Willy were brought
out of the detention cell while accused-appellant,
who was then sleeping, was left in confinement.
Jong-jong and Willy were brought into the office and
were made to sign a document on a yellow pad,
prepared by the police officers. The police officers
then cautioned the two that they will be implicated in
the case if they interfered. They were then released
and accompanied out to Camp Crame by a police
officer.[42] Accused-appellant was the only one who
remained in detention and was, subsequently, solely
charged for the illegal sale and possession of shabu.
While in detention, accused-appellant learned that
the vehicle he borrowed from Jess Hipolito was
owned by a certain Evita Ebora, who was also
detained in the Mandaluyong City Jail for a drug-
related offense.[43]
On November 17, 1997, the trial court found
accused-appellant guilty as charged. The dispositive
portion of the trial courts decision reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding
accuse LORETO MEDENILLA y DORIA GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt of violating Sections 15
and 16, in relation to Section 20, of Republic Act No.
6425, as amended, otherwise known as the
Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972. Said accused is
hereby sentenced to: (a) with respect to Criminal
Case No. 3618-D, suffer an indeterminate sentence
of a minimum of one (1) year, eight (8) months and
twenty (20) days, to a maximum of four (4) years
and two (2) months of prision correccional; (b) with
respect to Criminal Case No. 3619-D, suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua, and pay a fine in the
amount of Two Million Pesos (P2,000,000.00); (c)
suffer all the accessories penalties consequent
thereto; and (d) pay the costs.
The shabu involved in this action is hereby
confiscated in favor of the government and ordered
to be forwarded to the Dangerous Drugs Board to be
disposed of in accordance with law.
SO ORDERED.[44]
Hence, this appeal where accused-appellant raises
the following issues:
I. Was the accused arrested illegally?
II. Was there in fact any buy-bust operation?
III. Was the accused accorded his right to due
process?[45]
Being interrelated, we shall discuss the first and
second issues jointly.
The defense insist that there was no prior
agreement between accused-appellant and SPO2
Cabral for the sale of 5 grams of shabu on April 16,
1996 and that no buy bust operation actually took
place.The prosecutions claim that there was a buy-
bust operation is, according to the defense, belied
by the testimonies of accused-appellant and
Wilfredo de Jesus that when the incident took place,
accused-appellant was not alone but was
accompanied by five (5) other persons.[46] thus, the
defense argues that since there was no buy-bust
operation, the arrest of accused-appellant was illegal
since the arresting officers were not properly armed
with a warrant of arrest.
Accused-appellants argument deserves scant
consideration. The prosecution through the
testimonies of SPO2 Cabral and SPO1 de Castro
adequately established the fact that there was a
legally conducted buy-bust operation. Their
testimonies clearly showed that their confidential
informant reported the drug operations of accused-
appellant; that a meeting took place between
accused-appellant and SPO2 Cabral where they
agreed on the sale of 5 grams of shabu; that the
NARCOM operatives planned a buy-bust operation;
that the said operation was indeed conducted; and
that the same resulted in the arrest of accused-
appellant and the confiscation of 5 plastic bags
containing a white crystalline substance. In this
regard, the testimonies of the police officers were
given full credence by the trial court, to wit:
The prosecution witnesses gave a detailed account
of the circumstances surrounding the apprehension
of accused Medenilla from the time Cabral was
introduced to accused Medenilla up to the buy-bust
operation, which culminated in the arrest of
accused-Medenilla. This Court can find no
inconsistency in their testimonies and, as such,
gives full faith and credit thereto. In addition, it is to
be noted that no evidence exists to show that the
law enforcers failed to perform their duty regularly.
Neither was any evidence presented to show that
there was improper motive on the part of said
witnesses to falsely implicate accused Medenilla. On
the contrary, it was
established that they did not know accused
Medenilla prior to the buy bust operation. xxx[47]
The trial courts determination of the credibility of the
police officers deserves the highest respect by this
court, considering that the trial court had the direct
opportunity to observe their deportment and manner
of testifying.[48] Furthermore, in the absence of any
proof of any intent on the part of the police
authorities to falsely impute such a serious crime
against accused-appellant, the testimonies of SPO2
Cabral and SPO1 de Castro on the buy-bust
operation are deserving of belief due to the
presumption of regularity in the performance of
official duty accorded to law enforcers.[49] Clearly,
accused-appellants mere denial and concoction of
another arrest scenario cannot overcome the
positive testimonies of the police officers.
Even the supposed corroborative testimony of
Wilfredo de Jesus is not credible since the said
witness appeared to have been making a mockery
of the proceedings before the lower court as noted
by the trial judge, to wit:
COURT:
You better refrain from smiling, I have been warning
you. You keep on laughing.
Atty. Arias:
Your Honor, because he laughs.(interrupted)
COURT:
No, he is laughing.
xxx
COURT:
And keep on laughing.
Atty. Arias:
He is smiling your Honor.
COURT:
No, he is not smiling, you can ask him. I do not
understand why this guy is keep (sic) on laughing.
Atty. Arias:
Binabalaan ka na bata. Huwag kang tatawa, huwag
kang ngingiti kundi magsalita ka ng maayos at tiyak
at tahasan.[50]
The testimonies of accused-appellant and Wilfredo
de Jesus are not convincing since they are replete
with numerous inconsistencies and improbabilities.
First, accused-appellant testified that the Bakahan
restaurant and the Music Box lounge they went to on
the evening of April 15, 1996 are located in Quezon
City.[51] However, Wilfredo de Jesus claimed that
the said establishments are located in
Mandaluyong.[52] The divergence of their assertions
on the location of these establishments goes into the
credibility of their claim that they were together with
other people and had a night out on the evening of
April 15, 1996. Second, accused-appellant claimed
that at the time the police officers approached the
car prior to the arrest, one of the officers requested
them to alight from the vehicle.[53] On the other
hand, Wilfredo de Jesus testified that when the
police officers approached them, they were forcibly
pulled out of their vehicle.[54] Their inconsistency on
this matter renders questionable the veracity of the
claim of Wilfredo de Jesus that he was present
during the arrest of accused-appellant by the
NARCOM operatives. Third, their claim that they
were at the parking lot of UCPB in Boni Avenue at
around 3:00 oclock in the morning of April 16, 1996
to return the rented vehicle to Jess Hipolito is hard to
believe. Human experience dictates that one does
not return a rented vehicle to its owner in the early
hours of the morning. Business transactions, such
as returning a rented car, would ordinarily be
transacted during regular hours of work or, perhaps,
even earlier but definitely not during the hours of
dawn. Fourth, both accused-appellant and Wilfredo
de Jesus claimed the improbable scenario that, after
they were accosted by the police officers, they were
all brought to camp Crame by riding the same
vehicle they rented. If this is believed, then two
unlikely situations are made to appear. Either all the
six original passengers boarded the vehicle along
with a seventh passenger, one of the NARCOM
operatives who will ensure that they will proceed to
the camp, or only the six original passengers
boarded the car to go to Camp Crame and they
were just escorted by the police officers who all rode
another vehicle. The first situation is implausible
since a bantam car, like a Toyota Corolla, can only
accommodate five, at most six, fully grown adults
but, definitely, not seven. On the other hand, the
second situation is contrary to human experience
since it will not be in accord with good police
operating procedure to allow a group of suspects
arrested for a drug-related offense to board a vehicle
by themselves and drive the same to the police
headquarters.
Furthermore, if there were indeed five other
passengers on board the vehicle aside from
accused-appellant, why were they not charged or, at
least, booked in the records of the NARCOM? No
proof, not even an allegation, was presented by the
defense to reasonably explain why charges were not
lodged against these alleged other passengers. The
most that accused-appellant did was to claim in his
appeal brief that the reason why the other suspects
were not charged was because the police officers
feared that bad luck might befall them if all were
charged. Thus, he argues:
xxx Due to the belief of karma, the Narcom
operatives instead of filing case or cases against all
the other occupants of the car together with the
accused, the Narcom operatives filed only one case
and that is against the accused and in open court
denied the presence of the other companions of the
accused.[55]
Clearly, such type of reasoning and justification
shows that accused-appellant is already grasping at
straws in order that he may be acquitted, through
whatever allegation, legal or otherwise, of the crimes
he is charged with.
We now come to the third issue raised by accused-
appellant that he was denied due process. In this
regard, accused-appellant claims that he was
deprived of such constitutional right on the following
grounds:
a) the denial of the court a quo of the motion of the
accused through his counsel to have the questioned
shabu quantitatively examined; and
b) the bias attitude of the presiding judge of the
lower court.[56]
Accused-appellant admits the veracity of the
quantitative test conducted by the PNP Crime
Laboratory on the 5 plastic containers of the white
crystalline substance which resulted in the issuance
of Physical Sciences Report No. D-448-96.[57] This
was stipulated upon by accused-appellant when the
forensic chemist of the PNP Crime Laboratory, P/Sr.
Insp. Julita T. de Villa, was presented as a witness,
to wit:
Prosec. Paz:
The testimony of the witness is formally offered to
prove in both cases, Crim. Cases No. 3618-D and
3619-D, that in Crim. Case 36180D that the white
crystalline substance which was sold by the accused
Loreto Medenilla to the police operatives was
examined by the witness and found positive to the
test of shabu and weighs 5.08 grams and in Crim.
Case No. 3619-D to prove that accused Loreto
Medenilla y Doria that the four (4) transparent plastic
bags found in the possession of the accused with a
total weight of 200.45 grams was found positive to
the test of shabu as examined by the witness, your
Honor.
May we know from counsel for the accused if he is
willing to enter into a stipulation?
COURT:
Atty. Arias, are you willing to enter into stipulation?
Atty. Arias:
I will admit that the witness is an expert, second, I
admit that there was an examination conducted by
her and that the result of her examination was
reduced into writing.
COURT:
And it was found positive that the specimen
submitted to the crime lab was shabu.
Atty. Arias:
Yes, your Honor, according to the examination and I
will also state for the record that the witness does
not know where the specimen came from, how the
specimen came into being.
xxx
Prosec. Paz:
May we request counsel for the accused to admit
the authenticity and veracity of this document
prepared by witness after examining the specimen
and the findings as stated in the initial laboratory
report.
Atty. Arias:
As we have stated earlier, your Honor, that the result
of her examination was reduced into writing, this is
the result of the examination, so be it, your Honor.
xxx
Prosec. Paz:
May we also request that the counsel will admit the
weights of the specimens as found by the forensic
chemist.
Atty. Arias:
Everything is written in the document.[58]
However, despite this admission, accused-appellant
filed a motion to require the forensic chemist to
conduct a quantitative as well as a qualitative
analysis on the subject menthamphetamine
hydrochloride or shabu to determine its purity.[59]
The trial court, after the prosecution filed its
Comment/Opposition[60] to the motion, issued an
Order, dated March 17, 1997, denying the motion, to
wit:
This resolves the motion filed by the accused
through his counsel praying that the forensic chemist
be required to conduct a qualitative and quantitative
analysis on the subject methamphetamine
hydrochloride.
Records will show (TSN dated October 23, 1996)
that the defense counsel, with the express
conformity of the accused, had agreed to enter into
stipulations or admissions of facts concerning the
nature, quality and quantity of the specimens
submitted for chemical analysis. The results of said
analysis indicated that said specimens were positive
to the test for shabu, and they weighed 5.08 and
200.45 grams, respectively. These results were
explicitly admitted by both the accused and his
counsel. The only matter that was not admitted was
the alleged source of the stuff, it being denied that it
was found in and taken from the possession of the
accused. The defense counsel who was given the
opportunity to cross-examine raised the forensic
chemist when she was presented, never raised the
issue or even suggested that what was examined
could not have been pure shabu, and that if such
was the case, it was necessary to determine which
part is shabu and which was otherwise. It appears
that this idea is merely an after-thought. To the mind
of the Court, the attempt to have the specimens
examine at this stage of the action, when the
prosecution had already terminated the presentation
of its evidence and is, in fact, about to make a
written formal offer of exhibits, can have no other
purpose than to repudiate the findings of the forensic
chemist, which had already been previously
admitted. This cannot be permitted bythe Court as it
detracts from the full respect that must be accorded
to judicial admissions that have been freely and
intelligently made. As correctly observed by the
prosecution, said judicial admissions are conclusive
and binding upon the accused. The judicial
admission that the stuff submitted for analysis,
weighing 5.08 and 200.45 grams, respectively, are
indeed shabu forecloses any further challenge as to
its alleged
purity.To speculate at this stage of the action that
the stuff is not pure shabu is to virtually repudiate
the findings of the forensic chemist, previously
admitted without any qualification that the stuff
analysed were indeed such illegal drug. This can no
longer be permitted by the Court.
WHEREFORE, the instant motion is DENIED for
lack of merit.[61]
In the instant appeal, accused-appellant insists that
he should have been allowed by the trial court to
have the shabu subjected to a quantitative test by
the PNP Crime Laboratory. He argues that such a
test is crucial in view of the nature of the penalties
for the violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972,
as amended, which are graduated depending on the
amount of regulated or prohibited drugs involved in a
case. Accused-appellant claims that a quantitative
test will definitely show that the shabu involved
herein is not pure and, as such, is less than 200
grams contrary to the assertion of the prosecution
that it is 200.45 grams. He anchors this argument on
the contention that shabu is never 100% pure but, at
most, is only 85% unadulterated.[62]
We find that the trial court committed no reversible
error in denying the motion. When the defense
stipulated with the prosecution that the results of the
laboratory examination, as reflected in Physical
Sciences Report No. D-448-96, were true and
correct, the accused-appellant, in effect, admitted
that the substance examine was indeed
methamphetamine hydrochloride having a weight of
5.08 grams, for Criminal Case No. 3618-D, and
200.45 grams, for Criminal Case No. 3619-D.
Accused-appellant made no qualifications on the
veracity of the PNP Crime Laboratorys finding on the
total weight of the examined shabu. In fact, no
cross-examination was conducted by accused-
appellants counsel on the witness, P/Sr. Insp. Julita
de Villa, regarding this matter. Thus, when the
defense tried to renege on the previous stipulation
by filing a motion requesting for a quantitative test
on the shabu involved herein, the trial court was
correct in denying the same.
Furthermore, in the case of People vs. Barita,[63] we
held that there is no need to examine the entirety of
the submitted specimen since the sample testing is
representative of the whole specimen, we held:
We are not persuaded by the claim of accused-
appellants that in order for them to be convicted of
selling 2,800 grams of marijuana, the whole
specimen must be tested considering that Republic
Act 7659 impose a penalty dependent on the
amount or the quantity of drugs seized or taken. This
court has ruled that a sample taken from one of the
packages is logically presumed to be representative
of the entire contents of the package unless proven
otherwise by accused-appellant.[64]
This ruling was reiterated in People vs. Zheng Bai
Hui,[65] thus:
To recall, appellants sold the NARCOM operatives a
substance weighing 992.3 grams. This amount is
more than the minimum of 200 grams required by
the law to warrant the imposition of either reclusion
perpetua or, if there be aggravating, circumstances,
the death penalty. Appellants however foist the
probability that the substance sold could contain
additives or adulterants, and not just
methamphetamine hydrochloride. Thus, the actual
weight of pure shabu could be less than 992.3
grams, thereby possibly reducing the imposable
penalty.
The contention has no merit. We rejected a similar
argument in People vs. Tang Wai Lan:
Accused-appellant then argues that the tests were
not done for the entire amount of drugs allegedly
found inside the bags. It is suggested that since the
law, Republic Act No. 7659, imposes a penalty
dependent on the amount or quantity of drugs
seized or taken, then laboratory test should be
undertaken for the entire amount or quantity of drugs
seized in order to determine the proper penalty to be
imposed.
The argument is quaint and even borders on being
ridiculous. In the present case, even assuming that
the confirmatory tests were conducted on samples
taken from only one (1) of the plastic packages,
accused-appellants arguments must still fail.
It will be recalled that each of the plastic packages
weighed 1.1 kilograms, an amount more than
sufficient to justify imposing the penalty under Sec.
14 of Rep. Act No. 6425 as amended by Rep. Act
No. 7659. A sample taken from one (1) of he
packages is logically presumed to be representative
of the entire contents of the package unless proven
otherwise by accused-appellant. Therefore, a
positive result for the presence of drugs is indicative
that there is 1.1 kilogram of drugs in the plastic
package from which the sample was taken. If it is
then proved, beyond reasonable doubt, xxx that
accused appellant transported into the Philippines
the plastic packages from which samples were taken
for tests, and found positive as prohibited drugs,
then conviction for importing shabu is definitely in
order.
Thus, if the prosecution proves that the sample is
positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride, it can
be presumed that the entire substance is shabu. The
burden of evidence shifts to the accused who must
prove otherwise. Appellants in this case have not
presented any evidence to overcome the
presumption.
It is clear, therefore, that when accused-appellant
stipulated that the weight of the examined
specimens for Criminal Case Nos. 3618-D and
3619-D totaled 5.08 and 200.45 grams, respectively,
he in effect admitted that the said amounts of shabu
are pure and unadulterated. Moreover, accused-
appellant made no reservations as to his admission
on the veracity of the results as reflected in Physical
Sciences Report No. D-448-96. His only concern, at
that time, was to make it clear that the forensic
scientist
who examined the confiscated substance was not
aware of where the specimen came from.[66] This
was in accord with the theory of the defense that it
was not accused-appellant but a companion, Alvin,
who was in possession of the confiscated
substance. Thus, due to the absence of any
reservation on the total weight of the shabu
examined, accused-appellant can no longer be
heard to go back on his previous admission by
requesting a quantitative test of the same.
Nevertheless, accused-appellant argues that a
quantitative test should be allowed in view of an
alleged circular issued by this Court sometime in
1996 directing the PNP Crime Laboratory to conduct
a qualitative and a quantitative examination on all
illegal drugs submitted to the said office in relation to
a case.[67]
This argument of accused-appellant is totally bereft
of any legal basis. This Court never issued any such
circular requiring the PNP Crime Laboratory to
conduct quantitative and qualitative tests on
substances which they examine. It is clear that this
argument was resorted to by counsel for the defense
in order to mislead the trial court and this court into
acquitting his client. This contemptuous conduct of
counsel for the defense will be dealt with
appropriately.
Accused-appellant also claims that the biased
attitude of the trial judge deprived him of due
process. In this regard, he cites in his appeal brief a
single instance when the judge allegedly revealed
his bias, to wit:
COURT:
Mark it.
Q What happened after the accused handed to you
one pack of crystalline substance?
A Immediately, I switched on our voyager pager
which prompted my backup to subdue the suspect
and introduce ourselves as Anti Narcotics police, sir.
COURT:
By the way, did you not give the money to the
accused when he handed to you the alleged
substance?
A I gave it to him, your honor.
COURT:
So the money was already in the possession of the
accused when you received the shabu from him.
A Yes, your Honor.[68]
We fail to see how this single noted instance of
questioning can justify a claim that the trial judge
was biased. We have exhaustively examined the
transcript of stenographic notes and determined that
the trial judge was more than equitable in presiding
over the hearings of this case. Moreover, a judge is
not prohibited from propounding clarificatory
questions on a witness if the purpose of which is to
arrive at a proper and just determination of the case.
Thus, in Zheng Bai Hui, we said:
In any case, a severe examination by a trial judge of
some of the witness for the defense in an effort to
develop the truth and to get at the real facts affords
no justification for a charge that he has assisted the
prosecution with an evident desire to secure a
conviction, or that he had intimidated the witnesses
for the defense. The trial judge must be accorded a
reasonable leeway in putting such questions to
witnesses as may be essential to elicit relevant facts
to make the record speak the truth. Trial judges in
this jurisdiction are judges of both the law and the
facts, and they would be negligent in the
performance of their duties if they permitted a
miscarriage of justice as a result of a failure to
propound a proper question to a witness which
might develop some material bearing upon the
outcome. In the exercise of sound discretion, he
may put such question to the witness as will enable
him to formulate a sound opinion as to the ability or
the willingness of the witness to tell the truth. A
judge may examine or cross-examine a witness. He
may propound clarificatory questions to test the
credibility of the witness and to extract the truth. He
may seek to draw out relevant and material
testimony though that testimony may tend to support
or rebut the position taken by one or the other party.
It cannot be taken against him if the clarificatory
questions he propounds happen to reveal certain
truths which tend to destroy the theory of one
party.[69]
The sale of less than 200 grams of
methampethamine hydrochloride, a regulated drug,
is punishable with a penalty ranging from prision
correccional to reclusion temporal, depending on the
quantity.[70]Thus, if the regulated drug weighs less
than 66.67 grams, then the penalty is prision
correctional, if 66.67 grams or more but less than
133.33 grams then the penalty is prision mayor, and
if 133.33 grams or more but less than 200 grams
then the penalty is reclusion temporal. In Criminal
Case No. 3618-D, the amount of shabu involved
weighs 5.08 grams, as such the appropriate penalty
is prision correccional.There being no aggravating or
mitigating circumstances, the penalty shall be
imposed in its medium period or from 2 years, 4
months and 1 day to 4 years and 2 months. Applying
the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the maximum
penalty shall be within the range of prision
correccional medium and the minimum penalty shall
be within the range of the penalty next lower to that
prescribed or, in this case, arresto mayor. It is,
therefore, clear from the foregoing that the trial
committed an error in imposing an indeterminate
sentence of 1 year, 8 months and 20 days, as
minimum, to 4 years and 2 months, as maximum,
ofprision correccional. Accordingly, this must be
modified.
On the other hand, the possession of 200 grams or
more of shabu carries with it the penalty of reclusion
perpetua to death and a fine ranging from Five
hundred Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00) to Ten
Million Pesos (P10,000,000.00). Since no
aggravating circumstance attended the commission
of the offense, the trial court, in Criminal Case No.
3619-D, was correct in imposing the penalty of
reclusion perpetua with a fine of Two Million Pesos
(P2,000,000.00).
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial
Court of Pasig is hereby AFFIRMED WITH
MODIFICATIONS. Accused-appellant Loreto
Medenilla y Doria is hereby found GUILTY of
violating Sections 15 and 16 of Republic Act No.
6425, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, and
hereby sentenced: (a) in Criminal Case No. 3618-D,
to suffer an indeterminate sentence of 6 months of
arresto mayor to 4 years and 2 months of prision
correccional; and (b) in Criminal Case No. 3619-D,
to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay
a fine of Two Million Pesos (P2,000,000.00).
Counsel for the defense, Atty. Marcelino Arias, is
hereby ordered to explain within ten (10) days why
he should not be cited in contempt for citing an
inexistent circular in his pleadings.
SO ORDERED.
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 121039-45. January 25, 1999]
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-
appellee, vs. MAYOR ANTONIO L. SANCHEZ,
GEORGE MEDIALDEA, ZIOLO AMA, BALDWIN
BRION, LUIS CORCOLON, ROGELIO
CORCOLON, and PEPITO KAWIT, accused-
appellants.
DECISION
MARTINEZ, J.:
. . . a plot seemingly hatched in hell . . .
This was how Judge Harriet O. Demetriou[1] of the
Pasig City Regional Trial Court, Branch 70, in her
132-page Decision dated March 11, 1995 now
before us on review, emphatically described the
Allan Gomez-Eileen Sarmenta rape-slay that drew
strong condemnation from an outraged populace in
the middle of 1993. After a protracted and grueling
16-month trial, she found all those charged
therewith, namely: Calauan Mayor Antonio Sanchez
(hereafter the Mayor), George Medialdea, Luis and
Rogelio Corcolon, Zoilo Ama, Baldwin Brion and
Pepito Kawit (appellants herein), guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of rape with homicide
on seven counts and sentenced each one of them:
. . . to suffer the maximum penalty of reclusion
perpetua for each of the seven offenses or a total of
seven reclusion perpetua for each accused. In
addition, the Court hereby orders all the accused to
jointly and severally pay the victims respective
families the following sums by way of civil indemnity:
1. the sum of P3,432,650.00 representing the actual
damages sustained by the Sarmenta family;
2. the sum of P3,484,000.00 representing the actual
damages sustained by the Gomez family;
3. the sum of P2,000,000.00 as moral damages
sustained by the Sarmenta family;
4. the sum of P2,000,000.00 as moral damages
sustained by the Gomez family;
5. the sum of P191,000.00 as attorneys fees and
litigation expenses incurred by the Gomez family;
and
6. the sum of P164,250.00 for litigation expenses
incurred by the Sarmenta family.
As to the antecedents, appellants all appear to
agree that the trial court, in the very words of
counsel[2] who prepared the consolidated brief for
the Mayor and Medialdea, made a very detailed
summary of both the prosecution and defense
evidence.[3] This Court can thus conveniently
provide a briefer but fairly accurate account of the
respective versions of the State and the defense on
the basis of the trial courts summary, rather than
combing the heap of evidence presented by both
sides.
The prosecutions version of the events on that
horrible night of June 28, 1993 was based mainly on
the recollections of its star witnesses Aurelio
Centeno and Vicencio Malabanan (a member of
appellant Sanchez security team) co-conspirators
turned state witnesses. Both admitted having taken
part in the abduction of Eileen and Allan, but denied
any personal involvement in the rape of Eileen and
the twin killings that followed. Heres their story.
Medialdea (then the Deputy Chief of the PNP
Calauan), together with Centeno who was driving an
ambulance, fetched witness Malabanan at his
residence in the early morning of June 28, 1993 on
the pretext that they will apprehend one Rodolfo
Calva alias Tisoy a notorious gun runner and drug
pusher in the locality. Next to be picked up was Ama
in Barangay Masiit, then Luis Corcolon (hereafter,
Luis) in Barangay Mabacan. On board the
ambulance, the five (5) men made stopovers in
Barangays Imok and Wawa until they headed back
for Calauan at past 7:00 oclock in the evening, upon
orders of Luis.
At the Shell gas station in the poblacion of Calauan,
the five (5) men met and picked up Rogelio Corcolon
(hereafter, Boy), Kawit and Brion, then they
proceeded to Los Baos. Along the way, Luis
announced to the group that the real purpose behind
the Los Baos trip is to take a pretty young lass long
desired by the Mayor and offer her to him as a gift.
Luis, to satisfy his companions curiosity, even
guaranteed that her beauty will make their saliva
drip.
Not for long, the ambulance arrived at the U.P. Los
Baos grounds. Witness Centeno drove the
ambulance around the campus at a snails pace
while Luis scoured the area with watchful eyes. As
the search inside the campus proved fruitless, Luis
then ordered Centeno to slowly drive out of the
university compound and to stop upon reaching the
vicinity of the Agrix complex. Luis, Boy, Ama, Brion
and Kawit alighted from the ambulance and went
inside the Agrix complex. Witness Centeno
overheard Medialdea informing the Boss, via the
radio, that they were already in the area. The Boss
was the Mayor.
Inside the Agrix complex is a restaurant called Caf
Amalia. Parked in front of that establishment was a
Tamaraw van. Eileen and Allan were its passengers,
both occupying the front seats. She was wearing a
T-shirt, white shorts and rubber shoes. Armed with
guns, Luis and Boy approached Eileen and Allan,
forcibly took the two and loaded them at the back of
the van. All the appellants boarded the van while
Centeno and Malabanan stayed in the ambulance.
Both vehicles then headed for Erais Farm situated in
Barangay Curba, owned by the Mayor.
As soon as the group arrived at the farm, the two (2)
captives were brought down the van. Eileen was
gagged by a handkerchief and her hands, like Allan,
were tied. A white towel was wound around Allans
mouth. The Mayor, then wearing a jogging attire,
emerged from the resthouse and asked the group:
My children, whats the problem? To this Luis
respondent: Mayor, this is our gift to you, the girl
youve been longing for. Shes really beautiful. But
whos that man? asked the Mayor. Eileens
companion, boss. Medialdea replied. We brought
him along to avoid complications, he continued.
The two youngsters were then brought inside the
resthouse where Eileen was taken to the Mayors
room. Allan was badly beaten up by Luis, Boy, Ama
and Medialdea and thereafter thrown
out of the resthouse. Kawit followed-up by striking
Allans diaphragm with the butt of an armalite,
causing Allan to fall against a cement box. Brion
thought Allan was already dead, but Kawit said: :His
death will come later.
Meanwhile, Centeno, while waiting for further orders,
joined the Mayors personal aides Edwin Cosico and
Raul Alorico watch television at the adjacent
resthouse. Alorico told Centeno that the Mayor had
been eagerly waiting for the group and worried that
they will not arrive.
At around 1:00 a.m. of the next day, a crying Eileen
was dragged out of the resthouse by Luis and
Medialdea her hair disheveled, mouth covered by a
handkerchief, hands still tied and stripped of her
shorts. The Mayor, clad merely in white polo,
appeared and thanked Luis and Medialdea for the
gift. I am through with her. Shes all yours, the Mayor
uttered in contentment. When asked what will
happen to Allan, Medialdea assured the Mayor that
they will also kill him for full measure. Eileen and
Allan were then loaded in the Tamaraw van by the
appellants and headed for Calauan, followed closely
by the ambulance.
En route to Calauan, Centeno, who was driving the
ambulance, noticed the van swaying from side to
side. Then he heard gunfire coming therefrom. The
van pulled over whereupon Kawit dragged Allan,
whose head was already drenched in blood, out of
the vehicle onto the road and finished him off with a
single gunshot from his armalite. The ambulance
and van then sped away.
The next destination was a sugarcane field in Sitio
Paputok, Kilometro 74 of Barangay Mabacan. It was
here that Luis announced that its tiime for the group
to feast on Eileen (the exact words of Luis were
Turbohin na rin natin ang tinurbo ni Boss). She was
laid at the back of the van, with her hands and legs
being held by the appellants while waiting for their
turn. Then the gang-rape began. The first to ravish
Eileen was Luis, then Medialdea, Boy, Ama, Brion
and finally, Kawit. Bewailing the helplessness of her
situation, Eileen pleaded, in between sobs and
whimpers, for the torture to stop. However, her tears
for compassion fell, weak and ineffective, upon the
insensitive brutes. Kawit invited Centeno to join the
sexual fiasco but the latter refused as he cannot, in
conscience, bear the bestiality being committed on
Eileen who appeared to be dead. After Kawits turn,
Eileen knelt on the seat of the van and begged for
her life. Unmoved, Luis muted Eileens cried by
forcing an object into her mouth and then fired his
baby armalite at her. Centeno was thereafter
ordered to get rid of Eileens dead body. Moments
later, all eight (8) men boarded the ambulance and
proceeded to Calauan, leaving the Tamaraw van
with Eileens remains behind. Along the way,
Centeno and Malabanan watched in dismay as Luis,
Boy, Medialdea, Ama, Brion and Kawit savored the
nights escapade, to their sickening delight.
Appellants and Malabanan were then brought to
their respective homes by Centeno.
June 29, 1993 and the day following were tense
moments for the group. In the morning of June 29,
Medialdea and Centeno fetched Malabanan, Luis
and Ama. They were going to Barangay Imok to
make it appear that they were conducting some
police operations in that area. Upon reaching
Barangay Imok, the group saw Allans body which
they dumped a few hours earlier. Luis, Medialdea
and Malabanan alighted from the ambulance,
whereupon Luis ordered Centeno to drive back to
the municipal hall.
Boy Corcolon, who was at the municipal hall,
informed Ama that a dead female loaded inside a
Tamaraw van was found in Barangay Mabacan.
Ama then radioed the PNP Chief of Calauan, Major
Cao, who at that time was summoned by the Mayor.
Major Cano thereafter arrived and ordered one
SPO2 Melencio Nuez to investigate the matter.
Meanwhile, Centeno received word
that he was to fetch Malabanan, Luis and Medialdea
in Barangay Imok. After picking up the three (3),
Centeno drove the ambulance to Barangay
Mabacan where the dead Eileen was found.
Eileens body lying inside the Tamaraw van was a
pitiful sight. Her face bore a gunshot wound; a
handkerchief was stuffed in her mouth; her T-shirt
was rolled up revealing her breasts; and her panty
was rolled down on one of her feet still with rubber
shoes on. Medialdea covered Eileens exposed
private parts by fixing her T-shirt and underwear and
by placing a sackcloth over her lower body. The
group then escorted the van with Eileens body in it,
to the UP Los Baos police station where student
milled around and identified the cadaver to be Eileen
indeed. Later on, the van carrying Eileen, as well as
Allans body, was brought to the Calauan municipal
hall. There, Centeno saw a prisoner named Arnold
cleaning the van.
Meanwhile, Malabanan, Ama and Medialdea, on
June 29, went to the site (Bgy. Imok) where Allans
body was found, started asking residents about the
incident and were able to retrieve an empty armalite
shell. Malabanan thereafter handed the empty shell
to Major Cao at the police station. The three (3) men
and one SPO3 Rizaldy Belen, sometime in the
afternoon of the same day, visited the Mayor at his
house in Bay, Laguna. Medialdea informed the
Mayor of the presence of people from the CIS, NBI
and press in the locality. The Mayor flared up and
blamed them for not using their heads. But he later
on assured them that he could fix the problem in
less the amount of a brand new car.
The following day, June 30, Medialdea, upon the
Mayors directive, handed a pair of white walking
shorts to Major Cao. When Malabanan asked
Medialdea whose pair of shorts was that, the latter
replied that it was the short of Eileen which the
Mayor wanted to be delivered to Major Cao.
That same day of June 30, Centeno went to see the
Mayor at his house in Calauan about his worries
over reports that the driver of the ambulance
involved in the rape-slay was being hunted down.
The Mayor gave Centeno P2,000.00 and advised
him to keep silent or better yet, to go into hiding.
Centeno did hide himself until CIS agents accosted
him at the Divisoria market on August 10, 1993. As
to Malabanan, he, Medialdea and Ama were brought
to the PNP Sta. Cruz Command to shed light on the
cleaning of the Tamaraw van.
Coming now to the defense, each of the appellants
had an alibi to tell and sought to put the blame on Kit
Alqueza, the son of a feared general (Dictador
Alqueza) who earned the monicker Barako from the
local residents.
The Mayor claimed that he was at the residence of
his mistress Elvira in Bay, Laguna in the morning of
June 28, 1993. They left for Makati City at about
1:00 oclock in the afternoon thereafter proceeded to
San Pablo City at around 4:00 p.m., left that city at
7:30 p.m. and then returned to Elviras house in Bay
at around 10:00 p.m. He and Elvira retired at around
12:30 in the morning. He woke up at 5:00 a.m.
Jogging was his favorite form of exercise, but foul
whether prevented him from running that morning.
His three (3) children with Elvira greeted him at
around 6:30 a.m. before heading for school.He took
his breakfast and lunch at Elviras house.
Medialdea, Ama and Malabanan arrived between
1:00 p.m. and 2:00 p.m. and informed the Mayor of
the rape-slay in which Kit Alqueza was the prime
suspect. This made the Mayor very angry, for which
he ordered a thorough investigation of the incident to
avoid any whitewash. "I will not hesitate to have the
perpetrators of this crime killed (by electric chair),
whether a generals son in involved or not, son of a
bitch!, he blurted. The Mayor then advised
appellants not to worry
if they were really innocent and that the primordial
concern is that a full investigation be conducted.
The Mayor then went to his residence in Calauan. At
around 4:00 p.m. of that same day (June 29), he
sent his driver Mario Puyales to Barangays Masiit
and Balayhangin to inquire from the residents about
the crime. Puyales returned at around 7:00 p.m. and
informed the Mayor that a card gambler was able to
retrieve a pair of white shorts lying near the national
highway in Barangay Balayhangin. Puyales was
sent back to that barangay to advise the residents
thereof to keep the shorts at their fence near the
highway as it may later on aid the on-going
investigation.
In the morning of June 30, 1993, the Mayor, with
some companions, jogged towards the direction of
Barangay Mabacan and at the same time inquired
from residents whether they noticed anything
unusual on the night of June 28, 1993. A certain
Mang Torio told the Mayor that he found a pair of
maong pants lying at the side of the road but left if
there. After inspecting the dirty maong pants, the
Mayor instructed Mang Torio to keep the pants as
the former will send someone back to pick it up.
Eventually, the Mayor got hold of the pairs of white
shorts and maong pants. The shorts was clean, with
complete beltloops and without any tear. He then
ordered his driver Puyales to send the articles to
Medialdea for safekeeping. But during the trial, the
Mayor, when shown the shorts and pants, claimed
that they are quite different from the articles he got
hold of previously. The maong pants shown to him
by Mang Torio was of a darker shade of blue. As to
the white shorts, it was the same pair he gave to
Medialdea, but now it is torn and has some missing
beltloops.
Based on his own investigation, the Mayor came to
know that Kit Alqueza is a feared and dangerous
student of the university, being a member of an elite
fraternity in the campus and a generals son at that.
The Mayor later informed Congressman Tingzon of
Kits probable involvement in the crime.
Congressman Tingzon, in turn, disclosed that Kit, his
nephew-in-law (the congressmans wife is the sister
of Gen. Alquezas wife), was hiding in his house and
that the legislator will call Gen. Alqueza in Davao
City to discuss the matter.
The Mayor also testified that he closely coordinated
with Major Cao in investigating the case. This
included frequent evening conferences with
Malabanan, medialdea and Ama who were
members of Major Caos investigation team.
Subsequently, the Mayor was requested to facilitate
the surrender of Luis and Boy Corcolon to Camp
Crame since the CIS suspected them of being
involved in the crime together with Kit. The Corcolon
brothers, accompanied by the Mayor, peacefully
surrendered to CIS operatives in the afternoon of
July 12, 1993.
On August 10, 1993, the Mayor received an
anonymous phone call advising him that he would
better leave the country because he was to be
arrested in three (3) days time. He refused to heed
the advice because he had nothing to do with the
crime. And so he was apprehended on August 13,
1993 at his Calauan residence and brought to Camp
Vicente Lim where he was presented to the media.
There he saw Centeno and Malabanan who did not
greet him. General Salimbangon ordered the two (2)
witnesses to implicate the Mayor. The general then
ordered that the Mayor be handcuffed as he is the
rapist. You son of a bitch, Salibangon. You framed
me up, the Mayor cursed.
The Mayor denied having given Centeno advice and
P2,000.00 pocket money on June 30, 1993. It was
only in the courtroom that he saw Centeno, although
he knows the latter. The Mayor also denied
Malabanans testimony implicating him in the crime.
In fact, Malabanan wrote him letters asking for his
help. The trial court noted, however, that the letter
adverted to by the Mayor were all addressed to
Judge Baldo.
Appellant Medialdea was Calauan policeman until
his summary dismissal on September 10, 1993. He
claimed that he, being a member of a crack team
formed by Major Cao and composed of Malabanan,
Luis and Ama, was preoccupied the whole day of
June 28, 1993 conducting police operations on
board an ambulance in different barangays of the
town in search of Tisoy. The fruitless operations
ended at about 9:00 p.m. of June 28. Driving the
ambulance, he got home at around 10:30 p.m.
where he saw his wife playing mahjong with some
friends. Medialdea joined the players for about an
hour, then he slept until 5:00 a.m. of the next day
(June 29).
The crack team met again in the morning of June
29, 1993 to continue the manhunt for Tisoy. At
around 7:15 a.m. in Barangay Imok, they saw Tisoy
speed by in a motorcycle. Medialdea and Luis fired
shots in the air but Tisoy managed to escape.
Centeno was not present when this event transpired
because he was instructed to go to the municipal
hall with the ambulance.
Upon hearing news over the radio that a dead body
was found at Sitio Paputok, Km. 74, Barangay
Mabacan, Medialdea radioed Centeno to fetch the
group at the fishpond of one Gani. As soon as
Centeno arrived at around 8:00 a.m., they
proceeded to Km. 74 where they saw Eileens body
inside the van parked in the sugarcane field. Major
Cao and several policemen were already there.
Medialdea had to pull down Eileens T-shirt and roll
up her underwear to spare her from numerous
kibitzers staring at her naked body. He recovered
several scattered items inside the van like cigarette
packs, a paddle, spike shoes, and 5 bottles of beer.
The van was then driven by a certain Gener to the
UP Los Baos escorted by the ambulance and Major
Caos police car.
Thereafter, at around 9:30 a.m., Medialdea, on
Major Caos directive, went to the Gomez residence
and asked for Allan. The maid told him that Allan
has not come home since the night before and that
she last saw him at around 6:30 p.m. with one Jet
Tejada. As there was no other person inside the
house except the maid, Medialdea, with her
permission, searched for Allan inside but to no avail.
Before leaving, he instructed the maid to tell Allan
that he better make good his hiding because Allan is
a suspect in the crime. At the Tejada residence, Jet
was neither there. So Medialdea proceeded to the
boarding house of Eileen and instructed the landlady
to inform calmly Eileens parents on what had
happened to their daughter.
Medialdea then returned to the UP Los Baos
security force where he told Major Cao that Allan
had escaped. Before leaving UP campus to bring
Eileens body to Calauan, Major Cao ordered
Medialdea to still look for Allan. When his efforts to
find Allan inside the campus proved futile, Medialdea
sought the aid of Barangay Captain Cesar Ruiz who
brought him to the barangay hall where Jet Tejada
was.Tejada strongly objected to Medialdeas
insinuation of his and Allans participation in the
crime, saying that they can never do anything as
dastardly as that.
Afterwards, a certain Allan, a barangay tanod,
volunteered that he knew Allan. This Allan opines
that if Allan was dead then Kit had a hand on it since
Allan had earned Kits ire when the former began
dating the latters girlfriend named Rose. Medialdea
informed Major Cao that Allan perhaps has gone to
Manila with his father. The Major replied that Allan is
here, but is likewise dead.
Ama then informed Major Cao that they have a
suspect named Kit who had an axe to grind against
Allan. Then someone in the crowd uttered Ako iyon.
Kit approached and told Ama that he and Allan had
patched up their differences three (3) months ago.
Medialdea noticed a drop of blood on the middle of
Kits right thigh. Kit explained that the blood oozed
after punching a wall with his right knuckle.
At the municipal hall, Ama handed an empty
armalite shell recovered from the site where Allans
body was found. Thereafter, Arnold (the prisoner
who was cleaning the van) was seen carrying the
rubber matting of the Tamaraw van to hang it over
the municipal fence to dry. Ama could not help but
curse Arnold and ordered the latter to bring it back.
Ama explained to Major Cao that they could be
dragged to the case just like what happened to the
policeman in the Paraaque massacre who burned a
mosquito net and was thereafter sacked.
Medialdea also testified that it was Major Cao who
ordered the cleaning of the van to diffuse the stench
caused by the blood stains therein.
Then on July 6, 1993, Medialdea, together with Ama
and Malabanan, went to the PNP Sta. Cruz
Command to answer queries about the cleaning of
the van. They were then brought to Canlubang
where they executed their respective sworn
statements. Medialdea also recalled that Major Cao
instructed them not to say anything about the
cleaning of the van. Afterwards, they were brought
back to the PNP Sta. Cruz and detained therein
pending the filing of formal charges against them.
Major Cao visited Medialdea the next day, July 7.
The major advised him that they should just point to
Malabanan as the one who cleaned the van.
Medialdea did not heed his advice for he pitied
Malabanan and besides, it was Major Cao who
really ordered its cleaning. The major then reiterated
the reason why he caused its cleaning (the
unbearable stench of blood).
Days later, on July 16, 1993, Medialdea and Ama,
together with Malabanan, were brought to the
Department of Justice where Fiscal Abesamis asked
them to sign a waiver of their detention. On July 24,
1993, the three (3) men were led back to PNP
Canlubang where Colonels Gualberto and Tiangco
began investigating then on July 27, 1993. During
the investigation, Medialdea was being enticed by
Col. Gualberto to cooperate with the government by
testifying against the Mayor, as there is an order
from the higher echelon to bring the Mayor down. He
refused, saying that the Mayor is completely
innocent because he is pro-poor and the Mayor
even walks the church aisle on his knees. Col.
Gualberto threatened that he will be dragged all the
more to the case if he will not cooperate. Medialdea
begged for mercy and suggested that they should
investigate Kit instead. The colonel said that
messing up with Kit is like ramming into a wall.
Medialdea was then asked to sign a statement that
contained inaccurate answers.The inaccuracies
were supplied by Col. Gualberto.
Medialdea also professed his ignorance before Col.
Tiangco. This colonel was less diplomatic. He
splashed coffee on Medialdeas face, cursed him and
whipped his face. So was Malabanan. The
investigators would hit then when they try to reason.
Back to his cell, Medialdea heard Col. Tiangco order
somebody to have him killed in the evening.
On August 13, 1993, one Colonel Versoza advised
Medialdea to follow Malabanan in testifying against
the Mayor. They will be placed under the Witness
Protection Program where they would be entitled to
allowances, free housing facilities and the chance to
go abroad with their families where they can live
peacefully, Col. Versoza assured them. Medialdea
refused once
again. Malabanan therafter informed him that he and
Centeno had already given false statements for they
can no longer stand the torture inflicted on them. But
Medialdea stood pat with his refusal, for he cannot
testify falsely against his companions just to free
himself. It is still better to live than to die a martyr,
Malabanan answered.
We now to go appellant Luis Corcolons story which
painted the Kit Alqueza angle in greater detail. In the
morning of June 25, 1993, three (3) men went to
Luis residence in Barangay Mabacan. They told Luis
that their boss, Edgardo Lavadia alias Uod, wanted
to see him the next day. Lavadia is a very generous
friend of Luis for so many years who, as a
professional forger of checks, is being protected by
General Alqueza.
Luis arrived at Lavadias house at around 2:00 p.m.
of June 26. There he saw Kit and Lavadias men.
Lavadia requested him to abduct and kill Allan
because the latter has done something wrong to
Kit.Luis asked what Allans fault was and then
suggested that if its just a small squabble, they
better forgive Allan. Lavadia insisted, but Luis
appeared hesitant since it might put him in big
trouble. Lavadia tempered his request by asking
Luis to merely help in getting rid of the body. Luis
agreed. He and Lavadia were to meet again on June
28, 1993 in the Bay cockpit. After this, Luis left.
Luis was also a member of the team formed by
Major Cao to hunt down Tisoy. At around 8:30 in the
morning of June 28, 1993, he was fetched by
Medialdea, Ama, Malabanan and proceeded to
Barangay Imok on board the ambulance driven by
Centeno to apprehend Tisoy. At around 1:00 p.m.,
Luis left the group and went to Bay cockpit to meet
Lavadia, as agreed upon the previous day. When he
arrived at the cockpit, only Lavadias men were
there. Luis then asked one of the men to tell Lavadia
that he is backing out of the agreement. He first
attended the derby being held at the cockpit before
returning to Barangay Imok at around 5:00 p.m. and
re-joined the team. They left Barangay Imok at
around 7:30 p.m. and proceeded to Barangay
Wawa, San Pablo City where they stayed for about
two (2) hours waiting for Tisoy. Sensing that Tisoy
would not be passing by, the team headed back for
Calauan. Luis was driven home first and reached his
house at around 9:30 p.m. A certain Ernesto Bustillo
was waiting for him to borrow his passenger
jeepney. Thereafter, Luis slept at around 10:30 p.m.
At around 4:45 a.m. of the next day (June 29) while
Luis was preparing the breakfast of his children, a
Tamaraw van, driven by Kit, stopped in front of his
house honking its horn continuously. Four (4)
motorcycle-riding men, each wearing bonnet masks
and maong jackets, escorted the van. Kit sought his
help in burying at once the dead female body inside
the van. Luis inspected the van and saw a naked
corpse of a woman. He refused Kits summons after
which Luis immediately returned to his house, turned
off the lights and closed door for fear that Kits
escorts would shoot him. The convoy then headed
towards the direction of Sitio Paputok, Km. 74.
At about 6:30 a.m., Luis, Centeno, Medialdea and
Malabanan met and continued their surveillance of
Tisoy at Barangay Imok. They saw Tisoy pass by at
around 7:10 a.m. but were not able to apprehend
him. The group thereafter went to Ganis fishpond at
about 8:30 a.m. then proceeded to Km. 74 to verify
reports of a females death. There they saw the
Tamaraw van with a dead woman inside. Luis
recognized the vehicle as that driven by Kit hours
earlier, but he kept silent. The group then brought
the van to the UP Los Banos campus.
In the morning if June 30, 1993, Luis met the Mayor.
The latter instructed him to investigate on who
dumped Eileens body at Km. 74. Luis obliged and
said that he will make a report within a week. He,
however, did not tell the Mayor about Kits
involvement in the crime.
On July 7, 1993, CIS agents of Canlubang raided his
house during his absence thereat. The agents, his
wife said, planted a gun inside. The next day, Luis
read in the papers that a P100,000.00 reward has
been offered for his and brother Boys capture. He
rushed to the Mayor who advised him to remain
quiet.
In the afternoon of July 12, 1993, Luis went to Boys
house upon being summoned by the Mayor who
was with General Quizon and Colonel Hilario. He
and Boy were brought to Camp Crame for interview.
After the interview, the CIS took their sworn
statements. The answers therein, Luis said, were
furnished by the agents. He signed the statement
out to fear without the assistance of a lawyer of his
own choice. For several days, he was investigated
by PACC agents. Then on or July 20, 1993, he and
Boy were transferred to CIS Canlubang and were
interrogated by Col. Tiangco who repeatedly
manhandled and cursed him. Luis insisted on his
innocence and suggested that it is Kit who they
should investigate. After the interview, Luis was
tortured by way of water treatment, denied of food
and was not allowed to receive visitors. In the
afternoon of June 28, 1993, Luis was brought before
the PACC where he was again manhandled during
the 2-hour interrogation. He answered yes to all the
questions hurled at him because he was already
dizzy. He was also informed that Lavadia had
already executed a statement saying that the latter
paid him.
On August 1, 1993 at the PACC-TFH office, General
Quizon was forcing him to testify against the Mayor.
He was also interviewed by media afterwhich, he
was brought back to his cell where he met Lavadia.
He cursed and strangled Lavadia. Luis suggested
that they should now tell the truth about Kits
involvement, but Lavadia advised him to remain
silent because reprisal from General Alqueza would
be far worse. Luis was detained at the PACC until
the start of the trial. He also filed a complaint for
torture before the Commission on Human Rights.
Boy Corcolon testified that he never left house on
the night of June 28, 1993. He woke up at around
7:00 a.m. of the next day and proceeded to the
Calauan police station on his motorcycle upon being
informed of the discovery of a dead female in sitio
Paputok, Km. 74. After going to the municipal
building where he saw Ama, Major Cao and Judge
Baldo, Boy followed Major Cao and his men in going
to Km. 74. There he saw the naked body of the dead
woman inside the van. Boy thereafter followed the
van to the UP compound. Moments later, the van
was brought to Calauan municipal hall compound.
He did not stay in the municipal hall, but went
straight home instead.
The CIS agents raided his house on July 7, 1993.
The next day, Boy read in the papers that he and his
brother Luis were being haunted down by the
authorities and a P100,000.00 bounty is at stake for
their capture. He rushed to the house of the Mayor
to inform the latter of the raid. The Mayor advised
him to remain calm and to avoid being visible.
In the afternoon of July 12, 1993, he and Luis were
fetched by General Quizon and Colonel Hilario at
Luis residence and thereafter brought to Camp
Crame. At the camp, press people interviewed them
after which they were led to a room for taking of their
respective sworn statements. Boy claimed that he
was forced to give his statement after being kicked,
slapped and cursed by the investigators. He tried to
correct portions of his statement but the
investigating
officer did not allow him. Boy and Luis were detained
at the camp until charges have been filed against
them, for their refusal to cooperate with the CIS.
On July 20, 1993, the two (2) brother were brought
to an uninhabited place near a hill in Barangay
Paliparan where they were made to stand in front of
the military group consisting of Generals Quizon and
Salimbangon, Colonel Gualberto and his men. Boy
and Luis were each asked to hold an armalite rifle,
and then pictures were taken of them handing the
rifles over to the generals.
The next day (June 21), they were brought to CIS
Canlubang and stayed there until the start of the trial
in September, 1993. Boy claimed he was subjected
to electric shock and water treatment to make him
confess his guilt.
Ama, also a member of the team involved in the
Tisoy manhunt, related a similar story on the groups
sorties in different barangays on June 28, 1993.
After the failed mission, Centeno dropped him off at
his residence in Barangay Masiit at about 10:00 p.m.
of the same day and did not leave the house until
the next morning.
At around 6:15 a.m. of the next day (June 29), he
was at Barangay Balayhangin to wait for Tisoy per
Medialdeas instruction. Minutes later, he saw Tisoy
pass by on a motorcycle and thereafter reported the
matter to Medialdea. Ama learned of Eileens death
at around 8:00 a.m. when he was at the Calauan
police station. Centeno thereafter picked him up and
they, together with Medialdea, Malabanan and Luis
proceeded to Sitio Paputok where Eileens body was
found.
From the university compound, he, Medialdea,
Malabanan and a UP student named Butch went to
Allans house but the latter was not there. They also
went to Jet Tejadas and Eileens boarding houses.
At Barangay Batong Malaki, Los Baos, barangay
tanod Allan revealed to Medialdea that the dead
Allans enemy was Kit. Allan was fond of girls and
there was a time when Kit got angry at and
threatened Allan when the latter dated Kits girlfriend
Rose, the tanod narrated.
Ama and the rest of the group were able to talk to
Jet Tejada who denied any involvement in the crime.
After Major Cao informed him that Allan is already
dead, Ama told the major about the friction between
Allan and Kit. Then someone tapped Major Caos
shoulder and identified himself as Kit who clarified
that he had patched up with Allan about three (3)
months ago. Kit angrily pointed his finger at Ama,
then Major Cao pacified them. Ama asked Kit about
the drops of blood on his right thigh. Kit explained
that the blood came from his right knuckle. He is our
suspect Ama blurted. Major Cao, however,
reprimanded him for making such a loud comment.
*(On the cleaning of the van, Amas story is similar to
Medialdeas account heretofore discussed).
Thereafter, Ama, Medialdea and Malabanan found
their way to the Mayors residence in bay. Ama
revealed to the Mayor that Kit is the suspect. The
Mayor said that Kit comes from a very powerful and
influential family, and that his father, General
Alqueza, is a tough man. The Mayor nonetheless
assured them of his support.
On July 1, 1993, Ama accompanied some CIS
personnel at the site where Allans body was found.
They found drops of blood, cigarette butts and
wrappers in the area. Later in the afternoon, Ama
went to Canlubang as he was asked by Colonel
Roxas to make a written report on the Kit
Alqueza angle. He completed his statement in about
five (5) hours. The officer before whom he was
sworn, Ama noticed, was drunk.
On July 3, 1993, he received word that he was to
undergo counter-insurgency training effective that
same day. Two (2) days after (July 5), he asked a
certain Colonel Toco why he was being required to
undergo training again. The colonel promised to look
into the matter. On that same day, Malabanan
informed him that Luis appeared panicky and was
acting suspiciously, as the latter seemed to go back
and forth to the municipal hall and kept asking
Malabanan for the names of people investigating the
case. Also on that day, Ama gave the NBI Regional
Director some information about Kit and Luis which
started the NBI investigation.
On July 6, 1993, Ama, together with Medialdea and
Malabanan, executed his statement in CIS
Canlubang assisted by one Atty. Exconde who
asked him to sign the same even before Ama can
read it. At PHQ Sta. Cruz, the Deputy Provincial
Commander for Operations fumed when he declared
in his statement that he was absent during the
cleaning of the van. He declared so because Major
Cao instructed him to keep silent on that matter.
Subsequently (July 7), he learned of Malabanans
escape.
On July 24, 1993, Ama, Malabanan and Medialdea
were brought to CIS Canlubang. They ate drugged
food which gave him chest pain and made him very
weak and talkative. He saw Medialdea being
whipped on the head with a newspaper by one
official.
Five days later (July 29), they were brought to the
PACC where Luis pointed to them before the media.
The next day (July 30), he and General Alqueza met
at the Department of Justice. The general cursed
him for dragging Kit in the case and even challenged
him to a fistfight outside the building.
On August 7, 1993, at General Salimbangons office,
the general informed him that his summary dismissal
is on hand unless he testifies against the Mayor.
When he refused, the general cursed him.Colonel
Gualberto also tried to convince him by offering
promotion, house and lot, monthly allowance, or a
chance to leave the country with his family. But Ama
insisted on his innocence.
On August 13, 1993, a sobbing Malabanan
embraced Ama and asked for his forgiveness
because the former has already implicated him
falsely in the crime. Malabanan said he could no
longer bear the torture being inflicted on him and the
threats on his life and family. He was also advised
by Malabanan to follow suit, but he refused once
again.
Brion is the Mayors nephew. He denied being in the
company of any of the appellants on the evening of
June 28, 1993 as he stayed at their house on J. del
Valle St., Calauan the whole night. In the morning of
July 29, 1993, he was arrested at his father-in-laws
house without any warrant. The arresting officer told
him that Colonel Navarro (PNP Director of Laguna)
wanted to interview him. Brion was brought to the
Calamba police station from where he was taken to
Canlubang. There, Col. Navarro cursed him for
being so elusive. Brion answered that he never went
into hiding. Col. Navarro informed him that Luis
Corcolon has revealed that he was the third man to
rape Eileen. Brion then heard Malabanan shouting
that he is taking all the blame for the crime if they
would just spare the two students (Brion and Kawit)
who are totally innocent.
Brion, together with Malabanan, Ama and Luis, was
brought to the office of the then Vice-President
Estrada who asked Ama and Malabanan whether
they raped Eileen. Ama belied the
accusation.Malabanan, too, professed innocence
and said that in the nine (9) years he stayed in
Mindanao, it is his first time to cry this way. This
convinced the vice-president of Malabanans
innocence. Kawit also cried at this point. Brion saw
Luis being held up by two men towards the room as
Luis appeared to be on the brink of collapse. One of
the escorts then raised Luis hand so as to point at
Brion.
On July 30, 1993, Brion, Ama, Malabanan, Kawit,
Luis and Boy were brought to the Department of
Justice where Fiscal Zuo asked them to sign some
papers. Luis was instructed to re-affirm his sworn
statement before the PACC while Brion and Kawit
were asked to sign a waiver of detention. The three
(3), however, refused. Fiscal Zuno offered them a
lawyer from the Public Assistance Office (PAO) to
assist them but Brion rejected the offer.
On August 6, 1993, General Quizon asked Brion to
sign a confession but he refused. When a second
statement was prepared, he cried because he was
allowed to read only that portion relating to his
personal circumstances before being forced to sign
it without the assistance of a lawyer. Thereafter, he
was brought back to PHQ Sta. Cruz at around 5:00
p.m.
Brion related having executed a sworn statement
detailing the methods of torture he underwent to
force him into implicating the Mayor, Ama,
Medialdea and Malabanan, viz:
1) he would be placed in a doghouse-like cell fitted
with loudspeakers;
2) his hands would be tied behind his back and he
would be tied to a bench. A towel would be placed
over his mouth and nostrils, then 7-up is poured on
his face;
3) his body would be whipped with guns.
No medical examination was ever conducted on
him. More, his captors would padlock his cell
whenever Atty. Arias paid him a visit.
Kawit was a houseboy of the Mayor in his Calauan
residence. He claimed he slept at around 9:00 p.m.
of June 28, 1993 and woke up at 6:00 a.m. the
following day to water the plants.
On July 16, 1993, he was interrogated in connection
with the deaths of Eileen and Allan. Later in the day,
Medialdea and some policemen fetched him at his
house in Barangay Bagong Pook and brought him to
PHQ Sta. Cruz. Kawit was led into a room where
Medialdea, in the presence of Centeno and
Malabanan, asked him the name of the girl who was
reportedly shouting while Kawit was dragging her at
CPAMMS. Kawit answered that there were two (2)
bar girls, whose names are Carla and Ninja Joyce,
who were shouting at Barangay Bagong Pook. Ama
then entered the room and requested Malabanan
and Medialdea not to hurt Kawit. When Malabanan
and Medialdea left the room, Kawit explained to
Ama that the two (2) bar girls complained of one
Melvin Pajadan not paying them for their services.
Thereafter, Kawit was asked by one Major Uyami to
make a statement. After signing the statement,
Kawit was told by investigator Cansanay that the
major wanted him to include in his statement the
Mayors involvement in the Gomez-Sarmenta
slaying, but Kawit refused. He was thus detained for
the night. A policeman in civilian clothes thereafter
asked him to sign a paper bearing his name and the
handwritten words: Pauuwiin ka na bukas ng
umaga. Kawit signed the paper, but he was not
released the next day.
Before this Court, Mayor Sanchez and Medialdea
filed their consolidated Appellants Brief, and so did
Ama, Brion and Kawit. Brothers Luis and Boy
Corcolon, on the other hand, filed
separate appeal briefs. Briefly, the pith of the
assigned errors and the focus of the appellants
arguments is the issue of witnesses Centeno and
Malabanans credibility, whose open-court narrations
served as principal basis for the trial courts rendition
of a guilty verdict.
So oftenly repeated by this Court is that the matter
of assigning values to declarations on the witness
stand is best and most competently performed by
the trial judge[4] who had the unmatched opportunity
to observe the witnesses and to assess their
credibility by the various indicia available but not
reflected in the record. The demeanor of the person
on the stand can draw the line between fact and
fancy. The forthright answer or the hesitant pause,
the quivering voice or the angry tone, the flustered
look or the sincere gaze, the modest blush or the
guilty blanch these can reveal if the witness is telling
the truth or lying in his teeth.[5]
Judge Demetriou who presided over the entire trial
until its very conclusion expressed her satisfaction
with the way witnesses Centeno and Malabanan
survived the hot seat with flying colors, so to
speak.With respect to Centeno, the honorable Judge
had this to say:
In thus passing upon the credibility of Centeno, this
Court kept his alleged dubious reputation for veracity
in mind. But, after carefully reviewing the testimony
of Centeno in his direct examination and gruelling
(sic) cross-examination for almost 3 months, this
Court, even with a jaundiced eye, could not help but
be impressed about the myriad of details in his
testimony and his frank, spontaneous and
straightforward manner of testifying. The lengthy and
punishing cross-examination by seven lawyers to
which he was subjected failed to bring out any
serious flaw or infirmity in his perception or
recollection of events or destroy the coherence of
his narration. That Centeno merely wove such a
yarn from his fertile imagination, conflict with a
multitude of details, is highly improbable considering
that his highest educational attainment was sixth
grade in the elementary school.[6]
Similarly, Malabanan displayed a frank,
straightforward manner of answering questions and
a desire to state all the facts within his knowledge,
and his credibility was never shaken on cross-
examination; there was no indication of prevarication
or evasiveness. Consequently, (his) testimony is
entitled to full faith and credit, the honorable Judge
observed.[7] Her impressions of these star
witnesses for the State bind this Court, for we accord
great respect if not finality, to the findings of the trial
court on the credibility of witnesses.[8] They,
therefore, ought not to be disturbed.[9] And once the
prosecution witnesses are afforded full faith and
credit, the defenses version necessarily stands
discredited.[10]
To recall, all the appellants relied on the defense of
denial/alibi, i.e., they were at their respective homes
on the night of the rape-slay. But Centeno and
Malabanan confirmed the presence of all the
appellants on the night of June 28, 1993 till the early
morning of the following day and detailed the exact
participation of each in the crime. Positive
identification by credible witnesses of the accused
as the perpetrators of the crime, as we have
consistently held, demolishes the alibi[11] - the
much abused sanctuary of felons.[12] Moreover,
except for the Mayor who presented Ave Marie
Tonee Jimenez Sanchez (his daughter with his
mistress Elvira) and Medialdea who presented his
neighbor Anastacia Gulay, the other appellants
failed to present corroborating testimonial evidence
to butress their respective alibis.The defense of alibi
is inherently weak
especially when wanting in material corroboration.
Categorical declarations of witnesses for the
prosecution of the details of the crime are more
credible than the uncorroborated alibi interposed by
the accused.[13] Ave Maries testimony is of no help
to the Mayor, since alibi becomes less plausible as a
defense when it is invoked and sought to be crafted
mainly by the accused himself and his immediate
relatives.[14] Anastacia Gulays testimony is likewise
worthless since the trial court found her testimony
rehearsed. We will not disturb this finding because it
touches on credibility.
In fine, the defense of alibi is an issue of fact that
hinges on the credibility of witnesses, and the
assessment of the trial court, unless patently and
clearly inconsistent, must be accepted.[15]
In an attempt to discredit Centeno, appellants
principally harp on the contradictions in four (4)
Sworn Statements executed by Centeno on August
13, 1993, August 15, 1993, August 17, 1993 and
August 30, 1993. The Solicitor Generals Office
summarizes appellants asseverations on this point,
viz:
Appellants point out that while in his Sworn
Statement dated August 13, 1993, Centeno stated
that after the victims were seized, they were brought
to CPAMMS, in his Sworn Statement dated August
15, 1993, he claimed that the two were brought to
Erais Farm (p. 86-96, Sanchez and Medialdea; p.
11-12, Luis Corcolon; p. 38, Ama, Brion and Kawit;
p. 10, Rogelio Corcolon). Appellant also point out
that in the August 13, 1993 Sworn Statement,
Centeno merely referred to a person named Edwin
(without stating his family name) and another person
he did not know who was in the place where the
victims were brought. In his Sworn Statement dated
August 17, 1993, Centeno supplied the family name
of Edwin as Cosico and the name of the other
person whom he did not know as Lito Angeles (pp.
96-97, Sanchez and Medialdea).
Another major contradiction pointed out is that in his
August 13, 1993 Sworn Statement, Centeno
mentioned that he drove the Corcolon brothers to
the house of Edgardo Uod Lavadia in Bangkal
Street, Los Baos, Laguna. Upon arriving at the
house of Lavadia, Centeno saw Lavadia and Teofilo
Kit Alqueza talking. Later Lavadia handed an
envelop to Luis Corcolon. In the latest Sworn
Statement dated August 30, 1993, Centeno stated
that they did not go to the house of Lavadia and that
during the whole day of June 26, 1993, Centeno was
with Malabanan (pp. 99-102, Sanchez and
Medialdea; pp. 37-40, Ama, Brion and Kawit; p. 8,
Rogelio Corcolon).[16]
The trial judge found Centenos explanation on these
inconsistencies satisfactory, justifying such finding
with pertinent jurisprudence. The Court, therefore,
affirms and adopts her disquisition on the matter,
viz:
With respect to the portion of his sworn statement
dated August 13, 1993 which implicated Kit Alqueza,
Centeno explained that it was dictated by a CIS
agent named Rommel. He feared Rommel because
the latter threatened him that he would be hurt if he
did not cooperate. Even when his family was already
under the custody of the CIS
on August 15, 1993, he did not ask for the deletion
of the said portion because he was still under the
CIS custody. It was only on August 30, 1993 when
he was placed under the Witness Protection
Program that he found the courage to execute
another sworn statement for the specific purpose of
deleting the reference to Kit Alqueza. Although he
was placed under the Witness Protection Program
on August 17, 1993, there was a delay in his
retraction of Kit Alquezas involvement due to his
inability to reach Fiscal Arellano.
Centenos explanation is quite believable because he
had already implicated the accused Sanchez in his
sworn statement of August 13, 1993. Thus, the
portion implicating Kit Alqueza does not jibe with the
main story of Centeno that Eileen Sarmenta was
abducted by Medialdea, Ama, the Corcolon
brothers, Brion and Kawit to be given as a gift to
their boss, Mayor Sanchez.
As to his sworn statement of August 15, 1993 where
he stated that the victims were taken to Erais Farm
instead of CPAMMS as originally indicated in his
August 13, 1993 sworn statement, Centeno
explained that when he gave his first statement he
was still hoping that Mayor Sanchez would help him.
Furthermore, he feared the power and influence of
the Mayor. Thus, according to him, he gave the
wrong place to mislead his investigators. It was only
on August 15, 1993 when the accused Sanchez was
already in prison that Centeno decided to correct his
previous statements.
This Court is inclined to accept the explanation of
Centeno that his earlier attempt to mislead the
investigators by saying that the victims were taken to
CPAMMS was out of fear of the Mayor. Our
Supreme Court has recognized that the inherent fear
of reprisal by witnesses who refuse initially to
disclose what they know about a crime is quite
understandable, especially when the accused is a
man of power and influence in the community
(People v. Catao, 107 Phil. 861 [1960]).
In a recent case, People v. Pascua (206 SCRA 628
[1992]), the Supreme Court observed that Fear for
ones life explains the failure on the part of a witness
to immediately notify the authorities of what exactly
transpired. And, [o]nce such fear is overcome by a
more compelling need to narrate the truth, the
Supreme Court went on to say, then the witness
must be welcomed by the courts to help dispense
justice.
Consequently, this Court will not reject the testimony
of Centeno on the basis of inconsistencies in his
sworn statements taken by police authorities which
have been sufficiently explained. What is more
important is that Centeno testified on the witness
stand in a categorical, straightforward, spontaneous
and frank manner and remained consistent on
cross-examination. This Court, therefore, finds
Centeno a credible witness.[17]
To further fortify this observation, we advert to that
all-too familiar rule that discrepancies between
sworn statements and testimonies made at the
witness stand do not necessarily discredit the
witnesses.[18]Sworn statements/affidavits are
generally subordinated in importance to open court
declarations because the former are often executed
when an affiants mental faculties are not in such a
state as to afford him a fair opportunity of narrating
in full the incident which has transpired.[19]
Testimonies given during trials are mush more exact
and elaborate.[20] Thus, testimonial evidence
carries more weight than sworn
statements/affidavits.
Appellants would also quibble on the following
portions of Centenos testimony, to wit:
1) he could not give exactly where the appellants
went after sexually abusing Eileen;]
2) he was unsure whether it was Eileens left or right
foot that hit the chair of the van when she was
struggling;
3) he was unsure of their speed while on their way to
the UP compound;
4) he could not give the exact distance between the
ambulance he was driving and the van;
5) he said he could see the protruding end of the
roof of a kubo when he parked the ambulance in
front of the Big J restaurant. Appellants claim that
from where Centeno was allegedly standing, there
was no way he could see the roof of that kubo;
6) he was able to recall what appellants were
wearing on that night of June 28, 1993;
7) he saw Kawit hit Allan at his diaphragm with the
butt of an armalite, but the medico-legal finding of
Dr. Escueta revealed no injury in the abdominal
region of Allan;
8) his testimony that the appellants raped Eileen
inside the van which was very limited space, while
appellants could have chosen a far more
comfortable or remote place to do the crime. With
respect to the Mayor, it was very unbelievable for
him to commit rape inside his room filled with
religious adornments and in the process risk his
reputation as mayor and an established man in the
community;
9) his testimony to the effect that appellants rolled
their pants down to their knees and then climbed the
van to rape Eileen. Appellants would consider such
testimony impossible, claiming that the narrow
circumference of the waistline will impede and
obstruct the upward movement of the legs.
10) his admission that he can lie for money, or out
fear.
It may be conceded that these inconsistencies
marred Centenos testimony, but they refer to trivial
details which do not, in actuality, touch upon the
whys and wherefores of the crime
committed.[21]Equally settled is the rule that
inconsistencies in the testimony of witnesses when
referring only to minor details and collateral matters
do not affect either the substance of their
declaration, their veracity, or the weight of their
testimony. Although there may be inconsistencies on
minor details, the same do not impair the credibility
of the witnesses where there is consistency in
relating the principal occurrence and positive
identification of the assailants,[22] as in this case.
Slight contradictions in fact even serve to strengthen
the sincerity of a witness and prove that his
testimony is not rehearsed.[23] They are fail-safes
against memorized perjury.[24] Besides, errorless
testimonies cannot be expected especially when a
witness is recounting details of a harrowing
experience.[25] Even the most truthful witnesses
can make mistakes but such innocent lapses do not
necessarily affect their credibility.[26] Consequently,
Centenos and Malabanans credibility still remains
intact notwithstanding these inconsistencies.
Other pieces of evidence further enhance the
damaging testimonies of Centeno and Malabanan.
For one, a missing belt loop from the pair of white
shorts worn by Eileen on the night of the crime was
recovered from Erais Farm by prosecution witness
Major Lulita Chambers who, together with Col.
Gualberto and other officers, went there on August
19, 1993 to effect service of the search warrant
issued by RTC Judge Geraldez. Major Chambers, a
forensic chemist, conducted a series of laboratory
examinations and later concluded that the retrieved
beltloop matched in color, size and fiber composition
with a beltloop she detached from the white shorts of
Eileen which she (Major Chambers) used as a
standard.
Another corroborating evidence is the M16 empty
bullet shell recovered at the site where Allans body
was found. The ballistic examination on the empty
shell conducted by FID-PNP Chief Ballistician
Vicente de Vera revealed that the striations of the
empty shell were the same as those registered by
the cartridges from M16 rifle bearing Serial No.
773159 surrendered by Luis Corcolon. Mr. De Vera
also found the metallic fragments recovered from
Eileens body, after conducting microscopic
examinations thereof, to bear the same
characteristics as those from a bullet fired from an
M16 rifle.
The autopsy and vaginal examination conducted by
prosecution witness Dr. Vladimir V. Villasenor,
medico-legal officer of the PNP-CIS, on Eileens
cadaver buttresses all the more the gang-rape story
of the prosecution. Dr. Villaseors findings, in a
nutshell, disclosed the presence of multiple
contusions on Eileens body, fresh shallow
lacerations on her hymen, a congested cervix, a
gaping labia majora and oozing whitish fluid (tested
positive for spermatozoa) from the vaginal opening.
Oozing spermatozoa, Dr. Villaseor explained, means
that the amount of semen was much more than the
vaginal canal could contain and that there were
several seminal ejaculations that occurred therein.
He also noted that a great quantity of whitish fluid
continued to ooze from Eileens vaginal opening
despite her death for several hours. Taking into
account all these findings, Dr. Villaseor ruled out the
possibility of any consented sexual intercourse. In
this connection, appellants would belittle Dr.
Villaseors findings by insisting as the more
convincing opinion the defenses medical expert
witness, Dr. Ernesto Brion who testified to the effect
that there can be no multiple rape if there is only one
laceration on Eileens hymen as testified to by Dr.
Villaseor. We dismiss appellants argument by
reiterating anew that the absence of extensive
abrasions or contusions on the vaginal wall does not
rule out rape because the slightest penetrations
enough.[27]It is not an indispensable element for the
successful prosecution of said crime.[28] Moreover,
Dr. Brion is an uncle by consanguinity and erstwhile
counsel of record of the Mayor, thus making his
objectivity highly questionable.
Appellants Ama, Kawit and Brion would assail the
trial courts finding that they were part of the
conspiracy to commit the rape-slay. Their
concurrency of sentiment with the other appellants,
however, was evident from the time they abducted
Eileen and Allan, brought the two to Erais Farm
where Eileen was raped by the Mayor and Allan
beaten up black and blue, headed for a sugarcane
field killing Allan along the way, sexually abused
Eileen in rapid succession and finally killed her. In
not an instance did any of the three appellants
(Ama, Kawit and Brion) desist from that common
design.[29] Likewise, the complicity of the Mayor in
the crime can be deduced from the following
conversations he had with some of the appellants at
the Erais Farm (per Centenos testimony), viz.:
LUIS CORCOLON: Mayor, ito po yung regalo namin
sa inyo. Ito po yung babae na matagal na po
ninyong kursunada.
MAYOR: Aba, and ganda talaga ng babaeng yan.
Pero sino yung kasama ninyong lalake?
MEDIALDEA: Boss, kasama ho yan ng babae yung
lalake. Isinama na rin ho namin para wala pong
bulilyaso.
After raping Eileen, the Mayor had this short
exchange with Medialdea:
MAYOR: O sige mga anak, salamat sa regalo ninyo.
Salamat sa regalo ninyo sa akin. Tapos na ako, sa
inyo na iyan. Bahala na kayo diyan. Ano naman ang
gagawin ninyo diyan sa lalake?
MEDIALDEA: Boss, papatayin na rin po namin ito
para wala pong bulilyaso.
Finally, on appellants claim that the publicity given to
this case impaired their right to a fair trial, we need
only to revisit this Courts pronouncements in People
v. Teehankee, Jr. (249 SCRA 54), viz:
We cannot sustain appellants claim that he was
denied the right to impartial trial due to prejudicial
publicity. It is true that the print and broadcast media
gave the case at bar pervasive publicity, just like all
high profile and high stake criminal trials. Then and
now, we rule that the right of an accused to a fair
trial is not incompatible to a free press. To be sure,
responsible reporting enhances an accuseds right to
a fair trial for, as well pointed out, a responsible
press has always been regarded as the handmaiden
of effective judicial administration, especially in the
criminal field x x x. The press does not simply
publish information about trials but guards against
the miscarriage of justice by subjecting the police,
prosecutors, and judicial processes to extensive
public scrutiny and criticism.
Pervasive publicity is not per se prejudicial to the
right of an accused to fair trial. The mere fact that
the trial of appellant was given a day-to-day, gavel-
to-gavel coverages does not by itself prove that the
publicity so permeated the mind of the trial judge
and impaired his impartiality. For one, it is
impossible to seal the minds of members of the
bench from pre-trial and other off-court publicity of
sensational criminal cases. The state of the art of
our communication system brings news as they
happen straight to out breakfast tables and right to
our bedrooms. These news form part of our
everyday menu of the facts and fictions of life. For
another, our idea of a fair and impartial judge is not
that of a hermit who is out of touch with the world.
We have not installed the jury system whose
members are overly protected from publicity lest
they lose their impartiality. Criticisms against the jury
system are mounting and Mark Twains wit and
wisdom put them all in better perspective when he
observed: When a gentleman of high social
standing, intelligence, and probity swears that
testimony given under the same oath will outweigh
with him, street talk and newspaper reports based
upon mere hearsay, he is worth a hundred jurymen
who will swear to their own ignorance and stupidity x
x x. Why could not the jury law be so altered as to
give men of brains and honesty an equal chance
with fools and miscreants? Our judges are learned in
the law and trained to disregard off-court evidence
and on-camera performances of parties
to a litigation. Their mere exposure to publications
and publicity stunts does not per se fatally infect
their impartiality.
At best, appellant can only conjure possibility or
prejudice on the part of the trial judge due to the
barrage of publicity that characterized the
investigation and trial of the case. In Martelino, et al.
v. Alejsndro, et al., we rejected this standard of
possibility of prejudice and adopted the test of actual
prejudice as we ruled that to warrant a finding of
prejudicial publicity, there must be allegation and
proof that the judges have been unduly influenced,
not simply that they might be, by the barrage of
publicity. In the case at bar, the records do not show
that the trial judge developed actual bias against
appellant as a consequence of the extensive media
coverage of the pre-trial and trial of his case. The
totality of circumstances of the case does not prove
that the trial judge acquired a fixed opinion as a
result of prejudicial publicity which is incapable of
change even by evidence presented during the trial.
Appellant has the burden to prove this actual bias
and he has not discharged the burden.
And so we come to hear another tale of woe, of an
infamous public figure and his minions indicted for
having raped and killed a young lady and a budding
lad, of these victims who had led short obscure lives
that earned an equally ignominous end, and of a
criminal enterprise so despicable only the unthinking
beasts can orchestrate. It was, indeed, a plot
seemingly hatched in hell. And let it not be said that
the full protection of the law had been deprived
appellants. Even a beast cannot deny this.
WHEREFORE, the assailed decision is hereby
AFFIRMED in all respects. In addition, each of the
appellants having been found guilty of seven (7)
counts of rape with homicide and considering that
existing jurisprudence pegs the amount of indemnity
for the death of the victim at Fifty Thousand
(P50,000.00) Pesos, this Court hereby orders each
of the appellants to pay the respective heirs of
Eileen Sarmenta and Allan Gomez the amount of
Seven Hundred Thousand (P700,000.00) Pesos as
additional indemnity.
SO ORDERED.
EN BANC
G.R. No. 148468 January 28, 2003
ATTY. EDWARD SERAPIO, petitioner,
vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN (THIRD DIVISION), PEOPLE
OF THE PHILIPPINES, and PHILIPPINE NATIONAL
POLICE DIRECTOR-GENERAL LEANDRO
MENDOZA, respondents.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 148769 January 28, 2003
EDWARD SERAPIO, petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN and PEOPLE OF
THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 149116 January 28, 2003
EDWARD SERAPIO, petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN (THIRD
DIVISION) and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
respondents.
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
Before the Court are two petitions for certiorari filed
by petitioner Edward Serapio, assailing the
resolutions of the Third Division of the
Sandiganbayan denying his petition for bail, motion
for a reinvestigation and motion to quash, and a
petition for habeas corpus, all in relation to Criminal
Case No. 26558 for plunder wherein petitioner is
one of the accused together with former President
Joseph E. Estrada, Jose "Jinggoy" P. Estrada and
several others.
The records show that petitioner was a member of
the Board of Trustees and the Legal Counsel of the
Erap Muslim Youth Foundation, a non-stock, non-
profit foundation established in February 2000
ostensibly for the purpose of providing educational
opportunities for the poor and underprivileged but
deserving Muslim youth and students, and support
to research and advance studies of young Muslim
educators and scientists.
Sometime in April 2000, petitioner, as trustee of the
Foundation, received on its behalf a donation in the
amount of Two Hundred Million Pesos (P200 Million)
from Ilocos Sur Governor Luis "Chavit" Singson
through the latter's assistant Mrs. Yolanda Ricaforte.
Petitioner received the donation and turned over the
said amount to the Foundation's treasurer who later
deposited it in the Foundation's account with the
Equitable PCI Bank.
In the latter part of the year 2000, Gov. Singson
publicly accused then President Joseph E. Estrada
and his cohorts of engaging in several illegal
activities, including its operation on the illegal
numbers game known as jueteng. This triggered the
filing with the Office of the Ombudsman of several
criminal complaints against Joseph Estrada, Jinggoy
Estrada and petitioner, together with other persons.
Among such complaints were: Volunteers Against
Crime and Corruption, versus Joseph Ejercito
Estrada, Edward Serapio, et al., docketed as OMB
Crim. Case No. 0-00-1754; Graft Free Philippines
Foundation, Inc., versus Joseph Ejercito Estrada,
Edward Serapio, et al., docketed as OMB Crim.
Case No. 0-00-1755; and Leonardo De Vera,
Romeo T. Capulong and Dennis B. Funa, versus
Joseph Estrada, Yolanda Ricaforte, Edward
Serapio, Raul De Guzman, Danilo Reyes and Mila
Reforma, docketed as OMB Crim. Case No. 0-00-
1757.
Subsequently, petitioner filed his Counter-Affidavit
dated February 21, 2001. The other respondents
likewise filed their respective counter-affidavits. The
Office of the Ombudsman conducted a preliminary
investigation of the complaints and on April 4, 2001,
issued a joint resolution recommending, inter alia,
that Joseph Estrada, petitioner and several others
be charged with the criminal offense of plunder.
On April 4, 2001, the Ombudsman filed with the
Sandiganbayan several Informations against former
President Estrada, who earlier had resigned from his
post as President of the Republic of the Philippines.
One of these Informations, docketed as Criminal
Case No. 26558, charged Joseph Estrada with
plunder. On April 18, 2001, the Ombudsman filed an
amended Information in said case charging Estrada
and several co-accused, including petitioner, with
said crime. No bail was recommended for the
provisional release of all the accused, including
petitioner. The case was raffled to a special division
which was subsequently created by the Supreme
Court. The amended Information reads:
"That during the period from June, 1998 to January,
2001, in the Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, accused Joseph Ejercito
Estrada, THEN A PUBLIC OFFICER BEING THEN
THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES, by himself AND/OR in
CONNIVANCE/CONSPIRACY with his co-accused,
WHO ARE MEMBERS OF HIS FAMILY,
RELATIVES BY AFFINITY OR CONSANGUINITY,
BUSINESS ASSOCIATES, SUBORDINATES
AND/OR OTHER PERSONS, BY TAKING UNDUE
ADVANTAGE OF HIS OFFICIAL POSITION,
AUTHORITY, RELATIONSHIP, CONNECTION OR
INFLUENCE, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully
and criminally amass, accumulate and acquire BY
HIMSELF, DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, ill-gotten
wealth in the aggregate amount OR TOTAL VALUE
of FOUR BILLION NINETY SEVEN MILLION EIGHT
HUNDRED FOUR THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED
SEVENTY THREE PESOS AND SEVENTEEN
CENTAVOS [P4,097,804,173.17], more or less,
THEREBY UNJUSTLY ENRICHING HIMSELF OR
THEMSELVES AT THE EXPENSE AND TO THE
DAMAGE OF THE FILIPINO PEOPLE AND THE
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES through ANY OR
A combination OR A series of overt OR criminal
acts, OR SIMILAR SCHEMES OR MEANS,
described as follows:
(a) by receiving OR collecting, directly or
indirectly, on SEVERAL INSTANCES MONEY IN
THE AGGREGATE AMOUNT OF FIVE HUNDRED
FORTY-FIVE MILLION PESOS (P545,000,000.00),
MORE OR LESS, FROM ILLEGAL GAMBLING IN
THE FORM OF GIFT, SHARE, PERCENTAGE,
KICKBACK OR ANY FORM OF PECUNIARY
BENEFIT, BY HIMSELF AND/OR in connivance with
co-accused CHARLIE 'ATONG' ANG, Jose 'Jinggoy'
Estrada, Yolanda T. Ricaforte, Edward Serapio,
AND JOHN DOES AND JANE DOES in
consideration OF TOLERATION OR PROTECTION
OF ILLEGAL GAMBLING;
(b) by DIVERTING, RECEIVING,
misappropriating, converting OR misusing
DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, for HIS OR THEIR
PERSONAL gain and benefit public fund in the
amount of ONE HUNDRED THIRTY MILLION
PESOS (P130,000,000.00), more or less,
representing a portion of the TWO HUNDRED
MILLION PESOS [P200,000,000.00]) tobacco
excise tax share allocated for the Province of Ilocos
Sur under R.A. No. 7171, BY HIMSELF AND/OR in
CONNIVANCE with co-accused Charlie 'Atong' Ang,
Alma Alfaro, JOHN DOE a.k.a. Eleuterio Tan OR
Eleuterio Ramos Tan or Mr. Uy, and Jane Doe a.k.a.
Delia Rajas, AND OTHER JOHN DOES AND JANE
DOES;
(c) by directing, ordering and compelling FOR
HIS PERSONAL GAIN AND BENEFIT, the
Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) TO
PURCHASE, 351,878,000 SHARES OF STOCKS,
MORE OR LESS, and the Social Security System
(SSS), 329,855,000 SHARES OF STOCK, MORE
OR LESS, OF THE BELLE CORPORATION IN THE
AMOUNT OF MORE OR LESS ONE BILLION ONE
HUNDRED TWO MILLION NINE HUNDRED SIXTY
FIVE THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED SEVEN PESOS
AND FIFTY CENTAVOS [P1,102,965,607.50] AND
MORE OR LESS SEVEN HUNDRED FORTY FOUR
MILLION SIX HUNDRED TWELVE THOUSAND
AND FOUR HUNDRED FIFTY PESOS
[P744,612,450.00], RESPECTIVELY, OR A TOTAL
OR MORE OR LESS ONE BILLION EIGHT
HUNDRED FORTY SEVEN MILLION FIVE
HUNDRED SEVENTY EIGHT THOUSAND FIFTY
SEVEN PESOS AND FIFTY CENTAVOS
[P1,847,578,057.50]; AND BY COLLECTING OR
RECEIVING, DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, BY
HIMSELF AND/OR IN CONNIVANCE WITH JOHN
DOES AND JANE DOES, COMMISSIONS OR
PERCENTAGES OF SHARES OF STOCK IN THE
AMOUNT OF ONE HUNDRED EIGHTY NINE
MILLION SEVEN HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS
[189,700,000.00] MORE OR LESS, FROM THE
BELLE CORPORATION WHICH BECAME PART
OF THE DEPOSIT IN THE EQUITABLE-PCI BANK
UNDER THE ACCOUNT NAME "JOSE VELARDE";
(d) by unjustly enriching himself FROM
COMMISSIONS, GIFTS, SHARES,
PERCENTAGES, KICKBACKS OR ANY FORM OF
PECUNIARY BENEFITS, IN CONNIVANCE WITH
JOHN DOES AND JANE DOES, the amount of
MORE OR LESS THREE BILLION TWO HUNDRED
THIRTY THREE MILLION ONE HUNDRED FOUR
THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED SEVENTY THREE
PESOS AND SEVENTEEN CENTAVOS
[P3,233,104,173.17] AND DEPOSITING THE SAME
UNDER HIS ACCOUNT NAME "JOSE VELARDE"
AT THE EQUITABLE-PCI BANK.
CONTRARY TO LAW."1
On April 5, 2001, petitioner obtained a copy of the
Ombudsman's Joint Resolution finding probable
cause against him for plunder. The next day, April 6,
2001, he filed with the Office of the Ombudsman a
Motion for Reconsideration and/or Reinvestigation.2
Petitioner likewise filed on said date, this time with
the Sandiganbayan, an Urgent Omnibus Motion: (a)
To Hold in Abeyance the Issuance of Warrant of
Arrest and Further Proceedings; (b) To Conduct a
Determination of Probable Cause; (c) For Leave to
File Accused's Motion for Reconsideration and/or
Reinvestigation; and (d) To Direct the Ombudsman
to Conduct a Reinvestigation of the Charges against
accused Edward Serapio.3
On April 10, 2001, the Ombudsman issued an order
denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration
and/or reinvestigation on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction since the amended Information charging
petitioner with plunder had already been filed with
the Sandiganbayan.4
In a parallel development, the Sandiganbayan
issued a Resolution on April 25, 2001 in Criminal
Case No. 26558 finding probable cause to justify the
issuance of warrants of arrest for the accused,
including petitioner. Accordingly, the Sandiganbayan
issued an Order on the same date for the arrest of
petitioner.5 When apprised of said order, petitioner
voluntarily surrendered at 9:45 p.m. on the same
day to Philippine National Police Chief Gen. Leandro
Mendoza. Petitioner has since been detained at
Camp Crame for said charge.
The Sandiganbayan set the arraignment of the
accused, including petitioner, in Criminal Case No.
26558 on June 27, 2001. In the meantime, on April
27, 2001, petitioner filed with the Sandiganbayan an
Urgent Petition for Bail which was set for hearing on
May 4, 2001.6 For his part, petitioner's co-accused
Jose "Jinggoy" Estrada filed on April 20, 2001 a Very
Urgent Omnibus Motion alleging that he was entitled
to bail as a matter of right.
During the hearing on May 4, 2001 on petitioner's
Urgent Petition for Bail, the prosecution moved for
the resetting of the arraignment of the accused
earlier than the June 27, 2001 schedule. However,
the Sandiganbayan denied the motion of the
prosecution and issued an order declaring that the
petition for bail can and should be heard before
petitioner's arraignment on June 27, 2001 and even
before the other accused in Criminal Case No.
26558 filed their respective petitions for bail.
Accordingly, the Sandiganbayan set the hearing for
the reception of evidence on petitioner's petition for
bail on May 21 to 25, 2001.
On May 17, 2001, four days before the hearing on
petitioner's petition for bail, the Ombudsman filed an
urgent motion for early arraignment of Joseph
Estrada, Jinggoy Estrada and petitioner and a
motion for joint bail hearings of Joseph Estrada,
Jinggoy Estrada and petitioner. The following day,
petitioner filed a manifestation questioning the
propriety of including Joseph Estrada and Jinggoy
Estrada in the hearing on his (petitioner's) petition
for bail.
The Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution on May 18,
2001 resetting the hearings on petitioner's petition
for bail to June 18 to 28, 2001 to enable the court to
resolve the prosecution's pending motions as well as
petitioner's motion that his petition for bail be heard
as early as possible, which motion the prosecution
opposed.
On May 31, 2001, the Sandiganbayan issued a
Resolution denying petitioner's April 6, 2001 Urgent
Omnibus Motion. The court ruled that the issues
posed by petitioner had already been resolved in its
April 25, 2001 Resolution finding probable cause to
hold petitioner and his co-accused for trial.7
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the
said May 31, 2001 Resolution.
On June 1, 2001, the Sandiganbayan issued a
resolution requiring the attendance of petitioner as
well as all the other accused in Criminal Case No.
26558 during the hearings on the petitions for bail
under pain of waiver of cross-examination. The
Sandiganbayan, citing its inherent powers to
proceed with the trial of the case in the manner it
determines best conducive to orderly proceedings
and speedy termination of the case, directed the
other accused to participate in the said bail hearing
considering that under Section 8, Rule 114 of the
Revised Rules of Court, whatever evidence is
adduced during the bail hearing shall be considered
automatically reproduced at the trial.8
However, instead of proceeding with the bail hearing
set by it on June 18, 2001, the Sandiganbayan
issued an Order on June 15, 2001 canceling the
said bail hearing due to pending incidents yet to be
resolved and reset anew the hearing to June 26,
2001.9
On the eve of said hearing, the Sandiganbayan
issued a resolution denying petitioner's motion for
reconsideration of its May 31, 2001 Resolution. The
bail hearing on June 26, 2001 did not again proceed
because on said date petitioner filed with the
Sandiganbayan a motion to quash the amended
Information on the grounds that as against him, the
amended Information does not allege a combination
or series of overt or criminal acts constitutive of
plunder; as against him, the amended Information
does not allege a pattern of criminal acts indicative
of an overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy; the
money alleged in paragraph (a) of the amended
Information to have been illegally received or
collected does not constitute "ill-gotten wealth" as
defined in Section 1(d) of Republic Act No. 7080;
and the amended Information charges him of bribery
and illegal gambling.10 By way of riposte, the
prosecution objected to the holding of bail hearing
until petitioner agreed to withdraw his motion to
quash. The prosecution contended that petitioner's
motion to quash the amended Information was
antithetical to his petition for bail.
The Sandiganbayan reset the arraignment of
accused and the hearing on the petition for bail of
petitioner in Criminal Case No. 26558 for July 10,
2001 to enable it to resolve the pending incidents
and the motion to quash of petitioner. However,
even before the Sandiganbayan could resolve the
pending motions of petitioner and the prosecution,
petitioner filed with this Court on June 29, 2001 a
Petition for Habeas Corpus and Certiorari, docketed
as G.R. No. 148468, praying that the Court declare
void the questioned orders, resolutions and actions
of the Sandiganbayan on his claim that he was
thereby effectively denied of his right to due process.
Petitioner likewise prayed for the issuance of a writ
of habeas corpus; that the People be declared to
have waived their right to present evidence in
opposition to his petition for bail; and, premised on
the failure of the People to adduce strong evidence
of petitioner's guilt of plunder, that he be granted
provisional liberty on bail after due proceedings.11
Meanwhile, on June 28, 2001, Jose "Jinggoy"
Estrada filed with the Sandiganbayan a motion
praying that said court resolve his motion to fix his
bail.
On July 9, 2001, the Sandiganbayan issued a
Resolution denying petitioner's motion to quash the
amended Information. Petitioner, through counsel,
received on said date a copy of said resolution.12
The motion to fix bail filed by Jose "Jinggoy" Estrada
was also resolved by the Sandiganbayan.
On July 10, 2001, just before his arraignment in
Criminal Case No. 26558, petitioner manifested to
the Sandiganbayan that he was going to file a
motion for reconsideration of the July 9, 2001
Resolution denying his motion to quash and for the
deferment of his arraignment. The Sandiganbayan,
however, declared that there was no provision in the
Rules of Court or in the Sandiganbayan's rules
granting the right to petitioner to file a motion for the
reconsideration of an interlocutory order issued by it
and ordered petitioner to orally argue his motion for
reconsideration. When petitioner refused, the
Sandiganbayan proceeded with his arraignment.
Petitioner refused to plead, impelling the court to
enter a plea of not guilty for him.
On July 20, 2001, petitioner filed with the Court a
Petition for Certiorari, docketed as G.R. No. 148769,
alleging that the Sandiganbayan acted without or in
excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
in issuing its July 9, 2001 Resolution denying his
motion to quash, notwithstanding the fact that
material inculpatory allegations of the amended
Information against him do not constitute the crime
of plunder; and that he is charged, under the said
amended Information, for more than one offense.
Jose "Jinggoy" Estrada likewise filed petition for
certiorari with the Court docketed as G.R. No.
148965 for the nullification of a resolution of the
Sandiganbayan denying his motion to fix bail.
On August 9, 2001, petitioner filed with the Court
another Petition for Certiorari, docketed as G.R. No.
149116, assailing the Sandiganbayan's Resolution
dated 31 May 2001 which denied his April 6, 2001
Urgent Omnibus Motion and its June 25, 2001
Resolution denying his motion for reconsideration of
its May 31, 2001 Resolution.
Re: G.R. No. 148769
Petitioner avers that:
THE SANDIGANBAYAN ACTED WITHOUT OR IN
EXCESS OF JURISDICTION OR WITH GRAVE
ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK
OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION, IN DENYING
PETITIONER SERAPIO'S MOTION TO QUASH
NOTWITHSTANDING THAT
I
THE FACTS ALLEGED IN THE AMENDED
INFORMATION AS AGAINST PETITIONER
SERAPIO DO NOT CONSTITUTE THE CRIME OF
PLUNDER.
A The Amended Information, as against petitioner
Serapio, does not allege a combination or series of
overt or criminal acts constitutive of plunder.
B The Amended Information, as against petitioner
Serapio, does not allege a pattern of criminal acts
indicative of an overall unlawful scheme or
conspiracy.
C The money described in paragraph (a) of the
Amended Information and alleged to have been
illegally received or collected does not constitute 'ill-
gotten wealth' as defined in Section 1(d), Republic
Act No. 7080, as amended.
II
THE AMENDED INFORMATION CHARGES MORE
THAN ONE OFFENSE."13
Petitioner asserts that, on the face of the amended
Information, he is charged with plunder only in
paragraph (a) which reads:
"(a) by receiving OR collecting, directly or
indirectly, on SEVERAL INSTANCES, MONEY IN
THE AGGREGATE AMOUNT OF FIVE HUNDRED
FORTY-FIVE MILLION PESOS (P545,000,000.00),
MORE OR LESS, FROM ILLEGAL GAMBLING IN
THE FORM OF GIFT, SHARE, PERCENTAGE,
KICKBACK OR ANY FORM OF PECUNIARY
BENEFIT, BY HIMSELF AND/OR in connivance with
co-accused CHARLIE 'ATONG' ANG, Jose 'Jinggoy'
Estrada, Yolanda T. Ricaforte, Edward Serapio,
AND JOHN DOES AND JANE DOES, in
consideration OF TOLERATION OR PROTECTION
OF ILLEGAL GAMBLING;"14
Petitioner asserts that there is no allegation in
paragraph (a) of the amended Information of a
"combination or series of overt or criminal acts"
constituting plunder as described in Section 1(d) of
R.A. 7080 as amended. Neither does the amended
Information allege "a pattern of criminal acts." He
avers that his single act of toleration or protection of
illegal gambling impelled by a single criminal
resolution does not constitute the requisite
"combination or series of acts" for plunder. He
further claims that the consideration consisting of
gifts, percentages or kickbacks in furtherance of said
resolution turned over to and received by former
President Joseph E. Estrada "on several occasions"
does not cure the defect in the amended
information. Petitioner insists that on the face of the
amended Information he is charged only with bribery
or illegal gambling and not of plunder.
Petitioner argues that the P540 million which forms
part of the P4,097,804,173.17 amassed by former
President Joseph E. Estrada in confabulation with
his co-accused is not ill-gotten wealth as defined in
Section 1(d) of R.A. 7080.
We do not agree with petitioner. Section 6, Rule 110
of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides
that:
"Sec. 6 Sufficiency of complaint or information. A
complaint or information is sufficient if it states the
name of the accused, the designation of the offense
given by the statute; the acts or omissions
complained of as constituting the offense; the name
of the offended party; the approximate date of the
commission of the offense; and the place where the
offense was committed.
When the offense was committed by more than one
person, all of them shall be included in the complaint
or information."15
The acts or omissions complained or must be
alleged in such form as is sufficient to enable a
person of common understanding to know what
offense is intended to be charged and enable the
court to know the proper judgment. The Information
must allege clearly and accurately the elements of
the crime charged. What facts and circumstances
are necessary to be included therein must be
determined by reference to the definition and
elements of the specific crimes. The purpose of the
requirement of alleging all the elements of the crime
in the Information is to inform an accused of the
nature of the accusation against him so as to enable
him to suitably prepare for his defense.16 Another
purpose is to enable accused, if found guilty, to
plead his conviction in a subsequent prosecution for
the same offense.17 The use of derivatives or
synonyms or allegations of basic facts constituting
the offense charged is sufficient.18
In this case, the amended Information specifically
alleges that all the accused, including petitioner,
connived and conspired with former President
Joseph E. Estrada to commit plunder "through any
or a combination or a series of overt or criminal acts
or similar schemes or means." And in paragraph (a)
of the amended Information, petitioner and his co-
accused are charged with receiving or collecting,
directly or indirectly, on several instances money in
the aggregate amount of P545,000,000.00. In Jose
"Jinggoy" Estrada vs. Sandiganbayan (Third
Division), et al.,19 we held that the word "series" is
synonymous with the clause "on several instances";
it refers to a repetition of the same predicate act in
any of the items in Section 1(d) of the law. We
further held that the word "combination"
contemplates the commission of at least any two
different predicate acts in any of the said items. We
ruled that "plainly, subparagraph (a) of the amended
information charges accused therein, including
petitioner, with plunder committed by a series of the
same predicate act under Section 1(d)(2) of the law"
and that:
"x x x Sub-paragraph (a) alleged the predicate act of
receiving, on several instances, money from illegal
gambling, in consideration of toleration or protection
of illegal gambling, and expressly names petitioner
as one of those who conspired with former President
Estrada in committing the offense. This predicate act
corresponds with the offense described in item [2] of
the enumeration in Section 1(d) of R.A. No. 7080. x
x x."20
It is not necessary to allege in the amended
Information a pattern of overt or criminal acts
indicative of the overall unlawful scheme or
conspiracy because as Section 3 of R.A. 7080
specifically provides, the same is evidentiary and the
general rule is that matters of evidence need not be
alleged in the Information.21
The Court also ruled in Jose "Jinggoy" Estrada vs.
Sandiganbayan22 that the aggregate amount of
P4,097,804,173.17 inclusive of the P545 million
alleged in paragraph (a) of the amended information
is ill-gotten wealth as contemplated in Section 1,
paragraph 1(d) of Republic Act 7080, as amended,
and that all the accused in paragraph (a) to (d) of the
amended information conspired and confederated
with former President Estrada to enable the latter to
amass, accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth in the
aggregate amount of P4,097,804,173.17.
Under the amended Information, all the accused,
including petitioner, are charged of having conspired
and confabulated together in committing plunder.
When two or more persons conspire to commit a
crime, each is responsible for all the acts of others.
In contemplation of law, the act of the conspirator is
the act of each of them.23 Conspirators are one
man, they breathe one breath, they speak one voice,
they wield one arm and the law says that the acts,
words and declarations of each, while in the pursuit
of the common design, are the acts, words and
declarations of all.24
Petitioner asserts that he is charged under the
amended information of bribery and illegal gambling
and others. The Sandiganbayan, for its part, held
that petitioner is not charged with the predicate acts
of bribery and illegal gambling but is charged only
with one crime that of plunder:
"THE ISSUE OF WHETHER OR NOT THE
INFORMATION CHARGES MORE THAN ONE
OFFENSE
According to the accused Estradas and Edward
Serapio the information charges more than one
offense, namely, bribery (Article 210 of the Revised
Penal Code), malversation of public funds or
property (Article 217, Revised Penal Code) and
violations of Sec. 3(e) of Republic Act (RA No. 3019)
and Section 7(d) of RA 6713.
This contention is patently unmeritorious. The acts
alleged in the information are not charged as
separate offenses but as predicate acts of the crime
of plunder.
It should be stressed that the Anti-Plunder law
specifically Section 1(d) thereof does not make any
express reference to any specific provision of laws,
other than R.A. No. 7080, as amended, which
coincidentally may penalize as a separate crime any
of the overt or criminal acts enumerated therein. The
said acts which form part of the combination or
series of act are described in their generic sense.
Thus, aside from 'malversation' of public funds, the
law also uses the generic terms 'misappropriation',
'conversion' or 'misuse' of said fund. The fact that
the acts involved may likewise be penalized under
other laws is incidental. The said acts are mentioned
only as predicate acts of the crime of plunder and
the allegations relative thereto are not to be taken or
to be understood as allegations charging separate
criminal offenses punished under the Revised Penal
Code, the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act and
Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public
Officials and Employees."25
This Court agrees with the Sandiganbayan. It is
clear on the face of the amended Information that
petitioner and his co-accused are charged only with
one crime of plunder and not with the predicate acts
or crimes of plunder. It bears stressing that the
predicate acts merely constitute acts of plunder and
are not crimes separate and independent of the
crime of plunder. Resultantly then, the petition is
dismissed.
Re: G.R. No. 149116
Petitioner assails the May 31, 2001 Joint Resolution
of the Sandiganbayan denying his April 4, 2001
Urgent Omnibus Motion contending that:
"GROUNDS FOR THE PETITION
THE SANDIGANBAYAN ACTED WITHOUT OR IN
EXCESS OF JURISDICTION OR WITH GRAVE
ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK
OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN SUMMARILY
DENYING PETITIONER SERAPIO'S URGENT
OMNIBUS MOTION AND MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION (RE: RESOLUTION DATED
31 MAY 2001), NOTWITHSTANDING THAT THE
OMBUDSMAN HAD TOTALLY DISREGARDED
EXCULPATORY EVIDENCE AND COMMITTED
GRAVE AND MANIFEST ERRORS OF LAW
SERIOUSLY PREJUDICIAL TO THE RIGHTS AND
INTERESTS OF PETITIONER SERAPIO, AND
THERE IS NO PROBABLE CAUSE TO SUPPORT
AN INDICTMENT FOR PLUNDER AS AGAINST
PETITIONER SERAPIO."26
Petitioner claims that the Sandiganbayan committed
grave abuse of discretion in denying his omnibus
motion to hold in abeyance the issuance of a
warrant for his arrest as well as the proceedings in
Criminal Case No. 26558; to conduct a
determination of probable cause; and to direct the
Ombudsman to conduct a reinvestigation of the
charges him. Petitioner asseverates that the
Ombudsman had totally disregarded exculpatory
evidence and committed grave abuse of discretion in
charging him with plunder. He further argues that
there exists no probable cause to support an
indictment for plunder as against him.27
Petitioner points out that the joint resolution of the
Ombudsman does not even mention him in relation
to the collection and receipt of jueteng money which
started in 199828 and that the Ombudsman
inexplicably arrived at the conclusion that the Erap
Muslim Youth Foundation was a money laundering
front organization put up by Joseph Estrada,
assisted by petitioner, even though the latter
presented evidence that said Foundation is a bona
fide and legitimate private foundation.29 More
importantly, he claims, said joint resolution does not
indicate that he knew that the P200 million he
received for the Foundation came from jueteng.30
Petitioner insists that he cannot be charged with
plunder since: (1) the P200 million he received does
not constitute "ill-gotten wealth" as defined in
Section 1(d) of R.A. No. 7080;31 (2) there is no
evidence linking him to the collection and receipt of
jueteng money;32 (3) there was no showing that
petitioner participated in a pattern of criminal acts
indicative of an overall unlawful scheme or
conspiracy to amass, accumulate or acquire ill-
gotten wealth, or that his act of receiving the P200
million constitutes an overt criminal act of plunder.33
Petitioner argues further that his motion for
reinvestigation is premised on the absolute lack of
evidence to support a finding of probable cause for
plunder as against him,34 and hence he should be
spared from the inconvenience, burden and expense
of a public trial.35
Petitioner also avers that the discretion of
government prosecutors is not beyond judicial
scrutiny. He asserts that while this Court does not
ordinarily look into the existence of probable cause
to charge a person for an offense in a given case, it
may do so in exceptional circumstances, which are
present in this case: (1) to afford adequate
protection to the constitutional rights of the accused;
(2) for the orderly administration of justice or to avoid
oppression; (3) when the acts of the officer are
without or in excess of authority; and (4) where the
charges are manifestly false and motivated by the
lust for vengeance.36 Petitioner claims that he
raised proper grounds for a reinvestigation by
asserting that in issuing the questioned joint
resolution, the Ombudsman disregarded evidence
exculpating petitioner from the charge of plunder
and committed errors of law or irregularities which
have been prejudicial to his interest.37 He also
states that during the joint preliminary investigations
for the various charges against Joseph Estrada and
his associates, of which the plunder charge was only
one of the eight charges against Estrada et al., he
was not furnished with copies of the other
complaints nor given the opportunity to refute the
evidence presented in relation to the other seven
cases, even though the evidence presented therein
were also used against him, although he was only
charged in the plunder case.38
The People maintain that the Sandiganbayan
committed no grave abuse of discretion in denying
petitioner's omnibus motion. They assert that since
the Ombudsman found probable cause to charge
petitioner with the crime of plunder, the
Sandiganbayan is bound to assume jurisdiction over
the case and to proceed to try the same. They
further argue that "a finding of probable cause is
merely preliminary and prefatory of the eventual
determination of guilt or innocence of the accused,"
and that petitioner still has the chance to interpose
his defenses in a full blown trial where his guilt or
innocence may finally be determined.39
The People also point out that the Sandiganbayan
did not commit grave abuse of discretion in denying
petitioner's omnibus motion asking for, among
others, a reinvestigation by the Ombudsman,
because his motion for reconsideration of the
Ombudsman's joint resolution did not raise the
grounds of either newly discovered evidence, or
errors of law or irregularities, which under Republic
Act No. 6770 are the only grounds upon which a
motion for reconsideration may be filed.40
The People likewise insist that there exists probable
cause to charge petitioner with plunder as a co-
conspirator of Joseph Estrada.41
This Court does not agree with petitioner.
Case law has it that the Court does not interfere with
the Ombudsman's discretion in the conduct of
preliminary investigations. Thus, in Raro vs.
Sandiganbayan42 , the Court ruled:
"x x x. In the performance of his task to determine
probable cause, the Ombudsman's discretion is
paramount. Thus, in Camanag vs. Guerrero, this
Court said:
'x x x. (S)uffice it to state that this Court has adopted
a policy of non-interference in the conduct of
preliminary investigations, and leaves to the
investigating prosecutor sufficient latitude of
discretion in the exercise of determination of what
constitutes sufficient evidence as will establish
'probable cause' for filing of information against the
supposed offender."
In Cruz, Jr. vs. People,43 the Court ruled thus:
"Furthermore, the Ombudsman's findings are
essentially factual in nature. Accordingly, in assailing
said findings on the contention that the Ombudsman
committed a grave abuse of discretion in holding
that petitioner is liable for estafa through falsification
of public documents, petitioner is clearly raising
questions of fact here. His arguments are anchored
on the propriety or error in the Ombudsman's
appreciation of facts. Petitioner cannot be unaware
that the Supreme Court is not a trier of facts, more
so in the consideration of the extraordinary writ of
certiorari where neither question of fact nor even of
law are entertained, but only questions of lack or
excess of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion.
Insofar as the third issue is concerned, we find that
no grave abuse of discretion has been committed by
respondents which would warrant the granting of the
writ of certiorari."
Petitioner is burdened to allege and establish that
the Sandiganbayan and the Ombudsman for that
matter committed grave abuse of discretion in
issuing their resolution and joint resolution,
respectively. Petitioner failed to discharge his
burden. Indeed, the Court finds no grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the Sandiganbayan and the
Ombudsman in finding probable cause against
petitioner for plunder. Neither did the
Sandiganbayan abuse its discretion in denying
petitioner's motion for reinvestigation of the charges
against him in the amended Information. In its
Resolution of April 25, 2001, the Sandiganbayan
affirmed the finding of the Ombudsman that
probable cause exists against petitioner and his co-
accused for the crime of plunder, thus:
"In the light of the foregoing and considering the
allegations of the Amended Information dated 18
April 2001 charging the accused with the offense of
PLUNDER and examining carefully the evidence
submitted in support thereof consisting of the
affidavits and sworn statements and testimonies of
prosecution witnesses and several other pieces of
documentary evidence, as well as the respective
counter-affidavits of accused former President
Joseph Estrada dated March 20, 2001, Jose
"Jinggoy" Pimentel Estrada dated February 20,
2001, Yolanda T. Ricaforte dated January 21, 2001
and Edward S. Serapio dated February 21, 2001,
the Court finds and so holds that probable cause for
the offense of PLUNDER exists to justify issuance of
warrants of arrest of accused former President
Joseph Ejercito Estrada, Mayor Jose "Jinggoy"
Estrada, Charlie "Atong" Ang, Edward Serapio,
Yolanda T. Ricaforte, Alma Alfaro, John Doe a.k.a.
Eleuterio Tan or Eleuterio Ramos Tan or Mr. Uy, and
Jane Doe a.k.a Delia Rajas."44
Likewise, in its Resolution dated May 31, 2001 of
petitioner's omnibus motion, the Sandiganbayan
noted that a preliminary investigation was fully
conducted in accordance with Rule II, Administrative
Order No. 7 of the Office of the Ombudsman,
pursuant to Sections 18, 23 and 27 of Republic Act
No. 6770 (The Ombudsman Act of 1989); and that
all the basic complaints and evidence in support
thereof were served upon all the accused.45 It was
in light of such findings that the Sandiganbayan held
that there was no basis for the allegation that
accused therein (including petitioner) were deprived
of the right to seek a reconsideration of the
Ombudsman's Resolution dated April 4, 2001 finding
probable cause to charge them with plunder after
the conduct of preliminary investigation in
connection therewith. In addition, the
Sandiganbayan pointed out that petitioner filed a
motion for reconsideration of the Ombudsman's
resolution, but failed to show in his motion that there
were newly discovered evidence, or that the
preliminary investigation was tainted by errors of law
or irregularities, which are the only grounds for which
a reconsideration of the Ombudsman's resolution
may be granted.46
It bears stressing that the right to a preliminary
investigation is not a constitutional right, but is
merely a right conferred by statute.47 The absence
of a preliminary investigation does not impair the
validity of the Information or otherwise render the
same defective and neither does it affect the
jurisdiction of the court over the case or constitute a
ground for quashing the Information.48 If the lack of
a preliminary investigation does not render the
Information invalid nor affect the jurisdiction of the
court over the case, with more reason can it be said
that the denial of a motion for reinvestigation cannot
invalidate the Information or oust the court of its
jurisdiction over the case. Neither can it be said that
petitioner had been deprived of due process. He
was afforded the opportunity to refute the charges
against him during the preliminary investigation.
The purpose of a preliminary investigation is merely
to determine whether a crime has been committed
and whether there is probable cause to believe that
the person accused of the crime is probably guilty
thereof and should be held for trial.49 As the Court
held in Webb vs. De Leon, "[a] finding of probable
cause needs only to rest on evidence showing that
more likely than not a crime has been committed
and was committed by the suspect. Probable cause
need not be based on clear and convincing evidence
of guilt, neither on evidence establishing guilt
beyond reasonable doubt and definitely, not on
evidence establishing absolute certainty of guilt.''50
Absent any showing of arbitrariness on the part of
the prosecutor or any other officer authorized to
conduct preliminary investigation, courts as a rule
must defer to said officer's finding and determination
of probable cause, since the determination of the
existence of probable cause is the function of the
prosecutor.51 The Court agrees with the
Sandiganbayan that petitioner failed to establish that
the preliminary investigation conducted by the
Ombudsman was tainted with irregularity or that its
findings stated in the joint resolution dated April 4,
2001 are not supported by the facts, and that a
reinvestigation was necessary.
Certiorari will not lie to invalidate the
Sandiganbayan's resolution denying petitioner's
motion for reinvestigation since there is nothing to
substantiate petitioner's claim that it gravely abused
its discretion in ruling that there was no need to
conduct a reinvestigation of the case.52
The ruling in Rolito Go vs. Court of Appeals53 that
an accused shall not be deemed to have waived his
right to ask for a preliminary investigation after he
had been arraigned over his objection and despite
his insistence on the conduct of said investigation
prior to trial on the merits does not apply in the
instant case because petitioner merely prayed for a
reinvestigation on the ground of a newly-discovered
evidence. Irrefragably, a preliminary investigation
had been conducted by the Ombudsman prior to the
filing of the amended Information, and that petitioner
had participated therein by filing his counter-affidavit.
Furthermore, the Sandiganbayan had already
denied his motion for reinvestigation as well as his
motion for reconsideration thereon prior to his
arraignment.54 In sum then, the petition is
dismissed.
Re: G.R. No. 148468
As synthesized by the Court from the petition and
the pleadings of the parties, the issues for resolution
are: (1) Whether or not petitioner should first be
arraigned before hearings of his petition for bail may
be conducted; (2) Whether petitioner may file a
motion to quash the amended Information during the
pendency of his petition for bail; (3) Whether a joint
hearing of the petition for bail of petitioner and those
of the other accused in Criminal Case No. 26558 is
mandatory; (4) Whether the People waived their
right to adduce evidence in opposition to the petition
for bail of petitioner and failed to adduce strong
evidence of guilt of petitioner for the crime charged;
and (5) Whether petitioner was deprived of his right
to due process in Criminal Case No. 26558 and
should thus be released from detention via a writ of
habeas corpus.
On the first issue, petitioner contends that the
Sandiganbayan committed a grave abuse of its
discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction
when it deferred the hearing of his petition for bail to
July 10, 2001, arraigned him on said date and
entered a plea of not guilty for him when he refused
to be arraigned. He insists that the Rules on
Criminal Procedure, as amended, does not require
that he be arraigned first prior to the conduct of bail
hearings since the latter can stand alone and must,
of necessity, be heard immediately.55 Petitioner
maintains that his arraignment before the bail
hearings are set is not necessary since he would not
plead guilty to the offense charged, as is evident in
his earlier statements insisting on his innocence
during the Senate investigation of the jueteng
scandal and the preliminary investigation before the
Ombudsman.56 Neither would the prosecution be
prejudiced even if it would present all its evidence
before his arraignment because, under the Revised
Penal Code, a voluntary confession of guilt is
mitigating only if made prior to the presentation of
evidence for the prosecution,57 and petitioner
admitted that he cannot repudiate the evidence or
proceedings taken during the bail hearings because
Rule 114, Section 8 of the Revised Rules of Court
expressly provides that evidence present during bail
hearings are automatically reproduced during the
trial.58 Petitioner likewise assures the prosecution
that he is willing to be arraigned prior to the posting
of a bail bond should he be granted bail.59
The People insist that arraignment is necessary
before bail hearings may be commenced, because it
is only upon arraignment that the issues are joined.
The People stress that it is only when an accused
pleads not guilty may he file a petition for bail and if
he pleads guilty to the charge, there would be no
more need for him to file said petition. Moreover,
since it is during arraignment that the accused is first
informed of the precise charge against him, he must
be arraigned prior to the bail hearings to prevent him
from later assailing the validity of the bail hearings
on the ground that he was not properly informed of
the charge against him, especially considering that,
under Section 8, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of
Court, evidence presented during such proceedings
are considered automatically reproduced at the
trial.60 Likewise, the arraignment of accused prior to
bail hearings diminishes the possibility of an
accused's flight from the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan because trial in absentia may be
had only if an accused escapes after he has been
arraigned.61 The People also contend that the
conduct of bail hearings prior to arraignment would
extend to an accused the undeserved privilege of
being appraised of the prosecution's evidence
before he pleads guilty for purposes of penalty
reduction.62
Although petitioner had already been arraigned on
July 10, 2001 and a plea of not guilty had been
entered by the Sandiganbayan on his behalf,
thereby rendering the issue as to whether an
arraignment is necessary before the conduct of bail
hearings in petitioner's case moot, the Court takes
this opportunity to discuss the controlling precepts
thereon pursuant to its symbolic function of
educating the bench and bar.63
The contention of petitioner is well-taken. The
arraignment of an accused is not a prerequisite to
the conduct of hearings on his petition for bail. A
person is allowed to petition for bail as soon as he is
deprived of his liberty by virtue of his arrest or
voluntary surrender.64 An accused need not wait for
his arraignment before filing a petition for bail.
In Lavides vs. Court of Appeals,65 this Court ruled
on the issue of whether an accused must first be
arraigned before he may be granted bail. Lavides
involved an accused charged with violation of
Section 5(b) Republic Act No. 7610 (The Special
Protection of Children Against Abuse, Exploitation
and Discrimination Act), an offense punishable by
reclusion temporal in its medium period to reclusion
perpetua. The accused therein assailed, inter alia,
the trial court's imposition of the condition that he
should first be arraigned before he is allowed to post
bail. We held therein that "in cases where it is
authorized, bail should be granted before
arraignment, otherwise the accused may be
precluded from filing a motion to quash."66
However, the foregoing pronouncement should not
be taken to mean that the hearing on a petition for
bail should at all times precede arraignment,
because the rule is that a person deprived of his
liberty by virtue of his arrest or voluntary surrender
may apply for bail as soon as he is deprived of his
liberty, even before a complaint or information is
filed against him.67 The Court's pronouncement in
Lavides should be understood in light of the fact that
the accused in said case filed a petition for bail as
well as a motion to quash the informations filed
against him. Hence, we explained therein that to
condition the grant of bail to an accused on his
arraignment would be to place him in a position
where he has to choose between (1) filing a motion
to quash and thus delay his release on bail because
until his motion to quash can be resolved, his
arraignment cannot be held, and (2) foregoing the
filing of a motion to quash so that he can be
arraigned at once and thereafter be released on bail.
This would undermine his constitutional right not to
be put on trial except upon a valid complaint or
Information sufficient to charge him with a crime and
his right to bail.68
It is therefore not necessary that an accused be first
arraigned before the conduct of hearings on his
application for bail. For when bail is a matter of right,
an accused may apply for and be granted bail even
prior to arraignment. The ruling in Lavides also
implies that an application for bail in a case involving
an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua to
death may also be heard even before an accused is
arraigned. Further, if the court finds in such case
that the accused is entitled to bail because the
evidence against him is not strong, he may be
granted provisional liberty even prior to arraignment;
for in such a situation, bail would be "authorized"
under the circumstances. In fine, the Sandiganbayan
committed a grave abuse of its discretion amounting
to excess of jurisdiction in ordering the arraignment
of petitioner before proceeding with the hearing of
his petition for bail.
With respect to the second issue of whether
petitioner may file a motion to quash during the
pendency of his petition for bail, petitioner maintains
that a motion to quash and a petition for bail are not
inconsistent, and may proceed independently of
each other. While he agrees with the prosecution
that a motion to quash may in some instances result
in the termination of the criminal proceedings and in
the release of the accused therein, thus rendering
the petition for bail moot and academic, he opines
that such is not always the case; hence, an accused
in detention cannot be forced to speculate on the
outcome of a motion to quash and decide whether or
not to file a petition for bail or to withdraw one that
has been filed.69 He also insists that the grant of a
motion to quash does not automatically result in the
discharge of an accused from detention nor render
moot an application for bail under Rule 117, Section
5 of the Revised Rules of Court.70
The Court finds that no such inconsistency exists
between an application of an accused for bail and
his filing of a motion to quash. Bail is the security
given for the release of a person in the custody of
the law, furnished by him or a bondsman, to
guarantee his appearance before any court as
required under the conditions set forth under the
Rules of Court.71 Its purpose is to obtain the
provisional liberty of a person charged with an
offense until his conviction while at the same time
securing his appearance at the trial.72 As stated
earlier, a person may apply for bail from the moment
that he is deprived of his liberty by virtue of his arrest
or voluntary surrender.73
On the other hand, a motion to quash an Information
is the mode by which an accused assails the validity
of a criminal complaint or Information filed against
him for insufficiency on its face in point of law, or for
defects which are apparent in the face of the
Information.74 An accused may file a motion to
quash the Information, as a general rule, before
arraignment.75
These two reliefs have objectives which are not
necessarily antithetical to each other. Certainly, the
right of an accused right to seek provisional liberty
when charged with an offense not punishable by
death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, or
when charged with an offense punishable by such
penalties but after due hearing, evidence of his guilt
is found not to be strong, does not preclude his right
to assail the validity of the Information charging him
with such offense. It must be conceded, however,
that if a motion to quash a criminal complaint or
Information on the ground that the same does not
charge any offense is granted and the case is
dismissed and the accused is ordered released, the
petition for bail of an accused may become moot
and academic.
We now resolve the issue of whether or not it is
mandatory that the hearings on the petitions for bail
of petitioner and accused Jose "Jinggoy" Estrada in
Criminal Case No. 26558 and the trial of the said
case as against former President Joseph E. Estrada
be heard jointly.
Petitioner argues that the conduct of joint bail
hearings would negate his right to have his petition
for bail resolved in a summary proceeding since said
hearings might be converted into a full blown trial on
the merits by the prosecution.76
For their part, the People claim that joint bail
hearings will save the court from having to hear the
same witnesses and the parties from presenting the
same evidence where it would allow separate bail
hearings for the accused who are charged as co-
conspirators in the crime of plunder.77
In issuing its June 1, 2001 Order directing all
accused in Criminal Case No. 26558 to participate in
the bail hearings, the Sandiganbayan explained that
the directive was made was in the interest of the
speedy disposition of the case. It stated:
" x x x The obvious fact is, if the rest of the accused
other than the accused Serapio were to be excused
from participating in the hearing on the motion for
bail of accused Serapio, under the pretext that the
same does not concern them and that they will
participate in any hearing where evidence is
presented by the prosecution only if and when they
will already have filed their petitions for bail, or
should they decide not to file any, that they will
participate only during the trial proper itself, then
everybody will be faced with the daunting prospects
of having to go through the process of introducing
the same witness and pieces of evidence two times,
three times or four times, as many times as there are
petitions for bail filed. Obviously, such procedure is
not conducive to the speedy termination of a case.
Neither can such procedure be characterized as an
orderly proceeding."78
There is no provision in the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure or the Rules of Procedure of the
Sandiganbayan governing the hearings of two or
more petitions for bail filed by different accused or
that a petition for bail of an accused be heard
simultaneously with the trial of the case against the
other accused. The matter of whether or not to
conduct a joint hearing of two or more petitions for
bail filed by two different accused or to conduct a
hearing of said petition jointly with the trial against
another accused is addressed to the sound
discretion of the trial court. Unless grave abuse of
discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction
is shown, the Court will not interfere with the
exercise by the Sandiganbayan of its discretion.
It may be underscored that in the exercise of its
discretion, the Sandiganbayan must take into
account not only the convenience of the State,
including the prosecution, but also that of the
accused and the witnesses of both the prosecution
and the accused and the right of accused to a
speedy trial. The Sandiganbayan must also consider
the complexities of the cases and of the factual and
legal issues involving petitioner and the other
accused. After all, if this Court may echo the
observation of the United States Supreme Court, the
State has a stake, with every citizen, in his being
afforded our historic individual protections, including
those surrounding criminal prosecutions. About
them, this Court dares not become careless or
complacent when that fashion has become rampant
over the earth.79
It must be borne in mind that in Ocampo vs.
Bernabe,80 this Court held that in a petition for bail
hearing, the court is to conduct only a summary
hearing, meaning such brief and speedy method of
receiving and considering the evidence of guilt as is
practicable and consistent with the purpose of the
hearing which is merely to determine the weight of
evidence for purposes of bail. The court does not try
the merits or enter into any inquiry as to the weight
that ought to be given to the evidence against the
accused, nor will it speculate on the outcome of the
trial or on what further evidence may be offered
therein. It may confine itself to receiving such
evidence as has reference to substantial matters,
avoiding unnecessary thoroughness in the
examination and cross-examination of witnesses,
and reducing to a reasonable minimum the amount
of corroboration particularly on details that are not
essential to the purpose of the hearing.
A joint hearing of two separate petitions for bail by
two accused will of course avoid duplication of time
and effort of both the prosecution and the courts and
minimizes the prejudice to the accused, especially
so if both movants for bail are charged of having
conspired in the commission of the same crime and
the prosecution adduces essentially the same
evident against them. However, in the cases at bar,
the joinder of the hearings of the petition for bail of
petitioner with the trial of the case against former
President Joseph E. Estrada is an entirely different
matter. For, with the participation of the former
president in the hearing of petitioner's petition for
bail, the proceeding assumes a completely different
dimension. The proceedings will no longer be
summary. As against former President Joseph E.
Estrada, the proceedings will be a full-blown trial
which is antithetical to the nature of a bail hearing.
Moreover, following our ruling in Jose Estrada vs.
Sandiganbayan, supra where we stated that Jose
"Jinggoy" Estrada can only be charged with
conspiracy to commit the acts alleged in sub-
paragraph (a) of the amended Information since it is
not clear from the latter if the accused in sub-
paragraphs (a) to (d) thereof conspired with each
other to assist Joseph Estrada to amass ill-gotten
wealth, we hold that petitioner can only be charged
with having conspired with the other co-accused
named in sub-paragraph (a) by "receiving or
collecting, directly or indirectly, on several instances,
money x x x from illegal gambling, x x x in
consideration of toleration or protection of illegal
gambling.81 Thus, with respect to petitioner, all that
the prosecution needs to adduce to prove that the
evidence against him for the charge of plunder is
strong are those related to the alleged receipt or
collection of money from illegal gambling as
described in sub-paragraph (a) of the amended
Information. With the joinder of the hearing of
petitioner's petition for bail and the trial of the former
President, the latter will have the right to cross-
examine intensively and extensively the witnesses
for the prosecution in opposition to the petition for
bail of petitioner. If petitioner will adduce evidence in
support of his petition after the prosecution shall
have concluded its evidence, the former President
may insist on cross-examining petitioner and his
witnesses. The joinder of the hearing of petitioner's
bail petition with the trial of former President Joseph
E. Estrada will be prejudicial to petitioner as it will
unduly delay the determination of the issue of the
right of petitioner to obtain provisional liberty and
seek relief from this Court if his petition is denied by
the respondent court. The indispensability of the
speedy resolution of an application for bail was
succinctly explained by Cooley in his treatise
Constitutional Limitations, thus:
"For, if there were any mode short of confinement
which would with reasonable certainty insure the
attendance of the accused to answer the accusation,
it would not be justifiable to inflict upon him that
indignity, when the effect is to subject him in a
greater or lesser degree, to the punishment of a
guilty person, while as yet it is not determined that
he has not committed any crime."82
While the Sandiganbayan, as the court trying
Criminal Case No. 26558, is empowered "to proceed
with the trial of the case in the manner it determines
best conducive to orderly proceedings and speedy
termination of the case,"83 the Court finds that it
gravely abused its discretion in ordering that the
petition for bail of petitioner and the trial of former
President Joseph E. Estrada be held jointly. It bears
stressing that the Sandiganbayan itself
acknowledged in its May 4, 2001 Order the "pre-
eminent position and superiority of the rights of
[petitioner] to have the matter of his provisional
liberty resolved . . . without unnecessary delay,"84
only to make a volte face and declare that after all
the hearing of petition for bail of petitioner and Jose
"Jinggoy" Estrada and the trial as against former
President Joseph E. Estrada should be held
simultaneously. In ordering that petitioner's petition
for bail to be heard jointly with the trial of the case
against his co-accused former President Joseph E.
Estrada, the Sandiganbayan in effect allowed further
and unnecessary delay in the resolution thereof to
the prejudice of petitioner. In fine then, the
Sandiganbayan committed a grave abuse of its
discretion in ordering a simultaneous hearing of
petitioner's petition for bail with the trial of the case
against former President Joseph E. Estrada on its
merits.
With respect to petitioner's allegations that the
prosecution tried to delay the bail hearings by filing
dilatory motions, the People aver that it is petitioner
and his co-accused who caused the delay in the trial
of Criminal Case No. 26558 by their filing of
numerous manifestations and pleadings with the
Sandiganbayan.85 They assert that they filed the
motion for joint bail hearing and motion for earlier
arraignment around the original schedule for the bail
hearings which was on May 2125, 2001.86
They argue further that bail is not a matter of right in
capital offenses.87 In support thereof, they cite
Article III, Sec 13 of the Constitution, which states
that
"All persons, except those charged with offenses
punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of
guilt is strong, shall before conviction be bailable by
sufficient sureties, or be released on recognizance
as may be provided by law. The right to bail shall not
be impaired even when the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus is suspended. Excessive bail shall
not be required."88
The People also cited Rule 114, Secs. 7 and 4 of the
Revised Rules of Court which provide:
"Sec. 7 Capital offense or an offense punishable by
reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, not bailable.
No person charged with a capital offense, or an
offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment, shall be admitted to bail when
evidence of guilt is strong, regardless of the stage of
the criminal prosecution.
Sec. 4 Bail, a matter of right, exception. All
persons in custody shall be admitted to bail as a
matter of right, with sufficient sureties, or released
on recognizance as prescribed by law or this Rule x
x x (b) and before conviction by the Regional Trial
Court of an offense not punishable by death,
reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment."89
Irrefragably, a person charged with a capital offense
is not absolutely denied the opportunity to obtain
provisional liberty on bail pending the judgment of
his case. However, as to such person, bail is not a
matter of right but is discretionary upon the court.90
Had the rule been otherwise, the Rules would not
have provided for an application for bail by a person
charged with a capital offense under Rule 114,
Section 8 which states:
"Sec. 8 Burden of proof in bail application. At the
hearing of an application for bail filed by a person
who is in custody for the commission of an offense
punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or life
imprisonment, the prosecution has the burden of
showing that the evidence of guilt is strong. The
evidence presented during the bail hearing shall be
considered automatically reproduced at the trial but,
upon motion of either party, the court may recall any
witness for additional examination unless the latter is
dead, outside the Philippines, or otherwise unable to
testify."91
Under the foregoing provision, there must be a
showing that the evidence of guilt against a person
charged with a capital offense is not strong for the
court to grant him bail. Thus, upon an application for
bail by the person charged with a capital offense, a
hearing thereon must be conducted, where the
prosecution must be accorded an opportunity to
discharge its burden of proving that the evidence of
guilt against an accused is strong.92 The
prosecution shall be accorded the opportunity to
present all the evidence it may deem necessary for
this purpose.93 When it is satisfactorily
demonstrated that the evidence of guilt is strong, it is
the court's duty to deny the application for bail.
However, when the evidence of guilt is not strong,
bail becomes a matter of right.94
In this case, petitioner is not entitled to bail as a
matter of right at this stage of the proceedings.
Petitioner's claim that the prosecution had refused to
present evidence to prove his guilt for purposes of
his bail application and that the Sandiganbayan has
refused to grant a hearing thereon is not borne by
the records. The prosecution did not waive,
expressly or even impliedly, its right to adduce
evidence in opposition to the petition for bail of
petitioner. It must be noted that the Sandiganbayan
had already scheduled the hearing dates for
petitioner's application for bail but the same were
reset due to pending incidents raised in several
motions filed by the parties, which incidents had to
be resolved by the court prior to the bail hearings.
The bail hearing was eventually scheduled by the
Sandiganbayan on July 10, 2001 but the hearing did
not push through due to the filing of this petition on
June 29, 2001.
The delay in the conduct of hearings on petitioner's
application for bail is therefore not imputable solely
to the Sandiganbayan or to the prosecution.
Petitioner is also partly to blame therefor, as is
evident from the following list of motions filed by him
and by the prosecution:
Motions filed by petitioner:
Urgent Omnibus Motion, dated April 6, 2001,
for (1) leave to file motion for
reconsideration/reinvestigation and to direct
ombudsman to conduct reinvestigation; (2) conduct
a determination of probable cause as would suggest
the issuance of house arrest; (3) hold in abeyance
the issuance of warrant of arrest and other
proceedings pending determination of probable
cause;
Motion for Early Resolution, dated May 24,
2001;
Urgent Motion to Hold in Abeyance
Implementation or Service of Warrant of Arrest for
Immediate Grant of bail or For Release on
Recognizance, dated April 25, 2001;
Urgent Motion to allow Accused Serapio to
Vote at Obando, Bulacan, dated May 11, 2001;
Urgent Motion for Reconsideration, dated May
22, 2001, praying for Resolution of May 18, 2001 be
set aside and bail hearings be set at the earliest
possible time;
Urgent Motion for Immediate Release on Bail
or Recognizance, dated May 27, 2001;
Motion for Reconsideration of denial of Urgent
Omnibus Motion, dated June 13, 2001, praying that
he be allowed to file a Motion for Reinvestigation;
and
Motion to Quash, dated June 26, 2001.95
Motions filed by the prosecution:
Motion for Earlier Arraignment, dated May 8,
2001;96
Motion for Joint Bail Hearings of Accused
Joseph Estrada, Jose "Jinggoy" Estrada and Edward
Serapio, dated May 8, 2001;97
Opposition to the Urgent Motion for
Reconsideration and Omnibus Motion to Adjust
Earlier Arraignment, dated May 25, 2001;98 and
Omnibus Motion for Examination, Testimony
and Transcription in Filipino, dated June 19, 2001.99
The other accused in Criminal Case No. 26558 also
contributed to the aforesaid delay by their filing of
the following motions:
Motion to Quash or Suspend, dated April 24,
2001, filed by Jinggoy Estrada, assailing the
constitutionality of R.A. No. 7080 and praying that
the Amended Information be quashed;
Very Urgent Omnibus Motion, dated April 30,
2001, filed by Jinggoy Estrada, praying that he be
(1)excluded from the Amended Information for lack
of probable cause; (2) released from custody; or in
the alternative, (3) be allowed to post bail;
Urgent Ex-Parte Motion to Place on House
Arrest, dated April 25, 2001, filed by Joseph and
Jinggoy Estrada, praying that they be placed on
house arrest during the pendency of the case;
Position Paper [re: House Arrest], dated May
2, 2001, filed by Joseph and Jinggoy Estrada;
Supplemental Position Paper [re: House
Arrest], dated May 2, 2001, filed by Joseph and
Jinggoy Estrada;
Omnibus Motion, dated May 7, 2001, filed by
Joseph Estrada, praying by reinvestigation of the
case by the Ombudsman or the outright dismissal of
the case;
Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for Extension, dated
May 2, 2001, filed by Jinggoy Estrada, requesting for
five (5) days within which to respond to the
Opposition to Motion to Quash in view of the
holidays and election-related distractions;
Opposition to Urgent Motion for Earlier
Arraignment, dated May 10, 2001, filed by Joseph
Estrada;
Omnibus Manifestation on voting and
custodial arrangement, dated May 11, 2001, filed by
Joseph and Jinggoy Estrada, praying that they be
placed on house arrest;
Manifestation regarding house arrest, dated
May 6, 2001, filed by Joseph and Jinggoy Estrada;
Summation regarding house arrest, dated
May 23, 2001, filed by Joseph and Jinggoy Estrada;
Urgent Manifestation & Motion, dated May 6,
2001 filed by Jinggoy Estrada;
Manifestation, dated May 28, 2001, filed by
Joseph and Jinggoy Estrada, praying that they be
allowed to be confined in Tanay;
Motion to charge as Accused Luis "Chavit"
Singson, filed by Joseph Estrada;
Omnibus Motion, dated June 11, 2001, filed
by Joseph and Jinggoy Estrada, seeking
reconsideration of denial of requests for house
arrest, for detention in Tanay or Camp Crame;
motion for inhibition of Justice Badoy;
Urgent Motion to Allow Accused to Clear His
Desk as Mayor of San Juan, Metro Manila, dated
June 28, 2001, filed by Jinggoy Estrada;
Motion for Reconsideration, dated June 9,
2001, filed by Joseph and Jinggoy Estrada, praying
that the resolution compelling them to be present at
petitioner Serapio's hearing for bail be reconsidered;
Motion to Quash, dated June 7, 2001, filed by
Joseph Estrada;
Still Another Manifestation, dated June 14,
2001, filed by Joseph and Jinggoy Estrada stating
that Bishop Teodoro Bacani favors their house
arrest;
Manifestation, dated June 15, 2001, filed by
Joseph and Jinggoy Estrada, waiving their right to
be present at the June 18 and 21, 2001 bail
hearings and reserving their right to trial with
assessors;
Omnibus Motion for Instructions: 30-Day
House Arrest; Production, Inspection and Copying of
Documents; and Possible Trial with Assessors,
dated June 19, 2001, filed by Joseph and Jinggoy
Estrada;
Urgent Motion for Additional Time to Wind Up
Affairs, dated June 20, 2001, filed by Jinggoy
Estrada;
Manifestation, dated June 22, 2001, filed by
Jinggoy Estrada, asking for free dates for parties,
claiming that denial of bail is cruel and inhuman,
reiterating request for gag order of prosecution
witnesses, availing of production, inspection and
copying of documents, requesting for status of alias
case; and
Compliance, dated June 25, 2001, filed by
Jinggoy Estrada, requesting for permission to attend
some municipal affairs in San Juan, Metro
Manila.100
Furthermore, the Court has previously ruled that
even in cases where the prosecution refuses to
adduce evidence in opposition to an application for
bail by an accused charged with a capital offense,
the trial court is still under duty to conduct a hearing
on said application.101 The rationale for such
requirement was explained in Narciso vs. Sta.
Romana-Cruz (supra), citing Basco vs. Rapatalo:102
"When the grant of bail is discretionary, the
prosecution has the burden of showing that the
evidence of guilt against the accused is strong.
However, the determination of whether or not the
evidence of guilt is strong, being a matter of judicial
discretion, remains with the judge. This discretion by
the very nature of things, may rightly be exercised
only after the evidence is submitted to the court at
the hearing. Since the discretion is directed to the
weight of the evidence and since evidence cannot
properly be weighed if not duly exhibited or
produced before the court, it is obvious that a proper
exercise of judicial discretion requires that the
evidence of guilt be submitted to the court, the
petitioner having the right of cross-examination and
to introduce his own evidence in rebuttal."103
Accordingly, petitioner cannot be released from
detention until the Sandiganbayan conducts a
hearing of his application for bail and resolve the
same in his favor. Even then, there must first be a
finding that the evidence against petitioner is not
strong before he may be granted bail.
Anent the issue of the propriety of the issuance of a
writ of habeas corpus for petitioner, he contends that
he is entitled to the issuance of said writ because
the State, through the prosecution's refusal to
present evidence and by the Sandiganbayan's
refusal to grant a bail hearing, has failed to
discharge its burden of proving that as against him,
evidence of guilt for the capital offense of plunder is
strong. Petitioner contends that the prosecution
launched "a seemingly endless barrage of
obstructive and dilatory moves" to prevent the
conduct of bail hearings. Specifically, the
prosecution moved for petitioner's arraignment
before the commencement of bail hearings and
insisted on joint bail hearings for petitioner, Joseph
Estrada and Jinggoy Estrada despite the fact that it
was only petitioner who asked for a bail hearing;
manifested that it would present its evidence as if it
is the presentation of the evidence in chief, meaning
that the bail hearings would be concluded only after
the prosecution presented its entire case upon the
accused; and argued that petitioner's motion to
quash and his petition for bail are inconsistent, and
therefore, petitioner should choose to pursue only
one of these two remedies.104 He further claims
that the Sandiganbayan, through its questioned
orders and resolutions postponing the bail hearings
effectively denied him of his right to bail and to due
process of law.105
Petitioner also maintains that the issuance by the
Sandiganbayan of new orders canceling the bail
hearings which it had earlier set did not render moot
and academic the petition for issuance of a writ of
habeas corpus, since said orders have resulted in a
continuing deprivation of petitioner's right to bail.106
He argues further that the fact that he was arrested
and is detained pursuant to valid process does not
by itself negate the efficacy of the remedy of habeas
corpus. In support of his contention, petitioner cites
Moncupa vs. Enrile,107 where the Court held that
habeas corpus extends to instances where the
detention, while valid from its inception, has later
become arbitrary.108
However, the People insist that habeas corpus is not
proper because petitioner was arrested pursuant to
the amended information which was earlier filed in
court,109 the warrant of arrest issuant pursuant
thereto was valid, and petitioner voluntarily
surrendered to the authorities.110
As a general rule, the writ of habeas corpus will not
issue where the person alleged to be restrained of
his liberty in custody of an officer under a process
issued by the court which jurisdiction to do so.111 In
exceptional circumstances, habeas corpus may be
granted by the courts even when the person
concerned is detained pursuant to a valid arrest or
his voluntary surrender, for this writ of liberty is
recognized as "the fundamental instrument for
safeguarding individual freedom against arbitrary
and lawless state action" due to "its ability to cut
through barriers of form and procedural mazes."112
Thus, in previous cases, we issued the writ where
the deprivation of liberty, while initially valid under
the law, had later become invalid,113 and even
though the persons praying for its issuance were not
completely deprived of their liberty.114
The Court finds no basis for the issuance of a writ of
habeas corpus in favor of petitioner. The general
rule that habeas corpus does not lie where the
person alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in the
custody of an officer under process issued by a
court which had jurisdiction to issue the same115
applies, because petitioner is under detention
pursuant to the order of arrest issued by the
Sandiganbayan on April 25, 2001 after the filing by
the Ombudsman of the amended information for
plunder against petitioner and his co-accused.
Petitioner had in fact voluntarily surrendered himself
to the authorities on April 25, 2001 upon learning
that a warrant for his arrest had been issued.
The ruling in Moncupa vs. Enrile116 that habeas
corpus will lie where the deprivation of liberty which
was initially valid has become arbitrary in view of
subsequent developments finds no application in the
present case because the hearing on petitioner's
application for bail has yet to commence. As stated
earlier, they delay in the hearing of petitioner's
petition for bail cannot be pinned solely on the
Sandiganbayan or on the prosecution for that
matter. Petitioner himself is partly to be blamed.
Moreover, a petition for habeas corpus is not the
appropriate remedy for asserting one's right to
bail.117 It cannot be availed of where accused is
entitled to bail not as a matter of right but on the
discretion of the court and the latter has not abused
such discretion in refusing to grant bail,118 or has
not even exercised said discretion. The proper
recourse is to file an application for bail with the
court where the criminal case is pending and to
allow hearings thereon to proceed.
The issuance of a writ of habeas corpus would not
only be unjustified but would also preempt the
Sandiganbayan's resolution of the pending
application for bail of petitioner. The recourse of
petitioner is to forthwith proceed with the hearing on
his application for bail.
IN THE LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING,
judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
1 In G.R. No. 148769 and G.R. No. 149116, the
petitions are DISMISSED. The resolutions of
respondent Sandiganbayan subject of said petitions
are AFFIRMED; and
2 In G.R. No. 148468, the petition is PARTIALLY
GRANTED. The resolution of respondent
Sandiganbayan, Annex "L" of the petition, ordering a
joint hearing of petitioner's petition for bail and the
trial of Criminal Case No. 26558 as against former
President Joseph E. Estrada is SET ASIDE; the
arraignment of petitioner on July 10, 2001 is also
SET ASIDE.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
EN BANC
G.R. No. 139465 January 18, 2000
SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, petitioner,
vs.
HON. RALPH C. LANTION, Presiding Judge,
Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 25, and
MARK B. JIMENEZ, respondents.
MELO, J.:
The individual citizen is but a speck of particle or
molecule vis--vis the vast and overwhelming
powers of government. His only guarantee against
oppression and tyranny are his fundamental liberties
under the Bill of Rights which shield him in times of
need. The Court is now called to decide whether to
uphold a citizen's basic due process rights, or the
government's ironclad duties under a treaty. The
bugle sounds and this Court must once again act as
the faithful guardian of the fundamental writ.
The petition at our doorstep is cast against the
following factual backdrop:
On January 13, 1977, then President Ferdinand E.
Marcos issued Presidential Decree No. 1069
"Prescribing the Procedure for the Extradition of
Persons Who Have Committed Crimes in a Foreign
Country". The Decree is founded on: the doctrine of
incorporation under the Constitution; the mutual
concern for the suppression of crime both in the
state where it was committed and the state where
the criminal may have escaped; the extradition
treaty with the Republic of Indonesia and the
intention of the Philippines to enter into similar
treaties with other interested countries; and the need
for rules to guide the executive department and the
courts in the proper implementation of said treaties.
On November 13, 1994, then Secretary of Justice
Franklin M. Drilon, representing the Government of
the Republic of the Philippines, signed in Manila the
"Extradition Treaty Between the Government of the
Republic of the Philippines and the Government of
the United States of America" (hereinafter referred to
as the RP-US Extradition Treaty). The Senate, by
way of Resolution No. 11, expressed its concurrence
in the ratification of said treaty. It also expressed its
concurrence in the Diplomatic Notes correcting
Paragraph (5)(a), Article 7 thereof (on the
admissibility of the documents accompanying an
extradition request upon certification by the principal
diplomatic or consular officer of the requested state
resident in the Requesting State).
On June 18, 1999, the Department of Justice
received from the Department of Foreign Affairs U.S.
Note Verbale No. 0522 containing a request for the
extradition of private respondent Mark Jimenez to
the United States. Attached to the Note Verbale
were the Grand Jury Indictment, the warrant of
arrest issued by the U.S. District Court, Southern
District of Florida, and other supporting documents
for said extradition. Based on the papers submitted,
private respondent appears to be charged in the
United States with violation of the following
provisions of the United States Code (USC):
A) 18 USC 371 (Conspiracy to commit offense or to
defraud the United States; two [2] counts; Maximum
Penalty 5 years on each count);
B) 26 USC 7201 (Attempt to evade or defeat tax;
four [4] counts; Maximum Penalty 5 years on
each count);
C) 18 USC 1343 (Fraud by wire, radio, or television;
two [2] counts; Maximum Penalty 5 years on each
count);

D) 18 USC 1001 (False statement or entries; six [6]
counts; Maximum Penalty 5 years on each
count);
E) 2 USC 441f (Election contributions in name of
another; thirty-three [33] counts; Maximum Penalty
less than one year).
(p. 14, Rollo.)
On the same day, petitioner issued Department
Order No. 249 designating and authorizing a panel
of attorneys to take charge of and to handle the case
pursuant to Section 5(1) of Presidential Decree No.
1069. Accordingly, the panel began with the
"technical evaluation and assessment" of the
extradition request and the documents in support
thereof. The panel found that the "official English
translation of some documents in Spanish were not
attached to the request and that there are some
other matters that needed to be addressed" (p. 15,
Rollo).
Pending evaluation of the aforestated extradition
documents, private respondent, through counsel,
wrote a letter dated July 1, 1999 addressed to
petitioner requesting copies of the official extradition
request from the U.S. Government, as well as all
documents and papers submitted therewith; and that
he be given ample time to comment on the request
after he shall have received copies of the requested
papers. Private respondent also requested that the
proceedings on the matter be held in abeyance in
the meantime.
Later, private respondent requested that preliminary,
he be given at least a copy of, or access to, the
request of the United States Government, and after
receiving a copy of the Diplomatic Note, a period of
time to amplify on his request.
In response to private respondent's July 1, 1999
letter, petitioner, in a reply-letter dated July 13, 1999
(but received by private respondent only on August
4, 1999), denied the foregoing requests for the
following reasons:
1. We find it premature to furnish you with copies of
the extradition request and supporting documents
from the United States Government, pending
evaluation by this Department of the sufficiency of
the extradition documents submitted in accordance
with the provisions of the extradition treaty and our
extradition law. Article 7 of the Extradition Treaty
between the Philippines and the United States
enumerates the documentary requirements and
establishes the procedures under which the
documents submitted shall be received and admitted
as evidence. Evidentiary requirements under our
domestic law are also set forth in Section 4 of P.D.
No. 1069.
Evaluation by this Department of the aforementioned
documents is not a preliminary investigation nor akin
to preliminary investigation of criminal cases. We
merely determine whether the procedures and
requirements under the relevant law and treaty have
been complied with by the Requesting Government.
The constitutionally guaranteed rights of the
accused in all criminal prosecutions are therefore
not available.
It is only after the filing of the petition for extradition
when the person sought to be extradited will be
furnished by the court with copies of the petition,
request and extradition documents and this
Department will not pose any objection to a request
for ample time to evaluate said documents.
2. The formal request for extradition of the United
States contains grand jury information and
documents obtained through grand jury process
covered by strict secrecy rules under United States
law. The United States had to secure orders from
the concerned District Courts authorizing the United
States to disclose certain grand jury information to
Philippine government and law enforcement
personnel for the purpose of extradition of Mr.
Jimenez. Any further disclosure of the said
information is not authorized by the United States
District Courts. In this particular extradition request
the United States Government requested the
Philippine Government to prevent unauthorized
disclosure of the subject information. This
Department's denial of your request is consistent
with Article 7 of the RP-US Extradition Treaty which
provides that the Philippine Government must
represent the interests of the United States in any
proceedings arising out of a request for extradition.
The Department of Justice under P.D. No. 1069 is
the counsel of the foreign governments in all
extradition requests.
3. This Department is not in a position to hold in
abeyance proceedings in connection with an
extradition request. Article 26 of the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties, to which we are
a party provides that "[E]very treaty in force is
binding upon the parties to it and must be performed
by them in good faith". Extradition is a tool of
criminal law enforcement and to be effective,
requests for extradition or surrender of accused or
convicted persons must be processed expeditiously.
(pp. 77-78, Rollo.)
Such was the state of affairs when, on August 6,
1999, private respondent filed with the Regional Trial
Court of the National Capital Judicial Region a
petition against the Secretary of Justice, the
Secretary of Foreign Affairs, and the Director of the
National Bureau of Investigation, for mandamus (to
compel herein petitioner to furnish private
respondent the extradition documents, to give him
access thereto, and to afford him an opportunity to
comment on, or oppose, the extradition request, and
thereafter to evaluate the request impartially, fairly
and objectively); certiorari (to set aside herein
petitioner's letter dated July 13, 1999); and
prohibition (to restrain petitioner from considering
the extradition request and from filing an extradition
petition in court; and to enjoin the Secretary of
Foreign Affairs and the Director of the NBI from
performing any act directed to the extradition of
private respondent to the United States), with an
application for the issuance of a temporary
restraining order and a writ of preliminary injunction
(pp. 104-105, Rollo).
The aforementioned petition was docketed as Civil
Case No. 99-94684 and thereafter raffled to Branch
25 of said regional trial court stationed in Manila
which is presided over by the Honorable Ralph C.
Lantion.
After due notice to the parties, the case was heard
on August 9, 1999. Petitioner, who appeared in his
own behalf, moved that he be given ample time to
file a memorandum, but the same was denied.
On August 10, 1999, respondent judge issued an
order dated the previous day, disposing:
WHEREFORE, this Court hereby Orders the
respondents, namely: the Secretary of Justice, the
Secretary of Foreign Affairs and the Director of the
National Bureau of Investigation, their agents and/or
representatives to maintain the status quo by
refraining from committing the acts complained of;
from conducting further proceedings in connection
with the request of the United States Government for
the extradition of the petitioner; from filing the
corresponding Petition with a Regional Trial court;
and from performing any act directed to the
extradition of the petitioner to the United States, for
a period of twenty (20) days from service on
respondents of this Order, pursuant to Section 5,
Rule 58 of the 1997 Rules of Court.
The hearing as to whether or not this Court shall
issue the preliminary injunction, as agreed upon by
the counsels for the parties herein, is set on August
17, 1999 at 9:00 o'clock in the morning. The
respondents are, likewise, ordered to file their
written comment and/or opposition to the issuance
of a Preliminary Injunction on or before said date.
SO ORDERED.
(pp. 110-111, Rollo.)
Forthwith, petitioner initiated the instant
proceedings, arguing that:
PUBLIC RESPONDENT ACTED WITHOUT OR IN
EXCESS OF JURISDICTION OR WITH GRAVE
ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK
OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN ISSUING THE
TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER BECAUSE:
I.
BY ORDERING HEREIN PETITIONER TO
REFRAIN FROM COMMITTING THE ACTS
COMPLAINED OF, I.E., TO DESIST FROM
REFUSING PRIVATE RESPONDENT ACCESS TO
THE OFFICIAL EXTRADITION REQUEST AND
DOCUMENTS AND FROM DENYING PRIVATE
RESPONDENT AN OPPORTUNITY TO FILE A
COMMENT ON, OR OPPOSITION TO, THE
REQUEST, THE MAIN PRAYER FOR A WRIT OF
MANDAMUS IN THE PETITION FOR MANDAMUS,
CERTIORARI AND PROHIBITION WAS, IN
EFFECT, GRANTED SO AS TO CONSTITUTE AN
ADJUDICATION ON THE MERITS OF THE
MANDAMUS ISSUES;
II.
PETITIONER WAS UNQUALIFIEDLY PREVENTED
FROM PERFORMING LEGAL DUTIES UNDER
THE EXTRADITION TREATY AND THE
PHILIPPINE EXTRADITION LAW;
III.
THE PETITION FOR (MANDAMUS), CERTIORARI
AND PROHIBITION IS, ON ITS FACE, FORMALLY
AND SUBSTANTIALLY DEFICIENT; AND
IV.
PRIVATE RESPONDENT HAS NO RIGHT IN ESSE
THAT NEEDS PROTECTION AND
ENFORCEMENT, AND WILL NOT SUFFER ANY
IRREPARABLE INJURY.
(pp. 19-20, Rollo.)
On August 17, 1999, the Court required private
respondent to file his comment. Also issued, as
prayed for, was a temporary restraining order (TRO)
providing:
NOW, THEREFORE, effective immediately and
continuing until further orders from this Court, You,
Respondent Judge Ralph C. Lantion, your agents,
representatives or any person or persons acting in
your place or stead are hereby ORDERED to
CEASE and DESIST from enforcing the assailed
order dated August 9, 1999 issued by public
respondent in Civil Case No. 99-94684.

GIVEN by the Honorable HILARIO G. DAVIDE, JR.,
Chief Justice, Supreme Court of the Philippines, this
17th day of August 1999.
(pp. 120-121, Rollo.)
The case was heard on oral argument on August 31,
1999, after which the parties, as directed, filed their
respective memoranda.
From the pleadings of the opposing parties, both
procedural and substantive issues are patent.
However, a review of these issues as well as the
extensive arguments of both parties, compel us to
delineate the focal point raised by the pleadings:
During the evaluation stage of the extradition
proceedings, is private respondent entitled to the
two basic due process rights of notice and hearing?
An affirmative answer would necessarily render the
proceedings at the trial court, moot and academic
(the issues of which are substantially the same as
those before us now), while a negative resolution
would call for the immediate lifting of the TRO issued
by this Court dated August 24, 1999, thus allowing
petitioner to fast-track the process leading to the
filing of the extradition petition with the proper
regional trial court. Corollarily, in the event that
private respondent is adjudged entitled to basic due
process rights at the evaluation stage of the
extradition proceedings, would this entitlement
constitute a breach of the legal commitments and
obligations of the Philippine Government under the
RP-US Extradition Treaty? And assuming that the
result would indeed be a breach, is there any conflict
between private respondent's basic due process
rights and the provisions of the RP-US Extradition
Treaty?
The issues having transcendental importance, the
Court has elected to go directly into the substantive
merits of the case, brushing aside peripheral
procedural matters which concern the proceedings
in Civil Case No. 99-94684, particularly the propriety
of the filing of the petition therein, and of the
issuance of the TRO of August 17, 1999 by the trial
court.
To be sure, the issues call for a review of the
extradition procedure. The RP-US Extradition Treaty
which was executed only on November 13, 1994,
ushered into force the implementing provisions of
Presidential Decree No. 1069, also called as the
Philippine Extradition Law. Section 2(a) thereof
defines extradition as "the removal of an accused
from the Philippines with the object of placing him at
the disposal of foreign authorities to enable the
requesting state or government to hold him in
connection with any criminal investigation directed
against him or the execution of a penalty imposed
on him under the penal or criminal law of the
requesting state or government." The portions of the
Decree relevant to the instant case which involves a
charged and not convicted individual, are abstracted
as follows:
The Extradition Request
The request is made by the Foreign Diplomat of the
Requesting State, addressed to the Secretary of
Foreign Affairs, and shall be accompanied by:
1. The original or an authentic copy of the criminal
charge and the warrant of arrest issued by the
authority of the Requesting State having jurisdiction
over the matter, or some other instruments having
equivalent legal force;
2. A recital of the acts for which extradition is
requested, with the fullest particulars as to the name
and identity of the accused, his whereabouts in the
Philippines, if known, the acts or omissions
complained of, and the time and place of the
commission of these acts;
3. The text of the applicable law or a statement of
the contents of said law, and the designation or
description of the offense by the law, sufficient for
evaluation of the request; and
4. Such other documents or information in support of
the request.
(Sec. 4. Presidential Decree No. 1069.)
Sec. 5 of the Presidential Decree, which sets forth
the duty of the Secretary of Foreign Affairs,
pertinently provides
. . . (1) Unless it appears to the Secretary of Foreign
Affairs that the request fails to meet the
requirements of this law and the relevant treaty or
convention, he shall forward the request together
with the related documents to the Secretary of
Justice, who shall immediately designate and
authorize an attorney in his office to take charge of
the case.
The above provision shows only too clearly that the
executive authority given the task of evaluating the
sufficiency of the request and the supporting
documents is the Secretary of Foreign Affairs. What
then is the coverage of this task?
In accordance with Paragraphs 2 and 3, Article 7 of
the RP-US Extradition Treaty, the executive
authority must ascertain whether or not the request
is supported by:
1. Documents, statements, or other types of
information which describe the identity and probable
location of the person sought;

2. A statement of the facts of the offense and the
procedural history of the case;
3. A statement of the provisions of the law
describing the essential elements of the offense for
which extradition is requested;
4. A statement of the provisions of law describing
the punishment for the offense;
5. A statement of the provisions of the law
describing any time limit on the prosecution or the
execution of punishment for the offense;
6. Documents, statements, or other types of
information specified in paragraph 3 or paragraph 4
of said Article, as applicable.
(Paragraph 2, Article 7, Presidential Decree No.
1069.)
7. Such evidence as, according to the law of the
Requested State, would provide probable cause for
his arrest and committal for trial if the offense had
been committed there;
8. A copy of the warrant or order of arrest issued by
a judge or other competent authority; and
9. A copy of the charging document.
(Paragraph 3, ibid.)
The executive authority (Secretary of Foreign
Affairs) must also see to it that the accompanying
documents received in support of the request had
been certified by the principal diplomatic or consular
officer of the Requested State resident in the
Requesting State (Embassy Note No. 052 from U. S.
Embassy; Embassy Note No. 951309 from the
Department of Foreign Affairs).
In this light, Paragraph 3, Article 3 of the Treaty
provides that "[e]xtradition shall not be granted if the
executive authority of the Requested State
determines that the request is politically motivated,
or that the offense is a military offense which is not
punishable under non-military penal legislation."
The Extradition Petition
Upon a finding made by the Secretary of Foreign
Affairs that the extradition request and its supporting
documents are sufficient and complete in form and
substance, he shall deliver the same to the
Secretary of Justice, who shall immediately
designate and authorize an attorney in his office to
take charge of the case (Paragraph [1], Section 5,
P.D. No. 1069). The lawyer designated shall then file
a written petition with the proper regional trial court
of the province or city, with a prayer that the court
take the extradition request under consideration
(Paragraph [2], ibid.).
The presiding judge of the regional trial court, upon
receipt of the petition for extradition, shall, as soon
as practicable, issue an order summoning the
prospective extraditee to appear and to answer the
petition on the day and hour fixed in the order. The
judge may issue a warrant of arrest if it appears that
the immediate arrest and temporary detention of the
accused will best serve the ends of justice
(Paragraph [1], Section 6, ibid.), particularly to
prevent the flight of the prospective extraditee.
The Extradition Hearing
The Extradition Law does not specifically indicate
whether the extradition proceeding is criminal, civil,
or a special proceeding. Nevertheless, Paragraph
[1], Section 9 thereof provides that in the hearing of
the extradition petition, the provisions of the Rules of
Court, insofar as practicable and not inconsistent
with the summary nature of the proceedings, shall
apply. During the hearing, Section 8 of the Decree
provides that the attorney having charge of the case
may, upon application by the Requesting State,
represent the latter throughout the proceedings.
Upon conclusion of the hearing, the court shall
render a decision granting the extradition and giving
the reasons therefor upon a showing of the
existence of a prima facie case, or dismiss the
petition (Section 10, ibid.). Said decision is
appealable to the Court of Appeals, whose decision
shall be final and immediately executory (Section 12,
ibid.). The provisions of the Rules of Court governing
appeal in criminal cases in the Court of Appeals
shall apply in the aforementioned appeal, except for
the required 15-day period to file brief (Section 13,
ibid.).
The trial court determines whether or not the offense
mentioned in the petition is extraditable based on
the application of the dual criminality rule and other
conditions mentioned in Article 2 of the RP-US
Extradition Treaty. The trial court also determines
whether or not the offense for which extradition is
requested is a political one (Paragraph [1], Article 3,
RP-US Extradition Treaty).1wphi1.nt
With the foregoing abstract of the extradition
proceedings as backdrop, the following query
presents itself: What is the nature of the role of the
Department of Justice at the evaluation stage of the
extradition proceedings?
A strict observance of the Extradition Law indicates
that the only duty of the Secretary of Justice is to file
the extradition petition after the request and all the
supporting papers are forwarded to him by the
Secretary of Foreign Affairs. It is the latter official
who is authorized to evaluate the extradition papers,
to assure their sufficiency, and under Paragraph [3],
Article 3 of the Treaty, to determine whether or not
the request is politically motivated, or that the
offense is a military offense which is not punishable
under non-military penal legislation. Ipso facto, as
expressly provided in Paragraph [1], Section 5 of the
Extradition Law, the Secretary of Justice has the
ministerial duty of filing the extradition papers.
However, looking at the factual milieu of the case
before us, it would appear that there was failure to
abide by the provisions of Presidential Decree No.
1069. For while it is true that the extradition request
was delivered to the Department of Foreign Affairs
on June 17, 1999, the following day or less than 24
hours later, the Department of Justice received the
request, apparently without the Department of
Foreign Affairs discharging its duty of thoroughly
evaluating the same and its accompanying
documents. The statement of an assistant secretary
at the Department of Foreign Affairs that his
Department, in this regard, is merely acting as a post
office, for which reason he simply forwarded the
request to the Department of Justice, indicates the
magnitude of the error of the Department of Foreign
Affairs in taking lightly its responsibilities. Thereafter,
the Department of Justice took it upon itself to
determine the completeness of the documents and
to evaluate the same to find out whether they
comply with the requirements laid down in the
Extradition Law and the RP-US Extradition Treaty.
Petitioner ratiocinates in this connection that
although the Department of Justice had no
obligation to evaluate the extradition documents, the
Department also had to go over them so as to be
able to prepare an extradition petition (tsn, August
31, 1999, pp. 24-25). Notably, it was also at this
stage where private respondent insisted on the
following; (1) the right to be furnished the request
and the supporting papers; (2) the right to be heard
which consists in having a reasonable period of time
to oppose the request, and to present evidence in
support of the opposition; and (3) that the evaluation
proceedings be held in abeyance pending the filing
of private respondent's opposition to the request.
The two Departments seem to have misread the
scope of their duties and authority, one abdicating its
powers and the other enlarging its commission. The
Department of Foreign Affairs, moreover, has,
through the Solicitor General, filed a manifestation
that it is adopting the instant petition as its own,
indirectly conveying the message that if it were to
evaluate the extradition request, it would not allow
private respondent to participate in the process of
evaluation.
Plainly then, the record cannot support the
presumption of regularity that the Department of
Foreign Affairs thoroughly reviewed the extradition
request and supporting documents and that it
arrived at a well-founded judgment that the request
and its annexed documents satisfy the requirements
of law. The Secretary of Justice, eminent as he is in
the field of law, could not privately review the papers
all by himself. He had to officially constitute a panel
of attorneys. How then could the DFA Secretary or
his undersecretary, in less than one day, make the
more authoritative determination?
The evaluation process, just like the extradition
proceedings proper, belongs to a class by itself. It is
sui generis. It is not a criminal investigation, but it is
also erroneous to say that it is purely an exercise of
ministerial functions. At such stage, the executive
authority has the power: (a) to make a technical
assessment of the completeness and sufficiency of
the extradition papers; (b) to outrightly deny the
request if on its face and on the face of the
supporting documents the crimes indicated are not
extraditable; and (c) to make a determination
whether or not the request is politically motivated, or
that the offense is a military one which is not
punishable under non-military penal legislation (tsn,
August 31, 1999, pp. 28-29; Article 2 & and
Paragraph [3], Article 3, RP-US Extradition Treaty).
Hence, said process may be characterized as an
investigative or inquisitorial process in contrast to a
proceeding conducted in the exercise of an
administrative body's quasi-judicial power.
In administrative law, a quasi-judicial proceeding
involves: (a) taking and evaluation of evidence; (b)
determining facts based upon the evidence
presented; and (c) rendering an order or decision
supported by the facts proved (De Leon,
Administrative Law: Text and Cases, 1993 ed., p.
198, citing Morgan vs. United States, 304 U.S. 1).
Inquisitorial power, which is also known as
examining or investigatory power, is one or the
determinative powers of an administrative body
which better enables it to exercise its quasi-judicial
authority (Cruz, Phil. Administrative Law, 1996 ed.,
p. 26). This power allows the administrative body to
inspect the records and premises, and investigate
the activities, of persons or entities coming under its
jurisdiction (Ibid., p. 27), or to require disclosure of
information by means or accounts, records, reports,
testimony of witnesses, production of documents, or
otherwise (De Leon, op. cit., p. 64).
The power of investigation consists in gathering,
organizing, and analyzing evidence, which is a
useful aid or tool in an administrative agency's
performance of its rule-making or quasi-judicial
functions. Notably, investigation is indispensable to
prosecution.
In Ruperto v. Torres (100 Phil. 1098 [1957],
unreported), the Court had occasion to rule on the
functions of an investigatory body with the sole
power of investigation. It does not exercise judicial
functions and its power is limited to investigating the
facts and making findings in respect thereto. The
Court laid down the test of determining whether an
administrative body is exercising judicial functions or
merely investigatory functions: Adjudication signifies
the exercise of power and authority to adjudicate
upon the rights and obligations of the parties before
it. Hence, if the only purpose for investigation is to
evaluate evidence submitted before it based on the
facts and circumstances presented to it, and if the
agency is not authorized to make a final
pronouncement affecting the parties, then there is
an absence of judicial discretion and judgment.
The above description in Ruperto applies to an
administrative body authorized to evaluate
extradition documents. The body has no power to
adjudicate in regard to the rights and obligations of
both the Requesting State and the prospective
extraditee. Its only power is to determine whether
the papers comply with the requirements of the law
and the treaty and, therefore, sufficient to be the
basis of an extradition petition. Such finding is thus
merely initial and not final. The body has no power
to determine whether or not the extradition should
be effected. That is the role of the court. The body's
power is limited to an initial finding of whether or not
the extradition petition can be filed in court.
It is to be noted, however, that in contrast to ordinary
investigations, the evaluation procedure is
characterized by certain peculiarities. Primarily, it
sets into motion the wheels of the extradition
process. Ultimately, it may result in the deprivation of
liberty of the prospective extraditee. This deprivation
can be effected at two stages: First, the provisional
arrest of the prospective extraditee pending the
submission of the request. This is so because the
Treaty provides that in case of urgency, a
contracting party may request the provisional arrest
of the person sought pending presentation of the
request (Paragraph [1], Article 9, RP-US Extradition
Treaty), but he shall be automatically discharged
after 60 days if no request is submitted (Paragraph
4). Presidential Decree No. 1069 provides for a
shorter period of 20 days after which the arrested
person could be discharged (Section 20[d]).
Logically, although the Extradition Law is silent on
this respect, the provisions only mean that once a
request is forwarded to the Requested State, the
prospective extraditee may be continuously
detained, or if not, subsequently rearrested
(Paragraph [5], Article 9, RP-US Extradition Treaty),
for he will only be discharged if no request is
submitted. Practically, the purpose of this detention
is to prevent his possible flight from the Requested
State. Second, the temporary arrest of the
prospective extraditee during the pendency of the
extradition petition in court (Section 6, Presidential
Decree No. 1069).
Clearly, there is an impending threat to a
prospective extraditee's liberty as early as during the
evaluation stage. It is not only an imagined threat to
his liberty, but a very imminent one.
Because of these possible consequences, we
conclude that the evaluation process is akin to an
administrative agency conducting an investigative
proceeding, the consequences of which are
essentially criminal since such technical assessment
sets off or commences the procedure for, and
ultimately, the deprivation of liberty of a prospective
extraditee. As described by petitioner himself, this is
a "tool" for criminal law enforcement (p. 78, Rollo). In
essence, therefore, the evaluation process partakes
of the nature of a criminal investigation. In a number
of cases, we had occasion to make available to a
respondent in an administrative case or investigation
certain constitutional rights that are ordinarily
available only in criminal prosecutions. Further, as
pointed out by Mr. Justice Mendoza during the oral
arguments, there are rights formerly available only at
the trial stage that had been advanced to an earlier
stage in the proceedings, such as the right to
counsel and the right against self-incrimination (tsn,
August 31, 1999, p. 135; Escobedo vs. Illinois, 378
U.S. 478; Gideon vs. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335;
Miranda vs. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436).
In Pascual v. Board of Medical Examiners (28 SCRA
344 [1969]), we held that the right against self-
incrimination under Section 17, Article III of the 1987
Constitution which is ordinarily available only in
criminal prosecutions, extends to administrative
proceedings which possess a criminal or penal
aspect, such as an administrative investigation of a
licensed physician who is charged with immorality,
which could result in his loss of the privilege to
practice medicine if found guilty. The Court, citing
the earlier case of Cabal vs. Kapunan (6 SCRA
1059 [1962]), pointed out that the revocation of one's
license as a medical practitioner, is an even greater
deprivation than forfeiture of property.
Cabal vs. Kapunan (supra) involved an
administrative charge of unexplained wealth against
a respondent which was filed under Republic Act
No. 1379, or the Anti-Graft Law. Again, we therein
ruled that since the investigation may result in
forfeiture of property, the administrative proceedings
are deemed criminal or penal, and such forfeiture
partakes the nature of a penalty. There is also the
earlier case of Almeda, Sr. vs. Perez (5 SCRA 970
[1962]), where the Court, citing American
jurisprudence, laid down the test to determine
whether a proceeding is civil or criminal: If the
proceeding is under a statute such that if an
indictment is presented the forfeiture can be
included in the criminal case, such proceeding is
criminal in nature, although it may be civil in form;
and where it must be gathered from the statute that
the action is meant to be criminal in its nature, it
cannot be considered as civil. If, however, the
proceeding does not involve the conviction of the
wrongdoer for the offense charged, the proceeding
is civil in nature.
The cases mentioned above refer to an impending
threat of deprivation of one's property or property
right. No less is this true, but even more so in the
case before us, involving as it does the possible
deprivation of liberty, which, based on the hierarchy
of constitutionally protected rights, is placed second
only to life itself and enjoys precedence over
property, for while forfeited property can be returned
or replaced, the time spent in incarceration is
irretrievable and beyond recompense.
By comparison, a favorable action in an extradition
request exposes a person to eventual extradition to
a foreign country, thus saliently exhibiting the
criminal or penal aspect of the process. In this
sense, the evaluation procedure is akin to a
preliminary investigation since both procedures may
have the same result the arrest and imprisonment
of the respondent or the person charged. Similar to
the evaluation stage of extradition proceedings, a
preliminary investigation, which may result in the
filing of an information against the respondent, can
possibly lead to his arrest, and to the deprivation of
his liberty.
Petitioner's reliance on Wright vs. Court of Appeals
(235 SCRA 241 [1992]) (p. 8, petitioner's
Memorandum) that the extradition treaty is neither a
piece of criminal legislation nor a criminal procedural
statute is not well-taken. Wright is not authority for
petitioner's conclusion that his preliminary
processing is not akin to a preliminary investigation.
The characterization of a treaty in Wright was in
reference to the applicability of the prohibition
against an ex post facto law. It had nothing to do
with the denial of the right to notice, information, and
hearing.
As early as 1884, the United States Supreme Court
ruled that "any legal proceeding enforced by public
authority, whether sanctioned by age or custom, or
newly devised in the discretion of the legislative
power, in furtherance of the general public good,
which regards and preserved these principles of
liberty and justice, must be held to be due process of
law" (Hurtado vs. California, 110 U.S. 516).
Compliance with due process requirements cannot
be deemed non-compliance with treaty
commitments.
The United States and the Philippines share a
mutual concern about the suppression and
punishment of crime in their respective jurisdictions.
At the same time, both States accord common due
process protection to their respective citizens.
The due process clauses in the American and
Philippine Constitutions are not only worded in
exactly identical language and terminology, but more
importantly, they are alike in what their respective
Supreme Courts have expounded as the spirit with
which the provisions are informed and impressed,
the elasticity in their interpretation, their dynamic and
resilient character which make them capable of
meeting every modern problem, and their having
been designed from earliest time to the present to
meet the exigencies of an undefined and expanding
future. The requirements of due process are
interpreted in both the United States and the
Philippines as not denying to the law the capacity for
progress and improvement. Toward this effect and in
order to avoid the confines of a legal straitjacket, the
courts instead prefer to have the meaning of the due
process clause "gradually ascertained by the
process of inclusion and exclusion in the course of
the decisions of cases as they arise" (Twining vs.
New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78). Capsulized, it refers to
"the embodiment of the sporting idea of fair play"
(Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Owner's Association
vs. City Mayor of Manila, 20 SCRA 849 [1967]). It
relates to certain immutable principles of justice
which inhere in the very idea of free government
(Holden vs. Hardy, 169 U.S. 366).
Due process is comprised of two components
substantive due process which requires the intrinsic
validity of the law in interfering with the rights of the
person to his life, liberty, or property, and procedural
due process which consists of the two basic rights of
notice and hearing, as well as the guarantee of
being heard by an impartial and competent tribunal
(Cruz, Constitutional Law, 1993 Ed., pp. 102-106).
True to the mandate of the due process clause, the
basic rights of notice and hearing pervade not only
in criminal and civil proceedings, but in
administrative proceedings as well. Non-observance
of these rights will invalidate the proceedings.
Individuals are entitled to be notified of any pending
case affecting their interests, and upon notice, they
may claim the right to appear therein and present
their side and to refute the position of the opposing
parties (Cruz, Phil. Administrative Law, 1996 ed., p.
64).
In a preliminary investigation which is an
administrative investigatory proceeding, Section 3,
Rule 112 of the Rules of Court guarantees the
respondent's basic due process rights, granting him
the right to be furnished a copy of the complaint, the
affidavits, and other supporting documents, and the
right to submit counter-affidavits and other
supporting documents within ten days from receipt
thereof. Moreover, the respondent shall have the
right to examine all other evidence submitted by the
complainant.
These twin rights may, however, be considered
dispensable in certain instances, such as:
1. In proceeding where there is an urgent need for
immediate action, like the summary abatement of a
nuisance per se (Article 704, Civil Code), the
preventive suspension of a public servant facing
administrative charges (Section 63, Local
Government Code, B.P. Blg. 337), the padlocking of
filthy restaurants or theaters showing obscene
movies or like establishments which are immediate
threats to public health and decency, and the
cancellation of a passport of a person sought for
criminal prosecution;
2. Where there is tentativeness of administrative
action, that is, where the respondent is not
precluded from enjoying the right to notice and
hearing at a later time without prejudice to the
person affected, such as the summary distraint and
levy of the property of a delinquent taxpayer, and the
replacement of a temporary appointee; and
3. Where the twin rights have previously been
offered but the right to exercise them had not been
claimed.
Applying the above principles to the case at bar, the
query may be asked: Does the evaluation stage of
the extradition proceedings fall under any of the
described situations mentioned above?
Let us take a brief look at the nature of American
extradition proceedings which are quite noteworthy
considering that the subject treaty involves the U.S.
Government.
American jurisprudence distinguishes between
interstate rendition or extradition which is based on
the Extradition Clause in the U.S. Constitution (Art.
IV, 2 cl 2), and international extradition
proceedings. In interstate rendition or extradition, the
governor of the asylum state has the duty to deliver
the fugitive to the demanding state. The Extradition
Clause and the implementing statute are given a
liberal construction to carry out their manifest
purpose, which is to effect the return as swiftly as
possible of persons for trial to the state in which they
have been charged with crime (31A Am Jur 2d 754-
755). In order to achieve extradition of an alleged
fugitive, the requisition papers or the demand must
be in proper form, and all the elements or
jurisdictional facts essential to the extradition must
appear on the face of the papers, such as the
allegation that the person demanded was in the
demanding state at the time the offense charged
was committed, and that the person demanded is
charged with the commission of the crime or that
prosecution has been begun in the demanding state
before some court or magistrate (35 C.J.S. 406-
407). The extradition documents are then filed with
the governor of the asylum state, and must contain
such papers and documents prescribed by statute,
which essentially include a copy of the instrument
charging the person demanded with a crime, such
as an indictment or an affidavit made before a
magistrate. Statutory requirements with respect to
said charging instrument or papers are mandatory
since said papers are necessary in order to confer
jurisdiction on the government of the asylum state to
effect extradition (35 C.J.S. 408-410). A statutory
provision requiring duplicate copies of the
indictment, information, affidavit, or judgment of
conviction or sentence and other instruments
accompanying the demand or requisitions be
furnished and delivered to the fugitive or his attorney
is directory. However, the right being such a basic
one has been held to be a right mandatory on
demand (Ibid., p. 410, citing Ex parte Moore, 256
S.W. 2d 103, 158 Tex. Cr. 407 and Ex parte Tucker,
Cr., 324, S.W.2d 853).
In international proceedings, extradition treaties
generally provide for the presentation to the
executive authority of the Requested State of a
requisition or demand for the return of the alleged
offender, and the designation of the particular officer
having authority to act in behalf of the demanding
nation (31A Am Jur 2d 815).
In petitioner's memorandum filed on September 15,
1999, he attached thereto a letter dated September
13, 1999 from the Criminal Division of the U.S.
Department of Justice, summarizing the U.S.
extradition procedures and principles, which are
basically governed by a combination of treaties (with
special reference to the RP-US Extradition Treaty),
federal statutes, and judicial decisions, to wit:
1. All requests for extradition are transmitted through
the diplomatic channel. In urgent cases, requests for
the provincial arrest of an individual may be made
directly by the Philippine Department of Justice to
the U.S. Department of Justice, and vice-versa. In
the event of a provisional arrest, a formal request for
extradition is transmitted subsequently through the
diplomatic channel.
2. The Department of State forwards the incoming
Philippine extradition request to the Department of
Justice. Before doing so, the Department of State
prepares a declaration confirming that a formal
request has been made, that the treaty is in full force
and effect, that under Article 17 thereof the parties
provide reciprocal legal representation in extradition
proceedings, that the offenses are covered as
extraditable offenses under Article 2 thereof, and
that the documents have been authenticated in
accordance with the federal statute that ensures
admissibility at any subsequent extradition hearing.
3. A judge or magistrate judge is authorized to issue
a warrant for the arrest of the prospective extraditee
(18 U.S.C. 3184). Said judge or magistrate is
authorized to hold a hearing to consider the
evidence offered in support of the extradition request
(Ibid.)
4. At the hearing, the court must determine whether
the person arrested is extraditable to the foreign
country. The court must also determine that (a) it
has jurisdiction over the defendant and jurisdiction to
conduct the hearing; (b) the defendant is being
sought for offenses for which the applicable treaty
permits extradition; and (c) there is probable cause
to believe that the defendant is the person sought
and that he committed the offenses charged (Ibid.)
5. The judge or magistrate judge is vested with
jurisdiction to certify extraditability after having
received a "complaint made under oath, charging
any person found within his jurisdiction" with having
committed any of the crimes provided for by the
governing treaty in the country requesting extradition
(Ibid.) [In this regard, it is noted that a long line of
American decisions pronounce that international
extradition proceedings partake of the character of a
preliminary examination before a committing
magistrate, rather than a trial of the guilt or
innocence of the alleged fugitive (31A Am Jur 2d
826).]
6. If the court decides that the elements necessary
for extradition are present, it incorporates its
determinations in factual findings and conclusions of
law and certifies the person's extraditability. The
court then forwards this certification of extraditability
to the Department of State for disposition by the
Secretary of State. The ultimate decision whether to
surrender an individual rests with the Secretary of
State (18 U.S.C. 3186).
7. The subject of an extradition request may not
litigate questions concerning the motives of the
requesting government in seeking his extradition.
However, a person facing extradition may present
whatever information he deems relevant to the
Secretary of State, who makes the final
determination whether to surrender an individual to
the foreign government concerned.
From the foregoing, it may be observed that in the
United States, extradition begins and ends with one
entity the Department of State which has the
power to evaluate the request and the extradition
documents in the beginning, and, in the person of
the Secretary of State, the power to act or not to act
on the court's determination of extraditability. In the
Philippine setting, it is the Department of Foreign
Affairs which should make the initial evaluation of
the request, and having satisfied itself on the points
earlier mentioned (see pp. 10-12), then forwards the
request to the Department of Justice for the
preparation and filing of the petition for extradition.
Sadly, however, the Department of Foreign Affairs,
in the instant case, perfunctorily turned over the
request to the Department of Justice which has
taken over the task of evaluating the request as well
as thereafter, if so warranted, preparing, filing, and
prosecuting the petition for extradition.
Private respondent asks what prejudice will be
caused to the U.S. Government should the person
sought to be extradited be given due process rights
by the Philippines in the evaluation stage. He
emphasizes that petitioner's primary concern is the
possible delay in the evaluation process.
We agree with private respondent's citation of an
American Supreme Court ruling:
The establishment of prompt efficacious procedures
to achieve legitimate state ends is a proper state
interest worthy of cognizance in constitutional
adjudication. But the Constitution recognizes higher
values than speed and efficiency. Indeed, one might
fairly say of the Bill of Rights in general, and the Due
Process Clause, in particular, that they were
designed to protect the fragile values of a vulnerable
citizenry from the overbearing concern for efficiency
and efficacy that may characterize praiseworthy
government officials no less, and perhaps more,
than mediocre ones.
(Stanley vs. Illinois, 404 U.S. 645, 656)
The United States, no doubt, shares the same
interest as the Philippine Government that no right
that of liberty secured not only by the Bills of
Rights of the Philippines Constitution but of the
United States as well, is sacrificed at the altar of
expediency.
(pp. 40-41, Private Respondent's Memorandum.)
In the Philippine context, this Court's ruling is
invoked:
One of the basic principles of the democratic system
is that where the rights of the individual are
concerned, the end does not justify the means. It is
not enough that there be a valid objective; it is also
necessary that the means employed to pursue it be
in keeping with the Constitution. Mere expediency
will not excuse constitutional shortcuts. There is no
question that not even the strongest moral
conviction or the most urgent public need, subject
only to a few notable exceptions, will excuse the
bypassing of an individual's rights. It is no
exaggeration to say that a person invoking a right
guaranteed under Article III of the Constitution is a
majority of one even as against the rest of the nation
who would deny him that right (Association of Small
Landowners in the Philippines, Inc. vs. Secretary of
Agrarian Reform, 175 SCRA 343, 375-376 [1989]).
There can be no dispute over petitioner's argument
that extradition is a tool of criminal law enforcement.
To be effective, requests for extradition or the
surrender of accused or convicted persons must be
processed expeditiously. Nevertheless, accelerated
or fast-tracked proceedings and adherence to fair
procedures are, however, not always incompatible.
They do not always clash in discord. Summary does
not mean precipitous haste. It does not carry a
disregard of the basic principles inherent in "ordered
liberty."
Is there really an urgent need for immediate action
at the evaluation stage? At that point, there is no
extraditee yet in the strict sense of the word.
Extradition may or may not occur. In interstate
extradition, the governor of the asylum state may
not, in the absence of mandatory statute, be
compelled to act favorably (37 C.J.S. 387) since
after a close evaluation of the extradition papers, he
may hold that federal and statutory requirements,
which are significantly jurisdictional, have not been
met (31 Am Jur 2d 819). Similarly, under an
extradition treaty, the executive authority of the
requested state has the power to deny the behest
from the requesting state. Accordingly, if after a
careful examination of the extradition documents the
Secretary of Foreign Affairs finds that the request
fails to meet the requirements of the law and the
treaty, he shall not forward the request to the
Department of Justice for the filing of the extradition
petition since non-compliance with the aforesaid
requirements will not vest our government with
jurisdiction to effect the extradition.
In this light, it should be observed that the
Department of Justice exerted notable efforts in
assuring compliance with the requirements of the
law and the treaty since it even informed the U.S.
Government of certain problems in the extradition
papers (such as those that are in Spanish and
without the official English translation, and those that
are not properly authenticated). In fact, petitioner
even admits that consultation meetings are still
supposed to take place between the lawyers in his
Department and those from the U.S. Justice
Department. With the meticulous nature of the
evaluation, which cannot just be completed in an
abbreviated period of time due to its intricacies, how
then can we say that it is a proceeding that urgently
necessitates immediate and prompt action where
notice and hearing can be dispensed with?
Worthy of inquiry is the issue of whether or not there
is tentativeness of administrative action. Is private
respondent precluded from enjoying the right to
notice and hearing at a later time without prejudice
to him? Here lies the peculiarity and deviant
characteristic of the evaluation procedure. On one
hand there is yet no extraditee, but ironically on the
other, it results in an administrative if adverse to the
person involved, may cause his immediate
incarceration. The grant of the request shall lead to
the filing of the extradition petition in court. The
"accused" (as Section 2[c] of Presidential Decree
No. 1069 calls him), faces the threat of arrest, not
only after the extradition petition is filed in court, but
even during the evaluation proceeding itself by virtue
of the provisional arrest allowed under the treaty and
the implementing law. The prejudice to the
"accused" is thus blatant and manifest.
Plainly, the notice and hearing requirements of
administrative due process cannot be dispensed
with and shelved aside.
Apart from the due process clause of the
Constitution, private respondent likewise invokes
Section 7 of Article III which reads:
Sec. 7. The right of the people to information on
matters of public concern shall be recognized.
Access to official records, and to documents and
papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or
decisions, as well as to government research data
used as basis for policy development, shall be
afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as
may be provided by law.
The above provision guarantees political rights
which are available to citizens of the Philippines,
namely: (1) the right to information on matters of
public concern, and (2) the corollary right of access
to official records documents. The general right
guaranteed by said provision is the right to
information on matters of public concern. In its
implementation, the right of access to official records
is likewise conferred. These cognate or related
rights are "subject to limitations as may be provided
by law" (Bernas, The 1987 Phil. Constitution A
Reviewer-Primer, 1997 ed., p. 104) and rely on the
premise that ultimately it is an informed and critical
public opinion which alone can protect the values of
democratic government (Ibid.).
Petitioner argues that the matters covered by private
respondent's letter-request dated July 1, 1999 do not
fall under the guarantee of the foregoing provision
since the matters contained in the documents
requested are not of public concern. On the other
hand, private respondent argues that the distinction
between matters vested with public interest and
matters which are of purely private interest only
becomes material when a third person, who is not
directly affected by the matters requested, invokes
the right to information. However, if the person
invoking the right is the one directly affected thereby,
his right to information becomes absolute.
The concept of matters of public concerns escapes
exact definition. Strictly speaking, every act of a
public officer in the conduct of the governmental
process is a matter of public concern (Bernas, The
1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines,
1996 ed., p. 336). This concept embraces a broad
spectrum of subjects which the public may want to
know, either because these directly affect their lives
or simply because such matters arouse the interest
of an ordinary citizen (Legaspi v. Civil Service
Commission, 150 SCRA 530 [1987]). Hence, the
real party in interest is the people and any citizen
has "standing".
When the individual himself is involved in official
government action because said action has a direct
bearing on his life, and may either cause him some
kind of deprivation or injury, he actually invokes the
basic right to be notified under Section 1 of the Bill of
Rights and not exactly the right to information on
matters of public concern. As to an accused in a
criminal proceeding, he invokes Section 14,
particularly the right to be informed of the nature and
cause of the accusation against him.
The right to information is implemented by the right
of access to information within the control of the
government (Bernas, The 1987 Constitution of the
Republic of the Philippines, 1996 ed., p. 337). Such
information may be contained in official records, and
in documents and papers pertaining to official acts,
transactions, or decisions.
In the case at bar, the papers requested by private
respondent pertain to official government action from
the U.S. Government. No official action from our
country has yet been taken. Moreover, the papers
have some relation to matters of foreign relations
with the U.S. Government. Consequently, if a third
party invokes this constitutional provision, stating
that the extradition papers are matters of public
concern since they may result in the extradition of a
Filipino, we are afraid that the balance must be
tilted, at such particular time, in favor of the interests
necessary for the proper functioning of the
government. During the evaluation procedure, no
official governmental action of our own government
has as yet been done; hence the invocation of the
right is premature. Later, and in contrast, records of
the extradition hearing would already fall under
matters of public concern, because our government
by then shall have already made an official decision
to grant the extradition request. The extradition of a
fellow Filipino would be forthcoming.
We now pass upon the final issue pertinent to the
subject matter of the instant controversy: Would
private respondent's entitlement to notice and
hearing during the evaluation stage of the
proceedings constitute a breach of the legal duties
of the Philippine Government under the RP-
Extradition Treaty? Assuming the answer is in the
affirmative, is there really a conflict between the
treaty and the due process clause in the
Constitution?
First and foremost, let us categorically say that this
is not the proper time to pass upon the
constitutionality of the provisions of the RP-US
Extradition Treaty nor the Extradition Law
implementing the same. We limit ourselves only to
the effect of the grant of the basic rights of notice
and hearing to private respondent on foreign
relations.
The rule of pacta sunt servanda, one of the oldest
and most fundamental maxims of international law,
requires the parties to a treaty to keep their
agreement therein in good faith. The observance of
our country's legal duties under a treaty is also
compelled by Section 2, Article II of the Constitution
which provides that "[t]he Philippines renounces war
as an instrument of national policy, adopts the
generally accepted principles of international law as
part of the law of the land, and adheres to the policy
of peace, equality, justice, freedom, cooperation and
amity with nations." Under the doctrine of
incorporation, rules of international law form part of
the law of the and land no further legislative action is
needed to make such rules applicable in the
domestic sphere (Salonga & Yap, Public
International Law, 1992 ed., p. 12).
The doctrine of incorporation is applied whenever
municipal tribunals (or local courts) are confronted
with situations in which there appears to be a conflict
between a rule of international law and the
provisions of the constitution or statute of the local
state. Efforts should first be exerted to harmonize
them, so as to give effect to both since it is to be
presumed that municipal law was enacted with
proper regard for the generally accepted principles
of international law in observance of the observance
of the Incorporation Clause in the above-cited
constitutional provision (Cruz, Philippine Political
Law, 1996 ed., p. 55). In a situation, however, where
the conflict is irreconcilable and a choice has to be
made between a rule of international law and
municipal law, jurisprudence dictates that municipal
law should be upheld by the municipal courts
(Ichong vs. Hernandez, 101 Phil. 1155 [1957];
Gonzales vs. Hechanova, 9 SCRA 230 [1963]; In re:
Garcia, 2 SCRA 984 [1961]) for the reason that such
courts are organs of municipal law and are
accordingly bound by it in all circumstances
(Salonga & Yap, op. cit., p. 13). The fact that
international law has been made part of the law of
the land does not pertain to or imply the primacy of
international law over national or municipal law in
the municipal sphere. The doctrine of incorporation,
as applied in most countries, decrees that rules of
international law are given equal standing with, but
are not superior to, national legislative enactments.
Accordingly, the principle lex posterior derogat priori
takes effect a treaty may repeal a statute and a
statute may repeal a treaty. In states where the
constitution is the highest law of the land, such as
the Republic of the Philippines, both statutes and
treaties may be invalidated if they are in conflict with
the constitution (Ibid.).
In the case at bar, is there really a conflict between
international law and municipal or national law? En
contrario, these two components of the law of the
land are not pined against each other. There is no
occasion to choose which of the two should be
upheld. Instead, we see a void in the provisions of
the RP-US Extradition Treaty, as implemented by
Presidential Decree No. 1069, as regards the basic
due process rights of a prospective extraditee at the
evaluation stage of extradition proceedings. From
the procedures earlier abstracted, after the filing of
the extradition petition and during the judicial
determination of the propriety of extradition, the
rights of notice and hearing are clearly granted to
the prospective extraditee. However, prior thereto,
the law is silent as to these rights. Reference to the
U.S. extradition procedures also manifests this
silence.
Petitioner interprets this silence as unavailability of
these rights. Consequently, he describes the
evaluation procedure as an "ex parte technical
assessment" of the sufficiency of the extradition
request and the supporting documents.
We disagree.
In the absence of a law or principle of law, we must
apply the rules of fair play. An application of the
basic twin due process rights of notice and hearing
will not go against the treaty or the implementing
law. Neither the Treaty nor the Extradition Law
precludes these rights from a prospective extraditee.
Similarly, American jurisprudence and procedures
on extradition pose no proscription. In fact, in
interstate extradition proceedings as explained
above, the prospective extraditee may even request
for copies of the extradition documents from the
governor of the asylum state, and if he does, his
right to be supplied the same becomes a
demandable right (35 C.J.S. 410).
Petitioner contends that the United States requested
the Philippine Government to prevent unauthorized
disclosure of confidential information. Hence, the
secrecy surrounding the action of the Department of
Justice Panel of Attorneys. The confidentiality
argument is, however, overturned by petitioner's
revelation that everything it refuses to make
available at this stage would be obtainable during
trial. The Department of Justice states that the U.S.
District Court concerned has authorized the
disclosure of certain grand jury information. If the
information is truly confidential, the veil of secrecy
cannot be lifted at any stage of the extradition
proceedings. Not even during trial.
A libertarian approach is thus called for under the
premises.
One will search in vain the RP-US Extradition
Treaty, the Extradition Law, as well as American
jurisprudence and procedures on extradition, for any
prohibition against the conferment of the two basic
due process rights of notice and hearing during the
evaluation stage of the extradition proceedings. We
have to consider similar situations in jurisprudence
for an application by analogy.
Earlier, we stated that there are similarities between
the evaluation process and a preliminary
investigation since both procedures may result in the
arrest of the respondent or the prospective
extraditee. In the evaluation process, a provisional
arrest is even allowed by the Treaty and the
Extradition Law (Article 9, RP-US Extradition Treaty;
Sec. 20, Presidential Decree No. 1069). Following
petitioner's theory, because there is no provision of
its availability, does this imply that for a period of
time, the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is
suspended, despite Section 15, Article III of the
Constitution which states that "[t]he privilege of the
writ or habeas corpus shall not be suspended except
in cases of invasion or rebellion when the public
safety requires it"? Petitioner's theory would also
infer that bail is not available during the arrest of the
prospective extraditee when the extradition petition
has already been filed in court since Presidential
Decree No. 1069 does not provide therefor,
notwithstanding Section 13, Article III of the
Constitution which provides that "[a]ll persons,
except those charged with offenses punishable by
reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong,
shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient
sureties, or be released on recognizance as may be
provided by law. The right to bail shall not be
impaired even when the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus is suspended. . ." Can petitioner
validly argue that since these contraventions are by
virtue of a treaty and hence affecting foreign
relations, the aforestated guarantees in the Bill of
Rights could thus be subservient thereto?
The basic principles of administrative law instruct us
that "the essence of due process in administrative
proceeding is an opportunity to explain one's side or
an opportunity to seek reconsideration of the actions
or ruling complained of (Mirano vs. NLRC, 270
SCRA 96 [1997]; Padilla vs. NLRC, 273 SCRA 457
[1997]; PLDT vs. NLRC, 276 SCRA 1 [1997];
Helpmate, Inc. vs. NLRC, 276 SCRA 315 [1997];
Aquinas School vs. Magnaye, 278 SCRA 602
[1997]; Jamer vs. NLRC, 278 SCRA 632 [1997]). In
essence, procedural due process refers to the
method or manner by which the law is enforced
(Corona vs. United Harbor Pilots Association of the
Phils., 283 SCRA 31 [1997]). This Court will not
tolerate the least disregard of constitutional
guarantees in the enforcement of a law or treaty.
Petitioner's fears that the Requesting State may
have valid objections to the Requested State's non-
performance of its commitments under the
Extradition Treaty are insubstantial and should not
be given paramount consideration.
How then do we implement the RP-US Extradition
Treaty? Do we limit ourselves to the four corners of
Presidential Decree No. 1069?
Of analogous application are the rulings in
Government Service Insurance System vs. Court of
Appeals (201 SCRA 661 [1991]) and Go vs. National
Police Commission (271 SCRA 447 [1997]) where
we ruled that in summary proceedings under
Presidential Decree No. 807 (Providing for the
Organization of the Civil Service Commission in
Accordance with Provisions of the Constitution,
Prescribing its Powers and Functions and for Other
Purposes), and Presidential Decree No. 971
(Providing Legal Assistance for Members of the
Integrated National Police who may be charged for
Service-Connected Offenses and Improving the
Disciplinary System in the Integrated National
Police, Appropriating Funds Therefor and for other
purposes), as amended by Presidential Decree No.
1707, although summary dismissals may be effected
without the necessity of a formal investigation, the
minimum requirements of due process still operate.
As held in GSIS vs. Court of Appeals:
. . . [I]t is clear to us that what the opening sentence
of Section 40 is saying is that an employee may be
removed or dismissed even without formal
investigation, in certain instances. It is equally clear
to us that an employee must be informed of the
charges preferred against him, and that the normal
way by which the employee is so informed is by
furnishing him with a copy of the charges against
him. This is a basic procedural requirement that a
statute cannot dispense with and still remain
consistent with the constitutional provision on due
process. The second minimum requirement is that
the employee charged with some misfeasance or
malfeasance must have a reasonable opportunity to
present his side of the matter, that is to say, his
defenses against the charges levelled against him
and to present evidence in support of his defenses. .
..
(at p. 671)
Said summary dismissal proceedings are also non-
litigious in nature, yet we upheld the due process
rights of the respondent.
In the case at bar, private respondent does not only
face a clear and present danger of loss of property
or employment, but of liberty itself, which may
eventually lead to his forcible banishment to a
foreign land. The convergence of petitioner's
favorable action on the extradition request and the
deprivation of private respondent's liberty is easily
comprehensible.
We have ruled time and again that this Court's
equity jurisdiction, which is aptly described as
"justice outside legality," may be availed of only in
the absence of, and never against, statutory law or
judicial pronouncements (Smith Bell & Co., Inc. vs.
Court of Appeals, 267 SCRA 530 [1997]; David-
Chan vs. Court of Appeals, 268 SCRA 677 [1997]).
The constitutional issue in the case at bar does not
even call for "justice outside legality," since private
respondent's due process rights, although not
guaranteed by statute or by treaty, are protected by
constitutional guarantees. We would not be true to
the organic law of the land if we choose strict
construction over guarantees against the deprivation
of liberty. That would not be in keeping with the
principles of democracy on which our Constitution is
premised.
Verily, as one traverses treacherous waters of
conflicting and opposing currents of liberty and
government authority, he must ever hold the oar of
freedom in the stronger arm, lest an errant and
wayward course be laid.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises,
the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of
merit. Petitioner is ordered to furnish private
respondent copies of the extradition request and its
supporting papers, and to grant him a reasonable
period within which to file his comment with
supporting evidence. The incidents in Civil Case No.
99-94684 having been rendered moot and academic
by this decision, the same is hereby ordered
dismissed.
SO ORDERED.
EN BANC
G.R. No. 148571 September 24, 2002
GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA,
Represented by the Philippine Department of
Justice, petitioner,
vs.
HON. GUILLERMO PURGANAN, Presiding Judge
Regional Trial Court of Manila and
MARC JIMENEZ a.k.a. MARCIO BATACAN
CRESPO, respondent
Davide Jr., CJ, Bellosillo, Puno, Vitug, Mendoza,
Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago,
Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez,
Corona, Morales and Callejo, Sr.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
In extradition proceedings, are prospective
extraditees entitled to notice and hearing before
warrants for their arrest can be issued? Equally
important, are they entitled to the right to bail and
provisional liberty while the extradition proceedings
are pending? In general, the answer to these two
novel questions is "No." The explanation of and the
reasons for, as well as the exceptions to, this rule
are laid out in this Decision.
The Case
Before us is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of
the Rules of Court, seeking to void and set aside the
Orders dated May 23, 2001 1 and July 3, 2001 2
issued by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila,
Branch 42. 3 The first assailed Order set for hearing
petitioners application for the issuance of a warrant
for the arrest of Respondent Mark B. Jimenez.
The second challenged Order, on the other hand,
directed the issuance of a warrant, but at the same
time granted bail to Jimenez. The dispositive portion
of the Order reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, the
[Court] finds probable cause against respondent
Mark Jimenez. Accordingly let a Warrant for the
arrest of the respondent be issued. Consequently
and taking into consideration Section 9, Rule 114 of
the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, this Court
fixes the reasonable amount of bail for respondents
temporary liberty at ONE MILLION PESOS (Php
1,000,000.00), the same to be paid in cash.
Furthermore respondent is directed to immediately
surrender to this Court his passport and the Bureau
of Immigration and Deportation is likewise directed
to include the name of the respondent in its Hold
Departure List." 4
Essentially, the Petition prays for the lifting of the
bail Order, the cancellation of the bond, and the
taking of Jimenez into legal custody.
The Facts
This Petition is really a sequel to GR No. 139465
entitled Secretary of Justice v. Ralph C. Lantion. 5
Pursuant to the existing RP-US Extradition Treaty, 6
the United States Government, through diplomatic
channels, sent to the Philippine Government Note
Verbale No. 0522 dated June 16, 1999,
supplemented by Note Nos. 0597, 0720 and 0809
and accompanied by duly authenticated documents
requesting the extradition of Mark B. Jimenez, also
known as Mario Batacan Crespo. Upon receipt of
the Notes and documents, the secretary of foreign
affairs (SFA) transmitted them to the secretary of
justice (SOJ) for appropriate action, pursuant to
Section 5 of Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1069, also
known as the Extradition Law.
Upon learning of the request for his extradition,
Jimenez sought and was granted a Temporary
Restraining Order (TRO) by the RTC of Manila,
Branch 25. 7 The TRO prohibited the Department of
Justice (DOJ) from filing with the RTC a petition for
his extradition. The validity of the TRO was,
however, assailed by the SOJ in a Petition before
this Court in the said GR No. 139465. Initially, the
Court -- by a vote of 9-6 -- dismissed the Petition.
The SOJ was ordered to furnish private respondent
copies of the extradition request and its supporting
papers and to grant the latter a reasonable period
within which to file a comment and supporting
evidence. 8
Acting on the Motion for Reconsideration filed by the
SOJ, this Court issued its October 17, 2000
Resolution. 9 By an identical vote of 9-6 -- after
three justices changed their votes -- it reconsidered
and reversed its earlier Decision. It held that private
respondent was bereft of the right to notice and
hearing during the evaluation stage of the extradition
process. This Resolution has become final and
executory.
Finding no more legal obstacle, the Government of
the United States of America, represented by the
Philippine DOJ, filed with the RTC on May 18, 2001,
the appropriate Petition for Extradition which was
docketed as Extradition Case No. 01192061. The
Petition alleged, inter alia, that Jimenez was the
subject of an arrest warrant issued by the United
States District Court for the Southern District of
Florida on April 15, 1999. The warrant had been
issued in connection with the following charges in
Indictment No. 99-00281 CR-SEITZ: (1) conspiracy
to defraud the United States and to commit certain
offenses in violation of Title 18 US Code Section
371; (2) tax evasion, in violation of Title 26 US Code
Section 7201; (3) wire fraud, in violation of Title 18
US Code Sections 1343 and 2; (4) false statements,
in violation of Title 18 US Code Sections 1001 and
2; and (5) illegal campaign contributions, in violation
of Title 2 US Code Sections 441b, 441f and 437g(d)
and Title 18 US Code Section 2. In order to prevent
the flight of Jimenez, the Petition prayed for the
issuance of an order for his "immediate arrest"
pursuant to Section 6 of PD No. 1069.
Before the RTC could act on the Petition,
Respondent Jimenez filed before it an "Urgent
Manifestation/Ex-Parte Motion," 10 which prayed
that petitioners application for an arrest warrant be
set for hearing.
In its assailed May 23, 2001 Order, the RTC granted
the Motion of Jimenez and set the case for hearing
on June 5, 2001. In that hearing, petitioner
manifested its reservations on the procedure
adopted by the trial court allowing the accused in an
extradition case to be heard prior to the issuance of
a warrant of arrest.
After the hearing, the court a quo required the
parties to submit their respective memoranda. In his
Memorandum, Jimenez sought an alternative
prayer: that in case a warrant should issue, he be
allowed to post bail in the amount of P100,000.
The alternative prayer of Jimenez was also set for
hearing on June 15, 2001. Thereafter, the court
below issued its questioned July 3, 2001 Order,
directing the issuance of a warrant for his arrest and
fixing bail for his temporary liberty at one million
pesos in cash. 11 After he had surrendered his
passport and posted the required cash bond,
Jimenez was granted provisional liberty via the
challenged Order dated July 4, 2001. 12
Hence, this Petition. 13
Issues
Petitioner presents the following issues for the
consideration of this Court:
I.
The public respondent acted without or in excess of
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in
adopting a procedure of first hearing a potential
extraditee before issuing an arrest warrant under
Section 6 of PD No. 1069.
II.
The public respondent acted without or in excess of
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in
granting the prayer for bail and in allowing Jimenez
to go on provisional liberty because:
1. An extradition court has no power to authorize
bail, in the absence of any law that provides for such
power.
2. Section 13, Article III (right to bail clause) of the
1987 Philippine Constitution and Section 4, Rule 114
(Bail) of the Rules of Court, as amended, which
[were] relied upon, cannot be used as bases for
allowing bail in extradition proceedings.
3. The presumption is against bail in extradition
proceedings or proceedings leading to extradition.
4. On the assumption that bail is available in
extradition proceedings or proceedings leading to
extradition, bail is not a matter of right but only of
discretion upon clear showing by the applicant of the
existence of special circumstances.
5. Assuming that bail is a matter of discretion in
extradition proceedings, the public respondent
received no evidence of special circumstances
which may justify release on bail.
6. The risk that Jimenez will flee is high, and no
special circumstance exists that will engender a well-
founded belief that he will not flee.
7. The conditions attached to the grant of bail are
ineffectual and do not ensure compliance by the
Philippines with its obligations under the RP-US
Extradition Treaty.
8. The Court of Appeals Resolution promulgated on
May 10, 2001 in the case entitled Eduardo T.
Rodriguez et al. vs. The Hon. Presiding Judge, RTC,
Branch 17, Manila, CA-G.R. SP No. 64589, relied
upon by the public respondent in granting bail, had
been recalled before the issuance of the subject bail
orders." 14
In sum, the substantive questions that this Court will
address are: (1) whether Jimenez is entitled to
notice and hearing before a warrant for his arrest
can be issued, and (2) whether he is entitled to bail
and to provisional liberty while the extradition
proceedings are pending. Preliminarily, we shall take
up the alleged prematurity of the Petition for
Certiorari arising from petitioners failure to file a
Motion for Reconsideration in the RTC and to seek
relief in the Court of Appeals (CA), instead of in this
Court. 15 We shall also preliminarily discuss five
extradition postulates that will guide us in disposing
of the substantive issues.
The Courts Ruling
The Petition is meritorious.
Preliminary Matters
Alleged Prematurity of Present Petition
Petitioner submits the following justifications for not
filing a Motion for Reconsideration in the Extradition
Court: "(1) the issues were fully considered by such
court after requiring the parties to submit their
respective memoranda and position papers on the
matter and thus, the filing of a reconsideration
motion would serve no useful purpose; (2) the
assailed orders are a patent nullity, absent factual
and legal basis therefor; and (3) the need for relief is
extremely urgent, as the passage of sufficient time
would give Jimenez ample opportunity to escape
and avoid extradition; and (4) the issues raised are
purely of law." 16
For resorting directly to this Court instead of the CA,
petitioner submits the following reasons: "(1) even if
the petition is lodged with the Court of Appeals and
such appellate court takes cognizance of the issues
and decides them, the parties would still bring the
matter to this Honorable Court to have the issues
resolved once and for all [and] to have a binding
precedent that all lower courts ought to follow; (2)
the Honorable Court of Appeals had in one case 17
ruled on the issue by disallowing bail but the court
below refused to recognize the decision as a judicial
guide and all other courts might likewise adopt the
same attitude of refusal; and (3) there are pending
issues on bail both in the extradition courts and the
Court of Appeals, which, unless guided by the
decision that this Honorable Court will render in this
case, would resolve to grant bail in favor of the
potential extraditees and would give them
opportunity to flee and thus, cause adverse effect on
the ability of the Philippines to comply with its
obligations under existing extradition treaties." 18
As a general rule, a petition for certiorari before a
higher court will not prosper unless the inferior court
has been given, through a motion for
reconsideration, a chance to correct the errors
imputed to it. This rule, though, has certain
exceptions: (1) when the issue raised is purely of
law, (2) when public interest is involved, or (3) in
case of urgency. 19 As a fourth exception, the Court
has also ruled that the filing of a motion for
reconsideration before availment of the remedy of
certiorari is not a sine qua non, when the questions
raised are the same as those that have already been
squarely argued and exhaustively passed upon by
the lower court. 20 Aside from being of this nature,
the issues in the present case also involve pure
questions of law that are of public interest. Hence, a
motion for reconsideration may be dispensed with.
Likewise, this Court has allowed a direct invocation
of its original jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari
when there are special and important reasons
therefor. 21 In Fortich v. Corona 22 we stated:
[T]he Supreme Court has the full discretionary power
to take cognizance of the petition filed directly
[before] it if compelling reasons, or the nature and
importance of the issues raised, warrant. This has
been the judicial policy to be observed and which
has been reiterated in subsequent cases, namely:
Uy vs. Contreras, et. al., Torres vs. Arranz, Bercero
vs. De Guzman, and, Advincula vs. Legaspi, et. al.
As we have further stated in Cuaresma:
x x x. A direct invocation of the Supreme Courts
original jurisdiction to issue these writs should be
allowed only when there are special and important
reasons therefor, clearly and specifically set out in
the petition. This is established policy. x x x.
Pursuant to said judicial policy, we resolve to take
primary jurisdiction over the present petition in the
interest of speedy justice and to avoid future
litigations so as to promptly put an end to the
present controversy which, as correctly observed by
petitioners, has sparked national interest because of
the magnitude of the problem created by the
issuance of the assailed resolution. Moreover, x x x
requiring the petitioners to file their petition first with
the Court of Appeals would only result in a waste of
time and money.
That the Court has the power to set aside its own
rules in the higher interests of justice is well-
entrenched in our jurisprudence. We reiterate what
we said in Piczon vs. Court of Appeals: 23
Be it remembered that rules of procedure are but
mere tools designed to facilitate the attainment of
justice. Their strict and rigid application, which would
result in technicalities that tend to frustrate rather
than promote substantial justice, must always be
avoided. Time and again, this Court has suspended
its own rules and excepted a particular case from
their operation whenever the higher interests of
justice so require. In the instant petition, we forego a
lengthy disquisition of the proper procedure that
should have been taken by the parties involved and
proceed directly to the merits of the case.
In a number of other exceptional cases, 24 we held
as follows:
This Court has original jurisdiction, concurrent with
that of Regional Trial Courts and the Court of
Appeals, over petitions for certiorari, prohibition,
mandamus, quo warranto and habeas corpus, and
we entertain direct resort to us in cases where
special and important reasons or exceptional and
compelling circumstances justify the same."
In the interest of justice and to settle once and for all
the important issue of bail in extradition proceedings,
we deem it best to take cognizance of the present
case. Such proceedings constitute a matter of first
impression over which there is, as yet, no local
jurisprudence to guide lower courts.
Five Postulates of Extradition
The substantive issues raised in this case require an
interpretation or construction of the treaty and the
law on extradition. A cardinal rule in the
interpretation of a treaty or a law is to ascertain and
give effect to its intent. 25 Since PD 1069 is
intended as a guide for the implementation of
extradition treaties to which the Philippines is a
signatory, 26 understanding certain postulates of
extradition will aid us in properly deciding the issues
raised here.
1. Extradition Is a Major Instrument for the
Suppression of Crime.
First, extradition treaties are entered into for the
purpose of suppressing crime 27 by facilitating the
arrest and the custodial transfer 28 of a fugitive 29
from one state to the other.
With the advent of easier and faster means of
international travel, the flight of affluent criminals
from one country to another for the purpose of
committing crime and evading prosecution has
become more frequent. Accordingly, governments
are adjusting their methods of dealing with criminals
and crimes that transcend international boundaries.
Today, "a majority of nations in the world community
have come to look upon extradition as the major
effective instrument of international co-operation in
the suppression of crime." 30 It is the only regular
system that has been devised to return fugitives to
the jurisdiction of a court competent to try them in
accordance with municipal and international law. 31
An important practical effect x x x of the recognition
of the principle that criminals should be restored to a
jurisdiction competent to try and punish them is that
the number of criminals seeking refuge abroad will
be reduced. For to the extent that efficient means of
detection and the threat of punishment play a
significant role in the deterrence of crime within the
territorial limits of a State, so the existence of
effective extradition arrangements and the
consequent certainty of return to the locus delicti
commissi play a corresponding role in the
deterrence of flight abroad in order to escape the
consequence of crime. x x x. From an absence of
extradition arrangements flight abroad by the
ingenious criminal receives direct encouragement
and thus indirectly does the commission of crime
itself." 32
In Secretary v. Lantion 33 we explained:
The Philippines also has a national interest to help in
suppressing crimes and one way to do it is to
facilitate the extradition of persons covered by
treaties duly entered [into] by our government. More
and more, crimes are becoming the concern of one
world. Laws involving crimes and crime prevention
are undergoing universalization. One manifest
purpose of this trend towards globalization is to deny
easy refuge to a criminal whose activities threaten
the peace and progress of civilized countries. It is to
the great interest of the Philippines to be part of this
irreversible movement in light of its vulnerability to
crimes, especially transnational crimes."
Indeed, in this era of globalization, easier and faster
international travel, and an expanding ring of
international crimes and criminals, we cannot afford
to be an isolationist state. We need to cooperate
with other states in order to improve our chances of
suppressing crime in our own country.
2. The Requesting State Will Accord Due Process to
the Accused
Second, an extradition treaty presupposes that both
parties thereto have examined, and that both accept
and trust, each others legal system and judicial
process. 34 More pointedly, our duly authorized
representatives signature on an extradition treaty
signifies our confidence in the capacity and the
willingness of the other state to protect the basic
rights of the person sought to be extradited. 35 That
signature signifies our full faith that the accused will
be given, upon extradition to the requesting state, all
relevant and basic rights in the criminal proceedings
that will take place therein; otherwise, the treaty
would not have been signed, or would have been
directly attacked for its unconstitutionality.
3. The Proceedings Are Sui Generis
Third, as pointed out in Secretary of Justice v.
Lantion, 36 extradition proceedings are not criminal
in nature. In criminal proceedings, the constitutional
rights of the accused are at fore; in extradition which
is sui generis -- in a class by itself -- they are not.
An extradition [proceeding] is sui generis. It is not a
criminal proceeding which will call into operation all
the rights of an accused as guaranteed by the Bill of
Rights. To begin with, the process of extradition
does not involve the determination of the guilt or
innocence of an accused. His guilt or innocence will
be adjudged in the court of the state where he will
be extradited. Hence, as a rule, constitutional rights
that are only relevant to determine the guilt or
innocence of an accused cannot be invoked by an
extraditee x x x.
xxxxxxxxx
There are other differences between an extradition
proceeding and a criminal proceeding. An extradition
proceeding is summary in nature while criminal
proceedings involve a full-blown trial. In
contradistinction to a criminal proceeding, the rules
of evidence in an extradition proceeding allow
admission of evidence under less stringent
standards. In terms of the quantum of evidence to
be satisfied, a criminal case requires proof beyond
reasonable doubt for conviction while a fugitive may
be ordered extradited upon showing of the
existence of a prima facie case. Finally, unlike in a
criminal case where judgment becomes executory
upon being rendered final, in an extradition
proceeding, our courts may adjudge an individual
extraditable but the President has the final discretion
to extradite him. The United States adheres to a
similar practice whereby the Secretary of State
exercises wide discretion in balancing the equities of
the case and the demands of the nations foreign
relations before making the ultimate decision to
extradite."
Given the foregoing, it is evident that the extradition
court is not called upon to ascertain the guilt or the
innocence of the person sought to be extradited. 37
Such determination during the extradition
proceedings will only result in needless duplication
and delay. Extradition is merely a measure of
international judicial assistance through which a
person charged with or convicted of a crime is
restored to a jurisdiction with the best claim to try
that person. It is not part of the function of the
assisting authorities to enter into questions that are
the prerogative of that jurisdiction. 38 The ultimate
purpose of extradition proceedings in court is only to
determine whether the extradition request complies
with the Extradition Treaty, and whether the person
sought is extraditable. 39
4. Compliance Shall Be in Good Faith.
Fourth, our executive branch of government
voluntarily entered into the Extradition Treaty, and
our legislative branch ratified it. Hence, the Treaty
carries the presumption that its implementation will
serve the national interest.
Fulfilling our obligations under the Extradition Treaty
promotes comity 40 with the requesting state. On
the other hand, failure to fulfill our obligations
thereunder paints a bad image of our country before
the world community. Such failure would discourage
other states from entering into treaties with us,
particularly an extradition treaty that hinges on
reciprocity. 41
Verily, we are bound by pacta sunt servanda to
comply in good faith with our obligations under the
Treaty. 42 This principle requires that we deliver the
accused to the requesting country if the conditions
precedent to extradition, as set forth in the Treaty,
are satisfied. In other words, "[t]he demanding
government, when it has done all that the treaty and
the law require it to do, is entitled to the delivery of
the accused on the issue of the proper warrant, and
the other government is under obligation to make
the surrender." 43 Accordingly, the Philippines must
be ready and in a position to deliver the accused,
should it be found proper.
5. There Is an Underlying Risk of Flight
Fifth, persons to be extradited are presumed to be
flight risks. This prima facie presumption finds
reinforcement in the experience 44 of the executive
branch: nothing short of confinement can ensure
that the accused will not flee the jurisdiction of the
requested state in order to thwart their extradition to
the requesting state.
The present extradition case further validates the
premise that persons sought to be extradited have a
propensity to flee. Indeed,
extradition hearings would not even begin, if only the
accused were willing to submit to trial in the
requesting country. 45 Prior acts of herein
respondent -- (1) leaving the requesting state right
before the conclusion of his indictment proceedings
there; and (2) remaining in the requested state
despite learning that the requesting state is seeking
his return and that the crimes he is charged with are
bailable -- eloquently speak of his aversion to the
processes in the requesting state, as well as his
predisposition to avoid them at all cost. These
circumstances point to an ever-present, underlying
high risk of flight. He has demonstrated that he has
the capacity and the will to flee. Having fled once,
what is there to stop him, given sufficient
opportunity, from fleeing a second time?
First Substantive Issue:
Is Respondent Entitled to Notice and Hearing
Before the Issuance of a Warrant of Arrest?
Petitioner contends that the procedure adopted by
the RTC --informing the accused, a fugitive from
justice, that an Extradition Petition has been filed
against him, and that petitioner is seeking his arrest
-- gives him notice to escape and to avoid
extradition. Moreover, petitioner pleads that such
procedure may set a dangerous precedent, in that
those sought to be extradited -- including terrorists,
mass murderers and war criminals -- may invoke it in
future extradition cases.
On the other hand, Respondent Jimenez argues that
he should not be hurriedly and arbitrarily deprived of
his constitutional right to liberty without due process.
He further asserts that there is as yet no specific law
or rule setting forth the procedure prior to the
issuance of a warrant of arrest, after the petition for
extradition has been filed in court; ergo, the
formulation of that procedure is within the discretion
of the presiding judge.
Both parties cite Section 6 of PD 1069 in support of
their arguments. It states:
SEC. 6. Issuance of Summons; Temporary Arrest;
Hearing, Service of Notices.- (1) Immediately upon
receipt of the petition, the presiding judge of the
court shall, as soon as practicable, summon the
accused to appear and to answer the petition on the
day and hour fixed in the order. [H]e may issue a
warrant for the immediate arrest of the accused
which may be served any where within the
Philippines if it appears to the presiding judge that
the immediate arrest and temporary detention of the
accused will best serve the ends of justice. Upon
receipt of the answer, or should the accused after
having received the summons fail to answer within
the time fixed, the presiding judge shall hear the
case or set another date for the hearing thereof.
(2) The order and notice as well as a copy of the
warrant of arrest, if issued, shall be promptly served
each upon the accused and the attorney having
charge of the case." (Emphasis ours)
Does this provision sanction RTC Judge Purganans
act of immediately setting for hearing the issuance of
a warrant of arrest? We rule in the negative.
1. On the Basis of the Extradition Law
It is significant to note that Section 6 of PD 1069, our
Extradition Law, uses the word "immediate" to
qualify the arrest of the accused. This qualification
would be rendered nugatory by setting for hearing
the issuance of the arrest warrant. Hearing entails
sending notices to the opposing parties, 46 receiving
facts and arguments 47 from them, 48 and giving
them time to prepare and present such facts and
arguments. Arrest subsequent to a hearing can no
longer be considered "immediate." The law could not
have intended the word as a mere superfluity but, on
the whole, as a means of imparting a sense of
urgency and swiftness in the determination of
whether a warrant of arrest should be issued.
By using the phrase "if it appears," the law further
conveys that accuracy is not as important as speed
at such early stage. The trial court is not expected to
make an exhaustive determination to ferret out the
true and actual situation, immediately upon the filing
of the petition. From the knowledge and the material
then available to it, the court is expected merely to
get a good first impression -- a prima facie finding --
sufficient to make a speedy initial determination as
regards the arrest and detention of the accused.
Attached to the Petition for Extradition, with a
Certificate of Authentication among others, were the
following: (1) Annex H, the Affidavit executed on
May 26, 1999 by Mr. Michael E. Savage -- trial
attorney in the Campaign Financing Task Force of
the Criminal Division of the US Department of
Justice; (2) Annexes H to G, evidentiary Appendices
of various exhibits that constituted evidence of the
crimes charged in the Indictment, with Exhibits 1 to
120 (duly authenticated exhibits that constituted
evidence of the crimes charged in the Indictment);
(3) Annex BB, the Exhibit I "Appendix of Witness
[excerpts] Statements Referenced in the Affidavit of
Angela Byers" and enclosed Statements in two
volumes; (4) Annex GG, the Exhibit J "Table of
Contents for Supplemental Evidentiary Appendix"
with enclosed Exhibits 121 to 132; and (5) Annex
MM, the Exhibit L "Appendix of Witness [excerpts]
Statements Referenced in the Affidavit of Betty
Steward" and enclosed Statements in two volumes.
49
It is evident that respondent judge could have
already gotten an impression from these records
adequate for him to make an initial determination of
whether the accused was someone who should
immediately be arrested in order to "best serve the
ends of justice." He could have determined whether
such facts and circumstances existed as would lead
a reasonably discreet and prudent person to believe
that the extradition request was prima facie
meritorious. In point of fact, he actually concluded
from these supporting documents that "probable
cause" did exist. In the second questioned Order, he
stated:
In the instant petition, the documents sent by the US
Government in support of [its] request for extradition
of herein respondent are enough to convince the
Court of the existence of probable cause to proceed
with the hearing against the extraditee." 50
We stress that the prima facie existence of probable
cause for hearing the petition and, a priori, for
issuing an arrest warrant was already evident from
the Petition itself and its supporting documents.
Hence, after having already determined therefrom
that a prima facie finding did exist, respondent judge
gravely abused his discretion when he set the matter
for hearing upon motion of Jimenez. 51
Moreover, the law specifies that the court sets a
hearing upon receipt of the answer or upon failure of
the accused to answer after receiving the summons.
In connection with the matter of immediate arrest,
however, the word "hearing" is notably absent from
the provision. Evidently, had the holding of a hearing
at that stage been intended, the law could have
easily so provided. It also bears emphasizing at this
point that extradition proceedings are summary 52 in
nature. Hence, the silence of the Law and the Treaty
leans to the more reasonable interpretation that
there is no intention to punctuate with a hearing
every little step in the entire proceedings.
It is taken for granted that the contracting parties
intend something reasonable and something not
inconsistent with generally recognized principles of
International Law, nor with previous treaty
obligations towards third States. If, therefore, the
meaning of a treaty is ambiguous, the reasonable
meaning is to be preferred to the unreasonable, the
more reasonable to the less reasonable x x x ." 53
Verily, as argued by petitioner, sending to persons
sought to be extradited a notice of the request for
their arrest and setting it for hearing at some future
date would give them ample opportunity to prepare
and execute an escape. Neither the Treaty nor the
Law could have
intended that consequence, for the very purpose of
both would have been defeated by the escape of the
accused from the requested state.
2. On the Basis of the Constitution
Even Section 2 of Article III of our Constitution,
which is invoked by Jimenez, does not require a
notice or a hearing before the issuance of a warrant
of arrest. It provides:
Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever
nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and
no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue
except upon probable cause to be determined
personally by the judge after examination under oath
or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses
he may produce, and particularly describing the
place to be searched and the persons or things to be
seized."
To determine probable cause for the issuance of
arrest warrants, the Constitution itself requires only
the examination -- under oath or affirmation -- of
complainants and the witnesses they may produce.
There is no requirement to notify and hear the
accused before the issuance of warrants of arrest.
In Ho v. People 54 and in all the cases cited therein,
never was a judge required to go to the extent of
conducting a hearing just for the purpose of
personally determining probable cause for the
issuance of a warrant of arrest. All we required was
that the "judge must have sufficient supporting
documents upon which to make his independent
judgment, or at the very least, upon which to verify
the findings of the prosecutor as to the existence of
probable cause." 55
In Webb v. De Leon, 56 the Court categorically
stated that a judge was not supposed to conduct a
hearing before issuing a warrant of arrest:
Again, we stress that before issuing warrants of
arrest, judges merely determine personally the
probability, not the certainty of guilt of an accused. In
doing so, judges do not conduct a de novo hearing
to determine the existence of probable cause. They
just personally review the initial determination of the
prosecutor finding a probable cause to see if it is
supported by substantial evidence."
At most, in cases of clear insufficiency of evidence
on record, judges merely further examine
complainants and their witnesses. 57 In the present
case, validating the act of respondent judge and
instituting the practice of hearing the accused and
his witnesses at this early stage would be discordant
with the rationale for the entire system. If the
accused were allowed to be heard and necessarily
to present evidence during the prima facie
determination for the issuance of a warrant of arrest,
what would stop him from presenting his entire
plethora of defenses at this stage -- if he so desires -
- in his effort to negate a prima facie finding? Such a
procedure could convert the determination of a
prima facie case into a full-blown trial of the entire
proceedings and possibly make trial of the main
case superfluous. This scenario is also anathema to
the summary nature of extraditions.
That the case under consideration is an extradition
and not a criminal action is not sufficient to justify the
adoption of a set of procedures more protective of
the accused. If a different procedure were called for
at all, a more restrictive one -- not the opposite --
would be justified in view of respondents
demonstrated predisposition to flee.
Since this is a matter of first impression, we deem it
wise to restate the proper procedure:
Upon receipt of a petition for extradition and its
supporting documents, the judge must study them
and make, as soon as possible, a prima facie finding
whether (a) they are sufficient in form and
substance, (b) they show compliance with the
Extradition Treaty and Law, and (c) the person
sought is extraditable. At his discretion, the judge
may
require the submission of further documentation or
may personally examine the affiants and witnesses
of the petitioner. If, in spite of this study and
examination, no prima facie finding 58 is possible,
the petition may be dismissed at the discretion of the
judge.
On the other hand, if the presence of a prima facie
case is determined, then the magistrate must
immediately issue a warrant for the arrest of the
extraditee, who is at the same time summoned to
answer the petition and to appear at scheduled
summary hearings. Prior to the issuance of the
warrant, the judge must not inform or notify the
potential extraditee of the pendency of the petition,
lest the latter be given the opportunity to escape and
frustrate the proceedings. In our opinion, the
foregoing procedure will "best serve the ends of
justice" in extradition cases.
Second Substantive Issue:
Is Respondent Entitled to Bail?
Article III, Section 13 of the Constitution, is worded
as follows:
Art. III, Sec. 13. All persons, except those charged
with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua
when evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before
conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be
released on recognizance as may be provided by
law. The right to bail shall not be impaired even
when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is
suspended. Excessive bail shall not be required."
Respondent Mark B. Jimenez maintains that this
constitutional provision secures the right to bail of all
persons, including those sought to be extradited.
Supposedly, the only exceptions are the ones
charged with offenses punishable with reclusion
perpetua, when evidence of guilt is strong. He also
alleges the relevance to the present case of Section
4 59 of Rule 114 of the Rules of Court which, insofar
as practicable and consistent with the summary
nature of extradition proceedings, shall also apply
according to Section 9 of PD 1069.
On the other hand, petitioner claims that there is no
provision in the Philippine Constitution granting the
right to bail to a person who is the subject of an
extradition request and arrest warrant.
Extradition Different from Ordinary Criminal
Proceedings
We agree with petitioner. As suggested by the use
of the word "conviction," the constitutional provision
on bail quoted above, as well as Section 4 of Rule
114 of the Rules of Court, applies only when a
person has been arrested and detained for violation
of Philippine criminal laws. It does not apply to
extradition proceedings, because extradition courts
do not render judgments of conviction or acquittal.
Moreover, the constitutional right to bail "flows from
the presumption of innocence in favor of every
accused who should not be subjected to the loss of
freedom as thereafter he would be entitled to
acquittal, unless his guilt be proved beyond
reasonable doubt." 60 It follows that the
constitutional provision on bail will not apply to a
case like extradition, where the presumption of
innocence is not at issue.
The provision in the Constitution stating that the
"right to bail shall not be impaired even when the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended"
does not detract from the rule that the constitutional
right to bail is available only in criminal proceedings.
It must be noted that the suspension of the privilege
of the writ of habeas corpus finds application "only to
persons judicially charged for rebellion or offenses
inherent in or directly connected with invasion." 61
Hence, the second sentence in the constitutional
provision on bail merely emphasizes the right to bail
in criminal proceedings for the aforementioned
offenses. It cannot be taken to mean that the right is
available even in extradition proceedings that are
not criminal in nature.
That the offenses for which Jimenez is sought to be
extradited are bailable in the United States is not an
argument to grant him one in the present case. To
stress, extradition proceedings are separate and
distinct from the trial for the offenses for which he is
charged. He should apply for bail before the courts
trying the criminal cases against him, not before the
extradition court.
No Violation of Due Process
Respondent Jimenez cites the foreign case Paretti
62 in arguing that, constitutionally, "[n]o one shall be
deprived of x x x liberty x x x without due process of
law."
Contrary to his contention, his detention prior to the
conclusion of the extradition proceedings does not
amount to a violation of his right to due process. We
iterate the familiar doctrine that the essence of due
process is the opportunity to be heard 63 but, at the
same time, point out that the doctrine does not
always call for a prior opportunity to be heard. 64
Where the circumstances -- such as those present in
an extradition case -- call for it, a subsequent
opportunity to be heard is enough. 65 In the present
case, respondent will be given full opportunity to be
heard subsequently, when the extradition court
hears the Petition for Extradition. Hence, there is no
violation of his right to due process and fundamental
fairness.
Contrary to the contention of Jimenez, we find no
arbitrariness, either, in the immediate deprivation of
his liberty prior to his being heard. That his arrest
and detention will not be arbitrary is sufficiently
ensured by (1) the DOJs filing in court the Petition
with its supporting documents after a determination
that the extradition request meets the requirements
of the law and the relevant treaty; (2) the extradition
judges independent prima facie determination that
his arrest will best serve the ends of justice before
the issuance of a warrant for his arrest; and (3) his
opportunity, once he is under the courts custody, to
apply for bail as an exception to the no-initial-bail
rule.
It is also worth noting that before the US government
requested the extradition of respondent,
proceedings had already been conducted in that
country. But because he left the jurisdiction of the
requesting state before those proceedings could be
completed, it was hindered from continuing with the
due processes prescribed under its laws. His
invocation of due process now has thus become
hollow. He already had that opportunity in the
requesting state; yet, instead of taking it, he ran
away.
In this light, would it be proper and just for the
government to increase the risk of violating its treaty
obligations in order to accord Respondent Jimenez
his personal liberty in the span of time that it takes to
resolve the Petition for Extradition? His supposed
immediate deprivation of liberty without the due
process that he had previously shunned pales
against the governments interest in fulfilling its
Extradition Treaty obligations and in cooperating
with the world community in the suppression of
crime. Indeed, "[c]onstitutional liberties do not exist
in a vacuum; the due process rights accorded to
individuals must be carefully balanced against
exigent and palpable government interests." 66
Too, we cannot allow our country to be a haven for
fugitives, cowards and weaklings who, instead of
facing the consequences of their actions, choose to
run and hide. Hence, it would not be good policy to
increase the risk of violating our treaty obligations if,
through overprotection or excessively liberal
treatment, persons sought to be extradited are able
to evade arrest or escape from our custody. In the
absence of any provision -- in the Constitution, the
law or the treaty -- expressly guaranteeing the right
to bail in extradition proceedings, adopting the
practice of not granting them bail, as a general rule,
would be a step towards deterring fugitives from
coming to the Philippines to hide from or evade their
prosecutors.1wphi1.nt
The denial of bail as a matter of course in extradition
cases falls into place with and gives life to Article 14
67 of the Treaty, since this practice would
encourage the accused to voluntarily surrender to
the requesting state to cut short their detention here.
Likewise, their detention pending the resolution of
extradition proceedings would fall into place with the
emphasis of the Extradition Law on the summary
nature of extradition cases and the need for their
speedy disposition.
Exceptions to the No Bail Rule
The rule, we repeat, is that bail is not a matter of
right in extradition cases. However, the judiciary has
the constitutional duty to curb grave abuse of
discretion 68 and tyranny, as well as the power to
promulgate rules to protect and enforce
constitutional rights. 69 Furthermore, we believe that
the right to due process is broad enough to include
the grant of basic fairness to extraditees. Indeed, the
right to due process extends to the "life, liberty or
property" of every person. It is "dynamic and
resilient, adaptable to every situation calling for its
application." 70
Accordingly and to best serve the ends of justice, we
believe and so hold that, after a potential extraditee
has been arrested or placed under the custody of
the law, bail may be applied for and granted as an
exception, only upon a clear and convincing showing
(1) that, once granted bail, the applicant will not be a
flight risk or a danger to the community; and (2) that
there exist special, humanitarian and compelling
circumstances 71 including, as a matter of
reciprocity, those cited by the highest court in the
requesting state when it grants provisional liberty in
extradition cases therein.
Since this exception has no express or specific
statutory basis, and since it is derived essentially
from general principles of justice and fairness, the
applicant bears the burden of proving the above two-
tiered requirement with clarity, precision and
emphatic forcefulness. The Court realizes that
extradition is basically an executive, not a judicial,
responsibility arising from the presidential power to
conduct foreign relations. In its barest concept, it
partakes of the nature of police assistance amongst
states, which is not normally a judicial prerogative.
Hence, any intrusion by the courts into the exercise
of this power should be characterized by caution, so
that the vital international and bilateral interests of
our country will not be unreasonably impeded or
compromised. In short, while this Court is ever
protective of "the sporting idea of fair play," it also
recognizes the limits of its own prerogatives and the
need to fulfill international obligations.
Along this line, Jimenez contends that there are
special circumstances that are compelling enough
for the Court to grant his request for provisional
release on bail. We have carefully examined these
circumstances and shall now discuss them.
1. Alleged Disenfranchisement

While his extradition was pending, Respondent
Jimenez was elected as a member of the House of
Representatives. On that basis, he claims that his
detention will disenfranchise his Manila district of
600,000 residents. We are not persuaded. In People
v. Jalosjos, 72 the Court has already debunked the
disenfranchisement argument when it ruled thus:
When the voters of his district elected the accused-
appellant to Congress, they did so with full
awareness of the limitations on his freedom of
action. They did so with the knowledge that he could
achieve only such legislative results which he could
accomplish within the confines of prison. To give a
more drastic illustration, if voters elect a person with
full knowledge that he is suffering from a terminal
illness, they do so knowing that at any time, he may
no longer serve his full term in office.
In the ultimate analysis, the issue before us boils
down to a question of constitutional equal protection.
The Constitution guarantees: x x x nor shall any
person be denied the equal protection of laws. This
simply means that all persons similarly situated shall
be treated alike both in rights enjoyed and
responsibilities imposed. The organs of government
may not show any undue favoritism or hostility to
any person. Neither partiality nor prejudice shall be
displayed.
Does being an elective official result in a substantial
distinction that allows different treatment? Is being a
Congressman a substantial differentiation which
removes the accused-appellant as a prisoner from
the same class as all persons validly confined under
law?
The performance of legitimate and even essential
duties by public officers has never been an excuse
to free a person validly [from] prison. The duties
imposed by the mandate of the people are
multifarious. The accused-appellant asserts that the
duty to legislate ranks highest in the hierarchy of
government. The accused-appellant is only one of
250 members of the House of Representatives, not
to mention the 24 members of the Senate, charged
with the duties of legislation. Congress continues to
function well in the physical absence of one or a few
of its members. Depending on the exigency of
Government that has to be addressed, the President
or the Supreme Court can also be deemed the
highest for that particular duty. The importance of a
function depends on the need for its exercise. The
duty of a mother to nurse her infant is most
compelling under the law of nature. A doctor with
unique skills has the duty to save the lives of those
with a particular affliction. An elective governor has
to serve provincial constituents. A police officer must
maintain peace and order. Never has the call of a
particular duty lifted a prisoner into a different
classification from those others who are validly
restrained by law.
A strict scrutiny of classifications is essential lest[,]
wittingly or otherwise, insidious discriminations are
made in favor of or against groups or types of
individuals.
The Court cannot validate badges of inequality. The
necessities imposed by public welfare may justify
exercise of government authority to regulate even if
thereby certain groups may plausibly assert that
their interests are disregarded.
We, therefore, find that election to the position of
Congressman is not a reasonable classification in
criminal law enforcement. The functions and duties
of the office are not substantial distinctions which lift
him from the class of prisoners interrupted in their
freedom and restricted in liberty of movement.
Lawful arrest and confinement are germane to the
purposes of the law and apply to all those belonging
to the same class." 73
It must be noted that even before private respondent
ran for and won a congressional seat in Manila, it
was already of public knowledge that the United
States was requesting his extradition. Hence, his
constituents were or should have been prepared for
the consequences of the extradition case against
their representative, including his detention pending
the final resolution of the case. Premises considered
and in line with Jalosjos, we are constrained to rule
against his claim that his election to public office is
by itself a compelling reason to grant him bail.
2. Anticipated Delay
Respondent Jimenez further contends that because
the extradition proceedings are lengthy, it would be
unfair to confine him during the pendency of the
case. Again we are not convinced. We must
emphasize that extradition cases are summary in
nature. They are resorted to merely to determine
whether the extradition petition and its annexes
conform to the Extradition Treaty, not to determine
guilt or innocence. Neither is it, as a rule, intended to
address issues relevant to the constitutional rights
available to the accused in a criminal action.
We are not overruling the possibility that petitioner
may, in bad faith, unduly delay the proceedings. This
is quite another matter that is not at issue here.
Thus, any further discussion of this point would be
merely anticipatory and academic.
However, if the delay is due to maneuverings of
respondent, with all the more reason would the grant
of bail not be justified. Giving premium to delay by
considering it as a special circumstance for the grant
of bail would be tantamount to giving him the power
to grant bail to himself. It would also encourage him
to stretch out and unreasonably delay the extradition
proceedings even more. This we cannot allow.
3. Not a Flight Risk?
Jimenez further claims that he is not a flight risk. To
support this claim, he stresses that he learned of the
extradition request in June 1999; yet, he has not fled
the country. True, he has not actually fled during the
preliminary stages of the request for his extradition.
Yet, this fact cannot be taken to mean that he will
not flee as the process moves forward to its
conclusion, as he hears the footsteps of the
requesting government inching closer and closer.
That he has not yet fled from the Philippines cannot
be taken to mean that he will stand his ground and
still be within reach of our government if and when it
matters; that is, upon the resolution of the Petition
for Extradition.
In any event, it is settled that bail may be applied for
and granted by the trial court at anytime after the
applicant has been taken into custody and prior to
judgment, even after bail has been previously
denied. In the present case, the extradition court
may continue hearing evidence on the application
for bail, which may be granted in accordance with
the guidelines in this Decision.
Brief Refutation of Dissents
The proposal to remand this case to the extradition
court, we believe, is totally unnecessary; in fact, it is
a cop-out. The parties -- in particular, Respondent
Jimenez -- have been given more than sufficient
opportunity both by the trial court and this Court to
discuss fully and exhaustively private respondents
claim to bail. As already stated, the RTC set for
hearing not only petitioners application for an arrest
warrant, but also private respondents prayer for
temporary liberty. Thereafter required by the RTC
were memoranda on the arrest, then position papers
on the application for bail, both of which were
separately filed by the parties.
This Court has meticulously pored over the Petition,
the Comment, the Reply, the lengthy Memoranda
and the Position Papers of both parties. Additionally,
it has patiently heard them in Oral Arguments, a
procedure not normally observed in the great
majority of cases in this Tribunal. Moreover, after the
Memos had been submitted, the parties --
particularly the potential extraditee -- have
bombarded this Court with additional pleadings --
entitled "Manifestations" by both parties and
"Counter-Manifestation" by private respondent -- in
which the main topic was Mr. Jimenezs plea for bail.
A remand would mean that this long, tedious
process would be repeated in its entirety. The trial
court would again hear factual and evidentiary
matters. Be it noted, however, that, in all his
voluminous pleadings and verbal propositions,
private respondent has not asked for a remand.
Evidently, even he realizes that there is absolutely
no need to rehear factual matters. Indeed, the
inadequacy lies not in the factual presentation of Mr.
Jimenez. Rather, it lies in his legal arguments.
Remanding the case will not solve this utter lack of
persuasion and strength in his legal reasoning.
In short, this Court -- as shown by this Decision and
the spirited Concurring, Separate and Dissenting
Opinions written by the learned justices themselves -
- has exhaustively deliberated and carefully passed
upon all relevant questions in this case. Thus, a
remand will not serve any useful purpose; it will only
further delay these already very delayed
proceedings, 74 which our Extradition Law requires
to be summary in character. What we need now is
prudent and deliberate speed, not unnecessary and
convoluted delay. What is needed is a firm decision
on the merits, not a circuitous cop-out.
Then, there is also the suggestion that this Court is
allegedly "disregarding basic freedoms when a case
is one of extradition." We believe that this charge is
not only baseless, but also unfair. Suffice it to say
that, in its length and breath, this Decision has taken
special cognizance of the rights to due process and
fundamental fairness of potential extraditees.
Summation
As we draw to a close, it is now time to summarize
and stress these ten points:
1. The ultimate purpose of extradition proceedings is
to determine whether the request expressed in the
petition, supported by its annexes and the evidence
that may be adduced during the hearing of the
petition, complies with the Extradition Treaty and
Law; and whether the person sought is extraditable.
The proceedings are intended merely to assist the
requesting state in bringing the accused -- or the
fugitive who has illegally escaped -- back to its
territory, so that the criminal process may proceed
therein.
2. By entering into an extradition treaty, the
Philippines is deemed to have reposed its trust in
the reliability or soundness of the legal and judicial
system of its treaty partner, as well as in the ability
and the willingness of the latter to grant basic rights
to the accused in the pending criminal case therein.
3. By nature then, extradition proceedings are not
equivalent to a criminal case in which guilt or
innocence is determined. Consequently, an
extradition case is not one in which the constitutional
rights of the accused are necessarily available. It is
more akin, if at all, to a courts request to police
authorities for the arrest of the accused who is at
large or has escaped detention or jumped bail.
Having once escaped the jurisdiction of the
requesting state, the reasonable prima facie
presumption is that the person would escape again if
given the opportunity.
4. Immediately upon receipt of the petition for
extradition and its supporting documents, the judge
shall make a prima facie finding whether the petition
is sufficient in form and substance, whether it
complies with the Extradition Treaty and Law, and
whether the person sought is extraditable. The
magistrate has discretion to require the petitioner to
submit further documentation, or to personally
examine the affiants or witnesses. If convinced that
a prima facie case exists, the judge immediately
issues a warrant for the arrest of the potential
extraditee and summons him or her to answer and
to appear at scheduled hearings on the petition.
5. After being taken into custody, potential
extraditees may apply for bail. Since the applicants
have a history of absconding, they have the burden
of showing that (a) there is no flight risk and no
danger to the community; and (b) there exist special,
humanitarian or compelling circumstances. The
grounds used by the highest court in the requesting
state for the grant of bail therein may be considered,
under the principle of reciprocity as a special
circumstance. In extradition cases, bail is not a
matter of right; it is subject to judicial discretion in the
context of the peculiar facts of each case.
6. Potential extraditees are entitled to the rights to
due process and to fundamental fairness. Due
process does not always call for a prior opportunity
to be heard. A subsequent opportunity is sufficient
due to the flight risk involved. Indeed, available
during the hearings on the petition and the answer is
the full chance to be heard and to enjoy fundamental
fairness that is compatible with the summary nature
of extradition.
7. This Court will always remain a protector of
human rights, a bastion of liberty, a bulwark of
democracy and the conscience of society. But it is
also well aware of the limitations of its authority and
of the need for respect for the prerogatives of the
other co-equal and co-independent organs of
government.
8. We realize that extradition is essentially an
executive, not a judicial, responsibility arising out of
the presidential power to conduct foreign relations
and to implement treaties. Thus, the Executive
Department of government has broad discretion in
its duty and power of implementation.
9. On the other hand, courts merely perform
oversight functions and exercise review authority to
prevent or excise grave abuse and tyranny. They
should not allow contortions, delays and "over-due
process" every little step of the way, lest these
summary extradition proceedings become not only
inutile but also sources of international
embarrassment due to our inability to comply in
good faith with a treaty partners simple request to
return a fugitive. Worse, our country should not be
converted into a dubious haven where fugitives and
escapees can unreasonably delay, mummify, mock,
frustrate, checkmate and defeat the quest for
bilateral justice and international cooperation.
10. At bottom, extradition proceedings should be
conducted with all deliberate speed to determine
compliance with the Extradition Treaty and Law;
and, while safeguarding basic individual rights, to
avoid the legalistic contortions, delays and
technicalities that may negate that purpose.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The
assailed RTC Order dated May 23, 2001 is hereby
declared NULL and VOID, while the challenged
Order dated July 3, 2001 is SET ASIDE insofar as it
granted bail to Respondent Mark Jimenez. The bail
bond posted by private respondent is CANCELLED.
The Regional Trial Court of Manila is directed to
conduct the extradition proceedings before it, with all
deliberate speed pursuant to the spirit and the letter
of our Extradition Treaty with the United States as
well as our Extradition Law. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
EN BANC
G.R. No. 76118 March 30, 1993
THE CENTRAL BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES and
RAMON V. TIAOQUI, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and TRIUMPH SAVINGS
BANK, respondents.
Sycip, Salazar, Hernandez & Gatmaitan for
petitioners.
Quisumbing, Torres & Evangelista for Triumph
Savings Bank.
BELLOSILLO, J.:
May a Monetary Board resolution placing a private
bank under receivership be annulled on the ground
of lack of prior notice and hearing?
This petition seeks review of the decision of the
Court of Appeals in CA G.R. S.P. No. 07867 entitled
"The Central Bank of the Philippines and Ramon V.
Tiaoqui vs. Hon. Jose C. de Guzman and Triumph
Savings Bank," promulgated 26 September 1986,
which affirmed the twin orders of the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City issued 11 November 19851
denying herein petitioners' motion to dismiss Civil
Case No. Q-45139, and directing petitioner Ramon
V. Tiaoqui to restore the private management of
Triumph Savings Bank (TSB) to its elected board of
directors and officers, subject to Central Bank
comptrollership.2
The antecedent facts: Based on examination reports
submitted by the Supervision and Examination
Sector (SES), Department II, of the Central Bank
(CB) "that the financial condition of TSB is one of
insolvency and its continuance in business would
involve probable loss to its depositors and
creditors,"3 the Monetary Board (MB) issued on 31
May 1985 Resolution No. 596 ordering the closure
of TSB, forbidding it from doing business in the
Philippines, placing it under receivership, and
appointing Ramon V. Tiaoqui as receiver. Tiaoqui
assumed office on 3 June 1985.4
On 11 June 1985, TSB filed a complaint with the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, docketed as
Civil Case No. Q-45139, against Central Bank and
Ramon V. Tiaoqui to annul MB Resolution No. 596,
with prayer for injunction, challenging in the process
the constitutionality of Sec. 29 of R.A. 269,
otherwise known as "The Central Bank Act," as
amended, insofar as it authorizes the Central Bank
to take over a banking institution even if it is not
charged with violation of any law or regulation, much
less found guilty thereof.5
On 1 July 1985, the trial court temporarily restrained
petitioners from implementing MB Resolution No.
596 "until further orders", thus prompting them to
move for the quashal of the restraining order (TRO)
on the ground that it did not comply with said Sec.
29, i.e., that TSB failed to show convincing proof of
arbitrariness and bad faith on the part of petitioners;'
and, that TSB failed to post the requisite bond in
favor of Central Bank.
On 19 July 1985, acting on the motion to quash the
restraining order, the trial court granted the relief
sought and denied the application of TSB for
injunction. Thereafter, Triumph Savings Bank filed
with Us a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court6 dated 25 July 1985 seeking to
enjoin the continued implementation of the
questioned MB resolution.
Meanwhile, on 9 August 1985; Central Bank and
Ramon Tiaoqui filed a motion to dismiss the
complaint before the RTC for failure to state a cause
of action, i.e., it did not allege ultimate facts showing
that the action was plainly arbitrary and made in bad
faith, which are the only grounds for the annulment
of Monetary Board resolutions placing a bank under
conservatorship, and that TSB was without legal
capacity to sue except through its receiver.7
On 9 September 1985, TSB filed an urgent motion in
the RTC to direct receiver Ramon V. Tiaoqui to
restore TSB to its private management. On 11
November 1985, the RTC in separate orders denied
petitioners' motion to dismiss and ordered receiver
Tiaoqui to restore the management of TSB to its
elected board of directors and officers, subject to CB
comptrollership.
Since the orders of the trial court rendered moot the
petition for certiorari then pending before this Court,
Central Bank and Tiaoqui moved on 2 December
1985 for the dismissal of G.R. No. 71465 which We
granted on 18 December 1985.8
Instead of proceeding to trial, petitioners elevated
the twin orders of the RTC to the Court of Appeals
on a petition for certiorari and prohibition under Rule
65.9 On 26 September 1986, the appellate court,
upheld the orders of the trial court thus
Petitioners' motion to dismiss was premised on two
grounds, namely, that the complaint failed to state a
cause of action and that the Triumph Savings Bank
was without capacity to sue except through its
appointed receiver.
Concerning the first ground, petitioners themselves
admit that the Monetary Board resolution placing the
Triumph Savings Bank under the receivership of the
officials of the Central Bank was done without prior
hearing, that is, without first hearing the side of the
bank. They further admit that said resolution can be
the subject of judicial review and may be set aside
should it be found that the same was issued with
arbitrariness and in bad faith.
The charge of lack of due process in the complaint
may be taken as constitutive of allegations of
arbitrariness and bad faith. This is not of course to
be taken as meaning that there must be previous
hearing before the Monetary Board may exercise its
powers under Section 29 of its Charter. Rather,
judicial review of such action not being foreclosed, it
would be best should private respondent be given
the chance to show and prove arbitrariness and bad
faith in the issuance of the questioned resolution,
especially so in the light of the statement of private
respondent that neither the bank itself nor its officials
were even informed of any charge of violating
banking laws.
In regard to lack of capacity to sue on the part of
Triumph Savings Bank, we view such argument as
being specious, for if we get the drift of petitioners'
argument, they mean to convey the impression that
only the CB appointed receiver himself may question
the CB resolution appointing him as such. This may
be asking for the impossible, for it cannot be
expected that the master, the CB, will allow the
receiver it has appointed to question that very
appointment. Should the argument of petitioners be
given circulation, then judicial review of actions of
the CB would be effectively checked and foreclosed
to the very bank officials who may feel, as in the
case at bar, that the CB action ousting them from
the bank deserves to be set aside.
xxx xxx xxx
On the questioned restoration order, this Court must
say that it finds nothing whimsical, despotic,
capricious, or arbitrary in its issuance, said action
only being in line and congruent to the action of the
Supreme Court in the Banco Filipino Case (G.R. No.
70054) where management of the bank was
restored to its duly elected directors and officers, but
subject to the Central Bank comptrollership.10
On 15 October 1986, Central Bank and its appointed
receiver, Ramon V. Tiaoqui, filed this petition under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court praying that the
decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
07867 be set aside, and that the civil case pending
before the RTC of Quezon City, Civil Case No.
Q-45139, be dismissed. Petitioners allege that the
Court of Appeals erred
(1) in affirming that an insolvent bank that had
been summarily closed by the Monetary Board
should be restored to its private management
supposedly because such summary closure was
"arbitrary and in bad faith" and a denial of "due
process";
(2) in holding that the "charge of lack of due
process" for "want of prior hearing" in a complaint to
annul a Monetary Board receivership resolution
under Sec. 29 of R.A. 265 "may be taken as . .
allegations of arbitrariness and bad faith"; and
(3) in holding that the owners and former
officers of an insolvent bank may still act or sue in
the name and corporate capacity of such bank, even
after it had been ordered closed and placed under
receivership.11
The respondents, on the other hand, allege inter alia
that in the Banco Filipino case,12 We held that CB
violated the rule on administrative due process laid
down in Ang Tibay vs. CIR (69 Phil. 635) and
Eastern Telecom Corp. vs. Dans, Jr. (137 SCRA
628) which requires that prior notice and hearing be
afforded to all parties in administrative proceedings.
Since MB Resolution No. 596 was adopted without
TSB being previously notified and heard, according
to respondents, the same is void for want of due
process; consequently, the bank's management
should be restored to its board of directors and
officers.13
Petitioners claim that it is the essence of Sec. 29 of
R.A. 265 that prior notice and hearing in cases
involving bank closures should not be required since
in all probability a hearing would not only cause
unnecessary delay but also provide bank "insiders"
and stockholders the opportunity to further dissipate
the bank's resources, create liabilities for the bank
up to the insured amount of P40,000.00, and even
destroy evidence of fraud or irregularity in the bank's
operations to the prejudice of its depositors and
creditors. 14 Petitioners further argue that the
legislative intent of Sec. 29 is to repose in the
Monetary Board exclusive power to determine the
existence of statutory grounds for the closure and
liquidation of banks, having the required expertise
and specialized competence to do so.
The first issue raised before Us is whether absence
of prior notice and hearing may be considered acts
of arbitrariness and bad faith sufficient to annul a
Monetary Board resolution enjoining a bank from
doing business and placing it under receivership.
Otherwise stated, is absence of prior notice and
hearing constitutive of acts of arbitrariness and bad
faith?
Under Sec. 29 of R.A. 265,15 the Central Bank,
through the Monetary Board, is vested with
exclusive authority to assess, evaluate and
determine the condition of any bank, and finding
such condition to be one of insolvency, or that its
continuance in business would involve probable loss
to its depositors or creditors, forbid the bank or non-
bank financial institution to do business in the
Philippines; and shall designate an official of the CB
or other competent person as receiver to
immediately take charge of its assets and liabilities.
The fourth paragraph,16 which was then in effect at
the time the action was commenced, allows the filing
of a case to set aside the actions of the Monetary
Board which are tainted with arbitrariness and bad
faith.
Contrary to the notion of private respondent, Sec. 29
does not contemplate prior notice and hearing
before a bank may be directed to stop operations
and placed under receivership. When par. 4 (now
par. 5, as amended by E.O. 289) provides for the
filing of a case within ten (10) days after the receiver
takes charge of the assets of the bank, it is
unmistakable that the assailed actions should
precede the filing of the case. Plainly, the legislature
could not have intended to authorize "no prior notice
and hearing" in the closure of the bank and at the
same time allow a suit to annul it on the basis of
absence thereof.
In the early case of Rural Bank of Lucena, Inc. v.
Arca [1965],17 We held that a previous hearing is
nowhere required in Sec. 29 nor does the
constitutional requirement of due process demand
that the correctness of the Monetary Board's
resolution to stop operation and proceed to
liquidation be first adjudged before making the
resolution effective. It is enough that a subsequent
judicial review be provided.
Even in Banco Filipino, 18 We reiterated that Sec.
29 of R.A. 265 does not require a previous hearing
before the Monetary Board can implement its
resolution closing a bank, since its action is subject
to judicial scrutiny as provided by law.
It may be emphasized that Sec. 29 does not
altogether divest a bank or a non-bank financial
institution placed under receivership of the
opportunity to be heard and present evidence on
arbitrariness and bad faith because within ten (10)
days from the date the receiver takes charge of the
assets of the bank, resort to judicial review may be
had by filing an appropriate pleading with the court.
Respondent TSB did in fact avail of this remedy by
filing a complaint with the RTC of Quezon City on
the 8th day following the takeover by the receiver of
the bank's assets on 3 June 1985.
This "close now and hear later" scheme is grounded
on practical and legal considerations to prevent
unwarranted dissipation of the bank's assets and as
a valid exercise of police power to protect the
depositors, creditors, stockholders and the general
public.
In Rural Bank of Buhi, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,19
We stated that
. . . due process does not necessarily require a prior
hearing; a hearing or an opportunity to be heard may
be subsequent to the closure. One can just imagine
the dire consequences of a prior hearing: bank runs
would be the order of the day, resulting in panic and
hysteria. In the process, fortunes may be wiped out
and disillusionment will run the gamut of the entire
banking community.
We stressed in Central Bank of the Philippines v.
Court of Appeals20 that
. . . the banking business is properly subject to
reasonable regulation under the police power of the
state because of its nature and relation to the fiscal
affairs of the people and the revenues of the state (9
CJS 32). Banks are affected with public interest
because they receive funds from the general public
in the form of deposits. Due to the nature of their
transactions and functions, a fiduciary relationship is
created between the banking institutions and their
depositors. Therefore, banks are under the
obligation to treat with meticulous care and utmost
fidelity the accounts of those who have reposed their
trust and confidence in them (Simex International
[Manila], Inc., v. Court of Appeals, 183 SCRA 360
[1990]).
It is then the Government's responsibility to see to it
that the financial interests of those who deal with the
banks and banking institutions, as depositors or
otherwise, are protected. In this country, that task is
delegated to the Central Bank which, pursuant to its
Charter (R.A. 265, as amended), is authorized to
administer the monetary, banking and credit system
of the Philippines. Under both the 1973 and 1987
Constitutions, the Central Bank is tasked with
providing policy direction in the areas of money,
banking and credit; corollarily, it shall have
supervision over the operations of banks (Sec. 14,
Art. XV, 1973 Constitution, and Sec. 20, Art. XII,
1987 Constitution). Under its charter, the CB is
further authorized to take the necessary steps
against any banking institution if its continued
operation would cause prejudice to its depositors,
creditors and the general public as well. This power
has been expressly recognized by this Court. In
Philippine Veterans Bank Employees Union-NUBE
v. Philippine Veterans Banks (189 SCRA 14 [1990],
this Court held that:
. . . [u]nless adequate and determined efforts are
taken by the government against distressed and
mismanaged banks, public faith in the banking
system is certain to deteriorate to the prejudice of
the national economy itself, not to mention the
losses suffered by the bank depositors, creditors,
and stockholders, who all deserve the protection of
the government. The government cannot simply
cross its arms while the assets of a bank are being
depleted through mismanagement or irregularities. It
is the duty of the Central Bank in such an event to
step in and salvage the remaining resources of the
bank so that they may not continue to be dissipated
or plundered by those entrusted with their
management.
Section 29 of R.A. 265 should be viewed in this light;
otherwise, We would be subscribing to a situation
where the procedural rights invoked by private
respondent would take precedence over the
substantive interests of depositors, creditors and
stockholders over the assets of the bank.
Admittedly, the mere filing of a case for receivership
by the Central Bank can trigger a bank run and drain
its assets in days or even hours leading to
insolvency even if the bank be actually solvent. The
procedure prescribed in Sec. 29 is truly designed to
protect the interest of all concerned, i.e., the
depositors, creditors and stockholders, the bank
itself, and the general public, and the summary
closure pales in comparison to the protection
afforded public interest. At any rate, the bank is
given full opportunity to prove arbitrariness and bad
faith in placing the bank under receivership, in which
event, the resolution may be properly nullified and
the receivership lifted as the trial court may
determine.
The heavy reliance of respondents on the Banco
Filipino case is misplaced in view of factual
circumstances therein which are not attendant in the
present case. We ruled in Banco Filipino that the
closure of the bank was arbitrary and attendant with
grave abuse of discretion, not because of the
absence of prior notice and hearing, but that the
Monetary Board had no sufficient basis to arrive at a
sound conclusion of insolvency to justify the closure.
In other words, the arbitrariness, bad faith and
abuse of discretion were determined only after the
bank was placed under conservatorship and
evidence thereon was received by the trial court. As
this Court found in that case, the Valenzuela,
Aurellano and Tiaoqui Reports contained unfounded
assumptions and deductions which did not reflect
the true financial condition of the bank. For instance,
the subtraction of an uncertain amount as valuation
reserve from the assets of the bank would merely
result in its net worth or the unimpaired capital and
surplus; it did not reflect the total financial condition
of Banco Filipino.
Furthermore, the same reports showed that the total
assets of Banco Filipino far exceeded its total
liabilities. Consequently, on the basis thereof, the
Monetary Board had no valid reason to liquidate the
bank; perhaps it could have merely ordered its
reorganization or rehabilitation, if need be. Clearly,
there was in that case a manifest arbitrariness,
abuse of discretion and bad faith in the closure of
Banco Filipino by the Monetary Board. But, this is
not the case before Us. For here, what is being
raised as arbitrary by private respondent is the
denial of prior notice and hearing by the Monetary
Board, a matter long settled in this jurisdiction, and
not the arbitrariness which the conclusions of the
Supervision and Examination Sector (SES),
Department II, of the Central Bank were reached.
Once again We refer to Rural Bank of Buhi, Inc. v.
Court of Appeals,21 and reiterate Our
pronouncement therein that
. . . the law is explicit as to the conditions
prerequisite to the action of the Monetary Board to
forbid the institution to do business in the Philippines
and to appoint a receiver to immediately take charge
of the bank's assets and liabilities. They are: (a) an
examination made by the examining department of
the Central Bank; (b) report by said department to
the Monetary Board; and (c) prima facie showing
that its continuance in business would involve
probable loss to its depositors or creditors.
In sum, appeal to procedural due process cannot
just outweigh the evil sought to be prevented; hence,
We rule that Sec. 29 of R.A. 265 is a sound
legislation promulgated in accordance with the
Constitution in the exercise of police power of the
state. Consequently, the absence of notice and
hearing is not a valid ground to annul a Monetary
Board resolution placing a bank under receivership.
The absence of prior notice and hearing cannot be
deemed acts of arbitrariness and bad faith. Thus, an
MB resolution placing a bank under receivership, or
conservatorship for that matter, may only be
annulled after a determination has been made by
the trial court that its issuance was tainted with
arbitrariness and bad faith. Until such determination
is made, the status quo shall be maintained, i.e., the
bank shall continue to be under receivership.
As regards the second ground, to rule that only the
receiver may bring suit in behalf of the bank is, to
echo the respondent appellate court, "asking for the
impossible, for it cannot be expected that the
master, the CB, will allow the receiver it has
appointed to question that very appointment."
Consequently, only stockholders of a bank could file
an action for annulment of a Monetary Board
resolution placing the bank under receivership and
prohibiting it from continuing operations.22 In
Central Bank v. Court of Appeals, 23 We explained
the purpose of the law
. . . in requiring that only the stockholders of record
representing the majority of the capital stock may
bring the action to set aside a resolution to place a
bank under conservatorship is to ensure that it be
not frustrated or defeated by the incumbent Board of
Directors or officers who may immediately resort to
court action to prevent its implementation or
enforcement. It is presumed that such a resolution is
directed principally against acts of said Directors and
officers which place the bank in a state of continuing
inability to maintain a condition of liquidity adequate
to protect the interest of depositors and creditors.
Indirectly, it is likewise intended to protect and
safeguard the rights and interests of the
stockholders. Common sense and public policy
dictate then that the authority to decide on whether
to contest the resolution should be lodged with the
stockholders owning a majority of the shares for they
are expected to be more objective in determining
whether the resolution is plainly arbitrary and issued
in bad faith.
It is observed that the complaint in this case was
filed on 11 June 1985 or two (2) years prior to 25
July 1987 when E.O. 289 was issued, to be effective
sixty (60) days after its approval (Sec. 5). The
implication is that before E.O
. 289, any party in interest could institute court
proceedings to question a Monetary Board
resolution placing a bank under receivership.
Consequently, since the instant complaint was filed
by parties representing themselves to be officers of
respondent Bank (Officer-in-Charge and Vice
President), the case before the trial court should
now take its natural course. However, after the
effectivity of E.O. 289, the procedure stated therein
should be followed and observed.
PREMISES considered, the Decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 07867 is AFFIRMED,
except insofar as it upholds the Order of the trial
court of 11 November 1985 directing petitioner
RAMON V. TIAOQUI to restore the management of
TRIUMPH SAVINGS BANK to its elected Board of
Directors and Officers, which is hereby SET ASIDE.
Let this case be remanded to the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City for further proceedings to
determine whether the issuance of Resolution No.
596 of the Monetary Board was tainted with
arbitrariness and bad faith and to decide the case
accordingly.
SO ORDERED.
EN BANC
G.R. No. 85481-82 October 18, 1990
WILLIAM TAN, JOAQUIN TAN LEH and VICENTE
TAN, petitioners,
vs.
HERNANI T. BARRIOS, in his capacity as State
Prosecutor, Department of Justice, THE CITY
FISCAL OF CAGAYAN DE ORO CITY, THE
HONORABLE LEONARDO N. DEMECILLO,
Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Branch
24, Cagayan De Oro City, and THE PEOPLE OF
THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
GRIO-AQUINO, J.:
On the basis of Proclamation No. 1081 dated
September 21, 1972, then President Ferdinand E.
Marcos, thru General Order No. 8 dated September
27, 1972, authorized the AFP Chief of Staff to create
military tribunals "to try and decide cases of military
personnel and such other cases as may be referred
to them."
In General Order No. 21 dated September 30, 1972,
the military tribunals, "exclusive of the civil courts,"
were vested with jurisdiction among others, over
violations of the law on firearms, and other crimes
which were directly related to the quelling of
rebellion and the preservation of the safety and
security of the Republic.
In General Order No. 12-b dated November 7, 1972,
"crimes against persons . . . as defined and
penalized in the Revised Penal Code" were added to
the jurisdiction of military tribunals/commissions.
Subsequently, General Order No. 49, dated October
11, 1974, redefined the jurisdiction of the Military
Tribunals. The enumeration of offenses cognizable
by such tribunals excluded crimes against persons
as defined and penalized in the Revised Penal
Code. However, although civil courts should have
exclusive jurisdiction over such offenses not
mentioned in Section 1 of G.O. No. 49, Section 2 of
the same general order provided that "the President
may, in the public interest, refer to a Military Tribunal
a case falling under the exclusive jurisdiction of the
civil courts" and vice versa.
On April 17, 1975, the three petitioners, with twelve
(12) others, were arrested and charged in Criminal
Case No. MC-1-67 entitled, "People of the
Philippines vs. Luis Tan alias Tata alias Go Bon
Hoc, et al." before the Military Commission No. 1, for
the crimes of:
(1) murder through the use of an unlicensed or
illegally possessed firearm, penalized under Article
248 of the Revised Penal Code, in relation to
Section 1, par. 6 of General Order No. 49, for the
killing on August 25, 1973 of Florentino Lim of tile
wealthy Lim Ket Kai family of Cagayan de Oro City;
and
(2) unlawful possession, control, and custody of
a pistol, caliber .45 SN-1283521 with ammunition, in
violation of General Orders Nos. 6 and 7 in relation
to Presidential Decree No. 9.
The accused were:
1. Luis Tan alias Tata alias Go Bon Hoc
2. Ang Tiat Chuan alias Chuana
3. Mariano Velez, Jr.
4. Antonio Occaciones
5. Leopoldo Nicolas
6. Enrique Labita
7. Oscar Yaun

8. Joaquin Tan Leh alias Go Bon Huat alias
Taowie
9. Eusebio Tan alias Go Bon Ping
10. Vicente Tan alias Go Bon Beng alias Donge
11. Alfonso Tan alias Go Bon Tiak
12. Go E Kuan alias Kunga
13. William Tan alias Go Bon Ho
14. Marciano Benemerito alias Marcing alias
Dodong
15. Manuel Beleta, and
16. John Doe (Annex A, Petition).
(Names italicized are the petitioners herein.)
Because the case was a "cause celebre" in Cagayan
de Oro City, President Marcos, pursuant to the
recommendation of Defense Secretary Juan Ponce
Enrile, withdrew his earlier order (issued in response
to the requests of the defendants' lawyers) to
transfer the case to the civil courts. Hence, the case
was retained in the military court (Annexes A to C of
Supplemental/Amended Petition, pp. 72-88, Rollo).
All the accused were detained without bail in the
P.C. Stockade in Camp Crame.
Upon arraignment on May 6, 1975, all the accused
pleaded "not guilty." Manuel Beleta was discharged
to be used as a state witness. He was released from
detention on May 5, 1975 (p. 4, Rollo).
Almost daily trials were held for more than thirteen
(13) months. The testimonies of 45 prosecution
witnesses and 35 defense witnesses filled up
twenty-one (21) volumes of transcripts consisting of
over 10,000 pages (p. 75, Rollo).
On June 10, 1976, a decision entitled "Findings and
Sentence," was promulgated by the Military
Commission finding five (5) of the accused namely:
1. Luis Tan
2. Ang Tiat Chuan
3. Mariano Velez, Jr.
4. Antonio Occaciones, and
5. Leopoldo Nicolas
guilty of MURDER. Each of them was sentenced to
suffer an indeterminate prison term of from
seventeen (17) years, four (4) months, and twenty-
one (21) days, to twenty (20) years.
A sixth accused, Marciano Benemerito, was found
guilty of both MURDER and ILLEGAL
POSSESSION OF FIREARM, and was sentenced to
suffer the penalty of death by electrocution (Annex
B, Petition).
Eight (8) of the accused, namely:
1. Oscar Yaun
2. Enrique Labita
3. Eusebio Tan
4. Alfonso Tan
5. Go E Kuan
6. William Tan (petitioner herein)
7. Joaquin Tan Leh (petitioner herein) and
8. Vicente Tan (petitioner herein)
were acquitted of the charges, and released on June
11, 1976 (p. 8, Rollo).
On January 17, 1981, Proclamation No. 2045 ended
martial rule and abolished the military tribunals and
commissions.
On May 22, 1987, this Court promulgated a decision
in Olaguer vs. Military Commission No. 34, et al.
(150 SCRA 144), vacating the sentence rendered on
December 4, 1984 by Military Commission No. 34
against Olaguer, et al. and declaring that military
commissions and tribunals have no jurisdiction, even
during the period of martial law, over civilians
charged with criminal offenses properly cognizable
by civil courts, as long as those courts are open and
functioning as they did during the period of martial
law. This Court declared unconstitutional the
creation of the military commissions to try civilians,
and annulled all their proceedings as follows:
Due process of law demands that in all criminal
prosecutions (where the accused stands to lose
either his life or his liberty), the accused shall be
entitled to, among others, a trial. The trial
contemplated by the due process clause of the
Constitution, in relation to the Charter as a whole, is
a trial by judicial process, not by executive or military
process, Military commissions or tribunals, by
whatever name they are called, are not courts within
the Philippine judicial system. ...
xxx xxx xxx
Moreover, military tribunals pertain to the Executive
Department of the Government and are simply
instrumentalities of the executive power, provided by
the legislature for the President as Commander in-
Chief to aid him in properly commanding the army
and navy and enforcing discipline therein, and
utilized under his orders or those of his authorized
military representatives. Following the principle of
separation of powers underlying the existing
constitutional organization of the Government of the
Philippines, the power and the duty of interpreting
the laws (as when an individual should be
considered to have violated the law) is primarily a
function of the judiciary. It is not, and it cannot be the
function of the Executive Department, through the
military authorities. And as long as the civil courts in
the land remain open and are regularly functioning,
as they do so today and as they did during the
period of martial law in the country, military tribunals
cannot try and exercise jurisdiction over civilians for
offenses committed by them and which are properly
cognizable by the civil courts. To have it otherwise
would be a violation of the constitutional right to due
process of the civilian concerned. (Olaguer, et al. vs.
Military Commission No. 34, 150 SCRA 144, 158-
160.)
In October 1986, several months after the EDSA
revolution, six (6) habeas corpus petitions were filed
in this Court by some 217 prisoners 1 in the national
penitentiary, who had been tried for common crimes
and convicted by the military commissions during the
nine-year span of official martial rule (G.R. Nos.
75983, 79077, 79599-79600, 79862 and 80565
consolidated and entitled Manuel R. Cruz, et al. vs.
Minister Juan Ponce Enrile, et al., 160 SCRA 700).
The petitioners asked the Court to declare
unconstitutional General Order No. 8 creating the
military tribunals, annul the proceedings against
them before these bodies, and grant them a retrial in
the civil courts where their right to due process may
be accorded respect.
Conformably with the ruling in Olaguer, this Court in
Cruz vs. Enrile (160 SCRA 700), nullified the
proceedings leading to the conviction of non-political
detainees who should have been brought before the
courts of justice as their offenses were totally
unrelated to the insurgency sought to be controlled
by martial rule.
The Court
(1) granted the petition for habeas corpus and
ordered the release of those of some who had fully
served their sentences, or had been acquitted, or
had been granted amnesty;
(2) dismissed the petitions of those who were
military personnel; and
(3) nullified the proceedings against those who
were convicted and still serving the sentences
meted to them by the military courts, but, without
ordering their release, directed the Department of
Justice to file the necessary informations against
them in the proper civil courts. The dispositive part of
the decision reads:
Wherefore the petition is hereby GRANTED insofar
as petitioners Virgilio Alejandrino, 2 Domingo Reyes,
Antonio Pumar, Teodoro Patono, Andres Parado,
Daniel Campus, 3 Reynaldo C. Reyes and Rosalino
de los Santos, 4 are concerned. The Director of the
Bureau of Prisons is hereby ordered to effect the
immediate release of the abovementioned
petitioners, unless there are other legal causes that
may warrant their detention.
The petition is DISMISSED as to petitioners Elpidio
Cacho, William Lorenzana, Benigno Bantolino,
Getulio G. Braga, Jr., Tomas C. Amarte, Rogelio L.
Caricungan, Ernesto Baradiel, Isabelo Narne, Eric F.
Pichay, Pablo Callejo, Russel A. Paulino, Laurel
Lamaca, Tirso F. Bala, Calixto Somera, Edulino
Lacsina (Draftee), Ronnie A. Celiz, Elpidio Urbano,
Sofronio Galo, Aquilino Leyran, Leopoldo Arcadio,
Rolando Tudin Rosendo I. Ramos Pacifico Batacan,
Edilberto Liberato, Jimmy C. Realis. Democrito
Lorana who are all military personnel.
As to the other petitioners, the Department of Justice
is hereby DIRECTED TO FILE the necessary
informations against them in the courts having
jurisdiction over the offenses involved, within one
hundred eighty (180) days from notice of this
decision, without prejudice to the reproduction of the
evidence submitted by the parties and admitted by
the Military Commission. If eventually convicted, the
period of the petitioners' detention shall be credited
in their favor.
The Courts wherein the necessary informations are
filed are DIRECTED TO CONDUCT with dispatch
the necessary proceedings inclusive of those for the
grant of bail which may be initiated by the accused.
(Cruz, et al. vs. Enrile, et al., 160 SCRA 700, 711-
712.)
On September 15, 1988, Secretary of Justice
Sedfrey Ordoez issued Department Order No. 226
designating State Prosecutor Hernani Barrios "to
collaborate with the City Fiscal of Cagayan de Oro
City in the investigation/reinvestigation of Criminal
Case No. MC-1-67 and, if the evidence warrants, to
prosecute the case in the court of competent
jurisdiction" (Annex C, Petition). On November 15,
1988, State Prosecutor Barrios was designated
Acting City Fiscal of Cagayan de Oro City in hell of
the regular fiscal who inhibited himself (p. 66, Rollo).
Without conducting an investigation/reinvestigation,
Fiscal Barrios filed on December 9, 1988, in the
Regional Trial Court of Cagayan de Oro City two (2)
informations for:
1. Illegal Possession of Firearm docketed as
Crim. Case No. 88-824; and
2. Murder docketed as Crim. Case No. 88-825
against all the 15 original defendants in Criminal
Case No. MC-1-67 including those who had already
died 5 (Annexes D and E, Petition)
The State Prosecutor incorrectly certified in the
informations that:
this case is filed in accordance with the Supreme
Court Order in the case of Cruz, et al. vs. Ponce
Enrile in G.R. Nos. 75983, 79077, 79599, 79600,
79862 and 80565 as all accused are detained 6
except those that are already dead. (p. 7, Rollo.)
He recommended bail of P50,000 for each of the
accused in the two cases (p. 8, Rollo). Later, he
increased the recommended bail to P140,000 for
each accused in the firearm case (Crim. Case No.
88-824). In the murder case (Crim. Case No. 88-
825), he recommended that the bail be increased to
P250,000 for each of the accused, except Luis Tan,
Ang Tiat Chuan, and Mariano Velez, Jr., for whom
he recommended no bail. Still later, on October 28,
1988, he recommended no bail for all the accused
(pp. 8-9, Rollo) because of the presence of two
aggravating circumstances; (1) prize or reward; and
(2) use of a motor vehicle (p. 65, Rollo).
Criminal Cases Nos. 88-824 and 88-825 of the RTC,
Cagayan de Oro City, were assigned by raffle to the
sala of RTC Judge Leonardo N. Demecillo. Before
issuing warrants for the arrest of the accused, Judge
Demecillo issued an order on October 26, 1988,
requiring State Prosecutor Barrios to submit certified
copies of "the supporting affidavits of the previous
cases wherever they are now," and of the Supreme
Court order "which is the basis of filing the above-
entitled cases, within five (5) days from receipt" of
his said order (Annex F, Petition). The State
Prosecutor has not complied with that order for, as a
matter of fact, there is no Supreme Court order to re-
file the criminal cases against the herein petitioners
and their twelve (12) coaccused in Crim. Case No.
MC-1-67 of the now defunct Military Commission No.
1, because none of them, except Antonio
Occaciones, were parties in the Cruz vs. Enrile
habeas corpus cases (160 SCRA 700).
On November 7, 1988, William Tan, Joaquin Tan
Leh and Vicente Tan filed this petition for certiorari
and prohibition praying that the informations in Crim.
Cases Nos. 88-824 and 88-825, and the order of
respondent Judge dated October 26, 1988 be
annulled, and that the public respondents or any
other prosecution officer "be permanently enjoined
from indicting, prosecuting and trying them anew for
the offenses charged therein because they had
already been acquitted of the same by Military
Commission No. 1 in Crim. Case No. MC-1-67" (p.
23, Rollo).
On November 23, 1988, the First Division of this
Court dismissed the petition for being premature as:
... the petitioners have not yet filed a motion to
quash the allegedly invalid informations in Criminal
Cases Nos. 88-824 and 88825 (Annexes D and E)
whose annulment they seek from this Court (Sec. 3,
Rule 117, 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure). The
filing in the lower court of such motion is the plain,
speedy and adequate remedy of the petitioners. The
existence of that remedy (which they have not yet
availed of) bars their recourse to the special civil
actions of certiorari and prohibition in this Court
(Sec. 1, Rule 65, Rules of Court (p. 41, Rollo.)
Upon the petitioners' filing a motion for
reconsideration informing this Court that the lower
court had issued warrants for their arrest (p. 48,
Rollo), we issued a temporary restraining order on
January 16, 1989 enjoining the respondents from
implementing the orders of arrest and ordering them
to comment on the petition (p. 50, Rollo).
The petitioners allege that State Prosecutor Barrios
exceeded his jurisdiction and gravely abused his
discretion in reprosecuting them upon the supposed
authority of Cruz vs. Enrile for the following reasons:
1. The decision in Cruz vs. Enrile does not in
fact direct the filing of informations by the Secretary
of Justice against THOSE who, like the petitioners,
WERE ACQUITTED after court martial proceedings
during the period of martial law.
2. The decision in Cruz vs. Enrile does not
apply to the petitioners who were not parties in that
case, who were not heard, and over whom the court
did not acquire jurisdiction.
3. The reprosecution of the petitioners would
violate their right to protection against double
jeopardy.
4. The State is estopped from reprosecuting
the petitioners after they had been acquitted by the
military tribunal which the State itself had clothed
with jurisdiction to try and decide the criminal cases
against them. The State may not retroactively divest
of jurisdiction the military tribunal that tried and
acquitted them (pp. 14-15, Petition).
5. The retroactive invalidation of the jurisdiction
of the military court that acquitted the petitioners
would amount to an ex post facto ruling (p. 81, Rollo,
Supplemental Petition).
6. The information against the petitioners in
Crim. Case No. 88-825 is null and void because it
was filed without a prior preliminary investigation,
nor a finding of probable cause, nor the written
approval of the Chief State Prosecutor (Secs. 3 and
4, Rule 112, 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure).
In his Comment dated February 1, 1985 (should be
1989), Fiscal Barrios disclosed that the information
in Criminal Case No. 88-824 for illegal possession of
firearm was "already withdrawn by the prosecution
at a hearing on January 27, 1988" (should be 1989?)
(pp. 66-68, Rollo). The reason for dropping the
charge is not stated. It may be because Benemerito,
the gunman who was convicted of this felony and
sentenced to death by the Military Commission, is
already dead-possibly executed. Hence, only the
information for murder (Crim. Case No. 88-825)
against the petitioners and twelve (12) others,
including those already dead, is pending in the lower
court (p. 37, Rollo). He defended the reprosecution
of the petitioners on the ground that it will not
constitute double jeopardy because the nullity of the
jurisdiction of the military tribunal that acquitted them
prevented the first jeopardy from attaching, thereby
nullifying their acquittal. For the same reason, res
judicata is not applicable. Neither prescription,
because "it had been interrupted by the filing of the
earlier charge sheets with the Military Commission"
(p. 67, Rollo).
The Solicitor General, in his separate comment,
argued that the proceedings involving civilians
before a military commission were null and void
because we ruled in Olaguer that military tribunals
are bereft of jurisdiction over civilians, hence, their
decisions, whether of conviction or acquittal, do not
bar re-prosecution for the same crime before a civil
court (p. 102, Rollo).
The petition is meritorious. The public respondents
gravely abused their discretion and acted without or
in excess of their jurisdiction in misconstruing the
third paragraph of the dispositive portion of this
Court's decision in Cruz vs. Enrile as their authority
to refile in the civil court the criminal actions against
petitioners who had been tried and acquitted by
Military Commission No. 1 during the period of
martial law. It is an unreasonable application of Cruz
vs. Enrile, for the decision therein will be searched in
vain for such authority to reprosecute every civilian
who had ever faced a court martial, much less those
who had been acquitted by such bodies more than a
decade ago like the petitioners Tan, et al. herein.
The decision in Cruz vs. Enrile would be an
instrument of oppression and injustice unless given
a limited application only to the parties/petitioners
therein who sought the annulment of the court
martial proceedings against themselves and prayed
for a retrial in the civil courts of the criminal cases
against them. They alone are affected by the
judgment in Cruz vs. Enrile, not all and sundry who
at one time or another had been tried and sentenced
by a court martial during the period of martial law.
Res inter alios judicatae nullum aliis praejudicium
faciunt. "Matters adjudged in a cause do not
prejudice those who were not parties to it." (54 C.J.
719.) It is a cardinal rule of procedure that a court's
judgment or order in a case shall not adversely
affect persons who were not parties to the self same
case (Icasiano vs. Tan, 84 Phil. 860). Hence, this
court's pronouncement in Cruz vs. Enrile nullifying
the proceedings in military courts against the civilian
petitioners therein and ordering the refiling of
informations against them in the proper civil courts,
may not affect the rights of persons who were not
parties in that case and who, not having submitted to
the court's jurisdiction, did not have their day in court
(Busacay vs. Buenaventura, 94 Phil, 1033). Their
reprosecution, based on the decision in Cruz vs.
Enrile in which they took no part and were not heard,
would be violative of their right to due process, the
same right of the petitioners in Cruz vs. Enrile that
this Court endeavored to protect when it nullified the
proceedings against them in the military tribunals by
applying the Olaguer doctrine that the trial of
civilians by military process was not due process. 7
There is, however, a perceptible lack of consistency
in the application of the Olaguer doctrine to Cruz vs.
Enrile which needs to be rectified. For, although the
Court nullified the proceedings against the civilians-
petitioners who were still serving their sentences
after conviction by the military courts and
commissions, and we directed the Secretary of
Justice to file the necessary informations against
them in the proper civil courts, we did not nullify the
court martial proceedings against the other civilians
petitioners who: (1) had finished serving their
sentences; (2) had been granted amnesty; or (3)
had been acquitted by the military courts. We did not
order their reprosecution, retrial, and resentencing
by the proper civil courts. We set them free.
In effect, the Court applied one rule for those
civilians who were convicted by the military courts
and were still serving their sentences, and another
rule for those who were acquitted, or pardoned, or
had finished the service of their sentences. The
Court applied a rule of retroactive invalidity to the
first group (whom the Court ordered to be
reprosecuted before the proper civil courts) and
another of prospective invalidity for the others
(whom the Court ordered to be released from
custody).
In the interest of justice and consistency, we hold
that Olaguer should, in principle, be applied
prospectively only to future cases and cases still
ongoing or not yet final when that decision was
promulgated. Hence, there should be no retroactive
nullification of final judgments, whether of conviction
or acquittal, rendered by military courts against
civilians before the promulgation of the Olaguer
decision. Such final sentences should not be
disturbed by the State. Only in particular cases
where the convicted person or the State shows that
there was serious denial of the Constitutional rights
of the accused should the nullity of the sentence be
declared and a retrial be ordered based on the
violation of the constitutional rights of the accused,
and not on the Olaguer doctrine. If a retrial, is no
longer possible, the accused should be released
since the judgment against him is null on account of
the violation of his constitutional rights and denial of
due process.
It may be recalled that Olaguer was rescued from a
court martial which sentenced him to death without
receiving evidence in his defense. It would be a
cruel distortion of the Olaguer decision to use it as
authority for reprosecuting civilians regardless of
whether, unlike Olaguer, they had been accorded a
fair trial and regardless of whether they have already
been acquitted and released, or have accepted the
sentences imposed on them and commenced
serving the same. Not everybody who was convicted
by a military court, much less those who were
acquitted and released, desires to undergo the
ordeal of a second trial for the same offense, albeit
in a civil court. Indeed, why should one who has
accepted the justness of the verdict of a military
court, who is satisfied that he had a fair hearing, and
who is willing to serve his sentence in full, be
dragged through the harrow of another hearing in a
civil court to risk being convicted a second time
perchance to serve a heavier penalty? Even if there
is a chance of being acquitted the second time
around, it would be small comfort for the accused if
he is held without bail pending the completion of his
second trial which may take as long as, if not longer
than, the sentence he has been serving or already
served.
The trial of thousands of civilians for common crimes
before military tribunals and commissions during the
ten-year period of martial rule (1971-1981) which
were created under general orders issued by
President Marcos in the exercise of his legislative
powers, is an operative fact that may not be justly
ignored. The belated declaration in 1987 of the
unconstitutionality and invalidity of those
proceedings did not erase the reality of their
consequences which occurred long before our
decision in Olaguer was promulgated and which now
prevent us from carrying Olaguer to the limit of its
logic. Thus, did this Court rule in Municipality of
Malabang vs. Benito, 27 SCRA 533, where the
question arose as to whether the declaration of
nullity of the creation of a municipality by executive
order wiped out all the acts of the local government
thus abolished:
In Norton vs. Shelby Count, Mr. Justice Field said:
'An unconstitutional act is not a law; it confers no
rights; it imposes no duties; it affords no protection; it
creates no office; it is, in legal contemplation, as
inoperative as though it had never been passed.'
Accordingly, he held that bonds issued by a board of
commissioners created under an invalid statute were
unenforceable.
Executive Order 386 'created no office.' This is not to
say, however, that the acts done by the municipality
of Balabagan in the exercise of its corporate powers
are a nullity because the executive order is, in legal
contemplation, as inoperative as though it had never
been passed.' For the existence of Executive Order
386 is 'an operative fact which cannot justly be
ignored.' As Chief Justice Hughes explained in
Chicot County Drainage District vs. Baxter State
Bank:
'The courts below have proceeded on the theory that
the Act of Congress, having been found to be
unconstitutional, was not a law; that it was
inoperative, conferring no rights and imposing no
duties, and hence affording no basis for the
challenged decree. Norton vs. Shelby County, 118
U.S. 425, 442; Chicago, I. & L. Ry. Co. vs. Hackett,
228 U.S. 559, 566. It is quite clear, however, that
such broad statements as to the effect of a
determination of unconstitutionality must be taken
with qualifications. The actual existence of a statute,
prior to such a determination, is an operative fact
and may have consequences which cannot justly be
ignored. The past cannot always be erased by a
new judicial declaration. The effect of the
subsequent ruling as to invalidity may have to be
considered in various aspects-with respect to
particular relations, individual and corporate, and
particular conduct, private and official. Questions of
rights claimed to have become vested, of status, of
prior determinations deemed to have finality and
acted upon accordingly, of public policy in the light of
the nature both of the statute and of its previous
application, demand examination. These questions
are among the most difficult of those which have
engaged the attention of courts, state and federal,
and it is manifest from numerous decisions that an
all-inclusive statement of a principle of absolute
retroactive invalidity, cannot be justified.
There is then no basis for the respondents'
apprehension that the invalidation of the executive
order creating Balabagan would have the effect of
unsettling many an act done in reliance upon the
validity of the creation of that municipality.
(Municipality of Malabang vs. Benito, 27 SCRA 533)
The doctrine of "operative facts" applies to the
proceedings against the petitioners and their co-
accused before Military Commission No. 1. The
principle of absolute invalidity of the jurisdiction of
the military courts over civilians should not be
allowed to obliterate the "operative facts" that in the
particular case of the petitioners, the proceedings
were fair, that there were no serious violations of
their constitutional right to due process, and that the
jurisdiction of the military commission that heard and
decided the charges against them during the period
of martial law, had been affirmed by this Court
(Aquino vs. Military Commission No. 2, 63 SCRA
546) years before the Olaguer case arose and came
before us.
Because of these established operative facts, the
refiling of the information against the petitioners
would place them in double jeopardy, in hard fact if
not in constitutional logic.
The doctrine of double jeopardy protects the
accused from harassment by the strong arm of the
State:
The constitutional mandate is (thus) a rule of finality.
A single prosecution for any offense is all the law
allows. It protects an accused from harassment,
enables him to treat what had transpired as a closed
chapter in his life, either to exult in his freedom or to
be resigned to whatever penalty is imposed, and is a
bar to unnecessary litigation, in itself time-
consuming and expense-producing for the state as
well. It has been referred to as 'res judicata in prison
grey.' The ordeal of a criminal prosecution is inflicted
only once, not whenever it pleases the state to do
so. (Fernando, The Constitution of the Philippines,
2nd Ed., pp. 722-723.)
Furthermore, depriving the petitioners of the
protection of the judgment of acquittal rendered by
the military commission in their particular case by
retroactively divesting the military commission of the
jurisdiction it had exercised over them would amount
to an ex post facto law or ruling, again, in sharp
reality if not in strict constitutional theory. An ex-post
facto law or rule, is one which
1. makes criminal an act done before the
passage of the law and which was innocent when
done, and punishes such an act;
2. aggravates a crime, or makes it greater than
it was, when committed;
3. changes the punishment and inflicts a
greater punishment than the law annexed to the
crime when committed;
4. alters the legal rules of evidence, and
authorizes conviction upon less or different
testimony than the law required at the time of the
commission of the offense;
5. assuming to regulate civil rights and
remedies only, in effect imposes penalty or
deprivation of a right for something which when
done was lawful; and,
6. deprives a person accused of a crime of
some lawful protection to which he has become
entitled, such as the protection of a former
conviction or acquittal, or a proclamation of amnesty.
(In re: Kay Villegas Kami, Inc., 35 SCRA 428, 431)
Article IV, Section 22, of the 1987 Constitution
prohibits the enactment of an ex post facto law or bill
of attainder.
We need not discuss the petitioners' final argument
that the information against them is invalid because
there was no preliminary investigation, no finding of
probable cause by the investigating fiscal and no
prior approval of the information by the City Fiscal
before it was filed.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari and
prohibition is granted. Respondent State Prosecutor
and the Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 24, at Cagayan de Oro City, are hereby
ordered to discharge the petitioners from the
information in Criminal Case No. 88-825. The
temporary restraining order which we issued on
January 16, 1989 is hereby made permanent. No
costs.
SO ORDERED.
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-56741-42 April 15, 1988
AURORA MEJIA, petitioner,
vs.
HON. MANUEL PAMARAN, HON. ROMEO
ESCAREAL, HON. CONRADO MOLINA, Presiding
Justice and Associate Justices of the First Division
SANDIGANBAYAN, and PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.
Quiazon, De Guzman, Makalintal, Barot and
Natividad T. Perez for petitioner.
The Solicitor General for respondents.
GANCAYCO, J.:
This is a petition for review of the decision of the
SANDIGANBAYAN of April 23, 1981, the dispositive
part of which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as
follows:
1. In Criminal Case No. 1988, accused Aurora
Mejia y Rodriguez is hereby found guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of violation of paragraph (b),
Section 3 of Republic Act No. 3019 and is hereby
sentenced to an indeterminate imprisonment ranging
from FOUR (4) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY as
minimum to SEVEN (7) YEARS as maximum, to
suffer perpetual disqualification from public office
and to indemnify the victim Josefina Meimban the
sum of Pl,000.00 representing the money given to
her; and
2. In Criminal Case No. 1989, accused Aurora
Mejia y Rodriguez hereby found guilty beyond is and
reasonable doubt of violation of paragraph (b),
Section 3 of Republic Act No. 3019 and is hereby
sentenced to an indeterminate imprisonment ranging
from FOUR (4) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY as
minimum to SEVEN (7) YEARS as maximum, to
Buffer perpetual disqualification from public office
and to indemnify the victim Pilar Bautista the amount
of P500 representing the money given to her.
Accused is further ordered to pay the costs of these
proceedings.
In this petition, petitioner raises the following issues:
1. WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT
SANDIGANBAYAN IN TAKING COGNIZANCE OF
THE CASES AGAINST PETITIONER AND IN
EVENTUALLY CONVICTING HER, ACTED
WITHOUT JURISDICTION AND IN VIOLATION OF
THE GUARANTY OF DUE PROCESS OF LAW
CONSIDERING THAT IT HAS NEITHER BEEN
CREATED AS MANDATED BY THE
CONSTITUTION NOR CONSTITUTED AS
CONCEIVED BY THE DECREE FOR ITS
CREATION;
2. WHETHER OR NOT THE PROCEEDINGS
TAKEN BY RESPONDENT SANDIGANBAYAN IN
THE CASE AT BAR ARE VOID AB INITIO
CONSIDERING THAT THE DECREE CREATING IT
PROVIDE FOR THE PROCEDURES THAT
PARTAKES THE NATURE OF AN EX-POST
FACTO LAW AND SUCH PROCEDURES VIOLATE
THE GUARANTY TO EQUAL PROTECTION OF
THE LAW CONSIDERING THAT DIFFERENT AND
PREJUDICIAL METHOD OF APPEAL IS
PRESCRIBED;
3. WHETHER OR NOT PETITIONER MAY BE
CONVICTED OF AN OFFENSE NOT ALLEGED IN
THE INFORMATION AS WHEN THE PRETENDED
REQUEST AND RECEIPT OF MONEY FROM THE
COMPLAINING WITNESS WAS ALLEGEDLY IN
CONSIDERATION OF "THE EARLY SETTING OF
A MOTION TO WITHDRAW COMPROMISE
AGREEMENT AND A FAVORABLE RESOLUTION
THEREON "WHEN SAID COMPLAINANT WAS
NEVER A PARTY TO ANY COMPROMISE
AGREEMENT (Crim. Case No. 1988);
4. WHETHER OR NOT THE PETITIONER
MAY BE CONVICTED ON FATALLY DEFECTIVE
INFORMATION AS WHEN SAID INFORMATION
CHARGES THAT PETITIONER ALLEGEDLY
DEMANDED AND RECEIVED P500 AND THE
SANDIGANBAYAN MADE A FINDING THAT THE
AMOUNT WAS P1,000 Criminal Case 1988) AND
WHEN THE INFORMATION CHARGES THAT
PETITIONER ALLEGEDLY REQUESTED AND
RECEIVED P1,000 AND THE SANDIGANBAYAN
MADE A FINDING THAT THE AMOUNT WAS P500
(Crim Case No. 1989) (Annexes "B" and "C")
5. WHETHER OR NOT THERE IS
SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE ON RECORD TO
JUSTIFY THE VERDICT OF CONVICTION OF
PETITIONER CONSIDERING THAT THE
PROSECUTIONS EVIDENCE WAS MAINLY
HEARSAY AND THE MOTIVES OF COMMENT
COMPLAINANTS CLEARLY ESTABLISHED;
6. WHETHER OR NOT THE PETITIONER IN HER
CAPACITY AS BRANCH CLERK OF COURT
NTERVENES IN SETTING CASES FOR HEARING
AND FORMULATES RESOLUTIONS THEREON;
7. WHETHER OR NOT THE RESPONDENT
SANDIGANBAYAN COULD DISREGARD
ESTABLISHED RULES OF PROCEDURE, AS
WHEN IT ALLOWED THE RECALL OF
PETITIONER, AFTER EXHAUSTING CROSS-
EXAMINATION, AND SUBJECTED HER TO
ADDITIONAL CROSS-EXAMINATION ON
ALLEGED ATTEMPT ON PETITIONER'S PART TO
BRIBE PROSECUTOR CRISTINA PATERNO,
WHICH SHOULD HAVE BEEN PART OF THE
PROSECUTION'S EVIDENCE IN CHIEF.
The findings of facts of the respondent court are as
follows:
The instant prosecutions had their roots on six (6)
ejectment cases filed separately in the City Court of
Manila by Eusebio Lu against Feliciano F.
Endangan, Josefina Meimban, Teodorico Bontia,
Rolando Antillon, Jose Mabalot and Vicente
Villamor. All were decided by the City Court of
Manila against the defendants, all of whom appealed
in due time to the Court of First Instance of Manila
where the cases were raffled to Branch XXVI,
presided over b the Honorable Jose P. Alejandro,
docketed therein as follows: Civil Case No, L-22794
(Feliciano F. Endangan), Civil Case No. L-22795
(Josefina Meimban).
Civil Case No. L-22796 (Teodorico Bontia), Civil
Case No. L-22797 (Rolando Antillon), Civil Case No.
L-22798 (Jose Mabalot), Civil Cam No. L-22799
(Vicente Villamor), On August 12, 1979, five (5) of
the defendants-appellants, namely, Endangan (Case
No. L-22794), Bontia (Case No. L-22796, Antillon
(Case No. L-22797), Mabalot (Case No. L-22798)
and Villamor (Case No. L-22799) entered into a
compromise agreement with the plaintiff, Eusebio Lu
whereby the appellants individually received from
the appellee the sum of P5,000 in consideration of
which the appellants agreed to vacate the premises
in question and remove their houses therefrom
within sixty (60) days 3m the date of the execution of
the agreement, failing which the appellee shall have
the authority to demolish the appellant's houses with
costs thereof chargeable against them the
compromise agree went was-submitted to the court.
Josefina Meimban, the defendants-appellant-in
Case No. L-22795, did not join her co-defendants-
appellees in entering into the compromise
agreement (Exh. "A"). Up to that stage of the cases,
the counsel of record of the defendant-appellants
was Atty. S. G. Doron., On August 22, 1979, Atty.
Modesto R. Espano of the Citizens Legal Assistant
Office (CLAO), wrote Atty. Doron to inform him that
Mrs. Meimban has sought the assistance of the
CLAO regarding her case, and asked that the
records of the case be sent to Mm. (Exh. "F-l"). As a
consequence, Atty. Doron filed on August 30, 1979
his MOTION TO WITHDRAW APPEARANCE as
counsel for defendant-appellant Josefina Meimban
in Civil Case No. L-22795. (Exh. "F"). In short, while
the five (5) other defendants-appellants, Endangan,
Bontia, Antillon, Mabalot and Villamor, have decided
to settle with the plaintiff through compromise
agreement that they signed, Josefina Meimban
resolved to prosecute her appeal in her own case,
Civil Case No. L-22795. These backdrops are not
disputed.
What transpired while the cases were pending in the
Court of First Instance of Manila insofar as material
to the prosecutions at bar, are matters contested by
conflicting evidence of the prosecution and the
defense.
Josefina Meimban testified that she followed up her
case in Branch XVII of the Court of First Instance of
Manila and had occasion to talk to Danilo
Buenaventura of that Branch who told her that her
case was already submitted for decision. She sought
assistance from the CLAO where she was instructed
by Atty. Espano to find out the real status of the
case. She returned to the court sometime in July
1979 and that was when she first came to know Atty.
Aurora Mejia who told her that the case has not yet
been decided because there was still one party who
has not signed the compromise agreement prepared
by Atty. Doron. Atty. Mejia also remarked that she
was surprised why rich people were helping in that
case, like a certain Atty. Lu a brother of the plaintiff,
who has been approaching the presiding judge; and
then told her she would help them provided they
give Pl,000 each for a gift to the Judge, to which she
replied she would broach the matter to her
companions. From the court, she went to Atty.
Modesto Espano and told the lawyer the case was
not yet submitted. Atty. Espano instructed her to get
her papers from Atty. Doron, which she did.
Thereafter, she told Pilar Bautista, daughter of
defendant Jose Mabalot in Civil Case No. L-22798,
and Gloria Antonio, daughter of defendant Vicente
Villamor in Civil Case No. L-22799, about the help
offered by Atty. Mejia. The two said they would think
it over as they had already signed something. When
she went to the court to deposit her rentals Atty.
Mejia asked her if her companions were agreeable
to the suggestion and she replied she had already
told them and that they would consider the matter.
On August 22, 1979, Meimban and Atty. Espano
went to the City Hall and Atty. Espano filed his
formal appearance as counsel for Meimban in Civil
Case No. L-22795, Branch XXVI. On that Atty. Mejia
again mentioned to Meimban the gift she was asking
from the latter to be given to the Judge, and added
that if Meimban wanted to win the case and she
wanted her help, they have to give to the Judge
because she was the one making the decision. She
was not able to give any reply. She went home
without telling Atty. Espano what Atty. Mejia had told
her When she returned on August 30, 1979 to
deposit her rental, Atty. Mejia asked her why her
companions were not yet moving when they had a
chance of winning the case provided they returned
the money they received from the plaintiff under the
compromise agreement. She replied she would tell
them again. When she told Pilar Bautista and Gloria
Antonio about it, the two replied that if they could still
win their cases by returning the money, she
accompany them to Atty. Espano.
They saw Atty. Espano on October 26, 1979. After
knowing the purpose of their visit, Atty. Espano
agreed to help Bautista and Antonio and prepared a
MOTION TO WITHDRAW THE COMPROMISE E
AND TO FILE MEMORANDA (Exh."B") Bautista and
Antonio signed the motion for their fathers. The
three women Meimban Bautista and Antonio and
Atty. Espano proceeded to the City Hall and filed the
motion. From the court they went down to the
canteen at the mezzanine floor of the City Hall
where Atty. Espano left them to have some
documents xeroxed. Atty. Mejia followed them to the
canteen. This time Atty. Mejia told Bautista she
could help them provided they gave her P500 for
expenses. Bautista and Antonio just kept silent. Atty.
Espano returned to the canteen and rejoined them.
Atty. Mejia told Atty. Espano there was a chance of
winning the Meimban case. Before leaving them,
Atty. Mejia told her Meimban to take care of her
companions.
When she deposited her rentals on October 30,
1979, Atty. Mejia told her the Judge needed the
money right away. She promised to give Pl,000 on
November 20, 1979. From there she went to Atty.
Espano and told him about it. At Atty. Espano's
suggestion they agreed to meet in Branch XXVI at
10:00 a.m. on November 20 when the, would entrap
Atty. Mejia in the delivery of the money with the
assistance of her policeman friend assigned in the
office of the Mayor. She arrived in court with Sylvia
Dizon from whom she borrowed P500 to complete
the Pl,000 at about 11:00 a.m. but did not meet Atty.
Espano. At Atty. Mejia's instruction they waited for
about an hour Sylvia Dizon seated outside in the
corridor fronting the door of Atty. Mejia office. Atty.
Mejia asked her if she had brought the money, she
replied she had and gave the P1,000 to Atty. Mejia.
She and Sylvia Dizon then left and looked for Atty.
Espano in the different sala.8 of the court. Not
finding him, they went to his office. Atty. Espano got
mad upon knowing that she had given the money to
Atty. Mejia and told her not to give anymore.
December 7, 1979 was the date set for the hearing
of the MOTION TO WITHDRAW THE
COMPROMISE AND TO FILE MEMORANDA
(Motion in short) filed by Pilar Bautista and Gloria
Antonio in behalf of their father (Exh- "C"). Meimban
and Pilar Bautista went to Branch XXVI for that
hearing. Atty. Mejia told them to wait and that if an
oppositor to the Motion would appear, she would
accompany them to the sala of Judge Cui of Branch
XXV (the pair branch of Branch XXVI 1), where the
Motion would be heard since Judge Alejandro of
Branch XXVI was on leave. While they were waiting,
Atty. Mejia approached her Meimban and said no
oppositor might arrive, and asked her if Bautista had
brought one-half (1/2) of the P1,000.00. She asked
Bautista and the latter replied she did not have
anything as she thought it was Meimban who had
the money. In the meantime, Atty. Mejia left and told
her that if Bautista would have the money, just put it
in an envelope. Bautista borrowed P500 from her,
which was supposedly intended for the branch Clerk
of Court of Judge Cui. Bautista placed the money in
an envelope and the two of them, Bautista and
Meimban, went to Atty. Mejia's office. Bautista
handed the envelope containing the money to Atty.
Mejia who received it.
Pilar Bautista y Mabalot confirmed that her father,
Jose Mabalot, had received P5,000.00 from the
plaintiff in Civil Case No. L-22798 pursuant to the
compromise agreement that her father had signed;
that while they were waiting for their house to be
demolished Josefina Meimban told her they still had
hope of winning the case because she has been
frequenting Branch XXVI and talking with Atty. Mejia
who had promised to assist them; that Gloria
Antonio, the daughter of one of the other
defendants, Vicente Villamor, convinced her that
they try it; and that they asked Meimban to
accompany them to Atty. Espano of the CLAO on
October 26, 1979. She testified further that Atty.
Espano prepared the Motion at hers and Antonio's
request which they signed for their fathers (Exh.
"B"). With Atty. Espano, Meimban and Antonio, they
went to the court and Mod the motion with Atty.
Mejia. They proceeded to the canteen, and while
there Atty. Espano left to have some documents
xeroxed. Atty. Mejia arrived shortly after Atty.
Espano had left. Atty. Mejia told them if they wanted
the resolution of the Motion expedited they each
give Pl,000.00 for expenses. They did not say
anything. When Atty. Espano rejoined them, Atty.
Mejia commended him for his memorandum and
said it was well prepared and there was hope in the
case. Atty. Mejia then left and they went home after
Meimban paid their bill which they shared among
themselves. On December 6,1979, in the afternoon,
she and Meimban went to Branch XXVI to file a
motion for postponement of the hearing of the
Motion scheduled the next day, December 7,1979.
Atty. Mejia told them to come just the same on the
following day despite their motion for postponement.
So they did return on December 7, reaching the
court at about 8:30 a.m. Atty. Mejia told them to wait
because oppositors to the Motion might appear.
When no oppositor appeared, Atty. Mejia asked
them to give even one-half of the amount intended
for expenses because the case was with the a of
Judge Cui as Judge Alejandro was absent, and the
money was intended for the clerk of court of Judge
Cui. She asked Meimban if she had money with her
and it was from Meimban that she borrowed P500.
At Meimban's suggestion that they put the money in
an envelope, they secured one near the GSIS
building, put the P500 in it and returned to the office
of Atty. Mejia to whom she handed the envelope
containing the money. Atty. Mejia received the
envelope and placed it inside her desk drawer. A
few days later, she received a copy of an order
dated December 10, 1979 signed by Judge Cui
denying their Motion (Exh. "D"). She forthwith went
to Atty. Mejia and asked her what happened. Atty.
Mejia answered that she go to Meimban and get the
P500 because Meimban still lacked Pl,000, and that
she also tell Mrs. Meimban to see her (Atty. Mejia).
She went to Meimban and told her what Atty. Mejia
said. They went to Atty. Espano who told her not to
give anything.
Sylvia Dizon y Resurreccion confirmed that she
loaned P500 to Josefina Meimban and went with her
to the court on November 20, 1979 to verify if
Meimban really needed the money to give to Atty.
Mejia. She was seated at the corridor near the door
of Atty. Mejia's office which was partially open, and
she saw Meimban handed an envelope to Atty.
Mejia who put it inside her desk drawer.
Atty. Modesto Espano y Rodriguez was with the
lawyer assigned by the CLAO to assist Josefina
Meimban in her case. He was with Meimban on
August 22, 1979 when he filed his formal
appearance in the case pending before Branch XXVI
of the Court of First Instance. On the occasion, he
saw Atty. Mejia talk to Meimban. Later, on October
26, 1979, Meimban told him that Atty. Mejia was
demanding money and gift to be given to the
presiding judge of Branch XXVI, of the Judge and
that Atty. Mejia would reverse the decision of the
City Court in the appealed case. it was also on that
day, October 26, 1979, in his office at the CLAO that
he met Pilar Bautista and Gloria Antonio for the first
time accompanied by Meimban. Bautista and
Antonio were also seeking assistance from the
CLAO in their desire to withdraw a compromise
agreement that their fathers had signed and
submitted to the court for approval. From his
interview of Bautista and Antonio, he gathered that
Bautista's father, Jose Mabalot, and Antonio's father
Vicente Villamor, were defendants in the ejectment
cases filed by Eusebio Lu and that their fathers were
misled by one Endangan and Atty. Doron into
signing the agreement. When he asked the
whereabouts of their fathers he was told that Vicente
Villamor was in Cotabato and Jose Mabalot was an
octogenarian. He also gathered from Bautista and
Antonio that they had decided to withdraw the
compromise agreement because Atty. Mejia had told
them that they had a chance of winning the case by
having the decision of the lower court reversed if
they returned the P5,000 given by the plaintiff, as
she was the one preparing the decisions for Branch
XXVI. He prepared the Motion (Exh. "B") and had it
signed by Bautista for Jose Mabalot, and Antonio for
Vicente Villamor. That same afternoon of October
26, 1979, he filed the Motion in court with Meimban,
Bautista and Antonio. Meimban told him that Atty.
Mejia wanted to talk to her at the canteen. He and
his female companions went ahead to the canteen,
but he left them there to have some papers xeroxed
at the ground floor of the City Hall. When he
returned to the canteen, he saw Atty. Mejia talking to
his women companions. He joined them. Atty. Mejia
told him that they could win the Meimban case
because the decision of the lower court was against
Batas Pambansa Blg. 25, and advised him to file a
good memorandum. Atty. Mejia also mentioned that
there was a good chance of winning the Mabalot
and Villamor cases provided the P5,000 each
received by the defendants was returned. He did not
say anything since he had advised his clients
already not to give Atty. Mejia anything. After leaving
the canteen and while they were still at the ground
floor his clients told him that Atty. Mejia was
demanding money from them for expenses for the
Judge. He reiterated his advise to them not to give
any.
Testimony was also given regarding an alleged
attempt of Atty. Mejia to bribe the Tanodbayan
Investigator who investigated the complaints that led
to the filing of the instant cases. Christina Corall-
Paterna declared that she signed and submitted her
recommendation to prosecute the accused for
violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act
on the complaint of Josefina Meimban and Pilar
Bautista, and to drop the other complaints, on
August 27, 1980. On September 3, 1980, Atty. Mejia
came to her to inquire (nangumusta) She replied she
had already collated the evidence and submitted her
recommendation to Director Herrera. Atty. Mejia
then placed something on her table wrapped in pink
tissue paper and immediately stood up and left
without saying anything. She opened the wrapper
and found an intricate gold chain with a pendant
bearing an inscription of letter "C." Her initial reaction
was to return it but on second thought that she
needed somebody to witness the returning of the
jewelry, and it being almost 4:00 p.m. and Atty.
Mejia might not return to her office anymore, the
waited till next morning and asked one of their
employees, Dante Ramos, to return the gold chain
the first hour of September 4. Dante Ramos was
able to return it.
Under the first assigned error, petitioner contends
that respondent court acted without jurisdiction and
in violation of the guaranty of due process of law as
it has neither been created as mandated by the
Constitution nor constituted as conceived by the
decree for its creation. Petitioners stress that the
creation of the Sandiganbayan by Presidential
Decree No. 1606 is an arrogation by the President of
the power vested by the Constitution in the National
Assembly.
In the case of Nunez vs. Sandiganbayan 2 this Court
categorically ruled on the issue when it held:
It is to be made clear that the power of the then
President and Prime Minister Ferdinand E. Marcos
to create the Sandiganbayan in 1978 is not
challenged in this proceeding. While such
competence under the 1973 Constitution
contemplated that such an act should the National
Assembly the 1976 Amendments made clear come
from the National Assembly that he as incumbent
President" shall continue to exercise legislative
powers until martial law shall have been lifted. 3
Thus, there is an affirmation of the ruling of this
Court in Aquino Jr. v. Commission on Elections 4
decided in 1975. In the language of the ponente,
Justice Makasiar, it dissipated "all doubts as to the
legality of such lawmaking authority by the President
during the period of Martial Law, ... . 5 As the
opinion went on to state: "It is not a grant of authority
to legislate, but a recognition of such power as
already eating in favor of the incumbent President
during the period of Martial Law. 6
Under the second assigned error it is alleged that
the procedure provided for by the Sandiganbayan
are and hence all proceedings taken against
petitioner are void ab initio being investigation
violation of the Constitution.
It is further argued that only one stage of appeal is
available to the petitioner under PD No. 1606 which
effectively deprives her of the intermediate recourse
to the Court of Appeals and that in said appeal to
this Court only issues of law may be raised and
worse still the appeal has become a matter of
discretion rather than a matter of right. Petitioner
contends this is a denial of the equal protection of
the law.
Again, in Nuez 7 this Court effectively disposed of
this issue when it held:
2. Petitioner in memorandum invokes the
guarantee of equal protection in seeking to
Presidential Decree No. 1486. What does it signify?
To quote from J.M. Tuason & Co. v. Land Tenure
Administration. 8 The Ideal situation is for the law's
benefits to be available to all, that none be placed
outside the sphere of its coverage. Only thus could
chance and favor be excluded and the affairs of men
governed by that serene and impartial uniformity,
which is of the very essence of the Idea of law.9
There is recognition, however, in the opinion that
what in fact eats "cannot approximate the Ideal. Nor
is the law susceptible to the reproach that it does not
take into account the realities of the situation. The
constitutional guarantee then is not to be given a
meaning that disregards what is, what does in fact
exist. To assure that the general welfare be
promoted, which is the end of law, a regulatory
measure may cut into the rights to liberty and
property. Those adversely affected may under such
circumstances invoke the equal protection clause
only if they can show that the governmental act
assailed far from being inspired by the attainment of
the common weal was prompted by the spirit of
hostility, or at the very least, discrimination that finds
no support in reason. 10 Classification is thus not
ruled out, it being sufficient to quote from the Tuason
decision anew "that the laws operate equally and
uniformly on all persons under similar circumstances
or that all persons must be treated in the same
manner, the conditions not being different, both in
the privileges conferred and the liabilities imposed.
Favoritism and undue preference cannot be allowed.
For the principle is that equal protection and security
shall be given to every person under circumstances
which, if not Identical, are analogous. If law be
looked upon in terms of burden or charges, those
that fall within a class should be treated in the same
fashion, whatever restrictions cast on some in the
group equally binding on the rest. 11
3. The premise underlying petitioner's
contention on this point is set forth in his
memorandum that: 1. The Sandiganbayan
proceedings violates petitioner's right to equal
protection, because appeal as a matter of right
became minimized into a mere matter of discretion;
appeal likewise was shrunk and limited only to
questions of law, excluding a review of the facts and
trial evidence; and there is only one chance to
appeal conviction, by certiorari to the Supreme
Court, instead of the traditional two chances; while
all other estafa indicates are entitled to appeal as a
matter of right covering both law and facts and to
two appellate courts, i.e., first to the Court of
Appeals and thereafter to the Supreme Court. 12
That is hardly convincing, considering that the
classification satisfies the test announced by this
Court through Justice Laurel in People v. Vera 13
requiring that it must be based on substantial
distinctions which make real differences; it must be
germane to the purposes of the law; it must not be
limited to existing conditions only, and must apply
equally to each member of the class. 14 To repeat,
the Constitution specifically makes the urgency of
which cannot be denied, namely, dishonesty in the
public service. It follows that those who may
thereafter be tried by such court ought to have been
aware as far back as January 17, 1973, when the
present Constitution came into force, that a different
procedure for the accused therein, whether a private
citizen as petitioner is or a public official, is not
necessarily offensive to the equal protection clause
of the Constitution. Petitioner moreover, cannot be
unaware of the ruling of this Court in Co Chiong v.
Cuaderno, 15 a 1949 decision, that the general
guarantees of the Bill of rights included among
which are the due process of law and equal
protection clauses must "give way to [a] specific
provision, in that decision, one reserving to "Filipino
citizens of the operation of public services or utilities.
16 The scope of such a principle is not to be con
stricted, It is certainly broad enough to cover the
instant situation.
4. The contention that the challenged
Presidential Decree is contrary to the ex post facto
provision of the Constitution is similarly premised on
the allegation that "petitioner's right of appeal is
being diluted ordered efficacy wise ... 17 A more
searching scrutiny of its rationale would demonstrate
the lack of persuasiveness of such an argument.
The Kay Villegas Kami 18 decision, promulgated in
1970, cited by petitioner, supplies the most recent
and binding pronouncement on the matter. To quote
from the ponencia of Justice Makasiar: An ex post
facto law is one which: (1) makes criminal an act
done before the passage of the law and which was
innocent when done, and punishes such an act; (2)
aggravates a crime, or makes it greater than it was,
when committed; (3) changes the punishment and
inflicts a greater punishment than the law annexed
to the crime when committed; (4) alters the legal
rules of evidence, and authorizes conviction upon
less or different testimony than the law required at
the time of the commission of the offense; (5)
assuming to regulate civil rights and remedies only,
in effect imposes penalty or deprivation of a right for
something which when done was lawful, and (6)
deprives a person accused of a crime of some lawful
protection to which he has become entitled, such as
the protection of a former conviction or acquittal, or a
proclamation of amnesty. 19 Even the most careful
scrutiny of the above definition fails to sustain the
claim of petitioner. The lawful protection to which an
accused" has become entitled" is qualified, not given
a broad scope. It hardly can be argued that the
mode of procedure provided for in the statutory right
to appeal is therein embraced. This is hardly a
controversial matter. This Court has spoken in no
uncertain terms. In People v. Vilo, 20 a 1949
decision, speaking through the then Justice, later
Chief Justice Paras, it made clear that seven of the
nine Justices there composing this Court, excepting
only the ponente himself and the late Justice
Perfecto, were of the opinion that Section 9 of the
Judiciary Act of 1948, doing away with the
requirement of unanimity under Article 47 of the
Revised Penal Code with eight votes sufficing for the
imposition of the death sentence, does not suffer
from any constitutional infirmity. For them its
applicability to crimes committed before its
enactment would not make the law ex post facto.
5. xxxx
9. The argument based on denial of due
process has much less to recommend it. In the
exhaustive forty-two page memorandum of
petitioner, only four and a half pages were devoted
to its discussion. There is the allegation of lack of
fairness. Much is made of what is characterized as
"the tenor and thrust" of the leading American
Supreme Court decision, Snyder v. Massachusetts.
21 Again this citation cuts both ways. With his usual
felicitous choice of words, Justice Cardozo, who
penned the opinion, emphasized: "The law, as we
have seen, is sedulous in maintaining for a
defendant charged with crime whatever forms of
procedure are of the essence of an opportunity to
defend. Privileges so fundamental as to be inherent
in very concept of a fair trial that could be acceptable
to the thought of reasonable men will be kept
inviolate and inviolable however, which may be the
pressure of incriminating proof. But justice, though
due to the accused, is due to the accuser also. The
concept of fairness must not be strained till it is
narrowed to a filament We are to keep the balance
true. 22 What is required for compliance with the
due process mandate in criminal proceedings? In
Arnault v. Pecson, 23 this Court with Justice Tuason
as ponente, succinctly Identified it with a "a fair and
impartial trial and reasonable opportunity for the
preparation of defense. 24 In criminal proceedings
then, due process is satisfied if the accused is
"informed as to why he is proceeded against and
what charge he hall to meet, with his conviction
being made to rest on evidence that is not tainted
with falsity after full opportunity for him to rebut it and
the sentence being implied in accordance with a
valid law. It is assumed, of course, that the court that
rendered the decision is one of competent
jurisdiction. 25 The above formulation is a reiteration
of what was decided by the American Supreme
Court in a case of Philippine origin, Ong Chang
Wing v. United States 26 decided during the period
of American rule, 1910 to be precise. Thus: This
court has had frequent occasion to consider the
requirements of due process of law as applied to
criminal procedure, and, generally speaking, it may
be said that if an accused has been heard in a court
of competent jurisdiction, and proceeded against
under the orderly processes of law, and only
punished after inquiry and investigation, upon notice
to him, with an opportunity to be heard, and a
judgment awarded within the authority of a
constitutional law, then he has had due process of
law. 27
Under the third assigned error it is alleged that the
information in Criminal Case No. 1988 states that
the pretended request and receipt of money by
petitioner from companions t witness Josefina
Meimban was in consideration of the early setting of
the hearing of the motion to withdraw the
compromise agreement and to secure a favorable
resolution thereof when in fact said complainant was
never a party to any compromise agreement so that
she could not be convicted of an offense not alleged
in the information.
Under the fourth arraigned error the petitioner
alleges that she cannot be convicted on the two
defective informations, the first of which (Crim. Case
1988) she allegedly demanded and received P
500.00 which the respondent court found to be
P1,000.00; and that in Criminal Case No. 1989 the
information charged that the petitioner requested
and received P l,000.00 while the respondent court
found that the amount received was P500.00 so
petitioner pleads she cannot be convicted on such
defective informations. Under both informations
petitioner is charged for violation of Section
enumerates the corrupt practices of any public
officer which are declared unlawful as among others
Sec. 3 (b). Directly or indirectly requesting or
receiving any gift, present, share, percentage, or
benefit, for himself or for any other person, in
connection with any contract or transaction between
the Government and any other party, wherein the
public officer in his official capacity has to intervene
under the law.
The elements of the offense are that
1. It must be committed by
1) a public officer;
2) who requested and who received a gift,
present, etc.;
3) the gift, present, etc. was for the benefit of
said public officer;
4) said public officer requested and/or received
the gift, present, etc. in connection with a contract or
transaction with the government; and
5) said officer has the right to intervene in such
contract or transaction in his/her official capacity
under the law.
The finding of the respondent court is that the
petitioner demanded and received money from the
persons involved in certain cases in Branch 26 of
the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Manila where the
petitioner was the branch clerk of court in
consideration of a promise that she will help in
getting them a favorable judgment. In the case of the
complainant Josefina Meimban although it is true
that she did not enter into an amicable agreement
regarding her case as erroneously alleged in the
information, nevertheless it has been shown, and as
it is also alleged in the information, that she yielded
to the request of petitioner for some money in
consideration of a promise that petitioner wig get a
favorable judgment. In a prosecution under the
foregoing provision of the Anti-Graft Law the value of
the gift, money or present, etc. is immaterial nor is it
determinative of the guilt or innocence of the
accused or the penalty to be imposed. What is
penalized is the receipt of any gift, present, share,
percentage, or benefit by a public officer in
connection with a contract or transaction with the
Government, wherein the public officer has to
intervene in his official capacity.
Under the fifth assigned error petitioner argues that
there was an ulterior motive on the part of the
complainants in testifying against her and that the
prosecution evidence is hearsay.
Petitioner therefore raises the question of credibility
of the witnesses. The rule is that the findings of facts
of the respondent court are conclusive unless there
are some facts or circumstances that may have
been overlooked that may otherwise affect the result
of the case. Petitioner has not successfully
demonstrated any cogent reason why this Court
should depart from this rule.
Petitioner imputes that Meimban and Bautista
testified against her as she refused to intercede in
their behalf with the judge to secure a favorable
action. The court is not persuaded. Contrary to her
pretension that prosecution witnesses were
inmotivated in testifying against her. The Court finds
that said complaining witnesses would not impute
the serious charges against petitioner were it not the
truth. Moreover, the testimony of said complaining
witnesses are corroborated by Atty. Modesto
Espano and Sylvia Dizon who are certainly
disinterested witnesses. The bare denial of petitioner
cannot prevail over such positive evidence of the
prosecution.
Under the sixth assigned error petitioner alleges that
she does not intervene in the setting of the hearing
of cases and she does not formulate resolutions
thereof. The branch clerk of court is the
administrative assistant of the presiding judge
whose duty is to assist in the management of the
calendar of the court and in all other matters not
involving the exercise of discretion or judgment of
the judge. It is this special relation of the petitioner
with the judge who presumably has reposed
confidence in her which appears to have been taken
advantage of by the petitioner in persuading the
complainants to give her money in consideration of a
promise to get a favorable resolution of their cases.
Under the seventh assigned error the recall of
petitioner for further cross-examination on her
attempt to bribe the Tanodbayan prosecutor is a
matter within the sound discretion of respondent
court. Indeed the testimony of said prosecutor that
petitioner tried to persuade her not to prosecute
petitioner by giving her a gold chain with pendant
wrapped in tissue paper which said prosecutor
returned is material evidence to establish the guilt of
petitioner.
After a careful review of the records of the case, the
Court finds and so holds that the guilt of the
petitioner of the offenses charged against her has
been established beyond reasonable doubt. She
took advantage of her position as branch clerk of
court by persuading the offended parties Josefina
Meimban and Pilar Bautista to deliver to her the
sums of P 1,000.00 and P500.00, respectively, in
consideration of a promise that petitioner WW get a
favorable resolution of their cases in court.
The evils of corruption are slowly corroding the
pillars of our society. Our courts are not spared by
this plague. More often than not those in
government who are persuaded or tempted if not
actively involved in graft and corruption are the court
personnel who lead litigants to believe that they
could get a favorable judgment or action in their
favor or are otherwise approached or persuaded to
so help for a consideration. Worse still there are
instances when the corruption reaches the level of
the judge which spells the doom of our quest for an
honest and impartial administration of justice.
Anyone involved in such corrupt exercise should be
denounced. This Court does not hesitate to apply
the scalpel to cut off the roots of this cancer in the
judicial system that can destroy the very purpose of
its existence.
Those who are involved in the administration of
justice from the highest to the lowest level must live
up to the strictest standard of honesty and integrity
in the public service. The general public should
respect and support such imperative. No attempt to
influence them one way or the other much less to
bribe them should be made. One cannot buy a bad
case nor sell a good one. No amount of money can
make out a good case out of a bad one. And even if
one succeeds in so doing it would certainly be
uncovered and reversed on appeal. Justice will
prevail.
This case should be an object lesson for those in the
public service. All that we need to do is to go back to
the too well known rule of conduct that honesty is
the best policy. Those who cannot live up to this
criterion should get out of the government service. It
is as simple as that.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review is DENIED for
lack of merit, with costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
EN BANC
G.R. No. 130487 June 19, 2000
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-
appellee,
vs.
ROBERTO ESTRADA, accused-appellant.
PUNO, J.:
This is an automatic review of the death penalty
imposed on accused-appellant by the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 44, Dagupan City in Criminal Case
No. 94-00860-D. 1 We nullify the proceedings in the
court a quo and remand the case for proper
disposition.
In an Information dated December 29, 1994,
accused-appellant Roberto Estrada y Lopez was
charged with the crime of murder for the killing of
one Rogelio P. Mararac, a security guard. The
Information reads:
That on or about the 27th day of December 1994 in
the City of Dagupan, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, ROBERTO ESTRADA Y LOPEZ,
being then armed with a butcher's knife, with intent
to kill one ROGELIO P. MARARAC with treachery
and committed in a holy place of worship, did then
and there, wilfully, unlawfully and criminally, attack,
assault and use personal violence upon the latter by
stabbing him, hitting him on vital parts of his body
with the said weapon, thereby causing his death
shortly thereafter due to "Cardiorespiratory Arrest,
Massive Intrathoracic Hemorrhage, Stab Wound" as
per Autopsy Report and Certificate of Death both
issued by Dr. Tomas G. Cornel, Assistant City
Health Officer, this City, to the damage and
prejudice of the legal heirs of said deceased
ROGELIO P. MARARAC in the amount of not less
than FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.00),
Philippine currency, and other consequential
damages.
Contrary to Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code.
Dagupan City, Philippines December 29, 1994. 2
At the arraignment on January 6, 1995, accused-
appellant's counsel, the Public Attorney's Office, filed
an "Urgent Motion to Suspend Arraignment and to
Commit Accused to Psychiatric Ward at Baguio
General Hospital." It was alleged that accused-
appellant could not properly and intelligently enter a
plea because he was suffering from a mental defect;
that before the commission of the crime, he was
confined at the psychiatric ward of the Baguio
General Hospital in Baguio City. He prayed for the
suspension of his arraignment and the issuance of
an order confining him at the said hospital. 3
The motion was opposed by the City Prosecutor.
The trial court, motu proprio, propounded several
questions on accused-appellant. Finding that the
questions were understood and answered by him
"intelligently," the court denied the motion that same
day. 4
The arraignment proceeded and a plea of not guilty
was entered by the court on accused-appellant's
behalf. 5
The prosecution presented four (4) witnesses,
namely: (1) Dr. Tomas Cornel, the Assistant Health
Officer of Dagupan City who issued the death
certificate and conducted the autopsy on the victim;
(2) Crisanto Santillan, an eyewitness to the incident;
(3) SPO1 Conrado Francisco, one of the policemen
who apprehended accused-appellant; and (4)
Rosalinda Sobremonte, the victim's sister. The
prosecution established the following facts:
In the morning of December 27, 1994, at the St.
John's Cathedral, Dagupan City, the sacrament of
confirmation was being performed by the Roman
Catholic Bishop of Dagupan City on the children of
Dagupan. The cathedral was filled with more than a
thousand people. At 11:00 A.M., nearing the close of
the rites, the Bishop went down the altar to give his
final blessing to the children in the front rows. While
the Bishop was giving his blessing, a man from the
crowd went up and walked towards the center of the
altar. He stopped beside the Bishop's chair, turned
around and, in full view of the Catholic faithful, sat
on the Bishop's chair. The man was accused-
appellant. Crisanto Santillan, who was assisting the
Bishop at the rites, saw accused-appellant. Santillan
approached accused-appellant and requested him to
vacate the Bishop's chair. Gripping the chair's
armrest, accused-appellant replied in Pangasinese:
"No matter what will happen, I will not move out!"
Hearing this, Santillan moved away. 6
Some of the churchgoers summoned Rogelio
Mararac, the security guard at the cathedral.
Mararac went near accused-appellant and told him
to vacate the Bishop's chair. Accused-appellant
stared intensely at the guard. Mararac grabbed his
nightstick and used it to tap accused-appellant's
hand on the armrest. Appellant did not budge.
Again, Mararac tapped the latter's hand. Still no
reaction. Mararac was about to strike again when
suddenly accused-appellant drew a knife from his
back, lunged at Mararac and stabbed him, hitting
him below his left throat. Mararac fell. Accused-
appellant went over the victim and tried to stab him
again but Mararac parried his thrust. Accused-
appellant looked up and around him. He got up,
went to the microphone and shouted: "Anggapuy
nayan dia!" (No one can beat me here!). He returned
to the Bishop's chair and sat on it again. Mararac,
wounded and bleeding, slowly dragged himself
down the altar. 7
Meanwhile, SPO1 Conrado Francisco, who was
directing traffic outside, received a report of a
commotion inside the cathedral. Rushing to the
cathedral, SPO1 Francisco saw a man, accused-
appellant, with red stains on his shirt and a knife in
one hand sitting on a chair at the center of the altar.
He ran to accused-appellant and advised him to
drop the knife. Accused-appellant obeyed. He
dropped the knife and raised his hands. Thereupon,
Chief Inspector Wendy Rosario, Deputy Police
Chief, Dagupan City, who was attending the
confirmation rites at the Cathedral, went near
accused-appellant to pick up the knife. Suddenly,
accused-appellant embraced Chief Inspector
Rosario and the two wrestled with each other. Chief
Inspector Rosario was able to subdue accused-
appellant. The police came and when they frisked
appellant, they found a leather scabbard tucked
around his waist. 8 He was brought to the police
station and placed in jail.
In the meantime, Mararac, the security guard, was
brought to the hospital where he expired a few
minutes upon arrival. He died of cardio-respiratory
arrest, massive, intra-thoracic hemorrhage, stab
wound." 9 He was found to have sustained two (2)
stab wounds: one just below the left throat and the
other on the left arm. The autopsy reported the
following findings:
EXTERNAL FINDINGS
1. Stab wound, along the parasternal line, level of
the 2nd intercostal space, left, 1 1/2" x 1 1/2"
penetrating. The edge of one side of the wound is
sharp and pointed.
2. Stab wound, antero-lateral aspect, distal 3rd, arm,
left, 1/2" x 1/4" x 1/2". The edge of one side of the
wound is sharp and pointed.
INTERNAL FINDINGS
Massive intrathoracic, left, hemorrhage with
perforation of the upper and lower lobe of the left
lung. The left pulmonary blood vessel was severely
cut. 10
After the prosecution rested its case, accused-
appellant, with leave of court, filed a "Demurrer to
Evidence." He claimed that the prosecution failed to
prove the crime of murder because there was no
evidence of the qualifying circumstance of treachery;
that there was unlawful aggression by the victim
when he tapped accused-appellant's hand with his
nightstick; and that accused-appellant did not have
sufficient ability to calculate his defensive acts
because he was of unsound mind. 11
The "Demurrer to Evidence" was opposed by the
public prosecutor. He alleged that the accused
"pretended to be weak, tame and of unsound mind;"
that after he made the first stab, he "furiously
continued stabbing and slashing the victim to finish
him off undeterred by the fact that he was in a holy
place where a religious ceremony was being
conducted;" and the plea of unsound mind had
already been ruled upon by the trial court in its order
of January 6, 1995. 12
On February 21, 1995, a letter was sent by Inspector
Wilfredo F. Valdez, Jail Warden of Dagupan City to
the trial court. Inspector Valdez requested the court
to allow accused-appellant, who was confined at the
city jail, to be treated at the Baguio General Hospital
to determine whether he should remain in jail or be
transferred to some other institution. The other
prisoners were allegedly not comfortable with
appellant because he had been exhibiting unusual
behavior. He tried to climb up the jail roof so he
could escape and see his family. 13
As ordered by the trial court, the public prosecutor
filed a Comment to the jail warden's letter. He
reiterated that the mental condition of accused-
appellant to stand trial had already been determined;
unless a competent government agency certifies
otherwise, the trial should proceed; and the city jail
warden was not the proper person to determine
whether accused-appellant was mentally ill or not.
14
In an order dated August 21, 1995, the trial court
denied the "Demurrer to Evidence". 15 Accused-
appellant moved for reconsideration.
While the motion for reconsideration was pending,
on February 26, 1996, counsel for accused-
appellant filed a "Motion to Confine Accused for
Physical, Mental and Psychiatric Examination."
Appellant's counsel informed the court that accused-
appellant had been exhibiting abnormal behavior for
the past weeks; he would shout at the top of his
voice and cause panic among the jail inmates and
personnel; that appellant had not been eating and
sleeping; that his co-inmates had been complaining
of not getting enough sleep for fear of being
attacked by him while asleep; that once, while they
were sleeping, appellant took out all his personal
effects and waste matter and burned them inside the
cell which again caused panic among the inmates.
Appellant's counsel prayed that his client be
confined at the National Center for Mental Health in
Manila or at the Baguio General Hospital. 16
Attached to the motion were two (2) letters. One,
dated February 19, 1996, was from Inspector
Pedrito Llopis, Jail Warden, Dagupan City,
addressed to the trial court judge informing him of
appellant's irrational behavior and seeking the
issuance of a court order for the immediate
psychiatric and mental examination of accused-
appellant. 17 The second letter, dated February 21,
1996, was addressed to Inspector Llopis from the
Bukang Liwayway Association, an association of
inmates in the Dagupan City Jail. The letter, signed
by the president, secretary and adviser of said
association, informed the jail warden of appellant's
unusual behavior and requested that immediate
action be taken against him to avoid future violent
incidents in the jail. 18
On September 18, 1996, the trial court denied
reconsideration of the order denying the "Demurrer
to Evidence." The court ordered accused-appellant
to present his evidence on October 15, 1996. 19
Accused-appellant did not take the witness stand.
Instead, his counsel presented the testimony of Dr.
Maria Soledad Gawidan, 20 a resident physician in
the Department of Psychiatry at the Baguio General
Hospital, and accused-appellant's medical and
clinical records at the said hospital. 21 Dr. Gawidan
testified that appellant had been confined at the
BGH from February 18, 1993 to February 22, 1993
and that he suffered from "Schizophrenic Psychosis,
Paranoid Typeschizophrenia, paranoid, chronic,
paranoid type;" 22 and after four (4) days of
confinement, he was discharged in improved
physical and mental condition. 23 The medical and
clinical records consisted of the following: (1) letter
of Dr. Alfredo Sy, Municipal Health Officer, Calasiao,
Pangasinan to Dr. Jesus del Prado, Director, BGH
referring accused-appellant for admission and
treatment after "a relapse of his violent behavior;" 24
(2) the clinical cover sheet of appellant at the BGH;
25 (3) the consent slip of appellant's wife voluntarily
entrusting appellant to the BGH; 26 (4) the Patient's
Record; 27 (5) the Consent for Discharge signed by
appellant's wife; 28 (6) the Summary and
Discharges of appellant; 29 (7) appellant's clinical
case history; 30 (8) the admitting notes; 31 (9)
Physician's Order Form; 32 (10) the Treatment
Form/medication sheet; 33 and (11) Nurses' Notes.
34
The trial court rendered a decision on June 23,
1997. It upheld the prosecution evidence and found
accused-appellant guilty of the crime charged and
thereby sentenced him to death, viz:
WHEREFORE, the court finds accused Roberto
Estrada y Lopez guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of Murder and in view of the presence of
the aggravating circumstance of cruelty which is not
offset by any mitigating circumstance, the accused is
sentenced to suffer the Death Penalty and to
indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the amount of
P50,000.00.1wphi1.nt
The accused is ordered to pay the sum of
P18,870.00 representing actual expenses and
P100,000.00 as moral damages.
SO ORDERED. 25
In this appeal, accused-appellant assigns the
following errors:
I
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FINDING
ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY OF THE CRIME
CHARGED, DESPITE CLEAR AND CONVINCING
EVIDENCE ON RECORD, SUPPORTING HIS
PLEA OF INSANITY.
II
THE LOWER COURT LIKEWISE ERRED IN
HOLDING THAT THE STABBING TO DEATH OF
ROGELIO MARARAC WAS ATTENDED WITH
TREACHERY AND AGGRAVATED BY CRUELTY,
GRANTING ARGUENDO THAT ACCUSED-
APPELLANT'S PLEA OF INSANITY CANNOT BE
CONSIDERED AN EXEMPTING CIRCUMSTANCE.
36
The basic principle in our criminal law is that a
person is criminally liable for a felony committed by
him. 37 Under the classical theory on which our
penal code is mainly based, the basis of criminal
liability is human free Will. 38 Man is essentially a
moral creature with an absolutely free will to choose
between good and evil. 39 When he commits a
felonious or criminal act (delito doloso), the act is
presumed to have been done voluntarily, 40 i.e.,
with freedom, intelligence and intent. 41 Man,
therefore, should be adjudged or held accountable
for wrongful acts so long as free will appears
unimpaired. 42
In the absence of evidence to the contrary, the law
presumes that every person is of sound mind 43 and
that all acts are voluntary. 44 The moral and legal
presumption under our law is that freedom and
intelligence constitute the normal condition of a
person. 45 This presumption, however, may be
overthrown by other factors; and one of these is
insanity which exempts the actor from criminal
liability. 46
The Revised Penal Code in Article 12 (1) provides:
Art. 12. Circumstances which exempt from criminal
liability. The following are exempt from criminal
liability:
1. An imbecile or an insane person, unless the latter
has acted during a lucid interval.
When the imbecile or an insane person has
committed an act which the law defines as a felony
(delito), the court shall order his confinement in one
of the hospitals or asylums established for persons
thus afflicted, which he shall not be permitted to
leave without first obtaining the permission of the
same court.
An insane person is exempt from criminal liability
unless he has acted during a lucid interval. If the
court therefore finds the accused insane when the
alleged crime was committed, he shall be acquitted
but the court shall order his confinement in a
hospital or asylum for treatment until he may be
released without danger. An acquittal of the accused
does not result in his outright release, but rather in a
verdict which is followed by commitment of the
accused to a mental institution. 47
In the eyes of the law, insanity exists when there is a
complete deprivation of intelligence in committing
the act. Mere abnormality of the mental faculties will
not exclude imputability. 48 The accused must be
"so insane as to be incapable of entertaining a
criminal intent." 49 He must be deprived of reason
and act without the least discernment because there
is a complete absence of the power to discern or a
total deprivation of freedom of the will. 50
Since the presumption is always in favor of sanity,
he who invokes insanity as an exempting
circumstance must prove it by clear and positive
evidence. 51 And the evidence on this point must
refer to the time preceding the act under prosecution
or to the very moment of its execution. 52
To ascertain a person's mental condition at the time
of the act, it is permissible to receive evidence of the
condition of his mind within a reasonable period both
before and after that time. 53 Direct testimony is not
required. 54 Neither are specific acts of
derangement essential to establish insanity as a
defense. 55 Circumstantial evidence, if clear and
convincing, suffices; for the unfathomable mind can
only be known by overt acts. A person's thoughts,
motives, and emotions may be evaluated only by
outward acts to determine whether these conform to
the practice of people of sound mind. 56
In the case at bar, there is no direct proof that
accused-appellant was afflicted with insanity at the
time he killed Mararac. The absence of direct proof,
nevertheless, does not entirely discount the
probability that appellant was not of sound mind at
that time. From the affidavit of Crisanto Santillan 57
attached to the Information, there are certain
circumstances that should have placed the trial court
on notice that appellant may not have been in full
possession of his mental faculties when he attacked
Mararac. It was highly unusual for a sane person to
go up to the altar and sit in the Bishop's chair while
the Bishop was administering the Holy Sacrament of
Confirmation to children in a jampacked cathedral. It
goes against normal and ordinary behavior for
appellant, without sufficient provocation from the
security guard, to stab the latter at the altar, during
sacramental rites and in front of all the Catholic
faithful to witness. Appellant did not flee, or at least
attempt to flee after the stabbing. He nonchalantly
approached the microphone and, over the public
address system, uttered words to the faithful which
the rational person would have been made. He then
returned to the Bishop's chair and sat there as if
nothing happened.
Accused-appellant's history of mental illness was
brought to the court's attention on the day of
arraignment. Counsel for accused-appellant moved
for suspension of the arraignment on the ground that
his client could not properly and intelligently enter a
plea due to his mental condition. The Motion for
Suspension is authorized under Section 12, Rule
116 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure which
provides:
Sec. 12. Suspension of arraignment. The
arraignment shall be suspended, if at the time
thereof:
(a) The accused appears to be suffering from an
unsound mental condition which effectively renders
him unable to fully understand the charge against
him and to plead intelligently thereto. In such case,
the court shall order his mental examination and, if
necessary, his confinement for such purpose.
(b) x x x xxx xxx
The arraignment of an accused shall be suspended
if at the time thereof he appears to be suffering from
an unsound mental condition of such nature as to
render him unable to fully understand the charge
against him and to plead intelligently thereto. Under
these circumstances, the court must suspend the
proceedings and order the mental examination of
the accused, and if confinement be necessary for
examination, order such confinement and
examination. If the accused is not in full possession
of his mental faculties at the time he is informed at
the arraignment of the nature and cause of the
accusation against him, the process is itself a felo de
se, for he can neither comprehend the full import of
the charge nor can he give an intelligent plea
thereto. 58
The question of suspending the arraignment lies
within the discretion of the trial court. 59 And the test
to determine whether the proceedings will be
suspended depends on the question of whether the
accused, even with the assistance of counsel, would
have a fair trial. This rule was laid down as early as
1917, thus:
In passing on the question of the propriety of
suspending the proceedings against an accused
person on the ground of present insanity, the judges
should bear in mind that not every aberration of the
mind or exhibition of mental deficiency is sufficient to
justify such suspension. The test is to be found in
the question whether the accused would have a fair
trial, with the assistance which the law secures or
gives; and it is obvious that under a system of
procedure like ours where every accused person
has legal counsel, it is not necessary to be so
particular as it used to be in England where the
accused had no advocate but himself. 60
In the American jurisdiction, the issue of the
accused's "present insanity" or insanity at the time of
the court proceedings is separate and distinct from
his criminal responsibility at the time of commission
of the act. The defense of insanity in a criminal trial
concerns the defendant's mental condition at the
time of the crime's commission. "Present insanity" is
commonly referred to as "competency to stand trial"
61 and relates to the appropriateness of conducting
the criminal proceeding in light of the defendant's
present inability to participate meaningfully and
effectively. 62 In competency cases, the accused
may have been sane or insane during the
commission of the offense which relates to a
determination of his guilt. However, if he is found
incompetent to stand trial, the trial is simply
postponed until such time as he may be found
competent. Incompetency to stand trial is not a
defense; it merely postpones the trial. 63
In determining a defendant's competency to stand
trial, the test is whether he has the capacity to
comprehend his position, understand the nature and
object of the proceedings against him, to conduct his
defense in a rational manner, and to cooperate,
communicate with, and assist his counsel to the end
that any available defense may be interposed. 64
This test is prescribed by state law but it exists
generally as a statutory recognition of the rule at
common law. 65 Thus:
[I]f is not enough for the . . . judge to find that the
defendant [is] oriented to time and place, and [has]
some recollection of events, but that the test must
be whether he has sufficient present ability to
consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of
rational understandingand whether he has a
rational as well as factual understanding of the
proceedings against him. 66
There are two distinct matters to be determined
under this test: (1) whether the defendant is
sufficiently coherent to provide his counsel with
information necessary or relevant to constructing a
defense; and (2) whether he is able to comprehend
the significance of the trial and his relation to it. 67
The first requisite is the relation between the
defendant and his counsel such that the defendant
must be able to confer coherently with his counsel.
The second is the relation of the defendant vis-a-vis
the court proceedings, i.e., that he must have a
rational as well as a factual understanding of the
proceedings. 68
The rule barring trial or sentence of an insane
person is for the protection of the accused, rather
than of the public. 69 It has been held that it is
inhuman to require an accused disabled by act of
God to make a just defense for his life or liberty. 70
To put a legally incompetent person on trial or to
convict and sentence him is a violation of the
constitutional rights to a fair trial 71 and due process
of law; 72 and this has several reasons underlying it.
73 For one, the accuracy of the proceedings may
not be assured, as an incompetent defendant who
cannot comprehend the proceedings may not
appreciate what information is relevant to the proof
of his innocence. Moreover, he is not in a position to
exercise many of the rights afforded a defendant in a
criminal case, e.g., the right to effectively consult
with counsel, the right to testify in his own behalf,
and the right to confront opposing witnesses, which
rights are safeguards for the accuracy of the trial
result. Second, the fairness of the proceedings may
be questioned, as there are certain basic decisions
in the course of a criminal proceeding which a
defendant is expected to make for himself, and one
of these is his plea. Third, the dignity of the
proceedings may be disrupted, for an incompetent
defendant is likely to conduct himself in the
courtroom in a manner which may destroy the
decorum of the court. Even if the defendant remains
passive, his lack of comprehension fundamentally
impairs the functioning of the trial process. A criminal
proceeding is essentially an adversarial proceeding.
If the defendant is not a conscious and intelligent
participant, the adjudication loses its character as a
reasoned interaction between an individual and his
community and becomes an invective against an
insensible object. Fourth, it is important that the
defendant knows why he is being punished, a
comprehension which is greatly dependent upon his
understanding of what occurs at trial. An
incompetent defendant may not realize the moral
reprehensibility of his conduct. The societal goal of
institutionalized retribution may be frustrated when
the force of the state is brought to bear against one
who cannot comprehend its significance. 74
The determination of whether a sanity investigation
or hearing should be ordered rests generally in the
discretion of the trial court. 75 Mere allegation of
insanity is insufficient. There must be evidence or
circumstances that raise a "reasonable doubt" 76 or
a "bona fide doubt" 77 as to defendant's
competence to stand trial. Among the factors a
judge may consider is evidence of the defendant's
irrational behavior, history of mental illness or
behavioral abnormalities, previous confinement for
mental disturbance, demeanor of the defendant, and
psychiatric or even lay testimony bearing on the
issue of competency in a particular case. 78
In the case at bar, when accused-appellant moved
for suspension of the arraignment on the ground of
accused's mental condition, the trial court denied the
motion after finding that the questions propounded
on appellant were intelligently answered by him. The
court declared:
xxx xxx xxx
It should be noted that when this case was called,
the Presiding Judge asked questions on the
accused, and he (accused) answered intelligently.
As a matter of fact, when asked where he was born,
he answered, in Tayug.
The accused could answer intelligently. He could
understand the questions asked of him.
WHEREFORE, for lack of merit, the Urgent Motion
to Suspend Arraignment and to Commit Accused to
Psychiatric Ward at Baguio General Hospital, is
hereby DENIED.
SO ORDERED. 79
The fact that accused-appellant was able to answer
the questions asked by the trial court is not
conclusive evidence that he was competent enough
to stand trial and assist in his defense. Section 12,
Rule 116 speaks of an unsound mental condition
that "effectively renders [the accused] unable to fully
understand the charge against him and to plead
intelligently thereto." It is not clear whether accused-
appellant was of such sound mind as to fully
understand the charge against him. It is also not
certain whether his plea was made intelligently. The
plea of "not guilty" was not made by accused-
appellant but by the trial court "because of his
refusal to plead." 80
The trial court took it solely upon itself to determine
the sanity of accused-appellant. The trial judge is not
a psychiatrist or psychologist or some other expert
equipped with the specialized knowledge of
determining the state of a person's mental health. To
determine the accused-appellants competency to
stand trial, the court, in the instant case, should have
at least ordered the examination of accused-
appellant, especially in the light of the latter's history
of mental illness.
If the medical history was not enough to create a
reasonable doubt in the judge's mind of accused-
appellants competency to stand trial, subsequent
events should have done so. One month after the
prosecution rested its case, the Jail Warden of
Dagupan City wrote the trial judge informing him of
accused-appellant's unusual behavior and
requesting that he be examined at the hospital to
determine whether he should remain in jail or be
placed in some other institution. The trial judge
ignored this letter. One year later, accused-
appellant's counsel filed a "Motion to Confine
Accused for Physical, Mental and Psychiatric
Examination." Attached to this motion was a second
letter by the new Jail Warden of Dagupan City
accompanied by a letter-complaint of the members
of the Bukang Liwayway Association of the city jail.
Despite the two (2) attached letters, 81 the judge
ignored the "Motion to Confine Accused for Physical,
Mental and Psychiatric Examination." The records
are barren of any order disposing of the said motion.
The trial court instead ordered accused-appellant to
present his evidence. 82
Dr. Gawidan, testified that the illness of accused-
appellant, i.e., schizophrenia, paranoid type, is a
"lifetime illness" and that this requires maintenance
medication to avoid relapses. 83 After accused-
appellant was discharged on February 22, 1993, he
never returned to the hospital, not even for a check-
up. 84
Accused-appellant did not take the witness stand.
His counsel manifested that accused-appellant was
waiving the right to testify in his own behalf because
he was "suffering from mental illness." 85 This
manifestation was made in open court more than
two (2) years after the crime, and still, the claim of
mental illness was ignored by the trial court. And
despite all the overwhelming indications of accused-
appellant's state of mind, the judge persisted in his
personal assessment and never even considered
subjecting accused-appellant to a medical
examination. To top it all, the judge found appellant
guilty and sentenced him to death!
Sec. 12, Rule 116 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal
Procedure speaks of a "mental examination." 86 The
human mind is an entity, and understanding it is not
purely an intellectual process but depends to a large
degree upon emotional and psychological
appreciation. 87 Thus, an intelligent determination of
an accused's capacity for rational understanding
ought to rest on a deeper and more comprehensive
diagnosis of his mental condition than laymen can
make through observation of his overt behavior.
Once a medical or psychiatric diagnosis is made,
then can the legal question of incompetency be
determined by the trial court. By this time, the
accused's abilities may be measured against the
specific demands a trial will make upon him. 88
If the mental examination on accused-appellant had
been promptly and properly made, it may have
served a dual purpose 89 by determining both his
competency to stand trial and his sanity at the time
of the offense. In some Philippine cases, the medical
and clinical findings of insanity made immediately
after the commission of the crime served as one of
the bases for the acquittal of the accused. 90 The
crime in the instant case was committed way back in
December 1994, almost six (6) years ago. At this
late hour, a medical finding alone may make it
impossible for us to evaluate appellant's mental
condition at the time of the crime's commission for
him to avail of the exempting circumstance of
insanity. 91 Nonetheless, under the present
circumstances, accused-appellant's competence to
stand trial must be properly ascertained to enable
him to participate, in his trial meaningfully.
By depriving appellant of a mental examination, the
trial court effectively deprived appellant of a fair
trial.1awphil The trial court's negligence was a
violation of the basic requirements of due process;
and for this reason, the proceedings before the said
court must be nullified. In People v. Serafica, 92 we
ordered that the joint decision of the trial court be
vacated and the cases remanded to the court a quo
for proper proceeding. The accused, who was
charged with two (2) counts of murder and one (1)
count of frustrated murder, entered a plea of "guilty"
to all three charges and was sentenced to death. We
found that the accused's plea was not an
unconditional admission of guilt because he was
"not in full possession of his mental faculties when
he killed the victim;" and thereby ordered that he be
subjected to the necessary medical examination to
determine his degree of insanity at the time of
commission of the crime. 93
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the decision of the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 44, Dagupan City in Criminal
Case No. 94-00860-D convicting accused-appellant
Roberto Estrada and sentencing him to death is
vacated and the case is remanded to the court a quo
for the conduct of a proper mental examination on
accused-appellant, a determination of his
competency to stand trial, and for further
proceedings.1wphi1.nt
SO ORDERED.
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-46496 February 27, 1940
ANG TIBAY, represented by TORIBIO TEODORO,
manager and propietor, and
NATIONAL WORKERS BROTHERHOOD,
petitioners,
vs.
THE COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS and
NATIONAL LABOR UNION, INC., respondents.
Office of the Solicitor-General Ozaeta and Assistant
Attorney Barcelona for the Court of Industrial
Relations.
Antonio D. Paguia for National Labor Unon.
Claro M. Recto for petitioner "Ang Tibay".
Jose M. Casal for National Workers' Brotherhood.
LAUREL, J.:
The Solicitor-General in behalf of the respondent
Court of Industrial Relations in the above-entitled
case has filed a motion for reconsideration and
moves that, for the reasons stated in his motion, we
reconsider the following legal conclusions of the
majority opinion of this Court:
1. Que un contrato de trabajo, asi individual como
colectivo, sin termino fijo de duracion o que no sea
para una determinada, termina o bien por voluntad
de cualquiera de las partes o cada vez que ilega el
plazo fijado para el pago de los salarios segun
costumbre en la localidad o cunado se termine la
obra;
2. Que los obreros de una empresa fabril, que han
celebrado contrato, ya individual ya colectivamente,
con ell, sin tiempo fijo, y que se han visto obligados
a cesar en sus tarbajos por haberse declarando
paro forzoso en la fabrica en la cual tarbajan, dejan
de ser empleados u obreros de la misma;
3. Que un patrono o sociedad que ha celebrado un
contrato colectivo de trabajo con sus osbreros sin
tiempo fijo de duracion y sin ser para una obra
determiminada y que se niega a readmitir a dichos
obreros que cesaron como consecuencia de un paro
forzoso, no es culpable de practica injusta in incurre
en la sancion penal del articulo 5 de la Ley No. 213
del Commonwealth, aunque su negativa a readmitir
se deba a que dichos obreros pertenecen a un
determinado organismo obrero, puesto que tales ya
han dejado deser empleados suyos por terminacion
del contrato en virtud del paro.
The respondent National Labor Union, Inc., on the
other hand, prays for the vacation of the judgement
rendered by the majority of this Court and the
remanding of the case to the Court of Industrial
Relations for a new trial, and avers:
1. That Toribio Teodoro's claim that on September
26, 1938, there was shortage of leather soles in
ANG TIBAY making it necessary for him to
temporarily lay off the members of the National
Labor Union Inc., is entirely false and unsupported
by the records of the Bureau of Customs and the
Books of Accounts of native dealers in leather.
2. That the supposed lack of leather materials
claimed by Toribio Teodoro was but a scheme to
systematically prevent the forfeiture of this bond
despite the breach of his CONTRACT with the
Philippine Army.
3. That Toribio Teodoro's letter to the Philippine
Army dated September 29, 1938, (re supposed
delay of leather soles from the States) was but a
scheme to systematically prevent the forfeiture of
this bond despite the breach of his CONTRACT with
the Philippine Army.
4. That the National Worker's Brotherhood of ANG
TIBAY is a company or employer union dominated
by Toribio Teodoro, the existence and functions of
which are illegal. (281 U.S., 548, petitioner's printed
memorandum, p. 25.)
5. That in the exercise by the laborers of their rights
to collective bargaining, majority rule and elective
representation are highly essential and
indispensable. (Sections 2 and 5, Commonwealth
Act No. 213.)
6. That the century provisions of the Civil Code
which had been (the) principal source of dissensions
and continuous civil war in Spain cannot and should
not be made applicable in interpreting and applying
the salutary provisions of a modern labor legislation
of American origin where the industrial peace has
always been the rule.
7. That the employer Toribio Teodoro was guilty of
unfair labor practice for discriminating against the
National Labor Union, Inc., and unjustly favoring the
National Workers' Brotherhood.
8. That the exhibits hereto attached are so
inaccessible to the respondents that even with the
exercise of due diligence they could not be expected
to have obtained them and offered as evidence in
the Court of Industrial Relations.
9. That the attached documents and exhibits are of
such far-reaching importance and effect that their
admission would necessarily mean the modification
and reversal of the judgment rendered herein.
The petitioner, Ang Tibay, has filed an opposition
both to the motion for reconsideration of the
respondent National Labor Union, Inc.
In view of the conclusion reached by us and to be
herein after stead with reference to the motion for a
new trial of the respondent National Labor Union,
Inc., we are of the opinion that it is not necessary to
pass upon the motion for reconsideration of the
Solicitor-General. We shall proceed to dispose of the
motion for new trial of the respondent labor union.
Before doing this, however, we deem it necessary,
in the interest of orderly procedure in cases of this
nature, in interest of orderly procedure in cases of
this nature, to make several observations regarding
the nature of the powers of the Court of Industrial
Relations and emphasize certain guiding principles
which should be observed in the trial of cases
brought before it. We have re-examined the entire
record of the proceedings had before the Court of
Industrial Relations in this case, and we have found
no substantial evidence that the exclusion of the 89
laborers here was due to their union affiliation or
activity. The whole transcript taken contains what
transpired during the hearing and is more of a record
of contradictory and conflicting statements of
opposing counsel, with sporadic conclusion drawn to
suit their own views. It is evident that these
statements and expressions of views of counsel
have no evidentiary value.
The Court of Industrial Relations is a special court
whose functions are specifically stated in the law of
its creation (Commonwealth Act No. 103). It is more
an administrative than a part of the integrated
judicial system of the nation. It is not intended to be
a mere receptive organ of the Government. Unlike a
court of justice which is essentially passive, acting
only when its jurisdiction is invoked and deciding
only cases that are presented to it by the parties
litigant, the function of the Court of Industrial
Relations, as will appear from perusal of its organic
law, is more active, affirmative and dynamic. It not
only exercises judicial or quasi-judicial functions in
the determination of disputes between employers
and employees but its functions in the determination
of disputes between employers and employees but
its functions are far more comprehensive and
expensive. It has jurisdiction over the entire
Philippines, to consider, investigate, decide, and
settle any question, matter controversy or dispute
arising between, and/or affecting employers and
employees or laborers, and regulate the relations
between them, subject to, and in accordance with,
the provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 103
(section 1). It shall take cognizance or purposes of
prevention, arbitration, decision and settlement, of
any industrial or agricultural dispute causing or likely
to cause a strike or lockout, arising from differences
as regards wages, shares or compensation, hours of
labor or conditions of tenancy or employment,
between landlords and tenants or farm-laborers,
provided that the number of employees, laborers or
tenants of farm-laborers involved exceeds thirty, and
such industrial or agricultural dispute is submitted to
the Court by the Secretary of Labor or by any or
both of the parties to the controversy and certified by
the Secretary of labor as existing and proper to be
by the Secretary of Labor as existing and proper to
be dealth with by the Court for the sake of public
interest. (Section 4, ibid.) It shall, before hearing the
dispute and in the course of such hearing, endeavor
to reconcile the parties and induce them to settle the
dispute by amicable agreement. (Paragraph 2,
section 4, ibid.) When directed by the President of
the Philippines, it shall investigate and study all
industries established in a designated locality, with a
view to determinating the necessity and fairness of
fixing and adopting for such industry or locality a
minimum wage or share of laborers or tenants, or a
maximum "canon" or rental to be paid by the
"inquilinos" or tenants or less to landowners.
(Section 5, ibid.) In fine, it may appeal to voluntary
arbitration in the settlement of industrial disputes;
may employ mediation or conciliation for that
purpose, or recur to the more effective system of
official investigation and compulsory arbitration in
order to determine specific controversies between
labor and capital industry and in agriculture. There is
in reality here a mingling of executive and judicial
functions, which is a departure from the rigid
doctrine of the separation of governmental powers.
In the case of Goseco vs. Court of Industrial
Relations et al., G.R. No. 46673, promulgated
September 13, 1939, we had occasion to joint out
that the Court of Industrial Relations et al., G. R. No.
46673, promulgated September 13, 1939, we had
occasion to point out that the Court of Industrial
Relations is not narrowly constrained by technical
rules of procedure, and the Act requires it to "act
according to justice and equity and substantial
merits of the case, without regard to technicalities or
legal forms and shall not be bound by any
technicalities or legal forms and shall not be bound
by any technical rules of legal evidence but may
inform its mind in such manner as it may deem just
and equitable." (Section 20, Commonwealth Act No.
103.) It shall not be restricted to the specific relief
claimed or demands made by the parties to the
industrial or agricultural dispute, but may include in
the award, order or decision any matter or
determination which may be deemed necessary or
expedient for the purpose of settling the dispute or of
preventing further industrial or agricultural disputes.
(section 13, ibid.) And in the light of this legislative
policy, appeals to this Court have been especially
regulated by the rules recently promulgated by the
rules recently promulgated by this Court to carry into
the effect the avowed legislative purpose. The fact,
however, that the Court of Industrial Relations may
be said to be free from the rigidity of certain
procedural requirements does not mean that it can,
in justifiable cases before it, entirely ignore or
disregard the fundamental and essential
requirements of due process in trials and
investigations of an administrative character. There
are primary rights which must be respected even in
proceedings of this character:
(1) The first of these rights is the right to a hearing,
which includes the right of the party interested or
affected to present his own case and submit
evidence in support thereof. In the language of Chief
Hughes, in Morgan v. U.S., 304 U.S. 1, 58 S. Ct.
773, 999, 82 Law. ed. 1129, "the liberty and property
of the citizen shall be protected by the rudimentary
requirements of fair play.
(2) Not only must the party be given an opportunity
to present his case and to adduce evidence tending
to establish the rights which he asserts but the
tribunal must consider the evidence presented.
(Chief Justice Hughes in Morgan v. U.S. 298 U.S.
468, 56 S. Ct. 906, 80 law. ed. 1288.) In the
language of this court in Edwards vs. McCoy, 22
Phil., 598, "the right to adduce evidence, without the
corresponding duty on the part of the board to
consider it, is vain. Such right is conspicuously futile
if the person or persons to whom the evidence is
presented can thrust it aside without notice or
consideration."
(3) "While the duty to deliberate does not impose the
obligation to decide right, it does imply a necessity
which cannot be disregarded, namely, that of having
something to support it is a nullity, a place when
directly attached." (Edwards vs. McCoy, supra.) This
principle emanates from the more fundamental is
contrary to the vesting of unlimited power anywhere.
Law is both a grant and a limitation upon power.
(4) Not only must there be some evidence to support
a finding or conclusion (City of Manila vs. Agustin,
G.R. No. 45844, promulgated November 29, 1937,
XXXVI O. G. 1335), but the evidence must be
"substantial." (Washington, Virginia and Maryland
Coach Co. v. national labor Relations Board, 301
U.S. 142, 147, 57 S. Ct. 648, 650, 81 Law. ed. 965.)
It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable
mind accept as adequate to support a conclusion."
(Appalachian Electric Power v. National Labor
Relations Board, 4 Cir., 93 F. 2d 985, 989; National
Labor Relations Board v. Thompson Products, 6
Cir., 97 F. 2d 13, 15; Ballston-Stillwater Knitting Co.
v. National Labor Relations Board, 2 Cir., 98 F. 2d
758, 760.) . . . The statute provides that "the rules of
evidence prevailing in courts of law and equity shall
not be controlling.' The obvious purpose of this and
similar provisions is to free administrative boards
from the compulsion of technical rules so that the
mere admission of matter which would be deemed
incompetent inn judicial proceedings would not
invalidate the administrative order. (Interstate
Commerce Commission v. Baird, 194 U.S. 25, 44,
24 S. Ct. 563, 568, 48 Law. ed. 860; Interstate
Commerce Commission v. Louisville and Nashville
R. Co., 227 U.S. 88, 93 33 S. Ct. 185, 187, 57 Law.
ed. 431; United States v. Abilene and Southern Ry.
Co. S. Ct. 220, 225, 74 Law. ed. 624.) But this
assurance of a desirable flexibility in administrative
procedure does not go far as to justify orders without
a basis in evidence having rational probative force.
Mere uncorroborated hearsay or rumor does not
constitute substantial evidence. (Consolidated
Edison Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, 59 S.
Ct. 206, 83 Law. ed. No. 4, Adv. Op., p. 131.)"
(5) The decision must be rendered on the evidence
presented at the hearing, or at least contained in the
record and disclosed to the parties affected.
(Interstate Commence Commission vs. L. & N. R.
Co., 227 U.S. 88, 33 S. Ct. 185, 57 Law. ed. 431.)
Only by confining the administrative tribunal to the
evidence disclosed to the parties, can the latter be
protected in their right to know and meet the case
against them. It should not, however, detract from
their duty actively to see that the law is enforced,
and for that purpose, to use the authorized legal
methods of securing evidence and informing itself of
facts material and relevant to the controversy.
Boards of inquiry may be appointed for the purpose
of investigating and determining the facts in any
given case, but their report and decision are only
advisory. (Section 9, Commonwealth Act No. 103.)
The Court of Industrial Relations may refer any
industrial or agricultural dispute or any matter under
its consideration or advisement to a local board of
inquiry, a provincial fiscal. a justice of the peace or
any public official in any part of the Philippines for
investigation, report and recommendation, and may
delegate to such board or public official such powers
and functions as the said Court of Industrial
Relations may deem necessary, but such delegation
shall not affect the exercise of the Court itself of any
of its powers. (Section 10, ibid.)
(6) The Court of Industrial Relations or any of its
judges, therefore, must act on its or his own
independent consideration of the law and facts of
the controversy, and not simply accept the views of
a subordinate in arriving at a decision. It may be that
the volume of work is such that it is literally Relations
personally to decide all controversies coming before
them. In the United States the difficulty is solved with
the enactment of statutory authority authorizing
examiners or other subordinates to render final
decision, with the right to appeal to board or
commission, but in our case there is no such
statutory authority.
(7) The Court of Industrial Relations should, in all
controversial questions, render its decision in such a
manner that the parties to the proceeding can know
the various issues involved, and the reasons for the
decision rendered. The performance of this duty is
inseparable from the authority conferred upon it.
In the right of the foregoing fundamental principles, it
is sufficient to observe here that, except as to the
alleged agreement between the Ang Tibay and the
National Worker's Brotherhood (appendix A), the
record is barren and does not satisfy the thirst for a
factual basis upon which to predicate, in a national
way, a conclusion of law.
This result, however, does not now preclude the
concession of a new trial prayed for the by
respondent National Labor Union, Inc., it is alleged
that "the supposed lack of material claimed by
Toribio Teodoro was but a scheme adopted to
systematically discharged all the members of the
National Labor Union Inc., from work" and this
avernment is desired to be proved by the petitioner
with the "records of the Bureau of Customs and the
Books of Accounts of native dealers in leather"; that
"the National Workers Brotherhood Union of Ang
Tibay is a company or employer union dominated by
Toribio Teodoro, the existence and functions of
which are illegal." Petitioner further alleges under
oath that the exhibits attached to the petition to
prove his substantial avernments" are so
inaccessible to the respondents that even within the
exercise of due diligence they could not be expected
to have obtained them and offered as evidence in
the Court of Industrial Relations", and that the
documents attached to the petition "are of such far
reaching importance and effect that their admission
would necessarily mean the modification and
reversal of the judgment rendered herein." We have
considered the reply of Ang Tibay and its arguments
against the petition. By and large, after considerable
discussions, we have come to the conclusion that
the interest of justice would be better served if the
movant is given opportunity to present at the hearing
the documents referred to in his motion and such
other evidence as may be relevant to the main issue
involved. The legislation which created the Court of
Industrial Relations and under which it acts is new.
The failure to grasp the fundamental issue involved
is not entirely attributable to the parties adversely
affected by the result. Accordingly, the motion for a
new trial should be and the same is hereby granted,
and the entire record of this case shall be remanded
to the Court of Industrial Relations, with instruction
that it reopen the case, receive all such evidence as
may be relevant and otherwise proceed in
accordance with the requirements set forth
hereinabove. So ordered.
EN BANC
G.R. No. 148560 November 19, 2001
JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA, petitioner,
vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN (Third Division) and PEOPLE
OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
DECISION
BELLOSILLO, J.:
JOHN STUART MILL, in his essay On Liberty,
unleashes the full fury of his pen in defense of the
rights of the individual from the vast powers of the
State and the inroads of societal pressure. But even
as he draws a sacrosanct line demarcating the limits
on individuality beyond which the State cannot tread
- asserting that "individual spontaneity" must be
allowed to flourish with very little regard to social
interference - he veritably acknowledges that the
exercise of rights and liberties is imbued with a civic
obligation, which society is justified in enforcing at all
cost, against those who would endeavor to withhold
fulfillment. Thus he says -
The sole end for which mankind is warranted,
individually or collectively, in interfering with the
liberty of action of any of their number, is self-
protection. The only purpose for which power can be
rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized
community, against his will, is to prevent harm to
others.
Parallel to individual liberty is the natural and
illimitable right of the State to self-preservation. With
the end of maintaining the integrity and
cohesiveness of the body politic, it behooves the
State to formulate a system of laws that would
compel obeisance to its collective wisdom and inflict
punishment for non-observance.
The movement from Mill's individual liberalism to
unsystematic collectivism wrought changes in the
social order, carrying with it a new formulation of
fundamental rights and duties more attuned to the
imperatives of contemporary socio-political
ideologies. In the process, the web of rights and
State impositions became tangled and obscured,
enmeshed in threads of multiple shades and colors,
the skein irregular and broken. Antagonism, often
outright collision, between the law as the expression
of the will of the State, and the zealous attempts by
its members to preserve their individuality and
dignity, inevitably followed. It is when individual
rights are pitted against State authority that judicial
conscience is put to its severest test.
Petitioner Joseph Ejercito Estrada, the highest-
ranking official to be prosecuted under RA 7080 (An
Act Defining and Penalizing the Crime of Plunder),1
as amended by RA 7659,2 wishes to impress upon
us that the assailed law is so defectively fashioned
that it crosses that thin but distinct line which divides
the valid from the constitutionally infirm. He therefore
makes a stringent call for this Court to subject the
Plunder Law to the crucible of constitutionality
mainly because, according to him, (a) it suffers from
the vice of vagueness; (b) it dispenses with the
"reasonable doubt" standard in criminal
prosecutions; and, (c) it abolishes the element of
mens rea in crimes already punishable under The
Revised Penal Code, all of which are purportedly
clear violations of the fundamental rights of the
accused to due process and to be informed of the
nature and cause of the accusation against him.
Specifically, the provisions of the Plunder Law
claimed by petitioner to have transgressed
constitutional boundaries are Secs. 1, par. (d), 2 and
4 which are reproduced hereunder:
Section 1. x x x x (d) "Ill-gotten wealth" means any
asset, property, business, enterprise or material
possession of any person within the purview of
Section Two (2) hereof, acquired by him directly or
indirectly through dummies, nominees, agents,
subordinates and/or business associates by any
combination or series of the following means or
similar schemes:
(1) Through misappropriation, conversion, misuse,
or malversation of public funds or raids on the public
treasury;
(2) By receiving, directly or indirectly, any
commission, gift, share, percentage, kickbacks or
any other form of pecuniary benefit from any person
and/or entity in connection with any government
contract or project or by reason of the office or
position of the public office concerned;
(3) By the illegal or fraudulent conveyance or
disposition of assets belonging to the National
Government or any of its subdivisions, agencies or
instrumentalities, or government owned or controlled
corporations and their subsidiaries;
(4) By obtaining, receiving or accepting directly or
indirectly any shares of stock, equity or any other
form of interest or participation including the promise
of future employment in any business enterprise or
undertaking;
(5) By establishing agricultural, industrial or
commercial monopolies or other combinations
and/or implementation of decrees and orders
intended to benefit particular persons or special
interests; or
(6) By taking advantage of official position, authority,
relationship, connection or influence to unjustly
enrich himself or themselves at the expense and to
the damage and prejudice of the Filipino people and
the Republic of the Philippines.
Section 2. Definition of the Crime of Plunder,
Penalties. - Any public officer who, by himself or in
connivance with members of his family, relatives by
affinity or consanguinity, business associates,
subordinates or other persons, amasses,
accumulates or acquires ill-gotten wealth through a
combination or series of overt or criminal acts as
described in Section 1 (d) hereof, in the aggregate
amount or total value of at least fifty million pesos
(P50,000,000.00) shall be guilty of the crime of
plunder and shall be punished by reclusion perpetua
to death. Any person who participated with the said
public officer in the commission of an offense
contributing to the crime of plunder shall likewise be
punished for such offense. In the imposition of
penalties, the degree of participation and the
attendance of mitigating and extenuating
circumstances as provided by the Revised Penal
Code shall be considered by the court. The court
shall declare any and all ill-gotten wealth and their
interests and other incomes and assets including the
properties and shares of stocks derived from the
deposit or investment thereof forfeited in favor of the
State (underscoring supplied).
Section 4. Rule of Evidence. - For purposes of
establishing the crime of plunder, it shall not be
necessary to prove each and every criminal act
done by the accused in furtherance of the scheme or
conspiracy to amass, accumulate or acquire ill-
gotten wealth, it being sufficient to establish beyond
reasonable doubt a pattern of overt or criminal acts
indicative of the overall unlawful scheme or
conspiracy (underscoring supplied).
On 4 April 2001 the Office of the Ombudsman filed
before the Sandiganbayan eight (8) separate
Informations, docketed as: (a) Crim. Case No.
26558, for violation of RA 7080, as amended by RA
7659; (b) Crim. Cases Nos. 26559 to 26562,
inclusive, for violation of Secs. 3, par. (a), 3, par. (a),
3, par. (e) and 3, par. (e), of RA 3019 (Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act), respectively; (c) Crim. Case
No. 26563, for violation of Sec. 7, par. (d), of RA
6713 (The Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards
for Public Officials and Employees); (d) Crim. Case
No. 26564, for Perjury (Art. 183 of The Revised
Penal Code); and, (e) Crim. Case No. 26565, for
Illegal Use Of An Alias (CA No. 142, as amended by
RA 6085).
On 11 April 2001 petitioner filed an Omnibus Motion
for the remand of the case to the Ombudsman for
preliminary investigation with respect to specification
"d" of the charges in the Information in Crim. Case
No. 26558; and, for reconsideration/reinvestigation
of the offenses under specifications "a," "b," and "c"
to give the accused an opportunity to file counter-
affidavits and other documents necessary to prove
lack of probable cause. Noticeably, the grounds
raised were only lack of preliminary investigation,
reconsideration/reinvestigation of offenses, and
opportunity to prove lack of probable cause. The
purported ambiguity of the charges and the
vagueness of the law under which they are charged
were never raised in that Omnibus Motion thus
indicating the explicitness and comprehensibility of
the Plunder Law.
On 25 April 2001 the Sandiganbayan, Third Division,
issued a Resolution in Crim. Case No. 26558 finding
that "a probable cause for the offense of PLUNDER
exists to justify the issuance of warrants for the
arrest of the accused." On 25 June 2001 petitioner's
motion for reconsideration was denied by the
Sandiganbayan.
On 14 June 2001 petitioner moved to quash the
Information in Crim. Case No. 26558 on the ground
that the facts alleged therein did not constitute an
indictable offense since the law on which it was
based was unconstitutional for vagueness, and that
the Amended Information for Plunder charged more
than one (1) offense. On 21 June 2001 the
Government filed its Opposition to the Motion to
Quash, and five (5) days later or on 26 June 2001
petitioner submitted his Reply to the Opposition. On
9 July 2001 the Sandiganbayan denied petitioner's
Motion to Quash.
As concisely delineated by this Court during the oral
arguments on 18 September 2001, the issues for
resolution in the instant petition for certiorari are: (a)
The Plunder Law is unconstitutional for being vague;
(b) The Plunder Law requires less evidence for
proving the predicate crimes of plunder and
therefore violates the rights of the accused to due
process; and, (c) Whether Plunder as defined in RA
7080 is a malum prohibitum, and if so, whether it is
within the power of Congress to so classify it.
Preliminarily, the whole gamut of legal concepts
pertaining to the validity of legislation is predicated
on the basic principle that a legislative measure is
presumed to be in harmony with the Constitution.3
Courts invariably train their sights on this
fundamental rule whenever a legislative act is under
a constitutional attack, for it is the postulate of
constitutional adjudication. This strong predilection
for constitutionality takes its bearings on the idea
that it is forbidden for one branch of the government
to encroach upon the duties and powers of another.
Thus it has been said that the presumption is based
on the deference the judicial branch accords to its
coordinate branch - the legislature.
If there is any reasonable basis upon which the
legislation may firmly rest, the courts must assume
that the legislature is ever conscious of the borders
and edges of its plenary powers, and has passed
the law with full knowledge of the facts and for the
purpose of promoting what is right and advancing
the welfare of the majority. Hence in determining
whether the acts of the legislature are in tune with
the fundamental law, courts should proceed with
judicial restraint and act with caution and
forbearance. Every intendment of the law must be
adjudged by the courts in favor of its
constitutionality, invalidity being a measure of last
resort. In construing therefore the provisions of a
statute, courts must first ascertain whether an
interpretation is fairly possible to sidestep the
question of constitutionality.
In La Union Credit Cooperative, Inc. v. Yaranon4 we
held that as long as there is some basis for the
decision of the court, the constitutionality of the
challenged law will not be touched and the case will
be decided on other available grounds. Yet the force
of the presumption is not sufficient to catapult a
fundamentally deficient law into the safe environs of
constitutionality. Of course, where the law clearly
and palpably transgresses the hallowed domain of
the organic law, it must be struck down on sight lest
the positive commands of the fundamental law be
unduly eroded.
Verily, the onerous task of rebutting the presumption
weighs heavily on the party challenging the validity
of the statute. He must demonstrate beyond any
tinge of doubt that there is indeed an infringement of
the constitution, for absent such a showing, there
can be no finding of unconstitutionality. A doubt,
even if well-founded, will hardly suffice. As tersely
put by Justice Malcolm, "To doubt is to sustain."5
And petitioner has miserably failed in the instant
case to discharge his burden and overcome the
presumption of constitutionality of the Plunder Law.
As it is written, the Plunder Law contains
ascertainable standards and well-defined
parameters which would enable the accused to
determine the nature of his violation. Section 2 is
sufficiently explicit in its description of the acts,
conduct and conditions required or forbidden, and
prescribes the elements of the crime with
reasonable certainty and particularity. Thus -
1. That the offender is a public officer who acts by
himself or in connivance with members of his family,
relatives by affinity or consanguinity, business
associates, subordinates or other persons;
2. That he amassed, accumulated or acquired ill-
gotten wealth through a combination or series of the
following overt or criminal acts: (a) through
misappropriation, conversion, misuse, or
malversation of public funds or raids on the public
treasury; (b) by receiving, directly or indirectly, any
commission, gift, share, percentage, kickback or any
other form of pecuniary benefits from any person
and/or entity in connection with any government
contract or project or by reason of the office or
position of the public officer; (c) by the illegal or
fraudulent conveyance or disposition of assets
belonging to the National Government or any of its
subdivisions, agencies or instrumentalities of
Government owned or controlled corporations or
their subsidiaries; (d) by obtaining, receiving or
accepting directly or indirectly any shares of stock,
equity or any other form of interest or participation
including the promise of future employment in any
business enterprise or undertaking; (e) by
establishing agricultural, industrial or commercial
monopolies or other combinations and/or
implementation of decrees and orders intended to
benefit particular persons or special interests; or (f)
by taking advantage of official position, authority,
relationship, connection or influence to unjustly
enrich himself or themselves at the expense and to
the damage and prejudice of the Filipino people and
the Republic of the Philippines; and,
3. That the aggregate amount or total value of the ill-
gotten wealth amassed, accumulated or acquired is
at least 50,000,000.00.
As long as the law affords some comprehensible
guide or rule that would inform those who are
subject to it what conduct would render them liable
to its penalties, its validity will be sustained. It must
sufficiently guide the judge in its application; the
counsel, in defending one charged with its violation;
and more importantly, the accused, in identifying the
realm of the proscribed conduct. Indeed, it can be
understood with little difficulty that what the assailed
statute punishes is the act of a public officer in
amassing or accumulating ill-gotten wealth of at
least 50,000,000.00 through a series or
combination of acts enumerated in Sec. 1, par. (d),
of the Plunder Law.
In fact, the amended Information itself closely tracks
the language of the law, indicating with reasonable
certainty the various elements of the offense which
petitioner is alleged to have committed:
"The undersigned Ombudsman, Prosecutor and
OIC-Director, EPIB, Office of the Ombudsman,
hereby accuses former PRESIDENT OF THE
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Joseph Ejercito
Estrada, a.k.a. 'ASIONG SALONGA' and a.k.a.
'JOSE VELARDE,' together with Jose 'Jinggoy'
Estrada, Charlie 'Atong' Ang, Edward Serapio,
Yolanda T. Ricaforte, Alma Alfaro, JOHN DOE a.k.a.
Eleuterio Tan OR Eleuterio Ramos Tan or Mr. Uy,
Jane Doe a.k.a. Delia Rajas, and John DOES &
Jane Does, of the crime of Plunder, defined and
penalized under R.A. No. 7080, as amended by Sec.
12 of R.A. No. 7659, committed as follows:
That during the period from June, 1998 to January
2001, in the Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, accused Joseph Ejercito
Estrada, THEN A PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC
OF THE PHILIPPINES, by himself AND/OR in
CONNIVANCE/CONSPIRACY with his co-accused,
WHO ARE MEMBERS OF HIS FAMILY,
RELATIVES BY AFFINITY OR CONSANGUINITY,
BUSINESS ASSOCIATES, SUBORDINATES
AND/OR OTHER PERSONS, BY TAKING UNDUE
ADVANTAGE OF HIS OFFICIAL POSITION,
AUTHORITY, RELATIONSHIP, CONNECTION, OR
INFLUENCE, did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and criminally amass, accumulate and acquire BY
HIMSELF, DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, ill-gotten
wealth in the aggregate amount or TOTAL VALUE of
FOUR BILLION NINETY SEVEN MILLION EIGHT
HUNDRED FOUR THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED
SEVENTY THREE PESOS AND SEVENTEEN
CENTAVOS (4,097,804,173.17), more or less,
THEREBY UNJUSTLY ENRICHING HIMSELF OR
THEMSELVES AT THE EXPENSE AND TO THE
DAMAGE OF THE FILIPINO PEOPLE AND THE
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, through ANY
OR A combination OR A series of overt OR criminal
acts, OR SIMILAR SCHEMES OR MEANS,
described as follows:
(a) by receiving OR collecting, directly or indirectly,
on SEVERAL INSTANCES, MONEY IN THE
AGGREGATE AMOUNT OF FIVE HUNDRED
FORTY-FIVE MILLION PESOS (545,000,000.00),
MORE OR LESS, FROM ILLEGAL GAMBLING IN
THE FORM OF GIFT, SHARE, PERCENTAGE,
KICKBACK OR ANY FORM OF PECUNIARY
BENEFIT, BY HIMSELF AND/OR in connection with
co-accused CHARLIE 'ATONG' ANG, Jose 'Jinggoy'
Estrada, Yolanda T. Ricaforte, Edward Serapio,
AND JOHN DOES AND JANE DOES, in
consideration OF TOLERATION OR PROTECTION
OF ILLEGAL GAMBLING;
(b) by DIVERTING, RECEIVING, misappropriating,
converting OR misusing DIRECTLY OR
INDIRECTLY, for HIS OR THEIR PERSONAL gain
and benefit, public funds in the amount of ONE
HUNDRED THIRTY MILLION PESOS
(130,000,000.00), more or less, representing a
portion of the TWO HUNDRED MILLION PESOS
(200,000,000.00) tobacco excise tax share
allocated for the province of Ilocos Sur under R.A.
No. 7171, by himself and/or in connivance with co-
accused Charlie 'Atong' Ang, Alma Alfaro, JOHN
DOE a.k.a. Eleuterio Ramos Tan or Mr. Uy, Jane
Doe a.k.a. Delia Rajas, AND OTHER JOHN DOES
& JANE DOES; (italic supplied).
(c) by directing, ordering and compelling, FOR HIS
PERSONAL GAIN AND BENEFIT, the Government
Service Insurance System (GSIS) TO PURCHASE
351,878,000 SHARES OF STOCKS, MORE OR
LESS, and the Social Security System (SSS),
329,855,000 SHARES OF STOCK, MORE OR
LESS, OF THE BELLE CORPORATION IN THE
AMOUNT OF MORE OR LESS ONE BILLION ONE
HUNDRED TWO MILLION NINE HUNDRED SIXTY
FIVE THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED SEVEN PESOS
AND FIFTY CENTAVOS (1,102,965,607.50) AND
MORE OR LESS SEVEN HUNDRED FORTY FOUR
MILLION SIX HUNDRED TWELVE THOUSAND
AND FOUR HUNDRED FIFTY PESOS
(744,612,450.00), RESPECTIVELY, OR A TOTAL
OF MORE OR LESS ONE BILLION EIGHT
HUNDRED FORTY SEVEN MILLION FIVE
HUNDRED SEVENTY EIGHT THOUSAND FIFTY
SEVEN PESOS AND FIFTY CENTAVOS
(1,847,578,057.50); AND BY COLLECTING OR
RECEIVING, DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, BY
HIMSELF AND/OR IN CONNIVANCE WITH JOHN
DOES AND JANE DOES, COMMISSIONS OR
PERCENTAGES BY REASON OF SAID
PURCHASES OF SHARES OF STOCK IN THE
AMOUNT OF ONE HUNDRED EIGHTY NINE
MILLION SEVEN HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS
(189,700,000.00) MORE OR LESS, FROM THE
BELLE CORPORATION WHICH BECAME PART
OF THE DEPOSIT IN THE EQUITABLE-PCI BANK
UNDER THE ACCOUNT NAME 'JOSE VELARDE;'
(d) by unjustly enriching himself FROM
COMMISSIONS, GIFTS, SHARES,
PERCENTAGES, KICKBACKS, OR ANY FORM OF
PECUNIARY BENEFITS, IN CONNIVANCE WITH
JOHN DOES AND JANE DOES, in the amount of
MORE OR LESS THREE BILLION TWO HUNDRED
THIRTY THREE MILLION ONE HUNDRED FOUR
THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED SEVENTY THREE
PESOS AND SEVENTEEN CENTAVOS
(3,233,104,173.17) AND DEPOSITING THE SAME
UNDER HIS ACCOUNT NAME 'JOSE VELARDE'
AT THE EQUITABLE-PCI BANK."
We discern nothing in the foregoing that is vague or
ambiguous - as there is obviously none - that will
confuse petitioner in his defense. Although subject
to proof, these factual assertions clearly show that
the elements of the crime are easily understood and
provide adequate contrast between the innocent and
the prohibited acts. Upon such unequivocal
assertions, petitioner is completely informed of the
accusations against him as to enable him to prepare
for an intelligent defense.
Petitioner, however, bewails the failure of the law to
provide for the statutory definition of the terms
"combination" and "series" in the key phrase "a
combination or series of overt or criminal acts" found
in Sec. 1, par. (d), and Sec. 2, and the word
"pattern" in Sec. 4. These omissions, according to
petitioner, render the Plunder Law unconstitutional
for being impermissibly vague and overbroad and
deny him the right to be informed of the nature and
cause of the accusation against him, hence, violative
of his fundamental right to due process.
The rationalization seems to us to be pure sophistry.
A statute is not rendered uncertain and void merely
because general terms are used therein, or because
of the employment of terms without defining them;6
much less do we have to define every word we use.
Besides, there is no positive constitutional or
statutory command requiring the legislature to define
each and every word in an enactment. Congress is
not restricted in the form of expression of its will, and
its inability to so define the words employed in a
statute will not necessarily result in the vagueness or
ambiguity of the law so long as the legislative will is
clear, or at least, can be gathered from the whole
act, which is distinctly expressed in the Plunder Law.
Moreover, it is a well-settled principle of legal
hermeneutics that words of a statute will be
interpreted in their natural, plain and ordinary
acceptation and signification,7 unless it is evident
that the legislature intended a technical or special
legal meaning to those words.8 The intention of the
lawmakers - who are, ordinarily, untrained
philologists and lexicographers - to use statutory
phraseology in such a manner is always presumed.
Thus, Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary contains
the following commonly accepted definition of the
words "combination" and "series:"
Combination - the result or product of combining; the
act or process of combining. To combine is to bring
into such close relationship as to obscure individual
characters.
Series - a number of things or events of the same
class coming one after another in spatial and
temporal succession.
That Congress intended the words "combination"
and "series" to be understood in their popular
meanings is pristinely evident from the legislative
deliberations on the bill which eventually became RA
7080 or the Plunder Law:
DELIBERATIONS OF THE BICAMERAL
COMMITTEE ON JUSTICE, 7 May 1991
REP. ISIDRO: I am just intrigued again by our
definition of plunder. We say THROUGH A
COMBINATION OR SERIES OF OVERT OR
CRIMINAL ACTS AS MENTIONED IN SECTION
ONE HEREOF. Now when we say combination, we
actually mean to say, if there are two or more
means, we mean to say that number one and two or
number one and something else are included, how
about a series of the same act? For example,
through misappropriation, conversion, misuse, will
these be included also?
REP. GARCIA: Yeah, because we say a series.
REP. ISIDRO: Series.
REP. GARCIA: Yeah, we include series.
REP. ISIDRO: But we say we begin with a
combination.
REP. GARCIA: Yes.
REP. ISIDRO: When we say combination, it seems
that -
REP. GARCIA: Two.
REP. ISIDRO: Not only two but we seem to mean
that two of the enumerated means not twice of one
enumeration.
REP. GARCIA: No, no, not twice.
REP. ISIDRO: Not twice?
REP. GARCIA: Yes. Combination is not twice - but
combination, two acts.
REP. ISIDRO: So in other words, thats it. When we
say combination, we mean, two different acts. It
cannot be a repetition of the same act.
REP. GARCIA: That be referred to series, yeah.
REP. ISIDRO: No, no. Supposing one act is
repeated, so there are two.

REP. GARCIA: A series.
REP. ISIDRO: Thats not series. Its a combination.
Because when we say combination or series, we
seem to say that two or more, di ba?
REP. GARCIA: Yes, this distinguishes it really from
ordinary crimes. That is why, I said, that is a very
good suggestion because if it is only one act, it may
fall under ordinary crime but we have here a
combination or series of overt or criminal acts. So x
xxx
REP. GARCIA: Series. One after the other eh di....
SEN. TANADA: So that would fall under the term
"series?"
REP. GARCIA: Series, oo.
REP. ISIDRO: Now, if it is a combination, ano, two
misappropriations....
REP. GARCIA: Its not... Two misappropriations will
not be combination. Series.
REP. ISIDRO: So, it is not a combination?
REP. GARCIA: Yes.
REP. ISIDRO: When you say combination, two
different?
REP. GARCIA: Yes.
SEN. TANADA: Two different.
REP. ISIDRO: Two different acts.
REP. GARCIA: For example, ha...
REP. ISIDRO: Now a series, meaning, repetition...
DELIBERATIONS ON SENATE BILL NO. 733, 6
June 1989
SENATOR MACEDA: In line with our interpellations
that sometimes "one" or maybe even "two" acts may
already result in such a big amount, on line 25,
would the Sponsor consider deleting the words "a
series of overt or," to read, therefore: "or conspiracy
COMMITTED by criminal acts such as." Remove the
idea of necessitating "a series." Anyway, the criminal
acts are in the plural.
SENATOR TANADA: That would mean a
combination of two or more of the acts mentioned in
this.
THE PRESIDENT: Probably two or more would
be....
SENATOR MACEDA: Yes, because "a series"
implies several or many; two or more.
SENATOR TANADA: Accepted, Mr. President x x x
x
THE PRESIDENT: If there is only one, then he has
to be prosecuted under the particular crime. But
when we say "acts of plunder" there should be, at
least, two or more.
SENATOR ROMULO: In other words, that is already
covered by existing laws, Mr. President.
Thus when the Plunder Law speaks of
"combination," it is referring to at least two (2) acts
falling under different categories of enumeration
provided in Sec. 1, par. (d), e.g., raids on the public
treasury in Sec. 1, par. (d), subpar. (1), and
fraudulent conveyance of assets belonging to the
National Government under Sec. 1, par. (d), subpar.
(3).
On the other hand, to constitute a series" there must
be two (2) or more overt or criminal acts falling under
the same category of enumeration found in Sec. 1,
par. (d), say, misappropriation, malversation and
raids on the public treasury, all of which fall under
Sec. 1, par. (d), subpar. (1). Verily, had the
legislature intended a technical or distinctive
meaning for "combination" and "series," it would
have taken greater pains in specifically providing for
it in the law.
As for "pattern," we agree with the observations of
the Sandiganbayan9 that this term is sufficiently
defined in Sec. 4, in relation to Sec. 1, par. (d), and
Sec. 2 -
x x x x under Sec. 1 (d) of the law, a 'pattern'
consists of at least a combination or series of overt
or criminal acts enumerated in subsections (1) to (6)
of Sec. 1 (d). Secondly, pursuant to Sec. 2 of the
law, the pattern of overt or criminal acts is directed
towards a common purpose or goal which is to
enable the public officer to amass, accumulate or
acquire ill-gotten wealth. And thirdly, there must
either be an 'overall unlawful scheme' or 'conspiracy'
to achieve said common goal. As commonly
understood, the term 'overall unlawful scheme'
indicates a 'general plan of action or method' which
the principal accused and public officer and others
conniving with him follow to achieve the aforesaid
common goal. In the alternative, if there is no such
overall scheme or where the schemes or methods
used by multiple accused vary, the overt or criminal
acts must form part of a conspiracy to attain a
common goal.

Hence, it cannot plausibly be contended that the law
does not give a fair warning and sufficient notice of
what it seeks to penalize. Under the circumstances,
petitioner's reliance on the "void-for-vagueness"
doctrine is manifestly misplaced. The doctrine has
been formulated in various ways, but is most
commonly stated to the effect that a statute
establishing a criminal offense must define the
offense with sufficient definiteness that persons of
ordinary intelligence can understand what conduct is
prohibited by the statute. It can only be invoked
against that specie of legislation that is utterly vague
on its face, i.e., that which cannot be clarified either
by a saving clause or by construction.
A statute or act may be said to be vague when it
lacks comprehensible standards that men of
common intelligence must necessarily guess at its
meaning and differ in its application. In such
instance, the statute is repugnant to the Constitution
in two (2) respects - it violates due process for failure
to accord persons, especially the parties targeted by
it, fair notice of what conduct to avoid; and, it leaves
law enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out its
provisions and becomes an arbitrary flexing of the
Government muscle.10 But the doctrine does not
apply as against legislations that are merely
couched in imprecise language but which
nonetheless specify a standard though defectively
phrased; or to those that are apparently ambiguous
yet fairly applicable to certain types of activities. The
first may be "saved" by proper construction, while no
challenge may be mounted as against the second
whenever directed against such activities.11 With
more reason, the doctrine cannot be invoked where
the assailed statute is clear and free from ambiguity,
as in this case.
The test in determining whether a criminal statute is
void for uncertainty is whether the language conveys
a sufficiently definite warning as to the proscribed
conduct when measured by common understanding
and practice.12 It must be stressed, however, that
the "vagueness" doctrine merely requires a
reasonable degree of certainty for the statute to be
upheld - not absolute precision or mathematical
exactitude, as petitioner seems to suggest.
Flexibility, rather than meticulous specificity, is
permissible as long as the metes and bounds of the
statute are clearly delineated. An act will not be held
invalid merely because it might have been more
explicit in its wordings or detailed in its provisions,
especially where, because of the nature of the act, it
would be impossible to provide all the details in
advance as in all other statutes.
Moreover, we agree with, hence we adopt, the
observations of Mr. Justice Vicente V. Mendoza
during the deliberations of the Court that the
allegations that the Plunder Law is vague and
overbroad do not justify a facial review of its validity -
The void-for-vagueness doctrine states that "a
statute which either forbids or requires the doing of
an act in terms so vague that men of common
intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning
and differ as to its application, violates the first
essential of due process of law."13 The overbreadth
doctrine, on the other hand, decrees that "a
governmental purpose may not be achieved by
means which sweep unnecessarily broadly and
thereby invade the area of protected freedoms."14
A facial challenge is allowed to be made to a vague
statute and to one which is overbroad because of
possible "chilling effect" upon protected speech. The
theory is that "[w]hen statutes regulate or proscribe
speech and no readily apparent construction
suggests itself as a vehicle for rehabilitating the
statutes in a single prosecution, the transcendent
value to all society of constitutionally protected
expression is deemed to justify allowing attacks on
overly broad statutes with no requirement that the
person making the attack demonstrate that his own
conduct could not be regulated by a statute drawn
with narrow specificity."15 The possible harm to
society in permitting some unprotected speech to go
unpunished is outweighed by the possibility that the
protected speech of others may be deterred and
perceived grievances left to fester because of
possible inhibitory effects of overly broad statutes.
This rationale does not apply to penal statutes.
Criminal statutes have general in terrorem effect
resulting from their very existence, and, if facial
challenge is allowed for this reason alone, the State
may well be prevented from enacting laws against
socially harmful conduct. In the area of criminal law,
the law cannot take chances as in the area of free
speech.
The overbreadth and vagueness doctrines then
have special application only to free speech cases.
They are inapt for testing the validity of penal
statutes. As the U.S. Supreme Court put it, in an
opinion by Chief Justice Rehnquist, "we have not
recognized an 'overbreadth' doctrine outside the
limited context of the First Amendment."16 In
Broadrick v. Oklahoma,17 the Court ruled that
"claims of facial overbreadth have been entertained
in cases involving statutes which, by their terms,
seek to regulate only spoken words" and, again, that
"overbreadth claims, if entertained at all, have been
curtailed when invoked against ordinary criminal
laws that are sought to be applied to protected
conduct." For this reason, it has been held that "a
facial challenge to a legislative act is the most
difficult challenge to mount successfully, since the
challenger must establish that no set of
circumstances exists under which the Act would be
valid."18 As for the vagueness doctrine, it is said
that a litigant may challenge a statute on its face
only if it is vague in all its possible applications. "A
plaintiff who engages in some conduct that is clearly
proscribed cannot complain of the vagueness of the
law as applied to the conduct of others."19
In sum, the doctrines of strict scrutiny, overbreadth,
and vagueness are analytical tools developed for
testing "on their faces" statutes in free speech cases
or, as they are called in American law, First
Amendment cases. They cannot be made to do
service when what is involved is a criminal statute.
With respect to such statute, the established rule is
that "one to whom application of a statute is
constitutional will not be heard to attack the statute
on the ground that impliedly it might also be taken as
applying to other persons or other situations in which
its application might be unconstitutional."20 As has
been pointed out, "vagueness challenges in the First
Amendment context, like overbreadth challenges
typically produce facial invalidation, while statutes
found vague as a matter of due process typically are
invalidated [only] 'as applied' to a particular
defendant."21 Consequently, there is no basis for
petitioner's claim that this Court review the Anti-
Plunder Law on its face and in its entirety.
Indeed, "on its face" invalidation of statutes results in
striking them down entirely on the ground that they
might be applied to parties not before the Court
whose activities are constitutionally protected.22 It
constitutes a departure from the case and
controversy requirement of the Constitution and
permits decisions to be made without concrete
factual settings and in sterile abstract contexts.23
But, as the U.S. Supreme Court pointed out in
Younger v. Harris24
[T]he task of analyzing a proposed statute,
pinpointing its deficiencies, and requiring correction
of these deficiencies before the statute is put into
effect, is rarely if ever an appropriate task for the
judiciary. The combination of the relative
remoteness of the controversy, the impact on the
legislative process of the relief sought, and above all
the speculative and amorphous nature of the
required line-by-line analysis of detailed statutes, . . .
ordinarily results in a kind of case that is wholly
unsatisfactory for deciding constitutional questions,
whichever way they might be decided.
For these reasons, "on its face" invalidation of
statutes has been described as "manifestly strong
medicine," to be employed "sparingly and only as a
last resort,"25 and is generally disfavored.26 In
determining the constitutionality of a statute,
therefore, its provisions which are alleged to have
been violated in a case must be examined in the
light of the conduct with which the defendant is
charged.27
In light of the foregoing disquisition, it is evident that
the purported ambiguity of the Plunder Law, so
tenaciously claimed and argued at length by
petitioner, is more imagined than real. Ambiguity,
where none exists, cannot be created by dissecting
parts and words in the statute to furnish support to
critics who cavil at the want of scientific precision in
the law. Every provision of the law should be
construed in relation and with reference to every
other part. To be sure, it will take more than
nitpicking to overturn the well-entrenched
presumption of constitutionality and validity of the
Plunder Law. A fortiori, petitioner cannot feign
ignorance of what the Plunder Law is all about.
Being one of the Senators who voted for its
passage, petitioner must be aware that the law was
extensively deliberated upon by the Senate and its
appropriate committees by reason of which he even
registered his affirmative vote with full knowledge of
its legal implications and sound constitutional
anchorage.
The parallel case of Gallego v. Sandiganbayan28
must be mentioned if only to illustrate and
emphasize the point that courts are loathed to
declare a statute void for uncertainty unless the law
itself is so imperfect and deficient in its details, and
is susceptible of no reasonable construction that will
support and give it effect. In that case, petitioners
Gallego and Agoncillo challenged the
constitutionality of Sec. 3, par. (e), of The Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act for being vague.
Petitioners posited, among others, that the term
"unwarranted" is highly imprecise and elastic with no
common law meaning or settled definition by prior
judicial or administrative precedents; that, for its
vagueness, Sec. 3, par. (e), violates due process in
that it does not give fair warning or sufficient notice
of what it seeks to penalize. Petitioners further
argued that the Information charged them with three
(3) distinct offenses, to wit: (a) giving of
"unwarranted" benefits through manifest partiality;
(b) giving of "unwarranted" benefits through evident
bad faith; and, (c) giving of "unwarranted" benefits
through gross inexcusable negligence while in the
discharge of their official function and that their right
to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against them was violated because they
were left to guess which of the three (3) offenses, if
not all, they were being charged and prosecuted.
In dismissing the petition, this Court held that Sec. 3,
par. (e), of The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act
does not suffer from the constitutional defect of
vagueness. The phrases "manifest partiality,"
"evident bad faith," and "gross and inexcusable
negligence" merely describe the different modes by
which the offense penalized in Sec. 3, par. (e), of the
statute may be committed, and the use of all these
phrases in the same Information does not mean that
the indictment charges three (3) distinct offenses.
The word 'unwarranted' is not uncertain. It seems
lacking adequate or official support; unjustified;
unauthorized (Webster, Third International
Dictionary, p. 2514); or without justification or
adequate reason (Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v.
US Dept. of Justice, C.D. Pa., 405 F. Supp. 8, 12,
cited in Words and Phrases, Permanent Edition, Vol.
43-A 1978, Cumulative Annual Pocket Part, p. 19).
The assailed provisions of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act consider a corrupt practice and make
unlawful the act of the public officer in:
x x x or giving any private party any unwarranted
benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge
of his official, administrative or judicial functions
through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross
inexcusable negligence, x x x (Section 3 [e], Rep.
Act 3019, as amended).
It is not at all difficult to comprehend that what the
aforequoted penal provisions penalize is the act of a
public officer, in the discharge of his official,
administrative or judicial functions, in giving any
private party benefits, advantage or preference
which is unjustified, unauthorized or without
justification or adequate reason, through manifest
partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable
negligence.
In other words, this Court found that there was
nothing vague or ambiguous in the use of the term
"unwarranted" in Sec. 3, par. (e), of The Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act, which was understood in
its primary and general acceptation. Consequently,
in that case, petitioners' objection thereto was held
inadequate to declare the section unconstitutional.
On the second issue, petitioner advances the highly
stretched theory that Sec. 4 of the Plunder Law
circumvents the immutable obligation of the
prosecution to prove beyond reasonable doubt the
predicate acts constituting the crime of plunder when
it requires only proof of a pattern of overt or criminal
acts showing unlawful scheme or conspiracy -
SEC. 4. Rule of Evidence. - For purposes of
establishing the crime of plunder, it shall not be
necessary to prove each and every criminal act
done by the accused in furtherance of the scheme or
conspiracy to amass, accumulate or acquire ill-
gotten wealth, it being sufficient to establish beyond
reasonable doubt a pattern of overt or criminal acts
indicative of the overall unlawful scheme or
conspiracy.
The running fault in this reasoning is obvious even to
the simplistic mind. In a criminal prosecution for
plunder, as in all other crimes, the accused always
has in his favor the presumption of innocence which
is guaranteed by the Bill of Rights, and unless the
State succeeds in demonstrating by proof beyond
reasonable doubt that culpability lies, the accused is
entitled to an acquittal.29 The use of the "reasonable
doubt" standard is indispensable to command the
respect and confidence of the community in the
application of criminal law. It is critical that the moral
force of criminal law be not diluted by a standard of
proof that leaves people in doubt whether innocent
men are being condemned. It is also important in our
free society that every individual going about his
ordinary affairs has confidence that his government
cannot adjudge him guilty of a criminal offense
without convincing a proper factfinder of his guilt
with utmost certainty. This "reasonable doubt"
standard has acquired such exalted stature in the
realm of constitutional law as it gives life to the Due
Process Clause which protects the accused against
conviction except upon proof beyond reasonable
doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime
with which he is charged.30 The following
exchanges between Rep. Rodolfo Albano and Rep.
Pablo Garcia on this score during the deliberations
in the floor of the House of Representatives are
elucidating -
DELIBERATIONS OF THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES ON RA 7080, 9 October 1990
MR. ALBANO: Now, Mr. Speaker, it is also
elementary in our criminal law that what is alleged in
the information must be proven beyond reasonable
doubt. If we will prove only one act and find him
guilty of the other acts enumerated in the
information, does that not work against the right of
the accused especially so if the amount committed,
say, by falsification is less than 100 million, but the
totality of the crime committed is 100 million since
there is malversation, bribery, falsification of public
document, coercion, theft?
MR. GARCIA: Mr. Speaker, not everything alleged in
the information needs to be proved beyond
reasonable doubt. What is required to be proved
beyond reasonable doubt is every element of the
crime charged. For example, Mr. Speaker, there is
an enumeration of the things taken by the robber in
the information three pairs of pants, pieces of
jewelry. These need not be proved beyond
reasonable doubt, but these will not prevent the
conviction of a crime for which he was charged just
because, say, instead of 3 pairs of diamond earrings
the prosecution proved two. Now, what is required to
be proved beyond reasonable doubt is the element
of the offense.
MR. ALBANO: I am aware of that, Mr. Speaker, but
considering that in the crime of plunder the totality of
the amount is very important, I feel that such a
series of overt criminal acts has to be taken singly.
For instance, in the act of bribery, he was able to
accumulate only 50,000 and in the crime of
extortion, he was only able to accumulate 1 million.
Now, when we add the totality of the other acts as
required under this bill through the interpretation on
the rule of evidence, it is just one single act, so how
can we now convict him?
MR. GARCIA: With due respect, Mr. Speaker, for
purposes of proving an essential element of the
crime, there is a need to prove that element beyond
reasonable doubt. For example, one essential
element of the crime is that the amount involved is
100 million. Now, in a series of defalcations and
other acts of corruption in the enumeration the total
amount would be 110 or 120 million, but there are
certain acts that could not be proved, so, we will
sum up the amounts involved in those transactions
which were proved. Now, if the amount involved in
these transactions, proved beyond reasonable
doubt, is 100 million, then there is a crime of
plunder (underscoring supplied).
It is thus plain from the foregoing that the legislature
did not in any manner refashion the standard
quantum of proof in the crime of plunder. The
burden still remains with the prosecution to prove
beyond any iota of doubt every fact or element
necessary to constitute the crime.
The thesis that Sec. 4 does away with proof of each
and every component of the crime suffers from a
dismal misconception of the import of that provision.
What the prosecution needs to prove beyond
reasonable doubt is only a number of acts sufficient
to form a combination or series which would
constitute a pattern and involving an amount of at
least 50,000,000.00. There is no need to prove
each and every other act alleged in the Information
to have been committed by the accused in
furtherance of the overall unlawful scheme or
conspiracy to amass, accumulate or acquire ill-
gotten wealth. To illustrate, supposing that the
accused is charged in an Information for plunder
with having committed fifty (50) raids on the public
treasury. The prosecution need not prove all these
fifty (50) raids, it being sufficient to prove by pattern
at least two (2) of the raids beyond reasonable doubt
provided only that they amounted to at least
50,000,000.00.31
A reading of Sec. 2 in conjunction with Sec. 4, brings
us to the logical conclusion that "pattern of overt or
criminal acts indicative of the overall unlawful
scheme or conspiracy" inheres in the very acts of
accumulating, acquiring or amassing hidden wealth.
Stated otherwise, such pattern arises where the
prosecution is able to prove beyond reasonable
doubt the predicate acts as defined in Sec. 1, par.
(d). Pattern is merely a by-product of the proof of the
predicate acts. This conclusion is consistent with
reason and common sense. There would be no
other explanation for a combination or series of
overt or criminal acts to stash 50,000,000.00 or
more, than "a scheme or conspiracy to amass,
accumulate or acquire ill gotten wealth." The
prosecution is therefore not required to make a
deliberate and conscious effort to prove pattern as it
necessarily follows with the establishment of a series
or combination of the predicate acts.
Relative to petitioner's contentions on the purported
defect of Sec. 4 is his submission that "pattern" is "a
very important element of the crime of plunder;" and
that Sec. 4 is "two pronged, (as) it contains a rule of
evidence and a substantive element of the crime,"
such that without it the accused cannot be convicted
of plunder -
JUSTICE BELLOSILLO: In other words, cannot an
accused be convicted under the Plunder Law
without applying Section 4 on the Rule of Evidence if
there is proof beyond reasonable doubt of the
commission of the acts complained of?
ATTY. AGABIN: In that case he can be convicted of
individual crimes enumerated in the Revised Penal
Code, but not plunder.
JUSTICE BELLOSILLO: In other words, if all the
elements of the crime are proved beyond
reasonable doubt without applying Section 4, can
you not have a conviction under the Plunder Law?
ATTY. AGABIN: Not a conviction for plunder, your
Honor.
JUSTICE BELLOSILLO: Can you not disregard the
application of Sec. 4 in convicting an accused
charged for violation of the Plunder Law?
ATTY. AGABIN: Well, your Honor, in the first place
Section 4 lays down a substantive element of the
law x x x x
JUSTICE BELLOSILLO: What I said is - do we have
to avail of Section 4 when there is proof beyond
reasonable doubt on the acts charged constituting
plunder?
ATTY. AGABIN: Yes, your Honor, because Section
4 is two pronged, it contains a rule of evidence and it
contains a substantive element of the crime of
plunder. So, there is no way by which we can avoid
Section 4.
JUSTICE BELLOSILLO: But there is proof beyond
reasonable doubt insofar as the predicate crimes
charged are concerned that you do not have to go
that far by applying Section 4?

ATTY. AGABIN: Your Honor, our thinking is that
Section 4 contains a very important element of the
crime of plunder and that cannot be avoided by the
prosecution.32
We do not subscribe to petitioner's stand. Primarily,
all the essential elements of plunder can be culled
and understood from its definition in Sec. 2, in
relation to Sec. 1, par. (d), and "pattern" is not one of
them. Moreover, the epigraph and opening clause of
Sec. 4 is clear and unequivocal:
SEC. 4. Rule of Evidence. - For purposes of
establishing the crime of plunder x x x x
It purports to do no more than prescribe a rule of
procedure for the prosecution of a criminal case for
plunder. Being a purely procedural measure, Sec. 4
does not define or establish any substantive right in
favor of the accused but only operates in furtherance
of a remedy. It is only a means to an end, an aid to
substantive law. Indubitably, even without invoking
Sec. 4, a conviction for plunder may be had, for what
is crucial for the prosecution is to present sufficient
evidence to engender that moral certitude exacted
by the fundamental law to prove the guilt of the
accused beyond reasonable doubt. Thus, even
granting for the sake of argument that Sec. 4 is
flawed and vitiated for the reasons advanced by
petitioner, it may simply be severed from the rest of
the provisions without necessarily resulting in the
demise of the law; after all, the existing rules on
evidence can supplant Sec. 4 more than enough.
Besides, Sec. 7 of RA 7080 provides for a
separability clause -
Sec. 7. Separability of Provisions. - If any provisions
of this Act or the application thereof to any person or
circumstance is held invalid, the remaining
provisions of this Act and the application of such
provisions to other persons or circumstances shall
not be affected thereby.
Implicit in the foregoing section is that to avoid the
whole act from being declared invalid as a result of
the nullity of some of its provisions, assuming that to
be the case although it is not really so, all the
provisions thereof should accordingly be treated
independently of each other, especially if by doing
so, the objectives of the statute can best be
achieved.
As regards the third issue, again we agree with
Justice Mendoza that plunder is a malum in se
which requires proof of criminal intent. Thus, he
says, in his Concurring Opinion -
x x x Precisely because the constitutive crimes are
mala in se the element of mens rea must be proven
in a prosecution for plunder. It is noteworthy that the
amended information alleges that the crime of
plunder was committed "willfully, unlawfully and
criminally." It thus alleges guilty knowledge on the
part of petitioner.
In support of his contention that the statute
eliminates the requirement of mens rea and that is
the reason he claims the statute is void, petitioner
cites the following remarks of Senator Taada made
during the deliberation on S.B. No. 733:
SENATOR TAADA . . . And the evidence that will
be required to convict him would not be evidence for
each and every individual criminal act but only
evidence sufficient to establish the conspiracy or
scheme to commit this crime of plunder.33
However, Senator Taada was discussing 4 as
shown by the succeeding portion of the transcript
quoted by petitioner:
SENATOR ROMULO: And, Mr. President, the
Gentleman feels that it is contained in Section 4,
Rule of Evidence, which, in the Gentleman's view,
would provide for a speedier and faster process of
attending to this kind of cases?
SENATOR TAADA: Yes, Mr. President . . .34
Senator Taada was only saying that where the
charge is conspiracy to commit plunder, the
prosecution need not prove each and every criminal
act done to further the scheme or conspiracy, it
being enough if it proves beyond reasonable doubt a
pattern of overt or ciminal acts indicative of the
overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy. As far as the
acts constituting the pattern are concerned,
however, the elements of the crime must be proved
and the requisite mens rea must be shown.
Indeed, 2 provides that -
Any person who participated with the said public
officer in the commission of an offense contributing
to the crime of plunder shall likewise be punished for
such offense. In the imposition of penalties, the
degree of participation and the attendance of
mitigating and extenuating circumstances, as
provided by the Revised Penal Code, shall be
considered by the court.
The application of mitigating and extenuating
circumstances in the Revised Penal Code to
prosecutions under the Anti-Plunder Law indicates
quite clearly that mens rea is an element of plunder
since the degree of responsibility of the offender is
determined by his criminal intent. It is true that 2
refers to "any person who participates with the said
public officer in the commission of an offense
contributing to the crime of plunder." There is no
reason to believe, however, that it does not apply as
well to the public officer as principal in the crime. As
Justice Holmes said: "We agree to all the
generalities about not supplying criminal laws with
what they omit, but there is no canon against using
common sense in construing laws as saying what
they obviously mean."35
Finally, any doubt as to whether the crime of plunder
is a malum in se must be deemed to have been
resolved in the affirmative by the decision of
Congress in 1993 to include it among the heinous
crimes punishable by reclusion perpetua to death.
Other heinous crimes are punished with death as a
straight penalty in R.A. No. 7659. Referring to these
groups of heinous crimes, this Court held in People
v. Echegaray:36
The evil of a crime may take various forms. There
are crimes that are, by their very nature, despicable,
either because life was callously taken or the victim
is treated like an animal and utterly dehumanized as
to completely disrupt the normal course of his or her
growth as a human being . . . . Seen in this light, the
capital crimes of kidnapping and serious illegal
detention for ransom resulting in the death of the
victim or the victim is raped, tortured, or subjected to
dehumanizing acts; destructive arson resulting in
death; and drug offenses involving minors or
resulting in the death of the victim in the case of
other crimes; as well as murder, rape, parricide,
infanticide, kidnapping and serious illegal detention,
where the victim is detained for more than three
days or serious physical injuries were inflicted on the
victim or threats to kill him were made or the victim is
a minor, robbery with homicide, rape or intentional
mutilation, destructive arson, and carnapping where
the owner, driver or occupant of the carnapped
vehicle is killed or raped, which are penalized by
reclusion perpetua to death, are clearly heinous by
their very nature.
There are crimes, however, in which the
abomination lies in the significance and implications
of the subject criminal acts in the scheme of the
larger socio-political and economic context in which
the state finds itself to be struggling to develop and
provide for its poor and underprivileged masses.
Reeling from decades of corrupt tyrannical rule that
bankrupted the government and impoverished the
population, the Philippine Government must muster
the political will to dismantle the culture of
corruption, dishonesty, greed and syndicated
criminality that so deeply entrenched itself in the
structures of society and the psyche of the populace.
[With the government] terribly lacking the money to
provide even the most basic services to its people,
any form of misappropriation or misapplication of
government funds translates to an actual threat to
the very existence of government, and in turn, the
very survival of the people it governs over. Viewed in
this context, no less heinous are the effects and
repercussions of crimes like qualified bribery,
destructive arson resulting in death, and drug
offenses involving government officials, employees
or officers, that their perpetrators must not be
allowed to cause further destruction and damage to
society.
The legislative declaration in R.A. No. 7659 that
plunder is a heinous offense implies that it is a
malum in se. For when the acts punished are
inherently immoral or inherently wrong, they are
mala in se37 and it does not matter that such acts
are punished in a special law, especially since in the
case of plunder the predicate crimes are mainly
mala in se. Indeed, it would be absurd to treat
prosecutions for plunder as though they are mere
prosecutions for violations of the Bouncing Check
Law (B.P. Blg. 22) or of an ordinance against
jaywalking, without regard to the inherent wrongness
of the acts.
To clinch, petitioner likewise assails the validity of
RA 7659, the amendatory law of RA 7080, on
constitutional grounds. Suffice it to say however that
it is now too late in the day for him to resurrect this
long dead issue, the same having been eternally
consigned by People v. Echegaray38 to the archives
of jurisprudential history. The declaration of this
Court therein that RA 7659 is constitutionally valid
stands as a declaration of the State, and becomes,
by necessary effect, assimilated in the Constitution
now as an integral part of it.
Our nation has been racked by scandals of
corruption and obscene profligacy of officials in high
places which have shaken its very foundation. The
anatomy of graft and corruption has become more
elaborate in the corridors of time as unscrupulous
people relentlessly contrive more and more
ingenious ways to bilk the coffers of the government.
Drastic and radical measures are imperative to fight
the increasingly sophisticated, extraordinarily
methodical and economically catastrophic looting of
the national treasury. Such is the Plunder Law,
especially designed to disentangle those ghastly
tissues of grand-scale corruption which, if left
unchecked, will spread like a malignant tumor and
ultimately consume the moral and institutional fiber
of our nation. The Plunder Law, indeed, is a living
testament to the will of the legislature to ultimately
eradicate this scourge and thus secure society
against the avarice and other venalities in public
office.
These are times that try men's souls. In the
checkered history of this nation, few issues of
national importance can equal the amount of interest
and passion generated by petitioner's ignominious
fall from the highest office, and his eventual
prosecution and trial under a virginal statute. This
continuing saga has driven a wedge of dissension
among our people that may linger for a long time.
Only by responding to the clarion call for patriotism,
to rise above factionalism and prejudices, shall we
emerge triumphant in the midst of ferment.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, this Court holds that RA
7080 otherwise known as the Plunder Law, as
amended by RA 7659, is CONSTITUTIONAL.
Consequently, the petition to declare the law
unconstitutional is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
G.R. No. 171396 May 3, 2006
PROF. RANDOLF S. DAVID, LORENZO TAADA
III, RONALD LLAMAS, H. HARRY L. ROQUE, JR.,
JOEL RUIZ BUTUYAN, ROGER R. RAYEL, GARY
S. MALLARI, ROMEL REGALADO BAGARES,
CHRISTOPHER F.C. BOLASTIG, Petitioners,
vs.
GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, AS PRESIDENT
AND COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF, EXECUTIVE
SECRETARY EDUARDO ERMITA, HON. AVELINO
CRUZ II, SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE,
GENERAL GENEROSO SENGA, CHIEF OF
STAFF, ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES,
DIRECTOR GENERAL ARTURO LOMIBAO,
CHIEF, PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE,
Respondents.
x-------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 171409 May 3, 2006
NIEZ CACHO-OLIVARES AND TRIBUNE
PUBLISHING CO., INC., Petitioners,
vs.
HONORABLE SECRETARY EDUARDO ERMITA
AND HONORABLE DIRECTOR GENERAL
ARTURO C. LOMIBAO, Respondents.
x-------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 171485 May 3, 2006
FRANCIS JOSEPH G. ESCUDERO, JOSEPH A.
SANTIAGO, TEODORO A. CASINO, AGAPITO A.
AQUINO, MARIO J. AGUJA, SATUR C. OCAMPO,
MUJIV S. HATAMAN, JUAN EDGARDO ANGARA,
TEOFISTO DL. GUINGONA III, EMMANUEL JOSEL
J. VILLANUEVA, LIZA L. MAZA, IMEE R. MARCOS,
RENATO B. MAGTUBO, JUSTIN MARC SB.
CHIPECO, ROILO GOLEZ, DARLENE ANTONINO-
CUSTODIO, LORETTA ANN P. ROSALES, JOSEL
G. VIRADOR, RAFAEL V. MARIANO, GILBERT C.
REMULLA, FLORENCIO G. NOEL, ANA THERESIA
HONTIVEROS-BARAQUEL, IMELDA C. NICOLAS,
MARVIC M.V.F. LEONEN, NERI JAVIER
COLMENARES, MOVEMENT OF CONCERNED
CITIZENS FOR CIVIL LIBERTIES REPRESENTED
BY AMADO GAT INCIONG, Petitioners,
vs.
EDUARDO R. ERMITA, EXECUTIVE SECRETARY,
AVELINO J. CRUZ, JR., SECRETARY, DND
RONALDO V. PUNO, SECRETARY, DILG,
GENEROSO SENGA, AFP CHIEF OF STAFF,
ARTURO LOMIBAO, CHIEF PNP, Respondents.
x-------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 171483 May 3, 2006
KILUSANG MAYO UNO, REPRESENTED BY ITS
CHAIRPERSON ELMER C. LABOG AND
SECRETARY GENERAL JOEL MAGLUNSOD,
NATIONAL FEDERATION OF LABOR UNIONS
KILUSANG MAYO UNO (NAFLU-KMU),
REPRESENTED BY ITS NATIONAL PRESIDENT,
JOSELITO V. USTAREZ, ANTONIO C. PASCUAL,
SALVADOR T. CARRANZA, EMILIA P.
DAPULANG, MARTIN CUSTODIO, JR., AND
ROQUE M. TAN, Petitioners,
vs.
HER EXCELLENCY, PRESIDENT GLORIA
MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, THE HONORABLE
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, EDUARDO ERMITA,
THE CHIEF OF STAFF, ARMED FORCES OF THE
PHILIPPINES, GENEROSO SENGA, AND THE
PNP DIRECTOR GENERAL, ARTURO LOMIBAO,
Respondents.
x-------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 171400 May 3, 2006
ALTERNATIVE LAW GROUPS, INC. (ALG),
Petitioner,
vs.
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY EDUARDO R. ERMITA,
LT. GEN. GENEROSO SENGA, AND DIRECTOR
GENERAL ARTURO LOMIBAO, Respondents.
G.R. No. 171489 May 3, 2006
JOSE ANSELMO I. CADIZ, FELICIANO M.
BAUTISTA, ROMULO R. RIVERA, JOSE AMOR M.
AMORADO, ALICIA A. RISOS-VIDAL, FELIMON C.
ABELITA III, MANUEL P. LEGASPI, J.B. JOVY C.
BERNABE, BERNARD L. DAGCUTA, ROGELIO V.
GARCIA AND INTEGRATED BAR OF THE
PHILIPPINES (IBP), Petitioners,
vs.
HON. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY EDUARDO
ERMITA, GENERAL GENEROSO SENGA, IN HIS
CAPACITY AS AFP CHIEF OF STAFF, AND
DIRECTOR GENERAL ARTURO LOMIBAO, IN HIS
CAPACITY AS PNP CHIEF, Respondents.
x-------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 171424 May 3, 2006
LOREN B. LEGARDA, Petitioner,
vs.
GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, IN HER
CAPACITY AS PRESIDENT AND COMMANDER-
IN-CHIEF; ARTURO LOMIBAO, IN HIS CAPACITY
AS DIRECTOR-GENERAL OF THE PHILIPPINE
NATIONAL POLICE (PNP); GENEROSO SENGA,
IN HIS CAPACITY AS CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE
ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES (AFP);
AND EDUARDO ERMITA, IN HIS CAPACITY AS
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, Respondents.
DECISION
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
All powers need some restraint; practical
adjustments rather than rigid formula are
necessary.1 Superior strength the use of force
cannot make wrongs into rights. In this regard, the
courts should be vigilant in safeguarding the
constitutional rights of the citizens, specifically their
liberty.
Chief Justice Artemio V. Panganibans philosophy of
liberty is thus most relevant. He said: "In cases
involving liberty, the scales of justice should weigh
heavily against government and in favor of the poor,
the oppressed, the marginalized, the dispossessed
and the weak." Laws and actions that restrict
fundamental rights come to the courts "with a heavy
presumption against their constitutional validity."2
These seven (7) consolidated petitions for certiorari
and prohibition allege that in issuing Presidential
Proclamation No. 1017 (PP 1017) and General
Order No. 5 (G.O. No. 5), President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo committed grave abuse of
discretion. Petitioners contend that respondent
officials of the Government, in their professed efforts
to defend and preserve democratic institutions, are
actually trampling upon the very freedom
guaranteed and protected by the Constitution.
Hence, such issuances are void for being
unconstitutional.
Once again, the Court is faced with an age-old but
persistently modern problem. How does the
Constitution of a free people combine the degree of
liberty, without which, law becomes tyranny, with the
degree of law, without which, liberty becomes
license?3
On February 24, 2006, as the nation celebrated the
20th Anniversary of the Edsa People Power I,
President Arroyo issued PP 1017 declaring a state
of national emergency, thus:
NOW, THEREFORE, I, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo,
President of the Republic of the Philippines and
Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested upon me
by Section 18, Article 7 of the Philippine Constitution
which states that: "The President. . . whenever it
becomes necessary, . . . may call out (the) armed
forces to prevent or suppress. . .rebellion. . .," and in
my capacity as their Commander-in-Chief, do hereby
command the Armed Forces of the Philippines, to
maintain law and order throughout the Philippines,
prevent or suppress all forms of lawless violence as
well as any act of insurrection or rebellion and to
enforce obedience to all the laws and to all decrees,
orders and regulations promulgated by me
personally or upon my direction; and as provided in
Section 17, Article 12 of the Constitution do hereby
declare a State of National Emergency.
She cited the following facts as bases:
WHEREAS, over these past months, elements in the
political opposition have conspired with
authoritarians of the extreme Left represented by the
NDF-CPP-NPA and the extreme Right, represented
by military adventurists the historical enemies of
the democratic Philippine State who are now in a
tactical alliance and engaged in a concerted and
systematic conspiracy, over a broad front, to bring
down the duly constituted Government elected in
May 2004;
WHEREAS, these conspirators have repeatedly tried
to bring down the President;
WHEREAS, the claims of these elements have been
recklessly magnified by certain segments of the
national media;
WHEREAS, this series of actions is hurting the
Philippine State by obstructing governance
including hindering the growth of the economy and
sabotaging the peoples confidence in government
and their faith in the future of this country;
WHEREAS, these actions are adversely affecting
the economy;
WHEREAS, these activities give totalitarian forces of
both the extreme Left and extreme Right the
opening to intensify their avowed aims to bring down
the democratic Philippine State;
WHEREAS, Article 2, Section 4 of the our
Constitution makes the defense and preservation of
the democratic institutions and the State the primary
duty of Government;
WHEREAS, the activities above-described, their
consequences, ramifications and collateral effects
constitute a clear and present danger to the safety
and the integrity of the Philippine State and of the
Filipino people;
On the same day, the President issued G. O. No. 5
implementing PP 1017, thus:
WHEREAS, over these past months, elements in the
political opposition have conspired with
authoritarians of the extreme Left, represented by
the NDF-CPP-NPA and the extreme Right,
represented by military adventurists - the historical
enemies of the democratic Philippine State and
who are now in a tactical alliance and engaged in a
concerted and systematic conspiracy, over a broad
front, to bring down the duly-constituted Government
elected in May 2004;
WHEREAS, these conspirators have repeatedly tried
to bring down our republican government;
WHEREAS, the claims of these elements have been
recklessly magnified by certain segments of the
national media;
WHEREAS, these series of actions is hurting the
Philippine State by obstructing governance,
including hindering the growth of the economy and
sabotaging the peoples confidence in the
government and their faith in the future of this
country;
WHEREAS, these actions are adversely affecting
the economy;
WHEREAS, these activities give totalitarian forces;
of both the extreme Left and extreme Right the
opening to intensify their avowed aims to bring down
the democratic Philippine State;
WHEREAS, Article 2, Section 4 of our Constitution
makes the defense and preservation of the
democratic institutions and the State the primary
duty of Government;
WHEREAS, the activities above-described, their
consequences, ramifications and collateral effects
constitute a clear and present danger to the safety
and the integrity of the Philippine State and of the
Filipino people;
WHEREAS, Proclamation 1017 date February 24,
2006 has been issued declaring a State of National
Emergency;
NOW, THEREFORE, I GLORIA MACAPAGAL-
ARROYO, by virtue of the powers vested in me
under the Constitution as President of the Republic
of the Philippines, and Commander-in-Chief of the
Republic of the Philippines, and pursuant to
Proclamation No. 1017 dated February 24, 2006, do
hereby call upon the Armed Forces of the
Philippines (AFP) and the Philippine National Police
(PNP), to prevent and suppress acts of terrorism and
lawless violence in the country;
I hereby direct the Chief of Staff of the AFP and the
Chief of the PNP, as well as the officers and men of
the AFP and PNP, to immediately carry out the
necessary and appropriate actions and measures to
suppress and prevent acts of terrorism and lawless
violence.
On March 3, 2006, exactly one week after the
declaration of a state of national emergency and
after all these petitions had been filed, the President
lifted PP 1017. She issued Proclamation No. 1021
which reads:
WHEREAS, pursuant to Section 18, Article VII and
Section 17, Article XII of the Constitution,
Proclamation No. 1017 dated February 24, 2006,
was issued declaring a state of national emergency;
WHEREAS, by virtue of General Order No.5 and
No.6 dated February 24, 2006, which were issued
on the basis of Proclamation No. 1017, the Armed
Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and the Philippine
National Police (PNP), were directed to maintain law
and order throughout the Philippines, prevent and
suppress all form of lawless violence as well as any
act of rebellion and to undertake such action as may
be necessary;
WHEREAS, the AFP and PNP have effectively
prevented, suppressed and quelled the acts lawless
violence and rebellion;
NOW, THEREFORE, I, GLORIA MACAPAGAL-
ARROYO, President of the Republic of the
Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested in me by
law, hereby declare that the state of national
emergency has ceased to exist.
In their presentation of the factual bases of PP 1017
and G.O. No. 5, respondents stated that the
proximate cause behind the executive issuances
was the conspiracy among some military officers,
leftist insurgents of the New Peoples Army (NPA),
and some members of the political opposition in a
plot to unseat or assassinate President Arroyo.4
They considered the aim to oust or assassinate the
President and take-over the reigns of government as
a clear and present danger.
During the oral arguments held on March 7, 2006,
the Solicitor General specified the facts leading to
the issuance of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5.
Significantly, there was no refutation from
petitioners counsels.
The Solicitor General argued that the intent of the
Constitution is to give full discretionary powers to the
President in determining the necessity of calling out
the armed forces. He emphasized that none of the
petitioners has shown that PP 1017 was without
factual bases. While he explained that it is not
respondents task to state the facts behind the
questioned Proclamation, however, they are
presenting the same, narrated hereunder, for the
elucidation of the issues.
On January 17, 2006, Captain Nathaniel Rabonza
and First Lieutenants Sonny Sarmiento, Lawrence
San Juan and Patricio Bumidang, members of the
Magdalo Group indicted in the Oakwood mutiny,
escaped their detention cell in Fort Bonifacio, Taguig
City. In a public statement, they vowed to remain
defiant and to elude arrest at all costs. They called
upon the people to "show and proclaim our
displeasure at the sham regime. Let us demonstrate
our disgust, not only by going to the streets in
protest, but also by wearing red bands on our left
arms." 5
On February 17, 2006, the authorities got hold of a
document entitled "Oplan Hackle I " which detailed
plans for bombings and attacks during the Philippine
Military Academy Alumni Homecoming in Baguio
City. The plot was to assassinate selected targets
including some cabinet members and President
Arroyo herself.6 Upon the advice of her security,
President Arroyo decided not to attend the Alumni
Homecoming. The next day, at the height of the
celebration, a bomb was found and detonated at the
PMA parade ground.
On February 21, 2006, Lt. San Juan was recaptured
in a communist safehouse in Batangas province.
Found in his possession were two (2) flash disks
containing minutes of the meetings between
members of the Magdalo Group and the National
Peoples Army (NPA), a tape recorder, audio
cassette cartridges, diskettes, and copies of
subversive documents.7 Prior to his arrest, Lt. San
Juan announced through DZRH that the "Magdalos
D-Day would be on February 24, 2006, the 20th
Anniversary of Edsa I."
On February 23, 2006, PNP Chief Arturo Lomibao
intercepted information that members of the PNP-
Special Action Force were planning to defect. Thus,
he immediately ordered SAF Commanding General
Marcelino Franco, Jr. to "disavow" any defection.
The latter promptly obeyed and issued a public
statement: "All SAF units are under the effective
control of responsible and trustworthy officers with
proven integrity and unquestionable loyalty."
On the same day, at the house of former
Congressman Peping Cojuangco, President Cory
Aquinos brother, businessmen and mid-level
government officials plotted moves to bring down the
Arroyo administration. Nelly Sindayen of TIME
Magazine reported that Pastor Saycon, longtime
Arroyo critic, called a U.S. government official about
his groups plans if President Arroyo is ousted.
Saycon also phoned a man code-named Delta.
Saycon identified him as B/Gen. Danilo Lim,
Commander of the Armys elite Scout Ranger. Lim
said "it was all systems go for the planned
movement against Arroyo."8
B/Gen. Danilo Lim and Brigade Commander Col.
Ariel Querubin confided to Gen. Generoso Senga,
Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines
(AFP), that a huge number of soldiers would join the
rallies to provide a critical mass and armed
component to the Anti-Arroyo protests to be held on
February 24, 2005. According to these two (2)
officers, there was no way they could possibly stop
the soldiers because they too, were breaking the
chain of command to join the forces foist to unseat
the President. However, Gen. Senga has remained
faithful to his Commander-in-Chief and to the chain
of command. He immediately took custody of B/Gen.
Lim and directed Col. Querubin to return to the
Philippine Marines Headquarters in Fort Bonifacio.
Earlier, the CPP-NPA called for intensification of
political and revolutionary work within the military
and the police establishments in order to forge
alliances with its members and key officials. NPA
spokesman Gregorio "Ka Roger" Rosal declared:
"The Communist Party and revolutionary movement
and the entire people look forward to the possibility
in the coming year of accomplishing its immediate
task of bringing down the Arroyo regime; of
rendering it to weaken and unable to rule that it will
not take much longer to end it."9
On the other hand, Cesar Renerio, spokesman for
the National Democratic Front (NDF) at North
Central Mindanao, publicly announced: "Anti-Arroyo
groups within the military and police are growing
rapidly, hastened by the economic difficulties
suffered by the families of AFP officers and enlisted
personnel who undertake counter-insurgency
operations in the field." He claimed that with the
forces of the national democratic movement, the
anti-Arroyo conservative political parties, coalitions,
plus the groups that have been reinforcing since
June 2005, it is probable that the Presidents ouster
is nearing its concluding stage in the first half of
2006.
Respondents further claimed that the bombing of
telecommunication towers and cell sites in Bulacan
and Bataan was also considered as additional
factual basis for the issuance of PP 1017 and G.O.
No. 5. So is the raid of an army outpost in Benguet
resulting in the death of three (3) soldiers. And also
the directive of the Communist Party of the
Philippines ordering its front organizations to join
5,000 Metro Manila radicals and 25,000 more from
the provinces in mass protests.10
By midnight of February 23, 2006, the President
convened her security advisers and several cabinet
members to assess the gravity of the fermenting
peace and order situation. She directed both the
AFP and the PNP to account for all their men and
ensure that the chain of command remains solid and
undivided. To protect the young students from any
possible trouble that might break loose on the
streets, the President suspended classes in all
levels in the entire National Capital Region.
For their part, petitioners cited the events that
followed after the issuance of PP 1017 and G.O. No.
5.
Immediately, the Office of the President announced
the cancellation of all programs and activities related
to the 20th anniversary celebration of Edsa People
Power I; and revoked the permits to hold rallies
issued earlier by the local governments. Justice
Secretary Raul Gonzales stated that political rallies,
which to the Presidents mind were organized for
purposes of destabilization, are
cancelled.Presidential Chief of Staff Michael
Defensor announced that "warrantless arrests and
take-over of facilities, including media, can already
be implemented."11
Undeterred by the announcements that rallies and
public assemblies would not be allowed, groups of
protesters (members of Kilusang Mayo Uno [KMU]
and National Federation of Labor Unions-Kilusang
Mayo Uno [NAFLU-KMU]), marched from various
parts of Metro Manila with the intention of
converging at the EDSA shrine. Those who were
already near the EDSA site were violently dispersed
by huge clusters of anti-riot police. The well-trained
policemen used truncheons, big fiber glass shields,
water cannons, and tear gas to stop and break up
the marching groups, and scatter the massed
participants. The same police action was used
against the protesters marching forward to Cubao,
Quezon City and to the corner of Santolan Street
and EDSA. That same evening, hundreds of riot
policemen broke up an EDSA celebration rally held
along Ayala Avenue and Paseo de Roxas Street in
Makati City.12
According to petitioner Kilusang Mayo Uno, the
police cited PP 1017 as the ground for the dispersal
of their assemblies.
During the dispersal of the rallyists along EDSA,
police arrested (without warrant) petitioner Randolf
S. David, a professor at the University of the
Philippines and newspaper columnist. Also arrested
was his companion, Ronald Llamas, president of
party-list Akbayan.
At around 12:20 in the early morning of February 25,
2006, operatives of the Criminal Investigation and
Detection Group (CIDG) of the PNP, on the basis of
PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5, raided the Daily Tribune
offices in Manila. The raiding team confiscated news
stories by reporters, documents, pictures, and mock-
ups of the Saturday issue. Policemen from Camp
Crame in Quezon City were stationed inside the
editorial and business offices of the newspaper;
while policemen from the Manila Police District were
stationed outside the building.13
A few minutes after the search and seizure at the
Daily Tribune offices, the police surrounded the
premises of another pro-opposition paper, Malaya,
and its sister publication, the tabloid Abante.
The raid, according to Presidential Chief of Staff
Michael Defensor, is "meant to show a strong
presence, to tell media outlets not to connive or do
anything that would help the rebels in bringing down
this government." The PNP warned that it would
take over any media organization that would not
follow "standards set by the government during the
state of national emergency." Director General
Lomibao stated that "if they do not follow the
standards and the standards are - if they would
contribute to instability in the government, or if they
do not subscribe to what is in General Order No. 5
and Proc. No. 1017 we will recommend a
takeover." National Telecommunications
Commissioner Ronald Solis urged television and
radio networks to "cooperate" with the government
for the duration of the state of national emergency.
He asked for "balanced reporting" from broadcasters
when covering the events surrounding the coup
attempt foiled by the government. He warned that
his agency will not hesitate to recommend the
closure of any broadcast outfit that violates rules set
out for media coverage when the national security is
threatened.14
Also, on February 25, 2006, the police arrested
Congressman Crispin Beltran, representing the
Anakpawis Party and Chairman of Kilusang Mayo
Uno (KMU), while leaving his farmhouse in Bulacan.
The police showed a warrant for his arrest dated
1985. Beltrans lawyer explained that the warrant,
which stemmed from a case of inciting to rebellion
filed during the Marcos regime, had long been
quashed. Beltran, however, is not a party in any of
these petitions.
When members of petitioner KMU went to Camp
Crame to visit Beltran, they were told they could not
be admitted because of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5.
Two members were arrested and detained, while the
rest were dispersed by the police.
Bayan Muna Representative Satur Ocampo eluded
arrest when the police went after him during a public
forum at the Sulo Hotel in Quezon City. But his two
drivers, identified as Roel and Art, were taken into
custody.
Retired Major General Ramon Montao, former
head of the Philippine Constabulary, was arrested
while with his wife and golfmates at the Orchard Golf
and Country Club in Dasmarias, Cavite.
Attempts were made to arrest Anakpawis
Representative Satur Ocampo, Representative
Rafael Mariano, Bayan Muna Representative
Teodoro Casio and Gabriela Representative Liza
Maza. Bayan Muna Representative Josel Virador
was arrested at the PAL Ticket Office in Davao City.
Later, he was turned over to the custody of the
House of Representatives where the "Batasan 5"
decided to stay indefinitely.
Let it be stressed at this point that the alleged
violations of the rights of Representatives Beltran,
Satur Ocampo, et al., are not being raised in these
petitions.
On March 3, 2006, President Arroyo issued PP 1021
declaring that the state of national emergency has
ceased to exist.
In the interim, these seven (7) petitions challenging
the constitutionality of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 were
filed with this Court against the above-named
respondents. Three (3) of these petitions impleaded
President Arroyo as respondent.
In G.R. No. 171396, petitioners Randolf S. David, et
al. assailed PP 1017 on the grounds that (1) it
encroaches on the emergency powers of Congress;
(2) itis a subterfuge to avoid the constitutional
requirements for the imposition of martial law; and
(3) it violates the constitutional guarantees of
freedom of the press, of speech and of assembly.
In G.R. No. 171409, petitioners Ninez Cacho-
Olivares and Tribune Publishing Co., Inc. challenged
the CIDGs act of raiding the Daily Tribune offices as
a clear case of "censorship" or "prior restraint." They
also claimed that the term "emergency" refers only
to tsunami, typhoon, hurricane and similar
occurrences, hence, there is "absolutely no
emergency" that warrants the issuance of PP 1017.
In G.R. No. 171485, petitioners herein are
Representative Francis Joseph G. Escudero, and
twenty one (21) other members of the House of
Representatives, including Representatives Satur
Ocampo, Rafael Mariano, Teodoro Casio, Liza
Maza, and Josel Virador. They asserted that PP
1017 and G.O. No. 5 constitute "usurpation of
legislative powers"; "violation of freedom of
expression" and "a declaration of martial law." They
alleged that President Arroyo "gravely abused her
discretion in calling out the armed forces without
clear and verifiable factual basis of the possibility of
lawless violence and a showing that there is
necessity to do so."
In G.R. No. 171483,petitioners KMU, NAFLU-KMU,
and their members averred that PP 1017 and G.O.
No. 5 are unconstitutional because (1) they arrogate
unto President Arroyo the power to enact laws and
decrees; (2) their issuance was without factual basis;
and (3) they violate freedom of expression and the
right of the people to peaceably assemble to redress
their grievances.
In G.R. No. 171400, petitioner Alternative Law
Groups, Inc. (ALGI) alleged that PP 1017 and G.O.
No. 5 are unconstitutional because they violate (a)
Section 415 of Article II, (b) Sections 1,16 2,17 and
418 of Article III, (c) Section 2319 of Article VI, and
(d) Section 1720 of Article XII of the Constitution.
In G.R. No. 171489, petitioners Jose Anselmo I.
Cadiz et al., alleged that PP 1017 is an "arbitrary
and unlawful exercise by the President of her Martial
Law powers." And assuming that PP 1017 is not
really a declaration of Martial Law, petitioners
argued that "it amounts to an exercise by the
President of emergency powers without
congressional approval." In addition, petitioners
asserted that PP 1017 "goes beyond the nature and
function of a proclamation as defined under the
Revised Administrative Code."
And lastly, in G.R. No. 171424,petitionerLoren B.
Legarda maintained that PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5
are "unconstitutional for being violative of the
freedom of expression, including its cognate rights
such as freedom of the press and the right to access
to information on matters of public concern, all
guaranteed under Article III, Section 4 of the 1987
Constitution." In this regard, she stated that these
issuances prevented her from fully prosecuting her
election protest pending before the Presidential
Electoral Tribunal.
In respondents Consolidated Comment, the Solicitor
General countered that: first, the petitions should be
dismissed for being moot; second,petitioners in G.R.
Nos. 171400 (ALGI), 171424 (Legarda), 171483
(KMU et al.), 171485 (Escudero et al.) and 171489
(Cadiz et al.) have no legal standing; third, it is not
necessary for petitioners to implead President
Arroyo as respondent; fourth, PP 1017 has
constitutional and legal basis; and fifth, PP 1017
does not violate the peoples right to free expression
and redress of grievances.
On March 7, 2006, the Court conducted oral
arguments and heard the parties on the above
interlocking issues which may be summarized as
follows:
A. PROCEDURAL:
1) Whether the issuance of PP 1021 renders the
petitions moot and academic.
2) Whether petitioners in 171485 (Escudero et al.),
G.R. Nos. 171400 (ALGI), 171483 (KMU et al.),
171489 (Cadiz et al.), and 171424 (Legarda) have
legal standing.
B. SUBSTANTIVE:
1) Whetherthe Supreme Court can review the factual
bases of PP 1017.
2) Whether PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 are
unconstitutional.
a. Facial Challenge
b. Constitutional Basis
c. As Applied Challenge
A. PROCEDURAL
First, we must resolve the procedural roadblocks.
I- Moot and Academic Principle
One of the greatest contributions of the American
system to this country is the concept of judicial
review enunciated in Marbury v. Madison.21 This
concept rests on the extraordinary simple foundation
--
The Constitution is the supreme law. It was ordained
by the people, the ultimate source of all political
authority. It confers limited powers on the national
government. x x x If the government consciously or
unconsciously oversteps these limitations there must
be some authority competent to hold it in control, to
thwart its unconstitutional attempt, and thus to
vindicate and preserve inviolate the will of the
people as expressed in the Constitution. This power
the courts exercise. This is the beginning and the
end of the theory of judicial review.22
But the power of judicial review does not repose
upon the courts a "self-starting capacity."23 Courts
may exercise such power only when the following
requisites are present: first, there must be an actual
case or controversy; second, petitioners have to
raise a question of constitutionality; third, the
constitutional question must be raised at the earliest
opportunity; and fourth, the decision of the
constitutional question must be necessary to the
determination of the case itself.24
Respondents maintain that the first and second
requisites are absent, hence, we shall limit our
discussion thereon.
An actual case or controversy involves a conflict of
legal right, an opposite legal claims susceptible of
judicial resolution. It is "definite and concrete,
touching the legal relations of parties having adverse
legal interest;" a real and substantial controversy
admitting of specific relief.25 The Solicitor General
refutes the existence of such actual case or
controversy, contending that the present petitions
were rendered "moot and academic" by President
Arroyos issuance of PP 1021.
Such contention lacks merit.
A moot and academic case is one that ceases to
present a justiciable controversy by virtue of
supervening events,26 so that a declaration thereon
would be of no practical use or value.27 Generally,
courts decline jurisdiction over such case28 or
dismiss it on ground of mootness.29
The Court holds that President Arroyos issuance of
PP 1021 did not render the present petitions moot
and academic. During the eight (8) days that PP
1017 was operative, the police officers, according to
petitioners, committed illegal acts in implementing it.
Are PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 constitutional or valid?
Do they justify these alleged illegal acts? These are
the vital issues that must be resolved in the present
petitions. It must be stressed that "an
unconstitutional act is not a law, it confers no rights,
it imposes no duties, it affords no protection; it is in
legal contemplation, inoperative."30
The "moot and academic" principle is not a magical
formula that can automatically dissuade the courts in
resolving a case. Courts will decide cases, otherwise
moot and academic, if: first, there is a grave violation
of the Constitution;31 second, the exceptional
character of the situation and the paramount public
interest is involved;32 third, when constitutional
issue raised requires formulation of controlling
principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the
public;33 and fourth, the case is capable of
repetition yet evading review.34
All the foregoing exceptions are present here and
justify this Courts assumption of jurisdiction over the
instant petitions. Petitioners alleged that the
issuance of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 violates the
Constitution. There is no question that the issues
being raised affect the publics interest, involving as
they do the peoples basic rights to freedom of
expression, of assembly and of the press. Moreover,
the Court has the duty to formulate guiding and
controlling constitutional precepts, doctrines or rules.
It has the symbolic function of educating the bench
and the bar, and in the present petitions, the military
and the police, on the extent of the protection given
by constitutional guarantees.35 And lastly,
respondents contested actions are capable of
repetition. Certainly, the petitions are subject to
judicial review.
In their attempt to prove the alleged mootness of this
case, respondents cited Chief Justice Artemio V.
Panganibans Separate Opinion in Sanlakas v.
Executive Secretary.36 However, they failed to take
into account the Chief Justices very statement that
an otherwise "moot" case may still be decided
"provided the party raising it in a proper case has
been and/or continues to be prejudiced or damaged
as a direct result of its issuance." The present case
falls right within this exception to the mootness rule
pointed out by the Chief Justice.
II- Legal Standing
In view of the number of petitioners suing in various
personalities, the Court deems it imperative to have
a more than passing discussion on legal standing or
locus standi.
Locus standi is defined as "a right of appearance in
a court of justice on a given question."37 In private
suits, standing is governed by the "real-parties-in
interest" rule as contained in Section 2, Rule 3 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended. It
provides that "every action must be prosecuted or
defended in the name of the real party in interest."
Accordingly, the "real-party-in interest" is "the party
who stands to be benefited or injured by the
judgment in the suit or the party entitled to the avails
of the suit."38 Succinctly put, the plaintiffs standing
is based on his own right to the relief sought.
The difficulty of determining locus standi arises in
public suits. Here, the plaintiff who asserts a "public
right" in assailing an allegedly illegal official action,
does so as a representative of the general public.
He may be a person who is affected no differently
from any other person. He could be suing as a
"stranger," or in the category of a "citizen," or
taxpayer." In either case, he has to adequately
show that he is entitled to seek judicial protection. In
other words, he has to make out a sufficient interest
in the vindication of the public order and the
securing of relief as a "citizen" or "taxpayer.
Case law in most jurisdictions now allows both
"citizen" and "taxpayer" standing in public actions.
The distinction was first laid down in Beauchamp v.
Silk,39 where it was held that the plaintiff in a
taxpayers suit is in a different category from the
plaintiff in a citizens suit. In the former, the plaintiff is
affected by the expenditure of public funds, while in
the latter, he is but the mere instrument of the public
concern. As held by the New York Supreme Court in
People ex rel Case v. Collins:40 "In matter of mere
public right, howeverthe people are the real
partiesIt is at least the right, if not the duty, of
every citizen to interfere and see that a public
offence be properly pursued and punished, and that
a public grievance be remedied." With respect to
taxpayers suits, Terr v. Jordan41 held that "the right
of a citizen and a taxpayer to maintain an action in
courts to restrain the unlawful use of public funds to
his injury cannot be denied."
However, to prevent just about any person from
seeking judicial interference in any official policy or
act with which he disagreed with, and thus hinders
the activities of governmental agencies engaged in
public service, the United State Supreme Court laid
down the more stringent "direct injury" test in Ex
Parte Levitt,42 later reaffirmed in Tileston v.
Ullman.43 The same Court ruled that for a private
individual to invoke the judicial power to determine
the validity of an executive or legislative action, he
must show that he has sustained a direct injury as a
result of that action, and it is not sufficient that he
has a general interest common to all members of the
public.
This Court adopted the "direct injury" test in our
jurisdiction. In People v. Vera,44 it held that the
person who impugns the validity of a statute must
have "a personal and substantial interest in the case
such that he has sustained, or will sustain direct
injury as a result." The Vera doctrine was upheld in a
litany of cases, such as, Custodio v. President of the
Senate,45 Manila Race Horse Trainers Association
v. De la Fuente,46 Pascual v. Secretary of Public
Works47 and Anti-Chinese League of the
Philippines v. Felix.48
However, being a mere procedural technicality, the
requirement of locus standi may be waived by the
Court in the exercise of its discretion. This was done
in the 1949 Emergency Powers Cases, Araneta v.
Dinglasan,49 where the "transcendental importance"
of the cases prompted the Court to act liberally.
Such liberality was neither a rarity nor accidental. In
Aquino v. Comelec,50 this Court resolved to pass
upon the issues raised due to the "far-reaching
implications" of the petition notwithstanding its
categorical statement that petitioner therein had no
personality to file the suit. Indeed, there is a chain of
cases where this liberal policy has been observed,
allowing ordinary citizens, members of Congress,
and civic organizations to prosecute actions
involving the constitutionality or validity of laws,
regulations and rulings.51
Thus, the Court has adopted a rule that even where
the petitioners have failed to show direct injury, they
have been allowed to sue under the principle of
"transcendental importance." Pertinent are the
following cases:
(1) Chavez v. Public Estates Authority,52 where the
Court ruled that the enforcement of the constitutional
right to information and the equitable diffusion of
natural resources are matters of transcendental
importance which clothe the petitioner with locus
standi;
(2) Bagong Alyansang Makabayan v. Zamora,53
wherein the Court held that "given the
transcendental importance of the issues involved,
the Court may relax the standing requirements and
allow the suit to prosper despite the lack of direct
injury to the parties seeking judicial review" of the
Visiting Forces Agreement;
(3) Lim v. Executive Secretary,54 while the Court
noted that the petitioners may not file suit in their
capacity as taxpayers absent a showing that
"Balikatan 02-01" involves the exercise of Congress
taxing or spending powers, it reiterated its ruling in
Bagong Alyansang Makabayan v. Zamora,55that in
cases of transcendental importance, the cases must
be settled promptly and definitely and standing
requirements may be relaxed.
By way of summary, the following rules may be
culled from the cases decided by this Court.
Taxpayers, voters, concerned citizens, and
legislators may be accorded standing to sue,
provided that the following requirements are met:
(1) the cases involve constitutional issues;
(2) for taxpayers, there must be a claim of illegal
disbursement of public funds or that the tax measure
is unconstitutional;
(3) for voters, there must be a showing of obvious
interest in the validity of the election law in question;
(4) for concerned citizens, there must be a showing
that the issues raised are of transcendental
importance which must be settled early; and
(5) for legislators, there must be a claim that the
official action complained of infringes upon their
prerogatives as legislators.
Significantly, recent decisions show a certain
toughening in the Courts attitude toward legal
standing.
In Kilosbayan, Inc. v. Morato,56 the Court ruled that
the status of Kilosbayan as a peoples organization
does not give it the requisite personality to question
the validity of the on-line lottery contract, more so
where it does not raise any issue of constitutionality.
Moreover, it cannot sue as a taxpayer absent any
allegation that public funds are being misused. Nor
can it sue as a concerned citizen as it does not
allege any specific injury it has suffered.
In Telecommunications and Broadcast Attorneys of
the Philippines, Inc. v. Comelec,57 the Court
reiterated the "direct injury" test with respect to
concerned citizens cases involving constitutional
issues. It held that "there must be a showing that the
citizen personally suffered some actual or
threatened injury arising from the alleged illegal
official act."
In Lacson v. Perez,58 the Court ruled that one of the
petitioners, Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP),
is not a real party-in-interest as it had not
demonstrated any injury to itself or to its leaders,
members or supporters.
In Sanlakas v. Executive Secretary,59 the Court
ruled that only the petitioners who are members of
Congress have standing to sue, as they claim that
the Presidents declaration of a state of rebellion is a
usurpation of the emergency powers of Congress,
thus impairing their legislative powers. As to
petitioners Sanlakas, Partido Manggagawa, and
Social Justice Society, the Court declared them to
be devoid of standing, equating them with the LDP
in Lacson.
Now, the application of the above principles to the
present petitions.
The locus standi of petitioners in G.R. No. 171396,
particularly David and Llamas, is beyond doubt. The
same holds true with petitioners in G.R. No. 171409,
Cacho-Olivares and Tribune Publishing Co. Inc.
They alleged "direct injury" resulting from "illegal
arrest" and "unlawful search" committed by police
operatives pursuant to PP 1017. Rightly so, the
Solicitor General does not question their legal
standing.
In G.R. No. 171485, the opposition Congressmen
alleged there was usurpation of legislative powers.
They also raised the issue of whether or not the
concurrence of Congress is necessary whenever the
alarming powers incident to Martial Law are used.
Moreover, it is in the interest of justice that those
affected by PP 1017 can be represented by their
Congressmen in bringing to the attention of the
Court the alleged violations of their basic rights.
In G.R. No. 171400, (ALGI), this Court applied the
liberality rule in Philconsa v. Enriquez,60 Kapatiran
Ng Mga Naglilingkod sa Pamahalaan ng Pilipinas,
Inc. v. Tan,61 Association of Small Landowners in
the Philippines, Inc. v. Secretary of Agrarian
Reform,62 Basco v. Philippine Amusement and
Gaming Corporation,63 and Taada v. Tuvera,64
that when the issue concerns a public right, it is
sufficient that the petitioner is a citizen and has an
interest in the execution of the laws.
In G.R. No. 171483, KMUs assertion that PP 1017
and G.O. No. 5 violated its right to peaceful
assembly may be deemed sufficient to give it legal
standing. Organizations may be granted standing to
assert the rights of their members.65 We take
judicial notice of the announcement by the Office of
the President banning all rallies and canceling all
permits for public assemblies following the issuance
of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5.
In G.R. No. 171489, petitioners, Cadiz et al., who
are national officers of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) have no legal standing, having
failed to allege any direct or potential injury which
the IBP as an institution or its members may suffer
as a consequence of the issuance of PP No. 1017
and G.O. No. 5. In Integrated Bar of the Philippines
v. Zamora,66 the Court held that the mere
invocation by the IBP of its duty to preserve the rule
of law and nothing more, while undoubtedly true, is
not sufficient to clothe it with standing in this case.
This is too general an interest which is shared by
other groups and the whole citizenry. However, in
view of the transcendental importance of the issue,
this Court declares that petitioner have locus standi.
In G.R. No. 171424, Loren Legarda has no
personality as a taxpayer to file the instant petition
as there are no allegations of illegal disbursement of
public funds. The fact that she is a former Senator is
of no consequence. She can no longer sue as a
legislator on the allegation that her prerogatives as a
lawmaker have been impaired by PP 1017 and G.O.
No. 5. Her claim that she is a media personality will
not likewise aid her because there was no showing
that the enforcement of these issuances prevented
her from pursuing her occupation. Her submission
that she has pending electoral protest before the
Presidential Electoral Tribunal is likewise of no
relevance. She has not sufficiently shown that PP
1017 will affect the proceedings or result of her
case. But considering once more the transcendental
importance of the issue involved, this Court may
relax the standing rules.
It must always be borne in mind that the question of
locus standi is but corollary to the bigger question of
proper exercise of judicial power. This is the
underlying legal tenet of the "liberality doctrine" on
legal standing. It cannot be doubted that the validity
of PP No. 1017 and G.O. No. 5 is a judicial question
which is of paramount importance to the Filipino
people. To paraphrase Justice Laurel, the whole of
Philippine society now waits with bated breath the
ruling of this Court on this very critical matter. The
petitions thus call for the application of the
"transcendental importance" doctrine, a relaxation of
the standing requirements for the petitioners in the
"PP 1017 cases."1avvphil.net
This Court holds that all the petitioners herein have
locus standi.
Incidentally, it is not proper to implead President
Arroyo as respondent. Settled is the doctrine that the
President, during his tenure of office or actual
incumbency,67 may not be sued in any civil or
criminal case, and there is no need to provide for it
in the Constitution or law. It will degrade the dignity
of the high office of the President, the Head of State,
if he can be dragged into court litigations while
serving as such. Furthermore, it is important that he
be freed from any form of harassment, hindrance or
distraction to enable him to fully attend to the
performance of his official duties and functions.
Unlike the legislative and judicial branch, only one
constitutes the executive branch and anything which
impairs his usefulness in the discharge of the many
great and important duties imposed upon him by the
Constitution necessarily impairs the operation of the
Government. However, this does not mean that the
President is not accountable to anyone. Like any
other official, he remains accountable to the
people68 but he may be removed from office only in
the mode provided by law and that is by
impeachment.69
B. SUBSTANTIVE
I. Review of Factual Bases
Petitioners maintain that PP 1017 has no factual
basis. Hence, it was not "necessary" for President
Arroyo to issue such Proclamation.
The issue of whether the Court may review the
factual bases of the Presidents exercise of his
Commander-in-Chief power has reached its distilled
point - from the indulgent days of Barcelon v.
Baker70 and Montenegro v. Castaneda71 to the
volatile era of Lansang v. Garcia,72 Aquino, Jr. v.
Enrile,73 and Garcia-Padilla v. Enrile.74 The tug-of-
war always cuts across the line defining "political
questions," particularly those questions "in regard to
which full discretionary authority has been delegated
to the legislative or executive branch of the
government."75 Barcelon and Montenegro were in
unison in declaring that the authority to decide
whether an exigency has arisen belongs to the
President and his decision is final and conclusive on
the courts. Lansang took the opposite view. There,
the members of the Court were unanimous in the
conviction that the Court has the authority to inquire
into the existence of factual bases in order to
determine their constitutional sufficiency. From the
principle of separation of powers, it shifted the focus
to the system of checks and balances, "under which
the President is supreme, x x x only if and when he
acts within the sphere allotted to him by the Basic
Law, and the authority to determine whether or not
he has so acted is vested in the Judicial
Department, which in this respect, is, in turn,
constitutionally supreme."76 In 1973, the unanimous
Court of Lansang was divided in Aquino v. Enrile.77
There, the Court was almost evenly divided on the
issue of whether the validity of the imposition of
Martial Law is a political or justiciable question.78
Then came Garcia-Padilla v. Enrile which greatly
diluted Lansang. It declared that there is a need to
re-examine the latter case, ratiocinating that "in
times of war or national emergency, the President
must be given absolute control for the very life of the
nation and the government is in great peril. The
President, it intoned, is answerable only to his
conscience, the People, and God."79
The Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Zamora80 --
a recent case most pertinent to these cases at bar --
echoed a principle similar to Lansang. While the
Court considered the Presidents "calling-out" power
as a discretionary power solely vested in his
wisdom, it stressed that "this does not prevent an
examination of whether such power was exercised
within permissible constitutional limits or whether it
was exercised in a manner constituting grave abuse
of discretion."This ruling is mainly a result of the
Courts reliance on Section 1, Article VIII of 1987
Constitution which fortifies the authority of the courts
to determine in an appropriate action the validity of
the acts of the political departments. Under the new
definition of judicial power, the courts are authorized
not only "to settle actual controversies involving
rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable," but also "to determine whether or not
there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the
part of any branch or instrumentality of the
government." The latter part of the authority
represents a broadening of judicial power to enable
the courts of justice to review what was before a
forbidden territory, to wit, the discretion of the
political departments of the government.81 It speaks
of judicial prerogative not only in terms of power but
also of duty.82
As to how the Court may inquire into the Presidents
exercise of power, Lansang adopted the test that
"judicial inquiry can go no further than to satisfy the
Court not that the Presidents decision is correct,"
but that "the President did not act arbitrarily." Thus,
the standard laid down is not correctness, but
arbitrariness.83 In Integrated Bar of the Philippines,
this Court further ruled that "it is incumbent upon the
petitioner to show that the Presidents decision is
totally bereft of factual basis" and that if he fails, by
way of proof, to support his assertion, then "this
Court cannot undertake an independent
investigation beyond the pleadings."
Petitioners failed to show that President Arroyos
exercise of the calling-out power, by issuing PP
1017, is totally bereft of factual basis. A reading of
the Solicitor Generals Consolidated Comment and
Memorandum shows a detailed narration of the
events leading to the issuance of PP 1017, with
supporting reports forming part of the records.
Mentioned are the escape of the Magdalo Group,
their audacious threat of the Magdalo D-Day, the
defections in the military, particularly in the
Philippine Marines, and the reproving statements
from the communist leaders. There was also the
Minutes of the Intelligence Report and Security
Group of the Philippine Army showing the growing
alliance between the NPA and the military.
Petitioners presented nothing to refute such events.
Thus, absent any contrary allegations, the Court is
convinced that the President was justified in issuing
PP 1017 calling for military aid.
Indeed, judging the seriousness of the incidents,
President Arroyo was not expected to simply fold her
arms and do nothing to prevent or suppress what
she believed was lawless violence, invasion or
rebellion. However, the exercise of such power or
duty must not stifle liberty.
II. Constitutionality of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5
Doctrines of Several Political Theorists
on the Power of the President in Times of
Emergency
This case brings to fore a contentious subject -- the
power of the President in times of emergency. A
glimpse at the various political theories relating to
this subject provides an adequate backdrop for our
ensuing discussion.
John Locke, describing the architecture of civil
government, called upon the English doctrine of
prerogative to cope with the problem of emergency.
In times of danger to the nation, positive law enacted
by the legislature might be inadequate or even a
fatal obstacle to the promptness of action necessary
to avert catastrophe. In these situations, the Crown
retained a prerogative "power to act according to
discretion for the public good, without the
proscription of the law and sometimes even against
it."84 But Locke recognized that this moral restraint
might not suffice to avoid abuse of prerogative
powers. Who shall judge the need for resorting to
the prerogative and how may its abuse be avoided?
Here, Locke readily admitted defeat, suggesting that
"the people have no other remedy in this, as in all
other cases where they have no judge on earth, but
to appeal to Heaven."85
Jean-Jacques Rousseau also assumed the need for
temporary suspension of democratic processes of
government in time of emergency. According to him:
The inflexibility of the laws, which prevents them
from adopting themselves to circumstances, may, in
certain cases, render them disastrous and make
them bring about, at a time of crisis, the ruin of the
State
It is wrong therefore to wish to make political
institutions as strong as to render it impossible to
suspend their operation. Even Sparta allowed its law
to lapse...
If the peril is of such a kind that the paraphernalia of
the laws are an obstacle to their preservation, the
method is to nominate a supreme lawyer, who shall
silence all the laws and suspend for a moment the
sovereign authority. In such a case, there is no
doubt about the general will, and it clear that the
peoples first intention is that the State shall not
perish.86
Rosseau did not fear the abuse of the emergency
dictatorship or "supreme magistracy" as he termed
it. For him, it would more likely be cheapened by
"indiscreet use." He was unwilling to rely upon an
"appeal to heaven." Instead, he relied upon a tenure
of office of prescribed duration to avoid perpetuation
of the dictatorship.87
John Stuart Mill concluded his ardent defense of
representative government: "I am far from
condemning, in cases of extreme necessity, the
assumption of absolute power in the form of a
temporary dictatorship."88
Nicollo Machiavellis view of emergency powers, as
one element in the whole scheme of limited
government, furnished an ironic contrast to the
Lockean theory of prerogative. He recognized and
attempted to bridge this chasm in democratic
political theory, thus:
Now, in a well-ordered society, it should never be
necessary to resort to extra constitutional
measures; for although they may for a time be
beneficial, yet the precedent is pernicious, for if the
practice is once established for good objects, they
will in a little while be disregarded under that pretext
but for evil purposes. Thus, no republic will ever be
perfect if she has not by law provided for everything,
having a remedy for every emergency and fixed
rules for applying it.89
Machiavelli in contrast to Locke, Rosseau and Mill
sought to incorporate into the constitution a
regularized system of standby emergency powers to
be invoked with suitable checks and controls in time
of national danger. He attempted forthrightly to meet
the problem of combining a capacious reserve of
power and speed and vigor in its application in time
of emergency, with effective constitutional
restraints.90
Contemporary political theorists, addressing
themselves to the problem of response to
emergency by constitutional democracies, have
employed the doctrine of constitutional
dictatorship.91 Frederick M. Watkins saw "no reason
why absolutism should not be used as a means for
the defense of liberal institutions," provided it "serves
to protect established institutions from the danger of
permanent injury in a period of temporary
emergency and is followed by a prompt return to the
previous forms of political life."92 He recognized the
two (2) key elements of the problem of emergency
governance, as well as all constitutional governance:
increasing administrative powers of the executive,
while at the same time "imposing limitation upon that
power."93 Watkins placed his real faith in a scheme
of constitutional dictatorship. These are the
conditions of success of such a dictatorship: "The
period of dictatorship must be relatively
shortDictatorship should always be strictly
legitimate in characterFinal authority to determine
the need for dictatorship in any given case must
never rest with the dictator himself"94 and the
objective of such an emergency dictatorship should
be "strict political conservatism."
Carl J. Friedrich cast his analysis in terms similar to
those of Watkins.95 "It is a problem of concentrating
power in a government where power has
consciously been divided to cope with situations
of unprecedented magnitude and gravity. There
must be a broad grant of powers, subject to equally
strong limitations as to who shall exercise such
powers, when, for how long, and to what end."96
Friedrich, too, offered criteria for judging the
adequacy of any of scheme of emergency powers,
to wit: "The emergency executive must be appointed
by constitutional means i.e., he must be legitimate;
he should not enjoy power to determine the
existence of an emergency; emergency powers
should be exercised under a strict time limitation;
and last, the objective of emergency action must be
the defense of the constitutional order."97
Clinton L. Rossiter, after surveying the history of the
employment of emergency powers in Great Britain,
France, Weimar, Germany and the United States,
reverted to a description of a scheme of
"constitutional dictatorship" as solution to the vexing
problems presented by emergency.98 Like Watkins
and Friedrich, he stated a priori the conditions of
success of the "constitutional dictatorship," thus:
1) No general regime or particular institution of
constitutional dictatorship should be initiated unless
it is necessary or even indispensable to the
preservation of the State and its constitutional
order
2) the decision to institute a constitutional
dictatorship should never be in the hands of the man
or men who will constitute the dictator
3) No government should initiate a constitutional
dictatorship without making specific provisions for its
termination
4) all uses of emergency powers and all
readjustments in the organization of the government
should be effected in pursuit of constitutional or legal
requirements
5) no dictatorial institution should be adopted, no
right invaded, no regular procedure altered any more
than is absolutely necessary for the conquest of the
particular crisis . . .
6) The measures adopted in the prosecution of the a
constitutional dictatorship should never be
permanent in character or effect
7) The dictatorship should be carried on by persons
representative of every part of the citizenry
interested in the defense of the existing
constitutional order. . .
8) Ultimate responsibility should be maintained for
every action taken under a constitutional
dictatorship. . .
9) The decision to terminate a constitutional
dictatorship, like the decision to institute one should
never be in the hands of the man or men who
constitute the dictator. . .
10) No constitutional dictatorship should extend
beyond the termination of the crisis for which it was
instituted
11) the termination of the crisis must be followed
by a complete return as possible to the political and
governmental conditions existing prior to the
initiation of the constitutional dictatorship99
Rossiter accorded to legislature a far greater role in
the oversight exercise of emergency powers than
did Watkins. He would secure to Congress final
responsibility for declaring the existence or
termination of an emergency, and he places great
faith in the effectiveness of congressional
investigating committees.100
Scott and Cotter, in analyzing the above
contemporary theories in light of recent experience,
were one in saying that, "the suggestion that
democracies surrender the control of government to
an authoritarian ruler in time of grave danger to the
nation is not based upon sound constitutional
theory." To appraise emergency power in terms of
constitutional dictatorship serves merely to distort
the problem and hinder realistic analysis. It matters
not whether the term "dictator" is used in its normal
sense (as applied to authoritarian rulers) or is
employed to embrace all chief executives
administering emergency powers. However used,
"constitutional dictatorship" cannot be divorced from
the implication of suspension of the processes of
constitutionalism. Thus, they favored instead the
"concept of constitutionalism" articulated by Charles
H. McIlwain:
A concept of constitutionalism which is less
misleading in the analysis of problems of emergency
powers, and which is consistent with the findings of
this study, is that formulated by Charles H. McIlwain.
While it does not by any means necessarily exclude
some indeterminate limitations upon the substantive
powers of government, full emphasis is placed upon
procedural limitations, and political responsibility.
McIlwain clearly recognized the need to repose
adequate power in government. And in discussing
the meaning of constitutionalism, he insisted that the
historical and proper test of constitutionalism was
the existence of adequate processes for keeping
government responsible. He refused to equate
constitutionalism with the enfeebling of government
by an exaggerated emphasis upon separation of
powers and substantive limitations on governmental
power. He found that the really effective checks on
despotism have consisted not in the weakening of
government but, but rather in the limiting of it;
between which there is a great and very significant
difference. In associating constitutionalism with
"limited" as distinguished from "weak" government,
McIlwain meant government limited to the orderly
procedure of law as opposed to the processes of
force. The two fundamental correlative elements of
constitutionalism for which all lovers of liberty must
yet fight are the legal limits to arbitrary power and a
complete political responsibility of government to the
governed.101
In the final analysis, the various approaches to
emergency of the above political theorists - from
Locks "theory of prerogative," to Watkins doctrine of
"constitutional dictatorship" and, eventually, to
McIlwains "principle of constitutionalism" ---
ultimately aim to solve one real problem in
emergency governance, i.e., that of allotting
increasing areas of discretionary power to the Chief
Executive, while insuring that such powers will be
exercised with a sense of political responsibility and
under effective limitations and checks.
Our Constitution has fairly coped with this problem.
Fresh from the fetters of a repressive regime, the
1986 Constitutional Commission, in drafting the
1987 Constitution, endeavored to create a
government in the concept of Justice Jacksons
"balanced power structure."102 Executive,
legislative, and judicial powers are dispersed to the
President, the Congress, and the Supreme Court,
respectively. Each is supreme within its own sphere.
But none has the monopoly of power in times of
emergency. Each branch is given a role to serve as
limitation or check upon the other. This system does
not weaken the President, it just limits his power,
using the language of McIlwain. In other words, in
times of emergency, our Constitution reasonably
demands that we repose a certain amount of faith in
the basic integrity and wisdom of the Chief
Executive but, at the same time, it obliges him to
operate within carefully prescribed procedural
limitations.
a. "Facial Challenge"
Petitioners contend that PP 1017 is void on its face
because of its "overbreadth." They claim that its
enforcement encroached on both unprotected and
protected rights under Section 4, Article III of the
Constitution and sent a "chilling effect" to the
citizens.
A facial review of PP 1017, using the overbreadth
doctrine, is uncalled for.
First and foremost, the overbreadth doctrine is an
analytical tool developed for testing "on their faces"
statutes in free speech cases, also known under the
American Law as First Amendment cases.103
A plain reading of PP 1017 shows that it is not
primarily directed to speech or even speech-related
conduct. It is actually a call upon the AFP to prevent
or suppress all forms of lawless violence. In United
States v. Salerno,104 the US Supreme Court held
that "we have not recognized an overbreadth
doctrine outside the limited context of the First
Amendment" (freedom of speech).
Moreover, the overbreadth doctrine is not intended
for testing the validity of a law that "reflects
legitimate state interest in maintaining
comprehensive control over harmful, constitutionally
unprotected conduct." Undoubtedly, lawless
violence, insurrection and rebellion are considered
"harmful" and "constitutionally unprotected conduct."
In Broadrick v. Oklahoma,105 it was held:
It remains a matter of no little difficulty to determine
when a law may properly be held void on its face
and when such summary action is inappropriate.
But the plain import of our cases is, at the very least,
that facial overbreadth adjudication is an exception
to our traditional rules of practice and that its
function, a limited one at the outset, attenuates as
the otherwise unprotected behavior that it forbids the
State to sanction moves from pure speech toward
conduct and that conduct even if expressive falls
within the scope of otherwise valid criminal laws that
reflect legitimate state interests in maintaining
comprehensive controls over harmful,
constitutionally unprotected conduct.
Thus, claims of facial overbreadth are entertained in
cases involving statutes which, by their terms, seek
to regulate only "spoken words" and again, that
"overbreadth claims, if entertained at all, have been
curtailed when invoked against ordinary criminal
laws that are sought to be applied to protected
conduct."106 Here, the incontrovertible fact remains
that PP 1017 pertains to a spectrum of conduct, not
free speech, which is manifestly subject to state
regulation.
Second, facial invalidation of laws is considered as
"manifestly strong medicine," to be used "sparingly
and only as a last resort," and is "generally
disfavored;"107 The reason for this is obvious.
Embedded in the traditional rules governing
constitutional adjudication is the principle that a
person to whom a law may be applied will not be
heard to challenge a law on the ground that it may
conceivably be applied unconstitutionally to others,
i.e., in other situations not before the Court.108 A
writer and scholar in Constitutional Law explains
further:
The most distinctive feature of the overbreadth
technique is that it marks an exception to some of
the usual rules of constitutional litigation. Ordinarily,
a particular litigant claims that a statute is
unconstitutional as applied to him or her; if the
litigant prevails, the courts carve away the
unconstitutional aspects of the law by invalidating its
improper applications on a case to case basis.
Moreover, challengers to a law are not permitted to
raise the rights of third parties and can only assert
their own interests. In overbreadth analysis, those
rules give way; challenges are permitted to raise the
rights of third parties; and the court invalidates the
entire statute "on its face," not merely "as applied
for" so that the overbroad law becomes
unenforceable until a properly authorized court
construes it more narrowly. The factor that motivates
courts to depart from the normal adjudicatory rules is
the concern with the "chilling;" deterrent effect of the
overbroad statute on third parties not courageous
enough to bring suit. The Court assumes that an
overbroad laws "very existence may cause others
not before the court to refrain from constitutionally
protected speech or expression." An overbreadth
ruling is designed to remove that deterrent effect on
the speech of those third parties.
In other words, a facial challenge using the
overbreadth doctrine will require the Court to
examine PP 1017 and pinpoint its flaws and defects,
not on the basis of its actual operation to petitioners,
but on the assumption or prediction that its very
existence may cause others not before the Court to
refrain from constitutionally protected speech or
expression. In Younger v. Harris,109 it was held
that:
[T]he task of analyzing a proposed statute,
pinpointing its deficiencies, and requiring correction
of these deficiencies before the statute is put into
effect, is rarely if ever an appropriate task for the
judiciary. The combination of the relative
remoteness of the controversy, the impact on the
legislative process of the relief sought, and above all
the speculative and amorphous nature of the
required line-by-line analysis of detailed
statutes,...ordinarily results in a kind of case that is
wholly unsatisfactory for deciding constitutional
questions, whichever way they might be decided.
And third, a facial challenge on the ground of
overbreadth is the most difficult challenge to mount
successfully, since the challenger must establish
that there can be no instance when the assailed law
may be valid. Here, petitioners did not even attempt
to show whether this situation exists.
Petitioners likewise seek a facial review of PP 1017
on the ground of vagueness. This, too, is
unwarranted.
Related to the "overbreadth" doctrine is the "void for
vagueness doctrine" which holds that "a law is
facially invalid if men of common intelligence must
necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its
application."110 It is subject to the same principles
governing overbreadth doctrine. For one, it is also
an analytical tool for testing "on their faces" statutes
in free speech cases. And like overbreadth, it is said
that a litigant may challenge a statute on its face
only if it is vague in all its possible applications.
Again, petitioners did not even attempt to show that
PP 1017 is vague in all its application. They also
failed to establish that men of common intelligence
cannot understand the meaning and application of
PP 1017.
b. Constitutional Basis of PP 1017
Now on the constitutional foundation of PP 1017.
The operative portion of PP 1017 may be divided
into three important provisions, thus:
First provision:
"by virtue of the power vested upon me by Section
18, Artilce VII do hereby command the Armed
Forces of the Philippines, to maintain law and order
throughout the Philippines, prevent or suppress all
forms of lawless violence as well any act of
insurrection or rebellion"
Second provision:
"and to enforce obedience to all the laws and to all
decrees, orders and regulations promulgated by me
personally or upon my direction;"
Third provision:
"as provided in Section 17, Article XII of the
Constitution do hereby declare a State of National
Emergency."
First Provision: Calling-out Power
The first provision pertains to the Presidents calling-
out power. In Sanlakas v. Executive Secretary,111
this Court, through Mr. Justice Dante O. Tinga, held
that Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution
reproduced as follows:
Sec. 18. The President shall be the Commander-in-
Chief of all armed forces of the Philippines and
whenever it becomes necessary, he may call out
such armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless
violence, invasion or rebellion. In case of invasion or
rebellion, when the public safety requires it, he may,
for a period not exceeding sixty days, suspend the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or place the
Philippines or any part thereof under martial law.
Within forty-eight hours from the proclamation of
martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus, the President shall submit a
report in person or in writing to the Congress. The
Congress, voting jointly, by a vote of at least a
majority of all its Members in regular or special
session, may revoke such proclamation or
suspension, which revocation shall not be set aside
by the President. Upon the initiative of the President,
the Congress may, in the same manner, extend
such proclamation or suspension for a period to be
determined by the Congress, if the invasion or
rebellion shall persist and public safety requires it.
The Congress, if not in session, shall within twenty-
four hours following such proclamation or
suspension, convene in accordance with its rules
without need of a call.
The Supreme Court may review, in an appropriate
proceeding filed by any citizen, the sufficiency of the
factual bases of the proclamation of martial law or
the suspension of the privilege of the writ or the
extension thereof, and must promulgate its decision
thereon within thirty days from its filing.
A state of martial law does not suspend the
operation of the Constitution, nor supplant the
functioning of the civil courts or legislative
assemblies, nor authorize the conferment of
jurisdiction on military courts and agencies over
civilians where civil courts are able to function, nor
automatically suspend the privilege of the writ.
The suspension of the privilege of the writ shall
apply only to persons judicially charged for rebellion
or offenses inherent in or directly connected with
invasion.
During the suspension of the privilege of the writ,
any person thus arrested or detained shall be
judicially charged within three days, otherwise he
shall be released.
grants the President, as Commander-in-Chief, a
"sequence" of graduated powers. From the most to
the least benign, these are: the calling-out power,
the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus, and the power to declare Martial
Law. Citing Integrated Bar of the Philippines v.
Zamora,112 the Court ruled that the only criterion for
the exercise of the calling-out power is that
"whenever it becomes necessary," the President
may call the armed forces "to prevent or suppress
lawless violence, invasion or rebellion." Are these
conditions present in the instant cases? As stated
earlier, considering the circumstances then
prevailing, President Arroyo found it necessary to
issue PP 1017. Owing to her Offices vast
intelligence network, she is in the best position to
determine the actual condition of the country.
Under the calling-out power, the President may
summon the armed forces to aid him in suppressing
lawless violence, invasion and rebellion. This
involves ordinary police action. But every act that
goes beyond the Presidents calling-out power is
considered illegal or ultra vires. For this reason, a
President must be careful in the exercise of his
powers. He cannot invoke a greater power when he
wishes to act under a lesser power. There lies the
wisdom of our Constitution, the greater the power,
the greater are the limitations.
It is pertinent to state, however, that there is a
distinction between the Presidents authority to
declare a "state of rebellion" (in Sanlakas) and the
authority to proclaim a state of national emergency.
While President Arroyos authority to declare a "state
of rebellion" emanates from her powers as Chief
Executive, the statutory authority cited in Sanlakas
was Section 4, Chapter 2, Book II of the Revised
Administrative Code of 1987, which provides:
SEC. 4. Proclamations. Acts of the President
fixing a date or declaring a status or condition of
public moment or interest, upon the existence of
which the operation of a specific law or regulation is
made to depend, shall be promulgated in
proclamations which shall have the force of an
executive order.
President Arroyos declaration of a "state of
rebellion" was merely an act declaring a status or
condition of public moment or interest, a declaration
allowed under Section 4 cited above. Such
declaration, in the words of Sanlakas, is harmless,
without legal significance, and deemed not written.
In these cases, PP 1017 is more than that. In
declaring a state of national emergency, President
Arroyo did not only rely on Section 18, Article VII of
the Constitution, a provision calling on the AFP to
prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or
rebellion. She also relied on Section 17, Article XII, a
provision on the States extraordinary power to take
over privately-owned public utility and business
affected with public interest. Indeed, PP 1017 calls
for the exercise of an awesome power. Obviously,
such Proclamation cannot be deemed harmless,
without legal significance, or not written, as in the
case of Sanlakas.
Some of the petitioners vehemently maintain that PP
1017 is actually a declaration of Martial Law. It is no
so. What defines the character of PP 1017 are its
wordings. It is plain therein that what the President
invoked was her calling-out power.
The declaration of Martial Law is a "warn[ing] to
citizens that the military power has been called upon
by the executive to assist in the maintenance of law
and order, and that, while the emergency lasts, they
must, upon pain of arrest and punishment, not
commit any acts which will in any way render more
difficult the restoration of order and the enforcement
of law."113
In his "Statement before the Senate Committee on
Justice" on March 13, 2006, Mr. Justice Vicente V.
Mendoza,114 an authority in constitutional law, said
that of the three powers of the President as
Commander-in-Chief, the power to declare Martial
Law poses the most severe threat to civil liberties. It
is a strong medicine which should not be resorted to
lightly. It cannot be used to stifle or persecute critics
of the government. It is placed in the keeping of the
President for the purpose of enabling him to secure
the people from harm and to restore order so that
they can enjoy their individual freedoms. In fact,
Section 18, Art. VII, provides:
A state of martial law does not suspend the
operation of the Constitution, nor supplant the
functioning of the civil courts or legislative
assemblies, nor authorize the conferment of
jurisdiction on military courts and agencies over
civilians where civil courts are able to function, nor
automatically suspend the privilege of the writ.
Justice Mendoza also stated that PP 1017 is not a
declaration of Martial Law. It is no more than a call
by the President to the armed forces to prevent or
suppress lawless violence. As such, it cannot be
used to justify acts that only under a valid
declaration of Martial Law can be done. Its use for
any other purpose is a perversion of its nature and
scope, and any act done contrary to its command is
ultra vires.
Justice Mendoza further stated that specifically, (a)
arrests and seizures without judicial warrants; (b)
ban on public assemblies; (c) take-over of news
media and agencies and press censorship; and (d)
issuance of Presidential Decrees, are powers which
can be exercised by the President as Commander-
in-Chief only where there is a valid declaration of
Martial Law or suspension of the writ of habeas
corpus.
Based on the above disquisition, it is clear that PP
1017 is not a declaration of Martial Law. It is merely
an exercise of President Arroyos calling-out power
for the armed forces to assist her in preventing or
suppressing lawless violence.
Second Provision: "Take Care" Power
The second provision pertains to the power of the
President to ensure that the laws be faithfully
executed. This is based on Section 17, Article VII
which reads:
SEC. 17. The President shall have control of all the
executive departments, bureaus, and offices. He
shall ensure that the laws be faithfully executed.
As the Executive in whom the executive power is
vested,115 the primary function of the President is to
enforce the laws as well as to formulate policies to
be embodied in existing laws. He sees to it that all
laws are enforced by the officials and employees of
his department. Before assuming office, he is
required to take an oath or affirmation to the effect
that as President of the Philippines, he will, among
others, "execute its laws."116 In the exercise of such
function, the President, if needed, may employ the
powers attached to his office as the Commander-in-
Chief of all the armed forces of the country,117
including the Philippine National Police118 under the
Department of Interior and Local Government.119
Petitioners, especially Representatives Francis
Joseph G. Escudero, Satur Ocampo, Rafael
Mariano, Teodoro Casio, Liza Maza, and Josel
Virador argue that PP 1017 is unconstitutional as it
arrogated upon President Arroyo the power to enact
laws and decrees in violation of Section 1, Article VI
of the Constitution, which vests the power to enact
laws in Congress. They assail the clause "to enforce
obedience to all the laws and to all decrees, orders
and regulations promulgated by me personally or
upon my direction."
\ which shall have the force of an executive order.
Petitioners contention is understandable. A reading
of PP 1017 operative clause shows that it was
lifted120 from Former President Marcos
Proclamation No. 1081, which partly reads:
NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS,
President of the Philippines by virtue of the powers
vested upon me by Article VII, Section 10,
Paragraph (2) of the Constitution, do hereby place
the entire Philippines as defined in Article 1, Section
1 of the Constitution under martial law and, in my
capacity as their Commander-in-Chief, do hereby
command the Armed Forces of the Philippines, to
maintain law and order throughout the Philippines,
prevent or suppress all forms of lawless violence as
well as any act of insurrection or rebellion and to
enforce obedience to all the laws and decrees,
orders and regulations promulgated by me
personally or upon my direction.
We all know that it was PP 1081 which granted
President Marcos legislative power. Its enabling
clause states: "to enforce obedience to all the laws
and decrees, orders and regulations promulgated by
me personally or upon my direction." Upon the other
hand, the enabling clause of PP 1017 issued by
President Arroyo is: to enforce obedience to all the
laws and to all decrees, orders and regulations
promulgated by me personally or upon my direction."
Is it within the domain of President Arroyo to
promulgate "decrees"?
PP 1017 states in part: "to enforce obedience to all
the laws and decrees x x x promulgated by me
personally or upon my direction."
The President is granted an Ordinance Power under
Chapter 2, Book III of Executive Order No. 292
(Administrative Code of 1987). She may issue any of
the following:
Sec. 2. Executive Orders. Acts of the President
providing for rules of a general or permanent
character in implementation or execution of
constitutional or statutory powers shall be
promulgated in executive orders.
Sec. 3. Administrative Orders. Acts of the
President which relate to particular aspect of
governmental operations in pursuance of his duties
as administrative head shall be promulgated in
administrative orders.
Sec. 4. Proclamations. Acts of the President fixing
a date or declaring a status or condition of public
moment or interest, upon the existence of which the
operation of a specific law or regulation is made to
depend, shall be promulgated in proclamations
Sec. 5. Memorandum Orders. Acts of the
President on matters of administrative detail or of
subordinate or temporary interest which only
concern a particular officer or office of the
Government shall be embodied in memorandum
orders.
Sec. 6. Memorandum Circulars. Acts of the
President on matters relating to internal
administration, which the President desires to bring
to the attention of all or some of the departments,
agencies, bureaus or offices of the Government, for
information or compliance, shall be embodied in
memorandum circulars.
Sec. 7. General or Special Orders. Acts and
commands of the President in his capacity as
Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines shall be issued as general or special
orders.
President Arroyos ordinance power is limited to the
foregoing issuances. She cannot issue decrees
similar to those issued by Former President Marcos
under PP 1081. Presidential Decrees are laws which
are of the same category and binding force as
statutes because they were issued by the President
in the exercise of his legislative power during the
period of Martial Law under the 1973
Constitution.121
This Court rules that the assailed PP 1017 is
unconstitutional insofar as it grants President Arroyo
the authority to promulgate "decrees." Legislative
power is peculiarly within the province of the
Legislature. Section 1, Article VI categorically states
that "[t]he legislative power shall be vested in the
Congress of the Philippines which shall consist of a
Senate and a House of Representatives." To be
sure, neither Martial Law nor a state of rebellion nor
a state of emergency can justify President Arroyos
exercise of legislative power by issuing decrees.
Can President Arroyo enforce obedience to all
decrees and laws through the military?
As this Court stated earlier, President Arroyo has no
authority to enact decrees. It follows that these
decrees are void and, therefore, cannot be enforced.
With respect to "laws," she cannot call the military to
enforce or implement certain laws, such as customs
laws, laws governing family and property relations,
laws on obligations and contracts and the like. She
can only order the military, under PP 1017, to
enforce laws pertinent to its duty to suppress lawless
violence.
Third Provision: Power to Take Over
The pertinent provision of PP 1017 states:
x x x and to enforce obedience to all the laws and to
all decrees, orders, and regulations promulgated by
me personally or upon my direction; and as provided
in Section 17, Article XII of the Constitution do
hereby declare a state of national emergency.
The import of this provision is that President Arroyo,
during the state of national emergency under PP
1017, can call the military not only to enforce
obedience "to all the laws and to all decrees x x x"
but also to act pursuant to the provision of Section
17, Article XII which reads:
Sec. 17. In times of national emergency, when the
public interest so requires, the State may, during the
emergency and under reasonable terms prescribed
by it, temporarily take over or direct the operation of
any privately-owned public utility or business
affected with public interest.
What could be the reason of President Arroyo in
invoking the above provision when she issued PP
1017?
The answer is simple. During the existence of the
state of national emergency, PP 1017 purports to
grant the President, without any authority or
delegation from Congress, to take over or direct the
operation of any privately-owned public utility or
business affected with public interest.
This provision was first introduced in the 1973
Constitution, as a product of the "martial law"
thinking of the 1971 Constitutional Convention.122
In effect at the time of its approval was President
Marcos Letter of Instruction No. 2 dated September
22, 1972 instructing the Secretary of National
Defense to take over "the management, control and
operation of the Manila Electric Company, the
Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company, the
National Waterworks and Sewerage Authority, the
Philippine National Railways, the Philippine Air
Lines, Air Manila (and) Filipinas Orient Airways . . .
for the successful prosecution by the Government of
its effort to contain, solve and end the present
national emergency."
Petitioners, particularly the members of the House of
Representatives, claim that President Arroyos
inclusion of Section 17, Article XII in PP 1017 is an
encroachment on the legislatures emergency
powers.
This is an area that needs delineation.
A distinction must be drawn between the Presidents
authority to declare "a state of national emergency"
and to exercise emergency powers. To the first, as
elucidated by the Court, Section 18, Article VII
grants the President such power, hence, no
legitimate constitutional objection can be raised. But
to the second, manifold constitutional issues arise.
Section 23, Article VI of the Constitution reads:

SEC. 23. (1) The Congress, by a vote of two-thirds
of both Houses in joint session assembled, voting
separately, shall have the sole power to declare the
existence of a state of war.
(2) In times of war or other national emergency, the
Congress may, by law, authorize the President, for a
limited period and subject to such restrictions as it
may prescribe, to exercise powers necessary and
proper to carry out a declared national policy. Unless
sooner withdrawn by resolution of the Congress,
such powers shall cease upon the next adjournment
thereof.
It may be pointed out that the second paragraph of
the above provision refers not only to war but also to
"other national emergency." If the intention of the
Framers of our Constitution was to withhold from the
President the authority to declare a "state of national
emergency" pursuant to Section 18, Article VII
(calling-out power) and grant it to Congress (like the
declaration of the existence of a state of war), then
the Framers could have provided so. Clearly, they
did not intend that Congress should first authorize
the President before he can declare a "state of
national emergency." The logical conclusion then is
that President Arroyo could validly declare the
existence of a state of national emergency even in
the absence of a Congressional enactment.
But the exercise of emergency powers, such as the
taking over of privately owned public utility or
business affected with public interest, is a different
matter. This requires a delegation from Congress.
Courts have often said that constitutional provisions
in pari materia are to be construed together.
Otherwise stated, different clauses, sections, and
provisions of a constitution which relate to the same
subject matter will be construed together and
considered in the light of each other.123
Considering that Section 17 of Article XII and
Section 23 of Article VI, previously quoted, relate to
national emergencies, they must be read together to
determine the limitation of the exercise of
emergency powers.
Generally, Congress is the repository of emergency
powers. This is evident in the tenor of Section 23 (2),
Article VI authorizing it to delegate such powers to
the President. Certainly, a body cannot delegate a
power not reposed upon it. However, knowing that
during grave emergencies, it may not be possible or
practicable for Congress to meet and exercise its
powers, the Framers of our Constitution deemed it
wise to allow Congress to grant emergency powers
to the President, subject to certain conditions, thus:
(1) There must be a war or other emergency.
(2) The delegation must be for a limited period only.
(3) The delegation must be subject to such
restrictions as the Congress may prescribe.
(4) The emergency powers must be exercised to
carry out a national policy declared by Congress.124
Section 17, Article XII must be understood as an
aspect of the emergency powers clause. The taking
over of private business affected with public interest
is just another facet of the emergency powers
generally reposed upon Congress. Thus, when
Section 17 states that the "the State may, during the
emergency and under reasonable terms prescribed
by it, temporarily take over or direct the operation of
any privately owned public utility or business
affected with public interest," it refers to Congress,
not the President. Now, whether or not the President
may exercise such power is dependent on whether
Congress may delegate it to him pursuant to a law
prescribing the reasonable terms thereof.
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. et al. v. Sawyer,125
held:
It is clear that if the President had authority to issue
the order he did, it must be found in some provision
of the Constitution. And it is not claimed that express
constitutional language grants this power to the
President. The contention is that presidential power
should be implied from the aggregate of his powers
under the Constitution. Particular reliance is placed
on provisions in Article II which say that "The
executive Power shall be vested in a President . . .
.;" that "he shall take Care that the Laws be faithfully
executed;" and that he "shall be Commander-in-
Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States.
The order cannot properly be sustained as an
exercise of the Presidents military power as
Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces. The
Government attempts to do so by citing a number of
cases upholding broad powers in military
commanders engaged in day-to-day fighting in a
theater of war. Such cases need not concern us
here. Even though "theater of war" be an expanding
concept, we cannot with faithfulness to our
constitutional system hold that the Commander-in-
Chief of the Armed Forces has the ultimate power as
such to take possession of private property in order
to keep labor disputes from stopping production.
This is a job for the nations lawmakers, not for its
military authorities.
Nor can the seizure order be sustained because of
the several constitutional provisions that grant
executive power to the President. In the framework
of our Constitution, the Presidents power to see that
the laws are faithfully executed refutes the idea that
he is to be a lawmaker. The Constitution limits his
functions in the lawmaking process to the
recommending of laws he thinks wise and the
vetoing of laws he thinks bad. And the Constitution
is neither silent nor equivocal about who shall make
laws which the President is to execute. The first
section of the first article says that "All legislative
Powers herein granted shall be vested in a
Congress of the United States. . ."126
Petitioner Cacho-Olivares, et al. contends that the
term "emergency" under Section 17, Article XII
refers to "tsunami," "typhoon," "hurricane"and"similar
occurrences." This is a limited view of "emergency."
Emergency, as a generic term, connotes the
existence of conditions suddenly intensifying the
degree of existing danger to life or well-being
beyond that which is accepted as normal. Implicit in
this definitions are the elements of intensity, variety,
and perception.127 Emergencies, as perceived by
legislature or executive in the United Sates since
1933, have been occasioned by a wide range of
situations, classifiable under three (3) principal
heads: a) economic,128 b) natural disaster,129 and
c) national security.130
"Emergency," as contemplated in our Constitution, is
of the same breadth. It may include rebellion,
economic crisis, pestilence or epidemic, typhoon,
flood, or other similar catastrophe of nationwide
proportions or effect.131 This is evident in the
Records of the Constitutional Commission, thus:
MR. GASCON. Yes. What is the Committees
definition of "national emergency" which appears in
Section 13, page 5? It reads:
When the common good so requires, the State may
temporarily take over or direct the operation of any
privately owned public utility or business affected
with public interest.
MR. VILLEGAS. What I mean is threat from external
aggression, for example, calamities or natural
disasters.
MR. GASCON. There is a question by
Commissioner de los Reyes. What about strikes and
riots?
MR. VILLEGAS. Strikes, no; those would not be
covered by the term "national emergency."
MR. BENGZON. Unless they are of such proportions
such that they would paralyze government
service.132
xxxxxx
MR. TINGSON. May I ask the committee if "national
emergency" refers to military national emergency or
could this be economic emergency?"
MR. VILLEGAS. Yes, it could refer to both military or
economic dislocations.
MR. TINGSON. Thank you very much.133
It may be argued that when there is national
emergency, Congress may not be able to convene
and, therefore, unable to delegate to the President
the power to take over privately-owned public utility
or business affected with public interest.
In Araneta v. Dinglasan,134 this Court emphasized
that legislative power, through which extraordinary
measures are exercised, remains in Congress even
in times of crisis.
"x x x
After all the criticisms that have been made against
the efficiency of the system of the separation of
powers, the fact remains that the Constitution has
set up this form of government, with all its defects
and shortcomings, in preference to the commingling
of powers in one man or group of men. The Filipino
people by adopting parliamentary government have
given notice that they share the faith of other
democracy-loving peoples in this system, with all its
faults, as the ideal. The point is, under this
framework of government, legislation is preserved
for Congress all the time, not excepting periods of
crisis no matter how serious. Never in the history of
the United States, the basic features of whose
Constitution have been copied in ours, have specific
functions of the legislative branch of enacting laws
been surrendered to another department unless
we regard as legislating the carrying out of a
legislative policy according to prescribed standards;
no, not even when that Republic was fighting a total
war, or when it was engaged in a life-and-death
struggle to preserve the Union. The truth is that
under our concept of constitutional government, in
times of extreme perils more than in normal
circumstances the various branches, executive,
legislative, and judicial, given the ability to act, are
called upon to perform the duties and discharge the
responsibilities committed to them respectively."
Following our interpretation of Section 17, Article XII,
invoked by President Arroyo in issuing PP 1017, this
Court rules that such Proclamation does not
authorize her during the emergency to temporarily
take over or direct the operation of any privately
owned public utility or business affected with public
interest without authority from Congress.
Let it be emphasized that while the President alone
can declare a state of national emergency, however,
without legislation, he has no power to take over
privately-owned public utility or business affected
with public interest. The President cannot decide
whether exceptional circumstances exist warranting
the take over of privately-owned public utility or
business affected with public interest. Nor can he
determine when such exceptional circumstances
have ceased. Likewise, without legislation, the
President has no power to point out the types of
businesses affected with public interest that should
be taken over. In short, the President has no
absolute authority to exercise all the powers of the
State under Section 17, Article VII in the absence of
an emergency powers act passed by Congress.
c. "AS APPLIED CHALLENGE"
One of the misfortunes of an emergency,
particularly, that which pertains to security, is that
military necessity and the guaranteed rights of the
individual are often not compatible. Our history
reveals that in the crucible of conflict, many rights
are curtailed and trampled upon. Here, the right
against unreasonable search and seizure; the right
against warrantless arrest; and the freedom of
speech, of expression, of the press, and of assembly
under the Bill of Rights suffered the greatest blow.
Of the seven (7) petitions, three (3) indicate "direct
injury."
In G.R. No. 171396, petitioners David and Llamas
alleged that, on February 24, 2006, they were
arrested without warrants on their way to EDSA to
celebrate the 20th Anniversary of People Power I.
The arresting officers cited PP 1017 as basis of the
arrest.
In G.R. No. 171409, petitioners Cacho-Olivares and
Tribune Publishing Co., Inc. claimed that on
February 25, 2006, the CIDG operatives "raided and
ransacked without warrant" their office. Three
policemen were assigned to guard their office as a
possible "source of destabilization." Again, the basis
was PP 1017.
And in G.R. No. 171483, petitioners KMU and
NAFLU-KMU et al. alleged that their members were
"turned away and dispersed" when they went to
EDSA and later, to Ayala Avenue, to celebrate the
20th Anniversary of People Power I.
A perusal of the "direct injuries" allegedly suffered by
the said petitioners shows that they resulted from
the implementation, pursuant to G.O. No. 5, of PP
1017.
Can this Court adjudge as unconstitutional PP 1017
and G.O. No 5 on the basis of these illegal acts? In
general, does the illegal implementation of a law
render it unconstitutional?
Settled is the rule that courts are not at liberty to
declare statutes invalid although they may be
abused and misabused135 and may afford an
opportunity for abuse in the manner of
application.136 The validity of a statute or ordinance
is to be determined from its general purpose and its
efficiency to accomplish the end desired, not from its
effects in a particular case.137 PP 1017 is merely an
invocation of the Presidents calling-out power. Its
general purpose is to command the AFP to suppress
all forms of lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. It
had accomplished the end desired which prompted
President Arroyo to issue PP 1021. But there is
nothing in PP 1017 allowing the police, expressly or
impliedly, to conduct illegal arrest, search or violate
the citizens constitutional rights.
Now, may this Court adjudge a law or ordinance
unconstitutional on the ground that its implementor
committed illegal acts? The answer is no. The
criterion by which the validity of the statute or
ordinance is to be measured is the essential basis
for the exercise of power, and not a mere incidental
result arising from its exertion.138 This is logical.
Just imagine the absurdity of situations when laws
maybe declared unconstitutional just because the
officers implementing them have acted arbitrarily. If
this were so, judging from the blunders committed by
policemen in the cases passed upon by the Court,
majority of the provisions of the Revised Penal Code
would have been declared unconstitutional a long
time ago.
President Arroyo issued G.O. No. 5 to carry into
effect the provisions of PP 1017. General orders are
"acts and commands of the President in his capacity
as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines." They are internal rules issued by the
executive officer to his subordinates precisely for the
proper and efficient administration of law. Such rules
and regulations create no relation except between
the official who issues them and the official who
receives them.139 They are based on and are the
product of, a relationship in which power is their
source, and obedience, their object.140 For these
reasons, one requirement for these rules to be valid
is that they must be reasonable, not arbitrary or
capricious.
G.O. No. 5 mandates the AFP and the PNP to
immediately carry out the "necessary and
appropriate actions and measures to suppress and
prevent acts of terrorism and lawless violence."
Unlike the term "lawless violence" which is
unarguably extant in our statutes and the
Constitution, and which is invariably associated with
"invasion, insurrection or rebellion," the phrase "acts
of terrorism" is still an amorphous and vague
concept. Congress has yet to enact a law defining
and punishing acts of terrorism.
In fact, this "definitional predicament" or the
"absence of an agreed definition of terrorism"
confronts not only our country, but the international
community as well. The following observations are
quite apropos:
In the actual unipolar context of international
relations, the "fight against terrorism" has become
one of the basic slogans when it comes to the
justification of the use of force against certain states
and against groups operating internationally. Lists of
states "sponsoring terrorism" and of terrorist
organizations are set up and constantly being
updated according to criteria that are not always
known to the public, but are clearly determined by
strategic interests.
The basic problem underlying all these military
actions or threats of the use of force as the most
recent by the United States against Iraq consists in
the absence of an agreed definition of terrorism.
Remarkable confusion persists in regard to the legal
categorization of acts of violence either by states, by
armed groups such as liberation movements, or by
individuals.
The dilemma can by summarized in the saying "One
countrys terrorist is another countrys freedom
fighter." The apparent contradiction or lack of
consistency in the use of the term "terrorism" may
further be demonstrated by the historical fact that
leaders of national liberation movements such as
Nelson Mandela in South Africa, Habib Bourgouiba
in Tunisia, or Ahmed Ben Bella in Algeria, to
mention only a few, were originally labeled as
terrorists by those who controlled the territory at the
time, but later became internationally respected
statesmen.
What, then, is the defining criterion for terrorist acts
the differentia specifica distinguishing those acts
from eventually legitimate acts of national resistance
or self-defense?
Since the times of the Cold War the United Nations
Organization has been trying in vain to reach a
consensus on the basic issue of definition. The
organization has intensified its efforts recently, but
has been unable to bridge the gap between those
who associate "terrorism" with any violent act by
non-state groups against civilians, state
functionaries or infrastructure or military installations,
and those who believe in the concept of the
legitimate use of force when resistance against
foreign occupation or against systematic oppression
of ethnic and/or religious groups within a state is
concerned.
The dilemma facing the international community can
best be illustrated by reference to the contradicting
categorization of organizations and movements such
as Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) which
is a terrorist group for Israel and a liberation
movement for Arabs and Muslims the Kashmiri
resistance groups who are terrorists in the
perception of India, liberation fighters in that of
Pakistan the earlier Contras in Nicaragua
freedom fighters for the United States, terrorists for
the Socialist camp or, most drastically, the Afghani
Mujahedeen (later to become the Taliban
movement): during the Cold War period they were a
group of freedom fighters for the West, nurtured by
the United States, and a terrorist gang for the Soviet
Union. One could go on and on in enumerating
examples of conflicting categorizations that cannot
be reconciled in any way because of opposing
political interests that are at the roots of those
perceptions.
How, then, can those contradicting definitions and
conflicting perceptions and evaluations of one and
the same group and its actions be explained? In our
analysis, the basic reason for these striking
inconsistencies lies in the divergent interest of
states. Depending on whether a state is in the
position of an occupying power or in that of a rival,
or adversary, of an occupying power in a given
territory, the definition of terrorism will "fluctuate"
accordingly. A state may eventually see itself as
protector of the rights of a certain ethnic group
outside its territory and will therefore speak of a
"liberation struggle," not of "terrorism" when acts of
violence by this group are concerned, and vice-
versa.
The United Nations Organization has been unable to
reach a decision on the definition of terrorism exactly
because of these conflicting interests of sovereign
states that determine in each and every instance
how a particular armed movement (i.e. a non-state
actor) is labeled in regard to the terrorists-freedom
fighter dichotomy. A "policy of double standards" on
this vital issue of international affairs has been the
unavoidable consequence.
This "definitional predicament" of an organization
consisting of sovereign states and not of peoples,
in spite of the emphasis in the Preamble to the
United Nations Charter! has become even more
serious in the present global power constellation:
one superpower exercises the decisive role in the
Security Council, former great powers of the Cold
War era as well as medium powers are increasingly
being marginalized; and the problem has become
even more acute since the terrorist attacks of 11
September 2001 I the United States.141
The absence of a law defining "acts of terrorism"
may result in abuse and oppression on the part of
the police or military. An illustration is when a group
of persons are merely engaged in a drinking spree.
Yet the military or the police may consider the act as
an act of terrorism and immediately arrest them
pursuant to G.O. No. 5. Obviously, this is abuse and
oppression on their part. It must be remembered that
an act can only be considered a crime if there is a
law defining the same as such and imposing the
corresponding penalty thereon.
So far, the word "terrorism" appears only once in our
criminal laws, i.e., in P.D. No. 1835 dated January
16, 1981 enacted by President Marcos during the
Martial Law regime. This decree is entitled
"Codifying The Various Laws on Anti-Subversion
and Increasing The Penalties for Membership in
Subversive Organizations." The word "terrorism" is
mentioned in the following provision: "That one who
conspires with any other person for the purpose of
overthrowing the Government of the Philippines x x
x by force, violence, terrorism, x x x shall be
punished by reclusion temporal x x x."
P.D. No. 1835 was repealed by E.O. No. 167 (which
outlaws the Communist Party of the Philippines)
enacted by President Corazon Aquino on May 5,
1985. These two (2) laws, however, do not define
"acts of terrorism." Since there is no law defining
"acts of terrorism," it is President Arroyo alone,
under G.O. No. 5, who has the discretion to
determine what acts constitute terrorism. Her
judgment on this aspect is absolute, without
restrictions. Consequently, there can be
indiscriminate arrest without warrants, breaking into
offices and residences, taking over the media
enterprises, prohibition and dispersal of all
assemblies and gatherings unfriendly to the
administration. All these can be effected in the name
of G.O. No. 5. These acts go far beyond the calling-
out power of the President. Certainly, they violate
the due process clause of the Constitution. Thus,
this Court declares that the "acts of terrorism"
portion of G.O. No. 5 is unconstitutional.
Significantly, there is nothing in G.O. No. 5
authorizing the military or police to commit acts
beyond what are necessary and appropriate to
suppress and prevent lawless violence, the limitation
of their authority in pursuing the Order. Otherwise,
such acts are considered illegal.
We first examine G.R. No. 171396 (David et al.)
The Constitution provides that "the right of the
people to be secured in their persons, houses,
papers and effects against unreasonable search and
seizure of whatever nature and for any purpose shall
be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of
arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be
determined personally by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be searched and
the persons or things to be seized."142 The plain
import of the language of the Constitution is that
searches, seizures and arrests are normally
unreasonable unless authorized by a validly issued
search warrant or warrant of arrest. Thus, the
fundamental protection given by this provision is that
between person and police must stand the
protective authority of a magistrate clothed with
power to issue or refuse to issue search warrants or
warrants of arrest.143
In the Brief Account144 submitted by petitioner
David, certain facts are established: first, he was
arrested without warrant; second, the PNP
operatives arrested him on the basis of PP 1017;
third, he was brought at Camp Karingal, Quezon
City where he was fingerprinted, photographed and
booked like a criminal suspect; fourth,he was treated
brusquely by policemen who "held his head and tried
to push him" inside an unmarked car; fifth, he was
charged with Violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang
No. 880145 and Inciting to Sedition; sixth, he was
detained for seven (7) hours; and seventh,he was
eventually released for insufficiency of evidence.
Section 5, Rule 113 of the Revised Rules on
Criminal Procedure provides:
Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. - A
peace officer or a private person may, without a
warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested
has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense.
(b) When an offense has just been committed and
he has probable cause to believe based on personal
knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person
to be arrested has committed it; and
x x x.
Neither of the two (2) exceptions mentioned above
justifies petitioner Davids warrantless arrest. During
the inquest for the charges of inciting to sedition and
violation of BP 880, all that the arresting officers
could invoke was their observation that some
rallyists were wearing t-shirts with the invective
"Oust Gloria Now" and their erroneous assumption
that petitioner David was the leader of the rally.146
Consequently, the Inquest Prosecutor ordered his
immediate release on the ground of insufficiency of
evidence. He noted that petitioner David was not
wearing the subject t-shirt and even if he was
wearing it, such fact is insufficient to charge him with
inciting to sedition. Further, he also stated that there
is insufficient evidence for the charge of violation of
BP 880 as it was not even known whether petitioner
David was the leader of the rally.147
But what made it doubly worse for petitioners David
et al. is that not only was their right against
warrantless arrest violated, but also their right to
peaceably assemble.
Section 4 of Article III guarantees:
No law shall be passed abridging the freedom of
speech, of expression, or of the press, or the right of
the people peaceably to assemble and petition the
government for redress of grievances.
"Assembly" means a right on the part of the citizens
to meet peaceably for consultation in respect to
public affairs. It is a necessary consequence of our
republican institution and complements the right of
speech. As in the case of freedom of expression,
this right is not to be limited, much less denied,
except on a showing of a clear and present danger
of a substantive evil that Congress has a right to
prevent. In other words, like other rights embraced in
the freedom of expression, the right to assemble is
not subject to previous restraint or censorship. It
may not be conditioned upon the prior issuance of a
permit or authorization from the government
authorities except, of course, if the assembly is
intended to be held in a public place, a permit for the
use of such place, and not for the assembly itself,
may be validly required.
The ringing truth here is that petitioner David, et al.
were arrested while they were exercising their right
to peaceful assembly. They were not committing any
crime, neither was there a showing of a clear and
present danger that warranted the limitation of that
right. As can be gleaned from circumstances, the
charges of inciting to sedition and violation of BP
880 were mere afterthought. Even the Solicitor
General, during the oral argument, failed to justify
the arresting officers conduct. In De Jonge v.
Oregon,148 it was held that peaceable assembly
cannot be made a crime, thus:
Peaceable assembly for lawful discussion cannot be
made a crime. The holding of meetings for
peaceable political action cannot be proscribed.
Those who assist in the conduct of such meetings
cannot be branded as criminals on that score. The
question, if the rights of free speech and peaceful
assembly are not to be preserved, is not as to the
auspices under which the meeting was held but as
to its purpose; not as to the relations of the
speakers, but whether their utterances transcend the
bounds of the freedom of speech which the
Constitution protects. If the persons assembling
have committed crimes elsewhere, if they have
formed or are engaged in a conspiracy against the
public peace and order, they may be prosecuted for
their conspiracy or other violations of valid laws. But
it is a different matter when the State, instead of
prosecuting them for such offenses, seizes upon
mere participation in a peaceable assembly and a
lawful public discussion as the basis for a criminal
charge.
On the basis of the above principles, the Court
likewise considers the dispersal and arrest of the
members of KMU et al. (G.R. No. 171483)
unwarranted. Apparently, their dispersal was done
merely on the basis of Malacaangs directive
canceling all permits previously issued by local
government units. This is arbitrary. The wholesale
cancellation of all permits to rally is a blatant
disregard of the principle that "freedom of assembly
is not to be limited, much less denied, except on a
showing of a clear and present danger of a
substantive evil that the State has a right to
prevent."149 Tolerance is the rule and limitation is
the exception. Only upon a showing that an
assembly presents a clear and present danger that
the State may deny the citizens right to exercise it.
Indeed, respondents failed to show or convince the
Court that the rallyists committed acts amounting to
lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. With the
blanket revocation of permits, the distinction
between protected and unprotected assemblies was
eliminated.
Moreover, under BP 880, the authority to regulate
assemblies and rallies is lodged with the local
government units. They have the power to issue
permits and to revoke such permits after due notice
and hearing on the determination of the presence of
clear and present danger. Here, petitioners were not
even notified and heard on the revocation of their
permits.150 The first time they learned of it was at
the time of the dispersal. Such absence of notice is
a fatal defect. When a persons right is restricted by
government action, it behooves a democratic
government to see to it that the restriction is fair,
reasonable, and according to procedure.
G.R. No. 171409, (Cacho-Olivares, et al.) presents
another facet of freedom of speech i.e., the freedom
of the press. Petitioners narration of facts, which the
Solicitor General failed to refute, established the
following: first, the Daily Tribunes offices were
searched without warrant;second, the police
operatives seized several materials for publication;
third, the search was conducted at about 1:00 o
clock in the morning of February 25, 2006; fourth,
the search was conducted in the absence of any
official of the Daily Tribune except the security guard
of the building; and fifth, policemen stationed
themselves at the vicinity of the Daily Tribune
offices.
Thereafter, a wave of warning came from
government officials. Presidential Chief of Staff
Michael Defensor was quoted as saying that such
raid was "meant to show a strong presence, to tell
media outlets not to connive or do anything that
would help the rebels in bringing down this
government." Director General Lomibao further
stated that "if they do not follow the standards and
the standards are if they would contribute to
instability in the government, or if they do not
subscribe to what is in General Order No. 5 and
Proc. No. 1017 we will recommend a takeover."
National Telecommunications Commissioner Ronald
Solis urged television and radio networks to
"cooperate" with the government for the duration of
the state of national emergency. He warned that his
agency will not hesitate to recommend the closure of
any broadcast outfit that violates rules set out for
media coverage during times when the national
security is threatened.151
The search is illegal. Rule 126 of The Revised Rules
on Criminal Procedure lays down the steps in the
conduct of search and seizure. Section 4 requires
that a search warrant be issued upon probable
cause in connection with one specific offence to be
determined personally by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce.
Section 8 mandates that the search of a house,
room, or any other premise be made in the presence
of the lawful occupant thereof or any member of his
family or in the absence of the latter, in the presence
of two (2) witnesses of sufficient age and discretion
residing in the same locality. And Section 9 states
that the warrant must direct that it be served in the
daytime, unless the property is on the person or in
the place ordered to be searched, in which case a
direction may be inserted that it be served at any
time of the day or night. All these rules were violated
by the CIDG operatives.
Not only that, the search violated petitioners
freedom of the press. The best gauge of a free and
democratic society rests in the degree of freedom
enjoyed by its media. In the Burgos v. Chief of
Staff152 this Court held that --
As heretofore stated, the premises searched were
the business and printing offices of the "Metropolitan
Mail" and the "We Forum" newspapers. As a
consequence of the search and seizure, these
premises were padlocked and sealed, with the
further result that the printing and publication of said
newspapers were discontinued.
Such closure is in the nature of previous restraint or
censorship abhorrent to the freedom of the press
guaranteed under the fundamental law, and
constitutes a virtual denial of petitioners' freedom to
express themselves in print. This state of being is
patently anathematic to a democratic framework
where a free, alert and even militant press is
essential for the political enlightenment and growth
of the citizenry.
While admittedly, the Daily Tribune was not
padlocked and sealed like the "Metropolitan Mail"
and "We Forum" newspapers in the above case, yet
it cannot be denied that the CIDG operatives
exceeded their enforcement duties. The search and
seizure of materials for publication, the stationing of
policemen in the vicinity of the The Daily Tribune
offices, and the arrogant warning of government
officials to media, are plain censorship. It is that
officious functionary of the repressive government
who tells the citizen that he may speak only if
allowed to do so, and no more and no less than
what he is permitted to say on pain of punishment
should he be so rash as to disobey.153
Undoubtedly, the The Daily Tribune was subjected
to these arbitrary intrusions because of its anti-
government sentiments. This Court cannot tolerate
the blatant disregard of a constitutional right even if
it involves the most defiant of our citizens. Freedom
to comment on public affairs is essential to the
vitality of a representative democracy. It is the duty
of the courts to be watchful for the constitutional
rights of the citizen, and against any stealthy
encroachments thereon. The motto should always
be obsta principiis.154
Incidentally, during the oral arguments, the Solicitor
General admitted that the search of the Tribunes
offices and the seizure of its materials for publication
and other papers are illegal; and that the same are
inadmissible "for any purpose," thus:
JUSTICE CALLEJO:
You made quite a mouthful of admission when you
said that the policemen, when inspected the Tribune
for the purpose of gathering evidence and you
admitted that the policemen were able to get the
clippings. Is that not in admission of the admissibility
of these clippings that were taken from the Tribune?
SOLICITOR GENERAL BENIPAYO:
Under the law they would seem to be, if they were
illegally seized, I think and I know, Your Honor, and
these are inadmissible for any purpose.155
xxxxxxxxx
SR. ASSO. JUSTICE PUNO:
These have been published in the past issues of the
Daily Tribune; all you have to do is to get those past
issues. So why do you have to go there at 1 oclock
in the morning and without any search warrant? Did
they become suddenly part of the evidence of
rebellion or inciting to sedition or what?
SOLGEN BENIPAYO:
Well, it was the police that did that, Your Honor. Not
upon my instructions.
SR. ASSO. JUSTICE PUNO:
Are you saying that the act of the policeman is
illegal, it is not based on any law, and it is not based
on Proclamation 1017.
SOLGEN BENIPAYO:
It is not based on Proclamation 1017, Your Honor,
because there is nothing in 1017 which says that the
police could go and inspect and gather clippings
from Daily Tribune or any other newspaper.
SR. ASSO. JUSTICE PUNO:
Is it based on any law?
SOLGEN BENIPAYO:
As far as I know, no, Your Honor, from the facts, no.
SR. ASSO. JUSTICE PUNO:
So, it has no basis, no legal basis whatsoever?
SOLGEN BENIPAYO:
Maybe so, Your Honor. Maybe so, that is why I said,
I dont know if it is premature to say this, we do not
condone this. If the people who have been injured
by this would want to sue them, they can sue and
there are remedies for this.156
Likewise, the warrantless arrests and seizures
executed by the police were, according to the
Solicitor General, illegal and cannot be condoned,
thus:
CHIEF JUSTICE PANGANIBAN:
There seems to be some confusions if not
contradiction in your theory.
SOLICITOR GENERAL BENIPAYO:
I dont know whether this will clarify. The acts, the
supposed illegal or unlawful acts committed on the
occasion of 1017, as I said, it cannot be condoned.
You cannot blame the President for, as you said, a
misapplication of the law. These are acts of the
police officers, that is their responsibility.157
The Dissenting Opinion states that PP 1017 and
G.O. No. 5 are constitutional in every aspect and
"should result in no constitutional or statutory
breaches if applied according to their letter."
The Court has passed upon the constitutionality of
these issuances. Its ratiocination has been
exhaustively presented. At this point, suffice it to
reiterate that PP 1017 is limited to the calling out by
the President of the military to prevent or suppress
lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. When in
implementing its provisions, pursuant to G.O. No. 5,
the military and the police committed acts which
violate the citizens rights under the Constitution, this
Court has to declare such acts unconstitutional and
illegal.
In this connection, Chief Justice Artemio V.
Panganibans concurring opinion, attached hereto, is
considered an integral part of this ponencia.
SUMMATION
In sum, the lifting of PP 1017 through the issuance
of PP 1021 a supervening event would have
normally rendered this case moot and academic.
However, while PP 1017 was still operative, illegal
acts were committed allegedly in pursuance thereof.
Besides, there is no guarantee that PP 1017, or one
similar to it, may not again be issued. Already, there
have been media reports on April 30, 2006 that
allegedly PP 1017 would be reimposed "if the May 1
rallies" become "unruly and violent." Consequently,
the transcendental issues raised by the parties
should not be "evaded;" they must now be resolved
to prevent future constitutional aberration.
The Court finds and so holds that PP 1017 is
constitutional insofar as it constitutes a call by the
President for the AFP to prevent or suppress lawless
violence. The proclamation is sustained by Section
18, Article VII of the Constitution and the relevant
jurisprudence discussed earlier. However, PP
1017s extraneous provisions giving the President
express or implied power (1) to issue decrees; (2) to
direct the AFP to enforce obedience to all laws even
those not related to lawless violence as well as
decrees promulgated by the President; and (3) to
impose standards on media or any form of prior
restraint on the press, are ultra vires and
unconstitutional. The Court also rules that under
Section 17, Article XII of the Constitution, the
President, in the absence of a legislation, cannot
take over privately-owned public utility and private
business affected with public interest.
In the same vein, the Court finds G.O. No. 5 valid. It
is an Order issued by the President acting as
Commander-in-Chief addressed to subalterns in
the AFP to carry out the provisions of PP 1017.
Significantly, it also provides a valid standard that
the military and the police should take only the
"necessary and appropriate actions and measures to
suppress and prevent acts of lawless violence."But
the words "acts of terrorism" found in G.O. No. 5
have not been legally defined and made punishable
by Congress and should thus be deemed deleted
from the said G.O. While "terrorism" has been
denounced generally in media, no law has been
enacted to guide the military, and eventually the
courts, to determine the limits of the AFPs authority
in carrying out this portion of G.O. No. 5.
On the basis of the relevant and uncontested facts
narrated earlier, it is also pristine clear that (1) the
warrantless arrest of petitioners Randolf S. David
and Ronald Llamas; (2) the dispersal of the rallies
and warrantless arrest of the KMU and NAFLU-KMU
members; (3) the imposition of standards on media
or any prior restraint on the press; and (4) the
warrantless search of the Tribune offices and the
whimsical seizures of some articles for publication
and other materials, are not authorized by the
Constitution, the law and jurisprudence. Not even by
the valid provisions of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5.
Other than this declaration of invalidity, this Court
cannot impose any civil, criminal or administrative
sanctions on the individual police officers concerned.
They have not been individually identified and given
their day in court. The civil complaints or causes of
action and/or relevant criminal Informations have not
been presented before this Court. Elementary due
process bars this Court from making any specific
pronouncement of civil, criminal or administrative
liabilities.
It is well to remember that military power is a means
to an end and substantive civil rights are ends in
themselves. How to give the military the power it
needs to protect the Republic without unnecessarily
trampling individual rights is one of the eternal
balancing tasks of a democratic state.During
emergency, governmental action may vary in
breadth and intensity from normal times, yet they
should not be arbitrary as to unduly restrain our
peoples liberty.
Perhaps, the vital lesson that we must learn from the
theorists who studied the various competing political
philosophies is that, it is possible to grant
government the authority to cope with crises without
surrendering the two vital principles of
constitutionalism: the maintenance of legal limits to
arbitrary power, and political responsibility of the
government to the governed.158
WHEREFORE, the Petitions are partly granted. The
Court rules that PP 1017 is CONSTITUTIONAL
insofar as it constitutes a call by President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo on the AFP to prevent or
suppress lawless violence. However, the provisions
of PP 1017 commanding the AFP to enforce laws
not related to lawless violence, as well as decrees
promulgated by the President, are declared
UNCONSTITUTIONAL. In addition, the provision in
PP 1017 declaring national emergency under
Section 17, Article VII of the Constitution is
CONSTITUTIONAL, but such declaration does not
authorize the President to take over privately-owned
public utility or business affected with public interest
without prior legislation.
G.O. No. 5 is CONSTITUTIONAL since it provides a
standard by which the AFP and the PNP should
implement PP 1017, i.e. whatever is "necessary and
appropriate actions and measures to suppress and
prevent acts of lawless violence." Considering that
"acts of terrorism" have not yet been defined and
made punishable by the Legislature, such portion of
G.O. No. 5 is declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
The warrantless arrest of Randolf S. David and
Ronald Llamas; the dispersal and warrantless arrest
of the KMU and NAFLU-KMU members during their
rallies, in the absence of proof that these petitioners
were committing acts constituting lawless violence,
invasion or rebellion and violating BP 880; the
imposition of standards on media or any form of prior
restraint on the press, as well as the warrantless
search of the Tribune offices and whimsical seizure
of its articles for publication and other materials, are
declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 121777 January 24, 2001
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-
appellee,
vs.
CAROL M. DELA PIEDRA, accused-appellant.
KAPUNAN, J.:
Accused-appellant Carol M. dela Piedra questions
her conviction for illegal recruitment in large scale
and assails, as well, the constitutionality of the law
defining and penalizing said crime.
The Court affirms the constitutionality of the law and
the conviction of the accused, but reduces the
penalty imposed upon her.
The accused was charged before the Regional Trial
Court of Zamboanga City in an information alleging:
That on or about January 30, 1994, in the City of
Zamboanga, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
without having previously obtained from the
Philippine Overseas Employment Administration, a
license or authority to engage in recruitment and
overseas placement of workers, did then and there,
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, offer and promise
for a fee employment abroad particularly in
Singapore thus causing Maria Lourdes Modesto [y]
Gadrino, Nancy Araneta y Aliwanag and Jennelyn
Baez y Timbol, all qualified to apply, in fact said
Maria Lourdes Modesto had already advanced the
amount of P2,000.00 to the accused for and in
consideration of the promised employment which did
not materialized [sic] thus causing damage and
prejudice to the latter in the said sum; furthermore,
the acts complained of herein tantamount [sic] to
economic sabotage in that the same were
committed in large scale.1
Arraigned on June 20, 1994, the accused pleaded
not guilty2 to these charges.
At the trial, the prosecution presented five (5)
witnesses, namely, Erlie Ramos, SPO2 Erwin
Manalopilar, Eileen Fermindoza, Nancy Araneta and
Lourdes Modesto. The succeeding narration is
gathered from their testimonies:
On January 30, 1994, at exactly 10:00 in the
morning, Erlie Ramos, Attorney II of the Philippine
Overseas Employment Agency (POEA), received a
telephone call from an unidentified woman inquiring
about the legitimacy of the recruitment conducted by
a certain Mrs. Carol Figueroa. Ramos, whose duties
include the surveillance of suspected illegal
recruiters, immediately contacted a friend, a certain
Mayeth Bellotindos, so they could both go to No. 26-
D, Tetuan Highway, Sta. Cruz, Zamboanga City,
where the recruitment was reportedly being
undertaken. Upon arriving at the reported area at
around 4:00 p.m., Bellotindos entered the house and
pretended to be an applicant. Ramos remained
outside and stood on the pavement, from where he
was able to see around six (6) persons in the
house's sala. Ramos even heard a woman,
identified as Carol Fegueroa, talk about the possible
employment she has to provide in Singapore and
the documents that the applicants have to comply
with. Fifteen (15) minutes later, Bellotindos came out
with a bio-data form in hand.
On February 1, 1994, Ramos conferred with a
certain Capt. Mendoza of the Criminal Investigation
Service (CIS) to organize the arrest of the alleged
illegal recruiter. Also present were other members of
the CIS, including Col. Rodolfo Almonte, Regional
Director of the PNP-CIS for Region IX, Eileen
Fermindoza, and a certain SPO3 Santos. The group
planned to entrap the illegal recruiter the next day by
having Fermindoza pose as an applicant.3
On February 2, 1994, at around 8:00 p.m., Col.
Almonte directed the case to SPO2 Erwin
Manalopilar, a member of the Philippine National
Police who was assigned as an investigator of the
CIS, to conduct a surveillance of the area to confirm
the report of illegal recruitment. Accordingly, he,
along with Eileen Fermindoza, immediately
proceeded to Tetuan Highway. The two did not enter
the house where the recruitment was supposedly
being conducted, but Fermindoza interviewed two
people who informed them that some people do go
inside the house. Upon returning to their office at
around 8:30 a.m., the two reported to Capt.
Mendoza who organized a team to conduct the raid.
The raiding team, which included Capt. Mendoza,
SPO2 Manalopilar, Fermindoza and a certain Oscar
Bucol, quickly set off and arrived at the reported
scene at 9:30 that morning. There they met up with
Erlie Ramos of the POEA. Fermindoza then
proceeded to enter the house while the rest of the
team posted themselves outside to secure the area.
Fermindoza was instructed to come out after she
was given a bio-data form, which will serve as the
team's cue to enter the house.4
Fermindoza introduced herself as a job applicant to
a man and a woman, apparently the owners of the
house, and went inside. There, she saw another
woman, later identified as Jasmine, coming out of
the bathroom. The man to whom Fermindoza earlier
introduced herself told Jasmine that Fermindoza
was applying for a position. Jasmine, who was then
only wearing a towel, told her that she would just get
dressed. Jasmine then came back and asked
Fermindoza what position she was applying for.
Fermindoza replied that she was applying to be a
babysitter or any other work so long as she could go
abroad. Jasmine then gave her an application form.
A few minutes later, a certain Carol arrived. Jasmine
informed Carol that Fermindoza was an applicant.
Fermindoza asked Carol what the requirements
were and whether she (Fermindoza) was qualified.
Carol told Fermindoza that if she had a passport,
she could fill up the application papers. Fermindoza
replied that she had no passport yet. Carol said she
need not worry since Jasmine will prepare the
passport for her. While filling up the application form,
three women who appeared to be friends of Jasmine
arrived to follow up the result of their applications
and to give their advance payment. Jasmine got
their papers and put them on top of a small table.
Fermindoza then proceeded to the door and
signaled to the raiding party by raising her hand.
Capt. Mendoza asked the owners of the house, a
married couple, for permission to enter the same.
The owners granted permission after the raiding
party introduced themselves as members of the CIS.
Inside the house, the raiding party saw some
supposed applicants. Application forms, already
filled up, were in the hands of one Mrs. Carol
Figueroa. The CIS asked Figueroa if she had a
permit to recruit. Figueroa retorted that she was not
engaged in recruitment. Capt. Mendoza
nevertheless proceeded to arrest Figueroa. He took
the application forms she was holding as the raiding
party seized the other papers5 on the table.6
The CIS team then brought Figueroa, a certain
Jasmine Alejandro, and the three women suspected
to be applicants, to the office for investigation.7
In the course of their investigation, the CIS
discovered that Carol Figueroa had many aliases,
among them, Carol Llena and Carol dela Piedra.
The accused was not able to present any authority
to recruit when asked by the investigators.8 A check
by Ramos with the POEA revealed that the acused
was not licensed or authorized to conduct
recruitment.9 A certification10 dated February 2,
1994 stating thus was executed by Renegold M.
Macarulay, Officer-in-Charge of the POEA.
The CIS likewise interviewed the supposed
applicants, Lourdes Modesto, Nancy Araneta and
Jennelyn Baez, all registered nurses working at the
Cabato Medical Hospital, who executed their
respective written statements.11
At the trial, Nancy Araneta, 23, recounted that she
was at Jasmine Alejandro's house in the afternoon
of January 30, 1994. Araneta had learned from
Sandra Aquino, also a nurse at the Cabato Medical
Hospital, that a woman was there to recruit job
applicants for Singapore.
Araneta and her friends, Jennelyn Baez and Sandra
Aquino, arrived at Jasmine's house at around 4:30
p.m. Jasmine welcomed them and told them to sit
down. They listened to the "recruiter" who was then
talking to a number of people. The recruiter said that
she was "recruiting" nurses for Singapore. Araneta
and her friends then filled up bio-data forms and
were required to submit pictures and a transcript of
records. They were also told to pay P2,000, and "the
rest will be salary deduction." Araneta submitted her
bio-data form to Carol that same afternoon, but did
not give any money because she was "not yet sure."
On the day of the raid on February 2, 1994, Araneta
was again at the Alejandro residence to submit her
transcript of records and her picture. She arrived at
the house 30 minutes before the raid but did not
witness the arrest since she was at the porch when
it happened.12
Maria Lourdes Modesto, 26, was also in Jasmine
Alejandro's house on January 30, 1994. A friend of
Jasmine had informed her that there was someone
recruiting in Jasmine's house. Upon arriving at the
Alejandro residence, Lourdes was welcomed by
Jasmine.1wphi1.nt
Lourdes recalled that Carol Figueroa was already
briefing some people when she arrived. Carol
Figueroa asked if they would like a "good
opportunity" since a hospital was hiring nurses. She
gave a breakdown of the fees involved: P30,000 for
the visa and the round trip ticket, and P5,000 as
placement fee and for the processing of the papers.
The initial payment was P2,000, while P30,000 will
be by salary deduction.
Lourdes filled up the application form and submitted
it to Jasmine. After the interview, she gave the initial
payment of P2,000 to Jasmine, who assured
Lourdes that she was authorized to receive the
money. On February 2, 1994, however, Lourdes
went back to the house to get back the money.
Jasmine gave back the money to Lourdes after the
raid.13
Denial comprised the accused's defense.
Carol dela Piedra, 37, is a housewife and a resident
of Cebu City. Her husband is a businessman from
Cebu, the manager of the Region 7 Branch of the
Grollier International Encyclopedia. They own an
apartment in Cebu City, providing lodging to
students.
The accused claimed that she goes to Singapore to
visit her relatives. She first traveled to Singapore on
August 21, 1993 as a tourist, and came back to the
Philippines on October 20 of the same year.
Thereafter, she returned to Singapore on December
10, 1993.
On December 21, 1993, while in Singapore, the
accused was invited to a Christmas party sponsored
by the Zamboanga City Club Association. On that
occasion, she met a certain Laleen Malicay, who
sought her help. A midwife, Malicay had been
working in Singapore for six (6) years. Her employer
is a certain Mr. Tan, a close friend of Carol.
According to the accused, Malicay sent P15,000
home for her father who was then seriously ill.
Malicay was not sure, however, whether her father
received the money so she requested the accused
to verify from her relatives receipt thereof. She
informed the accused that she had a cousin by the
name of Jasmine Alejandro. Malicay gave the
accused Jasmine's telephone number, address and
a sketch of how to get there.
The accused returned to the country on January 21,
1994. From Cebu City, the accused flew to
Zamboanga City on January 23, 1994 to give some
presents to her friends.
On January 30, 1994, the accused called up
Jasmine Alejandro, Laleen Malicay's cousin, to
inform her that she would be going to her house. At
around noon that day, the accused, accompanied by
her friend Hilda Falcasantos, arrived at the house
where she found Jasmine entertaining some friends.
Jasmine came down with two of her friends whom
she introduced as her classmates. Jasmine told
them that the accused was a friend of Laleen
Malicay.
The accused relayed to Jasmine Malicay's message
regarding the money the latter had sent. Jasmine
assured her that they received the money, and
asked Carol to tell Malicay to send more money for
medicine for Malicay's mother. Jasmine also told her
that she would send something for Malicay when the
accused goes back to Singapore. The accused
replied that she just needed to confirm her flight
back to Cebu City, and will return to Jasmine's
house. After the meeting with Jasmine, the accused
went shopping with Hilda Falcasantos. The accused
was in the house for only fifteen (15) minutes.
On February 2, 1994, the accused went to the
Philippine Airlines office at 7:30 in the morning to
confirm her 5:30 p.m. flight to Cebu City. She then
proceeded to Jasmine's residence, arriving there at
past 8 a.m.
Inside the house, she met a woman who asked her,
"Are you Carol from Singapore?" The accused, in
turn, asked the woman if she could do anything for
her. The woman inquired from Carol if she was
recruiting. Carol replied in the negative, explaining
that she was there just to say goodbye to Jasmine.
The woman further asked Carol what the
requirements were if she (the woman) were to go to
Singapore. Carol replied that she would need a
passport.
Two (2) minutes later, three (3) girls entered the
house looking for Jasmine. The woman Carol was
talking with then stood up and went out. A minute
after, three (3) members of the CIS and a POEA
official arrived. A big man identified himself as a
member of the CIS and informed her that they
received a call that she was recruiting. They told her
she had just interviewed a woman from the CIS. She
denied this, and said that she came only to say
goodbye to the occupants of the house, and to get
whatever Jasmine would be sending for Laleen
Malicay. She even showed them her ticket for Cebu
City.
Erlie Ramos then went up to Jasmine's room and
returned with some papers. The accused said that
those were the papers that Laleen Malicay
requested Jasmine to give to her (the accused). The
accused surmised that because Laleen Malicay
wanted to go home but could not find a replacement,
one of the applicants in the forms was to be her
(Malicay's) substitute. Ramos told the accused to
explain in their office.
The accused denied in court that she went to
Jasmine's residence to engage in recruitment. She
claimed she came to Zamboanga City to visit her
friends, to whom she could confide since she and
her husband were having some problems. She
denied she knew Nancy Araneta or that she brought
information sheets for job placement. She also
denied instructing Jasmine to collect P2,000 from
alleged applicants as processing fee.14
The accused presented two witnesses to
corroborate her defense.
The first, Jasmine Alejandro, 23, testified that she
met the accused for the first time only on January
30, 1994 when the latter visited them to deliver
Laleen Malicay's message regarding the money she
sent. Carol, who was accompanied by a certain
Hilda Falcasantos, stayed in their house for 10 to 15
minutes only. Carol came back to the house a few
days later on February 2 at around 8:00 in the
morning to "get the envelope for the candidacy of
her daughter." Jasmine did not elaborate.
Jasmine denied that she knew Nancy Araneta or
Lourdes Modesto. She denied that the accused
conducted recruitment. She claimed she did not see
Carol distribute bio-data or application forms to job
applicants. She disclaimed any knowledge regarding
the P2,000 application fee.15
The other defense witness, Ernesto Morales, a
policeman, merely testified that the accused stayed
in their house in No. 270 Tugbungan, Zamboanga
City, for four (4) days before her arrest, although she
would sometimes go downtown alone. He said he
did not notice that she conducted any recruitment.16
On May 5, 1995, the trial court rendered a decision
convicting the accused, thus:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing
consideration[s][,] this Court finds the accused Carol
dela Piedra alias Carol Llena and Carol Figueroa
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Illegal
Recruitment committed in a large scale and hereby
sentences her to suffer the penalty of LIFE
IMPRISONMENT and to pay a fine of P100,000.00,
and also to pay the costs.
Being a detention prisoner, the said accused is
entitled to the full time of the period of her detention
during the pendency of this case under the condition
set forth in Article 29 of the Revised Penal Code.
SO ORDERED.17
The accused, in this appeal, ascribes to the trial
court the following errors:
I
WITH DUE RESPECT, THE LOWER COURT
ERRED IN NOT FINDING SEC. 13 (B) OF P.D.
442[,] AS AMENDED[,] OTHERWISE KNOWN AS
[THE] ILLEGAL RECRUITMENT LAW
UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
II
WITH DUE RESPECT, THE LOWER COURT
ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE
APPREHENDING TEAM COMPOSED OF POEA
AND CIS REPRESENTATIVES ENTERED INTO
[sic] THE RESIDENCE OF JASMIN[E] ALEJANDRO
WITHOUT ANY SEARCH WARRANT IN
VIOLATION OF ARTICLE III, SECTION 2 OF THE
PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION, AND ANY
EVIDENCE OBTAINED IN VIOLATION THEREOF,
SHALL BE INADMISSIBLE FOR ANY PURPOSE IN
ANY PROCEEDING AS PROVIDED UNDER
ARTICLE III, SECTION 3, (2) OF THE SAME
CONSTITUTION;
III
WITH DUE RESPECT, THE LOWER COURT
ERRED IN IGNORING THAT WHEN SPO2 [sic]
EILE[E]N FERMINDOZA ENTERED THE
RESIDENCE OF JASMIN[E] ALEJANDRO, THERE
WAS NO CRIME COMMITTED WHATSOEVER,
HENCE THE ARREST OF THE ACCUSED-
APPELLANT WAS ILLEGAL;
[IV]
WITH DUE RESPECT, THE LOWER COURT
ERRED IN NOT DISCOVERING THAT SPO2 [sic]
EILE[E]N FERMINDOZA WAS NOT ILLEGALLY
RECRUITED BY THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT,
HENCE, ACCUSED-APPELLANT SHOULD BE
ACQUITTED;
V
WITH DUE RESPECT, THE LOWER COURT
ERRED IN NOT DETECTING THAT NANCY
ARANETA WAS NOT ILLEGALLY RECRUITED BY
THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT, HENCE, ACCUSED
SHOULD BE EXONERATED;
VI
WITH DUE RESPECT, THE LOWER COURT
ERRED IN NOT REALIZING THAT MARIA
LOURDES MODESTO WAS NOT ILLEGALLY
RECRUITED BY THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT,
HENCE, ACCUSED-APPELLANT SHOULD BE
EXCULPATED;
VII
WITH DUE RESPECT, THE LOWER COURT
ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE ACCUSED-
APPELLANT WAS CHARGED WITH LARGE
SCALE ILLEGAL RECRUITMENT ON JANUARY
30, 1994, THE DATE STATED IN THE
INFORMATION AS THE DATE OF THE CRIME,
BUT ACCUSED WAS ARRESTED ON FEB. 2, 1994
AND ALL THE EVIDENCES [sic] INDICATED [sic]
THAT THE ALLEGED CRIME WERE [sic]
COMMITTED ON FEB. 2, 1994, HENCE, THE
INFORMATION IS FATALLY DEFECTIVE;
VIII
WITH DUE RESPECT, THE LOWER COURT
ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE ALLEGED
CRIME OF ILLEGAL RECRUITMENT WAS
COMMITTED NOT ON [sic] LARGE SCALE,
HENCE, THE PENALTY SHOULD NOT BE LIFE
IMPRISONMENT;
IX
WITH DUE RESPECT, THE LOWER COURT
ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THOSE
EVIDENCES [sic] SEIZED AT THE HOUSE OF
JASMIN[E] ALEJANDRO AND PRESENTED TO
THE COURT WERE PLANTED BY A BOGUS
ATTORNEY[,] ERLIE S. RAMOS OF THE POEA;
X
WITH DUE RESPECT, THE LOWER COURT
ERRED IN NOT DISCOVERING THAT ACCUSED-
APPELLANT DID NOT RECEIVE ANY PAYMENT
EVEN A SINGLE CENTAVO FROM THE ALLEGED
VICTIMS WHO DID NOT SUFFER DAMAGE IN
ANY MANNER, YET SHE WAS CONVICTED TO
SERVE HER ENTIRE LIFE BEHIND PRISON
BARS. SUCH PUNISHMENT WAS CRUEL AND
UNUSUAL, HENCE, A WANTON VIOLATION OF
THE CONSTITUTION.18
In the first assigned error, appellant maintains that
the law defining "recruitment and placement"
violates due process. Appellant also avers, as part
of her sixth assigned error, that she was denied the
equal protection of the laws.
We shall address the issues jointly.
Appellant submits that Article 13 (b) of the Labor
Code defining "recruitment and placement" is void
for vagueness and, thus, violates the due process
clause.19
Due process requires that the terms of a penal
statute must be sufficiently explicit to inform those
who are subject to it what conduct on their part will
render them liable to its penalties.20 A criminal
statute that "fails to give a person of ordinary
intelligence fair notice that his contemplated conduct
is forbidden by the statute," or is so indefinite that "it
encourages arbitrary and erratic arrests and
convictions," is void for vagueness.21 The
constitutional vice in a vague or indefinite statute is
the injustice to the accused in placing him on trial for
an offense, the nature of which he is given no fair
warning.22
We reiterated these principles in People vs.
Nazario:23
As a rule, a statute or act may be said to be vague
when it lacks comprehensible standards that men "of
common intelligence must necessarily guess at its
meaning and differ as to its application." It is
repugnant to the Constitution in two respects: (1) it
violates due process for failure to accord persons,
especially the parties targeted by it, fair notice of the
conduct to avoid; and (2) it leaves law enforcers
unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions and
become an arbitrary flexing of the Government
muscle.
We added, however, that:
x x x the act must be utterly vague on its face, that is
to say, it cannot be clarified by either a saving
clause or by construction. Thus, in Coates v. City of
Cincinnati, the U.S. Supreme Court struck down an
ordinance that had made it illegal for "three or more
persons to assemble on any sidewalk and there
conduct themselves in a manner annoying to
persons passing by." Clearly, the ordinance imposed
no standard at all "because one may never know in
advance what 'annoys some people but does not
annoy others.'"
Coates highlights what has been referred to as a
"perfectly vague" act whose obscurity is evident on
its face. It is to be distinguished, however, from
legislation couched in imprecise languagebut
which nonetheless specifies a standard though
defectively phrasedin which case, it may be
"saved" by proper construction.
Here, the provision in question reads:
ART. 13. Definitions.(a) x x x.
(b) "Recruitment and placement" refers to any act of
canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting,
utilizing, hiring or procuring workers, and includes
referrals, contract services, promising or advertising
for employment, locally or abroad, whether for profit
or not: Provided, That any person or entity which, in
any manner, offers or promises for a fee
employment to two or more persons shall be
deemed engaged in recruitment and placement.
x x x.
When undertaken by non-licensees or non-holders
of authority, recruitment activities are punishable as
follows:
ART. 38. Illegal Recruitment. (a) Any recruitment
activities, including the prohibited practices
enumerated under Article 34 of this Code, to be
undertaken by non-licensees or non-holders of
authority shall be deemed illegal and punishable
under Article 39 of this Code. The Ministry of Labor
and Employment or any law enforcement officer may
initiate complaints under this Article.
(b) Illegal recruitment when committed by a
syndicate or in large scale shall be considered an
offense involving economic sabotage and shall be
penalized in accordance with Article 39 hereof.
Illegal recruitment is deemed committed by a
syndicate if carried out by a group of three (3) or
more persons conspiring and/or confederating with
one another in carrying out any unlawful or illegal
transaction, enterprise or scheme defined under the
first paragraph hereof. Illegal recruitment is deemed
committed in large scale if committed against three
(3) or more persons individually or as a group.
x x x.
Art. 39. Penalties. (a) The penalty of life
imprisonment and a fine of One Hundred Thousand
Pesos (P100,000) shall be imposed if illegal
recruitment constitutes economic sabotage as
defined herein:
(b) Any licensee or holder of authority found violating
or causing another to violate any provision of this
Title or its implementing rules and regulations, shall
upon conviction thereof, suffer the penalty of
imprisonment of not less than five years or a fine of
not less than P10,000 nor more than P50,000 or
both such imprisonment and fine, at the discretion of
the court;
(c) Any person who is neither a licensee nor a holder
of authority under this Title found violating any
provision thereof or its implementing rules and
regulations shall, upon conviction thereof, suffer the
penalty of imprisonment of not less than four years
nor more than eight years or a fine of not less than
P20,000 nor more than P100,000 or both such
imprisonment and fine, at the discretion of the court;
x x x.
In support of her submission that Article 13 (b) is
void for vagueness, appellant invokes People vs.
Panis,24 where this Court, to use appellant's term,
"criticized" the definition of "recruitment and
placement" as follows:
It is unfortunate that we can only speculate on the
meaning of the questioned provision for lack of
records of debates and deliberations that would
otherwise have been available if the Labor Code had
been enacted as a statute rather than a presidential
decree is that they could be, and sometimes were,
issued without previous public discussion or
consultation, the promulgator heeding only his own
counsel or those of his close advisers in their lofty
pinnacle of power. The not infrequent results are
rejection, intentional or not, of the interest of the
greater number and, as in the instant case, certain
esoteric provisions that one cannot read against the
background facts usually reported in the legislative
journals.
If the Court in Panis "had to speculate on the
meaning of the questioned provision," appellant
asks, what more "the ordinary citizen" who does not
possess the "necessary [legal] knowledge?"
Appellant further argues that the acts that constitute
"recruitment and placement" suffer from overbreadth
since by merely "referring" a person for employment,
a person may be convicted of illegal recruitment.
These contentions cannot be sustained.
Appellant's reliance on People vs. Panis is
misplaced. The issue in Panis was whether, under
the proviso of Article 13 (b), the crime of illegal
recruitment could be committed only "whenever two
or more persons are in any manner promised or
offered any employment for a fee." The Court held in
the negative, explaining:
As we see it, the proviso was intended neither to
impose a condition on the basic rule nor to provide
an exception thereto but merely to create a
presumption. The presumption is that the individual
or entity is engaged in recruitment and placement
whenever he or it is dealing with two or more
persons to whom, in consideration of a fee, an offer
or promise of employment is made in the course of
the "canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting,
utilizing, hiring or procuring (of) workers."
The number of persons dealt with is not an essential
ingredient of the act of recruitment and placement of
workers. Any of the acts mentioned in the basic rule
in Article 13(b) will constitute recruitment and
placement even if only one prospective worker is
involved. The proviso merely lays down a rule of
evidence that where a fee is collected in
consideration of a promise or offer of employment to
two or more prospective workers, the individual or
entity dealing with them shall be deemed to be
engaged in the act of recruitment and placement.
The words "shall be deemed" create that
presumption.
This is not unlike the presumption in article 217 of
the Revised Penal Code, for example, regarding the
failure of a public officer to produce upon lawful
demand funds or property entrusted to his custody.
Such failure shall be prima facie evidence that he
has put them to personal use; in other words, he
shall be deemed to have malversed such funds or
property. In the instant case, the word "shall be
deemed" should by the same token be given the
force of a disputable presumption or of prima facie
evidence of engaging in recruitment and placement.
It is unfortunate that we can only speculate on the
meaning of the questioned provision for lack of
records of debates and deliberations that would
otherwise have been available if the Labor Code had
been enacted as a statute rather than a presidential
decree is that they could be, and sometimes were,
issued without previous public discussion or
consultation, the promulgator heeding only his own
counsel or those of his close advisers in their lofty
pinnacle of power. The not infrequent results are
rejection, intentional or not, of the interest of the
greater number and, as in the instant case, certain
esoteric provisions that one cannot read against the
background facts usually reported in the legislative
journals.
At any rate, the interpretation here adopted should
give more force to the campaign against illegal
recruitment and placement, which has victimized
many Filipino workers seeking a better life in a
foreign land, and investing hard-earned savings or
even borrowed funds in pursuit of their dream, only
to be awakened to the reality of a cynical deception
at the hands of their own countrymen.
Evidently, therefore, appellant has taken the
penultimate paragraph in the excerpt quoted above
out of context. The Court, in Panis, merely
bemoaned the lack of records that would help shed
light on the meaning of the proviso. The absence of
such records notwithstanding, the Court was able to
arrive at a reasonable interpretation of the proviso
by applying principles in criminal law and drawing
from the language and intent of the law itself.
Section 13 (b), therefore, is not a "perfectly vague
act" whose obscurity is evident on its face. If at all,
the proviso therein is merely couched in imprecise
language that was salvaged by proper construction.
It is not void for vagueness.
An act will be declared void and inoperative on the
ground of vagueness and uncertainty, only upon a
showing that the defect is such that the courts are
unable to determine, with any reasonable degree of
certainty, what the legislature intended. x x x. In this
connection we cannot pretermit reference to the rule
that "legislation should not be held invalid on the
ground of uncertainty if susceptible of any
reasonable construction that will support and give it
effect. An Act will not be declared inoperative and
ineffectual on the ground that it furnishes no
adequate means to secure the purpose for which it
is passed, if men of common sense and reason can
devise and provide the means, and all the
instrumentalities necessary for its execution are
within the reach of those intrusted therewith."25
That Section 13 (b) encompasses what appellant
apparently considers as customary and harmless
acts such as " labor or employment referral"
("referring" an applicant, according to appellant, for
employment to a prospective employer) does not
render the law overbroad. Evidently, appellant
misapprehends concept of overbreadth.
A statute may be said to be overbroad where it
operates to inhibit the exercise of individual
freedoms affirmatively guaranteed by the
Constitution, such as the freedom of speech or
religion. A generally worded statute, when construed
to punish conduct which cannot be constitutionally
punished is unconstitutionally vague to the extent
that it fails to give adequate warning of the boundary
between the constitutionally permissible and the
constitutionally impermissible applications of the
statute.26
In Blo Umpar Adiong vs. Commission on
Elections,27 for instance, we struck down as void for
overbreadth provisions prohibiting the posting of
election propaganda in any place including private
vehicles other than in the common poster areas
sanctioned by the COMELEC. We held that the
challenged provisions not only deprived the owner of
the vehicle the use of his property but also deprived
the citizen of his right to free speech and
information. The prohibition in Adiong, therefore,
was so broad that it covered even constitutionally
guaranteed rights and, hence, void for overbreadth.
In the present case, however, appellant did not even
specify what constitutionally protected freedoms are
embraced by the definition of "recruitment and
placement" that would render the same
constitutionally overbroad.
Appellant also invokes the equal protection clause28
in her defense. She points out that although the
evidence purportedly shows that Jasmine Alejandro
handed out application forms and even received
Lourdes Modesto's payment, appellant was the only
one criminally charged. Alejandro, on the other
hand, remained scot-free. From this, appellant
concludes that the prosecution discriminated against
her on grounds of regional origins. Appellant is a
Cebuana while Alejandro is a Zamboanguea, and
the alleged crime took place in Zamboanga City.
The argument has no merit.
At the outset, it may be stressed that courts are not
confined to the language of the statute under
challenge in determining whether that statute has
any discriminatory effect. A statute nondiscriminatory
on its face may be grossly discriminatory in its
operation.29 Though the law itself be fair on its face
and impartial in appearance, yet, if it is applied and
administered by public authority with an evil eye and
unequal hand, so as practically to make unjust and
illegal discriminations between persons in similar
circumstances, material to their rights, the denial of
equal justice is still within the prohibition of the
Constitution.30
The prosecution of one guilty person while others
equally guilty are not prosecuted, however, is not, by
itself, a denial of the equal protection of the laws.31
Where the official action purports to be in conformity
to the statutory classification, an erroneous or
mistaken performance of the statutory duty, although
a violation of the statute, is not without more a denial
of the equal protection of the laws.32 The unlawful
administration by officers of a statute fair on its face,
resulting in its unequal application to those who are
entitled to be treated alike, is not a denial of equal
protection unless there is shown to be present in it
an element of intentional or purposeful
discrimination. This may appear on the face of the
action taken with respect to a particular class or
person, or it may only be shown by extrinsic
evidence showing a discriminatory design over
another not to be inferred from the action itself. But a
discriminatory purpose is not presumed, there must
be a showing of "clear and intentional
discrimination."33 Appellant has failed to show that,
in charging appellant in court, that there was a "clear
and intentional discrimination" on the part of the
prosecuting officials.
The discretion of who to prosecute depends on the
prosecution's sound assessment whether the
evidence before it can justify a reasonable belief that
a person has committed an offense.34 The
presumption is that the prosecuting officers regularly
performed their duties,35 and this presumption can
be overcome only by proof to the contrary, not by
mere speculation. Indeed, appellant has not
presented any evidence to overcome this
presumption. The mere allegation that appellant, a
Cebuana, was charged with the commission of a
crime, while a Zamboanguea, the guilty party in
appellant's eyes, was not, is insufficient to support a
conclusion that the prosecution officers denied
appellant equal protection of the laws.
There is also common sense practicality in
sustaining appellant's prosecution.
While all persons accused of crime are to be treated
on a basis of equality before the law, it does not
follow that they are to be protected in the
commission of crime. It would be unconscionable,
for instance, to excuse a defendant guilty of murder
because others have murdered with impunity. The
remedy for unequal enforcement of the law in such
instances does not lie in the exoneration of the guilty
at the expense of society x x x. Protection of the law
will be extended to all persons equally in the pursuit
of their lawful occupations, but no person has the
right to demand protection of the law in the
commission of a crime.36
Likewise,
[i]f the failure of prosecutors to enforce the criminal
laws as to some persons should be converted into a
defense for others charged with crime, the result
would be that the trial of the district attorney for
nonfeasance would become an issue in the trial of
many persons charged with heinous crimes and the
enforcement of law would suffer a complete
breakdown.37
We now come to the third, fourth and fifth assigned
errors, all of which involve the finding of guilt by the
trial court.
Illegal recruitment is committed when two elements
concur. First, the offender has no valid license or
authority required by law to enable one to lawfully
engage in recruitment and placement of workers.
Second, he or she undertakes either any activity
within the meaning of "recruitment and placement"
defined under Article 13 (b), or any prohibited
practices enumerated under Article 34 of the Labor
Code.38 In case of illegal recruitment in large scale,
a third element is added: that the accused commits
said acts against three or more persons, individually
or as a group.39
In this case, the first element is present. The
certification of POEA Officer-in-Charge Macarulay
states that appellant is not licensed or authorized to
engage in recruitment and placement.
The second element is also present. Appellant is
presumed engaged in recruitment and placement
under Article 13 (b) of the Labor Code. Both Nancy
Araneta and Lourdes Modesto testified that
appellant promised them employment for a fee.
Their testimonies corroborate each other on material
points: the briefing conducted by appellant, the time
and place thereof, the fees involved. Appellant has
not shown that these witnesses were incited by any
motive to testify falsely against her. The absence of
evidence as to an improper motive actuating the
principal witnesses of the prosecution strongly tends
to sustain that no improper motive existed and that
their testimony is worthy of full faith and credence.40
Appellant's denials cannot prevail over the positive
declaration of the prosecution witnesses. Affirmative
testimony of persons who are eyewitnesses of the
fact asserted easily overrides negative testimony.41
That appellant did not receive any payment for the
promised or offered employment is of no moment.
From the language of the statute, the act of
recruitment may be "for profit or not;" it suffices that
the accused "promises or offers for a fee
employment" to warrant conviction for illegal
recruitment.
The testimonies of Araneta and Modesto, coming as
they do from credible witnesses, meet the standard
of proof beyond reasonable doubt that appellant
committed recruitment and placement. We therefore
do not deem it necessary to delve into the second
and third assigned errors assailing the legality of
appellant's arrest and the seizure of the application
forms. A warrantless arrest, when unlawful, has the
effect of invalidating the search incidental thereto
and the articles so seized are rendered inadmissible
in evidence.42 Here, even if the documents seized
were deemed inadmissible, her conviction would
stand in view of Araneta and Modesto's testimonies.
Appellant attempts to cast doubt on the
prosecution's case by claiming in her ninth assigned
error that Erlie Ramos of the POEA supposedly
"planted" the application forms. She also assails his
character, alleging that he passed himself off as a
lawyer, although this was denied by Ramos.
The claim of "frame-up," like alibi, is a defense that
has been invariably viewed by the Court with
disfavor for it can easily be concocted but difficult to
prove.43 Apart from her self-serving testimony,
appellant has not offered any evidence that she was
indeed framed by Ramos. She has not even hinted
at any motive for Ramos to frame her. Law enforcers
are presumed to have performed their duties
regularly in the absence of evidence to the
contrary.44
Considering that the two elements of lack of license
or authority and the undertaking of an activity
constituting recruitment and placement are present,
appellant, at the very least, is liable for "simple"
illegal recruitment. But is she guilty of illegal
recruitment in large scale? We find that she is not.
A conviction for large scale illegal recruitment must
be based on a finding in each case of illegal
recruitment of three or more persons whether
individually or as a group.45 In this case, only two
persons, Araneta and Modesto, were proven to have
been recruited by appellant. The third person named
in the complaint as having been promised
employment for a fee, Jennelyn Baez, was not
presented in court to testify.
It is true that law does not require that at least three
victims testify at the trial; nevertheless, it is
necessary that there is sufficient evidence proving
that the offense was committed against three or
more persons.46 In this case, evidence that
appellant likewise promised her employment for a
fee is sketchy. The only evidence that tends to prove
this fact is the testimony of Nancy Araneta, who said
that she and her friends, Baez and Sandra Aquino,
came to the briefing and that they (she and her
"friends") filled up application forms.
The affidavit47 Baez executed jointly with Araneta
cannot support Araneta's testimony. The affidavit
was neither identified, nor its contents affirmed, by
Baez. Insofar as it purports to prove that appellant
recruited Baez, therefore, the affidavit is hearsay
and inadmissible.48 In any case, hearsay evidence,
such as the said affidavit, has little probative
value.49
Neither can appellant be convicted for recruiting CIS
agent Eileen Fermindoza or even the other persons
present in the briefing of January 30, 1994.
Appellant is accused of recruiting only the three
persons named in the information Araneta,
Modesto and Baez. The information does not
include Fermindoza or the other persons present in
the briefing as among those promised or offered
employment for a fee. To convict appellant for the
recruitment and placement of persons other than
those alleged to have been offered or promised
employment for a fee would violate her right to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation
against her.50
In any event, the purpose of the offer of the
testimonies of Araneta, Morales and Fermindoza,
respectively, was limited as follows:
FISCAL BELDUA:
Your Honor please, we are offering the oral
testimony of the witness, as one of those recruited
by the accused, and also to identify some exhibits
for the prosecution and as well as to identify the
accused.51
xxx
FISCAL BELDUA:
We are offering the oral testimony of the witness,
Your Honor, to testify on the fact about her
recruitment by the accused and immediately before
the recruitment, as well as to identify some exhibits
for the prosecution, and also the accused in this
case, Your Honor.52
xxx
FISCAL BELDUA:
This witness is going to testify that at around that
date Your Honor, she was connected with the CIS,
that she was instructed together with a companion to
conduct a surveillance on the place where the illegal
recruitment was supposed to be going on, that she
acted as an applicant, Your Honor, to ascertain the
truthfulness of the illegal recruitment going on, to
identify the accused, as well as to identify some
exhibits for the prosecution.53
xxx
Courts may consider a piece of evidence only for the
purpose for which it was offered,54 and the purpose
of the offer of their testimonies did not include the
proving of the purported recruitment of other
supposed applicants by appellant.
Appellant claims in her seventh assigned error that
the information is fatally defective since it charges
her with committing illegal recruitment in large scale
on January 30, 1994 while the prosecution evidence
supposedly indicates that she committed the crime
on February 2, 1994.
We find that the evidence for the prosecution
regarding the date of the commission of the crime
does not vary from that charged in the information.
Both Nancy Araneta and Lourdes Modesto testified
that on January 30, 1994, while in the Alejandro
residence, appellant offered them employment for a
fee. Thus, while the arrest was effected only on
February 2, 1994, the crime had already been
committed three (3) days earlier on January 30,
1994.
The eighth and tenth assigned errors, respectively,
pertain to the penalty of life imprisonment imposed
by the trial court as well as the constitutionality of the
law prescribing the same, appellant arguing that it is
unconstitutional for being unduly harsh.55 Section
19 (1), Article III of the Constitution states:
"Excessive fines shall not be imposed, nor cruel,
degrading or inhuman punishment inflicted."
The penalty of life imprisonment imposed upon
appellant must be reduced. Because the prosecution
was able to prove that appellant committed
recruitment and placement against two persons
only, she cannot be convicted of illegal recruitment
in large scale, which requires that recruitment be
committed against three or more persons. Appellant
can only be convicted of two counts of "simple"
illegal recruitment, one for that committed against
Nancy Araneta, and another count for that
committed against Lourdes Modesto. Appellant is
sentenced, for each count, to suffer the penalty of
four (4) to six (6) years of imprisonment and to pay a
fine of P30,000.00. This renders immaterial the tenth
assigned error, which assumes that the proper
imposable penalty upon appellant is life
imprisonment.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the regional trial court
is MODIFIED. Appellant is hereby declared guilty of
illegal recruitment on two (2) counts and is
sentenced, for each count, to suffer the penalty of
four (4) to six (6) years of imprisonment and to pay a
fine of P30,000.00.1wphi1.nt
SO ORDERED.
EN BANC
G.R. No. 178552 October 5, 2010
SOUTHERN HEMISPHERE ENGAGEMENT
NETWORK, INC., on behalf of the South-South
Network (SSN) for Non-State Armed Group
Engagement, and ATTY. SOLIMAN M. SANTOS,
JR., Petitioners,
vs.
ANTI-TERRORISM COUNCIL, THE EXECUTIVE
SECRETARY, THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE,
THE SECRETARY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, THE
SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE, THE
SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR AND LOCAL
GOVERNMENT, THE SECRETARY OF FINANCE,
THE NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER, THE CHIEF
OF STAFF OF THE ARMED FORCES OF THE
PHILIPPINES, AND THE CHIEF OF THE
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE, Respondents.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
G.R. No. 178554
KILUSANG MAYO UNO (KMU), represented by its
Chairperson Elmer Labog, NATIONAL
FEDERATION OF LABOR UNIONS-KILUSANG
MAYO UNO (NAFLU-KMU), represented by its
National President Joselito V. Ustarez and Secretary
General Antonio C. Pascual, and CENTER FOR
TRADE UNION AND HUMAN RIGHTS, represented
by its Executive Director Daisy Arago, Petitioners,
vs.
HON. EDUARDO ERMITA, in his capacity as
Executive Secretary, NORBERTO GONZALES, in
his capacity as Acting Secretary of National
Defense, HON. RAUL GONZALES, in his capacity
as Secretary of Justice, HON. RONALDO PUNO, in
his capacity as Secretary of the Interior and Local
Government, GEN. HERMOGENES ESPERON, in
his capacity as AFP Chief of Staff, and DIRECTOR
GENERAL OSCAR CALDERON, in his capacity as
PNP Chief of Staff, Respondents.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
G.R. No. 178581
BAGONG ALYANSANG MAKABAYAN (BAYAN),
GENERAL ALLIANCE BINDING WOMEN FOR
REFORMS, INTEGRITY, EQUALITY, LEADERSHIP
AND ACTION (GABRIELA), KILUSANG
MAGBUBUKID NG PILIPINAS (KMP), MOVEMENT
OF CONCERNED CITIZENS FOR CIVIL
LIBERTIES (MCCCL), CONFEDERATION FOR
UNITY, RECOGNITION AND ADVANCEMENT OF
GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES (COURAGE),
KALIPUNAN NG DAMAYANG MAHIHIRAP
(KADAMAY), SOLIDARITY OF CAVITE WORKERS,
LEAGUE OF FILIPINO STUDENTS (LFS),
ANAKBAYAN, PAMBANSANG LAKAS NG
KILUSANG MAMAMALAKAYA (PAMALAKAYA),
ALLIANCE OF CONCERNED TEACHERS (ACT),
MIGRANTE, HEALTH ALLIANCE FOR
DEMOCRACY (HEAD), AGHAM, TEOFISTO
GUINGONA, JR., DR. BIENVENIDO LUMBERA,
RENATO CONSTANTINO, JR., SISTER MARY
JOHN MANANSAN OSB, DEAN CONSUELO PAZ,
ATTY. JOSEFINA LICHAUCO, COL. GERRY
CUNANAN (ret.), CARLITOS SIGUION-REYNA,
DR. CAROLINA PAGADUAN-ARAULLO, RENATO
REYES, DANILO RAMOS, EMERENCIANA DE
LESUS, RITA BAUA, REY CLARO CASAMBRE,
Petitioners,
vs.
GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, in her capacity as
President and Commander-in-Chief, EXECUTIVE
SECRETARY EDUARDO ERMITA, DEPARTMENT
OF JUSTICE SECRETARY RAUL GONZALES,
DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
SECRETARY ALBERTO ROMULO, DEPARTMENT
OF NATIONAL DEFENSE ACTING SECRETARY
NORBERTO GONZALES, DEPARTMENT OF
INTERIOR AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT
SECRETARY RONALDO PUNO. DEPARTMENT
OF FINANCE SECRETARY MARGARITO TEVES,
NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER NORBERTO
GONZALES, THE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE
COORDINATING AGENCY (NICA), THE
NATIONAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION (NBI),
THE BUREAU OF IMMIGRATION, THE OFFICE OF
CIVIL DEFENSE, THE INTELLIGENCE SERVICE
OF THE ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES
(ISAFP), THE ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING
COUNCIL (AMLC), THE PHILIPPINE CENTER ON
TRANSNATIONAL CRIME, THE CHIEF OF THE
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE GEN. OSCAR
CALDERON, THE PNP, including its intelligence
and investigative elements, AFP CHIEF GEN.
HERMOGENES ESPERON, Respondents.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
G.R. No. 178890

KARAPATAN, ALLIANCE FOR THE
ADVANCEMENT OF PEOPLE'S RIGHTS,
represented herein by Dr. Edelina de la Paz, and
representing the following organizations:
HUSTISYA, represented by Evangeline Hernandez
and also on her own behalf; DESAPARECIDOS,
represented by Mary Guy Portajada and also on her
own behalf, SAMAHAN NG MGA EX-DETAINEES
LABAN SA DETENSYON AT PARA SA
AMNESTIYA (SELDA), represented by Donato
Continente and also on his own behalf,
ECUMENICAL MOVEMENT FOR JUSTICE AND
PEACE (EMJP), represented by Bishop Elmer M.
Bolocon, UCCP, and PROMOTION OF CHURCH
PEOPLE'S RESPONSE, represented by Fr. Gilbert
Sabado, OCARM, Petitioners,
vs.
GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, in her capacity as
President and Commander-in-Chief, EXECUTIVE
SECRETARTY EDUARDO ERMITA,
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE SECRETARY RAUL
GONZALEZ, DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN
AFFAIRS SECRETARY ALBERTO ROMULO,
DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL DEFENSE ACTING
SECRETARY NORBERTO GONZALES,
DEPARTMENT OF INTERIOR AND LOCAL
GOVERNMENT SECRETARY RONALDO PUNO,
DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE SECRETARY
MARGARITO TEVES, NATIONAL SECURITY
ADVISER NORBERTO GONZALES, THE
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE COORDINATING
AGENCY (NICA), THE NATIONAL BUREAU OF
INVESTIGATION (NBI), THE BUREAU OF
IMMIGRATION, THE OFFICE OF CIVIL DEFENSE,
THE INTELLIGENCE SERVICE OF THE ARMED
FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES (ISAFP), THE
ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING COUNCIL (AMLC),
THE PHILIPPINE CENTER ON TRANSNATIONAL
CRIME, THE CHIEF OF THE PHILIPPINE
NATIONAL POLICE GEN. OSCAR CALDERON,
THE PNP, including its intelligence and investigative
elements, AFP CHIEF GEN. HERMOGENES
ESPERON, Respondents.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
G.R. No. 179157
THE INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES
(IBP), represented by Atty. Feliciano M. Bautista,
COUNSELS FOR THE DEFENSE OF LIBERTY
(CODAL), SEN. MA. ANA CONSUELO A.S.
MADRIGAL and FORMER SENATORS SERGIO
OSMEA III and WIGBERTO E. TAADA,
Petitioners,
vs.
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY EDUARDO ERMITA
AND THE MEMBERS OF THE ANTI-TERRORISM
COUNCIL (ATC), Respondents.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
G.R. No. 179461
BAGONG ALYANSANG MAKABAYAN-SOUTHERN
TAGALOG (BAYAN-ST), GABRIELA-ST,
KATIPUNAN NG MGA SAMAHYANG
MAGSASAKA-TIMOG KATAGALUGAN (KASAMA-
TK), MOVEMENT OF CONCERNED CITIZENS
FOR CIVIL LIBERTIES (MCCCL), PEOPLES
MARTYRS, ANAKBAYAN-ST, PAMALAKAYA-ST,
CONFEDERATION FOR UNITY, RECOGNITION
AND ADVANCEMENT OF GOVERNMENT
EMPLOYEES (COURAGE-ST), PAGKAKAISA'T
UGNAYAN NG MGA MAGBUBUKID SA LAGUNA
(PUMALAG), SAMAHAN NG MGA MAMAMAYAN
SA TABING RILES (SMTR-ST), LEAGUE OF
FILIPINO STUDENTS (LFS), BAYAN MUNA-ST,
KONGRESO NG MGA MAGBUBUKID PARA SA
REPORMANG AGRARYO KOMPRA, BIGKIS AT
LAKAS NG MGA KATUTUBO SA TIMOG
KATAGALUGAN (BALATIK), SAMAHAN AT
UGNAYAN NG MGA MAGSASAKANG
KABABAIHAN SA TIMOG KATAGALUGAN
(SUMAMAKA-TK), STARTER, LOSOS RURAL
POOR ORGANIZATION FOR PROGRESS &
EQUALITY, CHRISTIAN NIO LAJARA, TEODORO
REYES, FRANCESCA B. TOLENTINO, JANNETTE
E. BARRIENTOS, OSCAR T. LAPIDA, JR., DELFIN
DE CLARO, SALLY P. ASTRERA, ARNEL SEGUNE
BELTRAN, Petitioners,
vs.
GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, in her capacity as
President and Commander-in-Chief, EXECUTIVE
SECRETARY EDUARDO ERMITA, DEPARTMENT
OF JUSTICE SECRETARY RAUL GONZALEZ,
DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
SECRETARY ALBERTO ROMULO, DEPARTMENT
OF NATIONAL DEFENSE ACTING SECRETARY
NORBERTO GONZALES, DEPARTMENT OF
INTERIOR AND LOCAL GOVERNMEN T
SECRETARY RONALDO PUNO, DEPARTMENT
OF FINCANCE SECRETARY MARGARITO TEVES,
NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER NORBERTO
GONZALES, THE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE
COORDINATING AGENCY (NICA), THE
NATIONAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION (NBI),
THE BUREAU OF IMMIGRATION, THE OFFICE OF
CIVIL DEFENSE, THE INTELLIGENCE SERVICE
OF THE ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES
(ISAFP), THE ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING
COUNCIL (AMLC), THE PHILIPPINE CENTER ON
TRANSNATIONAL CRIME, THE CHIEF OF THE
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE GEN. OSCAR
CALDERON, THE PNP, including its intelligence
and investigative elements, AFP CHIEF GEN.
HERMOGENES ESPERON, Respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:

Before the Court are six petitions challenging the
constitutionality of Republic Act No. 9372 (RA 9372),
"An Act to Secure the State and Protect our People
from Terrorism," otherwise known as the Human
Security Act of 2007,1 signed into law on March 6,
2007.
Following the effectivity of RA 9372 on July 15,
2007,2 petitioner Southern Hemisphere
Engagement Network, Inc., a non-government
organization, and Atty. Soliman Santos, Jr., a
concerned citizen, taxpayer and lawyer, filed a
petition for certiorari and prohibition on July 16, 2007
docketed as G.R. No. 178552. On even date,
petitioners Kilusang Mayo Uno (KMU), National
Federation of Labor Unions-Kilusang Mayo Uno
(NAFLU-KMU), and Center for Trade Union and
Human Rights (CTUHR), represented by their
respective officers3 who are also bringing the action
in their capacity as citizens, filed a petition for
certiorari and prohibition docketed as G.R. No.
178554.
The following day, July 17, 2007, organizations
Bagong Alyansang Makabayan (BAYAN), General
Alliance Binding Women for Reforms, Integrity,
Equality, Leadership and Action (GABRIELA),
Kilusang Magbubukid ng Pilipinas (KMP), Movement
of Concerned Citizens for Civil Liberties (MCCCL),
Confederation for Unity, Recognition and
Advancement of Government Employees
(COURAGE), Kalipunan ng Damayang Mahihirap
(KADAMAY), Solidarity of Cavite Workers (SCW),
League of Filipino Students (LFS), Anakbayan,
Pambansang Lakas ng Kilusang Mamamalakaya
(PAMALAKAYA), Alliance of Concerned Teachers
(ACT), Migrante, Health Alliance for Democracy
(HEAD), and Agham, represented by their respective
officers,4 and joined by concerned citizens and
taxpayers Teofisto Guingona, Jr., Dr. Bienvenido
Lumbera, Renato Constantino, Jr., Sister Mary John
Manansan, OSB, Dean Consuelo Paz, Atty. Josefina
Lichauco, Retired Col. Gerry Cunanan, Carlitos
Siguion-Reyna, Dr. Carolina Pagaduan-Araullo,
Renato Reyes, Danilo Ramos, Emerenciana de
Jesus, Rita Baua and Rey Claro Casambre filed a
petition for certiorari and prohibition docketed as
G.R. No. 178581.
On August 6, 2007, Karapatan and its alliance
member organizations Hustisya, Desaparecidos,
Samahan ng mga Ex-Detainees Laban sa
Detensyon at para sa Amnestiya (SELDA),
Ecumenical Movement for Justice and Peace
(EMJP), and Promotion of Church Peoples
Response (PCPR), which were represented by their
respective officers5 who are also bringing action on
their own behalf, filed a petition for certiorari and
prohibition docketed as G.R. No. 178890.
On August 29, 2007, the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP), Counsels for the Defense of
Liberty (CODAL),6 Senator Ma. Ana Consuelo A.S.
Madrigal, Sergio Osmea III, and Wigberto E.
Taada filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition
docketed as G.R. No. 179157.
Bagong Alyansang Makabayan-Southern Tagalog
(BAYAN-ST), other regional chapters and
organizations mostly based in the Southern Tagalog
Region,7 and individuals8 followed suit by filing on
September 19, 2007 a petition for certiorari and
prohibition docketed as G.R. No. 179461 that
replicates the allegations raised in the BAYAN
petition in G.R. No. 178581.
Impleaded as respondents in the various petitions
are the Anti-Terrorism Council9 composed of, at the
time of the filing of the petitions, Executive Secretary
Eduardo Ermita as Chairperson, Justice Secretary
Raul Gonzales as Vice Chairperson, and Foreign
Affairs Secretary Alberto Romulo, Acting Defense
Secretary and National Security Adviser Norberto
Gonzales, Interior and Local Government Secretary
Ronaldo Puno, and Finance Secretary Margarito
Teves as members. All the petitions, except that of
the IBP, also impleaded Armed Forces of the
Philippines (AFP) Chief of Staff Gen. Hermogenes
Esperon and Philippine National Police (PNP) Chief
Gen. Oscar Calderon.
The Karapatan, BAYAN and BAYAN-ST petitions
likewise impleaded President Gloria Macapagal-
Arroyo and the support agencies for the Anti-
Terrorism Council like the National Intelligence
Coordinating Agency, National Bureau of
Investigation, Bureau of Immigration, Office of Civil
Defense, Intelligence Service of the AFP, Anti-
Money Laundering Center, Philippine Center on
Transnational Crime, and the PNP intelligence and
investigative elements.
The petitions fail.
Petitioners resort to certiorari is improper
Preliminarily, certiorari does not lie against
respondents who do not exercise judicial or quasi-
judicial functions. Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court is clear:
Section 1. Petition for certiorari.When any tribunal,
board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial
functions has acted without or in excess of its or his
jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there
is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy, and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person
aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the
proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and
praying that judgment be rendered annulling or
modifying the proceedings of such tribunal, board or
officer, and granting such incidental reliefs as law
and justice may require. (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
Parenthetically, petitioners do not even allege with
any modicum of particularity how respondents acted
without or in excess of their respective jurisdictions,
or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction.
The impropriety of certiorari as a remedy aside, the
petitions fail just the same.
In constitutional litigations, the power of judicial
review is limited by four exacting requisites, viz: (a)
there must be an actual case or controversy; (b)
petitioners must possess locus standi; (c) the
question of constitutionality must be raised at the
earliest opportunity; and (d) the issue of
constitutionality must be the lis mota of the case.10
In the present case, the dismal absence of the first
two requisites, which are the most essential, renders
the discussion of the last two superfluous.
Petitioners lack locus standi
Locus standi or legal standing requires a personal
stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure
that concrete adverseness which sharpens the
presentation of issues upon which the court so
largely depends for illumination of difficult
constitutional questions.11
Anak Mindanao Party-List Group v. The Executive
Secretary12 summarized the rule on locus standi,
thus:
Locus standi or legal standing has been defined as a
personal and substantial interest in a case such that
the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as
a result of the governmental act that is being
challenged. The gist of the question on standing is
whether a party alleges such personal stake in the
outcome of the controversy as to assure that
concrete adverseness which sharpens the
presentation of issues upon which the court depends
for illumination of difficult constitutional questions.
[A] party who assails the constitutionality of a statute
must have a direct and personal interest. It must
show not only that the law or any governmental act
is invalid, but also that it sustained or is in immediate
danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result of
its enforcement, and not merely that it suffers
thereby in some indefinite way. It must show that it
has been or is about to be denied some right or
privilege to which it is lawfully entitled or that it is
about to be subjected to some burdens or penalties
by reason of the statute or act complained of.
For a concerned party to be allowed to raise a
constitutional question, it must show that (1) it has
personally suffered some actual or threatened injury
as a result of the allegedly illegal conduct of the
government, (2) the injury is fairly traceable to the
challenged action, and (3) the injury is likely to be
redressed by a favorable action. (emphasis and
underscoring supplied.)
Petitioner-organizations assert locus standi on the
basis of being suspected "communist fronts" by the
government, especially the military; whereas
individual petitioners invariably invoke the
"transcendental importance" doctrine and their
status as citizens and taxpayers.
While Chavez v. PCGG13 holds that transcendental
public importance dispenses with the requirement
that petitioner has experienced or is in actual danger
of suffering direct and personal injury, cases
involving the constitutionality of penal legislation
belong to an altogether different genus of
constitutional litigation. Compelling State and
societal interests in the proscription of harmful
conduct, as will later be elucidated, necessitate a
closer judicial scrutiny of locus standi.
Petitioners have not presented any personal stake in
the outcome of the controversy. None of them faces
any charge under RA 9372.
KARAPATAN, Hustisya, Desaparecidos, SELDA,
EMJP and PCR, petitioners in G.R. No. 178890,
allege that they have been subjected to "close
security surveillance by state security forces," their
members followed by "suspicious persons" and
"vehicles with dark windshields," and their offices
monitored by "men with military build." They likewise
claim that they have been branded as "enemies of
the [S]tate."14
Even conceding such gratuitous allegations, the
Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) correctly points
out that petitioners have yet to show any connection
between the purported "surveillance" and the
implementation of RA 9372.
BAYAN, GABRIELA, KMP, MCCCL, COURAGE,
KADAMAY, SCW, LFS, Anakbayan, PAMALAKAYA,
ACT, Migrante, HEAD and Agham, petitioner-
organizations in G.R. No. 178581, would like the
Court to take judicial notice of respondents alleged
action of tagging them as militant organizations
fronting for the Communist Party of the Philippines
(CPP) and its armed wing, the National Peoples
Army (NPA). The tagging, according to petitioners, is
tantamount to the effects of proscription without
following the procedure under the law.15 The
petition of BAYAN-ST, et al. in G.R. No. 179461
pleads the same allegations.

The Court cannot take judicial notice of the alleged
"tagging" of petitioners.
Generally speaking, matters of judicial notice have
three material requisites: (1) the matter must be one
of common and general knowledge; (2) it must be
well and authoritatively settled and not doubtful or
uncertain; and (3) it must be known to be within the
limits of the jurisdiction of the court. The principal
guide in determining what facts may be assumed to
be judicially known is that of notoriety. Hence, it can
be said that judicial notice is limited to facts
evidenced by public records and facts of general
notoriety. Moreover, a judicially noticed fact must be
one not subject to a reasonable dispute in that it is
either: (1) generally known within the territorial
jurisdiction of the trial court; or (2) capable of
accurate and ready determination by resorting to
sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be
questionable.
Things of "common knowledge," of which courts take
judicial matters coming to the knowledge of men
generally in the course of the ordinary experiences
of life, or they may be matters which are generally
accepted by mankind as true and are capable of
ready and unquestioned demonstration. Thus, facts
which are universally known, and which may be
found in encyclopedias, dictionaries or other
publications, are judicially noticed, provided, they
are of such universal notoriety and so generally
understood that they may be regarded as forming
part of the common knowledge of every person. As
the common knowledge of man ranges far and wide,
a wide variety of particular facts have been judicially
noticed as being matters of common knowledge. But
a court cannot take judicial notice of any fact which,
in part, is dependent on the existence or non-
existence of a fact of which the court has no
constructive knowledge.16 (emphasis and
underscoring supplied.)
No ground was properly established by petitioners
for the taking of judicial notice. Petitioners
apprehension is insufficient to substantiate their
plea. That no specific charge or proscription under
RA 9372 has been filed against them, three years
after its effectivity, belies any claim of imminence of
their perceived threat emanating from the so-called
tagging.
The same is true with petitioners KMU, NAFLU and
CTUHR in G.R. No. 178554, who merely harp as
well on their supposed "link" to the CPP and NPA.
They fail to particularize how the implementation of
specific provisions of RA 9372 would result in direct
injury to their organization and members.
While in our jurisdiction there is still no judicially
declared terrorist organization, the United States of
America17 (US) and the European Union18 (EU)
have both classified the CPP, NPA and Abu Sayyaf
Group as foreign terrorist organizations. The Court
takes note of the joint statement of Executive
Secretary Eduardo Ermita and Justice Secretary
Raul Gonzales that the Arroyo Administration would
adopt the US and EU classification of the CPP and
NPA as terrorist organizations.19 Such statement
notwithstanding, there is yet to be filed before the
courts an application to declare the CPP and NPA
organizations as domestic terrorist or outlawed
organizations under RA 9372. Again, RA 9372 has
been in effect for three years now. From July 2007
up to the present, petitioner-organizations have
conducted their activities fully and freely without any
threat of, much less an actual, prosecution or
proscription under RA 9372.
Parenthetically, the Fourteenth Congress, in a
resolution initiated by Party-list Representatives
Saturnino Ocampo, Teodoro Casio, Rafael Mariano
and Luzviminda Ilagan,20 urged the government to
resume peace negotiations with the NDF by
removing the impediments thereto, one of which is
the adoption of designation of the CPP and NPA by
the US and EU as foreign terrorist organizations.
Considering the policy statement of the Aquino
Administration21 of resuming peace talks with the
NDF, the government is not imminently disposed to
ask for the judicial proscription of the CPP-NPA
consortium and its allied organizations.
More important, there are other parties not before
the Court with direct and specific interests in the
questions being raised.22 Of recent development is
the filing of the first case for proscription under
Section 1723 of RA 9372 by the Department of
Justice before the Basilan Regional Trial Court
against the Abu Sayyaf Group.24 Petitioner-
organizations do not in the least allege any link to
the Abu Sayyaf Group.
Some petitioners attempt, in vain though, to show
the imminence of a prosecution under RA 9372 by
alluding to past rebellion charges against them.
In Ladlad v. Velasco,25 the Court ordered the
dismissal of rebellion charges filed in 2006 against
then Party-List Representatives Crispin Beltran and
Rafael Mariano of Anakpawis, Liza Maza of
GABRIELA, and Joel Virador, Teodoro Casio and
Saturnino Ocampo of Bayan Muna. Also named in
the dismissed rebellion charges were petitioners
Rey Claro Casambre, Carolina Pagaduan-Araullo,
Renato Reyes, Rita Baua, Emerencia de Jesus and
Danilo Ramos; and accused of being front
organizations for the Communist movement were
petitioner-organizations KMU, BAYAN, GABRIELA,
PAMALAKAYA, KMP, KADAMAY, LFS and
COURAGE.26
The dismissed rebellion charges, however, do not
save the day for petitioners. For one, those charges
were filed in 2006, prior to the enactment of RA
9372, and dismissed by this Court. For another,
rebellion is defined and punished under the Revised
Penal Code. Prosecution for rebellion is not made
more imminent by the enactment of RA 9372, nor
does the enactment thereof make it easier to charge
a person with rebellion, its elements not having been
altered.
Conversely, previously filed but dismissed rebellion
charges bear no relation to prospective charges
under RA 9372. It cannot be overemphasized that
three years after the enactment of RA 9372, none of
petitioners has been charged.
Petitioners IBP and CODAL in G.R. No. 179157
base their claim of locus standi on their sworn duty
to uphold the Constitution. The IBP zeroes in on
Section 21 of RA 9372 directing it to render
assistance to those arrested or detained under the
law.
The mere invocation of the duty to preserve the rule
of law does not, however, suffice to clothe the IBP or
any of its members with standing.27 The IBP failed
to sufficiently demonstrate how its mandate under
the assailed statute revolts against its constitutional
rights and duties. Moreover, both the IBP and
CODAL have not pointed to even a single arrest or
detention effected under RA 9372.
Former Senator Ma. Ana Consuelo Madrigal, who
claims to have been the subject of "political
surveillance," also lacks locus standi. Prescinding
from the veracity, let alone legal basis, of the claim
of "political surveillance," the Court finds that she
has not shown even the slightest threat of being
charged under RA 9372. Similarly lacking in locus
standi are former Senator Wigberto Taada and
Senator Sergio Osmea III, who cite their being
respectively a human rights advocate and an
oppositor to the passage of RA 9372. Outside these
gratuitous statements, no concrete injury to them
has been pinpointed.
Petitioners Southern Hemisphere Engagement
Network and Atty. Soliman Santos Jr. in G.R. No.
178552 also conveniently state that the issues they
raise are of transcendental importance, "which must
be settled early" and are of "far-reaching
implications," without mention of any specific
provision of RA 9372 under which they have been
charged, or may be charged. Mere invocation of
human rights advocacy has nowhere been held
sufficient to clothe litigants with locus standi.
Petitioners must show an actual, or immediate
danger of sustaining, direct injury as a result of the
laws enforcement. To rule otherwise would be to
corrupt the settled doctrine of locus standi, as every
worthy cause is an interest shared by the general
public.
Neither can locus standi be conferred upon
individual petitioners as taxpayers and citizens. A
taxpayer suit is proper only when there is an
exercise of the spending or taxing power of
Congress,28 whereas citizen standing must rest on
direct and personal interest in the proceeding.29
RA 9372 is a penal statute and does not even
provide for any appropriation from Congress for its
implementation, while none of the individual
petitioner-citizens has alleged any direct and
personal interest in the implementation of the law.
It bears to stress that generalized interests, albeit
accompanied by the assertion of a public right, do
not establish locus standi. Evidence of a direct and
personal interest is key.
Petitioners fail to present an actual case or
controversy
By constitutional fiat, judicial power operates only
when there is an actual case or controversy.
Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one
Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be
established by law.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of
justice to settle actual controversies involving rights
which are legally demandable and enforceable, and
to determine whether or not there has been a grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government.30 (emphasis and
underscoring supplied.)
As early as Angara v. Electoral Commission,31 the
Court ruled that the power of judicial review is limited
to actual cases or controversies to be exercised
after full opportunity of argument by the parties. Any
attempt at abstraction could only lead to dialectics
and barren legal questions and to sterile conclusions
unrelated to actualities.
An actual case or controversy means an existing
case or controversy that is appropriate or ripe for
determination, not conjectural or anticipatory, lest
the decision of the court would amount to an
advisory opinion.32
Information Technology Foundation of the
Philippines v. COMELEC33 cannot be more
emphatic:
[C]ourts do not sit to adjudicate mere academic
questions to satisfy scholarly interest, however
intellectually challenging. The controversy must be
justiciabledefinite and concrete, touching on the
legal relations of parties having adverse legal
interests. In other words, the pleadings must show
an active antagonistic assertion of a legal right, on
the one hand, and a denial thereof on the other
hand; that is, it must concern a real and not merely a
theoretical question or issue. There ought to be an
actual and substantial controversy admitting of
specific relief through a decree conclusive in nature,
as distinguished from an opinion advising what the
law would be upon a hypothetical state of facts.
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Thus, a petition to declare unconstitutional a law
converting the Municipality of Makati into a Highly
Urbanized City was held to be premature as it was
tacked on uncertain, contingent events.34 Similarly,
a petition that fails to allege that an application for a
license to operate a radio or television station has
been denied or granted by the authorities does not
present a justiciable controversy, and merely
wheedles the Court to rule on a hypothetical
problem.35
The Court dismissed the petition in Philippine Press
Institute v. Commission on Elections36 for failure to
cite any specific affirmative action of the
Commission on Elections to implement the assailed
resolution. It refused, in Abbas v. Commission on
Elections,37 to rule on the religious freedom claim of
the therein petitioners based merely on a perceived
potential conflict between the provisions of the
Muslim Code and those of the national law, there
being no actual controversy between real litigants.
The list of cases denying claims resting on purely
hypothetical or anticipatory grounds goes on ad
infinitum.
The Court is not unaware that a reasonable certainty
of the occurrence of a perceived threat to any
constitutional interest suffices to provide a basis for
mounting a constitutional challenge. This, however,
is qualified by the requirement that there must be
sufficient facts to enable the Court to intelligently
adjudicate the issues.38
Very recently, the US Supreme Court, in Holder v.
Humanitarian Law Project,39 allowed the pre-
enforcement review of a criminal statute, challenged
on vagueness grounds, since plaintiffs faced a
"credible threat of prosecution" and "should not be
required to await and undergo a criminal prosecution
as the sole means of seeking relief."40 The plaintiffs
therein filed an action before a federal court to assail
the constitutionality of the material support statute,
18 U.S.C. 2339B (a) (1),41 proscribing the
provision of material support to organizations
declared by the Secretary of State as foreign
terrorist organizations. They claimed that they
intended to provide support for the humanitarian and
political activities of two such organizations.
Prevailing American jurisprudence allows an
adjudication on the merits when an anticipatory
petition clearly shows that the challenged prohibition
forbids the conduct or activity that a petitioner seeks
to do, as there would then be a justiciable
controversy.42
Unlike the plaintiffs in Holder, however, herein
petitioners have failed to show that the challenged
provisions of RA 9372 forbid constitutionally
protected conduct or activity that they seek to do. No
demonstrable threat has been established, much
less a real and existing one.
Petitioners obscure allegations of sporadic
"surveillance" and supposedly being tagged as
"communist fronts" in no way approximate a credible
threat of prosecution. From these allegations, the
Court is being lured to render an advisory opinion,
which is not its function.43
Without any justiciable controversy, the petitions
have become pleas for declaratory relief, over which
the Court has no original jurisdiction. Then again,
declaratory actions characterized by "double
contingency," where both the activity the petitioners
intend to undertake and the anticipated reaction to it
of a public official are merely theorized, lie beyond
judicial review for lack of ripeness.44
The possibility of abuse in the implementation of RA
9372 does not avail to take the present petitions out
of the realm of the surreal and merely imagined.
Such possibility is not peculiar to RA 9372 since the
exercise of any power granted by law may be
abused.45 Allegations of abuse must be anchored
on real events before courts may step in to settle
actual controversies involving rights which are
legally demandable and enforceable.
A facial invalidation of a statute is allowed only in
free speech cases, wherein certain rules of
constitutional litigation are rightly excepted
Petitioners assail for being intrinsically vague and
impermissibly broad the definition of the crime of
terrorism46 under RA 9372 in that terms like
"widespread and extraordinary fear and panic
among the populace" and "coerce the government to
give in to an unlawful demand" are nebulous, leaving
law enforcement agencies with no standard to
measure the prohibited acts.
Respondents, through the OSG, counter that the
doctrines of void-for-vagueness and overbreadth
find no application in the present case since these
doctrines apply only to free speech cases; and that
RA 9372 regulates conduct, not speech.

For a jurisprudentially guided understanding of these
doctrines, it is imperative to outline the schools of
thought on whether the void-for-vagueness and
overbreadth doctrines are equally applicable
grounds to assail a penal statute.
Respondents interpret recent jurisprudence as
slanting toward the idea of limiting the application of
the two doctrines to free speech cases. They
particularly cite Romualdez v. Hon.
Sandiganbayan47 and Estrada v.
Sandiganbayan.48
The Court clarifies.
At issue in Romualdez v. Sandiganbayan was
whether the word "intervene" in Section 549 of the
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act was intrinsically
vague and impermissibly broad. The Court stated
that "the overbreadth and the vagueness doctrines
have special application only to free-speech cases,"
and are "not appropriate for testing the validity of
penal statutes."50 It added that, at any rate, the
challenged provision, under which the therein
petitioner was charged, is not vague.51
While in the subsequent case of Romualdez v.
Commission on Elections,52 the Court stated that a
facial invalidation of criminal statutes is not
appropriate, it nonetheless proceeded to conduct a
vagueness analysis, and concluded that the therein
subject election offense53 under the Voters
Registration Act of 1996, with which the therein
petitioners were charged, is couched in precise
language.54
The two Romualdez cases rely heavily on the
Separate Opinion55 of Justice Vicente V. Mendoza
in the Estrada case, where the Court found the Anti-
Plunder Law (Republic Act No. 7080) clear and free
from ambiguity respecting the definition of the crime
of plunder.
The position taken by Justice Mendoza in Estrada
relates these two doctrines to the concept of a
"facial" invalidation as opposed to an "as-applied"
challenge. He basically postulated that allegations
that a penal statute is vague and overbroad do not
justify a facial review of its validity. The pertinent
portion of the Concurring Opinion of Justice
Mendoza, which was quoted at length in the main
Estrada decision, reads:
A facial challenge is allowed to be made to a vague
statute and to one which is overbroad because of
possible "chilling effect" upon protected speech. The
theory is that "[w]hen statutes regulate or proscribe
speech and no readily apparent construction
suggests itself as a vehicle for rehabilitating the
statutes in a single prosecution, the transcendent
value to all society of constitutionally protected
expression is deemed to justify allowing attacks on
overly broad statutes with no requirement that the
person making the attack demonstrate that his own
conduct could not be regulated by a statute drawn
with narrow specificity." The possible harm to society
in permitting some unprotected speech to go
unpunished is outweighed by the possibility that the
protected speech of others may be deterred and
perceived grievances left to fester because of
possible inhibitory effects of overly broad statutes.
This rationale does not apply to penal statutes.
Criminal statutes have general in terrorem effect
resulting from their very existence, and, if facial
challenge is allowed for this reason alone, the State
may well be prevented from enacting laws against
socially harmful conduct. In the area of criminal law,
the law cannot take chances as in the area of free
speech.
The overbreadth and vagueness doctrines then
have special application only to free speech cases.
They are inapt for testing the validity of penal
statutes. As the U.S. Supreme Court put it, in an
opinion by Chief Justice Rehnquist, "we have not
recognized an 'overbreadth' doctrine outside the
limited context of the First Amendment." In Broadrick
v. Oklahoma, the Court ruled that "claims of facial
overbreadth have been entertained in cases
involving statutes which, by their terms, seek to
regulate only spoken words" and, again, that
"overbreadth claims, if entertained at all, have been
curtailed when invoked against ordinary criminal
laws that are sought to be applied to protected
conduct." For this reason, it has been held that "a
facial challenge to a legislative act is the most
difficult challenge to mount successfully, since the
challenger must establish that no set of
circumstances exists under which the Act would be
valid." As for the vagueness doctrine, it is said that a
litigant may challenge a statute on its face only if it is
vague in all its possible applications. "A plaintiff who
engages in some conduct that is clearly proscribed
cannot complain of the vagueness of the law as
applied to the conduct of others."
In sum, the doctrines of strict scrutiny, overbreadth,
and vagueness are analytical tools developed for
testing "on their faces" statutes in free speech cases
or, as they are called in American law, First
Amendment cases. They cannot be made to do
service when what is involved is a criminal statute.
With respect to such statute, the established rule is
that "one to whom application of a statute is
constitutional will not be heard to attack the statute
on the ground that impliedly it might also be taken as
applying to other persons or other situations in which
its application might be unconstitutional." As has
been pointed out, "vagueness challenges in the First
Amendment context, like overbreadth challenges
typically produce facial invalidation, while statutes
found vague as a matter of due process typically are
invalidated [only] 'as applied' to a particular
defendant." Consequently, there is no basis for
petitioner's claim that this Court review the Anti-
Plunder Law on its face and in its entirety.
Indeed, "on its face" invalidation of statutes results in
striking them down entirely on the ground that they
might be applied to parties not before the Court
whose activities are constitutionally protected. It
constitutes a departure from the case and
controversy requirement of the Constitution and
permits decisions to be made without concrete
factual settings and in sterile abstract contexts. But,
as the U.S. Supreme Court pointed out in Younger
v. Harris
[T]he task of analyzing a proposed statute,
pinpointing its deficiencies, and requiring correction
of these deficiencies before the statute is put into
effect, is rarely if ever an appropriate task for the
judiciary. The combination of the relative
remoteness of the controversy, the impact on the
legislative process of the relief sought, and above all
the speculative and amorphous nature of the
required line-by-line analysis of detailed statutes, . . .
ordinarily results in a kind of case that is wholly
unsatisfactory for deciding constitutional questions,
whichever way they might be decided.
For these reasons, "on its face" invalidation of
statutes has been described as "manifestly strong
medicine," to be employed "sparingly and only as a
last resort," and is generally disfavored. In
determining the constitutionality of a statute,
therefore, its provisions which are alleged to have
been violated in a case must be examined in the
light of the conduct with which the defendant is
charged.56 (Underscoring supplied.)
The confusion apparently stems from the
interlocking relation of the overbreadth and
vagueness doctrines as grounds for a facial or as-
applied challenge against a penal statute (under a
claim of violation of due process of law) or a speech
regulation (under a claim of abridgement of the
freedom of speech and cognate rights).
To be sure, the doctrine of vagueness and the
doctrine of overbreadth do not operate on the same
plane.
A statute or act suffers from the defect of vagueness
when it lacks comprehensible standards that men of
common intelligence must necessarily guess at its
meaning and differ as to its application. It is
repugnant to the Constitution in two respects: (1) it
violates due process for failure to accord persons,
especially the parties targeted by it, fair notice of the
conduct to avoid; and (2) it leaves law enforcers
unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions and
becomes an arbitrary flexing of the Government
muscle.57 The overbreadth doctrine, meanwhile,
decrees that a governmental purpose to control or
prevent activities constitutionally subject to state
regulations may not be achieved by means which
sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the
area of protected freedoms.58
As distinguished from the vagueness doctrine, the
overbreadth doctrine assumes that individuals will
understand what a statute prohibits and will
accordingly refrain from that behavior, even though
some of it is protected.59
A "facial" challenge is likewise different from an "as-
applied" challenge.
Distinguished from an as-applied challenge which
considers only extant facts affecting real litigants, a
facial invalidation is an examination of the entire law,
pinpointing its flaws and defects, not only on the
basis of its actual operation to the parties, but also
on the assumption or prediction that its very
existence may cause others not before the court to
refrain from constitutionally protected speech or
activities.60
Justice Mendoza accurately phrased the subtitle61
in his concurring opinion that the vagueness and
overbreadth doctrines, as grounds for a facial
challenge, are not applicable to penal laws. A litigant
cannot thus successfully mount a facial challenge
against a criminal statute on either vagueness or
overbreadth grounds.
The allowance of a facial challenge in free speech
cases is justified by the aim to avert the "chilling
effect" on protected speech, the exercise of which
should not at all times be abridged.62 As reflected
earlier, this rationale is inapplicable to plain penal
statutes that generally bear an "in terrorem effect" in
deterring socially harmful conduct. In fact, the
legislature may even forbid and penalize acts
formerly considered innocent and lawful, so long as
it refrains from diminishing or dissuading the
exercise of constitutionally protected rights.63
The Court reiterated that there are "critical limitations
by which a criminal statute may be challenged" and
"underscored that an on-its-face invalidation of
penal statutes x x x may not be allowed."64
[T]he rule established in our jurisdiction is, only
statutes on free speech, religious freedom, and
other fundamental rights may be facially challenged.
Under no case may ordinary penal statutes be
subjected to a facial challenge. The rationale is
obvious. If a facial challenge to a penal statute is
permitted, the prosecution of crimes may be
hampered. No prosecution would be possible. A
strong criticism against employing a facial challenge
in the case of penal statutes, if the same is allowed,
would effectively go against the grain of the doctrinal
requirement of an existing and concrete controversy
before judicial power may be appropriately
exercised. A facial challenge against a penal statute
is, at best, amorphous and speculative. It would,
essentially, force the court to consider third parties
who are not before it. As I have said in my
opposition to the allowance of a facial challenge to
attack penal statutes, such a test will impair the
States ability to deal with crime. If warranted, there
would be nothing that can hinder an accused from
defeating the States power to prosecute on a mere
showing that, as applied to third parties, the penal
statute is vague or overbroad, notwithstanding that
the law is clear as applied to him.65 (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
It is settled, on the other hand, that the application of
the overbreadth doctrine is limited to a facial kind of
challenge and, owing to the given rationale of a
facial challenge, applicable only to free speech
cases.
By its nature, the overbreadth doctrine has to
necessarily apply a facial type of invalidation in order
to plot areas of protected speech, inevitably almost
always under situations not before the court, that are
impermissibly swept by the substantially overbroad
regulation. Otherwise stated, a statute cannot be
properly analyzed for being substantially overbroad
if the court confines itself only to facts as applied to
the litigants.
The most distinctive feature of the overbreadth
technique is that it marks an exception to some of
the usual rules of constitutional litigation. Ordinarily,
a particular litigant claims that a statute is
unconstitutional as applied to him or her; if the
litigant prevails, the courts carve away the
unconstitutional aspects of the law by invalidating its
improper applications on a case to case basis.
Moreover, challengers to a law are not permitted to
raise the rights of third parties and can only assert
their own interests. In overbreadth analysis, those
rules give way; challenges are permitted to raise the
rights of third parties; and the court invalidates the
entire statute "on its face," not merely "as applied
for" so that the overbroad law becomes
unenforceable until a properly authorized court
construes it more narrowly. The factor that motivates
courts to depart from the normal adjudicatory rules is
the concern with the "chilling;" deterrent effect of the
overbroad statute on third parties not courageous
enough to bring suit. The Court assumes that an
overbroad laws "very existence may cause others
not before the court to refrain from constitutionally
protected speech or expression." An overbreadth
ruling is designed to remove that deterrent effect on
the speech of those third parties.66 (Emphasis in the
original omitted; underscoring supplied.)
In restricting the overbreadth doctrine to free speech
claims, the Court, in at least two cases,67 observed
that the US Supreme Court has not recognized an
overbreadth doctrine outside the limited context of
the First Amendment,68 and that claims of facial
overbreadth have been entertained in cases
involving statutes which, by their terms, seek to
regulate only spoken words.69 In Virginia v.
Hicks,70 it was held that rarely, if ever, will an
overbreadth challenge succeed against a law or
regulation that is not specifically addressed to
speech or speech-related conduct. Attacks on overly
broad statutes are justified by the "transcendent
value to all society of constitutionally protected
expression."71
Since a penal statute may only be assailed for being
vague as applied to petitioners, a limited vagueness
analysis of the definition of "terrorism" in RA 9372 is
legally impermissible absent an actual or imminent
charge against them
While Estrada did not apply the overbreadth
doctrine, it did not preclude the operation of the
vagueness test on the Anti-Plunder Law as applied
to the therein petitioner, finding, however, that there
was no basis to review the law "on its face and in its
entirety."72 It stressed that "statutes found vague as
a matter of due process typically are invalidated only
'as applied' to a particular defendant."73
American jurisprudence74 instructs that "vagueness
challenges that do not involve the First Amendment
must be examined in light of the specific facts of the
case at hand and not with regard to the statute's
facial validity."
For more than 125 years, the US Supreme Court
has evaluated defendants claims that criminal
statutes are unconstitutionally vague, developing a
doctrine hailed as "among the most important
guarantees of liberty under law."75
In this jurisdiction, the void-for-vagueness doctrine
asserted under the due process clause has been
utilized in examining the constitutionality of criminal
statutes. In at least three cases,76 the Court brought
the doctrine into play in analyzing an ordinance
penalizing the non-payment of municipal tax on
fishponds, the crime of illegal recruitment punishable
under Article 132(b) of the Labor Code, and the
vagrancy provision under Article 202 (2) of the
Revised Penal Code. Notably, the petitioners in
these three cases, similar to those in the two
Romualdez and Estrada cases, were actually
charged with the therein assailed penal statute,
unlike in the present case.
There is no merit in the claim that RA 9372 regulates
speech so as to permit a facial analysis of its validity
From the definition of the crime of terrorism in the
earlier cited Section 3 of RA 9372, the following
elements may be culled: (1) the offender commits an
act punishable under any of the cited provisions of
the Revised Penal Code, or under any of the
enumerated special penal laws; (2) the commission
of the predicate crime sows and creates a condition
of widespread and extraordinary fear and panic
among the populace; and (3) the offender is
actuated by the desire to coerce the government to
give in to an unlawful demand.
In insisting on a facial challenge on the invocation
that the law penalizes speech, petitioners contend
that the element of "unlawful demand" in the
definition of terrorism77 must necessarily be
transmitted through some form of expression
protected by the free speech clause.
The argument does not persuade. What the law
seeks to penalize is conduct, not speech.
Before a charge for terrorism may be filed under RA
9372, there must first be a predicate crime actually
committed to trigger the operation of the key
qualifying phrases in the other elements of the
crime, including the coercion of the government to
accede to an "unlawful demand." Given the
presence of the first element, any attempt at singling
out or highlighting the communicative component of
the prohibition cannot recategorize the unprotected
conduct into a protected speech.
Petitioners notion on the transmission of message is
entirely inaccurate, as it unduly focuses on just one
particle of an element of the crime. Almost every
commission of a crime entails some mincing of
words on the part of the offender like in declaring to
launch overt criminal acts against a victim, in
haggling on the amount of ransom or conditions, or
in negotiating a deceitful transaction. An analogy in
one U.S. case78 illustrated that the fact that the
prohibition on discrimination in hiring on the basis of
race will require an employer to take down a sign
reading "White Applicants Only" hardly means that
the law should be analyzed as one regulating
speech rather than conduct.
Utterances not elemental but inevitably incidental to
the doing of the criminal conduct alter neither the
intent of the law to punish socially harmful conduct
nor the essence of the whole act as conduct and not
speech. This holds true a fortiori in the present case
where the expression figures only as an inevitable
incident of making the element of coercion
perceptible.
[I]t is true that the agreements and course of
conduct here were as in most instances brought
about through speaking or writing. But it has never
been deemed an abridgement of freedom of speech
or press to make a course of conduct illegal merely
because the conduct was, in part, initiated,
evidenced, or carried out by means of language,
either spoken, written, or printed. Such an expansive
interpretation of the constitutional guaranties of
speech and press would make it practically
impossible ever to enforce laws against agreements
in restraint of trade as well as many other
agreements and conspiracies deemed injurious to
society.79 (italics and underscoring supplied)
Certain kinds of speech have been treated as
unprotected conduct, because they merely evidence
a prohibited conduct.80 Since speech is not involved
here, the Court cannot heed the call for a facial
analysis.1avvphi1
IN FINE, Estrada and the other cited authorities
engaged in a vagueness analysis of the therein
subject penal statute as applied to the therein
petitioners inasmuch as they were actually charged
with the pertinent crimes challenged on vagueness
grounds. The Court in said cases, however, found
no basis to review the assailed penal statute on its
face and in its entirety.
In Holder, on the other hand, the US Supreme Court
allowed the pre-enforcement review of a criminal
statute, challenged on vagueness grounds, since the
therein plaintiffs faced a "credible threat of
prosecution" and "should not be required to await
and undergo a criminal prosecution as the sole
means of seeking relief."
As earlier reflected, petitioners have established
neither an actual charge nor a credible threat of
prosecution under RA 9372. Even a limited
vagueness analysis of the assailed definition of
"terrorism" is thus legally impermissible. The Court
reminds litigants that judicial power neither
contemplates speculative counseling on a statutes
future effect on hypothetical scenarios nor allows the
courts to be used as an extension of a failed
legislative lobbying in Congress.
WHEREFORE, the petitions are DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 113811 October 7, 1994
ISHMAEL HIMAGAN, petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and HON. JUDGE
HILARIO MAPAYO, RTC, Br. 11, Davao City,
respondents.
Victorio S. Advincula for petitioner.
KAPUNAN, J.:
Petitioner, a policeman assigned with the medical
company of the Philippine National Police Regional
Headquarters at Camp Catitigan, Davao City, was
implicated in the killing of Benjamin Machitar, Jr. and
the attempted murder of Bernabe Machitar. After the
informations for murder1 and attempted murder2
were filed with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 11,
Davao City, on September 16, 1992, the trial court
issued an Order suspending petitioner until the
termination of the case on the basis of Section 47,
R.A. 6975, otherwise known as Department of
Interior and Local Government Act of 1990, which
provides:
Sec. 47. Preventive Suspension Pending
Criminal Case. Upon the filing of a complaint or
information sufficient in form and substance against
a member of the PNP for grave felonies where the
penalty imposed by law is six (6) years and one (1)
day or more, the court shall immediately suspend
the accused from office until the case is terminated.
Such case shall be subject to continuous trial and
shall be terminated within ninety (90) days from
arraignment of the accused (Emphasis ours).
On October 11, 1993, petitioner filed a motion to lift
the order for his suspension,3 relying on Section 42
of P.D. 807 of the Civil Service Decree, that his
suspension should be limited to ninety (90) days
and, also, on our ruling in Deloso v.
Sandiganbayan,4 and Layno v. Sandiganbayan.5 In
his order dated December 14, 19936 respondent
judge denied the motion pointing out that under
Section 47 of R.A. 6975, the accused shall be
suspended from office until his case is terminated.
The motion for reconsideration of the order of denial
was, likewise, denied.7 Hence, the petition for
certiorari and mandamus to set aside the orders of
respondent Judge and to command him to lift
petitioner's preventive suspension.
We find the petition devoid of merit.
There is no question that the case of petitioner who
is charged with murder and attempted murder under
the Revised Penal Code falls squarely under Sec.
47 of RA 6975 which specifically applies to members
of the PNP. In dispute however, is whether the
provision limits the period of suspension to 90 days,
considering that while the first sentence of Sec. 47
provides that the accused who is charged with grave
felonies where the penalty imposed is six (6) years
and one (1) day shall be suspended from office "until
the case is terminated", the second sentence of the
same section mandates that the case, which shall
be subject to continuous trial, shall be terminated
within 90 days from the arraignment of the accused.
Petitioner posits that as a member of the Philippine
National Police, under Sec. 91 of RA 6975 which
reads:
Sec. 91. The Civil Service Law and its
implementing rules and regulations shall apply to all
personnel of the Department.
he is covered by the Civil Service Law, particularly
Sec. 42 of PD 807 of the Civil Service Decree, which
limits the maximum period of suspension to ninety
(90) days, thus:
Sec. 42. Lifting of Preventive Suspension
Pending Administrative Investigation. When the
administrative case against the officer or employee
under preventive suspension is not finally decided
by the disciplining authority within the period of
ninety (90) days after the date of suspension of the
respondent who is not a presidential appointee, the
respondent shall be automatically reinstated in the
service; Provided, That when the delay in the
disposition of the case is due to the fault, negligence
or petition of the respondent, the period of delay
shall not be counted in computing the period of
suspension herein provided.
He claims that an imposition of preventive
suspension of over 90 days is contrary to the Civil
Service Law and would be a violation of his
constitutional right to equal protection of laws. He
further asserts that the requirements in
Sec. 47 of R.A. 6975 that "the court shall
immediately suspend the accused from office until
the case is terminated" and the succeeding
sentence, "Such case shall be subject to continuous
trial and shall be terminated within ninety (90) days
from arraignment of the accused" are both
substantive and should be taken together to mean
that if the case is not terminated within 90 days, the
period of preventive suspension must be lifted
because of the command that the trial must be
terminated within ninety (90) days from arraignment.
We disagree.
First. The language of the first sentence of Sec. 47
of R.A. 6975 is clear, plain and free from ambiguity.
It gives no other meaning than that the suspension
from office of the member of the PNP charged with
grave offense where the penalty is six years and one
day or more shall last until the termination of the
case. The suspension cannot be lifted before the
termination of the case. The second sentence of the
same Section providing that the trial must be
terminated within ninety (90) days from arraignment
does not qualify or limit the first sentence. The two
can stand independently of each other. The first
refers to the period of suspension. The second deals
with the time frame within which the trial should be
finished.
Suppose the trial is not terminated within ninety days
from arraignment, should the suspension of accused
be lifted? The answer is certainly no. While the law
uses the mandatory word "shall" before the phrase
"be terminated within ninety (90) days", there is
nothing in R.A. 6975 that suggests that the
preventive suspension of the accused will be lifted if
the trial is not terminated within that period.
Nonetheless, the Judge who fails to decide the case
within the period without justifiable reason may be
subject to administrative sanctions and, in
appropriate cases where the facts so warrant, to
criminal8 or civil liability.9 If the trial is unreasonably
delayed without fault of the accused such that he is
deprived of his right to a speedy trial, he is not
without a remedy. He may ask for the dismissal of
the case. Should the court refuse to dismiss the
case, the accused can compel its dismissal by
certiorari, prohibition or mandamus, or secure his
liberty by habeas corpus. 10
Second. Petitioner misapplies Sec. 42 of PD 807. A
meticulous reading of the section clearly shows that
it refers to the lifting of preventive suspension in
pending administrative investigation, not in criminal
cases, as here. What is more, Section 42 expressly
limits the period of preventive suspension to ninety
(90) days. Sec. 91 of R.A. 6975 which states that
"The Civil Service Law and its implementing rules
shall apply to all personnel of the Department"
simply means that the provisions of the Civil Service
Law and its implementing rules and regulations are
applicable to members of the Philippine National
Police insofar as the provisions, rules and
regulations are not inconsistent with
R.A. 6975. Certainly, Section 42 of the Civil Service
Decree which limits the preventive suspension to
ninety (90) days cannot apply to members of the
PNP because Sec. 47 of R.A. 6995 provides
differently, that is, the suspension where the penalty
imposed by law exceeds six (6) years shall continue
until the case is terminated.
Third. Petitioner's reliance on Layno and Deloso is
misplaced. These cases all stemmed from charges
in violation of R.A. 3019 (1060), otherwise known as
the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act which,
unlike
R.A. 6975, is silent on the duration of the preventive
suspension. Sec. 13 of R.A. 3019 reads as follows:
Suspension and loss of benefits. Any public
officer against whom any criminal prosecution under
a valid information under this Act or under the
provisions of the Revised Penal Code on bribery is
pending in court, shall be suspended from office.
Should he be convicted by final judgment, he shall
lose all retirement or gratuity benefits under any law,
but if he is acquitted, he shall be entitled to
reinstatement and to the salaries and benefits which
he failed to receive during suspension, unless in the
meantime administrative proceedings have been
filed against him.
In the case of Layno, the duly elected mayor of
Lianga, Surigao del Sur, was preventively
suspended after an information was filed against him
for offenses under R.A. 3019 (1060), the Anti-Graft
Corrupt Practices Act. He had been suspended for
four (4) months at the time he filed a motion to lift his
preventive suspension. We held that his indefinite
preventive suspension violated the "equal protection
clause" and shortened his term of office. Thus:
2. Petitioner is a duly elected municipal mayor
of Lianga, Surigao del Sur. His term of office does
not expire until 1986. Were it not for this information
and the suspension decreed by the Sandiganbayan
according to the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act, he would have been all this while in the full
discharge of his functions as such municipal mayor.
He was elected precisely to do so. As of October 26,
1983, he has been unable to. It is a basic
assumption of the electoral process implicit in the
right of suffrage that the people are entitled to the
services of elective officials of their choice. For
misfeasance or malfeasance, any of them could, of
course, be proceeded against administratively or, as
in this instance, criminally. In either case, his
culpability must be established. Moreover, if there be
a criminal action, he is entitled to the constitutional
presumption of innocence. A preventive suspension
may be justified. Its continuance, however, for an
unreasonable length of time raises a due process
question. For even if thereafter he were acquitted, in
the meanwhile his right to hold office had been
nullified. Clearly, there would be in such a case an
injustice suffered by him. Nor is he the only victim.
There is injustice inflicted likewise on the people of
Lianga. They were deprived of the services of the
man they had elected to serve as mayor. In that
sense, to paraphrase Justice Cardozo, the
protracted continuance of this preventive suspension
had outrun the bounds of reason and resulted in
sheer oppression. A denial of due process is thus
quite manifest. It is to avoid such an unconstitutional
application that the order of suspension should be
lifted.
3. Nor is it solely the denial of procedural due
process that is apparent. There is likewise an equal
protection question. If the case against petitioner
Layno were administrative in character the Local
Government Code would be applicable. It is therein
clearly provided that while preventive suspension is
allowable for the causes therein enumerated, there
is this emphatic limitation on the duration thereof: "In
all cases, preventive suspension shall not extend
beyond sixty days after the start of said suspension."
It may be recalled that the principle against indefinite
suspension applies equally to national government
officials. So it was held in the leading case of Garcia
v. Hon. Executive Secretary. According to the
opinion of Justice Barrera: "To adopt the theory of
respondents that an officer appointed by the
President, facing administrative charges, can be
preventively suspended indefinitely, would be to
countenance a situation where the preventive
suspension can, in effect, be the penalty itself
without a finding of guilt after due hearing, contrary
to the express mandate of the Constitution and the
Civil Service law." Further: "In the guise of a
preventive suspension, his term of office could be
shortened and he could in effect, be removed
without a finding of a cause duly established after
due hearing, in violation of the Constitution. Clearly
then, the policy of the law mandated by the
Constitution frowns at a suspension of indefinite
duration. In this particular case, the mere fact that
petitioner is facing a charge under the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act does not justify a different rule
of law. To do so would be to negate the safeguard of
the equal protection guarantee. 11
The case of Deloso, likewise, involved another
elective official who
was preventively suspended as provincial governor,
also under RA 3019 the Anti-Graft Law. This Court,
faced with similar factual circumstances as in Layno,
applied the ruling in the latter case "in relation to the
principles of due process and equal protection."
It is readily apparent that Section 13 of R.A. 3019
upon which the preventive suspension of the
accused in Layno and Deloso was based is silent
with respect to the duration of the preventive
suspension, such that the suspension of the
accused therein for a prolonged and unreasonable
length of time raised a due process question. Not so
in the instant case. Petitioner is charged with murder
under the Revised Penal Code and it is undisputed
that he falls squarely under Sec. 47 of R.A. 6975
which categorically states that his suspension shall
last until the case is terminated. The succeeding
sentence of the same section requires the case to
be subjected to continuous trial which shall be
terminated within ninety (90) days from arraignment
of the accused. As previously emphasized, nowhere
in the law does it say that after the lapse of the 90-
day period for trial, the preventive suspension
should be lifted. The law is clear, the ninety (90)
days duration applies to the trial of the case not to
the suspension. Nothing else should be read into the
law. When the words and phrases of the statute are
clear and unequivocal, their meaning determined
from the language employed and the statute must
be taken to mean exactly what it says. 12
Fourth. From the deliberations of the Bicameral
Conference Committee on National Defense relative
to the bill that became R.A. 6975, the meaning of
Section 47 of R.A. 6975 insofar as the period of
suspension is concerned becomes all the more
clear. We quote:
So other than that in that particular section, ano ba
itong "Jurisdiction in Criminal Cases?" What is this
all about?
REP. ZAMORA. In case they are charged with
crimes.
THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. MACEDA). Ah, the
previous one is administrative, no. Now, if it is
charged with a crime, regular courts.
SEN. GONZALES. Ano, the courts mismo ang
magsasabing . . .
THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. MACEDA). No, the
jurisdiction.
REP. ZAMORA. The jurisdiction if there is robbery.
THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. MACEDA). Okay.
"Preventive Suspension Pending Criminal Case.
Upon the filing of a complaint or informations
sufficient in form and substance against a member
of the PNP for grave felonies where the penalty
imposed by law is six years and one day or more,
the court shall immediately suspend the accused
from the office until the case is terminated."
REP. ALBANO. Where are we now Mr. Chairman.
THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. MACEDA). Grave
felonies ito e. Six years and one day or more.
SEN. SAGUISAG. Kung five years and
litigation ng Supreme Court, ganoon ba and . . .?
THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. MACEDA). Hindi, dahil
iyong iba panay disciplinary iyon e.
SEN. PIMENTEL. Anong page iyan, Rene?
 SEN. ANGARA. Let's have continuous hearing and
THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. MACEDA). Page 29 be terminated not later than ninety days.
Preventive Suspension.
REP. ZAMORA. Ang point ni Ernie, that's really only
REP. GUTANG. Ang complaint kasi ng mga tao, the directory. All of these, well, looks exactly the
pagka may pulis na may criminal case at may baril same thing.
pa rin at nag-uuniforme, hindi magandang tingnan e.
So parang natatakot iyong mga witnesses. SEN. ANGARA. No, but at least, we will shorten it up
in a case like this. We are really keen on having it
SEN. GONZALES. Anyway, kung ma-exempt quick, swift.
na rito naman siya e.
SEN. PIMENTEL. Swift justice.
REP. GUTANG. Mayroong entitlement to
reinstatement and pay. . . . REP. ALBANO. Mr. Chairman.

xxx xxx xxx THE CHAIRMAN. (SEN. MACEDA). Yes.

SEN. PIMENTEL. Dito sa "Preventive
Suspension Pending Criminal Case." Okay ito but I
think we should also mandate the early termination
of the case. Ibig sabihin, okay, hindi ba "the
suspension of the accused from office until the case
is terminated?" Alam naman natin ang takbo ng mga
kaso rito sa ating bansa e.
REP. ZAMORA. Twenty days, okay na.
REP. ALBANO. Following the Veloso case in Anti-
graft cases before the Sandiganbayan, the
preventive suspension is only ninety days. In no
case shall it go beyond ninety days which can also
be applicable here because this is a preventive
suspension.
SEN. PIMENTEL. No, because you can
legislate at least.

SEN. PIMENTEL. Hindi, and ibig kong sabihin, SEN. SAGUISAG. But then the case may be
let us just assume that a case can be, as Rene anti-graft ha. The case filed against a policeman
pointed out, can run to six years bago may be anti-graft in nature. . .
ma-terminate, sometimes ten years pa nga e. Okay,
but maybe we should mandate. . . SEN. PIMENTEL. Correct, correct, but is that
a constitutional provision? Is it?
REP. ZAMORA. Continuous hearing.
REP. ALBANO. No, but as a standard procedure.
SEN. PIMENTEL. Not only that, but the case
must be terminated within a period. SEN. PIMENTEL. Then you can legislate.

REP. ALBANO. Ninety days na ho sa Supreme THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. MACEDA). No,
Court the trial. because this particular provision is for criminal
cases. I know anti-graft is a criminal case but here
SEN. PIMENTEL. Ha? we are talking, let's say, of murder, rape, treason,
robbery. That's why it is in that context that there is a
REP. ALBANO. The trial must be done within ninety difference between a purely anti-graft case and a
days, criminal case which could be a serious case since it
is six years and one day or more, so it must be
SEN. PIMENTEL. Ang ibig kong sabihin kung already a grave felony.
maari sanang ilagay rito that the case shall also be
terminated in one year from the time . . . aywan ko xxx xxx xxx
kung kaya nating gawin iyon.
REP. ALBANO. . . .
REP. ALBANO. One solution, Mr. Chairman.
What I mean to say is, preventive suspension, we
THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. MACEDA). Criminal can use the
case? Hindi ba that has all been held as directory Veloso case.
even if you put it in the law?
THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. MACEDA). No, that's
SEN. PIMENTEL. I know, but, iyon na nga, we too short, that's what I am saying. The feeling here
are looking at some solution to a particular situation. is, for policeman, we have to be stricter especially if
it is a criminal case.
What Rene is just trying to say is, he is agreeable
that the suspension is until the case is terminated,
but he just wants some administrative balancing to
expedite it. So let us study what kind of language
could be done along that line. So just on the
National Police Commission . . .
SEN. ANGARA. Can I suggest a language that may
reflect. . .
THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. MACEDA). Okay,
please.
SEN. ANGARA. "Such case shall be subject to
continuous trial and be terminated not later than . . ."
whatever we agree.
such as the one which exists in the instant case. If
the classification is based on real and substantial
differences; 15 is germane to the purpose of the law;
16 applies to all members of the same
class; 17 and applies to current as well as future
conditions, 18 the classification may not be
impugned as violating the Constitution's equal
protection guarantee. A distinction based on real
and reasonable considerations related to a proper
legislative purpose such as that which exists here is
neither unreasonable, capricious nor unfounded.
ACCORDINGLY, the petition is hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.

THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. MACEDA). Okay, so

let's study that.

So if there are any further amendments to Chapter 2

on the National Police Commission. . . . . . 13

The foregoing discussions reveal the legislative

intent to place on preventive suspension a member
of the PNP charged with grave felonies where the
penalty imposed by law exceeds six years of
imprisonment and which suspension continues until
the case against him is terminated.

The reason why members of the PNP are treated

differently from the other classes of persons charged
criminally or administratively insofar as the
application of the rule on preventive suspension is
concerned is that policemen carry weapons and the
badge of the law which can be used to harass or
intimidate witnesses against them, as succinctly
brought out in the legislative discussions.

If a suspended policeman criminally charged with a

serious offense is reinstated to his post while his
case is pending, his victim and the witnesses
against him are obviously exposed to constant threat
and thus easily cowed to silence by the mere fact
that the accused is in uniform and armed. The
imposition of preventive suspension for over 90 days
under Section 47 of
R.A. 6975 does not violate the suspended
policeman's constitutional right to equal protection of
the laws.

The equal protection clause exists to prevent undue

favor or privilege. It is intended to eliminate
discrimination and oppression based on inequality.
Recognizing the existence of real differences among
men, the equal protection clause does not demand
absolute equality. It merely requires that all persons
shall be treated alike, under like circumstances and
conditions both as to the privileges conferred and
liabilities enforced. 14 Thus, the equal protection
clause does not absolutely forbid classifications,