Galluzzo-The Medieval Reception of Book Zeta of Aristotle's Metaphysics (Vols. 1 & 2)

The Medieval Reception
of Book Zeta of Aristotles

Metaphysics
Volume 1
Studien und Texte
zur Geistesgeschichte
des Mittelalters
Begrndet von
Josef Koch
Weitergefhrt von
Paul Wilpert, Albert Zimmermann und
Jan A. Aertsen
Herausgegeben von
Andreas Speer
In Zusammenarbeit mit
Tzotcho Boiadjiev, Kent Emery, Jr.
und Wouter Goris
BAND 110/1
The titles published in this series are listed at brill.com/stgm

Metaphysics
Aristotles Ontology and the Middle Ages:
The Tradition of Met., Book Zeta
Volume 1
By
Gabriele Galluzzo
LEIDEN BOSTON
2013
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Galluzzo, Gabriele.
The medieval reception of book zeta of Aristotle's Metaphysics / by Gabriele Galluzzo.
volumes. cm. (Studien und Texte zur Geistesgeschichte des Mittelalters ; Band 110)
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN 978-90-04-22668-5 (v. 1 & 2: hardback : alk. paper) ISBN 978-90-04-23502-1 (e-book)
1. Aristotle. Metaphysics. 2. Philosophy, Medieval. 3. AristotleInfluence. I. Title. II. Series:
Studien und Texte zur Geistesgeschichte des Mittelalters ; Bd. 110.
B434.G355 2012
110dc23
2012028446
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CONTENTS
Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ix
Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
1. The Philosophical Significance of Book Zeta . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
2. The Monographic Chapters and the Centrality of Averroes . . . . 9
3. Paul of Venice: A New Perspective . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
4. Methodology and Future Perspectives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
1. Substance in Aristotles Metaphysics, Book Zeta . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19

Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
1. The Notion of Substance in the Categories . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
2. Metaphysics, Book Z: Some General Problems of
Interpretation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
3. Substance and Subjecthood in Met. Z 1 and Z 3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
3.1. Substance and Accidents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
3.2. The Subject . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
3.3. The Stripping-away Argument . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
3.4. Met. Z 3: Two Additional Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
4. Essence in Z 46 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
4.1. A Logical Enquiry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
4.2. The Essence of Substance and Accidents in Met. Z 45 . . . . 64
4.3. Z 6s Identity Thesis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
5. Generation in Met. Z 79 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
5.1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
5.2. The Synonymy Principle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90
5.3. The Ingenerability of Form (and Matter) in Met. Z 8 . . . . . . . 98
6. Definition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101
6.1. The Object of Definition in Z 1011 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101
6.2. The Unity of Definition in Met. Z 12 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111
7. Universals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116
7.1. The Problem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116
7.2. No Universal Is Substance: Z 13s Argument . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 122
7.3. Particulars and Definition: Met. Z 15 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 130
8. Substance As Cause in Met. Z 17 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 134
vi contents
2. Substance in Averroess Long Commentary on the Metaphysics,

Book VII . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 141
1. Averroess Interpretation of Met. Z . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 141
1.1. What Z Is About . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 141
1.2. Logic and Metaphysics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 146
1.3. The Question of Platonism. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 150
2. The Subject. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 153
3. Essence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 158
3.1. Essence in Met. Z 4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 158
3.2. Z 5s Puzzles. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 165
3.3. Averroess View on Accidents: Some General
Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 171
3.4. The Meaning of Met. Z 6 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 173
4. Averroess Treatment of Generation (Met. Z 79) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 182
4.1. The Meaning of Z 79: An Anti-Platonic Argument . . . . . . . 182
4.2. The Defence of the Synonymy Principle and the Case of
Spontaneous Generation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 190
5. Definition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 199
5.1. The Object of Definition in Met. Z 1011 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 199
5.2. The Unity of Definition: Genus As Matter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 213
6. Universals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 218
6.1. Introduction: An Overview of the Section on Universals . . 218
6.2. Z 13s General Meaning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 222
7. Substance As Cause in Met. Z 17 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 226
3. Aquinass Understanding of Metaphysics Z . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 235

Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 235
1. Aquinas on the Structure of Met. Z . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 236
1.1. The Logical Character of Book Z . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 237
1.2. The Anti-Platonic Character of Book Z . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 241
2. Aquinass General Interpretation of Aristotles Doctrine of
Substance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 245
2.1. Aquinass Compatibilism and the Role of the Categories . . 245
2.2. The Notion of Subject in Met. Z 3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 249
3. Essence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 258
3.1. The Essence of Substance and Accidents in Met. Z 45 . . . . 258
3.2. The Identity Thesis (Met. Z 6) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 269
contents vii
4. The Generation of Substances in Met. Z 79 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 275

4.1. The Role of Met. Z 79: An Anti-Platonic Argument . . . . . . . 275
4.2. Generation and Substantiality: The Primacy of
Composites . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 282
5. Definition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 286
5.1. The Object of Definition (Met. Z 1011). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 286
5.2. The Unity of Definition (Met. Z 12) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 295
6. Universals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 300
6.1. More on the Anti-Platonic Line . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 300
6.2. Aquinass Interpretation of Met. Z 13: Universality and
Substantiality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 305
6.3. Appendix: Aquinas on the Status of Aristotles Forms . . . . . 311
7. Substance As Cause in Met. Z 17: A Departure from the
Logical Level? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 317
4. Albert the Greats Metaphysics, Book VII . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 325

Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 325
1. Alberts Interpretation of Book Z and Avicennas Doctrine of
Essence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 329
2. Treatise 1: A Deflationary Account of Accidents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 340
3. Treatise 2: Anti-Platonism. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 350
3.1. The Identity Thesis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 350
3.2. Inchoation of Forms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 355
4. Treatises 3 and 4: Essence and Definition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 361
4.1. Preliminary Remarks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 361
4.2. Essence, Form and Matter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 363
4.3. Genus and Matter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 368
4.4. Formal Matter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 372
5. Treatise 5: Universals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 375
5. Alexander of Alexandria and Paul of Venice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 385

Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 385
1. The Structure of Alexanders Commentary. Alexander and
Paul Compared . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 387
2. Alexander and Averroes. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 391
2.1. Alexanders Use of Averroes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 391
2.2. Alexander and Averroes on the Ontological Status of
Accidents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 393
3. Alexander and Aquinas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 403
4. Alexander and Paul of Venice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 410
viii contents
6. Paul of Venice As a Reader of Averroes. The Case of Essence and

Definition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 421
Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 421
1. The Structure of Paul of Venices Commentary on the
Metaphysics and the Role of Averroess Long Commentary. . . . . 422
2. Met. Z 10 in the Medieval Interpretation. Averroes, Aquinas
and Alexander . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 431
3. Paul of Venices Interpretation of Met. Z 10 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 437
3.1. The General Strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 437
3.2. Points of Detail . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 442
4. Met. Z 11 in the Medieval Interpretation. Averroes, Aquinas
and Alexander . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 446
5. Paul of Venices Interpretation of Met. Z 11: Aquinas and
Averroes Reconciled . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 460
Summaries of the Text. Paul of Venices Commentary on the

Metaphysics, Book VII . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 467
Book VII, Treatise I . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 467
Chapter 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 467
Chapter 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 494
Chapter 3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 511
Chapter 4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 547
Book VII, Treatise II . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 564
Chapter 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 564
Chapter 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 592
Chapter 3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 632
Chapter 4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 670
Book VII, Treatise III. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 684
Chapter 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 685
Chapter 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 697
Chapter 3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 718
Chapter 4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 728
Bibliography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 753
General Index. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 765
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
Behind this book there is a long story, the story of some fifteen years of
research on Met. Zeta and on the philosophical problems which the book
discusses. Many people have been involved in some way or other in this
story and it is a pleasure for me to be able, on concluding my effort, to thank
them for their help.
It must have been 1995 or so when Francesco Del Punta scheduled the
first of a long series of seminars on Book Zeta. To borrow an Aristotelian
image, just like the water remains the same in spite of the continuous
changes of matter it undergoes, so the seminars on Book Zeta have re-
mained the same in form and spirit in spite of the continuous turnover of
attendants, students, friends, and colleagues. First of all, I wish to warmly
thank Francesco for suggesting the reception of Book Zeta as a theme
of research and for guiding me in the drafting of this book. Most of all,
however, I am grateful to him for encouraging me to combine textuality and
philosophy, an inspiration which I shall always treasure. I consider this book
as the point of arrival of a unique and rewarding intellectual experience and
so, in some sense, as the last of those old seminars.
I am also very grateful to Fabrizio Amerini, with whom I shared many
years of study of the medieval tradition of the Metaphysics. I am also in-
debted to him for his precious help in preparing the edition of the text and
for the many suggestions he has advanced to improve the monographic
chapters. Our constant exchange of information has always been for me
helpful and reassuring. In 2008 I had the pleasure of following up Matteo
Di Giovannis PhD-dissertation Averroes on Substance (at the Scuola Nor-
male Superiore of Pisa). I owe to him the discovery of Averroes as a consis-
tent commentator and an original philosopher. His excellent papers have
contributed much to give content and structure to my Chapter 2. I wish
to thank him for his help and support, and for always being a friend. My
thanks also go to Cristina Cerami for showing me her French translation
from the Arabic of Averroess commentary on Met. Z 79 as well as her PhD-
dissertation on generation and corruption in Averroes. Amos Bertolacci has
generously discussed with me the chapter on Albert the Great and made
many helpful comments. Over the years, I have also learned many things
from him concerning Avicenna and his reception in the Latin world. I take
the chance also to express my gratitude to Alessandro Conti for letting me
x acknowledgements
use his transcription of the second part of Pauls commentary on Book Zeta
as well as for his pieces of advice on Paul of Venice and his sources. I am also
very grateful to Mario Bertagna for helping me to trace down the sources of
Pauls digression, in Treatise 3, on the middle term of a demonstration and
for being of much assistance in revising the final draft of the book. In spite
of the precious help I received from so many competent people, the book
will certainly still contain mistakes and shortcomings for which I am solely
responsible.
My thanks go also to Andreas Speer for his constant support and encour-
agement, and for believing in this book right from the beginning.
Over the last seven years I had the opportunity to lecture a number of
times on the central books of the Metaphysics. I wish to thank all the stu-
dents from the Scuola Normale Superiore who have attended my seminars.
From their comments and doubts I have learned more than I can say and
more than I am aware of. Last but not least, I wish to thank Giulia for being
always there through thick and thin. This book is for her.
INTRODUCTION
I present here a work in two volumes, the second of which is the critical
edition of Paul of Venices Commentary on Book VII (Zeta) of Aristotles
Metaphysics, the treatise on substance. The first volume is an historical and
doctrinal study of the reception of Met. Z in the Middle Ages and conse-
quently presents itself as a partial reconstruction of the history of Aristotles
ontology. The first volume contains six monographic chapters, one on the
content and structure of Met. Z itself, and the others on some main figures
in the medieval fortune of the book: Averroes, Thomas Aquinas, Albert the
Great, Alexander of Alexandria and Paul of Venice. The volume is closed
by extended summaries of Paul of Venices Commentary on Book Zeta, in
which I try to outline the philosophical contents of Pauls writing and to
bring into light its internal structure. In the next few pages, I wish to say
some words on the general meaning of my book as well as on the connec-
tion among its different parts.
1. The Philosophical Significance of Book Zeta
At the heart of my enterprise is one of Aristotles philosophical master-

pieces, Met. Book Zeta or, as Myles Burnyeat has aptly described it, The
Mount Everest of Ancient Philosophy.1 Over the last fifty years or so, Aris-
totles book on substance has been at the centre of a large and particularly
hot critical debate. No other piece in the Aristotelian corpus has witnessed
such a boom of scholarly attention and philosophical analysis. No doubt the
attention is well-deserved and the book is bound to repay scholars efforts.
The philosophical issues which Aristotle discusses in Zetasubstances,
essence, definition, explanation, universals, the structure of concrete mate-
rial objectshave always been central to any ontological enquiry and still
shape the contemporary philosophical debate. It is an undeniable fact that
the success of Book Zeta among Aristotelian scholars has somehow run
parallel to the rediscovery by contemporary metaphysicians of some major
1 Cf. Burnyeat (2001), 1.

2 introduction
themes of Aristotles ontology.2 The case is not infrequent of contemporary

philosophers who have put their intelligences to the test in trying to make
sense of Aristotles intricate treatise.3 As I have pointed out elsewhere, I con-
sider this course of events as an important cultural fact, whose significance
should not be underestimated.4 The holy matrimony between Aristotelian
scholarship and contemporary philosophy has been a happy union from
which both scholars of ancient philosophy and contemporary metaphysi-
cians have equally benefited.
In Metaphysics Zeta Aristotle outlines an anti-reductionist account of
material objects, which has been consigned to history by the name of
hylomorphism.5 The world we live in is populated by mid-sized material
objects: human beings, animals, plants, as well as tables, chairs and beds
are among the things which we encounter in our everyday life and we tend
to classify as objects. There are many facts concerning material objects
that may be of philosophical and scientific interest: material objects seem
to belong to natural or artificial kinds, have properties, persist in time,
undergo changes, come into being and pass away, are involved in causal
processes. Aristotles main intuition in Book Zeta is that all the relevant
facts concerning material objects can be explained once we realise that such
objects are hylomorphic composites, i.e. composites of matter and form.
One peculiar feature of hylomorphism is that it forces us to reshape our
intuitive notion of parthood. Although matter and form may be described in
some sense as parts of a material object, they are clearly not to be confused
with the ordinary, physical parts of an object. One reason to keep the two
kinds of part distinct is that ordinary parts do not coincide with the object
of which they are the parts: the legs and hands of an animal, for instance, are
spatially distinct from the whole animal in so far as they occupy a sub-region
of the region of space occupied by the whole animal. Matter and form, by
contrast, coincide with the whole of which they are the parts: the matter and
form of an animal occupy exactly the same region of space as the animal
taken as a whole. On a stricter understanding of part, therefore, matter
and form are not parts of a sensible object, but rather principles or con-
2 Among the philosophers who have been inspired by Aristotles ontology I wish to
mention at least the following ones: Anscombe (1964); Loux (1978); Brody (1980); Wiggins
(1980); Lowe (1989) and (1998); Loux (2006a) and (2006b); Lowe (2006).
3 Wilfrid Sellars, Kit Fine and Michael Loux are three striking examples.
4 Cf. GalluzzoMariani (2006).
5 For the revival of hylomorphism in contemporary metaphysics see Oderberg (1999).
For a (sympathetic) evaluation of Aristotles hylomorphism see Fine K. (1994b).

introduction 3
stituents, i.e. entities we need to posit in order to explain the fundamental

character and typical behaviour of material objects. Aristotles departure
from the ordinary notion of part explains why contemporary supporters of
hylomorphism describe their own views as constituent ontologies to mark
the difference between talk of matter and form and talk of ordinary parts.6
It also explains why some other metaphysicians regard hylomorphism, and
constituent ontologies in general, as meaningless or utterly obscure.7
In providing an hylomorphic account of material objects, Aristotle in-
tends to resist the idea that material objects are reducible to their material
parts or, to put it otherwise, are just aggregates of their material parts. In
both Met. Z and H Aristotle defends the view that material objects are
neither sums of their material parts nor the sum of their material parts
plus some sort of relational tie keeping all such parts together. Aristotles
idea is that neither aggregates nor relational wholes possess the kind of
unity that is characteristic of the paradigmatic cases of material objects. As
an alternative, Aristotle presents material objects as structured wholes, the
intuition being that one ontological constituent of a material object, i.e. its
form, gives unity and structure to the object and arrange its material parts
in the way characteristic of the kind the object belongs to.8 The constituent
that gives unity and structure to the object is distinct in character from
the material parts and should rather be understood as an internal principle
of activity and organisation. Implicitly, therefore, Aristotle also gives an
answer to a problem much debated in contemporary philosophy, i.e. the so-
called puzzle of material constitution:9 is a statue identical with the bronze
that constitutes it? Is a human being identical with the body that constitutes
him or her? However the relationship between matter and form should
exactly be conceived, it is clear that for Aristotle a statue is not unqualifiedly
identical with the bronze that constitutes it; nor is a human being identical
with his or her constitutive body. For there is one good understanding of
bronze and body according to which a statue is not just bronze, but rather
bronze plus the form of the statue, and a human being is not just his or her
body, but rather the body plus the form of human beings.
6 Cf. in particular Loux (2006b). For an understanding of parthood which is sensitive to
Aristotles hylomorphism see in particular Fine K. (1994c), (1999), (2010). See also Koslicki
(2007).
7 Cf. in particular Van Inwagen (2004) and (2011).
8 For this cluster of ideas see Fine K. (1999).
9 The contemporary discussion of material constitution is particularly vast. See at least:
Wiggins (1980), Lowe (1989), Burke (1992), (1994), Lowe (1995), Rae (1995), Baker (1997), Rae
(1998), (2000), Varzi (2000), Fine K. (2003) and Paul (2006a).
4 introduction
There are many specific issues where Aristotle puts to use his hylomor-
phic account of material objects. Three are certainly of paramount impor-
tance and characterise Book Zeta as a whole: (1) the question of what we
should understand by substance, (2) the theme of essentialism and (3) the
problem of universality and particularity.
(1) Substance. Book Zetas contribution to the understanding of the notion

of substance is best understood against the background of Aristotles early
ontology, as it is expounded in the Categories. On Aristotles view, being a
substance amounts to being a fundamental entity, the existence of which
is in some sense the ground of the existence of all the other kinds of
entity. In the Categories Aristotle identifies primary substances with the
concrete, particular objects of our everyday experience such as particular
plants, animals and human beings. Aristotles conviction in the early works
is that all the other kinds of entity depend for their very existence on
concrete, particular objects and so exist only because particular objects do.
Properties for instance exist only because they are properties of concrete
particular objects. Even the natural kinds to which particular objects belong
exist only because they are instantiated or exemplified by such objects.
Aristotles conclusion in the Categories, therefore, is that, were particular
objects not to exist, nothing else could exist. One assumption implicit in
Aristotles argument for the primacy of particular objects is that there is
nothing more fundamental than particular objects, there is nothing, in other
words, that can explain and so ground their existence. As we have seen,
it is precisely this assumption that is called into question in the so-called
central books (ZH-) of the Metaphysics and in Book Zeta in particular.
In the hylomorphic framework, concrete particular objects are analysed
into two basic constituents, i.e. matter and form. And it is in terms of
these fundamental constituents that many facts about concrete objects
must be explained: familiar objects, for instance, belong to the natural kinds
they do because a certain relation obtains between their form and their
matter, because a certain kind of form gives structure and organisation to
a certain kind of matter. One of the consequences of the new picture is
that it is no longer clear that concrete particular objects can be regarded
as primary entities, as they were clearly regarded in the Categories. For
there is now something that explains and grounds the existence of concrete
objects, their matter and their form. If being a substance means being a
primary or fundamental entity, it seems that the matter and the form of
concrete objects lay better claim than the objects themselves to being called
substances.
introduction 5
As a matter of fact, a leading theme in Met. Z is the claim that the

form of familiar concrete objects is primary substance. What do we have
to make of this claim? Do we need to take it at face value and think that
form simply replaces concrete objects in the role of primary substances
which the Categories assigned to them? Or is form primary substance in a
sense different from that in which concrete objects are primary substances?
These alternatives divide both contemporary interpreters and medieval
commentators. Averroes, for instance, may be interpreted (and this is the
way I shall interpret him, in any event) as a supporter of the view that
there is just one sense of substance and that, according to that sense,
form is simply prior to the particular object of which it is the form. Alberts
position is complex, but is close to Averroess. Aquinas, Alexander and
Paul of Venice, by contrast, resist such a radical conclusion and hold the
more common view that form and the composite of matter and form are
substances in different senses. Behind the common view there is a concern
for the consistency of Aristotles system: when possible, it is preferable not
to attribute to Aristotle inconsistencies or changes of mind. This must also
be true in the case of the apparent contrast between the Categories and
the Metaphysics. Contemporary scholars who do not wish to credit Aristotle
with the view that form is unqualifiedly more substance than the composite
usually distinguish between the existential and the explanatory sense of
substance, the assumption being that the explanatory sense of substance
is somehow derivative and secondary with respect to the existential sense.
The composite, in other words, is substance in the existential sense, i.e. it
is an autonomous and independent object, while form is substance only in
the explanatory sense, in that it explains the substantial character of the
composite. It is interesting to note that the distinction is medieval. It is part
and parcel of Aquinass interpretation of Met. Z and is reaffirmed by both
Alexander and Paul.
(2) Essence. That things have essences is one of the fundamental tenets of
Aristotles metaphysical thought. In the Organon, the essence of a thing
is conceived of as a set of fundamental properties, the properties, roughly
speaking, that characterise the natural kind a certain thing belongs to.
Aristotles general idea is that essential properties are explanatory, that is,
they explain the necessary traits and the typical behaviour of the thing
that possesses them. A human being, for instance, is capable of doing
a certain range of characteristic activities because he possesses certain
essential properties, that is, in the final analysis, because he essentially
belongs to a certain natural kind. To conceive of essential properties as
6 introduction
a nuclear set of fundamental properties, the ones that are explanatory in

the relevant sense, means not to equate essence and necessity: essential
properties are not simply necessary properties, i.e. properties a certain
thing could not lose without ceasing to exist, but are that particular set of
necessary properties that explain all the others.10
Aristotles change of framework in the Metaphysics also affects his under-
standing of the notion of essence. For one thing, in the Organon Aristo-
tle is liberal enough to concede that accidents as well as substances have
essences. In Zeta, by contrast, his views become more exclusive. Strictly
speaking, only substances have an essence, while accidents either do not
have an essence at all or have one only in a secondary sense of essence.
There is, however, a more conspicuous shift. Without abandoning alto-
gether his conception of essence as a set of fundamental properties, Aris-
totle progressively rephrases the problem of essence in terms of ontological
constituents.11 The shift is better illustrated by taking the paradigmatic case
of familiar concrete objects. Since concrete objects are composites of matter
and form, we may reasonably wonder what contribution matter and form
make to determining their essence. Do the essence and definition of such
objects contain both their matter and form? Or do they make reference to
only one of their fundamental constituents, for instance their form? As in
the case of substance, contemporary interpretations of essence are at vari-
ance. Not surprisingly, the question of the essence and definition of material
substances was much discussed in the Middle Ages. It touches upon some
crucial anthropological questions such as: is a human being essentially a
soul or is he a soul and a body (soul and body being paradigmatic examples
of form and matter, that is, the form and matter of living things)? In this case
as well, Averroess interpretation differs from that of the other commenta-
tors I have taken into consideration. The Arabic philosopher consistently
maintains that, according to Aristotles doctrine, the essence of material
substances is exhausted by their form alone. Averroess interpretation is
strongly criticised by Aquinas in his commentary on the Metaphysics. And
10 For a particularly illuminating defence of the claim that the notion of essence cannot
be reduced to that of necessity see Fine K. (1994a) and (1995). Fines understanding of
essentialism is particularly congenial to Aristotles conception. For a recent criticism of
the irreducibility of the notion of essence and of Aristotelian essentialism see Paul (2006b)
(whose source of inspiration is Lewis D. (1986)). For a more neutral position cf. Kripke (1981).
For discussions of the relation between essentialism and modality see Loux (1979b) and
(2006b), 153186.
11 For a contemporary defence of Aristotles constituent ontology see Loux (2006b).
introduction 7
it is the Dominican Masters reading that prevailed in the tradition. It would

be a mistake to think that Aquinass position is only due to anthropological
concerns. Aristotles text seems to contain conflicting lines of thought con-
cerning the essence and definition of concrete objects, and it was difficult
for medieval interpreters to decide which one to take, just as it is difficult
for contemporary scholars.
(3) Universality and particularity. In the Categories, Aristotle is clearly a real-

ist about universals. Actually Aristotle admits two different kinds of univer-
sal, just as he recognises two different kinds of particular. As to particulars,
besides the concrete particular objects of our everyday experience Aristotle
also recognises their particular properties, i.e. properties that such objects
do not share (nor could they possibly share) with any other objects such as
the particular paleness of Socrates or the particular paleness of Plato. Cor-
respondingly, there will be two different kinds of universal, i.e. the univer-
sals whose instances are familiar concrete objects and the universals whose
instances are the particular properties of those objects. The tradition rightly
refers to these different kinds of universal as substantial and accidental uni-
versals, respectively.12 Substantial universals are the species and genera to
which concrete objects belong. Accidental universals, by contrast, are the
universal properties of which particular properties are instances, such as
the colour white of which the paleness of Socrates is an instance. Of course,
Aristotles universals are not Platonic universals: they depend for their exis-
tence on the existence of their particular instances. Nonetheless, they are
real entities just like the particulars that instantiate them.
Is Aristotle still a realist in Met. Z? It might be thought that he is not, after
all. For one thing, Aristotle is completely silent in Zeta concerning universal
accidents and everything makes us think that he no longer believes in their
existence. For another, Aristotle explicitly states that species and genera
are not substances. Since the only thing that species and genera could
possibly be is substantial universals, Aristotles statement seems to amount
to claiming that species and genera do not exist at all. Thus, the kinds of
universals which Aristotle admitted of in the Categories are regarded as
12 For a contemporary defence of the distinction between substantial and accidental
universals see Lowe (2006). For a criticism of the distinction see Armstrong (1997), 65
68. The contemporary literature on the problem of universals is as vast as contemporary
metaphysics itself. See at least the following classical anthologies: Loux (1970); MellorOliver
(1997); KimSosa (1999), 195268. See also Oliver (1996), Loux (2006b), 1783 and (2007) for
an illuminating survey of the different positions on the market.
8 introduction
non-existent in Met. Z. Does this mean that there are no universal entities
in Met. Z ontology and so Aristotle is some sort of nominalist? Things are
not as easy as that. For Aristotles forms may be thought to be universal
entities of some kind at least in so far as one and the same form, i.e. the
form typical of a certain natural kind, seems to exist in different pieces of
matter. To put it otherwise, if a form is made particular by the different
pieces of matter it is joined to, it is a repeatable and so a universal entity.
As a matter of fact, no issue has been so discussed in the literature on Met.
Z as the metaphysical status of Aristotles forms. Interpreters are equally
divided between particularists and universalists. Good arguments for either
conclusion are not missing and the dispute is ongoing.
The Middle Ages is the time of universals and so it is not surprising that
the problem of the extra-mental existence of universal entities should also
play a significant role in medieval commentaries on the Metaphysics. The
topic is usually discussed in correspondence with the section in Met. Z, i.e.
Chapters 1316, where Aristotle explicitly raises the question as to whether
universality is compatible with substantiality. More surprising is the fact
that the favourite theme of contemporary scholars, whether forms are par-
ticular or universal, is not explicitly connected by medieval commentators
with the problem of universals. There are various reasons for this anomaly,
which I shall try to explain in due course. Suffice it to say for now that, for
medieval philosophers, the problem of universals is not so much the ques-
tion of the metaphysical status of forms as that of the existence of traditional
universals, i.e. species and genera. This does not mean, however, that the
commentators whom I shall be studying in this book do not have a view on
the status of forms. On the contrary, all of them believe that forms are not
primitively particular, but are made particular by something else, and so are
universal according to the sense that the contemporary debate attaches to
the term.
In Chapter 1 of the first volume I shall present a textual and philosophical

guide to Book Zeta. The aim of the chapter is twofold. On the one hand, I
wish to offer a section-by-section reconstruction of Aristotles argument so
as to give a sense of the books contents and articulation. On the other, I shall
examine many of the interpretative and philosophical problems discussed
by contemporary interpreters in order to build up a conceptual grid that
will allow us to follow up the medieval proposals as well. As I have already
pointed out, and as my analysis will further show, medieval commentators
tackle the same issues as modern interpreters and their conceptual tools are
at the end not so different from the ones we are used to nowadays.
introduction 9
2. The Monographic Chapters

and the Centrality of Averroes
Averroes, Aquinas, Albert and Alexander are the main sources of Paul of
Venices commentary on Book VII of the Metaphysics. Thus, it might be
thought that the reason why I analysed at length these commentators is
simply to shed some light on Pauls background and on his main sources of
inspiration. But this is just part of the story and, probably, not the most inter-
esting part of it. For the authors I have taken into account are of paramount
importance in themselves in so far as they are the landmarks of the recep-
tion of Book Zeta in the Latin world. This is especially true of Averroes. The
prevailing interpretation of Met. VII in the Latin Middle Ages follows very
closely what might be called Aquinass paradigm. The paradigm is built
around the fundamental presupposition that Aristotles ontology is drawn
out once and for all in the Categories and so Met. Z must be read as a further
refinement of the early ontology and not as a replacement of it. Two claims
in particular characterise Aquinass interpretation: that particular objects
are more properly called substances than their ontological constituents;
that the essence and definition of material substances includes both their
matter and their form.
Averroess interpretation of Book Zeta is significantly different from what
I have called Aquinass paradigm.13 For one thing, Averroes seems to believe
that there is a significant sense in which the form of concrete particular
objects lays better claim than them to being called substance. For another,
his basic doctrine seems to be that the essence and definition of such objects
is restricted to their form alone. The doctrinal significance of Averroess
Long Commentary on the Metaphysics seems to have been underestimated
by scholars. This is due partly to the historical role that Averroes has played
in making the Metaphysics available to the Latin West and partly to the
intrinsic features of the Arabic commentators style of interpretation. In the
first part of the XIII century and before Aquinass masterly commentary,
Averroes was the only instrument of which Latin commentators could avail
themselves in order to become acquainted with Aristotles Metaphysics.
The attention, therefore, was more on the contribution Averroess works
could give to the simple understanding of Aristotles text than on their
own doctrinal implications. As things progressed, Averroess philosophical
thought did not pass completely unnoticed, but the connection between his
13 I have sketched out the two paradigms in Galluzzo (2009a).

10 introduction
philosophical views and his interpretation of the Metaphysics got more and
more tenuous.14 The progressive shift from literary commentaries to com-
mentaries per modum quaestionis made the phenomenon more evident by
sometimes reducing Averroes to a collection of authoritative quotations to
be thrown in the face of the philosophical adversaries. It seems that con-
temporary scholars as well have fallen prey to the same error of perspec-
tive and failed to see the philosophical orientation of Averroess interpre-
tative activity. Only recently have scholars started to see the close connec-
tion between Averroess exegetical work and his own philosophical views.15
Another important factor has contributed much to obscuring Averroess
merits, that is, the apparent simplicity of his exegetical style. On the face of
it, the Long Commentary presents itself as slightly more than a paraphrasis
of Aristotles text, where doctrinal digressions are rare and short. In Chap-
ter 2 I shall attempt to reverse this historiographical tendency by presenting
Averroess commentary on Book Zeta as a consistent interpretation of Aris-
totles theory of substance, dense with philosophical implications. As the
analysis will reveal, Averroess reading of the treatise on substance is all but
neutral and has a modern flavour about it.
The medieval commentator who saw most clearly the implications of
Averroess Long Commentary is Thomas Aquinas. For all we know, it is
unlikely that Aquinass activity as an Aristotelian commentator was moti-
vated by his desire to replace Averroess interpretation with a new, Christian
reading of Aristotle. Aquinass commentaries, by contrast, seem to have had,
at least at the beginning, a rather private character and mainly served the
purpose of enhancing the Dominican Masters comprehension of Aristotles
writings.16 In spite of this, it is certain that Aquinas read Averroes carefully
and did not fail to voice his disagreement with the Arabic commentators
interpretation. Aquinass criticism, in his commentary on Met. Z, of Aver-
roess doctrine of form is well-known and testifies to the deep ontological
14 One exception in this regard is the case of Averroess theory of intellect, which was
right from the beginning at the centre of a hot philosophical debate. In the De unitate
intellectus Aquinas also points out that Averroess noetic stems from a certain (wrong in
his eyes) interpretation of Aristotles De anima, besides being motivated by independent
philosophical arguments as well.
15 See especially Di Giovannis papers, which I examine and make use of in Chapter 2.
16 This view is defended in particular by R.-A. Gauthier in the introduction to his edition
of the Sententia Libri De Anima (ed. Leon., 45.1, pp. 288*294*). Gauthier also makes the
suggestion that Aquinass activity as an Aristotelian commentator may have served as a
preparation for the drafting of the different parts of the Summa Theologiae. Although this
may certainly be true, the theological (as opposed to philosophical) character of Aquinass
commentaries should not be overemphasised.
introduction 11
disagreement between the two commentators. In Chapters 2 and 3 I shall

argue that Aquinass reconstruction of Averroess doctrine is fundamentally
correct, but this is not the point I wish to stress here. What is more striking is
that even commentators who are more sensitive to Averroess influence
Alexander of Alexandria and Paul of Venice are two cases in pointseem
to have little perception of the doctrinal difference between Aquinas and
Averroes. On the contrary, altough in different ways, both Alexander and
Paul show a certain tendency to bring Averroess interpretation of Aristotle
into line with Aquinass doctrine, as it is presented in the Expositio Meta-
physicorum. Apart from the technical instruments by which reconciliation
was achieved, this tendency is in itself an important historical fact, which is
in need of some explanation.
As I shall explain in Chapter 5, doctrinally speaking, Alexanders com-
mentary is greatly influenced by Aquinas. It is not entirely clear why a Fran-
ciscan master at the beginning of the XIV century should have recourse to
Aquinas for understanding Aristotles Metaphysics. The explanation may lie
in the authority Aquinass commentaries had gained over time as well as in
the intrinsic merits of the Dominican Masters sober and neat exposition.
Be that as it may, if Aquinass influence on Alexander is strong, Averroess is
pervasive, to say the least. Not only is Averroes explicitly quoted throughout
Alexanders commentary, but he is also the basis for Alexanders philosoph-
ical excursuses. The importance of Averroes does not come as a surprise
given the geographical and historical context in which Alexander operated.
Alexander wrote his commentary on the Metaphysics in between 1305 and
1307 when he was lector at the Franciscan Studium of Bologna. It is an his-
torical datum that the North of Italy, and Bologna in particular, was in the
XIV century one of the major centres of diffusion of Averroess works and
thought. And even though the explosion of Averroess philosophy in the
North of Italy may date back to a few years after the peak of Alexanders
career, the influence of the Arabic commentator must have already been
strong when Alexander drafted his commentary on the Metaphysics. For
Alexander, Averroes is simply the point of reference for the interpretation
of the Metaphysics. The outcome of these historical factors is that Alexan-
ders commentary on the Metaphysics turns out to be a mixture of Aquinas
and Averroes. In some sense, it is Averroess thought that gets distorted in
this intellectual operation. Although Alexander occasionally shows himself
aware of some discrepancies between Averroess and Aquinass paradigms,
more often than not he flattens down the differences and reads back into
Averroess text some of the fundamental tenets of the Dominican Masters
metaphysics.
12 introduction
This general tendency to synthesis is even more apparent in the case of

Paul of Venice. Of course, Pauls interest in Averroes may also be explained
by geographical and contextual reasons. In the Padua of the beginning of
the XV century Averroes was certainly the main philosophical authority
especially when it came to the interpretation of Aristotles works.17 However,
there is something more in Pauls general attitude towards Averroes. This
emerges clearly if one considers the role that the Arabic commentator
plays in the structuring of Pauls commentary on the Metaphysics. As I shall
explain in some detail in Chapter 6, Averroes is not only the instrument
which Paul employs, implicitly or explicitly, for understanding Aristotles
text, but is also an object of his interpretation alongside Aristotle himself.
In Pauls commentary the exposition of the littera of Aristotles Metaphysics
is invariably accompanied by numerous quotations from Averroes. The
quotations are explained, commented upon and philosophically evaluated.
Thus, Pauls Expositio Metaphysicorum presents itself as a sort of double
commentary, where the Austin Master provides us with an interpretation of
both Averroes and Aristotle. In all probability, Pauls attitude is not without
an explanation. Paul comes at the end of a long tradition of interpretation
of Aristotles Metaphysics and sees himself as the collector of different
philosophical and exegetical tendencies, which he wishes to assess and
incorporate. His commentary is the testimony of this synthetic orientation.
In this context, Pauls tendency to harmonise Aquinass and Averroess
philosophical views is easily understandable. What may appear to us as
major philosophical differences were regarded by Paul as variations within
a unified tradition of reflection upon Aristotles Metaphysics. There seems
to be some sort of standard Aristotelian doctrine, which both Averroes and
Aquinas preserve, although in different ways.
There is an important medieval metaphysician who seems to be under-
represented in the picture which I have drawn so far, namely Avicenna.
Although Aquinas is certainly inspired by Avicennas thought, the Philoso-
phia prima is almost absent from the Dominican Masters commentary on
the Metaphysics. And the same thing is true of Alexanders and Pauls expo-
sitions, where Avicenna is quoted only occasionally and in connection with
rather insignificant points. This might be due to the peculiar nature of Avi-
cennas philosophical works. Although Avicenna follows rather closely the
17 On the other hand, Pauls adherence to Averroess most characteristic psychological
doctrines has been clearly overestimated by the interpreters (see for instance: Nardi (1958);
Ruello (1978); Kuksewicz (1983)). For a more balanced account see Conti (1992).
introduction 13
argument of Aristotles Metaphysics, his Philosophia prima is not a commen-

tary in the strict sense of the term, but rather a philosophical treatise, where
the writer expounds his own views.18 Also from a doctrinal point of view, Avi-
cenna is a mixed landscape, where Aristotelian and Neoplatonic elements
live in harmony. It is not surprising, therefore, that Avicenna should be lit-
tle employed by the literal commentators. This is true, with one important
exception, Albert the Great. Although Albert draws extensively on Averroes
for the interpretation of single passages in the Metaphysics, his main source
of inspiration when it comes to understanding the notion of substance is
Avicenna. As I shall show in Chapter 4, this is particularly evident in the case
of Alberts commentary on Met. Z, where Aristotles theory of substance is
read more in the light of Avicennas doctrine of essence than in accordance
with the standard Aristotelian categories (matter, form, the composite of
matter and form). In this sense, Albert is somehow at odds with the rest of
the tradition of literal commentaries. The comparatively little importance
that Albert plays when compared to Pauls other sources clearly shows the
Austin Masters preference for the traditional Aristotelianism and its cham-
pions.
3. Paul of Venice: A New Perspective
As is clear, I am not chiefly interested in Paul of Venice as an indepen-

dent and original philosopher, but rather as an Aristotelian commenta-
tor. Accordingly, I have not attempted in this book any reconstruction
of his general philosophical views.19 Pauls commentary on Book Zeta, for
instance, is interspersed with numerous doctrinal digressions about the var-
ious philosophical issues connected with Aristotles argument. In Chapter 6,
I shall give a list of these digressions and outline briefly their content. Some
of themlike the one on divine ideasare rightly famous and testify to
Pauls peculiar brand of late medieval realism.20 Although important, such
philosophical excursuses are not part of my general discourse. What I have
been focusing on is the way Paul understands Aristotles theory of substance
18 For the structure of Avicennas Philosophia Prima and its position with regard to
Aristotles Metaphysics see the comprehensive analysis in Bertolacci (2006).

19 For an introduction to Paul of Venices metaphysical thought see Conti (1996). See
also Contis entry Paul of Venice in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy: http://plato
.stanford.edu/entries/paul-venice/.
20 For a study of Pauls view on divine ideas see Conti (2003).
14 introduction
and so interprets some crucial pieces of doctrine which Aristotle defends in

the text. Thus, the only digression I have analysed in some detail is that on
the essence and definition of material objects, which Paul presents when
commenting on Met. Z 10. The digression clearly shows Pauls adherence
to Aquinass paradigm as well as his attempt to harmonise Averroess and
Aquinass different views.
These considerations can be pushed one step further. Pauls commentary
on Met. Zeta is not a particularly original piece of work as compared to its
sources. It must be regarded as the point of synthesis of a long tradition
of interpretation of Aristotles ontology. And it is precisely in this new
light that I wish to present Paul of Venices commentary. I regard, in other
words, Pauls writing as the point of arrival of a fascinating philosophical
history, the history of the medieval understanding of Aristotles theory
of substance. My analysis of Pauls commentary consists of three crucial
moments, which it is better to recall here: (i) the critical edition of Pauls
text; (ii) the monographic chapters on the principal literal commentaries
on Book Zeta; (iii) the extended summaries of Pauls commentary. There is
not much to say here on the critical edition. The criteria that have guided
it and the limits within which it should be understood will be specified
in the introduction to the second volume. I have already explained the
general meaning of the monographic chapters. However, let me restate
once again one crucial point: the chapters are not so much presentations
of Paul of Venices main sources as reconstructions of the different stages
of the interpretation of Aristotles ontology. This explains the centrality
and the length of the chapter on Aristotle, which remains the main focus
of my attention, as well as the importance I have attached to Averroes
and Aquinas, who lay down irreconcilable and paradigmatic readings of
Aristotles theory of substance.
I wish to say a few words, instead, on the summaries which follow the
monographic chapters. The summaries have both a material and a for-
mal aspect, as it were, of which the second is by far the more important.
Materially speaking, the summaries are supposed to replace a complete
translation of Pauls commentary. There are various reasons why translat-
ing Pauls text as it is, is not recommendable in itself. In general, Pauls
work looks unappealing to modern eyes. For one thing, Pauls style is par-
ticularly heavy and his text is full of references to authorities, as well as
of examples and asides. For another, the technical and scholastic jargon
which Paul employs throughout often obscures the real import of the dis-
tinctions he draws and of the philosophical points he wants to make. In
the summaries I have tried to remedy both problems. First, I have dra-
introduction 15
matically simplified Pauls text by focusing exclusively on its essential ner-

vatures and by leaving out, by contrast, those examples and references
that I thought were not essential to understanding the line of Pauls argu-
ment. Moreover, I have tried to translate Pauls jargon into a more up
to date philosophical language, which might make the commentary more
understandable to and more interesting for the philosophical community
in general. Besides replacing a complete translation, the summaries have
another and more important function. They wish to offer a sort of philo-
sophical radiography of the commentary by putting emphasis on its philo-
sophical contents. When stripped of its inessential traits Pauls text should
present itself as a stimulating work, where the author discusses both the
central tenets of Aristotles ontology and the main philosophical issues
of his time. Ideally, a philosophically oriented reader should be able to
go through the summaries quite independently of the original text and
get a sense of Pauls philosophical preferences. On the other hand, he
should be effectively guided into the structure and contents of the orig-
inal text, should he have the curiosity to go back to it and look by him-
self.
The general hope is that the monographic chapters together with the
summaries may give some content to my previous claim that Paul is the
point of arrival of a long and rich philosophical history.
4. Methodology and Future Perspectives
This book moves from a fundamental assumption, which it is better to make

explicit right from the start. The basic idea is that the history of Aristotelian-
ism is first of allif not exclusivelythe history of the interpretation of
Aristotles texts and of the philosophical doctrines which they convey. To
put things otherwise, in order to understand the history and the fortune of
Aristotles thought we must first of all reconstruct the way in which certain
crucial Aristotelian texts have been read as well as the way the doctrines
such texts present have been understood and philosophically evaluated.
This explains the structure of the monographic chapters I have included
in the first volume. Where possible, the chapters follow very closely the
structure of Aristotles argument: for each of the authors studied (and this
is particularly true of Averroes and Aquinas) I have tried to illustrate in
detail how they interpret the single sections of Book Zeta as well as some
crucial passages that divide scholars even nowadays. The aim is to show
how the philosophical options which different authors endorse in their
16 introduction
commentaries have their roots in different understandings of Aristotles

text. With this I do not want to deny that also the converse movement may
take place, that is, that Aristotles texts may be interpreted in the light of
independent philosophical doctrines. Neither do I wish to deny medieval
commentators their value and originality. All I want to do is to show how
medieval ontology and metaphysics are at least in part the result of a long
and unbroken effort to understand Aristotles Metaphysics.
There are two things which I could not do in this book and which I wish
to mention for further investigation. My orientation has been mainly doctri-
nal in character. Thus, I deliberately left out of consideration the complex
history of the letter of Aristotles Metaphysics, how, in other words, Aris-
totles original text has been translated and how translations affected the
medieval understanding of some crucial passages of it. However, the story
of the transformations and shifts that Aristotles text underwent over time
must be written. As is obvious, the way a text has been translated from one
language into another is not irrelevant to how it is understood, and this
is especially true of Aristotles Metaphysics, whose difficulty and technical
character have always baffled interpreters. In the monographic chapters
I have occasionally pointed to some peculiar features of the Arabic-Latin
or the Greek-Latin translations in order to account for the commentators
interpretative choices. But what we need is a systematic work on each sin-
gle passage of Aristotles text in order to provide a complete picture of the
text medieval commentators were forced to work with. This picture should
also include an analysis of the different techniques by which medieval com-
mentators tried to overcome the difficulties they were confronted with in
their attempts to make sense of Aristotle. The analysis of the transforma-
tions of Aristotles text, in other words, must be tightly linked with a study
of the literary genre of commentaries, that is, of the different layers of which
a literal commentary consists.21 The divisio textus and the paraphrasis of
the littera as well as the exposition of the sententia of the author and the
notanda all represent different ways of approaching the text which is being
commented upon as well as different angles from which commentators may
try to expound their personal views. Although in this book I have described
in some detail the different styles of the commentators I have taken into
consideration, I could not provide, for lack of space, a detailed analysis of
how the different styles have an impact on the interpretation of Aristotles
text.
21 For an overview of this issue see Del Punta (1998).

introduction 17
There is another area of research which I had to leave unexplored, i.e.

the vast landscape of commentaries per modum quaestionis (the only excep-
tion is Alexander of Alexandrias commentary, which contains a series of
quaestiones alongside the literal explanation of the text). Given my general
interest in Book Zeta as such, it is not surprising that I have been concentrat-
ing on literal commentaries, which present themselves, programmatically I
would say, as interpretations of the text which is taken into consideration.
Commentaries per modum quaestionis, by contrast, must be handled care-
fully in this respect, for the extent to which they may be taken to provide an
interpretation of the text they are about must be evaluated case by case and
may depend on the orientations of the single authors. The distance between
the quaestiones and the text they are officially about may be in some cases
rather great and this makes it somewhat arduous to extract from them a
clear reading of the text which is being commented upon. This being said,
it is clear that the work on the commentaries per modum quaestionis must
be done to complete the picture I have started to draw in this book. What
we need in particular is a detailed survey of the main tendencies of the dif-
ferent commentaries as well as of their different relations to Aristotles text.
It is unlikely, for instance, that Scotuss or Buridans commentaries should
not reveal a consistent understanding of Aristotle, in line with the general,
philosophical views of their authors. The research should show that, in spite
of the difference in literary genre, the quaestiones also belong to the history
of the understanding of Aristotles ontology.
My hope is to be able to contribute to filling both gaps in the future.
chapter one
SUBSTANCE IN ARISTOTLES METAPHYSICS, BOOK ZETA
Introduction
Metaphysics Zeta, Aristotles treatise on substance, has been rightly de-

scribed as the Mount Everest of Ancient Philosophy.1 Not only are the
single passages of Aristotles text particularly intricate, but there is also
no clarity as to the general, doctrinal meaning of the book. The internal
structure of the writing is also difficult in that it seems to contain a number
of dialectical sections where it is not easy to decide whether Aristotle puts
forward his own views or rather advances arguments he wants to refute or
simply discard later on. The difficulty of Met. Z is testified to by the huge
amount of critical literature on the book that has been coming out over
the last thirty or forty years. No other part of the Aristotelian scholarship
has witnessed a debate so huge and heated as that which has been sparked
by the contemporary interpreters rediscovery of Met. Z. Probably, such
an interesting historical phenomenon can be explained by looking at the
content of Aristotles treatise. For many themes Aristotle deals with in
Met. Zetasuch as, for instance, the structure of sensible objects, essence,
universals, individuation, matter and formare in fact issues that have
become of prominent importance in the contemporary ontological debate,
especially in the province of so-called analytic philosophy. Thus, the recent
return of interest in Met. Z has somehow run parallel to the rediscovery
by analytic philosophers of Aristotles ontology and of its significance for
the contemporary analytic debate. It is no chance that some of the scholars
involved in the controversy over Met. Zs general meaning have also taken
an active part in the contemporary debate about the very issues which are
touched upon in Aristotles book.2
In this chapter I intend to present a detailed introduction to Met. Zs
main contents and arguments. In light of what I have been saying so far,
1 Cf. Burnyeat (2001), 1.

2 For a critical overview of the main streams of the contemporary debate surround-
ing Met. Z see GalluzzoMariani (2006). The book pays also attention to the connections
between the rediscovery of Met. Z and the contemporary ontological debate.
20 chapter one
my presentation will have two different sides. On the one hand, I shall offer
a textual reconstruction of the different sections of the book, which follows
very closely the flow of Aristotles text and the order according to which
the different issues are introduced. The aim of my exposition is to try to
bring out the nervatures of the text and to offer a guide to the different
textual and exegetical problems it presents to the reader. On the other
hand, I shall pay special attention to the philosophical issues the treatise
deals with in order to convey the sense of the theoretical importance which
Aristotles book had in the ancient and medieval worlds and still continues
to have in contemporary philosophy. Although I shall make explicit use only
of those entries in the literature that are of crucial importance to clarify
the text, much of the contemporary debate surrounding Book Zeta will
be directly incorporated into my exposition. The aim is to present Met. Z
as a philosophical battlefield where radically different understandings of
Aristotles ontology come to clash with one another. Moreover, I hope that
the successive chapters will also show that the philosophical issues which
medieval interpreters read into Aristotles treatise are not so different from
those singled out by modern interpreters. Thus, my introduction to the book
and its contents should also work as a general grid for understanding the
medieval debate.
Met. Z is difficult for another reason, which should be taken into con-
sideration when drafting an introduction to the book. The Metaphysics is
not the only place where Aristotle sketches out what can be described as an
ontology of the sensible world. It can be argued in fact that the Categories
already presents a sufficiently detailed inventory of the inhabitants of our
everyday world. This is certainly the view defended by medieval interpreters
of the Metaphysics, whose main interpretative effort consists in trying to
reconcile Aristotles ontology in the Categories with the more fine-grained
views presented in Met. Z. The medieval persuasion seems to be shared by
the participants in the contemporary debate, where the issue of the relation
between the Categories and the Metaphysics is clearly on top of the agenda.
As a matter of fact, Met. Zs analysis of substance seems to depart from the
Categories ontological framework in that the latter treatise presents sensi-
ble substances as unanalysable (or at least unanalysed) wholes, while Book
Z describes them as composites of matter and form. The hylomorphic model
Aristotle applies in the Metaphysics has considerable consequences for the
question of substantiality as well. For it is not clear that in Met. Z sensi-
ble objects may continue to play the role of primary entities the Categories
assigns to them: the reason is that the ontological constituents in terms of
which sensible objects are analysableand in particular their formseem
substance in aristotles metaphysics, book zeta 21
to hold some kind of priority over them and so to be better qualified to be

described as primary entities. It comes as no surprise, therefore, that both
medieval and contemporary interpreters have spent some time in trying to
understand whether the Metaphysics ontology is simply supposed to replace
the sketchy ontological picture outlined in the Categories or should rather
be taken to be compatible with it. Opinions are, of course, at variance both
in the Middle Ages and in recent times. As I shall try to show in the follow-
ing chapters, for instance, Aquinas seems to be confident enough that Zs
ontology does not clash with Aristotles ontological views in the Categories,
while Averroes, without explicitly saying so, is clearly of the opinion that
the Metaphysics marks a major departure with respect to the earlier work.
Be that as it may, what is important for our present purposes is that a general
presentation of the treatment of substance in Met. Z cannot avoid consid-
ering the issue of the relationship between Aristotles two main ontological
treatises.
In light of the foregoing considerations, I shall devote Section 1 to a short
analysis of the ontological picture drawn by Aristotle in the Categories.
Moreover, in Section 2 I shall outline the main interpretative problems the
reading of Met. Z presents, including the issue of the relationship between
Aristotles treatise and the Categories. In Sections 38, I shall finally offer my
section-by-section reconstruction of Zs argument.
1. The Notion of Substance in the Categories
It is not clear whether Aristotles Categories was meant to be a book about

ontology. Already Porphyry, in his commentary by questions and answers,
raises the issue of the aim of the Categories and so of the status of the ten
items listed therein: Do the ten categories represent kinds of being or are
they simply a list of linguistic expressions?3 As is well known, Porphyry opts
for a compromise solution, which is often labelled semantic. Though not
representing kinds of being, the ten categories do not simply classify lin-
guistic expressions, either. They certainly pick out linguistic expressions but
only in so far as expressions signify things in the world. Such a solution was
ambiguous enough to leave room in the Middle Ages for both a linguistic
and an ontological approach to Aristotles treatise. Many medieval philoso-
phers, though respecting the letter of Porphyrys solution, maintain that the
aim of the Categories is to introduce ten different kinds of being through
3 Cf. Porphyry, In Cat., Proem., ed. Busse, pp. 56, 3457, 12.
22 chapter one
an analysis of the linguistic expressions corresponding to them. Aquinas, to

mention one, was of the opinion that Aristotle introduces ten distinct kinds
of being by means of a study of ten different kinds of predicates, i.e. of ten dif-
ferent ways in which something can be truly said or predicated of concrete
sensible objects.4 Whether directly or indirectly, therefore, the Categories
is a book about ontology, after all. Here, I am not particularly interested
in defending an ontological reading of Aristotles treatise as opposed to a
linguistic or semantic one. I shall simply go by the assumption that the Cat-
egories presupposes a certain understanding of the structure of the world as
well as a classification of the items necessary to explain this structure.5
The ten categories, then, can be interpreted as a list of ten distinct kinds
of being. Even if Aristotle in the Categories does not express himself thus, the
tradition quite rightly splits up the ten categories into two distinct groups,
substance on the one hand and nine accidental categories on the other,
qualities, quantities, relations etc. The basic idea behind this division is that
substances are primary entities and accidents secondary ones, because acci-
dents depend on substances according to some relevant sense of depen-
dence, while substances do not depend on accidents. This general picture
gets complicated in various ways. The most important one is that substance
as well as accidental categories contain, according to Aristotle, both uni-
versal and particular items. In other words, there are individual substances
such as individual men and horses, as well as substantial universals such as
the species man and horse and the genus animal, which all belong to the cat-
egory of substance. By the same token, there exist individual qualities, such
as individual instances of the colour red, as much as universal ones such the
colour red and the generic universal colour. And the same thing holds true of
all the other accidental categories. All in all, therefore, Aristotle presents us
with a fourfold classification of reality, which can be summarised as follows:6
Universal Substances Universal Accidents
Particular Substances Particular Accidents
4Cf. Aquinas, Exp. Metaph., Lib. V, lect. 9, ed. CathalaSpiazzi, n. 890.

5The critical literature on Aristotles ontological views in the Categories is particularly
vast. Among the contributions that bear most directly on the theory of substance and on Met.
Zs themes, I would like to mention at least: Ackrill (1963); Moravcsik (1967a) and (1967b);
Jones (1972); Stough (1972); Dancy (1975) and (1978); Frede (1987a) and (1987b); Driscoll (1981);
Graham (1987b); Furth (1988).
6 Cf. Aristotle, Cat., 2. For a contemporary defence of Aristotles fourfold division of
reality see Lowe (2006).

Now, Aristotles main ontological claim in the Categories is that particular

substances, i.e. the ordinary particular objects of our everyday experience,
such as particular men and horses, are the basic entities in the world. Aris-
totle himself expresses this claim by saying that, if particular substances did
not exist, nothing else could exist.7 Particular substances, therefore, are the
entities on whose existence the existence of any other thing (universal sub-
stances as well as universal and particular accidents) ultimately rests. But
how can such a general claim be justified? How and why can particular sub-
stances play the role Aristotle assigns to them? The most plausible answer to
this question is that particular substances play the role of primary entities by
being ultimate subjects, namely by being subjects for everything else there
is.8 The role played by particular substances and the notion of subject it
involves can be better understood by taking a closer look at the way Aristotle
conceives of the relations obtaining among the different items figuring in his
fourfold classification. For Aristotle gives a sufficiently clear account both of
the relation obtaining between items falling under the same category and
of that obtaining between items falling under different categories, i.e. the
items falling under the categories of substances and those falling under one
of the nine accidental categories. The relations between two items falling
under the same category are governed by the so-called said of relation,
whilst those between substances and accidents are governed by the being
in relation. Both relations should be primarily conceived of as ontological
relations obtaining between two things in the world, though they may
and presumably do havesome linguistic counterpart. Let me try to spell
out in some more detail the nature of such relations and bring to the fore
their implications for the ontology of the Categories.
The said of relation obtains between two items belonging to the same
category and can be seen, roughly speaking, as the ontological counterpart
of essential predication. In other words, if x is said of y, then x expresses
the essence or part of the essence of y. Examples may clarify things here. To
start with the category of substance, the species man is said of individual
men, and the genus animal is said of both the species man and individual
men. As is seen, (being a) man expresses the essence of individual men,
i.e. what individual men are, whilst (being an) animal expresses part of the
essence of both the species man and individual men. Likewise, to move to
non-substantial categories, red is said of the individual instances of red,
7 Cf. Aristotle, Cat., 5, 2b6b-c.

8 Cf. Aristotle, Cat., 5, 2b66c.
24 chapter one
and colour is said of both red and the individual instances of red. What is
particularly important for our purposes is that Aristotle seems to suggest
that the said of relation implies existential dependence. The items that
are said of other items depend for their own existence on the items they
are said of. Thus, one consequence of Aristotles view is that substantial
universals, i.e. genera and species, depend for their very existence on the
existence of their particular instances. The existence of the species man,
for instance, depends on the existence of particular men. Likewise, the
existence of universal qualities, say colour and red, depend on the existence
of particular instances of those qualities. The existential dependence of
universals, be they substantial or accidental universals, on their particular
instances is often referred to in contemporary metaphysics as Principle of
Instantiation.9
The being in relation, by contrast, obtains between items belonging to
accidental categories and items belonging to the categories of substance.
Traditionally, such a relation is understood in terms of inherence: accidents
inhere in substances. The being in relation is explicitly defined by Aristotle
in Cat. 1a2425 as follows:
by in a subject I mean what is in something, not as a part, and cannot exist
separately from what it is in10
There has been a certain amount of debate concerning the way to under-
stand the being in relation and the inseparability requirement Aristotle
introduces when he characterises it. The controversy revolves in particu-
lar around how we should understand particular accidents, i.e. whether
they should be taken to be unrepeatable and so absolutely peculiar to the
particular substance they inhere in, or whether they should rather be con-
strued as minimally universal properties, properties that can still be shared
by more than one substance.11 A particular instance of paleness, for instance,
could be taken either as an absolutely unrepeatable propertysuch as, for
instance, Socrates paleness as opposed to Platosor as a minimally uni-
versal propertysuch as, for instance, a fully determinate and not further
determinable shade of paleness. Depending on which view one takes, the
possibility can be allowed or not allowed of particular accidents inhering in
9For discussion of the principle see Loux (2007).

10 Ackrills translation.
11 For the view that individual accidents are repeatable see especially Ackrill (1963) (but
also Granger (1980)). For the opposed view see in particular Owen (1965b) and (with a slightly
different, but congenial account) Frede (1987a).
universal substances, i.e. species and genera. What is clear, in any case, is
that the main relation Aristotle is interested in explaining is that between
particular substances and particular accidents. For universal accidents exist
only because their particular instances do and hence they inhere in partic-
ular substances only via their particular instances. Moreover, some credit
can in fact be accorded to the traditional view, which construes particu-
lar accidents as unrepeatable entities. On this view, particular accidents
only inhere in particular substances and not in their species and genera.
Whatever position one decides to take regarding the nature of particular
accidents, the general point to be emphasised is that the being in relation
implies, as much as the said of relation, existential dependence. Accidents
exist only because they inhere in particular substances. Properties, in other
words, need a bearer.
It is now easier to see how Aristotle is entitled to the claim that particular
substances are those entities upon whose existence the existence of every-
thing else rests. Certainly, Aristotle in the Categories admits of the existence
of universal substances, i.e. the (specific and generic) kinds particular sub-
stances belong to. Such kinds express the essence (or part of the essence)
of particular substances. However, substantial universals depend for their
own existence on particular substances. For they exist only in so far as par-
ticular substances do. They are, therefore, secondary entities and are in fact
labelled secondary substances as opposed to particular substances, which
are referred to, instead, as primary substances.12 Accidents, too, are sec-
ondary entities, whose existence depends on the existence of the particular
substances they inhere in. It is also clear that particular substances play
the role of basic or fundamental entities by being the ultimate ontological
subjects for everything else there is. For everything else either is said of
particular substances or is in particular substances. I deliberately refrained
from adding of predication to the clause ultimate subject, because I want
to insist that the said of and the being in relations should be primarily
conceived of as ontological relations. However, since such ontological rela-
tions underlie standard instances of essential and accidental predication,
we can say with no harm that particular substances play the role of ultimate
subject of predication.
To sum up: Aristotle thinks in the Categories that ordinary particular
objects such as men and horses are the basic entities in the world. The kinds
such objects belong to do exist, but only in so far as their particular instances
12 Cf. Aristotle., Cat., 5, 2a1119; 3a810.

26 chapter one
exist. Particular substances possess particular accidental properties. These

properties, however, exist only in so far as they are in, i.e. inhere in, partic-
ular substances. Finally, also universal accidental properties exist, but only
through their particular instances inhering in particular substances.
Aristotles ontology in the Categories is problematic in many respects.
For one thing, the asymmetry between substances and accidental proper-
ties which Aristotle wishes to defend is not without problems of its own.
What is difficult, in particular, is to provide justification for the claim that
accidents depend on substances, whilst substances do not depend on acci-
dents. For it seems that, even though there is no accidental property in
particular on which the existence of a primary substance depends, primary
substances must still have some accidental property or other and so in some
sense depend, after all, on their accidental properties.13 There is, however,
a deeper difficulty somehow lurking behind the ontology of the Categories.
Aristotle clearly maintains that kinds only exist in so far as their particu-
lar instances do. Upon reflection, however, there seems to be a sense in
which the opposite might be true as well, i.e. a sense in which particular
substances would not exist, if their kinds did not. For Aristotle clearly holds
to the view that there could not exist a particular substance that is not an
instance of one kind or another, there could not be a particular substance
that is not, say, a man or a dog or a cat and so on. In some sense, therefore,
to exist for a particular substance means to exemplify a certain kind. Such
a view, according to which existence is tied up with the exemplification
of a certain kind, is known as essentialism. As is easily realised, Aristotles
essentialist stance risks endangering the ontological primacy he is willing
to assign to particular substances. For, if a particular substance could not
exist without being an instance of a certain kind, then particular substances
depend, so it seems, on the natural kinds they belong to as much as natu-
13 Probably, the asymmetrical relation of dependence Aristotle argues for in the Cate-
gories is better defended by endorsing the view that individual accidents are unsharable
properties, i.e. they are peculiar to the particular substance they inhere in. For one of the
consequences of this view is that, while there is one particular substance on which an acci-
dental property depends for its own existence, there is no accidental property in particular an
individual substance must possess, even if it must possess, of course, some property or other.
The asymmetry, by contrast, is more difficult to justify if one takes the view that individual
accidents can be had by more than one substance. For, on this account, it seems that, just as
an accidental property must inhere in some substance or other, so also individual substances
must possess some accidental properties or other. On this difficulty see Bostock (1994), 5760.
For a modern discussion of the problem of the asymmetrical relation of dependence between
objects and their properties see: Lowe (1998), 136153.
ral kinds depend on their particular instance.14 We shall see in what follows
that Aristotles commitment to essentialism is of particular significance in
understanding how the Categories ontology is revised and modified in Meta-
physics Z.
2. Metaphysics, Book Z:
Some General Problems of Interpretation
Book Z is the treatise of the Metaphysics specifically devoted to the notion

of substance. Traditionally, Z is grouped together with Books H and to
form a trio of treatises, the so-called central books, which study ontolog-
ical issues. The connection between Z and H is uncontroversial. H starts
off with a very selective summary of Zs results and for the most part does
nothing but expand on the notions of matter and form, which are one of
Zs main concerns. H, therefore, can be regarded as an important appendix,
which refines and completes the analysis of the structure of sensible sub-
stances carried out in Z. Less clear is the relationship between the book
about potentiality and actualityand the two preceding books. Scholars
have much debated how s enquiry is supposed to contribute to Aristotles
analysis of substance.15 Leaving aside any other consideration, it seems to be
clear that Book is intended, at least in part, to improve our understand-
ing of the notions of matter and form. For in Book H Aristotle somehow
explains the relation between matter and form in terms of that between
potentiality and actuality.16 And Book is precisely the place where such
two notions are spelt out and analysed in great detail. Thus, to such an
extent at least, seems to be part of Aristotles general enquiry into sub-
stance.
Although Metaphysics Z considerably refines and complicates the onto-
logical scheme sketched out in the Categories, the book presupposes the
general structure of the world laid out in the earlier work. More particularly,
it presupposes the division of the world into ten different kinds of being
and the general priority of the category of substance over the accidental
14 For a particularly insightful discussion of this difficulty for the ontology in the Cate-
gories see Loux (1991), 1348.

15 For a reconstruction of Met. that puts weight on the connection between and ZH
see Frede (1994). For a different view see Witt (2003). For an excellent discussion of the role
of Book within the plan of the Metaphysics see Makin (2006).
16 Cf. for instance: Aristotle, Met., H 2, 1042b910; 1043a57; a1421; H 6, 1045a2325; b16
23.
28 chapter one
categories. It comes as no surprise, therefore, that, as I have already hinted

in my introduction, one of the main interpretative problems concerning
Book Z consists in establishing whether Aristotles doctrine in the book
clashes with the ontology of the Categories or is, instead, compatible with
it. One simple way of highlighting the problem is the following. The Cat-
egories assigns the role of primary substances, i.e. the entities on whose
existence the existence of everything else rests, to the particular objects
of our ordinary perceptual experience. When compared to the Categories,
Book Zs ontological framework immediately presents a macroscopic aspect
of novelty. For particular objects or substances are now analysed in terms of
matter and form, i.e. in terms of the material composing them and the struc-
ture or organisation providing them with the functions and activities they
perform. The analysis in terms of matter and form is completely absent from
the Categories, where particular substances are regarded as unanalysable
wholes and not as composites of matter and form. I am not particularly
interested here in tracking down the origin of the distinction between mat-
ter and form. The traditional story has it that Aristotle came to discover
the notions of matter and form in the course of a physical enquiry into the
generation and corruption of sensible substances. For the generation and
corruption of a sensible substance can effectively be explained, respectively,
as the acquisition and the loss of a form on the part of a material substratum.
Be that as it may, what is of interest to us is that the analysis of sensible sub-
stances into matter and form is not without consequences for the question
of substance. For one might reasonably think that it is no longer the case
that, as Aristotle maintains in the Categories, particular objects are primary
substances, i.e. are those entities on whose existence the existence of all
the rest depends. For now it turns out that particular objects are analysable
in terms of matter and form. Thus, one reasonable suggestion is that mat-
ter and form (and, as we shall see, especially form) lay better claims to
the title of primary substance than the particular objects they contribute
to analysing. For it seems that the existence of particular objects depends
on that of matter and form and hence particular objects themselves can no
longer be regarded as primary in the sense specified. In this section I wish
to offer a general introduction to Zs structure and argument. Then, I shall
come back to the relationship between Z and the Categories. In particular, I
shall present two different ways of understanding such a relation, which will
turn out to be important for understanding the medieval interpretations as
well.
Met. Z is a book about substance. As such, it belongs to a more general
enquiry into the notion of being. BeingAristotle tells us in Met. and
reminds us at the very beginning of Met. Z17is spoken of in many ways,

that is the ways corresponding to the ten categories. Although Aristotle
casts his claim in linguistic terms, what he has to say mainly concerns the
world which language describes. There are substances as much as qualities,
quantities, relations and so on, and thus being is spoken of in different
senses depending on the kind of being it is applied to.18 The different kinds
of being, however, are grouped around a core or basic kind of being, which
is being in the sense of substance. All the other kinds of being are said
to be because they bear some relation or other to substance: some things
are said to be because they are qualitative properties of substances, some
others because they are quantitative properties of substances and so on
and so forth for all the items belonging to the other categories.19 Thus, an
enquiry into substance is supposed to provide us with an understanding of
the notion of being in general. For once one has understood the core or basic
sense of being, one will be able to understand also what being means for
the things that are beings in the secondary or derivative senses of being.
In some sense, therefore, the investigation into the notion of being reduces
itself to the investigation into the notion of substance.20 But what does it
mean to enquire into the notion of substance? What does such an enquiry
boil down to?
There are two different questions one might have in mind when address-
ing the issue of substance. Following the literature on Met. Z, I shall call
them Population Question and Nature Question.21 The population ques-
tion is the question as to what substances there are, i.e. what the basic
entities are the existence of which is the ground for the existence of every-
thing else. An answer to such a question must include at least a list of
(the types) of things which are considered to be basic and fundamental.
There is no doubt that the Categories mainly addresses a population ques-
tion. The treatise provides an inventory of the different kinds of things
that existparticular objects and the natural kinds they belong to, partic-
ular and universal propertiesand establishes that particular objects are
17 Cf. Aristotle, Met., , 2, 1003a33b13; Z, 1, 1028a1013.

18 Since Aristotles claim that being is spoken of in many ways is not so much about the
meaning of the term being, as about the things to which the term applies, I shall ignore the
use-mention distinction in the following.
19 Cf. Aristotle, Met., , 2, 1003b513; Z, 1, 1028a1820.
20 Cf. Aristotle, Met., Z, 1, 1028b27.
21 For such a distinction see in particular: Furth (1988), 5455; Witt (1989), 714; Burnyeat
(2001), 1314.
30 chapter one
primary substances, i.e. the basic and primary entities. However, one could
take the question about substance in a rather different way. One could try
to understand what being a substance consists in, i.e. what the nature of
substantiality itself amounts to. To raise such a question means to raise a
nature question. Presumably, an answer to the nature question will con-
sist in determining which aspects of the things we have singled out as
substances enable them to be called substances. It may be argued, for
instance, that the Categories implicitly provides an answer to the nature
question, too. We have seen that particular objects play the role of pri-
mary substances because they are the ultimate subjects for everything else
there is, i.e. for substantial universals as well as for particular and universal
accidents. Thus, it seems that, according to the analysis in the Categories,
substantiality simply consists in being an ultimate subject. At least theo-
retically, population and nature questions seem to be closely related. For
instance: if we had a firm grasp of the nature of substantiality, we would
be in a position to decide once and for all which substances there are. Con-
versely, it is likely that starting from some clear and uncontroversial cases of
substance will help us to understand what the nature of substance consists
in. There are also possible conflicts or tensions between the two questions,
but I shall come back to them after I have considered Zs general struc-
ture.
Now, which of these two questions is Aristotle addressing in Book Zeta?
And, if he addresses both, how does he see the connection between the
two? In Met. Z 2 (1028b813) Aristotle lists a series of items that are gen-
erally regarded as uncontroversial examples of substances: animals, plants
and their parts as well as the elements, the things composed out of them, the
universe and its parts. Everything in Aristotles text suggests that he consid-
ers the list as provisional and subject to revision. For he adds (1028b1315)
that the claims to substantiality of all the items listed need to be carefully
scrutinised. However, the list itself is a good example of an answer to the
population questionan answer, moreover, that seems to go along the
lines of that outlined in the Categories: ordinary sensible objects (and their
parts) are generally thought to be paradigmatic cases of substances. The rest
of Z 2s text reinforces the idea that Aristotle is interested in determining
which things are substances and so in answering the population question.
For after the mention of the items that are held to be substance by everyone,
he moves on to those things that are considered to be substances by some
philosophers only (1028b16ff.). The list comprises, for instance, Xenocrates
and Speusippus views on non-sensible substances. Thus, as Aristotle makes
clear, a full enquiry into the notion of substance must also include a deci-
sion over the existence of non-sensible substances as well as an indication

as to which types of non-sensible substances there are.
Even if Met. Z 2 as a whole suggests that Aristotle is trying to give an
answer to the population question, the very last lines of the chapter invite
us to think of the problem of substance in a different way. For Aristotle says
that, before addressing the question of which kinds of substances there are,
it is necessary to give a sketch of what substance is, i.e. of the very nature
of substance. Consequently, he presents, at the beginning of Z 3 (1028b34
36), four candidates for the title of substance: essence, the universal, the
genus and the subject. The four claimants to the title of substance are best
interpreted as four possible answers to the question about the nature of
substantiality. In other words, the suggestion is been advanced that being a
substance might simply consist in being an essence, or a universal or a genus
or a subject. As a matter of fact, almost all the rest of Book Z is devoted to
evaluating the candidacy of the four claimants listed in Z 3. The subject is
discussed in Z 3 itself, essence is taken up in its own terms in Z 46 and
then again in Z 1012 through the closely related notion of definition. The
candidacy of the universal is discussed and turned down in Z 1316. Genus
does not receive separate treatment, but its claims to the title of substance
seem to be dismissed together with those of the universal, as Aristotle
strongly suggests in its rsum of Zs results at the beginning of Book H.22
Z 17the last chapter of the bookmarks a fresh start with respect to the
list of four candidates in Z 3, by exploring the idea that substance may be
a cause or principle of some sort.23 This suggestion too, however, should be
taken as a possible answer to the nature question. For Aristotles proposal
seems to be that being a substance simply is being a cause or principle, of
course not any cause or principle but a cause or principle of a particular sort,
which is specified in the course of Z 17s argument.
Apparently, therefore, Book Z starts off with problems of population and
then shifts immediately to problems concerning the nature of substance,
which mainly occupy the rest of the book. So, what is the relationship,
according to Aristotle, between the two questions? Are the enquiries they
set about compatible? More fundamentally: Is there any ground for sup-
posing that Aristotle distinguishes in any significant way between the two
22 Cf. Aristotle, Met., H, 1, 1042a2122.

23 Met. Z 79 unexpectedly break Aristotles treatment of essence by introducing a sophis-
ticated discussion of the different kinds of generation. For more on the meaning and place
of these chapters as well as on how they can be brought to bear on Aristotles discussion of
essence, see below, Sect. 5.12.
32 chapter one
questions? In order to start solving this nest of problems, let me first hold to
the distinction between the two questions and explore one possible way in
which they might be connected. Aristotle lists in Z 2 a series of things that
may be or are in fact thought to be substances. Some of them are sensible,
some others non-sensible. Then Aristotle moves on to the question of the
nature of substance. The examination of such a question is conducted exclu-
sively with reference to the case of sensible substances. In other words, it is
the substantiality of sensible substances, i.e. what it means for them to be
substances, that is under scrutiny. This argumentative move suggests that
Aristotle thinks that a preliminary answer to the population question can
offer an easy way into the nature question as well. That is, it is by reflecting
upon some comparatively uncontroversial cases of substances that we may
arrive at a full understanding of the nature of substance itself. In Z, how-
ever, Aristotle also proceeds in the opposite direction, i.e. from the nature
question to the population question. In other words, once one has achieved
a clearer view on the nature of substantiality, one is in a better position to
refine and modify the initial list of substances. Thus, for instance, some of
the items listed by Aristotle in Z 2and notably the parts of living things
and the elementsare removed from the list in Z 16 (1040b516), after the
enquiry into the nature of substance has shown more clearly what being a
substance consists in. Analogously, Platonic Forms, the only case of non-
sensible substances which is discussed by Aristotle in Z, are excluded from
the number of substances (actually from existence) on the grounds that
they do not meet the conditions for substantiality emerging from Zs dis-
cussion.
It seems, therefore, that, if the two questions are distinct for Aristotle,
they can be easily connected and made compatible. But does he see them
as distinct? There are doubts that he does. In order to see this point, one has
only to look at how the results of Zs treatment of the nature question may
clash with or even replace the initial conclusions of the population question.
Aristotle discusses in Z four different candidates for the title of substance:
essence, the universal, the genus and the subject. Now, Aristotles conclu-
sion in Z is that substance must be identified with essence. Universals and
genera are clearly not substances. The destiny of the subject is, as we shall
see, less clear. However, even if being a subject should still be regarded as
one of the distinguishing marks of substantiality, the subject must play this
role together with essence, the general idea being that what is substance
must be a subject of some sort, in addition to being an essence. Besides
identifying substance with essence, Aristotle further identifies essence with
form, and hence substance with form. He even goes as far as to say that form
is primary substance.24 It is not difficult to see that it is the identification

between substance and form that makes troubles for our initial answer to
the population question. For Aristotle maintains in Z 2 that particular sensi-
ble substances are generally regarded as paradigmatic cases of substances.25
Sensible substances are, within Zs framework, composites of matter and
form. Throughout Z, however, Aristotle argues for the claim that it is the
form of sensible substances that deserves, most of all, the title of substance.
How are we supposed to understand this claim? Does it imply that the forms
of sensible substances replace them in the role of primary examples of sub-
stances? As is clear, the response to such a question has an impact also on
the issue of the relationship between the ontology of the Categories and that
of Metaphysics Z. For the Categories assigns the role of primary substances,
i.e. of primary entities, to the particular objects of our everyday experience.
But now it seems that in Z such objects are only regarded as secondary enti-
ties, though of a substantial character, in that their fundamental characters
ultimately depend on their form. For it is form that, by being the essence
of sensible objects, confers upon them their distinctive character and their
substantiality.
Scholars react to these general difficulties in two different ways. Some
simply accept Aristotles conclusion as it stands. In other words, they main-
tain that, in the Metaphysics, Aristotle revises and finally abandons his early
doctrine that particular objects are the primary entities in the world, i.e.
those things on whose existence the existence of everything else rests. For
now it turns out that particular objects are composites of matter and form
and hence depend for their very existence on the matter and form consti-
tuting them. Moreover, the philosophical analysis clearly shows that it is
the form of sensible objects that is responsible for what they are, for their
belonging, for instance, to the natural kinds they belong to. But if form is
responsible for ordinary particular substances being what they are, it must
be more of a substance than particular objects themselves. For short, I shall
call people endorsing such a view incompatibilists, because they insist
on the incompatibility between the ontology of the Categories and that of
Metaphysics Z.26 Sometimes, but not always, this view goes hand in hand
with the further view that the forms of sensible substances are particu-
lar as opposed to universal. I shall touch upon this claim later on when
24 Cf. Aristotle, Met., Z 7, 1032b12; 10, 1037a28.

25 Cf. Aristotle, Met., Z 2, 1028b813.
26 Good examples of incompatibilism are: Graham (1987b); Frede (1987a) and (1987b);
FredePatzig (1988).
34 chapter one
discussing the section of Z devoted to universals. For now, it is more impor-

tant to remark that, on the incompatibilist strategy, Aristotle does not
distinguish in any significant way between population and nature ques-
tion. The answer to the nature question constitutes ipso facto an answer
to the population question. For the nature of substance consists in being
an essence and essence is identified with form, which has better claims to
being called substance than the object it is the form of. Thus, a decision
over the nature of substance immediately entails also a decision over which
entities are primary substances.
Other scholars reject such radical conclusions and look for interpreta-
tions that try to reconcile the account of substance in the Categories with
the one provided in Z. I shall therefore call these interpreters compati-
bilists.27 Predictably, compatibilists insist on the distinction between pop-
ulation and nature question. They maintain that, while the Categories is
mainly concerned with a question of population, Met. Z, by contrast, deals
with the problem of the nature of substance. Hence, the two treatises raise
and answer different questions and so are not in conflict with each other.
Moreover, compatiblists give the nature question a causal or explanatory
interpretation and further insist that questions of explanation do not imme-
diately provide answers to the population question as well. In other words,
the Categories tries to determine which entities are primary substances, i.e.
which are the things whose existence grounds the existence of everything
else. The treatise singles out ordinary particular objects as the entities that
play such a role. The Metaphysics, by contrast, sets itself the task of discov-
ering which principle or constituent of particular substances is responsible
for their being substances. This task is performed through an analysis of the
nature of substance. The result of the analysis, i.e. that form is the principle
or constituent we are after, does not conflict with the claim that sensible
substances are primary substances in the Categories sense, because form is
substance only in the sense of being what is mainly responsible for the sub-
stantiality of particular substances and hence is not substance in the same
sense as them. Often, supporters of this line of interpretation appeal to the
distinction between substance and substance of, i.e. being a substance and
being the substance of something else. Ordinary particular objects are sub-
27 I would range among self-confessed compatibilists: Wedin (2000); Burnyeat (2001).
Many scholars take positions that can be rightly classified as intermediate between compati-
bilism and incompatibilism, in that they stress both similarities and differences between the
Categories and the Metaphysics. For such a mixed attitude see at least: Furth (1988); Lewis F.
(1991); Loux (1991).
stances tout court, i.e. are the basic or fundamental entities in the world.
Form, by contrast, is substance in so far as it is the substance of ordinary par-
ticular objects, i.e. the principle or constituent which is responsible for their
being substances. And these two senses of substance are two different and
quite compatible senses. It is important to observe that incompatibilists do
accept the idea that the nature question must be given a causal or explana-
tory interpretation, but also insist that such an interpretation compels us
to radically rethink the problem of population as well. For what is responsi-
ble for a things being substance must be considered to be substance in the
same sense as the thing of which it is the substance. Otherwise, it could not
explain in any way the substantiality of the thing of which it is the substance.
What is more, the substance of a thing must be more of a substance than
the thing whose substantiality it accounts for, simply because it explains its
substantiality. Thus, the substance of sensible substances is more substance,
tout court, than sensible substances themselves and hence any compatibilist
solution which appeals to the distinction between substance and substance
of is ultimately doomed to failure. In brief, we can say that incompatibilists
endorse an explanatory criterion of substantiality, according to which, if an
entity a explains the substantiality of an entity b then a is (substance in the
same sense as b and) more substance than b. So, form is more substance
than the composite because it explains its substantiality. Compatibilists,
by contrast, endorse an independent existence criterion of substantiality,
according to which primary substances must be autonomous and indepen-
dent objects. On this criterion, form cannot count as a primary substance
because it exists in matter and so depends for its existence on matter as well
as on the sensible object of which it is the form. Particular sensible objects,
by contrast, count as primary substances because they are autonomous and
independent objects.
As we shall see in the chapters about the medieval commentaries on
Book Z, the compatibility between the ontology of the Categories and that
of Z is one of medieval interpreters main concerns. Aquinas, for instance,
is a compatibilist, while Averroes is closer to incompatibilism.
3. Substance and Subjecthood in Met. Z 1 and Z 3
3.1. Substance and Accidents

Right from the beginning Aristotle sets his enquiry into substance within the
broader context of the general investigation into being. BeingAristotle
says in the first lines of Z 1is spoken of in many ways, as many, actually,
36 chapter one
as the ten categories: in one way, being signifies , i.e.

substance, in another quality, in still another quantity and so on and so forth
for each of the other categories.28 For we say that qualities and quantities
exist, i.e. are beings, as much as we say that substances exist. Despite its
being spoken of in as many ways as the ten categories, being does not
apply to the ten categories in the same way. Being in the sense of substance
is the primary sense of being, while the being corresponding to each of
the accidental categories is being only in a secondary sense. For things
belonging to the accidental categories are said to exist only in so far as they
are qualities or quantities or some other kind of property of substances.29
As is easily realised, Aristotle does nothing but repropose the view he
elaborates in Met. 13 and 7 to the effect that the different senses of
being are grouped around a basic or core sense of being, i.e. being in
the sense of substance. The second of the passages mentioned, Met. 7,
is explicitly referred back to by Aristotle in Z 1, 1028a11. The view is known
as the doctrine of , i.e. as the idea that the different senses of some
word or expression are related to one basic sense, and has been rebaptised
by Owen as theory of focal meaning.30 Although, as Owens label implies,
here and elsewhere Aristotle expresses himself as if the doctrine of
were a semantic doctrine concerning the different significations of the
term being, it is nonetheless clear that the structure is above all an
ontological view governing the relation between substance and accidents.
Substances are, i.e. exist, in a primary sense whereas accidents do so only
in a secondary sense. What is more, substances are said to be beings in a
primary sense only because they are beings, i.e. exist, in a primary sense
and, correspondingly, accidents are said to be beings only in a secondary
sense only because they are secondary beings, i.e. exist in a secondary sense.
Thus, it is the different ways of existence of substance and accidents that
explain why being is spoken of differently in the one case and in the
28 Cf. Aristotle, Met., Z 1, 1028a1013. For the interpretation of the difficult expression
, by which Aristotle refers to the category of substance, see Ross (1924), II,
159160 (according to whom the formula is meant to include both particular and universal
substances) and FredePatzig (1988), II, 1115 (who think, in accordance with their view that
Aristotles forms are particular, that the use of the formula shows that essences must be
particular).
29 Cf. Aristotle, Met., Z 1, 1028a1013.
30 Besides the classical study by Owen (1960), for Aristotles theory of focal meaning see
also: Kirwan (1971), 7686; Ferejohn (1980); Irwin (1981); Kung (1986); Bolton (1994); Frede
(1987c); Grice (1988); Frede (2000); Berti (2001). Some of the studies mentioned also touch
upon the related issue of the status of metaphysics as the science of being qua being.
other. All in all, therefore, the structure points to an asymmetrical

relation of dependence between substance and accidents. Accidents exist
only because they bear a certain relation to substances and so depend on
substances for their very existence. Substances, on the contrary, exist in
an unqualified way (i.e. there is nothing they need to bear relation to in
order to exist) and so do not depend on accidents for their existence. Of
course, being a quality is not the same thing as being a quantity or as being
a relative and so the relation of dependence on substance is, arguably, not
exactly the same for each of the accidental categories. However, Aristotles
view seems to be that all the accidental categories have in common the fact
of depending on substance for their existence and hence the differences
among them can be disregarded when this particular point is considered.31
31 This general picture gets considerably complicated in the course of Met. Zs argument.
So far, I have given an explanation of the focal meaning structure on the basis of purely
existential considerations, that is on the basis of the different ways of existing of substances
and accidents, respectively. Substances enjoy an independent existence, while accidents
depend for their existence on the substances of which they are the properties. The existential
model, however, works well enough when it comes to explaining the ontological difference
between substance and accidents in general, but can hardly serve as a model to produce
ten different kinds of being. For it seems that there are only two relevant ways of existing,
independent and dependent existence (or inherence), and not ten. Therefore, it is not
clear how Aristotle can make room for nine different ways of dependent being, given that
accidents seem to be perfectly on par in so far as their way of existing is concerned: although
a quality is something different from a quantity, the two kinds of accident seem to exist in
exactly the same way, i.e. by inhering in substance. The natural conclusion of the foregoing
reasoning should be that, in order to yield ten different kinds of being, one should appeal not
to existential but rather to essentialist considerations, i.e. considerations about the natures
of the different beings. It is because the essence of a substance is different from that of a
quality, and the essence of a quality is different from the essence of a quantity (and so on
and so forth) that we may arrive at ten different kinds of being. Also the essentialist strategy,
however, seems to present difficulties of its own. For it might be thought that focusing on
the natures of the different beings only produces ten equally independent kinds of being.
It might be thought, in other words, that essentialist considerations cannot make room for
the asymmetrical relation of dependence between substance and accidents which Aristotles
general theory requires, in that the different kinds of being possess different and unrelated
types of essence or nature. In the central books of the Metaphysics, however, Aristotle seems
to see things rather differently. In Z 4, 1030a17 ff. Aristotle explores the view that the focal
meaning structure might be transferred from the level of existence to the level of essences.
Just as being is spoken of in many ways, so are essence and definition as well. This
general thesis is supposed to include not only the claim that the content of the essence
differs from one kind of being to another and so there are ten different kinds of essence
corresponding to the ten different kinds of being, but also the further and more fundamental
claim that the essence of substance is a primary kind of essence while the essences of
accidents are secondary kinds of essence. The latter claim is true, presumably, because the
essence of accidents depend on the essence of substances while the other way round is not
the case. How this can be the case is explained by Aristotle in Z 1, 1028a3526 and restated in
38 chapter one
Z 1s general aim is to use the priority of substance over the accidental cat-
egories in order to conclude that the study of being in a sense reduces itself
to the study of substance (1028b27). The priority of substance is proved not
only by appealing to the structure, but also through different lines
of argument. One of those, which appears in the first part of the chapter
and crucially makes use of the notion of subject, will be examined in the
next subsection. Some more arguments are provided in the second part of
the chapter, where Aristotle lists three different kinds of priority substance
holds over accidents: priority (a) in time, (b) in definition and (c) in knowl-
edge (1028a31b2). (a) Priority in time is explained through the notion of
separability: of all the categories only substance is separable, whilst acci-
dents are not separable. It is not easy to understand what Aristotle means
by separability here.32 The notion plays an important part in Z 3s argu-
ment and so we shall say something more about it shortly. In the present
context, however, being separable seems to indicate some kind of indepen-
dent and autonomous existence. Substances are separable because they do
not depend on accidents for their existence, whereas accidents do depend
on substances and so are not separable. As I have already indicated, it is not
easy to provide justification for the asymmetrical relation of dependence
between substances and accidents which Aristotle needs for his theory to
work. An attempt, however, can be made by exploiting some suggestions
Aristotle already puts forward in the Categories and endorsing the view
that particular accidents are unrepeatable entities.33 According to the view
1, 1045b2832: the definition of accidents include a reference to substance, which I take

to mean that the definition of each kind of accident includes a reference to the kind of
substance the accident inheres in. This is supposed to yield the desired asymmetrical relation
of dependence (this time around the level of essence and definition) between substances and
accidents.
Alternatively, the suggestion could be advanced that Aristotle combines the existential
model with the essentialist one. Considerations about the different ways of existing produce
the required dependence of accidents on substances, while considerations about essence
should yield nine different kinds of accidental being. All things considered, I fail to see a
clear endorsement in Aristotles text of the combined model. For an excellent discussion of
all the issues I have touched upon in the present footnote see Bostock (1994), 4552.
32 Cf. Aristotle., Met., Z 1, 1028a3334. For the debate about the meaning of Aristotles
notion of separability see: Fine G. (1984) and Morrison (1985). Aristotles characterisation of
existential priority as priority in time is peculiar, for elsewhere (cf. Met. 11, 1018b14; 1019a2)
he contrasts priority in time with existential priority, which is labelled priority according
to nature and substance. However, Aristotles terminology concerning priorityas well as
many other thingsis not fixed. On this point, and more in general on Z 1s three different
kinds of priority, see especially Ross (1924), II, 160161.
33 For this way of construing particular accidents see Sect. 1 below.
in question, particular accidents are peculiar to the particular substance

they inhere in. As a consequence, two different particular substances have
no accidents in common. Of course, they can still have the same kind of
accidental property (they can be, for instance, both pale) but do not have
numerically the same accident. The paleness of Socrates is different from
the paleness of Callias simply because the two palenesses are properties of
two different substances, even if they may well be exactly the same shade of
paleness. Moreover, accidents do not recur and so one and the same sub-
stance cannot reacquire the same accident once it has lost it. This view
on accidents can help us to justify the asymmetrical relation of depen-
dence between substances and accidents Aristotles theory requires. For,
even though a particular substance must have some accident or other, there
is no particular accident a substance must possess in order to be the sub-
stance it is. As Aristotle already remarks in the Categories, for instance,
substances change their accidents over time and still remain the substances
they are in spite of the different changes they undergo.34 Thus, they do not
depend on any particular accidents for their own existence. Particular acci-
dents, by contrast, seem to depend on substance for their very existence.
For, on the understanding of particular accidents I have espoused so far, an
accident exists as the particular accident it is in that it inheres in one par-
ticular substance and not in another. Therefore, even if substances cannot
exist without accidents in general, they do not depend on any particular
accidents for their own existence in the way in which particular accidents
depend on the particular substances they inhere in. (b) Priority in definition
is explicitly described by Aristotle himself: substance figures in the defini-
tion of each of the other things.35 Thus, the definition of accidents contains
a reference to substance. In the light of the discussion in Met. Z 5, prior-
ity in definition should be taken specifically and not generically. In other
words, Aristotles doctrine is not that a generic reference to substance must
be made in the definition of accidents, but rather that the definition of each
type of accident must include a reference to the type of substance that type
of accident inheres in.36 For in Z 5 Aristotle seems to hold to the view that
each type of accident has a proper, specific subject of inherence, i.e. a cer-
tain kind of substance, and that such a subject must be mentioned in the
definition of the type of accident in question. (c) Priority in knowledge has
34 Cf. Aristotle, Cat, 5, 4a10b19.

36 For these two alternative interpretations see: Bostock (1994), 6062.
40 chapter one
been variously interpreted. Aristotle says that we think we know a thing,

say a man, most fully when we know what it is rather then when we
know its quality or quantity. For in general, it is true also with regards to
a quality and a quantity that we know them fully only when we know what
that quality or that quantity is.37 Difficulties concern the second part of
Aristotles argument, namely the view that full knowledge of a quality or
a quantity also consists in knowing what that quality or that quantity is. It
might be thought that Aristotles point is that, as in the case of substance,
we know qualities and quantities completely only when we know their
essence, i.e. when we are able to give a proper answer to the What is it?
question.38 But this can hardly be Aristotles point.39 For it is not clear how
this observation could establish the priority of substance over the other
categories. The What is it? question, in fact, can be asked and answered
indifferently for all the (items belonging to the) different categories and it is
not clear how the fact that we best know a quantity when we know what it
is could be evidence for the priority of substance over the other categories.
Thus, Aristotles point must be different. Presumably, the idea is that we
fully know a certain quality or quantity when we know what the thing is
that is qualified or quantified in a certain way. For instance, we fully know
a certain quality x when we know that it is a man that has the quality x, i.e.
that it is a man that is qualified in a certain way. This interpretation clearly
establishes the priority of substance over the other categories because it
shows that a complete knowledge of a certain quality or quantity must
include the knowledge of the substance that has that quality or quantity.
In Met. Z 1 Aristotle never specifies what we should understand by sub-
stance. The aim of the chapter is clearly not to go straightaway into the
question of the different senses in which we speak of substance or into an
analysis of the kinds of substance we may be prepared to accept, but rather
to offer a general argument to establish substance as the main object of
study. The chapter in fact ends with the rather lofty remark that the eternal
question What is being? can be reduced to the question What is sub-
stance? and hence substance is the main and in some sense the only subject
of study for the present enquiry (1028b27). Presumably, Aristotles general
intuition is that, since substances exist in the primary sense of existing, we
could not possibly understand what it means for something to be if we did
37 Cf. Aristotle, Met., Z 1, 1028a36b2.

38 Cf. for this interpretation Ross (1924), II, 159161.
39 Cf. FredePatzig (1988), II, 2324.
not understand what it means for a substance to be. For all the other things
only exist because they bear a certain relation to substance. Thus, only if we
understand what it means to be for substances will we be able to understand
also what it means to be for the entities whose being depends on the being
of substances. In this sense, the study of being reduces itself to the study
of substance. The rest of the treatise, therefore, will try to clarify what it
means to be for a substance. The task will prove to be much harder than
expected. And the results will lead us far away from the simple contrast
between sensible substances and their accidental properties Z 1 starts with
to take us into the very structure of sensible objects.
3.2. The Subject

Besides the three forms of priority explicitly singled out by Aristotle in
the final part of Z 1, the chapter presents another line of argument to the
conclusion that substance is prior to all the other kinds of being. Such a
line heavily relies on the intuition, already familiar from the Categories,
that substance is prior to the other beings because it is the subject for
everything else there is. Aristotle observes at 1028a20 ff. that one might
doubt whether things like walking, being healthy and the like, i.e. the
properties of sensible objects, exist at all, in that none of these things
can exist separately from substances. He also remarks that the walking
thing or the healthy thing exist or might be thought to exist to a greater
degree than the corresponding properties (1028a2425). This is so because
the walking thing and the healthy thing include a determinate subject or
substratum, which is a particular sensible substance (1028a2529). Thus,
Aristotles thought seems to be that the mark of what is real in the primary
sense of the term is being a determinate subject, i.e. something underlying
all the other forms of being. This idea is thoroughly explored and pushed to
the extreme in Met. Z 3.
At the beginning of Met. Z 3 Aristotle lists four candidates for the title of
substance: essence, the universal, the genus and the subject (1028b3436).
As I have already pointed out, the four candidates should not be taken to
be four different kinds of substance, but rather four different answers one
might put forward in response to the question about what being a substance
consists in. Thus, the four candidates belong to the domain of the nature
question and not to that of the population question. That this is actually the
case is shown by Aristotles general strategy in Z 2. For in Z 2 Aristotle seems
to content himself with a provisional answer to the population question,
i.e. that sensible objects are paradigmatic cases of substance, and then to
42 chapter one
suggest that the investigation cannot proceed without clarifying first the
very nature of substantiality, i.e. what it means for what is a substance to
be a substance. And this is precisely what Aristotle begins to do in Z 3
by presenting the list of four candidates. At 1028a3436 Aristotle remarks
that essence, the universal, the genus and the subject can be thought to be
the substance of each thing, i.e., presumably, of each sensible object. The
suggestion seems to be that, for instance, the universal that is predicated
of a sensible object can be thought to be the substance of the sensible
object in question, i.e. that which explains why the object is a substance.
Likewise, the essence of a sensible object can be naturally taken to be the
substance of the object in that it is that in virtue of which the object is what
it is. Finally, the subject of a sensible object, i.e. the thing that underlies
all the objects properties, can be thought to be its substance. As I have
said, the substance of language is often appealed to by scholars who think
that the nature question has no consequences for the population question:
to look for the substance of a sensible object simply means to look for an
explanation of its substantiality and not to introduce new substances, or at
least not things that are substances in the sense in which sensible objects are
substances. However, it is not difficult to see how Aristotles introduction
of the four candidates may lead to a reconsideration or revision of the
population question as well. At least two of the candidates, i.e. the essence
and the subject, indicate functions, i.e. being the essence of an object and
being the subject of all its properties, which are presumably performed by
the ontological constituents of a sensible object. It is also possibleand
some interpreters actually think thisthat one and the same constituent
play both the role of essence and that of subject and hence that being the
substance of a sensible object means being at the same time an essence
and a subject.40 Thus, the suggestion can be naturally advanced that the
constituentor constituentsthat proves to explain the substantiality of
a sensible object lays the best claims to being called substance. After all,
if the substantiality of a sensible object can be traced back to one of its
40 This interpretation is defended by supporters of the view that Aristotles forms are
particular; see for instance Frede (1987a) and (1987b); Irwin (1988). Some version of this view
is also anticipated in Sellars (1967a) and (1967b). Aristotles forms in fact are essences and
being an essence seems to be one of the distinguishing marks of substantiality according
to Aristotles discussion in Met. Z 412. However, if the subject criterion of substantiality is
still in play, forms must be particular, for only particulars can be genuine subjects. Thus, the
defence of the subject criterion is another road to the notion of particular form (on this see
GalluzzoMariani (2006), 179187).
fundamental constituents, it is such a constituentand not the sensible

object itselfthat is entitled to be regarded as a substance in the primary
sense of the term.
The first item Aristotle picks out of Z 3s list is the subject, which is dis-
cussed in detail in the rest of the chapter. Aristotles choice is understand-
able, since being an ultimate subject turned out to be the distinguishing
feature of primary substances according to the Categories account of sub-
stance. And in fact Aristotles general characterisation of the subject, i.e.
that of which all the other things are predicated, while it itself is not pred-
icated of anything further is strongly reminiscent of the Categories charac-
terisation of primary substance. Aristotles characterisation of subject also
makes it clear that by subject Aristotle primarily means not any kind of
subject but rather an ultimate subject of predication in line with the Cat-
egories account. All things considered, therefore, Met. Z 3 can be rightly
regarded as the place where Aristotle reconsiders the criterion of substan-
tiality he himself defends in the Categories and, as a consequence, the
account of substance sketched out in the early work. Whether one believes
that Aristotle still accepts in Met. Z 3 the subject criterion or rather thinks
that he abandons it, it is a fact that Z 3s treatment of the subject presents
one important element of novelty with respect to the Categories. For Aris-
totle remarks (1029a23) that in one way the matter of a sensible object
can be said to be the subject, in another its form and in a third the com-
posite of matter and form, i.e. presumably the sensible object itself.41 Thus,
the notion of subject is reread in the light of the hylomorphic model which
dominates Met. Z and finds itself associated right from the beginning with
the theme of the ontological constituents of a sensible object. With regard
to this, it is important to observe that Aristotles statement that matter and
form, as well as the composite of them, can all be regarded as subjects is
not without difficulties of its own. The problem lies with the notion of form.
For we are certainly familiar from the Categories with the idea that the sen-
sible object itself, which is analysed in the framework of the Metaphysics
as a composite of matter and form, plays the role of ultimate subject. More-
over, the idea that matter is an ultimate subject seems to have some intuitive
appeal, besides being the suggestion Aristotle explores at length in Z 3. More
41 In the present chapter I have simply assumed that sensible objects are composites
of matter and form. Among contemporary interpreters only Frede (1987a) does not grant
the full identity between sensible objects and composites of matter and form. According
to Frede, sensible objects are form+matter+accidents, while substantial composites are
matter+form. For a convincing criticism of this view see Wedin (2000), 129138.
44 chapter one
difficult is to see how form can be an ultimate subject, in that it seems rather
to be something which is acquired or taken on by a certain subject, i.e. mat-
ter, and not a subject in itself. As a matter of fact, only interpreters endorsing
the view that Aristotle does not reject in Met. Z 3 the subject criterion of
substantiality insist that we should take seriously the suggestion that form
can be an ultimate subject of predication. This readingwhich has been
strongly advocated by Fredeusually goes hand in hand with the claim that
Aristotles forms are particular.42 The main intuition behind Fredes account
is that form counts as the ultimate subject in that it grounds all the truths
concerning a sensible object. A sensible object, for instance, changes its
properties over time while it itself remains one and the same object. More-
over, it undergoes numerous changes of matter and material constitution
in general while still remaining one and the same object. What grounds
the possibility for a sensible object to change its properties and material
constitution is the fact that its individual form remains one and the same
all through such changes. Thus, the individual form of a sensible object is
what underlies all the different changes a sensible object undergoes and so
grounds all the truths concerning the object in question. And in this sense
the individual form of a sensible object can be considered an ultimate sub-
ject. Admittedly, this sense of being an ultimate subject of predication is not
the standard sense Aristotle employs when talking about subjecthood, for
he usually connects the ontological subject with the logical subject of predi-
cation. In Fredes interpretation, by contrast, it is not immediately clear how
this connection could be preserved in the case of form. For it is not clear how
standard examples of predication (such as Socrates is pale or Socrates is
6 feet tall) may be taken to be sentences about the form of Socrates. For
this reason, many interpreters prefer to say that form can be considered to
be a subject (but not necessarily an ultimate subject) in some sense, but
being a subject is not the distinguishing mark of form. This view goes usu-
ally hand in hand with the opinion that in Met. Z the subject criterion is no
longer the main criterion of substantiality. Whether the subject criterion
should be altogether rejected or simply needs to be associated with other,
more powerful criteria, it is clear that being an ultimate subject is no longer
what characterises primary substance as such. Met. Zs enquirysupporters
of this view argueclearly shows that being a primary substance is associ-
ated with being an essence. And being an essence goes together with being
42 Cf. Frede (1987a), 6465 and (1987b), 7475.

an explanatory principle. Thus, on this view, explanation replaces subject-

hood as a criterion for singling out primary substances, whether or not one
further believes that primary substances in the explanatory sense are also
substances tout court: explanation, in other words, is what is relevant for
deciding which entity is the substance of ordinary objects, whether or not
one believes that the substance of an ordinary object is more substance than
the object itself.
Although Met. Z 3 has given rise to a vast critical debate, the general
argumentative structure of the chapter seems to be clear enough.
(Step1) (1029a727) In the main bulk of the chapter, Aristotle puts
the notion of subjecthood to the test. The endorsement of the subject
criterion of substantiality leads to the (unwelcome) conclusion that
matter is substance.
(Step2) (1029a2730) Matter, however, cannot be substance because
it does not satisfy two important conditions for something to be sub-
stance, i.e. being separable () and being . Such two
requirements, by contrast, are satisfied by form and the composite.
Therefore, form and the composite turn out to be more substance than
matter.
(Step3) (1029a30b12)43 The chapter ends with the remark that the
investigation should primarily focus on the notion of form. The com-
posite should be put to one side, for it is posterior and clear. Matter too
is in some sense clear. On the contrary, the notion of form is by far the
most problematic and needs careful scrutiny. The notion of form will
be first examined in certain sensible substances, which are generally
recognised to be substances, in observance of the order of learning,
which proceeds from things that are less intelligible by nature but
more intelligible to us to those that are more intelligible by nature.
Thus, Aristotles general strategy seem to be the following. Endorsing the
subject criterion of substantiality leads to identify substance with the wrong
entity, i.e. matter. Since Aristotle always accords some degree of substantial-
ity to matter, what is wrong with the subject criterion is not that it accords
substantiality to matter, but rather that it promotes matter to the role of
primary substance or alternatively that the argument results in the paradox-
ical view that only matter is substance in that only matter can be an ultimate
43 The lines 1029b312 have been moved back to the current position by Bonitz. See on
this: Ross (1924), II, 166.

46 chapter one
subject of predication.44 This conclusion cannot be accepted because matter

does not satisfy two other important requirements for something to count
as a primary substance, i.e. being separable and being . Since Aris-
totle assumes at the beginning of the argument the validity of the subject
criterion, the general outcome of Met. Z 3 should be that the subject crite-
rion cannot single out primary substances or, at least, that it cannot do so
on its own. This seems to square with Aristotles remark at 1029a1011 to the
effect that subjecthood is neither sufficient nor clear. That it is not sufficient
might mean that it needs to be integrated by other criteria of substantiality,
such as for instance being separable and being . So, what counts as a
substance must be separable and besides being a subject. The idea
that the criterion needs integrating is open to different evaluations. It may
be thought that the subject criterion is still in play, after all. But one may
also reasonably think that the criterion holds only in a very weak sense. The
things that count as primary substances must be subjects in some sense or
other, but their being subjects is not what their being primary substances
consists in. In particular, primary substances do not need to be ultimate sub-
jects of predication. It is more difficult to understand what Aristotle means
by saying that the criterion is unclear. Something more on this point will
emerge from the next subsection. One possibility is that the criterion is
not clear because it can be easily misapplied, for instance in such a way as
to promote matter to the rank of primary substances. This reading leaves
room for the view that a correct application of the criterion might lead to
sound metaphysical results, even though this may not be Aristotles posi-
tion. On another reading, the criterion is unclear, as it were, intrinsically,
in that it identifies primary substance with the wrong entity, i.e. matter. On
this reading, there is little room for any sort of rehabilitation of the subject
criterion. The criterion as such is no longer capable of singling out instances
of primary substances. Hence, it is naturally pushed into the background by
Aristotle himself in the rest of the book.
The answer one gives to the general problem I have raised in the fore-
going, i.e. whether Aristotle intends to reject the subject criterion of sub-
stantiality or not, depends on the interpretation one provides of Step 1, i.e.
the argument for the conclusion that the endorsement of the subject cri-
44 See for this point FredePatzig (1988), II, 4245. Cf. Aristotle, Met., Z 3, 1029a19, where
the point is not simply that, according to the subject criterion, matter would turn out to
be substance, but rather that it would be the only substance. For places where Aristotle
describes matter as substantial, at least to some degree, see: Met., Z 3, 1029a2; H 1, 1042a2629;
1042b9; 7, 1049a36.
terion leads us to promote matter to the role of primary substance. The

argument is known in the literature as stripping-away argument in that
Aristotle presents there a sort of thought experiment in which a sensible
substance is progressively stripped of all its properties or attributes. What
is left when the stripping process is completedso the argument seems to
gois matter, which turns out to be, therefore, the ultimate subject under-
lying all the properties a sensible object possesses. The general meaning of
the stripping-away argument as well as its different points of detail have
been at the centre of a rather heated debate. It may be useful, therefore, to
analyse the argument in some detail and then reconsider the general ques-
tion of its relevance to the destiny of the subject criterion. This is precisely
what I intend to do in the next section.
3.3. The Stripping-away Argument

There are few things that we know for certain about the stripping-away
argument. One is the intended conclusion: the argument results in the
claim that matter is primary substance. Another is the way in which, at a
very general level, the argument is supposed to proceed: the conclusion is
reached by removing from a sensible object a certain number of properties
or attributes. The removal of properties is certainly mental and not physical
and hence the stripping away certainly qualifies as a thought experiment.
However, the mental character of the stripping process does not imply that
it does not reach ontologically significant conclusions. On the contrary,
everything in Aristotles argument suggests that the entity we are left with
once the properties of the sensible object are removed is an objective and
mind-independent entity and not a purely intentional or mental one.45
Apart from these few certainties, however, the stripping-away argument
remains controversial in many respects. For one thing, it is not clear which
layers of properties Aristotle wants us to remove before arriving at matter.
Are we supposed to remove only accidental properties? Or is there any step
in the argument where the form of a sensible object is also taken away? The
stripping process also raises some more general difficulties: is the argument
Aristotelian? Or is Aristotle presenting an argument he does not believe in?
It is not difficult to see why all these questions are relevant to the under-
standing of Z 3s general strategy. Suppose that the stripping-away argument
45 On this issue see Schofield (1972); Stahl (1981). In what follows I shall simply take it for
granted that what remains at the end of the stripping process is an ontological significant
entity and not just an intentional object.
48 chapter one
is Aristotelian. Since Aristotle clearly believes that the conclusion of the

argument, i.e. that matter is primary substance, is false, then at least one
of the premisses leading to the conclusion must be false. And the premiss in
question might well be the very idea that being a primary substance simply
is being an ultimate subject of predication. To avoid this conclusion, how-
ever, one may cast some doubt on the stripping process itself by arguing
that it is a procedure Aristotle does not contemplate. On this view, it is not
the subject criterion of substantiality that yields the wrong conclusion, but
the very procedure Aristotle employs to reach the conclusion, as well as the
assumptions behind such procedure. Thus, understanding the stripping-
away argument is crucial to evaluating whether Aristotle still believes in the
subject criterion of substantiality.
In order to flesh out these general intuitions, let me present a sketchy and
neutral reconstruction of the main stages of the argument and then go back
to the interpretative problems it poses.
1) Substance is that which is not predicated of a subject but of which all
the other things are predicated (1029a79).
2) This characterisation of substance is neither sufficient nor clear. More-
over, on this view, matter turns out to be substance (1029a910).
3) For matter is what remains once we have taken away from a sensible
object all the other things (1029a1012).
4) All the other things are (i) affections, products and potencies of bodies
(1029a1213); or (ii) length, breadth and depth (1029a1418). But nei-
ther the former nor the latter are substances (1029a1415).
5) Substance is rather that in which all these things inhere, i.e. what is
determined by all such things [i.e. matter] (1029a1516 plus a18).
6) Therefore, for those who consider things from this point of view [i.e.
from the point of view indicated in 1)5)] only matter turns out to be
substance (1029a1920).
7) By matter I mean that which is neither a certain kind of thing nor a
quantity nor a quality nor any of the other things by which what exists
is determined (1029a2021).
8) For there is something of which all such things are predicated, whose
being is different from that of each of the predicates (1029a2123).
9) For the things other than substance are predicated of substance, and
substance is predicated of matter (1029a2324).
10) Thus, the ultimate subject is none of the positive characteristics, nor
any of the negations, which belong to it only accidentally (1029a24
26).
11) Therefore, for those who consider things from this point of view,
matter turns out to be substance (1029a2627).
12) But this is impossible, for being separable and being seem to
be distinguishing marks of substance [and matter does not possess
either] (1029a2728).
13) Therefore, form and the composite seem to be more substance than
matter (1029a2930).
As a way into the many difficulties of the argument, let me start by present-
ing one general reconstruction, which seems to have many features to rec-
ommend itself. This interpretative proposal has been chiefly advanced by
M. Loux.46 On his reading, the argument consists of two main stages. In the
first stage, 1)6), Aristotle removes from a sensible object all the accidental
attributes, which may be roughly divided into qualities (4i)) and quantities
(4ii)). The outcome of this first stage of the argument is the sensible object
without its accidental properties, i.e. a composite of matter and form. In the
second stage of the argument, 7)11), the object is also stripped of its sub-
stantial form. The removal of form is carried out in 7), where Aristotle says
that matter in itself is neither any of the accidental properties of an object,
nor a certain kind of thing. And the expression a certain kind of thing indi-
cates the form that makes of matter an object of a certain kind. The removal
of form is also alluded in 9). There Aristotle tries to justify the claim that
matter is none of the positive characteristics. He remarks in particular that
accidents are predicated of substance, while substance is in its turn predi-
cated of matter. From how Aristotle expresses himself in 9), it seems that the
substance that is predicated of matter should be the same kind of substance
as that of which the accidents are predicated, i.e. either form or the com-
posite. If one takes the referent of substance to be form, the difficulty is to
explain how accidents can be predicated of form, for accidents are usually
taken to be predicated of the composite substance. If the referent is the com-
posite, by contrast, it is hard to explain how the composite substance can be
predicated of matter. For it seems more natural to say that it is form that is
predicated of matter, especially if predication is taken to be a fundamen-
tally ontological, as opposed to a linguistic, relation. And in fact, Aristotle at
times refers to the matter-form predication as the ontological relation tying
up matter and form.47 In light of these difficulties, it is not unreasonable to
46 Loux (1991), 5171.

47 Besides Met. Z 3, 1029a2324, see also: Z 17, 1041b49; H 2, 1043a56. The matter-form
predication is a very difficult piece of doctrine of which interpreters have tried to make
50 chapter one
thinkas Loux seems to dothat the two occurrences of substance in 9)

do not have precisely the same referent. That is, accidents are predicated
of substance taken as a composite, while it is substance taken as form that
is predicated of matter. This way of looking at things is all the more justi-
fied if one maintainsas Loux doesthat form is predicated of matter only
accidentally, just as accidents are accidentally predicated of the composite
substance. Form, in other words, is not part of what matter essentially is,
just as accidents are not part of what a composite substance essentially is.
Moreover, form is the substance of the composite substance, what makes
of a composite substance a substancewhich makes more understandable
the shift of referent in 9). Be that as it may, the result of the second stage
of the argument is that only matter remains and so only matter should be
taken to be substance in the strict sense of the term (11)). This conclusion,
sense in different ways. Some people (see in particular: Blackwell (1955); Chappell (1973);
Rorty (1973); Dancy (1978); Witt (1989)) have expressed doubts about the importance of
such a doctrine and tried to explaining it away by reconducting it to more familiar claims.
Blackwell (1955) and Dancy (1978), for instance, hold that the matter-form predication is
another way of expressing the familiar thought (cf. Met. Z 7, 1033a522 and 7, 1049a18
27) that matter is only paronymously predicated of the composite substance. As Aristotle
sees things, we do not say that a statue is wood but rather that it is wooden. The paronymy
involved in the predication is a sign of the fact that the matter of a composite substance
is not what a composite substance essentially is but is rather comparable to an accidental
property of it. And this would be the thought expressed also by Aristotles talk of the matter-
form predication. I fail, however, to see the immediate connection between the two pieces of
doctrine, which seem to me to remain rather distinct. For one thing is the relation between a
thing and its matter, quite another that between matter and form. Brunschwig (1979) rightly
points out the difficulty of understanding which linguistic form the matter-form predication
should possibly take. The difficulty can be partly softened if one thinks of the matter-form
predication as an eminently ontological relation which may or may not have a linguistic
counterpart. In my opinion, Loux (1991) and Lewis F. (1991) give the problem the right twist
by asking whether form is essentially or accidentally predicated of matter. To say that form
is essentially predicated of matter means to believe that a reference to form is built into
the very nature of matter or, alternatively, that matter is not identifiable independently of
form. To say, by contrast, that form is accidentally predicated of matter amounts to saying
that matter and form are two distinct things, which are identifiable independently of one
another. Loux and Lewis take the second alternativea view I tend to agree with. The claim
that form is essentially predicated of matter is part and parcel of a certain interpretative
stream, which tends to deny any significantly ontological distinction between matter and
form (see for instance: Rorty (1973), who explicitly denies that the matter-form predication
should be understood by analogy with the substance-accident predication; Halper (1989);
Kosman (1984). See also Sellars (1967b) for a forerunner of the view that matter and form
are not really distinct). The claim is also part of Scaltsas holism (see Scaltsas (1994a) and
(1994b). See also Ackrill (1972/1973) for some of the concerns behind the holistic position).
See GalluzzoMariani (2006), 89134 for an assessment of the debate over the matter-form
distinction.
however, cannot be accepted because matter does not possess two impor-
tant characteristics, i.e. being separable and being , which seem to be
distinguishing marks of substantiality (12)). Therefore, matter cannot be pri-
mary substance. Form and the composite, by contrast, which are separable
and , lay better claim to being called primary substances.
As can be seen, Louxs reconstruction takes the argument to be entirely
Aristotelian. Since Aristotle rejects the conclusion of the argument, i.e. that
matter is the only substance in the strict sense of the term, one (or more)
premisses must be false. On Louxs reading, the false premiss is that being
a substance is being an ultimate subject of predication. At best, the sub-
ject criterion must be supplemented by some other criteria of substantiality,
such as, for instance, being separable and being a . All in all, however,
the stripping-away argument shows that the subject criterion cannot sur-
vive the hylomorphic analysis of sensible substances and should be pushed
into the background. The problem with Louxs interpretation lies with (6)
in the argument, which calls into question the very idea that the stripping
process may take place in two stages. For Aristotle seems to state the conclu-
sion that matter turns out to be primary substance already at the end of the
first stage of the argument, i.e. when the stripping process is, according to
Louxs interpretation, only halfway through and only accidental properties
have been stripped off. If the argument is Aristotelian, however, what is left
at this stage of the stripping process is not matter but the composite of mat-
ter and form. For accidents inhere in the composite of matter and form, and
not directly in matter. Admittedly, 6) could be regarded as a sort of antici-
pation of Aristotles general conclusion, to be fully stated in 11). However, it
is not clear why Aristotle should anticipate a conclusion he does not seem
to be entitled to only on the basis of 1)5).
The difficulties concerning 6) are taken by Frede-Patzig as evidence
in favour of their own reconstruction of the stripping-away argument.48
According to the German scholars, Aristotle reaches the intended conclu-
sion that matter alone is substance already in 6). This shows, however, that
the stripping-away cannot be genuinely Aristotelian. For the only proper-
ties that are removed in Steps 1)5) are accidental propertiesqualities and
quantitiesand, according to Aristotles ontology, matter is not what we
get after removing qualities or quantities. For qualities and quantities do
not inhere directly in matter, but rather in the composite substance, which

52 chapter one
is composed of matter and form. According to Frede-Patzig, the stripping-

away process presupposes not the Aristotelian conception of matter, but
rather a different conception, in which matter is described as a characterless
receptacle that is first determined by dimensions and then, at a more super-
ficial level, by a bundle of sensible qualities. This is, arguably, the conception
of matter that Plato presents in the Timaeus where no mention is made of
anything analogous to Aristotles form. Thus, Aristotles intent in presenting
the stripping-away argument is to reject a particularly wrong understanding
of the nature of matter. Therefore, it is only from taking the wrong view on
the nature of matter that the conclusion in 6) is reached. This is the reason
why Aristotle presents his own understanding of matter in 7), according to
which matter is not only distinct from the accidental properties of a sensi-
ble object but also from its form. This way of reconstructing the stripping
away argument has several important consequences. The first is that the
argument does not concern Aristotles understanding of matter. For Aristo-
tles matter is not what we are left with when all qualities and quantities are
taken away from a sensible object. Moreoverwhat is probably even more
importanton this reconstruction Aristotles aim in the argument is not to
demolish the subject criterion of substantiality. On the contrary, the crite-
rion breaks down only when it is associated with the wrong conception of
matter. This is so because a wrong understanding of matter also produces
a wrong application of the criterion. What we are looking for, in fact, is not
just an ultimate subject of predication, but an ultimate subject of predica-
tion which is also separable and . AndFrede-Patzig insistsuch a
subject is form, as the rest of the argument in Book Zeta will show. On this
reading, therefore, being separable and being are not two alternative
criteria of substantiality with respect to the subject criterion, but rather two
manners of further specifying the correct application of the criterion itself.
The main difficulty with Frede-Patzigs reconstruction is that they do
not sufficiently explain why the stripping-away argument does not apply
to Aristotles conception of substance as well. Even though, according to
Aristotle, matter is not what we are left with once all the accidental prop-
erties are removed, it is certainly what is left when form is stripped off as
well. And there seem to be no reasons of principle to think that the stripping
process cannot be applied to form, too. As a matter of fact, there are indica-
tions that Aristotle strips form away in 7) and probably in 9) too. However,
if the stripping-away process applies to form as well and so concerns Aris-
totles conception of matter as well, it becomes more difficult to consider
being separable and being a as two ways of refining the subject cri-
terion. It seems more natural to think that, since the criterion leads to the
conclusion that matter is primary substance (whether we take Platos con-

ception of matter or Aristotles) it should be abandoned in favour of some
more powerful criterion of substantiality.
Another understanding of what is wrong with Z 3s argument can be
advanced.49 The idea is that the argument assumes throughout that there
is an ultimate subject of predication, i.e. that there is some one thing which
is subject for everything else there is. This is the assumption the argument
starts with and is also the claim Aristotle restates in 9): since accidents are
predicated of substance and substance is predicated of matter, matter turns
out to be the ultimate subject of predication. But it is precisely this assump-
tion that is wrong and it is thanks to this assumption that we are led to
the wrong conclusion that matter is primary substance. The assumption is
wrong because there is nothing that plays the role of subject for everything
else. On the contrary, there are two different kinds of subject: the composite,
which underlies all the accidental properties of a thing, and matter, which
underlies form. Correspondingly, there are two different kinds of predicate:
accidents, which are predicated of the composite, and form, which is pred-
icated of matter. Since the two subjects as well as the predicates associated
with them are distinct, we are not entitled to move from (i) accidents are
predicated of substance, substance is predicated of matter to (ii) matter
is the ultimate subject of predication. It is not by chance that in Met. Z 13
(1038b46), when he refers back to the discussion of the subject in Z 3, Aris-
totle only mentions two different kinds of subject: what is subject as a
, for instance the animal that underlies its accidental properties, and mat-
ter, which underlies actuality, i.e. form. The two kinds of subject referred to
are clearly the composite and matter. The same pointwith reference to
two kinds of subject and two kinds of predicateis restated by Aristotle in
Met. 7, 1049a27b3.50 All this seems to imply that Z 3s argument is flawed
because it does not distinguish between the two different kinds of subject
(and the two corresponding kinds of predicate) and looks, accordingly, for
an ultimate subject of predication. On this reading, the stripping-away argu-
ment turns out to be entirely Aristotelian. Its aim is to show that it is wrong
49 This interpretation is hinted at by Burnyeat (2001), 4546 (I shall expand here on his
sketchy suggestion).
50 Aristotles singling out, in Met. Z 13 and 7, only two different kinds of subject speaks
against regarding form as a genuine subject of predication. FredePatzig (1988), II, 243, by
contrast, insist that both in the Z 13 and in the 7 passage the subject in the sense of
(as opposed to the subject in the sense of matter) includes both form and the composite. On
this interpretation, form can still be a genuine subject of predication.
54 chapter one
to seek an entity which plays the role of subject for everything else. To do
so would mean to pave the way for the conclusion that matter is primary
substance, which cannot be accepted. All in all, therefore, Z 3s argument
casts doubts on the adequacy of the subject criterion as an effective criterion
of substantiality. For one thing, there is no ultimate subject of predication.
For another, the notion of subject is ambiguous in that it points to two
different kinds of subject, the composite and matter. It is better, therefore,
to look elsewhere when it comes to deciding what substantiality consists in.
Whether or not one accepts the reconstruction of Z 3s argument I have
just presented, it seems difficult to maintain that the subject criterion of
substantiality survives untouched through Met. Z 3s discussion. At best, it
must be integrated by some other criterion of substantiality. More probably,
it should be pushed into the background to leave room for an entirely
different kind of investigation, which centres not on the idea of subject but
rather on those of essence and explanation.
3.4. Met. Z 3: Two Additional Issues

I would like to conclude my analysis of Z 3s argument by alluding to two
additional problems the chapter presents. Aristotle explicitly claims that
matter cannot be primary substance because it is not separable and
, while being separable and being a seem to be the distinguishing
marks of substantiality. So, what does Aristotle means by being separable
and by being a ? I shall discuss in detail the notion of being separa-
ble and being a later on, when presenting the problem of the status
(universal or particular) of Aristotles forms. Let me say here, however, a
few words in connection with Z 3s argument. Aristotle says that form and
the composite are more substance than matter in that, unlike matter, they
are separable and . He does not say, however, whether form and the
composite are separable and in exactly the same sense or not. Thus,
Aristotles point could be either that substances must be separable and
according to well-defined senses of being separable and being , or,
alternatively that substances must be separable and in some sense or
other. We have already come across the notion of separability when com-
menting on the second part of Z 1, where Aristotle outlines three different
ways in which substance is prior to accidents. In Z 1 Aristotle remarks that
substances are prior in time to accidents because substances are separable,
which means in all probability that substances are separable from accidents
while the reverse is not the case. As we have seen, in this particular instance
separability seems to point to some kind of asymmetrical relation of depen-
dence between substances and accidents: accidents depend on substances

in a way in which substances do not depend on accidents. The notion of
separability at work in Z 1 fits very well the case of the composite, for it is
the composite that is the subject of accidental properties. On the contrary,
it does not seem to be congenial to form. For form is not the subject of
accidental properties. It can be argued, however, that in Z 3 Aristotle does
not have in mind the same notion of separability as he employs in Z 1. More
particularly, the suggestion can be advanced, unlike the notion at work in
Z 1, Z 3s notion does not concern the relationship between substance and
accidents, but rather that between one composite substance and another.
On this reading, the composite is not because it is separable from
its accidental properties, but rather because it is actually separate from, i.e.
autonomous and distinct from, all other composite substances. This reading
is possible because the Greek adjective has as possible meanings
both separable and separate in the sense specified, and there may be texts
where Aristotle employs it in the latter sense. It must be remarked, however,
that on this reading as well separation does not fit the case of form, for
the notion of separation at stake is designed to capture the relationship
between one sensible object and another and does not seem to concern
the ontological constituents of such objects. Nor is it clear, intuitively, how
it could significantly apply to form: for form is not spatially distinct from
the object of which it is the form or from the matter in which it exists,
but rather coincides with them. As a matter of fact, in Met. H 1 Aristotle
explicitly says that the composite and form are separable in two different
senses. The composite is separable unqualifiedly, while form is separable in
account. Separability in account will become clearer after my presentation
of the issue of definition in Met. Z 1011. However, Aristotles main idea must
be that the composite enjoys ontological independence, while form enjoys
definitional independence, i.e. presumably can be defined without making
reference to anything else and in particular to the material substratum it
exists in.
In the light of my previous considerations, should we suppose that form
and the composite are also in two different senses? Or does the notion
of apply to them in exactly the same sense? In the Categories being
a means or, at least, goes hand in hand with being a particular thing.
Presumably, the composite can be thought to be a in the Categories
sense, in that the composite is a particular sensible object. Is this true of
form as well? Is form a by being a particular thing? This is precisely
the issue I shall be discussing in Section 7 when presenting the problem of
the substantiality of universals which Aristotle takes up in Met. Z 13.
56 chapter one
The last problem which Met. Z 3 leaves on the table concerns the notion
of matter. In Met. Z 3, 1029a2026 Aristotle seems to put forward his own
understanding of matter. He says in particular that matter is that which is
not a certain kind of thing, or a quantity, or a quality or any other of the
properties by which being is determined. He also adds that matter is not
even the negations of such properties or characteristics. Matter, in other
words, is different by nature from both the positive characteristics and their
negations. As the argument shows, in the positive characteristics Aristo-
tle includes both the accidental properties of an object and form. Now, the
main problem is the following: What does Aristotle mean by matter? There
are fundamentally two options here. Either Aristotle is refering to prime
mattera notion that gained much popularity in medieval thoughtor he
rather alludes to the ordinary stuff of which sensible substances are made.
It is not difficult to see how Aristotles characterisation of matter fits in
well with the traditional notion of prime matter. Prime matter is standardly
described as a characterless substratum which is essentially distinct from
both positive and negative characteristics, be they substantial or accidental.
In medieval times, prime matter was often described as the pure potentiality
for different characteristicsa line of thought which is absent from Aristo-
tles discussion in Z 3, but is not against his general understanding of matter.
It is more difficult to see how the ordinary matter of sensible objects could
be captured by Aristotles characterisation of matter in Z 3. However, the
following suggestion may be advanced.51 It is certainly true that the matter
of particular sensible objects possesses in some sense objective properties.
The bronze of a statue, for instance, will certainly have certain physical
properties, a certain characteristic colour which is due to its chemical com-
position, a certain hardness and so on and so forth. But these properties are
not properties of the bronze qua matter. For matter is always the matter of
something, i.e. the matter of a certain sensible substance. Therefore, when a
certain kind of material is the matter of an object, the properties it possesses
are not the properties of the material but rather the properties of the object
of which the material is the matter. Thus, the properties of the bronze of
which a statue is made are not properties of the bronze but rather properties
of the statue that is made of bronze. When we attribute certain properties
to the bronze we are not treating the bronze as the matter of something but
rather as a substance in its own right. For when taken as matter, a certain
kind of material possesses in itself no properties, which belong, instead, to
51 For this suggestion see: FredePatzig (1988), II, 4647.

the object of which the bronze is the matter. In conclusion, the ordinary
stuff of which sensible objects are made possesses in itself none of the pos-
itive or negative characteristics which are had by material sensible objects.
For it is material sensible objectsand not their matterthat possess such
characteristics. In this sense, also the ordinary stuff of which sensible objects
are made seems to fit Aristotles characterisation of matter in Met. Z 3.
All things considered, I tend to think that it is the ordinary stuff of sensible
objects which Aristotle is talking about in Met. Z 3. For one thing, the
attribution to Aristotle of the notion of prime matter is dubious.52 Moreover,
even though Aristotle could be credited with a doctrine of prime matter, it
would be rather different from the one that permeates the medieval debate
in one crucial respect. For Aristotle seems to put to some use the notion
of prime matter only in order to explain elementary transformations, i.e.
the transformation of one element into another. In medieval thought, by
contrast, prime matter is a constituent of ordinary particular objects which
receives and is joined to one or more substantial forms. But nowhere does
Aristotle seem to use the notion of a characterless substratum to explain
the ontological structure of ordinary sensible objects, which seem to be
always described as composites of form and ordinary matter. It is unlikely,
therefore, that he should make use of such a notion in Met. Z 3. Thus, I am
inclined to think that it is the ordinary matter of particular objects that
Aristotle has in mind in Z 3. This seems to square with the fact that it is
ordinary matter, i.e. the bronze of a statue, that Aristotle mentions when
he introduces matter for the first time at 1029a34. And nothing of what he
says later on pushes us to suppose that he is willing to introduce some new
and highly theoretical entity such as prime matter. In conclusion, therefore,
it is the ordinary matter of sensible objects that seems to be crucial to
Metaphysics Zetas argument.
4. Essence in Z 46
4.1. A Logical Enquiry

Met. Z 3 ends with the statement that the enquiry into substance should
proceed with a study of the form of sensible substances. At the beginning
of Z 4, however, Aristotle does not seem to stick to his original plan and
52 For the debate over prime matter in Aristotle see at least: King (1956); Charlton (1970);
Chappel (1973); Jones (1974); Robinson (1974); Dancy (1978); Charlton (1983); Cohen (1984);
Graham (1987a); Gill (1989), 4182; Loux (1991), 6470; 239252.
58 chapter one
instead announces the treatment of another candidate from Z 3s list, i.e.

essence ( ). Of course, as we have already pointed out, in the
course of Zs enquiry Aristotle ends up identifying essence with form, but
it is not clear that the treatment of essence starting in Z 46 should be
straightaway identified with the expected study of form. Apart from any
other consideration, it seems that the identity between form and essence
is a rather controversial and strong claim, which needs to be proved and
argued for rather than being assumed right from the beginning.53
More generally, there are difficulties concerning the role played by mat-
ter and form within the section Z 46. The Greek term for form, , has
three basic meanings in Aristotles philosophical vocabulary: besides its
sense of form as opposed to matter, it can also refer to Platos separate Forms
as well as to the species, i.e. the natural kind under which individual sensible
substances fall. In the Organon picks out either Platos Forms or Aris-
totles species. In Met. Z, and in particular in Z 10 and 11, Aristotle makes it
clear that the species should not be identified with form as opposed to mat-
ter, but rather with some sort of universal composite of matter and form, i.e.
with a composite of matter and form taken universally.54 It is clear, there-
fore, that in the sense of form and in the sense of species should
be kept distinct. Now, the term crops up only three times in the course
of Z 46, i.e. in Z 4, 1030a12, Z 6, 1031b14 and b15. In the Z 6 passages it most
likely refers to Platonic Forms, and certainly not to Aristotelian forms. The
meaning of the Z 4 passage is controversial. Some scholars read a reference
to form into the text, some others believe that simply means species in
the Organon sense.55 As to matter, the term is completely absent from
Z 46. Thus, a natural suggestion might be that Aristotle starts off in Z 46
with a general treatment of essence, whose main aim is to identify substance
with essence, in order to arrive later on at establishing the further identity
between essenceand so substanceand form. That this could be what
Aristotle intends to do is confirmed by the fact that he takes up again the
53 On how an enquiry into essence could be interpreted, within the philosophical tradi-
tion Aristotle belongs to, as a treatment of form, see FredePatzig (1988), II, 5758.
54 Cf. Z 1035b2731, 1; Z 11, 1037a510. For the distinction between species and form and
the role it plays in the controversy over the status of Aristotles form see below, Sect. 7.1.
55 Those who think that the term means form include: FredePatzig (1988), II, 57ff.;
Lewis F. (1991), p. 186, n. 26; Wedin (2000), 230236. Others are of the opinion that
means species; see, for instance: Bostock (1994), 9092; Malcolm (1996), 89; Furth (1988),
248. Finally, Loux (1991) defends the view that the meaning of the term is left deliberately
undetermined by Aristotle to be further refined later on in the book.
notion of essence (through an analysis of the closely related notion of

definition) in Z 1011, where matter and form play a decisive role. This
suggests that Aristotle in Z 1011 intends to apply his general study of essence
to the issues connected with the matter-form machinery. In Z 46, by
contrast, matter and form remain in the background.
These considerations can be further refined by looking at an impor-
tant interpretative problem concerning the very beginning of Z 4. Aristotle
begins his treatment of essence by observing that, first of all, he intends to
say something about essence in a logical way (). So the question is:
How far do Aristotles logical considerations extend within Z 46? More-
over: What does Aristotle mean by logical considerations? In order to solve
these problems, let me present a very sketchy table of contents for Z 46:
Z4
Essence in general
Two questions about essence:
1) What is essence? (1029b122)
2) What things have an essence?
Exclusive answer to 2): only substances have an essence (1029b22
1030a17)
Inclusive answer to 2): substances have an essence in the primary
sense, while other things have an essense only in a secondary sense
(1030a171030b13)
Z5
The essence of coupled accidents (e.g. snub)
Two aporiae on the definition of coupled accidents (1030b141031a1)
1) First aporia (1030b1428)
2) Second aporia (1030b281031a1)
Conclusion: all accidents are coupled accidents (1031a114)
Z6
Are things identical with their essences?
Introduction (1031a1518)
Things said by accident, i.e. accidental composites such as white man,
are not identical with their own essences (1031a1827)
Things said per se, i.e. substances, are identical with their own es-
sences (1031a271031b22; 1031b281032a6)
60 chapter one
Accidents in one way are identical with their essence, whereas in

another they are not (1031b2228)
Final difficulty (1032a611)
All in all, the structure of Z 46 is simple. Z 4 raises two questions: (i) What
is essence?; (ii) What things have an essence? Aristotle offers a very short
treatment of the first question, while the rest of the long chapter is devoted
to the second one. In answering the second question Aristotle takes into
account three kinds of entity, i.e. substances, accidents and accidental com-
posites, i.e. things such as white man, which are composed of a substance
and an accident. He first offers a more exclusive solution (only substances
have an essence), then switches to a more relaxed one (substances have an
essence in the primary sense, the other things only in a secondary sense).
Z 5 clearly continues Z 4s treatment of the second question by taking into
account a particular kind of accidents, i.e. the so-called coupled accidents,
i.e. things such as snub which seem to have a reference to a particular kind of
substratum built into their own essence. The chapter also draws conclusions
about the essence of accidents in general by arguing that in the final anal-
ysis all accidents are coupled. Z 6 contains the discussion of a related but
different question, i.e. whether in general a thing is identical with its own
essence. Aristotle considers the same kinds of entity as he analyses in Z 4
substances, accidents and accidental compositesand concludes that only
substances are identical with the essence they possess.
So, where do Aristotles logical remarks about essence end? Answers vary
a lot, depending on the meaning one attaches to the adverb . Ross,
for instance, takes the logical remarks to be linguistic considerations, i.e.
considerations bearing on language as opposed to those concerning reality,
and makes them end in Z 4, 1030a27, that is in the course of the second solu-
tion to the question as to what things have an essence.56 In the text, in fact,
Aristotle says: Now one should ascertain how to express oneself on each
point, but not more than how things are. However, Rosss interpretation
can hardly be right. For one thing, he misunderstands the passage where he
wants to place the end of Aristotles logical considerations. For in the text
Aristotle is not marking a general transition from a linguistic discussion of
essence to a more realistic one, but is rather making a more local point. He is
just saying that the more inclusive view about what things have an essence
can be defended not only by inspecting the way we talk about essence but
56 Cf. Ross (1924), II, 168; 171.

also through a consideration of how things really are, i.e. of how essence
belongs to the different categories. In this sense, the connection of Aris-
totles remark with the logical enquiry announced at the beginning of Z 4
appears to be very weak. For another thing, it is dubious that logical simply
means linguistic as opposed to realistic. Therefore, Rosss proposal should
be dismissed. Other proposals have been advanced. One, by Woods, is par-
ticularly minimalist in so far as it limits the logical considerations to the few
lines in Z 4 (1029b1322) which Aristotle devotes to the first question (What
is essence?).57 The proposal centres on the idea that Aristotles brief char-
acterisation of essence is logical because it makes use of the notions of per
se and per se predication developed in the first Book of Posterior Analytics.
The connection Woods implicitly establishes between the meaning of log-
ical and the Posterior Analytics, one of Aristotles so-called logical works,
is interesting. For it does not seem unreasonable to suppose that the log-
ical considerations have something to do with the subject and method of
Aristotles logical works. The problem with Woodss interpretation is that
it is still somehow chained to the view that logical chiefly means linguis-
tic as opposed to ontological or realistic. Woods, in other words, basically
endorses Rosss interpretation of the meaning of logical and only disagrees
with him on the exact point where logical considerations end.
Recently, Burnyeat has put forward a complex analysis of the meaning
of the adverb .58 Burnyeats interpretation, besides being interesting
in itself, is also particularly useful for understanding, by similarity or by
contrast, the medieval debate. For the medievals too make much of the
idea that Z contains sections presenting a logical analysis of substance. It
is important, therefore, to spell out Burnyeats reading in some detail.
Burnyeat thinks that the logical considerations on essence which Aristo-
tle announces at the beginning of Z 4 cover in fact the whole of Z 46. The
peculiarity of Burnyeats interpretation, however, lies elsewhere: he main-
tains that the treatment of each candidate for the title of substanceand
also the discussion of substance as cause in Z 17, for that mattercan be
divided up into two sections, a logical and a metaphysical section.59 For
instance, essence is discussed at a logical level in Z 46 and at a metaphysical
level in Z 1012, while the universal is analysed first logically in Z 1314 and
then metaphysically in Z 1516. And the same scheme applies to the subject
57 Cf. Woods (1974/1975).

58 Cf. Burnyeat (2001), 1925.
59 Cf. Burnyeat (2001), 68.
62 chapter one
and to the notion of cause, which are discussed at two different levels, the
subject in Z 3 and the notion of substance as cause in Z 17.60 Such a recon-
struction of Zs general argument becomes possible in virtue of a certain
understanding of the meaning of the term . According to Burnyeat,
in Met. Z has two basic meanings.61 (i) In one sense, an enquiry
is logical if it discusses an issue in a certain philosophical domain with-
out making use of the proper principles of the domain in question. For
instance, a logical enquiry within the domain of physics is an enquiry that
does not make use of the proper principles of physics, i.e. matter and form.
Since matter and form are proper principles of metaphysics as well, a log-
ical investigation within the metaphysical domain is an investigation that
does not mention the notion of matter and form. In other words, a meta-
physical enquiry proceeds logically when it is very abstract and general, and
deliberately keeps away from an analysis of substances in terms of mat-
ter and form. This interpretation of logical has important consequences
for the structure of Zs argument. For a logical enquiry, in so far as it does
not take into account matter and form, i.e. the proper principles of meta-
physics, cannot achieve conclusive results and must possess a somewhat
preliminary character. As a matter of fact, Burnyeats view is that each logi-
cal section ends in a difficulty or aporia, which can be solved only once the
notions of matter and form are brought into the picture. Thus, the treat-
ment of each candidate possesses a preliminary part (the logical sections)
and a proper metaphysical investigation (the metaphysical sections). Since
Burnyeat draws this first sense of the term from Simplicius Com-
mentary on the Physics, he labels it Simplicius sense. (ii) In another sense,
an enquiry is logical if it borrows material and conceptual tools from the
works which have been regarded for centuries as Aristotles logical treatises,
i.e. the treatises collected in the so-called Organon. Since, according to the
tradition, it was Andronicus of Rhodes who was responsible for the arrange-
ment and order of Aristotles works, Burnyeat calls this second sense of
Andronicus sense. The logical sections of Z are logical in Andron-
icus sense as well because each of them takes as its starting point pieces
of doctrine drawn from the Organon. For instance, Z 3s discussion of the
subject starts from the Categories characterisation of the ultimate subject
of predication; Z 4s treatment of essence takes as its starting point the
60 The metaphysical discussion of subject starts in Z 3, 1029a22, while the metaphysical
analysis of substance as cause begins in Z 17, 1041a32.

61 Cf. Burnyeat (2001), 1926.
Posterior Analytics (A 4) discussion of essential predication, which is based

on the notion of per se; the candidacy of the universal is evaluated on the
basis of a general definition of universal, which corresponds to the one
Aristotle provides in De interpretatione, 7 (17a38b1). Finally, the first part
of the discussion in Z 17 is clearly inspired by the discussion of essence as
cause in the second Book of the Posterior Analytics (Chapters 12 and 711,
in particular).
I shall not stop here to critically evaluate Burnyeats general suggestion.
The most perplexing point of his reconstruction is the view that each section
of Z can be rigidly divided up into a logical and a metaphysical treatment.
This general scheme seems to work well for certain cases (for instance the
case of essence) but not for others (the discussion of the universal). Be that
as it may, what is important to stress is the attractiveness of Burnyeats
detailed examination of the meaning of the term . As to sense (i)
for instance, it fits in very well with Aristotles procedure in Z 46. We have
already pointed out for instance that the three chapters make little or no use
of the notions of matter and form and seem to work, by contrast, from within
a very simplified ontological framework, which is still that of the Organon.
Matter and form come into play only later on and in particular in Z 79 and
Z 1012. As to sense (ii), there is no doubt that there seem to exist important
connections between some parts of Met. Z and the Organon. The Posterior
Analytics, for instance, are put to use both in Z 4 (per se predication) and
in Z 17, where they somehow shape Aristotles treatment of substance as
cause. We have already seen that the characterisation of the subject in
Z 3 is strongly reminiscent of the definition of primary substance in the
Categories and, clearly, even the discussion of the universal in Z 13 keeps
traces of the treatment of such a notion in the Organon. Thus, Burnyeats
analysis of the senses of the term sheds some light on Zs argument,
whether or not one fully endorses his general understanding of the structure
of the book.
Burnyeats distinction of different senses of will turn out to be a
very useful instrument in understanding the medieval approaches to Met.
Z. In general, medieval commentators insist on the connections between
logic and metaphysics and, consequently, on those between the Organon
and the Metaphysics. Averroes, for instance, advances an explanation of
the meaning of the term that is very close to Burnyeats sense (ii).
Moreover, the general intuition contained in sense (i), i.e. the claim that
Met. Z has a somewhat abstract and general character, is to some extent
anticipated in medieval interpretations, including for instance Aquinass
and that of Averroes himself.
64 chapter one
4.2. The Essence of Substance and Accidents in Met. Z 45

Met. Z 4 sets itself to answer two questions: (i) What is essence (1029b13
22)? (ii) What things have an essence (1029b221030b13)? As a matter of fact,
most of the chapter is occupied with the second question, which is given two
different answers. First (1029b221030a17), Aristotle advances an exclusive
solution, according to which only substances have an essence while all other
things (accidental composites and accidents) have none. Then (1030a17
1031b13) he reconsiders the whole problem and defends a more inclusive
view, according to which substances have an essence in the primary sense,
while the other things have one only in a secondary sense. Z 5 continues the
discussion of the second question by considering a special kind of entity, the
so-called coupled accidents (e.g. snub or male), i.e. those accidents that
have built into themselves a reference to the kind of subject they inhere in
(nose in the case of snub, animal in the case of male). Z 45 are very difficult
chapters. In particular, Aristotles first answer to the second question is far
from being transparent. It is impossible to provide here a full account of
the many interpretative problems that the chapters pose. Therefore, I shall
content myself with bringing out the main points of Aristotles discussion
and indicating some general difficulties.
1. Aristotles general characterisation of essence in the first lines of Z 4 is very

short and to some extent disappointing.62 The main thesis defended is that
62 As is known, the literature on Aristotles notion of essence is particularly vast, also on
account of the rediscovery by contemporary philosophy of Aristotles essentialism. From

White (1972) (who maintains that Aristotle cannot commit himself to some kind of de re
essentialism on account of his different and poorer logical tools) and Brody (1973) (who
connects Aristotles essentialism with the distinction between substantial and accidental
change) onwards the discussion has been focusing on the conditions a property must
satisfy in order for it to be classified as essential and so on Aristotles distinction between
properties that are merely necessary and properties that, in addition to being necessary,
are also essential. Among the many contributions, see at least the following classic papers:
Cohen (1978); Kung (1978); Lewis F. (1984); Wedin (1984); Matthews (1990). Probably, the
most convincing account has been advanced by Kung (1978) (and partly by Brody (1972)),
who brings into the picture the notion of explanation: the essential properties of an object
should be identified with that sub-set of its necessary properties which explain all the
other properties the object possesses. The irreducibility of the notion of essence to that of
necessity has been defended (in an Aristotelian vein) by Fine K. (1994a) and (1995). Another
group of studies focus on the connection between essentialism and semantic theory in the
second book of the Posterior Analytics: Bolton (1976); DemossDevereux (1988); Charles
(2000). These studies make an attempt at reading back into Aristotles Posterior Analytics
some of the issues brought up by the KripkePutnam tradition (for a more sober account
see Barnes (1993), 218225). Witt (1989), 101142 has called into question the very idea that
the essence of a thing is what is said per se of that thing, in the appropriate
sense of per se (1029b1314). In other words, an essence is described as an
appropriate collection of per se predicates, i.e. the predicates figuring in a
proper definition. Thus Aristotles characterisation already emphasises the
close connection between essence and definition, which permeates Z 45s
argument as well as the rest of the book.
The intended conclusioni.e. the essence of x is what is said of x per se,
in the appropriate sense of per seis reached by ruling out other possible
kinds of predicates. Accidental predicates such as musical are the first to
be excluded (1029b1416). The example Aristotle uses to exclude accidental
predicates might lead someone to think that he is considering individual
essences. For he says that being for you is not the same as being for a
musical man and then concludes: so what being is for you is what you
are per se. However, since Aristotle is thinking about predicates, the most
natural suggestion is that he has in mind the human essence in general, and
so the mention of individual substances such as you should be taken as a
reference to the harmless fact that individual men all possess the human
essence.
Aristotles essence should be conceived of as a set of properties and argued for the view
that an essence should rather be thought of as an intrinsic principle of the substance of
which it is the essence. More particularly, Witt contends that, in Met. Z 17, Aristotle describes
the essence of a sensible object, i.e. its form, as a cause of the objects existence, that is as
the cause explaining why a certain piece of matter is a sensible substance. Being a cause,
the essence/form of a sensible substance cannot be one of its properties. For a property
is always posterior to the object of which it is a property in that it presupposes the very
existence of the object in question. All things considered, Witts argument is not convincing.
In Met. Z 4 Aristotle describes an essence as an appropriate set of predicates, to which there
presumably correspond an appropriate set of properties in the very thing possessing the
essence in question. Later on in the book, when the notions of matter and form come into
play, he explicitly identifies the essence of a sensible substance with its form, i.e. with the
principle explaining the substances fundamental character and behaviour. Thus, it is clear
that Aristotle does not see any contrast between the characterisation of essence in terms of
properties/predicates and that in terms of form. Witts worries can be met by distinguishing
between non-constitutive properties, which are posterior to the object they belong to, and
constitutive ones, which are prior to the object in that they determine what it is. Witt is
certainly right that, in principle, we should take the essence/form understood as a principle
to be explanatorily prior to the properties springing forth from it. The soul, for instance,
can be thought of as explanatorily prior to the functions it allows the organism to perform.
However, in another sense form can be thought of as the very set of properties springing
forth from it. The soul, for instance, can be thought of as the set of all the functions it allows a
substance to perform, especially if functions are taken not as actually performed operations
but rather as capacities or dispositions, according to Aristotles distinction in De an., B 1,
412a21b1.
66 chapter one
To say that an essence consists of per se predicates and not of acciden-

tal ones, however, is not enough, because there are different kinds of per se
predicates and not all of them count as essential predicates. As is known,
Aristotle lists four senses of per se in Post. Anal. A 4. A different classifica-
tion is offered in Met. 18. The senses of per se relevant to Z 4s discussion
are the first and the second ones in the Posterior Analytics. According to the
first sense of per se (per se1), x is said per se1 of y because x enters into the
essence and definition of y. For instance, animal is said per se1 of man
because animal enters into the essence and definition of man. Accord-
ing to the second sense of per se (per se2), by contrast, x is said per se2 of y,
because it is y that is part of the essence and definition of x. For instance,
odd or even are said per se2 of number because number is part of the
definition of odd and even. Thus, in the per se2 sense, the predicate is
said per se of the subject because the subject is part of the essence and defi-
nition of the predicate, and not the other way round. In other words, per se2
predication does nothing but specify the proper subjects of certain classes
of predicates: only numbers are odd or even, only surfaces are white or red
or of whatever colour. Aristotles point in Z 4 is that only per se1 predicates
count as essential predicates, while per se2 predicates should be ruled out
in this context. In order to make his point Aristotle considers the example
of the surface and the colour white. It is not clear whether Aristotle wants
to suggestand rule outthe possibility that being white may count as
an essential predicate of surface, or whether the suggestion is rather that
being a surface might be taken to be essential to white.63 Both solutions
are possible. The parallelism with the case of man and animal suggests that
Aristotle has in mind the case in which the colour white is taken to be an
essential part of the surface, because white is a per se2 predicate of sur-
face, just as animal is a per se1 predicate of man. On the other hand, since
Aristotle says in the Posterior Analytics that surface is part of the essence
and definition of its per se2 predicate white, the view that being white
is essentially being a certain surface with certain characteristics seems
to be a natural suggestion to make. Be that as it may, Aristotle is certainly
right that per se2 is of little use in characterising essence, whichever of the
two possible readings one chooses to endorse. For even though surfaces are
always coloured in one way or another, being a surface is not simply being
coloured (first reading). On the other hand, even though surface is somehow
part of the essence and definition of white, being white is certainly not being
63 Cf. Ross (1924), II, 167168; FredePatzig (1988), II, 5961; Bostock (1994), 8687.
a surface of some kind (second reading). Therefore, essential predications

should be restricted to per se1 predications. At 1029b18 another possibility
is taken into account, namely that the essence of surface (or white) might
be expressed by a formula such as white surface. This possibility too is
dismissed on the grounds that it clearly violates the simple rule that a
definition should not mention the thing it tries to define (1029b1921).
Aristotles treatment of essence is not entirely satisfactory. For one thing,
the characterisation of essence in terms of per se1 predicates is not particu-
larly informative. For both in Post. Anal. A 4 and in Met. 18 per se1 predi-
cates are defined in terms of essence and definition, i.e. as those predicates
that enter into the essence and definition of something. Essence, therefore,
is defined in terms of per se1 predicates and per se1 predicates in terms of
essence. And all this looks circular. For another thing, the general rule Aris-
totle establishes at the end of the section (the definiendum should not be
mentioned in the definiens) is a purely formal rule, which applies to any
definition and so says nothing about the kind of predicates one is supposed
to pick up when one tries to define a particular kind of object.
2. The second general question (i.e. what things have an essence) receives
two different answers in the course of Z 4, an exclusive answer (only sub-
stances have an essence, and nothing else) in the first part of the chapter
and a more inclusive one (substances have an essence in a primary sense,
whilst the other things have one in a secondary sense) in the second part.
The argument for the second solution is comparatively smooth and does
not present particular problems. The passage containing the first solution,
by contrast, is one of the most difficult in the whole Book Z. As I have already
pointed out in Section 4.1, one general difficulty with Z 4 and so with both
solutions is to understand what Aristotle means by substance. The items
he takes into account in addition to substances, i.e. accidents and accidental
composites, suggest that Aristotle is still operating within a Categories-style
framework, without bringing in the notions of matter and form. We shall
see that the analysis of the text seems to confirm this hypothesis.
Let me start then with the first solution to the problem of which things
have an essence, i.e. the view that only substances have an essence, whereas
accidental composites and accidents have none. Such a conclusion is
reached by rejecting a certain understanding, which we could call logic
or epistemic, of the correlation between essence and definition. In gen-
eral, we rightly think that if a thing x has an essence, there will also be a
definition of x. A definition is a linguitic formula spelling out what x is. How-
ever, this general correspondence between essence and definition should
68 chapter one
not be taken to imply that every linguistic formula expressing what some-
thing is counts as a definition. In other words, one should not be misled into
thinking that every formula corresponding to a name, i.e. spelling out the
meaning of a name, is a definition and hence the formula of something hav-
ing an essence (1030a78). For only the formulae corresponding to things
that have an essence count as definitions (1030a611). The formulae of the
things that do not have an essence, by contrast, are merely formulae explain-
ing the meaning of the names of the things in question (1030a78; 1417).
An example may clarify things here. Since men are among the things that
have an essence, the formula saying what a man is will be a definition. But
suppose that, say, white man is not the kind of thing that has an essence.
In this caseAristotle contendsthe formula saying what a white man
is will not be a definition but only an explanation of the meaning of the
expression white man.64 For definitions only belong to things that have an
essence. Thus, whether the formula of a thing x is a definition or not ulti-
mately depends on the kind of thing x is, i.e. on whether x is the kind of
thing that has an essence or not. Consequently, to have a name and a for-
mula spelling out the meaning of the name is not enough for something to
have also an essence and a definition.65
The restrictions Aristotle puts on the notion of definition may explain
his argument in the first section of Z 4. He first takes up the case of acci-
dental composites such as white man, i.e. things composed of a substance
and an accident, and asks whether they have a definition of the essence
or not (1029b2227). One might think that a white man does not have a
definition and an essence simply because white man is a complex expres-
sion, while what is defined must be signified by a single term. This line of
argumentAristotle repliesis unsatisfactory (1029b271030a1). For, sup-
pose that instead of the complex expression white man we use a single
term, for instance cloak, to designate white men. In this case, accidental
composites will be on a par with any other item. They will be designated by
64 The example Aristotle employs in the text (1030a89) is even more extreme. The poem
The Iliad, being a combination of words, can be regarded as a formula saying what the
name Iliad means. However, since the thing The Iliad is about, i.e. the Trojan War, is not
something that has an essence, its formula does not count as a proper definition, but only as
a formula spelling out the meaning of the name Iliad. For the Trojan War does not have the
degree of unity required of things that have an essence, being as it is a compound of many
different (though interconnected) events. Of course, accidental composites and accidents
have a higher degree of unity than the Trojan War. However, they do not qualify as things
that have an essence and definition, either, at least according to Aristotles first answer in Z 4.
a single term, and presumably there will be also a formula corresponding

to their name. If the formula is an adequate formulai.e. does not contain
a reference to the thing to be defined, nor does it leave anything outthe
formula of the cloak will tell us what a cloak is just as the formula of man
tells us what a man is. It is important to get clear about what Aristotles
point is in using the example of the cloak. Aristotle is of the opinion that
the structural complexity of things such as white man is one of the reasons
why they do not have an essence and a definition. However, he insists that
this conclusion cannot be reached on purely linguistic and formal grounds.
Linguistically speaking, accidental composites are like substances: they can
be designated by a single name and have a formula expressing the meaning
of their name. In order to decide whether a thing has an essence, therefore,
we must move away from purely linguistic and formal considerations and
look into the very structure of the thing in question. From 1030a1 on, Aris-
totle tells us something more about how we should conceive of the things
that have an essence. He basically says that what has an essence must be a
. I shall discuss the notion of later on when analysing the sec-
tion on universals. In the present context, however, as Aristotle explains,
being a means being primary (1030a10). And primary is what is not
analysable in terms of something being said of something else (1030a10
11), where the being said of relation should be taken here as an ontolog-
ical relation pointing towards some complexity in the object that can be
analysed as something being said of something else. Accidental compos-
ites are certainly analysable in terms of something being said of something
else. White man, for instance, is analysable in terms of white being said of
man. Accidental composites, in other words, are structurally complex, in
that they are made of two distinct entities, a substance and a property that
is predicated of it. Thus, accidental composites are not and so do
not have an essence. Aristotle does not explicitly mention the case of acci-
dents such as white or smooth. But he is clearly of the view that accidents
are not either because, despite appearances to the contrary, they too
are analysable in terms of something being said of something else. For even
if an accident such as white is not in itself complex, it is always said of a sub-
stance. Thus, it itself is said of something else, and hence its being what it
is, is after all explicable in terms of something being said of something else.
So, accidents are not either, and so do not have an essence. In the
end, only substances are not analysable in terms of something being said of
something else and so only substances have an essence. Therefore, only the
formulae of substances will be definitions. The formulae of accidents and
accidental composites, by contrast, will merely be formulae explaining the
70 chapter one
meaning of the names of accidents and accidental composites (1030a1417).

For definitions only belong to things that have an essence, i.e. to substances.
Aristotles first solution in Z 4 poses a very important problem of inter-
pretation. What does Aristotle mean by substance when he says that only
substances have an essence? The nature of the question can be under-
stood by reflecting upon the very criterion Aristotle uses for determining
whether things have an essence or not. He says that only those things have
an essence that are not analysable in terms of something being said of some-
thing else.66 Now, it seems that ordinary particular substances such as men
or horses are analysable in terms of something being said of something
else. For they are composites of matter and form and form is predicated
of matter. Composites of matter and form, therefore, are things in which
something is said of something else and so should not have an essence
according to Aristotles criterion. If this is true, one might suggest that Aris-
totle by substance means form when he says that only substances have
an essence. For forms are simple and so are not analysable in terms of
something being said of something else. As a matter of fact, at 1030a911
Aristotle affirms that essence only belongs to the of a genus, and
might be taken to mean forms in this case.67 There are two reasons why
I am inclined to resist this interpretation. First, as I have already pointed
out, in Z 46 Aristotle seems to operate within a Categories-style frame-
work (substance, accidents, accidental composites), which does not explic-
itly take into account matter and form. Thus, it seems reasonable to sup-
pose that Aristotle is happy with the provisional conclusion that only sub-
stances, generally speaking, have an essence and does not wish to decide
at this stage between composites and forms. He is certainly of the opin-
ion that substantial composites are things that can be analysed in terms
of something being said of something else. But such a conclusion will be
reached only at a later stage of Zs argument when matter and form are
significantly put to use.68 If this view is correct, at 1030a10 should be
translated as species and not as forms, the meaning being that only sub-
stances belonging to a certain kind have an essence. This characterisation
is general enough to leave room for further decision over what we should
66 Cf. Aristotle., Met., Z 4, 1030a1011. The criterion is restated in Z 6, 1031b1314 and
1032a46.
67 For this interpretation see: FredePatzig (1988), II, 57ff.; Lewis F. (1991), 186, n. 26;
Wedin (2000), 230236.

68 The place where Aristotle makes it clear that also composites of matter and form can
be analysed in terms of something being said of something else is Met. Z 11, 1037a291037b4.
exactly understand by substance. Another consideration should be added.

Although Aristotle is convinced that form is primary substance and so,
presumably, more of a substance than the composite of matter and form,
he repeatedly says that form is the essence of the composite substance.69
Thus, he would not deny substantial composites an essence. What Aristo-
tle denies is that substantial composites simply are the essence they have,
i.e. are identical with their essence. Forms, by contrast, are the essence they
have and this is, probably, one of the reasons why they have better claims
than anything else to the title of substance.70 So, there seems to be nothing
wrong with saying that both substantial composites and their forms have
an essence, and this can further explain why Aristotle talks generically of
substance in Z 4 without drawing any distinction between composites and
forms.
Aristotles argument in favour of a second, more inclusive solution to the
problem of essence, is easier to understand. The second solution simply con-
sists in the thought that all the items considered have an essence, but sub-
stances have an essence in the primary sense, while other things have one
only in a secondary sense. Aristotle bases his conclusion on two different
kinds of consideration: (a) semantic or linguistic considerations (1030a17
27) and (b) more ontological considerations (1030a27b13). a) From a lin-
guistic point of view the suggestion is that definition and are spoken
of in many ways, i.e. with different senses. In one sense they signify a sub-
stance, in another the other categoriesquantity, quality, and so on and so
forth. Thus, and definition seem to apply to all the categories, as is
confirmed by the fact that we can ask what a quality or a quantity is as much
as we ask what a substance is. However, definition and do not apply
to the different categories in the same sense. They apply to substance in a
primary sense, while they are attributed to the items falling within the other
categories only in a secondary sense. Aristotle concludes these first, linguis-
tic considerations with the not entirely perspicuous remark that the
belongs to the categories other than substance in the same sense as people
say, dialectically, that not-being is, i.e not unqualifiedly, but only in so far as
it is not-being (1030a2327). Probably, the meaning of Aristotles remark is
that, when we ask the What is it? question about an item different from a
substance, when we ask, say, about a quality what it is, we are not asking the
question in an unqualified sense. For in an unqualified sense the What is
69 Cf. Aristotle, Met., Z 7, 1032b12; 10, 1035b1517; 1035b32; 17, 1041a28.

70 Cf. Aristotle, Met., Z 11, 1037a29b5.
72 chapter one
it? question applies to substances, while it applies to qualities and the like
only qualifiedly, i.e. only to the limited extent to which we can ask also
about qualities what they are. b) To the multivocity of and defi-
nition there corresponds an ontological difference in the way the differ-
ent categories relate to essence. It is not only the case that the What is
it? question has different meanings according to the different categories,
but it is also the case that the items falling under the different categories
have an essence in different ways. Substances have an essence in a pri-
mary way, whereas things in the accidental categories have one only in a
secondary way. Aristotle proves this point by extending to the notion of
essence the logic of which he originally devised to capture the rela-
tion of existential dependence obtaining among the different kinds of being.
Although all the items falling under the different categories are beings,
they are not beings in the same way. For all the different kinds of being
are grouped around a basic kind of being, i.e. substance. Substances are
beings in a primary and unqualified way, whereas all the other things are
beings only because they bear a certain relation to substance, i.e. because
they are qualities of substance or quantities of substance and so on and
so forth. Aristotle extends the logic of to the notion of essence
(1030a27b3): there is a kind of thing, substance, which has an essence
unqualifiedly; the other kinds of thing have an essence only because their
essence bears some relation to the essence of substance. Thus, the other cat-
egories depend on substance not only for their existence, but also for their
essence, i.e. for what they (essentially) are. But is Aristotle entitled to pass
from the level of being/existence to that of essence? In other words: Are
the essences of accidents related to the essence of substance in the same
way as accidents relate to substances in their concrete existence? In Z 1
(1028a3536), Aristotle explains that a reference to substance must be con-
tained in the definition of each thing, i.e. of every accident. The point is
restated in Met. 1, 1045b2932. This suggests that accidents also depend
upon substances essentially, i.e. for what they are, and not only existentially.
Moreover, the application of the -scheme to the case of essences
seems to be not entirely unreasonable. For we could not understand what
an essence is, in general, if we did not understand how essence relates to
substance. In other words, we would not understand what it means for
something to have an essence if we did not understand what it means to
have an essence for the things that have an essence in an unqualified sense,
i.e. substances. Thus, the different senses of having an essence, too, are
grouped around a basic or core sense, the sense in which substances have
an essence.
In conclusion, Aristotles final view on the problem of which things have

an essence seems to be that there exists a hierarchy of essences.71 Substances
have an essence in the primary sense and so occupy the top level of the
hierarchy. Then come accidents, whose essence is simple but structurally
depends on another essence, the essence of substance. Accidents, therefore,
have only a secondary essence, i.e. an essence in a secondary sense of the
term. The lowest level is occupied by accidental composites, whose essence
seems to be the result of the composition of two other essences, the essence
of a substance and that of an accident. They possess an essence, accordingly,
only in a very derivative sense. Finally, therefore, both accidents and acci-
dental composites have an essence only because their essence bear some
relation to the essence of the things that have an essence in the strict sense
of the term.
3. Z 5 continues to explore the dependence of accidents upon substance

with regards to essence and definition. The chapter raises two difficulties
(aporiae) concerning a special class of accidents, i.e. the so-called coupled
accidents such as snub, which seem to have built into themselves a refer-
ence to the subject they inhere in. However, the chapter ends with some
general considerations on all accidents and, in particular, with the remark
that what has been said about coupled accidents holds true of accidents in
general. Thus, the case of coupled accidents can be read as a particularly
clear and striking example of the ontological status of accidents in general.
At a very general level, the argumentative structure of Met. Z 5 mirrors Z 4s
two solutions to the problem of what things have an essence. The difficulties
concerning coupled accidents show that such entities (and accidents in gen-
eral) either do not have an essence and a definition at all or, if they have an
essence and a definition, they have them differently from substances. Thus,
Aristotles conclusion seems to be that Met. Z 5s aporiae can be used to sup-
port either the exclusive solution to the problem of essence and definition
(only substances have an essence and a definition) or the more inclusive one
(substances have an essence and a definition in the primary sense, while all
the other things have an essence and a definition only in a secondary sense).
This seems to suggest that Aristotle regards the two solutions as substan-
tially equivalent provided that one is prepared to admit of both a strict and
a broad notion of essence and definition.
71 The idea of hierarchy of essences is particularly emphasised by Loux (1991).

74 chapter one
The general difficulty with coupled accidents is well illustrated in the first
aporia of Z 5 (1030b1428). (i) Suppose that we want to define snub or snub-
ness. Being snub is not simply being curved in a certain way, for instance
being concave. For, unlike concave, snub seems to involve a reference to a
particular subject of inherence, i.e. the nose. Only noses are snub and snub-
ness is a particular kind of concavity, i.e. the concavity of certain noses.
Thus, if we want to give a definition of snub, we must include a reference
to the kind of subject snub invariably inheres in, i.e. the nose. On the other
hand, even if only noses are snub, the property of being snub is not a nose,
not even a particular kind of nose. (Being) snub is a particular way a nose is
shaped, but is not itself a nose. Thus, if we include a reference to the nose
in the definition of snub, we seem to include something which is, strictly
speaking, external to what snub is. Aristotle calls definitions by additions
the definitions where something external is added to the essence of the
object defined (1030b16). Thereforethe first aporia statesif we think
that definitions by addition do not count as proper definitionsbecause
they contain something more than the object definedit seems that cou-
pled accidents such as snub cannot be defined. For they cannot be defined
independently of the subject they invariably inhere in.
(ii) The very same cluster of problems is touched upon by the second
aporia (1030b281031a1). Actually, the second aporia contains three puzzles,
which are the result of three different attempts at defining things like snub.
The reconstruction of the three puzzles as well as their general relevance to
the issue of essence and definition are matters of current debate. One gen-
eral problem is that the arguments leading to Puzzles 2 and 3 are regarded as
invalid by Aristotle himself in the Sophistical Refutations.72 Moreover, Puzzle
1 applies a subtraction rule which Aristotle considers not to be universally
valid in the Sophistical Refutations and clearly invalid in contexts such as
those generated by terms like snub. Thus, one difficulty consists in decid-
ing whether Aristotle considers the arguments leading to the puzzles valid
or not. If they are not valid, why does he advance them in order to make
an important point concerning the essence and definition of coupled acci-
dents? And if he takes them to be valid, what philosophical considerations
led him to change his mind with respect to the diagnosis in the Sophistical
Refutations? In light of these general difficulties I shall first offer a sketchy
reconstruction of the three puzzles and then go back to their relevance to
72 Cf. Aristotle, Soph. Ref., 13 and 31.

Z 5s strategy as well as to the issue of the relation between Z 5s second

aporia and the treatment of snub in the Sophistical Refutations.
(Puzzle 1: 1030b2830). Since the definition of snub is a definition by addi-
tion, the suggestion can be advanced that a reference to the nose must be
included in the very definiendum of snub. Thus, defining snub will sim-
ply amount to defining snub nose.73 One first attempt at defining snub is
that (1a) snub nose = concave nose.74 After all, Aristotle maintains in the
Sophistical Refutations that in the expression concave nose concave has
the same meaning as snub, and so it does not make any difference to say
snub nose or concave nose.75 From (1a), however, by taking equals from
equals, i.e. by subtracting nose from each member of the equivalence, we
can get (1b) snub = concave. But (1b) is false, because (1c) snub is not the
same thing as concave, in that the former but not the latter involves a ref-
erence to noses (1030b3031). Thus, the first attempt at defining snub leads
to absurdity and hence should be abandoned. In sum, Puzzle 1 runs as fol-
lows:
(1a) snub nose = concave nose
(1b) snub = concave (by taking equals from equals)
(1c) (1b) is false because snub is not the same thing as concave.
(Puzzle 2: 1030b3035). The second attempt at defining snub suggests that
we drop the reference to the nose in the definiendum and we confine the
addition to the definiens alone. In other words, what we want to define is
not snub nose but simply snub. Thus, if (1b) is false because the definition
of snub must contain a reference to the nose, a possible definition of snub
could be (2a) snub = concave nose, which contains a reference to the nose
in the definiens. This definition as well, however, leads to difficulties. For, if
we simply replace snub in the expression snub nose with its definition,
i.e. concave nose, we obtain (2b) snub nose = concave nose nose, which
is an instance of repetition or, as Aristotle puts it, of saying the same thing
twice.76 Thus, since repetitions should not be accepted, in that they imply
73 For reasons of clarity, I shall proceed sometimes as if what is being defined is the
term snub. The reader should always bear in mind, however, that definitions for Aristotle
concern more the things which terms signify than the terms themselves.
74 = is short for is the same thing as.
75 Cf. Aristotle, Soph. Ref., 31, 182a23.
76 At 1030b3233 Aristotle remarks that, since (1a) should be discarded, either the expres-
sion snub nose is not meaningful at all or leads to repetition. The first alternative is probably
introduced only for the sake of argument, while it is the second that leads to Puzzle 2.
76 chapter one
predicating the same thing twice, the second attempt at defining snub
should be rejected as well. In sum, Puzzle 2 runs as follows:
(2a) snub = concave nose
(2b) snub nose = concave nose nose (by replacing snub with its defini-
tion in the expression snub nose).
(2c) But (2b) is an instance of saying the same thing twice.
(Puzzle 3: 1030b351031a1). If we drop 2a) as a definition of snub, the only
alternative we are left with is to define snub as follows: (3a) snub = snub
nose.77 But in this case, Aristotle contends, instead of saying the same thing
twice, we shall end up saying the same thing infinitely many times. For from
3a) we easily get to (3b) snub nose = snub nose nose, simply by replacing
snub with its definition in the expression snub nose. The substitution
of the definition of snub for snub can be repeated over and over again
ad infinitum, as is easily realised. Thus, Puzzles 3 can be summarised in the
following way:
(3a) snub = snub nose
(3b) snub nose = snub nose nose (by replacing snub with its definition
in the expression snub nose)
(3c) snub = snub nose nose nose (by replacing again snub with its
definition) and so on and so forth ad infinitum.
What are we to make of Aristotles puzzles?78 According to one traditional
line of interpretation, Aristotle takes the arguments leading to the puzzles
77 Together with Lewis F. (2005) I take the at 1030b35 to brush aside (2a). This
possibility is also mentioned by Ross 1924, II, 174, who favours, however, the idea that the
clause is intended to deny the claim that entities such as snub have an essence and a
definition. On the interpretation Ross chooses, however, Puzzles 2 and 3 are not sufficiently
distinguished, just as they are not sufficiently distinguished saying the same thing twice and
the infinite regress. Hare (1979), 174, Balme (1984) and FredePatzig (1988), II, 8284 construe
Aristotles argument as a sort of dilemma: if things like snub have an essence and a definition,
either (2a) or (3a) must be accepted. Since (2a) leads to saying the same thing twice, while
(3a) induces an infinite regress, both alternatives must be rejected and so the premiss that
things like snub have an essence and a definition as well. I do not see anything wrong with
this suggestion, provided that (i) the dilemma I have just presented is not confused with
that at 1030b3233, which is all internal to Puzzle 2; (ii) the dilemma is only a way of closely
connecting Puzzle 2 and 3, which need to be further connected with Puzzle 1 within the
tripartite structure of Aristotles argument. For an entirely different way of construing the
whole argument see Bostock (1994), 9799.
78 Once again, I agree with Lewis F. (2005), 172174 that Puzzles (1)(3) do not have to do
with the fact that terms like snub are ambiguous, in that they can refer either to the quality,
snubness, or to a composite of a substance with snubness, i.e. a snub thing. Ross (1924), II,
to be valid.79 On this reading, the difficulties revealed by the puzzles are

insuperable and this shows that, strictly speaking, coupled accidents do
not have an essence and a definition. One severe problem for this line of
interpretation is that in the Sophistical Refutations Aristotle clearly states
that the arguments behind Puzzles (1)(3) are not valid, and also indicates
a way of solving the difficulties they appear to pose.80 More particularly,
puzzles of the kind of (2) and (3) are explicitly classified as arguments
that appear to reduce the opponent to babbling (), but fail to
do so.81 According to Aristotle, Puzzles (2) and (3) are flawed for two main
reasons. First, the arguments would be valid only if it were true that the
term snub carried the same meaning in (2a) and (2b) or in (3a) and (3b),
only if, in other words, snub had the same meaning in isolation and in
the expression snub nose. But this is not true, for terms like snub have
different meanings in and out of some special contexts with which they are
associated, in the case of snub the context being that in which the term
nose appears as well.82 In other words, terms like snub have a particular
meaning when associated with their correlative term, e.g. nose, and quite
another when they are taken in isolation. Thus, the inferences from (2a)
to (2b) or from (3a) to (3b) cannot be licensed and hence Puzzles (2) and
(3) cannot be valid. In Soph. Ref., 31, Aristotle points out another reason
why Puzzles (2) and (3) cannot be valid.83 It is simply false that snub is a
concave nose or a snub nose, as (2a) and (3a) wrongly assume. For snub is
not a nose of a certain kind, but rather a certain quality of a nose. Thus,
Aristotle famously suggests that the reference to the nose in the definition
of snub should be shifted from the nominative (as in the definition snub
= concave nose) to the genitive case (as in the definition snub = a certain
quality of a nose). Once the definitions are appropriately reformulatedso
Aristotle must be reasoningno difficulty will ensue. For what we get, after
the appropriate substitutions, is not (2b) but something like (2b*) snub
nose = nose having the concavity of a nose, which does not count as an
174 argues that Aristotle fails to see in Z 5 the ambiguity of snub, which he adverts to, by
contrast, in the Sophistical Refutations. But he clearly sees it in Z 6, 1031b2224. Thus, it can
hardly be the case that Z 5s puzzles revolve around the ambiguity of snub.
79 Cf. Bostock (1994), 97100 (Bostock maintains that Puzzle 1 rests on a logical mistake
but seems to think that Aristotle is not aware of it); Loux (1991). See also Ferejohn (1994).
80 Cf. Lewis F. (2005), 168171 and 177181. See also Bostock (1994), 99100.
81 Cf. Aristotle, Soph. Ref., 13, 173b1316.
82 Cf. Aristotle, Soph. Ref., 13, 173b1216 (with the analogous example of double); 31,
181b25182a3 (esp. 181b35182a3 for the case of concave and snub).

83 Cf. Aristotle, Soph. Ref., 31, 182a36.
78 chapter one
instance of saying the same thing twice, in that nose occurs in different
cases in the right and in the left member of the equivalence and so is not
predicated twice of the same thing. Arguably, Aristotles diagnosis of the
meaning of terms like snub also affects the validity of Z 5s Puzzle (1).
For Puzzle (1) makes use of a subtraction rule by which we move from
(1a) to (1b). However, on the basis of Aristotles remarks in the Sophistical
Refutations, the rule can hardly be applied to cases such as Puzzle (1). For the
premisses of the puzzle contain terms that have different meanings in and
out of certain special contexts. Concave, for instance, certainly means the
same thing as snub in the expression concave nose, but has a different
(we could say more general) meaning outside this special context, in that it
also concerns things other than noses, such as, for instance, (bandy) legs.
And the same thing is true of snub, as we have seen. Thus, the shift in
meaning of terms such as concave and snub seem to affect the validity
of Puzzle (1) as well.
Supporters of the traditional interpretation are compelled to hold that
Aristotle has changed his mind from the Sophistical Refutations to the Meta-
physics. If this is true, however, Aristotle must have reasons to think that the
solutions to the puzzles advanced in the Sophistical Refutations do not really
work, but Z 5 does not offer any indications as to why he should think so.
On the other hand, it must be admitted that the traditional line of inter-
pretation provides a smooth explanation of why the puzzles are relevant to
Z 5s general argument. If the arguments behind the puzzles are valid, they
clearly show that there is something wrong with the definitions and so with
the essence of things like snub. What is wrong with such entities is probably
best illustrated by Louxs remark that with things like snub you never get it
right.84 Either you try to define them leaving out the subject they invariably
inhere inand then you get too little, in that you end up defining snub
as concave in spite of the clear difference in meaning between snub and
concave (Puzzle 1). Or, alternatively, you try to define snub by dragging
along its subject of inherence, i.e. nose, and then you get too much. For Puz-
zles (2) and (3) indicate that trying to define snub together with its subject
leads to insuperable difficulties, which are ultimately due to the fact that the
nose is not part of the essence of snub but simply constantly associated with
it. The conclusion is that things such as snub either do not have an essence
and a definition at all, or they have an essence and a definition only in a very
qualified way.
84 Cf. Loux (1991), 106108.

The traditional line of interpretation has been recently called into ques-
tion by F. Lewis.85 He maintains that Aristotle has not changed his mind
from the Sophistical Refutations to the Metaphysics and still believes that
the arguments leading to Puzzles (1)(3) are invalid. Moreover, Aristotle is
still of the opinion that the solutions to the puzzles advanced in the Sophis-
tical Refutations (including the appropriate reformulations of the definition
of snub) work perfectly well and should be maintained as they stand.86 But
then, why does Aristotle display in Met. Z 5 a series of puzzles which he
takes to be invalid? What is their relevance to Z 5s general strategy? Puz-
zles (1)(3) apply a series of rulessuch as for instance the subtraction
rule in Puzzle (1) or the substitutions of equals for equals in Puzzles (2) and
(3)that normally work in standard cases of definition.87 For all such rules
revolve around the idea that in a proper definition definiens and definien-
dum signify one and the same thing.88 The substitution rule (putting equals
for equals) for instance applied in Puzzles (2) and (3) as well asit can be
arguedthe subtraction rule (taking equals from equals) applied in Puz-
zle (1) presuppose sameness between the definiens and the definiendum
in the definition of snub. Thus, by showing that the standard substitution
rules cannot be applied to things like snub and the like, Aristotle urges the
point that the general principle of sameness governing the relation between
definiens and definiendum does not hold in their case, either. This further
shows that things like snub do not have essences and definitions accord-
ing to the standard sense of such terms, but rather non-standard essences
and definitions.89 Lewiss analysis has great merits. In particular, it points
out a series of difficulties for the traditional interpretation of which I have
taken account in my reconstruction of Z 5s argument. Besides, it avoids
attributing to Aristotle a major shift from the Sophistical Refutations to the
Metaphysics. The only trouble with Lewiss interpretation is that Z 5s puz-
zles become relevant to the general topic of the chapter not in virtue of
their own conclusions, but only indirectly and, as it were, at a second order
85 Besides its intrinsic merits, I mention Lewiss interpretation also because it has some-
thing in common with Averroess. For the Arabic commentator too, in fact, Z 5s puzzles stem
from the wrong assumption that the definition of things like snub (and the definition of acci-
dents in general) behaves exactly like, and so should be treated exactly like, the definitions
of substances.
86 Cf. Lewis F. (2005), 186192.
87 Cf. Lewis F. (2005), 181186.
88 Cf. Lewis F. (2005), 183187.
89 Cf. Lewis F. (2005), 184; 191192.
80 chapter one
level. It is only by reflecting upon why the arguments leading to the puzzles
are invalidand not by assuming the truth of their conclusionsthat
we understand that things like snub do not have standard essences and
definitions. And although this reading of the text is perfectly possible and
consistent, it also presupposes a good deal of work on the part of the
interpreters in supplying what is explicitly missing in Aristotles text.
In the aporiae, Aristotle focuses exclusively on coupled accidents. This
might suggest that there is in fact a difference between coupled accidents
such as snub and simple accidents such as white in so far as their relation to
their subject is concerned. Unlike coupled accidents, it might be thought,
simple accidents can be defined without making reference to any subject of
inhere. As a matter of fact, in the course of Z 5 Aristotle expresses himself
as if this were the case, as when he says, for instance, that the relation
between snub and nose is different from that between white and man
(1030b1823). White is accidental to man in a way in which snub is not
accidental to nose. The final part of the chapter (1031a15), however, makes
it clear that this is not actually Aristotles view. Once we have specified
the right subject of inherence, all accidents behave exactly like snub, i.e.
they bring along with them their subject and so turn out to be, in the end,
coupled accidents. For instance, if surface were the appropriate subject of
inherence for whiteas it seems to be, because only surfaces are white,
strictly speakingthen white could not be defined without reference to
surface. The only difference from the case of snub is that our linguistic
practice allows us to extend the use of white so as to call white also
things that are not the proper subject of inherence for whitewhich is not
allowed in the case of snub. From an ontological point of view, however,
the two cases are perfectly on a par. As I have already mentioned, in the
final part of the chapter (1031a711) Aristotle also reaches his final verdict
about the problem of definitions by addition, which was raised in the first
aporia. While the conclusion of the puzzles was along the lines of Z 4s more
restrictive solution to the question of essence and definition, Aristotles
final verdict is in line with the more inclusive solution. The idea is that
there are different kinds of definition. The definitions of substances will
be perfect definitions and will not include any addition. The definitions of
accidents, by contrast, will be imperfect and secondary definitions, in so
far as they contain something external to the essence of the object defined.
There seems to be a hierarchy of essences and definitions. Substances have
primary essences and definitions, all the other things have merely secondary
ones. Whatever one makes of Z 5s puzzles, this is clearly the conclusion they
are supposed to lead to.
4.3. Z 6s Identity Thesis

Met. Z 6 contains a detailed discussion of the question as to whether a
thing is identical with its own essence. In general, we are used to talking
about things having essences. Aristotle himself abundantly uses the having
language throughout Z 45 when he raises the question of which things have
an essence. This way of talking presupposesor at least suggeststhat
there is in fact a distinction between the thing that possesses the essence
and the essence itself and hence that a thing has an essence but is not (i.e.
is not identical with) its essence. On the other hand, it might be thought
that things are identical with their own essences after all. At the beginning
of Z 6 (1031a1718), Aristotle presents a brief argument for this conclusion:
in general, each thing does not seem to be different from its substance,
and the essence of a thing is said to be its substance. Therefore, a thing
should be thought to be identical with its essence, too. This argument is,
of course, merely a preliminary one and needs important qualifications.
Certainly, Aristotle is not of the opinion that every thing is identical with its
own essence. In fact, his strategy in Z 6 consists in examining different kinds
of thing and checking out which of them is identical with its own essence.
In the end, only things said per se, i.e. primary entities or substances,
will turn out to be identical with their own essence, whereas all the other
things are different, distinct from their essence. This conclusion squares
perfectly with the results of Z 4 and 5. If there are things that have an
essence in the primary sense and others that have one only in a secondary
sense, it is perfectly natural to suppose that only things having an essence
in the primary sense are in fact identical with their own essence. In other
words, primary substances not only have an essence but are also the essence
they have. Thus, Aristotles preliminary argument at the beginning of Z 6 is
simply supposed to prepare the ground for and give some intuitive support
to the claim that some things, actually primary things, are in fact identical
with their essence, i.e. identical with the essence they have.
The examples chosen by Aristotle to argue for the identity thesis, as well
as the way he structures his argument in Z 6, suggest that the identity thesis
is a very general claim, virtually applicable to any (essentialist) ontology
whatsoever.90 In other words, anyone admitting of primary entities in their
ontology, however they want to further characterise them, should think of
such entities as being identical with their essence. The general validity of the
90 This general interpretation of Met. Z 6 has been convincingly argued by Scaltsas
(1994b), 179181.
82 chapter one
identity thesis explains why Aristotle employs Platonic Forms as examples

of things said per se, i.e. primary substances.91 Obviously, Aristotle thinks
that Forms are dispensable and ultimately do not exist. Nonetheless, he
argues that, if Forms did exist, they should be identical with their own
essence, since they are thought to be primary substances. Thus, by showing
that the identity thesis holds for entities he does not believe in, Aristotle
suggests that it must also be true of entities he does believe in, i.e. his own
primary substances. The fact that Aristotle does not talk in Z 6 of his own
primary substances, i.e. forms, confirms Burnyeats suggestion that Z 4
6 have a somewhat general and abstract character and deliberately keep
away from the hylomorphic analysis and from questions concerning the
structure of sensible substances. Z 6 establishes that primary entities must
be identical with their essence, the rest of Z will show that forms are in fact
such entities.
The structure of Met. Z 6 is to some extent quite simple. First, Aristotle
shows that things said by accident, i.e. accidental composites such as white
man, are not identical with their essence (1031a1928); then he moves to
things said per se, i.e. primary entities or substances, and puts forward
a series of arguments for the view that the identity thesis holds in their
case (1031a28b22). As has been said, Aristotle takes Platonic Forms as
examples of things said per se, i.e. of primary substances. There follows a
brief discussion of the identity thesis in the case of accidents such as white
or black (1031b2228); finally, Aristotle reverts to things said per se and adds
two more arguments in favour of the identity thesis (1031b281032a6). The
two final arguments are general and not exclusively focused on Platonic
Forms. The chapter ends with the remark that the discussion of the identity
thesis enables one to solve the sophistical problem as to whether Socrates is
identical with his own essence or not (1032a610). Here, I cannot go through
all of Aristotles arguments, which present many problems of reconstruction
and interpretation. In particular, the argument showing that accidental
composites are not identical with their own essence is particularly obscure
and difficult to understand.92 I shall confine myself, therefore, to an outline
of Aristotles reasoning and to a survey of his main points. Then, I shall say
a few words about the consequences of Z 6s thesis for Aristotles theory of
substance.
91 Cf. Scaltsas (1994b), 180181.

92 For the case of accidental composites see: Ross (1924), II, 176177; FredePatzig (1988),
II, 8991; Bostock (1994), 104107. See also: Dahl (1997) and (1999).
In general, it can be said that something is not identical with its own
essence if it contains something more or something less than it. Aristotles
discussion of accidental composites is particularly difficult. However, one of
the points in the discussion seems to be that accidental composites are not
identical with their own essence because they contain something less than
their essence (1031a2124). For the essence of accidental composites must
contain a reference to both the substance and the accident the accidental
composites are composed of (e.g. the essence of white man must include
a reference to both the white and the man, the intuition being that we
need a reference to both items to understand what a white man is). In
its concrete existence, however, a white man is just a man and so a white
man contains in fact something less than his essence (1031a2223). For the
argument to work, Aristotle must be thinking of particular white men.93
For in this case there is a sense in which a particular man is not a thing
numerically different from the man who is white: after all, a particular white
man and the particular man who is white are one and the same object and
not two distinct objects.94 The universal white man, by contrast, can be
thought to be different from the universal man in that the universal white
man seems to be the combination of two univerals, white and man, just as
the essence of white man is the combination of two essences, the essence of
white and the essence of man. Be that as it may, the view defended is clearly
that accidental composites are not identical with their essences.
Later on in the chapter (1031b2228), Aristotle tackles the related case of
accidents such as white or black. His view on the status of accidents is not
entirely clear. He says that in one way the identity in question does not hold
for the case of accidents, while in another way it does (1031b2428). a) When
taken together with the subject it inheres in, an accident is not identical with
its essence. Presumably, Aristotles thought is that so considered accidents
would be nothing but accidental composites, for which the identity in
93 Cf. Bostock (1994), 104.

94 Actually, considering the particular white man and the particular man who is white as
one and the same object presupposes a rather coarse-grained counting procedure (which is
allowed by sortals such as object), which is not standard for Aristotle. Usually, Aristotle
maintains (e.g. Top., I, 7, 103a2931) that an accidental composite such as white man is
only accidentally the same as the substance that has the property white, the assumption
being that accidental composites and corresponding substances are distinct things if we
count by strict identity, i.e. if we use a more fine-grained counting procedure. The non-
identity between an accidental composite and the corresponding substance is crucial to
understanding Aristotles solution to several puzzles in the Sophistical Refutations. For the
relationship between accidental composites and substances see Lewis F. (1991).
84 chapter one
question has been already ruled out. Alternatively, one might think that the
identity does not hold because the concrete accident cannot be separated
from the subject it inheres in, while the essence of the accident does not
need to include a reference to the subject. This suggestion presents some
difficulties but is not in itself impossible. Admittedly, Aristotle says in Z 1
(1028a3536) that the definition of an accident must make reference to
substancewhich might be taken to imply that the essence of the accident
also does so. However, in Z 5 Aristotle makes it clear that the definition of
an accident is by addition, i.e. contains something more than the essence
of the accident, i.e. a reference to the subject the accident inheres in. Thus,
strictly speaking, the essence of an accident does not contain the subject
and so is not identical with the concrete accident if it is taken together
with the subject. b) When taken in itself, i.e. separately from its subject, an
accident is identical with its essence. For in this case, both the accident and
its essence do not bring along with them the subject the accident inheres
in and so are in fact identical. It is difficult to understand only on the basis
of this text whether Aristotle wants us to take alternative a) or b). However,
given the general dependence of accidents on substances, it is natural to
suppose that taking an accident together with its subject best captures the
way an accident actually exists. This is the way, for instance, in which many
medieval commentators understood Aristotles text. If this interpretation is
correct, as I think it is, accidents are not identical with their own essence,
after all.95
The main part of Z 6 is devoted to showing that the identity thesis
holds for things said per se, i.e. primary substances. Many of the arguments
provided take as examples of primary substances Forms, while the last two,
in the final part of the chapter, seem to have a larger scope and concern
any primary substance whatsoever. Let me give a brief sketch of the most
important among these arguments.
95 For a different interpretation see Bostock (1994), 111112; 116118. According to Bostock,
Aristotles aim is to clarify the sense in which accidents are identical with their essence, i.e.
when taken separately from their subject of inherence. On this view, therefore, the contrast
Aristotle intends to draw by distinguishing between things said per se and things said per
accident is not that between substances on the one hand and accidents and accidental
composites on the other, but rather the contrast between simple entities (substances and
accidents) and non-simple entities (accidental composites). Simple entities are identical
with their essence, while non-simple entities are not. This interpretation seems to me to
be at odds with Z 4, where substances are said to have an essence in the primary sense
and are contrasted with both accidents and accidental composites, and also with Z 1, where
substances are said to be prior to all other things, including both accidents such as walking
and accidental composites such as the walking thing.
A first argument is presented at 1030a281031b3. Suppose that one admits

the existence of primary substances, i.e. substances such that no other sub-
stance is prior to them, such as for instance Platonic Forms. If the essences of
these primary substances were not identical with them, then such essences
would turn out to be substances prior to the substances of which they are
the essencesif it is true, as it is true, that essence is substance. So, it would
be such essences, and not the substances of which they are the essences,
that would be primary substancescontrary to the hypothesis we started
with. The argument clearly relies on the assumption that essence is sub-
stance. What is more, it does not make any significant distinction between
being a substance and being the substance of something. For the argument
works with the implicit assumption that, if x is the essence of y, and essence
is substance, then x is a substance without further qualifications.
The lines 1031b322 contain at least two interwoven arguments. The
arguments are marked by a certain shift in terminology. Aristotle moves
from the idea that a thing is not identical with its essence to the suggestion
that the thing and its essence are separate. Separation seems to imply
something more than non-identityin so far as two things can be non-
identical without being separate. The shift probably affects the conclusion
of the arguments proposed, which could not be reached by supposing that
a thing and its essence are simply non-identical, and not also separate. (i)
The first argument clearly concerns Platonic Forms. If the Good itself (i.e.
the Form of the good) is separate from its essence, then the essence of
the Good itself will not be good. For, being separate from the Good itself,
goodness cannot belong to it and so the essence of Good itself will not be
good. Likewise, the essence of Being itself (i.e. of the Form of being), if it is
separate from Being itself, will not be a being, i.e. will not exist. But, since all
essences share the same ontological status, if the essence of Being itself does
not exist, no other essence does. And there will be no essences, contrary to
the intuition that primary substances (and Forms are taken to be primary
substances) have an essence and a primary one. (ii) The essence of a thing
is that in virtue of which we come to know that thing, i.e. what that thing
is. However, if the essence of a thing x is separate from x, then when we
know the essence of x we do not know x, but a different thing, say, y. And
this conclusion conflicts with our idea that the essence is a principle of
knowledge.96
96 It seems crucial to both arguments that we talk of separateness and not simply of non-
identity. If the essence of Being is only non-identical with Being itself, but not separate from
86 chapter one
In the final part of the chapter, Aristotle advances two more arguments in
favour of the identity thesis. Both arguments are general and do not depend
on assuming the existence of Forms. (i) Suppose that the essence of x is not
identical with x, i.e. is something different from x. Then, we could give a
name to such an essence, say E, and ask whether E is identical with its own
essence. For instance, we could ask ourselves whether the essence of a horse
(E) is identical with its essence, i.e. the essence of the essence of the horse. If
we answer that the essence of E is identical with E, why not say straightaway
that E itself is identical with the thing of which it is the essence, i.e. with the
horse? In other words, if we think that the essence of the essence of a horse
is identical with the essence of a horse, why not say right from the beginning
that the essence of a horse is identical with the horse? (ii) If, by contrast, we
think that there are reasons to maintain that also the essence of E is not
identical with E, then we are off on an infinite regress of essences. For also
the essence of E will have a name and so an essence, which will be, for parity
of reasons, non-identical with the essence of Eand so on and so forth ad
infinitum.
What are we to make of Aristotles arguments? What are the conse-
quences of such arguments for Zs ontology? Two questions in particular
deserve attention. The first has to do with the relation between essence
and substance. Some of the arguments in Z 6 seem simply to take it for
granted that essence is substance. But where exactly, if anywhere, has Aris-
totle proved the identity between essence and substance? As we have seen,
in Z 4 it is shown that only substances have an essence, strictly speaking. But
Aristotle does not go as far as to say that the essence of a substance is itself a
it as well, it does not seem to follow that the essence of Being does not share in being and so
does not exist. Take a more familiar example. The essence of man may be thought of as an
internal constituent of men. In this way, the essence of man is certainly not a man, but is not
completely unrelated to what a man is. On the contrary, the essence of a man is that in virtue
of which a man is a man. Thus, it would be wrong to say that the essence of man has nothing
to do with the characters of men. Analogously, if the essence of x is distinct but not separate
from x, it does not seem to follow that when we know the essence of x we know another thing,
say y, and not x. For if the essence of x is an internal principle of x, non-identical with but
not separate from x, then such an essence can still play the role of a principle of knowledge
for x. Probably, it is not irrelevant to Aristotles argument that he is talking about Forms. In
the case of Forms, non-identity simply amounts to separateness. For Forms are immaterial,
simple (i.e. have no parts, not even substantial ones) and unmixed, and so whatever is not
identical with a Form is also separate from it. If this is the case, however, it not entirely clear
how Aristotles argument is applicable to any ontology whatsoever. For there are ontologies,
like Aristotles to mention one, where the essences of things may be distinct but not separate
from them.
substance. Nor does his argument in Z 4 and 5 require such a strong conclu-
sion. Thus, it might seem that Z 6 relies on an assumptionthe strict equiv-
alence between essence and substancethat has not been firmly estab-
lished. Probably, however, Aristotles strategy is precisely to show that the
identity thesis strengthens the general intuition that essence is substance.
In other words, Z 6s argument shows that in the case of primary substances
essence and substance simply coincide. For primary substances are identi-
cal with their essences and so primary substances simply are essences. This
conclusion gives further plausibility to the general intuition that the entities
which are substances in the primary sense of the term are precisely those
entities that play the role of essences. More generally, the conclusion gives
further plausibility to the claim that being an essence and being a primary
substance is just one and the same thing, because it is by being essences that
primary substances are primary substances.
These considerations leads us to the second general question which
Z 6s argument raises, i.e. how the argument applies to Aristotles theory
of substance. In the chapter, Aristotle never names the items he considers
to be primary substances. For much of the argument takes as examples of
primary substances Platonic Forms, i.e. entities Aristotle does not believe
in. However, the rest of the discussion in Z shows that forms should be
regarded as primary substances and hence only they should be taken to
be identical with their essence. One of the important consequences of this
view is that the composite of matter and form, i.e. the individual sensible
substance, is not identical with its essence. This conclusion is explicitly
drawn by Aristotle at the end of Z 11 (1037a29b5). Composites of matter
and form are not identical with their own essence simply because they are
composites of matter and form, while their essenceas Aristotle repeatedly
makes clearis their form alone.97 So, they contain something morei.e.
matterthan their own essence. Composites of matter and form have an
essence but are not, i.e. are not identical with, the essence they have.98
The conclusion that substantial composites are not identical with their
97 Cf. Aristotle., Met., Z 7, 1032b12; 10, 1035b1517; 1035b32; 17, 1041a28.

98 Aristotle alludes at the end of the chapter to the fact that the discussion in Z 6
may solve the problem the Sophists raise of whether Socrates is identical or not with his
essence. Aristotles solution to this problem should probably be understood in the light of
the distinction between form and the composite. When taken as a composite of matter and
form Socrates is not identical with his own essence. When taken as a form (when taken
as a soul) he is, by contrast, identical with his essence. That Socrates can be taken in both
ways is suggested by Aristotles remarks in Z 10, 1036 a1225 and Z 11, 1037a78. This is also,
incidentally, Averroess interpretation of the text in Z 6.
88 chapter one
essence gives further strength to the claim that such composites, though
being substances, are not primary substances. For primary substances must
be identical with the essence that they have, if the argument in Z 6 is right.
Thus, by showing in Z 6 that every (essentialist) ontology has to make room
for entities that are identical with their own essence, Aristotle opens the
way for the view that such entities are in fact his own forms. This point
is made explicitly in Z 1011, where matter and form enter the picture and
play a crucial role in the analysis of the connection between essence and
definition.
5. Generation in Met. Z 79
5.1. Introduction
Met. Z 79 have always made trouble for interpreters of Book Z. The chapters
offer a general treatment of generationand various related issuesand so
clearly interrupt the enquiry into essence, which Aristotle starts in Z 4 and
then resumes in Z 10. This has led scholars to suppose that Chapters 79
were an independent piece of writing and were inserted into the main body
of the book only later on. Apart from their interrupting unexpectedly the
long discussion of essence, other considerations suggest that Z 79 were not
part of the original draft of Z.99 Let us mention here only a couple of pieces
of evidence. The chapters are mentioned neither in the recapitulation of
the discussion of essence at the end of Z 11 nor in the summary of Zs
results in H 1. Furthermore, Z 8 is referred to in H 3 (1043b16) as in another
discussion. The chapters quite abruptly start talking about matter and
form, which are almost absent from Z 46, and simply take for granted
the claim that form is primary substance, which has not been argued for
anywhere in the previous discussion. Finally, the chapters clearly contain
a lot of material (the generation of artefacts in Z 7 as well as the analysis
of spontaneous generation in Z 9) whose relevance to Zs argument is not
immediately clear and which finds its place, instead, within a self-contained
treatment of the various types of generation such as Z 79 must have been
originally.
Even if Z 79 were not part of the first draft of Book Z, scholars usually
think that they were inserted into the body of the book by Aristotle himself.
99 For a thorough review of the evidence in favour of the insertion hypothesis see Burn-
yeat (2001), 2931. See also Cerami (2003).

The reasons for taking this view are eminently philosophical. In other words,
it is thought that Z 79 contain pieces of doctrine that are particularly
important for Zs argument and so justify the insertion of the chapters into
the first draft of the book. There are basically two proposals in this direction.
(i) Some scholars hold that the aim of the chapters is that of showing the
(almost) general validity of the so-called Synonymy Principle, i.e. the claim
that in all cases of generation producer and product are the same in form.100
The principle serves to establish the primacy of form in at least two senses.
It makes it clear that form is the most important factor when it comes
to explaining the coming into being of things, i.e. their generation. Since
producer and product are the same in form, it is form that is the causal
and explanatory link between the two, i.e. it is form that explains why we
have the kind of product we have and not another. However, the Synonymy
Principle also establishes that form is the principle accounting for the being
of things and not only for their coming into being. Foras it is shown
throughout Z 79the principles accounting for the coming into being of
things (matter and form) are also the principles accounting for their being,
i.e. are the constitutive principles of things once they are generated. The
matter and form, for instance, out of which a certain substance comes into
being also persist as ontological constituents of the substance once it has
been generated (even though, of course, the precise sense in which they
persist may need further specification). Thus, even if Z 79 analyse and
explain a physical phenomenon, i.e. generation, they should be thought
to offer a metaphysical treatment of generation.101 For form and matter are
discussed with a view to the role they play in the explanation of the being
of substances and not only of their coming into being. So, Z 79 constitute
a preparatory step in the general argument for the ontological primacy
of form. Scholars endorsing this general line of interpretation usually put
emphasis on Z 7where Aristotle proves the validity of the Synonymy
Principles for both natural and artificial productionand Z 9where a
partial exception to the principle, i.e. spontaneous generation, is taken into
account and explained away. Accordingly, they normally slightly play down
the role of Z 8s argument for the ingenerability of both form and matter. (ii)
Other interpreters, by contrast, have insisted on the connection between
Z 79s argument and the problem of definition dealt with in Z 1011.102
100 For this interpretation see in particular: Burnyeat (2001), 3436.

101 See for this important point Burnyeat (2001), 35.
102 For the second line of interpretation see Gill (1989), 120126 and Halper (1989), 8997.
90 chapter one
As we shall see, Z 1011 are mainly concerned with the problem of the object
of definition, i.e. the problem of determining which objects are definable
in the primary sense of the term. The criterion that Aristotle introduces in
order to solve this problem is the criterion of simplicity. The primary object
of definition must be simple in some relevant sense of simple. More partic-
ularly, definitional simplicity has something to do with predicative simplic-
ity, i.e. with the primary object of definition not being analysable in terms
of one thing being said of another. Now, Z 8 provides a very important argu-
ment for the view that both matter and form are not subject to generation
and corruption. The main reason why matter and form are not subject to
processes of generation and corruption is that they are simple. Any instance
of generation is analysable in terms of a material substratum taking on a
certain form. As a result, the product of generation must necessarily be
something composite, that is a composite of the material substratum and
the form it takes on. Neither matter nor form, however, are analysable into
two components whose combination would be the result of the process of
generation. Both, therefore, are simple and hence ingenerable. Analogously,
any instance of corruption is analysable in terms of a certain thing losing
its form. This implies that the thing that undergoes a process of corrup-
tion must be composite, given that corruption consists in losing one of the
things components. But both matter and form are simple and so they can-
not lose any component. Neither of them, therefore, is subject to corruption.
Thus, one natural suggestion is that Z 8s argument for the ingenerability of
form paves the way for the claim that form is the primary object of defini-
tion. For the reason why form is not generable, i.e. its simplicity, is precisely
the reason why it is the primary object of definition. Of course, matter too is
simple in the relevant sense, but there are independent reasons not to think
of matter as a primary object of definition. For scholars adopting this general
line of interpretation the core of Z 79 is Z 8s argument for the ingenerabil-
ity of form and matter, whereas Z 7 and 8, though crucial to the analysis of
generation, are not so relevant to Zs general argument.
In the following I shall try to flesh out these two general lines of interpre-
tation by presenting a brief reconstruction of the main issues discussed in
Z 79.
5.2. The Synonymy Principle

At the beginning of Met. Z 7 (1032a1213) Aristotle gives a threefold classi-
fication of the processes of generation: some things come to be by nature,
some others by art, while others come to be spontaneously. Z 7 deals with
both natural and artificial generation. Spontaneous generation is alluded to

at 10320301032032 but fully discussed only in Z 9. Met. Z 7 as a whole is not
linear in its argumentative structure and contains various asides and notes
of clarification. However, the general line of argument is clear enough and
can be reconstructed as follows:103 a) 1032a1526 discuss the case of natural
generation; b) 1032a261032b14 take up the case of artificial generation;
c) 1032b141033a1 present a case of spontaneous artificial production, i.e.
the case in which someone recovers his health spontaneously without the
intervention of a physician. The case is described as a partial exception to
how generation works in the standard cases of both natural and artificial
coming into being. The chapter ends with two asides: d) (1031a15) the
discussion of the case of spontaneous artificial production seems to have
some implications for the definitions of the things produced. In other words,
it seems that, since matter persists within the product of generation, it
should also be mentioned in the definition of the product. This issue is dealt
with in Met. Z 1011. e) 1031a523 is a long and interesting note of clarification
about the use of the expression from which ( ). More particularly,
Aristotle wants to explain why the expression came to be used to designate
matter, while it usually picks out the term from which change begins and
does not survive when change is completed, i.e. privation.
Also Aristotles general strategy seems to be clear enough. The main focus
of interest is the relation of identity or non-identity between producer and
product. Aristotles view is that the Synonymy Principle holds unqualifiedly
for the case of natural generation: producer and product are the same in
form. It also holds of artificial generation, though with some qualifications.
For the form of the producer and that of the product, though being the same
in some sense (we might say the same in content), are not the same kind of
form: the form of the producer is a form in the mind, that of the product is
a form in matter. Strictly speaking, the Synonymy Principle does not apply
to the case of spontaneous generations. For in this case there is no producer
and so no form that can be passed on to the product. Things come into being
spontaneously out of some preexisting matter. However, in Z 9 Aristotle
shows that the exception is only partial. For the matter out of which things
come to be spontaneously already contains part of the final product and
so in some sense part of the form of such a product. This conclusion is
anticipated already in Z 7 when discussing the case of spontaneous artificial
generation and will be reaffirmed and clarified in Z 9 through the analysis
103 Burnyeat (2001), 3536.

92 chapter one
of the case of spontaneous natural generation. Thus, in some sense the

principle holds good for all cases of generations. Let me now take a closer
look at each of the three cases considered by Aristotle and see how they
relate differently to the Synonymy Principle.
At the beginning of Z 7 (1032a1315) Aristotle provides a general descrip-
tion of the processes of coming to be: things that come to be come to be (i)
by something ( ), (ii) from something ( ) and come to be (iii)
something (). Aristotle adds that the something which things come to be
can belong to each of the different categories.104 This suggests that Aristo-
tle is giving a very general characterisation of coming to be, which includes
both substantial change (i.e. generation in the strict sense of the term) and
accidental change. However, all through the chapter Aristotle concentrates
his attention on substantial change, i.e. generation in the strict sense of the
term, presumably because only substantial change involves, strictly speak-
ing, the notions of matter and form. There are many difficulties of detail
concerning the way Aristotle conceives of the different terms involved in
change and in particular of the something () a thing comes to be when
it comes to be something. We can get closer to such difficulties by trying to
outline the general model Aristotle seems to have in mind and then point-
ing to some problems concerning substantial change in particular.
The Greek verb Aristotle employs to describe changelike
its English rendering to come to beis in itself ambiguous. It can be
taken in an incomplete, i.e. predicative sense, as well as in a complete, i.e.
existential, sense: something can come to be something else or can come to
be unqualifiedly, i.e. come into existence. We can say, for instance, that a
man comes to be musical, but also that a musical man comes to be, i.e. to
exist, as a result of a man acquiring certain musical skills. Likewise, in the
case of substantial change, we can say that a piece of matter comes to be a
statue as much as that a statue comes to be, i.e. comes into existence. Thus,
when Aristotle uses the expression things that come to be it is not clear
whether he means to pick out the things that become something else (i.e.
the man who becomes musical or the matter that becomes a statue) or the
result of the process of generation, i.e. the things that come into existence
as a result of the process of generation (i.e. the musical man or the statue).
Since Aristotle is mainly interested in explaining substantial change, where
104 Aristotles remark should probably be taken to mean to each category where change
takes place (which, according to Phys. , are substance, quality, quantity and place) and not
to each of the ten categories.
a particular substance comes into existence, it is likely that he has primarily

in mind the existential sense and so that the things that come to be are
the things that come into existence. Upon reflection, however, the contrast
between the predicative and the existential reading may not be as sharp
as it might look at first glance. For a natural suggestion is that part of
Aristotles point in Z 7 is precisely to show that every case of coming into
being (existential sense) can be analysed in terms of something coming
to be something else (predicative sense).105 This suggestion works slightly
differently in the case of accidental change and in that of substantial one.
In the case of accidental change what comes into being as a result of the
change is an accidental composite, i.e. the composite of a substance and
an accidental property. If a man acquires certain musical skills, we can say
that a musical man comes into existence as a result of such an acquisition.
Now, an accidental composite is an entity that can be analysed in terms
of a certain predicative structure: a musical man is analysable in terms of
the fact that musicality is predicated of man. This suggests that also the
change by which a musical man comes into existence can be explained in
terms of a certain predicative structure taking place. The idea is that since
a musical man can be analysed in terms of a certain predicative structure,
i.e. musicality being predicated of man, its coming into being as well can
be explained by means of a predicative fact, i.e. the fact that a man comes
to be musical. In other words, the coming into being of a musical man is
simply the fact that a man comes to be musical, i.e. that musicality comes
to be predicated of a man. Thus, the verbal expression to come to be
has the same logic as the verb to be and the dynamic situation can be
explained in the same way as the static one: just as a musical man exists
because musicality is predicated of man, so a musical man comes into
existence because musicality comes to be predicated of man. Within this
general framework we can understand Aristotles general description of
change: a change involves something by which the change occurs as well
as something from which the change occurs and something that the
105 In the following, I shall basically follow the line of argument proposed by Loux (2004).
Although there are difficulties with assimilating the case of substantial change to that of
accidental change (and hence with conceiving of the matter-form relation as an instance
of accidental predication), I believe this is the kind of view Aristotle is pushing towards.
For a completely different account, which sharply distinguishes between accidental and
substantial change see: Gill (1989). For a criticism of the claim that the matter-form relation
should be understood as an instance of accidental predication see: Kosman (1984); Scaltsas
(1994a) and (1994b).
94 chapter one
things that come to be come to be. In the case of the musical man the term
by which the change occurs is the agent that brings about the change in
the unmusical man, i.e. presumably the music teacher that passes on to
the pupil certain musical skills. Thus, the term by which change occurs is
another man who already possesses musicality. The term from which the
change occurs is the condition a man moves away from when he comes to
be musical, i.e. being unmusical or unmusicality. In other words, the term
from which change occurs is the privation of the positive condition acquired
during the change. In Phys. A 7 (190a2631), Aristotle explains that we can
express the term from which change occurs by means of either a simple
or a complex expression. We say either A man comes to be musical from
being unmusical or A man comes to be musical from being an unmusical
man. Both formulae will do, because in both cases the term from which
does not persist through the change. When he comes to be musical, a man
moves away from being unmusical, and so neither its being unmusical
nor its being an unmusical man survive the change. On the contrary, the
man who was first unmusical and then becomes musical is what persists
through the change. This perfectly squares with Aristotles remark at the
end of Z 7 (1033a2022), where he says that in standard cases, the term
from which of the change is what does not persist through and after the
change. Finally, according to this general model, the something of the
change, i.e. the something which a thing comes to be when it comes to be,
should be being musical, namely the condition that a thing acquires when
it becomes musical and that can be predicated of it as a result of the change.
In Phys. A 7, Aristotle allows us to say also A man comes to be a musical
man where the something of change is not a simple item but rather a
composite. There seems to be in fact nothing wrong with saying that a man
comes to be a musical man. However, it is the formula where the predicate
picks out a simple item that seems to reflect most accurately the predicative
structure that underlies the change.
The case of substantial change presents extra difficulties, but is neverthe-
less analogous to that of accidental change. Also the coming into being of a
substance can be analysed by means of a predicative fact. Since a substance
is just a piece of matter having a certain form, the most natural suggestion
is that, at least at a first approximation, a substance comes into being when
a piece of matter comes to be a certain form, just as a musical man comes
into being when a man comes to be musical. A statue, for instance, comes
into existence when a certain piece of matter comes to be a certain form, i.e.
the form of the statue. There seems to be something awkward in saying that
a piece of matter comes to be a certain form and so is a certain form after
the process is completed. After all, one might think, what a piece of matter
comes to be is a statue, i.e a composite of matter and form, and not the form
of a statue. However, the awkwardness may disappear once we have clari-
fied the sense of to be in the sentence A piece of matter comes to be the
form of the statue. In perfect analogy with the case of a man coming to be
musical, the predication A piece of matter comes to be the form of a statue
should be taken as a case of accidental predication. As a result of a process
of generation, a certain piece of matter comes to acquire a certain acciden-
tal property corresponding to the form of a given type of substance. For
instance, when a statue comes into being, a certain piece of matter acquires
a certain accidental property, e.g. being shaped in a certain way, which is
typical of statues and is conferred upon by the form of a statue. Such a prop-
erty is only accidental to the piece of matter because a piece of matter is
what it is independently of the particular shape it happens to take on during
the process of generation. Thus, the fact that a certain piece of matter comes
to be a statue, where statue picks out a composite of matter and form, is
grounded on the predicative fact that the very same piece of matter comes
to be shaped in the way corresponding to the form that statues have, i.e. that
a certain form comes to be accidentally predicated of the piece of matter in
question. Which are, then, according to this model, the three terms Aristo-
tle says every change involves? The term by which of a substantial change
is simply the agent that brings about the change and so imparts a certain
form to a given piece of matter. Aristotle says that the term from which
is matter itself. This is surprising because, usually, the term from which is
something which does not persist all through the change, while matter does
persist throughout the change by taking on the form and being a part of the
final product. In the final section of the Z 7 (1033a1319), however, Aristotle
puts down such an anomaly to the expressive resources of Greek language:
Greek does not have terms indicating the privations of substantial changes.
In other words, there are no words to indicate the condition of lacking a
certain substantial form, for instance the condition of lacking the form of a
statue. So we lack the linguistic resources to say that a piece of matter, for
instance, comes to be a statue from its being not shaped in the form of a
statue. Thus, we substitute matter-terms for privation-terms, even if matter
persists throughout the change, and we say that a statue comes to be from
its matter, say bronze. According to the predicative model we have so far
endorsed, the something of the change should be the form of the product,
i.e. the shape a certain piece of matter comes to acquire during the process
of generation. However, since we can say that a man comes to be a musical
man, we seem to be allowed to say as well that a piece of matter comes to
96 chapter one
be a statue, where statue is taken as a composite of matter and form. In this

case, the something of generation will be a composite of matter and form.
In conclusion, when Aristotle presents his different classifications of things
that come to be and of the terms involved in every process of coming to be,
he probably has in mind the existential sense of coming to be and so prob-
ably refers to the products of change, i.e. the things that come into being.
As we have seen, however, every case of the existential use of coming to
be seems to be analysable in the terms of the predicative use. Hence, there
seems to be no significant contrast between the two possible explanations
of the phenomenon of coming to be.
With the foregoing general analysis of change in mind, we are now in
a position to evaluate how the Synonymy Principle, i.e. the claim that
producer and product are the same in form, applies to the different types
of generation. The case of natural generation is straightforward (1032a15
27). The Synonymy Principle holds unqualifiedly (1032a2425). For in the
case of natural generation the producer is the term by which of generation.
For instance in the case of the generation of a human being the producer,
the male parent, is an individual human being, i.e. a composite of matter
and form. The generation of a human being simply consists in the male
parent transmitting his form to a certain piece of matter which is provided
by the female parent. Thus, the product, the offspring, will have the same
form as the male parent. That the parent and the offspring have the same
form does not mean that they have numerically the same form, because
presumably they will have two numerically distinct forms of exactly the
same type. The sense in whichand the reason whythe two forms are
distinct varies a good deal depending on whether one takes form to be
particular or universal. We can disregard this question for now. According to
Aristotles model, parent and offspring have at the very least the same type
of form and two different pieces of matter (Z 7, 1032a2425; Z 8, 1034a58).
And this seems sufficient for the Synonymy Principle to hold.
In Z 7 Aristotle also discusses the case of artificial generation (1032a27
b14). For artificial generation the principle does hold, but with some qualifi-
cations. The term by which of articial production is the artificer that brings
about the process of generation. The artificer has a form in his mind and
realises that form in matter. The form in the mind is an understanding of
the kind of object the artificer intends to realise in matter (1032a32b6). For
instance, a sculptor has in mind the form of a statue, i.e. has a grasp of what
being a statue is, and so produces a statue by realising in matter the form
he has in his mind. It is not difficult to see why Aristotle thinks both that
the Synonymy Principle holds in the case of artificial productions as well
and that it does so only in a qualified way (1032a1114). The principle holds
because there is a sense in which the producer and the product are the same
in form. Of course, the form of the producer is not the form of the artificer as
a human being, but rather the form of, say, the statue in the artificers mind.
This form is to some extent the same as the form realised in matter, at least
to the extent that the form in matter is just the material realisation of that
in the mind. We may say that the form of the producer and that of the prod-
uct are the same in content. On the other hand, the identity between the
form in matter and the form in the mind is not perfect. For the former is a
material form, while the latter is a mental form. So, the Synonymy Princi-
ple holds only to the extent that the form in the mind is the same as that in
matter, i.e. with some qualifications. The house in matter comes from the
house in the mind, but the two houses are the same in form only in a qual-
ified way.
The case of spontaneous generation seems to represent a real exception
to the Synonymy Principle. As Aristotle explains in Z 9, spontaneous genera-
tion comes about when matter can give itself the kind of movement which is
usually imparted by nature or art (1034b68), e.g. by the seed or by the artist.
This general description accounts for the fact that some products come to
be both spontaneously and by art or natureas in the case for instance of
health that come to be both spontaneously and by artwhile some oth-
ers come to be only by art or nature and not also spontaneouslyas in the
case of a house that is only produced by art and cannot come to be sponta-
neously. The reason is that in the former cases the matter is capable of giving
itself the movement that is usually brought about by art or nature, while in
the latter cases it cannot. It seems, therefore, that, while in the case of both
natural and artificial generation there is an agent (the term by which) that
sets about the process of generation and transmits its form to the product,
in the case of spontaneous generation there is nothing of the sort. For mat-
ter is capable of giving itself the movement that is otherwise given by the
agent. Thus, in the case of spontaneous generation there is no sameness in
form between product and producer. Aristotles aim both in Z 7 and Z 9
is to qualify this radical conclusion and show that spontaneous generation
too obeys the logic of the Synonymy Principle, if only to a limited extent.
The principle is partially satisfied because the matter out of which things
come to be spontaneously already contains something, i.e. a part, of the final
product and so some sort of sameness (though partial) also exists between
the product of spontaneous generation and what produces it (Z 7, 1032a23
29). Aristotles point is probably best explained by looking at the example of
spontaneous production he himself offers in Z 7 and then takes up again in
98 chapter one
Z 9, i.e. the case of the spontaneous recovery of health. Health was conceived
of in Antiquity as a certain combination and balance in the body of some
basic physical qualities, say hot, cold, dry and wet. Accordingly, illness was
seen as the lack of such a balance or appropriate combination, such as when
the body gets too cold due to a decrease of internal heat. In the standard case
of the artificial production of health, the doctor does nothing but restore the
balance of qualities by, for instance, heating the body. This operation may
need several steps, including for instance rubbing the appropriate parts of
the body, but the final result is that the body is heated up and the balance
of qualities restored. In the case of spontaneous production of heat, by con-
trast, the result is obtained without the intervention of a doctor. The body
spontaneously warms up from within and the balance is so restored. Now,
Aristotles point is that the agent of such a production is the heat present
in the body and that the heat is a part of the final product, i.e. health. For
health is nothing but a combination of certain primary qualities and heat
is one of them. Thus, the matter out of which health is spontaneously pro-
duced contains something, i.e. a part, of the final product and this is enough
to satisfy at least partially the Synonymy Principle. For the agent is a part of
the final product and being a part of something may be regarded as a kind
of sameness.
Therefore, Aristotles conclusion is that the Synonymy Principle holds,
although in different ways, for all cases of production he takes into account.
5.3. The Ingenerability of Form (and Matter) in Met. Z 8

Aristotles argument in the first part of Z 8 is particularly important in that
it establishes two significantly correlated claims: (i) that the product of any
substantial generation, i.e. what properly comes into existence as a result
of the process of generation, is always a composite of matter and form; (ii)
and so that matter and form cannot be the result of a process of generation.
First, Aristotle illustrates (i) by means of his favourite example, i.e. artificial
production (such as for instance the production of a bronze sphere). Then,
he gives an argument for (ii), mainly based on the idea that assuming form
and matter to be the result of a process of generation would set us on a
infinite regress.
(i) (1033a24b10) When someone makes a bronze sphere he makes nei-
ther the matter out of which the bronze sphere is produced, i.e. the bronze,
nor the form of the object, i.e. sphericity, but rather the combination of
bronze and sphericity. This clearly emerges from a consideration of what
the production of an artefact consists in. For an object like a bronze sphere
comes into being when a certain form is imposed on a certain piece of mat-
ter of the appropriate kind, i.e. when the artist introduces sphericity into
the bronze. Thus, artistic productionas well as generation in general
presupposes a material substratum that receives a certain form and a form
that is received by the substratum. The product of generation cannot be
either of these components but must rather be the combination of them.
(ii) (1033b1116 together with 1033a34b3) Aristotle takes into account and
rejects the hypothesis that matter and form too might be the result of a pro-
cess of generation. Such an hypothesisI thinkshould be understood in
the following sense. The fact is taken for granted that, when a bronze sphere
comes to be, the product of that generation is a composite of matter and
form, i.e. the composite of bronze and sphericity. But now the suggestion
is advanced that matter and form are generated together with the compos-
ite of them, i.e. that the generation of the bronze sphere involves also the
generation of the matter and form out of which the bronze sphere is made.
Aristotle shows that this position cannot be consistently held. For suppose,
for instance, that form is the product of a process of generation. Accord-
ing to Aristotles model of generation form can be the product of a process
of generation only if it is composed of a material substratum and a further
formal component. For generation consists in a material substratum receiv-
ing a certain form. Thus, if form is generated, it must be a composite of a
material and a formal component. Let us call such components, M1 and F1,
respectively. It is easy to see that the hypothesis leads to an infinite regress of
material and formal components. For we have supposed that when a com-
posite of matter and form is generated, its form is generated as well. But if
this is so, why not suppose, for parity of reasons, that also the formal compo-
nent of the form, i.e. F1, is the result of a process of generation? However, in
order for F1 to be the result of a process of generation, F1 must be composed
of a further material component and a further formal component, say M2
and F2. And so the introduction of further material and formal components
will go on ad infinitum. Form, therefore, cannot be the product of a process
of generation and so is not analysable into a material and a formal compo-
nent. The very same pattern of reasoning can be applied to matter as well.
Matter and form are ingenerable and hence are not analysable into further
material and formal components.
Aristotles argument has significant consequences for his understanding
of both matter and form. One of these is that both matter and form preexist
the final product of generation. For the coming into being of a certain
substance simply consists in combining two entities that in some sense
exist before their combination takes place. Admittedly, the preexistence
100 chapter one
of matter is different from that of form. For matter is what exists before
the process, persists throughout it and finally becomes an integral part of
the final product. Form preexists at least in the sense that it exists in the
producer before generation starts and gets transmitted to the product in the
course of the process. It is generally not true that the form that preexists is
numerically the same as that of the product. For one thing, we have seen that
in the case of artificial generation, for instance, the form of the producer,
the form in the mind, is different in nature from the form of the product,
the form in matter. For another, even in the case of natural generation
there is always a sense in which producer and product have two distinct
forms and not just one, even though the sense in which the two forms are
distinct varies a lot depending on whether one takes form to be universal or
particular. However, the general point remains that matter and form do not
undergo a process of generation but somehow preexist and are combined
in the final product.
Even if Aristotles argument works for both matter and form, he is clearly
particularly interested in its consequence for the ontological status of form.
For the argument shows that form is ingenerable because it is simple, i.e.
non-analysable into further material and formal components. And we shall
see shortlywhen dealing with Z 10 and 11that simplicity or at least a
certain kind of simplicity is one of the distinguishing features of definability.
Thus, the treatment of generation foreshadows and ultimately strengthens
the role of form as a primary object of definition and hence as a primary
substance.
It is important, in conclusion, to prevent one possible misunderstanding
concerning the implications of Z 8s argument. From what I have said so
far one might be misled into thinking that the conclusion that form is not
generable amounts to the claim that form is eternal, i.e. never comes to be
or ceases to exist. But this is not actually the case. All that the argument
shows is that form cannot undergo a process of generation or corruption.
This leaves open the possibility that form comes into being and passes
away without being generated or corrupted. As a matter of fact, this is
what Aristotle says in Z 15, 1039b2027. The idea here is simply that when a
composite substance comes into being it also comes to possess a form that
did not exist before and so comes into being together with the composite.
For, as we have seen, producer and product are the same in form, but do not
have numerically the same form. So, even if in some sense the form of the
product preexists in the producer (in that the producer has the same kind
of form as the product), the form of the product and that of the producer are
numerically different and hence the former did not exist before generation
took place. Likewise, when a composite is destroyed and corrupted the

form of the composite passes away together with the destruction of the
composite. The important point is that, however one wants to describe the
coming into being and passing away of form, it cannot be described as a
process of generation. For a process of generation presupposes a complexity
in the object generated which form lacks entirely. Thus, form comes into
being and passes away without being generated and corrupted.106
6. Definition
Met. Z 1012 take up once again the question of essence, this time around
from the closely related viewpoint of definition. Since Aristotles general
view seems to be that a definition reflects and spells out the content of
the corresponding essence, it is quite natural that a study of definition
should cast some light on the related notion of essence. The discussion
in Z 1012 differs from the treatment of essence in Z 46 also in another
important respect, i.e. in that Z 1012 make explicit and extensive use of the
notions of matter and form, which were already put to use in the account of
generation and corruption Aristotle provides in Z 79. To some extent, the
three chapters can be regarded as an attempt at clarifying the way in which
the matter-form distinction relates to definition and essence. Chapters 10
12 discuss two different issues: (i) the problem of the object of definition,
which is taken up in Z 1011, and (ii) the problem of the unity of definition,
which is dealt with in Z 12. The two problems are closely connected, but are
also textually and argumentatively quite distinct. Accordingly, I shall tackle
them separately.
6.1. The Object of Definition in Z 1011

The general issue of the object of definition centres on two related and yet
different questions:
106 The sense in which a form comes into being and passes away may vary depending
on whether forms are particular or universal. If forms are particular, then it is literally true
that a form comes into being and passes away, although such processes cannot be described
as processes of generation and corruption, respectively. If forms are universal, by contrast,
the coming to be and passing away of particular forms are just a matter of the universal
form being instantiated or ceasing to be instantiated in one particular piece of matter,
respectively. The universal form may have existed before being instantiated in a particular
piece of matter (because it may have been instantiated in another) and may continue to exist
after ceasing to be instantiated in one particular piece of matter (because it may continue to
exist in another).
102 chapter one
Q1: the question of what is definable in the proper and primary sense of
the term
Q2: the question of how we should define sensible substances, i.e. partic-
ular composites of matter and form.
Both questions are addressed in Met. Z 1011. It is not difficult to see that
the two questions are distinct. Q1 is a very general question asking which
entities, among all the possible objects of definition (accidents, accidental
composites, composites of matter and form, matter itself and form itself),
count as primary objects of definition. In order to answer this question, one
needs to provide a criterion of definability and check out which objects
meet the conditions laid down by the criterion. Q2, by contrast, is a more
limited issue and only focuses on the definition of one particular kind of
entity, namely composites of matter and form. Q2 is, in other words, the
traditional question, so debated in the Middle Ages, as to whether the
definition of sensible substances contains a reference to both matter and
form. Since Aristotles answer to Q1 is not that the composites of matter and
form are primary objects of definition, Q1 and Q2 are distinct also as a matter
of fact and not only in principle. For Q2 investigates the definition of entities
that are not considered to be primary objects of definition.
In this section, I shall try to understand what kind of answer Z 1011
offer to both Q1 and Q2. Before doing so, however, I wish to say something
more about the nature of Q1, the question as to what should count as the
primary object of definition. It seems that Aristotle elaborates a general
criterion of definability as early as in Z 46.107 There are different ways
of framing the criterion, but, probably, the best way is to formulate it in
terms of predicative simplicity. That is, an object counts as a proper object of
definition if its structure cannot be analysed in terms of something being
said of something else. The rationale behind the criterion is that, if a thing x
is what it is in virtue of y being predicated of z, then x is not a primary object
and so cannot be a primary object of definition, either. For what x is depends
on what some other, more fundamental, entities are. In even more general
terms, the criterion simply equates primary objects and primary objects of
definition.
In Z 46 Aristotle excludes, on the basis of the criterion, accidental com-
posites and simple accidents from being primary objects of definition. Acci-
107 Cf., for instance: Z 4, 1030a34; a1011; 1031b1314; 1032a46. For discussions of Aristo-
tles criterion see: Gill (1989); Halper (1989); Frede (1990); Loux (1991), 147164.
dental composites such as white man are clearly not predicatively simple.
For they can be analysed in terms of one thing being said of another, in the
case at issue in terms of white being said of man. It seems that accidents too
display some kind of predicative structure and hence cannot be classified
as primary objects of definition.108 For, even though they cannot be straight-
away analysed in terms of one thing being said of another, nonetheless they
are themselves predicated of substances. Moreover, Aristotle maintains in
Z 1 that the definition of accidents must contain a reference to the sub-
stances accidents are predicated of. Therefore, it seems that what accidents
are depends on some predication taking place, i.e. the predication where
the accident itself is said of a certain substance. So, accidents do have an
implicit, if not an explicit, predicative structure and hence do not count
as proper objects of definition. In Z 11 Aristotle extends the application of
the criterion so as to cover the case of substantial composites as well, i.e.
composites of matter and form.109 Substantial composites are not primary
objects of definition because they too can be analysed in terms of one thing
being predicated of another. In particular they can be analysed in terms
of form being predicated of (a certain piece of) matter. The nature of the
matter-form predication is not entirely clear and has been at the centre of a
heated debate. However, it is often acknowledged by Aristotle throughout
the central books and is sufficient to exclude substantial composites from
full definability. This is clearly Aristotles intention at the end of Z 11. On
summarising the achievements of the enquiry into essence and definition
he remarks:
By primary I mean what is not expressed by one thing being in another
which underlies it as matter.110
Clearly the relation between matter and form in a sensible substance is
captured by Aristotles description and hence sensible substances cannot be
regarded as primary objects and primary objects of definition in particular.
It seems therefore that we are left with only two possible candidates
for the title of primary object of definition, i.e. matter and form. Matter
cannot be ruled out on the basis of the criterion of predicative simplicity,
because it is simple in the relevant sense, as Aristotle has shown in the
course of his analysis of generation in Z 8. Matter, however, cannot count
108 On the question as to whether the criterion excludes accidents see in particular: Frede
(1990); Bostock (1994), 9092; 116118; Wedin (2000), 228230.

109 Cf. Z 11, 1037a29b4.
110 Cf. Z 11, 1037b34. Bostocks translation.
104 chapter one
as a primary object of definition, becauseas Aristotle says at timesit is

unknowable and hence indefinable.111 All things considered, then, it seems
that only form meets Aristotles requirements for something to be a proper
object of definition. For form cannot be analysed in terms of one thing being
said of another and so passes Aristotles test. It is important to remark at
this juncture, however, that in order for form to count as a primary object
of definition, the definition of form must be free from any reference to
matter. For form is predicated of matter and so, if the definition of form
included a reference to matter, the case of form would be analogous to that
of accidents, which are predicated of substances and contain a reference
to substances in their definitions. On the contrary, if the definition of form
does not include a reference to matter, form does not depend on matter for
its identity and so can count as a primary object of definition in spite of its
being predicated of matter.
Almost all scholars agree that Aristotles solution to Q1 is that form is
the primary object of definition.112 They disagree, by contrast, on Q2, i.e. on
the definition of the composite of matter and form. Some of them think
that, according to Aristotle, the definition of substantial composites makes
reference to their form alone, while others believe that it mentions both
their matter and form.113 As we shall see presently, this conflict of opinion
is partly motivated by the fact that Z 1011 seem to present conflicting lines
of argument with regard to Q2. In the rest of this section, I shall examine
what Z1011s argument has to say about both Q1 and Q2. I shall start by
111 Cf. Z 10, 1036a89. The meaning of this claim is not entirely clear. However, Aristotles
point could reasonably be that matter is always the matter of some substance or other. In
this sense, it is known only in so far as it is matter of a substance and not in itself. Of course,
different kinds of material have different intrinsic properties, such as their different chemical
and physical properties. However, when we talk about the intrinsic properties of a certain
piece of matter we are treating the piece in question as a substance and not as matter. For
matter is always the matter of a substance and so, when we consider matter as matter, we
must attribute the properties of the material to the substance of which the material is the
matter and not to the material in itself. For this suggestion see: FredePatzig (1988), II, 46
47; see also Dancy (1978).
112 See for instance: Driscoll (1981); Code (1984); Code (1985); Gill (1989); Halper (1989);
Loux (1991); Lewis F. (1991); Wedin (2000). Other scholars identify the primary object of
definition with the species without distinguishing very clearly between the notion of species
and that of form. See for instance: Owen (1965a); Woods (1974/1975); Modrak (1979).
113 The view that the definition of sensible substances makes reference to their form alone
has been strongly defended by Frede, see for instance: FredePatzig (1988) and Frede (1990).
Many other scholars, by contrast, believe that matter cannot be left out of the definition of
sensible substances; see for this view: Gill (1989); Halper (1989); Morrison (1990); Loux (1991);
Bostock (1994), 146151.
reconstructing a radical line of interpretation of the argument, which I shall

call formalistic, according to which not only is form the primary object
of definition, it is also the case that the definition of the composite makes
reference to form alone. We shall then look at what in the chapters suggests,
by contrast, that Q2 should be answered by including both matter and form
in the definition of the composite.
At the beginning of Z 10 Aristotle raises two general problems (1034b20
32). (a) The first can be phrased as follows: In general, must the parts of
a thing enter into its definition? The answer is difficult, because we seem
to be confronted with conflicting cases. The letters, for instance, figure in
the definition of the syllable, while the semicircles do not seem to figure
in the definition of the circle. An explanation is needed, therefore, of the
difference between the two cases. (b) The second problem concerns the
relationships of priority and posteriority between parts and wholes: Is it
unqualifiedly true that the parts are prior to the whole of which they are the
parts? Apparently, the answer seems to be no. For in many cases wholes
seem to be prior to their parts both in definitionthe definition of the
whole figure in the definition of the parts but not the other way roundand
in existencethe whole can exist without at least some of its parts, whereas
the parts cannot exist without the whole. For instance: the definition of a
finger must include a reference to the animal of which the finger is part,
while the reverse is not true; and the animal can exist without one of its
fingers, while the finger cannot exist without the animal of which it is a part.
In the case of problem (b) as well, therefore, we need to come up with a
general rule governing the relationship between parts and wholes. Roughly
speaking, the first half of Z 10 (1034b321035b3) deals with problem (a), while
the second (1035b31036a24) is concerned with problem (b).114 Actually, the
two problems are very closely related, as is shown by the fact that, in the
second half of the chapter, Aristotle assigns primary importance to priority
in definition, which is at the centre of problem (a). However, I shall be
particularly interested here in Aristotles treatment of problem (a) in the
first part of the chapter and, accordingly, in how he solves the conflicting
cases of the syllable and of the circle.
Aristotles argument in the first half of Z 10 can be reconstructed as
follows. (i) When talking about a thing, we may refer to the thing taken as
114 I say roughly speaking because Aristotle comes back to the question of definition at
1035b311036a2. Moreover, 1036a212 touches upon another important question of definabil-

ity, i.e. the fact the particulars, both sensible and mathematical particulars, are not definable.
106 chapter one
form or to the thing taken as a composite of matter and form. For example,
when talking about a statue, we may refer to the statue taken as form or to
the statue taken as a composite of matter and form (1035a19). (ii) Matter is
part of the thing taken as composite, while it is not part of the thing taken
as form (1035a27). (iii) Since defining a thing is defining the thing taken as
form and not the thing taken as composite, it is clear the material parts do
not figure in the definition of a thing (1035a2022). For they are not parts
of form and so do not figure in the definition of the thing taken as form.
Therefore, the letters enter into the definition of the syllable simply because
they are formal parts of the syllable, while semicircles do not enter into the
definition of the circle because they are material parts of it.
The argument makes at least three important points: (i) form is the
primaryperhaps the onlyobject of definition; (ii) the definition of form
makes no reference to matter. For such a definition includes only the parts
of form and material parts are not parts of form. (iii) Finally, the passage
states that we define the composite substance by giving a definition of its
form and so the definition of the composite makes no reference to matter,
either. In other words, the composite has a definition only in so far as its
form has one. On the whole, therefore, the passage supports a strongly
formalistic answer to both Q1 and Q2.
This line of interpretation receives confirmation from the way Aristotle
continues Z 10s enquiry in Z 11. The general aim of the chapter appears to
be that of refining and expanding on Z 10s account of definition by solving
some extra problems. In particular, the chapter opens with the general
difficulty of distinguishing the parts of form from the parts of the composite
(1036a2627). Leaving such a difficulty unresolved means not being able
to define things properly. For the definition belongs to form (1036a2729).
Clearly by parts of the composite Aristotle means here material parts, as
the continuation of the text plainly shows (1036a2931). Aristotle explains
in fact that the distinction between formal and material parts is easier
when a form can be realised in more than one type of matter, as is the
case with geometrical forms: the form of the circle can be realised in many
different kinds of material and so we have no difficulty in distinguishing
it from the material in which it is realised (1036a3134). On the contrary,
distinguishing between formal and material parts is particularly difficult
when a form is realised in only one type of matter, as is the case with
natural substances (1036b25). This is the reason why people often make
the mistake of including in the form (and so in the definition) parts which
are only material, as when they include flesh and bones in the form (and
the definition) of man (1036b57). He further remarks that the difficulty of
separating out material from formal parts sometimes induces some to make
the opposite mistake, i.e. to eliminate formal parts from definition, for fear,
so to speak, that they should turn out to be material parts. This is the case
with people who eliminate for instance continuity from the definition of
geometrical objects under the wrong the assumption that continuity is just
a material part of of them (1036b712).
The beginning of Z 11, therefore, strongly supports the formalistic answer
to both Q1 and Q2. Form is not only the primary object of definition, but
is also, to some extent, the only object of definition. This suggests that the
composite of matter and form has a definition only in so far as its form has
one. The definition of the composite is simply the definition of its form.
Moreover, the definition of a form (and so that of the composite) makes
no reference to the matter the form is realised in. All these conclusions are
explicitly stated by Aristotle in the final summary of Z 11, where he sums
up the results of the whole section about essence and definition, including
Z 46. The passage in question is particularly explicit and can accordingly
be quote in its entirety:
() we have said why it is that the formula of what being is for a thing
sometimes contains the parts of the thing being defined, and sometimes does
not. For we have said that the formula of the substance will not contain those
parts that are parts as matterwhich indeed are not parts of that substance
at all, but of the substance which is a combined whole. And this latter in a way
does not have a formula, though in a another way it does; when taken together
with its matter it does not have a formula, since matter is indeterminate, but
it does have a formula in accordance with its primary substance. (Thus a man
has the formula of the soul.)115
Particularly noteworthy in the text is Aristotles answer to Q2, i.e. the ques-
tion as to how we should define the composite of matter and form. The text
says that the composite has a definition only in so far as its form has one.
And therefore there is no definition of the composite including a reference
to its matter. Thus, to define a composite substance is simply to define its
form.
On the whole, therefore Z 1011 seem to present a quite robust and consis-
tent line of argument in favour of a formalistic answer to Q1 and Q2: form is
the primary object of definition; the definition of the substantial composite
makes reference to its formal parts alone. Things are not, however, as sim-
ple as that for the formalistic account. Problems do not concern Q1, which
115 Bostocks translation.

108 chapter one
is to some extent uncontroversial, since almost all scholars recognise that

only form satisfies Aristotles criteria of definability. It is Q 2, the question
about the definition of the substantial composite, that is problematic. For,
alongside texts supporting a formalistic answer to Q2, Z 1011 also contain
passages supporting the opposing view, that is the view that the definition
of the composite substance contains a reference to both its matter and its
form. The passages in question are basically two, a text in the first half of
Z 10 and the famous passage about Socrates the Younger in Z 11. Let us take
a quick look at both passages.
As we have seen, in the first part of Z 10 Aristotle tries to solve the problem
of which parts of a thing enter into its definition. His answer seems to be
that only the formal parts of a thing enter into its definition. For defining a
thing is just defining its form and material parts are not parts of form, and
so do not enter into its definition. This general solution enables Aristotle to
solve the apparently problematic cases of the syllable and of the circle. The
letters figure in the definition of the syllable because they are formal parts of
it, while the semicircles do not figure in the definition of the circle because
they are just material parts of it. Aristotles solution seems to be perfectly
in keeping with a formalistic reading of Q 2: the definition of a sensible
substance only mentions its formal parts. The problem is that at 1035a2223,
immediately after the clear statement of the formalistic solution, Aristotle
seems to change the picture. In particular, he talks about two different
kinds of definition, one in which certain parts are mentioned and another
in which the very same parts are not mentioned. The most natural reading
of the text is that the parts in question are material parts and that the
two kinds of definition Aristotle is talking about are the definition of the
composite and that of form, respectively.116 On this reading, Aristotles point
would be that material parts enter into the definition of the composite
but not into the definition of form. This interpretation is confirmed by
the explanation Aristotle provides immediately afterwards, at 1035a24
31. There are thingshe saysthat are corrupted into their constitutive
principles as well as things that are not corrupted into such principles. The
things at issue are, respectively, composites and forms, as the examples at
1035a25ff. plainly show: composites are corrupted into their material parts,
whereas forms have no material parts and so their parts are not parts into
116 For a different reading of the passage, in line with their general formalistic account of
Q 2, see FredePatzig (1988), II, 211213. See Bostock (1994), 149151 for a convincing criticism
of FredePatzigs reconstruction.
which forms are corrupted. These factsAristotle seems to assumemust

be reflected in the definition of composites and forms, respectively: the
definition of the composites mentions material parts, while the definition
of the forms does not. This section in Z 10, therefore, supports an anti-
formalistic answer to Q 2: the definition of the composite mentions both
its formal and material parts.
The same thing can be said of the famous passage concerning Socrates
the Younger in Z 11. In the passage in question, Aristotle protests against a
certain philosophical tendency to reduce everything to form and to elimi-
nate from definitions any reference to matter. Since Aristotles consistent
doctrine throughout Z is that the definition of form does not contain a
reference to matter, he is likely to be talking about the definition of the
composite in the passage under examination. This is confirmed by Aristo-
tles further remark that to eliminate matter is particularly inadequate in
the case of things that are, by their own nature, one thing in another or
certain things in a certain state. Both descriptions are best read as descrip-
tions of the composite substance in that they seem to make reference to
the combination of two constituents. The tendency Aristotle is protesting
against is well represented by the comparison Socrates the Younger used
to draw between an animal and a circle. The comparison is misleading
Aristotle remarksbecause it induces people to think that an animal can
exist without its material parts in the same way as a circle can exist with-
out a determinate kind of matter. One of the consequences of Socrates the
Youngers comparison, in other words, would seem to be that an animal
could be made of parts of a kind different from that of which it is actu-
ally made, just as a circle can be realised in different kinds of material.
But this is not true. For an animal is a perceptible being and so cannot be
defined without reference to change and to certain parts being in a cer-
tain state. If this text is about the definition of the compositeas I am
inclined to thinkthen it provides further support for an anti-formalistic
answer to Q 2. For the passage clearly states that sensible things such as
animals should be defined by making reference to their material parts as
well.117
117 FredePatzig (1988), II, 212213 have advanced a different interpretation of the passage
about Socrates the Younger. On any account, the text stresses the fact that there is a
difference between the definition of a circle and that of an animal. According to Frede
Patzig, however, the difference does not lie in the fact that, unlike the definition of a circle,
the definition of an animal mentions the material parts of the animal. On the contrary, the
definition of an animal only mentions its form or formal parts, as is the case with any other
110 chapter one
The reason why passages such as that on Socrates the Younger cannot
be easily explained away is that Aristotles standard doctrine outside Book
Z is that the definition of the composite substance should mention both
formal and material parts. Both in the Metaphysics and elsewhere,118 Aris-
totle defends a line of argument to the effect that, should we not include
matter in a definition of sensible substances, such a definition would turn
out to be incomplete. For sensible substances are composites of matter and
form and hence an account of what they are should mention both their
constituents. Thus, a definition of the composite which only mentions its
formal parts would be deficient and incomplete. This line of argument is
often connected with the general claim that sensible substances are physi-
cal objects and physical definitions contain a reference to both matter and
form.
In conclusion, it seems correct to say that, while Z 1011 provide a very
consistent answer to Q 1 (i.e. form is the primary object of definition), they
present conflicting lines of argument in so far as Q 2 is concerned. The
main line supports the view that the definition of the composite includes
its formal parts alone. But there are some passages that seem to defend the
thesis that an adequate account of the composite should mention both its
matter and its form. As we shall see in the following chapters, this conflict
in Aristotles text is reflected in the medieval debate on the definition of
sensible substances.
material substance. In this respect, therefore, the definition of an animal is not different
from that of a circle. However, the definitions of sensible substances have another important
peculiarity: they must be made in such a way that we may deduce from them the kind of
matter sensible substances are made of. In other words, from the definition of a sensible
substance we should be able to infer that the functions of such a substance can be realised
only in a certain kind of material parts. Thus, even though material parts are not mentioned
in the definition of sensible substances, they are nonetheless implied by or deducible from
the definition. This aspect differentiates the definition of sensible substances from that
of geometrical objects such as the circle, where no particular kind of material is implied
by or deducible from the definition. The trouble with this interpretation is that it seems
difficult to read the sentence An animal cannot be defined without its material parts as
meaning that material parts must be implied by the definition of an animal. The most
natural reading is that material parts must simply be mentioned in the definition of an
animal.
118 For the Metaphysics see: E 1, 1025b281026a6; H 2, 1043a 728 and 3, 1043b 2324. For
texts outside the Metaphysics see: Phys. B 2, 193b22194a12; De an. A 1, 403a29403b19.

6.2. The Unity of Definition in Met. Z 12119

In light of what we have been saying about Aristotles criteria of definability,
it should not be difficult to see why the question of the unity of definition
becomes so urgent and important.120 What is primarily definable must pos-
sess a certain degree of unity and simplicity. Form, for instance, which is the
primary object of definition, is predicatively simple in that it cannot be anal-
ysed in terms of one thing being said of another. Any definition, on the other
hand, has a plurality of parts. And it might be thought that such a plurality of
parts is somehow reflected in a plurality of corresponding parts in the object
defined. This consequence, however, would threaten the simplicity of the
object defined and so its definability. It is crucial, therefore, to understand
how a definition can be a unity despite the plurality of parts composing it. As
a matter of fact, Aristotle seems to have conceived the problem in precisely
these terms. For, when presenting the problem of the unity of definition in
Z 12, 1037b1013, he expresses himself as though the problem of the unity of
definition were ipso facto the problem of the unity of the thing defined. Fur-
ther on, at 1037b2427, he reiterates the point by saying that definition must
be a unity because definition belongs to substance and substance is a unity.
The general question of the unity of definition had already been raised in
the Organon121 without receiving, though, adequate treatment. Such a treat-
ment is provided in Met. Z 12 and then again in H 6.
There is a general difficulty with Z 12s argument which is worth men-
tioning at the beginning. The definitions whose unity Aristotle is trying to
119 There are problems concerning the place of Z 12 within the original plan of Book Z.
The main difficulty is that Aristotle summarises the results of his study of essence at the end
of Z 11which suggests that Z 12 might have not been part of the original draft of the book.
Moreover, like Z 79, Z 12 is not mentioned in the very sketchy rsum of Zs achievements in
H 1. Finally, in Z 11 (1037a1720) Aristotle promises a future treatment of the unity of definition
and it is unlikely that the reference is to Z 12s treatment, which starts just a few lines below.
Thus, Z 12 may be a later insertion. However, most scholars agree that Z 12 fits in very well
with the rest of the section on essence. Moreover, the chapter seems to disrupt the linearity
of Zs argument much less than Z 79. Thus, there are good reasons to think that Z 12 was
inserted by Aristotle himself and, all things considered, even to disregard the question of his
origin in the analysis of Zs argument. I shall take this course. For a different view, which
emphasises the extraneity of Z 12 to the rest of Zs argument, see Burnyeat (2001).
120 For the problem of the unity of definition see especially: Ross (1924), II, 205207; Rorty
(1973); Grene (1974); Granger (1984); Halper (1984); FredePatzig (1988), II, 221240; Gill
(1989), 138144; Halper (1989), 110118; 176195; Frede (1990); Loux (1991), 147196; Morrison
(1993); Mariani (1997); Bostock (1994), 176184; Wedin (2000), 237247; Modrak (2001), 145
217; Galluzzo (2002).
121 Cf. Aristotle, Post. Anal., B 6, 92a2930; De int., 5, 17a1315.
112 chapter one
explain are definitions by genus and differentia (1037b2729)the stan-

dard model of definition Aristotle endorses and discusses throughout the
Organon. Z 1011, however, present definition in different terms. For in those
chapters Aristotle constantly talks of matter and form being or not being
part of a definition, as if definitions by genus and differentia had to be
replaced with another model of definition, i.e. definitions by ontological
constituents. And, at least at first glance, it is not clear how definitions by
matter and form, or more generally definitions by constituents, connect
with the standard model of definition by genus and differentia.122 The prob-
lem is even more acute if one thinksas one shouldthat Z 12 is concerned
with the unity of the definition of the primary object of definition, i.e. the
definition of form. For Aristotles actual examples of the definition of a form,
such as for instance the definition of the soul in De an. B 1, are clearly not def-
initions by genus and differentia. So, how can Z 12s discussion have some
bearings on the questions raised in Z 1011? How can genus and differen-
tia be connected with form or form and matter? The difficulty is serious
enough and there are different ways in which one could try to solve it.123
For present purposes, I wish to mention only the solution I am inclined to
prefer. In a couple of places in the central books of the Metaphysics Aristotle
puts forward the view that the terms for substances are somehow ambigu-
ous.124 They can stand for the form of sensible substances or for sensible
substances taken as composites of matter and form. For instance, substan-
tial terms such as man or animal can signify both the form of man or
122 Some scholars (cf. Halper (1989), 181 and Bostock (1994), 287290) believe that in the
Metaphysics Aristotle abandons the standard model of definition by genus and differentia in
favour of definition by ontological constituents. In the light of the explicit reappearance in
Met. Z 12 of the standard model, I tend to resist this suggestion and to try to find a way of
reconciling the standard model of definition with Aristotles talk of matter and form.
123 Rorty (1973) and (1974), and a few others (cf. Lloyd (1962); Balme (1972); Lloyd (1981)),
have defended the view that in the definition of a sensible substance the genus literally
signifies matter while the differentia signifies form. Besides being a bad interpretation of
Aristotles genus-as-matter analogy (cf. Grene (1974); Galluzzo (2002)), Rortys suggestion
does not fit in well with Z 12s argument, where it is the definition of form and not that of the
composite that is at issue. Incidentally, Z 12s argument, which clearly appeals to the genus-
as-matter image in order to explain the problem of the unity of definition (1038a59), clearly
shows that Aristotles association of genus with matter should be taken analogically, i.e. in the
sense that the genus plays in definitions a role analogous to that played by matter in sensible
objects (while the differentia is correspondingly analogous to form). For the definition of
form contains no reference to matter and hence the genus figuring in the definition of form
cannot possibly signify matter in the literal sense.
124 Cf. H 3, 1043a29b4; Z 10, 1035a79; 1036a1325. For more on the ambiguity of substan-
tial terms see: Loux (1991), 115 ff.

animal and man or animal taken as composites of matter and form. Pre-
sumably, therefore, a definition like man is a two-footed animal can stand
for both the definition of the form of man and the definition of man taken as
a composite. In the former case all three terms involved in the definition
man, animal and two-footedwill signify forms or, better, formal com-
ponents of different levels of generality, while in the latter case they will sig-
nify composites of matter and form, again of different levels of generality.125
The ambiguity of substantial terms suggests that, if a standard definition by
genus and differentia can be read as a definition of a form, then Z 12s dis-
cussion of the unity of definitions by genus and difference bears, after all,
on the question of the unity of form.126 For the problem of the unity of genus
and differentia turns out to be the problem of the unity of form, provided
that the genus-term and the differentia-term are taken to stand for formal
components.
Aristotles strategy in Z 12 is quite simple.127 In the first part of the chapter
(1037b1327), he discards two possible solutions to the problem of the unity
of definition. In particular, he rules out the idea that the differentia forms
a unity with the genus by participating in it; then, he also dismisses the
suggestion that the unity between genus and differentia might be reached
by supposing that the differentiae are in the genus in a way comparable
to that in which accidents are in a substance. In the second part of Z 12
(1037b271038a35), by contrast, Aristotle advances his own solution. Here
I shall focus exclusively on Aristotles solution leaving aside the alternatives
he criticises.
Roughly speaking, Aristotles solution consists in maintaining that, de-
spite appearances to the contrary, a definition is not composed of a plurality
of items, but of only one item, namely the differentia. For the genus can
somehow be eliminated from the definition in that it does not count as an
item independent of the differentia. Thus, the problem of the unity of a
125 Incidentally, Aristotles view that substantial terms are ambiguous in the sense speci-
fied gives further support to an anti-formalist response to Q 2, the question about the defini-
tion of the substantial composite. For in the definition of a compositeAristotles doctrine
seems to implygenus and differentia signify composites of matter and form and so the
definition of such a composite contains a reference to both matter and form, as the anti-
formalistic view maintains.
126 These considerations suggest also that the problem of the unity of a definition by genus
and differentia is a general problem, quite independent of what the terms involved in a
definition stand for. Of course, the problem is the more acute, the higher the degree of unity
required of the object defined.
127 For an accurate reconstruction of Z 12s argument see in particular Frede (1990).
114 chapter one
definition is solved by denying that in a definition there are in fact a plurality

of items to be unified. So far, we have talked about definitions by genus
and differentia. Aristotle, however, seems to have in mind a slightly more
complex model of definition, according to which a definition is composed
of a genus and a series of differentiae progressively determining the content
of the genus. This presents him with the extra problem of accounting for the
unity of the many differentiae in addition to the unity of the genus with the
differentiae. Aristotles argument, therefore, comes in two steps. Suppose
we have a definition of the form G + D1, , Dn, i.e. a definition constituted
by a genus and a series of differentiae. Aristotle (i) first shows that, quite
independently of the number of differentiae contained in a definition, every
definition can be reduced to the form G + D, i.e. to the genus plus only one
differentia, where the differentia D is the last differentia Dn. Then (ii) he
argues that the genus G can be eliminated from the definition so that the
definition only consists of the last differentia Dn.
Step (i) is achieved by reflecting on the nature of definitions of the form
G + D1, , Dn (1037b291038a4). In such definitions it is possible to obtain
subordinate genera simply by adding a certain number of differentiae to the
first genus G. For instance: in the definition G + D1 Dn, both G + D1 and G+
D1+ D2 will be subordinate genera of the initial genus G. Thus, it is possible
to consider G+ D1, , Dn-1, i.e. the initial genus plus all the differentiae but
the last, as a unique genus for the last differentia Dn. In so doing, we simply
reduce a complex definition containing many differentiae to one of the
standard form G+D, where G is the subordinate genus G+ D1, , Dn-1 and
D is the last differentia Dn. Further on in the chapter (1038a9 ff.) Aristotle
makes the important point that such a procedure of reduction works only
if the division by means of which we add each differentia to the previous
one is carried through correctly. The method Aristotle recommends is that
of dividing through the differentia of the differentia (1038a9 ff.). In other
words, each new differentia which is added to the definition must be a
differentiation and a determination of the previous differentia as such. For
instance, let us assume animal to be the genus and two-footed the first
differentia. In this case, it would be incorrect to divide the intermediate
genus two-footed animal into winged and wingless, because winged
and wingless are not differentiae of two-footed as such in that they
make no reference to how feet can be. Being winged and wingless, in other
words, are not ways in which something can be footed and so winged and
wingless are only accidental differentiae of two-footed. On the contrary,
appropriate differentiae of two-footed are cloven-footed and uncloven-
footed, because they represent two different ways one can be two-footed
and so are differentiae of two-footed as such. If the process of division

is performed in the way Aristotle suggests, the result will be that each
differentia will entail the previous one and the last, in particular, will entail
all the others. The entailment makes it possible to reduce the definition to
the simplified form G + D.
In step (ii) Aristotle argues that in the standard definition G + D the
genus can be eliminated. Here is what he says concerning this crucial point
(1038a59):
If the genus does not, in an unqualified sense, exist apart from the forms of
the genus, or if it only exists but only as matter () then it is clear that the
definition is just the formula composed of the differentiae.128
Aristotle says that the genus does not exist apart from its forms (i.e. its
differentiated forms) or, if it exists, it does so only as matter. It is not clear,
in the passage quoted, how we should take the particle or, i.e. whether
it is a proper disjunctive particle or whether it rather points to some sort
of equivalence between the two disjuncts. In other words, it is not clear
whether Aristotle presents two alternative ways of eliminating the genus
from a definition or just two different formulations of the same elimination
process. One possibility is that the alternatives are in fact distinct and in
Z 12 Aristotle confines himself to discussing the first alternative (genus does
not exist apart from its differentiated forms), while he explores the second
alternative (genus as matter) in H 6, where he takes up again the problem
of the unity of definition.129 Whether distinct or not, however, the two
128 Cf. Z12, 1038a59. Bostocks translation.

129 For this interpretation see Frede (1990). As is known, Aristotle returns to the problem
of the unity of definition in Met. H 6, this time in connection with the parallel issue of
the unity of the composite of matter and form. For lack of space I shall leave out of my
consideration a full discussion of H 6s treatment of the unity of definition, since the chapter
throws on the table extra problems which cannot be analysed here in detail. One of those
is certainly the fact that it is not clear whether H 6 deals with the definition of form (as is
maintained, for instance, by Ross (1924), II, 238; Burnyeat (1984); Harte (1996)) or that of
the composite (Rorty (1973); Gill (1989); Halper (1989); Lewis F. (1991); Loux (1991); Charles
(1994)). For the philosophical content of Met. H 6 see, in addition to the contributions already
mentioned, especially: Rorty (1973); Grene (1974); Kosman (1984); Halper (1985); Gill (1989),
138144; Halper (1989), 176195; Scaltsas (1994a) and (1994b), 107111; Loux (1995); Galluzzo
(2002). Much of the debate about Met. H 6 concerns the issue of whether matter and form are
essentially or accidentally related, i.e. whether or not the identity of matter is determined by
the form matter is united with. This issue is often associated with the problem of whether the
matter-form distinction should be taken to be a mind-independent or a merely intentional
distinction. Although I could not devote much space to such two issues in the chapter,
so far I have tacitly endorsed the view that matter and form are two mind-independent
constituents of a sensible substance. Moreover, although pieces of evidence to the contrary
116 chapter one
alternatives yield exactly the same result, as the text quoted plainly shows.
It is not difficult to see why. According to the first alternative, the genus
only exists in its determined and differentiated forms. Animal for instance
only exists in its differentiated forms, i.e. exists only as a certain type of
animal, say, two-footed animal or four-footed animal. Thus, the genus can
be eliminated because it does not exist as such and does so only in so far as
it is differentiated. In the other alternative, the genus behaves as a sort of
matter. Presumably, this means that, just as matter exists in actuality only
when it is determined by the forms it takes on, so the genus is something
that exists in actuality only when it is determined by its differentiae. Before
being determined by form matter exists only potentially, and so does the
genus before being determined by its differentiae. In other words, the genus
is a mere determinable, which acquires actual and determined existence
only in virtue of its being differentiated by the differentiae. Therefore, it can
be eliminated because it does not enjoy, of itself, actual and determinate
existence. In conclusion, the two alternatives Aristotle proposes look like
slightly different, but equivalent ways of making the same general point.
Aristotles solution in Z 12, i.e. that a definition is reducible to the last
differentia, has important consequences for the ontology of Met. Z. For
Aristotle explicitly identifies the last differentia with the substance and
form (1038a1920; 2526). This confirms that it is the definition of form
that Aristotle has in mind in Z 12. Moreover, Z 12s argument provides
further support for Zs general thesis that form is primary substance. For
primary substance is the primary object of definition and the primary object
of definition must be structurally simple. Now, the analysis of definition
carried out in Z 12 confirms the structural simplicity of primary substance.
For, on an ontological analysis, the definition of a primary substance turns
out to be reducible to only one component, i.e. the last differentia.
7. Universals
7.1. The Problem

At the beginning of Met. Z 13 Aristotle reminds us that two of the four candi-
dates for the title of substance listed in Z 3the essence and the subject
have already been discussed. He then picks out of the list another candidate,
are not missing, I incline towards the view that matter and form are accidentally related and
hence are identifiable independently of one another. For a detailed reconstruction of the
critical debate about the matter-form distinction see GalluzzoMariani (2006), 89134.
the universal. The discussion of the universal occupies four chapters, from
Z 13 to Z 16. As a matter of fact, the analysis of the universal also clearly
includes a treatment of the remaining candidate on Z3 list, i.e. the genus.
Some of Z 13s arguments against the substantiality of the universal are in
fact directed against the substantiality of the genus. Z 14, moreover, chal-
lenges the Platonic conception of the genus and Z 16 levels criticisms against
the substantiality of what were regarded by Platonists as the highest genera,
i.e. being and one. Aristotle says as much in H 1 (1042a1516), when he sums
up the results of the section on universals and remarks that the argument
against the substantiality of universals hold good for the case of the genus
as well.
Although the whole section Z 1316 has as a common focus the issue of
universals, the different chapters tackle the issue from different angles and
with different degrees of intensity. Z 13 is the most important chapter in
the section and presents a battery of arguments against the substantiality
of universals. Z 14 has a more limited target in that it specifically addresses
the Platonic conception of universals. In particular, the chapter argues that
Platonists cannot consistently hold at the same time: (i) that genus and dif-
ferentia are Forms, i.e. independent and separate substances, as much as
the species they contribute to define; (ii) and that the species is composed
of genus and differentia. Z 15 takes up the correlative of universals, i.e. par-
ticulars, and argues at length for the view that particulars are not definable.
Z 16 has a rather miscellaneous character: in the first place (1040b516), the
chapter reconsiders two kinds of items that were taken to be substances
in Z 2i.e. the parts of living things and the elementsand concludes
that they are not substances after all; then (1040b1627), it summarises and
elaborates on Z 13s conclusion that universals are not substances; finally
(1040a271041a5), it evaluates Platos doctrine of Forms by pointing out both
its philosophical merits and the mistakes it runs into.
Besides the main theme, the four chapters on universals have, as can be
easily realised, another common subject of interest, namely the critique of
Platos doctrine. Z 14 is entirely devoted to the anti-Platonic polemic. Z 13s
arguments against the substantial character of universals clearly concern
Platonic Forms as well, which were conceived of as some kind of universals.
Moreover, among Z 15s arguments against the definability of particulars,
there is one specifically directed against the definability of Forms. For, at
least according to Aristotles reconstruction, Forms, in addition to being
regarded as some kind of universals, were also thought to be perfect partic-
ulars. It comes as no surprise, therefore, that Z 16 criticises the ontologically
ambiguous status of Platonic Ideas, i.e. their being somehow in between
118 chapter one
universals and particulars. As we shall see in the following chapters the anti-
Platonic line of argument is particularly stressed by medieval interpreters.
The section on universals has recently gained importance in the debate
over Aristotles ontological views in Book Z. The main reason is that inter-
preters search the section for an answer to one of the most controversial
problems in recent Aristotelian scholarship, i.e. the question as to whether
Aristotles forms are particular or universal. The debate is intricate from
both a textual and a philosophical point of view. Here, I do not intend to
go into the intricacies of the controversy.130 On the contrary, I shall confine
myself to sketching out the general problem and explaining how Z 1316
might be thought to offer solutions to it. Roughly speaking, supporters of
particular forms maintain that forms are unrepeatable and unsharable enti-
ties and so are peculiar to the individual sensible substances that possess
them. There are many versions of the theory of particular forms, but all agree
that each individual sensible substance possesses a form that is numerically
different from that possessed by the other individual substances of the same
kind. In Frede-Patzigs version,131 which is in many respects the clearest and
most authoritative from the point of view of textual analysis, the particular-
ity of forms is primitive. In other words, there is nothing accounting for the
fact that the form of one individual sensible substance is numerically differ-
ent from the form of another substance. Supporters of universal forms, by
contrast, contend that forms are sharable and repeatable entities. In partic-
ular, they maintain that for each kind of sensible substance there is just one
substantial form and that such a form gets multiplied and individualised by
being predicated of different pieces of matter. They concede, of course, that
each sensible substance possesses its own form, numerically different from
the form of the other cospecific individuals, but they insist that the partic-
ularity of forms is not primitive, but is rather due to the different pieces of
matter forms happen to be realised in. In other words, if the pieces of matter
of which cospecific substances are made could be removed from them, we
130 For a detailed reconstruction of the debate see GalluzzoMariani (2006), 167211.
Although there are numerous versions of each of the two rival interpretations, I would
range among supporters of particular forms: Sellars (1967a); Sellars (1967b); Hartman (1976);
Hartman (1977); Block (1978); Teloh (1979a); Teloh (1979b); Heinaman (1980); Lloyd (1981);
Matthen (1986); Whiting (1986); Frede (1987a); Frede (1987b); FredePatzig (1988); Irwin
(1988); Witt (1989); Spellman (1995); Berti (1989). For the theory of universal forms see: Woods
(1967); Woods (1974/5); Modrak (1979); Loux (1979a); Driscoll (1981); Code (1984); Modrak
(1985); Gill (1989); Lewis F. (1991); Loux (1991); Woods (1991a); Woods (1991b); Scaltsas (1994b);
Woods (1994); Wedin (2000); Modrak (2001).
131 Cf. FredePatzig (1988); Frede (1987a) and (1987b).
would be left with only one form. Thus interpreted, the question of partic-
ular versus universal forms is a question about the individuation of forms,
i.e. about what makes forms particular. According to supporters of particu-
lar forms, forms are primitively particular, while according to supporters of
universal forms, forms are made particular by the different pieces of mat-
ter of which they are predicated and in which they happen to exist. One
important text that seems to provide evidence in favour of universal forms
is clearly Met. Z 8, 1034b58. In the passage Aristotle seems to say that two
individual human beings, say Callias and Socrates, are distinct individuals
on account of their different matter, while their form is just one and the
same. This seems to suggest that two cospecific sensible objects are made
of two fundamental constituents: a common or universal constituent, i.e.
form, that is the same for the two objects, and a further constituent, i.e. mat-
ter, that is different for the two different objects and so is what makes the
two objects numerically distinct. Thus, form gets particularised because it
is predicated of different pieces of matter.
Chapters Z 1316 seem to provide conflicting evidence with regard to
the problem of the status of forms. Z 13 argues at length for the view that
universals cannot be substances. So, it seems that forms, if they areas
they areprimary substances, cannot be universals and must be particulars
instead. Z 15, on the contrary, establishes the point that no particular thing,
be it sensible or non-sensible, can be defined. Since definability is one
of the distinguishing features of substantiality, it seems to follow that, if
form is substance, it cannot be particular. Predictably, therefore, supporters
of universal forms try to explain away Z 13s arguments so as to show
that they do not compel us, despite appearances to the contrary, to take
forms as particulars. Supporters of particular forms, by contrast, owe us an
explanation of how particular forms can be both primary substances and
indefinable objects.
It is not difficult to imagine how one could get round Z 15s claim that
particulars are not definable. Supporters of particular forms simply accept
that particular forms are not definable qua particulars, but insist that this
fact alone neither makes particular forms indefinable nor obliges us to posit
universal forms in reality. Admittedly, there is no definition that uniquely
picks out one particular form of a certain kind to the exclusion of the
others. All the particular forms of a certain kind (e.g. the human souls)
share the same definition and so there is no definition that uniquely picks
out one of those forms to the exclusion of the others. This fact, however,
does not render particular forms indefinable in that particular forms are
still definable in so far as their kind is concerned, i.e. in so far as they are
120 chapter one
a certain kind of form. Nor does this fact alone make it any less true that
reality comprises only particular forms. For the fact that all cospecific forms
share the same definition is due to the nature of definition and not to
the nature of the world. A definition is a conjunction or combination of
predicates, and predicates are general in that they can always be applied, at
least in principle, to a plurality of things.132 Supporters of particular forms,
in other words, divorce ontology from semantics and epistemology. The
world is populated only by individual forms, even if our linguistic practices
and our knowledge of the world may sometimes involve a certain degree of
generality.
Something more must be said, by contrast, about the general strategy
supporters of universal forms endorse to explain away Z 13s arguments
against the substantiality of universals. Z 13s conclusion is that no univer-
sal can be substance. So, how can form be both substance and universal? It
seems that the only way out of the difficulty is to insist that form, though
being universal in character, is not what Aristotle would usually call uni-
versal in the technical sense of the term. In other words, form is universal
because it is a sharable and repeatable entity, but is not what Aristotle usu-
ally means by universal. To urge their point, supporters of universal forms
appeal to a distinction that is particularly important for a general assess-
ment of Zs ontology, i.e. the distinction between form and species (and
genus). So far, we have seen that the primary substances of Categories, i.e.
ordinary particular sensible substances, are analysed in Book Z as compos-
ites of matter and form. But what happens to the secondary substances of
the Categories, i.e. the species and genera that are essentially predicated of
primary substances? In a couple of passages in Z, Aristotle explicitly says
that species and genera undergo an analysis in terms of matter and form
which is somehow parallel to the one undergone by the individuals falling
under them.133 That is, while individual sensible substances are particular
132 There certainly are predicates that apply to at most one thing, such as for instance is
identical with Plato, owns the house in 10 Merton Street, Oxford, on the 1st of October 2011
or is two miles north of the Eiffel Tower. For one thing, however, it is not clear whether
or not such predicates are genuine predicates. For another, the predicates figuring in a
definition are clearly not of that kind in that they involve no reference to individuals. For
some of these issues see Adams (1979) and Loux (2006a), 97101.
133 Cf. Aristotle, Z 1035b2731, 1; Z 11, 1037a510. The distinction between species and form
has been explained with particular clarity by Loux (1979a) and Driscoll (1981). In the first
stages of the debate over the status of Aristotelian forms, some supporters of universal forms
have failed to see the importance of the distinction: see in particular Woods (1967) and
(1974/1975); Modrak (1979).
composites of matter and form, species and genera are universal compos-
ites of matter and form, i.e. composites of the kind of matter and form
proper to a certain natural kind. On this analysis, form is not identical with
species, because form is just a part of the universal composite a species con-
sists in. Now, supporters of universal forms insist that Z 13s arguments are
directed against species and genera and not against form. For it is species
and generaand not formthat Aristotle would usually call universals
in the technical sense of the term.
This interpretative strategy has both a textual and a theoretical basis.
Textually speaking, it must be noted that, when Aristotle distinguishes
between species and genera on the on hand and form on the other, he
emphasises that form is substance, while species and genera are not sub-
stances.134 The reason is that form is prior to the individual composite of
matter and form, in that it is a principle of structure and organisation for the
composite. Species and genera, by contrast, are posterior to the individual
composite of matter and form in that they are nothing but particular com-
posites of matter and form taken in general or, as Aristotle puts it, universal
composites of matter and form. Form, therefore, is an explanatory principle,
while species and genera play no explanatory role. In light of these distinc-
tions, it is not unreasonable to suppose that Aristotles claim that no uni-
versal is substance concerns species and genera, and not form. Supporters
of universal forms may also appeal to some more theoretical considerations.
For the label universal should be attached to what is universally predicated
of individual sensible substances, i.e. to what classify them into different
kinds and natural groups. Species and genera are so predicated of sensible
substances, because they are nothing but the natural kinds these substances
belong to. Form, by contrast, is not predicated of sensible substances. For
it is only a principle or substantial constituent of a sensible substance and
hence is only a part of the whole sensible substance. And a part, to put things
in medieval terms, can hardly be predicated of the whole of which it is a part.
Form is rather predicated, according to Aristotle, of the different pieces of
matter it happens to be joined to, but not of the whole sensible substance.
Therefore, form is not the universal in the technical sense, i.e. the univer-
sal that is universally predicated of a sensible substance, although it may be
universal from a wider philosophical perspective in that it is sharable and
repeatable. Possibly, a way to formulate more clearly this general strategy
is by distinguishing between two different questions: (i) Are the things that
134 Cf. Aristotle, Z 1035b2731, 1; Z 11, 1037a510.

122 chapter one
Aristotle usually calls universals substances? (ii) Does Aristotle admit of

universal entities in his ontology, i.e. entities that we would characterise as
universals? On the strategy that I am presenting the answer to question (i) is
clearly no. For the things that Aristotle standardly call universals are the
species and genera to which particular substances belong, and such things
are not regarded in the Metaphysics as substances, not even secondary sub-
stances. The answer to question (ii), by contrast, may be yes. For forms
seem to be universal entities, i.e. entities that are sharable and repeatable.
In the next two sections, I shall offer a sketchy reconstruction of both
Z 13s and Z 15s arguments and say something more about their signifi-
cance for the question of the status of Aristotles forms. I shall leave, by con-
trast, Z 14 and Z 16 out of my consideration. Though interesting in another
respects, the chapters are less relevant to an assessment of Aristotles view
on substance and universals.
7.2. No Universal Is Substance: Z 13s Argument

In the traditional reconstruction, Z 13 offers eight arguments against the
substantiality of universals plus a final dilemma, which brings to the fore a
difficulty emerging from the discussion. First of all, I shall give a brief outline
of each of the arguments (plus the final dilemma), then I shall make some
observations on their different nature as well as on the significance of some
of them in particular for the question of the status of Aristotles forms. In
the reconstruction of the single arguments I shall skip over the exegetical
difficulties many of them present and simply advance the interpretation I
favour without discussing it in detail.135
The first two arguments are straightforward. (1) (1038b915) The sub-
stance of a thing must be peculiar to the thing of which it is the substance,
i.e. must not belong to anything else. Universals belong by nature to many
things. Therefore, universals cannot be substances.136 (2) (1038b1516) A sub-
stance is what is not predicated of a subject. Universals are always predi-
cated of some subject. Therefore, universals cannot be substance.
135 In this section I present what can be regarded as the traditional understanding of Met.
Z 13s argument and internal structure (see for instance: Ross (1924), II, 208210; FredePatzig
(1988), II, 241263). The traditional reconstruction has been recently called into question,
although on different grounds, by Burnyeat (2001), 4452 and Gill (2001). For a defence of the
traditional view see Galluzzo (2004b).
136 It is important to note that the characterisation of a universal as something that by
nature belongs to many things is strongly reminiscent of the one Aristotle provides in De int.
7 (17a38b1). The clause by nature is supposed to capture the case where a universal has, as
a matter of fact, only one instance, even if by nature it is always capable of having many.
Argument (3) is obscure and difficult to reconstruct. Probably, however,

the best way to understand it is to take it to contain both a possible reply
on the part of supporters of the substantiality of universals (1038b1618)
and Aristotles rejection of the reply (1038b1823). (3) (1038b1623) The
supporters of the substantiality of universals accept the conclusion that
universals cannot be substances tout court, but suggest that universals can
be substances in the sense of parts of substances. Animal, for instance, might
be thought to be substance in the sense of being a substantial part, a part
for instance of the essence of both men and horses. Aristotles reply to this
suggestion would be that it will not do, because also the parts of a substance
must be peculiar to the thing of which they are the substantial parts. In
other words, the peculiarity condition brought forward in argument (1) (i.e.
a substance must be peculiar to that of which it is the substance) applies to
both the substance as a whole and the parts of a substance.
It seems that arguments (4)(5)(6) continue to explore the suggestion
that universals can be substance in the sense of parts and reject again such
an hypothesis. (4) (1038b2329) It is natural to suppose that what is a sub-
stance and a is made of substances and (things that are) , rather
than of non-substances and (things that are) . But universals are not
, but . Therefore, universals are not even parts of substances.137
(5) (1038b2930) If, for instance, the genus animal is substance in the sense
of being a substantial part of a substance, then it will be in Socrates who
is a substance, with the result that the universal animal will be (part of)
the substance of two things, presumably of man (of whose definition ani-
mal is clearly a part) and Socrates himself. And this seems to violate again
the peculiarity condition established by Aristotle in argument (1). Argument
(6) (1038b3034) is a generalisation of the conclusions of the previous argu-
ments against the suggestion that universals can be substances at least as
parts of substances. In general, if expressions such as man and the like
indicate substances, then none of the parts of their definition can exist inde-
pendently (of the object defined), nor can they be common parts, i.e. parts
common to several objects of definition.
Argument (7) (1038b341039a3) leaves for a while the problem of the
parts of substance and reverts to the substantiality of universals in general.
Aristotle remarks that the previous analysis has shown that no universal
137 Argument (4) might look question-begging in so far as it seems to assume the non-
substantial character of universals Aristotle wishes to argues for. As a matter of fact, however,
the non-substantiality of universals is proved through the notion of . What is not a
cannot be a substance, either.
124 chapter one
can be substance and that none of the things that are universally predicated
signify a , but rather a . Otherwise, i.e. if they did signify a
, many problems would ensue, including the Third Man.138
At first glance, argument (8) (1039a314) does not seem to have much to
do with the general issue of the chapter. The argument convincingly argues
for the view that a substance cannot be composed of further substances
existing in actuality. For if a substance were composed, for instance, of two
other substances existing in actuality, it would be two things and not one
thing in actuality, as it is supposed to be. The argument seems to concern
the structure of particular sensible substances and not the status of the
universals under which sensible substances fall. For instance, since sensible
substances are composites of matter and form, one of the conclusions of the
argument may be that matter and form should not be understood as two
actual components of a sensible substance. And in fact Aristotle explains in
H 6 that only form is the actual component of a sensible substance, while
matter exists only potentially. As a matter of fact, in the final dilemma,
Aristotles presents argument (8)s conclusion as something distinct from
the claim that universals are not substances. However, argument (8) is
introduced by the words the issue can also be made clear in this way,
which suggest that argument (8) is after all part of the general criticism
of the substantiality of universals. If this is so, Aristotles point is probably
that, if universals can be considered in some sense to be part of sensible
substances, they cannot possibly be actual components of them.
The final dilemma (1039a1425) brings to light a difficulty emerging from
the foregoing discussion. For, if (a) a substance cannot be composed of
universalssince a universal signifies a such () and not a this (
) (cf. Arg. 4)(b) nor can it be composed of substances existing in it in
actuality (cf. Arg 8), then it seems that substance is absolutely incomposite.
And this might be a problem, because it might seem that substance would
turn out to be indefinable. For what is definable must be complex, at least
to some extent, while the dilemma shows that substance is incomposite.
But substance is what is considered to be definable to the maximum degree
138 The Third Man Argument is one of Aristotles main arguments against Platos Theory
of Forms (cf. Aristotle, Met. A, 9, 990b817; Soph. Ref. 22, 178b36179a10) and figures promi-
nently in Aristotles polemical treatise On Ideas (cf. Leszl (1975) and Fine G. (1993)). A similar
argument is advanced by Plato himself in Parm. 132A133A as a difficulty for his own theory.
I cannot go into the details of the argument here. For a reconstruction and evaluation of the
Third Man see (among the many others) the following classical studies: Owen (1953); Vlastos
(1954); Sellars (1955); Geach (1956); Strang (1963); Cohen (1971).
and thus, if substance is not definable, nothing is. The final dilemma has
been variously interpreted.139 For one thing, it rests on the controversial
assumption that the disjunction between a) and b) is in fact exhaustive.
For another, it is not clear how it relates to the rest of Aristotles argument
in Chapter 13. In any event, my opinion is that the difficulty the dilemma
poses is not a real one for Aristotle or, at least, is not one Aristotle does
not have a ready solution to. Suppose that it is the composite of matter
and form that Aristotle has in mind in the final dilemma. Now, it is clear
from the discussion in H 6 (but probably, already from that in the second
part of Z 17) that a composite of matter and form is a unity because it
possesses only one actual part, i.e. form, while matter and material parts
are only potentially present in the composite substance. So, even though a
sensible substance cannot be composed of two actual parts, it can still be
composed of one actual part and one potential part. In this sense, a sensible
substance is both unified and complex, and so definable. What is more, Z 12s
discussion has shown that form is both ontologically simple and definable,
and so ontological simplicity and definability are not incompatible as the
final dilemma seems to presuppose.140 Thus the difficulty raised in the final
dilemma has a rhetorical flavour to it and should not be taken too seriously.
Leaving aside argument (8), Z 13s arguments can be divided up into two
groups: arguments (1), (2) and (7) seem to be directed against any sort of
universal, be it specific or generic, whereas arguments (3), (4), (5), (6) are
concerned with generic universals, i.e. genera, since they challenge the view
that universals may be the substantial parts of a substance. Predictably, it
is the arguments in the first group that are relevant to the debate over the
status of Aristotelian forms. Let us look, then, more closely to the way such
arguments contribute to the debate. Argument (1) is often regarded as a
decisive piece of evidence in favour of particular forms. It establishes that
forms must be peculiar to the things of which they are the forms. And only
particular formsit is arguedcan be so. Is there a way out for supporters
of universals forms? Two main strategies have been tried out. According
139 Burnyeat (2001) attaches particular importance to the final dilemma. Although I do not
have the space here to discuss his interpretation, I tend to believe that the final dilemma is
not so crucial as Burnyeat seems to think.
140 Of course, form may have some kind of functional complexity in that it contains
the capacities for many different activities. The soul, for instance, has a certain functional
complexity in that it is source of the living beings many activities. This kind of complexity
should not be confused with ontological complexity, i.e. with an entitys being analysable
into distinct ontological constituents. For this useful distinction see Wedin (2000).
126 chapter one
to one view, argument (1) does not aim at establishing the unqualified
conclusion that universals are not substances, but only the more limited
one that a universal cannot be the substance of what it is predicated of (i.e.
of what it is a universal for).141 Thus, the argument rules out the possibility
that species and genera might be the substance of the particular substances
they are universally predicated of. Likewise, it rules out the possibility that
form might be the substance of the matter it is predicated of (i.e. it is
a universal for). Nothing in the argument, however, prevents form from
being the substance of the composite. For form is not predicated of the
composite, as we have seen. The problem with this line of argument is that
it makes much of the distinction between being substance and being the
substance of something. In Z 13 as well as elsewhere,142 however, Aristotle
formulates his thesis in general terms by simply saying that universals are
not substances at all. He does not seem to distinguish, therefore, between
being substance and being the substance of something, at least in so far as
the substantiality of universals is concerned. A more promising strategy has
been recently suggested by Burnyeat.143 He insists that a universal form can
be considered in two different ways and that in both ways it satisfies the
peculiarity condition established by Aristotle in argument (1). In particular,
a form can be considered in itself, i.e. apart from the different pieces of
matter it is predicated of, or together with this or that particular piece of
matter of which it is predicated. Either way, form is peculiar to the thing
it is the substance of. For when taken in itself form is the substance of
nothing but itself and so is peculiar to itself. This perfectly squares with
Z 6s claim that primary substances, i.e. forms, are identical with their own
essences. For such a claim implies that the substantiality of form is not
to be looked for in anything but form itself. Form, however, satisfies the
peculiarity condition even when taken together with this or that piece of
matter it is predicated of. For when joined to a particular piece of matter
form is made particular by that piece of matter and so is peculiar to the
particular substance it is the form of. Nonetheless, form remains in itself
universal in that it is only when it is predicated of a particular piece of matter
that it is particular.
Strictly speaking, argument (2) makes trouble for both parties in the
dispute. For the argument seems to establish that substance cannot be a
141 Cf. for this interpretation: Lewis F. (1991); Loux (1991); Wedin (2000).
142 Cf. Aristotle, Z 1038b89; 3435; Z 16, 1041a35; H 1, 1042a2122.
143 Cf. Burnyeat (2001), 5455.
predicate. So, whoever admits that form is predicated of matter should

try to explain away the conclusion of the argument, regardless of whether
form is particular or universal. Upon reflection, however, the argument is
particularly embarrassing for advocates of universal forms. For supporters
of particular forms rather insist that form is a subject of predication, as
I have hinted when I illustrated Z 3s argument.144 Some of them may be
prepared to accept the idea that form is predicated of matter, without
attaching, however, much significance to such a doctrine. Talk of form being
predicated of matter is just a short way of introducing the idea that form
confers substantiality upon matter and so gives the composite substance
the substantial character it possesses. But this does not mean that form is
a predicate in the strict sense of the term. On the contrary, form is best
conceived of as an ultimate subject of predication. Supporters of universal
forms, by contrast, make much of the idea that form is a universal entity that
exists in different pieces of matter by being predicated of them. Therefore,
they really need to explain away argument (2). But how do it? Once again,
one could appeal to the distinction between being a substance and being
the substance of something else and insist that argument (2) only prevents
something from being the substance of what it is predicated of. This move,
however, as we have seen, is problematic. Perhaps, a more promising way
of rescuing universal forms is the following. Form is certainly predicated
of matter, but matter does not really count as a subject. And so form can
be a substance even if it is predicated of matter. For by subject Aristotle
means an entity that enjoys a complete and autonomous existence, i.e.
a fully actual being. Matter is not such an entity, because it only enjoys
a potential and non-autonomous existence. Thus, argument (2) excludes
from substantiality species and genera, which are predicated of actual and
autonomous beings, i.e. individual composites of matter and form, but
does not exclude form, which is only predicated of matter. This move is
interesting, but faces a difficulty. In the first lines of the chapter (1038b4
6), Aristotle reminds us that there are two kinds of subject, individual
substance (which is the subject of accidents) and matter (which is the
subject of form). Aristotle uses the same term for the subject ()
as he employs in Arg. (2) and clearly counts matter as one kind of subject.
So, why should he give the term a new (and narrower) sense just a few lines
below so as to exclude matter from the things that count as subjects?
144 Cf. above, Sect. 3.2.

128 chapter one
Another argument that has some bearing on the problem of the status of
forms is Arg. (7). It states that a substance must be (or signify, as Aristotle
expresses himself) a (a this or this something) and not a (a
such). In the Categories (5, 3b1023) being a goes hand in handor
possibly just meansbeing an individual. Primary substancesand only
theysignify a . Secondary substances, i.e. species and genera, do
not signify a but only a . The point is that universals do not
directly point to individual objects in the world, but simply indicate the kind
of thing such objects are. Elsewhere in the Metaphysics, Aristotle reproposes
the contrast between individuals and universals in the way the Categories
presents it, with the only difference that term tends to replace the
term to indicate the nature of universals.145 Thus, if our passage in Z 13
pursues this line of thought, the point which is being made should be that
substances must be and so particular. Forms, therefore, since they
are primary substances, must be and so particular. It must be noted
that, on this reading, the Metaphysics is stricter on the notion of substance
than the Categories. For substantial universals are deprived of the status of
secondary substances they enjoyed in the Categories and relegated to that
of non-substances. Substantiality is confined to particulars.
In light of the foregoing considerations, the general problem for support-
ers of universal forms is the following: How can form be at the same time
and universal, if being a usually implies being a particular?
And above all: What does it mean for form to be a , if it does not
mean to be a particular? In this case as well, various proposals have been
advanced. Two in particular deserve our attention, especially for their sig-
nificance for the medieval debate. According to one view, the composite of
matter and form is in a primary sense, i.e. the sense of being a full-
fledged individual of a certain kind, while form is only in a secondary
sense. Form in particular is only in the sense that it is that in virtue
of which something can be properly called a . In other words, form is
what turns matter into an actual being and so into something that can be
properly called a . Only to such a limited extent can form be described
as a . Proponents of this solution appeal to De an. B 1 (412a79), where
145 Cf., for instance, Met. B 6, 1003a10 (where Aristotle employs ). I have argued for
the equivalence between and in Galluzzo (2004b). One reason why Aristotle
may have thought that the term captures the nature of universals better than is
that may convey the wrong impression that species and genera are accidents. However,
continues to be used to characterise universals, as is shown by Arg. 4 of Met. Z 13, where
the opposition is between and .
Aristotle in fact describes form as that in virtue of which something (i.e. the
composite) is a . This solution, however, will not do. For all through
Metaphysics Z and H form is described as primary substance. Since being
a is one of the distinguishing features of substantiality, form should
be expected to be in a primary sense and not in a merely secondary
one. Probably, the best solution to the question of has been advanced
by Gill.146 As we have seen, in Z 3 Aristotle says that form and the compos-
ite have better claims than matter to the title of substance because, unlike
matter, they possess two crucial marks of substantiality: being separable and
being a . In H 1, when summing up the conclusions of Book Z, Aris-
totle reiterates his claim and adds something more about separability.147 He
makes it clear in particular that form and the composite are separable in
two different ways. The composite is separable in an unqualified way, i.e.
is an independent entity enjoying a separate and autonomous existence.
Form, by contrast, is separable only in account. Even if a form cannot
exist without being united with some piece of matter or other, it is defi-
nitionally independent of the piece of matter it is united with. Or, to put
it otherwise, the definition of form does not make reference to the matter
form is joined to. So, there are two distinct senses of separability. Why not
think, then, that there are also two distinct senses of being a one
for the composite and the other for formwhich perfectly parallel the two
senses of being separable? According to this suggestion, the composite is a
in the usual sense of being a full-fledged individual of a certain kind.
Upon reflection, this sense of being a perfectly squares with the way
in which the composite is separable. For, presumably, only particulars can
enjoy an autonomous and independent mode of existence. Form, by con-
trast, is in a different sense, which does not imply individuality. For
it is in the sense of being fully determinate. The idea here is that
form is a completely determinate entity, i.e. an entity that cannot be further
determined from a formal or qualitative point of view. This does not mean,
however, that form is individual or particular, but only that it cannot be fur-
ther specified and formally characterised. Particularity is obtained only if
one takes into account also the particular pieces of matter form happens to
be joined to. The sense of that is proper to form parallels the idea that
form is separable in account and not existentially. The merit of Gills inter-
pretation is twofold. First, it rescues form from Z 13s argument by showing
146 Cf. Gill (1989), 3138.

147 Cf. H 1, 1042a2631.
130 chapter one
how form can be both a universal and a . For a fully determinate entity
can still be a universal entity. Second, it explains what it means for form to
be a . Forms and composites are in two different, but equally
primary, senses.
In conclusion, the task of supporters of universal forms is not particularly
easy. They have to explain away at least three important arguments in Z 13,
which, as they stand, seem to rule out the possibility of form being a univer-
sal of some kind. However, we have seen that supporters of universal forms
are not without solutions to these difficulties. Moreover, all the solutions
proposed seem to draw on particular pieces of Aristotelian doctrine, which
are in some way or other contained in the body of the central books of the
Metaphysics. Thus, the view that Aristotles forms are universal seems to be
as plausible as any other.
7.3. Particulars and Definition: Met. Z 15

Met. Z 15 contains a rather self-contained discussion of the relationship
between definition and particularity.148 The general thesis the chapter sets
itself to prove is that particulars are not definable. The text presents basi-
cally three different arguments for such a conclusion. Actually, the three
arguments have different scopes and targets. In the first part of the chapter
(1039b201040a7), Aristotle puts forward (i) an argument that is exclusively
directed against the definability of sensible particulars, i.e. things subject to
generation and corruption. From 1040a8 on, the attention shifts to the inde-
finability of Platonic Forms, a paradigmatic case of non-sensible particulars
(at least on Aristotles reconstruction). As a matter of fact, however, Aris-
totle presents two different arguments: (ii) one shows the indefinability of
Forms qua Forms (1040a827), (iii) while the other seems to be applicable,
by contrast, to any particulars whatsoever, be they sensible or non-sensible
(1040a27b3 together with 1040a912). The latter argument shows that par-
ticulars as such are not definable on account of the nature of definition itself.
In this section, I shall briefly examine each of these arguments. Then, I shall
try to see whether they compel us to say that Aristotelian forms are universal
and not particular.
(i) Aristotles argument against the definability of sensible objects is to some

extent straightforward, even though it is loaded with some important logi-
148 On Met. Z 15 see: Ross (1924), II, 213217; FredePatzig (1988), II, 280296; Castelli (2003).
cal assumptions. It can be reconstructed as follows. (a) Demonstration and

definition concern things that are necessary and not things that can be
otherwise such as sensible particulars. (b) For, if demonstration and defi-
nition did concern things that can be otherwise, then scientific knowledge,
of which demonstration and definition are instances, would be sometimes
knowledge and sometimes ignorancewhich is incompatible with the very
nature of scientific knowledge. Aristotle explains and justifies conclusion
(b) by means of a further reasoning. (c) Since sensible particulars are sub-
ject to corruption, it might be the case that they no longer exist when we
no longer perceive them. So, when we do not perceive them we do not
know whether they still exist or not and, consequently, we do not know
whether the things we used to say truly about them are still true. Presum-
ably, the line of thought Aristotle has in mind is the following. Suppose
that a sensible particular x is F, that we perceive x and we know that x is
F. When x no longer exists, x is no longer F and so it is no longer true to
say that x is F. Thus, our alleged knowledge of x being F was not knowl-
edge after all, because there cannot be knowledge of what is now true and
then false. Alternatively, we should be compelled to admit that our knowl-
edge becomes ignorancewhich is equally unacceptable because knowl-
edge can never become ignorance.149 As can be easily realised, Aristotles
argument is based on two strong assumptions concerning the semantic
behaviour of sentences in general. First, sentences can change their truth-
value; second, when x no longer exists the sentence x is F (supposing it to
be true when x existed) becomes false. Both assumptions are already stated
in the Categories.150 Within this framework, the argument makes sense. For
Aristotles point is that, since sensible objects go out of existence, any prop-
erty we migh attribute to themincluding definitional propertiesis actu-
ally a property these objects will cease to possess at some point. Thus, if a
definition picked out particular sensible objects, it would be true of them at
one time and false at another. But this cannot be the case because defini-
tion is a form of knowledge and knowledge must be about what is true all
149 For this reconstruction see FredePatzig (1988), II, 287288. Note that on this interpre-
tation of the argument the additional point that, when we do not perceive sensible objects,
we do not know whether they exist or not is not essential to the argument. For when they do
not exist, sensible objects do not have the properties they used to have whether we know it or
not. However, this additional point helps us to understand the problems we are confronted
with in the case of perishable objects.
150 For the first assumption see Cat., 5, 4a 21b13; for the second see Cat., 10, 13b1419. For
a careful discussion of both assumptions see Crivelli (2004), 2831.

132 chapter one
the time. The conclusion, therefore, is that a definition picks out the univer-
sal kinds sensible objects belong to, which always possess certain essential
properties, and not the particulars falling under such kinds.
(ii) The section concerning the definability of Forms qua Forms is particu-
larly obscure and difficult to understand. In fact, it probably contains two
arguments, the second starting at 1040a22. Here I shall confine myself to
reporting the main line of Aristotles reasoning. Platonic Forms were con-
ceived of as perfect particulars, i.e. paradigmatic instances of a certain prop-
erty F. Now, suppose two-footed animal to be the definition of the Form of
man. On Platos conception, to each component of this definition there cor-
responds a separate Form, that is in the case at issue the Form of animal and
the Form of two-footed. Each of these two Forms is a particular substance,
existing independently of the Form of man. Since the definition of the Form
of man is supposed to be the definition of a particular object, it must apply
to the Form of man alone. However, it is easily realised that this is not the
case. For the definition two-footed animal is predicable of both the Form
of animal and the Form of two-footed. It is predicated of the Form of ani-
mal not universally, because not all the animals are two-footed, but it is still
predicated of it particularly in that some animals are two-footed. On the
contrary, the definition is predicated of the Form of two-footed universally,
because only animals are two-footed and so two-footed things are animals.
Thus, since the definition two-footed animal applies to things other than
the Form of man, it cannot be the definition of one particular alone, i.e. the
Form of man, as it was thought to be.
(iii) Met. Z 15 presents also a third argument, which seems to apply to any
particular whatsoever, whether sensible or non-sensible. The argument is
not based on the nature of the object defined, but rather on that of definition
itself. The argument goes as follows: every predicate, being a common name,
is by nature applicable to a plurality of objects. A definition, however, is
nothing but a conjunction of predicates, and so will always be applicable
to a plurality of objects. Of course, it may happen, as a matter of fact, that
a definition applies to only one object, but, in principle, it will be always
applicable to a plurality of them. This fact clearly indicates that a definition
always picks out a certain kind of object and never a particular object as
such. To clarify things, Aristotle gives the example of the sun. The definition
of the sun only applies to one object, i.e. the sun, for the sun is the only actual
instance of the natural kind sun. But this is just a matter of fact and not of
metaphysical necessity. For there could well exist another object, which is
exactly like the sun and so shares with the sun all the essential properties.
In this case, the definition of the sun would apply to more than one object,
i.e. to more than one sun. This shows, once again, that a definition always
picks out the kind to which certain particular objects belong and not the
particular objects as such. Note that the argument presupposes nothing
about the nature of the object we wish to define (for instance its being
sensible or non-sensible) and so applies to any particular whatsoever.
It is a debated question whether Z 15s arguments force us to think that Aris-

totelian forms must be universal and not particular. One reason to think
they do so is that the arguments conclude that particulars are not definable.
Definability, however, is one of the distinguishing marks of substantiality.
For substance is what is definable to the highest degree. Now, form is pri-
mary substance. So, form must be definable and so universal. As I have
explained in Section 7.1, the force of this argument against the particularity
of Aristotelian forms has been largely overestimated. Supporters of partic-
ular forms have in fact an easy reply. They can simply point out that the
particular forms of a certain kind, though numerically different from one
another, are nonetheless specifically identical, i.e. are the same kind of form.
Therefore, they will share the same definition. So, for instance, two human
souls will be two numerically different particulars. However, being the same
kind of form, they will share exactly the same definition. This does not mean,
however, that there are universal forms in reality. For the general character
of definition is due to the character of definition and not to the character of
the objects defined. One thing is the nature of our language and knowledge,
quite another the nature of the world: we pick out and know things in gen-
eral, but there are no general things in reality.151 If this reply is correct, Z 15s
constraints on definitioni.e. definition always picks out a certain kind of
object and never an individual object as suchmay be satisfied even if in
reality there exist only particular forms.152
151 For a text that may be taken to support this response on the part of supporters of
particular forms see Met. M 10, 1087a1025.

152 This does not imply that particular forms of the same kind are qualitatively indis-
cernible. For they can still differ from one another for qualitative aspects, which are not
essential and so are not captured by a definition. Two human souls, for instance, will certainly
differ from one another in their moral and psychological qualities, which are accidental and
not essential properties.
134 chapter one
8. Substance As Cause in Met. Z 17
As Aristotle himself points out in the first lines of the chapter (1041a67),
Met. Z 17 marks a fresh start with respect to the four candidates listed in
Z 3 by exploring the new suggestion that substance is a cause or principle
of some sort. However, the discussion in the chapter is clearly intended as
a further confirmation of the main thesis emerging from the treatment of
the four candidates, namely that form is primary substance. Thus, one of
Z 17s main goals is to explain in what sense form is substance by being a
cause or principle of some sort. The expression of some sort is important
here because cause and principle are spoken of in many ways and,
presumably, form cannot be a cause and a principle in all the ways in which
cause and principle can be understood. All in all, the discussion in Z 17
makes it clear that form is a cause by being an essence, and so gives further
confirmation to the identity between form and essence which has already
firmly established in Z 1012.
The chapter falls into two distinct parts: (i) in the main bulk of the chapter
(1041a6b11), Aristotle provides a very detailed examination of the view that
substance is a principle or cause. (ii) In the final part (1041b1133), which
is a sort of appendix to the main argument, the claim is defended that the
principle that unifies the material parts of a sensible substance cannot be
one of those parts, but must be something different in character. The two
parts of the chapter are not unrelated. For in the first part Aristotle shows
that form is the principle responsible for the fact that certain material parts
are (in some sense of are) a sensible substance, for instance of the fact
that certain bricks and stones are a house. The final part adds the further,
important consideration that such a principle cannot be on par with the
material parts it is a principle for, but must possess a different nature and
ontological status.
(i) The main section of Z 17 owes much to the treatment of cause and causal
explanation in the second Book of the Posterior Analytics. Not only does
Aristotle use in crucial places material drawn from Post. Anal. B, but the
whole argument in Z 17 should be regarded as an attempt at applying to
the case of substances the model of causal explanation which was mainly
devised in the Analytics for the explanation of events and properties. The
first general point Aristotle establishes in Z 17 (1041a1014) is that any proper
causal enquiry should explain why a certain predicative fact obtains. In
other words, any proper causal enquiry should explain why x is y, i.e. why
a certain predicate belongs to a certain subject. In Post. Anal. B, 310, in
the course of his very sophisticated discussion of the relation between

definition and demonstration, Aristotle tells us which form a causal enquiry
should take.153 Suppose that we want to find the cause of a physical event
such as thunder. The first, preliminary thing to do, according to Aristotles
model, is to express the fact that it thunders in a predicative form, i.e. in
a sentence where a certain y is attributed to a certain x. This can be done
by assuming a preliminary definition or characterisation of thunder, for
instance by saying that a thunder is a certain noise in the clouds. Every
time a certain noise is in the clouds we are confronted with an instance
of thunder. Accordingly, we can rephrase the sentence It thunders in a
predicative form as (a certain) Noise belongs to the clouds where in fact a
certain y (noise) is attributed to a certain x (the clouds). Thus, the search for
the cause of thunder will be nothing but the search for the explanation of
the truth of the sentence Noise belongs to the clouds, i.e. the explanation
of why a certain noise belongs to the clouds. Both in Post. Anal. B and in
Met. Z 17, Aristotle adds the further point that the fact that noise belongs to
the clouds must be known to us before we set out to look for a cause of the
fact itself.154 In other words, we look for an explanation of facts and events
of which we know the existence or the obtaining.
Once we have expressed the phenomenon we want to explain in the
appropriate predicative form, we proceed to seek the cause of the phe-
nomenon. Aristotles idea is that the fact or event to be explained should
be the conclusion of a syllogism whose middle term actually indicates the
cause of the fact or event.155 Suppose for instance that we have found out,
presumably by means of an empirical investigation, that the cause of thun-
der is the extinguishing of fire in the clouds. Now we can build up a syllogism
illustrating the causal connection between the thunder and the extinguish-
ing of fire, i.e. a syllogism having Noise belongs to the clouds as its conclu-
sion and extinguishing of fire as its middle term:
1) Noise belongs to the extinguishing of fire
2) Extinguishing of fire belongs to the clouds
3) Noise belongs to the fire.
The syllogism presented, which is often called the syllogism of the cause,
shows the causal connection between the extinguishing of fire and thun-
der. For the middle term in the syllogism, extinguishing of fire is the reason
153 For the critical debate on Post. Anal. B 110, see supra, footnote 62.
154 Cf. Aristotle, Post. Anal. B, 8, 93a1520; Met. Z, 17, 1041a15.
155 Cf. Aristotle, Post. Anal. B,10, 93b3794a10.
136 chapter one
why the conclusion obtains. And the conclusion is the predicative counter-
part of the phenomenon of thunder. In Post. Anal. B 10 Aristotle suggests
that the syllogism of the cause enables us to get at a more complete defini-
tion of thunder.156 We started off with a partial and preliminary definition
of thunder as (a certain) Noise in the clouds. By rearranging the terms of
the syllogism of the cause we are now in a position to give a full definition
of thunder, a definition in particular that mentions the cause of this phe-
nomenon. Such a definition could be something like Thunder is a noise
in the clouds produced by the extinguishing of fire. The causal definition
includes our preliminary formula of thunder and adds a reference to the
cause of the phenomenon.
In Post. Anal. B 9 Aristotle hints at the fact that this general pattern of
explanation could be applied to substances as well, and not only to events
or properties.157 Met. Z 17 can be regarded as an attempt at fleshing out the
suggestion in Post. Anal. B 9. Intuitively, the idea is that the fundamental
structure of a sensible substance can be seen as the obtaining of some
predicative fact and that form should play a role analogous to that played
by the middle term in the syllogism of the cause and so explain why the
predicative fact in question obtains. There are, however, many difficulties
in applying the Posterior Analytics model to the case of substances. One,
preliminary difficulty is raised and solved by Aristotle himself in the course
of Z 17s argument.158 We have seen that what needs an explanation in any
proper causal enquiry is the obtaining of a predicative fact, i.e. the fact that
x is y or, equivalently, y belongs to x. It seems to be presupposed in this line
of argument that x and y should be distinct. For instance, it does not make
sense to ask why a musical man is a musical man, whereas it makes perfect
sense to ask why a man is musical, i.e. why the property musical belongs to a
man. Thus, a causal enquiry should take the form Why is x y? and not Why
is x x?.159 At first glance, however, the case of substances seems to be a case
of the form Why is x x?. For asking for a cause of the being of a man or of
a house would seem to amount to asking why a man is a man or a house is
156 Cf. Aristotle, Post. Anal. B, 10, 93b3794a10.

157 Cf. Aristotle, Post. Anal. B, 9, 93b2128.
158 Cf. Aristotle, Met. Z, 17, 1041a1415; a32b9.
159 Aristotle remarks (Z 17, 1041a1820) that one might think that there is in fact a cause
of x being x, namely the fact that each thing is indivisible from itself (presumably, a close
relative of the fact that each thing is identical with itself). Such an explanation, however, is
not the kind of causal explanation Aristotle is looking for. For it holds true of every kind of
thing, whereas Aristotle is clearly looking for causes explaining why a certain kind of thing
is the kind of thing it is. These causes will be different for different kinds of thing.
a housewhich both questions are not proper causal questions, since the
subject and the predicate are not two distinct things but one and the same
thing. Thus if questions concerning the cause of substances are to be proper
causal questions, they should be rephrased, if possible, so as to display a
certain predicative structure. The question Why is a house a house?, for
instance should take the form Why is something something else?.
Aristotles move in Z 17 consists in suggesting that questions of the form
Why is a substance x a substance x? should be reformulated as Why are
certain materials a substance x?.160 For instance, the question Why is a
house a house? should take the form Why are certain bricks and stones
a house?. This move is itself problematic because it is not entirely clear
what is the force of the verb to be in this example. Bricks and stones
constitute a house, but it is not clear in what sense they can be thought to
be a house. Certainly, bricks and stones are not a house in the sense that
they are identical with a house. For the point of the distinction between
matter and form seems precisely to deny the identity between a sensible
substance and the matter that constitutes it. Thus bricks and stones cannot
be simply identical with the house. Upon reflection, however, the verb to
be can retain its standard predicative force in the question Why are certain
bricks and stones a house?. Bear in mind the example of the thunder, where
the sentence It thunders was paraphrased as (a certain) Noise belongs to
the clouds. By analogy, in the case of bricks and stones, Aristotles point
could simply be that being a house belongs to bricks and stones. In other
words, bricks and stones are a house in that when they are shaped and
arranged in a certain way the property of being a house can be attributed
to them. Thus, to look for the cause of a house means to find what explains
the fact that being a house belongs to certain bricks and stones. Aristotles
claim in Z 17 is that form is what explains the fact that certain materials
are a substance in the sense specified. It is because the form of a house is
present in certain bricks and stones that the bricks and stones are a house.
Form is once again identified with essence and so the general claim is that
certain materials are a substance of a certain kind because the essence/form
corresponding to that kind of substance belongs to them, i.e. is present in
them.161 Bricks and stone are a house because the essence/form of a house
belongs to them. It is not clear whether Aristotle wants to build up a causal
syllogism having as its conclusion sentences of the form Being a house
160 Cf. Aristotle, Met. Z, 17, 1040a2628; b19.

161 Cf. Aristotle, Met. Z, 17, 1040a2632; b79.
138 chapter one
belongs to bricks and stones and as its middle term the form/essence of
a house. The text is completely silent on this point. A proposal could be a
syllogism such as the following:
1) Being a house belongs to a certain form/essence (i.e. whatever has a
certain form is a house)
2) A certain form/essence belongs to bricks and stones
3) Being a house belongs to bricks and stones162
Whether or not Aristotle intends to follow up literally the Posterior Analytics
model, his general strategy seems to be clear enough. He wants to use the
Posterior Analytics model of a causal investigation to bring into the fore the
causal role of form. The crucial premiss in the syllogism just presented is pre-
miss 2). For the idea that a certain form belongs to certain materials is just a
different way of expressing the more familiar idea that form is predicated of
matter. Thus, we clearly see that the form-matter predication explains the
structure of sensible particular substances. It is because a certain form is
predicated of a certain piece of matter that that piece of matter constitutes
a substance and so is (in the sense specified) a house. These considerations
can also explain the general priority of form over the composite substance.
For now it becomes clear that such a priority is, among other things, a prior-
ity in explanation. We have a particular composite substance only because
a certain form is predicated of the appropriate piece of matter. Thus form
must be prior to the composite of which it is the cause, since causes are
always prior to what they are the causes of. On this reading, Z 17 turns out to
be one of the most important steps in the argument showing that form is pri-
mary substance. For the existence and character of everything else depends
and is explained by the existence and character of form.
(ii) The final part of Z 17 adds another important point on the nature of
form. This section argues for the general claim that the principle that unifies
certain material parts or elements cannot be one further material part
and so must be different from them in nature and character. The point is
certainly proved with a view to form and so the intended conclusion is that
the form unifying the material parts of a sensible substance cannot be one
of them and so must be of a different nature from them. Aristotles proof is a
two-step argument. First (a) he shows that anything composed of material
162 For an insightful discussion of the application to substance of the Posterior Analytics
model see: Wedin (2000), 405454.

parts cannot simply be the sum of these parts, but must be these parts and
something else, namely a principle unifying the parts; then, (b) he proves
that such a principle cannot be one further material component by reducing
ad absurdum the opposed view.
(a) (1041b1219) The first step of the argument is achieved by making
use of the example of the syllable. The syllable BA cannot be the sum or
aggregate of the letters B and A, but must be the letters B and A, and
something else. This is shown by stressing the point that the sum of the
letters B and A and the syllable BA have different persistence conditions
and so cannot be identical: if we destroy the syllable BA by separating the
letters, the syllable no longer exists, while the letters as well as their sum
or aggregate, still do. Therefore, there must be something more to a syllable
than the letters composing it. This something more is the form of the syllable
that gives the letters a certain arrangement and keeps them together. The
letters B and A can also be arranged in a different way, for instance into
the syllable ABwhich shows that the form of the syllable AB is different
from that of the syllable BA and hence neither BA nor AB can be reduced to
their material components (A and B) alone. Likewise, also flesh is not just
the sum of its material components, for instance earth and fire, but must be
the material components plus something else, i.e. the form arranging the
material components and keeping them together.
(b) (1041b1927) Then Aristotle shows that form, the principle unifying
the material components, cannot be one further material component. Thus,
it is not only the case that a substance is not the sum of its material compo-
nents, but it is also the case that it is not the sum of the material components
and their form. For form is not one more element to be added to the sum
of material constituents, but is a principle of an entirely different nature,
which unifies and keeps together the material components of a substance.
This step of the argument is a reductio ad absurdum of the opposing hypoth-
esis. Suppose that form has the same nature as the material parts it unifies.
Then there seem to be only two possibilities: (j) either it is just another
material component (jj) or it itself is made of material components. If (j),
then we fall back into step (a) of the argument. For now we have a new plu-
rality of material components (i.e. the original material components plus
form, which is itself a further material component according to the hypoth-
esis) and so we need to posit a further unifying principle to keep together
the new set of material components. It is not difficult to see, however, that
we are off on an infinite regress of unifying principles, because the fur-
ther unifying principle will also be considered to be a material component
alongside the others and so we shall still need an extra unifying principle
140 chapter one
to keep together the new set of material components. And so at each step
ad infinitum. Therefore, we had better conclude that form is not a further
material component. (jj) The possibility is left that form be composed of a
plurality of material components. It must be composed of a plurality of com-
ponents, because if form were composed of only one material component,
there would be no distinction between case (j) and case (jj). But if form is
composed of a plurality of material components, we still need, according to
step (a) in the argument, to posit a principle unifying the different compo-
nents form is composed of. And so we are back to the starting point of the
argument, because the unifying principle will be either a further material
component or itself made of material components, and so on ad infinitum.
So, possibility (jj) will not do either and hence form cannot be a material
component on a par with the components it unifies. Aristotle concludes
that form must be of a different nature from the material components. It is
the substance and the primary cause of being of the material object it keeps
together and unifies.
In the second part of Met. Z 17, Aristotle makes as explicit as possible his
anti-reductionist account of material objects. More particularly, he wishes
to resist the reductionist claim that material objects are reducible to their
material parts. By insisting that we need to posit an extra principle to
unify the material parts of sensible objects, Aristotle makes the point that
material objects are not sums or aggregates of their material parts. By further
showing that the principle that unifies the material of a sensible object is
not one more material part, he also shows that form should be conceived of
as something different in nature from the parts it unifies. The result is that
material objects are structured wholes, in which one of their ontological
constituents, i.e. form, confers structure, organisation and fundamental
character to the whole object.
chapter two
SUBSTANCE IN AVERROESS
LONG COMMENTARY ON THE METAPHYSICS, BOOK VII
1. Averroess Interpretation of Met. Z
1.1. What Z Is About

As we have seen in Ch. 1, ones general interpretation of Aristotles doctrine
of substance in Met. Z depends on the stance one takes with regard to the
relation between Book Z itself and the Categories.1 In the Categories Aristotle
assigns the title of primary substances to ordinary particular objects, things
such as men, horses and plants. Ordinary particular objects are primary sub-
stances because they are the entities on whose existence the existence of
everything else rests. Both substantial universals and accidental properties
exist only in so far as they bear some relation to ordinary particular objects:
substantial universal exist in that they are said of, i.e. essentially predi-
cated of, particular objects, whilst accidental properties exist only in so far
as they are in, i.e. inhere in, them. According to the Categories, however,
ordinary particular objects are primary also in another sense. They are pri-
mary in that they cannot be analysed into more fundamental ontological
constituents. Aristotles claim should not be taken to imply that ordinary
particular objects are simple. On the contrary, they are not simple because
they clearly have some parts, for instance the physical parts they are made
of and can be divided into. However, the physical parts into which particu-
lar sensible objects can be divided do not count as ontological constituents,
i.e. are not principles that explain the substantial character of such objects.
The conclusion is that, in the Categories, the substantiality of primary sub-
stances is primary and cannot be explained in terms of more fundamental
entities.
Now, the difficulty with Met. Z is precisely that ordinary particular objects
are no longer regarded as unanalysable in the sense specified. According
1 For a general sketch of Averroess understanding of Aristotles theory of substance see
Galluzzo (2009a). See also Di Giovanni (2007) and (2008).

142 chapter two
to the doctrine in Z, particular objects do have fundamental ontological

constituents in terms of which their substantiality can be analysed and
explained. Ordinary particular objects are analysed, within Zs framework,
as composites of matter and form, and matter and form are the principles
or constituents which explain why a particular sensible object has the sub-
stantial character it does. Thus, the crucial question becomes: Does the fact
that particular objects are no longer primary in the sense of being ontolog-
ically unanalysable entail that they are no longer primary substances, i.e.
that they are no longer the entities that ground the existence of everything
else rests? In other words, does Aristotle maintain in Met. Z that the mat-
ter and form into which a particular sensible object is analysable are more
substances than the sensible object itself?
Clearly, these questions concern in particular the role of form. For even
though particular objects are analysed into matter and form, form is the
ontological constituent that is mainly or, possibly, solely responsible for par-
ticular objects having the substantial character they do. Forms, it might be
thought, simply replace particular objects in the role of primary substances
they played in the Categories. In Ch. 1 I have labelled incompatibilists those
who think that Zs enquiry marks a major departure from the ontology in the
Categories, and so that form replaces ordinary particular objects in the role
of primary substances. People who do not think, by contrast, that Zs enquiry
conflicts with the Categories may be called compatibilists. Compatibilists
insist that Met. Z and the Categories raise and answer two different kinds of
question. In the Categories, Aristotle is mainly interested in deciding which
things are primary substances, i.e. which entities are basic and so deserve
the title of primary entities. This question is answered once and for all in
the Categories by saying that ordinary particular objects are the basic enti-
ties in the world. Met. Z, by contrast, is concerned with another kind of
question. The treatise investigates the internal structure of primary sub-
stances and raises the question as to which of their ontological constituents
makes them the substances they are. The two questions do not clash with
one another, in that they concern two distinct ontological levels. In other
words, the principles explaining the substantial character of ordinary par-
ticular objects are not themselves objects, on a par with the things whose
substantiality they explain. On this account, form is only the substantial
principle of sensible substances, but is not a substance alongside sensi-
ble substances themselves. Often times, this point of view is expressed by
remarking that the Categories are interested in substances tout court, whilst
Met. Z is concerned with the substance of the entities that turn out to be
substances according to the analysis in the Categories. The expression the
substance in averroess long commentary 143
substance of is supposed to capture the idea that the explanatory princi-

ples of sensible substances do not compete with them for the title of primary
substances, but simply introduce a different level of analysis. On the com-
patibilist view, therefore, sensible objects and form are substances in two
different senses of substance: sensible objects are substances in the abso-
lute sense of the term, while forms are substances only in a relational and
secondary sense, i.e. only in so far as they are the substance of particular
sensible objects.
As we shall see in the next chapter, Thomas Aquinas endorses a strongly
compatibilist approach to the relation between Met. Z and the Categories.
For him, the claim in Met. Z that form is substance does not enter into
conflict with the view that ordinary particular objects, i.e. the objects that
within Zs framework are analysed as composites of matter and form, are
primary substances. For form is substance only in so far as it is the substance
of ordinary particular objects, and so is not a substance on a par with
them. Averroess position is more nuanced, but, in the end, goes rather
in the opposite direction. Although the Arabic commentator makes much
of the distinction between being a substance and being the substance of
something, he attaches to such a distinction an incompatibilist meaning.
According to Averroes, the general goal of Met. Z is to investigate the
causes and principles of sensible substances, i.e. of the objects which are
described in the Categories as primary substances and are analysed in Met.
Z as composites of matter and form.2 More determinately, the book aims to
reveal the nature of what is the principle and cause of sensible substances
by being their essence or quiddity, i.e. by being the item we should point
to when answering the question as to what sensible substances are.3 As
we shall see, the entity which is the principle and cause of sensible sub-
stances by being their essence or quiddity, is form. Thus, Averroes clearly
assumes that ordinary particular objects are the most paradigmatic cases of
substances and construes Zs enquiry as a causal investigation into the sub-
stance of sensible substances, i.e. the principle or ontological constituent
accounting for such substances being substances. However, Averroes
thinks that the investigation into what counts as the substance of sensi-
ble substances is not without consequences for the question of what we
should consider a substance in the absolute sense of the term. For he clearly
seems to endorse the principle that, if x is the cause of ys being F, then
2 Cf. Averroes, In Met., VII, ed. Venice 1562, t.c. 44, fol. 197C.
3 Cf. Averroes, In Met., VII, t.c. 5, fol. 156A.
144 chapter two
x is more F than y.4 This clearly emerges from his treatment of the rela-
tion between substances and accidents, which Aristotle deals with in Met.
Z 1. Substances, Averroes explains, are prior in being to, i.e. more real than,
accidents because they are the causes of their existence.5 Presumably, sub-
stances are the causes of the existence of accidents because substances do
not depend on accidents in the way accidents depend on them, and hence
explain in some sense why accidents exist. Therefore, even though both sub-
stances and accidents exist, substances are more real than accidents in that
they explain why accidents exist, whilst the reverse is not the case. This gen-
eral scheme can also be applied without difficulties to the case of the rela-
tion between sensible substances and their ontological constituents.6 The
substance of sensible substancesi.e. form, which is the cause of sensible
substances by being their essenceexplains why such substances are sub-
stances, and hence is more substance than the sensible substances whose
substantiality it explains. Therefore, even though form and sensible sub-
stances, i.e. the composites of matter and form, are both substances, form
will be so to higher degree than the sensible substances of which it is the
cause.
As can be seen, the distinction between being a substance and being the
substance of something else, which is usually employed to defend a com-
patibilist strategy, is used by Averroes to uphold a different, incompatibilist
approach. For him, the expressions being a substance and being the sub-
stance of something do not introduce two different senses of substance and
so two different questions about substance. On the contrary, what counts as
the substance of something else also counts as a substance in its own rights;
what is more, it turns out to be more of a substance than the thing of which
it is the substance in that it explains its substantiality. Thus, on Averroess
account, even though it is true that Met. Z continues the enquiry into sub-
stances started up in the Categoriesbecause the things of which we seek
the causes and principles are the sensible substances of the Categoriesit is
also true that the book reopens the question of substantiality and provides
a new answer to it. On the new account, ordinary particular objects, which
are now analysed in terms of matter and form, continue to be substances.
4 This principle is endorsed by Aristotle in Met., 1, 993b2425 and clearly approved by
Averroes in the corresponding commentary (cf. In Met., II, t.c. 4, fol. 30AB).
5 Cf. Averroes, In Met., VII, t.c. 3, fol. 154EF; t.c. 5, fol. 155M.
6 Cf. Averroes, In Met., VII, t.c. 7, fol. 157L, where Averroes clearly applies the general prin-
ciple to the case of the relation between particular sensible substances and their ontological
constituents.
After all, as Averroes puts it, they are the particular ostensible substances,
the objects which are given to us as substances in our ordinary perceptual
experience.7 However, they are no longer thought of as primary substances
in that they turn out to be less substantial than the principle or ontological
constituent which accounts for their substantiality, i.e. form. This outcome
clearly represents a departure from or at least a revision of the sketchy ontol-
ogy Aristotle lays out in the Categories.
On Averroess reading, therefore, Met. Z contains a unique, long argu-
ment, whose main aim is to prove that form is the principle of sensible
substances by being their essence or quiddity and, as a consequence, that
form is primary substance. Thus, the discussions of each of the four candi-
dates for the title of substance (the subject, the essence, the universal and
the genus), as well as the treatment of the notion of substance as cause in
Met. Z 17, all contribute something towards establishing the role of form as
primary substance. Of course, the discussion of essence and definition in
Z 46 and 1012, and the treatment of substance as cause in Z 17, make a
more direct contribution to proving the substantial character of form. For
form is substance by being a cause of some sort, i.e. by being cause in the
sense of essence and quiddity. And the sense in which form is essence and
cause is clarified precisely in Z 412 and Z 17, respectively. However, also
the analysis of subject in Z 3 and that of universals in Z 13 provide indirect
evidence for the claim in question. Z 3, for instance, sheds some light on
the substantial character of form by showing that matter cannot be taken
to be a self-standing, actual substance. It is form that confers upon matter
a certain substantial character by turning it into an actual and determi-
nate being. But the treatment of universals is also important. Since form, in
fact, is the cause of sensible substances by being their essence, and essence
is expressed in a definition containing universal predicates, it is crucial
to understand the ontological status of the universals figuring in a defini-
tion. From Section 2 onwards I shall illustrate in some more detail how
the discussion of each candidate contributes to establishing the substan-
tial character of form. Right from the start, it is important to emphasise
once again that the clarification of the role of form as a primary substance
represents, according to Averroes, the unifying trait of Zs enquiry as a
whole.
7 Cf. Averroes, In Met., VII, t.c. 5, fol. 156FG.

146 chapter two
1.2. Logic and Metaphysics8

Another general aspect of Averroess interpretation of Met. Z as a whole is
his view that Zs enquiry into the notion of substance is logical in character.
In other words, the arguments and notions Aristotle uses in Z to prove that
form is primary substance are logical, i.e. they are arguments drawn from
logic or based on logical notions. What can Averroes possibly mean by this
claim? And what is his general motivation for attributing to metaphysics a
logical character?
In order to answer these questions, it may be useful to briefly recall the
analysis of the term which has been recently provided by M. Burn-
yeat. In Met. Z 4 (1029b1314) Aristotle starts his treatment of essence by
presenting some logical considerations. In Burnyeats reconstruction, logi-
cal considerations are opposed to metaphysical considerations: essence is
first dealt with at a logical level (Z 46) and then at a metaphysical one (Z 10
12). What is more, Burnyeat does not think that the distinction between a
logical and a metaphysical level of analysis is confined to the case of essence
alone. On the contrary, he believes that also the discussion of the other can-
didates for the title of substanceas well as that of the notion of substance
as a cause in Met. Z 17can be divided into a logical and a metaphysical
section. Each candidate, therefore, is discussed first at a logical level and
then at a metaphysical one. Burnyeats view is based on a certain under-
standing of the meaning of the term logical. On his account, the term
carries in the context of Zs enquiry two basic meanings. (i) In one sense,
an enquiry is logical if it is abstract and general and so does not make use of
the proper principles of a certain science. Thus, a logical enquiry within the
metaphysical domain is an enquiry which does not put to use the proper
principles of metaphysics, i.e. matter and form. Accordingly, the logical dis-
cussion of the different candidates for the title of substance is an abstract
analysis, which does not mention the notion of matter and form. It is, there-
fore, to some extent an aporematic discussion, i.e. a discussion that ends in
difficulties which can be resolved only when matter and form, the proper
metaphysical principles, are brought into the picture. The resolution of the
difficulties raised by the logical sections is precisely the task of the meta-
physical sections, which make extensive use of the notions of matter and
form. (ii) Logical sections, however, are logical also in another sense. They
are so in that they literally draw material from the treatises which have been
regarded for centuries as Aristotles logic, i.e. the works contained in the so-
8 On the topic of this section see Di Giovanni (2010). See also Di Giovanni (2009).
called Organon. Thus, on Burnyeats view the discussion of each candidate,

as well as the treatment of substance as cause in Z 17, deliberately start from
definitions or notions which can be traced back to Aristotles Organon.
Burnyeats analysis of the meaning of the term logical can help us to
clarify Averroess problematic claim that Met. Z as a whole has a logical
character. One important difference between Burnyeats and Averroess
approaches is that, whilst Burnyeat thinks that logical and metaphysical
sections alternate in the course of Zs argument, Averroes believes that the
whole of Met. Z has a logical character. As we shall see, this view is shared,
with some small differences, by Aquinas as well. This means that, strictly
speaking, neither Averroes not Aquinas are of the opinion that Zs enquiry
is logical in the first of the two senses singled out by Burnyeat. Admittedly,
Averroes and Aquinas do take Zs argument to be very general and abstract,
especially because it relies on very general notions such as predication, defi-
nition, essence and so on. However, they clearly find themselves in disagree-
ment with the view that some sections in Book Z deliberately eschew any
reference to matter and form. For them, it is rather the case that the notions
of matter and form are introduced through an indirect and abstract analy-
sis, i.e. an analysis which starts from a logical discussion of predication and
definition. But this does not mean that such notions are absent from entire
sections of Book Z. Accordingly, Averroes and Aquinas do not think that
some sections of the book are deliberately aporematic, either. Though being
abstract, Aristotles argument is conclusive, through and through.
Averroes is close to Burnyeat, by contrast, in so far as the second sense
of logical is concerned, i.e. the idea that Zs enquiry is logical in that
it borrows material from Aristotles logical works. Averroes seems to say
exactly this in an important and famous passage in his commentary on Met.
Z 1, which deserves to be quoted in full:
It must be known that this exposition is logical and that many demonstra-
tions in this science [i.e. metaphysics] are logical, since the propositions of
this science are drawn from dialectic [i.e. logic]. For dialectic can be used in
two ways. (i) In one way in so far as it is an instrumentand in this way it
is used by the other sciences. (ii) In another way, it is used in so far as what
is demonstrated in dialectic is assumed by the other sciences () for meta-
physics considers unqualified being, and dialectical propositionsas much
as [dialectical] definitions and descriptionsare about unqualified being
()9
9 Cf. Averroes, In Met., VII, t.c. 2, fol. 153KL: Et sciendum est quod ista declaratio est
logica, et plures demonstrationes in hac scientia sunt logicae, scilicet quoniam propositiones
148 chapter two
In the passage quoted, Averroes explains that logic can be used by the
other sciences in two different ways. In one way, logic is used as an instru-
ment. In other words, the other sciences use logical notions and proce-
duresdefinitions, schemes of inference, methods of refutationto reach
positive conclusions. This way of using logic is common to all sciences and
does not concern metaphysics specifically. In another way, however, logic is
not used as an instrument but rather as a positive science which can offer to
other sciences positive doctrines and conclusions. It is this way of using logic
that is proper to metaphysics and to Met. Z in particular: the metaphysi-
cian takes as starting points of his enquiry propositions which have been
established in logic. Averroes does not say so explicitly, but clearly for him
propositions established in logic simply means propositions contained in
Aristotles logical works. Thus, Zs enquiry is logical because it takes as its
starting points doctrines contained in Aristotles logical worksand this is
precisely the second sense of logical singled out by Burnyeat.
The logical propositions Met. Z draws on certainly include for Averroes
the characterisations of the four candidates for the title of substance which
can be found in some way or other in Aristotles Organon. By far the most
important among those characterisations is Aristotles logical description
of essence as what is given in response to the question about what a thing
is, i.e. as what is revealed in the definition spelling out what a thing is.10
This is not surprising in the light of what we have said about Averroess
interpretation of Zs general aim. Since the book aims at showing that
form is the substantial cause of sensible objects by being their essence,
Aristotles logical characterisation of essence should be the cornerstone of
Zs argument as a whole. As a matter of fact, the logical characterisation
of essence guides Averroess reconstruction of the whole section Z 416.
The other, important logical proposition Averroes puts emphasis on is the
notion of substance as cause, which Aristotle presents in Met. Z 17 once
the discussion of Z 3s four candidates is concluded. Although the notion
of cause may be thought to be a typically physical notion, it is regarded
by Averroes as logical on the grounds that it is used by Aristotle in the
Posterior Analytics in order to clarify the relations between demonstration
eius sunt acceptae a Dialectica. Dialectica enim usitatur duobus modis : uno modo secundum
quod est instrumentum, et sic usitatur in scientiis aliis. Et alio modo ut accipitur illud
quod declaratum est in illa in aliis scientiis () cum ista considerat de ente simpliciter, et
propositiones dialecticae sunt entis simpliciter, sicut definitiones and descriptiones et alia
dicta in eis. The translation is mine.
10 Cf. Averroes, In Met., VII, t.c. 11, fol. 161D.
and definition. Moreover, according to Averroes, the outcome of Z 17s dis-

cussion is the claim that the only kind of cause that can play the role of
the substance of sensible objects is the formal cause, i.e. the essence that
explains why sensible substances are what they are. And the essence is iden-
tified by Averroes with the form of sensible substances. So, the connection
between the notion of cause and the logical notion of essence is firmly estab-
lished in Averroess mind. In conclusion, Met. Zs discussion is dominated by
two logical propositions which Averroes traces back to Aristotles Organon:
the claim that essence is what is revealed by a definition, which guides the
argument from Z 4 to Z 16, and the further claim that the substance of sen-
sible things is their cause in the sense of formal cause and essence, which is
at the centre of Z 17.
Besides further clarifying Averroess understanding of logical, the pas-
sage from the commentary on Met. Z 1 also indicates why metaphysics is
entitled not only to use logical notions and procedures, but also to borrow
logical propositions, i.e. positive doctrines and definitions established in
logic. Logical propositionsAverroes observesare about the same sub-
ject as metaphysics deals with, i.e. absolute or unqualified being. This sug-
gests that metaphysics is entitled to start from logical propositions in that
logic and metaphysics study the same general subject matter. As a matter
of fact, in a passage from his commentary on Met. 2, Averroes explic-
itly states that absolute or unqualified being is the subject matter of both
logic and metaphysics.11 In this chapter, I cannot go into the details of such
an important view of Averroess, nor can I dwell on the passage from the
commentary on Met. . It may be useful, however, to sketch out Averroess
general intuition by contrasting it with a different way of construing the
relation between logic and metaphysics, which is characteristic for instance
of Aquinas. According to Aquinas, both logic and metaphysics study the
whole of reality, but they do so from two different perspectives.12 More par-
ticularly, the two sciences study two different kinds of being: metaphysics
is concerned with extra-mental being whilst logic studies mental being.
This means that metaphysics is concerned with concepts such as man,
horse, animal and so on, i.e. concepts which directly represent the things
existing in the extra-mental world. The concepts logic is most interested
in, by contrast, are notions such as species, genus, universal, individ-
ual and so on. Such concepts do not directly represent things existing in
11 Cf. Averroes, In Met., IV, t.c. 5, fol. 70HK.

12 Cf. Aquinas, Exp. Metaph., Lib. IV, lect. 4, n. 574.
150 chapter two
the extra-mental worldeven though they may be remotely grounded on

how things exist in the extra-mental worldbut rather reflect our way of
knowing extra-mental things and so concern the relation those things bear
to our intellect. The implicit presupposition behind Aquinass view is that
mental and extra-mental being are two rather different kinds of being.13
This is true from both an extensional point of viewbecause mental being
includes also things that do not exist as such in the extra-mental world and
so exist only in the mindand an intensional point of viewin that mental
beings have properties extra-mental beings do not possess and the other
way round. Now, it is important to stress that this is not the way Averroes
conceives of the relation between mental and extra-mental being.14 For
him, mental and extra-mental being are not two different kinds of being,
but rather one and the same kind of being, i.e. absolute or unqualified
being, considered in two different ways. Mental being is extra-mental being
as it is represented in the mind, and being as it is represented in the
mind is just extra-mental being considered in a particular way, i.e. extra-
mental being considered in its relation to the mind and not in itself. This
explains why logic and metaphysics end up studying exactly the same kind
of being. Of course, the fact that metaphysics and logic both study absolute
or unqualified being does not mean that they deal with their subject in
the same way. On the contrary, Averroes makes it clear elsewhere in his
Long Commentary that logic is mainly concerned with the relations among
concepts rather than with those among things.15 However, these remarks
never lead Averroes to give up his general view that logic and metaphysics
share the same subject matter. For concepts and things are just one and the
same thing, i.e. absolute being, under two different modes of consideration.
In conclusion, Averroess general view on the relation between logic and
metaphysics grounds and justifies Met. Zs logical character and explains
why the book takes as its starting points a number of propositions which
have been established in logic.
1.3. The Question of Platonism

A third, general feature of Averroess interpretation of Met. Z is the Arabic
commentators belief that the book contains, alongside Aristotles positive
doctrine, a robust anti-Platonic line of argument. Thus, besides arguing in
13 See on this particular point: Aertsen (1992) and (1996), 244289; Galluzzo (2010b).
14 Cf. Di Giovanni (2010).
15 Cf. Averroes, In Met., VII, t.c. 43, fol. 194AB; see also: VIII, t.c. 2, fol. 210CD.
favour of Aristotles doctrine of substance and form, Met. Z spends some

time rejecting Platos doctrine of substance, i.e. the view that the true sub-
stances are separate Forms. Since Averroess interpretation of Aristotles
doctrine of substance centres on the notion of cause, it is perfectly natural
for him to read Aristotles critique of Plato in terms of cause and explana-
tion as well. Averroes, in other words, puts emphasis on the fact that Platos
Forms cannot play the explanatory role they are supposed to play. They can-
not, for instance, explain our knowledge of sensible things, nor can they be
of any use in explaining how sensible things come into being or why they
possess the fundamental and essential characteristics they possess. There-
fore, if Platos Forms cannot play such fundamental explanatory functions,
we should dispense altogether with them in our ontology. The explana-
tory roles indicated, by contrast, are successfully played by Aristotles forms,
which should accordingly be contemplated in our ontology and described
as the real substances precisely in virtue of the explanatory roles they are
capable of playing.
Averroess interpretation of the anti-Platonic line of argument is best
seen at work in the single sections of the text. For, clearly, the fact that some
sections of Z are regarded as parts of a general anti-Platonic argument may
affect considerably the way in which we should interpret them. Thus, I shall
say something more about the anti-Platonic critique when presenting the
single sections of Averroess commentary. Moreover, Averroess intuition as
to the importance of Platonism for our understanding of Met. Z is followed
and expanded on in a more systematic form by Aquinas, who presents a very
clear picture of how Aristotles anti-Platonic argument is structured and
organised. Here, therefore, I shall simply confine myself to indicating the
places in Z which, according to Averroes, have a distinctively anti-Platonic
character.
(i) The first attack on Platos theory of Ideas is contained in Met. Z 6.

The main thesis defended in the chapter, i.e. that primary substances are
identical with their own essence, rules out the existence of separate Forms.16
For Forms are usually regarded as the essences of the sensible particulars
that participate in them. However, if Forms are separate, they cannot be, a
fortiori, identical with the things of which they are the essences. Therefore,
Forms cannot be the essences of sensible substances and so are better
dispensed with altogether in our ontology. Z 6 also shows that Platos Forms,
16 Cf. Averroes, In Met., VIII, t.c. 20, fol. 169E.

152 chapter two
in so far as they are separate from the things of which they are the forms,
cannot explain either why sensible things are the kind of things they are or
how we come to have knowledge of them. Forms, therefore, are completely
useless in explaining the being and knowability of sensible things and hence
should be simply eliminated from the number of existing things.
(ii) Also the section Z 79 has a distinctively anti-Platonic character. As we

have seen, Z 79 break the discussion of essence by introducing an unex-
pected study of the principles of generation of sensible substances. Accord-
ing to Averroess interpretation, the main reason why Aristotle introduces a
discussion of generation in between the two sections on essence is precisely
to add a further piece to Z 6s criticism of Platos Forms. In Z 6, in fact, it is
proved that Forms can explain neither the being nor the knowability of sen-
sible things. Z 79 add the further point that Forms are useless even when
it comes to explaining the generation of such things. Just as we do not need
to posit separate forms, but only immanent ones, in order to explain what
sensible substances are and how we get to know them, so also the coming
into being of sensible substances can be explained by having recourse only
to forms that exist in the things of which they are the forms and not sepa-
rately from them. As we shall see, Averroes believes that Z 79 contribute
to Zs general argument also in some other respects, for instance in so far
as they defend the so-called Synonymy Principle, i.e. the principle that in
generation producer and product are the same in form. For the principle
confirms the role of form as the substance and cause of sensible substances.
However, it is clear that for Averroes the main aim of Z 79 is to produce
further evidence against Platos separate Forms.
(iii) The third, crucial moment of Aristotles anti-Platonic argument is the

section (Z 1316) on universals. This does not come as a surprise because
some parts of the section on universals are explicitly devoted to criticis-
ing Platos theory of Forms: Z 14 shows that Platos understanding of genus
and differentia is incompatible with the claim that genus and differentia
are the constitutive parts of a species; Z 15 establishes that particulars in
general are not definable and so proves the indefinability of Forms as well,
which Aristotle at times presents as perfect particulars; finally, Z 16 argues
that Platos highest generabeing and onecannot be the substance of
the things they are predicated of and henceso the argument seems to
implycannot be substances in any sense. Moreover, Z 16 also offers a final
evaluation of the merits and flaws of Platos doctrine of Forms. Thus, when
Averroes describes the section on universals as mainly concerned with crit-
icising Plato, he is in a sense merely following closely Aristotles text. The

important thing, however, is that Averroes describes the most important
chapter in the section, i.e. Z 13, as anti-Platonic. For the chapter argues for
the view that no universal is substance. As we have seen, many contem-
porary interpreters bring the chapter to bear on the status of Aristotelian
substance, i.e. form. Some take the chapter to establish that Aristotles forms
cannot be universal, if they are substances. Others resist this conclusion
and suggest that Z 13 does not commit us to the particularity of Aristotles
forms. Both parties agree, however, that the chapter has something to say
about the status of Aristotles forms. To interpret, as Averroes does, Z 13
as an anti-Platonic chapter offers a different perspective on the text. On
this reading, the aim of Z 13 is not so much that of arguing for the gen-
eral claim that no universal whatsoever is substance, as the more limited
one of establishing that no Platonic universal, i.e. no separate universal, is
substance. Of course, the chapter may have something to say about the sta-
tus of Aristotles forms too, but this is not in the end what the chapter is
about.
2. The Subject
At the beginning of Met. Z 3 (1028b3336) Aristotle lists four candidates for

the title of substance: the essence, the universal, the genus and the subject.
Aristotle leaves aside for the time being the other candidates and selects
the subject as the immediate object of investigation. At least the first three
items on the list should be taken to be candidates for being the substance
of particular sensible substances, i.e. the entity explaining why sensible
substances are substances.17 Thus, the suggestion is that, for instance, the
essence of a particular object may be taken to be the cause or explanation
of the particular objects being a substance (and being the kind of substance
it is). As we have seen in Section 1.1, Averroes thinks that, if the essence
should turn out to be the substance of a particular object, it should also
be considered to be more substance than the particular object of which it
is the substance. And the same kind of considerations apply to the cases
of the universal and the genus. In contrast with modern interpreters, but
also with Aquinas, Averroes takes the universal to refer to the remote, i.e.
the most universal genera, whilst the genus would refer to the proximate
17 Cf. Averroes, In Met., VII, t.c. 7, fol. 157KL.

154 chapter two
genus, i.e. presumably the species.18 Thus, the suggestion is that the genera
and species that are predicated of particular objects could be thought to
be their substances, i.e. the entities explaining why particular objects are
substances.19 On this view, a particular sensible object is the substance it is
because it belongs to a certain species or to a certain genus.
An interesting question is whether the subject is also interpreted by
Averroes in the same way, i.e. in line with his causal or explanatory reading
of Zs enquiry. In order to answer the question, it is crucial to realise that
Averroes makes the subject play two different roles within Z3 argument.
At first, he takes the subject to name a particular kind of entity, i.e. the
particular substance composed of matter and form. Then, he seems to
suggest that the subject also plays the role of a criterion to single out the
substance of particular sensible objects. In other words, it may be thought
that the ontological constituent of sensible substances that plays the role of
subject of their properties is also the substance of sensible substances and so
the cause of their substantiality: a sensible substance is a substance because
one of its constituent (for instance matter) underlies all its properties and
hence is the subject of them. This is precisely the suggestion Aristotle
explores in Z 3. In the final analysis, Averroes downplays considerably the
importance of the subject criterion in deciding what ontological constituent
plays the role of the substance of particular sensible objects. The point
remains, however, that the discussion of the subject criterion falls within
Zs causal investigation into the notion of substance. For what the criterion
is supposed to revealwhether this is actually the case or notis the
substance of particular sensible objects, i.e. the ontological constituent
which explains their substantiality. In the rest of this section, I shall try to
spell out in some more detail how Averroes reconstructs Z 3s argument.
Aristotle gives a general characterisation of the subject as that of which
other things are predicated while it itself is predicated of nothing further
(1028b3637). This is clearly a characterisation of an ultimate subject of
predication and is strongly reminiscent of Aristotles description of primary
substances in the Categories. Not surprisingly, Averroes puts the emphasis
on the connection between Z 3s characterisation of an ultimate subject of
predication and the primary substances of the Categories.20 For him, the
characterisation of the subject in Z 3 is precisely one of the logical propo-

20 Cf. Averroes, In Met., VII, t.c. 7, fol. 157L.
sitions Met. Z starts from: since Zs enquiry is about the notion of substance,
it is perfectly natural for Aristotle to start from his own characterisation of
primary substance in the Categories. Thus, on this reading, the notion of
subject in Z 3 does not point to a criterion of substantiality, which can be
plausibly thought to be satisfied in different ways by different entities, but
rather to a particular type of entity, i.e. the particular sensible objects which
the Categories describes as primary substances on account of their being
subjects for everything else.
However, it is clear that for Averroes the Categories notion of primary
substance is only the starting point of Aristotles analysis of the subject in
Met. Z 3. The hylomorphic model Aristotle endorses in Met. Z forces him to
revise the sketchy account of substantiality he provides in the Categories.
Since the particular sensible objects which the Categories describes as pri-
mary substances are analysable into matter and form, the question should
be raised of which constituent of a particular sensible object explains the
objects being a substance.21 The answer to this question has important
consequences also for the general issue of substance. For, from Averroess
perspective, the constituent of a sensible object which accounts for its sub-
stantiality has better claims to the title of substance than the sensible object
itself. For instance, if it should turn out that formrather than matteris
the cause or explanation of a composites substantiality, then form should
be considered to be more of a substance than the composite of matter and
form.22 What we need, then, is a criterion to decide which constituent of a
sensible object explains its substantiality. It is here that the subject comes
into play again. For one suggestion might be that the cause of a partic-
ular objects substantiality is the ontological constituent which plays the
role of subject for all the properties of the object. I talk of ontological con-
stituent here because the suggestion Aristotle (and Averroes) explores in
Z 3 is clearly that the true bearer of a sensible objects properties is not the
sensible object as such, but rather one of its fundamental constituents, i.e.
matter or form. From this new perspective, the subject does not point univo-
cally to a particular kind of entity, but rather to a general criterion to single
out the ontological constituent that explains the substantiality of a particu-
lar sensible object.
According to Averroes, Aristotle rejects the suggestion that the subject
criterion may act successfully to determine the cause of substantiality of
21 Cf. Averroes, In Met., VII, t.c. 7, fol. 157L.

156 chapter two
sensible objects. Actually, on the basis of Averroess text alone it is difficult

to decide whether according to the Arabic commentator Aristotle rejects
altogether the subject criterion as a criterion of substantiality or rather
believes that it needs being accompanied by other criteria in order not
to be misapplied. Be that as it may, it is clear that according to Averroes
the subject criterion is intrinsically ambiguous and so cannot be Aristotles
main criterion of substantiality in Z. The problem with the subject criterion
is that it points to the wrong candidate, i.e. matter. The task of the so-called
stripping-away argument is precisely to show how the subject criterion
can lead up to the mistaken conclusion that matter is the substance of
particular sensible objects and to explain why this conclusion is to be
rejected. Of course, Averroes does not deny that matter possesses some
degree of substantiality. What he wants to deny is that matter is substance
to a higher degree than form. For matter is not, while form is, the substance
of sensible objects.
Averroess literal reconstruction of the stripping-away argument is
straightforward. Aristotles thought experiment consists in stripping away
from a sensible substance all its non-substantial properties.23 What remains
after all the non-substantial properties of a thing are stripped off should be
taken to be the substance of the thing, i.e. what accounts for its being a sub-
stance.24 The process of stripping away comes in two steps. First, we strip
away from the individual substance its qualities, including its potentialities
for acting and being acted upon.25 Then, we remove quantities, and in partic-
ular dimensions, which seem to be the most intrinsic among the properties
of a sensible thing in that they mark out a sensible substance as a body.26
Whatever else a sensible substance is, it is also a body, and every body
is defined by being a tridimensional object. Both classes of properties
qualities and dimensionsare stripped off on account of their being non-
substantial properties. What remains after all the non-substantial proper-
ties of a sensible object are stripped off is the substance of the sensible
object, i.e. the substantial constituent of the object which accounts for its
being a substance. Such a component cannot be but matter. Forso the
argument goesmatter is what underlies both the superficial (qualities)
and the more intrinsic (dimensions) non-substantial properties of a sen-
23 Cf. Averroes, In Met., VII, t.c. 8, fol. 158LM.

25 Cf. Averroes, In Met., VII, t.c. 8, fol. 158M.
26 Cf. Averroes, In Met., VII, t.c. 8, fol. 159AB.
sible object. It is important to note once again that, in light of Averroess

endorsement of an explanatory criterion of substantiality, if the conclusion
of the stripping-away argument were true, matter would not only be the
substance of sensible objects but also a substance in its own right. What
is more, it would also be more substance than sensible objects themselves
precisely because it would explain why sensible objects are substances.
The fact that we arrive at matter after stripping away all the non-substan-
tial properties of a thing clearly indicates that Averroes does not take the
stripping-away argument as a genuinely Aristotelian procedure. For in the
Aristotelian ontology Averroes endorses one should take into account,
besides non-substantial properties and matter, also the substantial form
in virtue of which a sensible substance is the kind of thing it is. Averroes
alludes in fact, in the course of his reconstruction of the stripping-away
argument, to the view of some philosophers who did not clearly distinguish
between accidents and substantial form.27 The view is reported by Aquinas
as well and is usually attributed to the Presocratics.28 The origin of their
confusion lies in the fact that both accidents and substantial forms can be
regarded as some kind of formal principles, in so far as they are both prin-
ciples in virtue of which an object comes to acquire certain characteristics.
There is, however, a huge differenceAverroes impliesbetween the prin-
ciple that confers upon the thing its fundamental character (i.e. substantial
form) and that in virtue of which a thing acquires only non-permanent and
non-essential properties. Overlooking such a fundamental distinction can
mislead people into thinking that a substantial form can be removed from
a sensible object in the same way as its non-substantial properties. Form,
however, is not one of the non-substantial properties of a thing. Therefore, it
is not true to say, as the proponents of the stripping-away argument suggest,
that matter is the only substantial constituent which remains once all the
non-substantial properties of a sensible thing are stripped away. For form
remains as well. And form has better claim than matter to being described as
the substance of a sensible object. Since according to Averroes the stripping-
away argument is not Aristotelian, the possibility remains open that a cor-
rect application of the subject criterion may lead to identify form with the
substance of a sensible thing. However, this does not seem to be the case.
As we shall see, in fact, form comes to be described as the substance of sen-
sible things not on the basis of the subject criterion, but rather because it

28 Cf. Aquinas, Exp. Phys., Lib. II, lect. 2, ed. Maggiolo, n. 149.
158 chapter two
is the essence or quiddity of sensible substances. In other words, a careful

study of the predicates figuring in the definition of a sensible thing and of
their mutual relations shows that we should take form to be the substance
of a sensible object. Therefore, however useful the subject criterion may be
thought to be, it is not, according to Averroes, the fundamental criterion of
substantiality in Met. Z.
It should be noted, finally, that in Aristotles text the conclusion that
matter is substance to the highest degree is rejected because matter does not
satisfy two important requirements for something to be substance, namely
being separable and being a . Unfortunately, the translation of the
Greek text available to Averroes completely obscures the sense of Aristotles
text corresponding to such two requirements.29 Thus, Averroes has almost
nothing to say about the two requirements in the corresponding section
of his commentary. He confines himself to remarking that the concepts
which can be understood separately from other concepts, i.e. presumably
the predicates which figure in the definition of a sensible thing, indicate
that form rather than matter should be considered to be the substance of
a sensible object.30 This remark perfectly squares with Averroess doctrine
that the predicates making up the definition of a sensible substance only
refer to the formal parts of the substance and not to the material ones. I
shall deal with this crucial doctrinewhich is to some extent the core of
Averroess interpretation of Zin Section 5.
3. Essence
3.1. Essence in Met. Z 4

According to Averroes, Met. Zs enquiry takes as its starting point a series
of logical propositions, that is a series of propositions Aristotle has proved
in his logical books. By far the most important of these propositions is the
claim that the substance of a thing is what one gives in response to the
question about what the thing is.31 In other words, the substance of a thing
is the essence revealed by the definition expressing what the thing is. Not
surprisingly, therefore, Z 4s discussion of the notion of essence is one of the
most important sections in Met. Z, in that the study of essence is, according
29 Cf. Averroes, In Met., VII, t.c. 8, fol. 158H.

to the logical proposition Averroes takes as starting point, simply a study of

the substance of sensible things, i.e. of the ontological principle accounting
for their substantiality. It is important to emphasise that Averroes takes the
logical character of the investigation into essence rather seriously. Since
the essence of a thing is revealed by its definition, an analysis of essence
will result in an analysis of the relations obtaining among the predicates
figuring in a definition and between such predicates and the object defined.
That this is actually the case is easily seen if one looks at the way Averroes
reconstructs Z 4s general argument. We have seen in Ch. 1 that Aristotle
raises in Z 4 two questions: (1) What is an essence? (2) What things have an
essence? Now, it is clear that for Averroes the solutions to both questions
are guided by the same general principle, which we can call Principle of
Essential Unity (PEU): in a proper definition, the predicates figuring in the
definiens form an essential unity both with one another and with the thing
defined, i.e. the definiendum.32 In other words, in a definition by genus and
differentia, the genus, the differentia and the species express one thing, i.e.
one essence, and not three different things. All the descriptions or linguistic
formulae which do not satisfy PEU do not count as proper definitions and so
cannot be said to be formulae revealing a genuine essence. In this section, I
wish to show how PEU is applied by Averroes in order to answer Questions
(1) and (2).
(1) An essence is revealed by a proper definition. And PEU provides a

criterion for establishing which predicates are essential and so can figure
in the definition of a thing, and which are not essential and so are excluded
from the definition. (i) The first kind of predicate that Aristotle excludes
from the number of the essential ones are those which are only accidentally
said of a thing.33 It is important to note that by thing Averroes means here,
like Aristotle, a particular sensible substance. The hypothesis is not taken
into consideration that the predicates which are accidental with regard
to a sensible substance may turn out to be essential with regard to some
other thing, for instance a certain kind of accident. This is in keeping with
Averroess general claim that it is sensible substances of which we seek the
substance and essence, in that sensible substances are the things which we
naturally tend to describe as the fundamental objects in the world.
32 Cf. Averroes, In Met., VII, t.c. 11, fol. 161D; F.

33 Cf. Averroes, In Met., VII, t.c. 11, fol. 161GH.
160 chapter two
Now, how does PEU rule out accidental predicates? Averroess recon-
struction seems to be the following.34 Suppose that the accidental predi-
cate is in a place expressed the essence of man. Then, by PEU, being
in a place and being a man would indicate one and the same nature
or essence. For parity of reasons, however, all the other accidental predi-
cates should also express the essence of man. Being musical, for instance,
would express the same nature as being a man as much as being in a
place does. But the relation expressing the same nature as is naturally taken
to be transitive and so, if being in a place and being musical both express
the same nature as being a man it would follow that also being in a place
and being musical express one and the same naturewhich is clearly
false. Therefore, accidental predicates do not express the essence of sen-
sible substances. If they didAverroes further remarksthe consequence
would be that all the accidental categories would be of the same nature
which is absurd.35 For the different categories classify different kinds of
properties.
(ii) The second kind of predicate which Aristotle excludes from the num-
ber of the essential predicates are per se predicates in the second sense
of per se singled out by Aristotle in Post. An., A 4: that is, those predi-
cates which are said per se of their subject not because they enter into the
definition of their subject but rather because their subject is part of their def-
inition.36 The example employed in Z 4 is that of white which is said per
se2 of surface (1029b1619). Actually, Aristotle in the text seems to exclude
two different cases: neither the per se2 predicate white nor the complex
predicate white surface express the essence of surface. In his commen-
tary, by contrast, Averroes focuses exclusively on the second case, that in
which it is the composite of a per se2 predicate and its subject that is taken
to express the essence of the subject. Presumably, Averroes thinks that the
case of the composite white surface also shows that white by itself cannot
be an essential predicate of surface either. Be that as it may, Averroes does
not think that the formula white surface can be taken as a complex, essen-
tial predicate, or even a definition, of surface. This time around, he uses
PEU not to evaluate the relation between the subject and the alleged essen-
tial predicate, but rather that between the constitutive parts of the formula
white surface. White surface is not the essence of surface because the

36 Cf. Averroes, In Met., VII, t.c. 11, fol. 161HI.
formula white surface implicitly contains a repetition, and containing

a repetition is a sign of the formulas being the formula of two different
natures, and not of one single nature. The reason why Averroes thinks that
the formula white surface contains a repetition is the following.37 White
surface is a formula containing two terms; thus, the definition of white
surface will be composed of the definition of surface plus the definition
of white. But the definition of white is in its turn composed of or will
contain a reference to two terms, i.e. whiteness, and the subject in which
whiteness inheres per se, i.e. surface. Here Averroes is simply going by
the assumption, which will be proved in Met. Z 5, that the definition of
per se accidentsand, as a matter of fact, the definition of all accidents
contains a reference to the subject in which such accidents inhere per
se. In other words, the definition of accidents is a definition by addition,
i.e. a formula mentioning something external to the nature of the object
defined, in the case at issue the (kind of) subject a certain kind of accident
necessarily inheres in. The outcome of the argument is that the definition
of white surface will mention surface twice, once in its own terms and
the other in the definition of white. The fact that white surface implicitly
contains a repetition indicates that white surface does not signify one
single nature, but rather two different natures. For proper definitions, i.e.
definitions signifying one single nature, contain no repetition. For instance
the formula rational animal contains no repetition and so counts as a
proper definition. The formula white surface violates PEU because white
and surface express two different natures. In the formula rational animal,
by contrast, rational and animal signify a single nature.
In conclusion, those predicates can be taken as essential which do not
bring about any repetition when they are conjoined.38 Essential predicates
form an essential unity with one another and with the thing of which they
are essentially predicated.
(2) PEU also dominates the discussion of the second question dealt with
in Met. Z 4, i.e. the question of which things have an essence. As we have
seen in Ch. 1, Aristotle gives two different solutions to this question, an
exclusive solution, according to which only substance have an essence and
a definition while all the other things have no essence and definition, and
a more inclusive one, according to which substances have an essence and a
37 Cf. Averroes, In Met., VII, t.c. 11, fol. 161IL.

38 Cf. Averroes, In Met., VII, t.c. 11, fol. 161M162A.
162 chapter two
definition primarily while other things can be said to have an essence and
a definition only in a secondary sense. Here I shall be only interested in
Averroess interpretation of Aristotles exclusive solution.
There are three classes of things which might be said to have an essence:
substances, accidents, and accidental composites, i.e. things like a white
man which are composites of a substance and an accident. In his commen-
tary, Averroes discusses only the case of substances and that of accidental
composites, without dwelling on the case of accidents. More precisely, Aver-
roes thinks that the discussion concerns two different kinds of composite:
individual substances, which are composites of matter and form, and acci-
dental composites, which are composites of a substance and an accident.
The reason why Averroes leaves aside the case of accidents is a metaphysical
one. From his commentary on Met. Z 45 it clearly emerges that accidents,
at least when considered according to their concrete existence, are nothing
but accidental composites.39 In other words, the property whiteness exists
in no other way than as a white thing in that it cannot exist independently of
the subject it inheres in. Therefore, once it is demonstrated that accidental
composites have no essence, it is also demonstrated that accidents do not
have one either. Thus, the case of accidents is somehow dealt with together
with that of accidental composites.
According to Aristotles exclusive solution, therefore, accidental compos-
ites have no essence. But why? On Averroess reading, accidental compos-
ites have no essence because their definitions violate PEU, the principle
according to which all the predicates in the definiens signify one single
nature, i.e. the nature of the thing signified by the definiendum. Let me
spell out in some detail why Averroes thinks that the definitions of acci-
dental composites violate PEU. If accidental composites have an essence,
their definitions should be exactly like the definitions of substances, i.e.
they should be formulae where the conceptual content of one single term
is spelt out by means of two terms, a genus-term and a differentia-term.40
One reason why the definitions of accidental composites might be thought
not to conform to the standard model of definition is that in their case the
definiendum is not one single term, such as for instance man, but rather a
complex term such as white man, which is actually composed of two other
39 Cf. for instance: Averroes, In Met., VII, t.c. 12, fol. 163A: () qui vult definire quidditatem
albedinis existentis in homine, accipiet in definitione eius definitionem hominis albi, cum
albedo existens in homine non constituatur nisi per hominem et album.
terms, white and man. This difficulty, however, can be overcome.41 We

can assign in fact to white man a single name, say cloak and simply
stipulate that cloak signifies the same thing as white man. Therefore,
if cloak has an essence it must have a definition by genus and differentia.
Averroes assumes, for the sake of argument, that white man is in fact the
definition of cloak.42 If cloak has an essence, then in the formula white
man man should signify the genus and white the differentia, just as
animal and rational signify respectively the genus and the differentia in
the definition of man.43 However, it is clearAverroes arguesthat the
relation between man and white is not the same as the relation between
a genus and a differentia.44 For the genus and the differentia expresses
one single nature, whilst man and white clearly signify two different
natures.45 This emerges from the fact that the terms man and white are
not homogeneous. While the definition of man does not contain anything
external to the nature signified by man, the definition of white contains
something external to the nature of whiteness, namely the subject which
needs to be added in the definition of all accidents and so also in the
case of white. In other words, the definition of white is a definition by
addition while that of man is not.46 The different behaviour of the terms
white and man shows that they cannot signify a single nature in the
same way as rational and animal do. Man and white are not a genus
and a differentia, which express a single nature, but rather a subject and a
property, which are things of different natures.
The argument ends with the remark that things have an essence only if
they are wholes, i.e. unities.47 Talking about wholes or unities is another
way of restating PEU. Things have an essence if their nature is a single
nature, and not a nature resulting from the composition of two different
natures. The nature of substance is a single nature, whereas that of acciden-
tal compositesand so of accidentsresults from the composition of two
different natures. Therefore, only substances have an essence and a defini-
tion. Accidental composites and accidents have no essence and definition.
Accordingly, the formula which says what they are will not be a proper
41 Cf. Averroes, In Met., VII, t.c. 12, fol. 162IK.

42 Cf. Averroes, In Met., VII, t.c. 12, fol. 162K.
44 Cf. Averroes, In Met., VII, t.c. 12, fol. 162M163C.
47 Cf. Averroes, In Met., VII, t.c. 12, fol. 163CD.
164 chapter two
definition, but rather a description which explains the meaning of their

name and generically indicates the way they concretely exist.48 Since both
accidental composites and accidents are the result of two different natures,
the formula which says what they are must make reference to such two
natures. But this formula is not a definition. And so accidental composites
and accidents have no essence.
I wish to conclude this section with a remark about the general signifi-
cance of Met. Z 4 within Averroess reconstruction of Zs enquiry. I said that
the discussion of essence is supposed to reveal the substance of sensible
objects, i.e. the principle or ontological constituent that accounts for sen-
sible objects being substances. The principle or constituent in question is
form. It is form that explains why sensible objects are substances. There-
fore, form is the substance of sensible objects and so is also more substance
than them. However, it is hard to see how Z 4s abstract treatment of essence
might contribute to the clarification of the notion of form. On the face of
it, the chapter says little or nothing about form and confines itself to talk-
ing about sensible objects and their essence without further specifying what
essences are or are made of. But Averroes would not agree. At the end of his
first solution to the question of what things have an essence, Aristotle fur-
ther specifies his claim that only substances have an essence by saying that
essence belongs only to the . As we have seen in Ch. 1, contempo-
rary interpreters are divided into those who take to mean species and
those who take the term in the sense of forms. Averroess interpretation is in
line with that of the second group of contemporary scholars. Aristotle dis-
tinguishes, according to the Arabic commentator, between forms that have
a genus, and so have an essence as well, and forms that do not have a genus,
and so do not have an essence, either.49 The first group contains substantial
forms, whilst the second comprises accidental forms.50 Thus, when Aristo-
tle says that only substances have an essence what he means to say is that
only substantial forms have an essence. This seems to suggest, as we shall
see in Section 5, that sensible objects, i.e. composites of matter and form,
have an essence only in so far as their forms have one. From a more techni-
cal point of view, the contrast between forms that have a genus and forms
that do not have a genus should be understood in the light of the consider-
ations Averroes makes when he reconstructs Aristotles exclusive solution.
48 Cf. Averroes, In Met., VII, t.c. 13, fol. 163GL.

Forms that have a genus means forms whose definition contains a genuine
genus-term, as is the case with the definition of man, whilst the expression
forms that do not have a genus means form whose definition does not
contain a genuine genus-term, as is the case with the definition of white
man or of white, where the place of the genus is taken by the subject of
inherence.
In conclusion, Z 4 alludes to the doctrine, which Averroes presents in
more detail when commenting on Z 1012, that the essence of a sensible sub-
stance should be identified with its form alone. Accordingly, the definition
of a sensible substance makes reference only to its formal characteristics
and so is in a significant sense a definition of its form. This doctrine also
implies that all the terms figuring in the definiens of a definitioni.e. the
genus-term and the differentia-termsignify formal characteristics of the
thing defined, though at different levels of generality. I shall deal at length
with Averroess views on the essence and definition of sensible substances
in Section 5. The important thing to stress here is that his views are antici-
pated, though briefly, in the commentary on Met. Z 4.
3.2. Z 5s Puzzles
In Z 5 Aristotle presents two difficulties (aporiae) concerning a particular
class of accidents, i.e. the so-called coupled accidents. Coupled accidents
are things like snub or snubness, i.e. properties which exist only in one kind
of subject (the nose in the present case) and so seem to have built into
their own nature a reference to the kind of subject they exist in. The gen-
eral idea behind the two aporiae is that the unavoidable reference to the
subject coupled accidents seem to contain generate paradoxes both when
we try to define things like snub and when we use the word snub in com-
plex expressions such as, for instance, snub nose. There are two general
aspects concerning Averroess interpretation of the chapter which are worth
bearing in mind. The first is that Averroes follows very closely Aristotle in
his evaluation of the relation between coupled and standard, uncoupled
accidents. In other words, he first distinguishes sharply between coupled
accidents (i.e. things like snub), which are bound up with one particular
kind of subject, and uncoupled accidents (i.e. things like white), which are
not bound up with any subject in particular, and lets us understand that
the difficulty presented in the chapter arises only in connection with cou-
pled accidents.51 At the end, however, he endorses Aristotles conclusion
51 Cf. Averroes, In Met., VII, t.c. 17, fol. 166I; t.c. 18, fol. 167CE.
166 chapter two
that all accidents behave exactly like snubness: for all kinds of accident, that
is, there is a subject which bears to the accident in question the same rela-
tion as the nose bears to snubness.52 Therefore, once we have singled out
the right kind of subject, all accidents turn out to be coupled accidents. The
second general aspect concerns Averroess diagnosis of the difficulties and
paradoxes presented in the chapter. As emerges especially from his inter-
pretation of the second aporia, Averroes seems to think that Z 5s puzzles
stem from treating the definition of accidents as if they obeyed the logic of
the definitions of substances. Once we abandon the presupposition that the
definitions of accidents are exactly like those of substances, the puzzles can
be solved and any impression of paradox disappears. Predictably, the pre-
supposition is wrong because the definitions of accidents do not conform
to the standard model of definition by genus and differentia according to
which substances are defined.53 In this section I shall try to illustrate these
two general aspects of Averroess interpretation by looking at the way he
reconstructs the two aporiae the chapter presents us with.
(Aporia 1) Averroess understanding of the first aporia (1030a1428)) is to

some extent peculiar. Aristotle simply says that, if we take definitions by
addition, i.e. definitions where we must mention something external to the
nature of the object defined, not to be true definitions, there will be prob-
lems with defining coupled accidents (1030a1416). For coupled accidents
can only be defined by addition, by also mentioning the subject they invari-
ably inhere in. Thus, if definitions by addition do not count as proper defini-
tions, coupled accidents will have no definition at all. The argument clearly
presupposes a distinction between coupled and uncoupled accidents: the
former, i.e. things like snub, make reference to a particular kind of sub-
ject, while the latter, i.e. things like white, do not make reference to any
particular kind of subject but can inhere in different kinds of subject. Usu-
ally, Aristotles distinction is taken to imply that uncoupled accidents have
better claims to being definable than coupled ones. In so far as uncoupled
accidents can be defined without making reference to any particular kind
of subject, they seem to be proper objects of definition on a par with sub-
stances. Of course, the last part of Z 5 (1031a17) will correct this perspective
by making it clear that all accidents are in the end coupled accidents and so
the problems we face in the case of things like snub present themselves for
52 Cf. Averroes, In Met., VII, t.c. 19, fol. 168BC.

53 Cf. Averroes, In Met., VII, t.c. 18, fol. 167EF.
any accident whatsoever. However, a prima facie consideration of accidents

may lead one to think that, while coupled accidents are particularly difficult
to define on account of the subject they always bring along with them, this
is not true of simple or uncoupled accidents.
Averroes, by contrast, seems to take things the other way round. For
him coupled accidents have better claims to being defined than simple
accidents.54 He goes as far as to say that, if one considered simple accidents
alone, one might come to the wrong conclusion that accidents have no
definition, either in a primary or in a secondary sense.55 By contrast, if
one considered only coupled accidents one might come to the equally
incorrect conclusion that accidents have a definition unqualifiedly in the
same way as substances.56 Thus, the general sense of Aristotles argument
becomes on Averroess reading the following. The only accidents which can
be thought to have an unqualified definition on a par with substances are
coupled accidents, because their definition seems to have the same form
as the definition of substances. However, treating the definition of coupled
accidents in the same way as the definition of substances yields insuperable
difficulties and paradoxes. Therefore, we should abandon the claim that the
definition of coupled accidents is an unqualified definition and be content
with the claim that they have a definition only in a secondary sense. But
simple accidents too turn out in the end to be coupled accidents. So, all
accidents have a definition only in a secondary sense. If simple accidents
were not coupled accidents, they would have no definition at all.
Admittedly, Averroess reconstruction is quite surprising. But I suspect
that what he means is consistent with his general reading of Z 5. Since in
the definition of coupled accidents we mention the subject they invariably
inhere in, the definitions of coupled accidents are the only ones that might
be taken to be exactly like the definitions of substances. For one might
wrongly assume that in the definition of a coupled accident the subject
of inherence plays the role of genus whilst the property that inheres in
the subject plays the role of differentia. Such a possibility is not available
in the case of simple accidents, because in their case there is no specific
and determinate subject we should mention in their definition. Thus, there
seems to be no reason to take (even wrongly) the definitions of simple
accidents to be exactly like the definitions of substances, i.e. definitions by
genus and differentia.
54 Cf. Averroes, In Met., VII, t.c. 18, fol. 167CE.

168 chapter two
(Aporia 2) The reason why it is wrong to take the definitions of coupled

accidents to be exactly like definitions of substances is shown in the sec-
ond aporia.57 Treating the definitions of coupled accidents as if they obeyed
the same logic and had the same structure as the definitions of substances
leads to a series of difficulties and paradoxes. The moral to draw is that the
definitions of coupled accidents are different from the definitions of sub-
stances, i.e. are definitions only in a secondary sense. Once this conclusion
is established, the difficulties and paradoxes pointed out by Aristotle can be
overcome.58
According to Averroes, what gives rise to difficulties and paradoxes is to
think that (i) snub is defined by genus and differentia. For instance, one
might think that the definition of snub is snub nose or concave nose. In
these formulae, nose would play the role of genus and snub or concave
would be differentiae, just as animal is the genus and rational is the
differentia in the definition rational animal. The exact reconstruction
of the difficulties arising from taking snub to be defined by genus and
differentia is made difficult by the differences between the Greek text and
the Arabic translation available to Averroes. What gets lost in particular
is the connection among the different paradoxes presented by Aristotle.
However, it seems to me that Averroes presents basically three puzzles,
along the lines of contemporary interpreters.
P1) If one takes snub as a species of which nose is the genus and
snubness or snub is the differentia, then one should concede that snub
nose is the same as concave nose. For concave is a differentia of nose as
much as snub and a snub nose is nothing but a concave nose. However,
if concave and snub are differentiae, then snub nose will be the same
thing as bow leg. For a bow leg is a concave leg, and so snub nose and
bow leg will be defined by means of the same specific differentia, i.e.
concave. And two species sharing the same specific differentia are just one
and the same species. Therefore, snub nose and bow leg are one and the
same species. But this conclusion is absurd. Since all the other premisses
seem to be true, we should reject the claim that snub and concave are
specific differentiae.59
P2) The second puzzle is somewhat obscure.60 However, I shall attempt
the following reconstruction. One difficulty with taking snub = snub nose
57 Cf. Averroes, In Met., VII, t.c. 18, fol. 167EK.

58 Cf. Averroes, In Met., VII, t.c. 18, fol. 167HK.
59 Cf. Averroes, In Met., VII, t.c. 18, fol. 167EG.
to be a definition with the same structure as man = rational animal, is that

snub plays at the same time the role of species and that of differentia.
Thus, on one interpretation, i.e. when snub is taken to stand for the
species, snub nose will be some sort of meaningless expression exactly
like man animal: nobody attaches any meaning to man animal and so
nobody should attach some to snub nose. To avoid this consequence, we
may suppose that the definition of snub is not snub nose but concave
nose. In this case, however, the expression snub nose will implicitly
contain a repetition. For if we substitute for snub its definition in the
expression snub nose, we shall get concave nose nose, where nose
is mentioned twice. Thus, also the definition of snub as concave nose
should be rejected.61
P3) The third puzzle is not particularly clear either.62 Averroes seems
to suggest that if we attributed to things such as snub a proper definition
we would be off on an infinite regress of noses. My impression is that
Averroes reverts to the definition of snub as snub nose after rejecting
the suggestion that snub could be defined as concave nose (for the latter
definition generates repetitions when we use the expression snub nose).
But defining snub as snub nose will lead to an infinite regress of noses
without avoiding repetitions. For, if we substitute snub nose for snub in
the expression snub nose, we obtain snub nose nose and, by substituting
again snub nose for snub in snub nose nose, we obtain snub nose nose
nose, and so on ad infinitum. Thus, also the definition of snub in terms of
snub nose should be rejected.
The difficulties mentioned in Puzzles 13 can be overcome if we abandon
the idea that the definition of accidents should have the same structure and
obey the same logic as the definition of substances.63 In other words, we
should stop thinking that nose is the genus of snub and concave its
differentia. On the contrary, a nose is only the subject in which concavity
61 Averroes seems to allude to a further possibility, i.e. the case in which snub indicates
something opposed to what is indicated by the nose (t.c. 18, fol. 167H). Presumably, the
suggestion here is that we could avoid saying that snub or concave are differentiae of
nose by saying that they are differentiae of some other genus. However, this would not
mend things much. For the genus of which snub or concave are taken to be differentiae
would be a genus different from and incompatible with nose, i.e. a genus we obtain by
dividing a higher genus through differentiae incompatible with those through which we
obtain the genus nose. Therefore, to say snub nose or concave nose would entail a
contradiction in that snub and concave would be not differentiae of nose but of some
other genus incompatible with nose.
170 chapter two
inheres and a subject of inherence is not to be confused with a genus.

Moreover, concavity is an accidental property inhering in a subject and
an accidental property should not be confused with a specific differentia.64
Averroess suggestion seems to be that the expression the snub is ambigu-
ous between the snubness, i.e. the property of being snub, and the snub
thing, the thing that is snub. Of course, the snub thing is a nose, i.e. a snub
nose, but this is not the primary sense of the word snub. Snub means pri-
marily a certain property, presumably concavity, which is found in noses. If
we define the snub or the snubness as the concavity which is found in a
nose we shall see that nose is not a genus but rather the subject of inher-
ence of concavity. The new definition will enable usAverroes addsto
solve the puzzles raised by Aristotle.65 For when it is defined as the concav-
ity which is found in a nose, snubness will not signify the nose directly
but only as a consequence, i.e. as something implied by the primary mean-
ing of the word. Averroes says in fact that snubness signifies the nose only
potentially.66 So, when the nose is actually mentioned, as is the case in the
expression snub nose, the potentiality contained in the expression snub-
ness (i.e. the potential or implicit reference to the nose) will be realised
and the expression snub nose will signify the nose in actuality. On this
reading, however, the expression snub nose will give rise to no repeti-
tion or infinite regress of noses, because the potentiality of meaning con-
tained in snubness or snub is realised and, as it were, used up when
snub is conjoined with nose. In other words, in the expression snub
nose, snub does not signify the nose, not even implicitly or potentially,
because a reference to the nose is already present in the expression snub
nose.
In conclusion, the moral Averroes draws from Z 5s argument is that we can

assign to coupled accidents an essence and a definition, provided that we
do not assign to them the same kind of definition as substances. In other
words, coupled accidents have only a secondary kind of definition. And
since all accidents turn out to be coupled accidents once we have singled
out the right subject of inherence for them, all accidents have an essence
and a definition, although a secondary one.

66 Cf. Averroes, In Met., VII, t.c. 18, fol. 167I.
3.3. Averroess View on Accidents: Some General Conclusions

In the light of our analysis of Averroess exposition of Met. Z 15, it becomes
possible to draw some general conclusions about the Arabic commentators
view on the ontological status of accidents. Let me start by distinguishing
two related but different problems, i.e. (i) the question concerning the very
reality of accidents, whether they exist or not, and (ii) the further question as
to whether accidents have an essence (and a definition). Averroess strategy
is identical in the case of both questions and consists in striking the right
balance between two extreme and equally wrong alternatives.
As to the reality of accidents, for instance, Averroess position seems to
be that it is wrong to maintain that accidents have no reality whatsoever,
i.e. do not exist at all. On the other hand, it is equally wrong to say that acci-
dents exist in the same way as substances, i.e. have the full and unqualified
kind of existence that characterises substances. Averroess position on the
reality of accidents takes inspiration from Aristotles doctrine of or
focal meaning. In Averroess eyes, the doctrine is primarily a metaphysical
doctrine, which grounds our semantic practices.67 At the metaphysical level,
Averroes maintains that substances are the causes of the existence of acci-
dents.68 What Averroes means, presumably, is that, since accidents depend
for their existence on the existence of substances while substances do not
depend for their existence on the existence of accidents, the existence of
substances explains the existence of accidents. The result is that accidents
do exist, but only because substances exist. Averroes expresses this point
also by saying that accidents exist only because they are dispositions of
substances, i.e. ways in which substances are characterised.69 Accidents, in
conclusion, are real properties of substances, which exist only because the
substances of which they are properties exist. The causal or explanatory
structure that obtains at the metaphysical level is reflected in our seman-
tics. Being is predicated of both substances and accidents. However, it is
predicated primarily of substances and only secondarily of accidental prop-
erties.70 Moreover, being is said of accidents only because it is said of sub-
stances, because the secondary sense in which being is said of accidents
can only be understood if we understand the (primary) sense in which it
67 Cf. Averroes, In Met., VII, t.c. 3, fol. 154F.

69 Cf. Averroes, In Met., VII, t.c. 4, fol. 155B. See also: t.c. 3, fol. 154DE.
70 Cf. Averroes, In Met., VII, t.c. 2, fol. 153FH; t.c. 3, fol. 154C; E.
172 chapter two
is said of substances.71 The conclusion is that, in its primary sense, being

signifies the being of substance, which is a primary form of being, while
in its secondary senses the term signifies the being of accidents, which is
a secondary form of being. In its secondary senses, in other words, being
signifies the different dispositions of substances, that is the different ways
in which a substance can be characterised.
As we have already seen, Averroes also takes an analogous position con-
cerning the problem of the essence of accidents. When commenting on
Aristotles inclusive solution in the second part of Met. Z 4, for instance,
Averroes reconsiders the whole issue of the essence of accidents and acci-
dental composites (t.c. 1416). He explicitly says that one should try to strike
the right balance between two opposed and equally wrong positions, i.e.
the view that accidents (and accidental composites) have no essence at all
and the claim that they have an essence in the same way as substances.72
The first position gives accidents too little, while the second gives them too
much. Averroess analysis of Z 5s puzzles confirms his dissatisfaction with
the two alternatives. We have seen in fact that, on Averroess reconstruc-
tion, the puzzles originate in the wrong assumption that accidents have
the same kind of essence as substances and hence their definition should
obey the same logic as the definition of substances. Since this assumption
makes the puzzles insoluble, one is easily lead to pass from the view that
accidents have the same kind of essence as substance to the opposed view
that they have no essence at all. Both alternatives, however, are unsatisfac-
tory. Averroes in fact defends an intermediate position, mainly based on the
idea that essence and definition are spoken of in many ways and so can
be attributed to different things according to different degrees. Substances
have an essence and a definition in a primary way, while accidental com-
posites and accidents can be said to have an essence and a definition only
secondarily and in a derivative way. This view is grounded on the considera-
tion that things can be said to have an essence and a definition in proportion
to their degree of unity.73 So, even though accidents and accidental compos-
ites do not have the same degree of unity as substancesin that they are the
result of two different naturesthey are nonetheless more one than things
which are one merely by contact or conjunction or by means of some exter-
nal link holding them together. Accordingly, it is wrong to attribute to them
no essence at all.

72 Cf. Averroes, In Met., VII, t.c. 15, fol. 165AC.
73 Cf. Averroes, In Met., VII, t.c. 16, fol. 166AC.
3.4. The Meaning of Met. Z 6

1. Averroess interpretation of Met. Z 6 is important in several respects.
The first is the general purpose the Arabic commentator assigns to the
argument in the chapter. At the beginning of Z 6 (1031a1516) Aristotle
asks the general question of whether each thing is identical with its own
essence. The prevailing interpretation among modern interpreters is that
each thing should be taken as a sort of quantified variable, ranging over
all kinds of entities we can think of as things. In other words, there are
many kinds of thing, i.e. substances, accidents and accidental composites,
and for each of them we should check whether they are identical with their
own essence or not. The outcome of Aristotles enquiry is that only primary
substances are identical with their own essence. Z 6 itself does not tell us
much about what primary substances are. However, as we have seen in
Ch. 1, the rest of Book Z clearly shows that by primary substances Aristotle
means forms, thus excluding the composites of matter and form from the
scope of the identity thesis. In any case, the fact remains that, independently
of its actual results, the enquiry into the identity thesis is set up in very
general terms, i.e. as an enquiry concerning all sorts of things we can think
of.
Averroess view on the general aim of Z 6s argument seems to be dif-
ferent. For him, the main question Aristotle wishes to answer in the chap-
ter is whether particular sensible substances are identical with their own
essence.74 Of course, Averroes also discusses the cases of accidents and acci-
dental composites and maintains, consistently with Aristotles text, that
they are not identical with their respective essences. However, his main
focus of interest remains the case of particular sensible substances. At a
very general level, it is not difficult to see why Averroes is mainly inter-
ested in whether particular substances are identical with their own essence.
I have said that, according to Averroes, the essence of sensible substances
is their form: as we shall see in Section 5, it is form and formal parts in
general that we should mention in response to the question as to what
sensible substances are. Moreover, form is also the substance of particular
sensible substances, i.e. the ontological constituent explaining their sub-
stantiality. Thus, to ask whether a particular sensible substance is identi-
cal with its essence means to enquiry into the relation between a sensible
substance and the ontological constituent which accounts for its substan-
tiality.
74 Cf. Averroes, In Met., VII, t.c. 20, fol. 169DE.

174 chapter two
The importance of focusing on the essence of sensible substances can be

better clarified if we look at another general problem which Z 6s argument
presents. Aristotle argues in favour of his main claimi.e. that things that
are spoken of per se, primary substances, are identical with their own
essenceby taking as paradigmatic cases of primary substances Platos
Forms. This has created some embarrassment among commentators, in
that it is not all clear why Aristotle should choose as paradigmatic cases
of primary substances entities in whose existence he does not believe.
The solution that is generally offered consists in thinking that the identity
thesis sets requirements for any (essentialist) ontology whatsoever. In other
words, any ontology must include entities for which the identity thesis
holds, i.e. entities which are identical with their own essence. Therefore, if
Platos Forms exist, they must be identical with their own essence. Of course,
Aristotle has independent reasons for believing that Forms do not exist,
but his point that the identity thesis should hold for Forms if they existed
gives further strength to claim that his primary substances must be identical
with their own essence. In this case too, Averroess interpretation differs
from that of modern interpreters. For one thing, according to Averroes,
Z 6 does not take Platonic Forms, but rather Aristotles particular sensible
substances, as paradigmatic cases of substances and proves of them and
not of Platos Forms that they are at least in some sense identical with
their own essence. For another, Z 6 has, on Averroess reading, an anti-
Platonic character.75 This means that the arguments in favour of the claim
that the identity thesis holds of primary substances also call into question
the existence of Forms, that is show that Platos Forms cannot be primary
substances.
What does the anti-Platonic character of the chapter have to do with the
problem of the relation between particular sensible substances and their
essence, which Averroes regards as the main focus of Z 6? From Averroess
commentary it emerges that the anti-Platonic point of the chapter is no so
much that Platos Forms are not identical with their own essence as that
they cannot be the essences of particular sensible substances, as Platonists
think they are.76 The main reason why Forms cannot be the essences of
sensible substances is that they are separate, i.e. they are independent
substances separate from the sensible substances of which they are thought
to be the essences. In other words, if sensible substances and Forms are both
75 Cf. Averroes, In Met., VII, t.c. 20, fol. 169E.

76 Cf. Averroes, In Met., VII, t.c. 20, fol. 169K170C.
independent substances separate the ones from the others, Forms cannot
be the essences of sensible substances.77 In the light of these considerations,
one suggestion might be that, when Aristotle talks about identity, he does
not always mean strict identity but sometimes only non-separateness. In
other words, there may be things which are strictly identical with their
essences: for instance Aristotles forms are likely to be things that are simply
the essences they have, i.e. things for which no distinction can be drawn
between the essence and its bearer. But there are other things which can
be thought to be identical with their essence in a weaker sense, namely not
because they simply are the essence they have but because their essence
is not separate from them. Particular sensible substances belong to this
second group of things. They are identical with their essence not because
no distinction can be drawn between them and their essence, but because
their essence exists in them and so they and their essence are not things
existing separately from one another.
One may wonder why Averroes should be interested in the reading I
have just proposed, i.e. in distinguishing between different senses of being
identical with. We have seen in Section 1.1 that for Averroes form is the
substance and essence of particular sensible substances, i.e. the compos-
ites of matter and form. We have also seen that, in virtue of being the
substance and essence of sensible substances, form is also more substance
than the sensible substances of which it is the substance and essence. If
this is the case, Averroes may have an interest in preserving a distinction,
i.e. a mind-independent distinction, between sensible substances and their
forms. Sensible substances and their forms are non-different or identical
in that forms are not distinct and independent objects over and above the
sensible substances of which they are the forms. One could say that a sensi-
ble substance and its form coincide in their concrete existence in that they
are the same concrete, ostensible object. However, sensible substances and
forms are not strictly identical in that forms are ontological constituents
of sensible substances which can still be distinguished from the sensi-
ble substances at least on the basis of their respective causal or explana-
tory properties: forms are what explains why sensible substances are sub-
stances, while sensible substances are what is explained by forms. Intro-
ducing some form of mind-independent distinction between a sensible sub-
stance and its form is also in agreement with the realistic interpretation of
the matter-form composition Averroes seems to defend, i.e. with the idea

176 chapter two
that talking of matter and form is talking of two distinct constituents of a

particular sensible substance.78
That Averroes takes such a flexible view on the meaning of the identity
thesis is confirmed by the text of his commentary on Z 6. Clearly, when
he denies that accidents and accidental composites are in fact identical
with their essence, he is taking identical in the sense of strictly identical.
And the same is true, I believe, of the claim Aristotle better illustrates in
Z 10 and 11 that forms are identical with their essence: Aristotles forms in
fact are strictly identical with their own essence. But the case of particular
sensible substances seems to be different. Throughout his commentary on
Z 6 Averroes defends the thesis that sensible substances are identical with
their own essence. However, it is clear from the way he phrases the identity
thesis that he does not mean that a sensible substance and its form are
strictly identical, but rather that they are not separate.79 A form exists in a
sensible substance, i.e. by being the form of a sensible substance, and hence
a sensible substance and its form are not two distinct sensible objects. This
does not mean, however, that they are strictly identical.
My reading receives further support from an important passage at the
end of Averroess commentary on Z 6. Aristotle hints in the text at the diffi-
culty raised by the Sophists about whether Socrates (i.e. a particular sensi-
ble substance) is identical with his essence or not (1032a68). According to
Averroes, the difficulty is the following:80 (i) either a man is identical with
his essence (ii) or he is not. (ii) If he is not identical with his essence, then his
essence will not make known what the man in question is, nor will it bear in
general any relation to the man of whom it is the essence. The arguments in
Z 6 have in fact shown that these are the consequences of a things not being
identical with its essence. (i) On the other hand, if a man is identical with his
essence, the essence of a man will be a man and so will possess an essence.
But, for parity of reasons, the essence of the essence of a man must be iden-
tical with the essence of a man and so be a man and possess an essence. So,
by assuming (i) we are off on an infinite regress of essences. Averroes, how-
78 Of course, to say that matter and form are two constituents of a particular sensible sub-
stance does not mean that they are like two physical parts of it. They are rather ontological
parts, i.e. principles which can be distinguished in some sense from the whole the funda-
mental characteristics of which they contribute to explain. Thus, matter and form are not
spatially distinct parts, but rather non-spatial (and non-temporal) constituents that coincide
spatiotemporally with the whole of which they are constituents.
79 Cf. for instance: Averroes, In Met., VII, t.c. 20, fol. 169K; 170BC; t.c. 21, fol. 171BC.
ever, has a solution to the difficulty raised by the Sophists.81 He says that in
one sense a man is identical with his essence, whilst in another he is not.
A man is identical with his essence if man is taken as the form of a man,
whilst he is not when man means the composite of matter and form. The
implicit assumption in Averroess solution is that the essence of a man is his
form. Thus, his view seems clearly to be that when a man is taken as a com-
posite of matter and form, i.e. as a particular sensible substance, he is not
identical with his own essence. A particular sensible substance and its form
are identical only in that they are not separate, i.e. they are not two distinct
actual objects. By contrast, a man is identical with his essence when a man
is taken in the sense of the form of a man. Presumably, Averroes thinks that
there is nothing wrong with saying that the form of a man is a man, if all that
we mean by this is that the form of a man is what a man essentially is. When
considered in its essential features a man is just his form.
It may be objected to my reconstruction that the point Averroes wishes
to make in his solution is simply that a man is not identical with his essence
when taken as a particular man, while he is identical with his essence when
taken as a universal man, i.e. as the species man. In other words, the only
identity Averroes would have in mind is that between the definiendum
man and the definiens rational animal, i.e. an identity between univer-
sals. This objection is inadequate for two reasons. First, because the iden-
tity between definiendum and definiens holds for every kind of thing, whilst
there are clearly things, such as accidents and accidental composites, which
are not, according to Averroes, identical with their essence. Thus, pointing
to the identity between the definiendum and the definiens in the definition
of a man cannot be all that Averroes has to say about the identity thesis. Sec-
ond, the objection is inadequate because we shall see in Section 5 that the
definition of a man is the definition of the form of a man, and so the definiens
in the definition of man indicates only the formal parts of a man. Thus, the
contrast between form and composite of matter and form is more impor-
tant for Averroes than that between universal and particular. Of course, the
definition of the form of a man is also the definition of a man in universal, i.e.
the definition of the species man. However, this point is not so relevant for
the question of the identity between a sensible substance and its essence.
2. Let me turn now briefly to Averroess interpretation of some of Z 6s main

arguments. Aristotle discusses first the case of things which are spoken

178 chapter two
of accidentally (1031a1928), i.e. accidental composites, and then moves

to things which are spoken of per se (1031a281031b22; 1031b281032a6),
i.e. substances. The discussion of substances is broken by a short analysis
of the case of accidents (1031b2228). I shall analyse Averroess treatment
of the cases of accidental composites and accidents together, because they
are to some extent one and the same case (1); then I shall turn to his anal-
ysis of substances and focus in particular on the anti-Platonic arguments
(2).
(1) Averroess argument against the identity between an accidental com-
posite and its essence presents some problems for the reconstruction.82 The
first thing to note, however, is that by identity Averroes means here strict
identity and not non-separateness: regardless of whether the essence of an
accidental composite is separate from the accidental composite in ques-
tion, it is in any case something different from it. Averroes presents the
case of accidental composites by saying that it is appropriate to think of
the predicates composing an accidental composite that they are not iden-
tical with the quiddities of those things of which they are predicated.83
The way Averroes phrases this claim, as well as the difficult argument he
advances in support of it, suggest that the identity between an acciden-
tal composite and its essence is denied on the basis of PEU, the principle
that in a proper definition the predicates figuring in the definiens form an
essential unity both with one another and with the thing defined, i.e. the
definiendum. In the present case the principle is applied by supposing that
man and white are both parts of the essence and definition of white
man.84 This is after all a natural supposition to make, given that a white
man seems to be essentially composed of both manhood and whiteness.
Thus, if a white man were identical with his essence, then by PEU both
man and white should be essentially identical with white man, i.e. should
express the same nature as white man. For in the case of man, a thing
which is identical with its essence, both parts of its essence, i.e. animal
and rational, are essentially identical with man in that they both express
the same nature as man. But this is not true in the case of white man and
the parts of its essence. Averroes does not spell out the argument in detail,
but confines himself to illustrating the case of man. Man is not essentially
the same as white man, for white man signifies something more than just
82 Cf. Averroes, In Met., VII, t.c. 20, fol. 169FK.

83 Cf. Averroes, In Met., VII, t.c. 20, fol. 169G.
man.85 Neither are the two parts of the essence of white man essentially
the same, in that white is only accidentally predicated of man and so
cannot form an essential unity with it.86 Apart from some difficulties of
detail, the general sense of Averroess argument seems clear enough. Things
like white man cannot be identical with their essence because the parts of
their essence (and hence of their definition) indicate two natures distinct
from one another and from the thing of whose essence they are the parts.
The essential parts, by contrast, of the things which are identical with their
own essence indicate the same nature as one another and as the thing of
whose essence they are the parts.
Later on in the chapter (1031b2228) Aristotle briefly discusses the case
of accidents. He seems to say that accidents can be taken in two ways, i.e.
together with the subject they inhere in and apart or in isolation from it.
When taken together with the subject they inhere in accidents are nothing
but accidental composites and so, as it has already been shown, are not
identical with their essence. On the contrary, when they are taken apart
from their subject, accidents are identical with their essence. Aristotles
point here must be that, when taken separately from their subject, accidents
are simple items and hence the parts of their essence all refer to the same,
single nature. However, the general tenor of the argument suggests that
the most correct way of taking accidents is together with their subject of
inherence. Therefore, in the end accidents are things which are not identical
with their own essence. Averroes, too, denies that accidents are identical
with their essence. His motivations in favour of this claim are not so distant
from the ones I have just indicated, even though he proves to misunderstand
Aristotles text concerning some small points of detail. First of all, Averroes
does not see any significant difference between the case of accidents and
that of accidental composites.87 The problem of the identity between white
and its essence reduces itself to that of the identity between white man
and his essence. This is a natural move for Averroes to make since he
believes that accidents in their concrete existence are nothing other than
accidental composites: whiteness only exists as a white thing. As we have
seen, however, accidental composites are not identical with their essence
because the parts of their definitions, which signify corresponding parts
of their essence, indicate different natures. In order to prove that this is

180 chapter two
actually the case, Averroes suggests that we consider the sentence White
is man and remarks that in one sense the subject and the predicate of
the sentence are not identical, whilst in another they are.88 They are not
identical in that white signifies a nature different from that of its subject
man. They are identical, by contrast, because white is truly predicated
of man.89 Behind Averroess argument there is the view that every kind of
predication is grounded on some form of identity between the items which
the subject and the predicate stand for. However, the identity between the
items which man and white signify is only an accidental identity, which
implies the diversity of the natures of the items entering into the relation
of identity. Thus, if white and man are of different natures, the composite
they make up, i.e. white man, will be composed of two different natures
and will not be identical with its essence. But an accident is nothing but
the corresponding accidental composite. Thus, accidents are not identical
with their essence, either.
(2) Things which are spoken of per se, i.e. primary substances, are instead
identical with their essence. In his logical treatment of the identity the-
sis in Z 6, Aristotle does not say what we should understand by primary
substances. The rest of Book Z, however, makes it clear that primary sub-
stances are forms and hence forms are things that are identical with their
own essence, while particular composites of matter and form turn out to
be different from their own essence.90 Averroes agrees with modern inter-
preters that forms are primary substances and so that they are identical with
their own essence. However, he also believes that Z 6s argument accords
some kind of identity with their essence to the composites of matter and
form as well. This suggests that the kind of identity Averroes has in mind
when he says that the composites of matter and form are identical with
their essence is not strict identitywhich is reserved for forms alone
but rather non-separateness. As I have already explained, my suggestion
seems to be confirmed by the way Averroes reads Aristotles reference, in
the course of the arguments, to Platos Forms. For modern scholars, Aristo-
tle chooses Platos Forms as paradigmatic cases of substances to show that

89 This is clearly a misunderstanding of Aristotles text. Aristotle does not say that white
is in one sense identical with its subject, say man, whilst in another sense it is not. His point
is rather that in one way, i.e. when taken together with its subject, an accident like white is
not identical with its own essence, whilst it is identical with such an essence in another way,
i.e. when taken as a simple property.
90 See in particular: Aristotle, Met. Z 11, 1037a331037a7.
the identity thesis must hold for the fundamental level of any (essentialist)
ontology: whatever primary substances are, whether Platos Forms or some-
thing else, they must be identical with their own essence. Thus, for modern
scholars the problem Aristotle chooses to put into focus in Z 6 is that of the
identity between Platos Forms and their own essence. According to Aver-
roes, by contrast, the main point of the chapter is not so much to establish
whether Platos Forms are identical with their own essence as to prove that
Forms cannot be the essences of particular sensible objects, i.e. the compos-
ites of matter and form, in that they are separate from them. In other words,
if the essences of particular sensible objects were not identical with them,
they would be exactly like Platos Forms. But Platos Forms are separate from
the things of which they are the essences and no separate essence can be a
genuine essence. This argument strengthens my suggestion that when Aver-
roes claims that sensible substances are identical with their own essence, by
identity he means non-separateness.
Among the several arguments Averroes puts forward against Platos
Forms, I am particularly interested here in illustrating two fundamental
lines of thought, which also appear in Aquinass Commentary on the Meta-
physics. According to Averroes, Platos Forms, being separate from the par-
ticular things of which they are thought to be the essences, can explain (i)
neither the being of sensible things, i.e. what sensible things are, (ii) nor
their knowability.
As to (i), the basic assumption in play is that an essence confers upon
a thing x its fundamental character. For instance, I can say that a thing x
is essentially a man because x possesses the essence of man. However, if
the essence of x is separate from x, then the essence cannot confer upon
x its fundamental character because x cannot be said to possess an essence
which is separate from it. But Platos Forms are separate essences. Therefore,
they cannot confer upon the sensible things of which they are thought to be
the essences their fundamental character. In other words, Forms cannot be
the essences of sensible things in that they cannot explain what sensible
things are.91
Point (ii) is also clear enough. We normally say that to know what a thing
x is, is just to come to know its essence. But if the essence of x is separate
from x, then what we get to know when we know the essence of x is not x,
but rather an entirely different thing. For things which are separate are just
numerically different things. Now, Platos Forms are separate from sensible

182 chapter two
things. Therefore, they cannot be of any use in our knowing what sensible
things are and so cannot be the essences of sensible things.92
In conclusion, if Forms can explain neither the being nor the knowability
of particular sensible substances they should be altogether eliminated from
the ontology. For Forms were postulated in the first place precisely to
explain the being and the knowability of sensible things.
4. Averroess Treatment of Generation (Met. Z 79)
4.1. The Meaning of Z 79: An Anti-Platonic Argument

As we have seen in Ch. 1, contemporary scholars believe that there are rea-
sons to suppose that Met. Z 79 were not part of the original plan of Book Z:
the chapters unexpectedly broke Aristotles treatment of essence and are
significantly unconnected with what comes before and after them. Most
scholars, however, also believe that Z 79 were inserted into the original
draft of the book by Aristotle himself. Opinions as to why Aristotle may
have felt the need to present a metaphysical discussion of generation are
at variance. Some think that the main aim of the section on generation is
to defend the so-called Synonymy Principle, i.e. the principle that in every
kind of generation the producer and the product are the same in form. The
principle clearly holds in the case of natural generation, while its applicabil-
ity to the case of artificial and especially of spontaneous generation is not
unqualified. However, it seems clear that Aristotle believes that the princi-
ple applies in some way or other to all kinds of generation. The defence of
the Synonymy Principle is supposed to contribute to establish the role of
form as the substantial principle of sensible objects. For if in the genera-
tion of substances the producer and the product are the same in form, it is
clearly form that directs and orients the coming into being of sensible sub-
stances. It is the pre-existence of form in the producer that explains why
the product possesses the essential characteristics it has, in that generation
can be described as a process consisting in the transmission of a form from
one thing (the producer) to another (the product). This suggests that the
role form plays in generation simply mirrors the role it plays in the structure
and organisation of sensible objects. Such objects are what they are because
they possess a form of a certain kind, which is therefore their substance
and essence. Analogously, their coming into being consists in acquiring a
92 Cf. Averroes, In Met., VII, t.c. 20, fol. 169L170A.

form of a certain kind. As we have seen, scholars insisting on the impor-

tance of the Synonymy Principle put emphasis on Z 7 and Z 9 and slightly
downplay Aristotles argument for the ingenerability of form (and matter)
in Z 8.
Other scholars, by contrast, connect the analysis of generation with Aris-
totles treatment of definition in Z 1012. This second group of scholars
emphasise the importance of Met. Z 8s proof that form is not subject to
generation and corruption. One of Aristotles main points in Z 1011 is that
form is the primary object of definition because it is structurally simple, i.e.
because it cannot be analysed into two distinct and more fundamental com-
ponents. Things which are analysable into more fundamental components
depend for what they are on the components they are analysable into and
so cannot count as primary objects of definition. For primary objects of def-
inition are what they are independently of anything else. So, composites
of matter and form do not seem to count as primary objects of definition,
in that they are analysable into more fundamental constituents, i.e. matter
and form. Forms, by contrast, are primary objects of definition because they
are not analysable into more fundamental constituents, and in particular
into a formal and a material component. Z 8s argument for the ingenera-
bility of form provides indirect support for this conclusion. For, according to
Aristotle, form is not generable because it is simple while every generation
presupposes that the product of generation be analysable into a formal and
a material component. Generation in fact consists in a certain material sub-
stratums acquiring a certain form. Therefore, matter and form are not only
the principles of generation, but also the constituents of the final product of
such a process. Analogously, form is not corruptible, either. For corruption
consists in a material substratums losing a certain form, and so presupposes
that the thing which undergoes a process of corruption be composed of a
formal and a material component. Form, by contrast, is not composed of
a formal and a material component and so is not subject to the process of
corruption. As can be seen, Aristotles argument for the ingenerability of
form is perfectly in keeping with his claim in Z 1011 that form is the pri-
mary object of definition. For both arguments rely on the assumption that
form is simple, i.e. non-analysable into a formal and a material component.
Thus, it is not unreasonable to regard Z 8s discussion of the ingenerability
of form as a step towards the conclusion that form is the primary object of
definition.
Against this background we can better introduce Averroess general
interpretation of the section on generation. What distinguishes in fact Aver-
roess reading from all the modern ones is the Arabic commentators
184 chapter two
insistence on the anti-Platonic character of the section.93 Not that Averroes

does not touch upon many of the issues that are also the main concern of
modern scholars: as we shall see, for instance, the defence of the Synonymy
Principle is part and parcel of Averroess anti-Platonic strategy and also Z 8s
argument for the ingenerability of form and matter plays an important role
in the general structure of the section on generation. However, the discus-
sion of those issues is entirely subordinate to establishing the point that
Platos Forms are of no use in explaining the generation of sensible sub-
stances. Thus, Z 79 continue from a different perspective the anti-Platonic
polemic Aristotle starts in Z 6. The latter chapter shows that introducing
separate Forms does not explain either what sensible substances are or how
we get to know them; the section on generation adds the further, important
point that separate Forms are useless also when it comes to explaining how
sensible substances come into being.94 Thus, if Forms do not contribute any-
thing to the explanation of how sensible things come into being as much
as they are of no use in accounting for the fundamental characters of such
things, they can be entirely dispensed with in the ontology.
The core of Averroess anti-Platonic argument is the view that in genera-
tion both the producer and the product are not pure forms, but must rather
be composites of matter and form. The producers being a composite of mat-
ter and form shows that Platos Forms cannot be the efficient causes of a
process of generation. For Platos Forms are separate Forms, i.e. forms that
do not exist in a material substratum. Therefore, they cannot be the pro-
ducer in a process of generation, in that the producer must be a composite
of matter and form. What is more, the fact that the product of generation too
must be a composite of matter and form proves that forms in general and
consequently also Platos Forms cannot be the result of a process of genera-
tion, either. For the result of generation, exactly like its efficient cause, must
be a composite of matter and form.
It is interesting to see how Averroes justifies his claim that in generation
both (i) the producer and (ii) the product must be composites of matter and
form.
Part (ii) is clearly the result of Aristotles argument in Z 8 to the effect
that form (and matter) are ingenerable. Averroes reproduces in essence
the structure of Aristotles argument. Generation is a process consisting
in a certain piece of matter acquiring a certain form by the action of an

agent.95 The product of generation, therefore, must be a composite of the

piece of matter acquiring the form and of the form which is acquired by
matter. To suppose that form itself is the result of a process of generation
would imply that form itself is composed of a material and a formal part,
would imply, in other words, that form is the result of a certain material
component taking on a formal component. But form is simple, i.e. cannot be
analysed into a formal and a material component, and so cannot come into
being as the result of a process of generation. Even if Averroes follows very
closely the general structure of Aristotles argument, he also particularly
insists both in his commentary on Z 7 and in that on Z 8 on the role
that matter plays in establishing the composite nature of the product of
generation. GenerationAverroes sayscomes about because an agent
transforms matter thereby introducing into it some form which matter did
not possess beforehand or, at least, did not possess in a complete and actual
manner. This general characterisation of generation implies not only that
every generation presupposes some preexisting matter, but also that matter
persists throughout the process and is still present in some way or other
in the product of generation. Averroess use of the word transformation
suggests that matter may not remain the same all through the process of
generation and may undergo, on the contrary, some considerable changes.
However, whether matter remains the same or not during the process of
generation, the main point for Averroes is that some matter is part of the
final product of generation and hence such a product turns out to be a
composite of matter and form.
This general picture is confirmed by the analysis of matter and privation
which Averroes presents in connection with Aristotles discussion of the
expression from at the end of Z 7.96 Averroes puts emphasis on both dis-
similarities and similarities between matter and privation. On the one hand,
Averroes wants to establish the point that, unlike privation, matter persists
throughout the process of generation. Usually, we use the expression from
in connection with privation, i.e. the term of change that does not persist
95 As we shall see in the next subsection, the idea that matter acquires a certain form
needs a word of clarification. For Averroes takes Aristotles claim that matter is in potentiality
for a certain form to imply that the form which is acquired is not something completely
extraneous to the matter acquiring it, but rather something which is in some sense extracted
from the potentiality of matter. For present purposes, however, what is important to stress is
that the product of generation is a two-part object, regardless of how precisely the two parts
of the object are related.
96 Cf. Averroes, In Met., VII, t.c. 24, fol. 174L; t.c. 26, fol. 176B.
186 chapter two
throughout the change but rather gets replaced therein. For instance, we
say that the healthy comes from the unhealthy thereby indicating that the
state of disease does not persist all through the change but is rather replaced
by health. Admittedly, we also say that a statue comes from wood, and
this linguistic usage might mislead someone into thinking that the role of
matter in a process of generation is similar to that of privation. But things
are not quite so, for the role of matter is rather that of the subject of change,
the term that persists throughout the change. When we say, for instance,
that a man becomes healthy from being unhealthy, we wish to indicate
that the man persists through the change from being unhealthy to being
healthy. Analogously, matter persists all through the process of generation
and acquires a new form, say the form of a statue. Moreover, the result
of the change from unhealthy to healthy is not a simple item, but rather
a composite, the composite of the man that becomes healthy and of his
health. Analogously, the product of generation is not a simple item, but
rather a composite, i.e. a composite of the matter that underlies the change
and of the form that is being acquired during the change. The reason we
use the expression from in connection with matter as well is that the
matter from which generation starts is not just matter, but rather matter
plus privation, even if we usually do not have a name for the corresponding
privation. A statue does not come to be simply from matter but from
unstatued matter, i.e. from matter plus the privation opposed to the state
of having the form of a statue. Matter persists all through the generation of
a statue, while the privative state of being unstatued disappears.
On the other hand, Averroes puts emphasis on the fact that there is
indeed some analogy between matter and privation. The point of the anal-
ogy is that, although matter persists all through the process of generation,
it does not persist as the same, but rather undergoes a process of transfor-
mation. First of all, as we have seen, the matter from which the product of
generation originates is not simple matter but matter plus privation, and
so it is clear that the composite matter-plus-privation does not survive the
process of generation in that matter moves away from the privative state
and acquires a positive form. This is the reason why the product of gen-
eration does not take the name of the matter it comes from but is rather
denominated by means of an adjectival expression: we do not say that a
statue is wood but rather that it is wooden, i.e. made of wood. The adjectival
form indicates that the term from which generation starts is not identical
with the material constituent of the final product. Judging from what Aver-
roes says, however, there might be a deeper sense in which matter does not
remain exactly the same in the process of generation. For even when it is
taken as a subject, i.e. without the privative state it is accompanied by at

the beginning of the change, matter undergoes a series of transformations
before acquiring the form of the final product. This is harder to see in the
case of artificial production, where the acquisition of a new form seems to
consist simply in a change of shape on the part of matter, but becomes more
evident in the case of natural generation. It is clear, for instance, that in the
generation of animals the matter in which the seed is received undergoes
many internal transformations before becoming the constitutive matter of
the full-grown animaltransformations which follow upon the transform-
ing action of the formal principle contained in the seed. Averroes, however,
does not see any particular contrast between the view that matter is the
persisting subject of generation and the further claim that it is transformed
during the process. What is more, he takes the latter claim as a further con-
firmation of the fact that the product of generation is a composite of matter
and form. If matter remained absolutely the same all through the process
of generationAverroes arguesgeneration would simply consist in the
production of a new form and not in the constitution of a new composite.
But matter undergoes transformation during the process of generation, and
this shows that it is a new substance that comes into being and not simply
a form to be imposed on a preexisting material substratum. Averroess gen-
eral point, therefore, seems to be that generation is not the assembling of
two components or alternatively the imposition of a new form on a preex-
isting substratum, but rather a process of transformation of matter which
results in a not beforehand existing being.
Part (i) of Averroess claim, i.e. the view that also the agent of generation
must be a composite of matter and form, is the most important within Aver-
roess anti-Platonic argument. For Platos forms were thought to play a cru-
cial role in the production of sensible things. Thus, it is particularly urgent
for Averroes to show that separate Forms cannot be the efficient causes of
generation. But how can the Arabic commentator prove this point? It seems
to me that Averroes appeals to different orders of consideration. (a) On the
one hand, he offers a general argument to show that Forms cannot bring
about the kind of process generation consists in. (b) On the other, he rea-
sons back from the Synonymy Principle to prove that both the producer and
the product of generation must be composites of matter and form.
As to (a), Averroes starts from the assumption that generation is a process
where matter is transformed in such a way as to take on a certain specific
form. The result of the process of transformation is a composite of mat-
ter and form, i.e. an individual material substance. Nowso the argument
continuesonly a material agent, i.e. only an agent existing in matter, can
188 chapter two
act upon matter and transform it in such a way as to generate a material

substance.97 Immaterial agents, by contrast, can only generate immaterial
substances.98 As we shall see in the next section, Averroes is chiefly interest-
ing in ruling out one particular kind of immaterial agent, the so-called Giver
of forms, together with the view that sensible substances would receive their
substantial forms from a separate intelligence.99 But it is clear that the argu-
ment is designed to exclude any kind of immaterial agent, including in par-
ticular Platos Forms.100 The argument hinges upon the crucial premiss that
only a material agent can act upon matter and transform it in such a way as
to produce another material being. Averroess justification for this premiss
seems to go along the following lines. In order for a substance to come into
being matter must be acted upon and modified, which can be done only by
an agent which is itself material and corporeal, an agent in other words that
possesses corporeal parts and active qualities that can interact with matter
and effect the required changes therein. The case of natural generation can
explain what Averroes may have in mind. The main agent of natural gen-
eration is a natural substance which is the same in form as the product of
generation. The agent transmits its form through the seed, which is received
in a material substratum and starts off the generation of the new substance.
Thus, the main agent of natural generation is a material being, which acts
only through a material instrument (the seed). And the proximate agent of
generation too, i.e. the seed, can act upon matter only because it is itself a
material being, although it contains some formal power which is capable of
driving and orients the process of transformation of matter. Averroess gen-
eral point seems to hold good for the case of artificial production as well.
For the artist too can transmit to matter the form he conceives in his mind
only by means of material instruments, be they bodily parts of the agent or
artificial tools. Thus, the agent of artificial generation too is a material being.
Averroess insistence on the material character of the agent of generation
perfectly squares with his general understanding of the nature of the gener-
ative process. For the Arabic commentator often points out that generation
consists in the agents actualising the potentiality for form which is already
present in matter. Occasionally, Averroes speaks as if the action of the agent
only consisted in extracting from matter a form which is already potentially
97 Cf. Averroes, In Met., VII, t.c. 31, fol. 181G; KL.

99 Cf. Averroes, In Met., VII, t.c. 31, fol. 181B.
100 Cf. Averroes, In Met., VII, t.c. 31, fol. 180G; KL.
present in it.101 It is not entirely clear how far Averroes wishes to push this
general intuition. It is not clear, in other words, whether Averroes is pre-
pared to endorse the theory that form somehow preexists in matter in an
incipient and incomplete statethe theory which would become popular
in the Latin world under the name of Inchoation of forms (Inchoatio for-
mae). Probably, on a weaker reading, Averroes simply means to put empha-
sis on the fact that matter does not receive form as something absolutely
extraneous, but rather as a principle it has an aptitude and a potentiality
for. Be that as it may, within this general framework it becomes all the more
understandable that Averroes insists on the claim that the agent of gener-
ation must be a material being. For generation does not simply consist in
matters receiving an external formal principle but rather in a long process
of transformation of matter in which the transmission of form coincides
with the emergence of a potentiality for form which matter already con-
tains. And this process can be brought about only by a material agent, which
continuously interacts with the matter in which form comes to exist.
(b) Averroes also proves that the producer must be a material being by
appealing to some immediate consequences of the Principle of Synonymy.102
The principle establishes that the producer and the product of generation
must be the same in form. It also presupposes, however, that producer
and product are the same in form but two in number, i.e. two distinct
individuals. NowAverroes arguesthe only thing that can distinguish
two individuals that are identical in form is the material substratum in
which the form is received: two individuals of the same species in fact share
the same form and are different on account of their matter. This shows
that both the producer and the product must be composites of matter
and form. Clearly, Averroess argument presupposes the view that matter
is what accounts for the individuation of sensible substances, a claim which
the Arabic commentator reads, not unreasonably, into the final lines of
Met. Z 8 (1034a58).103 According to this view, the form characteristic of a
certain natural species is one in number and is multiplied only because it
is received in different pieces of matter. Thus, the numerical plurality of
sensible substances can be obtained only by introducing matter into the
picture.
101 Cf. Averroes, In Met., VII, t.c. 28, fol. 178H; t.c. 31, fol. 181G. See also: In Met., XII, t.c. 18,
fol. 304B.
102 Cf. Averroes, In Met., VII, t.c. 28, fol. 178HI; t.c. 31, fol. 180IK.
190 chapter two
As we have seen, the Principle of Synonymy is part of Averroess anti-

Platonic strategy, even if it is not the only conceptual tool he employs in
order to destroy Platos theory of Forms. In the next section, I shall illustrate
in some more detail how the Arabic commentator tries to vindicate the
general validity of the principle.
4.2. The Defence of the Synonymy Principle

and the Case of Spontaneous Generation
On Averroess understanding the Synonymy Principle represents Aristotles
response to Platos theory of Forms, conceived of as a complete explanation
of how things come into being in the sensible world. Since a man is gener-
ated by another man having the same form as the man generated there is no
need to posit separate forms that confers upon sensible things the substan-
tial forms they have. In this perspective, it becomes particular urgent for
Averroes to prove the universal validity of the Synonymy Principle. What
must be shown, in other words, is that the principle holds in all cases of
generation, i.e. natural, artificial and spontaneous generation, and that the
apparent exceptions to the principle can be successfully explained away.
Although the defence of the Synonymy Principle permeates Averroess com-
mentary on Book Zeta, it is particularly in the discussion of spontaneous
generation that the theme comes more directly into focus. This is not sur-
prising given that the case of spontaneous generation represents the most
serious obstacle to the general validity of the principle. And this is the reason
why Averroes discusses the case of spontaneous generation in a long digres-
sion (t.c. 31) in the appendix to his literal exposition of Met. Z 9. The aim of
the digression is to defend Aristotles doctrine of generation against some
rival understandings of the coming into being of sensible things, including
Avicennas theory of the Giver of forms and Themistius doctrine of gen-
eration. All of the theories presented in the Z 9 digression are assimilated
by Averroes to Platos doctrine of Forms in that they postulate separate
agents as well as separate forms to explain the generation of sensible sub-
stances. The reason why such theories are introduced in the course of the
discussion of spontaneous generation is that the case of spontaneous gen-
eration was thought to be an argument in favour of positing separate forms.
Aristotles difficulties with handling the case of spontaneous generation,
in other words, would show that Aristotles general model of explanation
of coming to be must be dropped in favour of a Plato-style doctrine. The
same themes and the same polemical targets reappear in another impor-
tant digression, which Averroes presents at the end of his literal exposition
of Met. 3, 1070a2730 (t.c. 18). The 3 digression, which contains a long

excerpt from Themistius paraphrase of Met. , makes even more explicit
the connection between the refutation of Avicennas and Themistius the-
ories and the defence of the Synonymy Principle.104 This important point,
however, should not be misunderstood. Both in the Z 9 and in the 3 digres-
sions Averroes makes it clear that some version of the Synonymy Principle
lies behind the endorsement of separate forms. It is, among other things,
the defence of the Synonymy Principle that led Themistius to explain gen-
eration by having recourse to separate forms existing in the World Soul
and Avicenna to posit a universal Giver of forms. Clearly, Themistius and
Avicenna do not believe, as Aristotle does, that synonymy, i.e. sameness in
name and definition, holds, as it were, horizontally, i.e. between two individ-
ual material beings, but rather vertically, between an immaterial principle
and the forms that such a principle creates in the sensible world. Thus, all
things considered, Averroess defence of the Synonymy Principle against the
various Platonist theories of generation turns out to be the defence of Aris-
totles interpretation of the principle against an erroneous understanding
of it. Another qualification is important in this connection. In its strictest
form, the Synonymy Principle holds that the producer and the product of
generation are the same in form. However, if the principle must hold uni-
versally, it must be appropriately weakened so as to cover cases where its
validity is partial or qualified. Thus, all that is required for a general defence
of the principle is that producer and product be similar in form. It comes as
no surprise, therefore, that Averroes resorts to the similarity language espe-
cially when he wants to state the principle in its universal form.105 In the
following, I shall briefly sketch out how Averroes tries to give an account
of the way in which the Synonymy Principle holds in the different kinds of
generation.
In the case of natural generation, the Synonymy Principle holds unquali-
fiedly.106 For in the natural generation of animals and plants the producer is
an individual of the same species as the product. In the generation of an ani-
mal, in particular, the main producer is the male parent, which transmits its
form through the seed, while the female parent provides the matter in which
the seed of the father is received. Given Averroess view on the individuation
of sensible substances, in natural generation producer and product are the
104 Cf. Averroes, In Met., XII, t.c. 18, fol. 303EF.

105 Cf. for instance: Averroes, In Met., VII, t.c. 29, fol. 179A; t.c. 30, 179IK; t.c. 31, fol. 180I.
192 chapter two
same in form in a very strict sense, in so far as they share the same form and
are different individuals only on account of the different pieces of matter in
which the form is received. Natural generation is not without problems of
its own. The generation of a mule, for instance, does not seem to obey the
Synonymy Principle.107 The mule, in fact, is generated by a horse and an ass
and so not by an individual of the same species as the mule itself. Averroess
reply to this apparent exception to the Synonymy Principle is twofold. For
one thing, the generation of the mule is in many respects accidental and
against nature.108 In the natural course of things, an animal is generated
by a cospecific individual, i.e. the male parent. For another, some kind of
similarity in form obtains also in the case of the generation of the mule, in
that the mule is after all generated from a nature similar to it, i.e. the nature
common to the horse and the ass.109 Of course, the Synonymy Principle holds
in this case only qualifiedly and imperfectly: mules are sterile and so it is
not the case that a mule generates a mule. However, in some sense the
nature common to the horse and the ass is the nature of the mule and this
guarantees the qualified validity of the principle.110
In the case of artificial generationAverroes maintainsthe Synonymy
Principle holds only partially.111 Partially here should be taken rather lit-
erally in that the synonymy in question concerns only a part of both the
producer and the product. What Averroes means is that only a part of the
producerand not the producer as a wholeis similar to the product. The
artist in fact is similar to the artefact he produces not in so far as he is a
particular composite of matter and form but only in so far as he has the
form of the product in his mind.112 Thus, producer and product are simi-
lar only with respect to one of their parts and not as wholes, in that only
a part of the productits formcomes from the producer. In the case of
natural generation, by contrast, the whole is generated by the whole, in
that the producer is similar to the product as a whole and not only with
respect to one of its parts (even if, of course, it is one part of both producer

108 Cf. Averroes, In Met., VII, t.c. 28, fol. 178E. See also In Met., VII, t.c. 30, fol. 180G, where
Averroes mentions the case of a female offspring as another instance (besides that of the
mule) of how things may go wrong with natural generation.
110 Cf. Averroes, In Met., VII, t.c. 28, fol. 178F. Cf. also fol. 178G, where Averroes refers to
Aristotles De animalibus for an explanation of how the horse and the ass can produce a
nature intermediate between them.
and product, i.e. their form, that is mainly responsible for their similarity).113
Although interesting, Averroess explanation is dubious, for it seems to be
rather different from the one Aristotle advances in Met. Z 7 (1032b1114).
The reason why the Synonymy Principle holds only qualifiedly in the case
of artificial generationAristotle seems to sayis not that only a part of
the agent is synonymous with the product, but rather that the form of the
agent and that of the product are forms of different kind. The form of the
producer is a form in the soul, while the form of the product is a form in
matter. Of course, there is some relevant similaritywe might say similar-
ity in contentbetween the form in the mind and the corresponding form
in matter, but such a similarity does not eliminate the difference in nature
between the two forms. Possibly, however, the part-whole language which
Averroes employs in describing the case of artificial production obscures his
real point, which may be a slightly different one. The artist does not com-
municate to the product his own nature, but rather some other nature, i.e.
the nature of the product whose notion the artist possesses in his mind.
Thus, it is not qua the kind of substance he is that the artist produces the
product of art, but only qua knower, i.e. in that he knows how to produce
in matter the form of the object he intends to create. Thus, the product of
art is not of the same nature as the artist, but only possesses in a mate-
rial fashion the form that the artist has in mind. On either interpretation
of Averroes, however, the general point remains true that the Principle of
Synonymy also holds in the case of artificial generation, although quali-
fiedly.
The case of spontaneous generation is, admittedly, the most difficult for
the upholder of the Aristotelian version of the Synonymy Principle. For in
the case of spontaneous generation the product does not seem to be gener-
ated by an individual similar in species, either totally or partially, and hence
the similarity between producer and product which the Synonymy Princi-
ple demands does not seem to obtain in this case. Actually, the only cases of
spontaneous generation which Averroes takes into account are instances of
natural spontaneous generation, i.e. cases where things that usually come
to be by nature are produced by chance. What Averroes has in mind are
cases of animals and plants that come into being without seed, i.e. that are
not generated, as usually happens, by another individual animal or plant,
but rather originate from some putrefied matter. Cases of casual artistic

194 chapter two
production, such as for instance the casual recovery of health on the part
of a patient, are not taken into account by Averroes or, at least, are not
thought to be relevant to the general topic of spontaneous generation.114 In
114 This is due to Averroess misunderstanding of the first part of Met. Z 9, the chapter on
spontaneous generation. At the very beginning of the chapter (1034a910), Aristotle raises the
question as to why some things, such as health, are produced both by art and spontaneously,
while some others, such as a house, are produced by art only. Aristotles response (1034a10ff.)
to this difficulty is that there are different kinds of matter. Some matter is of such a nature
as to be able to be moved by itself (towards a certain form), while some other cannot be
moved without the aid of an external agent. What Aristotle means is that the matter from
which the production of health starts, i.e. the body of the patient, is capable of moving
by itself in a way similar to the one in which it is moved by the doctor when he heals
the body. This explains why health can be produced both artificially and spontaneously.
The matter from which the production of a house begins, by contrast, cannot be moved
without the intervention of the builder. As is clear, Aristotles attention is focused on artificial
spontaneous generation and on what makes it possible. Artificial spontaneous generation
is possible because some kind of matter possesses an internal principle, such for instance
internal heat, that is similar to the principle communicated by art in the standard cases of
artificial production.
Averroess understanding of the text is very different. For him, the opposition Aristotle
has in mind is not that between things that can be produced both by art and spontaneously
and things that can be produced only by art, but rather that between things that are produced
by art only, like a house, and things that result from the joint action of art and nature, like
health (cf. In Met., VII, t.c. 29, fol. 179B). Thus, Aristotles reference to artificial spontaneous
production substantially disappears on Averroess interpretation. The case of things that
result from the joint action of nature and art makes trouble for the Synonymy Principle in
that it might seem that two forms come into play in the production of such things, i.e. a
natural form and an artificial one (cf. In Met., VII, t.c. 29, fol. 179B). The Synonymy Principle,
however, establishes that the producer and the product must be one thing in formwhich
cannot be the case if two different forms contribute to the generation of the product (cf.
In Met., VII, t.c. 29, fol. 179B). Averroes solves the difficulties by distinguishing between two
different kinds of matter. One kind of matter possesses a natural power or potentiality which
is similar to that of the art, while the other does not possess such a natural power (cf. In
Met., VII, t.c. 29, fol. 179C). The things that have the first kind of matter, i.e. matter endowed
with the appropriate kind of natural power, are generated by the common action of nature
and art in that matter is naturally capable of beginning the process of generation which
will be brought to completion by art. In the case of such things, therefore, the main agent
of generation is nature, and art confines itself to helping nature to develop and bring to
perfection the natural power contained in matter (cf. In Met., VII, t.c. 29, fol. 179C; EF). Thus,
things that result from the joint action of nature and art, such as health, do not violate the
Synonymy Principle in that the form that drives the process of generation is just one, i.e.
the natural power contained in matter which is similar to the end which art intends. Of
course, the natural power contained in matter is only an imperfect or diminished power
when compared to the end which the art intends. However, it remains the main driving
principle of generation. Things having the second kind of matter, i.e. matter deprived of the
appropriate kind of power or potentiality, can be produced only by art, in that, in their case,
the art imposes on matter a form which is in no way present therein, not even in an imperfect
or diminished manner (cf. In Met., VII, t.c. 29, fol. 179B). This is the case with the production
both his Z 9 and 3 digressions Averroes says that the case of natural spon-
taneous generation is usually considered to be a piece of evidence in favour
of positing separate forms to explain the existence of enmattered forms.115
The general idea must be that, since Aristotles model of explanation of gen-
eration does not account for the case of natural spontaneous generation, in
that the forms of animals and plants generated without seed are clearly not
transmitted by an individual of the same species as the product, we should
posit separate forms to explain how animals generated without seed acquire
their forms. But if separate forms are necessary to explain spontaneous gen-
eration, there are good reasons to believe that they also explain the stan-
dard cases of natural generation. In the 3 digression Averroes blames
Themistius for having paved the way for a series of Neoplatonic doctrines
of generation, such as Avicennas theory of the Giver of forms, which are
centred on the claim that only separate, immaterial agents can explain the
coming to be of sensible objects.116 Themistius mistake consists in particu-
lar in exploiting the alleged inadequacy of Aristotles theory in dealing with
the case of spontaneous generation to reconsider the whole issue of gener-
ation and advance a Plato-style explanation thereof. Themistius doctrine,
as least as it is reported and reconstructed by Averroes, seems to contain a
general argument to the effect that natural agents alone are not sufficient
to account for natural generation.117 The seed of each species of animal or
plant contains determinate proportions and forms which are characteris-
tic of the species in question and different from those proper to another
species.118 The sperm of a man, therefore, does not produce a horse and
vice versa; nor does the seed of one kind of plant produce another kind
of plant.119 NowThemistius arguesnatural agents seem not to produce
such proportions and forms, but rather to operate in virtue of and on the
basis of them. Proportions and forms, therefore, must be infused into the
seed from outside. Themistius view is that they are infused into matter by
of a house. Matter deprived of the appropriate power and principle, in fact, is not capable of
beginning of itself any process of generation.
Averroess misunderstanding of the text can also explain why he discusses the case of
spontaneous generation in a separate digression. On his reading, Z 9 ends up not addressing
directly the crucial issue of spontaneous generation and natural spontaneous generation in
particular.
115 Cf. Averroes, In Met., VII, t.c. 31, fol. 180K; XII, t.c. 18, fol. 303FG.
116 Cf. Averroes, In Met., XII, t.c. 18, fol. 303LM304D (esp. 303LM and 304D).
117 Cf. Averroes, In Met., XII, t.c. 18, fol. 303GI.
118 Cf. Averroes, In Met., XII, t.c. 18, fol. 303GH.
119 Cf. Averroes, In Met., XII, t.c. 18, fol. 303G.
196 chapter two
the World Soul, which contains in itself the proportions and forms of all
sensible things.120 Thus, even if it is in some sense true to say that a man
produces a man, this is true only in the sense that a man begins the gen-
eration of a man, but not in the sense that it is a man that determines the
development of the seed into a full-grown human being.121 On the contrary,
the seed develops according to the proportions and forms conferred upon
it by the World Soul. This should explain why animals and plants can be
generated without seed: the World Soul can confer proportions and forms
upon the appropriate kind of matter and so bring about generation without
the intervention of a natural agent. Thus understood, Themistius doctrine
seems to lie halfway through between the recognition of the importance of
Aristotles natural agents and their dismissal. Subsequent theories, such as
the theory of the Giver of forms, goes even farther in doing away with natu-
ral agents by according to them only a very limited role in generation.
Supporters of the Giver of forms, however, do not base the defence of
their theory only on the difficulties Aristotles theory encounters in the case
of spontaneous generation. In his Z 9 digression, for instance, Averroes
presents a series of argumentsfour in essencewhich the proponents
of the Giver of forms present in support of their views. Here, I am not
interested in the details of the arguments.122 What I wish to put emphasis
on, by contrast, are the general principles on which the supporters of the
Giver of forms base their criticism of Aristotles theory and the defence
of their own alternative solution. According to Averroess reconstruction,
the principles behind the Giver of forms are essentially two: (i) the claim
that what is in potentiality is brought to actuality by something similar
in species or genus;123 (ii) the claim that material substantial forms are
essentially neither active nor passive; it is only primary qualities that are
active or passive.124 Both claim (i) and (ii) are used in all the arguments in
support of the Giver of forms. Here is an example of the general form such
arguments take.125 Substantial forms are something exceeding the primary
qualities of which material bodies are mixtures. However, for claim (ii), only
primary qualitieshotness, coldness, wetness and drynessare active and
120 Cf. Averroes, In Met., XII, t.c. 18, fol. 303E; 304D.
121 Cf. Averroes, In Met., XII, t.c. 18, fol. 303I.
122 For a reconstruction and a detailed analysis of the arguments see: Cerami (2007), 370
384.
passive, while substantial forms are neither active nor passive. Thus, when
for instance fire generates fire, the fire cannot be produced by the sub-
stantial form of the producing fire, because substantial forms are neither
active nor passive. Nor can the primary qualities of fire generates other
fire. For one thing, primary qualities cannot produce something exceed-
ing them, but only something of the same kind. Thus, the primary qualities
of fire can generate other primary qualities but not substantial forms. For
another, if we supposed that the substantial form of fire were generated by
the primary qualities, fire would not come to be from something similar in
species or genus, in violation of claim (i). Therefore, the substantial form
of fire must come from outside, and in particular from the Giver of forms,
the separate intelligence that confers upon sensible things their substantial
forms.
What is of particular interest for us is that claim (i) is nothing other
than the Synonymy Principle. Thus, it is clear that also the defence of the
Giver of forms is grounded on the endorsement of some version of the Syn-
onymy Principle. Differently from the case of Aristotles doctrine, sameness
in name and definition does not hold between two material objects of the
same species, but rather between the substantial form of material objects
and its separate model, i.e. the separate form contained in a separate intel-
ligence. This aspect is overtly recognised by Averroes, who regards claim (i)
as one of the main philosophical motivations behind the theory of the Giver
of forms.126 Moreover, when he presents in the Z 9 digression Themistius
view, which is taken to be at the origin of the Neoplatonic transformation of
Aristotles doctrine, Averroes explicitly remarks that Themistius move was
mainly motivated by the desire to preserve the validity of the Synonymy
Principle.127 Accordingly, in the 3 digression the Greek commentator is
blamed for completely misunderstanding the claim that the product of gen-
eration comes from something similar in species or genus.128
Within Averroess general strategy, therefore, it becomes particularly
urgent to show that the Synonymy Principle holds good of all cases of gen-
eration. As we have seen, natural generation represents the paradigmatic
case for supporters of the Aristotelian version of the principle. And artificial
generation too can be more or less easily accommodated into the general

127 Cf. Averroes, In Met., VII, t.c. 31, fol. 181BC.
128 Cf. Averroes, In Met., XII, t.c. 18, fol. 303L.
198 chapter two
model of explanation. The controversial case is that of natural spontaneous

generation. According to Averroes, however, spontaneous generation can
also be brought into line with the other cases of generation.129 Natural spon-
taneous generationAverroes maintainsis explicable by analogy with
the standard cases of natural generation, even if it has something in com-
mon with artificial generation as well.130 In standard natural generation,
forms are communicated to the product of generation through the seed. The
seed in fact, which is provided by the male parent, contains a natural power
which is capable of transforming matter in such a way as to result in a full-
fledged individual of a certain species.131 In so far as the seed contains such
a natural power, it possesses a formal principle and hence can be said to
transmit the form of the parent. Something analogous happens in the case
of the animals and plants that are generated without seed.132 For in their case
it is the heavenly bodies that confer upon matter a formative power which
is similar to the power naturally possessed by the seeds of plants and ani-
mals. The formative power which matter comes to receive mainly operates
through heat, which is a primary quality of the body, to bring about the pro-
cess of transformation of matter which is required to produce a full-fledged
animal or plant. In this way, animals and plants can come out of matter
without seed, in that matter itself receives the formative power directly
from the heavenly bodies and not from the male parent. From a different
perspective, the way the formative power provided by the heavenly bod-
ies operates is similar to how the arts generate their products.133 Differently
from natural agents, which operate through determinate instruments and
determinate bodily parts, the formative power bestowed by the heavenly
bodies does not operate through determinate bodily parts.134 Therefore, its
action is comparable to that of the intellectual agents and of the intellect in
general.
Averroess appeal to the formative power and to the celestial bodies is
supposed to reconduct the case of spontaneous generation within Aristo-
tles general explanation of generation and to vindicate the general validity
of the Synonymy Principle. First of all, it is clear that Averroess doctrine
obeys the general principle that only a material being can modify matter
129 Cf. Averroes, In Met., VII, t.c. 31, fol. 181DH.

in such a way as to generate another material being. For the heavenly bodies
that confer upon matter the formative powers are themselves material
beings, in so far as they are composed of a body and a soul. Moreover,
the formative power itself is similar to the power contained in the seeds
of animals and plants in that it exists in a material substratum. Finally,
although the operation of the formative powers differs from that of natural
agents in that it does not require determinate bodily parts, it still operates
by means of heat, which is a primary quality of bodies. As to the Synonymy
Principle, it seems to be safeguarded by Averroess model of explanation, at
least in some important respects. In particular, Averroes seems to think that
the similarity between the power conferred upon matter by the heavenly
bodies and the form of the product of generation is enough to guarantee at
least the partial validity of the principle. After all, on Averroess explanation
generation without seed is very similar to the standard cases of natural
generation, in so far as the power bestowed by the heavenly bodies does
nothing but replace the formative action of the seed.
5. Definition
5.1. The Object of Definition in Met. Z 1011

1. Since form is the substance of sensible objects by being their quiddity, and
a quiddity is what is expressed by a definition, it would be natural to expect
from Averroess commentary on Met. Z 1011 a clear and detailed analysis
of the relation between form and definition. Such an expectation, however,
is in part disappointed: Averroess text is to some extent discouraging in so
far as it seems to contains a number of incompatible claims on the crucial
issues discussed in Z 1011. For instance, with regards to the problem of the
definition of form, Averroes can be credited with the following assertions:
(F1) form is the only thing that we really define; (F2) the definition of form
contains no reference to the matter form exists in; (F3) it is not form which
we define, but rather the composite of matter and form, even if its definition
may turn out to make reference only to its formal parts; (F4) the definition
of form is a secondary kind of definition, in that it contains a reference to
the matter form exists in and hence is in some sense a definition by addi-
tion. There is already a certain tension between (F1) and (F3), but (F1) and
(F4), just like (F2) and (F4), are simply incompatible. Things are not better
off with the definition of the composite of matter and form, about which
Averroes seems to defend the following, incompatible claims: (C1) the com-
posite of matter and form has no definition; (C2) the composite of matter
200 chapter two
and form has a definition, which makes reference only to its formal parts;
(C3) the definition of the composite makes reference to both its formal
and its material parts. Of course, Averroes is not the only one to blame for
such inconsistencies: we have seen in Ch. 1 that Aristotles text presents dif-
ferent lines of argument which even modern interpreters find particularly
hard to reconcile, and so it is natural to suppose that Averroess commen-
tary sometimes reflects Aristotles ambiguities. Given the difficulty of the
textual situation I shall not present a neutral reconstruction of Averroess
exposition of Met. Z 1011, but rather try to raise some general interpretative
problems and look for answers in Averroess text. By proceeding in this way
I hope to show that Averroes has indeed a sufficiently consistent doctrine
of definition and that at least some of the difficulties the text presents can
be explained away or at least downplayed. My view is that Averroess funda-
mental doctrine is in keeping with what I have called in Ch. 1 the formalistic
line of argument: the definition of a sensible substance makes reference only
to its formal parts and hence to some extent just is the definition of its form.
In this sense, form is the primary and in a way the only object of defini-
tion.
2. Let me start with a preliminary issue, i.e. that of determining which

question Met. Z 1011 are supposed to address. In Ch. 1 I have distinguished
between two different questions concerning the object of definition:
Q1: the question of what is definable in the proper and primary sense of
the term
Q2: the question of how we should define sensible substances, i.e. partic-
ular composites of matter and form.
The difference between Q1 and Q2 lies in their scope. Q 1 is a very general
question concerning all possible objects of definition. In order to answer it,
we must provide a general criterion of definability and verify which of the
possible objects of definition best satisfies the criterion. As we have seen,
Aristotle thinks that substances in general satisfy his criteria of definabil-
ity better than accidental composites and accidents; moreover, he believes
that, among substances, forms are more properly definable than the com-
posites of matter and form, i.e. the particular sensible objects. Q 2, by con-
trast, is not a general question but rather concerns a specific object of def-
inition, namely the composite of matter and form. Basically, Q 2 asks us to
determine whether the material parts of a sensible substance are also parts
of its definition. Aristotles view on Q 2 is not entirely clear: some texts in
Met. Z 1011 suggest that the definition of a sensible substance makes ref-
erence only to its formal partsfor only formal parts are essential parts,
while others seem to contend that matter cannot be entirely dispensed with
in the definition of sensible substances.
Our first problem, therefore, is to see whether Averroes distinguishes in
fact between Q1 and Q 2. It is clear that to some extent the Arabic com-
mentator is aware of the distinction. When he says for instance, on com-
menting on Z 45, that substances have primary essences and definitions,
while accidents and accidental composites have only secondary ones, he is
clearly answering Q 1 and not Q 2. In the context of Z 45, Averroess cri-
terion for establishing which objects have an essence and a definition in
the primary sense is the Principle of Essential Unity, i.e. the claim that, in a
proper definition, the predicates figuring in the definiens form an essential
unity both with one another and with the thing defined, i.e. the definiendum.
The theme of Met. Z 1011, however, is the definition of substances and its
parts. So, the problem is whether Averroes regards forms and composites of
matter and form as two distinct objects of definition. Some parts of his com-
mentary seem to suggest that he does. When commenting for instance on
the first part of Z 10, he repeatedly distinguishes between things in whose
definition matter does not appear and things in whose definition mat-
ter appears.135 As Averroess remarks make clear, the first group of things
includes the composites of matter and form, while the second certainly
includes their forms. As we shall see shortly, Averroess distinction is partic-
ularly problematic, especially for the consequences it seems to have for the
definition of the composite of matter and form. Problems apart, taken at its
face value the distinction seems to support the view that a composite of mat-
ter and form and its form are in fact two different objects of definition, and
that to define the form of a sensible substance is as legitimate as to define
the sensible substance itself. In the same vein, Averroes at times describes
form as that which possesses the true definition, thereby making it clear
both that form is a distinct object of definition with respect to the composite
of matter and form and that it is the proper object of definition.136 Unfortu-
nately, other texts push us in a different direction. When commenting on
Z 11, Averroes draws a further distinction between the object of definition
and the content of the definiens. He seems to say that the object of defini-
tion, what we actually define, is always the thing which has the form, i.e.
the composite of matter and form, whereas the definiens contains only the
135 Cf. Averroes, In Met., VII, t.c. 34, fol. 184G; t.c. 35, 186EF. See also t.c. 35, fol. 186K; M.
202 chapter two
form or the formal characteristics of the composite.137 What Averroes is

saying, in other words, is that we always try to define a sensible substance,
even though we actually define it by means of its formal characteristics
alone. Thus, the text in Z 11 does not recognise form as an object of definition
distinct from the composite and so does not make any room for Q1 in the
case of substances.
My view is that this difficulty in Averroess text should not be overesti-
mated, especially if we succeed in explaining away those passages where
Averroes seems to say that the definition of a sensible substance, i.e. of a
composite of matter and form, makes reference to its matter as well. If the
definition of a composite substance makes reference only to its form or for-
mal parts, the question of whether form is an object of definition distinct
from the composite of which it is the form loses part of its significance. In
other words, the thing that we want to define is always a sensible substance,
a composite of matter and form, for sensible substances are the only inde-
pendent and autonomous objects existing in the world. However, to define
a sensible substance means to capture its essence, and the essence of a sen-
sible substance only includes its form or formal parts. Thus, in the end, the
definition of a sensible substance is the definition of its form. Therefore, in
one sense the definition of form is not the definition of an object distinct
from the sensible substance, in that form is not an autonomous object, but
rather the substance and essence of a sensible substance, and so the defini-
tion of form is just the definition of the substance and essence of a sensible
substance. In another sense, however, the definition of form is the definition
of something distinct from the sensible substance, in that it is the definition
of the real substance, i.e. the substantial constituent, of a sensible substance.
This perspective may explain why Averroes at times talks of form as if it were
an independent object which, as it were, happens to exist in matter and in
the sensible substance. In these contexts the emphasis is on the fact that
form is the real substance within a sensible object and so can be treated
almost as an independent entity possessing a definition of its own. At other
times, by contrast, when he wishes to stress the role of form as the essence
of the composite substance, Averroes does not regard form as an object of
definition distinct from the composite it exists in.
Thus, my next task will be to study the problem of the definition of the
composite of matter and form and to try to explain away the texts where
Averroes seems to imply that it contains matter in addition to form.

3. At the beginning of Met. Z 10 Aristotle raises two general problems.138

The first (P1) can be phrased in the following terms: Do the parts of a
thing enter into its definition? There seem to be contradictory pieces of
evidence concerning (P1). The parts of the syllable, i.e. the letters, enter into
the definition of the syllable, while the parts of the circle, for instance the
semicircles, do not enter into its definition. Thus, we need to explain why
the parts sometimes figure in the definition of the wholes of which they are
the parts and sometimes do not. Presumably, the explanation will consist in
indicating which parts of a thing enter into its definition and which do not.
Also the second problem is a general one: Are the parts of a thing prior or
posterior to it? Both answers seem to be plausible, depending on how one
conceives of the relation between parts and whole. On the one hand, parts
seem to be prior to the whole in that they constitute it. On the other, parts
can be thought to be posterior to the whole, because the parts are defined
in terms of the whole, while the reverse is not the case: the finger is a part of
the animal and is defined in terms of it, while the animal is not defined in
terms of the finger. Thus, in the case of P2) we have to adjudicate between
the two competing intuitions concerning the part-whole relation.
Averroess discussion of both P1) and P2) is particularly complicated. So,
I shall leave aside for the time being P2) and concentrate on P1), which is
more directly concerned with definition. Later on, I shall show how the
question of the relations of priority and posteriority discussed in P2) relates
to the problem of definition. Now, P1) asks which parts of a thing enter into
its definition. One possible answer could be that it all depends on which
things we are talking about. For different things have different kinds of parts
and so different kinds of parts enter into their definition. For instance, take
two different kinds of object: a composite of matter and form and the form
of the composite. Matter is clearly a part of the composite but not of the
form. Thus, it is natural to think that the matter or material parts in general
figure in the definition of the composite of matter and form, but not in
that of form. The definition of form contains only formal parts, while that
of the composite contains both formal and material parts. Matter enters
into the definition of the composite in so far as each species of composite
would be defined, according to this view, by making reference to the kind
of matter which is proper to the species in question: the definition of men,
for instance, would make reference to flesh and bones, of which men are
138 Cf. Aristotle, Met., Z, 1034b2032 (for a full discussion of the two problems see above,
Ch. 1, Sect. 6.1).

204 chapter two
necessarily made. It might be thought that Averroes in fact endorses the

view I have just presented. When commenting on the first part of Z 10,
for instance, he distinguishes between things in whose definition matter
appears and things in whose definition matter does not appear.139 The
things in whose definition matter appears seem clearly to be (or at least to
include) composites of matter and form, for Averroes mentions as examples
things such as a man or a bronze circle.140 Matter, therefore, is mentioned
in the definition of the composites of matter and form. The things in whose
definition matter dos not appear, by contrast, must be identified with forms,
i.e. with things like the form of a bronze circle or the soul of a man. In their
case, Averroes explicitly says that the definition includes only formal parts.141
This reading of Averroess text is not problematic in so far as the definition
of form is concerned. For it is perfectly reasonable to suppose that, since a
form has no material parts, its definition does not contain any reference to
matter or to material parts in general. The problems concern, instead, the
definition of the composite of matter and form. For, as I have said, my view is
that for Averroes the definition of a composite of matter and form does not
contain a reference to its material parts. Thus, it seems that I have to explain
away the texts where Averroes says that the definition of the composite is
one of those where matter appears. But how to do it?
Averroes draws from his discussion of P1) two conclusions, which repre-
sent a difficulty for any reading of the Arabic commentators text: (c1) in the
case of things in whose definition matter appears, it is not true that all the
parts of a thing enter into its definition; (c2) by contrast, in the case of things
in whose definition matter does not appear, it is true that all the parts of a
thing enter into its definition.142 (c2) is clear and, all things considered, not
particularly problematic. Since the definition of a form contains only formal
parts, it follows that in the case of form all its parts enter into its definition.
So, all the parts of a form are essential to it. (c1), instead, seems simply to
contradict what we have learned so far about Averroess view on definition.
Since a composite of matter and form have both formal and material parts,
and Averroes seems to say that both of them figure in its definition, how
can he possibly say that not all the parts of a composite substance enter
into its definition? There are different possible solutions to this difficulty. I
139 Cf. Averroes, In Met., VII, t.c. 34, fol. 184GH. See also: t.c. 35, fol. 186EM.
142 For (c1) and (c2) see: Averroes, In Met., VII, t.c. 34, fol. 184GH, but also t.c. 35, fol. 186E
M.
shall discuss some of them in the next section in connection with Averroess
understanding of P2), i.e. the problem of the relations of priority and poste-
riority between parts and wholes. Here I wish to present my solution, which
mainly consists in denying that material parts figure in the true definition of
a composite of matter and form, i.e. in the definition of its essence. Let me
spell out my view in some more detail. Averroes characterises the compos-
ites of matter and form as those things in whose definition matter appears.
My view is that this characterisation does not refer to the true definition
of the composites, i.e. to the definition of their essence, but is only a prima
facie description of what composites of matter and form are. In other words,
sensible substances can be described as things in whose definition matter
appears in that they are not simple things but rather composites of matter
and form. However, their true definition, the definition of their essence does
not mention material parts but makes reference only to their form and to
their formal parts in general. This interpretation explains the apparent con-
tradiction in c1). What Averroes means is that in the case of things which
we can roughly describe as things in whose definition matter appears, i.e.
composites of matter and form, it is not true that all their parts enter into
their definition. For the definition of their essence, i.e. their true definition,
only includes their formal parts. Thus, matter figures only in our prima facie
characterisation of sensible substances, but not in their true definition.143
My interpretation perfectly squares with the places in Averroess com-
mentary where he claims that form is the essence of sensible substances.144
If we assume that a definition simply reflects the content of an essence, then
the definition of sensible substances must make reference to form alone.
This seems to be confirmed by Averroess interpretation of the first part
of Met. Z 11. Averroes rightly takes the chapter to be concerned with dis-
tinguishing the parts of the composite, i.e. material parts, from the parts
of form.145 This distinction between different kinds of part is necessary
because the definition concerns the universal and the form.146 Distinguish-
ing between formal and material parts is particularly easy when a form is
143 My view seems to be confirmed also by Averroess remark that some parts of some
things are not parts of their definition but only of the things defined (cf. Averroes, In Met.,
VII, t.c. 40, fol. 192I). This is exactly the way in which I suggest we should understand c1): the
material parts of sensible substances (which can be roughly described as things in whose
definition matter appears) are not parts of their true definition, but only parts of the thing
defined, i.e. parts of the substance in its concrete existence.
144 Cf. in particular Averroes, In Met. VII, t.c. 33, fol. 184DF.
206 chapter two
realised in different kinds of material. This is the case for instance with geo-
metrical objects, which can exist in different kinds of material: the form of
a circle for instance can exist in wood, iron, stone and so on.147 The distinc-
tion is, by contrast, much more difficult when a form is necessarily realised
in only one kind of material. This is the case with the forms of natural
things: the form of men, for instance, can only be found in flesh and bones.148
Nonetheless, Averroes follows Aristotle in his claim that even in the case of
natural things we are able, by means of a philosophical analysis, to tell apart
formal from material parts.149 As is clear, Averroess interpretation of the
beginning of Met. Z 11 supports my view that the true definition of a sensible
substance mentions its formal parts alone. For Averroess words imply that
to define a sensible substance simply consists in isolating its formal from its
material parts.
There is only one more text that may be taken to resist my general inter-
pretation, namely Averroess commentary on the passage in Z 11 about
Socrates the Younger (Met. Z 11, 1036b2132). As we have seen in Ch. 1,
in the passage in question Aristotle protests against a certain tendency to
reduce everything to form and to eliminate from definitions any reference
to matter. Aristotle further remarks that to eliminate matter is particularly
inadequate in the case of things that are, by their own nature, one thing

148 Cf. Averroes, In Met., VII, t.c. 37, fol. 189EF; 189GH. Actually, Averroes distinguishes
three different cases. The first case concerns the forms which we see realised in different
kinds of material, like for instance the form of the circle. In this instance, the simple fact
that a form exists in materials of different kind enables us to draw the distinction between
formal and material parts. The second case is an hypothetical one: suppose that the form
of the circle were realised, de facto, in only one kind of material, for instance that we had
experience only of wooden circles. Distinguishing between material and formal parts would
be in such a case more difficult than in the previous one, but Averroes seems to think that
we could still easily do it by appealing to our imagination (In Met., VII, t.c. 37, fol. 189G
H). In other words, even if there were only wooden circles around, we could still imagine
the form of the circle to be realised in materials other than wood. This is so because after
all the relation between the form of the circle and the material it exists in is accidental.
The most difficult case is that of the forms of natural things. For they seem to exist in the
material in which they exist necessarily and not accidentally. It is not a simple matter of fact
that the form of men exists in flesh and bones. So, in the case of natural things we cannot
even imagine their form existing in some other matter. However, in this case too, we are
able, according to Averroes, to separate out material and formal parts, presumably by having
recourse to some purely theoretical considerations (In Met., VII, t.c. 37, fol. 189EI). We may
for instance distinguish between the functions a sensible substance performs, which pertain
to form, and the substratum which makes the realisation of such functions possible, which
pertains instead to matter.
149 Cf. Averroes, In Met., VII, t.c. 37, fol. 189EI.
in another or certain things in a certain state. As his language suggests,

Aristotle is in all likelihood talking about the composites of matter and
form. The tendency Aristotle is protesting against is well represented by the
comparison Socrates the Younger used to draw between an animal and a cir-
cle. The comparison is misleadingAristotle remarksbecause it induces
people to think that an animal can exist without its parts in the same way
as a circle can exist without (being made of) a determinate kind of matter.
But this is not true. For an animal is a perceptible being and so cannot be
defined without reference to change and to certain parts in a certain state.
As we have seen, the passage about Socrates the Younger is a serious obsta-
cle for all modern supporters of a formalistic interpretation of Aristotles
doctrine of definition. Thus, predictably, Averroess commentary on this dif-
ficult passage also seems to resist my general reconstruction of the Arabic
commentators interpretation, which is in line with the formalistic view. For
Averroes explicitly says that Socrates the Younger is wrong because he mis-
takenly supposes that the matter of an animal must not be mentioned in
its definition, just as the matter in which a circle exist must not be men-
tioned in the definition of the circle.150 So, matter seems to be included in the
definition of sensible substances, according to Averroes. As a partial solu-
tion to this difficulty it may be said that Averroes regards the passage about
Socrates the Younger as an anti-Platonic text, as is testified to by his mis-
taken identification of Socrates the Younger with Plato. So, the main flaw of
Socrates the Youngers argument is that it implies the existence of a sepa-
rate form of man or of a separate form of animal. In other words, Socrates the
Youngers comparison can mislead people into thinking that there can exist
a man or an animal without flesh and bones. If this is the main point Aver-
roes wishes to protest against, then the claim that matter must appear in the
definition of a sensible substance need not be taken literally, i.e. in the sense
that we have to mention in the definition of a certain sensible substance the
kind of matter it is made of. All that is required is that the definition of a
sensible substance makes us understand that we are confronted with a sen-
sible thing, i.e. with a thing which is composed of sensible matter.151 But this
result can be obtained even if the definition of a sensible substance makes
reference only to its formal parts. For the functions which are characteris-
tics of the form of a sensible substance can be realised only in one kind of
material. For instance: there is only one kind of matter, i.e. flesh and bones,

151 This sort of implication can perhaps be read into In Met., VII, t.c. 39, fol. 191G.
208 chapter two
that can sustain the functions characteristic of a human being. Therefore,

even if matter is not explicitly mentioned in the definition of sensible sub-
stances, the kind of matter a certain species of sensible substance is made
of can be somehow inferred from its definition.152 Admittedly, this is not the
most natural reading of Averroess text. However, it cannot be completely
ruled out especially in the light of what Averroes says in the rest of his com-
mentary on Z 1011, where form is described as the thing we end up defining
when we define a sensible substance.
In conclusion, I defend the view that, according to Averroes, the defini-
tion of a sensible substance makes reference to its form alone. It should be
noted that this entails that form and species are in fact one and the same
thing. For when we define a certain species of sensible substance we end up
defining its characteristic form. In other words, since the species of a sen-
sible substance does not contain matter, it must be identical with form. At
most, form and species can be distinguished conceptually: species is the
term we favour when we wish to classify things into different kinds, while
the term form best designates the substantial, ontological constituent of a
sensible substance. The species, therefore, is just the epistemic counterpart
of form.153 In spite of their conceptual difference, however, in reality form
and species are just one and the same thing.
4. Since Averroess reading of Aristotles doctrine of essence and definition

is particularly important for Paul of Venice and in general for the whole
Latin medieval tradition, I wish to present here some alternative interpreta-
tions of his view on definition and its parts. One such interpretation makes
much of a certain ambiguity that the notion of partand in particular that
of formal partbrings along with it. To see this point, it may be useful to
outline some aspects of Averroess solution to (P2), i.e. the question con-
cerning the relation of priority and posteriority between parts and wholes.
Are parts prior or posterior to the whole of which they are the parts? The first
kind of whole Aristotle seems to have in mind is a sensible substance and its
physical parts, i.e. the parts into which a sensible substance can be divided.
Since there are many senses of being prior, it may turn out that physical
152 For the distinction between being mentioned in a definition and being implied by a
definition see the fine discussion in Di Giovanni (2004). See also Di Giovanni (2011).
153 Thus, Aquinas is right after all in his Commentary on the Metaphysics (cf. Exp. Metaph.,
Lib. VII, lect. 9, n. 1467) when he maintains that, according to Averroes, species and form are
really identical and are distinct only conceptually (see Ch. 3 below, Sect. 5.1). For more about
the relation between form and species in Averroes, see: Di Giovanni (2003) and (2011).
parts are prior to the whole of which they are the parts according to one
sense of being prior and posterior to it according to another. And in fact
for Averroes the physical parts of a sensible substance are posterior to it
according to priority in definition, while they are prior to it according to pri-
ority in generation, i.e. compositional priority.154 In general, we can say that x
is prior to y in definition if and only if x enters into the definition of y while
y does not enter into the definition of x. Thus, for instance, a finger is poste-
rior in definition to the animal it belongs to because animal is mentioned
in the definition of finger, while finger is not mentioned in the definition
of animal. Compositional priority is simply the kind of priority parts enjoy
over the whole in so far as they constitute it. And physical parts are clearly
prior to the whole of which they are parts according to compositional prior-
ity. Although Averroes recognises both kinds of priority,155 he puts emphasis
on the fact that priority in definition is the most important kind of priority,
whereas being compositionally prior is only a weak and derivative sense of
being prior.156 Thus, absolutely speaking, the physical parts of a sensible
substance are posterior to it. Moreover, from what Averroes says it follows
that only the things which are prior to a sensible substance are mentioned
in its definition, i.e. are the parts of its definition.
Thus, the parts of the definition of a sensible substance are prior to it,
whilst the physical parts are posterior. The problem is to understand what
Averroes means by physical parts and parts of definition. On my inter-
pretation, the answer is simple: the physical parts of a sensible substance
are its material parts, while the parts of its definition are its formal parts.
No matter enters into the definition of a sensible substance and so the parts
of the definition of a sensible substance only include formal parts. Thus, a
sensible substance, i.e. a composite of matter and form, possesses both parts
154 Cf. Averroes, In Met., VII, t.c. 35, fol. 186M187A (but the distinction is present through-
out t.c. 35, i.e. Averroess commentary on the second part of Met. Z 10, and is already alluded
to in t.c. 33, fol. 183D). As a matter of fact, Averroes says that the whole precedes its parts by
the priority by which form precedes matterwhich I have labelled priority in definition
while parts precede their whole by the priority by which matter precedes formwhich I
have labelled compositional priority and which is called by Averroes himself priority in
generation in t.c. 33, fol. 183D and priority in time in t.c. 35, fol. 187D. The idea behind the
notions of priority in generation and priority in time must be that a whole is put together
out of or from the parts of which it is constituted and hence such parts somehow precede
the whole temporally or in generation.
155 Cf. Averroes, In Met., VII, t.c. 33, fol. 183D; t.c. 35, fol. 186M187A.
156 This is clear from the whole of Averroess discussion in t.c. 35 and especially on
fol. 186L187A.
210 chapter two
which are prior to itself (formal parts) and parts which are posterior (mate-
rial parts). A form, by contrast, only possesses parts which are prior to itself,
because all the parts of a form figure in its definition and so are prior to it.
This is not, however, the only way in which the contrast between physi-
cal parts and parts of the definition can be interpreted. Another possibility
is to read the contrast in the light of the opposition between particular and
universal. On this reading, the physical parts of a sensible substance are not
the material parts in general, but rather the individual or particular material
parts, i.e. the parts into which a sensible substance can be divided. The parts
of the definition of a sensible substance, by contrast, are its conceptual parts,
i.e. not the parts into which the substance can be divided but rather the parts
which contribute to our understanding of what it is. Such parts include some
material parts, not the individual material parts into which a substance can
be divided but material parts taken universally, i.e. the kind or type of matter
a certain sensible substance is made of. As can be seen, this interpretation
of Averroess doctrine is based on Aquinass distinction between individ-
ual matter, which does not pertain to the essence and the definition but
only to the individual, and common matter, which pertains instead to the
essence and definition. It is also the interpretation of Averroess text which
Alexander of Alexandria and Paul of Venice end up endorsing, as we shall
see in some detail in Chapters 5 and 6. Supporters of this interpretation
are prepared to concede that the parts of the definition of a sensible sub-
stance can be called formal parts, but insist that formal connects here
with the so-called forma totius and not with the so-called forma partis. I shall
say something more about the distinction between forma totius and forma
partis in Ch. 3 when presenting Aquinass view on essence and definition.
Since now, however, we can say that if formal is understood in terms of
the forma partis, then the contrast between formal and material should be
read in the light of the standard Aristotelian opposition between matter and
form. Form, in other words, is one of the two ontological constituents of a
sensible substance. On the contrary, when formal is connected with the
forma totius, the contrast between formal and material comes to the same
thing as that between essential and accidental. In this sense, the essential
parts of a sensible substance, i.e. the parts of it that figure in its definition,
can include also material parts in the standard sense, i.e. material parts
taken universally. For material parts taken universally are formal parts if
formal is contrasted with accidental, on the assumption, of course, that
some kind of matter (i.e. matter taken universally) enters into the essence.
In the second sense of formal, the formal parts of a thing are just its essen-
tial parts.
I must confess that I do not see how Alexander and Pauls interpretation
can be read into Averroess text. For one thing, the Arabic commentator
never talks about matter taken universally. On the contrary, he explicitly
says that a concrete sensible object is composed of matter, which is respon-
sible for the individuality of the object, and form, which is rather universal at
least in so far as it is not in itself particular or individual but is made such by
matter.157 So, the only matter Averroes seems to take into account is individ-
ual matter. For another thing, the interpretation I have presented assumes
that Averroes distinguishes between forma partis and forma totius or, to put
it otherwise, between form and species. For the species would contain in
addition to form matter taken universally. But it seems to me that Averroes
explicitly identifies species with form and distinguishes them only concep-
tually. Therefore, I think that we should reject this alternative proposal.
I wish to end this section by hinting briefly at another strategy which

might be used in dealing with the problem of the definition of sensible
substances, one which does not disambiguate the notion of formal part but
rather that of material part. One could distinguish, for instance, between
two kinds of matter, proximate and remote matter. Proximate matter is
the functional matter of a sensible substance, for instance the functioning
body and its organs. Being characterised as it is by the fact of performing
certain functions, proximate matter is not really distinct from the form of
which it is the matter. For being defined in terms of certain functions means
being defined in terms of form. Remote matter, by contrast, is the chemical
matter of a sensible substance, for instance the elements and, perhaps, some
homeomerous parts of the body. Such matter is not defined in terms of
the form of which it is the matter but is rather identifiable independently
of it: the elements, for instance, are not identified and defined in terms
of the functions of the sensible substances they come to compose. Thus,
one might suggest that, when Averroes says that matter enters into the
definition of sensible substances, it is the proximate matter that he has
in mind and not the remote matter. If it is the proximate matter that
figures in the definition of a sensible substance, then in some sense such a
definition contains only formal parts, because proximate matter is defined
and identified in terms of form. This would explain why Averroes at times
says that matter enters into the definition of a sensible substance and at

212 chapter two
others denies that it does. For proximate matter is in one sense matter
in that it can be logically opposed to the functions in terms of which it
is definedand in another formin so far as it is defined in terms of
the functions of form. This sophisticated interpretation is interesting in
so far as it would enable us to explain away some of Averroess apparent
contradictions. However, it clashes with some of Averroess explicit remarks
in the text. For when he talks about functional material parts such as fingers,
hands and so on, Averroes seems to say that they do not enter into the
definition of the substances of which they are parts. Fingers and hands are
defined in terms of the animal, while the animal is not defined in terms of its
hands and fingers. All in all, therefore, I prefer to stick with my solution. The
definition of a sensible substance makes reference only to its formal parts.
The material partsboth functional and non-functionalcan nonetheless
be inferred from the definition, by reasoning on the kind of material which is
necessary for the kind of substance in question to perform its characteristic
functions.158
158 There is one final difficulty for my interpretation which I would like to deal with
before moving on to Averroess interpretation of Met. Z 12. Throughout his commentary on
Met. Z 1011 Averroes maintains that the definition of form contains no reference to the
matter form exists in. This is true both when form is defined as an independent object of
definition and when form and its parts figure in the essential definition of a composite of
matter and form. However, on commenting on Z 11s final summary, where Aristotle sums
up the results of the whole section on essence and definition, Averroes puts forward the
surprising view that the definition of the form of a sensible substance must mention the
matter form exists in (In Met., VII, t.c. 40, 192LM). He goes as far as to assimilate the status
of form to that of accidents: the definition of a form, say the soul, in so far as it must mention
the material subject the form exists in, is an imperfect definition and generates difficulties
and paradoxes (repetitions, regresses, etc.) similar to those generated by the definition of
snub (In Met., VII, t.c. 40, fol. 192M193A). In other words, Averroes seems to be saying, the
definition of forms is, exactly like the definition of accidents, a definition by addition, i.e.
a definition mentioning items external to the essence of the object defined. This view is
surprising for many reasons. First, it clearly violates Aristotles (and Averroess) claim in Met.
Z 5 that, unlike the definition of accidents, the definitions of substances are not definitions by
addition. And forms are not only substances, but also primary substances. Second, because
a few lines above Averroes seems to restate once again the opposed view that the definition
of form contains no matter (In Met., VII, t.c. 40, fol. 192K). Third, because Averroes seems
to think elsewhere that assimilating forms and accidents is a gross philosophical mistake.
In commenting on Z 3, as we have seen, he blames the Ancients for confusing forms and
accidents (In Met., VII, t.c. 8, fol. 158M). Moreover, his exposition of Z 11 suggests that the
relation between matter and form in a composite substance is not merely accidental (In Met.,
VII, t.c. 37, fol. 189DH). Geometrical forms are merely accidentally related to the matter
they exist in, as is shown by the fact that they can exist in more than one kind of material.
Natural forms, by contrast, are bound up with a particular kind of matter, as is shown by
the fact that they exist only in that particular kind of matter and not in another. I have no
5.2. The Unity of Definition: Genus As Matter

Averroess interpretation of the structure and meaning of Met. Z 12 follows
very closely Aristotles text. The problem the chapter deals with is that of
understanding how it is possible for a definition to be one in spite of its being
composed of many parts.159 As for Aristotle, for Averroes too the question is
not simply a question about definitions. Since the object defined, i.e. the
object of which the definition reveals the essence, is one thing and one
substance, to solve the problem of the unity of definition means to solve
indirectly also the problem of the unity of the object defined. In other words,
a definition must be one formula because the thing of which it reveals the
essence is one thing and one substance (1037b2427).160 Thus, if we can show
that a definition does not contain a plurality of real parts we also prove that
the thing the definition refers to does not contain a plurality of real parts,
either.
The definitions Aristotle investigates are definitions by genus and dif-
ferentia (1037b2729).161 Thus, the problem of the unity of definition reduces
satisfactory solution to this difficulty. One reasonable hypothesis is that Averroes simply
misunderstands the last lines of Z 11 and provides a literal interpretation of what he believes
to be their meaning without worrying too much about the consistency of Aristotles (and
his own) argument. However, if one wants to take Averroess remarks seriously and preserve
the consistency of his general doctrine of definition, there might be one possible way out,
which can be tentatively outlined as follows. What Averroes is talking about is not the form
in itself but rather the form in matter. An analogy may clarify things here. If I talk of the form
of the circle in itself, it is clear that no sensible matter enters into its essence and definition:
neither iron nor wood, for instance, are part of the essence and definition of the form of the
circle. However, if what I am talking about is not the form of the circle in itself but rather
the form of the circle in wood or iron, then iron or wood should be taken to be part at
least of the definition of the form of the circle in iron or wood, respectively. By saying at
least of the definition I want to leave open the possibility that, unlike the definition of the
form of the circle in itself, the definition of the form of the circle in matter is a definition
by addition, as Averroess remarks seem to imply. The matter the circle exists in must be
mentioned in the definition of the circle in matter (but not in the definition of the circle
in itself); nevertheless matter falls outside the essence of the form of the circle because the
circle in matter is essentially just a circle. Analogously, one might say that, while flesh and
bones are not part of the essence and definition of the human soul in itself, they are part at
least of the definition of the human soul in matter, i.e. of the human soul in flesh and bones.
By analogy with the case of the form of the circle, also the definition of the human soul in
flesh and bones, would turn out to be, accordingly to this analysis, a definition by addition.
For even though flesh and bones figure in the definition of the soul in flesh and bones, they
still fall outside the essence of the soul in that the soul in flesh and bones is essentially just a
soul.
159 Cf. Averroes, In Met., VII, t.c. 42, fol. 194A; CD; t.c. 43, fol. 195GH.
160 Cf. Averroes, In Met., VII, t.c. 42, fol. 194MG.
214 chapter two
to the question of how genus and differentia form a real unity. The question
is slightly complicated by the fact that usually definitions do not present
themselves in the form G + D, i.e. one genus plus one differentia, but rather
in that G + D1, , Dn, i.e. one genus plus a string of differentiae. Thus, a
solution to the problem of the unity of definition must also account for the
case in which the differentiae in a definition are in fact more than one. In
Averroess reconstruction, Aristotles strategy in the chapter is quite sim-
ple. (i) First, Aristotle excludes one possible solution to the problem of the
unity of definition, consisting in supposing that the many differentiae form a
unity with their genus by being in, i.e. inhering in it (1037b1424).162 On this
view, the genus would be some kind of subject for the many differentiae
inhering in it. This solution is ruled out by Averroes for two fundamental
reasons. First, because a genus is differentiated by contraryand in gen-
eral incompatibledifferentiae. So, if we endorse the inherence model, we
get the result that one single subject will have two contraryand in gen-
eral incompatibleproperties at the same timewhich is impossible.163
Second, even if we leave aside the problem of contrary differentiae, the
inherence model does not yield a real unity between genus and differen-
tiae. For the unity in subject is only an accidental unity, i.e. an accidental
unity between things of different natures, and not an essential one.164 The
kind of unity which the parts of the definition possess, by contrast, must
be an essential unity, as is established by PEU: genus and differentiae must
express one single nature.165
(ii) Then Aristotle advances his own solution to the problem of the unity
of definition, which comes in two steps.166 A) The first consists in showing
that every definition of the form G + D1, , Dn can be reduced to the form G
+ D (1037b291038a4).167 This is possible because the first genus plus some
of the differentiae can be treated as a subordinate genus: for instance, in
the definition G + D1, , Dn, both G + D1 and G+ D1+ D2 will be subordinate
genera of the genus G. Thus, it is possible to consider G+ D1, , Dn-1, i.e.
the initial genus plus all the differentiae but the last, as a unique genus
for the last differentia Dn. The result is that the complex definition G + D1,
, Dn will be reduced to the standard form G + D, which contains only
162 Cf. Averroes, In Met., VII, t.c. 42, fol. 194DM.

164 Cf. Averroes, In Met., VII, t.c. 42, fol. 194DE; M.
165 Cf. Averroes, In Met., VII, t.c. 42, fol. 194 M.
166 Cf. Averroes, In Met., VII, t.c. 43, fol. 195H196C.
one genus and one differentia, i.e. the last differentia. B) In the second
step of his argument, Aristotle proves that the genus is eliminable from
the definition (1038a59).168 Averroes takes this to mean that the genus has
only a potential existence and so is not an actual part of the definition.169
Therefore, if the genus is eliminable, every definition will consist of only one
item, i.e. the last differentia, which absorbs in itself all the other parts of the
definition. As Averroes himself puts it, a definition has only one real part,
i.e. the last differentia, and a number of potential parts, i.e. the genus and
the other differentiae.170 After the main argument, the chapter closes with
an illustration of the method of division which guarantees the validity of
steps (A) and (B) (1038a925).171 We can reduce the whole definition to the
last differentia only if we divide correctly, namely if each differentia which
is added in the definition is an essential differentia of the previous one.172
For instance, we should not divide footed into winged and wingless,
for being winged and being wingless are not ways of being footed, but
rather into cloven-footed and uncloven-footed, which are ways of being
footed. Taking essential and not accidental differentiae ensures that the
successive differentia will include the previous one and so that the last
differentia will include all the others. Moreover, we should avoid repetitions
and omissions.173 For instance, we should avoid formulae such as two-
footed footed animal in that footed is already contained in two-footed.
Nor should we leave out any of the differentiae which are essential to a given
species. When such indications are followed through, the last differentia
will absorb in itself the content of the whole definition.
As can be seen, Averroess reconstruction of Z 12s argument is very
faithful to Aristotles text and does not present particular traits of originality.
More interesting is, by contrast, Averroesss brief discussion of step (B) of
Aristotles solution, i.e. the claim that the genus can be eliminated from the
definition. In the relevant passage (1038a59) Aristotle says that the genus
is eliminable because (i) either it does not exist at all in an unqualified sense
apart from the forms of the genus (ii) or it exists but only as matter. The most
relevant point is to see how Averroes understands Aristotles alternative and
in particular horn (ii), i.e. the famous claim that genus is like matter.
168 Cf. Averroes, In Met., VII, t.c. 43, fol. 195K196AB.

169 Cf. Averroes, In Met., VII, t.c. 43, fol. 195M; 196B.
170 Cf. Averroes, In Met., VII, t.c. 43, fol. 196GH; K.
171 Cf. Averroes, In Met., VII, t.c. 43, fol. 196CM.
172 Cf. Averroes, In Met., VII, t.c. 43, fol. 196CF.
173 Cf. Averroes, In Met., VII, t.c. 43, fol. 196HM.
216 chapter two
Let me start from the genus-as-matter image and observe that in gen-
eral there are two ways of understanding it: one could take the similitude
either literally or analogically.174 Suppose we want to define a sensible sub-
stance, i.e. a composite of matter and form. On the literal interpretation
of the genus-as-matter image, in a definition by genus and differentia the
genus literally signifies the matter of the composite substance, while the dif-
ferentia signifies its form. This interpretation clearly presupposes that the
definition of a composite substance makes reference to both its matter and
its forma claim which I tend not to attribute to Averroes. The analogical
interpretation, by contrast, does not take the genus to literally signify mat-
ter, but simply maintains that in a definition the relation between genus
and differentia is analogous to that obtaining between matter and form in a
sensible substance. Presumably, the analogy will consist in the fact that both
genus and matter exist only potentially, i.e. they exist in actuality only when
they are determined by an actual component, i.e. the differentia in the case
of the genus and form in the case of matter. It should be noted that the ana-
logical interpretation is quite neutral with regard to what the genus-term
and the differentia-term signify. For it is compatible with the view that the
genus-term and the differentia-term signify only the formal parts of a sen-
sible substance, but also with the claim that they both signify composites
of matter and form. Aquinas, to give just one example, goes for the analogi-
cal interpretation of the genus-as-matter image and maintains, at the same
time, that both the genus-term and the differentia-term signify composites
of matter and form.
Now, it seems clear to me that Averroes endorses an analogical interpre-
tation of the genus-as-matter claim. In particular, he explicitly rejects the
view that the genus-term literally signifies matter. He contrasts for instance
a genus such as voice with a genuine example of matter, bronze, on the
grounds that the bronze can exist separately from the different forms it
can receive, whereas the genus voice cannot exist at all independently of
its forms, i.e. the specific kinds of voices it is a genus for.175 Thus, Averroes
concludes, the genus is not a genuine example of matter, but only resembles
matter, i.e. plays in the definition a role analogous to that played by matter
in a sensible substance.176 Therefore, Averroes is clearly a supporter of an
174 For a comprehensive study of the genus-as-matter problem in Averroes see: Di Gio-
vanni (2004) and (2006). See also Galluzzo (2002) and (2007b) for Aquinass understanding
of the image.
176 Cf. Averroes, In Met., VII, t.c. 43, fol. 196B and also 195LM.
analogical reading of the genus-as-matter claim. But what do genus-term

and differentia-term signify? Averroes is explicit that the differentia-term
signifies the form of a sensible substance. In particular, the last differentia
signifiesand in a way isthe form and substance of a sensible object. To
see what the genus-term signifies we have to go back to Aristotles dilemma
concerning the status of the genus: (i) either the genus does not exist at all
in an unqualified sense apart from the forms of the genus (ii) or it exists but
only as matter. Averroes sees two real alternatives here, but also believes
that the dilemma does not affect the general result of the argument. Either
way, the genus does not exist in actuality in the thing and it is only the last
differentia that exists in actuality.177 Thus, in some sense, for Averroes both
alternatives end up treating the genus as a sort of matter, i.e. as a potentially
existing item, even if the genus-as-matter claim is made explicit only in horn
(ii). Where alternatives (i) and (ii) diverge, by contrast, is on the kind of sig-
nification they attribute to the genus-term. Averroes glosses the dilemma in
the following way: (j) either the genus is nothing but the form of the subject
receiving the form (jj) or it is both such a form and the subject.178 I take it
that (j) means that the genus-term signifies only a formal part of the object
defined (i.e. the generic form), whereas (jj) seems to suggest that the genus-
term signifies a composite of matter and form or at least formal properties
in matter.
Since I defend the view that, according to Averroes, the definition of a
composite substance signifies only the formal parts of it, I am bound to take
(j) as Averroess genuine view and (jj) as an hypothetical alternative he does
not really believe in. On my view, both the genus and the differentia of a sen-
sible substance must refer to formal parts. This interpretation seems to find
some support in Averroess text. When he comments for instance on Aris-
totles remarks that a definition is a formula composed of the differentiae
(1038a89), Averroes observes that there is no real difference between genus
and differentia except that the one is a generic form and the other a specific
one.179 The most natural reading of this passage is that both the genus-term
and the differentia-term refer to formal aspects of a sensible substance,
which differ only in their degree of generality. Even if I should happen to
be right about Averroess view on the signification of genus and differentia,
I still owe an explanation as to the reason why Averroes introduces alter-
native (jj). It seems to me that alternative (jj) is introduced because some

179 Cf. Averroes, In Met., VII, t.c. 43, fol. 196C.
218 chapter two
genera seem to be more material than others.180 Voice, for instance, is not
only the genus of the letters but is also the material substratum out of which
the letters are fashioned.181 Avicenna and Aquinas would say that the two
senses of the term voice, i.e. as a genus and as matter, are equivocal and
that it is not one and the same thing that is the genus and the matter of the
letters. Averroes, by contrast, at least entertains the possibility that there
might be some connection between voice as a genus and voice as mat-
ter. To this effect, he considers alternative (jj), i.e. the claim that unlike the
differentia-term, the genus-term may signify not purely formal properties
but the properties of, or at least in, some material subject. However, this
does not seem in the end the alternative he favours. For one thing, he does
not say anywhere that a genus-term like animal carries the same ambigu-
ity as voice. On the contrary, everything suggests that animal signifies the
generic form of the different species of animal. For another thing, as I have
already pointed out, at the end of his discussion of the case of voice, Aver-
roes seems to distinguish sharply between genus and matter along the lines
of Avicennas and Aquinass views.182 Finally, it must be noted that Aver-
roes explicitly remarks that the genus voice, in so far as it is predicated of
the different kinds of letter, resembles form and not matter.183 For it is form
and not matter which is predicated per se of a sensible substance, as one
should expect if the parts of a definition refer only to the formal parts of the
thing defined.184 In conclusion, therefore, Averroess view must be that, even
if genera like voice have some connection with the matter of the things of
which they are genera, strictly speaking they only indicate the formal parts
of those things.
6. Universals
6.1. Introduction: An Overview of the Section on Universals

In Section 1.3, I said that Met. 1316 contains, according to Averroes, an
extensive anti-Platonic argument. The anti-Platonic character of Z 14, 15 and

181 Cf. Averroes, In Met., VII, t.c. 43, fol. 195M196B.
184 Averroes introduces the claim that form is predicated per se of the sensible substance
which has the form (while matter is never predicated per se of the thing which has matter)
as early as in his commentary on Z 10: cf. Averroes, In Met., VII, t.c. 34, fol. 184F. This doctrine
is further evidence in favour of my interpretation of Averroess doctrine of definition.
16 is particularly evident. Z 14s main point, for instance, is that Platos con-
ception of universals cannot explain how a universal can be composed of
other universals.185 We all concede that a species is in some sense composed
of a genus and a differentia. Now, species, genus and differentia are all uni-
versals in that they are all predicated of many different things. However, if
universals are conceived of in the way Plato does, i.e. as separately existing
things, it is impossible to explain how genus and differentia can make up a
species. For being separate seems to be incompatible with being a part or a
component of something else. Following Aristotle, Averroes focuses in par-
ticular on the status of the genus.186 Platonists seem to face a dilemma: either
the genus animal, which is predicated of the different animal species, is one
in number in all the different species of which it is predicated or there will
be as many different genera animal as there are animal species. Both solu-
tions seem to lead to insuperable difficulties.
Z 15 too has, in Averroess eyes, a distinctively anti-Platonic character.
Admittedly, the chapter seems to have a wider scope than criticising Platos
doctrine and to defend a very general thesis, i.e. that no kind of particu-
lar can be defined. The argument in the first part of the chapter concerns
a special kind of particulars, i.e. particulars which are subject to genera-
tion and corruption (1039b201040a8).187 The main point here is that the
object of definition, as well as the object of scientific demonstration, must
be a necessary and stable object. Sensible things, however, are not necessary
and stable objects because they come into being and pass away. There-
fore, they cannot be objects of definition just as they cannot be objects of
demonstrative science. In the second part of the chapter, by contrast, Aris-
totle sketches out an argument which captures any particular whatsoever
(1040a914; a29b4).188 Each of the predicates in a definitionso the argu-
ment goescan always be applied to a plurality of objects and so never
applies to only one particular. Therefore, the definition as a whole, too,
being a conjunction of common predicates, will always apply to a plural-
ity of objects and never capture one particular alone. Of course, it may
be the case that, as a matter of fact, a definition applies to only one par-
ticular: this is the case when there happens to be only one particular of
a certain kind or species. However, in principle a definition can always
be applied to more than one particular and so particulars as such cannot

186 Cf. Averroes, In Met., VII, t.c. 52, fol. 201AG.
187 Cf. Averroes, In Met., VII, t.c. 53, fol. 202AG.
188 Cf. Averroes, In Met., VII, t.c. 54, fol. 202M; t.c. 55, fol. 204BD.
220 chapter two
be defined. What we define is only the kind particulars belong to and not
particulars as such. As can be seen, Met. Z 15 seems to concern all sorts of
particular and not only Forms. However, besides the two aforementioned
arguments the chapter also contains an explicit attack on the definability
of Platos Forms (1040a810). And it is in fact this section which Averroes
most focuses on in his commentary. Interestingly enough, on Averroess
reconstruction the argument against the definability of Platos Forms does
not hinge so much on their particularity as on their status as separate
particulars. Thus, the main point of the argument is not that Forms are not
definable because they are particular, while the object of definition must be
universal, but rather that conceiving of Forms as separate particulars is in
contrast with the relation obtaining between definiendum and definiens in
a proper definition.189 Suppose, for instance, that we define man as two-
footed animal. If A man is a two-footed animal is a proper definition,
all the terms involved, i.e. man, animal and two-footed signify one
and the same nature, although in different ways. However, if the object
defined, i.e. man, is a Form, so must be, for parity of reasons, the parts
of its definiens as well, i.e. animal and two-footed. So, man, animal
and two-footed will stand for three separate particulars, i.e. respectively
the Form of man, the Form of animal and the Form of two-footed. But
clearly the three Forms are three distinct particulars of different nature and
so do not express one and the same nature. Thus, if the terms involved in
the formula A man is a two-footed animal stand for Forms, the formula
will not be a proper definition and man will turn out not to be defin-
able.190
The anti-Platonic character of Met. Z 16 is uncontroversial. The chapter
is somewhat miscellaneous and contains in fact three distinct sections:
(i) an argument to the effect that both the parts of living substances and
the elements are only potential substances (1040b516); (ii) a criticism of
Platos view that the highest genera, i.e. being and one, are substances and
substances to the highest degree (1040b1627); (iii) a general assessment of
the merits and demerits of Platos theory of Forms (1040b271041a5). Clearly,
sections (ii) and (iii) are directed against Plato. Moreover, Averroes believes
189 Cf. Averroes, In Met., VII, t.c. 54, fol. 202M203F. However, the claim that Forms are
indefinable because they are particular, whilst a definition only refers to the universal kind a
particular belongs to, is not completely absent from Averroess commentary: cf. In Met., VII,
t.c. 53, fol. 202GH.
190 For this argument cf. in particular: Averroes, In Met., VII, t.c. 54, fol. 202A203F.
that section (i) is also connected to the main anti-Platonic theme.191 To

admit of the existence of FormsAverroes observesamount to maintain-
ing that the forms of sensible substances are separate from matter. Thus, Z 16
aims to show that all the things which we are prepared to call substances
at least within the domain of sensible thingsexist in matter.192 The parts
of an animal, for instance, are not substances when they exist separately
from the animal of which they are the parts, but only when they exist as
parts thereof.193 There may be some doubts as to the cogency of Averroess
argument. The Arabic commentator in fact seems to trade on a certain
ambiguity the term separate brings along with it. Separate is ambiguous
between separate from matter and separately, i.e. autonomously, exist-
ing: the first sense is relevant to the anti-Platonic argument, whilst the
second seems to be in play when it comes to evaluating the status of the
parts of an animal. Some clarification as to how the two senses are con-
nected in the present instance seems to be in order, but Averroes does not
provide any. Be that as it may, the important point for us is that Averroes
regards Z 16 as mainly occupied with Platos Forms and with the issue of
separateness.
In conclusion, therefore, Z 1416 can be regarded as an extensive criticism
of Platos theory of Forms. Is this also true for the most important chapter
in the section on universals, i.e. Met. Z 13? Is the main claim Z 13 argues for,
i.e. that no universal is substance, to be read in the light of Averroess anti-
Platonic polemic? Moreover, the chapter is usually taken to say a decisive
word on the issue of the status of Aristotles forms, namely on the problem of
whether forms are particular or universal. Does the chapter have, on Aver-
roess reconstruction, anything to do with the status of Aristotles forms?
Does he think that Z 13s argument forces us to regard Aristotles forms as
particular, given that it concludes that no universal is substance? These are
questions I intend to deal with in the next section. Now, however, I wish to
make one general observation concerning the meaning of Met. Z 13. Platon-
ists are never explicitly mentioned throughout Averroess commentary on
Z 13. However, at 1038b68 Aristotle justifies his enquiry into the notion of
universal with the remark that there are some people who regard universals
as causes and principles to the highest degree. In his commentary, Averroes
does not explicitly identify these philosophers with Platonists, but observes,
191 Cf. Averroes, In Met., VII, t.c. 56, fol. 204HM.

222 chapter two
nevertheless, that whoever believes that universals are the substances of

things is also compelled to say that they are separate.194 Given the promi-
nence that the question of separateness has within Averroess anti-Platonic
polemic, it is natural to think that the supporters of the substantiality of
universals are in fact Platonists. This seems to be confirmed by the way
Averroes introduces Met. Z 13s general theme. He observes that in Met.
Z 79 Aristotle has shown that universals cannnot be the efficient causes
of particular sensible substances, while in Z 13 he sets himself the task
of proving that they cannot be the formal causes of sensible substances,
either.195 Since the universals Z 79 talk of are clearly Platos Forms, we seem
entitled to assume that Z 13 too is concerned in some way or other with
Forms. In the next section, I shall try to show how taking the anti-Platonic
polemic as Z 13s main concern affects Averroess general reading of the
chapter.
6.2. Z 13s General Meaning

According to Averroes, Z 13s general aim is to examine whether form is
substance or not.196 This remark may appear slightly surprising in light of
Averroess interpretation of the rest of the book. For it seems that the the-
sis that form is the substance of sensible objects and so is primary substance
has already been established well before Z 13s enquiry into universals. How-
ever, Averroess observation should probably be taken in the sense that Z 13
further confirms the substantiality of form by tackling this issue from a dif-
ferent perspective, i.e. by reaching the conclusion that form is substance
through an analysis of the notion of universal. The starting point of this anal-
ysis is definition.197 Since Z 4 has made it clear that what definition indicates
is the substance of sensible objects, and since definitions are composed of
universals, Z 13 raises the question whether the universals figuring in a def-
inition are the substances of sensible objects.198 The answer is clearly nega-
tive. The universals figuring in a definition are not the substances of sensible
194 This observation is absent from the Latin version of Averroess text (cf. In Met., VII,
t.c. 45, fol. 197K), but is present in the Arabic text.

196 Cf. Averroes, In Met., VII, t.c. 44, fol. 197C. Averroes also remarks that it is already clear
that matter is substance. What he means, of course, is not that matter is primary substance
but rather that it is substance in some sense, i.e. is better described as substance than as
non-substance, even if it is substance only in a secondary sense.
197 Cf. Averroes, In Met., VII, t.c. 44, fol. 197C.
things, and there is no other substance in individual sensible objects than

the particular form which is the principle of their substantiality.199
In the contemporary literature Met. Z 13 is especially important for the
debate over the status of Aristotles forms. The main thesis defended in
the chapter, i.e. that no universal is substance, seems to imply that forms,
if they are, as they seem to be, substances, must be particular and not
universal. The way I have presented Averroess reconstruction of Z 13s
general meaning may suggest that he actually agrees with the modern
supporters of particular forms. The universals figuring in a definition are
not the substances of the particular sensible objects and soon Averroess
causal understanding of the notion of substanceare not substances at all.
All the substances there are, are particular. So, both the sensible objects
and the forms that are their substances are particular. Averroes, therefore,
seems to be an advocate of particular forms. But is this actually the case? To
answer the question, we must bear in mind what it means for a form to be
particular or universal. As we have said in Ch. 1, the question is best phrased
in terms of individuation. All the parties in the controversy agree that each
sensible substance has a form which is numerically distinct from the form of
the other cospecific particular substances. Thus, according to everyone, in
some sense or other only particular forms exist. Scholars disagree, however,
on what makes a particular form particular. Supporters of particular forms
maintain that the particularity of particular forms is primitive and so does
not depend on anything else and especially on the different pieces of matter
forms are joined to. On the contrary, it is the (primitive) particularity of form
that explains the (derivative) particularity of matter. Supporters of universal
forms, by contrast, contend that the particularity of form is derivative and
depends on the different pieces of matter form happens to exist in. On this
view, we are certainly allowed to talk about particular forms, but only in
the sense of particularised forms, i.e. forms made particular by matter. In
other words, if we could strip matter away from all sensible substances of a
certain kind, we would be left with only one form. Thus, forms are universal
in the sense that they are sharable and repeatable entities, which are made
peculiar to the substances of which they are the forms only by the different
pieces of matter they exist in. If these are the terms of the debate over the
status of Aristotles forms, it is very hard to describe Averroes as a supporter
199 Cf. Averroes, In Met., VII, t.c. 44, fol. 197D. In this case too, Averroes adds (particular)
matter to the list of things which can be said to be substances. For the sense of this remark
see supra, n. 196.
224 chapter two
of particular forms in the sense specified. For one thing, Averroes seems
to be quite explicit throughout his commentary on Met. Z that forms are
made particular by matter and so their individuality is not primitive but
derivative.200 For another, as has been remarked, several pieces of doctrine
defended by Averroesincluding his doctrine of intellectseem to push
towards the view that numerical multiplication is possible only in virtue
of matter, which multiplies a form that is in itself unique.201 Thus, Averroes
seems to be a supporter of universal forms in the modern sense of the term.
For him, even if forms exist only as particular forms, their individuality is
not primitive but rather depends on the different pieces of matter in which
forms exist.
If the foregoing reconstruction is correct, it is clear that we must recon-
sider the sense of Averroess general interpretation of Met. Z 13. Since Aver-
roess view is that forms are made particular by matter, his insistance on
the claim that universals are not the substances of sensible things cannot
be understood through the lenses of the modern controversy over the onto-
logical status of forms. In other words, Averroess claim that the substance
of sensible objects, i.e. form, is particular as opposed to universal cannot
be taken to mean that a form is particular in the sense of the modern con-
troversy. For Aristotles forms, according to Averroes, are universal in the
sense of the modern controversy, i.e. are somehow sharable and repeatable
entities which are made particular only by the different pieces of matter
they happen to exist in. Thus, we have to find a different meaning for the
particular-universal opposition on which Averroes builds up his interpre-
tation of Met. Z 13. I think that Averroess polemic against Platonism can
be of some help here and suggest a possible line of interpretation. We have
seen that, according to Averroes, the predicates figuring in the definition of
a sensible substance signify only the formal properties of it, i.e. the differ-
ent aspects of the form characteristic of the sensible substance in question.
Such predicates are universal predicates but it is not as universals that they
exist in reality. What exists in reality is a form which is particular and pecu-
liar to the substance of which it is the form. This form is the substance of
the sensible object of which it is the form. If the things which the predicates
of a definition signify existed in reality as universals, they could only exist
as Platonic universals. For the predicates of a definition indicate the sub-
stance of the things the definition refers to. However, if universals are the
200 For an insightful discussion of the question of particular-universal forms in Averroes
see Di Giovanni (2007).

201 See again: Di Giovanni (2007).
substance of something, they must be the substance of all the things they
are predicated of, in that they bear the same relation to all of them. Thus,
they cannot exist in any of them in particularotherwise they would be
peculiar to the thing they exist inand so must exist separate from all of
themwhich is the distinguishing mark of Platos universals.202
On this interpretation, Met. Z 13 does not concern the problem of the
individuation of forms, but rather the mode of existence enjoyed by the
things signified by the predicates of a definition. Although we conceptualise
things by means of universal concepts and define them by means of univer-
sal predicates, the forms that concepts represent and predicates signify do
not exist as universals in reality but rather as constituents of extra-mental
things, which are particular in that they exist in particular things. In other
words, the problem Averroes reads into the chapter is closer to the tradi-
tional problem of whether universals exist in the things of which they are
predicated or separate from them. The modern controversy over the status
of Aristotles forms, by contrast, is a problem of individuation, which already
presupposes that forms do not exist separately from the things of which they
are the forms. The forms of sensible substances exist in themselves and so
are in this sense particular: each sensible substance has its own form and
not that of another sensible substance. This thought, however, is quite com-
patible with forms being described as universal from the point of view of
individuation, i.e. with the claim that their individuality is not primitive but
rather derivative.
202 This interpretation also explains Averroess remark (absent from the Latin version, cf.
above, footnote 194) to the effect that if universals are the substances of something they
must be conceived of as separate. On my reading, Averroess point is not that everything
that is the substance of something else must also be separate, but rather that if universals
are the substances of something else they must be separate. Admittedly, Aristotle explicitly
says in Met. Z 16 (1040b2829) that the Platonists were right in supposing that Forms must be
separate if they are substances, and one may well suppose that Averroes is simply echoing
Aristotles words here. However, it is not entirely clear that Aristotles principle applies also
to notion of substance of. That is, it is not clear that all the things that are the substances
of something else must be separate, if we take separate to mean existentially separate,
as Averroes seems to do. For Aristotles forms are the substances of sensible things, but are
clearly not separate in that they exist in matter. One might try to reinterpret Aristotles and
Averroess claims so as to accommodate the case of the notion of substance of as well, by
saying for instance that substances must be separate in some way or other. This new version
of the principle would also capture the case of forms, because Aristotles forms, though not
being existentially separate, are at least separate in thought (i.e. they can be understood and
defined independently of any other thing). Be that as it may, it is clear that in our passage
Averroess point is that, if Platos universals are the substances of something else, they must
be existentially separate.
226 chapter two
7. Substance As Cause in Met. Z 17
Averroess commentary on Met. Z 17 is the place where the Arabic commen-

tators causal interpretation of Aristotles doctrine of substance becomes
most evident. This is not surprising given that the chapter makes a fresh
start with respect to Z 3s list of four candidates for the title of substance
by exploring the idea that substance is a cause of some sort. According to
Averroes, the outcome of Aristotles discussion is that the substance of sen-
sible objects, i.e. the composites of matter and form, is their essence and
formal cause, i.e. their form. Of course, there are different kinds of causes
of a sensible substance, for instance the agent which is responsible for its
coming to be, the end that orients its behaviour, and its material cause. But
it is only its formal cause, i.e. its form, that counts as its substance. As we
have seen, Averroess identification of form with the cause and substance
of sensible objects surfaces many times throughout his commentary on Z.
However, in his exposition of Met. Z 17 it becomes the central theme and
acquires new evidence.203 This consideration leads to another issue con-
cerning the way in which Z 17 connects with the rest of Zs enquiry. In Met.
Z 4 Aristotle begins a series of logical considerations about the notion of
essence. As we have seen, for Averroes the logical considerations mainly
revolve around the claim that the substance of sensible things is what is
indicated by their definition. This claim, besides being logical in that it cen-
tres on notions such as definition and predication, is logical also because
it is a piece of doctrine contained in Aristotles logic, i.e. in the Organon.
Now, it is clear that Z 17s enquiry does not work with the assumption that
the substance of sensible objects is what is indicated by their definition,
but rather with the different claim that what counts as the substance of
sensible objects is a principle and a cause. Thus, it might be thought that
Z 17s enquiry is no longer part of the logical investigation which begins
in Met. Z 4, but rather introduces a different sort of investigation. Thomas
Aquinas, for instance, without going as far as to say that Z 17 begins a dif-
ferent sort of investigation and so is not part and parcel of Zs main line of
argument, remarks that Z 17s discussion goes much beyond the scope of Zs
logical investigation.204 For the notion of cause is, strictly speaking, a phys-
ical and metaphysical notion and so in some sense contrasts with purely
logical notions such as definition and predication. This is clearly not the

204 Cf. Aquinas, Exp. Metaph., Lib. VII, lect. 17, n. 1468.
way Averroes understands the relation between Met. Z 17 and the rest of Zs
enquiry. For Averroes, on the contrary, the enquiry into the notion of sub-
stance as cause is part of the logical considerations which Aristotle begins
in Z 4.205 The reason why the claim that the substance of sensible objects is
their formal cause is taken to be part of the logical considerations is exactly
the same as it is with the claim that the substance of sensible things is what
is expressed by their definition: both claims belong to Aristotles logic. In
particular, Aristotles logical treatment of cause can be found in Book II of
the Posterior Analytics (Chapters 111), where Aristotle explores at length
the connections between demonstration and definition. For Averroes, Met.
Z 17s investigation into the notion of substance as cause is nothing but a
straightforward application to the case of substances of the Posterior Ana-
lytics analysis of cause, which is used in the Analytics mainly in connection
with the case of events and physical phenomena. As is well known, in Post.
An., II, 1 Aristotle distinguishes four kinds of question: the that-question (i.e.
whether something is the case), the why-question (i.e. why something is the
case), the whether-question (i.e. whether something exists) and the what-
question (what is the something that exists).206 At the beginning, Aristotle
seems to distinguish between the that-question and the why-question on
the one hand, which concern the obtaining and the explanation of facts, and
the whether-question and what-question on the other, which concern the
existence and essence of things. But there are indications that Aristotle may
be prepared to raise the question as to why things are what they are. From
Averroess point of view, this possibility is secured by Aristotles identifica-
tion, in the Analytics, of the answer to the what-question with the answer
to the why-question.207 In other words, the cause in virtue of which or the
explanation of why a thing exists is the answer to the question about what
the thing in question is, i.e. the essence of the thing.208 Thus, the kind of cause
of sensible substances which Z 17 is seeking is the kind of cause which is also
their essence. Being the essence of sensible objects, such a cause is also their
substance.209 Accordingly, both Z 416s investigation into the predicates fig-
uring in definitions and Z 17s analysis of the notion of substance as cause
lead to the same result, i.e. identifying the essence of sensible substances

206 Cf. Aristotle, An. Post., B, 1, 89b2325.
207 Cf. Aristotle, An. Post., B, 2, 90a1415; a3132.
209 Cf. Averroes, In Met., VII, t.c. 59, fol. 207FH.
228 chapter two
with their substance, and can be presented as two logical clarifications

of the notion of essence. Moreover, both lines of argument further refine
the notion of essence by identifying essence with form. In conclusion,
Z 17s discussion is just another aspect of Aristotles logical enquiry into the
essence of sensible things.
As is known, Met. Z 17 falls into two parts. In the first (1041a10b11),
Aristotle explores the idea that we should identify the substance of sensible
objects with one of its causes and concludes that the substance of sensible
objects is their formal cause or form, i.e. the cause explaining why a certain
piece of matter is the substance it is. In the second part of the chapter
(1041b1133), Aristotle defends at length the view that a material substance is
not merely the sum of its material parts, but is rather its material parts and
something else, i.e. the form which keeps the material parts together and
confers upon them the structure and organisation they possess. Averroes
provides a clear and substantially faithful exposition of Aristotles text.
Therefore, in the rest of this section, I shall confine myself to presenting
some remarkable aspects of Averroess interpretation of both sections of the
chapter.
(1) Aristotles main effort in the first part of Z 17 is to fix the correct logical
form which any proper causal investigation should take. Aristotles idea
is that any proper causal investigation should take the predicative form
Why is x y?, where x and y are distinct. Thus, for instance, Why is a man
musical? is a correct causal question, in that it asks for an explanation
of the predicative link between man and musical, which are two distinct
entities. On the contrary, the question Why is a man a man? is not a proper
causal question, because the subject and the predicate do not signify two
distinct things but one and the same thing. As it stands, therefore, Why
is a man a man? is an entirely vacuous question, which can be answered
uninformatively by pointing out that every thing is identical with itself. On
the other hand, it is clear that, when we ask Why is a man a man? what
we really want to know is why a particular man is the kind of thing it is,
i.e. why it is the case that a particular man is the kind of thing he is and
not another. Therefore, Aristotle suggests that the question Why is a man
a man? should be rephrased in such a way as to turn it into a proper causal
question. Aristotle suggests in particular to paraphrase the question as Why
are these flesh and bones a man?. In the new form, the question counts as
a proper causal question in that the subject and the predicate stand for two
distinct things, i.e. a man and his flesh and bones. Of course, the difficulty
remains of understanding what are means in the sentence these flesh
and bones are a man. However, there seems to be a plausible and intuitive
sense of to be according to which some particular flesh and bones are a
man, i.e. in the sense that they possess the shape and perform the functions
which are characteristic of a man and not of some other thing. Thus, the
causal question Why are these flesh and bones a man? asks for the reason
why a certain pack of flesh and bones is a human being. Aristotles answer
is that a certain pack of flesh and bones is a human being because they
possess the essence of a human being, which must be identified with the
form of a human being. In other words, a certain piece of matter isin
the appropriate sense of isa human being because there is a certain
form which provides the piece of matter with the properties and functions
characteristic of a human being. The human form is what makes of a certain
piece of matter a human being and so is the essence of the resulting human
being.
Averroes seems to reconstruct correctly Aristotles general strategy. For
him too, causal questions make sense only when what we ask for is the
explanation of a certain link obtaining between two distinct items.210 Aver-
roes goes even farther than that by observing that any proper causal ques-
tion presupposes an ontological composition in the thing about which we
raise the question.211 The result is that only things that are composed can be
the object of a proper causal investigation, while simple things give rise to no
causal investigation because in their case there is no link between two dis-
tinct items and no composition which we should attempt to explain. Aver-
roes seems to take into consideration two cases, that in which the causal
question concerns an accident and that in which what is investigated is
a substance. The case of accidents perfectly satisfies the requirement for
a proper causal question to take place.212 For clearly the question Why is
a man musical? presupposes two distinct items (a man and musicality)
whose predicative link we would like to explain, and so an ontological com-
position in the very thing we enquire aboutin the case at issue a compo-
sition between a substance, a man, and an accident, musicality. The case of
substances is more complicated and Averroess treatment of it is not as clear
as one could wish for. As we have seen, the problem with substances is that
questions of the form Why is a man a man? do not count as proper causal
questions in that the subject and the predicate in the question do not stand

211 Cf. Averroes, In Met., VII, t.c. 59, fol. 207D; HI.
230 chapter two
for two distinct entities but for one and the same thing.213 Questions of such a
form, as Averroes would put it, do not point to any ontological composition
in the very thing we enquire about.214 So, causal questions about substances
must take a different form, one in particular in which the subject and the
predicate stand for two distinct items and so point to a real composition in
the very thing we enquire about. Unfortunately, Averroess understanding
of Aristotles paraphrasis of the causal questions about substances is to some
extent disappointing. For one thing, he tentatively suggests that questions
such as Why is a man a man? might be replaced by questions of the form
Why is a man an animal?.215 However, even though in the question Why
is a man an animal? the subject and the predicate are at least verbally dis-
tinct, it is not clear that they point to two really distinct items and so to a
real composition in the thing about which we raise the causal question. For
another thing, Averroes seems to overlook the force of the paraphrasis sug-
gested by Aristotle himself. According to Averroes, questions of the form
Why are these flesh and bones a man? or Why are these bricks and stones
a house do not enquire, as Aristotle clearly implies, into the formal cause
of a man or of a house, but rather concern only their material cause.216 What
is worse, some remarks in Averroess commentary on Z 17 might be taken to
imply that substances are simple items, and so not the right kind of things
about which a causal question may be raised.217
In spite of such difficulties, there is evidence that Averroes does not miss
completely the force of Aristotles argument. Later on in his commentary,
he seems to suggest that sensible substances can be the object of a causal
investigation in that they are composed of matter and form.218 Moreover,
when distinguishing between material and formal cause, Averroes observes

216 Cf. Averroes, In Met., VII, t.c. 60, fol. 208EF. Averroes seems to think that questions
of the form Why are these bricks and stones a house? tacitly assumes that a substance
is only made of material constituents and hence possesses no substantial form. On such
an hypothesiswhich Averroes obviously discardsthe why-question about sensible sub-
stances would just amount to a question about their material constituents. The reason why
a house is what it is, in other words, would be that it is made of certain kinds of material.
217 Cf. Averroes, In Met., VII, t.c. 59, fol. 207HI. I think that Averroes means to say in the
passage mentioned that substances seem to be simple in that it is not immediately clear in
their case how a causal investigation should be formulated. However, it is clear that material
substances are not simple, even though of course there are other kind of substances, i.e.
separate substances, that are in fact simple.
that form is the cause in virtue of which matter is what it is.219 This seems
to imply that, for instance, a man is what he is because his matter possesses
the essence of a human being, i.e. the form of a human being. Averroes also
adds that, by being the cause in virtue of which a certain sensible object is
what it is, form is also the substance of the object in question.220 Thus, even
if Averroes is not in this instance so accurate in reconstructing the literal
meaning of Aristotles text, he seems to understand its general point, which
is perfectly in keeping with his overall interpretation of Met. Z as I have so
far described it. Form is the cause in virtue of which matter acquires the
characteristic properties of a certain kind of sensible substance, and so is the
cause in virtue of which a sensible substance of a certain kind is what it is.
By being such a cause, form is also the substance of the sensible substance,
i.e. the cause of its substantiality, and hence a primary substance in its own
right.
(2) The causal role of form is even more emphasised in Averroess exposi-
tion of the second part of Z 17. As is known, in this section Aristotle argues
for the view that a sensible substance is not only the aggregate of its material
components, which Aristotle labels elements, but is rather such material
components and a further entity, i.e. a principle that keeps the material
components together. The point is proved by showing that the entity that
keeps together the material elements of a sensible substance can be neither
one of the elements nor a composite of them. Without going into the details
of Aristotles text again, it is important to recall that the aim of the entire
section is to emphasise the difference in nature between the material com-
ponents of a sensible substance and the formal principle that keeps them
together. One of the arguments Aristotle advances to this effect consists in
pointing out that, if the formal principle that keeps together the material
components of a sensible substance were another such component, i.e. if it
were the same in nature as the material components it keeps together, then
we would need a further unifying principle to keep together the material
components and the formal component. By parity of reasons, however, we
should suppose such further unifying component to be of the same nature
as the components it unifies and so we would clearly be off on an infinite
regress. The conclusion is that what keeps together and unifies the material
components of a sensible substance must be of a different nature from the
components it keeps together and unifies.

232 chapter two
Averroess reconstruction is essentially faithful to Aristotles text. For

him, the difference between genuine wholes, i.e. things such as substances
which possess an internal structure and complexity, and mere heaps or
aggregates consists in the fact that, unlike heaps and aggregates, genuine
wholes do not resolve into parts of the same nature as the whole of which
they are the parts.221 A syllable, for instance, does not resolve into further
syllables, and a piece of flesh, even if it can perhaps be physically divided
into smaller pieces of flesh, does not metaphysically resolve into pieces of
flesh, but rather into elements, which are different in nature from the flesh
they compose.222 Heaps and aggregates, by contrast, resolve into parts of the
same nature as the whole of which they are parts.223 This difference between
genuine wholes and heaps reveals a deeper difference in their metaphysical
structure. The fact that genuine wholes do not resolve into their physical
parts shows that a genuine whole is not just the aggregate of its material
components, but is rather such components plus a further and different
principle, which unifies the material components providing them with a
certain structure and organisation. When a genuine whole falls apart and
loses its unifying principle, it also loses its structure and organisation and
so resolves into elements different in nature from the whole of which they
are the parts. For it is the presence of the unifying principle that confers
upon the whole a certain structure and organisation, which is not preserved
when the whole is deprived of such a principle. Heaps and aggregates, in so
far as they are the mere sum of their material components and so possess,
strictly speaking, no unifying principle, resolve into parts of the same nature
as the aggregate of which they are parts. The fact that in a genuine whole
there is a formal principle which is different in nature from the material
constituents can be proved through Aristotles regress argument, which
Averroes reconstructs rather accurately.224 What is of importance for us is
that Averroes identifies the unifying principle of genuine substances with
form.225 Although he occasionally describes form as a further component or
element of sensible substances, he means in such instances by component
or element metaphysical constituent and clearly holds the view that the
unifying principle of a genuine whole is different in nature from the material
221 Cf. Averroes, In Met., VII, t.c. 60, fol. 208GI.

224 Cf. Averroes, In Met., VII, t.c. 60, fol. 208IM.
components which it unifies.226 The difference, so it seems, mainly consists

in the fact that the unifying principle is a cause. In other words, the unifying
principle is the principle that provides the material components with a
certain structure and organisation, while the material components are the
items which are organised in a certain way depending on the nature of the
principle which organises and unifies them: the form of flesh, for instance,
will organise the material constituents of flesh in the way in which flesh
should be organised, and the same is true of all the other kinds of thing.227
In so far as it plays the role of organising and unifying principle, form is also
the substance of material objects.228 It is the substance of material objects
in that it explains why a certain ensemble of material parts is not a mere
aggregate but rather an organised whole provided with a certain unity and
structure.
In conclusion, Averroess interpretation of Met. Z 17 confirms his general

doctrine of substance. As in the rest of his Long Commentary, the emphasis
is put on the role of form as the cause of the existence, structure and sub-
stantiality of material objects. This role makes of form a primary substance,
on the basis of the principle that what explains the substantiality of some-
thing else is more substance than the thing whose substantiality it explains.

chapter three
AQUINASS UNDERSTANDING OF METAPHYSICS Z
Introduction
As is the case with all his commentaries on Aristotle, Aquinass literal expo-
sition of the Metaphysics is characterised by a high level of systematicity.
This general feature of the Dominican Masters approach to Aristotle can
be observed from at least two different points of view. On a smaller scale,
Aquinas does not confine himself to offering a line-by-line explanation of
Aristotles text, but also provides us with an overall interpretation of the
Metaphysics as well as of the meaning and place of each single book. The
whole Metaphysics is conceived of as a unitary work where each single book
plays a precise role and bears a certain relation to the others. And each
book in its turn is viewed as a unitary treatise, provided with an orderly
structure and a well-defined arrangement of its single sections.1 On a larger
scale, Aquinass systematic attitude is apparent in the way he conceives
of the relations among the different writings of Aristotles corpus. Aristo-
tles philosophical works are regarded as a complete and entirely consistent
exposition of the different realms of human science, where each different
work cuts out for itself a special sector of human science and a particu-
lar kind of being. Physics, for instance, studies being in so far as it is sub-
ject to movement and so Aristotles Physics offers a complete account of
the phenomenon of change. As is well known, metaphysics (and so Aris-
totles Metaphysics) represents an exception to the general rule. For meta-
physics is a general science and hence does not study a particular region
of human science and a special kind of being, but is rather concerned with
being qua being, i.e. (created) being in general. However, Aquinas is of the
opinion that the results of the universal science and so of Aristotles Meta-
physics do not clash with the achievements of Aristotles special treatises.
On the contrary, he thinks that Aristotles investigation into being qua being
confirms and to some extent grounds the results of his more particular
enquiries into the single sectors of human science.2 It is not hard to see the
1 For Aquinass reconstruction of the structure of the Metaphysics see Galluzzo (2004a).
2 For Aquinass conception of the subject matter of metaphysics see Wippel (2000), 161.
236 chapter three
consequences of Aquinass general approach for his interpretation of Aris-

totles text. In general, difficult passages are interpreted in the light of other,
more understandable ones so as to preserve the general consistency of Aris-
totles thought. What is more, crucial pieces of doctrine are understood on
the basis of other notions, which are considered to be more fundamental
and basic. We shall see shortly, for instance, that Aquinass understanding
of the theory of substance in Met. Z is moulded upon the doctrine of sub-
stance which Aristotle outlines in the Categories. And the solution Aquinas
offers to the question of essence and definition in Z 1011 is strongly influ-
enced by Aristotles considerations in the Physics and in the other works of
natural philosophy.
In the light of Aquinass general approach to Aristotles text, it is partic-
ularly useful to start our analysis of the Dominican Masters commentary
on Book Z by dealing with two general topics, i.e. the structure of Met. Z
(Section 1) and Aquinass general interpretation of the doctrine of substance
expounded in the book (Section 2.1). I shall then offer a detailed account of
the sections of Aquinass commentary corresponding to the different parts
of Aristotles text (Sections 2.27).
1. Aquinas on the Structure of Met. Z
At first glance, Aquinass understanding of the structure of Book Z does

not seem to be very different from that of modern interpreters. When he
comments on Met. Z 3, Aquinas clearly singles out four different ways of
understanding the notion of substance and assigns a different section of Z
to the treatment of each different way.3 The subject is dealt with in Z 3. The
section on essence occupies the main part of the book, from Z 4 to Z 12.
As we shall see, the section Z 79, which is usually regarded by modern
interpreters as a later insertion, is seen by Aquinas as an integral part of
Aristotles discussion of essence on a par with Z 46 and Z 1012. Finally,
both the universal and the genus are discussed in Z 1316. Aquinas thinks
that the universal and the genus do not receive independent treatments
because they are just two different types of universal entity: in particular,
what Aristotle calls the universal is nothing but what he elsewhere calls
the species.4 So, the genus and the universal in Z 3s list are both universal
entities, though of different level of generality, and hence their claims to
3 Cf. Aquinas, Exp. Metaph., Lib. VII, lect. 2, nn. 12701273.

aquinass understanding of metaphysics z 237
substantiality are appropriately discussed in the same section of Book Zeta.

Aquinas also shares with modern interpreters the view that Z 17 concludes
Zs enquiry by introducing a new theme, i.e. the notion of substance as
cause, which is not included in Z 3s list.
On closer inspection, however, Aquinass understanding of the struc-
ture of Z presents some peculiar traits that are worth discussing in some
detail. In particular, (i) he puts emphasis on the logical character of Book
Z and (ii) regards the anti-Platonic polemic as one of the distinguishing
marks of Aristotles treatise. The first aspect owes much to Averroes, even
though the ways in which the Arabic and the Latin commentator conceive
of the logical character of the book differ in some non-insignificant points of
detail. As we have seen, also the second general aspect of Aquinass recon-
struction is somehow anticipated by Averroess exposition, but Aquinas
pushes the idea of the existence of an anti-Platonic line to its extreme
consequences in accordance with his highly systematic understanding of
the book. I shall start then with a detailed illustration of points (i) and
(ii).
1.1. The Logical Character of Book Z

At the beginning of Z 4, Aristotle expresses his intention of starting the
analysis of essence in a logical manner (). As we have seen in
Ch. 1, modern interpreters disagree on the exact meaning of Aristotles
logical remarks on essence and consequently also on how far the logical
remarks extend within Aristotles text. Myles Burnyeat has recently argued
for the view that the term logical carries in the context of Met. Z two basic
meanings: (i) logical remarks are abstract in that they eschew any reference
to the principles proper to metaphysics, i.e. matter and form; (ii) logical
remarks make reference to and start literally from doctrines contained
in Aristotles logical works, i.e. in the Organon. Burnyeat further argues
that the discussion of each of the claimants to the title of substanceand
not only that of essencecontains two distinct sections, a logical and a
metaphysical section. The logical considerations on essence in particular
go up to the end of Met. Z 6, while the metaphysical section on essence
comprises Z 1012.
The peculiar feature of Aquinass interpretation is that he takes the log-
ical remarks to cover the whole of Book Z. For instance, he explicitly con-
trasts Book Zs approach to the question of substance with the discussion
of substance in Book H. Book H takes as the starting point of the enquiry
into substance the very principles of substance, i.e. matter and form, while
238 chapter three
Book Zs treatment is based on common and logical arguments.5 But what

does it mean, exactly, that Book Z as a whole is logical in character? As is
easily realised, there are several difficulties here. First of all, since many sec-
tions in Z explicitly deal with the notions of matter and form, Aquinas can
hardly mean that the book deliberately keeps away from any reference to
matter and form. More likely, Aquinas intends to draw our attention to a
particular approach, i.e. the logical approach, to the notion of substance and
so to a particular way of treating all the notions involved in the analysis of
substance, including matter and form. Second, Aquinas usually opposes a
logical and a metaphysical (or physical) consideration of a certain subject.
The opposition is usually construed as the contrast between a more concep-
tual approach, i.e. an approach based on how we think about things, and
a more realistic approach, i.e. one focused on how things are.6 This is also
the standard way in which Aquinas describes the difference between logic
and metaphysics (or physics) as intellectual disciplines: logic deals with
the way we think about things and understand them, whilst metaphysics
is concerned with how things are in reality.7 Once again, however, this can
hardly be the kind of contrast Aquinas has in mind when he characterises
the whole of Book Z as logical. For he cannot possibly think that Book Z is a
book of logic. On the contrary, he at times emphasises that Aristotle in Z is
concerned with how things are in reality, and not with how we think about
them, and so is properly doing metaphysics.8
Thus, when he describes Z as a logical book, Aquinas must be thinking of
a certain way of doing metaphysics and building up a theory of substance
a way which has some affinity with the logical methodology, but does not
prevent one from dealing with proper metaphysical topics, such as mat-
ter and form, and in general with how things are in reality. But which way
of doing metaphysics does Aquinas have in mind? Aquinas himself gives

6 Cf. Aquinas, Q. De An., q. 7, a. 17, Opera Omnia, XXIV.1, p. 62, lin. 475489 (on two
different approacheslogical and physicalto the problem of the genus and differentia of
separate substances); S. Boet. De Trin., q. 4., a. 2, Opera Omnia, L, p. 124, lin. 159185 (on the
distinction between the logical and the physical/metaphysical notion of genus).
7 This contrast is particularly emphasised in Aquinass commentary on Met. 2 (Exp.
Metaph., Lib. IV, lect. 4, n. 573), where he frames the opposition between metaphysics and
logic by appealing to the distinction between first and second intentions. Metaphysics works
with first intentions, i.e. with concepts that directly represent things in the extra-mental
world, whereas logic makes use of second intentions, i.e. concepts which do not directly
represent things in the world, but rather capture the way we understand and think about
them. The passage as a whole is strongly influenced by Averroes (cf. In Met., V, t.c. 5, fol. 70H).
us some clues as to meaning of logical when he comments on Aristo-

tles use of the term in Met. Z 4.9 He remarks that it is entirely
appropriate for Aristotle to start his investigation into substance with some
logical considerations. For metaphysics has some affinity and connection
with logic. In particular, both sciences are general and universal, presum-
ably because they study, although in different ways, the whole of reality.10
Therefore, metaphysics is entitled to borrow some of logics methods and
procedures. The one that is most relevant to Zs enquiry is the analysis of
predication, i.e. an analysis of how different predicates relate to their sub-
ject. Thus, Aquinass text suggests that the logical way of doing metaphysics
and investigating into substance and essence consists in an abstract analy-
sis, mainly based on the study of predication and of the items involved in
predication. Nothing of what Aquinas says prevents a logical enquiry into
metaphysics from dealing with proper metaphysical notions such as matter
and form. All that the text implies is that such notions are not the start-
ing points of the enquiry, but rather something the enquiry may arrive at
through an analysis of predication. This last point also explains the contrast
Aquinas draws between Book Z and Book H. Book H takes directly as its
starting points matter and form, and provides a detailed analysis of such
items understood as constitutive principles of sensible substances. Book Z,
by contrast, comes to discover, so to speak, matter and form as a result of a
general investigation into the various predicative structures.
That this is what Aquinas means by the logical character of Book Z is
confirmed by the way he interprets the meaning of Z3 stripping-away
argument. The thought experiment the argument is based upon arrives at
the notion of matter after stripping away from a sensible substance all its
properties. I shall come back later on to the details of Aquinass interpreta-
tion of the argument. What I am interested in here is his general attitude
towards Aristotles procedure. He remarks that in Z 3 Aristotle proves the
difference in nature between matter and accidental properties by means of
an argument mainly based on predication.11 This procedureAquinas fur-
ther remarksis entirely different from the one employed in the Physics,
where matter is introduced by means of an argument centred on the nature
of change. Then Aquinas significantly adds that Z 3s way of proceeding is
perfectly appropriate. Given the close similarities between logic and meta-
physics, the latter is entitled to use the formers methods and procedures, in

10 Cf. Aquinas, Exp. Metaph., Lib. IV, lect. 4, n. 573. See also Ch. 2, Sect. 1.2.
240 chapter three
the case at issue the analysis of predication.12 Aquinass comment supports

my interpretation of the meaning of Zs logical character. First, Zs logical
enquiry is mainly an enquiry that takes as its starting point the analysis
of predication and of the items involved in predication. Second, a logical
enquiry into metaphysics does not keep away from the notions of matter
and form, but only arrives at them subsequently, as a result of an abstract
study of the predicative structures.
If one compares Aquinass understanding of the meaning of Aristotles
logical remarks with the two senses of Burnyeat has recently
pointed out, one can easily find both similarities and differences. As to the
first of Burnyeats senses, it bears only a partial resemblance to Aquinass
interpretation. For Aquinas as well the logical level of analysis is more
abstract and general than any other level. However, as we have seen,
Thomas is not of the opinion that the logical analysis within the metaphysi-
cal domain deliberately avoids any reference to matter and form, the proper
principles of metaphysics, as Burnyeat seems to think. He only maintains
that matter and form are not the starting points of the analysis, even if they
may well beand as a matter of fact arethe final result of a careful study
of the items involved in predication. There is also another point of differ-
ence between Aquinass and Burnyeats interpretations. The latter seems
to think that the logical sections of Met. Z are somehow introductory and
intrinsically aporematic. In other words, they end in a difficulty or aporia
that can be solved only when the logical level is abandoned and the meta-
physical notions of matter and form are brought into the picture. Aquinas,
by contrast, does not seem to think that the logical enquiry is aporematic.
A logical enquiry only marks a more abstract level of analysis, but does not
produce results fundamentally different from those of a non-logical discus-
sion. Accordingly, he explicitly says that in Book H Aristotle does nothing
but apply Zs results to a more direct analysis of matter and form, thereby
implying that the two books defend the same general views.13 As to the
second of Burnyeats senses, it is generally in keeping with Aquinass under-
standing of the logical remarks. For, according to Aquinas, the notion at
the centre of the logical level of analysis is predication, which is of course
discussed and analysed in all its different aspects throughout the Organon.
However, it is important to remark that Aquinas never explicitly says that
the logical enquiry literally starts from pieces of doctrine or even proposi-
tions contained in the Organon. He confines himself to the weaker claim

13 Cf. Aquinas, Exp. Metaph., Lib. VIII, lect. 1, n. 1681.
that metaphysics makes use of logics procedures and tools. Upon reflec-
tion, here lies a point of difference with respects to Averroess reading as
well. For the Arabic commentator explicitly makes the point that meta-
physics literally starts from propositions defended in Aristotles Organon
and hence does not confine itself to using logical methods and procedures.
In this respect, Averroes is closer, as we have seen, to Burnyeats intuition.
1.2. The Anti-Platonic Character of Book Z

Aquinass understanding of the structure of Book Z presents another impor-
tant peculiarity. The Dominican Master seems to think that the whole book
is built around a series of attacks on Platos doctrine of separate Forms.
Thus, in addition to Aristotles positive teaching on substance, Book Z
also contains a secondary line of argument, specifically designed to reject
Platos ontological views. In this case as well, Aquinas is influenced by Aver-
roess Long Commentary, where the anti-Platonic polemic plays a major
role. And, as a matter of fact, many of the anti-Platonic sections to which
Aquinas draws our attention are acknowledged by Averroes as well.14 How-
ever, Aquinas is far more systematic in reconstructing the different steps of
Aristotles anti-Platonic argument and in recognising the importance of the
anti-Platonic line for the single sections of Z and for the book in general.
Therefore, the attention paid to Zs polemical side should be regarded as
one of the distinguishing marks of Aquinass reading.
Aquinas singles out four different attacks on Platos doctrine of Forms.
The fourth, which concerns the section on universals (Z 1316) is by far
the most important and detailed, but the others are also significant for the
interpretation of the sections in which they are made. In this section, I shall
pass in review the different attacks and point to their significance within Zs
overall argument.
(i) The first attack is made in Met. Z 6 in the course of the discussion of
the problem of the identity between a thing and its essence.15 On Aquinass
reading, the results of the chapter clearly rule out the existence of separate
Forms. The argument in Z 6 establishes that the identity between a thing
and its essence holds in the case of substances.16 In other words, the essence
14 Cf. Ch. 2, Sect. 1.3.

15 Cf. Aquinas, Exp. Metaph., Lib. VII, lect. 5, nn. 13671371; lect. 9, n. 1470.
16 As we shall see, Aquinas significantly qualifies Aristotles identity thesis. According
to him, the identity between a thing and its essence holds only for the case of separate
substances, but it does not hold for sensible substances, which are different from their
242 chapter three
of a substance cannot be different (in some relevant sense) from it. So much
the less, therefore, can it be separate from the substance of which it is the
essence. Were an essence separate from the substance of which it is the
essence, it could not perform the functions it was supposed to perform in the
first place. For, generally, an essence is supposed to explain the being and
the knowability of the thing of which it is the essence. When we know, for
instance, the essence of a thing we know also what that thing is. However, if
the essence of a thing x is separate from x, it seems that we do not know
x when we grasp the essence of x, but an entirely different thing. For in
this case it is not clear what connects the essence of x, which we know,
from the thing of which it is supposedly the essence, which we do not
know. Therefore, the essence of a thing cannot be separate from it. Platonic
Forms, however, were thought to be both the essences of sensible things and
separate beings. The argument shows that they cannot be both things at the
same time.
It is important to realise that Aquinass anti-Platonic reading has impor-
tant consequences for his general interpretation of Met. Z 6. Modern com-
mentators usually interpret Aristotles mention in Z 6 of Platonic Forms in a
rather different way. Aristotlethey thinkuses the example of Forms to
show the general validity of the identity thesis defended in the chapter. In
other words, primary beings must be identical with their own essence, be
they Platonic Forms, Aristotelian substances or any other kind of primary
entities. Thus, Aristotles main goal is not to show whether Forms exist or
not, but rather to vindicate the general validity of the identity thesis. This
interpretation is not available to Aquinas. For him, Forms are introduced
only to be immediately dismissed. Being separate beings, they cannot be
the essences of sensible substances. On this point Thomas clearly follows
Averroess general understanding of the chapter.
(ii) The second criticism of Platos ontology takes place in Z 79, the chap-
ters devoted to a metaphysical analysis of the generation of sensible sub-
stances.17 Aquinass argument is straightforward. All that is required to
explain both natural and artificial production is immanent forms. Natural
essence. However, this particular point is irrelevant to the evaluation of Aquinass anti-
Platonic polemic. For even if the essences of sensible substances are not identical with the
substances of which they are the essences, they are not separate from them, as Platonic
Forms are taken to be. Moreover, when commenting on Z 6, Aquinas seems to maintain that
the identity thesis holds also for the case of sensible substances. It is only later on, i.e. when
commenting on Z 11, that he significantly qualifies and revises Aristotles position.
17 Cf. Aquinas, Exp. Metaph., Lib. VII, lect. 6, n. 1381; lect. 7, n. 1417; 14271429.
production are explained by means of a form that exists in the male parent
and is then trasmitted to the offspring. Artificial production comes about
because the artist uses as a model for the production of an artefact a form
that exists in his minda form that he imposes on a particular parcel of
matter. Thus, if both natural and artificial production can be explained by
having recourse to immanent forms, separate Forms are useless and then
(on the basis of a principle of ontological parsimony) inexistent. We shall
come back in greater detail to Aquinass anti-Platonic interpretation of Met.
Z 79. Suffice it to say for now that Aquinass reading is a further confirma-
tion of his general view that Chs. 79 are part of Aristotles main argument
in Z. In particular they contribute a decisive step towards the refutation of
Platos theory of Forms.
(iii) Aristotles discussion, in Met. Z 1011, of the problem of definition con-

tains another important criticism of Platos Forms.18 As is known, Aquinas
attributes to Aristotle the view that the essence and definition of sensible
substances include both their matter and their form, and not their form
alone. Aquinass idea is not that essence and definition contain the matter
of the single individual substances belonging to a certain species, but rather
that they contain the so-called common matter, i.e. the kind of matter indi-
viduals belonging to a certain species share. How is this general thesis about
essence and definition supposed to rule out Platos Forms? The point is that
Platos Forms, being separate from sensible particulars, were conceived of
as entirely immaterial. Since Forms were also thought to be the essences
of sensible particulars, Platos ontology implies that the essence and defini-
tion of sensible substances contains no matter, but is limited to form alone.
Thus, Aristotles argument in favour of the claim that matter belongs to the
essence and definition of sensible substances brings along with it a refuta-
tion of Platonic Forms, or at least establishes that Platonic Forms cannot be
the essences of sensible substances.
(iv) Finally, the whole section on universals, i.e. Z 1316, is regarded by

Aquinas as an extensive criticism of Platos doctrine of Forms. The main
argument is put forward in Met. Z 13. As Aquinas explains in an introduc-
tory note, the aim of the chapter is to show the incompatibility between the
18 Cf. Aquinas, Exp. Metaph., Lib. VII, lect. 2, nn. 14691470. At n. 1470 Aquinas presents a
brief summary of the different steps of Aristotles anti-Platonic argument up to Met. Z 6. The
list is completed by the section on universals.
244 chapter three
notion of substance and that of universal.19 There cannot exist substances

that are also universal in actuality. The possibility remains open for there
to be some substances that are potentially universal. This is the case for
instance with the essences of sensible objects, which are potentially univer-
sal in that they can be made universal by the intellect. But no substance
and no autonomous and independent substance in particularcan be uni-
versal in actuality. This claim reveals the contradictory nature of Platonic
Forms, which were taken to be both substances and universals.20 The other
three chapters attack Platos doctrine from more specific angles. Z 14 argues
for the view that no things can be at the same time a universal and a sep-
arate, i.e. independent and autonomous, substance.21 Here Aquinas does
nothing but expand on Aristotles occasional remarks to the effect that
the ontological status of Forms is somehow ambiguous, i.e. something in
between particulars and universals.22 Z 15 adds the important point that
Forms, if they are separable and so particular, cannot be definable.23 For no
particular is definable qua particular. So, even though Aquinas realises that
some of Z 15s arguments are directed against the definability of any partic-
ular whatsoever, he still thinks that their main target is a specific type of
particular, i.e. Platonic Forms. Z 16 has a somewhat miscellaneous charac-
ter. However, it fits in very well with the general anti-Platonic vein of the
section on universals. For it puts forward an argument against the substan-
tiality of the Platonic highest genera, i.e. being and one, and offers a final
assessment of the merits and mistakes of Platos doctrine.24
We shall come back to the detail of the section of universals. However,
it is important to remark now that the emphasis Aquinas puts on the anti-
Platonic character of the section strongly affects his general understanding
of the meaning and aim of Aristotles argument. Take, for instance, the case
of Met. Z 13. In contemporary scholarship, the chapter is viewed as a sort
of battlefield for determining whether Aristotles forms are particular or
universal. Clearly, Aquinass anti-Platonic reading prevents him from seeing
any reference to this issue in the chapter. For him the question at stake
in Met. Z 13 is whether the natures signified by genus-terms and species-
terms exist in the sensible substances of which they are the natures or
22 Cf. for instance: Arist., Met., Z 16, 1040b27 ff.
24 Cf. Aquinas, Exp. Metaph., Lib. VII, lect. 16, nn. 16371641 and 16421647.
rather separate from them. Aristotelian forms, by contrast, whether they are
particular or universal in themselves, are clearly immanent forms, i.e. forms
existing in the very things of which they are the forms. On Aquinass reading,
therefore, Met. Z 13 has nothing to do with the problem of the ontological
status of Aristotles forms.
In conclusion, the anti-Platonic character of Book Zeta should be taken very

seriously in order to understand some peculiar aspects of Aquinass reading
of the book. This point will emerge even more clearly as I proceed with my
exposition of the single sections of Aquinass commentary.
2. Aquinass General Interpretation

of Aristotles Doctrine of Substance
2.1. Aquinass Compatibilism and the Role of the Categories

In the Introduction I hinted at Aquinass systematic attitude towards Aris-
totles corpus as a whole. This crucial aspect should not be understood as
if the Dominican Master confined himself to smoothing away the contra-
dictions between one treatise and another in order to provide a harmonic
interpretation of Aristotles text. The point is rather that some of Aristo-
tles doctrines (and hence some of his works) are taken to be particularly
clear and basic and so are used to guide the interpretation of less clear texts
and doctrines. Aristotles theory of substance is a good example of Aquinass
general approach. It is no exaggeration to say that Aquinas interprets Aris-
totles doctrine of substance in Metaphysics Z in the light of the ontology
laid out in the Categories. Let me try to flesh out this general intuition.
One major interpretative difficulty with Met. Z consists in evaluating the
impact of the hylomorphic analysis on Aristotles theory of substance. In the
Categories ordinary particular objects are regarded as primary substances,
i.e. the fundamental entities that ground the existence of everything else:
species and genera exist only because they are predicated of particular
objects, and accidental properties exist only because they inhere in par-
ticular objects. Moreover, in the Categories, particular objects are taken to
be unanalysable wholes, i.e. things that cannot be analysed into more fun-
damental ontological constituents. In the Physics and in the Metaphysics,
however, ordinary particular objects are analysed in terms of matter and
form. Thus, they are no longer regarded as unanalysable wholes, but rather
as composite objects, i.e. composites of a certain piece of matter and a cer-
tain structure or form. It might be thought, therefore, that as a consequence
246 chapter three
of the hylomorphic analysis they undergo, ordinary particular objects are

no longer the fundamental entities in the world, i.e. are no longer primary
substances. For now it seems that their existence as well depends on more
fundamental entities, that is the matter and form they are made of. As a mat-
ter of fact, in Met. Z Aristotle clearly maintains that it is the form of particular
objects that deserves the title of primary substance. How should this claim
be read? Does it imply that the forms of particular objects simply replace
such objects in the role of primary substances the Categories assigned to
them? Or is there a way of reconciling Aristotles ontology in Met. Z with
the one outlined in the Categories? I have called scholars who think that
there is a way of making the two treatises compatible compatibilists and
those who do not think so incompatibilists.
Now, Aquinas endorses an extreme version of the compatibilist strat-
egy. The main intuition that guides his interpretation of Aristotles theory of
substance is the unqualified ontological primacy of composite substances.
In other words, it is only ordinary particular objects, which are analysed
in the context of the Metaphysics as composites of matter and form, that
deserve the title of substance in the strict sense of the term. All the other
things that can be called substances in some way or other are so called
only in a derivative sense of substance. Like many modern interpreters,
Aquinas distinguishes between two different questions and so two differ-
ent senses of substance in order to reconcile Aristotles ontology in the
Categories with that defended in Met. Z. On the one hand, there is the ques-
tion as to which things are substances, i.e. which things are the fundamen-
tal entities on whose existence the existence of everything else depends.
For Aquinas this question is answered once and for all in the Categories.
Ordinary particular objects are the entities on which the existence of every-
thing else depends and so are primary substances. On the other hand, the
question arises of explaining why particular objects are substances, that is
of determining which constituent of particular objects is mainly responsi-
ble for their being substances. Met. Z sets itself the task of answering this
second question and establishes that the form of particular objects is the
constituent that is mainly responsible for their being substances. What is
important to understand, however, is that, on Aquinass account, the role
played by form in explaining the substantiality of composite substances
does not make of form a substance on a par with the composites it con-
tributes to explaining. On the contrary, form is substance only in the sense
of being the substance of sensible particular objects. As modern interpreters
sometimes put it, form is substance only in the biargomental sense of the
term (x is the substance of y) and not in the monoargumental one (x is
substance). Form, in other words, is a principle explaining why a particu-

lar object is a substance, but is not a substance on a par with the object of
which it is the form.
It might surprise us that Aquinas regards the sense in which form is sub-
stance as secondary when compared to that in which particular compos-
ites are substances. For one natural intuition in this context is that what
explains the substantiality of something else, for instance what explains
the substantiality of the composite substance, should be thought to be sub-
stance in exactly the same sense of substance as the thing it explains.
Moreover, what explains the substantiality of something else can be rea-
sonably thought to be more substance than the thing whose substantiality it
explains. According to this intuitionwhich may be described as explana-
tory criterion of substantialityform will turn out to be substance in the
same sense of substance as the composite of matter and form. Moreover,
form will be more substance than the composite in that it explains its sub-
stantiality. As we have seen in Ch. 2, this is basically the way Averroes
understands Aristotles theory of substance in Met. Z. However, it is clear
enough that Aquinas does not accord priority to the explanatory criterion
when it comes to attributing substantiality. What he puts more empha-
sis on is the criterion of ontological independence. Only things that enjoy
an autonomous and independent existence count as real substances. Com-
posites of matter and form possess independent existence and so are sub-
stances in the strict sense of the term. Forms, by contrast, which are con-
stituents of particular objects and hence exist in them, do not possess inde-
pendent existence and so do not count as substances in the strict sense of
the term. The fact that form accounts for the substantiality of sensible sub-
stances is, of course, of some significance, but it is sufficient only to confer
upon form the status of the substance of sensible objects, i.e. the status of
substance in a secondary sense of the term. As we shall see, Aquinass option
in favour of the composite substanceand the corresponding downplay-
ing of the role of formalso emerges in the interpretation of other crucial
aspects of Met Zs argument such as, for instance, the problem of gener-
ation and the question of definition. In the case of generation, Aquinas
makes much of the idea that it is the composite and not the form that
undergoes a process of generation. Moreover, Aquinass view that the def-
inition of sensible substances includes both their matter and their form
perfectly squares with the ontological primacy he assigns to composite sub-
stances.
A very good example of Aquinass attempt at reconciling the Metaphysics
with the Categories is provided by his commentary on Aristotles list of
248 chapter three
candidates for the title of substance at the beginning of Met. Z 3.25 In

the passage at issue, Aristotle says that substance is spoken of in at least
four senses: the essence, the universal, the genus and the subject. Aquinas
remarks in his commentary that Aristotles division of substance in Met. Z 3
is not exactly the same as that offered in the Categories, where substance
is divided into primary and secondary substances.26 As a matter of fact,
the two divisions are probably different in character and obey different
logics. Nonetheless, the Dominican Master goes out of his way to show that
the two classifications are not at odds with each other.27 He first observes
that the subject in Met. Z 3s classification should be taken to be the same
thing as the primary substances in the Categories. The equivalence which
Aquinas establishes between subjects and primary substances is of capital
importance, as we shall see shortly in section 2.2. Equating the two notions
is made easier by the fact that Aristotles definition of subject in Met. Z 3 (i.e.
that of which other things are predicated without being itself predicated of
anything further) is very close to the Categories characterisation of primary
substances as ultimate subjects of predication.28 The universal and the
genusAquinas goes onperfectly correspond to the species and the
genus in the Categories. I have already explained that Aquinas identifies
what Aristotle calls the universal with a universal of specific as opposed
to generic level. Thus, the universal and the genus correspond to the two
types of secondary substances, species and genus, which are mentioned in
the Categories. Aquinas concedes that essence is mentioned in Z 3s list
while it is left out of the ontological scheme drawn out in the Categories.
This divergence too, however, can be explained away. EssenceAquinas
remarksis not an individual or a species or a genus, but rather the formal
principle of all other things, that is of individuals as well as of species and
genera.29 Aquinass explanation is not likely to convince modern readers,
but his general point is clear enough. Essence is not a thing alongside
individual and universal substances, i.e. species and genera. It is rather the
principle in virtue of which individuals as well as species and genera are
what they are. Individuals are what they are in virtue of their possessing
a certain essence, and species and genera are essentially predicated of the
individuals because individuals have the essence they have. Therefore, since

the Categories is mainly interested in classifying which kinds of things there

are, be they particular or universal, it is only natural that essence should be
left out of consideration. It is only in the Metaphysics, where the explanatory
or causal level is introduced, that essence enters the picture. For only in
the Metaphysics does Aristotle raise the questions of what makes sensible
substances the substances they are and of why they belong to the natural
kinds they belong to.
2.2. The Notion of Subject in Met. Z 3

Aquinass commentary on Met. Z 3 deserves close attention for two reasons.
First, for the Dominican Masters interpretation of the notion of subject,
which provides further confirmation of the influence of the Categories
ontology on Aquinass reconstruction of Met. Z as a whole. Second, because
Aquinas offers in his exposition a very suggestive interpretation of the so-
called stripping-away argument, i.e. of the argument by which Aristotle puts
to the test and finally rejects the hypothesis that matter is substance to
the highest degree. Moreover, in the course of his reconstruction of the
stripping-away argumentand especially while discussing the notions of
separable (separabile) and (hoc aliquid)Aquinas further shows
the ontological priority of the composite substance over its form and its
ontological constituents in general. In this section I shall illustrate in some
detail the different aspects of Aquinass understanding of Met. Z 3.
(i) Aquinas identifies the subject on Z 3s list with the primary substances
of the Categories. This identification may take aback modern readers and
interpreters of Aristotle. For the impression one gets from Aristotles text
is that the notion of subject does not point to a determinate kind of entity
in the world, but rather to a certain function or role that can be played by
different entities. For instance, Aristotle suggests that matter and form as
well as the composite of them can play the role of subject. Presumably,
matter, form and the composite are subjects in slightly different senses,
or at least are subjects for different things. Be that as it may, nothing of
what Aristotle says indicates that the notion of subject univocally picks out
one among form, matter and the composite to the exclusion of the others.
Thus, Aquinass identification of the subject with the primary substances of
the Categories, i.e. with the composites of matter and form, seems in many
respects unaccountable. Upon closer inspection, however, Aquinass inter-
pretation is more complicated than it might seem at first sight. Admittedly,
Aquinas remarks that Aristotles characterisation of the subject in Met. Z 3 is
250 chapter three
nearly identical with the characterisation of primary substances, i.e. partic-

ular objects, in the Categories.30 Accordingly, he concludes that the subject
in Z 3s list of claimants to the title of substance picks out the primary sub-
stances of the Categories. However, he adds that the subject splits up into
matter, form and the composite of them. This division should not be taken
as the division of a genus (the subject) into three different species (matter,
form and the composite), but rather as a list of analogates, that is of things
related to each other by the fact that one single term is predicated of all of
them analogically.31 Thus, matter, form and the composite are not three dif-
ferent types of subject, but rather three different entities that can be called
subjects in different, though related, senses and to different degrees. And
if they can be called subjects to different degrees they can also be called
substances to different degrees. The task of the chapter is exactly to deter-
mine which of them is substance in the strictest sense of the term. Aquinass
view is that it is the composite that deserves the title of substance to the
maximum degree.
Thus, once translated into non-technical jargon, Aquinass reading is not
so outlandish. Aristotles characterisation of subject in Met. Z 3 invites us to
think that particular objects are still regarded in the Metaphysics as ultimate
subjects of predication and hence as primary substances. Particular objects,
however, are analysed as composites of matter and form, and this poses the
general problem of understanding whether matter and form have better
claim to the title of substance than the composite they make up. Met.
Z 3 gives a negative answer to this question by reaffirming the ontological
priority of the composite over its ontological constituents. Thus, even if the
Metaphysics introduces a further level of analysis by bringing in the notions
of matter and form, it ends up confirming the conclusions of the Categories.
(ii) The result of Aquinass understanding of the notion of subject in Met. 3

is that the argumentative part of the chapterthe controversial stripping-
away argumentis intended to show that the composite is more substance
that the matter and form composing it. As a matter of fact, this section of the
chapter is mainly concerned with evaluating and rejecting the candidacy
of matter. However, the criteria of substantiality emerging in the course
of the discussion of matter are sufficient to turn down the candidacy of
form as well. On Aquinass reconstruction, Aristotles argument comes in
three steps. (a) (1029a1019) First, Aristotle examines the Ancients (i.e. the

Presocratics) view that matter is primary substance. This view is based on

the argument (the stripping-away argument) that matter is what is left once
all the properties of a substance are stripped away from it. The argument
is rejected because it is based on a misconception about the nature of
matter. (b) (1029a1926) Then, Aristotle puts things right by introducing
and justifying his own conception of matter. (c) (1029a2630) Finally, he
explains why matter cannot be primary substance. The reasons advanced
are sufficient to conclude that form is not primary substance either.
(a) The Ancients thought that matter is primary substance because it
is what remains once all the properties are stripped away from a sensible
particular object.32 Thus, matter is primary substance because it plays the
role of ultimate subject for everything else there is. The stripping-away of
properties has two fundamental steps. In the first step, sensible particular
objects are stripped of their qualities such as hotness, coldness and the like.33
Qualities are the first items to be removed because they are thought to be
the most superficial features of sensible objects. Qualities also include the
objects capacities for acting or being acted upon in a certain way. After all
the qualities are stripped away, what remains is just matter plus quantities,
i.e. dimensions. Thus, if dimensions too are removed the only thing that is
left is matter, which is hence the substantial kernel of sensible objects, i.e.
the real substance inside sensible objects, which survives the removal of all
their accidental properties.34 The idea that dimensions are the last items
to be removed rests on the assumption that dimensions inhere directly
or immediately in matter. Dimensions must inhere immediately in matter
because they make matter divisible and so capable of receiving any further
determination it may receive.35 In other words, if matter were not divided
into different portionswhich implies that it has certain dimensions
we would not have different things with different properties but only one
undifferentiated material substratum. For instance, we would not have
different things with different colours but only a one-coloured material
substratum.
Aquinas considers the argument inconclusive and the conception of
matter underlying it flawed. What is wrong with the Ancients suggestion
is that they do not take into account the role of substantial form.36 Once

252 chapter three
both qualities and quantities are taken away from a sensible object what
remains is still a composite, i.e. a composite of matter and of the substantial
form that makes the object the kind of object it is. For instance, if we remove
all the qualities and quantities which a particular horse possesses what is
left is a composite of matter and of the substantial form that makes the
horse the kind of substance it is. Accidental properties, be they qualities
or quantities, inhere in substances, i.e. in composite substances, and not
directly in matter. It is no chance that what the Ancients called matter
were in fact the four elements, fire, water, air and earth. For the elements are
not just matter, but rather composites of matter and of a certain substantial
form: fire, for instance, is a composite of matter and of the substantial form
that makes the fire fire and not something else.37
(b) After rejecting the Ancients conception of matter, Aristotle intro-
duces and defends his own conception. On Aristotles view, matter does
not possess any categorial determinations, either substantial or accidental.38
Clearly, Aquinas is here attributing to Aristotle the defence of the notion of
prime matter, that is the notion of a substratum that possesses in actuality
none of the positive characteristics, be they substantial or accidental, it is
able to take on, but is rather the mere potentiality for receiving all such
characteristics. Aquinas makes some interesting remarks concerning the
way in which the existence of prime matter can be proved. He observes
that the best and most direct argument to this effect is the one Aristotle
advances in the Physics (Book I), which is based on a study of change.39
The main point of the argument is that the substratum of a change must
be different from the termini of the change, i.e. from both the privation
and the positive characteristic that the substratum takes on as a result of
the change. Since Aristotle shows that there must exist a material substra-
tum for any kind of change, i.e. for both accidental and substantial change,
matter must be different not only from the termini of accidental change
but also from those of substantial change. Thus, matter possesses in actu-
ality neither the accidental nor the substantial forms it is capable of receiv-
ing.40

40 Aquinass argument might appear faulty because, strictly speaking, accidental prop-
erties inhere in the composite of matter and form and not in matter. However, Aquinas
probably reasons that, if accidental properties are different from the composite substance
they inhere in, they cannot be non-different, a fortiori, from matter.
Interestingly, Aquinas observes that the conclusion drawn in the Physics

can be reached also by means of another kind of argument, based on the
nature of predication. This is the course Aristotle takes in Met. Z 3 in
accordance with the logical character of Met. Z.41 The argument rests on the
assumption that a predicate must be different in essence from the subject
of which it is predicated. It is not hard to see that this assumption needs
some important qualifications. In particular it does not seem to hold true
of essential (or, as Aquinas labels it, univocal) predication, but only of
accidental (or, in Aquinass terminology, denominative) predication.42 In
the sentence A man is an animal subject and predicate do not seem to
be essentially different, in that the predicate falls within the essence of
the subject. What is more, as Aquinas sees things, the genus does nothing
but express the nature of the species in an indeterminate way, and so
is not even a part of the species in the usual sense of part but rather
the whole species at a higher level of generality. In the sentence The
table is red, by contrast, subject and predicate seem to be different in
essence, in that the subject signifies a substance and the predicate an
accidental property of it. Thus, the assumption which is really in play in the
argument is that in all cases of accidental predication, the subject and the
predicate are different in nature. But how is this assumption supposed to
prove the existence of prime matter? First of all, the assumption has as an
immediate consequence that accidental properties are different in nature
from the particular substance they are predicated of, i.e. from the composite
of matter and form. From this Aquinas infers that, a fortiori, they must also
be different from the matter that constitutes the particular substance. For
whatever matter is, it is not one of the accidents that are predicated of
particular composite substances. What remains to be proved is that matter
is also different from the substantial forms it comes to acquire. For instance,
a certain piece of matter becomes a man; what needs to be proved is that
that piece of matter qua matter is different from the man it becomes.
This result is achieved by first showing that the predicative link between
matter and substantial predicates is only accidental and by then using the
assumption that in all cases of accidental predication subject and accident
are different in nature.43 When matter acquires a certain substantial form,
say for instance the form of man, the result of the change can be expressed
by means of the following true predication: This material thing is a man

254 chapter three
(Hoc materiatum est homo). However, the predication contained in the

sentence counts as a case of accidental predication because being a man
is not built into the nature of this material object qua material object, just
as being pale as opposed to being tanned is not built into the nature of
a man qua man.44 A material object can be many other things and not
only a man. This shows that matter is different in essence not only from
accidental properties but also from the substantial forms it is capable of
taking on.
(iii) The third step in Aristotles argument consists in showing that matter,
when rightly understood, cannot be a substance in the strict sense of the
term, because it does not meet two important requirements for something
to be a primary substance, i.e. being separable and being a hoc aliquid
( ). Something is separable, according to Aquinas, if it enjoys an
autonomous and independent existence.45 Clearly, matter is not separable
in this sense, because it exists as an actual being only in virtue of the form
it happens to be joined to. As such matter exists only potentially and hence
is not existentially autonomous and independent. Aquinass interpretation
of the notion of hoc aliquid is more complicated. In his commentary on Z 3,
the Dominican Master does not give us much information about what it
means for something to be a hoc aliquid. He is more explicit, by contrast,
in his philosophical and theological writings.46 From what he says, it clearly
emerges that something is a hoc aliquid if and only if it satisfies both of two
conditions: (1) it is capable of existing per se, i.e. not in virtue of something
else; (2) it represents a full-fledged member of a certain natural kind. Note
that, on this understanding, condition (1) is in fact equivalent to being
separable, i.e. existing per se. Thus, matter clearly does not satisfy the first
condition. Nor does it satisfy the second, either: for matter is not a full-
fledged member of a natural kind in separation from the form that turns
it into an actual being and so into an individual substance of a certain
kind. Therefore, matter is neither separable nor a hoc aliquid. It is both of
these things only potentially, that is only in so far as it is capable of being
turned by forms into an actual being. All that matter can be is a potential
substance.

46 Cf. in particular: Q. De An., q. 1, p. 7, lin. 192205. But see also Sent. De An., Lib. II, c. 1,
Opera Omnia, XLV, p. 96, lin. 97117; S. Th., Ia, q. 75, a. 2, ad 1, ed. Paulinae, p. 345; In II Sent.,
d. 17, q. 1, a.2, ed. Mandonnet, vol. II, p. 418.
Aristotles text suggestsand probably impliesthat both the compos-

ite and form are separable and hoc aliquid in some sense or other. For the
argument concludes that the composite and form are more substance than
matter, and all that counts as a substance must be separable and hoc aliquid
in some sense or other. That both form and the composite are separable and
hoc aliquid is explicitly restated by Aristotle in Met. H 1 (1042a2631), when
he summarises the results of Zs enquiry. In line with his general under-
standing of the notion of substance, Aquinas does not think that the com-
posite and form are separable and hoc aliquid in exactly the same sense. Pre-
dictably, he maintains that the composite is separable and hoc aliquid in the
strict sense of the term, whilst form is so only in a derivative sense. Accord-
ingly, the composite is substance in the strict sense of the term, whereas
form is substance only derivatively. Let me start with the notion of hoc ali-
quid, which is in many respects the most important. In Ch. 1 we have seen
that modern scholars offers three different solutions to the problem:
(1) form and the composite are in exactly the same sense, i.e. in the
sense of being particular things. This interpretation squares with Aristotles
standard use of the notion of , both in the Categories and in the Meta-
physics. (2) Form and the composite are in two different, but equally
primary senses. The composite is because it is a particular instance of
a certain natural kind. Form, by contrast, is a in that it is a fully deter-
minate entity, i.e. an entity that is not further determinable from a formal
point of view. Advocates of this solution insist that, if form is in the
sense specified, it does not need to be a particular thing. (3) Only the com-
posite is a in the strict sense of the term. Form, by contrast, is
only in a secondary sense, i.e. only in so far as it is that in virtue of which
a composite substance can be called a . In other words, form is not a
itself, but is the principle accounting for the composite being a
. Interpretations (1) and (2) usually go hand in hand with the view that
form is primary substance, i.e. that form is more substance than the com-
posite. Interpretation (3), on the contrary, fits in well with the view that, at
least from the point of view of existential autonomy and independence, the
composite is prior to form and so more substance than it. Form, of course,
holds some kind of priority in the order of explanation in that it accounts
for the characteristics that make of the composite a full-fledged substance.
However, for supporters of solution (3) this kind of priority is not enough to
regard form as more substantial in character than the composite of which
it is the form.
Predictably, Aquinass understanding of the notion of /hoc aliquid
is very close to interpretation (3). Only the composite is a hoc aliquid in the
256 chapter three
strict sense of the term, whereas form is so only derivatively.47 The same
result comes out of the two conditions for something to be a hoc aliquid
which Aquinas fixes in his philosophical and theological works. Form does
not satisfy the first condition, because it cannot exist per se, that is can
only exist in a certain piece of matter and so does not enjoy independent
existence. But form does not satisfy the second condition, either. For it is
not a full-fledged member of a certain natural kind, but only a part thereof.
It is only when joined to a certain piece of matter that form represents a
complete member of a certain natural kind. For instance, the human soul
is not a complete human being, but only a part of it. It is a human being
only when joined to a certain body.48 Although form does not satisfy either
of the two conditions for something to be a hoc aliquid, it is not on a par
with matter with respect to substantiality. For form is that in virtue of which
something can be properly called a hoc aliquid, i.e. is the constituent of
the composite that accounts for its being an actual being and a member
of a certain natural kind.49 Therefore, form is more substance than matter,
for it is that in virtue of which the composite is a substance, even though
its substantiality is secondary when compared to the sense in which the
composite is substance.
As to the notion of being separable, Aquinas adopts the same strategy as
he does for the notion of hoc aliquid. Matter is separable only potentially and
hence counts as a substance only potentially. Form is that in virtue of which
a composite substance can be said to be separableand so it is separable in
some sense, though only derivatively. Finally, the composite is separable in
the strict sense of the term in that it enjoys autonomous and independent

48 The case of the human soul, i.e. of the form of human beings, is an exception to
Aquinass general view that the forms of sensible substances do not satisfy either of the two
conditions for something to be a hoc aliquid. Like all the other sensible forms, the human
soul does not satisfy the second condition, in that it is not a complete member of a natural
kind. It is so only together with the body it is joined to. However, the human soul satisfies
the first condition in so far as it is capable of existing per se. According to Christian theology,
in fact, the human soul outlives the destruction of the body and continues to exist even after
a human beings death. In so far as it satisfies at least the first condition, the human soul
is a hoc aliquid to a higher degree than the other sensible forms, even though it is not a hoc
aliquid in the full sense in which the composite is so. This view also has consequences for the
problem of individuation and so for the question whether forms are particular or universal.
While the other sensible forms are individuated by matter (and hence are universal in the
sense the term carries in the modern debate), the human soul does not owe its individuality
to matter, but is individual in itself (i.e. it owes its being an individual to nothing other than
Gods creative act). For more on these issues see: Galluzzo (2003) and (2007a).
existence. Usually modern scholars solve the problem of separability by

appealing to a distinction Aristotle makes in Met. H 1 (1042a2832) between
two senses of being separable, one applicable to the composite and the
other to form. Aristotle suggests in the text at issue that the composite is
separable unqualifiedly, which means, presumably, that the composite is
existentially independent. Form, by contrast, is separable in thought, i.e.
can be understood and defined without making reference to the matter
it exists in. In other words, the definition of form does not contain any
reference to matter and so form is separable in thought. Aquinas does not
make much use of such an Aristotelian distinction in order to explain the
notion of separability. The reason is simply that he does not think that form
is separable even in thought. He does not think, in other words, that the
definition of form contains no reference to matter, but rather consistently
insists that matter enters into the definition of form.50 The soul, for instance,
cannot be defined independently of the body, in accordance with Aristotles
model of definition in De an. B 1. Thus, Aquinas prefers to understand
the separability of form not by appealing to a different sense of being
separable, but rather in relation to the separability of the composite. Form
is separable because it bears a certain relation to the composite, i.e. because
it is that in virtue of which the composite can be called separable, just as
it is that in virtue of which the composite can be called a hoc aliquid in the
strict sense of the term.
In conclusion, Aristotles interpretation of Met. Z 3s argument confirms his

general understanding of Aristotles notion of substance. In spite of their
being analysable into matter and form, sensible particular objects retain
the role of primary substances the Categories assigns to them. They do so
on account of their existential independence and completeness: sensible
substances, i.e. composites of matter and form, both exist per se and are full-
blown members of a natural kind. Form is neither and hence is substance
only in a derivative sense, i.e. in so far as it is that in virtue of which the com-
posite is substance. Thus, form is, at most, prior in the order of explanation,
but the order of explanation comes after the order of existential indepen-
dence and completeness.
50 Cf. Aquinas, S. Boet. De Tri., q. 5, a. 3, p. 149, lin. 258263; Exp. Metaph., Lib. VIII, lect. 1,
n. 1687.
258 chapter three
3. Essence
3.1. The Essence of Substance and Accidents in Met. Z 4551

1. Met. Z 45 are very difficult chapters. Especially in the first part of Z 4 the
Greek is hard and the argument at times obscure. Also Moerbekes render-
ing of the text is far from being transparent. As a result, Aquinass exposition
too is not as precise as usual in so far as the details of Aristotles text are
concerned. In spite of these exegetical difficulties, Aquinass commentary is
particular interesting for its treatment of the question of the essence of sub-
stance and accidents. For one thing, Aquinass analysis further bolsters his
view that the composites of matter and form are primary instances of being
in the material world. For another, the discussion of the essence of acci-
dents reveals Aquinass commitment to an ontological notion of essence as
opposed to a logical or epistemological one.
As we have seen in Ch. 1, Aristotle raises in Z 4 two questions: (1) What
is essence? (2) What things have an essence? Aristotles answer to the first
question consists in explaining which kinds of predicates figure in the for-
mula that spells out the essence of a thing. As to the second question, Aris-
totle advances two different solutions: an exclusive solution, according to
which only substances have an essence, and a more inclusive one, accord-
ing to which substances have an essence in the primary sense of the term,
whereas all the other thingsaccidents and accidental compositeshave
one only in the secondary sense of the term. Z 5 continues the discussion of
the second question by taking into account a particularly problematic case
of accidents, the so-called coupled accidents, i.e. things like snub. Coupled
accidents are problematic because they seem to have built into themselves
a reference to the kind of subject they inhere inwhich makes them very
hard to define. Z 5 draws also some conclusions about accidents in general.
Upon closer inspection, all accidents turn out to be coupled accidents and
so to bring along with them the kind of subject they inhere in. This does
not mean, however, that accidents do not have an essence and a definition,
provided that one is prepared to accept the more inclusive solution to the
second of Z 4s questions. Accidents have an essence and a definition, but
only in a derivative sense.
(1) Aquinass interpretation of Aristotles solution to question (1) does not
pose any particular problems. He follows very close the different steps of
Aristotles argument. First, Aristotle eliminates accidental predicates from
51 For the topic of this section see Amerini (2001) and (2005).
the number of essential predicates.52 If I am asked to define a man, I can

hardly be expected to answer that he is musical. For what a man is, is not
what a musical thing is. Thus essential predicates should be confined to the
class of per se (i.e. non-accidental) predicates. Second, Aristotle further nar-
rows down the class of essential predicates by excluding per se predicates in
the second of the senses of per se singled out in Post. Anal. A 4.53 The con-
clusion is that only per se predicates in the first of the Posterior Analytics
senses count as essential predicates. Per se2 predicates must be eliminated
because they do not express the essence of the subject they are predicated
of. For they are predicated per se not because they enter into the definition
of their subject, but rather because their subject enters into their definition.
Thus, such predicates can hardly express the essence of their subject. For
instance, white is said per se of surface only because surface is part of the
definition of white, i.e. because only surfaces are white. But being white is
not what a surface essentially is. For similar reasons, the composite white
surface cannot be the essence of surface, either. For, in the composite white
surface, white is extrinsic to the essence of surface.54 Since per se2 predicates
are characterised by the fact of containing in their definition the subject
they are predicated of, it remains that, as a general rule, only those per
se predicates that do not contain their subject in their definition count as
essential predicates.55 In other words, only per se1 predicates count as essen-
tial predicates.
(2) More interesting is Aquinass treatment of the second question, i.e.
the question as to which things have an essence. The first thing to note is
that Thomas reconstructs correctly Z 4s overall structure and distinguishes
between an exclusive and a more inclusive solution to the question raised
in the chapter. At the end of the discussion, however, he remarks that, all
things considered, it is not so important whether one endorses the exclusive
solution (only substances have an essence and a definition) or the more lib-
eral one (substances have an essence and a definition in the primary sense,
while accidental composites and accidents only in a secondary sense).56 For
the two solutions presuppose in fact two different notions of essence (and
of definition). The exclusive solution rests on an all-or-nothing notion of

55 Cf. Aquinas, Exp. Metaph., Lib. VII, lect. 3, n. 1313. Note that Aquinas interprets the
general rule at 1029b1920 not as designed to avoid repetition (i.e. the repetition of the
definiendum in the definiens) but as a rule that sets per se1 predicates apart from per se2 ones.
260 chapter three
essence, i.e. it sets requirements for something to have an essence which

only substances can satisfy. One of those requirements, for instance, is that
what possesses an essence should also possess a strong internal unity, or,
to put it otherwise, a per se unity. And only substances in fact possess a
per se unity. The inclusive solution, by contrast, is based on the view that
essence and definition come in degree, in accordance with the -
structure Aristotle employs to group the different senses of being.57 Just as
the different senses of being are grouped around a core sense, i.e. being as
substance, so the different senses of essence (and definition) are grouped
around a core sense of essence (and definition), i.e. the sense in which
substances have an essence (and a definition). Accordingly, accidental com-
posites and accidents have an essence only in so far as their essence bears
some relation to the essence of substances, just as they are beings only in so
far as they bear some relation to primary beings, i.e. substances. The rela-
tion which the essences of accidental composites and of accidents bear to
the essence of substance is a relation of dependence. Thus, the general pic-
ture is that there are primary essences, which do not depend on any other
essences, and secondary ones, which depend on primary essences, i.e. the
essences of substances. Within this framework, substances as well as acci-
dental composites and accidents all have an essence, though in different
ways and to different degrees.
The way Aquinas solves the problem of coupled accidents in Met. Z 5
suggests that he is particular sympathetic with the more inclusive solution.
I shall explain this point in due course. However, it is when discussing
the exclusive solution that he offers the most complete account of the
relation between substances and accidents. Therefore, I shall concentrate
my attention on this particular aspect of Aquinass commentary. I shall skip,
by contrast, Aquinass exposition of Aristotles inclusive solution, where the
Dominican Master follows very closely the letter of Aristotles text.
2. Aquinass interpretation of the first part of Z 4 (exclusive solution) is char-

acterised by two main theses: (i) the ontological equivalence of accidents
and accidental composites; (ii) the rejection of a logical or epistemological
understanding of essence.
(i) The first case which Aristotle examines when answering the question
as to which things have an essence, is that of accidental composites.58 Do
57 Cf. Aquinas, Exp. Metaph., Lib. VII, lect. 4, nn. 13311337 (nn. 13311334 in particular for
the idea that essence and definition come in degrees; nn. 13351337 for the -structure).
accidental composites, things such as white man, have an essence? In order

to explain Aristotles answer to the question, Aquinas first examines the
relation between accidental composites and the accidental properties that
are part of them, for instance the relation between a white man and the
property white that is part of him.59 Aquinass aim is to show that properties
such as white have no other essence than that of the corresponding acciden-
tal composite. For instance: white has an essence only in so far as a white
man has one. The proof of such a crucial point can be reconstructed as fol-
lows.60 It is natural to expect the definition of a white man to mention both
the man and the property white that is predicated of him. However, the def-
inition of white also mentions both these items. For an accident cannot be
defined independently of the subject it inheres in. But, if the definition of
white mentions both the property white and man, it will not be different
from the definition of white man. Therefore, the property white will have
no other definition than that of the corresponding accidental composite.
There are some difficulties with Aquinass argument. A minor one is that
it is not clear why man should be mentioned in the definition of white.
After all, white is predicated of many other things and not only of man,
and so why should man in particular be mentioned in its definition? The
difficulty is solved in Aquinass commentary on Z 5. An accident cannot
be defined independently of its proper subject of inherence. Man is clearly
not the proper subject of inherence for white. However, as Aquinas himself
recognises in his commentary on Z 4, man is just an example to let us
understand the ontological status of accidents: suppose man is the proper
subject of inherence of white; then white will have an essence only in so far
as the corresponding accidental composite has one. Once we have singled
out the real proper subject of white, say surface, we only have to replace
man with surface: the property white will have no other definition than that
of a white surface. Whether or not man is the proper subject of white, the
general point still holds.
There is another, more serious difficulty, though. For it seems that the
way in which man (assuming it to be the proper subject of white) enters
into the definition of white is not the same as that in which man enters into
the definition of a white man. In order to see this point, it is sufficient to
make a distinction between being predicated in recto and being predicated
in obliquo, i.e. between being mentioned in a definition in a direct case
and being mentioned in an indirect one. Suppose that we want to define

60 Cf. Aquinas, Exp. Metaph., Lib. VII, lect. 3, n. 1320; 1322.
262 chapter three
man and we come up with the definition rational animal. Both terms
mentioned in the definition, rational and animal, are in a direct case. This
signals the fact that both (being) rational and (being an) animal are part of
the essence of man. Likewise, the definition of white man will probably
consist in a very complex formula in which all the terms mentioned (both
those explaining man and those explaining white) will be in a direct case
and so will jointly spell out the essence of a white man. The case of the
definition of the property white seems to be different. Presumably, such a
definition should be something of the form: a certain property of a man
(assuming man to be the proper subject of white). The subject man does
enter into the definition of the property white, but not in a direct case. The
presence of an indirect case (the genitive in this instance) suggests that
the subject mentioned in the definition is not part of the essence of the
property, even though its mention is necessary to give a complete account
of what the property in question is. This point seems to be acknowledged
by Aquinas himself when he says that the subject figuring in the definition
of accidents is not part of the essence of accidents, even if it must be
included in their definition.61 This difficulty, however, is not insuperable
either. For part of Aquinass point is exactly that the property white is
nothing but a white thing, be it a white man or a white surface. Accidents
never exist, in nature, separately from the subject they inhere in and so, from
an existential point of view, they are nothing but accidental composites. Of
course, we are used to defining accidents as though they were properties
that exist independently of any subject. Such a way of defining is often
called the abstract way, for we consider the property white as though it
were an abstract and independently existing object. We say, for instance,
that whiteness (where whiteness is an abstract term) is a certain property
of a man. HoweverAquinas urgesthis is not the most correct manner
of defining an accident. An accident should be rather defined according
to the concrete way, i.e. as an object with a certain property, for instance
a white thing. When taken in this way, an accident is nothing but an
accidental composite. White is nothing but a man or a surface having a
certain property. If we define an accident in the concrete, its definition will
contain only terms in a direct case. It is only when we define an accident
in the abstract that the subject figures in the definition in an indirect case.
But the abstract way of defining does not capture the ontological status of
accidents and so should be abandoned when it comes to deciding what kind

of essence accidents have. Thus, the impression of a difference between

accidental composites and accidents only stems from confusing the abstract
and the concrete way of signifying and defining an accident.
Thus, to go back to the question of essence, the first point established by
Aquinas is that accidents have no other essence than that of the correspond-
ing accidental composites. But do accidental composites actually have an
essence? Aquinas remarks that, being aliquid, i.e. objects, and not aliquale,
i.e. properties, accidental composites lay better claims to having an essence
than accidents.62 However, if we endorse a strict notion of essence, acciden-
tal composites do not possess an essence either. For what has an essence
in the strict sense of the term must also be a hoc aliquid, i.e. a thing that is
not analysable in terms of something being said of something else as of its
subject.63 And accidental composites are clearly so analysable, because they
are made of an accident that is predicated of a substance as of its subject. In
other words, accidental composites do not have a sufficient degree of unity
in so far as they are kept together only by an accidental relation between a
substance and an accident. In conclusion, only substances have the required
degree of unity and hence only substances possess an essence in the strict
sense of the term. From the context it is perfectly clear that by substances
Aquinas means particular sensible substances, i.e. the Categories-style pri-
mary substances, which in the Metaphysics are taken to be composites of
matter and form.64 This is evident, for instance, from Aquinass use of the
term hoc aliquid, which denotates in the Categories the particulars in the
category of substances. Thus, Aquinass interpretation of the problem of

64 Two objections might be levelled against Aquinass view. The first is that the definitions
of substances are composed of genus and differentia and so substances too seem to be things
for which it holds that something is said of something else. However one characterises,
though, the relation between genus and differentia, the differentia is clearly not predicated
of the genus as of its subject, as Aristotle (followed by Aquinas) makes clear in Z 12. The
second difficulty is that composites of matter and form seem to be analysable in terms of
something being said of something else as of its subject. For Aristotle says (Met., Z 3, 1029a2;
H 1, 1042a2629; 2, 1042b9; 7, 1049a36.) that form is predicated of matter as of its subject,
and the matter-form predication might be interpreted as a case, though a special one, of
accidental predication. Therefore, it seems that composites of matter and form do not have
an essence in the strict sense. To this objection it can be replied that Aquinas does not
seem to count the relation between matter and form as a case of predication, as modern
interpreters tend to do. Thus, he does not pay any attention to the possible implications of
the matter-form predication for the unity (or lack of unity) of the composite. According to
him, composites of matter and form possess a degree of unity sufficient for them to have an
essence in the strict sense of the term.
264 chapter three
what things have an essence perfectly squares with his general understand-
ing of the notion of substance. Sensible substances, i.e. composites of matter
and form, are primary entities and so only they have an essence, at least
according to a strict understanding of the notion. The hypothesis that it
might be the forms of sensible substances that have an essence in the strict
sense of the term is not even taken into account by Aquinas. This is easily
explainable if one recalls that Aquinas does not consider the forms of sen-
sible objects primary substances.
(ii) After explaining Aristotles exclusive solution to the problem of which

things have an essence, Aquinas goes back to the case of accidents to reject
an alternative way of understanding the notion of essence. This alternative
way may be called the logical or epistemological understanding of essence.
According to the logical understanding, each thing that has a name and a
formula explaining the meaning of the name, also has an essence.65 Since
accidents have names and formulae explaining the meaning of their names,
they must have an essence as well, just as substances do. The rationale
behind this proposal seems to be the following. Essences serve to under-
stand what things are: we understand what things are by knowing their
essences. But we understand what an accident is when we understand the
formula corresponding to its name. So why deny accidents an essence?
Aquinas has two replies to this proposal. The first is that, if we accept unre-
strictedly the principle that everything having a name and a formula corre-
sponding to the name, has also an essence, we end up attributing essences
to things which we clearly do not think have one.66 For instance, on this
account, even the Trojan war would have an essence. For it has a name,
Iliad, and a formula corresponding to the name, i.e. the ensemble of the
words composing the poem The Iliad. But clearly, we do not think that the
Trojan war has an essence, presumably because the ensemble of facts and
events narrated in Homers poem do not have a sufficient degree of unity
for them to count as one thing. The second objection is that, even if we
leave aside the Iliad and the like and confine ourselves to things that, intu-
itively, might have an essence (i.e. accidents, accidental composites etc.), it
is wrong to assign essences without taking into account the way in which
65 Cf. Aquinas, Exp. Metaph., Lib. VII, lect. 3, n. 1324. For Aquinass understanding of the
difference between nominal and real definition, see Galluzzo (2009b). Nominal and real
definition are especially discussed in : Exp. Post., Lib. II, lect. 8, Opera Omnia, I*2, pp. 202
204, lin. 70191.
things concretely exist.67 In other words, essences cannot be assigned with-

out employing ontological considerations. If we fail to do so, i.e. if we
endorse a logical consideration of essence, we run the risk, for instance, of
treating accidents as abstract objects. Accidents, by contrast, only exist as
concrete objects, i.e. as accidental composites, as emerges from an ontolog-
ical analysis of their way of being. Likewise, a purely logical consideration of
essence misleads people into disregarding the internal structure of acciden-
tal composites and treating them as unitary objects. An ontological analysis,
by contrast, reveals that accidental composites do not possess a degree of
unity sufficient for them to have an essence in the strict sense of the term.
Thus the logical understanding of essence, familiar as it may be, does not
enable one to decide which things have an essence in a correct and princi-
pled way.
Note that the logical understanding of essence should not be confused
with the inclusive solution to the problem of essence, which Aristotle illus-
trates in the second half of Z 4. Admittedly, like the logical understanding
of essence, Aristotles inclusive solution grants essences to things that pos-
sess a lower degree of unity, such as accidents and accidental composites.
However, Aristotles inclusive solution is also based on ontological consid-
erations. In particular, it is based on the application to the level of essence of
the relations of dependence between substance and accidents that obtain
at the level of concrete existence. Just as the different kinds of being can be
grouped around a basic kind of being, being as substance, so the essences of
the different kinds of being can be grouped around a basic kind of essence,
the essence of substances. Essential dependence mirrors existential depen-
dence. Clearly, this solution is not merely based on the synonymy between a
name and the formula expressing its meaning, as is the case with the logical
consideration of essence. The ontological import of Aristotles solution will
become more evident as we analyse Aquinass exposition of Z 5.
3. Z 5 takes up a particularly problematic kind of accidents, the so-called

coupled accidents, i.e. things like snub. The trouble with this sort of acci-
dents is that they seem to have built into themselves a reference to the
subject they inhere in. Only noses are snub and so snub seems to be incom-
prehensible without making reference to the kind of subject, the nose, it
invariably inheres in. The fact that coupled accidents always bring their sub-
ject along with them makes it particularly hard to define them. Aristotle
67 This reply is implicit in: Aquinas, Exp. Metaph., Lib. VII, lect. 3, n. 1326 (I have slightly
expanded on what Aquinas actually says).

266 chapter three
presents in the chapter two difficulties (aporiae) that befall any attempt at
defining things like snub. Aristotle does not say whether the difficulties are
in fact insuperable and so things like snub are actually indefinable. The fact
remains, however, that he himself does not present any positive solution to
the aporiae. Even if at the beginning of the chapter Aristotle distinguishes
accidents such as snub from the other accidents, he suggests at the end that
all accidents are like snub. All accidents have a certain kind of subject they
invariably inhere in. Thus, the difficulties raised against the definability of
things like snub turn out to be difficulties concerning accidents in general.
In light of Aquinass interpretation of Met. Z 4, it should not be difficult to
guess how he understands the argument in Z 5 and the difficulties the chap-
ter raises. In Z 4, Aristotle presents two different answers to the question
of which things have an essence and a definition, an exclusive and a more
inclusive answer. The argument in Z 5 should be read in the light of Aristo-
tles two solutions. The aporiae raised against the definability of snub and
accidents in general clearly show that accidents do not have an essence and
a definition. However, if we take a more liberal view about what counts as
an essence and a definition, the aporiae can be solved and accidents can be
granted an essence and a definition, though only in a secondary sense. Let
us take a closer look, then, at Aquinass understanding of the aporiae and at
the solutions he advances.
(i) The first aporia concerns the structure and content of a definition. It sim-
ply states that, if definitions by addition do not count as proper definitions,
then coupled accidents will not be definable, for the only definition they
have is a definition by addition. A definition by addition is a formula that
contains something external to the essence of the object defined.68 The for-
mula of coupled accidents is clearly a definition by addition, for it contains
a mention of the subject such accidents inhere in and the subject is not
part of the essence of the accidents inhering in it. This first aporia makes
a distinction between coupled accidents such as snub and simple accidents
such as white or concave.69 Unlike coupled accidents, simple accidents can
be defined without mentioning one particular kind of subject, presumably
because they inhere in different kinds of subject and so there is no kind of
subject they invariably inhere in.70 However, the distinction between cou-
pled and simple accidents is only provisional. At the end of the chapter

(1031a26), Aristotle suggests that all accidents are coupled. So, if definitions
by addition do not count as proper definitions, no accidents will be defin-
able.
Aquinas accepts Aristotles conclusion as it stands, but he reads it in the
light of Z 4s two answers to the problem of which things have an essence. If
one endorses Z 4s exclusive solution (only substances have an essence and
a definition) then accidents will not have a definition, in that definitions
by addition are not definitions, according to a strict understanding of the
notion of definition. If one, on the contrary, adopts Z 4s more inclusive
solution, then accidents will have a definition and definitions by addition
will count as definitions, though of a secondary kind. In other words, in line
with Z 4s second solution one should distinguish between the definitions of
substances, which are not by addition and do not contain anything external
to the essence of the object defined, and the definitions of accidents, which
are by addition and so contain something external to the essence of the
object defined.
(ii) The second aporia shows that any attempt at defining snub fails on
account of the subject that snub always brings along with itself. The point is
made by proving that the different definitions of snub one might come up
with make it impossible to use correctly the complex expression snub nose
and in fact lead to a series of syntactical problems (repetitions, regresses).
The definitions of snub Aristotle puts to the test are basically three: (a)
snub = concave; (b) snub = snub nose; (c) snub = concave nose. (a) One
view is that a snub nose is (= is identical by definition with) a concave nose.
But if a snub nose is identical with a concave nose, then snub must be iden-
tical with concave. However, snub and concave do not seem to be identical,
because snub implies a reference to the subject of inherence which con-
cave does not imply.71 (b) Suppose then that we distinguish between snub
and concave on the basis of the fact that, unlike concave, snub entails a ref-
erence to the nose. On this view, snub = snub nose. But if this is the case,
if snub = snub nose, then the expression snub nose either is not sayable
at all or, if it is, it contains a repetition. For if we replace snub with its defi-
nition (snub nose) in the expression snub nose we get snub nose nose,
which clearly contains a repetition.72 (c) To avoid repetition one might sug-
gest that snub does not mean snub nose, but rather concave nose. But if
snub = concave nose we are off on an infinite regress. For in the expression

268 chapter three
concave nose, snub can be substituted for concave so as to get snub

nose. After all, concavity in a nose is just snubness and so a concave nose is
a snub nose. However, from snub nose we can get concave nose nose by
replacing snub with its definition, concave nose. And from concave nose
nose we first get snub nose nose and then concave nose nose noseand
so on and so forth ad infinitum.73
Aquinas thinks that the difficulties presented in the aporia are real and
prove that accidents do not have an essence and a definition. However, he
once again makes appeal to Z 4s two solutions. If one takes the essence
and definition of substances as paradigmatic, accidents do not have an
essence and a definition. But if we are prepared to accept the view that
essence and definition come in degrees, then accidents will have an essence
and a definition, though of a secondary kind.74 Endorsing the more liberal
view also enables one to solve the syntactical problems presented in the
second aporia. Aquinas shows how this can be done by taking into account
two different cases, i.e. the case in which snub is signified in the abstract
and that in which it is taken in the concrete.75 When signified abstractly,
snub means the property snub and so is equivalent to snubness. The
definition of snubness is simply the concavity of a nose. The concavity
of a nose is clearly different from a concave nose or from a snub nose,
because the mention of the subject nose appears in an indirect case in the
former expression and in a direct case in the latter ones. As a consequence,
we are not allowed to substitute snub nose for snub in the expression
snub nose, because nose figures in the definition of snub in a indirect
case and so not as part of its essence.76 Therefore, such a definition of
snub/snubness does not generate any of the syntactical difficulties pointed
out in the aporia. When taken concretely, snub means the snub, i.e. the
snub thing. Its definition then will simply be concave nose. In this case
too, we cannot substitute concave nose for snub in the expression snub
nose.77 For the only difference between snub and concave is that snub
implies a reference to a certain kind of subject. However, once the subject
is specified, snub simply means concave: a snub nose is a concave nose
and not a concave nose nose.
73 Cf. Aquinas, Exp. Metaph., Lib. VII, lect. 4, n. 1349. Aquinass solution here echoes the
one Aristotle himself presents in Soph. Ref., 13 and 31.

In conclusion, the moral to be drawn seems to be that, if we try to apply to

accidents the model of definition which is proper to substances, we run into
difficulties. For the subject accidents always bring along with them prevents
the correct application of the standard rule of substitution and so on. How-
ever, if we allow for accidents to have a different and secondary model of
definition, the difficulties can be solved and accidents can be defined.
3.2. The Identity Thesis (Met. Z 6)

Aquinass interpretation of Met. Z 6 is an interesting example of a two-
time reading. First, Thomas presents a certain interpretation of the chapter,
according to which particular sensible substances are or may be thought
to be identical with their essences. Then, he reconsiders and revises his
interpretation when commenting on Z 11s final summary, where Aristotle
sums up the result of the whole section on essence. Curiously enough, the
argumentative movement Aquinas attributes to Aristotle is in this instance
very similar to Myles Burnyeats reconstruction of Zs general strategy. In Z 6
Aristotle endorses a strongly logical point of view, which somehow obscures
the relevance of the matter-form distinction to the issue of identity. In Met.
Z 1011, by contrast, the notions of matter and form are put to full use and
this sheds a different light also on the question of the identity between a
thing and its essence.
Aquinass commentary on Met. 6 is also important for another reason.
The Dominican Master interprets the long section about Platos Forms
as an argument against the existence of such entities. This reading is at
odds with modern scholars interpretation, who do not tend to see Z 6
as an anti-Platonic chapter and justify the reference to Platos doctrine of
Forms in a completely different way. In this section, I shall offer a general
reconstruction of Aquinass commentary on Met. Z 6 by paying particular
attention to the two points just mentioned.
In Z 6 Aristotle passes in review three different kinds of entity in order
to see which of them is in fact identical with its own essence. The kinds of
entity in play are (i) accidental composites, (ii) accidents, and (iii) things
that are spoken of per se, i.e., roughly, substances. Like Aristotle, Aquinas
thinks that the identity thesis does not hold for either accidental composites
or accidents. His explanation follows very closely the letter of Aristotles
text. (i) Accidental composites such as white man are not identical with
their own essence. The argument for this conclusion can be reconstructed
in the following way.78 From the point of view of its concrete existence, a

270 chapter three
white man is nothing but a man. For nothing is predicated of a white man
if it is not also predicated of the man who is white.79 Thus, if the essence of
a white man were identical with the white man, it should be also identical
with the man. For a white man is just a man. But the essence of white man is
not identical with a man (because it contains a reference to white that the
essence of a man does not contain.) Therefore, it cannot be identical with
the white man, either.
(ii) As for the case of accidents, Aristotle says at 1031b2228 that their
status with regards to the identity thesis is not entirely clear. For acci-
dents can be taken in two different ways. If they are taken together with
the subject they inhere in, they are not identical with their essence (pre-
sumably, because in this case they would be just accidental composites
and the identity does not hold in the case of accidental composites). If,
on the contrary, they are taken without their subject, i.e. as mere prop-
erties, they are identical with their own essence, presumably because the
essence and definition of a certain property only contains (or might be taken
to contain) the property itself and nothing else. In Ch. 1 I suggested that,
according to Aristotle, accidents should be taken together with their sub-
ject and so they are not identical with their essence, after all. Be that as it
may, this is certainly Aquinass position.80 In the previous section, we saw
that Aquinas tends to reduce accidents to accidental composites. More-
over, he resists the logical or epistemological line of argument according
to which accidents can be considered in isolation from the subject they
inhere in. In their concrete existence accidents are just accidental com-
posites. So, according to Aquinas, they cannot be identical with their own
essence.
(iii) The most interesting case is that of things spoken of per se, i.e.
substances. Aristotle presents several arguments for the conclusion that the
identity thesis holds for the case of substances. The last two arguments are
very general in that they do not take as a paradigmatic case of substance
any specific kind of entity. The first two arguments, by contrast, take as
paradigmatic cases of substances Platonic Forms and argue for the view that
Forms must be identical with their essence, if they are substances. Since
79 It might be objected that there are attributes that are predicated of a white man qua
white man, which are not also predicated of a man qua man. However, it is clear that Aquinas
(and probably Aristotle as well) is thinking here of a particular white man, i.e. of the man who
is white. And on this reading (some kind of de re reading) it seems true to say that everything
that is predicated of a white man is also predicated of the particular white man who is white.
Aristotle does not believe in Forms, the first two arguments are to some
extent problematic. Contemporary interpreters generally solve the diffi-
culty by remarking that Aristotles intention is to show that the identity the-
sis is a very general claim, which holds good for any (essentialist) ontology
whatsoever. It is for this reason that Aristotle chooses to make his case by
assuming the existence of Platos Forms. In other words, if Forms existed
and we know, for independent reasons, that they do notthey ought to be
identical with their own essence. For Forms are thought to be primary sub-
stances and primary substances are identical with their essence. Thus, to
show that the identity thesis should hold also for the case of Platos Forms
(if they existed) strengthens Aristotles case that the identity holds for his
own primary substances, i.e. immanent forms.
Predictably, Aquinass explanation of the presence of Platos Forms in
the chapter is completely different from contemporary interpreters. For
him, Aristotle uses the identity thesis to prove that Forms do not exist.81
According to Aquinas, Platonists accept the identity thesis and so grant that
Forms are identical with their own essence. However, they cannot do so
without running into contradictions or insuperable difficulties. The root of
their difficulties lies in the fact that Platos Forms are separate substances
and this characteristic of theirs is to some extent incompatible with the
identity thesis. Let us take, therefore, a closer look at the way Aquinas
reconstructs the arguments involving Forms.
(Arg. 1) Suppose that there are primary substances, i.e. substances for
which it is true that there are no other substances prior to them. Suppose
further that such primary substances are Platos Forms. Then the essences
of Forms must be identical with Forms themselves. For if they were not so,
there would exist other substances, i.e. the essences of Forms, which would
be prior to Forms, and so Forms would not be primary substances, after all
contrary to our assumption.82 On the face of it, the argument seems to be an
argument in favour of the view that Forms are identical with their essence.
In what sense, then, can it be taken to be an argument against the existence
of Forms? The answer comes from a peculiar characteristic of Platos Forms,
separateness. Forms are conceived of as separate from material particulars.
However, they are also thought to be the essences of them. Thus, by parity
of reasons, if there are essences of Forms, they must be separate from the
Forms they are the essences of. But it is easy to see that we are now off
on a infinite regress. For the essences of Forms, since they are separate, are

272 chapter three
substances and hence must have essences. Such essences, however, must be
separate from the substances of which they are the essences and hence we
shall have another level of essences (the essences of the essences of Forms)
besides Forms, and so on and so forth ad infinitum. Moreover, if the essences
of Forms are substances, as they must be if they are separate, they will be
substances prior to Formswhich runs against the assumption that Forms
are primary substances.83
(Arg. 2) The anti-Platonic character of the second argument is even more
evident. Forms were supposed to perform two basic functions: to make
things what they are and to explain how we come to know them.84 But if
the essence of a thing is separate from it, an essence can perform neither of
these two functions. Let us take up the problem of knowledge, first.85 On an
essentialist understanding of knowledge, to know something just is to know
its essence. Now, Forms were thought to be the essences of sensible things.
However, if they are separate from sensible things, they cannot explain how
we come to know sensible things. For if the essence of x is entirely separate
from x, when we grasp the essence we grasp another thing, say y, and not
the very thing we were supposed to know in the first place. In other words,
the knowledge of the essence (the Form) of a thing x is the knowledge of an
entity completely different from x and so can be of no help in understanding
what x is. The case of being is slightly more complicated.86 Suppose that
the essence of something is separate from it. Then, the essence of a Form
must be separate from the Form in question. But if the Form and its essence
are separate, the result is that, for instance, the essence of the good does
not inhere in the Form of the good (for the essence is separate from the
Form), and, conversely, that the good does not inhere in the essence of the
good (for, being separate from the Form of the good, the essence of the
good cannot have the attribute the Form of the good possesses and confers
upon things). Likewise, the essence of being will not inhere in the Form of
being and being will not inhere in the essence of being. But if being does not
inhere in the essence of being, then the essence of being is not a being, i.e.
83 Cf. Aquinas, Exp. Metaph., Lib. VII, lect. 5, n. 1362. Note that an Aristotelian essence
is not vulnerable to the argument. For Aristotelian essences are not separate from the
things of which they are the essence, but rather exist in them. It should be added that,
on Aquinass particular reading of Aristotles ontology (cf. above, Sect. 2), the essences of
sensible substances are not substances on a par with the things of which they are the
essences. Therefore, they cannot be prior to sensible substances in the order of substantiality.
it simply does not exist. If the essence if being does not exist, nor does any
other essence. For all the essences seem to have the same ontological status.
Thus, if the essences of Forms do not exist, how can they explain what the
other things (both Forms and sensible particulars) are?
In conclusion, according to Aquinas, accidental composites and acci-
dents are not identical with their own essence. Platonic Forms are not iden-
tical with their essence, either, because they simply do not exist. But, then,
what things are identical with their essence? More particularly: Are sen-
sible things, i.e. individual composites of matter and form, identical with
their own essence according to Aquinass reading? When commenting on
the final summary of Met. Z 11, Aquinas reconsiders the problem of the
identity between a thing and its essence as well as Aristotles doctrine in
Z 6.87 He remarks that in Z 6 Aristotle excludes from the identity in question
only two kinds of entity, i.e. accidental composites and accidents, letting
us understand that sensible substances, i.e. the individual composites of
matter and form, are in fact identical with their own essence. In Z 11, by con-
trast, he makes it clear that material substances are not identical with their
own essence, either. According to Thomas, Z 11s position is the right one.
Aquinas explains also why things are so.88 An essence is what is expressed
by a definition. A definition, however, always picks out a species and never
an individual. Essences, in other words, are common. Now the essences
of material things exist as multiplied in different individuals. This means
that an individual material substance contains something that falls outside
the essence, i.e. the principle of individuation that makes of it one particu-
lar individual and not another. A material individual, therefore, cannot be
identical with its own essence, because it contains something more than
its essence, i.e. the principle of individuation. Since the essence of mate-
rial substances contains matter in addition to form, the distinction between
essence and principle of individuation implies a further distinction between
two kinds of matter, common matter, which falls within the essence, and
individual matter, which is the principle of individuation and hence falls
outside the essence. I shall come back later on to Aquinass view on essence
as well as on the distinction between individual and common matter, when
dealing with Aquinass commentary on Z 11. In order to prevent possible
misunderstandings, Aquinas also makes it clear that it is not the material
character of sensible particulars that prevents them from being identical

274 chapter three
with their essence.89 If there could existper impossibilea man who is not
also a particular man, he would be identical with his own essence even if he
were material (i.e. even if he were made of form and common matter). Thus,
what really prevents individual material men from being identical with their
essence is the fact that the essence of men needs something else, i.e. indi-
vidual matter, to subsist. In other words, in order to subsist the essence of
men needs to be received in something else and, as a result of it, cannot
but exist as multiplied in different individuals. If the essence of men were
a self-subsisting essence, which is in need of nothing else to subsist, then
there would be only one man and such a man would of course be identical
with his essence, i.e. with the essence he would be. Aquinass word of clari-
fication perfectly squares with his general view on substance. The essences
of sensible substances (be they forms or some kind of universal composites
of matter and form) are not autonomous and independent things on a par
with the substances of which they are the essences. On the contrary, they
are just internal principles of sensible substances, which need something
else to exist and to subsist as complete and autonomous entities.
In addition to defending Z 11s position Aquinas also explains why Aris-
totle in Z 6 expresses himself differently.90 We have seen that, if there could
exist a man who is not also an individual man, he would be identical with
his essence. Even if a similar man does not exist in the extra-mental world,
he does exist in some sense in the intellect, for in the intellect a man exists
without his individuating conditions. Aquinas is here exploiting the con-
ceptual machinery of Avicennas doctrine of essence, according to which
mental concepts are just essences as existing in the intellect, i.e. essences in
their mental mode of being. Thus, the man who exists in the intellect is in
some sense the extra-mental man as existing in the intellect. I shall come
back to Aquinass use of Avicennas doctrine in Section 6.2 when dealing
with Aquinass interpretation of Met. Z 13. What interests me at the moment
is that, on Aquinass reading, in Met. Z 6 Aristotle considers only the mental
existence of a man. Aquinas remarks in fact that, from the point of view of a
logician, who considers not the way things exist in the extra-mental world,
but rather how they exist in the intellect, a man is after all identical with his
own essence. In Z 6 Aristotle endorses a logical point of view and so does not
exclude material substances from the identity with their essence. In Section
1.1 I have said that, generally speaking, the logical level of analysis does not
clash with the metaphysical one. However, there are a few cases where the

logical approach may be potentially misleading and needs to be corrected

with a more realistic and metaphysical approach. The case of the difference
between Z 6 and Z 11 is one of those. We shall come across another similar
case when dealing with notion of cause in Met. Z 17.
Given Aquinass general view on what counts as a substance, it is not
surprising that, unlike contemporary scholars, he does not think that it is
the forms or the essences of sensible substances that are identical with their
essence. Both forms and essences (for Aquinas, in fact, they are distinct)
are not autonomous and independent things, which have essences, but only
internal principles of autonomous and independent things. Thus, in a way,
they are not the kind of things about which it is correct to ask whether
they are identical with their essences or not. For only autonomous and
independent things possess an essence, strictly speaking.91
The result of Aquinass discussion is that the only things that are in
fact identical with their own essence are separate substances. For separate
substances, unlike material substances, are self-subsisting essences and so
do not need anything external to themselves in order to subsist. Therefore,
they are simply identical with their essence, i.e. they are the essence they
have.92
4. The Generation of Substances in Met. Z 79
4.1. The Role of Met. Z 79: An Anti-Platonic Argument

According to contemporary scholars, Chapters Z 79 unexpectedly break
the enquiry into essence which Aristotle begins in Z 4 and then resumes
in Z 10 by taking up the problem of definition. This and other observations
91 A word of qualification is in order here. What I am saying does not imply that we
cannot ask what a certain kind of form, the soul for instance, is and also come up with a
correct definition of it. The point is rather that the sense in which a form has an essence is
not the same sense as that in which an autonomous and independent object does. To put it
otherwise, a form can be said to have an essence only because it is part of something, i.e. the
composite, which has an essence in the proper sense of the term (cf. Aquinas, Q. De An., q. 1,
ad 9, p. 7, lin. 200207; ad 13, p. 12, lin. 439441; q. 9, ad 18, p. 86, lin. 524526). The case of form
is also complicated by the fact that for Aquinas the definition of a certain kind of form must
make reference to the kind of matter in which the form in question exists. This aspect would
make it difficult to allow for a full identity between a form and its essence even if forms were
to be granted essences in the strict sense of the term.
92 A full treatment of the case of separate substances goes far beyond the scope of the
present chapter. For more information about the question of the identity between a separate
substance and its essence in Aquinas see: Galluzzo (2007a), 461ff. See also Cross (2002), 246
256.
276 chapter three
have led many scholars to conclude that Z 79 were once an independent

piece of writing, which was incorporated into the body of the book only
later on. Being an insertion, however, does not mean being irrelevant. On
the contrary, some of Z 79s themes and arguments seem so relevant
to Zs general strategy that many interpreters believe that the insertion
was made by Aristotle himself. It is a fact, for instance, that matter and
form are almost completely absent from Z 46s discussion, whereas they
play a major role in Z 1012s treatment of definition and its parts. At a
very general level, therefore, the suggestion may be advanced that Z 7
9 are meant to elucidate some important points concerning the matter-
form distinction. In Ch. 1 we have seen that there are two more specific
suggestions as to how Z 79 contribute to Zs general argument. (i) Some
scholars maintain that the main focus in the chapters is the defence of
the so-called Synonymy Principle, i.e. the claim that producer and product
are the same in form. The principle is supposed to shed some light on the
prominent role played by form in the constitution of sensible substances
and hence to prepare us for Z 1011s identification of form with primary
substance. Scholars endorsing this view usually give prominence to Met.
Z 7. (ii) Other interpreters, by contrast, put emphasis on the connection
between the analysis of generation and the problem of definition. In Z 1011
Aristotle establishes that the primary object of definition must be simple,
i.e. not analysable into a material and a formal component. Z 8 helps us
to understand that form is the best candidate for being the primary object
of definition. For the chapter puts forward an argument to the effect that
form is not subject to generation (and corruption). The reason is that form
is simple, while the product of generation must be analysable into a material
and a formal component. Scholars favouring this second line of argument
regard Z 8 as the doctrinal core of the section on generation.
Aquinass general understanding of the aim and structure of Met. Z 7
9 differs in many respects from that of modern interpreters. First of all,
Aquinas is not of the opinion that Z 79 interrupt in any significant way
Book Zs main line of argument and so does not even entertain the hypoth-
esis that the three chapters may be a later insertion. This is hardly surprising
given Aquinass systematic and harmonic approach to Aristotles text. How-
ever, in this particular instance, Aquinass position is not simply guided by
the desire to preserve the consistency of Aristotles text. For Z 79 are part
and parcel of a long anti-Platonic argument, to which they contribute a very
important step. When emphasising the anti-Platonic character of Z 79,
Aquinas does nothing but expand on Averroess interpretation. As we have
seen, the anti-Platonic argument has basically four moments: Z 46 prove
that Forms cannot explain either the being or the knowability of sensible
things; Z 79 add the point that they are completely useless also for explain-
ing the generation of sensible beings; Z 1011 show that the doctrine of Forms
presuppose the wrong answer to the problem of the definition of sensible
substances; finally, Z 1316 put the gravestone on Platos theory of Ideas by
arguing at length that they cannot be substances. For Aquinas, therefore,
the anti-Platonic polemic is the doctrinal core of Met. Z 79 and the reason
why Aristotle engages himself in an analysis of generation and corruption.93
This interpretation cannot be regarded as a merely ad hoc exegetical move,
devised to explain away Z 79s apparent oddity. For the anti-Platonic char-
acter of Book Z is one of the distinguishing marks of Aquinass interpreta-
tion, and hence Z 79 fit in very well with the Dominican Masters general
interpretative scheme. Z 79 make also an additional, but not less relevant
point: they reaffirm the ontological priority of the composite of matter and
form over its constitutive principles, matter and form. For it is the compos-
ite of matter and form, and not its constitutive principles, that is subject to
generation and corruption. The chapters, therefore, confirm Aquinass gen-
eral understanding of Zs analysis of substantiality I have outlined in Section
2. I shall address this issue in the next section.
Since the anti-Platonic polemic is the main focus of the chapters, it does
not come as a surprise that the themes contemporary scholars put emphasis
on are absent from Aquinass reconstruction or are in any case subordinate
to the main polemical objective. For instance, Aquinas does not see any
connection between Z 8s argument and the problem of definition in Z 1011.
Aquinas has independent reasons for doing so. According to contemporary
interpreters, Z 8 prepares us for the view defended in Z 1011 that form is the
primary object of definition. Aquinas, however, does not think that form is
the primary object of definition. For him, the primary object of definition is
the composite of matter and form taken universally, i.e. the species whose
essence is spelt out in a definition. And the essence of the species does not
include form alone but also common matter, i.e. the kind of matter all the
individuals belonging to a certain species somehow share. The simplicity
of form is not, for Aquinas, sufficient for form itself to be considered the
primary object of definition and, consequently, Aristotles argument in Z 8
cannot have anything to do with the question of definition. The case of
the Synonymy Principle is more complicated. For Aquinas certainly takes
the defence of the principle to be one of the main themes of the section
93 Cf. Aquinas, Exp. Metaph., Lib. VII, lect. 6, n. 1381; lect. 7, n. 1417.
278 chapter three
on generation and corruption. However, on Aquinass reading the principle

does not serve the same purpose as in modern interpretations. For Thomas,
the principle is just another ingredient in Aristotles general claim that
separate forms cannot explain the generation of sensible substances. The
discussion of the Synonymy Principle, therefore, is subordinate to the anti-
Platonic polemic. According to contemporary interpreters, by contrast, the
principle makes a contribution towards understanding the primacy of form.
In this case too, Aquinass interpretation is not surprising. According to him,
it is the composite of matter and formand not formthat is ontologically
primary. So, the Synonymy Principle cannot contribute to establish, on
Aquinass reading, the ontological primacy of form.
The main conclusion of the section on generation is that separate forms
such as Platonic Forms are completely useless in explaining the coming
into being of sensible substances and so should be dispensed with. This
conclusion is formally reached in Met. Z 8, which is the doctrinal core of the
section. Z 7 plays a preparatory role in that it lays down a series of principles
which are necessary to reach the main conclusion. As Aquinas makes clear
at the beginning of his commentary on Z 8, these principles are basically
two: (i) that every instance of generation involves some preexisting matter;
(ii) that everything that is generated, is generated by something similar to
it.94
Principle (i)every generation proceeds from some preexisting mat-
terholds true of all three cases of generation studied by Aristotle. Aquinas
in his commentary on Z 7 says explicitly that it holds for the case of natural
and artificial generation, but the way he describes spontaneous generation
suggests that the principle holds for it as well.95 After all, there are only two
cases of spontaneous generations, i.e. natural spontaneous generation and
artificial spontaneous generation, and both cases seem to presuppose some
preexisting matter. For instance, the coming into being of some plants with-
out the concourse of seedsa case of natural spontaneous generation
clearly presupposes the existence of a material substratum, i.e. some kind
of putrefied matter which is acted upon by the suns heat. The same thing is
true of cases of artificial spontaneous generation. When, for instance, some-
one casually rubs a part of his own body, thereby restoring the balance of
humours in the body and regaining health, there is clearly a material sub-
stratum, the body itself or one of its parts, which is acted upon and altered so
as to become healthy. In other words, the difference between spontaneous

generation and the other kinds of production lies in the way form is imposed
on matter: whilst in natural and artificial production form is imposed on
matter by an external agent, in cases of spontaneous generation form seems
to emerge somehow from the matter of generation. On the contrary, spon-
taneous generation is exactly like all the other kinds of generation in so far
as the preexistence of a material substratum is concerned.
Principle (ii) is just a generalisedand weakerversion of the Syn-
onymy Principle. Exactly like Averroes, Aquinas says similar instead of
identical in species because he is looking for a formula that may encom-
pass all three cases of production studied by Aristotlenatural, artificial
and spontaneous production.96 In his commentary on Met. Z 9, Aquinas dis-
cusses in detail the different ways in which the product of generation can
be similar to the producer.97 He lists in particular three possibilities. (1) The
first is that of totally univocal generation: the form of the producer and that
of the product have the same mode of being (modus essendi) and inform
different pieces of the same kind of matter. This case clearly corresponds
to natural generation, where product and producer have the same kind of
form (e.g. the human form) but in different pieces of matter.98 (2) Another
case is that of partially univocal generation: the form of the producer and
that of the product do not have the same mode of being, even though the
two forms are similar in some way. The case Aquinas has in mind is that
of artificial generation. We may say that in artificial generation the form of
the producer and that of the product are identical as to their content (the
form in the mind of the artist is the form of the thing realised in matter, say
a statue or health, and not of something else), but not as to their ontological
status (the form in the mind is a mental entity, whereas the form in matter
is an extra-mental principle). (3) The last possibility is that of equivocal gen-
eration: what exists in the producer is not the form of the product, but only
a part of it or even something containing a part of the form of the product.99
Does case (3) correspond to spontaneous generation? The answer is diffi-
cult and would require a detailed analysis of Aquinass complex treatment
of spontaneous generation throughout his commentary on Z 79.100 For our
96 For Averroes see Ch. 2, Sect. 4.2.

100 All through his commentary on Z 79 Aquinas discusses a number of problems sur-
rounding spontaneous generation: (i) the question whether spontaneous generation should
be classified as a case of per se or per accidens generation (Cf. Aquinas, Exp. Metaph., Lib.
VII, lect. 6, nn. 14021403); (ii) the question whether all that is generated by nature can also
280 chapter three
present purposes suffice it to say that at least some cases of spontaneous

generation fall within case (3). For instance, artistic spontaneous genera-
tion is an instance of equivocal generation as it is described by Aquinas.
The accidental rubbing of a part of a body brings about heat, which is not
the form of health but only a part of it. It must be noted that, in this instance
as well, some sort of similarity obtains between producer and product: the
heat in the body that begins the recovery of health has certainly some con-
nection with the resulting health (it can be thought to be, for instance, a part
of it), although the connection in question is not similarity in form. Thus, the
Synonymy Principle seems to hold, though to different degrees, for all the
different kinds of generation.
Aquinass criticism of Platos Forms in his commentary on Z 8 mainly
focuses on natural generation.101 Z 8s argument shows that what comes into
being, i.e. the product of generation, is always a composite of matter and
form. The matter and form of the final product do not undergo a process
of generation, but only contribute to the generation of the composite sub-
stance. Now, principles (i) and (ii) establish that form and matter preexist
the product. Moreover, principle (ii)Aquinass version of the Synonymy
Principleimplies that the form that preexists the product is not a sepa-
rate form, but rather a form existing in some material substratum. In the
case of natural generation, it is the form existing in the male parent; in
the case of artificial generation it is the form existing in the mind of the
artist. The form existing in the producer is transmitted to the product by
be generated spontaneously. The latter question is first addressed in the commentary on Z 7

(Cf. Aquinas, Exp. Metaph., Lib. VII, lect. 6, nn. 13991401), where Aquinas compares Aristo-
tles position to those of Averroes and Avicenna, and then again in the commentary on Z 9,
where Aquinas explains in more detail why Aristotles position is preferable (Cf. Aquinas,
Exp. Metaph., Lib. VII, lect. 8, nn. 14371442). More particularly, Avicenna is regarded as the
supporter of the view that everything that come to be by nature can also come to be spon-
taneously, while Averroes is credited with the view that none of things that come to be by
nature can also come to be spontaneously (and so, for instance, animals that come to be
spontaneously are not the same in species as those generated by nature). A detailed analy-
sis of Aquinass treatment of spontaneous generation falls outside the scope of the present
chapter. For some discussion of Averroess position see supra, Ch. 2, Sect. 4.2. For some traces
of the debate reported by Aquinas see: Alexander of Alexandria, Lib. VII, c. 7., q. 3, ed. Venice
1572, fol. 208rbva and Paul of Venice, Exp. Met., Lib. VII, tr. 2, c. 1, pp. 215, 21222, 2.
101 Aquinas explicitly says that Platonists did not posit separate forms of artefacts (Cf.
Aquinas, Exp. Metaph., Lib. VII, lect. 7, n. 1427). In his commentary on Z 9, by contrast,
Aquinas reports and rejects a view according to which the partial violation of the Synonymy
Principle in cases of spontaneous generation is an indication that we need to postulate
separate forms at least to explain spontaneous generation (Cf. Aquinas, Exp. Metaph., Lib.
VII, lect. 7, nn. 14551457).
the producer itself, i.e. is imposed by the producer on another material sub-
stratum. Thus, in order to explain generation we do not need to postulate
separate forms such as Platos Forms. Generation can be explained by hav-
ing recourse only to forms existing in some material substratum. Since they
are useless in explaining the generation of sensible things, Platos Forms can
be completely done away with.
In addition to this general criticism of Platos doctrine, Aristotle presents,
according to Aquinas, two more specific arguments against Forms. Sepa-
rate forms cannot be the causes of the generation of sensible things either
(1) per modum generantis102 or (2) per modum exemplaris.103 Argument (1)
centres on the question of whether there exist separate forms, for instance
whether there exists a sphere over and above the spheres existing in mat-
ter.104 Aristotles response is that, even if separate forms existed, they would
be of no use to explaining generation.105 The reason is the following. If there
existed separate forms such as Platos Forms, they would not be hoc aliquid,
i.e. particular and determinate objects, but rather quale quid, i.e. common
or universal things. The Form of man, for instance, would be a universal
man and not a particular and determinate man. However, we experience
that what causes the generation of a particular man is itself a particular
man.106 Therefore, separate forms, even if they existed, could not contribute
to explaining the generation of sensible things. So, why postulate their exis-
tence in the first place? Argument (2) focuses on an apparent exception to
the Synonymy Principle even in the case of natural generation, i.e. the gener-
ation of a mule.107 Mules are sterile by nature and so are crossings generated
by a horse and an ass. This seems to represent a violation of the Synonymy
Principle, according to which in natural generation the male parent and the
offspring are one in form and species: horses and mules, as well as asses and
mules, belong in fact to different species. Aquinas replies with Aristotle that
the exception is only partial.108 The reason why in some cases a horse does
not beget a horse but rather a mule is that the matter that receives the form
of the horsei.e. the matter provided by the assis not commensurate to
the form, i.e. is not appropriate for the generation of a horse. In spite of this,
the form provided by the male parent manages to realise as high a degree
282 chapter three
as possible of likeness in the offspring. Horses and asses are similar in some
respects, and there certainly exists a proximate genus to which both horses
and asses belong. And this is presumably the proximate genus mules too fall
under. Therefore, even if the identity in form is not preserved at the level of
species, it is presumably preserved at least at the level of genus. The case of
the mule clearly showsAquinas remarksthat there is no need to posit
separate forms to explain the generation of sensible things.109 Both standard
and deviant cases can be explained by means of a form existing in the male
parent. Actually, it is the nature of the relation between the form transmit-
ted by the male parent and the matter receiving it that tells us whether the
identity between parent and offspring will be perfect (as in standard cases)
or imperfect (as in deviant cases).
In conclusion, separate forms, in addition to being incapable of account-
ing for the being and knowability of sensible things, are also completely
useless in explaining their coming into being. Therefore, they should be sim-
ply dispensed with.
4.2. Generation and Substantiality: The Primacy of Composites

Modern interpreters think that Met. Z 7 and 8 tell us something important
about Aristotles views on substance and essence. On their reading, the anal-
ysis of generation those chapters carry out is not meant to be a physical
analysis of the mechanism of substantial change, but rather a metaphysi-
cal study of substantial change. Aristotles aim is not to explain how things
come into being, but rather to bring to light the consequences of the way
things come into being for the investigation of the notion of substance. As
we have seen, most scholars think that the analysis of generation prepares
us for the thesis that form is primary substancea thesis Aristotle develops
and defends from Z 10 onwards. Some of them put emphasis on the role form
plays in the Synonymy Principle. Others give weight to the claim that form,
being ingenerable and incorruptible, must be simple. But all agree that the
analysis of the principles of generation in Met. Z 78 shows the ontological
priority of form over both matter and the composite of matter and form. For
Aquinas too, the study of generation is metaphysical in character. Aristotles
goal is not to explain generation as such, but rather to discover the princi-
ples of being through an analysis of the way things come into being. As we
have seen, the Dominican Master puts emphasis on the negative and polem-
ical side of Aristotles metaphysical analysis of generation, i.e. the refutation

of Platos theory of Forms, but he also recognises that such an analysis has
also a positive side and so gives us some indications about Aristotles own
views on substance and essence. However, the way in which Aquinas views
the positive side of Z 78s discussion is radically different from the tendency
prevailing among modern commentators. For him, the study of generation
gives further confirmation to his own general interpretation of Aristotles
theory of substance in Book Z and so to the view that the composites of mat-
ter and form are ontologically primary. In this section, I shall briefly analyse
two arguments in Z 7 and 8, whichAquinas thinkssupport the ontolog-
ical primacy of composite substances. Finally, I shall discuss a quick remark
by Aquinas about the connection between the analysis of generation and
Z 6s identity thesis.
(i) First of allAquinas believesthe ontological priority of the compos-

ite clearly results from Z 8s main line of argument. The chapter establishes
that every process of generation consists in a certain piece of matter tak-
ing on a certain form. Therefore, what comes into being as a result of a
process of generation must be a composite of matter and form. Form and
matter are the principles of generation, but are not themselves subject to a
process of generation. For if they were themselves generated together with
the composite substance, they should be analysable into a material and a
formal component, in accordance with the principle that every product of
generation must be a composite. But we have seen that assuming matter
and form to be analysable into further material and formal components
leads to an infinite regress of both material and formal components. There-
fore, matter and form are the main ingredients in a process of generation,
but are not themselves generated. How is all this supposed to give further
confirmation of the ontological primacy of the composite? Aquinass rea-
soning is straightforward.110 Generation is the process through which things
come into existence. As a result of a process of generation something exists
that did not exist beforehand. Thus, what properly exists are not the princi-
ples making generation possible, but rather the result or the product of the
process of generation. Now, Aristotle says that the product of a process of
generation is a composite of matter and form. Therefore, it is the composite
of matter and formand not the form and matter which make genera-
tion possiblethat properly exists. To say this is not tantamount to saying
that form does not exist. The point is rather that form is not what exists

284 chapter three
primarily: for form is that through which something exists, in so far as some-
thing comes into existence because a certain form is received in a certain
piece of matter. Thus, form does exist, but only in a derivative sense of exist-
ing as compared to the sense in which the composite exists. But clearly
substantiality chiefly belongs to what properly exists and not what makes
existence possible. For being a substance is the core sense of being, i.e.
of existence, and so substances must be things that properly exist and
not things that only make existence possible. In conclusion, therefore, it
is the composite of matter and form that should be called substance in
the proper sense. Form is only one of the principles of substance, but is
not substance in the strict sense of the term. Aquinass reasoning perfectly
squares with his general understanding of substantiality. As I have pointed
out in Section 2, Aquinas endorses an independent existence criterion of
substantiality and consequently plays down the importance of the explana-
tory criterion. Substance is what enjoys an autonomous and independent
existence. The items explaining the substantiality of independently exist-
ing things are only principles of substances and not themselves substances
in the strict sense of the term.
(ii) This understanding of the notion of substance is confirmed by Aquinass

analysis, at the very beginning of Z 7, of the terms involved in all kinds of
generation. All kinds of generation involve three terms: the ex quo, the ab
quo and the aliquid of generation.111 The ex quo of generation is the matter
out of which things come into being. The ab quo is the agent that brings
about the process of generation. In the case of the generation of a human
being, for instance, the agent is the male parent that passes the human
form onto a material substratum and so transmits it to the offspring; in
the case of artificial production, the agent is the artist. What is the aliquid
of generation? Following a certain tendency prevailing among modern
interpreters I have explored in Ch. 1 the suggestion that the aliquid of
generation might be the form a certain piece of matter comes to acquire
during the process of generation. The intuition behind this suggestion is
that generation is predication in making. In other words, as a result of the
process of generation, a certain form comes to be (accidentally) predicated
of a certain piece of matter, just as an accident comes to be predicated of
a certain substance as a result of an accidental change. This view should
not be taken to imply that it is matter that is generated. For the product of

generation is always a composite of matter and form. The point is rather

that the coming into being of the composite simply consists in its matter
becoming something, i.e. in its matter becoming shaped in a certain way as
a result of a certain form coming to be predicated of it.112
This is clearly not Aquinass view, at least in so far as the most important
case, natural generation, is concerned. For him the aliquid of natural gener-
ation is a composite of matter and form, or to say better, one of the species
a composite of matter and form belongs to.113 In other words, according to
Aquinas the meaning of the sentence What comes to be comes to be some-
thing (aliquid) is that the product of a process of generation falls under a
natural species, i.e. is a man, a horse or something else. Natural species clas-
sify composites of matter and form and so, as we shall see shortly, they are
for Aquinas composites of some sort, i.e. universal composites of matter and
form. Form is not the aliquid of generation, but rather the secundum quod of
generation, i.e. the principle in virtue of which generation takes place.114 It
is evident that in his analysis of the different terms involved in generation,
Aquinas wants to keep straight the different ontological roles. In particu-
lar, he does not want to mix up the role played by the composite with that
played by form. The composite is the substance that comes into being as a
result of generation, while form is the principle in virtue of which substances
are generated and hence is not a substance on a par with the product of gen-
eration.115
(iii) In his commentary on Met. Z 8, Aquinas makes an interesting remark

about the consequences of Aristotles argument for the notion of essence.
Aquinas observes that the conclusion of Z 8s argument does not only apply
to the form of sensible substances, but also to their essence. It is not the
essence of sensible substances that comes into being as a result of the pro-
cess of generation, but rather sensible substances themselves, which are
composites of matter and form.116 As I have already pointed out, according
to Aquinas the form of a sensible substance is distinct from its essence, in
112 This view becomes less awkward if one maintainsas FredePatzig do (cf. Frede
Paztig (1988), I, 51)that form, in addition to being accidentally predicated of the matter
it is joined to, is also essentially predicated of the composite substance. For in this case, form
is both what matter accidentally comes to be and what the composite substance essentially
comes to be, and hence is the aliquid of generation in both senses.
286 chapter three
that the latter contains in addition to form common matter, i.e. the kind of
matter all the particulars belonging to a certain natural species possess. So,
to say that essence is not generated does not amount, for Aquinas, to restat-
ing the point that form is generated. Aquinas observes that Z 8s conclusion
seems to clash with Aristotles doctrine in Z 6, where sensible substances
were taken to be identical with their own essence.117 However, from the anal-
ysis of generation it emerges that this cannot actually be the case, in that a
sensible substance and its essence differ in at least one fundamental prop-
erty: sensible substances, in fact, are generated whilst their essences are not.
And things that do not share all their (genuine) properties cannot be iden-
tical. Aquinas solves the problem by implicitly admitting that Z 8s doctrine
is the right one.118 Essence, though including common matter, does not con-
tain the individual material properties that the different individuals possess.
Thus it cannot be identical with the individual material substance and can-
not be the product of a process of generation. In conclusion, therefore, the
analysis of generation makes a contribution towards Aristotles final solu-
tion to the problem of the identity between a thing and its essence. As said
above, such a solution is defended in the final summary of Met. Z 11.
5. Definition119
5.1. The Object of Definition (Met. Z 1011)

1. Aquinass commentary on Met. Z 1011 is generally not unknown to schol-
ars interested in medieval philosophy. For, in the text, the Dominican Mas-
ter attributes to Aristotle the view that the essence and definition of sensible
substances contains both their matter and their form. Just as particular sen-
sible substances are composites of matter and form, so their essence too is
composed of matter and form. This view is actually the one Aquinas himself
endorses and defends throughout his career.120
Before going into the details of Aquinass interpretation of Met. Z 10 and
11, it is important to make clear how he understands in general the problem
dealt with in the two chapters and construes Aristotles solution to it. Z 10
11 are concerned with the problem of the object of definition. In Ch. 1, I

119 For the topic of this section see Amerini (2003) and (2005); Galluzzo (2007a), 451461.
120 See for instance: Aquinas, De ent. et ess., c. 2, Opera Omnia, XLIII, pp. 370371, lin. 1104;
S. Th., Ia, q. 75, a. 4, p. 346; C. Gent., II, c. 57, ed. Pera, vol. II, nn. 13291330.
have shown that the general problem of the object of definition branches
off into two different but related issues. On the one hand, there is the
question of deciding which object is definable in the strict sense of the term
(Q1). This question is solved by establishing some criteria of definability
and deciding which objectmatter, form or the compositesatisfies them
best. Most contemporary scholars think that only form satisfies Aristotles
criteria and so should be regarded as the proper object of definition. On the
other hand, Aristotle raises the further question of how we are supposed
to define sensible substances in particular, i.e. the composites of matter
and form (Q2). This second question consists in deciding whether or not
material parts enter into the definition of sensible substances.
Now, Aquinas does not think that Z 1011 touch in any way upon Q1, i.e.
the problem of establishing which of the possible objects of definition is
definable in the strict sense of the term. In the light of what I have said in
Section 2 about Aquinass understanding of Aristotles notion of substance,
this fact should not come as a surprise. According to Aquinas, when Aristo-
tle talks about substance in the strict of the term he always means to refer to
particular sensible substances, which in Met. Z are analysed as composites
of matter and form. Thus, since composites of matter and form are primary
substances, they must also be the primary objects of definition. Form, by
contrast, is substance only in a derivative sense of the term, and so must also
be a secondary object of definition. For Aquinas, Q1 is, so to speak, settled
in advance and hence Z 1011 are not concerned with establishing the pri-
macy of the composite substance as an object of definition. On the contrary,
the question the two chapters are concerned with is Q2, i.e. the problem of
understanding how the composite substance should be defined and, more
particularly, whether or not material parts enter into its definition. The def-
inition of form is only a secondary instance of definition and so cannot be
Aristotles main concern in Z 1011.
Aquinas prefaces his literal exposition of Met. Z 10 with a very important
note, where he outlines the general terms of question Q2 and reviews the
possible responses to it.121 He remarks that there are basically two positions
concerning the essence and definition of sensible substances. According
to one view, the essence of sensible substances is confined to their form
alone and, consequently, the definition of such substances should make
reference only to their form or formal parts.122 For instance, the essence of
human beings is their soul and so the definition of human beings should
288 chapter three
only mention their soul. Aquinas also frames the first view in more techni-
cal terms by having recourse to the distinction between forma partis and
forma totius. The view in questionhe sayspresupposes the real iden-
tity between forma partis and forma totius, which can be distinguished only
conceptually. Aquinass technical point can be explained in the following
way.123 Take a particular sensible substance. There are two facts about that
substance which need explaining. First, the fact that the matter of the sub-
stance, which is in itself a potential object, is now an actual object, an object
which enjoys autonomous and independent existence. Second, the fact that
the particular sensible substance at issue belongs to a natural kind. One pos-
sible explanation is that two different principles account for such two differ-
ent facts. It might be thought, in other words, that form (which is called in
Aquinass jargon forma partis) accounts for matters being an actual being,
while another principle, i.e. essence (which is called forma totius) accounts
for the individual substances belonging to the natural kind it belongs to.
Implicit in this view is the claim that the essence (i.e. the forma totius) does
not only contain form but also includes some matter. Now, the supporters of
the first view listed by Aquinas reject precisely this way of looking at things.
According to them, it is one single principle that accounts for both mat-
ter being an actual being and the composite falling under a natural kind.
Thus, forma partis and forma totius are in reality one and the same thing
and the only distinction that can possibly be introduced between the one
and the other is a distinction of reason, i.e. a conceptual distinction result-
ing from our way of thinking about things and not from how things are. For
instance, we may wish to distinguish the function of turning matter into
an actual being and that of placing the composite under a natural kind, but
these functions are performed in reality by one single principle. From an his-
torical point of view Aquinas attributes the position in question to Averroes
and some of his followers.124 As we have seen in Ch. 2, Aquinass attribution
is basically correct.
According to another view, which Aquinas himself endorses, the essence
of sensible substances does not consist of their form alone, but also includes
some matter.125 Even though Aquinas does not explicitly say so much in his
note, the view is clearly not that any kind of matter enters into the definition
of sensible substances. Usually, Aquinas draws a distinction between com-
mon matter and individual matter. This distinction is made explicit later

on in the commentary on Z 10.126 Common matter is the type of matter that

all the individuals belonging to a certain species possess. For instance, the
common matter of human beings is flesh and bones. Individual matter, by
contrast, is the matter belonging to this or that individual, i.e. matter with
determinate individual characteristics. The individual matter of a human
being is the flesh and bones of one particular human being as opposed to
another, that is for instance flesh and bones with particular dimensions
and particular qualitative features. According to Aquinass doctrine, it is
clearly common matter that is part of the essence of sensible substance,
and so the definition of a sensible substance should mention the matter
characteristic of the species of substance in question in addition to its form.
Predictably, unlike the first view, the second presupposes a real distinction
between forma partis and forma totius.127 In other words, the function of
turning matter into an actual being and that of placing the composite under
a natural kind are performed by two different principles. Form (the forma
partis) makes of matter an actual being, while essence (the forma totius),
which contains common matter besides form, is responsible for the com-
posites belonging to a natural kind. Aquinas attributes the second opinion
to Avicenna.128
Besides being Aquinass own view, the second opinion is also, according
to him, the right interpretation of Aristotles text. Thomas also provides a
text-based argument for his interpretation.129 In accordance with his gen-
eral exegetical model, he explains Met. Z in the light of other Aristotelian
texts, in this particular instance in the light of Aristotles doctrine in Met.
E 1. Aquinass argument can be reconstructed as follows. (i) Sensible sub-
stances must contain sensible matter in their definition, otherwise they
would not be different from mathematical objects, which contain no such
matter; (ii) it cannot be said that the matter figuring in the definition of
sensible substances is not part of their essence. For only the definition of
accidentsand not that of substancescontains something external to
the essence of the object defined. (iii) Therefore, matter must be part of both
the essence and definition of sensible substances. Step (ii) in the argument
is comparatively uncontroversial. Aquinas recalls Z 5s doctrine to the effect
that only the definition of accidents is by addition, i.e. contains something
126 Cf. Aquinas, Exp. Metaph., Lib. VII, lect. 10, n. 1492 (commentary on 1035b33ff.), but see
also n. 1490.
290 chapter three
external to the essence of the object defined. Thus, if matter is part of the
definition of sensible substances, it must also be part of their essence. The
difficult step in Aquinass argument is step (i), where it is shown that mat-
ter belongs to the definition of sensible substances. Aquinas clearly appeals
to a certain number of textsand in particular to Met. E 1where Aris-
totle sharply distinguishes between the essence and definition of physical
objects and those of mathematical or geometrical ones.130 The main point
of these texts, at least on Aquinass reading, is that the objects of different
sciences must have different objective characteristics, which marks them
off the ones from the others. What distinguishes physical objects, i.e. the
objects of physics, from mathematical or geometrical objects is that the for-
mer are intrinsically or essentially material. In other words, sensible matter
is part of the essence and so of the definition of physical objects, but is not
part of the essence and definition of mathematical objects. This conclusion
can be reached by reflecting upon the relation between form and matter in
the different objects in question. Mathematical objects can be realised in
different kinds of material. A geometrical circle for instance can be indiffer-
ently realised in iron, bronze as well in many other kinds of matter. A certain
kind of physical objects, by contrast, can only be realised, of necessity, in
one type of material. Human beings can only existof necessityin flesh
and bones. It seemsso the reasoning goesthat this difference between
physical and mathematical objects with regards to matter must pertain to
their essence and so must be reflected in the definition that spells out the
content of the essence. Therefore, sensible matter belongs to the essence
and definition of physical objects. Sensible substances are physical objects
and so their essence and definition must contain matter.
2. We are now in a better position to look at the details of Aquinass interpre-

tation of Met. Z 1011. What is particularly important from our point of view
is to see what textual evidence Aquinas provides for his general interpreta-
tion of the text and how he explains away the passages that seem to back up
the rivalling reading, i.e. the view that the essence and definition of sensible
substances contains form alone. Let me start with the way Aquinas inter-
prets the main line of argument in Met. Z 10, which is often taken to support
a formalistic answer to the problem of the definition of sensible substances.
We have seen that Aristotle presents, at the beginning of Z 10, two
general problems: (i) Which parts of a thing enter into its definition? (ii) Are
130 Cf. Aristotle, Met., E 1, 1025b281026a6 and Z 10, 1035a22b1; 11, 1036b2132; H 2, 1043a14
28; 3, 1043b2332. See also: Phys., B 2, 193b22194a12; De An., A 1, 403a29b19.

parts prior or posterior to the whole of which they are the parts? Roughly
speaking, the first part of Z 10 (1035a1b3) deals with the first problem, while
the second part (1035b31036a13) takes up the second. Now, on Aquinass
interpretation, the main problem discussed in Z 10 is problem (i), i.e. the
issue of which parts of a sensible substance enter into its definition.131 The
discussion of priority and posteriority in the second half of the chapter
is subordinate to the solution of problem (i), in that it is only meant to
further clarify some distinctions which had not been made sufficiently clear
in the first half. Such distinctions include that between form and species,
that between universal and particular as well as the distinction between
individual and common matterall the notions, in short, that are essential
to Aquinass understanding of Chapters 10 and 11.132
Aristotles discussion of problem (i) centres on the analysis of two con-
crete cases, the syllable and the circle. The letters figure in the definition
of the syllable, whilst the semicircles do not figure in the definition of the
circle (1034b2428). It seems, therefore, that we need an explanation as to
why parts bear different relations to the definition of the whole in the one
case and in the other. Aristotles solution seems to be that the letters enter
into the definition of the syllable because they are formal parts of it, while
the semicircles do not enter into the definition of the circle because they
are only material parts. This answer invites the general conclusion that only
the formal parts of a thing figure in its definition. Predictably, this is not the
way Aquinas interprets Aristotles treatment of the two conflicting cases.133
According to him, letters enter into the definition of the syllable not because
they are formal parts of it, but because they are parts of the species, i.e. of
the essence corresponding to a certain species.134 Semicircles, by contrast,
do not enter into the definition of the circle not because they are simply
material parts, but because they are individual material parts, i.e. parts of
an individual circle and not of the essence of the circle. In other words, the
contrast Aquinas has in mind is the following. On the one hand, there is
the essence of a species. Such an essence does not only contain form but
also common matter, the matter characteristic of a certain species of object.
The species/essence is therefore a sort of universal composite of matter and
131Cf. Aquinas, Exp. Metaph., Lib. VII, lect. 9, n. 1460 together with n. 1467.
132Cf. Aquinas, Exp. Metaph., Lib. VII, lect. 9, n. 1467; lect. 11, n. 1482.
134 Of course, if the letters are formal parts of a syllable they figure a fortiori in its definition.
But the point is that not only formal parts enter into the definition, because also common
material parts do so.
292 chapter three
form, i.e. a composite of form and common matter. On the other hand, there
are the particular composites of matter and form, that is the individual sen-
sible substances, which contain in addition to the essence individual matter,
i.e. the individual material features of this or that individual of a certain
species. Unlike common matter, individual matter falls outside the essence
and hence does not figure in the definition. So, Aquinas does nothing but
apply to Aristotles text his general understanding of the notion of essence.
One may reasonably wonder how Aquinas manages to interpret Aristo-
tles text in the way he does. The answer lies in a certain ambiguity of the
Latin term species, which perfectly reflects a corresponding ambiguity in the
Greek . The term species in fact can stand for both form and species. Of
course, if one takes the view that the essence of a certain species contains
only form, all ambiguity disappears. In this case, species and form are simply
equivalent, since the essence of the species and so the species only contains
form. But if one maintains, on the contrary, that the essence of a certain
species contains common matter in addition to form, then form and species
are no longer equivalent, because the species is not only form but form plus
common matter. It is not difficult to see how Aquinas is able to exploit the
ambiguity of the term species in order to strengthen his general interpre-
tation of the text. Each time Aristotle contrasts (in the Latin translation)
species with materia, Aquinas understands the opposition as one between
species, which includes common matter besides form, and individual mat-
ter. And each time Aristotle opposes (in the Latin translation) species and
compositum, he takes the text to oppose species and individual composite,
which contains something external to the essence of the species, i.e. individ-
ual matter. Aquinass general approach is also evident in his reading of the
first lines of Met. Z 11. At the beginning of the chapter (1036a2631), Aris-
totle remarks that it is necessary to distinguish between the parts of the
and the parts of the composite. If this distinction is not clear, definition
will turn out to be altogether impossible: for only the is definable, and
so defining the presupposes distinguishing between its parts and the
parts of the composite. In all likelihood, Aristotle means by form and
by the parts of the composite the material parts of a sensible substance.
Once again, however, this is not Aquinass interpretation. The Dominican
Master understands species in the sense of species and takes the parts of
the composite to be the individual material parts of the composite and not
any material parts whatsoever.135 Thus, he reads once again into the text the
opposition between species (or the essence of the species), which includes
common matter, and individual matter. It is important to observe, however,
that Aquinas is perfectly aware of the ambiguity of the term species, as he
himself points out in his commentary on Z 10.136 Therefore, he considers the
meanings of species and deliberately chooses to take the term in the sense
of species.
As we have seen in Ch. 1, Aquinass interpretation is not completely at
odds with Aristotles text. For there are passages in Z 1011 that invite us
to think that some matter enters after all into the definition of the com-
posite substance (although they do not seem to represent the main line of
argument in Z 1011). For instance, in Z 10 (1035a2234), Aristotle seems to
distinguish between two kinds of definition, one in which material parts
are mentioned and another in which such parts are not mentioned. It is
easy for Aquinas to take the two kinds of definition to refer, respectively,
to the definition of the composite, where material parts are mentioned, and
to the definition of form, where such parts are absent.137 Aquinas also qual-
ifies Aristotles doctrine in so far as the definition of form is concerned.138
What Aristotle says in the passage is true of a mathematical or geometrical
form, whilst it is not true of the definition of the form of physical objects,
such as for instance the soul. We have already pointed out that, according
to Aquinass doctrine, matter cannot be completely eliminated from the def-
inition of the forms of physical objects, even though, presumably, the way
in which matter figures in the definition of such forms is not the same as
that in which matter enters into the definition of the composite of matter
and form. For matter is part of the essence of the composite of matter and
form, while it is not part of the essence of form.139 Leaving these complica-
tions aside, what is important for our purposes is that this passage in Z 10 is
generally in keeping with Aquinass opinion that matter is part of the defi-
nition of composite substances. Another such passage is Z 11s section about
139 The expression the essence of form should be taken in the sense of the intrinsic nature
of form. As we have seen below, forms are not the kind of things that can be said to have an
essence in the strict sense of the term. For objectsand not their ontological constituents
are the kind of things that can be said to have an essence in the strict sense of the term.
However, we can always specify in a formula what the nature of form is. Equivalently, one
may say that form has a secondary essence, in analogy with the sense in which other kinds
of entities, such as accidents for instance, can be said to have an essence only in a secondary
sense.
294 chapter three
Socrates the Younger (1036b2132). Aristotle says in the text that the com-
parison that Socrates the Younger used to draw between an animal and a
circle is incorrect, for it misleads people into thinking that an animal could
exist without its material parts in the way in which a circle can exist without
a particular kind of matter, say bronze. An animal, on the contrary, is a per-
ceptible thing and so cannot be defined independently of change and of its
material parts. Clearly, the text is most naturally read as a piece of evidence
in favour of Aquinass position.140 As a matter of fact, as I have remarked in
Ch. 1, the section on Socrates the Younger undoubtedly makes trouble for
scholars maintaining that matter is completely absent from the definition
of the composite.141
The texts supporting Aquinass reading, however, are not in the majority.
I have already pointed out that both the main line of thought in Z 10 and the
thrust of the argument in Z 11 seem to resist his interpretation, and rather
invite one to identify essence with form. One particularly difficult passage in
this respect is Z 11s final summary (1037a2129), where Aristotle sums up the
achievements of his enquiry into essence and definition. In the summary,
Aristotle remarks that the composite substance in one way does not have
a definition, whereas in another it does. When taken together with matter,
the composite has no definition, whilst it has a definition when taken in
accordance with its primary substance, i.e. its form. Man, for instance, has
as its definition the definition of his soul. The text seems to be very explicit
on the point that matter does not figure in the definition of the composite.
The definition of the composite, by contrast, mentions only its form. There
is even more to it than that: the composite has a definition only in so far its
form has one. In order to defend his general interpretation, Aquinas needs
to take the text as if it said that the composite has a definition when it is
taken universally, i.e. as a species, whereas it has no definition when it is
141 Two further texts may be added to the list. In a couple of passages in Z 10 and
11 (Z 10, 1035b2731; Z 11, 1037a510) Aristotle seems to say that species and genera are
structurally identical with the particulars falling under them: particular substances are
particular composites of matter and form; species and genera are universal composites of
matter and form, i.e. composites of the type of form and of matter a particular kind of sensible
substance is made of. Thus, these passages may be taken to support the view that something
like Aquinass common matter is part both of the species and of the genus (Cf. Aquinas,
Exp. Metaph., Lib. VII, lect. 10, n. 1490; lect. 11, n. 1523). Some caution, however, is in order
here. For in the Z 10 passage Aristotle also says that the species (and a fortiori the genus) is
not substance. Therefore, it can hardly be identified with the essence of sensible substances,
for the essence is substance according to Aristotles standard doctrine in Z. Thus, all things
considered, the texts could also be exploited to refute Aquinass interpretation.
taken as a particular composite.142 What makes such a reading particularly

difficulty is Aristotles observation that the composite has a definition only
in accordance with its form. For this seems simply to mean that the compos-
ite has the definition of its form and, consequently, no definition of its own.
Aquinas, however, plays down the meaning of Aristotles assertion. On his
reading, to define the species amounts to defining the composite in accor-
dance with its form.143 He explains that form is not on a par with matter
when it comes to explaining why a composite possesses the essence it pos-
sesses and so belongs to the species it belongs to. Form is the principle that is
mainly responsible for the composite having the essence it has, while mat-
ter is the principle that is mainly responsible for the individuation of the
composite substance.144 ThusAquinas arguesit is perfectly natural for
Aristotle to call the definition of the species a definition of the composite
according to its form.
5.2. The Unity of Definition (Met. Z 12)

Aquinass commentary on Met. Z 12 does not present any peculiarities from
an exegetical point of view. As a matter of fact, the Dominican Master
confines himself to following very closely Aristotles text and explaining the
different steps of the argument in the chapter. The commentary, by contrast,
is very interesting from a doctrinal point of view. For one thing, it contains
a quite detailed account of Aquinass view on the nature of genus. For
another, in the final part of his commentary, Aquinas connects Aristotles
solution to the problem of the unity of definition with his doctrine of the
unicity of substantial form. In other words, Aristotles solution is taken to
be a further confirmation of the view that in sensible substances there is
only one substantial form.
On Aquinass interpretation, the structure of the chapter is quite simple.
(1) First, Aristotle raises the problem of the unity of definition (1037b814).
(2) Then, he presents two arguments against the unity of definition: (2i) it
seems to be impossible for a genus and a differentia to form a real unity
(1037b1421); (2ii) it seems also impossible for the various differentiae con-
tained in a definition to form a unity with one another (1037b2124). (3)
Aristotle gives the reason why the items contained in a definition must be
a unity (1037b2427). The definition is a unity because it is the definition
296 chapter three
of substance, which is a unity. (4) Finally, he solves the difficulties raised

in arguments (2i) and (2ii). (4i) The genus and the differentia form a unity
because the genus does not exist apart from the differentiae that determine
it, and so the definition turns out to consist of only one item, i.e. the differen-
tia (1037b271038a9). In other words, the genus is only a determinable item
and so can be somehow eliminated from the definition. (4ii) As to the unity
of the differentiae, it can be obtained simply by a correct process of division
(1038a935). If each differentia is divided correctly, the last differentia will
entail all the others. Thus, in the end, the definition will consist of only one
item, namely the last differentia, since, as we have seen, the genus does not
exist apart from the differentiae and hence can be dispensed with.
Aquinass doctrinal notes are introduced in sections (4i) and (4ii), when
Thomas explains Aristotles solution to the difficulties that seem to make
it impossible for a definition to be a unity. (1) The first concerns the nature
of the genus. We have seen in Ch. 1 that, when solving the problem of the
relation between genus and differentia, Aristotle presents two alternatives:
either the genus does not exists at all apart from its specifications or it exists
only as matter (1038a59). Either way, the text seems to imply, the genus can
be dispensed with and so the definition will consist of the differentia alone.
On this interpretation, Aristotles second alternativegenus as matter
introduces a mere analogy between genus and matter. The genus bears to
the differentia the same relation as matter bears to form: it is a merely
potential being, a determinable entity, which receives determinateness and
actual being only when differentiated by a differentia. In this sense, it can
be eliminated from the definition, because it never exists as an autonomous
entity, but always together with a certain specification and determination.
There is no animal that is not also a particular kind of animal. And thus
the genus animal exists only when determined and specified. Therefore,
whether the genus absolutely does not exist or it exists only as matter, it
can be done away with in definitions.
Now, Aquinas shares with Aristotle the view that the relation between
genus and matteras well as that between differentia and formis merely
analogical, as is shown by his comments on the passages where Aristo-
tle talks about the nature of the genus. This position is also defended by
Aquinas in his philosophical works such as, for instance, the De ente et essen-
tia.145 Surprisingly, however, the Dominican Master does not interpret Aris-
totles solution in Z 12 and the two alternatives it contains in the way I have
145 Cf. Aquinas, De ent. et ess., c. 2, pp. 371373, lin. 105242.

suggested. For him, Aristotle is basically presenting a case of homonymy,

i.e. a case in which one single term can stand for both genus and matter.146
The cases Aquinas has in mind are those of terms such as sound, which
can signify the genus of the letters as well as their constitutive matter, or
body, which can stand for the genus body or for a constitutive part of a sub-
stance.147 Thus, on Aquinass interpretation, the meaning of Aristotles text
is the following: either a term signifies something that cannot exist apart
from its specificationand so it signifies a genusor otherwise it simply
signifies the matter of something. In other words, on Aquinass reading, only
the first of the two alternatives presented by Aristotle concerns the nature
of genus. Why does Aquinas read the passage in that way? In other words:
Why does he not see in the passage an allusion to the genus-as-matter anal-
ogy, despite his general endorsement of the analogy? Clearlyas he himself
explains in his commentary148Aquinas wants to emphasise, even more
than Aristotle does, the difference between genus and matter (and between
differentia and form) and hence to reaffirm the purely analogical charac-
ter of their relation. The difference between genus and matter is proved by
means of an argument drawn from Avicenna, which Aquinas reproposes
often when he takes up the question of the relation between genus and
matter.149 Genus and differentia cannot be literally matter and form. For
genus and differentia are predicated of the substance they contribute to
define. Matter and form, by contrast, are constitutive parts of a substance
and no constitutive part can be predicated of the substance of which it is a
part. Thus, genus and differentia are not matter and form, respectively, and
genus-terms and differentia-terms do not signify matter and form. Besides
ruling out the identity between genus and matter and that between differen-
tia and form, the argument also tells us what genus and differentia actually
are. Since, as we have seen, the species is according to Aquinas a universal
composite of matter and form, i.e. a composite of the type of form and mat-
ter characteristic of a certain natural kind, also genus and differentia must
be composites. Since genus and differentia are predicated of the species,
they must be homogeneous with it with respect to their being simple or
composite. But the species is a composite, and so genus and differentia must
be composites as well.
149 See for instance: Aquinas, De ent. et ess., c. 2, pp. 371, lin. 100ff.; Exp. Metaph., Lib. X, lect.
10, nn. 21142115. For Avicenna see : Phil. Pr., tr. V, c. 3, ed. Van Riet, p. 247, 15ff.
298 chapter three
Even if genus and differentia are not identical with matter and form,
respectively, they are obtained by analogy with matter and form.150 The basis
for the analogy is twofold. On the one hand, in a composite of matter and
form, matter is the indeterminate item while form is the item providing
determinateness. Analogously, in a definition the genus is the indetermi-
nate item while the differentia is the determining one. A genus is indeter-
minate with respect to the various differentiae it can be determined by,
just as matter is indeterminate with respect to the different forms it can
receive. On the other hand, once matter receives a form we no longer have
two things but one new thing, i.e. a composite of matter and form.151 The
unity of the new thing is guaranteed by the fact that matter is of such a
nature as to become something determinate and actual only on receiving
a form. Analogously, when a genus is determined by a differentia, we no
longer have two items, but only one, i.e. the species. In this case too, the
unity of the species is guaranteed by the fact that the genus is of such a
nature as to become something determinate only when differentiated by
a differentia. Before being differentiated, a genus is only a determinable
entity.
(2) Aquinas makes a second doctrinal point in section (4ii), which con-
cerns the unicity of substantial form. According to Aquinass ontology, every
sensible substance is constituted of prime matter plus one and only one sub-
stantial form. For instance, a human being is constituted of prime matter
plus the substantial form characteristic of human beings, i.e. the rational
soul. On this view, the unique substantial form of a certain being (be it a
man, a horse or a plant) contains in itself all the functions and properties
belonging to lower-level substantial beings. Thus, for instance, the unique
form of human beings, the rational soul, contains in itself all the functions
and properties belonging to the forms of lower beings such as, for instance,
being a body (which belongs to the form of a stone), being capable of nour-
ishing itself (which belongs to the form of plants) and being capable of
perceiving (which belongs to the form of all the different kinds of animal).
According to the rival theory, by contrast, the theory of the plurality of sub-
stantial forms, a sensible substance possesses (roughly) as many substantial
forms as the levels of functions it contains. For instance, a human being has
150 For a more detailed explanation of the metaphysical basis of the genus-matter and
the differentia-form analogies see: Galluzzo (2002) and (2007b). For some difficulties in
Aquinass position see: Galluzzo (2010a).
151 Of course, matter and form are still two mind-independently distinct constituents of a
sensible object. Nonetheless, they are one object and not two.
one substantial form corresponding to his being a body, another for his veg-
etative functions and so on and so forth up to the rational soul.
Now, in his commentary on Z 12, Aquinas maintains that Aristotles solu-
tion to the problem of the unity of definitionand in particular his treat-
ment of differentiaegives support to the unicity of substantial form.152 It
is crucial to understand why he thinks so. A definition is usually composed
of a genus plus a series of differentiae. In the second part of Z 12 (1038a9 ff.),
Aristotle explains how the many differentiae form a unity with one another.
He says that, if the process of division is carried out correctly, every suc-
cessive differentia will entail the previous ones and so the last differentia
will entail all the others. By dividing correctly Aristotle means that each
new differentia should be a proper determination of the previous one, i.e.
a proper determination of the previous differentia as such. For instance,
the pair two-footed and many footed are proper differentiae of the dif-
ferentia footed, for they represent two ways in which something can be
footed. Winged and unwinged will not do, by contrast, because they are
not ways of being footed. Thus, if the procedure is carried out correctly, the
last differentia will entail all the previous ones and the definition will end
up containing only one differentia, the last. Aquinas is able to bring Aristo-
tles solution into line with the theory of the unicity of substantial form by
reflecting upon the notion of entailment. We know that, according to the
Dominican Master, the differentia does not signify form alone, but a com-
posite of matter and form. However, form is at least part of the signification
of the differentia and so presumably the many differentiae contained in a
definition introduce different levels of formality. But Aristotle says that the
last differentia entails all the others. This meansAquinas observesthat,
from an ontological point of view, all the different levels of form are virtually
contained in the last one. Thus, just as the definition is composed of only one
differentia entailing all the others, so a sensible substance possesses only
one substantial form containing in itself the functions and characteristics
of all the lower-level substantial forms.
300 chapter three
6. Universals
6.1. More on the Anti-Platonic Line

In Met. Z 13 Aristotle picks up a new theme from Z 3s list of candidates for
the title of substance, i.e. the universal. As a matter of fact, the discussion of
universals goes up to the end of Chapter 16. At 1038b68, Aristotle justifies
the treatment of the new subject by remarking that the universal is thought
by some philosophers to be a cause and a principle to the highest degree.
Aquinas does not hesitate to identify the philosophers in question with
Plato and his followers.153 Actually, as we have already seen in Section 1.2,
the section on universals represents for Aquinas the most detailed and
prolonged attack on Platos theory of Forms. Each chapter in the section
takes up a different aspect of Platos theory of Forms and criticises it by
showing the inconsistencies and philosophical costs of Platos position.
The anti-Platonic character of the section on universals is already antic-
ipated by Aquinas in his commentary on Met. Book Beta. As is known, the
book contains a series (14 according to Rosss standard enumeration) of
aporiae concerning the nature and object of metaphysics as well as some
more specific metaphysical issues such as the nature of the principles. On
Aquinass interpretation, Book Beta is a sort of programme for the rest of the
Metaphysics: Aristotle lays out in Beta the different issues he sets himself to
discuss in the rest of the work.154 In conformity with his general interpre-
tation, Aquinas explicitly indicates in his commentary on Beta the places
in the Metaphysics where the different aporiae are solved and sketches out
Aristotles solution. Some of Betas aporiae are of direct relevance to Zs sec-
tion on universals. We may mention for instance: aporia 6 (raised in B 1,
995b2729 and discussed in B 3, 998a20998b14), i.e. whether it is genera,
i.e. universals, or elements, i.e. the material constituents of a thing, that are
most of the nature of principles;155 aporia 7 (raised in B 1, 995b2931 and
discussed in B 3, 998b14999a23), i.e. whether, on the assumption that uni-
versals are in fact principles, it is infimae species or highest genera that are
154 For a general reconstruction of Aquinass commentary on Met. B see Galluzzo (2005).
For a general reconstruction of Betas aporiae see Ross (1924), I, 221250 (Ross discusses
in detail also the problem of the difference between the order in which the aporiae are
presented and that in which they are discussed); see also Madigan (1999).
155 Cf. Aquinas, Exp. Metaph., Lib. II, lect. 8, nn. 423430 (and 442 for the indication of the
place where the aporia is solved).

most of the nature of principles, and whether they are separate beings;156
aporia 8 (raised in B 1, 995b3136 and discussed in B 3, 999a32999b20),
whether there is something formal existing apart from the composite of
matter and form;157 aporia 11 (raised in B 1, 996a49 and discussed in 1001a4
b25), whether being and one are substances or attributes;158 aporia 12 (raised
in B 1, 996a910 and discussed in B 6, 1003a517), whether principles are uni-
versal or particular.159 It is not difficult to see that Aquinass intuition is at
least in part correct and that many of the difficulties raised in the aforemen-
tioned aporiae are in fact solved in Zs section on universals. Aristotle argues
in this section, and in particular in Z 13, that universals are not substances.
But if they are not substances, they cannot be the principles of substance,
either, for the principles of substances must be substances. This solves apo-
ria 6 and the first part of aporia 7. It is rather the constituents of sensible
substances, i.e. matter and form, that are the principles of them, even if, in
all probability, Aristotle would avoid referring to forms by the term ele-
ments and reserve it for the material constituents of sensible substances.
In this sense, Zs solution to aporia 6 cannot be straightaway identified with
the second horn of the aporia, i.e. that elements are principles, either. Be
that as it may, if universals are not substances, they cannot be separate, for
only substances are separate, as Aristotle suggests already in Z 14 and explic-
itly states in the second part of Z 16.160 Thus, the second part of aporia 7 is
also solved, and together with it, aporia 8, since the foregoing considerations
clearly prove that there is nothing formal existing apart from the composite
of matter and form.161 Aporia 11 is solved in Z 16 (1040b1627): one and being,
just like any other universal, are not substances. Finally, the solution to apo-
ria 12 simply results from the overall argument of the section: the principles
of particular things must be themselves particular. In Ch. 1, Sections 7.12,
156 Cf. Aquinas, Exp. Metaph., Lib. II, lect. 8, nn. 431442.
158 Cf. Aquinas, Exp. Metaph., Lib. II, lect. 12, nn. 488501 (besides Z, Aquinas includes in
Aristotles solution also the discussion of the number of principles in 45 and the treatment
of unity in ).
160 Cf. Aristotle, Met., Z 14, 1039a2426; 16, 1040b2730.
161 This conclusion too needs some words of qualification. Of course, Aristotle thinks that
there are separate substances and that they are formal in character (at least in the sense that
they are not material). However, aporia 8 is probably directed against the existence of some
separate thing that is the same in form as the composite substance. Aquinas (cf. Aquinas, Exp.
Metaph., Lib. II, lect. 8, n. 446) sees the difficulty and so distinguishes between those separate
substances that are not the same in form as the composite of matter and form, which exist,
and those that are the same in form as the composite of matter and form, like Platos Forms,
which do not exist.
302 chapter three
I have reconstructed in some detail the contemporary controversy over the

status (particular or universal) of Aristotles forms. One of the outcomes of
my analysis has been that the conclusion that principles must be particular
needs a word of qualification. For something can be particular primitively
or derivatively. If a principle is particular primitively, then it is particular
in the sense attached to the term in the contemporary controversy; if it is
only derivatively particular, by contrast, it is universal in the sense accorded
to the term in the contemporary controversy. This distinction also applies
to the case of Aquinas. Thus, when Aquinas says that forms are particular,
he may not mean that they are primitively particular. I shall deal with this
issue in the next section. In any case, the fact remains that both Aquinas
and Aristotle think that, even if the constituents of a particular object may
be said in some sense common or universal, there are no universal objects
around, there are no things that are, at the same time, universals and inde-
pendent objects. To my knowledge, Aquinas is the medieval commentator
who draws the closest parallel between Bs discussion of the aporiae and the
treatment of universals in Met. Z.
The different chapters in the sections on universals attack Platos theory
of Forms from different angles. Z 13 argues for the general view that uni-
versals cannot be substances.162 Z 1415 establishes the more specific claim
that they are not separate substances.163 Finally Z 16 is concerned with clar-
ifying a series of points somehow touched upon in the previous discussion.
In particular, the chapter (i) clarifies the notion of part of a substance, (ii)
answers Bs aporia 11 by showing that being and one are not substances, and
(iii) makes a final evaluation of the merits and mistakes of Platos doctrine.164
Even if the differences between Z 13 and Z 1415 lines of argument should
not be overemphasised, it is useful to try to understand where Aquinas in
fact sees a difference. According to Aquinas, in Z 13 Aristotle tries to show
that universality qua universality is incompatible with substantiality. In the
nature of things, i.e. in the extra-mental world, there is no common or uni-
versal thing that exists as a substance. However, since Platonists think that
Forms qua universals are the substances, i.e. the natures and the essences,
of the concrete particulars participating in them, then Aristotle in Z 13 sets
himself to make the additional point that universals qua universals cannot
even be the substances of particular things. Thus, according to Aquinass
reconstruction, in Z 13 Aristotle would be interested in showing that the
163 Cf. Aquinas, Exp. Metaph., Lib. VII, lect. 13, n. 1569; lect. 14, n. 1592.
164 Cf. Aquinas, Exp. Metaph., Lib. VII, lect. 16, n. 1631; 1637; 1642.
notion of universal is incompatible with that of substance, be it the notion of

substance tout court or that of substance of. It might be objected that there is
a sense in which also Aquinass essencesas well as his substantial forms
are common and so his interpretation of Met. Z 13 makes trouble for his own
views as well. However, Aquinass essences are common in the sense that
their individuation is derivative (it depends on matter) and surely not in the
sense of being universal objects alongside ordinary particular objects. I shall
devote the next section to Aquinass interpretation of Met. Z 13, whilst in sec-
tion 6.3 I shall say something about the sense in which Aquinass essences
and substantial forms can be said to be common or universal. This issue has
clearly something to do with the modern debate over the status of Aristotles
forms.
In Z 1415 Aristotle finds a slightly different point of attack. He argues
that Forms do not possess one of the fundamental traits of substantiality,
i.e. separateness, which Platonists tend to ascribe to them. More precisely,
Forms cannot, at the same time, be separate substances and play the other
roles Platonists make them play in their ontology.165 The argument in Z 14
concludes that for Platonists it is impossible to maintain both (i) that
Forms are separate substances and (ii) that the species is composed of
genus and differentia.166 I am not particularly interested here in Aquinass
interpretation of Z 14. Suffice it to say that (i) and (ii) are incompatible
because, if each species of animal is a separate Form, it becomes difficult to
explain how the genus animal can be common to the Forms of the different
species. It seems that there are only two options available: either the genus
animal is one and the same in all the different species or it is different in
the different species. Aquinas follows closely Aristotle in showing that both
options are untenable.167
More interesting is Aquinass reading of Met. Z 15. From his anti-Platonic
point of view, Aquinas believes that the chapter aims at showing that Forms
are not definable. For, if they are separate substances, they must be partic-
ular and, if they are particular, they cannot be defined.168 Aquinass recon-
struction of Z 15 may surprise the modern reader. We have seen in Ch. 1
that Z 15 contains three different lines of argument: (i) (1039b201040a7) an
argument specifically directed against the definability of particular material
167 Cf. Aquinas, Exp. Metaph., Lib. VII, lect. 14, nn. 15931599 (for the first alternative);
nn. 16001604 (for the second alternative).

304 chapter three
substances. Such an argument mainly relies on the generability and cor-

ruptibility of material substances. Being subject to generation and corrup-
tion, material substances are contingent objects and so do not possess
the stability and necessity which every object of knowledge and definition
should possess. (ii) (1040a827) Then Aristotle attacks the definability of
Platos Forms, conceived of in this instance as particular objects. (iii) Finally
(1040a27b4), he presents a general argument to the effect that any particu-
lar whatsoever, in so far as it is particular, cannot be defined. The argument
(which is briefly sketched at 1040a1014 and then presented in full in the
final part of the chapter) is based on the very nature of definition. A def-
inition is a conjunction of predicates. Each predicate always picks out a
certain kind of object and never a particular object as such. Also a defi-
nition, therefore, being a conjunction of predicates, will always pick out a
certain kind and never a particular object as such. All things considered, Z 15
does not seem to focus chiefly on Platos Forms, but seems rather concerned
with establishing the indefinability of particular objects as such, whatever
their nature might be. Aquinas perfectly sees and correctly reconstructs the
different stages of Aristotles argument. He realises that argument (i), for
instance, does not touch Platonic Forms, since the latter are thought to be
ingenerable and incorruptible.169 Likewise, he explicitly says that argument
(iii) is a very general argument, which concerns any particular whatsoever
regardless of its specific nature (i.e. be it a material substance, a Platonic
Form or some other kind of particular object).170 However, he still insists that
Platonic Forms are the main target of the chapter.171 Accordingly, Aristotles
strategy should be reconstructed as follows. First, he advances an argument
to prove that particular material substances are not definable because they
are material and so subject to generation and corruption. Then, he moves on
to show that the very same material substances are not definable not only
because they are material but also because they are particular. To this effect,
he briefly sketches what we have called argument (iii), which he fleshes
out in the final part of the chapter. If particular objects cannot be defined
because they are particular, then Platonic Forms cannot be defined, either.
For, if they are separate substances, they must be particular objects. Aris-
totle concludes by presenting some extra reasons for thinking that Forms
are not definable, i.e. reasons that depend on the nature of Forms as such
171 Aquinas might have been influenced here by Averroess similar reading. See supra,
Ch. 2, Sect. 6.1.

and not only on their being particular. Thus, Z 15 displays an argumentative

movement, which starts from material sensible substances, passes through
particular objects qua particular and culminates in a criticism of Platos
Forms as such.
6.2. Aquinass Interpretation of Met. Z 13:

Universality and Substantiality
As often happens with crucial and difficult chapters, Aquinas introduces
his literal exposition of Met. Z 13 with a short digression, which illustrates
the meaning of the chapter and Aristotles general objective. Let me quote
directly Aquinass words and then comment on them:
For the clarification of this chapter it must be noted that the term universal
can be taken in two senses. (i) First it can be taken to mean the very nature to
which the intellect attributes the aspect of universality, and in this sense uni-
versals such as genera and species signify the substances of things inasmuch
as they are essentially predicated of them; for animal signifies the substance
of the thing of which it is predicated, and so does man. (ii) Second, a universal
can be taken insofar as it is universal, and insofar the aforementioned nature
falls under the aspect of universality, i.e. insofar as animal or man is consid-
ered as a one-in-many. And in this sense the Platonists claimed that animal
and man in their universal aspect are substances.
This is what Aristotle aims to disprove in this chapter by showing that animal
in general or man in general is not a substance in reality, but that the form
of animal or of man takes on this generality insofar as it exists in the mind,
which understands one form as common to many things in that it abstracts
it from all individuating principles.172
The text is particularly technical and dense, and so needs some words
of explanation at different levels. Clearly, in the background of Aquinass
distinctions in the text there lies Avicennas doctrine of the indifference
172 Cf. Aquinas, Exp. Metaph., Lib. VII, lect. 13, nn. 15701571: [1570] Sciendum est autem,
ad evidentiam huius capituli, quod universale dupliciter potest accipi. Uno modo pro ipsa
natura, cui intellectus attribuit intentionem universalitatis: et sic universalia, ut genera et
species, substantias rerum significant, ut predicantur in quid. Animal enim significat sub-
stantiam eius, de quo predicatur, et similiter homo. Alio modo potest accipi universale
inquantum est universale, et secundum quod natura predicta subest intentioni universal-
itatis : idest quod consideratur animal vel homo ut unum in multis. Et sic posuerunt Pla-
tonici animal et hominem in sua universalitate esse substantias. [1571] Quod Aristoteles
in hoc capitulo intendit reprobare, ostendens quod animal commune vel homo commu-
nis non est aliqua substantia in rerum natura. Sed hanc communitatem habet forma ani-
malis vel hominis secundum quod est in intellectu, qui unam formam accipit ut multis
communem, inquantum abstrahit eam ab omnibus individuantibus. Rowans translation,
slightly modified.
306 chapter three
of essence, which Aquinas endorsed since the early De ente et essentia.173

According to Avicenna, a nature or essence, when considered absolutely,
i.e. regardless of the different ways in which it exists or can exist, is neither
universal nor particular. In itself, a nature only possesses the characteristics
that are indicated in its definition. For instance, the nature of human beings
possesses per se only animality and rationalitywhich are mentioned in its
definition. A nature, however, can acquire some other properties accord-
ing to its different modes of existence. According to Avicenna, the modes
of existence a nature can take on are fundamentally two: extra-mental and
mental existence. The properties which a nature acquires as a result of its
different modes of existence are accidental properties of a nature, if acci-
dental properties means non-essential properties. However, such proper-
ties are not accidental, if by accidental properties we mean properties
which a thing may indifferently have or not have. For a certain mode of exis-
tence has invariably associated with itself a set of characteristic properties.
Thus, for instance, when it exists in the intellect, a nature acquires the prop-
erty of being universal, whereas when it exists in the extra-mental world it
acquires the property of being particular. However we should understand
exactly the relationship between modes of existence and their characteristic
properties, the fact remains that universality is a property a nature possesses
only derivatively, i.e. in virtue of the nature of the intellect it happens to
exist in. Likewise, particularity is a property a nature has only derivatively,
i.e. on account of its existing in the extra-mental world where everything
that exists is individual.
In the passage quoted, Aquinas exploits Avicennas doctrine to disam-
biguate the notion of universal. When we talk about universals such as
species and genera, there are two different things we may have in mind.
One is the natures genera and species point to, natures considered abso-
lutely. The other is universals in so far as they are universals, i.e. in so far
as they are actually common to many things. In the first sense of univer-
sal, species and genera are the substances of extra-mental things in that
they are essentially predicated of them.174 In the second sense of univer-
173 Cf. Aquinas, De ent. et ess., c. 3, pp. 374375; Q. De Quo., VIII, q. 1, a. 1, Opera Omnia, XXV,
vol. I, pp. 5153; Sent. Lib. De An., Lib. II, c. 12, pp. 115116, lin. 95151; Q. De Pot., q. 5, a. 9, ad 16,
ed. Bazzi et alii, vol. II, p. 155; S. Th., Ia, q. 85, a. 2, ad 2, pp. 412413; a. 3, ad 1, p. 414 and ad 4,
p. 414. For the doctrine of the indifference of essence see: Avicenna, Phil. Pr., tr. V, c. 1 passim.
174 Note that on this account it is the nature absolutely considered that is predicated of
the particular things of which it is the nature. This is slightly problematic because, usually,
predication is supposed to be an operation that involves the action of the intellect and so it
might be thought that it is the universal concept (i.e. the essence as existing in the intellect)
sal, such natures are not the substances of particular things, because they
are universal only in the intellect and so cannot be the substances of extra-
mental things. It is the intellect that adds to the natures the character of
universality, in that it is capable of stripping an essence of the individual
characteristics it is joined to in the extra-mental world. In other words, uni-
versals qua universals are only concepts of the mind, which are common
in that they represent all the particular objects falling under them in the
same way. Platos mistakeAquinas remarksconsists precisely in think-
ing that there can exist in the extra-mental world something with the char-
acteristics that things possess only when they exist in the intellect. On the
basis of this misconception, Plato concluded that there are universals exist-
ing in the extra-mental world.175
We are now in a better position to understand Aquinass general inter-
pretation of Met. Z 13. As is shown by his introductory note, the Dominican
Master sees an incompatibility between the notion of substance and the
notion of universal when taken strictly. No universal thing exists as uni-
versal in the extra-mental world, where everything that exists is individual.
Thus, the chapter shows that it is a mistake to take universality as one of the
marks of things existing in the extra-mental world. The chapter, however,
also makes an additional point, i.e. that universals qua universals, besides
not being substances tout court, cannot even be the substances of the things
existing in the extra-mental world. From what Aquinas says in his intro-
ductory note, it seems that it is their essence absolutely consideredand
not the essence existing in the extra-mental thingsthat is their substance.
This conclusion is motivated by the observation that the properties charac-
teristic of essence absolutely considered are essentially predicated of the
extra-mental things: animality and rationality, for instance, are essentialy
predicated of extra-mental men. On the other hand, part of Aquinass anti-
Platonic point must also be that the essences of extra-mental things exist
in them and not separate from them, as Platonists maintain. From this
that is predicated of particular things, i.e. of the particular things it represents. I cannot
go into this difficulty here. However, it is possible that Aquinas implicitly distinguishes
between two kinds of predication: metaphysical predicationwhich concerns the nature
absolutely consideredand logical predication (some sort of concept-based classification),
which involves the essence as existing in the intellect.
175 Often Aquinas describes Platos mistake in terms of a confusion between modus essendi
and modus intelligendi (roughly the way in which things are in the extra-mental world as
opposed to the way they are understood by and so exist in the intellect). See for instance:
Exp. Metaph., Lib. I, lect. 10, n. 158; C. Gent., II, c. 75, vol. II, n. 1551; S. Th., Ia, q. 76, a. 2, ad 4,
p. 354; q. 84, a. 1, pp. 400401 On this and related points see: Henle (1970), esp. 323350.
308 chapter three
perspective, it seems that the substances of things are the natures existing
in them and not their natures considered absolutely. This is a somewhat
difficult issue I shall briefly take up in the next section.
Given Aquinass general reading of the chapter, it is not surprising that
his commentary does not say a word about the issue, so much debated in
modern scholarship, of whether Aristotles forms are universal or particular.
First of all, strictly speaking, Aquinass essences do not include form alone
but also matter. However, as we shall see in the next section, for Aquinas
forms and essences are exactly on a par in so far as their ontological status
is concerned (i.e. either they are both universal or both particular). This
point of difference between modern interpreters and Aquinas, therefore,
can be disregarded. For the reason why Aquinas does not address the
issue of the status of forms is more of a theoretical nature. As we have
seen in Ch. 1, the modern problem of universal versus particular forms is
basically a question of individuation. It is a matter of deciding whether the
individuality of Aristotles forms is primitivein which case form can be
called particularor derivative, i.e. dependent on matterin which case
form can be called universal. No one doubts that each form exists as a
constituent of particular things, and so is particular at least in the sense of
being proper to the particular thing of which it is the form once it exists
in it. The problem is rather whether a form is particular in itself or made
particular by the piece of matter it exists in. This is clearly not the problem
Aquinas thinks Z 13 is concerned with. According to him, by contrast, the
chapter deals with traditional problem of universals and rejects a Platonic
solution to it. Do general terms signify and general concepts represent
universals existing outside the mind? Aristotles answer is negative: the
natures and essences corresponding to universal terms and concepts do not
exist as universal outside the mind, but only in the very particular things of
which they are the natures and essences. As can be seen, this problem has
little to do with the modern controversy over the status of forms/essences.
In particular, the answer to the problem of universals Aquinas ascribes to
Aristotle is compatible with both positions in the modern controversy. Once
established that essences only exist in particular things and so are in this
sense individual, it remains to be ascertained whether their individuality is
primitive or derivative (i.e. due to matter).
Let me take a quick look now at how Aquinas reconstructs the struc-
ture of Met. Z 13 and some of the crucial arguments therein. As we have
seen, modern interpreters divide the chapter into eight arguments plus a
final dilemma: (1) 1038b915; (2) 1038b1516; (3) 1038b1623; (4) 1038b23
29; (5) 1038b2930; (6) 1038b3034; (7) 1038b341039a3; (8) 1039a314; (Final
Dilemma) 1039a1525. On Aquinass reading the chapter contains two differ-

ent groups of arguments: the first group proves that universals are not sub-
stances starting from the common (i.e., presumably, shared by both Plato
and Aristotle) assumption that a universal is predicated of many things. This
first group contains arguments (1) and (2) as well as argument (3), which
is regarded by Aquinas as Platos (unconvincing) response to arguments
(1) and (2).176 Modern interpreters agree that argument (3) contains Platos
reply. They insist, however, that it is also the first of a series of argument
against the further suggestion that universals can at least be substances in
the sense of being parts of substances. For Aquinas, by contrast, the refuta-
tion of this second line of thought (universals as parts of substances) starts
only with a second group of arguments, which include argument (4)(8).177
The chapter concludes with the final dilemma. Thus, all things considered,
Aquinass reconstruction of the structure of the chapter is very close to mod-
ern interpreters. It is more interesting to look closely into Thomass under-
standing of the details of some of the arguments. I shall confine myself to
arguments (1) and (2), which are by far the most important from the point
of view of the general meaning of the chapter.
Argument (1) simply establishes that the substance of a thing must be
peculiar to it (Peculiarity Condition). Therefore, universals cannot be the
substances of anything because they are by nature common to many things
and hence cannot be peculiar to any of them. In modern scholarship, the
argument has been taken to support the view that forms are particulars.
A formit is arguedcan be peculiar to the thing of which it is the form
only if it is particular. We have seen that the argument is not decisive in
favour of particular forms. For clearly each sensible substance possesses
a form that is peculiar to it in that it does not share its form with any
other substance. In this sense, forms are particular. However, the question
is still open whether the individuality of forms is primitive or derivative.
A form can be particular because it is made particular or particularised by
matter. If this is so, form as such is universal. Be that as it may, Aquinass
interpretation moves along entirely different lines in accordance with his
general anti-Platonic understanding of the chapter.178 For him the point of
177 Cf. Aquinas, Exp. Metaph., Lib. VII, lect. 13, nn. 15791589. There are small differences
between Aquinass internal division of the second group of arguments and that provided
by modern interpreters: in particular, the Dominican Master does not regard 1038b2930
as an independent argument and consequently considers 1038b291039a2 as a continuous
argumentative section (Cf. Aquinas, Exp. Metaph., Lib. VII, lect. 13, nn. 15841585).
310 chapter three
the Peculiarity Condition is simply that the substance of something must

be in (inesse) the thing of which it is the substance and not in something
else. Universals cannot satisfy the Peculiarity Condition because they exist
by nature in many things and so cannot be peculiar to any of them. For
suppose universals do satisfy the Peculiarity Condition and are substances.
Then, either they are the substances of all the things they exist in or they are
the substances of only one of them. But a universal cannot be the substance
of all the things it exists in; for in such a case all the things in question
will be only one thing (presumably because they will share numerically the
same essence), contrary to the assumption that they are in fact different
things. Nor can a universal be the substance of only one of the things it
exists in, because, for parity of reasons, it should be the substance of all
the other things. For a universal seems to bear the same relation to all
the things it exists in. A universal, therefore, cannot be the substance of
anything. As can be seen, Aquinas is interested in establishing that the
natures and essences of sensible substances exist extra-mentally only in
sensible substances themselves and so each sensible substance possesses
an essence that is peculiar to it. Aquinas, however, does not say a word
about what makes particular essences particular, that is whether they are
particular of themselves or made particular by matter. Thus, his concerns
have little to do with the modern controversy over the status of Aristotles
forms/essences.
The second argument is very similar to the first in shape and conclusion.
Substance is that which is not said of a subject. But universals are always
said of some subject. Therefore, universals cannot be substances.179 Inter-
estingly enough, Aquinas raises a possible objection to the argument, an
objection based on the apparent conflict between the Categories and the
Metaphysics.180 In the Categories, a substance is that which is not in some-
thing else according to the technical sense of being in. Things that are
said of something else, by contrary, are substances. Species and genera,
for instance, are said of individual substances and are explicitly called in the
Categories secondary substances. It is somewhat surprising, therefore, that
Aristotle should regard the fact of being said of something else as the distin-
guishing mark of non-substances. The objectionit must be remarkedis
legitimate. For, even if we take to be said of in the Metaphysics in the
generic sense of being predicated and not in the technical sense intro-
duced in the Categories, the fact still remains that in the Categories only
accidental predicates are taken to indicate non-substances, while essential

predicates designate secondary substances. Not everything that is predi-
cated of something else is a non-substance and so the premiss of Aristotles
argument seems simply to be false.
Aquinass reply to the objection is compressed and not crystal clear.181 But
I think that its general meaning is the following. Aquinas appeals to the
different character of the Categories and the Metaphysics. The Categories
proceeds according to a logical point of view, while Metaphysics Z takes a
metaphysical and so more realistic approach. Logic in particular considers
things in so far as they exist in the mind. Thus, when Aristotle in the
Categories talks about secondary substances, i.e. species and genera, he
is thinking of them primarily as mental things falling under the intentio
universalitatis, i.e. universal concepts that can be applied to things existing
in the extra-mental world. So the said of relation is actually a relation
between concepts and extra-mental things indicating that extra-mental
things are classified in a certain way according to their essential properties.
Since the concepts that are said of extra-mental things are obtained on the
basis of their essential properties, they can be called substantial concepts
and so, from a logical perspective, secondary substances. The Metaphysics,
by contrast, is not interested in things in so far as they exist in the mind, but
rather in how they exist in the extra-mental world. Therefore, metaphysics
does not draw any distinction between being in a subject and being said
of a subject. For the metaphysician both notions refer to some kind of
dependent existence, i.e. the existence of what exists in something else,
and so point to the kind of existence that is typical of non-substances.
Universals, since they exist in the things of which they are said, cannot be
substances. For they depend for their existence on the very things in which
they exist.
6.3. Appendix: Aquinas on the Status of Aristotles Forms

Aquinass exposition of Met. Z 13 does not touch upon the problem, so
much debated in modern literature, of the status (universal or particular)
of Aristotles forms. This does not mean, however, that the commentary
on Met. Z as a whole does not give us information about Thomass view
on such an important interpretative and doctrinal issue. On the contrary,
Aquinas clearly holds that Aristotelian forms are universal according to the
meaning the term carries in the modern literature. It may be useful to restate
312 chapter three
once again the position Aquinas defends. Supporters of universal forms do

not deny that each individual sensible substance possesses a form that is
numerically different from that of any other sensible substance. According
to them too, therefore, the forms of sensible substances exist as individual or
particular forms. What they insist on, by contrast, is that such forms are not
primitively individual, but only derivatively so. In particular, they owe their
individuality to the different pieces of matter they exist in. Thus, one can
talk of individual or particular forms, but only in the sense of forms made
particular or individual by matter. In conclusion, for each natural species,
there is just one substantial form, which gets multiplied and individuated
by matter. To convince ourselves that this is the position Aquinas credits
Aristotle with is sufficient to quote a passage from his commentary on Met.
Z 8 (1034a58)a text which is often invoked in support of the universal
character of Aristotles forms:
and every form which is in matter, namely in this flesh and these bones, is
one singular thing such as Callias or Socrates. And this form, which causes a
likeness in species in the process of generation, also differs numerically from
the form of the thing generated because of the difference in matter. For material
diversity is the principle of diversity among individuals in the same species; for
the matter containing the form of the man who begets and that of the man who is
begotten are different. But both forms are the same in species; for form itself is
indivisible, i.e. it does not differ in the one who generates and the one who
is generated. Hence it follows that it is not necessary to posit a form apart
from singular things, which causes the form in the things generated, as the
Platonists claimed.182
The text is as explicit as it can be in endorsing the point of view of univer-
salists: forms are in themselves common and are made particular only by
the different pieces of matter they are joined to. Moreover, this is also the
position Aquinas himself endorsed and defended since the early De ente et
essentia.183 Aquinass position raises a number of doctrinal difficulties, which
182 Cf. Aquinas, Exp. Metaph., Lib. VII, lect. 7, n. 1435: Omnis autem forma, que est
in materia, scilicet in his carnibus et in his ossibus, est aliquid singulare, ut Callias et
Socrates. Et ista etiam species causans similitudinem speciei in generando est diversa a specie
generati secundum numerum propter diversam materiam. Cuius diversitas est principium
diversitatis individuorum in eadem specie. Diversa namque est materia, in qua est forma
hominis generantis et hominis generati. Sed utraque forma est idem secundum speciem. Nam
ipsa species est individua, idest non diversificatur in generante et generato. Relinquitur
ergo, quod non oportet ponere aliquam speciem praeter singularia, quae sit causa speciei
in generatis, ut Platonici ponebant (The empahsis is mine). Rowans traslation, slightly
modified.
183 Cf., Aquinas, c. 2, pp. 371, lin. 6768; p. 376, lin. 6589. Cf. also: S. Boet. De Tr., q. 4, a.3,
p. 125, lin. 195 ff.

go far beyond the scope of this presentation of Aquinass commentary on

Met. Z. However, it may be useful to hint at some of them in the light of the
issues I have touched upon in the previous section. The difficulties I see are
basically four.
(i) The first problem is that the view that forms are made individual by
matter is not universally true for Aquinas. Separate substances, for instance,
are pure forms, and thus their individuality cannot depend on matter, since
they do not exist in matter. In a way separate substances are individual of
themselves, at least in the sense that their individuality does not depend on
anything other than Gods creative act. But even if we leave aside separate
substances, the case of the forms of sensible substances is also somewhat
complicated. For Aquinas consistently maintains that one special kind of
form, i.e. the human soul, is not individuated by matter.184 The issue of the
ontological status of the human soul is a very complex one and there are
in fact various ways of explaining and justifying the claim that, unlike that
of the other sensible forms, the individuality of the human soul does not
depend on matter.185 One possible way is the following. Even if the human
soul exists in matter, its being does not depend on matter, as is the case
with all the other forms of sensible substances. That this is the case can
be seen from the fact that the human souls principal activityintellectual
cognitionis carried out without the concourse of any bodily or organic
supportwhich could not be the case, if the human soul did not have a
form of existence independent of the body it is joined to. For everything
operates in accordance with the kind of being it has. Moreover, according to
Christian theology, the human soul outlives the corruption of the body and
so is able to continue to exist without itwhich is a further confirmation
that its existence does not dependent on the body. But if the human soul
has a being independent of the body, its individuality cannot depend on the
body, either. For, in the end, the reason why the individuality of the forms
other than the human soul depends on the body is that also the very being
and activities of such forms depend on the body. As a matter of fact, Aquinas
thinks that the human soul is directly individuated by God at the moment
of creation.
184 Cf. Aquinas, C. Gent., II, c. 75, vol. II, n. 1549; c. 81, nn. 16201621; Q. De An., q. 3, p. 28, lin.
292318; Q. De Spir. Creat., a. 9, ad 3, Opera Omnia, XXIV 2, p. 96, lin. 353364; Q. De Pot., q. 3,
a. 10, vol. II, pp. 7071.
185 For more information about the ontological status of the human soul see: Bazn (1983)
and (1997); Sweeney (1999); Galluzzo (2003) and (2007a).

314 chapter three
In conclusion: Aquinas thinks that the substantial forms of sensible sub-

stances are universal according to the meaning carried by the term in the
modern debate over Aristotles forms. However, he gets very close to the
modern notion of particular forms when dealing with the special case of
the human soul.
(ii) Another difficulty is that throughout his commentary on Met. Z 13

16 Aquinas talks about the essences of sensible substances. And Aquinass
essences do not contain form alone but also common matter. Thus, one
might wonder whether Aquinass essences are universal or particular ac-
cording to the modern sense of these terms. This difficulty is easy to solve.
For Aquinass general doctrine of essence clearly implies that the criteria
of individuation for forms are exactly the same as those for essences. After
all, some essences turn out to be pure forms. The essences of separate sub-
stances, for instance, i.e. the essences separate substances are identical with,
are pure forms and do not contain matter. So, since the forms of sensible
substances are universal in the sense of the modern debate over Aristo-
tles forms, their essences must be so as well. The individuality and par-
ticularity of the essences of sensible substances is not primitive either, but
rather depends on matter. Since the essences of sensible substances con-
tains common matter in addition to form, their individuality will depend
on individual matter, i.e. the particular material characteristics each indi-
vidual possesses.
(iii) So far, I have talked about individuation by matter. However, Aquinas

is often credited with the view that it is matter plus dimensionsand not
matter alonethat is responsible for a sensible substances individuality.
As a matter of fact, Aquinass position on this particular point is not entirely
clear, just as it is not clear whether or not the Dominican Master consistently
maintained the same position over time.186 On the one hand, it seems that
dimensions must play a role in individuation. For in order to receive the
different substantial forms matter must be divided or at least divisible, and
matter cannot be so unless it possesses dimensions (whether determined or
undetermined).187 On the other hand, Aquinas seems to hold to the principle
that no accidental determinations can come between matter and form, and
186 For a critical survey of Aquinass various texts on dimensions and their role in individ-
uation see: Wippel (2000), 351375.

187 See for instance: Aquinas, S. Boet. De Tr., q. 4, a.3, p. 125, lin. 195ff.
so form is joined to matter somehow immediately.188 Thus, if dimensions

play a role in individuation, it is not entirely clear how they can do so
without violating the principle. I do not intend to go into such a difficult
issue here. Suffice it to say that, when explaining Aristotles text, Aquinas
is often happy with a simplified version of the problem, where the main
opposition is the one between individuation by matter and individuation by
form. After all, the theme of dimensions and their role in the individuation
of sensible substances is clearly non-Aristotelian and is rather grafted onto
the Latin philosophical tradition by Arabic philosophers such as Avicenna
and Averroes.189 So, Aquinas tends to leave it out when explaining Aristotles
text.
(iv) Probably the most difficult problem is that of reconciling the lan-
guage Aquinas uses when he talks about individuation with the Avicennian
scheme he employs in the short introduction to his commentary on Met.
Z 13. Let me try to explain the nature of the problem by focusing on the
notion of essence (which includes both form and common matter) and leav-
ing aside Aristotelian forms for a while. We have seen that, according to
Avicennas theory, an essence is in itself neither particular nor universal.
It becomes particular when it exists in the extra-mental world, whereas it
becomes universal when it exists in the mind. One of the consequences of
this theory seems to be that in the extra-mental world everything is indi-
vidual. When I have analysed, by contrast, Aquinass view on essence in the
light of the contemporary debate, I have concluded that there is a sense in
which Aquinass essence can be said to be common or universal: essences
are universal because their particularity is not primitive but derivative. Are
these two perspectives (Avicennas doctrine and the issue of individuation)
in conflict? Or are there two senses of being universal so that essences can
be said not to be universal according to the Avicennian perspective and to
be so, by contrast, in connection with the issue of individuation? Even if the
problem deserved a more detailed treatment, my view is that the second
hypothesis is on the right track.190 The Avicennian scheme and the discus-
sion of individuation introduce two different levels of analysis.
Avicennas theory serves to explain the level of actual extra-mental exis-
tence. The main point of the theory is to distinguish between what belongs
to an essence in itself and what pertains to it only as a consequence of its
188 See for instance: Aquinas, S. Th., Ia, q. 76, a. 6, p. 348 and ad 1, p. 348.
189 For an introduction to this issue : Donati (1986) and (2007).
190 For more on this issue see: Galluzzo (2012).
316 chapter three
existing in some way or other. An essence in itself is neither particular nor

universal: it becomes particular when it exists in the extra-mental world,
while it becomes universal when it exists in the mind. The fact that the
properties that belong to the essence in its mental or extra-mental existence
do not belong to it in itself is supposed to explain how one single essence
can have incompatible properties at the same time. Such properties do not
belong to the essence as such, but are rather the result of the essences exist-
ing in one way or another. On the other hand, however, it is just as clear that
the properties that accompany a certain way of existence (e.g. particularity
and universality) do so of necessity. Thus, everything existing in the extra-
mental world is individual and, more in particular, every essence exists in
the extra-mental world as an individual thing. This is the level of actual exis-
tence.
The question of individuation introduces another level of analysis with
respect to that of actual existence. We may call this further level the level
of metaphysical constituency. Even if every essence is individual in its extra-
mental actual existence, one may still raise the question as to whether the
individuality of an essence is primitive or derivative. Aquinass distinction
between essence and principle of individuation amounts to the view that
the individuality of an essence is not primitive. Note that Aquinas is not
saying that an essence is actually common to all the things that possess
it. On the contrary, an essence exists in the extra-mental world as totally
individuated. However, in order to explain why it is individual, we need to
posit another, distinct principle, the principle of individuation. Thus, the
distinction between essence and principle of individuation does not belong
to the level of actual existence, but rather to that of the analysis of the meta-
physical constituents of a particular substance. This is confirmed by the
fact that, in order to prove the distinction between essence and principle
of individuation, Aquinas often appeals to counterfactual or even counter-
possible considerations: if we couldbut we cannotstrip the sensible
substance of their individuating principles we would be left with only one
essence.191 The counterpossible considerations Aquinas employsi.e. con-
siderations concerning not how something actually exists but rather how
it would exist if it could exist in a different way, which it cannothelp us
to understand the metaphysical constitution of a thing. In the actual exis-
tence, however, an essence is always individuated by the principle of indi-
191 Cf. Aquinas, Exp. Metaph, Lib. VII, lect. nn. 15351536. See also: C. Gent., Lib. II, c. 42,
vol. II, n. 1275; Q. De Spir., a. 8, p. 80, lin. 189204. See also Exp. Peryer., Lib. I, lect. 10, Opera
Omnia, I* 1, p. 50, lin. 95103.
viduation and so is always individual. If this distinction is correct, it is not

surprising that Aquinas consistently maintains that the distinction between
essence and principle of individuation is mind-independent. The distinc-
tion is objectiveotherwise individuality would remain unexplained
even though what we get in the extra-mental actual existence is always
the result of an essence being individuated by the principle of individua-
tion.
The foregoing distinction of levels may help us to answer the problem
I raised in Section 6.2 above, i.e. whether the substance of sensible things
is the essence in itself or the essence existing in the extra-mental world.
Now, if we keep ourselves to the level of actual existence, it is the essence
in itself that is the substance of sensible things. For the essence as existing
in the extra-mental world is totally individuated and so in a way coincides
with the particular sensible substance. And a particular sensible substance
is what it is because it possesses the essential properties that characterise
the essence in itself. However, if we move to the level of the metaphysical
constitution of things, it is the essence as a metaphysical constituent that
is the substance of sensible things. Once we have distinguished between
two principles of a sensible thing, i.e. the essence and the individuating
principle, we also have to distinguish between what makes of the thing
what it is (i.e. the essence) and what makes of it the particular thing it
is (the principle of individuation). And it is clearly what makes the thing
what it is, i.e. the essence as a metaphysical constituent, which should be
identified with the substance of the thing. Thus, even if there might be
some tension between the level of actual existence and that of metaphysical
constituency, the two levels seem to obey different logics and so not to be
incompatible.
7. Substance As Cause in Met. Z 17:

A Departure from the Logical Level?
On Aquinass reading, Met. Z 17 presents aspects of both continuity and

discontinuity with respect to the investigation carried out in the rest of the
book. From an objective point of view, the chapter marks a fresh start with
respect to Z 3s list of four claimants to the title of substance by introducing
a new subject of discussion, i.e. substance as cause. The idea is explored,
in other words, that substance might be a cause and a principle of some
sort. When presenting the general theme of the chapter, Aquinas puts
more emphasis on the continuity than on the discontinuity with respect
318 chapter three
to Zs overall argument. On Aquinass understanding, Aristotles aim is not

to offer a general treatment of substance as cause, but rather to show that
the essence, which has been regarded throughout Z as the substance of
sensible things, is also a cause and a principle of such things.192 In other
words, Thomass point seems to be that substance can be taken to be a
cause and a principle only according to one particular sense of cause, i.e.
formal cause and essence. The first consequence of this general reading
is that the chapter presents itself as more unified than it might seem at
first sight. As we have seen in Ch. 1, Z 17 falls naturally into two parts: (i)
(1041a6b11) the first shows that the essence (which Aristotle identifies with
the form) of sensible objects is a cause and a principle in that it is that
in virtue of which the matter of sensible objects becomes an actual and
determinate thing; (ii) (1041b1133) the second argues for the view that what
keeps together the material parts of a sensible object cannot be one of those
parts, but must rather be something different in nature from them. Thus,
the form/essence of sensible objects is not on a par with the material parts
it keeps together, but belongs to another ontological level. On Aquinass
reading, the two arguments in the chapter are just the two sides of the
same coin. The first argument shows that essence is a cause and a principle
of sensible objects, while the second explains how it can be so, i.e. which
function an essence plays in the metaphysical constitution and functional
organisation of sensible objects.193 Of course, where Aristotle talks about
form, Aquinas talks about essence, which includes on his view both form
and common matter. However, this is a very natural shift given Aquinass
views on essence and definition, and I shall pay no further attention to it in
the following. Moreover, as we have already pointed out, essence as well is
taken by Aquinas to play a formal role (the role of forma totius), somehow
comparable to that played by form. Therefore, the difference he introduces
between form and essence is not of much importance for our evaluation of
Aquinass interpretation.
Together with the continuity, Aquinas draws also the attention to the
discontinuity of Z 17s discussion with respect to the general method of the
rest of the book. The main issue here is that Aquinas thinks that the whole
of Book Zeta proceeds at a logical level of analysis. However, the notion
of cause does not seem to be a logical notion. Aquinas grants the point
193 Cf. Aquinas, Exp. Metaph., Lib. VII, lect. 17, n. 1649; 1672. In the following, I shall basically
leave out of my consideration Aquinass reading of the second part of the chapter, in which
Thomas follows very closely Aristotles text.
and hence regards Z 17s investigation into the notion of cause as a partial
departure from Zs main line of argument and method.194 The Dominican
Master seems to offer two justifications for this departure. The first is that
the analysis of cause gives further confirmation to the claim that the essence
of sensible substances is one of their ontological constituents and not a
separate entity, as Platonists maintain.195 The second justification is that
the treatment of the notion of causeand in particular the discussion of
essence as a formal principle of sensible objectsprepares us for a full
understanding of the nature of Aristotles separate substances, which are
causes to the highest degree.196 It should be noted, incidentally, that Z 17s is
not the only departure from Book Zs logical method, at least according to
Aquinas. For instance, in Z 11s final summary, Aristotle reconsiders Z 6s
answer to the problem of the identity between a thing and its essence
by abandoning the logical level and going into the internal structure of
sensible substances.197 Once the notions of matter and form are put to
full use we realise that material substances cannot be identical with their
essencewhich was not so clear according to Z 6s logical analysis. The
moral seems to be that some deviations from the general method of the
book are allowed as long as they are functional to the argument or shed
some light on particularly difficult matters. Z 17s investigation falls within
the cases just mentioned, in that it helps us to better understand the notion
of essence and the relation it bears to the substance of which it is the
essence.
It is also important to realise that on the interpretation of Z 17 Aquinas
parts company with Averroes. For the Arabic philosopher, the notion of
cause should be regarded as a logical notion in that Z 17s treatment of
cause heavily relies on the parallel analysis of cause in the second Book
of the Posterior Analytics. Although Aquinas puts much emphasis on the
connections between the Posterior Analytics and Met. Z and goes as far as
to present Z 17s enquiry as an attempt at applying the Analytics method
to the case of substance, he does not regard this fact alone as sufficient for
describing the notion of cause as a logical notion. This point is of particular
importance and in some sense shapes Aquinass overall interpretation of
the chapter. Therefore, let me look in some more detail at the way Met.
Z 17s argument employs the Posterior Analytics machinery and, at the
320 chapter three
same time, departs from the logical level of analysis. I shall single out two
steps in Aristotles argument and then see how Aquinass understands and
comments on each of them. The first, preliminary step explains which
logical form a causal question should take, the second connects the notion
of cause with the notion of essence.
(i) (Preliminary Step) The main problem of the first half of the chapter
is that of putting the question about cause into its proper form, i.e. of
phrasing a causal question in such a way that it may have an informative and
non-tautological answer. As I have pointed out in Ch. 1, Aristotles strategy
consists in showing that every causal question should take a predicative
form. Every time we ask for the cause of something, we should frame the
question in such a way that what we actually ask for is the reason why
something x is something else y, where x and y are distinct. Thus, the
question Why is a man a man? does not count as a proper causal question,
for the subject and the predicate in the question do not stand for two distinct
items. The question Why is a man musical?, by contrast, is a proper causal
question, because the subject and the predicate stand for two distinct items.
Thus, the search for a cause turns out to be the search for the reason why
a certain predicative fact obtains. Note that Aristotles argument does not
imply that there is no cause of man, but rather that, if we want to look for the
cause of man we have to put our causal question into the proper, predicative
form. Later on in the chapter, Aristotle indicates how to rephrase questions
such as Why is a man a man? so as to turn them into proper causal
questions.
Aquinas expands on Aristotles text and place this first step of the argu-
ment within the general context of Post. Anal. . Every enquiryAquinas
remarkspresupposes something which is already known as well as some-
thing which is not yet known and so must be discovered.198 Now, in Post.
Anal. B 1, Aristotle singles out four different questions: (1) the that-question
(the question resulting in the knowledge that something is the case); (2) the
why-question (the question why something is the case); (3) the whether-
question (i.e. the question whether something exists); (4) the what-question
(i.e. the question as to what something is). Aquinas remarks that (4), the
what-question, and (2), the why-question, are in one way different and in
another the same question.199 As a matter of fact, part of the second step
of Aristotles argument consists in showing that the answer to the what-

question can also beor at least can be turned intoan answer to the why-
question: the essence of a thing is also a cause and a principle of it. In the
first part of the argument, Aquinas provisionally takes the what-question
and the why-question to be distinct. Both questions presuppose something
that is already known as well as something that is not yet known. The (4)
what-question presupposes an answer to the (3) whether question: when
we wish to know the essence of something we must already know that the
thing in question exists. The (2) why-question, by contrast, presupposes a
previous answer to the (1) that-question: when we want to know why some-
thing is the case, we must know in advance that a certain state of affairs is
the case.200 Aquinas agrees with Aristotle on the logical form a why-question
should take. The state of affairs of which we seek the cause must be of the
form x is y, where x is y are distinct items. To investigate into why x is x
simply amounts to investigating into nothing.201 In conclusion, therefore,
Aquinas does nothing but follow very closely Aristotles text. He only makes
more explicit than Aristotle himself does the reference to the background
provided by the Posterior Analytics.
(ii) In the second step of the argument Aristotle exploits the Posterior
Analytics machinery to show the connection between the notion of cause
and the notion of essence. In particular, he tries to apply the Posterior
Analytics model of explanation, which is mainly designed for the case of
physical events, to the case of substances. Suppose that we want to discover
the cause of thunder. The first thing to do is to give our causal investigation
its proper form, so that it may display a certain predicative structure. A
thunder is a noise in the clouds and hence a correct rephrasing of the
question Why does it thunder? might be something of the form Why does
a certain kind of noise belongs to the clouds?. To look for the cause of
thunder means to explain why a certain kind of noise belongs to the clouds,
i.e. to explain why a certain predicative link (between noise and clouds)
obtains. As we have seen in Ch. 1, the intuition which Aristotle expounds
in the Analytics and recalls in Met. Z 17 is that it is possible to build up a
syllogism where (a certain) Noise belongs to the clouds is the conclusion
and the cause of thunder, say the extinguishing of fire, is the middle term of
the syllogism. On this view, the extinguishing of fire explains why a certain
noise belongs to the clouds and so figures as the middle term of the proposed
322 chapter three
causal syllogism. For the middle term of a syllogism plays in general a causal
role with respect to the predicative fact displayed in the conclusion. Thus,
the extinguishing of fire is the cause of thunder, but is it also its essence?
Not precisely, because the extinguishing of fire is an agent cause, i.e. an
external cause, and hence cannot be, strictly speaking, the essence of the
phenomenon it causes. However, Aristotle believes in Posterior Analytics
B 10 that the extinguishing of fire is in some sense at least part of the essence
of thunder. For, from the aforementioned causal syllogism, it is possible to
obtain a causal definition of the form thunder is a certain noise brought
about by the extinguishing of fire, where the cause of thunder appears in
the definiens.
In Met. Z 17 Aristotle tries to apply the Posterior Analytics model to the
case of substances. The expression to look for a cause of substances is in
itself particularly ambiguous and opaque, and so needs clarifying. The first
thing is to put a causal question into predicative form. Aristotles idea is that
to seek the cause of a substance is to find out the explanation of the fact that
a certain piece of matter is a substance, for instance that certain bricks and
stones are a house or a certain body is a human being. In accordance with
the Posterior Analytics model, Aristotle implicitly suggests that there is a
syllogism having as conclusion sentences such as Certain bricks and stones
are a house and as middle term the cause of such a state of affairs. The cause
of certain bricks and stones being a house is the fact that the essence of the
house belongs to the bricks and stones. Thus, the essence of a substance is
its cause in that it explains why a certain piece of matter is the substance
at issue. In spite of the many difficulties it presents, the case of substances
is more linear when compared to the explanation of events in the Posterior
Analytics. For in the case of substances cause and essence seem to coincide
perfectly, while they do so only in part in the case of events.
Aquinass analysis of the second step of the argument is particularly
interesting, because he pays much attention to the differences between the
application of the explanatory model in the Analytics and that provided
by Aristotle in Met. Z 17. He basically agrees with Aristotle on every single
detail of the argument. First, for instance, he recognises that in the Analytics
every causal enquiry consists in explaining why a certain predicative link
obtains.202 To find the cause of thunder amounts to explaining why a certain
noise belongs to the clouds. The extinguishing of firethe agent or moving
cause of thunderexplains why a certain noise belongs to the clouds.
Aquinas also agrees that this very predicative model can be applied with
some refinements to the case of substances.203 In order for a causal question
to make sense, the subject and the predicate of the question must be
distinct. Thus, it seems that in the case of substances we are left with only
two possibilities: either we ask why a substantial universal is predicated of
one of its subjective partsas in the question Why is Socrates a man?
or we ask why a substantial universal belongs to the material parts of a
substanceas in the question Why are these flesh and bones a man?.204
The former case is an instance of essential predication, while the second is
in all probability a case of accidental predication. However, the answer to
the causal question is analogous in both cases: Socrates is a man because the
essence of man belongs to him; certain flesh and bones are a man because
the essence of man belongs to them. Thus, an essence is a cause of the
substances of which it is the essence.
However, Aquinas also sees a discrepancy between the case of events
and that of substances. The point is somehow already implicit in Aristotles
text, but Aquinas brings it into the fore explicitly and discusses it at some
length.205 The problem is that the perfect equivalence between essence and
cause seems to work only for the case of substances. For in the case of
events such as thunder or eclipse the cause is not properly the essence of
the phenomenon we wish to explain. The extinguishing of fire is no more
the cause of thunder than the interposition of the sun is the cause of the
eclipse. For both are the moving cause that brings about the phenomenon,
and a moving cause, being external to the thing of which it is the cause,
cannot be the essence of it. At mostAristotle seems to concede in the
Posterior Analyticsthe extinction of fire and the interposition of the sun
can figure in a causal definition, i.e. a definition manifesting also the cause
of the phenomenon, and hence be in some sense part of the essence.
Aquinas solves the problem by appealing once again to the distinction
between logical and metaphysical level.206 In the Posterior Analytics, Aris-
totle endorses a logical point of view on the notion of essence. For a logi-
cian everything is part of the essence of a thing that contributes to the
understanding of what the thing is. Since the moving cause and the final
cause contribute towards understanding events such as thunder, they are
included by the logician in their essence and definition. In other words,
324 chapter three
the logicians notion of essence is a broad one including everything that

contributes to our understanding of a thing. In the Metaphysics, by con-
trast, Aquinas endorses a metaphysical and so more realistic point of view.
According to the new perspective, moving and final causes are not part of
the essence because they are only external causes, i.e. are things, facts or
events that are external to the object of which we seek the essence. Within
the metaphysical framework, only the internal principles of a thing can
count as the essence or as parts of the essence of the thing we wish to
define.207 On this account, for instance, it would not be correct to define
a house by indicating the end with a view to which the house has been
built or the agent that brought about the assembling of the house. The
essence of a house is the internal principle that makes a certain piece of
matter a house. Aquinass solution may seem artificial, but is not so. First
of all, part of the Dominican Masters point is that metaphysics works with
an ontologically loaded notion of essence, according to which it is not the
case that everything that may contribute to the understanding of a thing
is part of its essence in the strict sense of the term. Second, it is implicit
in Aquinass remarks that such an ontologically loaded notion of essence is
mainly designed to capture the case of substances, which have essences in
the primary sense of the term. Both points square with Aquinass reading of
Aristotles treatment of essence in Met. Z 4.
In conclusion, Met. Zs analysis of substance as cause represents a departure

from the logical level of analysis which prevails in the rest of Book Z. The
departure is functional to providing a more precise characterisation of
essence. In the particular case of the notion of cause, the endorsement of
a logical perspective might be misleading and finally lead to too broad a
notion of essence. Only a metaphysical perspective can show that essence
is an internal and not an external principle of the thing of which it is the
essence.
chapter four
ALBERT THE GREATS METAPHYSICS, BOOK VII
Introduction
Drafted around 1263, Albert the Greats Metaphysics occupies a peculiar

position as compared to the commentaries we have studied so far.1 In one
sense, Alberts work is more a paraphrasis than a literary commentary in
the strict sense of the term. By saying paraphrasis I do not simply mean
that Albert endorses what I have called in the general introduction the
paraphrastic model, I do not simply mean, in other words, that Albert para-
phrases Aristotles text in the ordinary sense by explaining the meaning of
the text in different and more understandable words. My point, by con-
trast, is the more technical one that Albert does not single out sections of
Aristotles treatise and then comment on them, but rather presents a con-
tinuous exposition which directly incorporates single passages of the text.
This is easily realised when Alberts Metaphysics is compared to one of his
main sources, i.e. Averroess Long Commentary. Unlike Alberts, Averroess
commentary is essentially build around a series of comments on large quo-
tations from Aristotles text. The reader is supposed first to go through Aris-
totles text and then to have recourse to Averroess comments for a valuable
interpretation of Aristotles thought. Alberts writing, by contrast, somehow
replaces Aristotles text, and Aristotles words figure only as part of Alberts
unbroken exposition.
In another sense, however, Alberts Metaphysics goes much beyond a sim-
ple paraphrasis. This point can be seen by comparison with Aquinass Expo-
sitio Metaphysicorum, written a few years later than Alberts commentary.
Although, as we have seen, Aquinass exposition is full of significant, doc-
trinal insights and reflects a strong understanding of Aristotles text, from a
structural point of view it is nothing but a brilliant line-by-line explanation
of Aristotle, where important doctrinal points are often confined to digres-
sions or explanatory notes. Alberts commentary, by contrast, has more
1 For information about the chronology of Alberts works see Weisheipl (1980). For an
introduction to his intellectual enterprise see: De Libera (1990) and (2005).

326 chapter four
the character of a treatise. The sections containing a paraphrase of Aristo-

tles Metaphysics are in fact integrated into a larger discourse, where Albert
expounds a general metaphysical theory. Of course, Alberts agenda is set
by the different sections of Aristotles text and the resulting metaphysical
theory is supposed to be Aristotles. But this result is not achievedor not
only achievedby providing an interpretation of single passages of Aristo-
tles treatise, but rather by, in some sense, rewriting Aristotles Metaphysics
and turning it into a more systematic exposition. If there is a model to look
at in this respect, it is probably Avicenna. Admittedly, the Arabic philoso-
phers operation is much more radical than Alberts in that Avicenna does
away with any sort of literal exposition of Aristotle to opt for, instead, an
independent and self-contained treatise on the very issues Aristotle deals
with in his works. However, Alberts craving for systematicity in the sense
specified is clearly influenced by the general structure of Avicennas writ-
ings.
The foregoing considerations about the structural features of Alberts
Metaphysics do not imply that Alberts commentary on Met. Z has no exeget-
ical value. On the contrary, Albert certainly provides a rather consistent and
general interpretation of the book. It is clear, however, that Albert imposes
on Aristotles text a well-defined and to some extent extraneous structure
and injects into it a good number of doctrinal and theoretical presupposi-
tions. And it is precisely in light of such a structure and of such doctrinal
presuppositions that Alberts interpretative work must be properly evalu-
ated. This general point can be illustrated both with reference to the way in
which Albert understands the articulation of the book, i.e. from the point
of view of the so-called divisio textus, and with reference to the doctrinal
interpretation of Met. Z. Let me start with the divisio textus.
The way Albert divides up the book is to some extent surprising. The
whole book is divided into five treatises, each of which is in turn subdivided
into chapters. It is the division into treatises that is particularly important
and that must first retain our attention. Here is Alberts general division:
Treatise 1: Z 15
Treatise 2: Z 69
Treatise 3: Z 1011
Treatise 4: Z 12
Treatise 5: Z 1317.
Alberts groupings do not correspond to how we, or many medieval com-
mentators, would understand the structure of the book. Z 6, for instance,
is usually grouped together with Z 4 and Z 5 to form a unitary section on
albert the greats metaphysics, book vii 327
the notion of essence. Albert, by contrast, places Z 5 in the first treatise and
Z 6 in the second. Similarly, Z 12 is often thought to belong together with
Z 1011 within a general treatment of the notion of definition. In Alberts
division, however, it constitutes by itself the entire Treatise 4. Finally, as
we have seen, Z 17 makes a fresh start with respect to Z 3s list of candi-
dates for the title of substance (by introducing the notion of substance as
cause) and hence should be isolated from the rest of Zs argument. Albert,
by contrast, groups it together with Chapters 1316, the section on univer-
sals. All these considerations can be summed up in the idea that Albert
does not use, as we are inclined to do, Z 3s list of four candidates for the
title of substance as an agenda and a principle of structure for the entire
book.
Alberts reconstruction of Zs argument becomes more understandable
if one considers Alberts systematic approach as well as his intention of
imposing on Aristotles text a well-defined and orderly structure. In this
perspective, it becomes only natural that each treatise of Alberts division
should centre on one main theme of interest around which he then groups
the different chapters of the modern division. For instance: the main theme
of Alberts Treatise 1 is the nature of accidents. This explains why Z 1 belongs
in the same treatise as Z 4 and 5. First, Aristotle clarifies the ontological sta-
tus of accidents, that is the way in which they depend on substance (Z 1),
and then, further on (Z 45), he examines the way in which the essence and
definition of accidents compares to that of substances. Thus, Z 45 is not as
much a general treatment of essence as a specific discussion on the essence
and definition of accidents. The issue of the essence or quiddity of sub-
stances, which is probably the pivotal theme of Book VII of Alberts Meta-
physics, receives full treatment in Treatise 3 (Z 1011), the treatise on essence
and definition, more than in Treatise 1. Similar considerations account for
the fact that Z 6 is grouped together with Z 79 and not with Z 45. Fol-
lowing Averroes, Albert holds that both Z 6, the chapter on the identity
between a thing and its essence, and Z 79, the section on generation,
have a strongly anti-Platonic character. More particularly, Z 6 shows that
Platos separate essences cannot explain the being and knowability of sen-
sible substances, while Z 79 prove that they cannot explain how sensible
substances come into being, either. On this reading, therefore, Z 6 should
naturally go together with the section on generation, as the first moment
of a two-part critique of Platos doctrine of separate essences. On Alberts
systematic understanding of the structure of the book, also Z 17s presence
within the section on universals becomes more explainable. Albert is not
unaware that Z 17 marks a fresh start with respect to the rest of Book Zs
328 chapter four
argument.2 However, this consideration is for him less decisive than the con-
nection he sees between the chapter and Aristotles treatment of universals.
The main task of the section on universals (Z 1316) is to show that the uni-
versal, at least according to Platos understanding thereof, is neither a formal
principle of individual sensible objects nor a part of them. Z 17, by contrast,
makes clear what the formal principle of individual sensible objects is like
by clarifying, in opposition to Platos theory, the real nature of the essence
or quiddity, which is the substance of sensible objects. Such a clarification is
carried out by showing in which sense the essence or quiddity is a cause or
explanation of the being of sensible objects. Thus, on Alberts reconstruc-
tion, Treatise 5 (Z 1317) naturally falls into two parts, one containing an
extensive criticism of Platos conception of essence and the other introduc-
ing Aristotles own views on this very notion. Only the privileged position of
Z 12, which occupies by itself the entire Treatise 4, remains slightly awkward.
However, Treatise 4 is very short and hence it may simply be the case that
Albert wished to distinguish the question of the unity of definition, which
is the theme of Z 12 and so of Treatise 4, from the different question of the
object of definition, which Aristotle deals with in Z 1011 and Albert takes
up in Treatise 3. After all, the two issues are clearly related, but remain dis-
tinct.
To move away from Alberts divisio textus, the sense in which the Domini-
can Master imposes on Aristotles text a well-defined theoretical structure
can also be grasped from a more genuinely doctrinal point of view. In many
respects, Alberts understanding of Met. Z is strongly indebted to Averroess
Long Commentary on the Metaphysics. There are several sections in par-
ticular where Averroess influence on Albert is particularly evident. The
discussion of the essence and the definition of accidents in Z 45 and the
treatment of generation in Z 79 are clearly two cases in point. Furthermore,
at a more general level, Averroess contention that Met. Z contains a well-
recognisable anti-Platonic line of argument plays a certain role in Alberts
reconstruction of the book as much as it does in Aquinass case. However, it
is not Averroes who provides Albert with the main theoretical tool to under-
stand Aristotles theory of substance in Met. Z, but rather Avicenna. It is in
fact Alberts endorsement of Avicennas doctrine of essence, and of all the
distinctions it brings along with it, that shapes his general understanding
of Aristotles doctrine of substance. This is a fact which is in itself rather
significant. For obvious reasons, i.e. since Averroes fundamentally opposes
2 Cf. Albert, Met., Lib. VII, tr. 5, c. 8, Opera Omnia, XV, pp. 383, 73384, 3.
Avicennas doctrine of essence and in particular the essence-existence dis-

tinction that such a doctrine presupposes, Avicennas doctrine of essence
does not play any role in Averroess interpretation of Book Z. But Aquinas
too, who is more sympathetic towards Avicennas doctrine of essence and
endorses it in several contexts, makes little use of it in his commentary on Z.
As a matter of fact, he employs it only locally, i.e. to understand Aristotles
claim in Z 13 that universals are not substances. Avicennas doctrine is par-
ticularly useful in this context because it enables us to distinguish universal-
ity from the nature to which universality is attributed. As for the rest, how-
ever, Aquinas interprets Book Z in the light of a more Aristotelian notion
of essence, deprived of any particular Avicennian connotations. Albert, by
contrast, does not confine himself to using Avicennas doctrine to under-
stand the section on universals, but rather makes of it the fundamental
instrument to put into focus fundamental notions such as that of essence
and form. Therefore, Alberts general interpretation of Book Z cannot be
comprehended without taking into account his peculiar reading of Avi-
cennas doctrine of essence.
In this chapter, I shall take up some important themes from each of
Alberts five treatises and try to show how their treatment has implications
for the Dominican Masters interpretation of Book Z s argument and doc-
trine. Before doing so, however, I shall start with a brief presentation of
Alberts general interpretation of the book and try to flesh out the idea that
it is mainly guided by his reading of Avicennas doctrine of essence.
1. Alberts Interpretation of Book Z and

Avicennas Doctrine of Essence
Met. Zs characteristic claim is that the form of sensible objects is primary

substance. In Chs. 2 and 3, we saw that Averroes and Aquinas, whether they
accept Aristotles claim as it stands or not, interpret it as being about the
form of sensible objects as opposed to matter, i.e. the form understood as an
ontological constituent of sensible objects. Aquinas, for instance, does not
accept Aristotles view as it stands. For Thomas, the form of sensible objects
is not primary substance, at least if this is taken to mean that form is more
substance than the composite of matter and form. At best, form can be the
substance of sensible objects, the principle or constituent that is responsible
for their substantiality. There is another important piece of doctrine that
Aquinas rejects, namely the claim that the form of sensible objects is their
essence. For Aquinas, the essence of sensible objects is distinct from their
330 chapter four
form with respect to its content in that it contains common matter in addi-
tion to form. However, whether he accepts Aristotles main theses as they
stand or interprets them differently, Thomas believes that it is form under-
stood as a constituent of sensible objects that Aristotle is talking about. This
is all the more true in the case of Averroes. For, if my reconstruction is cor-
rect, Averroes endorses both of Aristotles claims, i.e. that form is primary
substance and that it is the essence of sensible objects. And in this case as
well, it seems clear to me that it is form taken as an ontological constituent
of sensible objects that he is speaking of.
Alberts understanding of Aristotles general doctrine in Met. Z is more
complex in many respects. At the very beginning of his exposition of Met.
Z, Albert tries to fix the main subject of the book. He observes, in line with
Aristotles general doctrine, that Zs enquiry mainly concerns the principles
of substance and that it is especially form that plays the role of principle
of substanceby which he means, presumably, the substantial principle of
sensible objects.3 Albert, however, immediately adds that the nature of form
can be determined in two different ways.4 (i) In one way, in so far as form is
the whole being (totum esse) and the quiddity of a primary substance (i.e.
of a sensible object), which is signified by a definition.5 (ii) In another way,
in so far as it is a certain form (forma) and a nature different from matter and
hence constitutes together with matter a composite of matter and form.6 In
this second sense, form is sometimes called quiddity in a broad sense of
the term, although improperly.7 Albert concludes that it is form considered
in the first way, as quiddity, that is the object of Met. Zs enquiry, while
form considered in the second way, form in the standard sense as opposed
to matter, will be under investigation in Book .8 Albert does not express
himself in so many words in Tr. 1, c. 1, but it seems clear, from what he says
elsewhere in Books VII and VIII of his Metaphysics, that it is one and the
same entity that can be considered in one way or another.9 It is one and the
same entity, in other words, that, when taken in one way, plays the role of
quiddity and, when taken in another, plays the role of form. Depending on
3 Cf. Albert, Met., Lib. VII, tr. 1, c. 1, p. 316, 1028.

4 Cf. Albert, Met., Lib. VII, tr. 1, c. 1, p. 316, 29 ff.
8 Cf. Albert, Met., Lib. VII, tr. 1, c. 1, p. 316, 3234 and 3941.
9 For some texts that seem to be very explicit on this particular point see: Albert, Met.,
Lib. VII, tr. 1, c. 5, pp. 322, 79323, 14; tr. 3, c. 2, pp. 356, 69357, 4. See also: tr. 5, c. 1, p. 373,
1334 (which I discuss below).
how one takes it, form acquires different properties with respect to that of
which it is the form. For instance, when taken as quiddity, form expresses
the whole being of the object of which it is the quiddity and is predicated
of it. This is in line with Alberts claim that, when taken in this way, form is
the quiddity signified by a definition. When taken as a part of the sensible
object, however, form is not predicated of it, in observance of Avicennas
principle that a part is never predicated of the whole of which it is part.
At first sight, it might seem that Albert is simply echoing here Aver-
roess doctrine to the effect that there is no real distinction between form
and species or, to use Aquinass wording in reporting Averroess doctrine,
between forma partis and forma totius.10 This impression, however, is rather
deceptive. For the notion of form as quiddity or essence which Albert
employs throughout his commentary on Met. Z comes from a different
source, i.e. Avicennas doctrine of essence. This is clear from the fact that
Albert introduces Avicennas doctrine of essence immediately after distin-
guishing the two senses of forma I have just considered.11 Thus, it is impos-
sible to understand what Albert has to say about Aristotles doctrine in Met.
Z without first explaining his peculiar reading of Avicennas doctrine of
essence and universals. This should enable us to tackle some crucial ques-
tions concerning Zetas most characteristic claims: since Albert believes
that the book is concerned with form taken as quiddity or essence, what
is the relation between the quiddity and the sensible object of which it is
the quiddity? Which of them is substance in the primary sense and accord-
ing to which criteria? Moreover: What is the ontological status of form in
the sense of quiddity?
Understanding Alberts peculiar version of Avicennas doctrine of es-
sence is difficult for at least three reasons. First, Albert interweaves Avi-
cennas doctrine of essence with a partly different conceptual scheme, that
is the Neoplatonic doctrine of the three states of a universal (ante rem, in
re, post rem).12 Second, the Dominican Master complicates Avicennas neat
and linear doctrine through a series of conceptual and semantic distinc-
tions, i.e. by adding on to the list of the ways in which an essence can be
considered or signified. Finally, Albert deals with the notions of essence
10 Cf. Aquinas, Exp. Metaph, Lib. VII, lect. 9, n. 1467.

12 Cf. Albert, Met., Lib. V, tr. 6, c. 5; Lib. VII, tr. 5, c. 1, pp. 372, 48373, 67. Of course, Avicenna
himself makes use of the doctrine of the three states of a universal and integrates it into his
general system. Nonetheless, it is clear that such a doctrine is not the same thing as his theory
of essence, and so it is better to keep the two conceptual schemes distinct.
332 chapter four
and universal in several places in his Metaphysics.13 Although the differ-

ent treatments agree in their fundamental traits, they differ in some points
of detailwhich makes a general reconstruction particularly hard. Here, I
wish to present an outline of Alberts main distinctions, especially in so far
as they bear on Aristotles theory of substance.14 To start with, let me brush
aside the doctrine of the three states of a universal, which I shall take up
again in Section 6 when dealing with Met. Z 1317, and focus, instead, on the
more Avicennian line of thought.
Albert holds that a general, substantial term, say man, has both a pri-
mary and a secondary meaning. According to its primary meaning, it refers
to that in virtue of which the term itself is imposed; according to its sec-
ondary meaning, by contrast, it refers to that to which it is imposed.15 Thus,
in its primary meaning man refers to the form of man, say humanity, in
virtue of which everything that is called man is so called. When considered
in this way, such a form is absolutely simple, i.e. displays no composition,
and hence has no definition, in that a definition presupposes at least com-
position in terms of genus and differentia.16 In its secondary meaning, by
contrast, man does not refer to the form in virtue of which the term is
imposed, but to that to which it is imposed, which is the substance of man.
Such a substance is composed of genus and differentia and hence is that to
which definition can be properly attributed.17 Although Albert is not entirely
consistent on this point, it seems natural to think that Avicennas doctrine
of essence applies, strictly speaking, to Alberts secondary meaning of sub-
stantial terms.18 For Avicenna maintains that an essence, when considered
13 See, to mention only the main discussions: Albert, Met., Lib. V, tr. 1, c. 57; Lib. VII, tr. 1,
c. 1, p. 316, 4764; tr. 2, c. 1, pp. 338, 48340, 5; tr. 5, c. 1, pp. 372, 48373, 67. But references to
the doctrine of essence and universals are scattered throughout Alberts exposition of Book
Zs doctrine.
14 In outlining Alberts general position, I shall take as a guiding text the discussion in
Met., Lib. VII, tr. 5, c. 1, pp. 372, 48373, 67 which, I think, clarifies many difficult points of
detail. However, I do not think that the account which Albert presents in the other texts is
fundamentally different in so far as the crucial aspects of his doctrine are concerned.
15 Cf. Albert, Met., Lib. VII, tr. 2, c. 1, p. 339, 1321; tr. 5, c. 1, pp. 372, 59373, 13. See also: tr.
1, c. 1, p. 316, 4755.
16 Cf. Albert, Met., Lib. VII, tr. 2, c. 1, p. 339, 2123 together with tr. 3, c. 2, pp. 356, 69357,
11. See also: tr. 1, c. 1, p. 316, 4755.

18 In Met., Lib. VII, tr. 2, c. 1, p. 339, 21 ff., for instance, Albert seems to introduce a series of
semantic distinctions (a series of ways of considering and signifying an essence) with regard
to both the first and the second meaning of an essence. Such distinctions are moulded upon
Avicennas general opposition between essence in itself and essence as existing in something
or other. Alberts oscillations, however, are explainable if we take into account that the two
in itself or absolutely, possesses only the properties that are indicated in its
definition. All the other propertiessuch as for instance being one or many,
being universal or particulardo not belong to an essence in itself but only
as a result of its acquiring a certain being, a certain mode of existence. Now,
since it is only according to Alberts secondary meaning of a substantial term
that an essence has a definition, it is natural to think that Avicennas essence
in itself is mainly associated with Alberts secondary meaning. This first con-
sideration invites another one. As we have seen, Albert observes that Met. Z
is mainly concerned with the quiddity of substance which is signified by a
definition. Thus, it seems that the main object of Zetas investigation into
substance is the referent of Alberts secondary meaning of a substantial
term, i.e. the essence of sensible things which can be spelt out in a defi-
nition. This is confirmed by Alberts frequent remarks in his commentary
to the effect that the object of Zs enquiry is the essence of sensible sub-
stances, to which definition properly pertains. What I have just said about
Alberts doctrine should not be taken too rigidly. After all, some texts clearly
indicate that the two meanings of a substantial term do not point to two
distinct entities in reality, but rather reflect two different ways of consider-
ing one and the same entity.19 This explains why considerations about the
first meaning of a substantial term can sometimes be transferred to the sec-
ond and vice versa.20 However, for the sake of clarity, it is better to think of
Avicennas doctrine as mainly concerned with the second meaning of sub-
stantial terms, i.e. with the essence which is spelt out in a definition.
According to Avicennas doctrine, an essence, when considered in itself
or absolutely, only possesses those attributes or properties that are indi-
cated in its definition. The other attributes or properties belong to an es-
sence only in so far as it acquires a certain mode of existence. As is known,
Avicenna admits of two different modes of existence, extra-mental and
mental existence. The different modes of existence are accidental to the
essence taken in itself in the broad sense of accidental, i.e. in that they fall
outside the definition of the essence. They are not accidental, however, if
by accidental we mean something a thing may indifferently possess or not
possess. For, necessarily, an essence either exists mentally or extra-mentally
meanings of an essence do not introduce two different entities in reality, but only one entity
considered in two different ways.
19 Cf. in particular Albert, Met., Lib. VII, tr. 2, c. 1, p. 339, 13ff. (where there is no hint that
Albert is introducing two distinct kinds of entity); tr. 5, c. 1, pp. 372, 59373, 13.
20 Compare, for instance, Albert, Met., Lib. VII, tr. 2, c. 1 with the parallel treatment in Met.,
Lib. VII, tr. 5, c. 1.

334 chapter four
and hence mental and extra-mental existence are disjunctively necessary

(though non-essential) features of an essence. Although he basically follows
Avicennas lead, Albert slightly complicates the Arabic philosophers gen-
eral scheme. In Treatise 5, for instance, Albert lists three different kinds of
being in relation to which an essence can be considered and consequently
be said to possess properties.21 The last kind of being, in turn, can be consid-
ered in two different ways. (1) An essenceAlbert explainscan be con-
sidered according to the being it has in so far as it is an irradiation of the
First Intelligence.22 When so taken, an essence happens to be in the possi-
ble intellect as an object of thought. Thus, Alberts (1) is Avicennas mental
existence of an essence, which is grounded, as it were, from above in the
light of the Divine Intelligence, in accordance with Alberts endorsement of
ante rem universals existing in the Divine Intellect. (2) Secondly, an essence
can be considered according to the being it happens to have in matter. And
in such a way, it is the actuality of matter.23 (2) seems to correspond to the
standard, Aristotelian notion of form as opposed to matter. (3) Finally, an
essence can be considered according to the being it has in extra-mental
individuals.24 This way of existence of an essence can in turn be considered
in two different ways, (3i) according to potentiality and aptitude and (3ii)
according to actuality. According to (3i), i.e. potentiality and aptitude, an
essence is multipliable in the different particulars and so is in this sense
universal.25 Later on, Albert adds that it is according to its being multipli-
able that an essence is predicated of the individuals into which it can be
multiplied.26 This is reasonable enough, for an essence can be predicated of
the individuals of which it is the essence only in so far as it is thought of
as multiply instantiable and participable.27 According to (3ii), i.e. in actual-
ity, an essence is a particular supposit, i.e. an individual of a certain kind
or nature (sub natura communi demonstratum).28 As Albert suggests else-
where, an essence retains its potentiality to be multipliable and predicable
even when it exists in actuality in particular supposits.29 Throughout his dis-
21Cf. Albert, Met., Lib. VII, tr. 5, c. 1, p. 373, 1344.

22Cf. Albert, Met., Lib. VII, tr. 5, c. 1, p. 373, 2023.
27 For a particularly explicit text in this sense, see: Albert, Met., Lib. VII, tr. 3, c. 2, pp. 356,
74357, 4.
cussion of the different ways of existence of an essence, Albert holds on

to Avicennas tenet that an essence must exist in some way or other. An
essence must exist in some thing or other, and never exists in separation
from some mode of existence or other, even though the different modes of
existence, the different beings it acquires, remain external to its nature and
definition. Another observation may be added in this context. Alberts (2),
(3i) and (3ii) all concern the extra-mental existence of an essence. This sug-
gests that they are not three different modes of existence, but three ways
of articulating the notion of extra-mental existence, i.e. three ways of con-
sidering an essence when it exists in the extra-mental individuals. It is one
and the same essence that can be considered as in (2), (3i) and (3ii). How-
ever, talking about different ways of considering an essence does not seem
to be, in this particular instance, entirely innocuous from a metaphysical
point of view. For the essence takes on very different and even incompatible
properties depending on how it is considered. According to (2), for instance,
an essence is opposed to matter and so is a part of the individual, while,
according to (3ii), it seems to be identical with the whole of the individual.
Finally, according to (3i), it seems to coincide with the individual but not to
be fully identical with it, in that the essence possesses some properties
being multipliable and predicablethat the individual does not possess.
Thus, even if I am inclined to think that (2), (3i) and (3ii) do not mark com-
pletely unrelated modes of existence of an essence, their status with respect
to the general notion of extra-mental existence is not entirely clear. Albert,
in other words, should have made it more clear what the different ways of
considering an extra-mentally existing essence consist in.
Be that as it may, Alberts general classification of the different ways in
which an essence can be taken to exist already enables us to clarify some
crucial points of his understanding of Met. Z. As we have seen, when he
tries to fix Zs general objectives, Albert distinguishes between two senses
of forma, i.e. forma as essence or quiddity and forma in the standard Aris-
totelian sense, form as opposed to matter. Book Zs main concern is forma
in the sense of essence or quiddity. Now, Alberts distinction of two senses
of forma fits in very nicely with his treatment of essence and existence in
Treatise 5. Forma in the sense of form as opposed to matter corresponds to
(2), while forma in the sense of quiddity seems to go together with (3i), i.e.
essence taken as multipliable and communicable. The equivalence between
forma in the sense of essence and (3i) is established by the fact that they
share one distinguishing feature, i.e. they are both predicable of the individ-
ual of which they are, respectively, forma and quiddity. Thus, it is essence in
the sense of (3i), essence understood as multipliable and predicable, that is
336 chapter four
the essence and substance of sensible objects. And it is essence in the sense
of (3i) that Met. Z is about.30
With the foregoing distinctions in mind, we can now tackle the main
issue concerning Alberts general interpretation of Met. Z: What is the rela-
tionship between the quiddity and the individuals of which it is the quid-
dity? Which of them is primary substance and according to which criteria?
In the course of his discussion of essence in Treatise 5, Albert puts weight
on the fact that the essence, whether one takes it as in (2), (3i) or (3ii), is
not a per se existing being, but rather the substantial being of the things
of which it is the essence.31 Essence, in other words, is not an independent
object, but the substantial principle of an independent object. This suggests
that the composite of matter and form holds some kind of existential priority
over its essence. For an essence exists, extra-mentally, only in the individu-
als of which it is the essence. This, however, is not the end of the story. For
Albert, in a couple of places in Treatise 1, explicitly raises the question as to
the relationships of priority and posteriority between the essence and the
individual of which it is the essence. In Tr. 1, c. 2, for instance, he remarks
that the essence depends on the individual according to being (secundum
esse), i.e. existentially.32 This is the reason why Aristotle in the Categories
calls sensible individuals primary substances and their essences, i.e. the
natures signified by universal terms such as man or horse, secondary
substances.33 Sensible individuals are primary because they do not depend
for their existence on their essences, while their essences do depend on
them for their existence. Albert adds, however, that essence is prior to the
individual in the way in which a principle is prior to the thing of which it is
the principle.34 Presumably, what Albert means is that essence is prior to the
individual in nature, that is an individual is what it is because it has a cer-
tain essence. Thus, Alberts text at least establishes a mutual dependence
between essence and individual, although with respect to different orders
of dependence. In Tr. 1, c. 5, however, Albert goes back to the issue of priority
and posteriority to make it clear that the kind of priority an essence holds
over the individuals is ontologically more significant than that that individ-
uals hold over their essence.35 The context of Alberts remarks is Aristotles
30 Cf. Albert, Met., Lib. VII, tr. 3, c. 2, pp. 356, 74357, 4, where Albert is as explicitly as he
can be on this particular point.

discussion of subjecthood in Met. Z 3. As is known, in Z 3 Aristotle discusses

the idea that to be a primary substance is to be an ultimate subject. The main
line of argument seems to be that the subject criterion is insufficient to char-
acterise substantiality in that it points to the wrong candidate for the title
of substance, i.e. matter. But matter cannot be primary substance because
it does not satisfy other, and more significant, criteria of substantiality. For
Albert, Aristotles criteria of substantiality are fundamentally two and both
point to forma, i.e. quiddity or essence, as the right candidate for the title
of substance.36 First, Albert remarks, what counts as a primary being, i.e. a
primary substance, must be separable from matter according to its essence,
i.e. must not depend on matter for what it is.37 And form/essence depends
on matter only for its being or existence, but not for what it is.38 Second, a
primary substance must be the entity that, in virtue of its essential actuality,
i.e. in virtue of being in actuality what it is, makes everything that is some-
thing be what it is.39 And form/essence perfectly satisfies this criterion as
well.40 As can be seen, Alberts two criteria are nothing but loose renderings
of Aristotles notion of being separable and being a . While Aristo-
tle clearly indicates that being separable and being a apply to both
form and the composite, Alberts very formulation of the two criteria sug-
gests that he wants them to single out forma in the sense of essence. After
presenting the two criteria, in fact, Albert takes the opportunity to explain
in some more detail the relationship between the individual composite of
matter and form and its essence and so to settle the issue of the conflict
between Aristotles ontology in the Catagories and Met. Zs investigation
into substance.41 Albert observes that it is sometimes said that substance in
the primary sense of the term is the individual in the category of substance,
such as a particular man or a particular cow.42 This is clearly Aristotles con-
ception of primary substance in the Categories. Albert adds, however, that it
is not according to this conception that Aristotle evaluates primary substan-
tiality in the Metaphysics.43 For substantiality can be evaluated according to
two different intuitions: (i) either it indicates the relation of priority that the
subject holds over the things which it underlies and which are predicated of

338 chapter four
it; (ii) or it points to what is the true essence in itself and so is the cause of the
essence of other things.44 According to the first intuition, substance is that
which is not predicated of anything else, i.e. an ultimate subject of predica-
tion. This is the position Aristotle takes in the Categories, where he studies
the relationship between the predicables and their subject.45 In the Meta-
physics, by contrast, he clearly follows the second intuition, which points
toward what is a true entity, i.e. to the actuality which does not depend on
anything else for being what it is, but rather confers upon other things the
characters that make of them what they are.46 Such an entity is the essence
of sensible objects such as Albert describes it throughout Book VII of his
Metaphysics. Alberts remark also contains a timid attempt at reconciling
the Categories ontology with Aristotles views in the Metaphysics along the
lines of the opposition between a more logical approach (the Categories)
and a more metaphysical and realistic one (the Metaphysics). However, his
main line of argument is contrastive. It is the Metaphysics that investigates
the real nature of things and so it is the essences of particular objects, more
than particular objects themselves, that should be taken to be primary sub-
stances.
Against this background, it does not come as a surprise that Albert con-
siderably plays down the role of the subject criterion of substantiality which
Aristotle discusses in Met. Z 3. Admittedly, Albert regards the argument
leading to the conclusion that matter is the ultimate subject and so pri-
mary substancethe famous stripping-away argumentas fallacious and
invalid.47 After all, the ultimate subject of predication is not matter, but
rather the composite of matter and form, i.e. the individual sensible sub-
stance. This strongly suggests that the application of the subject criterion
Aristotle explores in Z 3 is, all things considered, an incorrect one. But even
if the subject criterion is applied correctly, it remains inadequate, for Albert,
to single out the entity which is substance in the primary sense of the term,
i.e. the essence of sensible objects. For the criterion seems to identify pri-
mary substances with the composites of matter and form, and not with their
essence. Moreover, Alberts peculiar interpretation of Aristotles list of four
candidates for the title of substance should be read in the wider context of

47 For Alberts detailed reconstruction of the stripping-away argument see: Met., Lib. VII,
c. 5, pp. 323, 35325, 4. On pp. 324, 26325, 4 Albert first singles out and then strongly criticises
the four main assumptions behind the view that matter turns out to be primary substance.
his understanding of Aristotles criteria of substantiality.48 As is known, the

items on Aristotles list of candidates are essence (quid erat esse), the uni-
versal, the genus and the subject. On Alberts interpretation, the first three
items on Aristotles list all refer to one single entity and so to one single can-
didate for the title of substance, i.e. forma taken in the sense of essence. As
Albert makes clear, the expression quid erat esse picks out essence taken as
an object of definition and hence as predicable of the different particulars
possessing it.49 Moreover, the association between essence and universal is
typical in the Avicennian tradition. For it is essence in itself, essence abso-
lutely considered, that happens to be universal according to one of its modes
of existence, i.e. mental existence.50 As a matter of fact, it is often in the
course of a clarification of the notion of universal that both Avicenna and
Albert introduce the issue of essence. Finally, the genus is some sort of con-
ceptual constituent of essence taken as an object of definition, and so is
predicable of the particulars falling under it.51 The genus, therefore, must
be discussed and understood within the general treatment of essence. Of
course, there is a Platonic understanding of the notions of quid erat esse,
universal and genus, which should be rejected.52 But, when understood cor-
rectly, such notions enables one to grasp and give content to Aristotles
notion of essence. All in all, therefore, there are only two candidates for the
title of substance, essence and the subject. On one (and incorrect) under-
standing, the subject should be identified with matter; on another (and
correct) understanding, it is the composite of matter and form, i.e. the indi-
vidual sensible substance. On either understanding, however, essence holds
primacy over the subject.
Let me sum up the main results of my analysis of Alberts general inter-
pretation of Book Zeta. The main thesis I have been arguing for in this sec-
tion is that Met. Zs main claim, i.e. that form is primary substance, should be
read, according to Albert, in light of Avicennas doctrine of essence. Form
should be taken in the sense of essence and essence should be taken as an
object of definition, i.e. as the thing to which definition primarily belongs.
Moreover, the essence Albert is talking about throughout Book VII of his
Metaphysics is Avicennas essence in itself, considered according to one par-
ticular mode of existence, i.e. its potential existence in particulars. It is when
48 Cf. Albert, Met., Lib. VII, tr. 1, c. 5, pp. 322, 36323, 34.
49 Cf. Albert, Met., Lib. VII, tr. 1, c. 5, p. 322, 4347; 323, 28.
340 chapter four
associated with this particular mode of existence that an essence is multi-

plied and hence predicable of the particulars of which it is the essence. It is
when associated with this mode of existence that the essence is the essence
of and so the substance of the particulars in which it exists.
2. Treatise 1: A Deflationary Account of Accidents
As I have already pointed out, the central theme of Alberts Treatise 1 (Z 1

5) is the nature of accidents and their relationship to substance. In Z 1
5 Aristotle defends two main claims concerning the nature of accidents:
C1) accidents depend on substance existentially, i.e. accidents depend on
substance for their very existence in that they exist or inhere in substances;
C2) accidents depend on substance essentially, i.e. the definition of a certain
kind of accident must make reference to the kind of substance the accident
in question invariably inheres in. C1) is mainly advanced in Z 1, even if it is in
keeping with Aristotles treatment of the relation in Met. 13 and in
some sense also underlies the logical treatment of essence in Z 4 and 5. C2)
is argued for at length in Z 5, even if it is already hinted at in Z 1, 1028a3436.
Thus, it is in Alberts commentary on Z 1 and Z 45 that we have to look for
an interpretation of both claims.
The only account of the nature of accidents that C1) and C2) rule out is
one that totally eliminates accidents from the ontology. For C1) and C2)
clearly presuppose that accidents do exist and are real, even if they may
turn out to be radically dependent entities. However, endorsing C1) and C2)
does not by itself tell us what kind of reality one should assign to accidents.
Although all medieval commentators accept in some sense or other C1)
and C2), they are at variance as to the precise sense in which accidents
are real. For instance, one might argue that not all the different kinds of
accident are fully real, but only some of them are so. A distinction might
be drawn in this connection between absolute properties (qualities and
quantities), which are fully real, and relational properties (all the other kinds
of accident), which on the contrary have no mind-independent existence.
And further arguments could be provided to eliminate even one of the
two absolute categories thereby reducing the ontology to only two kinds
of entity, substance and one kind of accidental property. What is important
to stress, however, is that, whether one takes all the kinds of accident to
be real or only some of them, different views can be advanced as to the
ontological contributions provided by accidental properties. It is with this
general observation in mind, I think, that we have to evaluate Alberts
understanding of Aristotles doctrine of accidents. For throughout Treatise

1 Albert seems to present a rather deflationary account of the ontological
role of accidents. In other words, even though Albert does not deny that
accidents are in some sense real, he tends to play down their independent
ontological contribution and rather emphasises their radical dependence
on the substances they exist in. Such a general idea can be seen at work
in the interpretation of both C1) and C2). Generally speaking, Claim C1)
has to do with particular accidents in that it is particular accidents that,
according to Aristotles doctrine, primarily inhere in particular sensible
substances, while Claim C2) concerns kinds of accident, for it is presumably
kinds of accident that we define when we define accidents. As to C1), Albert
maintains that an accident, i.e. a particular accident, is nothing other than
a particular substance under an accidental kind of being. An accident, in
other words, is nothing other than a particular substance existing in a
certain way. What is true of the concrete existence of accidents, is also true
of their essence and definition. Thus, with regard to C2), Albert holds that an
accident can be ordered and constituted into a kind, and so be defined, only
because it is a certain way in which a substance exists, only because, in other
words, the definition of an accident is the definition of a substance existing
in a certain way. From C1) and C2) Albert concludes that the principles of
substance simply are the principles of accidents.53 In the rest of this section,
I wish to say something more about Alberts reading of both C1) and C2).
Let me start with C1), the existential dependence of accidents on sub-
stances. There are two different formulae which Albert employs throughout
Treatise 1 to defend his deflationary account of accidents. An accident
Albert saysis a certain substance under such-and-such a being, i.e. the
being corresponding to the kind of accident in question;54 hence, an acci-
dent is just a mode of a substance, i.e. a way a substance is.55 The two
formulae are equivalent and point to the same general idea, namely that
accidents can be reduced to substances being in a certain way and hence
an accident is nothing but a certain way in which a substance exists.56 The
paleness of Socrates is nothing other than Socrates being in a certain way,
i.e. being pale, and hence the paleness of Socrates is simply a way Socrates

54 Cf., for instance, Albert, Met., Lib. VII, tr. 1, c. 1, p. 316, 6668; 7074; c. 2, p. 318, 4852;
c. 7, p. 327, 9498.
55 Cf., for instance, Albert, Met., Lib. VII, tr. 1, c. 1, p. 317, 2021; 4041; c. 2, p. 318, 2832;
4852; 8081, c. 7, p. 327, 9498; c. 9, p. 330, 57.

56 See in particular: Albert, Met., Lib. VII, tr. 1, c. 7, p. 327, 9498, where the two formulae
are clearly associated.

342 chapter four
is. Describing accidents as modes or ways is rather common in the con-

temporary ontological debate over the nature of properties.57 People using
the language of ways usually have two aims in view. On the one hand,
they want to make unattractive the suggestion that properties may be con-
stituents of substances. Properties are ways substances are characterised
and so cannot be constituents of them. For properties presuppose the sub-
stances of which they are the properties, while constituents do not presup-
pose the substances which they constitute. On the other hand, contem-
porary metaphysicians wish to distinguish the ontological role of objects
from that of their properties. Properties are not objects, i.e. independent
entities, but rather ways objects are characterised. It is clearly this second
use of the ways language that it is more in keeping with Alberts strategy.
Albert, however, gives the ways language a particularly deflationary flavour.
This point can be further elucidated if we compare Alberts view with some
claims of Aquinass, which could be mistakenly taken to be perfectly equiv-
alent to Alberts position.58 In Ch. 3 we saw that, in his commentary on
Met. Z 4, Aquinas maintains that accidents, in their concrete existence,
are nothing but accidental composites. Whiteness, for instance, in its con-
crete existence is nothing but a substance that is white, say Socrates that
is white. Is Aquinass claim equivalent to Alberts idea that accidents are
only substances existing in a certain way or, alternatively, that accidents
are only modes or ways of substances? I think not, for Alberts claim is prob-
ably stronger than Aquinass, as emerges from the fact that Aquinas does
not employ Alberts strong formulations and in particular does not have
recourse to the notion of modus. Thomass main point is that in reality
an accident exists only as an accidental composite, i.e. a substance with a
certain accidental property. An accidental composite is just one object, an
object with a certain property, and not many objects joined together. How-
ever, even if an accident only exists as an accidental composite, there is still
a sense in which an accidental composite is the result of two distinct entities
(even if not of two distinct objects) making up a third entity, even though in
another sense one of the two constituent entities, the accident, only exists in
its concrete existence together with the other constituent entity. The com-
position language, by contrast, is relatively absent from Alberts doctrine.
An accident is a propertied substance, a quality, for instance, is a qualified
57 Cf. for instance Levinson (1978); Martin (1980); Lowe (2006).

58 Similar claims can also be found in Averroes. As in the case of Aquinas, Averroess
remarks should not be taken in a deflationary way. For more on this see Ch. 2, Sect. 3.3 and
Ch. 5, Sect 2.2.
substance and that is it. It is not that accidents do not exist, but that they
do so only as a result of there being propertied substances. In other words,
accidents make no ontological contribution independently of the substance
of which they are modes or ways. I am not sure that Aquinas would accept
such a strong wording and this may explain why he never has recourse to
the language of modes or ways. Alberts frequent appeal to Averroess ada-
gio that an accident is not an ens, unless ens is taken to be a term derived
from esse should, I suggest, be taken in the same deflationary or at least lim-
iting sense.59 Presumably, the sense of Alberts statement is that accidents
exist not as independent beings, but only as ways in which substances are
characterised, i.e. modes of substances. To use a traditional formula which
Albert himself pushes to the extreme, accidents are not beings (entia), but
rather something of (what is) being (aliquid entis).60
Alberts general views on the nature of accidents become even clearer if
we consider his understanding of C2), the essential dependence of accidents
on substance. Alberts reading of C2) is more complex and more articulated
than his straightforward interpretation of C1). So let me start with what the
Dominican Master says in c. 1 of Treatise 1, at the very beginning of his
commentary on Met. Z.61 An accident, Albert maintains, can be taken in
two ways.62 (i) In one way, an accident expresses something of a substance
under such-and-such a being.63 As Albert makes clear a few lines later, this
first manner of taking an accident is equivalent to saying that an accident
is (or says) a substance being in a certain way or state.64 In other words, the
first way of taking an accident corresponds to the deflationary account of
accidents I have tried to elucidate above, i.e. to the real nature of accidents.
(ii) In another way, an accident expresses the very being such-and-such of
the substance in question.65 As Albert again makes clear, this second way
of taking an accident consists in isolating the accident from the substance
of which it is a mode.66 Thus, trying to define an accident according to (i)
59 Cf. Albert, Met., Lib. VII, tr. 1, c. 9, p. 330, 5759 and c. 4, p. 320, 2628 (where the adagio
is applied, though, to the level of essence and not to that of concrete existence); c. 10, pp. 333,
91334, 1 (where both the level of existence and that of essence are taken into account). For
Averroess text which Albert refers to see: Averroes, In Met., VII, t.c. 15, fol. 165G.
60 Cf. Albert, Met., Lib. VII, tr. 1, c. 2, p. 318, 5592 (esp. lin. 5565; 7578; 8789).
61 Cf. Albert, Met., Lib. VII, tr. 1, c. 1, p. 316, 66317, 62.
63 Cf. Albert, Met., Lib. VII, tr. 1, c. 1, p. 316, 6668: Potest enim accipi accidens sic, quod
dicat aliquid substantiae sub esse tali quod cadit in genere accidentis.
344 chapter four
means defining it as a mode of a substance, while defining it according

to (ii) means trying to separate it out from the substance of which it is a
mode. Now, Albert is as explicit as one can be in saying that an accident
is definable only if it is taken in way (i), while it is not intelligible at all,
if it is taken in way (ii).67 In other words, an accident can be defined only
when it is taken as a mode of a substance, i.e. when it is taken to be a
substance in a certain state. When by contrast an accident is not taken as a
mode, it will simply be a defective being and so will not be intelligible.68
Alberts way of phrasing his general point is here particularly strong. He
says, for instance, that if the substance of which an accident is a mode were
removed, nothing would remain of the nature of an accident either in reality
or in thought.69 Moreover, he contends that only when taken as a mode
of substance can an accident be ordered into a kind and so belong to one
of the accidental categories.70 In the same vein, the similar point is made
that without understanding that accidents are modes no difference and no
opposition could be introduced between substance and accidents.71 Albert
also provides a number of examples of correct definitions of accidents,
namely of definitions that bring out the real nature of accidents, their being
modes of substance.72 Thus, Alberts digression at the beginning of Treatise
1 already indicates that the radical dependence of accidents on substance
does not hold only at the level of concrete existence, but also at that of
definition and essence.
There are some difficulties with Alberts account of the essence and
definition of accidents. One is the following: How about the definitions of
accidents by genus and differentia? Should they be taken to be definitions
according to the second way of taking an accident, i.e. without substance,
and so dismissed as utterly unintelligible? There is another related difficulty
which we have already encountered when presenting Aquinass doctrine of
69 Cf. Albert, Met., Lib. VII, tr. 1, c. 1, p. 317, 79. See also: c. 3, p. 319, 1114 (accidents are not
separable from substances not because the intellect cannot distinguish between substances
and accidents, but rather because an accident would have no being and no intelligibility if it
were totally separated from substance).
70 Cf. Albert, Met., Lib. VII, tr. 1, c. 1, p. 317, 1012; 3134.
72 Cf. Albert, Met., Lib. VII, tr. 1, c. 1, pp. 316, 69317, 62. Alberts examples include: the
definitions of colour, hot, cold, wet and dry for the qualities; the definition of the continuum
for the quantities. No example is given for the other categories, whose dependence on
substanceAlbert argues (p. 317, 5760)is evident in that they are relational in character
and so presuppose the relata which they tie up.
accidents. From how Albert expresses himself it seems that all there is to
an accident is a substances being in a certain way. This suggests that in the
definition of an accident substance should figure in a direct case and hence
that there is no distinction between the definition of a substance having
a certain property and the definition of the property itself. However, in all
the definitions of accidents Albert puts forward, substance does not figure
in a direct but rather in an indirect case. A colour, for instance, is such-
and-such a quality of a substance. One may wonder, therefore, what the
relation is between the formulae where substance appears in an indirect
case and those where it appears in a direct case. Does substance appear in
recto or in obliquo in the definition of accidents? Both difficulties are solved
by Albert in his detailed treatment of the issue of the essence and definition
of accidents, which Aristotle discusses in Z 45.
Alberts interpretation of Met. Z 45 is strongly influenced by Averroess
Long Commentary. Averroess influence is evident in two characteristic
claims that somehow shape the Arabic commentators understanding of the
question of the definition of accidents. (1) The first claim says that we should
strike the right balance between two opposed and equally wrong positions,
i.e. the position of those who maintain that accidents have an essence and
a definition in exactly the same way as substances and that of those holding
that accidents have no essence and definition. Endorsing the first position
means giving too much to accidents, endorsing the second giving them too
little.73 Predictably, the solution consists in insisting that accidents do have
an essence and a definition, but only a secondary essence and a secondary
definition. Thus, like Averroes (and also Aquinas for that matter), Albert
endorses the more liberal of the two solutions to the problem of the essence
of accidents which Aristotle presents in Z 4: substances have an essence
and a definition in the primary sense of the terms, while accidents have
an essence and a definition only in a secondary sense.74 In other words, the
notions of essence and definition are structured around some kind of
structure, very similar to the structure that governs the relationship of exis-
tential dependence between substance and accidents.75 On this account,
Aristotles more restrictive solution in Z 4only substances have essence
and definition, while accidents have nonedoes not show that accidents
74 See Albert, Met., Lib. VII, tr. 1, c. 9 for Alberts discussion of the more liberal solution.
75 For Alberts discussion of analogy in the case of the relation between the essence of
substance and that of accidents see in particular: Albert, Met., Lib. VII, tr. 1, c. 9, pp. 331, 40
332, 7 (esp. 331, 73332, 7).
346 chapter four
lack any essence and definition, but only that they cannot be credited with
essence and definition in the primary sense of the term.76 In line with his
general understanding of the nature of accidents, Albert holds that acci-
dents have an essence and a definition only in that they are modes of sub-
stance, only in so far as, in other words, their intelligibility depends on
the substance of which they are the modes. The difference between sub-
stances and accidents, Albert explains, is that, unlike substances, accidents
are not essences in themselves, i.e. autonomous and per se essences, but
only something of substance, which is constituted by substance.77 Acci-
dents, therefore, have an essence only in so far as they are taken to be modes
of substance. The definition of an accident must reveal that an accident is
of such a nature as to be essentially constituted by substance and hence
include a reference to the substance of which the accident is a mode.
(2) There is another characteristic claim of Averroess, which is equally
decisive in shaping Alberts treatment of accidents, namely the view that
all problems we have in trying to define accidents stem from mistakenly
assuming that the definition of accidents behaves, logically and semanti-
cally, exactly like the definition of substances. On the contrary, the defini-
tion of accidents must behave differently, for the nature of the things we
are defining is different. This observation is clearly of much importance in
solving the puzzles concerning the definition of accidents which Aristotle
presents in Met. Z 5. As Albert points out several times, Z 5s puzzles and
difficulties have their origin in the mistaken assumption that accidents are
entities of the same kind as substances and so the definition of accidents
is exactly like that of substances.78 More precisely, the mistake consists in
assuming that the definition of an accident is the definition of an abso-
lute, i.e. an independent and per se, being and hence that the essence of an
accident is an absolute, i.e. independent and per se, essence. Accidents, by
contrast, essentially depend on the substances of which they are the modes
and so the essence of an accident is a dependent and not per se essence.
Consequently, the definition of accidents must be different from the defi-
nition of substances. The definitions of accidents are in fact definitions by
addition, that is, as Albert understands the formula, definitions where the
76 See Albert, Met., Lib. VII, tr. 1, c. 8 for Alberts discussion of the more restrictive solution.
See in particular pp. 329, 1330, 19, where Albert lays down and analyses at length the four
distinctive features of essence and definition in the primary sense of the term.
77 Cf. Albert, Met., Lib. VII, tr. 1, c. 4, p. 320, 1631 (esp. lin. 1922).
78 Cf. Albert, Met., Lib. VII, tr. 1, c. 7, p. 327, 3175; c. 10, p. 334, 624; c. 11, p. 334, 5470;
p. 335, 424; 2526; 4650.

accident is added to the subject (in order, presumably, to acquire intelligi-

bility and definability).79 And definitions by addition do not obey the same
logic and semantics as the definition of substances. Officially, Z 5s puzzles
specifically concern a particular kind of accidents, coupled accidents, i.e.
accidents that have built into their own nature a reference to the kind of
substance they invariably inhere in. Albert, however, follows very closely
Aristotle and Averroes in maintaining that also uncoupled accidents can
be reduced to coupled ones.80 Once the proper subject is specified, all acci-
dents turn out to be coupled accidents. Thus, the general considerations on
the nature of accidents which Albert presents in his commentary apply to
all accidents whatsoever.
That the definitions of accidents are different from those of substances
can be seen from the fact that they obey different rules. If we assumed in
fact that the definitions of accidents were exactly like those of substance,
puzzles and difficulties would ensue of the kind Aristotle indicates in Met.
Z 5. Albert explains in great detail how such results would follow.81 The main
rule governing primary definitions, the definitions of substances, is that the
items figuring in the definiens are present in actuality in the first concept of
the object defined, i.e. in our first understanding of the term corresponding
to the concept in question.82 To be present in the first concept of the object
defined is equivalent to or at least implies being predicated in recto and
so essentially of the object defined.83 For instance: rational and animal
are both present in actuality in the first concept of man, i.e. in our first
understanding of what being a man is and of what man signifies, and
hence figure in recto, i.e. in a direct case, in the definition of man. This
is the reason why, unlike man or rational animal, animal man cannot
be defined correctly.84 For animal is contained in actuality in the first
concept of man and hence animal man will immediately give rise, by
substitution of rational animal for man, to rational animal animal,
which contains a repetition. Suppose now that the definitions of accidents
obeyed the same rules as the definitions of substances, i.e. suppose that all
the items appearing in the definiens of accidents were present in actuality
in the first concept of the accident. This means that, in the case of snub,
79 Cf. Albert, Met., Lib. VII, tr. 1, c. 7, p. 327, 2122; c. 10, p. 333, 1718.
81 Cf. Albert, Met., Lib. VII, tr. 1, c. 7, p. 327, 3176; c. 10, p. 333, 4559; p. 334, 624; c. 11,
pp. 334, 54335, 50.

82 Cf. for instance: Albert, Met., Lib. VII, tr. 1, c. 7, p. 327, 3335. See also: c. 10, p. 334, 613.
83 Cf. for instance: Albert, Met., Lib. VII, tr. 1, c. 7, p. 327, 4548; 5456.
84 Cf. Albert, Met., Lib. VII, tr. 1, c. 10, p. 333, 6076; c. 11, p. 334, 6670; p. 335, 1724.
348 chapter four
nose would be present in actuality in the first concept of snub and hence
that it would figure in its definition in recto.85 The definition of snub could
be something like concave nose where both concave and nose are
predicated in recto of snub.86 But if this is the case, we should conclude
that the expression snub nose, exactly like the expression animal man,
contains a repetition.87 For, according to the view in question, nose is
present in actuality in the first concept of snub and so the expression snub
nose would immediately give rise, by substitution of concave nose for
snub, to concave nose nose. Since, however, snub nose seems to be,
unlike animal man, a perfectly meaningful expression we should reject
the assumption that the definitions of accidents obey the same rules as the
definitions of substances. In other words, we should abandon the idea that,
in the case of an accident, all the items figuring in the definiens are present
in actuality in the first concept of the object defined and so are predicated
of it in recto. Indeed, the subject which is mentioned in the definition of
an accident is present only potentially and not actually in the first concept
of the accident.88 This is equivalent to or at least implies the fact that the
subject figures in the definition of an accident only in obliquo, i.e. in an
indirect case. The fact that the subject is present in the first concept of the
accident only potentially explains why the expression snub nose does not
contain a repetition. Since the presence of the subject in the first concept of
the accident is only potential, when the subject is added to the accident, as
in the expression snub nose, it is separated from our first concept of the
accident in which it existed only potentially and so it is no longer present in
it.89 Thus, snub nose contains nose only once. In other words, as Averroes
would have put it, when the subject is added to the accident in expressions
such as snub nose, the potential reference to the subject contained in
snub is actualised by the addition and so nose is no longer present in
snub.90
The general aim of Alberts analysis is clear enough. The fact that the
definitions of accidents do not obey the same rules as those of substances
show that accidents have only a secondary and radically derivative kind of
essence. Incidentally, Alberts analysis also solves one of the two difficul-
ties I raised some paragraphs ago when presenting the digression at the
88 Cf. Albert, Met., Lib. VII, tr. 1, c. 7, p. 327, 6176; c. 10, p. 333, 4549; p. 334, 1316.
beginning of Treatise 1, i.e. the problem of whether the definition of acci-

dents is simply equivalent to the definition of the corresponding acciden-
tal compositeand so includes a reference to its subject in rectoor not.
From Alberts words in fact it clearly emerges that the subject appears in
the definition of an accident only in obliquo and so the definition of an acci-
dent is not unqualifiedly equivalent to that of the corresponding accidental
composite. This point, however, should not be misunderstood. In Alberts
eyes, the subjects being mentioned in an indirect case in the definition of
an accident is a sign of the fact that the substance plays a causal role in
constituting the essence of the accident.91 Admittedly, Albert distinguishes
between being causally responsible for the constitution of an essence and
being part of an essence: substance plays a crucial, causal role in the con-
stitution of the essence of an accident, but is not part of it, at least when
we consider the essence corresponding to the first concept of an accident.92
This is, however, not an implausible view for Albert to take. For, even if, as I
have insisted, Albert presents a rather deflationary account of the nature of
accidents, he never denies that accidents are real. Our talk of properties cer-
tainly add something ontologically relevant to our talk of substances alone.
After all, to deflate is not to eliminate. What Albert puts emphasis on is that
both the existence and the essence of accidents are radically dependent on
substance and hence the most correct way of describing the nature of acci-
dents is by talking of radically dependent modes of substance.
Earlier on I raised another difficulty in connection with Alberts digres-
sion at the beginning of Treatise 1, namely what we are to make of the
definitions of accidents by genus and differentia, i.e. the definitions of acci-
dents that do not make reference to their proper subject of inherence. In his
digression, Albert argued that without taking into account the substance of
which it is a mode an accident is not even intelligible and definable. This
suggests that the definition of an accident by genus and differentia does
not count at all as a definition in that it portrays an accident as separa-
ble from the substance of which it is a mode. The difficulty is solved by
Albert at the end of his analysis of Met. Z 5.93 The definitions of accidents
by genus and differentia are acceptable only if the subject is understood in
the definition, even if it is not explicitly mentioned. In other words, the defi-
nitions of accidents by genus and differentia can be accepted only if they are
92 Cf. Albert, Met., Lib. VII, tr. 1, c. 7, p. 327, 4549 together with 6468; c. 10, p. 333, 4549
together with p. 333, 88334, 5.
93 Cf. Albert, Met., Lib. VII, tr. 1, c. 11, p. 335, 5161 together with c. 12, p. 336, 918.
350 chapter four
abbreviated or incomplete forms of definitions mentioning the subject. The

implicit thought seems to be that, if such definitions are taken to be charac-
terisations of the real nature of accidents, they are simply unintelligible in
that an accident cannot be understoodneither can it fall within a kind
without the substance of which it is a mode.
3. Treatise 2: Anti-Platonism
Following Averroes, Albert maintains that Met. Z 79 are mainly directed

against Platos theory of Forms. Treatise 2, therefore, contains a long anti-
Platonic argument, which falls into two main parts: (i) the discussion of the
so-called identity thesis, i.e. the problem as to whether a thing is identical
with its essence or not (Z 6); (ii) the treatment of generation and corrup-
tion. In part (i) it is shown that Platos Forms, being separate substances,
can explain neither the being of sensible things nor how we come to know
them. In part (ii) the further point is added that Forms cannot even explain
the coming to be of sensible objects. Being completely unable to play the
roles for which they were postulated in the first place, Forms should be com-
pletely eliminated from the ontology. Let me start with Alberts discussion
of the identity thesis.
3.1. The Identity Thesis

As we have seen in Ch. 1, Aristotles discussion of the identity thesis is
very general. Aristotle passes in review different kinds of entityaccidental
composites, accidents and substancesand for each of them tries to see
whether they are identical with their essence or not. The conclusion seems
clearly to be that only things that are spoken of per se, i.e. primary sub-
stances, are identical with their own essence. Although Albert follows very
closely the structure of Aristotles text, it is mostly the case of sensible
objects that he shows interest in. For him, Z 6s main question is whether
sensible objects are the same as their quiddity or not. At a first level, Alberts
answer is affirmative: sensible objects are the same as their quiddity. How-
ever, the precise sense of this claim should be understood against the back-
ground of the anti-Platonic character of the discussion. Since Plato main-
tains that the essences of sensible things are separate from them, the rejec-
tion of Platos view first of all amounts to the claim that essences are not
separate from sensible things. To be not separate from something, how-
ever, is not equivalent to being strictly identical with it: the essences of
sensible things may well be non-separate from such things without being
strictly identical with them. Thus, the criticism of Platos position leaves
room for some kind of intermediate claim in between identity and non-
identity. One could say, for instance, that the essences of sensible things
are the same as, i.e. are not different from, them, though still maintain-
ing that they are not fully identical with them. This is the kind of solution
that, I shall argue, Albert ends up endorsing. The peculiarity of his strategy
consists in making his point by means of the conceptual tools provided by
Avicennas doctrine of essence, i.e. by appealing to the properties that an
essence possesses when considered in one way but not when considered in
another.
Alberts reconstruction of Aristotles argument against Plato is not par-
ticularly original when compared to that of the commentators I have taken
into account so far. Like Averroes or Aquinas, Albert argues at length that
taking essences to be separate leaves us with no explanation as to why sen-
sible things are what they are and as to how we get to know them. We
can, therefore, leave aside the details of Alberts reconstruction. What is,
by contrast, highly original is the digression with which Albert prefaces his
discussion of the identity thesis, where he explains the nature of Platonism
and the origin of Platos mistakes.94 Alberts digression is peculiar because
it is mainly based on the disambiguation of a series of Platonic conclusions.
At the very beginning of his note, Albert credits Platonists with a battery of
inferences and arguments, of which I report here the most significant for
the discussion of the identity thesis:95
Arg. 1
1) Quiddity is predicated of many things, e.g. the quiddity of man is
predicated of many men
2) That which is predicated of many men is not (a) man
3) Therefore, it is not (a) man,
4) And so the quiddity of man is not (a) man
Arg. 2
5) The quiddity of man is not substance
6) That which is not substance is not (a) man
7) Therefore, the quiddity of man is not (a) man

352 chapter four
Arg. 3
8) If the quiddity of man is (a) man, then, for parity of reasons, the
quiddity of Socrates is Socrates
9) Therefore, if Socrates runs, also the quiddity of Socrates runs and, if
man runs, also the quiddity of man runs
Platos arguments are intended to establish the non-identity between the
essence of sensible things and each of the things of which it is the essence.
Take, for instance, Arg. 1. If the quiddity of man is not (a) man, then it is
distinct from each of the different men of which it is the quiddity. But if
so, it must be separate from the individual men of which it is the quiddity.
Presumably (see 2)) the argument is supposed to establish only that the
quiddity of men is not one of the men of which it is predicated. This leaves
room for the view that it might be a man of a special sort, a man distinct
from all the particular sensible men, an ideal Man. For Albert, the premisses
and the conclusions of Platos arguments need disambiguation. There is
a perfectly reasonable sense in which the essence of man is not a man:
the essence of man is not a particular man over and above the individual
sensible men; nor is it any in particular of the different individual men.
However, this does not imply that the essence of man is separate from the
different individual men. For it exists as the individual sensible men and
not otherwise. Thus, it is not different from the individual sensible men
and in this sense is the same as them. Still, it has properties that cannot be
attributed to individual sensible men. And in this other sense, it is not fully
identical with them, either.
If this is Alberts general attitude towards Platos arguments, the problem
becomes how to carry out disambiguation on a systematic scale. In short,
Alberts strategy seems to be the following. As we have seen, the name of an
essence or quiddity has two fundamental meanings: the primary meaning,
that in virtue of which the name is imposed, is a simple form; the secondary
meaning, that to which the name is imposed, is a composite of genus
and differentia, i.e. that to which definition properly belongs.96 In both
these meanings, an essence can be considered according to different modes
of signification.97 Depending on which mode of signification one takes,
different things will be true or false of the essence and this will also affect

97 Cf. Albert, Met., Lib. VII, tr. 2, c. 1, p. 339, 2124 (which concerns only the primary
meaning of essence; but it is perfectly clear that analogous considerations extend to the
secondary meaning as well: cf. Met. Lib VII, tr. 2, c. 1, p. 339, 3336).
the truth-value of sentences about essence. Basically, an essence can be

considered according to two different modes of signification: in separation
(absoluta) from the things of which it is the essence (appellata, as Albert
calls them) or in conjunction with them.98 Alberts strategy is probably best
understood at work. Take the primary meaning of an essence or quiddity, i.e.
essence as a simple form. The sentence Man is predicated of many things
is true because man, i.e. the essence of man, is signified in separation
from the things of which it is the essence.99 None of the things of which
the essence of man is the essence is predicated of many things and so the
predicate being predicated of many things pertains to the essence when it
is, as it were, contrasted with the things of which it is the essence. And the
same thing could be said of predicates such as being multipliable, which
belongs only to the essence and not the things of which it is the essence.100
Analogous considerations can be applied to the secondary meaning of an
essence, the essence as a composite of genus and differentia.101 If I say Man
is definable, I signify the essence of man in separation from its supposits,
i.e. from the things of which it is the essence.102 When I say, by contrast, Man
runs I signify the essence in conjunction with its supposits, i.e. as existing as
the different individual men.103 What I want to say when I state the sentence
Man runs is that some particular man or other runs. Thus, the property of
running belongs to the essence signified in conjunction with its supposits,
but does not belong to it when it is signified in separation from them.
The distinction between modes of signification disarms Platos Arg. 3. The
inference in (8) is valid only if the essence of Socrates signifies the essence
in conjunction with its supposits. But all that The essence of Socrates
runs says on the conjoined mode of signification is that Socrates runs
which is perfectly acceptable. For in the conjoined mode of signification
the essence of Socrates is just Socrates. If, by contrast, the essence of
Socrates introduces a consideration of the essence in separation from its
supposits, from the fact that Socrates runs it does not follow that also the
98 Cf. Albert, Met., Lib. VII, tr. 2, c. 1, p, 339, 24 ff.

100 Cf. Albert, Met., Lib. VII, tr. 2, c. 1, p. 339, 2933. As we have seen, in Met., tr. 5, c. 1 Albert
attributes the properties of being predicable and of being multipliable to the essence taken
in its secondary meaning. Here in tr. 2, c. 1, by contrast, he attributes such properties to the
essence taken in its primary meaning. This is one of the oscillations concerning the notion
of essence which I talked about in Sect. 1 above.
354 chapter four
essence of Socrates runs. For the property of running does not belong to the
essence of man when taken in separation from its supposits. Arg. 3, however,
will not do also for another reason, the very same reason why Arg. 1, too,
is flawed.104 Both arguments rest on the crucial premiss The quiddity of
man is (a) man. However, the sentence The quiddity of man is (a) man
is, strictly speaking, false.105 For the quiddity of man is naturally taken in
the separate mode of signification. But then, so read, the sentence comes to
say that the essence of man is one of the particular men, one particular man
or another. Taken in this way, however, the sentence is false, presumably
because, when signified in separation from its supposits, the essence of man
is the essence of all men and not one particular man, whoever he might
be.106
Alberts general strategy also allows us to solve the problem of the iden-
tity thesis. Even if (10) The essence of man is (a) man is false, sentence
(11) The essence of man is not other than (a) man and sentence (12) The
essence of man is the same as (a) man are both true.107 Albert explains why
(11) is not incompatible with (12).108 The essence of man, when existing in
actuality in the extra-mental world, only exists in some individual man or
other: it is only potentially that it exists in something other than the indi-
vidual in which it exists, in that some other individuals may participate
in the same essence. Thus, to say that (11) is false might mislead someone
into thinking that the essence of man exists separately from the individual
men and hence is some ideal Man over and above the sensible individ-
ual men, as Platonists contend.109 It seems to me that the position Albert

106 Albert also shows what is wrong with Platos Arg. 2 (cf. Met., Lib. VII, tr. 2, c. 1, p. 339,
5155). The sentence The quiddity of man is not substance is not unqualifiedly true. For
quiddity could be taken to mean (i) either the definition or (ii) the form. If quiddity means
form, it can in turn be taken in two senses: (iia) either as the form as opposed to matter and
so the quiddity of man is a substance, or (iib) as the substantial and actual being of matter,
and so the quiddity of man is not a substance but rather the substantial being of something
else. If I understand Alberts remark correctly, what he means is that in senses (i) and (iib) the
quiddity is not a substance over and above the particular things of which it is the quiddity,
but rather their substantial being. However, this does not imply that it is separate from the
things of which it is the quiddity, as Plato would have us think. In sense (iia), i.e. as opposed
to matter, the quiddity is a substance distinct from matter, even though it does not exist
outside matter in the extra-mental word. In this case again, Platos separation claim cannot
be vindicated.
is somehow struggling towards may be formulated in the following way. The

essences of sensible substances only exist extra-mentally as the individual
substances of which they are the essences. Thus, the essences of sensible
substances only exist as the same things as the sensible substances them-
selves, i.e. not as something other than or different from them. However, an
essence, when considered in a certain way, has properties that cannot be
attributed to the individuals of which it is the essence.110 Such properties are
the modal properties that characterise the relation between an essence and
its supposits, i.e. multipliability, predicability, communicability and so on,
the properties, in other words, that go together with certain potentialities an
essence retains even when existing in extra-mental particulars. Given that
an essence has properties that its supposits do not have, it cannot be fully
identical with them. It should be borne in mind that Albert can avail him-
self of such a sophisticated analysis of the relation between an essence and
its supposits only because he holds on to Avicennas doctrine of essence. It
is only because an essence can be considered in different ways and can be
thought to exist in different conditions that it can be attributed different
and incompatible properties, depending on the way it is considered and on
the conditions in which it is thought to exist.111
3.2. Inchoation of Forms

Alberts treatment of generation is greatly influenced by the corresponding
section in Averroess Long Commentary. Albert shares with Averroes the
general idea that the section on generation is mainly designed to show the
uselessness of Platos doctrine of Forms in explaining the coming into being
of sensible things.112 He also believes with the Arabic commentator that the
criticism of Platos position rests on a defence of the general validity of the
Synonymy Principle, i.e. the claim that in all cases of generation producer
and product must be the same or at least similar in form.113 Besides these
general points of agreement, Averroess influence can also be detected with
regards to more specific points of interpretation. From Averroes come, for
instance, the following crucial insights. (i) Separate Forms cannot explain
generation because, being separate and immaterial, they cannot operate on
matter.114 The agent of generation, therefore, must be a material being, i.e. a

112 Cf. Albert, Met., Lib. VII, tr. 2, c. 5, p. 344, 1925; c. 8.
113 Cf. Albert, Met., Lib. VII, tr. 2, c. 9; c. 10, p. 353, 5259.
114 Cf. Albert, Met., Lib. VII, tr. 2, c. 8, p. 349, 4750; p. 350, 1330.
356 chapter four
being which can operate on matter. (ii) In the case of natural generation,
the Synonymy Principle holds both at the level of the remote agent (e.g.
the animal or the plant) and at the level of the proximate one (the seed).115
(iii) In the case of artificial generation synonymy holds only partially in
that it obtains only on the side of form. The matter of artificial generation,
by contrast, does not contain anything of the form it is going to receive.116
(iv) Cases of natural spontaneous generationsuch as the generation of
insects from putrefied mattermust be explained through the intervention
of celestial bodies, which confer upon matter a power similar to that that
the seed possesses in the case of the corresponding natural generation.117
(v) Exactly like Averroes, Albert misunderstands the first part of Met. Z 9
(1034a9ff.).118 For him, in other words, this section of Aristotles text does
not aim at explaining why some things come into being both by nature
and by art, while others come into being only by art, but rather provides
an explanation of why some things can be produced by the joint action of
nature and art, while some others are produced by art alone. Both Averroes
and Albert, in fact, are of the opinion that things that are produced by
the joint action of nature and art represent an apparent violation of the
Synonymy Principle and in particular of the claim that it is just one form and
not more than one that gets transmitted from the producer to the product.
Although Albert draws heavily on Averroes for the interpretation of the
section of generation, there is one crucial point where he goes much beyond
his Arabic source. Albert believes in fact that the section on generation pro-
vides support for the doctrine of the inchoation of forms, the view, in other
words, that the form that is acquired through the process of natural gener-
ation is already present in matter in an incomplete or inchoate state.119 The
main point of this doctrine is to deny that the process of generation can be
reasonably thought to consist in the acquisition on the part of matter of a
form which matter did not possess at all before the process of generation.
On the contrary, according to the doctrine of inchoation, generation con-
sists in a long process of transformation of matter in which the incomplete
or inchoate form which is present in matter gets progressively elaborated
on so as to reach its complete state. Thus, in some sense, the main function
of the agent consists in extracting form from matter, i.e. in giving complete-
119 On Alberts doctrine of the inchoation of forms see: Nardi (1936).
ness to the incomplete and inchoate form contained in matter. Of course,

this process can be accomplished only because the agent of generation is
the same in form as the product, only because the synonymous agent can
transform matter in the appropriate way. In the standard cases of natural
generation, for instance, the main agentthe male parentcontributes to
generation an active and spermatic principle, i.e. the seed. It is this principle
that can operate on matter in such a way as to produce an individual of the
same species as the main agent. And it is only because the seed is the seed,
say, of a man that the final product will be a man as well. For the support-
ers of the inchoation theory, however, this explanation, though correct, is
not sufficient. For in order for the seed to operate in the appropriate way,
the matter on which it operates must possess in an inchoate and incom-
plete state the form of the product. Otherwise, matter could never become
an individual of the same species as the main agent. Thus, some kind of sim-
ilarity in form must obtain both on the side of the agent and on the side of
the matter of generation. And generation itself should not be conceived of
as the assembling of two unrelated constituentsmatter and a form com-
ing from outside matter.
What arguments does Albert put forward in support of the inchoation
theory? How does he connect them with Aristotles text? Alberts key intu-
ition is that the Synonymy Principle should be extended so as to cover not
only the sameness or similarity in form between the agent and the product,
but also some kind of sameness or similarity between the matter of gen-
eration and the product. Thus, it is not only the case that the product of
generation is the same in form as (or at least similar to) the agent, but it is
also true that some similarity in form must obtain between the product and
the matter of generation. It is important that the similarity between matter
and the product be formal, otherwise the process of transformation of mat-
ter could never result in the appropriate kind of product.120 There are two
places in Met. Z 79 where Albert finds evidence in favour of the inchoation
doctrine: (1) Aristotles discussion of the preexistence of matter in Z 7 and
(2) the strong attack on Platos separate Forms in Z 8. Let me say a few things
about each of the two pieces of argument.
(1) in Z 7, Aristotle argues that both parts of the product of generationits

matter and its formmust preexist. Form preexists in the agent of gener-
ation and is in some sense transmitted by the agent to the product. Matter

358 chapter four
preexists in that it is the subject of generation, that in which form is received,

and survives after generation is completed as a part of the final product.
Albert gives Aristotles doctrine a peculiar twist, in line with his endorse-
ment of the inchoation theory. First, he insists that talking of preexistence
of matter and form is not enough. In order for generation to come about, the
final product must be similar in form both to the agent of generation and to
the matter from which generation starts.121 In other words, the Synonymy
Principle must govern not only the relation between product and agent but
also that between the product and the matter of generation. Second, Albert
contends that the preexistence of matter needs qualifying. It is certainly true
that matter is the subject of generation and hence persists throughout the
process. But matter does not remain unaltered through the process of gener-
ation. For generation consists in a process of transformation of matter and
more specifically in the progressive development and actualisation of the
incomplete and inchoate form which matter already possesses at the begin-
ning of the process. Where exactly in Z 7 does Albert find support for this
view on matter? Basically, in Aristotles discussion, at the end of Z 7 (1033a5
23), of the different uses of the expression from which. Following Aristotle,
Albert remarks that the expression from which (ex quo) can be used both
in relation to the privation, which is one of the termini of change, and in
relation to the matter from which the product of generation comes.122 The
two uses, however, are different, as is shown by the different relations that
privation and matter bear to the final product of change. Privation in fact is
not predicated of the product either in recto (i.e. directly, with no grammat-
ical change in the term predicated) or denominatively (i.e. paronymously,
with some grammatical change in the term predicated).123 Matter, by con-
trast, even though it is not predicated in recto of the product of generation,
is at least predicated denominatively or paronymously: we do not say that
a statue is wood, but that it is wooden, i.e. made of wood.124 The fact that
matter is predicated denominatively of the product of generation implies
two things. For one, matter, unlike privation, persists throughout the pro-
cess of generation and hence is the subject of generation.125 For another,
as the phenomenon of paronymy shows, matter does not remain the same
all through the process, but rather undergoes a deep process of transfor-
mation.126 As Albert expresses himself, in a process of generation, matter is

progressively assimilated to the form of the product.127 This claim means,
when it is read through the lenses of the inchoation theory, that the inchoate
and incomplete state of a form which is present in matter develops into
more and more complex and determinate states until it reaches its comple-
tion in the final product.128 In Z 7, Aristotle remarks that, strictly speaking,
the matter from which the product of generation comes is matter plus pri-
vation, but often there is no handy name for the privations corresponding
to substantial forms. Thus, we simply refer to matter instead of referring
to matter plus privation in sentences describing the process of generation:
when we say that a statue comes from bronze, what we should really say is
that the statue comes from the unstatued bronze or simply from the unstat-
ued. Albert observes that this is a further confirmation of how generation
comes about.129 In generation, matter progressively moves away from pri-
vation, i.e. from a state dissimilar to the form of the product, to become
more and more similar in form to the thing that is being generated.130 This is
possible, however, only if matter is to some extent similar from the start to
the product of generation, only if, in other words, it already possesses form
in some incomplete and inchoate state. The Synonymy Principle, in other
words, must concern not only the agent but also the matter of generation.131
(2) Albert reproposes this general line of argument in Tr. 2, c. 8, the section
corresponding to Met. Z 8s criticism of Platos theory of Forms. Met. Z 8s
general argument shows that the product of generation must be a composite
of matter and form. Matter persists all through the processand hence is
not generated, but simply transformedwhile form itself is not generated
per se, but only per accidens, i.e. only in so far as the composite of which
it is the form is generated. According to Albert, the conclusion that the
product of generation must be a composite of matter and form proves that
Platos Forms cannot be the agents of generation. The Dominican Master
puts forward two main arguments in support of this claim. (i) If the product
of generation is a composite of matter and form, then generation consists
in a process of transformation of matter. But Platos Forms, being separate
127 Cf. for instance: Albert, Met., Lib. VII, tr. 2, c. 6, 10; 27; c. 7, p. 348, 8.
360 chapter four
and immaterial, cannot act on matter and transform it in the appropriate

way.132 The argument clearly comes from Averroes. Albert seems also to
imply that another reason why Forms cannot act on matter is that they are
common quiddities, i.e. because they are universals and not particulars.133
To maintain that only particulars are causally active is a rather strong
assumption, even though not one that cannot be argued for. (ii) Secondly,
simple forms are neither active nor passive. Simple fire, for instance, neither
acts on something nor is acted upon. It is rather its qualities that act and are
acted upon. Thus, if Platos Forms are simple substantial forms, they can
neither act nor be acted upon, and so cannot, once again, act on matter
and transform it.134 Curiously, Albert is here echoing, without taking much
notice of it, some of the arguments Averroes attributes to the supporters of
the Giver of forms. Particularly typical is the claim that substantial forms
are neither active nor passive.
The general moral which Albert wants to draw from his criticism of
Platos view is that Platos model of explanation should be replaced by a
theory of generation based on the Synonymy Principle. In the version of the
principle that Albert defends, it states that similarity in form must obtain
both between the product and the agent and between the product and
matter.135 The product is similar to the agent in actuality, in that the agent
is another composite of matter and form, which possesses in actuality the
same form as the product, whereas it is similar to matter in potentiality.136
Albert puts emphasis on the fact that the potentiality in question is not
only material but also formal: it should be conceived of, in other words,
as an inchoate and confused form, which continuously proceeds from the
less perfect and determinate to the more perfect and determinate, like
for instance from life to perception and from perception to reason.137 It
is clear that Albert believes that generation can be fully explained only if
two conditions are in place. First, the agent of generation too must be a
material being so that it may act on matter. Second, generation should not
be conceived of as the imposition on matter of a form coming from outside.
On the contrary, matter must already possess in some way or other the
form of the final product. Otherwise, the lack of connection between matter

and form would make the transformation of matter and so generation itself
impossible. For Albert, the real alternative is not between separate and
immanent forms, but rather between separate and inchoate forms.138
4. Treatises 3 and 4: Essence and Definition
4.1. Preliminary Remarks

Since Albert often repeats that the main object of Met. Zs investigation is
the essence of sensible things which is spelt out in a definition, it is nat-
ural to expect his treatment of definition to further clarify his conception
of essence. As is known, Aristotle takes up the issue of definition in Met.
Z 1012. Roughly speaking, Z 1011 are about the problem of the object of def-
inition, i.e. the problem of deternining what we define and how we define
it, while Z 12 concerns the problem of the unity of definition, i.e. the ques-
tion as to how the different parts of a definition make up a unity. Albert
discusses the issue of the object of definition in Treatise 3, while he reserves
the problem of the unity of definition for the very brief Treatise 4. And both
treatises contain in fact important indications about how Albert conceives
the content and the structure of the definition of sensible substances. How-
ever, while Alberts understanding of the problem of the unity of definition
is sufficiently clear, his solution to the question of the object of definition
presents many problems for the interpretation. We have seen, for instance,
that at the beginning of Book VII of his Metaphysics Albert distinguishes two
senses of forma: forma in the standard Aristotelian sense, i.e. form taken as
a constituent of a sensible object as opposed to matter, and forma in the
sense of the essence or quiddity which is spelt out in a definition. In this
second sense, a forma expresses the whole being of a sensible object and so
is predicated of it. As I have said, many texts indicate that Alberts distinc-
tion is not a distinction between different entities. It is one and the same
entity that can be taken either as a constituent of sensible objects or as
the essence or quiddity of them. Therefore, one view that Albert might be
expected to take is that the definition of sensible objects, the definition of
their essence, makes reference only to the form (in the Aristotelian sense) or
to the formal characteristics of sensible objects and leaves out any reference
to matter. And, as a matter of fact, there are several passages in Treatise 3
where Albert seems to endorse this view. Although a definition is made of

362 chapter four
a potential (the genus) and of an actual (the differentia) component, both

components make no reference to matter. Unfortunately, not everything
that Albert says can be smoothly interpreted along the lines which I have
indicated. For one thing, Albert often alludes to Aristotles claim that sen-
sible substances, qua physical objects, are conceived together with matter
and so cannot be understood without matter. As we have seen in Chap-
ter 1, this claim, which is typical of Aristotles physical works, is stated again
in Met. E 1 and is not completely absent from Met. H, either. One conse-
quence of these texts may seem to be that some reference to matter must
be included in the definition of sensible objects. For another, Albert usually
establishes a connection between genus and matter. At times, the connec-
tion seems to be some sort of analogical link, on the grounds that both genus
and matter are potential items. On this view, the genus would be some sort
of matter of the definition, a potential component which can described, ana-
logically, as intellectual matter as opposed to sensible matter, i.e. the matter
of sensible objects, and to imaginable matter, i.e. the matter of geometrical
and mathematical objects. As it stands, this view does not seem to require
that sensible matter be mentioned in the definition of sensible objects. At
other times, however, the connection between genus and matter appears
to be stronger. The genus, Albert seems to say, is a designation of matter,
i.e. designates matter. And it is not entirely clear how one can understand
the notion of designation without endorsing the view that some reference
to sensible matter is made in the definition of sensible objects.
How can we solve these difficulties? Should we think that, exactly like
Aquinas, Albert draws a distinction between individual and common mat-
ter and that it is common matter that figures in the definition of sensible
objects? Being common matter some universal matter, it could be regarded
as somehow formal in character, especially if the distinction between mate-
rial and formal is cashed out not as a distinction between matter and form in
the standard Aristotelian sense, but rather as the opposition between uni-
versal and particular. All that is universal as opposed to particular, in other
words, is formal. As we shall see, both Alexander of Alexandria and Paul
of Venice take this line in their attempts to bring Thomas Aquinass con-
ception of essence into line with Aristotles text and Averroess comments.
Attributing this line of argument to Albert is somewhat difficult, if it is true
that forma in the sense of form and forma in the sense of essence point to
one and the same entity. But then a way must be found of interpreting the
connection between genus and matter without slipping into the view that
the definition of a sensible substance does mention matter, after all. And
this is no easy task, either.
In this section, I wish to tackle these difficulties. In Section 4.2, I shall

present the texts where Albert seems to hold that no matter is included in
the definition of sensible substances. Then, in Section 4.3, I shall explore
a different line of argument, which seems to result in the claim that some
matter must be included in the definition of sensible substances. Such a line
of argument mainly relies on the connection Albert establishes between
genus and matter. Finally, I shall try to present one possible solution to
this conflict of intuitions. The solution I shall sketch out hinges on Alberts
theory of the inchoation of forms (Section 4.4). In other words, the matter
that is designated by the genus is not matter as opposed to form, but rather
some kind of informed matter. More particularly, the matter designated by
the genus is what Albert names potential matter, i.e. matter possessing
some low level of form and so some potentiality for further levels of form.
4.2. Essence, Form and Matter

In its most general form, the question which Aristotle raises in Z 10 and
which Albert addresses in Treatise 3 concerns which parts of a thing enter
into its essence and definition. More specifically, when sensible substances
are considered, what we have to decide is whether only the formal parts of a
sensible substance enter into its essence and definition or both formal and
material parts. Most of what Albert says in Treatise 3 seems to indicate that,
on his view, the definition of sensible substances contains only its formal
parts. Let me illustrate, briefly, four different lines of argument in Treatise
3 for the conclusion that matter should not be included in the essence and
definition of sensible substances.
(1) In Z 10, 1035a14, for instance, Aristotle presents a general division of

substance into matter, form and the composite of them. As we have seen,
for Albert the notion of forma is somewhat ambiguous: it may indicate
a constituent of a sensible object, which as such is not predicated of the
sensible object itself; or it may indicate the essence or quiddity of the
sensible object which is, instead, predicated of it.139 It is forma in the sense
of essence or quiddity that is an object of definition and so has a definition.
Now, Albert is explicit in saying that matter is not part of the essence and
definition of sensible objects.140 For the essence and definition of sensible
objects, Albert argues, consists only of those things that constitute the being
364 chapter four
of such objects, and matter is not part of the being of sensible objects. Matter
is rather that in which the essence of sensible objects exists when it exists
in extra-mental individuals. Therefore, it is part of the individual sensible
objects but not of their essence.
This line of argument is further pressed by Albert by appealing to seman-
tic considerations.141 Sensible matter, Albert remarks, is an essential part of
some things, but is not an essential part of some others. It is an essential part
of the things the name of which designates matter, while it is not an essential
part of the things the name of which does not designate matter.142 Exam-
ples of the first kind of thing are coupled accidents, such as snub, whose
name designates a particular kind of matter, and particular substances, such
as Callias or Socrates, the names of whom indicate that they are made of
particular pieces of matter, for instance of particular flesh and bones.143 On
the contrary, the name picking out the essence of Socrates and Callias, i.e.
man, does not designate matter. For even if the essence of human beings
must exist in matter, it does not have matter as one of its constitutive prin-
ciples, but is rather constituted by its intrinsic principles, i.e. the potential
principle signified by the genus-term and the actual principle signified by
the differentia-term.144 This suggests that both the genus and the differentia
figuring in the definition of sensible substances signify, the one in potential-
ity and the other in actuality, formal characteristics of sensible substances.
Matter enters the picture only when it comes to explaining the structure
of particular human beings, i.e. when an essence exists in the extra-mental
world as the different particulars of a certain kind. What is true of sensible
substances seems to hold of mathematical objects as well.145 The essence of
the circle contains only the formal characteristics of the circle, and hence
does not comprise matter, not even the intelligible or imaginable matter of

145 At the beginning of Met. Z 10 (1034b2428) Aristotle is looking for an explanation of
why the letters enter into the essence and definition of the syllable, while the semicircles
do not enter into the essence and definition of the circle. Alberts solution to this difficulty
(Met., Lib. VII; tr. 3, c. 2, pp. 357, 74358, 17) seems clearly to be that letters are formal parts
of the syllable and so enter into its definition, while the semicircles are material parts of the
circle and so do not enter into its definition. The syllable BA for instance will be defined in
terms of its constitutive letters, B and A, one of which may be taken to play a potential (and
so genus-like) role in the definition, while the other plays an actual (and so differentia-like)
role (Met., Lib. VII; tr. 3, c. 2, p. 357, 7989). The semicircles, by contrast, are not parts of the
essence of the circle, but rather parts in which the essence of the circle exists (Met., Lib. VII;
tr. 3, c. 2, p. 357, 8992). Therefore, they are only parts of the individual circle.
which geometrical objects are made.146 It is particular circles that are made
of intelligible or imaginable matter and not the essence of the circle. Thus,
exactly like the definition of a sensible substance, the definition of a geo-
metrical object will be made of a genus-like and of a differentia-like part
and both of them will signify formal characteristics of the object.147
2) In Treatise 3, and especially in c. 3, Albert draws a distinction between

two kinds of totum, totum essentialem and totum integrum, between, in
other words, an essential and an integral whole.148 The essential whole is
the essence or quiddity, whose parts are the intrinsic constituents of the
essence, i.e. genus and differentia. The integral whole is the individual
object, whose parts are its constitutive parts, i.e. the parts that enter into
its constitution.149 When presenting the distinction between two kinds of
whole, Albert is explicit that material parts are constitutive parts only of the
integral whole and not of the essential whole. Flesh and bones, for instance,
are parts of the individual human beings, but not of their essence.150 Admit-
tedly, Albert is clearly talking about individual flesh and bones. But nothing
of what he says alludes to a distinction between individual and common
material parts, between for instance particular flesh and bones and flesh
and bones in general. From what Albert says it rather seems that material
parts go together with the individual and formal parts with the essence.
In the same vein, Albert further remarks that some things, when they are
resolved into their constitutive and essential principles, are resolved into
matter, while some others are not resolved into matter.151 The first kind of
things are clearly individual substances, while the second are their essences.
Essences are not resolved into material parts or, more precisely, they are
resolved into material parts only accidentally, i.e. only in so far as they hap-
pen to exist in individuals.152 As such, however, essences do not resolve into
material parts, but rather into their constitutive principles, genus and dif-
ferentia. As in the case of 1) above, the same pattern of reasoning applies
to geometrical objects as well, with the only (but here negligible) difference

148 Cf. Albert, Met., Lib. VII, tr. 3, c. 2, p. 358, 1013; c. 3, passim (esp. p. 358, 5059; p. 359,
2130); c. 4, p. 360, 6894.

152 Cf. Albert, Met., Lib. VII, tr. 3, c. 3, p. 359, 113. Divine things do not resolve at all into
material parts, not even per accidens.

366 chapter four
that geometrical objects are made of imaginable matter and not of sensible
one. It is the individual or particular circle that is resolved into imaginable
material parts, such as the semicircles or the other portions of a circle, and
not the essence of the circle. The essence of the circle is resolved into its
constitutive principles, some genus-like principle and some differentia-like
principle.153
3) In Z 10, 1035b1416 Aristotle remarks that the soul is the substance accord-
ing to definition, the form and the essence of the living being. In comment-
ing on Aristotles passage, Albert makes it clear that it is one and the same
entity that plays all the different roles Aristotle attributes to the soul.154 Take,
for instance, the soul of human beings. (i) When considered as a constituent
of a human being, the soul is a form.155 (ii) When taken as the principle of ani-
mal life, which is further determined and perfected by reason as by its final
actuality, the human soul is a quiddity.156 Albert is presumably alluding here
to the two constituents of an essence, genus and differentia, which relate to
one another as potentiality and actuality. (iii) When we consider the essen-
tial principles that make known its being, the human soul is a definition and
in some sense also the definition of human beings, for the definition reveal-
ing the essence of human beings is attributed to them in consideration of
their having a human soul.157 As can be seen, Alberts remarks reinforce the
idea that the essence and definition of human beings (and presumably of
all the other sensible substances as well) only contains their formal charac-
teristics. Alberts qualification the soul is the definition of human beings in
some sense is probably designed to remind us that it is not qua constituent
of an individual human being that form plays the role of essence, but rather
as something that can be predicated of the individual. However, ontolog-
ically speaking, it is one and the same entity that plays the roles of form
and essence. Consequently, the essence should consist only of formal (in
the standard Aristotelian sense) principles.
4) At the beginning of Met. Z 11 (1036a2629), Aristotle points out that,

since definition belongs only to form, it is particular urgent to distinguish
between the formal and the material parts of the thing one wants to define.

Only by telling apart these two different kinds of part, in fact, can one isolate
formal parts and hence define the thing one wants to define. Aristotle seems
to distinguish three cases, which are arranged according to their progressive
degree of difficulty. (C1) The first case is that of the forms that are actually
realised in different kinds of material, such as for instance the form of the
circle, which is actually realised in bronze, iron, wood and so on. In this
case, we have no difficulty in distinguishing between form and matter. (C2)
Then there is the hypothetical case in which a geometrical form is, as a
matter of fact, realised in only one kind of material, as if, for instance, all
circles were made of bronze. In this case as well, we could easily distinguish
between matter and form, presumably because, even if all circles happened
to be made of bronze, this would just be a matter of fact and not a matter
of necessity. (C3) Finally, there comes the most difficult case, i.e. the case
of physical objects, for instance human beings. Even if Aristotle does not
say so explicitly, the implication of his argument seems to be that human
beings must be made of flesh and bones and so that the form of human
beings can be realised, of necessity, only in one particular kind of material.
Aristotle, however, also suggests that, in this case as well, philosophical
considerations can lead us to distinguish between material and formal parts,
which are the only parts that enter into the essence and definition of human
beings. One consequence of Aristotles reasoning, therefore, seems to be
that material parts are necessary but not essential to human beings.
It seems to me that Albert follows very closely the main line of Aristotles
argument and so maintains that in all three cases under consideration we
can, and in fact we should, distinguish between material and formal parts.158
In case C3) too, then, the case of physical objects, defining consists in iso-
lating the formal parts.159 Flesh and bones are not parts of the quiddity of
human beings but only parts in which the quiddity of human beings exists.160
Admittedly, Albert defines physical objects as objects conceived together
with matter and further remarks that it is impossible to understand a human
being without the designation of his matter (sine materie hominis desig-
natione) and this is true also of all the other physical objects.161 However,
in light of Alberts endorsement of Aristotles analysis of C1), C2) and C3),
this need not imply that physical objects cannot be defined without mak-
ing reference to sensible matter and sensible material parts. Of course, when
158 Cf. Albert, Met., Lib. VII, tr. 3, c. 7.

161 Cf. Albert, Met., Lib. VII, tr. 3, c. 7, p. 363, 41 and 4446.
368 chapter four
we define human beings we must take account of the fact that the human
nature can exist only in sensible matter and so the particular instances of
human nature will be made of sensible material parts. But this in itself does
not imply that sensible matter should be explicitly mentioned in the defini-
tion of the human nature.
The line of argument contained in points 1)4) above is espoused by Albert

also in his exposition of the final summery of Met. Z 11 (1037a21b7), where
Aristotle sums up the results of the whole section on essence.162 In all these
texts, Albert seems to defend the view that matter only concerns individual
objects, i.e. the extra-mental existence of an essence in the individuals
of which it is the essence, while the essence considered as an object of
definition only contains formal characteristics.
4.3. Genus and Matter

The line of argument I have presented in the previous section is counterbal-
anced by a different one, which seems to result in the idea that some matter
must be included in the definition of sensible substances, after all. This sec-
ond line of argument mainly centres on the close connection Albert estab-
lishes between genus and matter. As is known, the connection between
genus and matter is introduced by Aristotle himself in Met. .163 It is then
put to use in Met. Z 12 in order to solve the problem of the unity of defini-
tion, i.e. the question of how genus and differentia make up one thing and
not many.164 The genus-as-matter doctrine reappears in Met. H 6 and then
again in Met. I 8.165 As Aristotle describes it, the association of genus with
matter may be nothing more than an analogy and so need not be particu-
larly significant from a metaphysical point of view. In some sense, it is just
a conceptual device to disarm the possible ontological implications of the
notion of genus. Just as matter has only a potential existence and so does
not exist in actuality over and above the different forms it acquires, so the
genus has only a potential existence and hence does not exist in actuality
over and above its specifications. As we have seen, the analogical interpre-
162 Cf. Albert, Met., Lib. VII, tr. 3, c. 11, pp. 366, 62367, 44 (esp. pp. 366, 71367, 24). Albert
also remarks that the diffinitum cannot be identical with its diffinitio, because the diffinitum
is a composite of matter and form, while the definition only mentions form. By diffinitum
here Albert clearly means the individual object.
163 Cf. Aristotle, Met., , 6, 1016a2528; 28, 1024b69.
164 Cf. Aristotle, Met., Z, 12, 1038a59.
165 Cf. Aristotle, Met., H 6, 1045a2325; b1623; I, 8, 1058a1; a2325.
tation of the connection between genus and matter is strongly advocated

by Aquinas. For him, all the terms involved in a definitionthe species-
term as well as the genus- and the differentia-termsignify composites of
matter and form. The genus, therefore, does not signify matter but is only
analogous to it, i.e. plays the same role in a definition as matter does in the
constitution of sensible objects.
As a matter of fact, Albert does not deny the usefulness of pressing
the analogy between genus and differentia. He has recourse to it both in
Book VII, Tr. 4, where he discusses the question of the unity of definition,
and in his presentation of the notion of genus in Book V, tr. 6, cc. 911. How-
ever, it is clear that Albert wants the connection between genus and matter
to result in something more than mere analogy. Albert, for instance, often
repeats that genus designates matter or, alternatively, that matter is des-
ignated in a definition through the genus. In Tr. 3, c. 2, of Book VII Albert
distinguishes three different kinds of matter: sensible matter, imaginable
matter, i.e. the matter of mathematical and geometrical objects, and intel-
lectual matter, i.e. the genus.166 The label intellectual matter seems to be
connected with the potential character of the genus, with its being some sort
of potentiality which always exists in some actual form or other.167 Albert,
however, adds that the notion of intellectual matter should be handled care-
fully. For sometimes, i.e. in the case of sensible substances, the designation
of intellectual matter is the designation of sensible matter, while at other
times, i.e. in the case of mathematical and geometrical objects, it is the desig-
nation of imaginable matter.168 Thus, taken at their face value, Alberts words
imply that the genus of sensible objects designates sensible matter, while
the genus of mathematical and geometrical objects designates imaginable
matter. In both cases, the connection between genus and matter seems
to concern the very signification of the genus and is clearly more than an
analogy. The notion of designation Albert employs to give some content to
the connection between genus and matter is ambiguous and not easy to
understand. It seems to me that there are two possibilities of making sense
of it. Probably the most natural way of interpreting the notion is through
the idea of partial signification. If x designates y, then y is part of the total
signification of x. According to this reading, matter is part of the total signi-
fication of the genus and so is part of what the genus refers to. If this is cor-
rect, the genus does not signify matter alone, but rather some composite of

370 chapter four
matter and form. This reading squares with Alberts constant claim that
matter and genus are distinct, although connected. Designation, however,
might be given a weaker reading. One might think, for instance, that matter
is not strictly speaking contained in the signification of the genus, but is
rather something the signification of the genus implies. On this second
reading, the genus-term signifies, strictly speaking, a form, but the form that
the genus-term signifies must be a form of a material thing, of a composite of
matter and form. Alternatively but equivalently, one might say that matter
is not signified by the genus explicitly, but only implicitly. If this view
is correct, the notion of designation does not only refer to the semantic
properties of the genus, i.e. to its signification, but also to the ontological
fact that the form of the genus, unlike the form of the differentia, is a form
that must be designated (i.e. specified, individualised) by matter, i.e. exists
as the form of a material object. Note that, on either reading of the notion
of designation, Alberts doctrine of genus is different from Aquinass. This
is obvious in the case of the second reading, where the genus-term does
not contain matter at all in its signification, not even as a part of it. But the
point remains true in the case of the first reading as well. For, even if the
genus signifies some composite of matter and form, this is clearly not true
of the differentia. For the differentia, Albert contends, signifies a form, i.e.
the last actuality of the object defined. For Aquinas, by contrast, both genus
and differentia signify composites of matter and form, although in different
ways.
Albert directly tackles the problem of the presence of matter in the defi-
nition of sensible substance on commenting on Z 11s passage about Socrates
the Younger (1036b2132).169 As we have seen, in the passage in question
Aristotle seems to suggest, against Socrates the Youngers view, that matter
cannot be entirely eliminated from the definition of sensible substances.
Aristotles suggestion is in line with his claim in other parts of the Meta-
physics that sensible substances, qua physical objects, cannot be conceived
without sensible matter and so, presumably, should be defined accordingly.
Albert advances three different solutions to the problem of the definitions
of sensible substances. All three solutions, Albert remarks in the end, come
to one and the same thing.170 (i) According to one solution, to be conceived
together with matter can be understood in two ways. In one way, that is
conceived together with matter which contains in its ratio, i.e in its essence
and definition, designated and determinate matter.171 Examples of this first

kind of thing are the snub and individual substances like Socrates, i.e. the
things that in Tr. 3, c. 2 Albert characterises as things whose name designates
matter.172 In another way, those things are conceived together with matter
in the essence and definition of which there does not figure matter, proper,
but rather a designation of matter determined to its actuality (materie des-
ignatio ad actum terminate).173 And it is in this way that the physical genus,
i.e. the genus figuring in the definition of physical objects, designates mat-
ter.174 Alberts distinction is not entirely perspicuous. On the one hand, it
is certainly compatible with Aquinass opposition between individual and
common matter. On this reading, the genus (but remember, only the genus)
would contain a reference to the kind of matter of which all the individu-
als of a certain species are made. On the other hand, Alberts opposition
between figuring in the essence and definition of something and being
designated through the genus in the definition of something may be inter-
preted as the distinction between being mentioned in a definition and
being implied by a definition. On this view, the genus would not con-
tain a direct reference to matter, but only an implicit and indirect one. (ii)
Alternatively, one might say that physical things have intellectual matter,
which is the genus, and this is the kind of matter without which none of
them can be conceived; but physical things also have sensible matter and
not all physical objects cannot be conceived without this second kind of
matter.175 Presumably, the physical things that cannot be conceived without
sensible matter are the individual physical objects, while their essence can
be so conceived. (iii) As a third solution, it could be said that there is both
matter in potentiality and matter in actuality.176 Matter in potentiality is the
matter that is adequate to the species and that is designated through the
genus. The matter in actuality is the matter of the individual, i.e. the matter
which is determined in actuality by accidents and substantial forms. As can
be seen, solution (iii) pushes us to endorse a distinction between individ-
ual and common matter. On this reading, the genus (and only the genus)
would contain a reference to the kind of matter of which all the individuals
of a certain species are made.

372 chapter four
It is clear that Albert is struggling to find a way for the definition of

sensible objects to express the material nature of such objects without
smuggling too much matter into their definition. All in all, the texts I
have presented in this section suggest that this can be done by somehow
distinguishing between the matter of the individual, which falls outside the
definition, and the matter of the species (the kind of matter characteristic
of a certain species), which is part of the signification of the genus. But if
this is true, this line of argument directly contradicts the general intuition I
have presented in Section 4.2 that only formal parts figure in the definition
of sensible substances.
4.4. Formal Matter

I suggest that, in order to soften the conflict between the texts presented
in Sections 4.2 and 4.3, we look at Alberts remarks on the nature of genus
and differentia in Books V and VIII of his Metaphysics. At the beginning of
Book VIII, for instance, Albert restates the distinction between two ways of
considering the notion of forma which he introduces at the beginning of
Book VII.177 In one way, forma can be taken as one kind of distinct nature
as opposed to another kind of distinct nature, i.e. matter. In this way, forma
will be a part of that of which it is the forma and so will not be predicated
of it. As Albert expresses himself, in this way forma will be a being (ens),
i.e. a distinct kind of thing, and not the being (esse) of that of which it is
the form. In another way, forma can be taken as the nature and actuality
which confers being and substantiality to that of which it is the form. In
this way, i.e. as an essence or quiddity, form will be predicated of the whole
of which it is the form, in that it expresses its whole being. A few lines
above, Albert suggests that the same considerations can be applied to the
notion of matter.178 Thus, matter can be considered in two ways. (i) When
taken as a part of the composite, it is not predicated of it in so far as it is
a certain being (ens) and not the being (esse) of something else. (ii) When,
on the contrary, it is taken according to its potentiality for form, it is the
being (esse) of something and not a being (ens) in itself. In this way, matter
is designated by the genus, which is predicated of that of which it is the
genus. Therefore, Albert concludes, matter is not the genus, but genus is not
without matter.179
177 Cf. Albert, Met., Lib. VIII, tr. 1, c. 3, p. 391, 4661.

It seems to me that Alberts distinction between two ways of considering

matter provides us with some indications as to the meaning of his doc-
trine of definition. We have seen that, when commenting on Socrates the
Youngers view, Albert invokes the notion of matter in potentiality as a
possible way of describing the matter that is designated by the genus. This
notion is appealed to once again in the remarks in Book VIII concerning
the two ways of considering matter.180 Thus, it is matter in potentiality that
is designated by the genus. But matter in potentiality is matter already pos-
sessing a certain potentiality for the form characteristic of the species.181 This
suggests that matter in potentiality is to be understood as matter possessing
some minimal and low-level degree of form, which is actualised and per-
fected by the high-level degree of form signified by the differentia.182 This
claim by itself would be sufficient to dispel part of the doubts about the con-
sistency of Alberts doctrine of definition. For matter in potentiality, as it is
described by Albert, cannot be characterised independently of the further
levels of formality expressed by the differentia. Thus, the matter which is
designated by the genus is not simply matter, but some sort of formal mat-
ter. In this sense, the definition can still be taken to point in some sense to
the formal characteristics of a thing. For the matter which is designated by
the genus has no form-independent characterisation.183
I think, however, that Alberts view can be further refined and elucidated
by connecting the notion of matter in potentiality with his doctrine of
the inchoation of forms, i.e. with his claim that the matter out of which
something is generated already contains some potential and imperfect
level of formality, which gets actualised and perfected when generation is
completed. Connecting the doctrine of genus with that of the inchoation
of forms will also enable us to better understand the difficult notion of
designation. The line of thought which Albert seems to sketch out is the
following.184 Matter in potentiality is matter plus a certain potentiality for
form. Therefore, it is a composite of matter and some low-level degree of
formality. But such a low-level degree of formality is the inchoate state of
180 For an appeal to the same notion see also Albert, Met., Lib. VIII, tr. 1, c. 5, pp. 394, 75395,
9.
181Cf. Albert, Met., Lib. VIII, tr. 1, c. 5, p. 395, 3940.
182Cf. Albert, Met., Lib. VIII, tr. 2, c. 2, p. 402, 6170; c. 6, p. 408, 28ff.
183 Cf. Albert, Met., Lib. V, tr. 6, c. 10, p. 291, 5255; Lib. VIII, tr. 1, c. 5, p. 395, 2530; tr. 2, c. 2,
p. 402, 6069.
184 For the explicit connection between the signification of the genus and the doctrine of
inchoate forms see: Albert, Met., Lib. V, tr. 6, c. 10, p. 291, 4155; Lib. VIII, tr. 1, c. 3, p. 391, 4245;
tr. 2, c. 6, p. 409, 5161.
374 chapter four
a form, the state that must be actualised and perfected by the higher-level
degrees of form. Now, Albert explicitly maintains in Book V, tr. 6, c. that the
genus is the low level of form which is present in matter. In other words,
the genus is the form of the composite constituted by matter and some low
level of formality, i.e. the composite in which matter in potentiality consists.
Thus, when Albert says that the genus designates matter in potentiality,
what he means to say is that the genus signifies directly the low level of
form which is part of the matter in potentiality (i.e. signifies the potentiality
for form which is present in matter and which is itself some low level of
form) and so, by implication or indirectly, also the composite which matter
in potentiality consists in.
In light of these considerations, I attempt the following general recon-
struction of Alberts view on the essence and definition of sensible things.
That in virtue of which everything is what it is and is called the way it is
called, is a simple form.185 This form is presumably signified by the last dif-
ferentia taken in the abstract, say humanitas. When taken in this way, i.e. as
a simple form, this nature is not predicated of the things it gives the name
to and so is not, strictly speaking, their essence or quiddity. When taken as
the quiddity of things and so as something predicable of them, however, this
nature is a composite, a composite of a potential and an actual component.
These components are signified, respectively, by the genus and the differen-
tia, taken, presumably, in their concrete signification. Genus and differentia
signify two different levels of form, which stand in a potentiality-actuality
relation to each other. More particularly the genus signifies the low level or
inchoate state of form which exists in matter. Thus, the genus signifies the
form of a material being and hence by implication also the material being
of which it is the form, because the low level of form which the genus sig-
nifies is the inchoate state of form existing only in the matter of sensible
beings. If this is true, the definition of sensible substances mentions in one
way only their formal characteristics, for both genus and differentia signify
forms. However, since the form signified by the genus is a low level of form
that exists only in matter, the genus in another sense designates, i.e. sig-
nifies by implication, the composite of matter and such a low-level form,
i.e. the composite which Albert describes as matter in potentiality. There-
fore, the definition of sensible substances also conveys information about
the proximate matter, the matter characteristic of a species, for it is after all
this matter that Albert labels matter in potentiality.
185 Cf. Albert, Met., Lib. VIII, tr. 1, c. 6, pp. 395, 71396.
5. Treatise 5: Universals
Treatise 5, which corresponds to Met. Z 1317, contains a long attack on

Platos understanding of the nature of universals. It brings to completion,
therefore, the anti-Platonic polemic Albert starts up in Treatise 2, the sec-
tion corresponding to Met. Z 69. As will be remembered, Treatise 2 levels
two main objections against Platos doctrine of separate essences. For one
thing, separate essences cannot account either for what sensible substances
are or for how we get to know them (Z 6). For another, separate essences
are of no use in explaining how sensible substances come into being and
pass away (Z 79). Therefore, separate essences should be dispensed with
altogether in our ontology. The discussion in Treatise 5 adds the impor-
tant, clarifying point, that Platos doctrine of separate essences stems from a
radical misconception of the nature of universality. Thus, Alberts interpre-
tation of the section Z 1317 can only be elucidated by taking into account
his understanding of the problem of universals and of the nature of uni-
versality. Predictably, one component of Alberts view will be Avicennas
doctrine of essence, which is in fact often presented, both by Albert and by
Avicenna, as a clarification of the very notion of universal. There is, however,
another aspect that we should consider in order to give a complete account
of Alberts view on universals, i.e. his endorsement of the Neoplatonic doc-
trine of the three states of a universal, ante rem, in re and post rem. In some
sense, Alberts view on universals is the result of accommodating Avicennas
doctrine of essence within the Neoplatonic threefold schema.186 Since both
Avicennas doctrine of essence and the doctrine of the three states of a uni-
versal introduce different ways of existence of one and the same essence,
the crucial question becomes to understand with which of such different
ways of existence universality is properly connected. It is also particularly
important to locate the source of universality. For, even if an essence should
turn out to exist as universal only according to one of its different modes of
existence, this does not imply of itself that the mode of existence at issue is,
ipso facto, the source of an essences universality. In the light of these consid-
erations, I shall first present a sketch of Alberts conception of universality
and then try to show how it influences his reading of Met. Z 13, the chapter
where Aristotle argues that no universal is substance. My reconstruction of
Alberts doctrine of universals will be mainly based on his discussion of uni-
versality in Books V and VII of the Metaphysics.
186 On this and some related themes see: De Libera (1990), 179213. On Alberts doctrine of
universals see also: McInerny (1980); De Libera (1996), 245262.

376 chapter four
According to the Neoplatonic doctrine of universals, a nature exists in

three different states, ante rem, in re, post rem.187 Alberts understanding of
ante rem universals is, in many respects, peculiar. (1) For he maintains that
the notion of existing before sensible extra-mental things can be under-
stood in two different ways, and according to both of these ways an essence
can be rightly said to precede, to be prior to, extra-mental things.188 (1.1)
According to one way, i.e. the standard Neoplatonic way, an essence can be
said to exist before extra-mental things because it exists in the First Intel-
lect as in a formal and first light from which everything that exists flows
and proceeds.189 In this first sense, an essence is universal because the First
Intellect is the universal cause of all things, encompassing all of them in
Its absolute simplicity. I am not particularly interested here in the details
of Alberts Neoplatonic understanding of the Christian doctrine of creation
and of Divine Ideas. Suffice it to say that in the First Intellect all the essences
exist in a simple and undivided form: in the First Intellect essences possess
a peculiar kind of being, which is nothing but the being of the first intel-
lectual cause, from which everything that exists proceeds. When existing in
the First Intellect, an essence precedes extra-mental things temporally pre-
cisely because their being is the being of the First Cause, which precedes
temporally all the different beings It creates.190 (1.2) An essence, however,
can be said to exist before extra-mental things in another sense as well, i.e.
not temporally, but in substance and essence (substantia et ratione).191 In
this way, an essence is taken as a formal cause, which constitutes the being
of extra-mental things.192 In this sense, it is universal because it is equally
and indifferently the nature of all individuals of a certain species or kind.193
Alberts characterisation, and in particular his reference to the essences
being prior in substance to extra-mental individuals, makes it clear that this
second way of talking about an ante rem essence should be identified with
Avicennas absolute consideration of an essence. We have seen in fact in
Section 1 that, in Alberts understanding, Avicennas essence depends on
extra-mental particulars for its (extra-mental) existence, but is prior to them
187 Cf. Albert, Met., Lib. V, tr. 6, c. 5, pp. 285, 57286, 23. On the theory of the three
states of a universal see: Lloyd (1981), 6268; Lloyd (1990), 6268; De Libera (1996), 103108;
Chiaradonna (2002), 89117; Chiaradonna (2004).
188 Cf. Albert, Met., Lib. V, tr. 6, c. 5, p. 285, 5986.
in nature and substance. Within the Neoplatonic schema Albert is willing to

endorse, this amounts to saying that the essence in itself is a special kind of
ante rem universal. Albert also makes clear the relation it bears to the other
kind of ante rem universal he contemplates, i.e. the essence as existing in
the First Intellect. Avicennas essence is a ray, an irradiation, of the light
of the First Intellect, it is, in other words, a product of the First Intellects
all-encompassing causal power. Admittedly, there is a textual obstacle to
my identification of the second kind of ante rem universal with Avicennas
essence. In a passage in Book V of his Metaphysics, Albert explicitly says
that we should distinguish the being of the essence Avicenna and Avice-
bron speak ofi.e. the essence which is neither one nor manyfrom the
being connected with the states of a universal, i.e. from the being of ante
rem, in re, and post rem universals.194 The being of Avicennas essence when
compared to its supposits should be characterised as universitas and con-
trasted with the universality (universalitas) associated with one or another
of the three states of a universal.195 However explicit this text may seem, it
is at odds with what Albert says elsewhere concerning Avicennas essence,
which is properly described as prior in substance and nature to all its par-
ticular instances and so as a sui generis ante rem universal.196 Presumably, it
is precisely the sui generis nature of Avicennas essence that Albert wants
to stress when he contrasts it with the items falling within the Neoplatonic
tripartite schema.197
If my identification of (1.2) with Avicennas essence is correct, it becomes
easy to see how Avicennas mental and extra-mental existence of an essence

196 Besides the texts discussed in Sect. 1, see in particular: Albert, Met., Lib. VII, tr. 5, c. 1,
p. 372, 5759.
197 Two possible ways come to my mind of explaining away the problematic text in Met.,
Lib. V, neither of which is entirely satisfactory. One might say that, when he contrasts
Avicennas essence with the three states of a universal, Albert has only the first kind of ante
rem universal in mind, i.e. the essence as existing in the First Intellect, and not also the
second. Alternatively, one might appeal to Alberts distinction between the two meanings
of an essence-term, one pointing to a simple form, the other to a composite of genus and
differentia. Thus, one might contend that it is the essence in its first meaning, i.e. as a single
form, that is one kind of ante rem universal, while the Avicennian essence rather corresponds
to the essence in its secondary meaning, i.e. as an object of definition. Since, however, the two
meanings of an essence-term do not seem to introduce two distinct entities, it is not easy to
see how only one of the two meanings, and not also the other, could correspond to one kind
of ante rem universal. See, for instance, Albert, Met., Lib. VII, tr. 5, c. 1, p. 372, 5759, where
the priority in nature which Albert attributes to the essence seems to hold indifferently for
both meanings of an essence-term.
378 chapter four
fit into the doctrine of the three states of a universal. (2) Universals in re cor-
respond to the extra-mental existence of an essence. Following Avicenna,
Albert holds that an essence exists in the extra-mental world in its individ-
ual instances.198 Interestingly, however, Albert also remarks that, even when
existing in its extra-mental instances, an essence can be said to be in some
sense universal in that it is of itself always multipliable.199 It preserves, in
other words, its (modal) property of being instantiable in individuals other
than that in which it is actually instantiated. (3) Finally, the universal post
rem is the essence as existing in the human mind, where it is universal in
that it exists as concept representing all individuals of a certain kind in the
same way.200 Usually, Albert characterises post rem universals as posterior to
the particulars which they conceptually represent. For one thing, concepts
are obtained through abstraction from particulars and so conceptualisation
presupposes the particulars on which it operates. For another, the univer-
sality which an essence enjoys in the human intellect is only accidentally
related to extra-mental particulars. A concept is not the essence and sub-
stance of the particulars it represents, and the particulars themselves are
only accidentally related to the intellect that understands them. However,
as we shall see, post rem universals are not unconnected with the two senses
in which an essence exists before extra-mental particulars, i.e. ante rem.
As we have seen, the doctrine of the three states of a universal allows
for an essence to be said universal in each of the states in which it exists,
according to different senses of universal. It is clear, however, that all these
different senses of universal cannot be on a par. For Avicennas doctrine
of essence invites us to distinguish, when talking about universals, between
the nature that happens to be universal and the property of universality that
the nature comes to acquire. Thus, it becomes urgent to determine how and
when an essence can be said to be universal in the strict sense of the term.
According to Avicennas doctrine of essence, an essence is universal only in
the intellect, where it exists as a concept representing all cospecific individ-
uals in the same way. Albert sticks to this fundamental tenet, but qualifies
it in one important respect.201 While maintaining that an essence is univer-
sal only in the intellect, he also contends that it is not universal because it
is in the intellect or, to put it otherwise, that the source or ground of an

201 Cf. Albert, Met., Lib. V, tr. 6, c. 6; c. 7, p. 287, 6990; Lib. VII, tr. 1, c. 5, p. 323, 28.
essences universality does not lie in its existing in the intellect.202 So what
is the universality of an essence grounded on? Albert locates the source of
an essences universality at two different levels: as Albert expresses himself,
there are two different causes of the universality of an essence, i.e. a primary
and a secondary cause.203 The primary cause of an essences universality is
its ante rem existence in the First Intellect.204 As we have seen, existence in
the First Intellect involves some kind of universality, because the First Intel-
lect is the universal, intelligent cause of all things, which encompasses all of
them in Its simplicity. Occasionally, Albert directly connects the essence as
existing in the human intellect with its existence in the First Cause by pre-
senting the former as a ray, an irradiation of the latter.205 This is another
way of saying that, even though universal concepts are strictly speaking
obtained through abstraction, the source of the intelligibility and knowa-
bility of all things is the First Intellect. More interesting from our present
point of view is the secondary cause of an essences universality. For Albert
seems to identify the secondary source of an essences universality with its
being multipliable into and communicable to the things of which it is the
essence.206 Even though an essence exists as universal only in the intellect it
is not universal in virtue of its being in the intellect, but rather in virtue of
its communicability. As we have seen in Section 1, the essence taken as mul-
tipliable and communicable is one way of considering the secondary mean-
ing of an essence, i.e. the essence taken as an object of definition and so as
analysable into genus and differentia. In particular, multipliability and com-
municability are properties that characterise the extra-mental existence of
an essence considered from a particular angle, i.e. from the point of view
of the potentiality and aptitude an essence has to be multiply instantiable.
Taken in this way, the essence retains some kind of priority over the partic-
ulars it is the essence of. In conclusion, therefore, it is a cluster of important
modal properties of an essence, its being multipliable, communicable and
the like, that constitutes the extra-mental ground of the universality the
essence enjoys when exiting in the human intellect.
If we leave aside the essence as existing in the First cause to concen-
trate instead on its status as multipliable and communicable, we can say
202 Cf. Albert, Met., Lib. V, tr. 6, c. 6, p. 286, 7175; c. 7, p. 287, 6961; Lib. VII, tr. 1, c. 5, p. 323,
28.
203 Cf. Albert, Met., Lib. V, tr. 6, c. 6 for a detailed treatment of this question.
206 Cf. Albert, Met., Lib. V, tr. 6, c. 6, pp. 286, 64287, 13; Lib. VII, tr. 1, c. 5, p. 323, 28.
380 chapter four
that Platos main error consists in confusing the status an essence possesses
in the intellect with that it enjoys extra-mentally and in particular with
its modal properties. And this is precisely the kind of mistake that Aris-
totle intends to expose in Met. Z 1317. In itself, Alberts strategy is rather
common. For Aquinas too, for instance, Platos doctrine of separate Forms
is based on a confusion between mental and extra-mental existence, on
attributing to the essence as it exists extra-mentally characters it possesses
only in its mental existence. However, the way Albert presents this famil-
iar point is interesting both from a technical point of view and from the
point of view of his reconstruction of Aristotles doctrine of substance. In
explaining the nature of Platos mistake Albert has recourse to a distinc-
tion we have already encountered several times, namely the opposition
between what is a being (ens) and what is the being of (esse) something
else. He observes that, when taken as the quiddity of sensible things, an
essence is not a substance, i.e. a being which exists per se and indepen-
dently, but only expresses and constitutes the substantial being of the sen-
sible objects of which it is the quiddity.207 Taken as the substantial being
of sensible objects, however, an essence has no independent existence in
that it must always exist in something else.208 Therefore, it cannot be a sub-
stance, i.e. a per se existing and independent being. Thus, if by universal
we mean the common nature which is the essence and quiddity of sensi-
ble things, the universal is not a substance, but only the substantial being
of sensible things. If, by contrast, by universal we mean to refer to the
universal qua universal, i.e. to what is actually common and bears a uni-
form relation to all its instances, then we are clearly referring to the essence
existing in the mind, where it is a similitude of particular things. Taken in
this way, however, the universal bears no substantial relation to the par-
ticulars falling under it.209 It is not, in other words, the essence and quid-
dity of sensible objects, but rather a similitude of them which is clearly
posterior to and dependent on the individuals from which it is drawn.
Admittedly, in the intellect, an essence possesses some kind of separate-
ness with respect to the individuals of which it is the essencewhich it
does not possess in the extra-mental existence. However, the separateness
an essence enjoys in the mind is immaterial to the question of substantial-
ity. For the essence existing in the intellect, i.e. the universal qua universal,
is only accidentally related to the particulars falling under it. Thus, how-
207 Cf. Albert, Met., Lib. VII, tr. 5, c. 1, p. 373, 3850; c. 2, p. 374, 2429; 5863.
ever one takes the notion of universal, Aristotles claim in Z 13, i.e. that no
universal is substance, turns out to be true. If the universal is the nature
or essence of particular things, then it is their substantial being, but not
a substance, a per se existing being. If the universal is the universal as
such, i.e. the universal in the intellect, then it is clearly neither a substance
nor the substance of the particular things, to which it is only accidentally
related.
In light of the foregoing considerations, Platos mistake can be easily
explained. Plato thought that universals are substances. But universals are
not substances if by substances we mean separately and per se exist-
ing beings. At most universals can express the substantial being of their
instances, but in this case universality indicates a certain modal property
a potentiality or aptitudeof extra-mentally existing essences and not a
feature that essences possess in actuality. Such a property of an essence
clearly grounds the possibility of forming universal concepts, but is not uni-
versality in the actual sense of the term. Plato, by contrast, insisted that it
is universals qua universals, i.e. universals in actuality, that are both sub-
stances in themselves and the substances of the things falling under them.
But universals qua universals exist only in the mind and when so taken they
are neither substance, nor do they bear any substantial relation to the things
falling under them.
I wish to end my treatment of Book VII of Alberts Metaphysics with some
remarks about the consistency of his doctrine of essence and universals.
For some of Alberts remarks in Treatise 5and in particular in c. 2, the
section corresponding to Met. Z 13may sound rather puzzling when set
against the general picture I have drawn so far. For here and there, Albert
seems to be saying that it is the substantial being of sensible things, their
essence, that is posterior to them.210 Moreover, some remarks of his might
be interpreted as if the essence of sensible things were somehow an accident
of them, a qualitative property which presupposes the substantial character
of the individuals.211 This, however, seems to clash with Alberts doctrine
in Book VII. Throughout the book, Albert puts weight on the claim that it
is the essence that confers upon extra-mental individuals their substantial
character and so holds, for this very reason, some kind of priority over them.
Admittedly, Albert sometimes describes the last differentia as a quality, but
all that he means by this is that it is some kind of property or characteristic
211 Cf. Albert, Met., Lib. VII, tr. 5, c. 1, p. 373, 5053; c. 2, pp. 374, 64375, 11.
382 chapter four
of the genus. The differentia is a substantial quality and not an accident.

Ultimately, it is that in virtue of which things are what they are and so is the
substance and essence of things.
My general impression with respect to this difficulty is that, when he
explains Z 13s doctrine, Albert is not always careful enough to keep sepa-
rate two distinct points. The first is that universals are not substances, i.e.
per se and independent beings. At most, when they are taken as the natures
or essences of sensible things, they are the substantial being of such things.
Even so, they remain existentially dependent on the particulars of which
they are the essences. The other point is that universals are posterior to
particulars. In this sense, they are accidentally related to particulars and
so some kind of quality of them. Presumably, the second point concerns
only mental universals, i.e. universals qua universals or, to put it otherwise,
actual universals. Since mental universals are somehow extracted from par-
ticulars, they presuppose particulars and so are posterior to them. The first
point, by contrast, concerns the status of extra-mental essences.212 They are
not per se and independent beings in that they exist in particulars and so
are existentially dependent on them. However, the existential dependence
of essences on particulars does not prevent them from being prior to them
in some other way, for instance in substance or nature. In Tr. 5, c. 2the
section corresponding to Met. Z 13Albert somewhat conflates these two
points and does not distinguish enough between the posteriority of mental
universals and the existential dependence of an essence on extra-mental
particulars. The confusion is partly brought about by an argument in Aris-
totles text (Z 13, 1038a2329) to the effect that universals cannot be con-
stituents of substances because the constituents of substances must be sub-
stances, while universals are qualitative in character. More clarity is intro-
duced in c. 2, the section corresponding to Met. Z 14. For one thing, Albert
explicitly reserves the posteriority argument for the mental universal.213 It
is the mental universaland not the common naturethat is somehow
extracted from particulars and hence is posterior to them. For another, he
remarks that in one sense the universal is a quality, while in another it is
not.214 When taken according to what it is, i.e. as a certain nature or essence,
the universal is an object of definition and so is substantial and not qualita-
tive. When, by contrast, it is taken qua universal, it is a quality and not an
212 Even though, of course, it is also true of mental universals that they are not per se and
separately existing beings.

object of definition. Alberts allusion to the universal qua universal makes it

clear that it is mental universalsand not the natures of thingsthat he is
talking about.
Two more facts, I think, contribute to Alberts confusion. One is a certain
ambiguity of the notion of predication. In Book VII Albert puts emphasis
on the fact that the essence, when existing in sensible things, still possesses
some modal properties, such as multipliability and communicability, which
ground our capacity of forming universal concepts. Connected with multi-
pliability and communicability is also predicability. The essence of sensible
things is predicable of them. We should never forget, however, that pred-
icability is a potential property, i.e. a modal property, and not an actual
one. When essence is actually predicated, it is presumably a concept. In this
sense, it is a mental entity and so is posterior to all the things of which it is
predicated. When it is taken as the substance of sensible things, the essence
seems to be predicable but not predicated of them. Albert does not explicitly
introduce this distinction, which his general theory of essence forces upon
him, with the result of attributing sometimes to the essence taken as the
substantial principle of sensible things characteristics that it possesses only
as a mental entity. An extra element of confusion comes from Alberts ten-
dency to stretch out some aspects of Avicennas doctrine of essence. For Avi-
cenna, the different ways in which an essence exists, including extra-mental
existence, are accidental to the essence when taken in itself. Avicenna sim-
ply means that the different ways of existence falls outside the definition of
an essence and so are in this sense inessential to it. What he does not mean,
however, is that such ways of existence are accidents in the strict sense of the
sense, characteristics an essence may or may not have. For, according to Avi-
cenna, an essence always exists in some way or other, be it extra-mentally
or mentally. So, mental and extra-mental existence are disjunctively neces-
sary properties of an essence. Now, at times Albert says that an essence is
the being of sensible objects only accidentally.215 In the same vein, he also
observes that multipliability, communicability and predicability are acci-
dents of the essence taken in itself.216 Within Avicennas conceptual scheme,
these claims are fully comprehensible and not particularly shocking. It is not
built into the definition of an essence in itself that it must be related to sensi-
ble particulars, and so all the properties that somehow concern the relation
between essence and extra-mental particulars fall outside the definition of
the essence. Being the essence of sensible particulars or being multipliable

216 Cf. Albert, Met., Lib. VII, tr. 5, c. 1, p. 373, 1320 together with 2629.
384 chapter four
are properties an essence acquires under a particular mode of existence, i.e.

extra-mental existence, even if they are not unconnected with the essence
taken in itself, which is in some sense their ground. However, these claims
should not be confused with the different one that essences are qualities of
particular objects, which presuppose particulars and hence are posterior to
them. After all, even if essences always exist in extra-mental particulars, in
a perfectly reasonable sense they constitute their being, explain what they
are and so do not presuppose but are rather presupposed by them.
chapter five
ALEXANDER OF ALEXANDRIA AND PAUL OF VENICE
Introduction
Alexander Bonini of Alexandria wrote his commentary on Aristotles Meta-

physics when he was lector at the Franciscan Studium of Bologna between
1303 and 1307.1 As the textual analysis shows, Alexander is one of the main
sources for the material composition of Paul of Venices commentary on
Met. Z. Not only does Paul often report and assess Alexanders views in
his doctrinal digressions, but he also makes extensive use of the Francis-
can Masters exposition in interpreting specific sections of Aristotles text.
However, it is not only for his role as a material source of Pauls writing
that Alexanders commentary deserves attention. There are in fact two more
aspects for which reading Alexander is crucial to understanding Pauls activ-
ity as an interpreter of Met. Z. Both of them concern Averroes and his
growing importance as a second object of interpretation alongside Aristo-
tle himself. Alexanders commentary is full of references to Averroess Long
Commentary. Rather often, Alexander does not confine himself to reporting
Averroess text in support of a certain understanding of Aristotle (or of a cer-
tain philosophical position), but also stops to explain the way in which the
Arabic commentator should or could be understood. In so doing, Alexander
not only uses the Long Commentary in order to refine his comprehension of
Aristotles text, but also provides a certain interpretation of Averroes, which
may be different from that of other medieval authors and from ours. In this
respect, the Franciscan Master clearly anticipates Paul of Venice. Without
going as far as to quote passages from Averroes for each portion of Aristo-
tles text he is commenting uponwhich Paul will systematically do in his
commentaryAlexander does not regard Averroes as one source among
others, but rather as the main instrument and authority when it comes
to understanding Aristotle. This explains why Averroess words need to be
referred to as often as possible and clarified, if necessary.
1 For an overview of the structure and contents of Alexanders commentary on the
Metaphysics see Amerini (forthcoming). For Alexanders life and works see Veuthey (1932).
386 chapter five
There is another respect in which Alexander can be taken to anticipate

Paul of Venices general attitude. Doctrinally speaking, Alexanders com-
mentary is not an original piece of work. Besides drawing extensively on
Averroes, the Franciscan Master defends also a certain number of views
which can be traced back to Thomas Aquinas. Even though significant dis-
agreements with Aquinass standard doctrine are not absent, more often
than not Alexander directly incorporates Aquinass views into the body of
his exposition of the Metaphysics as well as into his doctrinal discussions.
Thus, it would not be incorrect to describe Alexanders commentary as an
intelligent mixture of Averroess and Aquinass ideas. This point can even
be pressed a little further. There are traces in Alexander of a certain ten-
dency, which will become even more robust in the case of Paul of Venice,
to harmonise Averroess and Aquinass views. This strategy, however, is
not carried out by Alexander as systematically as it is by Paul. Moreover,
Alexander does not seem to be unaware, at least occasionally, of the dif-
ferences between Averroess and Aquinass readings of Aristotle. The con-
troversial interpretation of Aristotles doctrine of essence and definition is
a case in point. I shall discuss the case at some length in the next chapter
when dealing with Pauls interpretation of Averroes. It may be useful, how-
ever, to anticipate some points of my analysis. In discussing the problem
as to whether matter is part of the essence and definition of sensible sub-
stances, Alexander clearly espouses Aquinass position according to which
some matter, i.e. common matter, is in fact part of the essence and defi-
nition of sensible substances.2 Although somewhat tentatively, Alexander
also recognises that some texts in Averroes seem to suggest a different view,
according to which we should distinguish between the essence of sensible
substances (which contains matter) and their quiddity (which, by contrast,
does not contain matter).3 Thus, matter should be excluded at least from the
quiddity of sensible substances. Moreover, Alexander remarks, not unrea-
sonably, that the distinction Averroes wishes to introduce has some basis
in Aristotles text.4 He concludes, however, that Aquinass interpretation is
all in all preferable and so no significant distinction of content should be
introduced between essence and definition.5 It is clear that in this particular
instance Alexander opposes Averroes and Aquinas and perceives the differ-
ence between their interpretations of Aristotle. Paul of Venice, by contrast,
2 Cf. Alexander of Alexandria, Exp. Met., Lib. VII, c. 10, q. 8, fol. 222rarb.
3 Cf. Alexander of Alexandria, Exp. Met., Lib. VII, c. 10, q. 8, fol. 222rb.
5 Cf. Alexander of Alexandria, Exp. Met., Lib. VII, c. 10, q. 8, fol. 222rbva.
alexander of alexandria and paul of venice 387
will not be content with this strategy and will go out of his way to reinterpret
Averroess text so as to bring it into line with Aquinass standard doctrine.
Apart from the particular case of essence and definition, however, Alexan-
der usually puts together Averroes and Aquinas without drawing attention
to any significant disagreement between them. Pauls strategy is, in some
sense, just a radicalisation of Alexanders general tendency.
In this chapter, I wish to flesh out some of the characteristics of Alexan-
ders commentary to which I have just alluded. In Section 1, I shall concen-
trate on the structure of Alexanders work and on its literary form. I shall
also try to point to both similarities and differences between the ways in
which Alexander and Paul structure their respective commentaries. From
Section 2 on, I shall move on to more doctrinal considerations, by presenting
first Averroess influence on Alexander (Section 2) and then by discussing
the case of Aquinas (Section 3). In Section 4, I shall finally tackle the issue
of Paul of Venices attitude towards Alexanders commentary. In this case
as well, I shall mainly focus on some doctrinal aspects by taking into con-
sideration the places in Pauls commentary where Alexanders opinion is
explicitly reported and evaluated.
1. The Structure of Alexanders Commentary.

Alexander and Paul Compared
Alexanders commentary on the Metaphysics has a mixed nature. The literal

exposition of Aristotles text is in fact interspersed with a series of questions,
which Alexander usually appends to his exposition of important passages in
Aristotle. In so far as Met. Z is concerned, Alexander presents 67 questions of
different length and significance. The number of questions presented for the
different chapters varies from a minimum of 2 (Met. Z 17) to a maximum of
9 (Met. 10). The only chapters that contain no questions are Met. Z 15 and 16.
The presence of questions in addition to the literal exposition considerably
affects the general shape of Alexanders writing. For, clearly, Alexanders
intent is to provide a rather quick and cursory exposition of Aristotles text
leaving to the questions the discussion and solution of the important doc-
trinal issues that emerge, directly or indirectly, from the different sections
commented upon. This does not mean that the literal exposition is, as it
were, unimportant. For it contributes to revealing Alexanders debts toward
Averroes or Aquinas. Generally speaking, however, the contrast between
the exposition of the text and the questions is evident. It must also be added
that not all the questions Alexander discusses in his commentary have a
388 chapter five
purely theoretical nature: some of them, on the contrary, bear directly on

the exegesis of difficult passages of Met. Z. Consider two examples. When
commenting on Met. Z 3, for instance, Alexander discusses two questions
that directly come from Aristotles text: the first investigates into the nature
of Aristotles division of substance into matter and form, i.e. whether sub-
stance is predicated univocally, equivocally or analogically of matter and
form;6 the second raises the problem as to whether the division should be
understood according to a genus-species model.7 Another example. The first
question in Met. Z 4 focuses on why Aristotle decides to impose one sin-
gle name (cloak) on the accidental composite white man in order to see
whether things such as white man have an essence or not.8 In this case as
well, the question is purely exegetical and only serves to clarify a difficult
move in Aristotles argument. The examples could, of course, be multiplied.
The general result is that Alexanders questions are not only designed to
raise doctrinal issues, but also serve to discuss at greater length than in the
literal exposition the most controversial aspects of Aristotles littera. In con-
clusion, it is mainly in the questions that Alexander expounds his views
on both the content of Aristotles text and the theoretical problems that it
poses.
Alexander, therefore, presents two levels of analysis of Aristotle, i.e. the
literal exposition and the questions. There are both analogies and differ-
ences with respect to Paul of Venices strategy. Certainly, Pauls commentary
does not contain formal questions, i.e. questions that are detached, from a
structural point of view, from the literal exposition of the text. This does
not imply, however, that Paul presents a one-level analysis of the text. On
the contrary, at the end of some important sections in Aristotles text, Paul
introduces long digressions that are clearly modelled upon the structure of
a question, with their apparatus of arguments in favour and against a cer-
tain conclusion, the solution and the answers to the arguments in favour
of the position which Paul wishes to reject. From a literary point of view,
Pauls digressions are not separate from the exposition of the text in that
they are presented as discussions of some difficult conclusions in Aristotles
text or in Averroess exposition thereof. However, exactly like Alexanders
questions, Pauls digressions are clearly designed to introduce a second level
of analysis of Aristotle by raising general doctrinal issues that go far beyond
what can be extracted from the passages under discussion.

7 Cf. Alexander of Alexandria, Exp. Met., Lib. VII, c. 3, q. 3, fol. 188va.
8 Cf. Alexander of Alexandria, Exp. Met., Lib. VII, c. 4, q. 1, fol. 192vb.
It must be observed, however, that Pauls digressions are fewer in num-

ber when compared to Alexanders questions. Besides the different literary
form of the two commentaries, there is a further reason for this difference.
Although, as I have already pointed out, Alexander makes extensive use of
Averroess Long Commentary both in his literal exposition and in the ques-
tions, he does not reserve some portions of his writing to comment explicitly
on Averroess observations. Paul, by contrast, comments on both Aristo-
tle and Averroes in a rather systematic form. Normally, therefore, Pauls
literal exposition of Aristotle is organised in the following way. First, Paul
divides Aristotles text into a series of conclusions or general claims. Then
he picks up one of Aristotles claims and offers a sketchy reconstruction
of the argument leading to the claim. There follows the full quotation of
Aristotles text corresponding to the claim. After Aristotle, Paul moves to
Averroes by presenting (in the form of one or more notes), some impor-
tant passages from the Long Commentary that bear directly on the meaning
of the Aristotelian text under discussion. More often than not, Averroess
texts are quoted, commented upon and discussed at length by raising and
solving doubts about the implications of the Arabic commentators obser-
vations. The result of this general method is that many of the issues that are
taken up in Alexanders questions are tackled by Paul when commenting
on Averroes. The digressions, therefore, only touch upon very general top-
ics, which are implicit in Aristotles or Averroess texts but also go beyond
what we actually find in them. This explains why Pauls digressions are
comparatively few in number. There is another way of making my general
point, namely that in Pauls commentary the weight of the philosophical
discussion is evenly distributed between his comments on Averroes and the
digressions. In the case of Alexander, by contrast, it is almost exclusively car-
ried by the questions.
Alexander and Paul can also be compared from a different angle. Pauls
style as an Aristotelian commentator can be summarised by the slogan
putting Aristotle into logical form. In other words: instead of offering a
line-by-line paraphrase of Aristotle, Paul is rather inclined to rearrange the
text in such a way as to put it into some sort of quasi-syllogistic or deductive
form. In dividing Aristotles text, for instance, Paul singles out a series of pre-
misses or assumptions from which the argument moves and a certain num-
ber of conclusions following from the assumptions. At times, he also stops
to point to some corollaries that Aristotle wishes to infer from the main
line of his argument. To each assumption, conclusion or corollary there
usually corresponds a single section of Aristotles text, which Paul care-
fully quotes. It must be noted, however, that Aristotles text is quoted after
390 chapter five
Pauls reconstruction of the different assumptions, conclusions or corollar-

ies. What is more, Pauls reconstructions are not paraphrases. What Paul
does is rather to bring out the structure of Aristotles argument by reformu-
lating it in a syllogistic form, i.e. by specifying the major and minor premiss
the argument is supposed to contain. Usually, Paul is careful enough to let us
know which of the premisses is explicitly stated in Aristotles text and which,
instead, should be supplied. Moreover, he also indicates the textual and/or
theoretical support each of the premisses can count on. To conclude: the
quotations of Aristotle, in other words, have the only function of reminding
the reader of where exactly in the text he should look for the assumptions,
conclusions and corollaries Paul is talking about.
It is clear that, when compared to Pauls well-structured and sophisti-
cated commentary, Alexanders literal exposition of the text appears to be
much more paraphrastic in character. This point, however, should not be
overestimated. For one thing, Alexander is not simply paraphrasing Aris-
totles text. On the contrary, he marks very clearly the different stages of
Aristotles argument by indicating what Aristotle is doing in each portion
of the text, i.e. whether he is stating a general claim, is giving some proof
in favour of it, is reporting someone elses view or is dealing with some
possible counterexamples, and so on and so forth. For another, Alexander
also attempts at bringing into light the assumptions that underlie Aristo-
tles argument and evaluates their force and theoretical ground. This is done
either directly in the course of the paraphrase or by means of supplemen-
tary notes. Not infrequently, this work of decomposition of the text is also
applied to Averroess comments in order to make explicit their assumption
or to unveil their true meaning. To some extent, therefore, Alexander also
tries to put some logical order into Aristotles (and Averroess) text, even
though this never results in the kind of restructuring of Aristotles writing
which is so typical of Paul of Venices general method.
My considerations about the structure of Alexanders and Pauls com-
mentaries invite some general conclusions. In both authors, the litter of
Aristotles text is just the starting point of a more sophisticated interpre-
tative process, whose aim is to shed some light on the issues Aristotle
raises rather than providing a word-by-word explanation of the different
passages of the Metaphysics. Upon reflection, this is natural enough. For
Averroess and Aquinass expositions represented already for Alexander,
and even more so for Paul, two paradigmatic interpretations of Aristotles
text, to be incorporated, evaluated and compared. It does not come as a sur-
prise, therefore, that both Alexander and Paul dispense with an entirely new
reading of Aristotle and often refer us to Averroes or Aquinas for the literal
meaning of the text they comment upon. Their chief interest lies in intro-
ducing a different level of discourse in which the philosophical issues which
Aristotle and Averroes raise may be discussed and solved. It is also evident,
however, that the distance from Aristotles text is greater in the case of Paul
than in that of Alexander. Certainly, Pauls attitude towards the text, i.e. his
desire to put it into logical and demonstrative form, must also correspond
in part to his personal inclinations and to his craving for systematicity. It
must not be forgotten, however, that Paul wrote his commentary one cen-
tury after Alexander, in a period, in other words, in which literal expositions
of Aristotle were even less needed. Thus, in some sense, Alexander can be
placed at the beginning of a slow historical movement of which Paul clearly
represents the culminating point.
2. Alexander and Averroes
2.1. Alexanders Use of Averroes

As I said in the introduction, Averroes is present throughout Alexanders
commentary on Met. Z, both in the literal exposition of the text and in the
questions. Although it is difficult to provide an exhaustive classification
of the different ways in which Alexander makes use of Averroess Long
Commentary, there are nonetheless some general lines that can be drawn.
What is clear, for instance, is that Alexander uses Averroes differently in
different contexts. In so far as the literal exposition is concerned, Averroes
is often introduced simply to clarify some difficult aspects of the text that is
being commented upon. Averroess words usually confirm the paraphrase
of the text that Alexander himself offers. In the same vein, Averroes is
invoked at times for an alternative interpretation of the text, which is
thought to be compatible with the one just provided by the Franciscan
Master.
Averroes plays a major role in the questions as well. In a couple of cases,
the solution to a question simply consists in the quotation and explanation
of passages from the Long Commentary.9 This is the case, for instance, with
questions that do not need a particularly sophisticated discussion and solu-
tion. But also in the case of more difficult questions, Alexanders discussion
happens to be built around a series of explicit or implicit references to Aver-
roess commentary. This is the case with Q. 1 of Met. Z 8, which focuses on
9 Cf. for instance: Alexander of Alexandria, Exp. Met., Lib. VII, c. 9, q. 1, fol. 215rb; q. 3,
fol. 215vbra.
392 chapter five
the problem as to whether Platonic Forms are needed in order to explain

generation. Both in presenting the Platonic view and in rejecting it, Alexan-
der makes extensive use of Averroess discussion and rejection of the theory
of the Giver of forms.10 More generally, Averroes seems to be a point of ref-
erence for Alexanders solutions to simpler and more complex questions.
There are, of course, exceptions. In some cases, Averroess opinion is men-
tioned alongside some others and finally rejected. In Q. 4 of Met. Z 1, for
instance, Alexander passes in review different explanations of Aristotles
claim that substance is prior to accidents in time.11 Averroess explanation is
mentioned together with two anonymous solutions, the second of which is
clearly Aquinass. At the end, Alexander goes for Aquinass solution, which is
explicitly described as truer than the others. In this case, however, Alexan-
ders departure from Averroess view is not particularly significant in that
the question discussed concerns a comparatively minor point of exegesis.
More complex is the case of Q. 3 of Met. Z 7, which is about spontaneous
generation. Alexander raises the problem as to whether the same kind of
animals can come to be both from seed and without seed. In answering the
question, Alexander reports two extreme positions: one according to which
the animals that come to be from seed are never the same in species as those
that come to be without seed; the other according to which these two kinds
of animal are always the same in species. The former position is attributed to
Averroes, while the latter is associated with Avicenna. Alexander chooses an
intermediate position, which is described as the position of the moderns,
according to which perfect animals can only come to be from seed, while in
the case of imperfect animals it is possible for the same kind of animals to
come to be both from seed and without seed. In this case as well, Alexander
parts company with Averroes, but the reason is perfectly clear. The struc-
ture of Alexanders question directly comes from Aquinas. It is Aquinas that
establishes the contrast between Averroess and Avicennas position and
comes up with an intermediate position. Thus, it is Aquinas who is hid-
den behind Alexanders reference to the moderns. In the case at issue,
therefore, Alexander does nothing but reproduce Aquinass reconstruction
of the problem of spontaneous generation and choose the Dominican Mas-
ters balanced position. Apart from these and other sporadic cases, however,
Averroes is usually appealed to in support of the position Alexander finally
endorses.
10 Cf. Alexander of Alexandria, Exp. Met., Lib. VII, c. 8., q. 1, fol. 212vb; 213va.
11 Cf. Alexander of Alexandria, Exp. Met., Lib. VII, c. 1, q. 4, fol. 185vb186rb.
Averroess role, however, is not confined to being a source of inspiration

for Alexanders interpretative choices or theoretical discussions. As I have
hinted in the introduction, sometimes Averroes is also the object of Alexan-
ders interpretative activity. Since this fact is important in order to under-
stand Pauls general attitude toward Averroes, it may be useful to explain the
point in more detail. What I mean is simply that, not infrequently, Alexan-
der does not confine himself to reporting Averroess view, but also stops to
explain how Averroess comments should be understood and interpreted.
Clearly, this phenomenon is more apparent when Averroess observations
are slightly obscure or make use of technical terminology. It is also clear,
however, that Alexanders operation goes beyond the simple clarification of
Averroess words. This is testified to by the fact that, occasionally, Alexan-
der submits Averroess comments to the same kind of logical analysis as
he applies to Aristotle, by trying to bring to light their philosophical pre-
suppositions and assumptions. A particularly striking example of this tech-
nique is offered by Alexanders literal exposition of Met. Z 4, 1029b2122.
First, Alexander reports Averroess interpretation of the difficult passage.12
According to the Arabic commentator, Aristotles point is that, if accidents
are taken to express the essence of the subject they inhere in, then all the
accidents that inhere in a given subject will be the same in nature: for
instance, if whiteness and lightness both express the essence of the sub-
ject in which they inhere, they must be essentially the same, i.e. the same in
nature. But this is absurd. Accidents, therefore, do not express the essence of
the subject they inhere in. After reporting Averroess interpretation, Alexan-
der reconstructs in great detail its argumentative structure. He singles out
in particular four assumptions on which Averroess reasoning is based and
carefully discusses each of them.13 I am not so much interested here in the
content of Alexanders reconstruction as in the Franciscan Masters attitude
towards Averroes. In the case at issue, in fact, Averroes is treated in almost
the same way as Aristotle and turns out to be a second object of interpreta-
tion alongside Aristotle himself.
2.2. Alexander and Averroes on the Ontological Status of Accidents

So far, I have focused my attention on the different ways in which Alexan-
der makes use of Averroes, both in the literal exposition of Aristotle and
in the questions. Now I wish to move to a different issue, which concerns
12 Cf. Alexander of Alexandria, Exp. Met., Lib. VII, c. 4, fol. 192ra.

13 Cf. Alexander of Alexandria, Exp. Met., Lib. VII, c. 4, fol. 192rava.
394 chapter five
the impact that the Long Commentary has on Alexanders interpretation

of some crucial aspects of Aristotles doctrine of substance. We have seen
that Alexander makes extensive use of Averroes both in the literal exposi-
tion and in the questions. This shows that Averroes is regarded not only as
a point of reference for the understanding of the letter of Aristotles text,
but also as a starting point for more general and doctrinal considerations. It
may be useful in this connection to raise the question as to whether there
are sections in Alexanders commentary where Averroess influence is par-
ticular strong and systematic. What I wish to investigate, in other words, is
whether there are general issues concerning Aristotles theory of substance
that are interpreted by Alexander exclusively in light of Averroess doctrine.
My impression is that one such issue is the ontological status of accidents.14
As is known, there are two places in Met. Z where Aristotle discusses the
ontological status of accidents, i.e. Z 1 and Z 45. In Z 1 the focus is on the
reality of accidents, i.e. on whether and in which sense accidents can be
said to exist. This issue is part of a more general problem concerning the
relationships among the different entities (substances, accidents and acci-
dental composites), which we are inclined to regard as beings. In Z 45, by
contrast, Aristotle is interested in the essence of accidents and more specif-
ically on whether accidents can be rightly said to have an essence (and a
definition). In this case as well, the issue is part of a more general discus-
sion concerning the sense in which different entities (substances, accidents
and accidental composites) can be said to have an essence as well as the
relationships among the different kinds of essence we may be prepared to
accept. It is therefore in Alexanders exposition of Met. Z 1 and Z 45 and
in the related questions that we should expect to find indications about the
Franciscan Masters views on the nature and ontological status of accidents.
With regard to both the question of the reality of accidents and that of
their essence Alexander takes an intermediate position, which is character-
istic of Averroes. It is wrong to maintain that accidents do not exist at all,
i.e. have no kind of reality. However, it is equally wrong to maintain that
accidents exist and are real in the same way as substances. Likewise, it is
not correct to say that accidents have no essence at all (and so cannot be
defined). But it is equally incorrect to credit accidents with the same kind
of essence as substances. Averroess influence on Alexander is more evident
in the treatment of the question of the essence of accidents, but it may be
useful to say a few words also concerning the problem of their reality. In his
14 For the theme of this section see Amerini (2005).

commentary on Met. Z 1, Alexander devotes two questions (Q. 12) to the

problem of the reality of accidents. In the first, he investigates directly into
whether or not accidents are real, i.e. whether or not accidents exist.15 In
the second, he tackles a more specific issue, i.e. whether accidents signified
in the abstract are beings, i.e. are among the things that exist.16 As Aristo-
tles text shows, in fact, there is a special problem with accidents signified
in the abstract when compared to accidents signified in the concrete.17 The
problem is that in their concrete mode of signification accidents seem to
be more real than they do in their abstract mode of signification. A con-
crete accident in fact does not only signify a property but also the object
having the property and so seems to point to something existing in the
extra-mental world, i.e. the object having the property: album, for instance,
does not only signify whiteness but also the substance that is white, and sub-
stances are fully existing things. An abstract accident, by contrast, seems to
signify only an abstract property and it is not immediately clear whether
abstract properties exist at all: albedo, for instance, seems to signify only the
abstract property whiteness and it is not entirely clear whether things like
whiteness exist or not. Although Alexander makes some interesting consid-
erations also with regard to the status of abstract accidents, it is especially in
his first question that he develops an articulated view about the ontological
status of accidents. In line with Averroess (and Aquinass) solution, Alexan-
der maintains that accidents exist, are real, even though they do not have
the complete form of existence that substances have.18 Accidents, in other
words, have only a diminished or incomplete kind of existence or reality.
Predictably, it is the existential dependence of accidents on substances that
makes their existence incomplete: accidents depend on substances for their
existence in a way in which substances do not depend on accidents. Alexan-
der makes his point in three steps: first he lists the motivations behind
the view that accidents have no kind of reality;19 then he shows that acci-
dents (or at least non-relational accidents) must have some kind of reality;20
finally, he describes in some more detail the kind of reality accidents must
be credited with.21 Admittedly, Alexanders arguments in favour of attribut-
ing some kind of reality to accidents are not to be found as such in Averroess
15 Cf. Alexander of Alexandria, Exp. Met., Lib. VII, c. 1, q. 1, fol. 184ravb.

16 Cf. Alexander of Alexandria, Exp. Met., Lib. VII, c. 1, q. 2, fol. 185vbrb.
18 Cf. Alexander of Alexandria, Exp. Met., Lib. VII, c. 1, q. 1, fol. 184rvva.
19 Cf. Alexander of Alexandria, Exp. Met., Lib. VII, c. 1, q. 1, fol. 184ra.
396 chapter five
text. The arguments mainly revolve around physical considerations.22 The

most important one, for instance, relies on the reality of accidental change:
if things change in their accidental properties, then there must exist proper-
ties that they acquire as a result of the process of change.23 Even if the argu-
ments of which Alexander makes use to establish the reality of accidents
are not directly drawn from Averroes, it is clear that the way in which the
Franciscan Master describes the kind of existence accidents must be cred-
ited with is strongly indebted to Averroess interpretation of Met. Z 1. In the
Long Commentary Averroes defends a conception of accidents according to
which accidental properties are beings only in so far as they are disposi-
tions of beings. By this Averroes means that accidental properties are just
ways in which substances, which are primary beings, are characterised.24
In Ch. 4, I tried to explain that describing accidents as ways in which sub-
stances are may serve some sort of deflationary strategy and even lead to
eliminate accidents from the ontology. One might say, for instance, that the
ways in which substances are characterised are not real things, distinct from
the substances that are characterised in some way or other. This is clearly
not Averroess view: accidents exist, are real properties of substances. At the
same time, to say that accidents exist only because they are dispositions
of substances emphasises the different ways in which substances and acci-
dents exist. Averroess conception has both a metaphysical and a semantic
side.25 Metaphysically speaking, Averroes maintains that substances are the
causes of the existence of accidents.26 The meaning of this claim is that acci-
dents depend for their existence on substances, while the reverse is not the
case: accidents are ways in which substances are. Thus, it is wrong to say
that accidents do not exist, are not real, but it is also wrong to maintain
that they exist in the same way as substances, because accidents exist in
virtue of substances, i.e. only because substances exist. Accidents exist, in
other words, only because they bear some relation (of existential depen-
dence) to substances. The causal structure obtaining at the metaphysical
level is mirrored in our semantics. The term being is predicated primarily
of substances and only secondarily of accidents.27 Moreover, being is pred-
icated of accidents only because it is predicated of substances, i.e. only with

24 Cf. Averroes, In Met., Lib VII, t.c. 4, fol. 155r B. See also: t.c. 3, fol. 154r DE.
27 Cf. Averroes, In Met., VII t.c. 2, fol. 153FH; t.c. 3, fol. 154C; E.
reference to the way in which it is predicated of substances.28 Thus, in its

primary sense being signifies substances, which are primary beings. In its
secondary senses, by contrast, being signifies the different ways in which
primary beings are characterised. The secondary senses of being presup-
pose the sense of being that applies to substances.
There are clear traces, in Alexanders commentary, of Averroess gen-
eral view. Alexander reproduces, for instance, Averroess two-level analy-
sis of accidents. At the metaphysical level, Alexander holds that accidents
are entia quia entis, i.e. they are beings only because they bear some rela-
tion (of existential dependence) to substances, which are primary beings.29
Alexanders use of the word quia (because, in virtue of) echoes the causal
language which is so typical of Averroess understanding of the relationship
between substances and accidents. In line with Averroess general concep-
tion, Alexander characterises accidents as dispositions of complete being,
i.e. ways in which primary beings are characterised, and attributes to acci-
dents only a diminished or incomplete form of existence as compared to the
form of existence characteristic of substances.30 Following Averroes again,
Alexander makes his point at the semantic level as well by explaining in
some detail how the analogy of being should be understood. He rejects
in particular two extreme positions concerning the semantics of being
and endorses Averroess intermediate stance. One position maintains that
being is said of many things, but only one of the things of which being
is said is formally being, i.e. only one of them can be characterised as exist-
ing, while the others bear some relation to being, but do not really exist.31
According to this account, the semantics of being would be the same as
those of healthy: we say that both animals and medicines are healthy, but
it is only animals that are healthy, while medicines are just the causes of
health, but are not really healthy. The position in question misconstrues
the relation of dependence obtaining between substances and accidents.
It is certainly true that accidents are called beings only because they bear
some relation to substances, but this does not imply that accidents are not
formally beings, i.e. they do not exist. Accidents are rather real ways in
which substances are characterised. Another opinion maintains that acci-
dents may well be incomplete beings when compared to substances, but
28 Cf. Averroes, In Met., VII t.c. 3, fol. 154F.

29 Cf. Alexander of Alexandria, Exp. Met., Lib. VII, c. 1, q. 1, fol. 184ra; 184rbva.
31 Cf. Alexander of Alexandria, Exp. Met., Lib. VII, c. 1, q. 1, fol. 184ra (for the position); 184va
(for Alexanders reply).

398 chapter five
not because they bear some relation to substances.32 Perhaps, the position
in question should be understood in the following way: being can be pred-
icated of two different kinds of being, complete and incomplete being, but
the sense in which incomplete being is being does not make reference to
that in which complete being is being. For Alexander, this second position
runs the risk of making the term being univocal and consequently main-
taining that accidents exist in the same sense as substances. The correct
position, therefore, should fall in between the two extreme ones.33 Being
is predicated of both substances and accidents. Moreover, being is pred-
icated formally of both of them with the result that both substances and
accidents exist. However, being is predicated primarily of substances and
secondarily of accidents. The distinction between a primary and a series of
secondary senses of being should be construed in such a way that it takes
account of the ontological relation of dependence between substances and
accidents. Thus, accidents are called beings only because substances are
so called, i.e. only because, in the case of accidents, being signifies the dif-
ferent, real ways in which substances can be characterised.
Averroess influence is even more evident in Alexanders treatment of
the essence of accidents.34 At the very beginning of his exposition of Met.
Z 5, for instance, Alexander reproposes, without explicitly quoting him,
Averroess general assessment of the problem of the essence and defini-
tion of accidents.35 Some people maintain that accidents have no essence
and definition. Others think that they have an essence and a definition in
an unqualified sense. Aristotles position, which is the correct one, is some-
how intermediate: accidents do have an essence and a definition, but only
qualifiedly, i.e. they do not have an essence and a definition in the same,
unqualified sense as substances do. Moreover, Alexander also takes from
Averroes another important point of interpretation, i.e. the view that Z5
puzzles have their origin in the wrong assumption that accidents have the
same kind of essence as substances and so the definition of accidents obeys
the same logic as that of substances.36 Since substances are defined by genus
and differentiaso the wrong assumption goesaccidents too must be
defined by genus and differentia. It is easily realised, however, that accidents
32 Cf. Alexander of Alexandria, Exp. Met., Lib. VII, c. 1, q. 1, fol. 184va (for an illustration of
the second position and for Alexanders alternative model).

34 For Averroess treatment of the essence of accidents see Ch. 2, Sections 3.2 and 3.3.
35 Cf. Alexander of Alexandria, Exp. Met., Lib. VII, c. 5, fol. 196rb. See also: fol. 199vb.
36 Cf. Alexander of Alexandria, Exp. Met., Lib. VII, c. 5, q. 3, fol. 198rarb; q. 4, fol. 198vavb;
q. 6, fol. 199rbva.
are not defined by genus and differentia, but rather by mentioning a certain
kind of property and a certain kind of subject. And it is precisely the assump-
tion that the property-subject model works in the same way as the genus-
differentia model that gives rise to the puzzles which Aristotle illustrates
in Met. Z 5. The standard substitution rule, for instance, i.e. the rule that
definiendum and definiens can be substituted for each other salva veritate in
every context, holds for the definition of substances but not for that of acci-
dents. This explains why substituting an accident for its definition gives rise
to repetitions or infinite regresses. Finally, Alexander also follows Averroes
concerning the solution to Met. Z 5s puzzles, which mainly consists in dis-
tinguishing between the potential and the actual meaning of a term.37 The
idea is that, for instance, snubness or snub signifies the nose only poten-
tially, i.e. implicitly and indirectly. Therefore, when the nose is actually men-
tioned, as in the expressions snub nose or the snubness of a nose, the
potentiality contained in the meaning of snubness or snub is actualised
with the result that, when conjoined with nose, snubness or snub do
not signify the nose even potentially or implicity. Thus, the expressions the
snubness of a nose and snub nose do not generate any repetition or infi-
nite regress. The thought is implicit in Averroess account (which Alexander
seems to follow rather closely) that the distinction between potential and
actual meaning can be drawn only in the case of accidents. Thus, distin-
guishing between the potential and the actual meaning of an accidental
term is another way of making the point that accidents do not have the
same kind of essence as substances and so are not defined in the same way
as them. It must also be added that Alexander is also faithful to Averroes on
the question of the distinction between simple accidents (like whiteness)
and coupled accidents (like snubness). First, he borrows from Averroes a
rather technical characterisation of their distinction.38 Then, he concludes
with the Arabic commentator that, once the proper subject of inherence is
specified, all accidents turn out to be coupled accidents.39
It is interesting to note that Averroess influence on Alexanders under-
standing of the notion of essence (and of the essence of accidents in par-
ticular) extends well beyond the interpretation of Met. Z 5. In Ch. 2, we
saw that Averroess treatment of the notion of essence is mainly guided by
the Principle of Essential Unity (PEU), i.e. the principle that, in any proper
definition, the predicates figuring in the definiens form an essential unity
37 Cf. Alexander of Alexandria, Exp. Met., Lib. VII, c. 5, q. 6, fol. 198vb199ra.

38 Cf. Alexander of Alexandria, Exp. Met., Lib. VII, c. 5, fol. 196vb197ra.
39 Cf. Alexander of Alexandria, Exp. Met., Lib. VII, c. 5, fol. 197ra.
400 chapter five
both with one another and with the thing defined. Species, genus and dif-
ferentia, for instance, are just one nature and not three. Averroess extensive
use of PEU is one of the consequences of his peculiar understanding of the
relationship between logic and metaphysics.40 For Averroes, the enquiry in
Met. Z is logical not only because it makes use of logical notions and pro-
cedures, but also because Aristotle draws on propositions that have already
been defended in his logical works. The most important of such proposi-
tions is the claim that the essence of something is what is revealed by its
definition. PEU is the principle that enables us to check whether the for-
mulae we are presented with are proper instances of definition and hence
whether the things which the the formulae pick out have a genuine essence
or not.
Now, Alexander directly appeals to Averroess authority for the explana-
tion of the relationship between logic and metaphysics. In his commentary
on Met. Z 1, for instance, Alexander reports with approval Averroess claim
that logic can be used by the other sciences in two ways: as an instrument,
by using logical techniques and procedures, and as an autonomous disci-
pline, by taking as starting points propositions that have been established
in logic.41 In the Metaphysics, Aristotle employs logic also in the second way
by making use of propositions that he himself has established in his logi-
cal works. In the same vein, Alexander endorses, in his commentary on Z 4,
Averroess understanding of the adverb : Aristotle will offer a logical
treatment of essence by relying on one of the propositions he has estab-
lished in his logical works, i.e. the claim that the essence of something is
that which is revealed by its definition.42 Against this background, it is not
surprising that PEU plays a crucial role in Alexanders understanding of the
section on essence and in the related questions. After presenting Averroess
interpretation of the meaning of logical, for instance, Alexander observes
that PEU is a direct consequence of the logical claim that an essence is what
is revealed by a definition. Alexander makes his point by means of three
quotations from Averroes Long Commentary:43 (i) the essence is expressed
by means of three per se predicates, the species, the genus and the differ-
entia;44 (ii) genus and differentia must express the same formality and so
40 Cf. above, Ch. 2, Sect. 3.1.

41 Cf. Alexander of Alexandria, Exp. Met., Lib. VII, c. 1, fol. 182vb183ra.
42 Cf. Alexander of Alexandria, Exp. Met., Lib. VII, c. 4, fol. 191va.
43 Cf. Alexander of Alexandria, Exp. Met., Lib. VII, c. 4, fol. 191vavb.
44 Cf. Alexander of Alexandria, Exp. Met., Lib. VII, c. 4, fol. 191va and Averroes, In Met., VII,
t.c. 11, fol. 161DE.

the same essence as the whole definition, although they do so in differ-

ent ways: the genus expresses an essence confusedly, the differentia in the
manner of a quality specifying the genus, while the definition expresses
a nature that can be and is specified in actuality by the differentia.45 (iii)
Therefore, genus and differentia must form an essential unity not only with
the object defined, but also with each other.46 (iii) is nothing but PEU.
Alexander remarks that PEU holds in the case of substantial predicates but
not in that of accidental ones.47 Alexander appeals to PEU also to solve
two crucial questions connected with Z 4s main argument: whether it is
true that essence belongs only to substances (Q. 3)48 and whether acci-
dental beings, i.e. accidental composites, can be defined (Q. 4).49 In both
cases, Alexander answers the question by having recourse to PEU: both
accidents and accidental composites are not one single nature but rather
two natures. As a consequence, the predicates figuring in their definitions
do not form an essential unity either with one another or with the object
defined. It must finally be observed that Alexander also puts PEU to use
to solve the problem Aristotle raises in Z 6, i.e. the question as to whether
a thing is identical with its essence. Towards the beginning of his exposi-
tion of Z 6, Alexander makes an excursus in order to clarify the terms of
the identity thesis.50 The excursus is interesting in so far as it lets us see
how Alexander understands the question Aristotle raises in the chapter. In
Z 6 Aristotle is interested in understanding which of the different entities
he admits in his ontology (substances, accidents and accidental compos-
ites) is in fact identical with its own essence. Although many aspects of
Aristotles argument are not entirely clear, his final solution seems to be
that accidents and accidental composites are not identical with their own
essence, while substances (or at least primary substances) are. At least at
the beginning, Alexander seems to understand the identity thesis in a rather
different way. For him, the question Aristotle is interested in is whether dif-
ferent kinds of predicates are definitionally identical with their subject of
predication. Since all predications can be ultimately analysed as predica-
tions concerning individual substances, i.e. the primary substances of the
45 Cf. Alexander of Alexandria, Exp. Met., Lib. VII, c. 4, fol. 191vavb and Averroes, In Met.,
VII, t.c. 11, fol. 161E.

46 Cf. Alexander of Alexandria, Exp. Met., Lib. VII, c. 4, fol. 191vb and Averroes, In Met. VII,
t.c. 11, fol. 161E.

47 Cf. Alexander of Alexandria, Exp. Met., Lib. VII, c. 4, fol. 191vb.
48 Cf. Alexander of Alexandria, Exp. Met., Lib. VII, c. 4, q. 3, fol. 193vb.
50 Cf. Alexander of Alexandria, Exp. Met., Lib. VII, c. 6, fol. 200va201rb.
402 chapter five
Categories, Z 6s problem becomes, according to Alexander, to understand

whether either accidental or substantial predicates are definitionally iden-
tical with the substances of which they are predicated.51 Thus understood,
the question has already been solved in Z 4 as a direct consequence of PEU.52
Since the predicates figuring in a definition must form an essential unity
both with one another and with the object defined, it is perfectly clear that
accidental predicates cannot be definitionally identical with the substances
of which they are predicated. White, for instance, cannot be definition-
ally identical with the man of which it is predicated simply because the
nature of white is different from the nature of man. Likewise, white man
cannot be definitionally identical with the man of which it is predicated
because a man is one single nature, while a white man is an aggregate of
two different natures. Substantial predicates, by contrast, are definition-
ally identical with the substances of which they are predicated in that they
express the same nature as them. Man, rational and animal are just one sin-
gle nature.
Possibly, Alexander has not completely misunderstood here the question
Aristotle raises in Z 6, but is simply rephrasing it in different terms.53 Sup-
pose that we ask whether an accident is identical with its essence or not.
One way to answer this question might be to say that there will certainly
be a definition expressing the nature of the accident and so the accident
must be definitionally identical with the definition expressing its nature.
If the accident we enquire about, for instance, is a quality, say whiteness,
the definition of the accident will make reference to predicates in the cat-
egory of quality that are essentially predicated of the accident, say colour,
and so are essentially identical with it. Alexander is making the point that
this way of looking at things is fundamentally incorrect. Even if the sentence
Whiteness is a colour is an instance of essential predication, in that being
a colour is part if the essence of whiteness, the truth of the sentence in ques-
tion is ultimately grounded on the truth of another sentence, A white thing
is coloured, where the subject makes reference to an individual substance.
And the reference to substance is a reference to an essence different from
the essence of the accident. This squares with the idea that the subject of
inherence is always mentioned in the definition of accidents: what an acci-
dent is depends at least in part on what something else, i.e. a substance,

52 Cf. Alexander of Alexandria, Exp. Met., Lib. VII, c. 6, fol. 200vb201ra; 201rb.
53 Cf. in particular: Alexander of Alexandria, Exp. Met., Lib. VII, c. 6, fol. 200vavb (in the
excursus); c. 6, q. 6, fol. 201rbva.

is. The result of this reductive analysis is that the question of the identity
between an accident and its essence cannot be answered independently of
the further question whether the accident is of one nature with its subject
of inherence. And since the accident is not of the same nature as its subject
of inherence, it follows that an accident cannot be identical, strictly speak-
ing, with its own essence. Be that as it may, the important point is that Met.
Z 6 as a whole is understood by Alexander in the light of Averroess inter-
pretation of Z 4 and of the Principle of Essential Unity, which is the Arabic
commentators main conceptual tool for understanding Aristotles doctrine
of essence.
The general conclusion of my analysis must be that, in his discussion
of the ontological status of accidents, Alexander does not confine himself
to exploiting material from the Long Commentary, but also fully endorses
Averroess position by making systematic use of his main conceptual dis-
tinctions.
3. Alexander and Aquinas
Although Thomas Aquinas is never explicitly quoted in Alexanders com-

mentary on Met. Z, he certainly represents the second major source of the
Franciscan Masters writing. As in the case of Averroes, although to a lesser
extent, Aquinas influences the interpretation of single passages of Aristo-
tles text as well as some of Alexanders philosophical positions. In Section
2, I have already drawn the attention to some passages where Alexander
follows Aquinass interpretation of Aristotle, sometimes even against Aver-
roess. And there is no doubt that, not infrequently, Alexander has recourse
to Aquinas for the explanation of difficult texts in Aristotle and, more gener-
ally, for particular points of exegesis. It may be more useful in this section,
however, to illustrate a larger phenomenon, i.e. Alexanders endorsement
of Aquinass understanding of crucial Aristotelian doctrines as well as his
use of some of Aquinass most characteristic views in metaphysics. In the
following, I shall present two cases in which Alexander follows Aquinass
interpretation of some critical sections in Met. Z and one instance of Alexan-
ders employment of Aquinass metaphysical views.
We have seen in Ch. 2 that one of the distinguishing marks of Aquinass
interpretation of Book Z is the view that Zs investigation into the notion of
substance does not enter into conflict with the ontology Aristotle presents
in the Categories. The view, which I have often referred to as compatibil-
ism, rests on the idea that the Categories and Met. Z raise and answer two
404 chapter five
different questions: the Categories is interested in determining which enti-

ties are primary substances, i.e. which are the basic or fundamental entities
the existence of which is the ground for the existence of everything else.
This question is answered once and for all in the Categories by saying that
ordinary particular objects, such as human beings and horses, are primary
substances. Met. Z, by contrast, raises a different kind of question by try-
ing to determine what is the substance of the particular sensible objects of
our ordinary experience, i.e. which ontological constituent explains their
substantial character. To this effect, particular sensible objects are analysed
as composites of matter and form. The conclusion of Aristotles analysis is
that form is the ontological constituent that explains the substantial char-
acter of particular sensible objects. On Aquinass reading, therefore, Met.
Zs ontology does not clash with the one which Aristotle presents in the
Categories in that the two treatises work with two different senses of sub-
stance: the Categories is interested in the absolute or existential sense of
substance, which is at work in sentences such as x is a substance, while
Met. Z deals with the explanatory sense of substance, which is captured by
the expression the substance of and is at work in sentences if the form x
is the substance of y. Thus, even if form is the substance of the individual
composites of matter and form, it is not a substance in the same sense as the
composites themselves. What is more, in Aquinass metaphysics the abso-
lute sense of substance is clearly prior to the explanatory sense. The result
is that only individual composites of matter and form are substances in the
primary sense of the term, while form is substance only in a secondary sense,
i.e. only in so far as it is the substance of particular composites of matter and
form.
Now, when commenting on Met. Z 3, Alexander raises the question as to
whether form is more substance than the composite of matter and form.54
Apart from some small differences in terminology and emphasis, Alexan-
ders answer is perfectly in line with Aquinass general view. The Franciscan
Master remarks that form holds some kind of priority over the compos-
ite of matter and form in that it is the in virtue of which the composite is
what it is (ratio essendi).55 This kind of causal or explanatory priority, how-
ever, is not enough for form to qualify as a substance in the strict sense
of the term. It is only the composite in fact that is substance in the strict
sense of the term.56 As for Aquinas, also for Alexander there are two differ-

ent senses of substance, substance in the absolute sense and substance in

the causal or explanatory sense. Alexander is as clear as he can be that only
the composite is substance in the absolute sense, while form, if it can be
called substance at all, can be so called only with reference to the causal
or explanatory sense, i.e. only with reference to its being the substance of
the composite. Rather interestingly, Alexander remarks that from the fact
that form is that in virtue of which the composite is substance, it does not
follow that form too is a substance.57 The explanatory and the absolute sense
of substance, in other words, are not comparable and hence the composite
retains its priority over form when it comes to substantiality in the strict
sense of the term. In Ch. 2, I have tried to show that this is not how Averroes
construes the relationship between form and the composite. For the Arabic
commentator, form is more substance than the composite precisely because
it is that in virtue of which the composite is substance. On Averroess
account, therefore, facts about explanation are also relevant in determining
what counts as a substance in the absolute or existential sense of the term. It
is unlikely, however, that Alexander sees any significant difference between
Averroes and Aquinas here. For one thing, Alexander tends in general
to downplay the discrepancies between the two commentators. Even if
there are some places in Alexanders commentary where Aquinass reading
is contrasted with Averroes, the general impression is that the contrast
concerns minor points of interpretation and not more general doctrines.
Moreover, the interpretation of Averroes which I have defended in Ch. 2
was not popular in the Middle Ages. In all probability, under the influence of
the ontology of the Categories, medieval commentators tended to overlook
the passages in Averroes that seem to suggest that form is more substance
than the composite. Be that as it may, the fact remains that, when discussing
the question as to whether form is more substance than the composite,
Alexander does not explicitly report Averroess position or mention any
texts from the Long Commentary. Possibly, Alexander was just assuming
Averroess position to be in line with Aquinass or simply could not find any
texts from Averroes bearing on the particular issue under discussion.
Aquinass influence is also evident in Alexanders understanding of Met.
Z 1011, the chapters on the parts of essence and definition. Alexander
explicitly endorses Aquinass claim that the essence and definition of sen-
sible substances do not contain their form alone, but also some matter.
Consequently, Alexander distinguishes between the matter that is part of

406 chapter five
the essence and definition of sensible substances (common matter) and the
matter that is not (individual matter). The Franciscan Master goes out of his
way to explain away those passages in Met. Z where Aristotle seems to say
that only the form of sensible substances is part of their essence and def-
inition. To this effect, he replaces the standard distinction between form
and matter with a distinction between the formal and the material. The
sense of the new distinction is that Aquinass common matter too, i.e. the
kind of matter of which all cospecific sensible substances are made, counts
as formal in Alexanders sense and so must be regarded as a part of the
essence and definition. I shall analyse Alexanders strategy in the next chap-
ter, when I deal with Paul of Venices interpretation of Met. Z 1011. For
Alexanders distinction between the formal and the material is certainly
the basis for Pauls attempt at reading Averroes in the light of Aquinass
doctrine of essence and definition. For the time being, I wish to call the
attention to the fact that Aquinass influence is not confined to the question
of the essence and definition of sensible substances. When he comments
on Met. Z 11, for instance, Alexander presents two questions concerning the
case of mathematical and geometrical objects. He asks in particular whether
mathematical and geometrical objects are structurally similar to sensible
objects (Q. 1)58 and whether intelligible matter, i.e. the continuum, is part of
the essence of mathematical and geometrical objects (Q. 2).59 In answering
both questions, Alexander clearly espouses Aquinass view that mathemati-
cal and geometrical objects are structurally analogous to sensible ones. The
point of analogy consists in the fact that intelligible matter plays the same
role with regard to mathematical and geometrical objects as sensible mat-
ter does with regard to sensible objects. Intelligible matter, in other words, is
part of the essence and definition of mathematical and geometrical objects
just as sensible matter is essential to sensible objects. In parallel with the
case of sensible objects, therefore, Alexander draws a distinction between
common intelligible matter, which is part of the essence of mathematical
and geometrical objects, and individual intelligible matter, which falls out-
side their essence.60 In this context, it is not surprising that Alexander also
follows Aquinas in sharply distinguishing between genus and matter and
so in endorsing an analogical interpretation of the genus-as-matter image.61
In drawing the distinction, Alexander clearly appeals to Aquinass standard
60 Cf. Alexander of Alexandria, Exp. Met., Lib. VII, c. 11, fol. 225va; q. 2, fol. 225rb.
61 Cf. Alexander of Alexandria, Exp. Met., Lib. VII, c. 12, q. 1, fol. 228vavb.
doctrine, expounded as early as the De ente et essentia, according to which

the genus expresses in an indeterminate way the whole of the species (and
so is predicated of it), while matter is only a part of the species (and so is not
predicated of it).62 Thus, the relationship between genus and species should
be understood in terms of that between an indeterminate and a determi-
nate item, while the relationship between species and matter (as well as that
between species and form) is a proper whole-part relationship. Aquinas,
in conclusion, is the main source of inspiration for the Franciscan Masters
comprehension of the question of the parts of essence and definition.
Some of Aquinass most characteristic views crop up also in contexts
that bear less directly on Aristotles text. When commenting on Met. Z 1,
for instance, Alexander raises the question as to whether the inherence of
an accident (in a substance) is part of its essence.63 Officially, so to speak,
the question is prompted by Aristotles remark in Z 1 to the effect that
accidents are not separable from substances, while the other way round
is the case.64 The problem, in other words, is understanding whether the
inseparability of accidents from substances is essential to what an accident
is or is an inessential concomitant of the way an accident concretely exists.
It is clear, however, that, in spite of its loose connection with Aristotles
text, the problem is particularly important for theological reasons in that it
bears on the philosophical intelligibility of the sacrament of the Eucharist.65
In the Eucharist, in fact, accidents exist separately from the substance of
which they are the accidentswhich seems to be impossible if inherence
is part of their essence. Alexanders answer to this difficult question is
in line with Aquinass standard solution. It is based in particular on the
traditional distinction between the actual inherence of an accidental and
inherence taken as a natural aptitude or tendency to inhere.66 What is built
62 For this issue in Aquinas see Ch. 3, Sect. 5.2.

63 Cf. Alexander of Alexandria, Exp. Met., Lib. VII, c. 1, q. 3, fol. 185rbvb.
66 Cf. Alexander of Alexandria, Exp. Met., Lib. VII, c. 1, q. 3, fol. 185vavb. For Aquinass
position see: In IV Sent., d. 12, q. 1, ad 2, ed. Moos, pp. 496504; C. Gent., IV, cc. 6263; 65; S.Th.,
IIIa, q. 77, a. 1, pp. 22762277; Q. De Quod., IX, q. 3, a. un., ad 2, vol. I, p. 99, lin. 7895. According
to Aquinas, facts about the existence of a thing cannot be part of its essence. Therefore, to
exist in something else cannot be part of the essence of an accident, just as to exist per se
cannot part of the essence of a substance. However, in virtue of being the kind of thing it
is, an accident has a natural inclination to exist in something else, just as a substance has a
natural inclination to exist per se. In other words, things of the kind of accidents have built
into their own nature the natural inclination to exist in a subject (which can be suspended
in non-natural circumstances).
408 chapter five
into the essence of an accident is not its actual inherence in a substance,

but rather its natural aptitude or tendency to inhere. This means that
in standard circumstances an accident will inhere in a substance in that
it has natural tendency to exist in something else. Not even God could
separate an accident from its natural tendency to inhere because it is part
of the essence of the accident. God, however, can separate an accident
from its actual inherence in a substance in that the actual inherence is
not part of the essence of the accident. This is what God does in fact in
the miracle of the Eucharist. Thus, even if an accident normally exists in
a substance, there is nothing contradictory in supposing that it does not.
What is contradictory is to suppose that an accident could be separated
from its natural tendency to inhere. But an accident retains its natural
tendency even when it does not actually inhere in a substance, as happens
in the case of the Eucharist. All this, as I said, is just Aquinass standard
doctrine.
In spite of Aquinass great influence on Alexanders commentary, there
is one issue where Alexander seems to part company with Aquinass stan-
dard doctrine, i.e. the problem of the identity or non-identity between an
angelic substance and its essence. The disagreement between Alexander
and Aquinas is real, even if some words are required to clarify what exactly
it consists in. At the end of his commentary on Met. Z 11, Alexander raises the
question as to whether in things separate from matter the essence is iden-
tical with the thing of which it is the essence, where the expression things
separate from matter includes both God and angelic substances.67 Alexan-
der immediately translates the question into medieval jargon by observ-
ing that the problem at issue is nothing but the question as to whether,
in the case of separate substances, the essence is identical with the sup-
posit. The supposit is an individual substance of a certain species or nature
and so the problem consists in deciding whether or not an individual sep-
arate substance is identical with its essence. The case of God does not pose
any problems. Since God is absolutely simple and so admits of no com-
position of sort, He is fully identical with His essence.68 The problematic
case is that of angelic substances. Alexanders solution is that angelic sub-
stances are not identical with their essence. This solution is in contrast
with the view Aquinas standardly defends in his theological and philosoph-
ical works.69 According to Aquinas, the main contrast that is relevant to
67 Cf. Alexander of Alexandria, Exp. Met., Lib. VII, c. 11, q. 3, fol. 226va227rb.
69 For Aquinass view see for instance: C. Gent., IV, c. 40, vol. III, n. 3779; Q. De Pot., q. 9, a.
the question of the identity between an individual and its essence is that
between sensible substances and separate substances (including angelic
substances): while sensible substances are not identical with their essence,
in that they include in addition to the essence the principle of individua-
tion, which is external to the essence, separate substance are identical with
their essence, in that their individuality does not depend on a principle of
individuation external to the essence. Things, however, are more compli-
cated than that. For in one text, i.e. Quod. II.2.2, Aquinas departs from his
standard position and maintains that angelic substances are not identical
with their essence, either.70 Only God turns out to be identical with His
essence. The main reason which Aquinas advances in support of his view
is that the identity between a supposit and an essence holds if and only
if there is nothing in the supposit that is accidental to the essence. How-
ever, it seems that angelic supposits contain something accidental to their
essence, i.e. the act of existence in virtue of which the essence is actualised
and receives existence. Crucial to Aquinass position in Quod. II.2.2 is the
assumption that the act of existence must be taken to be part of the supposit
or, to put it in more familiar terms, that only actually existing individuals
are individuals in the strict sense. In Aquinass standard position, by con-
trast, one seems to be allowed to talk about an individual whether or not
the individual in question exists, whether or not, in other words, we take
into account the act of existence. As can be seen, Aquinass view in Quod.
II.2.2 is very close to Alexanders position in his commentary on the Meta-
physics.
Thus, one way of understanding Alexanders position would be simply
to say that he is following in his commentary Aquinass non-standard posi-
tion. This reconstruction is not without support in Alexanders text. The
Franciscan Master in fact puts forward two arguments for the claim that,
in angelic substances, supposit and essence are not identical. Alexanders
first argument corresponds very closely to Aquinass intuition in Quod. II.2.2
and mainly relies on the assumption that supposit and essence are iden-
tical if and only if the supposit does not contain anything external to the
essence.71 Alexanders second argument, however, reveals a deeper disagree-
ment with Aquinas. It is true that, in Quod. II.2.2, Aquinas maintains that
angelic substances are not identical with their essence, but he never goes as
far as to say that there could be more than one angelic substance for each
1, vol. II, p. 226; Exp. Metaph., Lib. VII, lect. 11, n. 1536.
70 Cf. Aquinas, Q. De Quod., II, q. 2, a. 2, vol. II, p. 217, lin. 85102.
71 Cf. Alexander of Alexandria, Exp. Met., Lib. VII, c. 11, q. 3, fol. 226vavb.
410 chapter five
species. Thus, he never gives up his standard view that angelic substances
differ from one another in species and not in number. Aquinass position
may seem to be incoherent: if angelic substances contain something more
than their essence, why not suppose that there could be more than one
angelic substance in the same species? On this view, angelic substances
would be multiplied according to their act of existence, which is different in
the different angelic substances and is distinct from their essence. But this
is precisely the view that Aquinas wishes to avoid. On his understanding,
the act of existence is not the principle of individuation and multiplication,
either for sensible substances or for angelic ones. The act of existence does
nothing but actualise the potentiality contained in the essence. The essence
of angelic substances is a self-subsisting essence, i.e. an essence that is not
of such a nature as to exist in something else. This seems to imply that, if
the essence of angelic substance enjoys actual existence, it is an individual
not in virtue of the act of existence it receives, but rather in virtue of its
being a self-subsisting essence. The conclusion is that the act of existence
is not a material substratum in which the essence is received in the same
way as individual matter is a material substratum in which the essence of
sensible substances is received. To think so would be to misconstrue the
relation between essence and existence and to turn the act of existence
into some sort of principle of individuation. Be that as it may, this is the
move Alexander makes in his commentary. He argues that the essence of
angelic substances could exist in more than one supposit and hence there
could be many angelic substances of the same species that are different only
in number.72 Thus, it is clear that Alexander does not confine himself to
endorsing Aquinass non-standard solution to the problem of the identity
between separate substances and their essences, but also manifests some
disagreement with Aquinas concerning the status of the essence of angelic
substances and its individuation.
4. Alexander and Paul of Venice
As I said in the introduction, Alexander contributes much to the material

composition of Paul of Venices commentary on Met. Z. When evaluating
Alexanders influence on Paul, however, it is important to keep in mind
the canonical distinction between implicit and explicit quotations. There is
one particular difference between these two typologies of quotation which
I wish to put emphasis on. Sometimes, Paul reports Alexanders interpre-

tation of the text or, more generally, Alexanders comments without mak-
ing explicit reference to the Franciscan Master. In this case, certain parts
of Alexanders commentary are simply integrated into Pauls exposition.
Whatever reasons Paul may have for not quoting Alexander explicitly, it is
evident that he shares Alexanders interpretation of the text which is being
commented upon and finds useful his further comments and explanations.
It is not surprising, therefore, that the implicit quotations of Alexander have
more to do with the exegesis of Aristotles text than with general points of
doctrine. The case of explicit quotations is different. In their case, Paul does
not confine himself to explicitly reporting Alexanders view, but also stops
to explain whether and why he agrees or disagrees with him. Explicit quo-
tations, in other words, normally imply some kind of judgment on Pauls
part on Alexanders interpretative or philosophical position. In this case as
well, it is not surprising that, more often than not, explicit quotations con-
cern some general points of doctrine. This does not mean that Alexanders
philosophical views are not discussed in connection with some crucial pas-
sages in Aristotles text. However, when Paul quotes Alexander explicitly,
he seems to be more interested in the philosophical consequences of his
understanding of Aristotle than in his interpretation as such. In this section,
I wish to make some considerations about the passages in Pauls commen-
tary where Alexander is explicitly quoted and evaluated.
Alexander is mentioned explicitly seven times in Paul of Venices com-
mentary on Met. Z.73 The importance of the quotations varies considerably
with the context. In some cases, Alexanders opinion concerns small points
of interpretation, in others it is discussed in the course of long philosoph-
ical digressions. It may be useful to list very briefly the seven passages in
question before saying something more about the most significant ones.
1) Comm. on Met. Z 1, 1028b26. Paul reports and criticises (among
others) Alexanders explanation of the meaning of Aristotles claim
that substance is prior to accidents in time.74
2) Comm. on Met. Z 2, 1028b1618. Paul reports and criticises Alexanders
claim that aptitudinal inherence is part of the essence of accidents.
73 The two mentions of the name Alexander in Pauls commentary on Met. Z 9 (cf. Paul of
Venice, Exp. Met., Lib. VII, tr. 2, c. 2, p. 297, 23; 27) are references to Alexander of Aphrodisias
rejection of the theory of the Giver of forms. Clearly, Paul is here simply reporting Averroess
discussion in the Long Commentary on the Metaphysics. As far as I know, there is no reason
to suppose that Paul did not distinguish between the two Alexanders.
74 Cf. Paul of Venice, Exp. Met., VII, tr. 1, c. 1, pp. 57, 2558, 1.
412 chapter five
The quotation comes in the context of a digression about whether

inherence is part of the essence of accidents.75
3) Comm. on Met. Z 6, 1032a611. Alexander is quoted with approval
with regard to the distinction between the principle of the species
(e.g. humanitas) and the species (e.g. homo). Alexanders opinion is
attributed also to Aquinas, Albert and Giles of Rome.76
4) Comm. on Met. Z 10, 1035b36. Paul reports and briefly criticises Alex-
anders view on the nature of genus and differentia.77
5) Comm. on Met. Z 11, 1037a23b7. Paul introduces a note on Alexanders
view on the identity between a separate substance and its essence.
Alexanders view is discussed at length and criticised.78
6) Comm. on Met. Z 16, 1040b2527. Alexander is criticised together with
Aquinas and Albert for holding that universality belongs to things in
virtue of the action of the intellect.79
7) Comm. on Met. Z 17, 1041b911. Paul raises and discusses at length the
question as to whether the middle term of a demonstration should
be taken to be the definition of the property or that of the subject.
He contrasts Giles of Romes position (according to which the middle
term is the definition of the property) with Alexanders (according to
which the middle term is the definition of the subject). Paul eventually
favours Alexanders view.80
As can be seen, Alexander is quoted in contexts of different importance and
theoretical weight. Quotations 3 and 4, for instance, are very brief. In quo-
tations 5 and 7, by contrast, Alexanders view is the starting point of a long
and question-like philosophical digression. Sometimes (as in quotations 3
and 7) Alexander is not alone, but is taken as one of the representatives of
a certain view or interpretation. More usually, on the contrary, it is Alexan-
ders distinctive opinion that Paul intends to evaluate, whether to approve
it or to criticise it. In any event, apart from quotation 1, Alexander is usu-
ally appealed to explicitly to introduce some philosophical position rather
than some particular point of exegesis. This is not the case, of course, with
implicit quotations, which often contribute directly to the understanding of
76 Cf. Paul of Venice, Exp. Met., VII, tr. 1, c. 4, p. 199, 2431.
79 Cf. Paul of Venice, Exp. Met., VII, tr. 3, c. 3, p. 522, 1223.
Aristotles text, either by providing some appropriate explanation or simply

by adding some important precisions.
In 5 cases out of 7 Alexander opinion is rejected by Paul. In only one case
(quotation 6) the view criticised is also attributed to some other philoso-
phers. Of the two cases where Alexander is quoted with approval only quo-
tation 7 is significant. In this case, in fact, Alexander favours Alexanders
opinion on the nature of the middle term and consequently rejects Giles
of Romes alternative solution. In the other case (quotation 3), by contrast,
Alexander is taken to be only one of the supporters of a certain philosophical
claim. Here Alexander is grouped together with a long tradition of philoso-
phers (Albert, Aquinas and Giles) who distinguish between the principle of
the species and the species itself. Thus, it is not Alexanders view in par-
ticular that Paul intends to quote with approval, but a rather widespread
opinion.
The impression one may gather from this cursory overview of the places
where Alexander is explicitly quoted by Paul is that, from a doctrinal point
of view, Alexander is just one source among others. Paul seems to show no
particular preference for Alexanders views, which are criticised more often
than not. This impression is basically correct, but should be conterbalanced
by two further facts, which I have already alluded to. The first is that Alexan-
ders presence in Pauls commentary is not limited to the explicit quota-
tions. It is not infrequent that Alexanders comments on Aristotles text are
simply incorporated into Pauls exposition. This is especially the case when
Alexander expands on Aristotles text by explaining the meaning of single
clauses or choices of words. Thus, even though Alexanders philosophical
views are treated in the same way as any others, Alexander holds a privileged
place in Pauls eyes as an interpreter of Aristotle. The second important fact
to be remembered is Alexanders influence on Pauls attitude towards Aver-
roes. When Paul takes Averroes as a second object of interpretation along-
side Aristotle himself, he is just pushing to the extreme a tendency which
is already apparent in Alexanders exposition. Moreover, as we shall see in
the next chapter, Alexander is clearly Pauls model when it comes to under-
standing Aristotles doctrine of essence and definition. More particularly,
Alexander provides Paul with the theoretical tools to interpret Averroes in
such a way as to bring him into line with Aquinass views on essence and
definition. All in all, therefore, the importance of Alexander for the com-
position of Pauls commentary on Met. Z extends well beyond what may
be suggested by Pauls explicit quotations of Alexander. Upon reflection,
it is not surprising that Alexanders philosophical views are treated in the
same way as those of any other philosopher. When it comes to determining
414 chapter five
a certain philosophical question, Paul feels free to criticise all the people he
disagrees with and to present his personal views. This does not prevent him
from drawing on Alexander when the explanation of single texts or entire
sections of Met. Z is concerned.
It may be useful to analyse in some more detail three of the eight explicit
quotations of Alexander, i.e. quotations 2, 5 and 7. Quotations 2 and 5
concern two issues, i.e. inherence and the identity thesis, which I have
already dealt with in Section 3 in connection with Alexanders attitude
towards Aquinas. Quotation 7, by contrast, is about the middle term of
demonstration. Let me start with quotation 2. In his commentary on Met.
Z 2, Paul singles out a series of conclusions around which Aristotles chapter
is structured. The third of the conclusions pertaining to Z 2 is the following:
it is not per se evident that sensible substances differ substantially from
their accidents. The conclusion is occasioned by the Presocratics view
(which Aristotle reports in Z 2), according to which the limits of a body,
i.e. points, lines and surfaces, are substances and more substances than
the body they limit. After criticising the view in question, which rests on
a confusion between substantial and accidental forms, Paul connects the
discussion of the Presocratics position with the question as to whether
or not inherence is part of the essence of accidents. Paul discusses this
question in a rather long digression, whose structure can be reconstructed
in the following way. (i) Paul remarks that the Presocratics position shows
that inherence, whether actual or aptitudinal inherence, is not part of
the essence of accidents. For if it were, Presocratics could not have had
any concept of points, lines and surfaces without also conceiving of their
inherence in some subject. What is part of the essence of something in
fact must be part of its concept. Their view shows, however, that their
concepts of points, lines and surfaces did not include the inherence of such
entities in a subject. (ii) Paul reports Alexanders view according to which
aptitudinal, but not actual inherence is part of the essence of accidents. Paul
also connects Alexanders view with the further claim that being descends
into the ten categories through different modes of being. In particular,
the distinction between substance and accident is obtained by contrasting
two modes of being, being per se and being in something else. (iii) Paul
presents four argument in support of Alexanders claims. All four arguments
find close correspondence in Alexanders text.81 (iv) Then Paul offers four
81 Cf. Alexander of Alexandria, Exp. Met., Lib. VII, c. 1, 3, fol. 185rbva. Actually, Alexander
presents three arguments. But the fourth argument mentioned by Paul is just a reworking
arguments against Alexanders additional claim, i.e. that being descends

into the ten categories through different modes of being, and argues against
it that substances and accidents are distinct in virtue of their own nature
prior to their acquiring a certain mode of being. (v) Finally, Paul moves to
Alexanders main claim, i.e. that aptitudinal inherence is part of the essence
of accidents, and presents four arguments against it. (vi) Paul clarifies his
view by explaining that inherence is part of the essence of accidents when
accident is taken formally according to the general concept of accident, but
is not part of their essence when accident is taken materially according to
the concept of the different kinds of accident. Inherence, in other words, is
part of the concept of accident in general, but not part of the concept of the
different kinds of accident, such as for instance lines, points and surfaces.
(vii) Paul ends his excursus by responding to Alexanders arguments.
I am not interested here in the doctrine which Paul defends against
Alexander, but rather in some general features of his discussion of the prob-
lem of inherence. The first thing to note is that Alexanders discussion of
the problem of inherence is the occasion for Pauls philosophical digres-
sion. Paul discusses the problem of inherence because he finds a separate
quaestio on inherence in Alexanders commentary. What is more, Pauls
digression has the complexity and structure of a quaestio, with its apparatus
of arguments on both sides, the solution and the responses to the argu-
ments. Thus, what Paul actually does is just to present, following Alexander,
some sort of quaestio on the problem of inherence, with the only literary dif-
ference that the quaestio is incorporated directly into the literal exposition
and not separated from it.82 All this shows that Paul does not confine him-
self to borrowing material from Alexander or to quoting him occasionally
with reference to some particular matters of interest. In some cases, Pauls
philosophical agenda is influenced by Alexanders choices as well.
Something analogous can be said about quotation 7, which concerns
the problem of the middle term of demonstration. When commenting on
Met. Z 17, 1041b911, Paul introduces a long digression on the problem of
whether the middle term of a demonstration is the definition of the prop-
erty or that of the subject. He remarks that the first alternative has been
of the reference to Avicenna which Alexander puts forward in the introduction to the first
argument.
82 It must also be added that, as I said in Section 3, Alexanders position on the inherence
of accidents is very close to Aquinass. Paul, however, does not mention Aquinas in his
criticism of Alexanders position, presumably because the Dominican Master is not explicitly
named in Alexanders discussion, either.
416 chapter five
defended by Giles of Rome, the second by Alexander. Paul then discusses

the issue in detail by having recourse once again to the structure of a quaes-
tio. (i) First, he puts forward four arguments in favour of Giless position. (ii)
Then he introduces Alexanders position and presents four arguments in its
defence. (iii) There follow four distinctions, which Paul describes as being
at variance with both Giless and Alexanders views. Actually, Pauls posi-
tion seems to be a refinement of Alexanders. (iv) After the distinctions, Paul
introduces three conclusions following from the distinctions. The conclu-
sions are mainly intended to refute Giless position. (v) The digression ends
with the responses to the four arguments advanced in favour of Giless view.
It is not difficult to see that Pauls digression is entirely modelled upon the
parallel question in Alexanders commentary on Z 17. Paul faithfully reports
Alexanders arguments in favour of the view that the middle term is the
definition of the subject. Also Giless arguments in favour of the opposed
conclusion are drawn from Alexander. The only difference between the
two reports is that Alexander does not explicitly name the supporter of
the view which Paul attributes to Giles. Predictably, the responses to the
arguments in favour of Giless position are also taken from Alexanders com-
mentary.
The case of quotation 5 is also of some interest. In Met. Z 11, 1037a33
b7 Aristotle says that those things are identical with their essence that do
not exist in something else as in their material substratum. In connection
with this particular passage in Aristotle, Paul mentions Alexanders claim
that, in separate substances, an essence is not the same as that of which
it is the essence. The claim is made by Alexander too in his commentary
on Z 11, where he raises the question, which I have analysed in Section
3, as to whether separate substances are identical with their essence or
not. Besides mentioning Alexanders claim, Paul also gives a compressed
but not inaccurate reconstruction of the arguments in favour of it which
Alexander puts forward in his quaestio. Pauls first reaction to Alexan-
ders claim is that it is explicitly against the letter of Aristotles text and
so should be set aside without further delay. This is not, however, what
Paul does in practice. On the contrary, Alexanders claim becomes the pre-
text for a rather lengthy discussion of the issue of the identity or non-
identity between supposit and essence or, as Paul alternatively puts it,
between individual and species. Pauls discussion can be summarised as fol-
lows.
(1) Paul tries to put some order in the question by explaining how differ-
ent kinds of entity relate to their respective essences. (a) The case of God
poses no problem. In the case of God, in fact, supposit and essence differ
only in the mode of signification, i.e. presumably because God is a con-

crete term and the essence of God is an abstract description. The cases
of separate substances different from God and of material substances are
more complicated. In order to deal with these cases, Paul makes use of
a distinction which he has drawn a few lines before introducing Alexan-
ders claim. Paul explains that the identity between a thing and its essence
can be taken in two ways: absolutely, i.e. only by comparing the essence
with that of which it is the essence, and relatively, i.e. by comparing the
parts of the essence with that of which the essence is the essence. When
identity is understood absolutely, both separate substances and material
substances are identical with their respective essence. When identity is
taken relatively, by contrast, only separate substances are identical with
their essence, while material substances are not identical. The parts of the
essence and definition of a separate substance in fact are distinct from one
another only conceptually and not really. Therefore, each of such parts is
identical with the thing of which the essence is the essence. The parts of
the essence and definition of material substances, by contrast, are really
distinct from one another (and from the essence as a whole). Therefore,
it is not the case that any part of the essence is identical with the thing
of which the essence is the essence: body and soul, for instance, are parts
of the essence of a human being but neither of them is identical with the
human being that has the human essence (or with the essence as a whole).
The account of material substances extends to all things that exist in matter
as in their subject, i.e. also to forms existing in matter and to geometrical
entities. For example: the organic body is part of the essence and defini-
tion of the soul, the nose is part of the essence and definition of snub and
the line is part of the essence and definition of the circle. But neither is the
organic body identical with the soul, nor the nose with the snub or the line
with the circle. Thus, when the identity between a thing and its essence is
understood relatively, no thing that exists in a material substratum (be it
a sensible or an intelligible substratum) can be said to be identical with its
essence. Pauls suggestion, in other words, is that in Met. Z 11 Aristotle under-
stands the identity claim relatively and so maintains that only separate sub-
stances are identical with their essence. It must be said, incidentally, that
Pauls distinction between two different ways of taking the identity claim
also solves a difficult problem of interpretation. Following Aquinas, Paul
observes that in Z 6 Aristotle seems to say that not only separate substances,
but also material ones, are identical with their essence, while in Z 11 he lim-
its the identity to separate substances alone. The apparent contradiction
can be solved by observing that, in Z 6, Aristotle must be understanding the
418 chapter five
identity claim absolutely and not relatively.83 And on the absolute under-
standing, both separate and material substances are identical with their
own essence.
(2) After his characterisation of the status of the different kinds of entity
with regard to the identity thesis, Paul remarks that the matter could be
clarified by raising the more general question as to whether the individual
adds something real to the species. (a) In trying to solve the more general
question, Paul first presents four arguments for the view that the individ-
ual adds something real to the species. (b) Then he lists four arguments for
the opposed view. (c) There follows Pauls solution, which relies on distin-
guishing between a stronger and a weaker sense of the expression adding
something real to the species. In a stronger sense, the individual adds some-
thing real to the species if and only if there is something in the individual
that is really different from the species or from any of its parts. And in this
sense, the individual adds nothing real to the species. In a weaker sense,
however, the individual adds something real to the species if and only if
there is something that can be said of the individual but not of the species
independently of any operation of the intellect. And in this weaker sense,
the individual adds something real to the species. Thus, the arguments in
(a) are good arguments when adding something real is taken in the weaker
sense, while the arguments in (b) are bad arguments when adding some-
thing real is taken in the same weak sense. (d) Therefore, Paul responds to
the arguments in (b) and show where they fail (Paul does not consider the
possibility, in other words, that adding something real might be taken in
the strong sense and so that the arguments in (a) might be taken to be wrong
and the arguments in (b) to be right).
From a doctrinal point of view, the details of Pauls discussion are far from
clear, just as the basic distinctions on which he bases his solution to the
identity problem are not clear. Pauls unclarity, however, should not detain
us here. What matters is the relationship between Paul and Alexander. Once
again, Pauls digression is introduced at the same place in the commentary
as Alexanders corresponding quaestio. Moreover, Pauls digression displays
once again the structure of a proper question, with arguments on both
sides, solution and responses. Admittedly, in the case of quotation 5, the
83 As I have explained in Ch. 3, Sect. 3.2, Aquinas solves the apparent contradiction by
appealing to the distinction between logical and metaphysical considerations. This solution
is explicitly rejected by Paul in favour of the view that the identity between a thing and its
essence can be taken in two ways, absolutely and relatively.
material connection between Pauls and Alexanders texts is slightly looser:

Alexanders claim about separate substances is just the starting point of
Pauls larger assessment of the supposit-essence problem. As a matter of
fact, the more general question which Paul addresses in his digression,
i.e. whether in general the individual adds something real to the species,
finds no direct parallel in Alexanders commentary. This aspect, however,
should not obscure the more relevant fact that, once again, Pauls agenda is
dictated by the content of one of Alexanders questions. Paul discusses the
supposit-essence problem because he finds a discussion of the same theme
in Alexanders commentary.
All in all, therefore, the analysis of the explicit quotations of Alexander

which we find here and there in Pauls commentary reinforces the conclu-
sion that Alexanders Expositio Metaphysicorum contributes much to the
structure of Paul of Venices commentary on Met. Book Z.
chapter six
PAUL OF VENICE AS A READER OF AVERROES

THE CASE OF ESSENCE AND DEFINITION
Introduction
Averroess Long Commentary occupies a peculiar position when compared

to all the other sources Paul of Venice may have used in drafting his com-
mentary on the Metaphysics. For in some sense Averroes is not only the
instrument which Paul employs, implicitly or explicitly, for understanding
Aristotles text, but is also an object of his interpretation alongside Aristo-
tle himself. This is shown by the fact that Paul almost invariably appends
to his exposition of the different sections of Aristotles littera one or more
quotations from Averroess Long Commentary in order to put into sharper
focus some of the issues emerging from Aristotles text. The quotations from
Averroes, which take the form of long notes (notanda), are interpreted, com-
mented upon and evaluated both textually and philosophically. Thus, it is
clear that Paul does not confine himself to interpreting Aristotles text but
also provides a detailed and rather systematic reading of large sections of
Averroess Long Commentary as well.
This feature of Pauls commentary is important for at least two reasons.
First, since in most cases Paul finds himself in agreement with Averroess
reading of Aristotle, it is evident that Averroes constitutes the basis for Pauls
literal and doctrinal understanding of the Metaphysics. Secondand this is
probably the most significant pointwhen commenting on Averroess text
Paul offers one particular interpretation of the Arabic commentator, which
may be different from that of other medieval interpreters as well as from
ours. If this is the case, the most important question becomes to ascertain
whether Pauls reading of Averroes obeys some consistent logic and follows
some well-defined pattern.
Although it is difficult to draw general conclusions concerning the char-
acter of Pauls interpretation of Averroes, at least in the commentary on
Book Z there seems to emerge a certain tendency on Pauls part to read
the Arabic commentator in light of Aquinass doctrinal framework. In other
words, when possible, Paul tries to bring Averroess reading of Aristotle
into line with Aquinass and more in general with the Dominican Masters
422 chapter six
metaphysical convictions. This is a particularly interesting phenomenon,

at least from an historical point of view. For we have seen in the previous
chapters that Averroess and Aquinass interpretations of Met. Book Z are
fundamentally divergent in their general results as well as concerning par-
ticular points of detail. Thus, it becomes particular significant to understand
how, i.e. by means of which conceptual and exegetical tools, Paul succeeds
in harmonising Averroess and Aquinass different readings of Aristotle.
The issue of essence and definition, which Aristotle discusses in Met.
Z 1011, is a particularly striking example of Pauls general strategy. In this
case, in fact, Pauls attempt at re-interpreting Averroes in light of Aquinass
doctrine seems to be particularly accurate and systematic. For, not only does
Paul provide a general interpretation of Averroess doctrine of essence and
definition which is line with Aquinass views, but he also goes out of his
way to explain away those passages in Averroes that seem to be in direct
opposition to Aquinass doctrine of essence and definition.
This chapter falls into five parts. In Section 1, I shall analyse the general
structure of Paul of Venices commentary on the Metaphysics, by putting
emphasis, among other things, on the crucial role that Averroes plays in
the Austin Masters interpretation of Aristotles text. In Section 2, I shall
briefly provide the general background against which Pauls interpretation
of Met. Z 10 should be understood by taking an overall look at Averroess and
Aquinass different interpretations of the chapter as well as at Alexander
of Alexandrias assessment of their different readings. In Section 3 I shall
present in some detail Pauls interpretation of Met. Z 10. In Sections 3 and 4
I shall do the same thing with Met. Z 11 by first presenting a synthetic picture
of Pauls predecessors interpretations and then by outlining Pauls peculiar
contribution to the debate.
1. The Structure of Paul of Venices Commentary on the

Metaphysics and the Role of Averroess Long Commentary
1. The general form of Pauls commentary can be synthetically reconstructed

in the following way. First of all, Paul divides up Aristotles text through a
complete logical re-structuring of the Greek philosophers argument. The
text, in other words, is put into some kind of syllogistic or deductive form:
Paul singles out a series of premisses or assumptions, a certain number
of conclusions which follow from the assumptions and, finally, some fur-
ther derivative conclusions or corollaria which are not explicitly drawn in
Aristotles text. The discussion of each element of Pauls divisioni.e. each
paul of venice as a reader of averroes 423
premiss, conclusion or corollaryis then followed by the quotation of the

text in Aristotle which is supposed to correspond to the premiss, conclusion
or corollary in question. As a final step, Paul introduces one or more quota-
tions from Averroess Long Commentary. The quotations from Averroes are
explained and illustrated in some detail with particular reference to their
doctrinal assumptions and implications. Not infrequently, the explanations
of Averroess text may develop into more extended and sophisticated dis-
cussions, which sometimes take the form of a quaestio with its apparatus of
arguments in favour and against a certain philosophical position and Pauls
solution.
There are several aspects of the structure of Pauls commentary that are
noteworthy. The first, macroscopic one can be condensed in the slogan
putting Aristotle into logical form. This aspect of Pauls attitude towards
the text can be better observed when compared to the paraphrastic model,
of which Aquinass commentary is a perfect example. Although Aquinas
divides Aristotles text with rigour and accuracy, his divisio textus is only
preliminary to a line-by-line exposition of the text, in which the Domini-
can Master follows rather closely the paraphrastic model. The general idea,
in other words, is that of replacing Aristotles text with a more linear and
perspicuous exposition of his words, in which linguistic difficulties are over-
come and intricate arguments are spelt out and made more understandable.
Admittedly, Aquinass exposition is interspersed with a number of doctrinal
annotations and some occasional digressions. Aquinass interest, however,
remains textual. His aim is to offer to himself and to his reader a clear under-
standing of the letter of Aristotles text and of its intrinsic structure.
It is clear, by contrast, that Paul belongs to a different phase of the history
of the reception of Aristotles text. Apart from a very few exceptions, the
Austin Master does not show any particular concern for the comprehension
of the peculiar aspects of Aristotles text. Nor does Paul wish to offer a basic
and clear understanding of Aristotles words. His aim is rather to present
the content of Aristotles Metaphysics and discuss its doctrinal implications.
In this context, Pauls divisio textus does not play only a preliminary role in
outlining the different steps of Aristotles argument, but rather becomes the
pretext for a complete restructuring of the text which is being commented
upon. The restructuring follows a syllogistic or deductive model: Paul singles
out the assumptions or premisses which Aristotle employs, the conclusions
he draws and the further implications of these conclusions. This feature of
Pauls procedure also emerges from a consideration of the place which Paul
assigns to the littera of the Metaphysics. The different portions of Aristotles
text are appended to the different elements of Pauls divisio textus and
424 chapter six
introduced by the formula Lege litteram: for instance, the discussion of a

certain premiss of the argument as well as of a certain conclusion is imme-
diately followed by the portion of Aristotles text that corresponds to the
premiss or to the conclusion. This way of proceeding suggests that the func-
tion of the littera is simply that of reminding the reader of where exactly
in Aristotles text he or she can find the premiss or the conclusion which
Paul has just illustrated and reconstructed. This seems to be confirmed by
the further fact that Pauls rejection of the paraphrastic model is apparent
not only at the level of the macrodivision of the text, but also at that of the
exposition of the single portions of it. In other words, not only are entire
chapters of the Metaphysics reconstructed according to a deductive model
(premisses, conclusions, corollaries etc.), but also each single portion of the
textfor instance each premiss, each conclusion and each corollaryis
put into syllogistic form. For each conclusion which he singles out in Aris-
totles text Paul carefully indicates the syllogism from which the conclusion
can be deduced and also indicates the textual or doctrinal support in favour
of the different premisses of the syllogism. At times, Paul also stops to make
clear which premisses of the syllogism are explicitly stated in Aristotles text
and which ones, by contrast, need to be supplied by the commentator and
his readership. In conclusion, Pauls interest in the immediate sense of Aris-
totles text is rather limited: his orientation is rather doctrinal. Although
this method of commenting finds some sort of anticipation in Alexander
of Alexandria, it is followed through by Paul with a systematicity which is
unprecedented for a literal commentary.
Pauls doctrinal orientations also emerge when one considers the con-
siderable weight that is attached in his exposition to philosophical notes
and digressions. As I have already made clear when discussing the structure
of Alexander of Alexandrias commentary, Paul of Venice does not append
to this exposition of Aristotles text formal quaestiones, i.e. questions that
are literarily separated from and independent of the literal explanation of
the text. On the contrary, Pauls notes and digressions are continuous with
the literal exposition of Aristotle or with the discussion of Averroess com-
mentary, and are often introduce to further clarify some difficult points of
Aristotles or Averroess doctrine. Nevertheless, some of Pauls digressions
are rather long and all follow very closely the structure of a quaestio by pre-
senting arguments in favour and against a certain philosophical position,
Pauls solution as well as Pauls responses to the arguments in favour of the
position he finally rejects. Although the decision over whether to classify
Pauls notes as digressions or not may be subjective, at least the following
philosophical discussions are worth recalling:
(After Z 1, 1028a2729). In Z 1 Aristotle seems to defend two claims: (i) that sub-
stance is more being than accidents; (ii) that abstract accidents are less being than
concrete accidents. Paul considers and rejects one objection for each of Aristotles
claims.1
(After Z 1, 1028a3031). Paul criticises the claim that accidents can exist without
inhering in any substance.2
(After Z 1, 1028b26). Paul examines Averroess explanation of Aristotles claim
that substance is prior to accidents in time together with Alberts and Alexanders
alternative proposals. Paul finds all the explanations considered unsatisfactory and
so presents a different interpretation.3
(After Z 2, 1028b1618). Paul raises the question as to whether or not inherence
is part of the essence of accidents. Paul defends the view that neither actual nor
aptitudinal inherence is part of the essence of accidents and criticises Alexander of
Alexanders position according to which aptitudinal inherence is part of the essence
of accidents.4
(After Z 6, 1031b1822). Paul discusses the problem of whether sensible substances
are really or only conceptually distinct from their quiddities. Paul defends the
view that they are conceptually distinct and criticises Burleys arguments for a real
distinction between sensible substances and their essences.5
(After Z 6, 1032a46). Paul goes back to the question of whether the quiddity and
that of which it is the quiddity are really identical or not, and further defends the
view that they are not. He also rejects a series of objections to his main claim.6
(After Z 7, 1032a2832). Pauls presents three positions concerning spontaneous
generation, Avicennas (all animals that are generated from seed can also be gen-
erated without seed), Averroess (none of the animals that are generated from seed
can also be generated without seed) and Aristotles (some animals can be generated
either way, while others can only be generated from seed). Paul endorses Aristotles
positions and criticises the arguments behind Avicennas and Averroess views.7
(After Z 8, 1033a34b7) Paul considers and rejects a series of objections to Aristotles
claim that it is the composite of matter and form, and not matter or form, that is
generated and corrupted per se.8
(After Z 8, 1033b1619) Paul considers and rejects a series of objections to Aristotles
claim that the quiddity of things is not generated and corrupted per se.9
1 Cf. Paul of Venice, Exp. Met., tr. 1, c. 1, pp. 39, 1943, 21.
426 chapter six
(After Z 8, 1034a25). Paul considers and rejects a series of objections to Aristotles

conclusion that there are no separate forms that play the role of paradigms.10
(After Z 10, 1035b2733). Paul considers four opinions concerning the essence, quid-
dity and definition of sensible substances. He rejects all the opinions considered
and ends up endorsing a fifth opinion, which he identifies with Aristotles view
in Book Zeta, according to which both form and matter are part of the essence,
quiddity and definition of sensible substances. This digression will be discussed in
Sections 3 and 4 below.11
(After Z 10, 1036a58). Paul discusses and rejects a series of objections to Aristotles
claim that it is the species and not the individual that is definable.12
(After Z 10 1036a2425). Paul discusses the problem of the principle of individua-
tion. He reports and rejects four opinions on the nature of the principle of individ-
uation. He then presents his own solution to the problem: in the case of sensible
substances both form and matter are principles of individuation; in the case of sep-
arate substances, by contrast, neither of them is, in that separate substances are
individual of themselves.13
(After Z 11, 1037a33b7). Paul raises the question as to whether or not the individual
adds something real to the species and presents four arguments in favour and
against a positive answer. The question is solved by distinguishing between a strong
and a weak sense of adding something real. In the weak sense it is true that the
individual adds something real to the species.14
(After Z 12, 1038a58). Paul discusses and rejects some objections to Aristotles
conclusion that genus and differentia signify the same nature.15
(After Z 12, 1038a1518). Paul raises and solves a difficulty for Aristotles claim
that there are as many species as last differentiae. In this context, he also reports
and criticises Burley and Buridans view that under the genus animal there are
several genera, less extended than animal but more extended than its different
species.16
(After Z 13, 1038b341039). Picking up on Averroess commentary, Paul briefly
defends the claim that universals do not only exist formally or objectively in the
soul, but also outside the soul and in the individuals, independently of any opera-
tion of the intellect. He also briefly rejects some objections to his claim.17
13 Cf. Paul of Venice, Exp. Met., tr. 2, c. 3, pp. 371, 1374, 2. On Pauls view on individuation
see Conti (1998).

(After Z 13, 1039a2123). Paul raises and discusses at length the question of the reality
of universals, i.e. whether some thing is universal independently of any operation
of the intellect.18
(After Z 14, 1039b1619). The longest digression in Pauls commentary on Book
Zeta concerns the nature of ideas (with particular reference to divine ideas). Paul
discusses at length four different opinions: Platos opinion and his defence by
Eustratius, Ockhams, Scotuss and, finally Aquinas and Giless view. Paul strongly
criticises Platos and Ockhams positions, while he finds himself partly in agreement
with both Scotuss view and with that of Aquinas and Giles of Rome. Paul finally
presents and illustrates in detail his own position.19
(After Z 15, 1040a33b2). Paul briefly discusses the question as to whether there can
be species with only one individual.20
(After Z 15, 1040b24). Paul considers and rejects some objections to Aristotles
claim that individuals cannot be defined.21
(After Z 16, 1041a35). Paul discusses and criticises four arguments for the Platonic
view that there may be two things of the same species, of which one is corruptible
and the other incorruptible.22
(After Z 17, 1041a1620). Paul considers and rejects some objections to Aristotles
treatment of the different questions about cause in the first half of Z 17.23
(After Z 17, 1041b911). Paul raises and discusses at length the question as to whether
the middle term of a causal demonstration is the definition of the subject or that
of the predicate that belongs per se to the subject. He presents in particular two
opinions, Giles of Romes opinion, according to which the middle term is the
definition of the predicate, and Alexander of Alexandrias, according to which the
middle term is the definition of the subject. Then Paul introduces three distinctions
which, he thinks, are missing in Giless and Alexanders solutions and ends up
endorsing a position which is closer to Alexanders.24
Pauls notes and digressions vary considerably in length and theoretical

importance. Some are little more than brief defences of Aristotles or Aver-
roess views; others, by contrast, like for instance the digression on the
18 Cf. Paul of Venice, Exp. Met., tr. 3, c. 1, pp. 460, 3466, 32. For Pauls treatment of the
problem of universals see Conti (1982) e Bottin (1983).

19 Cf. Paul of Venice, Exp. Met., tr. 3, c. 2, pp. 475, 10486, 10. On Paul of Venices doctrine
of divine ideas see Conti (2003).

23 Cf. Paul of Venice, Exp. Met., tr. 3. c. 4, pp. 558, 3540, 15.
428 chapter six
nature of ideas or that on the middle term of a demonstration, present

themselves as quaestiones in the strict sense of the term. Moreover, some
of Pauls digressions are closer to Aristotles or Averroess text, while others
seem to exploit some remote reference in Aristotle or Averroes to discuss
general philosophical issues. Altogether, however, Pauls philosophical dis-
cussions give us a sense of the general tenor of his commentary. What Paul
is mainly interested in is the doctrinal import of both Book Zeta and Aver-
roess commentary. The literal explanation of the text is somehow taken for
granted.
2. As I have already pointed out in the introduction, one of the distinguish-

ing features of Pauls commentary is the importance played by Averroess
Long Commentary on the Metaphysics. The point here is not simply that
Averroes is not one source among others of Pauls exposition (as is the
case for instance with Alexander of Alexandria), but rather that Averroes
becomes a second object of Pauls interpretative activity alongside Aristo-
tle himself. Paul, in other words, does not confine himself to representing
Averroess interpretation of the different sections of Aristotles Metaphysics,
but also fills his exposition with large extracts from Averroess commen-
tary. Averroess quotations are explained, analysed and interpreted in detail.
Thus, Pauls Expositio Metaphysicorum can be rightly described as a sort of
double commentary in that it provides an interpretation both of the Meta-
physics and of Averroess Long Commentary.
Let me illustrate my general point by quoting in full one section from
Pauls commentary on Met. Z 1:
Secundo sic: illud est simpliciter primum ens quod non presupponit aliud ens; sed
sola quiditas significans substantiam non presupponit aliud ens; ergo sola quiditas
est simpliciter primum ens. Tenet consequentia de se, et minor est declarata quarto
huius, ex analogia et attributione omnium accidentium ad substantiam tamquam
ad ens primum: dicimus enim quod substantia est ens non quia entis, sed quia est
ens in se. Accidentia autem omnia dicuntur entia quia sunt entis taliter vel tal-
iter dispositi, scilicet substantie: aliqua enim accidentia ideo dicuntur entia quia
sunt quantitates substantie, aliqua sunt entia quia sunt qualitates substantie, ali-
qua vero quia sunt actiones vel passiones substantie, et sic de aliis suo modo. Non
enim linee, superficies et corpora sunt entia nisi quia quantificant seu mensurant
substantiam secundum longitudinem, latitudinem et profunditatem. Non etiam
albedo et nigredo, caliditas et frigiditas sunt entia nisi quia qualificant substantiam,
reddentes eam dispositam ut a sensu percipiatur. Relatio etiam, actio et passio et
alia predicamenta respectiva non sunt entia nisi quia sunt modi et dispositiones
seu circumstantie substantiarum, per quas invicem habitudinem habent et respec-
tum.
Lege litteram: Alia vero dicuntur entia, scilicet accidentia, eo quod taliter entis
hec quidem qualitates esse, illa vero quantitates, alia vero passiones, alia aliud quid
tale.
Notandum primo, secundum Commentatorem, commento secundo, quod
Aristoteles intendebat quod predicabilia, que declarant quiditatem de indi-
viduis substantie demonstrate, sunt digniora hoc nomine ens quam predica-
bilia aliorum accidentium, cum numquam notificant quiditatem substantie
In hoc ergo capitulo intendit declarare quod quiditas individui substantie
est prior in esse quiditatibus accidentium.
Intendit Commentator quod ratio Philosophi sit ista: illa que magis declarant sub-
stantiam demonstratam et primam sunt digniora hoc nomine ens; sed predica-
bilia predicamenti substantie magis declarant substantiam primam quam predica-
bilia predicamentorum accidentium, cum utraque de substantia prima predicetur,
sed unum in sua predicatione indicat quiditatem essentialem que est intranea rei,
reliquum vero indicat dispositionem accidentalem, que est extranea substantie. Si
ergo substantia prima est primum ens, quanto aliquid magis accedit ad illam, tanto
est magis ens; sed substatie secunde magis accedunt ad illam primam quam acci-
dentia, cum sint de essentia rerum et non accidentia; ergo substantie secunde sunt
magis entia quam accidentia.
Et licet istam rationem intendat Philosophus cum loquitur de substantia in
communi, cum dicit illam esse primum ac principale ens inter omnia predicamenta
et predicabilia, dubitatur, quia videtur quod predicabilia accidentium ita bene
sument questionem quid est sicut predicabilia | substantie, quia de ratione generis
et speciei est predicari in quid, secundum Porphyrium; constat autem in omnibus
predicamentis accidentium genera et species contineri.
Respondetur quod, licet predicentur in quid et determinent questionem quer-
entem quid est hoc?, demonstrando individuum predicamenti accidentalis, non
tamen demonstrando individuum predicamenti substantialis; et licet predicentur
in quid in abstracto, non tamen in concreto, quia si queritur quid est hoc?, demon-
strando albedinem, respondetur color, sed si queritur quid est hoc?, demon-
strando album, non bene respondetur coloratum, quia illud quod est album est
substantia, ideo oportet respondere per conceptum substantialem; substantia ergo
simpliciter terminat questionem quid est, quia tam in abstracto quam in concreto,
accidens autem solum secundum quid, quia precise in abstracto questionem ter-
minat quid est. Quando ergo Aristoteles dicit quod illud est primum et principale
ens quod terminat questionem quid est, loquitur de eo quod terminat simpliciter
et non secundum quid.
Notandum secundo, secundum Commentatorem, eodem commento, quod
ista declaratio est logica, et plures demonstrationes in hac scientia sunt log-
ice, scilicet quoniam propositiones eius sunt accepte in dialectica. Dialec-
tica usitatur duobus modis: uno modo secundum quod est instrumentum, et
sic usitatur in aliis scientiis; alio modo secundum quod accipitur illud quod
declaratum est in ea in aliis scientiis cum ista scientia considerat ens sim-
pliciter, et propositiones hdialecticei sunt entis simpliciter, sicut diffinitiones,
descriptiones et alia dicta in eis.
430 chapter six
Distinctio Commentatoris est ista, quod logica dupliciter usitatur in aliis sci-
entiis, primo tamquam instrumento, et sic omnis scientia utitur dialectica, cum
ipsa sit scientia organica earum, ut dicit Simplicius, Super Predicamenta: accipiunt
enim omnes alie scientie a logica modos diffiniendi, demonstrandi et sillogizandi,
applicantes eos ad materiam propriam. Cum enim geometra diffinit, enunciat vel
sillogizat in terminis propriis, scilicet in triangulo et quadrangulo, talem modum
loquendi accipit a logico. Secundo usitatur dialectica in aliis scientiis ut principio,
in quantum accipiunt aliquam propositionem declaratam in logica et ea utuntur
tamquam manifesta. Et secundum hoc ratio primo facta a Philosopho | est logica,
quia accipit unum quod est declaratum in logica, videlicet illud esse substantiam
et quiditatem rei per quod convenienter respondetur ad questionem querentem
quid est hoc?, sicut est genus et species. Hanc accipit metaphisicus ad proban-
dum quod substantia est primum ens. Omnes ergo scientie, et si non semper sic
utuntur logica tamquam principio, tamen possunt ea sic uti. Nam logica considerat
totum ens ut est fundamentum rationis, et consequenter versatur circa ea que con-
sequuntur totum ens, videlicet circa diffinitionem et descriptionem, divisionem et
compositionem, et sic de aliis. Ideo declarata in ea aliis scientiis applicari possunt,
et precipue metaphisice, propter maximam affinitatem quam habet cum ea, cum
utraque sit circa totum ens, licet non eodem modo: considerat enim metaphisicus
totum ens ut habet esse reale, logicus vero ut habet esse rationis.
Contra predicta arguitur, et primo quod substantia non est primum ens, quia ea
que sunt diversa genere non sunt comparabilia, et per consequens non potest dici
substantia primum ens et accidens posterius.
Secundo arguitur quod non ex eo accidens est ens quia entis. Nam illud quod est
ens secundum se non est ens quia entis; sed accidens est ens secundum se; ergo et
cetera. Tenet consequentia cum maiori. Minor vero est Philosophi dividentis ens
secundum se in decem predicamenta, quinto huius.
Ad primum dicitur quod comparatio | potest dupliciter fieri, scilicet proprie et
communiter. Comparatio proprie non est secundum genus, sed secundum speciem
solum; sed communiter potest esse eorum que differunt genere vel specie aut sunt
diversa genera analogata in aliquo uno. Constat autem quod ens dicitur analogice
de substantia et de accidente non obstante quod sint diversa genera; ideo comparari
possunt sub esse secundum prius et posterius, cum sit de ratione analogi predicari
secundum prius et posterius.
Ad secundum respondetur quod ens secundum se dupliciter sumitur, scilicet
absolute et respective. Ens secundum se absolute sumptum est illud quod dicit
unam naturam aut unam intentionem et non aggregatum ex multis quorum unum
accidit alteri. Et isto modo vult Philosophus, quinto huius, quod tam homo quam
albedo sit ens secundum se, sed homo albus sit ens secundum accidens. Et sic
est concedendum quod accidens est ens secundum se, sive in concreto sive in
abstracto accipiatur. Ens vero secundum se respective sumptum dicitur esse illud
quod non dependet ab alio, et sic accidens non est ens secundum se, sed in alio,
iuxta sententiam Aristotelis hic.
The structure of Pauls text should be clear enough. First, Paul reconstructs
Aristotles argument in Met. Z 1, 1028a1820. According to Pauls interpre-
tation, the text gives a second proof of the general conclusion that sub-
stance is being primarily and unqualifiedly. As ever, Paul appends to his
reconstruction of Z 1, 1028a1820 the corresponding text in Aristotle, which
is introduced by the formula Lege litteram. Then, Paul presents two notes
(notanda), which contain two quotations from Averroess commentary on
the text discussed. In each case, Paul does not confine himself to report-
ing Averroess words, but also explains them in some detail, in one case
by bringing out the core (ratio) of Averroess argument and in the other
by directly explaining the distinction implicit in the Arabic commentators
text. Moreover, Paul also stops to discuss at some length some difficulties
that might emerge from Averroess interpretation of Aristotle and so from
Aristotles text itself as well. As can be seen, Averroess Long Commentary
receives the same treatment as the text of the Metaphysics it is about: Paul
brings out the logical structure of Averroess comment and points out his
doctrinal implications. Of course, Averroess commentary remains in some
sense subordinated to Aristotles text in that it is mainly introduced to put
into focus the philosophical issues emerging from the argument in Book Z.
There is no doubt, however, that the reader of Paul of Venices work may also
find in it a rather detailed interpretation of Averroess Long Commentary as
well as a presentation of the philosophical doctrine it contains. It must also
be added that, not infrequently, Pauls digressions and doctrinal discussions
are prompted not only from Aristotles words in Z but also from Averroess
comments. Thus, Averroes does not only contribute to Pauls analysis of
Aristotles theory of substance, but also gives him the occasion to advance
his philosophical views.
In conclusion, Pauls Expositio Metaphysicorum contains one interpreta-
tion of Averroess commentary on the Metaphysics, which may differ from
that of other medieval commentators and from ours. Thus, the important
question becomes: Which interpretation of Averroes does Paul defend? In
order to answer this question I shall study in the following sections one par-
ticular case, i.e. Pauls understanding of Aristotles treatment of essence and
definition in Met. Z 1011.
2. Met. Z 10 in the Medieval Interpretation.

Averroes, Aquinas and Alexander
Although, as we have seen in Chapter 1, Aristotles treatment of essence

and definition does not include only one single question but rather a num-
ber of different, though related, issues, medieval interpreters focused in
432 chapter six
particular on the problem of the essence and definition of the composite

of matter and form. Roughly speaking, the problem consists in deciding
whether the essence and definition of sensible substances includes their
form alone or also contains the kind of matter of which such substances
are made. If my reconstruction in Chapters 2 and 3 is correct, Averroes
and Aquinas present two opposed and irreconcilable interpretations of
Aristotles doctrine. Averroes in particular holds that the essence of sensible
substances contains their form alone, and hence the definition that spells
out the content of the essence must equally make reference to form alone,
to the exclusion of any material characteristics. For a definition is supposed
to reflect the content of the corresponding essence perfectly, i.e. without
adding or leaving out anything. Aquinas, by contrast, maintains that the
essence of sensible substances does not contain their form alone, but also
their matter. Consequently, the definition of these substances must make
reference to both of their ontological constituents.
Within this general framework, both Averroess and Aquinass positions
present peculiar traits which are worth keeping in mind in order to under-
stand Pauls discussion of essence and definition. Although Averroes main-
tains that the definition of the essence or quiddity makes reference to form
alone, he seems prepared to make room for an account of sensible sub-
stances which also mentions their matter in addition to their form. Such
an account will not be a definition of the essence of sensible substances
because their essence contains form alonebut rather a rough description
of the way sensible substances concretely exist. Thus, Averroes seems to
distinguish implicitly between the quiddity or essence in the strict sense
of the term, which is spelt out in the definition of sensible substances, and
a broader notion, say the nature or the essence in the broad sense of the
term, which is revealed in the account describing the way sensible sub-
stances concretely exist. As we shall see shortly, this distinction between
essence and natureor, equivalently, between essence in the strict sense
and essence in the broad senseis crucial to understanding Pauls reading
of Averroes. Aquinass view too needs a word of clarification. For, although
the Dominican Master clearly holds that matter enters into the essence
and definition of sensible substances, he does not believe that all matter
does so. On the contrary, Aquinas distinguishes between common matter,
which falls within the essence of sensible substances and so should be men-
tioned in their definition, and individual matter, which falls outside the
essence of sensible substances and so should not be mentioned in their def-
inition. Common matter is the kind of matter all the individuals of a certain
species are made of, while individual matter is the matter that characterises
one particular individual of the species in question and not another. In

the case of human beings, for instance, common matter is flesh and bones
in generalfor all human beings are essentially made of flesh and bones,
according to Aquinaswhile individual matter is presumably the particu-
lar pieces of flesh and the particular bones of which an individual human
being is made, i.e. flesh and bones of certain particular dimensions.
Since Aristotle in Met. Z 1011 seems in fact to present conflicting lines
of argument concerning the issue of essence and definition, both Averroes
and Aquinas need to explain away a good number of Aristotelian passages
to vindicate their own interpretation of the text. For our present purposes,
however, it is more significant to recall the way Aquinas operates on Aris-
totles text. Particular problematic for the Dominican Master are those pas-
sages in Aristotle where the essence of sensible substances is simply identi-
fied with form as well as those where Aristotle suggests that the definition
of sensible substances makes reference to form alone to the exclusion of
any material characteristics. Aquinass general strategy in dealing with these
texts consists in insisting that by form Aristotle does not mean to refer, in
the passages at issue, to form in the standard sense, i.e. form as opposed to
matter, but rather to the species. The species in fact does not contain form
alone, but also common matter, and it is therefore to the species that the
essence belongs. Thus, when Aristotle seems to draw an unqualified con-
trast between form and matter, the opposition he has in mindAquinas
insistsis actually the one between the species, which contains both form
and common matter, and individual matter. Aquinass position can also be
framed by saying that there are two kinds of form, namely the so-called
forma partis and the so-called forma totius. The forma partis is the form in
the standard, Aristotelian sense of the term. It pairs with and is opposed
to matter in general, including both common and individual matter. For
the ontological function of the forma partis is precisely that of actualising
matter and turning it into a full-fledged individual. The forma totius, by con-
trast, is the essence of the species, which contains form in the standard sense
(the forma partis) plus common matter. The forma totius pairs with and is
opposed to individual matter, while it contains common matter. The onto-
logical function of the forma totius consists in placing an individual in a
certain natural kind.
Aquinass distinctions as well as his general interpretation of Aristo-
tles doctrine of essence and definition are taken up and elaborated on
by Alexander of Alexandria in his literal exposition of Book Z. In many
respects, Alexander anticipates Pauls tendency to bring Averroes into line
with Aquinass general interpretation and it is presumably from Alexander
434 chapter six
that Paul takes inspiration when it comes to flattening out the difficulties of
Averroess text. However, this strategy is not endorsed by Alexander as sys-
tematically as it is by Paul. Moreover, Alexander seems to be occasionally
aware of the differences between Averroess and Aquinass readings.
As I have explained in Chapter 5, Alexanders commentary has a some-
what mixed nature in that the literal explanation of the text is accompanied
by a series of quaestiones concerning general points of interpretation or
doctrinal issues brought up by Aristotle. In Q. 8 of Met. Z 10which imme-
diately follows the literal exposition of Met. Z 10, 1035b2731Alexander
explicitly raises the question as to whether matter is part of the essence and
quiddity of sensible substances.25 The question immediately splits up into
two related sub-questions: (Q1) whether matter is part of the essence of sen-
sible substances; (Q2) whether matter, besides being part of the essence, is
also part of the quiddity of such substances. Alexanders response to Q1 is less
interesting for our purposes. He confines himself to reproducing the two-
step argument for the view that matter is part of the essence which we also
find in Aquinass Commentary on the Metaphysics: (i) first, he argues that
matter must be part of the definition of sensible substances on the grounds
that, otherwise, the definition of sensible substances could not be distin-
guished from that of mathematical objects;26 (i) second, he further contends
that matter figures in the definition of sensible substances as something
intrinsic to their essence and not as something extrinsic.27 Both steps are
clearly taken from Aquinass Expositio Metaphysicorum.28
More significant is Alexanders response to Q2.29 He remarks that some
people hold the view that matter is part of the essence of sensible substances
but not of their quiddity and consequently that only form is part of the
quiddity. The quiddityso the supporters of this view argueis that in
virtue of which a thing can be said to be a certain something (quid).
However, as Aristotle points out in Met. Z 3, matter is not a something
(quid), neither does it possess any positive characteristics. Therefore, it
cannot be part of the quiddity of a thing. Form, by contrast, is that in virtue
of which a thing can be said to be a certain something and so is simply
identical with the quiddity. From a more general point of view, the view in
question distinguishes between a broader and a stricter notion of essence.
25 Cf. Alexander of Alexandria, Exp. Met., Lib. VII, c. 10, q. 8, fol. 222rava.
According to the broader notion of essence (essentia), matter is part of the

essence of sensible substances, while it is not part of the essence when
essence is taken according to the stricter notion (quidditas). Presumably,
the difference between the broad and the strict notion of essence lies in the
fact that essence in the broad sense includes all the constituents making up
a sensible substance in its concrete existence, whereas essence in the strict
sense includes only the principles that are responsible for a things being
what it is.
Interestingly enough, Alexander does not completely reject the position
in question and the distinction between essence and quiddity (or essence in
the broad and essence in the strict sense) that it implies. On the contrary, he
significantly remarks that this position seems to be defended by Averroes
in many places of his Long Commentary.30 Quite rightly, Alexander points
to an important passage in Averroess commentary on Met. Z 6, where the
Arabic commentator observes that a man is identical with his essence in
one sense and non-identical in another.31 The passage should probably be
taken to mean that a man is identical with his essence when man stands for
form, whereas a man is non-identical with his essence when man stands
for a composite of matter and form. Moreover, it is clear that in the passage
reported Averroes is talking about essence in the strict sense, i.e. in the
sense of quiddity. Thus, the text from Averroes seems to imply that at least
the quiddity of a sensible substance should be identified with its form, as
Alexander himself suggests. Alexander also adds that the same position
seems to be the one Aristotle defends in several passages throughout Book
Zeta.32 In particular, Alexander refers to those passages where Aristotle
claims that forms are identical with their own essence, while composites
of matter and form cannot be identical with their essence because they
contain matterthe implicit thought being that essence in the strict sense
is confined to form alone.
Although Alexander does not explicitly reject the position just presented,
he seems to stick in his commentary to the traditional idea that essence
and quiddity are just one and the same thing and so that there are not two
notions of essence. At most, essence and quiddity can be distinguished con-
ceptually: in other words, the terms essence and quiddity pick out one
and the same thing in the extra-mental world and their different names
only point to different ways of describing such a thing. Consequently, he
31 Cf. Averroes, In Met., VII; t.c. 21, fol. 171IK.
436 chapter six
sides with Aquinas in believing that the essence or quiddity of sensible

substances contains common matter, even though it does not contain indi-
vidual matter. Also reminiscent of Aquinas is the way Alexander explains
away the texts in Aristotle that seem to exclude matter from the essence
and definition of sensible substances. Alexanders strategy hinges upon the
distinction between matter (materia) and what is material (materiale) with
respect to the species.33 ThusAlexander saysAristotle does not wish
to exclude matter from the essence and definition of sensible substances,
but only what is material with respect to the species. The notion of being
material with respect to the species is a familiar one.34 To be material with
respect to the species means not to belong to the species qua species or, to
put things slightly differently, to be accidental to the species. Now, sensi-
ble matter is not material with respect to the species of sensible substances,
for sensible substances are not made accidentally of the kind of matter they
are made of. What is material with respect to the species of sensible sub-
stances is individual sensible matter. For individual matter is accidental
with respect to the species of sensible substances in that the properties that
characterise one individual of the species are not the same as those that
characterise the species as such. Alexanders distinction also applies to the
case of mathematical objects, although in a slightly different way.35 Since
mathematical objects can be realised in different kinds of sensible matter,
every kind of sensible matterbe it common or individualwill be mate-
rial with respect to the species of such objects. Likewise, also the individual
intelligible matter, i.e. the matter of one particular mathematical object, will
be material with respect to the species, just as individual sensible matter is
material with respect to the species of natural objects. For a certain species
of mathematical object does not include the properties that characterise
one individual object as such. What is not material, by contrast, with respect
to the species of mathematical objects is common intelligible matter, just
as common sensible matter is not material with respect to the species of
natural objects. I shall come back later on to the distinction between com-
mon and individual intelligible matter. The important point, for now, is that
Alexanders distinction between materia and materiale is entirely moulded
upon Aquinass distinction between individual and common matter.
Although Alexander employs the distinction between materia and mate-
riale in order to explain away those texts in Aristotle that seem to support
33 Cf. Alexander of Alexandria, Exp. Met., Lib. VII, c. 10, qq. 34, fol. 219rbva.
35 Cf. Alexander of Alexandria, Exp. Met., Lib. VII, c. 11, qq. 12, fol. 225rarb.
a formalistic account of essence and definition, he does not explicitly use

such a distinction to soften the impact of similar texts in Averroes. Alexan-
der does not explicitly say, in other words, that where Averroes says that
matter falls outside the essence of sensible substances, we should take mat-
ter in the sense of what is material. However, it is clear that this is the
direction Alexander is moving in. As a consequence, Alexanders distinction
between materia and materiale as well as his general strategy in dealing with
Aristotles argument in Met. Z 10 pave the way for Pauls consistent and sys-
tematic attempt at rereading Averroes in the light of Aquinass conceptual
categories.
3. Paul of Venices Interpretation of Met. Z 10
3.1. The General Strategy

In essence, Pauls interpretation of Met. Z 10 is the same as Alexanders. Both
commentators in fact fundamentally endorse Aquinass understanding of
Aristotles doctrine of essence and definition and so credit Aristotle with
the view that the essence and the definition of sensible substances contain
common matter in addition to form. However, there are some peculiar traits
of Pauls commentary that set it apart from the work of his predecessors. The
most important is certainly the fact that the attempt at interpreting Aver-
roes in the light of Aquinass doctrine is much more consistent and system-
atic in Paul than it is in Alexander, at least in so far as the problem of essence
and definition is concerned. This fact is certainly due in part to the fact that,
unlike Alexander, Paul comments directly on large portions of Averroess
text, but should also be put down to Pauls craving for systematicity and
completeness, which is also apparent in other aspects of his commentary.
When discussing general doctrinal questions in his digressions, for instance,
Paul tends to list and examine all the opinions which are known to him and
even to put on the table views which cannot be traced back to some histor-
ical figure in particular but rather seem to be mentioned only for reasons of
logical completeness.
The problem of essence and definition is clearly a case in point. In the
second part of his commentary on Met. Z 10 Paul presents a long digression
concerning the issue of the essence and definition of sensible substances.36
In the digression, Paul discusses four views and ends up rejecting all of
36 Cf. Paul of Venice, Exp. Met., Lib. VII, tr. 2, c. 3, pp. 353, 13357, 32.
438 chapter six
them to endorse a fifth one, which is the view defended by Aquinas in his
Commentary on the Metaphysics. All four views criticised by Paul involve
the notions of essence, quiddity and definition and differ from one another
in the way they establish relations of identity and difference among these
notions. I am particularly interested in the third view listed and criticised
by Paul because it exhibits his general tendency to read Averroess text in
the light of Aquinass doctrine. However, it may be useful to say a few words
also about the other three views and the way they are rejected. Therefore, I
shall first describe views 1, 2 and 4 and then go back to view 3.
(V1) The first view maintains that matter belongs to the essence and quid-
dity of sensible substances but not to their definition.37 For the task of a
definition is to make a thing known. Matter, however, is in itself unknow-
able. Therefore, it cannot be part of the definition of a material thing in
that, being in itself unknowable, it cannot make anything known. Thus, the
first view seems to sharply distinguish between the ontological level, i.e. the
level of essence and quiddity, and the epistemic one, i.e. the level of def-
inition. Matter is part of what sensible things essentially are, but the role
matter plays at the ontological level cannot be reflected at the epistemic
level, since matter is in itself unknowable. As far as I can see, (V1) simply
identifies essence with quiddity in that both contain matter in addition to
form. Supporters of (V1) appeal to Aristotles Met. 2 (1013a2629) and Phys.,
B 3 (194b2627). More importantly for our purposes, they also appeal to
Averroess frequent statements in his Long Commentary on the Metaphysics
to the effect that definition belongs to form and not to the composite of
matter and form.
Paul criticises (V1) on textual grounds. Like Aquinas and Alexander of
Alexandria before him, he calls in support of his criticism Aristotles explicit
statement in Met. E 1 (1025b341026a6) to the effect that the definition of
sensible substances includes a reference to sensible matter.38 Thus, there is
no point in distinguishing between essence and quiddity on the one hand
and definition on the other. In his reply, Paul also indicates how to explain
away the texts where both Aristotle and Averroes suggest that definition
belongs to form and not to the composite of matter and form. Of particular
interest is the case of Averroes, for Paul remarks that the contrast Aver-
roes draws between form and the composite should be understood as an
opposition between species and individual.39 When understood in this way,
37 Cf. Paul of Venice, Exp. Met., Lib. VII, tr. 2, c. 3, p. 353, 1320.
Averroess doctrine is compatible with the claim that common matter is

part of the definition of sensible substances. For only individual material
characteristics, and not matter as such, turn out to be excluded from such a
definition. As can be seen, Paul interprets Averroes in the light of Aquinass
conceptual machinery, in this particular instance in the light of the distinc-
tion between form and species and the related one between common and
individual matter. This strategy will become even more evident in Pauls
discussion and rejection of (V3).
(V2) The second view holds that matter belongs to the definition of sen-
sible substances, but not to their essence and quiddity.40 Like (V1), (V2) too
does not introduce any real difference between quiddity and essence. How-
ever, while (V1) takes definition to contain something less than essence and
quiddity, (V2) defends the idea that it contains something more. Thus, the
most natural way of understanding (V2)and this is actually the way Paul
understands itis to think that, exactly like the definition of accidents, the
definitions of sensible substances are definitions by addition, i.e. are formu-
lae containing something external to the essence or quiddity of the object
defined. Paul rejects (V2) by appealing to Met. Z 45 and in particular to Aris-
totles claim that, unlike those of accidents, the definitions of substances are
not definitions by addition. Therefore, all that figures in the definition of a
substance must also belong to its essence and quiddity. Interestingly, Paul
also remarks that the perfect correspondence between essence and defi-
nition is defended by Averroes as well.41 This further confirms my general
claim above that usually Paul takes Averroes to provide the correct inter-
pretation of Aristotles text.
(V4) The fourth view on Pauls list is Platos opinion. According to it, mat-
ter belongs neither to the definition nor to the essence or quiddity of sen-
sible substances. Like (V1) and (V2), also (V4) draws no distinction between
essence and quiddity. (V4), however, takes a radically formalistic stance in
that it excludes matter both from the ontological level of essence or quid-
dity and from the epistemic level of definition. On Pauls reconstruction,
(V4) stems from (wrongly) assimilating the case of natural objects with that
of artificial ones. I shall come back to this point in Section 4, when present-
ing Pauls interpretation of Met. Z 11.
Let me come now to Pauls discussion of (V3), which represents a particu-
larly striking example of Pauls general strategy in dealing with Averroes and
440 chapter six
Aristotle. Unlike the other three views presented, (V3) draws an explicit dis-
tinction between essence and quiddity. More particularly, (V3) asserts that
matter belongs to the essence and definition of sensible substances but not
to their quiddity. For the quiddity of a thing is confined to its form, while
it is impliedessence and definition contain matter as well. I do not think
that, in spite of Pauls slightly misleading formulation, (V3) should be taken
to imply that, since definition captures the essence of a thing, the quiddity,
which is distinct from the essence, is in itself indefinable. The point must
rather be that the definitions by which we are used to defining sensible
substancesi.e. presumably definitions containing a reference to matter
are not definitions of the quiddity of these substances but rather of their
essence. For, unlike the essence, the quiddity does not contain matter. The
argument, however, does not rule it outand in all likelihood should not
rule it outthat there be in fact a definition also of the quiddity of sensi-
ble substances, i.e. a formula which is in fact different from our standard
definitions of sensible substances and makes reference to their form alone.
Be that as it may, what is clear is that (V3) is the same view as Alexander
of Alexandria discusses in his Q. 8 of Met. Z 10. For both views share the
basic idea that essence and quiddity are two different principles or, to put it
otherwise, that there are two different notions of essence, a stricter notion
according to which essence includes only form and a broader one accord-
ing to which essence includes matter as well. What is more, the theoretical
argument Paul advances in support of (V3) is drawn from Alexanders com-
mentary. It is argued that the quiddity is that in virtue of which a thing is
called a certain something (quid). However, matter is not a certain some-
thing, because it does not possess any positive characteristics. Therefore, it
cannot be part of the quiddity, either. As can be seen, Pauls presentation is
entirely moulded upon Alexanders Q. 8.
Pauls adds, however, that (V3) is supported also by Aristotles repeated
claim, both in the Metaphysics and elsewhere, that form is the essence of
sensible substances, where essence should be taken here in the stricter
sense of the term, namely in the sense of quiddity. MoreoverPaul
continues(V3) seems to be borne out by two important texts from Aver-
roess Long Commentary on the Metaphysics. In the first, Averroes claims
that form can be predicated in quid, i.e. quidditatively, of the thing that has
formwhich implies that form is the quiddity of the thing that possesses it.
For only the quiddity can be predicated in quid.42 The second textwhich
42 Cf. Averroes, In Met., VII, t.c. 34, fol. 184FG. As a matter of fact, the argument only
we have already come across in Alexandersays that a man is identical

with his essence in one sense and non-identical in another. A man is iden-
tical with his essence if man stands for the form of the man, whereas he
is not identical with his essence if man stands for the composite of mat-
ter and form.43 This second text from Averroes is as explicit as it can be in
identifying essence in the strict sense with form.
As I said, Paul endorses Aquinass doctrine of essence and definition,
according to which (i) the difference between essence and quiddity is only
a difference of signification without any ground in the extra-mental world;
(ii) the essence/quiddity of sensible substances does not contain form alone
but also common matter. Thus, it is incumbent upon him to try to explain
away the texts in Aristotle and Averroes which seem to restrict essence in
the strict sense to form alone. Predictably, Paul does so by making use of
Aquinass most important metaphysical distinctions, such as that between
individual and common matter and that between forma partis and forma
totius. As to the texts in Aristotle that suggest that form is the essence
of sensible substances, Paul observes that all that Aristotle means by his
remarks is simply that form is the principal part of the essence, i.e. is the
principle which plays a major role in determining the essence of sensible
things.44 This does not imply, however, that form is the only part of the
essence of sensible substances.45 Thus, Aristotles remarks are compatible
with common matter being part of the essence alongside form. As to the two
texts from Averroes, Paul insists that the interpretation defended in (V3) is
incorrect.46 When Averroes says that form is predicated in quid of that which
has form, he is not talking about the forma partis but rather about the forma
totius. In other words, Averroes does not mean to refer to the form in the
standard Aristotelian sense, i.e. the form which pairs with and is opposed
to matter, but rather to the essence, which pairs with and is opposed to the
individual. And the essence does not contain form alone but also common
matter. Analogously, when Averroes says that a man is identical with his
shows that form must be part of the quiddity of the thing that has it. For nothing in the
argument prevents the quiddity from having different parts and so from being expressible
through a plurality of in quid predicates.
44 Cf. Paul of Venice, Exp. Met., Lib. VII, tr. 2, c. 3, p. 356, 1013. Paul also remarks, without
giving much by way of explanation, that Aristotles remark in Z 3 that matter is indeterminate
is quite compatible with its being part of the essence of sensible substances.
45 This way of dealing with the texts in Aristotle that seem to say that form alone is the
essence of sensible substances can also be found in Aquinas (cf. Exp. Met., Lib. II, lect. 4, n. 320;
Lib. V, lect. 1, n. 726; lect. 2, nn. 764 and 775; lect. 10, nn. 902904; Lib. VII, lect. 2, n. 1296).
442 chapter six
essence when man stands for form, while he is not identical with his
essence when man stands for the composite of matter and form, he wants
to contrast the essence of a mani.e. the forma totiuswith the individual
man and his individual matter and not, as (V3) alleges, form with matter.47
And the essence of a man contains the common matter all men are made of,
and so is opposed to individual matter and not to matter taken generally.
After discussing and rejecting the four aforementioned views, Paul ex-
plicitly endorses a fifth view, which is actually Aquinass interpretation of
Aristotle as well as the Dominican Masters philosophical opinion.48 As it
is presented by Paul, such a view can be summarised in three basic points:
(i) there is no real, i.e. mind-independent, distinction between essence and
quiddity but only a conceptual distinction.49 Essence and quiddity point to
the same extra-mental thing and their different names only correspond to
different concepts. (ii) Both form and matter are part of the essence, quid-
dity and definition of sensible substances.50 (iii) However, only common
matter is part of the essence, while individual matter is part of the individual
and not of the essence.51 Although Paul does not explicitly say so, the gen-
eral tenor of his argument shows that he believes this view to be Averroess
view as well.
In conclusion, from Paul of Venices commentary on Z 10 it clearly
emerges that the Austin Master goes out of his way to interpret Aver-
roess (and Aristotles) text in the light of Aquinass main metaphysical dis-
tinctions thereby providing a unified account of the two most important
medieval interpretations of Aristotles Metaphysics.
3.2. Points of Detail

Pauls general attempt at reconciling Aquinass and Averroess interpreta-
tions of Aristotle is also apparent in the way he deals with Aristotles baffling
remarks in Z 10 concerning the problem of the parts of definition as well as
that of the relation of priority and posteriority between parts and wholes.
According to Pauls reading, in the first part of Z 10, Aristotle reaches four
main conclusions:52
50 Cf. Paul of Venice, Exp. Met., Lib. VII, tr. 2, c. 3, pp. 353, 2130; 354, 2428.
C1) (1035a16) Matter is part of the definition of some forms (e.g. snub-
ness), while it is not part of the definition of some others (e.g. con-
cavity).
C2) (1035a910) Some parts belong to the definition of their wholes, while
some others do not.
C3) (1035a923) Formal parts enter into the definition of their wholes,
while material parts do not.
C4) (1035a2326) Formal parts and not material parts are principles of the
species.
Furthermore, the second part of Z 10, which is mainly about the relation
of priority and posteriority between parts and whole, contains other four
important conclusions:53
C5) (1035b1122) Material parts are posterior to their wholes.
C6) (1035b2227) Of the parts making up a whole some are prior and some
posterior to it, and some others simultaneous with it.
C7) (1035b2733) Matter and form are formal parts of both the species and
the individual.
C8) (1035b331036a13) The formal parts of the species and not those of the
individual must be mentioned in the definition.
It is not difficult to see that conclusions C1)C8) form an inconsistent set.
For C7) in conjunction with C8) entails that matter should be included
in the definition of sensible substances. C7) in fact states that matter is
a formal part of the species and C8) asserts that the formal parts of the
species should be included in the definition. C3), however, contrasts formal
with material parts on the grounds that only the former enter into the
definition of sensible substances. And the same line of argument seems to be
implicitly defended in C4), which again contrasts formal with material parts
and states that only formal parts are principles of the species. But, since C8)
implies that definition refers to the species and not to the individual, the
natural conclusion is that formal parts and not material parts enter into the
definition of the species. Thus, either Aristotle uses the expression formal
parts in two different senses throughout Z 10 or his argument is simply
unsound.
Predictably, Paul regains consistency by reinterpreting C3) and redefin-
ing the meaning of the expression formal and material parts as it appears
444 chapter six
in C3). In other words, he does not take the expression formal and mate-
rial parts in the sense of parts of form and parts of matter, i.e. as referring
to the standard Aristotelian senses of form and matter. On the contrary,
he remarks that a formal part is a part belonging to a thing in so far as it is
such a thing (secundum quod huiusmodi), whereas a material part is a part
which does not belong to a thing in so far as it is such a thing.54 To put it
otherwise, the material parts of a thing in the new sense are those parts of
a thing that are accidental to it, while the formal parts are those parts of a
thing that are not accidental but rather essential to it. As is easily realised,
Pauls redefinition of the meaning of formal and material parts perfectly
mirrors Alexanders distinctions between materia and materiale and forma
and formale. Both sets of distinctions, moreover, correspond to Aquinass
distinctions between species/essence and individual matter and between
forma partis and forma totius. For Paul insists that the material parts of a
thing in the new sense of material are the individual material parts of a
thing. Common matter, by contrast, is a formal part of the species because
it is something belonging to an individual in so far it is a certain kind of
thing and not in so far as it is an individual. To this consideration it should
be added that the way in which Paul interprets the details of Aristotles text
is exactly the same as Aquinas and Alexander. At the beginning of Met. Z 10
Aristotle raises the question of why the semicircles do not enter into the
definition of the circle, while the letters enter into the definition of the syl-
lable. Pauls response is that the semicircles do not enter into the definition
of the circle because they are material parts of the circle in the new sense,
i.e. individual parts that do not belong to the species of the circle. Letters,
by contrast, enter into the definition of the syllable, i.e. are parts belonging
to the species of the circle.55 In general, therefore, Paul reads the contrast
between matter and form as a contrast between formal and material parts
in the new sense.
From a theoretical point of view, there is nothing new in Pauls inter-
pretation when compared to Aquinass or Alexanders. From an historical
point of view, however, it is interesting to emphasise once again Pauls sys-
tematic and consistent effort to interpret Averroess text too in the light of
his general distinction between formal and material parts. Paul repeatedly
55 Possibly, letters are also formal parts in the standard Aristotelian sense of the term.
The important point, however, is that, even if they were material parts in the standard
Aristotelian sense, they could still count as formal parts according to Pauls new meaning
of formal.
says, for instance, that Averroess claim that material parts do not figure in
the definition of sensible substances should be taken to exclude material
parts in the new sense of material from the definition. Let me just give
one example, drawn from Averroess commentary on Met. 1035a2023.56 In
this text, Averroes stresses that the material parts of a thing composed of
matter and form are in one sense parts of the substance, while in another
sense they are not. In particularAverroes goes on to saythey are parts
of the composite of matter and form, but are not parts of what possesses
a definition, i.e. form. Averroess text explicitly suggests that the definition
of sensible substances does not contain any reference to material parts in
the standard sense of material, but only contains a reference to formal
parts in the standard sense of formal. Paul, however, imposes on Aver-
roess text his understanding of the contrast between formal and material
parts. Here is the way he replies to the most natural interpretation of Aver-
roess words:
The question is answered by denying that every definition given through
matter is also given through material parts. For here by material parts or
by parts according to matter Aristotle means, together with Averroes, an
accidental part which pertains to something not in so far as it is a certain kind
of thing. Now, matter taken commonly pertains to something in so far as it
is a certain kind of thing. Therefore, common matter is a formal and essential
part of its species or of its definition. Designated matter [scil. individual
matter], which is matter taken particularly, is a material and accidental part
of the species, although it is a formal and essential part with respect to the
individual.57
In conclusion, on Pauls reading, both Aristotle and Averroes endorse an
anti-formalistic account of definition, which is ultimately the one Aquinas
defends in his Commentary on the Metaphysics.

57 Cf. Paul of Venice, Exp. Met., Lib. VII, tr. 2, c. 3, p. 332, 19: Respondetur negando quod
omnis diffinitio data per materiam detur per partem materialem, quia hic per partem mate-
rialem aut per partem secundum materiam intendit Aristoteles, una cum Commentatore,
partem accidentalem competentem alicui non secundum quod huiusmodi; modo materia
communiter sumpta competit alicui secundum quod huiusmodi; ideo materia communis
est pars formalis atque essentialis sue speciei aut sue diffinitionis. Materia autem signata,
que est materia particulariter sumpta, est pars materialis atque accidentalis species, licet sit
formalis et essentialis respectu individui. Presumably, Pauls remark that individual matter
is a formal part with respect to the individual picks up on Aquinass point (cf. for instance:
De ent. et ess., c. 2, p. 371, lin. 7780) that, if individuals had individual essences and so could
be defined, individual matter would be part of their essences.
446 chapter six
4. Met. Z 11 in the Medieval Interpretation.

Averroes, Aquinas and Alexander
1. Averroes, Aquinas and Alexander of Alexandria all provide the same gen-
eral interpretation of the connection between Z 10 and Z 11. Since Z 10
shows that the definition of sensible substances only mentions the parts of
their /species, Z 11 raises the general difficulty of telling apart the parts
of a sensible substance that belong to its /species from those that do
not belong to it.58 Predictably, the three commentators part company with
respect to the precise sense in which the contrast between parts belonging
to the /species and parts not belonging to the /species should be
understood. Since Averroes thinks that the /species should be taken in
the sense of the standard, Aristotelian notion of formand so the definition
of sensible substances includes form alonefor him Z 11 is simply about dis-
tinguishing the parts of form from the parts of matter, where matter should
be taken indistinctly, i.e. without introducing any distinction between com-
mon and individual matter. Aquinasand, following him, Alexander as
welltakes /species in the sense of species, i.e. as a universal composite
of matter and form, which includes, besides form, also the common matter
of which all the individuals of a certain species are made. For Aquinas and
Alexander, therefore, Z 11 is not concerned with distinguishing the parts of
form from the parts of matter taken indistinctly, but rather with the distinc-
tion between the parts of the species and individual matter.
There is another general point on which all our commentators agree,
namely that one of Z 11s main goals is to put emphasis on the difference
between natural and mathematical objects. Roughly speaking, the differ-
ence between such two kinds of object consists in the fact that the forms
of natural objects can exist, of necessity, only in one kind of material,
whereas the forms of mathematical objects can exist in more than one
kind of material. To use the jargon of contemporary philosophers, natu-
ral objects are compositionally rigid, while mathematical objects are com-
positionally plastic. It is not difficult to see that to defend this view is
much easier for Aquinas and Alexander than it is for Averroes. Since in fact
Aquinas and Alexander maintain that common sensible matter is part of
the essence and definition of sensible substances, while it is not part of the
essence and definition of mathematical objects, it immediately follows from
their assumption that natural objects can only exist in one kind of matter,
58 Cf. Averroes, In Met., VII, t.c. 37, fol. 189Aff; Aquinas, Exp. Metaph., Lib. VII, lect. 11,
nn. 15011502; Alexander of Alexandria, Exp. Met., Lib. VII, c. 11, fol. 223vavb.
while mathematical objects can exist in more than one kind of material.
Averroess position is more complicated. For his view seems to be that the
essence and definition of natural objects includes form alone. Thus, it seems
that the possibility is open to him of maintaining that the forms of natural
objects can be realised in more than one kind of material, just as it is the
case with mathematical objects. Nonetheless, Averroes clearly believes that
natural objects are compositionally rigid, i.e. can be realised in only one kind
of material. In this section, I wish to outline the different interpretations
of Met. Z 11 provided by our three commentators by starting with the most
difficult case, i.e. that of Averroes.
In order for the reader to follow up my discussion more easily, it may be
useful to recall that Met. Z 11 basically falls into three parts:
(Part 1) (1036a26b20) In the first part, Aristotle presents the difficulties
we face in distinguishing between matter and form both in the case of
sensible substances and in that of mathematical objects. The section
introduces different examples to illustrate the general point that the
relation between matter and form is different in different cases.
(Part 2) (1036b211037a20) Aristotle takes up again both sensible sub-
stances and mathematical objects. This part of the chapter is domi-
nated by Aristotles report and criticism of Socrates the Youngers posi-
tion (1036b2132). Although the section about Socrates the Younger
has been interpreted in different ways by both medieval and contem-
porary commentators, what is certain is that Aristotle rejects Socrates
the Youngers position on the grounds that it does not sufficiently dis-
tinguish between sensible substances and mathematical objects.
(Part 3: Final Summary) (1037a211037b7). Aristotle summarises the
achievements of the whole section on essence (Z 46 and Z 1011).
2. In his commentary on Z 11s final summary (1037a2127) Averroes repro-
poses his general interpretation of two important issues discussed by Aris-
totle in the long section on essence: the problem of the object of definition
and that of the identity between a thing and its essence. On both issues Aver-
roes represents once again the formalistic account he defends throughout
Z 411. With regard for instance to the problem of the object of definition,
he says once again that Aristotles view is that form alone (in the standard
sense of form) is the substance and essence of sensible substances.59 Thus,
form is what a definition is about. Moreover, he remarks that the material

448 chapter six
parts of a thing, which he labels quantitative parts, do not figure at all in

its definition, which contains only formal or qualitative parts, as Averroes
calls them.60 Averroes also provides a formalistic account of the issue of the
identity between a thing and its essence.61 His position is basically that a sen-
sible substance is identical with its essence when taken as a form, whereas
it is not identical with its essence when taken as a composite of matter and
form. For, when a substance is taken as a composite of matter and form, it
contains something more than its essence, i.e. matter, and hence cannot be
identical with it. Since, by contrast, form is precisely the essence of a sensi-
ble substance, a sensible substance will be identical with its essence when
it is taken as a form. The summary, therefore, confirms the general recon-
struction of Averroess doctrine of essence and definition I have defended
in Chapter 2.
When commenting on the first part of Z 11 (1036a26b20), however,
Averroes also argues for the view that, unlike mathematical objects, sensible
substances can be made of only one kind of material, i.e. are compositionally
rigid. As is known, Aristotle presents in the first part of Z 11 three different
cases:
Case (1). The case of a geometrical form, which can be realised in more
than one kind of matter, e.g. the case of the form of the circle that
can be realised in different kinds of material such as bronze, iron and
wood.
Case (2). The hypothetical case in which a geometrical form is realised
in only one kind of material, e.g. if all circles were made of bronze.
Case (3). The case of natural forms, which can be realised in only one
kind of material, e.g. the form of human beings that can exist only in
flesh and bones.
According to Averroess interpretation, Aristotles main point is to draw a
distinction between Case (1) and Case (3), i.e. the actual cases of geometri-
cal and natural objects. Averroes phrases the difference by remarking that,
unlike mathematical objects, natural ones possess proper materials.62 In
other words, the forms of natural objects can be realised in only one kind
of material, whereas the forms of mathematical objects can be realised in
more than one kind. As the general tenor of Averroess argument suggests,
the difference should be understood as a matter of necessity, i.e. something

61 Cf. Averroes, In Met., VII, t.c. 41, fol. 193CE.
concerning the necessary conditions for the existence of natural and math-
ematical objects, respectively.63 The intrinsic difference between these two
cases also affects our ability to tell matter and form apart in the one case and
in the other. Since geometrical objects can and are in fact made of different
kinds of material, we have no difficulty discriminating in their case between
material and formal parts.64 Presumably, in the case of geometrical objects
it is enough for us to reason on the basis of our empirical observations or,
should observations not be sufficient, on the basis of our imaginative fac-
ulty. Since natural objects, by contrast, can be made of only one kind of
matter, we have difficulties distinguishing in their case between matter and
form, or formal and material parts in general.65 For it seems that empirical
observations and imagination can be of no help in their case. Since in fact
we have never seen human beings who are not made of flesh and bones, we
cannot even appeal to our imagination to picture the form of human beings
in materials other than flesh and bones.66 However, it is clear that Averroes
thinks that, in spite of such difficulties, discriminating between matter and
form is possible even in the case of natural objects. In all probability, obser-
vation and imagination ought to be replaced in this case by some philo-
sophical arguments concerning the distinction between the functions of a
natural being (which imply the existence of a form) and the material which
supports the performing of these functions. Slightly surprisingly, unlike the
contemporary scholars who share his general view on essence and defini-
tion, Averroes does not see any significant difference between Case (2) and
Case (3), i.e. the hypothetical case where all circles are made of bronze and
the case of natural objects.67 For Averroes, if all circles were made of bronze,
we would find ourselves in a situation analogous to that which we face in the
case of natural objects. However, it seems that, at least in principle, a distinc-
tion between Case (2) and Case (3) could in fact be drawn.68 For, even if all
circles were made of bronze, the relation between the form of the circle and

66 Science fiction writers may disagree here. It is not clear, however, that robots or bionic
creatures count as human beings. Thus, it is not clear how imagining objects that behave
exactly like human beings but are made of non-human material may help us to distinguish
between the matter and form of human beings. Note, however that t.c. 37, fol. 189G suggests
that it is possible, after all, to represent through imagination the form of human being as
existing in materials other than flesh and bones. I am not sure, however, that by imagination
Averroes means here what we normally do.
450 chapter six
the bronze would remain extrinsic and accidental. The circumstance that
all circles are made of bronze has nothing to do with the nature of circles.
Thus, imagination might play a role in distinguishing form and matter in the
hypothetical case as well. The relation between the form of human beings
and flesh and bones, by contrast, is necessary and intrinsic, and so imagi-
nation can play no role in this case. Be that as it may, the important point
is that, according to Averroes, the forms of natural substances are composi-
tionally rigid, i.e. can be realised in only one kind of material.
How can Averroes reconcile this view with his standard claim that the
essence and definition of sensible substances contains their form alone?
For clearly this latter thesis invites the functionalist thought that a sensi-
ble substance can be made of more than one material in that no material in
particular is part of its essence. Although Averroes does not offer an explicit
solution to this difficulty, it is not unreasonable to think that his position
could be similar to the one defended in recent times by Frede and Patzig.69
The idea is that, even though the definition of a sensible substance men-
tions its form alone, the definition is made in such a way that it is possible
to infer from it that that kind of substance can be made of only one kind
of material. In other words, from a precise characterisation of the functions
performed by a certain kind of sensible substance it should be possible to
deduce, through a certain number of appropriate steps, that such functions
can be supported only by one kind of sensible matter. This, however, does
not mean that matter should be mentioned in the definition of sensible sub-
stances. It is enough that matter might be inferred from the definition. This
solution amounts to drawing a distinction between necessary and essen-
tial: natural objects are necessarily made of one particular kind of matter,
although being made of the kind of matter in question is not essential to
them. Being an essential property requires something more than being a
necessary property, presumably the fact of playing some particular explana-
tory role with respect to all the properties an object may have.
A good place for testing out Averroess views on the relation between
matter and form in the case of natural objects is the section in Z 11 about
Socrates the Younger. For this section is taken by many medieval and
contemporary interpreters as a piece of evidence in favour of the view that
the definition of sensible substances should not confine itself to implying
a certain kind of matter, but should rather mention it explicitly. In the
passage, Aristotle remarks that the comparison Socrates the Younger used

to draw between natural and mathematical objects is misleading in that

it can mislead people into thinking that a sensible substance can exist
without its material parts in the same way as a circle can exist without
bronze (i.e. without being realised in one specific kind of material). The
two cases, however, are distinct, because material substances are sensible
objects and as such they cannot be defined without matter and motion.
Usually, the passage is taken to imply that matter (and motion) should
be mentioned in the definition of sensible substances and a good deal of
explanatory work is required to make the passage say that matter should
only be implied by or inferred from the definition of sensible substances
and not explicitly mentioned therein. As a matter of factas I have tried
to explain in Ch. 2some lines in Averroess commentary on Socrates the
Youngers passage also seem to suggest that matter should be mentioned
in the definition of sensible substancesa claim which is in overt contrast
with Averroess standard doctrine.70 One way out of the difficulty is to
suppose that Averroes is not talking about the definition of essence in the
strict sense of the term, but rather about the definition of nature or essence
in the broad sense, i.e. the rough description of the way sensible substances
concretely exist. As I said earlier on, unlike the definition of essence in the
strict sense, the account of nature also mentions, in addition to form, the
kind of matter of which a certain sensible substance is made. Although
this solution is not impossible, it must be admitted that there are no clear
indications in Averroess text that he is not talking about the definition of
essence in the strict sense, but rather about some other kind of formula. It
seems to me, however, that Averroess words are not, strictly speaking, in
flat contradiction with his general views on essence and definition. For the
main point Averroes is insisting upon is that the relation between matter
and form in sensible substances is not accidental and hence the forms
of natural substances are always realised in only one type of material
which is not the case with geometrical objects.71 But, as we have seen, this
view is in itself compatible with the claim that the definition of sensible
substances contains form alone, provided that one is prepared to accept
the kind of distinction between being mentioned and being implied that
Frede and Patzig for instance evoke. Moreover, Averroes seems to connect
Socrates the Youngers view with an extreme form of Platonism according
70 Cf. in particular Averroes, In Met., VII, t.c. 39, fol. 191F, where he remarks that sensible
substances cannot be understood without matter and motionwhich is easily read as imply-
ing that matter (and motion) should be mentioned in the definition of sensible substances.
71 Cf. in particular Averroes, In Met., VII, t.c. 39, fol. 191DG.
452 chapter six
to which not only can the forms of sensible substances exist in more than
one kind of matter, but they can also exist without any matter at all, i.e.
separately.72 Thus, the suggestion can be advanced that Averroes is not so
much interested in the implications of Socrates the Youngers view for the
problem of definition as in its consequences for our understanding of the
relation between matter and form in natural substances.
Therefore, I conclude that, all things considered, Averroes seems to main-
tain at the same time (i) that the definition of sensible substances includes
their form alone and (ii) that sensible substances are compositionally rigid,
i.e. their forms can be realised, of necessity, in only one kind of material.
3. Aquinas agrees with Averroes that one of Z 11s main goals is to defend
the view that sensible substances are compositionally rigid, i.e. they can be
made, of necessity, of only one kind of material. This comes as no surprise
given Aquinass general doctrine of essence and definition. For if the kind
of matter of which the members of a natural species are made is part of
their essence, there immediately follows, a fortiori, that the members of the
species in question can be made, of necessity, of only kind of material. For
what is essential is also, a fortiori, necessary.73 Compositional rigidity only
makes trouble for those who hold, as Averroes does, that matter should be
excluded from the definition and essence of sensible substances. For in this
case, one should look for a sense in which the members of a certain species
are necessarily made of a certain kind of matter without that kind of matter
being part of their essence.74
As a matter of fact, Aquinas reads the whole of Met. Z 11 in light of his
general doctrine of essence and definition. At the beginning of the chap-
ter, for instance, Aristotle says that, since definition belongs to the
and not to the composite, we shall succeed in defining something only if
we are able to distinguish the parts of the from the parts of the com-
posite. Predictably, Aquinas takes Aristotles remark in the sense that we
should distinguish the parts of the species, which includes both form and
common matter, from the parts properly belonging to the individual com-
72 Cf. Averroes, In Met., VII, t.c. 39, fol. 191DF.

73 The reverse is, of course, not true within Aristotles general framework. For Aristotle
admits of properties, such as for instance the so-called propria, which are necessary but not
essential.
74 The distinction between being mentioned in a definition and being implied by it is
a way of giving content to the distinction between essence and necessity in the case of
composition. Matter is necessary to sensible substances, but not essential to them.
posite of matter and form, i.e. the individual matter of the composite.75 Pre-
dictably, Aquinass general interpretation of the chapter is mainly based on
the passage about Socrates the Younger, which is often taken even by mod-
ern interpreters as evidence in favour of the view that matter should not be
excluded from the essence and definition of sensible substances. Many pas-
sages in Z 11, however, seem to go in a completely different direction and
some of them are in fact not so easy to explain away. In the final summary,
for instance, Aristotle remarks that in one sense the composite of matter and
form has no definition, while in another it is definable (1037a2627). The
composite, in particular, will have no definition when it is taken together
with matter, while it will be definable when it is taken in accordance with
first substance, i.e. in accordance with form. A man for instance will have
the definition of his soul, i.e. will be definable only in so far as his form is
definable. It is difficult not to take this passage to say that the definition
of a sensible substance only mentions its form. For the text suggests that
there is no definition of the composite mentioning its matter. This seems
to be directly in contrast with Aquinass view, according to which some
matter, i.e. common matter, enters into the essence and definition of sen-
sible substances. The Dominican Master, however, explains away this text
by insisting once again on the contrast between species, understood as a
universal composite of form and common matter, and individual matter.76
Thus, the sense of Aristotles words would be that there is no definition of
the composite when it is taken together with its individual matter, i.e. when
it is taken as an individual composite of matter and form. On the contrary,
the composite will have a definition when it is taken according to form, i.e.
when it is taken as a universal composite of form and common matter. Thus,
the definition of the composite taken in accordance with its form is just the
definition of the specific essence of the composite. Admittedly, Aquinass
reading is exegetically very difficult, but it squares with his general claim
that, although both matter and form are part of the essence of sensible sub-
stances, they are not on a par.77 For form is by far the most important factor
when it comes to determining the essence of a sensible substance and hence
a sensible substance is the sensible substance it is mainly because it pos-
sesses a certain kind of form. So, it is not unreasonable to call the definition
of the species of a sensible substance the definition according to form.
75 Cf. Aquinas, Exp. Met., Lib. VII, lect. 11, n. 1501.

77 Cf. Aquinas, Exp. Met., Lib. II, lect. 4, n. 320; Lib. V, lect. 1, n. 726; lect. 2, nn. 764 and 775;
lect. 10, nn. 902904; Lib. VII, lect. 2, n. 1296.

454 chapter six
Also the first part of Z 11 (1036a26b20) is a serious obstacle to Aquinass

general interpretation of the chapter. For the main line of argument in this
part seems to be that to define something simply amounts to isolating its
formal parts. This operation is easy in the case of forms that are realised in
more than one kind of matter, as is the case with the forms of geometrical
objects, while it is much harder, but still possible, in the case of forms that
can exist only in one specific kind of material, as is the case with the forms of
natural objects. In keeping with this general line of argument, Aristotle sug-
gests (1036a31b20) that the difficulties involved in distinguishing between
formal and material parts lead people to make two opposed mistakes. On
the one hand, one may be misled into thinking that certain material parts
are in fact formal parts simply because a certain kind of object cannot exist
without such material parts. This happens in the case of the forms of natu-
ral objects, which can only be found in one specific kind of material. On the
other hand, one may be tempted to treat certain formal parts as material
parts for fear of including in the definition some material parts. This mistake
is made by those who eliminate any reference to lines and the continuum in
the definition of geometrical objects and define them only in terms of num-
bers. But lines and the continuum are in fact formal parts and not material
ones, and hence should be included in the definition of geometrical objects.
Aristotles description of both mistakes confirms that defining a thing sim-
ply amounts to isolating its formal parts.
Aquinass reading of the first part of Met. Z 11 is very different from
the one I have just presented. For the Dominican Master, this part of the
chapter does not present Aristotles own view but rather expounds Platos
general doctrine concerning the essence and definition of both natural and
mathematical objects.78 Platos doctrine is rejected in the second part of
the chapter (1036b211037a20) with regard to both natural (1036b2132) and
geometrical objects (1036b321037a5).79 Platos mistake consists primarily in
not seeing that some matter is part of the essence and definition of both
natural and geometrical objects, even if, of course, the kind of matter that
is part of the essence and definition is different in the one case and in the
other.
Let me start with natural objects, i.e. sensible substances. We have seen
that in the first part of Z 11 Aristotle presents three possible situations
concerning the matter-form relation:

Case (1) The case of a geometrical form, which can be realised in more
than one kind of matter, e.g. the case of the form of the circle that
can be realised in different kinds of material such as bronze, iron and
wood.
Case (2) The hypothetical case where a geometrical form is realised in
only one kind of material, e.g. if all circles were made of bronze.
Case (3) The case of natural forms, which can be realised in only one
kind of material, e.g. the form of human beings which can exist only in
flesh and bones.
On Aquinass reading, Aristotles aim in presenting Cases (1)(3) is to illus-
trate the mistake stemming from confusing Case (2) and Case (3).80 The
important thing to say about Case (2) is that sensible matter would not
be part of the essence of geometrical objects even in the hypothetical case
in which geometrical forms were realised in only one kind of material.
This is so because the relation between the forms of geometrical objects
and sensible matter is merely extrinsic, and so such forms could always
be found, in principle, in different kinds of matter, even if it should hap-
pen that they are realised, as a matter of fact, only in one kind of matter.
So, the hypothetical Case (2) only illustrates a factual situation and points
to no matter of necessity. Platos mistake consists in thinking that Case
(3) is an instance of Case (2), i.e. that the fact that the form of human
beings is invariably found in flesh and bones points to no matter of essence
and necessity.81 On this view, flesh and bones fall outside the essence of
human beings just as sensible matter falls outside the essence of geometri-
cal objects. Platos mistake is corrected in the passage concerning Socrates
the Younger.82 The main goal of the passage is to contrast the case of geomet-
rical objects with that of natural ones on account of the different relations
these objects bear to sensible matter. Socrates the Younger was mistaken
because he simply equated the two cases. In particular, he supposed that
an animal can exist without its material parts just as a circle can exist with-
out a certain kind of sensible matter. But the comparison is incorrect and
misleading because an animal is a sensible substance essentially. There-
fore, it cannot be defined without making reference to the kind of sensible
matter of which it is made, i.e. what Aquinas calls common sensible mat-
ter.83
80 Cf. Aquinas, Exp. Met., Lib. VII, lect. 11, nn. 15041506.
456 chapter six
Aquinass interpretation of the case of geometrical objects also deserves

attention. At 1036b720 Aristotle protests against those who eliminate any
reference to lines and the continuum in the definition of geometrical
objects. The general tenor of Aristotles argument suggests that what is
wrong with this view is that it leaves out of the definition of geometrical
objects parts which are in fact parts of their form. Thus, lines and the con-
tinuum are essential parts of geometrical objects because they are formal
parts, the implicit thought being that only the formal parts of an object
belong to its essence. Presumably, the philosophers Aristotle has in mind
are in general afraid of including material parts in the definition. Therefore,
they tend to eliminate from the definition all the parts that are somehow
dubious, such as for instance lines and the continuum. In doing so, how-
ever, they run the risk of leaving out of the definition also some parts that
are genuinely formal parts of the object defined.
In this case as well, Aquinass understanding differs from the one I have
just outlined.84 According to him, in the case of geometrical objects as well
the Platonists mistake consists in leaving out of the definition some kind
of matter. Since sensible matter is not part of the essence of geometri-
cal objects, the matter Platonists tend to eliminate from definition cannot
be sensible matter, but rather intelligible matter. The distinction between
sensible and intelligible matter is explicitly drawnAquinas remarksat
1036b321037a5,85 where intelligible matter is associated with geometrical
objects. Thus, lines and the continuum enter into the definition of geomet-
rical objects not because they are part of their form, but rather because
they are the intelligible matter geometrical objects are essentially made
of.86 Moreover, Aquinas believes that we are in fact in a position to draw
a distinction between common and individual intelligible matter, which
perfectly mirrors that between common and individual sensible matter.87
And it is common intelligible matter, and not individual intelligible matter,
that enters into the definition of geometrical objects. Intuitively, one way of
making sense of the notion of common intelligible matter is to think of it as
extension in space. All geometrical objects, no matter what their individual
dimensions might be, must be extended in space, and hence common intel-
ligible matter must figure in their essence and definition. On this account,
the individual intelligible matter of a geometrical object would be the

portion of space the geometrical object in question occupies, i.e. the set of
points a particular geometrical objects cuts out for itself within geometrical
space in general. However, Aquinass view might also be that, in addition to
being extended in space, each kind of geometrical object possesses general
characteristics which mark it off from all the other kinds of geometrical
object. Triangles for instance must have three angles and three sides, and
so having three angles and three sides could be taken as the common
intelligible matter of triangles, even if, of course, each individual triangle
will have angles of particular magnitude and sides of particular length. On
this second account, individual intelligible matter should be understood
as the individual dimensions and limits of a particular geometrical figure,
the particular magnitude of a triangles angles or the particular length of
a triangles sides. Probably, the first interpretation is preferable, because
having three angles or having three sides are better construed as formal
properties of a triangle and not as material ones. Moreover, lines and the
continuum seem to point towards some general notion of space and not
towards intelligible matters that are somehow specific to the different kinds
of geometrical objects. Be that as it may, what is clear is that Aquinas regards
lines and the continuum as parts of intelligible common matter and not
as parts of form. Thus, he rejects a formalistic account of both sensible
substances and geometrical objects.
4. Alexander of Alexandria has no original contribution to offer to the

interpretation of Met. Z 11. He confines himself to reproposing Aquinass
general model of interpretation, which can be summarised in the following
crucial points:
(i) The contrast Aristotle draws at the beginning of Z 11 between parts of

the and parts of the composite should not be taken as the opposition
between formal and material parts, but rather as the contrast between parts
of the species, which includes form and common matter, and parts of the
individual, i.e. individual matter.88 In this case as well, Alexander puts to use
his distinction between materia and materiale. Not all parts of matter fall
outside the definition of the species, but only those that are material and
accidental with respect to the species, i.e. individual material parts. Thus,
Z 11s aim is to distinguish between the parts of the species and the individual
material parts.
458 chapter six
(ii) Alexander follows Aquinas also in the interpretation of Aristotles re-

marks in the final summary. Aristotle remarks that the composite of matter
and form does not have a definition when it is taken together with matter,
while it has one when taken according to primary substance, i.e. according
to form. Alexanders interpretation is that the composite of matter and
form is not definable when taken together with individual matter, i.e. when
taken as an individual composite of matter and form.89 On the contrary, the
composite is definable when taken as a species, i.e. as a universal composite
of matter and form. Thus, Alexander takes from Aquinas the idea that the
definition of the composite according to form is simply the definition of
the species of the composite.90
(iii) Alexanders understanding of the argument in Z 11 is also the same

as Aquinass. In particular, Alexander thinks that in the first part of Z 11
Aristotle is merely reporting Platos position, which he then criticises and
finally rejects in the second part of the chapter.91 The Platonist view ends up
eliminating matter from the definition of both natural and mathematical
objects. In the second part of Z 11, Aristotle makes it clear that some matter
or other is part of the essence and definition of both kinds of object, even if
the kind of matter involved is different in the one case and in the other.92 For
the essence and definition of natural objects includes (common) sensible
matter, while the essence and definition of mathematical objects requires
(common) intelligible matter.
Predictably, Alexander also endorses Aquinass analysis of Cases (1)(3),

which I have discussed at length earlier on.93 Like Aquinas and unlike Aver-
roes, Alexander is of the opinion that in Case (3) Aristotle is not presenting
his own position.94 On the contrary, the point Aristotle wishes to emphasise
is that Platonists mistakenly believe that the situation described in Case (3)
is actually the same as that envisaged in Case (2). In other words, Aristotles
89 Cf. Alexander of Alexandria, Exp. Met., Lib. VII, c. 11, fol. 226rb.
93 Case (1): The case of a geometrical form, which can be realised in more than one kind of
matter, e.g. the case of the form of the circle that can be realised in different kinds of material
such as bronze, iron and wood. Case (2): The hypothetical case where a geometrical form is
realised in only one kind of material, e.g. if all the circles were made of bronze. Case (3). The
case of natural forms, which can be realised in only one kind of material, e.g. the form of
human beings which can exist only in flesh and bones.
remark that flesh and bones may not be taken to be part of the essence and
definition of human beings (Case 3) should simply be understood as a report
of Platos position, who assimilates the case of natural beings to the hypo-
thetical case in which mathematical forms would actually exist in only one
kind of material (Case 2). In both casesPlato would arguethe factual
circumstance that certain objects are made of only one kind of material does
not imply that the kind of material in question is part of the essence and def-
inition of these objects. Aristotle, however, wishes to distinguish between
Case (2) and Case (3), as is made clear in the second part of the chapter.
Within his commentary on Met. Z 11, Alexander also presents a quaestio
on whether natural and mathematical objects must be treated in the same
way.95 Alexander responds to the question by pointing out that there are
both similarities and differences between sensible substances and mathe-
matical objects.96 They differ in so far as their relation to sensible matter
is concerned. For mathematical objects can be defined without making
reference to any kind of sensible matter. Natural objects, by contrast, in
virtue of their very nature, must be defined by making reference to sen-
sible matter. This is after all the doctrine defended by Aristotle when he
responds to Socrates the Youngers argument. Natural and mathematical
objects, however, are in some sense structurally analogous. For just as sen-
sible matter must be mentioned in the definition of sensible substances, so
intelligible matter is part of the definition of mathematical objects. As can
be seen, Alexanders response to the quaestio is nothing but a reformulation
of Aquinass general position.
Of some interest is the way Alexander expands on Aquinass distinction
between common and individual intelligible matter.97 He connects in par-
ticular such a distinction with the question of whether a thing is in general
identical with its essence. Alexander remarks that each individual geomet-
rical object is not identical with its own essence. This is so because the
essence of geometrical objects does not contain form alone, but also com-
mon, i.e. indeterminate, matter. Thus, one particular geometrical object
differs from another in that it determines common matter in a way differ-
ent from the other particular objects, i.e. in that it occupies for instance a
different portion of space. To use Aquinass jargon, every single geometri-
cal object possesses different individual intelligible matter. And individual
intelligible matter falls outside the essence of the species of mathematical
460 chapter six
objects in that the species only contains the indeterminate intelligible mat-
ter that the different individuals determine in different ways and not the
different ways in which indeterminate matter is determined. This means
that each individual geometrical object is not identical with the essence of
the species it belongs to.
5. Paul of Venices Interpretation of Met. Z 11:

Aquinas and Averroes Reconciled
As compared to Alexanders exposition, Paul of Venices interpretation

of Met. Z 11 presents some peculiar and interesting traits. Although he
basically follows in his exposition Aquinass understanding of the general
meaning of Z 11, Paul tries to incorporate some aspects of Averroess reading
and even advances a somewhat original interpretation of the first part of
the chapter. Moreover, once again Paul tries to reconcile Averroess and
Aquinass interpretations by rereading Averroes in the light of Aquinass
conceptual categories. As we shall see, however, in the case of Z 11s doctrine
Paul of Venices strategy finds some basis in the ambiguities of Averroess
commentary.
As to the general meaning of Z 11, Paul follows Aquinas and Alexander in
pointing out that the chapter contains two fundamental claims: (i) there is
a basic difference between sensible substances and geometrical objects in
so far as their relation to sensible matter is concerned. For sensible matter is
part of the essence of sensible substances, while it is not part of the essence
of mathematical and geometrical objects. (ii) On the other hand, there is
also some analogy between the two types of object. For geometrical objects
bear to intelligible matter the same relation as sensible substances bear to
sensible matter.
For Paul, point (i) is more important than point (ii), as is already made
clear by his remarks in the second part of his commentary on Met. Z 10. As
we have seen in Section 3, in his commentary on Z 10, Paul discusses and
rejects four different views concerning the essence and definition of sensi-
ble substances.98 The fourth of these views(V4)maintains that sensible
matter belongs neither to the definition nor to the essence (or quiddity) of
sensible substances.99 According to Paul, (V4) can be attributed to Platon-
ists.100 He also remarks that it stems from mistakenly equating the case of
natural substances with that of artefacts.101 In particular, Platonists thought
that the relation between matter and form in natural objects is the same as
that between the forms of artefacts and the matter of which they are com-
posed. By the forms of artefacts Paul mainly means geometrical forms as is
made clear by the example of the circle he puts forward to illustrate Platos
position. Thus, the starting point of (V4) is the observation that geometri-
cal forms can exist in many different kinds of sensible matter. Therefore, no
kind of sensible matter can be part of the essence and definition of a cer-
tain geometrical object. Moreover, even if the form of a geometrical object
should be found to exist in only one kind of material, the kind of material in
question would not be part of the essence and definition of the geometrical
object. For the relation between form and matter would remain extrinsic in
the hypothetical case as well. Analogouslyso Platonists reasonedflesh
and bones are not part of the essence of human beings, in spite of the fact
that human beings are made of no other material. And the same argument
can be applied to all sensible substances. Pauls explicit reference, in his dis-
cussion of (V4), to the first part of Z 11 (1036a31b22) might suggest that he
basically endorses Aquinass interpretation of this part of the text and of the
three cases Aristotle presents therein. In other words, Pauls words might
suggest that, on his reading, in the first part of Z 11 Aristotle does nothing
but report Platos view, which he then criticises in the rest of the chapter.
A closer look at Pauls commentary, however, shows that things are more
complicated than that. After briefly presenting the general theme of Met.
Z 11,102 Paul observes that the chapter reaches four main conclusions:103
C1) (1036a31b2) Sensible matter is not part of the species of mathematical
objects.
C2) (1036b27) Sensible matter is part of the species of natural objects.
C3) (1036b722) Intelligible matter is part of the species of mathematical
objects.
102 Cf. Paul of Venice, Exp. Met., Lib. VII, tr. 2, c. 3, pp. 374, 3375, 7. In his presentation of
the general theme of Met. Z 11, Paul follows in Aquinass footsteps. According to Paul too, in
other words, the problem the chapter is dealing with is distinguishing the parts of the species
(which includes both form and common matter) from the parts of the individual composite
of matter and form. Thus, he interprets Aristotles opposition between form and matter as a
contrast between universal and particular, i.e. between the species and individual matter.
462 chapter six
C4) (1036b221037a10) Not all intelligible matter is part of the species of

mathematical objects.104
What is striking about Pauls conclusions is that the first three are already
put forward, according to Pauls reading, in the first part of Z 11 (1036a31
b22). This suggests that Paul endorses Averroess reconstruction of the first
part of Z 11 and not Aquinass. For Aquinas maintains that the first part of
the chapter does not contain Aristotles own view but rather reports Platos
position on both sensible substances and geometrical objects. Averroes, by
contrast, holds that Aristotle makes clear the difference between the two
kinds of object as early as in the first part of Z 11. And Paul seems to follow
the latter reconstruction of the argument in the chapter. Of course, exactly
like Aquinas, Paul puts emphasis on the section about Socrates the Younger,
which belongs to the second part of the chapter. According to Pauls reading,
in fact, the section restates and strengthens the point that sensible matter
is part of the essence and definition of sensible substances.105 However, on
Pauls interpretation, the outcome of the passage concerning Socrates the
Younger is already anticipated in the first part of Z 11, and precisely in the
section 1036b27, where Aristotle argues for C2).106 Thus, even if Paul shares
Aquinass view on the general doctrine of Z 11 as well as on the meaning of
Cases (1)(3), he seems to follow Averroes in so far the argumentative struc-
ture of the chapter is concerned. It is not clear whether Paul neatly perceives
the difference between Aquinass and Averroess different reconstructions
of the argument in Z 11. What is clear, by contrast, is that the Austin Mas-
ters interpretation ends up being some kind of synthesis of his predecessors
readings.
Pauls synthetic attitude is even more apparent if we move from the ques-
tion of the argumentative structure of the first part of Z 11 to that of the
104 C4) is simply the by now familiar point that we should distinguish, in line with
Aquinass doctrine, between common and individual intelligible matter.

106 Paul also thinks that the passage concerning Socrates the Younger gives further sup-
port to C3) as well, i.e. the thesis that intelligible matter is part of the essence of mathematical
and geometrical objects. Pauls idea is that the claim that sensible matter should be excluded
from the definition of sensible substances could easily lead to the parallel claim that intelli-
gible matter should be excluded from the definition of geometrical objects. For intelligible
matter plays with respect to geometrical objects the same role as sensible matter does with
respect to natural ones. Presumably, an account of geometrical objects which does away with
intelligible matter should be a purely numerical account (such as the one Aristotle describes
in Z 11, 1037b7 ff.) in which geometrical figures are defined exclusively in terms of numbers.
By refuting Socrates the Youngers account of sensible substanceso Paul thinksAristotle
also refutes his view on geometrical objects.
doctrinal content of the section. For, although he endorses Aquinass gen-

eral view as to the doctrine defended in the first part of Z 11, Paul quotes
Averroes in support of his interpretation. This shows once again Pauls ten-
dency to reconcile Averroess and Aquinass readings and to read Averroes
in light of Aquinass conceptual categories. However, in the case of Z 11,
Pauls reading of Averroes is somehow favoured by some ambiguities in
the Arabic commentators text itself. Since the point is important, let me
spell it out in some detail. As we have seen in Section 2, Averroes thinks
that Aristotle presents in the first part of Z 11 his own view and not some-
one elses. In particular, Averroes is of the opinion that one of Aristotles
main points in the section is to point to an important difference between
sensible substances and mathematical objects. However, if my reconstruc-
tion of Averroess Long Commentary is correct, such a difference does not
consist in the fact that the essence of sensible substances, unlike that of
mathematical objects, contains sensible matter. What differentiates sen-
sible substances from mathematical objects, by contrast, is the fact that
sensible substances possess proper matter, i.e. can be realised in only one
kind of matter, while mathematical objects possess no proper matter in that
they can be realised in different kinds of sensible matter. Although Aver-
roess position may appear difficult, this difference between the two kinds of
object does not imply that the definition and essence of sensible substances
contains proper matter, i.e. that the essence and definition of each kind of
sensible substance contains the matter of which the kind of substance in
question is invariably made. Even though matter and form are necessarily
connected in natural objects, this does not mean that matter is part of the
essence of such substances. For essence is restricted to form. According to
Averroes, the kind of matter a certain sensible substance is necessarily made
of can be inferred from the essence but should not be taken to be a part
thereof. It should be noted that Averroess distinction is not unAristotelian
in that Aristotle explicitly distinguishes between the essential properties of
a thing and the properties that are necessary but not also essential. And
properties that are only necessary but not essential are precisely those that
can be inferred from the essence of a thing. Thus, this distinction between
necessary and essential could be transferred to the case of matter as well.
It is important to remark that Paul explicitly quotes and discusses one
of the fundamental texts where Averroes explains his views about the dif-
ference between natural and mathematical objects.107 However, Paul draws
107 Cf. Paul of Venice, Exp. Met., Lib. VII, tr. 2, c. 3, p. 378, 1231, where he quotes and
comments on Averroes, In Met., VII, t.c. 37, fol. 189G.

464 chapter six
from Averroess text more than he is entitled to. For he takes Averroess
remark that sensible substance have proper matter to imply the further
claim that matter should be included in the essence and definition of
sensible substances. Clearly, Paul is influenced once again in his reading
of Averroes by Aquinass doctrine of definition and essence. For, according
to Aquinass doctrine, the connection between sensible substances and the
matter of which they are necessarily made is not only necessary but also
essential. Thus, sensible matter is part of the essence and definition of
sensible substances.
However, it is important to realise that Pauls interpretation of Aver-
roes finds some basis in the Arabic commentators text. This emerges, for
instance, if we look at Pauls analysis of the passage concerning Socrates
the Younger.108 According to Paul, the passage aims at rejecting two Platonic
objections to C2), the conclusion that sensible matter is part of the essence
of sensible substances. (i) The first objection says that, since hands and fin-
gers are not part of the essence of human beings, no other material parts
can be so, either. I am not particularly interested in this objection. How-
ever, Paul replies that, even though hands and fingers are not part of the
essence of human beings, other material parts are parts of their essence.109 In
particular, flesh and bones understood as common material parts are parts
of the essence of human beings. For individual material parts are material
with respect to the essence, while common material parts are formal with
respect to it.110 (ii) The second objection is more directly relevant to our
immediate concerns. Just as bronze and stone are not part of the essence
of a circleso the argument runsso flesh and bones are not part of the
110 Pauls response is not entirely satisfactory. For he seems to think that the hands and
fingers which are not mentioned in the definition of human beings are the particular hands
and fingers of a particular human being. Thus, Paul does not tell us whether hands and fingers
in general, i.e. hands and fingers taken as common material parts, should be mentioned or
nor in the definition of human beings. If the answer is negative, some extra justification
is required to explain why they should not be mentioned. The reason might be that, even
though hands and fingers are necessary material parts of a perfect and complete human
being, they cannot be part of the essence of human beings in that there are some living
human beings that lost or never had hands and fingers. Alternatively, one might point out
that, even if we confine ourselves to the case of perfect human beings, the difference between
flesh and bones on the one hand and hands and fingers on the other is that the former are
fundamental material parts which somehow ground the existence of all the other material
parts, including hands and fingers. Thus, it is reasonable to consider flesh and bones as
essential material parts of a complete human being and hands and fingers as necessary but
not essential parts (of perfect human beings).
essence of a human being. Pauls predictable answer to this objection is that

the two cases are by no means analogous.111 For a circle is not a sensible
object in virtue of its very nature. Therefore, it can be understood without
making reference to any kind of sensible matter in particular. An animal, say
a human being, by contrast, is a sensible object in virtue of its very nature.
Therefore, the definition of an animal as well as that of any other sensible
substance will include a reference to sensible matter, which will be specif-
ically different for the different natural species. According to Paul, this is
the doctrine defended by Aristotle in the passage concerning Socrates the
Younger. What is more, Paul also believes that it faithfully represents Aver-
roess view. He quotes and comments on four texts from Averroes which are
related in some way or another to the issue discussed in the section concern-
ing Socrates the Younger.112 I am particularly interested in the fourth of these
texts. In the passage in question Averroes contrasts the case of animals, a
paradigmatic case of natural objects, with that of geometrical objects. He
explicitly says that animals differ from geometrical objects in that, unlike
the latter, they cannot be understood without (understanding) perception
and motion, which imply sensible matter.113 In Section 3, I tried to bring this
text into line with Averroess general doctrine of definition by advancing the
suggestion that the text might refer not to the definition of the real essence
of sensible substances, but rather to the account or rough description of the
way sensible substances concretely exist. Sensible matter enters into such
an account, while it falls outside the definition of the real essence of sensible
substances. Even if it should turn out to be true, however, my interpretation
is admittedly difficult, and hence it comes as no surprise that Paul takes
Averroess text to imply that matter is simply part of the essence and def-
inition of sensible substances. For it is difficult to see how one could try to
make sense of the idea that sensible substances cannot be understood with-
out sensible matter without also maintaining that sensible matter is part
of the definition of these substances. What is more, if one adds the further
premiss that, unlike the definition of accidents, the definition of substances
does not mention anything external to the essence of the object defined,
the natural conclusion is that sensible matter should also be part of the
essence of sensible substances. Thus, in the case of Z 11, Pauls attempt at
reading Averroes in the light of Aquinass doctrine goes hand in hand with
the obscurities and ambiguities of the Arabic commentators text.
466 chapter six
In conclusion, one point that seems to emerge from my analysis is that,

when interpreting Aristotles doctrine of essence and definition in Met. Z 10
11, Paul of Venice also provides a certain reading of Averroess Long Com-
mentary. In particular, Paul reads Averroes through the lenses of Aquinass
doctrine of essence and definition. This shows Pauls synchretic and con-
ciliatory attitude towards his sources, but also points to some deeper his-
torical fact. Since in his Commentary on the Metaphysics Aquinas explicitly
criticises Averroess views on essence and definition, it is not surprising
that Averroes and Aquinas were perceived by Thomass contemporaries as
the supporters of two alternative readings of Aristotles text. Then, as time
went by, the desire for subtle philosophical distinction gave way to the con-
cern for producing a unified and codified interpretation of Aristotles Meta-
physics. And such an interpretation could be obtained only by showing that
Averroess and Aquinass readings were not so different as they seemed to
be at first sight. This attitude is already evident in Alexander of Alexandria,
who drafted his commentary a few decades after Aquinass death, and finds
its culminating point in Paul of Venices Expositio, where the attempt at rec-
onciling Averroess and Aquinass view is manifest. In some sense, it was
Averroes who paid the highest price for the success of such a cultural oper-
ation. For his genuine profile as a metaphysician and as a commentator of
Aristotle is somehow obscured, if not simply distorted, by Alexanders and
Pauls conciliatory attitudes. The fact remains, however, that historical phe-
nomena are often interesting in themselves in spite of the many and often
illustrious casualties they leave on the ground.
summaries of the text
PAUL OF VENICES COMMENTARY ON THE METAPHYSICS
Book VII
Book VII is devoted to the study of substance. In Book VI Aristotle estab-

lishes that metaphysics should study being per se and excludes from its
consideration both accidental being and mental being. Since substance is
being per se more than anything else, the study of substance chiefly per-
tains to metaphysics.
Book VII falls into three treatises: (1) in the first, Aristotle investigates
the essence of substance as compared to accidents; (2) in the second, he
studies this essence from the point of view of generation and corruption;
(3) in the third, he considers it from the point of view of commonness and
predication.
Treatise I
Chapter 1
Aristotle illustrates the eminent position of substance. The chapter falls into
two parts: (1) in the first, Aristotle establishes the eminence of substance; (2)
in the second, he shows how substance is evident and certain.
Part 1
Aristotle introduces a distinction useful for the main conclusion. Being is
spoken of in many ways. In one way, it signifies substance, both primary
and secondary substance, i.e. both individual substances and their essence;
in another, it signifies quality, in yet another quantity and so on for all
the different categories. Thus, being is spoken of in as many ways as
there are categories. Aristotles text (1028a1013) corresponding to the distinc-
tion.
Notandum. Averroes confirms Aristotles general distinction. He talks of
substance both in the sense of the individuals in the category of substance
and of the species and genera the individuals fall under. He also concedes
468 summaries of the text
that, for both kinds of substance, there are accidents that can be predicated
of them. These predications do not indicate the essence of substances, but
rather accidental dispositions of substances.
Aristotle illustrates the eminence of substance by means of four conclusions.
Conclusion 1. The quiddity that signifies substance is, among all beings, pri-
mary being.
The conclusion is proved in two ways.
Proof 1. Primary being is what answers the question as to what something is;
but only the quiddity signifying substance answers such a question; there-
fore, only the quiddity signifying substance is primary being. It is clear in
fact that, just as quiddity is prior to quality, quantity and all the other cate-
gories, so the question concerning quiddity, i.e. the what-question, is prior
to the questions concerning quality, quantity and so on. Moreover, it is also
clear that only the quiddity signifying substance answers the what-question.
For, in general, when we ask what a certain quality is, we answer by means
of predicates in the category of quality and not by means of predicates in
some other category. And this is also true of the category of quantity and of
all the other categories. By the same token, therefore, when we ask what a
substance is we shall answer by means of a substantial predicate and not by
means of predicates belonging to the accidental categories. Aristotles text
(1028a1317) corresponding to Proof 1.
Proof 2. Primary being is what does not presuppose any other being. But
only the quiddity signifying substance does not presuppose any other being.
Therefore, only such a quiddity is primary being. This point has been made
clear by Aristotle in Book IV of the Metaphysics by means of his theory of
analogy. Substance in fact is being per se, while all the other beings are
so only because they are something of being per se, which is substance.
Quantities, for instance, are beings because they are quantities of substance,
i.e. because they measure and give quantity to substance. And qualities are
beings because they are qualities of substance, i.e. they qualify substance.
And this is true of all the items in the other categories as well, which are
beings only because they are the properties of substance. Aristotles text
Notandum 1. Averroes explains Aristotles argument. The predicates that
are closer to primary substance lay better claim to the title of being. But
the predicates in the category of substance make known primary sub-
stances more than those in the accidental categories. For, even though both
paul of venices commentary on the metaphysics 469
predicates are truly predicated of primary substances, the substantial ones

indicate their essence, which is intrinsic to them, while the accidental
predicates only indicate certain dispositions of primary substances, which
are external to them. Therefore, the predicates in the category of substance
lay the best claim to the title of being.
Objection. It seems that accidental predicates answer the what-question
as much as substantial ones.
Reply. First of all, accidental predicates indicate only the essence of indi-
vidual accidents and not of individual substances. Moreover, accidental
predicates are predicated essentially (in quid) only in the abstract, but not
in the concrete. For instance: if asked what a particular whiteness is, we
would answer correctly by saying It is a colour. If asked, however, what
a particular white thing is, we would not answer correctly by saying It is
a coloured thing, because the thing which is coloured is a substance and
so a correct answer should include substantial predicates. Only substantial
predicates are predicated essentially both in the abstract and in the con-
crete, and hence it is only they that properly answer the what-question.
Notandum 2. Averroes remarks that Aristotles starting point in the first
conclusion is logic and explains his point with a distinction. Logic can be
used by the other sciences in two ways. In one way, sciences use logic as
an instrument, as when they use logical procedures, such as definition,
demonstration and syllogisms, to reach some conclusions in their own
fields. But logic can also be used in another way. The other sciences may
take as their starting points conclusions which have been demonstrated in
logic. Aristotle, for instance, in the present passage proves that substance is
primary being through a logical proposition, i.e. that the essence of a thing
is the correct answer to the what-question. And although the other sciences
may sometimes use logic in this second way, such a way is most proper to
metaphysics on account of the great affinity between metaphysics itself and
logic. Both sciences in fact deal with the totality of being, even though they
do not study it in the same way: metaphysics in fact studies real being, while
logic deals with mental being.
Two Objections to Conclusion 1.
Obj. 1. Things that are different in genus cannot be compared. Therefore, it
cannot be said that substance is primary being.
Obj. 2. Accidents are beings not in that they are something of another kind
of being. For, in Met., Book V, Aristotle describes accidents as beings per se
and beings per se are not beings because they are something of another kind
of being.
Reply to Obj. 1. One can compare things in two ways, properly and com-
monly. Properly, only things different in speciesand not in genuscan
be compared. Commonly, also things different in genus, as well as things
that are all related to one single thing according to analogy, can be com-
pared. Now, being is said of accidents and substance analogically and so
accidents and substance can be said to be more or less being. For being more
or less something is proper to things that are related according to analogy.
Reply to Obj. 2. Being per se is spoken of in two ways, i.e. absolutely
and comparatively. In the former sense, it indicates one nature which is not
composed of many things. And in this sense, accidents are beings per se,
as Aristotle explains in Met., Book V. Taken comparatively, however, being
per se indicates something which does not depend on something else. And
in this way, accidents are not beings per se.
Conclusion 2. Substance is more being than accidents.

Aristotle proves this conclusion in three ways.
Proof 1. When two things are such that one is separable from the other but
not vice versa, the thing that is separable is more being than the one that
is not. But substance is separable from accidents and not the other way
round. Therefore, substance is more being than accidents. That substance is
separable from accidents and not vice versa, can be seen by asking whether
accidents taken in the abstract, i.e. things such as walking, standing and
sitting, are beings existing per se or not. The answer is that they are not,
because there is no walking, standing or sitting without something that
walks, stands or sits. But the things that walk, stand and sit are primary
substances. Therefore, accidents cannot be separated from substances. On
the contrary, substances are separable from accidents. For there are some
substances, like God and separate intelligences, that have no accidents.
Aristotles text (1028a2024) corresponding to Proof 1.
Proof 2. The accident in the concrete, e.g. the walking thing, is more being
than the accident in the abstract, i.e. walking. This is so because the concrete
accident contains a reference to the subject underlying it. Therefore, the
underlying subject is more being than the accident in the concrete. But the
subject is a substance. Aristotles text (1028a2427) corresponding to Proof 2.
Proof 3. If two kinds of predicate are such that one can be predicated
without the other but not vice versa, then the one that can be predicated
without the other is more being. But substance can be predicated with-
out accidents, for secondary substances are predicated of primary sub-
stances without any reference to accidents, while the reverse is not the case.
Accidents in fact cannot be predicated without substance. Therefore, sub-

stance is more being than accidents. Aristotles text (1028a2729) correspond-
ing to Proof 3.
Notandum 1. Averroes explains Aristotles text in the following way. What
is more known to the senses is more being. But substance is more known to
the senses than accidents. Therefore, it is more being than accidents.
Objection to Averroess interpretation. What is more known to the senses
is that which is perceived per se and not accidentally. But accidents are
perceived per se and substances accidentally.
Reply. Accidents are more known to the senses only if we consider the
exterior senses. But if we consider senses in general, including both the exte-
rior and the interior senses, which is a cogitative faculty, substance is more
known to the senses than accidents. For, while the exterior senses know
substance only through accidents, the interior sense has a proper knowl-
edge of substance, in that it has knowledge of all the different categories.
And so the interior sense knows substance as a being per se and accidents
as beings existing in something else.
Notandum 2. Averroes further remarks that substance is constituted by
both primary and secondary substances. He draws a distinction between
the two kinds of substance on four counts. (i) Primary, and not secondary
substances, are subjects of the universals in the category of substance. For
secondary substances are precisely such universals. (ii) Primary substances
are determined per se by place and surface, while secondary substances
are so determined only accidentally. Since secondary substances are in
fact abstract from any quantity, place and time, they are determined by
quantity, place and time only on account of the primary substances they
are predicated of. (iii) Primary substances are bodies existing per se, while
secondary substances receive their existence from primary substances. If
primary substances did not exist, nothing else would remain, including
secondary substances. (iv) Secondary substances are formal parts of primary
substances, while primary substances are only subjective parts of secondary
ones. In conclusion, Averroes seems to say that secondary substances bear a
relation of analogy to primary substances. Depending on how we consider a
primary substance, we obtain the different secondary substances, with the
result that a primary substance somehow contains all the entities belonging
to the category of substance and adds to them something peculiar, i.e.
determinate matter. Moreover, thus considered, a primary substance is a
certain kind of whole of which secondary substances are parts.

Obj. 1. Substance is not more being than accidents, because accidents simply
are not beings. For instance, medicine has no health in itself, but is called
healthy only with reference to the health of an animal. Likewise, accidents
have no being in themselves, but are called beings only with reference to
the being of substances.
Obj. 2. The concrete accident is not more being than the abstract acci-
dent. For the concrete accident could be more being only if it, unlike the
abstract accident, signified the subject in addition to the property. But this
is false, because concrete and abstract accidents signify the same thing,
i.e. a form taken in the abstract, as Aristotle makes clear in the Categories.
Moreover, Aristotle says in Top., Book III, that it is justice (i.e. the abstract
accident) and not the just (i.e. the concrete accident) that belongs to a cat-
egory.
Reply to Obj. 1. There are two kinds of analogy, essential and accidental
analogy. The first case occurs when all the analogates receive their analogue
formally, even if some of them receive it completely and some others incom-
pletely. For instance, both matter and form are formally substance, even
if form is substance completely and matter only incompletely. Accidental
analogy, by contrast, occurs when only one analogate receives the analogue
formally, while the others receive it only denominatively. For instance, the
doctor and the medical instrument are both curative in some way or other,
but only the doctor is curative formally, because he has the medical art,
while the instrument is curative only denominatively, in that it contains no
such art.
Clearly, therefore, the objection confuses these two different kinds of
analogy, by taking the analogy of being to be an accidental analogy. On the
contrary, it is an essential analogy. For both substance and accidents are
formally being, even if substance receives the analogue being completely,
in that it is a stable and fixed being, while accidents receive it incompletely,
in that they are not stable and rather flow in and out of their subject.
So, it should not be said that accidents do not exist but rather inhere,
or that they are not beings. For they are beings, as Aristotle clearly says
in this chapter. Moreover, accidents can be: (i) end points of a change
(there are changes that concern accidental categories), (ii) instruments of
action (no one could heat something if heat did not exist), (iii) principles
of being (a thing is white because it has whiteness) (iv) and the starting
point of movement (accidents, both proper and common, move the senses).
Therefore, it must be concluded that both concrete and abstract accidents
are beings.
One might object against the existence of abstract accidents that it is the
white thing that is coloured and not whiteness, just as it is a man that
runs and not humanity. But the objection has no point. For what we are
talking about are verbs such as to exist, which are transcendental verbs
and so apply to all things, be they concrete or abstract. To run and to be
coloured, by contrast, are verbs of more limited meaning, which only apply
to supposits and concrete things.
Reply to Obj. 2. Actually, the concrete accident signifies not only an acci-
dental form, but also a substance. This is clear from Aristotles remarks in
this chapter to the effect that, unlike abstract accidents, concrete accidents
are never said without reference to a subject. This doctrine is confirmed by
what he says elsewhere in Book VII: for instance, by the remark that acci-
dents do not have a what-something-is (quod quid est) on account of their
twofold signification and by the further observation that snub is defined in
terms of two things (the property and its subject). Therefore, when Aristo-
tle says in the Categories that white signifies whiteness alone, he must be
talking of the distinct signification of the term. For white signifies white-
ness distinctly, while it signifies the subject confusedly, in that it does not
concern one subject more than another. To the same effect is Averroess
remark in his Commentary on Met., Book VIII, where he says that the name
of an accident primarily signifies the accidental form and secondarily the
composite of a substance and the form.
In light of these considerations, the further conclusion of the objection
can also be denied by saying that both a concrete and an abstract item
belong to a category, although not in the same way. In general, the item
that is intermediate between the purely abstract and the purely concrete
belongs per se and primarily to a category, while the others belong to
the category per se but not primarily. For instance, man is intermediate
between humanity, which is purely abstract, and human, which is purely
concrete, in that man is concrete when compared to humanity and abstract
when compared to human. So it is man that belongs to the category of
substance per se and primarily. For it is man that is the proper answer
to the question as to what a certain individual substance is. Humanity
and human belong to the category of substance per se, but not primarily.
Likewise, in the case of the category of quality, whiteness is intermediate
between whitenessity, which is purely abstract, and white, which is purely
concrete. And so it is whiteness that belongs to the category of quality per
se and primarily, for it is the right answer to the question as to what a
given individual quality is. Whitenessity and white belong to the categories
of quality per se, but not primarily. Therefore, when Aristotle says in Top.,
Book III, that it is justice and not the just that belongs to a category, he must
mean belong per se and primarily. For the just belongs to a category per se,
but not primarily. And if someone should object that Aristotles examples of
accidents in Met., Books VI and VII, are always concrete accidents, we shall
respond that he employs concrete accidents because they are more known
to us, just as he exemplifies the notion of substance by means of artefacts
because they are more known to us.
Conclusion 3. Substance is the cause of accidents with regard to their exis-

tence.
Proof 1. One thing is the cause of the existence of another if it is that in
virtue of which the other exists and the reverse is not true. But substance
is that in virtue of which accidents exist, whereas the reverse is not the
case. For accidents are beings because they are something of substance. So
substance is the cause of the existence of accidents. Aristotles text (1028a29
30) corresponding to Proof 1.
Proof 2. That which is primary and unqualified being must be the cause
of the existence of that which is just secondary and qualified being. But
substance and accidents relate as primary and secondary being. For acci-
dents cannot be separated from substances, as is shown in Conclusion 2.
Therefore, substance is the cause of the existence of accidents. Aristotles
text (1028a30) corresponding to Proof 2.
Notandum 1. Averroes argues against those who maintain that accidents
depend on substance for their existence but not for their essence. For him,
by contrast, since accidents depend on substance for their existence, they
must also depend on it for their essence.
It is probably preferable to say that an accident can be considered in two
ways, according to essence and existence and according to the inherence
of a predicate in a subject. Accidents depend essentially and per se on sub-
stance according to the first mode of consideration, but not according to
the second. For if accidents depended on substance also according to their
inherence in a subject, the propositions Whiteness is a colour and Line is
a quantity would not be per se propositions according to the first sense of
per se in Post. Anal., Book I. In other words, if accidents also depended on
substance according to the inherence of a predicate in a subject, then the
inherence of the predicate colour in the subject whiteness would have
some cause other than colour and whiteness themselves and so proposi-
tions such as Whiteness is a colour and Line is a quantity would not be
immediateas they should be, however, if they are per se predications in

the first sense of per se.
Notandum 2. Averroes further clarifies Aristotles text. He says that, when-
ever a term which is said of two things is said of one of them more properly
than of the other, the thing to which the term applies more properly is the
cause of the other. So, since being is said more properly of substance than
of accidents, substance is the cause of accidents.
Objection. Substance is said of matter, form and the composite, and is
also said more properly of the composite than of matter and form. However,
it seems that it is matter and form that are causes of the composite and not
the other way round.
Reply. As Aristotle explains in Met., Book V, it is perfectly possible for two
things to be reciprocally the cause of one another according to different
kinds of cause. So, matter and form are, respectively, the material and
the formal cause of the composite, while the composite itself is the cause
of matter and form as the final cause. Since the final cause is the most
important cause, the composite is a cause to a higher degree than matter
and form.
Four Objections to Conclusion 3.
Obj. 1. Accidents can exist without substance, from which it follows that
substance is not the cause of accidents with regard to their essence and
existence. Aristotle says in fact in Phys., Book VIII, that, if two things are
conjoined and we find the first existing without the second, then we can
also find the second existing without the first. But we find that substance
exists without accidents, so it is possible also for accidents to exist without
substance.
Obj. 2. Everything that is movable happens to be moved, as Aristotle
says in De coel., Book I and Phys., Book VII. Analogously, everything that is
separable happens to be separated. But some accidents are separable from
substance. So they also happen to be separated from substance.
Obj. 3. Aristotle says in Phys., Book VIII, that everything that is not nec-
essary can not be. But Aristotle himself says in Top., Book I, that it is not
necessary for an accident to inhere in a substance, in that it can inhere or
not inhere. Therefore, accidents can exist without substance.
Obj. 4. There are cases of accidents which do not exist in a subject. To
take one: the light is not drawn from the potentiality of the medium which
it illuminates, but rather from the potentiality of the luminous body, on
which it essentially depends. Therefore, the light is not in the medium as
in a subject.
Reply to Obj. 1. Aristotles words must be taken to refer to things that are
accidentally conjoined and do not have an essential order with respect to
one another. In the case of things that have an essential order with respect
to one another, it is not true that, if the first can exist without the second,
the second can also exist without the first. Form and matter, for instance,
are conjoined. But, while there can be form without matter, there cannot,
by contrast, be matter without form.
Reply to Obj. 2. It is true that an accident happens to be separated from
a substance only to the extent to which it is separable from a substance. So
it must be understood how an accident is separable from its subject. There
are three possibilities. It is separable either (i) because both the accident
and the substance remain after their separationand this is impossible; or
(ii) because the accident remains but not the substancewhich is equally
impossible; or (iii) because the substance remains but not the accident
which is necessary. Therefore, an accident is separable only in the sense that
its subject remains even if it does not remain.
Reply to Obj. 3. It is true that an accident can also not inhere in a sub-
ject. But this is so not because the accident remains even if the subject is
corrupted, but rather because the subject remains even if the accident is
corrupted.
Reply to Obj. 4. The light is in the medium as in a subject. Moreover, it is
also drawn from the potentiality of the medium, even though it is drawn
from the potentiality of the luminous body. For the light is drawn from
the latter potentiality actively, while it comes from the former passively.
Therefore, it exists as in a subject in the medium and not in the luminous
body.
It must be noted, finally, that the claim that an accident cannot exist
without a subject must be understood according to the natural course of
things and according to the nature of the objects that presuppose matter for
their actions. For the first agent, which is a supernatural agent and does not
presuppose any matter or movement for its action, can make an accident
exist without any subject, either by creating an accident and not its subject,
or by annihilating the subject while preserving the accident, or finally by
transubstantiating the subject of a certain accident, as is the case with the
Eucharist. In the sacrament of the Eucharist, in fact, quantity exists without
any subject and the other accidents remain in quantity without there being
any substance they inhere in. One should not conclude, however, that
quantity exists per se, even when it exists without a subject. For God plays
the role which is normally played by the subject, and so quantity still lacks
a fixed being and retains its natural inclination towards substance.
Conclusion 4. Substance is also the cause of accidents with regards to knowl-

edge.
General Proof. Substance is prior to accidents unqualifiedly, so it must be
the cause of the knowledge of all accidents. For the principles of being are
the same as the principles of knowledge.
Two Proofs of the antecedent (substance is prior unqualifiedly).
Proof 1. Substance is prior to accidents in cognition, definition and time. So
it is prior in all ways, for all the other forms of priority, such as the priority
of consequence or that of causality, reduce themselves to one or another of
the three mentioned.
Priority in time. Substance is prior in time to accidents, because no acci-
dent is separable from substance, while substance is separable from any
accident whatsoever. Aristotles text (1028a3134) corresponding to priority
in time.
Priority in definition. X is prior in definition to y, if x figures in the defini-
tion of y while y does not figure in the definition of x. But substance figures in
the definition of accidents and not vice versa. Therefore, substance is prior
in definition to accidents. That the minor premiss is true can be shown in the
following way. The differentia figures in the definition of the species because
it constitutes the species; but the substance also constitutes the accident;
therefore, it must be mentioned in its definition. This conclusion can be
borne out by passing in review the different cases of accident. Thus, the
subject is always mentioned in the definition of proper accidents, be they
convertible or non-convertible, abstract or concrete: man, for instance,
figures in the definition of capable of laughing and nose figures in the
definition of snub. As to common accidents, no one doubts that they will
be defined through their subject when they are taken in the concrete: the
white, for instance, is a thing having whiteness, where a thing stands for a
subject. And the same thing is true of common accidents taken abstractly:
colour, for instance, is defined as the extremity of the perspicuous in a
limited body, where perspicuous makes reference to the substance that
underlies the colour. Aristotles text (1028a3536) corresponding to Priority in
definition.
Priority in cognition. X is prior in cognition to y, if x makes us know what a
thing is more than y does. But substance makes us know what a thing is more
than accidents do. Therefore, substance is prior in cognition to accidents.
In fact we know a thing more when we know its substantial properties than
when we know its accidental ones. For instance: we know more a substance,
say Socrates, when we know that he is a man than when we know that
he is white or five feet tall. And also accidents are better known when we
know their essential properties than when we know their accidental ones. A
quality, for instance, is better known when we know what (quality) it is than
when we know how it is or when and when it is. Aristotles text (1028a36b2)
corresponding to Priority in cognition.
Proof 2. Aristotle argues that substance is unqualifiedly prior to acci-
dents on the basis of his contemporaries and predecessors testimony. For
those who enquired into being actually enquired into substance, under
the assumption that substance is either the sole being or at least the pri-
mary being. However, their positions with regard to substance were at vari-
ance. (i) Some posited only one substance, (ii) some others more than one.
(i) Philosophers in the first group split up into natural philosophers, who
believed the principle of things to be one material movable substance, and
non-natural philosophers (like Parmenides and Melissus), who conceived
of the principle of things as one immovable substance. (ii) The second
group includes philosophers who posited a finite number of substances
(like Empedocles, who posited the four elements as substances) as well
as philosophers who introduced an infinite number of substances (like
Anaxagoras, who admitted of an infinite number of parts of the same kind;
and Democritus, who posited infinite indivisible bodies). All these views are
views about substance. Aristotles text (1028b26) corresponding to Proof 2.
Notandum 1. Averroes explains priority in definition. The reason why
accidents are defined through substance and not the other way round is
that accidents are constituted through substances and not the other way
round. So, substance is defined through nothing external to its nature, while
accidents are defined also through substance, which is external to their
nature.
Two Objections to Averroess comment.
Obj. 1. The first part of Averroess comment is dubious. For it seems that
the continuum and the number as well as the figure and the circle are not
defined through substance.
Obj. 2. The second part of the comment is also dubious. For in Met.,
Book VI, Aristotle says that nose, eye, flesh, man and so on are not defined
without movement, which is an accident. Moreover, in Post. Anal., Book II,
he gives examples of the definition of man which include accidents such as
being capable of laughing or being capable of walking.
Reply to Obj. 1. An accident can be considered in two different ways,
according to its essential being or according to its mode of existence. When
taken in the first way, accidents are not defined through substance, but
only through their genus and essential differentia. When considered, by

contrast, according to their mode of existence, accidents must be defined
through their subject. And so there will be a definition of the continuum,
of number and so on which mentions substance. It must be added that an
accident qua accident is always defined through its subject, while when
it is considered absolutely, it is not always defined in this way. Therefore,
common accidents (such as whiteness) are not necessarily defined through
their subjects when taken in the abstract, but are necessarily so defined
only in the concrete. Proper accidents, by contrast, must always be defined
through their subject both in the abstract and in the concrete, in that they
always concern a determinate subject.
Reply to Obj. 2. According to Aristotles doctrine in Post. Anal., Book II,
there are two definitions of a thing, i.e. a formal and a material definition.
The formal definition is given through the cause of the object defined, while
the material one is given through the effect of the thing defined or, at least,
through something posterior to it. Rational animal is an example of formal
definition of man, whereas animal capable of laughing is an example of a
material one. When Averroes says that accidents are defined through sub-
stance and not vice versa, he refers to the formal definition and not to the
material one. The physicist, therefore, defines substance by making refer-
ence to movement only because he does not consider substance absolutely
but respectively, i.e. with a view to the natural operations of a substance,
which cannot be performed without movement.
Notandum 2. Averroes solves a difficulty one might have with the claim
that substance is prior to accidents in cognition. The difficulty is that several
texts from Aristotle suggest that it is accidents that are prior in cognition. In
De an., Book I, for instance, he says that accidents contribute much towards
knowing what a thing is. In De an., Book II, he also says that accidents
are perceived per se, while substance is perceived accidentally. But what
is perceived per se is known before what is perceived accidentally. In De
an., Book III, Aristotle remarks that intellectual knowledge presupposes
a previous acquaintance with phantasmata, which are representations of
accidents. Finally, he distinguishes in Phys., Book I, between what is more
known by nature, i.e. the causes, and what is more known with respect to
us, i.e. the effects. But natural effects are known through their accidents.
Therefore, it seems that accidents are prior to substance in cognition.
Averroes solve this difficulty by saying that the sentence Substance is
prior to accidents in cognition should be understood according to the
priority of perfection and not according to that of generation. Averroes
implies that the order of perfection is in fact distinct from the order of
generation. What is first in the order of generation is last in the order of

perfection, and what is first in the order of perfection is last in that of
generation, for generation proceeds from the imperfect to the perfect. But
our cognition proceeds from potentiality to actuality and, by consequence,
from the imperfect to the perfect. Therefore, what is more known according
to generation is less known according to perfection. And sensible things are
more known to us according to generation and so less known according to
perfection.
Now, Aristotle shows here that substance is prior in cognition to acci-
dents according to the priority of perfection. Accidents, by contrast, are
prior in cognition to substance according to the priority of generation. From
this Averroes infers that substantial dispositions are more known than acci-
dental ones, in that they are more perfect than them. And they are more
perfect because they make us know something more than accidental dispo-
sitions do.
In the same vein, Averroes says in his commentary on Phys., Book I, that
the process of our cognition is twofold, i.e. a priori and a posteriori. The
a priori process is propter quid, i.e. through causes, while the a posteriori
process is quia est, i.e. through effects. Even though accidents precede
substance according to the quia-cognition, substance precedes accidents
according to the propter quid-cognition. In the a posteriori process, we
proceed from the cognition of common accidents (which are the objects
of the senses) to that of proper accidents (which are the proper operations
of substances), and from that we finally move on to the cognition of the
quiddities of substances (which are the principles of all accidents). At the
end of the process, however, the intellect discovers that the accidents on
the basis of which we have come to know the quiddity of substances are not
the causes of substances, but are rather caused by them. Therefore, moving
backwards, the intellect starts from the cognition of substances to arrive at
a perfect understanding of accidents through their cause.
To put it otherwise, accidents are known prior to substance with respect
to us, but substances are known prior to accidents with respect to nature.
Thus, absolutely speaking, substance is prior to accidents in cognition.
Notandum 3. Averroes explains priority in time. He says that accidents
can be compared (i) either to the composite substance (ii) or to the simple
substance that is matter. If (i), substance precedes in time all non-innate
accidents; if (ii), substance precedes in time even the innate accidents. Fire,
for instance, precedes its moving upwards, if it was generated in the down
regions, but does not precede its natural heat or lightness. The matter of fire,
by contrast, precedes all these accidents too as well as the form of fire.
This explanation is not convincing, because it does not explain how sub-
stance is prior in time to all its accidents, as Aristotle maintains. There is,
moreover, a general difficulty with this Aristotelian claim. For it implies that
substance precedes temporally quantity, movement and time itself, given
that it precedes all its accidents. But it seems that substance cannot precede
quantity. For, given that quantity is coeternal with matter, substance should
precede matter as well, which is ruled out by Aristotle in De gen., Book I.
Neither can substance temporally precede movement. For this would imply
that at some point there exists time without movementwhich seems
impossible, since time is a property of movement. Finally, substance can-
not temporally precede time itself. For, if so, there would be time before the
whole, infinite timewhich is absurd.
Albert, therefore, explains priority in time differently. He says that sub-
stance, in so far it is a quiddity taken absolutely, is neither here nor now,
but everywhere and always. And this should not be understood in the sense
in which God is everywhere and always, i.e. by embracing every time and
place, but in the same sense as universals are everywhere and always, i.e. by
not being determined by any specific difference of time or place.
Alberts interpretation does not explain how substance is prior in time to
the accidents that seem to be coeternal with substance itself, i.e. quantity,
movement and time.
Thus, Albert puts forward a second interpretation. He argues that sub-
stances being prior in time to all accidents can be understood in two ways,
in the proper and in the ordinary sense. In the proper sense, time is the
number of movement with respect to the before and the afterand so sub-
stance does not precede temporally all accidents. For, if it did, it would also
precede movement and time, and so there would be time before move-
ment and before time. In the ordinary sense, however, time stands for
any durationand so some substance temporally precedes all accidents,
because God precedes all accidents, be they finite or infinite. For God is
measured by eternity, and no accident or substance other than God is mea-
sured by eternity.
However, since Aristotle seems to take time always in the proper sense as
the number of movement with respect to the before and the after and does
not concede, on the other hand, that the first cause precedes eternal acci-
dents by the measure of eternity, Alexander proposes another explanation.
He says that substance is prior in time to accidents, because it is not incom-
patible with the nature of a substance to exist without accidents, whereas it
is incompatible with an accident to exist without a substance, at least in the
natural order of things. For God, of course, can make accidents exist without
a substance in the Eucharist.
This interpretation too is difficult, because it seems to be against the nature

of substance to precede temporally movement and time itself.
Therefore, it must be said that substance is prior in time to accidents
according to the priority of consequence which Aristotle defines in the
Categories as follows: x is prior to y if from Y exists there follows X exists
and not the other way round. According to this definition, substance is prior
in time to every accidents, where time is taken to include both actual and
imagined time. In this sense, it is always true to say that, if an accident exists,
then a substance exists, and always false to say that if a substance exists, then
an accident exists, even though they always exist together in the actual time.
Thus, before the creation of the world, there was no quantity or movement
or time, and yet there existed the substance of the primary cause, i.e. God.
Aristotle draws the conclusion (1028b67) he was aiming at in Part 1, i.e. that
the metaphysicians task is to study primarily, most of all and, as it were,
solely substance. For the metaphysician studies being qua being. Thus, it
is his task to study what is being in the primary, eminent and sole sense.
But Conclusion 1 has shown that substance is primary being, whereas in
Conclusion 2 it has been proved that it is being more than anything else.
Conclusions 3 and 4, finally, have demonstrated that it is also, as it were, the
sole being.
Part 2
Aristotle shows the evidence of substance by showing its eminence. He draws
four conclusions.
Conclusion 1. It is per se evident that sensible substances exist

That is evident per se which everyone recognises as known to the senses.
But everyone recognises that sensible substances are known to the senses.
Therefore, it is per se evident that sensible substances exist. Everyone in fact
acknowledges the existence of bodies, which are sensible substances. There
are various kinds of body we describe as sensible substances: first, living
bodies, i.e. the animals and the plants; second, the four elements; third,
the things composed out of the elements, like the world and the sphere of
active and passive elements, or out of parts of the elements, like inanimate
mixtures; finally, the superior bodies, such as the heaven and the planets
existing therein. Aristotles text (1028b813) corresponding to Conclusion 1.
Notandum. Averroes explains the difference between the physicists and
the metaphysicians treatments of sensible bodies and their principles. The
physicist considers a sensible body in so far as it is at rest or in movement,
while the metaphysician considers it in so far as it is a substance and so

prescinds from movement and rest. Moreover, the physicist considers the
principles of sensible substances in so far as they are the principles of
movement and rest, whereas the metaphysician studies them as the causes
of substance. Therefore, Aristotle does not intend to conclude, from the
fact that the existence of sensible substances is evident, that metaphysics
studies sensible substances in so far as they are sensible. This would rather
be a physical consideration of sensible substances, for movement follows
upon being sensible and the physicist considers substances in so far as they
are movable.
Averroess comment solves one common difficulty, namely whether ani-
mals and plants include some common sensible accident. With regard to
this point, it should be said that an animal or a plant can be considered in
two ways: in so far as they are beings in an unqualified senseand thus
they do not include any sensible accident, in that they pertain to the con-
sideration of the metaphysician; or in so far as they are natural beingsand
thus they contain something more than what is included in the metaphysi-
cal consideration. Since metaphysics studies animals and plants in so far as
they are substances, what the physical consideration includes in addition to
the metaphysical one cannot be substance, but must rather be some sensi-
ble accident. This seems also to be Aristotles view in Met., Book VI, when
he remarks that sensible substances are like snub and cannot be defined
without movement. For movement is clearly a sensible accident.
There is a difficulty with this view. That is, since animals and plants include
a sensible accident and are not, on the other hand, pure accidents, they
must be composites of substance and accident. However, if they are such
composites, animals and plants are not beings per se but only accidental
beingswhich seems to be false, because, if they were accidental beings,
they could not be defined or be the object of scientific knowledge.
One answer to this difficulty is that a composite of substance and accident
taken in the concrete is not a being per se, while it is a being per se when
taken in the abstract. However, it should not be conceded that an animal
or a plant are composites of substance and accident on the grounds that
they include a sensible accident. For snubness includes the nose, but the
nose does not enter into the composition of snubness. Snubness in fact
does not signify the nose primarily but only secondarily. Likewise, animals,
plants and sensible substances in general include a sensible accident in that
they are natural beings, but the sensible accident does not enter into their
composition.
Conclusion 2. It is not per se evident that non-sensible substances exist.

What is denied by many cannot be per se evident. But many (like for
instance: Parmenides, Melissus, Eraclitus, Diogenes and Speusippus) de-
nied the existence of non-sensible substances. Therefore, their existence
cannot be per se evident. Neither can their non-existence be evident, for
many, including Plato, admitted the existence of non-sensible substances.
In conclusion, whether there only exist sensible substances or whether
there are other substances besides them, or even whether sensible sub-
stances in fact do not exist, and only some other substances different from
them doall these questions are matters of investigation. Such an investi-
gation will be carried out in Book XII. Aristotles text (1028b1315) correspond-
ing to Conclusion 2.
Notandum. Averroes continues his explanation of the differences be-
tween physics and metaphysics. He says that there are two divisions of
being: (i) one into substance and accident, which is the metaphysical divi-
sion; (i) the other into the movable and the immovable, which is the physical
division. To these two divisions there correspond two different questions: to
division (i) there corresponds the question of whether there are only sensi-
ble substances or also some non-sensible substances, which Aristotle deals
with in the Metaphysics; to division (ii) there corresponds the question of
whether there is only one principle of things or many, which Aristotle takes
up in the Physics.
Question (i) lead us to the first form and the ultimate end. Albert explains
why this is so. If sensible substances exist, it is necessary that their forms be
in one sense material and in another sense simple and immaterial. They are
material in that they are in matter, while they are simple and immaterial
in themselves. But the origin of such simplicity and immaterially cannot
but be the light of the divine intellect, which is the first form and the
ultimate end, in that it makes the forms of sensible things intelligible per
se.
However, another explanation is possible. If sensible substances exist,
either they are necessary or contingent. If they are necessary, they must
receive their necessary character from something else, in that they are
composite substances which presuppose simple substances. And since it
not possible to go on ad infinitum in necessary things, we must posit one
non-sensible, simple substance which possesses its necessary character per
se and not from something else. This substance is the first form and the
ultimate end of all things. If, by contrast, sensible substances are contingent,
they must receive their contingency from some necessary principle. But in
necessary things, there exists one first principle, which is the first form and
the ultimate end, as has been shown.
Question (ii) leads to the knowledge of prime matter, of the natural
forms and of the prime mover. For in question (ii) it is asked whether
there is one principle of all things or more than one. The answer is that
there are many. For principles are contrary and nothing is contrary to itself.
Since contraries inhere in a thing successively and one drives out the other,
there must be many natural forms, whose alternation brings about the
generation of natural things. Moreover, since one contrary does not receive
the other, there must also exist a subject underlying the transformation of
one contrary into the other. Finally, any transformation is a movement, and
movement is the actuality of a movable thing in so far as it is movable, as
Aristotle defines it in Phys., Book III. But no movable thing is moved by itself,
but by something else. And since it is not possible to go on ad infinitum
with movers and movable things, we must posit a mover that is unmovable
unqualifiedly, i.e. a prime mover. Those are in fact the proofs of the existence
of natural forms, prime matter and prime mover which Aristotle himself
presents in the Physics.
Conclusion 3. It is not per se evident that sensible substances differ substan-

tially from their accidents.
What is denied by many is not per se evident. But many denied that sensi-
ble substances differ substantially from their accidents. For instance, Par-
menides and Melissus, who maintained that all things are just one thing,
clearly denied any real difference between substance and accidents. More-
over, Platonists and Pythagoreans held that the limits of bodies, i.e. points,
lines and surfaces, are the substances of things. They also added to the
list of substances unity, which is the principle of discrete quantity. But all
the things mentioned are accidents. Platonists and Pythagoreans also com-
pared all the things on the list to one another and to the body they are the
limits of, by saying that points are more substances than lines, lines are more
substances than surfaces, and surfaces are more substances than bodies. For
the point is the principle of the line, the line is the principle of the surface
and so on and so forth. By the same token, they maintained that unity is
more substance than point, because it is its principle, and so that unity is
more substance than anything else they were prepared to call substance.
Aristotles text (1028b1618) corresponding to Conclusion 3.
Notandum. Averroes explains why Aristotle says body and bodily thing,
as his text has it, or, equivalently, body and solid, as another text has it.
There were in fact two opinions concerning the nature of body. According to
the first opinion a body is composed of matter and substantial form, which
is to be identified with the three dimensions. Supporters of this view held
that it is such a composite that should properly be called body. According
to another opinion, a body is not a composite of matter and form, but is
only composed of the three dimensions as of quantitative parts. Supporters
of this view insisted that such a thing should be properly called bodily
thing or solid rather than body. These two opinions agree, however,
in maintaining that points, lines and surfaces are more substance than the
bodies they are the limits of.
Both opinions are false: the first, because dimensions are not substantial
forms, but rather accidents; the second, because a body cannot be com-
posed of points, lines and surfaces as of its parts.
Digression. From the foregoing considerations it follows that inherence, be
it actual or aptitudinal, is not part of the essence of accidents, when they
are considered according to their specific concept. For, if it were, ancients
could not have conceived of points, lines and surfaces, which are accidents,
without conceiving of them as inhering in a subjectwhich they clearly
did not do. And geometers consider points, lines and surfaces without con-
sidering their inherence in a subject, just as they do not ask whether such
things are substances or accidentswhich is the metaphysicians task to
decide. Actual inherence is the union of an accident with a substance, which
results in a concrete accident according to its actual existence. Aptitudi-
nal inherence, by contrast, is the essential dependence of the quiddity of
an accident on that of a substance. The difference between the two is that
the aptitudinal inherence, but not the actual one, is the object of demon-
stration. For demonstration prescinds from actual existence but not from
aptitude.
Alexander has a different opinion. He maintains that, even though actual
inherence is not part of the essence of accidents, aptitudinal inherence must
be. He argues that the modes by which being descends into the ten kinds
of being that there are, are parts of the essence of such kinds of being, just
as the differentiae by which a genus descends into its species are parts of
the essence of such species. Alexander puts forward four arguments for his
conclusion.
Arg. 1. The essence of an accident is in a subject either per se or in virtue
of something else. If it is per se, we have the intended conclusion. If it is in
a subject in virtue of something else, we may ask whether that something
else is in a subject per se or in virtue of something else. If it is per se, we have
the intended conclusion; if not, we shall ask the same question once again,
and so on and so forth ad infinitum.
Arg. 2. Being of such a nature as to exist in a substance (i) either belongs
to the essence of an accident or (ii) is accidental to it. If (i), we have the
intended conclusion. If (ii), since analogy is based on dependence and
aptitude, the analogy between substance and accident will be accidental,
and the nature of accident will be an analogate only accidentallywhich
seems to run against Aristotles view in Met., Book IV.
Arg. 3. If the aptitude is not part of the concept of accidents, then an
accident can be understood without it. But when it is so conceived of, an
accident is conceived of (i) either as something existing in itself or (ii) as
something existing in something else. If (i), then it is conceived of as a
substancewhich is impossible. If (ii), an accident is conceived of together
with an aptitude, while it was supposed to be conceived of without it. The
result is that an accident will be something at the same time having and not
having an aptitudewhich is also impossible.
Arg. 4. Avicenna defines substance as what is of such a nature as not to
be in something else. Thus, since being divides immediately into substance
and accident, the definition of accident must be: what is of such a nature
as to be in something else. Therefore, just as the nature of substance is the
aptitude to exist per se, that of accident is the aptitude to exist in something
else.
Two lines of argument against Alexanders view.
Line 1. The categories are not distinct on account of their modes of existence.
Four arguments:
Arg.1. A mode of existence is proper to something only on account of its
ground. But existing in se is the mode of existence proper to substance,
while existing in something else is the mode of existence proper to accident.
These two modes of existence, therefore, have substance and accident,
respectively, as their proper grounds and so they presuppose the distinction
between substance and accident rather than grounding it.
Arg. 2. Things that are distinct only in virtue of their modes of existence
have the same essence. For if they had different essences, they could not
be distinct only in virtue of their modes of existence. But substance and
accident do not have the same essence. So, they are not distinct only in
virtue of their modes of existence.
Arg. 3. Nothing is a certain kind of thing in actuality only in virtue of an
aptitude. For aptitude only confers an aptitudinal being upon things. But
substance is actually distinct from the other categories. Therefore, it cannot

be distinct in virtue of an aptitude alone.
Arg. 4. Absolutes are not distinct in virtue of a relation. But quantity and
quality are absolutes, while aptitude involves a relation. Therefore, quantity
and quality cannot be distinct in virtue of an aptitude.
Thus, it must be concluded that the categories are primarily distinct not
on account of their different modes of existence, but rather on account of
their different natures. They are distinct on account of their modes of exis-
tence only secondarily, i.e. as a consequence of their primary distinction.
For an accident is not distinct from a substance because it has a different
mode of existence; quite the contrary, it has a certain mode of existence
because it is distinct from a substance, i.e. because it has a different nature.
Thus, it is also false that being descends into the categories through modes
of existence. For being divides into the different kinds of being immediately.
Line 2. Aptitudinal inherence is not part of the essence of accidents. Four

arguments.
Arg. 1. Actuality and potentiality belong to the same genus, just as for
instance the potential and the actual man belong to the same genus. Thus,
actual and aptitudinal inherence belong to the same genus. But actual
inherence is not part of the essence of an accident. Therefore, neither can
aptitudinal inherence be part of its essence.
Arg. 2. No property belongs to the essence of that of which it is the
property. But inherence is a property of an accident, for it is demonstrated
of it. Therefore, inherence, whether actual or aptitudinal, is not part of the
essence of an accident.
Arg. 3. A quantity and its inherence have different subjects. For the
subject of a quantity is a substance, while the subject of the inherence of a
quantity is the quantity itself. Therefore, a quantity and its inherence must
be different.
Arg. 4. Inherence is the same for all the accidental categories. Thus, if
it were part of the essence of accidents, it would be possible to abstract a
concept common to all the accidental categories and essentially predicated
of each of them. But then, all the accidental categories would fall under one
single genuswhich is impossible, because the categories are supposed to
be the most general genera.
Solution. It must be said, therefore, that inherence belongs to the general
concept accidentbecause accident cannot be conceived of without con-
ceiving of inherence as wellbut does not belong to the special concepts
of the different accidents such as line, surface, whiteness etc. For we can con-
ceive of each of them without also conceiving of their inherence. Accord-
ingly, the sentences Quantity is an accident and Quality is an accident
are not per se in the first sense of per se, but only in the second sense. For
inherence, which is contained in the notion of accident, does not belong to
the essence of the different kinds of accident, but is only a per se property
of them.
Replies to Alexanders arguments.
Reply to Arg. 1. The essence of an accident is in a subject both per se and in
virtue of something else. It is in a subject per se according to the second
sense of per se, in that inherence belongs to an accident not in virtue
of a subject other than the accident itself. The essence of an accident, by
contrast, is in a subject in virtue of something else, because it is in a subject
in virtue of inherence, which is external to the essence of an accident. And so
inherence itself is in a subject per se, i.e. not in a substance (for inherence
does not inhere) but in an accident, and is not in such a subject in virtue
of something else. Inherence does not inhere, because it is not an accident
formally, but only denominatively, i.e. on account of the accident it is in, just
as privation or indivision are not beings formally, but only denominatively,
i.e. on account of their subject.
Reply to Arg. 2. Even if inherence is not part of the essence of an accident
but is only something accidental that supervenes on it, from this fact it does
not follow that the relation of analogy between accidents and substance is
accidental. For accidents still depend on substance according to an essential
order. For instance: being capable of laughing is not part of the essence of
man; nevertheless, man and capable of laughing have an essential order
with respect to each other, for the capacity to laugh is not simply accidental
to man, but rather flows from his essence. Likewise, inherence as well as
the analogical relation which accidents bear to substance are not simply
accidental to an accident, but rather flow from its essence.
Reply to Arg. 3. It may be conceded that the concept of an accident can be
conceived of without the aptitude. In this case, it is conceived of neither as a
being in se nor as a being existing in something else, in spite of the fact that
every being is the one thing or the other. The geometer, for instance, can
conceive of a quantity absolutely, without thinking of it either as a being in
se or as a being existing in something else, i.e. neither as a substance nor as
an accident.
Reply to Arg. 4. Avicennas definition should certainly be taken in the
sense that a substance is that to which it naturally belongs not to exist in
something else, and an accident is that to which it naturally belongs to exist

in something else. But this definition only implies that inhering naturally
pertains to accidents and not that it is part of their essence. Thus, Avicennas
definition is quite compatible with what Aristotle means to say: his point in
fact is not that inherence or being in something else is part of the essence of
an accident, but rather that an accident has no essence or being if it is not
causally received in a substance, so that accidents are ordered with respect
to and essentially depend on substance.
Conclusion 4. It is not per se evident that sensible substances are separate from
non-sensible ones.
That this is not evident is clear from the fact that some concede while some
deny that sensible substances are separate from non-sensible ones. There
are in fact four opinions concerning this point.
Opinion 1. Some thought that, besides sensible substances, there exist no
other separate substance. Thus, mathematical forms, even if they are sub-
stances, are not separate from sensible substances. Parmenides and Melis-
sus, for instance, posited only one order of things, i.e. sensible substances,
and claimed that mathematical forms (i.e. points, lines, surfaces and so on)
are not really distinct from sensible substances. Pythagoreans, by contrast,
posited two orders of things: in the first order they placed principles, such as
mathematical forms; in the second they placed the things resulting from the
principles, such as mixtures and elements. But they did not separate these
two orders, and believed principles to be conjoined to the things resulting
from them. Aristotles text (1028b1819) corresponding to Opinion 1.
Opinion 2. Platonists thought that sensible substances are separate from
non-sensible ones. Thus, they posited different kinds of eternal substances,
which they considered to be more substances than corruptible substances.
On the whole, therefore, they admitted of three orders of substances: the
ideal Forms, such as the Form of man; mathematical forms; sensible sub-
stances. They were led to this conception by the assumption that what is
separable in thought must also be separate in reality. So, since we can under-
stand what a man is without thinking of particular men, there must exist a
man separate from particular men. But this is wrong, because our intellect
can think separately of things that do not exist separately in reality. Aristo-
tles text (1028b1921) corresponding to Opinion 2.
Opinion 3. Speusippus posited four orders of things: the ideal Forms; the
numbers; the magnitudes; the souls, in which he also included all sensible
substances. He said that all orders have the one as their generating principle,
even if each order is generated by a different sort of one. All the different
orders are separate. The substances belonging to the first three orders are
incorruptible, while those belonging to the fourth are corruptible. Aristotles
text (1028b2124) corresponding to Opinion 3.
Opinion 4. Some of Platos and Speusippus successors modified their
masters accounts and arranged the various orders of things differently.
They posited four orders: the first includes Forms and numbers, which they
simply identified with one another; in the second they placed magnitude,
in the third incorruptible sensible substances such as the celestial bodies,
while they assigned the fourth order to corruptible sensible substances.
They also established a relation of causal dependence among the different
orders so that the first derives from the second, the third from the second
and the fourth from the third. Aristotles text (1028b2427) corresponding to
Opinion 4.
It must be noted that one consequence of the foregoing opinions is that
the subject in which an accident inheres is not part of the concept of the
accident, just as inherence is not part of it. There are in fact two forms of
abstractionone by which we abstract the universal from the singulars and
the other by which we know a form without its matter or its subject. The
second form of abstraction enables us to understand an accident without
understanding its subject. If it is true in fact that an accident qua accident,
i.e. qua existing in something, cannot be understood without its subject, it
is also true that the very thing that is an accident can be understood with-
out its subject. For, even though an accident cannot exist without a subject,
nevertheless it can be understood without its subject, just as a genus, for
instance, cannot exist without its species but can still be understood with-
out them. Neither does the analogy of accident to substance require that
the accident be understood together with its subject, just as the analogy of
creature to God does not require the cognition of God together with that of
the creature.
Aristotle raises and solves a difficulty. Since there are so many different
opinions concerning the essence of substance and its different kinds, it
must be ascertained which of them is right and which is wrong. Such an
enquiry will be carried out in Met., Book XII, by addressing the following four
difficulties: who, among the philosophers mentioned, was right and who
was wrong; which of the entities mentioned are substances and which are
not substances but accidents; whether there are other substances besides
the sensible ones, and what is the nature of both sensible and non-sensible
substances; whether some non-sensible substance is separate from sensible
ones, and, if so, why and how it is separate. The present book is about
what substance is in itself, while the following is concerned with what
sensible substance, whose existence is evident, is. Aristotles text (1028b27
32) corresponding to the difficulty.
Digression. It may be asked, with regard to Aristotles division of being into
substance and accident, whether there exists an intermediate concept that
is predicated univocally of all accidents.
Arguments against the existence of an intermediate concept.
Arg. 1. Aristotle says in this book and in Book V of the Metaphysics that
being is spoken of in so many ways as there are categories, thereby not
allowing for any intermediate genus encompassing all the accidental cate-
gories. Moreover, we may ask whether being is said of the ten categories
immediately or mediately. If immediately, we have the intended conclu-
sion. If mediately, then being will be said mediately not only of the high-
est genera, but also of all the things falling under them. So, being will be
spoken of in so many ways as there are things falling under one genus or
anotherwhich is absurd.
Arg. 2. When something is divided into two things univocally, if one thing
is a genus, so is the other as well. Therefore, if being descends into substance
and accident univocally, then, given that substance is one of the highest
genera, accident too will be a highest genus. And so, there will be only two
highest genera.
The argument can be confirmed in the following way. When two things
divide something common immediately, the concepts of the two dividing
things must be one to the same degree. But the concept of accident is not as
one as that of substance. For the concept of accident is not the concept of a
genus, nor of a species or of a differentia, and so cannot have the same unity
as the concept of substance, which is the concept of a genus. Therefore,
substance and accident do not divide being immediately.
Argument in favour of the existence of an intermediate concept.
Arg. 1. When something divides per se into more things, if one such thing is
univocal, the others must be so as well. But being divides immediately and
per se into substance and accident and the concept of substance is univocal.
Therefore, the concept of accident too must be univocal.
Arg. 2. Each certain concept is different from each uncertain concept. But
someone may be certain that a thing is an accident and, at the same time,
be uncertain as to which accident it is. Therefore, the concept of accident is
different from that of all the nine categories of accidents.
Arg. 3. Every property that is one has also a subject that is one. But
inherence is a property common to all the nine categories of accidents.
Therefore, it must also have a common subject, i.e. accident.
Arg. 4. Accidents agree with each other more than they agree with sub-
stance. But they do not agree in virtue of the concept of being. So they must
do so in virtue of something less common than being, i.e. the concept of
accident.
Solution. It must be said that accident refers to one intention which
is common to and univocally predicated of all the accidental categories.
From this, however, it does not follow that being does not descend into
the ten categories immediately. For there are three different divisions of
being, i.e. essential, accidental and mixed division. The essential division is
that by which being divides into its subjective parts, i.e. substance, quality,
quantity, and so on. The accidental division is that by which being divides
into its modal parts, i.e. being per se and accidental being, being in se and
being in something else and so on. The mixed division splits being into both
subjective and modal parts, as when we divide being into substance, which
is a subjective part, and accident, which is a modal part.
Reply to Arg. 1. Being descends immediately into the ten categories, even
though it also descends immediately into substance and accident. For the
division of being is different in kind in the one case and in the other.
What is more, there is no difficulty in accident being a concept interme-
diate between being and the ten categories. For being intermediate can
be understood in two senses: either intermediate with respect to com-
monness or intermediate with respect to descent. The former sense clearly
applies to accident, in that it is more common than any of the ten cate-
gories, while the latter sense does not apply to it, in that accident is not a
genus.
Reply to Arg. 2. The antecedent cannot be conceded, because it does not
follow that, if one of the dividing things is a genus, the other must be a
genus as well. Actually, it is enough that, if the one is univocal, the other be
univocal too. And, even though being descends immediately into substance
and accident, it does not do so equally, but first it descends into substance
and then into accident, according to the order of priority between substance
and accident.
As a further confirmation of this point, it should be said that not all the
things that divide something common have the same degree of unity. For
instance: rational and irrational divide being, but rational has more unity
than irrational, for rational does not divide into many species but contains
only one species, while irrational divides into some further constitutive
differentiae. Likewise, substance has more unity than accident, because

substance does not further divide, while accident splits into nine categories.
Chapter 2
Aristotle makes known the multiplicity of substance, after he has shown
its eminent position and certainty. The chapter falls into three parts: (1) in
the first, Aristotle makes his main point; (2) in the second, he solves some
difficulties concerning the distinctions proposed; (3) in the third, he proves
his main point through a series of conclusions.
Part 1
The multiplicity of substance: two distinctions.
Distinction 1. Substance is spoken of in at least four ways, if not in more: (i)
the essence or quiddity signified by a definition; (ii) that to which definition
properly pertains, i.e. the species, which Plato called universal, in that
it contains universally all the individuals of the same nature; (iii) that to
which division properly pertains, i.e. the genus, which Plato took to be a
constituent of substances; (iii) the subject of which all the other things are
predicated, but it itself is not predicated of anything, i.e. the individual in the
category of substance. Since in fact an individual occupies the lowest level
in the category of substance, it is not predicated of anything, while all the
other things, be they substances or accidents, are predicated of it. Aristotles
text (1028b3337) corresponding to Distinction 1.
From this distinction Aristotle infers that the primary task of metaphysics
is to investigate primary substance. For metaphysics must study, primarily,
what is substance to the highest degree. But primary substance is substance
to the highest degree, because it underlies all the other things. Whatever in
fact is underlain by genus and species is also underlain by the individual sub-
stance, while the other way round is not true. For primary substance is the
substance that subsists per se, and all the other things are in primary sub-
stance. So, should primary substances be destroyed, no other thing would
remain. Aristotles text (1028a371029a2) corresponding to the inference.
Notandum. Averroes comments on Aristotles division of substance. He
says that, even if substance may be spoken of in more than four ways,
the four indicated by Aristotle are both the most important and the ones
corresponding to the way the ancients talked about substance. Sometimes,
ancient philosophers understood the first three senses of substance more
broadly, so as to apply the notions of quiddity, genus and species to all
the accidental categories as well. More strictly, however, they reserved

these notions for the category of substance. Now, among ancients, some
took the proximate genus to be more substance than the remote one,
whereas some others defended the opposite view. To the first three senses
of substance Aristotle adds a fourth sense, corresponding to his definition,
in the Categories, of an ultimate subject of predication.
It may be thought that the division of substance presented here in Met.,
Book VII, is superfluous, because Aristotle in the Categories divides sub-
stance only into primary and secondary substance. Actually, however, the
two divisions come almost to the same thing: for genus and species are sec-
ondary substances, and quiddity is the formal principle of both primary and
secondary substances.
Distinction 2. Primary substance, which is the subject of all other things,
is spoken of in three ways: as matter, as form and as the composite of
matter and form. So, both the composite and its parts, i.e. matter and
form, are in some sense primary substances. The distinction can be eluci-
dated by an analogy with the case of artefacts. The bronze is the matter of
the statue, the shape is its form, and the statue composed of bronze and
shape is the composite. Likewise, to take the case of a natural substance,
Socrates is the composite, his soul is his form, while matter is what under-
lies the change from one form to another. The analogy between artefacts
and natural substances, however, is not perfect. For the matter of arte-
facts is a being in actuality, while that of natural substances is a being in
potentiality. Moreover, the form of artefacts is an accident in the abstract
(e.g. the shape), while the form of natural substances is a substance in the
abstract (e.g. the soul). Aristotles text (1029a25) corresponding to Distinc-
tion 2.
From this distinction Aristotle infers that form is prior to the composite.
For matter is prior to the composite and form is prior to matter. Matter
is prior to the composite because what is potentially some thing is prior
to it, and matter is potentially the composite. Form, by contrast, is prior
to matter because potentiality presupposes actuality: nothing is brought
into actuality except in virtue of something which is actual, and form is
actual. So, form is prior to matter. Aristotles text (1029a57) corresponding
to Aristotles inference.
Notandum 1. Averroes explains that Aristotles second division is not the
division of something univocal. For substance is not said of matter, form
and the composite in the same way. Matter in fact is substance because
it underlies form; form is substance because it brings matter into (actual)
existence; finally, the composite is said to be substance because it is com-

posed of matter and form, which are substances.
Alternatively, one could also think that the composite is substance be-
cause it subsists per se, form is substance because is that in virtue of which
the composite subsists per se, and matter is substance because it is the
subject of form.
Neither is Aristotles division the division of something equivocal. For in
purely equivocals none of the things signified by the equivocal term is the
cause of any of the others, while form is the cause of both matter and the
composite with regard to their being and knowability. Aristotles division
must concern, therefore, something analogically predicated, i.e. something
that is said of the different analogates according to priority and posteriority.
It must be noted, however, that to be said of some things according to
priority and posteriority can be understood in two different senses: with
reference to the nature of the thing that is said or with reference to the
imposition of the name of the thing. For instance: with reference to the
nature of the thing, science is said primarily of the divine science and
secondarily of ours. From the point of view of the imposition of the name, by
contrast, the reverse is true. Since our knowledge starts with things we are
more familiar with, i.e. things known through the senses, we first impose the
name science on our science and then on the divine science, which we are
less familiar with. Thus, with reference to the nature of the thing signified,
substance is primarily said of form, which is the cause of the being and
knowability of the other analogates. With reference to the imposition of the
name, by contrast, substance is primarily said of the composite. For the
composite turns out to be primary according to a confused and superficial
knowledge, which does not penetrate into the principles of things. The
composite in fact is what is first known to us through the senses.
Notandum 2. According to Averroes, Aristotle wants to prove not only
that form is prior to the composite, but also that it is more substance
than the composite. Form, in fact, is more substance than matter because
it confers upon matter its substantial being. But it also confers upon the
composite its substantial being. Therefore, it must also be more substance
than the composite.
Four objections to Aristotles doctrine.
Obj. 1. Matter is not substance. For what is x in potentiality is not x. But
matter is substance in potentiality. Therefore, it is not substance.
Moreover, if matter is substance, (i) either it falls within the category
of substance (ii) or it does not. (i) cannot be the case, because everything
belonging to the category of substance is either a genus, or a species, or

a differentia or an individualand matter is none of these things. But
(ii) cannot be the case, either. For, otherwise, there would be a substance
outside the categorial scheme and so being would not descend immediately
into the ten categories.
Obj. 2. Form is not substance. For it is proper to substance not to be in a
subject. But form is in matter as in its subject.
Obj. 3. Matter is more substance than form. For the subject of change
precedes the terminus of change. But matter is the subject of change and
form the terminus. Therefore, matter is substance prior to form. But from
this it follows that matter must also be more substance than form, for
substance comes from substare (i.e. to underlie, to be a subject) and so
what is a subject to a higher degree is also a substance to a higher degree.
Obj. 4. The composite is more substance than form. For the composite
is properly, primarily and most of all substance, because it is a primary
substance, i.e. an individual in the category of substance. But form is not
an individual in the category of substance.
Moreover, the composite is more substance because it contains all the
perfections of substantial form and some more in addition, i.e. the perfec-
tions of matter. And what is more perfect is also more of a being.
Replies to the objections.
Reply to Obj. 1. We must distinguish between two kinds of potentiality, the
potentiality for being and the potentiality for form (or, to put it otherwise,
between objective and subjective potentiality). Things that are potentially
according to the first kind of potentiality are neither substances nor beings,
while things that are potentially according to the second kind of potentiality
are both substances and beings. For the potentiality for being excludes the
existence of the thing that is in potentiality, while the potentiality for form
does not. So, matter is substance when taken according to the potentiality
for form. So, the argument What is potentially a man is not a man; therefore,
what is potentially a substance is not a substance can be conceded only if
both the antecedent and the consequent make reference to the potentiality
for being. The argument cannot be conceded, by contrast, if the antecedent
refers to the potentiality for being and the consequent to the potentiality
for form. For in this case all that the consequent means is that matter is not
the form it is in potentiality for, from which it does not follow that matter is
not a being and a substance.
As a further confirmation of this line of argument, it must be said that sub-
stance is twofold, i.e. categorial and extra-categorial. Categorial substance
implies both potentiality and actuality and so is said per se only of its genera,
species and individuals, while it is not said per se of its differentiae (which
are not constituted per se by potentiality and actuality), of God (who is pure
actuality) and of prime matter (which is pure potentiality). On the contrary,
it is said per se of form, for form acts and is acted upon and so implies
both actuality and potentiality. Extra-categorial substance is analogically
predicated of all substances and so is predicated in the direct case also of
God and prime matter, in that the notion of extra-categorial substance is
broader than that of categorial substance.
To those who argue: if there were an extra-categorial substance, being
would not descend immediately into the ten categories but into substance
taken analogically, it must be responded that the transcendental being
that has principles and causes descends into the ten categories. The tran-
scendental being, by contrast, that has no principles and causes does not
descend into the ten categories, but into substance taken analogically and
accident taken analogically (i.e. accident as including both absolute and
relational accidents).
Reply to Obj. 2. There are two kinds of subject: the subject in actuality,
which is the composite of matter and substantial form, and the subject in
potentiality, which is prime matter. When Aristotle says that it is proper
to substance not to be in a subject, he refers to the subject in actuality
in order to exclude accidents from substantiality. Form does not inhere
in a subject in actuality, and so there is nothing preventing it from being
a substance. If someone said that secondary substances are in primary
substances and so should not be said to be substances, we should respond
that secondary substances are in primary substances not by inherence, but
rather by communicability and predication.
Reply to Obj. 3. Although matter is prior to this or that form, it is not prior
to form in general, just as some privation may be prior to the possession
of the corresponding property, but is not prior to possession in general.
For matter is defined through form, just as privation is defined through
possession.
Moreover, matter and form can be considered in two ways, according to
their being and according to their mode of existence. With regard to their
being, form is more substance than matter, in that it has more being and
perfection. With regard to their mode of existence, matter may be said to
be more substance than form, in that underlying and not being in a subject,
which are the modes of existence of substance, belongs more properly to
matter.
Reply to Obj. 4. To be prior with respect to nature is not the same thing
as to be prior with respect to the imposition of the name. With respect to
nature matter and form are prior to the composite, while with respect to
the imposition of the name the composite precedes matter and form and
form precedes matter. For the imposition of a name follows upon our way
of knowing things. And we know the composite before its matter and form,
and its form before its matter.
To the view that the composite is more substance than form, it should
also be objected that form can be compared to the composite in two ways:
it can be considered to be actual with respect to the composite, and in
this sense it is more substance than the composite. For the composite
receives its actual being, as well as its name and definition, from form. Form
itself, however, can also be considered to be potential with respect to the
composite, in that it is a part of the composite and is ordered towards the
composite as towards its end. In this sense, the composite is more substance
than form.
The principle expounded by Aristotle in Post. An., Book I, i.e. that in
virtue of which x is F, is more F than x, could be used to defend the view that
form is unqualifiedly more substance than the composite. For form is that
in virtue of which the composite possesses its substantial being. However, it
must be said that such a principle applies only in the case of efficient causes
and not also in that of formal, material and final causes. We do not say for
instance: You are white in virtue of whiteness, so whiteness is more white,
or You are corruptible in virtue of matter, so matter is more corruptible,
or even You walk with a view to health, so health is walking to a higher
degree. On the contrary, we say correctly Man generates in virtue of the
sun, so the sun generates to a higher degree.
Part 2
Aristotle raises and solves two difficulties.
Difficulty 1. The difficulty concerns Aristotles Distinction 1. It does not seem
that the definition of the fourth sense of substance (the subject is that of
which all the other things are predicated, but it itself is not predicated of
anything) is a correct definition after all. For, if it were, it would follow that
we would need no other characterisation of primary substancewhich is
contrary to Aristotles statement that primary substance is the object of the
present metaphysical enquiry.
Aristotles solution of Difficulty 1. The definition of primary substance pro-
vided is just a sketchy, prima facie and universal definition. In other words,
such a definition, being universal and logical, does not touch upon the
principles of the thing defined, but only confines itself to expressing some
general conditions by which primary substance can be made known not
distinctly and perfectly, but rather confusedly and imperfectly. In fact, a
more proper analysis of primary substance will be carried out in Met.,
Book VIII, when the focus will be on the principles of sensible substances,
i.e. matter and form, and on how they make up a composite substance.
Aristotles text (1029a79) corresponding to Difficulty 1 and its solution.
Difficulty 2. The difficulty concerns Aristotles Distinction 2. The division of
primary substance into matter, form and the composite does not seem to
be correct, either. For matter is the whole substance of sensible things.
The difficulty reflects the view of some ancient philosophers concerning
the notion of substance and can be summarised in the following way. Matter
seems to be the whole substance of sensible things, because, once all the
accidents are stripped away, the only thing that remains is matter. And
what remains once accidents are stripped away must be the substance of
sensible things. We reach matter by stripping away from sensible things the
following accidents: the affections of bodies, such as hotness and coldness;
actions, such as generation and corruption; the potentialities for acting or
being acted upon. All these things are not substances, but rather qualities of
some kind or other. Finally, we can strip off dimensions as well, which are
not substances, but quantities. Aristotles text (1029a1019) corresponding to
Difficulty 2.
And if someone asked for a definition of the matter that remains once all
the accidents are removed, Aristotle provides the following: matter is what
in itself is not a what, a quality, a quantity or any of the other categories
into which being is divided. For all the categories, both substance and acci-
dental categories, are predicated of matter not formally but denominatively.
Therefore, matter must be other than each of the categories. Denomina-
tive predication in fact expresses what is accidental to a certain thingand
everything is other than what is accidental to itself.
That the different categories are predicated of matter only denomina-
tively is clear, both in the case of accidents and in that of substance. For
matter is not hotness or coldness, action or passion, but is rather cold or
hot, active or passive. Nor is it a line or a surface, but rather possesses lines
and surfaces. Finally, matter is not a soul or a man, but is rather ensouled or
endowed with a human form. And just as the positive predicates belonging
to the different categories do not belong to the essence of matter, neither
do the privations and negations of those predicates. For matter is not a cer-
tain privation, but is rather deprived of a certain property. For if a certain
privation belonged to the essence of matter, matter could not receive the
form which the privation is the privation of. Aristotles text (1029a2027)
corresponding to the definition of matter.
Notandum 1. Averroes explains the pattern of reasoning behind the posi-
tion of the ancients. It is necessary that an individual substance be sub-
stance in virtue of one of its constituents. Now, an individual substance is
composed of matter and accidents. But it is not substance in virtue of its
accidents. Therefore, it must be substance in virtue of matter.
As Averroes himself implies, this argument is based on two assumptions,
which are both false. The first assumption is that an individual substance is
composed only of matter and accidents. This assumption is false, because
besides matter we must also posit the substantial form, which confers
actuality upon matter. Thus, it is also false that, once accidents are stripped
away, matter is the only thing that remains. For what remains is matter plus
form. The second assumption is that matter is a body. For the argument starts
from the presupposition that an individual substance is actual in virtue of
matter. But if matter were pure potentialityand not a bodyit could
not be that in virtue of which an individual substance is actual. Matter,
therefore, must be actual. But this is wrong. For it is built into the nature
of matter to be in potentiality for something else. If things are so, however,
matter must be different from the thing it has a potentiality for, as Averroes
himself shows in his commentary on De an., Book III: since matter receives
actuality it must be other than actuality. Averroes also rightly observes that
the mistakes contained in the argument stem from the ancients ignorance
of substantial forms. They believed in fact that all forms are accidents. And
so, since matter seems to be all that remains once accidents are removed,
they concluded that matter is the whole substance of an individual sensible
object.
In the same vein, Albert lists four reasons why the ancients took the
position illustrated in Difficulty 2: (i) matter is what remains when the
intellect strips away all the properties from a substance; (ii) matter makes
all such properties hold together by being an ultimate subject; (iii) matter
is different in essence from all the things inhering in it; (iv) matter is that to
which neither the positive nor the negative properties belong.
Albert also explains away these four reasons. (i) The fact that matter is
what remains only according to the intellect and not in reality as well shows
that it has only a diminished being, which is in need of something else to
be completed. And that something else cannot be but form, for accidents
too have a diminished being. (ii) Matter does not make all the properties
hold together in virtue of itself, but in virtue of form. (iii) Even if matter
is different in being from all other things, it is not separate from form in
being, but only conceptually. (iv) Also the fourth reason shows that matter
is an indeterminate being, which is in need of something else to acquire
determinateness. But accidents are determinate only in virtue of form. So
matter too needs form to acquire determinateness.
Notandum 2. Averroes recalls that the diversity in nature between matter
and all other things has been proved by Aristotle in Phys., Book I. Aristo-
tle shows in fact that the subject of a change must be different from both
termini of the change. But matter is the subject of all kinds of changes,
both accidental and substantial ones. Therefore, matter must be differ-
ent from all forms which are acquired in a change, be they accidental
or substantial. Here in the Metaphysics, by contrast, Aristotle does not
prove the difference in nature between matter and all the other things
by means an argument based on change, but rather by means of an argu-
ment based on predication. The argument relies on the fact that the pred-
icates belonging to the different categories are predicated of matter not
formally, but only denominatively. The argument based on change is typ-
ically physical, while that based on predication is properly logical, and
so can be used by metaphysics on account of the affinity between logic
and metaphysics which Averroes illustrates in his commentary on Met.,
Book IV.
When commenting, however, on the present passage in Book VII, Aver-
roes offers an alternative metaphysical argument for the same conclusion.
What is potentially some thing cannot be in itself that thing. If a man were
only potentially an animal, he would not be an animal in himself, just as he
is not white in himself, because he is only potentially white. But matter is
potentially all the categories. Therefore, it cannot be in itself any of them.
For the being of any of the categories is a formal being. But matter has no
formal being of itself; otherwise, it could neither receive some other formal
being nor remain when all the other forms are corrupted. Therefore, matter
in itself is only a potential being.
Notandum 3. Averroes further explains the nature of matter. From his
words, we can evince two points. The first is that every form is in the com-
posite only in virtue of matter. Since in fact matter is the ultimate subject
of all the forms belonging to the different categories, then such forms, of
necessity, are in matter per se and primarily and in the composite only as
a consequence of their being in matter. The ancients took a different view
and maintained that substantial form is subjectively in matter but not in
the composite, while accidents are subjectively in the composite but not in
matter.
The second point is that privation is not part of the essence of matter
which again goes against the ancients opinion, which identified privation
with matter. But if matter were privation, it could not receive all the forms:
it could not receive in particular the form that is opposite to the privation
in which its nature would consist.
If we put together, therefore, Aristotles and Averroess arguments, we
seem to have four ways of proving that matter is essentially distinct from
both form and privation.
Proof 1 (from the point of view of change). In every change, the subject of
the change must be different from both termini of the change. Now, matter
is the subject of every change, privation is the terminus from which change
starts, and form the terminus in which change ends. Matter, therefore, must
be different from both form and privation.
Proof 2 (from the point of view of predication). In the case of denominative
predication, the subject is essentially distinct from the predicate. But pri-
vation and form are predicated of matter only denominatively. Therefore,
matter is essentially different from both privation and form.
Proof 3 (from the point of view of reception). What receives many things
must be deprived of all such things. Matter receives both form and privation,
and so it must deprived of both.
Proof 4. (from the point of view of opposition). If one of two opposites
pertains essentially to x, then the other opposite will be incompatible with
the nature of x. But potentiality pertains essentially to matter, and actuality
and potentiality are opposites. Therefore, it will be incompatible with the
nature of matter to be actuality and form. But the privation of form will also
be incompatible with the nature of matter. Nothing in fact has a tendency
towards its own corruption. So, privation has no tendency towards form,
for form entails the corruption of privation. Matter, by contrast, has a
tendency towards form as towards its own corruption. Therefore, matter
and privation cannot be identical.
Objections to Aristotles and Averroess arguments.
Obj. 1. substance is not said of matter prior to all the accidental predicates.
For, otherwise, substantial form would inhere in matter before all accidental
propertieswhich seems to be false, because substantial form seems to
presuppose that matter is already determined by some quantitative and
qualitative dispositions.
Obj. 2. Matter is essentially privation. For matter is either essentially being
or essentially non-being. If it is essentially being, it must be a what or a quan-
tity or a quality etc.which is denied by Aristotle in the text just examined.
If, by contrast, matter is essentially non-being, it is pure privation. Moreover,

when a form supervenes, not only privation is corrupted but also potential-
ity. But potentiality belongs to the essence of matter. Therefore, privation
too belongs to the essence of matter.
Reply to Obj.1. It must be said that in one way accidents precede substan-
tial form, while in another it is substantial form that precedes accidents:
accidents in the making precede substantial form, while complete accidents
are rather posterior to substantial form. In other words: accidents have two
kinds of being, i.e. determinate and indeterminate being. They have inde-
terminate being from matter or from an agent, while they acquire determi-
nate being in virtue of form. So, without form, matter would not have any
quiddity or quantity or quality except for indeterminate ones. Once form
supervenes, by contrast, matter also has determinate properties.
Reply to Obj. 2. Matter is essentially being, which, however, does not imply
that it is a what or a quantity or a quality. For it is being in potentiality and
not in actuality. With regard to the claim that matter would be essentially
privation, just as it is essentially potentiality, it must be said that matter is
neither a relational potentiality, which is corrupted when form supervenes,
nor an absolute potentiality, which is a quality, but rather a potentiality
which divides being and is opposed to actuality.
Aristotle solves Difficulty 2. Against the ancients opinion Aristotle argues
that matter is not substance to the highest degree and so is not the whole
substance of sensible things. For being separable and being a this something
seems to belong chiefly to substance: God, for instance, who is substance
to the highest degree, is also separable and this something, in that He exists
per se and displays no composition. Matter, by contrast, is neither separable
nor a this something. Therefore, it cannot be substance to the highest
degree. Matter, in fact, being pure potentiality, is necessarily joined to an
actuality, be it substantial or accidental, and hence cannot be separable
or this something. Thus, the difficulty raised by the ancients is solved:
once all accidents are removed, matter is not the only thing that remains.
For form and the composite remain as well. Aristotles text (1029a2728)
corresponding to the solution.
Aristotle further concludes that both form and the composite are more
substance than matter: form because it is separable, the composite because
it is a this something. And if someone objected that, just as matter is insepa-
rable from form, so form is inseparable from matter, we should answer that
matter qua matter is inseparable, while form qua form is separable. There-
fore, separate forms, such as God and the intelligences, are most properly
called forms. Enmattered forms are separable per se, but inseparable acci-
dentally. Aristotles text (1029a2930) corresponding to the further conclusion.
Notandum 1. Averroes explains Aristotles notion of separability. When
two substances are such that one can be known by the intellect without the
other and not the other way round, the one that can be known without the
other is more substance than the other. But both form and the composite
can be known without matter while the other way round is not the case.
Therefore, they both must be more substance than matter. Matter in fact is
known through change, but change makes known form and the composite
before matter is known.
Notandum 2. Averroes further remarks that both the argument showing
that form is substance and those arguing for the opposed view are dialectical
arguments based on probable premisses. In Book VIII, however, Aristotle
will prove that form is substance demonstratively, i.e. through arguments
based on per se and necessary premisses.
Against what has been said about matter, it is argued that matter is not
pure potentiality, but also contains some actuality.
Arg. 1. Prime matter is not simpler than form. But form is not free from
potentiality, for it is in potentiality with respect to the being of the whole
composite. Analogously, matter is not free from actuality.
Arg.2. The contingent stands to potentiality as the necessary stands to
actuality. So, just as everything that is contingent has some potentiality,
everything that is necessary has some actuality. But prime matter is nec-
essary, incorruptible and eternal. So it must have some actuality.
This line of argument seems to be confirmed by Averroes in his com-
mentary on De an., III, where he says that the possible intellect bears to the
intelligible forms the same relation as prime matter does to natural forms.
But the possible intellect, in spite of its receiving intelligible forms, is also
something in itself. Therefore, prime matter too, in spite of its receiving nat-
ural forms, must also be something in itself.
Solution. Although prime matter is pure potentiality with respect to
formfor it is not a form, nor does it possess in itself any formit is
nevertheless in actuality in some sense.
First, it is actual according to the actuality of potentiality and existence,
because it is present and existent as well as spatially and temporally deter-
mined. Second, it is actual according to the actuality resulting from con-
taining and being contained. For matter contains some parts and so is a
certain kind of whole. But every whole has a formal and actual aspect. On the
other hand, matter is contained by the form it has a potentiality for, and it
could not lose its potentiality when form supervenes, if it did not have some
actuality. Third, matter is actual according to the actuality of distinction.

For matter is a principle of distinction, in that sensible things are not only
distinct from non-sensible ones in virtue of matter, but it is also in virtue of
matter that one composite is distinct from another. Distinction, however,
presupposes actuality or at least some actual aspect. Fourth, matter is actual
according to the actuality of cognition. For matter enters into the essence of
some things, which it could not do if it were not actuality or at least actual
with respect to the object defined.
As to the analogy Averroes draws between the intellect and prime matter,
he himself says that that it should not be taken to hold in all respects. The
intellect and prime matter agree in that, just as the intellect is in potentiality
with respect to all intelligible forms but does not have per se any of them,
so prime matter is in potentiality with respect to all natural forms but does
not have per se any of them. However, they also differ, because the intellect
receives only universal forms, while matter receives only particular ones.
Moreover, the intellect receives only accidental forms, while matter receive
substantial ones.
Part 3
Aristotle makes his main point and establishes the order of his enquiry by
means of three conclusions.
Conclusion 1. The first task of the metaphysician is to study the substance that
is form.
It is the metaphysicians task to study primary substance. Primary sub-
stance, however, divides into matter, form and the composite. Now, it is
not the first task of a metaphysician to study either the composite or mat-
ter. The composite in fact is posterior to the matter and form constituting
it; therefore it must be studied after its constituents. Moreover, the com-
posite is clear, because it is known to the senses. But matter cannot be the
first object of study for the metaphysician, either. For, on the one hand,
matter is posterior to form, as has been shown, and, on the other, it too
is clear in some sense, not only on account of the proof of its existence
conducted by Aristotle in Phys., Book I, but also because all the ancients
acknowledged the existence of matter. Therefore, the first task of the meta-
physician should be to investigate into form. Form in fact is the most prob-
lematic entity, in that it is not per se evident and was not recognised as
such by the ancients. Aristotles text (1029a3033) corresponding to Conclu-
sion 1.
Notandum 1. Averroes explains Aristotles remark that matter is clear

in some sense. Firstly, Aristotle says so because the ancients had a clear
knowledge of matter according to its genus, but not according to its species.
They all in fact took matter to be substance, but had very different opinions
as to the kind of substance that matter is. Secondly, Aristotle introduces
the qualification because matter is only a diminished substance, being as
it is pure potentiality. Therefore, it is not knowable in itself, but only by
analogy with the matter of artefacts, as Aristotle says in Phys., Book I: for
prime matter bears to natural forms the same relation as wood bears to the
form of a statue.
Notandum 2. Averroes explains the difference between the physical and
the metaphysical treatment of matter and form. In the Physics, Aristotle
proves the existence of matter and form only as principles we need to
posit to explain change and movement in general, but does not dwell upon
their nature as substances. This is the reason why he does not arrive at the
knowledge of God as the primary form, but only proves the existence of a
first mover. Taking by contrast matter and form as substances enables us
to know God as the primary form, in that such a form is the principle of all
substances.
Notandum 3. Averroes says something more about the difference be-
tween the physical and the metaphysical treatment of matter. Physics con-
siders matter in so far as it is a principle of movement, while metaphysics
studies it as a substance in potentiality. Therefore, since Aristotle has al-
ready proved the existence of prime matter in the Physics, he does not repeat
his proof in the Metaphysics, but rather investigates the substantiality of
matter.
Conclusion 2. The first task of the metaphysician is to study the form of sensible
things.
Since metaphysics studies sensible substances before non-sensible ones,
it must also study the forms of sensible substances before studying those
of non-sensible ones. For metaphysics starts with what is more known to
us and sensible substances are more known to us than non-sensible ones.
Aristotles text (1029a3334) corresponding to Conclusion 2.
Notandum 1. Averroes tries to explain why Aristotle in the Physics proves
the existence of prime matter but not that of a primary form. The answer is
that the physicist comes to know the existence of a certain nature through
the operation proper to it. Thus, since change is the operation of matter
and the physicists has a certain knowledge of this operationwhereas
he does not know any operations of the primary form in so far as it is a

substance and a primary formAristotle in the Physics proves the existence
of prime matter and of a first mover through an analysis of change: since
the transformations of matter are eternal but discontinuous and of different
kinds, there must be a numerically one, first and eternal movement, which
is common to all the different transformations of matter and makes them
all continuous. This first movement must be brought about by a first mover.
On the contrary, there is no operation common to sensible and non-sensible
forms. Therefore, the existence of a primary form cannot be proved through
change.
Notandum 2. Averroes explains how we come to know the existence of a
primary form. Just as the metaphysician takes from the physicist the proof
of the existence of some non-sensible substance, he also takes from him
the proof of the existence of a sensible body that is the cause of all the
other sensible bodies. Since in fact movement is the actuality of what is
sensible, if there is a primary movement, which is the cause of all the other
movements, there must also be a primary sensible body, which is the cause
of all the other sensible bodies. On this basis, the metaphysician further
proves that every sensible body is a substance on the grounds that all its
principles are substances. He then concludes the existence of a primary
form by means of the following argument: the form of one sensible body
stands to that of another as one sensible body stands to another; but there
exists a primary body, which is the cause of all the generable and corruptible
bodies; therefore, there must also exist a primary form that is the cause of
all the generable and corruptible forms.
Conclusion 3. The first task of the metaphysician is to study the quidditative

form.
Aristotle has distinguished four ways in which substance is spoken of:
quiddity, species, genus and primary substance. Since a primary substance
has two forms, the form of the whole and the form of the part, he does
not investigate the form of the part in this book, but in Book VIII. Here,
he enquiries into the form of the whole, i.e. the quidditative form, which
is more common than the form of the part. Therefore, this conclusion can
be argued for in the following way. As in all the other sciences, we proceed
in metaphysics from what is more known to us and less known by nature
towards what is more known by nature and less known to us. But it is clear
that the quiddities of sensible things are more known to us and less known
by nature, while the quiddities of sensible substances are less known to us
and more known by nature. Therefore, in this science we must start from the
quiddities of sensible substances to then move on to those of non-sensible
ones.
That every science proceeds from what is more known to us to what is
more known by nature is shown through the cases of the natural and moral
sciences. Natural sciences in fact proceed from accidents, which are more
known to us (in that they are perceivable per se) and less known by nature
(in that they are of less reality), to substances, which are less known to us
(in that they are perceivable accidentally) but more known by nature (in
that they are of more reality). Likewise, moral sciences proceed from the
particular goods, i.e. what is good for this or that person, to universal goods,
which are good for each and every person. And particular goods are more
known to us, while universal goods are more known by nature, because they
are of more reality and perfection. Aristotles text (1029b18) corresponding
to Conclusion 3.
Objection. Things that are more known by nature are not known through
those that are less known by nature. For things that are more known by
nature are known unqualifiedly, while things that are less known by nature
are known only in some respect. And things that are known unqualifiedly
cannot be made known through things that are known only in some respect.
But things that are less known by nature are more known to us. Therefore,
we cannot arrive at the knowledge of non-sensible substances, which are
more known by nature, through the knowledge of sensible substances,
which are more known to us. Aristotles text (1029b810) corresponding to the
objection.
Reply. It is not inappropriate to know things that are more known by
nature through things that are less known by nature but more known to us.
For this is the order of learning. So, in this science we must try to come to
the knowledge of things that are known completely and unqualifiedly, i.e.
separate intelligences, through the knowledge of things which are known
to the least degree but are the things from which our cognition starts,
i.e. sensible substances. Aristotles text (1029b1012) corresponding to the
reply.
Notandum 1. Averroes distinguishes between mathematical and non-
mathematical sciences. In mathematical sciences, there is no distinction
between what is more known to us and what is more known by nature.
For such sciences do not have their origin in experience. Moreover, in
mathematical sciences cause and effect are known at the same time. In
the case of non-mathematical sciences, by contrast, be they practical or
theoretical sciences, what is more known to us is distinct from what is
more known by nature. Futhermore, in all such sciences the effect is known
prior to its cause, while by nature the cause is known prior to the effect. Non-
mathematical sciences in fact have their origin in experience and proceed
from effects to causes out of wonder, doubt and ignorance.
Notandum 2. Averroes suggests that being, nature and knowability follow
upon one another. This squares with Aristotles view, in Met., Book II, that a
thing bears the same relation to knowability as it does to being. Thus, things
that are closer to absolute non-being, are also less knowable by nature, just
as they have less being. On the contrary, the more things are closer to the
first being, the more they have of reality and, consequently, the more they
are knowable by nature. The fact that the latter things are less known to us
only depends on the limits of our intellect, which knows things only through
the sense data.
Objection. We cannot come to know separate substances through sensible
substances. Three arguments.
Arg. 1. Sensible substances are natural agents and natural agents do not
act beyond the limits of their species. Thus, if they impress on the senses or
on the intellect the species of sensible things, they cannot impress those of
non-sensible ones.
Arg. 2. The principles of being are the same as the principles of knowl-
edge. But sensible things are not the principles of the being of separate
substances. Therefore, they cannot be their principles of knowledge, either.
Arg. 3. We know sensible substances through their effects and through
per se properties, which are the proper and common sensibles. But the
effects of separate substances clearly manifest themselves to us in the sen-
sible world. Therefore, we must know separate substances too directly
through their effects.
General Reply. The senses receive the species of sensible things, but do
not receive through them the species of intelligible things in that senses are
not receptive of the latter. The intellect, by contrast, on receiving the species
of sensible things receives also those of intelligible things in that it is recep-
tive of them too. Through the cognition of sensible substances, therefore,
the intellect can raise itself to the cognition of separate substances in that it
is equally receptive of both cognitions.
Reply to Arg. 1. It is not true that no agent acts beyond the limits of its
own species. For instance, primary qualities have the power to produce
substance, and sensibles produce sensible species and perceptions which
are of more perfection than them. It is true, however, that sensible species
cannot produce the species of separate substances. It is rather the intellect
that does so, although by means of the species of sensible substances.
Reply to Arg. 2. Principles of being and principles of knowledge are cer-

tainly the same, but only in the sense that all principles of being are also
principles of knowledge. It is not true, however, that all principles of knowl-
edge are also principles of being. For we find in natural effects principles
enabling us to know the cause of those effects, but the principles in ques-
tion are certainly not also the principles of the being of the cause which we
come to know.
Reply to Arg. 3. It is false that we must know separate substances immedi-
ately through their effects, just as we know sensible substances immediately
through their effects. For the effects of separate substances in sensible sub-
stances do not come immediately from separate substances, but rather from
other sensible substances: God and the intelligences, in fact, operate on sen-
sible things only through the mediation of heavenly bodies. This explains
why we know about sensible substances both that they exist and what they
are, while in the case of separate substance we only know that they are.
Chapter 3
Aristotle investigates the substance that is the quidditative form of sensible
things. The chapter falls into three parts: (1) in the first, Aristotle enquiries
into the what-something-is [quod quid est, i.e. the quiddity] itself; (2) in the
second, he makes it know what the quiddity belongs to; (3) in the third, he
corrects some mistakes made by the ancients.
Part 1
Aristotle explains the nature of quiddity by means of three conclusions.
Conclusion 1. Predicates that are per se in the first sense of per se belong to
the essence of their subject.
That belongs to the quiddity of a thing which properly answers the question
as to what that thing is. But per se1 predicates properly answer the question
as to what the subject is of which they are predicated.* Therefore, they
belong to the essence of their subject. If we ask what Socrates is, the proper
answer will be that he is a man; and if we ask what a horse is, the proper
answer will be that it is an animal. So man will be part of the quiddity
of Socrates and animal part of the quiddity of horse, and in general every
* Henceforth, I shall write per se1 predicates for per se predicates in the first sense of
per se and per se2 predicates for per se predicates in the second sense of per se.
superior will be part of the essence of its inferior, in that it is predicated of

it essentially and in a direct case.
Aristotle adds that the present enquiry is logical, because it assumes what
has been made clear in logic, like for instance what a subject and a predicate
are and what it means to be predicated essentially, qualitatively and quanti-
tatively. A study of quiddity based on predication, in fact, properly pertains
to logic. And since there are affinities between logic and metaphysics on
account of their commonness and of the similarity of their subjects, the
logical way of investigation is proper to metaphysics as well. Aristotles text
(1029b1314) corresponding to Conclusion 1.
Notandum 1. Averroes explains Aristotles text by saying that the proposi-
tion The substantial quiddity of a thing is that by which we properly answer
the question as to what that thing is is in fact a dialectical proposition. Thus,
quiddity is nothing other than what is signified by a definition.
Therefore, quiddity and what-something-is (quod quid est) only differ in
that the former is abstract and the latter concrete, in the same way as what
is (ens) differs from entity (entitas) or being (esse) from essence (essentia).
Neither do quiddity and essence differ from one another, expect for the fact
that the term essence expresses the nature of a thing absolutely, while
the term quiddity expresses the very same nature in its relation to the
intellect.
Notandum 2. Averroes explains that the genus and the differentia, as well
as the definition which they compose, express the same thing by means of
three different concepts: e.g. animal, rational and rational animal are just
the same thing expressed in three different ways. The genus expresses the
thing as something specifiable and in a confused manner; the differentia
expresses the same thing by means a quality that specifies the genus; the
definition, finally, expresses the thing as fully specified as to its essential
attributes. Therefore, all the predicates belonging to the category of sub-
stance are not only unified in their subject, i.e. in that primary substances
are the subjects of all such predicates, but are also unified with one another
through real identity, in that all such predicates express one and the same
thing. Accidents, by contrast, are unified in their subject but not with one
another: for instance, white and learned may be the same with respect to
their subject, but differ from one another, in that being white is not being
learned.
Two objections can raised against Averroess comment. (i) First, that he
adds definition to the list of Porphyrys five predicables (genus, species,
differentia, proprium and accident). (ii) Second, that on his account the
differentia turns out to be essentially predicated. For if genus and differentia
are unified with one another, and the genus is predicated essentially, also
the differentia must be predicated essentially. Otherwise, if the differentia
is predicated as a quality, so should be the genus as well. To point (i) it
should be answered that definition is a predicable only accidentally, i.e.
on account of its parts being predicables; moreover, it should not be said
to be a predicable according to formal predication, but only according to
identical and accidental predication, i.e. only to the extent that a definition
is made of predicables. To point (ii) it should be answered that, even if
genus and differentia are unified with each other, they do not have the
same mode of predication. For genus and differentia are unified in reality,
but not in concept. Thus, animality and humanity are quiddities, while
their differentiae are not quiddities, properly speaking, in that they are not
predicated essentially but only as qualities. In another sense, however, the
differentiae can be said to be quiddities, because they constitute a specific
quiddity and are predicated essentially when they are parts of definitions
that are essentially predicated.
Conclusion 2. Accidental predicates, however taken, are not parts of the quid-
dity of their subject.
As Aristotle shows in An. Post., Book I, only per se predicates belong to the
quiddity of their subject. But accidental predicates are not predicated per se
of their subject. Therefore, they are not part of its quiddity. As can be shown
inductively, in fact, accidents are not predicated of their subject essentially,
but accidentally. A man is not per se white, and he is what he is whether he
is white or not. White and man, therefore, are two different natures and so
white is predicated of man neither essentially nor as a substantial quality.
Notandum. Averroes lists four absurdities resulting from the view that
accidents, i.e. accidents that do not belong per se to their subject, are part of
the essence of their subject. (i) Accidents and substance will be of the same
nature. For what belongs to the essence of a thing is of the same nature
as the thing itself, as is clear from the case of genus, species, differentia
and definition. But then there will not be ten categories but only one. (ii)
Accidents of different species will be of the same nature. For if all accidents
are of the same nature as substance, they will be also of the same nature
as one another. (iii) What is signified by a definition will not be one thing
per se, but only accidentally. If accidents in fact are part of the essence and
definition of their subject, the thing they make up will not be one thing
per se, in that two or more accidents never make up one thing per se, but
only accidentally. (iv) Predicates in the nine accidental categories will be

essential differentiae of substance. For all such predicates are accidents of
substance and also belong to the essence of substance, according to the view
in question.
Conclusion 3. Per se2 predicates are not part of the quiddity of their subject.
This conclusion can be proved in two ways.
Proof 1. What belongs to the quiddity of a thing must be quidditatively the
same as that thing: animal, for instance, belongs to the essence of man and is
quidditatively the same as man. But per se2 predicates are not quidditatively
the same as their subject. This is evident. For white is predicated per se2 of
surface (for white is defined through surface), but is not part of the quiddity
of surface. Being white and being a surface are different things: they in fact
belong to different categories and categories are primarily distinct. And
just as whiteness does not belong to the quiddity of surface, neither does
the composite of whiteness and surface. For what belongs to the essence
of a thing does not add anything extrinsic to the thing. But clearly both
white and white surface add something extrinsic to surface, i.e. whiteness.
Aristotles text (1029b1619) corresponding to Proof 1.
Proof 2. Per se1 predicates are not defined through their subject: animal,
for instance, is not defined through man and horse. But per se2 predicates
are defined through their subject: snub, for instance, is defined through the
nose, of which it is predicated, and colour is defined through surface, of
which it is predicated. Therefore, per se2 predicates do not belong to the
essence of their subject.
That the conclusion follows can be clarified by the following observation.
If per se1 predicates do not add anything extrinsic to their subject because
they are not defined through their subject, but it is rather the subject that
is defined through them, then per se2 predicates add something extrinsic to
their subject because they are defined through it. And hence they cannot
be part of the quiddity of their subject. If this were the case, in fact, it would
follow that whiteness and smoothness would be quidditatively one and the
same thing. For both whiteness and smoothness are predicated per se2 of
surface and hence, if per se2 predicates were part of the quiddity of their
subject, they both should be part of the quiddity of surface. But then white-
ness and smoothness would turn out to be quidditatively identical: for each
of them would be quidditatively the same as surface, and so they should
also be quidditatively the same as one another. Aristotles text (1029b1922)
corresponding to Proof 2.
Notandum 1. Averroes explains that the compositions white surface and

rational animal are different in two respects. (i) They differ because rational-
ity is the quiddity of animal, while whiteness is not the quiddity of surface.
(ii) They also differ in that animal and rational make up one thing, i.e. the
species man, while whiteness and surface do not.
One might object that rationality is not the quiddity of animality, because
the quiddity of the genus is prior to that of the differentia. The reply to
this objection is that the sentence Rationality is the quiddity of animality
should not be understood according to formal predication, but according to
identical predication. Just as Humanity is animality is true not according
to formal predicationfor the definition of humanity is different from
that of animalitybut according to identical predication, in that humanity
and animality are not in reality two different things, so is the case with
rationality and animality. Rationality and the quiddity of animality do not
differ in reality, but only with regard to their definition and concept. Neither
is rationality a quality of animality in the same way as whiteness is a quality
of surface: for rationality is an essential quality, while whiteness is only an
accidental one.
Notandum 2. Averroes makes clear the difference between substantial
and accidental composites. A substantial composite can be defined per-
fectly without repetition. The definition A man is a rational animal, in
fact, contains no repetition. White, by contrast, cannot be perfectly defined
without repetition. Everything in fact that is composed of two definables
cannot be defined without making reference to both of them. But white is
composed of whiteness and its subject, which are both definable. Thus, the
definition if white, if it is to be a complete definition, must be composed
of both the definition of whiteness and that of its subject. But the defini-
tion of whiteness, in turn, contains the definition of its subject. Therefore,
the definition of the subject will be mentioned twice in the definition of
white.
Two objections to Averroess distinction.
Obj. 1. If Averroes is right, one could not perfectly define snub in that its
definition would contain a repetition. For the definition of snub will contain
both the definition of nose and that of snubness and the definition of
snubness will contain once again the definition of nose.
Obj.2. On Averroess view, man could not be perfectly defined unless
his definition contained both the definition of the body and that of the
soul. For both body and soul are definable and so man is composed of two
definables.
Reply to Obj. 1. It must be conceded that the definition of snub, as much

as that of white, is not a perfect definition, in that it contains a repetition
and hence does not perfectly express the quiddity of the object defined.
However, even if The white is a thing having whiteness and the snub
is a hollow nose are not perfect definitions, they are nonetheless perfect
descriptions, in so far as they perfectly express the meaning of the terms
white and snub.
Reply to Obj. 2. Averroes is talking about the composition of two things
that do not constitute one third nature. White, however, is composed of
two things, i.e. the subject and whiteness, which do not constitute one third
nature, even if they certainly constitute one single conceptotherwise
white would not be a per se being. And the same thing holds true of snub.
Man, by contrast, is composed of two things constituting one third nature,
whether we talk of conceptual parts (partes secundum rationem) or of real
parts (partes secundum fidem): body and soul in fact are real parts, whereas
animality and rationality are conceptual parts.
Notandum 3. Averroes expands on the distinction between perfect and
imperfect definitions. A perfect definition satisfies three conditions: (i) it
expresses the whole essence of the object defined; (ii) each of its parts
belongs to the quiddity of the object defined; (iii) it does not contain any
being that is added to another being. Now, the definition of a substance is
perfect, because it meets all three conditions. The definition of an accident,
by contrast, is imperfect, because it does not meet any of such conditions.
First of all, it does not express the whole essence of the object defined,
whether the accident is defined in the concrete or in the abstract. Sec-
ond, not all of its parts belong to the quiddity of the object defined. This
is true especially when it is the accident in the abstract that is defined:
for the nose is part of the essence of the snub, but is clearly not part
of the essence of snubness. Third, the definition of an accident contains
some being that is added to another being, i.e. the accident itself, which
is said to be being only by addition, i.e. in that it is attributed to a sub-
stance.
Part 2
Question. Aristotle enquiries into which things have a quiddity, by first raising
the question of whether the composites of a substance and an accident have
a definition expressing their quiddity. Just as there are, in fact, composites
of matter and form, such as for instance a man, there are also composites
of substance and accident, such as a white man. And since substantial
composites have a quiddity and a definition, we must see whether acciden-

tal composites too have a quiddity and a definition. And if someone said that
white man has no definition, because it is a complex name, while man is
a simple name, we should reply that this is no objection. For we could just
impose on white man a simple name, say cloak, and ask whether cloak
has a definition which expresses the essence of the thing signified. Aristotles
text (1029b2228).
Notandum 1. Averroes explains that, for instance, man and animal, which
are substances composed of matter and form, have definitions as well as
names equal to, i.e. convertible with, the corresponding definitions. Man,
for instance, is a name convertible with the definition rational animal.
We say names equal to and convertible with the corresponding definition,
because whatever is signified by the name is also signified by the definition
and vice versa, even though not in the same way: for a definition signifies
distinctly and separately what the name signifies confusedly and jointly.
And since substantial names are equal to their definitions, it is necessary
for both the name and the definition to be predicated essentially of primary
substances.
Notandum 2. Averroes remarks that, just as in the case of substances the
object defined involves one thing in actuality, i.e. the species, and two things
in potentiality, i.e. the genus and the differentia, so, if white man has a
definition, it must have a name signifying one thing in actuality and two
things in potentiality, i.e. man as genus and white as differentia. And this
seems to be a problem, because an accident is not the essential differentia
of a substance. Moreover, Averroes adds that, if white man or cloak have a
definition, both the name and the definition must answer the question as
to what the object defined is. For, in the case of substance, both the name
and the definition corresponding to it answer the question as to what an
individual substance is: if we ask what Socrates is, both man and rational
animal count as perfectly good answers. And the same thing must be true
of accidental composites, if they have a definition.
Aristotle advances two different solutions to the question of the definition
of accidental composites. Solution 1: accidents and accidental composites
do not have a definition, but only substances have one; Solution 2: we
can distinguish different senses of essence and definition and so grant
that accidents and accidental composites have a definition in one of those
senses.
Solution 1. Four Conclusions.
Conclusion 1. No accident is defined by a proper definition.

Only a per se being is defined by a proper definition. But no accident is a
per se being. Therefore, it is not defined by a proper definition. In fact, a
being is said to be per se if it is not a being without addition. But accidents
are beings by addition, because they bring along with them two things, the
accident itself and its subject. Now, the subject, which is a substance, is a
being without addition, because its definition does not contain anything
external to the essence of the object defined. The accident, by contrast, is
a being by addition (whether it is taken concretely or abstractly), because it
is necessarily added to another being, i.e. a substance. This fact is reflected
in its definition, for an accident cannot be defined without its subject.
Thus, white is not correctly defined unless we mention its subject, say
for instance man. And if cloak signifies white man, then its definition
too must necessarily make reference to man. Aristotles text (1029b2834)
corresponding to Conclusion 1.
Notandum. When commenting on Conclusion 1, Averroes seems to say
that whiteness can be considered in three ways: as whiteness, as an accident,
and as an accident of man. As whiteness, it is not defined by mentioning
the definition of its subject, in that it prescinds from a certain way of
being, i.e. being in something else. As an accident, it is defined through
its subject, but still indeterminately. As an accident of man, it is always
defined through man: when the accident is signified in the concrete, man
plays the role of genus, for a white man is a man having whiteness; when
the accident is signified in the abstract, man plays the role of a differentia, as
when we define snubness by mentioning the nose in an indirect case. Man,
by contrast, is defined neither through an accident nor through anything
external to its essence.
Conclusion 2. No composite of a substance and an accident is defined by a true

definition.
The conclusion is proved in three ways.
Proof 1. Only things that have a simple name have a true definition. But no
composite of a substance and an accident has a simple name. Therefore,
it does not have a true definition, either. The truth of the major premiss is
evident inductively: we define man and not rational animal. And if we
defined the definition, which is complex, and not the name, which is simple,
then every definition would be definable, and we would go on ad infinitum
with definitions and predicateswhich Aristotle proves to be impossible

in Post. An., Book I. Therefore, it is not white man that is defined, but
something else in its place, say cloak. Aristotle does not mean that cloak
has a true definition, but only that, if something must be defined in place
of white man, it must be something like cloak. Aristotles text (1029b34
1030a2) corresponding to Proof 1.
Proof 2. No composite of a substance and an accident has a what-being-
is (quod quid erat esse). Therefore, no accidental composite has a true
definition. For a true definition expresses the what-being-is of the object
defined. That accidental composites have no what-being-is can be proved
in the following way. Every what-being-is is a something; thus, if accidental
composites have a what-being-is, they must have one that is a something.
But if accidental composites have a what-being is that is a something, they
must have it unqualifiedly. For a what-being-is that is not a something
unqualifiedly is not a what-being-is. Accidental composites, however, do
not have a what-being-is that is a something unqualifiedly. For they are
composed of a subject and an accident, which is predicated of the subject
not essentially but simply as a quality. Therefore, they do not have a what-
being-is that is a something, just as they are not this something. Aristotles
Notandum 1. Averroes remarks that what signifies only one thing, is also
defined by only one definition, while what signifies more than one thing,
must be defined by more than one definition. But cloak signifies more than
one thing, i.e. man and white, and hence must be defined by more than one
definition, the definition of man and that of white. So, the definition of cloak
is not one single definition.
Notandum 2. Averroes proves that white man cannot be defined. For a
definition makes known the quiddity of the things that are one thing and
a whole. But white man is neither one thing nor a whole, because it is
composed of man and whiteness, which involve two different quiddities and
so cannot make up one thing.
Objection. We define movable body in spite of its being a composite
of a substance and an accident. Otherwise, we could not have scientific
knowledge of movable bodies.
Reply. Movable body is not definable, exactly like white man. For every
definition is made of a genus and a differentia, and so every definable object
must fall within a genus. But movable body does not fall within one single
genus, but rather within more than one. Moreover, every definition must
express the quiddity of some nature. But body and movement together do
not constitute one single nature. Therefore, movable body is not definable.
This does not imply, however, that we have no scientific knowledge of

movable bodies: for us to have science of movable bodies it is not necessary
that movable body be defined, but it is sufficient that movement and body
be defined, and that movability belong per se to bodies.
Conclusion 3. Only substance can be properly defined.

This conclusion follows from the previous ones. If neither accidents (Con-
clusion 1) nor accidental composites (Conclusion 2) can be properly defined,
the only proper object of definition must be the subject. But the subject is
a substance. In fact, since there is no definition of not-being, being must be
what definition is about. Thus, what is truly and properly definable must
be what is truly and properly being. But substance is truly and properly
being, in that it is primary, unqualified being, while accidents are beings
only because they relate to unqualified being, i.e. substance. Therefore, sub-
stance, and not accidents, is truly and properly definable.
Moreover, being and one are convertible. Thus, what is truly and properly
being is also truly and properly one and vice versa. But a substance is truly
and properly one, while an accident, whether taken abstractly or concretely,
is not properly one, in that it involves two natures, i.e. the nature of a
substance and that of an accident. Therefore, only substance is also truly
and properly being, and hence truly and properly definable. Aristotles text
(1030a56) corresponding to Conclusion 3.
From this argument Aristotle concludes that the what-being-is only be-
longs to that of which there is a definition, thereby excluding from the things
that have a what-being-is both accidents and accidental composites. For
only substances, properly, have a definition. Therefore, the what and the
something are really identical and differ only conceptually. For the notion
of something indicates what constitutes a certain degree of being, while
the what is that which expresses the nature of a thing. Now, in reality,
these two things are just one and the same thing. Aristotles text (1030a67)
corresponding to the inference.
It might be objected that accidents and accidental composites must be
definable, because there are in fact formulae that explain the meaning of
their names. Aristotles answer is that not any formula signifying the same
thing as a name is a definition, even if it can be called a notification. For,
if any formula signifying the same thing as a name were a definition, then
any formula whatsoever would be a definition. It is in fact always possible
to assign to any formula a corresponding name: it would be possible, for
instance, to find a name corresponding to the formula running man and
so such a formula would turn out to be a definitionwhich is not the case.

By the same token, the poem about the Trojan war would be a definition
corresponding to the name Iliadwhich is not the case, because the
poem makes reference to thousands of actions, passions, qualities and so
on, which clearly do not make up one single thing. Aristotles text (1030a79)
corresponding to the objection and the answer.
Notandum. Averroes explains that the following argument does not work:
this formula signifies the same thing as this name, so this formula is a
definition. For in order for a formula to be a definition, it is also required
that it contain some essential predicates that constitute the thing signified
by the name corresponding to the formula.
Conclusion 4. Only the species in the category of substance is truly and properly
defined.
This conclusion is proved by appealing to three conditions a proper defini-
tion must necessarily satisfy.
The first condition is that a definition be predicated per se1 of the object
defined, so that the definition contains nothing extrinsic to the object
defined. According to this condition, the definitions of accidents cannot be
true definitions, because they contain something extrinsic to the essence of
the accident defined, i.e. the subject. Aristotles text (1030a1011) correspond-
ing to Condition 1.
The second condition establishes that what a definition makes known
must belong to the species of a genus. Therefore, the definition of acci-
dental composites is not a true definition, because what such definition
makes known does not fall within one single category, but rather within
more than one. Likewise, also the definitions of the most general genera
are not true definitions, because no such genus is a species belonging to
one of the categories. Aristotles text (1030a1113) corresponding to Condition
2.
According to the third condition, a definition must not include something
that is participated in by the object defined, nor something that is a per
se property1 or an accident of it. Thus, burning does not enter into the
definition of iron, for it is predicated of iron only by participation; nor does
being capable of laughing belong to the definition of man, for it is just a per
1 Paul oscillates between per se properties and propria, the assumption being, pre-
sumably, that propria are per se properties or, at least, some kind of per se properties.
se property of man; white, finally, does not enter into the definition of swan,
because it is only an accident of it. Aristotles text (1030a1314) corresponding
to Condition 3.
On the basis of the foregoing three conditions, Aristotle concludes that only
the species in the category of substance are truly defined, in that only they
meet the three conditions specified. For the definition of a man (i) is pred-
icated per se1 of him; (ii) is predicated of something that is the species of
a genus; (iii) does not include any per se property or accident of man, nor
anything man participates in. All the other things do not have proper defi-
nitions, but only formulae convertible with their names, formulae, in other
words, which help us to know better the thing the formulae are about.
This may happen in two ways, i.e. by means of something complex or by
means of something non-complex. The first case occurs when the name is
explained through a complex formula, as when we explain philosopher
as lover of wisdom. The second case occurs when a name is explained
through another name: philosophy, for instance, can be explained as wis-
dom. Aristotles text (1030a1417) corresponding to the general conclusion.
Notandum 1. Averroes proves that substances cannot be defined through
accidents. For, in general, what defines a thing must signify the thing as its
primary object of signification and not as its secondary one, i.e. it must not
signify the thing it defines through some other thing. For instance animal
and rational define man in that they signify man as a primary object
of signification, and not as a secondary one. But accidents clearly do not
signify substances as their primary object of signification, for they signify the
essences of accidents as a primary object and substances only as secondary
objects. Therefore, accidents do not define substances.
Notandum 2. Averroes also proves that accidents cannot be defined. No
form can be defined if it lacks a genus. But accidents lack a genus and hence
cannot be defined. For, even though accidents have a genus predicated
of them, what plays the role of genus in the definition of accidents is not
the genus that is predicated of accidents, but rather their subject. And the
subject is not the genus of accidents, because the genus must be of the
same nature as the species it defines. Strictly speaking, what has been said
is true only of accidents taken concretely: when we define snub we use the
expression hollow nose, where nose takes the place of the genus. Things
are different with accidents taken abstractly: when we define snubness we
use the expression the hollowness of a nose, where nose takes rather
the place of the differentia. But the general point still stands. For in a
true definition, both the genus and the differentia must be of the same
nature as the species defined. And in the definition of accidents, either the
genus (when they are defined concretely) or the differentia (when they are
defined abstractly) is not of one nature with the species defined.
Notandum 3. Finally Averroes proves that only the species in the cate-
gories of substance are truly defined. For something is truly defined if and
only if the genus that is predicated of it is also the genus figuring in its defi-
nition. Moreover, the genus must have no communication with something
else, nor exist in something else as a per se property or an accident do. By
communication Averroes means participation. Thus, according to Aver-
roes, the species of accidents have some communication with the nature of
things belonging to the category of substance. Such species are said to be by
participation, because they participate in things different from them and
cannot be defined without them. The species of substances, by contrast, are
not said to be by participation or by communication, because in their
definition they have no communication with things belonging to other cat-
egories.
From these considerations it follows that in order for something to be
properly defined, three requirements must be satisfied on the side of the
object defined, and as many on the side of the definiens.
On the side of the object defined.
Req. 1. The object defined must belong to only one categorywhich ex-
cludes accidental composites.
Req. 2. The object defined must be constituted into being by its essential
principles and not by something external to its essence. This rules out the
case of accidents, which are constituted into being through their subject,
which is external to their essence.
Req. 3. The object defined must express one single nature composed of
essential parts. So, the differentia belonging to the category of substance,
even if it expresses one single nature, is not properly defined, because it
expresses such a nature in the manner of a formal part and not in the
manner of a whole. Thus, only the species in the category of substance is
properly defined, because it satisfies all the aforementioned requirements.
On the side of the definiens.
Req. 1. The predicates of a definition must not be participative but essential.
Req. 2. Neither must they be per se properties of the object defined.
Req. 3. Such predicates must not be accidents, either.
Therefore, since only per se1 predicates satisfy requirements 13, only
such predicates should be mentioned in a definition. It must be said, there-
fore, that there are two kinds of definition. One is the definition in the
proper sense of the term, which includes only the essential principles of the
thing defined. And this definition belongs only to the species in the category
of substance. The other kind is the definition in the common sense, which is
just a description of the thing. And this second kind of definition may belong
to things other than substances.
Objection: Things that pertain to the what-something-is are not predicated
in the first sense of per se. Two Arguments.
Arg. 1. Matter and form pertain to the essence of a thing. But clearly they
are not predicated per se1 of the thing to the essence of which they pertain,
but rather denominatively.
Arg. 2. When x is not predicated per se1 of y, even if y is added to x,
the predication will still be non-per se1: for instance, if the sentence The
white (thing) is an animal contains an instance of accidental predication,
so will the sentence The white animal is an animal. But the genus is
not predicated per se1 of the differentia. Therefore, since the differentia
is included in the species, the genus will not be predicated per se1 of the
species, either. Moreover, when two things are identical with the same
thing, they must also be identical with one another. Therefore, if genus and
differentia are predicated per se1 of the species, they must also be predicated
per se1 of one anotherwhich is false.
Reply to Arg. 1. As Averroes says in his commentary on Phys., Book I, the
species of natural things have two kinds of parts, real parts (partes secun-
dum fidem), i.e. matter and form, and conceptual parts (partes secundum
imaginationem), i.e. genus and differentia. Such parts agree in one way and
differ in another. They agree in that both kinds of parts are predicated per
se1. They differ, however, in that conceptual parts are predicated in a direct
case, while real parts are predicated in an indirect case, as in the sentence:
Man consists of matter and form. This is clearly an instance of per se1
predication, just as are A line consists of points or A triangle consists of
lines.
Reply to Arg. 2. From the argument it must not be inferred that the genus
is not predicated per se1 of the species, but rather that it is not predicated
of the composite of species and differentia or of the composite of genus
and differentia. But not even this latter conclusion follows, for the rule
mentioned in the argument only applies when the thing added and the thing
to which it is added are not essentially one and the same thing. But species
and differentia are essentially one and the same thing, just as genus and
differentia are so as well.
As a further confirmation, it should be added that it is not universally true
that, if x and y are identical with the same thing z, they are also identical
with one another: Socrates and Plato, for instance, are both identical with
man, but are not identical with one another. So, it is not universally true
either, that if x and y are predicated per se of the same thing z, they are also
predicated per se of one another. What Aristotle wants to show, however, is
that, if two things x and y are quidditatively the same as a thing z, then they
must be quidditatively the same as one another. And it must be conceded
that genus and differentia are quidditatively identical according to identical
predication, in the sense that they are the same quiddity and differ only
conceptually.
Part 2
Solution 2. After giving a first solution to the question of whether accidental
composites have a definition and an essence, in this part Aristotle presents a
second solution, and explains how definition and essence can be attributed
to accidents and accidental composites as well. He does so by means of four
conclusions.
Conclusion 1. The what-something-is can be found in every category.

Proof 1. Essence and quiddity convert. Therefore, the corresponding con-
crete items, being and what-something-is, must convert as well. Thus, wher-
ever there is being, there is also the what-something-is; but being is found
in every category, so the what-something-is too must be found in every cat-
egory. Just as being signifies all the different categories, although not in
the same wayfor it signifies substance primarily and the other categories
only as a consequenceso what-something-is signifies all the different
categories, even if it too signifies substance primarily and the other cate-
gories only as a consequence. Aristotles text (1030a1723) corresponding to
Proof 1.
Proof 2. In every nature there is a what-something-is, which is also the
answer to the what-question. But in each category there are natures by
which we can properly answer the what-question. Therefore, in every cat-
egory there is a what-something-is. As experience shows, in fact, we can
ask the what-question about individual substanceswhich we answer by
indicating their species or generaas well as about individual qualities or
quantities and so onwhich we equally answer by indicating their species
or genera. Therefore, each category has individuals, species and genera. It is
clear, however, that genera are the what of their species and species are the
what of their individuals. Aristotles text (1030a2324) corresponding to Proof
2.
Notandum. Averroes explains Aristotles text by means of two proposi-

tions.
The first proposition is the following: quiddity can be found in every cate-
gory. This is clear, because if essence is found in every category, so is quiddity
too. For one and the same thing is called essence, in that it is a formal prin-
ciple of a thing, and quiddity, in that it makes itself known to the intellect.
For the quiddity is that by means of which we answer the question as to
what (quid) something is.
The second proposition is: quiddity is not present in the same way in
substance and in the other categories. This proposition is clear, too. Since
essence and quiddity expresses one and the same thing in reality, quiddity
is present in the categories in the same way as essence. But essence is not
found in substance and in the other categories in the same way: it is present
in substance primarily and in the other categories only as a consequence.
Therefore, the same thing is true of quiddity.
From these two propositions Averroes concludes that definition too is pres-
ent in every category, even though not in the same way. Since a definition
indicates a quiddity, everything that has a quiddity also has a definition.
And quiddity is to be found in every category. But quiddities are not present
in the same way in every category, for they are in substance primarily and
in the other categories only secondarily. Therefore, definitions too are not
present in the different categories in the same way, but are primarily in
substance and secondarily in the other categories.
Objection. If the what can be found in every category, why does Aristotle
take examples from quality more than from everything else?
Averroes answers that this is so on account of the affinity between the
how (quale) and the what (quid). It is thought in fact that how signifies sub-
stance and the what when the question concerns the species, while it signi-
fies quality when the question concerns the individuals. Therefore, there are
two kinds of quality, substantial and accidental. Substantial quality belongs
to the genera and species of the category of substance primarily and to the
individuals only secondarily. Accidental quality, by contrast, belongs to the
individual in the category of substance primarily and to their genera and
species only secondarily. It could also be said, however, that Aristotle does
not take examples from substance, because the case of substance is clear in
itself. Instead, he concentrates on quality, because the presence of the what-
something-is in the category of quality is less evident than in the case of the
other categories. For the interrogative particle corresponding to quality is
how and not what.
Conclusion 2. Unqualified what-something-is is not found in every category.

Since what-something-is and being convert, the what-something-is is pres-
ent in the different categories in the same way as being. But being is not
present in all the categories as unqualified being: for the being of substance
is unqualified being, while the being of the other categories is qualified
being. In fact, just as we say that privation is not unqualified not-being,
but not-being-this, so we do not call the categories other than substance
unqualified being, but being-this. Therefore, we must also say that the
quiddity of substance is unqualified quiddity, while the quiddity of the other
categories is qualified quiddity. Aristotles text (1030a2427) corresponding to
Conclusion 2.
Notandum. Averroes explains Aristotles text by drawing a comparison
between accidents and privations. In Met., Book IV, Aristotle says that a
privation is a negation in a subject of such a nature as to receive the pos-
itive propertywhich means that privation is not absolute negation, but
negation in a determinate subject. Thus, accidents too are not unqualified
beings, but beings bearing some relation to substance. If this is true, the
definitions of accidents too are not unqualified definitions. For definitions
depend on the quiddity that they express and the quiddity of accidents is
not, as we have seen, unqualified quiddity.
Objection. In Top., Book II, Aristotle says: I say unqualifiedly what I
say without adding anything. But there is no addition in the sentence An
accident is being. Therefore, the being of accidents is unqualified and,
hence, so is their quiddity as well.
Reply. In the sentence An accident is being unqualifiedly the word
unqualifiedly can be taken in two ways: it can indicate absolute unqual-
ifiednessand so the sentence is false, for it omits the necessary reference
to substance. Alternatively, it can indicate the relative unqualifiedness of
the inherence of a predicate in a subjectand so the sentence is true,
because An accident is being is true without any addition. Clearly, Aristo-
tle in the passage from the Topics talks about relative unqualifiedness. And
it is only with regard to relative unqualifiedness that accidents may be said
to have an unqualified being and an unqualified quiddity.
Conclusion 3. The what-something-is is present in substance and accidents

analogically.
Aristotle introduces the proof of the conclusion by means of a preliminary piece
of evidence. He says that, when we try to establish how the what-something-
is is present in the different categories, we must diligently consider the
nature of each being as well as the conditions of each category in such

a way as not to give to each category less or more than what is due to
it. Consequently, we should neither deny the different categories some
kind of being, nor assign being to them according to the same degree, but
rather according to the more and the less or to the prior and the posterior.
Aristotles text (1030a2728).
Aristotle proves the conclusion in two ways.
Proof 1. When something common is present in two things not equally,
but in one thing primarily and unqualifiedly, and in the other secondarily
and qualifiedly, then the common item is present analogically. For anal-
ogy is implied by the distinction between primarily and secondarily or by
that between unqualifiedly and qualifiedly. But we have seen in the previ-
ous conclusions that both being and what-something-is pertain primarily
to substance and secondarily to the other categories. Therefore, being and
what-something-is are present in the different categories analogically. Aris-
totles text (1030a2832) corresponding to Proof 1.
Proof 2. The what-something-is is present in the different categories in
the same way as being. But being is present analogically, so also the what-
something-is must be present analogically. That being is not said equiv-
ocally of substance and accident is clear. For equivocity implies different
notions, which admit of no attribution of the one to the other, and no attri-
bution of both to a third thing. But being is said of substance and acci-
dent through the attribution of one to the other, for accident is said to be
being only because it is attributed to substance. Neither is being said uni-
vocally of substance and accident. For, if this were the case, then being
would be said of substance and accident according to one common notion,
which would be common to all the categories and so would enclose them
in one single category over and above the standard ten categories. But this
is impossible, for being is not a genus.
Therefore, we must conclude that being is said of substance and acci-
dent analogically, i.e. according to addition and diminution or according to
the more and the less. We say, for instance, that the unknowable is know-
able in an incomplete way, i.e. in that we know of the unknowable that it
is unknowable, while the knowable is knowable in a complete way. Like-
wise, being is said of substance in a complete way and of accident in an
incomplete way. Aristotles text (1030a3235) corresponding to Proof 2.
The point can be further confirmed. Being bears to substance and accident
the same relation as medical bears to the vase, the action and the body.
But medical is not said of the vase, the action and the body equivocally
or univocally, but analogically, i.e. according to different notions, which

all contain a reference to one single thing, medicine: the body is said to
be medical because it is the subject of medicine, the action is medical
because it is performed through medicine, while the vase is called medical
because medicine makes use of it. Thus, being as well is said analogically
of substance and accident. Aristotles text (1030a35b3).
From the foregoing considerations Aristotle infers that it does not really
matter whether we say that accidents have no what-something-is unquali-
fiedly, as is stated in Solution 1, or we say that they have one only qualifiedly,
as is stated in Solution 2. Both solutions are true, as long as we keep the
expression unqualifiedly and qualifiedly straight. Aristotles text (1030b3
4) corresponding to the inference.
Notandum. Averroes explains Aristotles text by alluding to three opinions
concerning the definition of accidents.
Opinion 1. Accidents are defined unqualifiedly. This opinion is wrong
because it gives accidents more than they deserve: since accidents do not
have an unqualified being, they cannot be defined unqualifiedly, either.
Opinion 2. Accidents are not defined at all. This opinion gives accidents
less than they deserve: since accidents are in some way beings, they must
also be defined in some way.
Opinion 3. The third opinion is Aristotles, which is true and strikes the
right balance. Accidents are defined in one way and not defined in another:
they are defined qualifiedly but not unqualifiedly, just as they are beings
qualifiedly and not unqualifiedly.
In connection with this question, it is often asked whether the essence of
accidents depends on that of substances. One reason for thinking that it does
not is that, if the essence of accidents depended on that of substance, then
all accidents would be relatives, in that they would have built into their own
essence a relation to something else. Moreover, there would be only one
genus for all accidents, i.e. relation. Finally, no accident could be known
without also knowing substance, for a relative cannot be known without
knowing also its correlative.
Reply. The essence of accidents is independent of that of substance can
be understood in two ways. It can mean that the essence of an accident is not
the essence of a substancewhich is true, because the essence of accidents
is a qualified essence, while that of substance is an unqualified one. But it
can also mean that accidents bear no relation to substancewhich is false.
In reply to the argument it must be said that bearing a relation to sub-
stance does not make accidents into relatives. For a relative is not that
which bears a relation to the subject but that which bears a relation to the
terminus of the relation. Science, for instance, is not a relative because it

bears a relation to the soul, but rather because it bears a relation to the
object of knowledge. Therefore, all that is required for an accident to be
understood independently of substance, is independence in the first of the
two senses specified (i.e. the essence of an accident is not the essence of a
substance). Although an accident necessarily bears a certain relation to sub-
stance, it can also be understood without such a relation, in that the relation
is somehow posterior to the accident itself. A complete understanding of an
accident, however, must take into account substance as well.
Conclusion 4. Definition belongs to substance unqualifiedly and primarily, and

to accidents unqualifiedly and secondarily.
Definition is present in the different categories in the same ways as the
what-something-is. But we have seen that the what-something-is is found
in substance unqualifiedly and primarily, while it is present in accidents
qualifiedly and secondarily. The same thing, therefore, must hold good of
definition as well. Aristotles text (1030b37) corresponding to Conclusion 4.
Someone might object that, just as there are formulae that spell out what
is signified by the name of a substance, there are also others spelling out
what is signified by the name of an accident, and hence definition must be
found unqualifiedly and primarily both in substance and accidents. Aristotle
replies that, in order for a formula to be a definition in an unqualified and
primary sense, it is not enough that it signify the same thing as the name
of the thing the formula refers to, but two extra conditions are required.
The first condition is that each part of the definition be said per se1 of the
object defined. This obtains, however, in the case of the definition of sub-
stance but not in that of the definition of accidents. For the subject figur-
ing in the definition of accidents is not said per se1 of the object defined.
Aristotles text (1030b78) corresponding to the objection and to the first con-
dition.
The second condition is that the object defined be one on account of
definition itself, and not one only by continuity (otherwise, the poem The
Iliad would be a definition unqualifiedly) or by binding together (otherwise,
the definition of a house, which is given through bricks and stones, would
be a definition unqualifiedly). The object defined, in other words, must be
one unqualifiedly. Now, although one, exactly like being, signifies each
of the ten categories, only substance is one unqualifiedly. Therefore, only
substance has a definition in an unqualified sense. Aristotles text (1030b8
12) corresponding to the second condition.
From the previous analysis Aristotle concludes that substance, accidents

and accidental composites are defined in three different ways. Substance is
defined per se and primarily. Accidents are defined per se but not primarily,
in that they are per se, but not primary beings. Accidental composites, by
contrast, are defined accidentally. Being composites, accidental composites
are accidental beings and so are defined according to their status as beings.
Aristotles text (1030b1213) corresponding to the final conclusion.
Notandum. Averroes explains that, according to Aristotle, not only simple
entities, such as substances and accidents, are definable, but also compos-
ites, though in a different way. For not only simple entities but also compos-
ites are beings.
Objections to Aristotle and Averroess view.
Obj.1. Accidents are not defined per se. First, because that whose definition
is dependent on something else is not defined per se. But the definition of
accidents depends on substance. Therefore, accidents are not defined per
se. Second, because what does not have a what-something-is per se cannot
be defined per se. But accidents do not have a what-something-is per se, as
is indicated by the fact that Aristotle reserves for substances the expression
what. Therefore, they cannot be defined per se, either.
Obj. 2. Accidental composites are defined per se. For their parts, i.e.
substance and accident, are defined per se and so also the wholes must be
defined per se. This is confirmed by the fact that the name cloak is defined
in that it stands for a simple entity belonging to one of the categories. But
the name cloak can also stand for an accidental composite such as a white
man. So, accidental composites, too, must be defined per se.
Reply to Obj. 1. This objection only proves that accidents are not defined
per se and primarily. But this does not mean, as we have seen, that an
accident cannot also be defined without mentioning substance, i.e. when
it is taken according to its essence and apart from its mode of existence.
Substance, by contrast, is defined per se and primarily. And this is the reason
why Aristotle reserves for substances the expression what.
Reply to Obj. 2. The conclusion does not follow. For both the substance
and the accident composing an accidental composite are beings per se,
while the composite itself is an accidental being. As to cloak, when the
name signifies a cloak it is defined per se, in that it is a simple entity
belonging to the category of having; when, by contrast, it signifies a white
man it is not defined per se, in that a white man is an accidental being.
Part 3
In this part, Aristotle corrects two opposed mistakes the ancients used to
make: the first is the claim that accidents cannot be defined at all; the second
is claim that accidents can be defined unqualifiedly in the same way as
substances. Aristotle proceeds by raising two questions:
Question 1. Is there any definition that is or can be given by addition?

Aristotle answers affirmatively. The ancients opinion was that every defini-
tion should be given through the essential principles of the thing defined, so
that no definition should be by addition. Against this view, Aristotle argues
that, if it were true, both simple and coupled accidents would not be defined
by additionwhich is false. Snubness, for instance, which is a coupled acci-
dent, is defined by addition, i.e. through its genus, concavity, and its subject,
the nose: snubness in fact is the concavity of a nose. There are three items
involved in this definition, the subject, i.e. the nose, and two properties, i.e.
concavity and snubness. Concavity is a simple accident, because it does not
imply any determinate subject. Snubness, by contrast, is a coupled accident,
in that it is a form in a determinate subject, i.e. the nose. This is the reason
why snubness, but not concavity, is said to be made of two things. Aristotles
text (1030b1418) corresponding to the answer.
Notandum. Averroes argues against those who maintain that snubness
does not signify the nose, but only concavity, while it is snub that signi-
fies both the nose and concavity. Now, this way of explaining the difference
between snubness and snub is not correct. For snubness and snub
agree in that they both signify the nose in addition to concavity. And they
differ only because snubness signifies concavity in a direct case and the
nose in an indirect oneas in the formula Snubness is the concavity of
a nosewhereas snub signifies the nose in a direct case and concavity
in an indirect oneas in the formula The snub is a nose having concav-
ity.
Aristotle further elucidates the problem and his solution by means of two
conclusions.
Conclusion 1. Coupled accidents are per se accidents and not accidental acci-
dents.
Per se accidents are those that concern one determinate subject, while acci-
dental accidents are accidents that concern no determinate subject. There-
fore, coupled accidents are per se accidents. Whiteness, for instance, is an

accidental accident, because it does not belong to Socrates more than to
Callias, nor does it belong to a man more than to a horse. Equality and
inequality, by contrast, or male and female, are per se accidents, because
they concern one determinate subject, i.e. quantity and animal, respec-
tively. Both snubness and concavity belong in this group, for they both have
one determinate subject they inhere in, i.e. the nose in the case of snubness
and depressed surface in that of concavity. Aristotles text (1030b1823) cor-
responding to Conclusion 1.
Notandum. Averroes rephrases Aristotles distinction between per se
and accidental accidents in terms of essential and non-essential accidents,
including in the class of essential accidents also those that do not convert
with their subject.
Objection. Whiteness is an accidental accident of man precisely because
it happens to a white thing to be a man just as it happens to a man to be
white. But it happens to a nose to be concave just as it happens to a concave
thing to be a nose. Therefore, concavity cannot be a per se accident.
Reply. Concavity can be understood in two ways. In one way, it is a genus
in a certain category, and so taken it is not a per se property of the nose,
but only an accidental property. In another way, however, concavity can be
taken to be a constitutive differentia of a speciesand in this way it is a per
se property of the nose. Just as a differentia constitutes a species when it is
added to the genus, so concavity constitutes snubness when it is added to
the nose. The argument in the objection, therefore, works only if we take
concavity as a genus.
If someone counter objected that the nose must be the determinate subject
of concavity on the grounds that, on one understanding of it, concavity
turns out to be a per se property of the nose, we should reply that concavity
is a property of the nose per se, but not primarily. The property 2R,2 for
instance, is a per se property of an isosceles triangle, but is not primarily
so, and consequently the isosceles triangle is not the determinate subject
of the property 2R. The same thing is true of concavity and the nose. The
determinate subject of concavity is depressed surface, because it is the
subject of which concavity is said per se and primarily. This also shows that
concavity is a coupled accident with respect to quantity but a simple one
with respect to substance.
2 That is, the property of having the sum of the internal angles equal to two right angles.
Further objection. Aristotle says in the text: Callias, who happens to be a

man, is white. But it does not seem that Callias simply happens to be a man,
for Callias is essentially a man.
Reply. Aristotle does not mean that Callias happens to be a man, but
rather that Callias as a white thing happens to be a man. For, even if man
is part of the essence of Callias, it is not part of the essence of Callias as
a white thing. If this were the case, in fact, every white thing would be a
man.
Conclusion 2. A per se accident is necessarily defined through its subject or the

definition of its subject.
This conclusion follows from the previous one. In fact, just as we put animal
or its definition in the definition of man, because animal belongs to the
notion of man, so we put the subject or its definition in the definition of an
accident, whether the accident converts with its subject or not. Thus, man or
the definition of man figures in the definition of capable of laughing, animal
or its definition in the definition of male, and the nose or its definition
in the definition of snubness. Aristotles text (1030b2324) corresponding to
Conclusion 2.
Notandum. Averroes remarks that, just as a quantity divides into its per
se properties, i.e. equal and unequal, and animal divides into its per se
properties, i.e. male and female, so does the nose, which divides into snub
and non-snub. And just as equal and unequal are defined through quantity,
and male and female through animal, so snub and non-snub are defined
through the nose. And the same thing is true of the definition of such things
when taken abstractly. Note, however, that non-snub is not the same thing
as aquiline, because there are noses that are neither snub nor aquiline.
Therefore, just as animal is not only divided into male and female, but also
into other properties, such as for instance hibernating and non-hibernating,
so nose divides not only into snub and non-snub, but also into aquiline and
non-aquiline.
Objection. Averroess remark to the effect that concavity is in a nose as
maleness is in an animal does not seem to be true. For, while maleness can
only be found in animals, concavity can be found in things other than noses,
for instance the heaven and the elements.
Reply. Averroes does not take concavity in its generality, but as already
contracted and determined so as to signify snubness alone. For, if it is true
that concavity is not the same thing as snubness, it is also true that they
are the same thing in a nose. So, when earlier on Averroes remarked that
concavity is a per se property of a nose, he was clearly referring not to

concavity in its generality, but to concavity as already contracted.
From the previous considerations Aristotle infers two corollaries.
Cor. 1. Simple accidents can be understood and defined without their sub-
ject, while coupled accidents cannot be understood and defined without
their subject. Whiteness, blackness and the like can be understood and
defined without their subject, because they do not concern one determi-
nate kind of subject more than another. And this is the reason why they are
called simple accidents. Snubness, femaleness, maleness and the like, by
contrast, cannot be understood and defined without their subject, because
they presuppose one particular kind of subject. And the relation they bear
to one particular kind of subject explains why they are called coupled acci-
dents. Aristotles text (1030b2426) corresponding to Corollary 1.
Cor. 2. Coupled accidents either do not have a definition or, if they
have one, must have a definition different from that of substances. For
substances are defined through their essential principles without anything
extraneous figuring in their definition. Coupled accidents, by contrast, are
necessarily defined through their subject, which is not one of their essential
principles but falls rather outside their essence. Aristotles text (1030b2628)
corresponding to Corollary 2. These two corollaries establish Aristotles main
conclusion, i.e. that some accidents must be defined by addition.
Notandum. Averroes draws an important distinction. Some accidents,
i.e. per se or essential accidents, are essentially in their subject, whereas
others, i.e. accidental or non-essential accidents, are accidentally in their
subject. The former are defined through their subject, while the latter are
not defined through their subject. The rationale behind Averroess distinc-
tion is that a definition signifies things that are determinate with respect
to the object defined: a definition, in fact, makes known the object defined,
and infinitude as such, i.e. lack of determinateness, is not knowable. But
accidental accidents, on account of the indeterminateness of their subject,
do not signify things that are determinate, in that they inhere in a compos-
ite in virtue of common matter, which is indeterminate. Their subject being
indeterminate, therefore, they cannot be defined through their subject. Per
se accidents, by contrast, do not inhere in a composite in virtue of common
matter, but rather in virtue of form, as in the case of the property 2R, or in
virtue of the matter that is proper to the subject they inhere in, as in the case
of maleness and femaleness. Maleness and femaleness, in fact, differ only on
account of material differences that are proper to the subject in which they
inhere per se, i.e. the animal.
Averroes remarks that the difference between these two kinds of accident
led philosophers to two different opinions.
Opinion 1. Some took into account only accidental accidents, i.e. simple
accidents, and concluded that accidents qua accidents cannot be defined.
Since accidents, in fact, essentially depend on their subject, they cannot
be defined without it. But simple accidents do not concern one particular
subject more than another. Therefore, they cannot be defined.
Opinion 2. Others took into account only per se accidents and concluded
that accidents are defined unqualifiedly, because they univocally point to
one determinate subject.
Both opinions are flawed. The first is wrong because, even if accidental
accidents cannot be defined through their subject, they can still be defined
through their genus and differentia, like all the other species belonging to
one of the categories. The mistake of the second opinion, by contrast, is that
per se accidents, although they can be defined through their subject, are
defined qualifiedly, because they can only be defined by addition.
Objection to Averroes. Aristotle says at the beginning of Book VII that
substance is prior in definition to accidents in that substance enters into the
definition of accidents. But this should hold of both per se and accidental
accidents, with the result that all accidents should be defined through its
subject.
Reply. Accidental accidents do not contain in their concept any reference
to a particular subject, be it proper or common, and this is why they can be
understood and defined without making reference to any subject. However,
since they essentially depend on a common subject, i.e. body, which belongs
to the category of substance, they are not defined completely when they are
not defined through this common subject. Clearly, therefore, when Averroes
says that accidental accidents are not defined through their subject, he
refers to the proper or determinate subject and not to the common subject.
Question 2. In the case of accidents, is the object defined identical with its defini-
tion? One opinion has it that in the case of accidents, too, the object defined
must be the same thing as its definition, as is the case with substances. On
this opinion snub nose contains a repetition just as man animal does,
for nose plays in the definition of snub the same role as animal does
in the definition of man. Thus, Aristotle first asks whether snub nose and
concave nose are one and the same thing or not.
Against identity. Snub nose is not the same thing as concave nose, be-
cause, if it were, snub and concave would also be one and the same
thing. For, if snub nose and concave nose are two identical wholes, and
the second part of the one is the same as the second part of the other, i.e.
nose, then the first part of the one must also be the same as the first part
of the other. The same conclusion can also be reached in the following way.
If snub is defined as concave nose, just as man is defined as rational
animal, and man is identical with rational, then also snub must be
identical with concave. But this is false, because concavity can be found
in things other than noses, for instance in legs. Therefore, concave is more
common than snub and so cannot be identical with it. Aristotles text
(1030b2830).
In favour of identity. According to the view that snub nose and con-
cave nose are not identical, the identity does not hold because snub brings
along with it nose, while concave does not. But this explanation is insuffi-
cient and leads to a dilemma: (i) either snub nose is something we simply
cannot say (ii) or snub nose will contain a repetition. For in general we
can always replace a term with its definition. Now, concave nose is the
definition of snub and so we can replace snub with concave nose in
the formula snub nose thereby obtaining the formula concave nose nose.
But this formula clearly contains a repetition and, therefore, so does the for-
mula snub nose. Take a parallel case: man animal contains a repetition
because if we replace man with its definition rational animal we obtain
the formula rational animal animal, which clearly contains a repetition.
Aristotles text (1030b3034).
Notandum. Averroes reports and refutes the ancients opinion concern-
ing the definition of accidents. The ancients thought that both substances
and accidents are defined unqualifiedly because concavity is an essential
differentia of the nose just as rational is an essential differentia of animal.
And since genus and differentia make up one thing, so concavity and the
nose make up one thing, i.e. snubness: the nose plays the role of matter and
genus, while concavity plays that of form and differentia.
Averroes levels two criticisms against this opinion.
(i) On this view, snub and concave would convert. For in general the
differentia is convertible with the species and concave is supposed to be
the essential differentia of snub. But snub and concave do not convert,
because concave is said of more things than noses.
(ii) Noses and legs would belong to the same species. For things sharing
their essential differentia must be of the same species. But concavity is
thought to be an essential differentia, which is found in both legs and noses.
Therefore, legs and noses must belong to the same species.
After arguing against and in favour of the identity between an accident and its
definition, Aristotle solves the difficulty through three conclusions.
Conclusion 1. It is impossible for accidents to have an unqualified definition.

For if they had an unqualified definition, we would be off on an infinite
regress of noses. There are various explanations of why this is so.
Aquinas gives the following account. snub is defined as concave nose.
But, since the concave in a nose is simply the snub, snub is the same
as snub nose. Now, in the expression snub nose we can replace snub
with its definition and so obtain concave nose nose. But again, since the
concave in a nose is simply the snub, concave nose nose is the same as
snub nose nose. But then we can replace, in the formula snub nose nose,
snub with its definition and obtain concave nose nose nose and so on ad
infinitum.
Aquinass explanation is not convincing. For one could apply the same
kind of reasoning to the case of man and say that the rational in a man
is the same as the man and so that rational animal is the same as man
animal. Now, by replacing man with its definition in man animal we get
rational animal animal and then, since the rational in a man is the same
as the man, we further get man animal animal. By substituting again the
definition of man for man we obtain rational animal animal animal,
and so on ad infinitum. On this view, therefore, man would not have an
unqualified definition, either.
Thus, Albert advances a different explanation. He says that if nose and
concave are respectively the genus and the differentia in the definition of
snub, it will be necessary for concave to be defined in its turn through
nose. For concave is a species of accident and, since it is only found in a
nose and is an essential differentia of the nose, it must be defined through
nose, for instance by the formula The concave is a nose depressed in the
middle. But then also depressed in the middle is a species of accident and
an essential differentia of the nose; therefore also depressed in the middle
must be defined through nose, for instance by the formula The depressed
in the middle is a curved nose. But the same considerations can be applied
to curved and so on and so forth ad infinitum.
To Alberts explanation, however, one might object that in the definition
of man, i.e. rational animal, rational is not further defined precisely in
order to block an infinite regress. Thus, presumably, concavity is not fur-
ther defined in the definition of snub as concave nose, either. Moreover,
when rational is defined it is not a differentia, but rather some common
term that is predicated analogically of the rationality of men and of that of

separate substances. Likewise, if concavity is defined, it is not an essential
differentia of the nose, but some common term that is predicated analogi-
cally of the concavity of noses and of that of other things such as mixtures
and elements.
Thus, Aristotles text must be explained in accordance with Averroess
doctrine. If snub is defined exactly like man, i.e. by genus and differentia,
then, if the expression man animal contains animal an infinite number
of times, also the expression snub nose contains nose an infinite number
of times. For man signifies animal unqualifiedly and in actuality. So, when
animal is added to man, the reference to animal contained in man is not
removed. As a consequence man animal will be the same as man animal
animal, which in turn will be the same as man animal animal animal, and
so ad infinitum. And the same pattern of reasoning can be applied to snub
nose, which will contain nose an infinite number of times. Aristotles text
(1030b341031a1) corresponding to Conclusion 1.
Notandum. Averroes explains again that, if snub nose is composed of
nose as genus and concavity as differentia, then it will contain an infinite
series of noses. The difficulty can be overcome by saying that accidents do
not have a true definition, i.e. unqualifiedly and primarily.
One might raise against Aristotles view the same difficulties as he himself
raises against the ancients. For, even if snubness is not defined in the same
way as a substance, it is nonetheless defined by the addition of its subject.
So, one may ask whether snub nose is the same as concave nose. If it
is, then snub is the same as concavewhich is false. If it is not, in that,
unlike concave, snub signifies the nose, then either we simply cannot say
snub nose or the expression itself will contain a repetition.
Averroes solves the difficulty by distinguishing between what the object
defined signifies in actuality and what it signifies in potentiality. What
the object defined signifies in actuality is what belongs unqualifiedly to
its essence, while what it signifies in potentiality is what falls outside its
essence. Since animal and rational belong to the essence of man, they are
both signified by man in actuality. Snubness, by contrast, signifies con-
cavity in actuality, because concavity falls within the essence of snubness,
and the nose only in potentiality, because the nose falls outside the essence
of snubness. Clearly, Averroes does not use actually and potentially in
their standard sense, but in the sense of complete or perfect meaning
and incomplete and imperfect meaning, respectively. And, since one and
the same thing can pass from diminished and incomplete being to per-
fect and complete being, one and the same nose is signified by snubness
completely, when snubness is taken without addition, and incompletely,

when it is taken together with an addition, as in the formula the snubness
of a nose.
Against the objection, therefore, it must be said that snub nose is the
same as concave nose and, consequently, snubness and concavity are one
and the same thing, not convertibly but essentially, in the way in which
the genus animal is the same thing as the species man. Man and animal,
in fact, are in one way identical and in another different. Really and essen-
tially they are identical, because they are just one and the same thing; but
they differ conceptually and modally, because the notion of man is dif-
ferent from that of animal and the mode of signification of man is dif-
ferent from that of animal. Both man and animal signify humanity,
but man signifies it determinately and animal indeterminately. Analo-
gously, snub and concave are really identical but differ in that they relate
to one another as determinate to indeterminate: the very thing that is sig-
nified determinately by snub is signified indeterminately by concave.
Determination comes about when nose is added to concave and so con-
cave nose and snub nose are identical also convertibly. It does not follow
from this, however, that their parts are also identical convertibly: concave
and snub are not identical convertibly. Alternatively, one may say that
concave and snub are identical convertibly, even if not in an absolute
sense, but only in so far as they are parts of snub nose and concave nose,
i.e. in so far as snubness and concavity, in a nose, are one and the same
thing.
Moreover, it is true that snubness signifies nose, while concavity does
not. However, this does not mean that snub nose contains a repetition,
but only that the nose which is signified incompletely without addition is
signified completely when the addition is made.
Finally, it is not true that to say snub nose amounts to saying concave
nose nose, because it is not legitimate to substitute the definition for the
name of the object defined unless all the parts of a definition are signified
in actuality by the object defined. Thus, the expressions rational man and
man animal contain a repetitionbecause it is legitimate to substitute
rational animal for man in these expressionswhile snub nose and
man capable of laughing do not contain any repetition. For snub and
capable of laughing signify, respectively, nose and man only potentially.
Nor does snub nose produce an infinite series of noses. Thus, it is clear
that the ancients mistake stemmed from supposing that accidents have the
same kind of definition as substances: they thought that nose and concavity
belong to the essence of snubness in the same way as man and rational
belong to that of man and, consequently, maintained that snub signifies

the nose in actuality, just as animal signifies man in actuality.
Two Objections to Averroess exposition.
Obj. 1. Every potentiality can be reduced to actuality. But, for Averroes,
snub signifies the nose in potentiality. Therefore, snub can signify the
nose in actuality and the nose can belong to the essence of snub. Now, when
something possible is posited, nothing absurd will follow. Thus, from posit-
ing that the nose belongs to the essence of snub, none of the aforementioned
absurdities will follow.
Obj. 2. Averroes himself says in his commentary on Phys., Book I, that the
subject of generation remains and is part of the thing generated: when a man
comes to be musical from being unmusical, man is the subject and so also
a part of the musical. But then the nose too must be a part of the snub and
so belong to its essence, because, if the musical is a man having the musical
art, the snub is a nose having snubness.
Reply to Obj.1. The potentiality for signifying the nose that is contained in
snub is brought into actuality by the fact that nose determines snub.
Hence it is right to say that snub, in the expression snub nose, signifies
the nose in actuality. However, the actuality in question is not an intrin-
sic actuality, because the nose does not belong to the essence of snub, but
an extrinsic one, i.e. an actuality resulting from an addition which deter-
mines what is indeterminate. And clearly Averroes talks about intrinsic
actuality, while the objection works with the notion of extrinsic actual-
ity.
Reply to Obj. 2. It is true that man is part of the musical and the nose is part
of the snub, but man and the nose are not part of the essence of the musical
and of the snub unqualifiedly, but rather qualifiedly. For man contributes
to the constitution of the musical only as a potential part, and so does the
nose with respect to the snub, and being a potential part means being part
of an essence only qualifiedly. In general, in fact, a substance falls outside
the essence of an accident, as is shown by the fact that a substance can be
said to belong to the essence of an accident only when the accident is taken
concretely and not abstractly: we say The snub (thing) is a nose, but we do
not say Snubness is noseness. In the case of a substance, by contrast, the
parts of its essence are said to belong to it both concretely and abstractly:
we say both A man is a rational animal and Humanity is animality and
rationality.
Further objection. Animal and rational are parts of the essence of man
because they are predicated per se1 of man. But also the nose is predicated
per se1 of both the snub and snubness. Per se1 predication applies in fact to
the cases where a definition or some part of it is predicated of the object
defined, regardless of whether the predication is in a direct or in an indirect
case. Therefore, the nose must be part of the essence of both the snub and
snubness.
Reply. Animal and rational are not parts of the essence of man unquali-
fiedly because they are predicated per se1 of man, but rather because they
are predicated of man in a direct case both concretely and abstractly. And
this does not apply to the case of the nose and snubness.
Conclusion 2. Definition in the unqualified sense belongs only to substance.

Some being must be defined unqualifiedly (otherwise, no being would be
defined unqualifiedly); but accidents are not defined unqualifiedly; there-
fore it is substance that is defined unqualifiedly. It is clear, in fact, that no
thing which is defined only by addition, i.e. through its subject, is defined
unqualifiedly. But every accident is defined by addition, i.e. through its sub-
ject. For instance: equality is defined through quantity, oddness through
number and femaleness through animal. And since equality, oddness and
femaleness are per se accidents, they must be defined through their proper
subjects. Aristotles text (1031a14) corresponding to Conclusion 2.
One might ask what a definition by addition precisely is. Aristotle an-
swers by saying that a definition by addition is a formula that, if taken to be
a definition in an unqualified sense, will produce a repetition. We have seen
that if we define snub as concave nose and we also take this formula to be
a definition in an unqualified sense, where nose is the genus and concave
the differentia, then the formula snub nose will contain nose twice. If we
take, instead, concave nose not as a definition in an unqualified sense, but
as a definition by addition, no repetition will occur. Aristotles text (1031a4
6).
Notandum. Averroes maintains that all the items belonging to categories
other than substance are defined by addition. Odd, for instance, is not
defined without number, nor is number defined without quantity, and
number is the subject of odd just as quantity is the subject of number.
Two Objections to Averroess exposition.
Obj. 1. It does not seem that every kind of accident is defined by the addition
of its subject. Coupled accidents are clearly defined by the addition of their
subjects, but this is not true of simple accidents such as line, surface, white-
ness, blackness and the like, which are not necessarily defined by addition.
Aristotle himself distinguishes between coupled and single accidents.
Obj. 2. Number is not defined through its subject, when it is defined

through quantity. For quantity is not the subject of number, but rather its
form, in that every superior is the form of its inferior.
Reply to Obj. 1. A definition must reveal the essence of the thing defined.
And, since the essence of accidents is constituted through their subject,
every accident must be defined through its subject. There is a difference,
however, between coupled and simple accidents: the former are always
explicitly defined through their subject, while the latter are defined through
their subject sometimes explicitly and sometimes implicitly. When colour
is defined as the extremity of the perspicuous in a limited body, three
kinds of subject are explicitly mentioned: surface (extremity), which is
the proximate subject, body, which is the remote subject, and substance
(the perspicuous), which is the most remote subject. When, by contrast,
whiteness is defined as a colour that causes sight to discern something,
the subject is not mentioned explicitly. It must, however, be understood
implicitly.
This solution is confirmed by Avicennas doctrine. He says that an accident
can be taken in two ways, i.e. as a species or as a property inhering in
something. When the accident is taken in the first way, substance is always
understood in the definition of an accident, but not explicitly mentioned;
when the accident is taken in the second way, by contrast, substance is both
understood and mentioned in the definition of an accident. Therefore, line,
surface, whiteness, blackness and the like, when they are taken as species,
can be defined simply by means of the principles that place them in a certain
categorial order. In such definitions, the subject is not explicitly mentioned,
but only understood.
It might be objected that the definitions that only mention the principles
placing a thing in a certain categorial order are dialectical, and dialectical
definitions are useless. For dialecticians do not care about finding out the
first principles of things, but content themselves with singling out the prox-
imate genus and its differentia.
It must be said, however, that a metaphysician always defines things
by resolving them into their first principles. Therefore, when he defines
an accident through its genus and differentia, he always understands the
subject of the accident, even if he does not always explicitly mention it in
the definition. This is the reason why, even when a metaphysician defines
an accident only through the principles placing it in a certain categorial
order, the definition in this case is not useless. For, even though dialecticians
and metaphysicians may give the same definition of an accident, i.e. a
definition which does not mention the subject, such a definition does not
have the same force in one case and in the other. For a metaphysician always
understands the subject, while a dialectician does not.
Reply to Obj. 2. When Averroes says that number is defined through
quantity, he does not mean that the quantity that is the genus of number is
also its subject, but rather that, when number is defined through quantity,
is also defined through a subject which is added to quantity. Number is
defined as a discrete quantity aggregated from unities and it is certain that
number is in its unities as in its subject, even if it is not in quantity, which is
its genus, as in its subject.
Conclusion 3. Accidents have a definition only qualifiedly.

Accidents in fact have a definition only secondarily and as a consequence
which implies that they have it only qualifiedly. We have seen above that
definition is not spoken of in only one way, but according to different
senses, so that definition belongs to substances primarily and to accidents
only secondarily. Many ancients did not realise that definition is spoken of
in many senses and hence concluded either that substance has no definition
or that accidents have a definition in an unqualified sense. They should
have said, by contrast, either that accidents have no definition at all or
that substance has a definition primarily, while accidents only secondarily.
Aristotles text (1031a710) corresponding to Conclusion 3.
Aristotle draws two corollaries from the previous discussion.
Cor. 1. In one way definition only pertains to substance, while in another it
also pertains to things other than substance. It pertains only to substance
unqualifiedly and primarily, whereas it pertains also to other things qual-
ifiedly and secondarily. Moreover, only substance is defined without addi-
tion. For the definition by addition pertains to things other than substance,
i.e. to accidents, both concrete and abstract accidents. The subject, in fact,
which falls outside the essence of accidents, is mentioned in their defini-
tion whether they are taken concretely or abstractly: it is mentioned in a
direct case when they are taken concretely and in an indirect case when
they are taken abstractly. Aristotles text (1031a1011) corresponding to Corol-
lary 1.
Cor. 2. Definition either pertains to substance alone or pertains to it to
the highest degree, primarily and unqualifiedly. The first alternative directly
follows from the first solution to the question of the definition of accidents
which Aristotle presents above (accidents have no definition), whereas
the second alternative follows from the second solution (accidents have a
definition only qualifiedly). Definition belongs to substance to the highest
degree, because the essence of substance is the cause of the essence of acci-
dents; it belongs to substance primarily, in that substance falls within the
concept of an accident, and unqualifiedly, because substance is not defined
through any extrinsic nature. Aristotles text (1031a1114) corresponding to
Corollary 2.
Notandum. Averroes remarks that, just as it is pertains to logic to dis-
tinguish the different senses of definition, it also pertain to it to answer
the question whether accidents have a definition. Since metaphysics has an
affinity with logic, it also pertains to the metaphysician to establish in which
sense the sentence Accidents have a definition is true and in which it is
false. It is true when the predicate stands for a qualified definition, while it
is false when the predicate stands for an unqualified definition.
Objections to Aristotles and Averroess accounts of accident.
Obj. 1. Accidents are defined unqualifiedly. For they are demonstrated un-
qualifiedly and so possess a cause in an unqualified sense. And cause and
definition as one and the same thing, as Aristotle establishes in Post. Anal.,
Book II.
Obj. 2. Accidents are simply not defined. For if they were, they would be
defined either according to form, i.e. by genus and differentia, or according
to matter, through their subject. But it can be shown that they are not
defined either way. Every definition in fact is either the principle or the
conclusion of a demonstration. So, which of the aforementioned definitions
is a principle? Not the definition according to form, because it does not
assign the cause of the thing, nor that according to matter, because such
a definition is in fact demonstrated. Nor can the definition composed out of
the two be a principle, for such a definition is just the whole demonstration
and differs from it only in the arrangement of the terms.
Obj. 3. An accident, taken as a species, is not implicitly defined through
its subject. Suppose that A is the species of the accident, B its genus and
C its differentia. Since B and C are both accidents, they are both defined
through their subject. Now, a genus is in some sense part of the notion of
the differentia; thus, the subject which is part of the definition of B will
also be part of the definition of C, and the definition of C will contain two
subjects, its own and Bs. These two subjects, however, cannot be of opposed
species, otherwise they could not figure in the same definition. Therefore,
they must be one and the same subject, and then the definition of C will
contain a repetition. Moreover, the subject cannot be part of the definition of
an accident if it is not also part of its essence. But the subject is not part of the
essence of an accident and so cannot be mentioned in its definition, either.
Obj. 4. An accident, taken as a per se accident, is not explicitly defined

through its subject. For, if it were so defined, this would be the case only on
account of its essential dependence on its subject. But sensible substances
essentially depend on separate substances. Therefore, sensible substances
should be defined through separate substances. In this case, however, the
definition of sensible substances would contain a repetition as much as the
definition of accidents. Moreover, just as accidents are not apart from their
subject, so universals are not apart from particulars. Therefore, universals
too should be defined through particulars.
Reply to Obj. 1. It may be conceded that accidents are demonstrated un-
qualifiedly and have a cause unqualifiedly, but not that they are defined
unqualifiedly. And even though cause and definition are one and the same
thing, they differ conceptually. Therefore, it can be the case that something
is demonstrated unqualifiedly, but not defined unqualifiedly.
Reply to Obj. 2. An accident is defined both according to form and accord-
ing to matter. Like the accident itself, its definition according to form is
demonstrated. The definition according to matter can be given in two ways,
through the subject and through the definition of the subject. The mate-
rial definition given through the subject is the middle term of the demon-
stration of the formal definition and is in its turn demonstrated by taking
as middle term the material definition given through the definition of the
subject. This latter, therefore, is the principle of demonstration and hence
demonstrates but is not demonstrated. In conclusion, the formal defini-
tion is demonstrated but does not demonstrate, while the definition given
through the subject both demonstrates and is demonstrated.
Reply to Obj. 3. It is true that the definition of C contains two subjects, but
those subjects are neither entirely different from nor completely identical
with one another, but relate to one another as genus and differentia in such
a way that one of them is determined by the other. Thus, the subject of B is
contained in the subject of C not actually, but potentiallywhich implies
that the definition of C does not contain a repetition.
Moreover, it is not true that the subject cannot be part of the definition of
an accident if it is not also part of its essence. For even if the subject is not
part of the essence of the accident, it is nonetheless the cause of its essence.
And a definition must reveal the cause of the object defined, if it must reveal
its nature completely.
Reply to Obj. 4. The dependence of accidents on substance is not the same
as that of sensible substances on separate ones: the former dependence
is in fact conjoined, the latter, by contrast, is disjoined. Therefore, sepa-
rate substances do not figure in the definition of sensible substances. The
dependence of accidents on substance is rather similar to the dependence

of natural forms on matter. And matter is mentioned in the definition of
natural forms, as the case of the definition of the soul plainly shows.
Moreover, it does not seem that universals are not apart from particulars.
For they are not apart from particulars as to their being, but are apart from
them as to their essence. Therefore, universals are not defined through the
principles of particulars taken in an unqualified sense, but rather through
the principles of particulars taken universally.
Chapter 4
Aristotle investigates the identity or distinctness between a quiddity and
its being, and so raises the question of whether the what-something-is is
identical with that of which it is the what-something-is or different from it.
This chapter falls into two parts: (1) in the first, Aristotle argues on both sides
of the question; (2) in the second, he solves the question by means of three
conclusions.
Part 1
Aristotle argues that the what-something-is is the same as that of which it is
the what-something-is. For each thing is the same as its substance and the
what-something-is is nothing but the substance and essence of a thing. In
the previous chapter, in fact, it has been shown that the quiddity of a thing
is the same as its substance and essence, so that the substance of a thing and
its what-something-is (quod quid est)3 are really one and the same thing and
differ only conceptually. Aristotles text (1031a1518).
Aristotle argues against the identity: in the case of accidental predicates
the what-something-is is different from the thing of which it is the what-
something-is. Therefore, it is not universally true that a thing and its what-
something-is are one and the same. Take the case, for instance, of the acci-
dental predicate white man which is predicated of man. The quidditative
being of a white man in so far as he is white, for instance, is not the same
as the white man in so far as he is a man. For suppose it were. Then, it
would follow that the quiddity of white would be the same as the quiddity
of manwhich is impossible. The consequence could be accepted by those
who think that all forms are accidents: for they do not see any difference
between the quiddity of a white man, in so far as he is white, and his quiddity
3 In Latin quiddity and what-something-is (quod quid est) are etymologically related.
in so far as he is a man. In conclusion, things that are predicated accidentally

are not of the same quiddity as the substances of which they are predicated.
This general point can be confirmed. For man is not only white but also
musical, and is a sort of middle term between these two extremes that are
predicated of him. Now, if white is quidditatively the same as man, so is
musical. But then, white should be quidditatively the same as musical: for
when two things are quidditatively the same as a third one, they are also
quidditatively the same as one another. For it is true that, when two things
are accidentally the same as a third thing, they are also accidentally the
same as one another, as is the case with white and musical, which are both
accidentally the same as man. So, the principle should hold also for the
case of quidditative identity. But white is clearly not quidditatively the same
as musical. So, white and musical are not quidditatively the same as man,
either.
One might say that white and musical, from the point of view of their
quiddity, are at least accidentally identical. But this is false. For, just as
whiteness is not accidentally the same as blackness, so the quidditative
being of white is not accidentally the same as the quidditative being of
musical. Aristotles text (1031a2528) corresponding to the confirmation of the
general point.
Notandum. Averroes explains the sense of Aristotles enquiry by mak-
ing reference to Platos doctrine. Plato posited two kinds of substance, i.e.
ideal Forms and sensible individuals. He called the former universal quid-
dities and the latter particular quiddities. Moreover, he separated such two
kinds of substance in place and subject by collocating them in two different
realms. Thus, Aristotle asks the question whether a specific or generic quid-
dity is really different from a particular quiddity, i.e. whether, for instance,
the humanity in virtue of which Socrates is a man is the same as or different
from the humanity in virtue of which he is Socrates.
Objection to Aristotles argument against the identity between a thing and
its quiddity. Man and horse are quidditatively the same as animal, but are
not the same as one another. Likewise, white and coloured are accidentally
the same as man, but not accidentally the same as one another, in that a
white thing is per se coloured, just as whiteness is a colour per se.
Reply. When two things are the same as something taken as an individual,
they are also the same as one another. They are not so, by contrast, when
such two things are the same as something taken as a species or a genus:
Socrates and Plato are the same as man, but are not the same as one
another. Clearly, Aristotle is talking about numerical sameness, for which
the principle clearly holds. Moreover, it can be said that white and coloured
are accidentally the same, not because a white thing is accidentally coloured
but rather because a coloured thing is accidentally white. It must also be
remembered that this part of Aristotles text is merely dialectical.
Aristotle solves the question through three conclusions.
Conclusion 1. In the case of per se predicates, the what-something-is is the same

as that of which it is the what-something-is.
The conclusion is proved in five ways.
Proof 1. If in the case of per se predicates the quiddity and that of which it is
the quiddity are different, then there will be Ideas of Ideas and substances
prior to primary substanceswhich is in conflict with Platos view that
there are some substances of which there is no Idea and to which no other
substance is prior. If, as Plato maintains, (i) the quiddity of each thing is
different from it, and (ii) every substance has a quiddity, then every Idea will
have a quiddity distinct from itself. But, according to Plato, every quiddity is
an Idea; so every Idea will have an Idea distinct from itself. Moreover, since
a quiddity is prior to that of which it is the quiddity, and Ideas are primary
substances, there will be substances prior to primary substances. Aristotles
text (1031a28b3) corresponding to Proof 1.
Proof 2. If a quiddity is different and separate from that of which it is
the quiddity, it follows that there will be no science of sensible substances
and that non-sensible substances will be not beings. By being separate
it should be understood that a quiddity is not in that of which it is the
quiddity and vice versa, so that, for instance, the quiddity of the good is not
in the good, nor does the good exist in its quiddity. Now, since everything
is known in virtue of its quiddity, and nothing can be known in virtue of
something extrinsic to itself, if separate substances and their quiddities are
separate, there will be no science of such quiddities, nor of the substances
of which they are the quiddities. And since the quiddity of a thing must be
necessarily in that thing, then the quiddities of sensible substances are not
beings, if they are separate. But Plato posited that the quiddities of sensible
substances are non-sensible substances. Therefore, non-sensible substances
are not beings, if they are separate. Aristotles text (1031b38) corresponding
to Proof 2.
Proof 3. If a quiddity is not the same as that of which it is the quiddity
and is separate from it, then no quiddity is a being. If in fact the quiddity of
the good is separate from the good and different from it, then the quiddity
of being is separate from being and is different from it. But if the quiddity
of being is not a being, no other quiddity can be a being, either. In fact,
suppose that the quiddity of a substance is a being. Then, since every being
is either substance or accident, and the quiddity of a substance cannot be
an accident, such a quiddity must be a substance. But this cannot be the
case, for a substance and its quiddity are different and separate, and so the
quiddity of a substance is not a substance. The same argument applies to the
essence of an accident: suppose that the essence of an accident is a being.
Then, since the essence of an accident cannot be a substance, it must be an
accident. But this too must be ruled out, because an accident and its essence
are different and separate, and so the essence of an accident cannot be an
accident. Aristotles text (1031b810) corresponding to Proof 3.
Proof 4. The good will be non-good. If that in which whiteness does not
inhere is non-white, that in which goodness does not inhere is non-good.
But goodness does not inhere in the good, if the good and its essence are
separate. Therefore, the good is non-good. Thus, the quiddity of the good
must be the same as the good, and in general all the things that are said per
se, in the first sense of per se, must be the same as their quiddities. And it is
not necessary to posit separate quiddities: it is sufficient to posit quiddities
existing in the things of which they are the quiddities, even if we do not
posit separate quiddities. What is more, separate quiddities would not serve
the purpose for which they were posited in the first place. Platonists in
fact posited separate species as if the quiddities existing in things were not
sufficient to explain the knowledge of things. On the contrary, only if we
posit quiddities existing in the things are we able to explain our knowledge
of them. For, if the quiddity of something is separate from it, to know the
quiddity is not to know the thing of which it is the quiddity, but something
different. Aristotles text (1031b1115) corresponding to Proof 4.
Proof 5. If the quiddities of things were separate Ideas, as Plato believed,
then sensible substances would not be substances. For separate substances
cannot be in and said of sensible substances, otherwise they would be sub-
stances only by participation, whilst Plato took them to be substances essen-
tially. (Everything that is in sensible substances and is predicated of them is,
according to Plato, a being only by participation). But the only way in which
sensible substances could be substances is by having substantial quiddities
and forms existing in them and predicated of them. Therefore, sensible sub-
stances are not substances. Aristotles text (1031b1518) corresponding to Proof
5.
From the foregoing arguments Aristotle draws his main conclusion, i.e.
that the quiddity and that of which it is the quiddity are not really different,
but rather one and the same thing, and are so not accidentally, but essen-
tially as well as per se in the first sense of per se. Thus, it is evident that to
know a thing is to know its quiddity, and that the quiddity of a thing must
exist in that very thing; otherwise, a quiddity would not make known the
thing of which it is the quiddity. Aristotles text (1031b1822) corresponding to
the main conclusion.
Notandum. Averroes maintains in his commentary that universal predi-
cables, both in the concrete and in the abstract, are not essentially distinct
from the individuals of which they are predicated: Socrates and rational ani-
mal are one and the same thing, and Socrates is nothing but animality and
rationality. Nor are animality and rationality different from the quiddity of
Socrates, so that the animality of Socrates and the common animality are
not two animalities, but only one.
Now, it cannot be said that Averroess argument is merely dialectical,
because further down in his commentary he restates the same point by say-
ing that sensible substances, which are primary substances and individuals
in the category of substance, are not really different from their quiddities,
but only conceptually and according to the mode of signification. The con-
cept of Socrates is a concept of incommunicability, which signifies in the
manner of a subject and concerns the individuating principles. The con-
cept of humanity or animality, by contrast, is a concept of communicability,
which signifies in the manner of form and does not concern the individ-
uating principles. Therefore, Socrates is really the same as animality and
rationality, but differs from each of them conceptually; otherwise, there
would not be any man or animal other than Socrates. And the same view
should be understood in Aristotles claim that, in sentences like Socrates
is a man or A man is an animal, the essence of the predicate is identical
with the subject, so that the quiddity of man is identical with Socrates and
the quiddity of animal is identical with man.
This view could be contested on the basis of Burleys doctrine in his com-
mentary on the Physics, where he says that universals exist extra-mentally
in their particulars as really distinct from them. He presents four arguments
for this conclusion.
Arg. 1. Avicenna says in the first Book of his Sufficientia that nature first
intends the species and not the individual. Suppose that fire A produces fire
B. If As intention was to produce B as an individual, then when A intends to
produce the same thing once again, its intention will be forever frustrated,
given that it can no longer produce B.
Arg. 2. An animal that goes after food does not go after particular food,
because it may not have perceived any particular food, but rather after
universal food. Therefore, particular food and universal food are differ-
ent.
Arg. 3. He who promises money promises something. But he does not
promise a particular sum, but money in general. Therefore, money as a
particular is different from money as a universal.
Arg. 4. It is the universal that is defined and not the particular. Therefore,
no particular is a universal and hence Socrates is not what animal or com-
mon man is. Nor is the quiddity of man or the quiddity of animal identical
with Socrates. For, if humanity and Socrates were identical, since Socrates
runs, humanity should run toowhich does not sound correct.
Reply to Arg.1. Even if nature intends the species and not the individual,
it does not follow that the species is not the individual, just as from the
fact that man signifies first man and then Socrates does not follow that
Socrates is not (a) man. It can be conceded, however, that no particular is a
universal: from Socrates is the common animal and the common animal is
a universal there does not follow Socrates is a universal. For in the premiss
Socrates is taken in simple supposition, while in the conclusion it is taken
in personal supposition.
Moreover, even if nature first intends the species, it does not intend to
produce the species but the individual, because the common man nei-
ther generates nor is generated. Consequently, it must be conceded that A
intends to produce B. When B is produced, however, the same intention
remains but is no longer the intention of producing B, but rather that of
producing something of the same species as B. Thus, the intention of the
producer is not frustrated.
Reply to Arg. 2. A hungry animal does not go after universal food, but
particular food, in that universal food cannot be eaten and digested. Thus, it
goes after infinite particular foods, even if it may have never perceived any
of them, for its appetite is not a determinate one, but is rather confused and
proceeds from natural instinct.
Reply to Arg. 3. Likewise, he who promises money does not promise
universal money, but a particular sum of money, in the sense that he does
not promise one in particular, but infinite particular sums of money. His
promise in fact is not determinate, but rather confused, in that it can be
kept by giving any of an infinite number of sums.
Reply to Arg. 4. It is true that no particular is a universal. From this, how-
ever, it does not follow that Socrates is not the common animal or the
common man, for such an inference illegitimately shifts from simple to per-
sonal supposition. The same mistake is detectable in the inference Socrates
runs and he himself is humanity, therefore humanity runs: for the verb to
run is taken in personal supposition in the antecedent (just like Socrates)

and in simple supposition in the consequent (just like humanity). Thus,
the right conclusion is that humanity is Socrates running. From these con-
siderations it is evident that the following inference This is Socrates, this
is Plato (where this stands for humanity), therefore Socrates is Plato is
not valid, because from premisses containing different kinds of supposition
there does not follow a conclusion containing only one of them. For in the
inference the middle term humanity is in personal supposition, while the
extremes (Socrates and Plato) are in simple supposition just as they are
in the conclusion. Thus, the only thing that follows is that Socrates is some-
thing which is Plato, where something stands for the common nature.
Conclusion 2. In the case of accidental predicates, the what-something-is is not

the same as the thing of which it is the what-something-is.
When in a sentence the subject and the predicate are not the essence of each
other, nor is one part of the essence of the other, then the what-something-
is of the predicate is not the same as the subject. This is evident, because
assuming that it were the same entails a contradiction: if the predicate is the
what-something-is of the subject, then the quiddity of the predicate must
be the quiddity of the subject or part of it. Now, in the case of accidental
predicates, the nature of the predicate is not the essence of the subject
or part of it: in the proposition Man is white, the predicate signifies the
nature of an accident, whiteness, while the subject signifies the nature
of a substance, humanity. Therefore, in accidental predicates, the what-
something-is of the predicate is not the same as the subject. Aristotles text
(1031b2225) corresponding to Conclusion 2.
Aristotle further infers that the quiddity of an accident is the same as
its subject in one sense, while in another it is not the same. It is the same
denominatively, in that it is predicated of the subject of the accident not in
the abstract, but in the concrete, as when we say Man is white. It is not the
same, however, quidditatively, because the quiddity of an accident is not
the quiddity of a substance. Aristotles text (1031b2528) corresponding to the
further inference.
Notandum. Averroes explains Aristotles text by means of two proposi-
tions.
(i) The first is that accidents are not their subjects, although they are the
same as them. They are not their subjects because they are properties of
their subjects and so are in their subjects. And nothing of what is in a subject
is the subject itself. Accidents, however, are the same as their subjects in that
they are predicated of them, and what is predicated of something else is also
the same as it.
(ii) The second proposition is that accidents are predicated of substances
according to their name, but not according to their definition. This propo-
sition may appear false, because, if a man is white then he is a thing hav-
ing whiteness, and hence, if white is predicated of man according to its
name, it must also be predicated according to its definition. But clearly
Averroes means that accidents are predicated of substances not quiddi-
tatively, but denominatively. To be predicated of something according to
definition means to be the definition of something or part of it. But it is evi-
dent that accidents are not the definitions of substances or part of them.
And this is also Aristotles distinction in the Categories, when he says that
white is predicated according to its name, but not according to its defini-
tion.
Obj. 1. Just as man is the subject of animal in the category of substance,
white is the subject of coloured in the category of quality. And, since the
what-something-is of animal is the same as man, so the what-something-is
of coloured must be the same as white. Therefore, also in the case accidental
predicates there is identity between the what-something-is and the thing of
which it is the what-something-is.
Obj. 2. White man is predicated accidentally of man. But the what-
something is of white man is the same as man. Therefore, the identity holds
also for the case of accidental predicates. For the quiddity of white man is (i)
either the quiddity of man or (ii) that of white. If (i), we have the intended
conclusion. If (ii), one can reason in the following way: white man is equally
composed of man and white; therefore, the quiddity of the whole cannot be
the quiddity of one part more than it is the quiddity of the other. Thus, if
the quiddity of white man is the quiddity of white, it is also the quiddity of
man.
Reply to Obj. 1. It is true that the what-something-is of coloured is the
same as white, as Aristotle himself concedes in the text. But from this it does
not follow that in accidental predicates the what-something-is is identical
with the thing of which it is the what-something-is, for coloured and white
are predicated accidentally of substance, while they are predicated of one
another per se.
Reply to Obj. 2. Properly speaking, white man has no what-something-is
or quiddity, in so far as it is an accidental being. However, if it has some
what-something-is, it is the same as white and not the same as man: for the
quiddity and the what-something-is are drawn more from form than from
the subject. And in the composite white man, man plays the role of subject,
while white plays that of form.
Conclusion 3. Every what-being-is is the same as that of the which it is the what-
being-is.
This conclusion is different from the others, because it concerns the com-
position of an abstract with a concrete item, as in the sentence Man is
humanity. Conclusion 1, by contrast, concerns the composition of a supe-
rior with its inferior and Conclusion 2 the composition of an accident with
its subject. Aristotle in fact takes the expression what-something-is (quod
quid est) to refer to the concrete and the expression what-being-is (quod
quid erat esse) to refer to the abstract.
The conclusion is proved in four ways.
Proof 1. If the what-being-is and the thing of which it is the what-being-is are
not one and the same thing, then a quiddity will have a quiddity. Suppose
that a horse has a quiddity which is different from it. Then, let A be the name
of such a quiddity. Now, the reason why a horse has a quiddity which is
different from it is that a thing and its quiddity cannot be really identical. But
A is a thing and so will have a quiddity which is really distinct from it. Thus
a quiddity will have a quiddity. Aristotles text (1031b2830) corresponding to
Proof 1.
Proof 2. The substance of a thing cannot be different in nature and essence
from the thing of which it is the substance. But the what-being-is of a thing
is its substance. Therefore, the what-being-is cannot be really distinct from
the thing of which it is the what-being-is, as if it were a nature and an essence
distinct from that thing. In some cases, it may be said that a quiddity is
really distinct from that of which it is the quiddityas when we say that
the quiddity of an accident is the quiddity of its subject only in some sense,
because it flows from and resolves into its subjectbut this is not true
in all cases. For substance, which is primary being, does not resolve into
anything else, nor does its quiddity flow from another quiddity. Therefore,
the quiddity of a substance does not really differ from its quiddity, nor
is a substance really distinct from its quiddity. Aristotles text (1031b3132)
Proof 3. Things that are one not accidentally, but essentially, do not really
differ. But a quiddity and the thing of which it is the quiddity are one
essentially. Therefore, they do not really differ. The case which is being
considered here is that in which one thing is the essence of another and not
that in which two things share the same essence. For two individuals share
the same specific essence and, nonetheless, they are different; likewise, two
species share the same generic essence, but are different from one another.
Man and rational animal, by contrast, do not involve any real difference,
because one is the essence of the other. But humanity is also the essence of
man. Therefore, also man and humanity do not really differ. Aristotles text
(1031b321032a2) corresponding to Proof 3.
Proof 4. If the quiddity of a thing and that of which it is the quiddity are
different, there will ensue an infinite regress of quidditiesthe impossibil-
ity of which is proved by Aristotle in Met., Book II, where he shows that it is
not possible to proceed ad infinitum in formal causes. Let A be the quiddity
of man and B its quiddity. It may be asked whether A and B are really differ-
ent. If they are not, for parity of reasons, man and his quiddity are not really
different, either; if they are really different, then B has a quiddity. Let that
quiddity be C and ask whether it is really different from B. If it is, then we are
off on an infinite regress; if it is not really different, then for parity of reasons,
man and his quiddity are not really different, either. Thus, if we do not want
to generate an infinite regress of quiddities, we must posit that the quiddity
and that of which it is the quiddity are not really different. Aristotles text
Aristotle sums up the results of his argument and concludes that in general,
with respect to the first sense per se, the what-something is or the what-
being-is are the same as the thing they belong to. It is not by chance that
Aristotle talks about the first sense of per se, because in the second sense
of per se the quiddity of the predicate is not the same as the subject. For
the subject is a substance and the predicate is an accident. Aristotles text
(1032a46).
Notandum 1. Averroes remarks that quiddity is not assigned only through
abstract terms, but also through concrete terms, so that not only animality,
rationality and the like are said to be quiddities, but also rational animal.
And just as man and rational animal are not separate from one another,
but are one and the same thing, so man, animality and rationality are not
separate from one another, but are rather one and the same thing. From
this it follows that many things are just one thing, although not in the same
way, because animality and rationality are one thing in actuality and many
things in potentiality: they are in fact different concepts, which can move
the intellect in different ways. Thus, just as man, animal and rational are
one thing and three concepts, so animality, rationality and humanity are
three quiddities and one nature or essence. For, exactly like intention and
concept, quiddity includes in its signification a relation to the intellect,
in that to predicate essentially (in quid) pertains to the intellect. And, just
as many things in potentiality are one thing in actuality, so quiddities that
are many formally are one thing materially, as is the case with animality and
rationality.
Notandum 2. Averroes implies that the thing defined and its definition
do not differ really, but only conceptually and with respect to their mode of
signification. Man in fact is not only one thing in the sense that he cannot
be the same as his definition; however, since a definition has parts that the
thing defined signifies only implicitly, in this sense, the thing defined and
its definition are different.
From Averroess comment, together with his previous one, it follows
that a quiddity is not a nature which is really different from the thing it
belongs to, but a concept or intention which is different from such a thing
only conceptually. Therefore, just as animal and rational are parts of man,
so animality and rationality are parts of humanity; and just as animal is
the form of man, so animality is the form of humanity. So, it can be said
that the quiddity of man has a quiddity in the manner of a part which is
contained in the quiddity of mana part which is different from the whole
only conceptually, and not in the manner of a form which contains the
quiddity of man.
Arguments against Conclusion 3.
Arg. 1. In composite substances a quiddity is not the same as that of which it
is the quiddity. For matter does not pertain to the quiddity of composite
substances, but only form does, as Plato rightly thought. For a quiddity
cannot be separated from what pertains to it. But we see, for instance, that
the circle exists in many different kinds of matter and so can be separated
from each of them. But even if the circle existed in only one kind of matter,
nonetheless matter would not pertain to its quiddity. Therefore, even if the
quiddity of man is found only in one kind of matter, matter does not pertain
to it.
Moreover, a quiddity is what is signified by a definition. But many parts
of a composite substance, like for instance the fingers and the hands in
the case of a man, are not mentioned in its definition. Therefore, there are
many parts of a composite substance that do not belong to its essence. On
this basis, Plato concluded that matter does not belong to the essence of
composite substances, and, furthermore, that a composite substance, for
instance a man, is not the same as its quiddity. And this view seems to be
endorsed by Aristotle himself when he says in De an., Book III, that water is
other than what it is to be water, i.e. the essence of water.
Arg. 2. In simple substances a quiddity is not the same as that of which

it is the quiddity. For simple substances have no quiddity, in that every-
thing that has a quiddity is predicated essentially (in quid); but simple sub-
stances are not predicated essentially, for they are not species or genera in
some category, nor are their definitions composed of genus and differen-
tia.
Arg. 3. The quiddity and that of which it is the quiddity are not one
and the same thing in the case of per se accidents, either. For the quiddity
of snubness is what is signified by its definition. Now, in the definition
of snubness we posit not only concavity, which falls within the nature of
snubness, but also the nose, which falls outside it. So, the nose belongs to
the quiddity of snubness but is not the same as snubness itself.
Arg. 4. The identity between a thing and its quiddity does not hold for the
case of accidental accidents, as can be shown. White in fact signifies both
the subject and the accident. It is clear, however, that the quiddity of white
is not the same as its subject, as Aristotle has shown in Conclusion 3. But it
can also be shown that the quiddity of white is not the same as whiteness,
either. For the quiddity of white includes both the subject and whiteness,
and nothing can be identical with one of its parts.
Reply to Arg. 1. Since mathematical objects abstract from sensible matter,
bronze and wood do not pertain to the quiddity of the circle. Since compos-
ite substances, by contrast, involve sensible matter, sensible matter itself
pertains to the essence of man and of the other sensible substances. And
just as there is no part of a man which is not also part of a rational animal,
so there is no part of a man which is not also part of his quiddity as it is
expressed in a definition. Conversely, since there are many parts of a man
that are not signified by the term man or included in the definition of man,
such parts are not included in his quiddity, either. As to Aristotles passage
in the De anima, some say that he must be talking of a conceptual differ-
ence between water and its essence. This interpretation, however, will not
do, because Aristotle immediately adds the remark that flesh and its essence
are one and the same. But clearly, flesh and its essence differ conceptually in
exactly the same way as water and its essence do. So, we must take Aristotle
to be talking of a causal predication employing indirect cases: water and its
essence are made of different principles, in that water has as its immediate
principles matter and form, while its essence has as its immediate principles
genus and differentia.
Reply to Arg. 2. In simple substances the quiddity is the same as that
of which it is the quiddity. First all, Aristotle says in De an., Book III, that
some things are the same as their quiddities, which Averroes takes to be
a reference to separate substances. Moreover, since intelligences cannot dif-

fer from one another only in number, in their case the quiddity and the
individual to which it belongs are made of the same principles. I concede,
furthermore, that all separate substances, except for God, are species in the
category of substance. God in fact falls within a category only by reduc-
tion.
Reply to Arg. 3. The nose does not pertain to the essence of the quiddity
of snubness as much as it does not pertain to the essence of snubness.
It is included in the definition of snubness not as something pertaining
to its essence and quiddity, but rather as something which determines
the dependence of snubness on the nose. The nose in fact figures in the
definition of snubness in an indirect case.
Reply to Arg. 4. Just as man and whiteness have their own quiddities, so
white has its own quiddity, which is composed of both the quiddity of man
and the quiddity of whiteness. However, the quiddity of white is mainly
composed of the quiddity of whiteness, for whiteness plays the role of form,
while man that of subject. Thus, even if it is true that the quiddity of white is
not identical with man or whiteness, it is nonetheless closer to the quiddity
of whiteness than to that of man.
Platonists advance a series of sophistical arguments against Aristotles con-
clusions. All the arguments contain the same mistake: they fallaciously use
premisses of different natures, one per se and the other per accidens, from
which nothing follows. So, Platonists commit the fallacy of accident and all
their arguments have in a sense the same solution, in that they all rest on
the same mistake.
One of such arguments is: Socrates and his quiddity are one and the same
thing; but Socrates is white; therefore the quiddity of Socrates and white
are one and the same thing. Another: man and humanity are one and the
same thing; but man runs, sits and disputes; so humanity too runs, sits and
disputes.
Both arguments rest on the assumption that, if Socrates and his quid-
dity or man and humanity are one and the same thing, they must be so
unqualifiedlywhich is false, because the quiddity of Socrates can be found
in something, say Plato, in which Socrates cannot be found, and something
is predicated of man which is not predicated of humanity. For man is a
species, while humanity is not, properly speaking, a species but rather a
specific nature: man, and not humanity, is the proper answer to the what-
question. Therefore, both arguments commit the fallacy of accident and so
are both solved in the same way. For, while Socrates and his quiddity are one
per se, Socrates and white are one only accidentally. Likewise, also man and
running are not one per se, but only accidentally. Aristotles text (1032a611)
corresponding to the Platonists arguments and their solution.
Notandum 1. Averroes reports another sophistical argument. Is man one
or not? If he is not, then no other composite substance will be one; if man
is one, since he is also animal and rational, he will be at the same time one
and many. Averroes replies that man and his definition are one and many,
but not in the same way: they are one in actuality and many in potentiality.
Man and rational animal are one in so far as they are one thing, and many
in so far as they are many concepts.
Notandum 2. Averroes explains the main sophistical argument in the
following way. It is asked whether the quiddity of man is man or is other than
man. If it is other, then man cannot be perfectly known. For man is known
through his quiddity; but his quiddity is other than him and nothing can
be known through something other than itself. If, by contrast, the quiddity
of man is man, and man has a quiddity, then the quiddity of man has a
quiddity, and, for parity of reasons, the latter quiddity has in its turn a
quiddity, and so on ad infinitum.
Averroes replies that man and his quiddity are neither unqualifiedly the
same nor unqualifiedly different. Humanity is the same as man, in that it,
like man, is not the form of the part, but the form of the whole; it differs
from man, however, in that it does not imply any composition of matter and
form, as man, instead, does. What Averroes has in mind is that humanity
signifies the human nature to the exclusion of any kind of supposit, be it
determinate or indeterminate; man, instead, signifies the human nature
including some kind of supposit, i.e. not a determinate supposit but an
indeterminate one; Socrates, finally, signifies the very same nature in a
determinate supposit. So neither Socrates nor man are formally the same as
humanity, but only identically the same. This is due to the different modes
of signification of the terms humanity, man and Socrates.
From Averroess words it should not be concluded that the quiddity of
a thing is drawn only from form, as Platonists thought, because it is in fact
drawn from the whole composite and includes both the form and the matter
of the species. Quiddity, however, is said to play the role of form, in that
it is responsible for the denomination a thing has. And what denominates
something else is form. And since the quiddity signifies in the manner
of form and the thing that has the quiddity signifies in the manner of a
composite, Aquinastogether with Alexander, Albert and Gilessays that
the sentence Man is humanity is as impossible as White is whiteness, and
so are also Animal is animality and Rational is rationality. For animality
is not a species, but the principle of a species as much as animality is not a

genus but the principle of a genus, and rationality is not a differentia but the
principle of a differentia. From this it follows that Socrates, although being
a man and rational, is not humanity or rationality.
Objection. The view defended by Aquinas and the others does not seem
to square with Averroess position. For he concedes that Socrates is nothing
but animality and rationality. From this, together with the further sentences
Socrates is something and Animality and rationality is something, it
follows that Socrates is animality and rationality. It also follows, against
Aquinass and the others conclusions, that animal is animality and rational
is rationality.
In the same vein, Averroes says that the quiddity of man is in some sense
manwhich could not be the case if the sentence Humanity is man were
just impossible in the same way as the sentence White is whiteness. For,
since whiteness is not white in any way, nor is white whiteness, it would
follow that humanity is not man in any way, nor is man humanity. But the
comparison is ill-chosen, because humanity is the form of the whole, in that
it expresses the whole nature of man, whereas whiteness is the form of the
part. Therefore, humanity must be predicated of man.
Moreover, humanity is a substance in the category of substance. There-
fore, it is either man, or horse, or stone or wood. But it is clearly neither
horse nor stone nor wood. Therefore, it is man.
Reply. All the aforementioned sentences are true not according to formal
predication, but according to identical predication. For the difference in the
mode of predication does not exclude the possibility for a concrete item to
be predicated of an abstract one. For, otherwise, it would not be true to say
that God is deity, or that being is entity, and all the sentences such as Man
is an animal, Man is rational or Man is a rational animal would turn out
to be false on account of the difference in the mode of predication between
the predicate and the subject. On the contrary, if a quiddity is the same as
that of which it is a quiddity, it must be predicated of that of which it is the
quiddity and vice versa. Thus, if matter were the whole substance of fire, it
would be fire; but humanity is the whole substance of man, and animality
is the whole substance of animal; so humanity must be man, and animality
must be animal.
Further objections.
Obj. 1. If Socrates is his quiddity, then a quiddity has a quiddity. For Socrates
has a quiddity; but Socrates is his quiddity; therefore, a quiddity has a
quiddity.
Obj. 2. Man is a species and animal is a genus. Therefore, humanity is a

species and animality is a genus.
Obj. 3. Every man is corruptible. So, if humanity is man, then humanity
is corruptiblewhich seems to be false, because species are eternal. Thus,
what is corruptible turns out to be incorruptible.
Obj. 4. Every man is incommunicable. Thus, if humanity is man, it is
incommunicable. However, humanity seems to be communicable, because
it is found in many things.
Reply to Obj.1. The consequence Socrates has a quiddity; Socrates is his
quiddity; therefore a quiddity has a quiddity cannot be conceded, because
has qualifies Socrates in the premiss and the quiddity in the conclusion.
All that follows is A quiddity is Socrates who has a quiddity, just as from
The blacksmith is good and the blacksmith is a man does not follow A
man is good, but only A man is a good blacksmith.
Reply to Obj. 2. The consequence Man is a species; man is humanity;
therefore, humanity is a species must be denied. First of all, because one
should not draw any conclusion on the basis of pure and indeterminate par-
ticulars; second, because the argument contains the fallacy of accident, in
that being a species is only accidental to man. One might try to build up
a syllogism in the third figure along the following lines: Man is a species;
every man is humanity; therefore, humanity is a species. But this will not
do, either. For the syllogism actually contains four terms, in that man is
taken in simple supposition in the major premiss and in personal supposi-
tion in the minor.
Reply to Obj. 3. The syllogism Every man is corruptible; every man is
humanity; therefore, every humanity is corruptible also contains four
terms, because corruptible qualifies man in the major premiss and hu-
manity in the conclusion. So, all that follows is Humanity is (a) man who
is corruptible.
Reply to Obj. 4. Likewise, we must deny the following consequence: Every
man is incommunicable; some humanity is man; therefore, some human-
ity is incommunicable. All that follows is Some humanity is (a) man who
is incommunicable. However, the sentence The communicable is incom-
municable admits of different readings: if the predicate is an adjective of
the subject, then it is false; if, on the contrary, the predicate is a neuter sub-
stantivised adjective, it is true, for it is equivalent to The communicable is
a thing that is incommunicable. And the same treatment should be given
to the sentence The corruptible is corruptible.
It should finally be remarked that Aristotles intention in this treatise was
to reject Platos view that we need to posit separate quiddities in order to
explain our acquisition of science. Aristotle and Plato agree that our science
of sensible things depends on the quiddities of such things. They disagree,
however, on the nature of those quiddities. Plato maintains that the quid-
dities of sensible things are separate from them in place and subjectthey
are in fact in the sphere of constellationsand so can move our possible
intellect unaided by the agent intellect which exists in us. Aristotle, by con-
trast, holds that such quiddities are conjoined to sensible things and are
identical with them, and so cannot move the intellect except through rep-
resentations. And since particular things are intelligible only potentially,
we need to posit the agent intellect, which removes the potentiality of par-
ticular things and the privation associated with representations, thereby
enabling the quiddities of sensible things to move the possible intellect
towards actual understanding. Now, Augustine says that the acquisition of
science is not sufficiently explained by the quiddities of sensible things
plus the agent intellect, and that an extra, separate quiddity is required,
which is the Idea in the divine mind, together with the light of the first
intelligence, which virtually contains in itself the light of the agent intel-
lect. For science concerns immutable and necessary things. But it is clear
that our intellect is mutable, in that it is pure potentiality, and also rep-
resentations are mutable. And so are the quiddities that are conjoined
to sensible things, in that they change together with the things they are
conjoined to and possess necessity and perpetuity only in virtue of the
necessity and perpetuity of the Ideas contained in Gods mind, which are
necessary and sempiternal forms. Thus, the particular agent does nothing
which is not also done by the virtue of the primary cause, neither is any-
thing known through the quiddities of sensible substances which is not
also known in the virtue of the ideal quiddities. Likewise, principles and
conclusions are not formally understood in the light of the agent intellect
unless they are first virtually understood in the light of the first intelli-
gence.
In conclusion, in order to acquire science we do not require Platos
separate quiddities, which are in the sphere of constellations. Neither are
Aristotles quiddities sufficient to fully explain science, but we also need
to posit, in addition to them, the exemplary quiddities, which exist in the
intellect of the first being.
Treatise II
In this treatise Aristotle shows against Plato that we do not need to posit
separate quiddities in order to explain generation, after having shown in
the previous treatise that separate quiddities are not necessary to explain
knowledge.
Chapter 1
Aristotle shows that the quiddity is not the effect of generation. The chap-
ter falls into two parts: (1) in the first, Aristotle introduces a preliminary
distinction; (2) in the second, he shows his main point by means of four
conclusions.
Part 1
Aristotle introduces the following distinction. Of the things that come to
be, some come to be by nature, some by art and others by chance. This
distinction is a direct consequence of Aristotles doctrine in Phys., Book II.
For all the things that come to be, come to be either (i) in virtue of a per
se cause or (ii) in virtue of an accidental cause. If (i), either such a cause
is a principle of change in the thing in which it isand this is natureor
is a principle of change in a thing in which it is notand this is art. If (ii),
then things come to be by chance, for they come to be differently from the
intention of the agent. If the agent is an intellect, they come to be by fortune;
if the agent is not an intellect, they come to be by chance. Everything that
comes to be by fortune is also said to come to be by chance, for chance has
more extension than fortune. Aristotles text (1032a1213) corresponding to
the preliminary distinction.
Notandum. Averroes explains that Aristotles argument is directed
against Platos Ideas. Plato posited Ideas for three reasons: to explain our
knowledge of sensible things, to explain their being and to explain their
generation. In the previous treatise Aristotle has shown that we must not
posit Ideas to explain the being of sensible things and our knowledge of
them. In this treatise, he further proves that sensible things do not come to
be from forms that exist separate from matter. And since Platos Ideas are
forms that exist separate from matter, they turn out to be useless when it
comes to explaining the generation of sensible things. It must be said, how-
ever, that, if Plato had collocated Ideas in Gods mind and not in the sphere
of constellations, Ideas would have turned out to be necessary to explain the
generation of sensible things. For everything that comes to be, comes to be
by the art of the prime mover, as Averroes explains in his commentary on

Met., Book XII. Now, the art of the prime mover is an Idea, just as we call
idea the house that exists in the mind of a builderin that it is an idea of
the house existing in bricks and stonesor the health in the mind of the
physicianin that it is an idea of the health that the physician produces in
a body. Moreover, Augustine says that man has been created through one
account and horse through another. But such accounts are Ideas existing in
the intellect of the primary cause. Thus, all the things that come to be by
nature, also come to be by art, i.e. by the art of the primary cause, though
not by the art of the secondary causes.
Now, when Aristotle introduces his threefold distinction, he is clearly
talking about particular and proximate causes. And so is Averroes. The
things that come to be by chance are said to come to be by themselves:
the expression indicates the lack of a determinate cause in the case of
generation by chance. Therefore, a per se cause is a determinate cause
attaining the effect it intends, while chance is an indeterminate cause
attaining an effect it does not intend, while a determinate cause that does
not attain the effect it intends is simply vain.
Part 2
Aristotle proves his main point by means of four conclusions.
Conclusion 1. Everything that is generated has three principles: the efficient

cause, matter and form.
Generation is a special case of movement, as Aristotle says in the Categories.
So, since in every movement we need to posit three things, the mover, the
thing moved and the terminus of the movement, so in every generation we
need to posit the thing that brings about generation, matter and form, which
are the principles of every generation. By form we should understand
sometimes a substantial form, sometimes an accidental one, for generation
is completed sometimes through a substantial form and sometimes through
an accidental one. At times, in fact, what is generated is a substance, at
others a quantity or an entity belonging to one of the other accidental
categories. Aristotles text (1032a1315) corresponding to Conclusion 1.
Objection. In Phys., Book V, Aristotle says that movement pertains only to
three categories, i.e. quantity, quality and place. Here, instead, he seems to
attribute movement to every category.
Reply. We should distinguish two kinds of movement, i.e. per se and
accidental movement. When per se movement is taken strictly and so is
contrasted with generation, it can be attributed only to the three aforemen-

tioned categories. When, by contrast, per se movement is taken broadly so
as to include generation and corruption as well, it can be found in four cat-
egories, i.e. substance, quantity, quality and place, as Aristotle says in Phys.,
Book III. Accidental movement, finally, can be attributed to every category,
in that entities belonging to all the categories can be the termini of an acci-
dental movement.
Thus, Aristotle wants to show that the efficient cause, form and matter
are needed to explain both per se and accidental movements. He does not
mention privation, because it is only an accidental principle and disappears
when form supervenes. Neither does he mention the end, because it numer-
ically coincides with form or with the composite that is generated, as he
himself explains in Phys., Book II.
Aristotle proves Conclusion 1 inductively, and first in natural generation, then
in artificial generation and finally in generation by chance.
Natural generation. Natural generation is twofold, i.e. unqualified and quali-
fied. Unqualified generation is the generation of substances, while qualified
generation is the generation of accidents. For every generation takes its
name from its terminus. But substance is unqualified being, while accident
is qualified being. Therefore, the generation of substance is unqualified,
while that of accidents is only qualified generation.
Now, in the generation of substances, we need to posit the aforemen-
tioned three principles: there must be in fact something from which gen-
eration comes aboutand this is matteras well as something by which
generation comes aboutand this is the efficient cause. Moreover, there
must be something that comes into being as a result of generation, i.e. a
man, a plant or something of the sort. However, a man or a plant are gen-
erated only on account of a form that terminates generation, and hence
form is the third principle of generation as well as of the product of genera-
tion. These three principles perfectly correspond to three essential features
of substantial generation Aristotle establishes in the Physics. First, gener-
ation is the actuality of a potential being qua potentialand so it requires
matter, which is potentiality and not actuality (Phys., Book III). Second, gen-
eration is the actuality of the thing that brings about generation, which is
an instrument of generationand so generation requires an efficient cause
too (Phys., Book III). Third, generation must be the road to nature, and so it
requires form. For the form generation is directed towards is nature (Phys.,
Book II). The three aforementioned principles are required also in the case
of qualified generation: when a quantified or a qualified thing is generated,
there must be a subject underlying the movement, an agent conferring the

quantity or the quality as well as a quantity or a quality that terminates
generation. Aristotles text (1032a1519).
There are two objections to this conclusion, which Aristotle himself solves in
the text.
Obj. 1. All that is required in natural generation is the agent and form. For
generation is a change from not-being to being, but nothing can make itself
pass from not-being to being. So, in addition to that which acquires being
as a result of generation, i.e. form, an agent is also required to confer being.
Matter, by contrast, does not seem to be required.
Reply. Just as the notion of change from not-being to being makes clear
that a form and an agent are needed, so the notion of potentiality for not-
being makes clear that matter is required as well. For all things that come to
be, whether by nature or by art, have matter, in virtue of which they can be
or not be. Matter in fact is that in virtue of which a thing can be and not be.
Aristotles text (1032a2022) corresponding to the first objection and the reply.
Obj. 2. If the agent, form and matter are the principles of natural gener-
ation, all of them can be rightly described as nature. However, in Phys.,
Book II, Aristotle says that only matter and form can be called nature.
Reply. The efficient cause, matter and form are all in some sense nature.
Matter is nature because it is the passive principle in natural generation,
so that, for instance, the generation of the elements is said to be natural
only on account of matter, in that their generation does not come about
from inside but from outside. For the form of the elements is capable of
local movement, while their matter is capable also of being altered by
something extrinsic. If matter is nature because it is the subject of natural
generation, also form is nature, because it is the terminus towards which
generation is directed. Every generation in fact is named after its terminus.
Now, the formal terminus of generation is form, while the material one
is the composite. Thus, both form and the composite are nature: form is
nature because it terminates generation; the composite is nature for the
same reason and also because it contains nature. Finally, the producer (i.e.
the agent) is nature because it is of the same species as the thing generated
and so must also be of the same nature as it. Therefore, if the thing generated
is nature, the producer must be so as well. Aristotles text (1032a2226)
corresponding to the second objection and the reply.
Notandum 1. Averroes explains that only the things in the category of
substance are generated in the strict sense of the term. For generation is
a change from not-being to being and such a change is undergone only by
things in the category of substance. Things in the other categories are not
properly generated, because they do not pass from not-being to being, but
from not being such to being such. In accidents the change is from one
contrary to another and not from one contradictory to another, as is the case
with substances. When something hot becomes cold, the hot thing does not
cease to be, but simply becomes cold, and the cold thing does not begin
to be, but simply begins to be cold. Thus, things in accidental categories
are not properly generated, but rather undergo some change in virtue of
an alteration. This is the reason why Aristotle talks especially of substances
here.
Notandum 2. In an old translation, which Averroes quotes and com-
ments upon, Aristotle says that the natural producer is sometimes the same
in species as the product, and sometimes only similar to the product on
account of the conformity of both the producer and the product with one
common genus. The latter case occurs, for instance, when a horse and a don-
key generate a mule. So, the producer and the product are sometimes of
the same specific natureand this is an instance of univocal generation,
while sometimes they are only of the same generic natureas it is the case
with equivocal generation and especially when one thing is generated by
two others that share the same generic form.
Objection. The sentence Matter is that in virtue of which a thing can
be and not be does not seem to be true. For one thing, the heaven is
material but cannot be and not be, because it is incorruptible. For another,
intelligences and prime matter can be and not be, in that they essentially
depend on the will of the first being, but are not material.
Reply. Neither the potentiality for form nor that for being belong to the
essence of matter, as Averroes proves in his commentary on Phys., Book I.
Thus, even if matter is that in virtue of which something can be and not
be, it does not follow that everything in which there is matter can be and
not be. Aristotle in fact does not talk about any matterfor according to
its essence matter is not that in virtue of which something can be and not
bebut only about the matter that has privation associated with it and so
is the subject of generation. Moreover, there are two kinds of potentiality,
subjective potentiality, i.e. potentiality for form, and objective potentiality,
i.e. potentiality for being. If intelligences and prime matter can be and not
be, this is not in virtue of the subjective potentiality but of the objective
potentiality, which is not what Aristotle has in mind in the text. In any case,
Aristotle would say that intelligences and prime matter cannot be and not
be, but are necessary substances in that they receive their necessity from
the first being.
Artificial generation. Artificial generation should be properly called produc-

tion. There are in fact three kinds of operation: the operation of nature,
which is properly called generation, that of the speculative intellect, which
is called action in so far as it does not pass into external matter, and that of
the practical intellect, which is called production. Even though the term
production is sometimes used in natural operations as well, it is most prop-
erly used in artificial operations, where the agent has a certain control over
the product so that it may produce it in a given way but also otherwise
which does not happen in natural generations, where the agent produces
its effects in a fixed and determinate way.
Thus, Aristotle wants to prove that Conclusion 1 also holds in the case of
artificial generations, i.e. productions, as well. Of productions, some come
from art, some from power and others from the mind. The productions
coming from art are those in which the practical intellect possesses a pro-
ductive aptitude accompanied by the correct definition of the product, as
in the production of a house or of a statue. Those productions, by contrast,
come from power that the intellect carry out only in virtue of the natural
potentiality of a natural body, such as pulling, throwing and so on. We say,
finally, that a production comes from the mind if it is accomplished by the
intellect only in virtue of the energy and aptitude existing in the cognitive
faculty. We see, for instance, sometimes ordinary people discuss and use
syllogisms in the way in which people possessing the dialectical art also
do.
Moreover, just as in natural generation one and the same thing is some-
times produced by nature and sometimes by chance (animals, for instance,
are sometimes generated from sperm and sometimes without it), so in arti-
ficial productions, one and the same thing can be the product of art or that
of chance, as is the case with health which can be produced by a doctor or
by a mid-wife. And the art is rightly assimilated to nature. For in both cases,
the effect can be sometimes the one intendedand so it will be the result of
nature or artand sometimes a different oneand so it will be the result
of chance.
In conclusion, it is clear that in all artificial productions, whether they
come from art, from power or from the mind, and also whether they come
from a per se cause or are just come about by chance, we need to posit
the three principles mentioned in Conclusion 1. Aristotles text (1032a2632)
corresponding to artificial production.
Digression. With regards to Aristotles words the same things can come to
be from sperm and without sperm there are three opinions.
Avicennas opinion. Everything that is generable from sperm can also

be generated without it. Avicenna puts forward four arguments for his
conclusion.
Arg. 1. Everything can be generated from those things into which it
resolves. But every animal resolves into the elements. Therefore, every
animal can be generated from a mixture of elements without sperm.
Arg. 2. The causes of contraries are contrary. But generation and cor-
ruption are contrary. Therefore, so must be their causes as well. Now, it
is evident that the heavenly bodies together with the elements are suffi-
cient to bring about the corruption of every animal without the concourse
of an agent of the same species as the thing undergoing corruption. There-
fore, heavenly bodies and the elements, when they act in the contrary way,
must be sufficient to bring about the generation of every animal without the
concourse of an agent of the same species as the thing undergoing genera-
tion.
Arg. 3. A superior power can do all that can be done by an inferior
power and even more. But particular agents produce perfect animals by
means of sperm; therefore, the powers of the heavenly bodies should be
able to produce them without sperm. Thus, the following argument could
be advanced: the heavenly bodies exert an active power on inferior things;
but if, by some feature of theirs, the heavenly bodies can produce imperfect
animals without sperm, they can also produce, by some nobler feature of
theirs, perfect animals without sperm; and by some even nobler feature they
can produce the noblest animals without sperm.
Arg. 4. Things which are closer to the first principle can be produced more
immediately. Now, imperfect animals are produced by celestial powers.
Therefore, perfect animals can be produced more immediately, and hence
men and horses can be equally produced with or without sperm. Thus,
the following argument can be advanced: nature is exactly like art; but art
can produce artefacts of the same species out of different kinds of matter;
therefore, nature as well must be able to produce natural things of the same
species out of different materials, i.e. with and without sperm.
Against Avicennas position it might be said that no natural potentiality
is idle, otherwise it would be completely vain. But there are animals, such
as men and donkeys for instance, which we never see be generated directly
from earthwhich means that there is no such potentiality in the nature
of things. Otherwise it would be vain, in that it would be never reduced to
actuality.
Averroess opinion. No animals can be generated in both ways, i.e. with
and without sperm. He puts forward four arguments for his conclusion.
Arg. 1 (from the side of matter). To different matters there correspond

different forms. But sperm and earth are different matters. Therefore, the
mouse that comes from sperm and the one that does not come from sperm
differ in species.
Arg. 2 (from the side of form). A species, as a whole, is not by chance, even
though some individuals in the species may be by chance. But if one and the
same species could originate both with and without sperm, then the whole
species would be by chance. For that is casual which has no determinate
cause. But what can be generated both with and without sperm has no
determinate cause, for it can proceed indifferently from one cause or the
other.
Arg. 3 (from the side of the agent). From different immediate principles
there originate effects different in species. But an animal that is generated
from sperm and one that is generated without sperm have principles differ-
ent in species. Therefore, they themselves must be different in species.
Arg. 4 (from the side of the end). The movements of the different species
are distinct on account of the termini they are directed towards. But the
generation proceeding from sperm and that which does not proceed from
sperm are movements of different species. Therefore, also the termini to-
wards which they are directed, i.e. the animal that has been generated from
sperm and the one that has not been thus generated, must be different in
species.
This opinion too is false. For operation makes known form, just as change
makes known matter. And clearly the operation of the mouse coming from
sperm and that of the one that does not come from sperm are of the same
species. Therefore, also the two kinds of mouse in question are of the
same species. In the same way, the fire that comes from water and the fire
that comes from earth are of the same species, even though their matters
differ.
Aristotles opinion. Aristotles opinion is intermediate between Avi-
cennas and Averroess: the former contends that all animals can be indif-
ferently generated with and without sperm, while the latter maintains that
no animal can be generated both with and without sperm. Against Averroes
Aristotle holds that some animals can be generated without sperm; against
Avicenna, however, he contends that some animals are not indifferently
generable. So Aristotle has in mind a tripartite distinction between ani-
mals: some animals can only be generated without sperm, like for instance
some worms, others can be generated only from sperm by propagation,
like men and horses, while a third group can be generated both ways, like
mice and some species of snake. And also in the case of the products of art,
some things can be produced only by art, like houses, and some others both
by art and by chance, like health.
The rationale of this classification is the following. The more perfect some
thing is, the more are the things that are required for it to be produced:
for a thing is the more perfect the more it is removed from prime matter,
which is the most imperfect being. Among living beings, plants are the most
imperfect, and so they are generated both from seed and without seed, i.e.
from the putrefaction of matter in virtue of the action of a celestial power.
And the same two factors, i.e. putrefied matter and celestial power, are also
needed in the case of the imperfect animals which are generated both with
and without sperm, like for instance mice. Now, the mice that have been
generated without sperm by putrefaction beget something similar to them
by propagation, and so do the plants produced without seed. But this could
not be the case, if the things coming from seed and those that are generated
without it were not of the same species. As to the more perfect animals,
they need some extra factor to be generated. The power of the celestial
bodies in fact does not suffice in their case to bring about generation, but
a particular power is also required, which acts together with the celestial
power. This is the sense of Aristotles remark in Phys., Book II: A man
and the sunbegets a man from matter. Therefore, perfect animals require
for their generation a determinate agent, a determinate mode of action, a
determinate matter, i.e. the sperm of the male parent, and a determinate
place, i.e. the uterus of the female parent.
Replies to Avicennas arguments.
Reply to Arg. 1. Just as animals are not generated immediately out of the
elements, so they are not immediately corrupted into the elements, but first
into corpses. Moreover, more intermediate steps are required for something
to be generated than for something to be corrupted: the foetus and the
embryo are generated before the heart and the liver, but an animal does
not resolve into heart and liver before it resolves into foetus and embryo.
Avicenna seems also to assume that the mode of generation and corruption
is exactly the same in all different kinds of animal. So, by following his patter
of reasoning, one could conclude that, since some animals are not generated
without sperm, no animal can be so generated. But the generation of more
perfect animals requires more intermediate steps.
Reply to Arg. 2. The conclusion of the argument must be denied because
more things are required to produce something than to destroy it. If Avi-
cenna were right, then one could prove that nothing is produced by a uni-
vocal agent on the grounds that nothing is destroyed by a univocal agent.
Reply to Arg. 3. The conclusion must be denied, because there are some
effects that celestial powers cannot produce without the concourse of a
univocal agent, just as a builder cannot produce a house without some
instruments.
Reply to Arg. 4. Material and immaterial things are produced in opposed
ways. The closer immaterial things are to the first principle, the fewer are the
intermediate steps through which they are produced, while in the case of
material things, the closer they are to the first principle, the more numerous
are the intermediate steps required for their production. Moreover, it must
be remarked that, even if two artefacts of the same species may have matters
different in species, this is not the case with animals: the forms of the
artefacts, in fact, are accidents, while those of animals are substances.
Replies to Averroess arguments.
Reply to Arg. 1. There are two kinds of matter: the matter of generation,
which is corrupted when form supervenes, and the matter of the product,
which remains when form supervenes. The matter of generation can vary
without the form varying together with it, in that the same product can
come from different matters; the matter of the product, by contrast, cannot
vary without the form varying together with it. Now, the animals that are
generated from sperm and those that are generated without sperm have
different matters of generation but the same matter of the product. It is not
necessary for the matter of generation to be one and the same according
to substance and power at the beginning of the change, but it is enough
that it be so at the end. When fire is generated from water and earth,
for instance, water and earth are very different at the beginning of the
change, but they progressively assimilate to one another if not substantially,
at least accidentally and qualitatively. Likewise, the matter of the things
generated by putrefaction and that of the things generated by propagation
is specifically different at the beginning of generation, both substantially
and accidentally. Towards the end of the process, however, they are the
same virtually and qualitatively, because the celestial power disposes the
matter of the things generated by putrefaction to the same end as the sperm
disposes the matter on which it operates.
Reply to Arg. 2. Both the things generated from sperm and those that
are not so generated have a determinate cause and so none of them is an
accidental or casual being. An effect can be called accidental or casual, in
fact, if it can be produced in infinitely many ways and by infinitely many
causes. But it is clear that a certain species of animal can be produced only
in two ways and only by two causes.
Reply to Arg. 3. Different univocal causes produce different effects, while

different equivocal causes do not, because the equivocal cause virtually con-
tains the univocal one. Thus, specifically the same heat is generated univo-
cally by fire and equivocally by the sun. And the reason is the following: just
as the equivocal cause virtually contains the univocal one, it also virtually
contains its effects. Therefore, the effects of an equivocal and of a univocal
cause need not differ specifically.
Reply to Arg. 4. Even if the modes of generation of the animals generated
from sperm and of those generated without sperm are different, nonetheless
the movement and the generation are of the same species.
In order to clarify what has been said so far, Aristotle raises and answers four
questions.
Question 1. Whether the products of art and those of nature are generated by a
similar agent.
Answer: They are not generated by a similar agent, because the products of
nature are generated by an agent existing in matter, while those of art are
generated by an agent existing in the soul, which is said to be the species,
quiddity, substance, reason and science of the thing to be produced.
The productive disposition of the soul is called species, because it
produces something similar to itself in the same way as a natural form
produces something specifically similar to itself.
It is then said quiddity in that it makes known the thing to be produced
in a distinct and explicit way. Just as we form a speculative concept of a thing
which can be known, we also form a practical concept of a thing which can
be produced. And just as a thing which can be known is first known under a
confused concept and then under a distinct one, so is the case with a thing
which can be produced.
The productive disposition is also called primary substance, i.e. primary
form, by analogy with God, who is the primary form with respect to nat-
ural things in that He participates in the production of any natural thing.
Analogously, the productive disposition participates in the production of
any artificial thing.
Moreover, such a disposition is called reason because artefacts are
produced by means of a certain reasoning, similar to that employed by
speculative or moral thinking: a builder for instance reasons about how big
a house should be made or about the nature of the material required for its
production.
Finally, it is also called science, because the disposition is a cognition

of two contraries, a positive and a negative one. The health which is in the
soul, in fact, makes known both the health which is in matter and the state of
disease, which is its contrary. So, health and disease are contrary in matter,
but not in the soul: for the concept of health is also the concept of disease.
Aristotles text (1032a32b6) corresponding to Question 1.
Notandum. Averroes explains Aristotles text by means of four propositions.
Prop. 1. Artificial things have their forms and quiddities in the soul. This
should not be taken to refer to the objects of knowledge, for in this sense
all natural things have their forms and quiddities in the soul, but rather to
the causal forms and quiddities, similarly to how Platonists said of natural
things that they have causal forms and quiddities existing separately in the
sphere of constellations. Analogously, artificial things have the forms and
quiddities from which they are produced in the soul.
Prop. 2. Contrary forms existing in the soul are in a way one and the same
form. Contrary forms possess two kinds of being: a real being in matter and
an intentional being in the soul. And such two kinds of being are different,
because contrary forms are not the same in matter, but are in a way one and
the same form in the soul, in that numerically one concept represents both
contraries.
Prop. 3. Even though the soul receives contrary forms, the contrary forms
do not exist together in the soul. The first part of the proposition is evident,
because the soul knows contrary forms and so does receive them, although
not really, but intentionally. As to the second part of the proposition, just as
in the extra-mental world two contrary forms do not exist together, in that
the generation of the one is the corruption of the other, so, for the same
reason, two contrary forms do not exist together in the soul. And just as the
form of whiteness and that of blackness are not opposed to one another in
the medium or in the eye, so the concept of health and that of disease are
not opposed in the intellect.
Prop. 4. The intellect knows intentional forms through the corresponding
contrary forms and, vice versa, contrary forms through intentional forms.
The intellect in fact possesses a twofold movement, from the things to the
soul and from the soul to the things. In the first movement, it first knows
the contraries and then knows the corresponding intelligible species. For
in the first kind of movement natural forms are the causes of intelligible
species and the measures of them. In the second movement, by contrast,
the intellect first knows the intentional forms and then the contrary, natural
forms. For a builder knows the form of the house which he has in his soul
before he knows the form of the house which exists in matter. For in this
case intentional forms are the causes and measures of the forms existing
outside the soul.
Question 2. Whether natural and artificial things are produced in a similar

way.
Answer: They are produced in a similar way. For the first things that nature
intends is the last thing that is produced and the last thing that nature
intends is the first thing that is produced. And art proceeds in exactly
the same way. The first thing which nature intends in fact is to produce
something similar to itself, but this is in fact the last thing that is produced.
And the same is true of art. The first thing a doctor intends is health, the
second the balance of humours, the third heat and the fourth the potion.
He knows, however, that health can be obtained through the balance of
humours, the balance through heat and heat by means of a potion. Thus,
he starts operating not from the first thing that he intends and knows but
from the last: the first thing he makes is in fact a potion, in that the potion
will cause heat, heat will cause a certain balance of humours and this, in
turn, will cause health. Thus, a craftsman operates analytically by resolving
the final end into the means to the end until he comes to the last thing
known, which is also the first thing to be produced. Aristotles text (1032b6
10) corresponding to Question 2.
From his answer to Question 2 Aristotle infers one of his main conclusions,
i.e. that, just as a man comes from a man and hotness comes from hotness, so
health comes from health and a house from a house, in that the health which
is in matter comes from the health which is in the soul and the house which
is in matter from that which is in the soul. The health and the house in the
soul are the species and forms of those existing in matter. And Aristotle calls
the form without matter, i.e. the form in the soul, what-being-is. Aristotles
text (1032b1114) corresponding to the further conclusion.
Notandum. Averroes explains Aristotles text by remarking that any arti-
ficial thing has two forms, one in matter and another outside matter, i.e. in
the soul, like for instance the health in matter and the one in the soul. And
these two types of health are different, because the health in the soul is the
cause of the health in matter and is prior to it. However, they are also said
to be one and the same form, because, just as from matter and form there
results something which is essentially one, from agent and patient or from
cause and effect there results something which is one according to the oper-
ation. The actuality of the agent is the same as that of the patient, and this is
the sense in which the health in the soul and that in matter are one and the
same. Art and nature agree in that in both cases the product is generated by
something similar to the producer: the product is generated by something
formally similar if generation is univocal, and from something virtually simi-
lar if generation is equivocal. Artefacts are certainly generated by something
similar existing in the soul, which, however, is not unqualifiedly the same as
the product in that the intentional health and the real health differ specifi-
cally. The health in the soul in fact is not health unqualifiedly.
Question 3. Whether natural and artificial things are produced in a similar

way.
Answer: They are not produced in a similar way. For, unlike natural things,
artificial products are produced by means of two movements, one in the
agent, i.e. the craftsman, and the other in the patient, i.e. the product of the
art. We have said in fact that the craftsman first understands the product
and then the means to the products realisation, but in his operation he
starts from the means and not from the product. Thus, clearly, an artefact is
produced by two movements, one in the soul, which is called intelligence
and another outside the soul, which is called production. Aristotles text
(1032b1517) corresponding to Question 3.
Notandum. Averroes remarks that intelligence differs from production
not only in that the former is a movement in the soul and the latter a move-
ment in matter, but also because intelligence is a resolutive movement, in
that it proceeds from effects to causes, while production is a compositive
movement in that it proceeds from causes to effects. A potion for instance
is the immediate cause of heat, heat itself is the immediate cause of the
balance of humours, and this in its turn is the immediate cause of health.
Moreover, the health in the soul and the health in matter do not only differ
in that the one is in the soul and the other in matter, but also because the
health in the soul relates per se to the health in matter, while the reverse is
not the case. The health in matter in fact relates to that in the soul only acci-
dentally, in the same way as the object of knowledge relates accidentally to
sciencewhile science relates per se to the object of knowledge.
Doubt. Since the intellect has two concepts of the health in matter,
i.e. a speculative and a practical concept, one may ask whether such two
concepts relate to the health in matter in the same way.
Solution. They relate to the health in matter in the same way with respect
to the similitude of perseity, but not with respect to the similitude of causal-
ity. For both relate per se to the health in matter, which, by contrast, relates
to either concepts only accidentally. However, in terms of causality, the
speculative concept relates to the health in matter as an effect to its cause,

while the practical concept relates to it as a cause to its effect.
Question 4. Whether the means to the end are produced in a similar way in
artificial and in natural things.
Answer: They are produced in a similar way. For nature, just as it intends
first the end and then the means to the end, but produces first the means
and then the end, so first intends a certain means and then its cause, but
again first produces the cause. For instance: nature first intends the animal
and then the sperm, but produces first the sperm and then the animal;
likewise, nature first intends the flesh and then the foetus, which are both
in between sperm and animal, but again first produces the foetus and then
the flesh.
In the same way, the doctor intends health before the balance of humours
and the balance of humours before the heat, but produces the balance of
humours before health, and the heat before the balance of humours. And
the same holds of other possible steps before the production of heat, such
as for instance the preparation of a laxative potion.
Thus, in nature sperm and animal are the extremes and the intermediates
are foetus and flesh, while in art the extremes are the potion and health,
while the intermediates are the heat and the balance of humours. In nature,
the sperm is ordered towards the foetus, the foetus towards the flesh and
the flesh towards the animaland so nature intends the animal before the
flesh, the flesh before the foetus and the foetus before the sperm. Similarly,
in art, the potion is ordered towards the heat, and the heat towards the
balance of humours and this towards healthand so art intends health
first and then all the other terms in the reversed order. However, in either
case, the operation starts from the last thing intended and ends with the
first thing intended.
Therefore, Aristotle says that art relates to the intermediates as it does
to the final end. In order for someone to be healthy, a certain balance of
humours is needed, which is very close to health and is one of the interme-
diates. But, just as a doctor does not produce health without knowing what
health is, so he does not produce the balance of humours without know-
ing what it is. Such a knowledge includes that the right balance of humours
cannot be restored if the body is not heated. Hence, the doctor must also
know what heating is and how it is brought about, e.g. by means of a hot
medicine, which the doctor can immediately produce. Therefore, the prin-
ciple of healthor at least of the health which is produced by artis the
species of health (or of some of the means to health) existing in the pro-
ducers soul. Aristotles text (1032b1823) corresponding to Question 4.
Notandum. Averroes explains Aristotles text by means of two observa-
tions.
Obs. 1. There are two kinds of healing, by nature and by art. The second
kind proceeds from the health which is a form in the soul, while the first
proceeds from the health which is in the body that can be healed. And even
though both kinds of principle are called health, none of them is health
formally, in that none of them denominates the subject in which it is. They
are rather called health causally, because each of them is a principle which
produces health.
Obs. 2. A body which can be healed has two kinds of disposition towards
health, a complete and a diminished disposition. The complete disposition
is the one which produces health unaided by art, while the diminished
disposition produces health only if aided by art.
After proving Conclusion 1 for the cases of natural and artificial generations,
Aristotle also proves it for the case of casual generations.
For there are in fact also generations by chance. For instance: if health is
produced with the concourse of an intelligence and a species, it is by art,
as when the heat is the final result of a process started by the intelligence
of the doctor. If, by contrast, the process of recovery starts not from the
heat which is produced by the intention of the doctor, but from a casual
rubbing of the body, then health is produced by chance. Now, the heat
produced by causal rubbing either is itself a part of healthi.e. when it is
sufficient to produce healthor it is not, and so some other thing following
upon heat will be a part of health, such as the power resulting from the
dissolution of the compact humours that heat brings about. And even if
there are some other steps before getting to health, what matters is that the
item corresponding to the last step, which actually produces health, will also
be a part of it.
These considerations about casual generation confirm the truth of Con-
clusion 1. It is clear, in fact, that casual generations require some matter,
i.e. the body that can be healed, an efficient cause, the heat, and a form,
health itself. Also the generation of monsters as well as the generation of
animals without sperm are called by chance and not by nature, in that they
come about contrary to the intention of the natural agent. These gener-
ations too, however, require the three aforementioned principles, matter,
form and an efficient cause. Aristotles text (1032b2330) corresponding to the
case of casual generations.
Notandum. Averroes remarks that every principle which produces health

and exists in the body will be part of health, whether such a principle is heat
alone or there are other things in addition which produce health. The art of
the doctor is a per se principle of health but is not a part of it, in that it is
an extrinsic principle. Also the causal rubbing, though it is intrinsic to the
body, is not a part of health, because it is only an accidental cause, in that
the rubbing was not intended to produce health. A hot drink, finally, is not
a part of health, because it is neither an intrinsic nor a per se principle.
Objection. How can heat be a part of health, given that heat is a primary
quality and the terminus of a change, while health is neither? Moreover:
How it is possible for health to come about by chance, if chance is an
accidental cause which falls outside the scope of what happens always or
for the most part, whereas health is produced for the most part by a per se
cause?
Reply. Heat is not a part of health when it is taken formally, i.e. as a dis-
position belonging the first kind of quality, but only when taken materially,
i.e. only in so far as health is a balance of primary qualities and the union
of all the factors that take part effectively, subjectively and not accidentally
in the production of health. Moreover, health is casual with respect to the
rubbing or the hot drink, while it is natural with respect to heat. Heat in fact
produces health frequently, whereas rubbing and wine do so only rarely.
Conclusion 2. Some parts of the thing generated preexist.

Matter and form preexist; but they are also parts of the product of genera-
tion; therefore, some parts of the product preexist. That matter and form
preexist follows from Conclusion 1, according to which every generation
requires three principles: an agent, matter and form. But principles are prior
to that of which they are the principles. Therefore, the agent, matter and
form must be prior to the composite, which is the product of generation.
However, they are prior to it in different ways, for the agent and matter pre-
cedes the composite temporally, while form is prior to it in nature.
It can also be shown that form and matter are parts of the product of
generation. Matter is the term from which of generation and remains at the
end of the process. Form is what terminates generation and exists in mat-
ter at the end of the process. Therefore, it is, together with matter, a part of
the product itself. Hence, matter and form are not included in the defini-
tion of the thing generated unless each of them is a part of it. Although in
fact the circle in general is not defined through its matter and form, a par-
ticular circle is defined through figure as a proximate genus and through its
matter and form as essential differentiae: for instance, a bronze circle is

defined as a circular figure existing in bronze, where circular indicates
the form and bronze the matter of the bronze circle. Since the matter and
form of the bronze circle figure in its definition, they must be both part of
it. Aristotles text (1032b301033a5) corresponding to Conclusion 2.
Notandum. Averroes says that, since both form and matter are part of a
copper circle and are included in its definition, the definition of a copper
circle in one way contains many circles and in another only one. It contains
many circles in so far as it contains copper, which is a circle in potentiality,
and a certain figure, which is a circle in actuality. It contains, by contrast,
only one circle because there is only one circle in the copper.
Objection. It has been said above that accidental being is not defined. But
a copper circle is an accidental being exactly like white man.
Reply. Actually, what has been said is not that accidental being cannot
be defined at all, but only that it is not defined unqualifiedly or per se, but
accidentally, on account of its parts. A snub nose, for instance, is defined as
a nose having concavity. Similarly, a copper circle is defined as a circular
figure existing in copper.
Aristotle raises and answers a difficulty.
Difficulty. Aristotle asks why in some cases that from which something
comes is predicated of it if not formally at least denominatively, while
in some others it is predicated neither formally nor denominatively. For
instance: we say both that a statue comes from stone and that the healthy
comes from the unhealthy. However, while we say that a statue is stony
(even though we do not say that it is stone), we do not say that the healthy
is unhealthy. Aristotles text (1033a58) corresponding to the difficulty.
It should be noted that in the difficulty Aristotle includes two questions.
The first is why a statue is stony and the healthy is not unhealthy, while
a statue comes from stone just as the healthy comes from the unhealthy.
The second question consists in explaining why a stone is not a statue while
a man is healthy and, on the other hand, why a statue comes from stone
while the healthy does not come from the man, in spite of the fact that
the stone is the subject of the statue just as the man is the subject of the
healthy.
Aristotles answer to question 1. To come from something can be under-
stood in two ways, subjectively and terminatively, so that the thing from
which something comes can be either a subject or a privation. A statue
comes from stone as from its subject, while the healthy comes from the
unhealthy as from its privation. When the thing from which something
comes is a subject, then it is predicated of the thing generated either for-

mally or denominatively. Thus, we say that a statue is stony. When, on the
contrary, the thing from which something comes is a privation, then it is not
predicated of the thing generated either formally or denominatively. Hence,
we do not say that the healthy is unhealthy. Upon reflection, it is not sur-
prising that things are so, because in the case of privations we rather use
the expression this comes from this than that this comes to be this. In
the case of subjects, by contrast, the latter form of expression is preferable.
Aristotles text (1033a813) corresponding to the answer to Question 1.
It should be noted that the preposition from properly indicates the pas-
sage from one thing to another, so that, if B comes from A, we should
understand that B follows from the corruption of A. This explains why the
Arabs use, as Averroes says, the preposition after instead of the proposi-
tion from. Since privation gets corrupted when form supervenes and the
subject remains, we do not properly say that the healthy comes from the
man as we say that the healthy comes from the unhealthy. For when a man
becomes healthy, the unhealthy state is corrupted while the man remains.
And since it is the subject that receives both contraries, we properly say that
a man comes to be healthy and not that the unhealthy comes to be healthy.
Objection. In Phys., Book I, Aristotle seems to license both forms of expres-
sion: The musical comes from the unmusical and The unmusical comes
to be musical.
Reply. The two sentences are in fact different: while The musical comes
from the unmusical should not be conceded on account of the subject
but on account of the privation, The unmusical comes to be musical is
true not on account of the privation, but on account of the subject. In
other words, just as musical signifies two things, primarily a form and
secondarily the subject, so does unmusical. And since everything should
be taken according to its primary meaning, we properly say The musical
comes from the unmusical because the musical properly comes from its
privation. On the contrary, we do not properly say that the unmusical comes
to be musical, because a privation does not become a positive state, but it is
rather the subject that comes to be something in virtue of acquiring a certain
positive state.
The outcome of the foregoing considerations is that something comes
from matter and from privation in four senses. (i) In one sense, something
comes from matter as from its subject and from privation as from the
terminus from which generation starts. (ii) In another sense, something
comes from matter as from something which remains in the thing generated
and from privation as from something which does not remain. (iii) In a
third sense, something comes from matter as from a principle not only of
generation but also of the thing generated, and from privation as from a
principle of generation alone. (iv) Finally, something comes from matter per
se and from privation accidentally.
Aristotles answer to question 2. There are two kinds of privation, the
named and the unnamed privation. The former is the one that has a name
distinct both from the name of its subject and from that of its opposite,
like for instance infirmity which is distinct from animal, the subject, and
sanity, the opposite. The unnamed privation, by contrast, is the one that
has no name of its own, but only the name of its opposite in a privative or
negative form, like unshaped or incomposite. Such two kinds of privation
differ also because the named privation is not included in its subject
infirmity, for instance, is not included in animal, while unnamed pri-
vation is included in its subject in that it has no name of its own. Unshaped
for instance is included in copper or bronze.
It must be said, therefore, that the subject which includes privation is
predicated of the thing generated formally in an indirect case and denomi-
natively in a direct case. We do not properly say that a house is stone, wood
or bricks, but rather that it is stony, wooden and made of bricks. On the con-
trary, we say correctly that a house comes from stone, wood and bricks just
as we say that the healthy comes from the unhealthy. The subject which
does not include privation is formally predicated of the thing generated in
a direct case and not in an indirect case: we say that an animal is healthy,
and not that the healthy comes from the animal. Aristotles text (1033a1319)
corresponding to the answer to Question 2.
The distinction between two kinds of privation enables us to solve the
difficulty mentioned above. It was argued in fact that, since the man is the
subject of health just as the stone is the subject of the statue, then either
we are not allowed to say The statue comes from stone just as we are not
allowed to say The healthy comes from the man, or, if we are allowed to
use one expression, we must be allowed to use the other as well.
The solution to the difficulty is that the argument does not work, because
a statue does not come from stone unqualifiedly but only on account of the
privation included in the stone. In other words, a statue comes from stone
only because the stone, when taken together with the privation included
in it, does not remain after the generation. Since in fact the privation
included in the subject is corrupted during the generation, the subject itself
cannot be said to remain unqualifiedly. Therefore, a statue is not stone, but
comes from stone, just as the healthy is not unhealthy, but comes from the
unhealthy. Infirmity, however, is a privation which has a name of its own
and is not included in the subject; thus, we properly say The man is healthy
but not The healthy comes from the man. Aristotles text (1033a1923).
Objection. It seems that the subject which includes the privation and the
thing generated are predicated of one another in a direct case: we say in fact
that a statue is shaped in a certain way or that a man is musical.
Reply. There are two kinds of form. One makes, together with its subject, a
substantive composite. For instance: substantial form makes together with
its subject, i.e. matter, a substantive composite, in that it does not give a
name and a definition to its subject but to the composite resulting from
the composition of matter and form. It is not the matter of a man that is
a man, but rather the composite of matter and form. The other kind of form
makes, together with its subject, an adjectival composite, in that it does
not give a name and a definition to the composite but only to the subject.
Whiteness or hotness are examples of this second kind of form. For it is
not the composite to which whiteness gives rise that is white but only the
subject. Now, clearly, the form of a statue makes, together with its subject,
a substantive composite. Therefore, it is not a stone that is a statue but the
composite of a stone and a certain shape.
And just as there are two kinds of form, there are also two kinds of priva-
tion, the one which is opposed to the form that makes a substantive com-
posite and the one which is opposed to the form that makes an adjectival
composite. The subject which includes the first kind of privation is not pred-
icated of its subject in a direct case, while the subject including the second
kind of privation is so predicated of its subject.
Conclusion 3. It is not matter or form, but rather the composite, that is gener-
ated per se.
Aristotle makes an assumption. The principles of every generation are three:
the efficient cause, matter and form. This assumption directly follows from
Conclusion 1. Aristotles text (1033a2428) corresponding to the assumption.
Aristotle proves Conclusion 3 in two ways. As a matter of fact, Aristotle
proves only that form is not generated per se. For it is evident that matter
is not generated per se, in that it preexists and is the subject of generation.
Moreover, everybody concedes that composites, i.e. animals, plants and so
on, are generated per se. Thus, also this point does not need proving.
Proof 1. Everything that is generated in something else is not generated
per se; but form is generated in something else; therefore, it is not generated
per se. In fact, just as no being which exists in something else is a being
per se, so no being which is generated in something else is generated per
se, but only accidentally. Form, however, is generated in something else.

The producer in fact makes both the composite and form, but not in the
same way. He makes the composite unqualifiedly, not in something else
but from something else, whereas he makes form in something else, i.e.
in matter. He who produces a spherical piece of bronze does not produce
unqualifiedly the spherical form; what he produces is the spherical piece
of bronze, while he produces the spherical form in matter. Aristotles text
Proof 2. Everything that is generated per se comes from two distinct
factors; but form does not come from two distinct factors; therefore, form
is not generated per se. Everything that is generated per se is generated
from a subject and from a terminus which is distinct from the subject: the
producer, for instance, makes a bronze sphere from the subject, which is
bronze, and from the terminus, which is the sphere. Now, it is clear that
form is not generated in this way. For, if it were, it would be generated from
a subject and from a terminus, i.e. from some matter and some form. But
then, for parity of reasons, even the second form from which the first form
is generated would come from a subject and from a terminus, i.e. from a
further matter and a further form, and so on and so forth ad infinitum. So,
if form as well were generated per se, the generation of a composite would
bring along with it the generation of an infinite number of formswhich is
absurd. Aristotles text (1033a34b7) corresponding to Proof 2.
Notandum. Averroes remarks that, just as form is said to move acciden-
tally together with the movement of the composite, so it is generated acci-
dentally together with the generation of the composite. He also notes that
a copper sphere is neither copper alone nor only a sphere, but a composite
of copper and sphere.
Four Objections.
Obj. 1. Matter is generated per se. Averroes says in fact, when commenting
on Phys., Book III, that matter is what is really generated. And Aristotle, in
Phys., Book III, says that generation is the actuality of what is generable in
so far as it is generable. But clearly, it can only be the actuality of matter. So,
matter is generated per se.
Obj. 2. Form is generated per se. For every change is specified by the term
towards which it tends and generation tends towards nature. Therefore,
nature is generated per se. But the nature towards which generation tends
is form.
Moreover, generation is a change from not-being to being. But form
changes from not-being to being. So form is generated per se. Form in fact
exists before the composite. Therefore, it does not receive its being from
the composite, but rather has its being before the composite on account of
generation.
Obj. 3. The composite is not generated per se. For what is generated per se
is the terminus of generation. But, as Aristotle explains in Phys., Book V, form
and not the composite is the terminus of generation. For if the composite
was also the terminus of generation, generation would have two termini
which is against Aristotles doctrine in Phys., Book II.
Obj. 4. The composite is generated accidentally. For that which is in move-
ment accidentally is in movement on account of its parts, as Averroes says
in his commentary on Phys., Book V. Analogously, that which is generated
accidentally is generated on account of its parts. But the composite is gener-
ated on account of its parts: one of them in fact, i.e. matter, is not generated
in that it preexists, while the other, i.e. form, is generated in that it does not
preexist but rather begins to exist as a whole.
Reply to Obj. 1. Matter is generated subjectively, i.e. in that it is the subject
of generation, but neither terminatively nor denominatively. For what is
generated terminatively is generated in matter. So if matter were generated
in matter, there would be an infinite number of coinciding matters, one
being generated from another. Nor is matter generated denominatively,
for what is subject to change denominatively is the composite of matter
and form. Thus, Aristotles and Averroess words must be referred to the
subjective generation of matter and not to its being generated terminatively
or denominatively.
Reply to Obj. 2. The argument only shows that form is generated ter-
minatively in that it terminates generation. Form in fact is not generated
subjectively because it is not the subject of generation. Nor is it gener-
ated denominatively, for being generatedas well as acting in generalis
not attributed to form but to the composite. Moreover, what is generated
denominatively contains the subject as one of its parts and the subject is
not part of form.
Moreover, it can be conceded that form is prior to the composite, not
temporally, but rather in nature. Thus, form has its being prior to the
composite but is not generated before it.
Reply to Obj. 3. Both form and the composite are termini of generation,
though not in the same way. Form is the terminus formally and immedi-
ately, while the composite is so materially and mediately. In other words,
form is the terminus of generation primarily and per se, whereas the com-
posite is the terminus per se but not primarily. And it is perfectly possi-
ble for one single movement to have such two termini: what one single
movement cannot have are two formal and immediate (or primary and per
se) termini. Thus, the composite is generated per se in that it is generated
from two principles, one of which is the per se subject of generation and the
other the per se terminus.
Reply to Arg. 4. Averroes is talking about quantitative parts, such as when
we say that someone recovers health according to his parts because some
particular part needs healing. When we say, by contrast, that the composite
is generated according to its parts, we mean qualitative parts: when we say
for instance that what is heavy moves downwards and what is light upwards
in virtue of their respective forms, we do not mean that their forms move per
se, but rather that they are the principles in virtue of which what is heavy
and what is light move the way they do. Thus, the composite is generated
in virtue of form not because form is generated per se and the composite
accidentally, but rather because form is the principle in virtue of which the
generation of the composite takes place, in that form itself is the terminus
of generation.
The doubt remains whether form or the composite is generated primarily.
For, if form is generated primarily, then it is generated per se and not
accidentally, for what belongs to something primarily also belongs to it per
se. If it is the composite, by contrast, that is generated primarily, and it
is the terminus of generation per se, as was conceded, then it will be the
terminus of generation primarily and per sewhich was denied. Moreover,
since each part of what moves primarily moves as well, if the composite is
generated primarily, each of its parts will be generated as well.
Reply. There are two senses of primarily. In one sense it is contrasted
with according to one of its parts. For instance we say that something
belongs primarily to something else, when it belongs to it as a whole and
not in virtue of one of its parts alone. In this sense Aristotle in Phys.,
Book V, divides movement into per se and primary movement, movement
according to parts and accidental movement. In another sense, however,
we use primarily to indicate the adequacy of a propertys belonging to a
subject. For instance, in Post. An., Book I, Aristotle defines the universal as
what is htruly predicated of the subjecti primarily, per se, qua itself and of
every instance of it. So a triangle has the property 2R primarily, for even
if this property belongs to the triangle in virtue of a cause other than the
subject, it does not belong to it in virtue of another subject. And in this
second sense, the composite can be said to be generated primarily, not
because each of its parts is generated as well, but because to be generated
belongs to the composite not in virtue of another subject.
Conclusion 4. The quiddity is that which is not generated per se.

This conclusion is proved in two ways.
Proof 1. What is generated in something else is not generated per se (for
generation is a movement, and what moves in something else does not
move per se). But quiddity is generated in something else. Therefore, it is
not generated per se. When the producer makes a bronze sphere he does not
make the sphere per se but only makes the sphere in the bronze. But what
is true of the form of the part is also true of the form of the whole, i.e. the
quiddity. For just as the form of the part is generated in matter, so the form of
the whole is generated in the whole composite. In general, therefore, what is
generated per se is generated not in something else but from something else
as from its part. But this is not the case with the quiddity, which has no part
from which it is generated. Aristotles text (1033b711) corresponding to Proof 1.
Proof 2. Everything that is generated per se is divisible into two parts, one
of which is matter and the other is form (this is true of every movement
and so of generation in particular). But quiddity is not divisible into such
two parts. Therefore, quiddity is not generated per se. If the quiddity of the
sphere were divisible into matter and form, then also its definition should
be divisible into a material part which receives and a formal part which is
received. But this is false: for what is so divisible is the composite which is
the product of generation, e.g. the bronze sphere, and not its quiddity, e.g.
the quiddity of the sphere. Aristotles text (1033b1216) corresponding to Proof
2.
From the foregoing considerations Aristotle concludes that four points are
clear. (i) Neither form nor quiddity are generated per se in that they are
generated in something else. (ii) The composite is that which is generated
per se, while form is the terminus of generationand this is the reason why
the composite is said to be generated in virtue of form. (iii) Everything that
is generated per se contains matter. For matter is the subject of generation.
(iv) It is impossible for what is indivisible to be generated. For everything
that is generated divides into matter and form. Aristotles text (1033b1619)
corresponding to the four points.
Notandum 1. Averroes says that if the agent generated a universal sphere,
then generation would be out of nothing, i.e. out of non-form. In fact, if the
universal sphere, which is a form, were generated from form, then also the
form from which the universal sphere is generated would be generated from
another form and so on and so forth ad infinitum.
Notandum 2. Averroes further remarks that what is generated must be
divisible into two conceptual parts and not into two actual parts. Two things
in fact are divided in actuality if they are separate in place and subject, like a
man and a donkey. And this is clearly not the way something is divided into
matter and form. Two things, by contrast, are divided conceptually when
they have different definitions and the one can be understood without the
other. And this is the case with substance and accident as well as with matter
and form.
Four Objections. The quiddity is generated per se.
Obj. 1. The quiddity and that of which it is the quiddity are one and the same
thing. But that of which the quiddity is the quiddity is generated per se.
Therefore, the quiddity is also generated per se.
Obj. 2. Matter and form are not generated per se, because they are not
composed of matter and form. But the quiddity of sensible substances is
composed of matter and form. So it must be generated per se.
Obj. 3. The quiddity is generated and is a per se being. Therefore, it must
be generated per se.
Obj. 4. This man is generated per se by that man. Therefore, man is
generated per se by man. This claim is borne out by Aristotles doctrine
in Phys., Book II, where he says that particular causes stand to particular
effects as universal causes stand to universal effects. Thus, Averroes is after
all wrong when he says that an agent does not generate a universal sphere.
General reply. Quiddity is not generated per se. Otherwise four inconve-
nient consequences would follow.
Cons. 1. The thing generated would exist before being generated. For
everything that is generated is generated from something which is similar
in species. But things similar in species share the same quiddity. Therefore,
the quiddity existing in the producer would exist before it is actually gener-
ated.
Cons. 2. Matter would be under some form before the form is actually
generated. Things similar in species in fact agree in their form and matter.
Thus, if a quiddity is generated from something similar to itself, the matter
of generation will be under the quiddity before the quiddity is generated.
Cons. 3. All men would be generated when only one of them is generated.
For when something belongs to a thing x, it also belongs to everything that
participates in x. If then the quiddity of man is generated per se and all men
participate in the quiddity of man, and, moreover, the quiddity of man is
not generated unless some man is generated, then all men will be generated
when one is generated.
Cons. 4. A quiddity could exist without any individuals existing. For what
is generated per se has the being of existence per se. And so, if a quiddity
is generated per se, no individual is required for it to have the being of

existence.
Reply to Arg. 1. The conclusion does not follow. For there are two things
of which the quiddity is the quiddity, i.e. the particular and the universal:
humanity, for instance, is not only the quiddity of man but also of this man.
And, while it is the quiddity of man per se, it is the quiddity of this man
only accidentally. Therefore, just as man in common is not generated per
se, neither is humanity, which is rather generated accidentally with the
generation of a particular man.
Reply to Arg. 2. The particular composite is generated per se, while the
universal composite is generated accidentally. Moreover, the quiddity is not
composed of individual matter and form, but of common matter and form.
And common matter is the subject of generation only accidentally, just as
form is the terminus of generation only accidentally.
Reply to Arg. 3. A quiddity is not a per se being according to the third
sense of per se, but only according to the first. And being per se according
to the first sense of per se does not allow something to be generated per
se. Matter and form, for instance, are per se in the first sense but are not
generated per se.
Reply to Arg. 4. Artefacts act and are acted upon per se, whether they
are taken particularly or universally, because they bear a certain relation to
the category of acting and being acted upon. Therefore, both the particular
and the universal builder build, although not in the same way, because
building belongs primarily and per se to the particular builder, whereas it
belongs to the universal builder per se but not primarily. But the universal
man does not bear any relation to the category of acting and being acted
upon, and so neither generates nor is generated. Thus, what Aristotle says
in Phys., Book II, should be referred to the case in which the cause bears
some relation to acting and being acted upon.
The question can also be raised as to whether a quiddity is corruptible.
Four arguments in favour of a positive answer.
Arg. 1. Matter is that in virtue of which something can be and not be. But
the quiddity of sensible substances contains matter. Therefore, it must be
corruptible.
Arg. 2. Everything which is composed of contraries is corruptible. But the
quiddity is composed of contraries (for instance of plants, beasts, and men).
Therefore, the quiddity must be corruptible.
Arg. 3. When a property pertains to two things, either it pertains to one
in virtue of the other or it pertains to both in virtue of a third thing. But both
Socrates and Plato are corruptible and neither of them is so in virtue of the
other. Therefore, they must be corruptible in virtue of a third thing, which
is common to them and corruptible.
Arg. 4. Corruptible and incorruptible are said of the things they are said
of per se, of necessity and not accidentally. But the quiddity is corruptible
in some way or other just as it is generable in some way or other. Therefore,
it must be corruptible per se.
Solution. Just as everything that is generable is composed per se of matter
and form, so also everything that is corruptible is composed of matter
and form, so that form is corrupted into matter as into a terminus from
which and the thing corrupted is corrupted into matter as into one of its
parts. But these characteristics do not belong to the quiddity, which is not,
therefore, corrupted per se, but only accidentally, i.e. with the corruption
of the individual. And also form and matter are corrupted accidentally,
when by matter we understand prime matter: for secondary matter, by
contrast, is generated and corrupted per se in that it is composed of matter
and form.
Reply to Arg.1. It is individual matterand not common matterwhich
is the cause of corruption. For matter is that in virtue of which a thing can be
and not be on account of its potentiality for form (and so it is that in virtue
of which something can be) and for privation (and so it is that in virtue
of which something can not be). Thus, the matter which is responsible for
corruption is the one that is sometimes under form and sometimes under
privation. However, common matter is never under privation, since species
are eternal. Individual matter, by contrast, is sometimes under form and
sometimes under privation.
Reply to Arg.2. The major premiss, i.e. that everything that is composed of
contraries is corruptible per se, is false. For this is true only of what is per se
composed of contraries. A quiddity, however, is composed of contraries only
accidentally, i.e. on account of the individuals with which it is accidentally
identical.
Reply to Arg.3. It is true that Socrates and Plato are corruptible in virtue
of something common to them, but this is actually common matter. It does
not follow from this, however, that common matter is per se corruptible,
but only that it is that in virtue of which something is said to be corruptible,
i.e. in so far as common matter can be taken particularly.
Reply to Arg.4. At the end of Met., Book X, Aristotle criticises the view
of those who maintain that some individuals of a certain species are cor-
ruptible, while others are incorruptible. He also shows that corruptible and
incorruptible are not like black and white, in that they cannot belong to one
and the same individual at different times or to two different individuals of

the same species at a time. In the very same passage, Aristotle refers corrupt-
ibility and incorruptibility to things existing per se, by saying that any such
thing is either per se corruptible or per se incorruptible, thereby implying
that things that do not exist per se, such as quiddities, are corruptible not
per se, but only accidentally on account of the individuals.
Chapter 2
After showing that no quiddity is the effect of generation, here Aristotle
proves against Plato that no quiddity is the cause of generation, either. The
chapter falls into two parts: (i) in the first, Aristotle makes his main point;
(ii) in the second, he raises some difficulties.
Part 1
Aristotle raises a question about Ideas. He asks whether there is any sub-
stance separate from particular things, for instance whether there is a
sphere over and above particular spheres and whether there is a house that
is separate from logs and stones, of which particular houses are made. Aris-
totle raises this question for the case of artefacts but he has clearly in view
natural things, whose species Plato wanted to be separate. Aristotles text
(1033b1921) corresponding to the question.
Notandum. Averroes explains Aristotles text by means of two distinctions.
The first distinction is that there are two kinds of form, artificial forms,
like the form of a house, and natural forms, like the form of a man. And
just as there are no forms separate from artificial things, so there are none
separate from natural things. Aristotle takes his examples from artefacts
for two reasons: first, because artefacts are more known to us than natural
things; second, because Platonists did not posit separate forms for artefacts.
So, much the less should they have posited separate forms for natural
things.
The second distinction is that an artificial form exists in two ways: in the
soul and outside the soul. The form in the soul is a productive disposition,
while the form outside the soul is a produced disposition. Thus, there is
nothing impossible in there existing in the soul a universal house separate
from particular houses. It is impossible, by contrast, for a universal house to
exist outside the soul.
Aristotle answers the question by means of four conclusions.
Conclusion 1. No separate quiddity actively contributes to generation.

No separate quiddity is a this something. Every producer, by contrast, is
a this something. Therefore, no separate quiddity actively contributes to
generation.
That no separate quiddity is a this something is clear. For no universal is a
this something, but rather a such. Universals in fact, being always and every-
where, are not determinate: man does not signify anything determinate,
but rather a common nature which is indifferent to the many things it is the
nature of. Particulars, by contrast, are determinate and so this something:
Socrates signifies something determined by place and other individuating
conditions.
It is also clear that every producer is a this something. For every product
of generation is a this something. Therefore, the producer too must be a this
something. The producer in fact produces out of matter something similar
to itself. Now, the product of generation is a composite of a determinate
matter and a determinate form and hence a this something. So, just as the
product of an artificial generation is not the bronze sphere in common,
but this bronze sphere, so the product of natural generation is not man
in common but Socrates or Callias. It follows, therefore, against Plato that
the quiddity of man or animal neither generates nor is generated, in that it
is an indeterminate universal. Aristotles text (1033b2126) corresponding to
Conclusion 1.
Notandum. Averroes comments on Aristotles text by putting forward the
following argument. If the forms of natural things are separate, it may be
asked whether the form of the producer and that of the product are one
and the same in species or in number. If they are the same form in species,
then such a form neither generates nor is generated, for actions pertain to
individuals. If they are the same form in number, two difficulties will follow.
The first is that nothing will be generated. For nothing is generated if both
its form and its matter preexist. But if the form of the producer and that of
the product are one and the same form in number, both matter and form
preexist. The second difficulty is that the producer and the product will be
one in number when they seem to be one only in species.
Objection. Flesh is generated in the course of nutrition and in this case
both the matter and the form of the flesh generated preexist. Moreover,
when a mixture resolves into its elements, each element is properly gen-
erated and its matter and form exist before the process of generation.
Reply. There are two kinds of generation and, correspondingly, two kinds
of corruption. Complete generation is that through which there begins to
exist not only the composite but also form. Incomplete generation is that
through which there begins to exist only the composite and not also form, as
in the case, for instance, of the generation of flesh or of the elements. Corre-
spondingly, complete corruption takes place when both the composite and
form cease to be, while in incomplete corruption only the compositeand
not also formceases to be. Thus, (i) when a mixture is generated out of the
elements, the mixture is generated completely, while the elements are cor-
rupted incompletely, in that their forms remain in the mixture. (ii) When,
by contrast, the elements are generated from a mixture, the mixture is cor-
rupted completely while the elements are generated only incompletely. (iii)
Finally, when a mixture is generated from a mixture or the elements from
the elements, both the generations and the corruptions involved are com-
plete. Increase and decrease are analogous to cases (ii) and (i), respectively:
in the case of increase, the food is corrupted completely, while some part of
the living body is generated incompletely; in the case of decrease, by con-
trast, the subtle body is generated completely, while some part of the living
body is corrupted incompletely.
Clearly, therefore, Averroes means to refer to the case of complete gen-
eration, when he says that nothing would be generated if the form of the
product preexisted. It is not absolutely impossible for a form to precede the
process of generation. What it is impossible is that form precedes genera-
tion in such a way that the producer and the product will turn out to be
the same in number, and this is especially true for complete generation.
Form is said to be generated accidentally precisely because there is a kind
of generationincomplete generationin which form does not begin to
exist, while there is anothercomplete generationin which form begins
to exist.
Conclusion 2. No separate quiddity is a per se existing substance.

For no other reason in fact did Platonists posit separate quiddities, which
are per se existing substances, than to explain generation. But we have seen
in Conclusion 1 that such quiddities are of no use in explaining generation.
Anaxagoras defended the latency of forms in matter, and maintained that
forms preexist and hence there is no generation of new forms. In response
to this view, Plato claimed that it is form and not the composite that is
generated, and introduced separate forms which he described as givers of
forms. Avicenna did not posit as many forms, but only one, which he himself
described as a giver of forms with the only difference that the forms given
are not generated but rather created. Together with Plato, in fact, he claimed
that a particular agent prepares matter and an external mover introduces
form. And since matter is not part of form, he held that form does not come
to be from matter but out of nothing. Aristotles doctrine excludes all the
aforementioned opinions. For him, it is the composite and not form that
is generated. He also maintains that there is no need to say that forms are
created from some external mover (be it one, as Avicenna says, or many, as
Plato contends), because what prepares matter and what introduces forms
are one and the same thing. Finally, against Anaxagoras Aristotle claims
that forms do not exist in actuality in matter, but only in potentiality. In
conclusion, there are no per se existing and separate quiddities. And, even
if there were, they would be of no use in explaining generation. Aristotles
text (1033b2629) corresponding to Conclusion 2.
Notandum. Averroes proves that there are no universal forms generating
particular forms, whether substantial or accidental forms. For every gener-
ation takes place when matter changes; but no universal form can change
matter. For every agent which can change matter is an individual agent
existing in matter, and universal forms are not individuals, nor do they exist
in matter.
That the agent of a change must be individual can in fact be proved. The
effect of a change is a particular, and so the agent must also be a particular.
For particular effects stand to particular causes as universal effects stand to
universal causes.
Moreover, it is also clear that the agent must exist in matter. The agent
that prepares matter and the one that brings about a change in matter must
be one and the same, in that in both artificial and natural production the
agent that introduces the end and the one introducing the means to the end
are one and the same. It is evident to the senses, however, that the agent that
prepares matter exists in matter. From this Averroes infers that those who
maintain that the world is generated must also hold that the agent bringing
about the generation of the world is a particular body and not a universal
substance.
Objection. It seems that not only particular agents, but also universal
ones, contribute to generation, as is suggested by Aristotles remark in
Phys., Book II, The sun and a man generate a man from matter. Now,
it is a fact that God and the intelligences are universal causes. Hence,
they actively contribute to generation, though being separate from matter.
Therefore, some separate form is capable of bringing about a change in
matter.
Reply. The argument is conclusive, but it does not support Platos opinion.
For he maintains that Forms are immediate causes of generation by being
the quiddities of the things generated, so that the forms of particular things
are not generated by particular agents but only by separate Forms. But this is
false. For both particular and universal agents act in generation, the former
as proximate and immediate agents, the latter, be they in matter or outside
matter, as remote and mediate agents.
That we need to posit a universal agent, which is a separate form and
actively contributes to generation, can be argued in two ways. (i) Nature,
in producing its effects, intends a certain end through certain means. But
nature does not know, in that it has neither sense nor intellectual under-
standing. Therefore, it must be directed towards a certain effect by some
agent separate from matter. Thus, just as movement presupposes a sepa-
rate unmoved mover, so generation presupposes a separate, ingenerable
producer.
(ii) Generation presupposes alteration, alteration presupposes local
movement, local movement an unmoved mover, and the unmoved mover a
separate form. Thus, generation presupposes a separate form. This demon-
strative chain is established by Aristotle in Phys., Book VIII.
Conclusion 3. In all cases what generates and what is generated are similar in
form.
This conclusion is proved inductively, and first for the case of natural gener-
ation. Things that are not one in number, but in species, are also similar in
form. But what generates and what is generated by nature are one in species.
Therefore, they are also similar in form. The major premiss is proved by Aris-
totle in Met., Book V. The minor can be shown to be true. What generates
and what is generated in fact must differ in number. However, since in natu-
ral generation what generates is exactly like what is generated, they are also
one in species. A man in fact generates a man, who is like him in species.
Then the conclusion is proved for the case of unnatural generation, where
what generates and what is generated need not be one in species, but it is
enough that they be one in genus. When a horse and a donkey generate
a mule, it is possible to assign a genus intermediate between horse and
donkey, which the mule as well as the horse and the donkey share, i.e. a
genus more common than each of the three species but less common than
animal. In this case, even though what generates and what is generated
are not similar in their specific form, they are nonetheless similar in their
generic one. Aristotles text (1033b291034a1) corresponding to Conclusion 3.
Notandum 1. In order to explain Aristotles text, Averroes distinguishes

between generation per se and accidental generation. Generation per se
takes place when the producer produces the intended effect (as in the case
of the generation of a man from a man), while in accidental generation the
producer produces a non-intended effect (as in the case of the generation
of a mule from a horse and a donkey). Such a distinction comes to the
same thing as Aristotles distinction in the text between natural generation,
where the producer and the product are of the same species, and unnatural
generation, where they are not of the same species but of the same genus.
Objection. It seems that the generation of a mule is not unnatural. For
natural generation takes place when an intrinsic or an extrinsic principle
confers a certain power upon the thing that is being generated. But the
generation of a mule corresponds to this description.
Reply. To be against nature and to be unnatural are not one and the
same thing. To be against nature is to be against the inclination of the thing
undergoing a certain movement: for instance, it is against the nature of fire
that it should move downwards. To be unnatural, by contrast, means that
something outside the natural inclination of a thing pertains to the thing
in question, but in such a way that what pertains neither follows upon the
nature of the thing nor is contrary to it: as, for instance, when fire moves
circularly. In the case at issue, therefore, the generation of a mule is simply
unnatural and not against nature. For the generation of a mule neither
follows upon the inclination of a horse nor is contrary to its nature, at least
when we talk of its primary inclination, according to which the producer
intends to produce something similar in species. In so far as its secondary
inclination is concerned, i.e. the inclination to produce something similar
in genus, the generation of a mule is, instead, natural.
Thus, against the argument it should be said that, if natural is opposed to
violent, then the generation of a mule is natural. If it is opposed to unnatural,
such a generation is not natural.
Notandum 2. The case of the generation of a mule seems to be an excep-
tion to the general rule Everything that is generated is generated from
something similar in form. Averroes has two answers to this difficulty. (i)
He distinguishes between actual and potential generation. Actual genera-
tion never departs from the intention of the producer, as is the case with the
generation of a horse from a horse, where actuality is introduced according
to the intention of the particular producer. Potential generation, by con-
trast, is the one that departs from the intention of the producer. The gen-
eration of a mule is a case of potential generation in that the actuality is
introduced not according to the intention of a particular producer but of
a universal one. The rule Everything that is generated is generated from

something similar in form, therefore, should be understood as confined to
cases of actual generation.
(ii) Even if a mule is generated from something which is different in
species, the general rule still holds good, because a mule is generated from
a nature common to the horse and the donkey and so similar to the mule.
This nature can be understood either as the nature of a logical genus, which
is predicated of horse, donkey and mule, or as the nature of a natural genus,
in which horse and donkey share in virtue of some mixing between them.
In either case, a mule is generated from something similar in generic form.
Notandum 3. Averroes remarks that from two different seeds (the sperm
of the donkey, which is cold, and that of the horse, which is hot) there results
a temperate nature, intermediate between horse and donkey. For just as
in the generation of a mixture the primary qualities of the elements lose
intensity till they reach a middle degree, and so what is generated is an
intermediate nature both on the side of the matter underlying the qualities
and on that of the form of the mixture, so in the generation of a mule the
hotness of the horses sperm and the coldness of the donkeys lose intensity
and result in a temperate nature balancing hot and cold. And such a nature
can be understood as a sort of matter congregated from the two seeds, or as
the formative power of the mule, which emerges from the qualities of the
seeds, or even as the form itself which is generated from the powers of the
two seeds.
Objection. If an intermediate formative power emerges in the matter
congregated from such two seeds, then a mule will be generated by nature
and not accidentally, in the same way as a man or a horse are generated
from the formative power of the sperm. But Aristotle and Averroes seem to
hold the contrary view.
Reply. In the generation of a mule there are two kinds of producer, a
remote and a proximate producer. The remote producer is the formative
power existing in the seed of the horse and in that of the donkey. And it is
with respect to this kind of producer that Aristotle describes the generation
of a mule as unnatural and Averroes as accidental, in that the power in
the seed is naturally ordered to produce something similar in species. The
proximate producer, by contrast, is the intermediate power resulting from
the seed of the horse and from that of the donkey. And with respect to
this second kind of producer the generation of a mule is natural and per
se, in that with reference to the proximate producer a mule is produced by
something similar in species. In fact, Aristotles remark above horse and
donkey there is some immediate, intermediate genus can be taken to refer
either to the logical or to the natural genus. When taken in the former way,
a mule is generated from a horse and a donkey as from something similar
in genus. When taken, by contrast, in the second way, a mule is generated
from the matter of the two seeds as from something similar in species, not
formally but virtually, in that such a matter naturally contains the formative
power of the mule.
Conclusion 4. No form is separate in the manner of an exemplary form.

What can be done through fewer things is done in vain through more. But
all natural generation can be accomplished without separate, exemplary
forms. Therefore, there is no need to prove the existence of such ideal, sepa-
rate quiddities. In fact, if ideal species were required to explain generation,
they would be most of all required to explain the generation of substances.
For the more perfect is the thing generated, the more things are required for
its generation. But the generation of substances can be explained without
having recourse to ideal species, but only to forms existing in matter. There-
fore, ideal species are not required to explain the generation of other things,
either. Aristotles text (1034a25) corresponding to Conclusion 4.
The conclusion is further confirmed. Platonists posited ideal species in
order to explain how it is possible for there to be many generable and
corruptible individuals of the same species. But this does not prove the
existence of ideal species, because we can have different individuals of
the same species also supposing that the specific form exists in matter, for
instance in these flesh and bones, as is the case with Socrates and Callias. For
a form existing in matter is both one and many, or the same and different:
it is one and the same on account of itself, while it is many and different
on account of matter. It is indivisible according to essence and divisible
according to being. And this is the reason why what generates and what is
generated are one in species and many in number. Aristotles text (1034a58)
corresponding to the confirmation of Conclusion 4.
Notandum 1. Averroes remarks that separate exemplars are not required
in order for the producer and the product of generation to be similar in form
or to be of the same species, but it is sufficient to posit two potentialities,
an active potentiality existing in the producer, and a passive potentiality
existing in matter. And since to these two potentialities there correspond
correlated forms, the producer can produce a form similar to its own out
of matter and in virtue of its active potentiality alone, without an extrinsic
exemplar playing any role in generation. For by means of the action of
the producer on matter no form is introduced from outside, but only from
within, in that the form that exists potentially in matter is brought into
actuality by the agent.
If one then asks how a single producer can produce many different things,
the answer is that this is so on account of the different matters on which the
agent operates.
Notandum 2. Averroes further remarks that if generation proceeded from
separate forms, it would not be possible for such forms to be the causes of
what is produced in generation, i.e. it would not be possible for the producer
and the product to be two in number and one in form.
The assumption of Averroess argument, namely that the producer and
the product of generation are one in form and two in matter, can be proved
to be true. As Aristotle says in De an., Book II, every dependent nature
desires to be divine and perpetuous. It is clear, however, that incorruptible
things, such as the intelligences and the heavenly bodies, possess an indi-
vidual perpetuity, while corruptible things have only a specific one. Thus,
the perpetuity of corruptible things can only be obtained through the con-
tinuity of generation. But the producer cannot perpetuate its species if it
does not make what underlies generation into something similar to itself
which in turn cannot be done if the producer does not agree with the prod-
uct in species and differs from it only because its form and that of the prod-
uct are different on account of their being received in different pieces of
matter.
This assumption being proved, the conclusion follows immediately. For
if the producer and the product agree in form and differ in matter, it is
impossible for ideal, separate forms to be producers, in that what is separate
and what is not separate do not agree in form, nor differ only on account of
different pieces of matter. Nor do they agree in species or proximate genus.
Objection. Art imitates nature. But craftsmen operate by looking at exem-
plars, according to the similitude of which they produce their artefacts. So,
nature too should operate by means of exemplars, which cannot be but
Ideas.
Reply. The cases of nature and art are not similar. For craftsmen look at
external exemplars on account of imperfection, i.e. in that they do not have
in themselves a sufficient operating principle. But natural things have in
themselves a sufficient operating principle and hence do not need to look at
some exemplars. Admittedly, it is necessary to posit separate exemplars of
inferior things existing in Gods mind, at which God himself looks in creating
and producing. But such exemplars are not Platos Ideas.
From the foregoing considerations it emerges that Platos Ideas or Species
are in no way causes of these inferior things. (i) First they are not causes
of being, for nothing can have its being formally in virtue of something
separate from it. So, since species are formal causes of particulars they
cannot be separate from them.
(ii) They are not causes of knowledge, for it is ridiculous to explain the
cognition of what is known through what is not known. It is clear in fact
that particulars, in so far as they are sensible, are more known to us, while
species, if they were separate, would be unknown, for our intellect is less
familiar with things which are most clear by nature.
(iii) Species are not even causes of generation. For the thing generated
is a this something; therefore, also the thing that generates must be a this
something, if producer and product are similar. But Ideas, if they existed,
would be neither composites nor this something in that they are rather
simple forms and universals, and universals signify a such and not a this
something.
(iv) Finally, Ideas are not exemplary causes, in that exemplars are re-
quired only on account of the imperfection of the agent. But natural agents
are perfect, in that perfect agents are such as to be able to produce some-
thing similar to themselves, and natural agents are clearly of such a nature.
Objections. Four reasons to posit separate Ideas to explain the generation of
sensible things.
Arg. 1. Everything that is F by participation can be reduced to what is F by
essence. But every particular participates in a common nature. Therefore, it
reduces to something which is F by essence, which seems to be nothing but
a separate Idea.
Arg. 2. Nothing acts outside the boundaries of its species. But in this infe-
rior realm the only things that act are accidents. Therefore, we must posit,
over and above inferior particulars, separate substances that introduce sub-
stantial forms. But such substances are precisely Ideas.
Arg. 3. What generates and what is generated are similar in species. But in
the case of generation by putrefaction there is nothing in the inferior world
that is similar to the thing generated. Therefore, we must posit something
separate which is similar to the thing generated, i.e. an Idea.
Arg. 4. The agent is nobler than the thing on which it acts. But when ani-
mals are generated from seed, the soul is not present in the seed. Therefore,
since the soul is produced through generation, it is necessary to posit a sep-
arate substance, which introduces the soul into matter and relates to that
on which it acts as the perfect to the imperfect.
Reply to Arg. 1. It may be conceded that all individuals of the human
species reduce to something which is human by essence, i.e. a common
man. But it is not separate from individual human beings except concep-
tually, so that Socrates and the common man are the same in number and
differ only conceptually, in that the concept of man is communicable while
that of Socrates is incommunicable. Moreover, man can be understood
without understanding Socrates, while the other way round is not true.
Reply to Arg. 2. It is true that only accidents can act on the matter which
is external to the agent, but also substantial form can act on the matter
which is part of the agent, sometimes without any instrument, as when
hot water becomes cold, sometimes with the aid of some instrument, as
is the case with heavy and light bodies which move towards their natural
places. This point is illustrated by Averroes in his commentary on Phys.,
Book II. Moreover, even though nothing acts in so far as it is in potentiality,
but only in so far as it is in actuality, there are things that act outside the
boundaries of their species only in virtue of their own power, when the thing
that receives the action has the appropriate disposition. For instance: colour
produces, in virtue of its own power, the visible species and the vision, which
are both of a higher species than colour itself.
Reply to Arg. 3. In univocal generation what generates and what is gen-
erated are similar in species, while in equivocal generation they are similar
only in genus. Moreover, in virtue of the action of the heaven and of the
primary qualities what originates from putrefied matter is substantially sim-
ilar to the producer only in genus, but accidentally similar also in species on
account of the formative power of the producer, which bears relation to one
species alone. Therefore, there is some putrefied matter from which only a
fly and nothing else can be generated and some other from which only a
worm and nothing else can originate.
Reply to Arg. 4. Even if the agent qua agent is nobler than the thing it
acts onin that the former is actual and the latter potentialabsolutely
speaking the agent is often less perfect than the thing it acts on. Fire, for
instance, is more perfect than water, and nonetheless water acts on fire and
corrupts it. Thus, there is nothing absurd if, in the generation of an animal,
the soul is produced by accidents alone.
It is clear therefore that we do not need to posit Ideas such as those con-
ceived of by Plato to explain the generation of sensible things. As Averroes
argues, in fact, an agent which is indifferent to many effects cannot produce
something determinate unless it gets determined. And Ideas are precisely
indifferent agents. Nor can it be said that they are determined by partic-
ular agents, because in such a case the agent that alters matter and that
which introduces form would be different, with the result that there would
not be only one product but many. However, even if it is not necessary to
posit Ideas, it is still necessary to reduce the cause of the generation and
corruption of inferior things to superior causes. Since inferior things are
generated and corrupted continuously, their generation and corruption
must be reduced to the movement of the heaven, which is continuously
different from itself on account of the suns occupying different positions
along an oblique orbit. Since the movement of the sun is also continuous,
the movement of the heavenly bodies must be reduced to causes that are
eternal, immaterial and separate from sensible thingsand such causes are
God and the intelligences.
Part 2
Aristotle solves four difficulties.
Difficulty 1. Why do some things come to be both by art and by chance, and
others only by art? Health, for instance, is not only produced by art, but also
by chance, as for instance when it is produced by a casual rubbing, while
a house can only be produced by art. Averroes phrases the difficulty differ-
ently by asking why some things are produced by art and nature, and some
others only by art. His point is that the health which is produced by chance
with respect to the casual rubbing is produced by nature with respect to
the heat produced. Therefore, health is at times produced only by nature,
as when neither a hot medicine nor a casual rubbing intervenes, when, in
other words, disease is produced by cold matter and health restored by the
hot elements; at other times, it is produced by art and nature, as when a
medicine is administered to help nature; in still other cases, finally, it is pro-
duced by art, nature and chance, i.e. when in addition to the hot medicine
and to nature also a casual rubbing of the body intervenes. Aristotles text
(1034a910) corresponding to Difficulty 1.
Notandum. Averroes remarks that Aristotles difficulty concerns his claim
that what generates and what is generated are similar in form. For in the
case of health the thing produced turns out to be similar to two forms of
different nature, i.e. natural and artificial healthwhich does not seem to
be possible.
It should be answered, however, that it is perfectly possible for one and
the same product to be similar in form to different producers according
to different generations. In other words, since one and the same health is
produced by art and nature, it will be similar to nature in so far as it is
produced by nature and similar to art in so far as it is produced by art.
In order to solve Difficulty 1 Aristotle introduces two distinctions.

Distinction 1. The matter of the things that are produced by art is of two
kinds: the matter in which there is part of the natural potentiality for form
and that in which there is no part of such a potentiality. The first kind of
matter is that which moves itself towards form, although with the aid of art,
as is the case with a curable body. The second kind of matter, by contrast,
is that which cannot be moved towards form from within but only from
outside, as is the case with logs and stones with respect to the form of the
house or with iron with respect to the form of the knife. For just as not any
natural form can come from any kind of matter, but a determinate kind of
form comes from a determinate kind of matter, so it happens also in the
case of artificial forms. A knife, for instance, cannot be made from wood,
but must be made from some harder material which is appropriate to the
function of cutting. Aristotles text (1034a1014) corresponding to Distinction
1.
Notandum. Averroes gives an answer to the question as to why some
things come to be both by art and by nature, while others only come to
be by art. He says that things that have in themselves a part of the natural
potentiality which is similar to the product of generation, come to be both
by art and by nature, while those which have no such part come to be only
by art. Just as in the case of moveable things some move of themselves, like
living things, and some are moved only from outside, so it happens in the
case of generable things as well. Of the moveable things, in fact, some are
moved only from outside, i.e. through a violent movement, some others are
moved from within, like living bodies, while some, finally, are moved in both
ways, as is the case with inanimate bodies when they move towards their
natural place. Inanimate bodies in fact are moved from within, in that they
are moved by their own forms, and from outside, in that their movement
needs something that actually starts the movement or removes an obstacle.
The same thing is true in the case of generable things. Some of them in
fact come to be only by nature, like thunders and earthquakes, some others
come to be only by art, like houses and knives; some, finally, come to be in
both ways, like health and cultivation. Things that come to be only by nature
possess the natural potentiality for a certain form in its entirety, while those
that come to be both by art and by nature possess only a part of such a
potentiality. Finally, things that come to be only by art possess no part of
the potentiality for form.
Distinction 2. The matter of the things that come to be by nature can be
of two kinds, potent and impotent matter. Potent matter is that which is
capable of moving towards form of itself, unaided by art, like for instance
the matter of the air or that of the fire, or some ill bodies, which can progress
towards health in virtue of a natural principle existing in them. Impotent
matter, by contrast, is the matter which cannot move towards form unaided
by art, such as the matter of cultivation and some ill bodies. Just as there is
some art which can perform its operation without the aid of some other
art, like for instance the art of building, so there is some nature which can
perform its operation unaided by art. And just as there is, by contrast, some
art which cannot perform its operation without being aided by another
art, like the art of dancing, which needs music, so also some nature cannot
perform its operation without art. Aristotles text (1034a1417) corresponding
to Distinction 2.
Aristotle solves Difficulty 1. He says that the artefacts whose matter has in
itself neither a principle of movement nor a part of the natural potentiality
for a certain form come to be only by art, as is the case with a house or a bed.
Those artefacts, by contrast, whose matter has in itself either a principle of
movement or a part of the natural potentiality for a certain form come to be
both by art and by nature, as is the case with health and with a knife: health
in fact is produced by heat and medicine, and a knife by the blacksmiths
art and by fire, which softens the iron. For just as an ill body does not have
a complete natural potentiality for health, but only a part of it, and hence
is moved towards health partly by art and partly by nature, so the iron does
not have a complete, natural potentiality for the form of knife, but only a
part of it, and hence is moved towards the form of knife partly by art and
partly by nature. Aristotles text (1034a1718) corresponding to the solution.
From the previous considerations Aristotle infers two corollaries.
Cor. 1. Of the things that are produced by something extrinsic, some cannot
be produced without the concourse of an agent possessing some art or
other, while others can. A house and a knife belong to the first group, while
iron and stones belong to the second, in that their matter can also be moved
by agents that possess no art. Aristotles text (1034a1820).
Cor. 2. Of the things that are produced by something extrinsic, some are
totally produced by nature and others only partly. For instance: a man or
a mule are produced by something extrinsic, i.e. by a power existing in the
spermatic matter, which does not involve art but only nature. Health and a
knife, by contrast, come to be only partly by nature, in such a way that art
takes part in generation as a partial principle and nature as the main one.
Notandum. Averroes comments on Aristotles text by introducing two
main principles.
Princ. 1. Some agents produce two kinds of effect: one by themselves, i.e.
unaided by art, and the other together with art. Fire, for instance, produces
fire unaided by art, while it cannot produce a knife without the concourse
of art.
Princ. 2. Some effects can be produced both without art and with the
aid of art, whether particular or universal art. Health is one such effect, in
that it can be produced by nature together with medical art, be it particular
or universal art: the particular medical art is the one that concerns only a
particular part of the body (like a particular surgical operation), while the
universal art concerns the whole body (like for instance the administration
of a medical potion).
Digression. With regards to the issues just discussed the question is usually
raised as to whether there is in matter some diminished form which is made
complete by the action of the agent.
Arguments for a positive answer.
Arg. 1. As Averroes repeatedly says, the agent extracts form from matter. But
it could not do so if form did not preexist in matter. But it is clear that it
preexists in matter in an incomplete state and not in a complete one.
Arg. 2. It is impossible for a form to come from a non-form. Therefore, a
form comes from a form. But it cannot come from a complete form. Hence,
it must come from an incomplete form.
Arg. 3. If there did not exist an incomplete form in matter, every form
would come from outside. And so it would be necessary to posit some Giver
of forms in the manner of Plato and Avicenna.
Arg. 4. Since form is in matter, it must come either from something or
from nothing. It cannot come from nothing: for, as Aristotle points out in
Phys., Book I, this view is abhorred by all natural philosophers. If then form
comes from something, it must come either from matter or from form. The
first alternative is not the case, for otherwise matter would be part of form.
Therefore, a form comes from a form, which cannot but be a diminished
form.
Four opinions concerning the existence of incomplete forms in matter.
(i) First Opinion (Anaxagoras opinion). The whole form preexists in matter
before the generation of the composite, partly in actuality and partly in
potentiality: in actuality with respect to the principles of the composite to be
generated, in potentiality with respect to the composite itself. In this sense,
the form preexisting in matter would be a diminished form, in that it is in
virtue of the agent that it becomes a complete form giving to the composite
its name and definition.
Aristotle argues against this opinion in Phys., Book I, where he points

out that Anaxagoras view entails, among other things, two impossible
consequences: that (a) it is possible to assign a quantity smaller than the
minimal quantity and (b) that a part is bigger than its whole.
(ii) Second Opinion. The whole form of the composite preexists in mat-
ter only potentially and in this sense it is a diminished form, which is made
complete by the action of the agent, in the same way as the elements exist
potentially in the mixture and become actual only when the mixture dis-
solves. This opinion seems to square with Aristotles claim in this book that
neither form nor matterbut only the compositeis subject to genera-
tion.
One can argue against this opinion by asking whether the potential form
is corruptible or incorruptible. If it is corruptible, then, since it is not gen-
erable, generation and corruption do not convertwhich is contrary to
Aristotles view in De coel., Book I. If it is incorruptible, such a form will
remain after the corruption of the composite just as it preexisted in matter
before the generation of the composite. As a consequence, numerically one
and the same thing would represent itself after its own corruptionwhich
is denied by Aristotle in De gen., Book II.
(iii) Third Opinion. What preexists is not the whole form, but only a
part of it, which consequently has a potential and diminished being and
is made actual and complete by the agent. And it is in such a remitted
and incomplete wayAverroes thinksthat the forms of the elements
exist in the mixture; after the resolution of the mixture, however, they are
intended and made complete by the action of a natural agent. In the same
vein, Averroes believes that contrary forms can coexist in the same thing,
namely not in their complete being but in a diminished form of being. And
this opinion too seems to be supported by Aristotles doctrine in this book,
and in particular by the claim that the matter of the artefacts which are
produced by art and nature contain a part of the thing to be produced.
To this opinion it should be objected that, according to it, a generable
and an ingenerable form, i.e. the form supervening on matter and the
preexisting form, would be of the same lowest specieswhich is ruled
out by Aristotle in Met., Book X, where he says that the generable and the
ingenerable differ more than in genus, just like the corruptible and the
incorruptible. Therefore, there seems to be no reason why one part of the
whole form rather than another should preexist, given that such parts are
all of the same kind as the whole form.
(iv) Fourth Opinion. There are two kinds of generation, complete and
incomplete generation. In complete generation form simply begins to exist
just as the composite does, so that neither the whole form nor any part
of it preexists in matter. It can be said, however, that form preexists in
potentiality, not only according to denominative potentiality, as the second
opinion maintains, i.e. in the way in which the form of an element exists
in the mixture, but also according to the potentiality for being, in the
sense in which an eclipse exists potentially in the full moon. In incomplete
generation, by contrast, it is not the form that begins to exist, but the
composite, as when the elements are generated with the corruption of the
mixture. And in this instance form preexists in matter, even though not in
all cases, for sometimes the form in question simply begins to be, as is the
case with the first generation of an element from another element, which
is an instance of complete generation. After the complete generation of
the composite, therefore, a form really exists in matter, while before the
generation a form exists in matter only potentially, not in the sense that
the form is in matter either as a whole or as a part, but because there is in
matter the potentiality for it.
Thus, when Aristotle says that form does not come to be, he himself
makes clear that he means that it does not come to be per se, but only acci-
dentally. As to Aristotles further claim that in the case of things produced by
nature and art matter contains a part of the thing to be generated, it is cor-
rectly explained by Averroes. He says that the matter of things produced by
nature and art possesses a part of the natural potentiality: in other words, by
a part of the thing to be generated we should understand a natural princi-
ple which is subservient to art and not a part of form. Otherwise, the matter
of the things that are produced only by nature would possess the whole form
to be generated, which is against what is stated in the third opinion.
Replies to the arguments.
Reply to Arg. 1. It is true that the agent extracts form from matter, but from
this it does not follow that form preexists in matter, but only that it preexists
in some way, i.e. potentially.
Reply to Arg. 2. It is in fact impossible for a form to come to be from a
non-form, if this means that a form would come to be in matter without any
form preexisting. However, a form comes from a form not as from its subject
or its part, but as from a terminus, in that the corruption of one form is the
generation of another.
Reply to Arg. 3. The argument is not conclusive. For, just as an artificial
form does not come from outside, even if it is produced only by an external
agent, so a natural form does not come to be outside matter, but only in
matter, even if it is produced by an external agent.
Reply to Arg. 4. Form comes from matter not as from a part but as from a
subject. Therefore, it is said to come from matter accidentally and not per
se.
Difficulty 2. The difficulty concerns Conclusion 3 of Part 1. One might ask

whether the sentence What generates and what is generated are similar is
universally true or not. If it is, it seems to follow that every generation is
univocal. If it is not universally true, then Conclusion 3 of Part 1 is false.
Aristotles answer. Things that come to be per se and not accidentally are
produced by an agent which is in some sense univocal. Things are said to
be produced per se by an agent when they are produced by the agent as
such, as when a house is produced by a builder. On the contrary, things are
said to be produced accidentally by an agent when they are produced by
the agent not as such, as when a house is produced by a musical man. In
the case of things generated accidentally, the agent need not be univocal,
while it must be in some sense univocal in the case of things generated per
se.
Aristotle proves his answer on the basis of one of the preestablished distinc-
tions. Among things that come to be per se, in fact, he distinguishes: (i)
things that are produced by nature alone; (ii) those that are produced by
the intellect alone and (iii) finally, those that are produced partly by nature
and partly by the intellect. In case (i), things are totally produced by a univo-
cal agent, in that what generates and what is generated agree in form both
according to essence and according to being: their forms in fact are of the
same species and have the same material being on account of their depen-
dence on prime matter. In case (ii), things come from a univocal agent only
partly, be the agent an intellect possessing art or one that possesses no art: a
house is produced by an intellect possessing art, while a letter of the alpha-
bet which a student copies down is produced by an intellect that does not
possess art. Things produced by an intellect come only partly from a univo-
cal agent in that the producer and the product agree in form only according
to essence but not also according to being. The house in the mind of the
builder and the house exiting outside the mind agree essentially in that the
house in the mind is a similitude of that outside the mind; however, they
differ in being, in that the house in the mind has an intentional being and
is not in matter, while the house outside the mind has a real being and is in
matter. And exactly the same thing is true of the relation between the letter
in the mind of a student and the letter which the student copies down on
some material support.
(iii) Things that are produced partly by nature and partly by the intel-
lectsuch as health, which is produced partly by the art of medicine and
partly by formal or virtual heatcome from a univocal agent, if not formally
as in cases (i) and (ii), at least virtually, in that they virtually come from a
univocal agent existing in the soul. The health of a healthy body is virtually
contained in the heat of the heart, while formally it is contained in the health
existing in the soul, in that it is caused by the health in the soul and bears
a formal similitude to it. In general, things that are produced by nature and
intellect are said to come from a part or from something having a part,
because there is no agent from which they are totally produced. If health is
produced by heat or by art, it is said to come from a part. If, by contrast, it is
produced by the intellect or by the heart, it is said to come from something
having a part, in that the intellect has in itself the art and the heart has in
itself the heat. Aristotles text (1034a2125) corresponding to Difficulty 2 and
Aristotles solution.
To the question as to whether it is art or nature that is the proximate cause
of the things that come to be by art and nature, Aristotle responds that
nature is the proximate cause and art the remote cause, since the virtual
heat existing in the movement is the proximate cause of the heat existing
in the body. The formal heat, in fact, is (i) either the whole health or a
part of it, (ii) or, alternatively, a disposition for heath or for a part of it. In
case (i), the virtual heat present in the movement is the proximate cause of
health; in case (ii), it is the formal heat itself which is the proximate cause of
health. Either way, nature is the proximate cause of health. Art is the cause
of health in so far as it is the cause of the movement in which heat is virtually
present, and so is only the remote cause of health. Aristotles text (1034a25
30).
Notandum 1. Averroes explains the difference between artefacts and nat-
ural things. Natural things are in their producers according to both form and
matter, because a natural agent generates both form and matter, and also
because not only the form of the thing generated is in matter but also that
of the producer. Artefacts, by contrast, are in their producers only accord-
ing to form, both because the matter of artefacts does not come from art
but from nature and because only the form of the thing generated, and not
also that of the producer, is in matter. By these remarks Averroes intends
to prove that there is more univocity in natural things than in artefacts, in
that in natural things univocity concerns both form and matter, whereas in
artefacts it only concerns form.
Notandum 2. Averroes further remarks that we should not concede that
heat is health in an unqualified sense, but only disjunctively or causally i.e.
qualifiedly, as in the sentences: Heat is either health or the cause of health;

If heat is in some way health, it is the potentiality for health or a part of
health.
Therefore, there are two opinions concerning the essence of health.
According to one view, health does not really differ from the primary
quality in virtue of which a body becomes healthy, but only conceptually.
Since heat makes a body healthy, it is just health, just as coldness, which
makes a body ill, is just illness. However, since the notion of heat does not
involve the balance of humours which is involved in the notion of health,
heat and health differ conceptually.
The other view maintains that health is not one of the primary qualities, in
that the movement towards health is not a movement per se, as it is, instead,
the movement towards any of the primary qualities. And since neither
Aristotle nor Averroes intend to adjudicate between these two opinions
here, they express themselves by means of disjunctive sentences. The truth
is, however, that heat is not health but rather the cause of health, and so
the sentence Heat is health should be understood according to causal
predication and not according to identical predication.
Notandum 3. Averroes explains Aristotles remark in the text to the effect
that movement is the cause of heat, not any movement but only the move-
ment involving some kind of rubbing. Just as not any light produces heat,
but only the light which is reflected in a body that is naturally disposed to
receive heat, so not any movement produces heat, but only the rubbing tak-
ing place in a body that is naturally disposed to receive heat. This explains
why the heaven does not produce heat in spite of its moving at great speed:
there is no rubbing involved in the movement of the heavenly bodies or any
natural disposition to receive heat.
There seems to be a difficulty here. Since the effect should be multiplied
with the multiplication of the cause and, on the other hand, the rays of the
sun clearly produce heat, it would seem that someone moving in the sun
should be hotter than someone restingwhich seems to be contradicted
by experience.
To the difficulty it should be answered that it is not always true that the
effect is multiplied with the multiplication of the cause, because, some-
times, two causes act more feebly than just one cause alone. The rays of the
sun, for instance, are reflected to a greater degree and make more impact
on someone resting than on someone moving.
Against Conclusion 3 of part 1 one might object that it is not true that
everything that is generated per se is generated by something univocal: for
instance what is generated from sperm is not univocal to it, nor is a women
univocal to the man she is generated by. Finally, the mule which is generated
from a horse and a donkey is not univocal to either of them.
Aristotle replies that, just as the principle of all artefacts is the quiddity
in the mind of the craftsman, from which proceed the practical syllogisms
which in turn give rise to the generation of artificial forms, so the principle
of natural things is the quiddity in the power of the agent, from which
come the dispositions of matter, which in turn give rise to natural forms.
Likewise, just as in the power of the craftsman there is the form of the
artefact to be produced, so in the power of the sperm there is the form of the
natural thing to be generated. Therefore, just as artefacts are in some sense
univocal to the craftsman on account of the art existing in him, so natural
things are in some sense univocal to the sperm on account of the formative
power existing in it. Such a formative power, even though it is not in itself
univocal to the product of generation, is in some sense so on account of
the thing from which the sperm comes. And in general it is not necessary
that there be complete univocity between producer and product, but it is
sufficient that they be univocal to some extent. When the producer and
the product, for instance, are both male human beings, there is univocity
in both species and gender. When the producer is a man and the product a
woman, by contrast, the univocity concerns the species but not the gender.
Finally, in the case of a mule, which is generated by a horse and a donkey,
there is univocity only in genus. As a general rule, however, there is always
unqualified univocity between producer and product, unless the seed gets
somehow damaged. This may take place for two reasons, either because the
power is not strong enough and has little control over matterwhich is the
case with monstersor because the thing on which the power acts is not
properly disposed. The generation of a mule or that of woman fall within
this second case. Aristotles text (1034a301034b3) corresponding to the reply.
Notandum 1. Averroes explains Aristotles text on the basis of De animal.,
c. 16. Art and seed are similar in their mode of operating, in that the artificial
form exists potentially in the art just as the natural form exists potentially
in the seed. Two things in fact concur in the production of an artefact:
the quiddity of the artefact in the mind of the craftsman and the practical
syllogism based on such a quiddity. Likewise, two things concur in the
generation of a natural thing: the quiddity of the thing existing in the
generative power and the intention of reproducing something similar to
itself, which is grounded on the quiddity of the thing. Art and seed, however,
are also different in some respects. For it is not necessary for a house to come
from a house existing in matter, although this may happen when someone
takes some house existing in matter as the model for building another one.
In the case of natural generation, by contrast, it is necessary for the sperm

to come from the animal, not as a physical part of it, say a part of flesh, but
as some portion of the food, which is in potentiality the whole animal not
only materially, but also effectively. An animal in fact does not come from
the seed only as from its matter, but also as from some kind of agent, in that
the seed contains a certain power of forming the limbs of the animal. For
these reasons, the seed is more similar to an instrument than to the art. For
just as an instrument does not introduce a form if it is not governed by the
art, so the sperm does not introduce a form if it is not regulated by another
agent, i.e. the male parent. Moreover, just as the form of an artefact exists
formally in the craftsman and virtually in the instrument, so the form of a
man exists formally in the producer and virtually in the sperm.
Notandum 2. On the basis of Aristotles doctrine in the De Animalibus
Averroes attributes to the power of the seed four eminent features.
(i) The first is that the power of the seed is a natural power. Every
non-cognitive power is a natural power and the power of the seed is non-
cognitive.
(ii) The power of the seed is a divine power. In fact, even though an
instrument can act outside the boundaries of its own form in that it acts
by means of the power of the main agent, it can never act outside the
boundaries of the form of the main agent. The power of the seed produces in
matter the diversity of an animals limbswhich it could not produce either
by itself, in that it is an instrument, or by means of the power of the main
agent, i.e. the male parent, because such a power is sufficient to nourish the
animals limbs but not to produce such diverse limbs. Therefore, it seems
that the power of the intellect, which is a divine power, concurs in producing
the effect.
(iii) The power of the seed acts in the manner of art, which becomes clear
from a comparison between art and nature. Nature in fact produces only one
effect from one kind of matter, while art can produce many effects from one
kind of matter: from wood, for instance, fire produces only fire, while there
are many different artefacts art can produce out of wood. Similarly to art,
the formative power in the seed produces from one kind of matter limbs of
different species.
(iv) The power of the seed acts in the manner of the intellect. For both
the intellect and the seed act without a bodily instrument. The intellect in
fact acts on the soul as on its proximate substance and on the body as on its
remote subject, and does not need a bodily instrument. Similarly, the power
of the seed acts on the seed as on its proximate matter and on the menstrual
blood as on its remote matter.
Since, unlike nature, the power of the seed does not act only in one way,
but in many ways, exactly like art and the intellect, and, moreover, since
it does not introduce only one form but many forms of different natures
just like the universal causes, which are God and the intelligences, Aristotle
attributes the power of the seed to divine principles and not to natural ones
and Galen wonders whether it should be regarded as creator or creature.
Notandum 3. Averroes explains the difference between the formative
power in the seed and the natural power in the already formed animal. The
difference is that the natural power of the animal makes use of determinate
instruments, i.e. the determinate limbs of the animal, while the formative
power in the seed does not make use of such instruments. The only instru-
ment it uses is the natural heat. It must also be said that the formative power
is not in the seed as the form of it, but is rather present in the same way as
the soul is present in the heavenly bodies, i.e. as a mover and not as a form.
Difficulty 3. Whether it is the case that, just as some artefacts are produced both
by art and by nature, and some others by art only, so some natural things come
to be both from seed and without seed, and others from seed only.
Aristotles answer is positive. Just as those artefacts are produced both by
art and by nature whose matter can move of itself in the same way as it
is moved by art, so those natural things come to be both from seed and
without seed whose matter can move of itself with the same movement as
the sperm usually imparts. By contrast, the artefacts whose matter cannot
move of itself in the same way as it is moved by art are produced only by art,
and the natural things whose matter cannot move with the same movement
as sperm imparts come to be only from seed. For instance: an animal can be
cured both by art and by nature, because its body can move of itself in the
same way as it can be moved by the medicine and by the doctor. A house,
by contrast, can be produced only by art because stones and logs cannot
move of themselves towards the form of the house and need an extrinsic
agent to do so. Similarly, in the case of natural things, mice and frogs are
generated both from sperm and without sperm because their matter moves
of itself with the same movement as the sperm imparts in the generation
of perfect animals. Men and horses, by contrast, are generated only from
sperm because their matter cannot move of itself with the same movement
as the sperm imparts, but needs an external agent.
Thus, it is clear that Averroess view, according to which no animal can be
generated both from sperm and without sperm, is wrong. Nor is Avicennas
opinion true, who maintains that all animals can be generated both from
sperm and without sperm. Aristotle takes an intermediate position by say-

ing that some animals are generated only from seed and some others both
from seed and without seed. He also says that the animals that are generated
from seed are generated by nature, while those that are generated with-
out seed are generated by chance. Aristotles text (1034b37) corresponding
to the answer. Difficulty 3 together with Aristotles answer seems to clash
with Conclusion 3 of part 1 and with the conclusion in Difficulty 2, because
things which are generated by chance or from putrefaction do not seem to
be univocal to what generates them.
Notandum. Averroes observes that Aristotles answer clearly reaffirms
that Platos Forms, even if they existed, would contribute nothing to gener-
ation, in that the producer and the product of generation are always things
that differ in matter and agree in form, either formally or virtually. For, even
if the sperm is not formally a man, it is nonetheless in some sense a man
in that it generates a man. And the power of the seed, even if it is not a
soul in actuality, is nonetheless in some sense a soul in potentiality in that a
soul is generated from such a power. Similarly, putrefied matter is in some
sense a mouse or a frog in so far as mice and frogs are generated from it
and the power in the putrefied matter generates the form of both mice and
frogs.
Averroes also reports four Platonic arguments against Aristotles opinion.
Arg. 1. Everything that passes from potentiality to actuality must be brought
into actuality by something existing in actuality, for nothing acts in so far as
it is in potentiality. But the animals and plants that are generated without
seed pass from potentiality to actuality. Therefore, they must be brought
into actuality by something existing in actuality, which cannot but be a
form separate from matter. In conclusion, a separate agent is necessary for
equivocal generation to take place.
Arg. 2. The second argument is the strongest one. Every substantial form,
be it the form of an element or of an inanimate mixture or of an animal, is
not a conjunction of primary or secondary qualities but rather a form over
and above such a conjunction. It is then asked whether substantial form is
generated by itself or by some extrinsic agent. It is not generated by itself, for
nothing generates itself. If then form is generated by an extrinsic agent, the
agent must be either an individual of the same species or genus as the thing
generated, or a separate form. It is a fact, however, that in the generation of a
soul from the seed, the individual that generates and that which is generated
are not of the same species or genus. Therefore, the agent in the generation
of a soul must be a separate form.
Arg. 3. In the transformation of the elements into one another action and
passion do not concern substantial forms but rather primary qualities. For
action and passion concern contraries and it is not substantial forms but
rather primary qualities that are contrary. Therefore, when the elements
pass from potentiality to actuality, they must be brought into actuality by
something existing in actuality, which cannot but be a separate form. This
is also true when a third element is generated from two others. For the
two elements that generate a third element are corrupted together with
their substantial forms and, on the other hand, qualities cannot generate
substances. Therefore, we need to posit a separate agent.
Arg. 4. The fourth argument comes from experience. We see in fact
that, as a result of a certain movement, what was only fire in potentiality
becomes fire in actuality. But we cannot say that the movement produces
the substantial form of fire, because movement is an accident. Therefore,
we must posit a separate form, which generates the substantial form of fire
when fire is generated as a result of certain movements, such as rubbing or
the collision of two bodies.
Notandum 2. Averroes reports Avicenna and Themistius view to the
effect that we need to posit a separate form to explain all kinds of genera-
tion. They both believe that the substantial forms of generable and corrupt-
ible things come from a separate form, even if they give different names to
it. Avicenna calls it Agent intelligence and Giver of forms and identifies
it with the tenth intelligence, namely the mover of the sphere of the moon.
Themistius, by contrast, calls it the celestial soul and takes it to contain
all the sensible and intelligible forms not only intentionally and objectively,
but also potentially and effectively. He says in fact that the celestial soul cre-
ates all the generable and corruptible substantial forms. In his treatise On
sperm he makes this point concerning the things that are generated from
seed. In the sixth part of his De anima he extends it to all generable and
corruptible things. From Averroes we also gather that this must have been
Al-Farabiss opinion as well.
Averroes criticises this view by showing that it leads to four inconvenient
consequences.
Cons. 1. Generation is not brought about by a natural agentwhich
clearly follows from Avicennas and Themistius views, since they maintain
that the generation of form is brought about by a separate agent. It can
also be shown that this view presents a difficult. For in general one and the
same agent produces the end and the means to the end. The generation of
form, however, is the end of alteration. Therefore, it is one and the same
agent that brings about the alteration of matter and the generation of form.
Now, for Avicenna and Themistius the alteration of matter is produced by

a natural agent. Therefore, the generation of form too must be produced by
a natural agent.
Cons. 2. The second consequence is that what generates does not form.
For that thing forms which introduces form. But, according to their view,
what generates does not introduce form, because, for instance, what gener-
ates fire does not introduce the form of fire. For them, it is rather a separate
agent that introduces the form of fire. It can also be shown that this view
presents a further difficult. For there is a certain parallelism between arte-
facts and natural things. But in the case of artefacts the thing that generates
is also the one that forms. This must be the case, therefore, with natural
things as well.
Cons. 3. Another consequence is that the subject and its form would be
two things in actualitywhich is clearly a difficulty because the subject
and its form make up one thing in actuality and so should not be two
things in actuality, but only potentially. That the view defended by Avicenna
and Themistius has this consequence can be shown in the following way.
Different actual agents that do not concur in the same effect produce
different actual effects. But the material and the immaterial agent are two
actual agents that do not concur in the same effect, in that the material agent
produces the subject while the immaterial one produces form. Therefore,
the subject and its form are two things in actuality.
Cons. 4. The fourth consequence is that one thing in actuality would
depend on two non-subordinate agents. This is difficult, because one thing
in actuality depends on one agent; if it depends on two agents, they must be
subordinate to one another. Now, their view clearly implies that one thing
in actuality depends on two non-subordinate agents. For, on their view, one
thing depends on a material agent for its subject and on an immaterial agent
for its form. And it is also clear that, according to them, such agents are not
subordinate to one another, for if they were, either both would generate the
subject or both would generate its formneither of which is the case.
Notandum 3. Averroes explains why all men incline towards Platos posi-
tion, which is also similar to that defended by the upholder of the Islamic
Law. They all believe that one is the creator of all things and that it is not
possible to proceed ad infinitum in efficient causes.
Besides Ideas, which are the special causes of the species, Plato also
posited one first incorporeal agent, from whom all the Ideas together with
the whole universe have been created. His view was followed by Christians,
Jews and Muslims and was also the view of those Jews who lived before
Christ, who posited one single creator of all things in order to avoid an
infinite regress of causes. Thus, Plato and Avicenna disagree concerning

the question of Ideas and the existence of a unique creator of all things.
They agree, by contrast, on the view that the material agent prepares mat-
ter without mediation and the immaterial agent introduces form without
mediation.
Averroes does not criticise Plato with regard to the creation of the world,
but only with regard to the point on which he agrees with Avicenna. He puts
forward two arguments.
Arg. 1. There is no process from one extreme to another except through a
middle term. But the immutable incorporeal and the mutable corporeal are
two extremes, whose middle term is the immutable corporeal, i.e. the heav-
enly body. Therefore, the immutable incorporeal cannot transform matter
immediately, but only through the mediation of the immutable corporeal.
Thus, just as the movement of the inferior things can be traced back to the
unmoved mover through the mediation of the heavenly movement, so the
transformation of matter can be traced back to an immaterial agent through
the mediation of a material agent, which is the heaven itself.
Arg. 2. What generates and what is generated in matter are similar to one
another. But the separate form and the form in matter are not similar to one
another. Therefore, it is impossible for a separate form to produce without
mediation a form in matter. Hence the intelligence cannot transform matter
without mediation. Averroes does not add any further arguments, for the
objections he has raised against Avicenna, Themistius and Al-Farabi can
also be raised against Plato.
Notandum 4. Averroes makes it clear that Aristotle posits two kinds of
agent, a separate agent for the generation of immaterial forms and an
agent in matter for the generation of material forms. Aristotle proves in
fact in De an., Book III that the human intellect is immaterial, unmixed
and separate; therefore, the speculative forms which are received therein
must be immaterial as well. As a consequence, an agent intellect must be
posited, i.e. an immaterial agent, which abstracts the speculative forms
from the representations and places them in the possible intellect. Thus,
the following reasoning can be advanced: an immaterial form stands to
an immaterial agent as a material form stands to a material agent; but an
immaterial form is generated by an immaterial agent; therefore, a material
form must be generated by an immaterial agent. For Aristotle, in conclusion,
it is one and the same agent that prepares matter and introduces form
a view which is also defended by Averroes as well as by Alexander of
Aphrodisias in his On animals. So, while Themistius and Al-Farabi follow
Avicennas opinion, Averroes and Alexander endorses Aristotles view.
To the first of Platos objections Averroes objects that, if one considers

Aristotles argument here to the effect that material forms are generated
by material forms, one will realise that it is the seed that generates the
form of the things which are generated from seed, and so such things are
not produced by any separate form, but rather by the seed itself by means
of the power which exists in it and depends on the agent from which the
seed comes. Nor is the power in the seed generated by the heaven or by the
intelligence of the heaven, but rather by the animal by which also the seed
is produced.
To the second objection Averroes replies that it will become clear that in
the case of the things which are not generated from seed it is the heavenly
bodies that confer upon them something similar to the seeds and to the
powers existing in them. Thus, just as the seeds and the powers existing in
them are made effective by animals and plants, so the putrefied matter and
the power existing in it, from which mice and frogs are generated, are made
effective by the heavenly bodies and not by some separate form.
As to how matter becomes putrefied, we must keep in mind Aristotles
definition of putrefaction in Meter., Book IV: Putrefaction is the corruption
of the proper heat in any moist subject by the heat of the containing body.
From the definition it clearly emerges that four things are necessary for
putrefaction to take place. (i) What becomes putrefied must be moist, so
that things which are moister get putrefied faster. (ii) What can become
putrefied must have some intrinsic heat. (iii) The containing body, be it
air, water or something else, must have some heat. (iv) The heat of the
containing body must be stronger than that of the thing that becomes
putrefied.
When, therefore, in a certain body there is some internal moistness with
a corresponding lack of heat in the containing body or, alternatively, some
excessive heat, it is necessary for putrefaction to take place that the moist-
ness be extracted up to the surface of the body; and since the moistness is the
nourishment of heat, it is also necessary that the natural heat be extracted
so that the subtler moistness may also be extracted and something grosser
and closer to earth may be left in the body. Thus, the animals that are gen-
erated from putrefaction are not generated from some terrestrial residue,
but rather from the moistness extracted up to the surface of the body. Only
thus can some sort of film be formed around the surface, which prevents
the heat and the spirits included in the moistness from evaporating. In
the spirits included in the moistness on account of the celestial powers
there is imprinted some generative power, which is virtually and potentially
the animal to be generated. The animals generated from putrefaction, in
conclusion, are generated on account of the power imprinted in the spirits

included in the moistness, just as the animals generated from seed are
generated on account of the power included in the seed.
To the third objection Averroes replies that that which moves matter is
necessarily either a body having some active quality or a certain power
that acts through such a body. Thus, when one element is generated from
another, there is not only action and passion through primary qualities,
but it is the determining element that transforms matter by means of the
primary qualities. When, by contrast, a third element comes to be from
two others, both elements transform one another and generate a third
element. It is not necessary that what generates and what is generated exist
at the same time when generation is concluded, but it is enough that they
do so in the course of the process of generation: the sperm from which
a man is generated does not exist any longer when the generation of the
man is completed, but exists throughout the time when the man is being
generated. Neither is it necessary that what is generated be simultaneous
with the thing which is generated, but it is sufficient that the two things
be simultaneous with respect to their power. Therefore, just as the sperm
does not remain at the end of generation, but what remains is the power
existing in it, so, when fire is generated from air and earth, air and earth do
not need to remain at the end of generation, but it is sufficient that their
powers remain, i.e. the hot and the dry which make the generation of fire
possible.
To the fourth objection Averroes replies that the subject of form has being
only in virtue of form and so the action of the agent depends on the subject
only in so far as it depends on form. Thus, what generates a form generates
the subject of the form only in so far as it generates a form. In general, as the
subject relates to form so the action concerning the subject relates to the
action concerning form. But subject and form relate to one another in such
a way that neither of them can exist without the other. Therefore, the action
concerning the subject cannot take place without the action concerning
form taking place as well and vice versa, and hence what generates the
subject also generates form and vice versa. Thus, movement generates both
fire and the form of fire, not as a principal agent, but as the instrumental
agent of the bodies which hit each other and are the principal agents in the
generation of fire. Everything which is generated, therefore, is generated by
something similar to itself and, to some extent, univocal to itself, either in
genus or in species, formally or virtually, actually or potentially. The result
is that we do not need to posit Platos Ideas or Avicennas Giver of forms or
even Themistius and Al-Farabiss Soul of the heaven.
There might be some doubts concerning Aristotles text and Averroess

comments. For it might seem that the animals that are not generated from
seed, but by putrefaction, are not generated by chance. A casual effect
comes about rarely and besides the intention of the agent, as Aristotle says
in Phys., Book II. The animals that do not come from seed, by contrast, are
generated frequently and in accordance with the intention of the heavenly
body generating them.
It should be replied that it is not inappropriate for some event to be casual
with respect to one cause and non-casual with respect to another. Therefore,
if the generation without seed of some animals is understood in relation to
the power of the heaven, it is not casual, because the heaven is the principal
agent of generation, which has in view the generation of this or that animal.
If, by contrast, generation without seed is understood in relation to the
putrefying heat of the containing body, which does not have in view the
generation of this or that animal, then it is casual and accidental. Causal
is here understood not strictly, as Aristotle takes it in the Physics, but in
a broad sense so as to cover every effect which comes about besides the
intention of the agent.
Difficulty 4. Whether the generation of an accident is similar to the generation

of a substance. If one should say that it is similar, it might be objected that, in
the generation of a substance, form, like matter, preexists in that it must be
one of the parts of the substance generated; in the generation of an accident,
by contrast, the accidental form does not preexist in that it is not a part
of the substance. If one says, by contrast, that the two kinds of generation
are not similar, this seems to be because a substance always comes from
a substance, while an accident does not always come from an accident
but sometimes from a substance as well. But this claim is in conflict with
Conclusion 3, which states that everything that is generated is generated by
something similar to itself, because substance and accident, being primarily
distinct categories, have no similarity.
Aristotles reply is that the generation of an accident is in one sense similar
to that of a substance and in another dissimilar from it.
First Aristotle shows in which sense they are similar. He says that, just as in
the generation of a substance, what is generated per se is not form or matter
but the composite of them, this is true also in the generation of an accident.
In the category of substance, for instance, what is generated per se is not
the matter or the form of the animal but the whole animal. Likewise, in the
category of quantity what is generated per se is not a piece of wood or its
quantity, but a piece of wood of a certain quantity. And the same is true
of all the other categories. And just as in the generation of a substance the
substantial form preexists in that it is a part of the composite substance, so
in the generation of an accident the accidental form preexists in that it is a
part of the accidental composite which is generated. For a piece of wood of
a certain quantity is composed of a piece of wood and of a certain quantity,
just as the piece of wood itself is composed of its subject and its substantial
form. Aristotles text (1034b716) corresponding to the case of similarity.
Then Aristotle shows in which sense the generation of a substance and that
of an accident are not similar. It is proper to the generation of a substance
that it always presupposes a substance in actuality as the agent of gener-
ation. For instance: when an animal is generated, there is always another
animal existing in actuality which is the agent of generation. But also in the
case of the generation of a mule from a horse and a donkey or in that of the
generation of a frog from putrefied matter, there will always be a substance
in actuality as the agent of generation, which agrees in species or genus with
the thing generated. The generation of an accident, by contrast, not always
presupposes an accident in actuality as the agent of generation. Sometimes
in fact the accident preexists only in potentiality, as when the agent of gen-
eration is a substance and the thing generated an accident. Aristotles text
(1034b1619) corresponding to the case of dissimilarity.
Notandum. Averroes explains Aristotles text by means of two distinctions.
First distinction. Some qualities are generated by a quality existing in
actuality and some others by a quality existing only in potentiality. The
first case occurs when the proximate agent of generation is a quality, as
when the heat of the water comes from the heat of the fire. The second
case occurs when the proximate agent of generation is a substance, as when
some hot water becomes cold because it naturally loses its heat. Just as
the seed is potentially the animal, both actively and passively, because it
generates the animal and the animal is generated from it as from its matter,
so a substance is potentially a quality because it generates a quality and a
quality is generated from it as from its matter.
Second distinction. Of the qualities which are generated from a quality
existing in actuality, some are generated from a quality which is similar
to them, while others are generated from a quality which is not similar
to them. The first case occurs when the quality generated and the quality
that generates are of the same species: as when hotness is generated from
hotness or coldness from coldness. The second case, by contrast, occurs
when the quality generated and the quality that generates are not of the
same species: colours, odours and flavours, for instance, are generated from
a mixture of primary qualities.
There are four difficulties concerning the whole issue of generation.

Difficulty 1: whether the composite is generated (i) from matter and form or (ii)
from matter only.
Three arguments in favour of (ii).
Arg. 1. A composite is generated from a being in potentiality and not from a
being in actuality. But form is a being in actuality, while matter is a being in
potentiality. Therefore, a composite is generated from matter only.
Arg. 2. Generation and corruption are opposite changes; therefore, a
composite is generated from that into which it is corrupted. But a composite
is corrupted into its matter and not into its form in that matter, and not form,
remains after the corruption. Therefore, a composite is generated from its
matter.
Arg. 3. A composite is generated from that which the agent transforms.
But the agent transforms matter and not form in that it operates on matter
and not on form. Therefore, a composite is generated from its matter alone.
One argument in favour of (i).
Arg. In general something is generated from the things from which it is
intrinsically made. But a composite is intrinsically made from both matter
and form and not from matter alone. Therefore, it is generated from both
matter and form and not from either of them alone. However, a composite
is generated more from form than from matter, because something can be
said to be more properly generated from the thing from which it has being.
And the composite has its being from its form more than from its matter.
Alternatively. Something is generated more from that in virtue of which
it has a new being than from that in virtue of which it does not have a new
being. But the composite has a new being in virtue of form and not in virtue
of matter, because matter is perpetual while form begins to be.
Reply. The preposition from can be taken in two ways. If it expresses
the relation of parthood, then the composite is generated from both matter
and form. Thus when it is said that nothing is generated from an actual
being (Arg. 1), it must be replied that form is in actuality with respect to
matter and in potentiality with respect to the composite. And it can also be
conceded that, since the composite is generated from matter and form it is
also corrupted into matter and form, although not in a proper sense (Arg. 2).
Moreover, even if matter alone is transformed, nonetheless the composite
is generated from form as well (Arg. 3).
If, on the contrary, the preposition from expresses the relation of sub-
jecthood, then the composite is generated from matter alone. And so it is
conceded that the composite comes intrinsically from matter alone. The
arguments for the conclusion that a composite is generated from both mat-
ter and formand more from form than from mattertake the preposition
from to expression the relation of parthood.
Difficulty 2. Whether the subject of the generation of the composite is (i) matter
and form together or (ii) matter alone.
Four arguments in favour of (i).
Arg. 1. It is not only matter that underlies the composite but also form, in
that both form and matter precede the composite.
Arg. 2. The composite is not generated only from matter, but also from
form. Neither is it true that only matter remains in the composite, but also
form does.
Arg. 3. The terminus of generation is the composite itself. Therefore, all
the things that precede the generation of the composite are subjects of
its generation. But both matter and form precede the generation of the
composite.
Arg. 4. Both form and matter are the subject of the privation of form, just
as both are the subject of the positive property. But the subject of privation
and that of generation are one and the same, as is implied by Aristotle in
Phys., Book I, and by Averroess commentary.
In favour of (ii) it may be argued that, as Aristotle implies in De gen, Book I,
and in Phys., Book I, the subject of generation must satisfy four conditions:
(1) it must be an unqualified being in potentiality; (2) it must temporally
preexist the composite; (3) it must be transformed by the agent; (4) it must
be one subject unqualifiedly.
It is clear that these four conditions are satisfied by matter alone and not
by matter and form together. So, only matter is the subject of the generation
of both the composite and form.
Reply to Arg. 1. Form does not underlie the composite, but only matter
does. Neither does form preexist the composite temporally but only in
nature.
Reply to Arg. 2. The composite is not generated from matter and form as
from its subjects but as from its parts. If flesh and blood are not the subject
of the animal, in spite of their being its matter, a fortiori form cannot be the
subject of generation.
Reply to Arg. 3. Generation has two termini, i.e. a formal and a material
terminus. The formal terminus is form itself, while the material one is the
composite. It is not impossible for one and the same generation to have two
termini per se, provided that one is a terminus per se and primarily and the
other a terminus per se but not primarily. Nor need all the things preceding
generation be also subjects of generation, especially if their precedence is
only according to nature.
Reply to Arg. 4. Only matter is the subject of privation, both of the priva-
tion of form and of the privation of the composite. It is also false that form
is the subject of the positive property. For, if form is not the subject of the
composite, it is not the subject of the positive property, either.
Difficulty 3. Whether an accident can be generated immediately by a non-

accident.
Four arguments for a negative answer.
Arg. 1. A separable accident is not generated by a substance immediately, but
through the mediation of an inseparable accident. But the action of every
agent is a separable accident. Therefore, an action is performed by an agent
only through the mediation of an inseparable accident.
Arg. 2. In things that are essentially ordered according to the prior and the
posterior, the last can be reduced to the first only through the mediation
of a middle, if there is any. But the categories are essentially ordered so
that substance holds the first place, quantity the second, quality the third,
relation the fourth and action the fifth. So, the category of action can be
reduced to substance only through quality, which is an accident.
Arg. 3. An agent acts only on its immediate patient, because agent and
patient must be simultaneous. It is evident, however, that a body becomes
the immediate patient of another body not through its substance but
through its quantity. Therefore, a body acts immediately on another body
only through the mediation of quantity.
Arg. 4. The nobler a form, the more active it is in its kind. But the soul
is the noblest of natural forms; hence it is also the most active. It is clear,
however, that the soul does not act through its substance but rather through
its accidents, which are its faculties. Much less, therefore, can the other
forms act immediately.
The opposite view, however, seems to be defended by Aristotle in the
text, when he says that it is proper to a substance to be generated by
another substance in actuality, while it is not proper to an accident to
be generated by another accident in actuality. Therefore, at least some
accident is immediately generated not by an accident but by a substance.
Thus, the following argument can be advanced: in things that are essen-
tially ordered as superior and inferior every perfection which belongs to
the inferior belongs also, and more appropriately, to the superior. But sub-
stance and accident are essentially ordered as superior and inferior. Now,
being active is a perfection which is found to belong immediately to acci-
dents; therefore, it belongs immediately to substance as well and in a more
perfect way than that in which it belongs to accidents. I ask then whether
substance acts immediately on an accident or on a substance. If it acts
immediately on an accident, we have the intended conclusion. If, by con-
trast, it does not act immediately on a substance but only through the medi-
ation of an accident, we have once again the intended conclusion.
It must be noted that the common opinion draws two conclusions. The first
is that an accident performs no action except in so far as it is an instrument
of a substance, in that it depends on substance both throughout the time
when it is being generated and when its generation is completed. For the
cause of a cause is also the cause of the thing caused.
Against the first conclusion it can be argued that the heat produced by hot
water is produced by the heat in the water as by a principal cause without
the concourse of any substance. Therefore, heat possesses some operation
as a principal agent and not only as an instrumental one. No agent in fact
produces per se a form which is contrary to itself. But hotness is contrary
to water, which has a natural inclination towards coldness. Therefore, heat
cannot be produced by water, but is rather produced by the accident of
which water is the subject.
The second conclusion is that substance performs no action except
through an accident, in that substance always operates through an instru-
ment.
This conclusion is not true, in that there are many counterexamples to
it. The intelligence moving the heavens produces movement without the
mediation of any accident. The form of air, when air is violently condensed,
brings air itself back to its natural rareness and to its natural place
and such a movement is brought about immediately by the substantial
form without any accident actively concurring in it. And fire, when it is
not in its natural disposition, reduces itself to its natural hotness, just as
water reduces itself to its natural coldness. Both movements are produced
without any accident concurring per se in them. For, if some accidents
intervened, either we would have an infinite regress of acting accidents
which is impossibleor we would arrive at an accident which is produced
immediately by a substance. And, in general, concerning all inseparable
accidents, which are the first and primary properties of a substance, it
is clear that they come from substance effectively and not through some
accidents.
Thus, it must be said that, although a substance does not produce a sub-
stance without an instrument, it produces an accident without an instru-
ment. And an accident too produces an accident not in so far as it is the
instrument of something else, but in virtue of itself. Neither is it necessary
in general that the cause of a cause also be the cause of the thing caused.
For instance: primary qualities are the per se causes of heat, and heat is the
per se cause of the visible species in the medium as well as of vision; how-
ever, primary qualities are not the per se causes of the visible species or of
vision. Consequently, it must be conceded that an accident can produce a
substantial form in virtue of itself and not as an instrument of something
else. It may happen, for instance, that a stone produces fire in some dry and
inflammable matter. However, the stone is not in this case the main agent,
because it is not the subject of hotness but rather of coldness. Therefore,
the main agent must be hotness itself. And it is not a problem if some-
thing acts beyond its own degree, if this happens on account of the thing
which is acted upon: for the actualities of the active things are in the things
acted upon when they are properly disposed, as Aristotle states in De an.,
Book II. Neither is the possibility for an accident to produce a substance
undermined by Aristotles claim that the generation of one substance pre-
supposes another substance existing in actuality. For this may be true either
mediately or immediately. And it is clear that the heat of a stone is produced
by fire, by the sun, or by some other substance which is formally or virtually
hot.
Reply to Arg. 1. Movement and primary qualities are separable accidents
and so are produced by a substance without the mediation of any accident,
be it separable or inseparable.
Reply to Arg. 2. To preserve the order among the five categories men-
tioned it is not necessary that an action be reduced to substance through
quality or quantity taken actively, but it is enough that they be taken pas-
sively. Thus the agent performs its action without the intervention of quality
or quantity. However, such an action is not received in the substance per-
forming it, if the substance does not have certain qualitative or quantitative
dispositions.
Reply to Arg. 3. A body does not act on another body through quantity,
when quantity is taken actively, for quantity is not an active power.
Reply to Arg. 4. Although the soul does not act without an accidental
instrument, many other forms act without any instrument. To act by means
of an instrument is not a sign of greater perfection: unlike the art in the
divine intellect, the art in the human intellect cannot act without an instru-
ment; nonetheless, the divine art is more perfect than the human art.
Difficulty 4. Whether there is in the matter of natural things some active

principle that leads matter towards the form to be generated.
Four arguments in favour of a positive answer.
Arg. 1. If there were no such principle, the generation of a natural thing
would be violent. For that action is violent whose principle comes from
outside, i.e. without the thing which is acted upon concurring in the action.
But if there were no active principle in matter, the thing which is acted upon
would not concur in any way in the generation. For the thing which is acted
upon is equally in potentiality for the natural and the violent movement,
and in the violent movement it does not contribute to the action. Thus, if
it did not possess an intrinsic active principle, it would not concur in the
natural movement, either.
Arg. 2. Natural things differ from artefacts in that they possess an intrinsic
principle of movement, while artefacts possess no such principle, but only
an extrinsic one. And this difference does not concern a passive principle,
but rather an active principle. Thus, natural things possess an active princi-
ple of movement.
Arg. 3. Nature is a principle of movement and rest. But nature is said of
both matter and form. Thus, matter is a principle of movement and rest.
However, matter cannot be such a principle according to its being pure
potentiality. Therefore, it must be such a principle in that it possesses some
innate or concreated principle which leads it to natural movement or to the
form to be generated.
Arg. 4. If the matter of natural things did not contain an active principle,
there would be no reason why from the seed of a plant, a plant is more easily
generated than an animal, or from the seed of a man, a man is more easily
generated than a horse. And this seems also to be Aristotles view when he
says that, unlike the matter of artefacts, the matter of natural things has a
principle by which it is moved towards form.
It must be noted that these and similar arguments are the ground for an
ancient opinion according to which in every generation there is in matter
an innate or concreated principle, which is usually called inchoation of
forms. Such a principle acts together with the extrinsic agent in such a
way that the principle does not bring matter into actuality unless it is acti-
vated by the extrinsic agent. And according to this opinion the difference
between natural and violent movement is that violent movement presup-
poses only one intrinsic principle, i.e. the passive principle in the thing
moved, and one extrinsic principle, which is also the active principle. Simi-
larly, the intrinsic principle of artefacts is merely passive, while their active
principle is extrinsic, i.e. is in their efficient cause. In natural movement,

by contrast, both the active and the passive principles are intrinsic. Now,
the generation of a form is a natural movement. So, it presupposes two
principles, i.e. an active and a passive principle, both existing in matter.
This opinion presented itself in two varieties. Some maintained that the
active principle which is present in matter should be assimilated to the
seminal power which exists in the seed of plants, in the sperm of animals
and even in putrefied matter. Others thought that such a principle is the
very form which is generated, not the form in actuality, but in potentiality,
so that a form, before acquiring actual being with generation, possesses
some potential and incomplete being in matter. The second variety was
supposed to preserve the difference between generation and creation: for
creation proceeds from nothing, while generation proceeds from something
of the thing generated. It is clear, however, that, if form did not have
some being in matter before generation, then the generation of form would
be out of nothing and hence generation would simply be an instance of
creation.
Against the first version of the opinion it can be said that, if it were
true, then the power in the seed or in the sperm would not come from
the agent of generation; neither would the power present in putrefied
matter come from the heaven in virtue of the primary qualitieswhich is
contrary to Aristotles and Averroess views. Moreover, it would follow that
hotness, coldness, wetness and dryness would not be primary qualities. For,
according to this opinion, matter precontains the seminal qualities that are
productive of hotness, coldness, wetness and dryness.
Against the second version of the opinion it can be argued that the com-
plete form is drawn either immediately out of the potentiality of matter or
immediately out of the potentiality of the incomplete form. If the first alter-
native is the case, the complete form will be drawn out of nothing of itself,
whether we posit an incomplete form or not, and hence generation will be
an instance of creation. Thus, it will be useless to introduce an incomplete
form to preserve the difference between generation and creation. If the sec-
ond alternative is the case, it will follow that the immediate subject of both
generation and complete form will be the incomplete form and not prime
matter. Thus, on the second alternative, (i) the complete and the incomplete
form will relate to one another as actuality and subjective potentiality; (ii)
a natural composite will come to be from such two forms. And both results
are problematic.
Moreover, it will follow that the incomplete form is essentially other than
the complete one, and so the latter will be drawn out of nothing of itself. The
second version of the inchoation theory, therefore, does not avoid treating
generation as an instance of creation, either.
Moreover, unqualified generation proceeds from unqualified not-being
to unqualified being, as Aristotle says in De gen., Book I, and Phys., Book V.
Therefore, form has no being before generation. Now to the supporters of
the inchoation of forms it may be asked whether the being which form has
in matter before generation is a total or a partial being. If it is a total being,
then form is not drawn from the potentiality of matter; neither does form
act in any way to complete its own being, because every agent acts only in
so far as it is in actuality, while the form existing in matter is only potential
according to the view at issue. If, by contrast, the form in matter has only
a partial being before generation, then it is not generated in an unqualified
way, but only qualifiedly. Actually, the production of such a form would not
be a true instance of generation but only an intention of form brought about
by the addition of one part to another in the same subject.
It must be said, therefore, that, before it is generated, a form does not
preexist, either totally or partially, either according to a complete or to
an incomplete being. Nor does it preexist according to an actual being or
according to a subjective potential being, but only according to an objective
potential being, in the same way as the Antichrist or the Day of Judgement
are said to exist in potentiality. Actually, according to AverroesOn Phys.,
Book IIthe elements are not altered per se from inside, but from outside;
nor do they have a principle of alteration according to form, but only
according to matter. And Averroes himself says in On Phys., Book VII, that
the movement of a piece of iron towards a magnet is certainly natural, but
does not come from inside the movable thing, but rather from outside. In the
same vein, Aristotle remarks, in Nich. Eth., Book III, that a natural movement
is that which proceeds from an intrinsic or extrinsic principle conferring
power on the thing which is acted upon.
Reply to Arg. 1. No generation of a form is violent. Moreover, in every
generation of a form both the agent and the thing which is acted upon
make their contribution. The agent concurs in that it contributes the natural
power which prepares matter to the reception of form. And the generation
of form is natural even if it proceeds from an extrinsic agent, because such
an agent confers upon matter the power in virtue of which matter moves
towards form. The thing which is acted upon, however, also concurs in the
generation, because in virtue of the privation which is joined to it matter
is naturally inclined towards form. Thus, the generation of form is natural
even if it proceeds from an extrinsic principle precisely because matter has
a natural inclination towards form. The upwards movement of a stone, by
contrast, is not natural, because in this instance neither the agent nor the
thing which is acted upon concur in the movement. Form does not concur
because it is naturally inclined towards the opposed movement. Neither
does matter concur, because the local movement is not naturally ordered
to the generation of form.
Reply to Arg. 2. It may be conceded that natural things have in themselves
the principle of all their natural movements, while artefacts as such do not
have in themselves any principle of their movements. Averroes, however,
makes it clear that the elements have in themselves the principle of alter-
ation in virtue of matter and the principle of local movement in virtue of
form. Mixtures, by contrast, have in themselves the active principle of both
kinds of movement. From this it clearly emerges that the elements do not
have in themselves the active principle of their movement towards form,
but only the passive one, and so they are altered, generated and corrupted
only from outside. Their matter, therefore, does not possess any active prin-
ciple leading it towards the generation of form. The matter of mixture, by
contrast, possesses such an active principle.
Reply to Arg. 3. In the definition of nature, the term principle stands not
only for form, but also for matter. For, if it is true that the local movement of
the elements is natural in virtue of form, it is also clear that their alteration
is natural only in virtue of matter. Therefore, in the definition Nature is a
principle of movement and rest, nature stands for both the active and the
passive principle.
Reply to Arg. 4. It may be conceded that the seeds of plants and animals
have in themselves an active principle which move matter towards form,
i.e. the seminal power. However, such a principle is not innate or concre-
ated with matter, but is rather generated together with the seed. Neither
do we need to posit universally such a principle in the matter of natural
things, i.e. a principle that moves matter towards the generation of form
when stimulated from outside. Moreover, this conclusion is not implied by
Aristotles distinction between the matter of natural things and that of arte-
facts. For Aristotle only means that the matter of those things which are
produced by art alone does not contain in itself an active principle of its
movement towards form. However, in some cases the matter of the natu-
ral things which are produced only by nature possesses in itself an active
principle of its movement towards form. And this seems to be Averroess
opinion as well in his On Phys., Book II, when he says that plants do not only
have an intrinsic passive principle of their nutrition and growth, but also an
active one.
Chapter 3
After having shown that an essence cannot generate or be generated, Aris-
totle illustrates the relation between an essence and its parts. Chapter 3 falls
into three parts: (1) Aristotle introduces an assumption and raises two ques-
tions concerning the assumption; (2) he answers the questions; (3) he raises
some doubts as to the answer just provided.
Part 1
Assumption: every definition and everything that can be defined have parts.
For every definition is a formula; but every formula has parts; therefore,
every definition has parts. Aristotles text corresponding to the assumption
(1034b2022).
Notandum. Averroess text supports the assumption : definition is con-
nected with composition and division and so presupposes a plurality of
parts in both the defining formula itself and the object defined.
Two objections to the assumption.
Obj. 1. It is not true that every definition has parts. For definition is the result
of a simple act of the intellect, which does not presuppose any composition
of parts.
Obj. 2. Not everything that can be defined has parts. Simple substances,
for instance, can be defined but have no parts.
Reply to Obj. 1. A definition in the proper sense of the term does not
consist of only one concept, but of many. So, to a definition there does
not correspond a single act of the intellect but many. However, definition
can still be called intelligence of simples for three reasons: (i) because
it does not assert that something is the case; (ii) because it provides an
understanding of one simple nature; (iii) because it investigates, through
composition and division, into the nature of the last differentia, which is
simple.
Reply to Obj. 2. Simple substances, even if they do not have real parts,
nevertheless have conceptual partswhich is sufficient for them to be anal-
ysed in terms of genus and differentia. Each simple substance in fact has
something in common with the others (from which the genus of the sim-
ple substance can be drawn) and something setting it apart from the others
(from which the differentia can be drawn). In natural substances, by con-
trast, the conceptual distinction between genus and differentia corresponds
to a distinction of real parts in the extra-mental world. The contrast Aver-
roes introduces in his commentary on the Physics between partes secundum
fidem and partes secundum imaginationem should be understood in accor-

dance with the distinction between real and conceptual parts.
Two questions related to the assumption.
Question 1. Must every definition contain the formula of the parts of the thing
defined? The question arises from a contrast between different cases. It
seems that the circle is not defined in terms of the formula of the semicircles,
which are its constitutive parts; rather, it is the semicircles that are defined
in terms of the formula of the circle. The syllable, by contrast, is defined in
terms of the letters, which are its constitutive parts, while the letters are not
defined in terms of the syllable. Aristotles text (1034b2228) corresponding
to Question 1.
Notandum. Averroess commentary confirms Aristotles words. The defi-
nition of the syllable contains the definition of the letters (a syllable is what
is composed of two letters, a vowel and a consonant), while the definition
of the circle does not contain the definition of the semicircles.
Two Objections to Averroes.
Obj. 1. In the definition of the syllable we mention vowels and consonants,
but not the definition of vowels and consonants. Thus, the case of the syllable
is not different from that of the circle. For also in the definition of the circle
we do not mention the definition of the semicircles.
Obj. 2. The definition of the syllable given by Averroes (a syllable is what
is composed of two letters, a vowel and a consonant) is incorrect. For there
are syllables composed of just two vowels as well as syllables composed of
one vowel and two consonants.
Reply to Obj. 1. Something can be mentioned in the definition of some-
thing else either implicitly or explicitly. Implicitly, when only the name is
mentioned and the definition corresponding to the name is merely under-
stood; explicitly, when the definition and not the name of the thing defined
is mentioned. Clearly, Averroes means that the definition of the letters is
mentioned implicitly, while the definition of the circle does not contain that
of the semicircles either implicitly or explicitly.
Reply to Obj. 2. Averroess definition of the syllable should be taken
to mean that a syllable is composed of a vowel and a consonant, either
formally or virtually. The distinction between being composed formally
and being composed virtually enables us to explain away the apparent
counterexamples to Averroess definition. For instance, even though the
syllable ui is formally composed of two vowels, it is virtually composed
of a vowel and a consonant, because the letter u loses the force of a vowel
and acquires that of a consonant.
Thus, in order to avoid difficulties, Albert revises Averroess definition by

saying that a syllable is composed of a sonant and a consonant, where by
sonant we should understand a completely uttered vowel and by conso-
nant the letter joined to the sonant. This account help us to explain away
other difficult cases. For instance: the syllable ter is formally composed
of three letters, but virtually composed of only two, because er takes the
place of just one vowel, as is shown by the fact that its time of utterance is
the same as that of just one vowel.
Question 2. Are parts prior to the whole of which they are the parts? On the
one hand, it seems that parts are prior to the whole, for in general what is
simple is prior to what is composed. On the other, if parts are prior to the
whole, then the acute angle should be prior to the right angle and the finger
should be prior to the animalwhich seems to be false for two reasons.
(i) First, because the parts of the definition are prior to the thing defined.
And so, since the right angle is part of the definition of the acute angle and
the animal is part of the definition of the finger, the right angle and the
animal should be prior to the acute angle and to the finger, respectively.
(ii) Aristotle says in the Categories that x is prior to y if x can exist without
y, but not the other way round. But a man can exist without a fingerwhile
a finger cannot exist without a manand the right angle can exist without
the acute anglewhile the other way round is not the case. So the man and
the right angle are prior to the finger and to the acute angle, respectively.
Aristotles text (1034b2832) corresponding to Question 2.
Notandum. Averroes explains Aristotles text by means of the distinction
between qualitative and quantitative parts. Qualitative parts are those that
contribute to the essence of a thing. Therefore, they are prior to the thing of
which they are the parts. Quantitative parts are integral parts, which do not
contribute to the essence of the thing. Therefore, they are posterior to the
thing itself.
Objection to Averroess distinction. The heart, the liver and the brain are
quantitative parts of a man, but are not posterior to him. For a man cannot
exist without such parts.
Reply. Averroes talks about accidental quantitative parts and not essen-
tial ones such as the heart, the liver and so on. In any case, the point still
stands that all qualitative parts are prior to the whole, whereas only some
of the quantitative parts may happen to be prior.
Part 2
Aristotle answers the questions just raised. In order to do so, he introduces two
distinctions.
Distinction 1. Part is spoken of in many ways. In one way, it means quan-
titative part; in another, the term points to the qualitative parts of which
the essence of a thing is constituted. Since what is under discussion is the
essence of a thing, the term part must be taken in the sense of qualitative
part. Aristotles text (1034b3234) corresponding to Distinction 1.
Distinction 2. Substance is spoken of in three different ways. For it is said
of matter, form and the composite of matter and form. Such a division
of substance should not be understood as though substance were a genus
common to matter, form and the composite. On the contrary, substance
is an analogical term signifying the three entities in question according
to the prior and the posterior. Aristotles text (1035a12) corresponding to
Distinction 2.
Aristotle answers Question 1 by means of four Conclusions.
Conclusion 1. Matter is part of the definition of some forms, but not of others.
This conclusion is evident. Flesh is the matter in which both snubness and
concavity exist. However, flesh enters into the definition of snubness (for
snubness cannot be defined independently of the nose, which is a kind of
flesh), while it does not enter into the definition of concavity. Aristotles text
(1035a16) corresponding to Conclusion 1.
Notandum. Averroes explains Aristotles text by saying that snubness
and concavity in one way bear the same relation to the nose, while in
another they bear different relations to it. They agree in the fact of exist-
ing in the nose as in their subject. But they different on two counts. First,
in that the nose is part of the definition of snubness, but not of the defini-
tion of concavity. Second, in that the nose is part of the composite signi-
fied by the term snubness but not of the composite signified by the term
concavity. Concavity signifies a composite of curvedness and depressed
surface, of which the nose is not a part; snubness, by contrast signi-
fies a composite of concavity and the nose, of which the nose is clearly a
part.
Conclusion 2. Some parts belong the essence of the whole of which they are
parts, others do not.
The conclusion is evident. For the parts according to form belong to the
essence of the whole of which they are parts, while the parts according
to matter do not, as the examples of nose, concave and snub have plainly
shown. Parts according to form are those parts that pertain to something as
such. Parts according to matter, by contrast, are those that pertain to some-
thing not as such. Aristotles text (1035a79) corresponding to Conclusion 2.
Notandum. Averroes confirms Aristotles words and explains in particular
the difference between form and matter. Form is predicated per se and
essentially of the composite of matter and form, while matter is predicated
of the composite neither per se nor essentially. Averroes makes clear also
the difference between the form of the whole and the form of the part. It
is the form of the whole and not the form of the part that is predicated of
the composite of matter and form. For a man is not his soul (i.e. the form
of the part). Some say that the form of the part and the form of the whole
differ only conceptually and not mind-independently. They hold that one
and the same thing is called form of the part in so far as it perfects matter,
and form of the whole in so far as it gives the composite its name and
definition besides placing it in a certain species. But this opinion is false,
because matter is not part of the form of the part, while it is part of the form
of the whole.
There is a difficulty concerning Averroess statement Snub is not a nose.
All parts of the definition of something are truly predicated of it. But the
nose is part of the definition of snub and so snub must be a nose.
Answer. Snub in the sentence Snub is a nose can be taken (i) in
personal or (ii) in simple supposition. If (i), the sentence is true. If (ii), it is
false, because it says that the composite of snubness and the nose is a nose,
and no whole can be the same as one of its parts.
Conclusion 3. Formal parts enter into the definition of the whole, while material
parts do not.
This conclusion can be proved. The parts that belong to the essence of a
whole also enter into its definition. Formal parts belong to the essence of
their whole and so enter into its definition as well; material parts do not
belong to the essence of their whole and so do not enter into its definition,
either.
This conclusion enables us to solve Question 1, i.e. why the parts of the
circle do not enter into its definition, while the parts of the syllable enter into
the definition of the syllable. The solution is that semicircles and segments
in general are not formal parts of the circle, but only material parts, and
hence do not enter into its definition. Letters, by contrast, are formal parts
of the syllable, i.e. parts pertaining to the syllable as such, and so enter into
its definition. Aristotles text (1035a911) corresponding to Conclusion 3.
Aristotle presents and rejects four objections against Conclusion 3.
Obj. 1. The segments seem to be formal parts of the circle. For if they were
material parts, there could exist a circle without segments in the same way
as a circle can exist without bronze.
Obj. 2. The letters are not formal parts of the syllable. For, if they were,
then the letters in stone or clay should also be formal parts of the syllable
which is clearly false.
Obj. 3. In general, quantitative parts are formal parts. For the formal
parts of a thing are the parts into which that thing is corrupted, such as for
instance the semicircles in the case of a circle and flesh and bones in the
case of a man.
Obj. 4. Material parts belong to the essence of the whole of which they
are parts. For, exactly like formal parts, material parts involve a reference to
the whole. Therefore, if formal parts belong to the essence of the whole, so
must material parts too.
Reply to Obj. 1. The comparison Objection 1 draws between segments and
bronze is incorrect. For segments and bronze are not parts of a circle in the
same way: bronze is a remote material part, while segments are proximate
material parts. Therefore, a circle can exist without bronze but not without
segments. Aristotles text (1035a1214) corresponding to the reply.
Reply to Obj. 2. Even if the letters are formal parts of the syllable, not all
kinds of letters are so. The letters in stone or clay are just material parts of
an individual syllable and so are not formal parts of the syllable. Aristotles
text (1035a1417) corresponding to the reply.
Reply to Obj. 3. It is not true that everything into which a thing is corrupted
is a formal part of it. For generation and corruption concern the individual
and not the species. Therefore, the parts into which a thing is corrupted
are rather material parts of it. For a thing is destroyed into such parts (for
instance: a man is destroyed into flesh and bones) not in so far as it is a
certain kind of thing, but rather in so far as it is a particular thing of a certain
kind. Aristotles text (1035a1720) corresponding to the reply.
Reply to Obj. 4. Material parts belong to the essence of an individual
and not to the essence of the species. Thus, just as there are two kinds of
part, i.e. formal and material parts, so there are two kinds of whole, formal
and material wholes. The formal whole is the species, the material whole
is the individual. Formal parts belong to the species and so figure in its
definition; material parts do not belong to the species and so do not figure in
its definition. However, they belong to the individual, and so would figure in
its definition if the individual could be defined. Aristotles text (1035a2023)
corresponding to the reply.
Notandum. Averroess commentary supports Aristotles text. Material
parts are in one way essential, while in another they are non-essential.
They are essential with respect to the individual but not with respect to the
species.
Difficulty concerning Averroess exposition. Every definition making ref-
erence to matter makes reference to material parts. But many definitions
make reference to matter. So, material parts must be essential parts of the
species and of the definition corresponding to it.
Solution of the difficulty. It is not true that every definition making ref-
erence to matter makes also reference to material parts. By material part
both Aristotle and Averroes understand an accidental part which pertains
to something not as such. But common matter pertains to something as such
and so is not a material part according to the aforementioned definition, but
rather a formal and essential part. Individual matter, by contrast, is a mate-
rial and accidental part of the species, although it is an essential and formal
part of the individual.
Conclusion 4. Formal parts are the principles of the species, while material
parts are not.
The first part of the conclusion is evident. For the principles of a species
are those parts into which it is resolved. But formal parts are the parts into
which a species is resolved. The second part follows from what has been just
said. For material parts are those parts into which the individual and not the
species is resolved. Aristotles text (1035a2326) corresponding to Conclusion
4.
From what has been said Aristotle infers two corollaries.
Cor. 1. (i) Composites of matter and form are corrupted per se into matter
and form; (ii) things, by contrast, that are conceived of without matter either
(a) are not corrupted at all or (b) are corrupted only accidentally. (i) Every
kind of composite, whether we understand by composite something com-
posed of matter and form or something composed of species and individual
principles, is always corrupted per se into matter and form, for matter and
form are its constitutive parts. (iib) Forms such as concavity and the like, by
contrast, are corrupted only accidentally: for, although they are not mate-
rial and can be conceived of without matter, they always exist in matter.
(iia) Separate intelligences, finally, are completely incorruptible. Aristotles
text (1035a2530) corresponding to Corollary 1.
Cor. 2. Material parts are parts and principles of the composite of matter
and form, and in general of the things that are conceived of together with
matter, while they are not parts and principles of the species and of the
things that are not conceived of together with matter. And this is the reason
why a composite of matter and form is resolved into its material parts.
Aristotles text (1035a3034) corresponding to Corollary 2.
Objection to Cor. 2. Corollary 2 conflicts with Conclusion 3. In the latter
Aristotle says that a circle does not resolve into its segments, while here he
holds that it does.
Reply. A circle can be taken in two different ways, i.e. formally and
materially. Taken formally, a circle is a specific form conceived of without
matter. Therefore, it does not resolve into its segments, but rather into genus
and differentia. Taken materially, by contrast, a circle is an individual form
conceived of together with matter or quantity, and hence it resolves into
its segments. Clearly, in Conclusion 3 Aristotle talks about the circle taken
formally, while in Corollary 2 he refers to the circle taken materially. The
name circle is ambiguous between the two senses, even if it refers per se to
the circle taken formally and only accidentally to the circle taken materially,
since there is no proper name for individual circles.
Notandum. Averroes explains Aristotles text by introducing two distinc-
tions.
The first is that there are two kinds of matter, i.e. sensible and intelligible
matter. Sensible matter concerns primary qualities, whereas intelligible
matter prescinds from every quality.
The second distinction is that there are also two kinds of circle, i.e. univer-
sal and particular circle. The universal circle concerns no matter, whether
sensible or intelligible. It is studied by metaphysics in so far as it is one thing
existing in many things, while it is studied by logic in so far as it is one thing
that is predicable of many thing. The particular circle has some matter as
part of itself. If it has sensible matter as a part of itself, it is studied by physics,
while it is studied by mathematics if it has intelligible matter as one of its
parts.
Two objections to Aristotles and Averroess words.
Obj. 1. A circle as such has quantitative parts. For semicircles in general bear
to the circle in general the same relation as the particular semicircles bear
to the particular circle. Therefore, the semicircles in general must be parts

of the circle in general.
Obj. 2. Circle is not said equivocally of the universal circle and of the
particular circle, just as man is not said equivocally of the universal man
and of the particular man, but according to one and the same definition.
Reply to Obj. 1. It is not true that particular semicircles bear the same rela-
tion to the particular circle as the semicircles in common bear to the circle in
common. For the semicircles in general refer to a particular matter, though
indeterminately. Therefore, the semicircles in general are not related to the
circle in general but to the indeterminate particular circle, i.e. something
like some circle. And the indeterminate particular circle is not identical
with the circle in general, just as the particular indeterminate man is not
identical with the species man.
Reply to Obj. 2. Equivocation can be considered in two different ways. In
one way, with respect to the very definition which is being predicatedand
in this way circle is not said equivocally of the universal circle and of the
particular circle. In another, with respect to the mode of predicationand
in this way circle is said equivocally, for it is said of the universal circle per
se and of the particular circle accidentally, just as man is said per se of the
universal man and accidentally of the particular man.
It might be objected that man is predicated of a particular man, say
Socrates, essentially and not accidentally.
This objection has a point. For usually, per se means what pertains to
a thing not in virtue of some other nature and accidental means what
pertains to a thing in virtue of some other natureand in this sense of
per se Socrates is a man per se and not accidentally. In the reply, however,
per se is taken in the sense of what pertains to a thing not in virtue
of something really or conceptually different from itand in this sense
Socrates is a man accidentally and not per se. Therefore, it is probably better
to rephrase the contrast in terms of primarily per se and non-primarily
per se instead of in terms of per se and accidentally. Circle is said of
the universal circle primarily and per se, and of the particular circle per se,
but not primarily. And so also for the case of man.
Aristotle answers Question 2.
Before directly answering the question he introduces two assumptions.
Assumption 1. Formal parts are those from which the essence of a thing results
and into which it is divided. If accepted, such an assumption provides the
solution to the second question, the solution being that formal parts, all
or at least some of them, are prior. There are different explanations of the
qualification some of them. Aquinas understands it in the sense that some
parts of a form belong only to the perfect specimens of a species and not to
all of them, and so cannot always be counted among the parts that are prior.
Sight and hearing, for instance, do not belong to all animals, but only to the
perfect ones.
Alexander appeals to genus and differentia. The genus expresses the
thing defined only potentially and so it might be thought not to be prior
to thing defined. The differentia, by contrast, which expresses the thing in
actuality, is always prior. Drawing on Averroes, Albert distinguishes
between separate substances, which are completely immaterial, and mate-
rial substances, which contain material parts. All the parts of separate sub-
stances are formal and so all their parts are prior to the thing defined. Mate-
rial substances, by contrast, have material parts and hence only some of
their partsthe formal partsare prior to the thing defined. For material
parts are posterior to the thing defined.
All the explanations mentioned are dubious. As to Aquinass, sight and
hearing do not seem to belong to the essence of animal. Therefore, they
are not formal parts and so have nothing to do with Aristotles qualifica-
tion, which only concerns formal parts. Alexanders interpretation is un-
grounded. For no one thinks that the genus is posterior to the differen-
tia. And so, if the differentia is prior to the thing defined, this must be
true of the genus as well. Alberts solution has the same disadvantages as
Aquinass. Aristotle is speaking only of formal parts and not of any kind of
part.
The true solution to the problem comes from Averroess distinctions
in his commentary on Met., Book II. There are two kinds of genus: some
genera are prior to their species, some others are not so. For instance, the
genus colour is prior to its species, while the genus number is not prior
to its species. In the case of the genera that are prior to their species,
both the genus and the differentia are prior to the object defined. And
since both genus and differentia are formal parts, in the case of the genera
that are prior to their species, all formal parts are prior to the whole. In
the case, by contrast, of the genera that are not prior to their species,
neither the proximate genus nor the differentia are prior to the object
defined. Prior to the object defined are rather the remote genera and the
transcendentals, such as being and one. Thus, in the case of the genera that
are not prior to their species, it is not true that all formal parts are prior to
the whole.
Aristotles text (1035b36) corresponding to Assumption 1.

Assumption 2. Material parts do not enter into the definition of the whole, but
it is rather the whole that enters into the definition of its material parts. The
assumption is illustrated by means of the examples of the acute angle and
the right angle, of the semicircles and the circle, as well as by means of that of
the finger and the man. The acute angle does not enter into the definition
of the right angle, but rather the other way round; the semicircles do not
enter into the definition of the circle, but rather the other way round; the
finger does not enter into the definition of the man, but rather the other
way round. Aristotles text (1035b610) corresponding to Assumption 1.
Notandum 1. By formal parts Aristotle does not mean the parts of a
certain whole that are of different kinds. For, otherwise, the finger, the hand
and the head would figure in the definition of man, since they are of a kind
different both from the whole and from one another. What he means, by
contrast, is the parts, whether qualitative or quantitative parts, that belong
to the essence of the whole in such a way that the whole itself cannot exist or
be conceived of without them. Qualitative parts of this sort are matter and
form as well as genus and differentia. Quantitative parts are those that are
composed of matter and form and the removal of which entails the removal
of the whole, such as, for instance, flesh, sinews and the like.
In the proemium of his commentary on the Physics, Averroes says the
species of natural things have two kinds of parts, conceptual parts, which
are genus and differentia, and real parts, which are matter and form. To
define something only through its proximate genus and its last differentia
is to provide a purely dialectical definition and not a complete definition
based on composition and division. The latter definition presupposes that
we also understand all the predicates above the proximate genus and the
last differentia. Such predicates need not be explicitly mentioned in the
definition, but must at least be implicitly understood in the proximate genus
and the last differentia. Analogously, a definition of the species through
matter and form is not complete if we do not also implicitly understand
in it all the quantitative parts that fall within the essence of the species.
For instance: if we define man through his matter and form, we must also
understand implicitly his flesh, blood etc. Moreover, even if we define a
species through its proximate matter and form, we must also understand
in the definition all the other levels of matter and form.
Notandum 2. By material parts Aristotle does not mean prime or sec-
ondary matter, nor proper or common matter. Nor does he mean proximate
or remote matter, nor even the matter of natural things or that of the arte-
facts. What he means are the partswhether subjective or integral parts,

parts of the same kind or of different kindsthat do not fall within the
essence of a thing. Such parts are those that do not enter into the definition
of the thing. For instance: Socrates does not figure in the definition if
man and man does not figure in the definition of animal. Nor does the
quantitative parts of fire enter into the definition of fire, since such parts are
infinite. This notion of material parts also explains why the acute angle does
not figure in the definition of the right angle and the finger does not figure
in the definition of man. For none of these parts fall within the essence of
their wholes.
There are two difficulties with Assumption 2, which tend to show that
material parts must figure in the definition of the whole.
Diff. 1. Aristotle says in the proemium of the Physics that the whole is more
known than its parts. A definition, on the other hand, is given in order to
make known the thing defined.
Diff. 2. The continuum is defined through its parts, i.e. parts that join at
one common limit, the number as a multitude aggregated from unities and
the obtuse angle as an angle greater than a right angle. But the parts of the
continuum, the unities and the right angle are clearly material parts.
Reply to Diff. 1. Although the whole is more known than its parts according
to confused cognition, the parts are more known according to distinct
cognition.
Reply to Diff. 2. Just as individual matter is a material part and does not
enter into the definition, so the individual material parts are material parts
and do not enter into the definition of the continuous quantity. On the
contrary, common matter is a formal part and does enter into the definition,
as do the parts of the continuous quantity taken universally. The unity is a
formal part of the number. To assimilate the acute angle to the right angle is
incorrect, for right angles are equal, while there are infinite acute angles of
different magnitude. More generally, even if a whole may be known in some
sense through its quantitative material parts, it is not known through such
parts when it comes to its essence.
Aristotle answers Questions 2 by means of four conclusions.
Conclusion 1. Material parts are posterior to the whole of which they are parts,
while formal parts are prior to it, all or at least some of them.
This conclusion can be proved in two different ways.
(i) The conclusion follows from Assumptions 1 and 2. The first part of
the conclusion (material parts are posterior to the whole) follows from
Assumption 2. For the whole enters into the definition of its material parts
and the parts of definition are prior to the object defined, unless they are
simultaneous with it. But material parts are not simultaneous in nature
with the whole of which they are parts. Therefore, they must be posterior
to it. The second part of the conclusion (formal parts are prior to the whole)
follows from Assumption 1. When discussing Assumption 1, in fact, Aristotle
explains in what sense formal parts, all or some of them, are prior to the
whole of which they are part. Aristotles text (1035b1114) corresponding to (i).
(ii) The conclusion is then proved by means of an example, i.e. that of
the animal. a) First, the second part of the conclusion is proved. The form
of the animal, i.e. the sensitive soul, is prior to the animal, since it is a part
and in particular a formal part of it. It is a part of the animal because it has
been proved earlier on that both parts of a composite, i.e. matter and form,
preexist. Moreover, that the sensitive soul is a formal part is clear from its
being the substantial form, quiddity, species and essence of the animal. In
conclusion, the formal parts of the animal, all or some of them, are prior to
it. Aristotles text (1035b1422) corresponding to (iia).
b) Then Aristotle proves the first part of the conclusion by means of the
same example. The organic body and its parts are posterior to the sensitive
soul. The reason is not that the soul divides into such partsfor it does not,
being as it is a simple formbut rather that both the organic body and its
parts are defined through the soul. But they are also defined through the
animal. Therefore, they are posterior to the animal as well. Aristotles text
(1035b1422) corresponding to (iib).
Notandum : Averroes explains Aristotles words by saying that the parts
are prior to the whole according to the priority which matter holds over
form, while the whole is prior to its parts according to the priority which
form holds over matter. For form is the cause of matter and so is prior to it,
while matter is in another sense the cause of form and so is prior to form:
it is possible for matter and form to be mutually the cause of one another,
because form and matter are causes according to different kinds of cause.
Now, quantitative parts relate to the whole as matter to form. Accordingly,
they are prior to the whole according to the priority of matter, i.e. priority in
generation or time. The whole, by contrast, is prior to its quantitative parts
according to the priority of form, i.e. priority in definition. Since, however, it
is form that necessitates matter and not the other way round, just as it is the
end that necessitates the agent and not the other way round, the priority
which form holds over matter is of higher order than the priority which
matter holds over form. Accordingly, the priority according to which the
whole is prior to its quantitative parts is of higher order than that according
to which such parts are prior to the whole.
Two objections to Conclusion 1.

Obj. 1. The soul is not prior to the organic body. For everything that under-
goes a process of generation presupposes a subject. The soul undergoes a
process of generation and hence presupposes the organic body as its sub-
ject.
Obj. 2. The soul is not mentioned in the definition of the organic body. For
the soul relates to the body as to its subject, and what inheres in a subject is
not mentioned in the definition of the subject, as is made clear by the case
of substance and accidents. Accidents in fact do not figure in the definition
of substances.
Reply to Obj. 1. The soul is the cause of the organisation of the body. As a
cause, therefore, it must be prior to its effect. To the objection it should be
replied that everything that is generated presupposes a subject, but not the
subject it has when it is already generated. The subject for the generation of
the soul is different from the one the soul has when already generated. The
former is somehow prior to the soul, the latter is posterior to it.
Reply to Obj. 2. The definition of the organic body as well as that of its parts
is known from the operation they perform. But such an operation cannot be
known without making reference to the form that makes it possible, i.e. the
soul. Therefore, the body and its parts cannot be defined without the soul. It
may be conceded to the objection that form can be defined through matter a
posteriori, even if not a priori, just as substance is defined through accidents
a posteriori but not a priori.
Conclusion 2. With regard to the parts composing a whole, some are prior and
some posterior to it, while others are simultaneous with it.
The first part of the conclusion (some parts of a whole are prior to it) proves
to be true of any form with respect to the composite of which it is the form.
The second part (some parts of a whole are posterior to it) concerns all
the parts such that the whole can exist without them but they cannot exist
without the whole. A case in point is that of the finger. An animal can survive
the loss of one of its fingers, while a finger is no longer a finger when it is
severed from the animal it used to be the finger of. The third part (some
other parts of a whole are simultaneous with it) is true of the so-called
principal parts, i.e. the parts without which a whole cannot exist, such as
the heart and the brain in the case of an animal. Aristotles text (1035b2227)
Notandum. Averroes clarifies Aristotles text with a distinction: of the
quantitative parts, some precede their whole in time and generation, while
others do not. For instance, the parts of the elements and those of the
inanimate mixtures are generated before the whole and remain after its
corruption. The parts of an animal neither precede it in generation nor
remain after its corruption.
Two objections to Aristotles conclusion and Averroess distinction.
Obj. 1. The roots of the plants precede the whole plant in generation. By
analogy, something of the animal should precede it in generation, say for
instance the heart.
Obj. 2. It seems that the finger is the same in species when it is united
with the body and when it is severed from it. For it possesses numerically
the same accidents, such as quantity, organisation and colour, both before
and after the separation from the body.
Reply to Obj. 1. Just as place, time and number have both a material aspect,
which pertains to the category of quantity, and a formal aspect, which
pertains to the category of relation, so things such as the heart and the like
have a material aspect, which pertains to the category of substance, and a
formal aspect, which pertains to the category of relation. Thus, the heart
precedes the animal according to the material aspect, but not according to
its formal aspect. The heart is the material cause of the animal, while the
animal is the final cause of the heart.
Reply to Obj. 2. The accidents which a finger preserves when separated
from the animal are the common accidents and not the proper accidents. If
the finger remained one and the same after the separation from the body,
it should preserve the proper accidents. For it is they that contribute to
the knowledge of the essence of a thing. What remains after the separation
from the body is not the finger, but the matter which underlies the common
accidents.
Conclusion 3. Matter and form are formal parts of both the species and the
individual.
Proof of the conclusion. The formals parts of a thing are those that belong
to its intrinsic essence. But matter and form belong to the intrinsic essence
of both the species and the individual, meaning by form the form of the
whole and not the form of the part. Therefore, matter and form are formal
parts of both the species and the individual. The matter and form that are
formal parts of the species are not any matter and any form, but determinate
matter and form, i.e. the matter and form characteristic of the species in
question, and not even any kind of determinate matter and form, for the
matter and form that are formal parts of the species are matter and form
taken universally and not individual matter and form. The matter and form
that are formal parts of the individual, by contrast, are individual matter and
form, i.e. the individual matter and form of the kinds characteristic of the
species the individual belongs to. Aristotles text (1035b2733) corresponding
to Conclusion 3.
Notandum. Averroes comments on Aristotles text by introducing two
distinctions.
Distinction 1. Species can be taken in two ways, i.e. universally and par-
ticularly. Taken particularly, the species is the form of the individual. Taken
universally, it is a universal composed of genus and differentia. Therefore,
the name species is equivocal.
Distinction 2. Form too can be taken universally or particularly. Taken
universally, form is what expresses the essence of the species. And in this
way both genus and differentia are called forms. Taken particularly, form is
the form of the part existing in matter.
Two objections to Conclusion 3.
Obj. 1. A species is composed of genus and differentia and hence not of
matter and form, as Porphyry says.
Obj. 2. Species are eternal. Matter, by contrast, is a principle of corruption.
And even form is subject to generation and corruption. Therefore, matter
and form cannot be parts of the species.
Digression concerning Question 3 and Objections 1 and 2.
There are four opinions concerning the issue of essence and definition.
First opinion: matter belongs to the quiddity and essence of a thing, but not
to its definition. For a definition is what makes something known, while mat-
ter is in itself unknown. Moreover, Averroes says that definition concerns
form and not the composite of matter and form.
This opinion runs against Aristotles doctrine in Met., Book VI, where he
says that, unlike metaphysical and mathematical things, natural things are
involved with matter both at the level of being and at that of definition.
Metaphysical things, in other words, do not involve matter either at the
level of being or at that of definition, while mathematical things are involved
with matter at the level of being but not at that of definition. Natural things,
by contrast, are concerned with matter at both levels. Moreover, matter is
certainly unknown in itself, but can be known by analogy with the matter of
artefacts. It must also be remembered that, even though individual matter
does not enter into the definition of natural things, common matter does
so and hence plays somehow a formal role. Finally, when Averroes says
form he means species and when he says composite he means individual.
And this squares with Aristotles view in this book that definition pertains
to the species and not to the individual.
Second opinion: matter belongs to the definition of a thing, but not to its
essence and quiddity. Matter is something added to the essence. Hence,
definitions of substances will be definitions by addition in so far as they
contain matter, which is external to their essence, just as the definition of
accidents are definitions by addition, in that they contain a reference to
substance, which is external to the essence of accidents. Moreover, matter
and form are parts of the concrete man but not of the essence of man, i.e.
humanity. Otherwise, a man would be the same thing as humanity, which
is false. This is the reason why Aristotle says later on in Book VII that in the
case of things conceived of together with matter, the thing and its essence
are not identical, while they are identical in the case of the things that are
conceived of without matter.
This opinion is at odds with Aristotles doctrine in Book VII to the effect
that the definition of substances is not by addition. Matter, therefore,
belongs to the essence of substances if it enters into their definition. More-
over, later on in Book VII, Aristotle blames Socrates the Younger for elimi-
nating matter from the definition of sensible substances. Therefore, matter
and form are not only parts of the concrete man, but also of his essence, i.e.
the parts of a man are also parts of humanity. This implies that in the case
of all things that are per se, be they things taken with matter or without it,
the thing and its essence are identical.
Third opinion: matter belongs to the definition and to the essence of a thing,
but not to its quiddity. On this view, form exhausts the whole quiddity of a
thing. The view seems to be supported by many passages in Aristotle and
by Averroess exposition of them. Aristotle says in Book VII that form and
not matter is predicated per se, which Averroes takes to mean that form
is predicated essentially of sensible substances. Moreover, earlier on in his
commentary, Averroes says that in one way the essence of man is identical
with him, while in another it is not identical with him: what he means, in all
probability, is that a man is identical with his essence when man is taken in
the sense of form, whereas he is not identical with his essence when man
is taken in the sense of the composite of matter and form.
This opinion is false. First of all, there is no real distinction between
essence and quiddity, as the opinion alleges, but only a distinction concern-
ing the mode of signification. Moreover, in the passage where he seems to
identify form with essence, Aristotle is only emphasising that form is what
makes the most important (but not the only) contribution to the essence
of a thing. Thus, when Aristotle and Averroes say that form is predicated
essentially, it is the form of the whole that they have in mind and not the
form of the part. As to the other passage from Averroes, the Commentator
should be taken to say that the essence of man and man are identical with
respect to thing signified but not with respect to the mode of signification.
Fourth opinion: matter belongs neither to the definition nor to the essence
and quiddity of a thing. This is Platos view, who considered the essence and
quiddity of sensible things to be separate from them. Plato assimilated the
case of natural things to that of artefacts. On the face of it, the two cases look
different, because the forms of natural things, unlike those of artefacts, can
be found in only one kind of matter. Nevertheless, Plato insisted, matter is
not part of the essence of natural things, just as it is not part of the essence
of artefacts.
This opinion is refuted by Aristotle in many ways throughout Book VII.
Separate essences destroy science and demonstration and make the exis-
tence and generation of sensible things impossible. Moreover, the compar-
ison Plato draws between artefacts and natural things is wrong, because
the forms of artefacts are not substantial forms but only accidental ones.
Therefore, we must conclude with Aristotle that matter belongs to the def-
inition as well as to the essence and quiddity of sensible things. The matter
belonging to the essence and definition is common matter and not individ-
ual matter.
The foregoing discussion enables us to solve the two objections raised
against Conclusion 3.
Reply to Obj. 1. Porphyry does not want to eliminate from the species the
matter-form composition, but rather to reaffirm it.
Reply to Obj. 2. It is not common matter that is a principle of corruption,
but rather individual matter, which falls outside the essence.
Conclusion 4. Only the formal parts of the species, and not those of the individ-
ual, figure in the definition.
The conclusion can be proved: we must mention in the definition only
the parts of what is defined; but it is the species that is defined and not
the individual. That it is the species that is defined can be proved in three
different ways.
Proof 1. That is defined which is identical in all its parts with the essence,
i.e. that all parts of which are also parts of the essence. But all the parts of
the species are parts of the essence. Not all the parts of the individual, by
contrast, are parts of the essence. This is easily realised, for instance, in the
case of a particular circle, whether intelligible or sensible. The particular
intelligible circle has quantitative parts, the segments, which fall outside the
essence. The particular sensible circle, for instance a bronze circle, has parts,
i.e. the material parts such as the bronze, which are not parts of the essence.
Aristotles text (1035b331036a5) corresponding to Proof 1.
Proof 2. Nothing is defined unless it is a per se object of the intellect; but
the species and not the individual is a per se object of the intellect; therefore,
only the species is defined. In fact, the object of the intellect can be known
without any concourse of the senses. Now, the species is known without the
concourse of the senses, while the individual is not known in this way. For
it is impossible to know an individual without the concourse of the senses,
in the case of a perceptible particular, or of the imagination, in the case of
an intelligible particular such as a mathematical or a geometrical particular.
Proof 3. Everything that is definable is knowable per se; but the individual
is not knowable per se; therefore, it is not definable. Only the species
is definable. The reason why an individual is per se unknowable is that
it contains individual matter, which is per se unknown, be it individual
sensible matter or individual intelligible matter. Sensible matter is the
matter that is determined by sensible qualities, like bronze, wood and so
on. Intelligible matter is the matter that is abstracted, through the action of
the intellect, from motion and sensible qualities. Intelligible matter exists in
sensible matter according to its being, even though not as such. Examples
of intelligible matter are lines, surfaces and the continuum. Aristotles text
Notandum 1. Averroess commentary confirms Aristotles words. All that
is defined must be immutable; but individuals are mutable; therefore, they
are not defined. Definition in fact is the principle of every demonstration
and demonstration concerns immutable things. Individuals are not known
through definition or demonstration, but through sense perception and
imagination. In the same vein, Avicenna says that an individual is not defin-
able, because what is definable possesses a formality which is communica-
ble to many things. This rules out individuals. For, even if we put together
an infinite number of communicable formalities, we never reach the level
of the individual as such. What we get is always something communicable
to many things, i.e. to more than one individual.
Notandum 2. Another text from Averroes supports Aristotles view on
matter. Matter is not known per se, but through form. All the things that
have a material aspect are not known per se but accidentally. Some things
have both a material and a formal aspect, and so they are known acciden-
tally in so far as they have a material aspect and per se in so far as they have
a formal aspect. Things of that sort are, for instance, the elements, magni-
tude and in general all the things in between prime matter and the last form.
Individuals, by contrast, since they have only a material aspect, are known
accidentally and only through their form. The genus as well has only a mate-
rial aspect and so is known only accidentally.
Objections to Conclusion 4.
Obj. 1. It seems that species are not definable. All that is definable must be
communicable and immutable. But all species lack at least one of these
two characteristics and some of them even both. The species of the inferior
world are not immutable, for they change as to their form. The species
of the superior world, i.e. the species of the heavenly bodies, are neither
immutablefor they change placenor communicablefor there is only
one individual for each species of heavenly body.
Moreover, there cannot be definition of that of which there is demonstra-
tion, as Aristotle says in Post. Anal., Book II. But some species are demonstra-
ble, such as, for instance, the prime mover, whose existence Aristotle proves
in Phys., Book VIII. Therefore, at least such species cannot be defined.
Obj. 2. Individuals are definable. For everything of which something can
be demonstrated, can also be defined. But something can be demonstrated
of individuals.
Moreover, Averroes says in the proemium of his commentary on the
De anima that definitions do not concern universals but particular extra-
mental things. Therefore, individuals are definable.
Obj. 3. Individuals are knowable per se (as is shown by the case of God
and separate substances). What has being per se must be knowable per se;
but individuals have being per se; therefore, they must be knowable per se.
Moreover, proper and common sensibles are known by the senses not in
so far as they are universal, but in so far as they are particular.
Obj. 4. There are many cases of individuals that are known not through
the senses or the imagination: God, separate substances, Aristotle, the Anti-
christ, the last sphere, and so on and so forth.
Reply to Obj. 1. All species are per se immutable and communicable. If
they happen to lack those characteristics, this is only accidentally, due to
the particulars they are united with. Thus, if the species of the inferior world
are mutable as to their form, this is due to the particulars they are united
with. Likewise, the species of the heavenly bodies are per se communicable,
but they happen to be incommunicable accidentally, due to the lack of an
agent capable of bringing about the communication of the form. Moreover,
Aristotle means that what is defined cannot be demonstrated according
to the first sense of per se, but does not rule it out that it might be
demonstrated according to the second sense of per se.
Reply to Obj. 2. If one endorses a broader notion of accidentally (accord-
ing to which everything that belongs to something through something else
belongs accidentally), then there will be science of universals per se and
of particulars accidentally, i.e. through universals. If one endorses a stricter
notion of accidentally (according to which everything that belongs to some-
thing not in virtue of its nature, but in virtue of the nature of some other
thing, belongs accidentally), then there will be science of universals per se
and primarily, and of particulars per se but not primarily. Moreover, Aver-
roess passage is clearly directed against Platonic universals, which are sep-
arate beings.
Reply to Obj. 3. Aristotle is talking about individuals having sensible or
intelligible matter, while God and separate substances have no matter.
Moreover, from the fact that something has being per se it does not follow
that it is also knowable per se, as is shown by the case of prime matter, which
has being per se but is not knowable per se. Finally, it is true that the senses
know proper and common sensibles in so far as they are particular and not
in so far as they are universal, but it is always form and not matter that sense
perception captures.
Reply to Obj. 4. Aristotle is talking of those individuals which are known
per se. God, the intelligences, Aristotle and the Antichrist are known acci-
dentally and not per se.
Aristotle suggests how to answer the question about priority and posteriority
on the basis of the solution just provided. He says that the answer must be
qualified, since the notions of whole and part are ambiguous and there are
many opinions regarding them. Aristotles text (1036a1316).
The First opinion holds that a thing is identical with its essence, for
instance that an animal is identical with its soulif the soul is the essence
of the animaland a circle is identical with the essence of the circle.
According to this opinion, the question about priority and posteriority has a
qualified answer. For we must previously distinguish what whole and what
part we are talking about and what the different terms, e.g. circle, animal
etc. signify. Aristotles text (1036a1620) corresponding to the first opinion.
The opinion presupposes two distinctions. On the one hand, whole can
refer to the universal whole or to the particular whole. On the other, by
part can be meant either formal or material part. Such distinctions help
to solve the question of priority and posteriority. Formal parts are prior to
the whole, all or at least some of them. For there are some wholes whose
formal parts are all prior to the whole, as in the case of the circle, and some
other wholes whose formal parts are not all prior to the whole, as is the case
with the animal: some parts of the animal in fact are simultaneous with it.
Material parts are always posterior to the whole. Aristotles text (1036a2123)
corresponding to the distinctions.
The second opinion holds that a thing is different from its essence, for
instance an animal is different from its soul. According to the second opin-
ion too, the question about priority and posteriority has a qualified answer,
which is based on a distinction among the different senses of part and
whole. Nonetheless, on this view as well, formal parts are prior to the
whole and material parts posterior to it. Aristotles text (1036a2425) corre-
sponding to the second opinion.
Notandum 1. Averroess text confirms Aristotles distinctions. The terms
whole, part, prior and posterior as well as right angle, circle and
animal are equivocal. Whole is ambiguous between universal whole and
particular whole, part between formal and material part. In the case of
prior and posterior we must decide whether we mean priority and poste-
riority according to form or according to matter. And also right angle, cir-
cle and animal can be taken either universally or particularly. Depending
on which sense we have in mind when we use the terms, some attributions
of priority and posteriority may be true or false.
Notandum 2. In his commentary Averroes expresses himself as though
the particular circle existed in matter, while the universal one did not. But
this seems odd, especially if one takes the view that the essence of the
circle is identical with the circle. For, in this case, the essence of the cir-
cle should have the same subject, i.e. matter, as the circle. The difficulty is
solved by observing that Averroes talks of intelligible matterand not of
sensible matterand, what is more, of particular intelligible matter. Par-
ticular intelligible matter does not belong to the essence of the circle, but
only to the particular circle, and hence it is right to say that the univer-
sal circle does not exist in this kind of matter. Only universal intelligible
matter belongs to the essence of the circle, just as only universal sensi-
ble matter, and not particular sensible matter, belongs to the essence of
man.
Notandum 3. Averroes denies in his commentary that an animal is its soul.
This seems to be a reasonable view to take because animal is the form of the
whole, while the soul is the form of the part, and the form of the part and
the form of the whole are not one and the same thing. Actually, however,
the view seems to be dubious. For in Nich. Eth., Book VII, Aristotle seems to
identify a man with his intellect and so with his soul.
The answer to this difficulty is that the sentence A man is an intellect

simply means that a man is what he is mainly on account of his intellect.
For the intellect gives a man his name and definition, in that everything
takes its name from its principal part. The sentence, therefore, should not
be taken as an identity claim.
Digression about the principle of individuation. Four opinions.
First opinion. Matter is the principle of individuation. According to this
opinion, matter is responsible for the multiplicity of individuals within one
single species.
There seem to be counterexamples to the first opinion. There are many
things that are individual but do not contain matter, such as separate
substances and points.
Second opinion. Form is the principle of individuation. For the principle
in virtue of which something is an individual thing and that in virtue of
which it is distinct from other things, is one and the same. But form is both
what makes each thing what it is and what makes each thing distinct from
the other things.
There seem to be counterexamples to this opinion too. Genera, species
and differentia are forms but are not individuals. Moreover, matter seems
to be individual per se, and hence cannot be made individual by form.
Third opinion. Quantity is the principle of individuation. Opposites must
be brought about by the same thing. Division and indivision are opposites.
But division comes about through quantity. Therefore, indivision too must
come about through quantity. Every individual, therefore, is individual
because of quantity, for indivision is the distinguishing mark of individuals.
Counterexamples to this opinion are the cases of God and separate sub-
stances, which are individuals but have no quantity. Moreover, substance
precedes quantity and hence cannot receive individuation from it.
Fourth opinion. The agent of generation is the principle of individuation.
For an individual is the product of generation and generation is the effect of
the agent. Therefore, the agent is the principle of individuation.
This opinion is even less true than the others. For God and separate sub-
stances are individuals but are not generated. Moreover, matter, quantity
and heavenly bodies are individuals but do not receive individuation from
an agent.
Solution. It must be said that in the case of the composites of matter
and form both matter and form are principles of individuation. Matter is
a potential principle of individuation, while form is an actual one. For the
principle of individuation is that in virtue of which something is a particular
thing of a certain kind. But the composite is a particular thing of a certain

kind on account of both matter and form. In simple things, such as God,
separate substances as well as matter and form themselves, neither matter
nor form are principles of individuation. For these things are individual of
themselves.
Comment on opinion 1. From the fact that the things whose matter is
one are themselves one, and from the further fact that there are as many
separate substances as there are species of them, it does not follow that
matter is the principle of individuation. For Socrates and Plato differ not
only in their matter, but also in their form.
Comment on opinion 2. This opinion only shows that form is the principle
of individuation in composites of matter and form, but not in general. But
in the case of the composites of matter and form as well, form alone is not
the principle of individuation.
Comment on opinion 3. The division and indivision which are properties
of quantity come about only through quantity, but the division and indivi-
sion which are the properties of being taken as a transcendental, and which
follow upon one and many, belong to things independently of quantity.
Comment on opinion 4. The agent is merely an extrinsic principle of
individuation. When the agent no longer exists, a thing remains individual
on accounts to its intrinsic principles of individuation, which are distinct
from the agent.
Part 3
Aristotle raises a doubt about the previous discussion.
Since it has been established that what is defined is the universal, i.e.
the species, and not the singular thing, i.e. the individual, it is important
to clarify which parts are the parts of the species, i.e. the formal parts, and
which ones are the parts of the individual, i.e. the material parts. Aristotles
text (1036b2631) corresponding to the doubt.
Notandum. Averroes says in his commentary that definition concerns the
universal concept and not the particular one, the universal form and not
the particular one. Thus definition belongs only to the species, and not to
the genus or the individual, except on account of the species. The genus
has no definition, because it has no parts. The individual, although having
parts, i.e. matter and form, has parts which do not enter into the definition,
for a definition pertains to many things while the parts of the individual
pertain to one thing alone. Since the genus and the individual have no
definition because they have a material aspect, Platonists thought, wrongly,
that matter falls altogether outside the definition. Aristotle, however, shows
that both form and matter enter into the definition, not any form and
any matter, but rather the form and matter that are appropriate to the
conditions of the object defined.
Aristotle solves the doubt by means of four conclusions.
Conclusion 1. Sensible matter is not part of the species of mathematical objects.

Proof of the conclusion: what can be separated from a certain species is
not part of it; but the species of mathematical objects can be separated
from sensible matter; therefore sensible matter is not part of the species
of mathematical objects. The minor premiss is evident, for we experience
that geometrical objects are made of many different materials. A circle, for
instance, is realised in wood, bronze and so on. And even if all circles were
made of bronze, this would not imply that bronze would be part of the
species. For a part of the species must be a constituent of the very notion of
the species. And bronze is not a constituent of the very notion of the circle.
Aristotles text (1036a31b2) corresponding to Conclusion 1.
Notandum. Averroes in his commentary proves that copper is not part
of the species of the circle in the following way. If copper were part of the
species of the circle, then the circle would be the proper form of copper and
copper would be the proper matter of the circle. But if so, then copper could
never exist without the circlewhich is clearly false, since we experience
that many other forms are realised in copper.
Two objections to the foregoing line of argument.
Obj. 1. According to Aristotle (Met., Book II) a thing bears to knowledge the
same relation as it does to being. But a circle cannot exist without some
sensible matter, so it cannot be known without it, either.
Obj. 2. Sphericity is a per se property of both the heavens and the earth.
So, both the heaven and the earth, which are sensible matter, enter into
the notion of sphericity. For the subject enters into the notion of its per se
properties.
Reply to Obj.1. Aristotle only means, very broadly, that the things that have
more of being are also more knowable.
Reply to Obj. 2. Even though sphericity is a per se property of the heavens
and the earth, which might be doubted, it does not follow that the heaven
and the earth enter into the notion of sphericity. For the perseity in question
concerns the subject and not the property, in the sense that it is the subject
that determines the property and not the property that determines the kind
of subject it inheres in. Thus, the case of sphericity is different from that
of the snub, where it is the property that determines the kind of subject it
invariably inheres in.
Conclusion 2. Sensible matter is part of the species of natural things.

What is part of the species cannot be separated from it; but sensible matter
cannot be separated from the species of a natural thing; therefore, it must
be part of the species. The minor premiss is evident inductively: man cannot
be separated from flesh and bones. For it is very hardor to say better
impossibleto conceive of a man without flesh and bones. Here lies the
difference with geometrical objects: natural things can only exist in one type
of matter, whereas geometrical objects can exist indifferently in many kinds
of matter. And even if a certain kind of geometrical object should exist in
only one type of matter, this would be just a matter of fact and not a matter
of nature. For the nature of a geometrical object does not require any kind of
matter in particular. Aristotles text (1036b27) corresponding to Conclusion
2.
Notandum. Averroes illustrates Aristotles distinction between natural
and geometrical things. Natural forms exist in one determinate kind of
matter, in such a way that it is against their nature to exist in some other
kind of matter. Therefore, a natural form cannot be understood without the
kind of matter which is characteristic of it. Mathematical forms, by contrast,
do not exist in one determinate kind of matter. And even if they did exist in
only one kind of matter, it would not be against their nature to exist in some
other. Therefore, mathematical forms can be understood without sensible
matter.
Objection to Conclusion 2. What is prior can be understood without what
is posterior. But substance is prior to quantity, which is an accident. So
a man can be understood without quantity and hence without flesh and
bones.
Reply to the objection. Things such as flesh and bones present two aspects,
a material and a formal aspect. The material aspect is pure substance, the
formal aspect is accidental, i.e. quantity together with sensible quality. Thus,
if one abstracts from a man flesh and bones taken according to their formal
aspect, there will still remain a man with flesh and bones taken according to
their material aspect, i.e. as substances. In such a case, we would understand
flesh and bones in their material aspect and without their formal aspect, i.e.
their being qualified and quantified, just as we understand man only as a
substance, i.e. without his accidents. Therefore, a man can be understood in
two ways: with respect to his essence aloneand in this case we understand
a man without taking into account his quantitative parts (such as flesh and
bones) taken formally; with respect to its concrete existenceand in this
case we cannot understand a man without understanding flesh and bones
taken formally.
Counter objection. If the intellect or the divine potency stripped quantity
away from a man, what would remain would not be an animal. For it would
lack the sense of touch, which requires quantity as well as sensible qualities.
Moreover, such a thing would not be a body, either. For, lacking quantity, it
would not be divisible.
Reply to the counter objection. Both conclusions are false. A man without
quantity would not have the sense of touch according to its formal being, but
would still have it according to his material being, which is the sensitive soul.
For the sense of touch according to his material being is the potentiality to
touch, which a man does not lose even if he cannot use the sense of touch
in actuality after he has been stripped of quantity. Moreover, such a man
would still be a body, because he would be potentially divisible even if he is
not actually so.
In conclusion, there are two considerations of a man, a physical and
a metaphysical one. According to the physical consideration, the organic
body belongs to the essence of man taken both in its formal and material
aspect. According to the metaphysical consideration, which concerns only
the essence of man, the organic body belongs to the essence of man only in
its material aspect.
Conclusions 3. Intelligible matter is part of the species of mathematical objects.

This conclusion is directed against Platos opinion. Aristotle presents Platos
opinion by means of two testimonies.
First Testimony. Platonists thought that, since some matter (e.g. hands
and fingers) does not enter into the essence of man, no matter does. They
further thought that, since no sensible matter enters into the essence of
mathematical objects, the same is true of natural things as well. On these
grounds they concluded that no intelligible matter enters into the essence
of mathematical objects, since intelligible matter is to mathematical objects
what sensible matter is to natural things. On this view, therefore, the con-
tinuum and the line are not part of the essence of mathematical objects.
Aristotles text (1036b813) corresponding to the first testimony.
Second Testimony. There were two opinions among Platonists. Some
posited three levels of beings, by introducing mathematical objects as an
intermediate level between sensible things and separate Ideas, e.g. a math-
ematical line in between the sensible line and duality, the Idea of the line.
Some others, by contrast, maintained that there are no intermediate objects
between sensible things and Ideas. Both parties agree, however, that in
general the essences of things are separate Ideas. Therefore, they both con-
cluded that the essence of mathematical objects were the ideal numbers
(duality etc.) and relegated the continuum and the line to the role of mat-
ter. Aristotles text (1036b1317) corresponding to the second testimony.
Notandum. Just as it is built into the nature of prime matter to receive sub-
stance, so it is built into the nature of continuous quantity to receive quality.
Thus, of all the categories continuous quantity is the one that has most of all
the character of matter, and hence is called matter. However, being prior
to qualities, continuous quantity can be abstracted from qualityand when
it is so abstracted it cannot be called sensible matter. It is rather called
intelligible matter and is the subject in which mathematical objects exist.
And it is this kind of matter that Platonists excluded from the definition of
mathematical objects.
Aristotle rejects the Platonists opinion and proves Conclusion 3.
If number is not the whole essence of things, as it is not, then the continuum,
which is intelligible matter, must be part of the species of mathematical
objects. That number is not the whole essence of things can be proved by
means of two arguments.
Arg. 1. If number is the whole essence of things, then things that partic-
ipate in the same number will belong to the same species. But the triangle
and the body participate in the same number (i.e. the number three); there-
fore, they belong to the same specieswhich is clearly false. Aristotles text
(1036b1719) corresponding to Argument 1.
Arg. 2. If number is the whole essence of things, there will be just one
species for all things and everything will be one in species. For Platonists
identified matter with duality and form with unity. But then they further
maintained that matter falls outside the species and the definition of each
thing. So unity will be the species of all things. Aristotles text (1036b1922)
corresponding to Argument 2.
Notandum. Averroess text confirms Aristotles opinion by bringing into
the fore four impossible consequences of the Platonists line of argument.
Cons. 1. A stone and a man would be of the same specieswhich is false.
In fact things having one and the same specific form are of the same species.
But a stone and a man have the same specific form, i.e. unity, according to
the Platonists.
Cons. 2. The term one would be neither equivocal nor analogical, but
rather univocal, because it would signify all things that are one according to
one and the same definition.
Cons. 3. Discrete and continuous quantity as well as stones, animals and
heavenly bodies would be of the same naturewhich is false. All these
things, in fact, would possess the same form, i.e. the number three, and so
would be of the same nature. For things having the same form are also of
the same nature.
Cons. 4. Everything would be number. But this is impossible because
in this case one single thing would have many essences: the triangle, for
instance, would have the essence of the one (in so far as it is just one surface)
as well as that of the three (in so far as it has three lines or angles).
Aristotle refutes two more Platonic arguments.
Arg. 1. The finger and the hand do not belong to the essence of man;
therefore neither does any other quantitative part.
Arg. 2. Neither bronze nor stone are part of the essence of the circle.
Likewise, neither flesh nor bones are part of the essence of man.
Reply to Arg. 1. The consequence does not follow. For, while the form of
man is not necessarily present in the finger or in the hand, it is necessarily
present in other quantitative parts, which can be rightly called formal
parts. Therefore, the view defended by Socrates the Younger (by whom
Aristotle means Plato) is misleading in that it makes people believe that a
man can exist without quantitative parts in the way in which a circle can
exist without bronze or stone. Aristotles text (1036b2228) corresponding to
Arg. 1 and reply.
Reply to Arg. 2. The relation that flesh and bones bear to man is different
from that which bronze and stone bear to the circle. For unlike the form
of man, the form of the circle is not essentially a sensible form. A man in
fact must be defined through movement and perceptionwhich require
certain material parts in a certain condition. In particular they require
animate material parts, i.e. parts capable of performing certain functions.
The inanimate material parts of a mansuch as a dead hand or a painted
handare not really parts of a man. In conclusion, the form of a man is
a sensible form that brings along with it sensible matter. Aristotles text
(1036b2832) corresponding to Arg. 2 and reply.
Notandum 1. Averroes says that all natural forms or at least most of them
do not exist outside matter. He uses a disjunction because he has in mind
a distinction between two ways of taking a natural form, i.e. commonly
and properly. In the common sense, a natural form is that to which a
certain natural operation correspondsand in this sense God and separate

substances too are natural forms, even if they do not exist in matter. In the
proper sense, by contrast, a natural form is a principle of movement and
rest for the thing in which the form exists primarily and per seand in this
sense a natural form always exists in matter.
Notandum 2. Averroes in his commentary points out three inconvenient
consequences of Platos view.
Cons. 1. If one posits, as Plato does, a separate man besides sensible men,
then all generations will be equivocal. For in this case the producer and the
product of generation will not be of the same species: the product will be an
animal, while the producer will not. The Idea of man in fact is not a sensible
animated substance, but rather an immaterial and separate one.
Cons. 2. In the same vein, a man will not be generated by a man. For the
Idea of man and the sensible man are of different species, being the one
material and the other immaterial.
Cons. 3. There will exist a man without body. This is problematic. For
the soul is the actuality of an organic natural body. And so in the case
contemplated by Plato there will exist a man that is not animated (in so
far as he does not have a body of which the soul is the actuality)which is
absurd.
Notandum 3. Averroes text further confirms Aristotles doctrine. Things
that are not conceptually separate, are not separate in their concrete exis-
tence, either. We see in fact that even things that are conceptually separate
are sometimes not separate in their concrete existence. So, this must be all
the more true of things that are not conceptually separate. But natural forms
are not conceptually separate from sensible matter. Therefore, they are not
separate from it in their concrete existence, either.
Notandum 4. Averroes explains the difference between natural and math-
ematical forms. Averroess point is not that natural forms cannot be con-
ceived of without both sense perception and movement, for there are forms
that can be conceived of without sense perception such as the form of the
bronze. His point is rather that natural forms cannot be conceived of with-
out sense perception or movementeither of which implies sensible mat-
ter. Mathematical forms, by contrast, can be conceived of without making
reference to either sense perception or movement. However, mathemati-
cal forms bear to intelligible matter the same relation as natural forms bear
to sensible matter. For they cannot be understood without intelligible mat-
ter.
Difficulty concerning Conclusion 3. Just as substance is not part of quality,
neither is quantity. Therefore, the line, which is a quantity, cannot be part
of the triangle, which is a quality. And in general, intelligible matter cannot

be part of mathematical objects.
Reply. We must distinguish between the parts of the definition and the
real parts. Just as in substances and simple accidents genus and differentia
are parts of the definition and not real parts, so in coupled accidents form
and subject are parts of the definition and not real parts. The nose, for
instance, is part of the definition of snubness, for it constitutes the species
of snubness together with concavity, and not a real part. Likewise, the
line is part of the definition of the circle and not a real part. According to
the distinction, moreover, substance is part of the definition of accidents,
although it is not a real part of them. Generally speaking, therefore, there
are three kinds of part. Some parts are only parts of the definition, like for
instance the nose with respect to snubness and the line with respect to the
circle. Some parts, by contrast, are only real parts, like for instance the finger
with respect to the man and the semicircles with respect to the circle. Some
others, finally, are both parts of the definition and real parts, like matter and
form with respect to the composite. Intelligible matter clearly belongs in the
first group: it is only part of the definition of mathematical objects and not
also a real part of them.
Conclusion 4. Not any intelligible matter is part of the species of mathematical

objects.
If intelligible matter stands to mathematical objects as sensible matter
stands to natural ones, then, since there is some sensible matter that is part
of the species of natural things and some that is not, there will also be some
intelligible matter that is part of the species of mathematical objects and
some that is not. The continuum and the line, for instance, are part of the
species of the circle, while being two feet long is not. For a circle cannot exist
without the continuum and the line, but there are circles longer or shorter
than two feet.
It might be thought, however, that the semicircles, for instance, should be
part of the species of the circle, since they are intelligible and not sensible
matter. The response to this objection is that it does not matter whether
the semicircles are sensible or intelligible matter. The reason why they are
excluded from the species is that they are parts of the individual circle.
Therefore, only the intelligible matter that is part of the universal circle,
and not the sensible matter that is part of the individual circle, is also part
of the species. Aristotles text (1036b321037a5) corresponding to Conclusion
4.
Objection to Conclusion 4. Since body and soul are part of the definition
of man, the semicircles should be part of the definition of the circle.
Reply. The comparison is not appropriate. The semicircles are not parts
of the universal circle, but only of the particular one, and so are not parts
of the definition of the circle. Soul and body are parts of the universal man
and so are parts of his definition. For soul and body, as well as man and
animal, can be taken either particularly or universally. Particular soul and
body are not parts of the universal man or animal, but only of the par-
ticular man and animal, and so fall outside their definition. It must also
be noted that it is irrelevant to the point whether one takes the soul to
be the whole essence of man or only part of it. Either way, the particu-
lar soul does not enter into the definition of man, but only the univer-
sal soul. Aristotles text (1037a510) corresponding to the objection and the
reply.
Notandum 1. Averroes in his commentary argues that mathematical ob-
jects contain some matter on the grounds that there exist many mathemat-
ical individuals of the same species. For where there are many individuals
in one species, there must be some matter accounting for such a plurality.
In the case of mathematical objects, what accounts for the plurality of indi-
viduals is intelligible matter.
Two objections to Averroess view.
Obj. 1. Averroess argument seems to imply that where there are not many
individuals in one species, there is no matter. But the sun and the moon are
unique instances of their species and, nonetheless, are material beings.
Obj. 2. Separate substances, which are individuals, should have matter,
whether sensible or intelligiblewhich is false.
Reply to Obj. 1. Not any matter is the principle of individuation, but only
the matter that is accompanied by privation and potentiality for form. The
matter of the heavens is not accompanied by privation and potentiality for
forms. Therefore, it cannot be the principle of individuation.
Reply to Obj. 2. Just as genus is not matter but has the character of matter
in that it receives many differentiae, so the individual in separate substances
is neither matter nor includes matter, be it sensible or intelligible matter,
but has rather the character of matter in that it is not communicable. There-
fore, we are used to saying that there are three kinds of matter: sensible
matter, which belongs to natural things, intelligible matter, which is proper
to mathematical objects, and rational matter, which pertains to separate
substances. According to a different terminology, the matter of mathemat-
ical objects is called imaginable matter and that of separate substances
intelligible matter. The matter of separate substances is nothing but their

individuality itself.
Notandum 2. Averroes explains that, just as the species signifies the genus
and the formal differentia which constitute the universal whole, so the
individual signifies the species and the particular differentia constituting
the particular whole. Individuals, however, differ from one another in the
same way as species. Just as some species have both real parts (partes
secundum fidem) and conceptual parts (partes secundum imaginationem)
and others have only conceptual parts, so some individuals have both kinds
of part, others only conceptual parts. The conceptual parts of the species
are genus and differentia, while those of the individual are species and
haecceity. Socrates, for instance, is not only composed of matter and form,
which are his real parts, but also of humanity and Socrateity, i.e. haecceity,
which are his conceptual parts. In general, the species and the individuals
existing in sensible or imaginable matter have both kinds of composition;
the species and the individuals possessing only intelligible matter, like
separate substances, have only conceptual parts, i.e. genus and differentia
for the species and species and haecceity for the individuals.
It may be doubted whether the species is predicated of the individual. If
it is not, then no particular man is a manwhich is false. If it is predicated
of the individual, then it follows that (i) the species cannot be a part of the
individual and (ii) every part of the individual is part of the species.
Reply. The species is predicated of the individual, even if it is a part of it,
because it is not a real part but rather a conceptual one. Moreover, it may
be conceded that every part of the individual is part of the species, but only
accidentally and not per se. Just as the individual is accidental to the species
so its parts are only accidentally parts of the species. A species, therefore, has
both parts per se and accidental parts: parts per se are formal parts, which
are prior to the species, accidental parts are material parts (i.e. the parts of
the individual), which are posterior to the species.
Aristotle raises and answers two questions concerning the previous
discussion.
Question 1. Whether there exists, alongside matter, form and the composite,
some separate substance such as the numbers of Pythagoreans, Platos Ideas
or the intelligences which Peripatetics believe in.
Question 2. Whether the definition of natural forms is a unity, in spite of
its having parts.
Reply to Question 1. There are separate substances. However, a full treat-
ment of such substances is postponed to Book XII after the investigation
into sensible substances is completed. For the investigation into sensible

substances is preliminary and necessary to the study of separate substances.
It must be noted, however, that the investigation into sensible substances
carried out in the Metaphysics is a metaphysical investigation and not a
physical one. For physics is mainly concerned with sensible substances and
studies separate substances only in so far as they contribute something to
the understanding of sensible substances. Metaphysics, by contrast, chiefly
investigates separate substances and takes into account sensible substances
only in so far as they are useful in understanding separate substances.
Aristotles text (1037a1117) corresponding to Question 1 and reply.
Reply to Question 2. The definition of natural forms is a unity, as is the
thing which the definition is about. This issue will be dealt with in the next
chapter. Aristotles text (1037a1720) corresponding to Question 2 and reply.
Notandum. Averroes confirms Aristotles answer to Question 1. Both
physics and metaphysics study sensible substances, but differently. The first
difference is that physics studies such substances in so far as they are sensi-
ble and movable, metaphysics in so far as they are substances. The second
difference is that physics studies them without having in view any other
object of research; metaphysics, by contrast, deals with sensible substances
with a view to the study of separate substances.
Aristotle sums up the results of the present and the foregoing chapters. He
concludes that six questions have been successfully answered.
Question 1: What is essence? Essence is what is predicated universally ac-
cording to the first sense of per se. Aristotles text (1037a2122) correspond-
ing to Question 1.
Question 2: Why is it the case that the parts of the object defined are
sometimes mentioned in the definition and sometimes are not? Formal
parts, which are prior to or simultaneous with the whole, are mentioned
in the definition, while material parts, which are posterior to the whole, are
not mentioned in the definition. Aristotles text (1037a2226) corresponding
to Question 2.
Question 3: Why are some parts of a single whole mentioned in its defini-
tion while some others are not (e.g. the heart is mentioned in the definition
of man, while the foot is not)? Some parts of a whole belong to the species,
whereas some others belong to the individual. And since the species but
not the individual is defined, the parts of the individual are not mentioned
in the definition. Aristotles text (1037a2527) corresponding to Question 3.
Question 4: Does the definition of the composite mention both matter
and form? Or does it mention only form or, more generally, only one or
the other? It mentions both matter and form. For a composite has its being
through matter and form, and so cannot be defined by mentioning only the
one or the other. However, since form is primary substance, in that it gives
to the composite its name and definition, the composite is mainly (but not
exclusively) defined through form. Form is said to be primary substance
in a different sense from the composite: the composite is called primary
substance because it is the thing that primarily plays the role of subject, form
because it is the entity conferring being, existence and subsistence upon the
composite. Aristotles text (1037a28) corresponding to Question 4.
Question 5: Is form the whole essence of the composite? No, it is not. For
a composite comes to be not only from form, but also from matter, and
matter is not part of form but of the composite. The case of the composite
is analogous to that of the snub: as the snub is composed of both the nose
and concavity and the nose is not part of concavity, so a man is composed of
both matter and form and matter is not part of form but of the composite.
Aristotles text (1037a2834) corresponding to Question 5.
Question 6: Is an essence identical with that of which it is the essence?
In some case it is identical, while in some others it is not. In the case of
primary substances, there is identity. By primary substances Aristotle does
not mean substantial form or the particular supposit in the category of
substance, but rather everything that does not possess its being in virtue
of something being in something else as in its matter or subject. According
to this description, separate intelligences, in so far as they are not composed
of matter and form, are primary substances. In the case of things that exist
with matter or are conceived of together with matter, there is no identity
between the essence and that of which it is the essence. Here are three
examples from the second group of things: material composites are not
identical with their essence, nor are their substantial forms; the essence of
white is not identical with the substance in which it inheres, e.g. the man
who is white and of whom white is predicated. Aristotles text (1037a34b7)
corresponding to Question 6.
Notandum 1. According to Aquinas, Aristotle presents here an account of
the identity between a thing and its essence which is different from the one
he has put forward earlier on (Z 6) when investigating what essence is and
what things have an essence. In Z 6 Aristotle speaks from a logical point of
view and so excludes from the identity with their own essence only acci-
dental beings, including, instead, both material and immaterial substances.
Here (Z11), by contrast, he speaks from a metaphysical point of view and so
restricts identity to separate substances alone. The motivation behind the
metaphysical account is the following. Definition belongs to the species and
not the individual, and so individual matter, which is the principle of indi-
viduation, falls outside the essence of the species. It is impossible, however,
for the species of a material thing not to exist in some individual or other. It
follows that we must distinguish the matter that falls within the essence of
a species from that which does not. It also follows that any material individ-
ual is not identical with its own essence, but it is rather something that has
an essence. If there could exist an individual that is composed of matter and
form, but not of individual matter and form too, such an individual would be
identical with its own essence. Those substances, therefore, which are just
subsistent forms and are not individuated in virtue of something external
to their essence, are unqualifiedly identical with their essence.
This explanation of the apparent contrast in Aristotles text is not con-
vincing. For one thing, if the contrast which Aristotle has in mind is that
between things per se and accidental things, as it seems to be the case in
Z 6, there is no reason to think that, in Z 11, he excludes material substances
and forms in matter from the identity with their essence. For material sub-
stances are things per se and so have a quiddity per se just as much as sep-
arate substances. For another thing, just as it is impossible to find a species
of a material thing that does not exist in an individual, this is true also of the
species of separate substances. Therefore, if in material things the quiddity
and that of which it is the quiddity are different on account of individuation,
they are also different in the case of separate substances.
Therefore, we must say that the claim that the quiddity is the same as that
of which it is the quiddity may be taken in two ways, either absolutely, i.e. by
comparing only the quiddity to that of which it is the quiddity, or relatively,
i.e. by also comparing the parts of the quiddity to that of which the quiddity
is the quiddity. Absolutely, both material and immaterial substances are
identical with their quiddity, as Aristotle himself says earlier on (Z 6).
Relatively speaking, by contrast, only separate substances are identical with
their essence. In separate substances every part of the quiddity is identical
with the thing to which the quiddity belongs, because in their case the
parts of the definition do not differ really, but only conceptually. In material
substances, on the contrary, it is not true that every part of the quiddity is
identical with the thing of which the quiddity is the quiddity. For matter and
form are parts of the quiddity of man, but neither of them is a man. And this
is what Aristotle has in mind here when he says that the identity between
the quiddity and that of which it is the quiddity does not hold in the case of
material things.
According to Alexander, in separate substances the quiddity and that of
which it is the quiddity are not one and the same, just as they are not so
in the case of material substances. For the quiddity of a thing is identical

with what belongs to that thing per se. But in separate substances there are
many things that belong to them not per se but only accidentally. God is
the only thing to which nothing belongs accidentally and so only God is
identical with His quiddity. Separate substances would be identical with
their quiddity only if they could not exist in more than one supposit. But
the quiddity of separate substances can exist in more than one supposit,
otherwise it would be false that a specific quiddity is per se multipliable.
Since Alexanders opinion is explicitly against Aristotles doctrine, there
is no need to reject it here. No one doubts in fact that species and supposit
do not differ really but only conceptually. Thus, the doctrine which Aristotle
expounds can be summarised as follows. In God, the quiddity and that
of which it is the quiddity are identical and differ only in the mode of
signification. In separate substances the quiddity and that of which it is the
quiddity differ not only in the mode of signification, but also according to
the relation between a species and an individual (which does not obtain in
the case of God, because in God, strictly speaking, there is no individual, but
only singularity and this something). In material composites, the quiddity
does not really differ from that of which it is the quiddity, but the parts
of the quiddity, both real and conceptual parts, really differ from both the
quiddity itself and that of which it is the quiddity. In simple material forms
and in mathematical forms, finally, the quiddity and that of which it is the
quiddity are not really different, but some parts of the quiddityI mean:
conceptual parts and not real partsare different both from the quiddity
and from that of which it is the quiddity.
Digression. In order to clarify the foregoing discussion, the question may be
raised as to whether the individual adds something real to the species.
Four reasons to think that the individual does add something real.
Reason 1. The individual is to the species what the bronze circle is to the
circle. But the bronze circle adds to the circle something real, i.e. the bronze.
Therefore, the individual too adds something real to the species.
Reason 2. The individual bears to the species the same relation as the
genus does to the species. But the genus adds to the species something real,
i.e. the differentia. So, the individual too adds something real to the species.
Reason 3. To abstract is to separate out two things that are joined in
their concrete existence. But the species is abstracted from the individual.
Therefore, the species is abstracted from something different from itself to
which it is joined in its concrete existence. This argument is in keeping with
Aristotles distinction between common and individual matter.
Reason 4. If the individual does not add something real to the species,
then the operations of the individual and those of the species are just the
same. Consequently, a species could generate and be generatedwhich is
against Aristotles doctrine in Book VII.
Four reasons to think that the individual does not add anything real to the
species.
Reason 1. If the individual adds something real, it adds either a substance or
an accident. It cannot add a substance, for in separate individuals there is
no other substance than their quiddity, with which they are in fact identical.
But the individual cannot add an accident, either; otherwise substances
would be individuated through accidentswhich is false.
Reason 2. If the individual adds something, it must be either matter or
form. It does not add matter, because separate substances have no matter.
It does not add form, for otherwise a species would be divided through
formal differentiaewhich is against Aristotles doctrine in Met., Book
II.
Reason 3. Let us call A what the individual adds to the species. If A is
individual of itself, then the individual would be individual by means of
another individualwhich is impossible. If A is not individual of itself, but
in virtue of something else, let us call this other thing B and repeat the same
reasoning. Clearly we are off on an infinite regress.
Reason 4. Whatever is in a part is also in the whole. Consequently, what-
ever is in the individual is also in the species. Therefore, the individual adds
to the species only something constructed by the intellect and not some-
thing real.
Solution. The claim that an individual adds something real to the species
can be understood in two senses: the individual can add something that
is real (i) either in virtue of a reality distinct from both the species and
any of its parts (ii) or in virtue of an extra-mental reality which does not
depend on an operation of the intellect. In sense (i), the individual does not
add anything real to the species because there is nothing in the individual
that is not also identical with the species or with every part of it. Every
part of the individual in fact is part of the species, even though it is part
of the individual per se and of the species accidentally. In sense (ii), the
individual adds something real to the species. For quite independently
of any operation of the intellect an individual is per se generable and
corruptible, while a species is communicable per se and generable and
corruptible only accidentally. When understood according to sense (ii), the
arguments for the distinction of individual and species are sound.
Reply to Reason 1 against the distinction between individual and species.

In sense (ii) the individual adds neither a substance nor an accident, but
rather something in the manner of a substance or of an accident, just as the
species adds to the genus not a substance but something in the manner of
a substance.
Reply to Reason 2. Likewise, the individual does not add form or matter,
but a material differentia, just as the species adds to the genus a formal
differentia. An individual is composed of species, which plays the role of
form, and of haecceity, which plays the role of matter, just as the species is
composed of genus, which plays the role of matter, and of differentia, which
plays the role of form.
Reply to Reason 3. The A the objection talks about is not an individual per
se, but rather that in virtue of which an individual is an individual. Thus, it
is per se neither universal nor singular.
Reply to Reason 4. Just as the species adds something to the genus not
in so far as it is a part of it, but in so far as it is a whole, so the indi-
vidual adds something to the species not in so far it is a part of it but in
so far as it is a whole. Therefore, just as the genus is contracted to the
species through formal and essential differentiae, so the species is con-
tracted to the individual through material and accidental differentiae. The
differentiae of the individual are called accidental not because they are
accidents, but because, just like accidents, they introduce a material dis-
tinction.
Chapter 4
After having shown which parts figure in the definition, Aristotle investi-
gates the unity of definition. Chapter 4 falls into three parts: (1) Aristotle
raises a difficulty about definition; (2) he presents arguments in favour of
two opposed solutions to the difficulty; (3) he solves the difficulty.
Part 1
Aristotle asks the question as to whether a definition is one thing or many
things. This question is most necessary to the enquiry into substance. For
it is usually asked why the essence of which the definition is the formula
is one thing, e.g. why the essence of man signified by the definition two-
footed animal is one thing. But it might seem that the essence is one thing,
while the definition signifying the essence is many things. So, it must be
ascertained whether a definition is one thing or not. Aristotles text (1037b8
14) corresponding to the question.
Notandum 1. Averroes in his commentary introduces two distinctions

concerning definition.
Distinction 1. There are two ways of considering a definition, i.e. as an
instrument and with reference to the thing it signifies. A logician does
not study definition with a view to the essence it signifies, but only as
an instrument leading to the knowledge of essence. A metaphysician, by
contrast, studies definition in so far as it signifies substance and essence.
Therefore, it is clearly the metaphysicians task to explain the unity of
definition, given that the unity of definition depends on the unity of the
substance and essence signified by the definition.
Distinction 2. There are two kinds of differentia, differentia in actuality
and differentia in potentiality. The differentia in actuality is the one that
gives the thing defined its name and definition, i.e. the last differentia by
means of which the object defined is both a being and one thing in actuality.
The differentia in potentiality is a sort of material disposition to receive
form. And so every differentia but the last is a differentia in potentiality.
The case of definition is analogous to that of the structure of the mixtures.
In a mixture, there are many forms, but only the last is in actuality, while
the others are just dispositions to receive form. Likewise, only the last
differentia is actual, while the others are only potential.
Notandum 2. Averroes explains why Aristotle did not solve the problem
of the unity of definition in the Posterior Analytics. In the Posterior Analytics,
Aristotle takes a logical point of view and so only assumes that the definition
signifies a single essence without giving any explanation of why this is so.
For to explain the unity of definition is the task of a metaphysician, who
can settle questions left open in logic on account of the affinity between
logic and metaphysics. Aristotles book is called Analytics, because there it
is taught how to resolve a proposition into its principle, i.e. its premisses.
The resolution can be into premisses not yet contracted to their necessary
matterand this is what Aristotle does in the Prior Analyticsor into
premisses contracted to their necessary matterwhich Aristotle does in
the Posterior Analytics. The Analytics as a whole belongs to that part of logic
which is called resolutive part; the other part is the inventive part, which
comprises Topics and Sophistical Refutations.
Part 2
First Aristotle presents arguments against the view that definition is a unity.
The definition is not one thing, both (i) because genus and differentia
cannot make up a unity and (ii) because two differentiae cannot make
up a unity. (i) Two things cannot make up one thing unless one of them
inheres or participate in the other. But the differentia does not inhere in
the genus, nor does it participate in it. For if it did, then, since the genus is
divided through contrary differentiae, two contraries would inhere in the
same thing at the same timewhich is impossible. Therefore, genus and
differentia cannot make up one thing. Aristotles text (1037b1521).
(ii) Even if one concedes that the differentia and the genus make up one
thing, still the many differentiae figuring in a definition cannot make up one
thing. Suppose for instance that the differentiae capable of walking, two-
footed and unwinged figure in the definition of man. If these differentiae
make up one thing it is because they all exist in one thing, i.e. the genus
animal. But then, by the same token, all the accidental categories would
make up one thing per se, because they all inhere in substancewhich is
absurd. Aristotles text (1037b2124).
Then Aristotle gives arguments in favour of the view that definition is a unity.
Definition is just one formula; therefore its parts make up one thing. The
antecedent can be proved in the following way. The definition and what
it signifies are convertible as to unity and multiplicity. But what definition
signifies is one thing, since it is one nature belonging to the category of
substance. Therefore the definition must be one formula corresponding to
the nature. Aristotles text (1037b2427) corresponding to the argument.
Notandum. Averroess commentary confirms Aristotles arguments. The
reason why the parts of a definition are one cannot be that they are in one
thing. Otherwise, according to the same criterion, all the things that are in
one thing would be one: for instance, all the things would be one, for all the
things are in the worldwhich is absurd. On the contrary, the parts of a
definition are one because they signify one essence. Genus and differentia
signify the same essence, the one in a confused way the other in a distinct
way. The differentia adds to the genus only a further specification and not a
different nature or essence.
Part 3
Aristotle solves the question of the unity of definition.
Assumption. Every purely quidditative definition must be investigated
through composition and division. In the Posterior Analytics, in fact, Aris-
totle explains that definition cannot be investigated through the different
kinds of syllogism, but must be studied through composition and division.
He says purely quidditative definition, because the definitions by acci-
dents, parts, properties or extrinsic causes need not be investigated through
composition and division. Aristotles text (1037b2729) corresponding to the

assumption.
Aristotle solves the question by means of four conclusions.
Conclusion 1. Every definition consists of the first genus and the last differentia.
Every definition consists of genus and differentia. Now, the genus in a
definition is either the most general genus or a subalternate genus. If it is the
most general genus, the conclusion is proved, for the most general genus is
the first genus. If the genus is a subalternate genus, the conclusion is equally
proved. For a subalternate genus is nothing other than the first genus plus
a series of differentiae determining the genus. For instance, if we define
man through animal we define him through the first genus; but even if we
define man through two-footed animal we equally define him through
the first genus, because two-footed animal is nothing but the first genus
plus a differentia determining it. And the point remains true regardless of
how many terms the subalternate genus is composed of. Aristotle does not
argue for the case of the last differentia, because, clearly, every differentia
but the last has more extension than the species. And so only when the last
differentia is added to the genus do we get a definition, since the definition
must have the same extension as the object defined. Aristotles text (1037b29
33) corresponding to Conclusion 1.
Objection. The model proposed seems to go by the wrong assumption
that a definition can be composed of more than two terms. Just as in a
real composition the composite is composed of only two things, so in a
definitionwhich is a conceptual compositionthe composite should not
include more than two terms.
Reply. It does not matter how many terms figure in a definition. For
a definition is always, strictly speaking, composed of one genus and one
differentia. If a definition consists of a genus plus a series of differentiae, the
intermediate differentiae, i.e. all the differentiae but the last, are not proper
parts of the definition, but only dispositions which are added to the genus
in order to narrow it down. So, only the genus and the last differentia are
proper parts of a definition. Aristotles text (1037b331038a4) corresponding
to the objection and the reply.
Notandum. Averroess commentary confirms Aristotles reply. In fact, just
as a natural composite is composed of only two natures, matter and form,
so a definition is composed of only two natures, genus and differentia. For,
just as in natural composites all the forms but the last are closer to the side
of matter, so all the differentiae but the last are closer to the side of the
genus, in so far as they are, exactly like the genus, potential with respect to
the last differentia. Finally, in natural composites all the forms in between
prime matter and the last form are composite matters and composite forms,
and yet they have something of the nature of prime matter in so far as they
contain prime matter. Likewise, in a definition all intermediate differentiae
are composite genera and composite species, and yet they have something
of the nature of the first genus, in so far as they contain it.
Two Objections to Averroes.
Obj. 1. No differentia is like a genus. For the differentia is like form and
actuality, in that it gives the species its name and definition.
Obj. 2. It is not true that a definition is composed of two natures, because
the genus and the differentia express only one nature.
Reply to Obj. 1. Just as in natural composites a form can be sometimes
form, sometimes matter, so in definitions a differentia can at times play the
role of last differentia, at others that of genus. Therefore, it is false that no
differentia is like a genus.
Reply to Obj. 2. A definition is composed of two natures which are differ-
ent only conceptually and not really. One might ask the question how the
last differentia can be equal to the object defined: for the object defined and
the definition are composed of two natures, while the differentia entails no
composition. The answer is that the differentia is equal to the object defined
not in the order of composition, but in that of predication: all that is predi-
cated of the thing defined is also predicated of the differentia and vice versa.
Conclusion 2. The genus is not unqualifiedly different from both the differentiae
and the species.
No universal whole is unqualifiedly different from its subjective parts.
Therefore, the genus is not unqualifiedly different from its species, which
are its subjective parts. Neither is it unqualifiedly different from the differ-
entiae. For the differentiae are identical with the species, and so, since the
genus too is identical with the species, by transitivity genus and differentiae
must be identical. If the genus differs from the species and the differentiae,
it does so not qua genus, but qua matter. For instance, the sound is both the
genus and the matter of the letters. When the sound is a genus, it does not
differ from the letters, since it is nothing but the letters at a different level
of generality. When it is matter, it differs from the letters, because it is just a
principle and a part of the letter, which needs a form to make up a complete
letter. This is the reason why the genus is said to be a whole and matter to
be a part. Aristotles text (1038a58) corresponding to conclusion 2.
Aristotle draws the further conclusion that a definition is a formula receiv-

ing unity from the differentiae. For the whole essence of a definition is
somehow contained in the differentia. The genus cannot exist without the
species, precisely because the forms of the species, i.e. the differentiae, are
not different from the form of the genus, but are rather that very form plus
some extra determination. The differentia does not add a further essence to
the genus, but only indicates distinctly what the genus indicates confusedly.
Aristotles text (1038a89) corresponding to the further point.
Notandum 1. Averroes in his commentary makes four important observa-
tions.
Obs. 1. The genus is in one way similar to matter and in another to form. In
so far as it is contracted and determined, it is similar to matter. It is similar
to form, by contrast, in that it is predicated.
Obs. 2. Even if all genera have both a material and a formal aspect, some
genera are more similar to matter, others more similar to form. The sound
and the body are more similar to matter: for the sound is also the matter
out of which letters are produced and the body is a part of a certain kind
of composite. Since the sound and the body are predicated essentially,
they maintain their formal aspect, even if, on a whole, they remain more
similar to matter in that their most characteristic trait is to be constituents
of something else. Animal and colour, by contrast, are more similar to
form. They retain their material aspect in that they can be contracted and
determined. However, they remain more similar to form, because their most
characteristic trait is to be predicated.
Obs. 3. Matter is not predicated of a thing through its principal name, i.e.
in so far as it is matter. Since a genus has both a formal and a material aspect
and, on the other hand, it is predicated of the species, then matter must
be predicated in some way of the thing defined. However, since a genus is
predicated of a thing according to its formal aspect and not according to
its material one, matter is not predicated of the thing defined through its
principal name, in so far as it is matter. For matter as such, being as it is a part
of a material thing, cannot be predicated of it: we do not say, for instance,
that a man is flesh or bones.
Obs. 4. Although something can be both genus and matter, it is not genus
and matter in the same way. For matter, in so far it is not predicated of
a thing, is only a part of the thing, while the genus, being predicated of
a thing, is the whole of the thing. Thus, just as sometimes the name of
matter signifies matter together with privation, i.e. when the privation has
no name, so when form has no name, the name of matter signifies matter
and form, not determinate form but form in common. And this is the sense
in which matter is a genus. So the species is matter plus determinate form,

the genus is matter plus form in common.
Notandum 2. Averroes compares the cases of sound and copper with
respect to the things that are produced out of them. Sound and copper
agree in being matter: for, just as a letter is made from the sound, so a
statue is made from copper. However, they also differ in that copper is pure
matter, while the sound is both matter and genus. Copper is predicated of
the statue not formally, but only denominatively: we do not say that a statue
is copper but that it is made of copper. The sound, by contrast, in addition to
being matter, is also a genus, because it is predicated of the letters formally
and not denominatively. Body is like sound in that it is both matter and
genus.
The foregoing consideration provides a solution to the difficulty men-
tioned above, i.e. that genus and differentia do not seem to make up one
thing because the differentia neither inheres nor participates in the genus.
In response to the difficulty it can be said: (i) that contraries can exist in one
single thing, when the contraries are determinate and the thing indetermi-
nate, as is the case with the differentiae and the genus. (ii) The differentia is
not added to the genus in the way in which white is added to man. For the
differentia does not express an accident of the genus or a nature entirely
different from that of the genus. Rather, the differentia expresses the same
nature as the genus, although in a different way.
Four Objections to the conclusion that genus and differentia signify the same
essence.
Obj. 1. Man and donkey agree in their genus and differ on account of their
differentiae. Now, if the differentiae are really different from the essence of
the genus, then genus and differentia do not signify the same essence. On
the contrary, if they differ from the essence of the genus only conceptually,
man and donkey too will differ only conceptuallywhich is absurd.
Obj. 2. If a definition signifies the whole of the object defined, its parts
must signify the parts of the object defined. But genus and differentia are
two distinct parts of a definition and so cannot signify the same essence.
Obj. 3. If genus and differentia signified the same essence, just one of them
would suffice to constitute a full definitionwhich is not the case.
Obj. 4. A form is known through the operation corresponding to it. But
the operations corresponding to genus and differentia are different: for
instance, perception, which corresponds to animal, is different from
understanding, which corresponds to rational. So genus and differentia can-
not signify the same essence.
Reply to Obj. 1. To the objection it must be conceded that the species adds
the differentia to the genus not as a different essence, but as a different
concept, which is capable of affecting the intellect in a way different from
that in which it is affected by the concept of the genus. For capable of
perception affects the intellect in a way different from rational. In fact,
if genus and differentia were two distinct essences, separate intelligences
would be composed of two different essences, since they are analysable
into genus and differentiawhich is not the case. So, the two differentiae
rational and irrational differ from the genus only conceptually, even if
they differ from each other really and not only conceptually, just as two
individuals do not really differ from the species, but do really differ from
each other.
Reply to Obj. 2. Genus and differentia are certainly parts of the essence
of the object defined, and yet they are also the whole essence of such an
object, although in a different way. They are parts of the essence of the
object defined conceptually, in so far as they are two concepts constituting
the concept of the object defined. They are the whole essence of the object
defined really, in that they do not really differ from such an essence.
Reply to Obj. 3. Since the species agrees with something and differs from
something else, there is one concept indicating that the species agrees with
something and another indicating that the species differs from something
else. The former concept is the genus, the latter is the differentia. Since a
definition serves the purpose of making us understand all aspects of a thing
distinctly, both concepts, i.e. the genus and the differentia, must figure in a
definition.
Reply to Obj. 4. The argument only shows that genus and differentia are
different conceptually and not really. Since they differ conceptually, it is
well possible for a thing to have some properties on account of its genus
and some others on account of its differentia, like for instance being capable
of perceiving, which is had on account of the genus, and being capable of
understanding, which is had on account of the differentia.
Conclusion 3. Essential division does not only belong to the genus but also to
the differentia.
Just as there is a first and a last predicable in the category of substance, so
there is a first and a last predicable in the category of quantity. And since in
each category all the predicables but the last are divisible, so are the pred-
icables in the category of quality. Thus, all the differentiae but the last are
divisible. Moreover, the differentia must be divided through differentiae per
se and not through accidental differentiae. Footed, for instance, should

not be divided through winged and unwinged, because winged and
unwinged are only accidental differentiae of footed. Sometimes, how-
ever, since the differentiae per se are unknown, we need to replace them
with accidental differentiae as signs of the differentiae per se. Aristotles text
(1038a915).
Notandum. Averroes in his commentary fixes three rules for the correct-
ness of a definition, on the basis of Aristotles treatment of definition.
Rule 1. Definition must be investigated through division. Division is nec-
essary for definition, both from the point of view of the thing defined and
from that of the parts of the definition. It is necessary from the point of view
of the object defined, because one should not be content with the definition
of the genus. For such a definition is too general and does not make us know
properly the object defined. Division is also necessary from the point of view
of the parts of the definition. Since each superior expresses the nature of its
inferiors in an indeterminate way, the genus needs to be further divided
until one reaches a differentia which is equal to the object defined.
Rule 2. The division of both genus and differentia must be carried out
through immediate differentiae. Otherwise, the process of division would
not capture the whole of the thing to be divided. For instance, body
should not be divided through capable of perception and incapable of
perception. For these differentiae are immediate differentiae of animated
body and not of body. Body must be divided through its immediate
differentiae, animated and inanimate.
Rule 3. The division of both genus and differentia must be carried out
through essential differentiae. Each successive differentia in fact does not
express a nature other than that of the thing divided, but rather the same
nature in a more determinate way. The rational for instance is not a differ-
ent nature from the animal, but a certain kind of animal. Accidental dif-
ferentiae, however, do not express the same nature as the thing divided,
but a different one. For instance, if we divide animal through winged
and unwinged, these differentiae will not express the same nature as ani-
mal. Therefore, division must be carried out through essential differentiae.
Sometimes, accidental differentiae may replace essential ones, when the lat-
ter are not known to us.
Two Objections.
Obj. 1. The genus is not divisible through differentiae. For nothing can
be divided through differentiae unless it expresses a single concept or a
single nature. But the genus expresses neither a single concept nor a single
nature. It does not express a single concept, because man and horse belong
to the same genus, whether or not our intellect is aware of their doing
so. Moreover, the genus does not express one single nature, because, as
Aristotle says in De an., Book I, the universal animal is nothing.
Obj. 2. Superior differentiae cannot be divided through inferior ones.
For, otherwise, the superior and the inferior differentia would constitute a
species, just as genus and differentia do. But this is impossible, because, if
this were the case, there would be species that do not fall within a category,
i.e. the species constituted from two differentiae.
Reply to Obj. 1. The genus expresses both a single nature and a single
concept. For, either it expresses the nature of only one of its species and
so is exclusively predicated of the species in question, or it expresses the
nature of all its species and so is predicated of none of them, or again it
expresses the nature common to all its species and hence is predicated of
all of them. When Aristotle says in the De anima that the genus is nothing,
he is clearly talking about the Platonic genus. But the genus also expresses
one single concept; otherwise, it would not be predicated of many things.
Aristotle, therefore, says in Post. Anal., Book I that the universal is one
in many and one of many. The expression one in many indicates that
the genus expresses one single nature, while the expression one of many
means that it is predicable of many things and so is a single concept. For the
genus to be a single concept it is not required that it be actually predicated,
but it is enough that it be predicable.
Reply to Obj. 2. Two differentiae do not make up a species. A definition
in fact is not made of any two parts, but of one part which is subject and
potentiality and another which is form and actuality. Therefore, a definition
needs a genus, which is a sort of subject and expresses the essence of the
object defined, and a differentia, which is a sort of form and expresses a
certain quality of the object defined.
Conclusion 4. There are as many species as last differentiae.

Just as the division of the genus cannot proceed ad infinitum but must end
with the lowest species, so the division of the differentia cannot proceed
ad infinitum, but must end with the last differentia. But the last differentia
is the one constituting the species, because it is the only differentia that
is equal to and convertible with the species. Therefore, there are as many
species as last differentiae. This conclusion is directed against those who
think that the last differentia is not convertible with the species but rather
more common. Aristotles text (1038a1518) corresponding to Conclusion 4.
Difficulty. Animal is the last genus in the category of substance and

possesses only two differentiae, rational and irrational. But under irrational
there fall innumerable different species. So it is not true that there are as
many species as last differentiae.
Notandum. Burley and Buridans solution to this difficulty consists in
maintaining that under the genus animal there are many subordinate gen-
era, which, however, have no name. The rationale behind this solution is
that men and monkeys are more similar than men and horses. This must
be so on account of some similarity between men and monkeys, which is
grounded on some one thing. And the one thing in which men and donkeys
agree must be more general than the species to which men and monkeys
belong and less general than the genus animal. Thus, there must be an inter-
mediate genus including men and monkeys but not horses.
This solution is dubious. For it implies that no one can understand, for
instance, what a horse is without knowing all the species of animalwhich
is absurd. For in order to understand what a horse is we need to know all
the genera it belongs to. Now, horses belong to innumerable subalternate
genera: they belong together with donkeys to one subalternate genus, to
which cows do not belong; they belong together with mules to another
subalternate genus to which dogs do not belong, and so on and so forth.
However, in order to know all the subordinate genera horses belong to, we
must know all the species of animal, in that we need to know which animal
is similar to which other.
Moreover, if we endorse the principle behind the solution, there will
be many species under the lowest species. For Socrates is more similar to
Plato than he is to Berta and so, according to the principle of similarity
presupposed by the solution, Socrates and Plato should fall under some
species less common than man. Moreover, from the solution it follows that
there will be more genera than species. For suppose that under the genus
animal there fall only four lowest species, say A, B, C and D. Since the
solution maintains that for every two species there is always a genus above
them to which only the two species in question belong, for the species A B C
D there will be six immediate subalternate generawhich is absurd. And
many other absurd consequences will ensue.
Solution. In between man and animal there is no subordinate genus. So,
the differentia rational immediately determines the species man. On the
contrary, under the differentia irrational there are many further differen-
tiae, which play the role of subordinate genera, as Aristotle explains in the
Posterior Analytics and above in this text, without being genera in the proper
sense of the term.
To the argument contained in the Burley-Buridan solution it should be re-

sponded that a man and a monkey are more similar than a man and a horse
on account of some similarity which is grounded on some one thing. But
such a thing is nothing but the genus animal. A man and a monkey in fact
are similar not in virtue of only one similarity, but in virtue of two, one
of which is grounded in the man and the other in the monkey. In other
words, just as a species, e.g. the human species, has a certain latitude within
which some individuals are more similar to each other than others, thus
a genus, say the genus animal, has a certain latitude within which some
species are more similar to each other than others. Burley and Buridans
argument, therefore, does not work. From A man and a horse are more
different from one another than a man and a monkey and A man and a
monkey are different in species, it does not follow A man and a horse are
different more than in species.
Two objections to the solution.
Obj. 1. Aristotle says earlier on in Book VII that there is an unnamed genus
above horse and donkey. Moreover, in the Post. Anal., Book II, he says that
terrestrial, volatile and aquatic are genera of less extension than animal.
Objection 2. Porphyry says that rational animal is a subalternate genus
and not a lowest species. Moreover, he further implies that, since irrational
does not constitute together with animal a lowest species, neither does
rational.
Reply to Obj. 1. In Book VII Aristotle does not affirm unqualifiedly the exis-
tence of such an unnamed genus, but rather talks somewhat dubitatively.
Alternatively, he may be taken to refer to the logical genus and not to the
physical genus. The genera mentioned in the Posterior Analytics are just
examples. For terrestrial, volatile and aquatic are not really genera in the
category of substance, but rather belong to the category of quality, in so far
as they make reference to shape and external organisation, which are qual-
ities.
Reply to Obj. 2. In this case, Porphyrys opinion must be rejected. For
he falsely believed, following Platos view, that the heavenly bodies are
rational animals and so considered rational animal to be an intermediate
genus. Neither is his further claim that rational and irrational are on a
par true. For rational is a differentia which is not further divisible and so
immediately constitutes a lowest species when added to the genus animal.
Irrational, by contrast, is further divisible and so does not constitute any
lowest species.
Aristotle infers four corollaries from the previous discussion.

Cor. 1. The unity of definition must be evaluated on the basis of the unity
of the last differentia. The definition and the object defined are each one
thing, provided that the last differentia is one. For the last differentia is the
substance both of the definition and of the object defined, when we take is
in the sense of causal predication and not in that of identity. Aristotles text
(1038a1820) corresponding to Corollary 1.
On the basis of Corollary 1, someone might put forward the following
argument. Since the unity of definition must be evaluated on the basis of the
unity of the last differentia, if the last differentia is one, the definition is one.
Aristotle replies that this argument needs an extra premiss: the definition
must contain no repetition of a genus or of a differentia. Aristotles text
(1038a2023) corresponding to the extra premiss.
Cor. 2. There are as many objects defined as last differentiae. Since divi-
sion cannot proceed ad infinitum, then, if it is carried out correctly, i.e. if
the genus is divided through differentiae and each differentia through other
differentiae without omitting anything, there will be only one last differen-
tia and so only one object defined. Therefore, even if a definition contains
many parts, the object defined will be just one, since the last differentia is
just one. Aristotles text (1038a2326) corresponding to Corollary 2.
Cor. 3. The object defined is not one unless each of the differentiae is per se.
This corollary is evident. For, if some differentia were not per se but acci-
dental, the object defined would not be one but many, as if, for instance,
one divided footed animal through the accidental differentiae white and
black. The reason is that accidental differentiae express something differ-
ent from the nature which they differentiate. On the contrary, differentiae
per se do not express something different from the nature which they dif-
ferentiae, but are only a further specification thereof. For instance, in the
definition Man is a living substance capable of sensation, capable of sen-
sation is just a further specification of living substance. In the definition,
by contrast, Man is a white two-footed animal, white is not a further
specification of two-footed but rather indicates a nature different from
the nature of two-footedness. Aristotles text (1038a2628) corresponding to
Corollary 3.
Cor. 4. A definition is not one unless the differentiae are placed in the right
order. Each definition presupposes a process of composition going from the
more common to the less common, so that first comes the genus, then the
more common differentiae and finally the last differentia. If one does not
proceed in this way, the definition will contain repetitions, as if one defined
man as a footed two-footed animal. Footed is clearly more common
than two-footed and hence should be placed before two-footed in order

to avoid repetition. Aristotles text (1038a2835) corresponding to Corollary
4.
Notandum. Averroes lays down four conditions for the unity of a defini-
tion.
Cond. 1. No difference should be repeated in a definition.
Cond. 2. A definition should not omit any differentia. Just as a natural
mixture would not be a unity if it should lack one of its forms, so a definition
would not be a unity if it should lack one of its differentiae.
Cond. 3. The last differentia in the division should be the last in the
composition. Just as a natural mixture receives its name and definition from
the last form, so the object defined receives its name and definition from the
last differentia.
Cond. 4. No differentia should be accidental. In the case of forms and
things conceived per se there is no room for a process ad infinitum, whereas
such a process may take place in the case of forms and things conceived
per accidens. Thus, if the definition is composed of accidental differentiae,
there will be an infinite series of differentiae and hence no last differentia.
But a process ad infinitum makes the knowledge of the object defined
completely impossible as much as it makes impossible to demonstrate the
per se properties of the object.
Two Objections.
Obj. 1. The definition composed of a genus and a unique differentia is not a
unity. For many things existing in actuality cannot make a unity, and genus
and differentia are two different things existing in actuality.
Obj. 2. Neither can a definition composed of a genus and many differen-
tiae be a unity. Such a definition in fact will contain repetitions, in that the
previous differentia is always included in the successive one and so will be
repeated over and over again.
Reply to Obj. 1. Genus and differentia can be considered in two different
ways, either in so far as they relate to each other or in so far as they both
relate to the object defined. When compared to each other, genus and
differentia are related as matter and form (and so one of them is potential
and the other actual); when compared to the object defined, they both relate
to it as forms (and so they are both actual). However, the unity of a definition
depends on the relation genus and differentia bear to each other and not on
that which they bear to the object defined.
Reply to Obj. 2. One differentia can be included in another in two ways,
i.e. either only with reference to the thing included or with reference to both
the thing and its name. Repetition will occur only in the latter case, when
the successive differentia also takes its name from the previous one.
Further Objections.
Obj. 1. The successive differentia does not seem to be included in the pre-
vious one. For, just as the genus is not included in the differentiae through
which it is divided, so a differentia is not included in the differentiae through
which it is divided.
Obj. 2. If a differentia is included in all its inferior differentiae, such differ-
entiae will not be simple but rather composed of a genus and a differentia.
For, just like the species, all the inferior differentiae will have something in
commonwhich is the genusand something making them different one
from the otherwhich is the differentia.
Reply to the objections. To be included in something else can be under-
stood in two different ways, either formally, i.e. in the sense of being con-
tained in something else, or virtually, i.e. in the sense of being implied by
something else. A genus, for instance, is included formally in a species as
a part contained in the species; the form of an element, by contrast, is
included in the form of a mixture only virtually, in that the former form is
implied by the latter: if there is the form of the mixture there is also that of
the element, but not the other way round. Now the superior differentiae is
not included in its inferior differentiae formally in the way in which a part
is included in a whole, but only virtually, in that the inferior differentiae
imply their superiors. The same thing holds for the case of the genus. The
genus is not contained in the differentiae formally, because the genus falls
outside the essence of the differentia and vice versa. However, it is included
in the differentiae virtually, in that the differentiae imply the genus and not
the other way round. Therefore, a well-formed definition contains no rep-
etition, because the genus is included in the differentiae only virtually and
not formally, so much as superior differentiae are included in the inferior
ones only virtually and not formally. Repetition would occur only if both
the genus and the superior differentiae were included formally.
Treatise III
Aristotle investigates substance from the point of view of communication

and predication.
Chapter 1
Aristotle proves against Plato that universals do not exist per se.
Part 1
Aristotle restates the division of substance presented earlier on in the book.
Substance is spoken of in four different ways: the subject, the essence, the
composite of matter and form and the universal. The first two ways have
been specifically dealt with in the foregoing discussion. The third way has
been investigated more generally in the course of the analysis of definition
by showing that what is defined is a universal composite and not a particular
one. Now, Aristotle moves on to the universal in order to refute the Platonist
view that universals are the causes and principles of things more than
anything else. Aristotles text (1038b18).
Notandum. Averroes comments on Aristotles text by introducing four
propositions.
Prop. 1. Definitions signify the substance of things.
Prop. 2. The universals that compose a definition are predicated of par-
ticulars, while the universals that do not compose a definition, such as God
and separate intelligences, are not predicated of particulars.
Prop. 3. An individual is composed only of particular matter and form
which does not mean that universals are not in particulars, but that partic-
ulars are not composed per se of universals.
Prop. 4. The substance signified by the definition is the form of particular
thingsby which we should not understand the particular form, but the
universal form existing in particulars.
Part 2
Aristotle refutes Platos view by means of three conclusions.
Conclusion 1. No universal as such is a substance existing per se.

Two assumptions.
Assumption 1. If a substance is proper to one thing, it cannot belong to
another. Otherwise, it would not be proper to the thing in question. Aris-
totles text (1038b810) corresponding to Assumption 1.
Assumption 2. The universal is what is of such a nature as to be in many
things. Aristotle does not say that a universal is in many things, but only that
it is of such a nature as to be in many things, because some universals, such
as the sun and the moon, have unique instantiations. This, however, is not
due to the nature of the species, which in itself can always be in many things,
but rather to the fact that the whole matter of the species is exhausted by
one individual. Aristotles text (1038b1012) corresponding to Assumption 2.
Two Proofs of Conclusion 1.
Proof 1. If the universal as such is a per se existing substance, then it is
the substance either of none of the things of which it is predicated, or of
only one of them, or of all of them. The first alternative cannot be the case,
because to belong to nothing is against the nature of the universal. Neither
can the second alternative be true, because in this case the universal would
be proper to just one thing, while we have defined the universal as that
which is of such a nature as to be in many things. The third alternative
too should be discarded. For if the universal were the substance of all the
things it is predicated of, then all the individuals of the same species would
be numerically the same in that they would have numerically the same
substance and essence. Aristotles text (1038b1215) corresponding to Proof
1.
Notandum. Averroes explains Aristotles text. Earlier on in the book Aris-
totle rejected the view that universals are the efficient causes of their par-
ticulars. Now, he further shows that they cannot be the formal causes of
particulars, by pointing out that universals cannot be parts of a per se exist-
ing substance. For whatever is the substance of a particular thing must be
proper to it, while universals, by definition, cannot be proper to anything.
It should be noted that the argument works only if substance is under-
stood as numerically one substance. For two things can have the same
substance, if substance is taken in the sense of a substance that is specifi-
cally or generically one.
It must be added that Aristotle quite rightly qualifies Conclusion 1 by say-
ing universal as such and a substance existing per se. For each of the
following sentences is false: No universal is substance; No universal is
a per se existing substance; No universal as such is substance. The first
is false, because Aristotle in the Categories calls genera and species sub-
stances, although only secondary substances. The second too is false. For
both man and animal are universals; man, however, is identical with this
man and animal is identical with this animal; but this man and this animal
are substances existing per se. However, the conclusion as stated by Aristo-
tle is true: No universal as such is a substance existing per se. For a univer-
sal as such is always in something and belongs to somethingboth of which
characteristics never pertain to a substance existing per se. Finally, also the
third sentence is false, because the universal in the category of substance is,
as such, a substance, being it a secondary substance. However, the sentence

No universal as such is a per se existing substance is true, because every
universal as such exists in something else and belongs to something else.
Proof 2. No substance existing per se is said of any subject; but every
universal is said of some subject; therefore, no universal can be a substance
existing per se. The major premiss is stated by Aristotle in the Categories
when he says that primary substances are said of no subject. The minor can
be proved: whatever is in a subject is also predicated of it; but universals as
such are always in some subjects, i.e. in the particulars falling under them;
therefore, they are also predicated of those subjects. Aristotles text (1038b15
Platonists object that universals neither are in a subject nor are said
of a subject. For universals are the object of definition and the object of
definition must be necessary and incapable of being otherwise. Things, by
contrast, that are in a subject or are predicated of a subject are contingent
and can be otherwise. Therefore, universals cannot be such things.
Aristotle replies that, whether universals are definable or not, they are in
a subject and are predicated of a subject. For both genera and species are in
the things of which they are the genera and the species, and are predicated
of them. For otherwise they could not be in some sense the substance of the
things of which they are the genera and the species. Aristotles text (1038b18
23) corresponding to the objection and the reply.
Notandum 1. Averroes clarifies Aristotles text by means of two distinc-
tions.
The first distinction is between substance and substantial. A substance
is what subsists in itself and not in something else. According to this defi-
nition, only the individuals in the category of substance are substances, in
that only they are beings per se and subsist per se. Substantial, by contrast, is
what belongs to the essence of per se subsisting things, not being itself a per
se subsisting thing, like for instance the form of particular things. Clearly,
Aristotle intends to deny that universals are substances, i.e. per se subsist-
ing beings, and not also that they are substantial.
Second distinction. Each inferior (i.e. each thing that fall under a species
or a genus) has a twofold nature, i.e. a proper and a common nature. The
proper nature is that which sets one thing apart from others, the common
nature is that in virtue of which one thing agrees with others. Man and
horse, for instance, both have a proper nature, i.e. humanity and equinity,
respectively, and a common nature, i.e. animality.
Notandum 2. Averroes further clarifies Aristotles text by saying that the
universals that compose a definition are not parts of sensible substances.
For sensible substances are what they are whether they are defined or
not, and actually even whether they are definable or not. By analogy with
Averroess words, it can be said that universals are in a subject and are said
of a subject whether they are definable or not. Therefore, by substance
Aristotle does not mean any substance, but only primary substance, which
neither is in a subject nor is said of a subject.
It might be objected that, according to the Categories, secondary sub-
stances are said of a subject, but are not in a subject. Therefore, since sec-
ondary substances are universals, some universals are not in a subject. To
the objection it should be replied that there are two kinds of subject, the
subject of inherence and the subject of predication. Universals are not in
a subject of inherence, but they are always in some subject of predica-
tion.
Conclusion 2. No universal as such is part of a substance existing per se.

Two proofs of the conclusion.
Proof 1. If the universal as such is part of a per se existing substance, then
also the aptitude to be in many thingswhich is part of the definition of
universalwill be part of a per se existing substance. But if this is the case,
a substance will be made of non-substances, because the aptitude to exist in
many things is a quality. This conclusion, however, is unacceptable, because
the parts of which something is made are prior to it and a quality cannot be
prior to a substance, as Aristotle has shown earlier on in the book. Aristotles
text (1038b2329) corresponding to Proof 1.
Notandum. Averroes clarifies Aristotles text by means of a distinction.
That is, universals have two kinds of being, a real and an intentional being.
According to their real being, universals exist in the extra-mental things,
from which they differ only conceptually and not really. According to their
intentional being, by contrast, universals exist in the intellect as concepts
or intelligible species. When considered in its intentional being, a universal
is not a part of a substance, but rather a quality or a disposition of the
intellect by means of which the real universal is compared to its instances
and predicated of them.
Proof 2. If the universal as such is a part of a per se existing substance,
and both man and animal are universals under which Socrates falls, then
both man as man and animal as animal are parts of Socrateswhich is
false, because in this case Socrates would be composed of two universals
as of parts. In general, therefore, the parts of a definition are not parts of any
substance existing per se. The parts of a definition, and universals in general,
cannot exist without the substances existing per se and the substances they
contribute to define, since there cannot exist an animal which is not also
a particular animal, nor some parts of a definition existing independently
of the objects defined. Aristotles text (1038b2934) corresponding to Proof
2.
From the foregoing discussion Aristotle concludes against Plato that none
of the things that exist universally or are universally predicated can be
substances existing per se. For a per se existing substance signifies a this
something and not a certain kind of thing, whilst universals signify a certain
kind of thing. To posit universals as per se existing things generates many
impossible consequences and, in particular, the Third Man Argument. For,
since the common man is in the particular man but is not a part of him, from
the common man and the particular man there results a third man, just as
an individual results from matter and form and a species from genus and
differentia. The particular man in fact would play the role of matter and the
common man that of form. Aristotles text (1038b341039a3) corresponding to
the conclusion.
Notandum 1. Averroess commentary confirms Aristotles doctrine. It is
not incorrect to say that a universal is in some sense a substance existing
in an individual, or that every superior is in its inferiors. Likewise, it is not
incorrect to say that a universal is a part of an individual, provided that part
is taken in the sense of conceptual part. However, it is impossible for a
universal to be a real part of an individual as much as it is impossible for it
to be a substance alongside the substance in virtue of which an individual
is an individual. For in this case the universal and the individual would be
two really distinct substanceswhich is falseand the universal, being a
part of the individual, could not be predicated of it.
Notandum 2. Averroes gives a further argument in favour of Aristotles
doctrine. Every substance belongs to the category of substance; universals
as such, by contrast, pertain to the category of relatives; therefore, universals
as such cannot be substances.
Notandum 3. Averroes makes a further point. When universals are predi-
cated essentially of individuals, they do not signify the individuals according
to their proper nature, i.e. the nature in virtue of which one individual dif-
fers from another, but according to their common nature, i.e. the nature in
virtue of which one individual agrees with another.
Aristotles and Averroess words have the following consequence: universals
do not only exist in the intellect but also extra-mentally in their individ-
uals, independently of any intellectual operation. Four arguments can be
advanced in favour of this claim.
Arg. 1. In every genus there is one first principle which is the measure
of all the things belonging to the genus. Such a principle cannot be some-
thing individual, because in the individuals of the same species there is
no prior and posterior. Neither can the first principle be fabricated by the
intellect, for in this case it would be posterior to individual things. There-
fore, the principle in question must exist in the extra-mental individual
things.
Arg. 2. Similarity and equality are grounded on some one thing. But things
are similar or equal to one another independently of any operation of the
intellect. Therefore, the one thing in question must be the universal nature
in virtue of which two things are similar or equal.
Arg. 3. The producer and the product of generation are similar in form
independently of any operation of the intellect. Moreover, some cases of
generation are univocal and others are equivocal. Now, in equivocal gener-
ation, the producer and the product are of different species and of the same
genus. Therefore, there are in the extra-mental world genera and species,
which are the forms common to producers and products.
Arg. 4. Things dividing a whole must either be both mental or both
extra-mental, for the things that divide a whole must be simultaneous by
nature and must divide the whole equally. But the circle is divided through
particular and universal circle. And since the particular circle is extra-
mental, so must be the universal as well.
Objection. Opposites are not in the same thing at the same time; but
universal and particular are opposites; therefore, since the particular exists
extra-mentally, the universal must exist only in the intellect.
Reply. The argument confirms Aristotles view rather than disproving
it. For, since universals and particulars are opposites and particulars exist
extra-mentally and independently of any operation of the intellect, univer-
sals too must exist extra-mentally and independently of the operation of
intellect.
With regard to this point, it must be added that universals and particulars
are relative opposites and nothing prevents such opposites from being in
the same thing at the same time, just as nothing prevents a thing from
being both similar and dissimilar or father and son. Accordingly, a generic or
specific nature is particular in so far as it is received in one individual, while
it is universal in so far it is communicated to many things and predicated
of them. Moreover, when Averroes says that an individual has two natures,
he does not mean to refer to two really distinct natures (for man and this
man are one thing and one substance and not two) but only to two different
concepts and intentions.
Conclusion 3. No universal as such is a being in actuality.

It is impossible for two things existing in actuality to make up one thing ;
but universals do make up one thing; therefore, universals do not exist in
actuality.
The major premiss is proved in three different ways.
Proof 1. What is one in actuality is so in virtue of a form actualising it. So, if
two things are one in actuality, it must be in virtue of some form. But this can
occur only if two things are both in potentiality with respect to such a form,
just as a line is made of two half-lines existing in it only in potentiality. For
if the two things existed in actuality, they would be distinct and separate,
in that they would have two actualities and so two forms. Actuality is in
fact what distinguishes and separates and things receive their actuality from
their form. Aristotles text (1039a38) corresponding to Proof 1.
Proof 2. Aristotles doctrine is borne out by Democritus view. Democritus
maintains that it is impossible for one thing to be made from things existing
in actuality or for two things existing in actuality to be made from one. He
makes this claim in the context of his theory of atoms, which he construes as
indivisible magnitudes and substances in actuality. And although the theory
of atoms is false, the general principle behind the theory is correct. Aristotles
Proof 3. Aristotles view is further confirmed by the common belief that
numbers are made of unities. If the number two is composed of unities,
either it is not something one or the unities it is made of exist only poten-
tially. The Pythagoreans chose the first alternative, the Peripatetics the sec-
ond, which is the right one. Aristotles text (1039a1114) corresponding to Proof
3.
Notandum. Averroes expands on Aristotles text. If a universal is a part
of an individual substance over and above the substance that is proper
to the individual in question, then that universal cannot be a separate
substance. For otherwise one substance in actuality would be made out of
two substances in actuality, i.e. the universal and the individualwhich is
impossible.
Two objections.
Obj. 1. Averroes himself says in On Phys., Book II, that an animal is composed
of two things in actuality, i.e. the mover and the thing moved.
Obj. 2. A pair of men is one in actuality, in that it is a species in the category
of quantity, and at the same time contains two unities in actuality, since
each man composing the pair is one in actuality.
Reply to Obj. 1. One thing can be made out of two things existing in poten-
tiality. It can also be made out of two things of which one is in potentiality
and the other in actuality. For instance, matter, which is in potentiality, and
form, which is in actuality, make up one individual. However, even though
form is actuality when compared to matter, both matter and form are in
potentiality when compared to the composite of which they are the parts.
And the same is true of all the parts of a whole. Therefore, the mover and
the thing moved in the animal are both in potentiality with respect to the
whole animal, even though the mover is in actuality when compared to the
thing moved.
Reply to Obj. 2. There are two kinds of number, as Aristotle says in Phys.,
Book IV, i.e. the number counted and the number by which we count. The
first kind of number is not really distinct from the things counted and is not
something in actuality, but only some kind of aggregate of many things. A
pair of men is a number counted and so is nothing over and above two men.
The number by which we count, i.e. the mathematical number, is distinct
from both the things counted and the unities composing it. Such a number
is a being per se belonging to the category of quantity.
Aristotle points out two inconvenient consequences of his previous argument.
Cons. 1. No substance can be defined. For it has been argued (i) that a
substance cannot be composed of universals, since they signify a certain
kind of thing and not a this something, and (ii) that no substance can be
composed of substances existing in actuality. From (i) and (ii) there follows
that every substance is incomposite. (i) makes it impossible for secondary
substances to be composed, for they could only be composed of universals.
(ii) makes it impossible for primary substances to be composed, for they
could only be composed of actual substances. For potential substances are
not substances. But if substance is incomposite, it cannot be defined, since
what can be defined has parts. Aristotles text (1039a1419) corresponding to
Consequence 1.
Cons. 2. If substance is not defined, nothing else is. For it has been shown
earlier on in the book that definition belongs only or at least chiefly to sub-
stance. The other things either are not defined at all or are defined only in a
qualified sense. Aristotles text (1039a1921) corresponding to Consequence 2.
Aristotles solution. The two consequences do not really follow. For sub-
stance is defined and has parts: it has substances as parts, if we understand
by substances potential substances; it has non-substances has parts, if
we understand by substances actual substances. Moreover, it is not true
that potential substances are non-substances. For there are two kinds of
potentiality, subjective and objective potentiality. Subjective potentiality is

potentiality for form and is a substance. Objective potentiality is potential-
ity for being and is not substance. Aristotles text (1039a2123) corresponding
to the solution.
Notandum. Averroes clarifies Aristotles text. There is no substance which
is not composed of potentiality or actuality, according to either real or con-
ceptual composition. For, in the case of material substances, there is some
part of them from which we draw the genus and some other from which we
draw the differentia. And also in the case of intelligible substances, since
they are not completely free from potentiality, there is something from
which we draw the genus and something else from which we draw the dif-
ferentia.
Digression. Is there anything which is universal independently of the action of
the intellect?
Arguments in favour of a negative answer to the question.
Arg. 1. Averroes says in the proemium of his commentary on the De anima
that it is the intellect that makes something universal. But if things were
universal in themselves, we would need no intellect to make them such.
Arg. 2. Porphyry and Boethius maintain that everything that exists is one
in number, i.e. particular. Moreover, Avicenna says that a thing is in itself
neither particular nor universal, but is made particular by the individuating
principles and universal by the intellect.
Arg. 3. As Aristotle says in Post. Anal., Book I, the universal is one in
many, i.e. one thing existing in many things, and one of many, i.e. one thing
predicated of many. But nothing can be such independently of the action of
the intellect. For predication is an act of the intellect.
Arg. 4. When one of two opposites inheres per se in a thing, the other
cannot inhere in that same thing per se. But universal and particular are
opposites, and every extra-mental thing is per se particular. Therefore,
universality does not pertain per se to any extra-mental thing.
On the basis of arguments such as those just presented we are used to
saying that a thing is not in itself universal, but only potentially so, in so far
as it needs, in order to become universal, the intellect, which understands
it in a universal manner.
Arguments for a positive answer to the question.
Arg. 1. Every cognitive faculty has its proper object; but the object of the
intellect is the universal; therefore, the universal must be presupposed
before any operation of the intellect.
Arg. 2. The universal is of such a nature as to be predicated of many

things. But a thing is of such a nature independently of any operation of
the intellect.
Arg. 3. Representations stand to the intellect as colours do to sight. But
colours are visible independently of sight. Therefore, representations must
be intelligible independently of any operation of the intellect. However,
they are not intelligible in so far as they are signs of particulars, in that par-
ticulars are only potentially intelligible. Therefore, they must be intelligible
in so far as they are signs of universals.
Arg. 4. The agent intellect is comparable to light. Now, although light
is required for colours to be seen, colours are visible per se. Likewise,
although the agent intellect is required for things to be understood, things
are understandable per se. Therefore, they must be universal because the
intellect understands universals per se and particulars only through senses.
Solution. A thing is universal independently of any operation of the
intellect.
Four Arguments for the solution.
Arg. 1. The solution is implied by several claims Aristotle makes in Book VII:
that in things per se the essence is identical with that of which it is the
essence; that what is defined is the essence and not the individual; that a
species has both formal and material parts; that it is not particular matter
and form that enter into the definition, but rather common matter and form.
Arg. 2. Aristotle says, in Post. Anal., Book I, that the universal is one-
in-many and one-of-many. The order suggests that a thing is one in many
before being predicable of many things. Therefore, a thing is universal inde-
pendently of its being predicable and hence independently of the operation
of the intellect.
Arg. 3. In the prologue of the Physics Aristotle defines the universal as
a certain kind of whole that is known to sense perception. Moreover, in
De an., Book II, he says that colour is the proper object of sight. Now, the
colour Aristotle talks about cannot be some individual colourfor there
is no individual colour in particular on which sight depends. Neither can
the colour be something fabricated by the intellect, since sense perception
precedes intellection. Therefore, there must exist some universal colour in
the extra-mental world.
Arg. 4. Porphyry would not say that genera and species are predicated
of individuals and are parts of them, if genera and species did not exist in
individuals independently of any operation of the intellect. This point can
also be shown through the following argument. If one of two correlatives
exists in reality independently of the intellect, so does the other as well.

An individual is part of a universal and the other way round; so, individual
and universal are correlatives. But individuals exist independently of any
operation of the intellect. Therefore, universals also exist independently of
any operation of the intellect.
Arg. 5. If one of the things dividing a certain notion exists in the extra-
mental world independently of the intellect, the other too must exist in
the extra-mental world independently of the intellect. But primary and sec-
ondary substances divide the notion of substance and primary substances
exist independently of the intellect. Therefore, secondary substances also
exist independently of the intellect.
Replies to the arguments concluding that universals do not exist mind-
independently.
Reply to Arg. 1. When Aristotle says in the De Anima that the universal is
nothing or posterior, he refers polemically to Platos separate universals.
For a universal cannot exist separately, if it is not abstracted and separated
out by the intellect. And abstraction is posterior to the existence of the
particular thing. The intellect, therefore, does not make things universal,
but separate universals from particulars, as Averroes says. Plato was thus
wrong in thinking that universals can exist separately independently of any
operation of the intellect. For, if this were the case, we would not need
the agent intellect to understand things. On the contrary, we need such an
intellect precisely because universals are joined to the particulars they exist
in and the function of the agent intellect is precisely that of separating them
out from particulars.
Reply to Arg. 2. One in number can be understood in two ways: in
opposition to one in species or genus and so not everything that exists
is one in number; or in opposition to many in number and so everything
that exists is one in number. Even so, it is not true that all that is one in
number is particular. As to Avicenna, when he says that things in themselves
are neither particular nor universal, he refers to transcendentals such as
one and being. Of the other things, some are in themselves universal, like
humanity, and some particular, like Socrates. And just as particulars are not
made particular by the intellect, so universals are not made universal by the
intellect.
Reply to Arg. 3. A universal nature has three properties. (i) The first is com-
municability, which does not depend in any way on the intellect. The nature
of horse would be communicated to particular horses, even if no intellect
should or could ever exist. And things are one or different in species or genus
independently of any relation to the intellect. (ii) The second property is

predicability. And this property does not depend on an intellect operating in
actuality, but only in potentiality, just as visibility does not imply a relation
to sight in actuality, but only to sight in potentiality. In other words, the
universal nature is predicable independently of any actual operation of the
intellect, but it would not be predicable if the intellect were altogether
incapable of operating. (iii) The third property is actual predication. And
this property depends on an intellect operating in actuality, just as actual
vision depends on an eye seeing in actuality. Therefore, a common nature
is universal in actuality, predicable in potentiality before any operation
of the intellect, while it is predicable in actuality due to the operation of
the intellect. As a result, a universal has two definitions: a formal, a priori
definition, i.e. one in many, which is the principle of a demonstration, and
a material, a posteriori definition, i.e. one of many, which is the conclusion
of a demonstration. Unlike being one in many, being one of many is not part
of the essence of universal.
Reply to Arg. 4. It is false that every thing is particular. For, even if every
thing is a this something, not every thing that is a this something is also par-
ticular. Things that are communicable, like universals, are this something
but not particular. Therefore, it is also wrong to think that universals are
made universal by the intellect. For things are particular or universal in
themselves and the intellect does not affect their particularity or universal-
ity. All the intellect does is to separate out universals from the individuating
conditions they are joined to when existing in particular things. In fact it
would be impossible for the intellect to make universal something that is in
itself particular.
The foregoing considerations show that in this chapter Aristotle does not
intend to deny the existence of real universals. On the contrary, he rejects
separate universals but admits of universals existing in the particulars.
Moreover, the conclusion of his argument is not that universals are not
substances at all, but rather that they are not per se existing substances,
as Averroes rightly says. For the universals in the categories of substance
are substances. Thus, if one should ask whether universals are substances
or accidents, it must be replied that some universals are substances and
some others are accidents: the universals in the category of substance are
substances, while those in the accidental categories are accidents. However,
taken as such, i.e. in so far as it is a universal, a universal is an accident,
indeed not an accident in the abstract, but an accident in the concrete: the
universality that happens to belong to the common nature is an accident in
the abstract, while the universal itself is an accident in the concrete. And this
is possibly the meaning of Avicennas claim that in itself a thing is neither

universal nor particular. Universality and particularity do not belong per
se to the essence of the quiddity, and so a quiddity is not per se universal
or particular in the first sense of per se, even though it is per se universal
or particular in the second sense of per se, just as a human being is not
capable of laughing per se, if per se is taken in the first sense, while he is
so if per se is taken in the second sense.
Chapter 2
Aristotle shows that universals are not separate.
Part 1
Aristotle shows that universals are not separate by means of two conclu-
sions.
Conclusion 1. If there exists a separate species, there also exists a separate

genus.
Proof 1. Since species are composed of genus and differentia, when many
species fall under the same genus, the genus must be in each of them.
There are then two alternatives: either the genus is numerically one in
all its species, or it is numerically different. If it is numerically one, if
the species are separate, so is the genus. If it is different, the following
argument can be advanced: the genus differs from the species in the same
way as the species differs from the individuals; but the difference between
species and individuals is sufficient for the species to be separate from the
individuals. Accordingly, the difference between species and genus must
also be sufficient for the genus to be separate, if the species is separate.
Aristotles text (1039a2428) corresponding to the Proof 1.
Proof 2. Just as the individuals of the same species are one in virtue of
the unity of the species, so the species of the same genus are one in virtue
of the unity of the genus. But the unity of the species is sufficient for the
species to be separate. Therefore, the unity of the genus must be sufficient
for the genus to be separate. Aristotles text (1039a28b2) corresponding to
Proof 2.
Notandum. Aristotle says in Nich. Eth., Book I, that Plato did not posit
Ideas of things that have an essential order of priority and posteriority.
Now, species have an essential order of priority and posteriority when
compared to the genus, since the different species have different degrees
of perfection. Therefore, there is no Idea of the genus. On the contrary,
individuals do not have an order of priority and posteriority and so there
is an Idea corresponding to the species.
Platos reasoning is not sound. For he posits an Idea of the species for two
reasons: (i) because the individuals falling under the species agree in name
and definition; (ii) because the intellect understands man without under-
standing the individual men. Now, the very same reasons allow us to posit
an Idea of the genus. For (i) the different species agree in name and defini-
tion and (ii) the intellect can understand the genus without understanding
the different species. So, Plato is forced to admit of as many Ideas as there
are essential predicates, be they specific or generic, as Eustratius correctly
points out in his commentary on Nich. Eth., Book I.
Conclusion 2. It is impossible for there to be a separate genus.

In fact, if we allow for the existence of a separate genus, three impossible
consequences will follow.
Cons. 1. Contraries would exist in something that is one and the same in
number. For, if the genus is separate, it is also one in number. Moreover, the
genus would participate at the same time in contrary differentiae. Aristotles
text (1039b24) corresponding to Consequence 1.
It might be objected that a species does not result from genus and differ-
entiae by participation. But then it must result from genus and differentia
either by composition or conjunction or mixture. All these ways, however,
will not do. For according to all of them, the genus will not be the same in
all its species but different, just as different parts of the same material are
in different houses or different parts of the same ingredient are in differ-
ent mixtures. As a consequence, the nature of the genus will not be entirely
present in all its species and so the genus will not be predicated of its species,
just as a part is not predicated of the whole. Aristotles text (1039b47).
Cons. 2. One and the same thing will be the substance of infinitely many
things. For the species falling under a genus are infinite or nearly so, and
the genus, on the other hand, belongs to the essence and substance of its
species. Aristotles text (1039b79) corresponding to Consequence 2.
Cons. 3. What is one in number will be many in number. Since the genus
is, by hypothesis, separate, it must be one in number. However, the genus
is predicated of the different species not as of something different, but
as of something identical, since the genus is the substance of the species.
However, the different species are many in number. Therefore, the genus as
well must be many in number. Aristotles text (1039b911) corresponding to

Consequence 3.
Notandum. The sentence The genus is one in number can be under-
stood in three different ways. (i) In contrast with one in genus and one
in species, and so the genus is not one in number. (ii) In the sense that the
genus and its species make up the number, as Plato maintains. And in this
sense too the genus is not one in number, because animal and man are not
two unities, just as they are not two things. (iii) In contrast with many in
number and so the genus is one in number. Case (iii), however, can be taken
in two different ways: per se and accidentally. Per se, the genus is opposed
to many in number. Accidentally, by contrast, it is many in number, for the
genus is in its species, which are many in number.
Objection. It should be clarified whether, when we say that animal is
divided through rational and irrational, we mean the conjoined animal or
the separate animal. If the second, we have Platos opinion. If we mean
the conjoined animal, it must be remarked that such an animal is part of
the species. But the division of the genus precedes the constitution of the
species. Therefore, the conjoined animal is not the animal that is divided.
Reply. Some things are separate conceptually but not in reality and in
being, like for instance substance and accidents and matter and form. Like-
wise, genus and species are separate only conceptually and not in reality
and in being as well, and the division of a genus is not a real but a con-
ceptual division. So, what is divided is certainly the separate animal and
not the conjoined animal, but an animal which is separate only concep-
tually. Accordingly, rational and irrational become divisive differentiae of
animal only when the intellect actually performs the division. Beforehand,
they exist in reality independently of any operation of the intellect and are
divisive differentiae only potentially, in so far as they can divide the genus
when the intellect performs the actual division.
Conclusion 3. It is impossible for there to be a separate species.

The conclusion is proved in three different ways.
Proof 1. If there is a separate species, there will be Ideas of both genera
and differentiaewhich is against the Platonists view, who did not posit
Ideas for genera and differentiae, but only for species. The Platonists saw a
difference between how the individuals relate to the species and how the
species relate to the genus. But there they were wrong. For, just as to any
individual there corresponds something of the substance of its species, so
to each species there corresponds something of the substance of its genus.
Therefore, if one posits Ideas for species, one must do so for genera and
differentiae as well. Aristotles text (1039b1114) corresponding to Proof 1.
Proof 2. If species are separate, animal is neither a part of man nor the
substance of itwhich is false and against the Platonists view. In fact one
individual is not part of another individual or the substance of it, nor is
one species part of another species or the substance of it. For different
individuals are separate from one another, and so are different species as
well. However, we have seen in Conclusion 1 that, if the species is separate,
the genus is also separate. Therefore, the genus cannot be a part of the
species or the substance of it. Aristotles text (1039b1416) corresponding to
Proof 2.
Proof 3. If some species are not separate, none can be. For there is no
reason why one species should be separate and another should not be so.
Clearly, however, some species are not separate, like for instance the species
of sensible individuals. In fact, positing separate species will entail the same
three absurd consequences as if one posited separate genera: (i) contraries
will exist in one and the same thing; (ii) one and the same thing will be the
substance of infinitely many things; (iii) what is one in number will be many
in number. Besides, even more absurd consequences will follow, such as, for
instance, that what is divisible will be indivisible and what is material will
be immaterial. Sensible things are in fact divisible and material, Ideas, by
contrast, are indivisible and immaterial. But Ideas are predicated of sensible
things and are their substances. Therefore, sensible things will be both
divisible and indivisible, material and immaterial. Aristotles text (1039b16
Digression on the question of Ideas.
There are four opinions about Ideas.
1) Platos Opinion. Plato maintains that Ideas are substances separate from
their particular instances and are the exemplars upon which God modelled
the creation of inferior beings. He further holds that Ideas are never per se
in the world or outside it, but happen to be in the world accidentally in so
far as they are the instruments of the First Being.
Eustratius, however, reports in defence of Plato that he did not take Ideas
to be in the world, but rather in the intellect of the First Being. Moreover,
Eustratius attributes to Platos Ideas four main characteristics: (i) they are
reasons existing in the intellect of the First Being and so standing, just like
the First Being, above the whole realm of nature. (ii) They are productive
and practical Ideas and not only principles of knowledge. (iii) They have
a number in such a way that they are finite and have a finite number
of species. They also produce things according to numbers. (iv) They are
divine, since they differ from one another only conceptually and not really,
just like any other thing existing in the divine intellect.
Eustratius defence is laudable but at odds with Aristotles testimony,
which describes Platonic Ideas as existing outside the First Beings intel-
lect. Clearly, however, Aristotle must be right. For Plato takes universals to
be separate on the grounds that our intellect can understand them with-
out understanding their particular instances. But our intellect understands
universals without understanding the First Being. So universals must be sep-
arate from the First Being too.
2) Ockhams opinion. Ockham places Ideas outside the divine intellect
and maintains that there are as many Ideas as creatures produced or capable
of being produced. Therefore, every creature is an Idea and an exemplar
of itself. If a created craftsman knew perfectly the thing he was about to
produce he would use that thing as an Idea and exemplar just as he uses a
thing similar to the one he wants to produce. But God perfectly knows the
creatures he wants to produce. Thus, the creature itself is an Idea and an
Idea is nothing but an object of knowledge which the knower looks at when
producing something. Therefore, it must be concluded that Ideasexactly
like the things that God can produceare not in God subjectively, but only
objectively.4 Moreover, there are distinct Ideas of all the things that can be
produced, because all these things are distinct, as well as of all their parts,
both essential and integral parts. And so God has infinite Ideas. And since
there are no universals in the extra-mental world only particulars and not
also universals have ideas corresponding to them.
Ockhams opinion is unreasonable for four reasons.
Reason 1. Similarity requires that things that are similar be really distinct. So,
nothing can be similar to itself and so nothing can be the idea and exemplar
of itself.
Reason 2. Aristotle says here in Book VII that the house in matter comes
from the house in the mindwhich implies that it is the house in the mind
and not the house in matter that is an Idea.
Reason 3. God knows the Antichrist through the Idea of the Antichrist.
But God knows nothing through that which does not exist. But the Anti-
christ does not exist. Therefore, the Idea of the Antichrist must be distinct
from the Antichrist himself.
4 i.e. they do not exist in God, but are just objects of Gods knowledge.
Reason 4. If a builder builds a house A by similarity with a house B, B is not

the Idea of A but only its exemplar. For an Idea, besides being an exemplar,
must be an object of knowledge and a causal principle. Therefore, it is the
house in the mind of the craftsman that is the idea of the house in matter,
because the former is not only similar to the latter but also the cognitive
and causal principle of it. Moreover, if the craftsman knew only the house
he wanted to producewhich is impossiblethere would be no exemplar
or Idea of it.
3) Scotuss Opinion. An Idea is the eternal reason existing in Gods mind,
according to which everything is producible. And such a reason cannot exist
outside Gods mindfor this would imply some kind of imperfection in
Godbut must exist in God Himself. And everything existing in God is
eternal.
Scotus draws four corollaries from his general thesis.
Cor. 1. An Idea is an object known by the divine intellect in its determinate
intelligible being. This is evident because the object known by the divine
intellect is the proper reason of a thing that can be produced in the outside
world, just as the house in the mind is the proper reason of the house in
matter. As a consequence, a stone in its intelligible being, for instance, is
the idea of a stone existing in its proper nature.
Cor. 2. To whatever thing that can be produced there corresponds its
intelligible being in the divine mind, just as also outside the divine mind
each thing has, within its own genus, a being distinct from that of all the
other things.
Cor. 3. The plurality of the infinite Ideas exists objectively in the divine
mind. For whatever has in itself the intelligible being of a thing has also
the idea of it. But in God there exists objectively the intelligible being of
all things, both possible and really existing things. For God cannot produce
something without knowing it. But such things are infinite. Therefore, God
must also have in Himself an infinity of Ideas.
Cor. 4. The Idea existing in the divine mind is Gods intellection of things,
both possible and really existing things. For in us the intelligible being of a
thing is just our intellection of that thing. If I know my father who does not
exist, the intelligible being of my father is neither my father nor my intellect
and so must be my intellection of him. The case of God is entirely analogous.
Scotuss opinion is reasonable. For he does not place divine Ideas outside
the divine intellect, but only in it, and attributes to the Ideas an intelligible
being in the divine intellect and not a real being. However, his theory is
dubious on two points.
(i) The first is Corollary 3, according to which in God there are infinitely
many Ideas corresponding to the infinite things that are produced or can be
produced. But we see that the created craftsman has only one idea for many
artefacts of the same kind. And so, by analogy, God too should have only one
Idea for the many things of the same kind he brings into existence. Moreover,
art can be assimilated to nature. But nature produces many things different
in number through only one form. So the created craftsman and God also
should produce many things different in number by means of only one Idea.
(ii) The second point is Corollary 4, according to which the Idea in the
divine mind is the cognition of the very thing that can be produced. But this
is false in the case of the human mind. For whether a craftsman considers
a certain thing or not, whether he acts or not, the idea of the thing remains
one and the same, just as one and the same is the productive capacity of the
craftsman.
4) Aquinas and Giless opinion. They say that there are not many Ideas
in God, but only one, i.e. the divine essence itself in so far as it is imitable.
Since it is imitable in infinitely many ways, the divine essence represents
the infinitely many things that are produced or can be produced. For if
our concept of Socrates, which is a quality, represents things which are
very different, i.e. substance and accidents, a fortiori the divine essence can
represent through one simple reason things no matter how different from
one another.
There are similitudes and exemplars that represent only one thing, like
the concept of an individual, others that represents things of the same
species, like a specific concept, and there are also similitudes representing
things of the same genus, like a generic concept, or all the things, like a
transcendental concept. The first kind of concept is distinct, all the others
confused. If you imagine a concept that represents things in the way a
transcendental concept does with regard to commonness, and in the way
an individual concept does with regard to distinctness, you will get the
similitude through which God knows all things.
Moreover, the more perfect an intelligence is, the more it makes use of
fewer, more universal and more distinct species. Now, the mode of knowl-
edge of separate intelligences is opposed to the human mode of knowledge.
The human intellect, for instance, when it knows things through more uni-
versal species, knows them more confusedly; separate intelligences, by con-
trast, know things the more perfectly and distinctly, the more universal are
the species they use. But God knows more things and knows them more per-
fectly than any created intelligence and, moreover, knows them not through
an accidental species, but through His own essence. Therefore, the divine
essence must be a distinct and perfect cognition of all things, both possible
and really existing things. As a consequence, there is only one Idea in God
for all things and no multitude of ideas.
Aquinas and Giless opinion is probable and well grounded, but presents
some difficulties on account of the analogy everybody admits between the
divine intellect and the intellect of a created craftsman.
(i) The idea of a house is not the intellect of the created craftsman or his
essence, but rather a form added to the intellect and to the essence of the
craftsman by means of which the craftsman produces in the extra-mental
world a similitude of the form. Likewise, the Idea in Gods mind cannot be
formally the divine essence, but must be the quiddity of a creature in its
intelligible being, which is distinct formally but not really from the divine
essence.
(ii) Form and perfection are one and the same thing. But in God there
are the perfections of all things and, hence, also the forms of all things. But
such forms are nothing but the quiddity of the creatures in their intelligible
beingcreatures which exist objectively in Gods mind and through which
God knows things and produces them, in perfect analogy with the case of
the created craftsman.
(iii) If in God there is only one Idea for all things, then a horse and a
man are produced according to the same reason, exemplar and similitude
which is explicitly rejected by Augustine in his 83 Questions. For, if it is
inconvenient for a created craftsman to produce a house and health accord-
ing to the same model, all the more it is inconvenient for God to create men
and horses according to the same model. Thus, just as in God there are many
attributes not really but only formally distinct, so there are also in Him many
Ideas that are not really but only formally distinct.
Pauls solution to the question of Ideas. Clearly, there are no separate Ideas,
but only Ideas that are separate from particulars in that they exist in a
created or uncreated intellect. For all things proceed from God and, since
they cannot proceed in the manner of nature, they must proceed in the
manner of intellect and art. But this implies that they proceed as things
which are modelled upon exemplarswhich cannot be the case, if the
exemplar does not exist in the mind of the craftsman. Therefore, in God
there are the Ideas of all creatures, which are called exemplars and forms of
the divine mind.
Thus, Idea can be understood in two different ways, commonly and prop-
erly.
The idea taken commonly is the specific quiddity causally existing in
the intellect, which is used as an exemplar by the producer to produce
things. This description of Ideas contains four aspects, which correspond to

Aristotles and Averroess doctrine in Book VII.
(i) An Idea must be a specific quiddity. For an Idea has the character of
form and actuality, while the genus and the individual have the character of
matter.
(ii) An Idea must also exist subjectively in the intellect. For the intellect,
just like nature, operates through an instrument existing in itself. So, those
who place Ideas outside the intellect are completely wrong.
(iii) An Idea must be the cause of a similar effect, in the way in which
the house in the mind is the cause of the house in matter. Therefore, the
pictures a painter may use as models when painting are not ideas but only
exemplars and similitudes.
(iv) An Idea must be an exemplar. Therefore, an Idea must be in the intel-
lect not only subjectively but also objectively, so that it may be before the
intellects gaze not only in itself but also with respect to thing it represents.
For the intellect, when it gazes at the Idea, does not see only the Idea itself
but also the thing it represents. From this it also emerges that the Idea is
not the cognition of the intellect, but rather the quiddity of a thing in its
intelligible being, which is presented to the intellect as an object of knowl-
edge. So, when I have a cognition of my dead father, what I have in the mind
is a species of my father presented to my intellect and existing in it objec-
tively. And such a species is the intentional father as distinct from the real
one.
The Idea taken in the proper sense is the specific quiddity causally existing
in the divine mind, which is used by the God to put creatures into existence.
This description finds support in Augustine, who clearly states that Ideas,
properly speaking, can only be found in the divine mind. He also provides
a characterisation of Ideasby stressing their eternity, immutability and
stability as well as their role of forms, causes and exemplars of all things
which clearly does not apply to the ideas of created intellects. This view
is further confirmed by Averroes in his commentary on Book XII of the
Metaphysics.
This view has four consequences.
Cons. 1. It is not true that to every thing that can be produced there corre-
sponds an Idea in the divine mind. For, just as things of the same species
have only one quiddity in reality, they have also only one Idea correspond-
ing to them in the divine mind. Moreover, from the fact that every thing that
can be created has its own intelligible being in the divine mind, it does not
follow that it has also an Idea in the divine mind.
Cons. 2. It is not necessary to posit infinite Ideas in the divine mind.

For, even if in the divine mind there are infinitely many intelligible beings
corresponding to the infinite things which can be produced, there is only
one Idea for all the things of the same species. Note, however, that we need
this argument only if we agree with the theologians that species are infinite.
If on the contrary we believe with the philosophers that they are finite, we
are in need of no argument.
Cons. 3. The divine intellect knows all things through one simple reason,
but does not produce them through one single Idea. Like the craftsman, in
fact, God has in His mind two concepts, i.e. a speculative concept through
which He knows infinitely many things (and this first concept is the divine
essence in so far as it is imitable) and a practical concept through which he
operates. And this second concept is the Idea, which is formally different
from the divine essence.
Cons. 4. Although being an intelligible specific quiddity, the Idea is one in
number and has the character of a whole rather than that of a part. This is
clearly explained in Eustratius commentary on Book I of the Nichomachean
Ethics, where he says that the Idea possesses by essence what the form in
matter possesses only by participation, and has unitedly and totally what
the form in matter has only particularly and dispersedly. Eustratius also
distinguishes three kinds of whole: the whole in the parts, the whole after
the parts and the whole before the parts. The whole in the parts is the whole
which is constituted by its parts. And such a whole is not the Idea, for an
Idea concerns essence, while the whole in the parts pertains to quantity.
The whole after the parts is the universal intention acquired by the intellect
through abstraction. This second kind of whole is not the Idea but the
universal. The whole before the parts is the exemplar after which the parts
are made, so that it has in an essential and eminent way what the parts have
only in a diminished way. And such a whole is in fact the Idea. Moreover, it is
one in number, because one and the same exemplar is sufficient to produce
all the things of a certain species.
Part 2
Aristotle shows that Ideas would not be definable, even if they existed in reality
as separate beings.
He first lays down two assumptions.
Assumption 1. There are two kinds of substance, i.e. particular and universal.
The particular substance is a composite of matter and form, the univer-
sal substance is form without matter: the particular substance cannot be
conceived of without matter, the universal substance is a simple form con-

ceived of without matter. For instance: Socrates is a particular substance,
the humanity existing in him is a universal and a simple form. Aristotles
text (1039b2022) corresponding to Assumption 1.
Assumption 2. Generation and corruption pertain to particular sub-
stances and not to universal substances, which are the essences of par-
ticular substances. The case of natural beings is identical to that of arte-
facts. But in artefacts what is subject to generation is not the essence but
the particular artefact. Essences come in and out of existence not because
they are subject to generation and corruption, but only as a result of the
generation and corruption of particular things. In other words, particulars
are generated and corrupted per se, universals only per accident, i.e. only
because particulars are generated and corrupted. And this is also the case
with natural things. Aristotles text (1039b2227) corresponding to Assump-
tion 2.
Notandum. Averroes illustrates Aristotles doctrine by means of three
distinctions.
Distinction 1. There are two kinds of form, i.e. particular and universal
form. The particular form is the ostensible form, so called because it is a
this something and belongs to one thing alone. It is also called form of the
part, because it acts on a part of a substance, and form of matter, because
it is received in matter. The universal form is the form of the whole, which
is so called because it is received in the whole individual and not in some
part of it.
Distinction 2. There are also two kinds of matter, the matter that is capable
of receiving form and the matter that is not capable of doing so. The first
kind of matter has associated with it the privation of a certain form, and such
is the matter of mixtures and of the elements. The second kind is the matter
that has no privation associated with it such as the matter of the heavenly
bodies. This explains why inferior things are generated and corrupted, while
the heavenly bodies are not.
Distinction 3. Something can be generated and corrupted in two ways,
unqualifiedly and qualifiedly. To be generated or corrupted unqualifiedly
is to be generated or corrupted per se, whereas to be generated or cor-
rupted qualifiedly is to be generated and corrupted accidentally. Therefore,
since particulars are generated and corrupted per se, they are also gener-
ated and corrupted unqualifiedly, while their essences, since they are gen-
erated and corrupted accidentally, are also generated and corrupted quali-
fiedly.
Two objections to Distinction 2.

Obj. 1. The essences of sensible substances should be subject to generation
and corruption. For they are composed of matter and form like the things
of which they are the essences.
Obj. 2. The particular cause stands to the particular effect as the universal
cause stands to the universal effect. But the particular builder produces
the particular house; therefore, the universal builder must produce the
universal house.
Reply to Obj. 1. The matter of which essences are composed, being univer-
sal matter, is not the matter that is capable of receiving form. This explains
why essences are not generated.
Reply to Obj. 2. There is a difference between the quiddity of the house
and the house in common. The quiddity does not imply any supposit,
whether determinate or indeterminate. The house in common implies an
indeterminate supposit. Therefore, it may be conceded that the builder in
common builds the house in common, but not that he builds the essence of
the house.
Aristotle shows that Ideas are not definable by means of four conclusions.
Conclusion 1. No sensible individual can be defined.

The conclusion is proved in three ways.
Proof 1. No corruptible thing can be defined; but every sensible individ-
ual is corruptible; therefore, no sensible individual can be defined. In Post.
Anal., Book I, Aristotle shows that there can be no demonstration concern-
ing corruptible things. But definition is the middle term of a demonstration.
Therefore, corruptible things cannot be defined, either. Moreover, that sen-
sible individuals are corruptible is clear, since they contain matter, in virtue
of which they can exist and not exist. The matter they contain in fact is
potentially both a form and its privation. Aristotles text (1039b2731) corre-
sponding to Proof 1.
Proof 2. No contingent thing can be defined; but every sensible individual
is contingent; therefore, no sensible individual can be defined. Sensible indi-
viduals are contingent because they are subject to generation and corrup-
tion. That no contingent thing can be defined can be proved in the following
way. In Post. Anal., Book I, Aristotle proves that demonstration does not con-
cern things that can be otherwise, but rather necessary things. Definition
is the middle term of a demonstration. Therefore, definition too concerns
necessary things and not things that can be otherwise. For if definition con-
cerned things that can be otherwise, it would be sometimes definition and
sometimes non-definition: every sentence about contingent things, in fact,

is sometimes true and sometimes false. But definition, being as it is certain
knowledge, must be definition all the time. Aristotles text (1039b311040a2)
Proof 3. That of which there is no science and demonstration cannot be
defined; but there is no science and demonstration of sensible individuals;
therefore, sensible individuals cannot be defined. The major premiss is
clearly true, for definition is the principle of science and demonstration. As
to the minor premiss, it is proved in Post. Anal., Book I. Things of which there
is science and demonstration bears to the intellect the following relation: if
their notion is preserved in the intellect, the scientific and demonstrative
knowledge that the intellect has of them must also be preserved. But this
is not the case with corruptible things. For when they are corrupted or
simply away from sense perception, their notion is in the intellect, but the
intellect itself possesses no scientific and demonstrative knowledge of them.
Thus, Aristotle concludes that an individual can always be removed from
the senses or from existence even if its notion remains in the intellect, while
definition concerns only things that cannot be removed when their notion
remains in the intellect. Therefore, individuals are not definable. Universals
are definable because they cannot be removed from existence when their
notion remains in the intellect. And just as their notion always remains in
the intellect, so they always remain in existence. Aristotles text (1040a57)
corresponding to the conclusion.
Notandum. Averroes clarifies Aristotles text by means of two distinctions.
Distinction 1. An individual is known in two ways, by science and by opin-
ion. An individual is known by science when it is present to the senses, by
opinion when it is absent from the senses. By science we should not under-
stand demonstrative knowledge, but more generally certain knowledge.
Distinction 2. The scientific knowledge of an individual can be destroyed
in two ways, either because the individual is corrupted or because it is
absent. Take, for instance, the sentence Socrates is white; when Socrates
is present, the sentence, if it is true, is also known. But it is no longer known
when Socrates dies or is absent. When he dies, the sentence is not known
because it is simply false; when he is absent the sentence is not known
because we no longer know whether it is true or false.
Objection. It is not true that every sensible individual is corruptible. For
the heavenly bodies are sensible individuals but are not corruptible.
Reply. By sensible individual Aristotle does not mean an individual that
can be perceived by some sense or other, but only an individual that can
be perceived by the sense of touch. And every such individual is in fact

corruptible.
Conclusion 2. No intelligible individual can be defined.

It seems that, if some intelligible individuals could be defined, Platos Ideas,
which are conceived of as separate individuals, should be definable to
the highest degree. However, Ideas are not definable. For every definition
contains more than one name, in that it does not only express the meaning
of the name of the object defined but also makes known the object by
spelling out the parts of its essence. A definition given through only one
name would not spell out the essence of the thing defined, but would only
provide some sort of synonym of its name. Now, every formula containing
more than one name is always applicable to more than one thing, while
the definition of an individual should be applicable to one thing alone.
For instance, if I define you as An animal capable of walking, clearly
this formula will also apply to things other than you and so will not be a
definition of you. Therefore, Ideas are not definable. Aristotles text (1040a8
Objection. Even if each of the names figuring in the definition of an Idea
is more common than the Idea itself and can be applied to other things as
well, the combination of such names is not more common than the Idea
but rather convertible with and proper to it. Aristotles text (1040a1415)
corresponding to the objection.
Reply. The definition of the ideal man, i.e. two-footed animal, does not
only belong to the ideal man, but also to other things. For the genus animal
does not only belong to the ideal man but also to the ideal animal. Likewise,
the differentia two-footed does not only belong to the ideal man, but also
to the ideal two-footed. Besides, there is also another problem with the
definition advanced, i.e. that not only does it belong to things other than the
ideal man, but also belongs to them primarily. For animal and two-footed
are parts of the ideal man and parts are prior to the whole. Therefore, if the
definition two-footed animal belongs to the ideal animal and to the ideal
two-footed, it belongs primarily to them and only secondarily to the ideal
man. Aristotles text (1040a1518) corresponding to the reply.
Two counter objections.
Counter objection 1. The argument does not work, because the genus and the
differentia of which the ideal species is composed are not separate.
Reply. Platonists should be asked whether no universal is separate or
there is some separate universal. If no universal is separate, neither is the
specieswhich is against their view. But if some universal is separate, i.e.

the species, also genus and differentia must be so. This can be proved in
two ways. (i) The reasons to posit a separate species are exactly the same
as those to posit separate genera and differentiae. For, just as the species
is prior to the individual (the existence of an individual entails that of
a species, while the existence of the species does not entail that of any
individual in particular), so genera and differentiae are prior to the species
(the existence of a species entails the existence of a genus and a differentia,
while the other way round is not the case). (ii) things that are simpler
are also more separate. But genera and differentiae are simpler than the
species, in that they constitute it. So, they must also be more separate.
Aristotles text (1040a1823) corresponding to the counter objection and the
reply.
Counter objection 2. Perhaps, animal and two-footed, when taken sepa-
rately, belong to something different from the ideal man, i.e. the ideal ani-
mal and the ideal two-footed. Jointly, however, they belong to the ideal man
alone. For the ideal man is precisely what a two-footed animal is.
Reply. If this were the case, there would be an Idea that is predicated
of and participated in by only one thing. The argument states in fact that,
when taken separately, the ideal animal is predicated of many things; when
joined to the differentia two-footed, by contrast, it is predicated of only
one thing, the ideal man. This occurs because the ideal animal is restricted
and limited by the ideal two-footed to which it is joined. But then the
ideal two-footed is predicated of only one thing, i.e. the ideal man. Being
predicated of only one thing, however, is against the very nature of an
Idea, which should be predicated of and participated in by many things.
Aristotles text (1040a2327) corresponding to the counter objection and the
reply.
Notandum 1. Averroes says that Platonists were not able to define Ideas.
For every definition is composed of names; but we do not give a name to
something which we do not know. It is a fact, however, that Platonists did
not know Ideas, i.e. did not know their essences. Therefore, they could not
define them.
Averroess observation has two consequences.
Cons. 1. That he who imposed names on things knew the things he was
imposing a name on.
Cons. 2. That the name-giver was a metaphysician and not a grammarian.
For only a metaphysician knows the real properties of things.
Notandum 2. Averroes proves that Ideas cannot be defined. For every
definition is composed of common names, while Ideas are particular things.
Therefore, the name employed to define an Idea belongs to other things

as well. Moreover, genus and differentia are drawn from one and the same
thing, although considered in two different ways. This is the reason why
genus and differentia are predicated of the species. In the case of Ideas,
however, genus and differentia are not drawn from one and the same thing,
but from different things. As a consequence, genus and differentia will be
really distinct and so two really distinct parts of the species. Therefore, they
will not be predicated of the specieswhich is absurd.
Notandum 3. Averroes gives further arguments against the definability of
Ideas. (i) If Ideas are definable, numerically one exemplar (the species) will
have as its parts numerically many exemplars (the genus and the differen-
tiae). For the species as well as the genus and the differentia are numerically
one, according to Platonists. (ii) the ideal man, which is separate, will have
as its parts many things which are themselves separatewhich is against
the notion of parts, since parts are not separate from the whole.
Notandum 4. One more argument by Averroes. Since definition is com-
posed of genus and differentia, the question may be raised as to whether
genus and differentia are (a) one and the same thing or (b) different things.
If (a), then the Idea of the genus will be identical with the Idea of the
differentiawhich is against the Platonists opinion. If (b), then the differ-
entia is prior to the genuswhich is false, because the differentia is added
to the genus and so must be posterior. Platonists are forced to say that the
differentia precedes the genus, because genus and differentia, being Ideas,
are intelligible things. And whilst in sensible things matter precedes form,
in intelligible things form precedes matter. And genus and differentia relate
to each other as matter and form.
Notandum 5. One more argument by Averroes. The genus and differentia
of which definition is composed must not be two things distinct and sepa-
rate in actuality, but rather two dispositions one of which perfects the other.
Clearly, the Ideas of genus and differentia do not satisfy these requirements.
For they are beings in actuality and neither is a disposition of the other.
Therefore, they do not make up a real unity. Such requirements, by contrast,
are met by the universals existing in particulars, which are many things in
potentiality and only one in actuality, in so far as the differentia is only a
disposition of the genus. This is the reason why genus and differentia are
predicated of each other.
To the last sentence it might be objected that Aristotle says in Met., Book III,
that genus and differentia are not predicated of each other. It should be
answered that genus and differentia are predicated of each other not per
se but accidentally, not according to formal predication but only according
to identical predication, on account of the species of which they both are

predicated per se.
Notandum 6. One more argument by Averroes. A definition is composed
of two natures, one more universal and the other less universal. The less
universal nature specifies and determines the more universal one: the genus
is an indeterminate concept which is made determinate by the differentia.
Clearly, however, one Idea cannot specify and determine another, since
they are two separate and distinct natures. Therefore, Ideas cannot be
defined.
Averroes draws the following conclusion from the foregoing discussion. Nei-
ther the universals corresponding to genus and differentia nor the one
corresponding to the species are separate substances. Instead of separate
universals, we must posit universal conjoined to particulars and existing
in them. For, if we did not posit such universals, there would follow three
absurd consequences. (i) There would be no science of particulars. For
science concerns necessary things, while particulars are contingent. (ii)
There would be no sameness in particulars. For sameness can be generic,
specific or numerical. But there cannot be generic or specific sameness
without genera and species. Neither there can be numerical sameness. For
whatever is numerically the same as itself is also generically and specif-
ically the same as something else. (iii) There would be no opposition in
sensible things. For opposition presupposes sameness and we have seen
that there is no sameness in sensible things without universals existing in
them.
Digression. Is the universal conjoined to particulars defined (i) according to
the being it has in the soul or (ii) according to its extra-mental being?
In support of (i). A definition expresses the what-it-is of a thing. But the
what-it-is is the object of the intellect. Therefore, a universal is defined in so
far as it makes the intellect know something and hence is defined according
to the being it has in the intellect.
In support of (ii). Definition concerns extra-mental, sensible particular
things. Therefore, universals must be defined according to the being they
have in the extra-mental world.
Solution. If by mental being we mean objective being and by extra-
mental being the being of existence, then a universal is defined according
to neither of them. For both beings are accidental to a universal. Moreover,
strictly speaking, from the fact that a universal has either a mental or an
extra-mental being it does not follow that it must be defined according to
one or the other kind of being. If, by contrast, by extra-mental being we
understand the being of essence, then a universal is defined according to its

extra-mental being.
Alternatively, we can say that a universal can be taken in two ways, i.e.
as a first intention or as a second intention. In the first way, a universal is
defined neither according to its mental being nor according to the being
it has in the supposits, but rather according to its essential being. When
taken as a second intention, a universal has two definitions: an a priori
definition in accordance with the being it has in extra-mental supposits and
an a posteriori definition in accordance with the being it has in the soul.
Conclusion 3. Not even individuals that are unique instances of a species can
be defined.
Aristotle explains the problem solved in Conclusion 3. When there are many
individuals in one species, we immediately see the difference between
individual and species and so we easily conclude that individuals cannot be
defined if the species is defined. When, by contrast, the species is confined to
only one individual, as is the case for instance with the sun and the moon, we
do not immediately see the difference between individual and species and
hence we might be misled into concluding that the individual is defined if
the species is defined. In conclusion 3 Aristotle shows that even individuals
that are unique instances of a species cannot be defined. Aristotles text
(1040a2729).
Proof of the conclusion. If unique individuals are defined, they must be
defined (i) either through accidental predicates (ii) or through substantial
ones. But they cannot be defined through either of them.
Case (i). If we defined them through accidental predicates, we would
make two mistakes: (a) the definition and the object defined would not be
convertible, for the object defined would not be removed if the definition
were removed and vice versa. For instance, if we defined the sun as a planet
turning around the earth, clearly the object defined would not be removed
should the definition be removed. For the sun would remain what it is even
if it stopped turning around the earth. (b) The second mistake is that a
substance would be defined through accidents. Aristotles text (1040a2933)
corresponding to case (i).
Case (ii). Even if we defined the sun and the like through substantial
predicates, the definition of the sun would always be applicable to other
things as well. If, for instance, there existed another sun, the definition of
the sun would be predicated of it univocally, since the two suns would be of
the same species and so would have the same definition. For even though,
as a matter of fact, the sun has only one supposit, in principle it could have
many. Aristotles text (1040a33b2) corresponding to case (ii).
Notandum. Averroes clarifies Aristotles text. If we try to define the sun we
shall never come up with a definition convertible with the object defined.
For either the sun is not removed when the predicates figuring in its defi-
nition are removed, as when we define the sun as a planet non-visible at
night; or the sun is removed when such predicates are removed, but in this
case the definition will also apply to other things as well. In either case, def-
inition and object defined will not be convertible.
Three objections.
Obj. 1. No species can have only one individual. For each whole must have
many parts and the species is a kind of whole of which individuals are parts.
So, a species must have many individuals.
Obj. 2. The relation between genus and species is the same as that be-
tween species and individuals. But there is no genus having only one species.
Therefore, there is no species having only one individual.
Obj. 3. Porphyry implies that species have many individuals when he
defines it as what is predicated of many individuals. And Aristotle implies
the same thing when he defines the universal as one in many and one of
many.
Solution. In order to solve the difficulty one needs to make three distinc-
tions.
Distinction 1. A universal can be considered in three ways, according to
the intentional being it has in the soul, according to the being of essence and
according to the being of existence. When considered in the first two ways, a
universal does not require any individual: in the first mode of consideration,
in fact, the intellect abstracts the species from any individuals whatsoever
and, in the second, an individual is not part of the essence of the species.
When considered in the third way, by contrast, a universal requires an
individual not only in potentiality but also in actuality.
Distinction 2. There are two kinds of corruptible thing. Some are gener-
ated by propagation, others by putrefaction. In the former case, the species
requires many supposits in actuality in order for it to continue to exist. In
the latter case, the species does not require (even if it occasionally may have)
many supposits existing at the same time, but only many supposits existing
in succession.
Distinction 3. There are also two kinds of incorruptible things, material
and immaterial corruptible things. The heavenly bodies belong to the first
kind, the intelligences to the second. Since these things are incorruptible,
their species have only one individual. For one individual alone is able to
perform the operations of the whole species. However, it is not against the
nature of such species to have many individuals. For every form is of such
a nature as to exist in many things. When it does not, this is due to some
external factor such as that the matter of the species is exhausted by one
form aloneas is the case with the heavenly bodiesor that form has no
matter to exist inas is the case with the intelligences.
Reply to Obj. 1. There are two kinds of whole, the universal and the integral
whole. The former only requires one part existing in actuality, while the
latter requires many such parts.
Reply to Obj. 2. The relation between genus and species is not the same as
that between species and individuals. For a genus descends into its species
through formal differentiae, while a species descends into the individuals
through material differentiae. However, it should be said that a genus may
happen to have only one species, even if not perpetually. For it is not
possible for a genus to be naturally capable of having a certain species and
not to have it in actuality at some time or other. A genus in fact is divided
through contrary differentiae and if a contrary exists in reality, so does the
other too at some time or other.
Reply to obj. 3. Porphyrys and Aristotles words should be taken to refer
to the aptitude and not to the actuality. A species remains of such a nature
as to be predicated of many things or to exist in many things, even if it does
not do so in actuality.
Conclusion 4. Ideas cannot be defined.

The conclusion follows from the previous ones. For Ideas could be defined
either as individuals or as universals. As to the first case, it has been shown
that individuals cannot be defined. As to the second, the Ideas of the genus
and of the differentia cannot be defined, because genus and differentiae
are not defined. Neither can the Idea of the species be defined, because it
would be composed of many Ideas, i.e. the Idea of the genus and that of the
differentiawhich is impossible. Aristotles text (1040b24) corresponding
to Conclusion 4.
Notandum. Averroes gives support to Conclusion 4. If idea were the
name of a species, then in one species there could be many similar Ideas
which differ from one another only in number, which is impossible.
Objections to Conclusion 4.
Obj. 1. Particulars can be defined. For a definition indicates the essence and
only particulars have essences.
Obj. 2. Definition belongs to substances. But the universal as such is an

accident. Therefore it cannot be the object of definition.
Obj. 3. Definition concerns either (a) the universal as singular or (b) the
universal as universal. If (a), particulars can be defined. If (b), definition
will belong to accidents alonewhich is against Aristotles doctrine in this
book.
Obj. 4. Particulars must be known through some cognition or other.
But they cannot be known through sense cognition, for sense cognition
concerns sensible qualities. Therefore they must be known through some
form of intellectual cognition, i.e. through demonstration or definition.
Argument is support of Conclusion 4. Definition concerns incorruptible
things and things that are objects of art or science. But individuals are
corruptible and are not objects of art or science, because they are infinite.
Therefore, they cannot be defined.
Solution. A definition expresses the principles of a thing. Since such
principles are many, a definition must contain many names and not only
one. Now, the names figuring in the definition of an individual can be either
singular or common. If they are singular, the definition of an individual may
be something like Socrates is this animal and this rational thing, where
clearly the terms in the definition, being all convertible with each other, do
not express Socrates principles. If they are common, they will be applicable
to many things and hence will not define the individual as such. From these
considerations it also follows that a conjunction of accidents is not the
principle of individuation. For a conjunction of accidents will always apply
to many things.
Reply to Obj. 1. It is not true that only particulars have an essence, because
universals also have one.
Reply to Obj. 2. Even though the universal as such is an accident, the
nature subject to universality is a substance.
Reply to Obj. 3. The universal taken as a first intention is defined, and not
as universal or as singular: man is defined as man and not as universal or as
singular. The universal taken as a second intention is defined as universal,
and so is defined as accident and not as substance.
Reply to Obj. 4. There are particulars both in the category of substance
and in the accidental categories. Accidental particulars are known through
external sense cognition, substantial particulars through internal sense cog-
nition such as through the estimative faculty. All particulars, whether sub-
stantial or accidental, are known through some intellectual cognition,
which is not, however, demonstration or definition, but rather the simple
and discrete cognition of particulars.
Chapter 3
Aristotle shows some of the Platonists mistakes. The chapter falls into three
parts: (1) Aristotle shows the Platonists mistakes; (2) he proves that being
and one taken universally are not the substances of things; (3) he makes it
clear where Platonists were right and where they were wrong.
Part 1
Aristotle shows two mistakes made by Platonists.
Mistake 1. Since they did not clearly distinguish between things that are
conceived of together with matter and things that are not conceived of
together with matter, they believed that everything that is common in
substance is also separate in being. But this is false. For the parts of animals
such as hands, eyes, etc., have commonness in substance but do not have
separate being, since they can only be the potential parts of a whole. In fact,
when such parts are separated from the whole, they immediately lose their
name and definitionfor they lose their form which provides them with
their name and definitionand are no longer the parts they used to be
when joined to the whole, except homonymously. Aristotles text (1040b5
8) corresponding to Mistake 1.
Objection. Just as the parts of an animal exist potentially in the animal, so
the elements exist potentially in the mixture. But the elements of a mixture
can have separate actuality. For just as a mixture is composed of elements,
so it resolves into elements.
Reply. The comparison is not appropriate. For the elements do not give
rise to one mixture unless they are first altered and broken against each
other. Before such a process the elements are one thing only by aggrega-
tion just like a heap; after the process, they become one thing because the
form of the mixture supervenes on them. The parts of an animal, by con-
trast, become one thing not by being altered or broken against each other.
Aristotles text (1040b810) corresponding to the reply.
Notandum. Averroes explains Aristotles text. Just as the elements making
up a mixture do not have the form of the mixture when they are separate,
but receive it only when they are brought together, so the parts of an animal
do not have the form of the soul when they are separated from the animal,
but have it only when they are united in the animal.
Objection. (a) Either an animal has only one form for the whole (b) or it
has different forms of different species for its different parts. If (a), then the
parts, when separated, will survive under the form they had before being
joined to the whole, exactly like the parts of the elements or of the inanimate
mixtures. If (b), again the parts will be united under the form they had in
advance, exactly as happens in the case of the plants which have parts of
different species.
Reply. Since to different operations there correspond different forms and
an animal has different kinds of operation, it must also have different forms
for its different parts. It does not follow, however, that the parts of an animal
survive under an inferior form like the parts of the plants. For in plants
separation can come about only through locomotion and locomotion does
not imply the corruption of one substantial form and the generation of
another. Thus, the form of the different parts remains the same before and
after the separation. The separation of the parts of an animal, by contrast,
does not come about through locomotion, but is always accompanied by an
alteration that brings about the corruption of one substantial form and the
generation of another.
Objection. since Aristotle denies that one thing can come from many
things existing in actuality, the question arises as to whether one form can
came from many forms of different species. The answer is that no one thing
can come from things existing in complete actuality, i.e. in an actuality that
has no potentiality for further forms. For instance: a man and a horse cannot
make up one animal. However, things that are in mixed actuality, i.e. in an
actuality that still has some potentiality for further forms, can make up one
thing. And this is the case with the parts of the animals.
Mistake 2. On observing that the parts of certain animals, like for instance
ringed animals, continue to live and move even when they are separated
from the whole, Platonists concluded that operations such as living and
moving belong to the parts in virtue of some separate soul, which is a self-
moving number. They reasoned that, since the parts of more perfect animals
do not live or move when they are separated from the whole, because the
soul of the parts is corrupted together with the whole, also the soul of the
parts of ringed animals and the like must be corrupted together with their
whole; and so the life and movement such parts possess must come to
them from some extrinsic principle, i.e. a separate soul. Their reasoning,
however, is mistaken. For when many things make up something singular
and continuous (I mean by nature and not by force or by grafting), the
many things in question are one in actuality and many in potentiality. So,
the many parts of the soul are one soul in actuality and many souls in
potentiality. This explains the case of the ringed animals: when a part of
a ringed animal is separated from the whole, the soul of the part, which was
just a potential soul, is not corrupted but rather becomes an actual soul
now that it is no longer a part of a soul but an autonomous soul. Aristotles
text (1046b1016) corresponding to Mistake 2.
Notandum 1. Averroes clarifies Aristotles text by means of a distinction.
The parts of animals are of two kinds: some have a potentiality which is
closer to actuality, while others have a potentiality which is more removed
from actuality. The first kind of parts are those that receive the powers of
the soul in such a way that all the powers that are in one part are also in all
the others. The parts of ringed animals are of such a nature. The second kind
of parts are those that do not receive all the powers of the soul, so that some
powers are in one part and others in another. Of such a nature are the parts
of the perfect animals.
This explains why some parts continue to live when they are separated
and others do not. The parts having a potentiality which is closer to actuality
continue to live, whereas those having a potentiality which is removed from
actuality do not continue to live.
Averroess distinction is in keeping with Aristotles doctrine in De an.,
Book II, where he says that in plants and imperfect animals the different
faculties of the soul are not distinct in place and subject. All the faculties of
the vegetative soul for instancenutritive, augmentative and generative
exist in all the parts of a plant, as becomes apparent when the parts of a plant
are separated from the plant. Likewise, in ringed animals all the faculties of
the soulperception, locomotion, imagination and appetiteare in all the
parts of the animal.
One might object that the parts of some imperfect animals, like fishes
and worms, do not continue to live when they are separated. The answer
is that only the animals whose parts are curved and tortuous have parts
that continue to live. For this kind of part contains a great amount of humid
viscosity, which ensures their soul a stronger unity with matter.
Notandum 2. Averroes reports the Platonist position on the problem of
the parts of animals. According to them, the parts of some animals continue
to live while the parts of others do not, because the parts that continue to
live have a separate soul, while the others have a soul existing in matter.
Averroes himself rejects this view by saying that it is impossible for the
soul of an imperfect animal to be nobler than that of a perfect animal.
But, according to Platonists, the soul of a perfect animal is not separate.
Therefore, neither can the soul of an imperfect animal be separate. The
solution is rather that in imperfect animals the powers of the soul are closer
to each other, so that every power that is in one part is also in all the
others.
Notandum 3. Averroes explains why in imperfect animals the powers of

the soul are closer to each other, so that they are all found in all the parts.
The cause is the weakness of the power and of the principle of movement of
imperfect animals. In other words, since such animals are imperfect, they do
not require a great variety and diversity of parts. For they are not capable of
many operations and so do not require many organs, with the result that one
and the same power can operate in all the parts of the body. Perfect animals,
by contrast, possess many organs and many different powers operating in
the different parts. Therefore, when a part is removed, the soul does not
remain therein.
Objections.
Obj. 1. Against the letter of Aristotles text it should be said that the parts
from which something one and continuous results are not always many in
potentiality. For what is in potentiality must become actual at some point
or other, while the parts of perfect animals never become actual.
Obj. 2. Against Averroes it should be said that it is not true that in
imperfect animals every power that is in one part is also in all the others.
For instance: the powers of sight, hearing and smelling are in some parts
but not in others.
Reply to Obj. 1. The parts of perfect animals are in themselves separable
and capable of becoming actual, but cannot be separated in actuality on
account of their dependence on the whole for motion and for the sense of
touch, which get transmitted from the whole to the parts. In fact, to the
extent that the parts of imperfect animals have a proper form and a proper
matter, they could exist separately under an inferior form, but they cannot
actually be separated without being corrupted on account of their essential
dependence on the whole.
Reply to Obj. 2. A soul possesses two kinds of power, i.e. an active and a
passive power. The active power is the motive power; the passive power is
the cognitive one. Although in imperfect animals passive powers, such as
internal and external senses, are not close to each othersince they are
in a determinate part of the bodyall the active powers are close to each
other and are not distinct in place and subject. In perfect animals, by con-
trast, some of the active powers are also distinct in place and subject, such
as for instance the powers of the hands, the fingers and of the heteroge-
neous parts in general. Therefore, in perfect animals certain powers are not
equally distributed between whole and parts, and this is the reason why the
parts of perfect animals do not survive as such when they are separated.
In imperfect animals, by contrast, powers are nearly equally distributed
between whole and parts, and this is the reason why the parts of those
animals continue to exist.
Part 2
Aristotle proves by means of three arguments that being and one, in so far as
they are common and universal, are not the substances of things.
Arg. 1. Each substance is a being and one thing in number, since being
and one are convertible so that all that is a being is also one in number.
But being and one, in so far as they are common or universal, are not
the substances of things. This conclusion can be reached in the following
way. The signification of being and one is like that of principle and
element. But when we say that something is a principle or an element,
we signify both a substance and an accident of the substance. For instance,
when we say Form is a principle, we actually say two things: that form
is formand thus we signify a substanceand that form is a principle
and thus we signify an accident of the form. Likewise, when we say Man
is a species we introduce a substance, signified by the subject, and an
accident, signified by the predicate. Consequently, to come back to the main
point, when we say Being and one are common we introduce a substance,
signified by being and one, and an accidental property, signified by
common. For commonness and universality are accidental properties of
being and one, just as being a principle is an accidental property of form
or being a species an accidental property of man. In conclusion, therefore,
predicates such as being or one cannot indicate the substance of things
because their signification includes both a substantial and an accidental
aspect. Aristotles text (1040b1621) corresponding to Argument 1.
Arg. 2. A substance as such does not inhere in anything; but being and
one, in so far as they are common, inhere in something; therefore they
cannot be substances. That a substance does not inhere in anything is
Aristotles doctrine in the Categories. That being and one, in so far as they
are common, inhere in something can be shown through the following
argument. If what is less universal inheres in something, so does, a fortiori,
what is more universal as well. But principle and element, which are less
universal than being and one, inhere in something. For the signification of
principle and element, as we have seen, includes an accidental aspect
and every accident inheres in a subject. Therefore, being and one too must
inhere in a subject. In particular being and one inhere in the substances
that are principles and elements as well as in the substances that have
principles and elements. For, just as matter and form are being and one, so
the composites of them are being and one, too. Aristotles text (1040b2124)
corresponding to Argument 2.
Arg. 3. The substance of a thing is not as such in many things. Therefore,
being and one, in so far as they are common and universal, cannot be
the substance of things. For they are by definition in many things and
predicated of many things. That a substance as such is not in many things
is clear, because, otherwise, primary substances, which are one in number,
should be in many thingswhich is false. In conclusion, no universal as
such is separate from particular things. For all universals are in many things.
Aristotles text (1040b2527) corresponding to argument 3.
Notandum. Averroess remarks on Aristotles text seem to support both
of two opposed opinions on the problem of universals.
According to one opinion, universals only exist in the intellect. Supporters
of this view invoke two arguments from Averroess text to the effect that
no universal is substance. The first argument runs: nothing common is
substance; every universal is common; therefore, no universal is substance.
The second states: no substance is in many things; every universal is in many
things; therefore, no universal is substance.
According to another opinion, universals exist in reality independently
of any operation of the intellect. Supporters of this view also invoke two
arguments from Averroes. The first runs as follows: everything common
is in many things; every universal is common; therefore, every universal
is in many things. Clearly, however, nothing can be in many things only
on account of an operation of the intellect. The second argument says:
universal and particular are correlatives, exactly like a principle and the
thing of which it is the principle; but a principle and the thing of which
it is the principle exist in reality independently of the intellect; therefore,
also the universal and the particular must exist independently of the intel-
lect.
It must be said that the first opinion has no ground in Averroess text. For
Averroes does not take substance broadly speakingi.e. so as to include
both the primary and secondary substances of the Categories or the four
senses of substance listed earlier on in Book VIIbut rather strictly speak-
ing, in the sense of separate, per se existing substance. And no universal can
be such.
From these consideration it follows that Aquinas, Alexander and Albert
are wrong when they say that universality belongs to things on account of
the action of the intellect. For universal and singular are correlatives and
hence, since singularity does not belong to things in virtue of the action
of the intellect, neither does universality. Actually, singularity is a certain
property of an individual directly flowing from the individual itself, while

universality is another property of an individual flowing from its common
nature.
Objection. Averroess text seems to entail a contradiction. He says that a
principle and the thing it is the principle of are correlatives, but also that a
principle does not need for its existence the thing of which it is the principle.
But correlatives always exist and do not exist at the same time.
Reply. There is no contradiction. Averroes does not say that a principle
does not need the thing of which it is the principle, but only that the being
of a principle does not need that of the thing of which it is the principle.
In fact, a father needs a son, but what a father is does not need what a son
is. Likewise, although universal and particular are correlatives, the being of
the universal and the being of the particular are not so. Therefore, just as
the being of a principle does not need that of the thing of which it is the
principle but is rather prior to it, the being of a universal does not need that
of its particular but is rather prior to it.
Part 3
Aristotle shows where Platonists were right and where they were wrong.
He makes four points.
Point 1. They were right in making species separate substances. For it is
necessary for them to be separate substances, since they are supposed to
be separate intelligences and to move the world perpetually and uniformly.
They were wrong, by contrast, in maintaining that such separate substances
are in sensible particulars and are predicated of them. For, being separate,
separate substances cannot be in particulars. Aristotles text corresponding
to Point 1 (1040b2730).
Point 2. Aristotle shows the reason of the Platonists mistake. They knew
that separate substances exist, but did not know their essence. Therefore,
they conceived of them as the species of sensible particulars, not realising
that they are in fact different from them. So, they held that the separate
man and the sensible man are of the same species and only differ in that the
former is essentially a man, while the latter is a man only by participation.
For in the sensible man there are things that do not pertain to the species,
while in the separate man everything pertains to the species. Aristotles text
corresponding to Point 2 (1040b3032).
Aristotle further explains how the Platonists distinguished, from a purely
linguistic point view, the sensible man and the separate man, given that
they are both called man. They resorted to the prefix auto (i.e. per se)
so that the sensible man was simply called man, whereas the separate man
was called auto-man (i.e. man per se). Aristotles (1040b3334) text.
Point 3. The reason why the Platonists held that the sensible man and
the separate man are of the same species is not cogent. They said that
separate substances are understood by us, but insisted that they cannot be
understood unless they are of the same species as sensible substances. For
the Platonists discovered the existence of separate substances and tried to
grasp their essence. And since our knowledge proceeds from sensible things,
they made separate substance the same in species as sensible things.
Aristotle contends, however, that separate substances exist even if they
are not understood by us, just as the stars exist even if they are not seen
by us. Moreover, he also denies that, if separate substances are understood
by us, they must be of the same species as sensible substances. For this
argument leads to the conclusion that there exist a corporeal incorruptible
man and a corporeal incorruptible horse, similar to the animals that the
poets imagined existed among the stars. Aristotles text corresponding to
Point 3 (1040b341041a3).
Point 4. Aristotle sums up the results of his arguments and draws three
conclusions: (a) no universal is substance; (b) no per se existing substance
is universal; (c) no substance is made of substances existing in actuality.
Aristotles text corresponding to Point 4 (1041a35).
Notandum 1. Averroes reconstructs the argument of the Platonists. Sci-
ence concerns incorruptible things; but man is an object of science; there-
fore, there must exist an incorruptible man. And since sensible men are
corruptible, the incorruptible man must be a man over and above the sen-
sible men. Moreover, since man is a species, the corruptible man and the
incorruptible one must be of the same species. This, however, is a mistake.
For things of the same species have the same definition and in general the
same properties. But the sensible man and the separate man do not have
the same definition. For the former is a rational animal, while the latter is
not. Moreover, they do not have the same properties, either. For the sensi-
ble man is corruptible, whereas the separate man is incorruptible. The cause
of the mistakeAverroes explainsis that the Platonists were not able to
distinguish the nature that is an object of science from the nature that is a
per se existing substance. The nature that is an object of science is not sep-
arate from the sensible substance existing per se, but rather exists in it as
a universal form which is communicable to all the individuals in the same
species. And since this nature is identical with the individuals of which it
is the nature, it receives the definition and the properties of the individu-
als.
Notandum 2. Averroes points out another mistake the Platonists made.

They thought that the essence signified by a definition is part of sensible
substances only in so far as it is understood by us. But, if this were true,
by the same reasoning we could establish that sensible substances are
parts of their being only in so far as they are understood by uswhich is
absurd, because sensible substances exist whether we know them or not.
Actually, just as sensible things exist whether they are perceived or not,
both sensible and intelligible things exist whether they are understood or
not.
Notandum 3. Averroes illustrates four aspects of the doctrine of Ideas
which are clearly wrong. (i) Just as intelligibles, i.e. Ideas, are always beings
in actuality, they are also always understood in actuality, even if they are
not actually being understoodwhich is wrong, for sensibles are not per-
ceived unless they are actually being perceived. (ii) Intelligibles are eternally
understoodwhich is rejected by Aristotle by saying that our intellect is
like a scraped tablet where no content of knowledge is written down at the
beginning. So, intelligibles are known by our intellect as something new. (iii)
Intelligibles are formal parts of sensible thingswhich cannot be the case,
since something incorruptible cannot be part of something corruptible. (iv)
Intelligibles are of the same species as sensibles. But this too is false, as we
have seen.
Notandum 4. Averroes illustrates the difficulties of the Platonist theory
of knowledge. They wanted to maintain that intelligibles are always in
the possible intellect and, consequently, that there is no new acquisition
of knowledge but all knowledge consists in learning and recollecting. In
order to defend this view, however, they had to make the absurd claim
that intelligibles are known in actualityfor all the things that are in the
possible intellect are known in actualityeven though they are not actually
being known by anyone. For if they had maintained that intelligibles are
known only contingently, they would have been forced to admit that there
is in fact new acquisition of knowledge. Aristotle, by contrast, by placing
universals in the sensible things and by distinguishing between potential
knowledge and actual knowledge allows for the intellect to acquire new
contents of knowledge. Intelligibles are in the soul only potentially and are
actualised by the agent intellect.
Objections. From the point of view of Aristotles doctrine as well, it is possible
for two things of which one is corruptible and the other incorruptible to be of
the same species.
Obj. 1. The infinite movement and each of its parts as well as the infinite
time and each of its parts are good examples.
Obj. 2. In the same vein, the central parts of the earth are incorruptible,
because they are in their natural place and cannot reach the place where
they would be corrupted. The superficial parts of the earth, by contrast,
are clearly corruptible. However, no one doubts that the central and the
superficial parts of the earth are of the same species.
Obj. 3. A man is corruptible, while his intellective soul is incorruptible.
However, they are arguably of the same species. For if they were of dif-
ferent species, such species should be (i) either of equal perfection (ii)
or of different degrees of perfection. (i) cannot be the case, because each
species has a different degree of perfection. But neither can (ii) be the case.
For it does not seem that a man can be more perfect than his intellective
soul, since he receives from it his name and definition. But neither can the
intellective soul be more perfect than the man of which it is the soul, for
there is no perfection that the soul does not communicate to the compos-
ite.
Obj. 3. The common or universal man is incorruptible, while the particu-
lar man is corruptible. However, according to Aristotles doctrine, they are
of the same species, since they share their name and definition.
Reply to Obj. 1. In the strict sense of generation and corruption, no move-
ment and no time is generable or corruptible. If we understand, by contrast,
generation in the sense of any beginning and corruption in the sense of
any end, then it may be conceded that movement and time are generated
and corrupted. But in this sense there is nothing wrong in saying that the
movement and the time that are incorruptible are of the same species as
the movement and the time that are corruptible. Alternatively, one could
say that the infinite movement and the infinite time are generated and
corrupted accidentally together with the generation or corruption of their
parts.
Reply to Obj. 2. The central parts of the earth are in themselves corrupt-
ible, even though they are never corrupted and never will be. For, even if
they do not have the potentiality for corruption, nevertheless they have the
aptitude for it. For the earth qua element, as well as each part of it, can, i.e.
has the aptitude to, move with rectilinear movement in so far as it possesses
a nature which is a principle of active movement.
Reply to Obj. 3. Form and the composite can be considered in two ways,
i.e. absolutely and comparatively. Absolutely, they are of equal perfection.
Comparatively, form is more perfect than the composite, in that it gives the
composite its name and definition, but also less perfect than the composite,
in that it is a part of it. To the question whether a man and his intellect are
of the same species or not, it must be answered that they are of different
species, without being of different degrees of perfection. Alternatively, one

could say that they are of the same species not per se but only in so far as the
species of a form can be reduced to the species of the composite of which it
is the form. On this second account, however, there is no difficulty with the
form being incorruptible and the composite corruptible.
Reply to Obj. 4. There is no problem if two things of the same species
are one incorruptible and the other corruptible, provided that the two
things relate as part and whole, as is the case with the universal man
and the particular man. Difficulties arise when the two things have no
communication with one another and so do not relate as part and whole,
as is the case with Platos theory.
Chapter 4
After showing that Platos separate quiddities are not substances, Aristotle
explains the nature of the quiddity which is substance. The chapter falls into
three parts: (1) Aristotle connects the present treatment to the rest of the
discussion of substance; (2) he shows that the quiddity existing in particular
things is their substance and hence their cause and principle; (3) he proves
that the quiddity of a thing is not one of its parts.
Part 1
Aristotle explains that, after having rejected Platos opinion, we must ex-
plain the nature of the quiddity which is the substance of things, by setting
aside the quiddity of separate substances and confining ourselves to that of
sensible ones. The treatment of the essence of sensible substances will help
us to understand also the essence of separate substances. And, even though
the notion of quiddity has been already clarified through those of definition
and predication, we now need to investigate into it by using another logical
principle, i.e. the notion of cause. This will enable us to show that quiddity,
in addition to being the substance of things, is also their intrinsic cause and
principle. Aristotles text (1041a610).
Notandum. Averroes clarifies Aristotles investigation in this chapter by
means of four propositions.
Prop. 1. It is in itself evident that sensible substances have causes, since
we all experience that sensible substances have parts of which they are
composed.
Prop. 2. It is in itself evident that the causes of substances are substances.
For a substance is first of all a subject for accidents, and both the whole
substance and its parts, which are causes, are subjects for accidents.
Prop. 3. The investigation of substance presupposes an investigation into

its causes. In fact, as Aristotle says in Phys., Book I, and in the Post. Anal.,
Book I, we think we know something when we know its causes.
Prop. 4. The investigation into these causes presupposes the enumeration
of the different questions about causes. This proposition is evident, because
every question, either explicitly or implicitly, asks about the cause of some-
thing, as is clear from Post. Anal., Book II, where Aristotle lists four kinds of
question: whether something is (whether-question), what something is
(what-question), that something is (the case) (that-question), why some-
thing is (the case) (why-question). That the enumeration of questions is
exhaustive is clear. For a question may concern either incomplexes or com-
plexes. If it concerns incomplexes, one first asks whether some incomplex
isand this is the whether-questionand then what it isand this is the
what-question. If the question, by contrast, concerns incomplexes, one first
asks about the inherence of a predicate in a subjectwhich is the that-
questionand then about the reason why the predicate inheres in the
subjectwhich is the why-question.
Objection. Aristotle says in Post. Anal., Book I, that the what-question and
the that-question are precognitions. Therefore, there are only two ques-
tions, i.e. the whether-question and the why-question. Moreover, he also
says that every question is about the middle term. So in a way there is only
one question.
Reply. Both consequences should be denied. As to the first, the that-
question and the what-question which concern the principles of demon-
stration, as well as those concerning the subject and the properties of the
subject, are in effect not questions, but precognitions. However, the that-
question and the what-question which concern the conclusion of a demon-
stration are real questions about something we do not know. Therefore, it
is not true that the that-question and the what-question are always precog-
nitions.
As to the second consequence, it must be said that, although every question
is about the middle term, there is not only one question just as there is not
only one kind of middle term. For the middle term is different for each of
the four questions listed above.
Part 2
Aristotle shows by means of four conclusions that the quiddity existing in
particular things is their substance, cause and principle.
Conclusion 1. There is no why-question when something is predicated of itself.

Every question presupposes something that we know and something else
that we do not know. For instance: if we ask whether a man exists, we
know the meaning of the term man and we do not whether the thing
corresponding to the term exists; likewise, when we ask what a man is, we
know the existence of man and we do not know what he is. Again, if we
ask whether a man is musical, we know the existence of man and that of
musical and we enquire into whether musical inheres in man. And when
we ask why a man is musical, we know the existence of man, that of musical
as well as the inherence of musical in man, and we ask for the reason
why the inherence obtains. Now, it is easily realised that in the question
Why is a man a man? there is really nothing we do not know. For the
question presupposes that we know that a man exists and that he is a man
which leaves no room for further enquiry. The point can also be seen in
the following way. When we ask why a man is a man, we already know
that a man is a man. But the sentence implies that a man is identical with
himself. And there is no reason why something is identical with itself. So, the
question is pointless, in that there is nothing unknown we should enquire
about. Aristotles text (1041a1020) corresponding to Conclusion 1.
Aristotle further clarifies the idea that there is no cause in virtue of which
a man is a man. What he means is that there is no particular cause, but there
is just a general cause in virtue of which each thing is predicated of itself, i.e.
that each thing is identical with itself. This cause, however, is known as soon
as we know that, for instance, a man is a man. And if someone were to put
forward another cause, for instance that each thing is undivided from itself,
we should say that to be undivided from itself is the same as to be identical
with itself and is known as soon as we know that, for instance, a man is a
man. That each thing is identical with itself is one of the general principles,
such as for instance that no thing can be and not be at the same time,
which everybody knows and which are presupposed by any investigation
whatsoever. Aristotles text (1041a1628) corresponding to the clarification.
Objections.
Obj. 1. The what-question does not presuppose a positive answer to the
whether-question. For we ask what a rose is even if no rose exists, and we ask
what a centaur is, and centaurs do not exist. Aristotle himself in the Physics
(in Books IV and III, respectively) gives definitions of the void and of the
infinite, even if they are proved not to exist.
Obj. 2. The why-question does not presuppose the inherence of the predi-
cate in the subject. Aristotle says in Phys., Book I, that mathematical demon-
strations show at the same time the cause and the state of affairs explained
by the cause. Moreover, in Post. Anal., Book II, he remarks that the what-
question and the why-question are one single question; but the what-
question does not presuppose the inherence of the predicate in the subject;
so, neither does the why-question.
Obj. 3. There is room for the why-question even when something is
predicated of itself. For there is a cause why a man is a man, as has been
conceded, and such a cause is precisely the object of the why-question and
of no other.
Obj. 4. There are many questions as things we know as true. That a man
is a man is something we know as true and hence must be the object of one
of the questions. But it can only be the object of the why-question.
Reply to Obj. 1. In general, a question is not grounded on the absolute
ignorance of the thing to be known, but rather on the ignorance of a
particular aspect of the thing in question. Thus, the what-question does
not presuppose the being of the rose in the sense of its being of existence,
but presupposes at least the being of the rose in the sense of its being of
essencewhich is the minimal requirement for any definition. This point
can also be made in a slightly different way. Just as there are two kinds of
definition, the definition of the name and that of the essence, there are also
two kinds of what-question, that relative to the name and that relative to the
essence. The first kind of what-question presupposes the being of the thing
defined, the second only the being of its name. So, the definition of the void
and of the infinite which Aristotle gives in the Physics are definitions of the
name and not of the essence.
Reply to Obj. 2. The fact that mathematical demonstrations show at the
same time the cause and the state of affairs explained by the cause rather
proves that there is no why-question in mathematical things, regardless
of whether something is predicated of itself or of something else. More
precisely, in mathematical things we only find the kind of why-question
which is answered by a definition, in that the definition of the subject is
also the definition of its property, although not in the same way. For it is
the quidditative definition of the subject and the causal definition of the
property. Moreover, even if the what and the why are in a way one and the
same thing, since the what of the subject is also the why of its property, they
are not unqualifiedly the same, for the what concerns incomplexes whereas
the why concerns complexes.
Reply to Obj. 3. The why-question is answered by a demonstration. There-
fore, what is not demonstrable cannot be investigated through the why-
question, either. Clearly, however, the propositions where something is
predicated of itself are not demonstrable and hence cannot be investigated
through the why-question. Moreover, although every question is about a
cause, not everything that has a cause is the object of a question. For when
the cause is evident, as is the case with the sentence A man is a man, there
is no question to ask. In conclusion, it may be conceded that everything that
is knowable in the strict sense of the term is the object of a question. But in
this case we must add that A man is a man is not knowable in the strict
sense, in that it is not definable or demonstrable.
Conclusion 2. The why-question can be properly asked when one thing is

predicated of another.
Every question presupposes something known and something unknown.
But where one thing is predicated of another, there is in effect something
known and something unknown. Therefore, the why-question can be prop-
erly raised. For instance: when we ask why a man is such and such an ani-
mal, e.g. musical, we have something known, i.e. that a man is musical, and
something which we do not know yet, i.e. why musicality inheres in a man.
In cases, by contrast, where something is predicated of itself, such as for
instance in the question as to why a man is a man, there is no room for
a proper why-question, because the cause is already known. The question
as to whether a man is musical is similar to the question as to why certain
bricks and stones are a house. In this case too, in fact, we already know the
fact that certain bricks and stones are a house and we look for the cause
of this state of affairs. The question is answered by indicating either the effi-
cient cause, i.e. the builder of the house, or the final cause, i.e. the protection
from harmful events. Aristotles text (1041a2027) corresponding to Conclu-
sion 2.
Notandum. It should be noted that the why-question can be properly
raised not only when an accident is predicated of a substance, but also when
a substance is predicated of a substance or an accident of an accident. For
instance: it is possible to ask why a man is rational or animal. For, even
though man, animal and rational are one and the same thing in reality,
their conceptual difference leaves room for us to raise questions and assign
proper causes. For instance: we could say that a man is rational because
he has an intellect and that he is an animal because he is a living substance

capable of perception.
Objection. It may be asked why Aristotle in the text, when answering the
question as to why it thunders, assigns the formal cause, i.e. that a sound
is produced in the clouds, whereas in the Post. Anal., Book II, he assigns
either the material or the final cause by saying that it thunders because of
the extinguishing of fire in the clouds or to intimidate the inhabitants of the
Tartarus.
Reply. A definition can be assigned according to all four kinds of cause
and the why-question concerns all such kinds. For instance: if we ask why
a line is straight, we will answer by giving the formal cause, by saying for
instance because the middle point is not different from the extremes; if we
ask, by contrast, why a man is corruptible, the answer will make reference
to matter by saying because he is composed of contraries; if, finally, we ask
why these people are at war, the answer will make reference to the efficient
cause, e.g. because one party robbed the other of their belongings, or to
the final cause, e.g. to dominate one another. Therefore, when Aristotle
here in Book VII makes reference to the formal cause in the definition of
thunder, he does not mean to exclude the other kinds of cause, just as he
does not mean to exclude them when in the Posterior Analytics he makes
reference to the formal and the material cause. For the cause of thunder
can be assigned in four different ways, i.e. by making reference to each of
the four kinds of cause. For instance: if we say because there is a sound
in the clouds, we mention the formal cause; if we say because the fire is
extinguished in the clouds, we make reference to the material cause; the
answer, by contrast, because the heat of the fire splits the clouds makes
reference to the efficient cause, while by saying in order for the air to be
cleaned we mention the final cause. And just as the answer to the questions
what thunders is and why thunder occurs can employ all kinds of cause, so
also a demonstration of thunder can be conducted by making reference to
any of such kinds.
Conclusion 3. Broadly speaking, the what and the why are one and the same
thing.
The why concerns all the causes; but also the what can be associated with
all the causes; therefore, the why and the what are one and the same thing.
In so far as the major premiss is concerned, we have already said that
the why-question can be answered by making reference to all kinds of
cause. As to the minor premiss, also the what-question can be answered
by employing all the different kinds of cause, as examples make clear.

Aristotles qualification broadly speaking is perfectly appropriate. For,
strictly speaking, the what and the why differ in that the what concerns
the form, while the why concerns the cause. This is also the reason why
the physicist differs from the logician. For the former, when enquiring into
essence, is only concerned with the efficient and the final cause and so does
not include in the essence the intrinsic causes. The logician, by contrast,
considers the way things are predicated and so considers as pertaining to
the essence all that can answer the what-question, be it an intrinsic or
an extrinsic cause. Aristotles text (1041a2732) corresponding to Conclusion
3.
Objection. The what and the why cannot be the same thing, because there
are some things which admit of the what-question but not of the why-
question. For instance: in the case of simple things, i.e. where it is not the
case that one thing is predicated of another, we can ask the what-question,
but not the why-question. For the why-question seems to require some
complexity as well as one things being predicated of another. Aristotles text
(1041a32b2) corresponding to the objection.
Reply. Either (i) the what-question presupposes that a quiddity is in
something or (ii) it does not. If (i), the what and the why are the same thing.
If, for instance, we establish that the quiddity of man is rational animal and
we also presuppose that such a quiddity is in Socrates, we can further ask
why Socrates is a man and answer because he is a rational animal. For the
quidditys being in Socrates is a complex state of affairs, of which we seek
the explanation. (ii) If, by contrast, we do not presuppose that the quiddity
exists in something, in one sense we shall ask something, while in another
we shall ask nothing. We shall ask something in that we seek that in virtue of
which a thing receives its name and definition; we shall ask nothing, in that
we presuppose nothing, while every genuine question must have something
presupposed as well as something to ask about. Aristotles text (1041b24)
corresponding to the reply.
Notandum. Aristotle says in Phys., Book II, that formal, efficient and final
causes coincide in something identical in species and number, while matter
can never coincide with any of the other causes. Therefore, matter does
not enter into the definition unless it somehow plays a formal role. For the
parts of definition are formal. This explains why Aristotle in the text answers
the what-question and the why-question by making reference to formal,
efficient and final cause and not to examples of material cause.
Objection. It seems that the question as to why there is a house cannot be
answered by mentioning the efficient cause. For the definition, on which the
why-question is based, is the middle term in a demonstration. But artificial

effects can be demonstrated only by means of the final cause.
Reply. As Aristotle explains in Phys., Book II, artefacts are defined and
demonstrated not only through the final cause, but also through matter.
However, they are defined and demonstrated through matter only acciden-
tally, i.e. in so far as matter bears a certain relation to the final cause. For,
strictly speaking, the only necessary cause in artefacts is the final cause,
while the efficient cause, as well as form and matter, possess no necessity
unless they are considered in relation to the final cause. The efficient cause
is not necessary because the agent, being an intelligent agent, can choose
whether or not to bring about a certain effect. In natural things, by contrast,
agents are necessary: the wind, for instance, cannot choose not to move a
certain object in a certain way. But not even form, at least if it is taken to
be distinct from the final cause, is necessary in artefacts. For the kind of
form a craftsman introduces in matter only depends on the end he wants
to achieve. Natural things, by contrast, have of necessity a certain degree of
being and so a determinate form as well. Finally, in artefacts necessity does
not lie with matter, either. For the art requires one kind matter rather than
another only in consideration of a certain end to be achieved: a house must
be made of bricks and stones only because it must serve to protect people
and belongings. Natural things, by contrast, are made of necessity of a cer-
tain kind of matter because the end they are meant to achieve is fixed in
advance.
Conclusion 4. The what-question and the why-question can be asked only in

the case of composites and not in that of simple things.
The what-question presupposes the existence of a thing with a certain
quiddity and so implies some kind of composition between the quiddity
itself and the thing that has the quiddity. The why-question asks about
the composition of a certain form with matter, like for instance when
we ask why certain bricks and stones are a house. Therefore, the why-
question too presupposes some kind of composition. Aristotles text (1041b4
Aristotle infers two corollaries.
Cor. 1. The quiddity existing in a thing is the substance, the principle and
the cause of the thing. The what-question and the why-question enquire
into the quiddity existing in sensible things, which is their substance, i.e. the
form in virtue of which matter is a sensible substance. And if the quiddity
existing in sensible things is their substance, it is also their cause and
principle. Aristotles text (1041b79) corresponding to Corollary 1.
Cor. 2. Although simple things do not admit of the what-question and

of the why-question, they admit of the whether-question and of the that-
question. It has already been proved that in simple things there is neither
the what-question nor the why-question. However, it can be shown that
they admit at least of the whether-question and the that-question. For
Aristotle in Phys., Book VIII, proves that the prime mover exists and that it is
indefatigable and indivisible. And, since every demonstration provides the
answer to a certain kind of question, the existence of the prime mover must
be the answer to the whether-question, while its being indefatigable and
indivisible must be the answer to the that-question. Aristotles text (1041b9
11) corresponding to Corollary 2.
Notandum 1. According to Aquinas, no question can be properly asked
with regard to simple substances. For every question presupposes some-
thing we know and something we do not knowwhich implies a plurality
of parts in the thing the question is about. But simple substances have no
parts. Therefore, they cannot be the object of any question. Moreover, the
why-question asks about the cause of forms being in matter. But in sim-
ple substances there is no form in matter. Therefore, they do not admit of
the why-question. And since the why-question is the basis of any demon-
strative knowledge, simple substances are not the object of demonstrative
science, but are either fully grasped or simply not known. However, simple
substances can be known through sensible substances, which are used as a
sort of middle term in our understanding of simple substances. Just as in the
case of sensible substances, in fact, we presuppose matter and enquiry into
form, in the case of simple substances we presuppose sensible substances
and enquiry into simple ones.
Aquinass exposition seems to be dubious. First, because it is not true that
simple substances admit of no question. We have shown in fact that they
admit of the whether-question and of the that-question, as also Averroes
seems to imply. Second, because Aquinas says that there is no science of
simple substances, while Aristotle assigns a specific theoretical science to
them, i.e. metaphysics. In fact, if simple substances could only be known
through their effects, they would be studied by physics and not by meta-
physics, in that any demonstration starting from effects is a physical demon-
stration.
It must be said, therefore, that if we consider simple substances as abso-
lutely simple, they do not admit of the what-question and of the why-
question. If, by contrast, we consider them as somehow composed, they
admit of these two questions. For the only thing that is required for the
what-question and the why-question to take place, is a conceptual com-
position. For instance: created simple substances, although they are not
composed of two real parts such as matter and form, at least display the con-
ceptual composition of genus and differentia. And some sort of conceptual
composition can be detected even in God. For, even though in God there is
no matter-form or genus-differentia composition, we can still find in Him
something that plays the role of matter or genus and something that plays
the role of form or differentia. Aristotle and Averroes say in fact that God
assembles in Himself the perfection of all things. This means that we can
find in God something playing the role of subject, something playing the
role of definition as well as something playing the role of propertywhich
allows us to ask, respectively, whether God exists, what His essence is and
why a certain attribute belongs to him. For instance the proof that God is
pure actuality is an a priori demonstration of the cause, which produces
demonstrative science. Clearly, the distinctions giving rise to the different
questions are only conceptual distinctions, which do not imply any real
composition in God.
Notandum 2. Aristotle puts forward in Book VII three characterisations of
the what. First, he defines it as that which is indicated by a definition. And
this is the notion at work when he discusses the identity between a thing and
its essence, the problem as to whether essence is generated and the issue of
the parts of an essence. Second, he defines the what as the answer to the
what-question. And this is the way he takes the what in Conclusion 3 where
he discusses the relation between the what-question and the why-question.
Third, he means by what form as opposed to the matter of the supposit
and to the individuating principles. Aristotle makes reference to this sense
of what in Conclusion 2 and Corollary 2. So conceived of, the what includes
common matter and excludes individual matter.
From these considerations, it follows that, alongside sensible and intelli-
gible matter, we must posit another kind of matter, i.e. the matter of the
supposit. Such matter is called conceptual matter, because it differs from
the quiddity existing in it only conceptually. In both sensible substances and
created simple substances there is the composition of supposit and essence
and so both can be said to have an essence. In God there is no such compo-
sition and so the question as to whether God has an essence or not either is
an improper question or is just no question at all. At most, we can say that
in God there is something playing the role of quiddity, such as deity, and
something playing the role of supposit, such as God Himself.
Digression. Is the what, which is the answer to the why-question, (i) the what
of the property or (ii) the what of the subject?
In favour of (ii). Aristotle says in Phys., Book IV, that the definition of the
subject is the cause of all the things that are in the subject. But the definition
is the middle term of a demonstration.
In favour (i). The middle term is the definition of the major term. But the
major term is the property.
The are two opinions concerning this question.
The first is Giles of Romes, who defends (i) and presents four arguments.
Arg. 1. The middle term and the property must be homogeneous. But they
could not be so, if the middle term were the definition of the subject.
Arg. 2. The middle term must be a real and material middle term so as
to be prior to one term and posterior to the other. Now, the definition of
the property has the desired characteristics. The definition of the subject,
by contrast, is prior to both the subject and the property.
Arg. 3. If the middle term is the definition of the subject, then it serves
to demonstrate that either (a) the first property or (b) one of the successive
ones belongs to the subject. But (a) is not the case, because the first property
inheres immediately in the subject and is not more known to belong to the
definition of the subject than to the subject itself. Neither can (b) be the case,
because then the demonstration would not be from immediate premisses.
Arg. 4. If the middle term were the definition of the subject, the Principle
of the Excluded Middle would arise from the premiss of a demonstration
which runs against Aristotles view in Post. Anal., Book II, that the principle
is the first and most important proposition which every teacher must pos-
sess. The principle, in fact, comes from the essence of a thing.
The second opinion is Alexanders, who defends (ii) and puts forward four
arguments.
Arg. 1. Aristotle says in Met., Book IV, that a thing x is F to the highest
degree if the other things being F depends on their being more or less
close to x. But the middle term is more demonstrative the closer it is
to the definition of the subject. So, the definition of the subject must be
demonstrative to the highest degree.
Arg. 2. Every proposition having a why is demonstrable because the why
itself is the principle of demonstration. But the proposition where the first
property is predicated of the subject has a why, i.e. the nature of the subject
the property is predicated of. But such a nature is expressed in the definition
of the subject.
Arg. 3 Exactly like the proposition in which the second property is predi-
cated of the subject, that in which the first property is predicated of the very
same subject is both mediate and immediate: it is immediate with respect
to the subject and mediate with respect to the cause. But like the former
proposition, the latter too is demonstrable. It is clear, however, that it can
be so only through the definition of the subject.
Arg. 4. Every real distinction can be reduced to a conceptual distinction.
But when the second property is proved to belong to the subject through the
first property, the middle term differs from the subject only conceptually.
And this must be the case also when the first property is proved to belong
to the subject.
Solution. The solution to the problem requires four distinctions.
Distinction 1. There are two kinds of subject of a property, the immediate
and the mediate subject. The immediate subject is that to which the prop-
erty belongs through no other subject, like for instance triangle for the prop-
erty 2R. The mediate subject is that to which the property belongs through
some other subject, as when the property 2R is proved to belong to isosceles
triangles through the subject triangle. Therefore, when a property is proved
to belong to a mediate subject, the middle term is neither the definition of
the mediate subject nor that of the property, but rather the definition of the
immediate subject.
Distinction 2. A property can be either convertible or non-convertible
with its subject. The convertible property is that which flows from the
principles of the species, like for instance capable of laughing or capa-
ble of learning with respect to man. The non-convertible property is that
which flows from the principles of the individual, like snub with respect
to the nose and straight with respect to the line. The second kind of prop-
erty is not demonstrated trough the definition of the subject but through
that of the property. Otherwise, since the subject is more common than
the property, the major premiss of the demonstration would be clearly
false.
Distinction 3. There are also two kinds of convertible property: one kind
is immediate with respect to its subject, the other is mediate. A property
is immediate when there is no other property between it and its subject.
A mediate property is always demonstrated through the previous property,
which is said to be the definition of the successive one, while an immediate
property is always demonstrated through the definition of the subject.
Suppose, for instance, that capable of learning is the first property of man
and capable of laughing the second. Then capable of laughing will be proved
to belong to man through capable of learning, whilst capable of learning will
be proved to belong to man through the definition of man.
Distinction 4. There are also two kinds of non-convertible property: one
comes from within, like for instance snubness, while the other comes from
outside, like for instance the eclipse. Properties of the first kind are demon-
strated through the identical definition of the property: snubness for in-
stance is proved to belong to the nose through concavity. Properties of the
second kind, by contrast, are demonstrated through a causal definition and
not through an identical definition: the eclipse, for instance, is proved to
belong to the moon through the interposition of the earth and not through
its being a privation of light.
The foregoing distinctions have three consequences.
Cons. 1. They show against Giles that the definition of the subject can be
the middle term of a demonstration. For, as Aristotle explains in Post. Anal.,
Book II, the cause, the definition and the middle term are one and the same
thing. But the definition of the subject is the cause of both the subject and
all its properties. Therefore, it must also be the middle term. Consequently,
in the same book, Aristotle teaches how to prove the material definition
of something through its formal definition. For every subject has both a
material and a formal definition: the formal definition is the conclusion of
a demonstration, while the material is the principle of a demonstration, as
Aristotle explains in Post. Anal., Book II.
Cons. 2. The property 2R is not proved of the triangle through an external
angle which is equivalent to two right angles. For no necessary property can
be proved through a contingent one.
Cons. 3. It also follows against Aristotles doctrine in Post. Anal., Book II,
that the highest sort of demonstration can come about not only through the
cause or through an essential middle term but also through an accidental
middle term. For instance: the property of having an external angle equiv-
alent to two right angles is not an essential middle term for the triangle.
For the triangle has the property 2R whether we posit that it also has an
external angle equivalent to two right angles or not. The property 2R, there-
fore, belongs to triangles in virtue of the essence of triangle and not in virtue
of the property of having an external angle equivalent to two right angles.
Thus, by nature, we know that triangles have the property 2R only through
the definition of triangle without appealing to the property of having an
external angle equivalent to two right angles. With respect to us, however,
the definition of the subject is not sufficient to prove that triangles have the
property 2R: although such a definition is the cause in virtue of which we
know that the property 2R belongs to triangles, we still need a propertyi.e.
to have an external angle equivalent to two right anglesto further deter-
mine the definition and make the proof possible. Therefore, with respect to
us, a demonstration of the highest sort can be carried out through an acci-
dental property, which does not play, strictly speaking, the role of middle
term, but rather that of a property clarifying and determining the middle
term.
Replies to Giless Arguments.
Reply to Arg. 1. The requirement that the middle term and the extremes
be of the same genus should not be taken to refer to the categorial genus.
For, if this were the case, no property could be demonstrated of a certain
subject, for subject and property do not fall within the same category. On
the contrary, Aristotle talks about the genus-subject, of which we seek the
principles and the properties. In a demonstration in fact it is not possible to
move from one genus-subject to another.
Reply to Arg. 2. The definition of the subject expresses both the what of the
subject and the why of the property, in that it expresses the cause in virtue
of which the property inheres in the subject. Consequently, the definition
of the subject is the cause of the subject and of the property in two respects,
i.e. being and inherence. In so far as the definition is the cause of being for
both the subject and the property, it is prior to both of them but is not a
middle term. In so far as, by contrast, it is the cause the propertys inhering
in the subject, it is a middle term and makes it possible to demonstrate that
the property holds of the subject.
Reply to Arg. 3. The definition of the subject is the middle term for the
demonstration of the first property alone; however, virtually it enters into
the demonstration of all the other properties as well, in that every property
inheres in the subject in virtue of such a definition. Therefore, the second
property is not proved of the subject through the definition of the subject,
but through the first property, since the first property is the immediate
cause of the second propertys inherence in the subject. And, although the
first property inheres immediately in the subject, since the definition of the
subject is the cause of its inherence, the inherence of the first property is
proved through the definition of the subject. In fact, the first property is
more known to belong to the definition than to the subject. For the subject
expresses confusedly what the definition spells out distinctly.
Reply to Arg. 4. The Principle of the Excluded Middle, when taken gen-
erally, comes from transcendental being; when taken particularly, as in the
sentence Every man either is or is not, comes from the nature of the thing
under consideration. And since every premiss presupposes the nature of
the subject, every premiss presupposes the principle, both generally and
particularly taken. For, just as man presupposes being, principles taken par-
ticularly presuppose principles taken universally.
Now, someone might argue that, since the middle term is the definition
of the major term, which is a property, the definition of the subject cannot
be the middle term of a demonstration. To this it should be replied that the
definition of the subject expresses the what of the subject and the why of
the property and so is the definition of both, though not in the same way:
it is the identical definition of the subject and the causal definition of the
property.
Part 3
Aristotle shows that the quiddity of a thing is not one of its parts, such as matter
and form.
Preliminary Distinction. There are two kinds of composition, i.e. per se and
accidental composition. Composition per se is that in virtue of which the
composite is one whole unqualifiedly, as is the case with the composition in
virtue of which a man or a house are composed. The accidental composition
is that in virtue of which the composite is one whole only qualifiedly,
as is the case with the composition in virtue of which a heap of stones
is assembled. Composition per se differs from accidental composition in
that the former comes from the form which gives a thing its name and
definition, while the latter comes from the relation which many things bear
to one single thing. For instance, a heap of stones is not said to be one in
virtue of a certain form, but in virtue of the one single place where all the
different stones are assembled. Aristotles text (1041b1112) corresponding to
the Preliminary Distinction.
Notandum. Averroes clarifies Aristotles text by means of a further dis-
tinction. There are two kinds of composite, the composite in potentiality
and the composite in actuality. The composite in actuality is that composed
of parts of which one is the form of the other, such as for instance the flesh,
a house and a syllable. The composite in potentiality, by contrast, is the one
in which none of the parts is the form of another, but all the parts are kept
together by contact or by the relation they bear to something extrinsic. This
is the case of a heap of stones or of an army. Consequently, there are also
two kinds of whole: one which is different from its parts and another which
is not. The composite in actuality differs from all its parts, whether they are
taken collectively or separately. The composite in potentiality, even if it is
different from any of its parts taken separately, is not different from them
taken collectively.
Objection. Aristotle says in Phys., Book I, that what is one in subject is
many things conceptually, what is one by continuity is many things accord-
ing to division, and what is one in actuality is many things in potentiality.

And this line of thought is confirmed both in De an, Book II, and in Met.,
Book V.
Reply. We must distinguish between identical predication and causal
predication. The former occurs when the predicate is mentioned in the
definition of the subject in a direct case, as for instance in Man is an
animal. The latter occurs when the predicate is mentioned in the definition
of the subject in an indirect case, as for instance in the sentence A house is
bricks and stones, which should be rephrased as A house is from bricks
and stones. Thus, all the claims mentioned in the objection should be
understood according to causal predication: One is many means One
thing is from many things, Matter and form are one should be rephrased
as From matter and form something one results and Two halves are
one continuous thing should be taken to mean From two halves one
continuous thing results.
Such a distinction is observed by Averroes in his commentary on the
Physics, Book I, when he says that the sentence All the parts are different
from the whole admits of two readings, according to composition and
according to division. According to division, the proposition is true in that
it means that this part is different from the whole as much as any other
part taken separately. According to composition, by contrast, the sentence
is false, because it means that all the parts taken together are different from
the whole. It is important to bear in mind that Averroes does not mean
that all the parts taken together are just the wholefor if this were the
case, one part would be identical with any other, according to the principle
that all the things that are identical with something are also identical with
one another. What he means is that in all the parts taken together there is
nothing other than the whole, while in all the parts taken separately there is
something other than the whole. Moreover, it must also be conceded that a
whole is different from any of its parts according to both identical and causal
predication, while it is not different from its parts taken together. For the
whole is like form and the parts like matter.
Aristotle makes his general point by means of four conclusions.
Conclusion 1. The quiddity of a thing is not the elements composing the whole.
If one of two things remains when the other is corrupted, the two things
are not identical. But the elements remain when the quiddity of a thing is
corrupted: for instance the elements of the syllable AB, i.e. the letters A and
B, remain when the syllable AB is destroyed and the elements of flesh, i.e.
fire and earth, remain when flesh is destroyed. Therefore, the quiddity of a
thing cannot be the elements composing the whole. Aristotles text (1041b12
Objection. The corruption of one thing is the generation of another. Thus,
the corruption of flesh is the generation of fire and earth, which therefore
did not preexist in the syllable and were not components of it.
Reply. In the corruption of flesh the elements are generated not com-
pletely but incompletely, since the elements begin to exist but not their
form. Therefore, the elements preexist in some way, i.e. potentially and not
actually.
In the same vein, Aristotle says in Phys., Book I, that when a house is
destroyed there come to be bricks and stoneswhich should be understood
not with respect to their name and essential definition, but rather with
respect to their actual existence. Bricks and stones existed potentially in
the house because they existed therein not per seas they do after the
destruction of the housebut in something else.
Conclusion 2. The quiddity of a thing is something other than the elements

composing the whole.
A thing that is one in an unqualified sense cannot be made from many things
existing in actuality or from many things existing only potentially: what is
required is that one of the components be actual and the other potential.
But the elements all exist in potentiality. Therefore, besides the elements,
we must posit something which is actual in itself. Thus, a syllable is not only
the letters but also something else in addition to the letters, i.e. the form
of the syllable. And the same thing holds good in the case of flesh as well.
Notandum. Averroes clarifies Aristotles text by means of a distinction.
There are two kinds of union: one which adds something to the parts united,
i.e. the form of the whole, as is the case with the syllable and the house;
another which does not add anything to the parts united, as is the case with
a heap of stones. In the first kind of union, the whole is not just its parts but
is also something else; in the second kind of union, by contrast, the whole
is nothing over and above its parts. A heap of stones in fact can be resolved
into further heaps, while a syllable cannot be resolved into further syllables,
nor can a given amount of flesh be resolved into further flesh. This is a sign
of the difference between the two kinds of union.
Objection. Just as a big heap can be resolved into further heaps, there is
an amount of flesh which can be resolved into further flesh, for instance a
piece of flesh can be resolved into two halves or three thirds. And just as
a particular amount of flesh cannot be resolved into further flesh, there is
some heap which is so small that it cannot be resolved into further heaps.
Reply. Flesh has two kinds of parts, the congregated parts and the uncon-
gregated parts. The former are the parts that do not contain the form of the
whole, such as the letters and the elements. The latter are the parts that con-
tain the form of the whole, such as the two halves of a piece of flesh. When
flesh is corrupted according to its congregated parts, it does not resolve into
further flesh; when, by contrast, it is corrupted according to its uncongre-
gated parts it is corrupted into further flesh. Moreover, there can exist a heap
so small as not to be further divisible into heaps. But this is only due to the
incapacity of matter to be further divided and not the species of heap as
such.
Conclusion 3. What a quiddity adds to the element (i) is not an element, nor is
it composed of (ii) one or (iii) more elements.
(i) As to the first part of the conclusion, we have seen in the previous
conclusions that the elements by themselves do not form a real whole,
but need something else in addition. Now, if what is added was a further
element, it could not form a real whole together with the elements it is
added to, and so we would need to posit in addition something else. But
if this something else were in turn an element, it could not form a real
whole with the other elements, and so we would need to posit once again
something else in addition, and so on and so forth ad infinitum. Therefore,
what is added to the elements cannot be an element. (ii) As to the second
part of the conclusion, if what is added was composed of only one element,
we would fall back into the case discussed and discarded in the first part
of the conclusion. For what is composed of only one element is just that
element. So, if what is added is composed of elements, it must be composed
of more than one element. (iii) But thisto come to the third part of the
conclusioncannot be the case, either. For, just as a syllable or flesh cannot
be composed only of elements, so that which is added to the elements
cannot be composed only of elements, either. For what is added is (a)
either the form of the part or (b) the form of the whole. If (a), then it is
not composed of elements. For being composed of implies that the thing
composed is many things and not one thing, and so it is hard to see how a
thing that is many things could make up one thing with the elements it is
added to. If (b), i.e. if the thing added is the quiddity of flesh or of the syllable,
then the flesh and the syllable are not just made of elements, but contain in
addition the form of the parts received in matter. Thus, the quiddity of the
flesh or of the syllable adds the same form of which it is composed. Aristotles
text (1041b1925) corresponding to Conclusion 3.
Objection. In Phys., Book I, Aristotle says that we understand a thing when
we know the principles and causes of the thing down to the elements, where
by elements he means matter an form. Thus, if what is added is form, it
must be an element.
Reply. In the Physics Aristotle employs a broader notion of element,
according to which an element is a primary constituent of something,
which is not divisible into parts specifically different from itself. Here, by
contrast, he means by element that into which the composite resolves.
And according to this notion, matter is an elementfor matter remains and
so the composite resolves into itwhile form is notfor it is not what the
composite resolves into, since it does not remain. Consequently, Aristotle
calls element everything which plays the role of matter such as the letters,
fire, and earth. On the contrary, everything which plays the role of form,
such as what is added to the material constituents, is not an element.
Conclusion 4. The quiddity of a thing is an element and a cause giving to the

thing its name and definition.
We have seen that flesh is not only fire and earth but something else too,
as much as a syllable is not only the letters but also something else. Now,
what is added must be the cause giving to the thing its name and definition.
For what is added is form and form is what gives things their name and
definition. It should be noted, however, that the conclusion ought not to
be taken according to identical predication, but rather according to causal
predication: The quiddity of a thing is an element and a cause etc. means
The quiddity is composed of an element and a cause.
In the same vein, it can be argued that flesh is flesh not in virtue of
the elements composing it. And so what is added to the elements must
be what gives flesh its name and definition. Aristotles text (1041b2528)
Notandum. Averroes clarifies Aristotles text by saying that, when some-
thing is composed of parts of different substance, one of those parts must be
a material element, while the other must be the primary cause of being and a
form. Such a form can be said to be an element only qualifiedly, i.e. provided
that we add the qualification immaterial element and cause of being. Aver-
roes is right in saying parts of different substance, because things like flesh
are also divisible into two parts of the same substance, i.e. two parts which
are flesh. And it is not true of such parts that one is a material element and
the other a cause of being.
Two objections to Aristotles text and to Averroess explanation.
Obj. 1. Some things are composed only of material parts but are nonetheless
wholes in the strict sense of the term: like, for instance, prime matter, certain
kinds of quantity existing in matter such as line, surface and body, both
primary and secondary qualities, movement and time.
Obj. 2. It is not true that a syllable adds some form to the elements. For
a syllable is composed of a vowel and a consonant, and the vowel plays the
role of form with respect to the consonant. Therefore, to add another form
to a vowel and a consonant is entirely superfluous. Moreover, on the view in
question, the number two would be composed not only of two unities, but
also of a form added to the unitieswhich does not seem to be the case.
Reply to Obj. 1. There are two kinds of parts, heterogeneous and homoge-
neous parts. Heterogeneous parts, i.e. parts of the same kind, need a form
in order to constitute something different from themselves. Homogenous
parts need a form not in order to constitute something different from them-
selves, but only in order for them to be united: the two halves, for instance,
of a certain amount of water need some surface not as the form of water
but only as a form enabling the two halves to hold together and to form
something continuous. This distinction allows us to deal with the examples
presented in the objection. Prime matter is not only composed of material
parts, but also of quantity, which unites the different parts of matter. Like-
wise, quantities, in addition to their material parts, have a principle that
unites the material parts: the parts of a body are united through surface and
the parts of a surface are one through lines and lines through points. And
the same thing holds true for primary and secondary quantity as well as for
movement and time.
Reply to Obj. 2. Even if the vowel plays the role of form with respect to the
consonant, a vowel and a consonant together do not form a syllable without
a further formal component. Moreover, the case of the syllable is not com-
parable to that of the number. The parts of a syllable are heterogeneous and
so need the addition of a form to constitute a syllable. The parts of a num-
ber, by contrast, are homogeneous and so do not need, in order for them
to constitute a number, a form which is also a part of the number, just as
the parts of a line do not need, in order for them to constitute a line, a form
which is also a part of the line. However, the parts of a line need at least the
point in order for them to be unified. Unities, by contrast, being indivisible,
do not even need something else to be unified and hence are exactly like
points. Therefore, a number is not made of unities as of parts, but only as of

subjective material principles: for number is subjectively in the unities.
Aristotle makes a point of clarification. Since he said that what is added to
the components of a mixture is the substance of the thing, which gives to the
thing itself its name and definition, the question may be raised as to whether
what is added to the components of a mixture is always the substance of the
thing.
Aristotle answers that this is not always the case, for many things which
are added to the components of a mixture are actually accidents. What
is added turns out to be the substance giving to the thing its name and
definition only if it satisfies three conditions. (i) It must be a natural being,
and in this respect it does not differ from accidents, which are natural
beings as well. (ii) It must be a certain nature, and in this respect it does
not differ from material elements, which can be called natures too. (iii) It
must be a formal principle, and in this respect it differs from an element.
For an element is that into which a thing resolves and which preexists in
the thing. But the formal principle is not something a thing resolves into.
The second clause of the definition, i.e. which preexists in the thing, is
meant to rule out considering a dead thing as an element of a living one: for
a living thing resolves into a dead thing, but the dead thing does not preexist
in the living one. Examples of elements are the letters of a syllable, which
meet both clauses of the definition of element. Aristotles text (1041b2832)
corresponding to the answer.
Notandum. Averroes further proves that substantial form is not an ele-
ment. For an element possesses three features: (i) it must play the role of
matter (and so need not be, necessarily, matter in the strict sense); (ii) it
must be something a thing resolves into (so, prime matter is not an element
of flesh, because flesh resolves into fire and earth and not into prime mat-
ter); (iii) it must remain after the resolution of the thing (which excludes the
heterogeneous parts of an animal, which do not remain after the resolution
of the animal). Form does not possess any of these features and so is not an
element.
From what Averroes says two things emerge.
First, that Aristotle defines an element differently in Book V and in Book VII
of the Metaphysics. In Book V, he defines an element as the primary con-
stituent of something, which is indivisible into parts specifically different
from itselfwhich definition includes only prime matter and substantial
form. Here in Book VII, by contrast, he defines an element as that into
which a thing resolves and which preexists in the thing, which only per-
tains to matter, whether prime or secondary matter. In De coel., Book III, he

gives a third definition: an element is a body into which the other bodies
are divided, present in them potentially or actually, and not itself divisible
into hbodiesi of some other specieswhich definition only pertains to the
four elements, as they are commonly called.
Second, it emerges that the whole composed of matter and form is not
identical with its parts taken together. For form is the principle of the
composite of form and matter, but not of form and matter. Aristotle says
in fact that a syllable is not its letters, because the letters remain when the
syllable is corrupted. Likewise, fire is not its matter and its form, because
both of them remain when fire is corrupted in the generation of a mixture.
Note that form as well may remain after the corruption of the composite as
long as it has a material character, as it happens to the forms of the elements
in a mixture.
Against the foregoing doctrine it is argued that every whole is just its parts.
For if this were not the case, it would follow that:
Arg. 1. One florin and its halves would be heavier and worthier than one
florin alonewhich is against experience.
Arg. 2. A whole could exist without its partswhich is inconceivable. For
if a whole is not identical with all its parts taken together, then it is prior to
them. But, according to Aristotle in the Categories, x is prior to y, if x can
exist without y while the other way round is not the case. So, if all the parts
of Socrates exist Socrates exists, but it is not true that if Socrates exists all its
parts exist.
Arg. 3. There would exist the last instant of a permanent thing, contrary
to Aristotles doctrine in Phys., Book VIII. For a surface which is seen at the
instant t will be divided immediately afterwards into two halves and so will
no longer exist (nor will our visual perception of it) if the whole is not its
parts.
Arg. 4. If we increased something by the length of one foot taken inclu-
sively, we would produce a greater increase than by increasing it by the same
length taken exclusively, which is at odds with Aristotles doctrine in Phys.,
Book VII, according to which if we add the indivisible to the divisible, we
make no increase in quantity.
Eight arguments for the opposed view, i.e. that a composite of matter and
form or of quantitative parts is not its parts taken together. For if it were, it
would follow that:
Arg. 1. The principles would come from other things. For fire, for instance,
is matter and form, but is also, according to the opposed view, two halves.
Like fire itself, however, its two halves come from other things. Therefore,
matter and form come from other thingswhich cannot be the case, if they
are principles.
Arg. 2. The continuum would be divisible into infinite parts of the same
quantitywhich is against Aristotles view in Phys., Book III. For every
continuum is divisible into parts of the same proportion and is just all
its parts of the same proportion taken collectively. But, according to the
opposed view, every continuum is also all its parts of the same quantity.
Therefore, the parts of the same quantity must be identical with the parts
of the same proportion and every continuum must be divisible into parts of
the same quantity.
Arg. 3. No continuum would be divisible ad infinitum. For, according to
the opposed opinion, no continuum has more than two parts. For, even if
it contains three thirds, four fourths and so on and so forth, three thirds or
four fourths are not more than two halves, in that the two halves of a thing
are identical with its infinite parts.
Arg. 4. The proportion between the diameter and the side of a square
would be a rational proportionwhich is ruled out by Euclid. For the
opposed view holds that every continuum is two halves and four fourths
and hence the diameter will be four and the side two. But two to four is a
rational proportion.
Arg. 5. A thing composed of contraries would exist perpetually. For the
opposed opinion identifies Socrates with this number two, the two unities
of which are the matter and form of Socrates; and this number two is com-
posed of contraries. But each unity of this number two will exist perpetually:
for matter is ingenerable and incorruptible, and the intellect is perpetual.
Arg. 6. Contraries would be simultaneously true of one single thing.
For suppose that A is the matter and form of Socrates and B is his form
alone. Then, one and the same thing will be at the same time divisible and
indivisible, animate and inanimate, man and non-man. For Socrates is AB,
but A is divisible, animated and man, while B is indivisible, inanimate and
non-man.
Arg. 7. Two things would be both equal and unequal to each other.
Suppose that A and B are the two halves of a stone, C the third and D all
the rest. That A and B are equal to each other is evident. But they are also
unequal. For, according to the opposed opinion, A and B are just C and D.
And C and D are unequal to each other.
Arg. 8. The material parts of a thing would be its formal parts. For a stone
is matter and form; however, it is also two halves; therefore, the two halves
are matter and form. It is a fact, on the other hand, that matter and form are
the formal parts that enter into the definition of a thing, while the two halves
are material parts. And so it follows that numerically the same parts are both
quantitative and qualitative, homogeneous and heterogeneous, for matter
and form are qualitative and heterogeneous parts, while the two halves are
quantitative and homogeneous parts.
Replies to the four arguments for the opposed view.
Reply to Arg. 1. The consequence does not follow. For, even though three
things are heavier than one when they are separate, this is not true when
they are parts of the third thing. Thus, the weight of the whole is different
from the weights of its two halves, but such halves weigh as much as the
whole when they exist separately from it.
Reply to Arg. 2. It is not true that a whole is prior to all its parts taken
together. For it is prior to some and posterior to some others. As to Aristotles
principle of priority in the Categories, it holds for the case in which two
thingsand not many thingscompose a whole.
Reply to Arg. 3. Aristotles point in the Physics, Book VIII, is that there is
no last instant of a permanent thing according to the thing itself and all its
parts. In other words, he refers to things that are necessarily acquired and
lost part by part. For, on the contrary, there is a last instant of things which
are acquired and lost indivisibly such as numbers, figures and locations.
Therefore, a surface, if it ceases to be at an instant, it does not do it according
to all its parts, but only by being divided into parts.
Reply to Arg. 4. The consequence does not follow. The length of one foot
will be acquired regardless of whether the increase is inclusive or exclusive.
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GENERAL INDEX
Abstraction, 378379, 488, 491, 668, 695, Actuality

706 actual vs. potential meaning, 170,
Accidents 347348, 399, 539541
abstract vs. concrete, 262263, 265, form as, see form(s)
268, 395, 425, 469470, 472473, in general, 27, 53, 116, 124, 196,
477, 479, 483, 491, 495, 516, 518, 216217, 244, 252, 334, 337338,
520, 522523, 534, 541542, 544, 347348, 354, 360, 364, 366, 368,
553, 696 370372, 374, 381, 401, 480, 485,
accidental, 532533, 535536, 558 487488, 495, 498, 501, 503506,
accidental composite(s), 5960, 64, 508, 517, 539541, 557, 560, 566,
6770, 73, 8284, 93, 102, 162164, 570, 576, 581, 585, 589, 595, 597,
172174, 176180, 200201, 258 600, 602, 606, 615617, 622623,
265, 269270, 273, 342, 349350, 625, 627630, 641, 658, 661, 671,
388, 394, 401, 515, 517, 519521, 523, 674, 679, 683, 691693, 696, 705,
525, 531, 622 712, 715716, 718721, 725, 737,
coupled, 5960, 64, 7380, 165170, 742744
258, 260, 265268, 347348, 364, Adams, R.M., 120n132
399, 532543, 662 Aertsen, J.A., 150n13
essence and definition of, 6, 37, Agent
38n31, 39, 5960, 6480, 83, as an efficient cause, see cause(s)
102103, 161170, 172, 212n, 258 univocal, 572573, 609610
269, 289, 327328, 340341, Albert the Great, 1, 5, 9, 13, 325384,
343350, 393394, 398403, 412413, 425, 481, 484, 501, 538, 560,
411412, 414415, 425, 439, 465, 634, 641, 723
477, 486490, 518547, 648, 661 Alexander of Alexandria, 1, 5, 9, 1112, 17,
662 210211, 280n100, 362, 385419, 422,
in the Eucharist, 407408, 476, 481 424425, 427428, 433438, 440441,
ontological status of, 2227, 36 444, 446, 457460, 466, 481, 486487,
41, 5455, 73, 8384, 143144, 489, 560, 641, 667668, 723, 738
162, 171172, 179180, 260265, Alexander of Aphrodisias, 411n73, 618
270, 327, 340, 350, 392403, 407, Al-Farabi, 616, 618, 620
425, 467482, 485490, 492 Amerini, Fabrizio, 258n, 286n119, 385n,
494 394n
per se, 161, 510, 521n, 523, 532536, Anaxagoras, 478, 594595, 606607
546, 558, 656, 683 Andronicus of Rhodes, 62
simple vs. uncoupled, 80, 102, 165 Anscombe, G.E.M., 2n2
167, 266, 347, 399, 532, 535536, Aquinas, Thomas, 1, 57, 912, 1415,
542543, 662 2122, 35, 63, 143, 147, 149151, 153,
universal vs. particular, 7, 2227, 30, 157, 181, 208n153, 210, 216, 218, 226,
3839, 341, 469 235325, 328331, 342345, 351, 362,
Ackrill, J.L., 22n5, 24n10, 24n11, 50n 369371, 380, 386387, 390, 392, 395,
766 general index
Aquinas, Thomas (cont.), 403410, 412 553554, 556558, 560561, 564

414, 415n82, 417, 418n, 421423, 427, 565, 567568, 570571, 573, 575577,
432434, 436439, 441442, 444 579582, 585589, 592595, 597
446, 452466, 538, 560561, 641, 666, 600, 602608, 610622, 624, 629636,
703704, 723, 736 638639, 641642, 644653, 655657,
Aristotle, 117, 19142, 144156, 158162, 659661, 663665, 671676, 678, 683,
164168, 170177, 179185, 190191, 685691, 693, 695696, 705, 707, 709,
192n110, 193, 194n, 195198, 200, 711713, 715716, 718, 720721, 723
203, 206208, 212n, 213215, 217, 219, 726, 728, 736737, 742744, 746748
221232, 235255, 257261, 263n64, Avicenna, 1213, 190191, 195, 218, 274,
264267, 268n73, 269271, 272n83, 280n100, 289, 297, 305306, 315, 326,
273279, 280n100, 281283, 285287, 328329, 331335, 339, 351, 355, 375
289297, 299305, 308312, 314315, 378, 383, 392, 415n81, 425, 487, 489,
318332, 336341, 345347, 350351, 490, 543, 551, 570572, 594595, 606,
356359, 361363, 364n145, 366368, 614, 616618, 620, 650, 693, 695, 697
370, 375, 380382, 385395, 398404,
406407, 411, 413414, 416417, 421 Baker, L.R., 3n9
428, 430445, 447448, 450, 452459, Balme, D.M., 76n77, 112n123
461463, 465485, 487, 490492, Barnes, Jonathan, 64n
494496, 498514, 516522, 525 Bazn, B.C., 313n185
539, 542, 544545, 547551, 553560, Being(s)
562569, 571572, 574579, 581593, accidental, 38n31, 401, 467, 483, 493,
595600, 603615, 618619, 621622, 531, 554, 581, 666
624625, 627653, 655675, 678701, and one, 117, 152, 220, 244, 301, 520,
705712, 714738, 740744, 746751 641, 695, 718, 722723
Armstrong, D.M., 7n mental vs. extra-mental, 8, 47, 97,
Art 149150, 225, 238n7, 274, 302, 306
artefacts, 88, 280n101, 461, 474, 307, 310311, 315317, 333336,
495, 507, 570, 573574, 577, 590, 339, 354355, 364, 368, 376384,
592, 600, 605, 607, 610, 612614, 441442, 467, 469, 551, 575, 632,
617, 628, 631, 647, 649, 703, 707, 669, 688690, 693695, 713714
735 per se, 346, 414, 467471, 483, 493,
as a principle of generation, see 516, 518, 531, 584, 589590, 651
artificial generation 652, 687, 692
Augustine, 563, 565, 704705 qua being/being in general, 2829,
Averroes, 1, 56, 915, 21, 35, 63, 79n85, 36n30, 235, 482
87n98, 141233, 237, 238n7, 241242, senses of, see focal meaning
247, 276, 279, 280n100, 288, 304n171, Berti, Enrico, 36n30, 118n130
315, 319, 325, 327331, 342n58, 343, Bertolacci, Amos, 13n18
345348, 350351, 355356, 360, Blackwell, R.J., 50n
362, 385400, 401n45, 403, 405 Block, Irving, 118n130
406, 411n73, 413, 421428, 431435, Body, 3, 6, 98, 156, 194n, 198199, 211,
437442, 444452, 458, 460, 462 256257, 276, 278, 280, 297299, 313,
469, 471, 473475, 478480, 482485, 322, 414, 417, 475477, 482, 485486,
494496, 501503, 505510, 512513, 501, 508, 515516, 519520, 528529,
515519, 521524, 526527, 529, 531 543, 565, 569, 578580, 594595,
537, 539, 541542, 544545, 548, 551, 603606, 610611, 613614, 619621,
general index 767
625, 627, 644646, 658659, 661, 663, Charlton, William, 57n

675676, 678, 721, 747, 749 Chiaradonna, Riccardo, 376n187
Boethius, 693 Code, Alan, 104n112, 118n130
Bolton, Robert, 36n30, 64n Cohen, S.M., 57n, 64n, 124n
Bonitz, Hermann, 45n Compatibilism vs. incompatibilism,
Bostock, David, 26n, 38n31, 39n36, 3335, 142145, 245249, 403404
58n55, 66n, 76n77, 77n79, 77n80, Composite(s) of matter and form
82n92, 83n93, 84n95, 103n108, are generated per se, 90, 98101,
103n110, 104n113, 107n, 108n, 111n120, 183190, 280286, 359360, 425,
112n122, 115n128 584588, 590, 621
Bottin, Francesco, 427n18 definition of, 101110, 199212, 286
Brody, B.A., 2n2, 64n 295, 431445, 453, 457458,
Brunschwig, Jacques, 50n 635654, 665666
Buridan, John, 17, 426, 680681 material objects as, 27, 2021, 27
Burke, M.B., 3n9 28, 3235, 41, 57, 70, 8788, 102,
Burley, Walter, 425426, 551, 680681 110, 112113, 120121, 124, 141145,
Burnyeat, Myles, 1, 19n1, 29n21, 34n, 164, 175, 181, 200, 226, 245250,
53n49, 6163, 82, 88n, 89n100, 89n101, 257, 264, 273, 285287, 292,
91n, 111n119, 115n129, 122n135, 125n139, 294n141, 404, 486, 495496, 515
126, 146148, 237, 240241, 269 517, 584, 638, 654655, 664, 666
668, 673674, 685, 737, 742, 749
Castelli, L.M., 130n universal, 58, 120121, 274, 285, 291
Cause(s) 292, 294n141, 297298, 446, 453,
accidental, 564, 580 458, 590, 685
agent/efficient/moving, 9495, 97 Conti, A.D., 12n, 13n19, 13n20, 426n13,
98, 185, 187190, 193196, 198199, 427n18, 427n19
226, 279, 284, 322324, 355360, Crivelli, Paolo, 131n150
476, 504, 510, 563564, 567, 569 Cross, Richard, 275n92
574, 576577, 579580, 588589,
595596, 600602, 605610, 612 Dahl, Norman, 82n92
631, 644, 651, 654655, 735 Dancy, Russell, 22n5, 50n, 57n, 104n111
causal enquiry/investigation, 134 Definition
138, 143, 154, 228231, 321, 332 and demonstration, see demonstra-
causal question, see question tion
final (the end), 194n, 226, 323324, by addition, 7475, 80, 84, 161170,
475, 499, 566, 571, 576, 578, 595, 199, 212n, 213n158, 266267,
616, 644, 646, 732735 289290, 346350, 439, 516, 518,
material, 226, 230, 646, 733734 532547, 648
per se, 564565, 569, 580, 627 material vs. formal, 479, 545546,
Cerami, Cristina, 88n, 196n122 740
Chance, 193, 564566, 569, 571572, object of, 90, 100112, 116, 183, 199
579580, 603, 615, 621 212, 219220, 276277, 286295,
Change 304, 328, 339, 361374, 377n197,
accidental, 64n, 9294, 282, 284, 396 379, 382383, 431466, 632640
substantial, 64n, 9296, 252, 282 unity of, 101, 111116, 213218, 295
Chappell, V.C., 50n 299, 328, 361, 368372, 401403,
Charles, David, 64n, 115n129 664665, 670684
768 general index
De Libera, Alain, 325n, 375n, 376n187 essence-existence distinction, 306,

Del Punta, Francesco, 16n 315317, 329, 332335, 339340,
Democritus, 478, 691 375380, 383384, 407n66, 409
Demonstration 410
and definition, 131, 134136, 148149, essentialism, 47, 2627, 37n, 38n31,
219, 227, 412, 415416, 427, 469, 64n, 65n, 8182, 88, 174, 180181,
545, 650651, 696, 708709, 712, 271272
717, 729, 73442 is not generated and corrupted per
causal syllogism, 135138, 321322, se, 285286, 425, 588592, 708
728742 of accidents, see accidents
middle term of, 135138, 321322, of substance, see substance(s)
412416, 427428, 546, 548, 553, Euclid, 750
708, 729, 73542 Eustratius, 427, 698, 700701, 706
Demoss, David, 64n
Devereux, Daniel, 64n Ferejohn, M.T., 36n30, 77n79
Differentia(e) Fine, Gail, 38n32, 124n138
and genus, see genus Fine, Kit, 2n3, 2n5, 3n6, 3n8, 3n9, 6n10,
per se, 114115, 215, 667668, 682 64n
683 Focal meaning, theory of
Di Giovanni, Matteo, 10n15, 141n, 146n, and being/existence, 2829, 3538,
150n14, 208n152, 208n153, 216n174, 171172, 467474, 492494
224n200, 224n201 and essence/definition, 7172, 172
Diogenes, 484 173, 525531
Donati, Silvia, 315n189 Form(s)
Driscoll, John, 22n5, 104n112, 118n130, accidental, 164, 414, 473, 506, 595,
120n133 621622
as actuality, 27, 53, 124125, 216, 288
Elements, 30, 32, 57, 117, 138, 211, 220, 289, 298, 334, 337338, 354n106,
232, 252, 478, 482, 490, 534, 539, 567, 366, 370, 372374, 495, 499, 501,
570, 572, 593594, 598, 607608, 615 503, 623, 654, 661, 674, 679, 683,
616, 620, 630631, 646, 651, 684, 707, 691692, 705, 720, 744
718719, 727, 743749 as essence, 3234, 71, 137, 143145,
Empedocles, 478 148, 157158, 199, 205, 229, 330
End, see final cause(s) 331, 361, 363, 406, 433, 440441,
Eraclitus, 484 652
Essence (and quiddity) as primary substance, 5, 3235, 46,
as a candidate for substantiality, 71, 82, 8788, 100, 107, 116, 119, 126,
3134, 4142, 4445, 54, 5760, 128129, 133134, 138, 142146,
6467, 81, 88, 116, 143150, 152 173174, 180, 212n, 222, 230233,
153, 157161, 164165, 226228, 245249, 255257, 264, 271, 276,
236241, 248249, 258259, 275, 282, 294, 329340, 403404, 458
326328, 337340, 494495, 508 distinct from species, 120121, 208,
509, 511516, 685 211, 291292, 331, 407, 439
Avicennas doctrine of, 13, 274, is not generated/corrupted per se,
289, 305307, 315317, 328340, 8990, 98101, 183185, 276, 280,
351355, 375384, 693, 695 283, 285286, 359, 425, 584587,
697 589590, 594, 630
general index 769
of the part (forma partis) vs. of the 242243, 275282, 327, 355359,
whole (forma totius), 210211, 564565, 592596, 601603, 615
288289, 318, 331, 433, 441442, 620
444, 508, 560561, 588, 636, 646 and Giver of forms, 188, 190191, 195
647, 649, 653, 707, 744746 197, 360, 392, 411n73, 595, 606, 616,
particular vs. universal, 78, 3334, 620
42n, 54, 96, 100101, 118130, 133, and Inchoation of forms, 189, 355
222224, 308314 361, 363, 373374, 606609,
Platos, 32, 58, 82, 8487, 117, 124n, 628632
130, 132, 151152, 174175, 180 artificial, 91, 96100, 187188, 192
182, 184, 187188, 190, 220222, 193, 194n, 197198, 242243,
225n, 241244, 269273, 276278, 278281, 284285, 356, 566, 569,
280283, 300305, 350, 355, 357, 579, 593
359360, 380, 392, 490491, 548 casual/by chance, see spontaneous
550, 564, 592, 596, 600603, 615, complete vs. incomplete, 594, 607
617618, 620, 659, 664, 697701, 608, 744
706716, 726 natural, 9192, 96, 100, 182, 187,
substantial, 49, 57, 95, 118, 157, 164, 191192, 195, 197199, 242243,
188, 190, 196197, 230n216, 251 278281, 284285, 356357, 566
254, 295, 298299, 303, 312, 314, 567, 569, 593, 595597, 599, 613
359360, 371, 486, 497498, 501 of accidents, 621622
504, 565, 584, 601602, 615616, per se vs. per accidens, 359, 584590,
622, 626627, 644, 649, 666, 719, 597, 609, 611, 621
748 potential vs. actual, 597598
Fortune, 564 spontaneous, 8889, 9798, 182, 190
Frede, Michael, 22n5, 24n11, 27n15, 199, 278280, 356, 392, 425, 566,
33n26, 36n28, 36n30, 40n39, 42n, 579580, 603, 621
43n, 44, 46n, 5152, 53n50, 56n, Synonymy Principle, 9098, 152, 182
58n53, 58n55, 66n, 70n67, 76n77, 184, 187199, 276282, 355360,
82n92, 102n, 103n108, 104n111, 104n113, 574576, 609614
108n, 109n, 111n120, 113n127, 115n129, terms/principles of, 9298, 185187,
118, 122n135, 130n, 131n149, 285n112, 284285, 358, 497, 503, 565580
449n68, 450451 univocal vs. equivocal, 279280, 568,
Furth, Montgomery, 22n5, 29n21, 34n, 602, 615, 690
58n55 Genus
and differentia(e), 111117, 152, 159,
Galen, 614 162164, 166170, 213219, 238n6,
Galluzzo, Gabriele, 2n4, 9n, 19n2, 42n, 263n64, 295299, 332, 344, 349,
50n, 111n120, 112n123, 115n129, 116n, 352353, 362366, 368374,
118n130, 122n135, 128n, 141n, 150n13, 377n197, 379, 382, 398401, 412,
216n174, 235n1, 256n48, 264n65, 426, 479, 512513, 515519, 522
275n92, 286n119, 298n150, 300n154, 525, 539546, 558, 561, 580581,
313n185, 315n190 632, 639, 641642, 647, 662664,
Gauthier, Ren-Antoine, 10n16 670684, 689, 693, 697698, 710
Geach, P.T., 124n 714, 716, 737
Generation as a candidate for substantiality, 31
and Anti-Platonism, 152, 182190, 32, 4142, 117, 122123, 125, 145, 153,
770 general index
as a candidate for substantiality proper subject of, 39, 66, 80, 170, 261
(cont.), 236, 248, 294n141, 339, 262, 347, 349, 398399, 542
494495, 508, 697699 Intelligences, see separate/immaterial
as matter, 112n123, 115116, 213218, substance(s)
296298, 362363, 368372, 406 Irwin, T.H., 36n30, 42n, 118n130
407, 663, 675676, 705
logical vs. natural, 598, 681 Jones, Barrington, 22n5, 57n
Giles of Rome, 412413, 416, 427, 560,
703704, 738, 740741 Kim, Jaegwon, 7n
Gill, M.L., 57n, 89n102, 93n, 102n, King, H.R., 57n
104n112, 104n113, 111n120, 115n129, Kirwan, C.A., 36n30
118n130, 122n135, 129 Koslicki, Kathrin, 3n6
Graham, D.W., 22n5, 33n26, 57n Kosman, L.A., 50n, 93n, 115n129
Granger, Herbert, 24n11, 111n120 Kripke, Saul, 6n10, 64n
Grene, Marjorie, 111n120, 112n123, 115n129 Kuksewicz, Zadzislaw, 12n
Grice, H.P., 36n30 Kung, Joan, 36n30, 64n
Haecceity, 664, 670 Leszl, Walter, 124n

Halper, E.C., 50n, 89n102, 102n, 104n112, Levinson, Jerrold, 342n57
104n113, 111n120, 112n122, 115n129 Lewis, David, 6n10
Hare, J.E., 76n77 Lewis, F.A., 34n, 50n, 58n, 64n,
Harte, Verity, 115n129 70n67, 76n77, 76n78, 77n80, 79,
Hartman, Edwin, 118n130 83n94, 104n112, 115n129, 118n130,
Heinaman, Robert, 118n130 126n141
Henle, R.J., 307n175 Lloyd, A.C., 112n123, 118n130, 376n187
, see metaphysics and logic
Ideas Loux, M.J., 2n2, 2n3, 3n6, 6n10, 6n11,
divine, 13, 376, 427, 563, 565, 600, 7n, 24n9, 27n14, 34n, 49, 5051, 57n,
700706 58n55, 73n71, 77n79, 78, 93n, 102n,
Platos, see form(s) 104n112, 104n113, 111n120, 112n124,
Identity thesis, 5960, 71, 8188, 126, 115n129, 118n130, 120n132, 120n133,
151152, 173182, 241242, 269 126n141
275, 283, 285286, 319, 350355, Lowe, E.J., 2n2, 3n9, 7n, 22n6, 26n,
401403, 414, 416419, 425, 435, 342n57
440442, 448, 459460, 536537,
547563, 618, 648649, 652, 666 Madigan, Arthur, 300n154
669, 694 Makin, Stephen, 27n15
Inchoation of forms, see generation Malcolm, John, 58n55
Individuals, see particular(s) Mariani, Mauro, 2n4, 19n2, 42n, 50n,
Individuation 111n120, 116n, 118n130
of forms, see particular vs. universal Martin, C.B., 342n57
form(s) Mathematics
principle of, 273, 316317, 409410, mathematical demonstration, 731
426, 654655, 663, 667, 717 mathematical/geometrical entities,
Inherence 105n, 106107, 110n117, 206, 289
actual vs. aptitudinal, 407408, 411, 290, 293, 362, 364367, 369,
414415, 425, 486490 406, 417, 434, 436, 446449, 451,
general index 771
454463, 465, 490, 558, 647, 650, Metaphysics

656659, 661663, 668, 692, and logic, 5763, 146150, 154155,
731 158159, 180, 226228, 237241,
mathematical sciences, 509510 253, 269, 274275, 311, 318320,
Matter 323324, 338, 340, 400401, 418n,
as potentiality, 27, 56, 116, 124125, 469, 499500, 502, 512, 545, 639,
127, 185n95, 188189, 194n, 216 666667, 671, 728, 734
217, 252, 254, 288, 296, 298, 318, as a science, 36n30, 6163, 89, 146
360, 362363, 368369, 371374, 150, 226, 235, 237241, 274275,
495498, 501507, 566568, 591, 282, 300, 311, 323324, 338, 400,
599, 604, 608, 623, 628630, 633, 418n, 467, 469, 482484, 494, 499,
663, 683, 692, 708 502, 506508, 512, 543544, 639,
common vs. individual, 210211, 647, 658, 665666, 671, 711, 733
223n, 243, 273274, 277, 286, Modrak, D.K.W., 104n112, 111n120,
288289, 291293, 294n141, 314, 118n130, 120n133
318, 330, 362, 371, 386, 406, 410, Moravcsik, J.M.E., 22n5
432433, 436, 439, 441442, 444 Morrison, Donald, 38n32, 104n113,
446, 452453, 457459, 461n102, 111n120
535, 590591, 638, 640, 642643,
647, 649650, 667668, 685, 694, Nardi, Bruno, 12n, 356n119
737 Neoplatonism, 13, 195, 197, 331, 375377
conceptual, 737
functional, see proximate vs. remote Ockham, William of, 427, 701
imaginable, 362, 364366, 369, 663 Oderberg, D.S., 2n5
664 Oliver, Alex, 7n
ingenerability and incorruptibility Owen, G.E.L., 24n11, 36, 104n112, 124n138
of, 8990, 98101, 183184, 283
284, 359, 505, 586, 607, 750 Parmenides, 478, 484485, 490
intellectual, 369, 371 Part(s)
intelligible, 406, 436, 456462, 639, conceptual vs. real, 516, 524, 632, 642,
650, 652653, 658659, 661664, 662, 664, 668, 737
737 identical with/distinct from the
prime, 5657, 252253, 298, 485, 498, whole, 749751
505508, 568, 572, 591, 609, 629, material vs. formal, 3, 106110, 125,
651652, 659, 674, 747748 134, 138140, 158, 173, 177, 199212,
proximate vs. remote matter, 211 216218, 228, 232233, 287288,
212, 374, 613, 637, 642 291294, 318, 363368, 372, 442
rational, 663 446, 449, 451, 454457, 464, 471,
sensible, 207, 213n158, 289290, 362, 636650, 652653, 655, 660, 664
364, 367371, 406, 436, 438, 446, 665, 694, 726, 747, 750751
450, 455456, 458465, 558, 639, ontological parts/constituents, 24,
650, 653, 656663 6, 9, 20, 3435, 4243, 55, 57, 86n,
Matthen, Mohan, 118n130 8990, 99100, 109112, 115n129,
Matthews, G.B., 64n 119, 121, 124, 125n140, 138145, 154
McInerny, Ralph, 375n 157, 164, 173176, 183, 185187, 202,
Melissus, 478, 484485, 490 208210, 225, 230n216, 231233,
Mellor, D.H., 7n 245250, 256, 276, 283, 293n139,
772 general index
ontological parts/constituents 664, 681, 685, 689, 695, 697701, 710,

(cont.), 298n151, 300302, 308, 728
316317, 319, 329330, 342, 357, Platonists, 117, 174, 219, 221222, 225n,
361, 363366, 382, 404, 432, 435, 271, 280n101, 302303, 305, 307, 312,
494, 501, 506, 516, 524, 632, 642, 319, 351, 354, 456, 458, 460461, 485,
662, 664, 668, 737 490, 550, 559560, 575, 592, 594, 599,
parthood, 24, 203, 407, 623624, 655, 658659, 687, 699700, 710712,
635, 712 718720, 724726
prior vs. posterior to the whole, 105, Porphyry, 21, 512, 647, 649, 681, 693694,
203, 205, 208212, 442445, 634 715716
654 Potentiality
Particular(s) in general, see actuality
accidents, see universal vs. particular matter as, see matter
accidents objective vs. subjective, 497, 568,
are not definable, 105n, 117119, 608, 629630, 692693
130133, 152, 219220, 244, 304, potential vs. actual meaning, see
708717 actuality
as ordinary objects, see composite(s) Predication
of matter and form accidental, 25, 50, 65, 93n, 95, 160,
forms, see form(s) 179, 253254, 258259, 263n64,
Patzig, Gnther, 33n26, 36n28, 40n39, 284, 285n112, 311, 323, 402, 469,
46n, 5152, 53n50, 56n, 58n53, 503, 513, 524, 547548, 553554,
58n55, 66n, 70n67, 76n77, 82n92, 714
104n111, 104n113, 108n, 109n, 111n120, essential, 23, 25, 50n, 63, 6667, 120,
118, 122n135, 130n, 131n149, 285n112, 141, 160161, 248, 259, 285n112,
449n68, 450451 305307, 311, 323, 402, 469, 488,
Paul, L.A., 3n9, 6n10 512513, 517, 521, 558, 648, 675,
Paul of Venice, 1, 5, 9, 1115, 208, 210 689, 698
211, 280n100, 362, 385391, 393, 406, matter-form, 4950, 70, 93n, 103104,
410419, 421466, 521n, 704 127, 138, 263n64
Peculiarity condition, 123, 126, 308310, per se1 61, 63, 6567, 259, 400, 475,
685686 489, 511, 513514, 521525, 530,
Peripatetics, 664, 691 541542, 549551, 556, 652, 665,
Physics, 62, 110, 148, 226, 238, 282, 290, 697
362, 367, 370371, 396, 479, 482484, per se2 61, 63, 6667, 160161, 259,
502, 507508, 639, 658, 665, 681, 734, 489, 514, 522523, 525, 533, 556,
736 652, 697
Plato, 5253, 58, 117, 124n, 132, 151153, Principle of Essential Unity, 159163,
174, 180181, 184, 187188, 190, 195, 178, 201, 214, 399403
207, 219222, 225, 241244, 269, 271, Presocratics/the Ancients, 157, 212n,
277, 280281, 283, 300, 301n161, 302, 250252, 414, 486, 494495, 500504,
304305, 307, 309, 327328, 350 506507, 511, 532, 537, 539540, 544
353, 354n106, 355, 357, 359360, 375, Priority
380381, 427, 439, 454455, 458459, in definition, 3839, 105, 209, 477
461462, 484, 491, 494, 548550, 557, 478, 536, 644
559, 562564, 592596, 600, 602, 606, in generation, 209, 644, 646
615, 617620, 649, 655, 658, 660661, in knowledge, 3840, 477482
general index 773
in time, 38, 54, 209n154, 392, 411, 425, 293294, 370373, 447, 450455, 459,
477, 480482, 645 462, 464465, 648, 660
Putnam, Hilary, 64n Sosa, Ernest, 7n
Pythagoreans, 485, 490, 664, 691 Soul
human/rational, 6, 87n98, 107, 119,
Question 133, 193, 204, 213n, 256, 287288,
causal, 136137, 228230, 320323 294, 298299, 313314, 366, 417,
nature vs. population, 2935, 4142 426, 453, 495, 500, 515516, 530,
that-question, 227, 320321, 729, 736 574577, 579, 610, 613, 636, 663,
what-question, 227, 320321, 468 713715, 726727
469, 525, 729731, 733737 in general, 65n, 112, 125n140, 212n,
whether-question, 227, 729730, 257, 275n91, 293, 366, 417, 490,
736 495, 547, 615, 625, 627, 644645,
why-question, 227, 230n216, 320, 661, 721
729737 of the heavenly bodies, 199, 614
Quiddity, see essence (and quiddity) sensitive, 601602, 615, 644, 652653,
658, 718721
Rae, M.C., 3n9 vegetative, 299, 720
Robinson, H.M., 57n World soul, 191, 195196, 616, 620, 719
Rorty, Richard, 50n, 111n120, 112n123, Species
115n129 distinct from form, see form(s)
Ross, W.D., 36n28, 38n32, 40n38, 45n, distinct from/identical with
6061, 66n, 76n77, 76n78, 82n92, individuals, 669670
111n120, 115n129, 122n135, 130n, 300 Spellman, Lynne, 118n130
Rowan J.P., 305n, 312n182 Speusippus, 30, 484, 490491
Ruello, Francis, 12n Stahl, D.E., 47n
Stough, C.L., 22n5
Scaltsas, Theodore, 50n, 81n, 82n91, 93n, Strang, Colin, 124n
115n129, 118n130 Stripping-away argument, 4754, 156
Schofield, Malcolm, 47n 158, 239240, 249254, 338, 499506
Scotus, John Duns, 17, 427, 702 Subject
Sellars, W.S., 2n3, 42n40, 50n, 118n130, as a candidate for substantiality, 31
124n 32, 4154, 6163, 116, 145, 153158,
Separation/separability 236, 248257, 336340, 494506
as a mark of substantiality, 4546, proper subject, see inherence
4952, 5455, 129, 158, 249, 254 subject criterion/subjecthood, 23
257, 337, 470, 504 26, 30, 32, 4248, 5154, 154158,
of substance from accidents, 2427, 248254, 337338, 494496, 501,
38, 41, 5455, 407, 470, 474477 623, 666
Simplicius, 62, 430 Substance(s)
Snub/snubness, 5960, 64, 7380, as cause, 6163, 134140, 145, 147
165166, 168170, 212, 258, 265268, 148, 226233, 237, 317325, 327,
347348, 364, 371, 399, 417, 443, 473, 728736, 746748
477, 483, 514516, 518, 522, 532542, essence and definition of, 67, 9,
558559, 581, 635636, 657, 662, 666, 14, 37n, 38n31, 5960, 6473, 80,
739740, 755 101116, 145, 158170, 172, 199218,
Socrates the Younger, 108110, 206208, 226, 236, 243, 258269, 286299,
774 general index
essence and definition of (cont.), Teloh, Henry, 118n130

318, 322324, 327, 330333, 341, Themistius, 190191, 195197, 616618,
346348, 361374, 386387, 394, 620
398399, 405407, 413, 422, 426, Third Man Argument, 124, 689
431466, 511516, 520525, 632 This something ( /hoc aliquid), 36,
684 4546, 49, 5155, 69, 123124, 128
in the Categories 45, 7, 9, 2035, 130, 158, 249, 254257, 263, 281, 337,
39, 41, 43, 55, 6263, 67, 70, 120 504, 519, 593, 601, 668, 689, 692, 696,
122, 128, 141144, 154155, 236, 707
245250, 255257, 263, 310311, Time, 471, 480482, 646, 726727, 747
336340, 401405, 495, 686688,
722723 Unity
primary, 45, 2535, 4348, 5154, accidental/per accidens, 214, 560
63, 71, 8182, 8485, 8788, 100, per se, 260, 560
107, 116, 119120, 126129, 133134, Principle of Essential Unity, see
138, 141146, 151, 154155, 173174, predication
180181, 212n, 222, 231, 233, 245 Universal(s)
251, 254257, 263264, 271272, ante rem, in re, post rem 331, 334,
276, 282, 287, 294, 329330, 336 375379, 706
339, 350, 401, 404, 458, 468471, problem of, 4, 78, 225, 308, 375, 427,
494495, 497500, 506, 508, 512, 723724
517, 549, 551, 574, 666, 687688, substantiality of, 8, 2225, 3132,
692, 695, 723 36n28, 41, 55, 61, 63, 69, 116130,
secondary, 25, 120, 122, 128, 248, 310 145, 152154, 218225, 236237,
311, 336, 467, 470471, 495, 498, 239, 241, 243245, 248, 300311,
686688, 692, 695, 723 327329, 331340, 375384, 471,
separate/immaterial, 86n, 117, 188, 685700
191, 195, 230n217, 238n6, 241n16,
243, 271, 275, 301304, 313314, Van Inwagen, Peter, 3n7
319, 350, 355, 360, 408410, 412, Varzi, A.C., 3n9
416417, 419, 426, 470, 490, 504, Veuthey, Lon, 385n
509511, 539, 546, 549550, 559, Vlastos, Gregory, 124n
568, 573, 595, 600601, 603, 614,
617618, 639, 641, 651652, 654 Wedin, M.V., 34n, 43n, 58n55, 64n,
655, 661, 663669, 677, 685, 691, 70n67, 103n108, 104n112, 111n120,
703, 713, 715716, 724725, 728 118n130, 125n140, 126n141, 138n
substance vs. substance of, 3435, 42, Weisheipl, J.A., 325n
45, 50, 85, 122123, 126127, 142 White, N.P., 64n
145, 149, 152159, 164, 173, 199, 217, Whiting, J.E., 118n130
222, 225n, 226233, 246247, 302 Wiggins, David, 2n2, 3n9
303, 329330, 339340, 403405, William of Moerbeke, 258
500501, 504, 748 Wippel, J.F., 235n2, 314n186
substantial wholes vs. aggregates, Witt, Charlotte, 27n15, 29n21, 50n, 64n,
24, 138140, 231233, 718, 742 65n, 118n130
751 Woods, M.J., 61, 104n112, 118n130, 120n133
Sweeney, Michael, 313n185
Xenocrates, 30
Metaphysics
Volume 2
Studien und Texte
zur Geistesgeschichte
des Mittelalters
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Metaphysics
Pauli Veneti
Expositio in duodecim libros Metaphisice Aristotelis,
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Volume 2
By
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LEIDEN BOSTON
2013
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CONTENTS
Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vii
Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
1. Paul of Venices Intellectual Profile . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
2. Paul of Venices Commentary on the Metaphysics: The
Manuscripts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3. The Text of Pauls Commentary on the Metaphysics, Book VII 8
3.1. The Relationship between the Two Manuscripts . . . . . . . . . . 8
3.2. The Value of M and Pv . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
4. Aristotles and Averroess Texts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
Conspectus Siglorum . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
Pauli Veneti: Expositio in Duodecim Libros Metaphisice Aristotelis,

Liber VII . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
Tractatus I . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
Capitulum I . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
Capitulum II . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
Capitulum III . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112
Capitulum IV . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 176
Tractatus II . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 205
Capitulum I . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 205
Capitulum II . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 254
Capitulum III . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 315
Capitulum IV . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 408
Tractatus III . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 441
Capitulum I . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 441
Capitulum II . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 467
Capitulum III . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 510
Capitulum IV . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 532
Bibliography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 581
Index locorum . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 587
Index authorum . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 604
Index authorum et philosophorum a Paulo Veneto nominatorum . . . . . 605
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
Many people have been of help to me in preparing the present critical

edition and it is pleasure for me to be able to thank all of them on completing
my work.
A first transcription of the Pavia manuscript was made available to me
through Gianluca Riccadonnas dissertation on Book VII of Paul of Venices
Commentary on the Metaphysics, which had been discussed at the univer-
sity of Pisa in 1995 under the supervision of Francesco Del Punta. Although
the transcription was in need of corrections and revisions, it has certainly
represented a first step toward my becoming acquainted with Pauls text. I
wish to thank also Alessandro Conti for showing me his transcription, based
on the Pavia manuscript, of Treatise 3.
Fabrizio Amerini has made an important contribution to the edition. He
was so generous as to let me use a provisional text of Treatise 1 and the
corresponding apparatus. He has also gone through the final text and made
valuable comments. I am very grateful to him for his assistance, support
and friendly collaboration. My gratitude goes also to Mario Bertagna, who
has carefully read the final version of the edition, pointed out mistakes and
suggested corrections.
Concetta Luna has been so kind as to read the philological introduction
and make important observations, which have considerably improved my
analysis of the manuscripts and saved me from slips and mistakes. I take this
chance to thank her for her benevolence and for the many things she has
taught me over the last fifteen years. Many thanks also go to Maria Cristina
Rossi, who has helped me to prepare the description of the manuscripts and
has been of constant assistance with her codicological and paleographical
competence. I am grateful also to Marco Forlivesi for being so kind as to
provide me with an up-to-date bibliography on Antonio Trombetta (the
owner of the Casale Monferrato manuscript) and his historical context.
Special thanks go to Francesco Del Punta for the many pieces of advice he
has given me during the preparation of the edition and for inviting me not
to overlook any details, no matter how small they appeared to be.
Although I have been so lucky as to benefit from the help of so many
competent friends and colleagues, the edition will certainly still contain
mistakes and shortcomings, for which I am solely responsible.
INTRODUCTION
1. Paul of Venices Intellectual Profile
Paul of Venices name is mainly spoken of in connection with his fine log-
ical works, the Logica Parva, the Logica Magna and the Sophismata aurea.
Paul, however, was one of the leading philosophers of his time and his con-
tributions cover a vast area of discourse, including theology, psychology,
ontology and theory of knowledge. He also took a strong interest in Aris-
totles philosophy and his commentaries may in a sense be regarded as the
point of arrival of a long tradition of understanding and interpretation of
Aristotles texts.
We have rather scanty information about the details of Pauls life. Also
the dates of some of his major works are still uncertain.1 Paolo Nicoletti was
born in Udine, a town in the north-eastern part of Italy, in 1369. When he was
fourteen he joined the Augustinian Order and entered the convent of Santo
Stefano in Venice. He completed his literary and theological education in
the general studium of the order in Padua, a sort of excellence school for
the most gifted pupils of the province. In the summer of 1390 Paul was sent
to Oxford, where he remained for three years. The Oxford years were bound
to have a lasting effect on Pauls philosophical inclinations. It is in Oxford
that he became acquainted with the works of the English reformer John
Wyclif and with those of his immediate followers, and so chose the defence
of ontological realism as one of the leading motives of his philosophical
career. It is also in Oxford that Paul developed his strong interest in logic,
which marked the first steps of his activity as a philosophical writer and
remained constant throughout his life.
Paul was back in Padua by 1395, where he became first Bachelor (1395
1405/6) and then Master of Arts and Theology. His success and fame as
a brilliant philosopher and teacher were also accompanied by an equally
prestigious career within the order. He was nominated Provincial of the
order in 1409 and took an active part both in the promotion of the University
of Padua and in the religious and political life of the Republic of Venice.
1 For Paul of Venices life and works see: Momigliano (1907); Perreiah (1982); Bottin
(1983). My brief presentation here is mainly based on the excellent state-of-the-art in Conti
(1996).
2 introduction
The last years of Pauls life were darkened by a series of conflicts with
the Republic, which culminated in his confinement to Ravenna in 1420.
Pauls political misfortunes did not overshadow his glory as an acclaimed
philosopher. In the years 14201424 Paul stayed in Siena at the local convent
of the Eremitans and was also allowed to teach at the University. He was also
in Bologne, Rome and Perugia, where he spent the most part of the years
14241428. In consideration of his severe health conditions, the Republic of
Venice allowed Paul to go back to Padua in the summer of 1428. It is in Padua
that Paul now rests, in the sagresty of the church of his order.
We have fairly secure information about the dates of his major logical
works. The Logica parva, Pauls most fortunate work, was drafted for the
most part in Oxford (13931395). The Logica Magna (13961399) and the
Sophismata aurea (1399), instead, dates back to Pauls teaching as a Bach-
elor in Padua. No such certainty can be reached, however, with regards to
his philosophical commentaries. Pauls activity as a philosophical commen-
tator was intense and spanned more than two decades. He also explored
different literary genres of commentary. He composed, for instance, a series
of Conclusiones on Aristotles Posterior Analytics, Ethics and Politics, which
should probably be dated back to the last years of his teaching as a Bach-
elor (14031405). The Conclusiones are a rather peculiar genre of literary
work, where the text which is being commented upon is reduced to a
series of philosophical conclusions and any literal exposition is suppressed.
Although Pauls literal expositions are large and all but synthetic, there are
still some significant connections between the Conclusiones and his most
traditional commentaries. For Pauls expositions are also in a sense domi-
nated by the desire to put Aristotles text into logical form and so to reduce it
to a series of arguments and philosophical conclusions. There are in fact two
philosophical commentaries of which we know the date with certainty: the
gigantic commentary on the Physics, which Paul completed in 1409, and the
commentary on Porphyrys Isagoge and on the Ars Vetus, which was finished
in Perugia in 1428. We also know for certain the date of the composition of
another related work, the Summa philosophiae naturalis, a synthetic expo-
sition in six parts of different sectors of Aristotles philosophy. An early date
(before 1407 and around 1406) suggests itself for the commentary on the Pos-
terior Analytics, while the remaining Aristotelian commentaries belong to
Pauls maturity. The commentary on the De Anima is best assigned to the
years 14151420, while the huge commentary on the Metaphysics was drafted
between 1420 and 1424. Another important work by Paul also belongs to the
same period as the Expositio Metaphisicorum, i.e. the Quaestio de universa-
libus, the mature fruit of his ontological realism.
introduction 3
All in all, the vastness and depth of Pauls philosophical interests is

impressive. His logical works are rightly famous and deserve a place of
honour in the history of medieval logic. Pauls ontologyhis peculiar ver-
sion of the so-called Oxford realismis also worth our attention for the
sophistication with which he updates the conceptual tools of traditional
XIV-century realism.2 The Aristotelian commentaries may be regarded as
the least original part of Pauls philosophical activities. In compiling them,
he draws on a large number of sources with regards to both the literal expo-
sition of the text and the more doctrinal sections. It would be a mistake,
however, to underestimate the importance of Pauls commentaries on Aris-
totle. For one thing, the commentaries often contain important indications
concerning Pauls main philosophical options: suffice it to mention, by way
of example, Pauls treatment of the problem of universals in Book I of his
commentary on the Physics or his discussion of identity and difference in
his commentaries on the Metaphysics (Book V) and on the Categories (in
the chapter on relatives), or finally his long discussion of divine Ideas in
Book VII of the commentary on the Metaphysics. Generally speaking, Pauls
expositions of Aristotle display a high level of theoretical analysis and are
always rich with a number of philosophical insights. For another thing,
Pauls exegetical works should be carefully studied as the ending and cul-
minating point of a long tradition of understanding and appropriation of
Aristotle. When seen through the microscope, the Austin Masters commen-
taries reveal themselves as maps of and guides to the medieval reception of
the different branches of Aristotles philosophy, in so far as they enable us
to unravel and put into focus the different interpretative options which are
present, as it were, on the medieval philosophical market. In the first vol-
ume of the present work, I tried to show how this holds true in the case of
Aristotles ontology.
2. Paul of Venices Commentary on the Metaphsyics:

The Manuscripts
Paul of Venices Commentary on the Metaphysics was written in the years

14201424. Possibly due to its length, the writing saw no Renaissance edition.
For all we know, the text of the commentary is preserved in only two
manuscripts:
2 For a survey of late medieval realists see Conti (2007) and (2010).
4 introduction
M Casale Monferrato, Biblioteca del Seminario, a35

Pv Pavia, Biblioteca Universitaria, Fondo Aldini 324
Both M and Pv are monographic manuscripts, i.e. they contain only Pauls
Commentary on the Metaphysics. M now falls into four volumes, but, as the
colophons and the ancient quire signatures show, the edition of the Pauls
work that the manuscript transmits was originally in two volumes, each
including the commentary on six books of the Metaphysics. In this section,
I shall present a description of M. Pv has already been described in some
detail by M.A. Casagrande3. Therefore, I shall confine myself to recalling
some general features of the manuscript and describe its contents.
M
(Vol. I)
Casale Monferrato, Biblioteca del Seminario, a3
1495 January the 30th, Padua
Paper; fols. III, 130, III; 11310; ancient quire signatures; folio; 415 280 =
50 [275] 90 40 [70 (35) 70] 65; lines 51 to a page (fol. 38r); blind ruling
(not always detectable); no catchwords; marginal notes in a different hand
(humanistic writing) up to fol. 4r; titles and text words in display script; space
reserved for initials. Limp binding in parchment closed with two leather
laces.
On fol. 1r scroll ornament containing the title, emblem: two crossing
trumpets with four stars on a blue ground.
Ancient signatures: 86 on the upper cover; 412 low on the spine (title on
the spine: Pauli Veneti in Metaphysicam Aristotelis).
Contents
(fols. 1ra130vb) inc. (tit.): Liber expositorius primorum sex librorum Meta-
phisice Aristotelis prestantissimi doctoris magisteri PAULI VENETI O.H.S.A.
feliciter incipit; (prol., fol. 1ra): Mecum sepissime repetens quibus tanquam
expertibus nostra in totum; (text., fol. 1va): Omnes homines natura scire desi-
derant et cetera. Iste est liber Metaphysice Aristotelis cuius doctrina atque
sapientia; hI (fols. 1va65vb), II (fols. 66ra82vb), III (fols. 83ra121ra), IV (fols. 121rb
130vb)i; expl. (fol. 130vb): homines periti, in scientia medicine aliqua dicuntur
medicativa quia sunt bene disposta ad artem medicine.
3 Casagrande (1993), 201202.

introduction 5
(Vol. II)
Paper; fols. III, 134, III; fol. 134 unwritten; 1310, 48, 56, 61410; ancient quire
signatures; folio; 416 280 = 50 [276] 90 40 [70 (35) 70] 65; lines 51 to a
page (fol. 11r); blind ruling (not always detectable); no catchwords; words in
display script; space reserved for initials. Limp binding in parchment closed
with two leather laces.
In the colophon emblem representing two crossing trumpets with four
stars on a blue ground. Ancient signatures: 88 on the upper cover; N7 on the
spine in the centre; 412 low on the spine (title on the spine: Pauli Veneti in
Metaphysicam Aristotelis).
Contents
(fols. 1ra133vb) inc. (text.): ut scolares bene inclinati ad scientiam medicine
aliqua dicunt medicativa quia operantur sanitatem; hIV (fols. 1ra44vb), V
(fols. 45ra119va); VI (fols. 120ra133vb)i; expl. (fol. 133vb): ymmo nichil cognoscit
sub ratione veri et falsi, intellectus autem cognoscit verum et falsum tam
in se quam in alio sub propriis rationibus; subscr. (fol. 133v, in the hand of
the copyst): Editionis magistri Pauli Veneti doctoris eximii super primos sex
libros Metaphisicae Aristotelis que cum preter expositiones aliorum Aver-
rois sentencias aliqua ex parte dilucidet ut ingeniolis viris qui Aristotelis
et commentatoris mentem habere desiderant facilius consultum esset, ego
magister Antonius Trombeta provincie Sancti Antonii minister ordinarie
in universitate hac patavina Metaphisicam publice tradens opus hoc tran-
scribi feci et Alberti artium et medicine scolaris Flandrensis sicuti scriptione
ita cura et diligentia non mediocri correctum eddere curam. Anno salutis
1495 die penultima ianuarii quo in lucem prodii.
(Vol. III)
Casale Monferrato, Biblioteca del Seminario, a3bis
Paper; fols. I, 139, I; 110-I (with loss of the corresponding text), 21410; ancient
quire signatures; folio; 413 275 = 50 [271] 92 45 [70 (35) 70] 55; lines. 51 to
a page (fol. 14r); blind ruling (not always detectable); no catchwords; few
marginal notes in a different hand; words in display script; space reserved
for initials. Limp binding in parchment closed with two leather laces.
Ancient signatures: 87 on the upper cover; 412 low on the spine (title on
the spine: Pauli Veneti in Metaphysicam Aristotelis).
6 introduction
Contents
(fols. 2ra140vb) inc. (text., fol. 1ra): est logica, quia accipit unum quod est
declaratum in logica, videlicet illud esse substantiam et quiditatem rei per
quod convenienter; hVII (fols. 2ra79vb); VIII (80ra101vb); IX (102ra126vb); X
(127ra140vb)i; expl. (fol. 140vb): sed in hyys equalitas et unitas proprie est, non
autem ydemptitas. Notandum, secundum Aristotelem, primo Thopicorum.
(Vol. IV)
Paper; fols. I, 127, I; fols. 126127 unwritten; 1410, 510-VII (without loss of text),
68, 71310; ancient quire segnature; folio; 415 280 = 45 [275] 95 40 [70 (35)
70] 65; lines 51 to a page (fol. 69r); blind ruling (not always dectable); no
catchwords; words in display script; space reserved for initials. Limp binding
in parchment closed with two leather laces.
In the colophon emblem representing two crossing trumpets with four
stars on a blue ground. Ancient signatures: 89 on the cover; 412 low on the
spine (title on the spine: Pauli Veneti in Metaphysicam Aristotelis).
Contents
(fols. 1ra125rb) inc. (text. fol. 1ra): et hoc huius quod pluribus modis accipitur
idem. Nam aliqua dicuntur eadem natura, aliqua dicuntur eadem analo-
gia, ut sanum quod; hX (fols. 1ra27rb), XI (27va57vb); XII (58ra125rb)i; expl.
(fol. 125rb): tales fallacias apparentes propriis logice fundamentis sciant ex-
cludere. Quare et cetera: subscr. (f. 125v, in the end of the copyst): Editionis
magistri Pauli Veneti doctoris eximii super ultimos sex libros Metaphisicae
Aristotelis que quidem cum preter aliorum expositiones Averrois senten-
cias aliqua ex parte dilucidet ut ingeniolis viris qui Aristoteles et commen-
tatoris mentem habere desiderant facilius consultum esset, ego magister
Antonius Trombeta provincie Sancti Antonii minister ordinarie in universi-
tate hac patavina Metaphisicam publice tradens opus hoc transcribi feci et
Alberti artium et medicine scolaris Flandrensis sicuti scriptione ita diligen-
tia non mediocri correctum eddere curam. Anno salutis 1495 die penultima
ianuarii quo in lucem prodii.
Note: as the colophons inform us, the manuscript was owned by the
Franciscan philosopher and theologian Antonio Trombetta (Padua 1436-
Padua, 6th of March 1511)4. The text of Paul of Venices Expositiones in libros
4 For information about the life and works of Antonio Trombetta see: Poppi (1989)
introduction 7
Metaphysicae was copied in Padua by Albert, a Flemish student at the Fac-

ulty of Arts and Medicine when Antonio was the provincial minister of his
order. Trombetta was a faithful follower of Duns Scotuss metaphysics and
the author, among many other writings, of a series of Quaestiones metaphy-
sicales, published in Venice in 1493 and then republished in 1503 under the
title Opus in Metaphysicam Aristotelis Padue in thomistas discussum.
Pv
Pavia, Biblioteca Universitaria, Fondo Aldini 324 (10)
1434 november 18th, Padua
Vellum; fols. II, 471, II; 11210, 136-IIV(with loss of the text), 144710, 485 (loose
leaves), starting with the flesh-side; catchwords; quire signatures; folio;
354256 = 6 [243]75 35 [71 (16) 71] 63; lines 53 (col. a)54 (col. b) (fol. 7);
5462 lines to a page; writing area slightly variable; blind ruling; corrections
and marginal notes in the same and coeval hands, one from the XVIth cent.;
running titles; the first letter is decorated (fol. 1ra, on gold leaf); ornate book
initials; watermark letters; rubricated paragraph signs.
Ancient guard leaf: one vellum bifolio, XVth cent., 345 243 = 35 [240]
7030 [70 (15) 70] 58; ll. 61 (f. II); ruling not detectable; spaces reserved for
initials and paragraph signs.
Version parallel to fols. 234vb236vb in so far as text and pagination are
concerned. Conservation state: fol. Ir presents large stains partly overlapping
the writing area; traces of glue testifying to the fol.s employment as a guard
leaf.
Contents
1 (fols. 1ra471rb) hPAULUS NICOLETTUS VENETUS O.E.S.A., Lectura super
librum Metaphysicorumi. inc. (prol.): Mecum sepissime repetens quibus tan-
quam expertibus nostra in totum; (text., fol. 1va): Omnes homines natura scire
desiderant et cetera. Iste est liber Metaphysice Aristotelis cuius doctrina
atque sapientia: hI (fols. 1va63vb), II (fols. 63vb80vb), III (fols. 80vb121ra), IV
(fols. 121ra159rb), V (fols. 159rb222vb), VI (fols. 223rb234vb), VII (fols. 234vb
311vb), VIII (fols. 312ra332rb), IX (fols. 333rb358ra), X (fols. 358rb392vb), XI
(fols. 393rb416va), XII (fols. 416vb471vb)i; expl.: tale fallacias apparentes pro-
priis loyce fundamentis sciant excludere et cetera. Quare et cetera; subscr.:
and (2003); Cortese (1976); Rossetti (1976). For some important aspects of Trombettas
philosophical thought see: Forlivesi (2008) and (forthcoming).
8 introduction
Explicit duodecimus liber Metaphysice Aristotelis una cum omnibus libris

precedentibus luculenter mirificeque expositus per referendum et egre-
gium artium sacreque teologie doctorem famosissimum magistrum Paulum
de Veneciis ordinis fratrum heremiatarum santissimi doctoris Augustini qui
vere philosophie monarcha suo tempore merito censebatur. Scriptus vero
per fratrem Petrum de Brugis studentem licet imperito eo tempore cuius
scripture cura et solicitudo reverendo magistero Iohanni de Mediolano
commissa extitit qui, ut me ad scripture adduceret complementum, magnos
labores et fastidia sustinuit, anno domini 1434 die 18 novembris. Frater
Petrus Brugensis prenominatus.
2 (fols. IraIIvb) hPAULUS NICOLETTUS VENETUS O.E.S.A., Lectura super
librum Metaphysicorum. Liber VII (fragm.)i. inc. hEins diciutur multipliciter.
Iste est septimus Metaphysice Aristotelis in quo ipse determinat; expl.:
melius quod accidencia dupliciter considerantur videlicet secundum essen-
tiam et.
3. The Text of Pauls Commentary

on the Metaphysics, Book VII
3.1. The Relationship between the Two Manuscripts

M and Pv are clearly two independent witnesses of Paul of Venices text:
both of them present peculiar errors (be they wrong readings or omissions)
which cannot possibly have been mended by conjecture. Thus, none of the
manuscripts is a copy of the other. Since the mutual independence of the
two manuscripts seems to me clear and uncontroversial, I shall omit here a
full discussion of Ms and Pvs peculiar mistakes and refer the reader to the
apparatus.
Besides their peculiar errors, M and Pv also share a good number of
common errors, which are worth discussing in some detail. I have divided
the errors into three different categories: (a) wrong readings, i.e. cases
where the text transmitted by both manuscripts seems to be wrong and
so correction is needed; (b) omissions; (c) additions, i.e. cases where the
text transmitted by both manuscripts contains words or sentences which
should be excised in order to restore an acceptable sense. For reasons which
will become clear in Section 4 below, I exclude from the list of common
errors those concerning the text of Aristotles Metaphysics which Paul is
commenting upon as well as the ones concerning the quotations from
Averroes Long Commentary, to confine myself to discussing the errors we
encounter in Pauls exposition.
introduction 9
The presence of such a good number of common errors strongly suggests

that M and Pv derive from some common model. We know nothing about
the manuscript tradition of Pauls commentary on the Metaphysics. It must
be observed, however, that Pvs text was copied six years after Pauls death
and ten years after the drafting of the commentary. This seems to suggest
that the errors common to the two manuscripts originated at an early stage
in the transmission of the writing.
a. Wrong Readings
Tr. 1, c. 1, p. 54, 712
Respondet Commentator, dicens quod illa propositio substantia est prior
accidente cognitione non est intelligenda de prioritate generationis*, sed
de prioritate perfectionis, ad hunc intellectum, quod de individuo perfectior
notitia habetur per universalia substantialia quam accidentalia. Ymaginatur
enim Commentator duplicem ordinem, scilicet generationis et perfectionis.
* generationis scr.] durationis M Pv
durationis is irrelevant, because, as Paul immediately makes clear, Averroes

has in mind the contrast between the priority of generation and the priority
of perfection. And it is precisely this contrast that is explained at some
length in the sequel of the text.
Tr. 1, c. 2, p. 86, 78
Item, si materia est substantia*, aut ergo substantia predicabilis aut extra
predicamentum.
* substantia scr.] substantialis M Pv
In terms of sense, the mistake is a small one, but is still a mistake. The
consequent of the conditional shows that substantia is required: if matter
is substance, then it is either a substance within the categorial scheme or
outside it. Substantialis is not absolutely impossible, but very unlikely.
Tr. 1, c. 2, p. 101, 811

quoniam, licet intellectus et materia in hoc conveniant, quod, sicut intel-
lectus nullam de se habet formam intelligibilem, sed ad quamlibet est positus
in potentia, ita materia nullam de se habet formam naturalem, sed ad quam-
libet est posita* in potentia
* posita scr.] positus M Pv
The error can easily be accounted for by the presence of positus a few words
earlier in the same sentence.
10 introduction
Tr. 1, c. 3, p. 137, 1012

Conceditur tamen quod genus et differentia sint quiditative idem in predica-
tione* identica, ad hunc intellectum, quod sunt realiter eadem quiditas, ex
quo tantum ratione differunt, ut dictum est.
* predicatione scr.] suppositione M Pv
suppositio identica, besides being out of context, means little or nothing.

On the contrary, the contrast between predicatio identica and predicatio
causalis is one of Pauls main conceptual tools.
Tr. 1, c. 3, p. 144, 3132

Nam, sicut se habet medicinale ad* vas et opus et corpus, ita ens ad substan-
tiam et accidens
* ad scr.] et M Pv
Correction is clearly necessary.
Tr. 1, c. 3, p. 151, 1721

Differunt autem quia simitas significat concavitatem in recto et nasum in
obliquo, dicendo simitas est concavitas nasi aut concavitas in naso; simus
autem econtra significat concavitatem* in obliquo et nasum in recto, dicendo
simus est nasus habens concavitatem.
*concavitatem scr.] simitatem M Pv
The context makes it clear that concavitatem is required. I corrected the text
in the same way in Tr. 1, c. 3, p. 161, 4. The constant alternation of the two
terms in the context may explain the mistake.
Tr. 1, c. 3, p. 159, 3033

si non est idem nasus simus et nasus concavus, hoc videtur esse ex eo quia
simum* dat intelligere nasum, concavum autem non concernit nasum, sed
superficiem depressam, in quocumque fuerit, sive in naso sive in brachio sive
in crure.
* simum scr.] simus M Pv
As the previous case shows, simus is not impossible: the fact that simus is
always predicated of nasus explains why simus in the masculine may be
used as an example of an accidental concrete term. However, in considera-
tion of the near occurrence of concavum, I finally decided to correct the text
and preserve symmetry.
introduction 11
Tr. 1, c. 3, pp. 167, 34168, 1

Minor vero est evidens, quia primus* modus dicendi per se est quando pre-
dicatur diffinitio vel pars eius, loquendo de diffinitione data a priori.
* primus scr.] secundus M Pv
The example shows that Paul is talking about the first of the senses of per
se listed by Aristotle in An. Post., I, 4.
Tr. 1, c. 4, p. 196, 2124

neque ponitur nasus in diffinitione simitatis tamquam aliquid pertinens ad
quiditatem aut ad essentiam eius, sed tamquam determinans dependentiam
eius, in cuius significato* non ponitur nasus in recto, in diffinitione simitatis,
sed in obliquo.
*significato scr.] significatum M Pv
significatum is not grammatical.
Tr. 2, c. 1, p. 205, 2526

Si enim agens fuerit intellectus*, illa dicuntur fieri a fortuna; si autem non
intellectus*, illa dicuntur fieri a casu
*intellectus intellectus scr.] -tum -tum M Pv
intellectum is clearly not correct and may have originated from a miscon-
strual of the syntax, as if Paul wanted to contrast the case in which the agent
is understood or conceived of with that in which it is not. The contrast, how-
ever, is between the case where the agent is the intellect and that in which
it is not the intellect.
Tr. 2, c. 1, p. 211, 2526

Numquam ergo forma in eis movetur per se alterative, sed tantum localiter.
Materia autem illorum utroque motu movetur*.
* movetur scr.] movet M Pv
Both eis and illorum refer to the elements. The point is not that matter moves
something else, but rather that it has both the movement of alteration and
the local movement. Therefore, movetur is required.
12 introduction
Tr. 2, c. 2, p. 262, 1214

equus enim intendit producere equum et producit mulum, ideo agit effec-
tum quem* non intendit, et per consequens generat mulum per accidens.
* quem scr.] quod M Pv
quod is ungrammatical.
Tr. 2, c. 2, p. 272, 1112

Et hoc ad denotandum quod sanitas que* fit a casu respectu confricationis,
fit a natura respectu caloris.
* que scr.] quod M Pv
quod is ungrammatical.
Tr. 2, c. 2, p. 274, 1416

Consimiliter dicatur in generabilibus, quoniam eorum que generantur, que-
dam fiunt a natura* solum, ut tonitrus et terremotus, et aer atque ignis in
propriis speris; quedam fiunt tantum ab arte .
*natura scr.] materia M Pv
Pauls point is that some things are generated by nature alone (and not by
matter), some others by art alone, while a third group of things are generated
by the joint action of nature and art.
The opposite error occurs further down in the same chapter, p. 305, 25
28:
Ad primum dicitur quod forma non supponitur composito, sed solum mate-
ria. Neque forma preexistit composito duratione, quod tamen requiritur ad
hoc quod sit subiectum generationis, sed tantum materia* preexistit compos-
ito et cetera.
* materia scr.] natura M Pv
It is clearly matterand not naturethat preexists the composite of mat-

ter and form. In both cases the mistake can be easily explained given the
way in which materia (maa) and natura (naa) are abbreviated.
Tr. 2, c. 2, p. 276, 1820

Verbi gratia, homo et mulus fiunt ab intrinseco, videlicet a virtute existente
in materia illorum* spermatica
* illorum scr.] illarum M Pv
Correction is required since the reference is to homo and mulus.

introduction 13
Tr. 2, c. 2, p. 296, 35
Plato ergo voluit quod preter ydeas, quas dixit esse causas speciales* specie-
rum, daretur unum agens primum incorporeum a quo create sunt omnes
ydee una cum toto universo.
* speciales scr.] specialium M Pv
The point is not that Ideas are the causes of special species, but rather that
they are the special causes of the species, as opposed to the first incorporeal
agent, which is the general cause of Ideas as well as of the whole universe.
Therefore, we need speciales instead of specialium.
Tr. 2, c. 3, p. 344, 1113

Secunda pars conclusionis sequitur ex prima suppositione, quia corpus ani-
matum non est prius* vegetativo nec figura rectilinea est prior triangulo
* prius scr.] prior M Pv
prior is ungrammatical.
Tr. 2, c. 3, p. 344, 2729

Nam anima animalium, que est anima sensitiva, est prior animali; sed* est
pars et pars formalis eius; ergo partes formales animalis sunt priores illo, aut
omnes aut quedam.
*sed scr.] quod M Pv
If taken as a relative, quod is clearly wrong. Neither can it be taken as a

(rather rare) causal quod or corrected into quia. For Pauls reasoning is the
following: (i) the soul is prior to the animal; (ii) the soul is a part and a formal
part of the animal; (iii) therefore, the formal parts of the animal are prior to
it. Thus, that the formal parts of the animal are prior to it is the conclusion of
the argument and cannot possibly be one of the premisses. What we need is
a particle introducing the second premiss. Therefore, I corrected quod into
sed, which is the standard conjunction for the minor premiss. The confusion
between quod and sed is rather common, given that the two terms are often
abbreviated in a very similar way.
Tr. 2, c. 3, p. 381, 79
quoniam ita se habet materia intelligibilis, videlicet continuum et linea, ad
circulum et trigonum, sicut se habent caro et ossa ad formam* hominis, aut
lapis et es ad formam circuli vel trigoni.
* formam scr.] formas M Pv
14 introduction
The plural is very odd and could be justifiable only if Paul wished to talk
about a plurality of forms in a human beingwhich is not the case with the
present passage.
Tr. 2, c. 3, p. 395, 1317

Generaliter ergo, species et individua reperta* in materia sensibili vel ymag-
inabili habent duplicem compositionem, videlicet realem et rationis; species
autem et individua, que non habent nisi materiam intelligibilem et rationis,
tantum** unam compositionem habent .
* et individua reperta scr.] reperte et individua M Pv ** tantum scr.] tamen M Pv
This is a rather difficult passage. Since reperte should naturally go with
in materia sensibili, there seems to be something wrong with the order
of words. Moreover, et individua cannot be excised as is shown by the
continuation of the text (species autem et individua etc.). Therefore, I printed
species et individua reperta. One might suspect that reperta got misplaced
at some point and then was modified in accordance with its new position.
Alternatively, one might think that the words et individua were added in
the margin by Paul himself at a later timein which case the text need
not be corrected. The corruption from tantum into tamen, by contrast, is
easily explainable, the two terms being paleographically very close, and the
correction is natural enough.
Tr. 2, c. 4, p. 420, 35
Cum ergo differentia additur generi, non est additio essentie ad essentiam,
sed conceptus ad conceptum tamquam alicuius indicantis distincte quod*
per genus significatur confuse.
* quod scr.] quid M Pv
The sense requires a relative and not an interrogative pronoun.
Tr. 2, c. 4, p. 421, 1217

Sicut enim aliquando simplici nomine materie significatur materia cum pri-
vatione, scilicet quando privatio est innominata, ut es, quod dicitur signifi-
care es infiguratum* quando ex ere fit statua, ita quando forma est innom-
inata materia simplici nomine significat materiam et formam, non quidem
determinatam sed in communi, et sic materia est genus.
infiguratum scr.] in figura M Pv
in figura does not make much sense, for what we would expect is a privative
term. infiguratum is the natural correction to make, given that Paul uses the
same term elsewhere in the same context (cf. Tr. 2, c. 1, p. 238, 2728).
introduction 15
Tr. 2, c. 4, p. 433, 37
Volatile ergo aquaticum et gressibile non sunt in predicamento substantie
nisi secundum famositatem et per accidens, ratione connotationis* extranee :
connotant enim aerem, aquam et terram, sed magis sunt in predicamento
qualitatis, connotantia organizationem et figuram.
* connotationis scr.] connectationis M Pv
The continuation of the text (connotantia) makes it clear that connotationis

is required, the point being that terms like aquaticum and gressibile fall
within the category of substance only on account of their connotation, i.e.
only because, from an etymological point of view, they make reference to
substances such as air, water and fire.
Tr. 3, c. 1, p. 441, 2427

De duobus primis modis accipiendi substantiam determinatum est ante,
videlicet de subiecto et quiditate. De subiecto* quidem, quod aliquando
est ens in actu subiectum accidentibus, ut animal cui insunt passiones, et
quandoque est subiectum in potentia, ut materia subiecta forma substantiali.
De quiditate
* subiecto scr.] substantia M Pv
As the context shows, substantia cannot be right: as Paul recalls, earlier on

in Book VII Aristotle has talked about the first two ways of understanding
substance, i.e. as subject and as quiddity. And it is precisely Aristotles dis-
cussion of the subject that Paul summarises. What is required, therefore, is
subiecto and not substantia. The mistake is explainable with the paleograph-
ical similarity of the two terms.
Tr. 3, c. 2, p. 485, 1620

ita Deus habet in se duplicem conceptum, unum quidem speculativum,
per quem infinita cognoscit, et iste conceptus est divina essentia sub infinitis
respectibus creaturarum, alium* vero per quem cognoscit et operatur, et iste
est ydea formaliter differens ab essentia divina.
* alium scr.] aliquando M Pv
aliquando does not make sense. Alium seems to be the most natural correc-
tion.
Tr. 3, c. 2, p. 487, 915

Dictum est enim superius quod nullus generat* vel corrumpit quiditatem,
sed individuum. Hec autem intelligenda sunt cum nota perseitatis, ita quod
16 introduction
individuum est illud quod per se generat et per se generatur, per se corrumpit
et per se corrumpitur, quiditas autem et essentia individui non per se generat
nec per se generatur, non per se corrumpit nec per se corrumpitur, sed per
accidens, ratione individui, omnes has recipit predicationes.
* generat scr.] generatur M Pv
The pair corrumpit corrumpitur shows that generat is required.
Tr. 3, c. 2, p. 494, 1820

Ita stat quod nomina posita in diffinitione ydee singularis, separata sint
communia et competant alteri, tamen coniuncta sunt propria illius ydee et
nulli alteri competunt*.
* competunt scr.] competit M Pv
The plural seems to be needed in this case.
Tr. 3, c. 2, p. 502, 2224

Et arguitur quod secundum esse quod habet in anima, quia diffinitio est ratio
indicans quod quid est rei, per Aristotelem, primo Topicorum; sed ipsum*
quod quid est intellectus est obiectum
*ipsum scr.] ipsius M Pv
ipsius is clearly a mistake, because the point is that the quod quid est itself
(i.e. the thing of which the definition is the formula) is the object of the
intellect.
Tr. 3, c. 2, pp. 503, 34504, 2

Quando autem tota species salvatur in unico individuo nec potest esse extra
illud, non apparet differentia inter* speciem et individuum, sicut est sol et
luna
* inter scr.] extra M Pv
The correction is necessary. The error can be easily accounted for by the
presence of extra in the same sentence.
Tr. 3, c. 2, p. 506, 1216

Minor vero declaratur, eo quod genus eque primo dividitur per differentias
contrarias; et differentia adveniens generi constituit speciem; ergo non est
ratio quare magis salvabitur genus in unica specie constituta* per unam
differentiam quam in alia constituta* per aliam differentiam.
* constituta constituta scr.] constitutiva constitutiva M Pv
introduction 17
constitutiva cannot be right, because the species is constituted through the

differentia and is not constitutive of it. In any case, per unam differentiam
requires constituta.
Tr. 3, c. 2, p. 509, 46
In oppositum arguitur sic: diffinitio est solum incorruptibilium* et eorum que
sub arte cadunt aut sub scientia; singularia autem aut sunt corruptibilia aut
non cadunt sub arte neque sub scientia, quia sunt infinita.
* incorruptibilium scr.] corruptibilium M Pv
Definition concerns incorruptible things and so the correction is necessary.

The error is due to aplography (m-in).
Tr. 3, c. 2, p. 509, 78
Respondetur quod, cum diffinitio detur causa innotescendi, oportet quod
exprimat* principia rei
* exprimat scr.] exprimet M Pv
The future is hardly tenable and so I corrected it into exprimat.
Tr. 3, c. 3, p. 525, 57
dicentes quod homini sensibili respondet homo separatus eiusdem speciei,
et equo corruptibili respondet equus* separatus eiusdem speciei.
* equus scr.] homo M Pv
The mistake is evident and the correction natural.
Tr. 3, c. 3, p. 528, 1013

Quod quidem verum non est, quia sensibilia non sunt actu sensata nisi
actualiter sentiantur; ergo, a pari*, intelligibilia non sunt actualiter intellecta
nisi actualiter intelligantur.
* a pari scr.] opera M Pv
opera does not make sense. Paul is drawing a comparison between the
objects of sense and those of the intellect. What we need, therefore, is an
expression indicating analogy or similarity. Paleographically speaking, a
pari seems to be close enough to opera and so should be the right correction
to make.
18 introduction
Tr. 3, c. 3, p. 530, 2024

Ad primum dicitur quod, proprie loquendo de generatione et corruptione,
ut* sunt termini alterationum precedentium, iuxta doctrinam Philosophi,
primo De generatione, nullus motus nec aliquod tempus est generabile vel
corruptibile. Accipiendo autem large pro omni inceptione vel desinitione, sic
conceditur tempus et motum generari et corrumpi
* ut scr.] non M Pv
non, besides being syntactically difficult, does not give a good sense. Paul is
distinguishing two ways of talking about generation and corruption and so
ut should be right.
Tr. 3, c. 4, p. 539, 13
Et licet questio quid est rosa? non presupponit esse rose quod est esse*
existentie, tamen presupponit esse rose quod est esse essentie
* esse scr.] ens M Pv
Of course, esse existentie is the right, technical expression.
Tr. 3, c. 4, p. 542, 912

ut ostendit Philosophus, secundo Posteriorum*, dicens quod, si queritur
propter quid linea est recta, respondetur per formam, quia medium non
discrepat ab extremis
* Posteriorum scr.] Phisicorum M Pv
The reference is to An. Post., II, 11, a chapter Paul refers to often in the course
of his discussion of the question propter quid.
Tr. 3, c. 4, p. 549, 1617

Syllogismi etiam demonstrativi facientis* scire medium est propter quid est,
ut habetur secundo Posteriorum.
* facientis scr.] facientes M Pv
The sentence is slightly odd, but the genitive singular seems to be required,
the meaning being that the propter quid is the middle term of the syllogism
that produces knowledge.
b. Omissions
M and Pv also share a certain number of omissions. In most cases the omis-
sion concerns small particles and the correction is unproblematic given the
introduction 19
general sense of the passage. In other cases, the missing words can be easily
conjectured from the context. Four cases, however, seem to be less obvious.
Tr. 1, c. 1, p. 31, 1723

Nam si querimus quale quid est hoc?, respondemus per accidentia predica-
menti qualitatis et non per aliquod predicabile alterius predicamenti, quia
dicimus quod illud est bonum vel malum, calidum aut frigidum, non autem
dicimus quod sit homo vel animal, bicubitum aut tricubitum. Quia dum quer-
itur de qualitate, non debet responderi per aliquod haliudi predicabile
Without my integration the text makes little sense. Pauls point cannot
possibly be that when we ask about quality we should not answer through
any predicables whatsoever, but rather that we should not answer through
predicables belonging to some other category. Integrating aliud seems to
be the shortest way of restoring a good sense. Alteratively, one could simply
correct aliquod into aliud. I chose to integrate the text in consideration of
the phrase per aliquod predicabile alterius predicamenti, which makes me
think that aliquod is genuine, after all.
Tr. 1, c. 3, p. 168, 2125

equalitas enim diffinitur per quantitatem et imparitas per numerum et
femininitas per animal. Hec autem sunt proprie passiones, ideo diffiniuntur
per subiecta sua, alioquin non concernerent illa, neque cum eisdem facerent
proprias hpassionesi secundi modi, contra doctrinam primi Posteriorum.
The missing word should be passiones. There is something awkward in
Pauls turn of phrase here, but alioquin should be referred back to diffini-
untur per subiecta sua: the properties just mentioned are per se properties
(passiones) and hence are defined through their subjects. If they were not so
defined they would not, in fact, pertain exclusively (concernerent) to their
subjects, nor would they be per se properties of such subjects.
Tr. 2, c. 1, p. 233, 2129

Respondetur quod calor non est principium agens simpliciter, sed est princip-
ium agens per se; confricatio autem et vini potatio sunt agentia per accidens.
Non etiam calor est pars sanitatis formaliter sumpte ut est habitus vel dis-
positio prime speciei qualitatis, sed est pars sanitatis materialiter sumpte,
que est adequatio qualitatum primarum et congregatio omnium eorum que
ad sanitatem formalem concurrunt effective et subiective simul neque acci-
dentaliter. Hic adequatio vel congregatio hnon sumituri formaliter, ut dicit
tantum respectum de predicamento relationis, sed materialiter, ut importat
fundamentum
20 introduction
I have integrated non sumitur on account of Pauls use, a few lines above,
of the expressions formaliter sumpte and materialiter sumpte. Non accipitur
might also have been an equally good integration.
Tr. 2, c. 1, p. 236, 2429

Et ista est causa propter quam illud ex quo fit aliquid predicatur de generato
hformaliter veli denominative et aliquando non predicatur formaliter neque
denominative. Si enim illud ex quo fit aliquid sit subiectum, necessario predi-
catur de eo formaliter vel denominative, et quia ex lapide fit statua tamquam
ex subiecto, ideo statua est lapidea.
The passage shows that the integration of formaliter vel is needed. For
one thing, Pauls example shows that he has in mind a case where that
from which something comes to be is predicated of it either formally or
denominatively. For another, logically speaking, the correct negation of non
formaliter neque denominative is formaliter vel denominative. I also suspect
that an aliquando has dropped after aliquid in the expression illud ex quo
fit aliquid predicatur de generato, but I did not supply it, the correction not
being absolutely necessary.
c. Additions
Among the various cases where I thought that excision was needed in order
to restore an acceptable sense, three in particular deserve discussion, in that
they do not concern single words or short expressions, but rather entire
sentences.
Tr. 2, c. 3, pp. 389, 32390, 2

Sicut enim in substantiis et accidentibus simplicibus differentia adveniens
generi constituit speciem et ex hoc dicuntur partes specie, ita in accidentibus
[simplicibus differentia adveniens generi constituit speciem et ex hoc dicun-
tur partes speciei, ita in accidentibus] copulatis forma adveniens subiecto
constituit speciem et ex hoc subiectus et forma dicuntur partes speciei
There is clearly something wrong with the text transmitted by both M and
Pv. The error seems to be a case of dittography (the sentence simplicibus
accidentibus is written twice) due to homoteleuton: in all evidence, after
writing the second occurrence of accidentibus, the copyist just went back
to the first one and copied the sentence simplicibusaccidentibus once
again. Errors due to dittography have usually no conjunctive value, in that
they might have been made independently by the different manuscripts. In
consideration, however, of the extension of the repetition, the error is worth
mentioning in the present context.
introduction 21
Tr. 3, c. 3, p. 551, 1320

Demonstratio enim per quam probatur quod Deus est actus purissimus est
demonstratio propter quid a priori, aggenerans scientiam. Non tamen reali-
ter differunt primum simpliciter et Deus et actus purissimus, ex quibus fit illa
demonstratio, sed differunt ratione ; et non solum ex opere intellectus, sed
ex natura rei [prius et primum simpliciter est causa propter quam Deus est
actus purissimus, et] esse primum simpliciter est causa propter quam Deus
est actus purissimus.
The text as in M and Pv cannot stand, simply because the thought that Gods
being unqualifiedly first is the cause of His being pure actuality is formulated
twice. My excision seems to give an acceptable sense, even though one is left
with the impression that there is something wrong with these lines.
3.2. The Value of M and Pv

Since M and Pv are two independent witnesses of Pauls commentary,
they are of equal value when it comes to reconstructing the text. This is
confirmed by the analysis of the readings transmitted by both manuscripts.
None of the two extant manuscripts is uncomparably superior to the other:
all in all, both of them are generally fairly correct and preserve an equal
number of good readings. In the case of indifferent readings, however, I
generally preferred to follow M in that its testimony seems to be slightly
more reliable. There are in fact some peculiar features of Pv that seem
to indicate a certain tendency on the manuscripts part to normalise and
simplify the text:
(i) Pv contains a higher number of material mistakes and accidents: larger
omissions, iterations, corrections, and portions of text omitted and
recovered in the margins.
(ii) The manuscript has a certain tendency to introduce coordinative con-
junctions even when none is strictly required.
(iii) Pv also shows a certain dislike of variations.
(iv) Finally, Pv often presents a longer text by introducing additional
words which are not present in M or by filling in the abbreviating for-
mulae (like et cetera, huiusmodi and the like) we encounter in M. Here
are a couples of examples among the many others:
Tr. 2, c. 3, p. 341, 2123
Partes quantitative sunt ille que componuntur ex materia et forma, et quarum
remotionem sequitur remotio totius, ut caro, nervi* et huiusmodi in homine.
* nervi M] cor epar et cerebrum add. Pv
22 introduction
Tr. 2, c. 3, p. 341, 34342, 3

Et ideo, diffiniendo hominem per materiam et animam intellectivam, oportet
intelligere ad perfectam notitiam hominis carnem, sanguinem* et huius-
modi, sicut non perfecte cognoscitur domus nisi cognoscantur lapides, ligna,
tectum et huiusmodi**.
* sanguinem M] et ossa cor epar cerebrum add. Pv ** huiusmodi M] paries et funda-
mentum Pv.
Admittedly, these examples might also be taken the other way round, i.e.
as omissions on Ms part. However, in consideration of the other features
of Pv I mentioned at points (ii) and (iii) above, I am inclined to take Pvs
additions as further evidence of the manuscripts tendency to normalise
and simplify the text. The additions, in other words, are better intepreted
as later glosses or clarifications that somehow found their way into the text.
In consideration of these general features of Pvs testimony, I followed M
when other things were equal.
4. Aristotles and Averroess Texts
Aristotle. The text of Aristotle which Paul quotes in his Expositio is William
of Moerbekes revision and translation of the Metaphysics, which has been
edited by Vuillemin-Diem in volume XXV 3 of the Aristoteles Latinus (Moerb.
in the apparatus). The existence of a critical edition of Moerbekes transla-
tion allows us to form a precise idea of the text which the Austin Master
was reading when commenting on the Metaphysics. The sense in which the
critical edition of Moerbekes translation is useful for the reconstruction of
the text Paul was reading should not be misunderstood. As is well known,
the portions of a literal commentary that are most subject to corruption
and contamination are precisely the lemmas of the text that is being com-
mented upon. Over the century and a half separating Moerbekes activity
from Pauls, the text of the translation had certainly undergone a process of
radical corruption and contamination with the result that the text of Latin
Aristotle that Paul was reading must have been very different from the orig-
inal of Moerbekes work, which is reconstructed in the critical edition. It is
precisely such a corrupted and contaminated text that the editor of Paul of
Venice should try to reconstruct. This implies that the editor should not cor-
rect the textlet alone on the basis of the critical edition. This is in fact the
general policy I followed in the present critical edition. It remains true, how-
ever, that the existence of a critical edition of Moerbekes translation may
help us to evaluate more precisely the extent to which the Latin Aristotle
introduction 23
was corrupted and contaminated by singling out, for instance, the different
manuscripts of Moerbeke tradition to which the text read by Paul is closer
at different points.
Concretely, when we try to reconstruct the text of Aristotle that Paul
was actually reading, we seem to be confronted with four different cases.
(1) In some rare cases, one of the two manuscripts reads the text printed
in Vuillemin-Diems edition and the reading of the other manuscript is
also attested in the manuscript tradition of Moerbeke. (2) In some other
cases, one of the two manuscripts reads the same text as the critical edi-
tion, but the reading of the other manuscript is not attested in Moerbekes
manuscript tradition. In cases (1) and (2), I have considered of no partic-
ular importance the agreement between one of the two manuscripts and
Moerbekes critical text and tried, instead, to determine which text Paul was
reading by looking at his literal exposition. Other things being equal, I gen-
erally printed Ms text in accordance with my slight preference for M. (3) In
a large number of cases, both manuscripts have a reading different from the
one chosen by Vuillemin-Diem, but attested by Moerbekes manuscript tra-
dition. In these cases, I have always printed the text of M and Pv. (4) There
are finally cases where the text of M and Pv is not attested in Moerbekes tra-
dition. These include some instances of omissions. In all such cases I have
tried to resist the temptation of correcting the text and printed Moerbekes
critical text only when it seems to be presupposed by Pauls literal exposi-
tion.
In cases (1), (2) and (3) I reported in my critical apparatus the manuscripts
of Moerbekes tradition with which either M or Pv or both agree as well
as the pieces of information provided by Vuillemin-Diem. From the study
of cases (1), (2) and (3) it emerges that there is no manuscript or family of
manuscripts in particular that M and Pv consistently follow. Admittedly,
there are a certain number of agreements with one or another of three
manuscripts transmitting the so-called Italian text of Moerbekes work, i.e.
Da (Vat., Pal. lat. 1060), Op (Patav., bibl. Univ. 453) and Si (Scorial., bibl.
monas. f. II.1 M). But this datum is counterbalanced by a substantial number
of coincidences with manuscripts transmitting the Parisian text as well. This
is further evidence of the process of contamination and corruption that
Moerbekes text must have undergone by the time of Pauls commentary.
Averroes. In the absence of a critical edition of Averroes Long Commen-
tary on the Metaphysics the only point of reference for an assessment of
Pauls quotation remains the 1562 edition, printed in Venice by Giunta (Iunt.
in the apparatus). I registered in the critical apparatus the main differences
between the text quoted by Paul and the Venice edition. Such differences,
24 introduction
however, should be handled carefully. For Pauls quotations are often impre-
cise, full of gaps and rather loose as to their syntactical structure. Only
the critical edition of Averroess text may clarify whether such peculiari-
ties must be put down to Pauls own way of making reference to the text
or rather correspond to some genuine readings in the tradition of the Latin
Averroes. In the case of Averroes as well, I tried to correct the text as little as
possible in order to present the readers with the text of Averroes as reported
by Pauls manuscripts. In all cases, I have tried to determine which text of
Averroes Paul was reading by looking at his explanation of the Arabic com-
mentators words. Occasionally, I have supplied words which are missing in
M and Pv when they seemed to be presupposed by Pauls comments.
CONSPECTUS SIGLORUM
Codices Aristotelis Metaphysicae
J Vindoboniensis, bibl. nat. phil. gr. 100

E Parisinus, bibl. nat. gr. 1853
Ab Florentinus, bibl. Laur. 87, 12
Codices Recensionis et Translationis Guillelmi
A. Textus Italici
Da Vaticanus, bibl. apost., Palat. lat. 1060
Id Inticensis, bibl. Capit. 16
Op Patavinus, bibl. Univ. 453
Ry Ragusensis, bibl. Conv. frat. Praed. 6
Si Scolariensis, bibl. monasterii f. II.i
Zl Venetus, S. Marci 1639 (Z.L. 235)
B. Textus Parisiacus (P)

1. Textus exemplaris Pariasici antiquioris (P1)
Aj Assisiensis, bibl. comm. 280
F Florentinus, bibl. Laur. Leop. Med. Fesul. 167
Gp Brugensis, bibl. publ. 478
Il Vaticanus, bibl. Apost., Barb. Lat. 165 A
Je Monacensis, bibl. Bavarica publ., Clm 162
Ne Neapolitanus, bibl. Nat. VIII.E.45
Nm Neapolitanus, bibl. nat. VIII.E.24
Th Turonensis, bibl. munic. 679
Uc Parisinus, bibl. Mazar. 3460
Uj Lipsiensis, bibl. Univ 1339
Uu Vaticanus, bibl. apost., Vat. lat. 2082
Uv Vaticanus, bibl. apost., Vat. lat. 2083
Xa Florentinus, bibl. Laur., Ashburn. 1674
Xy Cantabrigensis, bibl. Univ. Ii,II,10
Zp Parisinus, bibl. nat., lat. 17809
Zz Pampalonensis, bibl. capit. 8
26 conspectus siglorum
2. Textus exemplaris Parisiaci (P2)

Kw Parisinus, bibl. nat., lat. 16584
Fb Florentinus, bibl. Laur., Plut. LXXXIV, 3
Hs Cusanus, bibl. Hosp. 182
Nd Venetus, bibl. S. Marci 2462
Rj Remensis, bibl. munic. 868
SJ Spinalensis, bibl. munic. 104
To Tolosanus, bibl. munic. 733
Codices Pauli Veneti Expositionis Metaphisicorum
M Casale Monferrato, Biblioteca del Seminario, I a(35)

Pv Pavia, biblioteca Universitaria, Fondo Aldini 324
Abbreviationes aliae quae in apparato critico usitantur
Anon. Metaphysica, Translatio Anonyma sive Media. Lib. IX XIIXIV (AL XXV 2)
Junt. Averrois Cordubensis In Aristotelis Metaphysicorum Libros Commentar-
ium, in Aristotelis Opera cum Averrois Commentariis, Venetiis, apud Junc-
tas, 15621574 (repr. Frankfurt a. M.: Minerva, 1962), vol. VIII
Moerb. Metaphysica, Recensio et Translatio Guillelmi de Moerbeka. Lib. IXIV (AL
XXV 3.2)
add. addidit, -erunt
corr. correxit, -erunt
correct. correctio, -ione, ionem
del. delevi, -it
exp. expunxit
fort. fortasse
i.l. in linea
inv. invertit, -erunt
iter. iteravit, -erunt
mg. margine
om. omisit, -erunt
pr.m. prima manu
praem. praemisit, -erunt
s.l. supra lineam
scr. scripsi, -it, -erunt
sec.m. secunda manu
secl. seclusi
suppl. supplevi
var. err. varie erravit, -erunt
[] textus ab editore deletus
hi textus ab editore suppletus
aeremterram a verbo aerem usque ad verbum terram
aerem terram verbum aerem et verbum terram
PAULI VENETI
EXPOSITIO IN DUODECIM LIBROS METAPHISICE ARISTOTELIS
LIBER VII
hLIBER VIIi
hTRACTATUS Ii
hCAPITULUM Ii
1ra M Ens dicitur multipliciter h1028a10ssi.

234vb Pv Iste est septimus Metaphisice Aristotelis, in quo ipse determinat de 5
substantia, in qua principaliter salvatur ratio entis, postquam in sexto
determinavit de ipso ente in communi, ostendens quod ad metaphisicum
spectat considerare ens in quantum ens, excludendo tamen a sua consi-
deratione tam ens per accidens quam ens in anima. Metaphisicus ergo
solum considerat ens per se, et quia substantia est maxime ens per se, 10
ideo ad ipsum de substantia precipue considerare pertinet.
Dividitur ergo liber iste in tres tractatus, in quorum primo Philosophus
determinat de substantia secundum suam quiditatem per comparatio-
nem ad accidentia; in secundo considerat de illa secundum generationem
et corruptionem, ibi: Horum autem que fiunt h1032a12ssi; in tertio vero 15
perscrutatur de eadem secundum communitatem et [perscrutationem]
predicationem, ibi: Quoniam vero de substantia h1038b1ssi.
Primus tractatus dividitur in quatuor capitula, quorum primum mani-
festat dignitatem substantie; secundum distinguit multiplicitatem illius,
235ra Pv ibi: Dicitur autem substantia h1028b33ssi; | tertium ostendit quiditati- 20
vam rationem eiusdem, ibi: Et primo dicemus h1029b13ssi; quartum vero
declarat identitatem quiditatis sue cum suo esse, ibi: Utrum autem idem
h1031a15ssi.
Primum capitulum dividitur in duas partes, in quarum prima facit quod
dictum est; in secunda vero ostendit quanta sit evidentia et certitudo 25
substantie, ibi: Videtur autem substantie h1028b8ssi. Prima pars dividitur
iterum in duas, in quarum prima premittit unam distinctionem superius
positam et declaratam quinto huius, in secunda vero exequitur de intento
per conclusiones, ibi: Totiens autem h1028a13ssi.
Quantum ad primum sit hec distinctio, quod ens multipliciter dici- 30
tur, quoniam aliquando significat substantiam tam primam quam secun-
dam, scilicet essentiam substantie et individuum eius, ut hominem et
hunc hominem, animal et hoc animal; aliquando significat qualitatem,
f. 1rv M (= pp. 29, 434, 11) vacat perscrutationem secl.

30 pauli veneti
ut album et nigrum, bonum et malum; aliquando significat quantitatem,

ut pedale et bipedale, bicubitum et tricubitum; aliquando significat rela-
tionem, ut simile et dissimile, equale et inequale, et sic consequenter
secundum alia predicamenta. Ita quod, sicut sunt decem predicamenta,
proportionaliter modis decem accipitur ens, sic quod entium quoddam 5
est substantia, quoddam qualitas, quoddam quantitas et sic de aliis.
Lege litteram: Ens dicitur multipliciter, sicut divisimus in hiis que de
quotiens, idest in quinto huius, in quo distinguitur quotiens dicitur unum-
quodque nominum ad metaphisicum pertinentium. Significat enim
ipsum ens hoc quidem quid est, scilicet substantiam secundam, et hoc ali- 10
quid, scilicet substantiam primam, illud vero quod quale aut quantum aut
aliorum unumquodque predicamentorum sic.a
Notandum, secundum Commentatorem, commento primo, quod
hoc nomen ens quandoque significat quiditatem demonstrate sub-
stantie, et quandoque ipsam substantiam demonstratam, et quan- 15
doque aliquod accidens in istis substantiis non ita quod declarent
substantiam, sed predicantur secundum quale aut secundum quan-
tum aut ubi aut quando aut alio modo.b
Intendit Commentator per substantiam demonstratam individuum pre-
dicamenti substantie et per quiditatem substantie demonstrate genus 20
aut speciem eiusdem predicamenti, et concedit quod in utraque ista-
rum substantiarum sunt accidentia predicabilia de illis, non predicatione
declarante quid est substantia, sed solum predicatione indicante qualis et
quanta est substantia, aut ubi et quando invenitur illa substantia. Si enim
queritur quid est Sortes aut homo?, numquam respondebitur tantus vel 25
talis, hic aut nunc, sed quod est animal aut corpus vel substantia; sed
si queritur quantus est Sortes?, respondebitur convenienter quod bicu-
bitus aut tricubitus; et si queritur qualis est ille?, convenienter dicitur
quod albus vel niger; et si queritur ubi aut quando est aliquis illorum?,
convenienter respondetur quod in hoc loco et in illo tempore. Huiusmodi 30
ergo accidentia non declarant quiditatem substantie, sed solum indicant
dispositiones que sunt de illa.
sicut] prius add. Moerb. (om. P) predicamentorum sic] sic predicatorum Moerb.
demonstrate substantie inv. Iunt. secundum2 om. Iunt. indicante] quid
add. et del. Pv qualis et scr.] et qualis Pv
a Aristotle, Met., VII, 1, 1028a1013 (AL XXV 3.2, p. 132, lin. 36). b Averroes, In Met., VII, t.c.
1, ed. Venice 1562, fol. 153BC.

expositio in vii librum metaphisice aristotelis i 31
Totiens autem h1028a13ssi.

Ista distinctione premissa, Philosophus exprimit quatuor conclusiones
declarantes dignitatem substantie, quarum prima est hec: quiditas signifi-
cans substantiam inter omnia entia est ens primum simpliciter. Secunda
conclusio: substantia est magis ens quam accidens, ibi: Unde et utique 5
h1028a20ssi. Tertia conclusio: substantia est causa omnium acciden-
tium in essendo, ibi: Palam ergo h1028a29ssi. Quarta conclusio: sub-
stantia est causa omnium accidentium in cognoscendo, ibi: Multipliciter
h1028a31ssi.
Prima conclusio dupliciter arguitur, et primo sic: illud est simpliciter 10
primum ens quod terminat questionem querentem quid est; sed inter
omnia entia sola quiditas significans substantiam terminat questionem
quid est; ergo inter omnia entia sola quiditas significans substantiam
est simpliciter primum ens. Tenet consequentia cum maiori, quia, sicut
quiditas prius est quam sit qualitas et quantitas et alia subsequentia pre- 15
dicamenta, ita questio quid precedit questionem quantum et quale
et omnem aliam questionem accidentalem. Sed minor declaratur. Nam
si querimus quale quid est hoc?, respondemus per accidentia predica-
menti qualitatis et non per aliquod predicabile alterius predicamenti,
235rb Pv quia dicimus quod illud | est bonum vel malum, calidum aut frigidum, 20
non autem dicimus quod sit homo vel animal, bicubitum aut tricubitum.
Quia dum queritur de qualitate, non debet responderi per aliquod haliudi
predicabile; similiter, dum queritur quantum quid est hoc?, respondetur
quod bicubitum vel tricubitum, non autem bonum vel malum, nec homo
vel animal; ergo pariformiter dum queritur quid est homo?, non debet 25
responderi quod bonum vel malum, calidum vel frigidum, bicubitum vel
tricubitum neque per aliud predicatum accidentale, sed solum per predi-
catum substantiale, dicendo quod homo vel animal, Deus aut celum.
Lege litteram: Totiens autem ente dicto palam quia horum primum
ens quod quid est, quod significat substantiam. Nam cum dicimus quale 30
quid hoc, aut bonum dicimus aut malum, sed non tricubitum aut hominem;
quando vero quid est, nec album nec calidum nec tricubitum, sed hominem
aut deum,a videlicet orbem, secundum expositionem Commentatoris.b
aliud suppl. cum] quando Moerb.
a Aristotle, Met., VII, 1, 1028a1318 (AL XXV 3.2, p. 132, lin. 611). b Averroes, In Met., VII,
t.c. 2, fol. 153H.
32 pauli veneti
Secundo sic: illud est simpliciter primum ens quod non presupponit
aliud ens; sed sola quiditas significans substantiam non presupponit aliud
ens; ergo sola quiditas est simpliciter primum ens. Tenet consequentia
de se, et minor est declarata quarto huius,a ex analogia et attributione
omnium accidentium ad substantiam tamquam ad ens primum: dicimus 5
enim quod substantia est ens non quia entis, sed quia est ens in se. Acci-
dentia autem omnia dicuntur entia quia sunt entis taliter vel taliter dispo-
siti, scilicet substantie: aliqua enim accidentia ideo dicuntur entia, quia
sunt quantitates substantie, aliqua sunt entia quia sunt qualitates sub-
stantie, aliqua vero quia sunt actiones vel passiones substantie, et sic de 10
aliis suo modo. Non enim linee, superficies et corpora sunt entia nisi quia
quantificant seu mensurant substantiam secundum longitudinem, latitu-
dinem et profunditatem. Non etiam albedo et nigredo, caliditas et frigi-
ditas sunt entia nisi quia qualificant substantiam, reddentes eam dispo-
sitam ut a sensu percipiatur. Relatio etiam, actio et passio et alia predi- 15
camenta respectiva non sunt entia nisi quia sunt modi et dispositiones
seu circumstantie substantiarum, per quas invicem habitudinem habent
et respectum.
Lege litteram: Alia vero dicuntur entia, scilicet accidentia, eo quod
taliter entis hec quidem qualitates esse, illa vero quantitates, alia vero pas- 20
siones, alia aliud quid tale.b
Notandum primo, secundum Commentatorem, commento se-
cundo, quod Aristoteles intendebat quod predicabilia, que decla-
rant quiditatem de individuis substantie demonstrate, sunt digniora
hoc nomine ens quam predicabilia aliorum accidentium, cum 25
numquam notificant quiditatem substantie In hoc ergo capitulo
intendit declarare quod quiditas individui substantie est prior in
esse quiditatibus accidentium.c
Intendit Commentator quod ratio Philosophi sit ista: illa que magis decla-
rant substantiam demonstratam et primam sunt digniora hoc nomine 30
ens; sed predicabilia predicamenti substantie magis declarant substan-
tiam primam quam predicabilia predicamentorum accidentium, cum
utraque de substantia prima predicetur, sed unum in sua predicatione
indicat quiditatem essentialem, que est intranea rei, reliquum vero indi-
cat dispositionem accidentalem, que est extranea substantie. Si ergo sub- 35
de individuis] individui Iunt. notificant] notificent Iunt.
a Aristotle, Met., IV, 2, 1003a33b12. b Aristotle, Met., VII, 1, 1028a1820 (AL XXV 3.2, p. 132,
lin. 1113). c Averroes, In Met., VII, t.c. 2, fol. 153I.
stantia prima est primum ens, quanto aliquid magis accedit ad illam, tanto
est magis ens; sed substantie secunde magis accedunt ad illam primam
quam accidentia, cum sint de essentia rerum et non accidentia; ergo sub-
stantie secunde sunt magis entia quam accidentia.
Et licet istam rationem intendat Philosophus cum loquitur de sub- 5
stantia in communi, cum dicit illam esse primum ac principale ens inter
omnia predicamenta et predicabilia, dubitatur, quia videtur quod predi-
cabilia accidentium ita bene sument questionem quid est sicut predica-
235va Pv bilia | substantie, quia de ratione generis et speciei est predicari in quid,
secundum Porphyrium;a constat autem in omnibus predicamentis acci- 10
dentium genera et species contineri.
Respondetur quod, licet predicentur in quid et determinent questio-
nem querentem quid est hoc?, demonstrando individuum predicamenti
accidentalis, non tamen demonstrando individuum predicamenti sub-
stantialis; et licet predicentur in quid in abstracto, non tamen in concreto, 15
quia, si queritur quid est hoc?, demonstrando albedinem, respondetur
color, sed si queritur quid est hoc?, demonstrando album, non bene
respondetur coloratum, quia illud quod est album est substantia, ideo
oportet respondere per conceptum substantialem; substantia ergo sim-
pliciter terminat questionem quid est, quia tam in abstracto quam in con- 20
creto, accidens autem solum secundum quid, quia precise in abstracto
questionem terminat quid est. Quando ergo Aristoteles dicit quod illud
est primum et principale ens quod terminat questionem quid est, loqui-
tur de eo quod terminat simpliciter et non secundum quid.
Notandum secundo, secundum Commentatorem, eodem com- 25
mento, quod ista declaratio est logica, et plures demonstrationes
in hac scientia sunt logice, scilicet quoniam propositiones eius sunt
accepte in dialectica. Dialectica usitatur duobus modis: uno modo
secundum quod est instrumentum, et sic usitatur in aliis scientiis;
alio modo secundum quod accipitur illud quod declaratum est in 30
ea in aliis scientiis cum ista scientia considerat ens simpliciter, et
propositiones hdialecticei sunt entis simpliciter, sicut diffinitiones,
descriptiones et alia dicta in eis.b
notandum secundo inv. Pv in] a Iunt. dialectica2] enim add. Iunt.

dialectice suppl. ex Iunt.
a Porphyry, Isag., c. De genere (AL I 67, pp. 6, 267, 2); c. De specie (AL I 67, pp. 8, 229,
7). b Averroes, In Met., VII, t.c. 2, fol. 153K.

34 pauli veneti
Distinctio Commentatoris est ista, quod logica dupliciter usitatur in

aliis scientiis, primo tamquam instrumento, et sic omnis scientia utitur
dialectica, cum ipsa sit scientia organica earum, ut dicit Simplicius, Super
Predicamenta:a accipiunt enim omnes alie scientie a logica modos diffi-
niendi, demonstrandi et sillogizandi, applicantes eos ad materiam pro- 5
priam. Cum enim geometra diffinit, enunciat vel sillogizat in terminis
propriis, scilicet in triangulo et quadrangulo, talem modum loquendi acci-
pit a logico. Secundo usitatur dialectica in aliis scientiis ut principio, in
quantum accipiunt aliquam propositionem declaratam in logica et ea
utuntur tamquam manifesta. Et secundum hoc ratio primo facta a Phi- 10
2ra M losopho | est logica, quia accipit unum quod est declaratum in logica,
videlicet illud esse substantiam et quiditatem rei per quod convenien-
ter respondetur ad questionem querentem quid est hoc?, sicut est genus
et species. Hanc accipit metaphisicus ad probandum quod substantia est
primum ens. Omnes ergo scientie, et si non semper sic utuntur logica tam- 15
quam principio, tamen possunt ea sic uti. Nam logica considerat totum
ens ut est fundamentum rationis, et consequenter versatur circa ea que
consequuntur totum ens, videlicet circa diffinitionem et descriptionem,
divisionem et compositionem, et sic de aliis. Ideo declarata in ea aliis
scientiis applicari possunt, et precipue metaphisice, propter maximam 20
affinitatem quam habet cum ea, cum utraque sit circa totum ens, licet
non eodem modo: considerat enim metaphisicus totum ens ut habet esse
reale, logicus vero ut habet esse rationis.
Contra predicta arguitur, et primo quod substantia non est primum
ens, quia ea que sunt diversa genere non sunt comparabilia, et per con- 25
sequens non potest dici substantia primum ens et accidens posterius.
Secundo arguitur quod non ex eo accidens est ens quia entis. Nam
illud quod est ens secundum se non est ens quia entis; sed accidens est
ens secundum se; ergo et cetera. Tenet consequentia cum maiori. Minor
vero est Philosophi dividentis ens secundum se in decem predicamenta, 30
quinto huius.b
235vb Pv Ad primum dicitur quod comparatio | potest dupliciter fieri, scilicet
proprie et communiter. Comparatio proprie non est secundum genus, sed
earum scr.] eorum Pv possunt] potest M ideo] hec M dicitur] dico M

potestfieri] dupliciter potest accipi et fieri M
a Simplicius, In Cat., Trans. Moerb., ed. Pattin, pp. 6, 1902; 6, 248, 55. b Aristotle, Met., V,
7, 1017a2224.
secundum speciem solum; sed communiter potest esse eorum que diffe-
runt genere vel specie aut sunt diversa genera analogata in aliquo uno.
Constat autem quod ens dicitur analogice de substantia et de accidente
non obstante quod sint diversa genera; ideo comparari possunt sub esse
secundum prius et posterius, cum sit de ratione analogi predicari secun- 5
dum prius et posterius.
Ad secundum respondetur quod ens secundum se dupliciter sumitur,
scilicet absolute et respective. Ens secundum se absolute sumptum est
illud quod dicit unam naturam aut unam intentionem et non aggregatum
ex multis quorum unum accidit alteri. Et isto modo vult Philosophus, 10
quinto huius,a quod tam homo quam albedo sit ens secundum se, sed
homo albus sit ens secundum accidens. Et sic est concedendum quod
accidens est ens secundum se, sive in concreto sive in abstracto accipiatur.
Ens vero secundum se respective sumptum dicitur esse illud quod non
dependet ab alio, et sic accidens non est ens secundum se, sed in alio, 15
iuxta sententiam Aristotelis hic.
Unde et utique h1028a20ssi.
Secunda conclusio: substantia est magis ens quam accidens.
Istam conclusionem Philosophus tripliciter probat, et primo sic: quan-
documque aliqua duo sic se habent quod unum est separabile a reliquo 20
et non econtra, illud quod est separabile est magis ens quam illud quod
non est separabile; sed substantia est separabilis ab accidente et non econ-
tra; ergo et cetera. Tenet consequentia cum prima parte antecedentis, et
secunda est manifesta ex una dubitatione que communiter fit, videlicet
utrum ire, stare, sedere et alia accidentia in abstracto, scilicet albedo et 25
nigredo, caliditas et frigiditas et huiusmodi, sint entia per se existentia aut
non.
Et respondetur quod non, quia nec actu nec potentia nec aptitudine
separantur a substantia. Non enim invenitur sessio neque statio neque
ambulatio sine substantia, quia non est sessio absque sedente neque 30
statio absque stante neque ambulatio absque ambulante; constat autem
2rb M quod sedens, | stans, ambulans sunt substantie, cum de primis substantiis
dicantur hec predicata. Similiter non invenitur albedo sine albo neque
nigredo sine nigro; non est caliditas et frigiditas sine calido et frigido;
obstante] absolute M sumptum] acceptum M sententiam] intentionem M

substantia s.l. Pv sine12] absque Pv
a Aristotle, Met., V, 7, 1017a1319; a2224.

36 pauli veneti
sed indubie nichil est proprie calidum vel frigidum, album vel nigrum
nisi substantia. Ideo non separatur accidens a substantia. Econtra sepa-
ratur autem substantia ab accidente, quia Deus et intelligentie sunt sine
aliquo accidente per Commentatorem, tertio De animaa et duodecimo
huius.b 5
Lege litteram. Unde et utique dubitabit aliquis utrum vadere et sanare
et sedere unumquodque ipsorum sit ens aut non ens, scilicet per se existens;
similiter autem et in aliis talibus, cuius ratio est: nichil enim ipsorum est nec
secundum se aptum natum nec separari possibile a substantia.c
Secundo sic: accidens in concreto est magis ens quam accidens in 10
abstracto, et non nisi ratione subiecti; ergo subiectum est magis ens quam
accidens in abstracto; sed illud est substantia; ergo substantia est magis
ens quam accidens. Prima pars antecedentis declaratur, quoniam sedens
est magis ens quam sessio et sanans quam sanitas et ambulans quam
ambulatio; neque istud indiget probatione, quia est notum ad sensum: 15
videmus enim quod ambulans, sedens et sanans per se existunt, non
autem per se existit ambulatio neque sessio neque sanitas.
Lege litteram: Sed magis siquidem vadens entium est aliquid et sedens
et sanans quam sua abstracta. Hec autem magis apparent entia, quia est
aliquod subiectum ipsis determinatum, hoc autem est substantia.d 20
Tertio sic: quorumcumque predicabilium unum potest de aliquo pre-
dicari sine alio et non econtra, primum est magis ens quam secundum;
236ra Pv sed substantia | et accidens sunt predicabilia quorum substantia potest de
aliquo predicari sine accidente et non econtra; ergo substantia est magis
ens quam accidens. Tenet consequentia cum maiori. Minor declaratur. 25
Nam de substantia prima predicatur substantia secunda, omni accidente
remoto; non autem de aliquo predicatur accidens sine substantia, ut patet
inductive, quia bonum et malum, calidum et frigidum, album et nigrum,
omnino de nullo predicantur absque substantia.
separatur autem inv. Pv prima] autem add. M etambulatio om. M

est notum inv. Pv ambulans om. M existunt] subsistunt M hec M
Moerb.] hoc Pv aliquod] aliquid Moerb. nigrum] sanans et sedens stans et
ambulans add. Pv
a Averroes, In De an.,
III, t.c. 9, pp. 421, 27422, 32. b Averroes, In Met., XII, t.c. 51, fol. 336E.
c Aristotle,
Met., VII, 1, 1028a2024 (AL XXV 3.2, p. 132, lin. 1317). d Aristotle, Met., VII, 1,
1028a2427 (AL XXV 3.2, p. 132, lin. 1719).
Lege litteram: Et unumquodque accidentium sine substantia non

predicatur quod quidem in cathegoria tali apparet, idest in predicatione;
bonun enim aut sedens non sine hoc dicitur, idest sine substantia.a
Notandum, secundum Commentatorem, commento tertio, quod si
concesserimus quod hoc nomen ens significat ista, tunc substantia 5
est dignior ut significetur hoc nomine ens secundum quod apparet
sensui, scilicet quoniam est manifestior apud sensum.b
Ratio Commentatoris est ista: illud est magis et dignius ens quod est magis
notum apud sensum; sed substantia est magis nota apud sensum quam
accidens; ergo substantia est magis ens quam accidens. 10
Ista ratio est multum dubia, quoniam manifestius est apud sensum
illud quod sentitur per se quam illud quod sentitur per accidens; sed acci-
dens sentitur per se et substantia per accidens, ut demonstrant Philoso-
phus et ipse Commentator, secundo De anima;c ergo manifestius est apud
sensum accidens quam substantia. 15
Respondetur quod, licet notitia habita per solum sensum exteriorem
manifestius sit accidens quam substantia, tamen notitia habita per sen-
sum in communi, copulando sensum exteriorem sensui interiori, qui
est cogitativa virtus, manifestior est substantia quam accidens. Quam-
2va M vis enim sensus exterior substantiam solum per accidens | cognoscat, 20
tamen virtus interior cogitativa substantiam cognoscit, cum hec virtus
cognoscat intentiones omnium decem predicamentorum, per Commen-
tatorem, secundo De anima.d Licet ergo hec virtus prius cognoscat acci-
dens quam substantiam, tamen huic virtuti est magis manifestum sub-
stantiam esse ens quam accidens: cognoscit enim hec virtus substantiam 25
esse ens per se existens, accidens autem non cognoscit esse ens nisi in
alio.
Notandum secundo, secundum Commentatorem, eodem com-
mento, quod subiectum primum substantiarum et universalium
earum sunt individua substantie, que sunt terminata per se, scili- 30
cet a locis et superficiebus, quia sunt corpora existentia per se,
sensui scr. ex Iunt.] sensu MPv ipse om. M decem om. Pv notandum
secundo inv. Pv terminata] a se et add. M a om. M
t.c. 3, fol. 154C. c Aristotle, De an., II, 6, 418a2024; Averroes, In De an., II, t.c. 65, p. 227,
1519. d Averroes, In De an., II, t.c. 63, p. 225, 4450.
38 pauli veneti
et quiditas est pars istius substantie, que sunt individua substan-

tiarum particularium, et secundum hec duo dicitur predicamentum
substantie.a
Intendit Commentator quod non solum substantie prime nec tantum
substantie secunde constituunt predicamentum substantie, sed ambo 5
simul, que quidem quadrupliciter differunt.
Primo, quia substantie prime sunt subiecta omnium universalium pre-
dicamenti substantie, non autem substantie secunde. Nam de substantiis
primis predicantur omnia genera et species predicamenti substantie, de
substantiis autem secundis non predicantur omnia genera et species illius 10
predicamenti, eo quod substantie secunde sunt ipsa genera et species pre-
dicamenti substantie.
Secundo differunt, quia substantie prime terminantur per se, substan-
tie autem secunde terminantur per accidens. Unde Sortes et Plato termi-
nantur per se loco et superficie, homo autem et equus et animal tantum 15
per accidens: Sortes enim est per se pedalis aut bipedalis, et Plato per se
est in loco tam proprio quam communi; homo autem et animal non sunt
per se quanta, neque sunt per se in loco neque in tempore, quoniam, cum
talia sint abstracta ab omni quantitate, loco et tempore, ipsa non denomi-
nantur per se aliqua istarum denominationum, sed solum per accidens, 20
ratione individuorum predicamenti substantie.
Tertio differunt, quia substantie prime sunt corpora per se existen-
tia, substantie autem secunde non per se existunt, sed suum esse exi-
stere recipiunt a substantiis primis, dicente Philosopho, in Predicamentis:b
236rb Pv Destructis | primis substantiis impossibile est aliquod horum remanere, 25
scilicet generum et specierum predicamenti substantie. Propterea dicit
Philosophus, primo De generatione:c Homo non generat nec generatur,
sed Sortes et Plato. Actiones enim sunt suppositorum, inquit Philoso-
phus, primo De anima et in prohemio huius.d
Quarto differunt, quia substantie secunde sunt partes formales sub- 30
stantiarum primarum, substantie autem prime non sunt partes forma-
les sed solum subiective substantiarum secundarum. Dicit enim Philoso-
quoniamtempore om. M Predicamentis] quod add. Pv suppositorum]

et non universalium add. Pv in om. Pv
a Averroes, In Met., VII, t.c. 3, fol. 154CD. b Aristotle, Cat., 5, 2b56. c Aristotle, De gen., I,
5, 322a1618. d Aristotle, De an., I, 4, 408a34b18; Met., I, 1, 981a1617.

phus, secundo Phisicorum et quinto huius,a quod omne superius est forma
sui inferioris. Porphyriusb autem dicit, et idem intendit Philosophus,
quarto Phisicorum,c quod species est pars subiectiva generis et indivi-
duum speciei.
Ex hiis videtur ymaginari Commentator quod omnia predicabilia pre- 5
dicamenti substantie analogiam habent ad substantiam primam. Secun-
dum enim quod diversimode aspicitur substantia prima, secundum hoc
fit distinctio generum et specierum predicamenti substantie: nam alio
modo aspicit homo Sortem et alio modo aspicit animal illum, et conse-
quenter ascendendo, ita quod prima substantia continet omnia que sunt 10
in predicamento substantie et aliquid addit, videlicet signationem mate-
rie. Et secundum hoc prima substantia est quoddam totum et omnes alie
quiditates eiusdem predicamenti sunt partes eius. Ymmo videtur velle
Commentator quod omnia predicamenta substantiam primam respici-
ant, licet differenter, quia predicamentum substantie respicit essentia- 15
liter, terminando questionem quid est, alia autem predicamenta respi-
ciunt accidentaliter, terminando questiones importantes qualitatem,
quantitatem, ubi et sic de aliis.
Contra predicta arguitur, et primo quod substantia non est magis ens
2vb M quam accidens, quia accidens non est ens. | Nam medicina ideo nullam 20
habet in se sanitatem, quia dicitur sana solum per attributionem ad sani-
tatem animalis; sed accidens non dicitur ens nisi per attributionem ad
substantiam, ut ostensum est quarto huius;d ergo accidens nullam in se
entitatem habet et per consequens non est ens.
Secundo arguitur quod accidens concretum non est magis ens quam 25
accidens abstractum, quia, si sic, hoc videtur esse ratione subiecti signifi-
cati a concreto, quod non significatur ab abstracto; sed hoc est falsum,
quia concretum et abstractum solum idem significant, scilicet formam
in abstracto, secundum Philosophum dicentem in Predicamentise quod
album solam qualitatem significat. Item, si accidens concretum est magis 30
ens quam abstractum, et ens dividitur in decem predicamenta, ergo acci-
dens concretum est magis in predicamento quam accidens abstractum.
autem] idem add. M qualitatemubi] quantitatem qualitatem ubi et quando

Pv dicentem post Predicamentis Pv significat] et cetera add. Pv
a Aristotle, Phys., II, 3, 194b2629; Met., V, 2, 1013a2629. b Porphyry, Isag., c. De specie (AL
I 67, p. 14, 711). c Aristotle, Phys., IV, 3, 210a1718 (cf. Averroes, In Phys., IV, t.c. 23, ed.
Venice 1562, fol. 230CF). d Aristotle, Met., IV, 2, 1003b610. e Aristotle, Cat., 5, 3b19.
40 pauli veneti
Contra: Philosophus, tertio Topicorum,a dicit quod iustitia est per se in

genere, non iustum.
Ad primum dicitur quod duplex est analogia, videlicet essentialis et
accidentalis. Analogia essentialis est quando omnia analogata suum ana-
logum formaliter recipiunt formalitate completa et incompleta. Verbi gra- 5
tia, substantia analogice dicitur de materia et forma, et utraque est forma-
liter substantia. Hec tamen formalitas substantie non eodem modo reci-
pitur in materia et forma. Nam in forma recipitur complete, cum sit actus
dans nomen et diffinitionem substantialem; in materia autem recipitur
incomplete, cum sit pura potentia tendens in ulteriorem perfectionem 10
tamquam in finem.
Analogia accidentalis est illa quando non omnia analogata formaliter
recipiunt suum analogum, sed unum tantum formaliter et reliquum deno-
minative. Verbi gratia, medicus et vetula analogantur sub medicatione,
non tamen formaliter, quia vetula est medicativa tantum denominative, 15
cum in ea non sit ars medicandi; in medico autem est ars medicandi, ideo
medicus est formaliter medicativus.
Ita in proposito dicitur quod non est similis analogia accidentis ad
substantiam et urine ad animal, quoniam analogia sanitatis urine ad ani-
mal est accidentalis, eo quod urina est tantum denominative sana, in 20
quantum est signum sanitatis, sicut etiam cibus est solum denominative
sanus in quantum est causa sanitatis; ipsum autem animal non solum
denominative est sanum, sed etiam formaliter, eo quod sanitas est for-
maliter in eo. Analogia autem entis, que est accidentis ad substantiam,
236va Pv est analogia essentialis, eo quod tam substantia quam | accidens est for- 25
maliter ens, sed non simili formalitate. Nam formalitas entis recipitur
complete in substantia, in quantum est ens fixum in se ipso, non inclina-
tum ad aliud; sed in accidente recipitur incomplete, in quantum est ens
non in se ipso manens, sed fluens in subiectum et inclinatum in substan-
tiam. 30
Non est ergo dicendum, sicut multi dicunt, quod accidens non est sed
inest, aut quod non est ens sed entis, quia, ex ipso quod substantia est
magis ens quam accidens, et accidens concretum quam abstractum, et
accidens non est ens nisi quia entis, ut concedit Philosophus in littera,
genere] et add. Pv etiam om. M et om. M ex] eo Pv Philosophus]

Aristoteles Pv
a Aristotle, Top., III, 1, 116a2325.

sequitur quod accidens sit ens. Primo enim accidens est ens in quantum
est terminus formalis motus: dicit Philosophus, quinto Phisicorum,a quod
in tribus predicamentis est motus, scilicet in quantitate, qualitate et ubi.
Secundo, in quantum est ratio et instrumentum agendi: non enim ignis
calefaceret mediante caliditate nisi caliditas esset ens. Tertio, in quan- 5
tum est principium essendi: non enim album esset album per albedinem
nisi albedo esset ens. Quarto, in quantum est principium movendi; con-
stat quidem quod accidentia propria et communia per se movent sensum,
3ra M ut ostendunt Philosophus et Commentator, secundo De anima.b | Et ita
oportet concedere quod accidens est ens tam in concreto quam in abs- 10
tracto.c
Et si arguitur sic: si homo currit, humanitas non currit, et si album est
coloratum, albedo non est colorata; ergo, per idem, si album est, albedo
non est, et si album est ens, albedo non est ens; dicitur quod non est simi-
litudo, quia esse et existere sunt verba transcendentia, ideo omnibus 15
competunt, sed currere et sedere sunt verba particularia et non com-
petunt nisi suppositis, per Philosophum, primo De anima.d Consimiliter
dicitur de albo et colorato quod ista sunt nomina limitata non predica-
bilia de abstractis; ens autem et entitas sunt nomina transcendentia, que
indifferenter de omnibus predicantur, iuxta doctrinam Aristotelis, tertio 20
huius.e
Ad secundum conceditur quod concretum significat substantiam et
non tantum formam. Dicit enim Philosophus in litteraf quod vadens et
sedens dicuntur magis entia quam eorum abstracta, quia istis determina-
tur subiectum, quod est substantia, et quod bonum et sedens de nullo dici- 25
tur sine hoc. Et inferius dicit quod dictum secundum accidens non habet
quod quid est propter duplex significare. Septimo autem huiusg dicit quod
simum est dictum ex duobus, unde illud per nomen significatur quod per
diffinitionem exprimitur; constat autem quod per diffinitionem acciden-
tis exprimitur subiectum: hec enim album currit ita impossibilis esset 30
sicut illa albedo currit, si album non significaret aliud quam albedo
si2 om. M verba om. M Philosophum] Aristotelem Pv et2] aut Pv

propter] suum add. M
a Aristotle, Phys., V, 2, 226a2325. b Aristotle, De an., II, 6, 418a720; Averroes, In De an.,

II, t.c. 65, p. 229, 5666. c pp. 40, 3141, 11, cf. Alexander of Alexandria, Exp. Met., VII, c. 1,
q. 1, ed. Venice 1572, fol. 184ravb. d Aristotle, De an., I, 4, 408a3034. e Aristotle, Met., III,
4, 1001a2122. f Aristotle, Met., VII, 6, 1028a2021. g Aristotle, Met., VII, 6, 1031b2224; 5,
1030b1718.
42 pauli veneti
significet. Cum autem dicit Philosophusa quod album solum albedinem

significat, loquitur Philosophus de significatione distincta, unde album
distincte significat albedinem, confuse autem significat subiectum, cum
non concernat magis unum subiectum quam reliquum. Sicut ergo homo
primo et per se significat hominem, et per se non primo animam et cor- 5
pus, prius tamen animam quam corpus, ita album significat primo et
per se album, per se vero non primo significat albedinem et subiectum,
et prius albedinem quam subiectum, videlicet primitate denominationis,
licet prius significet subiectum primitate constitutionis. Et ita intendit
Commentator, octavo huius,b dicens quod nomen primo significat for- 10
mam, secundo aggregatum, idest compositum substantiale aggregatum
illi forme. Et si allegatur Philosophus, quarto huius,c dicens quod illud
quod significatur per nomen est tantum unum, et quod qui unum non
intelligit nichil intelligit, respondetur quod Aristoteles loquitur de signifi-
cato primario nominis univoci, quoniam illud est tantum unum, cum quo 15
stat quod significata secundaria possunt esse plura.
Et ad confirmationem negatur consequentia et dicitur quod tam abs-
tractum quam concretum est per se in predicamento, licet non eodem
modo, quia aliquando concretum est per se primo et abstractum per se
non primo, quandoque vero econtra. Unde in predicamentis absolutis 20
236vb Pv illud quod mediat inter pure | abstractum et pure concretum est per se
primo in predicamento et alia sunt per se non primo. Unde inter huma-
nitatem, que est pure abstractum, et humanum, quod est pure concre-
tum, mediat homo, qui est partim abstractum et partim concretum: est
enim abstractum respectu humani, quod est eius concretum; respectu 25
humanitatis tamen absolute loquendo debet dici concretum, quia signi-
ficat compositum ex materia et forma. Tale ergo est primo et per se in
predicamento, quia sibi proprie convenit ratio generis vel speciei, que
est predicari in quid. Cum enim queritur quid est hoc?, demonstrando
individuum predicamenti substantie, non respondetur humanitas neque 30
humanum, non etiam animalitas neque animale, sed homo et ani-
mal. Et quia albedo mediat inter albedineitatem, que est pure abstractum,
3rb M et album, quod est pure concretumrespectu | quorum dicitur concre-
tum et abstractum, licet absolute dicatur abstractum, quia non significat
nisi formam, ideo per se primo est in predicamento et alia per se non 35
abstractum concretum inv. Pv que] quod M quod est om. Pv
a cf.
supra, p. 39, 29. b Averroes, In Met., VIII, t.c. 7, fol. 215KL. c Aristotle, Met., IV, 4,
1006a2834; 1006b1113.
primo. Albedini autem et colori proprie convenit ratio generis vel spe-
ciei, quia, dum queritur quid est hoc?, demonstrando individuum pre-
dicamenti qualitatis, respondetur quod albedo et color, non autem quod
album neque coloratum, non etiam quod albedineitas vel coloreitas. Et ita
intendit Philosophus, tertio Topicorum,a dicens quod iustitia est in genere 5
per se, idest per se primo; non autem iustum est in genere per se, sed tan-
tum ex consequenti; et quia iustitia est de intrinseca ratione iusti, dicimus
quod iustum est per se non primo in eodem genere et in eodem predi-
camento. Item, in predicamentis autem respectivis non est per se primo
in predicamento concretum substantivum vel adiectivum, sed illud quod 10
est pure abstractum, ita quod paternitas et filiatio, actio et passio et huiu-
smodi, ista sunt per se primo in predicamento, quia predicantur in quid,
non autem pater neque filius, non agens neque patiens, quia hec predi-
cantur accidentaliter tantum.
Et si allegatur Aristoteles, quinto aut sexto aut septimo huius,b qui, divi- 15
dens ens in decem predicamenta, semper accipit dividentia modo con-
creto et non abstracto, dicens quod predicamentorum quedam significant
quid, alia quantum, alia quale, alia ad aliquid, alia ubi, alia quando et
cetera, dicitur quod Aristoteles accipit concreta tamquam notiora ut per
ea abstracta intelligamus, sicut communiter magis exemplificat in artifi- 20
cialibus quam naturalibus, cum artificialia sint nobis magis nota.
Palam ergo h1028a29ssi.
Tertia conclusio: substantia est causa omnium accidentium in essendo.
Probatur dupliciter, et primo sic: illud est causa alterius in essendo
propter quod illud est et non econtra; sed omnia accidentia sunt propter 25
substantiam et non econtra; ergo et cetera. Tenet consequentia cum
maiori, quia ly propter quod dicit causam in essendo. Minor est nota
ex eo quia accidentia non sunt entia nisi quia entis, ut ostensum est in
probatione prime conclusionis.c
Lege litteram: Palam ergo quia propter eam, scilicet substantiam, et 30
eorum singula sunt, scilicet accidentia.d
Secundo sic: illud quod est primum ens et non est ens secundum quid,
sed est ens simpliciter, est causa illius in essendo quod est secundarium
se3] primo add. Pv vel] neque concretum Pv ubiquando] vero alia M

quam] in add. Pv cum sint] quia sunt Pv et om. M essendo] et add.
Pv eorum] illorum Pv Moerb.
a Aristotle, Top., III, 1, 116a2325. b Aristotle, Met., V, 7, 1017a2427; VI, 2, 1026a35b1; VII, 1,
1028a1013. c cf. supra, p. 32, 618. d Aristotle, Met., VII, 1, 1028a2930 (AL XXV 3.2, p. 132,
lin. 2122).
44 pauli veneti
ens et ens secundum quid, ut de se notum est; sed substantia est primum
ens et non est ens secundum quid, sed est ens simpliciter, ut probatum est
in prima conclusione; accidentia autem sunt entia secundaria et secun-
dum quid, ex quo non possunt actu nec aptitudine a substantia separari,
ut est declaratum in probatione secunde conclusionis; ergo substantia est 5
causa omnium accidentium in essendo. Ita quod tam conclusio hec quam
probatio eius sequitur ex probationibus aliarum conclusionum.
Lege litteram: Quare primo ens et non aliquid ens sed ens simpliciter
substantia utique erit, ut probatum est, et ex hoc sequitur quod substantia
sit causa omnium accidentium in essendo.a 10
Notandum primo, secundum Commentatorem, commento tertio,
quod substantie sunt cause essentie accidentium et accidentia non
sunt nisi propter substantias.b
Istud commentum est contra illos qui dicunt quod accidentia depen-
dent a substantia secundum esse et non secundum essentiam, nisi in 15
quantum habent esse. Si ergo secundum esse dependent a substantia,
necesse est quod etiam dependeant a substantia secundum essentiam.
Ideo est dicendum melius quod accidentia dupliciter considerantur, vide-
237ra Pv licet secundum essentiam et | esse aut secundum inherentiam predicati
ad subiectum. Primo modo dependent essentialiter et per se accidentia 20
a substantia, sed non secundo modo. Unde Philosophus, quinto huius,c
dicit quod hominis sunt multe cause, nulla tamen est causa propter quam
3va M homo est homo. | Et quia quelibet istarum est immediata homo est ani-
mal, albedo est color, ergo nullius illarum inherentia predicati ad subiec-
tum habet aliam causam preter illa extrema, et per consequens acciden- 25
tia, et si dependent a substantia secundum essentiam et esse, ac etiam
secundum inherentiam ipsorum accidentium ad substantiam, non tamen
dependent ab illa secundum inherentiam predicati ad subiectum; aliter
iste propositiones albedo est color, linea est quantitas, non essent in
primo modo dicendi per se, oppositum cuius asserit Aristoteles, primo 30
Posteriorum.d
mento, quod cum declaratum est quod hoc nomen ens dicitur
entia] accidentia Pv aliquid Pv Moerb.] aliquod M accidentium post essendo

Pv
t.c. 3, fol. 154E. c Aristotle, Met., V, 18, 1022a3235. d Aristotle, An. Post., I, 4, 73a3437.
de decem predicamentis et dignius de substantiis, et est declara-

tum quod cum plura communicant in eodem nomine et quoddam
dignius, illud quod est dignius isto nomine est causa ceterorum.a
Intendit Commentator istam rationem: quandocumque aliquod nomen
dicitur de duobus, et de uno dignius quam de alio, illud de quo dignius 5
dicitur est causa alterius; sed ens dicitur de decem predicamentis et
dignius de substantia quam de aliquo aliorum predicamentorum acciden-
tium; ergo substantia est causa omnium accidentium.
Sed dubitatur, quia sanum dicitur de animali et cibo, et dignius de ani-
mali quam de cibo; non tamen animal est causa cibi, sed cibus est causa 10
sanitatis animalis. Similiter, substantia dicitur de materia, forma et com-
posito, ut videbitur in secundo capitulo huius tractatus,b et dignius dicitur
de composito quam de materia et forma, cum sit substantia perfectior
quam aliqua illarum; tamen compositum non est causa materie et forme,
sed econtra, cum sint partes essentiales eius. 15
Respondetur secundum Philosophum, quinto huius,c quod non incon-
venit aliquid esse causam alterius et econtra in diversis generibus causa-
rum. Nam ambulatio est causa depositionis cibi in genere cause efficien-
tis, depositio autem cibi est causa ambulationis in genere cause finalis. Sic
in proposito cibus est causa sanitatis in genere cause efficientis, sanitas 20
vero in genere cause finalis est causa cibi. Similiter, forma et materia sunt
causa compositi in genere cause materialis et formalis, ipsum autem com-
positum est causa illarum in genere cause finalis. Et quia finis est causa
causarum, ut habetur secundo Phisicorum,d ideo sanitas est magis causa
cibi quam econtra, et compositum est magis causa materie et forme quam 25
econtrario.
Contra predicta arguitur quod accidens potest esse preter substantiam.
Quo habito, sequitur quod substantia non est causa omnium accidentium
secundum essentiam et secundum esse. Nam, octavo Phisicorum,e dicit
Philosophus quod, si est reperire duo coniunctim, et unum illorum potest 30
esse per se sine alio, necesse est quod econtra illud sine illo per se possit
reperiri, ut quia in eodem simul invenitur movens et motum, et invenitur
et] de add. Pv materia] et add. Pv causa] cause Pv ut habetur om. M

per se2 post possit Pv
a Averroes, In Met., VII, t.c. 2, fol. 153G (even though the words et est declaratumceterorum
do not appear in the Giunta edition). b cf. infra, c. 2, p. 83, 1126. c Aristotle, Met., V, 2,
1013b911. d Aristotle, Phys., II, 8 passim. e Aristotle, Phys., VIII, 7, 260b1719.
46 pauli veneti
motum quod non est movens, ideo etiam invenitur movens quod non est
motum. Constat autem quod substantia et accidens inveniuntur simul
coniuncta et est reperire substantiam sine accidente per primam causam;
ergo etiam est reperire accidens sine substantia.
Secundo sic: omne mobile contingit esse motum, per Philosophum, 5
primo Celi et sexto Phisicorum;a ergo, per idem, omne separabile quan-
doque contingit esse separatum; sed aliquod est accidens separabile a
substantia, per Porphyrium in Universalibusb et per Philosophum, primo
Phisicorum;c ergo contingit accidens separatum esse a substantia.
Tertio sic: omne quod non est necessarium potest non esse, per Aristo- 10
telem, octavo Phisicorum;d sed non est necessarium accidens substantie
inesse, per Philosophum, primo Topicorum,e dicentem: accidens est quod
contingit inesse et non inesse; ergo accidens potest esse sine substantia.
Quarto arguitur per instantias, quoniam lumen non educitur de poten-
tia medii illuminati, sed de potentia corporis luminosi, ex quo ab illo 15
dependet essentialiter tam in fieri quam in facto esse; ergo lumen non est
in subiecto et est accidens; ergo accidens est preter subiectum. Idem patet
de ymagine in speculo, que accidens est; non tamen est subiective in spe-
culo, quia, speculo quiescente, movetur ymago. Et consimiliter videtur de
237rb Pv odore derelicto in manu, quod nullum || subiectum habet. 20
3vb M Ad primum dicitur quod illa auctoritas Philosophi est intelligenda
de hiis que accidentaliter coniuncta sunt non habentia invicem ordi-
nem essentialem, ut si in lacte simul reperitur album et dulce, et album
est sine dulci, scilicet in nive, et econverso dulce est sine albo, scili-
cet in melle. In hiis tamen que habent ordinem essentialem, illud non 25
tenet, quia in eodem coniunguntur simul forma et materia, et inveni-
tur forma sine materia, non tamen potest inveniri materia sine forma.
In eodem etiam coniunguntur simitas et nasus, aut superficies et cir-
culus, et invenitur nasus absque simitate et superficies absque circulo,
non tamen inveniri potest circulus absque superficie neque simitas abs- 30
que naso. Quia ergo substantia essentialiter preordinatur accidenti, potest
esse substantia sine accidente, non autem potest esse accidens sine sub-
stantia.
sic om. Pv Philosophum] ipsum Aristotelem Pv sic om. Pv
a Paul
must have in mind Aristotles remarks in De coel., I, 12, 281b225 and in Phys., III, 4,
203b30. b Porphyry, Isag., c. De accidente (AL I 67, p. 20, 89). c Aristotle, Phys., I, 3,
186b2122. d Aristotle, Phys., VIII, 5, 256b912. e Aristotle, Top., I, 5, 102b47.
Ad secundum dicitur quod, sicut accidens est separabile, ita contingit

ipsum separatum esse. Modo quod accidens sit a suo subiecto separabile
contingit tripliciter: aut utroque manente, et hoc est impossibile; aut
accidente manente, subiecto corrupto, et hoc iterum non potest esse;
aut subiecto manente et accidente corrupto, et hoc est necessarium. Sic 5
enim loquitur Philosophus, quarto Phisicorum,a dicens quod locus est
separabilis a locato, non quod locus posset manere sine locato, sed quia
locatum potest manere corrupto loco.
Ad tertium conceditur quod omne quod non est necessarium potest
non esse; et quod non est necessarium accidens esse in subiecto; et quod 10
accidens potest non inesse suo subiecto, non quidem per corruptionem
subiecti, accidente manente, sed per corruptionem accidentis, non cor-
rupto subiecto.
Ad quartum respondetur quod lumen est in medio subiective et edu-
citur de potentia eius, non obstante quod educatur de potentia corpo- 15
ris luminosi, quia educitur active de potentia corporis luminosi, passive
autem de potentia medii; ideo est subiective in medio et non in corpore
luminoso. Consimiliter dicitur de ymagine, quod est subiective in speculo
neque movetur speculo quiescente, sed continue est alia et alia ymago,
licet hoc non percipiatur. Non tamen inconvenit concedere ymaginem 20
speculi moveri, non moto speculo, dummodo moveatur obiectum ex quo
essentialiter dependet ab illo tam in fieri quam in facto esse: alibi enim
concessib quod talis species potest variare subiectum aut per mutationem
medii aut per mutationem obiecti, numquam tamen potest esse species
visibilis aut ymago absque subiecto. De odore autem dicitur quod non 25
est in manu subiective, sed in fumali evaporatione resoluta a pomo per
caliditatem manus. Que quidem fumalis evaporatio non est accidens, sed
corpus resolutum ab odorabili inexistens manui. Et quod fiat talis resolu-
tio a pomo arguitur per signum. Nam, si pomum longo tempore detineatur
in manu, apparet rugosum et marcescit. Quod non contingeret nisi aliquid 30
a pomo resolveretur.
Intelligendum quod ea que dicta sunt, quod accidens non potest esse
absque subiecto, intelligi debent secundum cursum et naturam parti-
cularium agentium et omnium eorum que materiam presupponunt in
suis actionibus. Quoniam primum agens, quod est agens supernaturale, 35
ex quo in sua actione non presupponit motum neque materiam, potest
a Aristotle, Phys., IV, 2, 209b2228; b3031; 211b36212a2. b Paul of Venice., Exp. De an., Lib.
II, tr. 2, p. 2, c. 1, ed. Venice 1504, fol. 73rbva.

48 pauli veneti
facere accidens sine subiecto aut creando accidens non creato subiecto
aut corrumpendo, annichilando vel transubstantiando subiectum acci-
dente remanente, sicut omni die contingit in sacramento altaris, quia ibi
est quantitas absque subiecto omnino, in ipsa autem quantitate remanent
alia accidentia absque substantia, videlicet colores, odores et sapores et 5
alie qualitates prime et secunde, tam motive quam alterative. Nec ex hoc
ipsa quantitas per se existit, licet nullum subiectum habeat, quia Deus
supplet vices subiecti et ipsa adhuc non habet esse fixum in se ipsa, sed
habet esse inclinatum in substantiam tunc, sicut prius et naturalem incli-
4ra M nationem | ad esse in subiecto. 10
Multipliciter quidem h1028a31i.
Quarta conclusio: substantia est causa omnium accidentium in cogno-
scendo.
Probatur. Substantia est simpliciter prior accidente, ergo est causa
237va Pv cognitionis omnium accidentium. Patet consequentia, quia eadem sunt | 15
principia essendi et cognoscendi. Antecedens Philosophus dupliciter pro-
bat. Primo per rationem sic: substantia est prior accidente cognitione,
diffinitione et tempore; ergo est simpliciter prior accidente. Consequen-
tia tenet, quia, cum principium multipliciter accipiatur, non apparet quod
pluribus modis possit accipi. Omne enim quod est altero prius, neces- 20
sario est prius altero istorum modorum: prioritas enim consequentie et
causalitatis et alie prioritates, de quibus Aristoteles mentionem facit in
Postpredicamentis, octavo Phisicorum et quinto huius,a omnes reducuntur
ad aliquam istarum prioritatum. Sed antecedens Philosophus partibili-
ter probat, et primo quod substantia est prior accidente tempore, quo- 25
niam nullum accidens alicuius novem predicamentorum est separabile a
substantia; ipsa autem substantia separabilis est a quolibet accidente ali-
cuius novem predicamentorum; ergo substantia est prior accidente tem-
pore. Patet consequentia, quia talis separatio dat intelligere prioritatem
temporis. Antecedens autem pro qualibet parte est notum ex precedenti- 30
bus.
Lege litteram: Multipliciter quidem igitur dicitur quod primum; sed
substantia omnium accidentium est primum ratione et notitia.et tempore.
probat] et add. Pv possit] posset M Postpredicamentis] in add. Pv

et] in add. Pv et1 om. M
a Aristotle, Cat., 12, 14a29b8; Phys., VIII, 5, 257a3031; 7, 260b1719; Met., V, 11, 1019a1114 et
passim.
Aliorum enim cathegoreumatum, scilicet predicamentorum, nullum est

separabile, hec autem sola, videlicet substantia separabilis est.a
Secundo arguit Philosophus quod substantia est prior accidente dif-
finitione. Nam omne illud est prius alio diffinitione quod accipitur in
diffinitione illius et non econtra; sed substantia accipitur in diffinitione 5
accidentis et non econtra; ergo et cetera. Tenet consequentia cum maiori.
Minor autem declaratur. Nam differentia ponitur in diffinitione speciei
ex eo quia constituit speciem; sed substantia constituit ipsum accidens;
ergo ponitur in diffinitione illius. Quod quidem inductive potest ostendi.
Nam homo ponitur in diffinitione risibilis et nasus in diffinitione simi et 10
caput in diffinitione crispi et generaliter omnia accidentia propria, sive
sint convertibilia sive non, diffiniuntur per subiecta sua, sive in concreto
accipiantur sive in abstracto. Accidentia autem communia nemo dubitat
semper diffiniri per subiectum, ut album est res habens albedinem et colo-
ratum est res habens colorem, ubi per rem continue intelligitur subiec- 15
tum. In abstracto etiam non bene diffiniuntur nisi accipiatur subiectum:
cum enim dicit Philosophus, in libro De sensu,b quod color est extremitas
perspicui in corpore terminato, per perspicuum intelligitur substantia
subiecta colori. Sic etiam et alia accidentia communia diffiniuntur, ut cali-
ditas est qualitas prima rarefactiva substantie, frigiditas est qualitas prima 20
condensativa substantie, humiditas est qualitas prima refluens super se
ipsam in aere et in aqua, siccitas vero est qualitas prima terminata in igne
et in terra, et sic de aliis suo modo dicatur.
Lege litteram: Et ratione autem hoc primum, silicet substantia; ne-
cesse enim in uniuscuiusque ratione, idest diffinitione accidentis, substan- 25
tie rationem esse.c
Tertio arguit Philosophus quod substantia est prior accidente cogni-
tione, quia illud est altero prius cognitione, quod magis facit cognoscere
rem; sed substantia magis facit cognoscere rem quam accidens; ergo et
cetera. Maior est nota. Et minor apparet, quia magis cognoscimus rem 30
quando cognoscimus substantiam eius quam accidentalia eiusdem, sicut
magis cognoscimus Sortem quando cognoscimus quod est homo quam
quando cognoscimus quod est albus vel niger, bicubitus vel tricubitus.
cathegoreumatum scr. ex Moerb.] cathegorizantium MPv minor autem] et minor

Pv esse] inesse Moerb. (esse P) cognoscere rem inv. Pv
a Aristotle, Met., VII, 1, 1028a3134 (AL XXV 3.2, p. 133, lin. 2427). b Aristotle, De sensu, 3,
439b1112. c Aristotle, Met., VII, 1, 1028a3436 (AL XXV 3.2, p. 133, lin. 2728).
50 pauli veneti
Magis etiam cognoscimus hunc ignem quando scimus quod est ignis
quam quando scimus quod est talis vel tantus, hic vel ibi. Et generaliter
quelibet substantia magis cognoscitur per substantialia sua, que sunt
4rb M genera | et species predicamenti substantie, quam per accidentalia, que
sunt quantitas, qualitas, ubi, quando et sic de aliis. Etiam ipsa accidentia 5
magis cognoscuntur per essentialia sua quam per accidentalia: magis
enim cognoscitur qualitas quando scitur quid est quam quando scitur
qualis est, et ubi et quando. Et magis cognoscitur quantitas quando scitur
237vb Pv quid est quam quando scitur quanta est | et cui est similis vel dissimilis
et quid agit vel patitur: linea enim magis cognoscitur quando scitur quod 10
est quantitas continua quam quando scitur quod est longa vel brevis. Et
albedo magis cognoscitur quando scitur quod est color quam quando
scitur quod disgregat visum.
Lege litteram: Et scire autem tunc singula maxime putamus quando
quid est homo cognoscimus aut ignis magis quam quale aut quantum aut 15
ubi; quoniam tunc horum, scilicet accidentium, eorundem singula scimus,
quando quid est ipsum quale aut quantum scimus.a
Deinde arguit Philosophus quod substantia est simpliciter prior acci-
dente testimonio omnium antiquorum qui fuerunt tempore suo aut in
preteritum ante. Hii enim, dubitantes et querentes principia entis, sem- 20
per quesiverunt principia substantie. Ita quod dubitantes de ente dubi-
tabant de substantia, credentes quod substantia aut esset totum ens aut
ens primum simpliciter et prius omni accidente. Non tamen consimili-
ter locuti sunt de substantia, quoniam aliqui posuerunt tantum unam
substantiam principium rerum, aliqui plures. Illi qui posuerunt tantum 25
unam substantiam, fuerunt in duplici differentia. Quorum quidam fue-
runt naturales, ponentes unam substantiam mobilem esse principium
rerum materiale, sicut illi qui solam materiam putabant esse substan-
tiam; alii vero fuerunt non naturales, ponentes unam substantiam immo-
bilem principium rerum, sicut Parmenides et Melissus. Omnes enim isti, 30
tam naturales quam non naturales, ponentes unum ens propter materiale
principium, per unum ens intelligebant unam substantiam. Item, ponen-
tes plura principia materialia etiam diversificati sunt, quoniam quidam
ponebant illa esse finita, ut Empedocles, qui posuit quatuor elementa,
sic de aliis] huiusmodi Pv et] aut Pv vel] aut Pv simpliciter om. M
a Aristotle, Met., VII, 1, 1028a36b2 (AL XXV 3.2, p. 133, lin. 2832).
scilicet ignem, aerem, aquam et terram; alii autem infinita, ut Anaxagoras,

qui posuit infinitas partes consimiles, aut Democritus, qui posuit infinita
corpora indivisibilia. Ponentes ergo plura principia materialia, posuerunt
plures substantias. Et si dixerunt principia materialia esse finita, concesse-
runt substantias esse finitas; si autem voluerunt principia materialia esse 5
infinita, consequenter concesserunt substantias esse infinitas.
Lege litteram: Et quod olim et nunc et semper quesitum est et semper
dubitatum, quid ens est, fuit responsum hoc est que substantia. Hoc enim
hii quidem unum esse dicunt illi vero plura quam.unum, et hii quidem finita
illi vero infinita.a 10
Notandum primo, secundum Commentatorem, commento quarto,
quod necesse est ut substantia accipiatur in diffinitione cuiuslibet
accidentium, quoniam partes diffinitionum sunt illa per que consti-
tuitur res. Et quia accidentia constituuntur per substantias, necesse
fuit ut accipiantur in diffinitionibus Et in diffinitionibus substan- 15
tiarum non accipiuntur alia extra suam naturam, cum sue cause
accipiantur in suis diffinitionibus, que sunt substantie.b
Ratio ergo, secundum Commentatorem, quare substantia non diffinitur
per accidens, econtra autem accidens diffinitur per substantiam, est quia
accidens constituitur per substantiam, non autem substantia constituitur 20
per accidens. Et quia substantia constituitur per substantiam, ideo diffini-
tur per substantiam et non per aliquid quod sit extra naturam substantie;
ipsum autem accidens diffinitur per substantiam, que est extra naturam
accidentis.
Prima pars istius commenti est dubia, quoniam continuum et nume- 25
4va M rus, figura et circulus et alia plura accidentia non diffiniuntur per | sub-
stantiam. Continuum enim est illud cuius partes copulantur ad unum
terminum communem; numerus est multitudo ex unitatibus aggregata;
figura est illud quod termino vel terminis clauditur; circulus vero est figura
a cuius centro ad circumferentiam omnes linee ducte sunt equales. In qui- 30
bus diffinitionibus numquam exprimitur substantia, sicut neque exprimi-
tur cum diffinitur linea vel superficies, binarius vel ternarius, triangulus
vel quadrangulus.
aeremterram] aquam terram et aerem Pv aut] etiam M quare] propter quam

Pv
a Aristotle, Met., VII, 1, 1028b25 (AL XXV 3.2, p. 133, lin. 3235). b Averroes, In Met., VII, t.c.
4, fol. 154M.
52 pauli veneti
238ra Pv Secunda pars commenti etiam est dubia, quoniam sexto huiusa dicit
Philosophus quod nasus, oculus, facies, caro, os, animal, folium, radix,
cortex, planta et huiusmodi non sine motu diffiniuntur. Secundo autem
Posteriorumb docet diffinire per propriam passionem, et diffiniens homi-
nem dicit quod est animal gressibile bipes; constat autem quod risibile, 5
gressibile et huiusmodi sunt accidentia; ergo substantia eque bene diffi-
nitur per accidens, sicut accidens per substantiam.
Ad primum dicitur quod accidentia dupliciter considerantur, videlicet
secundum suum esse et secundum suum modum essendi. Si conside-
rantur secundum suum esse quiditativum tantum, abstrahendo a modo 10
essendi ipsorum accidentium, sic non diffiniuntur per substantiam, sed
sufficit propinquum genus cum ultima differentia essentiali, eo modo quo
docet Philosophus, secundo Posteriorum.c Dicit enim ipse, primo Topico-
rum,d quod diffinitio est oratio significans quid est esse rei; constat autem
quod composita oratio ex genere et differentia significat quid est esse rei. 15
Si enim abstrahentium non est mendacium, ut dicitur secundo Phisico-
rum,e tam mathematicus quam metaphisicus abstrahit accidentia abso-
luta a substantia et sic ea diffinit absque substantia. Considerando autem
accidens secundum suum modum essendi, qui est esse in alio actu vel
aptitudine, semper diffinitur per subiectum suum, sive sit in subiecto sive 20
non (quod quidem dicitur propter accidentia que sunt in sacramento alta-
ris). Et tunc accidentia nominata superius aliter diffiniuntur quam diffi-
nita sunt: ut continuum est quantitas mensurativa substantie secundum
aliquam dimensionem; numerus est quantitas mensurativa substantie
secundam aliquam discretionem; figura est qualitas indicans quantitatem 25
substantie, et sic de aliis suo modo. Accidens ergo, ut accidens est, semper
diffinitur per subiectum suum; ut autem consideratur secundum modum
suum absolutum, sic non semper diffinitur per subiectum suum. Acciden-
tia enim communia, ut albedo, nigredo et huiusmodi, in abstracto non
necessario diffiniuntur per subiectum suum, sed bene in concreto; acci- 30
dentia vero propria, quia concernunt distincte subiectum suum, necessa-
rio tam in concreto quam in abstracto diffiniuntur per subiectum suum:
sicut enim simus, ita simitas diffinitur per nasum.
modum suum inv. Pv distincte om. M
a Aristotle, Met., VI, 1, 1026a13. b Aristotle, An. Post., II, 6, 92a2930; 13, 96b3132.
c Aristotle, An. Post., II, 13, 97a23ff. d Aristotle, Top., I, 5, 101b3738. e Aristotle, Phys.,
II, 2, 193b35.
Ad secundum respondetur quod duplex est diffinitio rei, iuxta doctri-

nam Aristotelis, secundo Posteriorum,a videlicet formalis et materialis. Et
diffinitio formalis non datur nisi per causam diffiniti; diffinitio vero mate-
rialis datur per effectum seu per aliquid posterius diffinito. Unde animal
rationale est diffinitio formalis hominis et est principium demonstratio- 5
nis; sed animal risibile est diffinitio materialis eiusdem et est conclusio
demonstrationis. Quia ergo diffinitio datur causa innotescendi, per Ari-
stotelem, sexto Topicorum,b et res potest dupliciter cognosci, scilicet a
priori per causam suam et a posteriori per effectum, ut habetur in prologo
Phisicorum,c ideo res potest dupliciter diffiniri, scilicet a priori et a poste- 10
riori. Diffinitio ergo data a priori vocatur formalis et a posteriori dicitur
materialis. Quando ergo dicit Commentator quod substantia non diffini-
tur per accidens, sed accidens per substantiam, loquitur de diffinitione
formali et non materiali. Phisicus ergo, quia non considerat substantiam
absolute sed respective, in ordine ad operationes naturales, que quidem 15
4vb M sine | motu fieri non possunt, ideo substantiam diffinit ipse per motum. Et
si aliquando in suis diffinitionibus non ponit motum, tamen eas et partes
suas semper considerat in ordine ad motum.
mento, quod scire individuum per sua universalia substantialia est 20
perfectius quam scire per universalia accidentium Et quia scire
hanc substantiam per suas dispositiones essentiales est perfectius
quam scire eam per suas dispositiones accidentales, necesse est ut
dispositiones substantiales sint manifestiores dispositionibus acci-
dentalibus.d 25
238rb Pv Istud commentum solvit unum dubium, quia videtur quod substantia non
sit prior accidente cognitione, sed potius econtra. Dicitur enim in pro-
logo De animae quod accidentia magnam partem conferunt ad cognoscen-
dum quod quid est; et secundo De animaf dicit Philosophus quod acci-
dentia tam propria quam communia sentiuntur per se, substantia autem 30
per accidens; constat autem quod cognoscibilia per se prius cognoscun-
tur quam cognoscibilia per accidens. Tertio vero De animag dicit quod
necesse est intelligentem fantasmata speculari, modo ipsa fantasmata
notandum secundo inv. Pv individuum] substantie add. Iunt. intelligentem

ante necesse M
a Aristotle, An. Post., II, 10, 93b3894a10. b Aristotle, Top., VI, 1, 139b1415; 4, 141a2728.
c Aristotle, Phys., I, 1, 184a1621. d Averroes, In Met., VII, t.c. 4, fol. 155AB. e Aristotle, De
an., I, 1, 402b2122. f Aristotle, De an., II, 6 passim. g Aristotle, De an., III, 8, 432a810.
54 pauli veneti
sunt similitudines accidentium immutantium sensus exteriores. Deinde,

in prologo Phisicoruma determinat Aristoteles, una cum Commentatore,
quod non eadem sunt nobis notiora et nature, quia cause sunt notiores
nature, effectus autem sunt notiores nobis; constat autem effectus natu-
rales cognosci a nobis per accidentia ipsorum; ideo accidentia precedunt 5
substantiam in cognitione.
Respondet Commentator, dicens quod illa propositio substantia est
prior accidente cognitione non est intelligenda de prioritate generatio-
nis, sed de prioritate perfectionis, ad hunc intellectum, quod de individuo
perfectior notitia habetur per universalia substantialia quam accidentalia. 10
Ymaginatur enim Commentator duplicem ordinem, scilicet generationis
et perfectionis. Quod enim est primum secundum generationem, est ulti-
mum secundum perfectionem, et quod est ultimum in generatione, est
primum in perfectione, quia omnis generatio procedit de imperfecto ad
perfectum: natura enim prius producit animal quam hominem, et medi- 15
cus prius inducit calorem quam sanitatem, et sic de aliis tam naturalibus
quam artificialibus. Sed cognitio nostra procedit de potentia ad actum,
per Aristotelem, secundo et tertio De anima,b et per consequens de imper-
fecto ad perfectum; ideo quod est nobis primo notum in via generationis,
est minus notum in via perfectionis; constat autem quod sensibilia sunt 20
nobis prius nota in via generationis et ideo sunt minus et posterius nota
in via perfectionis.
Nunc autem Philosophus ostendit hic quod substantia precedit acci-
dens prioritate perfectionis, econtra autem notitia accidentis precedit
notitiam substantie prioritate generationis. Ex quibus concludit Com- 25
mentator quod dispositiones substantiales sunt manifestiores dispositio-
nibus accidentalibus, quia quanto aliquid est perfectius tanto est mani-
festius, iuxta illud Philosophi, secundo Metaphisice:c Sicut se habet ocu-
lus noctue ad lucem solis, ita intellectus noster ad manifestissima in
natura. Constat autem quod dispositiones substantiales sunt perfectio- 30
res dispositionibus accidentalibus, ex quo perfectius faciunt scire quam
dispositiones accidentales. Hec ergo propositio substantia est prior acci-
dente cognitione est vera ad hunc intellectum, quod substantia perfectius
effectus] notiores add. M generationis scr.] durationis MPv est primum inv.
Pv in om. M
a Aristotle, Phys., I, 1, 184a18. b Cf., among other texts: Aristotle, De an., II, 5, 417a2130a; III,
5, 429b29430a2. c Aristotle, Met., II, 1, 993b911.

cognoscitur et manifestius quam accidens; aut quod de individuo perfec-

tiorem et manifestiorem notitiam facit quam accidens de eodem indivi-
duo; aut quod perfectius et manifestius facit scire quam accidens.
Item, dicit Commentator in prologo Phisicoruma quod duplex est pro-
5ra M cessus nostre cognitionis, scilicet a priori et a posteriori. Processus a | 5
priori est propter quid, per causam; processus a posteriori est quia est,
per effectum. Licet ergo accidens precedat substantiam cognitione quia,
tamen substantia precedit accidens cognitione propter quid: constat
enim quod in acquirendo scientiam a posteriori primo sunt nobis nota
accidentia communia, que sunt obiecta sensuum, ex quorum cognitione 10
devenimus in cognitionem propriorum accidentium, que sunt proprie
operationes substantiarum, ex quarum cognitione insurgimus in cogni-
tionem formarum et quiditatum, que sunt principia talium propriorum
accidentium. Et tunc intellectus, penetrans et profundans se, cognoscit
quod illa ex quibus accepit cognitionem substantie non sunt cause sub- 15
stantie, sed magis substantia est causa eorum. Ideo iterum, reflectens ex
cognitione substantiarum, consurgit in perfectam cognitionem acciden-
tium per eorum causam, que est substantia.
Item, licet quo ad nos prius accidentia cognoscantur quam substantia,
238va Pv tamen quo | ad naturam substantia prius cognoscitur quam accidentia, 20
quia cause sunt notiores suis effectibus apud naturam, ut declarat Com-
mentator in prologo Phisicorum;b et quia ea que sunt notiora nature sunt
notiora simpliciter, ut etiam testatur Philosophus ibi,c ideo simpliciter
loquendo substantia est prior accidente cognitione, licet quo ad nos acci-
dentia precedant in cognitione, et hoc forte potuit intendere Philosophus. 25
Notandum tertio, secundum Commentatorem, eodem commento,
quod substantia est prior tempore quam accidens, quoniam si
accidens sit post corpus in quo est, manifestum est quod corpus
precedit ipsum secundum tempus, et si fuerit secundum tempus
ex accidentibus inseparabilibus a re in qua fiunt, tunc substantia 30
subiecta ad istam rem precedit illam rem et accidentia consequentia
ipsam. Verbi gratia, quoniam subiectum, ex quo generatur ignis, est
prius forma heti calore ignis.d
insurgimus] fort. pro consurgimus etiam om. Pv notandum tertio inv. Pv

et suppl. ex Iunt.
a Averroes, In Phys., I, t.c. 2, fol. 6K7A. b Averroes, In Phys., I, t.c. 3, fol. 7D. c Aristotle,
Phys., I, 1, 184a1618. d Averroes, In Met., VII, t.c. 4, fol. 155CD.

56 pauli veneti
Intendit Commentator exponere illam propositionem substantia est

prior accidente tempore, dicens quod potest fieri comparatio acciden-
tis vel ad substantiam compositam vel ad substantiam simplicem que est
materia. Si primo modo sic: substantia precedit omnia accidentia adve-
nientia tempore, scilicet accidentia non innata. Si secundo modo sic: ite- 5
rum substantia tempore precedit ipsa accidentia que sunt innata, sicut,
verbi gratia, ignis tempore precedit esse sursum, si deorsum generetur;
sed ignis, licet non precedat tempore calorem suum aut levitatem suam,
tamen materia ignis tempore precedit et formam ignis et omnia acciden-
tia sequentia illam formam. 10
Ista expositio est dubia, quia non declarat quomodo substantia prece-
dit omne accidens, ut asserit Philosophus in littera, sed tantum quod hec
substantia precedit sua accidentia tam separabilia quam inseparabilia
eo modo quo expositum est. Unde arguitur sic: substantia est prior acci-
dente tempore; ergo substantia precedit tempore quantitatem, motum et 15
tempus. Consequens est impossibile, quia, si substantia precedit tempore
quantitatem, et ipsa quantitas est coeterna materie, per Commentato-
rem, in De substantia orbis,a ergo substantia precedit materiam primam
tempore, contra Philosophum, primo De generatione.b Si etiam precedit
substantia motum tempore, ergo aliquando est tempus sine motu, con- 20
tra Philosophum dicentem, quarto Phisicorum,c quod tempus est passio
motus et quod est numerus motus secundum prius et posterius. Octavo
autem Phisicorumd probat Philosophus quod motus est eternus, ita quod
numquam incepit esse. Deinde, si substantia precedit omnia accidentia
tempore, ergo precedit tempus tempore, et sic est procedere in infinitum 25
in temporibus; ymmo est dare tempus ante totum tempus in infinitum.
Quorum quodlibet est absurdum.
Et ideo aliter exponit Albertus,e dicens quod substantia ut est quiditas
5rb M absolute sumpta non est hic nec nunc, | sed ubique et semper, non ita
quod sit ambiens omne tempus et locum, quia sic solus Deus est ubique 30
et semper, sed ita quod non determinatur aliqua differentia temporis
vel loci, quomodo etiam universalia dicuntur esse ubique et semper,
ut vult Philosophus in Posterioribus.f Substantia igitur sic considerata
substantia mg. Pv temporis loci inv. Pv
a Averroes, De sub. orb, ed. Venice 1572, fol. 4D. b Aristotle, De gen., I, 3, 317b2931.
c Aristotle, Phys., IV, 11, 220a2425. d Aristotle, Phys., VIII, 1 passim. e Albert, Met.,
Lib. VII, tr. I, c. 3, Opera Omnia, XV, p. 319, 3656. f Aristotle, An. Post., I, 24, 85b1718.
potest dici ante omne tempus et ante omnem locum, quia accidit sibi
esse hic et nunc, et sic precedit tempus et locum et omnia acciden-
tia.
Sed nec ista expositio evadit difficultates, quoniam adhuc queritur quo-
modo substantia precedit tempore quantitatem, tempus et motum et alia 5
accidentia coeterna substantie: ut enim substantia abstrahit a tempore
et loco, non videtur quod aliquod talium accidentium tempore prece-
dat. Propter quod ipse Albertusa dat aliam expositionem, dicens quod
substantiam precedere omne accidens tempore potest dupliciter intel-
ligi: aut proprie, accipiendo tempus secundum quod est numerus motus 10
secundum prius et posterius, et sic impossibile est substantiam prece-
dere omnia accidentia tempore, quia iam precederet tempus tempore
et motum tempore et esset tempus ante tempus et ante motum, que
omnia manifestam falsitatem pretendunt; aut communiter, pro quacum-
que duratione, et sic substantia precedit omne accidens tempore, idest 15
duratione, quoniam Deus omnia accidentia precedit sua eternitate sive
238vb Pv sint finita sive infinita. Aliqua enim substantia men-|-suratur eternitate, ut
prima causa, et aliqua mensuratur evo, ut celum et intelligentie, et aliqua
tempore, ut generabilia et corruptibilia. Ideo aliqua substantia precedit
omne accidens duratione, quia nullum accidens neque aliqua alia crea- 20
tura mensuratur eternitate.
Verumptamen, quia non invenitur quod Philosophus umquam aliter
tempus acceperit quam pro numero motus secundum prius et poste-
rius, neque Philosophus concessisset causam primam precedere eterna
mensura eternitatis, ideo Alexanderb aliter exponit illam propositionem, 25
dicens quod ideo substantia est prior accidente tempore, quia sibi non
repugnat esse absque accidente. Cuilibet autem accidenti repugnat esse
absque substantia, quoniam substantia prima est simpliciter absoluta ab
omni accidente, nullum autem accidens est absolutum a substantia per
naturam suam, sed solum per divinam potentiam, eo modo quo dictum 30
est de sacramento altaris.
Hec glossa iterum difficilis est, quoniam nature substantie repugnat
precedere tempus tempore et motum tempore propter implicationem
precedere] tempore add. M difficilis est inv. Pv implicationem]

multiplicationem M
a Albert, Met., Lib. VII, tr. I, c. 3, p. 319, 42ff. b Alexander of Alexandria, Exp. Met., VII, c. 1,
q. 4, fol. 186rab.
58 pauli veneti
contradictionis. Quam ob rem dicitur quod Philosophus hic per prius

tempore intendit prioritatem consequentie secundum illud in Postpredi-
camentis:a prius est illud a quo non convertitur subsistendi consequentia.
Unde, quia sequitur homo est, ergo animal est et non econtra, dicitur
animal esse prius homine tempore, quia stat animal esse absque homine 5
per verum tempus aut ymaginarium non obstante eternitate utriusque.
Ita prius est substantia quam accidens tempore, quia, si accidens est, sub-
stantia est, et non econtra, ita quod stat subiectum esse per quodcum-
que tempus verum vel ymaginarium. Et quod ista sit intentio Philosophi
patet ex sua probatione. Ideo eniminquit ipsesubstantia est prior 10
accidente tempore, quia potest separari ab accidente et non econtra. Et
secundum istum intellectum concedatur quod substantia est prior tem-
pore quantitate, motu et tempore, quoniam si quantitas est aut motus aut
tempus, substantia est, et non econtra. Unde ante creationem mundi non
erat tempus nec motus nec quantitas, et tamen tunc erat substantia prime 15
cause, que Deus est.
Quapropter nobis h1028b6ssi.
Ex predictis Philosophus concludit suum principale intentum, videli-
cet quod ad metaphisicum spectat considerare primo et maxime et solum
quid est. 20
5va M Probatur. Ad metaphisicum | pertinet considerare ens in quantum ens,
ut patuit quarto et sexto huius;b ergo ad eum spectat primo et maxime
et solum considerare de eo quod est maximum et primum et solum ens;
constat autem quod substantia est primum ens, quia nullum presup-
ponit et ab omnibus presupponitur, ut est probatum in prima conclu- 25
sione.c Est etiam maximum ens, cum sit magis ens quam accidens per
secundam conclusionem. Iterum est solum ens, ut est dicere, in quan-
tum sola substantia est causa omnium accidentium, et in quantum ipsa
substantia reperitur solitaria ab omni accidente separata tam secundum
esse quam secundum diffinitionem, ut manifestat tertia et quarta conclu- 30
sio.
Lege litteram: Quapropter nobis maxime et primum et solum ut est
dicere de sic ente speculandum est quid est.d
Notandum quod non dicitur metaphisicus solum de substantia consi-
derare quia non considerat de accidente, sed dicitur solum de substantia 35
a Aristotle, Cat., 12, 14a2935. b Aristotle, Met., IV, 1, 1003a21 et passim; VI, 1, 1026a3132.
c cf. supra, p. 32, 118. d Aristotle, Met., VII, 1, 1028b67 (AL XXV 3.2, p. 133, lin. 3537).
considerare per se et non per attributionem ad aliquid aliud; de accidente

autem non considerat nisi per attributionem ad substantiam in quantum
est dispositio eius.
Videtur autem substantia h1028b8ssi.

Ista est secunda pars huius capituli, in qua Philosophus ostendit quanta 5
est evidentia substantie, postquam manifestavit quanta est dignitas illius,
ponens quatuor conclusiones. Quarum prima est hec: per se manifestum
est substantias sensibiles esse. Secunda conclusio: non est per se manife-
239ra Pv stum substantias insensibiles esse, ibi: Utrum | vero h1028b14ssi. Tertia
conclusio: non est per se manifestum substantias sensibiles a suis acci- 10
dentibus substantialiter differre, ibi: Videtur autem h1028b16ssi. Quarta
conclusio: non est per se manifestum substantias sensibiles a substantiis
insensibilibus realiter separari, ibi: Amplius preter h1028b19ssi.
Prima conclusio arguitur sic: illud est per se manifestum quod omnes
concedunt tamquam notum ad sensum; sed omnes concedunt tamquam 15
notum ad sensum substantias sensibiles esse; ergo manifestum est sub-
stantias sensibiles esse. Patet consequentia cum maiori. Et minor decla-
ratur ex eo quod omnes concedimus corpora esse que sunt substantias
sensibiles. Primo quidem dicimus quod corpora animata sunt substantie,
scilicet animalia et plante et partes animalium atque plantarum. Secundo 20
dicimus corpora naturalia simplicia esse substantias, ut ignem, terram,
aerem et aquam, et etiam partes istorum. Tertio dicimus corpora com-
posita ex elementis aut ex partibus elementorum esse substantias: mun-
dus enim et tota spera activorum et passivorum componuntur ex omni-
bus elementis secundum totum; mixta autem inanimata, tam perfecta 25
quam imperfecta, componuntur ex partibus elementorum, quia compo-
nuntur non ex toto igne neque ex tota terra, sed solum ex partibus. Mixta
imperfecta sunt vapor, nix, grando, pruina, ros, pluvia et huiusmodi; per-
fecta vero ut aurum, argentum, plumbum, ferrum, lapis et huiusmodi, que
omnia dicimus esse substantias. Quarto dicimus corpora superiora esse 30
substantias, videlicet celum et partes eius, que sunt sol, luna et alia astra
tam fixa quam erratica: nemo enim dubitat omnia corpora nominata esse
substantias, et hoc ideo, quia cognoscuntur per sensum.
Lege litteram: Videtur autem substantia existere manifestissime qui-
dem corporibus. Unde animalia et plante et eorum partes substantias esse 35
per se om. M notum om. M

60 pauli veneti
dicimus, heti naturalia corpora, ut ignem et aquam et terram et talium sin-

gula, et quecumque aut partes eorum aut ex hiis sunt, aut partibus aut omni-
bus, ut celum et partes eius, astra, luna et sol.a
Notandum, secundum Commentatorem, commento quinto, quod
Aristoteles in Phisico auditu fuit perscrutatus alio modo ab isto. 5
Illic enim perscrutatus est de principiis corporis secundum quod
est naturale, idest secundum quod quiescit aut movetur; hic autem
5vb M perscrutatus est de eis | secundum quod est substantia tantum.b
Intendit Commentator quod tam phisicus quam metaphisicus conside-
rat de corpore sensibili et de principiis eius, sed non eodem modo, quia 10
phisicus considerat de corpore sensibili in quantum quiescit aut movetur,
metaphisicus vero in quantum est substantia abstracta a motu et quiete.
Iterum, considerat phisicus principia corporis sensibilis in quantum sunt
cause motus et quietis, metaphisicus vero in quantum sunt cause sub-
stantie. Licet ergo Philosophus dicat in hac conclusione quod est per se 15
manifestum substantias sensibiles esse aut quod corporibus insunt sub-
stantie sensibiles, non tamen intendit quod ad metaphisicum pertinet
considerare de substantia in quantum sensibilis est neque de corpore in
quantum inest illi sensibilitas, cum hec sit consideratio phisica: ex quo
enim mobilitas inest corpori per sensibilitatem, sicut phisicus considerat 20
corpus vel substantiam sub ratione mobilitatis, ita etiam sub ratione sen-
sibilitatis, cum sensibilitas non possit ad actum reduci nisi per motum.
Ex isto commento solvitur unum commune dubium, videlicet utrum
animal et planta includant aliquod commune accidens sensibile. Dici-
tur quod tam animal quam planta potest dupliciter considerari: vel ut 25
est ens simpliciter, et sic non includit aliquod accidens sensibile, quia
pertinet ad considerationem metaphisici; vel ut est ens naturale, et sic
includit aliquod accidens sensibile, cum sic pertineat ad considerationem
phisici. Unde arguitur sic: animal aut planta, ut pertinet ad consideratio-
nem phisici, includit aliquid plus quam includat ut pertinet ad conside- 30
rationem metaphisici, cum phisicus sit artifex specialis et metaphisicus
sit artifex communis. Semper enim species superaddit generi, sed illud
plus quod est superadditum non est substantia aliqua, quia, ut pertinet
239rb Pv ad considerati-|-onem metaphisici, includit omnem substantiam quam
et suppl. ex Moerb. astra] et add. Moerb. Philosophus] Aristoteles Pv
a Aristotle, Met., VII, 2, 1028b813 (AL XXV 3.2, p. 133, lin. 3843). b Averroes, In Met., VII,
t.c. 5, fol. 156B.
includit ut pertinet ad considerationem phisici. Ergo illud plus est aliquod

accidens sensibile, et per consequens animal aut planta includit aliquod
accidens sensibile ut pertinet ad considerationem phisici.
Ista videtur esse intentio Philosophi, sexto huius,a dicentis quod omnia
phisica dicuntur sicut simum, et quod nullius illorum ratio est sine motu; 5
constat autem quod simum non potest absolvi a materia sensibili, ut
ipse dicit; ergo omnia phisica includunt materiam sensibilem, deinde
includunt motum, qui est accidens sensibile; ergo et cetera.
Sed contra: compositum ex subiecto et accidente non est per se unum,
quinto Metaphisice;b si ergo animal aut planta, ut est ens naturale, inclu- 10
dit aliquod accidens sensibile, constat autem quod includit substantiam,
cum non sit purum accidens; ergo animal aut planta est aliquod composi-
tum ex substantia et accidente. Quo dato, sequitur quod nullum eorum
est ens per se unum, sed tantum per accidensquod est falsum, quia
tunc nullum illorum esset diffinibile, neque de aliquo illorum esset ali- 15
quid predicabile et demonstrabile, neque scientia haberetur de illis. Que
omnia absurda sunt. Ymmo sequeretur quod nullum illorum predicare-
tur in quid, quia compositum ex subiecto et accidente non predicatur in
quid, sed in quale aut in quantum aut alio modo, ut est ostensum in prima
parte huius capituli. 20
Respondetur quod compositum ex subiecto et accidente in concreto
non est ens per se, sed per accidens, ut homo albus seu Coriscus musicus;
sed in abstracto est ens per se, ut album et musicum. Non tamen est con-
cedendum quod animal aut planta, ut est ens naturale vel phisicum, sit
compositum ex subiecto et accidente propter hoc quod includit aliquod 25
accidens sensibile, quia simitas includit nasum, non tamen nasus ingre-
ditur compositionem simitatis; et figura includit quantitatem, non tamen
6ra M quantitas est pars figure faciens cum alio compositionem. | Et hoc ideo,
quia figura significat quantitatem et simitas nasum non tamquam princi-
pale significatum, sed secundarium. Ita etiam homo et asinus, animal et 30
planta, et generaliter omnia phisica, includunt aliquod accidens sensibile,
ut entia naturalia sunt, nullum tamen illorum componitur ex subiecto et
accidente sensibili, nec alicuius talis accidens sensibile ingreditur compo-
sitionem, sed tantum materia et forma substantialis.
simum] simus M aliquid] aliquod M predicabile et om. Pv seu om. M
a Aristotle, Met., VI, 1, 1025b301026a6. b Aristotle, Met., V, 6, 1015b1636.

62 pauli veneti
Utrum vero h1028b14ssi.

Secunda conclusio: non est per se manifestum substantias insensibiles
esse.
Probatur. Illud non est per se manifestum quod a multis negatur; sed
multi negant substantias insensibiles esse; ergo et cetera. Tenet conse- 5
quentia cum maiori. Et minor est nota consideranti opiniones antiquo-
rum. Illi enim qui posuerunt tantum unum esse, et illud esse immobile,
ut Parmenides et Melissus, dixerunt nullas esse in universo substantias
insensibiles. Alii etiam qui dixerunt tantum unum esse materiale princi-
pium, et illud esse aliquod elementorum, ut Eraclitus, Dyogenes, Speusip- 10
pus, negaverunt tales substantias esse. Non est ergo per se manifestum
substantias insensibiles esse ex quo antiqui naturales negaverunt illas
esse, neque est manifestum per se tales substantias non esse ex quo eas
esse concesserunt Platonici.
Et ideo perscrutandum est utrum sint tantum substantie sensibiles, 15
ut ponebant antiqui naturales, aut sint alique alie substantie cum istis,
secundum quod arbitrati sunt Platonici, aut de facto non sint iste, sed
tantum alie ab istis, ut multi iam opinantur. Hec tamen perscrutatio non
est hic facienda, sed posterius, videlicet duodecimo huius.
Lege litteram: Utrum vero hee sole substantie sunt, scilicet sensibiles, 20
aut alie, videlicet insensibiles, aut horum nulla sit insensibilis, altere autem
quedam sint, videlicet sensibiles, perscrutandum est, sed non hic.a
prima divisio, secundum quam dividitur ens, est in substantiam et
accidens, et ista questio differt ab alia que est in scientia naturali, 25
quoniam ista questio inducit ad sciendum primam formam omnium
entium et ultimum finem, et illa questio, quam incepit in scientia
naturali, inducit ad sciendum primam materiam et formas naturales
et primum motorem.b
239va Pv Intendit Commentator quod ens dupliciter dividitur. Primo dividitur per | 30
substantiam et accidens, et hec est divisio metaphisica; secundo dividitur
per mobile et immobile, et est divisio phisica.
Hiis duabus divisionibus respondent due questiones, quarum unam
pertractat Philosophus in Metaphisica, videlicet utrum solum sint
Speusippus scr.] et Pseusippus(?) Pv, Leucyppus M alie] et alie Moerb. (et om.
Da) horum] quidem add. Moerb. (om. Da) nulla] nullum Moerb. (nulla Da)
a Aristotle, Met., VII, 2, 1028b1415 (AL XXV 3.2, p. 133, 4345). b Averroes, In Met., VII, t.c.
5, fol. 156BC.
substantie sensibiles an preter eas sint alie substantie insensibiles; aliam

vero pertractat in primo Phisicorum, utrum tantum sit unum principium
rerum naturalium aut plura.
Prima questio inducit ad cognoscendum primam formam et ultimum
finem. Quod sic declarat Albertus,a quia, si substantie sensibiles sunt, 5
necesse est quod forme illarum sint aliquo modo materiales et aliquo
modo immateriales et simplices: sunt enim materiales per accidens et
ratione materie, immateriales vero et simplices sunt secundum se. Origo
autem huius immaterialitatis et simplicitatis non videtur esse nisi in
quantum est radius quidam prime forme et ultimi finis, qui est intellectus 10
divinus. Deinde, forma substantialis non est intelligibilis per materiam,
sed per se ipsam, et non per aliud, sicut accidens cognoscitur per aliud,
scilicet per substantiam. Non autem est intelligibilis forma per se ipsam
nisi in quantum est illi immixtum lumen prime intelligentie, que est Deus.
Sed potest aliter argui, ut si aliqua substantia sensibilis est, illa est 15
necessaria vel contingens. Si est necessaria, oportet quod suam neces-
sitatem recipiat ab alio, ex quo est substantia composita presupponens
substantiam simplicem; sed non contingit procedere in infinitum in rebus
6rb M necessariis; ergo est devenire ad | aliquam substantiam insensibilem sim-
plicem, que habet necessitatem a se et non ab alio. Hec autem est prima 20
forma et ultimus finis omnium. Si autem substantia sensibilis sit contin-
gens, ipsam contingentiam suam recipit ab aliquo alio necessario. Quo-
niam, sicut ens per accidens reducitur in ens per se et generaliter quodli-
bet posterius in suum prius, ita contingens reducitur in necessarium; sed
in rebus necessariis datur unum primum quod est prima forma et ultimus 25
finis, ut iam ostensum est; ergo si substantia sensibilis sit contingens, per
eam devenitur in cognitionem prime forme et ultimi finis.
Secunda autem questio inducit ad cognoscendum primam materiam
et formas naturales ac primum motorem. Quoniam, dum queritur utrum
tantum est unum principium aut plura, necesse est quod plura, quia prin- 30
cipia sunt contraria, ut probatur primo Phisicorum,b et nichil contrariatur
sibi. Et quia contraria vicissim insunt et mutuo se expellunt, necesse est
quod multe forme naturales sint, quarum una generatur et alia corrum-
pitur, ex quo generatio unius est corruptio alterius, ut probatur primo
formam mg. Pv quia] nam Pv suam necessitatem] sua necessitate M

aliquam om. Pv insensibilem simplicem inv. Pv alio om. Pv
a Albert, Met., Lib. VII, tr. I, c. 4, p. 320, 1338. b Aristotle, Phys., I, 56 passim.
64 pauli veneti
De generatione.a Item, si principia sunt contraria sic quod unum alterum

expellit, et nullum contrarium suum contrarium recipit neque conducit,
ut declaratur primo Phisicorum,b oportet aliquod esse subiectum deferens
transmutationem de uno in aliud. Huiusmodi autem subiectum est prima
materia. Deinde, omnis transmutatio est motus, ut habet videri in Postpre- 5
dicamentis,c et omnis motus est actus mobilis in quantum mobile, ut pro-
batur tertio Phisicorum;d nullum autem mobile movetur a se ipso primo,
sed omne quod movetur ab alio movetur, et non contingit procedere in
infinitum in moventibus et motis, ut demonstratur septimo Phisicorum;e
ergo est devenire ad motorem simpliciter immobilem. Hic autem est pri- 10
mus motor. Et ita habetur quod prima questio quam facit Aristoteles in
Phisicis ducit in cognitionem formarum naturalium et prime materie ac
primi motoris.
Videtur autem quibusdam h1028b16ssi.
Tertia conclusio: non est per se manifestum substantias sensibiles a 15
suis accidentibus substantialiter differre.
Probatur. Illud non est per se manifestum quod a multis negatur; sed
a multis negatur substantias sensibiles a suis accidentibus substantiali-
ter differre; ergo et cetera. Secunda pars antecedentis est nota, quoniam
Parmenides et Melissus, ponentes omnia esse unum, dicebant substan- 20
tiam et accidens esse realiter idem, et quod non differebant nisi secun-
dum existimationem. Ita quod caliditas erat substantia calida et albedo
res alba, et sic de aliis accidentibus. Pitagorici autem et Platonici dixe-
239vb Pv runt quod termini corporis sunt substantie rerum, | videlicet puncta, linee
et superficies. Etiam unitatem, que est principium quantitatis discrete, 25
voluerunt esse substantiam rerum. Constat autem omnia ista accidentia
esse, cum pertineant ad predicamentum quantitatis. Deinde compara-
bant hec accidentia invicem et ad corpus, quod vocatur solidum, dicen-
tes quod puncta sunt magis substantie quam linee et linee quam super-
ficies et superficies quam corpus, quia propter quod unumquodque tale, 30
et illud magis; sed linee sunt propter puncta et superficies propter lineas
et corpora propter superficies, ex quo puncta sunt principia linearum et
linee superficierum et superficies corporum et solidorum; ergo et cetera.
Dicebant etiam quod unitas est magis substantia quam corpus, quoniam
unum] et add. M et s.l. Pv quod om. Pv
a Aristotle, De gen., I, 3, 318a2325. b Aristotle, Phys., I, 6, 189a2226. c Aristotle, Cat., 14,
15a1314. d Aristotle, Phys., III, 1, 201a915; a2529. e Aristotle, Phys., VII, 1, 242a49243a2.
unitas est magis substantia quam punctus. Constat autem quod punctus
est magis substantia quam corpus, secundum eos, ex quo est principium
eius, licet remotum.
Primam partem antecedentis declarabant. Nam punctus ideo est magis
6va M substantia quam linea, quia est principium eius; | est autem principium 5
eius quia ponitur in diffinitione illius. Sed etiam unitas est principium
puncti, quia ponitur in eius diffinitione, videlicet punctus est unitas situ-
ata.
Lege litteram: Videntur autem quibusdam corporis termini, ut super-
ficies et linea et punctus et unitas, esse substantie magis quam corpus et 10
solidum.a
Aristoteles dixit corpus et corporeum, quoniam isti habent duas
opiniones in corpore. Quidam enim dicunt quod tres dimensiones
sunt forma substantalis corporis, et isti dicunt corpus; illi autem 15
dicunt a coniunctione superficierum adinvicem, et dignius est dici
ab eis corporeum. Et secundum utrumque sermonem sequitur ut
superficies et linee et puncta sint substantie magis quam corpora et
priora eis, aut secundum quod forma est prior composito ex materia
et forma, secundum priorem sermonem, aut secundum quod partes 20
[sui] compositi sunt priores composito, secundum posteriorem ser-
monem.b
Prima ergo opinio voluit quod corpus componitur ex materia et forma
substantiali tamquam ex partibus essentialibus, et illam formam dixit esse
tres dimensiones, videlicet longitudinem, latitudinem et profunditatem, 25
et tale compositum asseruit proprie debere dici corpus.
Secunda opinio voluit quod corpus non componitur ex partibus essen-
tialibus, que sunt materia et forma trium dimensionum, sed quod compo-
nitur tantum ex superficiebus tamquam ex partibus quantitatis, et huiu-
smodi compositum dixit quod dignius vocari deberet corporeum quam 30
corpus. Ideo in littera dicitur corpus et solidum, ut per corpus intel-
ligatur compositum ex materia et tribus dimensionibus, per solidum
videntur scr. ex Moerb.] videtur MPv magis] et magis Moerb. (et om. P)
corporeum] solidum Iunt. a coniunctione] ad coniunctionem Iunt. sui
secl., om. Iunt. deberet] debet Pv in littera post dicitur Pv
t.c. 5, fol. 156KL.
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vero intelligatur compositum ex superficiebus. Et licet in hoc disconve-

nerint iste due opiniones, in alio tamen concordes fuerunt, videlicet quod
puncta, linee et superficies sunt magis substantie quam corpora, quia sunt
principia corporum et priora illis. Dixit enim prima opinio quod forma est
prior suo composito et principium illius; si ergo puncta, linee et superfi- 5
cies sunt forme substantiales corporum, oportet quod sint principia illo-
rum et priora illis. Secunda vero opinio idem probavit per hoc quod partes
sunt priores toto et principium illius; modo superficies, puncta et linee
sunt partes sui compositi, secundum quod opinabantur.
Nulla tamen istarum opinionum fuit vera, quia puncta, linee, superfi- 10
cies ac etiam tres dimensiones sunt accidentia et non possunt esse forme
substantiales. Non iterum componitur corpus ex superficiebus tamquam
ex partibus, sicut nec superficies ex lineis, neque linea ex punctis, ut
demonstratur sexto Phisicorum.a
Ex predictis sequitur quod inherentia non est de ratione accidentis 15
secundum specialem intentionem accepti. Nam punctus, linea et superfi-
cies sunt accidentia, de quorum rationibus non est quod inhereant, quia
tunc antiqui non potuissent concipere punctum, lineam et superficiem
quin concepissent inherentiam ad subiectumquod est falsum. Patet
consequentia, quia nullus potest concipere hominem nisi concipiat ani- 20
240ra Pv mal, ex eo quia animal includitur in ratione hominis; inherentia | ergo,
sive sit actualis sive aptitudinalis, non est de essentia neque de ratione
talium accidentium, si enim abstrahentium non est mendacium, per Ari-
stotelem, secundo Phisicorum.b Constat geometriam considerare punc-
tum, lineam et superficiem absque inherentia qualitercumque accepta: 25
considerat enim punctum esse indivisibilem, similiter lineam vero esse
longam et superficiem latam, absque hoc quod consideret si hec inherent
aut non inherent; sicut etiam non considerat utrum talia sint substantie
6vb M vel accidentia, cum hec consideratio | ad metaphisicum pertineat et non
ad mathematicum. Inherentia actualis est unio faciens accidens in con- 30
creto secundum actualem existentiam, cuiusmodi est unio albedinis cum
re alba et simitatis cum naso; inherentia aptitudinalis est dependentia
essentialis quiditatis accidentis ad quiditatem substantie. Et differt hec ab
iste] hee Pv illorumillis] illis et priora M modo om. Pv inhereant]

inhereat M falsum] et add. Pv nisi] quin Pv hoc] eo Pv
a Aristotle, Phys., VI, 1, 231a2126. b Aristotle, Phys., II, 2, 193b25.

alia, quia de accidente non demonstratur inherentia actualis sed aptitudi-

nalis: demonstratio enim abstrahit ab existentia et non ab aptitudine, cum
non demonstretur hominem ridere, sed esse risibilem. Quantitas enim
sacramenti altaris est accidens, non tamen actu inheret alicui, sed tantum
potentia et aptitudine. 5
Oppositum tamen ymaginatur Alexander,a dicens quod, licet inheren-
tia actualis non sit de essentia accidentis, tamen inherentia aptitudinalis
est de essentia illius. Ymaginatur enim quod, sicut genus descendit in spe-
cies per differentias, ita ens descendit in decem predicamenta per modos;
et sicut differentie per quas genus descendit in species sunt de essentia 10
specierum et primo distinctive illarum, ita modi essendi per quos descen-
dit ens in decem predicamenta sunt de essentia illorum et eadem predi-
camenta primo distinguunt.
Primob ergo arguit sic: essentia accidentis aut per se est in subiecto aut
per aliud. Si per se, habetur propositum. Si per aliud, queritur de illo alio, 15
utrum sit per se in subiecto vel per aliud. Si per se, idem poterat ac dici de
primo. Si per aliud, sequitur processus infinitus.
Secundo:c aut est de essentia accidentis quod sit aptum natum esse
in substantia aut est sibi accidentale. Si primum, habetur intentum. Si
secundum, cum analogia oriatur ex dependentia et aptitudine, ergo ana- 20
logia que est inter accidens et substantiam est accidentalis; ergo natura
accidentis non est de se analoga, sed sibi accidit quod sit analogacuius
oppositum colligitur de mente Philosophi, quarto et septimo Metaphi-
sice.d
Tertio:e si aptitudo non est de conceptu accidentis, ergo conceptus 25
accidentis potest intelligi preter aptitudinem. Quando ergo sic concipitur
sine aptitudine, aut concipitur ut ens aptum natum esse in se, aut in
alio. Si primum, ergo concipitur ut substantiaquod est impossibile.
Si secundum, ergo concipitur cum aptitudine, et prius tollebatur ab eo
aptitudo; ergo concipitur cum aptitudine et sine aptitudinequod est 30
impossibile.
genus descendit inv. Pv est] sit M
a Alexander of Alexandria, Exp. Met., VII, c. 1, q. 3, fol. 185rbvb. b Alexander of Alexandria,
Exp. Met., VII, c. 1, q. 3, fol. 185va. c Alexander of Alexandria, Exp. Met., VII, c. 1, q. 3, fol. 185va.
d Aristotle, Met., IV, 2, 1003a331003b12; VII, 1, 1028a1013. e Alexander of Alexandria, Exp.
Met., VII, c. 1, q. 3, fol. 185va.

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Quartoa arguit auctoritate Avicenneb diffinientis substantiam sic: sub-

stantia est ens de cuius natura est quod non sit in alio. Ergo, cum ens
dividatur immediate in substantiam et accidens, diffinitio accidentis erit
ita: accidens est ens de cuius natura est quod sit in alio. Sicut ergo natura
substantie est aptitudo essendi in se, ita natura accidentis est aptitudo 5
essendi in alio; et sicut esse in se nichil addit supra substantiam, ita esse
in alio nichil addit supra accidens. Et hec videtur esse intentio Philosophi,c
dicentis hic quod accidens non est ens nisi quia entis et cetera. Concordat
Porphyrius,d dicens quod accidentis esse est inesse.e
Contra hanc positionem arguitur quod predicamenta non primo dis- 10
tinguuntur per modos essendi, quia nullus modus est proprius alicuius
nisi ratione proprii fundamenti; sed esse in se est modus proprius substan-
tie et esse in alio est modus proprius accidentis; ergo isti modi habent in
substantia et accidente propria fundamenta. Ergo substantia et accidens
primo distiguuntur per illa propria fundamenta et non per modos essendi, 15
ut arguatur sic: sicut se habet modus essendi in communi ad esse in com-
muni, ita se habet modus essendi proprius ad esse proprium; sed modus
7ra M essendi in | communi presupponit esse in communi; ergo modus essendi
proprius presupponit esse proprium, et per consequens prima distinctio
accidentis a substantia non est per modos essendi, sed per proprium esse. 20
240rb Pv Iterum, illa que distinguuntur precise per | modos essendi, habent ean-
dem essentiam; sed substantia et accidens non habent eandem essentiam;
ergo substantia et accidens non distinguuntur precise per modos. Patet
consequentia cum minori. Et maior tenet ex eo quia oppositum implicat
contradictionem: si enim aliqua habent diversas essentias, illa non distin- 25
guuntur precise per modos. Ergo et cetera.
Item, nichil est tale in actu per solam aptitudinem, quia aptitudo non
dat nisi esse aptitudinale; sed quantitas est actu distincta a substantia;
ergo huiusmodi distinctio non est per solam aptitudinem, sed per aliquid
prius. 30
et1] in add. Pv
a Alexander of Alexandria, Exp. Met., VII, c. 1, q. 3, fol. 185rbva. b Avicenna, Phil. Pr., tr.
VIII, c. 4, ed. Van Riet, p. 403, 7780. c Aristotle, Met., VII, 1, 1028a1820. d This claim,
which Paul attibutes to Porphyry, is actually extracted from a series of Aristotelian texts
(e.g. Top., I, 5, 102a67; IV, 1, 120b3435; Met., VII, 1, 1028a1820). Cf. the editorial note on
Aquinas, Exp. Post., Lib. I, lect. 2, Opera Omnia, I* 2, p. 11, ad lin. 40. e pp. 67, 668, 9,
cf. Alexander of Alexandria, Exp. Met., VII, c. 1, q. 3, fol. 185rbvb (critical edition in Amerini
(2005), 224227).
Preterea, absolutum non est absolutum per aliquem respectum; sed

qualitas et quantitas sunt formaliter absoluta, aptitudo autem, cum sit
formaliter ad aliud, dicit formaliter respectum; ergo quantitas et qualitas
non distinguuntur a substantia sola aptitudine.
Et ideo est dicendum quod predicamenta non primo distinguuntur per 5
modos essendi, sed per formales proprias rationes illorum priores; per
modos autem essendi secundario distinguuntur, sicut species distingu-
untur primo per differentias essentiales, secundario autem per proprias
passiones. Non enim accidens distinguitur a substantia quia habet alium
modum, sed ideo habet alium modum quia distinguitur a substantia, sicut 10
substantia et accidens non ex eo habent diversas naturas quia habent
diversos modos, sed ideo habent diversos modos quia habent diversas
naturas et distinctas. Prima ergo ratio distinguendi predicamenta non est
modus, sed natura propria, in qua fundatur modus. Nec est verum quod
ens descendat in decem predicamenta per modos, sed immediate per se 15
ipsum, ut testatur Commentator, decimo huius.a Ideo enim genus non
predicatur per se de suis differentiis, quia descendit in speciem per illas;
si ergo ens descenderet in decem predicamenta per modos, non per se,
predicaretur de illis, et sic aliquid esset extra rationem entiscuius oppo-
situm asserit Philosophus, tertio huius.b 20
Deinde arguitur quod inherentia aptitudinalis non est de essentia acci-
dentis, quia actus et potentia sunt in eodem genere, ut homo in actu et
homo in potentia sunt eiusdem predicamenti; sed inherentia actualis et
inherentia aptitudinalis se habent sicut ens in actu et ens in potentia; ergo
sunt in eodem genere. Sed inherentia actualis non est de essentia acci- 25
dentis, quia potest separari ab eo, ut patet in sacramento altaris; ergo nec
inherentia aptitudinalis.
Iterum, passio non est de essentia sui subiecti; sed inherentia est passio
accidentis; ergo inherentia, sive sit actualis sive aptitudinalis, non potest
esse de essentia accidentis, ut arguitur sic: inherentia demonstratur de 30
accidente tamquam passio de subiecto; non autem demonstratur essen-
tia accidentis de aliquo, quia ipsum quod quid est non demonstratur, sed
investigatur per diffinitionem; ergo inherentia non est de essentia acci-
dentis.
primo mg. Pv diversos diversas naturas et distinctas] distinctos distinctas

naturas Pv ens] genus M ut] sicut Pv
a Averroes, In Met., X, t.c. 8, fol. 257EK. b Aristotle, Met., III, 3, 998b2227.

70 pauli veneti
Item, quantitas et inherentia sua habent diversa subiecta; ergo quanti-

tas et inherentia sua sunt diversa. Patet consequentia, quia idem accidens
non perficit immediate diversa subiecta. Antecedens declaratur. Nam
substantia est subiectum immediatum quantitatis, non autem est subiec-
tum immediatum inherentie; ymmo ipsa quantitas est subiectum imme- 5
diatum inherentie, quia substantia non inheret, quantitas autem inheret.
Constat autem illud esse subiectum accidentis quod recipit predicatio-
nem eius.
Item, inherentia est eiusdem rationis in omnibus accidentibus. Ergo
7rb M si est de essentia quantitatis et qualitatis et aliorum predicamentorum | 10
accidentium, ab illis potest abstrahi conceptus dictus in quid de eis, infe-
rior quidem conceptui entis et superior eis. Constat autem quod omnis
talis est conceptus generis; ergo quantitas, qualitas, relatio et huiusmodi
non sunt genera generalissima, quia habent supra se aliquod superve-
niens genus.a 15
Dicendum ergo quod, sicut albedo est de essentia albi formaliter
sumpti secundum hanc intentionem communem album, non tamen est
de essentia albi materialiter sumpti secundum hanc intentionem homo
vel equus, de quibus dicitur album. Ita inherentia est de essentia acci-
240va Pv dentis formaliter sumpti secundum | hanc generalem intentionem acci- 20
dens, non tamen est de essentia accidentis materialiter sumpti secun-
dum has intentiones speciales linea, superficies, albedo, nigredo. Est
enim inherentia de ratione huiusmodi conceptus accidens, cum non
possit concipi conceptus ille quin concipiatur inherentia; sed non est de
ratione horum conceptuum specialium, quia potest concipi linea, super- 25
ficies, albedo, nigredo, non concipiendo inherentiam. Ex quo prius est
quodlibet istorum quam inherentia eius, sicut prius est subiectum sua
propria passione. Dicit enim Commentator, in hoc septimo, quod homo
non potest concipi sine carnibus et ossibus ex eo quia sunt de essentia
eius. Si ergo hec accidentia nominata possunt concipi sine inherentia, 30
necesse est quod inherentia non sit de ratione neque de essentia illorum.
Et ex hoc habetur quod iste propositiones quantitas est accidens, quali-
tas est accidens, non sunt per se in primo modo, sicut nec iste linea est
inherens, albedo est inherens, ex quo predicatum non est de essentia
subiecti, sed sunt in secundo modo dicendi per se. Et ita non quodlibet 35
a pp.68, 1070, 15, cf. Francis of Marchia, Quaestiones in Metaphysicam, Lib. VII, q. 1, ms.
Paris, Bibliothque Mazarine, lat 3490, fol. 48va49ra (critical edition in Amerini (2006),
144150).
divisum predicatur essentialiter de quolibet suorum dividentium, quia

accidens dividitur in novem predicamenta et non essentialiter predica-
tur de illis; et hoc ideo, quia aliquid est de intellectu eius quod non est
de intellectu suorum dividentium. Propter quam causam non inconvenit
aliquod genus non predicari de sua specie in primo modo dicendi per se, 5
quia scientia est genus ad geometriam et arismeticam, ut habetur in Pre-
dicamentis,a non tamen predicatur per se in primo modo, ex quo scientia
dicit respectum ad scibile, non autem geometria et arismetica includunt
huiusmodi respectum.
Ad primum respondetur quod essentia accidentis est per se in subiecto 10
et per aliud, eo modo quo homo est per se risibilis et per aliud: est enim
per se risibilis perseitate secundi modi, in quantum risibilitas competit
homini non per aliud subiectum; est autem per aliud risibilis, in quantum
est risibilis per risibilitatem, que est aliud ab homine. Ita essentia acciden-
tis est per se in subiecto perseitate secundi modi, in quantum inherentia 15
competit illi non per aliud subiectum. Iterum, essentia accidentis est in
subiecto per aliud, quia est in subiecto per inherentiam, que est aliud ab
essentia accidentis. Et consequenter dicitur quod ista inherentia est in
subiecto per se, non quidem in substantia, sed in accidente, et non est
in subiecto illo per aliquid aliud. 20
Et cum dicitur quod idem poterit dici de primo, negatur, quia essentia
accidentis inheret, inherentia autem non inheret, sicut albedo intenditur,
intentio autem non intenditur. Et si arguitur sic: inherentia est accidens,
ergo inheret actu vel aptitudine; dico quod illa inherentia non est accidens
formaliter, sed tantum denominative, ratione accidentis in quo est, sicut 25
etiam privatio aut indivisio non est formaliter ens, sed tantum denomina-
tive, ratione subiecti. Potest tamen concedi quod inherentia est formaliter
accidens et quod formaliter inheret non per aliquod additum, sed per se
ipsam tantum. Neque inconvenit quod predicetur de se ipsa denomina-
tive ex quo est passio quodammodo transcendens, eo modo quo concedi- 30
tur quod unitas est una et entitas est ens.
Ad secundum respondetur quod aptitudo essendi in substantia non
7va M est de essentia accidentis, | sed est quoddam accidentale adveniens illi.
predicatur essentialiter inv. Pv arismeticam] astronomiam M et includunt]

nec includit Pv aut] et M additum] superadditum Pv
a Perhaps, the sentence is drawn from Post. Anal., I, 14, 79a1820.

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Ex hoc tamen non sequitur quod analogia accidentis ad substantiam sit

accidentalis aut quod natura accidentis non sit per se analoga, quia adhuc
accidens essentiali ordine dependet a substantia. Unde risibilitas non est
de essentia hominis, sed est accidens superadditum illi; tamen homo est
per se risibilis, et inter risibilitatem et hominem est ordo essentialis. Et 5
sicut risibilitas non dicitur accidere homini, sed per se competit homini
in quantum fluit ab essentia hominis, ita inherentia et analogia non
accidit accidenti, sed per se competit illi, in quantum fluit ab essentia
eius.
Ad tertium conceditur quod conceptus accidentis potest concipi sine 10
aptitudine, et in hoc casu non concipitur ut est ens in se nec in alio,
non obstante quod omne ens sit ens in se vel in alio. Concipit enim
240vb Pv geometra quantitatem continuam et arismeticus | quantitatem discretam
absolute, absque aptitudine, nec eam concipit ut est ens in se nec ut est
ens in alio, sicut non concipit eam sub modo substantie neque sub modo 15
accidentis, quia talis consideratio non ad mathematicum pertinet, sed ad
metaphisicum.
Ad quartum respondetur quod diffinitio Avicennea est sane intelli-
genda ut substantia est illud cui naturaliter competit non esse in alio
et accidens est illud cui naturaliter competit esse in alio. Dicimus enim 20
quod homo de sua natura est risibilis, non quod risibilitas sit de natura
hominis, sed quod risibilitas naturaliter competit homini. Quando autem
Philosophusb dicit quod accidens non est ens nisi quia entis, non intendit
quod inherentia aut quod esse in alio sit de essentia accidentis, sed quod
accidens non habet essentiam neque esse nisi illud causaliter recipiat a 25
substantia, ita quod sit ordo atque dependentia essentialis accidentis ad
substantiam. Porphyriusc autem, dicens quod accidentis esse est inesse,
non intendit quod esse et inesse accidentis sunt unum et idem, sed quod
ad esse accidentis sequitur inesse, sicut ad esse hominis sequitur esse
risibilis. Ideo propositio illa non est intelligenda identice in recto, sed cau- 30
saliter in obliquo.
Amplius autem h1028b19ssi.
Quarta conclusio: non est per se manifestum substantias sensibiles a
substantiis insensibilibus realiter separari.
vel] ens add. Pv sua natura inv. Pv
a Cf. supra, p. 68, 1. b Cf. supra, p. 68, 78. c Cf. supra, p. 68, 9.
Probatur. Illud non est per se manifestum quod a quibusdam concedi-

tur et a quibusdam negatur; sed a quibusdam conceditur substantias sen-
sibiles a substantiis insensibilibus realiter separari, a quibusdam autem
negatur; ergo et cetera. Prima pars antecedentis est nota et alia declara-
tur recitando opiniones in hac materia. Quarum prima posuit quod preter 5
substantias sensibiles non est dare aliquam aliam substantiam separa-
tam, ita quod forme mathematice, et si sunt substantie, non tamen sepa-
rantur a substantiis sensibilibus. Unde Parmenides et Melissus posue-
runt tantum unum ordinem rerum, scilicet substantias sensibiles, quia
formas mathematicas, videlicet puncta, lineas et superficies, unitates et 10
numeros et figuras, dixerunt non realiter distingui a substantiis sensibili-
bus, sed tantum secundum existimationem, ex quo ponebant omnia esse
unum.
Pitagorici autem posuerunt duos ordines rerum: in primo ordine posu-
erunt principia, videlicet puncta, lineas et superficies; in secundo vero 15
posuerunt principiata, videlicet substantias sensibiles, ut mixta et ele-
menta. Non tamen separaverunt istos ordines invicem, quia dixerunt
principia esse coniuncta principiatis, eo modo quo materia et forma con-
iunguntur composito aut partes quantitative suo toti.
Lege litteram: Amplius preter sensibilia hii quidem non opinantur esse 20
aliquid talium separatum ab illis.a
7vb M Secunda fuit opinio Platonicorum ponentium | substantias sensibiles
separari a substantiis insensibilibus. Hii enim posuerunt plura entia sem-
piterna et magis entia quam sensibilia, quia sensibilia mobilia sunt et
corruptibilia, hec autem sempiterna incorruptibilia sunt et immobilia. 25
Propter quod ponebant ea esse substantias et quiditates rerum sensibi-
lium. Posuit ergo Plato tres ordines rerum: in primo collocavit formas
ydeales, ut hominem communem, equum communem et huiusmodi; in
secundo collocavit formas mathematicas, ut puncta, lineas, superficies,
unitatem, numeros et figuras; in tertio vero ordine collocavit substan- 30
tias sensibiles, ut hunc hominem, illum equum. Et omnes istos ordines
invicem separavit. Credidit enim quod priora in conceptu sint priora in
substantia et separata in conceptu sint separata in esse; et quia intellec-
tus concipit hominem sine isto homine et concipit lineam sine materia,
a quibusdam] ab aliis Pv scilicet s.l. Pv numeros mg. Pv videlicet] scilicet

M
a Aristotle, Met., VII, 2, 1028b1819 (AL XXV 3.2, p. 133, lin. 4849).
74 pauli veneti
ideo oportet dare hominem separatum ab isto homine et lineam separa-

tam a materia. Sed isti decepti sunt, quia substantia est prior accidente et
tamen prius concipitur accidens quam substantia. Non etiam separatur
albedo a dulcedine in lacte et tamen intellectus concipit albedinem sine
dulcedine et econtra. Isti ergo posuerunt tres ordines rerum separatarum 5
invicem: unum quidem substantiarum sensibilium et duos substantiarum
insensibilium.
241ra Pv Lege litteram: Illi vero plura entia | posuerunt et magis entia dixerunt
esse que sunt sempiterna, ut Plato species ipsas et mathematica duas sub-
stantias, tertiam vero sensibilium substantiam.a 10
Tertia fuit opinio Speusippi, philosophi achademici, qui fuit nepos Pla-
tonis, de sorore natus. Hic enim asseruit quatuor esse ordines rerum,
quorum primus erat formarum ydealium; secundus numerorum; tertius
magnitudinum; et quartus animarum, in quo ponebat omnes substantias
sensibiles. Quilibet tamen istorum ordinum inchoavit ab uno, quia cuiu- 15
slibet substantie principium ponebat esse unum, licet non idem unum.
Nam aliud unum dicebat esse substantiam ydearum, aliud substantiam
numerorum, aliud substantiam magnitudinum et aliud substantiam ani-
marum et rerum sensibilium. Processit ergo iste a formis ydealibus ad
formas sensibiles, quas posuit in ordine animarum, et omnes istos ordi- 20
nes separavit. Et quia posuit animas coniungi corporibus sensibilibus, tam
animas quam substantias sensibiles posuit in ordine uno, quas dixit esse
corruptibiles; omnes autem alias substantias, videlicet ydeales, numero-
rum et magnitudinum, asseruit incorruptibiles.
Lege litteram: Sed Speusippus plures substantias ab uno inchoans 25
et principia cuiuslibet substantie, aliud quidem numerorum, aliud autem
magnitudinum, deinde anime; et hoc modo protendit substantias.b
Quarta fuit opinio quorumdam successorum Platonis et Speusippi dis-
cordantium ab hiis et dicentium quod quatuor sunt ordines rerum, quo-
rum primus est ydearum et numerorum, ita quod numeros et ydeas dice- 30
bant esse eiusdem nature, cum non possint esse ydee absque unitate et
abseparatam mg. Pv sensibilium] corporum add. Moerb. Speusippi]

Leucippi M dicebat] dixit Pv substantiam om. M Speusippus Pv Moerb.]
Leucippus M (sec.m. FSiUv) cuiuslibet] cuiusque Moerb. Speusippi] Leucippi
M
a Aristotle, Met., VII, 2, 1028b1921 (AL XXV 3.2, p. 133, lin. 4951). b Aristotle, Met., VII, 2,
1028b2123 (AL XXV 3.2, pp. 133134, lin. 5154).
multitudine; secundus est magnitudinum, in quo ponebant puncta, lineas

et superficies et figuras; tertius est sensibilium incorruptibilium, in quo
ponebant omnia corpora celestia; quartus vero sensibilium corruptibi-
lium, in quo ponebant omnia elementa et omnia mixta, tam animata
quam inanimata. Istos denique ordines dicebant habere invicem causali- 5
tatem et dependentiam essentialem, ita quod numeri et ydee erant cause
magnitudinum, et magnitudines erant cause corporum celestium, cor-
8ra M pora autem celestia erant cause omnium inferiorum existentium | infra
orbem lune. Dependebat ergo essentialiter secundus ordo a primo et ter-
tius a secundo et quartus a tertio, eo modo quo caliditas dependet a 10
lumine et lumen a luce et lux a corpore luminoso.
Lege litteram: Quidam vero species et numeros eandem habere dicunt
naturam, alia vero habita, idest immediata hiis, dixerunt lineas et superfi-
cies, usque ad primam celi substantiam et sensibilia.a
Notandum quod ex opinionibus recitatis habetur quod, sicut inhe- 15
rentia non est de ratione accidentis, ita nec subiectum est de intellectu
illius, loquendo de subiecto substantiali: quoniam, cum duplex sit abs-
tractio, una per quam abstrahitur universale a singulari et alia per quam
abstrahitur forma a materia, sicut cognoscitur per primam abstractio-
nem universale non cognito singulari, ita per secundam abstractionem 20
cognoscitur forma non cognita materia, et consequenter cognoscitur acci-
dens non cognito subiecto. Licet ergo non possit cognosci inherentia
neque accidens in eo quod accidens, nec aliquid omnino ut habet modum
essendi in alio subiective, neque accidens proprium, ut est simitas et cri-
spitudo, quin cognoscatur subiectum, ex doctrina Aristotelis, quinto et 25
sexto huius,b illud tamen quod est accidens potest intelligi non cointel-
lecto subiecto, sive fuerit absolutum sive respectivum: potest enim tam
qualitas quam quantitas intelligi absque subiecto, et etiam relatio et actio
et passio, quia cognoscitur equalitas et inequalitas sine subiecto, licet
non sine fundamento, quod est quantitas; etiam similitudo et dissimi- 30
litudo cognoscitur sine subiecto, licet non cognoscatur sine qualitate,
ita] sic Pv cause] causa Pv singulari] particulari Pv et] ac Pv

cognoscitur cognoscatur] pro cognoscuntur cognoscantur?
a Aristotle, Met., VII, 2, 1028b2428 (AL XXV 3.2, p. 134, lin. 5457). b Aristotle, Met., V, 30
passim; VI, 2 passim.
76 pauli veneti
que est fundamentum eius. Paternitas autem et filiatio, dominium et ser-

241rb Pv vitus, et huiusmodi, quia concernunt determinatum subiectum, non |
intelliguntur sine subiecto. Licet enim accidens non possit esse sine sub-
iecto, tamen potest intelligi sine subiecto, sicut genus non potest esse
sine specie, neque materia sine forma, neque causa particularis sine causa 5
universali, et tamen potest intelligi genus absque specie et materia abs-
que forma et causa particularis non cognita causa universali. Nec ana-
logia accidentis ad substantiam necessitat cognoscere substantiam cum
accidente, sicut neque analogia creature ad Deum necessitat cognoscere
Deum cognita creatura. 10
Et si instatur: quoniam res sicut se habet ad esse ita ad cognosci; sed
accidens est per subiectum suum; ergo accidens cognoscitur per subiec-
tum suum; dicitur quod illa maior est intelligenda quo ad naturam et
non quo ad nos, quia nos prius cognoscimus accidens quam substantiam,
natura autem econtra prius cognoscit substantiam quam accidens, et ex 15
cognitione subiecti venit in cognitionem accidentis. Quo non obstante
natura, si cognosceret et abstraheret, posset cognoscere accidens non
cognito subiecto, sicut nos cognoscimus substantiam non cognito acci-
dente, abstrahendo conceptum substantie a conceptu accidentis, non
obstante quod non possimus cognoscere substantiam nisi prius cogno- 20
verimus accidens. Unde, licet accidens sit ens per subiectum, et habeat
essentialem dependentiam ad subiectum, tamen non est verum quod
accidens non est ens nisi per subiectum, quia accidens est ens per subiec-
tum perseitate causalitatis, in secundo modo, et est ens per se ipsum per-
seitate formalitatis, in primo modo, ita quod accidens est ens per aliud 25
causaliter et est ens per se formaliter. Dictum enim est supra quod acci-
dens habet duplicem inherentiam, scilicet causalitatis et predicationis:
primam inherentiam habet a subiecto suo et secundam ex propria natura,
que quidem alia est a natura substantie et subiecti.
De hiis ergo h1028b28ssi. 30
Hic Aristoteles movet et solvit unum dubium. Cum de quiditate et
8rb M diversitate substantie multe fuerunt opiniones, ut ostensum est, | que-
ritur que istarum opinionum vera fuerit et qui istorum bene et qui non
bene locuti sunt. Respondet Philosophus quod hoc videbitur duodecimo
et1 om. Pv possimus] possumus Pv habet post inherentiam Pv scilicet]

videlicet Pv ergo] igitur Moerb.
huius, quoniam in libro isto non sunt perscrutande ille opiniones, sed
solum quid est substantia in se; in sequenti autem libro quid est substantia
sensibilis, cuius esse est per se manifestum. Prima ergo questio perscru-
tanda erit ista: utrum hii bene aut non bene opinati sunt et qui istorum
bene et qui non bene locuti sunt. Secunda questio: utrum alique res sint 5
substantie et alique non, et que sunt ille res que sunt substantie et que
sunt ille que non sunt substantie sed accidentia. Tertia questio: utrum
sint alique substantie preter sensibiles aut non, et quomodo se habent
substantie sensibiles et quomodo substantie insensibiles. Quarta questio:
utrum sit aliqua substantia insensibilis separata a substantia sensibili aut 10
non, et, si est separata, quare et quomodo est separata, utrum sicut dixit
Plato, aut sicut dixit Speusippus, aut sicut alii opinati sunt successores
istorum.
Lege litteram: De hiis ergo quid dicitur bene aut non bene, et que sunt
substantie, et utrum sint alique preter sensibiles aut non sunt, et iste quo- 15
modo sunt, et utrum est aliqua separabilis substantia, et quare et quomodo,
aut nulla preter sensibiles, perscrutandum, cum descripserimus primo sub-
stantiam quid est.a
Sed circa divisionem Philosophi in principio capituli premissam, dubi-
tatur utrum sub intentione entis sit aliqua intentio media, univoca novem 20
predicamentis accidentium. Et arguitur quod non. Primo auctoritate Ari-
stotelisb, dicentis hic quod ens multipliciter dicitur, videlicet de substan-
tia, quantitate, qualitate et huiusmodi; ergo non mediat aliqua inten-
tio communis novem predicamentis accidentium. Et quinto huiusc dicit
quod ens totiens dicitur quotiens sunt figure predicationis. Quero ergo 25
utrum ens totiens dicitur quotiens sunt figure predicationis immediate
aut mediate. Si immediate, habetur propositum. Si mediate, cum ens dica-
tur mediate non solum de primis generibus, sed etiam de omnibus con-
tentis sub illis, sequitur quod ens totiens dicitur quot sunt concepta sub
quolibet generequod est absurdum. 30
241va Pv Secundo: quandocumque aliquid dividitur per se et immediate in ali-
qua duo univoce, si unum dividentium est genus, et reliquum erit genus,
sunt om. Pv Speusippus] Leucippus M ergo] igitur Moerb. sint] sunt

Moerb. (sint P1b P2) descripserimus] descripsimus Moerb. capituli om. M et
om. M
a Aristotle,
Met., VII, 2, 1028b2832 (AL, XXV 3.2, p. 134, lin. 5863). b Aristotle, Met., VII, 1,
1028a1013. c Aristotle, Met., V, 7, 1017a2224.
78 pauli veneti
ex quo illud immediate et ex equo descendit in illa, et utrumque est eque

unum sicut reliquum. Si ergo ens descendit immediate in substantiam et
accidens tamquam in univoca, et substantia est genus generalissimum,
ergo accidens est genus generalissimumquod est falsum, quia tunc non
essent nisi duo genera generalissima. 5
Et confirmatur: quandocumque aliqua duo dividunt aliquod commune
immediate, utrumque intentionum dividentium est eque una sicut alia;
sed intentio accidentis non est ita una sicut intentio substantie; ergo
substantia et accidens non immediate dividunt ens. Tenet consequentia
cum maiori. Et minor declaratur, quoniam omnis intentio universalis, que 10
neque est genus neque species neque differentia, est magis una quam sit
intentio generis; constat autem quod intentio accidentis non est intentio
generis nec speciei nec differentie; ipsa autem intentio substantie est
intentio generis; ergo et cetera.
In contrarium arguitur. Primo sic: quandocumque aliquid dividitur per 15
se in aliqua plura, si unum dividentium est univocum, et reliquum est uni-
vocum, quoniam in divisione per se univocum non dividit cum equivoco;
sed ens per se et immediate dividitur in substantiam et accidens; con-
stat autem quod substantia est univocum, cum sit genus; ergo accidens
est univocum. 20
Secundo: omnis intentio certa est alia ab intentione dubia; sed aliquis
potest esse certus de aliquo quod est accidens et dubius utrum sit qualitas
aut quantitas aut aliquid aliud; ergo intentio accidentis est alia ab inten-
tione novem predicamentorum accidentium. Tenet consequentia cum
maiori. Et minor declaratur. Quoniam multi concedunt quod tam motus 25
quam ubi est accidens, dubitant tamen utrum sit accidens absolutum vel
respectivum.
8va M Tertio: omnis passio una habet subiectum unum primum; sed inhe-
rentia est quedam passio communis novem predicamentis accidentium;
ergo habet unum subiectum commune primum. Illud autem commune 30
non est ens sed aliquid contentum sub ente; ergo aliqua intentio com-
munis novem predicamentis accidentium est immediate contenta sub
ente.
Quarto: accidentia magis inter se conveniunt ex natura rei quam cum
substantia; sed accidentia non magis conveniunt convenientia entis sim- 35
et1 om. M neque1] non Pv intentio substantie] substantia M est] sit M

qualitas aut quantitas] quantitas vel qualitas Pv dubitant] dubitat M
pliciter; ergo magis conveniunt inter se convenientia alicuius minus com-

munis quam sit ens. Illud autem non videtur nisi intentio accidentis.
Dicendum ergo quod accidens dicit unam intentionem communem
univocam novem predicamentis accidentium. Sicut enim ens est quod-
dam univocum decem predicamentis, ita accidens novem predicamentis. 5
Illud enim est univocum quod importat plura secundum unum nomen et
eandem rationem, ut ponit Philosophus in Predicamentis;a constat autem
quod accidens secundum idem nomen predicatur de novem predicamen-
tis, et secundum eandem rationem, iuxta illud Porphyrii:b Accidentis esse
est inesse. Ex hoc non sequitur quin ens dividatur immediate in decem 10
predicamenta. Unde entis est triplex divisio, scilicet essentialis, acciden-
talis et mixta. Divisio essentialis est illa qua dividitur ens in partes subiec-
tivas, cuiusmodi est divisio entis in substantiam, qualitatem, quantita-
tem et huiusmodi. Divisio accidentalis est illa qua dividitur ens in partes
modales, ut cum dividitur ens in ens a se et in ens ab alio, aut in ens per 15
se et in ens per accidens, aut in ens in se et in ens in alio. Divisio mixta est
illa qua dividitur ens in partem subiectivam et partem modalem, ut cum
dividitur ens in substantiam et accidens: substantia enim est pars subiec-
tiva entis et accidens est pars modalis, in quantum includit esse in alio,
quod est modus entis. 20
Ad primum dicitur quod ens immediate descendit in decem predica-
menta, non obstante quod immediate descendat in substantiam et acci-
dens, quia non est idem modus descensus, sicut non est idem modus
divisionis. Neque obstat quod accidens est intentio univoca media sub
ente, communior novem predicamentis accidentium, quoniam quod sit 25
medium intelligitur dupliciter: aut medium mediatione communitatis
aut medium mediatione descensus. Primum est necessarium, quoniam
241vb Pv accidens est minus commune quam sit | ens et magis commune quam
aliqua intentio novem predicamentorum accidentium. Secundum vero
est impossibile, quoniam ex quo accidens non est genus neque species 30
neque differentia, non potest per ipsum descendere in aliquod predica-
mentum.
Ad secundum negatur antecedens, quia non oportet quod, si unum
dividentium sit genus, [quod] aliud sit genus, sed sufficit quod, si unum
Philosophus] Aristoteles Pv qualitatem quantitatem inv. Pv est] pars

modalis et add. M quod secl.
a Aristotle, Cat., 1, 1a67. b Cf. supra, p. 68, 9.

80 pauli veneti
eorum sit univocum, quod reliquum sit univocum. Natura enim dividitur
in materiam primam et formam substantialem, per Aristotelem, secundo
Phisicorum et quinto huius,a et tamen forma substantialis est genus pre-
dicamenti substantie, non autem prima materia, cum non sit in predica-
mento nisi per reductionem. Et licet ens immediate descendat in substan- 5
tiam et accidens, non tamen oportet quod equaliter, quia prius descendit
in substantiam quam in accidens, sicut ordine nature prius est substantia
quam accidens.
Consimiliter dicitur ad confirmationem quod non omnia dividentia
aliquod commune habent equalem unitatem. Quoniam rationale et irra- 10
tionale dividunt animal, et tamen rationale est magis unum quam irratio-
nale, quia rationale non dividitur in plures species, ex quo tantum unam
constituit; irrationale vero dividitur in plures alias differentias constituti-
vas specierum. Substantia ergo habet maiorem unitatem quam accidens,
quia substantia est minus divisibilis, cum non sit divisibilis in plura pre- 15
dicamenta; accidens autem dividitur in novem predicamenta. Iterum,
substantia, cum sit genus, dicit unam naturam, sicut unum conceptum;
accidens autem, sicut et ens transcendenter sumptum, dicit unam inten-
tionem tantum. Ergo et cetera.
hCAPITULUM IIi 20
8vb M Dicitur autem substantia h1028b33ssi.

Istud est secundum capitulum huius primi tractatus, in quo Philoso-
phus manifestat multiplicitatem substantie, postquam manifestavit dig-
nitatem et evidentiam eiusdem, ut ostendat ordinem in dicendis sue
intentionis. 25
Et dividitur in tres partes, in quarum prima facit quod dictum est; in
secunda solvit dubia circa distinctiones datas de substantia, ibi: Nunc
quidem h1029a7ssi; in tertia exequitur de intento per conclusiones, ibi:
At tamen eam h1029a30ssi.
Prima pars dividitur in duas distinctiones, quarum secunda incipit ibi: 30
Tale vero h1029a3ssi.
Prima ergo distinctio est ista, quod substantia dicitur ad minus quatuor
modis, et si non multiplicius dicitur.
a Aristotle, Phys., II, 1, 193a9b8; Met., V, 4, 1014b261015a3.

Primo quidem dicitur substantia illud quod est quiditas et essentia

rei importata per diffinitionem, ut humanitas est substantia hominis et
equitas est substantia equi, cum sit forma eius.
Secundo dicitur substantia illud cui proprie et per se competit diffini-
tio, ut species, quam Plato vocavit universale, quia universaliter continet 5
omnia individua eiusdem nature, ut homo et equus. Sola enim species
diffinitur, quia, si genus diffinitur, hoc non est in quantum genus, sed in
quantum species.
Tertio dicitur substantia illud cui proprie et per se competit divisio, ut
genus, quod Plato dixit predicari in quid et ingredi constitutionem sub- 10
stantie tamquam elementum eius, ut animal et corpus. Genus enim est
illud quod proprie dividitur, videlicet divisione formali, per differentias
essentiales, in suas species, ut habetur tertio huius.a
Quarto dicitur substantia illud quod est subiectum de quo omnia alia
predicantur et ipsum de nullo dicitur, ut individuum predicamenti sub- 15
stantie. Ipsum enim ex quo est infimum predicamenti substantie de nullo
dicitur, omnia autem alia predicantur de eo, sive sint substantie sive acci-
dentia: omnis enim substantia secunda predicatur de prima, quia Sortes
est homo, animal et huiusmodi; omnia etiam accidentia predicantur de
eadem substantia prima, quia Sortes est bicubitus, albus, pater, dominus, 20
agens, patiens et huiusmodi.
Lege litteram: Dicitur autem substantia, si non multiplicius, de qua-
tuor maxime dicitur. Et enim quid erat esse et universale et genus vide-
tur substantia esse cuiuslibet, et quartum horum subiectum etiam dicitur
substantia. Subiectum vero est de quo alia dicuntur, et illud ipsum non 25
242ra Pv ad-|-huc de aliquo predicatur. Ex quo nichil illi subicitur tamquam infe-
rius.b
Ex ista distinctione infert Philosophus quod ad metaphisicum pertinet
primo determinare de substantia prima. Probatur. Nam ad metaphisi-
cum pertinet determinare primo de eo quod est maxime substantia. Con- 30
stat autem quod prima substantia est maxime substantia, ut probatur in
Predicamentis,c eo quod omnibus aliis substat: cuicumque enim substat
genus aut species predicamenti substantie, eidem substat individuum,
humanitas] seu equitas humanitas enim add. Pv equitas] equinitas M cuiusli-

bet] cuiusque Moerb. aliquo] alio Pv Moerb. determinare] considerare M
a Aristotle,Met., III, 3, 998b2227. b Aristotle, Met., VII, 3, 1028b331029a1 (AL XXV 3.2, p.
134, lin. 6468). c Aristotle, Cat., 5, 2a1112.
82 pauli veneti
et non econtra. Substantia enim prima est illa que per se subsistit, et
omnia alia sunt in substantiis primis, sic quod destructis substantiis pri-
mis impossibile est aliquid aliorum remanere, ut habetur in Predicamen-
tis,a et cetera.
Lege litteram: Propter quod hprimumi de hoc subiecto quod est prima 5
substantia determinandum est; maxime namque videtur esse substantia
subiectum primum.b
Notandum, secundum Commentatorem, commento septimo, quod
substantia dicitur multis modis famosis. Hoc enim nomen sub-
stantia dicitur de quiditate rei et dicitur de universali predicabili 10
de aliquo secundum quid, et similiter estimatur quod genus propin-
quum, quod est predicabile de aliquo, sit substantia. Et forte dixit
hoc, quia antiqui diversantur in hoc et ista est sententia Platonis
Et quartum istorum est subiectum, idest individuum substantie.
Et ideo induxit suam diffinitionem, qua diffinit ipsam in libro Cathe- 15
gorico.c
Intendit Commentator quod, licet pluribus modis quam quatuor possit
9ra M dici substantia, ut patet | ex distinctione data quinto huiusd una cum
distinctione hic posita, tamen solum isti quatuor sunt famosi tam secun-
dum veritatem quam etiam secundum modum loquendi antiquorum, ita 20
quod tres primi modi large accipiuntur et extenduntur ad omnia predi-
camenta in quibus inveniuntur quiditates, genera et species. Sed anti-
qui, stricte accipientes, non posuerunt genera et species nisi in predica-
mento substantie, et consequenter quiditates, et dicentes genera et spe-
cies predicamenti substantie proprie et vere predicari in quid. De quo- 25
rum numero aliqui dixerunt genus propinquum magis esse substantiam
quam genus remotum, quia continetur in eo, sicut universaliter totum
substantiale est magis substantia quam aliqua pars eius. Alii vero con-
cesserunt genus remotum, ut ens et unum, esse magis substantiam, quia
genus remotum est principium et causa generis propinqui. Neque Phi- 30
losophus diffinit hic aliquam substantiam preter quatuor cui assignavit
diffinitionem datam in Predicamentis,e dicens quod substantia sumpta
primum suppl. ex Moerb. estimatur] existimatur Iunt. diversantur]

diversabantur Iunt. et vere post quid M universaliter] generaliter Pv
a Aristotle, Cat., 5, 2b16c. b Aristotle, Met., VII, 3, 1029a12 (AL XXV 3.2, p. 134, lin. 6870).
c Averroes, In Met., VII, t.c. 7, fol. 157KL. d Aristotle, Met., V, 8 passim. e Aristotle, Cat., 5,
2b16c.
quarto modo est subiectum de quo omnia alia dicuntur et ipsum non
dicitur de alio.
Et si aliquis instaret quod ista divisio est superflua, quia Aristoteles
in Predicamentisa divisit substantiam solum in substantiam primam et
secundam, diffiniens quamlibet illarum, dicens quod substantia prima 5
significat hoc aliquid et substantia secunda significat quale quid; re-
spondetur quod divisio hic posita reducitur ad illam, quoniam genus et
species sunt substantie secunde, quiditas autem est formale principium
tam substantie prime quam substantie secunde.b
Tale vero h1029a3ssi. 10
Secunda distinctio est quod substantia prima, que est subiectum om-
nium, tripliciter dicitur, videlicet de materia, forma et composito, ita
quod, sicut compositum est substantia prima, ita et materia et forma,
que sunt partes eius. Ista distinctio declaratur, quia sicut est in artificiali-
bus, ita etiam est in naturalibus, ex quo ars imitatur naturam in quantum 15
potest, ut habetur secundo Phisicorum.c Constat autem quod in artificiali-
bus aliquid est materia, sicut es, et aliquid est forma, ut figura dans eri spe-
ciem, et aliquid est compositum, ut statua que, secundum Porphyrium,d
componitur ex ere et figura. In naturalibus ergo Sortes est compositum,
forma vero est anima, et materia est illud quod defert transmutationem 20
ex una forma in aliam formam. Istud tamen exemplum non est per omnia
simile, quia materia artificialium est ens in actu et materia naturalium est
ens in pura potentia; forma artificialium est purum accidens in abstracto,
ut figura, sed forma naturalium est substantia in abstracto, ut anima; com-
positum vero artificiale est accidens in concreto, ut statua, sed composi- 25
242rb Pv tum | naturale est substantia in concreto, ut Sortes.
Lege litteram: Tale vero subiectum, quod est prima substantia, modo
quodam materia dicitur, et alio modo forma, tertio vero quod ex hiis est,
scilicet compositum. Dico autem materiam quidem es, formam autem figu-
ram speciei, quod autem ex hiis statuam totam.e 30
Ex ista distinctione Aristoteles infert quod forma est prior composito
ex materia et forma, quoniam materia est prior composito; sed forma est
et] substantiam add. Pv illarum] earum Pv videlicet om. M etiam est] et

Pv et om. M
a Aristotle, Cat., 5, 3b1023. b lin. 39, cf. Aquinas, Exp. Met., VII, lect. 2, ed. Cathala-Spiazzi,
n. 1275. c Aristotle, Phys., II, 2, 194a2122; 8, 199a1517. d Porphyry, Isag., c. De differentia

(AL I 67, p. 18, 1112). e Aristotle, Met., VII, 3, 1029a35 (AL XXV 3.2, p. 134, lin. 7073).
84 pauli veneti
prior materia, sicut etiam est magis ens; ergo et cetera. Tenet consequen-
tia cum maiori, quia illud quod est in potentia ad aliquid est prius illo; sed
materia est in potentia ad compositum, ex quo compositum fit ex mate-
ria sicut ex subiecto; ergo materia est prior composito. Minor declaratur,
quoniam potentia presupponit actum, cum nichil educatur de potentia ad 5
actum nisi per aliquid quod est in actu; sed forma est actus; ergo forma est
prior materia, et consequenter est magis ens, cum sit maioris perfectionis.
Lege litteram: Quare si species, idest forma, materia est prior et magis
ens, et ipso quod ex utrisque, scilicet composito, prior erit ipsa forma, per
eandem rationem.a 10
Notandum primo, secundum Commentatorem, commento sep-
9rb M timo, quod Philosophus | dicit quoquo modo materiam et alio modo
formam, quia materia est substantia secundum quod est subiecta
forme; et forma est substantia secundum quod constituit; et compo-
situm est substantia secundum quod est compositum ex eis.b 15
Intendit Commentator quod ista secunda divisio non est divisio univoci,
sicut genus in species, quia substantia secundum eandem rationem non
dicitur de materia, forma et composito. Nam materia est substantia secun-
dum quod est subiectum forme, et forma est substantia secundum quod
constituit materiam in esse, compositum vero est substantia secundum 20
quod componitur ex materia et forma, quia ex non-substantiis non fit sub-
stantia, ut habetur primo Phisicorum.c
Econtra autem reddatur alia ratio, ut compositum ideo est substantia,
quia per se subsistit; forma vero est substantia quia est ratio propter
quam compositum per se subsistit; sed materia est substantia quia est 25
subiectum forme dantis per se existere.
Non iterum est hec divisio equivoci in sua equivocata, quia in equivo-
cis a casu unum significatum non est causa alterius nec in essendo nec in
cognoscendo; sed forma est causa essendi et cognoscendi tam materiam
quam compositum; oportet ergo quod sit divisio analogi, ita quod sub- 30
stantia dicatur de eis secundum prius et posterius, et secundum causam
et causatum. Et ita intendit Commentator, dicens quod Aristoteles dicit
quoquo modo materiam et alio modo formam.
sicut] tamquam Pv minor] vero add. Pv per M] propter Pv Moerb.

Philosophus] Aristoteles Pv
t.c. 7, fol. 157M. c Aristotle, Phys., I, 6, 189a3334.
Sed est advertendum quod dici de aliquibus secundum prius et poste-

rius est dupliciter, scilicet quantum ad naturam rei et quantum ad nomi-
nis impositionem. Sicut scientia quantum ad naturam rei prius dicitur de
scientia Dei, que est causa rerum, quam de scientia nostra, que causatur a
rebus; sed quantum ad nominis impositionem est econverso: prius enim 5
nostre scientie quam divine imponitur nomen scientie, quia ea que sunt
in sensibus sunt magis manifesta nobis quam que sensum transcendunt
et nostro intellectui preeminent. Nomina enim imponimus rebus quas
nominamus, ideo primo imponimus ea rebus quas primo nominamus.
Quantum ergo ad naturam significatam nomine substantie, prius dici- 10
tur substantia de forma, que est causa essendi et cognoscendi alia; sed
quantum ad nominis impositionem, prius dicitur de composito: ipsum
enim compositum cognitione confusa et superficiali, non penetrante in-
trinseca principia et essentialia, prius est nobis notum quam forma et
materia, dicente Philosopho, in prologo Phisicorum,a quod totum nobis 15
notius est quam partes et diffinitum diffinientibus. Constat autem quod
substantia composita, que est subiectum in genere substantie, est aliquid
sensu comprehensum. Inde est ergo quod Philosophus, diffiniens primam
substantiam in Predicamentis,b que est compositum, non dixit que pro-
242va Pv prie, principaliter et maxime est, sed que dicitur, per hoc innuens | quod 20
non est prima secundum naturam, sed secundum dici et significari vel
cognosci.
mento, quod Aristoteles intendebat quod, cum forma sit prior com-
posito ex materia et forma, et compositum est substantia, sequitur 25
quod forma sit magis substantia quam compositum.c
Ita quod, secundum Commentatorem, Philosophus non solum intendit
probare quod forma est prior composito, sed etiam est magis substan-
tia quam compositum, quoniam ex eo forma est magis substantia quam
materia, quia dat materie esse substantiale; sed etiam dat composito esse 30
substantiale, quia ei tribuit nomen et diffinitionem; ergo sicut forma est
magis substantia quam materia, ita est magis substantia quam composi-
tum.
est om. Pv enim] quidem Pv notandum secundo inv. Pv
a Aristotle,
Phys., I, 1, 184a21b3. b Aristotle Cat., 5, 2a1112. c Averroes, In Met., VII, t.c. 7,
fol. 158AB.
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Contra predicta arguitur. Et primo quod materia non est substan-

tia, quia quod est potentia album non est album et quod est potentia
homo non est homo. Ergo, per idem, quod est substantia in potentia non
est substantia; sed materia est substantia in potentia, per Aristotelem,
primo Phisicorum et primo De generatione;a ergo materia non est substan- 5
tia.
Item, si materia est substantia, aut ergo substantia predicabilis aut
extra predicamentum. Non primum, quia nichil est in predicamento nisi
9va M genus, species, differentia vel individuum; | constat autem materiam non
esse aliquid istorum. Non etiam secundum, quia tunc daretur substan- 10
tia extra omne predicamentum, et per consequens ens non immediate
descenderet in substantam predicamentalem, sed in substantiam analo-
gam aut equivocam, contra determinationem alterius capituli.
Secundo arguitur quod forma non est substantia, quia proprium est
substantie in subiecto non esse; sed forma est in subiecto; ergo et cetera. 15
Tenet consequentia cum minori. Maior vero est Aristotelis in Predicamen-
tis.b Deinde dicit Porphyriusc quod accidens est quod adest et abest preter
subiecti corruptionem; constat autem quod non corrumpitur subiectum
forme, scilicet materia, in absentia forme; ergo forma, quecumque sit illa,
est accidens et non substantia. 20
Tertio arguitur quod substantia prius et magis dicitur de materia quam
de forma, quoniam subiectum motus precedit terminum motus; sed
materia est subiectum motus, primo Phisicorum,d et forma est terminus
eiusdem motus per Philosophum, quinto Phisicorum;e ergo materia est
prius substantia quam forma. Ex quo sequitur quod est magis substan- 25
tia, quia substantia dicitur a substare, et illud quod magis substat, magis
dicitur esse substantia; sed materia magis substat quam forma, quia ipsa
est subiectum omnium formarum, non autem forma; ergo et cetera.
Quarto arguitur quod substantia prius et magis dicitur de composito
quam de forma. Nam compositum proprie et principaliter et maxime dici- 30
tur substantia, cum illud sit prima substantia; forme autem non compe-
tunt ille conditiones ex quo non est individuum predicamenti substantie;
ergo compositum est prius substantia quam forma.
substantia scr.] substantialis MPv genus] vel add. Pv dicitur esse] est Pv
a Aristotle, Phys., I, 9, 192a2729; De gen., I, 3, 317b2325. b Aristotle, Cat., 5, 3a78.

c Porphyry, Isag., c. De accidente (AL I 67, p. 20, 78). d Aristotle, Phys., I, 9, 192a3032.
e Aristotle, Phys., V, 1, 224b413.
Iterum, est magis substantia quia continet omnem perfectionem sub-

stantialem forme et aliquam ultra, scilicet perfectionem materie. Sicut
enim omne totum est maius sua parte, ita est perfectius et per consequens
est magis ens.
Ad primum dicitur quod duplex est potentia, scilicet ad esse et ad for- 5
mam. Potentia ad esse est potentia obiectiva respiciens terminum motus;
potentia autem ad formam est potentia subiectiva respiciens subiectum
motus. Illud quod est in potentia primo modo non est substantia neque
ens; quod autem est in potentia secundo modo est ens et substantia. Ideo,
licet materia prima sit substantia in potentia, tamen materia prima est 10
substantia, quia talis potentia, cum sit subiectiva, non excludit existen-
tiam rei. Cum ergo arguitur: quod est potentia album non est album et
quod est potentia homo non est homo, ergo quod est potentia substan-
tia non est substantia; dicitur concedendo consequentiam et consequens,
loquendo de potentia obiectiva, et tunc negatur quod materia sit substan- 15
tia in potentia. Ubi autem in antecedente intelligatur potentia ad esse et in
consequente potentia ad formam, negatur consequentia propter equivo-
cationem, sed solum sequitur quod illud quod est substantia in potentia
non est illa substantia ad quam est in potentia. Ideo materia prima non
est aliqua forma generanda, quia est in potentia ad quamlibet talem. 20
Et ad confirmationem dicitur quod duplex est substantia, scilicet predi-
camentalis et extra predicamentum. Predicamentalis, quia dicit actum et
potentiam, non dicitur per se et in recto nisi de suis generibus et speciebus
242vb Pv et in-|-dividuis; de differentiis autem et Deo et prima materia non per se
predicatur, quia differentie non per se constituuntur ex actu et potentia, 25
et Deus dicit purum actum, materia vero prima dicit potentiam. De forma
autem dicitur substantia predicamentalis, quia, cum agat et patiatur, dicit
actum et potentiam, ideo est per se in predicamento, videlicet albedo et
figura; per idem, et forma substantialis. Substantia extra predicamentum
est analoga ad omnes substantias et predicatur in recto de Deo et materia 30
prima, cum sit maioris communitatis quam substantia predicamentalis.
Et cum arguitur quod tunc ens non immediate descenderet in predi-
camentum substantie, sed in substantiam analogam, respondetur quod
ens transcendenter sumptum habens principia et causas, iuxta doctri-
9vb M nam Aristotelis quarto et | sexto huius,a immediate descendit in decem 35
sed] quia M
a Aristotle, Met., IV, 2, 1003a33b12; VI, 1, 1025b34.

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predicamenta, sed ens transcendenter sumptum non habens principia

et causas, analogum ad Deum et creaturas, non immediate descendit in
decem predicamenta, sed in substantiam analogam et accidens analogum
ad absolutum et respectivum.
Ad secundum respondetur quod duplex est subiectum, iuxta doctri- 5
nam Aristotelis, secundo De anima,a scilicet subiectum in actu et subiec-
tum in potentia. Subiectum in actu est compositum ex materia et forma
substantiali; subiectum in potentia est ipsa prima materia nullam de se
habens formam. Quando ergo dicit Philosophus in Predicamentisb quod
proprium est substantie in subiecto non esse, et Porphyrius in Univer- 10
salibusc quod accidens adest et abest preter subiecti corruptionem, dici-
tur quod ambo loquuntur de subiecto in actu. Unde forma substantialis
non est inhesive in subiecto in actu, sed solum in subiecto in potentia;
accidens autem habet subiectum in actu, quod quidem non corrumpitur
corrupta forma accidentali, sed bene corrumpitur corrupta forma sub- 15
stantiali.
Et si instatur de substantiis secundis, que sunt in substantiis primis
tamquam in subiecto in actu, dicitur quod non sunt in eis tamquam
per inherentiam, sed per communicabilitatem et predicationem. Ex quo
enim individua corrumpuntur et species sunt eterne, et etiam genera, 20
impossibile est ut inhereant substantiis primis sicut accidens suo subiecto
in actu et forma substantialis suo subiecto in potentia.
Ad tertium respondetur quod, licet materia sit prior hac forma aut
illa, non tamen est prior forma simpliciter, sicut etiam aliqua privatio est
prior suo habitu et aliqua potentia precedit suum actum, tamen absolute 25
loquendo habitus est prior privatione et actus potentia. Nam privatio dif-
finitur per habitum et potentia per actum. Materia ergo, cum sit quedam
potentia, diffinitur per formam que est actus eius. Ideo absolute simplici-
ter forma est prior materia, licet secundum quid materia sit prior forma.
Deinde materia et forma possunt dupliciter considerari, scilicet secun- 30
dum suum esse et secundum suum modum essendi. Si considerantur
secundum suum esse, sic forma est magis substantia quam materia, sicut
etiam plus habet de entitate et perfectione; si considerantur secundum
suum modum essendi, sic non inconvenit materiam esse magis substan-
et] in add. Pv quidem om. M ut] quod Pv actus potentia] accidens (sed
del.) potentia est prior actus M
a Aristotle, De an., II, 1, 412a611; a1622; 2, 414a1219. b Aristotle, Cat., 5, 3a78 . c Porphyry,
Isag., c. De accidente (AL I 67, p. 20, 78).

tiam, ex quo substare et non esse in subiecto, qui sunt modi substantie,
magis competunt materie quam forme.
Ad quartum est responsurum quod non est idem esse prius secundum
naturam et prius secundum significationem aut nominis impositionem.
Secundum naturam substantia prius dicitur de forma et materia quam de 5
composito, sed secundum significationem et nominis impositionem prius
dicitur de composito quam de forma, et prius de forma quam de mate-
ria, quoniam significatio et nominis impositio sequuntur intelligere. Con-
stat autem quod prius cognoscimus et intelligimus compositum quam
formam, et prius formam quam materiam: cognoscimus enim materiam 10
per transmutationem et formam per operationem; constat autem quod
prius cognoscimus rem operari quam ipsam transmutari. Cum autem
arguebatur quod compositum est magis substantia quam forma, dicitur
quod forma respectu compositi potest dupliciter considerari: uno modo
ut habet rationem actus, et sic forma est magis substantia quam compo- 15
situm, quia forma habet a se rationem actus ac etiam nomen et diffinitio-
243ra Pv nem substantie; compositum autem recipit esse actuale a forma ac etiam |
nomen et diffinitionem substantialem. Secundo potest considerari forma
ut habet rationem potentie, quoniam forma, ut est pars compositi et ut
10ra M ordinatur in compositum tamquam in finem, | habet rationem potentie, 20
et sic est minus substantia quam compositum, quoniam compositum, ut
est quoddam totum, habet rationem forme, et forma, ut est pars et ali-
quid ordinatum ad finem, habet rationem materie; constat autem formam
magis esse substantiam quam materiam.
Et si allegatur illud Philosophi, primo Posteriorum:a Propter quod 25
unumquodque tale, et illud magis, concludendo quod absolute simpli-
citer forma est magis substantia quam compositum, ex quo recipit esse
substantiale propter formam; respondetur quod illa propositio non est
intelligenda in causis formalibus neque materialibus neque finalibus, sed
tantum in causis efficientibus principalibus essentialiter ad effectum ordi- 30
natis, quia non sequitur tu es albus propter albedinem, ergo albedo est
magis alba, tu es corruptibilis propter materiam, ergo materia est magis
corruptibilis, tu ambulas propter sanitatem, ergo sanitas magis ambu-
lat, ignis calefacit propter caliditatem, ergo caliditas magis calefacit. Sed
bene sequitur homo generat propter solem, ergo sol magis generat. 35
modi substantie] magis (sed del.) substantie modi M materiam2 post transmuta-
tionem (lin. 11) M et2] aut Pv
a Aristotle, An. Post., I, 2, 72a2930.

90 pauli veneti
Nunc quidem ergo h1029a7ssi.

Ista est secunda pars huius capituli, in qua Philosophus movet duo
dubia contra distinctiones datas et solvit.
Primum dubium est contra primam distinctionem, arguendo quod
substantia sumpta quarto modo non debet diffiniri per hoc quod est 5
subiectum de quo omnia alia dicuntur et ipsum de nullo dicitur, quia, cum
diffinitio detur causa innotescendi, sequitur quod ultra non requiritur
aliqua determinatio de substantia prima, que est substantia quarto modo
sumpta, contra Philosophum concludentem ex ista distinctione quod ad
metaphisicum pertinet primo determinare de prima substantia. 10
Respondet Philosophus, dicens quod illa declaratio substantie prime,
videlicet quod est subiectum de quo omnia alia dicuntur et ipsum de nullo
dicitur, accepta est figurative, superficialiter et modo universali, per quam
non sufficienter declaratur natura rei. Hec enim diffinitio, cum sit univer-
salis et logica, non tangit principia rei, ex quibus rei cognitio dependet, 15
sed solum exprimit aliquam communem conditionem per quam notifica-
tio quedam habetur non distincta et perfecta, sed confusa et imperfecta.
Omnis enim manifestatio est ex resolutione rei in principia sua. Ideo sub-
stantia hic diffinita non bene manifestatur nisi manifestentur principia
sua, que sint in se et quomodo ex ipsis fiat substantia composita. Quod 20
quidem octavo huius ostendetur, ubi manifestabitur materia et forma, que
sunt principia substantie sensibilis, ubi etiam patefiet quomodo ex hiis
fit unum. Et quia hoc non manifestat diffinitio data, propterea bene dicit
hic Philosophus quod substantia non est hic manifestata nisi sub quodam
typo et in quodam universali. 25
Lege litteram: Nunc quidem igitur typo, idest figurative, in universali,
dictum est quid substantia, quia non de subiecto predicatur, sed de quo
alia dicuntur. Oportet autem non solum ita manifestare substantiam; non
enim sufficiens est ipsa diffinitio. Ipsum enim hoc subiectum per ipsum est
manifestum.a 30
Metaphisica enim, cum sit scientia demonstrativa, non considerat de
substantia modo topico, quia modus iste communis est et ex probabilibus,
et consequenter non manifestus, quia non est per essentialia immediata
determinans quid et propter quid.
dicens om. M hic om. Pv quid] quid est Moerb. (est om. P) quia] quod
add. Moerb. manifestum] immanifestum Moerb. (manifestum AjIl1Xa)
a Aristotle, Met., VII, 3, 1029a710 (AL XXV 3.2, p. 134, lin. 7578).
Secundum dubium est contra secundam distinctionem, quia videtur

hquodi non bene dividatur substantia prima in materiam, formam et
compositum, quia materia est tota substantia rerum sensibilium; ergo
superflua est illa divisio.
Probatur antecedens, eo quod non apparet aliqua alia substantia: sub- 5
latis enim accidentibus, nichil remanet nisi materia. Primo quidem pas-
siones corporum, ut caliditas, frigiditas et huiusmodi, non sunt substantie;
10rb M secundo factiones, idest generationes | et corruptiones et motus, non sunt
substantie; tertio potentie naturales ad agendum et patiendum non sunt
substantie, sed magis ponuntur in genere qualitatis; quarto dimensiones, 10
videlicet longitudo, latitudo et profunditas, etiam non sunt substantie, sed
quantitates inexistentes ei quod est vere substantia et subiectum primum
earum, determinatum hiis dimensionibus.
Arguebant ergo sic antiqui: illud quod solum remanet, sublatis omni-
bus accidentibus rerum sensibilium, est tota substantia rerum sensibi- 15
243rb Pv lium; | sed nichil remanet nisi materia, sublatis omnibus accidentibus
rerum sensibilium; ergo materia est tota substantia rerum sensibilium, et
per consequens frustra ponitur alia substantia distincta a materia, scilicet
forma aut compositum.
Lege litteram: Amplius et materia quod tota substantia sit, videtur 20
ex hoc. Si enim non ipsa est tota substantia, que est alia substantia ab ea,
diffugit a nobis notitia talis substantie. Aliis enim sublatis nichil apparens
remanet. Nam alia quidem corporum sunt passiones et factiones et potentie,
longitudo vero et latitudo et profunditas quantitates quedam sunt sed non
substantie (quantitas enim non substantia); sed magis cui insunt hec ipsa 25
primum, illo modo est substantia. At vero ablata longitudine, latitudine et
profunditate nichil videmus remanens, nisi si quid est determinatum ab hiis;
quare materiam necesse videri solam substantiam sic intendentibus.a
Et si aliquis quereret diffinitionem talis materie que manet sublatis
omnibus accidentibus, respondet Philosophus quod diffinitio sua est hec: 30
materia est illud quod de se non est nec quid nec quale nec quantum
nec aliud predicamentorum quibus determinatur et dividitur ens. Proba-
tur. Materia est illud de quo predicatur quodlibet predicamentorum non
quod suppl. patiendum] has generationes corruptiones et motus iterum add. Pv

ergo] autem M et] et adhuc Moerb. (adhuc om. P, suppl. sec. m. NeXy) sit]
fit Moerb. apparens remanet] remanens apparet Moerb. longitudine]
longitudine et Moerb. (et om. Si P) profunditate] profundo Moerb. hec] quod
add. M
a Aristotle, Met., VII, 3, 1029a1019 (AL XXV 3.2, pp. 134135, lin. 7887).
92 pauli veneti
formaliter, sed denominative; ergo esse materie est aliud ab esse cuiusli-
bet predicamenti. Patet consequentia, quia unumquodque est aliud ab eo
quod accidit ei. Antecedens declaratur. Nam predicamenta accidentium
predicantur de substantia non formaliter, sed denominative; substantia
etiam predicatur de materia non formaliter, sed denominative; ergo mate- 5
ria est ultimum suscipiens omnia ista predicata, quod quidem non est
formaliter aliquod illorum, sed omnia sibi accidunt.
Prima pars autem est nota, quia substantia non est caliditas nec fri-
giditas nec relatio nec passio, sed est calida et frigida et relata, agens
et patiens. Secunda pars antecedentis etiam patet, quia materia non est 10
anima nec homo, sed est animata et humanata, quo etiam modo predi-
cantur de ea predicamenta accidentium. Non enim materia est linea vel
superficies, albedo aut nigredo, sed est lineata, superficiata, alba, nigra,
aut dealbata et denigrata. Et sicut nullum predicamentorum est de essen-
tia materie, sed quodlibet accidit illi, ita privationes et negationes eorum 15
que sunt in predicamentis non sunt de essentia materie, sed accidunt ei.
Non enim materia est privatio alicuius forme substantialis vel accidenta-
lis, sed est privata hac vel illa forma substantiali vel accidentali. Si enim
privatio alicuius forme esset de essentia materie, illam formam non posset
recipere materia, sicut si aliqua forma esset de essentia materie, nullam 20
aliam posset recipere, ut probat Commentator, primo Phisicorum.a
Lege litteram: Dico autem materiam que secundum se neque quid
neque quantitas neque aliud aliquid dicitur quibus ens est determinatum.
Est enim quoddam ipsa materia de quo predicatur horum quodlibet, cui
est esse alterum et cathegoriarum unicuique, idest predicamentorum; alia 25
namque predicamenta novem de substantia predicantur, hec vero de mate-
ria. Quare quod est ultimum secundum se neque quid neque quantitas,
neque aliud aliquid est; neque itaque negationes, idest privationes predi-
camentorum, sunt de essentia materie, et enim hee erunt secundum acci-
dens in ipsa materia. Et concludit per intentum antiquorum, dicens ex 30
hiis ergo speculantibus accidit substantiam totam rerum sensibilium esse
materiam.b
Notandum primo, secundum Commentatorem, commento octavo,
quod necesse est ut individuum substantie sit substantia per aliquid
materia] etiam add. Pv
a Averroes, In Phys., I, t.c. 66, fol. 39I. b Aristotle, Met., VII, 3, 1029a2027 (AL XXV 3.2, p.
135, lin. 8795).
10va M existens in eo, quod sit substantia, si non | fuerit substantia per
omnes partes eius, et necesse est ut illi qui perscrutantur hac
perscrutatione, et concedunt has duas propositiones, opinentur
quod sola materia est substantia individui substantie demonstrate.a
Ratio ergo eorum erat ista: necesse est ut individuum substantie sit sub- 5
stantia per aliquid existens in eo; sed individuum substantie est composi-
tum ex materia et accidentibus, et non est substantia per accidentia; ergo
est substantia per materiam tantum, et per consequens materia est tota
substantia rei. Ista ratio fundatur super duas propositiones falsas, qua-
243va Pv rum | prima est quod individuum substantie est compositum ex materia 10
et accidentibus tantum. Nam preter materiam oportet ponere formam
actuantem eam, ad quas sequuntur passiones et accidentia que sunt in
individuo. Et ideo falsum est quod remotis passionibus et aliis accidenti-
bus nichil remanet nisi materia, quia remanet materia cum forma.
Secunda propositio est quod materia est corpus. Cum enim dicit hec 15
opinio quod individuum est substantia in actu per materiam, hoc non
posset esse si materia esset pura potentia. Necessitantur ergo ponere quod
materia est ens in actuquod est impossibile, quia de ratione materie est
quod sit in potentia ad actum; quod autem est in potentia ad aliud, de
se non est illud; ideo materia neque est corpus neque est de se in actu.b 20
Probat enim Commentator, secundo De anima,c quod omne recipiens
denudatur a natura recepti; cum ergo materia recipiat actum, necesse est
quod de se non habeat actum, sed quod de se sit nuda ab actu. Error ergo
istorum ponentium materiam esse totam substantiam rerum processit,
ut vult Commentator, ex ignorantia forme substantialis. Estimaverunt 25
enim omnes formas esse accidentia, et quia visum est eis nichil remanere,
sublatis accidentibus, crediderunt materiam esse totam substantiam.
Unde Albertusd tangit quatuor rationes in littera, propter quas ita cre-
diderunt. Prima est quia remanet materia omnibus aliis per intellectum
sublatis; secunda, quia stare facit omnia alia tamquam primum subiec- 30
tum; tertia, quia est diversum quid in essentia sua ab omnibus aliis; quarta,
quia ipsa est cui essentialiter nec affirmationes nec negationes conve-
niunt aliquorum et cetera.
opinentur scr. ex Iunt.] opinantur MPv est] in add. M
a Averroes, In Met., VII, t.c. 8, fol. 159AB, D. b lin. 520, cf. Alexander of Alexandria, Exp.
Met., VII, c. 3, fol. 189rbva. c Averroes, In De an., II, t.c. 67, p. 232, 4957. d Albert, Met., Lib.
VII, tr. I, c. 5, p. 324, 2636.
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Istas rationes solvit ille, et primo primam,a dicens quod, ex hoc quod
omnibus aliis sublatis remanet materia secundum intellectum tantum et
non secundum esse, apparet quod est ens diminutum indigens omnibus
ad suum esse completum. Et quia accidentia habent esse diminutum,
necesse est formam esse dantem illi esse completum. 5
Secunda ratiob solvitur per hoc quod non facit stare omnia alia propria
virtute, sed per virtutem forme.
Tertiac nichil concludit, quia, et si materia habet diversum quid in
essentia sua ab aliis, illud tamen non separatur a forma secundum esse,
sed solum secundum rationem. 10
Quarta ratiod iterum ostendit quod materia est ens confusum et inde-
terminatum, indigens aliis ad sui determinationem; accidentia autem non
sunt determinata nisi per formam; ergo materia indiget forma ut determi-
netur, et per consequens non tantum materia est substantia rerum sensi-
bilium, sed preter illam est dare formam et compositum, ut sonat secunda 15
distinctio.
mento, quod materia non est per se quale nec quantum nec aliquid
aliud entium predicamentorum, quoniam est in potentia omnia ista,
scilicet decem predicamenta, ut declaratum est in Phisicis.e 20
Unde primo Phisicorumf probatum est quod oportet subiectum muta-
tionis alterum esse ab utroque terminorum motus; constat autem quod
materia est primum subiectum substans omnibus motibus qui sunt
secundum quantitatem, qualitatem, ac etiam omnibus mutationibus que
sunt secundum substantiam; ergo materia non est substantia nec quali- 25
tas neque quantitas neque aliquod alterum predicamentorum, eo quod
10vb M omnia predicamenta acquiruntur | vel per se vel per accidens, per motum
aut per mutationem. At tamen diversitatem materie ab omnibus pre-
dicamentis non probat hic Philosophus per viam motus, quia hec pro-
batio ad naturalem pertinet, sed per viam predicationis, que est pro- 30
pria logice, quam dicit Commentator, quarto huius,g esse affinem huic
scientie. Si enim animal predicatur de homine denominative solum, non
notandum secundo inv. Pv omnibus] aliis add. M alterum] pro aliud vel1
om. Pv esse s.l. Pv
a Albert, Met., Lib. VII, tr. I, c. 5, p. 324, 7180. b Albert, Met., Lib. VII, tr. I, c. 5, p. 324, 8085.
c Albert,Met., Lib. VII, tr. I, c. 5, p. 324, 8591. d Albert, Met., Lib. VII, tr. I, c. 5, pp. 324,
91325, 4. e Averroes, In Met., VII, t.c. 8, fol. 159D. f Aristotle, Phys., I, 6, 189a2732; 7
passim. g Averroes, In Met., IV, t.c. 5, fol. 70H.
dicemus animal esse de essentia hominis, neque hominem esse essen-

tialiter animal, sed magis accidentaliter; constat autem quod predica-
menta non dicuntur de materia essentialiter, sed denominative; ideo
materia de se non est quid nec qualis nec quanta, sed tantum per acci-
dens. 5
243vb Pv Sed Commentator eandem propositionem metaphisice sic arguit: |
illud quod est in potentia ad aliquid non est de se illud; sed materia est
in potentia ad decem predicamenta; ergo de se non est aliquod predica-
mentorum. Tenet consequentia cum maiori, quia, si homo esset potentia
animal, non esset de se animal, sicut non est de se albus vel niger, quia est 10
potentia albus vel niger. Minor vero declaratur, quia esse cuiuslibet predi-
camenti est esse formale; materia autem de se nullum esse formale habet,
quia nullum aliud esse formale reciperet nec maneret omnibus aliis for-
mis corruptis; de se ergo non habet nisi quod sit ens in potentia. Quod
autem aliquod esse formale habeat, hoc est virtute agentis, sicut color 15
habet per naturam suam quod sit qualitas; quod autem sit in esse existen-
tie, hoc est per naturam agentis.
quod subiectum ultimum, quod est subiectum per se primo, non
est quantum nec quale nec aliquod decem predicamentorum, nec 20
privatio istorum entium, quoniam hoc est ei per accidens quo-
niam, si aliqua forma aut aliqua privatio esset in materia essentiali-
ter, non reciperet omnes formas.a
Ex prima parte istius commenti sequitur quod nulla forma est in compo-
sito nisi ratione materie, quia, si materia est subiectum ultimum et per 25
se primum omnium predicamentorum, necesse est omnia predicamenta
esse per se primo in materia et ex consequenti in composito.
Oppositum tamen huius communiter dixerunt antiqui, scilicet quod
forma substantialis est subiective in materia et non in composito, econtra
autem forma accidentalis est in composito subiective et non in materia. 30
Ex secunda parte eiusdem commenti sequitur quod privatio non est
de essentia materie, cuius oppositum dicunt quidam antiqui, credentes
privationem esse materiam. Si enim privatio esset de essentia materie,
ipsa materia non reciperet omnes formas, quia non reciperet oppositum
aliquid] aliud M quia] nam Pv notandum tertio inv. Pv se] et add. Iunt.
aliqua aliqua scr. ex Iunt.] alia alia MPv
a Averroes, In Met., VII, t.c. 8, fol. 159EF.

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illius privationis, sicut homo non reciperet oppositum animalis, quia

animal est de essentia sua. Sive ergo forma sive privatio forme ponatur de
essentia materie, necesse est quod materia non recipiat omnes formas.
Colligendo ergo in unum dicta Aristotelis et Commentatoris, quadru-
pliciter probatur quod materia essentialiter distinguitur a forma et a pri- 5
vatione. Et primo ex parte transmutationis, quia in omni transmutatione
oportet aliquod subiectum esse distinctum ab utroque termino transmu-
tationis, quia subiectum transmutationis manet in tota transmutatione,
et in principio et in fine, terminus autem a quo non manet in fine nec
terminus ad quem est in principio. Cum ergo horum terminorum unus 10
sit forma et alter privatio, necesse est materiam essentialiter distingui a
forma et privatione.
Secundo ex parte predicationis, quia in predicatione denominativa
predicatum essentialiter distinguitur a subiecto, et ideo genus non pre-
dicatur denominative de suis speciebus, nec species de individuis, sed 15
accidens de subiecto. Constat autem quod nec forma nec privatio aliter
predicatur de materia quam denominative, ut ostensum est, quia materia
11ra M non est forma, sed formata, neque privatio, sed privata; | ergo nec forma
nec privatio est de essentia materie.
Tertio ex parte receptionis. Nam omne receptum multorum oportet 20
denudatum esse a quolibet illorum; si enim unum inesset ei naturaliter,
illud prohiberet receptionem aliorum, ut ostenditur secundo De anima.
Ideo enim visus est abscolor ut recipiat omnes colores, et auditus sine
sono ut recipiat omnes sonos. Materia ergo ad hoc quod recipiat omnes
formas et privationes, oportet quod sit denudata ab hiis et cetera. 25
Quarto ex parte oppositionis. Nam cui convenit essentialiter unum
oppositorum, sibi alterum repugnat; sed materie essentialiter competit
potentia; actus autem et potentia sunt opposita, per Commentatorem, in
prologo De anima;a ergo materie repugnat esse actum et formam, et conse-
quenter privationem, eo quod in adventu forme privatio corrumpitur, ut 30
probatur primo Phisicorum.b Ut arguitur sic: nichil appetit naturaliter sui
244ra Pv corruptionem; | sed forma est corruptiva privationis, ut habetur ibidem,
pro utraque parte; ergo privatio non appetit ipsam formam, quia tunc sui
corruptionem appeteret; constat autem quod materia naturaliter appetit
formam tamquam sui corruptionem; ergo materia non est sua privatio. 35
a om. Pv recipiat post formas (lin. 25) M
a Averroes, In De an., I, t.c. 6, p. 10, 2021. b Aristotle, Phys., I, 8, 191b1516; 9, 192a2527.

Contra predicta arguitur, et primo quod non prius dicitur substan-

tia de materia quam predicamenta accidentium, quoniam tunc forma
substantialis precederet omnia accidentia in materiaquod est incon-
veniens, quia forma substantialis presupponit materiam dispositam esse
tam quantitative quam qualitative, iuxta illud secundi De anima:a Actus 5
activorum sunt in patiente bene disposito, et omnium natura constan-
tium terminata est ratio magnitudinis et augmenti.
Secundo arguitur quod materia sit essentialiter privatio, quia mate-
ria aut est essentialiter ens aut est essentialiter non-ens. Si materia est
essentialiter ens, ergo est essentialiter quid aut quantum aut quale, con- 10
tra Philosophum in littera; si autem dicitur quod materia est essentiali-
ter non-ens, ergo est pura privatio. Item, sicut corrumpitur privatio in
adventu forme, ita corrumpitur potentia, per Commentatorem, primo
Phisicorum;b sed potentia est de essentia materie, ut probatum est; ergo,
per idem, et privatio. 15
Ad primum dicitur quod accidentia precedunt aliquo modo formam
substantialem in materia, et aliquo modo forma substantialis precedit
illa. Unde accidentia in fieri precedunt formam substantialem, econtra
autem forma substantialis precedit illa in facto esse, ad hunc intellectum,
quod accidentia habent duplex esse, videlicet terminatum et intermina- 20
tum. Esse interminatum habent a materia vel ab agente, sed esse termi-
natum habent a forma: seclusa enim forma non haberet materia quidi-
tatem, quantitatem et qualitatem nisi interminatam; posita autem forma
oportet assignare terminum quantitati et qualitati. Quod enim ignis habet
caliditatem summam et aer caliditatem remissam, hoc est ratione forme 25
substantialis. Propterea bene dicit Philosophus quod materia et forma
sunt cause accidentium que sunt in composito: materia quidem est causa
subiectiva et forma est causa finalis et aliquo modo effectiva, in quantum
reducit compositum ad gradum dispositionis sibi connaturalem.
Ad secundum dicitur quod materia est essentialiter ens, ex quo non 30
sequitur quod sit essentialiter quid aut quale aut quantum, quia non est
essentialiter ens in actu, sed in potentia. Et cum concluditur quod, per
idem, materia est essentialiter privatio sicut est essentialiter potentia,
negatur consequentia, quia non conceditur quod materia sit essentialiter
potentia respectiva, que corrumpitur in adventu forme, neque quod sit 35
bene om. Pv precedunt post modo Pv habet] pro habeat
a Aristotle, De an., II, 2, 414a2527. b Averroes, In Phys., I, t.c. 70, fol. 41E.
98 pauli veneti
essentialiter potentia absoluta, que est qualitas secunde speciei, videlicet

naturalis potentia, sed quod est essentialiter potentia dividens ens, oppo-
sita actui, de qua dicit Commentator in De substantia orbisa quod materia
substantiatur per suum posse. Ita quod, sicut Deus est essentialiter actus
11rb M purus, | ita prima materia est essentialiter pura potentia. Quare et cetera. 5
Sed impossibile h1029a27ssi.
In oppositum contra antiquos arguit Philosophus quod materia non est
maxime substantia, et consequenter quod non est tota substantia rerum
sensibilium, quoniam esse separabile et esse hoc aliquid competit ei quod
est maxime substantia; sed materia non est separabilis neque est hoc ali- 10
quid; ergo non est maxime substantia. Tenet consequentia cum maiori,
quia illi sunt modi predicamenti substantie. Unde, quia Deus est maxime
substantia, ideo separabilis est et hoc aliquid, cum sit per se existens,
nullam omnino habens in se compositionem substantialem vel accidenta-
lem, ut demonstratur duodecimo huius.b Minor vero est evidens, quoniam 15
materia, cum sit pura potentia, ut declaratum est, necessario coniungi-
tur actui tam substantiali quam accidentali; ideo non separabilis est nec
244rb Pv hoc aliquid, cum non sit per se existens. Ratio autem antiquorum | soluta
est, quia remotis accidentibus per intellectum aut per divinam potentiam,
non tantum remanet materia, sed etiam forma et compositum. 20
Lege litteram: Sed impossibile est materiam esse maxime substan-
tiam; et enim separabile et hoc aliquid inesse videtur maxime substantie et
cetera.c
Ex hiis concludit Philosophus quod tam forma quam compositum ex
materia et forma est magis substantia quam materia: forma quidem quia 25
separabilis est, compositum autem quia est hoc aliquid.
Et si instatur quia, sicut materia non separatur a forma, ita forma,
cum sit actus eius, non separatur a materia, dicitur quod materia ut
materia inseparabilis est, cum sit pura potentia necessario determinata
per actum; forma autem ut forma separabilis est, quia dicitur forma quasi 30
foris manens.
Propterea Deus et intelligentie proprie dicuntur forme, cum foris
maneant per separationem a materia; sed forma, ut est quidam actus
sed] est add. M impossibile] materiam add. M nec] est add. Pv
a Averroes, De sub. orb., fol. 3L. b Aristotle, Met., XII, 67 passim. c Aristotle, Met., VII, 3,
1029a2728 (AL, XXV 3.2, p. 135, lin. 9597).
eductus de potentia materie, inseparabilis est, ita quod forma per se est
separabilis et per accidens est inseparabilis.
Lege litteram: Quapropter species, idest forma, et quod ex ambobus
est, videlicet compositum, substantia videbitur esse magis quam materia.a
Notandum primo, secundum Commentatorem, commento octavo, 5
quod impossibile est ut materia sola sit substantia, cum opinatur
quod intentiones separabiles in intellectu, scilicet que non intelli-
guntur in respectu aliorum, sicut est in materia, sed que intelliguntur
per se, sunt magis substantie.b
Ratio Commentatoris est ista: quandocumque sunt due substantie, qua- 10
rum una potest cognosci ab intellectu sine alia et non econtra, prima est
magis substantia quam secunda; sed tam forma quam compositum potest
cognosci ab intellectu sine materia et non econtra; ergo tam forma quam
compositum est magis substantia quam materia. Tenet consequentia cum
maiori. Minor vero declaratur, quia non cognoscitur ab intellectu materia 15
nisi per transmutationem; constat autem quod transmutatio prius ducit
intellectum in cognitionem compositi et forme que generatur et corrum-
pitur quam in cognitionem materie.
mento, quod isti sermones, quos induxit hic, sunt logici famosi, et 20
ideo induxit eos ad destruendum et ad confirmandum formam esse
substantiam. Deinde perscrutabitur de hoc perscrutatione demon-
strativa.c
Intendit Commentator quod tam rationes probantes formam esse sub-
stantiam, quam etiam probantes formam non esse substantiam, sunt 25
argumenta topica procedentia ex probabilibus tantum, sed in octavo
huius probabitur formam esse substantiam demonstrative, ex propriis et
per se ac necessariis et impossibilibus aliter se habere.
Dubitatur circa dicta, quia videtur quod prima materia non sit pura
potentia, ymmo quod de se aliquam actualitatem habeat. Nam materia 30
prima non est simplicior forma; sed quelibet forma substantialis est in
11va M potentia ad esse totius compositi; ergo similiter materia | habet aliquid
actualitatis. Ut arguatur sic: non magis est propria actualitas forme quam
materia] et cetera add. M una post cognosci Pv notandum secundo inv. Pv

habeat] habet M
a Aristotle, Met., VII, 3, 1029a2930 (AL, XXV 3.2, p. 135, lin. 9798). b Averroes, In Met., VII,
t.c. 8, fol. 159F. c Averroes, In Met., VII, t.c. 8, fol. 159G.

100 pauli veneti
potentialitas materie; sed forma non est libera a potentialitate, dicente

Commentatore, tertio De anima,a quod nulla forma preter primam est
libera a potentia; ergo neque materia prima est absoluta ab omni actuali-
tate.
Item, sicut se habet contingens ad potentiam, ita se habet necessa- 5
rium ad actum; sed illud quod est contingens habet aliquid potentialitatis;
ergo illud quod est necessarium habet aliquid actualitatis. Sed materia
prima est necessaria, incorruptibilis et eterna, ut habetur primo Phisico-
rum et primo De generatione;b ergo materia prima habet aliquid actuali-
tatis. 10
Et confirmatur auctoritate Commentatoris, dicentis, tertio De anima,c
quod, sicut se habet intellectus possibilis ad formas intelligibiles, ita mate-
244va Pv ria prima ad formas naturales; sed intellectus | possibilis, non obstante
quod recipiat omnes formas intelligibiles, adhuc de se est aliquid in actu;
ergo, per idem, materia prima est de se aliquid in actu, non obstante quod 15
omnes formas materiales recipiat.
Respondetur quod, licet prima materia sit pura potentia respectu
forme, quia materia non est aliqua forma, neque de se habens formam,
tamen ipsa est aliquo modo in actu. Primo quidem ipsa est in actu actua-
litate potentialitatis et existentie, quia ipsa presens est et existens, deter- 20
minata loco et tempore.
Secundo ipsa est in actu actualitate continentie tam active quam pas-
sive: ipsa enim continet partes suas et est quoddam totum ad illas; constat
autem totum habere rationem forme et actus, sicut pars habet rationem
potentie. Ipsa etiam continetur a forma ad quam erat in potentia, ratione 25
cuius est determinate speciei: non enim esset absoluta a potentia per
adventum forme nisi aliquam actualitatem haberet sub forma.
Tertio ipsa est in actu actualitate distinctionis: eadem enim sunt princi-
pia essendi et distinguendi; sed materia est principium essendi compositi;
ergo etiam est principium distinguendi illud, quia non tantum sensibile 30
distinguitur ab insensibili per materiam, sed etiam unum compositum ab
alio. Constat autem quod omnis distinctio est per actum vel per aliquid
habens rationem actus.
per] secundum M
a Averroes, In De an., III, t.c. 5, pp. 409, 661410, 667. b Aristotle, Phys., I, 9, 192a2729; De
gen., I, 3, 318a6319b5. c Averroes, In De an., III, t.c. 5, pp. 387, 27388, 37.
Quarto ipsa est in actu actualitate cognitionis, quoniam, sicut est prin-
cipium essendi, ita est principium cognoscendi perfecte et distincte noti-
tia propter quid. Non enim esset pars diffinitionis nisi esset actus vel
haberet aliquam rationem actus respectu sui diffiniti, dicente Philosopho,
secundo Phisicorum et quinto huius,a quod partes diffinitionis sunt forme. 5
Sed ad illam similitudinem datam a Commentatore inter intellectum
et materiam, dicit ipse ibi quod illa similitudo non est universaliter acci-
pienda: quoniam, licet intellectus et materia in hoc conveniant, quod,
sicut intellectus nullam de se habet formam intelligibilem, sed ad quam-
libet est positus in potentia, ita materia nullam de se habet formam natu- 10
ralem, sed ad quamlibet est posita in potentia, tamen in alio differunt,
quia intellectus recipit formas universales et materia solum particulares,
intellectus recipit solum accidentales formas et materia recipit substan-
tiales.
At tamen eam h1029a30ssi. 15

Ista est tertia pars huius capituli, in qua Philosophus exequitur de
intento, ostendens ordinem sue intentionis atque determinationis per
tres conclusiones, quarum prima est hec: ad metaphisicum pertinet primo
determinare de substantia que est forma. Secunda conclusio: ad metaphi-
sicum pertinet primo determinare de substantia que est forma rerum sen- 20
sibilium, ibi: Confitentur autem h1029a33ssi. Tertia conclusio: ad meta-
phisicum spectat primo determinare de substantia que est forma quidita-
tiva rerum sensibilium, ibi: Quoniam autem in principio h1029b1ssi.
Prima conclusio arguitur sic: ad metaphisicum pertinet primo determi-
nare de substantia prima, ut est ostensum in prima distinctione; sed sub- 25
stantia prima dividitur in materiam, formam et compositum, per
11vb M secundam distinctionem; | ergo ad metaphisicum pertinet primo deter-
minare de substantia que est materia aut que est forma aut que est com-
positum ex hiis; sed ad metaphisicum non spectat primo determinare de
substantia composita neque de substantia que est materia; ergo ad ipsum 30
pertinet primo determinare de substantia que est forma.
sicutcognoscendi] sic (ex sicut post correct.) est principium cognoscendi sicut est
principium essendi et hoc cognoscendi M conveniant scr.] conveniunt MPv
formam] substantialem add. M posita scr.] positus MPv
a Aristotle, Phys., II, 3, 194b2629; Met., V, 2, 1013a2629.

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Tenet consequentia cum maiori. Et minor declaratur. Non enim spec-

tat ad metaphisicum primo determinare de substantia composita, et hoc
propter duas rationes, quarum prima est quia substantia composita poste-
rior est materia et forma; ergo cognitio illius est posterior cognitione
materie et forme in scientia demonstrativa. Patet consequentia, quia, 5
sicut res se habet ad esse, ita ad cognosci. Secunda ratio est quia substantia
composita est aperta et manifesta ad sensum, cum non sit aliquis sensus
244vb Pv exterior | qui non cognoscat substantiam compositam propter sensibilia
propria et communia que sunt in ea. Iterum, non spectat ad metaphisi-
cum primo determinare de materia, tum quia materia est posterior forma, 10
ut patuit, tum quia materia est aliqualiter manifesta, non tantum propter
demonstrationem factam primo Phisicorum,a sed etiam quia ab omnibus
antiquis concessum est materiam esse. Restat ergo quod ad metaphisicum
spectat primo determinare de forma, cum ipsa non sit per se manifesta ad
sensum neque ab antiquis concessa, sed multum dubitabilis apud omnes. 15
Lege litteram: At tamen eam que nunc ex ambobus substantiam, dico
autem eam que ex materia et forma, dimittendum; posterior enim est forma
et materia, et aperta, idest manifesta sensui. Manifesta autem aliqualiter
et materia. De tertia autem perscrutandum, scilicet de forma, hec namque
maxime dubitabilis.b 20
Notandum primo, secundum Commentatorem, commento nono,
quod concessum est ab omnibus materiam esse substantiam, et
dicitur quoquo modo, quia antiqui diversantur in materia. Quidam
dicunt partes esse indivisibiles et quidam corpora consimilium par-
tium et alia numerata in naturalibus. Et quia omnes antiqui conce- 25
dunt materiam esse, sed differunt in ea, dixit quoquo modo, quia
conveniunt secundum genus tantum et non simpliciter. Et fortasse
dixit quoquo modo quia est substantia diminuta, quia est in poten-
tia.c
Intendit Commentator exponere illam litteram Philosophi materia est 30
aliqualiter manifesta, dicens quod dupliciter potest intelligi.
Primo, quod materia fuit antiquitus manifesta secundum genus, non
autem secundum speciem. Nam omnes concesserunt materiam esse sub-
perscrutandum] est add. Moerb. (om. P) quidam] ergo add. Pv
a Aristotle, Phys., I, 7, 190b1ff. b Aristotle, Met., VII, 3, 1029a3033 (AL, XXV 3.2, p. 135,
lin. 98102). c Averroes, In Met., VII, t.c. 9, fol. 159IK.

stantiam, sed in ipsa diversantur. Nam quidam posuerunt eam esse fini-
tam, ut Parmenides, quidam infinitam, ut Melissus. Quidam posuerunt
eam esse corpora indivisibilia dissimilium partium, ut Democritus et Leu-
cippus, et quidam similium partium, ut Anaxagoras et Anaximandros.
Quidam posuerunt eam esse unum tantum elementum, ut Yppasus, qui 5
dixit eam esse aquam, et Dyogenes, qui asseruit eam esse aerem; alii
vero dixerunt eam esse plura elementa, ut Empedocles, asserens eam esse
aerem, ignem, terram et aquam.
Secundo potest intelligi quod materia sit aliqualiter manifesta per hoc
quod est substantia diminuta. Est autem substantia diminuta, quia est 10
pura potentia. Unde materia non est de se cognoscibilis, sed per analo-
giam et ad materiam artificialium et ad accidentia naturalium, ut habetur
primo Phisicorum.a Cognoscitur ergo materia secundum quandam simi-
litudinem proportionis, ut sicut se habet lignum ad formam statue seu
corpus ad formam coloris, ita prima materia ad formas naturales. 15
mento, quod ista perscrutatio est differens ab ea que est in primo
Phisicorum, quoniam illic, quia perscrutatio est naturalis, non per-
scrutatur ad declarandum nisi primam materiam esse secundum
quod est materia, non secundum quod est substantia, heti ad decla- 20
randum formas naturales esse tantum, non primam formam
12ra M omnium rerum sensibilium, | nec formam secundum quod est sub-
stantia. Et ideo consideratio de formis naturalibus, secundum quod
sunt naturales, non inducit ad primam formam. Consideratio enim
de forma inducens ad primam formam est consideratio de ea secun- 25
dum quod est substantia, et naturalis scientia non considerat de
rebus secundum quod sunt substantie.b
Istud commentum est clarum. Nam Aristoteles probat, primo Phisicorum,c
tam materiam quam formam esse, non tamen considerat materiam ut
substantia est, sed tantum ut est materia, neque considerat formam ut 30
substantia est, sed tantum ut est forma naturalis acquisibilis per trans-
mutationem et motum. Ideo ex cognitione forme sic considerate non
pervenitur in cognitionem prime forme que est Deus, ut est forma prima
esse om. M notandum secundo inv. Pv et suppl. ex Iunt. materiam

formam inv. Pv
a Aristotle, Phys., I, 7, 191a812. b Averroes, In Met., VII, t.c. 9, fol. 159LM. c Aristotle,
Phys., I, 7, 190b1720.
104 pauli veneti
omnium rerum sensibilium, sed pervenitur in cognitionem primi motoris

per hoc quod forma naturalis movet et movetur, et non contingit proce-
dere in infinitum in moventibus et motis. Ex cognitione autem forme con-
siderate in eo quod substantia, devenitur in cognitionem ultime forme,
quoniam talis forma est principium substantie et principiatur a substan- 5
tia, et non contingit procedere in infinitum in substantiis principiantibus
245ra Pv et principiatis. Ideo necesse est | devenire ad unam substantiam princi-
piantem et non principiatam: hec autem est prima forma, que dicitur esse
prima causa et ultimus finis.
Notandum tertio, secundum Commentatorem, eodem commento, 10
quod de prima materia considerat utraque scientia, sed naturalis
considerat de illa secundum quod est principium transmutationis,
philosophus autem considerat de illa secundum quod hesti substan-
tia in potentia. Et quia Aristoteles consideravit de illa in naturalibus,
ideo contentus fuit illa consideratione, et non iteravit consideratio- 15
nem in hac scientia.a
Istud commentum non indiget expositione, quoniam, sicut geometra
et astrologus considerant de figura, licet non eodem modo, ut habetur
secundo Phisicorum,b ita phisicus et metaphisicus considerant de mate-
ria, licet non eodem modo: considerat enim phisicus de materia ut est 20
subiectum motus, metaphisicus autem ut est substantia in potentia. Et
quia in primo Phisicorumc probavit Aristoteles primam materiam esse,
ideo contentus illa demonstratione non probat in hac scientia materiam
esse, sed materiam esse substantiam. Consimiliter dicatur de forma, quod
de ea consideratur in scientia naturali ac etiam in scientia divina, sed 25
non eodem modo: nam ibi consideratur forma ut est terminus motus, hic
autem ut est substantia in actu et cetera.
Confitentur autem h1029a33ssi.
Secunda conclusio: ad metaphisicum pertinet primo determinare de
substantia que est forma rerum sensibilium. 30
Probatur. Sicut se habet res sensibilis ad rem insensibilem, ita forma
rei sensibilis ad formam rei insensibilis; sed ad metaphisicum spectat
prius determinare de substantiis sensibilibus quam de substantiis insen-
sibilibus; ergo et cetera. Tenet consequentia cum maiori. Minor autem
notandum tertio inv. Pv est suppl. ex Iunt. quod] quia M
a Averroes, In Met., VII, t.c. 9, fol. 159M160A. b Aristotle, Phys., II, 2, 193b22194a12.
c Aristotle, Phys., I, 7, 191a814.
declaratur, quoniam ista scientia procedit a notioribus nobis ad minus

nota nobis, sicut etiam scientia naturalis. Constat autem quod substantie
insensibiles sunt minus note nobis et substantie sensibiles magis note:
nam omnes confitentur substantias sensibiles esse, non autem omnes
confitentur substantias insensibiles esse, ut patuit in precedenti capitulo. 5
Lege litteram: Confitentur autem substantie esse sensibilium quedam,
quare in hiis querendum prius.a
Notandum primo, secundum Commentatorem, commento nono,
quod illa quibus pervenitur ad cognitionem essentie rerum igno-
rate, sunt actiones eorum proprie, et actio materie est transmutatio. 10
Forme vero, quia non sunt plures et non habent eandem actionem
communem, ideo non potuit declarare de suis actionibus in scien-
tia naturali primam formam. Sed illud fuit declaratum in hoc quod
actiones formarum perveniunt ad actionem prime forme, que non
est in materia et est primus motor.b 15
12rb M In hoc commento | solvit Commentator unum dubium, propter quid Phi-
losophus in Phisicis probavit primam materiam et non primam formam.
Respondet quod phisicus non venit in cognitionem alicuius essentie
ignote nisi per operationem propriam. Et quia transmutatio est propria
operatio materie, que est nota phisiconon autem aliqua est opera- 20
tio prime forme in quantum substantia est aut in quantum est prima
forma, que sit nota phisico, sed solum in quantum est primus motor,
ideo in libro Phisicorum demonstratur prima materia et primus motor:
ex hoc enim quod transmutatio materie est eterna eternitate discontinua
diversarum rationum, oportet dare motum unum numero, eternum, com- 25
munem omnibus transmutationibus materie, continuantem omnes alias
transmutationes. Hic autem est primus motus, qui est actio primi motoris.
Constat autem quod nulla est actio communis omnium formarum sensi-
bilium et insensibilium substantiarum continens omnes actiones parti-
culares earundem formarum; ergo per viam actionis et motus non potest 30
phisicus probare primam formam sicut probat primam materiam et pri-
mum motorem.
insensibilesmagis] sensibiles sunt magis note nobis substantie autem insensibiles sunt
minus Pv primo om. M illa] ex add. Iunt. illudin] illud quod fuit illic
declaratum est ex hoc Iunt. cognitionem] notitiam Pv operationem propriam
inv. Pv
a Aristotle,VII, 3, 1029a3334 (AL XXV 3.2, p. 135, lin. 102104). b Averroes, In Met., VII, t.c.
9, fol. 160AB.
106 pauli veneti

mento, quod cum declaratum est in scientia naturali hoc esse
corpus sensibile quod est causa aliis substantiis sensibilibus, prius
eis, declarabitur quod forma istius corporis est principium ultime
substantie, que est prior aliis substantiis, et quod ipsum est quod 5
dat aliis substantias et formas substantiales generabiles et corrup-
tibiles.a
Istud commentum ostendit modum perveniendi in primam formam.
Unde, sicut metaphisicus accipit a phisico aliquas esse substantias sepa-
245rb Pv ratas a materia, ita accipit ab eodem aliquod esse | corpus sensibile quod 10
est causa omnium aliorum corporum sensibilium, et prius eis: cum enim
motus sit actus sensibilis, si datur primus motus, qui est causa omnium
aliorum motuum, necesse est quod detur primum corpus sensibile, quod
sit causa omnium aliorum corporum sensibilium. Isto habito, probat
metaphisicus omne corpus sensibile esse substantiam per hoc quod 15
omnia principia illius sunt substantie, et tunc arguit sic: sicut se habet
corpus sensibile ad corpus sensibile, ita se habet forma unius corporis ad
reliquam; sed aliquod est primum corpus sensibile quod est causa alio-
rum corporum sensibilium generabilium et corruptibilium; ergo aliqua
est prima forma que est causa omnium aliarum formarum generabilium 20
et corruptibilium. Celum enim, et si est ultimum corpus sensibile quo ad
nos, est tamen primum quo ad naturam. Ideo forma, que est principium
substantie talis corporis, debet esse prima forma similiter.
Quoniam autem in principio h1029b1ssi.
Tertia conclusio: ad metaphisicum spectat determinare primo de sub- 25
stantia que est forma quiditativa rerum sensibilium.
Dicebatur enim in prima distinctione huius capituli quod substan-
tia quadrupliciter sumitur: primo de quiditate, secundo de specie, tertio
de genere et quarto de substantia prima. Et quoniam substantia prima
habet duplicem formam, scilicet formam totius, cuiusmodi est humani- 30
tas, et partis, sicut est anima actuans materiam, de substantia que est
forma partis non determinatur in hoc septimo, sed in octavo. Hic autem
determinatur de substantia que est forma quiditativa, que communior
est quam sit forma partis. Ista conclusio arguitur sic: hec scientia imitari
notandum secundo inv. Pv declaratum est inv. Pv causa] in add. Iunt.

sensibilibus] et add. Iunt. primum post naturam M sumitur] dicitur add.
Pv
a Averroes, In Met., VII, t.c. 9, fol. 160BC.

debet modum aliarum scientiarum atque artium; sed in aliis scientiis et

in artibus nos procedimus a magis notis nobis et minus notis nature ad
magis nota nature et minus nota nobis; ergo etiam in hac scientia proce-
dere debemus a magis notis nobis et minus notis nature ad magis nota
nature et minus nota nobis. Constat autem quod quiditates rerum sensi- 5
bilium, sicut et ipse substantie sensibiles, sunt magis note nobis et minus
12va M note nature; quiditates autem rerum insensibilium, | sicut et ipse substan-
tie insensibiles, sunt magis note nature et minus note nobis; ergo in hac
scientia debemus procedere a notitia quiditatum sensibilium ad cogni-
tionem quiditatum insensibilium. Et per consequens ad metaphisicum 10
spectat determinare primo de substantia, que est forma quiditativa rerum
sensibilium.
Tenet consequentia cum prima parte antecedentis. Et secunda decla-
ratur. Primo quidem notum est quod alie scientie, et precipue naturales,
procedunt a magis nobis notis et minus notis nature ad magis nota nature 15
et minus nota nobis: quia accidentia sunt minus nota nature quam sub-
stantie, cum sint minoris entitatis, nobis autem accidentia sunt notiora
quam substantie, quoniam illa sunt nobis notiora que primo cadunt in
sensu, cum sint sensibilia per se, substantie vero ex consequenti cadunt
in sensu, cum sint sensibilia per accidens, ut habetur secundo De anima.a 20
Propter quod dicit Philosophus, in prologo De anima,b quod accidentia
magnam partem conferunt ad cognoscendum quod quid est.
Secundo idem ostenditur in artibus et maxime pertinentibus ad actus
morales, in quibus ex bonis particularibus uniuscuiusque, scilicet ex hiis
que sunt bona huic et illi, fiunt nota ea que sunt universaliter bona, que 25
ex consequenti sunt bona unicuique. Militaris enim pervenit ad victoriam
totius exercitus, que est quoddam universale bonum, ex singulis victoriis
huius et illius. Et licet divinius sit bonum istius civitatis quam istius homi-
nis, et divinissimum sit bonum quod est totius gentis, tamen processus
est in talibus ex bonis particularibus que sunt uniuscuiusque, que fiunt 30
primo per monasticam, in universalia bona, que sunt bona reipublice,
scilicet civitatis aut regni. Hii quidem qui circa propria in monastica pro-
bati sunt, civium rectores eliguntur. Similiter, edificativa ex compositione
horum lapidum et illorum pervenit ad constitutionem totius domus, que
est quoddam universale bonum. 35
in om. Pv notis nobis inv. Pv illorum] provenit et add. M
a Aristotle, De an., II, 6, 418a2024 et passim. b Aristotle, De an., I, 1, 402b2122.

108 pauli veneti
Si ergo particularia bona sunt nobis magis nota quam universalia, con-
stat autem quod universalia sunt magis nota nature quam particularia,
cum sint maioris entitatis et perfectionis. Ergo in scientiis activis sicut in
245va Pv speculativis nos procedimus a magis notis | nobis et minus notis nature
ad magis nota nature et minus nota nobis. 5
Lege litteram: Quoniam autem in principio huius capituli divisimus
quot modis determinavimus substantiam, et horum unum quidem videtur
esse quod quid erat esse, speculandum est de ipso. Pre opere enim, in autem
omnia hoc est necessarium ad transeundum ad quod notius est secundum
naturam. Disciplina enim ita fit omnibus per minus nota nature ad nota 10
magis. Et hoc opus est in scientiis: quemadmodum in actibus moralibus et
artificialibus facere ex unicuique bonis totaliter, idest universaliter, bona,
que etiam sunt unicuique bona, sic ex ipsis notioribus que nature quidem
nota sunt primo, deinde ipsi nota addiscenti.a
Contra dicta arguit Philosophus sic: notiora nature non cognoscuntur 15
per minus nota nature, sed magis nota nobis sunt minus nota nature; ergo
nos non cognoscimus notiora nature per magis nota nobis, et per conse-
quens nos non pervenimus in notitiam substantiarum intelligibilium per
cognitionem substantiarum sensibilium.
Prima pars antecedentis ostenditur. Nam notiora nature sunt nota 20
simpliciter et minus nota nature sunt nota secundum quid. Modo non
cognoscuntur ea que sunt nota simpliciter per ea que sunt nota secundum
quid, iuxta illud primi Posteriorum:b Propter quod unumquodque tale, et
illud magis. Secunda pars antecedentis etiam declaratur. Nam accidentia
sunt nobis notiora, ut liquet; sunt autem debiliter nota nature, quia parum 25
aut nichil habent de ratione entis secundum se considerata, cum ipsa non
sint entia nisi quia entis, ut patuit in alio capitulo.
12vb M Lege litteram: | Que autem singulis simpliciter nota et prima sunt
multotiens debiliter nota sunt apud naturam et parum aut nichil entis
habent.c 30
Respondet Philosophus, dicens quod non inconvenit magis nota na-
ture cognosci per minus nota nature, dummodo illa minus nota nature
determinavimus] determinamus Moerb. (determinavimus Xy UuZz[?pr.m. P2]Nd)

ipsis] ipsi Moerb. secundum se om. M simpliciter om. Moerb. (sic P1, pr.m.
P2NdSj1To1)
a Aristotle, Met., VII, 4, 1029b19 (AL XXV 3.2, pp. 135136, lin. 105112). b Aristotle, An.
Post., I, 2, 72a2930. c Aristotle, Met., VII, 4, 1029b910 (AL XXV 3.2, p. 136, lin. 112113).
sint nobis magis nota, quoniam hec est via addiscendi, scilicet ex magis
notis addiscenti ad ea que sunt minus nota illi. Ideo ex male noscibilibus
quo ad naturam, nobis autem bene noscibilibus, procedimus ad ea que
sunt optime atque simpliciter noscibilia. Quapropter temptandum est
in hac scientia pervenire in cognitionem eorum que sunt omnino atque 5
simpliciter nota, cuiusmodi sunt intelligentie separate, procedendo per
ea que sunt minime nota apud naturam, cuiusmodi sunt hec sensibilia, a
quibus nostra cognitio habet ortum.
Lege litteram: At tamen ex male quidem noscibilibus quo ad naturam
ipsis autem addiscentibus bene noscibilibus que omnino noscibilia sunt 10
apud naturam est noscere temptandum, procedentes, sicut dictum est, per
hec ad ipsa.a
Notandum primo, secundum Commentatorem, commento decimo,
quod similiter est processus doctrine in omnibus scientiis, preter
quam in mathematicis, scilicet quod in eis proceditur ab eis que sunt 15
maioris cognitionis apud nos et minoris cognitionis apud naturam
ad ista que sunt maioris cognitionis apud naturam.b
Intendit Commentator quod scientie sunt in duplici differentia: quedam
sunt mathematice et quedam non mathematice. In scientiis mathema-
ticis eadem sunt nobis notiora et nature, quia illa non accipiunt esse ab 20
experientia, ideo in talibus iuvenes et inexperti quandoque multum profi-
ciunt. Similiter enim in eis manifestatur causa et effectus, unde non prius
nec apud nos nec apud naturam cognoscitur equalitas trium angulorum
ad duos rectos quam causa illius passionis.
In scientiis autem non mathematicis, sive sint scientie practice vel spe- 25
culative, sive sint morales sive mechanice, non eadem sunt nobis notiora
et nature. Et ita intendit Philosophusc, dicens: que autem sunt simplici-
ter nota singulis et prima sunt multotiens debiliter nota apud naturam.
In omnibus enim hiis prius cognoscimus effectus quam causas; econtra
autem natura prius cognoscit causas quam effectus, aut quia ab illis incipit 30
operari aut quia sunt maioris entitatis secundum naturam suam. Omnes
enim hee scientie ab experimento sumunt initium. Ideo ex effectibus
procedunt in causas ex admiratione, dubitatione et ignorantia illarum.
ipsis] ipsi Moerb. ista] illa Iunt. vel] sive Pv
t.c. 10, fol. 160IK. c Aristotle, Met., VII, 4, 1029b910 (AL XXV 3.2, p. 136, lin. 112113).
110 pauli veneti
245vb Pv Propter quod dicitur in prohemio huiusa quod propter admirari incepe-
runt homines philosophari, videntes enim eclipsim lune et admirantes,
causam invenerunt, quod erat interpositio terre.
mento, quod illa que sunt cognita cuilibet sunt pauce et parve 5
cognitionis in respectu eorum que sunt cognita apud naturam, quia
in eis que sunt primo cognita a nobis aut nichil est de cognitione
entis aut modicum, sed ex eis pervenitur ad cognitionem perfecti
entis.b
Ymaginatur Commentator quod ens, natura et cognoscibilitas seinvicem 10
consequuntur, ita quod habens plus de ratione entis est altioris nature
et maioris cognoscibilitatis. Et ita intendit Philosophus, secundo huius,c
dicens quod, sicut res se habet ad esse, ita se habet ad cognosci, et sicut se
habet oculus noctue, ita intellectus noster ad manifestissima in natura.
Ea ergo que magis appropinquant ad non-esse simpliciter, sicut minus 15
habent de ratione entis, ita minus habent de ratione cognoscibilitatis
apud naturam, et quanto magis appropinquant ad primum simpliciter,
tanto sunt maioris entitatis et consequenter sunt maioris cognoscibilitatis
13ra M secundum naturam suam. | Quod autem male seu debiliter cognoscan-
tur a nobis, hoc est ex defectu nostri intellectus, qui non cognoscit nisi 20
per sensata. Cognitio ergo nostra et cognitio nature respiciunt opposita
cognoscibilia, quia primo nota nature sunt maxime entitatis, ut Deus et
intelligentie, primo autem nota nobis sunt minime entitatis, ut motus et
accidentia ipsorum. Quo non obstante, ex cognitione talium minime per-
fectorum venimus in cognitionem maxime perfectorum. Quare et cetera. 25
Dubitatur, quia videtur quod per substantias sensibiles non possimus
devenire in cognitionem substantiarum separatarum, quia nullum agens
naturale agit ultra speciem propriam; sed hec sensibilia sunt agentia
naturalia; ergo non agunt ultra speciem propriam, et per consequens, si
in sensu vel intellectu imprimunt species sensibilium, non imprimunt 30
species intelligibilium.
Item, eadem sunt principia essendi et cognoscendi; sed sensibilia non
sunt principia essendi substantiarum abstractarum; ergo nec sunt princi-
pia cognoscendi.
notandum secundo inv. Pv perfecti Pv Iunt.] perfectam M et] quod add. Pv

nostra nature inv. Pv vel] in add. Pv abstractarum] separatarum Pv
a Aristotle,Met., I, 2, 982b1217. b Averroes, In Met., VII, t.c. 10, fol. 160L. c Aristotle, Met.,
II, 1, 993b3031; 993b911.
Preterea, nos devenimus in cognitionem substantiarum sensibilium

per effectus et passiones suas, que sunt sensibilia propria vel communia;
constat autem quod effectus substantiarum separatarum nobis apparent
in istis sensibilibus; ergo per suos effectus devenimus in cognitionem
earum. 5
Respondetur quod, sicut celum recipit motum, non tamen mediante
motu recipit calorem, ex eo quia non est receptivus caloris, ita sensus
recipit species sensibilium, non tamen mediantibus hiis recipit species
intelligibilium, quia non est receptivus illarum. Et sicut homo recipiens
motum recipit calorem mediante motu, quia est receptivus illius, ita intel- 10
lectus recipiens species sensibilium recipit mediantibus illis species intel-
ligibilium, quia est receptivus illarum. Cognitis ergo substantiis sensibi-
libus, intellectus potest elevari in cognitionem substantiarum separata-
rum, sicut per effectus in cognitionem causarum, ex quo utriusque cogni-
tionis est ipse aliqualiter susceptivus. 15
Nec est verum quod nullum agens naturale agit ultra speciem pro-
priam, quia qualitates prime per se agunt substantiam ex propria virtute;
sensibilia autem propria agunt species sensibiles et sensationes que sunt
maioris perfectionis et alterius speciei. Dicitur tamen quod species sensi-
biles non agunt species substantiarum separatarum, sed intellectus est ille 20
qui agit huiusmodi species, mediantibus tamen speciebus substantiarum
sensibilium tamquam cause sine qua non.
Et concesso quod eadem sint principia essendi et cognoscendi, quia
ea que faciunt ad esse etiam faciunt ad cognitionem perfectam propter
quid, non tamen omnia principia cognoscendi sunt principia essendi, 25
quoniam in naturalibus effectus est principium cognoscendi causam, non
tamen est principium essendi illius.
Cum vero additur quod, sicut immediate cognoscimus substantias sen-
246ra Pv sibiles per effectus suos, ita immediate debemus cognoscere | substantias
separatas per effectus suos, hoc negatur, quia effectus substantiarum exi- 30
stentes in rebus sensibilibus non proveniunt immediate ab eis, sed a sub-
stantiis sensibilibus, cum in hec inferiora non agant Deus et intelligentie
nisi mediantibus corporibus celestibus, que sunt substantie sensibiles. Et
ista est causa propter quam de substantiis sensibilibus habemus perfecte
quia est et quid est, non autem de substantiis separatis, sed solum quia est 35
et quod sunt cause.
caloris scr.] motus MPv cause] causa Pv effectus post principium sed corr. Pv
essendi illius inv. M
112 pauli veneti
hCAPITULUM IIIi
Et primo dicemus h1029b13ssi.

Istud est tertium capitulum huius primi tractatus, in quo Philosophus
investigat illam substantiam que est forma quiditativa rei sensibilis, post-
quam expressit ordinem in dicendo. 5
13rb M Et dividitur hoc capitulum in tres partes, in quarum prima investigat
ipsum quod quid est; in secunda declarat cuius est quod quid erat esse, ibi:
Quoniam vero sunt h1029b22ssi; in tertia vero removet quosdam errores
antiquorum, ibi: Habet autem dubitationem h1030b14ssi.
Prima pars dividitur in tres conclusiones, quarum prima est hec: predi- 10
catum per se, perseitate primi modi, est de quiditate sui subiecti. Secunda
conclusio: predicatum per accidens qualitercumque sumptum non est de
quiditate sui subiecti, ibi: Non enim est h1029b14ssi. Tertia conclusio:
predicatum per se, perseitate secundi modi, non est de quiditate subiecti,
ibi: Neque etiam hoc h1029b16ssi. 15
Prima conclusio arguitur sic: illud est de quiditate alicuius per quod
convenienter respondetur ad questionem querentem quid est hoc?; sed
per predicatum per se, perseitate primi modi, convenienter responde-
tur ad questionem querentem quid est hoc?, demonstrando subiectum
eius; ergo predicatum per se, perseitate primi modi, est de quiditate sui 20
subiecti.
Tenet consequentia cum maiori. Et minor inductive liquet. Nam si que-
ritur quid est hoc?, demonstrando Sortem, convenienter respondetur
quod homo; et si queritur quid est hoc?, demonstrando equum, conve-
nienter respondetur quod est animal. Ideo homo est de quiditate Sortis 25
et animal de quiditate equi, et generaliter quodlibet superius est de qui-
ditate sui inferioris. Nam quodlibet superius predicatur essentialiter et in
recto de suo inferiori; quo remoto, removetur suum inferius, non tamen eo
posito, ponitur suum inferius, sed econtra: posito inferiori, ponitur suum
superius. 30
Et dicit Philosophus quod ista perscrutatio est logica, quia accipit ea
que sunt declarata in logica. Ibi enim ostenditur quid est subiectum
et quid predicatum, et quid predicari in quid, in quantum et in quale.
primi mg. Pv declarat] illud add. Pv esse s.l. Pv alicuius] alterius M

quod est om. Pv est om. Pv predicatur post recto (lin. 28) Pv quid1] est
add. Pv quid2] est add. Pv quid3] et add. Pv
Investigare enim quiditatem et essentiam rei seu quod quid est aut quod
quid erat esse ex modo predicandi ad logicam proprie pertinet. Et quia
hec scientia affinitatem quandam habet cum logica propter utriusque
communitatem et convenientiam in subiecto, ideo modus logicus huic
scientie est proprius.a 5
Lege litteram: Et primo dicemus quedam de eo logice, scilicet quid est
quod quid erat esse, et respondetur unumquodque quod dicitur secundum
se de aliquo, idest in primo modo, est quod quid erat esse illius.b
Notandum primo, secundum Commentatorem, commento unde-
cimo, quod Aristoteles perscrutatur hic, in maiori parte, de propo- 10
sitionibus dialecticis, quarum una est quod substantia rei est illud
quod dicitur in responsione ad quid est hoc individuum substantie
Et iam descripsimus istam substantiam alibi descriptione dialec-
tica, quod est idem quod significat sermo qui dat essentiam rei, que
est diffinitio.c 15
Hec ergo propositio est dialectica: quiditas substantialis rei est illud per
quod convenienter respondetur ad questionem querentem quid est
hoc?, demonstrando individuum predicamenti substantie. Et si queritur
que res est quiditas substantialis, respondetur quod est illud quod signi-
ficatur per diffinitionem, ut habet videri in libro Topicorum.d Sicut ergo 20
246rb Pv ens et entitas, seu esse et | essentia, non differunt invicem nisi sicut con-
cretum et abstractum, ita quiditas et quod quid est differunt solum sicut
concretum et abstractum, ita quod quiditas est abstractum, cuius concre-
tum est quod quid est seu quod quid erat esse; et generaliter illud dicitur
quod quid est per quod convenienter respondetur ad questionem queren- 25
tem quid est hoc?. Neque differunt invicem essentia et quiditas rei nisi
quia essentia dicit naturam rei absolute, ut est dans esse, quiditas autem
illud idem dicit in ordine ad intellectum.
mento, quod ista predicabilia sunt tria, scilicet genus, differentia 30
et diffinitio, que componitur ex eis; que diffinitio est idem cum
idest] videlicet Pv substantiam scr.ex Iunt.] scientiam M, substantiam fort. Pv

est] illud add. Iunt. entitas] non convertuntur add. M quiditas] est
abstractum add. Pv Notandum secundo inv. Pv et om. Pv
a lin. 15, cf. Aquinas, Exp. Met., VII, lect. 3, n. 1308. b Aristotle, Met., VII, 4, 1029b1314 (AL
XXV 3.2, p. 136, lin. 117118). c Averroes, In Met., VII, t.c. 11, fol. 161D. d Aristotle, Top., VI, 1,
139a29ff; 4, 141a23ff.
114 pauli veneti
substantia rei. Et universaliter predicabilia substantialia sunt ista

que adunantur hini subiecto et adunantur adinvicem, et accidentalia
econverso.a
13va M Intendit Commentator quod genus | et differentia, et diffinitio compo-
sita ex hiis, dicunt eandem realitatem sub tribus conceptibus, quia eadem 5
realitas est animal et rationale et animal rationale, sed non eodem modo
neque eadem ratione. Genus enim dicit realitatem suam ut specificabi-
lem et per modum confusum; differentia vero dicit eandem realitatem per
modum qualis specificantis; sed diffinitio dicit ipsam eandem naturam
per modum quid specificatam.b Omnia ergo predicabilia predicamenti 10
substantie adunantur in subiecto, videlicet in substantia prima, que est
subiectum omnium predicabilium eiusdem predicamenti. Que quidem
adunatio est per essentialem predicationem et realem identitatem, quia
homo, animal, corpus, substantia, sicut predicantur de Sorte, ita identi-
ficantur ei, et consequenter adunantur inter se per realem identitatem, 15
quia homo, animal, corpus, substantia sunt unum et idem. Accidentia
autem econverso non adunantur invicem, sed adunantur in subiecto, quia
album et musicum sunt idem subiecto et differunt inter se eo quod albedo
non est musica, neque aliquod illorum est subiectum alterius.
Et si aliquis instaret contra Commentatorem, inferens quod sex sunt 20
predicabilia et quod differentia predicatur in quid, quia per eum, in hoc
commento, diffinitio est predicabile, Porphyrius autem ponit quinque,
quorum nullum est diffinitio, scilicet genus, species, differentia, proprium
et accidens; si etiam genus et differentia adunantur invicem, et genus pre-
dicatur in quid, igitur differentia predicatur in quid; aut si differentia pre- 25
dicatur in quale, oportet quod genus predicetur in qualerespondetur
quod diffinitio non dicitur [solum] predicabile per se, sed solum per acci-
dens, ratione suarum partium, neque debet dici predicabile predicatione
formali aut per se, sed solum identica et per accidens, ad hunc intel-
lectum, quod diffinitio est aliqua quorum quodlibet est predicabile, aut 30
quod est ex aliquibus quorum quodlibet est predicabile. Et licet invicem
adunentur genus et differentia, non tamen habent eundem modum pre-
dicandi, quia adunantur in realitate, sed non in conceptu, sicut etiam
in suppl. ex lin 11] cum Iunt. subiectum post predicabilium M predicamenti]

omnium predicabilium add. M quidem] quedam Pv solum secl.
a Averroes, In Met., VII, t.c. 11, fol. 161DE. b lin. 410, cf. Alexander of Alexandria, Exp. Met.,
VII, c. 4, fol. 191vab.

adunantur homo et musicum, non tamen habent eundem modum pre-

dicandi sicut neque eundem conceptum. Et ex hoc dicitur consequenter
quod, licet homo et animal et diffinitiones istorum sint quod quid est,
humanitas autem et animalitas sunt quiditates, tamen differentie isto-
rum, proprie loquendo, non sunt quiditates neque quod quid est, ex quo 5
non predicantur in quid, sed in quale; sed potius sunt partes formales ipsa-
rum quiditatum aut ipsorum quod quid est. Dicuntur tamen differentie
quiditates in quantum constituunt quiditates specificas et dicuntur pre-
dicari in quid in quantum sunt partes diffinitionum predicantium in quid.
Ita quod per se predicantur in quale, sed cum alio, scilicet cum genere, 10
predicantur in quid, et hoc per accidens.
Non enim est h1029b14ssi.
Secunda conclusio: predicatum per accidens qualitercumque sump-
tum non est de quiditate sui subiecti.
Probatur. Nichil est de quiditate alicuius nisi per se predicetur de illo; 15
sed predicatum per accidens non per se predicatur de subiecto suo; ergo
246va Pv et cetera. | Tenet consequentia cum prima parte antecedentis, quoniam
quelibet quiditas et quelibet pars eius predicantur per se de illo cuius
est quiditas, ut habet videri primo Posteriorum.a Secunda autem pars
antecedentis patet inductive, quoniam homo non est per se ipsum albus, 20
nec tu es per te ipsum musicus: sive enim sit albedo sibi sive musica, non
minus homo est et tu es, et per consequens esse album accidit homini et
esse musicum accidit esse tui, ita quod hominem esse et musicum esse,
seu te esse et album esse, dicunt diversas quiditates extraneas invicem,
cum sint diversorum predicamentorum. Non enim predicatur musicum 25
nec album de subiecto suo in quid, neque in quale substantiale, sed in
quale accidentale. Ideo nullum eorum per se predicatur de subiecto suo.
13vb M Lege litteram: Non enim est tibi esse mu-|-sicum esse. Non enim secun-
dum te ipsum es musicus. Quod ergo dicitur secundum te ipsum non est
aliquod predicatum per accidens et cetera.b 30
Notandum, secundum Commentatorem, commento undecimo,
quod ista que demonstrantur per aliquod accidens non sunt diffi-
nitiones, quoniam, si essent, contingeret ut accidentia predicabilia
de aliquo essent eiusdem nature. Idem enim videtur disponi per
plura accidentia; sed illud quod congregatur ex eis non est unum 35
nisi per accidens. Et diffinitio declarat substantiam rei, et illud quod
a Aristotle,An. Post., I, 4, 73a34ff. b Aristotle, Met., VII, 4, 1029b1417 (AL XXV 3.2, p. 136,
lin. 118120).
116 pauli veneti
congregatur ex eis non est unum essentialiter Et universaliter

ex hac propositione novem predicamenta essent eiusdem nature,
idest substantie, quoniam secundum hoc erunt differentie substan-
tiales.a
Inconvenientia quatuor inducit Commentator si accidentia per accidens 5
essent de quiditate sui subiecti, sic quod constituerent diffinitiones eius-
dem.
Primum inconveniens est quod accidens est eiusdem nature cum sub-
stantia, quia illud quod est de quiditate alicuius est eiusdem nature cum
illo, sicut patet de genere, specie, differentia et diffinitione. Si ergo acci- 10
dens per accidens esset de quiditate substantie, necessario esset eiusdem
nature cum substantiaquod est impossibile, quia tunc non essent pre-
dicamenta decem, sed tantum predicamentum substantie.
Secundum inconveniens est quod accidentia diversarum specierum
et generum sunt eiusdem nature inter se, quoniam quecumque sunt 15
eiusdem nature cum uno tertio sunt eiusdem nature inter se; accidentia
per accidens diversarum specierum et generum sunt eiusdem nature cum
uno tertio, scilicet cum substantia, ex quo in eodem subiecto sunt plura
talia accidentia, scilicet quantitas, qualitas, ut pedalitas, albedo et musica.
Tertium inconveniens est quod declaratum per diffinitionem essentia- 20
lem non est unum per se, sed per accidens, quia, si accidentia per accidens
sint de quiditate et natura sui subiecti, oportet quod ex illis fiat diffinitio
essentialis et quiditativa; constat autem ex duobus aut pluribus acciden-
tibus non fieri unum ens per se, sed solum per accidens, videlicet ex albe-
dine et musica aut ex albo et musico, ut est ostensum quinto huius.b 25
Quartum inconveniens est quod omnia novem predicamenta acciden-
tium sunt differentie essentiales substantie, quia omnia illa predicamenta
sunt accidentia substantie. Si ergo omnia accidentia substantie sunt de
quiditate et natura substantie; omnia autem que sunt de quiditate et
natura alicuius sunt differentie essentiales eius, ut patet inductive; ergo 30
et cetera.
Neque etiam omne h1029b16ssi.
Tertia conclusio: predicatum per se, perseitate secundi modi, non est
de quiditate subiecti.
propositione] positione Iunt. sunttertio mg. Pv cum uno] uni M

si s.l. Pv omnianatura mg. Pv
a Averroes, In Met., VII, t.c. 11, fol. 161FG. b Aristotle, Met., V, 6, 1015b1636.
Ista conclusio dupliciter arguitur. Et primo sic: illud quod est de qui-
ditate alicuius est idem quiditative cum illo; sed predicatum per se, per-
seitate secundi modi, non est idem quiditative cum subiecto suo; ergo
et cetera. Maior patet inductive. Nam animal est idem quiditative cum
homine, quia est de quiditate hominis, et color est idem quiditative cum 5
albedine, quia est de quiditate illius, et sic de aliis. Minor autem est evi-
dens, quia album per se predicatur de superficie perseitate secundi modi,
ex quo albedo diffinitur per superficiem, non tamen est idem quiditative
cum superficie, quia superficiem esse et album esse non sunt idem, neque
quiditas superficiei est quiditas albedinis, neque aliquod illorum quovi- 10
246vb Pv smodo pertinet ad quiditatem alterius, cum sint nature diversorum | pre-
dicamentorum. Predicamenta enim sunt primo distincta, primo Posterio-
rum.a Et sicut albedo non est primo de quiditate superficiei, ita nec aggre-
gratum ex albedine et superficie est de quiditate superficiei, quia illud
quod est de quiditate alicuius non adest illi tamquam aliquid exstrinse- 15
cus adveniens; constat autem quod, sicut albedo, ita superficies alba adest
superficiei tamquam aliquid exstrinsecus adveniens: sicut enim superfi-
cies est prior albedine, ita est prior superficie alba, non ratione superficiei,
sed ratione albedinis.
Lege litteram: Neque etiam omne predicatum per se est de quiditate 20
subiecti; non enim quod ita est secundum se ut superficiei album est de
14ra M quiditate | illius, quia non est superficiei esse album esse idem. At vero
neque hquodi ex utrisque est de quiditate superficiei ut superficiei albe esse.
Quare? Quia adest hec, scilicet superficies alba adest superficiei.b
Secundo: predicatum per se, perseitate primi modi, non diffinitur per 25
subiectum suum, et ex hoc est de quiditate sui subiecti; sed predicatum
per se, perseitate secundi modi, diffinitur per subiectum suum; ergo pre-
dicatum per se in secundo modo non est de quiditate sui subiecti.
Prima pars antecedentis est nota inductive, quia animal non diffinitur
per hominem, neque per equum, neque per aliquod aliud subiectum 30
suum. Non etiam color diffinitur per albedinem, neque per nigredinem,
neque per aliquod alterum subiectum suum. Et ita de aliis que predicantur
hini primo modo dicendi per se.
quiditative mg. Pv distincta] ut habetur add. Pv et om. Pv etiam] hoc

add. Moerb. quod suppl. ex Moerb. in suppl.
a Aristotle An. Post., I, 15, 79b1214 (cf. Paul of Venice, Exp. Post., ed. Venice 1477, fol. K4rab).
b Aristotle, Met., VII, 4, 1029b1619 (AL XXV 3.2, p. 136, lin. 120123).
118 pauli veneti
Secunda pars inductive etiam liquet. Nam in diffinitione risibilis poni-

tur homo, et in diffinitione simi nasus, et in diffinitione coloris seu albedi-
nis superficies; constat autem quod simitas predicatur de naso, et risibili-
tas de homine, et color seu albedo de superficie in secundo modo dicendi
per se, ut habet videri primo Posteriorum.a 5
Sed consequentia declaratur, quia, sicut predicatum primi modi ex
hoc quia non diffinitur per subiectum suum, sed est diffiniens subiectum
illud, non additur illi subiecto, ita predicatum secundi modi ex hoc quod
diffinitur per subiectum suum necessario est aliquid additum illi subiecto,
et per consequens non potest esse de quiditate illius. Alioquin sequitur 10
quod albedo et levitas sunt quiditative idemquod est impossibile. Et
probatur illud sequi. Nam sicut albedo est propria passio superficiei, ita
et levitas, et sicut albedo predicatur per se de superficie, ita et levitas
in secundo modo. Ergo si albedo est de quiditate superficiei, per idem
et levitas est de quiditate eiusdem, et per consequens tam levitas quam 15
albedo est quiditative idem superficiei. Tunc arguitur sic: quecumque
sunt eadem quiditative uni tertio sunt eadem quiditative inter se; sed
albedo et levitas sunt quiditative eadem superficiei, per adversarium; ergo
sunt quiditative idem inter sequod est impossibile, quia sunt species
desparate. 20
Lege litteram: In qua ergo non inerit ratione dicente ipsum, idest mani-
festante ipsum subiectum, hec ratio erit quod quid erat esse singulis, idest
quiditas seu quod quid est singulorum subiectorum. Quare si superficiei
albe esse est superficiei esse, semper sequitur quod albo et levi est idem esse
et unum erit.b 25
Et intendit Philosophus per totum hunc septimum per esse hoc, sicut
per esse album, vel per esse huic, sicut per esse superficiei, esse quidi-
tativum rei.c
cimo, quod albedo non est quiditas superficiei, quando dicimus 30
superficies alba, sicut rationabilitas est quiditas animalis, quando
dicimus animal rationale Nec illud quod demonstrat iste sermo
est aliquod unum compositum ex ambobus, sicut illud quod
secunda] etiam add. Pv inductive etiam inv. Pv quod] quia Pv ergo] igitur
Moerb. inerit] ratione ipsum subiectum ipsum add. Pv ratione] ipsum add.
Moerb. idem esse inv. Moerb. septimum om. M
a Aristotle, An. Post., I, 4, 73a37b3. b Aristotle, Met., VII, 4, 1029b1922 (AL XXV 3.2, p. 136,
lin. 124127). c Aquinas, Exp. Met., VII, lect. 3, n. 1310.

significat animal rationale est aliquod unum compositum ex

ambobus, scilicet homo.a
Intendit Commentator quod iste compositiones, superficies alba et ani-
mal rationale, dupliciter differunt, non obstante quod rationalitas est
qualitas animalitatis sicut albedo superficiei. Primo quidem differunt quia 5
rationalitas est quiditas animalis, sed albedo non est quiditas superficiei,
247ra Pv cum sint diversorum | predicamentorum superficies et albedo; non autem
animal et rationale differunt, quia ex superficie et albedine non fit aliquod
unum, sed ex animali et rationali fit unum, scilicet homo: differentia enim
adveniens generi constituit speciem. 10
Et si instatur quod rationalitas non est quiditas animalis, quia prius est
quiditas generis quam differentie, dicitur quod illa propositio est intelli-
genda in predicatione identica, et non formali, sicut ista humanitas est
animalitas: non quod formaliter humanitas sit animalitas, cum sit alia
ratio humanitatis et alia ratio animalitatis, sed quia realiter unum est 15
14rb M aliud, quia humanitas et | animalitas non sunt due realitates, sed solum
duo conceptus. Ita rationalitas et quiditas animalis non realiter differunt,
sed solum formaliter et ratione. Sunt enim due formalitates et duo con-
ceptus non realiter, sed tantum ratione differentes. Neque eodem modo
rationalitas est qualitas animalitatis et albedo superficiei, quia rationalitas 20
est qualitas essentialis animalitatis, albedo autem est qualitas accidentalis
superficiei.
mento, quod quoniam compositum ex ambobus diffinitur com-
posite ex duabus diffinitionibus istorum duorum, ideo sequitur ut 25
diffinitio albi composita sit ex diffinitione albedinis et diffinitione
subiecti albedinis. Et quia in diffinitione albedinis accipitur diffini-
tio subiecti, contingit ut in diffinitione albi bis accipiatur diffinitio
subiecti Et hoc non accidit in composito ex substantiis, verbi gra-
tia quoniam diffinitio hominis componitur ex animalitate et ratio- 30
nalitate, et non accidit ex hoc iteratio que accidit in composito ex
substantia et accidente.b
humanitatis animalitatis ] animalitatis humanitatis M sed s.l. M notan-

dum secundo inv. Pv ut] quod Iunt. bis post subiecti (lin. 28) Iunt. composito
scr. ex p. 120, lin. 1ss (cfr. Iunt.)] compositione MPv composito scr. ex p. 120, lin. 1ss (cfr.
Iunt.)] compositione MPv
a Averroes, In Met., VII, t.c. 11, fol. 161IK. b Averroes, In Met., VII, t.c. 11, fol. 161KL.
120 pauli veneti
Commentator ponit differentiam inter compositum accidentale et

compositum substantiale. Ponens suas diffinitiones, dicit quod composi-
tum substantiale potest perfecte diffiniri absque reiteratione, non autem
compositum accidentale. Si enim dicitur homo est animal rationale, per-
fecte diffinitur homo. In cuius diffinitione nulla apparet reiteratio. Sed 5
si debet diffiniri album perfecte, necesse est quod fiat reiteratio in dif-
finitione eius, quoniam omne compositum ex duobus diffinibilibus non
perfecte diffinitur nisi aggreget in sua diffinitione utriusque diffinibilis
diffinitiones. Constat autem quod album componitur ex subiecto et albe-
dine, que quidem diffinibilia sunt. Ergo diffinitio albi, si perfecta fuerit, 10
debet esse composita ex diffinitione subiecti et ex diffinitione albedinis;
sed diffinitionem albedinis ingreditur diffinitio sui subiecti, si complete
et perfecte debet diffiniri albedo; ergo in diffinitione albi reiteratur diffi-
nitio subiecti, ita quod semel ponitur ratione sui et semel ponitur ratione
albedinis. 15
Sed dubitatur, quia tunc non posset perfecte diffiniri simum, dicendo
quod est nasus cavus, quia in sua diffinitione oportet ponere diffinitio-
nem nasi et diffinitionem simitatis, et sic esset reiteratio, quia simitas, ut
albedo, debet diffiniri per diffinitionem sui subiecti.
Item, dato modo loquendi Commentatoris, sequitur quod homo non 20
possit diffiniri perfecte nisi in sua diffinitione ponatur diffinitio corporis et
diffinitio animequod est contra eum. Tenet consequentia, quia corpus
et anima sunt duo diffinibilia, ex quibus componitur homo.
Ad primum dicitur concedendo quod illa non est perfecta diffinitio
simi, quia non perfecte diffinitur simum nisi explicetur tota natura eius. 25
Non autem explicatur tota natura eius nisi explicetur natura simitatis
et nasi. Constat autem quod non explicatur bene natura nasi nisi per
suam diffinitionem, nec bene explicatur natura simitatis nisi explicetur
natura nasi, qui est subiectum eius, a quo essentialiter dependet. Ideo non
potest perfecte diffiniri simum sicut nec album absque reiteratione. Licet 30
ergo res habens albedinem, quod dicitur esse diffinitio albi, et nasus
cavus, quod dicitur esse diffinitio simi, non sint perfecte diffinitiones,
quia non perfecte exprimunt quiditates suorum diffinibilium, tamen sunt
perfecte descriptiones, in quantum perfecte exprimunt quid per nomen
importatur. 35
accidentale substantiale] substantiale accidentale Pv suas diffinitiones inv.

Pv ponitur mg. Pv possit] posset M eum] et add. Pv qui] quoniam Pv
eius] suum Pv esse om. Pv sint] sunt M
Ad secundum dicitur quod Commentator loquitur de compositione

247rb Pv duorum non | facientium unam tertiam naturam. Unde album compo-
nitur ex subiecto et albedine, ex quibus non fit una tertia natura, ex quo
sunt nature diversorum predicamentorum; sicut neque ex naso et simi-
14va M tate, licet ex eis fiat unus | conceptus, quia album aut simum, licet non 5
dicat unam naturam, tamen dicit unum conceptum, aliter album non
esset ens per se, neque simum. Homo autem componitur ex duobus tam
secundum fidem quam secundum rationem, facientibus unam tertiam
naturam, quoniam humanitas, fluens a corpore et anima, que sunt par-
tes secundum fidem, aut ab animalitate et rationalitate, que sunt par- 10
tes secundum rationem, est tertia natura distincta a naturis componen-
tium.
quod diffinitio perfecta est sermo qui, cum completur, non rema-
nebit in eo aliquod ens in actu, de quo interrogatur per quid, cum 15
in eo sit data quiditas, que est inesse illius rei, et non est in eo ens
additum suo enti. Et ista est differentia enim inter diffinitiones sub-
stantiarum et diffinitiones accidentium.a
Ista est distinctio quam intendit Commentator, quod duplex est diffini-
tio, scilicet perfecta et imperfecta. Diffinitio perfecta est illa que expri- 20
mit totam essentiam diffiniti, cuius quelibet pars est de quiditate eius-
dem, et in ea non ponitur ens additum enti. Diffinitio autem imperfecta
est illa cui deficit aliqua istarum conditionum. Et in hoc differt diffini-
tio substantialis a diffinitione accidentium, quoniam diffinitio substan-
tie perfecta est, cum exprimat totam essentiam diffiniti et quelibet pars 25
eius sit de quiditate illius, et in ea non ponitur ens additum enti, sed
solum ens simpliciter, quod est substantia. Diffinitio autem accidentis
imperfecta est, primo quia non exprimit totam essentiam eius, sive acci-
dens diffiniatur in concreto sive in abstracto; secundo quia non queli-
bet pars eius est de quiditate diffiniti, et maxime quando diffinitur acci- 30
dens in abstracto: licet enim nasus sit de essentia simi, non tamen est
de essentia simitatis; tertio quia in qualibet tali diffinitione ponitur ens
additum enti, quia ponitur accidens quod dicitur ens per additamentum
propter attributionem quam habet ad substantiam, et ideo diffinitiones
nature] vere M notandum tertio inv. Pv
a Averroes, In Met., VII, t.c. 11, fol. 161LM.

122 pauli veneti
accidentium dicuntur dari per additamenta, non autem diffinitiones sub-

stantiarum.
Quoniam vero sunt h1029b22ssi.

Ista est secunda pars huius capituli, in qua Philosophus investigat
ea quorum sunt ipsum quod quid est, querendo utrum compositum ex 5
subiecto et accidente habeat quod quid erat esse, idest diffinitionem
exprimentem quiditatem rei. Sicut enim in predicamento substantie inve-
niuntur composita ex materia et forma, ita in predicamentis accidentium
inveniuntur composita ex subiecto et accidente. Nam accidentia non sunt
sine subiecto, ut probatum est primo capitulo huius tractatus, ideo quan- 10
titas et qualitas, relatio, actio, passio, ubi, quando, situs et habitus habent
subiecta sua, et non solum ista que sunt tantum unius predicamenti, sed
etiam que sunt diversorum predicamentorum, ut motus et mutatio.a Ideo,
quia homo et animal habent suas quiditates et suas diffinitiones quiditati-
vas, oportet videre utrum etiam homo albus habeat diffinitionem quidita- 15
tivam per quam exprimatur quiditativum esse hominis albi, quod videtur
esse homini albo esse, sicut hominis quiditativum esse est hominem esse
aut homini esse.
Et si dicitur quod homo est nomen simplex et homo albus est nomen
compositum, ideo homo habet diffinitionem quiditativam et non homo 20
albus, istud non potest impedire, quia imponatur homini albo hoc nomen
vestis, quod est nomen simplex, et queratur utrum habeat diffinitionem
exprimentem quiditativum esse vestis, quod est vesti esse. Et habetur
questio intenta.b
Lege litteram: Quoniam vero sunt et secundum alias cathegorias, idest 25
predicamenta accidentium, composita (est enim aliquod subiectum cuique,
ut qualitati et quantitati et quando et ubi et motui), perscrutandum est si
est ratio ipsius quod quid erat esse cuique ipsorum, et inest hiis ipsum quod
quid erat esse, ut albo homini quod quid erat esse albo homini. Sit itaque
nomen ipsius vestis; et queritur: quid est vesti esse?c 30
14vb M Notandum | primo, secundum Commentatorem, commento duo-
247va Pv decimo, quod substantie composite manifestum est ipsas habere
dari] diffiniri M aliquod] -quid Moerb. est] ergo add. Moerb. cuique]
cuiusque Moerb.
a lin. 913, cf. Albert, Met., Lib. VII, tr. I, c. 8, p. 328, 1821. b lin. 1924, cf. Aquinas, Exp.
Met., VII, lect. 3, n. 1317; Alexander of Alexandria, Exp. Met., VII, c. 4, fol. 192vb. c Aristotle,
Met., VII, 4, 1029b2228 (AL XXV 3.2, pp. 136137, lin. 128133).
diffinitiones et nomina equalia suis diffinitionibus; et predicantur de

individuis substantie secundum quid aut diffinitiones aut nomina
equalia illis diffinitionibus, scilicet illa que congregate significant
illud quod diffinitiones significant distincte.a
Unde homo et animal, que sunt substantie composite ex materia et forma, 5
habent diffinitiones, videlicet animal rationale et substantia animata et
sensitiva, et habent nomina equalia, idest convertibilia, cum illis diffini-
tionibus, quoniam ille conceptus homo et animal rationale convertun-
tur, et ille conceptus animal convertitur cum illa diffinitione substantia
animata sensitiva. Dicuntur autem nomina equalia diffinitionibus et con- 10
vertibilia cum illis, quia quicquid significatur per nomen significatur per
diffinitionem et econtra, licet non eodem modo, quia diffinitiones signifi-
cant distincte et separate ea que nomina diffinibilia significant coniunc-
tim et confuse: homo enim significat animal et rationale confuse, sed
animal rationale, quod est diffinitio hominis, significat eadem distincte. 15
Et quia nomina substantialia sunt equalia suis diffinitionibus, necesse est
quod ambo aut unum eorum predicetur in quid de substantiis primis, ut
cum queritur quid est hoc?, demonstrando Sortem, convenienter respon-
detur quod est homo aut animal rationale.
mento, quod si homo albus habeat diffinitionem, necesse est ut
habeat nomen equale ei in significatione, ita quod illud quod con-
gregatur de homine et albo sit unum in actu et duo in potentia; et
homo erit genus et albus differentia.b
Intendit Commentator quod, sicut diffinitum substantiale importat unum 25
in actu, scilicet speciem, et duo in potentia, scilicet genus et differentiam,
ita, si homo albus diffinitur, oportet illi assignare nomen equale in signifi-
catione, quod significet unum in actu et duo in potentia, que erunt partes
eius, scilicet homo ut genus et album ut differentia. Et istud videtur incon-
veniens, quia nullum accidens est differentia essentialis substantie. Et hoc 30
totum diciturinquit Commentatorut sciatur quod, si homo albus aut
vestis habet diffinitionem, oportet quod per aliquod istorum respondea-
tur ad questionem querentem quid est hoc?, sicut contingit in substantiis
et1 om. M diffinitione om. M eadem scr.] eandem MPv est om. Pv aut]
quod add. Pv notandum secundo inv. Pv congregatur M Iunt.] aggregatur Pv
ut2] tamquam Pv
a Averroes, In Met., VII, t.c. 12, fol. 162H. b Averroes, In Met., VII, t.c. 12, fol. 162IK.
124 pauli veneti
compositis, quarum diffinita et diffinitiones terminant questionem que-

rentem quid est hoc?, demonstrando individuum predicamenti substan-
tie.a Cum enim queritur quid est hoc?, demonstrando Sortem, responde-
tur quod est homo et quod est animal rationale. Ita, si vestis aut homo
albus habet diffinitionem, oportet utrumque istorum terminare questio- 5
nem querentem quid est hoc?.
At vero neque h1029b28ssi.
Istam questionem Philosophus dupliciter solvit. Et primo absolute dicit
accidens nullam habere diffinitionem, sed solam substantiam. Secundo
distinguit ipsum quod quid est, ostendens quod accidens aliquo modo 10
habet diffinitionem, ibi: Aut et diffinitio h1030a17ssi.
Prima solutio consistit in quatuor conclusionibus, quarum prima est
hec: nullum accidens diffinitur propria diffinitione. Secunda conclusio:
nullum compositum ex subiecto et accidente diffinitur vera diffinitione,
ibi: Albus itaque homo h1029b34ssi. Tertia conclusio: tantum substantia 15
vere et proprie diffinitur, ibi: Sed quidem hoc h1030a5ssi. Quarta conclu-
sio: sola species predicamenti substantie vere et proprie diffinitur, ibi: Sed
si primi h1030a10ssi.
Prima conclusio arguitur sic: nichil diffinitur propria diffinitione nisi
ens secundum se; sed nullum accidens est ens secundum se; ergo nullum 20
accidens diffinitur propria diffinitione. Tenet consequentia cum maiori,
ex quo diffinitio predicatur in primo modo dicendi per se. Minor autem
declaratur. Nam ens secundum se dicitur illud quod est ens sine addi-
tione; constat autem nullum accidens esse ens sine additione, ymmo
quodlibet accidens tam concretum quam abstractum est ens per additio- 25
nem; unde quodlibet accidens importat duo, videlicet subiectum et ipsum
accidens. Subiectum quidem, cum sit substantia, est ens sine additione,
247vb Pv eo quod in sua diffinitione nichil additur | ei quod sit extra essentiam
15ra M suam; ideo dicitur ens non additum enti, quia nichil presupponit | cui
addatur. Accidens vero, sive accipiatur in concreto sive in abstracto, est 30
ens per additionem, quia est ens necessario additum alteri, scilicet sub-
stantie. Cuius signum est quia non potest diffiniri nisi in sua diffinitione
ponatur subiectum: si enim homo est subiectum albi, non bene diffini-
tur album nisi in sua diffinitione ponatur homo aut ratio hominis albi. Et
habet] haberet M solam] solum Pv
a pp. 123, 29124, 3, cf. Alexander of Alexandria, Exp. Met., VII, c. 4, q. 1, fol. 192vb.
si vestis significat hominem album, necessario in sua diffinitione ponitur

homo.a
Lege litteram: At vero neque de numero secundum se dictorum est
aliquod accidens, nec hoc, videlicet abstractum, aut ipsum, scilicet con-
cretum, non secundum se dicitur, sed per additionem. Unde dupliciter, 5
et huius, scilicet accidentis, est aliquid hoc quidem ex additione, videlicet
accidens, illud vero non, scilicet subiectum est ens, eo quod ipsum addi dici-
tur accidenti quod diffinitur, ut si albo esse diffiniens fuerit aliquis, necesse
est quod dicat albi hominis rationem; hoc autem, scilicet accidens, est ens
eo quod alii ipsi inest diffinitioni, ut si significat vestis album hominem, dif- 10
finiet vestem ut album per subiectum suum.b
Notandum, secundum Commentatorem, commento duodecimo,
quod in diffinitione albedinis additur subiectum secundum quod
est accidens; in diffinitione vero hominis, qui accipitur in hoc ser-
mone tamquam genus, nichil additur extra ipsum, cum non existat 15
in subiecto, sicut albedo.c
Intendit Commentator quod albedo potest tripliciter considerari: in eo
quod albedo et in eo quod accidens et in eo quod accidens hominis. In
eo quod albedo, ut abstrahit a modo essendi in alio, sic non diffinitur
per subiectum suum. Sed in quantum accidens diffinitur per subiectum 20
suum, modo tamen indeterminato. In quantum vero est accidens homi-
nis, sic diffinitur per hominem tamquam per genus, dummodo diffiniatur
concretive et non abstractive, ut album est homo habens albedinem; in
abstracto vero diffiniretur per hominem in obliquo, se habentem ut dif-
ferentiam, sicut contingit de simitate que diffinitur per nasum in obliquo 25
casu. Homo autem, cum non sit accidens alicuius, non diffinitur per ali-
quod accidens neque per aliquod quod sit extra suam essentiam et quidi-
tatem.
Albus itaque homo h1029b34ssi.
Secunda conclusio: nullum compositum ex subiecto et accidente diffi- 30
nitur vera diffinitione.
scilicet] videlicet Pv ens] hoc quidem enim add. Moerb. addi] alii addi Moerb.
(alii om. P) alii] aliud Moerb. diffiniet] -at Moerb. quod3] est add. M
et om. M
a pp. 124, 23125, 2, cf. Alexander of Alexandria, Exp. Met., VII, c. 4, fol. 192vb193ra. b Ari-
stotle, Met., VII, 4, 1029b2834 (AL XXV 3.2, p. 137, lin. 133139). c Averroes, In Met., VII, t.c.
12, fol. 162M163A.
126 pauli veneti
Istam conclusionem Philosophus dupliciter probat. Et primo sic: vera

diffinitio non competit nisi habenti nomen simplex; nullum autem com-
positum ex subiecto et accidente habet nomen simplex, sed nomen com-
positum ex adiectivo et substantivo; ergo et cetera.
Prima pars inductive patet, quia non diffinitur animal rationale, sed 5
homo, nec diffinitur substantia animata sensitiva, sed animal. Si enim
diffiniretur complexum, cum non sit maior ratio de uno quam de alio,
quelibet diffinitio, cum sit quoddam complexum, diffiniretur, et sic esset
procedere in infinitum in diffinitionibus et in predicatis tam per se quam
per accidenscuius oppositum demonstratur primo Posteriorum.a Non 10
ergo diffinitur homo albus, sed aliquid loco eius, videlicet vestis. Licet
homo sit albus, non tamen debet diffiniri albus loco hominis albi, cum sit
pars eius, sed oportet accipere unum nomen simplex, continens implicite
illud compositum homo albus, sicut homo continet implicite animal
rationale. Neque hic asseritur quod vestis diffiniatur vera diffinitione, sed 15
quod si aliquid debet diffiniri loco hominis albi, videtur maxime quod
vestis.
Lege litteram: Albus itaque homo est quidem album, non tamen quod
quid erat esse, idest diffinitio quiditativa est assignanda albo esse, sed vesti
esse, ita quod non diffinitur esse quiditativum albi loco hominis albi, sed 20
esse quiditativum vestis.b
Secundo arguit sic Philosophus: nullum compositum ex subiecto et
accidente habet quod quid erat esse; ergo nullum tale habet veram dif-
finitionem. Tenet consequentia, quia omnis vera diffinitio indicat quod
15rb M quid erat esse diffiniti. Probatur antecedens. Nam omne | quod quid erat 25
esse est aliquid, cum omne quid alicuius sit aliquid eiusdem; si ergo tale
compositum habet quod quid erat esse, ergo habet aliquid quod quid erat
248ra Pv esse. Patet consequentia, quia nichil est quod quid erat | esse alicuius nisi
sit esse aliquid quod quid erat esse eiusdem.
Tunc sic: compositum ex subiecto et accidente habet aliquid quod quid 30
erat esse: aut ergo simpliciter aut non. Si non, ergo non habet quod quid
erat esse. Patet consequentia, quia omne quod quid erat esse est simpli-
citer aliquid quod quid erat esse. Si sic, contra: homo albus componitur
implicite] hoc aliquid est add. M videtur maxime inv. Pv quod om. Pv
a Aristotle, An. Post., I, 22, 83b784a10. b Aristotle, Met., VII, 4, 1029b341030a2 (AL XXV
3.2, p. 137, lin. 139141).
ex subiecto et accidente, quod predicatur de eo non in quid, sed in quale;

ergo homo albus non est simpliciter aliquid quod quid erat esse, sicut
non est quod est vere hoc aliquid, scilicet substantia, sed compositum ex
substantia et accidente.
Lege litteram: Ergo est quid erat esse aliquid ipsius compositi per 5
accidens, aut totaliter, idest simpliciter, aut non. Quod quidem enim quid
erat esse est id quod aliquid erat esse. Quando vero aliud de alio dicitur
accidentaliter, non est quod quidem aliquid hoc aliquid, ut albus homo non
est quod vere hoc aliquid.a
Notandum primo, secundum Commentatorem, commento duode- 10
cimo, quod necesse est ut illud quod significat hoc nomen vestis
diffiniatur duabus diffinitionibus, scilicet diffinitione hominis et dif-
finitione albedinis, cum hoc nomen vestis significat utrumque, sci-
licet hominem et albedinem Et necesse est ut diffinitio vestis com-
posita sit ex duabus diffinitionibus duorum , scilicet albedinis et 15
sui subiecti.b
Intendit Commentator sic arguere: illud quod significat tantum unum dif-
finitur tantum una diffinitione; ergo illud quod significat plura diffinitur
pluribus diffinitionibus; sed vestis significat plura, videlicet hominem et
albedinem; ergo diffinitur diffinitione hominis et diffinitione albedinis, ita 20
quod diffinitio vestis non tantum est una diffinitio, sed est diffinitio com-
posita ex duabus diffinitionibus.
mento, quod diffinitio que declarat quiditatem rei est rerum que
sunt totum et unum; sed homo albus non est totum et unum, sed est 25
aggregatum ex homine et albedine.c
Probat Commentator quod homo albus non potest diffiniri, quia diffinitio
declarat quiditatem eorum que sunt unum et totum. Constat autem quod
homo albus non est aliquod unum nec aliquod totum, sed est compositum
ex homine et albedine, que important quiditates diversorum predicamen- 30
torum, non potentes constituere aliquod unum totum, sicut nec aliquam
unam naturam.
Sed dubitatur, quia corpus mobile est diffinibile, alioquin non posset
haberi scientia de corpore mobili; constat autem quod corpus mobile est
accidente] albedine vel accidente M notandum secundo inv. Pv
t.c. 12, fol. 163AB. c Averroes, In Met., VII, t.c. 12, fol. 163CD.
128 pauli veneti
compositum ex subiecto et accidente. Respondetur quod corpus mobile

non diffinitur, sicut nec homo albus, quia, cum omnis diffinitio constet ex
genere et differentia, omne diffinibile debet esse in aliquo genere; constat
autem quod corpus mobile non est in aliquo uno genere, sed in pluribus
predicamentis. 5
Deinde, cum diffinitio detur causa innotescendi, necesse est diffini-
tionem indicare et exprimere quiditatem alicuius nature; constat autem
quod corpus et motus nullam naturam dicunt constitutam ex hiis; ideo
corpus mobile non diffinitur. Neque ex hoc tollitur scientia de corpore
mobili, quia non oportet quod corpus mobile diffiniatur, sed sufficit quod 10
diffiniatur motus aut corpus, et quod mobilitas competat per se corpori
sicut passio proprio subiecto.
Sed quidem hoc h1030a5ssi.
Tertia conclusio: tantum substantia vere et proprie diffinitur.
Ista conclusio sequitur ex precedentibus. Si enim aliquid vere et pro- 15
prie diffinitur, et non accidens vere et proprie diffinitur, per primam con-
clusionem,a neque compositum ex subiecto et accidente, per secundam
conclusionem,b necesse est quod subiectum sit illud quod vere et proprie
diffinitur. Constat autem subiectum esse substantiam, ut arguatur sic: de
non ente non est scientia neque diffinitio, ut habetur primo Posteriorum;c 20
15va M ergo illud de quo | habetur diffinitio est ens, et per consequens quod est
vere et proprie ens vere et proprie diffinitur; sed certum est quod substan-
tia est vere et proprie ens, cum sit ens primum simpliciter, ut probatum
fuit in primo capitulo huius tractatus; ergo substantia vere et proprie dif-
finitur. Accidens autem, cum non sit ens nisi quia entis, ut patuit in loco 25
allegato, et sit illud quod non vere est, ut habetur primo Phisicorum,d ideo
248rb Pv accidens non est vere | et proprie ens, et per consequens non vere neque
proprie diffinitur.e
Item, ens et unum convertuntur et dicunt eandem naturam, ut habetur
quarto huius;f ergo illud est vere et proprie ens quod est vere et proprie 30
unum; substantia autem est vere et proprie unum; ergo substantia est vere
et proprie ens. Accidens autem sumptum in abstracto vel in concreto, aut
compositum ex accidente et subiecto, non est vere et proprie unum, cum
dicat duas naturas, scilicet substantie et accidentis. Ideo nullum illorum
est vere inv. M dicat] dicit M
a Cf. supra, p. 124, 13. b Cf. supra, p. 124, 14. c Aristotle, An. Post., I, 2, 71b2526. d Aristotle,
Phys., I, 2, 185a27ff. e lin. 1528, cf. Alexander of Alexandria, Exp. Met., VII, c. 4, fol. 193rb.
f Aristotle, Met., IV, 2, 1003b2225.
est vere et proprie ens, et per consequens non vere et proprie diffinitur,
sed solum substantia.a
Lege litteram: Sed quidem hoc substantiis inest solum, videlicet diffi-
nitio et quod quid est.b
Ex predictis Aristoteles infert generaliter quid est illud cuius est quod 5
quid erat esse, dicens quod illius est quod quid erat esse cuius est dif-
finitio, ad ostendendum quod solius substantie est quod quid est, non
autem accidentis neque compositi ex subiecto et accidente, ex quo solius
substantie est vere et proprie diffinitio. Unde quid et aliquid sunt idem
realiter, sed differunt ratione: illud enim proprie est aliquid ut distinguitur 10
contra omne quod constituit determinatum gradum in latitudine entis;
illud autem est quid quod declarat naturam alicuius. Constat autem idem
esse quod constituit gradum in latitudine entis et quod declarat naturam
alicuius, sicut est homo vel animal, aut quiditas alicuius istorum. Acci-
dens autem non est proprie aliquid, neque compositum ex subiecto et 15
accidente, sicut nec est proprie ens; ergo non est proprie quid, et per
consequens nullius illorum est ipsum proprie quod quid est, sicut nec dif-
finitio.c
Lege litteram: Quare quid erat esse est quorumcumque ratio est diffi-
nitio.d 20
Et si obiceret aliquis, dicens quod inveniuntur alique rationes declaran-
tes quid importatur per nomen accidentis aut per nomen compositi per
accidens, ergo talia diffiniuntur, respondet Philosophus negando conse-
quentiam, quia non omnis ratio significans idem quod nomen est diffini-
tio, licet posset dici notificatio. Si enim omnis ratio significans idem quod 25
nomen esset diffinitio, omnes rationes essent termini et diffinitiones, quia
potest nomen imponi cuilibet rationi sicut hiis orationibus homo cur-
rens, homo sedens,e eo modo quo huic rationi arma gerens imponitur
hoc nomen armiger; non tamen iste rationes sunt diffinitiones, alioquin
Ylias, idest historia seu poema factum de bello Troiano, esset una diffi- 30
nitio, quia est una ratio exprimens illud bellumfquod est falsum, quia
sed quidem] si quidem le Moerb. (le om. SiF2) cuius est s.l. Pv obiceret aliquis
inv. Pv dici] vocari Pv
a pp. 128, 29129, 2, cf. Alexander of Alexandria, Exp. Met., VII, c. 4, fol. 193rbva. b Aristotle,
Met., VII, 4, 1030a56 (AL XXV 3.2, p. 137, lin. 145). c lin. 518, cf. Alexander of Alexandria,
Exp. Met., VII, c. 4, fol. 193va. d Aristotle, Met., VII, 4, 1030a67 (AL XXV 3.2, p. 137, lin. 145
146). e lin. 2228, cf. Aquinas, Exp. Met., VII, lect. 3, n. 1325. f lin. 2831, cf. Alexander of
Alexandria, Exp. Met., VII, c. 4, f. 193vab; Aquinas, Exp. Met., VII, lect. 3, n. 1325.
130 pauli veneti
poema illud infinita milia continet actionum et passionum et qualitatum

et aliorum accidentium ad unam rem non reducibilium.a
Lege litteram: Diffinitio vero est non si nomen rationi idem significat
(omnes enim essent rationes termini, idest diffinitiones; erit enim nomen
quod cuilibet secundum rationem idem, quare et Ylias diffinitio erit; quod 5
non est dicendum).b
Notandum, secundum Commentatorem, commento decimotertio,
quod diffinitio non est omnis sermo significans illud quod significat
nomen rei, sed necesse est cum hoc quod sermo convenit nomini ut
significet predicabilia substantialia, per que constituitur.c 10
Ita quod hec consequentia non valet: hec oratio significat idem quod istud
nomen, ergo hec oratio est diffinitio istius nominis; sed ultra requiritur
quod quelibet pars illius orationis importet aliquod predicabile essentiale
per quod constituatur diffinitum stans sub significatione illius nominis.
Et dat exemplum Commentator,d dicens quod omnia metra belli 15
Troiani fere in idiomate grecorum habuerunt nomina propria, non
15vb M tamen erant diffinitiones, quia non exprimebant predicabilia essentialia |
alicuius importati per tale nomen simplex appropriatum alicui metro.
Sed si primi h1030a10ssi.
Quarta conclusio: sola species predicamenti substantie est illud quod 20
vere et proprie diffinitur.
Probatur ista conclusio ex tribus conditionibus vere diffinitionis, qua-
rum primae est quod predicetur de diffinito per se in primo modo, tam-
quam intrinsecum de intrinseco, et non per accidens, tamquam extrinse-
248va Pv cum de extrinseco, eo modo quo album predicatur de homine aut | colora- 25
tum de animali. Per istam conditionem excluduntur diffinitiones acciden-
tium a veris diffinitionibus, quia aliquid ponitur in diffinitione accidentis
quod non predicatur per se de accidente in primo modo nec tamquam
intrinsecum de intrinseco dicente essentiam eius, sed tamquam extrinse-
cum, separatum omnino ab essentia accidentis, videlicet subiectum. Cum 30
enim subiectum sit substantia, necesse est quod non sit de essentia acci-
dentis.
milia s.l. Pv significat] -et Moerb. (-et Si) secundum rationem] rationi Moerb.
significet Pv Iunt.] -at M
a pp. 129, 30130, 2, cf. Albert, Met., Lib., VII, tr. 1, c. 8, p. 329, 8588. b Aristotle, Met., VII,
4, 1030a79 (AL XXV 3.2, p. 137, lin. 146149). c Averroes, In Met., VII, t.c. 13, fol. 163G.
d Averroes, In Met., VII, t.c. 13, fol. 163H. e Cf. Alexander of Alexandria, Exp. Met., VII, c. 4,
fol. 193vb; Aquinas, Exp. Met., VII, lect. 3, n. 1325.

Lege litteram: Sed si primi modi illa diffinitio alicuius fuerit ipsa enim
vera diffinitio; talia vero sunt quecumque dicuntur non eo quod aliud de alio
dicitur tamquam extrinsecum illi.a
Secunda conditiob est quod illa diffinitio notificet diffinitum quod sit
de numero specierum alicuius generis. Propterea diffinitio que datur de 5
homo albo aut de alio composito ex subiecto et accidente, quod dicitur
ens per accidens, iuxta doctrinam Aristotelis, quinto huius,c non est vera
diffinitio, quia tale diffinitum non est in aliquo uno predicamento, sed in
multis. Etiam diffinitio que datur de generalissimo non est vera diffinitio,
quia nullum generalissimum est de numero specierum alicuius generis 10
vel predicamenti.
Lege litteram: Non erit ergo nulli non generis specierum existens quid
erat esse, idest diffinitio quiditativa, sed hiis solum inest, scilicet specie-
bus.d
Tertia conditioe est quod illa diffinitio non includat aliquid ut participa- 15
tum a diffinito suo, nec ut passio neque ut accidens eius. Ideo ignitum non
ingreditur diffinitionem ferri veram, quia non predicatur de ferro secun-
dum essentiam, sed solum secundum participationem; risibile etiam non
ingreditur veram diffinitionem hominis, nec simitas veram diffinitionem
nasi, quia risibilitas est propria passio hominis et simitas nasi. Non ite- 20
rum ingreditur veram diffinitionem cigni albedo, neque veram diffinitio-
nem corvi ingreditur nigredo, quia albedo est accidens commune cigni et
nigredo corvi.
Lege litteram: Hec namque videntur non secundum participationem
dici et passionem nec ut accidens.f 25
Hiis conditionibus premissis vere diffinitionis, Aristoteles intendit
talem rationem: illud vere et proprie diffinitur cui competit diffinitio
habens nominatas conditiones; sed sola species predicamenti substan-
tie habet predictas conditiones; ergo sola species predicamenti substantie
vere et proprie diffinitur. 30
dicitur] dicatur Moerb. notificet] notificat M ergo] igitur Moerb. includat]

includit M diffinito suo inv. Pv et Pv Moerb.] nec M
a Aristotle, Met., VII, 4, 1030a1011 (AL XXV 3.2, p. 137, lin. 149151). b Cf. Alexander of
Alexandria, Exp. Met., VII, c. 4, fol. 193vb194ra. c Aristotle, Met., V, 7, 1017a822. d Aristotle,
Met., VII, 4, 1030a1113 (AL XXV 3.2, p. 137, lin. 151152). e Cf. Aquinas, Exp. Met., VII, lect.
3, n. 1328; Alexander of Alexandria, Exp. Met., VII, c. 4, fol. 194rb. f Aristotle, Met., VII, 4,
1030a1314 (AL XXV 3.2, p. 137, lin. 152153).
132 pauli veneti
Tenet consequentia cum maiori. Minor vero declaratur, eo quod dif-

finitio hominis vel animalis predicatur de illo in primo modo tamquam
de eo quod est species alicuius generis, non includens passionem neque
accidens animalis aut hominis, neque aliquid aliud participatum ab illo.
Omnia autem alia, si diffiniuntur, deficiunt in aliqua istarum conditio- 5
num, ut inductive liquet secundum quod ostensum est. Hec ergo non
habent proprie diffinitionem neque vere quod quid est, sed habent qua-
sdam rationes convertibiles aut equales nominibus, que sunt quedam
notificationes quibus cognoscitur minus notum per magis notum. Et hoc
dupliciter, scilicet complexe vel incomplexe. Complexe quidem quando 10
scitur quid importatur nomine philosophi per hoc quod est amator
sapientie; incomplexe vero quando cognoscitur quid importatur nomine
philosophie per hoc quod est sapientia.a Nam amator sapientie quam-
dam compositionem dicit, sapientia vero importat simplicitatem.
Dicendo ergo philosophia est sapientia, predicatum inest subiecto inhe- 15
rentia simplici; et dicendo philosophus est amator sapientie, predicatum
inest subiecto inherentia complexa; et utrobique predicatur magis notum
16ra M de minus noto, tamquam | ratio indicans quod importatur per subiectum,
non tamquam diffinitio neque quod quid erat esse illius subiecti.b
Lege litteram: Sed ratio quidem erit diffinitio cuiuslibet et aliorum a 20
specie predicamenti substantie quid significat, si est nomen, quia hoc huic
inest inherentia simplicis predicati, aut pro sermone simplici certior sermo
complexus; diffinitio vero non erit nec quod quid erat esse.c
Notandum primo, secundum Commentatorem, commento decimo-
tertio, quod nomina istorum, scilicet accidentium, non significant 25
essentiam eorum, idest substantiarum, prima significatione, sed
248vb Pv significant mediantibus illis accidentibus, | et ideo illi sermones non
debent esse diffinitiones.d
Hic probat Commentator quod substantie non possunt diffiniri per acci-
dentia, quia diffiniens aliquid debet illud significare primaria significa- 30
tione et non secundaria, mediante aliquo alio; sed accidentia significant
substantias non primaria, sed secundaria significatione; ergo accidentia
vero declaratur] autem est clara Pv secundaria] significatione add. Pv
a lin. 1013, cf. Aquinas, Exp. Met., VII, lect. 3, nn. 132930. b lin. 1319, cf. Alexander of
Alexandria, Exp. Met., VII, c. 4, fol. 193vb194ra; Aquinas, Exp. Met., VII, lect. 3, nn. 1329
1330. c Aristotle, Met., VII, 4, 1030a1417 (AL XXV 3.2, p. 137, lin. 153156). d Averroes, In
Met., VII, t.c. 13, fol. 163I.
non possunt diffinire substantias. Maior patet inductive. Nam animal et

rationale, quia significant hominem primaria significatione, non medi-
ante aliquo alio, ideo vere diffiniunt ipsum. Minor autem declaratur. Nam
accidens, cum non sit ens nisi quia entis, significat essentiam accidentis
primaria significatione et essentiam substantie secundaria significatione, 5
ideo significat substantiam mediante accidente.a
mento, quod diffinitiones, que significant quiditates rerum, non
sunt alicuius formarum carentium genere, scilicet formarum qua-
rum subiectum est eis genus , quia subiecta accidentium sunt alia 10
a naturis eorum, et ideo non sunt genera istorum.b
Hic probat Commentator quod accidentia non possunt diffiniri, quia
nulla forma potest diffiniri si caret genere; sed accidentia carent genere;
ergo et cetera. Tenet consequentia cum maiori, quia omnis diffinitio datur
per genus et differentiam sui diffiniti. Minor declaratur, quia accidentia, 15
et si habent genus predicans, non tamen habent genus diffiniens. Illud
enim quod ponitur loco generis est subiectum accidentium, quod quidem
est aliud a naturis accidentium.c Constat autem quod genus debet esse
de natura sue speciei, cum sit pars speciei et predicetur de illa essentiali-
ter et in quid. Si enim diffinitur simus, dicitur quod est nasus cavus, ubi 20
ponitur nasus loco generis, qui est subiectum simitatis. Et licet hoc sit
verum de accidente concreto, quod subiectum eius ponitur loco generis,
non tamen est verum de accidente abstracto, quia diffiniendo simitatem
dicimus quod est cavitas nasi, ubi iam diffinitur per proprium genus sui
predicamenti, sed per differentiam que est subiectum eius et alterius pre- 25
dicamenti. Quia ergo tam genus quam differentia debent esse eiusdem
predicamenti cum suo diffinito, et cum diffinitur accidens concretum,
genus est alterius predicamenti, cum vero diffinitur accidens abstractum,
differentia iterum est alterius predicamenti, ideo accidens neque in con-
creto neque in abstracto proprie diffinitur. 30
quod forme substantiales solummodo habent genus, scilicet sub-
iectum ex natura illarum, quia estimatur quod non invenitur per
notandum secundo inv. Pv diffiniti] et add. Pv notandum tertio inv. Pv

estimatur] existimatur Iunt.
a pp. 132, 29133, 6, cf. Alexander of Alexandria, Exp. Met., VII, c. 4, fol. 194ra. b Averroes,
In Met., VII, t.c. 13, fol. 163K. c lin. 1218, cf. Alexander of Alexandria, Exp. Met., VII, c. 4,
fol. 194ra.
134 pauli veneti
communicantiam cum aliis, sicut accidentia, neque sunt passiones

in aliis , et universaliter non sunt de natura accidentium, quorum
esse est in alio.a
Hic probat Commentator quod species predicamenti substantie vere dif-
finiuntur, quia illud vere diffinitur cuius genus predicans est genus diffi- 5
niens, et non habet communicantiam cum alio, nec est in alio, sicut passio
vel accidens. Constat autem species predicamenti substantie has habere
diffinitionis conditiones, ut inductive liquet. Et intendit Commentator
per communicantiam participationem, sicut habetur in littera. Unde,
secundum Commentatorem, quedam sunt species aliquorum predica- 10
mentorum, sicut accidentium, que communicant nature alterius predi-
camenti, ita quod sunt entia per additionem; et tales species dicuntur
secundum participationem, quia participant aliis et non possunt diffiniri
16rb M sine illis; et tales non habent | diffinitiones neque quod quid est proprie.
Alie sunt species que non dicuntur secundum participationem nec secun- 15
dum communicationem, sicut species substantie, que in suis diffinitioni-
bus non communicant aliis predicamentis; et talium proprie est diffinitio
et ipsum quod quid est.b
Ex predictis sequitur quod ad hoc quod aliquid proprie diffiniatur tria
requiruntur ex parte ipsius diffiniti. 20
Primo, ut ipsum diffinitum dicat rem unius predicamenti. Et ideo com-
positum ex subiecto et accidente, ut homo albus, non diffinitur proprie,
quia dicit res diversorum predicamentorum.
Secundo requiritur quod diffinitum constituatur in esse per sua prin-
cipia essentialia et non per aliquod extraneum ab essentia sua. Et ideo 25
accidens per se sumptum non diffinitur, quia non constituitur in esse per
249ra Pv essentiam suam, sed per subiectum, quod est extra eius naturam, | non
obstante quod ipsum accidens dicat rem unius predicamenti.
Tertio requiritur quod dicat unam naturam compositam ex partibus
essentialibus. Et inde est quod, licet differentia in genere substantie dicat 30
rem unius predicamenti et unam naturam, tamen, quia dicit illa per
modum partis formalis, et non per modum totius, ideo non diffinitur. Sola
ergo species predicamenti substantie proprie diffinitur, quia in ea omnes
predicte diffinitionis conditiones reperiuntur.
reperiuntur] inveniuntur Pv
a Averroes, In Met., VII, t.c. 13, fol. 163KL. b lin. 418, cf. Alexander of Alexandria, Exp.
Met., VII, c. 4, fol. 194rab.
Hiis tribus requisitis ex parte diffiniti correspondent tria alia ex parte

diffinientium, que tanguntur in littera.
Primum est quod diffiniens non sit participative, sed essentialiter. Ideo
ignis non potest poni in diffinitione ferri, quia non predicatur de illo nisi
secundum participationem, dicendo ferrum est ignitum. 5
Secundum est ut non predicetur ut passio. Ideo color non ponitur in
diffinitione superficiei.
Tertium est quod non predicetur ut accidens. Et inde est quod accidens
commune non intrat diffinitionem sui subiecti.
Quia ergo illa que predicantur de specie primo modo dicendi per se non 10
predicantur de ipsa secundum participationem nec secundum passionem
nec secundum accidens, sed essentialiter, ideo per talia debet dari diffi-
nitio. Sola ergo species predicamenti substantie diffinitur per proprium
genus et per propriam differentiam, que de ipsa per se et essentialiter pre-
dicantur. 15
Dicendum ergo quod duplex est diffinitio, scilicet proprie dicta, que
sola principia essentialia diffiniti includit. Et talis diffinitio est solius spe-
ciei predicamenti substantie, licet ad talem diffinitionem pauci attin-
gant, eo quod differentie essentiales sunt nobis ignote, ut dicit Boethius.a
Alia est diffinitio communiter sumpta, que est descriptio velut dicit 20
Commentatorbratio maioris declarationis, sive sumatur ratio decla-
rativa pro nomine uno, ut amor sapientie pro philosophia, sive nomen
notius pro ignotiori, ut sapientia pro philosophia. Et huiusmodi diffini-
tio potest esse aliorum a substantia.
Circa predicta dubitatur, ostendendo quod illa que pertinent ad quod 25
quid est non predicantur per se in primo modo de eo cuius sunt. Et primo
sic: predicatio denominativa extranea est a predicatione per se primi
modi, ex hoc: enim dictum est prius quod materia non est quid, nec quale,
nec quantum essentialiter, quia non predicatur de eis nec econverso nisi
denominative; constat autem quod tam forma quam materia pertinent 30
ad quod quid est rei, nec predicantur de re nisi denominative; ergo et
cetera.
correspondent] respondent Pv diffinientium] diffinitionum vel diffinientium M

primum] prima M sit om. M principia essentialia inv. Pv
a Actually,this doctrine is more explicitly expounded by Averroes, In Met., VIII, t.c. 5,

fol. 212M213A. b Averroes, In Met., VII, t.c. 14, fol. 164D.
136 pauli veneti
Secundo, quando aliquid predicatur de alio non per se, si coniungatur

alteri, adhuc de toto non predicabitur per se. Si enim hoc sit per accidens,
album est animal, cuicumque coniungatur alterum extremorum, adhuc
totum erit per accidens, ut animal album est animal; sed genus non
predicatur per se de differentia, per Philosophum, tertio huius,a sed per 5
accidens; ergo, cum differentia includatur in specie, sequitur quod genus
non predicatur de specie per se, scilicet primo modo. Constat autem quod
genus pertinet ad quod quid est, cum sit pars diffinitionis.
Item, quecumque uni et eidem sunt eadem per se, illa inter se sunt
eadem per se, ut si esse album et esse leve sunt eadem per se cum 10
superficie, illa inter se sunt eadem per se, ut dictum est supra. Si ergo
16va M genus | et differentia, que pertinent ad quod quid est, predicantur de
specie per se, necesse est quod de seinvicem predicentur per sequod
est falsum.
Ad primum dicitur, secundum Commentatorem, in prologo Phisico- 15
rum,b quod species rerum naturalium habent duplices partes, scilicet
secundum fidem, que sunt materia et forma, et secundum ymaginatio-
nem, que sunt genus et differentia. Iste partes aliquo modo conveniunt
et aliquo modo differunt. Conveniunt quidem, quia omnes per se predi-
cantur de specie in primo modo. Differunt autem, quia partes secundum 20
ymaginationem predicantur in recto, partes autem secundum fidem pre-
dicantur in obliquo, ut homo est ex materia et forma aut ex corpore et
anima intellectiva: quelibet istarum est in primo modo dicendi per se,
sicut ille linea est ex punctis et triangulus est ex lineis, ut testatur Philo-
sophus, primo Posteriorum.c 25
Ad secundum dicitur quod ex illo autem non debet inferri quod genus
non per se de specie predicatur, sed quod non predicatur per se de compo-
sito ex specie et differentia, neque de composito ex genere et differentia,
249rb Pv ita quod quelibet istarum est per accidens: homo | rationalis est animal
et animal rationale est animal. Neque istud sequitur, quia regula illa est 30
intelligenda quando additum et illud cui fit additio non sunt essentiali-
ter idem. Constat autem quod homo et rationale sunt essentialiter idem,
ac etiam animal et rationale; neque differunt nisi ratione. Propterea talia
vocat Commentator partes secundum ymaginationem, idest secundum
rationem. 35
esse1 s.l. M, om. Pv ille] illa M
a Aristotle, Met., III, 3, 998b2426. b Averroes, In Phys., I, t.c. 5, fol. 8DE. c Aristotle, An.
Post., I, 4, 73a3437.
Et ad confirmationem dicitur quod, sicut non quecumque sunt eadem

uni tertio sunt eadem inter se, quia Sortes et Plato sunt idem homini et
non sunt idem inter se, homo et equus sunt eadem animali et non sunt
eadem inter se, ita non quecumque sunt eadem per se uni tertio sunt
per se eadem inter se, neque quecumque predicantur per se de uno ter- 5
tio invicem predicantur. Nec exemplum Aristotelis convincit, quia solum
intendit probare Philosophus quod quiditas albedinis non est quiditas
superficiei, quia tunc, per idem, quiditas levitatis esset quiditas superfi-
ciei; quo concesso, albedo et levitas essent quiditative idemquod est
falsum. Conceditur tamen quod genus et differentia sint quiditative idem 10
in predicatione identica, ad hunc intellectum, quod sunt realiter eadem
quiditas, ex quo tantum ratione differunt, ut dictum est. Quare et cetera.
Aut et definitio h1030a17ssi.

Ista est secunda pars huius capituli in qua, postquam Philosophus
dedit primam solutionem ad questionem querentem utrum composita ex 15
subiecto et accidente diffiniantur et habeant quod quid est, ostendendo
quod accidentia non proprie diffiniuntur, consequenter dat secundam
solutionem, per quam manifestat modum quo diffiniuntur accidentia et
in eis invenitur quod quid est, per quatuor conclusiones, quarum prima
est hec: in quolibet predicamento invenitur quod quid est. Secunda con- 20
clusio: non in quolibet predicamento invenitur simpliciter quod quid est,
ibi: Sed non simpliciter h1030a24ssi. Tertia conclusio: in substantia et
accidente modo analogo invenitur quod quid est, ibi: Oportet quidem igi-
tur h1030a27ssi. Quarta conclusio: diffinitio est in substantia simpliciter
et primo, in accidente vero secundum quid et ex consequenti, ibi: Illud 25
autem palam h1030b4ssi.
Primam conclusionem Philosophus dupliciter probat. Et primo sic:
essentia et quiditas invicem convertuntur, ergo etiam esse et quod quid
est convertuntur. Tenet consequentia, quia, sicut se habet abstractum
ad abstractum, ita concretum ad concretum, per regulam a coniugatis. 30
Tunc sic: esse et quod quid est invicem convertuntur; ergo in quocumque
invenitur esse, in eodem invenitur quod quid est; sed in quolibet predica-
mento invenitur esse; ergo in quolibet predicamento invenitur quod quid
est.a Tenet consequentia cum maiori. Et minor est evidens, quia, sicut ens,
predicatione scr.] suppositione MPv istaqua om. Pv eodem] eo M
a lin. 2734, cf. Alexander of Alexandria, Exp. Met., VII, c. 4, fol. 194vab.
138 pauli veneti
ita esse significat substantiam et quantitatem et qualitatem et alia predi-

camenta, licet non eodem modo, quia primo significat substantiam et ex
consequenti predicamenta accidentium, ita quod quod quid est signifi-
cat omnia predicamenta, videlicet quantitatem, qualitatem et huiusmodi,
sed diversimode: nam significat simpliciter et primo substantiam, predi- 5
camenta vero accidentium significat non primo, sed ex consequenti. Ut
arguitur sic: sicut se habet esse ad decem predicamenta, ita se habet quod
16vb M quid est, ex quo invicem convertuntur; sed esse inequaliter | significat
decem predicamenta, quia prius substantiam quam predicamenta acci-
dentium; ergo quod quid est etiam inequaliter significat decem predica- 10
menta, videlicet primo substantiam et ex consequenti alia predicamenta.
Lege litteram: Aut dicitur ad questionem tactam quod et diffinitio
sicut et quod quid hesti multipliciter dicitur? Et enim quod quid est uno
quidem modo significat substantiam et hoc aliquid, alio vero quodcumque
predicamentorum, quantitatem, qualitatem et alia quecumque. Sicut enim 15
et le est, idest ly esse, existit in omnibus, sed non similiter sed huic quidem
primum, illis vero consequenter, ita et quod quid est simpliciter quidem
substantie, alio vero modo aliis.a
Secundo arguit Philosophus hic sic: in omni natura est quod quid est,
per quam respondetur ad questionem querentem quid est hoc?; sed in 20
quolibet predicamento est aliqua natura per quam convenienter respon-
detur ad questionem querentem quid est hoc?; ergo in quolibet predica-
mento est quod quid est. Tenet consequentia cum maiori. Et minor patet
inductive, quoniam in predicamento substantie queritur quid est hoc?,
demonstrando Sortem vel Platonem, et respondetur quod homo et ani- 25
249va Pv mal; in predicamento quantitatis queritur | quid est hoc?, demonstrando
lineam vel superficiem, et respondetur quantitas; in predicamento quali-
tatis etiam queritur quid est hoc?, demonstrando albedinem vel colorem,
et convenienter respondetur qualitas; et sic de aliis suo modo; unde in
quolibet predicamento inveniuntur genera, species et individua. Constat 30
autem omne genus esse quid sue speciei, et quamlibet speciem esse quid
sui individui.b
quod2 om. Pv predicamenta] predicata vel predicamenta M vero om. M

decem predicamenta inv. Pv decem predicamenta inv. Pv est1 suppl. ex Moerb.
quecumque] alia add. Pv (quecumque talia Moerb.) in om. Moerb. (in P) alio]
aliquo Moerb. (alio P) sedhoc mg. Pv
a Aristotle, Met., VII, 4, 1030a1723 (AL XXV 3.2, pp. 137138, lin. 157163). b lin. 1932, cf.
Alexander of Alexandria, Exp. Met., VII, c. 4, fol. 194vb; Aquinas, Exp. Met., VII, lect. 4, n.
1332.
Lege litteram: Et enim qualitatem dicemus utique quid est, quare et

qualitas eorum que quid est quidem.a
Notandum, secundum Commentatorem, commento decimo quarto,
quod quiditas in substantia invenitur alio modo ab eo quod inveni-
tur in aliis predicamentis , et ideo talis est dispositio diffinitionum 5
que significant has duas quiditates. Nam proportio diffinitionis ad
diffinitionem debet esse sicut proportio quiditatis ad quiditatem.b
Prima propositio quam intendit Commentator est hec: in quolibet pre-
dicamento est quiditas. Probatur. In quolibet predicamento est essen-
tia, ergo in quolibet predicamento est quiditas. Patet consequentia, quia 10
essentia et quiditas invicem convertuntur, sicut esse et quod quid est:
idem enim quod vocatur essentia in quantum est principium formale rei,
dicitur quiditas in quantum est declarativum sui ipsius apud intellectum.
Eadem enim humanitas est essentia et quiditas: essentia quidem in quan-
tum est principium formale hominis, quiditas vero in quantum certificat 15
dubitationem de natura hominis. Dubitans enim querit quid est hoc?, cui
questioni respondetur per essentiam rei, et si non in abstracto, tamen in
concreto. Quia ergo respondetur ad questionem factam per quid, ideo
vocatur quiditas. Et hoc intendit Philosophus, primo Topicorum,c dicens
quod in quolibet predicamento contingit reperire quid.d 20
Secunda propositio: quiditas alio modo invenitur in substantia et alio
modo in aliis predicamentis. Probatur. Eo modo invenitur quiditas in
substantia et in aliis predicamentis quomodo invenitur essentia, ex quo
essentia et quiditas dicunt eandem realitatem, licet diversis rationibus;
sed essentia alio modo invenitur in substantia et in aliis predicamentis, 25
quoniam in substantia invenitur primo, in aliis autem predicamentis
invenitur ex consequenti; ita etiam quiditas primo invenitur in substantia,
deinde in aliis predicamentis.
Ex hiis duabus propositionibus concludit Commentator quod in quo-
libet predicamento inveniuntur diffinitiones, sed non eodem modo, quo- 30
niam in quacumque natura invenitur quiditas in eadem invenitur diffi-
nitio, ex quo diffinitio est oratio indicans quiditatem rei; sed in quoli-
bet predicamento inveniuntur quiditates generum et specierum, ideo in
alioinvenitur mg. Pv quod] quo Iunt. hoc] ita Pv alio modo] aliter et
alio modo M
t.c. 14, fol. 164FG. c Aristotle, Top., I, 9, 103b20ff. d lin. 820, cf. Alexander of Alexandria,
Exp. Met., VII, c. 4, fol. 194vab.
140 pauli veneti
quolibet predicamento sunt diffinitiones, sed non eodem modo, quia

talis est proportio diffinitionum invicem qualis est proportio quiditatum;
sed quiditates non sunt eodem modo in omnibus predicamentis, quia
primo sunt in substantia et ex consequenti in aliis predicamentis; ergo
etiam diffinitiones non sunt consimiliter in omnibus predicamentis, sed 5
secundum prius et posterius, ita quod primo sunt in substantia, posterius
autem in aliis predicamentis.
17ra M Dubitatur: cum in omni predicamento inveniatur quid ratione gene-
rum et specierum, propter quid magis exemplificavit Philosophus de qua-
litate quam de aliis predicamentis? 10
Respondet Commentator,a dicens quod est propter affinitatem quam
habet quale, quod est denominativum qualitatis, cum ipso quid. Existi-
matur enim quale significare substantiam et quid quando interrogatur
in speciebus, qualitatem vero quando interrogatur in individuis. Unde ad
interrogationem factam per quale, aliquando respondetur per substan- 15
tiam rei, ut qualis est homo?, respondetur rationalis. Duplex est ergo
qualitas, videlicet substantialis et accidentalis. Qualitas substantialis inve-
nitur primo et per se in generibus et speciebus predicamenti substantie
et ex consequenti in individuis eiusdem predicamenti; qualitas acciden-
talis invenitur primo in individuis eiusdem predicamenti et consequen- 20
ter in generibus et speciebus.b Ideo questio qualis, quando interrogat
de substantia, proprie interrogat de speciebus, iuxta illud Aristotelis in
Predicamentis:c Substantia secunda significat quale quid; quando vero
interrogat de accidente, proprie interrogat de individuis, secundum illud
249vb Pv Porphyrii:d Accidens primo inest individuis, | deinde speciebus. 25
Potest tamen dici quod ideo Aristoteles non exemplificavit de substan-
tia, quia hoc est notum de se. De aliis autem predicamentis non exem-
plificavit nisi in qualitate, quia quod quid est minus videtur in qualitate
quam in altero predicamento, quoniam proprium interrogativum predi-
camenti qualitatis est questio quale est? et non questio quid est hoc?. Si 30
ergo questio quid est? invenitur in predicamento qualitatis, a fortiori et
in quolibet alio predicamento. Unde, primo Topicorum,e dicit Philosophus
quod quale dicit quid et qualitatem significat.
sunt] sint M aliis] ceteris Pv de s.l. Pv
a Averroes, In Met., VII, t.c. 14, fol. 164HI. b lin. 821, cf. Alexander of Alexandria, Exp.
Met., VII, c. 4, q. 5, fol. 195ra. c Aristotle, Cat., 5, 3b1316. d Porphyry, Isag., c. De his
communibus quae assunt generi et speciei et differentiae et proprio et accidenti (AL I 67, p.
21, 1518). e Aristotle, Top., I, 9, 103b3133.
Sed non simpliciter h1030a24ssi.

Secunda conclusio: non in quolibet predicamento invenitur simpliciter
quod quid est.
Probatur. Esse et quod quid est convertuntur; ergo in quolibet predi-
camento taliter invenitur quod quid est qualiter invenitur esse; sed non 5
in quolibet predicamento invenitur esse simpliciter; ergo non in quoli-
bet predicamento invenitur simpliciter quod quid est. Minor patet, quo-
niam tantum in predicamento substantie invenitur esse simpliciter, in
aliis autem predicamentis invenitur esse secundum quid, quemadmodum
et ens, ut est ostensum in primo capitulo huius tractatus. Unde, sicut 10
quidam logice loquentes de non ente dicunt quod privatio non est sim-
pliciter non ens, sed est non ens hoc, ita quantitatem, qualitatem et alia
predicamenta non vocamus entia simpliciter, sed entia hec.a Debemus
ergo dicere quod quiditas hominis vel animalis est quiditas simpliciter,
quiditas autem coloris aut albedinis est quiditas secundum quid et non 15
simpliciter, videlicet huius vel illius, sic quod quiditas coloris est albedi-
nis, et quiditas albedinis huius albedinis, et quiditas quantitatis continue
est linee vel superficiei, quiditas autem quantitatis discrete est binarii vel
ternarii.
Lege litteram: Sed non simpliciter invenitur quod quid est in quolibet 20
predicamento, sed sicut de non ente logice dicunt quidam esse non ens,
non simpliciter sed esse non ens, sic ita nos dicimus et qualitatem et alia
predicamenta.b
Notandum, secundum Commentatorem, commento decimoquarto,
quod nomen diffinitionis in eis, videlicet accidentibus, non dicitur 25
modo simplici, sed diffinitio est in eis secundum quod dictum est
in diffinitione privationis, scilicet quod est illud quod non est tale
nec tale, idest illud quod est non esse alicuius, non autem non esse
simpliciter.c
Unde quarto huius dicit Philosophusd quod privatio est negatio in subiecto 30
apto nato, ita quod non est negatio simpliciter, sicut nullam cymeram
esse, sed est negatio in determinato subiecto. Et ita est intelligendum illud
estsimpliciter] non est quiditas simpliciter sed quiditas secundum quid Pv

vel] aut Pv esse om. Pv est negatio mg. Pv : negatio s.l. M cymeram om.
M
a lin. 213, cf. Alexander of Alexandria, Exp. Met., VII, c. 4, fol. 195ra. b Aristotle, Met., VII, 4,
1030a2427 (AL XXV 3.2, p. 138, lin. 165167). c Averroes, In Met., VII, t.c. 14, fol. 164GH.
d Aristotle, Met., IV, 2, 1004a1416.
142 pauli veneti
primi Phisicorum:a Privatio est non ens, non quidem quod nullo modo
sit ens, sed quod est non ens huius vel illius forme. Ita accidentia non
sunt dicenda entia simpliciter, sed entia substantiarum. Tunc arguitur sic:
accidentia non sunt entia simpliciter; ergo quiditates accidentium non
sunt quiditates simpliciter. Constat autem quod diffinitiones non sunt 5
diffinitiones nisi ratione quiditatum quas important; ergo diffinitiones
17rb M accidentium | non sunt diffinitiones simpliciter, sed solum secundum
quid, videlicet illius vel istius, scilicet quantitatis vel qualitatis.
Sed dubitatur, quia Philosophus dicit, secundo Topicorum:b Simplici-
ter dico quod nullo addito dico; sed ista propositio est vera absque addita- 10
mento: accidens est ens; ergo accidens est ens simpliciter. Constat autem
quod in quolibet predicamento taliter invenitur quod quid est qualiter
invenitur ens; ergo in quolibet predicamento accidentium est simpliciter
quod quid est.
Respondetur quod ly simpliciter in hac propositione accidens est ens 15
simpliciter potest dupliciter intelligi: uno modo ut dicit simplicitatem
absolutam, et sic propositio est falsa, quia denotatur quod accidens est
ens absque attributione ad substantiam; alio modo ut dicit simplicitatem
inherentie predicati ad subiectum, et sic illa propositio est vera, quia nullo
addito hec propositio est concedenda accidens est ens. Non autem ita 20
hec est concedenda ethiops est albus, sed oportet addere secundum
dentes. Non ergo accipit eodem modo Philosophus simpliciter hic et
in libro Topicorum, quia hic accipit ut dicit simplicitatem absolutam,
ibi autem ut dicit simplicitatem inherentie predicati ad subiectum. Et
250ra Pv consequenter conceditur | quod in quolibet predicamento accidentium 25
invenitur quod quid est simpliciter, non quidem simplicitate absoluta,
excludente omnem causam et attributionem, sed simplicitate respectiva,
excludente omnem additionem ad alterum extremorum.c
Oportet quidem igitur h1030a27ssi.
Tertia conclusio: in substantia et accidente modo analogo invenitur 30
quod quid est.
Pro demonstratione huius conclusionis Philosophus premittit hoc
documentum, quod volentes cognoscere qualiter invenitur in predica-
mentis quod quid est, oportet diligenter considerare naturam cuiuscum-
que entis et conditionem uniuscuiusque predicamenti, non magis nec 35
nisi ratione mg. Pv simpliciter ante quod Pv
a Aristotle, Phys., I, 8, 191b1516. b Aristotle, Top., II, 11, 115b2930. c lin. 928, cf. Alexander
of Alexandria, Exp. Met., VII, c. 4, q. 6, fol. 195rb.

minus dantes alicui predicamento quam exigat natura sua. Unde non
debet natura entis omnino a predicamentis auferri, nec eis dari debet
secundum equalem gradum, sed secundum magis et minus, prius et pos-
terius, ita quod natura entis magis invenitur in substantia quam in aliis
predicamentis, et prius in predicamentis absolutis quam in respectivis.a 5
Lege litteram: Oportet quidem igitur intendere et quomodo oportet
dicere circa unumquodque predicamentorum, non tamen magis dando illi
de ente quam quomodo habet natura sua.b
Isto documento premisso, Philosophus probat dupliciter conclusio-
nem. Et primo sic: quandocumque aliquod unum commune invenitur 10
in duobus, non equaliter, sed in uno primo et simpliciter, in alio vero
ex consequenti et secundum quid, necesse est quod modo analogo inve-
niatur in eis; constat autem quod ipsum quod quid est tamquam unum
quoddam commune invenitur in substantia et accidente, in substantia
quidem simpliciter et primo, in accidente vero ex consequenti et secun- 15
dum quid; ergo in eis modo analogo invenitur. Patet consequentia cum
maiori, quia simpliciter et secundum quid, primum et secundum, impor-
tant magis et minus, prius et posterius, que sunt de ratione analogi. Minor
vero sequitur ex precedentibus conclusionibus. Unde, sicut ens dicitur
simpliciter de substantia et secundum quid de accidente, ita et quod 20
quid est simpliciter competit substantie et aliis predicamentis secundum
quid. Nam quod quid est substantie est simpliciter quod quid est, ipsius
autem accidentis quod quid est non est simpliciter tale, sed cum addi-
tamento, scilicet quantitatis vel qualitatis vel alterius predicamenti acci-
dentium. 25
Lege litteram: Quapropter et nunc, quoniam quod dicitur manifestum,
et quod quid erat esse similiter sicut ens inerit primum quidem et simpliciter
substantie, deinde aliis, quemadmodum quid est accidentisnon simplici-
ter quid erat esse sed qualitati aut quantitati quid erat esse.c
Secundo: taliter invenitur quod quid est in substantia et accidente 30
qualiter de illis dicitur ens; sed modo analogo de illis dicitur ens; ergo
modo analogo in illis invenitur quod quid est. Tenet consequentia cum
maiori, quia ens et quod quid est convertuntur sicut entitas et quiditas.
in2 om. Pv magis dando illi] dandi illi magis M unum om. M de2 dicitur]
in invenitur M
a pp.142, 30143, 5, cf. Alexander of Alexandria, Exp. Met., VII, c. 4, fol. 195va. b Aristotle,
Met., VII, 4, 1030a2728 (AL XXV 3.2, p. 138, lin. 168170). c Aristotle, Met., VII, 4, 1030a2832
(AL XXV 3.2, p. 138, lin. 170174).
144 pauli veneti
Minor declaratur. Nam ens dicitur de substantia et accidente, et non

equivoce nec univoce, ergo analogice.
Quod non equivoce patet, quia dictum equivoce importat diversas
17va M rationes, non habentes invicem attributionem neque | ad aliquod tertium,
sicut patet de cane et acuto. Constat autem ens significare substantiam 5
et accidens per attributionem unius ad alterum, quia accidens non est
ens nisi ratione substantie: quantitas enim ideo est ens, quia est mensura
substantie; et qualitas est ens quia est dispositio substantie; et relatio est
ens quia est habitudo substantie ad substantiam.
Etiam non dicitur ens univoce de substantia et accidente, quoniam 10
tunc diceretur de illis secundum eandem rationem communem omnibus
predicamentis, que non esset in aliquo predicamento, sed omnia predica-
menta reducerentur in rationem illam communem aggregantem omnia
predicamenta in unum predicamentumquod est impossibile, quia ens
non est genus, sed transcendens omnia genera, ut est probatum tertio 15
huius.a
Oportet ergo dicere quod ens predicatur de substantia et accidente
analogice, secundum additionem et diminutionem, et secundum magis
et minus. Dicimus enim quod non scibile est scibile secundum minus et
modo incompleto, quia de non scibili scitur quod ipsum non scitur; scibile 20
250rb Pv autem est scibile | secundum magis et modo completo. Ita debemus dicere
de substantia et accidente quod ens dicitur de substantia secundum magis
et modo completo, de accidente autem secundum minus et modo incom-
pleto. Non est ergo rectum quod ens dicatur de eis equivoce tantum, diver-
sis rationibus, neque univoce secundum aliquam unam naturam, sed ana- 25
logice, per attributionem ad unum, scilicet ad substantiam.b
Lege litteram: Oportet autem aut equivoce hec dicere entia, videlicet
substantiam et accidens, aut addentes aut auferentes secundum magis et
minus, quemadmodum et quod non scibile scibile. Quoniam hoc quidem
rectum est: neque equivoce dicere neque eodem modo, scilicet univoce.c 30
Et confirmatur. Nam, sicut se habet medicinale ad vas et opus et cor-
pus, ita ens ad substantiam et accidens; sed medicinale non dicitur de vase
et opere et corpore equivoce neque univoce, sed analogice; ergo consi-
militer ens non dicitur de substantia et accidente equivoce neque uni-
minor] autem add. Pv autem] enim Moerb. dicere] esse add. Moerb. aut2]
et Moerb. (aut P) et3 scr.] ad MPv
a Aristotle,Met., III, 3, 998b2227. b pp. 143, 30144, 26, cf. Alexander of Alexandria, Exp.
Met., VII, c. 4, fol. 195vb196ra. c Aristotle, Met., VII, 4, 1030a3235 (AL XXV 3.2, p. 138,
lin. 174177).
voce, sed analogice. Prima pars patet a sufficienti similitudine, et secunda

declaratur. Primo quidem medicinale non dicitur de illis tribus equivoce,
quia, licet dicatur de illis diversis rationibus, tamen omnes ille rationes
habent respectum et attributionem ad unum: dicitur enim corpus medi-
cinale quia est subiectum medicine, et opus medicinale quia exercetur 5
per medicinam, ut purgatio; et vas etiam dicitur medicinale quia eo uti-
tur medicina, ut cristere. Non etiam dicitur univoce medicinale de hiis
tribus, quia non secundum eandem rationem, cum alia sit ratio propter
quam corpus egrotans est medicinale, et operatio medici est medicinalis,
et instrumentum medici est medicinale. Necesse ergo est quod analogice 10
dicatur de illis, scilicet per respectum ad medicinam.
Lege litteram: Sed quemadmodum medicinale eo quod ad idem qui-
dem et unum, scilicet medicinam, non idem autem et unum, idest secun-
dum eandem rationem, non tamen neque equivoce. Nichil enim medicati-
vum corpus et opus et vas dicitur nec equivoce nec secundum unum, sed ad 15
unum.a
Ex predictis Aristoteles infert quod non refert dicere predicamenta
accidentium non habere quod quid est simpliciter et eadem habere quod
quid est secundum quid. Dictum est enim in prima solutione quod acci-
dentia non habent quod quid est simpliciter, in secunda vero quod habent 20
quod quid est secundum quid, et utrumque verum est, sicut verum est
quod ethiops non est albus simpliciter, sed est albus secundum quid.
Quicumque ergo dicit accidentia non habere quod quid est, intelligendo
simpliciter, bene respondet, et iterum bene respondet dicendo ea habere
quod quid est, videlicet secundum quid. 25
Lege litteram: Hec quidem ergo que dicta sunt in ambabus solutioni-
bus quomodocumque quis velit dicere, differt nichil.b
Notandum, secundum Commentatorem, commento decimoquinto,
17vb M quod qui dicit accidentia habere diffinitiones, | dicit ea habere
magis quam habent, et qui dicit quod non dicit ea non habere id 30
quod debent habere. Et dixit hoc quia antiqui habebant in eis has
duas opiniones, et ipse induxit mediam, que est vera.c
enim] esse M est1] sit M est2] sit Pv videlicet om. M ergo] igitur Pv
Moerb. diffinitiones Pv Iunt.] diffinitionem M ea Pv Iunt.] eam M magis mg.
Pv] om. M ea Pv Iunt.] eam M
a Aristotle,
Met., VII, 4, 1030a35b3 (AL XXV 3.2, p. 138, lin. 177181). b Aristotle, Met., VII,
4, 1030b34 (AL XXV 3.2, p. 138, lin. 181182). c Averroes, In Met., VII, t.c. 15, fol. 165B.
146 pauli veneti
Tres ergo fuerunt opiniones secundum Commentatorem de diffinitio-

nibus accidentium.
Prima dixit quod accidentia simpliciter diffiniuntur. Et hec fuit super-
flua, quia dedit accidentibus plus quam habere debeant. Non enim debent
habere esse simpliciter, et hec opinio dedit eis esse simpliciter. 5
Secunda opinio dixit quod accidentia nullo modo diffiniuntur. Et hec
fuit diminuta, quia minus dedit accidentibus quam habere debeant, quo-
niam accidentia sunt aliquo modo entia. Hec autem opinio asseruit acci-
dentia non habere aliquod esse.
Tertia opinio fuit Aristotelis. Et hec fuit sufficiens, quia tenuit medium 10
et veritatem. Dixit enim quod accidentia aliquo modo diffiniuntur et
aliquo modo non diffiniuntur: diffiniuntur quidem secundum quid, sed
non simpliciter, sicut non sunt entia simpliciter, sed secundum quid.
Circa dicta dubitari solet utrum essentia accidentis sit absoluta ab
essentia substantie. Et arguitur quod sic, quia aliter cuiuslibet accidentis 15
essentia esset in habitudine ad substantiam et consequenter esset in
habitudine ad aliud, quod est proprium relativorum. Quo dato, sequitur
250va Pv quod non est nisi unum genus accidentium, | videlicet relatio, et quod
non potest cognosci aliquod accidens nisi cognoscatur substantia, sicut
non potest cognosci unum relativorum nisi cognoscatur et reliquum, 20
iuxta illud Philosophi in Predicamentis:a Si quis diffinite cognoverit unum
relativorum, diffinite noscet et reliquum.
Dicendum quod essentiam accidentis esse absolutam ab esse substan-
tie potest intelligi dupliciter. Uno modo quod essentia accidentis non est
essentia substantie, eo modo quo dicimus patrem esse absolutum a filio, 25
quia pater non est filius. Et iste intellectus est verus, ex quo essentia sub-
stantie est essentia simpliciter et essentia accidentis est essentia secun-
dum quid. Alio modo quod essentia accidentis non habet habitudinem ad
essentiam substantie, sicut nec essentia substantie habet habitudinem ad
essentiam accidentis. Et iste intellectus est falsus. 30
Et cum arguitur ex hoc omnia accidentia pertinere ad predicamentum
relationis, negatur consequentia, quia habitudo ad subiectum non facit
relationem, sed habitudo ad terminum. Non enim scientia est de predi-
enim s.l. Pv asseruit] asserit M esse] genus M medium] nichil Pv

cognoverit relativorum] cognoscit correlativorum Pv noscet] novit Pv
intelligi dupliciter inv. Pv accidentis substantie] substantie accidentis M
dicimus] diceremus Pv relationis s.l. Pv
a Aristotle, Cat., 7, 8a3537; b1315.

camento relationis propter respectum quem habet ad animam scientem,

sed propter respectum quem habet ad scibile. Et ad hoc quod accidens
intelligatur sine subiecto sufficit essentiam accidentis absolutam esse ab
essentia substantie primo modo. Licet enim accidens habeat necessa-
riam habitudinem ad substantiam, non tamen semper movet intellectum 5
cum illa habitudine, quia posterior est quam sit ipsum accidens. Accidens
tamen intellectione completa non potest intelligi sine substantia, sicut
nec complete diffiniri nec significari potest sine subiecto.
Illud autem palam h1030b4ssi.
Quarta conclusio: diffinitio est in substantia simpliciter et primo, in 10
accidente vero secundum quid et ex consequenti.
Probatur. Eo modo invenitur diffinitio in substantia et accidente quo-
modo invenitur in eis quod quid est; sed in substantia invenitur quod
quid est simpliciter et primo, in accidente vero secundum quid et ex con-
sequenti; ergo et cetera. Tenet consequentia cum qualibet parte antece- 15
dentis ex probatione precedentium conclusionum, ita quod substantia et
accidens aliquo modo conveniunt in quantum cuilibet eorum competit
diffinitio, differunt autem in quantum substantia diffinitur simpliciter et
primo, accidens autem ex consequenti et secundum quid.
Lege litteram: Illud autem palam quia que primo et simpliciter diffini- 20
tio et quod quid erat esse substantiarum est. Et non solum substantiarum
est diffinitio, sed et aliorum similiter est, verumptamen non primo.a
Et si aliquis instaret quod, sicut datur oratio indicans quid importatur
18ra M per nomen substantie, ita datur oratio | indicans quid per nomen acciden-
tis importatur, ergo sicut in substantia, ita in accidente invenitur diffini- 25
tio simpliciter et primo, respondet Philosophus negando consequentiam,
dicens quod non omne illud quod est idem rationi significate per nomen
est diffinitio simpliciter et primo, sed ultra requiruntur due conditiones.
Quarum prima est quod quelibet pars diffinitionis per se dicatur de dif-
finito in primo modo, sic quod identificetur diffinito. Constat autem hoc 30
inveniri in diffinitione substantie, non autem in diffinitione accidentis, eo
quod subiectum positum in diffinitione accidentis non dicitur per se de
accidente.
complete om. Pv diffiniri significari] significari diffiniri Pv differunt]

disconveniunt Pv simpliciter Pv Moerb.] principaliter M ita] et add. Pv in
om. M
148 pauli veneti
Lege litteram: Non enim est necesse, si hoc ponimus, huius diffinitio-
nem esse, scilicet primo et simpliciter, quod utique rationi idem significat
propter hoc sit diffinitio simpliciter, sed cuidam rationi, videlicet perti-
nenti ad primum modum.a
Secunda conditio est quod diffinitum sit unum per ipsam diffinitio- 5
nem, non quidem unum unitate continuitatis, quia sic Ylias, idest poema
de bello troiano, esset diffinitio simpliciter; nec unum unitate colligatio-
nis, quia tunc diffinitio domus, que datur per lapides et ligna, esset dif-
finitio simpliciter; sed debet esse unum unitate simpliciter dicta. Constat
autem quod, cum unum significet decem predicamenta, sicut ens, scilicet 10
substantiam, quantitatem, qualitatem et huiusmodi, tantum in substan-
tia est unitas simpliciter, sicut etiam entitas; ergo tantum in substantia est
diffinitio simpliciter.
Lege litteram: Hoc autem est diffinitio simpliciter, si unius fuerit diffi-
250vb Pv niti simpliciter, non eo quod continuum sicut Ylias aut | quecumque colliga- 15
tione, sed si quotiens dicitur unum. Unum vero dicitur sicut ens. Ens autem
hoc quidem hoc aliquid, aliud vero quantitatem, aliud vero qualitatem signi-
ficat.b
Ex predictis infert Philosophus quod alio modo diffinitur substantia et
accidens, et alio modo compositum ex substantia et accidente, quoniam 20
substantia diffinitur per se primo, ex quo in substantia reperitur ens
et quod quid est per se primo; accidens autem diffinitur per se non
primo, ex quo est per se unum ens post substantiam. Unum enim per se
dividitur in decem predicamenta, ut iam allegatum est ex quinto huius.c
Compositum vero ex substantia et accidente diffinitur per accidens. Nam 25
taliter diffinitur qualiter est ens; sed huiusmodi compositum est ens per
accidens; ergo per accidens diffinitur. Ita quod homo habet diffinitionem
per se primo et album per se non primo, sed homo albus habet tantum
per accidens diffinitionem.
Lege litteram: Quapropter erit albi hominis ratio et diffinitio, alio vero 30
modo et albi et substantie.d
Notandum, secundum Commentatorem, commento decimosexto,
quod cum hoc nomen ens significat hanc substantiam et quoddam
unum om. M
1030b812 (AL XXV 3.2, p. 138, lin. 187190). c Aristotle, Met., V, 6, 1016a24ff. d Aristotle,
Met., VII, 4, 1030b1213 (AL XXV 3.2, p. 138, lin. 191192).
hanc quantitatem et quoddam hanc qualitatem, manifestum est

quod non eadem intentione est eis omnibus [modis] diffinitio et
nomen , et ideo homo albus habebit nomen et diffinitionem, et
similiter unumquodque predicamentorum, sed diffinitio et nomen
est eis alio modo, et substantie alio modo.a 5
Istud commentum introductum est ut cognoscatur quod intentionis est
Aristotelis et Commentatoris quod non solum simplicia diffiniuntur, sed
etiam composita, sicut non solum simplicia sint entia, sed etiam compo-
sita.
Contra predicta arguitur. Et primo quod accidentia non per se diffi- 10
niuntur, quia illud non per se diffinitur cuius diffinitio non absolvitur ab
alio; sed diffinitio accidentis tam concreti quam abstracti non absolvitur
a substantia, ut dictum est; ergo et cetera. Deinde, quod non habet per se
quod quid est, non per se diffinitur, ex quo diffinitio est oratio significans
quid est esse rei; sed accidens non habet quod quid est per se, quia Ari- 15
stoteles, distinguens ens in decem predicamenta, semper ponit quid pro
substantia.
Secundo arguitur quod compositum ex subiecto et accidente per se
diffinitur, quia, sicut se habet pars ad partem, ita totum ad totum; sed
subiectum habet per se diffinitionem et accidens habet per se diffinitio- 20
nem; ergo et compositum habet per se diffinitionem.
18rb M Et confirmatur, quia vestis per se diffinitur, cum sit nomen simplex
alicuius predicamenti; sed vestis potest poni loco hominis albi; ergo etiam
homo albus per se diffinitur. Patet consequentia cum maiori. Minor vero
est Aristotelis in littera. 25
Ad primum dicitur quod solum probat accidens non diffiniri per se
primo. Et hoc est concessum. Non tamen negatur quin accidens consi-
deratum secundum suam essentiam, abstrahendo a modo essendi in alio,
possit diffiniri absque substantia, videlicet per suum genus et per suam
differentiam. Conceditur consequenter quod accidens non habet simpli- 30
citer et primo quod quid est, sed solum substantia; ideo Philosophus per
quid semper intelligit substantiam. Omne enim habet quod quid est,
quod potest movere intellectum; constat autem quod accidens tam con-
cretum quam abstractum potest movere intellectum.
modis secl. (om. Iunt.) oratio] ratio Pv intelligit substantiam inv. Pv

150 pauli veneti
Ad secundum negatur consequentia, quoniam tam subiectum quam

accidens est ens per se, sed totum compositum est ens per accidens; et
sicut est ens per accidens, ita diffinitur per accidens et habet quod quid
est per accidens. Nichil enim per se diffinitur nisi sit species alicuius
predicamenti. 5
Et ad confirmationem dicitur quod vestis significans vestem per se
diffinitur, quia sic est species predicamenti habitus. Sed significans homi-
nem album, non per se diffinitur, quia licet sit nomen simplex, non tamen
significat aliquid quod sit per se unum. Constat autem quod nichil per se
diffinitur nisi sit per se unum. Ergo et cetera. 10
251ra Pv Habet autem dubitationem h1030b14ssi.

Ista est tertia pars huius capituli in qua Philosophus removet duos
errores antiquorum. Quorum primus erat quod accidentium nullo modo
est diffinitio. Secundus fuit quod accidentium simpliciter est diffinitio
sicut substantie. Ideo Aristoteles movet et solvit hic duas questiones, qua- 15
rum prima est: utrum aliqua sit diffinitio danda sive dabilis ex additione.
Secunda: utrum generaliter [si] tam substantie quam accidentis diffini-
tum sit idem cum sua diffinitione, ibi: Est autem et alia h1030b28ssi.
Prima questio dividitur in duas partes, in quarum prima Philosophus
probat partem affirmativam; in secunda vero eandem confirmat per con- 20
clusiones, ibi: Et non secundum accidens h1030b18ssi.
Quantum ad primum, opinio fuit quorundam nichil debere diffiniri nisi
per essentialia principia diffiniti, ita quod nulla diffinitio, secundum eos,
erat ex additione.
Contra quos arguit Philosophus, dicens quod, si quis hoc ponat, sequi- 25
tur quod accidentia non tantum simplicia sed copulata non diffiniuntur
ex additione. Sed hoc est falsum, quia simitas, que est accidens copula-
tum, necessario diffinitur ex additione, videlicet per suum genus, quod
est concavitas, et per suum subiectum, quod est nasus, dicendo simi-
tas est concavitas nasi. Tria enim hic occurrunt, scilicet subiectum et 30
due passiones eius. Quarum passionum una est accidens simplex, sci-
licet concavitas, et alia est accidens copulatum, scilicet simitas. Dicitur
autem concavitas accidens simplex quia non significat nasum nec aliud
substantie determinatum subiectum; simitas vero est accidens copula-
tum quia significat formam in determinato subiecto, videlicet simitatem 35
in naso. Et ex hoc dicitur simitas fieri ex duobus, scilicet ex concavitate
si secl.
et naso; cavitas vero non dicitur fieri sic ex duobus, ex quo non signifi-
cat aliquod determinatum subiectum, sed tantum formam, que est genus
simitatis.
Lege litteram: Habet autem dubitationem, si quis non dicit diffinitio-
nem esse ex additione rationem, cuius erat diffinitio ipsorum accidentium 5
non simplicium sed copulatorum; ex additione enim necesse palam facere.
Dico autem ut est nasus et concavitas, et simitas ex duobus dictum eo quod
hoc in hoc, idest concavitatem in naso significat simitas.a
Notandum, secundum Commentatorem, commento decimosep-
timo, quod necesse est ut diffinitio simitatis sit ex ambobus, quia 10
simitas significat nasum et concavitatem.b
Istud commentum est contra illos qui dicunt quod simitas non significat
18va M nasum, sed solum simitatem aut concavitatem, significatam | in habitu-
dine tamen ad nasum; simus autem est illud quod significat utrumque,
videlicet concavitatem et nasum. Hec enim differentia non est bene assi- 15
gnata, quia simitas et simus conveniunt et differunt. Conveniunt qui-
dem, quia utrumque significat concavitatem et nasum. Differunt autem,
quia simitas significat concavitatem in recto et nasum in obliquo,
dicendo simitas est concavitas nasi aut concavitas in naso; simus autem
econtra significat concavitatem in obliquo et nasum in recto, dicendo 20
simus est nasus habens concavitatem.
Et non secundum accidens h1030b18i.
Pro declaratione huius difficultatis Philosophus ponit duas conclusio-
nes.
Quarum prima est hec: accidentia copulata sunt accidentia per se et 25
non sunt accidentia per accidens.
Probatur. Accidentia per se sunt illa que concernunt aliquod determi-
natum subiectum et accidentia per accidens sunt illa que non concernunt
aliquod determinatum subiectum; ergo et cetera. Tenet consequentia
cum maiori ex determinatis primo Posteriorum c. Minor declaratur. Nam 30
251rb Pv albedo | est accidens per accidens ex eo quod non magis competit Sorti
quam Callie, nec magis homini quam equo: accidit enim tam Callie quam
homini quod sit albus, sicut accidit albo quod sit homo vel Callias; ymmo
erat] erit Moerb. hoc in hoc iter. Moerb. (hoc in hoc DaSi Je AjFUjXasec.m.NeSjZz )
simus] nasus M concavitatem post recto M concavitatem scr.] simitatem
MPv in obliquo] in recto et nasum in obliquo Pv, scr. et del. M dicendo] nasus
add. Pv Posteriorum] et add. Pv
a Aristotle, Met., VII, 5, 1030b1418 (AL XXV 3.2, p. 139, lin. 193197). b Averroes, In Met.,
VII, t.c. 17, fol. 166I. c Aristotle, An. Post., I, 4 passim.
152 pauli veneti
accidit Callie albo quod sit homo. Equalitas autem et inequalitas sunt
accidentia per se, quia concernunt aliquod determinatum subiectum, sci-
licet quantitatem, cuius sunt proprie passiones, secundum illud Aristo-
telis in Predicamentis:a Proprium est quantitati secundum eam equale
vel et cetera. Similiter, masculinum et femininum sunt accidentia per se, 5
quia concernunt determinatum subiectum, videlicet animal, cuius sunt
proprie passiones. Ita etiam dicatur de simitate et concavitate quod sunt
accidentia per se, ex quo concernunt determinatum subiectum: simitas
enim concernit nasum, cum sit propria passio eius, et concavitas superfi-
ciem depressam, cuius etiam dicitur esse passio. 10
Lege litteram: Et non secundum accidens nec concavitas nec simitas
passio nasi, sed secundum se; nec ut album Callie aut homini, quia Callias
albus cui accidit hominem esse, sed ut masculinum animali et quantitati
equale et omnia quecumque secundum se dicuntur existere hunc determi-
natum subiectum, cuius dicuntur proprie passiones.b 15
timo, quod concavitas non est passio existens in naso per acci-
dens, sed per se, et simitas non est in naso sicut albedo in Sorte vel
in homine: simitas enim est in naso de accidentibus essentialibus,
albedo autem in homine de accidentibus non essentialibus.c 20
Intendit distinguere accidens Commentator per essentiale et non essen-
tiale, sicut primo Philosophus per se et per accidens, ita quod accidens
essentiale est accidens per se et accidens non essentiale est accidens per
accidens. Nec est cura si accidens per se convertatur cum suo subiecto aut
non, quoniam omne tale vocat Commentator accidens essentiale. 25
Sed dubitatur, quia albedo est accidens per accidens in homine, ex eo
quod accidit albo esse hominem et accidit homini esse album, sed accidit
naso esse concavum sicut accidit concavo esse nasum; ergo concavitas
non est passio existens in subiecto vel naso per se, sed per accidens
cuius oppositum ponit Commentator et Philosophus. 30
Respondetur quod concavitas potest dupliciter considerari: uno modo
ut est quoddam genus predicamentale, et sic non est per se passio nasi,
sed per accidens; alio modo ut est quedam differentia constitutiva speciei,
et sic est passio per se existens in naso. Sicut enim differentia adveniens
vel] aut Pv primo om. Pv
a Aristotle, Cat., 6, 6a2627. b Aristotle, Met., VII, 5, 1030b1823 (AL XXV 3.2, p. 139, lin. 197
202). c Averroes, In Met., VII, t.c. 17, fol. 166I.

generi constituit speciem, ita concavitas adveniens naso constituit simi-

tatem. Et quia albedo adveniens homini nullam speciem constituit, ideo
albedo non est per se passio hominis, sed per accidens. Et tunc ad argu-
mentum accidit naso quod sit concavus et accidit concavo quod sit nasus;
18vb M ergo concavitas non est | per se passio nasi, conceditur consequentia et 5
consequens, accipiendo concavitatem ut genus; accipiendo autem ut dif-
ferentiam modo dicto, negatur consequentia.
Et si aliquis instaret, dicens: concavitas est passio per se nasi, ergo
concernit nasum, negatur consequentia, quia non est passio per se primo,
sed ex consequenti. Spericitas enim est per se passio celi et non concernit 10
celum; et habere tres angulos est per se passio ysochelis aut equilateri
et non concernit aliquod illorum; sed concavitas, quia est per se primo
passio superficiei depresse aut inverse, concernit illud subiectum. Ex
quo apparet quod, et si concavitas aut curvitas sit accidens copulatum
copulatione quantitatis, non tamen est accidens copulatum copulatione 15
substantie, sed simplex respectu illius.
Iterum, dubitatur contra illud Philosophi in littera: Callias albus cui
accidit esse hominem,a quia, licet homini accidat esse Calliam, non tamen
Callie accidit esse hominem. Licet enim inferius accidat suo superiori, non
tamen superius accidit suo inferiori, cum sit de essentia. 20
251va Pv Dicendum quod Philosophus per illam propositionem non intendit
quod Callie accidat esse hominem, sed quod Callie albo accidat esse
hominem, quia, et si homo est de essentia Callie, non tamen est de
essentia Callie in quantum albus, quia tunc omne album esset homo, sicut
etiam econtra coloratum non est de essentia Callie, sed est de essentia 25
Callie in quantum est albus. Sicut enim non potest concipi Callias quin
concipiatur homo, ita non potest intelligi Callias in quantum albus quin
intelligatur in quantum coloratus.b
Hec autem sunt h1030b23ssi.
Secunda conclusio: accidens per se necessario diffinitur per subiecta 30
sua aut per rationes illorum subiectorum.
Patet ista conclusio ex precedente, ex quo talia accidentia concer-
nunt subiecta sua. Sicut enim in diffinitione hominis ponitur animal aut
accipiendo1] capiendo M si s.l. Pv concavitas] cavitas M aut] et M

quin concipiatur] nisi concipitur M
a Aristotle,
Met., VII, 5, 1030b2021 (AL XXV 3.2, p. 139, lin. 199200). b lin. 2128, cf.
Alexander of Alexandria, Exp. Met., VII, c. 4, fol. 197rab; Aquinas, Exp. Met., VII, lect. 4, n.
1344.
154 pauli veneti
diffinitio animalis loco eius, dicendo homo est animal rationale aut
homo est substantia animata sensitiva rationalis, quia animal est de
primo intellectu eius, ita subiectum aut ratio subiecti debet ingredi dif-
finitionem accidentis per se, cum sit de primo intellectu eius, sive fue-
rit accidens convertibile sive non convertibile cum subiecto suo. Unde 5
in diffinitione risibilis ponitur homo aut loco hominis sua diffinitio, que
est animal rationale. Similiter, in diffinitione masculi ponitur animal,
dicendo masculum est animal potens generare, aut diffinitio animalis,
dicendo masculum est substantia animata sensitiva potens generare. Et
ita dicatur de simitate et feminino, quod in diffinitione simitatis neces- 10
sario ponitur nasus aut ratio nasi et in diffinitione feminini ponitur de
necessitate animal vel ratio animalis.
Lege litteram: Hec autem sunt accidentia per se in quibuscumque
existit aut ratio aut nomen cuius hec passio est per se, et non contingit
aliquod tale accidens sine suo subiecto diffiniri.a 15
timo, quod concavitas in naso est sicut masculinitas in animali-
bus et equalitas in quantitate; et nasus dividitur in simum et non
simum, sicut animal in masculinum et femininum, et quantum in
equale et inequale Et ista accidentia sunt in quorum diffinitione 20
accipitur aut diffinitio rei cuius est passio ista aut nomen eius.b
Sicut ergo quantum dividitur in suas passiones, que sunt equale et ine-
quale, et animal dividitur in suas passiones, que sunt masculinum et femi-
ninum, ita nasus dividitur in suas passiones, que sunt simum et insimum;
et sicut equale et inequale diffiniuntur per quantum, et masculinum et 25
femininum diffiniuntur per animal, ita simum et insimum diffiniuntur
19ra M per nasum. | Unde equale est quantum non excedens nec excessum;
inequale est quantum excedens vel excessum; masculinum est animal
potens active generare; femininum est animal potens passive generare;
simum est nasus cavus; insimum est nasus non cavus. 30
Consimiliter diffiniuntur abstracta istorum, ut equalitas est passio
quantitatis per quam unum quantum alterum non excedit neque ab eo
sensitiva] sensibilis M diffinitio] eius add. M passio ista] ipsa passio Iunt.
insimum] non simum M quantum] quantitatem M insimum] non simum M
insimum] non simum M
VII, t.c. 17, fol. 166K.
exceditur; inequalitas est passio quantitatis per quam unum quantum

alterum excedit vel ab eo exceditur; masculinitas est passio animalis per
quam potest active generare; femininitas est passio animalis per quam
potest passive generare; simitas est cavitas nasi et insimitas est inca-
vitas nasi. Neque idem est insimitas et aquilitas, quia aliquis est nasus 5
qui non est simus nec aquilus, et talis est insimus et inaquilus. Unde
sicut animal et quantitas non solum dividuntur per passiones nomina-
tas, sed etiam per alias, quia animal dividitur per dormiens et vigilans,
251vb Pv et quantitas per finitum et infinitum, ita na-|-sus non solum dividitur
per simum et insimum, sed etiam per aquilum et inaquilum: nam aqui- 10
litas et inaquilitas sunt passiones nasi sicut simitas et insimitas. Alia
namque translatioa loco cavi habet aquilum et est planior intellectus,
quoniam, sicut in diffinitione simi, ita et in diffinitione aquili ponitur
nasus.
Dubitatur, quia non videtur commentum verum, scilicet quod concavi- 15
tas est in naso sicut masculinitas in animali et equalitas in quantitate, quia
non invenitur masculinitas sine animali nec equalitas sine quantitate, sed
bene invenitur concavitas sine naso, scilicet in celo et in elementis.
Respondetur quod Commentator non accipit concavitatem in sua
communitate generica, sed tantum contracte et determinate, ut tantum 20
simitatem importat; ideo non dicit quod concavitas est in naso sicut
masculinitas est in animali, sed quod concavitas est in naso sicut mascu-
linitas in animalibus. Licet ergo non sit idem concavitas et simitas, tamen
idem est simitas et concavitas in naso.
Et ita potest responderi ad dubitationem alterius commenti, cum dicit 25
Commentator quod concavitas est passio existens in naso per se, quod
non accipit ibi concavitatem absolute, ut est genus simitatis, sed con-
tracte, ut supponit tantum pro curvitate nasi. Quare et cetera.
Quare horum h1030b24ssi.
Ex predictis Aristoteles infert duo correlaria. Quorum primum est 30
quod, licet accidentia simplicia possint diffiniri atque intelligi separa-
tim sine subiectis suis, non tamen accidentia copulata. Albedo enim et
nigredo et huiusmodi, ex quo non magis concernunt hominem quam
nasi] eiusdem Pv aquilitas] aquilinitas M aquilitas] aquilinitas M

inaquilitas] inaquilinitas M importat] importet Pv et om. Pv
a Aquinas, Exp. Met., VII, lect. 4, n. 1344 (cf. AL XXV 3.2, p. 139, lin. 198).
156 pauli veneti
equum, nec aliquod aliud determinatum subiectum, possunt diffiniri et

intelligi sine illo subiecto. Simitas autem, quia concernit nasum, non
potest diffiniri neque intelligi separatim absque naso; et femininitas aut
masculinitas, quia concernit animal, non potest separatim diffiniri nec
intelligi sine animali. Et ex hoc ista sunt accidentia copulata, quia dicunt 5
respectum copulationis et dependentie ad subiecta sua; albedo autem
et nigredo, caliditas, frigiditas et huiusmodi dicuntur accidentia simpli-
cia, quia se tantum intellectui ostendunt absque respectu ad sua sub-
iecta.
Lege litteram: [Quare horum] Ostendere separatim, sicut album sine 10
homine contingit sed non femininum sine animali.a
Secundum correlarium, quod accidentium copulatorum [diffinitio et
quod quid est] aut nullius est diffinitio aut, si est alicuius, oportet quod
aliter se habeat quam diffinitio substantie, quia diffinitio substantie datur
per essentialia diffiniti absque mixtura alicuius extrinseci; accidentia 15
19rb M autem copulata, ut dictum est, necessario diffiniuntur | per subiecta sua,
que non sunt essentialia illis, sed extra naturam eorum. Nasus enim et ani-
mal sunt substantie, sed simitas et masculinitas sunt accidentia de predi-
camento qualitatis, licet non eiusdem speciei modalis: nam masculinitas
et femininitas pertinent ad secundam speciem qualitatis, cum sint que- 20
dam naturales potentie; simitas autem et aquilinitas collocantur in quarta
specie propter figurationem quam important.
Lege litteram: Quare horum quod quid erat esse et diffinitio aut non est
alicuius aut, si est, aliter est quam substantie, ut diximus.b
Et ex hiis duobus correlariis habet Philosophus intentum suum, scilicet 25
quod aliqua accidentia necessario diffiniuntur ex additione.
Notandum, secundum Commentatorem, commento duodevice-
simo, quod accidentia sunt in substantiis duobus modis, aut acci-
dentaliter, ut albedo in homine, aut essentialiter, ut simitas in naso
et masculinitas in animalibus. Et primus modus istorum duorum 30
[modorum] non habet diffinitionem omnino. Diffinitio enim signifi-
252ra Pv cat res terminatas in diffinito Et qui considerat ad istum modum |
quare horum secl. diffinitioest secl. ut] quemadmodum Pv Moerb.

duodevicesimo] decimoseptimo M substantiis] subiectis Iunt. modorum
secl.
a Aristotle, Met., VII, 5, 1030b2426 (AL XXV 3.2, p. 139, lin. 203205). b Aristotle, Met., VII,
5, 1030b2628 (AL XXV 3.2, p. 139, lin. 205206).
accidentium et non ad alium negat accidentia habere diffinitionem

omnino; et qui considerat accidentia habere subiecta essentialia
affirmat ea habere diffinitiones simpliciter.a
Distinctio Commentatoris est ista, quod, sicut sunt duplicia accidentia,
scilicet per se et per accidens, essentialia et accidentalia, ita dupliciter 5
accidentia sunt in subiecto, videlicet essentialiter et accidentaliter. Illa
accidentia sunt essentialiter in subiecto que dant intelligere determina-
tum subiectum; et hec diffiniuntur per subiecta sua, ut simitas et mascu-
linitas. Illa autem accidentia sunt accidentaliter in subiecto que non dant
intelligere determinatum subiectum; et hec nullo modo diffiniuntur per 10
subiecta sua, ut albedo et nigredo.
Et ratio Commentatoris est ista: quia diffinitio significat res termina-
tas in ipso diffinito, aliter diffinitio non esset causa innotescendi diffini-
tum, cum infinitum secundum quod infinitum sit ignotum. Hec autem
accidentia per accidens non significant res terminatas propter subiecti 15
indeterminationem eo quod insunt composito ratione materie commu-
nis, que de se indeterminata est; ideo non possunt diffiniri per subiectum
suum. Accidentia autem per se aut insunt subiecto ratione forme, sicut
habere tres inest triangulo, aut ratione materie, sicut simitas et aquilitas
naso, ac etiam masculinitas et femininitas animali, que differunt tantum 20
differentiis materialibus, non materia communi, sed propria materia ani-
malis, que est materia spermatica.b
Isti duo modi accidentiumdicit Commentatorfecerunt duas opi-
niones.
Nam aliqui, considerantes tantum accidentia per accidens, que Phi- 25
losophus vocat accidentia simplicia, dixerunt quod accidentium nullo
modo est diffinitio eo quod accidentia, cum essentialiter dependeant a
suis subiectis, non possunt diffiniri sine illis. Constat autem quod albedo,
nigredo et huiusmodi, cum sint accidentia per accidens in suis subiec-
tis, non magis respiciunt unum subiectum quam aliud, et sic aut infinita 30
subiecta ponerentur aut nullum, quorum quodlibet est inconveniens.
Alii autem, considerantes solum accidentia per se, que Aristoteles
vocat accidentia copulata, dixerunt quod accidentium est simpliciter
accidentia habere M Iunt.] inv. Pv habere] habentia Iunt. ipso om. Pv sit
ex est post correct. Pv] est M se s.l. Pv materie] determinate add. Pv suis
subiectis inv. Pv
a Averroes, In Met., VII, t.c. 18, fol. 167CD. b lin. 422, cf. Alexander of Alexandria, Exp.
Met., VII, c. 4, fol. 196vb197ra.
158 pauli veneti
diffinitio eo quod talia respiciunt determinatum subiectum; ideo per

ipsum possunt diffiniri, ut simitas per nasum et masculinitas per animal.a
Sed iste opiniones deficiunt, quia, licet accidentia per accidens non
possint diffiniri per subiecta sua, tamen possunt diffiniri per suum genus
et differentiam, a priori vel a posteriori, ut albedo est color disgregati- 5
vus visus et nigredo est color congregativus visus. Omnis enim species
alicuius predicamenti, ex quo habet quod quid est, potest aliquo modo
diffiniri. Accidentia autem per se, et si diffiniuntur per subiectum suum,
non tamen simpliciter diffiniuntur, ex quo diffiniuntur ex additione sola.
Ergo substantia est illa que diffinitur simpliciter, cum non diffiniatur per 10
additamenta: Simpliciter enim dico quod sine additione dico, inquit Phi-
losophus, primo Topicorum.b
19va M Dubitatur contra commentum, | quia Philosophus dicit, primo capitulo
huius tractatus, quod substantia ideo est prior accidente diffinitione, quia
in cuiuslibet accidentis diffinitione ponitur substantia; ergo quodlibet 15
accidens, tam per se quam per accidens, diffinitur per subiectum suum
cuius oppositum dicit Commentator.
Respondetur quod accidentia per accidens in suo conceptu non dan-
tur intelligere aliquod subiectum neque proprium nec commune, et ex
hoc possunt intelligi et diffiniri sine subiecto. Tamen, quia talia acci- 20
dentia essentialiter dependent a subiecto communi, quod est corpus de
predicamento substantie, ideo non complete diffiniuntur nisi diffinian-
tur per huiusmodi subiectum et per modum essendi in alio. Et ex hoc
dicuntur accidentia communia, quia essentialiter dependent ab huiu-
smodi subiecto communi et non ab aliquo proprio, sicut de necessitate 25
hnoni concernunt proprium subiectum. Quando ergo Commentator dicit
252rb Pv quod talia accidentia non diffiniuntur per subiectum omnino, loquitur |
de subiecto proprio et determinato in quo sunt, ita quod albedo hominis
non diffinitur per hominem nec albedo equi per equum; potest tamen dif-
finiri per corpus sicut et color. Dicit Philosophus in libro De sensuc quod 30
color est extremitas perspicui in corpore terminato; ita dicetur de albe-
dine et nigredine quod albedo est color corporis disgregantis visum, et
nigredo est color corporis congregantis visum; quare et cetera.
talia] illa Pv non suppl. accidentia mg. Pv equi] diffinitur add. Pv

disgregantis visum] disgregativus visus vel disgregantis visum M
a pp. 157, 23158, 12, cf. Alexander of Alexandria, Exp. Met., VII, c. 4, fol. 197ra. b In truth,
Aristotle, Top., II, 11, 115b2930. c Aristotle, De sen., III, 3, 439b1112.
Est autem et alia h1030b28ssi.

Ista est secunda dubitatio, in qua Philosophus removet errorem dicen-
tium quod accidentium est diffinitio simpliciter sicut substantiarum. Et
quia in substantiis diffinitio et diffinitum sunt idem, videtur quod ita
debet esse in accidentibus. Et sicut est nugatio dicere animal homo, ita 5
videtur esse nugatio dicendo nasus simus, ex quo nasus se habet in diffi-
nitione simi sicut animal in diffinitione hominis, secundum hanc opinio-
nem. Querit ergo Philosophus utrum nasus simus et nasus concavus sint
idem aut non.
Circa quam questionem facit duo, quoniam primo arguit ad partes; 10
secundo vero respondet per conclusiones, ibi: Propter quod inconveniens
h1030b34ssi.
Primo ergo Philosophus arguit ad partem negativam questionis, quod
non est idem nasus simus et nasus concavus, quia, si idem est nasus simus
et nasus concavus, idem est simum et concavum. Patet consequentia, 15
quia, sicut se habet totum ad totum, ita pars ad partem. Si ergo nasus
simus est idem quod nasus concavus, et prima pars unius est eadem prime
parti alterius, ergo etiam secunda pars est eadem secunde parti.
Deinde, si diffinitur simum per nasum concavum, sicut homo per ani-
mal rationale, et idem est homo et [animal] rationale, ergo idem est 20
simum et concavum. Sed consequens est falsum, quia in aliquo inveni-
tur concavum, scilicet in crure, in quo non invenitur simum. Sicut enim
minus commune est homo quam animal, ex hoc hquodi non sunt omnino
idem homo et animal, quia aliquid est animal quod non est homo, ita com-
munius est concavum quam simum, cum omne simum sit concavum et 25
non econtra, propter quod non sunt penitus idem simum et concavum.
Lege litteram: Est autem et alia dubitatio de eis accidentibus copula-
tis. Si enim idem simus nasus et concavus nasus, idem erit simum et conca-
vum.a
In oppositum arguit Philosophus sic: si non est idem nasus simus et 30
nasus concavus, hoc videtur esse ex eo quia simum dat intelligere nasum,
concavum autem non concernit nasum, sed superficiem depressam, in
quocumque fuerit, sive in naso sive in brachio sive in crure. Sed ista ratio
videtur insufficiens, quia ex illa sequitur unum istorum: aut quod non
animal secl. minus commune] communius Pv quod suppl. simum scr.

(cfr. concavum lin. 32)] simus MPv
160 pauli veneti
contingit dicere nasum simum aut quod in dicendo nasum simum est
nugatio et eiusdem inutilis repetitio, quoniam loco diffiniti semper lici-
tum est ponere suam diffinitionem, ut loco hominis licet ponere animal
rationale; sed nasus concavus est diffinitio simi, ideo loco simi licitum
est ponere nasum concavum; et per consequens nasus simus idem est 5
quod nasus nasus concavus. Constat autem quod nasus nasus concavus
19vb M est oratio nugatoria et inutilis eiusdem repetitio; | ergo idem contingit de
hac oratione nasus simus. Verbi gratia, ista est oratio nugatoria animal
homo, quia, cum diffinitio hominis sit animal rationale, et semper loco
diffiniti licitum est ponere suam diffinitionem, ergo idem est dicere ani- 10
mal homo ac si diceretur animal animal rationale. Constat autem quod
hec oratio est nugatoria animal animal rationale, quia inutiliter repetitur
idem; ergo hec est oratio nugatoria animal homo. Ita in proposito videtur
quod hec sit oratio nugatoria nasus simus, sicut hec nasus nasus conca-
vus. 15
Lege litteram: Si vero non est idem, quia impossibile est dicere simum
sine re cuius est passio secundum se (et est simum concavitas in naso)
tamquam sua diffinitio, sequitur quod nasum simum dicere aut non est,
idest non contingit, aut bis idem erit dictum, nasus hnasusi concavus; nasus
enim simus: hnasus nasusi concavus erit.a 20
Notandum hic, secundum Commentatorem, commento duodevice-
252va Pv simo, quod dicere quod simitas est differentia | substantialis nasi
et quod illud quod congregatur de eis est unum, sicut est dispositio
in differentia cum genere, continget dicenti hoc ut nasus simus et
nasus concavus sint idem, quoniam concavitas erit differentia sub- 25
stantialis in naso Et ex hoc contingit quod crura concava et nasus
simus sunt idem, scilicet eiusdem speciei, quoniam subiectum con-
cavitatis est tamquam genus concavitatis et concavitas tamquam
differentia; et sic omnia in quibus reperitur concavitas sunt eius-
dem speciei, quemadmodum omnia, hque constituunturi per ean- 30
dem differentiam, sunt eiusdem speciei.b
Opinio ergo antiquorum dicentium quod accidentia [non] diffiniuntur
simpliciter sicut substantie fuit quod, sicut rationale est differentia essen-
nasus2 s.l. Pv nasus4 s.l. Pv nasus suppl.ex Moerb.] om. MPv (om. sed corr. P2)
nasus nasus suppl. ex Moerb. reperitur] invenitur Iunt. que constituuntur
suppl. ex Iunt. non secl.
VII, t.c. 18, fol. 167FG.
tialis animalis, ita concavitas est differentia substantialis nasi; et sicut

ex genere et differentia fit unum, cuius genus et differentia sunt partes
essentiales, ita ex concavitate et naso fit simum, cuius partes essentiales
sunt nasus et concavitas; et quod, sicut genus habet rationem materie et
differentia rationem forme in diffinitione substantie, ita in diffinitione 5
simi nasus se habet ut materia et genus, et concavitas sicut forma et
differentia.
Contra hanc opinionem arguit Commentator, inferens duo inconve-
nientia.
Primum, quod simum et concavum sunt convertibiliter idem. Quod 10
istud sit inconveniens, manifestum est, quia non omne concavum est
simum: crus enim est concavum et non est simum. Et quod illud sequitur,
ostenditur, quia generaliter differentia adveniens generi et constituens
speciem est convertibiliter idem cum specie, quia nulli competit nisi illi
speciei et econtra. Si ergo concavitas est differentia essentialis adveniens 15
naso et constituens simum, necesse est quod simum et concavum invicem
convertantur.
Secundum inconveniens est quod crura et nasus sunt eiusdem speciei,
quia omnia illa sunt eiusdem speciei quibus competit eadem differentia
specifica essentialis, ut inductive patet. Nam omnes homines sunt eius- 20
dem speciei, quia eis competit eadem differentia essentialis specifica, ita
quod omnia sunt eiusdem speciei in quibus invenitur rationalitas divi-
dens animal et constituens hominem; sed concavitas est differentia essen-
tialis dividens nasum et constituens simum, secundum hanc opinionem;
ergo in quibuscumque invenitur concavitas, illa sunt eiusdem speciei. 25
Constat autem quod in cruribus et in naso invenitur concavitas; ergo crura
et nasus sunt eiusdem speciei.
Propter quod inconveniens h1030b34ssi.
Postquam Philosophus obiecit ad utramque partem questionis, conse-
quenter per conclusiones destruit errorem antiquorum, dicentium quod 30
accidentium sicut substantiarum est diffinitio simpliciter.
Quarum prima est hec: impossibile est quod accidentium sit simpliciter
diffinitio. Patet, quia, dato opposito, sequitur quod contingit procedere in
infinitum in nasis. Quod hoc sequatur, declarat sanctus Thomas,a dicens
20ra M quod simus diffinitur per nasum concavum, et quia concavum | in naso 35
concavitas scr.] simitas MPv differentia] habet add. Pv genus] ut add. Pv

sanctus] beatus Pv
a Aquinas, Exp. Met., VII, lect. 5, n. 1349.

162 pauli veneti
non est aliud quam simum, ideo simus idem est quod nasus simus; et
quia loco diffiniti licitum est ponere diffinitionem, ideo nasus simus idem
est quod nasus nasus concavus; et quia iterum concavum in naso non est
aliud quam simum, ideo nasus nasus concavus est nasus nasus simus;
et quia iterum loco simi potest poni diffinitio sua, propterea nasus nasus 5
simus est nasus nasus nasus concavus, et sic in infinitum.
Iste modus probandi est dubius, quia possent dicere adversarii quod,
per idem, homo non diffinitur simpliciter per animal rationale, quia
aliter procederetur in infinitum, quia rationale in animali non est aliud
quam homo, ideo homo idem est quod animal homo; et quia loco homi- 10
nis licitum est ponere suam diffinitionem, ideo animal homo idem est
quod animal animal rationale; et quia rationale in animali non est aliud
quam homo, ideo animal animal rationale est idem quod animal animal
homo; et quia iterum loco hominis potest poni sua diffinitio, propterea
animal animal homo idem est quod animal animal animal rationale; et 15
sic procedendo ab homine ad rationale et econtra multiplicabitur animal
252vb Pv in infinitum, sicut in infinitum multi-|-plicatur nasus discurrendo a simo
ad concavum et econtra.
Et ideo Albertusa consequentiam Philosophi aliter declarat, dicens
quod, si simus diffinitur simpliciter per nasum concavum tamquam per 20
genus et per differentiam essentialem suam, ut illi dixerunt, necesse est
quod concavum iterum diffiniatur per nasum, quoniam concavum est
species accidentis, ergo diffinitur, et cum non inveniatur nisi in naso, cum
sit differentia essentialis eius, per eos, ergo diffinitur per nasum, dicendo
concavum est nasus depressus in medio; et cum iterum depressus in 25
medio sit species accidentis, ergo diffinitur et est differentia essentia-
lis nasi, per illos; ergo diffinitur per nasum, dicendo depressus in medio
est nasus curvus. Iterum, curvus, cum sit accidens, diffinitur per subiec-
tum suum et illud non est nisi nasus, si curvitas est differentia essentialis
nasi, per illos; ergo curvum iterum diffinitur per nasum. Et quoniam in 30
diffinitione curvi necessario ponitur aliud accidens, quod est differentia
essentialis nasi, iterum illud accidens diffinietur per curvum; et sic in infi-
nitum.
nasus2 s.l. Pv idem mg. Pv animal1 s.l. Pv animal1 s.l. Pv diffiniatur]

diffinitur M quoniam] quia Pv cum sit] ex quo est Pv ponitur] accipitur
Pv
a Albert, Met., Lib. VII, tr. 1, c. 10, p. 335, 2544.

Huic modo declarandi consequentiam Philosophi posset aliquis obvi-

are, dicens quod, sicut rationale diffiniens hominem tamquam differen-
tia essentialis non ultra diffinitur, ad tollendum processum in infinitum,
ita nec concavitas diffiniens nasum tamquam differentia essentialis non
ultra diffinitur. Et sic rationale, si diffinitur, non est differentia essentia- 5
lis divisiva animalis et constitutiva hominis, sed est quoddam commune
analogum ad illud rationale et ad rationale repertum in substantiis sepa-
ratis. Ita, si concavitas diffinitur, illa non est differentia essentialis nasi,
sed unum commune analogum ad illam concavitatem et ad alias repertas
in mixtis et in elementis. 10
Ideo aliter demonstratur illa consequentia Philosophi iuxta doctrinam
Commentatoris. Nam, sicut ista oratio est nugatoria animal homo, ita et
ista nasus simus, dato quod diffiniatur simus per nasum tamquam per
proprium genus et per concavitatem tamquam per differentiam essen-
tialem, ut illi dixerunt. Et sicut in hac oratione animal homo infinities 15
repeteretur animal, ita et in hac nasus simus infinities repetitur nasus.
Homo enim simpliciter et in actu significat animal; ergo per adventum
illius conceptus animal ad illum conceptum homo non tollitur signi-
ficatio hominis; et per consequens dicendo animal homo idem est ac
si diceretur animal animal homo; et cum iterum homo reservet suam 20
significationem et suum significatum adhuc significat animal, ut prius, et
sic dicere animal animal homo est dicere animal animal animal homo;
et sic in infinitum. Consimiliter dicatur de illa oratione nasus simus, quod
20rb M per illam infinities repetitur nasus, | ita quod tertius nasus inest secundo
per primum nasum et quartus tertio per primum et secundum, et sic in 25
infinitum.a
Lege litteram: Propter quod inconveniens est inesse talibus quod quid
erat esse, idest diffinitio simpliciter. Si autem non est inconveniens in
infinitum sunt nasi in hac ratione nasus simus; naso namque nasi simo
adhuc aliud inerit; ita quod nasus simus includit nasum nasi simum et 30
iste tertium nasum, ut sit aliquis nasus nasi nasi simus.b
essentialis] eius add. Pv commune analogum inv. M ad2 om. M in1 om. Pv
Commentatoris] Averroys Pv simus2 s.l. Pv per1] propriam differentiam sive
add. M : propriam differentiam scr. et. exp. Pv per2 om. M adhuc significat mg.
Pv animal5 om. Pv in infinitum Pv Moerb.] infiniti M hac] significatione
et add. M simo] si non Moerb. (simo Si)
a lin. 1126, cf. Alexander of Alexandria, Exp. Met., VII, 4, q. 6, fol. 199rbva. b Aristotle, Met.,
VII, 5, 1030b341031a1 (AL XXV 3.2, p. 139, lin. 212215).

164 pauli veneti
Notandum, secundum Commentatorem, commento duodevice-

simo, quod si profunditas esset substantia in naso, tunc hoc nomen
simitas consignificaret nasum in actu, et tunc esset dicere nasus
simus sicut dicitur nasus nasus Manifestum est ergo quod, si illud
haberet diffinitionem veram, contingeret ut nasus haberet nasum 5
et sic in infinitum, ita quod impossibile esset invenire nasum post-
quam non esset alius.a
Ecce quod Commentator declarat processum in infinitum in nasis, di-
cendo nasus simus, si concavitas est differentia essentialis nasi, quo-
niam quocumque naso capto, secundum proprium nomen, oportet alium 10
nasum capere secundum nomen simitatis, ex quo simitas, secundum
illos, componitur essentialiter ex naso et concavitate, sicut homo essen-
tialiter componitur ex animali et rationali. Et ad tollendum hoc incon-
253ra Pv veniens, necesse | est dicere quod accidentium non est vera diffinitio,
videlicet simpliciter et primo. 15
Sed dubitatur, inducendo eadem inconvenientia contra Philosophum
que ipse inducit contra antiquos, quia, et si non diffinitur simitas simpli-
citer sicut substantia, tamen diffinitur ex additione per subiectum suum.
Quero ergo utrum nasus simus sit idem quod nasus concavus aut non. Si
est idem, ergo simum et concavum sunt idemquod est falsum. Si non est 20
idem, hoc est ex eo quia simus significat nasum, quem non significat con-
cavum. Quo concesso, sequitur quod non contingit dicere nasum simum
aut quod est nugatio heti inutilis repetitio sui, et consequenter quod in tali
diffinitione idem infinities repetitur.
Tria ergo inconvenientia que Philosophus arguit contra illos, et contra 25
eum obiciuntur, scilicet quod simum et concavum convertuntur, et quod
illa oratio est nugatoria nasus simus, et quod infiniti nasi repetuntur in
illa oratione.
Respondet Commentator, dicens quod duplex est significatum diffi-
niti, videlicet in actu et in potentia. Significatum in actu est illud quod 30
est simpliciter de essentia sua; significatum in potentia est illud quod est
extra essentiam diffiniti. Verbi gratia, quia animal et rationale sunt de
essentia hominis simpliciter, ideo utrumque illorum hominis est signi-
ficatum in actu. Simitatis autem significatum in actu est concavitas, quia
contra Philosophum mg. Pv est1 om. M quem] quod M et suppl.

Philosophus arguit inv. M
a Averroes, In Met., VII, t.c. 18, fol. 167IK.

concavitas est de essentia simitatis; nasus autem est significatum in

potentia, quia non est de essentia simitatis, sed extra essentiam illius,
sicut generaliter substantia est extra essentiam accidentis. Non ergo in-
tendit Commentator per significatum in actu illud quod actualiter signi-
ficatur et per significatum in potentia illud quod non significatur et 5
potest significari; sed per significatum in actu intendit significatum com-
pletum et perfectum, et per significatum in potentia intendit significa-
tum incompletum et imperfectum. Simitas ergo complete et perfecte
concavitatem significat, incomplete autem et diminute significat nasum.
Et quia idem numero quod habet esse diminutum et incompletum potest 10
exire ad esse completum et perfectum, ideo idem nasus numero, quem
diminute significat simitas, absque additione significatur per eandem
cum additione acceptam, ita quod, dicendo nasi simitas aut nasus
simus, iam ly simitas aut ly simus complete significat nasum quem prius
incomplete significabat et diminute.a 15
Dicendum ergo ad argumentum quod nasus simus est idem quod nasus
concavus, et consequenter quod simitas et concavitas sunt idem, non qui-
dem convertibiliter, sed essentialiter, eo modo quo genus est idem cum
20va M sua specie. Homo enim et animal aliquo modo | sunt idem et aliquo modo
differunt: realiter quidem et essentialiter sunt idem, in quantum sunt una 20
res et animal est de essentia hominis, de quo in recto essentialiter pre-
dicatur; differunt autem ratione et modaliter, in quantum ratio hominis
est alia a ratione animalis et modus significandi hominis diversus est
a modo significandi animalis. Idem enim significatur ab utroque, sed
diversimode: nam homo significat humanitatem determinate et animal 25
indeterminate. Sicut ergo homo et animal sunt idem realiter et differunt
tamquam determinatum et indeterminatum, ita simum et concavum.
Simum enim simitatem determinate significat et concavum illud idem
indeterminate importat; determinatur autem cum dicitur nasus conca-
vus; ideo nasus concavus et nasus simus sunt idem convertibiliter. Neque 30
ex hoc sequitur quod partes sunt idem convertibiliter, quia homo risibi-
lis et animal risibile sunt convertibiliter idem, tamen prime partes non
convertuntur, scilicet homo et animal; ita nasus simus et nasus concavus
sunt convertibiliter idem, non tamen secunde partes invicem convertun-
253rb Pv tur. Et concesso | quod secunde partes sunt convertibiliter idem, debet 35
sed] est add. Pv
a pp. 164, 29165, 15, cf. Alexander of Alexandria, Exp. Met., VII, c. 4, q. 5, fol. 198vb.
166 pauli veneti
negari hec consequentia simum et concavum non invicem convertuntur,

ergo secunde partes non sunt convertibiliter idem, quia, et si non invi-
cem convertuntur simum et concavum absolute sumpta, tamen invicem
convertuntur ut sunt partes illorum totorum, quia simum et concavum in
naso convertuntur. 5
Item, conceditur quod simitas significat nasum, quem concavitas
non significat. Et ex hoc non sequitur quod hec sit nugatoria nasus simus,
neque repetitur idem, sed solum accipitur nasus explicite et complete,
quem simus sine additione implicite et incomplete significat.
Et cum arguitur quod dicere nasum simum est dicere nasum nasum 10
cavum, illud negatur. Neque licitum est ponere diffinitionem loco diffi-
niti, nisi quelibet pars diffinitionis actu significetur per diffinitum. Ideo
iste rationes sunt nugatorie homo rationalis, animal homo, quia loco
hominis licitum est ponere animal rationale; quo posito, tam homo
quam animal rationale bis repetitur. Hec autem orationes nasus simus 15
et homo risibilis non sunt nugatorie, nec idem repetitur bis, ex quo loco
simi non licet ponere suam diffinitionem, neque loco risibilis debet poni
sua diffinitio. Sicut enim simum significat nasum in potentia, ita risi-
bile significat hominem in potentia, cum non sit homo simpliciter de
essentia risibilis sicut nec nasus de essentia simi. Et quia illa oratio nasus 20
simus non est nugatoria neque in ea idem repetitur bis, ideo non contingit
procedere in infinitum in nasis. Ipsi autem antiqui concedere habuerunt
omnia inconvenientia adducta, quia volebant quod nasus et concavitas
essent simpliciter de essentia simi, sicut animal et rationale sunt de essen-
tia hominis, et consequenter habebant dicere quod simus actu significat 25
nasum, sicut animal actu significat hominem.
Contra Commentatorem arguitur. Nam omnis potentia est reducibilis
ad actum; sed, per eum, simus significat nasum in potentia; ergo potest
significare in actu, et per consequens nasus potest esse de essentia simi.
Constat autem quod, possibili posito in esse, nullum sequitur inconve- 30
niens; ergo non sequuntur inconvenientia data, concesso quod nasus sit
de essentia simi et quod simus significet nasum in actu.
Item, dicit Commentator, primo Phisicorum,a quod ideo in generatione
manet subiectum et non manet oppositum, quia subiectum est pars gene-
rati; sed quando musicum fit ex immusico, tunc homo est subiectum; ergo 35
implicitesignificat] et incomplete significat et implicite M essentia simi]

ratione simi et essentia eius M ideo om. Pv
a Averroes, In Phys., I, t.c. 59, fol. 35HI.

homo est pars musici. Quo concesso, sequitur quod nasus est pars simi
et consequenter quod est de essentia simi, quia, sicut musicus est homo
habens musicam, ita simus est nasus habens simitatem.
Ad primum dicitur quod potentia significandi nasum, reperta in simo,
reducitur ad actum per determinationem simi factum a naso, dicendo 5
20vb M nasus simus, | et consequenter conceditur quod simus in tali oratione
significat nasum in actu, non tamen ea actualitate de qua loquitur Com-
mentator, quia ipse intendit de actualitate intrinseca, et argumentum pro-
cedit de actualitate extrinseca. Simus ergo absque determinatione signi-
ficat nasum in potentia et, determinatum, significat nasum in actu, non 10
quidem actualitate intrinseca, cum non sit de essentia eius, sed actuali-
tate extrinseca, per quamdan additionem determinantis ad indetermina-
tum.
Ad secundum conceditur quod homo est pars musici et quod nasus est
pars simi, non tamen homo simpliciter est de essentia musici nec nasus 15
simpliciter est de essentia simi, sed solum secundum quid, quoniam esse
in potentia est esse secundum quid et esse in actu est esse simpliciter.
Constat autem quod homo concurrit ad constitutionem musici ut pars in
potentia et musica ut pars in actu. Nasus etiam est pars potentialis simi et
simitas est pars actualis, neque inconvenit quod substantia de essentia 20
253va Pv accidentis in concreto dicatur, sed in abstracto est inconveniens. | Et
ex hoc dicitur quod substantia est extra essentiam accidentis, animal
autem et rationale, quia in recto essentialiter predicantur de homine,
habent rationem forme respectu illius, ideo sunt simpliciter de essentia
illius, et precipue quia, sicut predicantur de homine in concreto, ita et de 25
humanitate in abstracto: vere enim dicitur quod humanitas est animalitas
et rationalitas, sicut quod homo est animal et rationalis; non autem vere
dicitur simitas est naseitas, sicut vere dicitur simus est nasus. Propter
quam causam dicitur nasus esse extra essentiam simi.
Dubitatur, quia animal et rationale ideo sunt simpliciter de essentia 30
hominis, quia de homine predicantur in primo modo dicendi per se; sed
nasus predicatur tam de simo quam de simitate in primo modo dicendi
per se; ergo nasus est simpliciter de essentia simi. Tenet consequentia
cum maiori. Minor vero est evidens, quia primus modus dicendi per se est
quando predicatur diffinitio vel pars eius, loquendo de diffinitione data 35
indeterminatum] indeterminatam M quod2 om. Pv simpliciter est inv.

Pv simpliciter est inv. Pv potentialis mg. Pv essentiam s.l. Pv primus
scr.] secundus MPv
168 pauli veneti
a priori. Neque valet si quis dicat quod Aristoteles, primo Posteriorum,a

intendit de diffinitione simpliciter et de predicatione in recto, quorum
nullum contingit de accidentibus, quia Philosophus ibidem exemplificat
in accidentibus, dicens quod linea est ex punctis et triangulus est ex lineis.
Respondetur quod non propter hoc animal et rationale sunt simplici- 5
ter de essentia hominis, quia predicantur de illo in primo modo dicendi
per se, sed quia in recto simpliciter predicantur de illo, videlicet tam in
abstracto quam in concreto, et sunt eiusdem predicamenti cum eo. Punc-
tus autem non predicatur de linea neque linea de triangulo neque nasus
de simitate in recto, sed solum in obliquo, dicendo simitas est in naso. 10
Palam itaque h1031a1ssi.
Secunda conclusio: solius substantie est diffinitio simpliciter.
Probatur. Aliquod ens simpliciter diffinitur et nullum accidens simpli-
citer diffinitur; ergo tantum substantia simpliciter diffinitur. Patet conse-
quentia, quia omne ens vel est substantia vel accidens. Maior tenet, quia, 15
si nullum ens simpliciter diffiniretur, etiam nullum ens diffiniretur secun-
dum quid, quia, sicut ens per accidens presupponit ens secundum se, ita
ens secundum quid presupponit ens simpliciter. Minor vero declaratur,
quoniam nichil simpliciter diffinitur quod diffinitur ex additione. Constat
autem omne accidens diffiniri ex additione, scilicet per subiectum suum, 20
quod est extra essentiam diffiniti: equalitas enim diffinitur per quantita-
tem et imparitas per numerum et femininitas per animal. Hec autem sunt
proprie passiones, ideo diffiniuntur per subiecta sua, alioquin non con-
cernerent illa, neque cum eisdem facerent proprias hpassionesi secundi
modi, contra doctrinam primi Posteriorum.b 25
Lege litteram: Palam itaque quia solius substantie est diffinitio simpli-
citer. Nam et si aliarum cathegoriarum, idest predicamentorum a predica-
mento substantie, est diffinitio, necesse est ex additione esse, ut qualitatis
21ra M et imparis; non enim sine numero diffinitur impar, neque | que est feminini
sine animali.c 30
Et si aliquis quereret que diffinitio nuncupanda est ex additione, re-
spondet Philosophus quod illa diffinitio est ex additione que, si esset sim-
pliciter diffinitio, contingeret idem bis dicere in oratione nugatoria, ut si
diffiniretur simus per nasum concavum simpliciter, ita quod nasus esset
Aristoteles] in add. Pv vel1 om. Pv passiones suppl. diffiniretur] diceretur

vel diffiniretur M
a Aristotle, An. Post., I, 4, 73a34ff. b Aristotle, An. Post., I, 4, 73a37b3. c Aristotle, Met., VII,
5, 1031a14 (AL XXV 3.2, p. 140, lin. 216219).

genus simi et concavitas differentia essentialis, indubie nasus bis dicere-

tur in hac oratione nasus simus: semel enim dicetur ratione sui et iterum
semel ratione simi, loco cuius licitum esset ponere diffinitionem simi,
eo modo quo supra ostensum est. Ex quo patet quod accidentium copu-
latorum non est diffinitio simpliciter, videlicet equalis, imparis, simi et 5
huiusmodi, ut crediderunt plures antiquorum, sed est diffinitio ex addi-
tione. Ex quo addendo subiectum diffinito non resultat oratio nugatoria
repetens idem bis. Unde, dicendo numerus impar aut quantum equale
aut animal femininum, non repetitur idem bis, sicut nec in hac oratione
nasus simus, ut supra demonstratum est. 10
Lege litteram: Ex additione vero dico in quibus accidit idem bis dicere,
sicut in hiis iam nominatis. Si vero hoc verum, non copulatorum erit diffini-
tio simpliciter, sicut nec repetitio eiusdem, ut numeri imparis.a
Notandum, secundum Commentatorem, commento undevicesimo,
quod si alia predicamenta habent diffinitionem, necesse est ut in 15
illis diffinitionibus sit additio supra naturam diffiniti , sicut diffi-
nitio quantitatis et imparis. Impar enim non diffinitur sine numero
nec numerus sine quantitate et ista sunt subiecta eorum: subiecta
enim eorum adduntur in diffinitionibus eorum.b
Istud commentum est dubium. Primo quidem, quia non videtur omnia 20
predicamenta accidentium diffiniri ex additione suorum subiectorum,
quia frustra diceret Philosophus quod accidentium quedam sunt sim-
plicia et quedam copulata. Quod enim accidentia copulata diffiniantur
necessario per subiecta sua, hoc est manifestum. De accidentibus autem
simplicibus non videtur verum, quia linea, superficies, albedo, nigredo et 25
huiusmodi non necessario diffiniuntur per subiecta sua. Et hoc manife-
stum de quantitate, cuius diffinitio est ista per Aristotelem, quinto huius:c
Quantum dicitur quod est divisibile in ea que insunt, quorum utrumque
aut singulum unum aliquid et hoc aliquid natum est esse. Constat autem
quod in hac diffinitione non ponitur subiectum quantitatis. 30
Secundo, videtur quod numerus, cum diffinitur per quantitatem, hnoni
diffiniatur per subiectum suum. Nam quantitas non est subiectum
numeri, ymmo forma, ex eo quod omne superius est forma sui inferioris,
copulata1] composita vel copulata M per Aristotelem mg. Pv natum s.l. M

non suppl. suum s.l. Pv
t.c. 19, fol. 168B. c Aristotle, Met., V, 13, 1020a69 (AL XXV 3.2, p. 110, lin. 517519).
170 pauli veneti
per Aristotelem, quinto huius et quinto Phisicorum.a Neque diffinitur per

quantitatem, sed per multitudinem et unitatem, cum dicitur numerus est
multitudo ex unitatibus aggregata.
Ad primum dicitur quod, cum diffinitio detur causa innotescendi, dif-
finitio rei debet declarare essentiam rei; et cum essentia accidentis con- 5
stituatur per subiectum suum, oportet omne accidens diffiniri per subiec-
tum suum; sed non eodem modo, quia accidentia copulata explicite dif-
finiuntur per subiectum suum, accidentia autem simplicia aliquando
implicite et aliquando explicite diffiniuntur per subiectum suum. Color
enim est accidens simplex et explicite diffinitur per subiectum suum, cum 10
dicitur color est extremitas perspicui in corpore terminato. In hac diffi-
nitione exprimitur triplex subiectum, scilicet propinquum, et est super-
ficies, cum dicitur extremitas; et remotum, cum dicitur in corpore ter-
minato, quod quidem corpus est de predicamento quantitatis; remotis-
simum autem subiectum est substantia demonstrata per perspicuum. 15
Sed albedo et nigredo diffiniuntur implicite per subiectum suum, cum
dicitur albedo est color disgregativus visus, nigredo est color congrega-
tivus visus, eo quod tota diffinitio generis includitur in diffinitione spe-
ciei. Si ergo subiectum ponitur explicite in diffinitione coloris, oportet,
21rb M si non explicite ponitur in diffinitione albedinis vel nigre-|-dinis, quod 20
implicite intelligatur, alioquin non haberetur perfecta notitia illius diffi-
niti.
Istam sententiam confirmat Avicenna,b dicens quod accidens potest
dupliciter considerari: uno modo, ut species subiecta; alio modo, ut passio
inexistens. Si consideratur ut species subiecta, sic quidem intelligitur 25
substantia in eius diffinitione, sed non accipitur; si autem consideratur ut
passio, sic substantia et intelligitur et accipitur in eius diffinitione. Linea
ergo et superficies, albedo, nigredo et huiusmodi, si considerantur ut
species possunt diffiniri per principia sue coordinationis; semper tamen
in diffinitionibus illorum intelligitur subiectum. Si autem considerantur 30
ut passiones, necesse est quod in diffinitionibus suis accipiatur subiectum
254ra Pv eo modo quo superius ostensum est. | Et ita dicatur de quantitate, quod,
si accipitur ut pars subiectiva entis, sic in eius diffinitione non accipitur
et] quod Pv habereturnotitia] haberet perfectam notitiam M
a Aristotle, Met., V, 2, 1013a2629; Phys., II, 3, 194b2629. b Avicenna, Phil. Pr., tr., III, c. 3,
pp. 117, 87118, 93; c. 4, p. 122, lin. 7283; pp. 126, 45127, 71 (cf. Albert, Met., Lib. VII, tr. 1, c.
12, p. 336, 1118).
eius subiectum, sed intelligitur. Quo modo consideravit quantitatem Phi-

losophus, quinto huius, ut asserit Commentator ibi.a Si autem accipitur
ut passio substantie, necessario diffinitur per subiectum tam acceptum in
diffinitione quam intellectum, dicendo quantitas est mensura substan-
tie. 5
Et si instatur, quoniam omnes diffinitiones dialectice inutiles sunt et
vane, per Aristotelem, in prologo De anima,b constat autem quod dialec-
tice diffinitiones sunt que dantur per principia sue coordinationis, dicitur
quod dialecticus non resolvit diffinitionem usque ad prima principia, sed
non curat nisi invenire proprium et immediatum genus cum differentia 10
sua; ideo talis diffinitio, cum non assignet omnes causas diffiniti, est vana.
Metaphisicus autem, cum nichil diffiniat nisi per resolutionem ad prima
principia, diffiniens accidentia per genus et differentiam, semper intelligit
subiectum, licet non semper accipiat; ideo talis diffinitio metaphisice data
per principia coordinationis non est vana. Numquam enim metaphisicus 15
diffiniet albedinem nisi prius diffiniat colorem; ideo omnia contenta in
diffinitione coloris intelligit in diffinitione albedinis, licet illa non expri-
mat. Si ergo tam dialecticus quam metaphisicus dicat quod albedo est
color disgregativus visus et diffinitiones videantur omnino similes, non
tamen sunt eque perfecte, quia dialecticus non intelligit subiectum in dif- 20
finitione albedinis, metaphisicus autem intelligit illud. Nec metaphisicus
dat illam diffinitionem nisi assignando omnes causas essentiales et per
se albedinis, dialecticus autem non assignat illas causas. Constat autem
quod diffinitio que non assignat huiusmodi causas, est inutilis et vana.
Ad secundum dicitur quod Commentator, dicens numerum diffiniri 25
per quantitatem, in cuius diffinitione ponitur subiectum, non intendit
quantitatem, que est genus numeri, esse subiectum eius, sed intendit
quod, cum diffinitur per quantitatem, diffinitur per subiectum eius addi-
tum quantitati, dicendo numerus est quantitas discreta hexi unitatibus
aggregata. Certum enim est quod numerus est subiective in suis unitati- 30
bus, licet non sit subiective in quantitate, que est genus. Et licet numerus
communiter sumptus diffiniatur per multitudinem, tamen numerus ut est
intellectum scr.] intellectu MPv in] om. M ex suppl. diffiniatur] diffinitur

M
a Averroes, In Met., V, t.c. 18, fol. 125DH. b Aristotle, De an., I, 1, 402b25403a2 (cf. Albert,
Met., Lib. VII, tr. 1, c. 12, p. 336, 2646, esp. 2731).

172 pauli veneti
species predicamenti quantitatis proprie diffiniri debet per quantitatem,

sicut generaliter quelibet species diffinitur per genus suum.
Sed latet h1031a7ssi.
Tertia conclusio: accidentium est diffinitio secundum quid.
Probatur. Illud quod competit alicui posterius et ex consequenti, com- 5
petit ei secundum quid; sed diffinitio competit accidenti posterius et ex
consequenti; ergo et cetera. Patet maior eo quod competens alicui primo,
competit ei simpliciter. Minor est nota ex dictis ante, quoniam diffini-
tio, sicut quod quid erat esse, non dicitur aliquo uno certo modo, sed
multipliciter, secundum prius et posterius, sicut et ipsum ens, ita quod 10
primo competit substantie, secundario accidenti. Et quia hanc simplicita-
tem multi antiquorum non cognoverunt, ideo dixerunt aut quod nullius
substantie est diffinitio aut quod accidentis est simpliciter diffinitio, sicut
21va M substantie; sed erra-|-verunt, quia nullum eorum est verum. Debuerunt
enim dicere aut quod diffinitio nullo modo competit accidenti quam sub- 15
stantie, aut quod diffinitio multipliciter dicitur, videlicet simpliciter et
secundum quid, aut per prius et posterius, sic quod competit substantie
simpliciter et primo, accidenti autem secundum quid et ex consequenti.
Lege litteram: Sed latet antiquos natura diffinitionum quia non certe,
idest univoce, dicuntur rationes, idest diffinitiones. Si vero sunt et horum 20
termini, idest diffinitiones accidentium, aut alio modo sunt quam substan-
tie aut, quemadmodum dictum est, multipliciter oportet dicere esse diffini-
tionem et quid erat esse.a
Ex predictis Philosophus concludit duo correlaria. Quorum primum est
quod diffinitio et quod quid erat esse aliquo modo nulli competit nisi sub- 25
stantie et aliquo modo competit alteri a substantia. Patet, quia simpliciter
254rb Pv et primo nulli | competiti nisi substantie; alteri vero a substantia competit
secundum quid et ex consequenti.
Iterum, diffinitio data sine additione nulli competit nisi substantie, sed
diffinitio data ex additione alteri competit a substantia, videlicet acci- 30
denti tam in concreto quam in abstracto, quia in eius diffinitione poni-
tur subiectum, quod est extra naturam diffiniti, dicens essentiam addi-
tam essentie aliquando in recto et aliquando in obliquo: in recto quidem
quando diffinitur accidens concretum, ut simus est nasus concavus; in
obliquo vero quando diffinitur accidens abstractum, ut simitas est con- 35
cavitas nasi.
et cetera om. Pv
Lege litteram: Quare sic quidem, idest aliquo modo, nullius erit diffini-
tio nec quod quid erat esse alicui inerit nisi substantiis, sic autem erit, idest
aliquo modo erit aliorum a substantia.a
Secundum correlarium, quod diffinitio, que est ratio quiditatis et essen-
tie, aut soli inest substantie aut sibi inest maxime et primum et simpli- 5
citer. Prima pars sequitur ex prima solutione questionis et secunda pars
sequitur ex secunda solutione. Dixit enim prima solutio quod nullius acci-
dentis est diffinitio. Secunda vero solutio concedit quod accidentis est dif-
finitio secundum quid et ex consequenti. Substantie autem est maxime
diffinitio eo quod quiditas substantie est causa quiditatis omnium acci- 10
dentium; primum autem inest substantie diffinitio in quantum substan-
tia cadit in intellectu accidentium; simpliciter vero, quia substantia non
diffinitur per naturam alienam.
Lege litteram: Quod quidem ergo est diffinitio que ipsius quid erat esse
ratio, et quid erat esse aut solum substantiarum est aut maxime et primum 15
et simpliciter, palam.b
Notandum, secundum Commentatorem, commento undevicesimo,
quod cum fuerit positum quod diffinitio dicitur multis modis, dis-
solvetur questio; et ista est dispositio demonstrationis cum sermo-
nibus logicis, scilicet quod distinguit partem veram a parte falsa. 20
Dicere enim accidentia habere diffinitiones quodammodo est fal-
sum, quia non habent diffinitiones substantie, et quodammodo est
verum, quia habent alias diffinitiones.c
Intendit Commentator quod, sicut ad logicum pertinet docere diffinire et
dare modum multiplicitatis diffinitionum ac etiam distinguere verum a 25
falso, ita ad eum pertinet respondere ad hanc questionem: utrum acci-
denti competat diffinitio. Et quia in hac scientia dispositio demonstratio-
nis habet affinitatem cum logica, ideo hec propositio accidentia habent
diffinitiones est a metaphisico distinguenda, dicendo quod est aliquo
modo vera et aliquo modo falsa: est enim vera si predicatum supponit pro 30
diffinitionibus secundum quid, est autem falsa si supponit pro diffinitio-
nibus simpliciter.
Contra predicta arguitur. Et primo quod accidens simpliciter diffini-
tur, quia accidens simpliciter demonstratur; ergo simpliciter habet cau-
sam. Patet consequentia per diffinitionem demonstrationis datam primo 35
intellectu s.l. M ergo] igitur Moerb.
a Aristotle, Met., VII, 5, 1031a1011 (AL XXV 3.2, p. 140, lin. 224226). b Aristotle, Met., VII, 5,
1031a1114 (AL XXV 3.2, p. 140, lin. 226228). c Averroes, In Met., VII, t.c. 19, fol. 168F.
174 pauli veneti
Posteriorum,a et antecedens est Philosophi, secundo Posteriorum,b ubi pro-

bat quod substantia diffinitur et non demonstratur, accidens autem est
illud quod vere et simpliciter demonstratur. Tunc sic: accidens simpliciter
habet causam, ergo simpliciter diffinitur. Patet consequentia, quia causa
et diffinitio sunt idem, per Aristotelem, circa principium secundi Poste- 5
riorum.c
Secundo arguitur quod accidens nullo modo diffinitur, quia, si diffini-
21vb M tur, aut ergo | secundum formam, ex genere et differentia, aut secundum
materiam, per subiectum suum; sed nullo istorum modorum. Probatur.
Omnis diffinitio est principium aut conclusio demonstrationis, per Aristo- 10
telem, secundo Posteriorum.d Quero ergo que illarum est principium. Non
quidem diffinitio secundum formam, quia illa non assignat causam. Nec
diffinitio secundum materiam, quia illa demonstratur. Non etiam com-
posita diffinitio ex utraque, quia illa est tota demonstratio, sola positione
differens, per Philosophum, primo Posteriorum.e 15
Tertio arguitur quod accidens, ut species, non implicite diffinitur per
subiectum suum, quia sit A species accidentis et B suum genus et C sua
differentia, et sequitur quod, cum tam B quam C sit accidens, neutrum
est sine intellectu subiecti. Tunc arguitur sic: genus est aliquo modo de
254va Pv intellectu differentie, ergo subiectum quod est | de intellectu B, etiam est 20
de intellectu C. Constat autem quod C simplex etiam in suo intellectu
habet subiectum et per consequens duo sunt subiecta de intellectu C. Aut
ergo sunt opposita in specie, quod esse non potest, quia sic unum non
esset de intellectu alterius; aut sunt idem, et tunc idem bis dicitur cum
nugatione.f 25
Item, diffinitio est ratio significans quod quid est. In cuius ergo qui-
ditate non cadit subiectum, in eius diffinitione non intelligitur; sed in
quiditate accidentis non cadit subiectum; ergo nec in diffinitione intel-
ligitur.
Quarto arguitur quod accidens, ut passio, non explicite diffinitur per 30
subiectum suum, quia, si sic, hoc videtur propter dependentiam essen-
tialem accidentis ad subiectum suum; sed substantie sensibiles etiam
cum s.l. Pv de s.l. Pv diffinitur mg. Pv
a Aristotle,An. Post., I, 2, 71b1719. b Aristotle, An. Post., II, 3, 90b1ff. c Aristotle, An. Post.,
II, 2, 90a3132 (Cf. Albert, Met., Lib. VII, tr. 1, c. 12, p. 336, 4751). d Aristotle, An. Post., II,
10, 94a1114. e Aristotle, An. Post., I, 8, 75b3032 (Cf. Albert, Met., Lib. VII, tr. 1, c. 12, p. 336,
6782). f lin. 1625, cf. Albert, Met., Lib. VII, tr. 1, c. 12, pp. 337, 83338, 3.
essentialiter dependent a substantiis insensibilibus; ergo in diffinitioni-

bus substantiarum sensibilium debent poni substantie insensibiles. Quo
concesso, substantia diffinitur per additamenta, sicut accidenscuius
oppositum asserit Philosophus.
Deinde, sicut accidens non est preter subiectum, sic nec universale est 5
preter singulare; qua ergo ratione diffinitur accidens per subiectum, pari
ratione diffinietur universale per singulare.
Ad primum conceditur quod accidens simpliciter demonstratur et sim-
pliciter habet causam; non tamen simpliciter diffinitur. Et licet causa et
diffinitio sint idem, tamen differunt ratione. Nam causa est illud ad cuius 10
esse sequitur aliud et diffinitio est ratio significans quiditatem rei. Et ideo
potest alicuius esse causa simpliciter, cuius non est diffinitio simpliciter,
sicut alicuius est causa simpliciter, cuius non est demonstratio simplici-
ter, non obstante quod omnis demonstratio simpliciter detur per causam
simpliciter. 15
Ad secundum respondetur quod accidens diffinitur tam secundum for-
mam quam secundum materiam. Et dicitur quod, sicut accidens demon-
stratur, ita demonstratur sua diffinitio secundum formam: sicut enim
demonstratur eclipsis, ita demonstratur privatio lucis in luna obiectu
terre. Diffinitio autem data secundum materiam est dupliciter, scilicet per 20
subiectum et per diffinitionem subiecti. Si datur per subiectum, ipsa est
medium in demonstrando diffinitionem secundum formam, et demon-
stratur per diffinitionem in qua ponitur diffinitio subiecti. Et ista est prin-
cipium demonstrationis, ita quod ista demonstrat et non demonstratur.
Diffinitio secundum formam demonstratur et non demonstrat, diffinitio 25
autem data per subiectum demonstrat et demonstratur.
Ad tertium conceditur quod in C includuntur duo subiecta, non qui-
dem disparata nec simpliciter eadem, sed se habent invicem sicut genus
et differentia. Et ideo unum est determinans alterum, sicut differentia
determinat genus: ita enim se habet subiectum B ad subiectum C sicut 30
vegetativum ad sensitivum. In talibus enim primum est in secundo non
actu, sed potentia; propter quod non idem bis dicitur nec est nugatio.
Unde nugari est frequenter idem bis dicere, quando aliquid expresse bis
repetitur, ut homo homo, vel semel exprimitur et iterum per significatum
alterius actu intelligitur, ut animal homo: nugatio enim est immediata 35
copulatio duorum idem actu significantium.
est2 om. Pv
176 pauli veneti
Et cum arguitur: diffinitio est ratio significans quod quid est; sed subiec-
tum non est de quiditate accidentis; ergo non est de ipsius intellectu;
22ra M negatur consequentia, quia, licet non sit de | quiditate eius, tamen est
causa illius quiditatis. Constat autem quod diffinitio debet significare cau-
sam diffiniti, si debet indicare naturam diffiniti. 5
Ad quartum respondetur quod non similis est dependentia accidentis
ad substantiam et substantiarum sensibilium ad substantias insensibiles,
quoniam prima dependentia est coniuncta et secunda est disiuncta. Ideo
non oportet ponere in diffinitionibus substantiarum sensibilium substan-
tias insensibiles sicut oportet ponere in diffinitione accidentis subiectum 10
suum. Talis enim est habitudo et dependentia accidentis ad subiectum
suum qualis est forme naturalis ad materiam. Constat autem quod diffini-
254vb Pv tur forma naturalis | per materiam, sicut exemplariter ostenditur in diffi-
nitione anime, cum dicitur quod anima est actus corporis phisici organici
potentia vitam habentis. 15
Deinde, non videtur verum quod universale non sit preter singulare,
quia, licet non sit universale preter singulare secundum esse, tamen est
preter illud secundum essentiam et quiditatem. Et si non diffinitur uni-
versale per principia singularium simpliciter accepta, tamen diffinitur
per principia singularium universaliter accepta: eadem enim sunt princi- 20
pia singularium et universalium, licet non eodem modo accepta. Constat
autem quod diffinitio exprimit principia rei. Quare et cetera.
hCAPITULUM IVi
Utrum autem idem h1031a15ssi.

Istud est quartum capitulum huius primi tractatus, in quo Philosophus 25
investigat identitatem et distinctionem quiditatis cum suo esse, post-
quam manifestavit ipsum quod quid est ac manifestavit illud cui tam sim-
pliciter quam secundum quid competit quod quid est.
Querit ergo Philosophus utrum quod quid est sit idem cum eo cuius
est aut alterum ab eo. Utraque pars huius questionis est disputanda et 30
determinanda, eo quod decisio huius questionis necessario est prepo-
nenda perscrutationi de substantia, cuius consideratio ad metaphisicum
maxime spectat.
insensibiles] sensibiles M non1 s.l. M secundum] in M simpliciter] pro

singulariter? manifestavit2] declaravit Pv
Dividitur ergo hoc capitulum in duas partes, in quarum prima Philoso-

phus arguit ad partes questionis; in secunda vero respondet ad questio-
nem per conclusiones, ibi: In dictis vero secundum se h1031a28ssi.
Primo ergo arguit Philosophus quod idem est quod quid est cum eo
cuius est. Nam unumquodque est idem cum sua substantia; sed quod 5
quid non est aliud quam substantia et essentia rei; ergo et cetera. Tenet
consequentia cum maiori. Et minor est declarata in altero capitulo, in quo
ostensum est quod quiditas rei idem est quod substantia et essentia rei, ita
quod essentia rei et ipsum quid sunt unum et idem in re, differentia solum
ratione: illud enim idem quod dicitur essentia in quantum est principium 10
formale entis vocatur quid aut quiditas in quantum est certificativum
nature rei. Si ergo idem est substantia, essentia et quiditas, necesse est
quod res non differat a sua quiditate, si non differt a sua essentia.
Lege litteram: Utrum autem idem est aut alterum quod quid erat esse
ab eo cuius est et unumquodque, perscrutandum est. Est enim aliquid preo- 15
pere ad de substantia perscrutationem. Singulum enim non aliud videtur
esse a suimet substantia, et quod quid erat hessei dicitur singuli substantia.a
In contrarium arguitur sic: in predicatis secundum accidens alterum
est quod quid est ab eo cuius est; ergo non universaliter idem est quod
quid est cum eo cuius est. Probatur antecedens. Esse quiditativum homi- 20
nis albi, secundum quod est albus, est alterum ab homine albo, secundum
quod est homo; ergo in predicatis secundum accidens alterum est quod
quid est ab eo cuius est. Tenet consequentia, quia album est predicatum
secundum accidens et homo subiectum, dicendo homo est albus.
Assumptum arguitur: si enim quiditativum esse hominis albi, secun- 25
dum quod est albus, est idem homini albo, secundum quod est homo,
sequitur quod quiditas albi est quiditas hominisquod est impossibile,
quia quiditas albi, cum sit accidens, est realiter et essentialiter differens
a quiditate hominis. Tenentes tamen formas substantiales esse acciden-
tia dicunt quod quiditas hominis est quiditas albi, dicentes quod omnino 30
22rb M sunt idem | homo albus secundum quod est homo et secundum quod est
albus.
Sequitur ergo alterum istorum, aut quod homo albus secundum quod
est homo et homo albus secundum quod est albus sunt quiditative idem,
aut quod non est necesse ea que predicantur secundum accidens esse 35
esse1 om. M esse2 suppl. ex Moerb. ab] cum M homo1] est add. Pv
178 pauli veneti
eiusdem quiditatis cum substantiis suis de quibus predicantur. Sed pri-

mum est impossibile. Ergo secundum est dandum, et habetur propositum.
Lege litteram: In dictis quidem itaque secundum accidens videbitur
utique diversum esse, ut albus homo alterum et albo homini esse. Si enim
idem, necesse est homini esse et albo homini idem, ita quod quiditas acci- 5
255ra Pv dentis est quiditas substantie; idem enim homo et albus | homo secundum
quod est albus, ut dicunt adversarii; quare et albo homini et homini est idem
quiditativum esse. Aut non necesse est quecumque secundum accidens esse
eadem suis substantiis quiditative.a
Et confirmatur, quia non solum homo est albus, sed etiam est musicus, 10
tamquam medium inter duo extrema predicabilia de illo per accidens.
Si ergo album est quiditative homo, per idem et musicum est quiditative
homo; sed quecumque sunt quiditative eadem uni tertio, sunt quiditative
eadem inter se; ergo album et musicum sunt quiditative idem inter se.
Consequens est falsum, ex quo albedo et musica sunt species disparate. 15
Minor est manifesta, quia ea que sunt per accidens eadem uni tertio, sunt
per accidens eadem inter se, sicut musicum et album sunt per accidens
eadem inter se, quia sunt per accidens idem quod homo; ergo, per idem,
ea que sunt quiditative eadem uni tertio, sunt quiditative eadem inter se.
Et si ex hoc aliquis concluderet quod illa duo extrema, musicum et 20
album, quiditative accepta, sunt per accidens eadem inter se, negatur
consequentia, quia, sicut albedo non est per accidens nigredo, ita esse
quiditativum albi non est per accidens esse quiditativum musici; et ex
consequenti esse quiditativum albi et esse quiditativum musici non sunt
eadem inter se. 25
Lege litteram: Non enim similiter extremitates sunt eedem quiditative
sicut per accidens. Sed forsitan illud videtur accidere, videlicet extremitates
quiditative sumptas fieri easdem secundum accidens, ut albo esse et musico;
videtur autem non sequi illud inconveniens.b
Notandum, secundum Commentatorem, commento vicesimo, quod 30
Aristoteles vult hic perscrutari utrum ista substantia, que est qui-
ditas, et substantia singularis, que est individuum substantie, sunt
idem, ita quod quiditas, que est substantia eius, sit quiditas singula-
tertio] illa add. Pv ex consequenti] consequenter Pv sunt MPv Anon.]

fiunt Moerb. forsitan] forsan Moerb. (forsitan P) que est] scilicet Pv Iunt.
a Aristotle, Met., VII, 6, 1031a1924 (AL XXV 3.2, p. 140, lin. 234239). b Aristotle, Met., VII,
6, 1031a2428 (AL XXV 3.2, p. 140, lin. 239241).
ris, et istud singulare est substantia per illam quiditatem, aut quidi-
tas rei sit aliud a re in actu. Et quesivit hoc propter formas quas dicit
Plato, quoniam secundum illam opinionem erunt quiditates prima-
rum substantiarum alie a primis substantiis, que sunt etiam prime
substantie existentes per se.a 5
Plato ergo posuit duas primas substantias existentes per se, videlicet for-
mas ydeales et individua sensibilia. Formas ydeales vocavit quiditates
universales et individua sensibilia dixit esse quiditates singulares. Quas
quiditates invicem separavit loco et subiecto, dicens quiditates universa-
les esse in orbe signorum, quiditates autem singulares esse infra speram 10
activorum et passivorum.
Propter hanc opinionem querit Philosophus utrum quiditas specifica
vel generica a quiditate singulari realiter sit distincta. Cum enim Sortes
sit substantia singularis per humanitatem, queritur utrum humanitas per
quam homo est homo sit humanitas per quam Sortes est Sortes, ita quod 15
non sint due humanitates realiter differentes.
Dubitatur circa confirmationem rationis ad oppositum facte, quoniam
homo et equus sunt quiditative eadem animali, et tamen non sunt qui-
ditative eadem inter se. Similiter, album et coloratum sunt per accidens
eadem homini, et tamen non sunt per accidens eadem inter se, eo quod 20
album est per se coloratum, sicut albedo est per se color.
22va M Respondetur quod quecumque sunt eadem | uni tertio individualiter
sumpto, illa sunt eadem inter se; non autem si sunt eadem uni tertio
specifice vel generice sumpto, quia Sortes et Plato sunt idem homini et
non sunt idem inter se, homo et asinus sunt idem animali et non sunt 25
idem inter se. Aristoteles autem loquitur de identitate numerali, ita quod,
sicut sequitur musicum et album sunt quiditative idem homo numero,
ergo sunt quiditative idem inter se, ita sequitur homo et equus sunt
quiditative idem animal numero, ergo sunt quiditative idem inter se. Sed
antecedens est impossibile. Deinde conceditur quod album et coloratum 30
sunt per accidens eadem inter se, quia, licet album non sit per accidens
coloratum, tamen coloratum est per accidens album. Hec tamen ratio non
est autentica, quia est disputativa ad alteram partem questionis.
istud] illud Iunt. illam] istam Iunt. que] quia Iunt. aetiam (sed etiam scr. ex
Iunt. et infra, lin. 67: omnia MPv) iter. MPv in] loco signorum sive add. M vel]
aut Pv
a Averroes, In Met., VII, t.c. 20, fol. 169DE.

180 pauli veneti
In dictis vero secundum se h1031a28ssi.

255rb Pv Ad questionem propositam | respondet Philosophus per tres conclusio-
nes, quarum prima est hec: in predicatis secundum se idem est quod quid
est cum eo cuius est. Secunda conclusio: in predicatis secundum accidens
non est idem quod quid est cum eo cuius est, ibi: Secundum accidens vero 5
h1031b22ssi. Tertia conclusio: quodlibet quod quid erat esse est idem
cum eo cuius est, ibi: Absurdum vero h1031b28ssi.
Prima conclusio quintumpliciter probatur.
Et primo sic: si in predicatis secundum se quiditas est aliud ab eo
cuius est quiditas, sequitur quod ydee habent ydeas et quod substantie 10
prime habent substantias priores, contra Platonem ponentem oppositum
huius conclusionis, dicentis quod alique sunt substantie a quibus non
sunt alie substantie abstracte, neque eis sunt alie substantie priores. Quas
substantias Platonici vocaverunt ydeas.
Et quod illud sequatur, arguitur. Si enim quiditas boni est aliud a 15
bono et quiditas animalis est aliud ab animali et quiditas entis est aliud
ab entesecundum Platonem ponentem omnem quiditatem esse aliud
ab eo cuius est quiditas, et cuiuslibet substantie est aliqua quiditas,
sequitur quod in qualibet ydea est aliqua quiditas ab illa ydea distincta.
Tunc arguitur sic: quelibet ydea habet quiditatem a se distinctam; sed 20
quelibet quiditas est ydea, secundum Platonem; ergo quelibet ydea habet
ydeam a se distinctam. Deinde, cum quelibet quiditas sit prior eo cuius
est quiditas, et ydee sunt substantie prime, secundum Platonem, ergo
substantie prime habent substantias prioresquod fuit probandum.
Lege litteram: In dictis vero secundum se semper necesse idem esse 25
quod quid est cum eo cuius est, ut si que sunt substantie simplices, nec
altere nature priores, quales dicunt ydeas esse quidam, scilicet Platonici. Si
enim erit alterum ipsum bonum et quod bono esse et animal et quod animali
esse et ens et quod enti esse, erunt alie substantie et nature et ydee preter
dictas, et priores substantie ille, si quod quid erat esse substantie estaper 30
bono esse et animali esse et enti esse intendit Philosophus quiditas
boni, animalis et entis.
Secundo: si quiditas est aliud ab eo cuius est quiditas et separatur ab eo,
sequitur quod de substantiis sensibilibus non habetur scientia, et quod
est idem inv. Pv inydea1] cuiuslibet ydee Pv substantie] a quibus altere non
sunt substantie add. Moerb. nature priores inv. M et2 om. Moerb. esse12 om.
Moerb. (esse Si P) animalis mg. Pv
a Aristotle, Met., VII, 6, 1031a28b3 (AL XXV 3.2, p. 141, lin. 242248).
substantie insensibiles non sunt entia. Patet consequentia, intelligendo

per separationem quiditatis ab eo cuius est quiditas ipsam quiditatem non
esse in eo cuius est quiditas, nec econverso, ita quod quiditas boni non exi-
stit in bono, neque bonum existit in quiditate boni. Nichil enim scitur nisi
per suam quiditatem, neque aliquod scitur nisi per aliquod intrinsecum ei. 5
Si ergo quiditates substantiarum sensibilium separantur ab ipsis substan-
tiis sensibilibus, sequitur quod de ipsis quiditatibus habebitur scientia,
non autem de rebus quarum sunt quiditates. Et quoniam quiditas alicuius
necessario est intrinseca illi, ex quo de illo predicatur, sequitur quod qui-
ditates rerum sensibilium non sunt entia, si separantur ab illis. Huiusmodi 10
autem quiditates sunt substantie insensibiles, secundum Platonem; ergo
substantie insensibiles non sunt entia.
Lege litteram: Et si quidem absolute ab invicem sunt res et sue qui-
22vb M ditates, harum quidem non erit scientia, | videlicet rerum sensibilium, hec
autem non erunt entia, scilicet quiditates insensibiles. (Dico autem absolvi, 15
si nec bono ipsi existet esse bono nec huic esse bonum). Scientia enim cuiusli-
bet consistit in cognoscendo hoc: quod quid erat illi esse, scilicet intrinsece.
Et in bono et in aliis similiter se habet.a
Tertio: si quiditas non est illud cuius est quiditas, sed separatur ab
eo, sequitur quod nulla quiditas est ens, quod est inconveniens. Nam, 20
cum unumquodque sit ens per suam quiditatem, necesse est dicere quod
unumquodque est ens per non-ensquod est absurdum. Et quod illud
sequatur, arguitur: si enim quiditas boni est separata a bono, nec est idem
quod ipsum bonum, eodem modo quiditas entis est separata ab ente,
nec est idem quod ipsum ens; et similiter quiditas unius est separata ab 25
uno, nec est ipsum unum. Eadem enim est ratio in omnibus: nam omnia
consimiliter se habent quantum ad hoc quod vel omnia sunt idem cum
sua quiditate vel nullum est idem cum illa.
255va Pv Fiat ergo hoc | argumentum: quiditas entis non est ens, nec aliqua
alia quiditas est ens; ergo nulla quiditas est ens. Tenet consequentia cum 30
maiori, quia nulla quiditas est illud cuius est quiditas, per concessum.
Minor declaratur. Nam nulla quiditas substantie est ens, nec aliqua qui-
ditas accidentis est ens; ergo nulla alia quiditas a quiditate entis est ens.
Antecedens patet, quia, si quiditas substantie est ens, et omne ens est
existet] existit Moerb. hoc] hec Moerb. (hoc P1a Hs Rj) similiter] consimiliter
Pv concessum] et add. Pv
182 pauli veneti
substantia vel accidens, ergo quiditas substantie est substantia vel acci-
dens; sed non accidens; ergo est substantiacuius oppositum est con-
cessum. Iterum, si aliqua quiditas accidentis est ens, et omne ens est sub-
stantia vel accidens, ergo quiditas accidentis est substantia vel accidens;
constat autem quod non est substantia; ergo est accidenscuius contra- 5
rium est suppositum.
Lege litteram: Quare si nec boni esse bonum, nec quod enti ens nec
quod uni unum. Similiter autem omnia sunt sua quiditas aut nullum est
quod quid erat esse; quare si neque quod enti ens, idest si quiditas entis non
est ens, nec aliorum nullum, idest nullius aliorum quiditas est ens.a 10
Quarto sequitur quod bonum est non-bonum. Probatur. Illud est non-
album cui non inest albedo et illud est non-musicum cui non inest musica;
ergo, per idem, illud est non-bonum cui non inest bonitas. Constat autem
quod bono non inest bonitas, si quiditas boni separatur a bono; ergo
bonum est non-bonum. Necesse est ergo dicere quod idem est bonum et 15
quiditas boni, et benignum et quiditas benigni. Et generaliter in omni-
bus que dicuntur secundum se, quantum ad primum modum dicendi
per se, oportet dicere quod idem est quod quid est cum eo cuius est.
Neque oportet ponere quiditatem separatam: sufficiens est enim quiditas
in re existens, et si non ponatur species separate. Et si ponerentur species 20
separate, adhuc magis sufficiens est quiditas existens in re quam species
ydealis separata. Ponebant enim Platonici quiditatem separatam propter
scientiam, ac si quiditas existens in re non sufficeret; sed istud est super-
fluum, quia scire rem est scire naturam et quiditatem rei; hoc autem non
potest esse, nisi ponatur natura coniuncta, quia, si separata est, scire eam 25
non est scire aliquid rei. Ponere ergo quiditatem in re multum facit ad
habendum scientiam de re, ponere autem separatam nichil facit.
Lege litteram: Amplius cui non inest bono esse, illud est non bonum.
Necesse ergo unum esse benignum et benigno esse et bonum et bono esse,
quecumque non secundum aliud dicuntur, idest non secundum accidens, 30
sed prima et secundum se. Et enim hoc sufficiens si extiterit quiditas in
re, quamquam non sint species; magis autem forsan sufficit ad scientiam
quiditas et si sint species.b
boni] bono Moerb. quod1] que Moerb. (quod Si) quantum] quo Pv existens
ante in Pv sufficeret] sufficiat M est] fuit Pv ergo] igitur Moerb. forsan
Pv Moerb.] forsitan M
1031b1115 (AL XXV 3.2, p. 141, lin. 256260).
Quinto: si quiditates rerum sunt ydee separate, sicut ponebat Plato,

sequitur quod substantia sensibilis non est substantia, quia has substan-
tias, quas Platonici vocant ydeas, necesse est non dici de substantia sensi-
23ra M bili: si enim dicerentur, essent substantie per participationem. | Arguitur
ergo sic: substantie sensibiles non sunt substantie nisi per quiditates et 5
formas; non autem esse possunt substantie per quiditates et formas nisi
in eis sint quiditates et forme, et de illis dicantur; ergo quiditates et forme
sunt in substantiis sensibilibusquod est contra Platonem. Voluit enim
ipse quod nichil est in substantiis sensibilibus, neque aliquid dicitur de
illis, nisi sit ens secundum participationem; quiditates autem et formas 10
dixit esse entia per essentiam; si ergo quiditates substantie non sunt in
rebus sensibilibus, necesse est quod res sensibiles non sunt substantie.
Lege litteram: Simulque palam quia si sunt ydee quales quidam dicunt,
non erit substantia subiectum, idest res sensibilis. Has enim substantias
esse est necesse, non de subiecto autem; erunt enim secundum participatio- 15
nem.a
255vb Pv Ex predictis Philosophus | concludit intentum suum, dicens quod idem
est quod quid erat esse cum eo cuius est, ita quod quiditas et subiectum
suum non sunt diversa realiter, sed unum et idem sunt, non per accidens,
sed per se et essentialiter, perseitate primi modi. Est etiam manifestum 20
quod scire unumquodque est scire suam quiditatem existentem in eo,
quia secundum istam expositionem non invicem separantur quiditas et
subiectum suum, sed sunt unum et idem, alias non haberetur scientia de
re per suam quiditatem.
Lege litteram: Ex hiis itaque rationibus convincitur esse unum et idem 25
non secundum accidens ipsum unumquodque et quod quid erat esse, et quod
scire unumquodque horum est quod quid erat esse scire; quare secundum
expositionem necesse unum aliquid esse ambo.b
Notandum, secundum Commentatorem, commento vicesimo, quod
substantia, que est quiditas, est substantia singularis, verbi gratia, 30
Sortes est animal rationale: Sortes enim nichil aliud est quam anima-
litas et rationalitas, que sunt quiditas eius. Nec animalitas et ratio-
nalitas sunt quiditates nisi Sortis et Platonis.c
substantia subiectum inv. Moerb. (substantia subiectum Da P) cum eo] et illud

Pv
a Aristotle,
Met., VII, 6, 1031b1518 (AL XXV 3.2, p. 141, lin. 260264). b Aristotle, Met., VII,
6, 1031b1822 (AL XXV 3.2, p. 141, lin. 264267). c Averroes, In Met., VII, t.c. 20, fol. 169F.
184 pauli veneti
Istud commentum manifestat universalia predicabilia, tam in concreto

quam in abstracto, non essentialiter distingui a suis singularibus, quo-
niam Sortes et animal rationale sunt unum et idem, et Sortes non est aliud
quam animalitas et rationalitas, neque animalitas et rationalitas est alia
quiditas ab animalitate et rationalitate Sortis, ita quod animalitas Sor- 5
tis et animalitas communis non sunt due animalitates, sed tantum una
animalitas. Neque obstat si quis dicat quod Commentator non asserit ex
intentione, sed tantum disputative loquitur, quia in eodem commento,
ubi determinative loquitur, sic inquit:
In eis autem que sunt unum per se, rectum est dicere quod sunt 10
cum suis quiditatibus idem necessario verbi gratia, quoniam, si
iste substantie sensibiles sunt prime substantie, manifestum quod
ipse sunt idem cum suis quiditatibus.a
Ecce quod substantie sensibiles, que sunt prime substantie et indivi-
dua predicamenti substantie, non realiter differunt a suis quiditatibus, 15
sed solum ratione aut in modo significandi. Ratio enim Sortis est ratio
incommunicabilis et significat per modum subiecti et concernit principia
individuativa. Ratio autem humanitatis aut animalitatis vel rationalitatis
est ratio comunicabilis et significat per modum forme, neque concernit
principia individuativa, ita quod, licet Sortes sit idem realiter cum quali- 20
bet illarum quiditatum, tamen differt ratione a qualibet illarum, alioquin
nichil esset homo, neque animal neque rationale, nisi Sortes.
Et ita intendit Philosophus quando dicit quod in talibus predicatio-
nibus per se, Sortes est homo, homo est animal, quod quid erat esse
predicati est idem cum subiecto, ita quod quiditas hominis est idem quod 25
Sortes et quiditas animalis est idem cum homine. Eandem intentionem
habet Porphyrius, dicens in Universalibusb quod participatione speciei
plures homines sunt unus homo communis.
Contra predicta arguitur rationibus Burlei, asserentis, in prologo Phisi-
corum,c quod universalia sunt extra animam in suis singularibus, realiter 30
distincta ab illis. Et primo auctoritate Avicenne, dicentis, primo sue Suf-
ficientie,d quod natura primo intendit speciem et non individuum. Nam
Sortis] et add. sed del. MPv sunt M Iunt.] sint Pv manifestum] est add. Iunt.
idem] eedem Iunt. predicationibus scr.] predicabilibus M predicabus Pv
a Averroes, In Met., VII, t.c. 20, fol. 169K. b Porphyry, Isag., c. De specie (AL I 67, p. 12,
1819). c Burley, Exp. Phys., Lib. I, ed. Venice 1482, fol. 8va9ra. d Avicenna, Lib. Nat., tr. I,
c. 1, ed. Van Riet, pp. 8, 5311, 109.
23rb M postquam | A ignis produxit B ignem, manet eadem intentio, sicut idem
appetitus et eadem forma. Ergo si A primitus intendebat producere B, et
iam intendit producere idem, et non potest amplius producere B, ergo
aliqua intentio naturalis perpetuo frustrabitur.
Secundo: animal appetens cibum, nullum cibum singulare appetit, 5
quia forte nullum talem sensit; ergo appetit cibum universalem. Tunc sic:
animal appetit cibum universalem et non cibum singularem; ergo cibus
singularis non est cibus universalis.
Tertio: promittens denarium, aliquid promittit; sed non denarium sin-
gularem, quia, cum non sit maior ratio de uno quam de reliquo, infinitos 10
denarios promitteret, et sic non posset satisfacere pro illa promissione;
256ra Pv ergo promittit denarium universalem, et per consequens | denarius uni-
versalis non est denarius singularis.
Quarto: universale diffinitur et nullum singulare diffinitur, per Aristo-
telem in hoc septimo;a ergo nullum singulare est universale. Et per con- 15
sequens Sortes non est [animal] homo communis, nec idem Sortes est
animal commune, non etiam quiditas hominis nec quiditas animalis: si
enim Sortes est humanitas et Sortes currit et est albus, ergo humanitas
currit et est alba; quod est dissonum.
Ad primum negatur illa consequentia natura primo intendit speciem 20
et non primo intendit individuum, ergo species non est individuum,
sicut non sequitur homo significat primo hominem et non significat
primo Sortem, ergo Sortes non est homo. Conceditur tamen quod nullum
singulare est universale. Nec sequitur Sortes est animal commune et
ipsum animal commune est universale, ergo Sortes est universale, quia 25
consequenter probaretur quod Sortes est genus et species. Arguitur enim
a suppositione personali ad suppositionem simplicem, eo quod Sortes in
antecedente supponit personaliter et in consequente simpliciter.
Item, licet natura intendat primo speciem, non tamen intendit pro-
ducere speciem, sed individuum, quia homo communis non generat nec 30
generatur, sed Sortes aut Plato, primo De generatione.b Individua enim
generantur et corrumpuntur, et species sunt eterne, primo Posteriorum.c
singulare] particulare M cibum2] particularem vel add. M ergo] quia M non

om. M animal secl. idemest om. Pv et2albus mg. Pv Plato] per
Aristotelem add. Pv
a Aristotle, Met., VII, 15 passim. b Aristotle, De gen., I, 5, 322a1618. c Aristotle, An. Post., I,
24, 85b1518.
186 pauli veneti
Et consequenter concedatur quod A intendit producere B. Quo pro-

ducto, manet eadem intentio nature, per quam tamen non amplius inten-
dit producere B, ex quo est productum, non potens redire idem numero;
nec ex hoc frustratur intentio nature, quia potest producere alia eiusdem
speciei cum B. 5
Et si arguatur sic: pro eadem mensura pro qua A producit B, poterit
producere C; ergo poterit agere a casu, contra Commentatorem, octavo
Phisicorum,a dicentem impossibile est fieri aliquam speciem a casu et
a natura. Patet consequentia, quia produceret quod non intendit. Hoc
negatur, quia A, producendo B, etiam intendit producere C et omnia 10
producibilia eiusdem speciei. Quod autem producat B et non C, hoc est
ex dispositione materie una cum determinatione nature universalis.
Ad secundum dicitur quod animal famescens non appetit cibum uni-
versalem, sed singularem, quia cibus universalis non potest corrumpi nec
digeri. Et conceditur quod appetit infinitos cibos singulares, licet nullum 15
umquam senserit, quia talis appetitus non est determinatus, sed confusus,
proveniens ex instinctu nature. Formica enim colligit grana pro tempore
yemali et aranea facit telam ut capiat muscam, et tamen formica num-
quam sensit tempus yemale, si nata est in estate, et aranea numquam
vidit muscam antequam faciat telam, sed huiusmodi opera proveniunt ex 20
instinctu nature.
Ad tertium dicitur quod promittens denarium aliquid promittit; non
quidem denarium universalem, sed singularem, neque unum tantum pro-
mittit, sed infinitos, ex quo per infinitos potest absolvi a promissione facta.
Nec sequitur infinitos denarios promittit, ergo dando A denarium vel B 25
23va M denarium adhuc | remanet obligatus, quia non determinate, sed confuse
infinitos denarios promisit. Et sicut non sequitur tu appetis cibum sin-
gularem et non appetis cibum universalem, ergo cibus universalis non
est cibus singularis, ita non sequitur tu promittis denarium singularem
et non universalem, ergo denarius singularis non est universalis. Ergo et 30
cetera.
Ad quartum conceditur quod nullum singulare est universale. Ex quo
non sequitur quod Sortes non sit homo communis nec animal commune,
quia arguitur a suppositione simplici ad suppositionem personalem. Et
producere] speciem add. Pv alia] illa M fieri post speciem Pv natura] et add.
Pv
a Averroes, In Phys., VIII, t.c. 46, fol. 387H.

cum dicitur Sortes est albus et ipse est humanitas, ergo humanitas est
alba, negatur consequentia; nec est sillogismus demonstrativus, ex quo
non concluditur maior extremitas de minori. Ideo bene sequitur quod
256rb Pv humanitas est Sortes albus. Con-|-similiter non sequitur Sortes currit et
ipse est humanitas, ergo humanitas currit, quia participium huius verbi 5
currit in antecedente stat personaliter, sicut ly Sortes, et in consequente
simpliciter, sicut ly humanitas. Propterea debet concludi quod humani-
tas est Sortes currens.
Ex predictis patet quod ista consequentia non valet hoc est Plato, hoc
est Sortes, demonstrando humanitatem, ergo Sortes est Plato. Nec sequi- 10
tur hoc est asinus et hoc est homo, demonstrando animalitatem, ergo
homo est asinus, quia ex premissis diversarum suppositionum non sequi-
tur conclusio unius suppositionis tantum. Constat autem quod in pre-
missis medium consequentie supponit simpliciter, ex quo demonstratur
quiditas specifica vel generica; extremitates vero supponunt personaliter, 15
et ita supponunt in conclusione. Ideo sequitur ex illis premissis quod Sor-
tes est aliquid quod est Plato et quod homo est aliquid quod est asinus,
ubi iam ly aliquid simpliciter supponit pro natura communi.
Et si allegatur Philosophus, dicens, primo Priorum,a quod, cum medium
fuerit hoc aliquid, necesse est extrema coniungi, respondetur quod me- 20
dium non est hoc aliquid, ex quo non demonstratur individuum, sed est
quale quid demonstrans naturam communem.
Secundum accidens vero h1031b22ssi.
Secunda conclusio: in predicatis secundum accidens non est idem
quod quid est cum eo cuius est. 25
Probatur. Quandocumque extrema propositionis significant duas
naturas, quarum nulla est quiditas alterius, neque de quiditate illius, quod
quid est predicati non est idem cum subiecto suo; sed in predicatis secun-
dum accidens extrema propositionis significant duas naturas, quarum
nulla est quiditas alterius, neque de quiditate illius; ergo in predicatis 30
secundum accidens quod quid est predicati non est idem cum subiecto
suo.
Prima pars antecedentis patet, quia oppositum implicat contradictio-
nem. Nam quandocumque predicatum est quod quid est subiecti, oportet
Plato] et add. Pv
a Theprinciple cum medium fuerit hoc aliquid, necesse est extrema coniungi is com-
monly attributed by medieval logicians to Aristotle (cf. An. Pr., I, 2, 25a1417; I 6, 28a26ff),
even though he never explicitly formulates it. See Maier (1981).
188 pauli veneti
quod quiditas predicati sit quiditas subiecti aut de quiditate illius, ut est
ostensum in declaratione prime conclusionis. Secunda pars anteceden-
tis etiam est nota inductive, quia, si dicitur homo est albus seu homo
est musicus, predicatum significat naturam accidentis, scilicet albedi-
nem aut musicam, subiectum autem significat naturam substantie, scili- 5
cet humanitatem. Constat autem quod natura accidentis non est quiditas
substantie, neque est pars quiditatis substantie, quia ex non-substantiis
non fit substantia, primo Phisicorum.a
Lege litteram: Secundum accidens vero dictum, ut musicum aut
album, propter duplex significare, scilicet predicati et subiecti, non est 10
verum dicere quod idem quod quid erat esse et ipsum. Et enim alterum est
subiectum cui accidit album et accidens.b
Ex ista conclusione, una cum sua probatione, infert Philosophus quod
quiditas accidentis est aliquo modo idem cum subiecto accidentis, et ali-
quo modo non. Est enim idem denominative, quia predicatur de subiecto 15
accidentis non in abstracto, sed in concreto, dicendo homo est albus
aut musicus; sed non est idem quiditative, quia quiditas accidentis non
est quiditas substantie: quiditas enim albi hominis, idest albi quod pre-
dicatur de homine, non est eadem homini, sed passioni, videlicet albe-
dini. 20
Lege litteram: Quare est quidem ut idem, est autem ut non idem quod
quid erat esse accidentis et ipsum subiectum; nam homini et albo homini
non idem hoc, scilicet quiditas albi, passioni autem idem, scilicet albedini.c
23vb M Notandum, | secundum Commentatorem, commento vicesimo
primo, quod accidentia secundum quod sunt in subiectiis, non sunt 25
subiecta; secundum vero quod sunt passiones, sunt idem, verbi gra-
tia, homo albus Quoniam, secundum quod sunt passiones sub-
stantiarum, possunt predicari de substantiis secundum nomina ;
256va Pv secundum autem diffinitiones non possunt | predicari de substan-
tiis.d 30
substantia] per Philosophum add. Pv quod1] quia Moerb. (quod Da) hoc om.
Moerb. (hoc P) accidentiaquod] secundum autem quod accidentia Iunt. vero]
autem Iunt. passiones] subiectorum add.Iunt. secundum] quod add. Iunt.
autem] enim Iunt.
a Aristotle, Phys., I, 6, 189a3334. b Aristotle, Met., VII, 6, 1031b2225 (AL XXV 3.2, p. 141,
lin. 268271). c Aristotle, Met., VII, 6, 1031b2528 (AL XXV 3.2, pp. 141142, lin. 271273).
d Averroes, In Met., VII, t.c. 21, fol. 171D.
Prima propositio commenti est hec: accidentia non sunt sua subiecta,
licet sint eadem suis subiectis. Patet, quia accidentia sunt in suis subiectis
et sunt passiones illorum; secundum quod sunt in subiectis, non sunt
subiecta, quia nichil est in seipso secundum quod huiusmodi, ut probatur
quarto Phisicorum;a secundum vero quod sunt passiones subiectorum, 5
sunt eadem subiectis, quia predicantur de illis: omne enim quod de altero
predicatur, est idem illi.
Secunda propositio: accidentia predicantur de substantiis secundum
nomen, non secundum diffinitionem. Hec enim propositio apparet falsa,
quia, si homo est albus, ipse est res habens albedinem; ideo, si secun- 10
dum nomen album predicatur de homine, etiam predicatur secundum
diffinitionem. Sed intendit Commentator quod accidentia predicantur
de substantiis denominative, non quiditative. Predicari enim secundum
diffinitionem de aliquo est esse diffinitionem illius aut aliquid illius diffi-
nitionis. Constat autem accidentia non esse diffinitiones substantiarum, 15
neque aliquid esse illarum diffinitionum, ut patet ex quo substantie non
diffiniuntur per additamenta. Et ita intendit Philosophus in Predicamen-
tis,b dicens quod album predicatur secundum nomen et non secundum
rationem.
Contra conclusionem arguitur sic: sicut homo est subiectum animalis 20
in predicamento substantie, ita album est subiectum colorati in predica-
mento qualitatis; sed quod quid est animalis est idem cum homine per
primam conclusionem; ergo quod quid est colorati est idem cum albo.
Constat autem quod album et coloratum sunt predicata secundum acci-
dens; ergo in predicatis secundum accidens idem est quod quid est cum 25
eo cuius est.
Secundo: homo albus secundum accidens predicatur de homine; sed
quod quid est hominis albi est idem cum homine; ergo et cetera. Tenet
consequentia cum maiori. Et minor ostenditur. Nam quiditas hominis
albi necessario est hominis quiditas aut quiditas albi. Si primum, habetur 30
intentum. Si secundum, arguitur sic: homo albus equaliter componitur
ex homine et albo; ergo non magis quiditas totius est unius partis quam
alterius, et per consequens, si quiditas hominis albi est quiditas albi, per
idem est quiditas hominis.
suis2 om. Pv propositio] est ista add. Pv nomen] et add. Pv denominative]

et add. Pv et] ex add. Pv
a Aristotle, Phys., IV, 3 passim. b Aristotle, Cat., 5, 2a2734.

190 pauli veneti
Ad primum conceditur quod quod quid est colorati est idem cum albo,
sicut quod quid est coloris est idem cum albedine. Neque Philosophus
dicit contrarium, ymmo concedit, cum dicit quod quiditas hominis albi,
in eo quod est albus, est eadem passioni. Neque ex hoc sequitur quod in
predicatis secundum accidens sunt idem quod quid est cum eo cuius est, 5
quia album et coloratum, et si sunt predicata secundum accidens respectu
substantie, non tamen invicem predicantur per accidens, sed per se.
Ad secundum dicitur quod homo albus non habet proprie quod quid
est, neque quiditatem, cum sit ens per accidens; tamen si habet aliquod
quod quid est aut quiditatem, illud est idem cum albo et non cum homine, 10
quia tam quiditas quam quod quid est potius sumuntur a forma quam a
subiecto. Constat autem quod huiusmodi compositi homo albus, homo
habet rationem subiecti et album rationem forme.
Absurdum vero h1031b28ssi.
Tertia conclusio: quodlibet quod quid erat esse est idem cum eo cuius 15
est.
Ista conclusio non coincidit cum aliqua precedentium, quia prima con-
clusio concernit compositionem superioris cum suo inferiori, ut Sortes
est homo; secunda concernit compositionem accidentis cum subiecto
suo, ut homo est albus; tertia vero concernit compositionem abstracti 20
cum concreto, ut homo est humanitas. Intendit ergo Philosophus quod
omnis quiditas alicuius est eadem illi cuius est quiditas, sic quod homo
et humanitas sunt idem, animal et animalitas sunt idem, et sic de aliis. Et
sicut Philosophus accipit hic communiter quod quid est pro concreto, ita
accipit hic quod quid erat esse pro abstracto. 25
256vb Pv Hanc conclusionem per quatuor | probat. Et primo inferendo quod
24ra M quiditatis est quiditas eo modo quo in prima ratione | prime conclusionis
intulit quod ydea habet ydeam. Si enim quiditas equi est alia res ab equo,
imponatur sibi hoc nomen A, et arguitur sic: propter hoc equus habet
quiditatem distinctam a se realiter, quia res et quiditas rei non possunt 30
esse idem realiter; sed A est quedam res; ergo A habet quiditatem a se
realiter distinctam; et sic quiditatis est quiditasquod est inconveniens,
sicut est inconveniens quod rationis sit ratio aut diffinitionis diffinitio. Et
ideo absurdum videtur quod quis imponat nomen ipsi quiditati per quod
distinguatur in essentia et in natura ab eo cuius est quiditas. 35
sumuntur] sumitur Pv vero om. M accipit hic inv. Pv

Lege litteram: Absurdum vero apparebit si quis unicuique nomen

imposuerit ipsorum quod quid erat esse tamquam realiter distincto ab eo
cuius est. Erit enim et preter illud aliud ei quod quid erat esse et hoc si equo
ipsi assignatur quod quid erat esse equo alterum.a
Secundo: substantia rei non potest esse alterius nature et alterius essen- 5
tie ab eo cuius est substantia; sed quod quid erat esse est substantia rei;
ergo quod quid erat esse non potest distingui realiter ab eo cuius est tam-
quam natura et essentia ab illo diversa. Licet enim posset dici quod aliqua
quiditas distinguitur realiter ab illo cuius est quiditas, dicendo quod quidi-
tas accidentis est aliquo modo quiditas subiecti, in quantum fluit ab illo et 10
resolvitur in illud, non tamen potest hoc universaliter dici, quoniam sub-
stantia, cum sit primum ens, non est resolubilis in aliud, sed sistit in se
ipsa. Ideo quiditas eius non fluit in aliam quiditatem. Sicut ergo quiditas
substantie non realiter differt a sua quiditate, ita nec substantia realiter
distinguitur a sua propria quiditate. 15
Lege litteram: Et quid prohibet nunc esse quedam statim quid erat esse
non fluxibilia in aliud, siquidem substantia rei est quod quid erat esse? b
Tertio: illa que sunt unum non secundum accidens, sed secundum
rationem, nullam habent diversitatem realem; sed quiditas et illud cuius
est quiditas sunt huiusmodi; ergo et cetera. Minor patet, quia unum et 20
esse quiditativum unius non sunt unum secundum accidens, sed quia
ratio ipsorum eadem est. Maior est evidens, non loquendo de hiis quorum
est eadem ratio tertia, sed de hiis quorum unum est ratio alterius, quia
duo individua conveniunt in una ratione specifica et tamen diversa sunt
invicem; etiam due species conveniunt in una ratione generis et tamen 25
invicem [ratione] differunt realiter; homo autem et animal rationale non
compatiuntur diversitatem realem, quia unum est ratio alterius. Constat
autem quod humanitas etiam est ratio hominis; ideo etiam non differunt
realiter homo et humanitas. Neque inconvenit aliquid habere duas tales
rationes, ymmo est necessarium, quarum una est diffinitiva, dicens quid, 30
et alia formalis, dicens quale.
Lege litteram: At vero non solum unum secundum accidens sunt
quiditas et illud cuius est, sed et ratio eadem ipsorum, sicut palam est ex
si] et si Moerb. quod om. Moerb. (quod Da) prohibet] et add. Moerb. (om. Si P)
ratione secl.
6, 1031b3132 (AL XXV 3.2, p. 142, lin. 277278).
192 pauli veneti
dictis; non enim secundum accidens unum sunt, videlicet quod uni esse et
unum, idest unum et quiditas unius.a
Quarto: si quiditas rei est aliud ab illa re, sequitur processus infinitus
in quiditatibuscuius oppositum est demonstratum secundo huius,b ubi
ostensum est quod non contingit procedere in infinitum in causis for- 5
malibus. Constat autem omnem quiditatem habere rationem forme. Et
quod illud sequatur, arguitur, quia, si homo et sua quiditas realiter diffe-
runt, non est ratio propter quam homo habet quiditatem quin, per idem,
quiditas hominis habet quiditatem, ex quo sunt due res. Sit ergo quiditas
257ra Pv hominis A, | habens quiditatem stabilem B, et quero utrum A et B reali- 10
ter differant aut non: si non, per idem homo et A non differunt realiter;
24rb M si sic, ergo B habet quiditatem. Sit ergo illa C, | et iterum queritur utrum
B et C realiter differunt aut non: si sic, oportet procedere in infinitum; si
non, per idem homo et sua quiditas non realiter differunt. Necesse est ergo
quod non realiter differunt quiditas et illud cuius est quiditas, aut quod 15
procedatur in infinitum; sed secundum est impossibile; ergo primum et
necessarium.
Lege litteram: Amplius si aliud erit quod quid erat ab illo cuius est, in
infinitum; hoc quidem erit quod quid erat esse quod est uni esse illud vero
unum aliud quod quid erat esse; quare et in illis erit eadem ratio.c 20
Ex predictis Aristoteles, epilogando, infert quod generaliter, in primo
modo dicendi per se, quod quid est, seu quod quid erat esse, et illud
cuius est sunt unum et idem. Et notanter dicit Philosophus in primo
modo dicendi per se, quia in predicatis per se pertinentibus ad secundum
modum non est idem quiditas predicati cum subiecto, ut homo est risi- 25
bilis seu nasus est simus, ex quo subiectum est substantia et predicatum
accidens, ita quod, quandocumque predicatur accidens de subiecto, sive
predicetur per se sive per accidens, numquam quiditas predicati identifi-
catur cum subiecto.
Lege litteram: Quod quidem ergo in primis et secundum se dictis uni- 30
cuique esse et unumquodque idem et unum, palam.d
Notandum primo, secundum Commentatorem, commento vice-
simo primo, quod homo et sua quiditas, que est animal rationale,
infinitum] sunt add. Moerb. esse1] le add. Moerb. (om. Si) quod2 om. M
cum om. Pv ergo] igitur Moerb.
a Aristotle, Met., VII, 6, 1031b321032a2 (AL XXV 3.2, p. 142, lin. 278281). b Aristotle,
Met., II, 2, 994b1627. c Aristotle, Met., VII, 6, 1032a24 (AL XXV 3.2, p. 142, lin. 281283).
d Aristotle, Met., VII, 6, 1032a46 (AL XXV 3.2, p. 142, lin. 283285).
sunt idem, non separabiles, et similiter rationalitas et animalitas,

que sunt in eo, sunt idem in actu et duo in potentia.a
Intendit Commentator quod quiditas non solum assignatur per abstrac-
tum, sed etiam per concretum, ita quod non solum dicitur quiditas ani-
malitas, rationalitas vel aliquod simile, sed etiam animal rationale. Et 5
sicut homo et animal rationale non invicem separantur, sed sunt idem,
ita homo et animalitas et rationalitas non invicem separantur, sed sunt
idem. Ex quo sequitur quod multa sunt unum, sed non eodem modo,
quia animalitas et rationalitas sunt unum in actu et multa in potentia:
non enim differunt realiter inter se, sed solum conceptibiliter, in quantum 10
sunt due intentiones et duo conceptus potentes divisim movere intellec-
tum. Et sicut homo et animal et rationale sunt una res et tres conceptus,
ita animalitas, rationalitas et humanitas sunt tres quiditates et una natura
seu essentia. Sicut enim intentio et conceptus dicunt ordinem ad intellec-
tum, sic et quiditas, eo quod predicari in quid pertinet ad intellectum; et 15
non dicitur rationalitas quiditas ex eo quod predicetur in quid, sed quia
est pars illius quiditatis que predicatur in quid. Et sicut multa in poten-
tia sunt unum in actu, ita multe quiditates formaliter sunt una quiditas
materialiter, quoniam animalitas et rationalitas sunt multe quiditates for-
maliter et una quiditas materialiter, in quantum sunt una humanitas. 20
mento, quod diffinitum non est unum tantum, sed diffinitio et diffi-
nitum sunt idem , verbi gratia, homo non est unum tantum, sed
est unum cum sua diffinitione.b
Ita quod diffinitum et diffinitio non realiter differunt, sed solum ratione 25
et modo significandi. Non enim homo est unum tantum, sic quod non sit
idem cum sua diffinitione; tamen, quia diffinitio importat explicite partes
diffiniti quas ipsum diffinitum implicite significat, ideo secundum hoc
invicem differunt diffinitio et diffinitum.
Ex isto commento una cum alio sequitur quod, licet quiditas non sit 30
quiditas tamquam natura realiter differens, tamen quiditas est quiditas
tamquam conceptus vel intentio ratione differens. Unde sicut animal et
rationale sunt partes hominis, ita animalitas et rationalitas sunt partes
animalitas] aut add. Pv notandum secundo inv. Pv est] erit Iunt.

diffinitio diffinitum] diffinitum diffinitio Iunt. diffinitio diffinitum]
diffinitum diffinitio Pv
a Averroes, In Met., VII, t.c. 21, fol. 171A. b Averroes, In Met., VII, t.c. 21, fol. 171F.
194 pauli veneti
humanitatis; et sicut animal est forma hominis, quia omne superius est
forma sui inferioris, ita animalitas forma est humanitatis. Quiditas ergo
24va M hominis habet quiditatem || per modum partis contente et non per
257rb Pv modum forme continentis, non quidem realiter differentis, sed solum
ratione. 5
Contra conclusionem arguitur. Et primo quod in substantiis compositis
non est idem quiditas cum eo cuius est. Et hoc per rationem Platonis,
dicentis materiam non pertinere ad quiditatem rei, sed solum formam.
Arguebat enim sic: quiditas non potest separari ab aliquo quod ad ipsum
pertinet; sed species substantie composite separatur a materia; ergo et 10
cetera. Minor declaratur in hiis que possunt esse in diversis materiis,
sicut circulus in ere et in ligno, ad cuius circuli quiditatem non pertinet
es neque lignum; etiam non pertineret es ad quiditatem circuli, dato
quod solum in ere inveniretur; ergo similiter, licet species hominis non
reperiatur nisi in carnibus et ossibus, partes materiales non pertinebunt 15
ad quiditatem eius.
Item, quiditas est illud quod significatur per diffinitionem; sed multe
sunt partes substantie composite, ut digitus et manus, que non cadunt in
diffinitione; ergo multe sunt partes rei que non pertinent ad quiditatem
rei, propter quod posuit Plato quod species sive in una sive in multis 20
materiis inveniatur, ad ipsam non pertinet materia. Et ex hoc concessit
quod quiditas hominis est aliud ab homine, et quod quiditas aque est aliud
ab aqua. Quod sonare videtur littera Philosophi, tertio De anima,a scilicet
aliud est aqua et aque esse.
Secundo arguitur quod in substantiis simplicibus non est idem quiditas 25
et illud cuius est quiditas, quia substantie simplices non habent quidi-
tatem, eo quod omne habens quiditatem predicatur in quid; substantie
autem simplices non predicantur in quid, cum non sint species neque
genera alicuius predicamenti, nec diffinitiones composite ex generibus et
differentiis. Neque bene dicitur quod Deus in se divinitatem habeat, quia, 30
cum divinitas sit Deus, oporteret quod Deus esset in seipso et seipsum
haberetquod videtur inconveniens.
Tertio arguitur quod in accidentibus per se non est idem quiditas cum
eo cuius est, quoniam simitas est accidens per se, cui non identificatur
sua quiditas. Nam quiditas simitatis est illud quod importatur per diffi- 35
nitionem eius; constat autem quod in diffinitione simitatis non tantum
a Aristotle, De an., III, 4, 429b1011.

ponitur concavitas, que est de essentia simitatis, sed etiam ponitur nasus,
qui est extra naturam eius; ergo nasus pertinet ad quiditatem simitatis,
non autem est idem cum simitate. Ergo et hoc videtur velle Philosophus,
tertio De anima,a dicens quod aliud est magnitudo et magnitudinis esse,
et rectum et recti esse. 5
Quarto arguitur quod in accidentibus per accidens non est idem quidi-
tas cum eo cuius est, quoniam album est accidens per accidens, cui non
identificatur sua quiditas. Probatur. Album significat subiectum et albe-
dinem. Constat autem quod quiditas albi non est idem cum subiecto, per
Philosophum, in tertia conclusione. Et quod non sit idem cum albedine 10
patet, quia, sicut diffinitio albi componitur ex subiecto et albedine, ita
quiditas componitur ex eisdem, ex quo quiditas importatur per diffinitio-
nem. Constat autem quod nullum totum identificatur sue parti: non enim
compositum ex subiecto et albedine est idem albedini, sicut nec homo est
idem anime sue. 15
Ad primum dicitur quod mathematica, quia abstrahunt a materia sen-
sibili, ideo es et lignum non pertinent ad quiditatem circuli; et quia sub-
stantie composite concernunt materiam sensibilem, ideo materia sensibi-
lis pertinet ad quiditatem hominis et aque et consimilium. Et sicut nulla
est pars hominis que non sit pars animalis rationalis, ita nulla est pars 20
hominis que non sit pars quiditatis importate per diffinitionem; et sicut
multe sunt partes hominis que non significantur per hominem neque
per suam diffinitionem, ita multe sunt tales partes que non importantur
per quiditatem hominis neque per quiditatem sue diffinitionis. Cum vero
dicit Philosophus, tertio De anima:b Aliud est aqua et aque esse, dicunt 25
aliqui quod loquitur de alietate rationis et non de alietate reali. Quod qui-
24vb M dem || non potest stare, quia statim subiungit: In quibusdam autem idem
257va Pv est caro et carnis esse. Constat autem quod caro et sua quiditas ita diffe-
runt ratione sicut aqua et quiditas aque, sive accipiatur caro pro carne
sive pro vivente abstracto. Et ideo dicitur quod illa propositio est intel- 30
ligenda in predicatione causali obliqui casus, idest: ex alio est aqua et
ex alio quiditas aque, cum principia sint diversa. Materia enim et forma
sunt principia immediata aque, sed genus et differentia sunt principia
et] ex M albi componitur inv. Pv quiditas1] albi add. Pv alietate

alietate M] ex alienitate alienitate post correct. Pv caro post carne sed cum signis
transpositionem recte faciendam indicantibus Pv
a Aristotle, De an., III, 4, 429b1011. b Aristotle, De an., III, 4, 429b1013.

196 pauli veneti
immediata quiditatis aque, ita quod ex aliis principiis est aqua et ex aliis
quiditas aque.
Ad secundum respondetur quod in substantiis simplicibus idem est
quiditas et illud cuius est quiditas. Secundum iam allegatum, in quibu-
sdam enim idem est caro et carnis esse, ubi dicit Commentator quod per 5
carnem intelligit Philosophus substantias abstractus, et per carnis esse
quiditates illarum. Et quoniam due intelligentie non possunt esse solo
numero differentes, ideo ex eisdem principiis est quiditas et illud cuius
est quiditas et individuum in substantiis abstractis. Et consequenter con-
cedo quod omnis substantia abstracta, preter Deum, est alicuius speciei 10
predicamenti substantie, alioquin frustra divideret Porphyriusa substan-
tiam in corpoream et incorpoream; Deus autem non est in predicamento
aliquo nisi per reductionem, ideo non est species predicamenti substan-
tie nisi reductive. Et hoc sufficit ad hoc quod predicetur in quid. Et non
sequitur: Deus habet in se divinitatem et divinitas est Deus, ergo Deus 15
habet in se Deum, quia, licet Deus et divinitas non differant realiter, tamen
differunt ratione seu in modo significandi, quia divinitas significat per
modum forme denominantis, Deus autem significat per modum subiecti
denominati.
Ad tertium dicitur quod nasus non est de essentia quiditatis nasi, sicut 20
non est de essentia simitatis, neque ponitur nasus in diffinitione simi-
tatis tamquam aliquid pertinens ad quiditatem aut ad essentiam eius,
sed tamquam determinans dependentiam eius, in cuius significato non
ponitur nasus in recto, in diffinitione simitatis, sed in obliquo. Cum vero
dicit Philosophus, tertio De anima:b Aliud est magnitudo et magnitudi- 25
nis esse, et aliud rectum et recti esse, ille propositiones sunt intelligende
in obliquo casu in predicatione causali, ita quod ex alio est magnitudo et
ex alio est magnitudinis esse: magnitudo enim est ex partibus quantita-
tis tamquam principiis, sed magnitudinis esse est ex genere et differen-
tia. 30
Ad quartum respondetur quod, sicut homo habet propriam quidita-
tem, et albedo habet propriam quiditatem, ita album habet quiditatem
propriam, videlicet compositam ex ambobus quiditatibus, principaliter
tamen ex quiditate albedinis, ex quo albedo se habet ut forma determi-
in1] substantiam add. Pv significato scr.] significatum MPv aliud] est add. Pv
tamquam] ex add. Pv
a Porphyry, Isag., c. De specie (AL I 67, p. 9, 19ff). b Aristotle, De an., III, 4, 429b1011.
nata et homo ut subiectum determinatum. Ideo talis quiditas non identi-

ficatur homini neque albedini, magis tamen trahitur ad quiditatem albe-
dinis quam ad quiditatem hominis.
Sophistici autem elenci h1032a6ssi.
Contra predicta, ad astruendam positionem de ydeis, Platonici facie- 5
bant aliquos sillogismos heti sophisticos elenchos, apparentes tantum et
non concludentes. Quorum solutio habetur ex prima et secunda conclu-
sionibus, unde predicata per se faciunt propositiones per se, et predicata
per accidens faciunt propositiones per accidens; constat autem quod ex
una propositione per se et altera per accidens nichil sequitur, sed est fal- 10
lacia accidentis; sicut ergo omnia talia argumenta coincidunt in eodem
fundamento falso, ita omnia solvuntur per eandem solutionem.
Arguebant enim sic Platonici: idem est Sortes et quiditas Sortis; sed
Sortes est albus; ergo idem est album et quiditas Sortis.
257vb Pv Item, | idem est homo et humanitas; sed homo currit, sedet aut dispu- 15
tat; ergo humanitas currit, sedet aut disputat.
Omnes iste obiectiones fundantur in hoc, quia, si Sortes et quiditas
25ra M Sortis sunt idem, quod sunt simpliciter idem, et si | idem est homo et
humanitas, quod sunt simpliciter idemquod falsum est, quia in aliquo
invenitur quiditas Sortis, puta in Platone, in quo non invenitur Sortes, et 20
aliquid predicatur de homine quod non predicatur de humanitate. Homo
enim, proprie loquendo, est species, non autem humanitas est species,
sed est natura specifica, sicut animalitas, proprie loquendo, est natura
generica, non autem genus, sed animal est illud quod est proprie genus:
animal enim et homo terminant questionem quid est, non autem huma- 25
nitas neque animalitas, quia, si queritur quid est hoc?, non respondetur
humanitas neque animalitas, sed respondetur quod homo aut animal.
Et sicut omnes isti sophistici elenci fundantur super eodem fundamento,
ita solvuntur eadem solutione, dicendo quod omnes peccant per fallaciam
accidentis, quia, licet Sortes et quiditas Sortis sint per se unum, non tamen 30
Sortes et album, neque homo et currens, sed per accidens, quia accidit
Sorti quod sit albus sicut accidit albo quod sit Sortes, et accidit homini
quod currat sicut accidit currenti quod sit homo.
Lege litteram: Sophistici autem elenchi ad positionem hanc platoni-
cam fundandam palam quod eadem solvuntur solutione, et si idem Socrates 35
et Socrati esse non tamen sunt idem simpliciter; nichil enim differt nec
et1 suppl. altera] alia Pv est1 om. Pv respondetur] quod add. Pv

neque] quod add. Pv
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ex quibus interrogabit utique aliquis nec ex quibus solvens fuerit, ita quod,
sicut omnes interrogationes sunt eedem, ita et eedem sunt omnes solu-
tiones. Deinde Philosophus epilogat circa determinata, dicens Quomodo
quidem igitur quod quid erat esse idem et quomodo non idem unicuique,
dictum est.a 5
Notandum primo, secundum Commentatorem, commento vice-
simo primo, quod sophistice querebant si homo est unus: si respon-
detur ita!, dicetur nonne homo est animal et rationale?; ergo est
unum et non unum . Et dicetur eis quod homo et sua diffinitio
sunt unum in actu et plura in potentia.b 10
Interrogabant ergo sophistice si homo est unum aut non: si non, ergo, per
idem, nulla alia substantia composita est una; si sic, cum ergo homo sit
animal et rationale, ergo homo est plura, et per consequens est unum et
non unum. Respondet Commentator, dicens quod homo et sua diffinitio
sunt unum et plura, sed non eodem modo: sunt enim unum in actu et 15
plura in potentia. Unde homo et animal rationale sunt unum in actu,
in quantum sunt una res, sunt autem plura in potentia, in quantum
sunt plures intentiones habentes diversos modos significandi, per quos
diversimode possunt movere intellectum.
mento, quod forte questio Sophistarum est ista: quiditas hominis
aut est aliud cum homine aut eadem. Si aliud, tunc homo non habe-
bit cognitionem; si idem, tunc quiditas hominis est homo, et homo
habet quiditatem; ergo quiditas habet quiditatem, et sic in infinitum.
Et solutio est quoniam quiditas hominis est homo uno modo et non 25
alio modo idest est forma hominis et non est homo qui est congre-
gatus ex materia et forma.c
Querebant ergo sophistice utrum quiditas hominis sit homo vel aliud ab
homine: si aliud ab homine, ergo homo non potest perfecte cognosci, quia
nichil perfecte cognoscitur per aliud a se. Constat autem quod homo non 30
perfecte cognoscitur nisi per quiditatem. Si autem quiditas hominis est
sophistice] sophiste Iunt. respondetur] quod add. Iunt. dicetur] dicunt Iunt.
una res] mg. Pv Notandum secundo inv. Pv aliud1 eadem] eadem aliud
Iunt. : aliud (sed del.) cum homine eadem aut aliud Pv cognitionem] quiditatem Iunt.
habet2] habebit Iunt. non] est homo add. Iunt.
t.c. 21, fol. 171H. c Averroes, In Met., VII, t.c. 21, fol. 171I.
homo et homo habet quiditatem, ergo quiditas hominis habet quiditatem,

et, per idem, alia quiditas habet quiditatem, et sic erit processus in infini-
tum in quiditatibus.
Respondet Commentator quod homo et quiditas hominis non sunt
simpliciter idem, nec simpliciter diversa: humanitas enim est homo in 5
258ra Pv quantum non est forma | partis hominis, sed forma totius; differt autem ab
homine in quantum non importat compositum ex materia et forma, sicut
25rb M homo. Ymaginatur enim Commentator quod humanitas significat | natu-
ram humanam cum precisione suppositorum, nullum scilicet supposi-
tum neque determinatum neque indeterminatum includendo; sed homo 10
significat naturam humanam non cum exclusione suppositorum, ymmo
significat eam ut in supposito, non tamen hoc aut illo determinato; Sor-
tes vero significat eandem naturam ut in supposito determinato. Et ideo
nec Sortes nec homo est formaliter humanitas, sed tantum identice, et
hoc propter diversos modos significandi. Dicit enim Avicennaa quod qui- 15
ditas significat per modum partis formalis et denominantis, sed habens
quiditatem significatur per modum totius, quia dicit illam naturam non
absolute, sed in supposito.
Nec propter hoc debet intelligi quod quiditas sumatur tantum a forma,
ut dixerunt Platonici et plures sequentes, sed a toto composito, secun- 20
dum quod includit formam et materiam speciei. Dicitur autem pro tanto
habere rationem partis formalis, quia habet rationem denominantis, quod
est proprium forme, unde et ab humanitate denominatur homo; illud
autem quod denominat est sicut forma. Et quoniam quiditas significat
per modum forme et habens quiditatem per modum compositi, dicit bea- 25
tus Thomas, una cum Alexandro, Alberto et Egidio,b quod, sicut hec est
impossibilis album est albedo, ita hec est impossibilis homo est humani-
tas, ac etiam quelibet istarum animal est animalitas, rationale est ratio-
nalitas, quia humanitas non est species, sed principium speciei, neque
animalitas est genus, sed principium generis, neque rationalitas est dif- 30
ferentia, sed principium differentie. Non ergo humanitas est homo, sed
principium hominis, neque animalitas est animal, sed principium anima-
lis, non etiam rationalitas est rationale, sed principium rationalis. Et ex
tamen] autem M albedo] dulcedo M
a Paul may have in mind Avicennas remarks in Phil. Pr., tr. V, c. 5, pp. 274, 57276, 83.
b Aquinas, Exp. Met., VII, lect. 5, nn. 13789; Alexander of Alexandria, Exp. Met., VII, c. 6,
q. 6, fol. 203rb; Albert, Met., Lib. VII, tr. 2, c. 1, p. 339, 4055; Giles of Rome, Q. Metaph., Lib.
VII, q. 3, ed. Venice 1501, fol. 28vb.
200 pauli veneti
hoc sequitur quod Sortes, licet sit homo et rationalis, non tamen est huma-
nitas neque animalitas neque rationalitas.
Ista sententia videtur aliqualiter aliena ab intentione Commentato-
ris, quoniam Commentator concedit quod Sortes nichil aliud est quam
animalitas et rationalitas, ex qua propositione, una cum istis Sortes est 5
aliquid et animalitas et rationalitas est aliquid, sequitur quod Sortes
est animalitas et rationalitas, quia ex opposito sequitur oppositum. Unde
sequitur Sortes non est animalitas nec rationalitas, et Sortes est aliquid
et animalitas est aliquid et rationalitas est aliquid, ergo Sortes est aliud
ab animalitate et rationalitatecuius oppositum asserit Commentator, 10
dicens quod Sortes nichil aliud est quam animalitas et rationalitas. Patet
consequentia ab exponentibus ad expositam. Si ergo Sortes est animalitas
et rationalitas, sequitur quod animal est animalitas et rationale est ratio-
nalitas, tamquam ab inferiori ad suum superius.
Deinde dicit Commentator quod quiditas hominis est aliquo modo 15
homo, quod quidem non esset dicendum si hec esset impossibilis huma-
nitas est homo, sicut ista album est albedo: sicut enim albedo nullo
modo est alba, neque album aliquo modo est albedo, ita deberet dicere
Commentator quod humanitas nullo modo est homo et quod homo nullo
modo est humanitas. Constat autem quod non est bona similitudo, quia 20
humanitas est forma totius et albedo est forma partis: humanitas dicit
totam naturam hominis, albedo autem non dicit totam naturam albi.
Sicut ergo animal non predicatur de homine, quia est forma hominis
dicens totam naturam hominis, ita humanitas debet predicari de homine,
ex quo non est forma partis, sed forma totius, dicens totam naturam homi- 25
nis.
Preterea, humanitas est substantia de predicamento substantie, ex
quo, per Commentatorem et illos, humanitas nichil aliud est quam homo;
ergo humanitas est homo vel equus aut lapis aut lignum, et sic de aliis
258rb Pv speciebus substantie. Tenet consequentia, quia a genere ad omnes suas | 30
species disiunctim acceptas est bona consequentia. Sic enim arguit Phi-
25va M losophus, primo Phisicorum,a contra Parmenidem | et Melissum, ut si
omnia sunt substantia, ergo omnia sunt homo vel omnia sunt equus vel
sententia] intentio M est1 om. Pv rationalitas] et add. Pv expositam]

expositum Pv est2 om. Pv acceptas] sumptas Pv vel1] aut Pv
a Aristotle, Phys., I, 3 passim.

animalia, et sic de aliis. Constat autem quod humanitas non est equus
neque lignum neque lapis, et sic de aliis speciebus; ergo humanitas est
homo.
Respondetur concedendo omnes propositiones nominatas non in pre-
dicatione formali, sed identica. Diversitas enim modorum significandi 5
non tollit predicationem concreti de abstracto, quia tunc non esset verum
dicere quod Deus est deitas, aut quod ens sit entitas, et consequenter
omnes iste essent false homo est animal, homo est rationalis, homo est
animal rationale, quia continue subiectum et predicatum habent alium et
alium modum significandi. Si enim quiditas est idem cum eo cuius est qui- 10
ditas, ut sepe a Commentatore concessum est, necesse est quod utrumque
de altero predicetur. Unde, si materia esset tota substantia ignis, ipsa esset
ignis, et si esset tota substantia aque, ipsa esset aqua; sed humanitas est
tota substantia hominis et animalitas est tota substantia animalis, et gene-
raliter quelibet quiditas est tota substantia illius cuius est quiditas; ergo 15
humanitas est homo et animalitas est animal, et generaliter quelibet qui-
ditas est illud cuius est quiditas.
Contra istam rationem arguitur, inferendo quod quiditas habet quidi-
tatem, et quod est genus vel species, et quod corruptibile est incorrupti-
bile, et communicabile incommunicabile, que omnia sunt impossibilia. Et 20
quod hec omnia sequantur, arguitur. Quoniam Sortes habet quiditatem,
et Sortes est quiditas per concessum, ergo quiditas habet quiditatem, si
etiam homo est humanitas et animal animalitas.
Constat autem quod homo est species et animal est genus; ergo huma-
nitas est species et animalitas est genus. 25
Deinde, omnis homo est corruptibilis. Si ergo humanitas est homo,
sequitur quod humanitas est corruptibilis; constat autem ipsam esse in-
corruptibilem, quia species sunt eterne; ergo corruptibile est incorrupti-
bile.
Iterum, nullus est homo nec aliquod est animal quin ipsum sit incom- 30
municabile; ergo humanitas est incommunicabilis, si ipsa sit aliquis
homo, et animalitas est incommunicabilis, si ipsa est aliquod animal. Con-
stat autem quod tam humanitas quam animalitas est incommunicabilis,
ex quo invenitur in multis; ergo et cetera.
Ad primum negatur illa consequentia Sortes habet quiditatem et Sor- 35
tes est quiditas, ergo quiditas habet quiditatem, quia non concluditur
habent] habet Pv concessum est inv. Pv tota om. M est] et M

202 pauli veneti
maior extremitas de minori in conclusione, eo quod ly habens inclusum

in illo verbo habet est adiectivum Sortis in minori et in conclusione est
adiectivum quiditatis. Sed solum sequitur quod quiditas est Sortes habens
quiditatem, sicut etiam non sequitur iste faber est bonus, et iste faber est
aliquis homo, ergo aliquis homo est bonus, sed solum sequitur quod ali- 5
quis homo est bonus faber. Et ita dictum est supra quod non sequitur iste
homo currit, et iste homo est humanitas, ergo humanitas currit, sed solum
sequitur quod humanitas est homo currens.
Ad secundum negatur illa consequentia homo est species et homo est
humanitas, ergo humanitas est species. Primo, quia ex puris particulari- 10
bus vel indefinitis nichil sequitur; secundo, quia est fallacia accidentis, ex
quo accidit homini quod sit species, in quantum species habet rationem
predicabilis. Et si arguitur sic, in tertia figura, homo est species et omnis
homo est humanitas, ergo humanitas est species, negatur consequentia,
quia est sillogismus quatuor terminorum, ex quo ly homo in maiori habet 15
suppositionem simplicem et in minori personalem. Consimiliter negatur
quelibet illarum consequentiarum animal est genus, et animal est ani-
malitas, ergo animalitas est genus, animal est genus, et omne animal est
animalitas, ergo animalitas est genus.
Ad tertium negatur quelibet illa consequentia omnis homo est cor- 20
258va Pv ruptibilis, omnis homo est humanitas, ergo humanitas est | corruptibilis,
quia arguitur ex quatuor terminis propter variationem maioris extremita-
25vb M tis in conclusione, eo quod ly corruptibilis in maiori est adiectivum | illius
termini homo et in conclusione illius termini humanitas; ideo non con-
cluditur maior extremitas de minori in conclusione; sed sequitur solum ex 25
illis premissis quod humanitas est homo corruptibilis. Unde, in simili, non
sequitur omnis homo est albus, omnis homo est monachus, ergo omnis
monachus est albus: dato enim quod omnis homo sit albus secundum
colorem faciei et sit ordinis sancti Benedicti, cuius habitus est coloris nigri,
antecedens est verum et consequens falsum. Sed solum sequitur quod ali- 30
quis monachus est homo albus.
Ad quartum consimiliter respondetur negando illam consequentiam
nullus est homo quin ipse sit incommunicabilis, aliqua humanitas est
homo, ergo aliqua humanitas est incommunicabilis, sed solum sequitur
quod aliqua humanitas est homo incommunicabilis. Ita conceditur de 35
animalitate, quod ipsa est animal incommunicabile, licet ipsa sit commu-
genus1] idest add. M et om. M

nicabilis. Hec tamen propositio communicabile est incommunicabile est

distinguenda, eo quod predicatum potest esse adiectivum subiecti, et sic
est falsa, et potest teneri in neutro genere substantivato, et sic est vera,
quia equivalet huic communicabile est res incommunicabilis. Etiam hec
est falsa corruptibile est incorruptibile, si predicatum fuerit adiectivum 5
subiecti; si autem steterit in neutro genere substantivato, illa est conce-
denda, eo quod corruptibile est res incorruptibilis: Sortes enim, qui est
corruptibilis, est humanitas incorruptibilis, et animalitas, que est commu-
nicabilis, est Sortes incommunicabilis.
Intelligendum quod Philosophus hunc tractatum fecit ut ostenderet 10
contra opinionem Platonis quiditates non de necessitate separatas esse
propter scientiam acquirendam. Convenerunt ergo Philosophus et Plato
in hoc quod omnis scientia dependet a sensibilibus quiditatibus, sic quod
remotis quiditatibus removetur scientia et eis positis, cum debita applica-
tione ad intellectum, ponitur scientia. In alio autem disconvenerunt, quia 15
Plato voluit quiditates rerum sensibilium separari a rebus sensibilibus
loco et subiecto et esse in orbe signorum, et per se posse movere intel-
lectum possibilem absque auxilio intellectus agentis existentis in nobis;
Aristoteles autem posuit quiditates coniunctas rebus sensibilibus et iden-
tificari illis, nec posse movere intellectum nisi in singularibus medianti- 20
bus fantasmatibus. Et quia singularia sunt potentia intelligibilia, necesse
est ponere intellectum agentem copulatum intellectui possibili, remo-
ventem potentialitatem singularium et privationem fantasmatum, ut vir-
tute illius, tamquam omnia facientis, quiditates rerum sensibilium pos-
sint intellectum possibilem movere ad actum intelligendi et ad scientiam 25
acquirendam. Sed beatus Augustinus dicit quod hec quiditas non suffi-
cit cum lumine intellectus agentis, sed ultra requiritur quiditas separata,
que est ydea in mente divina, ac lumen prime intelligentie, in qua virtua-
liter continetur lumen intellectus agentis, cum enim scientia debeat esse
immutabilium et necessariorum. Constat autem quod intellectus mutabi- 30
lis est, cum sit pura potentia, et fantasmata mutabilia sunt, quia generan-
tur et corrumpuntur. Quiditates etiam coniuncte sensibilibus mutantur
simul cum ipsis, neque necessitatem et perpetuitatem habent ex se, sed
solum ex necessitate et perpetuitate ydealium quiditatum existentium in
mente divina, que quidem de se immutabiles sunt, ac forme simpliciter 35
necessarie et sempiterne. Sicut ergo nichil fit ab agente particulari nisi fiat
Philosophus] Aristoteles Pv
204 pauli veneti
in virtute prime cause, ita nichil scitur per quiditates rerum sensibilium
nisi in virtute ydealium quiditatum; et sicut nichil videtur in lumine lune
258vb Pv formaliter quin illud videatur in lumine solis virtualiter, | eo quod lumen
lune essentialiter dependet a lumine solis, ita principia et conclusiones
26ra M non intelliguntur formaliter in lumine | intellectus agentis quin virtuali- 5
ter intelligantur in lumine prime intelligentie.
Non ergo ad scientiam acquirendam requiruntur quiditates ydeales
orbis signorum, quas Plato prius designavit, neque sufficiunt quiditates
predicabiles rerum sensibilium, quas Aristoteles posterius docuit, sed
ultra requiruntur quiditates exemplares existentes in intellectu primi 10
entis, quas Augustinus subtilius adinvenit.
hTRACTATUS IIi
hCAPITULUM Ii
Horum autem que fiunt h1032a12ssi.

Iste est secundus tractatus huius septimi Metaphisice, in quo Philoso-
phus ostendit contra Platonem quod non requiruntur quiditates ydeales 5
separate propter generationem, postquam manifestavit in primo tractatu
quod ille non requiruntur propter scientiam.
Dividitur ergo tractatus iste in quatuor capitula, in quorum primo
Philosophus demonstrat quod quiditas non est effectus generatus; in
secundo quod non est causa generationis, ibi: Utrum ergo quedam 10
h1033b19ssi; in tertio ostendit quomodo se habet quod quid est ad partes
suas, ibi: Quoniam vero diffinitio h1034b20ssi; in quarto autem quomodo
quod quid est dicitur esse unum, ibi: Nunc autem dicamus h1037b8ssi.
Primum capitulum dividitur in duas partes, in quarum prima Philoso-
phus premittit unam distinctionem; in secunda vero exequitur de intento 15
per conclusiones, ibi: Omnia vero que fiunt h1032a13ssi.
Quantum ad primum Philosophus premittit hanc distinctionem, quod
eorum que fiunt, quedam fiunt a natura et quedam ab arte et quedam a
casu. Hec distinctio colligitur ex determinatis secundo Phisicorum.a Nam
omnia que fiunt, aut fiunt a causa per se aut a causa per accidens. Si a causa 20
per se, aut ergo illa causa est principium motus eius in quo est, et sic est
natura; aut est principium motus eius in quo non est, et sic est ars. Omnia
ergo que fiunt a causa per se fiunt ab arte vel a natura. Si autem aliqua
fiunt a causa per accidens, illa dicuntur fieri a casu, in quantum fiunt
preter intentionem agentis. Si enim agens fuerit intellectus, illa dicuntur 25
fieri a fortuna; si autem non intellectus, illa dicuntur fieri a casu: inventio
enim thesauri et reportatio pecunie a debitore preter intentionem agentis
dicuntur fieri a fortuna; evasio autem mortis equi currentis de palea ad
primo tractatu inv. Pv intellectus scr.] intellectum MPv intellectus scr.]

intellectum MPv
a Aristotle, Phys., II, 1; 46.

206 pauli veneti
stabulum, aut statio super pede tripode descendentis deorsum, dicitur

fieri a casu. Omnia tamen que dicuntur fieri a fortuna, etiam dicuntur
fieri a casu, quia casus in plus se habet quam fortuna et est genus eius,
ut habetur secundo Phisicorum.a
Lege litteram: Horum autem que fiunt hec quidem natura fiunt, hec 5
autem arte, alia autem a casu.b
Notandum, secundum Commentatorem, commento altero et vice-
simo, quod Aristoteles intendit in hoc capitulo declarare quoniam
forme Platonis nichil prosunt ad generationem, quoniam cum de-
struxit eas non prodesse in scientia, si concesserimus eas esse, vult 10
in hoc capitulo destruere eas non prodesse in generatione. Et dixit
quod omne quod generatur, hgeneraturi ab aliquo trium: aut a
natura aut ab artificio aut ex se, scilicet a casu.c
Necessitas ergo huius capituli et huius tractatus est ad destruendum opi-
nionem Platonicorum de ydeis. Posuit enim Plato ydeas propter tria, sci- 15
licet propter scientiam, dicens sensibilium non posse esse scientiam; et
propter esse rerum sensibilium, asserens sensibilia non habere esse nisi ex
259ra Pv partecipatione | ydearum; et etiam propter generationem, ut essent prin-
cipia generationis et forme exemplares ipsorum generatorum. In primo
namque tractatu probatum est non esse ponendum ydeas propter duo 20
prima, scilicet propter scientiam et propter esse rerum sensibilium; ymmo
26rb M potius positis ydeis tollitur scientia | et esse rerum sensibilium. In hoc
autem tractatu probatur quod sensibilia non generantur ex aliquibus for-
mis extra materiam existentibus. Quo habito, manifestum est ydeas, que
sunt forme a materia separate, nichil valere ad sensibilium generationem. 25
Sed si Plato posuisset ydeas in mente divina, sicut posuit in orbe signo-
rum, ipse necessarie essent ad generationem, sicut et ad scientiam et ad
esse rerum sensibilium, quia omnia que fiunt, fiunt ab arte existente in
intellectu primi motoris, ut vult Commentator, duodecimo huius.d Con-
stat autem talem artem esse ydeam, sicut et domus existens in mente 30
edificatoris dicitur ydea domus existentis in lapidibus et lignis, et sanitas
horum] eorum Moerb.(horum P-[Uu GpNeUj To]) a om. Moerb. quoniam] quod
Iunt. generatur suppl. ex Iunt. a om. Iunt. et] ac Pv ut] scilicet add. Pv
propter1 om. Pv
a Aristotle, Phys., II, 6, 197a36197b1. b Aristotle, Met., VII, 7, 1032a1213 (AL XXV 3.2, p. 142,
lin. 292293). c Averroes, In Met., VII, t.c. 22, fol. 172DE. d Averroes, In Met., XII, t.c. 18,
fol. 305I; t.c. 24, fol. 309F; t.c. 51, fol. 336AB.
expositio in duodecim libros metaphisice aristotelis ii 207
existens in intellectu medici vocatur ydea sanitatis existentis in corpore

temperato, quia ad similitudinem illius facit medicus sanitatem in humo-
ribus adequatis et domificator domificat domum in lapidibus et lignis.
Beatus autem Augustinus dicita quod alia ratione conditus est homo et alia
ratione conditus est equus. Constat autem quod tales rationes sunt ydee 5
in intellectu prime cause, sine quibus nichil agit, sicut nec domificator nec
medicus sine arte existente in mente eius. Et ideo omne quod generatur
a natura, generatur etiam ab artificio prime cause, licet non generetur ab
artificio cause secundarie.
Loquitur ergo Philosophus et Commentator de causa particulari et 10
propinqua cum dicit: omne quod generatur, aut generatur a natura, aut
ab arte, aut a casu.b Dicitur autem illud quod generatur a casu, generatur
ex se, prout ly ex se dicit privationem cause determinate. Unde causa
per se est causa determinata attingens effectum quem intendit, casus
vero est causa indeterminata attingens effectum quem non intendit, sed 15
vanum est causa determinata non attingens effectum quem intendit.
Unde, si aliquis exeat domum causa deponendi cibum et videndi amicum,
et revertatur deposito cibo, non tamen viso amico sed debitore a quo
reportavit pecuniam preter intentionem, in hoc casu homo ille est causa
per se respectu depositionis cibi et causa vana respectu visionis amici; est 20
autem casus respectu reportationis pecunie a debitore.
Omnia vero que fiunt h1032a13ssi.

Ista est secunda pars huius capituli, in qua Philosophus, premissa dis-
tinctione necessaria ad propositum suum, exequitur de intento per qua-
tuor conclusiones, quarum prima est hec: cuiuslibet generati tria sunt 25
principia, videlicet efficiens, materia et forma. Secunda conclusio: cuiusli-
bet quod generatur aliqua pars prefuit, ibi: Quare sicut dicitur
h1032b30ssi. Tertia conclusio: in omni generatione illud quod fit est com-
positum et non materia neque forma, ibi: Quoniam vero ab aliquo
h1033a24ssi. Quarta conclusio: in nulla generatione illud quod fit est qui- 30
ditas rei sensibilis, ibi: Neque quod quid erat esse h1033b7ssi.
Prima conclusio patet ex eo quia omnis generatio est motus, per Ari-
stotelem in Postpredicamentis.c Omnis autem motus est actus motivi et
nec2] aut Pv eius] illius Pv indeterminata] determinata M motivi] moti Pv
a Augustine, De Div. Quaest. 83, q. 46, ed. Mutzenbecher, p. 72, lin. 5152. b Cf. supra, p. 205,
1719; 206, 56. c Aristotle, Cat., 14, 15a1.

208 pauli veneti
mobilis in quantum huiusmodi et est actus entis in potentia secundum

quod in potentia, per ipsum, tertio Phisicorum.a Sicut ergo in omni motu
requiritur movens et motum et terminus ad quem, ita in qualibet gene-
ratione invenitur illa tria, scilicet generans, materia et forma. Sicut ergo
cuiuslibet quod movetur tria sunt principia, videlicet motor, mobile et ter- 5
minus ad quem, ita cuiuslibet quod generatur tria sunt principia, scilicet
efficiens, materia et forma. Hec autem forma invenitur in quolibet pre-
dicamento, scilicet substantie, quantitatis et cetera, quoniam generatio
aliquando terminatur per formam substantialem, aliquando per quanti-
tatem et sic de aliis, quoniam aliquando generatur substantia, aliquando 10
quantitas, aliquando vero quando vel ubi et sic de aliis.
Lege litteram: Omnia vero que fiunt ab aliquo fiunt tamquam ab effi-
ciente et ex aliquo tamquam ex materia et aliquid terminat factionem
26va M tamquam forma. Hoc autem aliquid || dico secundum quamlibet cathego-
259rb Pv riam; aut enim hoc, scilicet substantia, aut quantum aut quale aut quando.b 15
Dubitatur, quia dicit Philosophus, quinto Phisicorum,c quod tantum
in tribus predicamentis est motus, videlicet in quantitate, qualitate et
ubi; hic autem dicit quod in quolibet predicamento aliquid fit tamquam
terminus generationis.
Respondetur quod duplex est motus, scilicet per se et per accidens. 20
Motus per se stricte sumptus, ut distinguitur contra generationem, non est
nisi in tribus predicamentis nominatis; motus autem per se large sumptus,
ut est quoddam commune ad generationem et corruptionem, invenitur in
quatuor predicamentis, per Philosophum et Commentatorem, tertio Phi-
sicorum d, scilicet substantia, quantitate, qualitate et ubi. Motus autem per 25
accidens invenitur in omnibus predicamentis: motus enim specificatur
a termino ad quem, ut habetur quinto Phisicorum;e constat autem quod
terminus ad quem non invenitur nisi in quatuor predicamentis, terminus
autem per accidens potest inveniri in quolibet predicamento.
efficiens materia et forma] materia et forma efficiens Pv et sic de aliis om. Pv

quantitas] quantum aliquando quale Pv vel] et Pv et sic de aliis om.
Pv tertio Phisicorum post Philosophum (lin. 24) Pv scilicet] in add. Pv
quantitate] et ubi et add. et del. Pv
a Aristotle, Phys., III, 1, 201a1011; a2729. b Aristotle, Met., VII, 7, 1032a1315 (AL XXV 3.2,
p. 142, lin. 293296). c Aristotle, Phys., V, 1, 225b59; 2 passim. d Aristotle, Phys., III, 1,
200b33201a3; Averroes, In Phys., III, t.c. 4, fol. 87 A, D. e Aristotle, Phys., V, 1, 224b78.
Intendit ergo Philosophus ostendere quod, sive generetur aliquid per se

sive per accidens, necesse est cuiuslibet generati tria sint principia, videli-
cet efficiens, materia et forma. De privatione autem non loquitur Philoso-
phus, quia est principium per accidens et corrumpitur in adventu forme.
De fine autem non loquitur, quia coincidit in idem numero cum forma aut 5
cum composito generato, ut probatur secundo Phsicorum.a Loquitur ergo
Philosophus de principiis per se numeraliter distinctis manentibus in fine
generationis, et de fieri et generari large ut se extendit tam ad generatio-
nem per se quam ad generationem per accidens.
Et generationes h1032a15ssi. 10
Istam primam conclusionem Philosophus inductive probat, et primo in
generationibus naturalibus; secundo in generationibus artificialibus, ibi:
Generationes vero alie h1032a26ssi; tertio in generationibus casualibus,
ibi: Si vero a casu h1032b23ssi.
Primo ergo probat Philosophus necessitatem trium nominatorum prin- 15
cipium in qualibet generatione naturali, intelligens per generationem
naturalem illam que fit a natura et non ab arte neque a casu. Talis autem
est duplex, videlicet simpliciter et secundum quid. Generatio simpliciter
est generatio substantie et generatio secundum quid est generatio acci-
dentis, ut habetur primo Phisicorum et primo De generatione.b Unde quili- 20
bet motus et quelibet mutatio denominatur a termino ad quem, ut proba-
tur quinto Phisicorum;c constat autem quod substantia est ens simpliciter
et accidens est ens secundum quid, ut probatum est tractatu primo huius
septimi;d ergo generatio substantie est generatio simpliciter et generatio
accidentis est generatio secundum quid. 25
In generatione autem substantie inveniuntur illa tria principia, quia
necesse est dare aliquid ex quo fit generatio, et hoc est materia, et aliquid
a quo fit generatio, et hoc est efficiens. Iterum, oportet dare aliquid quod
generatur per illam generationem, scilicet homo vel planta aut aliquod
tale, quod maxime dicimus esse substantiam eo quod substantia sensibilis 30
est nobis maxime manifesta, ut ostensum est tractatu precedentie. Non
generationes] autem add. Pv quem] quod Pv hoc om. M precedenti]

precedente Pv
a Aristotle, Phys., II, 7, 198a2427. b Aristotle, Phys., I, 7, 190a3133; De gen., I, 3, 319a814 et
passim. c Aristotle, Phys., V, 1, 224b78. d Cf. supra, tr. I, c. 1, p. 31, 34. e Cf. supra, tr. I, c.
1, p. 59, 57.
210 pauli veneti
autem generatur homo vel planta nisi ratione forme terminantis genera-
tionem, ideo forma est tertium principium tam generationis substantialis
naturalis quam ipsius geniti per illam generationem. Et ratio huius neces-
sitatis est ista, quoniam tria sunt de ratione generationis substantialis.
Primum quod sit actus entis in potentia secundum quod in potentia, ut 5
habetur tertio Phisicorum;a et propter hoc requiritur materia que de se
est in potentia et non in actu, ut probatur primo Phisicorum et septimo
huius.b Secundum est quod sit actus generantis tanquam instrumentum
eius, sicut motus est actus moventis, ut habetur tertio Phisicorum;c propter
quod de necessitate requiritur efficiens. Tertium quod sit via in naturam, 10
ut habet videri secundo Phisicorum;d propter quod requiritur forma, quia
forma ad quam est generatio est natura, ut probatur ibidem. Hec etiam
tria inveniuntur in generatione naturali secundum quid: cum enim gene-
259va Pv ratur quantum aut quale, requiritur subiectum de se || deferens genera-
26vb M tionem et motum; requiritur etiam agens quantificans aut qualificans; ite- 15
rum requiritur quantitas aut qualitas terminans generationem et motum,
a qua denominatur aliquid quantum aut quale.
Lege litteram: Et generationes autem naturales quidem hee sunt qua-
rum generatio ex natura est. Hoc autem ex quo fit, quod dicimus mate-
riam; hoc autem a quo eorum que natura aliquid sunt; hoc autem aliquid 20
ut homo vel planta aut aliud quid talium, que maxime dicimus substantias
esse.e
Circa probationem huius conclusionis duo occurrunt dubia, quorum
quodlibet Philosophus solvit. Primum est quod in omni generatione natu-
rali requiruntur duo principia tantum, scilicet efficiens et forma. Signum 25
ad hoc manifestum est eo quod generatio est mutatio de non-esse ad
esse; constat autem quod nichil potest se ipsum deducere de non-esse
ad esse; ergo preter illud quod per generationem capit esse, oportet dare
agens tribuens illud esse. Non autem apparet aliquod signum manifestum
per quod convincatur materiam esse principium in qualibet generatione 30
naturali.
substantialis naturalis inv. Pv primum] add. est Pv quod sit om. M

tertium] est add. Pv habet videri inv. Pv et] aut M aliquid] aliquod M
quod] quam Moerb. vel] aut Moerb. (vel P1b)
a Aristotle, Phys., III, 1, 201a1011. b Aristotle, Phys., I, 9, 192a2729; Met., VII, 3, 1029a2026.
c Aristotle, Phys., III, 1, 201a2729. d Aristotle, Phys., II, 1, 193b1213. e Aristotle, Met., VII, 7,
1032a1519 (AL XXV 3.2, pp. 142143, lin. 296300).

Respondet Philosophus quod, sicut exitus de non-esse ad esse est sig-

num manifestans agens et formam, ita potentia ad non-esse est signum
declarans materiam. Omnia enim que fiunt, sive fiant a natura sive ab
arte, habent materiam ex eo quia possunt esse et non esse: materia enim
est illud per quod res potest esse et non esse. Deus enim et intelligentie 5
non possunt esse et non esse, sed perpetuo necessitantur in esse, quia non
habent materiam.
Lege litteram: Omnia vero que fiunt aut natura aut arte habent mate-
riam; possibile enim et esse et non esse eorum quodlibet, hoc autem est que
in unoquoque materia, scilicet generabili et corruptibili.a 10
Secundum dubium: si cuiuslibet generationis sint tria principia
materia, efficiens et formaet naturale dicitur a natura, sicut et princi-
piatum dicitur a suis principiis, sequitur quod tam de efficiente quam de
materia et forma dicitur naturacuius oppositum habetur secundo Phi-
sicorum,b ubi probatur naturam non dici nisi de materia et forma; ipsum 15
autem compositum est ens naturale seu ens habens naturam.
Istud solvit Philosophus, dicens: concedo tam efficiens quam formam
esse aliquo modo naturam. Materia enim est natura ex eo quia ipsa
est principium passivum in generatione naturali, unde generatio ele-
mentorum non dicitur naturalis nisi ratione materie, eo quod genera- 20
tio illorum non fit ab intrinseco, sed ab extrinseco. Dicit enim Com-
mentator, secundo Phisicorum,c quod corpora simplicia habent princi-
pium in se ipsis motus localis secundum formam et motus alterationis
secundum materiam, ita quod moventur localiter a se ipsis, sed alte-
rantur ab alio. Numquam ergo forma in eis movetur per se alterative, 25
sed tantum localiter; materia autem illorum utroque motu movetur. Si
ergo materia est natura, quia est subiectum generationis naturalis, per
idem terminus ad quem est natura, quia generatio est via in naturam:
omnis enim mutatio denominatur a termino ad quem. Terminus autem
ad quem formalis est forma et materialis est compositum ex materia 30
et forma, et per consequens uterque terminus est natura, scilicet tam
forma quam compositum, ut animal aut planta: forma est natura quia
terminat primo et per se generationem naturalem, compositum vero est
dicitur om. Pv a suis principiis scr.] denominatur add. M : denominatur a suis

principiis Pv concedo] concedendo Pv movetur scr.] movet MPv
a Aristotle, Met., VII, 7, 1032a2022 (AL XXV 3.2, p. 143, lin. 300303). b Aristotle, Phys., II, 1
passim. c Averroes, In Phys., II, t.c. 1, fol. 48EF.

212 pauli veneti
naturale non solum quia terminat generationem, sed etiam quia habet
in se naturam. Efficiens autem, cum sit eiusdem speciei cum genito, licet
individualiter differat ab eo, oportet quod sit eiusdem nature cum eo. Si
ergo genitum est natura, oportet quod generans sit etiam natura: sicut
enim homo generans, ita homo generatus debet dici natura. 5
Lege litteram: Universaliter vero et ex quo, idest materia, est natura et
259vb Pv secundum quod, idest generatum, est natura (factum | enim habet natu-
27ra M ram, ut planta aut | animal) et a quo, idest generans, etiam est natura.
Nam que secundum speciem dicta, idest forma genita, est natura que eius-
dem speciei est cum forma generantis (hoc autem in alio est quam forma 10
genita); homo namque hominem generat. Et concludit Philosophus,
dicens: Sic ergo quidem fiunt que fiunt propter naturam.a
Notandum primo, secundum Commentatorem, commento altero et
vicesimo, quod sermo eius est de generabilibus que sunt in pre-
dicamento substantie, hquei dicuntur generari proprie; generabilia 15
autem que sunt in aliis predicamentis magis dicuntur pati quam
generari.b
Unde generatio proprie loquendo est mutatio de non-esse ad esse; con-
stat autem quod generabilia predicamenti substantie, ut animal et planta,
mutantur de non-esse ad esse; ideo talia proprie generantur. Generabilia 20
autem predicamentorum accidentium non proprie generantur, quia non
mutantur de non-esse ad esse, sed de non-esse tale ad esse tale. Calidum
enim et frigidum, album et nigrum, mutantur de contrario in contrarium,
non autem de contradictorio in contradictorium; ideo, si calidum fit fri-
gidum aut si album fit nigrum, non mutatur calidum aut frigidum, album 25
vel nigrum, de esse ad non-esse neque de non-esse ad esse, sed de esse
tali ad esse tale. Non enim calidum desinit esse neque album, sed cali-
dum desinit esse calidum et album desinit esse album; frigidum autem
econtra aut nigrum non incipit esse, sed frigidum incipit esse frigidum
et nigrum incipit esse nigrum. Talia ergo non proprie generantur et cor- 30
rumpuntur, sed proprie patiuntur per alterationem. Quia ergo generabilia
predicamenti substantie sunt illa tantum que proprie generantur, ideo de
hiis solum facit Philosophus specialem mentionem.
naturale] pro natura? sicut] sic Pv ita] sicut Pv hoc] hec Moerb. ergo
quidem] quidem igitur Moerb. que suppl. ex Iunt. et2] nec Pv
a Aristotle, Met., VII, 7, 1032a2226 (AL XXV 3.2, p. 143, lin. 303308). b Averroes, In Met.,
VII, t.c. 22, fol. 172F.
Notandum secundo, secundo Commentatorem, eodem commento,

quod Aristoteles dixit aut simile propter illa que generantur a na-
tura communi duabus formis diversis, ut mulus ab equo et ab asino.a
Philosophus in antiqua translationeb dicit quod generans aliquando est
eiusdem speciei cum genito, ut quando homo generat hominem; ali- 5
quando est simile ei propter conformitatem ad unum, ut quando equa
et asinus generant mulum. Generans ergo et genitum aliquando sunt
eiusdem nature, scilicet in generatione univoca, et aliquando sunt eius-
dem nature generice, scilicet in generatione equivoca et maxime quando
unum generatur a duobus convenientibus in forma communi generica, ut 10
exemplificatum est.
Dubitatur circa illam propositionem materia est illud per quod res
potest esse et non esse, quia in celo est materia et tamen celum non
potest esse et non esse, cum sit ingenerabile et incorruptibile, primo Celi.c
Intelligentia etiam et prima materia possunt esse et non esse ex quo 15
essentialiter dependent a voluntate primi entis, et tamen in eis non est
materia.
Respondetur quod nec potentia ad esse nec potentia ad formam est de
essentia materie, ut probat Commentator, primo Phisicorum.d Ideo, et si
materia est illud per quod res potest esse et non esse, non tamen sequitur 20
omne illud posse esse et non esse in quo est materia. Non ergo loquitur
Philosophus de omni materia, quia materia secundum suam essentiam
non est illud quo res potest esse et non esse; sed loquitur de materia cui
est annexa privatio per quam materia est in potentia ad formam et est
subiectum generationis. 25
Item, duplex est potentia, scilicet subiectiva et obiectiva: potentia sub-
iectiva est potentia ad formam et potentia obiectiva est potentia ad esse.
Intelligentie ergo et prima materia, si possunt esse et non esse, hoc non
est per potentiam subiectivam, sed per potentiam obiectivam. De qua non
loquitur Philosophus, sed de potentia subiectiva. Diceret tamen Philoso- 30
phus quod intelligentie et prima materia non possunt esse et non esse,
sed sunt substantie necessarie, accipientes suas necessitates a necessitate
260ra Pv primi entis sicut et a primo vero suas veritates recipiunt, ut as-|-serit Phi-
losophus, secundo huius.e
notandum secundo inv. Pv ab2 om. Iunt.
a Averroes, In Met., VII, t.c. 22, fol. 172H. b Cf. Averroes, In Met., VII, textus, fol. 172C.
c Aristotle, De coel., I, 1011 passim. d Averroes, In Phys., I, t.c. 63, fol. 38CD; t.c. 69, fol. 40L
M; t.c. 70, fol. 41EF. e Aristotle, Met., II, 1, 993b2631.

214 pauli veneti
Generationes vero alie h1032a26ssi.

27rb M Secundo probat Philosophus | eandem primam conclusionem in gene-
rationibus artificialibus, que magis dicuntur factiones quam generationes.
Unde triplex est operatio, videlicet nature, et intellectus speculativi et
intellectus practici: operatio nature proprie dicitur generatio; operatio 5
intellectus speculativi proprie dicitur actio, quia non transit in mate-
riam exteriorem; operatio autem intellectus practici proprie dicitur fac-
tio. Quamvis enim nomine factionis, que in greco dicitur praxis, utamur
sepe in naturalibus, dicentes quod ignis facit ignem et aqua facit aquam,
magis tamen proprie utimur in hiis que fiunt per intellectum practicum, 10
in quibus intellectus agens habet dominium super id quod facit, ut possit
sic et aliter facere; quod quidem in rebus naturalibus non contingit, quia
agunt efficacius effectus suos modo determinato atque regulato a supe-
rioribus causis.
Intendit ergo Philosophus manifestare conclusionem primam in ope- 15
rationibus intellectus practici, que non sunt proprie generationes neque
actiones, sed factiones. Harum factionum quedam proveniunt ab arte,
quedam a potestate et quedam a mente. Ille factiones proveniunt ab arte
que efficiuntur ab intellectu practico habente habitum factivum recta
ratione regulatum, secundum illud Philosophi, sexto Ethicorum:a Ars est 20
habitus recta ratione factivus aut ars est recta ratio factibilium. Isto modo
domificatio et statuificatio dicuntur factiones provenientes ab arte secun-
dum quas domus et statua fiunt. Ille factiones proveniunt a potestate que
efficiuntur ab intellectu practico per solam naturalem potentiam corpo-
ris naturalis, sicut impulsio et expulsio, tractio et proiectio: hec enim fiunt 25
per quandam violentiam, cum sint motus violenti, per Aristotelem, sep-
timo Phisicorum;b ideo dicuntur fieri a potestate. Sed ille factiones prove-
niunt a mente que efficiuntur ab intellectu practico per solam industriam
et aptitudinem existentem in potentia cognitiva. Videmus enim quod ali-
qui faciunt per industriam naturalem ea que alii faciunt per artem: nam 30
quidam ydiote arguunt et silogizant sine arte sicut faciunt logici cum arte,
ut ponit Philosophus, primo Elenchorum.c
et intellectus speculativi et intellectus practici] intellectus practici et intellectus

speculativi M efficacius om. M proveniunt] a mente add. Pv silogizant] per
artem add. Pv
a Aristotle, Eth. Nic., VI, 4, 1140a910. b Aristotle, Phys., VII, 2, 243a11ff. c Aristotle, Soph.
El., I, 1, 165a1517.
Item, sicut in operationibus naturalibus aliqua dicuntur fieri a natura,

sicut animalia que generantur ex spermate, et aliqua dicuntur fieri a casu,
videlicet animalia que generantur sine spermate, ita in operationibus
practicis quedam dicuntur fieri ab arte, ut sanitas a medico, et quedam
a casu, ut sanitas a vetula. Recte enim ars assimilatur nature. Nam, sicut 5
ars per determinata media pervenit ad formam quam intendit, ita virtus
formativa existens in spermate; et sicut contingit effectus artis aliquando
accidere ex intentione artis et aliquando preter intentionem, ita contingit
effectum naturalem aliquando provenire preter intentionem agentis, et
tunc dicitur fieri a casu, et aliquando ex intentione agentis, et tunc dicitur 10
fieri a natura.
Manifestum est ergo quod in omnibus hiis factionibus, sive proveniant
ab arte sive a potestate sive a mente, sive proveniant a causa per se sive
per accidens, sive a casu sive a fortuna, necesse est illa tria principia
concurrere, videlicet materiam, efficiens et formam. 15
Lege litteram: Generationes vero alie dicuntur factiones. Omnes autem
factiones sunt aut ab arte aut a potestate aut a mente. Harum autem que-
dam fiunt a casu et a fortuna, similiter ut in factis a natura; quedam enim et
illic eadem et ex spermate fiunt et sine spermate. De hiis quidem ergo poste-
rius perscrutandum,a videlicet in secundo capitulo.b 20
27va M Notandum circa istam litteram, eadem animalia fiunt ex spermate | et
260rb Pv sine spermate, quod de generatione animalium | ex semine et sine semine
fuerunt tres opiniones.c
Prima fuit Avicenne,d dicentis quod omne animal generabile ex semine
est etiam generabile sine semine, ita quod, sicut homo generatur imme- 25
diate ex spermate, ita potest immediate generari ex terra. Primo qui-
dem, quia unumquodque est naturaliter generabile ex hiis in que resol-
vitur; sed quodlibet animal immediate resolvitur in elementa; ergo quod-
libet animal est immediate generabile ex commistione elementorum, sine
semine. Ut arguatur sic: quorum est similis modus resolutionis, est similis 30
fiunt] fiunt et Moerb. (et om. F HsNdRj) ergo] igitur Moerb. generatur
immediate inv. Pv
a Aristotle, Met., VII, 7, 1032a2632 (AL XXV 3.2, p. 143, lin. 309314). b Cf. infra, c. 2, p. 272,
1ff (esp. 286, 6ff). c Pauls discussion of the different opinions on spontaneous generation
is largely inspired by Francis of Marchia, Q. in Met., Lib. VII, q. 9, ms. Paris, Bibliothque
Mazarine, lat 3490, fol. 53ravb (critical edition in Amerini (forthcoming)). d Cf. Avicenna,
as interpreted by Averroes, In Phys., VIII, t.c. 46, fol. 387H.
216 pauli veneti
modus generationis; sed omnium animalium est similis modus resolutio-

nis, quia omnia animalia immediate resolvuntur in terram; ergo omnium
animalium est similis modus generationis ex terra. Et per consequens, si
aliquod animal potest immediate generari ex terra, et quodlibet sic potest
generari. 5
Secundo: contrariorum contrarie sunt cause; sed generatio et corrup-
tio hominis sunt contrarie; ergo generationis et corruptionis eius sunt
principia contraria. Constat autem quod corpora celestia cum elemen-
tis sunt sufficientia principia corruptionis omnium animalium absque
agente univoco sue speciei. Ergo similiter corpora celestia cum elemen- 10
tis modo contrario se habentibus sunt sufficientia principia generationis
omnium animalium absque agente univoco proprie speciei, quia non est
maior ratio quare corpora celestia cum elementis sint principia sufficien-
tia corruptionis et non sint sufficientia principia generationis.
Tertio: quod potest virtus inferior, potest superior et adhuc amplius; 15
sed agentia particularia producunt animalia perfecta cum semine, ut
homo hominem et equus equum; ergo multo fortius virtus celestis potest
eam producere sine semine. Ut arguatur sic: in corporibus celestibus est
determinatus respectus stellarum habentium virtutem activam respectu
horum inferiorum; sed secundum aliquem respectum producunt anima- 20
lia imperfecta sine semine; ergo secundum respectum nobiliorem pro-
ducere possunt animalia perfectiora sine semine, et secundum respec-
tum nobilissimum producere possunt animalia nobilissima etiam sine
semine.
Quarto: que sunt propinquiora primo principio ab eo immediatius sunt 25
producta; sed animalia imperfecta producuntur a virtute celesti; ergo ani-
malia perfecta immediatius produci possunt, et per consequens homo et
equus possunt fieri sine semine sicut cum semine. Unde potest sic argui:
sicut se habet ars in artificialibus, ita natura in naturalibus, per Aristote-
lem, secundo Phisicorum;a sed ars producit artificiata eiusdem speciei ex 30
diversis materiis, videlicet duas statuas eiusdem figure ex lapide et ligno;
ergo etiam natura poterit producere duo naturalia eiusdem speciei ex
diversis materiis, videlicet unum ex materia spermatica et aliud ex mate-
ria putrefacta.
quiaterram mg. Pv contrarie] contraria Pv maior] magis Pv principia]

corruptionis add sed fort. del. Pv duo naturalia mg. Pv unum ex mg. Pv
a Aristotle, Phys., II, 8, 199a832.

Contra istam opinionem arguitur sic: nulla potentia naturalis est oti-
osa, qui tunc esset frustra; sed aliqua animalia, puta equus et asinus,
numquam sunt visa immediate ex terra generari; ergo talis potentia non
est in rerum natura, quia esset otiosa, cum non sit reducibilis ad actum.
Ex quo ergo videmus aliqua animalia generari sine semine, ut musce et 5
vermes, alia autem numquam videmus generari aliter quam ex semine,
ut homines et equos, debemus concludere quod hec non possunt generari
sine semine.
Secunda opinio fuit Commentatoris, dicentis, octavo Phisicorum,a quod
nulla eadem animalia sunt generabilia utroque modo, scilicet cum semine 10
et sine semine, ita quod mus generatus ex terra et mus generatus ex
semine differunt specie. Quod quidem probare nititur quatuor rationibus,
quarum prima sumitur ex parte materie, quoniam, diversificata propria
materia, diversificatur forma; sed semen et terra, aut sperma et humidum
putrefactum, sunt materie diversarum specierum; ergo mus genitus ex 15
27vb M semine | et genitus ex non semine differunt specie. Tenet consequentia
cum minori. Maior autem est Philosophi, secundo De anima,b dicentis:
Actus activorum sunt in patiente disposito et uniuscuisque proprius
actus est in propria materia. Primo autem et secundo Phisicorum,c dicit
260va Pv quod non quodlibet | fit ex quolibet indifferenter, sed determinatum ex 20
determinato.
Secunda ratio sumitur ex parte forme, quia nulla tota species est a casu,
licet aliquod individuum speciei sit a casu; sed si eadem species esset ex
semine et sine semine, tota species esset a casu. Nam illud est casuale
quod non habet determinatam causam, per Philosophum, secundo Phisi- 25
corum et quinto huius;d constat autem quod generabile ex semine et sine
semine non habet determinatam causam, sed indifferenter provenit ab
utraque causa; ergo et cetera.
Tertia ratio sumitur ex parte agentis. Nam a diversis principiis imme-
diatis proveniunt diversi effectus specie: cum diversificentur effectus, 30
diversificata causa; sed animal generatum ex semine et animal generatum
ex non semine habent principia diversa specie differentia; ergo et ipsa dif-
ferunt specie.
ex terra] a mure Pv semine] terra Pv dicentis] quod add. Pv eadem

species esset] eedem species essent M
a Averroes, In Phys., VIII, t.c. 46, fol. 387EH. b Aristotle, De an., II, 2, 414a2527. c Aristotle,
Phys., I, 5, 188a31b21; II, 8, 199b1318. d Aristotle, Phys., II, 5, 196b2729; 197a89; Met., V,
30, 1025a2425.
218 pauli veneti
Quarta ratio sumitur ex parte finis, quoniam motus diversarum spe-

cierum specie distinguuntur per terminos ad quos vadunt, per Philoso-
phum, quinto Phisicorum;a sed transmutatio facta in semine et trans-
mutatio facta in non semine sunt motus diversarum specierum, sicut
et modi generandi differunt specie; ergo termini ad quos vadunt diffe- 5
runt specie, scilicet animal generatum ex semine et generatum absque
semine.
Ista opinio etiam est falsa, quia operatio dat cognoscre formam, sicut
transmutatio materiam; constat autem quod operationes et proprietates
muris generati ex semine et muris generati ex non semine sunt eiusdem 10
speciei; ergo et illi mures sunt eiusdem speciei. Nemo enim diceret quod
ignis genitus ex terra et ignis genitus ex aqua differant specie, et tamen
materie differunt specie. Ita, licet materia spermatica et materia putre-
facta differant specie, tamen animalia generata ex hiis possunt esse eius-
dem speciei. 15
Tertia opinio fuit Aristotelis, media inter opiniones extremas nomina-
tas. Dixit enim Avicenna quod omne animal est indifferenter generabile
ex semine et sine semine. Averroes autem asseruit quod nullum animal
est indifferenter generabile ex semine et sine semine, sed quod est gene-
rabile ex semine non est generabile sine semine et econtra. Aristoteles 20
autem dixit quod aliquod animal non est generabile sine semine, contra
Avicennam, et aliquod animal est indifferenter generabile ex semine et
sine semine, contra Commentatorem.
Ymaginabatur enim Philosophus animalia esse in triplici differentia.
Nam quedam sunt que non possunt generari ex semine, sed tantum ex 25
non semine per putrefactionem, sicut sunt multa genera vermium; que-
dam sunt que non possunt generari ex non semine, sed tantum ex semine
per propagationem, ut homo, equus et cetera animalia perfecta; quedam
vero sunt media que generantur utroque modo, scilicet mures et ser-
pentes participantes cum extremis. Et hoc dicit Philosophus in littera,b 30
videlicet quod quedam animalia fiunt ex spermate et quedam sine sper-
mate. Sicut enim in factis ab arte quedam ita fiunt ab arte quod non pos-
sunt fieri a casu, ut domus, quedam autem ita fiunt ab arte quod possunt
et] animal add. Pv opiniones extremas nominatas] nominatas opiniones

extremas Pv Averroes] Averrois M sunt que om. M
a Aristotle, Phys., V, 1, 224b78. b Aristotle, Met., VII, 7, 1032a3031 (AL XXV 3.2, p. 143,
lin. 312313).
fieri a casu, ut sanitas, sic aliqua animalia ita fiunt per vim seminis quod
non possunt fieri ex non semine, quedam autem fieri possunt utroque
modo.
Huius autem ymaginationis ratio est: nam quanto aliquid est perfec-
tius, tanto plura requiruntur ad eius productionem, eo quod quanto per- 5
fectius est, tanto magis distat a prima materia, que est ens imperfectissi-
mum. Cum ergo omnia generabilia producantur ex materia, illud quod
28ra M est propinquius prime materie imperfectius est, et quod est | remotius
magis perfectum est. Et per consequens, sicut in numeris quanto nume-
rus est perfectior, tanto ab unitate ad ipsum per plura pervenitur media, 10
et quanto imperfectior est, tanto per pauciora media devenitur, ita in
naturalibus quanto entia perfectiora sunt, tanto per plura media a prima
260vb Pv materia ad | illa pervenitur, et quanto imperfecta sunt, tanto per pau-
ciora media ad illa pervenitur. Et ideo, quia plante inter omnia viventia
imperfectissima sunt, ipsa producuntur ex semine et sine semine, quia ex 15
putrefactione alicuius materie terrestris per virtutem celi.
Consimile est de animalibus imperfectis que producuntur ex semine
et sine semine. Mures enim, generati ex non semine per putrefactionem,
generant sibi simile per propagationem, sicut etiam plante producte sine
semine germinant et fructum faciunt et sibi simile producunt. Quod qui- 20
dem esse non posset nisi generata ex semine et sine semine eadem in
specie essent. Animalia vero perfecta per plura media producuntur: non
enim sufficit virtus celi ad productionem illorum sicut in aliis; ymmo
requiritur virtus particularis coagens cum virtute celesti. Et hoc intendit
Philosophus, dicens, secundo Phisicorum,a quod homo generat hominem 25
et sol ex materia. Animalia ergo perfecta requirunt determinatum agens,
determinatum modum agendi, determinatam materiam, scilicet sperma
decisum a generante, et determinatum locum, scilicet matricem in utero
femine.
Ad primum argumentum Avicenne dicitur quod animalia, sicut non 30
immediate fiunt ex elementis, ita non immediate corrumpuntur in ele-
menta, sed prius in cadavera. Et plura media requiruntur in generatione
quam in corruptione: prius enim generantur fetus et embrio in genera-
tione animalis quam cor et epar, et tamen non ideo prius resolvitur animal
propinquius] propinquior M media] ab illo ad primam materiam vel add. M

ideo om. M
a Aristotle, Phys., II, 2, 194b13.

220 pauli veneti
in cor et epar quam in fetum et embrionem. Unde, dato modo arguendi

Avicenne, posset probari quod iam de facto nullum animal generatur
ex semine, si aliquod animal non generatur ex semine, quia consimilis
est modus generationis et resolutionis omnium animalium per eum. Sed
istud non est verum, quia animalia perfecta per plura media generantur 5
quam imperfecta.
Ad secundum negatur ultima consequentia, eo quod plura requiruntur
ad constituendum quam ad destruendum: artifex enim pauciora instru-
menta requirit ad destruendam domum quam ad componendum ipsam.
Si enim ratio Avicenne esset sufficiens, probaretur quod nichil generatur 10
ab agente univoco, quia nichil corrumpitur ab agente univoco.
Ad tertium negatur consequentia, eo quod aliqui sunt effectus quos
celum producere non potest absque agente univoco. Licet enim corpora
celestia habeant determinatos respectus ad hec inferiora, non tamen ad
omnes effectus producendos sufficiunt ex se, quia edificator determina- 15
tum respectum habet ad edificandum, non tamen potest illud producere
sine instrumentis.
Ad quartum respondetur quod materialia et immaterialia modo oppo-
sito producuntur, quoniam immaterialia quanto sunt propinquiora primo
principio, tanto per pauciora media fiunt, materialia autem econtra 20
quanto sunt propinquiora, tanto per plura media generantur. Deinde dici-
tur quod, licet duo artificialia eiusdem speciei habeant materiam diversa-
rum specierum, non tamen plura animalia eiusdem speciei habent mate-
riam diversarum specierum, licet ex materiis diversarum specierum pos-
sint fieri. Nam forme artificialium sunt accidentia, forme autem anima- 25
lium sunt substantie.
Rationes etiam Commentatoris non concludunt. Nam ad primam dici-
tur quod duplex est materia, scilicet in fieri, que corrumpitur in adventu
forme, et in facto esse, que manet cum forma genita. Licet ergo varietur
28rb M materia in fieri, non propter hoc | variatur forma, sive sit forma perfecta 30
sive imperfecta, quia idem ignis generatur ex lignis et ex paleis, que dif-
ferunt specie, et eadem caro specie generatur ex pane et ex vino, que
differunt specie; sed diversificata materia in facto esse, necessario varia-
tur forma. In animalibus ergo generatis ex semine et sine semine, licet
sit alia materia in fieri, tamen est eadem materia in facto esse. Item, non 35
oportet quod materia que est in fieri sit eadem in principio motus secun-
dum substantiam nec secundum virtutem, sed in fine. Et si non est eadem
ignis mg. Pv
secundum substantiam, tamen est eadem secundum virtutem. Quando

enim generatur ignis ex terra et aqua, continue manet terra et aqua
261ra Pv usque ad | generationem forme ignis. Et in principio transmutationis
terra et aqua dissimiles sunt substantialiter et qualitative, in fine autem,
et si substantialiter dissimiles sunt, tamen accidentaliter et qualitative 5
assimilantur. Et hoc sufficit ad generationem nove forme.
Ita dicitur in proposito quod, licet materia generatorum per putrefac-
tionem et propagationem in principio sit diversa secundum speciem tam
substantialiter quam accidentaliter, tamen in fine est eadem virtualiter
et qualitative, quia in materia putrefactibili fluit quedam virtus ab agente 10
celesti mediantibus qualitatibus primis, que disponit et ordinat materiam
ad eundem finem ad quem disponit virtus seminis ipsum semen. Unde in
fine transmutationis ille due materie sunt uniformiter disposite ad eun-
dem finem.a
Ad secundum dicitur quod tam generata ex semine quam generata ex 15
non semine habent determinatam causam et ideo nullum illorum est ens
per accidens neque casuale. Effectus enim per accidens et casualis infini-
tis modis et ab infinitis causis potest provenire; constat autem quod talis
species animalium solum duobus modis et a duabus causis potest pro-
venire; quia ergo talis species modo determinato et a causa determinata 20
provenit tam materiali quam effectiva, ideo non a casu generatur nec a
fortuna.
Ad tertium respondetur quod, licet diversificata causa univoca diversi-
ficetur effectus ex quo est eiusdem speciei cum illa, non tamen diversifi-
cata causa equivoca diversificatur effectus ex eo quod virtualiter continet 25
causam univocam: idem enim calor specie generatur in aqua et in aere ab
igne univoce et a sole equivoce. Et ratio est: nam sicut causa equivoca con-
tinet virtualiter causam univocam, ita virtualiter continet effectum eius.
Quia ergo mus generans murem et corpus celeste generans murem equi-
voce differunt, sicut causa univoca et causa equivoca eiusdem effectus, 30
non oportet quod effectus equivoce et specie differant.
Ad quartum respondetur quod, licet modi generandi illorum duorum
animalium ex semine et sine semine sint diversi, tamen motus et gene-
rationes sunt eiusdem speciei: dealbatio enim transiens per rubeum et
diversa mg. Pv sine s.l. M
a pp. 220, 27221, 14, cf. Alexander of Alexandria, Exp. Met., VII, c. 7, q. 3, fol. 208va.
222 pauli veneti
dealbatio transiens per fuscum sunt eiusdem speciei, licet vie et modi
procedendi specie sint diversi.
Ab arte vero fiunt h1030a32ssi.
Pro declaratione dictorum Philosophus solvit quatuor questiones, qua-
rum prima est utrum ab agente consimili fiant ea que sunt ab arte et a 5
natura.
Respondetur quod non, quia ea que fiunt a natura, fiunt ab agente
existente in materia, et ea que fiunt ab arte, fiunt ab agente existente
in anima, quod dicitur esse species et quiditas et prima substantia rei
factibilis, ac etiam ratio et scientia eiusdem. 10
Primo quidem habitus factivus anime dicitur species, quoniam, sicut
forma naturalis dicitur species in quantum est productiva sibi similis in
specie, ita habitus factivus anime debet dici species in quantum producit
sibi simile, quoniam sanitas que est in materia assimilatur sanitati que est
in anima. 15
Secundo, habitus factivus dicitur quiditas rei factibilis in quantum dat
28va M intelligere ipsam rem factibilem | modo distincto et explicito. Sicut enim
de re speculabili formamus conceptum speculativum, ita de re operabili
formamus conceptum practicum. Et sicut prius cognoscitur a nobis res
speculabilis sub conceptu confuso et postea sub conceptu distincto, ita 20
et res operabilis: primo enim concipit intellectus quod Sortes est ens,
deinde quod est substantia, deinde quod est corpus, et consequenter quod
est corpus animatum et animal et homo, per hoc quod est substantia
corporea animata rationalis.
Tertio, habitus factivus dicitur prima substantia, idest prima forma, 25
quoniam, sicut Deus est prima forma respectu naturalium, quia active
concurrit ad formationem cuiuscumque rei naturalis, ita habitus factivus
existens in anima active concurrit ad factionem cuiuscumque rei artificia-
lis, scilicet domus, statue, sanitatis et huiusmodi.
Quarto, ille habitus vocatur ratio eo quod artificialia cum ratione fiunt, 30
sicut et moralia et speculabilia: prudentia enim est recta ratio agibilium
et ars recta ratio factibilium, ut habet videri sexto Ethicorum.a Quanta
enim debet esse domus, et ex quibus et ex qualibus fieri debeat lignis et
procedendi] sint add. Pv est] hec add. Pv conceptum practicum] intellectum

practicum vel praem. M factionem] formationem Pv
a Aristotle, Et. Nic., VI, 5, 1140b46; 4, 1040a910.

lapidibus, domificator ratione concludit; quibus etiam et qualibus medi-

cinis sanitas inducatur argumentis et rationibus, medicus convincit.
261rb Pv Ultimo, dicit Philosophus quod habitus factivus | est scientia rei facti-
bilis, quoniam, sicut oppositorum eadem est scientia, sic habitus ille est
cognitio duorum contrariorum, ac etiam positivi et privativi: sanitas enim 5
que est in anima dat intelligere sanitatem que est in materia et infirmita-
tem, que est eius privatio. Sicut enim in absentia lucis cognoscitur tenebra
per conceptum luminis, ita in absentia sanitatis cognoscitur egritudo per
conceptum sanitatis. Unde, et si sanitas et egritudo contrariantur in mate-
ria, sic quod posita sanitate removetur egritudo et econtra, non tamen 10
contrariantur in anima, quia stant simul conceptus sanitatis et conceptus
egritudinis; ymmo idem est conceptus utriusque.a
Lege litteram: Ab arte vero fiunt quorumcumque species est in anima.
Speciem autem dico quid erat esse cuiuscumque et primam substantiam,
idest formam. Et enim contrariorum modo quodam eadem species est cog- 15
nitio. Privationis enim substantia que substantie est opposita cognoscitur
per conceptum positivi, ut sanitas est cognitio infirmitatis; illius enim
absentia ostenditur infirmitas, sanitas autem que in anima ratio et scientia
est sanitatis extra animam.b
Notandum, secundum Commentatorem, commento vicesimo ter- 20
tio, quod res existentes ab artificio sunt illa quorum forme et qui-
ditates sunt in anima, et forme contrarie existentes in anima sunt
quodammodo eadem forma; et ideo recipit anima formas contra-
rias Et signum eius est quoniam multotiens scimus formas per
sua contraria et contraria per suas formas , non quia congregantur 25
in anima due forme contrarie insimul, sicut non congregantur extra
animam, quoniam esse alterius est corruptio reliquic et econtra.
Prima propositio commenti est ista: res artificiales habent formas et quidi-
tates in anima. Quod non est intelligendum de formis et quiditatibus tan-
tum cognitis, quia sic omnes res naturales habent formas et quiditates in 30
anima, cum habeant conceptus et diffinitiones in intellectu significantes
cuiuscumque] cuiusque Moerb. et] in add. Moerb. cum E J, om. Ab illa Pv

Iunt.] ille M formas contrarias inv. Iunt. eius] huius Iunt. sua contraria]
suas formas contrarias Iunt.
a pp. 222, 11223, 12, cf. Alexander of Alexandria, Exp. Met., VII, c. 7, fol. 208vb209ra.
b Aristotle, Met., VII, 7, 1032a32b6 (AL XXV 3.2, p. 143, lin. 314319). c Averroes, In Met.,
VII, t.c. 23, fol. 173HI.
224 pauli veneti
res naturales. Sed est illud intelligendum de formis et quiditatibus cau-

salibus, eo modo quo dicebant Platonici de ipsis rebus naturalibus quod
habent formas et quiditates ydeales separatas in orbe signorum, a quibus
fiunt causaliter et effective. Ita est dicendum de rebus artificialibus, quod
domus et sanitas habent in anima formas et quiditates a quibus fiunt, ita 5
quod eadem res habet duplicem formam et quiditatem, unam scilicet in
materia et aliam in anima.
Secunda propositio: forme contrarie existentes in anima sunt quodam
modo eadem forma. Sicut color habet duplex esse, ut ait Commentator,
secundo De anima,a scilicet reale et intentionale: secundum esse reale est 10
28vb M in materia et secundum esse | intentionale est in anima; ita forme contra-
rie, ut sanitas et egritudo, habent tale duplex esse: secundum esse reale
sunt in corpore animalis et secundum esse intentionale sunt in anima. Et
differunt isti modi essendi, quia forme contrarie non sunt eadem forma
in materia, sed in anima sunt quodam modo eadem forma, in quantum 15
idem conceptus numero representat ambo contraria.
Tertia propositio: licet anima recipiat formas contrarias, non tamen
congregantur in anima forme contrarie. Prima pars patet, quia anima
cognoscit formas contrarias, scilicet albedinem et nigredinem, sanitatem
et egritudinem; ergo recipit illas, non quidem realiter, sed intentionaliter, 20
eo modo quo loquitur Philosophus, secundo De anima,b dicens: Opor-
tet universaliter de omni sensu accipere quoniam est susceptivus specie-
rum sine materia. Secunda pars ostenditur, quoniam extra animam non
congregantur invicem forme contrarie, cum generatio unius sit corruptio
alterius in eodem subiecto; ergo consimiliter in anima propter eandem 25
causam non congregantur simul forme contrarie. Sicut enim non invi-
cem contrariantur species visibiles albedinis et nigredinis in medio aut
in oculo, ita non invicem contrariantur conceptus sanitatis et egritudinis
in intellectu.
Quarta propositio: intellectus cognoscit formas intentionales per sua 30
contraria et econtra formas contrarias per formas intentionales. Patet,
quoniam intellectus habet duplicem motum, unum qui est a rebus ad ani-
mam et alium qui est ab anima ad res. Et primo motu intellectus cognoscit
261va Pv primo contraria sicut ea primo sentit, scilicet albedinem et nigredinem, |
est illud inv. Pv forme] forma M contrariantur om. Pv (congregantur scr. et

del.)
a Averroes, In De an., II, t.c. 97, p. 277, 2733. b Aristotle, De an., II, 12, 424a1719.
calidum et frigidum; ex consequenti vero cognoscit species intelligibi-

les talium contrariorum, quoniam venit in notitiam effectus per notitiam
cause. Constat enim quod forme naturales in primo motu causant species
intelligibiles et sunt mensure illarum. In secundo autem motu intellectus
primo cognoscit formas intentionales, deinde formas contrarias, quoniam 5
edificator prius cognoscit formam domus quam habet in anima quam
eam que est in materia, et medicus prius cognoscit sanitatem et egritu-
dinem que sunt conceptus in anima quam sanitatem et egritudinem que
sunt forme in corpore animalis, quoniam tales forme sunt cause et men-
sure formarum extra animam existentium in materia. 10
Fit itaque sanitas h1032b6ssi.
Secunda questio: utrum modo consimili fiant ea que sunt ab arte et que
sunt a natura.
Respondet Philosophus quod sic. Nam, sicut primo intentum a natura
est ultimo factum ab ea et ultimo intentum est primo factum ab ea, ita 15
in arte ordo cognitionis opponitur ordini operationis: certum enim est
quod natura primo intendit sibi simile, secundo intendit causas illius quas
primo operatur, ultimo vero facit suum simile. Ita etiam ars. Nam in re
sanabili medicus primo intendit sanitatem, secundo regularitatem humo-
rum, tertio calorem et quarto potionem: cognoscit enim quod sanitas est 20
inducenda per regularitatem humorum et regularitas humorum per calo-
rem et calor per potionem. Primo ergo intentum et cognitum a medico
est sanitas, ultimo vero intentum et cognitum est potio. Constat autem
quod operatio non incipit a primo cognito, sed ab ultimo cognito, quia
non primo inducitur sanitas deinde datur potio, sed potius econtra medi- 25
cus incipit a potione et ultimo inducit sanitatem, quoniam potio est causa
caloris et calor est causa regularitatis humorum et regularitas humorum
est causa sanitatis. Illud ergo quod est ultimum intentum est primo fac-
tum et operatio incipiens ab ultimo intellecto vocatur factio. Artifex ergo
in suo artificio procedit modo resolutorio, quia primo intelligit finem, 30
29ra M secundo ea que sunt | ad finem, et semper resolvit unum in aliud eorum
que sunt ad finem donec perveniat ad id quod est ultimo cognitum et ab
eo incipit operationem.
Lege litteram: Fit itaque sanitas in materia aliquo intelligente ita: quo-
niam hoc sanitas primo intelligitur et necesse si sanitas erit, hoc existere, 35
puta regularitatem, sed si hoc erit, necesse est esse calorem; et ita sem-
intentionales] intellectuales vel praem. M que sunt om. Pv et om. M

potius om. Pv
226 pauli veneti
per intelligit, donec utique adducat in hoc quod ipse valet ultimum facere.
Deinde iam ab hoc motus factio vocatur ad sanandum.a
Ex responsione ad questionem Philosophus concludit principale inten-
tum, videlicet quod, sicut ex homine fit homo et ex calido calidum, ita
sanitas fit ex sanitate et domus ex domo, quia sanitas que est in mate- 5
ria, scilicet in corpore animalis, fit a sanitate que est in anima, ut domus
que est in materia, scilicet in lapidibus et lignis, fit a domo que est in
anima. Ars enim medicinalis, que est in anima, est species et forma sani-
tatis fiende in humoribus adequatis, et ars edificatoria in anima existens
est species et forma edificii existentis in materia, sic quod a forma que est 10
sine materia fit forma in materia. Quam formam sine materia Philosophus
vocat quod quid erat esse.
Lege litteram: Quare accidit modo quodam ex sanitate sanitatem fieri
et domum ex domo, sine materia materiam habentem; medicinalis enim
est et edificatoria species sanitatis et domus, dico autem substantiam, idest 15
formam, sine materia quod quid erat esse.b
Notandum, secundum Commentatorem, commento vicesimo ter-
tio, quod forma artis dicitur duobus modis, quorum unus est forma
que est in anima et alia est illa que est extra animam; et sunt idem,
et illa que est extra anima est ab illa que est in anima. Verbi gratia, 20
quoniam sanitas dicitur duobus modis: dicitur enim de intellectu
261vb Pv sanitatis que est in anima et dicitur de sanitate existente in | cor-
pore; et sanitas que est in corpore est a sanitate que est in anima. Et
artificium in hoc est simile nature, scilicet quod illud quod fit,
fit ab eodem in natura et forma aut a simili; et sanitas in anima est 25
sanitas in prima intentione et sanitas que est extra animam est
posterior.c
Istud commentum est clarum. Unde cuiuslibet artificialis due sunt forme,
scilicet in anima et extra animam aut in materia et extra materiam: domus
enim habet unam formam domus in anima et unam extra animam; corpus 30
sanatum per medicinam habet unam sanitatem in materia et aliam in
animam. Et differunt iste due sanitates, quia sanitas que est in anima est
ab] ad M ad questionem mg. Pv ut] et Pv in1 om. M alia] alius Iunt.

que] qui Iunt. natura et om. Pv Iunt. in om. Iunt.
1032b1114 (AL XXV 3.2, pp. 143144, lin. 324328). c Averroes, In Met., VII, t.c. 23, fol. 173I
K.
causa sanitatis que est in materia et per consequens est prior illa, sic quod
sanitas que est in anima est prima intentio et sanitas existens in materia
est secunda intentio. Dicuntur tamen idem forma que est in anima et
forma que est in materia, quoniam sicut ex materia et forma fit unum
secundum essentiam, ita ex agente et patiente aut ex causa et effectu fit 5
unum secundum operationem: idem enim est actus agentis et patientis,
per Philosophum, tertio Phisicorum.a Et hoc modo sunt idem sanitas que
est in anima et sanitas que est in materia.
Conveniunt ergo ars et natura in hoc, quoniam, sicut istud quod fit
a natura semper fit a sibi simili, ita et illud quod fit ab arte. Si enim 10
generatio est univoca, illud quod generatur fit a suo simili formaliter; si
autem equivoca, illud fit a simili virtualiter. Artificialia vero fiunt a suo
simili existente in anima, sed non ab eodem simpliciter, eo quod sanitas
intentionalis et sanitas realis differunt specie, sicut etiam domus in anima
et domus in materia. 15
Propterea dicit Philosophus accidit modo quodam ex sanitate sanitatem
fieri et domum ex domo, sine materia materiam habentem,b quoniam sani-
tas que est in materia est simpliciter sanitas et domus que est in lignis est
29rb M simpliciter domus, sanitas vero que est in | anima non est simpliciter sani-
tas, quia non denominat suum subiectum esse sanum, neque domus que 20
est in anima est simpliciter hdomusi, cum in anima non sint realiter lapi-
des et ligna ex quibus fit domus. Homo autem fit simpliciter ab homine,
et calidum a calido, eo quod homo generans et homo generatus, aut calor
faciens et calor factus, sunt eiusdem speciei simpliciter.
Generationum vero h1032b15ssi. 25
Tertia questio: utrum modo consimili fiant ea que sunt ab arte et a
natura.
Respondet Philosophus quod non, quia ea que fiunt a natura non fiunt
pluribus motibus, quorum unus est in agente et alter in patiente, quia,
licet agens naturale prius intendat finem quam ea que sunt ad finem, 30
nullus tamen motus est in ipso agente quo proveniat a fine ad ea que sunt
ad finem. Ea autem que sunt ab arte necessario fiunt duobus motibus,
quorum unus est in artifice et alter in artificiato. Dictum est enim quod
per consequens] consequenter Pv ex om. M domus suppl. generationum]

generationi M a natura non fiunt] om. M proveniat] proveniant M
a Aristotle, Phys., III, 3, 202a1516 et passim. b Aristotle, Met., VII, 7, 1032b1112 (AL XXV 3.2,
p. 143, lin. 324326).

228 pauli veneti
artifex primo intelligit artificiatum, deinde intelligit ea que ordinantur ad

ipsum, sed in operando primo incipit ab eo quod ordinatur ad artificia-
tum. Ex quo sequitur quod artificiatum fit duplici motu, quorum unus est
in anima et vocatur intelligentia, alter vero est extra animam in mate-
ria et dicitur factio. Motus autem incipit a primo intellecto et termina- 5
tur ad ultimum intellectum, et sicut tam intelligentia quam factio voca-
tur motus, ita etiam dicitur generatio, large accipiendo generationem,
iuxta diffinitionem de motu datam a Commentatore, tertio Phisicorum,a
dicente: Motus est generatio partis post partem, terminum ad quem ten-
dit res mota. 10
Lege litteram: Generationum vero et motuum hec quidem intelligentia
vocatur illa vero factio. Que quidem a principio et a specie intellecta per
modum finis dicitur intelligentia, que vero incipit ab ultimo intelligente,
idest intellecto, factio.b
Notandum, secundum Commentatorem, commento vicesimo ter- 15
tio, quod motus qui incipit ab ultimo in dissolutione et est composi-
262ra Pv tio dicitur actio procedens ad sanitatem, | ita ut accidit quod sanitas
que est extra animam sit ad sanitatem que est in anima.c
Intendit Commentator quod non solum differt intelligentia a factione in
eo quod intelligentia est motus in anima et factio est motus in materia, 20
sed etiam differunt penes compositionem et resolutionem, eo quod intel-
ligentia est motus resolutivus, quia procedit ab effectu ad causam, factio
autem est motus compositivus, quia procedit a causa ad effectum, eo quod
potio laxativa est immediata causa caloris et calor est immediata causa
regularitatis humorum, regularitas autem humorum est immediata causa 25
sanitatis. Neque differunt sanitas que est in anima et sanitas que est extra
animam tantum ex eo quia una illarum sanitatum est in materia et alia
extra materiam, sed etiam quia sanitas que est in anima per se refertur ad
sanitatem que est extra animam, cum sit similitudo illius, sanitas autem
que est extra animam non per se refertur ad sanitatem que est in anima, 30
sed solum per accidens, eo modo quo dicitur, quinto huius,d quod scientia
per se refertur ad scibile, econtra autem scibile refertur ad scientiam ex
sola operatione anime unius ad reliquum.
intelligente] intelligentie Moerb. ut accidit quod] quod accidat ut Iunt.
a Averroes, In Phys., III, t.c. 4, fol. 87D. b Aristotle, Met., VII, 7, 1032b1517 (AL XXV 3.2,
p. 144, lin. 329331). c Averroes, In Met., VII, t.c. 23, fol. 173M. d Aristotle, Met., V, 15,
1021a2832.
Sed dubitatur, cum intellectus habeat de sanitate que est extra animam
duplicem conceptum, scilicet practicum et speculativum, utrum quilibet
illorum conceptuum consimiliter referatur ad sanitatem que est extra
animam in materia.
Respondetur quod consimiliter referuntur similitudine perseitatis, sed 5
non similitudine causalitatis, quoniam uterque conceptus per se refer-
tur ad sanitatem que est extra animam, ipsa autem sanitas extra animam
solum per accidens refertur ad utrumque conceptum sanitatis in anima.
Loquendo autem de similitudine causalitatis, non consimiliter refertur
uterque conceptus: nam conceptus speculativus refertur tamquam effec- 10
29va M tus ad causam et per modum mensurati, conceptus autem practicus |
refertur tamquam causa ad effectum et per modum mensure.
Similiter autem et in aliis h1032b17ssi.
Quarta questio: utrum processu consimili fiant ea que sunt ad finem in
arte et in natura. 15
Respondet Philosophus quod sic. Nam, sicut natura prius intendit
finem quam id quod est ad finem, et tamen prius operatur id quod est
ad finem quam ipsum finem, ita intendit prius id quod est ad finem quam
causam eius, si causam habet, et tamen prius operatur causam. Verbi gra-
tia, sperma est propter generationem animalis, ideo natura prius intendit 20
animal quam sperma. Inter autem animal et sperma sunt duo ordinata
etiam ad generationem animalis, videlicet fetus et caro, quorum primum
ordinatur in secundum; ideo natura prius intendit carnem quam fetum,
prius tamen operatur fetum quam carnem.
Consimiliter dicatur in arte quod, sicut medicus prius intendit con- 25
valescentiam et sanitatem quam adequationem humorum, prius tamen
adequat humores quam sanitatem inducat, ita prius intendit adequare
humores quam inducere caliditatem, prius tamen calorem inducit quam
adequationem humorum. Similiter, si calor habet aliquid ante se ordi-
natum ad sanitatem, sicut est potio laxativa, prius operatur illud quam 30
calorem, licet prius intendat calorem quam potionem laxativam.
Sicut ergo in natura sperma et animal sunt extrema, et media sunt
fetus et caro, ita in arte extrema sunt potio et sanitas, intermedia vero
calor et humorum adequatio. Et sicut in natura sperma ordinatur propter
fetum et fetus propter carnem et caro propter animal, ita et in arte potio 35
refertur] referuntur Pv tamquam] conceptus add. M intendit prius inv. Pv

sicut medicus inv. Pv (sicut s.l. M)
230 pauli veneti
ordinatur propter calorem et calor propter adequationem et adequatio

propter sanitatem. Et sicut natura prius intendit animal quam carnem et
carnem quam fetum et fetum quam sperma, ita ars medicine prius inten-
dit sanitatem quam adequationem et adequationem quam calorem et
calorem quam potionem. Et sicut natura incipit operari ab ultimo intento 5
perveniens ad primum intentum, quia prius operatur sperma quam fetum
262rb Pv et prius | fetum quam carnem et prius carnem quam animal, ita ars operari
incipit ab ultimo intellecto perveniens ad primum intellectum: primum
enim operatur potionem quam calorem et prius calorem quam adequa-
tionem et prius adequationem quam convalescentiam vel sanitatem. 10
Dicit ergo Philosophus quod, sicut est de actione artis respectu ultimi
finis, ita est de omnibus aliis intermediis, sicut ad hoc quod convale-
scat infirmus requiritur adequatio humorum in ipso, que quidem est pro-
pinquissima sanitati et unum de intermediis. Et sicut medicus non facit
sanitatem nisi prius sciat quid est sanitas, ita non adequat humores nisi 15
prius sciat quid est adequatio, scilicet quod est humorum debita propor-
tio respectu nature humane. Hoc autem erit si corpus fuerit calefactum,
quando scilicet quis egrotat infrigidatus propter defectum caloris. Iterum,
oportet quod sciat quid est calefieri et propter quam causam proveniatur,
scilicet propter medicinam calidam, que quidem immediate consistit in 20
potestate medici. Principium ergo sanationis est species sanitatis existens
in anima aut aliorum intermediorum per que acquiritur sanitas. Quod
quidem intelligendum est si sanitas fiat ab arte, quia, si fieret solum a
natura, non esset principium sanationis species que est in anima, sed ali-
quid extra animam. 25
Lege litteram: Similiter autem et in aliis intermediis unumquodque fit.
Dico autem ut si convalescit, oportet adequari. Quid ergo est adequari? Hoc.
Hoc autem erit, si calefactum fuerit. Hoc vero quid est? Hoc. Idest prop-
ter quid est? Dicitur quod propter medicinam calidam. Existit autem hoc
potestate medici: hoc autem iam in ipso. Faciens itaque et unum aliquod 30
istorum, ipse medicus inchoat motus sanandi a forma que est in anima,
si quidem ab arte fiat sanitas, species que est in anima huiusmodi princi-
pium.a
prius] primo M operari om. Pv convalescat] convalescit M sanitatis

existens in anima] existens in anima sanitatis Pv ergo] igitur Moerb. unum]
unde Moerb. motus Pv Moerb.] modus M que est M] inv. Pv Moerb.
29vb M Notandum, secundum | Commentatorem, commento vicesimo ter-

tio, quod sanitas si fuerit ab arte medicine, tunc primum agens
sanitatem est forma que est in anima; et si fuerit sine arte, tunc agens
ipsam est ex sanitate que est in corpore sanabili, sed est diminutum,
ideo indiget artificio , quoniam virtutes generative naturales sunt 5
similes virtutibus artificialibus.a
Prima conclusio quam intendit Commentator est hec: quod duplex est
sanatio, scilicet ab arte et a natura. Sanatio que est ab arte est ex sanitate
que est forma in anima, sanatio a natura est ex sanitate que est in corpore
sanabili. Et licet utrumque istorum principiorum sanationis vocetur sani- 10
tas, nullum tamen eorum est formaliter sanitas, eo quod nullum eorum
denominat suum subiectum esse sanum, sed quodlibet istorum principio-
rum est causaliter sanitas in quantum quodlibet eorum est generativum
sanitatis, eo modo quo dicitur solem esse calidum et lunam esse frigidam
non quidem formaliter, sed causaliter et virtualiter, in quantum sol habet 15
virtutem calefaciendi et luna frigefaciendi.
Secunda conclusio est quod in corpore sanabili est duplex virtus sana-
tiva, scilicet completa et diminuta. Virtus completa se sola inducit sanita-
tem absque auxilio artis, virtus autem diminuta indiget artificio, eo quod
natura iuvatur ab arte propter similitudinem que est inter virtutes natu- 20
rales et artificiales: virtus enim calefactiva existens in corpore sanabili est
similis virtuti existenti in vino aut in alia medicina calida, licet una earum
sit fortis et altera debilis.
Si vero a casu h1032b23ssi.
Postquam Philosophus probavit primam conclusionem tam in genera- 25
tionibus naturalibus quam in artificialibus, consequenter probat in casua-
libus, dicens quod sanitas non solum fit ab arte et a natura, sed etiam a
casu. Si enim ad sanationem concurrit intelligentia et species, tunc illa est
ab arte et non a casu, quia que sunt a casu sunt preter intelligentiam arti-
ficis; si autem incipiat ab ultimo in intellectu preter actum intelligentie 30
et voluntatis, tunc a casu erit. Verbi gratia, si calor est ultimum intellec-
tum a quo incipiat sanatio per intelligentiam medici, sanitas consequens
forma] sanitatis add. Iunt. diminutum] et add. Iunt. generative Pv (post naturales
Iunt.)] generatione M et] vel Pv

232 pauli veneti
erit ab arte et non a casu; si autem incipiat a calore non per intelligentiam
262va Pv medici, sed per confricationem |non intentam, tunc sanitas consequens
est a casu, etiam dato quod habuisset medicinam ut excitaret calorem a
qua non fuisset excitatus calor, aut quia non fuisset appropriata aut prop-
ter debilitatem virtutis. Calor itaque excitatus per confricationem preter 5
intentionem confricantis aut est pars sanitatis, quando sua alteratio ad
sanitatem sufficit, aut non est pars sanitatis, sed aliquid aliud consequens
ad ipsam, sicut virtus proveniens ex dissolutione humorum compactorum
facta a calore, que quidem virtus est causa immediata sanitatis. Potest
etiam sanitas induci per plura media, sicut quando, consumptis humori- 10
bus superfluis impedientibus debitum motum in corpore, fit conveniens
motus spirituum ad aliquas determinatas partes corporis. Hoc autem ulti-
mum immediate factivum sanitatis est aliqua pars sanitatis ingrediens
constitutionem eiusdem, sicut lapides et ligna sunt partes domus: sicut
enim lapides et ligna habens habet aliquid domus, ita habens hoc ulti- 15
mum habet aliquid sanitatis.
Hec omnia dicta sunt ut in generationibus casualibus appareat veritas
prime conclusionis. Certum enim est quod in talibus generationibus est
materia, scilicet corpus sanabile, et etiam efficiens, scilicet calor, ac etiam
forma, scilicet sanitas. Quando etiam generantur monstra naturalia aut 20
animalia ex non semine, illa dicuntur fieri a casu et non a natura, quia
fiunt preter intentionem agentis naturalis, in quibus tamen inveniuntur
30ra M tria principia | nominata sicut et in hiis que sunt a natura.
Lege litteram: Si vero a casu fiat generatio, ab hoc incipit sanatio quod
quidem faciendi est principium facienti ab arte, sed preter intelligentiam 25
artis, ut quod in mederi forsan a calefactione principium sumit sanatio; hoc
autem facit fricatione et non per artem. Calor itaque in corpore aut pars est
sanitatis aut sequitur eum aliquid tale quod est pars sanitatis, aut per plura;
hoc autem ultimum faciens sanitatem, et quod est immediatum ei ita, pars
est sanitatis ut domus et lapides.a 30
Notandum, secundum Commentatorem, commento vicesimo ter-
tio, quod calor qui est in corpore, qui fit a confricatione aut a potu
casu] fiat add. M debitum motum] debitos motos Pv corpus sanabile inv. M
etiam1 om. Pv sicut] ut Pv calefactione] calefactore M utlapides] et
domus ut lapides et aliorum Moerb. calor] igitur add. Iunt.
vini, aut est pars sanitatis aut illud quod sequitur ex eo est pars
sanitatis, et hoc aut erit unum aut plura. Omnia ergo ista erunt partes
sanitatis et unum eorum erit principium agens, scilicet calor.a
Ita quod, si tantum calor est faciens sanitatem, solus ipse est pars sanita-
tis; et si est aliud etiam faciens sanitatem, etiam illud est pars sanitatis, ita 5
quod omne principium per se existens in corpore faciens sanitatem est
pars sanitatis. Ars enim medicandi, licet sit principium sanitatis per se,
non tamen est pars sanitatis, quia est principium extrinsecum. Confrica-
tio non est pars sanitatis, non obstante quod sit principium intrinsecum,
quia est principium per accidens. Etiam potus vini non est pars sani- 10
tatis, quia est principium extrinsecum et principium per accidens, dato
quod confricans et potans non intendat excitare calorem neque sanita-
tem inducere.
Sed tunc est dubium: quomodo calor est principium agens, si fit a
confricatione aut a potatione vini, et quomodo calor est pars sanitatis, 15
cum sit qualitas prima ad quam est per se motus, sanitas autem non est
qualitas prima nec ad illam est per se motus, per Philosophum, septimo
Phisicorum.b Iterum, quomodo sanitas fit a casu, cum fit a causa per se
sepe aut frequenter, casus autem est causa per accidens extra semper et
frequenter, per Philosophum, secundo Phisicorum.c 20
Respondetur quod calor non est principium agens simpliciter, sed est
principium agens per se; confricatio autem et vini potatio sunt agen-
tia per accidens. Non etiam calor est pars sanitatis formaliter sumpte ut
est habitus vel dispositio prime speciei qualitatis, sed est pars sanitatis
materialiter sumpte, que est adequatio qualitatum primarum et congre- 25
gatio omnium eorum que ad sanitatem formalem concurrunt effective et
subiective, simul neque accidentaliter. Hic adequatio vel congregatio
262vb Pv hnon sumituri formaliter, ut dicit tantum respectum | de predicamento
relationis, sed materialiter, ut importat fundamentum, eo modo quo dicit
Philosophus, tertio Phisicorum,d quod eadem est distantia a Thebis ad 30
Athenas et econtra, et Commentator, ibidem,e quod eadem est propor-
tio duorum ad unum et econtra. Cum vero additur quod illa sanitas non
est a casu ex quo frequenter fit et habet causam per se, dicitur quod
itasanitatis1 mg. Pv per Philosophum] ut declarat Philosophus Pv hic] hec

M non sumitur suppl.
a Averroes, In Met., VII, t.c. 23, fol. 174CD. b Aristotle, Phys., VII, 3, 246b320. c Aristotle,
Phys., II, 5, 196b1017. d Aristotle, Phys., III, 3, 202b1016. e Averroes, In Phys., III, t.c. 18,
fol. 90HI.
234 pauli veneti
respectu confricationis aut potationis est a casu, sed respectu caloris est a
natura: calor enim est causa per se, frequenter inducens sanitatem; con-
fricatio autem et potatio sunt cause per accidens, raro inducentes sanita-
tem.
Quare sicut dicitur h1032b30ssi. 5
Secunda conclusio: cuiuslibet generati aliqua pars prefuit.
Probatur. Materia et forma praefuit; sed tam materia quam forma est
pars generati; ergo et cetera. Prima pars antecedentis sequitur ex prima
conclusione,a quia cuiuslibet generati tria sunt principia: efficiens, mate-
ria et forma, ex cuius probatione conclusum est quod omne generatum 10
generatur ex sibi simili tam ex parte materie quam ex parte agentis. Si ergo
cuiuslibet generati tria sunt principiaefficiens, materia et forma,
oportet quodlibet eorum precedere generatum, cum principium prius sit
principiato, alioquin aliquid fieret ex nichilo, quod est contra communem
sententiam omnium philosophorum. Hec ergo tria precedunt composi- 15
30rb M tum, sed non eodem modo, quia efficiens et | materia precedunt compo-
situm tempore, forma vero precedit natura.
Secunda pars antecedentis etiam declaratur. Nam materia est illud ex
quo fit generatum et manet in fine generationis; ergo est pars generati.
Forma autem terminat generationem, sic quod est in materia in fine 20
generationis; ergo simul cum materia est pars generati. Unde materia
et forma non includerentur in diffinitione generati nisi quelibet earum
esset pars generati. Licet enim circulus aut figura non diffiniatur per
materiam neque per formam illius, tamen particularis circulus diffinitur
per figuram tamquam per genus primum eius, et per materiam et formam 25
tanquam per differentias essentiales illius. Verbi gratia, circulus ereus sic
diffinitur: circulus ereus est figura circularis existens in ere. Quia ergo
circuli erei forma est circulus et materia est es, quorum quodlibet ponitur
in diffinitione circuli erei, necesse est quod circuli erei tam circulus quam
es sit pars. 30
Lege litteram: Quare, sicut dicitur, impossibile est aliquid factum esse,
si nichil preextiterit. Quod quidem ergo pars ex necessitate existat, palam;
materia namque pars, inest enim composito et fit hoc, scilicet in predica-
tione causali. Sic ergo et eorum que in ratione, scilicet forma, est pars et
et cetera om. Pv ergo] igitur Moerb. existat] existet Moerb. (existat Da)
hoc] hec Moerb. sic] sed Moerb. ergo] igitur Moerb. (ergo Da)
a Cf. supra, p. 207, 2526.

prefuit. Utroque autem modo, scilicet ex parte materie et forme, dicimus

ereos circulos quid sunt: et materiam dicentes quia es, et speciem quia figura
talis, et hoc est genus in quod primum ponitur circulus. Ereus itaque circulus
habet in ratione materiam, idest in diffinitione, et cetera.a
Notandum, secundum Commentatorem, commento vicesimo quar- 5
to, quod Aristoteles intendit per duos modos materiam et formam,
idest quod pars composita continet duos modos, scilicet materiam
et formam, verbi gratia, circulum cupri. Et ideo diffinitio continet
multos circulos quodammodo et quodammodo unum.b
Quia ergo tam forma quam materia est pars circuli cuprei et quelibet 10
earum ponitur in diffinitione illius, ideo diffinitio circuli cuprei quodam-
modo continet multos circulos, in quantum continet cuprum, quod est
circulus in potentia, et continet talem figuram, que est circulus in actu;
quodammodo autem continet tantum unum circulum pro quanto in
cupro non est nisi unus circulus. 15
Sed dubitatur, quia dictum est, tractatu primo,c quod non diffinitur ens
per accidens; constat autem quod circulus cupreus est ens per accidens,
sicut homo albus.
Respondetur quod non est dictum ens per accidens nullo modo posse
diffiniri, sed quod non potest diffiniri simpliciter neque per se, sed per 20
accidens, ratione suarum partium. Diffinitur enim nasus simus per nasum
habentem simitatem aut concavitatem, ex quo non habetur diffinitio
nasi; sed homo albus diffinitur per hominem habentem albedinem aut
per animal rationale habens albedinem; ita etiam circulus cupreus dif-
finitur per figuram circularem existentem in cupro aut per figuram exi- 25
stentem in cupro a cuius centro ad circumferentiam omnes linee ducte
sunt equales.
263ra Pv Ex quo vero h1033a5ssi.
Circa predicta Aristoteles movet unum dubium: propter quid illud ex
quo fit aliquid aliquando predicatur de generato, et si non formaliter 30
tamen denominative, quandoque autem non predicatur de illo formaliter
nec denominative. Verbi gratia, ex lapide fit statua et ex infirmo fit sanus
aut ex laborante fit convalescens; constat autem quod vere dicitur statua
ereos] multos Moerb. (ereos P) modos] scilicet add. M materiam et formam inv.
Iunt. unum] istud Pv generato] aliquo M
a Aristotle, Met., VII, 7, 1032b301033a5 (AL XXV 3.2, p. 144, lin. 343350). b Averroes, In
Met., VII, t.c. 24, fol. 174IK. c Cf. supra, tr. I, c. 3, p. 124, 1215.
236 pauli veneti
est lapidea, sed non vere dicitur statua est lapis; non autem vere dicitur
quod sanus sit infirmitas neque quod sanus sit infirmus.
Lege litteram: Ex quo vero ut materia fit aliquid propter quod quedam
dicuntur, quando fiunt, non illud sed illius modi; ut statua non lapis sed lapi-
dea, homo autem convalescens non dicitur illud ex quo, videlicet infirmus 5
aut laborans.a
Notandum quod Philosophus in hoc dubio intendit duas questiones,
quarum prima est propter quid statua est lapidea et sanus non est infir-
mus, cum sanus fiat ex infirmo sicut statua ex lapide.
30va M Secunda questio: propter quid lapis non est statua et homo est sanus | 10
et ex lapide fit statua et ex homine non fit sanus, cum tamen homo sit
subiectum sani sicut lapis statue. Dicitur enim communiter quod homo
est sanus et quod homo fit sanus, non autem quod ex homine sit sanus
nec quod ex homine fiat sanus. Econtra autem dicimus quod lapis non
est statua, sed quod ex lapide est statua et quod lapis non fit statua, sed 15
ex eo fit statua. Et dicit Commentatorb quod hoc magis manifestatur in
naturalibus, quia non dicimus quod homo fit caro aut sanguis, sed quod
homo sit carneus et sanguineus, et quod ex carne et sanguine fit homo.
Causa vero h1033a9ssi.
Ad primam questionem respondet Philosophus, dicens quod aliquid 20
fieri ex aliquo dicitur dupliciter, videlicet subiective et terminative, ita
quod aliquid fit ex aliquo tamquam ex subiecto et aliquid fit ex aliquo
tamquam ex privatione: statua enim fit ex lapide tamquam ex subiecto et
hhomoi fit sanus ex infirmo tamquam ex privatione. Et ista est causa prop-
ter quam illud ex quo fit aliquid predicatur de generato hformaliter veli 25
denominative, et aliquando non predicatur formaliter neque denomina-
tive. Si enim illud ex quo fit aliquid sit subiectum, necessario predicatur
de eo formaliter vel denominative, et quia ex lapide fit statua tamquam
ex subiecto, ideo statua est lapidea. Si autem illud ex quo fit aliquid sit
privatio aut terminus, non oportet quod predicetur de illo, et quoniam ex 30
infirmo aut laborante fit sanus tamquam ex termino et privatione, prop-
terea sanus non est labor neque infirmitas, non est etiam laborans neque
infirmus. Nec est mirum si subiectum predicatur de eo quod generatur et
Philosophus] Aristoteles Pv et1] aut M dicitur] intellegitur Pv homo

suppl. formaliter vel suppl. aut] ex add. Pv est etiam inv. Pv
t.c. 24, fol. 174M.
non privatio, quia in privativis proprie dicimus ex hoc fit hoc, non autem
proprie dicitur hoc fit hoc; econtra autem in subiectis proprie dicimus
hoc fit hoc et non proprie dicimus ex hoc fit hoc: proprie enim dicimus
quod ex infirmo fit sanus, sed non ita proprie quod infirmus fiat sanus;
proprie etiam dicimus quod homo fit sanus, sed non proprie dicimus quod 5
ex homine fit sanus.
Lege litteram: Causa vero prime questionis est ista, quia fit ex pri-
vatione et subiecto, quia dicimus materiam aliquid dupliciter, ut et homo
et laborans fit sanus. Magis tamen dicimus ex privatione, ut ex laborante
sanus quam ex homine; propter quod laborans quidam qui sanus non dici- 10
tur, sed homo, et homo sanus dicitur sanus.a
Notandum quod ista prepositio ex, proprie loquendo, dicit quendam
ordinem transitus unius post reliquum, ut si ex A fit B, debet intelligi quod
corrupto A sequitur B. Et ideo Arabes, ut dicit Commentator, primo Phisi-
corum,b loco illius prepositionis ex utuntur illa prepositione post, ut ex 15
aurora fit dies et ex animali fit cadaver, idest post auroram fit dies et post
animal fit cadaver. Quia ergo privatio corrumpitur in generatione forme
et subiectum manet, ut dicitur et probatur primo Phisicorum,c ideo non
proprie dicitur ex homine fit sanus sicut proprie dicitur ex infirmo fit
sanus: corrumpitur enim egritudo et homo manet. Proprie enim dicitur 20
quod post egritudinem fit sanitas, sed non proprie dicitur post homi-
nem fit sanitas. Et quoniam subiectum recipit utrumque contrariorum,
263rb Pv nullum autem contrarium recipit suum contrarium, | ut habetur primo
Phisicorum,d ideo proprie dicimus quod homo fit sanus, non autem pro-
prie dicimus quod infirmus fit sanus, sicut non bene dicitur quod egritudo 25
fiat sanitas.
Sed dubitatur, quia Philosophus, primo Phisicorum,e sicut concedit
illam ex immusico fit musicus, ita concedit hanc immusicus fit musicus;
ergo eque propria est quelibet earum.
Respondetur negando consequentiam, quia hec non conceditur ex 30
immusico fit musicus ratione subiecti, sed ratione privationis, et econ-
tra hec immusicus fit musicus non conceditur ratione privationis, sed
quia] quod Moerb. dicimus] et add. M : fieri add. Moerb. quidam] quidem
Moerb. et2] ex animali fit cadaver, idest add. M
a Aristotle, Met., VII, 7, 1033a813 (AL XXV 3.2, pp. 144145, lin. 353358). b Averroes, In
Phys., I, t.c. 58, fol. 35EG. c Aristotle, Phys., I, 7, 190a2023. d Aristotle, Phys., I, 6,
189a2226. e Aristotle, Phys., I, 7, 189b35; 190a67.

238 pauli veneti
ratione subiecti. Unde sicut musicus significat duo, scilicet subiectum et

30vb M formam, principaliter quidem formam | et ex consequenti subiectum, ita
immusicus significat duo, scilicet privationem et subiectum, et principa-
lius privationem quam subiectum. Quoniam ergo unumquodque proprie
sumitur a suo principali significato, ideo proprie dicitur ex immusico fit 5
musicus, ex quo musicus fit proprie ex privatione et non ex subiecto. Non
autem proprie dicitur immusicus fit musicus, ex quo privatio non fit habi-
tus, sed subiectum est illud quod perficitur per habitum.
Ex predictis sequitur quod quadrupliciter aliter fit aliquid ex materia et
privatione. Primo, quia aliquid fit ex materia tamquam ex subiecto gene- 10
rationis, ex privatione vero tamquam ex termino a quo incipit generatio.
Secundo, quia aliquid fit ex materia tamquam ex aliquo permanente in
substantia facti, ex privatione vero tamquam non ex aliquo manente, sed
abiecto per generationem. Tertio, quia aliquid fit ex materia tamquam ex
principio rei non tantum in fieri sed etiam in facto esse, ex privatione vero 15
tamquam ex principio in fieri tantum. Quarto, quia aliquid fit ex materia
per se, sed ex privatione per accidens, non in quantum privatio, sed in
quantum potentiam passivam materie concomitatur.
Quorum vero privatio h1033a13ssi.
Ad secundam questionem respondet Philosophus, dicens quod duplex 20
est privatio, scilicet nominata et innominata. Privatio nominata est illa
que habet proprium nomen distinctum contra nomina sui subiecti et
oppositi, ut infirmitas et curvitas: subiectum infirmitatis est animal et
oppositus habitus est sanitas, subiectum curvitatis est linea et habitus
oppositus est rectitudo, ita quod hec omnia habent propria nomina. Priva- 25
tio autem innominata est illa que non habet proprium nomen, sed habet
nomen sui oppositi habitus privative aut negative sumptum, ut infigu-
ratum, incompositum, inordinatum: figuratum enim et infiguratum, ac
etiam compositum et incompositum, ordinatum et inordinatum, oppo-
nuntur privative, neque differunt opposita nomina nisi penes additio- 30
nem negationis ad nomen significans habitum. Et differunt privatio nomi-
nata et privatio innominata ex parte subiecti, quia privatio nominata non
includitur in subiecto suo, quia in animali non includitur infirmitas vel
egritudo neque in linea curvitas; sed privatio innominata includitur in
subiecto suo ex quo non habet proprium nomen, ita quod infiguratum 35
includitur in ere aut in cupro, incompositum vel inordinatum includitur
aliquid] aliquod Pv incipit generatio] fit generatio vel incipit M ex1 iter. Pv
ac etiam om. M
in lapidibus et lignis, que sunt materia domus, sicut es est materia statue
et cuprum ydoli.
Dicendum ergo quod subiectum includens privationem predicatur de
generato in obliquo formaliter et in recto denominative. Non enim bene
dicitur quod statua sit lapis nec quod ydolum sit cuprum nec quod domus 5
sit lapides, ligna et lateres, sed bene dicitur quod statua est lapidea et quod
ydolum est cupreum et quod domus est lignea, lapidea et latericia. Dicitur
etiam bene quod statua est ex lapide et ydolum est ex cupro et domus
ex lapidibus, lignis et lateribus, sicut proprie dicitur quod ex laborante fit
sanum et ex curvo rectum. Subiectum autem non includens privationem 10
componitur cum generato in recto formaliter et non in obliquo, quia bene
dicitur quod animal est sanum et quod linea est recta, non autem bene
dicitur quod ex animali fiat sanum aut quod ex linea fiat rectum.
Lege litteram: Quorum vero privatio non manifesta et innominabilis,
263va Pv ut in ere est privatio | figure cuiuslibet aut in lateribus et lignis est privatio 15
domus, ex hiis videtur fieri ut illic ex laborante sanum. Propter quod sicut
nec ibi ex quo aliquid fit hoc, illud non dicitur, videlicet quod laborans
est sanus, nec hec statua lignum, sed producitur lignea, et enea, non es, et
31ra M lapidea sed non lapis, | et domus latericia sed non lateres.a
Ex hac distinctione solutum est argumentum quando dicebatur: sicut 20
homo est subiectum sani, ita lapis est subiectum statue; ergo, sicut homo
et sanum de seinvicem predicantur in recto et non proprie dicitur quod
ex homine fiat sanus, ita lapis et statua de seinvicem predicantur in recto
et non proprie dicitur ex lapide fit statua, aut si proprie dicitur, per idem
et proprie dicitur quod ex homine fit sanum. 25
Respondetur negando quamlibet illarum consequentiarum, quia sta-
tua non fit simpliciter ex lapide neque domus ex lignis, sed solum ratione
privationis incluse in lapide et in lignis. Quia autem forma fit proprie ex
privatione, ex quo privatio non manet, ideo statua fit proprie ex lapide, ex
quo lapis permutatur et non manet cum privatione quam includit. Non 30
ergo manet simpliciter es in generatione ydoli, neque manet simpliciter
lignum aut lapis in generatione statue, neque manent simpliciter ligna
aut lapides in generatione domus, ex quo privatio corrumpitur inclusa
in tali subiecto. Et ita habetur quod statua non est lapis neque domus
et1] lapides add. Pv lignea lapidea] lapidea et lignea Pv hec] hic Pv Moerb. (hec
P1a Zz P2) lignea] non lignum add. Moerb.
240 pauli veneti
lateres, sed statua est ex lapidibus et domus ex lateribus, sicut sanus non
est infirmus, sed est ex infirmo. Infirmitas autem est privatio sanitatis
habens proprium nomen, et ex hoc est distincta a subiecto et non inclusa
in eo; et ideo proprie dicimus quod homo est sanus et non econtra, non
autem proprie hdicimusi quod ex homine fiat sanus. 5
Lege litteram: Quoniam neque ex ligno fit statua aut ex lateribus
domus, si quis valde inspexerit, non utique simpliciter dicet, quia oportet
permutato fieri ex quo, idest subiecto, sed non permanente. Propter hoc
quidem igitur ita dicitur, scilicet quod statua non est lapis.a
Sed dubitatur, quia videtur quod subiectum includens privationem et 10
illud quod generatur de seinvicem predicantur in recto, quia lapis est figu-
ratus et homo est musicus. Constat autem quod infiguratum includitur in
lapide et immusicum in homine, ex quo sunt privativa innominata pro-
priis nominibus.
Respondetur quod duplex est forma. Quedam enim est que cum suo 15
subiecto facit concretum substantivum, quedam que cum suo subiecto
facit concretum adiectivum. Verbi gratia, forma substantialis facit cum
suo subiecto concretum substantivum eo quod non dat subiecto suo
nomen et diffinitionem, sed composito: non enim materia est homo aut
lapis, sed compositum ex materia et forma. Homo ergo et lapis sunt con- 20
creta substantiva, sed albedo, nigredo, caliditas, frigiditas et huiusmodi
faciunt cum suis subiectis concreta adiectiva, quia non dant nomen et
diffinitionem composito ex subiecto et forma, sed tantum subiecto: non
enim compositum ex subiecto et albedine est album, sed tantum subiec-
tum est album. Dico ergo quod forma statue aut ydoli vel domus facit 25
concretum substantivum et non adiectivum, quia non denominat subiec-
tum sed solum compositum. Ideo lapis non est statua, sed figuratus, et
homo est musicus, quia figura et musica faciunt concreta adiectiva.
Et sicut duplex est forma, ita duplex est privatio. Quedam enim est pri-
vatio que opponitur forme facienti concretum substantivum et quedam 30
est privatio opposita forme facienti concretum adiectivum. Subiectum
includens primam privationem non predicatur in recto de subiecto suo,
sed bene subiectum includens secundam privationem. Per concretum
et2 om. Pv dicimus suppl. neque] quod add. Moerb. scilicet quod inv. M
in recto mg. Pv substantivum] et add. Pv albedo] et add. Pv caliditas] et
add. M suis subiectis inv. Pv
substantivum intelligo compositum denominatum, ut homo et statua;

per concretum adiectivum intelligo compositum denominans, ut album,
coloratum, figuratum, circulare et huiusmodi.
Quoniam vero ab aliquo h1033a24ssi.
31rb M Tertia conclusio: nec materia nec forma est illud quod per se generatur, 5
sed compositum.
263vb Pv Pro declaratione huius conclusionis Aristoteles premittit | hanc sup-
positionem, quod cuiuslibet generationis tria sunt principia per se, videli-
cet efficiens, materia et forma. Ista suppositio patet ex probatione prime
conclusionis,a quoniam omne quod generatur fit ab aliquo quod est prin- 10
cipium activum generationis; et fit ex aliquo non tamquam ex privatione,
sed tamquam ex materia, quod est subiectum generationis; et fit iterum
ex aliquo quod est terminus generationis. Hoc autem, ut ostensum est, est
forma que incipit esse per generationem, scilicet spera aut circulus aut
aliud aliorum predicamentorum, quod evenit materie per transmutatio- 15
nem eius.
Lege litteram: Quoniam vero ab aliquo fit quod fit (hoc autem dico
unde principium generationis est) et ex aliquo (fit non autem privatio hoc
sed materia; iam enim diffinitum est quomodo hoc dicimus) et quod fit, sci-
licet forma (hoc autem spera aut circulus aut quodcumque evenit aliorum).b 20
Ista suppositione premissa, probat Philosophus dupliciter conclusio-
nem. Non quo ad primam partem, quoniam manifestum est materiam
non fieri per se, ex quo subicitur generationi et preexistit illi per secundam
conclusionem.c Non etiam quo ad tertiam partem, quia omnes concedunt
hominem et plantam per se generari, sicut concedunt quodlibet illorum 25
per se moveri. Sed probatur conclusio tantum quo ad secundam partem,
videlicet quod forma non generatur per se, sed solum per accidens.
Et primo sic: illud quod generatur per se, non generatur in alio; sed
forma generatur in alio; ergo non generatur per se. Tenet consequentia
cum maiori, quia, sicut nullum ens in alio est ens per se, ita nichil quod 30
generatur in alio generatur per se. Sicut ergo materia non generatur, ita
nec forma, sed solum per accidens, quia generans, sicut non facit es,
album] et add. Pv efficiens] et add. Pv eius] illius Pv unde Pv Moerb.] un

M (unum P) fit] sit Moerb. (fit Si P) autem] est add. Moerb. (om. P) forma]
solum add. et del. M sed solum s.l. M (et non add. et del.)
a Cf. supra, pp. 207, 32208, 11. b Aristotle, Met., VII, 8, 1033a2428 (AL XXV 3.2, p. 145,
lin. 368372). c Cf. supra, p. 207, 2627.
242 pauli veneti
sic nec facit speram nisi secundum accidens, ex eo quod facit speram
eream et ipsa spera erea est spera. Et minor declaratur. Universaliter
enim generans facit tam formam quam compositum ex subiecto, sed non
eodem modo, quia facit compositum non in alio sed ex alio, formam
autem facit in alio, scilicet in materia, ita quod generans, in faciendo 5
es esse rotundum aut spericum, non facit absolute rotunditatem nec
spericitatem, sed es rotundum aut spericum facit absolute, rotunditatem
autem et spericitatem facit in alio, scilicet in ere.
Lege litteram: Quemadmodum nec subiectum facit es ipsum generans,
sic nec speram, nisi secundum accidens quia enea spera est et illam facit. 10
Nam hoc aliquid facere ex totaliter subiecto, idest compositum, hoc facere
est absolute et per se. Dico autem quia es rotundum facere est non quod
rotundum aut speram facere sed alterum aliquid, idest compositum per se,
aut speciem hanc in alio, idest forma in subiecto.a
Secundo sic: omne quod per se generatur, fit ex aliquo et ex alio; sed 15
forma non fit ex aliquo et ex alio; ergo forma non per se generatur. Prima
pars antecedentis patet, quia omne quod generatur per se, fit ex ali-
quo tamquam ex subiecto generationis et ex alio tamquam ex termino
generationisex suppositione premissa. Agens enim dicitur facere spe-
ram eneam ex hoc subiecto quod est es et ex hoc termino qui est spera. 20
Secunda pars antecedentis etiam est nota, quia, si forma fieret ex aliquo
tamquam ex subiecto et ex alio tamquam ex termino, illud aliud etiam
fieret ex aliquo et ex alio, et esset procedere in infinitum. Unde breviter
arguitur sic: si forma fit per se et compositum fit per se, ergo consimili-
ter fit forma sicut compositum; sed compositum fit ex materia et forma; 25
ergo forma fit ex materia et forma; sed non est ratio quare una forma fit
ex materia et forma quin, per idem, quelibet alia; ergo forma forme fit
ex materia et forma, et sic in infinitum. Generans ergo non poterit gene-
rare aliquod compositum quin generet infinitas formas eo quo similiter
31va M generabitur forma sicut compositum. | Constat autem quod procedere in 30
264ra Pv infinitum in generationibus et in formis est inconveniens | et absurdum.
Lege litteram: Nam si facit agens aliquid, ex aliquo facit et alio, hoc
enim subiciebatur, idest presupponebatur; ut facere eneam speram, hoc
autem ita quia ex hoc quod est es, hoc facit quod est spera. Si igitur et hoc
aut] ut Moerb. (aut P) generatur per se] per se generatur Pv generabitur

forma] generabit formam Pv igitur] ergo Moerb.
facit ipsum, scilicet formam per se, palam quia similiter faciet sicut compo-
situm, et ibunt generationes in infinitum. Et ex hoc concludit Philosophus
suum intentum, dicens: Palam ergo quod nec species, aut quodcumque
oportet vocare in sensibili, idest in aliqua re sensibili, forma non fit, nec est
eius generatio, ita quod non generatur forma substantialis nec accidenta- 5
lis sive sit naturalis sive artificialis.a
Notandum, secundum Commentatorem, commento vicesimo sexto,
quod Aristoteles dixit per accidens quia, cum fecerit aliquid habens
formam, tunc faciet formam per accidens , quoniam spera cupri
est spera cuprea, non spera tantum nec cuprum tantum, et ideo est 10
id quod facit artifex.b
Sicut ergo forma movetur per accidens ad motum compositi, ita generatur
per accidens ad generationem compositi; et sicut lapis non est materia
tantum nec forma tantum, sed compositum ex hiis, ita spera cuprea non
est spera tantum nec cuprum tantum, sed compositum ex cupro et spera. 15
Et hoc est illud quod artifex facit per se, speram autem facit per accidens.
Contra predicta arguitur, et primo quod materia per se generatur, quia
dicit Commentator, secundo Phisicorum,c quod materia est illud quod in
rei veritate generatur; et tertio Phisicorum,d dicit Philosophus quod gene-
ratio est actus generabilis in quantum generabile; constat autem quod 20
generatio non est actus nisi materie, per Aristotelem, primo De genera-
tione;e ergo materia per se generatur. Ut arguatur sic: sicut se habet mate-
ria ad alterationem, ita et ad generationem; sed materia per se alteratur;
ergo per se generatur. Tenet consequentia cum maiori, quia generatio est
finis alterationis, per Philosophum, primo De generatione.f Minor est eius- 25
dem in eodem primo, dicentis quod forme competit agere, materie vero
pati. Sicut ergo forma per se agit, ita materia per se patitur et alteratur.
Secundo arguitur quod forma per se generatur, quia omnis mutatio
specificatur a termino ad quem, per Aristotelem, quinto Phisicorum,g
et generatio est via in naturam, per ipsum, secundo Phisicorum;h ergo 30
forma] formam Moerb. quia] quoniam Iunt. faciet] facit Iunt. cuprea] et
add. Iunt. id] illud Iunt.
a Aristotle, Met., VII, 8, 1033a34b7 (AL XXV 3.2, pp. 145146, lin. 377383). b Averroes, In
Met., VII, t.c. 26, fol. 176DE. c Actually, Averroes defends the view that it is the composite
of matter and form, and not matter, that is properly generated (cf. In Phys., I, t.c. 64, fol. 38I).
d Aristotle, Phys., III, 1, 201a1415. e Aristotle, De gen., I, 3, 317b13ff. f This claim, which
Paul attributes to the De generatione, is more explicitly formulated by Averroes, In Phys.,

VI, t.c. 45, fol. 274LM. g Aristotle, Phys., V, 1, 224b78. h Aristotle, Phys., II, 1, 193b1213.
244 pauli veneti
natura per se generatur, sicut generatio est per se generatio. Constat

autem quod natura in quam tendit generatio est forma, per Philosophum,
ibidem.a
Item, generatio est mutatio de non-esse ad esse; sed forma mutatur per
se de non-esse ad esse; ergo forma per se generatur. Tenet consequentia 5
cum maiori per Aristotelem, quinto Phisicorum et in Postpredicamentis b.
Minor declaratur, quia forma prius est quam compositum, ex probatione
secunde conclusionisc et per Philosophum, dicentem, primo Phisicorum,d
quod partes sunt priores toto; ergo forma non recipit esse ab esse compo-
siti, sed habet esse ante compositum per generationem. 10
Tertio arguitur quod compositum non generatur per se, quia illud per
se generatur quod est per se terminus generationis; sed compositum non
est per se terminus generationis; ergo et cetera. Tenet consequentia cum
maiori ex doctrina Aristotelis, quinto Phisicorum.e Et probatur minor,
quoniam forma est per se terminus generationis, ut habetur ibidem: sicut 15
enim albedo est per se terminus alterationis et caliditas calefactionis, ita
forma generationis. Si ergo compositum est per se terminus generationis,
sequitur quod eiusdem mutationis sunt duo termini ad quem per se
cuius oppositum determinat Philosophus, secundo Phisicorum.f
Quarto arguitur quod compositum generatur per accidens, quia illud 20
movetur per accidens quod movetur ratione partis, per Commentatorem,
quinto Phisicorum;g ergo pariformiter illud generatur per accidens quod
generatur ratione partis; compositum autem generatur ratione partis,
quia illius una pars non generatur, scilicet materia, ex quo preexistit
generationi, altera autem pars generatur, scilicet forma, que incipit esse 25
secundum se totam, ita quod nichil eius prefuit.
264rb Pv Ad | primum | dicitur quod materia per se generatur subiective in
31vb M quantum ipsa est per se generationis subiectum, sed non generatur per se
terminative nec denominative. Nichil enim per se generatur terminative
nisi generetur in materia; sed materia non generatur in materia, aliter 30
plures materie invicem coextenderentur et esset processus in infinitum in
materiis, quarum una ex altera generaretur; ergo materia non generatur
terminative. Non etiam denominative, quia illud quod per se movetur
Postpredicamentis] et add. Pv necterminative mg. Pv
a Aristotle, Phys., II, 1, 193b1218. b Aristotle, Phys., V, 2, 225b1217; Cat., 14 passim. c Cf.
supra, p. 234, 630. d The claim is probably drawn from Aristotle, Phys., I, 4, 187b1516
(cf. Averroes, In Phys., I, t.c. 36, fol. 24CD, F). e Aristotle, Phys., V, 1, 224b35ff. f In truth,
Aristotle, Phys., V, 4, 227b20228a3. g Averroes, In Phys., V, t.c. 1, fol. 207CD.
denominative componitur ex materia et forma, ut demonstrat Philoso-

phus, octavo Phisicorum;a materia autem non componitur ex materia et
forma. Quando ergo Aristotelesb dicit quod generatio est actus generabi-
lis in quantum huiusmodi et Commentator quod materia in rei veritate
generatur,c dicitur quod auctoritates ille solum probant materiam per se 5
generari subiective. Et hoc conceditur, quo etiam modo conceditur quod
materia per se alteratur; secundum quod ipsa per se alteretur denomina-
tive, hoc non est verum.
Ad secundum dicitur quod non plus probat nisi quod forma generatur
per se terminative, idest per se terminat generationem. Non enim gene- 10
ratur subiective, cum non sit subiectum generationis. Neque generatur
denominative, quia sibi non attribuitur generari sicut nec agere, sed toti
composito, secundum illud Aristotelis, primo De anima:d Actiones sunt
suppositorum. Omne enim quod per se generatur denominative, fit ex
subiecto ut ex parte sui. Constat autem nullum subiectum esse partem 15
forme sue.
Item, conceditur quod forma prius est quam compositum, non priori-
tate temporis, sed nature. Et ita forma prius habet esse quam compositum,
non tamen prius generatur quam compositum, sicut non prius movetur
materia vel forma quam compositum, licet prius habeat esse tam forma 20
quam materia quam ipsum compositum.
Ad tertium respondetur quod compositum est per se terminus gene-
rationis ac etiam forma, sed non eodem modo, quia forma est terminus
formalis et immediatus, compositum autem est terminus materialis et
mediatus. Item, forma est terminus primo et per se generationis, com- 25
positum autem est terminus per se non primo. Neque inconvenit ali-
quem unum motum habere duos tales terminos per se; quod autem motus
habeat duos terminos ad quem formales aut immediatos aut per se primo
non est possibile. Compositum ergo generatur per se sicut movetur per se,
quia generatur ex duobus, quorum unum est subiectum generationis per 30
se et alterum per se terminus, sicut componitur ex duobus, quorum unum
primo facit motum, scilicet ipsa forma, et alterum primo recipit motum,
scilicet materia.
Ad quartum respondetur quod Commentator loquitur ibi de parte
quantitativa, eo modo quo dicitur aliquis sanari secundum partem si nulla 35
hoc] illud Pv forme sue inv. Pv
a Aristotle, Phys., VIII, 4, 254b2833; 255b1217. b Cf. Aristotle, Phys., III, 1, 201a1415. c Cf.
supra, p. 243c. d Aristotle, De an., I, 4, 408a34b18.

246 pauli veneti
eius pars sanatur nisi oculus aut pectus. Cum autem dicitur compositum
generari per partem, hoc intelligitur de parte qualitativa, eo modo quo
dicimus grave moveri deorsum aut leve sursum per formam, non quia
forma moveatur per se et ipsum grave aut leve per accidens, sed quia
forma est ratio movendi. Ita compositum generatur per formam, non quia 5
ipsum generetur per accidens et forma generetur per se, sed quia forma
est ratio propter quam compositum generatur, ex quo est per se terminus
generationis.
Sed dubitatur, utrum forma aut compositum primo generetur. Si forma
primo generatur, ergo non generatur per accidens, sed per se. Patet con- 10
sequentia, quia omne quod competit alicui primo, competit ei per se, per
Aristotelem, primo Posteriorum.a Si compositum generatur primo, et est
per se terminus generationis, ut concessum est, ergo est terminus gene-
rationis per se primoquod est negatum. Deinde, si compositum gene-
ratur primo, ergo quelibet eius pars generatur. Consequens est manife- 15
stum propter materiam, et tenet consequentia per Philosophum, quinto
et sexto Phisicorum,b dicentem quod si aliquid movetur secundum se
ipsum primo, quelibet pars eius movetur.
Respondetur quod primo accipitur dupliciter: uno modo ut distin-
guitur contra partem, ut scilicet illud dicatur inesse alicui primo quod 20
sibi non inest secundum partem unam tantum, sed secundum totum,
32ra M quomodo loquitur Philosophus, quinto Phisicorum,c distinguens moveri ||
264va Pv in per se primo et secundum partem et per accidens; quo etiam modo
loquitur sexto Phisicorum,d dicens quod, si aliquid movetur in aliquo tem-
pore, ipsum movetur in qualibet parte illius temporis. Alio modo acci- 25
pitur primo ut dicit precisionem et adequationem passionis, quo modo
loquitur Philosophus, primo Posteriorum,e dicens quod universale est illud
quod est primo et per se et secundum quod ipsum et de omni, et sic trian-
gulus habet primo tres angulos equales duobus rectis: licet enim equalitas
trium angulorum ad duos rectos competit triangulo per aliam causam, 30
non tamen per aliud subiectum. Et hoc modo conceditur quod compo-
situm primo generatur, non quia eius quelibet pars generetur, sed quia
per om. M quia s.l. M aut] et M ei] illi Pv est manifestum om. Pv
primo s.l. M] primum Pv accipitur] dicitur M Philosophus] Aristoteles
Pv
a Aristotle, An. Post., I, 4, 73b3874a3. b Aristotle, Phys., V, 1, 224a2130; VI, 4, 234b10
235a10. c Aristotle, Phys., V, 1, 224a2130. d Aristotle, Phys., VI, 6, 236b1923. e Aristotle,

An. Post., I, 4, 73b2574a3.
generari competit ei non per aliud subiectum, licet ei competat per aliam
causam, loquendo de subiecto denominationis.
Neque quod quid erat esse h1033b7ssi.
Quarta conclusio: quiditas est illud quod non generatur per se.
Istam conclusionem Philosophus dupliciter probat. Et primo sic: illud 5
quod generatur in alio non generatur per se; sed quiditas generatur in
alio; ergo et cetera. Tenet consequentia cum prima parte antecedentis,
quia, sicut illud quod movetur in alio non movetur per se, ita illud quod
generatur in alio non generatur per se, sive generetur ab arte sive a
natura sive a potestate. Secunda pars antecedentis declaratur. Nam, cum 10
generans facit speram eream, non facit speram per se, sed facit eam in
alio, scilicet in ere; sed idem est iudicium de forma totius et forma partis;
ergo generans speram eream generat quiditatem spere in alio, videlicet in
spera erea. Sicut enim forma partis generatur in materia, que est altera
pars compositi, ita forma totius generatur in toto composito, eo modo 15
quo dicimus quod anima generatur in corpore, sed humanitas generatur
in toto homine. Illud ergo quod generatur per se non generatur in alio,
sed generatur ex alio tamquam ex parte. Ideo, si quiditas spere per se
generatur, ipsa generatur ex alio tamquam ex parte; constat autem quod
quiditas non habet partem aliquam ex qua generetur, sicut nec forma 20
partis.
Lege litteram: Neque quod quid erat esse huic est generatio; hoc enim
est quod in alio fit aut ab arte aut a natura aut a potestate. Eream vero spe-
ram esse facit ipsum generans. Facit enim ex ere et spera; nam in hoc hanc
speciem facit, et est hoc spera enea; hoc autem spere esse, idest quiditas, 25
est in spera erea ut in subiecto. Eius vero quod est spere esse omnino si est
generatio, ex aliquo aliquid erit tamquam ex parte.a
Secundo sic: omne quod per se generatur est divisibile in duo, quo-
rum unum est materia et aliud forma; sed quiditas non est divisibilis in
duo, quorum unum est materia et aliud forma; ergo quiditas non per se 30
generatur. Tenet consequentia cum maiori, quia, sicut omne quod per
se movetur, sive moveatur localiter sive alteretur sive augeatur vel dimi-
nuatur, necessario dividitur in duo, quorum unum est forma et reliquum
materia, ita omne quod per se generatur dividitur in talia duo. Minor vero
ostenditur. Si enim quiditas spere divisibilis est in formam et materiam, et 35
sedforma mg. P est] sit Pv est iter. Pv
248 pauli veneti
quiditas spere est figura a cuius medio usque ad circumferentiam omnes

linee ducte sunt equales, ergo hec diffinitio est divisibilis in duo, quorum
unum est materia recipiens et reliquum est forma receptaquod est fal-
sum: omne enim sic divisum est compositum factum, sicut spera enea, et
non tantum quiditas spere. 5
Lege litteram: Oportebit enim divisibile esse semper quod fit, et esse
hoc quidem hoc et hoc, scilicet duo distincta; dico autem quod hoc quidem
materiam illud vero speciem. Si ergo est spera ex medio figura equalis, idest
figura equaliter distans a medio, huius quiditatis hoc quidem est in quo
erit quod facit, scilicet materia, hoc autem in illo, scilicet forma, hoc autem 10
omne tales habens partes est compositum quod factum est, ut erea spera,
32rb M et non quiditas | tantum.a
Ex predictis Philosophus concludit quatuor esse manifesta ex dictis.
Primo quidem est manifestum quod neque forma neque quiditas genera-
264vb Pv tur per se, ex quo | quelibet earum generatur in alio. Neque datur aliquid 15
ex quo fiat quiditas aut forma tamquam ex parte.
Secundo est manifestum quod compositum est illud quod per se gene-
ratur, et quia forma est terminus per se et immediatus generationis; ideo
compositum dicitur generari secundum formam.
Tertio est manifestum quod in omni per se generato est materia, eo 20
quod materia est subiectum immediatum generationis.
Quarto est manifestum quod est impossibile aliquod indivisibile per se
generari: omne enim quod per se generatur dividitur in hoc et in hoc, idest
in duo, quorum unum est materia et reliquum forma.
Lege litteram: Palam ergo ex dictis quia quod quidem est ut species, 25
idest forma, aut ut substantia, idest quiditas, dicitur non fit, synodus autem,
idest compositum, secundum hanc, idest formam, dicta fit, et quod in omni
generato materia inest, et est hoc quidem quod fit et hoc et hoc, idest
divisibile in duo.b
Notandum primo, secundum Commentatorem, commento vice- 30
simo septimo, quod si agens generaret speram universalem, tunc
generatio esset ex nichilo, idest ex non forma.c
hoc3] hoc add. Moerb. (om. Si P1b) ergo] igitur Moerb. equalis fort. Pv, Moerb.]
equali M tales habens inv. Pv erea] enea Moerb. ergo] igitur Moerb. est
om. Pv hoc3] hoc add. Moerb.
a Aristotle,
8, 1033b1619 (AL XXV 3.2, p. 146, lin. 393396). c Averroes, In Met., VII, t.c. 27, fol. 177A.
Patet, quia, si spera universalis generatur ex forma, ergo, per idem, illa
forma generatur ex alia forma, et sic forme erit forma et erit processus
infinitus in formis et generationibus formarum. Et tenet consequentia,
quia spera universalis est forma. Modo non apparet ratio propter quam
una forma fit ex forma quin, per idem, quelibet forma fiat ex forma. 5
mento, quod necesse est ut omne generatum sit divisibile in duas
partes ratione, non actu, materiam scilicet et formam.a
Intendit Commentator istam distinctionem, quod aliqua esse divisa invi-
cem intelligitur duobus modis, scilicet actu et ratione. Illa sunt divisa actu 10
quorum unum ab alio separatur loco aut subiecto, et sic Sortes et Plato
invicem dividuntur, sicut etiam homo et asinus. Isto modo non invicem
dividuntur materia et forma. Illa vero sunt divisa ratione, quorum sunt
diverse diffinitiones et potest unum intelligi altero non intellecto, et sic
dividuntur subiectum et accidens, ac etiam materia et forma que sunt 15
partes compositi. Et hoc intendit Commentator, dicens omne generatum
divisibile esse in duas partes ratione et non actu.
Contra predicta arguitur quod quiditas generatur per se. Et primo
sic: quiditas et illud cuius est quiditas sunt idem et unum, ut superius
determinatum est;b constat autem quod illud cuius est quiditas per se 20
generatur, per tertiam conclusionem;c ergo et cetera.
Secundo: materia non generatur per se nec etiam forma, quia non com-
ponitur ex materia et forma; sed quiditas substantie sensibilis componitur
ex materia et forma, ut videbitur;d ergo quiditas substantie sensibilis per
se generatur. 25
Tertio: quiditas generatur et est ens per se; ergo generatur per se. Tenet
consequentia cum maiori, quia generatur per accidens ad generationem
individui. Et minor est Aristotelis, superius,e dicens quod in hiis que sunt
secundum se idem est quiditas cum eo cuius est.
Quarto: iste homo per se generatur ab isto homine; ergo homo per se 30
generatur ab homine. Patet consequentia per Philosophum, dicentem,
secundo Phisicorum,f quod, sicut se habet effectus particularis ad causam
notandum secundo inv. Pv actu] in add. Iunt. istam distinctionem om. M

intelligitur duobus modis] est dupliciter Pv idem et unum] unum et idem Pv
sedforma mg. Pv
a Averroes, In Met., VII, t.c. 27, fol. 177A. b Cf. supra, tr. 1, c. 4, p. 180, 67. c Cf. supra, p. 207,
2829. d Cf. infra, tr. 2, c. 3, pp. 353, 13357, 32. e Cf. Aristotle, Met., VII, 6, 1031b1314;
1032a46. f Aristotle, Phys., II, 3, 195b2526.
250 pauli veneti
particularem, ita effectus universalis ad causam universalem. Et exempli-

ficat, dicens quod, si hic statuificator facit hanc statuam per se, statui-
ficator in communi facit statuam in communi. Et ex hoc videtur quod
Commentator deficiat quando dicit quod agens non generat speram uni-
versalem.a 5
Respondetur quod quiditas non per se generatur, alioquin sequuntur
quatuor inconvenientia.
Primum est quod generatum est antequam generetur, quia omne quod
generatur ex sibi simili in specie generatur, per Philosophum in hoc
septimo;b sed similia in specie participant eandem quiditatem, secundum 10
illud Porphyrii, in Universalibus:c Participatione speciei plures homines
sunt unus homo; ergo quiditas in generante est antequam ipsa generetur.
Secundum inconveniens, quod materia est sub aliqua forma antequam
illa forma generetur. Nam similia in specie conveniunt in materia et in
32va M forma. Si ergo quiditas per se generatur ex sibi simili, | materia generatio- 15
nis est sub quiditate antequam generatur illa quiditas.
Tertium inconveniens est quod, uno homine generato, generantur
omnes alii, quia, quando aliquid convenit alicui per se, simul convenit
cuilibet participanti ipsum. Si ergo quiditas generatur per se et ipsa par-
ticipatur a quolibet homine, et non generatur quiditas nisi genito aliquo 20
homine, consequenter et cetera.
Quartum inconveniens est quod quiditas potest existere sine indivi-
265ra Pv duis, | quia quod generatur per se habet esse existere. Si ergo quiditas
generatur per se, necesse est quod habeat esse existere per se, et per con-
sequens ad suum esse non requiritur existentia individuorum. 25
Ad primum negatur consequentia. Unde duplex est illud cuius est qui-
ditas, scilicet particulare et universale, quoniam humanitas non solum est
quiditas hominis, sed etiam istius hominis; et si est quiditas hominis per
se, est tamen quiditas istius hominis per accidens: accidit enim humani-
tati quod sit in isto homine; ideo per accidens generatur ad generationem 30
istius hominis. Quia autem homo in communi non per se generatur, per
Aristotelem, primo De generatione,d ideo humanitas non per se generatur.
primum] inconveniens add. Pv in materia et in forma] in forma et in materia

Pv consequenter] ergo M generatur] et cetera add. Pv
a Averroes, In Met., VII, t.c. 27, fol. 177A. b Aristotle, Met., VII, 7, 1032a245; 8, 1033b29
1034a8. c Porphyry, Isag., c. De specie (AL I 67, p. 12, 1819). d Aristotle, De gen., I, 5,
322a1618.
Ad secundum dicitur quod compositum particulare generatur per se,

compositum autem universale generatur per accidens. Neque componi-
tur quiditas per se ex materia et forma signata, sed tantum ex materia
et forma in communi. Neque materia in communi est subiectum genera-
tionis nisi per accidens, sicut etiam forma in communi non est terminus 5
generationis nisi per accidens.
Ad tertium respondetur quod quiditas non est ens per se perseitate
tertii modi (quod requiritur ad hoc quod aliquid generetur per se), sed est
ens per se perseitate primi modi. Constat autem quod talis perseitas non
facit aliquid generari per se, quia nec materia nec forma per se generatur, 10
et tamen materia et forma est ens per se in primo modo.
Ad quartum respondetur quod artificialia agunt et patiuntur per se,
tam universaliter quam particulariter accepta, quia includunt conceptum
de genere actionis et passionis. Unde non solum iste edificator per se
edificat, sed etiam edificator in communi, licet non eodem modo, quia 15
edificare competiti huic edificatori per se primo et edificatori per se non
primo; ita etiam edificium per se edificatur sicut hoc edificium, licet
per se primo edificetur hoc edificium et per se non primo edificetur
edificium. Constat autem quod homo non dicit aliquod respectum de
predicamento actionis vel passionis; ideo homo non per se generatur sicut 20
nec per se generat. Cum vero dicit Philosophusa quod ita se habet causa
universalis ad effectum universalem et econtra sicut causa particularis
ad effectum particularem, illud est intelligendum quando causa importat
respectum de predicamento actionis et passionis. Et licet agens non per se
generet speram universalem, ut dicit Commentator, tamen per se generat 25
spericum, puta compositum ex ere et spera.
Dubitatur iterum de quiditate, utrum sit per se corruptibilis. Et arguitur
primo quod sic, quia materia est illud per quod res potest esse et non esse,
per Philosophum in hoc septimo;b sed in quiditate substantie sensibilis
includitur materia; ergo quiditas est per se corruptibilis. 30
Secundo: omne compositum ex contrariis est per se corruptibile; sed
quiditas est composita ex contrariis; ergo quiditas est per se corruptibilis.
Tenet consequentia cum maiori. Et minor patet, ex eo quod ipsum quod
quid est componitur ex contrariis, ut planta, bestia et homo.
genere] predicamento Pv quod1] quia Pv homo] et cetera add. Pv
a Cf. Aristotle, Phys., II, 3, 195b2526. b Aristotle, Met, VII, 15, 1039b2930.
252 pauli veneti
Tertio: quandocumque aliqua passio competit duobus, necesse est

quod uni competat per alterum aut ambobus per unum tertium; sed
tam Sortes quam Plato est corruptibilis et neuter eorum per alterum;
ergo uterque est corruptibilis per tertium; hoc autem esse non potest
nisi per aliquod commune in utroque; ergo aliquid commune est per se 5
corruptibile.
Quarto: corruptibile et incorruptibile per se et de necessitate dicuntur
de unoquoque et non per accidens, per Aristotelem, decimo huius;a con-
stat autem quod quiditas est aliquo modo corruptibilis, sicut aliquo modo
est generabilis; ergo quiditas est per se corruptibilis. 10
Dicendum quod, sicut omne generatum componitur per se ex materia
32vb M et forma, quarum materia per se generationi | subicitur et forma per se
terminat generationem, ita omne quod per se corrumpitur, componitur
ex talibus, quarum forma corrumpitur in materiam tamquam terminus a
quo et ipsum corruptibile in materiam tamquam in partem eius; constat 15
autem quod quiditati hec non competunt; ergo quiditas non corrumpi-
tur per se, sed solum per accidens, ad corruptionem individuorum, sicut
etiam forma corrumpitur per accidens, ac etiam materia, loquendo de
materia prima, quia materia secunda per se generatur et per se corrumpi-
tur, ex quo componitur ex materia et forma. 20
265rb Pv Ad primum dicitur quod | materia signata est causa corruptionis et
non materia communis. Materia enim est illud quo res potest esse et non
esse, ratione potentie ad formam et ad privationem: et ex hoc quidem
quod est in potentia ad omnem formam est illud per quod res potest
esse; et ex hoc quod est in potentia ad omnem privationem est illud 25
quo res potest non esse. Illa ergo materia est principium generationis
que quandoque est sub forma et quandoque sub privatione eiusdem. Sed
materia pertinens ad quiditatem numquam est sub privatione, ex quo
species sunt eterne. Sed materia huius individui quandoque est sub forma
et quandoque sub privatione, et ideo ipsa est principium corruptionis. Et 30
huius ratio est quia corruptio non est sine accidentibus, cum accidentia
sint instrumenta in generatione et corruptione naturali; constat autem
quod materia pertinens ad quiditatem est absoluta ab omni accidente,
materia autem individui subiecta est accidentibus.
solum per accidens] per accidens solum M primum scr.] primam MPv quia]
nam Pv
a Aristotle, Met., X, 10, 1058b361059a8.

Ad secundum negatur maior, quod omne compositum ex contrariis

sit per se corruptibile, sed conceditur quod omne per se compositum ex
contrariis est per se corruptibile. Constat autem quod quiditas non per
se componitur ex contrariis, sed tantum per accidens, ratione individuo-
rum quibus per accidens identificatur. Sicut ergo edificator per se edificat 5
et homo per accidens, ratione identificationis, ita individuum per se cor-
rumpitur, sicut per se componitur ex contrariis; quiditas autem, ratione
identificationis, tantum per accidens corrumpitur et componitur ex con-
trariis.
Ad tertium conceditur quod Sortes et Plato sunt corruptibiles per ali- 10
quid commune repertum in eis, scilicet per materiam in communi. Non
tamen propter hoc materia in communi est per se corruptibilis, sed est
ratio propter quam aliquid est per se corruptibile, in quantum scilicet par-
ticulariter potest sumi. Dicit enim Philosophus in littera quod secundum
formam compositum generatur, non tamen forma generatur per se, sed 15
solum per accidens.
Ad quartum respondetur quod Aristoteles, in fine decimi huius,a repro-
bat opinionem quorundam antiquorum dicentium quod eiusdem speciei
quedam individua sunt corruptibilia et quedam incorruptibilia. Et osten-
dit quod corruptibile et incorruptibile non se habent ad res sicut album 20
et nigrum, quoniam eidem individuo possunt competere diversis tempo-
ribus album et nigrum, et eidem speciei possunt simul convenire album
et nigrum, sed pro diversis individuis. Talia vero non sunt corruptibile et
incorruptibile: nullum enim individuum potest esse successive corrupti-
bile et incorruptibile; neque aliqua species potest simul esse corruptibilis 25
et incorruptibilis ratione diversorum individuorum. Comparat ergo Ari-
stoteles ibi corruptibile et incorruptibile ad substantias per se existentes,
ostendens quod quelibet est per se corruptibilis aut per se incorruptibi-
lis, cum quo stat quod substantia non per se existens, scilicet quiditas aut
quod quid est vel universale, sit corruptibile, non quidem per se, sed per 30
accidens ratione individuorum. Quare et cetera.
est per se] dicitur M
a Aristotle, Met., X, 10, 1059a1014.

254 pauli veneti
hCAPITULUM IIi
Utrum ergo quedam spera h1033b19ssi.

Istud est secundum capitulum huius tractatus, in quo Philosophus
ostendit contra Platonem quod non est aliqua quiditas que sit causa
generationis, postquam demonstravit quod non est aliqua talis que sit 5
effectus generatus.
Et dividitur istud capitulum in duas partes, in quarum prima facit quod
33ra M dictum est; in secunda vero movet dubia | contra dicta, ibi: Dubitabit
autem aliquis h1034a9ssi.
In prima parte sic procedit, quia primo movet dubium de ydeis; secun- 10
do respondet ad illud per conclusiones, ibi: Aut numquam h1033b21ssi.
Quantum ad primum querit Philosophus utrum sit aliqua forma uni-
versalis separata a rebus singularibus, scilicet utrum sit aliqua spera sepa-
rata a materia preter has speras sensibiles, aut etiam sit aliqua domus sine
materia preter has domus particulares, que separata sit a lignis et lapidi- 15
265va Pv bus, et in qua non sunt | lateres ex quibus fiunt domus sensibiles. Movet
autem Philosophus questionem in artificialibus propter naturalia, quo-
rum species a materia separari Plato voluit, ut intelligatur esse quesitum
utrum sit homo universalis preter carnem et ossa, ex quibus fiunt parti-
culares homines, et utrum sit planta preter radices et ramos, ex quibus 20
sensibiles plante constituuntur in esse.
Lege litteram: Utrum ergo quedam spera universalis sit preter has
particulares aut domus preter lateres?a
Notandum, secundum Commentatorem, commento duodetrice-
simo, quod questio querens utrum sit hec spera separata a mate- 25
ria, existens extra animam alia a materiali, aut domus separata a
lateribus, et universaliter forma separata a materia, alia a formis
rerum particularium, que sit causa spere composite aut domus facte,
est questio impossibilis.b
Intendit Commentator duas distinctiones. Prima est quod duplex est 30
forma, scilicet artificialis, ut spera vel forma domus, et naturalis, ut forma
hominis vel equi. Sicut ergo impossibile est quod sint forme artificia-
lium separate a rebus artificialibus, ita impossibile est quod sint forme
ergo] igitur Moerb. : est add. Moerb. (om. P1b Hs) ergo] igitur Moerb. : est add. Moerb.
(om. P1b Hs) hec] hic Iunt. a2] sine Iunt. aut om. Iunt.
VII, t.c. 28, fol. 177M.
naturalium separate a rebus naturalibus. Exemplificat autem Philosophus

de artificialibus, cum loquitur de spera et de domo, primo quia artificialia
sunt nobis magis nota quam naturalia, ut per simile debeamus intelligere
in naturalibus; secundo, quia Platonici non ponebant artificialia separata,
et ex hoc multo minus formas naturalium ponere debuerunt a sensibili- 5
bus separari.
Secunda distinctio est quod duplex est forma artificialis, videlicet in
anima et extra animam. Forma artificialis in anima dicitur habitus facti-
vus et forma artificialis extra animam est habitus factus, ita quod datur
spera in anima et spera extra animam, domus in anima et domus extra 10
animam. Non ergo inconvenit quod detur in anima domus universalis
separata a domibus particularibus, aut spera universalis separata a speris
particularibus et sensibilibus; sed quod detur huiusmodi forma separata
a rebus particularibus est simpliciter impossibile.
Aut numquam h1033b21ssi. 15
Ad questionem propositam respondet Philosophus per quatuor con-
clusiones, quarum prima est hec: nulla quiditas separata active concurrit
ad generationem. Secunda conclusio: nulla est quiditas separata, que sit
substantia per se existens, ibi: Manifestum igitur h1033b26ssi. Tertia con-
clusio: generans et genitum universaliter sunt consimilia in forma, ibi: In 20
quibusdam vero h1033b29ssi. Quarta conclusio: nulla est quiditas sepa-
rata per modum forme exemplaris, ibi: Quare palam h1034a2ssi.
Istarum conclusionum prima est antecedens ad secundam, secunda
ad tertiam et tertia ad quartam. Prima ergo arguitur sic: nulla quiditas
separata est hoc aliquid; sed quodlibet generans est hoc aliquid; ergo nulla 25
quiditas separata est generans, et per consequens non active concurrit ad
generationem.
Prima pars antecedentis est nota, quia nullum universale est hoc ali-
quid, sed quale quid. Universalia enim, cum sint semper et ubique, non
sunt determinata; singularia vero sunt hoc aliquid, quia sunt determinata: 30
homo enim non significat aliquid determinatum, sed quandam naturam
communem indifferentem multis; Sortes autem aut Plato est hoc aliquid,
cum sit aliquid determinatum loco et aliis conditionibus individuantibus.
Secunda pars antecedentis declaratur. Nam quodlibet generatum est
33rb M hoc aliquid; | ergo quodlibet generans est hoc aliquid. Patet consequen- 35
tia, quia generans facit ex materia tale quale ipsum est, et ipsum genitum,
particularibus et om. Pv secundam] et add. M aut] et M

256 pauli veneti
quando generatum est ex materia, est tale quale est ipsum generans. Pro-
batur antecedens sic: quodlibet generatum est compositum ex materia et
forma, ut patuit in alio capitulo; ergo quodlibet generatum est hoc aliquid.
Patet consequentia, quia determinata materia est subiectum generationis
et determinata forma est terminus generationis. Sicut ergo generatur hec 5
spera enea et non spera enea in communi, ita generatur Sortes et Callias
et non homo vel animal, quia Sortes et Callias est sicut hec spera et homo
vel animal est sicut spera enea in communi. Et ita sequitur contra Plato-
265vb Pv nicos quod quiditas hominis | vel animalis, sicut non generatur, ita non
generat, cum sit universale indeterminatum. 10
Lege litteram: Aut, idest respondetur quod numquam facta est qui-
ditas generans, quia si sic ipsa erit, hoc aliquid, quod est falsum, sed quia
tale significat in communi, hoc autem et determinatum non est, sed facit
et generat ipsum agens ex hoc, idest ex materia, tale quale ipsum est, et
quando generatum est, hoc ipsum est tale hoc, scilicet simile generanti et 15
determinatum. Hoc autem omne hoc, idest omne tale, tam generans quam
generatum, est hoc aliquid; nam Callias aut Socrates est, quemadmodum
spera enea hec, homo vero et animal quemadmodum spera enea totaliter,
idest universaliter.a
Notandum, secundum Commentatorem, commento duodetrice- 20
simo, quod si forme rerum generabilium essent eadem forma in
numero, scilicet forma generantis et generati, non esset hoc aliquid
factum omnino. Generans enim et generatum sunt duo numero et
unum in intentione universali.b
Intendit Commentator talem rationem: si forme rerum naturalium sunt 25
separate, utrum forma generantis et generati sit eadem forma specie aut
numero. Si eadem forma specie, sequitur quod illa non generat sicut
nec generatur: actiones enim sunt suppositorum et non universalium, ut
habetur primo De anima et in prohemio huius.c Si eadem forma numero,
sequuntur duo inconvenientia. Primum est quod nichil est generatum 30
omnino, quia nichil omnino generatur, si tam forma quam materia sua
precessit generationem. Constat autem quod cuiuslibet generati tam
forma quam materia precessit generationem, si eadem est forma numero
generantis et generati. Secundum inconveniens est quod generans et
ipsum om. Pv erit] erat Moerb. quale iter. M tale hoc inv. Moerb. in
om. Iunt. generantis generati] generans generata Iunt.
VII, t.c. 28, fol. 177M178A. c Aristotle, De an., I, 4, 408a34b18; Met., I, 1, 981a1617.
generatum sunt idem numero. Consequens est falsum, quia non sunt
eadem numero, sed eadem intentione communi, videlicet specie. Et quod
illud sequitur, patet, quia illa sunt idem numero quorum est eadem forma
numero. Quare et cetera.
Dubitatur, quia in nutritione generatur caro proprie, et tamen tam 5
materia quam forma carnis genite precessit generationem. Quando etiam
resolvitur mixtum in elementum, quodlibet elementorum proprie gene-
ratur, quorum tam forma quam materia precessit generationem. Ergo illa
ratio Commentatoris non est valida. Antecedens est de intentione Philo-
sophi, tradentis, primo De generatione,a quod augmentatio et nutritio fit 10
secundum formam et non secundum materiam, et quod forme elemento-
rum sunt potentia in mixto.
Respondetur quod duplex est generatio, scilicet completa et incom-
pleta. Generatio completa est per quam incipit esse non solum compo-
situm, sed etiam forma; generatio incompleta est per quam incipit esse 15
compositum et non forma, sicut est generatio carnis et sanguinis in nutri-
tione et augmentatione, et generatio elementi in corruptione mixti. Con-
similiter dicatur de corruptione, quod corruptio completa est per quam
desinet esse tam forma quam compositum; corruptio incompleta est per
quam corrumpitur compositum sine forma. Quando ergo generatur mix- 20
tum ex elementis, ipsum mixtum complete generatur et elementa incom-
plete corrumpuntur, quia remanent forme illorum in mixto; et quando
33va M econtra generantur | elementa ex mixto, complete corrumpitur mixtum
et incomplete generantur elementa; quando autem generatur elemen-
tum ex elemento aut mixtum ex mixto, elementum aut mixtum corrup- 25
tum complete corrumpitur et elementum aut mixtum genitum complete
generatur. Sic etiam in augmentatione complete corrumpitur alimentum
et incomplete generatur pars corporis animati; in diminutione vero econ-
tra complete generatur corpus subtile et incomplete corrumpitur pars
corporis animati. 30
Non ergo loquitur Commentator de generatione incompleta, sed com-
pleta, cum dicit quod nichil est generatum omnino, si forma geniti preces-
266ra Pv sit generationem, et maxime | si ita precessit quod fuerit forma generantis.
Sicut enim non inconvenit quod terminus ad quem motus localis, qui est
ipsum ubi, precesserit motum illum, ut colligitur a Philosopho, quinto 35
augmentatio et nutritio] nutritio et augmentatio Pv
a Aristotle, De gen., I, 4, 321b22322a4; 10, 327b2231.

258 pauli veneti
Phisicorum,a et quod terminus ad quem augmentationis et diminutionis

precesserit mutationem illam, ex quo quantitas est coeterna materie, per
Commentatorem, in De substantia orbis,b ita non inconvenit quod ter-
minus ad quem generationis precesserit illam generationem. Et ex hoc
dicitur forma generari per accidens, quia aliqua est generatio per quam 5
forma incipit esse et aliqua est per quam forma non incipit esse. Non ergo
est impossibile quod forma precesserit generationem, sed est impossi-
bile ipsam taliter precessisse quod generantis et generati sit eadem forma
numero, et precipue in generatione completa.
Manifestum ergo h1033b26ssi. 10
Secunda conclusio: nulla est quiditas separata que sit substantia per se
existens.
Probatur. Platonici, ut patet ex eorum modo loquendi consueto, non
ponunt quiditates aut species ydeales, que sunt substantie per se exi-
stentes, nisi propter generationem rerum singularium; sed constat quod 15
huiusmodi quiditates non sunt utiles ad generationem, ex quo non active
concurrunt ad generationem, per primam conclusionem;c ergo et cetera.
Unde, quia Anaxagoras posuit latitationem formarum in materia, dicens
formas actu preexistere et nullam esse generationem nove forme, ideo
Plato dixit formam fieri de novo et non compositum, ponens formas sepa- 20
ratas, quas datrices formarum appellabat. Avicenna vero tot formas non
posuit, sed unam tantum, quam posuit esse datorem formarum, neque
per generationem sed per creationem: voluit enim, una cum Platone,
quod agens particulare disponit materiam et motor extrinsecus introdu-
cit formam. Et quia materia non est pars forme, ideo asseruit formam non 25
fieri ex materia, sed ex nichilo. Aristoteles autem, dicens compositum fieri
et non formam, omnes has opiniones excludit. Non enim oportet dicere
quod forme sint create ab aliquo extrinseco, sive illud sit unum, sicut
dicit Avicenna, sive multa, ut asserit Plato, quia idem est agens disponens
materia et introducens formam. Neque oportet quod forme semper actu 30
fuerint in materia, sicut docuit Anaxagoras, sed tantum in potentia, ut cre-
didit Aristoteles, et quod in generatione compositi sint educte de potentia
ad actum. Non ergo sunt et huiusmodi species et quiditates separate a sin-
gularibus per se existentes. Et si essent, non essent utiles ad generationem.
modo loquendi consueto] consueto modo loquendi Pv
a Aristotle, Phys., V, 1, 224a35b12. b Averroes, De sub. orb., fol. 4D. c Cf. supra, p. 255,
1718.
Lege litteram: Manifestum ergo quia specierum causa, sicut consueti

sunt quidam dicere species, si sunt quedam preter singularia, ad generatio-
nes et substantias nichil utiles; neque utique erunt propter hoc substantie
secundum se, idest per se existentes.a
Notandum, secundum Commentatorem, commento duodetrice- 5
simo, quod si intendunt quod forme universales sunt cause agen-
tes formas particulares, non prosunt in generationibus, scilicet in
generatione formarum et accidentium. Omnis enim generatio mani-
festum est quod fit per transmutationem materie et materia est indi-
33vb M viduum generans , | quoniam impossibile est quod forme separate 10
transmutent materiam. Non enim transmutat materiam nisi illud
quod est in materia, et ideo contingit dicentibus mundum generari,
quod transmutans ipsum sit aliquod individuum, scilicet corpus par-
ticulare.b
Commentator probat quod non sunt forme universales generantes for- 15
mas particulares substantiales vel accidentales, quoniam omnis genera-
tio est per transmutationem materie; sed forme universales non possunt
transmutare materiam; ergo et cetera. Tenet consequentia cum maiori.
Et minor declaratur. Nam omne agens transmutans materiam est agens
individuale existens in materia; constat autem quod forme universales 20
266rb Pv non sunt agen-|-tia individualia, cum sint species, per illos; neque sunt
in materia, quia separantur a singularibus loco et subiecto, per eosdem;
ergo forme universales non possunt transmutare materiam.
Quod autem agens transmutans debeat esse individuale agens, proba-
tur, quia effectus productus est individualis, ergo etiam efficiens produ- 25
cens debet esse individuale. Patet consequentia, quia effectus particularis
refertur ad causam particularem, sicut effectus universalis ad causam uni-
versalem, ut habet videri secundo Phisicorum.c
Iterum, agens transmutans debet esse in materia, quia idem est agens
disponens et transmutans materiam, eo quod, sicut in artificialibus, ita 30
et in naturalibus idem est agens inducens finem et ea que sunt ad finem.
Constat autem quod agens disponens est in materia, ut apparet ad sen-
sum: videmus enim quod calefaciens et frigefaciens est in materia.
hoc] hec Moerb. (hoc Je GpNeXy Zz Hs) formarum] substantiarum Iunt. quo-
niam] quia Iunt.
a Aristotle, Met., VII, 8, 1033b2629 (AL XXV 3.2, pp. 146147, lin. 403406). b Averroes, In
Met., VII, t.c. 28, fol. 178BC. c Aristotle, Phys., II, 3, 195b2526.
260 pauli veneti
Ex quibus infert Commentator quod dicentes mundum generari

debuerunt dicere quod transmutans mundum est corpus particulare et
non substantia incorporea universalis. Anaxagoras enim dixit quod trans-
mutans mundum est intellectus immaterialis et immixtus, Plato vero
quod est forma universalis abstracta. 5
Dubitatur tamen, quoniam ad generationem active concurrunt non
tantum agens particulare, sed etiam universale, iuxta illud Philosophi,
secundo Phisicorum:a Sol et homo generant hominem ex materia; con-
stat autem quod Deus et intelligentie sunt cause universales; ergo active
concurrunt ad generationem et sunt forme separate a materia. Ergo aliqua 10
forma separata transmutat materiam.
Dicendum quod argumentum concludit, sed non pro opinione Platoni-
corum, dicentium quod ideo sunt forme separate propter generationem,
ut ille forme sint immediate cause generationis tamquam quiditates et
species generatorum, ita quod forme rerum particularium non generan- 15
tur ab agentibus particularibus, sed tantum a formis ydealibus separa-
tis omnino. Quod quidem non est verum. Ymmo agens particulare agit
sicut agens universale et modo determinato, regulato ab agente univer-
sali, ita quod agens particulare est agens propinquum et immediatum,
agens autem universale, sive sit in materia sive extra materiam, est agens 20
mediatum et remotum.
Et quod sit necessarium ponere agens universale quod sit forma sepa-
rata active concurrens ad generationem arguitur primo sic: natura, suos
effectus producendo, intendit certum finem per determinata media, ut
ostendit Philosophus, secundo Phisicorum;b ipsa autem natura non cogno- 25
scit, cum non habeat sensum neque intellectum; ergo dirigitur ab aliquo
agente separato a materia, inclinante naturam in effectum illum ne pro-
cedatur in infinitum, eo modo quo sagitta dirigitur in signum a sagittante.
Sicut ergo motus arguit motorem separatum immobilem, ita generatio
arguit generans separatum ingenerabile. 30
Item, generatio arguit alterationem, alteratio arguit motum localem,
motus localis arguit motorem immobilem, motor autem immobilis arguit
formam separatam; ergo a primo ad ultimum generatio arguit formam
dubitatur] sed pream. Pv concurrunt] pro concurrit agit] generat Pv

Philosophus] Aristoteles Pv autem] enim M
a Aristotle, Phys., II, 2, 194b13. b Aristotle, Phys., II, 8, 199a832.

separatam. Antecedens declaratur octavo Phisicorum.a Sicut ergo motum

34ra M ad formam | presupponit motum ad ubi, quod non est motum ad formam,
videlicet celum, et motum ad ubi, non tantum motum ad formam, presup-
ponit movens non motum ad ubi nec ad formam, ita generatum presup-
ponit generans ingenerabile existens in materia, videlicet corpus celeste, 5
generans autem ingenerabile existens in materia presupponit generans
ingenerabile separatum a materia. Constat autem huiusmodi generans
esse formam universalem separatam ad omnem generationem active con-
currentem.
In quibusdam vero h1033b29ssi. 10
Tertia conclusio: generans et genitum universaliter sunt consimilia in
forma.
Probatur ista conclusio inductive, et primo in generationibus secun-
dum naturam. Quecumque non sunt unum et idem numero, sed unum
specie, illa sunt consimilia in forma; sed generans et genitum secundum 15
naturam sunt huiusmodi; ergo et cetera. Patet consequentia cum maiori
266va Pv ex quinto huiusb. | Et minor declaratur. Nam generans et genitum ab eo
necessario differunt numero; tamen, quia generans secundum naturam
est tale quale est ipsum generatum, ambo dicuntur esse unum in specie,
ut inductive liquet: homo enim generat hominem talem in specie qualis 20
ipse est, et equus generat equum talem in specie qualis ipse est, et sic de
aliis que generantur secundum naturam.
Secundo arguitur eadem conclusio in generationibus preter naturam,
in quibus non oportet quod generans et genitum sint similia in specie,
sed sufficit quod in genere. Sicut enim quando equus generat mulum, 25
contingit assignare unum genus immediatum equo et asino, in quo genere
convenit mulus simul cum equo et asino, et tunc dicitur quod generans
et genitum sunt similia in forma generica, et si non sunt similia in forma
specifica, quoniam equus et asinus sunt in genere illo quasi mulus: ut, dato
quod illud genus vocetur iumentum, quod est magis commune quam 30
aliquod illorum trium et minus commune quam animal, ergo equus non
convenit cum mulo in specie equi, tamen convenit in genere iumenti.
Lege litteram: In quibusdam vero palam quia generans tale quidem est
quale generatum, nec tamen idem nec unum numero, sed unum specie, ut
in phisicis et generationibus naturalibus (homo namque hominem generat) 35
immediatum] innominatum add. Pv similia1] in genere et add. Pv
a Aristotle, Phys., VIII, 710 passim. b Aristotle, Met., V, 6, 1016b3135.

262 pauli veneti
nisi quid preter naturam fiat, ut equus mulum. Et hoc quoque similiter; quod
enim commune est super equum et asinum non est nominatum, proximum
genus, sunt ambo forsan, velut mulus.a
Notandum, secundum Commentatorem, commento duodetrice-
simo, quod omnis species generat speciem sibi similem, verbi 5
gratia homo hominem, nisi generatio sit per accidens et non secun-
dum naturam, ut mulus, qui generatur ab equo et ab asino.b
Intendit Commentator hanc distinctionem, quod duplex est generatio,
scilicet per se et per accidens. Generatio per se est illa quando generans
producit effectum intentum, ut generatio hominis ab homine et equi ab 10
equo; generatio per accidens est quando generans producit effectum non
intentum, ut generatio muli ab equo vel ab asino: equus enim intendit
producere equum et producit mulum, ideo agit effectum quem non inten-
dit, et per consequens generat mulum per accidens. Hec distinctio coinci-
dit cum distinctione hai Philosopho posita in littera, scilicet quod duplex 15
est generatio, scilicet secundum naturam et preter naturam. Generatio
secundum naturam est quando generans et genitum sunt eiusdem spe-
ciei; generatio preter naturam est quando generans et genitum non sunt
eiusdem speciei, sed eiusdem generis.
Sed dubitatur, quia motus naturalis est ille qui fit a principio intrinseco 20
vel extrinseco conferente vim passo, per Philosophum, tertio Ethicorum;c
sed generatio muli fit a principio intrinseco vel extrinseco conferente vim
passo, ut constat; ergo generatio muli est naturalis, et per consequens non
est preter naturam.
Respondetur quod non est idem esse contra naturam et preter natu- 25
ram. Nam esse contra naturam est esse contra inclinationem mobilis aut
passi, sicut contra naturam ignis est quod moveatur deorsum. Sed esse
34rb M preter naturam est quando aliquid convenit | alicui extra inclinationem
sue nature, ita quod illud non sequitur ad naturam suam neque illi repu-
gnat, sicut quod ignis circulariter moveatur in concavo lune non est contra 30
naturam eius, sed preter naturam. Ita in proposito, quod sperma equi
faciat ad generationem muli non est contra naturam, sed preter natu-
ram. Unde generatio muli non consequitur inclinationem equi neque illi
repugnat, loquendo de inclinatione primaria, secundum quam generans
hoc] hec Moerb. (hoc P1b HsRj) sunt] autem add. Moerb. ab2 om. Iunt. quem
scr.] quod MPv a suppl. in concavo om. M
a Aristotle, Met., VII, 8, 1033b291034a2 (AL XXV 3.2, p. 147, lin. 406413). b Averroes, In
Met., VII, t.c. 28, fol. 178DE. c Aristotle, Eth. Nic., III, 1, 1110a13.
intendit sibi simile in specie; quia loquendo de inclinatione secundaria,

per quam generans intendit sibi simile in genere propinquum sue speciei,
dicitur quod illa generatio muli est secundum naturam.
Dicitur ergo ad argumentum quod naturale dupliciter consideratur:
uno modo ut opponitur violento, et sic generatio muli est naturalis; alio 5
modo ut opponitur preter naturali, et sic non est illa generatio naturalis.
266vb Pv Aristoteles | autem, tertio Ethicorum,a loquitur de motu naturali ut oppo-
nitur violento.
mento, quod dubitatur de animalibus propinquarum specierum, 10
quorum congregatione generatur aliud animal in specie, ut ab equo
et asina mulus. Et ideo ad verificandum hanc propositionem, dicen-
dum est quod omne generatum generatione actuali, idest genera-
tione non cessabili, hgeneraturi a suo simili. Et respondetur quod
hoc non negat universalitatem propositionis dicentis quod omne 15
quod generatur, generatur a sibi simili in forma, quoniam mulus
generatur a natura sibi simili, et est natura communis asino et equo.b
Dubium est istud, quia non videtur quod propositio illa sit universaliter
vera omne quod generatur, generatur a sibi simili in forma, quia mulus
generatur et non a sibi simili in forma, quia generatur ab equo et asino, 20
qui sunt alterius speciei a mulo.
Respondet Commentator dupliciter. Et primo quod duplex est gene-
ratio, scilicet actualis et potentialis. Generatio actualis est illa que non
cessat ab intentione generantis, generatio potentialis est illa que cessat
ab intentione generantis. Generatio equi ex equo est generatio actualis, 25
quia actum inducit secundum intentionem generantis particularis; sed
generatio muli ex equo est potentialis, quia non inducit actum secundum
intentionem generantis particularis, sed universalis. Dicitur ergo quod
illa propositio omne quod generatur, generatur a sibi simili in forma est
intelligenda de omni eo quod generatur generatione actuali. 30
violentoopponitur mg. Pv notandum secundo inv. Pv de] ex Iunt.

asina] asino Iunt. generatur suppl. ex Iunt. sibi M] suo Pv Iunt. quoniam
mulus] mulus enim Iunt. asino et equo] equo et asino Iunt. propositio illa inv. Pv
secundum] generationem et add. M sed] generantis add. Pv estomni
mg. Pv
a Aristotle, Eth. Nic., III, 1, 1110a13. b Averroes, In Met., VII, t.c. 28, fol. 178EF.
264 pauli veneti
Secundo respondet Commentator, dicens quod, licet mulus generetur

ab eo quod est alterius speciei, non propter hoc debet negari illa propo-
sitio omne quod generatur, generatur a sibi simili in forma, [et] quia
mulus generatur a natura communi equo et asino, que est similis mulo.
Hec autem natura potest intelligi natura generis logici, per predicationem 5
in qua conveniunt equus, asinus et mulus, aut natura generis naturalis, in
qua conveniunt per mixtionem equus et asinus. Mulus ergo generatur ex
suo simili in forma generica predicabili et in forma generica naturali, et
hoc si ponitur huiusmodi genus innominatum.
Propterea dicit Philosophus in littera sub dubio quod ambo forsan 10
sunt sicut mulus. Quia ergo iumentum generat iumentum, et ex materia
communi equo et asino generatur mulus, propterea mulus generatur a
suo simili in forma, et si non specifica, tamen generica, tam predicabili
quam naturali.
quod rectum est ut ex duobus seminibus generetur natura equalis,
idest temperata. Et innuit hoc quod dicit Philosophus, idest Ari-
stoteles, in libro De animalibus, quod sperma asini est frigidum et
sperma equi calidum, et temperantur apud mixtionem, et fit illic
natura media inter equum et asinum.a 20
Ita quod, sicut in generatione mixti omnia elementa remittuntur in qua-
litatibus primaris versus gradum medium, et ex hoc generatur natura
34va M media tam ex parte materie | existentis sub qualitatibus remissis quam
ex parte forme ipsius mixti, determinantis sibi omnes qualitates prima-
rias sub aliquo gradu medio inter gradum summum et non gradum; ita in 25
generatione muli remittitur caliditas spermatis equi et frigiditas sperma-
tis asini, et fit una natura media equalis et temperata ex calido et frigido.
Que quidem natura media potest intelligi esse tam materia congregata ex
duobus seminibus quam etiam virtus formativa muli, fluens a qualitati-
bus illorum seminum, quam etiam ipsa forma generata a virtute illorum 30
duorum seminum, et ita declaravit in libro De animalibus.b
Sed dubitatur: si in materia congregata ex illis duobus seminibus resul-
tat una virtus media formativa muli, sequitur quod mulus generatur
267ra Pv secundum naturam et | non per accidens, sicut generatur homo aut equus
et secl. notandum tertio inv. Pv est] igitur Iunt.
a Averroes, In Met., VII, t.c. 28, fol. 178FG. b Aristotle, De gen. anim., II, 8 passim.
ex virtute formativa spermatiscuius oppositum dicit Philosophus in

litteraa et Commentator in commento.b
Respondetur quod in generatione muli est duplex generans, scilicet
remotum et propinquum. Remotum est virtus formativa existens in
semine deciso ab equo vel ab asino. Et respectu huius generantis dicit 5
Philosophusc quod generatio muli est preter naturam et Commentatord
quod huiusmodi generatio est per accidens, quia talis virtus est natura-
liter ordinata ad producendum simile in specie ei a quo decisa est. Sed
generans propinquum est virtus media resultans ex commixtione semi-
num equi et asini. Respectu ergo huius generantis generatio muli est per 10
se et secundum naturam, respectu cuius dicitur quod generatio muli est
a suo simili in specie, quia istud generans propinquum est tale in virtute
qualis est mulus in actu.
Illa ergo littera Philosophi super equum et asinum est aliquod genus pro-
ximum immediatume potest intelligi tam de genere logico quam de genere 15
naturali. Si intelligitur de genere logico, sic mulus generatur ab equo vel
ab asino tamquam a suo simili in genere; si intelligitur in genere actuali
naturali, sic mulus generatur a materia duorum seminum tamquam a suo
simili in specie, non formaliter sed virtualiter, in quantum illa materia
continet virtutem naturaliter ab intrinseco formativam muli. 20
Quare palam quia h1034a2ssi.
Quarta conclusio: nulla est quiditas separata per modum forme exem-
plaris.
Probatur. Frustra fit per plura quod potest fieri per pauciora; sed omnes
generationes naturales possunt fieri sine talibus quiditatibus exemplari- 25
bus separatis, ex quo generans et genitum universaliter sunt similia in
forma, ut determinatum est in tertia conclusione; ergo non oportet pro-
bare esse huiusmodi quiditates ydeales separatas ut sint exemplaria gene-
ratorum. Si enim requirerentur species ydeales propter generata, maxime
requirerentur propter generata que sunt substantie, quia quanto gene- 30
ratum est perfectius tanto plura requiruntur ad eius generationem; con-
stat autem quod non requiruntur propter generata substantialia, quia ad
generationem istorum sufficit ponere formam in materia, que est causa
rei generate; ergo non requiruntur propter aliqua alia.
potest intelligi mg. Pv actuali om. Pv
a Aristotle, Met., VII, 8, 1033b33. b Averroes, In Met., VII, t.c. 28, fol. 178DE. c Cf. footnote
a. d Cf. footnote b. e Aristotle, Met., VII, 8, 1033b341034a1 (AL XXV 3.2, p. 147, lin. 411412).
266 pauli veneti
Lege litteram: Quare palam quia non oportet quasi exemplum spe-
ciem probare, scilicet ydealem, ut dixerunt Platonici (maxime enim in hiis
generatis substantialibus exquirerentur, nam substantie maxime hee sunt
respectu artificialium), sed sufficiens est generans facere et speciei causam
esse in materia absque huiusmodi speciebus ydealibus.a 5
Et confirmatur: si essent tales species ydeales, hoc ideo contingeret, ut
individua generabilium et corruptibilium essent eiusdem speciei, secun-
dum doctrinam Platonicorum. Sed hoc non probat tales species esse, quia
ponendo omnem formam specificam esse in materia, videlicet in hiis car-
nibus et ossibus, sicut Callias et Socrates sunt in materia, adhuc aliqua 10
differunt numero et conveniunt specie, quoniam forma existens in mate-
ria est unum et multa seu eadem et diversa: est enim unum et idem ratione
34vb M sui, et multa | ac diversa ratione materie; est enim ipsa forma indivisibilis
secundum essentiam et divisibilis secundum esse. Propterea generans et
generatum sunt unum specie et diversa numero propter formam utrius- 15
que divisibilem secundum esse, et hoc propter diversam participationem
materie.
Lege litteram: Omnis vero iam talis species in hiis carnibus et ossibus
est sicut Callias et Socrates; et diversa quidem est ipsa forma et eadem
propter materiam (diversa namque), idem vero specie; nam individua, idest 20
indivisibilis est species.b
Notandum primo, secundum Commentatorem, commento duode-
tricesimo, quod sufficit in generatione ut in generante sit potentia
ad generandum formam sibi similem in materia, que est in poten-
tia forma eius, quia actio eius nichil aliud est quam extrahere illud 25
quod est in potentia in actum; et erit causa in multiplicatione gene-
rabilium ab uno generante multiplicatio materiarum in quas agit.c
267rb Pv Intendit | Commentator quod non requiritur forma exemplaris separata
ad hoc quod generans et genitum sint similia in forma aut eiusdem spe-
ciei, sed sufficiunt due potentie, quarum una est activa, existens in gene- 30
rante, et alia passiva, existens in materia. Et quia iste due potentie respi-
ciunt consimiles formas, ideo generans absque exemplari extrinseco, per
suam potentiam activam, facit formam sibi consimilem de potentia mate-
rie. Nam per actionem agentis in materia non inducitur aliqua forma ab
aliqua] ibi fort. add. Pv quia] quod Iunt. materiarum] materierum Iunt.
in materia non inducitur] non inducitur in materia Pv
a Aristotle,
Met., VII, 8, 1034a25 (AL XXV 3.2, p. 147, lin. 413416). b Aristotle, Met., VII, 8,
1034a58 (AL XXV 3.2, p. 147, lin. 416419). c Averroes, In Met., VII, t.c. 28, fol. 178H.
extrinseco, sed solum ab intrinseco, quoniam eadem forma que primo est
potentia in materia, postea per agens fit in actu, ita quod extrahitur non
de potentia agentis separati, sed de potentia materie.
Et si queritur unde provenit multiplicatio generabilium ab eodem
generante, quia idem homo producit multos homines et idem ignis mul- 5
tos ignes, dicitur quod hoc est ratione diversarum materiarum in quas agit
ipsum generans. Si enim agens non ageret nisi in unam materiam, num-
quam produceret nisi unum effectum.
mento, quod si generatio esset a formis separatis, non esset possi- 10
bile quod iste forme essent cause eius quod apparet, scilicet quod
generans et generatum sunt duo numero et unum forma.a
Consequentia Commentatoris est ista: generans et generatum sunt duo
numero et unum forma; ergo forme separate non possunt esse cause
generationis. 15
Huius consequentie primo declaratur antecedens. Nam, ut habetur
secundo De anima,b omnis natura dependens appetit esse divinum et esse
perpetuum; constat autem quod ea que incorruptibilia sunt, ut intelli-
gentie et corpora celestia, habent perpetuitatem individualem, ea vero
que sunt corruptibilia, ut homo et asinus, habent perpetuitatem speci- 20
ficam; huiusmodi autem speciei perpetuitas est per continuam genera-
tionem; generans ergo in generando intendit perpetuare speciem suam.
Non autem potest perpetuare illam nisi trahendo passum ad similitudi-
nem suam; constat autem quod non trahitur passum ad similitudinem
generantis nisi conveniat cum generante in forma specifica et differat ab 25
eo in hoc quod ista forma est alia et in alia materia recepta est; et per
consequens generans et generatum conveniunt in forma et differunt in
materia.
Et hoc intendit Commentator, dicens quod generans et generatum sunt
duo materia et unum forma. Probato ergo antecedente, probatur conse- 30
quentia, quoniam, si generans et generatum conveniunt in forma et diffe-
runt in materia, impossibile est quod quiditas que ponitur forma ydealis
separata sit generans, quia separatum et non separatum non conveniunt
in eadem forma, neque differunt per diversas materias, cum in rebus
notandum secundo inv. Pv quod1] ut Iunt. duo] in add. Iunt. unum] in

add. Iunt. hocmateria mg. Pv
a Averroes, In Met., VII, t.c. 28, fol. 178vHI. b Aristotle, De an., II, 4, 414a26415b2.
268 pauli veneti
separatis non sit materia, neque convenientia in specie aut in genere

propinquo cum rebus non separatis.
Dubitatur contra quartam conclusionem. Nam ars imitatur naturam
in quantum potest, ut habet videri secundo Phisicorum;a sed ita est in
35ra M arte quod | artifices in operando aliqua exemplaria respiciunt, ad quo- 5
rum similitudinem exemplata producunt; ergo sic est et in naturalibus.
Constat autem quod talia exemplaria non possunt esse nisi ydee; ergo et
cetera.
Respondetur quod non est omnino simile de arte et natura. Artifices
enim respiciunt ad exemplaria extrinseca propter imperfectionem, quia 10
non habent in se sufficiens principium operandi. Sed naturalia habent
in se principium sufficiens operandi, et ideo non oportet in operando
inspicere ad aliqua exemplaria. Necesse est tamen ponere exemplaria
separata in mente divina respectu horum inferiorum, ad que aspicit ipse
Deus in creando et producendo generata. Sed huiusmodi exemplaria non 15
sunt ydee per se existentes, ut opinabatur Plato.
Ex predictis sequitur quod ydee, quas Plato vocavit species et quidi-
tates separatas, nullo modo sunt cause horum inferiorum. Primo quidem
non sunt cause in essendo, quia impossibile est aliquid habere esse for-
maliter per id quod est separatum ab eo; constat autem quod species sunt 20
cause formales particularium; ergo impossibile est ipsas esse separatas.
Secundo, non sunt cause in cognoscendo, quia ridiculum est querere
cognitionem notorum per ignota. Constat autem quod particularia, cum
sint sensibilia, sunt nobis magis nota; species autem, si essent separate,
267va Pv ignote essent, quia intellectus noster se | habet ad ea que sunt manifestis- 25
sima in natura, sicut oculus noctue ad lucem solis, ut declaratur secundo
huius.b
Tertio, non sunt cause in generando, quia generatum est hoc aliquid et
compositum; ergo generans, cum sit simile genito, etiam est hoc aliquid
et compositum. Sed ydee, si essent, non essent composite nec hoc aliquid, 30
quia essent forme simplices et essent universalia, quorum conditio est
significare quale quid et non hoc aliquid et cetera.
Quarto, ipse ydee non sunt cause in exemplando, quia exemplar sci-
licet extrinsecum requiritur propter imperfectionem et insufficientiam
separatis] et cetera add. Pv ars] ex natura s.l. corr. M : natura Pv in] om. M
sedoperandi mg. Pv ergocompositum mg. Pv requiritur mg. Pv
a Aristotle, Phys., II, 2, 194a2122; 8, 199a1517. b Aristotle, Met., II, 1, 993b911.

agentis, ut dictum est. Si enim scriptor haberet omnia in mente que con-
tinentur in exemplari, sicut edificator habet in mente formam domus,
scriptor non indigeret aliquo exemplari, sicut nec edificator indiget domo
ad hoc quod domum aliquam faciat. Agentia autem naturalia perfecta
sunt, quia tunc unumquodque perfectum est cum potest sibi simile pro- 5
ducere; constat autem quod talia sunt agentia naturalia: ignis enim ignem
producit et homo hominem.
Contra predicta arguitur quod necesse est ponere ydeas separatas
propter generationem rerum sensibilium, et hoc quatuor rationibus, qua-
rum prima est hec: omne quod est tale per participationem reducitur in 10
aliquid quod est tale per essentiam; sed unumquodque particulare, sive
sit homo sive equus, participat naturam communem; ergo reducitur in
aliquid quod est tale per essentiam, quod non videtur esse nisi ydea sepa-
rata. Maior de se patet, quia, sicut omne per accidens reducitur in aliquid
per se et omne secundum quid reducitur in aliquid simpliciter, ita omne 15
participans reducitur in participatum quod est tale per essentiam. Minor
vero est Porphyrii, in Universalibus,a dicentis quod participatione speciei
plures homines sunt unus homo communis.
Secunda ratio: nichil agit ultra suam speciem; sed in istis inferioribus
non inveniuntur agentia preter accidentia; ergo preter hec particularia 20
inferiora oportet ponere alias substantias separatas que formas substan-
tiales inducant. Constat autem quod tales non sunt nisi ydee. Prima pars
antecedentis patet, quia omne agens agit secundum quod est in actu, ut
habetur tertio Phisicorum.b Secunda pars ostenditur ex eo quod omnis
35rb M actio est ratione contrarietatis, ut declaratur primo De generatione;c | con- 25
stat autem quod non est contrarietas in substantiis, sed solum in acci-
dentibus, ut habet videri in Predicamentis;d unde ignis non tantum ignem
generat, sed etiam ferrum intense calidumquod non contingit ratione
forme substantialis, sed tantum accidentalis.
Tertia ratio: generans et generatum sunt similia in specie; sed in gene- 30
ratis per putrefactionem nichil hic inferius est simile generato quod con-
currit active ad generationem eius; ergo oportet in separatis aliquid simile
esse generato, quod non videtur aliud esse nisi ydea. Ita quod ad genera-
tionem vermium et muscarum ex materia putrefacta non sufficiunt qua-
aliquid] aliquod M aliquid] aliquod M ad iter. Pv
a Porphyry, Isag., c. De specie (AL I 67, p. 12, 1819). b Aristotle, Phys., III, 3, 202a1617.
c Aristotle, De gen., I, 7, 323b2931. d Aristotle, Cat., 5, 3b2425.
270 pauli veneti
litates, sed ultra requiritur agens separatum, quod Plato vocavit muscam
aut vermem ydealem.
Quarta ratio: agens nobilius est passo et causa causato; sed cum gene-
rantur animalia ex semine, non est anima in semine; cum ergo anima
per generationem producatur, oportet necessario preter semen ponere 5
aliquam substantiam separatam, que animam inducat tamquam magis
perfectum minus perfectum. Non enim potest poni principale agens gene-
rans illud a quo semen decisum est, quia forte illud est alterius speciei,
sicut cum generatur mulus ex equo, aut corruptum est, sicut quando gene-
ratur filius patre iam mortuo. 10
Ad primum conceditur quod omnia individua speciei humane aut eque
reducuntur in aliquid quod est tale per essentiam, scilicet in hominem
communem et in equum communem. Sed nullum istorum est separatum
a singularibus nisi secundum rationem, ita quod Sortes et homo com-
munis sunt idem secundum numerum et non differunt nisi ratione, in 15
267vb Pv quantum ratio hominis | est ratio communicabilis et ratio Sortis est ratio
incommunicabilis. Et potest cognosci homo per intellectum non cognito
Sorte, licet non possit cognosci Sortes nisi cognoscatur homo, eo quod
homo est de primo intellectu Sortis, non autem econtra.
Ad secundum dicitur quod, licet in materia extranea sola accidentia 20
agant, tamen in materia intranea agit forma substantialis, aliquando sine
instrumento, ut cum aqua calida reducitur ad frigiditatem, et aliquando
mediante instrumento, ut cum moventur gravia et levia ad loca sua. Dicit
enim Commentator, secundo Phisicorum,a quod corpora simplicia habent
in se principium motus localis secundum formam, licet non habeant in 25
se principium alterationis nisi secundum materiam; corpora vero mixta
animata habent in se principium omnis motus ad formam, non tantum
passivum, sed etiam activum, quod dicitur esse anima. Deinde, licet nichil
agat in eo quod est in potentia, sed solum in eo quod est in actu, tamen
aliquid agit ultra propriam speciem secundum dispositionem recipientis, 30
et hoc propria virtute, iuxta illud secundi De anima,b Actus activorum
sunt in patiente disposito: color enim agit speciem visibilem et visionem
propria virtute, que sunt altioris speciei et perfectioris gradus quam color;
similiter, terra propria virtute corrumpit aerem et generat ignem, qui est
maioris perfectionis. 35
quando om. M secundum numerum] numero Pv nisi] quin Pv
a Averroes, In Phys., II, t.c. 1, fol. 48EF. b Aristotle, De an., II, 4, 414a2527.
Ad tertium respondetur quod generans et genitum generatione uni-

voca sunt similia in specie, sed generatione equivoca sunt similia in
genere; et quod ex materia putrefacta, virtute celi et qualitatum prima-
rum, generatur unum mixtum quod est substantialiter simile genito in
genere et accidentaliter in specie, ratione virtutis formative generantis in 5
eo, que non habet aspectum nisi ad determinatam speciem, sic quod ali-
qua est materia putrefacta ex qua non potest generari nisi musca et aliqua
est ex qua non potest generari nisi vermis aut rana.
Ad quartum conceditur quod, licet agens ut agens sit nobilius passo,
quia agens ut sic est in actu et patiens secundum quod huiusmodi est 10
35va M in potentia, tamen, absolute loquendo, sepe agens est | minus perfectum
quam patiens, sive accipiatur patiens subiective sive terminative. Nam
ignis est perfectior aqua et tamen aqua agit in ignem, alterando et cor-
rumpendo ipsum et generando ex eo aerem, qui iterum est maioris perfec-
tionis quam aqua. Et ita non inconvenit quod in generatione animalis ex 15
semine sola accidentia producant animam, sicut, quando generatur ter-
tium elementum ex duobus, solum qualitates prime producunt formam
substantialem.
Et sic patet quod non oportet ponere ydeas propter generationem sen-
sibilium, eo modo quo posuit Plato, quia, ut arguit Commentator,a nul- 20
lum agens indifferens ad multa producit determinatum nisi determinetur;
ergo ydee, si essent, cum non essent nisi cause indeterminate et ad multa
indifferentes, non possent aliquod determinatum producere nisi determi-
nentur. Et si dicatur quod determinentur per agentia particularia, sequi-
tur quod factum non sit unum, ex quo transmutans materiam et inducens 25
formam sint diversa agentia. Et si non sunt necessarie ydee, oportet tamen
reducere causam generationis et corruptionis horum inferiorum in cau-
sas superiores, sicut docet Philosophus, octavo Phisicorum et duodecimo
huius.b Quia enim hec inferiora generantur continue et corrumpuntur,
oportet ea reducere in motum celi, continue diversimode se habentem 30
propter accessum et recessum solis in obliquo circulo. Et quia iste acces-
sus et recessus est continuus, sicut et hec inferiora continue generantur
et corrumpuntur, ideo oportet motum corporum celestium reduci in cau-
sas sempiternas a materia abstractas et a sensibilibus separatas, que sunt
Deus et intelligentie. Quare et cetera. 35
producant] producunt M
a Averroes, In Met., VII, t.c. 28, fol. 178BD. b Aristotle, Phys., VIII, 46; Met., XII, 6.
272 pauli veneti
268ra Pv Dubitabit autem h1034a9ssi.

Ista est secunda pars huius capituli, in qua Philosophus solvit quatuor
dubia. Secundum dubium solvitur ibi: Palam vero h1034a21ssi. Tertium
ibi: Quecumque autem a casu h1034b4ssi. Quartum ibi: Non solum autem
h1034b7ssi. 5
Primum dubium est istud: propter quid aliqua fiunt ab arte et a casu,
quedam vero fiunt solum ab arte. Verbi gratia, sanitas non solum fit
ab arte, sed etiam fit a casu, videlicet ex confricatione non concurrente
arte; sed domus aut cultellus fit solum ab arte. Commentator autem
introducit hoc dubium sic: propter quid aliqua fiunt ab arte et a natura, 10
aliqua vero ab arte tantum.a Et hoc ad denotandum quod sanitas que
fit a casu respectu confricationis, fit a natura respectu caloris. Sanitas
ergo aliquando fit solum a natura, videlicet quando non concurrit medi-
cina calida neque confricatio, egritudine proveniente ex materia frigida
et actione tantum proveniente ab elementis calidis; aliquando provenit 15
simul ab arte et a natura, ut quando datur medicina calida in adiuto-
rium nature; quandoque vero provenit et ab arte et a natura et a casu,
ut quando cum natura et medicina calida accidit confricatio preter inten-
tionem agentis.
Lege litteram: Dubitabit autem aliquis quare alia fiunt arte et a casu, 20
ut sanitas, alia non, ut domus.b
Notandum, secundum Commentatorem, commento undetricesimo,
quod existimatur aliquid generari propter hoc a duabus formis,
artificiali et naturali. Et est dubitatio super hoc quod generans et
generatum sunt idem in forma.c 25
Quia ergo dictum est in tertia conclusione prime partis huius capituli
quod generans et generatum sunt similia in forma, ideo mota est hec que-
stio ad ostendendum quod aliquod generatum est simile duabus formis
diversarum rationum, videlicet sanitas nature et artiquod non videtur
verum. 30
Sed respondetur quod non inconvenit idem generatum assimilari duo-
bus generantibus in forma diversis rationibus. Ex quo enim eadem sanitas
fit ab arte et a natura, in quantum fit ab arte assimilatur arti et non nature,
quecumquecasu corr. ex infra, p. 290, 23] non solum autem MPv et] non add.
M, add. et del. Pv non Pv Moerb.] vero M propter hoc prae aliquid Iunt.
rationibus Pv, ex generationibus post correct. M
a Averroes, In Met., VII, t.c. 29, fol. 179B. b Aristotle, Met., VII, 9, 1034a910 (AL XXV 3.2, p.
147, lin. 420421). c Averroes, In Met., VII, t.c. 29, fol. 179B.
in quantum autem fit a natura assimilatur nature et non arti, sicut idem
35vb M motus est sanatio | et medicatio, ut colligitur a Philosopho, secundo Phi-
sicorum:a sanatio quidem ratione sanitatis quam inducit, medicatio vero
ratione medicine a qua provenit.
Causa vero h1034a10ssi. 5
Pro solutione huius dubii Philosophus premittit duas distinctiones,
quarum prima est hec: eorum que generantur ab arte duplex est materia,
scilicet materia in qua est pars potentie naturalis ad formam et materia
in qua non est pars potentie naturalis ad formam. Materia in qua est pars
potentie naturalis ad formam est illa que movet se ipsam ad formam, sed 10
cum iuvamento artis, sicut corpus sanabile; materia in qua non est pars
potentie naturalis ad formam est illa que non potest ab intrinseco moveri
ad formam, sed solum ab extrinseco, ut lapides et ligna respectu forme
domus et ferrum respectu cultelli aut serre. Sicut enim non quelibet forma
naturalis potest ex qualibet materia fieri indifferenter, sed determinata 15
forma ex determinata materia, ita non quelibet forma artificialis potest
fieri indifferenter ex qualibet materia artis, sed determinata forma ex
determinata materia, quia non potest fieri serra aut cultellus ex lana vel
268rb Pv ex lino, sed ex | ferro aut ex alia materia dura proportionali ad secandum
et scindendum. 20
Lege litteram: Causa vero est quia horum quidem est materia incipiens
motum generationis in facere et fieri aliquid eorum que ab arte, in qua
existit aliqua hparsi rei factibilis, hec quidem talis est qualis apta nata est
moveri ab ea illa vero non habet huiusmodi partem.b
Notandum, secundum Commentatorem, commento undetricesimo, 25
quod in materia quorundam eorum que generantur ab arte est pars
potentie naturalis similis artificio et in materia quorundam non est
pars potentie naturalis similis artificio. Et ista sunt que generantur
ab artificio tantum; illa autem in quibus est pars potentie naturalis
similis artificio generantur ab utroque. Ita est enim de generabilibus 30
sicut de mobilibus: quemadmodum enim eorum que moventur in
loco, quedam moventur ex se et quedam ex alio, ita est de generabi-
libus.c
etformam om. M alia om. M pars suppl. ex Moerb. arte] artificio Iunt.
generabilibus scr. ex Iunt.] generationibus MPv mobilibus] mobus M
a Possibly, Aristotle, Phys., II, 1, 193b1317. b Aristotle, Met., VII, 9, 1034a1014 (AL XXV 3.2,
p. 147, lin. 421424). c Averroes, In Met., VII, t.c. 29, fol. 179CD.
274 pauli veneti
Solvit Commentator questionem dicentem propter quid aliqua fiunt

ab arte et a natura et aliqua ab arte solum. Et ait quod ea que habent in se
partem naturalis potentie similis artificio, illa fiunt ab arte et a natura, ut
sanitas et agricultura; ea vero que non habent huiusmodi partem poten-
tie naturalis similis artificio fiunt solum ab arte, ut scamnum et domus. Et 5
quemadmodum in mobilibus quedam moventur ex se, ut animata, et que-
dam ab alio, ut inanimata, ita et in generabilibus. Unde mobilium quedam
moventur tantum ab extrinseco, ut ea que moventur motu violento; que-
dam tantum ab intrinseco, ut corpora animata; quedam autem ab intrin-
seco et ab extrinseco, ut inanimata dum moventur ad loca sua: moventur 10
enim ab intrinseco in quantum moventur a formis suis, et moventur ab
extrinseco in quantum ad suum motum indigent generante aut remo-
vente prohibens, iuxta doctrinam Aristotelis, octavo Phisicorum.a
Consimiliter dicatur in generabilibus, quoniam eorum que generantur,
quedam fiunt a natura solum, ut tonitrus et terremotus, et aer atque ignis 15
in propriis speris; quedam fiunt tantum ab arte, ut domus, cultellus et
huiusmodi; quedam vero fiunt ab arte et a natura, ut sanitas, agricultura,
campana, phyala et huiusmodi. Dicuntur autem ea que sunt ab arte et a
natura habere potentiam naturalem similem artificio, in quantum natura
in eis operatur eundem effectum quem operatur ars; ea autem que sunt 20
solum a natura non habent potentiam naturalem similem artificio, in
quantum operantur effectum quem non operatur ars. Ubi enim agentia
sunt similia, operantur similes effectus; et si non operatur consimiles
36ra M effectus, non sunt agentia consimilia. | Ex quibus sequitur quod aliqua
habent in se totam potentiam naturalem ad formam, scilicet ea que fiunt 25
solum a natura; aliqua habent partem potentie naturalis ad formam,
scilicet ea que fiunt ab arte et a natura; quedam vero sunt que non habent
totam potentiam naturalem neque partem potentie naturalis ad formam,
illa scilicet que fiunt solum ab arte.
Et huius h1034a14ssi. 30
Secunda distinctio est quod eorum que fiunt a natura duplex est mate-
ria, scilicet potens et impotens. Materia potens est illa que potest ex se
moveri ad formam absque auxilio artis, sicut est materia aeris aut ignis,
que potest moveri ad formam ignis absque iuvamento artis, et sicut est
quoniam] quod Pv eorum] ea M natura scr.] materia MPv solum]

tantum Pv domus] lettulus scamnum add. Pv consimiles] similes M a] in M
a Aristotle, Phys., VIII, 4, 255b1331.

aliquod corpus egrotans, quod potest a principio nature existente in eo

moveri ad sanitatem absque iuvamento artis. Materia impotens est illa
que non potest moveri ad formam absque auxilio artis, sicut est mate-
ria agriculture et aliquod corpus egrum: non enim potest natura perficere
messes absque iuvamento artis, et aliquod est corpus egrotans ita dimi- 5
268va Pv nutum in virtute naturali quod ad sanitatem non potest | moveri absque
auxilio artis medicine. Sicut enim aliqua est ars que potest perficere ope-
rationem suam absque auxilio alterius artis, ut puta ars edificandi vel
statuificandi, ita aliqua est natura que potest perficere opus suum abs-
que iuvamento alicuius artis. Et sicut aliqua est ars que non potest com- 10
plere operationem suam absque iuvamento alterius artis, sicut est ars sal-
tandi in tripudiis, que indiget musica cantativa aut pulsativa, ita aliqua est
natura que sine auxilio artis suam operationem perficere non potest. Dicit
enim Commentator hic quod ars saltandi non complebitur nisi cum arte
lirali, que est pars musice.a 15
Lege litteram: Et huiusmodi materia naturalis hec quidem sic potens,
sicut aliqua ars, hec autem impotens, sicut alia ars. Multa namque possunt
quidem ab ipsis moveri sed non sic, videlicet sine auxilio alterius, puta
saltare.b
Istis duabus distinctionibus premissis, Philosophus respondet ad pri- 20
mum dubium, dicens quod artificialia quorum materia non habet in se
principium motus neque partem potentie naturalis ad formam, non fiunt
nisi ab arte, sicut est domus: in lapidibus enim, que sunt materia domus,
non est aliquod principium neque potentia naturalis ad formam domus;
ideo domus non fit aliquo modo ab intrinseco, sed solum ab extrinseco, 25
scilicet ab arte. Sic etiam contingit in naturalibus quod quedam sunt que
non fiunt nisi ab extrinseco, ut ignis aut aer in propria spera. Artificialia
autem quorum materia habet in se principium motus aut partem natu-
ralis potentie ad formam, illa fiunt ab arte et a natura, ut sanitas et cul-
tellus: sanitas enim fit a calore et a medicina, cultellus vero fit ab arte 30
fabrili et ab igne mollificante ferrum. Sicut ergo corpus egrotans dimi-
nutum in virtute non habet completam potentiam naturalem ad sani-
tatem, sed tantum partem illius potentie, et ex hoc movetur ad sanita-
tem partim ab arte et partim a natura, ita ferrum non habet comple-
ita] et add. Pv domus1] aut scamnum vel lectulus add. Pv
a Averroes, In Met., VII, t.c. 29, fol. 179D. b Aristotle, Met., VII, 9, 1034a1416 (AL XXV 3.2, p.
147, lin. 424426).

276 pauli veneti
tam potentiam naturalem ad formam cultelli, sed tantum partem illius

potentie, et ex hoc movetur ad formam cultelli partim ab arte et partim a
natura.
Lege litteram: Quorum ergo talis est materia, ut lapides, sine principio
intrinseco motus ad formam artificialem, impossibile sic moveri nisi ab 5
alio; sic tamen itaque et ignis ab extrinseco generatur solum.a
Ex predictis Aristoteles infert duo correlaria, quorum primum est quod
eorum que fiunt ab extrinseco, quedam fieri non possunt sine habente
artem et quedam fiunt sine habente artem. Verbi gratia, domus et cultel-
36rb M lus fieri non possunt sine habente artem, sed ferrum et lapis fiunt | sine 10
habente artem, quia materie istorum moventur ab agentibus non haben-
tibus artem. Unde in visceribus terre generantur lapides et metalla, ubi
non operatur ars, sed solum natura.
Lege litteram: Propter hoc hec quidem non erunt sine habente artem,
hec autem erunt sine habente artem; ab hiis enim naturalibus principiis 15
movebuntur non habentibus quidem artem.b
Secundum correlarium, quod eorum que fiunt ab intrinseco, quedam
fiunt ex toto a natura et quedam fiunt ex parte. Verbi gratia, homo et
mulus fiunt ab intrinseco, videlicet a virtute existente in materia illorum
spermatica, non concurrente arte, sed solum natura; sanitas autem et cul- 20
tellus non fiunt totaliter a natura, sed partialiter, ita quod ars concurrit
tamquam partiale principium et natura tamquam aliud principale princi-
pium.
Lege litteram: Moveri vero potentibus eis, videlicet ab intrinseco, acci-
268vb Pv dit fieri, aut ab aliis non habentibus artem, sed solum a | natura aut ex parte 25
nature, una cum habente artem.c
Notandum, secundum Commentatorem, commento undetricesimo,
quod inveniuntur quedam que non possunt generare aliquid sine
artificio et possunt generare alia ex se, verbi gratia ignis, qui non
potest generare cultellum nisi ex arte et potest generare alium ignem 30
ex se Et accidit quibusdam moveri ex se absque eo quod indi-
geant artificio omnino, et sunt illa que indigent artificio particulari
ergo] igitur Moerb. itaque] utique Moerb. solum ante ab Pv sedartem

mg. Pv hecartem mg. Pv quidem] quasi Moerb. illorum scr.] illarum
MPv inveniuntur] invenimus Iunt. , que indigent per] que non indigent
preter Iunt.
9, 1034a1820 (AL XXV 3.2, p. 147, lin. 428430). c Aristotle, Met., VII, 9, 1034a2021 (AL
XXV 3.2, p. 147, lin. 430432).
aut universali adiuvante, ut sanitas, que fit per medicinam in quibu-

sdam egritudinibus.a
Primum documentum Commentatoris est istud: quod aliquod est agens
producens duos effectus, unum ex se omnino sine arte et aliud necessario
cum arte. Verbi gratia, ignis generat ignem sine arte omnino, sed non 5
potest facere cultellum nisi cum arte.
Secundum documentum est quod aliquis est effetus qui potest prove-
nire sine arte omnino ac etiam cum arte, tam particulari quam universali.
Patet, quia sanitas potest provenire a natura una cum medicina, tam uni-
versali quam particulari: sanitas enim proveniens ex cyrorgia dicitur pro- 10
venire ab arte particulari, quia provenit a medicativa respiciente deter-
minatam partem corporis; sanitas autem proveniens a medicina calida
tollente febres dicitur provenire ab arte universali, quia provenit a medi-
cativa respiciente totum corpus febriens et totum corpus sanandum.
Circa predicta solet queri utrum in materia sit aliqua forma dimi- 15
nuta que per agens fiat completa. Et arguitur quod sic. Primo, quia agens
extrahit formam de materia, per Commentatorem, commento duodetri-
cesimob et in multis aliis locis; sed nichil extrahitur ab aliquo nisi prefuerit
in eo; ergo forma prefuit in materia. Constat autem quod non prefuit sub
esse completo; ergo prefuit sub esse diminuto. 20
Secundo: impossibile est quod forma fiat ex non-forma, per Commen-
tatorem, undecimo huius;c ergo forma necessario fit ex forma; non autem
fit ex forma completa; ergo fit ex forma diminuta.
Tertio: nisi in materia esset forma diminuta, que per agens fit forma
completa rei, sequitur omnem formam generandam venire ab extrinseco, 25
et sic oportebit dare datorem formarum, ad modum Platonis aut Avi-
cenne.
Quarto: forma est in materia; aut ergo processit ex aliquo aut ex nichilo.
Non ex nichilo, quia hoc abhorrent omnes naturales philosophi, ut habe-
tur primo Phisicorum.d Si ex aliquo, aut ergo ex forma aut ex materia. Non 30
ex materia, quia tunc materia esset pars forme, ut colligitur a Philosopho
in precedenti capitulo.e Ergo forma fit ex aliquo tamquam ex forma, quod
quidem esse non potest nisi forma diminuta.
Commentatorem] supra illius add. Pv ergo om. M aut2] vel Pv ex1] ab M
a Averroes, In Met., VII, t.c. 29, fol. 179F. b Averroes, In Met., VII, t.c. 28, fol. 178H. c In truth,
Averroes, In Met., XII, t.c. 18, fol. 304C. d Aristotle, Phys., I, 4, 186a2629. e Aristotle, Met.,
VII, 8 1033b1213.
278 pauli veneti
In hac materia fuerunt quatuor opiniones. Prima fuit Anaxagore, dicen-

tis quod ante generationem compositi tota forma prefuit in materia par-
tim in actu et partim in potentia: in actu quidem respectu principio-
36va M rum, | in potentia vero respectu compositi generandi. Et secundum hoc
fuit forma diminuta, que postmodum per agens fit forma completa dans 5
nomen et diffinitionem. Verbi gratia, si ex aqua datur generari caro, tota
forma carnis prefuit in aqua denominans infinita principia carnis, et
secundum hoc prefuit in actu. Et quia non denominavit aquam, secun-
dum hoc prefuit in potentia et fuit forma diminuta.
Contra hanc opinionem arguit Philosophus, primo Phisicorum,a dedu- 10
cens ex illo quod est dare minus minimo et quod pars est maior suo toto,
et alia plura, que ostendunt illam opinionem esse impossibilem.
Secunda opinio fuit quod tota forma compositi generandi prefuit in
materia solum in potentia, nulli dans nomen neque diffinitionem. Et
secundum hoc fuit forma diminuta, que postmodum per agens fit forma 15
in actu dans nomen et diffinitionem. Et sic fit forma completa, eo modo
quo dicit Philosophus, primo De generatione,b formas elementorum esse
potentia in mixto, que postmodum fiunt in actu per resolutionem mixti.
Et sic transeunt de esse diminuto ad esse completum. Hanc opinionem
videtur approbasse Philosophus, dicens in precedenti capituloc quod 20
269ra Pv materia non fit neque forma, sed solum compositum | fit.
Contra hanc opinionem arguitur querendo utrum ista forma sit cor-
ruptibilis aut non. Si est corruptibilis et non generabilis, ergo corruptibile
et generabile non invicem convertunturcuius oppositum dicit Philo-
sophus, primo Celi.d Si autem illa forma est incorruptibilis, ergo in cor- 25
ruptione compositi manet illa forma in potentia, sicut erat in materia
ante generationem, et per consequens corruptum potest redire idem in
numero, contra Philosophum, secundo De generatione.e
Tertia opinio fuit quod ante generationem compositi non prefuit tota
forma, sed solum pars eius, et sic prefuit in potentia et habuit esse diminu- 30
tum, que postmodum per agens completur et ponitur in actu, dans nomen
et diffinitionem, eo modo quo ymaginatur Commentator, tertio Celi,f de
formis elementorum in mixto, que sunt in eo modo diminuto et remisso;
corruptibile et generabile] generabile et corruptibile Pv
a Aristotle, Phys., I, 4, 187b7ff. b Aristotle, De gen., I, 10, 327b2231. c Aristotle, Met., VII, 8,
1033a2831. d Aristotle, De coel., I, 10, 279b2021 et passim; 12 passim. e Aristotle, De gen.,

II, 11, 338b1617. f Averroes, In De coel, III, t.c. 67, ed. Carmody, pp. 634635, lin. 105114.
cum autem resolvitur mixtum, forme ille intenduntur et complentur per

agens naturale. Sic etiam vult Commentator, quinto Phisicorum,a quod
forme contrarie stant simul non sub esse completo, sed diminuto, quarum
una, si fieret summa, non generaretur secundum totum, sed secundum
partem. Huius opinionis videtur fuisse Aristoteles hic,b dicens quod mate- 5
ria artificialium que sunt ab arte et a natura habet in se partem rei.
Contra hanc opinionem arguitur, probando quod alique sunt due
forme eiusdem speciei specialissime, quarum una est generabilis et alia
ingenerabilis, contra Philosophum, decimo huius,c volentem quod gene-
rabile et ingenerabile differunt plus quam genere, sicut corruptibile et 10
incorruptibile. Et quod istud sequatur, manifestum est de forma preexi-
stente et forma noviter adveniente. Unde non est ratio quare una pars
magis prefuit quam alia, ex quo sunt eiusdem rationis et partes eiusdem
forme totalis. Potest etiam argui de ista partiali forma utrum sit corrup-
tibilis vel incorruptibilis, eo modo quo arguebatur de forma totali contra 15
precedentem opinionem.
Quarta opinio asserit quod duplex est generatio, scilicet completa et
incompleta. In generatione completa forma simpliciter incipit esse sicut
compositum, ita quod neque tota neque pars prefuit in materia ante
dispositionem materie. Dicitur tamen prefuisse tota forma in potentia, 20
non quidem in potentia denominativa solum et modo quo est forma ele-
menti in mixto, ut asserit secunda opinio, sed in potentia ad esse, eo
modo quo eclipsis est potentia in luna plena et circulus in ligno quadrato.
In generatione autem incompleta forma non incipit esse, sed composi-
36vb M tum, sicut quando generantur elementa in corruptione mixti. | Et tunc 25
forma prefuit in materia, sed non semper, quia aliquando illa forma sim-
pliciter incipit esse, videlicet in prima generatione illius elementi ex alio
elemento, que fuit generatio completa. Sicut ergo concedit Commenta-
tor, secundo De anima,d quod idem color numero est realiter in pariete et
intentionaliter in oculo, ex eo quod intentio coloris est in oculo (non enim 30
lapis est in anima, sed species lapidis, per Aristotelem, tertio De anima),e
ita forma post generationem completam compositi est realiter in materia
et ante illam generationem fuit potentialiter in illa, non quia illa forma
de forma totali post opinionem (lin. 16) M
a An exact parrellel to Pauls reference is hardly to be found in Averroes. But see: In Phys.,
II, t.c. 15, fol. 53GI. b Aristotle, Met., VII, 9, 1034a1013. c Aristotle, Met., X, 10 passim.
d Averroes, In De an., II, t.c. 97, p. 277, 2733. e Aristotle, De an., III, 8, 431b29432a1.
280 pauli veneti
fuit in materia secundum totum vel secundum partem, sed quia potentia
respectiva illius prefuit in materia.
Cum vero dicit Philosophus quod forma non fit, ipse se ipsum exponit,
dicens quod forma non fit per se, sed per accidens. Quando vero asserit
hoc, quod in materia est pars rei generande, illud exponit Commentator, 5
dicens quod materia eorum que sunt ab arte et a natura habet partem
potentie naturalis; ideo per partem rei intelligitur naturale principium
in re subserviens arti aut adiutum per artem. Si enim materia eorum
que sunt ab arte et a natura habet partem forme generande, sequitur
quod materia eorum que sunt tantum a natura habet totam formam 10
generandamquod est contra opinionem tertiam et cetera.
Ad primum conceditur quod agens extrahit formam de materia, non
tamen propter hoc prefuit in materia, sed bene sequitur quod forma ali-
quo modo prefuit in materia, scilicet potentialiter. Ex quo non sequitur
quod forma prefuit in materia, quia a secundum quid ad simpliciter fal- 15
lit consequentia: ex quo enim forma fit, secundum Philosophum, primo
Phisicorum et in precedenti capitulo,a sequitur quod non prefuit in mate-
ria.
Ad secundum respondetur quod impossibile est formam fieri ex non-
269rb Pv forma sic quod forma | fiat in materia, nulla forma preexistente: aut enim 20
materia fuisset aliquando sine forma aut materia simul incepisset cum
forma, quorum quodlibet est contra intentionem Commentatoris. Forma
ergo fit ex forma non tamquam ex subiecto neque tamquam ex parte, sed
tamquam ex termino a quo, eo quod generatio unius forme est corruptio
alterius, ut habetur primo De generatione.b 25
Ad tertium negatur consequentia. Sicut enim forma artificialis non
venit ab extrinseco, licet non fiat nisi ab agente extrinseco, ita forma
naturalis non fit extra materiam, sed fit tantum in materia, licet non
fiat nisi ab agente extrinseco: venire namque ab extrinseco importat
factionem extra materiam. 30
Ad quartum respondetur quod forma fit ex materia non tamquam ex
parte, sed tamquam ex subiecto. Ideo dicitur fieri ex materia per accidens
et non per se: quod enim fit ex materia per se fit ex ea tamquam ex parte,
ut patuit in precedenti capitulo.c
bene sequitur inv. Pv
a Aristotle, Phys., I, 7, 191a58 et passim; Met., VII, 8, 1033a2829. b Aristotle, De gen., I, 3,

318a2325. c Aristotle, Met., VII, 7, 1032b291033a1.
Palam vero h1034a21ssi.

Secundum dubium, iterum circa tertiam conclusionem prime partis,a
est istud: utrum ista propositio generans et genitum sunt similia sit
universaliter vera aut non. Si est universaliter vera, sequitur quod omnis
generatio est univoca. Si non est universaliter vera, sequitur quod illa 5
tertia conclusio est falsa.
Respondet Philosophus ex dictis circa solutionem primi dubii per istam
conclusionem, quod omnia que fiunt per se et non per accidens fiunt
aliquo modo ab agente univoco. Illud dicitur fieri ab agente per se quod fit
ab illo secundum quod huiusmodi, ut domus a domificatore; illud vero fit 10
ab agente per accidens quod fit ab illo non secundum quod huiusmodi, ut
domus a musico. Non ergo oportet quod generatum per accidens fiat ab
agente univoco, quia inventio thesauri aut reportatio pecunie a debitore
non dicitur fieri ab agente univoco, ex quo fit a causa per accidens preter
37ra M intentionem agentis. Sed necesse est quod omne generatum | per se fiat 15
ab agente aliquo modo univoco.
Istam conclusionem Philosophus probat ex distinctione superius
dicta.b Nam omnia que fiunt per se aut fiunt a natura tantum aut ab
intellectu tantum aut partim a natura et partim ab intellectu. Si fiunt a
natura tantum, sicut homo, equus et huiusmodi, aut fiunt ab agente uni- 20
voco secundum totum, eo quod generans et genitum conveniunt in forma
secundum essentiam et secundum esse: nam forme utriusque eiusdem
speciei sunt et habent idem esse materiale propter dependentiam quam
habent ad materiam primam. Si autem fiant tantum ab intellectu, illa fiunt
ab agente univoco secundum partem, sive fiant ab intellectu habente 25
artem sive ab intellectu non habente artem: domus enim fit ab intellectu
[non] habente artem et littera in addiscente fit ab intellectu sine arte,
quando fit mediante exemplari extrinseco. Dicuntur autem talia fieri ab
agente univoco secundum partem, quia generans et genitum conveniunt
in forma secundum essentiam et non secundum esse: cum enim domus fit 30
ex domo, domus que est in anima et domus que est extra animam conver-
tuntur in essentia eo quod domus que est in anima est similitudo domus
existentis extra animam; differunt autem secundum esse, quia domus in
anima habet esse intentionale et non est in materia, domus autem extra
animam habet esse reale et est in materia. Similiter, littera extra animam 35
per se om. M agente univoco mg. Pv dependentiam] substantiam add.

Pv primam om. Pv non secl.
a Cf. supra, p. 255, 1920. b Cf. supra, pp. 205, 17206, 4.

282 pauli veneti
habet esse reale et materiale, littera autem existens in anima habet esse
intentionale et immateriale, quia non est subiective in materia, sed in
intellectu.
Si autem aliqua fiant ab intellectu et ab arte, sicut sanitas que fit ab arte
medicine et a calore formali aut virtuali, illa iterum fiunt aliquo modo ab 5
agente univoco, et si non formaliter omnino, sicut fiunt ea que sunt ab arte
vel a natura tantum, tamen virtualiter fiunt ab agente univoco existente
in anima: sanitas enim que est in corpore sano virtualiter continetur in
calore cordis, formaliter vero continetur in sanitate existente in anima,
in quantum formaliter causatur ab illa et habet formalem similitudinem 10
cum illa. Talia autem que sic fiunt ab intellectu et a natura dicuntur fieri
ex parte aut ab aliquo habente partem, quia non datur aliquod agens a
quo totaliter fiant, sed solum partialiter: si enim sanitas fit a calore vel
269va Pv ab arte, | dicitur fieri ex parte; si autem fiat ab intellectu vel a corde,
dicitur fieri ab habente partem, quoniam intellectus habet in se artem per 15
quam inducit sanitatem, et cor habet in se caliditatem per quam generat
eandem sanitatem.
Lege litteram: Palam vero ex dictis quoniam modo quodam omnia
fiunt ex univoco, quemadmodum naturalia, aut ex parte univoco, ut domus
ex domo aut ab intellectu sine arte (ars enim species est rei extra animam), 20
aut ex parte aut ab habente partem, nisi secundum accidens fiat.a
Et si queratur utrum ars vel natura sit causa propinqua eorum que
sunt ab arte et a natura, respondet Philosophus quod natura est causa
propinqua et ars est causa remota, quia calor virtualis existens in motu
est causa immediata caloris formalis existentis in corpore. Constat autem 25
quod calor formalis est tota sanitas intenta aut pars illius sanitatis vel est
dispositio ad totam sanitatem vel ad partem eius. Si est tota sanitas vel
pars eius, manifestum est quod calor virtualis qui est in motu est causa
propinqua sanitatis; si autem est dispositio ad sanitatem totam vel ad
partem eius, tunc calor formalis est causa immediata eius; ergo natura est 30
causa propinqua et immediata sanitatis. Ars autem medicandi est causa
sanitatis ex eo quod est causa motus infirmi, in quo est virtualiter calor,
37rb M ad quem motum et ad quem calorem sequitur | effective sanitas; ergo ars
est causa mediata et remota sanitatis.
quoniam] quia Moerb. habente] aliquam add. Moerb. formalis] naturalis M

quod] quia Pv
Lege litteram: Causa namque faciendi prima, idest propinqua, est

secundum se pars, idest partiale principium naturale. Calor enim in motu
calorem in corpore fecit; si vero est aut sanitas aut pars, aut sequitur eum
aliqua pars sanitatis aut sanitas ipsa. Propter quod et dicitur facere ars
sanitatem, quia illud facit sanitatem, cui consequitur et accidit calor faciens 5
sanitatem, eo quod quicquid est causa cause est causa causati in eodem
genere cause.a
Notandum primo, secundum Commentatorem, commento trice-
simo, quod artificiatum componitur ex materia et forma, et non est
in anima artificis ex generato nisi forma tantum que est pars generati 10
, non aggregatum congregatione materie et forme, sicut est dispo-
sitio in generabilibus naturalibus; et ideo non dixit in istis generari
totum a toto.b
Hic ponit Commentator differentiam inter artificialia et naturalia, dicens
quod naturalia que generantur sunt in suis generantibus secundum for- 15
mam et materiam, eo quod generans naturale non solum generat formam,
sed etiam materiam, videlicet propinquam, et non solum forma generata
est in materia, sed etiam forma generans est in materia. Artificialia autem
non sunt in suis generantibus nisi secundum formam, quia materia arti-
ficialium non fit ab arte, sed a natura, et forma generata est in materia, 20
scilicet forma domus in lapidibus et lignis, forma autem generans, vide-
licet ars, non est in materia, sed in anima. Ideo dicit Aristoteles quod in
naturalibus generatur totum a toto, in artificialibus vero non generatur
totum a toto, sed tantum pars. Et ex hac distinctione intendit Commen-
tator probare quod maior est univocatio in naturalibus quam in artificia- 25
libus, quia in naturalibus inter generans et genitum est univocatio tam ex
parte materie quam ex parte forme: nam homo generans et homo genera-
tus assimilantur tam in forma quam in materia, sed domificans et domus
assimilantur tantum in forma.
Notandum secundo, secundum Commentatorem, eodem comm- 30
ento, quod calor qui sequitur motum corporis est sanitas quoquo
modo, quia generat in corpore aliquem calorem et generatio illius
aliqua pars inv. Moerb. (aliqua pars Da) aggregatum] congregatum Iunt.
artificialia et naturalia] naturalia et artificialia Pv notandum secundo inv. Pv
Met., VII, t.c. 30, fol. 179KL.
284 pauli veneti
caloris est sanitas aut sequitur eum sanitas. Et universaliter calor qui
est in corpore aut est pars sanitatis aut sanitas in potentia.a
Intendit Commentator quod non est simpliciter concedendum calorem
esse sanitatem, sed disiunctive aut causative cum addito, videlicet calor
269vb Pv est sanitas aut causa sanitatis; vel: si calor est | aliquo modo sanitas, est 5
potentia sanitas aut pars sanitatis. Ex quibus non sequitur quod calor sit
sanitas aut pars sanitatis, quia a secundum quid ad simpliciter fallit con-
sequentia. Dicitur enim calor aliquo modo sanitas aut potentia sanitas,
in quantum est dispositio ad sanitatem aut in quantum ex eo generatur
sanitas. 10
Unde de quiditate sanitatis due fuerunt opiniones, quarum una dixit
quod sanitas non realiter differt a qualitate prima per quam corpus reddi-
tur sanum, sed solum ratione, ita quod si per caliditatem corpus redditur
sanum, calor est sanitas, et si per frigiditatem corpus redditur sanum,
frigiditas est sanitas. Sed quia caliditas et frigiditas non important adequa- 15
tionem humorum in corpore animalis quam importat sanitas, ideo sanitas
non differt a caliditate et frigiditate nisi sola ratione, eo modo quo locus
differt a superficie et numerus a multitudine.
Alia opinio asseruit quod sanitas non est aliqua qualitatum primarum,
sed tam re quam ratione distinguitur a qualibet earum, eo quod ad sani- 20
tatem non est motus per se, bene tamen est motus per se ad quamlibet
qualitatem primam, ut ostenditur septimo Phisicorum.b
Et quia non est presentis speculationis discutere que illarum opinio-
num sit vera, ideo Philosophus et Commentator non asserunt aliquam
37va M illarum opinionum, sed solum sub disiunctione loquuntur, | dicentes 25
quod calor aut est sanitas aut sequitur eum sanitas. Tamen in rei veritate
est dicendum quod calor non est sanitas, sed est causa sanitatis. Et si ali-
quando invenitur quod calor est sanitas, illa propositio est intelligenda
in predicatione causali et non identica; et si identica, tunc non accipitur
sanitas formaliter, sed solum materialiter, pro subiecto sanitatis. 30
quod confricatio et exercitium agunt sanitatem, quia agunt illud ad
quod sequitur sanitas; illud autem cui accidit calor facit medicus.c
eum] eam Iunt. aut2] est add. Iunt. si] sic Pv tamen] autem Pv solum]
virtualiter add. et del. Pv notandum tertio inv. Pv ad om. Iunt.
a Averroes, In Met., VII, t.c. 30, fol. 180A. b Aristotle, Phys., VII, 3, 246b320. c Averroes, In
Met., VII, t.c. 30, fol. 180B.
Ita quod medicus est causa confricationis et exercitii ipsius egrotantis,

confricatio autem et exercitium est causa caloris. Et quia calor est causa
immediata sanitatis, ideo tam medicus quam confricatio quam etiam
exercitium est causa mediata sanitatis.
In hoc Commentator declarat Philosophum, dicentem in littera quod 5
motus est causa caloris, quia non quilibet motus est causa caloris, sed
motus confricationis. Sicut enim lumen est causa caloris, ut habetur
primo Celi,a ita motus est causa caloris, ut habetur primo Metheororum.b Et
sicut non quodlibet lumen est causa caloris, sed tantum lumen reflexum
in subiecto apto nato, ita non quilibet motus est causa caloris, sed solum 10
motus confricationis in subiecto apto nato. Ideo celum, non obstante
quod velocissime movetur, non tamen calefit, quia in corporibus celesti-
bus non est confricatio neque aptitudo ad caliditatis receptionem. Ele-
menta etiam in suis motibus localibus non calefiunt, quia, licet habeant
aptitudinem ad receptionem caloris, non tamen in eis proprie invenitur 15
confricatio, sed solum in mixtis, per collisionem mixti cum mixto aut
elementi cum mixto: videmus enim trubellum calefieri in perforatione
ligni ac etiam ferrum molendini. Etiam naute experiuntur malum navis
in magnis tempestatibus accendi propter velocitatem motus et magnam
confricationem provenientem ex collisione aeris ad partes extremales 20
mali. Dicit etiam Philosophus, secundo Celi,c quod sagitte plures, mote
velociter propter collisionem aeris circumstantis, frequenter liquefiunt.
Quia ergo animalis partes in motu locali confricantur, ideo motus localis
animalis, cui est coniuncta confricatio, est causa caloris in eo.
Sed dubitatur, quoniam multiplicata causa multiplicatur effectus, et 25
radii solares sunt causa caloris sicut motus localis; ergo motum in sole
magis calefit quam quiescens in illocuius oppositum experimur: nam
aque stagnales calidiores sunt fluentibus et homo quiescens in radiis
270ra Pv solaribus magis calefit quam homo am-|-bulans in eis.
Respondetur quod non semper multiplicata causa multiplicatur effec- 30
tus, quia aliquando due cause debilius agunt quam una causa per se. Unde,
quia radii solares magis reflectuntur et magis imprimuntur in homine
sedente quam in homine moto, ideo magis calefit homo sedens quam
homo motus; est etiam maioris potentie radius solaris reflexus in homine
ideo] et add. Pv ad] recipiendum add. et del. Pv calefit] calefacit M
a Possibly, Aristotle, De coel., II, 7, 289a1921. b Aristotle, Meteor., I, 3, 341a13ff. c Aristotle,
De coel., II, 7, 289a2328.

286 pauli veneti
sedente ad generandum calorem quam sit radius reflexus in homine

ambulante una cum motu locali. Hec tamen materia non est hic per-
tractanda nisi superficialiter, quia eius perscrutatio pertinet ad primum
Metheororum.
Quare quemadmodum h1034a30ssi. 5
Contra conclusionem posset aliquis instare, dicens quod genitum ex
spermate non est univocum illi nec mulier nata ex viro univocatur ei, non
etiam mulus generatus ex equo et asino univocatur alicui illorum; et hec
omnia generantur per se et nullum eorum per accidens; ergo non omne
quod per se generatur fit ex aliquo univoco. 10
Respondet Philosophus, dicens quod, sicut omnium artificialium prin-
37vb M cipium est quiditas rei in mente artificis, ex qua proveniunt sillogismi |
practici et ex sillogismis practicis procedunt generationes formarum arti-
ficialium, ita omnium naturalium generabilium principium est quiditas
rei in potentia agentis, ex qua proveniunt dispositiones naturales in mate- 15
ria, et ex dispositionibus naturalibus fiunt generationes formarum natu-
ralium.
Item, sicut in artificis potestate est forma rei generande artificialis, ita
in potestate spermatis est forma rei generande naturalis; et consequenter,
sicut artifex per artem existentem in eo facit artificialia, ita sperma per 20
virtutem existentem in eo facit naturalia. Ex quibus sequitur quod, sicut
artificialia habent aliquam univocationem cum artifice ratione artis exi-
stentis in eo, ita naturalia habent aliquam univocationem cum spermate
ratione virtutis formative existentis in eo. Que quidem virtus, et si non
ratione sui univocatur ei quod generatur ex spermate, tamen ratione illius 25
a quo sperma decisum est dicitur univocari illi. Neque requiritur quod
inter generans et genitum sit semper omnimoda univocatio, sicut est inter
hominem generantem et hominem genitum, sed sufficit quod generans
et genitum aliqualiter univocentur, aliquando magis et aliquando minus.
Unde homo masculus generans et homo masculus genitus maxime uni- 30
vocantur, ex eo quia in tali generatione generans et genitum univocan-
tur in specie et in sexu; sed homo masculus generans et homo mulier
genita tantum univocantur ex eo quia in tali generatione generans et geni-
tum assimilantur in specie et non in sexu; cum autem generatur mulus
ex equo et asina adhuc est minor equivocatio, quia in tali generatione 35
illi om. M equo s.l. M accidens] fit add. Pv ergo s.l. M rei om. M
univocantur] assimilantur Pv genita] non add. Pv, scr. et del. M
assimilantur invicem generans et genitum in genere et non in specie. Sed

si non fuerit orbatio in semine, semper generans et genitum ex spermate
simpliciter univocantur. Dupliciter autem contingit orbatio in semine:
primo quidem propter defectum virtutis non habentis perfecte dominium
super materiam, sicut accidit in effectibus monstruosis; secundo, propter 5
indispositionem passi. Quod enim sperma equi non generat equum sed
mulum, hoc est quia sperma asini est indispositum ad formam equi, ideo
commiscentur et fit apud mixtionem virtus media. Similiter, quod sperma
masculi generat mulierem et non masculum, hoc est propter indispositio-
nem mestrui non potentis recipere formam masculi. Hoc autem provenit 10
ex intentione nature universalis ad quam spectat conservare species, que
sine sexus distinctione servari non possunt.
Lege litteram: Quare, quemadmodum in sillogismis practicis, omnium
principium est substantia, idest quiditas rei; nam ex quid est sillogismi sunt,
et huiusmodi generationes artificialium. Similiter itaque hiis et que sunt 15
270rb Pv natura constituta se habent. Nam sperma | facit sicut que ab arte. Habet
enim potestate speciem, idest formam generandam, et a quo sperma est
aliqualiter univocum est cum ipso genitonon enim omnia sic oportet
querere ut ex homine homo; et enim femina ex viro, unde mulus non ex mulo.
Ideo in hiis est univocatio secundum quid, sed si non orbatio fuerit, tunc 20
erit univocatio simpliciter.a
Notandum primo, secundum Commentatorem, commento uno et
tricesimo, quod semen generat per potentiam in eo similem artifi-
cio, idest que est quiditas artificiati. Et hoc declaratum est in sex-
todecimo libro De animalibus : forma enim generati est in semine 25
in potentia quemadmodum forma artificiati est in artifice in poten-
tia.b
Unde, sextodecimo De animalibusc, declaratur quod semen et ars in ope-
38ra M rando assimilantur, quia, sicut forma artificialis est in potentia in arte, |
ita forma naturalis est in potentia in semine. Ad factionem enim arti- 30
ficiati duo concurrunt, scilicet quiditas rei artificiate in mente artificis
et sillogismus practicus fundatus super istam quiditatem: primo quidem
artifex, volens facere domum, preconcipit quiditatem domus; secundo
species] speciem Pv possunt] potest Pv et1] hic add. Moerb. genera-

tiones] animalium add. M semen] enim add. Iunt. animalibus] non add. et del.
M
a Aristotle, Met., VII, 9, 1034a30b4 (AL XXV 3.2, p. 148, lin. 441448). b Averroes, In Met.,
VII, t.c. 31, fol. 180FG. c Aristotle, De gen. anim., II, 6, 744b2126.
288 pauli veneti
sillogizat quod si domus fieri debet, oportet quod fit ex lapidibus et lignis,
et quod fundamentum sit inferius et tectum superius, quia hoc requirit
quiditas domus preconcepta, et ab istis duobus proceditur ad opus. Ita ad
factionem rei naturalis duo concurrunt, scilicet quiditas rei naturalis in
potentia generantis et intentio assimilandi sibi simile fundata in quiditate 5
illa, a quibus incipit operari sperma ipsum aut semen, quod est agens
naturale. Et licet in hiis conveniant semen et ars, in aliis tamen differunt,
quia non oportet quod forma domus, que est in mente artificis, fit a
domo existente in materia, licet quandoque hoc accidat, sicut quando
aliquis ad exemplar unius domus facit aliam domum. Sed semper oportet 10
in generatione naturali ex semine quod sperma sit ab animali decisum
non sicut pars carnis aut ossis, sed ut quedam portio alimenti, quod
est potentia totum animal non tantum materialiter, sed etiam effective,
quia non solum ex semine tamquam ex materia generatur totum animal,
sed etiam ex semine tamquam ex generante, propter virtutem activam 15
formativam membrorum existentem in spiritibus seminis. Ista de causa
semen magis assimilatur instrumento quam arti. Nam instrumentum per
se acceptum numquam inducit formam artis, sicut patet de serra, que
numquam inducit formam arche nisi reguletur ab arte; ita sperma de se
non inducit formam animalis nisi reguletur ab alio agente: sicut enim 20
instrumentum virtute artis inducit formam artificiati, sic sperma virtute
patris inducit formam generandam vel rem generandam. Deinde, sicut
forma artificiati est formaliter in artifice, virtualiter autem in instrumento,
ita forma hominis vel asini geniti est formaliter in generante, virtualiter
autem in spermate. 25
mento, quod omnia ista sunt virtutes naturales divine generantes
sibi similia, secundum quod artes generant sua artificiata. Et ideo
dicit Aristoteles in libro De animalibus quod sunt similes intellectui,
scilicet quia agunt actione intellectus et quod iste virtutes assimi- 30
lantur intellectui in hoc, quod agunt non per instrumentum corpo-
rale Et ideo dubitat Galienus, dicens: Nescio utrum ista virtus sit
creator aut non. Et Aristoteles magnificat hanc virtutem et attribuit
illam principiis divinis non naturalibus.a
sperma ipsum inv. Pv formam generandam vel om. Pv notandum secundo

inv. Pv secundum M Iunt.] sed Pv quod] hee add. Iunt. actione intellectus]
actiones intellectuales Iunt.
a Averroes, In Met., VII, t.c. 31, fol. 181EG.

Quatuor dignitates attribuit Commentator seminis virtuti ex doctrina

Aristotelis in libro De animalibus. Prima dignitas est quod virtus seminis
est virtus naturalis. Probatur. Omnis virtus non cognoscens est virtus
naturalis; sed virtus seminis est virtus non cognoscens, sicut etiam virtus
nutritiva et augmentativa; ergo et cetera. 5
Secunda dignitas: virtus seminis est virtus divina. Patet. Nam, licet
270va Pv instrumentum possit agere ultra formam | suam in quantum agit virtute
principalis agentis, tamen numquam potest agere ultra formam princi-
palis agentis, sicut patet de serra, que agit ultra speciem propriam in
quantum agit virtute aeris, nichil tamen potest agere ultra speciem artis. 10
Constat autem quod virtus seminis in eadem materia agit diversitatem
membrorum, quod quidem a se ipsa habere non potest in quantum est
instrumentum, ut patet; nec a virtute patris, que est agens principale, quia,
licet virtus illa sufficiat ad nutriendum membra, non tamen sufficit ad
generandum membra ita diversa. Ideo ad hoc videtur specialiter concur- 15
38rb M rere virtus | intelligentie, que est virtus divina.
Tertia dignitas est quod virtus seminis agit per modum artis. Patet ex
differentia que est inter artem et naturam, quia natura ex una materia
unum effectum facit: ignis enim ex ligno non generat per se nisi ignem,
ars autem ex ligno generat archam, lectulum et huiusmodi. Sic virtus for- 20
mativa in semine ex una materia inducit membra diversarum specierum,
videlicet cor, epar et huiusmodi.
Quarta dignitas est quod virtus seminis agit per modum intellectus.
Patet. Sicut enim intellectus agit absque instrumento corporali, ita et
virtus seminis: agit enim intellectus in animam tamquam in subiectum 25
propinquum et in corpus tamquam in subiectum remotum, neque indi-
get instrumento corporali; ita virtus seminis agit in semen tamquam in
materiam propinquam et in menstruum tamquam in materiam remotam,
neque ad talem actionem exigit instrumentum corporale. Quia ergo virtus
seminis non agit tantum uno modo, sicut natura, sed pluribus modis, sicut 30
ars et intellectus, neque inducit tantum unam formam, sed plures diversa-
rum rationum ad modum causarum universalium, que sunt Deus et intel-
ligentie, ideo hanc virtutem Philosophus attribuit principiis divinis et non
naturalibus; Galienus autem dubitavit utrum tales virtutes essent creator
vel creatura, quia operari videntur ad modum creatoris et non creature. 35
seminis virtuti inv. Pv speciem propriam inv. Pv archam] scamnum add. Pv

epar] cerebrum add. Pv Philosophus] Aristoteles Pv
290 pauli veneti

quod differunt iste virtutes generative quas medici vocant formati-
vas a virtutibus naturalibus que sunt in corporibus animalium. Iste
enim agunt per instrumenta terminata et propria membra, virtus
autem informativa non agit per membrum proprium, sed universa- 5
liter non agit nisi per calorem, qui est in semine, non ita quod sit
forma in eis sicut anima in calore naturali, sed ita quod sit inclusa in
eis sicut anima in corporibus celestibus.a
Ista ergo est differentia quam assignat Commentator inter virtutem for-
mativam in semine et virtutem naturalem in animali iam formato et gene- 10
rato, quia virtus naturalis in corpore iam formato operatur per instru-
menta determinata, que sunt determinata membra animalis, ut cor, epar
et huiusmodi; sed virtus formativa non utitur talibus instrumentis: solum
autem calor naturalis est instrumentum eius, qui licet de se sit consump-
tivus et resolutivus, est tamen formativus membrorum in quantum est 15
instrumentum virtutis formative. Hec autem virtus formativa non est in
semine sicut forma in eo, sed est inclusa in illo sicut anima inclusa est
in corporibus celestibus, scilicet ut motor et non ut forma. Virtus ergo
seminis, quam medici vocant formativam, non est in illo ut forma eius,
sed magis ut motrix et efficiens se habens per medium artis. Si enim ars 20
navifactiva esset in ligno, non quidem esset forma ligni, sed tantum esset
motor ligni extrahens ipsum de potentia ad formam navis et cetera.
Quecumque autem a casu h1034b4ssi.
Tertium dubium est istud: utrum, sicut artificialium quedam fiunt ab
arte et a natura, quedam autem ab arte tantum, ita naturalium quedam 25
fiunt ex semine et sine semine, et quedam ex semine tantum.
Respondet Philosophus quod sic, quoniam, sicut illa artificialia fiunt
270vb Pv ab arte et a natura quorum materia potest moveri a se ipsa eo | motu quo
movetur ab arte, ita illa naturalia fiunt ex semine et sine semine quorum
materia potest moveri a se ipsa eo motu quo sperma movet. Et sicut illa 30
artificialia fiunt solum ab arte quorum materia non potest moveri a se
ipsa eo motu quo movetur ab arte, ita illa naturalia fiunt solum ex semine
quorum materia non potest moveri a se ipsa eo motu quo sperma movet.
Verbi gratia, animal sanari potest ab arte et a natura, quia corpus eius
notandum tertio inv. Pv qui Pv Iunt.] que M ergo est inv. Pv sicut1] virtus in
eo vel add.. M et cetera om. Pv et sine semine mg. Pv
a Averroes, In Met., VII, t.c. 31, fol. 181EF.

38va M potest moveri | a se ipso per confricationem et calefactionem, sicut potest

moveri ab arte medicine precipiente confricationem et dante medicinam
calidam; domus autem et statua non potest fieri nisi ab arte, quia lapides
et ligna non possunt moveri a se ipsis ad formam domus et statue, sed
solum ab extrinseco per actionem artis. Consimiliter dicatur de natura- 5
libus quod mures et rane fiunt ex semine et sine semine, quia materia
eorum movetur a se ipsa sicut movet speram ad generationem anima-
lis perfecti; homo autem et equus fiunt tantum ex semine, quia materia
eorum non movetur a se ipsa eo motu quo sperma movet, sed necessario
materia eorum movetur ab aliquo generante extrinseco, conveniente in 10
forma et in materia.
Ex quibus patet quod non est vera opinio Averrois, dicentis quod nulla
animalia que generantur ex semine possunt generari ex non semine, iuxta
illud dictum suum, octavo Phisicorum:a Impossibile est quod eadem spe-
cies fit a casu et a natura. Non etiam est vera opinio Avicenne,b dicentis 15
quod omnia animalia possunt generari ex semine et sine semine: exem-
plificans de cane cadente de aere, dicit illum generatum esse ex mate-
ria putrefacta in media regione aerisquod non est verum, sed quodam
vento, qui dicitur typho, canis ille elevatus est et ad partem aliam tran-
slatus. Aristoteles autem tenuit medium inter contraria illorum, dicens 20
aliqua animalia generari ex semine tantum, quedam autem generari ex
semine et sine semine: animalia que generantur ex semine dixit generari
a natura, animalia vero que generantur ex non semine asseruit generari a
casu.
Lege litteram: Quecumque autem a casu fiunt, scilicet ex non semine, 25
sicut ibi fit, quorumcumque materia potest a se ipsa moveri hoc motu quo
sperma movet; quorumcumque vero non potest moveri materia a se ipsa,
ea impossibilia sunt fieri aliter quam ex ipsis seminibus.c
Istud dubium cum sua responsione iterum videtur obviare tertie con-
clusioni prime partis et etiam conclusioni in secundo dubio posite huius 30
secunde partis, quoniam generata a casu et ex putrefactione non videntur
assimilari suis generantibus neque univocationem habere cum illis.
Notandum, secundum Commentatorem, commento uno et trice-
simo, quod hec est summa eorum que dicit Aristoteles in hoc loco,
generatum] genitum Pv ipsa Pv Moerb.] ipso M dicit Aristoteles] dicit hic

Aristoteles M : dicuntur Iunt. in hoc loco Pv Iunt.] om. M
a Averroes, In Phys., VIII, t.c. 46, fol. 387H. b Cf. supra, p. 215d. c Aristotle, Met., VII, 9,
1034b47 (AL XXV 3.2, p. 148, lin. 448451).
292 pauli veneti
quod si sunt forme separate, nichil prosunt in generatione, et quod

generatio est ex rebus convenientibus secundum formam et diversis
secundum materiam.a
Ita quod generans et genitum, et si differunt secundum materiam, tamen
conveniunt semper secundum speciem, et hoc formaliter aut virtualiter, 5
ita quod semper conveniunt aliquo modo nomine et diffinitione.
Inquit Commentator hic: sperma enim, et si non sit simpliciter homo,
tamen est aliquo modo homo, in quantum generat hominem; et si virtus
seminis non sit actu anima, tamen est aliquo modo anima in potentia, in
quantum ex ea effective generatur anima. Similiter, materia putrefacta est 10
aliquo modo mus aut rana, in quantum ex illa materia generatur mus aut
rana, et virtus existens in illa generat formam muris aut rane.
Contra Aristotelem inducit quatuor rationes Plato valde difficiles, in-
quit Commentator in hoc commento. Quarum prima est quoniam omne
quod educitur de potentia ad actum, oportet quod educatur per aliquid 15
existens in actu, quia nichil agit ut est in potentia, sed solum ut est in
actu, ut habetur in tertio Phisicorum;b sed plante et animalia que fiunt ex
non semine, educuntur de potentia ad actum; ergo educuntur per aliquid
quod est in actu. Constat autem quod agens in actu non apparet nisi
forma separata a materia; ergo in generatione equivoca eorum que fiunt 20
ex putrefactione, necesse est concurrere agens separatum.
38vb M Secunda ratio | inter ceteras fortissima fuit: quelibet forma substantia-
lis, tam elementi quam mixti inanimati quam etiam animalis, que dici-
tur esse anima, non est complexio qualitatum primarum nec qualitatum
secundarum, sed est quedam forma addita omnibus illis complexionibus. 25
271ra Pv Queritur | ergo utrum talis forma superaddita generetur a se aut a gene-
rante extrinseco. Non a se, quia tunc aliqua generatio esset a non gene-
rante, ex quo nichil generat se ipsum. Si a generante extrinseco, necesse
est quod illud sit individuum eiusdem generis vel speciei cum generato
aut forma separata; constat autem quod in generatione anime ex semine 30
individuum generans et genitum non sunt eiusdem speciei neque generis;
ergo oportet dare formam separatam, que sit agens in tali generatione.
in generatione Pv Iunt.] ad generationem M materiam] numerum Iunt. in

quantumrana mg. Pv quoniamratio post generatione (lin. 32) Pv, sed cum signis
transpositionem recte faciendam indicantibus aliquid] aliquod M vel] aut Pv
a Averroes, In Met., VII, t.c. 31, fol. 180IK. b Aristotle, Phys., III, 3, 202a1617.
Tertia ratio: in transmutatione elementorum ex seinvicem non fit actio

secundum formas substantiales, sed tantum per qualitates primas, quia
actio et passio est ratione contrarietatis, ut probatur primo De genera-
tione;a constat autem quod forme substantiales elementorum non sunt
contrarie, sed qualitates prime; ergo cum elementa educuntur de potentia 5
ad actum, necesse est quod educantur per aliquid existens in actu, quod
non videtur esse nisi forma separata. Unde, quando ex duobus elementis
generatur tertium, ambo elementa corrumpuntur cum formis substan-
tialibus. Cum autem qualitates non generant substantiam et generans et
genitum sunt simul, ut ostenditur septimo Phisicorum,b ergo requiritur 10
agens separatum.
Quarta ratio est experimentalis, quoniam videmus a motu generari
ignem in actu ex eo quod est ignis in potentia, et non possumus dicere
quod motus facit formam substantialem ignis, ex quo motus est acci-
dens; ergo oportet ponere formam separatam generantem formam ignis, 15
quando generatur ignis in motu confricationis aut collisionis vel repercus-
sionis duorum corporum invicem. Sic etiam potest argui, quando genera-
tur ignis ex reflexione radiorum solarium in speculo concavo, quod radius
non producit formam ignis, sed forma separata.
mento, quod cum Avicenna obedit istis propositionibus, credidit
omnes formas esse ab intelligentia agente, quam vocat datorem for-
marum. Et estimatur quod Themistius dicit hoc. In entibus vero que
generantur ex semine manifestum est de eo, et iam dixit hoc aperte
in tractatu libri sue Abbreviationis. In omnibus vero formis appa- 25
ret hoc quod dicit in sexto sue Abbreviationis de anima, quod anima
non est illud in quo sunt omnes forme tantum, scilicet intelligibile et
sensibile, sed est illud quod ponit omnes formas in materiis et creat
eas. Et est manifestum quod ipse intendit per hanc animam formam
separatam.c 30
Opinio ergo tam Avicenne quam Themistii fuit quod omnes forme sub-
stantiales rerum generabilium et corruptibilium sunt a forma separata a
materia, licet illam formam separatam non consimiliter nominaverunt.
esse om. M notandum secundo inv. Pv istis Pv Iunt.] rationibus et add. M

estimatur] existimatur etiam Iunt.
a Aristotle, De gen., I, 7, 323b2931. b Aristotle, Phys., VII, 1, 242a5760. c Averroes, In Met.,
VII, t.c. 31, fol. 181BC.

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Unde Avicenna vocavit illam intelligentiam agentem et datorem forma-

rum, quam dixit esse decimam intelligentiam, scilicet moventem orbem
lune. Themistius autem vocavit eam animam celi, in qua dixit esse non
solum intentionaliter et obiective omnem formam tam sensibilem quam
intelligibilem, sed etiam potentialiter et effective voluit esse omnem for- 5
mam substantialem generabilem et corruptibilem: dixit enim animam
celi creare in materia omnem formam que generatur et corrumpitur. In
tractatu enim De spermate expresse asseruit omnes formas eorum que
generantur ex semine creari ab anima celi; in sexta vero parte libri De
anima hoc generaliter concessit de omnibus formis generabilium et cor- 10
39ra M ruptibilium. Hos autem libros vocavit Abbreviationes, | quia, abbreviando
dicta antiquorum, in summa collegit meliora et principaliora. Huius etiam
opinionis videtur fuisse Alpharabius in suo libro De duabus philosophiis,
271rb Pv ut innuit Commentator eodem commento, ita quod omnes volue-|-runt
subiectum et materiam fieri ab agente particulari coniuncto materie, for- 15
mam vero fieri ab agente universali separato.
Contra hanc opinionem arguit Commentator eodem commento, infe-
rens quatuor inconvenientia. Quorum primum est quod generatio non fit
ab agente materiali. Quod istud sequatur manifestum est, quia per illos
generatio forme fit solum ab agente separato. Et quod istud sit incove- 20
niens arguitur, quoniam eiusdem agentis est finis et id quod est ad finem:
idem enim medicus inducit sanitatem et calorem in corpore animalis per
medicinam calidam, et idem edificator disponit lapides et ligna et inducit
formam domus. Constat autem quod generatio forme est finis alteratio-
nis, ut ostenditur primo De generatione;a ergo eiusdem agentis est alteratio 25
materie et generatio forme. Sed alteratio materie, per illos, est ab agente
materialiet etiam secundum veritatem ita est; ergo generatio forme
etiam est ab eodem agente materiali.
Secundum inconveniens est quod generans non est formans. Quod
istud sequatur patet, quia illud est formans quod inducit formam; sed 30
generans non inducit formam, eo quod ignis generans ignem non inducit
formam ignis, secundum illam opinionem, sed inducens formam ignis est
agens separatum, quod est dator formarum aut anima celi; ergo generans
non est formans. Quod autem illud sit inconveniens arguitur, quia, sicut
formam substantialem inv. Pv per illos] et secundum veritatem add. Pv et

est om. Pv
a In truth, Averroes, In Phys., VI, t.c. 45, fol. 274LM (cf. supra, tr. 2, c. 1, p. 243, 25).
est in artificialibus, ita est in naturalibus; sed in artificialibus generans

est formans, quia generans domum format domum et generans statuam
format statuam; ergo etiam in naturalibus generans hominem est formans
hominem et generans equum est formans equum et sic de aliis.
Tertium inconveniens est quod subiectum et sua forma sunt duo in 5
actu. Quod istud sit inconveniens manifestum est, quia ex subiecto et
forma fit unum in actu, scilicet unus homo aut unus equus; ergo subiec-
tum et forma non sunt duo in actu, sed duo in potentia. Patet conse-
quentia, quia unum in actu et multa in actu opponuntur, ut habet videri
quinto huius:a unum enim in actu non est multa in actu, sed est multa in 10
potentia, ut ostenditur quinto Phisicorum.b Et quod illud sequatur osten-
ditur, quia a diversis agentibus in actu non concurrentibus ad eundem
effectum fiunt diversi effectus in actu; sed agens materiale et agens imma-
teriale sunt diversa agentia in actu non concurrentia ad eundem effec-
tum, quia, secundum illam opinionem, agens materiale facit subiectum 15
et agens immateriale facit formam; ergo subiectum et forma sunt duo in
actu.
Quartum inconveniens est quod unum in actu secundum quod est
unum in actu dependet a dubobus agentibus non subordinatis. Quod
istud sit inconveniens patet, quia eo facto quod effectus est unus in 20
actu non habet nisi unum agens, quia, si habet plura agentia, oportet
quod illa sint subordinata, iuxta illud Philosophi, secundo Phisicorum:c
Sol et homo generant hominem ex materia. Et quod illud sequatur
manifestum est, quia tam homo quam equus, qui est unus effectus in
actu, secundum quod huiusmodi necessario dependet ab agente materiali 25
generante subiectum et ab agente immateriali generante formam. Et
quod ista agentia non sint subordinata, secundum illos, patet, quia, si
essent subordinata, aut ambo generarent subiectum aut ambo generarent
formamquod negat ista opinio.
quod omnes homines declinant magis ad opinionem Platonis, quia
39rb M est similis ei quod loquentes | nostre legis opinantur, scilicet quod
agens omnia est unum et quod non operantur in se adinvicem.
Videtur enim quod contingit eis ex creatione eorum adinvicem
manifestum] ostensum Pv effectus] efficiens M notandum tertio inv. Pv
a Aristotle, Met., V, 6, 1017a36. b Aristotle, Phys., V, 3, 227a1013. c Aristotle, Phys., II, 2,

194b13.
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procedere in infinitum in causis agentibus, et ideo posuerunt unum

agens non corpus.a
Plato ergo voluit quod preter ydeas, quas dixit esse causas speciales spe-
cierum, daretur unum agens primum incorporeum a quo create sunt
omnes ydee una cum toto universo. Quam opinionem secuti sunt omnes 5
271va Pv Christiani, Judei et Saraceni, de quorum lege fuit Commentator, | ymmo
et omnes Hebrees, qui fuerunt a tempore Christi, quo ad hoc quod datur
unus creator celi et terre, visibilium omnium et invisibilium; alioquin
mundus fuisset eternus et esset procedere in infinitum in causis, quoniam
Sortes fuisset a Platone et Plato a Cicerone et sic in infinitum, nisi fuisset 10
unum primum a quo creata sunt omnia. Disconveniens ergo fuit Plato ab
Avicenna in positione ydearum et unius primi creatoris omnium; in alio
autem conveniunt, videlicet quod agens materiale est illud quod imme-
diate disponit materiam et subiectum, agens autem immediate separa-
tum immediate introducit formam. 15
Contra Platonem, quantum ad creationem mundi, non arguit Com-
mentator, sed solum contra illud in quo convenit cum Avicenna. Et hoc
dupliciter. Et primo sic: non est processus de extremo ad extremum nisi
per medium; sed intransmutabile incorporeum et transmutabile corpo-
reum sunt duo extrema, quorum medium est intransmutabile corporeum; 20
ergo nullum intransmutabile incorporeum potest immediate transmu-
tare materiam, sed necessario transmutat materiam mediante intransmu-
tabili coporeo, quod est corpus celeste. Sicut ergo motus horum inferio-
rum reducitur in motorem immobilem mediante motu celi, ita transmu-
tatio materie reducitur in agens immateriale mediante agente materiali, 25
quod est celum.
Secundo: generans et genitum invicem assimilantur; sed forma sepa-
rata a materia simpliciter et forma immixta materie non invicem assi-
milantur; igitur impossibile est quod forma separata a materia simplici-
ter immediate producat formam immixtam materie, et per consequens 30
intelligentie celi non possunt immediate transmutare materiamcuius
oppositum asseruit Plato. Neque ultra arguit Commentator, quia incon-
venientia adducta contra Avicennam, Themistium et Alpharabium etiam
induci possunt contra Platonem.
speciales scr.] specialium MPv Christiani] et add. Pv et hoc] om. Pv igitur

quod mg. Pv
a Averroes, In Met., VII, t.c. 31, fol. 181IK.

Notandum quarto, secundum Commentatorem, in fine eiusdem

commenti, quod movit Aristotelem ad ponendum movens sepa-
ratum a materia in factione virtutuum intelligentium, quia virtu-
tes intellectuales apud ipsum sunt non mixte cum materia. Unde
necesse est quod illud quod est non mixtum cum materia genere- 5
tur a mixto cum materia.a
Aristoteles ergo posuit duplex generans, scilicet separatum a materia et
mixtum cum materia: generans separatum a materia posuit propter for-
mas immateriales et generans mixtum cum materia posuit propter formas
materiales. Probatur enim, tertio De anima,b quod intellectus humanus 10
est immaterialis, immixtus et separatus; ideo forme speculative que reci-
piuntur in eo etiam sunt immateriales. Ideo ponitur intellectus agens, qui
est generans immateriale, ut formas speculativas abstrahat a fantasmati-
bus et eas ponat in intellectu possibili. Fiat ergo hoc argumentum: sicut
se habet forma immaterialis ad generans immateriale, ita forma mate- 15
rialis ad generans materiale; sed forma immaterialis generatur a gene-
rante immateriali; ergo forma materialis generatur a generante materiali.
Necesse est ergo quod mixtum cum materia generetur a mixto cum mate-
ria, sicut non mixtum cum materia generatur a non mixto cum materia.
Et ideo, secundum Aristotelem, idem est agens disponens materiam et 20
39va M introducens formam, quia, ut ait Commentator hic: Generans est illud |
quod movet materiam donec recipiat formam, idest illud quod extrahit
illam de potentia ad actum Et Alexander videtur convenire ei quod Ari-
stoteles dicit hic et ei quod dicit in sextodecimo De animalibus,c videlicet
quod forma ab eodem generatur a quo disponitur materia. Sicut ergo The- 25
mistius et Alpharabius sequuntur et sustinent opinionem Avicenne, ita
Averroes et Alexander sustinent opinionem Aristotelis.
Ad primam rationem Platonis respondet Commentator, dicens quod,
cum considerata fuerit demonstratio Aristotelis in hoc loco super hoc
271vb Pv quod forme materiales sunt generantes formas materiales, | apparebit 30
quod semina sunt illa que dant formas rerum generatarum in seminibus,
per formas quas dederunt generantia semina,d ita quod forma animalis
et plante et aliorum que generantur ex semine non fit ab aliqua forma
notandum quarto inv. Pv quod quod] quod ut Pv : ut quod Iunt. a] cum

Pv separatus] inseparatus M a] ab agente vel M Averroes scr.] Averrois
MPv Alexander] Alexandri M in] a Iunt.
a Averroes, In Met., VII, t.c. 31, fol. 181KL. b Aristotle, De an., III, 5, 430a1718. c Averroes,
In Met., VII, t.c. 31, fol. 181C, G. d Averroes, In Met., VII, t.c. 31, 181DE.
298 pauli veneti
separata, sed fit ab ipso semine per virtutem existentem in eo, dependen-
tem ab eo generante a quo decisum est semen. Ita quod neque ydea neque
aliqua forma separata generat formam hominis aut equi, sed sperma gene-
rat illam formam per virtutem seminalem formativam existentem in illo.
Neque generatur illa virtus a celo neque ab aliqua intelligentia celi, sed 5
generatur ab homine vel ab equo a quo generatur sperma.
Ad secundam respondet Commentator, dicens quod, in generationi-
bus non ex se, apparebit quod corpora celestia sunt illa que dant istis ali-
quid loco seminum et virtutum que sunt in seminibus.a Sicut ergo semina
et virtutes existentes in seminibus sunt effective a plantis et animalibus, 10
ita materia putrefacta et virtus existens in ea, ex quibus generantur mures
et rane, sunt effective a corporibus celestibus, et non ab aliqua forma sepa-
rata, tamquam a principali propinquo agente. Quomodo autem fiat talis
materia putrida est notanda diffinitio putrefactionis data a Philosopho,
quarto Metheororum,b dicens: Putrefactio est corruptio facta in humido 15
proprie caliditatis a caliditate continentis.
Ex qua diffinitione patet quod ad putrefactionem quatuor requiruntur.
Primum est quod putrefactum sit humidum, unde magis humida citius
putrefiunt. Secundum est quod putrefactibile habeat calorem intraneum,
aliter non esset corruptio proprie caliditatis. Tertium est quod continens, 20
puta aer vel aqua vel aliquid aliud, habeat caliditatem, ideo temporibus
humidis minus putrefiunt humida. Quartum est quod caliditas continen-
tis sit fortior quam caliditas putrefactibilis, aliter enim non corrumpetur
ab illa, ex quo agens prestantius est passo.
Cum ergo in aliquo corpore existit humidum interius cum calido defi- 25
ciente in continente, aut fuerit calidum superexcellens aperiens porosi-
tates corporis putrefactibilis, necesse est quod extrahatur ipsum humi-
dum ad superficiem corporis; et quia humidum est nutrimentum calidi,
oportet quod simul etiam extrahatur calidum naturale. In qua quidem
extractione humidum subtilius extrahitur cum calido naturali et relinqui- 30
tur interius quod grossum est et magis propinquum nature terre, propter
quod omnia putrefacta resolvuntur in terram et cineres. Animalia ergo
que generantur ex putrefactione non generantur ex residuo terrestri, sed
ex humido extracto ad superficiem, circa quod efficitur quedam pellicula
generationibus] generabilibus Iunt. seminum Pv Iunt.] seminibus M vel

aqua om. Pv quod] quid M quod] quid M
a Averroes, In Met., VII, t.c. 31, 181E. b Aristotle, Meteor., IV, 1, 379a1719.
prohibens calores et spiritus inclusos exalare. In quibus spiritibus inclu-

sis virtute celi, quod est alterans primum, imprimitur quedam virtus for-
mativa, que est virtualiter et potentia tale animal generandum aut tale,
secundum materie dispositionem et celestis corporis influentiam. Gene-
rantur ergo animalia ex putrefactione per virtutem formativam impres- 5
sam in spiritibus inclusis in humido, sicut animalia generantur ex semine
39vb M per virtutem existentem in semine; ipsum autem semen | est virtualiter
totum animal ac illius immediatum efficiens.
Ad tertiam respondet Commentator, dicens quod illud quod movet
materiam necessario est corpus habens qualitatem activam, aut poten- 10
tiam que agit per corpus habens qualitatem activam.a Quando ergo ex
uno elemento alterum generatur, non tantum est actio et passio per qua-
litates primas, sed elementum determinans est illud quod transmutat
272ra Pv materiam mediantibus qualitatibus primis. Quando autem ex duobus |
elementis generatur tertium, iterum ambo elementa seinvicem transmu- 15
tant et generant tertium elementum. Neque oportet quod generans et
genitum in facto esse sint simul, sed sufficit quos sint simul generans et
genitum in fieri: sperma enim ex quo generatur homo numquam est simul
cum homine generato, quia corrumpitur in generatione hominis, sed est
simul cum homine dum est in generari. Unde, etiam septimo Phisicorum,b 20
habetur quod movens et motum sunt simul, et tamen non oportet quod
movens sit simul cum moto in fine motus, sed sufficit quod est simul cum
eo dum movetur.
Item, non oportet quod generans secundum substantiam sit simul
cum genito, sed sufficit quod secundum virtutem. Sicut ergo sperma 25
non manet in fine generationis, sed manet virtus seminis existens in eo,
ita quando generatur ignis ex terra et aere seinvicem transmutantibus,
non expedit aerem aut terram manere in fine generationis cum igne
genito; sufficit autem quod manent virtutes illorum secundum quas fiebat
transmutatio aeris et terre et generatio ignis, videlicet caliditas et siccitas: 30
obtinet enim caliditas aeris super frigiditatem terre et siccitas terre supra
aeris humiditatem. Si autem ex hiis elementis generetur aqua, contingit
econtra quod humiditas aeris obtineat supra siccitatem terre et frigiditas
terre supra caliditatem aeris.
tertiam] rationem add. Pv generato] genito Pv super] supra Pv

frigiditatem] siccitatem Pv
a Averroes, In Met., VII, t.c. 31, 181GH. b Aristotle, Phys., VII, 1, 242a5760.
300 pauli veneti
Ad quartam respondet Commentator, dicens quod subiectum forme

non habet esse nisi per formam; ideo actio agentis non pendet ab ipso
nisi secundum quod pendet de forma, cum actio agentis non pendet de
forma neque a subiecto sine forma. Et cum ita sit, manifestum quod actio
agentis pendet a subiecto propter quod pendet de forma. Illud ergo quod 5
non generat formam in uno, non generat subiectum nisi quia generat for-
mam.a Sicut ergo se habent invicem subiectum et forma, ita se habent
invicem actio subiecti et actio forme, eo quod motus denominatur a ter-
mino ad quem, ut habetur quinto Phisicorum;b sed subiectum et forma
ita se habent invicem quod non potest esse subiectum sine forma neque 10
econtra; ergo non potest esse actio subiecti sine actione forme et econtra,
et per consequens omne agens generans subiectum etiam generat for-
mam et econtra. Motus ergo generat tam ignem quam formam ignis, non
tamquam agens principale, sed solum tamquam agens instrumentale cor-
porum se percutientium, que accipiuntur in generatione ignis tamquam 15
agens principale; similiter, dum generatur ignis a radiis reflexis, princi-
pale agens est sol et radius reflexus est agens instrumentale. Omne ergo
quod generatur fit a suo simili et aliqualiter univoco in genere vel in spe-
cie, formaliter aut virtualiter, actu vel potentia, absque eo quod ponantur
ydee Platonis aut dator formarum Avicenne aut anima celi Themistii et 20
Alpharabii.
Dubitatur circa litteram et commentum, quia videtur quod animalia
genita ex non semine, per putrefactionem, non generentur a casu, quia
effectus casualis fit raro et preter intentionem agentis, ut ostendit Philoso-
phus, secundo Phisicorum;c constat autem talia animalia frequenter fieri 25
ac etiam ex intentione corporis celestis generantis huiusmodi animalia;
ergo et cetera.
40ra M Respondetur quod non est inconveniens aliquid comparatum ad unam
causam esse casuale quod tamen comparatum ad aliam causam non sit
casuale, sicut supra dicebatur de sanitate quod est casualis respectu con- 30
fricationis et non casualis respectu caloris, eo modo quo loquitur Philoso-
phus, secundo Phisicorum,d dicens quod depilatio sive evacuatio malorum
humorum est per se causa sanitatis, presentia autem solis aut ventorum
deforma Pv Iunt.] a forma M a] de Iunt. a] de Iunt. non1uno] generat

subiectum forme est illud quod generat formam ymmo Iunt. univoco] vel add. M s.l.
in genere vel] et in genere et M et] vel Pv casualis] casu animalis M
a Averroes, In Met., VII, t.c. 31, 181HI. b Aristotle, Phys., V, 1, 224b78. c Aristotle, Phys., II,
5, 196b10197a8. d Aristotle, Phys., II, 3, 194b35195a1; 5, 197a2125.

est causa per accidens et casualis. Si ergo generatio animalium ex non

272rb Pv semine comparatur ad virtutem celi, cuius inclinatio et ap-|-petitus est
omnem formam que est in potentia ad actum reducere, sic non est casua-
lis, quia celum est principale generans, imprimens virtutem formativam
in spiritibus humidi attracti, intendens huius vel illius generationem. Si 5
autem comparatur ad calorem putrefacientem ipsius continentis, qui non
intendit generationem huius vel illius animalis, sic generatio talium ani-
malium est per accidens et casualis; neque accipitur hic casuale stricte, ut
in libro Phisicorum, sed large pro omni effectu proveniente preter inten-
tionem agentis. 10
Non solum autem h1034b7ssi.
Quartum dubium: utrum generatio accidentis sit similis generationi
substantie. Si dicitur quod sic, contra: in generatione substantie forma
substantialis preexistit, ex eo quia est pars substantie genite, sicut mate-
ria; in generatione autem accidentis non preexistit forma accidentalis, 15
quia non est pars substantie. Si dicitur quod non est similis, hoc videtur
esse ex eo quia substantia necessario fit a substantia, accidens autem non
necessario fit ab accidente, sed aliquando a substantia, et habetur contra
tertiam conclusionem quod non omne genitum fit a suo simili, eo quod
substantia et accidens nullam invicem similitudinem habent neque con- 20
venientiam, ex quo predicamenta sunt primo distincta, ut habetur primo
Posteriorum.a
Respondet Philosophus, dicens quod generatio accidentis aliquo modo
est similis generationi substantie et aliquo modo dissimilis. Primo qui-
dem probat Philosophus similitudinem, dicens quod, sicut in generatione 25
substantie non fit per se forma nec materia, sed compositum, ita et in
generatione accidentis. Dictum est enim quod non fit es neque spera,
sed fit spera enea aut es spericum. Et quod est dictum particulariter de
spera enea est intelligendum in omnibus predicamentis. Unde in predi-
camento substantie non generatur per se materia aut forma animalis, sed 30
ipsum animal; et in predicamento quantitatis non fit per se lignum neque
quantitas, sed lignum quantum; in predicamento qualitatis non fit hper sei
lignum aut animal nec qualitas aut calor, sed fit lignum quale et animal
coloratum. Et ita dicatur de aliis predicamentis. Et sicut in generatione
substantie forma substantialis prefuit, ex eo quia est pars compositi sub- 35
vel] aut Pv dicens om. M enea] erea Pv enea] erea Pv per se suppl.
a Aristotle, An. Post., I, 15, 79b1214 (cf. Paul of Venice, Exp. Post., fol. K4rab).
302 pauli veneti
stantialis, ita in generatione accidentis forma accidentalis prefuit, quia

est pars compositi accidentalis: sicut enim lignum componitur ex mate-
ria et forma substantiali, ita lignum quantum aut quale componitur ex
subiecto et forma accidentali, videlicet ex ligno et ex quantitate et quali-
tate. Talia enim concreta, scilicet quantum et quale, bicubitum et album, 5
dicunt compositionem ex substantia et accidente, sed in abstracto exclu-
dunt huiusmodi compositionem.
Lege litteram: Non solum autem de substantia ratio ostendit non fieri
speciem, idest formam, sed de omnibus similiter primis, idest predicamen-
tis, est communis ratio, ut in quantitate, qualitate et in aliis cathegoriis, 10
idest predicamentis. Fit enim velut enea spera, sed non spera nec es, et in ere
fit spericitas si fit (semper enim oportet preexistere materiam et speciem):
sic et in quid, idest in substantia, et in qualitate et in quantitate et in aliis
similiter cathegoriis. Non enim fit quale, idest qualitas, sed quale scilicet
lignum, nec quantum, idest quantitas, sed quantum lignum aut animal.a 15
Secundo probat Philosophus quod generatio accidentis est aliquo
40rb M modo dissimilis generationi substantie, quia hoc est proprium substantie |
que generatur, quod semper presupponit substantiam actu generantem,
ut si generatur animal, necessario presupponitur animal actu generans,
si fuerit generatio simpliciter univoca. Et si non fuerit generatio simpli- 20
citer univoca, ut quando mulus generatur ex equo vel ex asino, aut rana
272va Pv ex materia putrefacta, semper | presupponitur substantia actu generans,
conveniens in genere aut in specie cum animali genito. In generatione
autem accidentis non necessario presupponitur accidens actu generans,
sed aliquando non preexistit accidens actu generans nisi in potentia, sci- 25
licet quando generans est substantia et genitum est accidens.
Lege litteram: Sed proprium substantie ex hiis accipere est quia ne-
cesse preexistere semper alteram substantiam actu existentem que facit, ut
animal in generatione animalis: quale vero et quantum non necessarium
nisi potestate solum.b 30
Notandum, secundum Commentatorem, commento altero et trice-
simo, quod non est necesse ut ante qualitatem generatam sit alia
qualitas agens, sed est necesse ut ante qualitatem generatam sit
quantitate et qualitate] qualitate et quantitate Pv similiter cathegoriis Pv

Moerb.] predicamentis vel cathegoriis similiter M etunivoca om. M animal]
si fit animal add. Moerb. (om. P1bc) et] aut Moerb. (et P)
a Aristotle,
9, 1034b1619 (AL XXV 3.2, p. 148, lin. 459462).
aliquid quod est in potentia qualitas, idest materia. Et dixit hoc,

quoniam qualitatum alia generatur a qualitate sibi simili et alia est
cuius generatio sequitur formam mixtionis primarum qualitatum.a
Prima distinctio quam intendit Commentator est hec: quod aliqua qua-
litas generatur a qualitate in actu et aliqua a qualitate in potentia. Illa 5
qualitas generatur a qualitate in actu, cuius proximum generans est qua-
litas, ut caliditas aque proveniens a caliditate ignis; illa autem qualitas
generatur a qualitate in potentia, cuius proximum generans est substan-
tia, ut frigiditas aque proveniens ab aqua calefacta sue nature dimissa.
Sicut enim semen est in potentia animal, tam active quam passive, quia 10
generat animal et ex eo generatur animal tamquam ex materia, ita sub-
stantia est potentia qualitas, quia ipsa immediate generat qualitatem et
ex ipsa tamquam ex materia et subiecto immediate generatur qualitas.
Secunda distinctio est quod quantitatum que generantur a qualitate
in actu, quedam generantur a qualitate simili et quedam a qualitate 15
dissimili. Illa generantur a qualitate simili que sunt eiusdem speciei cum
qualitate generante, ut quando generatur caliditas a caliditate et frigiditas
a frigiditate. Illa vero generantur a qualitate dissimili que sunt alterius
speciei a qualitate generante, ut colores, sapores, odores et alie qualitates
secunde, que generantur ex mixtione qualitatum primarum. 20
Circa predicta occurrunt quatuor difficultates. Quarum prima est
utrum compositum generetur ex materia et forma aut ex materia tantum.
Et arguitur quod ex materia tantum, quia compositum non generatur ex
ente in actu, sed ex ente in potentia, per Aristotelem, primo Phisicorum
et primo De generatione;b sed forma est ens in actu et materia est ens in 25
potentia, per eundem, ibidem; ergo et cetera.
Item, ex illo generatur compositum in quod resolvitur et corrumpitur,
ex quo generatio et corruptio sunt mutationes opposite, per Aristotelem,
quinto Phisicorum;c sed compositum corrumpitur in materiam et non
in formam, ex quo remanet materia et non forma, per Philosophum, 30
secundo De generatione;d ergo compositum generatur ex materia et non
ex forma.
idest Pv Iunt.] et est M sibi simili ante a Iunt. qualitate dissimili scr.] frigiditate
dissimili M, dissimili qualitate Pv, sed frigiditate del. ante dissimili sapores] et add.
Pv et om. M
a Averroes, Met., VII, t.c. 32, fol. 182E. b Aristotle, Phys., I, 9, 192a2729; De gen., I, 3, 317b23
25. c Aristotle, Phys., V, 1, 224a3334. d Aristotle, De gen., II, 7, 334b47.

304 pauli veneti
Preterea, compositum generatur ex illo quod transmutatur per poten-

tiam agentis; constat autem quod materia et non forma transmutatur per
potentiam agentis, quia agens non agit in formam, sed in materiam.
In oppositum arguitur sic: unumquodque generatur ex hiis ex quibus
est intrinsece; sed compositum est intrinsece ex materia et forma, et non 5
ex materia tantum; ergo ex utroque generatur et non ex altero tantum. Et
ita videtur velle Aristoteles,a dicens quod faciens speram eneam facit eam
ex spera et ere. Ymmo videtur compositum magis generari ex forma quam
ex materia, quia unumquodque magis generatur ex illo ex quo magis
40va M habet esse; constat autem quod compositum magis habet esse | a forma 10
quam a materia; ergo magis generatur ex forma quam ex materia. Vel
272vb Pv sic: unumquodque | magis generatur ex illo per quod habet esse novum
quam ex illo per quod non habet esse novum; sed compositum habet esse
novum per formam et non per materiam, quia materia est perpetua, forma
autem incipit esse. 15
Dicendum est ergo quod illa prepositio ex, quantum ad presens spec-
tat, dupliciter potest accipi. Uno modo ut dicit habitudinem partis, et
sic compositum generatur ex materia et forma. Cum vero dicitur quod
nichil generatur ex ente in actu, respondetur quod forma, licet sit in actu
respectu materie, tamen est in potentia respectu compositi, sicut gene- 20
raliter ordinatum ad finem est in potentia respectu finis. Et conceditur
quod, sicut compositum generatur ex materia et forma, ita corrumpitur
in materiam et formam, licet non ita proprie; et quod, sicut forma est
prior composito, ita est eo posterior, non duratione, sed natura. Et licet
sola materia transmutetur, tamen, quia forma est terminus transmuta- 25
tionis, ideo non solum ex materia generatur compositum, sed etiam ex
forma et cetera. Si autem illa prepositio ex dicit habitudinem subiecti,
sic compositum generatur tantum ex materia et consequenter concedi-
tur quod est intrinsece tantum ex materia. Omnia ergo argumenta facta in
oppositum concludunt quod compositum generatur ex materia et forma 30
et magis generatur ex forma quam ex materia, prout illa prepositio ex
importat habitudinem partis. Et ita intendit Philosophus,b dicens quod
faciens eneam speram facit eam ex ere et spera.
spera et ere] ere et spera Pv ex2] spera add. sed fort. del. Pv generatur]
generantur M est om. Pv generatur om. Pv
a Aristotle, Met., VII, 8, 1033b89. b Aristotle, Met., VII, 8, 1033b89.

Secunda difficultas: utrum subiectum generationis compositi sit mate-

ria et forma simul aut materia tantum. Et arguitur quod sit utrumque.
Primo, quia non tantum materia supponitur composito, sed etiam forma,
ex quo tam forma quam materia precedit compositum, per Aristotelem
in littera. 5
Secundo, quia non tantum ex materia generatur compositum, sed
etiam ex forma; neque tantum manet in composito materia, sed etiam
forma.
Tertio, quia terminus generationis est ipsum compositum; ergo prece-
dentia generationem sunt subiectum generationis; constat autem quod 10
precedunt generationem materia et forma.
Quarto, quia tam forma quam materia est subiectum privationis com-
positi, sicut utrumque simul est subiectum positionis eiusdem; constat
autem quod idem est subiectum privationis et generationis, ut colligitur
de mente Philosophi et Commentatoris, primo Phisicorum.a 15
In contrarium arguitur sic: subiectum generationis debet habere qua-
tuor conditiones, ut colligitur de mente Philosophi, primo De generatione
et primo Phisicorum.b Quarum prima est quod sit ens simpliciter in poten-
tia. Secunda conditio: quod preexistat duratione ipsi composito, ratione
alterationis cuius generatio est terminus. Tertia conditio: quod transmu- 20
tetur per agens. Quarta conditio: quod sit unum subiectum per se. Con-
stat autem quod iste conditiones non competunt materie et forme simul,
sed tantum materie; ergo solum materia est subiectum generationis, tam
forme quam compositi.
Ad primum dicitur quod forma non supponitur composito, sed solum 25
materia. Neque forma preexistit composito duratione, quod tamen requi-
ritur ad hoc quod sit subiectum generationis, sed tantum materia preexi-
stit composito et cetera.
Ad secundum dicitur quod compositum non generatur ex materia et
forma tamquam ex subiecto, sed tamquam ex partibus. Si enim caro et 30
sanguis non est subiectum animalis non obstante quod sit materia illius,
a fortiori non est subiectum generationis compositi ipsa forma, neque
totale neque partiale.
tertiaagens om. Pv quod] quia M materia scr.] natura MPv
a Aristotle, Phys., I, 7, 190b9ff; 9, 192a2527; Averroes, In Phys., I, t.c. 6466 passim. b Ari-
stotle, De gen., I, 3 passim; Phys., I, 67; 9 passim.

306 pauli veneti
Ad tertium respondetur quod generatio habet duplicem terminum, sci-

licet formale et materiale. Terminus formalis est ipsa forma, terminus
autem materialis est ipsum compositum. Neque inconvenit quod eius-
dem generationis sint duo termini per se, dummodo unus sit terminus per
se primo et alius sit terminus per se non primo. Neque omnia precedentia 5
40vb M generationem debent esse subiectum illius, et | maxime si precessio est
secundum naturam tantum.
Ad quartum respondetur quod sola materia est subiectum privationis,
tam forme quam compositi. Et negatur quod materia et forma sit subiec-
tum positionis compositi. Si enim forma non est subiectum compositi, 10
etiam non est subiectum positionis eius.
Tertia difficultas: utrum accidens possit immediate generari a non
accidente. Et arguitur quod non. Primo, quia accidens separabile non
273ra Pv fit | immediate a substantia, sed mediante accidente inseparabili; sed
cuiuscumque agentis actio est accidens separabile; ergo actio non fluit ab 15
aliquo agente nisi mediante accidente inseparabili.
Secundo: in essentialiter ordinatis secundum prius et posterius ulti-
mum non reducitur in primum nisi mediante medio, si quod habetur;
sed predicamenta sunt essentialiter ordinata, ita quod substantia est pri-
mum, quantitas secundum, qualitas tertium, relatio quartum, actio quin- 20
tum; ergo predicamentum actionis non reducitur in substantiam nisi
mediante qualitate, et per consequens substantia nullam actionem habet
nisi mediante qualitate, que est accidens.
Tertio: agens non immediate agit nisi in passum immediatum, quia
agens et patiens debent esse simul, septimo Phisicorum;a constat autem 25
nullum corpus esse immediatum alteri corpori per substantiam et suam
essentiam, sed per quantitatem; ergo nullum corpus agit immediatum in
aliud per suam substantiam, sed mediante accidente quod est quantitas.
Quarto: quanto aliqua forma est nobilior, tanto est magis activa in suo
genere; sed inter formas naturales anima est nobilior; ergo etiam activior. 30
Constat autem quod anima non immediate agit per suam substantiam,
sed per accidentia que sunt potentie illius, ut habet videri secundo et
tertio De anima;b ergo multo magis nec aliqua alia forma immediate agit.
subiectum] generationis add. sed fort. del. P habetur scr.] habet MPv est om.
M substantiam et om. Pv suam substantiam inv. Pv
a Aristotle, Phys., VII, 1, 242a5760. b Cf., e.g., Aristotle, De an., II, 3, 414a2932; III, 9,
432a1517.
In oppositum est Philosophus in littera,a dicens quod proprium est sub-

stantie genite quod habeat substantiam actu generantem, non autem est
proprium accidenti quod habeat accidens actu generans; ergo aliquod
accidens immediate generatur a substantia et non ab accidente. Unde
arguitur sic: in essentialiter ordinatis secundum sub et supra quicquid 5
perfectionis est in inferiori convenientius est in superiori; sed substan-
tia et accidens sunt essentialiter ordinata, sic quod substantia est prior
et superior accidente, ut patuit tractatu primo;b constat autem quod esse
activum est perfectionis simpliciter et reperitur immediate in accidente;
ergo reperitur immediate in substantia et perfectiori modo quam in acci- 10
dente. Quero ergo utrum substantia immediate agat accidens vel sub-
stantiam. Si immediate agit accidens, habetur intentum; si autem non
immediate agit substantiam, sed mediante accidente, et iterum habetur
intentum.
Notandum quod communis opinio ponit duas conclusiones. Quarum 15
prima est hec: accidens nullam actionem habet nisi sicut instrumentum
substantie, ex quo dependet a substantia tam in fieri quam in facto esse:
quicquid enim est causa cause est causa causati.
Contra istam conclusionem arguitur sic: calor generatus ab aqua calida
generatur a calore aque sicut a causa principali, nichil cooperante sub- 20
stantia per se; ergo accidens aliquam operationem habet sicut agens prin-
cipale et non instrumentale. Probatur antecedens. Nullum agens naturale
per se agit formam sibi contrariam; sed caliditas est forma contraria aque,
ex quo naturaliter inclinatur in frigiditatem; ergo aqua non per se agit cali-
ditatem, sed tantum per accidens, quia est subiectum eius. 25
Secunda conclusio est quod substantia nullam actionem habet nisi
mediante accidente, ex quo substantia non agit nisi mediante instru-
mento, ut videtur in omnibus substantiis tam materialibus quam imma-
terialibus.
Ista conclusio etiam non est vera, quia intelligentia movens celum 30
41ra M producit motum celi et non mediante | aliquo accidente; forma etiam
aeris violenter condensati generat motum quo reducit aerem ad propriam
raritatem et ad proprium situm; constat autem motum illum localem
immediate fieri a forma substantiali absque accidente medio concurrente
active. Ignis etiam extra naturalem dispositionem reducit se ipsum ad 35
convenientius] eminentius Pv
a Aristotle, Met., VII, 9, 1034b1618. b Cf. supra, tr. 1, c. 1, pp. 48, 1451, 6.
308 pauli veneti
caliditatem suam absque instrumento accidentali, sicut aqua calefacta se

ipsam reducit ad frigiditatem naturalem sine accidente alio per se concur-
rente, quia, si datur aliud accidens, aut proceditur in infinitum in acciden-
tibus agentibus, quod est impossibile, aut devenietur ad accidens geni-
273rb Pv tum immediate a substantia. | Unde generaliter de accidente inseparabili, 5
quod est propria passio et prima alicuius substantie active, est manife-
stum quod est a substantia effective et non mediante aliquo accidente.
Dicendum ergo quod, licet substantia non agat substantiam nisi medi-
ante instrumento, tamen agit accidens sine instrumento; et etiam acci-
dens immediate agit accidens non tamquam accidens est alicuius instru- 10
mentum, sed virtute propria. Nec oportet quod quicquid per se est causa
cause sit per se causa causati, quia prime qualitates sunt per se causa calo-
ris, calor est per se causa speciei visibilis in medio et visionis in oculo, et
tamen qualitates prime non sunt per se causa speciei visibilis nec visio-
nis. Et consequenter concedatur quod accidens propria virtute, non tam- 15
quam instrumentum alicuius, sed tamquam principale agens, producit
formam substantialem. Potest enim ferrum aut lapidem tantum calefieri
quod generabit formam ignis in stupa aut in illa materia sicca et faciliter
inflammabili. Nec ferrum aut lapis in ista actione erit principale agens,
cum non sit per se subiectum caliditatis, sed frigiditatis. Relinquitur ergo 20
quod sola caliditas erit principale agens. Neque inconvenit quod aliquid
agat ultra gradum proprium ratione susceptivi, eo quod actus activorum
sunt in patiente disposito, per Philosophum, secundo De anima.a Neque
obstat quod dicit Philosophus hic,b quod substantia genita presupponit
substantiam actu generantem, quoniam hoc est intelligendum mediate 25
vel immediate. Constat autem quod caliditas ferri aut lapidis inducitur ab
igne vel a sole vel ab alio corpore formaliter aut virtualiter calido.
Ad primum dicitur quod motus est accidens separabile, et etiam qua-
litates prime sunt accidentia separabilia et fiunt immediate a substantia
absque aliquo accidente separabili aut inseparabili. 30
Ad secundum respondetur quod, propter ordinem illorum quinque
predicamentorum, non oportet quod actio reducatur in substantiam
mediante qualitate vel quantitate active, sed sufficit quod passive, ita
quod agens facit actionem immediate non concurrente active qualitate
accidens est om. Pv (accidens scr. et del.) , qualitate vel quantitate]

quantitate vel qualitate Pv
a Aristotle, De an., II, 2, 414a2527. b Aristotle, Met., VII, 9, 1034b1618.

vel quantitate. Non tamen recipitur illa actio in substantiam nisi illa
disposita sit quantitative et qualitative.
Ad tertium dicitur quod corpus non agit in corpus mediante quantitate
active, quia quantitas non est virtus activa, ut habetur quarto Phisicorum.a
Et dato quod corpus non agat in corpus nisi mediante accidente, non 5
propter hoc sequitur quin in multis actionibus substantia immediate
producit accidens.
Ad quartum respondetur quod, licet anima non agat nisi instrumento
accidentali, tamen multe alie forme agunt sine instrumento. Agere enim
cum instrumento non dicit maiorem perfectionem: ars enim existens in 10
intellectu humano non potest agere absque instrumento et ars existens
in intellectu divino non indiget instrumento, et tamen ars divina est
perfectior quam ars humana.
Quarta difficultas: utrum in materia naturalium sit aliquod activum
principium promovens ipsam ad formam generandam. Et arguitur quod 15
41rb M sic. Primo, quia, dato opposito, quelibet generatio rerum naturalium |
esset violenta, quia violentum est illud cuius principium est ab extra, non
conferente vim passo, per Philosophum, tertio Ethicorum;b sed si in mate-
ria naturalium non esset principium activum, ipsum passum non confer-
ret vim ad actionem; ergo et cetera. Probatur minor. Nam in motu violento 20
passum est in potentia ad ipsum sicut in motu naturali: lapis enim est ita
in potentia ad motum sursum sicut ad motum deorsum. Nec magis con-
ferret vim motui naturali quam violento, nisi in se haberet principium
activum sui motus naturalis. Ita, a pari, nisi in materia naturalium esset
principium activum generationis, ipsa generatio esset violenta. 25
Secundo: naturalia differunt ab artificialibus in hoc quod naturalia
habent in se principium intrinsecum, artificialia vero principium extrin-
secum. Et ex hoc naturalia in quantum huiusmodi habent in se prin-
cipium sui motus, artificialia vero secundum quod huiusmodi nullum
habent principium motus, ut ostenditur secundo Phisicorum.c Neque illa 30
273va Pv differentia attenditur penes principium passivum, | quia vult Commen-
tator, ibidem,d omnem motum localem naturalem alicuius provenire a
principio intrinseco activo. Ergo illa differentia attenditur penes prin-
quantitas post activa Pv quia] quoniam Pv motum localem inv. M (localem

s.l.)
a Aristotle, Phys., IV, 9, 217a21b20 (cf. Averroes, In Met., IV, t.c. 84, 171L). b Aristotle, Nich.
Eth., III, 1, 1110a13. c Aristotle, Phys., II, 1, 192b1319. d Averroes, In Phys., II, t.c. 1, fol. 48F.
310 pauli veneti
cipium activum, ita quod in naturalibus principium activum sit intrinse-

cum et in artificialibus sit extrinsecum.
Tertio: natura est principium motus et quietis, secundo Phisicorum;a
sed natura dicitur de materia et forma, ut habetur ibidem;b ergo materia
est principium motus et quietis; non autem materia secundum quod 5
est pura potentia; ergo secundum quod in ea est aliquod principium
innatum vel concreatum, promovens eam ad motum naturalem vel ad
formam generandam. Et si dicitur quod natura non solum dicitur de
principio activo, sed etiam de principio passivo, contra hoc videtur esse
Philosophus in eodem libro,c dicens quod ars et natura sunt cause agentes. 10
Quarto: nisi in materia naturalium esset principium activum, non esset
ratio propter quam ex semine plante magis generaretur planta quam
animal, aut ex semine hominis magis homo quam equus. Et hoc videtur
intendere Philosophus, dicens hic quod materia artificialium non habet in
se principium quo moveatur ad formam, materia autem naturalium habet 15
in se principium quo movetur ad formam.
Notandum quod propter ista et similia argumenta posuit una antiqua
opinio in omni generatione naturali aliquod esse principium activum in
materia innatum vel concreatum, quod quidem vocant inchoationem
formarum, quia est coagens ipsi agenti extrinseco, ita quod de se non 20
movet materiam ad actum nisi per agens extrinsecum excitetur. Et dice-
bat hec opinio quod hec est differentia inter motum naturalem et violen-
tum, quia motus violentus habet tantum unum principium intra, scilicet
passivum in mobili, et aliud extra, scilicet activum. Similiter, artificialia
habent unum principium hpassivumi intra, in ipso factibili, principium 25
autem activum habet esse extra, in efficiente. Sed motus naturalis habet
utrumque principium intra, scilicet activum et passivum; constat autem
quod generatio forme est transmutatio naturalis non violenta nec artifi-
cialis; ergo generatio forme habet duplex principium, scilicet passivum
materie et activum, quod movet ipsam materiam ad formam generan- 30
dam.
Ista opinio fuit bipartita, quoniam quidam dixerunt huiusmodi prin-
cipium activum esse quandam virtutem seminalem innatam vel concrea-
tam materie, eo modo quo loquitur de virtute seminali existente in semine
secundo] primo Pv similia] consimilia Pv passivum suppl.
a Aristotle, Phys., II, 1, 192b2123. b Aristotle, Phys., II, 1, 193a2831. c Aristotle, Phys., II, 3,
194b2932; 195a38.
plante et in spermate animalis ac etiam in materia putrefacta, ex qua

generantur rane, musce et mures. Alii vero docuerunt huiusmodi acti-
vum principium esse formam ipsam generandam non actu, sed potentia,
41va M ita quod forma antequam generetur, per cuius | generationem habet esse
actuale completum et perfectum, habet prius in materia esse potentiale et 5
diminutum et incompletum. Quod quidem ipsi ponebant ad salvandum
generationem simpliciter, quia hec est differentia inter creationem et
generationem simpliciter, quia creatio est ex nichilo sui, generatio autem
est ex aliquo sui. Constat autem quod, si forma non haberet aliquod esse
proprium in materia ante generationem, tunc generatio forme esset ex 10
nichilo sui, ex quo materia nichil est forme generande, et ita generatio
simpliciter esset creatioquod est impossibile. Huius opinionis videtur
fuisse Aristoteles in littera,a dicens quod generationem compositi preces-
sit tam forma quam materia.
Contra primam opinionem arguitur, quia, data illa, sequitur quod vir- 15
tus in semine aut in spermate non est virtus decisa a generante, neque vir-
tus materie putrefacte est generata a celo virtute qualitatum primarum
cuius oppositum determinat Commentator supra commento uno et tri-
273vb Pv cesimo,b ex intentione Aristotelis et medicorum. Et | patet consequentia,
quia frustra poneretur talis virtus noviter genita, si materia habet unam 20
innatam vel concreatam.
Item, sequitur quod caliditas, frigiditas, humiditas et siccitas non sunt
qualitates prime, contra Philosophum, secundo De generatione.c Et patet
consequentia, quia in materia horum inferiorum precedunt qualitates
seminales productive harum qualitatum, per hanc opinionem. 25
Contra secundam opinionem iterum arguitur, quia forma completa
aut educitur de potentia materie immediate aut immediate de potentia
forme incomplete et diminute. Si primum, ergo ita educitur immediate
de nichilo sui, presupposita forma incompleta sicut non presupposita, et
per consequens generatio simpliciter non differt a creatione; frustra ergo 30
ponitur talis forma diminuta ad salvandam generationem et vitandam
creationem. Si autem forma completa educitur immediate de potentia
forme incomplete, sequitur quod subiectum immediatum tam generatio-
nis quam forme complete est forma diminuta et non prima materia; et
ad] propter Pv creationem et generationem] generationem et creationem M

quia] nam Pv quia] nam Pv
a Aristotle, Met., VII, 8, 1033b819. b Averroes, In Met., VII, t.c. 31, 181EF. c Aristotle, De
gen., II, 2 passim.
312 pauli veneti
consequenter sequitur quod forma completa et incompleta essentialiter

differunt tamquam actus et potentia subiectiva, et quod ex ambobus for-
mis fit compositum naturaleque omnia sunt inconvenientia.
Item, sequitur quod forma incompleta nichil sit forme complete, ex
quo essentialiter differunt, et per consequens forma completa ex hoc 5
quod extrahitur de forma incompleta extrahitur de nichilo sui, et sic non
vitatur creatio.
Item, generatio simpliciter est de non-esse simpliciter ad esse simpli-
citer, per Aristotelem, primo De generatione et quinto Phisicorum;a ergo
forma ante sui generationem nullum habuit esse. Unde queritur utrum 10
forma ante generationem habeat esse in materia secundum totum vel
secundum partem. Si secundum totum, ergo non educitur de potentia
materie, neque illa forma aliquo modo agit ad complementum sui, quia
omne agens agit secundum quod est in actu, illa autem forma non habet
esse actuale, sed solum potentiale, secundum hanc opinionem. Si autem 15
forma ante generationem habet esse secundum partem, ergo non sim-
pliciter generatur, sed secundum quid, scilicet secundum partem; ymmo
productio talis forme non est vere generatio, sed intensio per additionem
partis ad partem in eodem subiecto. Et ex hoc arguitur sic: in essentialiter
ordinatis eiusdem ordinis, agens continens virtualiter gradum superiorem 20
continet virtualiter quemlibet gradum inferiorem, licet non econverso;
sed gradus actualitatis eiusdem forme sunt eiusdem ordinis et essentia-
liter ordinati, secundum hanc opinionem, quia unus est in potentia ad
reliquum; ergo agens continens virtualiter gradum posteriorem continet
et quemlibet priorem; ergo potest inducere primum gradum sicut ulti- 25
mum, et per consequens frustra supponitur aliquis gradus aut pars forme
et cetera.
41vb M Dicendum ergo quod forma ante | sui generationem non prefuit secun-
dum totum nec secundum partem, non secundum esse completum vel
diminutum, non secundum esse actuale neque potentiale subiectivum, 30
sed tantum obiectivum, eo modo quo Antichristus dicitur esse in potentia
vel dies iudicii. Neque per hoc differt generatio a creatione, quia generatio
est ex aliquo sui et creatio ex nichilo sui, sed quia generatio presupponit
tam subiectum quam privationem forme, creatio autem non presuppo-
nit aliquod istorum. Forma ergo generatur ex materia non tamquam ex 35
vere om. Pv gradum om. Pv
a Aristotle, De gen., I, 3, 317b25; Phys., V, 1, 225a1517.

aliquo sui, sed sicut ex subiecto; et ideo forma est per se terminus gene-
rationis, non autem per se generatur, sed compositum, quia generatur ex
materia tamquam ex aliquo sui.
Deinde non oportet ponere talem formam in material, aut virtutem
seminalem, aut quovis modo activum principium movens materiam ad 5
274ra Pv formam generan-|-dam, propter motum naturalem habentem utrumlibet
principium in mobili, quia calefactio aque est motus naturalis, cuius acti-
vum principium est extra. Ymmo, secundum Commentatorem, secundo
Phisicorum,a elementa non per se alterantur ab intrinseco, sed ab extrin-
seco, neque habent principium sue alterationis secundum formam, sed 10
solum secundum materiam. Et, septimo Phisicorum,b dicit idem Com-
mentator, quod motus ferri ad magnetem est naturalis et tamen non fit
a principio intrinseco mobilis, sed tantum extrinseco. Et ita Philosophus,
tertio Ethicorum,c dicit quod motus naturalis est ille qui est a principio
intrinseco vel extrinseco conferente vim passo. 15
Ad primum dicitur quod nulla generatio forme est violenta, et quod
ad quamlibet talem confert vim tam agens quam passum. Agens quidem
confert vim in quantum confert virtutem naturalem disponentem mate-
riam pro receptione forme: sicut enim motus vaporum sursum est natura-
lis, non obstante quod fiat ab extrinseco, quia agens extrinsecum confert 20
illi vim, scilicet caliditatem et levitatem, per quam movetur sursum, ita
generatio forme est naturalis non obstante quod fiat a principio extrin-
seco, quia agens ipsum extrinsecum confert virtutem materie, per quam
movetur ad formam. Etiam passum confert vim, quia materia, propter pri-
vationem annexam, naturaliter inclinatur ad formam, ut habetur primo 25
Phisicorum:d sicut enim calefactio aque est naturalis propter inclinatio-
nem materie et motus celi est naturalis propter inclinationem forme, non
obstante quod quilibet istorum motuum fiat ab extrinseco, ita genera-
tio forme est naturalis propter inclinationem materie, non obstante quod
generatio illa fiat ab extrinseco. Motus autem lapidis sursum non est natu- 30
ralis, quia agens non confert vim ad illum motum, neque passum: forma
enim lapidis non confert vim, quia inclinatur ad motum contrarium; non
etiam materia confert vim, quia motus ille localis non ordinatur a natura
in generationem forme.
itaextrinseco mg. Pv
a Averroes, In Phys., II, t.c. 1, fol. 48CD. b Averroes, In Phys., VII, t.c. 10, fol. 315E. c Aristotle,
Eth. Nich., III, 1, 1110a13. d Aristotle, Phys., I, 9, 192a2527.

314 pauli veneti
Ad secundum conceditur quod naturalia habent in se principium om-

nium suorum motuum naturalium, et quod artificialia secundum quod
huiusmodi non habent in se aliquod principium sui motus, ubi dicit Com-
mentator quod elementa habent in se principium sui alterationis secun-
dum materiam, et habent in se principium sui motus localis secundum 5
formam. Mixta vero habent in se principium activum utriusque motus. Ex
quo patet quod elementa non habent in se principium activum sui motus
ad formam, sed tantum principium passivum, ita quod alterantur et gene-
rantur et corrumpuntur tantum ab extrinseco. Ideo materia illorum non
habet in se principium aliquod activum promovens ipsum ad formam 10
generandam; materia autem mixtorum, scilicet difformium in suis par-
tibus, habet in se principium huiusmodi, quod quidem dicitur qualitas
prima agens in qualitatem oppositam et repatiens ab eadem.
42ra M Ad tertium respondetur quod in diffinitione nature | principium sup-
ponit non solum pro forma, sed etiam pro materia, ut declarat Commen- 15
tator, ibidem,a quoniam motus localis elementorum, et si est naturalis
ratione forme, tamen alteratio ipsorum est naturalis solum ratione mate-
rie. Quando ergo dicitur: natura est principium motus et quietis, patet
quod ly natura non supponit tantum pro principio activo, sed etiam pro
principio passivo. 20
Et cum allegatur Philosophus, dicens quod ars et natura sunt cause
agentes, concedatur illud. Ex quo non sequitur quod omnis natura sit
causa agens, sed quod aliqua sic et aliqua non, ex quo natura dicitur de
materia et forma, ut probat Philosophus, secundo Phisicorum.b
Ad quartum conceditur quod semina plantarum et animalium habent 25
in se principium activum motivum ad formam, scilicet virtutem semina-
lem. Hoc tamen principium non est innatum neque concreatum materie,
sed est genitum simul cum semine. Nec ex hoc oportet ponere univer-
saliter tale principium activum in materia naturalium, quod excitatum
ab extrinseco promoveat materiam ad formam generandam. Non etiam 30
hoc concludit differentia quam ponit Philosophus inter materiam natu-
ralium et artificialium, quia intendit Philosophus quod nulla materia arti-
ficialium que sunt tantum ab arte habet in se principium activum sui
274rb Pv motus ad formam; aliqua autem | materia naturalium que sunt tantum
a natura habet in se principium sui motus activum ad formam. Quod 35
principium huiusmodi inv. Pv ut probat Philosophus om. M
a Averroes, In Phys., II, t.c. 1, fol. 48F. b Aristotle, Phys., II, 1, 193a2831.
quidem declarat Commentator, secundo Phisicorum,a dicens quod vegeta-

bilia habent in se principium intrinsecum non solum passivum, sed etiam
activum, sue nutritionis et augmentationis, quoniam anima principali-
ter et calor naturalis instrumentaliter, regulatus ab anima, nutrit et auget
plantas et animalia et cetera et cetera. 5
hCAPITULUM IIIi
Quoniam vero diffinitio h1034b20ssi.

Istud est tertium capitulum tractatus huius, in quo Philosophus osten-
dit quomodo se habet ipsum quod quid est ad partes suas, postquam
manifestavit illud non per se generare nec generari. 10
Et dividitur in tres partes, in quarum prima Philosophus premittit
unam suppositionem cum duabus questionibus; in secunda respondet ad
illas questiones, ibi: Aut multipliciter h1034b32ssi; in tertia vero dubitat
circa responsionem, ibi: Dubitatur autem merito h1036a26ssi.
Quantum ad primum, presupponit Philosophus quod omnis diffinitio 15
et omne diffinibile habet partes, quoniam omnis ratio habet partes et
omnis diffinitio est ratio; ergo omnis diffinitio habet partes. Patet conse-
quentia cum minori, quia diffinitio est illud per quod intellectus ratioci-
natur de re. Maior autem est evidens, quia ratio, proprie loquendo, non est
intellectus neque aliqua potentia rationalis, sed est illud per quod intel- 20
lectus ratiocinatur de re, resolvendo eam ad sui principia; quod esse non
potest nisi partes habeat. Et si omnis diffinitio habet partes, necesse est
quod omne diffinibile habeat partes, quia, sicut se habet tota diffinitio ad
totum diffinibile, ita se habent partes diffinitionis ad partes diffinibilis:
dictum est enim suprab quod diffinitio et diffinitum sunt idem, et quod 25
non differunt nisi in modo significandi. Si ergo omnis diffinitio habet par-
tes, necesse est omne diffinibile habere partes.
Lege litteram: Quoniam vero diffinitio ratio est et omnis ratio partes
habet, ideo omnis diffinitio partes habet, et consequenter omne diffinibile
partes habet, ut autem ratio ad rem et partes rationis ad partes rei similiter 30
se habent.c
habent habet M presupponit] supponit Pv et2] om. M habet] habeat M

habet] habeat M est habere] est quod habeat Pv partes partes M]
pars partem Pv Moerb. habent M] habet Pv Moerb.
a Averroes, In Phys., II, t.c. 1, fol. 48DE. b Cf. supra, tr. 1, c. 4, p. 193, 2526. c Aristotle,
Met., VII, 10, 1034b2022 (AL XXV 3.2, p. 148, lin. 463465).
316 pauli veneti
Notandum est, secundum Commentatorem, commento tricesimo

tertio, quod quodadmodum diffinitio declarat quiditatem rei, ita
pars diffinitionis declarat partem quiditatem rei.a
Istud commentum non esset verum nisi quelibet diffinitio et quodlibet
diffinitum haberent partes. Docet enim Aristoteles, secundo Posteriorum,b 5
investigare diffinitionem per naturam compositionis et divisionis; ubi
42rb M autem est compositio | vel divisio ibi est multitudo partium. Intellectus
ergo, diffiniens rem, primo investigat conceptum generis secundum quem
convenit cum alia re; secundo investigat conceptum differentie secun-
dum quem differt ab alia re. Constat autem quod genus et differentia sunt 10
partes tam diffiniti quam diffinitionis, secundum Porphyrium,c licet non
eodem modo, quia sunt partes diffiniti modo confuso, diffinitionis vero
modo distincto. Ergo et cetera.
Contra predicta arguitur, et primo quod diffinitio non habet partes,
quia diffinitio fit per actum intelligentie simplicium, ut colligitur a Philo- 15
sopho, tertio De anima;d constat autem actum simplicem intellectus non
habere partes, et hoc videtur intendere Aristoteles, dicens, in sequenti
capitulo,e quod finalis differentia est tota substantia rei et diffinitio; sed
certum est quod ultima differentia nullam partem habet.
Secundo arguitur quod non omne diffinibile habet partes, quia sub- 20
stantie simplices abstracte a materia diffiniuntur, cum sint species pre-
dicamenti substantie, et tamen non habent partes, cum sint indivisibiles
per Aristotelem, octavo Phisicorum.f
Ad primum dicitur quod unius conceptus non potest esse diffinitio pro-
274va Pv prie loquendo, quia oportet diffinitionem distincte | notificare principia 25
rei concurrentia ad essentiam rei constituendam. Propter quod dicit Phi-
losophus, in prohemio Phisicorum,g quod diffinitio dividit in singularia,
idest exprimit distincte singula principia diffiniti; quod fieri non potest
nisi per plures conceptus. Diffinitio autem que datur tantum uno nomine
aut uno conceptu non est proprie diffinitio, sed descriptio aut expres- 30
sio maioris declarationis, ut supra asseruit Commentator,h eo modo quo
declaratur nomen minus notum per nomen magis notum, ut hoc nomen
vel] et Pv
a Averroes, In Met., VII, t.c. 33, fol. 182L. b Aristotle, An. Post., II, 13 passim. c Porph, Isag., c.
De differentia (AL I 67, p. 18, lin. 1215). d Aristotle, De an., III, 6, 430a2628; 430b2730.
e Aristotle, Met., VII, 12, 1038a2526. f Aristotle, Phys., VIII, 10 passim. g Aristotle, Phys., I,
1, 184a23ff. h Averroes, In Met., VII, t.c. 14, fol. 164D.

antropos per hoc nomen homo aut hoc nomen philosophia per hoc
nomen sapientia.
Cum autem arguitur: diffinitio fit per actum intelligentie simplicium,
dicitur quod non fit tantum per unum actum, sed per plures. Dicitur
autem actus diffinitivus simplicium intelligentia, primo quia per talem 5
actum non dicitur rem esse vel non esse; secundo, quia per talem actum
intelligitur natura simplex, que non necessario habet partes reales, sed
sufficiunt partes rationis; tertio, quia per talem actum investigatur com-
ponendo vel dividendo ultima differentia, que omnino simplex est et
naturam simplicem constituit. 10
Quando vero Aristotelesa dicit quod finalis differentia est tota substan-
tia rei et diffinitio, illud est intelligendum virtualiter et non formaliter.
Non enim differentia ultima est formaliter tota substantia rei et diffinitio,
ex quo genus est pars essentialis illius, sed est virtualiter quelibet illorum,
in quantum, habita ultima differentia, habetur tota substantia et diffinitio 15
rei.
Ad secundum respondetur quod substantie simplices, et si non habent
partes reales, tamen habent partes rationis, quoniam in eis invenitur aliud
in quo cum aliis conveniunt et aliud in quo ab aliis different: omnes enim
conveniunt in esse intellectivo et differunt in modo intelligendi, quia ali- 20
que intelligunt per species magis universales et quedam per species minus
universales. Ideo in eis est aliud a quo accipitur ratio generis et aliud a quo
accipitur ratio differentie, et sic componuntur ex genere et differentia,
que sunt partes secundum rationem, ut asserit Commentator in prohe-
mio Phisicorum.b In rebus autem naturalibus inveniuntur partes reales 25
a quibus accipitur ratio generis et differentie: ab anima enim sensitiva
accipitur conceptus animalis et ab anima intellectiva accipitur concep-
tus rationalis; ab utraque autem accipitur conceptus hominis. Et quia
anima sensitiva se habet ut materia et intellectiva ut forma, ideo ani-
mal tenet locum materie, et differentia, que est rationale, tenet locum 30
forme. Non tamen animal et rationale sunt eodem modo partes homi-
nis et materia et forma, seu anima sensitiva et intellectiva, quia iste sunt
42va M partes reales secluso omni respectu | et omni ordine et habitudine ad
intellectum; animal autem et rationale sunt partes rationis, quia non sunt
vel] et Pv : add. M s.l. naturam] materiam scr. et corr. Pv a2] ex M et]

anima add. Pv et3] anima add. Pv
a Aristotle, Met., VII, 12, 1038a2526. b Averroes, In Phys., I, t.c. 5, fol. 8AB.
318 pauli veneti
partes alicuius nisi per habitudinem ad intellectum. Ita quod, secluso

opere intellectus, sunt partes hominis in potentia; adveniente autem
opere intellectus, per quem habetur distinctus conceptus hominis ex
distincto conceptu animalis et ex distincto conceptu rationalis, dicuntur
partes rationis in actu. 5
Et ita intendit Commentator, dicens, in prologo Phisicorum,a quod
species rerum naturalium habent duplices partes, videlicet secundum
fidem et secundum ymaginationem. Sicut ergo homo et animal, et animal
et rationale, sunt entia in rerum natura, secluso omni opere intellectus et
remota omni habitudine ad ipsum, non tamen homo est diffinibile, neque 10
animal et rationale sunt diffinibilia, nisi ex habitudine ad intellectum.
Que quidem habitudo si est actualis, sic homo est diffinitum in actu et
animal et rationale sunt diffinientia in potentia; si vero illa habitudo est
potentialis, sic homo est diffinitum aut diffinibile in potentia, et animal
et rationale sunt diffinientia aut diffinitiva in potentia. Genus ergo et 15
differentia sunt in rerum natura secluso omni respectu tam actuali quam
potentiali ad intellectum, sed non sunt partes speciei nisi per respectum
ad intellectum, et ex hoc dicuntur partes rationis aliquando in actu et
aliquando in potentia: in actu quidem, quando respectus est actualis ex
actuali operatione intellectus supra genus et differentiam; in potentia 20
vero quando non est actualis respectus sed solum potentialis.
274vb Pv Dubitatur autem h1034b22ssi.
Premissa suppositione, Philosophus movet duas questiones. Quarum
prima est hec: utrum quelibet diffinitio constitui debeat ex ratione par-
tium sui diffinibilis aut non. Ista questio movetur ex eo quia aliqua est dif- 25
finitio constans a partibus sui diffinibilis et aliqua non. Circulus enim non
diffinitur per partes suas que sunt semicirculus et portio circuli, sed econ-
tra: diffinitur enim circulus, quod est figura plana una linea contenta, in
qua diffinitione nulla pars circuli ponitur. Sed semicirculus et portio cir-
culi, que sunt partes circuli, diffiniuntur per circulum: dicitur enim quod 30
semicirculus est medieats circuli secata dyametro et quod portio est pars
circulis maior aut minor semicirculo. Constat autem quod in qualibet
istarum diffinitionum ponitur circulus. Sillaba autem diffinitur per par-
tes suas et non econtra, ut sillaba est pars dictionis composita ex litteris;
sed littera est minima pars composite vocis, ubi patet quod littera non 35
quem] quod Pv
a Averroes, In Phys., I, t.c. 5, fol. 8DF.

diffinitur per sillabam que est suum totum, sillaba autem diffinitur per
litteram que est eius pars. Fiat ergo hoc argumentum: sicut circulus est
quoddam totum diffinibile, ita et sillaba; et sicut circulus componitur ex
suis partibus et resolvitur in illas, ita sillaba componitur ex litteris et resol-
vitur in illas; ergo sicut circulus non diffinitur per suas partes, sed partes 5
circuli diffiniuntur per circulum, ita sillaba non debet diffiniri per litte-
ras, sed littere debent diffiniri per sillabam. Econtra etiam sequitur quod,
si diffinitur sillaba per litteras et non littere per sillabam, per idem diffi-
nitur circulus per partes suas et non partes circuli per ipsum circulum
quorum opposita sunt demonstrata. 10
Lege litteram: Dubitatur iam an oportet partium rationem esse in
totius ratione an non. In quibusdam enim videntur esse partes in diffini-
tione totius, in quibusdam non. Nam circuli ratio non habet eam que est
incisionum, idest portionum circuli, que autem sillabe habet eam que ele-
mentorum, idest litterarum, est. Et tamen dividitur circulus in incisiones ut 15
sillaba in elementa.a
Notandum, secundum Commentatorem, commento tricesimo ter-
tio, quod in diffinitionibus sillabarum est diffinitio litterarum, quo-
niam sillaba est illud quod componitur ex duabus litteris, scilicet
42vb M consonante et vocali , sed in diffinitione circuli non accipitur | 20
diffinitio medietatis nec quarte, et hoc manifestum est; ymmo feci-
mus econtrario: dicimus enim quod medietas circuli est arcus circuli
quem distinguit dyameter. Et sic circulus accipitur in diffinitione
semicirculi et non econtrario.b
Istud commentum est dubium, quia in diffinitione sillabe ponitur littera 25
consonans et vocalis, non autem ponitur diffinitio littere consonantis
neque vocalis. Similiter, in diffinitione semicirculi ponitur circulus, non
autem diffinitio circuli.
Ita videtur quod diffinitio sillabe non sit bene data, quia tunc istum
verbum do esset sillaba, quia componitur ex vocali et consonante, et ly 30
vi et ly vo, que sunt partes huius verbi vivo, non essent sillabe, quia
quelibet earum componitur ex duabus vocalibus tantum; ymmo nulla vox
esset sillaba composita ex tribus litteris, quarum una est vocalis et due
consonantes, aut due vocales et una consonansquod est falsum, quia
eius pars inv. Pv accipitur] est acceptus Iunt.
Met., VII, t.c. 33, fol. 183AB.

320 pauli veneti
in hac dictione paternitas sunt due sillabe, videlicet ter et tas, quarum
quelibet componitur ex una vocali et duabus consonantibus; in hac vero
dictione filiatio sunt due sillabe, videlicet lia et tio, quarum quelibet
componitur ex una consonante et duabus vocalibus.
Ad primum dicitur quod diffinitio alicuis ponitur in diffinitione ali- 5
cuius alterius dupliciter, scilicet implicite et explicite. Implicite quidem
quando exprimitur diffinitum et intelligitur diffinitio, et sic in diffinitione
hominis ponitur diffinitio animalis, dicendo homo est animal rationale:
exprimitur enim diffinitum, scilicet animal, et intelligitur sua diffinitio,
scilicet substantia animata sensitiva. Aliter non bene diffiniretur homo 10
per animal rationale, ex quo diffinitio datur causa innotescendi. Explicite
autem ponitur diffinitio alicuius in diffinitione alterius quando exprimi-
275ra Pv tur diffinitio sine diffinito, ut cum | diffinitur homo albus per animal
rationale habens albedinem aut corpus infinitum per quantum habens
tres dimensiones sine fine, iuxta doctrinam Commentatoris, tertio Phisi- 15
corum.a
Quando ergo Commentatorb dicit quod in diffinitione sillabe ponitur
diffinitio littere consonantis et vocalis, et in diffinitione semicirculi poni-
tur diffinitio circuli, intendit implicite et non explicite.
Ad secundum respondetur quod diffinitio Commentatoris est sic intel- 20
ligenda: sillaba est illud quod componitur in dictione formaliter aut vir-
tualiter ex duabus litteris, quarum una est consonans et alia vocalis. Con-
stat autem ista verba do, das, eo, is, it non componuntur in dictione,
sed in oratione. Similiter, ille sillabe vi et vo, licet componantur formali-
ter ex duabus vocalibus, tamen virtualiter componuntur tantum ex una 25
vocali et una consonante, quoniam in talibus prima vocalis perdit vim
vocalis et retinet vim consonantis.
Propterea, ad tollendam hanc difficultatem, Albertusc diffiniens silla-
bam dicit: sillaba est vox composita ex duabus vocibus, sonante et conso-
nante, ut per vocem sonantem intelligatur littera vocalis complete pro- 30
lata, et per vocem consonantem intelligatur littera illa coniuncta. Hec
autem sillabe, videlicet ter et tas, et si formaliter componuntur ex tribus
litteris, tamen virtualiter componuntur tantum ex duabus litteris, quia
sensitiva] sensibilis Pv alia] reliqua Pv tantum om. M ut] et M

componuntur tantum inv. M litteris om. Pv
a Averroes, In Phys., III, t.c. 43, fol. 104EG. b Averroes, In Met., VII, t.c. 33, fol. 183A.
c Albert, In Met., Lib. VII, tr. 3, c. 1, p. 356, 69; c. 2, p. 357, 7687.
vocalis cum consonante sequente ponitur loco unius vocalis, ex quo pro-
latio utriusque tanto tempore mensuratur quanto mensuratur una vocalis
tantum. Hec autem vox, scilicet lia aut tio, non est sillaba, sed quelibet
illarum vocum virtualiter componitur ex duabus sillabis, quoniam vocalis
ultima ponitur loco unius sillabe. 5
Amplius autem h1034b28ssi.
Secunda questio est utrum partes sint priores toto aut econtrario. Et
videtur quod partes sint priores toto, quia generaliter simplex est prius
composito et constituens constituto; sed partes sunt simpliciores toto et
constituentes totum; ergo sunt priores eo. 10
43ra M Sed arguitur quod non, quia, si partes sunt priores et angulus | acutus
est pars anguli recti, quia angulus rectus est divisibilis in infinitos acutos,
et digitus est pars hominis sicut et manus et brachium, ergo angulus
acutus est prior recto et digitus est prior homine. Quorum quodlibet
videtur esse falsum dupliciter. 15
Primo quidem: nam quelibet pars diffinitionis est prior suo diffinito,
ex quo partes diffinitionis sunt partes diffiniti; constat autem quod angu-
lus rectus ponitur in diffinitione anguli acuti, et homo ponitur in diffini-
tione digiti; ergo angulus rectus est prior acuto et homo est prior digito.
Tenet consequentia cum maiori et minor est evidens, quoniam angulus 20
acutus diffinitur per angulum minorem recto, sicut angulus obtusus vel
expansus diffinitur per angulum maiorem recto; digitus autem diffinitur
per hominem eo quod digitus est pars manus et manus instrumentum
seu organum operativi intellectus. Cum ergo intellectus sit de potentiis
naturalibus consequentibus esse hominis, necesse est quod digitus con- 25
sequatur esse hominis, et per consequens diffiniatur per suum totum et
cetera.
Secundo, quia illud est altero prius quod potest esse sine eo et non
econtra, ut est ostensum quinto huius et in Postpredicamentis.a Constat
autem quod homo potest esse sine digito et non econverso, quia digitus 30
separatus non est digitus nisi equivoce, sicut nec oculus mortuus aut
lapideus est oculus aliter quam equivoce, ut habetur secundo De anima.b
Etiam angulus rectus potest esse sine acuto et non econtra, ex quo angulus
acutus diffinitur per hoc quod est minor recto aut pars recti.
prolatio] prolato Pv est] hec add. Pv econverso] econtra Pv et non] non

autem Pv
a Aristotle, Met., V, 11, 1019a14; Cat., 12, 14a2935. b Aristotle, De an., II, 1, 412b2022.
322 pauli veneti
Lege litteram: Amplius autem si priores sunt partes toto, et recti acutus
est pars et digitus hominis etiam est pars, sequitur quod prior erit acutus
recto et digitus homine. Videntur autem illa esse priora, scilicet tota par-
tibus; secundum rationem namque diffinitivam dicuntur ex illis, et in esse
sine invicem sunt priora, ita quod sunt priora que sunt absque eo quod sint 5
invicem cum aliis.a
Notandum, secundum Commentatorem, commento tricesimo ter-
tio, quod partes dicuntur duobus modis: dicuntur enim de parti-
275rb Pv bus quali-|-tativis et de partibus quantitativis. Diffinitiones partium
quantitatis sunt posteriores diffinitione totius et toto; diffinitiones 10
vero partium qualitatis precedunt diffinitionem totius et totum.b
Distinctio Commentatoris est ista, quod duplex est pars, scilicet quali-
tativa et quantitativa. Pars qualitativa est pars simplex faciens per se ad
essentiam rei, ut materia et forma, genus et differentia; pars vero quanti-
tativa est pars composita non per se faciens ad essentiam rei, ut digitus 15
et manus. Sicut ergo pars qualitativa est prior toto, ita diffinitio partis
qualitative est prior diffinitione totius et etiam ipso toto; et sicut pars
quantitativa est posterior toto, ita diffinitio partis quantitative est poste-
rior diffinitione totius et ipso toto. Et hoc ideo, quia diffinitio et diffinitum
sunt idem realiter, licet differant ratione. Sicut ergo materia et forma, seu 20
animal et rationale, precedunt hominem, ita diffinitiones istorum prece-
dunt diffinitionem hominis et ipsum hominem; et sicut digitus et manus
sunt posteriores, ita diffinitiones illorum sunt post diffinitionem hominis
et post ipsum hominem.
Dubitatur, quia cor, epar et cerebrum sunt partes quantitative hominis 25
et non sunt posteriores homine, quia non potest esse homo sine talibus
partibus.
Respondetur quod Commentator loquitur de partis quantitativis acci-
dentalibus que accidunt ipsi toto, non autem de partibus quantitativis
essentialibus a quibus totum essentialiter dependet. Ita quod hec est dif- 30
ferentia inter partes qualitativas et quantitativas, quoniam quelibet pars
qualitativa est prior suo toto, non autem quelibet pars quantitativa, sed
43rb M aliqua sic et aliqua non. Et ita conformiter | dicatur de diffinitionibus par-
tium et sui totius.
qualitativis] qualitatis Iunt. quantitativis] quantitatis Pv Iunt.
VII, t.c. 33, fol. 183D.
Aut multipliciter dicitur h1034b32ssi.

Ista est secunda pars huius capituli, in qua Philosophus respondet ad
premissas questiones, premittens duas distinctiones. Quarum prima est
quod pars multipliciter dicitur. Uno modo dicitur pars secundum quanti-
tatem per quam mensuratur suum totum, sicut est pedale respectu bipe- 5
dalis et binarius respectu quaternarii: pedale enim aliquotiens replica-
tum mensurat bipedale, et binarius aliquotiens sumptus mensurat qua-
ternarium. Alio modo dicitur pars secundum qualitatem per quam con-
stituitur substantia et essentia rei. Et de tali parte est hic perscrutandum,
pretermittendo partem que est secundum quantitatem. Unde, quia hic 10
consideratur essentia rei et non quantitas eius, ideo pretermittenda est
pars secundum quantitatem et accipienda est pars secundum qualitatem,
cuiusmodi est materia et forma, seu genus et differentia.
Lege litteram: Aut, pro sed, multipliciter dicitur pars, quorum unus
quidem modus est quod mensurat secundum quantitatem. Secundum hoc 15
quidem pretermittatur. Ex quibus vero substantia est ut partibus perscru-
tandum est.a
Secunda distinctio est quod substantia tripliciter dicitur, scilicet de
materia, forma et composito, ita quod materia est substantia, forma est
substantia et compositum est substantia. Si enim in rerum natura inve- 20
niuntur materia et forma, oportet quod inveniatur compositum ex hiis;
et si materia et forma est substantia, oportet quod compositum ex hiis
sit substantia, quia, sicut ex non-substantiis non fit substantia, ita ex sub-
stantiis non fit non-substantia.
Hec divisio substantiae in materiam, formam et compositum non est 25
divisio secundum quod substantia est genus unicum, sed secundum quod
est commune analogum significans illa tria secundum prius et posterius,
et secundum causam et causatum, diversis rationibus: dicitur enim mate-
ria substantia quia substat forme, sive sit materia in qua sive materia ex
qua; forma dicitur substantia quia dat nomen et diffinitionem substan- 30
tialem, sive sit forma partis sive sit forma totius; compositum autem dici-
tur substantia quia recipit nomen et diffinitionem substantialem, sive sit
compositum individuale, ut Sortes, sive compositum universale, ut homo.
Lege litteram: Si igitur est hoc quidem materia illud vero species, aliud
ex hiis, et substantia est materia et species et quod ex hiis.b 35
secundum] sed Moerb. (secundum P1) substantia] et add. Pv sihoc Pv

Moerb.] magis est hec M
10, 1035a12 (AL, XXV 3.2, p. 149, lin. 477479).

324 pauli veneti
Istis distinctionibus premissis, Philosophus respondet ad primam que-

stionem per quatuor conclusiones, quarum prima est hec: aliqua est forma
cuius materia est pars diffinitiva et aliqua non. Secunda conclusio: ali-
275va Pv qua pars est de ratione sui totius | et aliqua non, ibi: Est totius quidem
h1035a6ssi. Tertia conclusio: partes formales ingrediuntur diffinitionem 5
totius et non partes materiales, ibi: Quapropter circuli h1035a9ssi. Quarta
conclusio: partes formales sunt principia speciei et non partes materiales,
ibi: Horum vero non h1035a23ssi.
Prima conclusio patet, quoniam caro est materia in qua tam concavi-
tatis quam simitatis, quia in diffinitione concavitatis non ponitur nasus 10
neque aliqua alia caro, in diffinitione autem simitatis ponitur nasus: dici-
tur enim simitas concavitas nasi; concavitas vero est curvitas superficiei
depresse. Et licet caro sit materia in qua simitatis et concavitatis, tamen
est materia ex qua simi et concavi, et est pars realis et integralis utriusque,
non tamen est pars diffinitiva concavi, sed simi, quia in diffinitione simi 15
ponitur nasus, qui est caro, non autem in diffinitione concavi, ut liquet.
Lege litteram: Est quidem ut materia est pars alicuius forme diffini-
tiva, est autem ut non, sed solum illa accipiuntur ex quibus species ratio est,
idest forme pretermittendo materiam. Ut concavitas non est pars caro, sci-
licet diffinitiva (hec namque materia in qua fit concavitas), simitatis vero 20
pars aliqua est diffinitiva ipsa caro.a
43va M Notandum, | secundum Commentatorem, commento tricesimo
quarto, quod nasus est pars substantie eius quod significat hoc
nomen simitas, quod est congregatio nasi et simitatis, et non est
pars diffinitionis concavitatis, sed est subiectum ei.b 25
Intendit Commentator quod simitas et concavitas conveniunt et differunt
per comparationem ad nasum. Conveniunt quidem, quia tam concavitas
quam simitas est subiective in naso. Sed differunt dupliciter: primo, quia
nasus est pars diffinitionis simitatis et non est pars diffinitionis concavita-
tis; secundo, quia nasus est pars aggregati significati per simitatem, non 30
autem est pars aggregati significati per concavitatem. Unde concavitas
significat compositum ex curvitate et superficie depressa, simitas vero
significat compositum ex concavitate et naso; constat autem nasum esse
partem substantialem huius compositi, non autem aggregati ex superficie
est1 M Moerb.] et Pv alicuius] dicitur add. Moerb. concavitas] -tatis Moerb.

(-tas Aj1 Ne1 Zz 1) simitatisdiffinitionis mg. Pv
VII, t.c. 34, fol. 184E.
et concavitate. Ex quibus sequitur quod non quelibet pars alicuius est

aliquid existens in illo, quia nasus est pars simitatis, non tamen nasus est
in simitate, sed econtra simitas est in naso. Similiter, corpus organicum
est pars anime, scilicet diffinitivam, cum dicitur, secundo De anima,a
quod anima est actus primus corporis phisici organici potentia vitam 5
habentis; nec tamen corpus organicum est in anima, sed econtra anima
est subiective in corpore organico. Omnis ergo pars realis vel integralis
alicuius est in eo, non autem omnis pars rationis vel diffinitiva alicuius
est in eo.
Et totius quidem est h1035a6ssi. 10
Secunda conclusio: aliqua pars est de ratione sui totius et aliqua non.
Patet, quoniam pars secundum formam est de ratione sui totius, non
autem pars secundum materiam. Nasus enim est pars simi et pars con-
cavi, non autem est de ratione concavi, sicut nec est de ratione concavi-
tatis, sed est de ratione simi, quia est de ratione simitatis. Similiter, es est 15
pars statue et pars statue eree, non tamen est de ratione statue, sicut nec
est de ratione figure que est species et forma statue, sed est de ratione
statue eree, quia non contingit concipere statuam eream sine conceptu
eris. Dicitur autem nasus pars simi secundum formam et concavi secun-
dum materiam, es vero est pars statue secundum materiam et statue eree 20
secundum formam. Unde pars secundum formam est illa que compe-
tit alicui [non] secundum quod huiusmodi; et quia nasus competit simo
secundum quod huiusmodi, quia non potest concipi simus sine naso, nec
statua erea sine ere, ideo nasus est pars simi secundum formam, et es est
pars statue eree secundum formam. Et generaliter tales partes dicuntur 25
partes speciei seu ad speciem pertinentes. Pars autem secundum mate-
riam est illa que competit alicui non secundum quod huiusmodi; et quia
nasus competit concavo non secundum quod huiusmodi, et es compe-
275vb Pv tit sta-|-tue non secundum quod huiusmodi, ideo nasus est pars concavi
secundum materiam, et es est etiam pars statue secundum materiam. Et 30
universaliter tales partes dicuntur partes individui seu ad individuum per-
tinentes.
Lege litteram: Et totius quidem statue pars est es secundum materiam,
eius autem quod ut species dicitur statue non est pars secundum formam.
Dicendum enim speciem, idest partem secundum formam, et in quantum 35
concipere] concipi Pv non secl.
a Aristotle, De an., II, 1, 412a2728.

326 pauli veneti
speciem habet unumquodque, sed materiale numquam secundum se est

dicendum.a
Notandum, secundum Commentatorem, commento tricesimo
quarto, quod differentia inter formam et materiam est quoniam
forma predicatur per se de habente formam secundum quid, et 5
declarat quiditatem eius substantialem; materia vero non predica-
tur de habente formam vera predicatione, nedum ut predicetur per
se: ydolum enim non dicitur esse cuprum nec homo caro nec simus
nasus.b
In hoc differt forma a materia, quia forma predicatur de composito ex 10
materia et forma per se et in quid, materia vero non predicatur de tali
composito neque per se neque vere: Sortes enim per se est homo et hoc
artificiatum est per se ydolum, demonstrando Mercurium cupreum. Et
si queritur quid est Sortes, respondetur homo, et quid hoc artificiatum
43vb M respondetur ydolum. | Constat autem quod homo est forma Sortis et 15
ydolum est forma huius artificiati, sicut generaliter quodlibet superius
est forma sui inferioris, ut habetur quinto huius et secundo Phisicorum.c
Materia autem Sortis non vere predicatur de homine, nec materia ydoli
de ydolo, quia hec sunt false homo est caro, ydolum est cuprum.
Ex isto commento patet differentia inter formam totius et formam 20
partis, quia forma totius vere predicatur de composito ex materia et
forma, non autem forma partis: sicut enim homo non est caro sua, ita
nec est anima sua. Quidam tamen dicunt quod non differunt secundum
rem forma totius et forma partis, sed tantum secundum rationem. Dicitur
autem forma partis in quantum perficit materiam et facit eam in actu; sed 25
dicitur forma totius in quantum dat composito nomen et diffinitionem, et
ipsum collocat in determinata specie.d Dicunt ergo quod idem est anima
et humanitas secundum rem, et quod non differunt nisi penes actuare et
denominare. Sed istud non est verum, quia materia non est pars forme
partis, sed est pars forme totius, ita quod corpus organizatum non est 30
pars anime, sed est pars humanitatis, ex quo materia sensibilis pertinet
ad essentiam rei, ut videbitur.e Et non accipitur pars in hac conclusione
secundum quid et] secundum quod Iunt. huius om. M hec] iste propositiones
Pv caro] et add. Pv
t.c. 34, fol. 184DG. c Aristotle, Met., V, 2, 1013a2629; Phys., II, 3, 194b2629. d lin. 2027,
Cf. Aquinas, Exp. Metaph., VII, lect. 9, n. 1467. e Cf. infra, pp. 353, 13357, 32.
ut in alia, quia in illa conclusionea accipitur pars pro parte diffinitiva et

rationis, in hac autem secunda accipitur pars pro parte reali et integrali,
ex qua cum alia parte fit unum totum.
Dubitatur circa illam propositionem Commentatoris, simus non est
nasus,b quia quelibet pars diffinitionis vere predicatur de suo diffinito; sed 5
simus diffinitur per nasum cavum; ergo simus est nasus. Si enim nasus
est simus, oportet per conversionem simplicem quod simus sit nasus et
cetera.
Respondetur quod subiectum illius propositionis simus est nasus,
potest accipi in suppositione personali vel simplici. Si primo modo, sic illa 10
propositio est vera; si autem in suppositione simplici, sic illa propositio
est falsa, quia significat quod compositum ex simitate et naso est nasus
quod est impossibile, quia nullum totum quantitativum est aliqua suarum
partium. Et ita intendit Commentator.
Quapropter circuli h1035a9ssi. 15
Tertia conclusio: partes formales ingrediuntur diffinitionem totius et
non partes materiales.
Probatur. Partes que sunt de ratione totius ingrediuntur diffinitionem
totius, et que non sunt de ratione totius non ingrediuntur diffinitionem
totius; sed partes formales sunt de ratione totius et partes materiales non 20
sunt de ratione totius, ut ostensum est,c quia partes formales sunt partes
secundum speciem et secundum formam, partes vero materiales sunt
partes secundum materiam et secundum quantitatem; ergo intentum.
Ex ista conclusione habetur solutio prime questionis, propter quid par-
tes circuli non ingrediuntur diffinitionem circuli et partes sillabe ingre- 25
276ra Pv diuntur diffinitionem | sillabe, quia pars circuli sunt partes materiales,
pars autem sillabe sunt partes formales. Incisiones enim et portiones cir-
culi, seu medietates circuli aut tertia aut quarta pars, non sunt partes for-
males circuli, sed partes secundum materiam, quia circulus, sicut et que-
libet alia figura, cum in indivisibili consistat, ex quo ad illam non est per 30
se motus, ut probatur septimo Phisicorum,d non habet huiusmodi partes
secundum quod huiusmodi, sed secundum quod est subiective in linea,
cui per se competit, ut habet rationem continui, divisibilitas in infinitum,
vel] et Pv totius1] illius Pv etdiffinitionem mg. Pv ettotius mg. Pv

totius] sed partes formales sunt de ratione totius add .et del. M aut1] et Pv
a Cf. supra, p. 324, 23. b Averroes, In Met., VII, t.c. 34, fol. 184G. c Cf. supra, p. 325, 1132.
d In truth, Aristotle, Phys., VI, 10, 240b89.
328 pauli veneti
iuxta doctrinam Aristotelis, sexto Phisicorum.a Partes autem sillabe sunt

partes formales, quia competunt ei secundum quod huiusmodi, cum non
sit possibile intelligere sillabam non intellectis litteris, quarum sonans
continue se habet ut forma et consonans ut materia. Sicut ergo materia et
forma sunt de ratione compositi et ingrediuntur diffinitionem illius, ita lit- 5
tera sonans et consonans sunt de ratione sillabe et ingrediuntur diffinitio-
44ra M nem sillabe; pars autem circuli non habent | hanc differentiam, sic quod
una se habeat ut materia et alia ut forma, sicut nec pars linee, quoniam
omnes partes linee sunt eiusdem rationis, nec aliqua illarum se habet ut
forma aut ut materia respectu eiusdem. 10
Lege Litteram: Quapropter circuli ratio non habet eam que est incisio-
num, idest divisionum et portionum, sed que sillabe est ratio habet eam
que elementorum, idest litterarum. Nam elementa, idest littere, rationis
partes sunt speciei et non materia, idest sunt partes formales et non mate-
riales.b 15
Contra dicta in hac conclusione possunt fieri aliqua motiva, quorum
quodlibet Aristoteles solvit. Primo quidem arguitur quod incisiones sunt
partes formales circuli, quia, si essent partes materiales, sequitur quod
posset esse circulus absque incisionibus. Consequens est impossibile,
quia, sicut non potest esse linea sine suis partibus, ita nec circulus. Et 20
probatur illud sequi. Nam incisiones sunt partes materiales circuli, sicut
es in quo est circulus; sed potest esse circulus sine ere, sicut et statua,
ut dictum est; ergo, per idem, potest esse circulus sine incisionibus, idest
absque partitionibus et aliis partibus.
Secundo arguitur quod littere non sunt partes formales sillabe, quia, 25
si sic, cum non sit maior ratio de una sonante et alia consonante quam
de qualibuscumque consimilibus, ergo omnes due littere, quarum una est
sonans et alia consonans, sunt partes formales sillabequod est falsum,
quia littere lapidee aut terree, quarum una est consonans et alia sonans,
non sunt partes formales sillabe, ex quo potest esse sillaba absque talibus 30
litteris.
Tertio arguitur quod universaliter partes quantitative sunt partes for-
males, quia illud est pars formalis alicuius in quo totum corrumpitur; sed
quocumque toto quantitativo signato, illud corrumpitur in suas partes
doctrinam] demonstrationem Pv sillabam] litteram M que] est add. Moerb.

nam Pv Moerb.] non M
a Aristotle, Phys., VI, 12 passim. b Aristotle, Met., VII, 10, 1035a911 (AL XXV 3.2, p. 149,
lin. 485488).
quantitativas; ergo et cetera. Tenet consequentia cum maiori. Et minor

ostenditur inductive, quoniam linea corrumpitur in suas medietates, facta
divisione, et homo corrumpitur in carnem et ossa et nervos; constat autem
quod medietates linee sunt partes quantitative linee, et caro, ossa et
nervos sunt partes quantitative hominis. 5
Quarto arguitur quod partes materiales sunt de ratione totius, quoniam
sicut partes formales dicunt respectum ad totum, ita partes materiales
referuntur ad totum; sed partes formales sunt de ratione totius, ut con-
cessum est; ergo, per idem, et partes materiales sunt de ratione totius.
Ad primum respondet Philosophus quod illud non sequitur, et negatur 10
quod incisiones sint ita partes circuli sicut es, quoniam es est pars mate-
rialis remota, et incisio, scilicet medietas aut portio maior vel minor, est
pars materialis propinqua. Ideo potest esse circulus sine ere, non autem
potest esse sine incisionibus, sicut non potest esse sine linea, ratione cuius
competit ei incisio. Sicut enim esse album et esse coloratum accidit ani- 15
mali, et tamen esse album accidit ei contingenter et esse coloratum accidit
276rb Pv ei de necessitate, | ita incisio et es accidit circulo, sed non eodem modo,
quia es accidit ei contingenter et incisio accidit ei necessario. Et sicut spe-
ciei genus et differentia sunt partes formales, tamen differentia est magis
formalis quam genus, ita eiusdem speciei alique sunt partes materiales, 20
quarum una est magis materialis quam reliqua. Circulus ergo potest esse
sine ere, licet non possit esse sine incisionibus, sicut non potest esse abs-
que linea et sine circulo signato.
Lege Litteram: Incisiones vero huius, scilicet circuli, sic partes sunt ut
materia in quibus fiunt circuli. Propinquius tamen speciei quam es, quando 25
in ere fit rotunditas.a
Ad secundum respondet Philosophus, dicens quod, licet littere sint
partes formales sillabe, non tamen quelibet littera est pars formalis sillabe,
et licet vocalis et consonans sint de ratione sillabe, non tamen quelibet
44rb M vocalis nec consonans est de ratione sillabe, quia non | vocalis neque con- 30
sonans terrea vel aerea, quia tales littere sunt partes materiales sillabe
et sicut materia sensibilis non pertinens ad speciem. Sicut ergo corpus
organizatum et anima intellectiva sunt partes formales hominis, nullum
tamen corpus organizatum neque aliqua anima intellectiva est pars for-
malis hominis, ita vocalis et consonans sunt partes formales sillabe, nulla 35
ei Pv, M s.l.] esse add. et del. M ei] illi Pv ei] eidem Pv sine2] absque Pv
330 pauli veneti
tamen vocalis neque aliqua consonans est pars formalis sillabe. Neque
contradicunt tales propositiones, sicut nec iste animal est genus, nullum
animal est genus, homo diffinitur et nullus homo diffinitur, et hoc prop-
ter variationem suppositionis, cum in affirmativa sit continue suppositio
simplex et in negativa sit suppositio personalis. 5
Lege litteram: Est autem ut neque elementa omnia sillabe in ratione
insunt, ut hec terrea aut que sunt in aere; iam enim et hec pars sillabe quasi
materia sensibilis.a
Ad tertium respondet Philosophus, negans omnem illam esse partem
formalem in qua aliquid corrumpitur, quoniam generatio et corruptio 10
est ratione individui et non ratione speciei. Et quia individuum habet
rationem materie et species forme, secundum illud, primo Celi:b Qui
dicit celum dicit formam et qui dicit hoc celum dicit materiam, ideo,
si dividitur linea in duas medietates, aut si corrumpitur homo in ossa et
carnem et sanguinem, non propter hoc oportet quod medietates linee, 15
in quas dividitur linea, sint partes formales linee, sed potius sunt partes
materiales, quia sunt partes individuales et signate; et propter eandem
rationem caro, sanguis et os, in que corrumpitur homo, non sunt partes
formales hominis, sed materiales. Non enim per se dividitur linea neque
per se corrumpitur homo, sed hec linea per se dividitur et hic homo per se 20
corrumpitur; constat autem quod hec linea et hic homo dicunt materiam
signatam et non pertinent ad speciem.
Lege litteram: Etenim linea non ut si divisa in dimidia corrumpitur, aut
homo in ossa et nervos et carnes, non propter hoc et si sunt ex hiis sic ut
entibus substantie partibus, idest formalibus, sed ut ex materia, idest sed 25
magis sunt ex partibus materialibus.c
Ad quartum respondet Philosophus, dicens quod partes materiales
sunt de ratione individui et non de ratione speciei. Sicut ergo duplices
sunt partes, videlicet formales et materiales, ita duplex est totum, scilicet
formale et materiale: totum formale est species, totum autem materiale 30
est individuum. Ideo, partes formales sunt de ratione speciei, et in eius
diffinitione ponuntur; partes autem materiales non sunt de ratione spe-
ciei, neque in eius diffinitione ponuntur, sed sunt de ratione individui et
sillabe in Pv Moerb.] inv. M terrea] cerea Moerb. (terrea P1ab NdTo) species]
habet rationem add. Pv non Pv s.l., om. M ut om. Moerb. divisa] individua
add.et del. Pv in ex correct. Pv, Moerb.] om. M non om. Moerb.
a Aristotle, Met., VII, 10, 1035a1417 (AL XXV 3.2, p. 149, lin. 490492). b Aristotle, De coel.,
I, 9, 278a1215. c Aristotle, Met., VII, 10, 1035a1720 (AL XXV 3.2, p. 149, lin. 492495).
diffinitionem individui ingrederentur, si individuum diffiniretur. Es ergo,

licet non sit de ratione statue, tamen est de ratione huius statue, demon-
276va Pv strando statuam eream; et in-|-cisio licet non sit de ratione circuli, tamen
est de ratione huius circuli signati; similiter, littera vocalis aut consonans
terrea licet non sit de ratione sillabe, tamen est de ratione huius sillabe 5
facte ex tali vocali et ex tali consonante. Et ita non inconvenit quod aliqua
sit pars formalis et materialis respectu diversorum: es quidem est pars for-
malis statue eree et est pars materialis statue, et generaliter pars formalis
respectu individui est materialis respectu speciei.
Lege litteram: Et huius quidem quod simul totum est, scilicet indivi- 10
duum compositum, pars es, scilicet formalis, speciei vero, cuius ratio est
secundum formam, non adhuc. Quapropter nec in rationibus. Horum qui-
dem ergo inerit talium partium ratio.a
quarto, quod partes materiales rerum, in quarum diffinitione inve- 15
nitur materia, sunt quodammodo partes substantie et quodammodo
non sunt partes substantie. In respectu enim congregati ex forma
et materia sunt partes substantie, in respectu vero eius quod habet
veram diffinitionem, scilicet forme, non sunt partes substantie.b
44va M Ita, partes materiales importate | per materiam signatam sunt aliquo 20
modo partes essentiales et aliquo modo partes accidentales: sunt quidem
essentiales respectu individui compositi ex materia et forma, sunt autem
accidentales respectu speciei habentis veram diffinitionem.
Sed dubitatur, quia omnis diffinitio data per materiam datur per par-
tem materialem; constat autem quod multe diffinitiones dantur per mate- 25
riam; ergo dantur per partem materialem, et per consequens pars materia-
lis est pars essentialis speciei seu diffinitionis eius. Minor est evidens, quia
ira diffinitur per ebulitionem sanguinis in corde, ut asserit Commentator
in prologo De anima,c et domus per lapides et ligna, ut ponit Philoso-
phus, ibidem,d anima vero diffinitur per corpus organicum; constat autem 30
quod sanguis et cor, lapides et ligna, et etiam corpus organicum important
materiam.
ingrederentur] ingrediuntur M etformalis1 mg. Pv pars] partes Moerb.

cuius] et cuius Moerb. (et om. P1b) ergo] igitur Moerb. enim om. Iunt.
forma et materia] materia et forma Iunt.
Met., VII, t.c. 34, fol. 184M185A. c Averroes, In De an., I, t.c. 16, p. 23, 2829. d Aristotle,
De an., I, 1, 403b56.
332 pauli veneti
Respondetur negando quod omnis diffinitio data per materiam detur

per partem materialem, quia hic per partem materialem aut per partem
secundum materiam intendit Aristoteles, una cum Commentatore, par-
tem accidentalem competentem alicui non secundum quod huiusmodi;
modo materia communiter sumpta competit alicui secundum quod huiu- 5
smodi; ideo materia communis est pars formalis atque essentialis sue
speciei aut sue diffinitionis. Materia autem signata, que est materia par-
ticulariter sumpta, est pars materialis atque accidentalis speciei, licet sit
formalis et essentialis respectu individui.
Horum vero non h1035a23ssi. 10
Quarta conclusio: partes formales sunt principia speciei et non partes
materiales.
Prima pars patet, quia illa sunt principia speciei in que resolvitur spe-
cies; sed in partes formales resolvitur species; ergo et cetera. Tenet conse-
quentia cum maiori, ex eo quia omnis effectus resolvitur in causas suas. 15
Et minor liquet inductive. Nam materia et forma sunt principia compo-
siti naturalis, quia compositum naturale resolvitur in illa; etiam animal et
rationale sunt principia hominis, quia homo resolvitur in illa, et corpus
animatum, quia resolvitur in animam et corpus organizatum; ideo talia
sunt principia eius. 20
Secunda pars sequitur ex priori, quoniam nulla species resolvitur in
partes materiales, ex quo illi non competunt secundum quod huiusmodi;
sed ipsum simul totum, quod est individuum, resolvitur et corrumpitur in
partes materiales; ergo non sunt principia speciei, sed individui.
Lege litteram: Horum vero non oportet inesse partes materiales tam- 25
quam si non fuerint simul sumpti, idest individui compositi. Nam propter
hoc quedam quidem ex hiis ut principiis sunt in que corrumpuntur, ut indi-
vidua, quedam vero non, ut species.a
Ex predictis Philosophus infert duo correlaria. Quorum primum est:
quecumque composita ex materia et forma corrumpuntur per se in mate- 30
riam et formam; quecumque autem concipiuntur sine materia aut nullo
modo corrumpuntur, aut corrumpuntur solum per accidens. Patet, quo-
276vb Pv niam simus per se corrumpitur in concavitatem et nasum, | et ereus cir-
culus in es et figuram, quoniam simus est quoddam simul sumptum et
quedam scr. ex Moerb.] quidam MPv que scr. ex Moerb.] quo M Pv non] sunt
add. Moerb.
compositum ex concavitate et naso; ereus vero circulus componitur ex

ere et figura circulari, sic quod cuiuslibet talis tam forma quam materia
est pars. Simul sumptum ergo, sive accipiatur pro composito ex mate-
ria et forma, ut statua vel es figuratum, sive pro composito ex specie et
ratione individuali, ut iste homo aut ille equus, ipsum per se corrumpitur 5
in materiam et formam, quia tam forma quam materia est pars consti-
tuens ipsum. Concavitas autem, circulus et figura, quia ista concipiuntur
sine materia, non per se corrumpuntur, sed per accidens, quia, licet non
concernant materiam, tamen sunt necessario in materia; ideo per acci-
dens corrumpuntur ad corruptionem compositi aut materie. Intelligen- 10
tie vero separate, quia abstrahunt a materia tam secundum intellectum
quam secundum rem, ideo non per se nec per accidens corrumpuntur,
sicut nec per se nec per accidens moventur, ut probatur octavo Phisico-
rum.a
Lege litteram: Quecumque quidem ergo simul sumpta, idest compo- 15
44vb M sita, species et materia sunt, ut simum aut ereus circulus, | hec quidem
corrumpuntur in hec et pars ipsorum materia; quecumque vero non conci-
piuntur cum materia sed sine materia, ut rationes speciei, scilicet forme,
solum, hec non corrumpuntur, aut omnino aut taliter non corrumpuntur
qualiter composita, sed per accidens.b 20
Secundum correlarium: partes materiales sunt partes et principia com-
positi et eorum que concipiuntur cum materia; forme autem et speciei
non concepte cum materia non sunt partes neque principia, ut es est pars
et principium statue eree, sed non pars neque principium figure. Simili-
ter, caro et os sunt partes et principia Sortis, non autem sunt partes neque 25
principia anime vel humanitatis eius. Et ista est causa propter quam sta-
tua lutea corrumpitur in luteum, et spera erea corrumpitur in es, et Callias
in carnem et ossa. Similiter, circulus resolvitur et corrumpitur in incisio-
nes, quoniam unumquodque resolvitur et corrumpitur in partes et prin-
cipia sua. Constat autem quod lutum est pars et principium statue lutee, 30
et es est pars et principium spere eree, et etiam carnes et ossa sunt par-
tes et principia Callie; ipse vero incisiones sunt partes et principia circuli
materialis et individuati.
sunt necessario inv. Pv ergo] igitur Moerb. ereus M] eneus Pv Moerb.

cumcorrumpuntur2 mg. Pv taliter non M] inv. Pv Moerb. carnem]
carnes Pv
a Aristotle, Phys., VIII, 5, 257a33258b9; 6, 258b10259b32. b Aristotle, Met., VII, 10,

1035a2530 (AL XXV 3.2, p. 150, lin. 500505).
334 pauli veneti
Lege litteram: Quare illarum quidem principia et partes que sunt sub
ipsis, idest ab illis dependent, speciei vero nec partes nec principia sunt hec.
Et ideo corrumpitur lutea statua in lutum et spera in es et Callias in carnem
et ossa. Amplius autem circulus incisionis.a
Et si contra hoc ultimum aliquis instaret, dicens quod repugnat dictis 5
in tertia conclusione,b in qua ostensum est quod incisiones non sunt de
ratione circuli, ideo non resolvitur circulus in incisiones.
Respondet Philosophus, dicens quod circulus dupliciter sumitur, scili-
cet formaliter et materialiter. Circulus formaliter sumptus est forma spe-
cifica non concepta cum materia, et sic non resolvitur in incisiones, sed in 10
genus et differentiam, que sunt principia et partes speciei: si enim diffini-
tur circulus per hoc quod est figura plana una linea contenta, resolvitur
in figuram planam tamquam in genus et in unitatem linee tamquam in
differentiam; si autem diffinitur per hoc quod est figura a cuius centro ad
circumferentiam omnes linee ducte sunt equales, resolvitur in figuram 15
tamquam in genus et in linearum equalitatem a centro ad circumferen-
tiam tamquam in differentiam. Circulus autem materialiter sumptus est
forma individualis concepta cum materia aut cum quantitate, sicut est
circulus ante tabernam aut descriptus in superficie, et hic resolvitur in
incisiones. 20
Loquitur ergo Philosophus de circulo secundum formam in tertia con-
clusione, hic autem de circulo secundum materiam. Nec est contradictio,
quia circulus equivoce dicitur de circulo secundum materiam et de circulo
secundum formam. Dicitur enim circulus de circulo secundum formam
277ra Pv per se tamquam proprium nomen eius, | eo quod circulus secundum for- 25
mam est simpliciter circulus et per se, non ratione alicuius alterius. Dicitur
autem de circulo secundum materiam per accidens, eo quod circulus non
est nomen proprium circulorum individualium, nec dicitur aliquis illo-
rum circulus nisi ratione circuli universalis, sicut nullus dicitur homo nisi
ratione hominis universalis, cui proprie competit quod sit homo. 30
Lege litteram: Etenim aliquis est circulus qui concipitur cum mate-
ria. Equivoce namque dicitur circulus qui simpliciter dicitur et singuli
idest] que add. Pv incisionis] in incisiones Moerb. (in om. Da Sj1) est] una linea
add. et del. M secundum1formam2] secundum formam et materiam Pv etenim]
est enim Moerb.
a Aristotle, Met., VII, 10, 1035a3034 (AL XXV 3.2, p. 150, lin. 505509). b Cf. supra, p. 324,
56.
particulares, quia non est proprium nomen singulorum circulorum sicut

circuli simpliciter.a
quarto quod partes eius, scilicet circuli, sunt quasi materia, licet
sit materia non sensibilis sed intelligibilis Circulus enim materia- 5
lis in respectu partium assimilatur entibus que sunt in aliis , et cum
ita sit, hoc nomen circulus, quando dicitur de circulo simpliciter et
quando dicitur de circulo qui est magis proprius et quasi particularis
in respectu ipsius, quia est ex cupro aut ex terra, hoc nomen cir-
culus equivoce dicitur. Plura enim que sunt huiusmodi non habent 10
proprium nomen, scilicet quoniam non est proprium nomen quod
significet circulum cupreum vel lapideum.b
45ra M Prima distinctio quam intendit Commentator est hec: quod duplex est
materia, scilicet sensibilis et intelligibilis. Materia sensibilis est illa que
concernit qualitates primas, ut caro, lapis et huiusmodi, materia intelli- 15
gibilis est illa que abstrahit ab omni qualitate, ut quantitas continua vel
discreta.
Secunda distinctio: quod duplex est circulus, videlicet universalis et
particularis. Circulus universalis est ille qui nullam materiam concernit,
sensibilem vel intelligibilem, tamquam partem eius. Et talis circulus est 20
natura communis predicabilis in quid de pluribus, et pertinet ad conside-
rationem metaphisicam, in quantum est unum in multis; in quantum vero
est unum predicabile de multis, pertinet ad considerationem logicam.
Circulus particularis est ille qui aliquam materiam concernit tamquam
partem eius, scilicet sensibilem vel intelligibilem: si concernit materiam 25
sensibilem dicitur circulus naturalis, ut circulus cupreus aut lapideus, et
pertinet ad considerationem phisicam; si autem includit materiam intel-
ligibilem, dicitur circulus mathematicus, ut circulus linealis aut superfi-
cialis, et est considerationis mathematice.
Neque aliquis istorum particularium circulorum habet nomen pro- 30
prium, quia nullus eorum datur intelligi per nomen simplex, sed composi-
tum. Speciei autem humane individua habent propria nomina, quoniam
non sensibilis scr. ex Iunt.] insensibilis MPv est magis inv. Iunt. proprius] illo
add. Iunt. equivoce dicitur inv. Iunt. proprium nomen1 inv. Iunt. caro] os
nervus add. Pv lapis] terra add. Pv concernit sensibilem inv. M
VII, t.c. 34, fol. 185CD.
336 pauli veneti
aliquis homo dicitur Sortes et aliquis Plato. Solus autem circulus univer-
salis habet nomen proprium.
Contra predicta arguitur. Et primo quod circulus secundum quod huiu-
smodi habet partes quantitativas. Nam, sicut se habent isti semicirculi
ad hunc circulum, ita semicirculi in communi ad [hunc] circulum in 5
communi; sed isti semicirculi sunt partes huius circuli secundum quod
huiusmodi; ergo semicirculi in communi sunt partes circuli in communi
secundum quod huiusmodi. Unde arguitur sic: semicirculi sunt partes
circuli; aut ergo per se aut per accidens. Si per se, habetur intentum. Si
per accidens, et omne per accidens reducitur ad per se per Aristotelem, 10
secundo Phisicorum,a ergo alicuius circuli sunt partes per se et non nisi
circuli; ergo semicirculi sunt per se partes circuli.
Secundo arguitur quod circulus non dicitur equivoce de circulo uni-
versali et circulo particulari, quia homo non dicitur equivoce de homine
universali et de homine particulari, cum dicatur de illis secundum ean- 15
dem rationem: ideo enim tam homo universalis quam homo particularis
est homo, quia est animal rationale. Constat autem quod etiam circulus
secundum eandem rationem dicitur de circulo universali et de circulo
particulari, quia, si queritur propter quid circulus universalis vel parti-
cularis est circulus, continue respondetur per eandem rationem et dif- 20
277rb Pv finitionem, dicendo quod est figura plana una li-|-nea contenta. Modo
habetur in Antepredicamentisb quod univocum importat plura secundum
unum nomen et unam rationem, equivocum plura importat uno nomine
et diversis rationibus.
Ad primum negatur maior, quod ita se habent semicirculi in com- 25
muni ad circulum in communi sicut isti semicirculi ad istum circulum,
quia semicirculi in communi dicunt materiam particularem, licet inde-
terminatam, sicut aliquis homo et aliquis equus sunt particularia inde-
terminata. Sed conceditur quod, sicut se habent isti semicirculi ad istum
semicirculum, ita semicirculi in communi ad aliquem semicirculum in 30
communi; constat autem quod aliquis semicirculus dicit materiam indivi-
dualem indeterminatam. Sicut ergo homo est species, non autem aliquis
homo est species nec iste homo, et ea que sunt per se partes et princi-
pia istius hominis aut alicuius hominis non sunt per se partes et principia
Plato] et aliquis Callias add. Pv hunc secl. ( s.l. post circulum M) vel] aut Pv
et om. M
a Aristotle, Phys., II, 6, 198a513. b Aristotle, Cat., 1, 1a112.

hominis in communi, ita circulus est species diffinibilis, non autem hic
circulus nec aliquis circulus, et per consequens ea que sunt per se partes
et principia huius circuli aut alicuius circuli non sunt per se partes et
principia circuli in communi.
Et cum arguitur: semicirculi sunt partes, aut ergo per se aut per acci- 5
dens, dicitur quod per accidens, videlicet ratione alicuius circuli. Isti ergo
semicirculi sunt partes circuli per accidens ratione istius circuli, et semi-
circuli in communi sunt etiam partes per accidens circuli non ratione
45rb M alicuius | circuli, sed ratione alicuius circuli indeterminati.
Et si arguitur sic: ille sunt partes circuli sucundum quod circulus, que 10
competunt universaliter cuilibet circulo; sed semicirculi competunt uni-
versaliter cuilibet circulo; ergo semicirculi competunt circulo secundum
quod huiusmodi; negatur prima pars antecedentis, quia, si omnis circu-
lus esset cupreus, non propter hoc competeret cupreum circulo secun-
dum quod huiusmodi, et tamen competeret omni circulo. Dictum etiam 15
est supra quod esse coloratum et quantum necessario competunt cuili-
bet animali, non tamen competunt animali secundum quod huiusmodi;
et, secundo Phisicorum, dicit Commentatora quod accidit artifici quod sit
homo vel animal, et tamen impossibile aliquem artificem esse qui non sit
homo vel animal. 20
Ad secundum respondetur quod equivocatio, quantum ad proposi-
tum spectat, dupliciter potest considerari. Uno modo ut dicit diversita-
tem rationis predicantis, et sic non dicitur equivoce hoc nomen circulus
de circulo universali et particulari, ut argumentum probavit. Alio modo
potest considerari ut dicit diversitatem modi predicandi, et sic conceditur 25
quod circulus equivoce dicitur de circulo universali et de circulo par-
ticulari per accidens, sicut etiam hoc nomen homo dicitur de homine
universali per se et de homine particulari per accidens.
Sed contra: sicut animal est totum hominis, ita homo est totum Sortis;
sed homo per se est animal; ergo Sortes per se est homo. Licet enim accidat 30
homini quod sit Sortes, non tamen accidit Sorti quod sit homo.
Respondetur quod accipitur ly accidens large, pro omni illo quod com-
petit per aliud re vel ratione, et ly per se accipitur stricte, pro omni illo
quod competit alicui non per aliud re vel ratione. Et sic conceditur quod
hominis mg. Pv semicirculi competunt] semicirculus competit M vel] et Pv

animal] et cetera add. Pv equivoce post circulus Pv dicit] dicat Pv
a Averroes, In Phys., II, t.c. 33, fol. 62CD (cf. Aristotle, Phys., II, 3, 195a3335).
338 pauli veneti
homo per accidens est animal, sicut Sortes per accidens est homo. Proprie
autem accipiendo per se, pro eo quod competit alicui non per naturam
alienam, et per accidens pro eo quod competit alicui per naturam alie-
nam, debet concedi quod homo per se est animal et Sortes per se est
homo. Ideo melius accipitur diversitas in modo predicandi penes per se 5
primo et non per se primo quam penes per se et per accidens, dicendo
quod homo universalis est homo et circulus universalis est circulus per
se primo; homo autem particularis est homo et circulus particularis est
circulus per se non primo. Ideo diversis modis predicantur homo et cir-
culus de universali et particulari. 10
Dictum est quidem h1035b3ssi.
Soluta prima questione, Aristoteles solvit secundam et facit duo, quo-
niam primo continuat se ad dicenda cum duabus suppositionibus; se-
cundo vero exequitur de intento, ibi: Quare quecumque h1035b11ssi, ita
quod ex dictis et dicendis manifestabitur solutio secunde questionis. 15
277va Pv Quantum ergo ad primum inquit Philosophus quod, licet dictum pro
solutione prime questionis verum sit in se, tamen iterum repetendum est
quo ad distinctionem datam de partibus secundum materiam et secun-
dum formam, ut illud manifestius fiat et ex illo solutio habeatur secunde
questionis. 20
Sit ergo hec prima suppositio: quod partes formales sunt ille ex quibus
resultat et in quas dividitur ratio alicuius. Qua suppositione admissa et
concessa, habetur solutio secunde questionis, videlicet quod partes for-
males sunt priores aut omnes aut quedam. Et notanter dicit Philosophus
quedam, ut exponit beatus Thomas,a quia forme partes quandoque non 25
sunt de necessitate speciei, sed de perfectione, ut visus et auditus, que
sunt partes anime sensitive non inexistentes cuilibet animali de neces-
sitate, sed tantum inveniuntur in animalibus perfectis. Tactus autem et
gustus imperfectus sunt etiam partes anime sensitive, et insunt cuilibet
animali de necessitate, ut habetur secundo et tertio De anima.b Quia ergo 30
multa animalia sunt sine visu et auditu, nullum autem est sine tactu et
gustu, ideo partes forme sunt priores toto, aut omnes aut quedam.
Alexanderc autem dicit quod genus et differentia sunt partes rationis,
tamen differenter, quia genus dicit rem in potentia, differentia vero dicit
quidem] igitur add. Pv forme partes inv. Pv
a Aquinas, Exp. Metaph., VII, lect. 10, n. 1482. b Aristotle, De an., II, 3, 414b34; III, 1, 424b24;
11, 434a1; 13, 435a1113. c Alexander of Alexandria, Exp. Met., VII, c. 10, q. 7, fol. 221rb.
45va M | eandem rem ut est in actu. Licet ergo videatur alicui quod genus propter
suam potentialitatem non sit prior ipso toto diffinibili, tamen nulli debet
videri quin differentia propter actum quem dicit sit prior. Cum ergo genus
et differentia sint partes formales, secundum hoc potest exponi quod
partes formales sunt priores, aut omnes aut quedam. 5
Sed Albertus,a iuxta expositionem Commentatoris,b dicit quod rerum
quedam sunt sine materia omnino, ut intelligentie separate; et quia hec
non habent nisi partes formales, in eis omnes partes sunt priores toto.
Quedam autem sunt res que sunt concepte cum materia sensibili vel
intelligibili, et huiusmodi habent partes formales et materiales. Et quia 10
partes formales sunt priores et partes materiales posteriores, ideo partes
sunt priores toto, aut omnes aut quedam: primum verificatur in rebus
abstractis a materia omnino; secundum verum locum habet in omnibus
habentibus materiam, sive sit materia sensibilis sive sit intelligibilis.
Iste expositiones sunt dubie. Prima quidem, quia visus et auditus, 15
licet sint de ratione animalis perfecti, non tamen de ratione animalis
simpliciter; ideo non sunt partes formales animalis. Philosophus autem
loquitur solum de partibus formalibus, dicens quod partes rationis et in
quas dividitur ratio sunt priores, aut omnes aut quedam.
Secunda expositio nullum verum fundamentum accipit, quia nulli 20
videtur quod genus sit posterius differentia, ymmo quod prius, ex quo
advenit ei. Ideo cuicumque apparet quod differentia est prior diffinito,
eidem etiam apparet quod genus est prius illo. Et si ita appareret, quia
illa apparentia essent falsa, non propter hoc exponitur textus verus, quia
partes formales sunt priores, aut omnes aut quedam. 25
Tertia expositio iterum videtur deficere sicut prima, quia non loquitur
Philosophus de partibus in communi, sed solum de partibus formalibus,
quia partes materiales non dicuntur partes rationis, ex quo ille non con-
stituunt diffinitionem neque diffinitio resolvitur in illas.
Dicendum ergo, iuxta doctrinam Commentatoris, secundo huius,c 30
quod duplex est genus: quoddam est prius suis speciebus et quoddam
non. Verbi gratia, color est prior suis speciebus, quia, quacumque spe-
cie coloris data, stat colorem esse sine illa specie; numerus autem non
est prior suis speciebus, quia, licet sit prior ternario et omni numero
dividitur] dividatur M posterius] posterior Pv
a Albert, In Met., Lib. VII, tr. 3, c. 4, p. 359, 6474. b Averroes, In Met., VII, t.c. 35, fol. 186G.
c In truth., Averroes, In Met., III, t.c. 11, fol. 50G.
340 pauli veneti
sequente, non tamen est prior binario, quia non stat numerum esse sine
binario. Et si genus non est prius sua specie neque etiam differentia;
constat autem quod genus et differentia sunt partes formales, ideo in
aliqualibus non omnes partes formales sunt priores toto, videlicet in
binario et in linea, quia, sicut non stat numerum esse sine binario, ita 5
277vb Pv non stat continuum esse sine linea; in talibus | ergo proximum genus
et ultima differentia, que sunt partes formales, non precedunt totum.
Alie autem partes formales sunt priores, scilicet genus remotum cum
remota differentia, aut transcendentia, que sunt ens et unum: hec enim
ingrediuntur diffinitionem, et si non explicite, tamen implicite. 10
Quando autem genus est prius speciebus, omnes partes formales sunt
priores toto diffinibili, ut inductive liquet, quia omnes tales accipiuntur
ad modum generis vel differentie; constat autem quod, quando genus
est prius specie, etiam differentia adveniens generi est prior illa specie;
cuiuslibet ergo totius diffinibilis partes formales sunt priores, aut omnia 15
aut quedam.
Lege litteram: Dictum est quidem ergo et nunc ipsum verum in solu-
tione prime questionis, et tamen amplius ut fiat manifestius dicemus repe-
tentes diffinitionem datam. Nam quecumque sunt rationis partes et in quas
dividitur ratio, hee sunt priores aut omnes aut quedam.a 20
Secunda suppositio est quod partes materiales non sunt de ratione
totius, sed potius ipsum totum est de ratione partium materialium. Patet,
quia totum non diffinitur per tales partes, sed magis econtra. Quod qui-
45vb M dem | inductive declaratur. Nam angulus acutus est pars materialis anguli
recti eo quod ratio anguli recti non dividitur neque resolvitur in rationem 25
anguli acuti, sed ratio anguli acuti resolvitur in rationem anguli recti: non
enim diffinitur angulus rectus per acutum, sed econtra, dicendo angulus
acutus est ille qui est minor recto, sicut angulus obtusus est ille qui est
maior recto. Angulus autem rectus est ille qui provenit ex contactu linee
recte dyametraliter cadentis super lineam rectam. 30
Consimiliter dicitur de circulo et de semicirculo, quod circulus non dif-
finitur per semicirculum, sed econtra, dicendo semicirculus est medietas
circuli secata dyametro; ideo semicirculus est pars materialis circuli. Sic
etiam est dicendum de digito quod est pars materialis hominis: non enim
ergo] igitur Moerb. dicemus] -amus Moerb. (-emus P) obtusus] vel expansus
add. Pv
diffinitur homo per digitum, sed digitus diffinitur per hominem, dicendo
digitus est talis pars, videlicet contemperata carne et osse, ad opus tactus
subtilem discriminationem. Et idem dicatur de manu et brachio suo
modo: hec quidem non inveniuntur nisi in homine, ideo per hominem
possunt diffiniri; econtra autem non diffinitur homo per aliquam istarum 5
partium, ex quo aliquis est homo qui non habet digitum nec manum nec
brachium.
Lege litteram: Recti vero ratio non dividitur in acuti rationem, sed que
est acuti ratio dividitur in que est recti rationem; utitur enim diffiniens acu-
tum recto: minor enim recto acutus. Similiter autem et circulus et semicircu- 10
lus se habent; semicirculus enim diffinitur circulo et digitus toto: talis enim
hominis pars digitus.a
Notandum primo quod per partes formales aut secundum formam non
intendit Philosophus partes alicuius totius que sunt diversarum rationum,
quoniam tunc digitus, manus et caput ingrederentur diffinitionem homi- 15
nis, cum sint diversarum specierum tam invicem quam a toto. Sed per
partes formales intendit partes, tam qualitativas quam quantitativas, que
sic sunt de ratione alicuius totius quod non contingit illud totum esse rea-
liter nec conceptibiliter sine huiusmodi partibus: partes qualitative sunt
materia et forma, genus et differentia, et generaliter quodlibet superius 20
respectu sui inferioris; partes quantitative sunt ille que componuntur ex
materia et forma, et quarum remotionem sequitur remotio totius, ut caro,
nervi et huiusmodi in homine.
Et quoniam, ut ait Commentator in prologo Phisicorum,b species rerum
naturalium habent duplices partes, videlicet secundum rationem, que 25
sunt genus et differentia, et secundum fidem, que sunt materia et forma,
278ra Pv sicut non recte diffinitur species per genus propinquum et ultimam | dif-
ferentiam, nisi intelligantur in diffinitione eius illa omnia predicata supe-
riora tam generum quam differentiarum, ut docet Aristoteles, secundo
Posteriorum,c alioquin diffinitio illa non esset bene investigata per viam 30
compositionis et divisionis, sed esset dialectica, inutilis et vana, ut habe-
tur in prologo De anima;d ita nec complete diffinitur species per materiam
et formam, nisi intelligantur omnes partes quantitative que includuntur
in essentia talis speciei. Et ideo, diffiniendo hominem per materiam et
caro] ossa add. Pv nervi] cor epar et cerebrum add. Pv huiusmodi] similia
add. Pv
a Aristotle, Met., VII, 10, 1035b610 (AL XXV 3.2, p. 150, lin. 515519). b Averroes, In Phys., I,
t.c. 5, fol. 8DF. c Aristotle, An. Post., II, 13, 97a23b6. d Aristotle, De an., I, 1, 403a29ff.
342 pauli veneti
animam intellectivam, oportet intelligere ad perfectam notitiam hominis

carnem, sanguinem et huiusmodi, sicut non perfecte cognoscitur domus
nisi cognoscantur lapides, ligna, tectum et huiusmodi. Et sicut in diffi-
nitione hominis per partes rationis non oportet explicite ponere omnia
essentialia predicata, sed sufficit explicite ponere proximum genus et ulti- 5
mam differentiam, implicite autem per intellectum omnia alia, ita in dif-
finitione eiusdem data per partes fidei non oportet ponere omnem mate-
riam et omnem formam illius explicite, sed sufficit ponere explicite mate-
riam et formam propinquam, alia vero implicite intelligendo ea, dicendo
homo est compositum ex corpore organizato et anima intellectiva, sicut 10
46ra M dicitur homo est animal rationale. Iste sunt partes formales, de quibus |
loquitur Aristoteles, que ingrediuntur diffinitionem totius et in quas resol-
vitur ratio eiusdem.
Secundo notandum quod per partes materiales aut secundum mate-
riam non intendit Philosophus materiam primam nec secundam, pro- 15
priam vel communem, non materiam propinquam vel remotam, non
materiam naturalium vel artificialium, sed intendit partes subiectivas ac
etiam integrantes, tam eiusdem rationis quam etiam diversarum ratio-
num, non facientes ad essentiam rei. Et iste sunt ille partes que non ingre-
diuntur diffinitionem sui totius: Sortes enim non ingreditur diffinitionem 20
hominis, nec homo animalis, quia Sortes et homo sunt partes materiales
suorum superiorum. Non etiam in diffinitione ignis ponitur aliqua pars
quantitativa ignis, quia, cum ille sint infinite, et diffinitio datur causa inno-
tescendi, oporteret infinita cognoscere. Et ista est causa propter quam in
diffinitione anguli recti non ponitur angulus obtusus neque acutus. Digi- 25
tus etiam et manus, licet ponantur in diffinitione hominis integri, non
tamen in diffinitione hominis, quia, et si non stat hominem integrum esse
sine illis partibus, aliquis tamen est homo qui non habet illas partes.
Sed dubitatur, probando quod partes materiales ingrediuntur diffini-
tionem totius, quia dicit Philosophus, in prologo Phisicorum,a quod totum 30
est notius suis partibus; constat autem quod diffinitio datur causa innote-
scendi: multi enim cognoscunt canem et equum et non cognoscunt mate-
riam et formam illorum.
sanguinem] et ossa cor epar cerebrum add. Pv lapides] et add. Pv et huiusmodi]

paries et fundamentum Pv ac] quam M rationis om. Pv etiam2 om. M
homo1] diffinitionem add. Pv manus] seu nasus et oculus add. Pv
a Aristotle, Phys., I, 1, 184a2425.

Item, arguitur quod partes materiales ingrediuntur diffinitionem

totius, quia diffinitur continuum per partes copulatas ad unum terminum
communem, et numerus per multitudinem ex unitatibus aggregatam, et
angulus obtusus per esse maiorem recto. Constat autem quod pars con-
tinui est pars materialis, cum sit pars quantitativa eiusdem rationis per 5
totum; etiam unitas est pars materialis per eandem rationem, et angulus
rectus est pars materialis anguli obtusi, sicut angulus acutus est pars mate-
rialis anguli recti. Deinde, quia mensura est notior mensurato et quantitas
continua mensuratur per partem suam, ergo diffinitur per partem suam,
que indubie est pars materialis. 10
Ad primum dicitur quod, licet totum sit notius suis partibus cognitione
confusa, tamen partes sunt notiores toto cognitione distincta.
Ad secundum dicitur quod, sicut materia signata est pars materialis et
non ingreditur diffinitionem, ita pars signata quantitatis continue est pars
materialis et non ingreditur diffinitionem; et sicut materia communis est 15
278rb Pv pars formalis et non ingreditur diffinitionem, | ita pars quantitatis conti-
nue universaliter accepta; unitas vero ex quo est principium numeri est
pars formalis. Nec est similitudo de angulo acuto et recto, quia omnes
anguli recti sunt equales, infiniti autem sunt anguli acuti inequales. Et
licet totum cognoscatur per partem materialem quantitative, non tamen 20
quiditative; Aristoteles autem loquitur de cognitione quiditatis et essen-
tie.
Quare quecumque h1035b11ssi.
Istis suppositionibus premissis Philosophus, responsurus ad secundam
questionem et declaraturus ea que dicta sunt pro solutione prime questio- 25
nis, ponit quatuor conclusiones, quarum prima est hec: partes materiales,
quecumque sint ille, posteriores sunt toto, partes autem formales priores
sunt eo, aut omnes aut quedam. Secunda conclusio: partium componen-
tium totum, quedam sunt eo priores et quedam posteriores et quedam
simul cum illo, ibi: Eo quidem igitur h1035b22i. Tertia conclusio: mate- 30
ria et forma sunt partes formales tam speciei quam individui, ibi: Homo
autem et equus h1035b27i. Quarta conclusio: partes formales speciei et
non individui ponende sunt in diffinitione, ibi: Secundum rationem partes
h1035b33i.
Prima conclusio dupliciter probatur, et primo ex suppositionibus, quo- 35
niam prima pars sequitur ex secunda suppositione. Nam angulus acutus
ex om. Pv cum illo om. M igitur M Moerb.] ergo Pv

344 pauli veneti
est pars materialis anguli recti et est illo posterior, quoniam quelibet pars
46rb M diffinitionis est prior diffinito nisi sit simul natura cum eo; | sed angulus
rectus est pars diffinitionis anguli acuti et non est simul natura cum illo;
ergo est illo prior. Similiter, semicirculus est pars materialis circuli et est
posterior eo, quia semicirculus est medietas circuli secata dyametro; con- 5
stat autem quod prius est circulus quam dyameter illius, et consequenter
prius est circulus quam semicirculus. Iterum, digitus est pars materialis
hominis et est posterior illo, quia omne quod potest esse sine alio et non
econtra est prius illo, ut patet quinto huius;a constat autem quod homo
potest esse sine digito et non econtra; ergo homo est prior digito, et conse- 10
quenter digitus est posterior homine. Secunda pars conclusionis sequitur
ex prima suppositione, quia corpus animatum non est prius vegetativo
nec figura rectilinea est prior triangulo; corpus autem et substantia sunt
priora vegetativo, sicut etiam figura et quantitas sunt priora triangulo.
Constat autem quod substantia, corpus et corpus animatum sunt partes 15
formales vegetativi, quemadmodum qualitas, figura et figura rectilinea
sunt partes formales trianguli: omne enim superius est forma sui inferio-
ris, ut habetur secundo Phisicorum et quinto huius.b
Lege litteram: Quare quecumque sunt partes ut materia et in que
dividitur ut in materiam, sunt posteriora; quecumque vero ut rationis et 20
substantie secundum rationem sunt, idest partes formales aut secundum
formam pertinentes ad speciem et ad diffinitionem, illa sunt priora aut
omnia aut quedam.c
Secundo probatur eadem conclusio exemplariter, incipiendo a se-
cunda parte, comparando totum ad alteram partem compositi, que est 25
forma compositionis, postquam in prima ratione comparatur ad suum
genus, quod est forma totius. Nam anima animalium, que est anima sensi-
tiva, est prior animali; sed est pars et pars formalis eius; ergo partes forma-
les animalis sunt priores illo, aut omnes aut quedam. Patet consequentia
cum prima parte antecendentis, eo quod cuiuslibet compositi naturalis 30
tam forma quam materia presunt, ut superius probatum est.d Et secunda
declaratur, ex eo quod anima sensitiva est forma substantialis et quiditas
et species et ratio ipsius animalis. Est enim primo anima sensitiva forma
prius] prior M prior scr.] prius MPv sunt om. Pv sed scr.] quod MPv
quod] quia Pv
a Aristotle,
Met., V, 11, 1019a14. b Aristotle, Met., V, 2, 1013a2629; Phys., II, 3, 194b2629.
c Aristotle,
Met., VII, 10, 1035b1114 (AL XXV 3.2, p. 150, lin. 519522). d Cf. supra, tr. 2, c. 1,
p. 234, 630.
substantialis animalis, in quantum actuat materiam eius et dat sibi esse

substantiale; secundo anima sensitiva est quiditas animalis, in quantum
est pars principalis essentie eius et facit ipsum predicari in quid de omni-
bus speciebus suis; tertio anima sensitiva est species animalis, in quantum
dat illi nomen specificum et collocat ipsum in determinata specie rerum; 5
quarto anima sensitiva est ratio animalis, in quantum dat illi diffinitio-
nem, dicendo animal est substantia animata sensitiva aut animal est
278va Pv compositum ex corpore organico et anima sensitiva. Et non | solum dat
diffinitionem animali, ymmo etiam et cuilibet parti eius quantitative, quia
non bene diffinitur aliqua talis pars sine operatione neque operatio abs- 10
que sensu: dicimus enim quod oculus est pars corporis animati per quam
animal videt, visio autem est operatio sensus visus, ipse vero visus est
potentia anime sensitive passibilis a colore. Ecce quomodo anima sen-
sitiva formaliter et explicite ingreditur diffinitionem animalis, virtualiter
vero et implicite ingreditur diffinitionem omnium partium eius. Et sicut 15
dictum est de animali quod partes formales eius sunt priores, aut omnes
aut quedam, ita dicendum est de quolibet alio toto et de singulis partibus
eius, scilicet de manu, pede et huiusmodi, quod partes formales talium
sunt illis priores, aut omnes aut quedam.
Lege litteram: Quoniam animalium anima (hec enim substantia est 20
animati corporis sensitivi) que secundum rationem substantia et species
et quod quid erat esse tali corpori (uniuscuiusque enim pars si diffiniatur
bene, non sine opere diffinietur, quod non existit sine sensu). Quare huiu-
smodi partes priores aut omnes aut quedam simul toto, scilicet composito
46va M animali; | et secundum unumquodque itaque similiter dicatur, sive sit aliud 25
totum sive sit pars eius.a
Deinde probatur prima pars conclusionis, videlicet quod omnes par-
tes materiales sunt posteriores toto, et hoc exemplariter, per comparatio-
nem iterum ad animal, quoniam corpus organicum et partes eius dicuntur
posteriores anima sensitiva, non quia dividitur anima sensitiva in partes 30
illas sicut in materiam, quia compositum quod est animal dividitur in par-
tes illas, non autem aliqua forma simplex, sed quia tam corpus organicum
quam singule partes eius diffiniuntur per animam; constat autem omnes
speciebus suis inv. Pv pede] oculo add. Pv quoniam] vero add. Moerb.
hec] hoc Moerb. (hec IlUv HsRj) enim Pv Moerb.] quidem M existit] -et
Moerb. (-it Si) huiusmodi] huius Pv Moerb.
a Aristotle, Met., VII, 10, 1035b1420 (AL XXV 3.2, pp. 150151, lin. 523529).
346 pauli veneti
has partes diffiniri per animal; ergo omnes hec materiales partes posterio-
res sunt animali. Tenet consequentia cum maiori. Minor vero evidens est,
quia, sicut digitus et manus diffinitur per hominem, ita alie singule par-
tes materiales animalis diffiniuntur per animal, licet diffinitiones talium
partium non sint omnibus note. 5
Lege litteram: Corpus vero et huiusmodi partes posteriores sunt hac
substantia que est anima, et dividitur in hoc ut in materiam non substantia
que est anima, sed simul totum, quod est animal.a
quinto, quod totum precedit partem magis quam pars totum, quo- 10
niam totum est prius parte prioritate forme ad materiam et pars est
prior toto prioritate materie ad formam, scilicet temporali indivi-
duali; et ideo pars circuli precedit circulum individualem non uni-
versalem.b
Duplex est ergo prioritas, scilicet forme ad materiam et materie ad for- 15
mam: nam forma est causa materie, ergo est prior materia, et materia est
cause forme, ergo est prior forma. Dicit enim Philosophus, secundo Phi-
sicorum,c quod alique cause sunt sibi invicem cause, ut exercitium seu
potio est causa sanitatis et econtra, in diversis autem generibus causarum.
Et quia forma necessitat materiam et non econtra, sicut finis necessitat 20
agens et non econtra, ut habetur secundo Phisicorum,d ideo maior est
prioritas forme ad materiam quam materie ad formam, sicut maior est
prioritas finis ad efficiens quam efficientis ad finem. Partes ergo quantita-
tive, quia se habent ut materia et totum ut forma, ideo [partes quantita-
tive] sunt priores toto prioritate materie ad formam, econtra vero totum 25
est prius partibus prioritate forme ad materiam. Propterea totum est
magis prius partibus quantitativis quam econtra. Partes ergo quantitative
sunt priores toto prioritate temporis et generationis, totum vero est prius
illis partibus prioritate perfectionis et diffinitionis. Ponitur autem totum
in diffinitionibus partium quantitativarum et materialium, non autem 30
econtra, et ideo, si pars circuli dicitur precedere circulum particularem,
non tamen universalem, quoniam, sicut quocumque circulo particulari
huiusmodi] huius Pv Moerb. posteriores] -ora Moerb. (-ores P) hac] hec M

hoc] hec Moerb. totum est prius] prius est totum Iunt. pars precedit] partes
precedunt Iunt. materia1] materie Pv sibi om. Pv partes quantitative
secl. quantitativis] quantitatis Pv
VII, t.c. 35, fol. 187A. c Aristotle, Phys., II, 3, 195a811. d Aristotle, Phys., II, 9, 200a5ff.
signato stat illum non esse circulo existente, ita stat circulum esse quibu-
scumque partibus signati circuli non existentibus.
Contra probationem conclusionis arguitur, et primo quod anima non
278vb Pv sit prior corpore organico, quia omne | generatum presupponit subiec-
tum, ut patuit; sed anima generatur, cuius subiectum est corpus organi- 5
cum; ergo anima presupponit corpus organicum.
Secundo arguitur quod anima non ponitur in diffinitione corporis orga-
nici, quia, sicut se habet accidens ad subiectum in actu, ita forma ad
materiam; sed accidens non ponitur in diffinitione subiecti in actu, ex quo
substantia non diffinitur per accidens, secundum Philosophum, tractato 10
primo huius septimi;a ergo forma non ponitur in diffinitione materie. Con-
stat autem quod anima est forma, cuius corpus organicum est materia.
Item, secundo De anima,b Philosophus non diffinit corpus organicum
per animam, sed econtra, dicendo anima est actus primus corporis phisici
organici potentia vitam habentis. 15
Ad primum dicitur quod, quia organizatio fit per animam, sicut nutritio
46vb M et augmentatio, | et causa prior est suo effectu, oportet quod anima prior
sit corpore organizato. Et tunc ad argumentum conceditur quod omne
generatum presupponit subiectum, non tamen presupponit subiectum
quod iam habet, quia, cum nutritio et augmentatio fiat secundum for- 20
mam, materia autem continue fluit et refluit, ut habetur primo De genera-
tione,c necesse est quod anima, et si in generatione presupponit subiectum
quod est materia, [quod] post generationem presupponatur a subiecto
suo, quod est corpus organicum.
Ad secundum dicitur quod anima est motor et forma corporis et cuiu- 25
slibet partis eius, et ex hoc quodlibet illorum est organicum et instru-
mentum eius; ratio autem organi cognoscitur ex operatione, sed secun-
dum diversitatem operum iudicamus diversitatem specificam organo-
rum: dicimus enim manum diversam esse a pede propter diversitatem
operationis. Propterea ratio corporis et cuiuslibet partis eius ex opera- 30
tione dependet; ratio autem operationis non potest perfecte sciri sine
forma que est ratio et principium operandi, ideo tam corpus organicum
quam pars eius sciri non potest sine anima; et per consequens, sicut
non contingit cognoscere materiam sine forma, ita non contingit bene
quod secl.
a Aristotle, Met., VII, 1, 1028a3436. b Aristotle, De an., II, 1, 412a2728. c Aristotle, De gen.,
I, 5, 321b2227.
348 pauli veneti
diffinire corpus organicum neque partem eius sine anima. Conceditur

tamen quod, sicut substantia diffinitur per accidentia a posteriori, ita
forma per materiam; a priori autem materia diffinitur per formam et
accidentia per substantiam.
Cum vero allegatur diffinitio anime data a Philosopho, in qua ponitur 5
corpus organicum, dicitur quod illa est diffinitio materialis data a poste-
riori, quia a priori corpus organicum diffinitur per animam hoc modo:
corpus organicum est illud quod habet partes diversarum rationum prop-
ter operationem anime. Sicut ergo homo diffinitur per risibile et econtra,
non quidem eodem genere diffinitionum, ita corpus organicum diffinitur 10
per animam et econtra.
Eo quidem igitur h1035b22ssi.
Secunda conclusio: partium componentium totum quedam sunt eo
priores, quedam posteriores et quedam simul cum illo.
Prima pars est probata de anima, sive sit vegetativa sive sensitiva aut 15
intellectiva, et generaliter de qualibet forma respectu sui compositi.
Secunda pars patet de partibus sine quibus potest esse totum et non econ-
tra. Digitus enim separatus ab homine non est digitus, quia digitus mor-
tuus non est digitus nisi equivoce, sicut nec digitus pictus vel lapideus:
ratio enim digiti et manus et talium partium est quod sunt organa; quando 20
ergo perdunt denominationem organi omittunt substantiale nomen. Quia
ergo organa non sunt mota neque vivificata nisi a forma, si perdunt for-
mam, excluduntur a denominatione organi, et per consequens non sunt
partes nisi equivoce.
Tertia pars patet de partibus principalibus sine quibus non potest esse 25
totum, cuiusmodi sunt cor et cerebrum. Dicuntur autem partes principa-
les quia in eis principaliter salvatur ratio animalis. Que autem et quot sint
partes principales in homine aut in animali, utrum sint plures aut tantum
una non est cura quantum ad presens spectat, et utrum cor sit pars prin-
cipalior cerebro aut econtra non est presentis speculationis. Sed sufficit 30
scire quod quedam sunt principales partes sine quibus non potest esse
totum, et iste dicuntur esse simul cum toto, et quedam sunt partes non
principales sine quibus potest esse totum, et iste sunt partes posteriores
279ra Pv toto, loquendo de partibus quantitativis. | Et ideo partes esse priores toto
est quodammodo verum et quodammodo non verum. 35
autem] aut M dicitur M] dicatur Pv est diffinitio inv. M igitur M Moerb.]

ergo Pv vel] aut Pv
Lege litteram: Eo quidem igitur quod simul totum, idest compositum,

esse priora hec, idest partes, est ut sic, est autem ut non. Neque enim possunt
47ra M esse separata; | neque enim quocumque modo se habens digitus animalis,
sed equivocuus qui mortuus. Quedam vero simul: quecumque principalia et
in quo prima ratio et substantia, puta si hoc cor aut cerebrum; nichil enim 5
differt, utrum tale sit pars principalis.a
quinto, quod partes que sunt secundum quantitatem sunt priores
secundum tempus et in generatione , et ista prioritas non inve-
nitur in omnibus, et sunt partes que non possunt separari a forma 10
neque precedere eam in esse neque sequi eam, ut partes animalis
cum animali.b
Distinctio quam intendit Commentator est hec: quod partium quantitati-
varum, quedam precedunt totum tempore et generatione, quedam autem
non. Verbi gratia, partes elementorum et mixtorum inanimatorum prius 15
generantur quam totum et precedunt tempore ipsum totum et in cor-
ruptione totius remanent post ipsum totum; partes autem animalis non
precedunt tempore ipsum animal neque remanent corrupto animali.
Sed contra, quia in plantis radices precedunt totam plantam tempore et
generatione; ergo, per idem, in animalibus est dare partem precedentem 20
animal tempore et generatione, et hoc videtur esse cor, de quo dicitur
quod est primum vivens et ultimum moriens. Unde animal non subito
generatur secundum se et quodlibet sui, neque dicitur aliquid animal nisi
habeat partes plures diversarum rationum. Constat autem quod, inter illas
partes, primo genita precedit animal tempore et generatione. 25
Item, arguitur quod digitus toti unitus et abscisus sit idem secundum
speciem, quia accidentia magnam partem conferunt ad cognoscendum
quod quid est, ut habetur in prologo De anima;c ergo eadem accidentia
numero arguunt idem subiectum et substantiam numero. Constat autem
quod digitus unitus et abscisus habet eadem accidentia numero, eandem 30
quantitatem, organizationem et colorem. Deinde, opposita habent fieri
circa idem subiectum, ut habetur in Postpredicamentis;d sed unio et divisio
igitur M Moerb.] ergo Pv est1 scr. ex Moerb.] et MPv sic] om. Moerb. (sic P)
separata om. M neque] non Moerb. (neque Da P) enim] qui add. Moerb. (om. Si)
prima] o Moerb. (-a P1b) et1] om. Iunt. plures] plurimas Pv
VII, t.c. 35, fol. 187CD. c Aristotle, De an., I, 1, 402b2122. d Aristotle, Cat., 11, 14a1516.
350 pauli veneti
sunt opposita; ergo si unio fit circa digitum, etiam et divisio fit circa illud,
et per consequens idem est digitus unitus et divisus.
Ad primum dicitur quod, sicut locus, tempus et numerus dicunt unum
materialem pertinens ad predicamentum quantitatis et unum formale
pertinens ad predicamentum relationis, ita cor, epar, cerebrum et huiu- 5
smodi dicunt duo, scilicet unum materialem pertinens ad predicamen-
tum substantie et unum formale pertinens ad predicamentum relationis.
Licet ergo cor precesserit animal generatione et tempore secundum suum
esse materiale, non tamen secundum suum esse formale: cor enim secun-
dum quod huiusmodi est pars organica animalis, ideo non invenitur cor 10
sine animali nec econtra. Ideo, inter ea non potest esse prioritas nature
secundum quam unum potest esse sine alio et non econtra, sed est prio-
ritas causalitatis eo quod cor est causa materialis animalis; sed animal
est causa finalis cordis, anima vero est causa efficiens, finalis et forma-
lis utriusque, dicente Philosopho, secundo De anima,a quod anima est 15
principium corporis animati in triplici genere cause, scilicet efficientis,
finalis et formalis. Et quia cor et animal habent invicem causalitatem ali-
quam et prioritatem, ideo seinvicem diffiniunt: cor enim est principium
motus in animali et animal est corpus animatum habens cor. Consimili-
ter dicatur de radicibus plantarum quod secundum suum esse materiale, 20
quod est esse substantiale, precedunt tempore et generatione plantas, sed
secundum suum esse formale, quod est esse organicum et instrumentale,
sunt simul cum plantis, ita quod non invenitur radix absque planta neque
econtra.
Ad secundum dicitur quod accidentia propria magnam partem con- 25
ferunt ad cognoscendum quod quid est; constat autem quod quantitas,
organizatio et color sunt accidentia communia; ideo, si non remanet digi-
tus facta abscisione, qui est subiectum in actu talium accidentium, tamen
279rb Pv remanet materia una cum formis | elementorum, | que est subiectum
47rb M talium accidentium: materia enim est subiectum immediatum quanti- 30
tatis et mediante quantitate recipit organizationem, mediantibus autem
qualitatibus primis recipit colorem. Et quoniam operatio facit cognoscere
et om. M unum] non add. et del. M efficiens] et add. Pv diffiniunt]

diffiniuntur M esse] plantare add. et del. M dicitur] respondetur Pv qui scr.]
quod M Pv
a Aristotle, De an., II, 4, 415b821.

formam, ut habetur quarto huius,a que quidem operatio est accidens

proprium forme, ideo non remanet forma digiti facta operatione, sicut
neque apparent proprie operationes digiti. Unio autem et divisio habent
fieri circa idem subiectum, sed illud non est digitus, ymmo homo est illud
subiectum cui unitur digitus et a quo dividitur digitus; ipse vero digitus, et 5
si est unitus homini, numquam tamen separatur ab eo, sic quod maneat
digitus nisi equivoce.
Homo autem et equus h1035b27ssi.
Tertia conclusio: materia et forma sunt partes formales tam speciei
quam individui. 10
Probatur: partes formales alicuius sunt ille que sunt de intrinseca rati-
one alicuius; sed materia et forma sunt de intrinseca ratione tam spe-
ciei quam individui, intelligendo per speciem non formam partis, que
est altera pars compositi, sed formam totius, que est ipsum quod quid
est compositum ex materia et forma; ergo et cetera. Tenet consequen- 15
tia cum maiori ex determinatis in suppositionibus. Et minor declaratur.
Nam homo et equus sunt species, Callias autem et Sortes sunt individui.
Sed quod materia et forma sint de intrinseca ratione tam hominis quam
equi patet, non loquendo de omni materia et forma indifferenter, quia
materia vel forma lapidis vel plante non est de intrinseca ratione alicuius 20
illorum, sed materia et forma determinata, quia non quodlibet fit ex quo-
libet indifferenter, sed determinatum ex determinato, ut habetur secundo
Phisicorum.b Non etiam materia et forma determinata sunt de intrinseca
ratione alicuius illorum quocumque modo sumpta, quia non modo singu-
lari, quia hec materia et hec forma non sunt de intrinseca ratione hominis 25
et equi, ex quo potest esse homo et equus sine hac materia et hac forma,
sed modo universali, eo modo quo homo et equus universalia sunt.
Consimiliter, ostenditur quod homo et equus sunt de intrinseca ratione
Sortis et Callie, non materia et forma qualitercumque sumpta, sed accepta
modo determinato et singulari, ita quod ultima materia et ultima forma 30
in via compositionis, que dicitur esse hec materia et hec forma signata,
sunt de intrinseca ratione Sortis et Callie. Ita quod, sicut homo et equus
diffiniuntur per materiam in communi et formam in communi, ita Sortes
et Callias, si diffinirentur, diffinirentur per hanc materiam et hanc formam
formam] forma M
a Possibly, Aristotle, Met., IV, 5, 1010a2225 (but cf. infra, c. 4, p. 423, 1920, where Paul
attributes the claim to Book VIII of the Metaphysics). b Aristotle, Phys., II, 8, 199b1318.
352 pauli veneti
signatam. Et sic in intellectu quiditativo hominis et equi includitur con-

ceptus communis materie et forme singularis.
Lege litteram: Homo autem et equus et que ita in singularibus univer-
saliter considerantur non sunt substantia que est forma partis, sed simul
totum quoddam ex hac, idest determinata, materia et hac ratione, idest 5
determinata forma, et universaliter. Singulare vero et ultima materia Sor-
tes iam est, et in aliis similiter. Pars quidem igitur est et speciei (speciem
autem dico quod quid erat esse) et simul totius est quod ex specie et materia
ipsa.a
Notandum, secundum Commentatorem, commento tricesimo 10
quinto, quod hoc nomen species dicitur de individuo et specie
equivoce, sed nomen forme dicitur de forma universali, que decla-
rat quiditatem speciei, et de forma particulari, que est forma materie
demonstrate.b
Prima distinctio est hec: quod species dupliciter accipitur, videlicet par- 15
ticulariter et universaliter. Species particulariter sumpta est forma indi-
vidui, que pro tanto dicitur species, quia individuum collocat in determi-
nata specie, dans illi nomen specificum et diffinitionem; species autem
universaliter sumpta est universale compositum ex genere et differentia,
quod pro tanto dicitur species, quia non solum unum, sed plura individua 20
unit in eandem convenientiam specificam. Et ideo species equivoce dici-
tur de forma individuali et specifica. Dicitur enim de forma individuali ut
279va Pv est unum preter multa; de forma | autem specifica ut est unum in multis:
universale enim est illud quod est unum in multis et de multis, ut habetur
primo Posteriorum.c 25
47va M Secunda distinctio est quod forma | etiam dupliciter sumitur, scili-
cet univeraliter et particulariter. Forma universaliter sumpta est illa que
declarat quiditatem speciei, et sic tam genus quam differentia dicitur
forma; sed forma particulariter sumpta est forma partis existens in mate-
ria. Dicitur autem utraque istarum forma, quia utraque istarum dat esse 30
seu nomen et diffinitionem, sed non eodem modo, quia forma particula-
ris, cum sit incommunicabilis, non dat nisi uni individuo esse specificum
autem] vero Moerb. (autem P) universaliter] autem add. Moerb. conside-

rantur] om. Moerb. (sed post singularibus lin. 3 add. F2) materia ratione] ratione
materia Moerb. (inv. Si P) et1] ut Moerb. (et P1b) est] eius Moerb. universali scr.
ex Iunt] universaliter MPv solum] tantum Pv unit] in eadem specie et add. M
VII, t.c. 35, fol. 187G. c Aristotle, An. Post., I, 11, 77a59.
ac nomen et diffinitionem; forma autem universalis, cum sit communica-

bilis, dat pluribus individuis specificum esse nomenque et diffinitionem.
Contra conclusionem arguitur. Primo sic: species componitur ex ge-
nere et differentia, sicut statua ex ere et figura, per Porphyrium, in Uni-
versalibus;a ergo species non componitur ex materia et forma. Patet con- 5
sequentia, quia statua non habet nisi unum modum compositionis.
Secundo: species sunt eterne, per Aristotelem, primo Posteriorum;b sed
materia est principium corruptionis, per Philosophum, dicentem in hoc
septimoc quod materia est illud per quod res potest esse et non esse,
sive sit res naturalis sive sit artificialis; ipsa autem forma generatur et 10
corrumpitur, per Aristotelem, supra;d ergo materia et forma non sunt
partes speciei.
In hac difficultate sunt quatuor opiniones. Quarum prima dicit quod
materia, licet pertineat ad quiditatem et essentiam substantie sensibilis,
non tamen pertinet ad diffinitionem, quia diffinitio datur causa innote- 15
scendi, materia autem est de se ignota, ut habetur primo Phisicorum.e
Propterea dicit Philosophus, tam quinto huius quam secundo Phisicorum,f
quod partes diffinitionis sunt forme; Commentator autem dicit in hoc sep-
timog quod diffinitio est forme universalis et non congregati ex materia et
forma. 20
Contra hanc opinionem est expressa doctrina Aristotelis, sexto huius,h
ubi, ponens differentiam inter res metaphisicas, mathematicas et natu-
rales, dicit quod res metaphisice non concernunt materiam neque quo
ad rem neque quo ad diffinitionem; res vero mathematice concernunt
materiam quo ad esse, sed non quo ad diffinitionem; res autem natura- 25
les concernunt materiam utroque modo. Sicut ergo inquit Philosophus,
simus diffinitur per materiam sensibilem, ita et alie res naturales: si enim
forma que est altera pars compositi diffinitur per materiam, sicut patet
de anima et motu, loco et colore, a fortiori species composita ex mate-
ria et forma diffinitur per materiam. Et quando dicitur: materia de se 30
ignota est, illud conceditur, tamen agnoscitur per analogiam ad mate-
riam artificialium et ad subiectum accidentium naturalium, ut habetur
dicitur] quod add. Pv
a Porphyry, Isag., c. De differentia (AL I 67, p. 18, 915) . b Aristotle, An. Post., I, 24, 85b17
18. c Aristotle, Met., VII, 15, 1039b2930. d Aristotle, Met., VII, 8, 1033a2930. e Aristotle,
Phys., I, 7, 191a814. f Aristotle, Met., V, 2, 1013a2629; Phys., II, 1, 193a3031; 3, 194b2629.
g Averroes, In Met., VII, t.c. 37, fol. 189BC. h Aristotle, Met., VI, 1, 1025b301026a6.
354 pauli veneti
primo Phisicorum,a et ex hoc potest esse principium cognoscendi rem.b

Luna enim de se caret lumine, tamen illuminata a sole alia illustrat. Et
licet materia signata non ingrediatur diffinitionem, quia ut sic non habet
rationem forme, tamen materia communis ut habet rationem predicabi-
lis est pars diffinitionis, quia ut sic habet rationem forme. Et ita intendit 5
Philosophus,c dicens quod partes diffinitionis sunt forme. Quando vero
dicit Commentatord quod diffinitio est forme universalis et non congre-
gati ex materia et forma, per formam universalem intendit speciem et per
congregatum intendit individuumeet hoc est verum, quia diffinitio est
speciei et non individui, per Aristotelem hic.f 10
Secunda opinio dicit quod materia pertinet ad diffinitionem rei, non
autem ad quiditatem et essentiam, sed magis debet dici quid additum qui-
ditati et essentie, sicut substantia ponitur in diffinitione accidentium, non
tamen est de quiditate neque de essentia illorum, sed se habet tamquam
essentia addita essentie. Et ex hoc diffinitiones accidentium dicuntur dif- 15
finitiones ex additione, ut superius docuit Philosophus in tractatu primo.g
279vb Pv | Materia ergo et forma sunt partes hominis et equi, non sunt partes huma-
nitatis nec equitatis, quia tunc homo foret humanitas et equus equitas
quod non est verum. Et hoc videtur intendere Philosophus, dicens in hoc
capituloh quod in conceptis cum materia non est idem quiditas cum eo 20
cuius est, sed in conceptis sine materia est idem. Et exemplificans de
47vb M anima et circulo, dicit | quod idem est anima et anime esse et idem cir-
culus et circuli esse.
Hec opinio est expresse contra Philosophum, dicentem in hoc septimoi
quod accidentia diffiniuntur per additamenta, non autem substantie; ideo 25
diffinitiones substantiarum naturalium sensibilium non dantur per addi-
tamenta, sed dantur per materiam; ergo materia pertinet ad quiditatem et
essentiam ipsarum substantiarum que diffiniuntur.j Patet consequentia,
quia diffinitio est ratio indicans quiditatem et essentiam rei, secundum
Philosophum, secundo Topicorum.k Unde, quia accidentia non pertinent 30
ad] quiditatem add. et del. M accidentium] accidentis M nec] et Pv

idem2 om. Pv
a Aristotle, Phys., I, 7, 191a814. b pp. 353, 21354, 1, cf. Aquinas, Exp. Metaph., VII, lect. 9, n.
1468. c Cf. Aristotle, Met., V, 2, 1013a2629; Phys., II, 3, 194b2629. d Averroes, In Met., VII,
t.c. 37, fol. 189BC. e lin. 79, cf. Aquinas, Exp. Metaph., VII, lect. 9, n. 1468; Alexander of
Alexandria, Exp. Met., VII, c. 10, q. 8, fol. 222rarb. f Aristotle, Met., VII, 15 passim. g Aristotle,
Met.,VII, 5, 1031a15. h Aristotle, Met., VII, 11, 1037a33b7. i Aristotle, Met., VII, 5, 1031a15.
j lin. 2428, cf. Aquinas, Exp. Metaph., VII, lect. 9, n. 1468; Alexander of Alexandria, Exp.
Met., VII, c. 10, q. 8, fol. 222rarb. k In truth, Aristotle, Top., I, 5, 101b3738.

ad quiditatem et essentiam substantie, ideo remotis accidentibus non

propter hoc tollitur quiditas et essentia substantie; ergo si materia non
pertinet ad quiditatem et essentiam substantiarum, non minus remane-
ret essentia et quiditas talium, et sic esset essentia et quiditas aque et ignis
sine materiaquod est absurdum. Propter quod dicet Philosophus infe- 5
riusa quod parabola de animali, quam consuevit Socrates iunior dicere,
non bene se habet: superfluum enim est auferre materiam a quiditate
rerum. Et ideo debet concedi quod partes hominis sunt partes humani-
tatis, scilicet materia et forma, et quod homo est humanitas, et quod in
hiis que sunt secundum se idem est quiditas cum eo cuius est quiditas, 10
sive accipiantur cum materia sive sine materia, ut supra ostensum est de
intentione Philosophi et Commentatoris.b Cum autem dicit Philosophusc
quod idem est anima et anime esse, circulus et circuli esse, non intendit
quod in conceptis cum materia non sit idem quiditas cum eo cuius est,
sed quod species est illud quod vere et proprie diffinitur, non autem indi- 15
viduum.
Tertia opinio posuit quod materia pertinet ad diffinitionem et essen-
tiam rei, non autem ad quiditatem, quia materia non est quid nec qualis
nec quanta, secundum Philosophum in hoc septimo.d Ipsa autem forma
est tota quiditas rei, quia dicit Philosophus hice quod anima est substantia 20
animati et species et quod quid erat esse; quinto autem huius et secundo
Phisicorum et in secundo De anima et in pluribus aliis locis,f ipsam formam
vocat quod quid erat esse, non autem materiam. Unde in hoc septimo
dicit Philosophusg quod forma predicatur secundum se et non ipsa mate-
ria. Quod quidem Commentatorh exponens, dicit quod predicatur in quid 25
de habente formam. Et superius dixit Commentatori quod quiditas homi-
nis est homo uno modo et non est homo alio modo, ac si vellet dicere quod
homo est sua quiditas, si accipiatur homo pro forma; si autem homo acci-
piatur pro composito ex materia et forma, sic non est sua quiditas. Et ita
vult ista opinio quod ista essentia rei composite comprehendit materiam 30
sine] absque Pv in1 om. Pv aliis] om. Pv homo1 om. Pv sic om. Pv
est] homo add. Pv
a Aristotle, Met., VII, 11, 1036b2432. b Cf. supra, tr. 1, c. 4, pp. 190, 15, 197, 3. c Aristotle, Met.,
VII, 10, 1036a12. d Aristotle, Met., VII, 3, 1029a2023. e Aristotle, Met., VII, 10, 1035b14
16. f Aristotle, Met., V, 2, 1013a27; b32; Phys., II, 2, 194a21; 3, 194b2629; 195a20; De an., II,
1, 412b11. g Aristotle, Met., VII, 10, 1035a79. h Averroes, In Met., VII, t.c. 34, fol. 184FG.
i Averroes, In Met., VII, t.c. 21, fol. 171I.
356 pauli veneti
et formam, quiditas autem dicit solam formam et est pars essentie sicut
materia et forma.a
Ista opinio non est vera, quia ostensum est superiusb quod, sicut ens
et quod quid est sunt idem, ita essentia et quiditas sunt idem; differunt
autem in modo significandi, quia essentia dicit absolute principium rei, 5
quiditas autem connotat ordinem ad intellectum. Et reprobatur hec opi-
nio sicut precedens ex dictis Aristotelis et Commentatoris. Quando autem
Philosophusc dicit quod materia non est quid nec quale nec quantum,
idest non determinat sibi formam alicuius predicamenti, cum quo tamen
stat quod ipsa est pars quiditatis; quando autem animam aut aliam for- 10
mam vocat Philosophusd quod quid erat esse, non intendit solam formam
esse quiditatem rei, sed solam formam facere principaliter ad quiditatem
280ra Pv rei, sicut ipsa sola est a qua | principaliter sumitur nomen et diffinitio.
Neque illud obstat quod dicit Philosophuse quod forma predicatur
secundum se et non materia, Commentatorf autem quod forma predica- 15
tur in quid, quia loquuntur de forma totius et non de forma partis. Quando
vero dicit Commentatorg quod quiditas hominis est homo uno modo et
non est homo alio modo, idest: est homo quo ad rem significatam et non
48ra M est homo quo ad modum significandi, quia hominis | quiditas signifi-
cat per modum forme denominantis, homo autem per modum subiecti 20
denominati.
Quarta opinio asseruit quod materia non pertinet ad diffinitionem
neque ad essentiam neque ad quiditatem, quoniam licet substantie sen-
sibiles componantur ex materia et forma, non tamen talis compositio
invenitur in quiditatibus et essentiis, et consequenter neque in diffinitio- 25
nibus, quia essentie et quiditates, cum sint genera et species, separantur
a sensibilibus. Et hec fuit opinio Platonicorum. Dixit enim Plato quod ita
est in naturalibus sicut in artificialibus, quod nec es nec lignum pertinet
ad essentiam circuli, ex eo quod circulus invenitur indifferenter tam in
ere quam in ligno; ymmo, si circulus non inveniretur nisi in ere, adhuc es 30
non esset de essentia circuli. Et ita in naturalibus videtur dicendum quod,
licet forma naturalis non inveniatur nisi in una materia tantum, ut forma
est homo2 om. Pv ad2 om. M quod] quia Pv
a pp. 355, 17356, 2, cf. Alexander of Alexandria, Exp. Met., VII, c. 10, q. 8, fol. 222rb. b Cf.
supra, tr. 1, c. 3, p. 139, 820. c Aristotle, Met., VII, 3, 1029a2023. d Aristotle, Met., V, 2,
1013a27; b32; Phys., II, 2, 194a21; 3, 194b2629; 195a20; De an., II, 1, 412b11. e Aristotle, Met.,
VII, 10, 1035a79. f Averroes, In Met., VII, t.c. 34, fol. 184FG. g Averroes, In Met., VII, t.c.
21, fol. 171I.
hominis in carnibus et ossibus, ipse tamen carnes et ossa non pertinent

ad essentiam hominis.
Sed hec opinio non est aliter reprobanda quam reprobat eam Philoso-
phus in hoc septimo et in pluribus libris tam precedentibus quam sequen-
tibus:a ponere enim quiditates separatas est destruere omnem scientiam 5
et demonstrationem, et omne esse ac generationem rerum sensibilium.
Et ideo dicendum est cum Philosopho quod tam forma quam materia
pertinet ad diffinitionem et quiditatem et ad essentiam rei sensibilis. Et
licet phisicus abstrahat ab hac materia et ab illa, non tamen a materia
in communi, ut, licet homo diffiniatur sine hiis carnibus et sine hiis ossi- 10
bus, non tamen sine carnibus et ossis, quia sine hiis non potest esse neque
intelligi. Neque bene assimilavit Plato naturalia artificialibus, quia forme
artificialium sunt accidentia, que cum sua materia non faciunt aliquod
vere unum; forme autem naturalium sunt substantie, que cum sua mate-
ria faciunt vere unum. Deinde circulus, cum sit res mathematica, abstrahit 15
a materia sensibili, ideo ad eius essentiam non pertinet es neque lignum;
naturalia autem non abstrahunt a materia sensibili, ideo materia sensibi-
lis pertinet ad quiditatem illorum.
Ad primam rationem negatur consequentia. Et ad Porphyrium dicitur
quod ipse noluit removere a specie compositionem a materia et forma, 20
sed magis asseruit illam compositionem, quia statua sic componitur; sed
voluit dicere quod, sicut statua componitur ex ere tamquam ex materia et
ex differentia tamquam ex forma, ita species componitur ex ere tamquam
ex materia et ex differentia tamquam ex forma. Hec tamen compositio
non est realis sicut est compositio statue, sed vocatur compositio rationis. 25
Compositio autem speciei ex materia et forma est compositio realis, sicut
compositio statue ex ere et figura.
Ad secundum dicitur quod materia communis non est principium
corruptionis, sed materia signata cui est coniuncta privatio; forma etiam
in communi non corrumpitur, quia oportet principia semper manere, ut 30
habetur primo Phisicorum,b sed corrumpitur forma signata, scilicet que
est per se terminus generationis et corruptionis.
Sed rationis partes h1035b33ssi.
Quarta conclusio: partes formales speciei ponende sunt in diffinitione
et non individui. 35
reprobat eam inv. Pv noluit] non (s.l.) voluit M dicitur] respondetur Pv
a Cf. e.g. Met., I, 9 passim; VII, 11, 1036b2132; XIII, 910 passim. b Aristotle, Phys., I, 6,
189a1920.
358 pauli veneti
280rb Pv Probatur: tantum illius quod diffinitur partes sunt ponende | in diffini-
tione; sed species diffinitur, non autem individuum; ergo et cetera. Tenet
consequentia cum maiori et minorem Philosophus tripliciter probat. Et
primo sic: illud diffinitur quod identificatur in partibus sue quiditati et
essentie; sed species, non autem individuum, identificatur in partibus 5
sue quiditati et essentie; ergo species diffinitur, non autem individuum.
Patet consequentia cum prima parte antecedentis, ex quo diffinitio est
48rb M ratio indicans quiditatem | et essentiam rei. Secunda vero pars ostendi-
tur inductive, quoniam idem est in suis partibus anima et anime esse seu
circulus et circuli esse, quoniam quelibet pars anime est pars quiditatis 10
anime et quelibet pars circuli est pars quiditatis circuli et econtra. Sed
quod individuum seu singulare non identificetur in partibus sue quiditati
et essentie ostenditur in circulis singularibus, tam intellectualibus quam
sensibilibus, quoniam circulus intellectualis, qui est circulus mathemati-
cus, habet partes quantitativas, scilicet incisiones et portiones, que non 15
sunt partes quiditatis circuli neque illius essentie, ut supra dictum est.
Circulus etiam singularis sensibilis, qui est circulus naturalis, habet partes
que non sunt partes quiditatis et essentie, ut puta circulus ereus et ligneus;
constat autem quod es est pars circuli erei et lignum est pars circuli lignei,
non tamen es aut lignum est pars quiditatis et essentie circuli, cum aliquis 20
sit circulus cuius non sit pars es neque lignum; tales ergo circuli singulares
non diffiniuntur, sed circulus in universali.
Lege litteram: Sed rationis, idest diffinitionis, partes sunt ille que
speciei solum sunt, ratio vero ipsius est universalis; circulo enim esse et
circulus et anime esse et anima idem. Simul totius autem, idest indivi- 25
dui singularis, ut puta circuli huius et singularium alicuius aut sensibilis
aut intellectualisintellectuales vero dico ut mathematicos, et sensibiles ut
ereos et ligneoshorum autem non est diffinitio.a
Secundo: nichil diffinitur nisi per se obiectum intellectus; sed species
est per se obiectum intellectus, non autem individuum; ergo species dif- 30
finitur et non individuum. Tenet consequentia cum maiori, quia solus
intellectus negotiatur circa diffinitionem rei. Minor declaratur. Nam illud
quod est per se obiectum intellectus, quantum est ex se, semper cogno-
scitur ab intellectu sive concurrat sensus sive non. Constat autem quod
dictum] ostensum Pv sed] est add. Pv ipsius est inv. Moerb. ut puta]
puta Moerb. (ut puta DaSi) ut1 scr. ex Moerb.] et MPv rei] sed add. Pv
a Aristotle, Met., VII, 10, 1035b331036a5 (AL XXV 3.2, pp. 151152, lin. 543548).
individuum non cognoscitur ab intellectu nisi concurrat sensus vel yma-

ginatio: sensus quidem si individuum est singulare sensibile, ymaginatio
vero si fuerit singulare mathematicum, ita quod circuli singulares, sive sint
naturales sive mathematici, secundum quod huiusmodi non cognoscun-
tur ab intellectu, si recesserint ab inspectione sensus et ymaginationis; et 5
si cognoscuntur, hoc est in quantum cadunt sub ratione universalis, quia
intellectus cognoscens circulum in universali cognoscit hunc circulum in
particulari, modo tamen confuso et indeterminato. Et ita intendit Com-
mentator, dicens, tertio De anima,a quod intellectus cognoscit universale
per se, singulare vero mediante sensu. 10
Fiat ergo hoc argumentum: intellectus cognoscit circulum et hominem
in universali, sive sit sensus concurrens sive non; sed hunc circulum
aut hunc hominem singularem non cognoscit utrum sit vel non sit nisi
concurrat sensus; ergo circulus aut homo in communi, qui est species, est
per se obiectum intellectus, non autem hic circulus aut hic homo, qui est 15
individuum et singulare sensibile vel intelligibile.
Lege litteram: Sed cum intelligentia, idest ymaginatione, aut sensu
cognoscuntur circuli singulares, hoc est cum actu videntur. Abeuntes vero
ex actu, idest ab actuali inspectione, non palam, idest non est manifestum,
280va Pv utrum quidem sunt aut | non sunt; sed semper dicuntur et cognoscuntur 20
universalis ratione.b
Tertio sic: omne diffinibile est per se cognoscibile; nullum individuum
est per se cognoscibile; ergo nullum individuum est diffinibile, et per
consequens tantum species est diffinibilis, ex quo genus in quantum
huiusmodi non est diffinibile. 25
Prima pars antecedentis est nota, quia omnis diffinitio est per se causa
cognoscendi diffinitum; quod esse non potest nisi omne diffinibile esset
cognoscibile per se, cum omnis causa per se habeat effectum per se, ut
48va M ostenditur quinto huius et secundo Phisicorum.c | Secunda pars antece-
dentis probatur. Nam materia est principium individuationis; sed materia 30
de se ignota est, sive sit sensibilis sive intelligibilis; ergo nullum indi-
viduum est per se cognoscibile. Tenet consequentia cum maiori, quia
forma, cum sit communicabilis per suam naturam, non est principium
individuationis. Minor autem est evidens, eo quod materia secundum
vero] autem Pv hocvidentur om. Moerb. (add. P) quantum] quod add. Pv

cognoscibile per se] per se cognoscibile Pv
a Averroes, In De an., III, t.c. 9, p. 422, 4750. b Aristotle, Met., VII, 10, 1036a58 (AL XXV
3.2, p. 152, lin. 548551). c Aristotle, Met., V, 2, 1013b34ff; Phys., II, 3, 195b3ff.
360 pauli veneti
quod huiusmodi est in potentia; quod autem per se cognoscitur debet esse
in actu, eo quod tale movet potentiam cognitivam; omne autem movens
secundum quod est in actu et non secundum quod in potentia, ut habet
videri secundo Phisicorum.a Et notanter dicitur quod materia est de se
ignota sive sit sensibilis sive intelligibilis, quia duplex est materia, scili- 5
cet intellectualis et sensibilis. Materia sensibilis est illa que sensibilibus
qualitatibus activis et passivis diffinitur, ut es, lignum, et quelibet materia
mobilis, in qua sunt principia motus ad formam, ut ignis, aqua et huiu-
smodi; materia autem intellectualis est que per rationem intellectus est
abstracta a motu et a materia sensibili, est tamen secundum suum esse 10
in materia sensibili, sed non in quantum huiusmodi, ut quantitas, conti-
nuum, linea et superficies et corpus. Sicut enim forma ignis aut equi est
in corpore organico, quod est materia sensibilis, ita circulus vel triangulus
est in quantitate continua, que est materia intellectualis.
Lege litteram: Materia quidem ignota secundum se. Materia vero que- 15
dam sensibilis alia intellectualis; sensibilis quidem ut es et lignum et quelibet
mobilis materia, intellectualis vero que in sensibilibus existit non in quan-
tum sensibilia, ut mathematica. Deinde Philosophus epilogando concludit
dicendo: quomodo ergo habetur de toto et parte et priore et posteriore, dic-
tum est, et cetera.b 20
Notandum primo, secundum Commentatorem, commento trice-
simo quinto, quod illa que cognoscuntur per diffinitionem non
mutantur, quia scientia eorum non mutatur; ergo sunt alia ab indi-
viduis.c
Argumentum Commentatoris est istud: illud quod diffinitur debet esse 25
immutabile; sed individua sunt mutabilia; ergo individuorum non est dif-
finitio. Tenet consequentia cum minori. Et maior arguitur. Nam scien-
tia est de immutabilibus; sed scientia est habitus acquisitus per demon-
strationem, ut ostenditur primo Posteriorum;d ergo demonstratio est de
immutabilibus. Constat autem quod diffinitio est principium omnis 30
demonstrationis, ut habetur primo Posteriorum et in prologo De anima;e
ergo illud de quo habetur diffinitio est immutabile.
autem] aut Pv quedam] alia Moerb. ergo] igitur Moerb. habetur]

habet Moerb. et1 Pv Moerb.] om. M mutantur] secundum substantiam add. Iunt.
a In truth, Aristotle, Phys., III, 3, 202a1617 (cf. supra, tr. 2, c. 2, p. 269, 24). b Aristotle, Met.,
VII, 10, 1036a813 (AL XXV 3.2, p. 152, lin. 551556). c Averroes, In Met., VII, t.c. 35, fol. 187I.
d Aristotle, An. Post., I, 2, 71b1719. e Aristotle, An Post., I, 2, 72a1424; 10, 76b35ff et passim;
De an.., I, 1, 402b2526.
Dicendum ergo quod species cognoscitur per diffinitionem et pas-

sio illius cognoscitur per demonstrationem; individuum vero naturale
et mathematicum cognoscitur per sensationem et ymaginationem quam
Aristoteles vocat hic intelligentiam, sicut et tertio Phisicorum,a quando
dicit quod non semper est credendum intelligentie, idest ymaginationi. 5
Dicit enim Avicenna, quinto Metaphisice,b quod individuum non diffini-
tur, quia illud quod diffinitur habet formalitatem communicabilem mul-
tis: ut, si queratur quid est Sortes et respondeatur quod est filius talis homi-
nis et iustus, hec due formalitates, scilicet esse filium et iustum, possunt
inesse alteri a Sorte. Iterum, si respondeatur quod est filius talis hominis, 10
iustus, interfectus tali tempore, tali loco, adhuc est possibile hec omnia
inesse alteri, et idem contingit de aliis formalitatibus, si infinite adderen-
tur.
Notandum secundo, secundum Commentatorem, quod materia
280vb Pv non per se cognoscitur, sed cognoscitur | per formam.c 15
Istud dicitur pro tanto, quia elementa per se cognoscuntur sensu tactus, et
magnitudo est sensibile per se, ut probat Philosophus, secundo De anima,d
et tamen elementa sunt materia mixtorum et magnitudo est materia figu-
rarum, sed nullum istorum per se cognoscitur, ut habet rationem materie.
Dicit enim Commentator, in prologo Phisicorum,e quod quecumque sunt 20
inter primam materiam et ultimam formam sunt materie composite et
forme composite; ergo ignis, aqua et huiusmodi habent rationem materie
48vb M et habent rationem forme. Ut habent rationem forme, | sic cognoscun-
tur per se; ut habent rationem materie, sic cognoscuntur per accidens, eo
modo quo substantia subiecta sensibilibus propriis et communis sentitur 25
per accidens, ut dicit Philosophus, secundo De anima.f Magnitudo etiam,
ut habet rationem materie, cognoscitur per accidens, sed ut habet ratio-
nem forme cognoscitur per se. Sic etiam genus et individuum, quia habent
rationem materie, non cognoscuntur per se, sed per accidens, et ista est
causa propter quam diffiniri non possunt et cetera. 30
Contra predicta arguitur. Et primo, quod species non diffinitur, quia
illud quod est diffinibile debet esse communicabile et immutabile, ut
dictum est. Constat autem quod cuilibet speciei deficit una illarum dua-
et1] aut Pv notandum secundo inv. Pv immutabile] incommunicabile M
a Aristotle, Phys., III, 8, 208a1415. b Avicenna, Phil. Pr., tr. V., c. 5, p. 276, 83ff. c Averroes,
In Met., VII, t.c. 35, fol. 187I. d Aristotle, De an., II, 6, 418a1718. e Averroes, In Phys., I, t.c. 1,
fol. 6E. f Aristotle, De an., II, 6, 418a2024.
362 pauli veneti
rum conditionum, quoniam omnis species aut est mundi superioris aut
est mundi inferioris. Si mundi inferioris, illa est mutabilis ad formam, ut
patet de singulis mixtis et elementis; si mundi superioris, illa est mutabilis
ad ubi aut non est communicabilis. Corpora enim celestia mutantur ad
ubi, et intelligentie non sunt communicabiles, quia non possunt esse 5
due intelligentie eiusdem speciei, per Aristotelem, duodecimo huiusa; sol
autem et luna sunt species et mutantur ad ubi, neque communicabiles
sunt, quia non possunt esse plures soles neque plures lune, sicut nec
plures mundi, ut demonstrat Philosophus, primo Celi.b
Item, nullius est diffinitio cuius est demonstratio, per Aristotelem, 10
secundo Posteriorum;c sed aliqua species demonstratur, quia, octavo Phi-
sicorum,d Aristoteles demonstrat primum motorem et alias substantias
separatas; ergo nullius talis est diffinitio, et tamen intelligentie sunt spe-
cies predicamenti substantie, aliter male divideret Porphyriuse substan-
tiam in corpoream et incorpoream. 15
Secundo arguitur quod individuum diffinitur, quia illud idem diffinitur
de quo aliquid demonstratur; sed de individuo aliquid demonstratur; ergo
individuum diffinitur. Patet consequentia cum maiori, ex quo diffinitio
est medium in demonstratione, per Aristotelem, primo Posteriorum.f Et
minor est manifesta, ex eo quia aliter frustra ponerentur demonstrationes 20
particulares, primo Posteriorum,g in quo docetur demonstrare tres angulos
non solum de triangulo, sed etiam de isto triangulo qui est ysosceles aut
equilaterus.
Item, dicit Philosophus, quinto huius,h quod illa sunt eadem specie
quorum ratio, idest diffinitio, est eadem; sed Sortes et Plato sunt eiusdem 25
speciei; ergo eorum eadem est diffinitio. Constat autem quod Sortes et
Plato sunt individua. Commentator autem dicit, in prologo De anima,i
quod diffinitiones non sunt universalium, sed rerum particularium extra
animam.
Tertio arguitur quod individuum est per se cognoscibile, quia Deus et 30
intelligentie per se cognoscuntur, cum sint maxime entitatis, aliter non
et] in substantiam add. Pv eadem est diffinitio] est diffinitio eadem Pv
a Aristotle, Met., XII, 8, 1073b3136. b Aristotle, De coel., I, 9, 277b27ff. c Aristotle, An. Post.,
II, 47 passim; 7, 92b3538. d Aristotle, Phys., VIII, 5, 256b20ff. e Porphyry, Isag., c. De

specie (AL I 67, p. 9, 19ff). f Aristotle, An. Post., I, 8, 75b3032. g Aristotle, An. Post., I, 1,
71a1929 (Cf. An. Post., I, 5, 74a432). h Aristotle, Met., V, 6, 1016b32. i Averroes, In De an.,
I, t.c. 8, p. 12, 2125.
diceret Commentator, secundo huius,a quod Aristoteles per manifestis-

sima in natura intendit substantias abstractas. Unde arguitur sic: sicut res
se habet ad esse, sic se habet ad cognosci, ut habetur in loco allegato; in
quo datur intelligi quod cognoscibilitas consequitur ens; sed quodlibet
individuum est per se ens; ergo quodlibet individuum est per se cogno- 5
scibile.
Item, sensibilia propria et communia per se cognoscuntur a sensu, ut
habetur secundo De anima,b et non cognoscuntur a sensu ut sunt uni-
versalia, quia ista est conditio intellectus; ergo cognoscuntur a sensu in
eo quod singularia. Et hoc intendit Philosophus, dicens, in primo Phisico- 10
281ra Pv rum,c quod | sensus est singularium et intellectus universalium.
Quarto arguitur quod individuum est cognoscibilem preter sensatio-
nem et ymaginationem, quoniam Deus et intelligentie cognoscuntur a
nobis non solo modo universali, sed etiam modo singulari, sicut et modo
singulari cognoscitur motus celi et multitudo sperarum celestium, medi- 15
antibus quibus cognoscuntur substantie abstracte, ut habetur octavo Phi-
49ra M sicorum et duodecimo huius.d | Constat autem quod intelligentie sepa-
rate non cadunt sub sensu neque sub ymaginatione. Puta de Aristotele,
Antichristo et de ultima spera, et de lineis, superficiebus eius et figura,
tamquam de rebus singularibus et de individuis mathematicis et natura- 20
libus habemus cognitionem; hec tamen non cadunt sub sensu nec sub
ymaginatione, sicut neque circuli abeuntes a prospectu nostro, ut dicit
Philosophus in littera.e
Ad primum dicitur quod quelibet species diffinitur, licet non eodem
modo, quia species substantiales diffiniuntur simpliciter, species acciden- 25
tales vero diffiniuntur secundum quid, ut patuit. Et dicitur quod, si species
horum inferiorum aut superiorum mutantur ad formam vel ad ubi, hoc est
per accidens ratione singularium quibus uniuntur; per se autem quelibet
species immutabilis est atque communicabilis. Quod autem sol et luna et
intelligentie celi non communicentur, hoc est per accidens ratione sin- 30
gularium quibus uniuntur, propter defectum agentis. Unde materia celi
de sui natura trasmutabilis est ad formam, ex quo est eiusdem rationis
abstractas] separatas Pv etiam] ita M et] etiam Pv Aristotele] de add. Pv

lineis] et add. Pv et3] ac Pv vero om. M communicabilis Pv post correct.]
incommunicabilis M
a Averroes, In Met., II, t.c. 1, fol. 29B. b Aristotle, De an., II, 6, 418a89. c Aristotle, Phys., I,
5, 189a58. d Aristotle, Phys., VIII, 610 passim; Met., XII, 610 passim. e Aristotle, Met.,
VII, 10, 1036a57.
364 pauli veneti
cum materia horum inferiorum et totum elementum terre est locali-

ter mobile, cum sit eiusdem nature cum quolibet pedali eius; tamen
materia celi non potest trasmutari ad formam neque elementum terre
potest moveri localiter, quia non potest esse agens naturale transmu-
tans materiam celi neque movens localiter elementum terre: Deus enim 5
et natura nichil facit frustra, ut habetur primo Celi;a modo frustra esset
tale agens, quia aut numquam ageret omnino aut ageret ad confusionem
mundi.
Et ad confirmationem dicitur quod eclipsis de luna demonstratur, et
etiam diffinitur per privationem luminis in luna obiectu terre, per Aristo- 10
telem, secundo Posteriorum.b Cum autem dicit quod nullius est demon-
stratio cuius est diffinitio, intendit simpliciter aut per se primo modo.
Substantia diffinitur simpliciter et per se primo, non autem hoc modo
demonstratur sed secundum quid et per se non primo; econtra autem
accidens demonstratur simpliciter et per se primo, diffinitur vero tantum 15
secundum quid et per se non primo, ut patuit.
Ad secundum respondetur quod, sicut de singularibus habetur scientia
et demonstratio per accidens aut per se non primo, ratione universalis
reperti in eo, ita de illis habetur diffinitio per accidens aut per se non
primo. Accipiendo enim per accidens pro eo quo competit alicui per 20
aliud, sic scientia, demonstratio et diffinitio competit universali per se,
singulari per accidens; accipiendo autem per accidens magis stricte, pro
eo quod competit alicui per naturam alterius et non per naturam suam,
sic diffinitio, scientia et demonstratio competunt singulari, non quidem
per accidens, sed per se non primo; ipsi autem universali competit per se 25
primo. Et per hoc conceditur quod Sortis et Platonis est eadem ratio et
diffinitio.
Quando vero dicit Commentatorc quod diffinitiones non sunt univer-
salium, loquitur contra Platonem ponentem universalia separata a suis
singularibus, et intendit quod diffinitiones non sunt universalium separa- 30
torum a singularibus, sed sunt universalium existentium in rebus particu-
laribus extra animam.
quolibet pedali eius] pedali eius quolibet M et om. M magis stricte inv. M
separatorum] separatarum M
a Aristotle, De coel., I, 4, 271a33. b Aristotle, An. Post., II, 2, 90a1518. c Averroes, In De an.,
I, t.c. 8, p. 12, 2125.
Ad tertium respondetur quod Philosophus loquitur de individuis natu-

ralibus vel mathematicis habentibus materiam sensibilem vel intelligibi-
lem, Deus autem et intelligentie nullam materiam habent. Et cum argui-
tur: sicut res se habet ad esse, ita se habet ad cognosci, sic quod cogno-
scibilitas consequitur ens, illud conceditur. Ex quo tamen non sequitur 5
quod, si omne individuum est per se ens, [quod] omne individuum est
per se cognoscibile. Unde materia prima non est per se cognoscibilis, et
tamen est per se ens, unde stat quod aliqua duo convertantur, et tamen
281rb Pv non quelibet illorum sequitur cum omni | determinatione, quia non sequi-
tur materia et quantitas convertuntur, et quantitas per se est divisibilis, 10
ergo materia per se est divisibilis.
49rb M Item, quia individuum aut singulare includit formaliter | rationem
forme et rationem materie, ideo cum dicitur individuum aut singulare est
per se cognoscibile, ly per se potest specificare subiectum ratione forme
contracte aut ratione materie contrahentis. Si primo modo, conceditur 15
quod individuum est per se cognoscibile; si secundo modo, dicitur quod
individuum est per accidens cognoscibile. Propterea sensus per se cogno-
scit sensibilia propria et communia, non in quantum sunt universalia,
sed in quantum sunt singularia, specificando formam et non specificando
materiam. 20
Ad quartum respondetur quod Philosophus loquitur de hiis individuis
qui cognoscuntur per se; constat autem quod Deus, intelligentie, Aristo-
teles, Antichristus et alia nominata cognoscuntur per accidens. Et si in
absentia individuorum sensibilium et mathematicorum cognoscuntur illa
per species derelictas in memoria aut in fantasia, non tamen per illas spe- 25
cies scitur utrum talia sunt vel non sunt, licet forte apparet illa esse sicut
in somniis. De speciebus autem scitur quod ille habent esse propter eter-
nitatem suam, sive actualem cognitionem habeat sensus sive non habeat,
ut habetur in littera.
Interrogationi vero h1036a13ssi. 30
Postquam Philosophus probavit conclusiones facientes pro solutione
secunde questionis, consequenter dat modum respondendi, dicens quod
questioni interroganti de prioritate et posterioritate totius et partis non
est respondendum simpliciter uno modo, sed multipliciter cum distinc-
tione, eo quod totum et pars sunt nomina equivoca, et de toto et parte sunt 35
intelligibilem] intellectualem Pv arguitur] quod add. Pv quod secl.

conceditur] concedatur Pv dicitur] dicatur Pv quod om. M Deus]
et add. Pv Aristoteles] et add. Pv
366 pauli veneti
diverse opiniones. Quedam enim dicit quod quelibet res est tota essentia
sua, quedam vero dicit contrarium. Quando ergo queritur utrum circu-
lus et angulus rectus et animal sunt priora aut posteriora suis partibus
in quas dividitur et ex quibus componitur ipsum totum, non est statim
respondendum quod sic, nec statim respondendum quod non, sed debet 5
precedere distinctio de toto circulo et partibus eius, et sic de aliis. Debet
etiam precedere recitatio opinionum de re et essentia sua, et per hanc
viam est obviandum et respondendum ad illam questionem.
Lege Litteram: Interrogationi vero obviare est necesse, quando quis
interrogat utrum rectus et circulus et animal priora sunt partibus aut in 10
quas dividuntur et ex quibus sunt ipsa tota priores sint partes, quia non
simpliciter est respondendum, sed multipliciter.a
Prima ergo opinio est quod res et sua essentia sunt idem, ita quod ani-
mal aut animatum est anima, dato quod anima sit essentia animalis aut
corporis animati, et circulus est essentia circuli, et rectus est quiditas et 15
essentia recti, et sic de aliis quibuscumque. Tenendo ergo istam opinio-
nem, non statim est respondendum ad questionem factam de prioritate
et posterioritate partium et totius, sed prius per distinctionem est viden-
dum quid est prius et quid posterius, et quo aliquid est prius et posterius:
ut puta si partibus diffinitis alique partes sint priores aut posteriores, et 20
quo recto est aliquis rectus prior aut posterior, aut de circulo et animali,
quo circulo est aliquis circulus prior vel posterior, et quo animali aliquod
animal prius et posterius.
Lege litteram: Si quidem enim est et anima animal aut animatum, aut
unumquodque unicuique sue essentie est idem, et circulus quod circulo 25
esse, et rectus quod recto esse et substantia recti: quid quidem et quo dicen-
dum est posterius, puta hiis que in ratione, idest in diffinitione et quo recto
est aliquis rectus prior aut posterius.b
Distinctio de toto est ista: quod duplex est totum, videlicet universale et
particulare. Totum universale est quodlibet superius respectu sui inferio- 30
ris, ut rectus et circulus et animal; totum particulare est quodlibet singu-
281va Pv lare, sive sit singulare signatum, | ut hic rectus hic circulus, sive singulare
vaguus, ut aliquis rectus aliquis circulus, iuxta doctrinam Aristotelis in
et sic de aliis] de toto angulo recto et partibus eius ac etiam de toto animali et partibus
eius Pv et1] ex M et scr.] ex M Pv et] de add. Pv circulus prior inv. Pv
unicuique] que uniuscuiusque Moerb. (que unicuique P) ut om. M
10, 1036a1620 (AL XXV 3.2, p. 152, lin. 559563).
Predicamentis,a dicentis quod aliquis homo aliquis equus est substan-

49va M tia prima. | Consimiliter distinguitur pars, dicendo quod duplex est pars,
scilicet formalis et materialis. Formalis est illa que est de ratione totius, et
sic genus et differentia sunt partes formales speciei; pars materialis est illa
que non est de ratione totius, ut es, lignum aut incisiones circuli respectu 5
circuli universalis. Unde triplex est circulus seu rectus, videlicet in mate-
ria sensibili, ut circulus ereus aut rectus lapideus, in materia intelligibili, ut
circulus aut rectus in lineis singularibus, et circulus sine materia ac etiam
rectus, ut circulus et rectus in universali non contractus ad determinatam
materiam. Constat enim quod nulla pars circuli concernentis materiam 10
est de ratione circuli, quia, sicut nullus circulus est de ratione circuli uni-
versalis, ita nulla pars circuli materialis est de ratione circuli universalis,
et ita dicatur de recto et animali.
Ex istis distinctionibus est soluta questio, dicendo quod partes formales
sunt priores toto, et hoc aut omnes aut quedam; partes autem materiales 15
omnes sunt posteriores toto, ita quod aliquod est totum cuius omnes
partes formales sunt priores, ut rectus et circulus, aliquod autem est totum
cuius non omnes partes formales sunt priores toto, sed alique priores et
alique simul, ut animal et planta: cor enim est simul cum animali et radix
est simul cum planta. 20
Lege Litteram: Etenim quidem hic cum materia, quia eneus rectus, et
qui in lineis singularibus; hic autem sine materia hiis que in ratione posterior
est partibus, eis vero que in singularibus partibus prior, simpliciter autem
non est dicendum, idest respondendum, sed cum distinctione.b
Secunda opinio est quod res est aliud ab essentia sua, ita quod animal 25
non est anima, dato quod anima sit tota essentia animalis, ut multi con-
cesserunt, neque rectus est essentia recti, non etiam circulus est essentia
aut quiditas circuli. Iterum, tenendo hanc opinionem, non est simplici-
ter respondendum ad questionem de prioritate et posterioritate totius
et partium, sed premittende sunt distinctiones eo modo quo dictum est, 30
concedendo quod alique partes sunt priores toto et alique posteriores, sic
quod de aliquibus est concedendum quod ipse sunt priores toto, ut de for-
malibus, et de aliquibus non est concedendum, ut de materialibus. Dato
scilicet] videlicet Pv es] aut add. Pv aut om. M et] sic add. M quidem
hic] hic quidem Moerb. (inv. Da) quia] qui Moerb. hiis] quidem add. Moerb.
animalis] sua M
a Aristotle, Cat., 5, 2a1114. b Aristotle, Met., VII, 10, 1036a2023 (AL XXV 3.2, p. 152, lin. 563
567).
368 pauli veneti
ergo quod tam animal quam rectus quam circulus sit aliud ab essentia sua,
adhuc est concedendum quod partes formales sunt priores hiis et partes
materiales posteriores.
Lege Litteram: Si vero est altera res ab essentia et non est anima
animal, sic hoc quidem dicendum, illud autem non dicendum, sicut dictum 5
est.a
sexto, quod omnia ista dicuntur equivoce et secundum attribu-
tiones diversas. Quiditas enim recti universalis, et est forma, attri-
buitur recto secundum quod sunt idem: dicimus enim quod quiditas 10
recti est rectus et dicimus quandoque quod quiditas recti est forma
eius quod existit in recto, et secundum hoc forma recti non erit rec-
tus, sicut anima non est animal.b
Intendit Commentator quod totum et pars, prius et posterius, rectus,
circulus et animal sunt nomina equivoca. Nam totum significat totum 15
universale et totum particulare diversis rationibus: significat enim totum
universale ut componitur ex partibus subiectivis, totum vero particulare
ut componitur ex partibus integrantibus. Pars etiam equivoce significat
partem formalem et partem materialem: significat enim partem forma-
lem ut constituit totum universale, et significat partem materialem ut 20
constituit totum particulare. Prius vero et posterius equivoce dicuntur,
secundum quod aliquid est alio prius vel posterius secundum formam aut
281vb Pv secundum | materiam. Consimiliter dicitur de recto et circulo et ani-
mali, quod rectus significat angulum rectum universalem et angulum
49vb M rectum particularem, circulus | significat circulum universalem et cir- 25
culum particularem, animal vero significat animal universale et animal
particulare, et hec omnia significantur diversis rationibus, ut superius est
ostensum.
Item, omnia ista habent attributiones diversas secundum quod nomen
aliter attribuitur toti universali et aliter attribuitur toti particulari, ali- 30
ter parti secundum formam et aliter parti secundum materiam, prop-
ter quam causam aliquando conceditur quod forma recti est rectus et
animal] et add. Moerb. hoc] hec Moerb. illud] hec Moerb. secundum
attributiones diversas] attributionibus diversis Iunt. recti2] et add. Iunt. quod
om. Iunt. totum] totam Pv ut2particulare prae significat M dicitur]
dicatur Pv diversas om. M attribuitur1 om. Pv causam om. M
a Aristotle, Met., VII, 10, 1036a2425 (AL,XXV 3.2, p. 152, lin. 567569). b Averroes, In Met.,
VII, t.c. 36, fol. 188D.
aliquando quod forma recti non est rectus. Cum enim omnis quiditas sit
forma, et aliquando attribuitur recto secundum quod est idem cum recto
et aliquando secundum quod non est idem, sed solum altera pars com-
positi, necesse est quod secundum primam attributionem concedamus
quod forma recti non est rectus. 5
mento, quod angulus rectus dicitur de illo qui est in materia, scilicet
particulari, et dicitur de illo qui est non in materia, scilicet universali;
et similiter circulus dicitur de hiis duobus modis. Universalia autem
istorum sunt post partes sue diffinitionis et ante partes que sunt in 10
particularibus et ante particularia et cetera.a
Sed dubium est quomodo rectus aut circulus universalis sit sine mate-
ria, cum non stet angulum rectum esse sine lineis neque circulum absque
quantitate continua. Deinde, si quiditas recti est rectus et quiditas circuli
est circulus, necesse est quiditatem tam recti quam circuli esse in eodem 15
subiecto in quo est rectus aut circulus; constat autem quod subiectum
talium est quantitas continua, que dicitur materia intelligibilis; ergo cir-
culus universalis, qui est quiditas circuli, est in materia.
Respondetur quod Commentator non loquitur de materia sensibili, sed
de materia intelligibili, non quidem universali, sed particulari, ita quod 20
rectus aut circulus particularis est in materia particulari, in qua non est
rectus neque circulus universalis, sed in materia universali. Sicut enim
materia sensibilis universalis est de ratione animalis et est pars formalis
eius, non autem materia sensibilis particularis, ita materia intelligibilis
universalis est de ratione recti aut circuli, non autem materia intelligibilis 25
particularis. Et si arguitur quia idem est circulus universalis et particularis;
sed particularis est in materia particulari; ergo etiam circulus universalis
est in eadem materia particulari; dicitur quod illud est verum per accidens
et non per se, quomodo intendit Aristoteles et Commentator: sicut enim
circulo universali accidit circulus particularis, ita accidit circulo universali 30
quod sit in materia particulari. Propterea dicit Commentatorb quod rectus
et circulus universalis sunt ante sua singularia et ante partes suorum
singularium, licet sint posteriora partibus suarum diffinitionum. Constat
autem quod omne posterius accidit suo priori.
notandum secundo inv. Pv istorum] ista Iunt. sine] absque Pv materia

particulari inv. Pv intendit] intelligit M
a Averroes, In Met., VII, t.c. 36, fol. 188EF. b Averroes, In Met., VII, t.c. 36, fol. 188EF.
370 pauli veneti

quod non attribuuntur adinvicem attributione vera quocunque
modo attributionis, sicut anime ad animal: dicere enim quod animal
est anima est falsum, et quod est animatum est verum.a
Intendit Commentator quod, licet concedendum sit quod anima est 5
forma animalis, non tamen concedendum quod animal sit anima, quia
animal est forma totius, que est quiditas animalis, non autem est forma
partis, que est altera pars compositi; ideo animal est animatum, non
autem anima. Et in hoc erravit Lincolniensis, dicens, secundo Posterio-
rum,b quod forma est verum esse rei, et quod non requiritur materia nisi 10
ad deferendum illud verum esse rei, et quod, si forma esset separata, ipsa
esset verius res quam sit materie coniuncta.
Sed dubitatur, quia Philosophus, nono Ethicorum,c movens questionem
utrum amator sui ipsius sit laudabilis, arguit [Philosophus] quod non,
quia, propter nimis amare se ipsum, sequitur homo delectationes sensibi- 15
les, faciens iniustitias, rapinas et alias iniquitates. Et respondet quod, licet
282ra Pv homo habeat animam et corpus, non tamen est corpus sed intellectus, | et
50ra M ideo | amans intellectum et rationem amat seipsum, et talis est iustus et
laudabilis. Secundum quod amat corpus, postponens intellectum et ratio-
nem, non amat se ipsum, et talis non est laudabilis, quia iniustus est, ex 20
quo videtur velle Philosophus quod homo sit anima sua.
Respondetur quod illa propositio homo est intellectus accipienda est
in predicatione tali ad hunc sensum, quod homo est principaliter prop-
ter intellectum et non propter corpus, quia ab intellectu recipit nomen et
diffinitionem, non autem a corpore. Cum ergo unusquisque denominari 25
debeat a parte principaliori, ille dicitur diligere se ipsum qui diligit ani-
mam suam, non autem ille qui diligit corpus suum. Et quia anima est pars
principalior, ideo dicimus eundem hominem et eundem equum tanto
tempore vivere, non obstante quod totum corpus substantialiter varietur,
ex eo quod anima maneat semper eadem numero absque variatione sub- 30
stantiali. Dicimus etiam sanctos iam in paradiso felicitari propter beati-
tudinem animarum, non obstante corporum apud nos incineratione iam
facta.
notandum tertio inv. Pv attributionis] fit add. Iunt. anima] animal Pv

Philosophus secl. recipit] recepit Pv maneat semper inv. Pv
a Averroes, In Met., VII, t.c. 36, fol. 188F. b Robert Grosseteste, In Post., II, 2, ed. Rossi, p. 330,
lin. 559564. c Aristotle, Eth. Nic., IX, 8.

Circa predicta dubitatur de principio individuationis, quod est illud

per quod aliquid est formaliter individuum. Ad quam questionem diver-
simode respondetur secundum diversitatem opinionum.
Quarum prima est quod materia est principium individuationis, quia,
quinto huius,a dicit Philosophus quod illud est unum numero quorum 5
materia est una, et in hoc septimob dicit quod generatum est divisum
a generante per materiam; et Commentator in libro Celic ait quod in
separatis a materia numerus specierum est equalis numero individuorum;
ergo multitudo individuorum in eadem specie est propter materiam, ita
quod Socrates et Plato sunt plura individua in specie humana ratione 10
materie, et per consequens materia est principium individuationis.
Ista opinio habet instantiam, quia substantie separate, secundum
Commentatorem iam allegatum,d cum quelibet earum sit hoc aliquid in se
non divisum a quolibet alio divisum, non tamen in eis invenitur materia.
Puncta etiam sunt individua, cum sint in se non divisa neque recipiunt 15
individuationem a materia, quia non a materia sensibili neque intelligi-
bili, ut patet. Unde arguitur sic: quelibet res tam primo est individuum
quam primo habet esse; sed forma prius habet esse quam sit in materia;
ergo forma prius est individuum quam sit in materia, et per consequens
non recipit individuationem a materia. 20
Secunda opinio dicit quod forma est principium individuationis, eo
quod idem est principium individuandi et ab aliis distinguendi; sed forma
est principium distinguendi; ergo etiam est principium individuandi.
Minor patet, quia, per idem, est unumquodque id quod est et ab alio
distinguitur; constat autem quod per formam unumquodque est id quod 25
est. Dicit enim Commentator, primo De anima,e quod membra leonis et
cervi non differunt invicem nisi quia anima differt ab anima, et per con-
sequens, sicut diversitas forme est principium multiplicandi, ita unitas
forme est principium individuandi.
Hec opinio etiam habet instantiam, quia genera et species et differen- 30
tie, ac etiam diffinitiones, sunt forme per Aristotelem, secundo Phisicorum
et quinto huius,f non tamen sunt principia individuationis, ex quo sunt
in multis. Deinde, materia de se individua est et ipsa precedit formam
est formaliter inv. Pv per] propter Pv
a Aristotle, Met., V, 6, 1016b3233. b Aristotle, Met., VII, 8, 1034a58. c Averroes, In De coel.,
I, t.c. 92, pp. 169170, lin. 3035. d Cf. supra, tr. 1, c. 2, p. 100, 2. e Averroes, In De an., I, t.c.
53, p. 75, 1719. f Aristotle, Phys., II, 3, 194b2629; Met., V, 2, 1013a2629.
372 pauli veneti
eductam de potentia eius; ergo non recipit individuationem ab illa neque

apparet aliqua alia forma a qua individuetur; ergo et cetera.
Tertia opinio asserit quod quantitas est principium individuationis,
quia opposita habent fieri circa idem, per Aristotelem, in Postpredicamen-
tis;a sed divisio et indivisio sunt opposita; constat autem quod divisio est 5
per quantitatem, secundum Philosophum, primo Phisicorum;b ergo etiam
indivisio est per quantitatem. Cum ergo quodlibet individuum sit indi-
50rb M visum, necesse est quod ipsum sit tale per quantitatem. | Deinde, dicit
282rb Pv Philosophus, tertio Phisicorum,c quod omne divisibile est magnitudo | vel
multitudo; ergo substantia non est divisibilis neque indivisibilis nisi per 10
quantitatem, si opposita habent fieri circa idem. Patet maior, quia tam
magnitudo quam multitudo est quantitas rerum.
Hec opinio habet instantiam, quia Deus et intelligentie sunt individua,
in quibus tamen non invenitur quantitas. Deinde, substantia est prior
accidente et causa quantitatis, per Aristotelem, in hoc septimo;d ergo 15
non recipit individuationem a quantitate, ymmo neque multitudinem
partium, quia, sicut se habet totum ad totum, ita pars ad partem; sed tota
materia est prior tota quantitate; ergo partes materie sunt priores partibus
quantitatis.
Quarta opinio concedit quod generans est principium individuationis, 20
quia non generatur quiditas nisi secundum quod est in individuo, per
Aristotelem in hoc septimo,e non autem generatur individuum nisi secun-
dum quod est terminus generationis; constat autem quod generatio est
effectus generantis; ideo illud quod est principium generationis est etiam
principium individuationis. 25
Sed hec opinio minus videtur vera quam alie, quia Deus et intelligentie
sunt individua et tamen non generantur, quia non inceperunt esse. Simi-
liter, materia et quantitas et corpora celestia sunt individua, et tamen non
recipiunt individuationem a generante, quia sunt perpetua et eterna.
Dicendum ergo quod, in rebus compositis ex materia et forma, tam 30
materia quam forma est principium individuationis, quia illud est prin-
cipium individuationis per quod aliquid est hoc aliquid singulare; con-
stat autem quod tam per materiam quam per formam ipsum composi-
tum est hoc aliquid singulare; non tamen sunt eodem modo principia
et eterna om. M ipsum om. M
a Aristotle, Cat., 11, 14a1516. b Aristotle, Phys., I, 2, 185b3234. c Aristotle, Phys., III, 5,
204a1112. d Aristotle, Met., VII, 1, 1028a31ff. e Aristotle, Met., VII, 8, 1033b58 et passim.
individuationis, quia materia est principium potentiale et forma est prin-

cipium actuale. In rebus autem simplicibus, nec materia nec forma est
principium individuationis; ideo quelibet talis res est individua per se
ipsam, aliter procederetur in infinitum. Deus ergo et intelligentie, ac
etiam materia et forma, sunt individua per se ipsa positive, privative 5
autem sunt individua per indivisionem, que est quedam privatio aut nega-
tio, ut dictum est quarto huius.a Et quia privatio habet rationem materie,
ideo dicimus quod materia est principium individuationis; et quia tam
materiam quam privatio secundum quod huiusmodi non est per se cogno-
scibilis, dictum est quod individuum secundum quod huiusmodi non per 10
se cognoscitur, sed per accidens.
Ad primam opinionem dicitur quod, licet illud sit unum numero cuius
materia est una, loquendo de numero naturali, et generatum dividatur
a generante propter materiam, et in separatis non sit maior numerus
individuorum quam specierum, non propter hoc sequitur quod solum 15
materia sit principium individuationis; nec etiam est verum quod sola
materia sit causa multitudinis individuorum in eadem specie, quia Sortes
et Plato non differunt solum per materiam, sed etiam per formam.
Ad secundam opinionem dicitur quod solum probat formam esse prin-
cipium individuationis in compositis ex materia et forma, non autem 20
probat generaliter in omnibus; neque in compositis sola forma est prin-
cipium individuationis, sed etiam materia. Quando vero dicit Commen-
tatorb quod membra leonis et cervi non differunt et cetera, responde-
tur quod loquitur de distinctione specifica et non de distinctione mate-
riali. 25
Ad tertiam opinionem respondetur quod divisio et indivisio que sunt
passiones quantitatis non inveniuntur nisi per quantitatem, sed divisio
et indivisio que sunt passiones entis transcendentis, sequentes unum et
multa transcendenter sumpta, inveniuntur in rebus preter quantitatem,
sicut etiam unitas et multitudo; propterea multa sunt individua carentia 30
quantitate.
282va Pv Ad quartam | opinionem dicitur quod generans est principium extrin-
secum individuationis; ideo, corrupto generante, adhuc generatum rema-
net individuum, quia remanent in eo principia intrinseca individuatio-
ideo om. Pv et cetera] nisi quia anima differt ab anima Pv entis transcendentis
inv. Pv
a Aristotle, Met., IV, 2, 1004a917. b Cf. Averroes, In De an., I, t.c. 53, p. 75, 1719.
374 pauli veneti
50va M nis, | que sunt materia et forma. In hac tamen difficultate non ultra me
extendo, quia in quarto huiusa diffusius sum locutus.
Dubitatur autem merito h1036a26ssi.

Ista est tertia pars huius capituli, in qua Philosophus dubitat circa dicta,
et facit duo. Nam primo facit quod dictum est, secundo autem exequitur 5
de intento, ibi: Quecumque ergo h1036a31ssi.
Quantum ad primum dubitat Philosophus de partibus speciei et de par-
tibus individui, que sunt partes speciei et que non, et ratio dubitationis
est hec: quoniam dictum est in quarta conclusioneb responsiva ad secun-
dam questionem quod universale diffinitur et non singulare, seu species 10
et non individuum. Ex quo sequitur quod partes speciei et non individui
sunt ille que ponuntur in diffinitione. Et ideo oportet cognoscere partes
speciei, que dicuntur partes secundum formam, et partes individui, que
dicuntur partes secundum materiam, quoniam, ignoratis huiusmodi par-
tibus, numquam erit manifestum que et qualis debet esse diffinitio rei. 15
Lege litteram: Dubitatur autem merito que speciei sunt partes et que
non, sed simul sumpti, idest individui. Hoc enim non manifesto existente
non est diffinire unumquodque; universalis enim et speciei est diffinitio. Que
ergo sunt partium ut materia et que non, si non fuerint manifeste, nec ratio
erit manifesta, idest diffinitio.c 20
Notandum, secundum Commentatorem, commento tricesimo sep-
timo, quod diffinitio est intentionis universalis et forme, idest uni-
versalis, et proprie non congregati ex materia et forma, ut declara-
tum est in Posteriobus Analiticis.d
Diffinitio ergo est intentionis universalis et non intentionis singularis, et 25
est forme universalis et non forme singularis, quoniam species est illa que
proprie diffinitur, non autem genus, quia non habet partes, neque indivi-
duum, quia, si habet partes, scilicet materiam et formam, ille tamen non
ingrediuntur diffinitionem, quia diffinitio competit multis, partes autem
individui competunt uni tantum. Si ergo genus aut individuum diffini- 30
tur, hoc non est proprie, scilicet per propriam rationem, sed per rationem
speciei, ut in libro secundo Posteriorume declaratur. Quia ergo tam genus
ergo] igitur Moerb. manifesta] que rei add. Moerb. materia forma] forma
materia Pv Iunt. et1 om. M intentionis om. M
a Paulof Venice, Exp. Met., V, tr. 2, c. 1, M, vol. a3, fol. 66rbva; Pv, fol. 178rava. b Cf. supra,
p. 343, 3233. c Aristotle, Met., VII, 11, 1036a2631 (AL XXV 3.2, p. 152, lin. 570574).
d Averroes, In Met., VII, t.c. 37, fol. 189BC. e Aristotle, An. Post., II, 13, 97b2539.
quam individuum habet rationem materie, et nullum istorum habet ratio-

nem diffinibilis, crediderunt Platonici quod numquam materia ingredie-
retur diffinitionem rei, sed solum forma, sicut antiqui, non cognoscentes
formam, solam materiam posuerunt in diffinitione rei. Aristoteles autem,
tenens medium, ostendit hic quod non solum forma, sed etiam materia 5
ingreditur diffinitionem rei, non tamen quecumque forma neque que-
cumque materia, sed determinata secundum conditionem diffinibilis.
Quecumque ergo h1036a31ssi.
Hac dubitatione premissa, Philosophus respondet per quatuor conclu-
siones, quarum prima est ista: materia sensibilis non est pars speciei in 10
rebus mathematicis. Secunda conclusio: materia sensibilis est pars spe-
ciei in rebus naturalibus, ibi: Hoc autem aufferre h1036b2ssi. Tertia con-
clusio: materia intelligibilis est pars speciei in rebus mathematicis, ibi:
Quoniam autem hoc h1036b7ssi. Quarta conclusio: non quelibet materia
intelligibilis est pars speciei in rebus mathematicis, ibi: Circa mathematica 15
h1036b32ssi.
Prima conclusio arguitur sic: illud non est pars speciei a quo sepa-
rari potest species illa; sed a materia sensibili potest separari species rei
mathematice; ergo materia sensibilis non est pars speciei in rebus mathe-
maticis. Tenet consequentia cum maiori, quia pars speciei est pars forma- 20
lis competens illi speciei secundum quod huiusmodi. Minor vero patet
282vb Pv in-|-ductive, quoniam es, lapis et lignum sunt materie sensibiles in qui-
bus recipitur forma circuli, que est species mathematica; constat autem
circulum separari a qualibet istarum materiarum, quia invenitur circulus
qui non est in ere neque in lapide neque in ligno. Et dato quod omnes cir- 25
50vb M culi essent in ere, non propter hoc es dici deberet pars circuli | secundum
speciem, quia pars secundum speciem est de intellectu speciei; constat
autem quod es non est de intellectu circuli, sive ponatur circulus separari
ab ere et inveniri in aliis materiis, sive non separari ab ere sed inveniri tan-
tum in ere: mathematicus enim intelligit circulum nulla intellecta materia 30
sensibili, sive sit es sive aliqud aliud, quia abstrahentium non est menda-
cium, ut habetur secundo Phisicorum.a
Lege Litteram: Quecumque ergo videntur facta in diversis specie, ut
circulus in ere et lapide et ligno, hec quidem ergo manifesta esse videntur,
quia nichil circuli substantie, idest speciei, est es nec lapis propter separari 35
habet1] habent M separari potest inv. M aliis] diversis Pv ergo]

quidem igitur Moerb. ere et lapide Pv Moerb.] lapide ere M ergo om. Moerb.

376 pauli veneti
ab ipsis. Que vero non videntur separata, nichil prohibet similiter hiis se
habere, ut si circuli omnes videantur enei; nichil utique minus non erat es
speciei pars circuli.a
Notandum, secundum Commentatorem, commento tricesimo sep-
timo, quod si forma circuli esset propria cupro et cuprum proprium 5
ei, ad modum secundum quod est in materiis rerum naturalium cum
suis formis, tunc non esset possibile cuprum esse sine forma nisi
diceretur cuprum equivoce, quodadmodum est impossibile carnem
existere sine sensu et motu nisi equivoce.b
Probat Commentator quod cuprum non est pars speciei circuli, quia, si sic, 10
ergo circulus est propria forma cupri, sicut sensus est propria forma carnis,
et cuprum est propria materia circuli, sicut caro est propria materia sen-
sus; et per consequens, sicut non invenitur caro sine sensu nisi equivoce,
ita non invenitur cuprum sine circulo nisi equivoce. Sed hoc est falsum,
quia cuprum secundum eandem rationem et formam invenitur in trian- 15
gulo, in quadrangulo et in aliis figuris. Fiat ergo hoc argumentum: circulus
aut separatur a cupro aut non. Si separatur, ergo cuprum non pertinet ad
speciem circuli. Si non separatur, aut ergo cuprum separatur a circulo aut
non. Si cuprum separatur a circulo, ergo non est de intellectu eius, ex quo
est tantum materia recipiens circulum, et per consequens non pertinet ad 20
speciem circuli; si autem cuprum non separatur a circulo, ergo est propria
materia eius non reperibilis absque circuloquod est falsum.
Dubitatur, quoniam, sicut se habet res ad esse, ita se habet ad cognosci,
per Philosophum, secundo huius;c sed circulus non potest esse absque
materia sensibili; ergo non potest cognosci absque materia sensibili. 25
Item, spericitas est propria passio celi et terre, alioquin non demon-
straretur in libro Celid terram esse spericam et celum esse spericum vel
rotundum; ergo tam celum quam terra est de intellectu spericitatis. Patet
consequentia, quia subiectum est de intellectu proprie passionis, ut patuit
superius; constat autem quod tam celum quam terra est materia sensibi- 30
lis.
nichil] enim add. Moerb. non om. Moerb. (non s.l. F2) circuli corr. ex Iunt.] cupri
MPv quod] quem Iunt. triangulo] et add. Pv reperibilis] reparabilis M
spericum vel om. Pv
a Aristotle,Met., VII, 11, 1036a31b2 (AL XXV 3.2, pp. 152153, lin. 574580). b Averroes, In
Met., VII, t.c. 37, fol. 189F. c Aristotle, Met., II, 1, 993b3031. d Aristotle, De coel., II, 4
passim; 13, 293b32294a10.
Ad primum negatur consequentia, quia Aristoteles per illam auctori-

tatem non plus intendit nisi quod tanta est cognoscibilitas rei quanta est
sua entitas, ita quod unumquodque tantum est cognoscibile quantum est
ens: ea enim que sunt magis entia magis sunt cognoscibilia, et que sunt
minus entia minus sunt cognoscibilia, et hoc secundum suam naturam. 5
Ad secundum dicitur quod spericitas non est propria passio celi neque
terre, sed est passio per se cuiuslibet illorum. Non tamen propter hoc
celum aut terra est de intellectu spericitatis, quia, et si spericitas est per
se passio celi aut terre, hoc non est perseitate passionis sed subiecti, quo-
51ra M niam illa passio non determinat sibi tale subiectum, sed econtra | illud 10
subiectum determinat sibi talem passionem. Propterea nasus est de intel-
lectu simitatis, et caput de intellectu crispitudinis, quia simitas determi-
283ra Pv nat sibi nasum pro subiecto, | ex quo non potest in alio inveniri; etiam
crispitudo determinat sibi caput, propter quam causam superius Philoso-
phusa simitatem vocavit accidens copulatum, albedinem vero dixit esse 15
accidens simplex.
Et si arguitur sic: idem est circulus et circulus cupreus; sed cuprum est
de intellectu circuli cuprei; ergo etiam est de intellectu circuli; negatur
consequentia, quia circulus et circulus cupreus sunt idem subiecto, sed
differunt ratione. Neque circulus cupreus est simpliciter forma mathe- 20
matica, sed est forma mathematica includens materiam naturalem. Ideo
cuprum, et si est pars speciei circuli cuprei, non tamen pertinet ad circu-
lum secundum speciem.
Hoc autem auferre h1036b2ssi.
Secunda conclusio: materia sensibilis est pars speciei in rebus natura- 25
libus.
Probatur. Illud est pars speciei a quo species separari non potest; sed
species rei naturalis non potest separari a materia sensibili; ergo et cetera.
Tenet consequentia cum maiori. Minor vero est evidens inductive, quo-
niam homo non potest separari a carne neque equus ab osse: est enim 30
valde difficile, ymmo impossibile, concipere mente hominem sine carne
et equum sine osse. Si ergo queritur utrum caro et os sunt partes speciei
humane, ac etiam diffinitionis hominis, aut non, oportet dicere quod sic,
quia species humana non potest esse indifferenter in aliis partibus sicut
in istis, eo modo quo forma circuli potest esse indifferenter in cupro et 35
non plus intendit] non intendit plus Pv est1 prae celum aut terra Pv quia] et M
a Aristotle, Met., VII, 5, 1030b1516.

378 pauli veneti
in lapide. Et dato quod circulus non esset nisi in ere, sicut nec homo nisi
in carne et osse, non propter hoc esset cuprum de ratione circuli, sicut
caro et os de ratione hominis, quia, et si circulus non esset nisi in ere, non
tamen determinaret sibi es secundum naturam suam, sicut determinat
sibi homo carnem et ossa et sanguinem; ideo per intellectum separatur es 5
aut cuprum a circulo, non autem caro et os ab homine.
Lege litteram: Hoc autem auferre mente est difficile, scilicet formam
naturalem a materia sensibili. Ut hominis species semper in carnibus appa-
ret. Utrum ergo et sunt partes huius speciei et rationis aut non, sed materia,
idest partes materiales? Sed quia non in aliis fiunt, non possumus separare. 10
Ideo sunt partes formales pertinentes ad speciem et ad diffinitionem.a
Notandum secundum Commentatorem, commento tricesimo sep-
timo, quod differentia inter formas que non habent materias pro-
prias, scilicet mathematicas, et formas naturales, que habent subiec-
tum proprium, verbi gratia forma hominis, que numquam est sine 15
carne et ossibus, est quoniam iste forme naturales difficile abstra-
huntur intellectu a suis materiis: impossibile enim est hominem
intelligere sine carne et ossibus. Forme autem mathematice, que
inveniuntur in pluribus una materia, intelliguntur abstracte a mate-
riis.b 20
Ista ergo est differentia inter formas naturales et mathematicas, quia
forma naturalis est in determinata materia, sic quod non potest esse alia
et repugnat nature sue esse in altera materia. Et quoniam huiusmodi est
materia sensibilis, ideo non potest intelligi forma naturalis absque mate-
ria sensibili. Forma autem mathematica non est in determinata materia 25
sensibili, sed quacumque data potest esse in alia; et dato quod sic esset in
una quod non posset esse in alia, adhuc non repugnaret nature sue esse
in alia. Et ex hoc potest intelligi forma mathematica absque materia sen-
sibili, sicut potest intelligi sol absque isto sole, non obstante quod forma
solis non possit esse absque isto sole: sufficit enim quod non repugnaret 30
nature solis esse in alio supposito et in alia materia.
Sed dubitatur, quoniam omne prius stat intelligi absque suo posteriori;
sed substantia est prior accidente cognitione, diffinitione et tempore,
et ossa om. Pv apparet] et ossibus et talibus partibus add. Moerb. huius speciei
inv. M : hec speciei Moerb. (huius speciei P) in] et in Moerb. (et om. Da) est post
differentia (lin. 13) Iunt. ergo est inv. Pv
t.c. 37, fol. 189G.

51rb M per Aristotelem, in hoc septimoa; | ergo stat intelligere hominem sine
quantitate, et consequenter absque carne et ossibus. Patet consequentia,
quia caro et ossa concernunt quantitatem sicut et qualitatem sensibilem.
283rb Pv Dicendum quod caro, os, epar et similia duo important, | scilicet unum
materiale, quod est substantia pura et unum formale, quod est accidens, 5
videlicet quantitas cum qualitate sensibili. Si ergo abstrahatur homo a
quantitate per intellectum remanebit caro, os et cetera secundum suum
esse materiale remoto esse formali. Ideo in tali abstractione, sicut intelli-
getur homo substantialiter tantum absque accidentibus, ita intelligetur
caro et os et alie partes hominis, tam homogenee quam etherogenee, 10
secundum suum esse materiale absque suo esse formali, quod est esse
quantificatum heti qualificatum. Potest ergo considerari homo secundum
puram quiditatem eius, et sic non concernit partes quantitativas formali-
ter sumptas; et potest considerari secundum suum esse existere, et sic non
intelligitur homo quin intelligatur caro, ossa et similia secundum suas for- 15
males denominationes.
Contra hanc responsionem instatur, ponendo quod homo sit absque
quantitate per divinam potentiam, aut per intellectum abstrahentem,
et sequitur hominem esse qui non est animal neque corpus animatum,
quia talis homo spoliatus quantitate non habet sensum tactus, eo quod 20
tactus requirit quantitatem cum determinata complexione qualitatum
primarum, ut habetur secundo De anima.b Si autem est aliquid non habens
tactum, illud non est animal, per Philosophum, secundo et tertio De
anima.c
Iterum, ille homo non est corpus cum nullam divisibilitatem habeat 25
nec partem extra partem. Et quoniam anima est actus corporis phisici
organici in potentia vitam habentis, ut diffinitur secundo De anima,d et
talis homo non habet corpus organicum phisicum, ex quo illi deficit
quantitas et figura, ergo ille homo non est animatus.
Respondetur quod nullum illorum sequitur, et conceditur quod ille 30
homo habet sensum tactus non secundum suum esse formale, quod est
quantificatum et qualificatum, sed secundum suum esse materiale, quod
est anima sensitiva existens in eadem materia in qua primo erat. Neque
os et cetera] et os et epar et similia Pv et suppl. ossa] et os Pv est aliquid

inv. Pv in om. Pv
a Aristotle, Met., VII, 1, 1028a3233. b Aristotle, De an., II, 11, 423b27424a5. c Aristotle, De
an., II, 2, 413b32414a3; 3, 414b34; III, 12, 434a2829; 13, 435a13; 435b2. d Aristotle, De an.,
II, 1, 412a2728.
380 pauli veneti
dicitur anima sensitiva quia actu sentiat, quia talis homo stante illa spo-
liatione sentire non potest, sed quia est apta nata sentire, que quidem
aptitudo non potest ad actum reduci nisi ille homo sit quantus et qualis.
Item, dicitur quod ille homo est corpus, non quidem de predicamento
quantitatis, sed de predicamento substantie, ex quo vere componitur ex 5
materia et forma substantialiter; et licet non habeat actu partem extra
partem propter defectum quantitatis, tamen habere potest, et ex hoc est
divisus non divisibilitate actuali sed potentiali. Et conceditur quod iste
homo est animatus cuius anima est actus corporis phisici organici, non
quidem actu, sed potentia et aptitudine. 10
De homine ergo habetur duplex consideratio, videlicet phisica, per
comparationem ad motum et ad operationes naturales, et metaphisica,
per comparationem tantum ad essentiam et quiditatem rei. Secundum
primam considerationem, corpus organicum est de ratione hominis tam
secundum esse materiale quam formale; secundum vero consideratio- 15
nem metaphisicam, corpus organicum est de ratione hominis secundum
esse materiale et non secundum esse formale. Plato autem voluit quod
materia sensibilis neque secundum esse formale neque materiale est de
essentia hominis, sicut nec circuli aut trianguli. Et in hoc eum reprobat
Philosophus. Quare et cetera. 20
Quoniam autem hoc h1036b7 ssi.
Tertia conclusio: materia intelligibilis est pars speciei in rebus mathe-
maticis.
Ista conclusio ponitur contra Platonicos, dicentes neque lineam neque
superficiem pertinere ad formas mathematicas. Et ut intelligatur tam con- 25
clusio quam opinio, Aristoteles facit duo, quoniam primo recitat opinio-
nem Platonicorum in duobus documentis; secundo vero probat conclu-
sionem reprobando opinionem illorum, ibi: Accidit itaque h1036b17i.
Primum documentum est hoc, quod Platonici, sicut a formis natura-
51va M libus | auferebant materiam sensibilem, ita a formis mathematicis mate- 30
283va Pv riam intelligibilem. Videntes enim quod | aliqua materia sensibilis non
est de ratione hominis, scilicet digitus, manus et similia, crediderunt nul-
lam materiam sensibilem esse de ratione hominis, ita quod, sicut aliquis
est homo sine digito et manu, ita aliquis est homo sine carne et osse, et
sine corde et cerebro. Deinde, percipientes quod nulla materia sensibilis 35
ille homo inv. Pv divisus Pv] divisibilis M voluit] dixit M manus et similia]
et manus aut pes aut tibia Pv manu] et sine pede et tibia add. Pv et2 om. M
est de ratione formarum mathematicalium, quia non es neque lapis est

de ratione circuli, crediderunt consequenter quod nulla materia sensibilis
sit de ratione formarum naturalium, eo quod, sicut forme naturales requi-
runt materiam sensibilem, ita et forme mathematice.
Ex isto fundamento dixerunt consequenter quod nulla materia intelli- 5
gibilis est de ratione formarum mathematicalium, videlicet circuli, trigoni
et huiusmodi, quoniam ita se habet materia intelligibilis, videlicet conti-
nuum et linea, ad circulum et trigonum, sicut se habent caro et ossa ad for-
mam hominis, aut lapis et es ad formam circuli vel trigoni; sed caro et ossa
non sunt de ratione hominis, neque lapis et es sunt de ratione circuli aut 10
trigoni, quia talia non ponuntur in diffinitione illorum; ergo continuum et
linea non sunt de ratione circuli et trigoni et aliarum formarum mathema-
ticalium. Non ergo dicebant illi hquodi diffiniuntur forme mathematice
continuo aut linea, sed per numeros, sic quod ratio circuli est ratio unius
propter unitatem linee, et ratio linee est ratio duorum propter dualitatem 15
punctorum, et ratio trianguli est ratio trium propter trinitatem angulo-
rum.
Lege Litteram: Quoniam autem hoc videtur contingere, scilicet mate-
riam sensibilem auferri a forma naturali, et est immanifestum quando
materia sensibilis est de ratione forme naturalis, dubitant quidem iam et in 20
circulo et trigono, quasi non competens lineis diffiniri et continuo, sed omnia
hec similiter dici ac si non carnes et ossa hominis et es et lapis circuli; et refe-
runt omnes ad numeros, et linee rationem eam que duorum esse dicunt.a
Secundum documentum est quod Platonicorum due fuerunt opinio-
nes, quarum una posuit tres gradus entium, scilicet sensibilium, intelli- 25
gibilium et mediorum inter ista. Isti enim posuerunt lineam sensibilem
et lineam mathematicam mediam et dualitatem huti speciem et ydeam
huius linee, dicentes quod species linee non est ipsa linea, quia linea
est medium, dualitas autem est species huius medii. Alia opinio asse-
ruit duos tantum esse gradus entium, videlicet sensibilium et specierum 30
separatarum, hii quidem non ponentes gradum medium, videlicet lineam
mathematicam inter lineam sensibilem et ydealem. Dixerunt quod linea
separata, que est species linee sensibilis, idem est quod ipsa dualitas, nec
formarum] naturalium vel add. et del. M lapis] neque lignum add. Pv ita] etiam
add. Pv caro] carnes Pv formam scr.] formas MPv et1] aut Pv quod suppl.
sic] ita Pv immanifestum] autem add. Moerb. et1] in add. Moerb. non]
non sit Moerb. (sit om. Da) non] ut Moerb. sensibilium] et add. Pv ut suppl.
382 pauli veneti
differunt linea separata et sua species. Omnes ergo isti ponentes species
et ydeas separatas, et si disconvenerunt in ponendo gradus entium, tamen
in hoc convenerunt quod tota essentia rei est species et ydea. Quia ergo
in mathematicis sicut in lineis duo intelligimus, videlicet continuitatem
et dualitatem in continuo, cum linea videatur esse dualitas punctorum, 5
posuerunt continuum esse materiam linee et non de ratione sua, totam
autem essentiam dixerunt esse dualitatem. Similiter, quia circulus est
quedam unitas in continuo, cum ex unica linea constet, crediderunt quod
forma et ydea circuli esset unitas, continuum autem esse preter essentiam
283vb Pv circuli et quasi materiale quoddam additum | essentie circuli. 10
In summa ergo dicit Philosophus quod ponentes tantum duos gra-
dus entium, dicunt dualitatem esse ydeam separatam et esse unum et
idem cum linea mathematica cuius est species, sicut est unum et idem
cum numero cuius est species; asserentes autem tres esse gradus entium,
dicunt dualitatem esse idem cum numero cuius est species, non autem 15
51vb M idem esse cum linea | cuius est species.
Lege Litteram: Et ydeas dicentium hii quidem ipsam mathematicam
lineam dualitatem dicunt esse, hii autem speciem linee dicunt esse idem
cum linea. Quidam autem esse eandem speciem et cuius est species, ut
dualitatem et speciem dualitatis, videlicet in numeris; in linea vero non 20
adhuc.a
Notandum quod, sicut de ratione materie prime est recipere substan-
tiam, sic de ratione quantitatis continue est recipere qualitatem, secun-
dum illud Aristotelis, in Predicamentis,b quanta fuerit superficies tantam
albedinem eius esse dicens, et quarto Phisicorumc: color est in homine 25
quia est in corpore, et est in corpore quia est in superficie. Ideo, inter
omnia predicamenta accidentium, quantitas continua maxime habet
rationem materie, et ex hoc vocatur materia, quia recipere est proprietas
materie, et quoniam prius potest abstrahi a posteriori. Quantitas autem
continua habet rationem prioris respectu qualitatis sensibilis, ideo quan- 30
titas continua potest abstrahi a qualitate sensibili; sic ergo abstracta non
potest vocari materia sensibilis. Vocabitur ergo materia intelligibilis et
erit subiectum formarum mathematicarum, sicut prima materia affecta
cum] videlicet Pv ipsam] -met Moerb. quidam] quedam Moerb. (quidam P)

autem] enim Moerb. eandem] eadem Moerb. (eandem P) est om. Pv sic]
ita Pv potest] possunt M
a Aristotle, Met., VII, 11, 1036b1317 (AL XXV 3.2, p. 153, lin. 590593). b Aristotle, Cat., 6,
5b12. c Aristotle, Phys., IV, 3, 210b45.
qualitatibus sensibilibus est subiectum formarum naturalium. Et quia

nulla materia videtur esse pars sue forme, propterea dixerunt Platonici
quod nec materia sensibilis est de ratione formarum naturalium nec
materia intelligibilis est de ratione formarum mathematicalium.
Accidit itaque h1036b17ssi. 5
Istis duobus documentis premissis, Aristoteles simul reprobat opinio-
nes Platonicorum, et demonstrat tertiam conclusionem, intendens talem
rationem: si numerus non est tota essentia rerum, continuum est de
ratione formarum mathematicarum; sed numerus non est tota essentia
rerum; ergo continuum est de ratione formarum mathematicarum, et per 10
consequens materia intelligibilis est pars speciei in rebus mathematicis.
Prima pars antecendentis fuit concessa ab eis, et secunda demonstra-
tur, inducendo duo inconvenientia dato opposito. Quorum primum est
quod ea que sunt diversarum specierum sunt eiusdem speciei, quoniam
triangulus et corpus sunt diversarum specierum, ut liquet. Et quod sunt 15
eiusdem speciei arguitur. Quecumque participant eodem numero sunt
eiusdem speciei, si numerus est tota essentia rerum; sed triangulus et
corpus participant eodem numero, scilicet ternario, propter tres lineas
repertas in triangulo et tres dimensiones repertas in corpore; ergo sunt
eiusdem speciei. Et istud inconveniens non solum accidit Platonici, sed 20
etiam Pitagoricis, qui antea posuerunt numeros esse totam essentiam et
quiditatem rerum.
Lege Litteram: Accidit itaque unam multorum esse speciem quorum
species videtur esse altera (quod et Pitagoricis accidit).a
Secundum inconveniens est quod tantum est una species omnium 25
rerum. Quod istud sit inconveniens manifestum est, quia tunc omnia
essent unum secundum speciem, neque esset differentia predicamento-
rum neque generum neque specierum, quod est absurdum. Et quod illud
sequatur ostenditur, quia secundum Platonicos caro et ossa non pertinent
ad essentiam hominis, neque linee ad speciem trianguli, et generaliter 30
nulla materia est pars speciei nec ad speciem pertinet; sed secundum eos
dualitas attribuitur materie, et unitas speciei; ergo sola unitas est species,
dualitas autem, et omnes alii numeri tanquam materiam implicantes, non
erunt species.
unam] unum Moerb.
384 pauli veneti
284ra Pv Lege Litteram: Et contingit unam omnium facere per se speciem, alia
vero non species erit propter unitatem. Quamvis sit alia species et sic
unum omnia erunt. Deinde Philosophus circa dicta epilogat, dicens: quod
quidem igitur habent dubitationem quandam que sunt circa diffinitiones,
et propter quam causam, dictum est,a scilicet propter materiam quam 5
Peripatetici dicunt esse partem speciei, Platonici vero dicunt contrarium.
Notandum, secundum Commentatorem, commento duodequadra-
52ra M cesimo, quod si unitas | existens in homine et in lapide est eadem,
necesse est ut forma hominis et lapidis sit eadem , et sic hoc nomen
unum non diceretur equivoce neque multipliciter, sed univoce ; 10
et quod trinitas existens in quantitate continua et discreta, et lapi-
dibus et animalibus et celis, facit omnia ista esse eiusdem nature, et
sic non erit differentia inter entia Et secundum hoc omnia erunt
numerus, et nichil erit hic extra naturam numeri, et cetera.b
Primum impossibile quod Commentator inducit contra Platonicos est 15
quod homo et lapis sunt eiusdem speciei, scilicet specialissime, quia
illa sunt eiusdem speciei quorum est eadem forma specie; sed hominis
et lapidis est eadem forma specie; ergo et cetera. Tenet consequentia
cum maiori. Et minor declaratur, quoniam unitas est forma tam hominis
quam lapidis secundum illam opinionem, et eiusdem speciei est unitas 20
in utroque illorum per eos, quia non distinguebant inter unum quod
convertitur cum ente et unum quod est principium numeri.
Secundum impossibile est quod hoc nomen unum non est equivocum
nec analogicum, sed solum univocum, quia illud nomen est tantum uni-
vocum quod plura significat secundum unicam rationem. Constat autem 25
quod hoc nomen unum omnia sua significata importat secundum uni-
cam rationem, si unitas est eiusdem rationis in omnibus de quibus dicitur
hoc nomen unum, ut illi voluerunt.
Tertium impossibile est quod quantitas continua et discreta, lapides et
animalia et corpora celestia, sunt eiusdem nature. Nam illa sunt eiusdem 30
nature que sunt eiusdem forme; sed hec omnia sunt eiusdem forme,
sicut etiam eiusdem numeri, quoniam trinitas invenitur tam in continuis
quam in discretis, tam in lapidibus quam in animalibus, quam etiam in
igitur M Moerb.] ergo Pv vero] autem Pv in2 om. Iunt. diceretur] dicetur
Iunt. trinitas] unitas Iunt. quorum scr.] quarum MPv unum om. Pv est1
om. M
VII, t.c. 38, fol. 190DF.
corporibus celestibus; constat autem secundum eos quod hoc nomen

ternarius est eiusdem rationis in omnibus de quibus predicatur.
Quartum impossibile est quod omnia sunt numeri nec aliquid inveni-
tur extra naturam numeri, quia omnia que sunt aut sunt unum aut plura;
et si plura, necesse est quod sint duo aut tria, et sic de aliis; constat autem 5
unum, duo et tria esse numeros. Et quod istud sit impossibile patet, quia
tunc una forma mathematica haberet plures quiditates et essentias
quod est falsum et contra illos: sicut enim in triangulo est trinitas angulo-
rum et linearum, ita est unitas superficiei, et per consequens tam unitas
quam trinitas est essentia et quiditas trianguli. 10
Quare omnia h1036b22ssi.
Reprobata opinione Platonicorum, Aristoteles solvit duas obiectiones,
quibus suadebant quod nulla materia sensibilis pertinet ad essentiam
formarum naturalium, ex quibus consequenter inferebant quod nulla
materia intelligibilis est de ratione formarum mathematicarum. 15
Primo quidem sic arguebant: digitus et manus non sunt de essentia
hominis; ergo, per idem, nec alia pars quantitativa.
Secundo: nec es nec lapis est de essentia circuli; ergo nec caro nec os
est de essentia hominis. Consequentia videtur tenere, quia, sicut forma
circuli recipitur in ere vel lapide, sic forma hominis in carne et osse. Quare 20
et cetera.
Respondet Philosophus, dicens quod omnia reducere ad numeros est
284rb Pv superfluum, et omnem auferre materiam ab essentia | rei est male con-
ceptum, quia alique sunt forme que necessario sunt in materia, aut se
habent sicut illa que habent formam in materia. Naturalia sunt illa que 25
proprie habent formam in materia, mathematica vero non habent proprie
formam in materia, eo quod continuum non est proprie materia, sed assi-
milatur materie. Ideo mathematica assimilantur naturalibus in quantum
proportio figure circuli aut trianguli ad lineas est sicut proportio forme
hominis ad carnes et ossa. Et ideo, sicut forma hominis non est sine car- 30
52rb M nibus et ossibus, ita forma circuli | vel trianguli non est sine lineis.
Ad primum dicitur quod consequentia non valet, quia, et si in digito et
in manu non est necessario forma hominis, forte est in aliqua alia parte,
scilicet in ea que est pars formalis et non pars materialis, propter quam
causam parabula de animali, quam consuevit dicere Socrates iunior, non 35
bene se habet.
aliquid scr.] aliquod MPv quod] illa add. Pv aut om. M nec3] non Pv
vel] et Pv sic] ut Pv aut] vel Pv et om. M
386 pauli veneti
Primo quidem Platonem vocat Aristoteles Socratem, quia in omnibus

libris suis intendit Socratem loquentem; secundo nominat eum iunio-
rem, quia Plato Socratis discipulus fuit; tertio opinionem Platonis de
immaterialitate naturalium specierum vocat parabulam, quia fabulis
assimilatur, que componuntur ut aliquam sententiam methaforice insi- 5
nuent, propter quod dixit Philosophus, tertio huius,a quod hec opinio assi-
milatur opinionibus fingentium deos esse, quorum forme sunt sicut forme
linee; quarto dicit quod Platonis opinio non bene se habet, quia a veritate
deviare facit, eo quod inducit audientem opinari quod ita contingit homi-
nem esse sine partibus quantitatis, sicut contingit circulum esse sine ere 10
et sine lapide.
Lege litteram: Quare omnia reducere ita in numeros et auferre mate-
riam superfluum est; quedam enim forsan hoc in hoc sunt, idest habent
determinatam formam in determinata materia, aut sic hec habentia. Et
parabula de animali, quam consuevit Socrates iunior dicere, non bene se 15
habet; abducit enim a veritate et facit suspicari quasi contingens sit homi-
nem esse sine partibus, sicut sine ere circulum.b
Ad secundum respondet Philosophus negando consequentiam, dicens
quod non est simile de ere et de lapide respectu circuli et de carne et
osse respectu hominis, quia circulus non est forma sensibilis secundum 20
suam essentiam, cum intelligatur absque materia sensibili; propterea nec
es nec lapis est pars speciei circuli, nec ad illius essentiam pertinet. Ani-
mal autem, cum distinguatur a non animali motu et sensu, ut habetur
in libro De anima,c necesse est quod diffiniatur sensu et motu, quod fieri
non potest absque partibus quantitatis determinato modo se habentibus 25
ad motum et sensum: non enim manus est pars hominis qualitercumque
sumpta et disposita, sed solum quando est sic disposita quod potest perfi-
cere operationem manus, quod quidem fieri non potest absque anima,
que est principium motus. Ideo est necessarium quod manus sit pars
hominis secundum quod est animata, quia inanimata non est pars homi- 30
nis, sicut manus mortua vel depicta. Quia ergo animal concernit sensum
et motum et hec non sunt sine materia sensibili, ideo animal est forma
sensibilis importans materiam sensibilem de essentia ipsius.
dixit] d. M fingentium] fingentibus Pv ita Pv Moerb.] om. M hoc1] et add.

M hec M Moerb.] hoc Pv (Da Zlc) sumpta et om. Pv
a Aristotle,Met., III, 2, 997b910. b Aristotle, Met., VII, 11, 1036b2228 (AL XXV 3.2, pp.
153154, lin. 599604). c Aristotle, De an., II, 3 passim.
Lege litteram: Sed hoc non simile; sensibile namque aliquid forsan
animal, et sine motu non est diffinire, quare nec sine partibus se habentibus
qualitercumque. Non enim omni modo pars hominis est manus, sed potens
opus perficere, quare animata existens si est pars hominis; non animata
vero non pars amplius.a 5
quadracesimo, quod quia materia non potest esse extra formam,
manifestum est quod forme naturales, aut plures aut omnes, non
sunt extra materiam.b
Intendit Commentator hanc distinctionem, quod forma naturalis duplici- 10
ter potest accipi, videlicet communiter et proprie. Forma naturalis com-
284va Pv muniter sumpta est cui | secundum quod huiusmodi competit aliqua
operatio naturalis, et sic Deus et intelligentie sunt forme naturales, quia
naturaliter movent corpora celestia et naturaliter influunt in hec infe-
riora. Forma autem naturalis proprie sumpta est illa que secundum quod 15
huiusmodi est principium motus et quietis eius in quo est primo et per
52va M se, eo modo quo diffinitur natura secundo Phisicorum.c | Accipiendo ergo
naturalem formam stricte et proprie, sic nulla forma naturalis est extra
materiam; accipiendo autem large, dicatur quod non omnes forme natu-
rales sunt in materia, sed plures, quia Deus et intelligentie non sunt in 20
materia, sed forme horum inferiorum sunt in materia, ut probatur octavo
Phisicorum.d Et ita intendit Philosophus cum dicit in litterae quod quedam
forsan sunt hoc in hoc: loquitur enim dubitative, ne credatur omnes for-
mas naturales esse in materia.
mento, quod illud quod opinatur Plato, scilicet animal abstrac-
tum esse et hominem separatum esse, est falsum et extra rationem,
quoniam, si ita esset, tunc possibile esset hominem esse a non-
homine et sine corpore.f
Primum inconveniens quod inducit Commentator contra Platonem, 30
ponentem animal separatum et hominem abstractum, est illud quod
pars hominis est] hominis est pars Pv Moerb. materiam] animam M notandum
secundo inv. Pv animalesse2 Pv Iunt.] hominem abstractum et animal
abstractum esse M a non-homine] ante hominem Iunt.
VII, t.c. 39, fol. 191D. c Aristotle, Phys., II, 1, 192b2123. d Aristotle, Phys., VIII, 10, 266a1024
according to Averroess interpretation: In Phys., VIII, t.c. 78, fol. 423I424M. e Aristotle,
Met., VII, 11, 1036b2324. f Averroes, In Met., VII, t.c. 39, fol. 191E.
388 pauli veneti
nulla generatio hominis est univoca, quia generatio univoca est quando
generans et genitum sunt eiusdem speciei. Constat autem quod homo
generans et homo genitus non sunt eiusdem speciei, quia homo genera-
tus est animal et homo generans non est animal, cum non sit substantia
animata sensibilis, sed ydea immaterialis et separata. 5
Secundum inconveniens est quod homo generatur a non-homine, quia
generans hominem non est homo, eo quod homo est species specialis-
sima; sed homo generatus et ydea generans sunt diversarum specierum,
sicut materiale et immateriale; ergo et cetera.
Tertium inconveniens est quod aliquis est homo sine corpore, videlicet 10
homo separatus. Et quod istud sit inconveniens patet. Nam cum anima sit
actus corporis phisici organici, aliquis esset homo qui non esset animatus,
quod est absurdum.
quod illud quod separatur sermone existimatur separari secundum 15
esse, illud autem quod non separatur sermone quanto magis non
separatur in esse, et ideo sermo novus obviavit vero in hac opi-
nione.a
Unde arguitur Commentator sic: illa que non separantur intellectu, ad
quem sequitur sermo, non separantur in esse; sed forme naturales non 20
separantur in [esse] intellectu a materia sensibili, quia diffiniuntur per
materiam sensibilem; ergo non separantur in esse a materia sensibili.
Si enim ea non separantur in esse quorum unum non est de intellectu
alterius, ut albedo et dulcedo in lacte, quanto magis non separantur illa
secundum esse quorum unum est de intellectu alterius. Et per sermonem 25
novum intendit Commentator Platonem, ut exponit in commento Aristo-
telem, vocantem in antiqua translatione sermonem novum. Aliqui tamen
textus et commenti habent sermonum, sed sive scribatur sermonum,
sive sermo novus, semper est intelligendus Plato.
Notandum quarto, secundum Commentatorem, eodem commento, 30
quod res naturales in hoc sunt econtrario mathematicis: quiditas
enim naturalium non potest intelligi sine motu et sensu, sicut potest
intelligi quiditas mathematicorum.b
speciei] quia homo add. Pv notandum tertio inv. Pv novus om. Iunt. esse
secl. sednovus] qualitercumque scribatur M notandum quarto inv. Pv
quiditas potest1 M (potuit Pv)] quiditates possunt Iunt. potest2
quiditas] possunt quiditates Iunt.
a Averroes, In Met., VII, t.c. 39, fol. 191F. b Averroes, In Met., VII, t.c. 39, fol. 191F.
Non intendit Commentator quod nulla quiditas naturalis possit intel-

ligi quin capiatur et concipiatur sensus et motus, quia intelligitur quiditas
eris et lapidis absque eo quod concipiatur sensus. Sed intendit Commen-
tator quod, si intelligitur aliqua quiditas non concipiendo motum neque
sensum, illa non est quiditas naturalis, et si aliqua quiditas naturalis intel- 5
ligitur, necesse est quod concipiatur motus aut sensus, et consequenter
materia sensibilis. Forma ergo naturalis et forma mathematica sunt divisi-
biles et contrariantur si comparentur ad materiam sensibilem, quia forma
mathematica potest concipi preter materiam sensibilem: potest enim
concipi circulus preter omnem materiam concernentem sensibilitatem 10
284vb Pv vel mo-|-tum, cum circulus sit qualitas quarte speciei fundata in quanti-
tate; constat autem quod tam ex parte quantitatis quam ex parte qualitatis
52vb M potest concipi circulus preter calidum et frigidum, humidum | et siccum,
que sunt materia sensibilis. Forma autem naturalis, ut naturalis est, non
potest concipi preter motum et sensum, ut exemplificavit Philosophus de 15
animali. Si autem comparetur forma mathematica ad materiam intelligi-
bilem, et naturalis ad sensibilem, sic est similitudo et convenientia, quia,
sicut non contingit intelligere formam naturalem sine materia sensibili,
puta hominem sine carne et osse, sic non contingit intelligere formam
mathematicam, scilicet circulum aut triangulum, sine materia intelligi- 20
bili, quam Aristoteles vocat continuum.
Dubitatur contra conclusionem, quoniam substantia non est pars qua-
litatis; ergo, per idem, quantitas non est pars qualitatis; ergo linea non est
pars circuli neque trianguli. Tenet consequentia, quia linea est quanti-
tas ac circulus et triangulus est qualitas; si ergo materia intelligibilis est 25
quantitas continua et quelibet figura est qualitas, necesse est quod mate-
ria intelligibilis non sit pars speciei in rebus mathematicis pertinentibus
ad predicamentum qualitatis.
Respondetur quod linea est pars circuli secundum rationem et non
secundum rem, quoniam circulus, cum sit forma simplex, non componi- 30
tur ex quantitate et qualitate tanquam ex partibus integrantibus ipsum
circulum, sed tamquam ex partibus diffinientibus. Sicut enim in substan-
tiis et accidentibus simplicibus differentia adveniens generi constituit
speciem et ex hoc dicuntur partes speciei, ita in accidentibus [simplicibus
differentia adveniens generi constituit speciem et ex hoc dicuntur partes 35
capiatur et om. Pv quantitatis qualitatis] qualitatis quantitatis Pv se-

cundumrem] non secundum rem sed secundum rationem Pv , simplicibus
accidentibus secl.
390 pauli veneti
speciei ita in accidentibus] copulatis forma adveniens subiecto constituit

speciem, et ex hoc subiectum et forma dicuntur partes speciei. Figura ergo
adveniens linee carenti extremis in actu constituit circulum, et ex hoc
figura et linea sunt partes circuli, non quidem integrantes, sed diffinien-
tes: diffinitur enim circulus per hoc quod est figura una linea contenta. 5
Sic etiam dicebatur superiusa quod nasus est pars simitatis, non quidem
integralis, sed diffinitiva: nam concavitas adveniens naso constituit dif-
finitionem simitatis, et ex hoc concavitas et nasus dicuntur partes simi-
tatis non secundum rem, sed secundum rationem. Et secundum hoc non
inconvenit quod substantia est pars accidentis, non quidem integralis, sed 10
diffinitiva.
Et ergo dicendum quod triplex est pars, videlicet secundum rationem
tantum, ut nasus simitatis et linea respectu circuli, et secundum rem
tantum, ut digitus respectu hominis et semicirculus, et utroque modo,
ut corpus et anima respectu animalis et generaliter materia et forma 15
respectu compositi. Materia ergo intelligibilis est pars speciei in rebus
mathematicis predicamenti quantitatis, non quidem secundum rem, sed
secundum rationem. Et quoniam diffinitio dicitur quiditas et essentia rei,
conceditur secundum hoc quod substantia est de quiditate et essentia
accidentis, et quod materia sensibilis est de essentia et de quiditate forme 20
mathematice.
Si autem aliquando concessum est quod substantia non est de essentia
accidentis et quantitas non est de essentia qualitatis, illud est intelligen-
dum secundum rem, quia secundum rationem omne illud est de ratione
alterius, quod ingreditur diffinitionem quiditativam illius. Et ita inten- 25
dit Philosophus, primo Posteriorum,b dicens quod substantia linee est ex
punctis et substantia trianguli est ex lineis: predicatur enim puncta de
linea et linee de triangulo in primo modo dicendi per se, quod fieri non
posset nisi puncta essent de essentia linee, et linee essent de quiditate
trianguli. 30
Circa mathematica h1036b32ssi.
Quarta conclusio: non quelibet materia intelligibilis est pars speciei in
rebus mathematicis.
quiditas et essentia] essentia et quiditas Pv de quiditate et essentia] de essentia

et de quiditate Pv est2] sit M
a Cf. supra, pp. 324, 26325, 9. b Aristotle, An. Post., I, 4, 73a3437.

Ista conclusio sequitur ex dictis. Si enim ita se habet materia intelligibi-

lis ad formas mathematicas, sicut materia sensibilis ad formas naturales,
necesse est quod aliqua materia intelligibilis non sit pars speciei in rebus
mathematicis, sicut aliqua est materia sensibilis que non est pars spe-
285ra Pv ciei in rebus naturalibus. | Sicut enim digitus aut manus non pertinet ad 5
53ra M speciem | hominis, sed caro et os, ita pedale et bipedale non pertinet ad
speciem circuli, sed linea et continuum: non enim invenitur circulus qui
non sit in linea vel in continuo, sed aliquis est circulus qui non est in quan-
titate pedali vel bipedali. Et ideo tales partes circuli, licet pertineant ad
materiam intelligibilem, non tamen pertinent ad speciem circuli neque 10
trianguli, neque alterius figure mathematice.
Ex ista conclusione patet solutio unius questionis,a propter quid in
mathematicis diffinitiones partium non sunt partes rationum totorum, ut
quare semicirculi non ponuntur in diffinitione circuli, ex quo semicirculi
non important materiam sensibilem, sicut est lapis aut es, sed solum 15
materiam intelligibilem: ita enim semicirculus est materia intelligibilis
sicut linea.
Respondetur quod non est cura utrum talis pars sit materia sensibilis
vel intelligibilis, quia, sicut datur aliqua materia sensibilis que non est
pars speciei in naturalibus, ita est aliqua materia non sensibilis que non 20
est pars speciei in mathematicis. Omnis enim pars que non est pars
totius quod secundum se est quiditas et species, sed est pars singularis
et individui, sive sit sensibilis sive intelligibilis, talis pars non ponitur in
diffinitione totius. Et quia semicirculi non sunt partes circuli universalis
sed particularis, ideo non ponuntur in diffinitione circuli. 25
Lege litteram: Circa mathematica autem quare non sunt partes ratio-
nes rationum totorum, ut circuli emichilia, idest semicirculi? Non enim sunt
sensibilia hec. Aut nichil differt; erit enim materia quorundam et non sensi-
bilium, et omnis quod non est quid erat esse et species eadem secundum se
sed hoc aliquid. Talis pars non est diffiniens totum circulum. Circuli qui- 30
dem ergo non erit eius qui universalis, singularium vero erunt partes hec,
videlicet semicirculi, sicut dictum est prius. Est enim materia hec quidem
sensibilis, hec autem intellectualis.b
rationum Pv Moerb.] ratione M emichilia] emikiclia Moerb. (var. err. cod.)

ergo] igitur Moerb. hec] hee Moerb.
a Cf. supra, pp. 318, 23319, 10. b Aristotle, Met., VII, 11, 1036b321037a5 (AL XXV 3.2, p. 154,
lin. 608616).
392 pauli veneti
Contra hanc responsionem posset aliquis instare, dicens: corpus et

anima sunt de ratione hominis et ponuntur in diffinitione illius; ergo, per
idem, semicirculi sunt de ratione circuli et poni debent in diffinitione eius.
Patet consequentia, quia, sicut corpus et anima sunt partes hominis, ita
semicirculi sunt partes circuli. 5
Respondet Philosophus, negans consequentiam et similitudinem, quo-
niam semicirculi non sunt partes universales alicuius totius universalis,
sed sunt partes singulares circuli singularis; anima autem, que est forma
substantialis, et corpus, quod est eius materia, sunt partes universales
totius universalis. Nam tam anima quam corpus, quam etiam homo aut 10
animal compositum ex hiis, dupliciter sumitur, videlicet universaliter et
particulariter, quia datur anima communis et anima particularis, corpus
commune et corpus particulare, homo communis et homo singularis, sci-
licet Sortes et Coriscus. Et quoniam non habetur nomen proprium, debet
designari particulare seu singulare aut individuum per pronomen demon- 15
strativum, ut hec anima, hoc corpus, hoc animal. Neque obstat duplex
opinio de anima, quarum una posuit quod anima est tota essentia corporis
animati, alia autem quod est tantum pars, quia, sive sit anima tota essentia
rei sive pars illius essentie, adhuc sumitur dupliciter tam ipsa quam cor-
pus, scilicet universaliter et particulariter: nam, sive predicetur de toto 20
sive non predicetur, necesse est dare animam universalem et animam
singularem, corpus universale et corpus singulare. Sicut ergo hec anima
et hoc corpus non sunt de ratione hominis in communi neque ponun-
tur in diffinitione illius, quia sunt partes singulares posteriores homine
universaliter sumpto, et consequenter partes materiales respectu illius, 25
ita semicirculi non sunt de ratione circuli in universali neque ponuntur
in diffinitione illius, sed sunt partes singulares et materiales posteriores
circulo universaliter sumpto. Et sicut hec anima et hoc corpus sunt de
53rb M ratione huius hominis aut istius animalis, | non tamen ponuntur in diffini-
285rb Pv tione illius, quia singulare non diffinitur, | ita semicirculi sunt de ratione 30
alicuius particularis circuli, non tamen ingrediuntur diffinitionem illius
propter eandem causam.
Lege litteram: Palam autem et quod anima est quidem substantia
prima, idest forma substantialis, corpus autem materia; homo vero aut
animal quod est ex utrisque ut universale, Socrates autem et Coriscus ut 35
corpus] hic equus add. Pv illius] eius Pv in universali] universalis Pv ut1

scr. ex Moerb.] aut MPv universale] universaliter Moerb. (universale DaOP)
singulare, si quidem anima dupliciter dicitur: alii namque ut anima alii

vero ut totum; si vero simpliciter anima hec et corpus hoc, ut quod quidem
universale et singulare.a
quadracesimo, quod materia alia sensibilis, alia intelligibilis, et 5
utraque non individuatur nisi quia est in materia.b
Intendit probare Commentator quod in mathematicis est materia, quia in
eis reperiuntur plura eiusdem speciei, sicut plures linee et plures circuli;
sed ubicumque est plurificatio speciei in suppositis, necesse est materiam
esse, que est individuationis principium; oportet ergo aliquam esse mate- 10
riam in mathematicis, et ista est materia intelligibilis seu ymaginabilis,
scilicet quantum et continuum. Sicut ergo plurificantur individua natura-
lia sub eadem specie per materiam sensibilem, ita et individua mathema-
tica per materiam intelligibilem.
Sed dubitatur: si materia sensibilis est causa plurificationis individuo- 15
rum naturalium in eadem specie, et materia intelligibilis est causa plurifi-
cationis individuorum mathematicorum in eadem specie; constat autem
quod non est pluralitas individuorum in specie solis aut lune; ergo neque
in sole neque in luna est materia sensibilis vel intelligibilisquod est
falsum, quia tunc neque ad phisicum neque ad metaphisicum pertine- 20
ret consideratio de sole[et] cuius oppositum determinat Aristoteles,
secundo Posteriorum.c
Item, cum individuum concernat materiam, sicut species formam,
dicente Philosopho, primo Celi,d quod qui dicit celum dicit formam et
qui dicit hoc celum dicit materiam, et in substantiis separatis inveniuntur 25
individuum sicut species, per Aristotelem et Commentatorem, dicentem,
tertio De anima,e quod in eis idem est caro et carnis esse, sequitur quod
substantie separate habent materiam sensibilem vel intelligibilem, contra
Philosophum, octavo Phisicorum,f probantem quod separantur ab omni
materia et magnitudine. 30
Ad primum dicitur quod, licet materia sit causa plurificationis indi-
viduorum in eadem specie, non tamen quelibet materia est huiusmodi,
dupliciter dicitur] dupliciter Moerb. (dupliciter dicitur P) et utraque] utraque

enim Iunt. et secl.
t.c. 39, fol. 191K. c Aristotle, An. Post., II, 12 passim. d Aristotle, De coel., I, 9, 278a12
15. e Aristotle, De an., III, 4, 429b1013; Averroes, In De an., III, t.c. 9, pp. 421, 27422, 32.
f Aristotle, Phys., VIII, 10 passim.
394 pauli veneti
sed illa solum cui est annexa privatio et potentia ad formam. Quia ergo
materia celi non habet privationem neque potentiam ad formam, ideo illa
non est causa plurificationis individuorum in eadem specie. Et si queritur
de materia celi, utrum sit materia sensibilis vel intelligibilis, dicitur quod
est sensibilis, non formaliter, ex quo in ea non sunt qualitates prime, 5
sed virtualiter, in quantum est subiectum qualitatum celi producentium
qualitates primas in spera elementorum.
Ad secundum dicitur quod, sicut genus non est materia, sed habet
rationem materie, in quantum recipit differentias formales constituti-
vas specierum, ita individuum in substantiis abstractis non est mate- 10
ria sensibilis vel intelligibilis, neque includit aliquam talem materiam,
sed habet rationem materie in quantum ipsum incommunicabile est,
sicut et materia secundum se incommunicabile est. Et ideo solet dici
quod triplex est materia, scilicet sensibilis, intelligibilis et rationis: mate-
ria sensibilis est in rebus naturalibus, materia intelligibilis est in rebus 15
mathematicis, et materia rationis est in rebus divinis. Aut sub aliis ver-
bis quod est triplex materia, videlicet sensibilis, ymaginabilis et intelligi-
bilis: materia sensibilis est naturalium, materia ymaginabilis est mathe-
maticorum, materia autem intelligibilis est divinorum. Et sic intellec-
tus aliquando sumitur pro potentia rationali, et aliquando pro fantasia, 20
ut habetur tertio De anima.a Intelligentia etiam aliquando sumitur per
instructionem, aliquando per ymaginationem, ut supra ostensum est.b Ita
285va Pv materia intel-|-lectualis | potest sumi aut pro materia ymaginabili, eo
53va M modo quo accipit Aristoteles in littera, aut pro materia intelligibili, que
non potest esse nisi obiectum intellectus rationalis, eo modo quo iam dic- 25
tum est de individuatione, que dicitur esse materia divinorum alterius
rationis a materia naturali et a materia mathematica.
mento, quod congregatum habet duas significationes, scilicet signi-
ficationem individualem, verbi gratia Sortem et istum hominem, et 30
significationem universalem, verbi gratia hominem.c
Intendit Commentator quod, sicut species significat genus et differentiam
formalem, ex quibus constituitur totum universale, ita individuum signi-
ficat speciem et differentiam particularem, ex quibus constituitur totum
notandum secundo inv. Pv
a Aristotle, De an., III, 3, 427b2728. b Cf. supra, p. 361, 45. c Averroes, In Met., VII, t.c. 39,
fol. 191M.
particulare. Ipsum autem individuum Commentator vocat aggregatum,

quia aggregat in se omnia predicata quiditativa et omnes differentias for-
males supra ipsum usque ad transcendens. Est tamen differentia de indi-
viduis sicut de speciebus, quoniam, sicut species alique habent partes
secundum fidem et partes secundum ymaginationem, ut vult Commen- 5
tator, in prologo Phisicorum,a et alique habent solum partes secundum
ymaginationem, que sunt genus et differentia, ita aliqua individua habent
partes secundum fidem et secundum rationem. Verbi gratia, Sortes non
solum componitur ex materia et forma, sed ex humanitate et sorteitate.
Similiter, hec linea non tantum componitur ex partibus quantitatis, sed 10
etiam ex specie linee et hecceitate linee, iuxta illud Philosophi, primo
Celi:b Qui dicit hoc celum dicit formam et materiam, ita quod species
dicit formam, hecceitas autem dicit materiam. Generaliter ergo, species
et individua reperta in materia sensibili vel ymaginabili habent duplicem
compositionem, videlicet realem et rationis; species autem et individua, 15
que non habent nisi materiam intelligibilem et rationis, tantum unam
compositionem habent, ut in substantiis separatis componuntur quidem
species solum ex genere et differentia, individua vero solum componun-
tur ex specie et hecceitate.
Dubitatur, querendo utrum species predicetur de individuo aut non. Si 20
non, ergo nullus homo est homo nec aliquis circulus est circulusquod
est falsum. Si sic, primo sequitur quod species non est pars individui
cuius oppositum asserit Commentator.c Secundo sequitur quod quelibet
pars individui sit pars speciei, contra determinationem Philosophi.d
Respondetur quod species predicatur de individuo non obstante quod 25
sit pars individui, quia non est pars secundum rem, sed tantum secundum
rationem, ita quod non est pars realiter differens ab individuo, sed solum
ratione, sicut etiam genus non realiter differt a specie, sed solum ratione.
Et consequenter conceditur quod quelibet pars individui est pars speciei,
sic quod hec materia et forma Sortis est pars hominis in communi, et 30
semicirculi sunt partes circuli universalis, aliter non vocaret Philosophus
tales partes materiales et Commentator partes posteriores diffinito.
Ipsum ergo diffinitum, quod est species, habet partes priores et partes
secundum2] ymaginationem add. et del. M et individua reperta scr.] reperte et

individua MPv tantum scr.] tamen MPv sit] est Pv tantum om. Pv
ratione1] secundum rationem M
a Averroes, In Phys., I, t.c. 5, fol. 8DF. b Aristotle, De coel., I, 9, 278a1215. c Cf. infra,
pp. 451, 32452, 3. d Cf. supra, p. 357, 3435.
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posteriores: partes priores sunt partes formales et per se, partes autem
posteriores sunt materiales et per accidens. Unde, sicut individuum acci-
dit speciei, ita partes individui sunt per accidens partes speciei. Quando
ergo Aristoteles dicit quod partes individui non sunt partes speciei, neque
semicirculi sunt partes circuli, loquitur per se et non per accidens, quia ea 5
que sunt per accidens sunt relinquenda in scientia speculativa, per Ari-
stotelem, secundo Phisicorum et sexto huius.a
Utrum autem h1037a10ssi.
285vb Pv Circa predicta Philosophus respondet | ad duas questiones, quarum
prima est hec: utrum, preter substantiam que est materia aut forma eius 10
aut compositum ex hiis, sit querenda alia substantia separata, que dici-
tur numerus ad modum loquendi Pitagoricorum aut ydea ad modum
loquendi Platonicorum aut intelligentia ad modum loquendi Peripateti-
corum.
Secunda questio est ista: utrum diffinitio formarum naturalium sit una 15
53vb M ex quo partes speciei ingrediuntur | illam, ut dictum est.
Ad primam questionem respondet Philosophus quod sic. Non tamen
de tali substantia est adhuc facienda perscrutatio, sed posterius, videlicet
duodecimo huius,b quoniam, sicut cognitio talis substantie presupponit
cognitionem rerum sensibilium, ita perscrutatio de illa est posterior per- 20
scrutatione de substantiis sensibilibus: quicquid enim dictum est de sub-
stantiis sensibilibus, totum dictum est ut perveniamus ad cognitionem
substantie immaterialis separate. Unde, sicut duplex est philosophia, sci-
licet prima et secunda, prima philosophia est metaphisica et secunda est
phisica, ita duplex est forma, scilicet prima, que est substantia insensibilis, 25
et secunda, que est substantia sensibilis. Metaphisica ergo principaliter
considerat de forma que est substantia insensibilis et minus principaliter
de forma que est substantia sensibilis; econtra autem phisicus principali-
ter considerat de forma que est substantia sensibilis et minus principaliter
de forma que est substantia insensibilis. Et sicut metaphisicus non per- 30
scrutatur de substantia sensibili nisi propter substantiam insensibilem,
ita phisicus non perscrutatur de substantia insensibili nisi propter sub-
stantiam sensibilem.
et] partes add. Pv partes autem om. M et] partes add. Pv dicitur] dicatur
Pv illam] diffinitionem add. Pv presupponit] precedit M scilicet om. M
et om. M
a Aristotle, Phys., II, 5 passim; 8, 199b1618; Met., VI, 2, 1026b35. b Aristotle, Met., XII, 610.
Et si aliquis diceret quod considerare de forma sensibili pertinet ad

metaphisicum et non ad phisicum, quia phisicus tantum de materia sen-
sibili considerat, illud negatur, quia ad phisicum spectat considerare de
natura; constat autem quod tam forma quam materia est natura, et magis
forma quam materia, ut probatur primo Phisicorum;a ergo ad phisicum 5
spectat magis considerare de forma quam de materia.
Lege litteram: Utrum autem est preter materiam talium aliqua sub-
stantiarum, et oportet querere substantiam ipsorum alteram quandam ut
numerus aut aliquid tale, perscrutandum est posterius. Huius enim gratia
et de sensibilibus substantiis temptamus diffinire, quoniam modo quodam 10
phisice et secunde philosophie opus circa sensibiles substantias speculatio.
Non enim solum de materia oportet scire phisicum sed de ea que secundum
rationem, scilicet de forma, est magis.b
Ad secundam questionem respondet Philosophus, dicens quod queli-
bet diffinitio talium formarum est una, sicut et res est una cuius est dif- 15
finitio. Hoc tamen non est hic perscrutandum, sed posterius, in sequenti
capitulo, in quo ostenditur quomodo se habent partes diffinitionis in diffi-
nitione, et quomodo diffinitio habens partes potest dici una, et quomodo
res diffinibilis sit una non obstante quod multas habeat partes, et quid est
illud per quod res habens multas hpartesi est una. 20
Lege litteram: In diffinitionibus vero quomodo partes que in ratione,
idest diffinitione, se habent, et quare una ratio diffinitio? Palam enim quia
res una. Res vero quomodo una partes habens, speculandum est posterius.c
Notandum, secundum Commentatorem, commento undequadra-
cesimo, quod philosophus primus non considerat de substantiis 25
sensibilibus secundum quod sunt sensibiles, sed secundum quod
sunt substantie, naturalis vero secundum quod sunt substantie sen-
sibiles , quia philosophia naturalis non est de substantia secundum
quod est substantia, sicut facit ista ars, sed de substantia secundum
quod est sensibilis.d 30
sensibili] se impedit add. Pv materiam] materia Pv substantiarum] alia

add. Moerb. numerus] numeros Moerb. sed] sed et Moerb. (et om. OpSi Sj1To)
est] et Moerb. magis] et cetera add. Pv ostenditur] ostendetur Pv partes
suppl. quomodo] quo Moerb. (quomodo SiZl P1a plur., P2, sec. m. NeOpUj) non
est om. Pv] non perscrutatur Iunt.
a In truth, Aristotle, Phys., II, 2, 193a9b8. b Aristotle, Met., VII, 11, 1037a1017 (AL XXV
3.2, pp. 154155, lin. 622629). c Aristotle, Met., VII, 11, 1037a1720 (AL XXV 3.2, p. 155,
lin. 629632). d Averroes, In Met., VII, t.c. 39, fol. 192BC.
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Tam ergo phisica quam metaphisica considerat substantias sensibiles,

sed differenti modo, et duas differentias innuit Commentator: quarum
286ra Pv prima est quod phisicus considerat substantias sensibiles ut | mobiles
et sensibiles sunt, metaphisicus vero eas considerat ut substantias abs-
olute et ut entia sunt. Secunda differentia est quia phisicus considerat 5
substantias sensibiles non habendo respectum ad aliquid aliud princi-
pium quesitum in scientia naturali, sed metaphisicus considerat eas non
ut in eis sistat eius consideratio, sed ut per cognitionem earum maniduca-
mur in cognitionem substantiarum separatarum, que sunt cause ipsarum:
effectus enim est aliquid cause, quia quod est in effectu abundantius est 10
in causa; ideo ex cognitione talium effectuum devenitur in cognitionem
talium causarum.
Quid quidem ergo h1037a21ssi.
54ra M Ex dictis tam in hoc capitulo quam in precedentibus Aristoteles epi-
logando concludit solutiones et determinationes sex questionum esse 15
manifestas.
Prima questio est quid sit ipsum quod quid erat esse. Ad quam est
responsum quod ipsum quod quid erat esse est illud quod predicatur de
omni secundum se, perseitate primi modi. Unde animal est quod quid est
hominis, quia universaliter predicatur de homine in primo modo dicendi 20
per se, homo autem non est quid est animalis, quia, et si de eo aliquo modo
predicetur per se in primo modo, non tamen universaliter: nam omnis
homo est animal, non autem omne animal est homo. Et si queritur quid
est homo convenienter respondetur animal, non autem si queritur quid
est animal convenienter respondetur homo, sed convenienter respon- 25
detur quod corpus animatum et corpus et substantia. Ideo quodlibet
istorum predicatorum est quod quid erat esse ipsius animalis.
Lege litteram: Quid quidem ergo est quod quid erat esse et quomodo
ipsum secundum se de omni dictum est.a
Secunda questio: propter quid est quod aliqua est diffinitio indicans 30
quiditatem rei in qua ponuntur partes diffiniti, ut in diffinitione sillabe
ponuntur littere, in diffinitione autem circuli non ponuntur incisiones,
in diffinitione hominis ponuntur caro et os, non autem in diffinitione
corporis animati.
sit om. Pv ergo] igitur Moerb. se] universaliter add. Moerb. (DaOp, om. cet.)
quod] animalia add. Pv sed fort. del.
Responsum est quod partes formales totius que sunt priores toto, aut
simul cum eo, ponuntur in diffinitione illius, partes autem materiales que
sunt posteriores non ponuntur in diffinitione. Et quia littere sunt partes
formales sillabe, et caro et os sunt partes formales hominis, ideo littere
ponuntur in diffinitione sillabe, et caro et os in diffinitione hominis; non 5
autem incisiones ponuntur in diffinitione circuli, quia sunt partes mate-
riales, neque caro et os in diffinitione corporis animati propter eandem
rationem.
Lege litteram: Et quare horum quidem ratio, idest diffinitio, que eius
quod quid erat esse habet partes diffiniti, horum autem non, respondetur: 10
et quod in substantie quidem ratione que sic partes ut materia non inerunt,
sed partes formales.a
Tertia questio: propter quid eiusdem totius alique partes ponuntur in
diffinitione et alique non, ut cor et cerebrum ponuntur in diffinitione
hominis, non autem manus et pes. 15
Responsum est quod eiusdem totius alique partes pertinent ad speciem
et alique non, sed magis ad individuum; et quod [sicut] aliquod totum dif-
finitur, videlicet universale, et aliquod totum non diffinitur, scilicet indivi-
duum singulare. Individuum enim dicit materiam signatam et secundum
quod huiusmodi indeterminatum est; ideo non diffinitur. Ideo alique par- 20
tes totius ponuntur in diffinitione, scilicet pertinentes ad speciem, partes
autem pertinentes ad individuum non ponuntur in diffinitione.
Lege Litteram: Neque enim sunt illius partes substantie, idest pertinen-
tes ad species, sed totius individui; huius autem quod est totum universale
286rb Pv est aliqualiter ratio, idest diffinitio, et non est diffinitio | totius individui. 25
Nam cum materia signata est aliquid illius, definitio non est, indetermina-
tum enim est ipsum individuum.b
Quarta questio est utrum compositum ex materia et forma diffiniatur
tantum per materiam aut tantum per formam aut per utrumlibet, quo-
niam res per illud diffinitur per quod habet esse; constat autem quod com- 30
positum habet esse per materiam et formam; ergo diffinitur per materiam
et formam. Non enim dicitur aliquid homo quia habet tantum animam
intellectivam, neque quia solum habet carnes et ossa, sed quia habet ani-
mam intellectivam in carnibus et ossibus; et quoniam forma est prima
sic Pv Moerb.] sint M sicut secl. tantum per formam aut] solum per formam
vel Pv
11, 1037a2527 (AL XXV 3.2, p. 155, lin. 637640).
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substantia rei a qua ipsum compositum recipit principaliter nomen et dif-

finitionem, ideo compositum principaliter diffinitur per formam. Et non
54rb M dicitur forma prima substantia | quia primo substat, quia illud est supposi-
tum singulare, ut habetur in precedentibus, sed quia est prima causa dans
esse et [existere] subsistere ipsi composito: forma enim est pars que, cum 5
sit, est res, inquit Commentator.a
Lege litteram: Secundum autem primam substantiam que est forma
est, ut hominis que est anime ratio, idest diffinitio.b
Quinta questio utrum forma sit tota essentia compositi.
Responsum est quod non, quia compositum non fit tantum ex forma, 10
sed etiam ex materia, nec materia est pars forme, sed compositi. Cer-
tum enim est quod nasus non est pars essentialis concavitatis, quia tunc,
dicendo nasus concavus, bis diceretur nasus, semel quidem explicite
nomine nasi et semel implicite nomine concavitatis; sed ex naso et con-
cavitate fit simus, cuius pars essentialis est tam nasus quam concavitas: 15
nam nasus quidem ut materia recipiens et concavitas ut forma recepta.
Sicut ergo ex concavitate et naso fit simus et simitas et nasus simus, et
non est nasus pars concavitatis, sed simi aut nasi simi, ita homo compo-
nitur ex materia et forma et Callias ex hac materia et hac forma, et non est
materia pars forme, sed totius compositi. 20
Lege litteram: Substantia namque est species que inest, ex qua et
materia tota dicitur substantia, ut concavitas; nam ex hac et naso simus
nasus est et simitas; bis enim in hiis inerit nasus. In tota vero substantia,
ut naso simo aut Callia, inest et materia.c
Sexta questio utrum quid est sit idem cum eo cuius est. 25
Responsum est quod in quibusdam sic et in quibusdam non. In pri-
mis enim substantiis idem est quiditas cum eo cuius est quiditas, ut idem
est curvitas et curvitati esse, dato quod curvitas sit prima substantia, ita
quod, preter curvitatem que est in materia sensibili et ymaginabili, detur
una curvitas ydealis, iuxta modum loquendi Platonicorum: certum enim 30
est quod talis curvitas, si daretur, esset abstracta ab omni materia, et
tunc in illa non inveniretur differentia quo ad suum esse et suam quidi-
tatem. Vocat autem Aristoteles substantiam primam illam que non habet
esse per aliud esse in alio tamquam in materia aut in subiecto. Et quia
existere secl. hac Pv Moerb.] hoc M simitas] est add. Moerb.
a Averroes, In Met., VII, t.c. 37, fol. 189C. b Aristotle, Met., VII, 11, 1037a2829 (AL XXV 3.2,
p. 155, lin. 640641). c Aristotle, Met., VII, 11, 1037a2933 (AL XXV 3.2, p. 155, lin. 641645).
intelligentie separate simplices sunt non composite ex materia et forma,

ideo ille [non] sunt prime substantie, ita quod accipitur hic prima sub-
stantia non pro forma substantiali nec pro supposito particulari substan-
tie, sed pro qualibet substantia simplici nullam habentem materialem
compositionem. 5
Sed in hiis que sunt ut materia, aut concipiuntur cum materia, aut
que sunt secundum accidens, non est idem quiditas cum eo cuius est
quiditas. Exemplum primum: in substantiis materialibus compositis non
286va Pv est idem quiditas | cum eo cuius est quiditas, quia non est idem homo
et hominis quiditas nec simus et simi quiditas. Exemplum secundum: in 10
formis naturalibus simplicibus et mathematicis abstractis non est idem
quiditas cum eo cuius est quiditas, quia non est idem anima cum sua
quiditate. Exemplum tertium: nam, quia album aut musicum predicatur
per accidens de Sorte, non est idem quiditas albi et musici cum Sorte.
Nam, ut patuit quinto huius,a Sortes et album et musicum non sunt idem 15
nisi secundum accidens; constat autem quod quiditas et illud cuius est
quiditas debent esse unum per se.
Lege Litteram: Et quod quid erat esse et unumquodque in quibusdam
idem, ut in primis substantiis, ut curvitas et curvitati esse, si prima est;
dico autem primam que non dicitur per aliud in alio esse et subiecto ut 20
54va M materia. Quecumque vero ut materia | aut concepta cum materia, non idem,
neque secundum accidens unum, ut Socrates et musicum; hec enim eadem
secundum accidens.b
Notandum primum, secundum Beatum Thomam,c quod aliter loquitur
Philosophus hic de quiditate rei et aliter superius,d ubi investigavit quid 25
est ipsum quod quid est et in quibus invenitur. Ibi enim, loquens tantum
logice, non exclusit nisi ea que sunt per accidens, et voluit quod tam
in substantiis materialibus quam in substantiis immaterialibus idem est
quiditas et illud cuius est quiditas. Nunc autem, metaphisice loquens,
considerans principia nature que sunt materia et forma, excipit etiam 30
substantias materiales et formas existentes in materia, dicens quod in eis
non est idem res et sua quiditas, sed tantum in substantiis immaterialibus
separatis.
non secl. idem] unum Pv quod] quod quod Moerb. (quod P) autem
primam] primam autem Moerb. (inv. DaOp, pr. m. P2b Nd) non om. M accidens]
et cetera add. Pv
a Aristotle, Met., V, 9, 1017b271018a4 (cf. 6, 1015b1636). b Aristotle, Met., VII, 11, 1037a33b7
(AL XXV 3.2, pp. 155156, lin. 645651). c Aquinas, Exp. Metaph., VII, lect. 11, nn. 15351536.
d Aristotle, Met., VII, 6.
402 pauli veneti
Et ratio huius est: nam diffinitio individuis non assignatur, sed specie-
bus, et ideo materia individualis que est individuationis principium est
preter ipsam quiditatem. Impossibile est autem esse in natura speciem
que non sit in hoc individuo, propter quod necesse est quamlibet rem
naturalem, si habet materiam que est pars speciei pertinens ad quidi- 5
tatem, quod etiam habeat materiam individualem non pertinentem ad
quiditatem; nulla ergo res nature, si habet materiam, est idem cum sua
quiditate, sed est habens illam, sicut Sortes non est humanitas, sed huma-
nitatem habens. Si autem esset possibile hominem compositum esse ex
corpore et anima, qui non esset compositus ex hoc corpore et hac anima, 10
ille esset sua quiditas quamvis haberet materiam, quoniam illa materia ad
speciem pertineret. Ille ergo substantie que sunt forme tantum subsisten-
tes, et non habent aliud per quod individuentur quod sit extra rationem
rei significantis quiditatem, in eis simpliciter idem est quiditas cum eo
cuius est. 15
Ista expositio est dubia, quia non est verisimile quod Philosophus supe-
rius universaliter expresserit quod in hiis que sunt per se idem est ipsum et
esse ipsum, excipiens tantum ea que sunt per accidens, et quod iam exclu-
dat omnes substantias materiales et omnes formas in materia, cum in hiis
inveniatur perseitas et quiditas simpliciter sicut in substantiis separatis. 20
Deinde, sicut non potest inveniri species rei materialis sine suo indivi-
duo, ita nec species rei immaterialis; et sicut individuum immateriale non
pertinet ad speciem, neque individuum materiale; si ergo in rebus mate-
rialibus propter individuationem differt quiditas ab eo cuuis est quiditas,
per idem et in rebus immaterialibus. Neque potest dici quod in substantiis 25
immaterialibus et separatis non sint species neque individua, quia aliter
non bene divideret Porphyriusa generalissimum predicamenti substantie
286vb Pv in substantiam corpoream | et incorpoream, quod non est dicendum. Pre-
terea, et si non invenitur in re homo compositus ex materia et forma in
communi, qui non sit compositus ex hac materia et hac forma individuali, 30
tamen in intellectu abstrahente universale ab singularibus invenitur huiu-
smodi compositio, sed facta abstractione, adhuc habet homo esse per
formam existentem in materiam; ergo talis homo non est idem cum sua
quiditatecuius oppositum asserit beatus Thomas. Et patet consequen-
tia, quia identitas quiditatis cum eo cuius est quiditas non invenitur nisi 35
natura corr. ex Thoma] materia MPv nature om. M compositum esse inv. Pv
immaterialibus et om. Pv
a Porphyry, Isag., c. De specie (AL I 67, p. 9, 19ff).

in substantiis primis in quibus non invenitur forma in subiecto, per Ari-

stotelem in littera.a
Et ideo est aliter dicendum quod quiditatem esse idem cum eo cuius est
dupliciter intelligi potest, aut absolute secundum se, comparando tantum
quiditatem ad illud cuius est quiditas, aut respective secundum aliud, 5
comparando partes quiditatis ad illud cuius est quiditas. Si primo modo,
54vb M sic universaliter tam in materialibus | quam in rebus immaterialibus
idem est quiditas cum eo cuius est; et sic locutus est Aristoteles superius,
ubi dixit Commentatorb quod Sortes nichil aliud est quam animalitas
et rationalitas. Si autem intelligitur secundo modo, sic non est idem 10
quiditas cum eo cuius est nisi tantum in substantiis separatis. In eis enim
quelibet pars quiditatis identificatur rei cuius est quiditas, cum partes
diffinitionum in eis non realiter differant, sed solum ratione. In rebus
autem habentibus materiam sensibilem aut intelligibilem non quelibet
pars quiditatis identificatur ei cuius est quiditas, unde materia et forma 15
sunt partes quiditatis hominis et nec materia nec forma est homo. Corpus
organicum est pars quiditatis anime, et nasus est pars quiditatis simitatis,
et linea est pars quiditatis circuli, loquendo de parte non secundum rem,
sed secundum rationem; constat autem quod corpus organicum non est
anima neque nasus est simitas neque linea est circulus. Et ita intendit 20
Aristoteles hic, cum dicit in rebus habentibus materiam non esse idem
quiditatem cum eo cuius est quiditas illa.
Notandum secundo, secundum Alexandrum,c quod in separatis a
materia non est idem quiditas cum eo cuius est quiditas, quoniam idem
est quiditas et perseitas rei; constat autem quod in separatis a materia 25
multa excluduntur que non sunt per se, sed per accidens, quoniam solus
Deus est ille cui nichil accidit, aliis autem accidunt multa; ergo in solo
Deo idem est quiditas et cuius est quiditas. Deinde, si quiditas substantia-
rum separatarum non posset inveniri nisi in uno supposito, ut contingit
in primo ente, in eis idem esset quiditas cum eo cuius est quiditas; con- 30
stat autem quod quiditas substantiarum separatarum dependentium a
primo ente potest inveniri in pluribus suppositis, quia est quiditas spe-
cifica partibilis in plura individua, sicut quiditas generica partibilis est in
plures species; alioquin daretur aliqua potentia passiva cui non respondet
intelligi potest inv. Pv intelligitur] intelligatur Pv illa om. Pv notandum

secundo inv. Pv cum eo] et Pv est om. M
a Aristotle, Met., VII, 11, 1037b34. b Averroes, In Met., VII, t.c. 20, fol. 169F. c Alexander of
Alexandria, Exp. Met., VII, c. 11, q. 3, fol. 226va227rb.
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aliqua potentia activa, quod est impossibile, quia non datur unum cor-
relativorum sine alio. Et patet consequentia: si non possunt esse plures
intelligentie in eadem specie, ex quo quiditas specifica est per se multi-
plicabilis? Sicut ergo differt quiditas et suppositum in specie humana, et
ex hoc differt quiditas ab eo cuius est quiditas, ita differt quiditas et sup- 5
positum in specie abstracta, propter quam causam oportet dicere quod
etiam in substantiis separatis non est idem quiditas cum eo cuius est qui-
ditas.
287ra Pv Sed quia ista | doctrina est expresse contra determinationem Aristote-
lis, ideo non est instandum contra eam. Nemo enim dubitat quod species 10
et suppositum differunt non quidem realiter, sed ratione; neque huic con-
tradicit Philosophus, sed tantum intendit quod in substantiis separatis
non datur pars quiditatis que differat realiter ab eo cuius est quiditas. In
substantiis autem concernentibus materiam naturalem aut mathemati-
cam, aliqua pars quiditatis differt realiter ab eo cuius est quiditas, sicut 15
etiam differt ab ipsa quiditate, ut probavit Aristoteles, non accipiendo hic
partes secundum rem, sed solum secundum rationem et diffinitionem. In
Deo ergo nullo modo differt quiditas ab eo cuius est quiditas nisi in modo
significandi. In substantiis separatis differt quiditas ab eo cuius est quidi-
tas non tantum in modo significandi, sed etiam in modo se habendi inter 20
speciem et individuum. Hic autem modus non invenitur in Deo cum in
eo non sit species neque individuum, proprie loquendo, sed solum sin-
55ra M gularitas et hoc aliquid. In compositis materialibus | non differt realiter
quiditas ab eo cuius est quiditas, sed partes quiditatis que sunt partes tam
secundum rem quam secundum rationem, realiter differunt tam a quidi- 25
tate quam ab eo cuius est quiditas, quia nec corpus nec anima est homo
vel humanitas. In formis autem materialibus simplicibus et mathemati-
cis iterum non differt realiter quiditas ab eo cuius est quiditas, sed partes
alique quiditatis non secundum rem, sed secundum rationem, differunt
tam a quiditate quam ab eo cuius est quiditas, sicut est ostensum de naso, 30
qui realiter differt tam a simitate quam a quiditate illius, et de linea, que
realiter differt tam a circulo quam a quiditate illius.
Et, ut ista clarius intelligantur, queritur utrum individuum supra suam
speciem aliquid reale addat.
Arguitur primo quod sic, quia ita se habet individuum ad speciem, sicut 35
circulus ereus ad circulum; sed circulus ereus seperaddit circulo aliquid
illius] eius Pv primo om. Pv

reale, scilicet es; ergo et individuum sue speciei aliquid superaddit, et

hoc videtur velle Aristoteles in littera,a dicens quod incisiones sunt partes
circuli singularis et non circuli universalis.
Secundo: ita se habet individuum ad speciem, sicut species ad genus;
sed species superaddit generi aliquid reale, scilicet differentiam; ergo, per 5
idem, individuum superaddit speciei aliquid reale. Patet consequentia
cum minori, quia differentia est extra rationem generis, per Aristotelem,
tertio huius.b Maior vero est Porphyrii, dicentis, in Universalibus,c quod
genus est pars speciei et species est pars individui, et quod ipsum indi-
viduum est totum speciei, sicut species est totum generis; constat autem 10
quod totum superaddit parti aliquid reale. Et confirmatur: nam, sicut spe-
cies differt a genere, sic individuum differt a genere; sed species differt a
genere per aliquid reale seperadditum generi; ergo etiam individuum dif-
fert a specie per aliquid reale superadditum speciei.
Tertio: abstrahere est separare unum ab alio eorum que sunt coniuncta 15
in esse; sed species abstrahitur ab individuo; ergo in individuo est natura
speciei coniuncta cum illo a quo separatur. Et hoc videtur velle Philo-
sophus in littera,d distinguens inter materiam communem et signatam;
et Commentator,e ponens individuum aggregatum ex natura speciei et
natura individuationis, dicit Sortem significare hominem universalem et 20
hominem singularem.
Quarto: nisi individuum aliquod singulare addit supra speciem, sequi-
tur quod eedem sunt operationes utriusque, et consequenter species
generant et generantur sicut individua, contra determinationem Aristote-
lis, primo De generatione et in hoc septimo.f Propterea dicit Philosophus 25
in littera quod in conceptis cum materia non est idem quid est cum eo
cuius est, et primo Celig ait quod qui dicit celum dicit formam, et qui dicit
hoc celum dicit materiam et formam, quod quidem esse non posset nisi
individuum super speciem aliquid reale adderit.
In oppositum arguitur primo sic: si individuum speciei aliquid superad- 30
dit, aut ergo substantiam aut accidens. Non substantiam, quia in indivi-
287rb Pv duis abstractis non est aliqua substantia que non sit quiditas specifica, | ex
sue om. M scilicetreale om. M materiam et formam] formam et materiam

Pv sic om. M
a Aristotle,Met., VII, 10, 1035a912. b Aristotle, Met., III, 3, 999b2328. c Porphyry, Isag.,
c. De specie (AL I 67, p. 14, 711). d Cf. supra, p. 332, 19. e Averroes, In Met., VII, t.c. 39,
fol. 191M. f Aristotle, De gen., I, 5, 322a1618; Met., VII, 8, 1033a24b19. g Aristotle, De coel.,
I, 9, 278a1215.
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quo in separatis a materia idem est quod quid est cum eo cuius est, per Ari-
stotelem in littera.a Non etiam superaddit accidens, quia tunc individua
predicamenti substantie individuarentur per accidentiaquod est fal-
sum, quia ex non-substantiis non fit substantia, per Aristotelem, in primo
Phisicorum.b 5
Secundo: si individuum superaddit speciei aliquid reale, aut ergo illud
est materia aut forma. Non est materia, quia in individuis separatis non
est materia, per Philosophum hic.c Non etiam forma, alioquin species
divideretur per differentias formales sicut genus, contra determinationem
Philosophi, tertio huius.d 10
Tertio: si individuum aliquid reale addit, sit ergo illud A, et quero utrum
A sit per se signatum aut non. Si est per se signatum, tunc ipsum est
55rb M individuum, et sic individuum | est individuum per aliud individuum
quod est impossibile. Si A non est per se signatum, sed per aliud, sit ergo
illud B, et idem arguitur de B, et sic procedendo in infinitum. 15
Quarto: omne quod est in parte est in toto; sed individuum est pars
speciei, per Porphyrium;e ergo quicquid est in individuo est in specie; et
per consequens nichil reale superaddit speciei ipsum individuum, sed
tantummodo superaddit aliquid rationis fabricatum per intellectum, ita
quod signatio per quam contrahitur species non est ex natura rei, sed 20
solum ex operatione intellectus.
Dicendum quod individuum superaddere speciei aliquod reale potest
intelligi dupliciter: aut quod superaddit aliquod reale realitate distincta
a specie et a qualibet parte eius, aut realitate extra animam non depen-
dente ex opere intellectus. Primo modo, non est verum quod individuum 25
aliquid superaddit, quia nichil est in individuo quin ipsum sit idem rea-
liter cum specie aut cum aliqua parte eius: quelibet enim pars individui
est pars speciei, licet non eodem modo, quia est pars individui per se et
pars speciei per accidens. Secundo autem modo, necessarium est quod
individuum aliquid superaddat reale, quoniam, secluso omni opere intel- 30
lectus, individuum est per se generabile et corruptibile, species autem
per se communicatur et per accidens generatur et corrumpitur, ut supra
ostensum est.f Et ideo omnes rationes ante oppositum concludunt verum.
per Aristotelem in om. M est1 om. Pv tunc om. M superaddat reale inv. Pv
a Aristotle, Met., VII, 11, 1037a33b3. b Aristotle, Phys., I, 6, 189a3334. c Aristotle, Met., VII,
11, 1037b34. d Aristotle, Met., III, 3, 999a16. e Porphyry, Isag., c. De specie (AL I 67, p.
14, 89). f Cf. supra, tr. 2, c. 2, pp. 247, 4248, 5; c. 3, p. 363, 2829.
De circulo autem ereo, dicitur quod superaddit circulo specifico es tam-

quam realiter differens ab illo et a qualibet parte eius; sed circulus ereus,
ut dicit aggregatum ex ere et circulo, non est individuum circuli.
Ad primum argumentum post oppositum dicitur: quia illud superaddi-
tum non est realiter differens a specie et a qualibet parte eius, ideo indi- 5
viduum non superaddit speciei substantiam neque accidens, sed supe-
raddit aliquid ad modum substantie vel accidentis, sicut etiam species
superaddit generi differentiam, non tamen superaddit generi substantiam
neque accidens, sed aliquid se habens per modum substantie.
Ad secundum dicitur consimiliter quod individuum non superaddit 10
speciei formam neque materiam, sed, sicut species superaddit generi
differentiam formalem, ita individuum superaddit speciei differentiam
materialem. Sicut enim species componitur ex genere tamquam ex mate-
ria et ex differentia tamquam ex forma, ita individuum componitur ex
specie tamquam ex forma et ex hecceitate tamquam ex materia. 15
Ad tertium respondetur quod, sicut A non est per se individuum, sed
pars individui, ita non est per se signatum, sed est illud quo individuum est
signatum. Et ita conceditur quod aliquid est quod non est formaliter et per
se universale nec singulare, sed tantum identice; dicitur tamen esse hoc
aliquid, quia hoc aliquid in plus se habet quam individuum et singulare. 20
Ad quartum respondetur quod, sicut species superaddit generi in quan-
tum est totum et non in quantum est pars illius, ita individuum supe-
287va Pv raddit speciei non in quantum habet | rationem partis, sed in quantum
habet rationem totius. Ex quibus sequitur quod, sicut genus contrahitur
ad species per differentias formales et essentiales, ita species contrahitur 25
ad individua per differentias materiales et accidentales. Dicuntur enim
differentie divisive generis formales et essentiales, quia constituunt qui-
ditates et essentias specierum, in quibus se habent ut forme dantes nomen
et diffinitionem; differentie autem divisive speciei dicuntur materiales,
quia ad modum materie non dant nomem neque diffinitionem; dicuntur 30
vero accidentales non quia sint accidentia, sed quia accidunt speciei et
ad modum accidentium declarant distinctionem materialem. Cognosci-
mus enim distinctionem individuorum eiusdem speciei per accidentia,
quibus remotis, aut positis omnino consimilibus accidentibus, non appa-
rebit distinctio inter huiusmodi individua. Quare et cetera. 35
dicitur] quod add. Pv differens scr.] differt MPv enim] genus add. et del. M
species componitur inv. M
408 pauli veneti
hCAPITULUM IVi
55va M Nunc autem dicamus h1037b8ssi.

Istud est quartum capitulum huius tractatus, in quo Philosophus inve-
stigat unitatem diffinitionis, postquam manifestavit que partes poni
debent in diffinitione, quia partes secundum formam et non partes secun- 5
dum materiam.
Dividitur ergo istud capitulum in tres partes, in quarum prima Philo-
sophus movet dubitationem de unitate diffinitionis; in secunda arguit ad
partes, ibi: In hoc namque h1037b14ssi; in tertia manifestat solutionem
dicte dubitationis, ibi: Oportet autem intendere h1037b27ssi. 10
Quantum ad primum querit Philosophus utrum diffinitio sit unum aut
multa. Ex quo enim ista questio non est determinata in libro Posteriorum,a
in quo docetur investigare diffinitionem rei, necesse est quod hic deter-
minetur. Cuius solutio est pernecessaria ad ea que de substantia deter-
minanda sunt, de qua principaliter intendit hec scientia. Ista questio ideo 15
preponitur, quia dubitari solet propter quid ipsum quod quid est, cuius est
ratio quam diffinitionem vacamus, est unum: verbi gratia, dato quod diffi-
nitio hominis sit animal bipes, quare ipsum quod quid est hominis quod
est animal et bipes, quod quidem significatur per hanc diffinitionem, est
unum et non multa. Nam ex quo diffinitio est ratio significans ipsum quod 20
quid est, ut superius ostensum est, videtur mirum quod ipsum quod quid
est sit unum et diffinitio sit multa, et ideo oportet videre utrum diffinitio
sit unum aut multa, ut hec ambiguitas excludatur.
Lege litteram: Nunc autem dicamus primum, in quantum in analiticis
idest Posterioribus de diffinitione non dictum est, quomodo est una. In illis 25
enim dubitatio dicta preopere, idest ante omnia, rationibus, idest determi-
nationibus, de substantia est. Dico autem hanc dubitationem: propter quid
quidem unum est cuius rationem diffinitionem esse dicimus, ut hominis ani-
mal bipes? Sit enim hec ipsius ratio. Propter quid itaque hoc unum est sed
non multa, animal bipes? b 30
Notandum, secundum Commentatorem, commento altero et qua-
dracesimo, quod considerare de diffinitionibus est commune logico
aut] vel Pv quantum Pv Moerb.] est add. M in2 om. M hec Pv Moerb.]
hoc M animal] et add. Moerb. notandum] est add. Pv
a Aristotle, An. Post., II, 6, 92a2934. b Aristotle, Met., VII, 12, 1037b814 (AL XXV 3.2, p. 156,
lin. 652658).
et philosopho, sed duobus modis diversis: logicus enim considerat

de diffinitionibus secundum quod est instrumentum, quod inducit
intellectum ad intelligere quiditates rerum, philosophus secundum
quod significat naturas rerum. Et ideo dare causas de hoc est magis
proprium huic scientie. Causa enim in hoc est quoniam ultima dif- 5
ferentia data in diffinitionibus est differentia que continet formam,
per quam ens est unum in acto et ens in acto; differentie autem que
287vb Pv sunt ante ultimam differentiam sunt | existentes in diffinito poten-
tia. Et ideo diffinitum non multiplicatur per multiplicationem par-
tium diffinitionis.a 10
Prima distinctio quam intendit Commentator est hec: quod de diffini-
tione est duplex consideratio, scilicet per modum instrumenti et per
modum significantis. Prima consideratio pertinet ad logicum et secunda
pertinet ad metaphisicum: logicus enim considerat diffinitionem non
propter essentiam et quiditatem significatam per eam, sed tantum ut 15
est instrumentum ducens intellectum ad cognitionem illius. Sicut enim
demonstratio est instrumentum sciendi complexum, ita diffinitio est
instrumentum sciendi incomplexum. Metaphisicus autem considerat dif-
finitionem in quantum per eam significatur quiditas et essentia rerum,
quam per se considerat. Et ideo magis ad metaphisicum quam ad logi- 20
cum spectat assignare causam unitatis diffinitionis, quoniam unitas dif-
finitionis pendet ex unitate essentie et quiditatis; constat autem quod
solus metaphisicus considerat causam propter quam essentia et quiditas
est una, sicut et ipse tantum considerat ens et unum, causam et cau-
satum secundum quod huiusmodi, ut ostensum est quarto huius.b Vult 25
ergo Commentator quod logicus et metaphisicus circa diffinitionem con-
veniunt et differunt: conveniunt quidem in re considerata, quia eorum
55vb M quilibet | considerat diffinitionem; differunt autem in modo considerandi,
quia logicus considerat diffinitionem per modum instrumenti disponen-
tis intellectum ad cognoscendum, metaphisicus vero considerat diffini- 30
tionem per modum indicantis et declarantis quiditatem et essentiam rei.
Secunda distinctio est quod duplex est differentia ingrediens diffini-
tionem, videlicet in actu et in potentia. Differentia in actu est illa que
se habet tamquam forma dans nomen et diffinitionem rei, et hec est
philosopho scr. ex Iunt.)] phisico MPv quod2 Pv Iunt.] et M philosophus scr.]

phisicus MPv pertinet om. Pv
a Averroes, In Met., VII, t.c. 42, fol. 194AC. b Aristotle, Met., IV, 2 passim.
410 pauli veneti
differentia ultima, per quam diffinitum est ens in actu et unum in actu.
Differentia in potentia est illa que se habet tamquam dispositio materia-
lis receptiva forme, et hec est quelibet differentia ante ultimam, que non
facit diffinitum esse ens unum neque ens in actu, quia non dat nomen
neque diffinitionem ipsi diffinito. Verbi gratia, si diffiniatur homo isto 5
modo: homo est substantia corporea animata sensitiva rationalis, pri-
mum quod ponitur in hac diffinitione est genus, omnia autem sequentia
sunt differentie, quarum tantum ultima est differentia in actu et alie tres
precedentes sunt differentie in potentia. Sicut enim in mixto sunt plures
forme, videlicet elementorum et ipsius mixti, quarum ultima est forma in 10
actu, videlicet ipsius mixti, et precedentes sunt in potentia, scilicet forme
elementorum, quia sunt tantum dispositiones, per quas in materia recipi-
tur forma mixti, ut asserit Commentator, tertio Celi;a ita ultima differentia
est in actu et alie sunt in potentia, in quantum sunt dispositiones median-
tibus quibus ultima differentia advenit generi. Et ideo, sicut mixtum est 15
unum et non multa non obstante multitudine formarum existentium in
eo, quia tantum una est in actu et alie in potentia, ita diffinitum est unum
et multa non obstante multitudine differentiarum existentium in eo, ex
quo tantum una, videlicet ultima, est in actu.
mento, quod diffinitio, quare significat unum et habet partes, non
fuit dictum in Posterioribus Analiticis, quoniam illic posuit hanc
positionem et non dedit causam Ideo intentio eius non est loqui
de diffinitione et dicere questionem quem dimisit in Analiticis, verbi
gratia, cum diffinitio hominis sit animal bipes, quomodo dicimus 25
quod homo est unum et non plura, cum accepimus in diffinitione
plura, animal et bipes .b
In secundo Posteriorum, Philosophus,c investigans modum diffiniendi
absolute, ponit diffinitionem significare unam essentiam non obstante
288ra Pv quod componatur ex multis partibus, et dum quereretur ibidem | quare 30
diffinitio significat unum et habet partes, pretermisit solutionem huius
questionis, quia non ad logicum, sed ad metaphisicum pertinet. Ideo
quod pretermisit in libro Posteriorum supplet Philosophus in hoc septimo;
sensitiva] sensibilis M forme om. Pv notandum secundo inv. Pv partes]

hoc add. Iunt. hanc positionem Pv Iunt.] hoc positione M pertinet prae sed
M
a Averroes,In De coel., III, t.c. 67, pp. 634635, lin. 105114. b Averroes, In Met., VII, t.c. 42,
fol. 194AC. c Aristotle, An. Post., II, 13, 97b1315 et passim.
et hoc totum est propter affinitatem que est inter logicam et metaphisi-
cam. Dicitur autem liber Posteriorum liber Analiticorum, idest resolutorio-
rum, quia docet resolvere in principia que sunt premisse. Resolutio autem
in premissas potest esse dupliciter: aut in premissas simpliciter sumptas
non contractas ad materiam necessariam, et sic docetur in libro Prio- 5
rum, aut in premissas contractas ad materiam necessariam, et sic doce-
tur in libro Posteriorum. Quia ergo resolutio in premissas simpliciter est
prior quam resolutio in premissas necessarias, sic propositio simpliciter
est prior quam propositio necessaria. Ideo, liber Priorum dicitur Priora
Analitica, liber vero Posteriorum dicitur Posteriora Analitica: ambo enim 10
sub una parte logice continentur, que dicitur resolutoria sive iudicativa,
divisa contra inventivam, que traditur in Topicorum et Elenchis, ut docet
Boethius in libro suorum Topicorum.a Est ergo questio, cum diffinitio et
diffinitum invicem convertantur, quomodo potest esse diffinitum unum
et diffinitio plura, ut propter quid homo est unum et animal bipes est 15
56ra M plura, ex quo | animal bipes est diffinitio hominis. Et iam responsum est
quod diffinitio est unum, quia in diffinitione est tantum una differentia in
actu dans nomen specificum, unum genus autem tenet locum materie, et
alie differentie sunt differentie potentiales, in quantum sunt dispositiones
materiales generis per quas recipitur in genere differentia ultima. 20
In hoc namque h1037b14ssi.

Ista est secunda pars huius capituli, in qua Philosophus arguit ad par-
tes, et primo quod ex partibus diffinitionis non potest fieri unum, quia in
genere et differentia non potest fieri unum neque ex duabus differentiis
potest fieri unum; ergo et cetera. Tenet consequentia, quia in diffinitio- 25
nibus non ponuntur nisi genera et differentie. Prima pars antecedentis
arguitur, quia ex duobus non potest fieri unum nisi alterum eorum insit
reliquo et participetur ab eo; sed differentia non inest generi neque parti-
cipatur ab eo; ergo ex genere et differentia non potest fieri unum. Maior
patet exemplariter, quoniam ex homine et albo non fit unum nisi album 30
insit homini tamquam subiecto et participetur ab eo denominative: si
enim album non inest homini neque participetur ab eo, indubie homo et
album multa sunt et non unum; si vero album inhereat homini et partici-
petur ab eo sic quod denominat ipsum, tunc homo et album sunt unum.
plura] multa Pv ex] in M eorum] illorum Pv ex] a Pv
a Boethius, De diff. top., Lib. I, PL, vol. 64, 1173B.

412 pauli veneti
Minus vero declaratur, quoniam genus dividitur per differentias contra-

rias. Si ergo differentia inest generi et participatur ab eo, necesse est quod
duo contraria sint simul in eodem et participentur ab eo, sic quod denomi-
netur a quolibet illorum, quod est impossibile, ut inductive liquet: nichil
enim simul est calidum et frigidum, neque album et nigrum. 5
Lege Litteram: In hoc namque homo et album: multa quidem sunt
cum alterum non insit alteri, unum vero quando inest et patitur aliquid
subiectum, homo; tunc enim unum fit et est albus homo. Hic autem non
participat alterum altero. Genus enim non videtur participare differentias;
simul enim contrariis idem participet; nam differentie contrarie sunt quibus 10
differt genus.a
Secunda pars antecedentis arguitur, videlicet quod ex pluribus diffe-
rentiis non potest fieri unum, etiam concesso quod differentia inest generi
et participatur ab eo. Quia ponatur quod in diffinitione hominis congre-
gentur iste tres differentie, videlicet gressibile, bipes et non alatum. Et 15
arguitur sic: si iste differentie possunt facere unum, hoc est quia sunt in
uno, videlicet in eodem genere animalis; quo dato, sequitur quod ex omni-
bus predicamentis posset fieri unum, quia omnia predicamenta sunt in
uno, videlicet substantia. Et particularius loquendo, sequitur quod omnia
accidentia que insunt uni subiecto sunt unum per se. Cum autem ea que 20
288rb Pv accidunt uni subiecti etiam accidant alteri, consequens est | quod etiam
illa duo subiecta sint idem; et sic nix et cignus, quibus inest albedo, sunt
unum et idem, et consequenter fiet argumentum de omnibus aliis, con-
cludendo quod omnia sunt unum.
Lege litteram: Si vero et participat genus et differentias eadem ratio 25
fiet: ex pluribus differentiis non potest fieri unum, si sunt differentie plures,
ut gressivum, bipes, non alatum. Quare namque hoc unum, scilicet quelibet
illarum, sed non multa? Sunt unum non enim quia insunt; namque sic ex
omnibus erit unum.b
In oppositum arguit Philosophus sic: diffinitio est una ratio; ergo ex 30
partibus diffinitionis fit unum. Patet consequentia, quia ex partibus dif-
finitionis fit diffinitio. Antecedens arguitur sic: diffinitio et illud quod per
insit Pv Moerb.] inest M differentias] -iis Moerb. (-ias DaOp P1b) participet]
participaret Moerb. (participet JeTh AjUj1Xj1 To) videlicet] scilicet Pv hoc] hec
Moerb. namque] nam Moerb. (namque P1b) quod] importatur add. M (scr. et del.
Pv)
12, 1037b2124 (AL XXV 3.2, p. 156, lin. 664667).

diffinitionem significatur invicem convertuntur secundum multitudinem

et unitatem; sed illud quod significatur per diffinitionem est unum; ergo
diffinitio est una ratio. Tenet consequentia cum maiori, quia, si diffinitio
56rb M est una ratio, oportet | quod suum significatum sit unum; et si illud quod
significatur per diffinitionem est unum, oportet quod diffinitio sit una 5
ratio. Minor vero est evidens, quia illud quod significatur per diffinitionem
est una natura et hoc aliquid, pertinens ad predicamentum substantie,
quia, sicut dictum est in hoc septimo,a diffinitio est simpliciter substan-
tiarum, si autem est accidentium hoc est secundum quid.
Lege litteram: Oportet autem unum esse quecumque in diffinitione; 10
diffinitio enim ratio quedam est una et substantia, quare unius alicuius
oportet ipsam esse rationem. Etenim substantia unum quid et hoc aliquid
est quam diffinitio significat, ut dictum est.b
Notandum, secundum Commentatorem, commento altero et qua-
dracesimo, quod si concesserimus quod omnia que sunt unius sunt 15
unum essentialiter, contingeret quod totus mundus esset unum
essentialiter: omnia enim sunt in celo, quod est unum Et est
necesse ut illa que sunt unum per diffinitionem sint unum numero,
quia diffinitio est aliquis sermo unus, qui significat substantiam
unam.c 20
Non ergo partes diffinitionis sunt unum quia sunt in uno, quia tunc totus
mundus esset unus essentialiter, quia totus mundus est in uno, videlicet in
celo: nam mixta et elementa sunt in celo, Deus etiam et intelligentie sunt
in celo, et ipsum celum est in celo secundum partes. Omnia etiam supe-
riora moventia et formantia sunt in inferioribus sicut in materia mota et 25
formata, non tamen omnia superiora sunt unum secundum naturam nec
secundum esse. Sed dicuntur partes diffinitionis esse unum, quia signi-
ficant unam substantiam et unam naturam: si enim genus significaret
unam naturam et differentia aliam, numquam ex genere et differentia fie-
ret unum diffinitum neque una diffinitio neque una ratio. Sed quia genus 30
et differentia dicunt unam naturam, ideo faciunt unum: illam enim natu-
ram quam dicit genus sub modo confuso, dicit differentia modo distincto.
dictum est Pv] dicimus M Moerb. altero et quadracesimo corr.] quadracesimo

primo MPv unius] in uno Iunt. est necesse] oportet Iunt. illa M, Pv
post correct. (omnia prae correct.) unus] unum Pv in2 om. M mota et
formata] formata et mota Pv
a Aristotle,
Met., VII, 4, 1030b47. b Aristotle, Met., VII, 12, 1037b2427 (AL XXV 3.2, p. 156,
lin. 667671). c Averroes, In Met., VII, t.c., 42, fol. 194FG.
414 pauli veneti
Cum enim dicitur animal non certificatur utrum sit homo vel asinus, per
differentiam autem certificatur; ideo non expectat genus ulteriorem natu-
ram, sed certificationem. Sicut etiam dicitur homo currit, non dicitur
quod homo alius a Sorte currit, sed solum dicitur Sortem currere, licet con-
fuse. Cum vero subiungitur quod homo qui est Sortes currit, non fit additio 5
nature ad naturam neque hominis ad hominem, sed tantum conceptus
distincti ad conceptum confusum, ita quod illud quod primo intelligeba-
tur per conceptum hominis modo confuso, iam intelligitur per eundem
conceptum limitatum modo distincto.
Oportet autem intendere h1037b27i. 10

Ista est tertia pars huius capituli, in qua Philosophus determinat que-
stionem. Et primo premittit istam suppositionem, quod omnis diffinitio
pure quiditativa est investiganda per viam compositionis et divisionis.
Ista suppositio patet ex secundo Posteriorum,a ubi Aristoteles osten-
dit quod diffinitio non est investiganda per sillogismum demonstrativum 15
neque diffinitivum neque reduplicativum, sed per compositionem et divi-
288va Pv sionem. Si enim debet investigari diffinitio quiditativa | hominis, primo
debet dividi substantia per corporeum et incorporeum, secundo corpus
per animatum et inanimatum, tertio corpus animatum per sensitivum et
insensitivum, quarto sensitivum per rationale et irrationale. Et quoniam 20
differentia adiuncta generi constituit speciem et diffinitionem, ideo for-
matis hiis tribus speciebus subalternis, que sunt corpus, corpus animatum
et animal, per aggregationem rationalis ad animal statim habebitur hec
diffinitio animal rationale, que est diffinitio hominis.
Et notanter dicitur quod diffinitio pure quiditativa investigatur per 25
hunc modum, quia diffinitiones que dantur per accidentia, aut per aliquas
partes et proprietates vel per causas extrinsecas, non investigantur per
compositionem et divisionem, sicut si diffiniretur homo per hoc quod
56va M est | animal habens latas ungues aut per hoc quod est animal risibile aut
generatum ab homine vel ordinatum ad felicitatem. 30
Lege litteram: Oportet autem intendere primum de hiis que secundum
divisiones diffinitionibus investigatur.b
substantia] substantiam Pv quoniam] quia Pv partes et om. Pv

investigatur] et cetera add. Pv
a Aristotle, Post. An., II, 310; 13. b Aristotle, Met., VII, 12, 1037b2729 (AL XXV 3.2, p. 156,
lin. 672673).
Ista suppositione premissa, Philosophus ponit quatuor conclusiones,

quarum prima est hec: quelibet diffinitio constat ex genere primo et
ultima differentia illius. Secunda conclusio: genus positum in diffinitione
non est aliud a differentiis et speciebus, ibi: Si ergo genus h1038a5ssi. Ter-
tia conclusio: divisio essentialis non tantum competit generi, sed etiam 5
differentie, ibi: At vero et oportet h1038a9ssi. Quarta conclusio: tot sunt
species predicamentales quot sunt differentie ultime, ibi: Et sic semper
h1038a15ssi.
Prima conclusio arguitur sic: quelibet diffinitio constat ex genere et
differentia per suppositionem; aut ergo genus positum in diffinitione est 10
genus generalissimum aut subalternum. Si genus generalissimum, habe-
tur intentum, quoniam illud est primum genus; si subalternum, iterum
habetur intentum, quoniam genus subalternum non est aliud quam pri-
mum genus et comprehense differentie determinantes illud genus. Verbi
gratia, si assignatur homini hec diffinitio substantia animata sensibilis 15
rationalis, constat quod in hac diffinitione ponitur primum genus, scilicet
substantia; si autem assignatur hec diffinitio animal rationale, iterum
ponitur primum genus, quia animal non est aliud quam substantia ani-
mata sensitiva. Sed Philosophus ponit aliud exemplum, dicens: ponamus,
gratia exempli, quod animal sit primum genus et secundum immedia- 20
tum isti sit animal bipes aut animal non alatum. Et patet quod, si homo
diffinitur per animal diffinitur per primum genus; si autem diffinitur per
animal bipes aut per animal non alatum, adhuc diffinitur per primum
genus, quia animal bipes aut animal non alatum non est aliud quam ani-
mal cum certa differentia determinante illud. Similiter dicitur, si preter 25
hec genera alia plura signentur, quod nulla est diffinitio in qua non poni-
tur primum genus. De differentia autem non arguit Philosophus, quia ex
suppositione sequitur omnem diffinitionem constare ex ultima differen-
tia, quoniam omnis alia differentia preter ultimam communior est quam
sit species, sicut et ipsum genus communius est, et per consequens talis 30
addita generi non facit diffinitionem, ex quo diffinitio converti debet cum
suo diffinito.
Lege litteram: Nichil enim aliud est in diffinitione quam primum
dictum genus et differentie; alia vero genera sunt primum et cum hoc
et oportet om. M aut] genus add. Pv genus2 om. Pv dicitur] dicatur Pv

ponitur] ponatur Pv diffinito] et cetera add. Pv
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comprehense differentie; ut dato quod sit genus primum animal, habitum

vero, idest consequens ad illud, sit animal bipes aut non alatum.a
Contra probationem huius conclusionis posset aliquis instare, dicens
quod ista non est diffinitio, substantia animata sensitiva rationalis, quia,
sicut in compositione reali compositum fit tantum ex duobus, videlicet 5
ex una materia et una forma, ita in compositione rationis, cuiusmodi
est compositio diffinitionis, ipsum compositum non fieri debet nisi ex
duobus, videlicet ex uno genere et unica differentia; constat autem quod
ibi sunt plures differentie quam una.
288vb Pv Respondet Philosophus, | dicens quod, sive in diffinitione ponantur 10
pauca sive multa, sive duo sive plura duobus, semper consimiliter dica-
tur, videlicet quod non componitur nisi ex uno genere et unica differentia,
scilicet ultima. Si enim in diffinitione ponantur tantum duo, sicut cum
dicitur animal bipes, patet quod componitur tantum ex uno genere et ex
una differentia; si autem ponuntur plura duobus, ut cum dicitur substan- 15
tia animata sensitiva rationalis, iterum non componitur nisi ex duobus
tamquam ex partibus, videlicet ex illo genere substantia et ultima diffe-
rentia, que est rationale. Animatum autem et sensitivum non ponuntur
tanquam partes diffinitionis, sed solum tamquam dispositiones superad-
56vb M dite | generi. Sicut enim mixtum non componitur nisi ex materia et forma 20
ultima tamquam ex partibus essentialibus et qualitativis, forme autem
elementorum non sunt partes mixti, sed tantum dispositiones existen-
tes in materia facientes ad generationem forme mixti, ita nulla differen-
tia preter ultimam est pars essentialis diffinitionis, sed tantum dispositio
generis contrahens ipsum ad differentiam ultimam. 25
Lege litteram: Similiter autem et si per plura dicatur ipsa diffinitio.
Omnino vero nichil differt per plura aut per pauca dici; quare nec per pauca
aut per duo; duorum vero hec quidem differentia illud vero genus, ut eius
quod animal bipes: animal quidem genus, differentia vero alterum.b
Notandum secundum Commentatorem, commento quadracesimo 30
tertio, quod illa que sunt preter primum genus, scilicet genera et
differentie illorum generum, sunt in suo esse de natura eius quod
significat primum genus preter differentiam equalem diffinito , ut
bipes] et iterum animal bipes add. Moerb. alatum scr. ex Moerb.] alato MPv
videlicet] scilicet Pv nisi om. M hec] hoc Moerb. vero] autem Moerb.
(vero Op) quadracesimo tertio corr.] altero et quadracesimo MPv preter]
post Iunt.
a Aristotle, Met., VII, 12, 1037b2933 (AL XXV 3.2, pp. 156157, lin. 673677). b Aristotle,
Met., VII, 12, 1037b331038a4 (AL XXV 3.2, p. 157, lin. 677681).
animal quod primo dividitur in animal bipes et multipes, deinde

bipes dividitur in pennatum et non pennatum. Omnia enim ista sunt
tamquam genus , et secundum hoc diffinitiones erunt composite
necessario ex duabus naturis, scilicet ex genere et differentia, sive
in ea sunt multe differentie sive unum genus et differentia tantum, 5
quoniam ista que sunt inter primum genus et ultimam differentiam
sunt quasi genus.a
Intendit Commentator quod, sicut compositum naturale componitur tan-
tum ex duabus naturis, videlicet ex materia et forma, ita diffinitio compo-
nitur tantum ex duabus naturis, scilicet ex genere et differentia. Et, sicut 10
in compositis naturalibus omnes forme preter ultimam tenent se ex parte
materie, ita in diffinitionibus omnes differentie preter ultimam tenent se
ex parte generis, quia sunt simul cum genere potentiales ad ultimam diffe-
rentiam. Et, sicut in compositis naturalibus omnia que sunt inter primam
materiam et ultimam formam sunt materie composite et forme compo- 15
site, ut inquit Commentator in prologo Phisicorum,b omnia tamen illa
intermedia dicuntur esse de natura prime materie, quia continent illam
et non formam ultimam, ita omnia que sunt inter primum genus et ulti-
mam differentiam sunt genera composita et species composite, et omnia
hec sunt de natura primi generis in quantum continent eum. Quodlibet 20
enim superius est formaliter in suo inferiori, quia formaliter et in actu
denominat ipsum: Sortes enim est formaliter homo et animal et corpus
et substantia. Si ergo dividitur animal in animal bipes et multipes, deinde
animal bipes in pennatum et non pennatum, aut in alatum et non alatum,
quia nullum istorum est differentia ultima hominis, quodlibet istorum se 25
tenet loco generis.
Sed dubitatur, quia nulla differentia constituens speciem se habet ut
genus, sed ut forma et actus, ex quo dat speciei nomen et diffinitionem;
constat autem quod omnis differentia constituit speciem per Porphy-
riumc; ergo nulla differentia se habet ut genus. 30
Item, quomodo diffinitio componitur ex duabus naturis, videlicet ex
genere et differentia, cum dictum sit quod eandem esse naturam importat
genus et differentia? Hoc ergo videtur repugnare heisi que asserit Com-
genere et differentia M Iunt.] differentia et genere Pv sive scr. ex Iunt. (fort. Pv post
correct.)] si vero M in ea sunt] sint in ea Iunt. unum om. Iunt. compositis om.
M animal et corpus] corpus et animal Pv eis suppl.
a Averroes, In Met., VII, t.c. 43, 195HI-K. b Averroes, In Phys., I, t.c. 1, fol. 6E. c Porphyry,
Isag., c. De differentia (AL I 67, p. 17, 13).

418 pauli veneti
mentator,a videlicet quod diffinitio est una numero et componitur ex dua-

bus naturis.
289ra Pv Ad | primum respondetur quod, sicut eadem forma in uno composito
naturali est tantum forma, in alio vero se habet ut materia, ita eadem dif-
ferentia in una diffinitione se habet tantum ut differentia ultima, in alia 5
autem ut genus: verbi gratia, forma elementi in elemento non se habet
57ra M nisi ut forma, in mixto autem se habet ut materia; | ita sensitivum in diffi-
nitione animalis se habet ut differentia ultima, in diffinitione vero homi-
nis se habet ut genus et se tenet ex parte generis. Et ideo negatur prima
pars antecedentis, videlicet quod nulla differentia constituens speciem se 10
habet ut genus, quia, licet non se habeat ut genus respectu speciei aut
diffinitionis quam constituit, se habet tamen ut genus respectu alterius
diffinitionis.
Ad secundum dicitur quod diffinitio componitur ex duabus naturis
non dualitate reali sed rationis, ita quod genus et differentia dicunt unam 15
naturam secundum rem, tamen dicunt duas naturas secundum rationes.
Et ita intendit Commentator, intendens per duas naturas duos conceptus
sola ratione differentes. Non tamen inconvenit aliquid esse unum numero
et componi ex diversis naturis diversarum rationum et realiter differen-
tibus, sicut contingit de quolibet composito naturali, cuius partes sunt 20
materia et forma realiter et specifice differentes.
Et si queritur quomodo differentia ultima est equalis diffinito, per Com-
mentatorem,b ex quo diffinitum, sicut et diffinitio, componitur ex duabus
naturis, ipsa autem differentia nullam compositionem dicit, responde-
tur quod differentia non dicitur equalis diffinito equalitate continentie 25
vel compositionis, sed equalitate significationis vel predicationis, quo-
niam quicquid significat diffinitum significat differentia et econtra, et de
quocumque predicatur diffinitum etiam differentia predicatur et econtra,
licet non eodem modo, quia diffinitum predicatur in quid et differentia in
quale. 30
Si ergo genus h1038a5ssi.
Secunda conclusio: genus positum in diffinitione non est aliud simpli-
citer a differentiis et speciebus.
naturali mg. Pv se habet ut genus om. Pv habeat scr.] habet MPv quale] et
cetera add. Pv
a Averroes, In Met., VII, t.c. 43, fol. 195K together with t.c. 42, 194MG. b Averroes, In Met.,
VII, t.c. 43, fol. 195I.
Probatur: nullum totum universale est simpliciter aliud a suis partibus

subiectivis; sed genus est totum universale et species sunt partes subiec-
tive; ergo genus non est aliud simpliciter a suis speciebus. Tenet conse-
quentia cum minori. Et maior est nota, ex eo quia universale predicatur
essentialiter et per se de suis partibus subiectivis, quod fieri non pos- 5
set si ipsum universale esset simpliciter aliud a suis partibus subiectivis.
Et quoniam de eisdem speciebus predicantur differentie, ideo differen-
tie sunt eedem cum speciebus; quecumque autem sunt eadem uni tertio
sunt eadem inter se; ergo genus est idem cum differentiis, et sic habetur
quod genus non est aliud simpliciter a differentiis et speciebus. Si autem 10
est aliquo modo aliud, hoc non est in quantum genus, sed in quantum
materia, eo quod materia secundum quod huiusmodi est aliud a forma
specifica. Vox enim est genus littere, et secundum hoc non est aliud a lit-
tera, quia secundum quod est genus non est nisi littera aliter signata: sive
enim dicatur quod littera est vox sive quod littera est littera, nichil dici- 15
tur nisi littera, licet alio modo. Cum enim dicitur littera est vox, accipitur
littera sub modo significandi confuso; cum vero dicitur littera est littera,
iam accipitur littera sub modo significandi distincto. Ideo vox secundum
quod est genus non expectat formationem littere tamquam formam aliam
advenientem sibi, sed eam includit infra se ipsam. Etiam vox est materia 20
littere, quia ex voce tamquam ex principio materiali fiunt littere, et secun-
dum hoc est aliud a littera, quia expectat formationem littere, eo modo
quo materia non est forma, quia eam expectat ut perficiatur per ipsam. Et
ex hoc oritur, quod materia dicit partem et genus dicit totum.
Lege Litteram: Si ergo genus simpliciter non est preter eas que ut gene- 25
ris species aut, si est quidem aliud, ut materia autem est (vox enim genus est,
289rb Pv differentie autem species et elementa, idest litteras, | et hoc faciunt, scilicet
vocem tamquam ex materia).a
Et ita conclusionem infert Philosophus tamquam manifestum, quod
diffinitio est quedam ratio ex differentiis unitatem habens, quia tota 30
essentia diffinitionis in differentia quodammodo comprehenditur. Ex hoc
57rb M enim genus | non potest esse absque speciebus, quia forme specierum,
que sunt differentie, non sunt alie a forma generis, sed sunt forma generis
cum quadam determinatione: nam animal est illud quod habet animam
eadem] eedem M eadem] eedem M est3] et materia add. Moerb. et hoc]

ex hac Moerb.
420 pauli veneti
sensitivam, homo autem est illud quod habet animam sensitivam ratio-
nalem, leo autem est illud quod habet animam sensitivam abundantem
audacia et sic de aliis. Cum ergo differentia additur generi, non est addi-
tio essentie ad essentiam, sed conceptus ad conceptum tamquam alicuius
indicantis distincte quod per genus significatur confuse. 5
Lege litteram: Palam quia diffinitio est ex differentiis ratio, scilicet
unitatem habens.a
Notandum secundum Commentatorem, commento quadracesimo
tertio, quod genera diversantur: quedam enim magis assimilantur
forme et quedam magis materie Sonus autem quodammodo assi- 10
milatur materie, quia est propinquus materie litterarum, et quodam-
modo assimilatur forme, quia predicatur de litteris secundum quid
et materia non predicatur de re nomine principali ; differentie
autem percussionum faciunt formam litterarum ex sono.b
Prima propositio commenti est hec: quodlibet genus est simile tam forme 15
quam materie. Patet naturam contrahi et determinari est conditio mate-
rie, predicari autem de aliquo est conditio forme; constat autem quodli-
bet genus contrahi et determinari ad certam speciem per differentiam,
ipsumque de qualibet sua specie predicatur in quid; ergo et cetera.
Secunda propositio: aliquod genus magis assimilatur materie quam 20
forme et aliquod magis forme quam materie. Prima pars patet de sono
et corpore: sonus enim est materia ex qua producitur littera, differentie
vero percussionum faciunt formam ex sono; corpus etiam est illud ex quo
fit compositum, scilicet homo vel equus. Et quia tam sonus quam corpus
predicatur in quid, ideo utrumque assimilatur forme et materie, magis 25
tamen assimilatur materie quam forme, quia manifestius est quod ex sono
fit littera et ex corpore animal quam quod predicetur in quid aliquid isto-
rum. Alia pars patet de animali et colore: hec enim assimilantur materie in
quantum possunt contrahi et determinari ad speciem, assimilantur etiam
forme in quantum predicantur in quid. Magis tamen assimilantur forme 30
quam materie, quia manifestius est hec predicari in quid quam differen-
tias contrahi ad diversas species.
quod scr.] quid MPv quadracesimo tertio corr.] altero et quadracesimo MPv
diversantur M Iunt.] diversant Pv autem] enim Iunt. quia] que Iunt.
conditio] additio M
VII, t.c. 43, fol. 195M196A.
Tertia propositio: materia non predicatur de re nomine principali.

Patet. Nam genus habet rationem forme et rationem materie, et genus
predicatur de specie; ergo materia predicatur de re. Quia autem genus, ut
habet rationem materie, non predicatur de specie, sed ut habet rationem
forme, ideo materia non predicatur de re nomine principali, idest secun- 5
dum quod materia: cum enim materia secundum quod huiusmodi sit pars
integralis rei, de re predicari non potest, quia non bene dicitur quod homo
sit caro aut os.
Quarta propositio: licet idem sit genus et materia, non tamen eodem
modo, quoniam materia ut sic, cum non predicetur de re, non dicit nisi 10
partem rei, genus autem ut sic dicit totum, ex quo genus secundum quod
huiusmodi predicatur de specie. Sicut enim aliquando simplici nomine
materie significatur materia cum privatione, scilicet quando privatio est
innominata, ut es, quod dicitur significare es infiguratum quando ex ere
fit statua, ita, quando forma est innominata, materia simplici nomine 15
significat materiam et formam, non quidem determinatam sed in com-
muni, et sic materia est genus. Sicut enim compositum ex materia et
forma determinata est species, ita compositum ex materia et forma in
communi est genus, ut corpus et substantia.
mento, quod differentia inter sonum in hoc quod est materia lit-
terarum, et inter cuprum in hoc quod est materia ydoli, est quia
sonus non dividitur a forma et percutiente, scilicet ex aliquo simili
289va Pv sillabe longe et brevis, et cuprum dividitur a forma omnino; et ideo |
57va M cuprum est materia pura, et sonus non est materia pura | litterarum, 25
sed est similis materie secundum quod recipit litteras, et est similis
generi secundum quod non est extra modos sonorum.a
Conveniunt ergo et differunt sonus et cuprum per comparationem ad ea
que fiunt ex eis. Conveniunt quidem, quia, sicut ex sono fit littera tam-
quam ex materia, ita ex cupro tamquam ex materia fit ydolum; differunt 30
autem, quia cuprum est materia pura, sonus autem est materia et genus.
Quod enim cuprum sit materia et non genus patet, quia non predicatur
de ydolo formaliter, sed solum denominative, quia non est verum dicere
specie] sed ut habet rationem forme add. et del. Pv ergore om. Pv enim] genus
seu add. M os] et cetera add. Pv infiguratum scr.] in figura MPv notandum
secundo inv. Pv dividitur] denudatur Iunt. dividitur] denudatur Iunt. forma]
et figura add. Iunt. et] ut Pv
a Averroes, In Met., VII, t.c. 43, fol. 196A.

422 pauli veneti
ydolum est cuprum, sed ydolum est cupreum. Sonus autem est materia,
ut dictum est, in quantum differentie percussionum ad modum sillaba-
rum largo aut brevi tempore mensuratarum faciunt ex illo litteras; est
autem genus, quia predicatur de litteris diversarum specierum non deno-
minative, sed formaliter, quia non bene dicitur quod littera est sonea vel 5
sonora, sed quod est sonus. Sed sonus et corpus conveniunt in materia et
in genere, quia, sicut corpus est materia in quantum ex illo fit animal et
planta, genus autem in quantum predicatur in quid de illis, ita sonus est
materia in quantum est subiectum, cui potest advenire formatio littere,
est autem genus in quantum in suo intellectu clauditur formatio littere in 10
communi, distincta in diversas formas litterarum, ex quo sequitur quod
sonus aut vox secundum quod est genus non potest esse sine specie. Non
enim potest esse sonus formatus aut vox quin aliquam determinatam for-
mam habeat huius vel illius littere; sed, si omnino careat forma litterali,
sic est materia solum absque litteris, sicut es absque forma ydoli. 15
Ex predictis patet solutio rationis facte contra veritatem inventam, sci-
licet quod genus et differentia non faciunt aliquod unum, eo quod dif-
ferentia non inest generi neque participatur ab eo. Primo dicitur quod
contraria sunt simul in eodem et predicantur de illo tamquam determi-
nata de aliquo indeterminato, quoniam verum est dicere quod animal in 20
communi est rationale et irrationale; sed quod duo contraria dicantur de
aliquo determinato est impossibile.
Secundo dicitur quod non illo modo advenit differentia generi sicut
albedo homini, quoniam differentia advenit generi non tamquam acci-
dens subiecto, dicens omnino distinctam essentiam ab essentia subiecti, 25
quia genus et differentia sunt una et eadem essentia distincta per modos,
albedo autem advenit homini tamquam accidens realiter et essentialiter
differens ab homine, non tantum dicens diversum conceptum sed etiam
diversam essentiam et naturam, et cetera.
Contra conclusionem arguitur quod genus et differentia non eandem 30
essentiam significant. Et primo auctoritate Porphyrii, dicentis, in Uni-
versalibus,a quod species per differentiam abundat a genere, quod non
esset verum si esset eadem essentia genus et differentia. Ut arguatur sic:
homo et asinus conveniunt in genere et differunt differentiis. Aut ergo ille
aut] et Pv quod om. Pv et] aut Pv esset eadem inv. Pv arguatur]

arguitur M
a Porphyry, Isag., c. De differentia (AL I 67, p. 17, 16).

differentie differunt realiter ab essentia generis aut solum ratione. Si pri-

mum, habetur intentum; si secundum, ergo homo et asinus non differunt
realiter, sed solum rationequod est impossibile.
Secundo, sicut se habet diffinitio ad diffinitum, sic partes diffinitionis
ad partes diffiniti, secundum Philosophum, in precedenti capitulo;a sed 5
tota diffinitio significat totam essentiam diffiniti; ergo partes diffinitionis
significant partes essentie diffiniti. Sed una pars diffinitionis est genus et
alia differentia; ergo genus et differentia non dicunt eandem essentiam,
sed partes unius essentie. Et hoc videtur intendere Porphyrius,b dicens
quod, sicut statua componitur ex ere et figura, ita species ex genere et 10
differentia; constat autem quod es et figura significant diversas essentias.
289vb Pv Tertio: si genus et differentia eandem essentiam signifi-|-carent, alte-
rum illorum sufficeret ad constituendum diffinitionem et per consequens
57vb M posito genere | superflueret differentiaquod est falsum; ymmo sequitur
quod genus et differentia de seinvicem predicantur per se perseitate primi 15
modi, contra doctrinam Aristotelis, tertio huius.c Et patet consequentia,
quia idem predicatur de se ipso in primo modo dicendi per se, secundum
Philosophum, quinto huius.d
Quarto: operatio dat cognoscere formam, secundum Philosophum,
octavo huius;e constat autem quod alia est operatio generis et alia differen- 20
tie, quoniam embrio in matrice prius fit animal quam rationale, et actio
animalis secundum quod huiusmodi est sensatio, actus autem rationalis
secundum quod huiusmodi est intellectio; sicut ergo sensus et intellectus
diversas essentias dicunt, ita animal et rationale.
Ad primum conceditur quod species superaddit generi differentiam 25
non tamquam essentiam aliam, sed tamquam alium conceptum. Sicut
enim sol et iste sol non sunt due res, sed tantum una, sunt tamen duo
conceptus, in quantum aliter movet intellectum sol secundum quod huiu-
smodi et aliter secundum quod iste sol, ita genus et differentia non sunt
due essentie, alioquin quelibet intelligentia separata componeretur ex 30
diversis essentiis, cum in qualibet tali invenitur ratio generis et differen-
tie, sed sunt duo conceptus seu due intellectiones diversimode potentes
movere intellectum: animal enim aliter movet in eo quod sensitivum et
aliter in eo quod rationale vel intellectivum. Cum autem queritur utrum
rationale et irrationale realiter differant ab essentia animalis, dicitur quod 35
a Aristotle,
Met., VII, 10, 1034b2022. b Porphyry, Isag., c. De differentia (AL I 67, p. 18,
915). c Aristotle Met., III, 3, 999b2328. d Aristotle, Met., V, 18, 1022a2627. e The claim
is drawn from Averroes, In Met., VIII, t.c. 5, fol. 213H.
424 pauli veneti
non tamen realiter et essentialiter differunt inter se: sicut enim individua
eiusdem speciei realiter differunt inter se et non realiter differunt a spe-
cie, sed solum ratione, ita due species realiter differunt inter se, et tamen
ab essentia generis non differunt nisi ratione.
Ad secundum conceditur quod genus et differentia sunt partes essen- 5
tie diffiniti et tamen sunt tota essentia diffiniti, sed non eodem modo.
Sunt enim partes essentie diffiniti non secundum rem, sed secundum
rationem, in quantum sunt duo conceptus integrantes totum conceptum
diffiniti; sunt autem tota essentia diffiniti secundum rem, in quantum
non realiter differunt ab illa. Cum vero dicit Porphyriusa quod, sicut sta- 10
tua componitur ex ere et figura, ita species ex genere et differentia, non
intendit omnimodam similitudinem, quoniam tunc compositio speciei ex
genere et differentia esset compositio accidentalis, sicut est compositio
statue ex ere et figura. Et sicut non predicatur de statua es et figura, ita
neque de specie predicetur genus vel differentiacuius oppositum asse- 15
rit Commentator et Philosophus.b Sed intendit quod, sicut in composi-
tione statue es concurrit ut materia et figura ut forma, ita in compositione
speciei se habet genus ut materia et differentia ut forma.
Ad tertium negatur consequentia, quoniam, sicut species cum aliquo
convenit et cum alio differt, ita oportet dare unam cognitionem per quam 20
cognoscitur species cum aliquo convenire, et unam aliam per quam cog-
noscitur species ab alio differre: prima cognitio, quia confusa est, dici-
tur cognitio generis, secunda autem, quia distincta est, cognitio diffe-
rentie. Constat autem quod diffinitio datur causa innotescendi perfecte
et distincte totam quiditatem rei; ergo oportet diffinitionem componi 25
ex duobus conceptibus, quorum unus respicit convenientiam diffiniti et
alter differentiam. Hii autem conceptus sunt genus et differentia. Et quia
hii duo conceptus, licet dicant eandem rem, tamen important diversas
rationes, quarum quelibet alteram excludit, ideo de seinvicem non predi-
cantur in aliquo modo dicendi per se. 30
Ad quartum respondetur quod solum probat genus et differentiam
esse formas diversas secundum rationem, non autem secundum rem.
Dicit enim Philosophus, tertio Phisicorum,c quod eadem est via a Thebis
290ra Pv ad Athe-|-nas et econtra; non tamen quicumque | movetur a Thebis ad
58ra M
et2] vel Pv vel] aut Pv ideo de] inde M
a Porphyry, Isag., c. De differentia (AL I 67, p. 17, 13). b Averroes, In Met., VII, t.c. 41,
fol. 193D; Aristotle, Met., VII, 12, 1037b1013. c Aristotle, Phys., III, 3, 202b13ff.
Athenas movetur econtra ab Athenis ad Thebas, quia, licet eadem sit

via secundum rem, non tamen secundum rationem. Ita, quia genus et
differentia differunt secundum rationem, licet non differant secundum
rem, ideo alicui potest competere aliqua actio ratione generis et non
ratione differentie; homo ergo prius generatur in eo quod animal quam 5
in eo quod rationalis, et prius sentit quam intelligit.
At vero et oportet h1038a9ssi.
Tertia conclusio: divisio essentialis non tantum competit generi, sed
etiam differentie. Patet. Nam, sicut datur primum et ultimum predicabile
in quid in aliquo predicamento, ita datur primum et ultimum predicabile 10
in quale in eodem predicamento. Sed quodlibet predicabile in quid supra
ultimum predicabile est divisibile usque ad ultimum; ergo, per idem, quo-
dlibet predicabile in quale supra ultimum predicabile est divisibile usque
ad ultimum predicabile in quale. Sicut ergo quodlibet genus dividitur
usque ad ultimam speciem, ita quelibet differentia preter ultimam est 15
divisibilis usque ad ultimam. Verbi gratia, animal dividitur in pedalitatem
et non pedalitatem, idest in habens pedes et non habens pedes; et quia
prima differentia multipliciter invenitur, ideo etiam est dividenda in alias
differentias non per accidens, sed per se; quia autem habenti pedes acci-
dit habere alas, ideo hec differentia que est pedalitas sive habens pedes 20
non est dividenda per alatum et non alatum, si homo velit bene dividere.
Quandoque tamen fit divisio per ea que sunt per accidens, quia dividens
non potest aliud facere, et hoc quia differentie per se sunt ignote, loco
quarum ponuntur differentie per accidens tamquam signa differentiarum
per se. Differentia ergo nominata est dividenda per habens pedes fissos 25
et non habens pedes fissos, quoniam hec sunt differentie per se minoris
communitatis quam pedalitas: omne enim habens pedes fissos est habens
pedes et non econtra. Propterea dicit Philosophusa quod fissio pedis est
quedam pedalitas ad denotandum quod communior est pedalitas quam
fissio pedis. 30
Lege litteram: At vero et oportet dividi differentie differentiam, ut ani-
malis differentia est pedalitas; item animalis habentis pedes differentias
oportet scire in quantum habens pedes. Quare non est dicendum habentis
pedes aliud alatum aliud non alatum, siquidem bene dicit (sed propter non
in quale om. Pv differentias] -iam Pv Moerb.
a Aristotle, Met., VII, 12, 1038a15.

426 pauli veneti
posse faciet hoc) sed aliud habens fissos pedes aliud non fissos pedes. Hee
namque sunt differentie pedis; nam fissio pedis pedalitas quedam est.a
tertio, quod divisio est que largitur tales sermones Et oportet
ponere divisionem essentialem et primam, scilicet quod primo divi- 5
datur genus in primam differentiam et suam oppositam, deinde
illam differentiam in suam primam differentiam, non ut primo divi-
datur genus in differentiam sue differentie. Verbi gratia, animal
habens pedes primo debet dividi in bipes et multipes, deinde bipes
dividatur per differentias essentiales ei, per quas dividitur prima 10
divisione , et sic fiat semper donec perveniatur ad illud aggrega-
tum ex differentiis equale diffinito.b
In hoc commento ponit Commentator tres regulas, iuxta doctrinam Ari-
stotelis, secundo Posteriorum.c
Prima regula est quod diffinitio est investiganda per divisionem. Sicut 15
enim diffinitio est medium investigandi passionem de subiecto, ita divisio
est medium venandi diffinitionem de diffinito. Propterea dicit Commen-
tator quod divisio largitur sermones diffinitivos et divisio essentialis largi-
tur divisionem essentialem. Est enim divisio necessaria ad investigandum
diffinitionem, primo quidem a parte diffinitorum, quia non est standum 20
in diffinitione generis, ut dicit Philosophus, in prologo De anima:d nam
290rb Pv talis diffinitio comunissima est, nec facit proprie sc-|-ire, cum scire sit ex
propriis, ut ostenditur primo Posteriorum.e Non ergo bene assignabitur
58rb M diffinitio ex parte diffiniti nisi dividatur | genus usque ad species specialis-
simas indivisibiles, quarum est proprissime diffinitio. Deinde est necessa- 25
ria divisio ex parte diffinientium: cum enim omne superius indeterminate
dicat naturam sui inferioris, oportet genus tantum dividi quod pervenia-
tur ad proximum genus et differentiam equalem diffinito, ex quibus tam-
quam ex duabus partibus, quarum una est in actu et reliqua in potentia,
perficitur diffinitio speciei. 30
sed] si add. Moerb. primam] generis divisionem add. Iunt. quod] qua Iunt.
dividatur Pv Iunt.] dividitur M pedes] quondam add. Iunt. in] suas primas
differentias add. Iunt. aggregatum] congregatum Iunt. investigandum]
investigandam Pv
VII, t.c. 43, fol. 196CE. c Aristotle, Post. An., II, 13 passim. d Aristotle, De an., I, 1, 402a23ff.
e Aristotle, An. Post., I, 2, 71b6; 72a6; 9, 75b3637.
Secunda regula est quod divisio tam generis quam differentie fieri
debet per differentias immediatas, alioquin non evacuaretur totum divi-
sum per ipsa dividentia. Ideo corpus non bene dividitur per sensitivum
et insensitivum, quia, cum sensitivum et insensitivum immediate divi-
dant animatum, et animatum sit altera differentia corporis, necesse est 5
quod non evacuaretur corpus per huiusmodi differentias. Propterea cor-
pus est dividendum per differentias immediatas, que sunt animatum et
inanimatum, deinde animatum dividatur per alias differentias immedia-
tas, que sunt sensitivum et insensitivum. Ita, animal primo debet dividi
per habens pedes et non habens pedes; secundo debet dividi habens 10
pedes per bipes et multipes; tertio debet dividi bipes per fissum usque quo
deveniatur ad ultimam differentiam equalem diffinito, ex qua et genere
propinquo diviso constituatur diffinitio.
Tertia regula est quod divisio tam generis quam differentie dari debet
per differentias essentiales, ex eo quia differentia dividens non dicit aliam 15
naturam a natura divisi, sed solum illam, modo tamen determinato, ut, si
homo divideret animal per se aut rationale, tam humanitas quam ratio-
nalitas non esset nisi quedam animalitas; et ita dicit Philosophusa quod,
si bipedalitas per se dividit pedalitatem, bipedalitas non est nisi quedam
pedalitas. Semper enim posterior pars diffinitionis est pars precedens sub 20
quadam particularitate, ut si homo diffiniatur per substantiam corpoream
animatam sensitivam rationalem, necesse est dicere quod rationale non
est nisi quoddam sensitivum, et sensitivum non est nisi quoddam anima-
tum, et animatum non est nisi quoddam corporeum, et corporeum non
est nisi quedam substantia. Constat autem quod differentia accidenta- 25
lis dicit aliam naturam a diviso, ut si dividatur animal per pennatum et
non pennatum aut per alatum et non alatum: non enim penna nec ala
est aliquod animal. Aliquando autem fiunt tales divisiones et diffinitiones
per differentias accidentales propter carentiam differentiarum per se et
essentialium; neque tales diffinitiones sunt vere diffinitiones, sed tantum 30
descriptiones que dantur causa maioris declarationis. Et quia ut pluri-
mum differentie essentiales et per se sunt nobis ignote, ideo bene dicit
Lincolniensis, primo Posteriorum,b quod ad veram diffinitionem et potis-
simam demonstrationem pauci attingunt: cum enim diffinitio sit medium
aut] ut M
a Aristotle, Met., VII, 12, 1038a1315. b Robert Grosseteste, In Post., I, 7, p. 141, lin. 131145.
428 pauli veneti
in demonstratione, ut habetur secundo Posteriorum,a non erit potissima

demonstratio nisi sit vera diffinitio.
Contra predicta arguitur. Et primo quod genus non est divisibile per
differentias, quia nichil est divisibile per differentias nisi dicat unum con-
ceptum aut unam naturam; sed genus non dicit unum conceptum neque 5
unam naturam; ergo et cetera. Maior patet. Et probatur minor. Primo qui-
dem genus non dicit unum conceptum, quia, sive intellectus concipiat
sive non concipiat, non minus homo et equus sunt eiusdem generis, sicut
Sortes et Plato sunt eiusdem speciei. Non etiam dicit unam naturam, quia
dicit Philosophus, in prologo De anima,b quod animal universale nichil 10
est, septimo autem Phisicorum,c quod in generabilibus latent multe equi-
vocationes: si enim genus diceret unam naturam, ita in eo fierent vere
290va Pv comparationes | sicut in speciecuius oppositum determinat Philoso-
phus ibi.
Secundo arguitur quod differentia superior non potest dividi per diffe- 15
58va M rentiam inferiorem, quoniam, sicut differentia divisiva generis constituit |
speciem addita illi generi, ita differentia divisiva differentie coloris, addita
illi, debet constituere speciem, et sic ex duabus differentiis poterit fieri
una speciequod est impossibile, quia tunc esset aliqua species que non
esset alicuius predicamenti, videlicet species composita ex duabus diffe- 20
rentiis.
Ad primum dicitur quod genus dicit tam unam naturam quam unum
conceptum, quia aut dicit tantum unam naturam unius speciei, et sic non
predicatur nisi de illa, aut naturas omnium suarum specierum, et sic de
nulla specie predicatur, aut dicit naturam communem omnibus suis spe- 25
ciebus, et habetur intentum. Quando autem dicit Philosophus, in prologo
De anima,d quod animal universale nichil est, loquitur de animali univer-
sali platonico et separato a suis singularibus. Propterea dicit Commenta-
tor ibie quod intellectus est qui facit universalitatem in rebus, et non sicut
dixit Plato, ita quod universalia non sunt separata a singularibus nisi per 30
intellectum. Etiam genus dicit unum conceptum, aliter non predicaretur
de pluribus, unde, primo Posteriorum,f dicit Philosophus quod universale
differentiam om. Pv esset aliqua inv. Pv species] que add. M

differentiis] et cetera add. Pv primum] primam M et om. Pv dicit
iter. Pv
a Aristotle, An. Post., II, 10, 93b3894a10. b Aristotle, De an., I, 1, 402b78. c Aristotle, Phys.,
VII, 4, 249a2125. d Aristotle, De an., I, 1, 402b78. e Averroes, In De an., I, t.c. 8, p. 12,

2526. f Aristotle, An. Post., I, 11, 77a59.
est unum in multis et de multis: ex hoc enim quod est unum in multis
dicit unam naturam, et ex hoc quod est unum predicabile de multis dicit
unum conceptum. Nec oportet quod intellectus actualiter operetur ad hoc
quod genus dicatur unus conceptus, sed sufficit respectus aptitudinalis ad
intellectum: non enim oportet quod actu predicetur, sufficit enim quod 5
sit predicabile, et secundum hoc genus dicitur conceptus in potentia;
quando autem actualiter predicatur, vocatur conceptus in actu.
Ad secundum respondetur quod non est similitudo, quoniam ad con-
stitutionem diffinitionis non sufficit dualitas partium, quarum una sit in
actu et reliqua in potentia, sed ultra oportet quod una se habeat ut subiec- 10
tum et alia ut forma, unde ex forma elementi et forma mixti non potest
fieri unum individuum naturale, non obstante quod forma elementi se
habeat ut potentia et forma mixti se habeat ut actus; et hoc ideo, quia
forma elementi non se habeat ut subiectum, sed materia prima. Ita in pro-
posito ex duabus differentiis non potest fieri species, quia oportet quod 15
una earum se habeat ut subiectum et quod predicetur in quid, alia autem
se habeat ut forma et predicetur in quale; constat autem quod nulla diffe-
rentia habet rationem subiecti nec modum predicandi in quid, sed solum
in quale.
Et si semper h1038a15ssi. 20
Quarta conclusio: tot sunt species predicamentales quot sunt differen-
tie ultime.
Probatur: sicut divisio generis non procedit in infinitum, sed est deve-
nire ad ultimam speciem, ita divisio differentie non vadit in infinitum,
sed procedit divisio usque ad ultimam differentiam, que ultra differen- 25
tiam nullam habet; sed differentia ultima constituit speciem, quia illa
sola equalis est speciei et convertibilis cum specie; ergo et cetera. Unde
tot sunt species pedalitatum quot sunt differentie ultime pedalitatis, et
animalia habentia pedes sunt equalia differentiis ultimis. Et istud est con-
tra aliquos dicentes quod differentia ultima non convertitur cum specie, 30
sed est ea communior, quoniam species, sicut habet differentiam acci-
dentalem a posteriori convertibilem cum specie, ita habet differentiam
essentialem a priori convertibilem cum illa: sicut enim risibile convertitur
cum homine, ita rationale dividens animal convertitur cum eodem, aliter
non acciperetur numerus specierum penes multitudinem differentiarum 35
ultimarumcuius oppositum asserit Philosophus hic.
materia prima inv. Pv et] quod add. Pv in quale] et cetera add. Pv species
om. Pv penes] numerum add et del. Pv
430 pauli veneti
Lege litteram: Et sic semper vult procedere ipse dividens, donec utique
290vb Pv veniat ad non differentiam, | idest ad differentiam non habentem differen-
tiam. Tunc autem erunt tot species pedis quot differentie, et pedes habentia
animalia equalia differentiis.a
58vb M Dubitatur contra conclusionem. Nam animal est ultimum genus | pre- 5
dicamenti substantie, cuius differentie sunt tantum due, scilicet rationale
et irrationale, sub quo continentur quodammodo innumerabiles species;
ergo plures sunt species quam differentie ultime.
Notandum quod Burleus et Iohannes Buridanusb asserunt quod infra
genus animalis sunt plura genera subalterna innominata, quorum quo- 10
dlibet est minus ratione quam animal et magis ratione quam homo vel
aliqua alia species specialissima. Quorum ratio est hec: magis conveniunt
homo et symea quam homo et equus; ergo ratione alicuius convenientie;
sed omnis convenientia fundatur in unitate, ut colligitur a Philosopho,
quinto huius;c ergo est dare aliquod unum in quo conveniunt homo et 15
symea, in quo non conveniunt homo et equus. Illud autem unum in plus
se habet quam species specialissima, quia convenit homini et symie et est
minus ratione quam animal, quia non convenit equo neque alteri animali
ab homine et symea, de quorum quolibet predicatur animal.
Ista opinio est dubia, quia ex ea sequitur quod nullus potest perfecte 20
cognoscere equum, quoniam non perfecte cognoscitur species nisi cogno-
scantur omnia predicata quiditativa illius, per Aristotelem, secundo Poste-
riorum.d Constat autem quod nullus potest certificari de multitudine
generum subalternorum ad equum. Nam equus est in uno genere sibi pro-
pinquo cum asino in quo non est cum bove et econtra, et in uno alio cum 25
mulo in quo non est cum cane et econtrario, et sic de aliis innumerabilibus
secundum maiorem et minorem convenientiam cum aliis speciebus, ita
quod, ad cognoscendum omnia genera subalterna infra animal et supra
equum, oportet cognoscere omnes species animalis. Sed certum est quod
nullus naturaliter omnium talium specierum cognitionem habere potest. 30
Item, dato illo fondamento, sequitur speciem specialissimam habere
speciem infra se, quia Sortes et Plato magis conveniunt quam Sortes et
differentiam1] differentia Moerb. (-am Si Je Sj2) tunc] tot M ultime] et cetera add.
Pv vel aliqua] et quam Pv est minus ratione] in minus Pv ea] illa Pv
habere] non add. et del. M
a Aristotle, Met., VII, 12, 1038a1518 (AL XXV 3.2, p. 157, lin. 692694). b Burley, Exp. Phys.,
Lib. I, fol. 10rab; Buridan, Q. Sup. Phys., Lib. I, q. 7, ed. Paris 1509, fol. 9rbva. c Aristotle, Met.,
V, 6, 1016a25b17. d Aristotle, An. Post., II, 13, 97b15ff.
Berta; ergo ratione alicuius convenientie fundate in aliquo uno, quod qui-
dem videtur esse species ad Sortem et Platonem minoris communitatis
quam sit homo. Ymmo sequitur quod plura sunt genera quam species,
ponendo quod sub genere animalis non sint nisi quatuor species specia-
lissime, videlicet A, B, C, D. Et patet, dato fundamento opinionis, quod 5
semper duabus speciebus competit proprium genus; sed quatuor unita-
tes faciunt sex combinationes, ut probatur secundo De generatione;a ergo
quatuor speciebus competunt sex genera subalterna immediataquod
est absurdum. Preterea, magis convenit linea cum superficie quam cum
corpore, et tempus magis convenit cum motu quam cum magnitudine; 10
ergo, ratione talis convenientie, oportet dare genera subalterna infra con-
tinuum et lineam et alias species quantitatis continue, et consequenter
sub numero sunt infinita genera subalterna, ac etiam sub figura, propter
infinitas convenientias infinitarum specierum contentarum sub numero
et figura. 15
Dicendum ergo aliter quod inter hominem et animal nullum est genus
medium, sed ipsum animal genus est immediatum omnibus suis specie-
bus, alioquin hec non esset diffinitio completa hominis, animal rationale,
quia diffinitio in qua non ponitur genus propinquum debet habere plures
differentias, quarum una teneat locum generis propinqui, ut habet videri 20
secondo Posteriorum.b Et ita intendit Philosophus in hoc capitulo. Si enim
diffinitur homo per substantiam, oportet ponere omnes differentias supe-
riores ad rationale, scilicet corporeum animatum sensitivum. Et licet sub
animali nullum sit genus, tamen sub illo sunt innumerabiles differentie,
291ra Pv quoniam, ut habetur in littera, non solum genus dividitur, | sed etiam 25
differentia. Ideo irrationale dividitur per duas differentias et iterum ille
59ra M differentie dividuntur, vel altera illarum, usque quo habentur | tot diffe-
rentie ultime quot sunt species animalium.
Et ad argumentum concedatur quod homo et symea magis conveniunt
quam homo et equus ratione alicuius convenientie fundate in uno, nul- 30
lum tamen est illud unum in quo ambo conveniunt preter genus animalis.
Unde due linee sunt equales equalitate fundata in aliquo uno, illud tamen
unum non dicitur de ambabus lineis, quia ille due linee sunt equales, non
tamen equalitate una, sed duabus fundatis in ambabus lineis. Ita homo et
symea non tantum una convenientia conveniunt sed duabus, quarum una 35
animal] asinum Pv genus om. Pv est immediatum inv. Pv Philosophus]

Aristoteles Pv equalitate una inv. Pv
a Aristotle, De gen., II, 3, 330a3031. b Aristotle, An. Post., II, 13, 97a3134.
432 pauli veneti
fundata in homine et alia in symea; ideo non oportet ponere aliud unum in
quo ambo illa adequate conveniunt, ex quo non tantum una convenientia
conveniunt. Sicut ergo species humana habet latitudinem in qua omnia
individua illius speciei conveniunt et disconveniunt, aliqua magis et ali-
qua minus, se ipsis tamen aut per suas formas, et non per aliquod tertium, 5
ita genus animalis habet latitudinem convenientie et disconvenientie, in
qua sunt omnes species animalis convenientes et disconvenientes invi-
cem, et non per aliquod tertium distinctum a genere. Consimiliter dicatur
de continuo, numero et figura et colore, ac etiam odore et sapore, quod
sub istis non inveniuntur genera, sed tantum species. 10
Ex quibus sequitur quod hoc argumentum fallit: homo et equus magis
differunt quam homo et symea; sed homo et symea differunt specie; ergo
homo et equus differunt plus quam specie. Sicut non sequitur: Sortes et
Berta magis differunt quam Sortes et Plato; sed Sortes et Plato differunt
numero; ergo Sortes et Berta differunt plus quam numero. Sicut enim sub 15
eadem specie aliqua magis et aliqua minus differunt, non tamen aliter
quam numeraliter, ita sub eodem genere alique species magis differunt
et alique minus, specie solum, non exeundo latitudinem generis.
Contra hanc responsionem arguitur. Et primo auctoritate Philosophi,
dicentis in hoc septimo,a ut prius patuit, quod supra equum et asinum est 20
innominatum genus; secundo autem Posteriorum,b asserit quod gressibile,
volatile et aquaticum sunt genera predicamenti substantie, mediantibus
quibus animal inest suis speciebus; constat autem quodlibet illorum esse
minoris communitatis quam animal.
Secundo arguitur auctoritate Porphyrii,c collocantis animal rationale in 25
predicamento substantie sub genere animalis tamquam genus subalter-
num. Unde arguitur sic: differentia adveniens generi constituit speciem
secundum eumd; ergo, sicut rationale adveniens animali constituit spe-
ciem, ita irrationale adveniens eidem constituit speciem. Constat autem
quod non constituit speciem specialissimam; ergo speciem subalternam, 30
que est genus.
Ad primum dicitur quod Aristoteles non asseruit illud simpliciter, sed
dubitative, ut ibi est manifestum in littera; aut quod ibi non est locutus
de genere logico, sed de genere naturali, iuxta expositionem Commenta-
continuo] et add. Pv generis] et cetera add. Pv secundum] per Pv
a Aristotle, Met., VII, 8, 1033b341034a1. b Aristotle, An. Post., II, 13, 97a15. c Porphyry,
Isag., c. De differentia (AL I 67, p. 17, 18). d Porphyry, Isag., c. De differentia (AL I 67, p.
15, 89; 1114).
toris.a In Posterioribus autem loquitur Philosophus tantum exemplariter

et non secundum veritatem: exempla enim ponimus, inquit ipse in libro
Elenchorum,b non quod ita sint, sed ut sentiant qui addiscunt. Volatile
ergo aquaticum et gressibile non sunt in predicamento substantie nisi
secundum famositatem et per accidens, ratione connotationis extranee: 5
connotant enim aerem, aquam et terram, sed magis sunt in predicamento
qualitatis, connotantia organizationem et figuram. Genus enim predica-
291rb Pv tur in quid; constat autem quod ad questionem que-|-rentem quid est
homo? numquam respondetur gressibile; et si queritur quid est piscis?
non respondetur aquaticum, neque si queritur quid est avis? responde- 10
tur volatile, sed ad hec omnia respondetur animal.
59rb M Ad secundum respondetur quod Porphyrius in illo non tenetur. | Posuit
enim, iuxta doctrinam Platonicorum, corpora celestia esse animalia ratio-
naliaquod non est verum. Quando autem iterum introducitur Porphy-
rius,c dicens quod differentia adveniens generi constituit speciem, dicitur 15
quod illud est verum si genus dividitur ambabus differentiis divisibilibus
vel ambabus indivisibilibus; ubi autem una sit divisibilis et altera indi-
visibilis, illud non oportet, quoniam sola indivisibilis constituit speciem,
alia autem dividitur usque ad differentias indivisibiles constituentes alias
species. Animal ergo rationale est diffinitio hominis sed animal irratio- 20
nale nullius est diffinitio, nisi forte diceretur quod bruti aut bestie aut
iumentiquod non est verum, propter connotationem extraneam: bru-
tum enim ab immunditia dicitur et bestia a devastatione et iumentum a
iuvando, ut patet ex ethimologia vocabulorum. Et si ad questionem que-
rentem quid est equus? convenienter respondetur animal irrationale, 25
non tamen animal irrationale est diffinitio, sed tantum pars diffinitio-
nis. Modo non inconvenit per partem diffinitionis includentem genus
bene respondere ad interrogationem querentem propter quid, quia ergo
genus, proprie loquendo, est conceptus simplex predicabilis in quid de
pluribus speciebus, et nec animal rationale nec animal irrationale est con- 30
ceptus simplex; ideo nullum istorum est genus. Bestia autem, brutum et
iumentum non sunt genera, quia non predicantur in quid; talia tamen
aliquando dicuntur genera aut propter famositatem aut propter simili-
tudinem aut examplariter aut ex suppositione. Dicit enim Philosophus,
quod] ut M et] aut Pv connotationis scr.] connectationis MPv iterum

introducitur inv. Pv autem] et add. M
a Averroes, In Met., VII, t.c. 28, fol. 178E. b In truth, Aristotle, An..Pr., I, 41, 49b3437; 50a12.
c Cf. Porphyry, Isag., c. De differentia (AL I 67, p. 15, 89; 1114).
434 pauli veneti
septimo Phisicorum,a quod linea est genus ad lineam rectam et lineam cur-
vam et, in prohemio huius,b vocat speciem humanam hominum genus,
et tamen linea non est genus neque homo; sed homo est species specialis-
sima, et ita dicit rationem similitudinis quam habent ista cum genere et
propter communem modum loquendi. 5
Si ita hec sic h1038a18ssi.
Ex predictis Philosophus infert quatuor correlaria, quorum primum
est istud: unitas diffinitionis et diffiniti attendi habet penes unitatem
ultime differentie, ita quod diffinitio est una et ipsum diffinitum est unum,
non obstante multitudine differentiarum, dunmodo una sit differentia 10
ultima. Quoniam penes illud attendi habet unitas diffiniti et diffinitionis,
quod est substantia diffiniti et ipsa diffinitio; sed ultima differentia est
substantia diffiniti et ipsa diffinitio; ergo et cetera. Tenet consequentia
cum maiori, minor autem est evidens, accipiendo eam in predicatione
causali et non identica, ad hunc intellectum, quod ex ultima differentia 15
habetur tota essentia diffiniti et complete ipsa diffinitio: posita enim
ultima differentia ponitur tam diffinitum quam diffinitio, et ea remota
removetur tam diffinitio quam diffinitum.
Lege litteram: Si itaque hec sic se habent ut determinatum est, palam
quia finalis differentia substantia rei erit et diffinitio.c 20
Et si aliquis argueret: unitas diffinitionis attendi habet penes unitatem
ultime differentie; ergo diffinitio est una, si ultima differentia est una,
respondetur Philosophus negando consequentiam, quia ultra hoc opor-
tet quod non repetatur idem in illa diffinitione, quia, si repetatur idem,
illa diffinitio esset nugatoria et superflua et non diceretur una. Fit autem 25
repetitio eiusdem quando eadem differentia bis dicitur aut idem genus. Si
enim quis diffiniat hominem vel alterum genus animalis per hoc quod est
291va Pv animal habens pedes bipes, talis diffinitio | non est una, quia est nugato-
ria et superflua, ex eo quod eadem differentia bis dicitur: idem enim est
dicere bipes sicut duos pedes habens; ergo tota diffinitio significat idem 30
quod animal habens pedes duos pedes habens. Constat autem quod in
hoc repetitur et bis dicitur hec differentia habens pedes.
sed homo] et Pv specialissima] specialissimas Pv et om. Pv repetatur2]

repetitur Pv esset] est Pv diceretur] dicitur Pv genus animalis] animal Pv
eadem] prima Pv
a Aristotle, Phys., VII, 4, 249a1416. b Aristotle, Met., I, 1, 980b7. c Aristotle, Met., VII, 12,
1038a1820 (AL XXV 3.2, p. 157, lin. 695696).
59va M Lege litteram: Si non oportet multorum eadem dicere | in terminis,

idest diffinitionibus, tunc diffinitio est una; superfluum enim est, quoniam
idem bis dicitur. Accidit autem hoc aliquando; nam quando dixit animal
habens pedes bipes, nichil aliud dixit quam animal pedes habens duos pedes
habens.a 5
Secundum correlarium: totiens dicitur diffinitum quotiens dicitur
ultima differentia, ita quod, si fiat divisio propria, sicut fieri debet, nichil
pretermittendo, si tantum semel diceretur ultima differentia, tantum
semel diceretur diffinitum, et si multoties diceretur ultima differentia,
etiam multoties diceretur diffinitum, et non aliter quia semper sunt dif- 10
finita equalia differentiis ultimis. Si ergo dividatur genus per differentias
et postea differentia per differentias, quia non proceditur in infinitum in
divisionibus, una differentia erit ultima et finalis, secundum quam accipi-
tur substantia diffiniti et unitas eius. Non ergo totiens dicitur diffinitum
quotiens dicitur aliqua differentia divisibilis, sed solum quotiens dici- 15
tur ultima differentia. Si enim dicendo hoc est animal rationale, statim
habito animali haberetur conceptus hominis, et iterum habito rationali
haberetur conceptus hominis, per illam diffinitionem idem conceptus
diceretur bis. Sed quia conceptus hominis non habetur nisi habito ratio-
nali, quod est ultima differentia, ideo diffinitum tantum semel dicitur per 20
omnes partes diffinitionis, quia ultima differentia tantum semel dicitur.
Lege litteram: Et si hoc dividat propria divisione, multoties dicet et
equaliter differentiis ultimis ipsa diffinita si multoties dicentur ultime
differentie. Si quidem differentie differentia fiat per divisionem, una erit
finalis a qua accipietur species et substantia diffiniti.b 25
Tertium correlarium: diffinitum non est unum nisi quelibet differen-
tiarum sit per se. Patet, quia, si aliqua differentiarum sit per accidens,
diffinitum non esset unum tantum, sed plura. Si enim dicatur animalium
habentium pedes aliud album, aliud non album vel nigrum, et diffini-
tur homo per hoc quod est animal bipes album, tot erunt diffinita quot 30
sunt differentie, et tot erunt sectiones et partitiones ipsorum diffinitorum
quot sunt sectiones et divisiones differentiarum. Cuius ratio est quia, si
non Pv Moerb.] vero M multorum] multoties Moerb. dixit] dicit Moerb.

ultima differentia inv. Pv conceptus2 om. M differentie] igitur differentie
Moerb. (igitur om. Da P1) erit] erit que Moerb. (que om. DaOp) non album vel
om. Pv
12, 1038a2326 (AL XXV 3.2, p. 157, lin. 699702).

436 pauli veneti
posterior differentia non haberet per se habitudinem ad priorem sed per

accidens, diceret omnino aliud ab illa, ita quod per priorem haberetur
unum quid et per posteriorem haberetur aliud quid, et sic haberentur duo
quid et duo diffinita. Sed quia posterior per se aspicit priorem et non est
alia natura, sed tantum certificatio illius, ideo per primam et secundam 5
non habentur duo diffinita sicut neque duo quid, sed unum tantum, cuius
unitas datur intelligi per ultimam. Si enim dicatur homo est substantia
animata sensitiva, quia sensitivum non est nisi quoddam animatum et
quedam certificatio illius, ideo sensitivum non dat intelligere aliud ab ani-
mato, sed tantum animatum, magis tamen certificatum; si autem dicatur 10
homo est animal bipes album, quia albedo non est quedam pedalitas
neque certificatio eius, sed quedam natura omnino extranea, ideo aliud
et aliud diffinitum habetur, sicut alia et alia natura designatur.
Lege litteram: Si vero secundum accidens, ut si dividat hsecundumi
accidens isto modo: habentis pedes aliud album aliud nigrum, tot quot 15
utique sectiones fuerint, tot erunt diffinita.a
Quartum correlarium: diffinitio non est una nisi differentie recto
ordine componantur. Patet, quia debet esse processus ordinatus a magis
communi ad minus comune, ita quod primo accipiatur genus, deinde
291vb Pv differentia communior, deinde differentia minus | communis, sic quod 20
differentia penes quam accipitur unitas tam diffiniti quam diffinitionis,
sicut est ultima in diffinitione, ita sit ultima in compositione. Si autem
quis hunc ordinem transponat, diffinitio non erit una, quia nugatoria erit
59vb M et superflua, propter repetitionem eiusdem differentie: si enim quis | dicat
quod diffinitio hominis est animal bipes pedes habens, quia bipes minus 25
commune est quam pedes habens, ideo habens pedes bis dicitur, scilicet
semel in se et semel in bipede, ex quo idem est quod duos pedes habens.
Similiter, si diffinitur animal per substantiam sensitivam animatam fit
nugatio, quoniam ex quo animatum includitur in sensitivo et sensitivum
est posterior differentia, oportebit iterum certificare animatum per sen- 30
sitivum et habebitur nugatio. Unde, quia partes diffinitionis respondent
partibus diffiniti, nisi sit rectus ordo in partibus diffinitionis, non poteri-
mus intelligere quid est prius et quid posterius in ipso diffinito.
haberetur om. Pv secundum suppl. differentia1 om. M deinde] tertio Pv

nugatoria erit inv. Pv eiusdem] ultime M
Lege litteram: Quare palam quod diffinitio ratio est que est ex diffe-
rentiis, et harum ex finali secundum rectum ordinem procedendi. Palam
autem erit, si quis transponat tales diffinitiones, idest differentias, ut eam
que est hominis, dicens animal bipes pedes habens; superfluum enim est
habens pedes dicto bipede. Sed ordo non est in substantia diffiniti; quomodo 5
namque oportet intelligere hoc quidam prius, illud autem posterius in ipso
diffinito? Deinde Philosophus epilogat circa determinata, dicens: De dif-
finitionibus quidem igitur secundum divisiones generum et differentiarum
tot dicantur primum; tantum dictum est quales quedam sunt diffinitionum
partes, quia secundum formam et non secundum materiam.a 10
Notandum, secundum Commentatorem, commento quadracesimo
tertio, quod si diviserit differentiam per differentiam essentialem
et illam per aliam, et non iteraverit neque diminuerit, tunc ultima
differentia erit forma et substantia illius speciei diffinite, et erit
unum necessario. Et si diviserit differentiam accidentalem divisio, 15
verbi gratia, album et nigrum, et istas in differentias accidentales et
illas accidentales in accidentales, tunc ille differentie erunt infinite
et infinitum non largitur scientiam.b
Quatuor conditiones ponit Commentator necessario requisitas ad unita-
tem diffinitionis. 20
Prima est quod in nulla diffinitione differentia iteretur. Si enim mixti
naturalis aliqua forma iteraretur, illud non esset vere unum; ita, si aliqua
differentia iteraretur in diffinitione, illa diffinitio non esset una; propterea
hec non est una diffinitio: animal bipes pedes habens.
Secunda conditio est quod nulla differentia deficiat. Sicut enim mix- 25
tum naturale non est unum si ei deficeret aliqua forma elementi, ita diffi-
nitio non est una si ei deficit aliqua differentia; propterea hec non est una
diffinitio animalis, substantia animata sensitiva, quia deficit ei una dif-
ferentia, scilicet corporea. Hec tamen diffinitio datur communiter gratia
brevitatis, accipiendo substantiam loco corporis, ne credatur corpus de 30
predicamento quantitatis accipi in diffinitione animalis.
Tertia conditio est quod ultima differentia in divisione sit ultima in
compositione, quoniam, sicut mixtum naturale ab ultima forma accipit
quod] quia Moerb. (quod P1b) prius posterius M] inv. Pv Moerb. autem
M] vero Pv Moerb. (autem Da To) accidentalem divisio] accidentali divisione Iunt.
gratia] bipes in add. Iunt. ille] iste Iunt. in om. Pv
Met., VII, t.c. 43, fol. 196KL.
438 pauli veneti
nomen et diffinitionem, ita diffinitum ab ultima differentia suscipit

nomen et diffinitionem, quoniam sola ultima differentia est in actu et
omnes alie sunt in potentia, in quantum se tenent ex parte generis. Neque
differt ultima differentia ab aliis nisi conceptibiliter, quoniam corporeum
animatum sensitivum rationale sunt una res accepta sub diversis concep- 5
tibus.
Quarta conditio est quod nulla differentia sit per accidens, quia, licet
in formis et in conceptibus per se non sit processus in infinitum, tamen
in formis et in conceptibus per accidens potest esse processus infinitus.
Si ergo diffinitio fiat per differentias accidentales, et eo modo fit diffinitio 10
quomodo fit divisio, sequitur diffinitionem procedere in infinitum, sicut
292ra Pv et divisionem. Quo concesso, sequitur quod per diffinitionem | non habe-
60ra M tur scientia de diffinito neque demonstratio | alicuius passionis de illo;
ymmo sequitur quod diffinitum non est unum, quia unitas diffiniti non
habetur nisi ab ultima differentia; constat autem quod non est ultima 15
differentia si proceditur in infinitum in differentiis componendo et divi-
dendo.
Contra predictam arguitur. Et primo quod diffinitio non est una que est
composita ex genere et differentia unica, quia ex pluribus existentibus in
actu non fit unum tertium, secundum Philosophum hic;a constat autem 20
quod genus et differentia sunt duo in actu. Quod sunt duo patet, quia
neutrum illorum alterum includit ut habetur tertio huiusb; et quod sint in
actu habetur ex eo quod utrumque ab ente accipitur, videlicet a forma,
propter quod dicit Philosophus, quinto huius et secundo Phisicorum,c
quod partes diffinitionis sunt forme. 25
Secundo arguitur quod diffinitio non est una que est composita ex
genere et multis differentiis, quoniam quelibet talis est nugatoria et super-
flua. Nam hec est nugatio: animal pedes habens bipes, quia prima dif-
ferentia includitur in secunda; sed cuiuslibet diffinitionis plurium diffe-
rentiarum, semper prior includitur in posteriori, alioquin non posset poni 30
ultima differentia cum genere nisi omnes superiores ponerenturquod
est falsum, quia diffinitur homo per animal rationale non ponendo dif-
ferentias superiores, scilicet sensitivum, animatum et corporeum.
ultima differentia inv. Pv in om. Pv non habetur nisi] habetur Pv quod

om. Pv ab Pv (M s. l. )] ex M i.l. et om. M
a Aristotle, Met., VII, 13, 1039a34. b Aristotle Met., III, 3, 999b2328. c Aristotle, Met., V, 2,
1013a2629; Phys, II, 194b2629.

Ad primum dicitur quod genus et differentia possunt dupliciter com-

parari, vel ad seinvicem vel ad ipsum diffinitum. Si ad seinvicem, sic genus
se habet ut materia et differentia ut actus et forma; si autem comparantur
ad diffinitum, utrumque se habet ut forma. Constat autem quod diffinitio
non est una comparando genus et differentiam ad diffinitum, sed compa- 5
rando ea adinvicem.
Ad secundum respondetur quod unam differentiam includi in alia
intelligitur dupliciter, aut re tantum aut re et nomine. Si includitur tan-
tum re, hoc non facit nugationem, sed bene si includitur re et nomine,
ita quod nomen unius derivetur a nomine alterius. Nam, quia idem est 10
dicere bipes quod duos pedes habens, ideo animal pedes habens bipes
est oratio nugatoria; hec autem non est nugatoria, substantia corporea
animata sensitiva rationalis, quia licet quelibet differentia superior inclu-
datur in inferiori, hoc non est inclusione nominis, sed tantum inclusione
rei: rationale enim non derivatur a sensitivo neque sensitivum ab ani- 15
mato neque animatum a corporeo.
Dubitatur, quia videtur quod differentia superior non includatur in
inferiori, quia, sicut genus dividitur per differentias, ita differentia supe-
rior per differentias inferiores; sed genus non includitur in aliqua suarum
differentiarum; ergo neque differentia superior includitur in aliqua diffe- 20
rentia inferiori.
Item, si differentia superior includitur in differentia inferiori, ergo dif-
ferentie dividentes illam in aliquo conveniunt et in aliquo differunt, eo
modo quo species contente sub genere differunt differentiis, que sunt
partes earum; ergo etiam differentie inferiores dividentes superiorem dif- 25
ferunt differentiis, que sunt partes earum, et per consequens differentie
non sunt simplices, sed componuntur ex genere et differentia seu ex actu
et potentiaquod est falsum.
Respondetur quod unum includi in alio intelligitur dupliciter, aut for-
maliter per modum continentie, eo modo quo genus includitur in specie 30
tamquam pars in toto, aut virtualiter per modum consequentie, eo modo
quo forma elementi includitur in forma mixti, ita quod, si est forma mixti,
est forma elementi et non econtra. Dico ergo quod differentia superior
non includitur in differentia inferiori formaliter, per modum continentie
tamquam pars in toto, quoniam tunc differentia componeretur et esset 35
60rb M species, sicut probatum est, sed includitur | virtualiter, per modum conse-
secundum] secundam M oratio] diffinitio Pv hoc] hec Pv

440 pauli veneti
292rb Pv quentie, ad hunc intellectum, quod, si est differentia inferior, | est etiam
superior et non econtra. Et hoc modo non negatur genus includi in sua
differentia divisiva. Quando autem dicitur genus non includi in sua dif-
ferentia nec econtra, illud est intelligendum de inclusione continentie,
quoniam ratio generis est omnino extra rationem differentie et econtra; 5
tamen, quia differentia est posterior genere et ad esse differentie sequitur
esse generis et non econtra, ideo genus includitur in differentia inclu-
sione consequentie. Si enim genus nullo modo includeretur in differen-
tia, neque differentia superior in differentia inferiori, ista non esset vera:
rationalitas est quedam animalitas, neque ista: fissio pedum est quedam 10
pedalitascuius oppositum ponit Philosophus in littera.a
Ex predictis patet quod ista consequentia non valet: hec oratio est
nugatoria, homo est substantia corpus animatum animal, ergo, per idem,
hec est nugatoria, homo est substantia animata corporea sensitiva ratio-
nalis, quia non eodem modo includitur differentia superior in differen- 15
tia inferiori quomodo genus in specie includitur, quia genus includitur
in specie formaliter et per modum continentie, differentia vero supe-
rior includitur in inferiori virtualiter, per modum consequentie. Et quia
tali modo includitur genus in differentia, ideo recte dicitur hoc est ani-
mal rationale absque nugatione. Non ergo est dicendum quod diffe- 20
rentia superior includitur in inferiori sicut genus in specie, quia tunc
non possent simul componi absque nugatione. Non etiam est dicendum
quod nullo modo includitur, quia tunc diffiniendo hominem per ani-
mal oporteret ponere omnes differentias convenientes homini, sicut dif-
finiendo ipsum per substantiamquod est falsum, quia ita completa est 25
hec diffinitio animal rationale sicut ista substantia corporea animata
sensitiva rationalis, quia totum hoc substantia corporea animata sen-
sitiva ponitur loco istius generis animal, ut asserit Philosophus in lit-
tera.b
in specie includitur] includitur in specie Pv istius] huius Pv
a Aristotle, Met., VII, 12, 1038a15. b Aristotle, Met., VII, 12, 1038a15.
hTRACTATUS IIIi
hCAPITULUM Ii
Quoniam vero de substantia h1038b1ssi.

Iste est tertius tractatus huius septimi, in quo Philosophus determi-
nat de quiditate substantie secundum communicationem et predicatio- 5
nem, postquam determinavit de illa secundum operationem et diffinitio-
nem.
Et dividitur in quatuor capitula, in quorum primo Philosophus probat
contra Platonem quod universalia non sunt per se existentia; in secundo
quod non sunt separata a singularibus, ibi: Manifestum autem 10
h1039a24ssi; in tertio manifestat quosdam errores Platonicorum, ibi: Mani-
festum est autem h1040b5ssi; in quarto que est illa quiditas que est sub-
stantia rei, ibi: Quod autem oportet dicere h1041a6ssi.
Primum capitulum dividitur in duas partes, in quarum prima reite-
rat distinctionem de substantia in principio huius septimi positam; in 15
secunda vero exequitur de intento, ibi: Videtur enim impossibile
h1038b8ssi.
Quantum ad primum, distinctio est hec, quod substantia dicitur qua-
drupliciter. Primo accipitur substantia pro subiecto recipiente formam;
secundo pro quiditate importata per diffinitionem; tertio pro composito 20
ex materia et forma, a quibus fluit quiditas; quarto pro universali predi-
cabili in quid, quod quidem Plato separatum ponebat. De duobus pri-
mis modis accipiendi substantiam determinatum est ante, videlicet de
subiecto et quiditate. De subiecto quidem, quod aliquando est ens in actu
subiectum accidentibus, ut animal cui insunt passiones, et quandoque 25
est subiectum in potentia, ut materia subiecta forma substantiali. De qui-
ditate etiam est determinatum quid est hquodi quid erat esse et cuius
est quod quid erat esse, et qualiter generat et generatur. De tertio modo
accipiendi substantiam non est dictum nisi in generali, manifestando
quid est illud quod diffinitur, videlicet compositum universale et non 30
292va Pv compositum particulare. In octavo autem | huius de illo distinctior fiet
autem] ex ipsis add. Pv subiecto2 scr.] substantia MPv quod suppl.

442 pauli veneti
60va M sermo.a | De ipso autem universali, quia pertinet ad quiditatem rei, deter-
minabitur in hoc tertio tractatu pro complemento huius septimi, et hoc
ut reprobetur opinio Platonicorum, quibus videtur ipsum universale
maxime causam esse et principium rerum.
Lege litteram: Quoniam vero de substantia perscrutatio, iterum redea- 5
mus ad priorem distinctionem substantie. Dicitur autem sicut subiectum
substantia esse et quod quid erat esse et quod ex hiis, et universale. De duo-
bus quidem ergo dictum est, etenim quod quid erat esse et de subiecto, quia
dupliciter subicitur: aut hoc aliquid ens, ut animal passionibus, aut ut mate-
ria actui. Videtur autem et universale causa quibusdam esse maxime, et esse 10
principium universale; unde et de hac tractemus.b
Notandum, secundum Commentatorem, commento quadracesimo
quarto, quod illa que significant diffinitiones sunt substantie rerum,
et diffinitiones componuntur ex universalibus, que predicantur de
particularibus , et de individuo non est substantia nisi materia 15
et forma particularis ex quibus componitur , et substantia quam
significat diffinitio est forma rerum particularium.c
Prima propositio est quod diffinitiones significant substantias rerum. Non
accipit Commentator substantiam hic stricte pro re tantum predica-
menti substantie, sed indifferenter pro qualibet essentia et quiditate rei. 20
Secunda propositio est quod universalia componentia diffinitiones
predicantur de particularibus, quia universalia que non componunt dif-
finitiones, videlicet Deus et intelligentie, non predicantur de particulari-
bus.
Tertia propositio est quod individuum non componitur nisi ex materia 25
et forma particulari. Per hoc non debet intelligi quod universalia non
sunt in singularibus, sed quod individuum non per se componitur ex
universalibus, sed singularibus.
Quarta propositio est quod substantia quam significat diffinitio est
forma rerum particularium. Non debet intelligi quod quiditas importata 30
per diffinitionem sit forma particularis, sed quod sit forma universalis
existens in re singulari, contra Platonem, ponentem quiditates generum
et specierum separatas esse a rebus particularibus.
perscrutatio] est add. Moerb. ergo] igitur Moerb. quod] de Moerb. quia Pv
Moerb.] quare M hac] hoc Moerb. quarto post correct. M] tertio Pv de] in
Iunt. hic om. M est1 om. M
a Aristotle,
Met., VIII, 2, 1043a728 together with 3, 1043b2332. b Aristotle, Met., VII, 13,
1038b18 (AL XXV 3.2, p. 158, lin. 712719). c Averroes, In Met., VII, t.c. 44, fol. 197 CE.
expositio in duodecim libros metaphisice aristotelis iii 443
Videtur enim impossibile h1038b8ssi.

Ista est secunda pars huius capituli, in qua Philosophus ponit tres
conclusiones contra Platonem, quarum prima est hec: nullum universale
secundum quod huiusmodi est substantia per se existens; secunda con-
clusio: nullum universale secundum quod huiusmodi est pars substantie 5
per se existentis, ibi: Amplius autem et impossibile h1038b23ssi; tertia
conclusio: nullum universale secundum quod huiusmodi est ens in actu,
ibi: Amplius autem est et ita h1039a3ssi.
Pro demonstratione prime conclusionis, Philosophus premittit duas
suppositiones, quarum prima est quod, si substantia est propria alicui, 10
ipsa non competit alteri. Patet, quia aliter non esset propria illi. Unde, quia
risibile est proprium homini et simitas est propria naso, ideo risibile non
competit alteri ab homine neque simitas competit alteri a naso.
Lege litteram: Videtur autem impossibile esse substantiam esse quod-
cumque universaliter dictorum. Primum enim supponamus quod substan- 15
tia que uniuscuiusque est propria est illa que non inest alteri.a
Secunda suppositio est quod universale est illud quod est aptum natum
in pluribus esse. Non autem dicit Philosophus quod in pluribus est, quia
universalia quedam sunt que non continent sub se nisi unum singulare,
sicut sol et luna; sed hoc non est quin ipsa natura speciei, quantum est de 20
se, apta nata est esse in pluribus, sed quia tota materia speciei compre-
henditur sub uno individuo, quia, cum Deus et natura nichil facit frustra,
si natura specifica potest perpetuari in uno individuo, frustra multipli-
caretur per plura individua. Propterea data est continua generatio rebus
corruptibilibus solum, ut salvaretur in esse natura specifica secundum 25
successivam generationem in multis individuis, que in uno corruptibili
individuo servari non potest, ut habet videri secundo De generatione.b
60vb M Propter quod dicit Commentator, secundo De anima,c | quod divina solli-
citudo inserta est rebus, ut que in uno individuo perpetuari non possunt,
perpetua habeant generationem. 30
Lege litteram: Universale vero commune. Hoc enim dicitur universale
hic quod pluribus inesse natum est.d
autem] enim Moerb. propria] uniuscuiusque add. Moerb. alteri] alii Moerb.
plura] multa Pv
a Aristotle, Met., VII, 13, 1038b810 (AL XXV 3.2, p. 158, lin. 719722). b Aristotle, De gen.,
II 11, 338b5ff. c Averroes, In De an., II, t.c. 34, p. 182, 5358. d Aristotle, Met., VII, 13,
1038b1012 (AL XXV 3.2, p. 158, lin. 722723).

444 pauli veneti
292vb Pv Hiis premissis suppositionibus Philosophus dupliciter probat istam

conclusionem primam. Et primo sic: si universale secundum quod huiu-
smodi est substantia per se existens, aut ergo est substantia nullius, aut
unius tantum, aut omnium de quibus predicatur. Primum non potest dari,
quia cum universale referatur ad singulare, contra rationem universalis 5
est quod ipsum non sit alicuius: universalia enim sunt forme suorum sin-
gularium, ideo si universale sit substantia, oportet quod sit substantia
alicuius. Secundum etiam concedi non potest, quia, si universale secun-
dum quod huiusmodi est substantia tantum unius, ergo est proprium illi;
quod autem est proprium alicui nulli alteri competit, per primam supposi- 10
tionem; ergo universale non est aptum natum in pluribus essequod est
contra secundam suppositionem. Aut si predicatur de aliis et est unius
tantum substantia, oportet omnia alia esse illud unum: omnia enim illa
sunt unum numero, quorum est una substantia eadem et quiditas una
numero, ut patet. Tertium vero, si concedatur, arguitur sic: universale 15
secundum quod huiusmodi est substantia omnium de quibus predicatur,
et est substantia per se existens, ut Platonici dicunt; ergo omnia individua
eiusdem speciei sunt unum numero. Consequens est falsum. Et patet con-
sequentia, quia quecumque sunt eadem uni eidem, numero sunt eadem
inter se. 20
Lege litteram: Cuius ergo substantia hec erit? Aut enim omnium aut
nullius. Omnium autem non est possibile neque nullius. Unius autem si erit,
et alia hoc erunt. Quorum enim una substantia est et quod quid erat esse
unum, et ipsa unum,a ita quod si una substantia eadem et eadem quiditas
numero est duorum, oportet quod illa duo sint unum numero et cetera. 25
quinto, quod Aristoteles locutus fuit in hoc, quod universalia non
sunt cause agentes particularia; et hic querit utrum sint cause for-
males , et dedit rationem super hoc quod universale non est pars
substantie alicuius eorum que sunt substantie existentes per se, 30
quia substantia cuiuslibet rei demonstrate est ei propria, universale
autem est commune pluribus; ergo universale non est substantia
propria.b
istamprimam] primam conclusionem Pv sit] est Pv est om. Pv eadem1]

eedem M omnium Pv Moerb.] omni M omnium Pv Moerb.] omni M quinto
corr.] quarto MPv
VII, t.c. 45, fol. 197IK.
Sicut ergo in precedenti tractatu Aristoteles quesivit utrum universa-

lia sint cause effective suorum singularium, et probavit quod non, ita in
hoc tractatu querit utrum universalia sint cause formales singularium,
et respondet quod non, probans quod universale non est pars alicuius
substantie per se existentis, quoniam quelibet substantia alicuius rei par- 5
ticularis est propria illi; sed nullum universale est proprium alicui, quia est
commune predicabile de multis; ergo nullum universale est substantia ali-
cuius rei particularis. Maior istius rationis est intelligenda de substantia
una numero, quia substantia una [numero] specie aut genere est sub-
stantia alicuius rei particularis, et non est propria illi. Ideo ratio procedit 10
contra Platonicos, dicentes universalia esse substantias per se existentes,
et consequenter esse unum numero. Propterea illa maior est vera ad hunc
intellectum: quelibet substantia una numero alicuius rei particularis est
propria illi.
Intelligendum quod notanter prima conclusio est specificata per se- 15
cundum quod huiusmodi et limitata per substantiam per se existen-
tem, quoniam quelibet istarum est falsa: nullum universale est sub-
stantia, hnullum universale est substantia alicuiusi, nullum universale
est substantia per se existens, nullum universale secundum quod huiu-
smodi est substantia. Prima quidem est falsa, quia genera et species pre- 20
dicamenti substantie sunt substantie, aliter non distingueret Aristote-
les in Predicamentis,a dicens quod substantiarum quedam prima et que-
dam secunda, et quod substantia prima significat hoc aliquid et substan-
tia secunda quale quid, ita quod, sicut substantie prime sunt individua,
ita substantie secunde sunt genera et species. Secunda propositio est 25
falsa, eo quod omne superius est forma sui inferioris, per Aristotelem,
61ra M secundo Phisicorum et quinto huius;b | genus etiam et differentia sunt
partes speciei, secundum Porphyrium, in Universalibus,c et Commenta-
torem, in prologo Phisicorum,d ac etiam Philosophus in tractatu prece-
dentee; ergo aliquod universale est substantia alicuius, videlicet univer- 30
sale predicamenti substantie. Tertia propositio etiam est falsa, quoniam
tam homo quam animal est universale: nam homo est species et animal
est genus, et illorum quodlibet est substantia per se existens, quia idem
293ra Pv est homo et hic homo, et animal et hoc animal; | constat autem quod
numero secl. dicentes] ponentes Pv nullum1alicuius suppl. et sub-

stantia] substantia vero Pv secunda] significat add. Pv illorum quodlibet inv. Pv
a Aristotle,
Cat., 5, 2a1116; 3b1023. b Aristotle, Phys., II, 3, 194b2629; Met., V, 2, 1013a26
29. c Porphyry, Isag., c. De differentia (AL I 67, p. 18, 1215). d Averroes, In Phys., I, t.c. 5,
fol. 8AB. e Aristotle, Met., VII, 12, 1037b2930.
446 pauli veneti
hic homo et hoc animal est substantia per se existens. Quarta propositio
iterum non est vera, quia universale predicamenti substantie secundum
quod huiusmodi est substantia, quia est secunda substantia. Hec autem
vera est, nullum universale secundum quod huiusmodi est substantia per
se existens, quoniam omne universale secundum quod huiusmodi est in 5
aliquo et alicuius, ut videbitur in secunda ratione; nulla autem substantia
per se existens est in aliquo aut alicuius.
Amplius substantia h1038b15ssi.
Secundo arguit Philosophus ad eandem conclusionem sic: nulla sub-
stantia per se existens dicitur de aliquo subiecto; sed universale quodlibet 10
secundum quod huiusmodi dicitur de aliquo subiecto; ergo nullum uni-
versale secundum quod huiusmodi est substantia per se existens. Tenet
consequentia cum maiori, quia nulla substantia prima dicitur de aliquo
subiecto, ut probatur in Predicamentis;a constat autem quod omnis sub-
stantia per se existens est substantia prima. Minor vero sic arguitur: omne 15
quod est in aliquo subiecto dicitur de illo subiecto; modo omne universale
secundum quod huiusmodi est in aliquo subiecto, sive sit universale pre-
dicamenti substantie sive predicamenti accidentis; ergo omne universale
secundum quod huiusmodi dicitur de subiecto aliquo. Tenet consequen-
tia cum secunda parte antecedentis. Prima autem est manifesta inductive: 20
nam animal dicitur de homine et de equo, quia existit in eis, et homo dici-
tur de Sorte et Platone, quia existit in illis. Non enim contingit universale
aliquod aut quiditatem aliquam esse in aliquibus et non predicari de illis.
Lege litteram: Amplius substantia dicitur que non de subiecto, et uni-
versale de subiecto aliquo dicitur semper. Sed an, idest certe, sic quidem non 25
contingit ut quod quid erat esse in ipso existit, ut animal in homine et equo,
et non predicari de illo.b
Ad istam obiectionem respondebant Platonici, dicentes quod univer-
sale nec est in subiecto neque de subiecto dicitur, quoniam diffinitio sicut
et demonstratio et scientia est de rebus necessariis impossibilibus aliter se 30
habere; sed universale est illud quod diffinitur; ergo universale est neces-
sarium impossibile aliter se habere. Constat autem quod tam existens in
subiecto, quam predicabile de subiecto, est contingens, possibile aliter se
habere, sicut et ipsum subiectum; ergo universale nec est in subiecto nec
de subiecto dicitur. 35
universale quodlibet] omne universale Pv aliquo subiecto inv. Pv ipso]

autem add. Moerb.
730).
Istam responsionem increpat Philosophus, dicens quod ista solutio

non tollit rationem iam factam, quia, sive diffiniatur universale sive non
diffiniatur, non minus universale secundum quod huiusmodi est in sub-
iecto et de subiecto dicitur, quoniam genus predicamenti substantie est
in illo cuius dicitur esse genus et predicatur de illo; species etiam eiusdem 5
predicamenti est in illo cuius dicitur esse species et predicatur de illo.
Et generaliter quodlibet proprium genus alicuius speciei est in illa specie
et predicatur de illa, ac etiam quelibet propria species alicuius individui
est in illo individuo et predicatur de eo. Quia ergo homo est species et
animal genus, sive diffinitur aliquod istorum sive non, semper tamen 10
est concedendum quod homo est substantia alicuius hominis tamquam
propria species eius, et animal est substantia alicuius animalis tamquam
proprium genus eius. Quod quidem verum non esset nisi homo communis
esset in aliquo homine et predicaretur de eo.
Lege litteram: Ergo palam quia est quedam ipsius ratio, idest diffinitio 15
universalis. Differt autem nichil nec si non omnium ratio est eorum que
sunt in substantia; nichil enim minus substantia erit huius alicuius, ut homo
hominis in quo existit. Quare idem accidit quod argutum est in secunda
ratione. Erit enim substantia illius substantia, aut animal, in quo est species
ut proprium est in eo cuius dicitur proprium.a 20
Notandum primo, secundum Commentatorem, commento quadra-
cesimo sexto, quod universale substantiale est illud quod predica-
61rb M tur de aliquo secundum quid, et substantia in rei veritate est illud |
quod non predicatur de aliquo omnino. Et cum ita sit, tunc uni-
versale non significat substantiam, nisi substantiam quam significat 25
pars, sicut animal de substantia equi et hominis, scilicet naturam
communem, non propriam.b
Prima distinctio quam intendit Commentator est hec: quod differentia est
293rb Pv inter substantiam et substantiale, quia substantia | proprie dicitur illud
quod in se subsistit, non in alio, secundum quem modum solum indivi- 30
duum substantie est substantia, quia est per se ens et per se subsistens.
Tale autem in rei veritate non predicatur omnino. Substantiale vero dici-
tur quod, licet in se non subsistat, pertinet tamen ad naturam et essentiam
animal] est add. Pv huius] hoc Moerb. accidit] accidet iterum Moerb.
aut] ut Moerb. est] existit Pv Moerb. sexto corr.] quinto MPv nisi
substantiam mg. M, Iunt.] om. Pv sicut Pv Iunt.] sive M animal M Iunt.]
significat add. Pv
Met., VII, t.c. 46, fol. 198BC.
448 pauli veneti
per se subsistentis, sicut forma Sortis est quid substantiale Sorti, quo-
modo dicimus diffinitionem non esse substantiam, sed substantiale ipsi
rei. Hanc distinctionem ponit Commentator ut ostendat Philosophum,
in hac conclusione dicentem quod universale non est substantia, solum
intendere de individuo predicamenti substantie, quod est substantia per 5
se existens.
Secunda distinctio est quod in quolibet inferiori est duplex natura, sci-
licet propria et communis. Natura propria est illud per quod constituitur
in esse et differt a quolibet alio; natura communis est illa per quam conve-
nit cum alio. Verbi gratia, natura propria hominis est humanitas et natura 10
propria equi est equinitas; natura autem communis utriusque est ani-
malitas. Et licet in eodem inveniatur utraque natura, non tamen omne
significans unam naturam significat aliam, quoniam animal significat ani-
malitatem, non autem significat humanitatem neque equinitatem. Homo
autem et equus significant utramque naturam, quoniam tam animalitas 15
quam humanitas est de ratione hominis, et tam animalitas quam equi-
nitas est de ratione equi, sed nec humanitas nec equinitas est de ratione
animalis.
mento, quod diffinitiones que componuntur ex universalibus non 20
sunt partes substantiarum sensibilium, quoniam substantie sensibi-
les non diversantur in suis substantiis quando diffiniuntur, quoniam
sunt substantie, licet non diffiniuntur, non minus quam quando dif-
finiuntur, sicut est dispositio in visibilibus vel in invisibilibus, quo-
niam ipsa non sunt minus visibilia quando videntur quam quando 25
non videntur.a
Intendit Commentator quod, sicut visio non est pars rei visibilis, ita nec
diffinitio rei sensibilis, sic quod homo est cognoscibilis, sive cognoscatur
sive non cognoscatur. Sicut ergo prius est color quam sit visibilis, et prius
est visibilis quam videatur, ita homo prius est quam sit cognoscibilis, et 30
prius est cognoscibilis quam cognoscatur. Consimiliter dicatur de univer-
salibus quod, sive diffiniantur sive non, non minus sunt in subiecto et
dicuntur de subiecto. Quando ergo Philosophus dicit quod substantia non
dicitur de subiecto, certum est quod non loquitur de omni substantia, quia
inveniatur scr.] inveniantur MPv notandum secundo inv. Pv suis] subiectis

add. Pv (scr. et del. M) diffiniuntur] diffiniantur Iunt. non1] diffiniantur add. Pv
a Averroes, In Met., VII, t.c. 46, fol. 198CD.

in Predicamentisa determinat substantiam secundam dici de substantia

prima, sed loquitur de substantia prima, que proprie, maxime et princi-
paliter dicitur substantia, ut habetur ibidem.b Hec autem est substantia
per se existens.
Sed dubitatur, quia Philosophus, in Predicamentis,c dicit quod substan- 5
tia secunda dicitur de subiecto et non est in subiecto; constat autem
quod substantia secunda est universale; ergo aliquod universale secun-
dum quod huiusmodi non est in subiecto.
Respondetur quod est duplex subiectum, scilicet inhesionis et predi-
cationis. Licet ergo universale non sit in subiecto inhesionis, est tamen 10
in subiecto predicationis. Quodlibet enim inferius recipit suum superius
non inhesive, quia superius est prius suo inferiori, sed informative, ex quo
est forma illius predicans de eo in quidsicut etiam dicitur de intellectu
humano, dato quod sit perpetuus, iuxta doctrinam Aristotelis et Com-
mentatoris, tertio De anima,d quod non inheret materie neque humano 15
corpori, licet in eo recipiatur tamquam forma actuans et informans, dans
nomen et diffinitionem.
Amplius autem et impossibile h1038b23ssi.
Secunda conclusio: nullum universale secundum quod huiusmodi est
pars substantie per se existentis. 20
Ista conclusio dupliciter probatur, et primo sic: nam si universale se-
cundum quod huiusmodi est pars substantie per se existentis, et univer-
sale secundum quod huiusmodi est aptum natum esse in pluribus, per
secundam suppositionem, ergo aptitudo esse in pluribus est pars sub-
293va Pv stantie | per se existentis; quo concesso, sequitur quod substantia sit ex 25
61va M non-substantiis et quod | accidens est pars substantie, si aptitudo essendi
in pluribus, que est quedam qualitas, est pars substantie per se existen-
tis. Et quod illud sit inconveniens, manifestum est, quia omne id ex quo
aliquid fit est prius illo, et etiam partes sunt priores toto. Si ergo ex non-
substantiis fit substantia, et qualitas est pars substantie, sequitur quod 30
non-substantia ac etiam qualitas est prius substantiaquod est falsum:
nam qualitas non est prior substantia diffinitione, neque tempore, neque
generatione. Oportet enim quod est altero prius, aliquo istorum trium
modorum esse separabile ab ipso; si ergo qualitas est prior substantia dif-
proprie] et add. Pv est tamen inv. Pv neque2 iter. Pv
a Aristotle, Cat., 5, 3a912. b Aristotle, Cat., 5, 2a1114. c Aristotle, Cat., 5, 3a912.

d Aristotle, De an., III, 5, 430a2223; Averroes, In De an., III, t.c. 20, pp. 447, 98454, 21.
450 pauli veneti
finitione aut tempore aut generatione, necesse est quod sit separabilis ab
ipsacuius oppositum est demonstratum in principio huius septimi.a
Lege litteram: Amplius autem et impossibile et inconveniens hoc, sicut
ex aliquibus non substantiis esse neque ex eo quod hoc aliquid, sed ex
quali; prius enim erit non substantia et quale substantia et ipso hoc aliquid, 5
quod est subiectum qualitatis. Quod est impossibile. Nec enim ratione nec
tempore nec generatione passiones possibile est priores esse substantia.
Erunt enim separabiles.b
septimo, quod, cum sit declaratum quod universalia intellecta sunt 10
dispositiones substantiarum, impossibile est ut ista sint partes sub-
stantiarum existentium per se. Impossibile enim est et turpe, si
posuerimus substantiam compositam ut non sit composita ex sub-
stantiis, sed ex qualitatibus.c
Intendit Commentator hanc distinctionem, quod universale habet duplex 15
esse, videlicet reale et intentionale. Secundum esse reale est extra ani-
mam in rebus singularibus, a quibus non realiter differt, sed solum rati-
one, quoniam idem est homo et iste homo, albedo et ista albedo. Univer-
sale secundum esse intentionale est in anima, et dicitur conceptus mentis
seu species intelligibilis universalis, quam Commentator vocat univer- 20
sale intellectum.d Et indubie tale universale non est substantia nec pars
substantie, sed est dispositio substantie, per quam ipsum universale reale
refertur per intellectum ad sua singularia et predicatur de illis. Et quo-
niam tale universale sic sumptum, cum sit qualitas, non potest esse pars
substantie, ideo universale ut predicabile et ut intellectum non est pars 25
substantie per se existentis.
Amplius Socrati h1038b29ssi.
Secundo, probat Philosophus illam conclusionem sic: si universale
secundum quod huiusmodi est pars substantie per se existentis, et tam
homo quam animal est universale Socratis, ergo homo ut homo et ani- 30
mal ut animal sunt partes Socratisquod est falsum, quia tunc substantia
Socratis componeretur ex duobus universalibus tamquam ex partibus,
videlicet ex homine et animali. Et sicut dicitur de homine et de animali, et
aut1] et M et inconveniens hoc Pv Moerb.] hoc et inconveniens M : et substantiam

add. Moerb. sicut] si est Moerb. non] ex add. Moerb. septimo corr.] sexto MPv
dispositiones] dispositio dispositionum Iunt. ista] hec Pv
a Aristotle, Met., VII, 1, 1028a3334. b Aristotle, Met., VII, 13, 1038b2329 (AL XXV 3.2, p. 159,
lin. 736741). c Averroes, In Met., VII, t.c. 47, fol. 198FG. d Averroes, In Met., VII, t.c. 47,
fol. 198F.
de omni superiori ad Socratem, quod nullum eorum est pars Socratis, ita
nullum eorum que sunt pars diffinitionis est pars alicuius substantie per
se existentis. Partes tamen diffinitionis seu alia universalia non possunt
esse sine talibus substantiis nec esse in alio, quia non invenitur aliquod
animal universale preter animalia particularia, neque partes diffinitionis 5
sine hiis quorum est diffinitio.
Lege litteram: Amplius Socrati inerit substantia substantie, idest uni-
versale universalis predicamenti substantie. Quare duorum universalium
erit substantia Socratis. Totaliter vero accidit, si est substantia homo et que-
cumque ita dicuntur, nichil eorum que in ratione esse nullius substantiam 10
per modum partis, neque sine ipsis existere neque in alio. Dico autem ut
non esse quoddam animal preter aliqua, nec aliquid eorum que in rationibus
nullius, idest nullam partem diffinitionis esse abque talibus substantiis
singularibus per se existentibus.a
Ex predictis Philosophus concludit contra Platonem quod nullum uni- 15
versaliter existentium, nec aliquid eorum que universaliter predicantur,
293vb Pv potest dici substantia per se existens, quia omnis substantia per | se exi-
stens significat hoc aliquid; quodlibet autem universale significat quale
quid; constat autem quod nullum quale quid est per se existens, sed
in alio. Si enim ponatur universale substantia per se existens, preter ea 20
impossibilia que dicta sunt accidunt alia, et per maxime quod ex duobus
61vb M hominibus fit tertius | homo. Cum enim homo communis sit in homine
singulari et non pars eius, videtur quod ex hiis duobus resultat tertius
homo: sicut enim ex materia et forma fit individuum et ex genere et diffe-
rentia fit species, ita ex homine communi et homine particulari fit tertius 25
homo, considerando hominem communem per modum forme et homi-
nem singularem per modum materie.
Lege litteram: Ex hiis itaque speculantibus palam quia nichil univer-
saliter existentium est substantia, quia nullum universaliter predicatorum
significat hoc aliquid, sed tale. Sin autem, alia quoque multa accidunt et ter- 30
tius homo.b
Notandum primo, secundum Commentatorem, commento duode-
quinquacesimo, quod si universale sit substantia existens in indi-
superiori] superiore M substantia substantie inv. Moerb. nullius] nullum

Moerb. (nullius DaOp P1bP2) idest] enim M substantia] et add. Moerb.
universaliter] communiter Moerb. (universaliter DaOp) sit] est Iunt.
13, 1038b341039a3 (AL XXV 3.2, p. 159, lin. 747750).

452 pauli veneti
viduo demonstrato, et est substantia addita substantie per quam

individuum demonstratum est individuum substantie, sic erunt in
individuo substantie due et cetera.a
Non est inconveniens quod universale sit substantia existens in individuo,
ymmo est necessarium, ex quo omne superius est in suo inferiori. Nec est 5
inconveniens quod universale sit pars secundum rationem individui, quia
necesse est quod species sit pars individui, sicut genus est pars speciei.
Sed impossibile est quod universale sit in individuo tamquam pars realis
eius, et tamquam substantia addita substantie per quam individuum sit
individuum substantie, quoniam tunc universale et individuum essent 10
due susbtantie realiter differentesquod est falsum, quia universale non
predicaretur de individuo, sicut nec forma de materia, neque compositum
de aliquo illorum.
mento, quod substantiarum substantie, quia sunt existentes per se, 15
et universale, quia est in ratione ad aliquid universale, non est sub-
stantia separata omnino: separata enim sunt de genere rerum exi-
stentium per se et non de genere relativorum. Et secundum hoc non
erit hic substantia nisi substantie particulares existentes per se aut
in materia aut in non-materia.b 20
Ratio Commentatoris est hec: quelibet substantia separata est de predi-
camento substantie; universale secundum quod huiusmodi est de predi-
camento relationis; ergo universale secundum quod huiusmodi non est
substantia separata. Ex quo sequitur quod omnis substantia separata est
substantia particularis per se existens, aut in materia, cuiusmodi est sub- 25
stantia sensibilis, aut sine materia, cuiusmodi est substantia intelligibilis
simplex.
quod nullum universalium predicabilium secundum quid de re
demonstrata significat eam secundum quod est demonstrata et indi- 30
vidua, sed secundum quod in ea hesti natura similis nature que est
in quolibet individuorum illius universalis, scilicet natura commu-
nis preter naturam propriam unicuique eorum.c
demonstratum est scr. ex Iunt.] inv. MPv in Pv s.l., om. M est om. Pv illorum]
et cetera add. Pv notandum secundo inv. Pv quiaratione] est in capitulo Iunt.
substantieexistentes] substantia particularis existens Iunt. notandum tertio inv.
Pv est suppl. ex Iunt.
a Averroes, In Met., VII, t.c. 48, fol. 198K. b Averroes, In Met., VII, t.c. 48, fol. 198KL.
c Averroes, In Met., VII, t.c. 48, fol. 198M.
Intendit Commentator quod si genus aut species predicatur in quid de

pluribus individuis, non significat aliquod individuorum secundum natu-
ram propriam, per quam differt ab alio individuo, sed secundum naturam
communem, per quam est conveniens alteri individuo et substantialiter
assimilatur ei. Et hoc idem dixit supra, commento quadracesimo quinto.a 5
Ex predictis sequitur quod universalia non sunt tantum in anima for-
maliter vel obiective, ut communiter dicitur, sed sunt realiter extra in suis
singularibus preter omnem operationem intellectus, alioquin non pone-
ret Commentator duplicem naturam in individuo, scilicet propriam et
communem. Unde arguitur sic: in quolibet genere est dare unum primum, 10
quod est mensura eorum que sunt in genere illo, per Aristotelem, quarto
huius;b constat autem quod istud principium non est aliquod singulare,
294ra Pv quia in individuis eiusdem speciei non est prius nec posterius, ut habetur |
tertio huius;c nec etiam est aliquid factum per intellectum, quia omne tale
est posterius singularibus; ergo tale principium est in rebus extra intellec- 15
tum, quod dicitur esse universale coniunctum singularibus.
Item, similitudo et equalitas fundantur in uno, per Aristotelem quinto
huius;d constat autem quod, nullo intellectu existente, aliqua albedo est
similis alteri et aliqua linea est alteri linee equalis, cum sit proprium
quantitati secundum eam equale vel inequale dici et proprium qualitati 20
simile vel dissimile dici; ergo tale unum est natura universalis per quam
conveniunt duo equalia aut similia.
62ra M Deinde, circumscripto | omni intellectu, generans et genitum sunt simi-
lia in forma, per Aristotelem in hoc septimo,e et aliqua esset generatio
univoca et aliqua esset generatio equivoca; constat autem quod in gene- 25
ratione equivoca generans et genitum sunt diversarum specierum et eius-
dem generis; ergo extra animam dantur genera et species, que sunt forme
communes ipsis generantibus et generatis.
Preterea, quia dividentia sunt simul natura et equaliter dividunt suum
totum, si unum dividentium est extra animam, oportet quod aliud etiam 30
sit extra animam; sed circulus dividitur per circulum singularem et cir-
culum universalem, ut supra ostensum est de intentione Aristotelis et
vel] et M nec] non Pv aliquid] aliquod M est iter. Pv quantitati]

qualitati Pv eam] esse M equale vel inequale] simile vel dissimile Pv
proprium qualitati] quantitati est proprium Pv simile vel dissimile] equale vel
inequale Pv quia] si M et] per add. M
a Averroes, In Met., VII, t.c. 45, fol. 197IK. b Aristotle, Met., IV, 2, 1004a2531. c Aristotle,
Met., III, 3, 999a1214. d Aristotle, Met., V, 15, 1021a1014. e Aristotle, Met., VII, 8, 1033b29
32.
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Commentatorisa; constat autem quod, secluso intellectu et omni opera-

tione anime, aliquis est in rebus circulus particularis; ergo etiam est in
rebus aliquis circulus universalis.
Sed dubitatur, quia opposita non sunt simul in eodem; sed univer-
sale et particulare sunt opposita; ergo non sunt simul in eodem, et per 5
consequens non in eodem invenitur universale et particulare, seu natura
propria et communis. Cum autem in rebus extra animam inveniuntur par-
ticularia, restat quod solum in anima inveniuntur universalia.
Respondetur quod istud argumentum probat intentum, quoniam, si
universale et particulare sunt opposita, et si unum oppositorum est in 10
natura, reliquum est in natura, per Aristotelem, primo Celi;b ergo si in
natura sunt particularia preter omnem operationem intellectus, necesse
est quod in natura sint universalia secluso omni opere intellectus.
Dicendum quod universale et particulare sunt opposita relative et
quod, sicut in eodem simul inveniuntur opposita relative, scilicet pater et 15
filius, equale et inequale, simile et dissimile, ita in eodem simul inveniun-
tur universale et particulare. Et sicut Deus est causa particularis respectu
primi motus, respectu autem omnium motuum est causa universalis, ita
natura generica vel specifica est particularis in quantum recipitur in uno
individuo, est autem universalis in quantum communicatur multis et pre- 20
dicatur de multis.
Quando autem dicit Commentatorc quod in individuo sunt due nature,
quarum una est communis et reliqua propria, non loquitur de duabus
naturis dualitate reali, sed tantum dualitate rationis, quoniam homo et
iste homo non sunt due res nec due substantie, sed tantum una res et una 25
substantia. Sunt tamen duo conceptus et due intentiones, in quantum
illa res, que est hic homo singularis et homo communis, aliter movet
intellectum in eo quod hic homo, et aliter in eo quod homo communis.
Amplius autem est et ita h1039a3ssi.
Tertia conclusio: nullum universale secundum quod huiusmodi est ens 30
in actu.
Istam conclusionem Philosophus dupliciter probat, una tamen ratione,
quoniam impossibile est ex duobus existentibus in actu fieri aliquod
unum; sed ex pluribus universalibus fit aliquod unum; ergo aliquod est
sed universale] universale autem Pv simul inveniuntur inv. Pv inve-

niuntur] invenitur Pv
a Aristotle, Met., VII, 10, 1035b13; Averroes, In Met., VII, t.c. 34, fol. 185D. b In truth,
Aristotle, De coel., II, 3, 286a2324. c Averroes, In Met., VII, t.c. 48, fol. 198M.
universale quod non est ens in actu. Tenet consequentia cum minori, quia
294rb Pv ex genere et differentia fit una diffinitio et unum diffinitum, | ut patuit.
Maior autem declaratur tripliciter. Et primo per rationem, quoniam unum
in actu est unum unitate forme actuantis ipsum; si ergo aliqua plura
dentur esse unum in actu, oportet quod sub aliqua forma claudantur. 5
Hoc autem non est nisi ambo sint in potentia respectu illius forme per
quam res est una in actu. Una enim linea fit ex duabus medietatibus eius
existentibus in potentia, quia, si essent in actu, non posset componi ex eis,
ex quo actus est ille qui separat et distinguit: ab eodem enim res habet
esse, unitatem et distinctionem; constat autem quod a forma res habet 10
esse et unitatem; ergo etiam a forma habet distinctionem. Forma ergo est
actus primus, et esse actus secundus, et operari est actus tertius.
Lege litteram: Amplius autem est et ita manifestum. Impossibile enim
substantiam ex substantiis esse inexistentibus sicut ut actu. Duo namque sic
actu numquam sunt unum actu, sed si potestate duo fuerint, erunt unum, et 15
62rb M que | dupla est, linea est ex duobus dimidiis potestate; actus enim separat.
Quare si substantia unum fuerit in actu, non erit ex substantiis inexistenti-
bus actu.a
Secundo, declaratur illa maior auctoritate Democriti, dicentis quod ex
duobus in actu non potest fieri unum, neque ex uno possunt fieri duo in 20
actu. Posuit enim Democritus magnitudines indivisibiles esse substantias
rerum, quas dixit esse in actu; et quia ex duobus indivisibilibus in actu
non potest fieri unum, nec ex uno indivisibili possunt fieri duo, ideo
ponens in singulis hos athomos esse distinctos suis actibus, nichil dixit
vere unum esse, sed positione, ordine et figura indivisibilium athomorum 25
res distingui voluit, et non secundum veram formam facientem unitatem
et distinctionem; propter quod negavit veram generationem. Licet ergo
opinio Democriti falsa esset in eo quod posuit magnitudines indivisibiles
esse rerum substantiam atque principia, tamen in hoc recte dixit quod ex
duobus actu perfectis existentibus et separatis numquam fit unum, neque 30
ex uno numquam fiunt duo perfecta et separata in eo distinctum esse
habentia.
Lege litteram: Et secundum hunc modum quem dicit Democritus recte.
Impossibile enim esse aut ex duobus unum aut ex uno duo fieri. Magnitudi-
nes enim indivisibiles substantias faciunt sequentes illius opinionem.b 35
sicut] sic Moerb. et] ut Moerb. aut1] ait Moerb.
a Aristotle, Met., VII, 13, 1039a38 (AL XXV 3.2, p. 159, lin. 751756). b Aristotle, Met., VII, 13,
1039a811 (AL XXV 3.2, pp. 159160, lin. 756759).

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Tertio, declaratur eadem maior ex communi modo loquendi eorum qui

dicunt numerum esse compositum ex unitatibus. Si enim dualitas com-
ponitur ex duabus unitatibus, necesse est quod dualitas non sit aliquod
unum, aut quod unitates componentes non sint in actu, sed in potentia,
ita quod sequitur: dualitas est aliquid in actu, ergo unitates componentes 5
eam sunt in potentia; et etiam sequitur: unitates sunt in actu, ergo dua-
litas non est aliquid in actu; sicut sequitur de mixto quod, si ipsum est
unum in actu, elementa sunt causa in potentia, et si elementa essent actu
in eo, ipsum non esset vere unum in actu, sed tantum per aggregationem.
Pitagorici ergo, dicentes numeros esse substantias rerum heti ponentes 10
unitates distinctas in actu, habuerunt concedere numerum nichil esse in
actu. Sed Peripatetici, docentes numerum esse accidens rerum, concesse-
runt numerum esse unum in actu, unitates autem multa esse in potentia.
Lege litteram: Similiter ergo manifestum quia et in numero habet, si
est numerus compositio unitatum, sicut dicitur a quibusdam. Aut enim non 15
unum dualitas aut non inest unitas in ipsa actu.a
Notandum secundum Commentatorem, commento undequinqua-
cesimo, quod impossibile est ut una substantia in actu sit ex duabus
substantiis in actu.b
Et intendebat quod hoc sequitur: si universale est pars substantie indi- 20
vidui demonstrati preter substantiam ei propriam, probat Commentator
quod non est possibile universale esse substantiam separatam et esse par-
tem realiter distinctam ab individuo, quoniam tunc una substantia in actu
fieret ex duabus substantiis in actu, videlicet ex individuo et universali,
quorum quodlibet est in actu, si quodlibet eorum est substantia per se 25
existens.
Dubitatur, quia dicit Commentator, secundo Phisicorum,c quod animal
294va Pv componitur | ex duabus partibus, quarum una est movens in actu et
altera motum in actu; constat autem quod animal est unum in actu.
Similiter, binarius duorum hominum est unum in actu, cum sit species 30
predicamenti quantitatis, et habet unitates in actu, quoniam quilibet
homo est unum in actu per formam suam.
et suppl. Peripatetici] Pitagorici M ergo] igitur Moerb. habet] habebit

Moerb. undequinquacesimo Pv post correct.] duode- M altera scr.] alterum
MPv : et (pro est) add. Pv
VII, t.c. 49, fol. 199E. c Averroes, In Phys., II, t.c. 1, fol. 48F.
Ad primum dicitur quod ex duobus existentibus in potentia fit unum,

quoniam linea ex duabus medietatibus, et mixtum ex elementis, fit tam-
quam unum in actu. Etiam ex duobus quorum unum est in actu et reli-
quum in potentia fit unum, quia ex materia, que est hini potentia, et forma,
62va M que est in actu, fit unum individuum. Fit iterum | species, que est vere 5
unum, ex genere tamquam ex potentia et ex differentia tamquam ex actu.
Et licet forma respectu materie habet rationem actus, ac etiam differentia
respectu generis, tamen forma, cum sit pars individui, respectu individui
habet rationem potentie, et differentia respectu speciei: generaliter enim
omne totum habet rationem actus et omnis pars habet rationem potentie 10
respectu compositi, licet anima rationem actus habeat respectu sui cor-
poris moti.
Ad secundum respondetur quod duplex est numerus, per Aristotelem,
quarto Phisicorum,a videlicet numerus numeratus et numerus quo nume-
ramus. Numerus numeratus non distinguitur realiter a rebus numeratis, 15
et talis numerus non est [ad] aliquid in actu, sed solum quoddam congre-
gatum ex multis, et sic numerus binarius duorum hominum nichil est, sed
est aliqua, scilicet illi duo homines. Numerus quo numeramus est nume-
rus mathematicus, realiter differens tam a rebus numeratis quam a suis
unitatibus, aliter numerus non esset per se ens nec per se unum, sed per 20
accidens, sicut ea que coacernantur. Quod quidem esse non potest, quia
numerus est quedam species determinata entis, que sub genere quantita-
tis continetur; quelibet autem species predicamenti est per se ens et per se
unum, ut dictum est quinto huius,b in quo dicit Philosophus quod senarius
non est sex unitates, nec bis tria, nec ter duo, sed est tantum semel sex, ad 25
innuendum quod est forma simplex resultans ex unitatibus aggregatis.
Habet autem quod h1039a14ssi.
Contra dicta arguit Philosophus inferens duo inconvenientia, quorum
primum est quod nulla substantia diffiniturcuius oppositum superius
determinatum est. Et quod illud sequatur arguitur. Nam dictum est quod 30
ex universalibus non potest esse aliqua substantia, propter hoc quod
universale non significat hoc aliquid, sed quale quid; dictum est etiam
quod ex substantiis in actu non fit aliqua substantia. Quo dato, sequitur
quod nulla substantia est composita. Non enim substantia secunda est
in suppl. ad secl. universale] sic add. Pv
a Aristotle, Phys., IV, 11, 219b67. b Aristotle, Met., V, 14, 1020b78 (cf. Met., V, 7, 1017a2224;
10, 1018a3538).
458 pauli veneti
composita, si universalia nullam substantiam componunt, quia, si se-

cunda substantia componitur, illa non componitur nisi ex universalibus,
ex quo quelibet substantia secunda est universale predicabile, ut habe-
tur in Predicamentis.a Non etiam substantia prima est composita ex sub-
stantiis in actu, quia, si componeretur ex substantiis in potentia, et cum 5
substantia in potentia non sit substantia, sequitur quod substantia prima
[non] componitur ex non-substantiiscuius oppositum est dictum. Fiat
ergo hoc argumentum: nichil diffinitur nisi habeat partes, ut supra osten-
sum est; sed nulla substantia habet partes, ex quo quelibet incomposita
est, ut probatum est; ergo nulla substantia diffinitur. 10
Lege litteram: Habet autem quod accidit ex dictis dubitationem. Si
enim neque ex universalibus possibile est esse nec unam substantiam prop-
ter tale sed non hoc aliquid significare, nec ex substantiis contingit actu esse
neque unam substantiam, incomposita utique erit substantia omnis. Quare
nec ratio utique erit neque unius substantie, idest nullius substantie erit dif- 15
finitio.b
Secundum inconveniens est quod nullum ens diffinitur, quod iterum
superius reprobatum est. Nam omnibus est quodammodo notum, et in
hoc septimo fuit demonstratum, quod solius substantie est diffinitio aut
maxime illius est diffinitio, quoniam, si accidentia diffiniuntur, non primo 20
diffiniuntur neque simpliciter, sed tantum secundum quid et ex conse-
quenti. Sola autem substantia est illa que primo et simpliciter diffinitur.
294vb Pv Sicut ergo sequitur: nulla substantia est ens, | ergo nichil est ens, quia acci-
dens non est ens nisi quia entis, ita sequitur: nulla substantia diffinitur,
ergo nichil diffinitur; sed nulla substantia diffinitur, ut probatum est; ergo 25
nullum ens diffinitur.
Lege litteram: At vero videtur omnibus et dictum est dudum in hoc sep-
timo: aut solum substantie esse terminum, idest diffinitionem, aut maxime.
Nunc autem neque huius est diffinitio; nullius ergo erit diffinitio.c
Respondet Philosophus ad hanc dubitationem, dicens quod non sequi- 30
tur aliquod illorum inconvenientium, quoniam substantia diffinitur et
62vb M ipsa componitur ex partibus, | et est quodammodo ex substantiis et
non secl. incomposita est inv. Pv incomposita Pv Moerb.] incompositam

M superius] demonstratum add. et del. M reprobatum est inv. M huius Pv
Moerb.] huiusmodi M ergo] igitur Moerb.
a Aristotle,
Cat., 5, 2a1419 together with 2a342b1. b Aristotle, Met., VII, 13, 1039a1419
(AL XXV 3.2, p. 160, lin. 763768). c Aristotle, Met., VII, 13, 1039a1921 (AL XXV 3.2, p. 160,
lin. 768770).
quodammodo ex non-substantiis: est enim ex substantiis in potentia et

est ex non-substantiis in actu. Hoc enim erit magis manifestum in hoc
tractatu et in octavo libro sequente.a Nec est verum quod omnis substantia
in potentia non sit substantia, quia duplex est potentia, scilicet subiectiva
et obiectiva: potentia subiectiva est potentia ad formam; potentia autem 5
obiectiva est potentia ad esse. Licet ergo nulla substantia sit que est
in potentia obiectiva, tamen aliqua substantia est que est in potentia
subiectiva. Unde tam genus quam materia est in potentia, et utrumque
illorum est substantia.
Lege litteram: Aut, idest respondetur, modo quodam erit substantia 10
ex substantiis, modo autem quodam non. Manifestum autem erit quod
dicitur ex posterioribus magis.b
Notandum secundum Commentatorem, commento quinquace-
simo, quod diffinitiones significant plures substantias in potentia et
unam in actu , et sunt composita ex partibus que sunt in potentia 15
in compositis, non composita ex partibus que sunt secundum quan-
titatem.c
Unde, quia genus et differentia sunt partes tam diffinitionis quam diffi-
niti, et non faciunt compositionem realem neque in diffinito neque in
diffinitione, ex quo utrumque dicit totam essentiam diffiniti, ideo talis 20
compositio non est ex partibus secundum quantitatem, sed ex partibus
secundum rationem, que sunt plures substantie in potentia et unum in
actu: sunt enim plures substantie non pluralitate reali, sed rationis, et
sunt in potentia in quantum constituunt speciem et possunt diversimode
movere intellectum; sunt autem unum in actu ex quo ex hiis fit composi- 25
tum diffinibile.
Non est ergo aliqua substantia diffinibilis que non componitur ex actu
et potentia, et hoc aut compositione reali vel rationis. Si enim est substan-
tia composita naturalis, in ea invenitur aliqua pars a qua sumitur ratio
generis, et aliqua a qua sumitur ratio differentie. Si autem fuerit substan- 30
tia simplex intellectualis, cum nulla talis preter primam formam liberata
sit a potentialitate, secundum Commentatorem, tertio De anima,d necesse
quinquacesimo corr.] unde- MPv in] actu add. Pv (sed fort. del.), scr. et del.
M innon] et sunt Iunt. diffinitionis diffiniti inv. Pv componitur]
componatur Pv
a Cf. infra, tr. 3, c. 4, pp. 564, 23565, 6; Exp. Met., VIII, c. 4, M, vol. a3bis, fol. 98rb99ra; 100vb
101rb; Pv, fol. 329vb330va; 332rb333vb. b Aristotle, Met., VII, 13, 1039a2123 (AL XXV 3.2, p.
160, lin. 770772). c Averroes, In Met., VII, t.c. 50, fol. 200AB. d Averroes, In De an., III,
t.c. 5, pp. 409, 661410, 667.
460 pauli veneti
est quod in qualibet tali inveniatur aliquid a quo sumatur ratio generis et
ratio differentie. Ergo.
Circa predicta queritur utrum res sit de se universalis circumscripto
opere intellectus. Et arguitur quod non. Primo, auctoritate Commenta-
toris, dicentis, in prologo De anima,a quod intellectus est ille qui facit 5
universalitatem in rebus, super illo verbo: Universale aut nichil est aut
posterius est.b Si enim res de se esset universalis, non indigeremus intel-
lectu agente, contra Philosophum et Commentatorem, tertio De anima.c
Et patet consequentia, quia ideo non indigemus sensu agente, quia res est
de se singularis et per se sensibilis. 10
Secundo arguitur auctoritate Porphyrii et Boethii,d dicentium: Omne
quod est, ideo est quia unum numero est; sed unum numero et singulare
sunt idem; ergo quelibet res de se est singularis et non universalis. Avi-
cennae autem dicit quod res de se non est universalis neque singularis,
quia, si de se esset singularis, non reperiretur in multis, et si de se esset 15
universalis, non reperiretur in uno; ita quod per intellectum agentem fit
universalis et per principia individuantia fit particularis.
Tertio, universale est unum in multis et de multis, per Aristotelem,
primo Posteriorum;f sed nichil est extra animam in multis et de multis,
seclusa omni operatione intellectus; ergo et cetera. Probatur minor. Nam 20
universale [non] dicitur unum de multis, quia ipsum aptum natum est
predicari de multis; constat autem quod predicari de multis est actus
295ra Pv rationis; | ergo et cetera.
Quarto, quandocumque unum oppositorum inest alicui per se, alterum
non inest illi per se; sed universale et particulare sunt opposita, et quelibet 25
res extra animam per se est particularis, quia, statim cum res est, ipsa est
hoc aliquid; ergo universalitas nulli rei convenit per se. Tenet consequen-
tia cum minori. Maior est evidens inductive, quia caliditas et frigiditas
sunt opposita, et frigiditas per se competit aque, caliditas per se non com-
63ra M petit illi, et quia caliditas per se competit igni, illi per se non competit | 30
frigiditas.
sunt] est M non secl. de] in M hoc Pv M s.l. (i.l. ad scr. et del. M) per
se non] non per se Pv
a Averroes, In De an., I, t.c. 8, p. 12, 2526. b Aristotle, De an., I, 402b78. c Aristotle, De an.,
III, 5, 430a1417, as understood by Averroes, In De an., III, t.c. 18, p. 440, 9698. d Porphyry,
Isag., Intr. (AL I 67, p. 5, 1014), as understood by Boethius, In Isag. 2, ed. Brandt, pp. 161,
22162, 3. e Avicenna, Phil. Pr., tr. V, c. 1, pp. 228, 32229, 44. f Aristotle, An. Post., I, 11,
77a59.
Et ideo propter hec argumenta dicitur communiter quod res non est de
se universalis, sed tantum in potentia, expectans operationem intellectus
intelligentis rem modo universali. Et sicut nigrum, quod est potentia
album, non fit actu album nisi per agens naturale removeatur nigredo,
ita et singulare, quod est potentia universale, non fit actu universale nisi 5
per intellectum agentem singularitas et individuatio removeatur.
In oppositum arguitur. Primo sic: omnis potentia cognitiva presuppo-
nit obiectum suum, per Aristotelem, dicentem, secundo De anima,a quod
potentie distinguuntur per actus, et actus per obiecta; sed obiectum intel-
lectus est universale, per Aristotelem, tertio De anima et etiam primo 10
Phisicorum,b dicentem quod intellectus est universalium et sensus singu-
larium; ergo universale presupponitur ante omnem operationem intellec-
tus.
Secundo: universale est illud quod est aptum natum predicari de mul-
tis, per Aristotelem et Porphyrium;c sed circumscripta omni operatione 15
intellectus, res de se est apta nata predicari de multis; ergo et cetera. Pro-
batur minor: circumscripto quocumque opere intellectus, est substantia-
lis similitudo inter duos homines et duo equos; constat autem quod illud
in quo substantialiter conveniunt predicatur de utroque; ergo et cetera.
Tertio: ita se habent fantasmata ad intellectum sicut colores ad visum, 20
per Aristotelem, tertio De anima;d sed circumscripta omni operatione
visus, colores sunt per se visibiles, per Commentatorem, secundo De
anima;e ergo circumscripta omni operatione intellectus, fantasmata sunt
per se intelligibilia, non quidem in quantum sunt signa singularium, quia
singulare est potentia intelligibile, per Commentatorem, tertio De anima;f 25
ergo in quantum sunt signa universalium.
Quarto: intellectus agens est habitus sicut lumen, per Philosophum,
tertio De anima;g sed licet requiratur lumen ad hoc quod color videatur,
color tamen est per se visibilis; ita intellectus agens, licet requiratur ad
hoc quod res intelligatur, ipsa tamen res est per se intelligibilis et per 30
consequens est universalis, ex quo intellectus intelligit universale per se,
et] ac Pv conveniunt scr.] convenit MPv
a Aristotle De an., II, 4, 415a1822. b In truth, Aristotle, De an., II, 10, 417b2123; Phys., I, 5,
189a58. c Aristotle, De int., 7, 17a3940; Met., VII, 13, 1038b1112; Porphyry, Isag., c. De his
communibus quae assunt generi et speciei et differentiae et proprio et accidente (AL I 67, p.
21, 23). d Aristotle, De an., III, 7, 431a1415; b68. e Averroes, In De an., II, t.c. 66, p. 230,
2131; t.c. 67, p. 223, 74ff. f Averroes, In De an., III, t.c. 16, p. 436, 3840. g Aristotle, De an.,
III, 5, 430a15.
462 pauli veneti
singulare autem mediante sensu, ut ait Commentator, tertio De animaa et

cetera.
Dicendum ergo quod res aliqua est universalis preter omnem opera-
tione intellectus, aliter frustra laboraret Philosophus in hoc septimo ad
probandum quod in hiis que sunt per se idem est quiditas et illud cuius est 5
quiditas, et quod ipsum quod quid est diffinitur, non autem individuum,
et quod species habet partes secundum formam et secundum materiam,
et quod non ista materia vel illa forma ingrediatur diffinitionem, sed mate-
ria et forma in communi.
Item, primo Posteriorum, dicit Philosophusb quod universale est unum 10
in multis et de multis, ad denotandum quod universale prius est in multis
quam sit predicabile de multis; et per consequens esse universalis nullo
modo dependet ab intellectu. Neque diceret ibidem quod scientia est de
universalibus non possibilibus aliter se habere, et non de singularibus, nisi
in rebus sint universalia non dependentia ab intellectu. 15
Item, in prologo Phisicorum,c dicit Philosophus quod universale est
quoddam totum notius secundum sensum, secundo autem De anima,d
quod color est obiectum adequatum visus; constat autem quod illud
obiectum adequatum non est aliquis color singularis, quia, quocumque
dato, visus potest videre sine illo; non est etiam aliquis color fabricatus 20
295rb Pv per intellectum abstrahentem a singularibus, quia operatio | sensus pre-
cedit operationem intellectus, per Aristotelem, tertio De anima;e ergo est
aliquis color universalis existens extra animam, nullo modo dependens
ab intellectu.
Item, non diceret Porphyriusf quod participatione speciei plures homi- 25
nes sunt unus homo communis, et quod genera et species predicantur
in quid de individuis, et quod species est pars individui et econtra, nisi
ista essent in rebus preter operationem intellectus. Non enim calidum
63rb M predicaretur de igne, nec frigidum de aqua, | nisi calidum et frigidum inve-
nirentur in igne et in aqua circumscripta omni operatione intellectus. Ita 30
homo communis et animal commune non predicarentur de singularibus
nisi invenirentur in eis absque operatione intellectus. Intellectus enim de
se est in pura potentia, ut habetur tertio De anima,g et mensuratur a rebus,
et Pv, M s.l. (vel i.l. M)
a Averroes, In De an., III, t.c. 9, p. 422, 4750. b Aristotle, An. Post., I, 11, 77a59. c Aristotle,
Phys., I, 1, 184a2425. d Aristotle, De an., II, 7, 418a2627. e Aristotle, De an., III, 3,
427b1416. f Porphyry, Isag., c. De specie (AL I 67, p. 12, 1819). g Aristotle, De an., III, 4,
429a2224; 429b2931.
per Philosophum, decimo huiusa; ideo non comparat universale singulari

nisi hec ante comparationem inveniantur in rebus. Arguitur ergo sic: si
unum correlativorum est in rerum natura preter operationem intellec-
tus, etiam reliquum est in rerum natura preter operationem intellectus;
sed singulare est pars universalis et econtra, et invenitur singulare pre- 5
ter omnem operationem intellectus; ergo etiam universale sic invenitur.
Patet consequentia, quia totum et pars sunt correlativa.
Similiter, si unum dividentium est in natura preter omnem opera-
tionem intellectus, et reliquum etiam est in natura preter operationem
intellectus; constat autem quod substantia prima et substantia secunda 10
dividunt substantiam, per Aristotelem, in Predicamentis,b et invenitur
substantia prima absque operatione intellectus; ergo etiam sic invenitur
substantia secunda. Nemo autem dubitat quod substantie secunde sunt
genera et species predicamenti substantie.
Ad primum dicitur quod, quando Aristoteles dicit, in prologo De 15
anima,c quod universale aut nichil est aut posterius est, loquitur de univer-
sali separato contra Platonem, quoniam universale separatum a singulari-
bus aut nichil est aut, si est aliquid, illud est posterius singulare: non enim
est tale universale separatum nisi per intellectum ipsum abstrahentem;
constat autem quod abstractio est post singulare. Ideo bene dicit Com- 20
mentatord quod intellectus est qui facit universalitatem in rebus, idest
universale separatum, non autem sicut dicit Plato, ponens universalia
separata ante omnem operationem intellectus et ante generationem sin-
gularis. Et sicut visus indiget lumine, non obstante quod color sit per se
visibilis, ita intellectus possibilis indiget intellectu agente, non obstante 25
quod universale sit per se intelligibile. Si enim universalia essent sepa-
rata, ut dicebat Plato, non indigeremus intellectu agente, per Commen-
tatorem, tertio De anima.e Sed quia sunt coniuncta singularibus, sine qui-
bus operari non possunt, ipsa autem singularia sunt intellecta in poten-
tia, secundum Commentatorem, ibidem;f propterea requiritur intellectus 30
agens ponens ea in actu, virtute cuius movent intellectum possibilem.
Ad secundum respondetur quod unum numero sumitur dupliciter: uno
modo contra unum specie et unum genere, et sic non omne quod est, est
arguitur] arguatur Pv rerum om. M aut2] vel Pv sit] est Pv movent]

movet M
a Aristotle
Met., X, 6, 1057a712. b Aristotle, Cat., 5, 2a1619; 2b2931. c Aristotle, De an., I,
1, 402b78. d Averroes, In De an., I, t.c. 8, p. 12, 2526. e Averroes, In De an., III, t.c. 18, p.
440, 9698. f Averroes, In De an., III, t.c. 16, p. 436, 3840.
464 pauli veneti
unum numero; alio modo ut distinguitur contra multa numero, et sic con-
cedatur dictum Boethii et Porphyrii.a Negatur tamen quod omne unum
numero sit singulare. Quando autem dicit Avicennab quod res non est de
se singularis nec universalis, loquitur de re transcendenter sumpta, quo-
niam ens et res abstrahunt ab universali et particulari. Aliqua tamen res 5
est de se universalis et aliqua singularis: humanitas enim est de se univer-
salis et Sortes est de se singularis, et sicut Sortes non efficitur singularis ex
operatione intellectus, sed solum ex suis principiis individuantibus eum,
ita humanitas non fit universalis ex aliqua operatione anime, sed tantum
ex suis principiis universalibus. 10
Ad tertium dicitur quod natura universalis habet tres passiones, qua-
rum prima est communicabilitas, et hec nullo modo dependet ab intel-
lectu, ita quod, si intellectus non esset neque posset esse, non minus
natura equi communicaretur equis particularibus et esset species, et
295va Pv natura animalis communicaretur equo | et cani et esset genus. Remoto 15
enim omni respectu ad intellectum, aliqua essent eiusdem speciei et ali-
qua eiusdem generis, sicut aliqua essent diversa specie et aliqua diversa
63va M genere: dicere enim quod omnia solo numero essent distincta | esset
confirmare opinionem Parmenidis et Melissi quam Aristoteles destruit,
primo Phisicorum.c 20
Secunda passio nature universalis est predicabilitas, per quam habet
rationem totius, sicut per primam habet rationem partis. Et hec non
dependet ab intellectu operante, sed solum terminante respectum apti-
tudinalem. Sicut enim visibile dicit respectum ad visum non actualem,
sed potentialem, ita predicabile dicit respectum potentialem, non actua- 25
lem, ad intellectum. Et sicut color est visibilis absque operatione visus,
non tamen est visibilis nisi visus possit videre, ita natura universalis est
predicabilis circumscripta omni operatione intellectus, non tamen esset
predicabilis si intellectus non posset intelligere.
Tertia passio est actualis predicatio. Et hec dependet ab intellectu ope- 30
rante, sicut actualis visio ab oculo actu vidente. Sicut ergo color est actu
passio perspicui et est potentia visibilis, fit autem actu visibilis ex ope-
ratione visus, ita natura communis est actu universalis, genus aut spe-
cies, et est potentia predicabilis ante operationem intellectus, fit autem
se om. Pv neque posset esse om. M operante] agente M
a Cf.
supra, p. 460d. b Avicenna, Phil. Pr., tr. V, 1, pp. 228, 32229, 44. c Aristotle, Phys., I,
23 passim.
actu predicabilis superveniente actuali operatione anime. Et sicut color

habet duplicem diffinitionem, scilicet unam formalem, datam a priori,
que est principium demonstrationis, videlicet extremitas perspicui in
corpore terminato, et unam materialem, datam a posteriori, que est con-
clusio demonstrationis, videlicet qualitas primo visibilis, ita universale 5
habet duas diffinitiones, quarum prima est formalis, data a priori, ingre-
diens demonstrationem tamquam principium, videlicet unum in multis,
secunda est materialis, data a posteriori, ingrediens demonstrationem
tamquam conclusio, scilicet unum de multis. Cum ergo dicitur univer-
sale est unum existens in multis, hec est predicatio primi modi; cum 10
vero dicitur universale est unum predicabile de multis, hec est predica-
tio secundi modi. Quando ergo Aristoteles dicit, primo Posteriorum,a quod
universale est unum in multis et de multis, non intendit quod predicari
aut quod predicabile de multis sit de essentia universalis, sicut esse de
multis, sed solum intendit exprimere duplicem diffinitionem et duplicem 15
predicationem per se ipsius universalis.
Ad quartum negatur quod quelibet res sit per se singularis. Et licet que-
libet res sit hoc aliquid, non tamen quelibet res est singularis: in plus enim
se habet hoc aliquid quam singulare. Unde communicari multis repugnat
singulari, non autem ei quod est hoc aliquid. Male ergo dicunt illi quod 20
nulla res est de se universalis, et quod expectat operationem intellectus ad
hoc quod fiat universalis, nec est possibile quod intellectus faciat aliquam
rem esse universalem nisi prius fuerit universalis. Et cum intellectus abs-
trahit universale a singulari et facit illud actu predicabile quod prius erat
potentia predicabile, nichil removet ab individuo neque a natura com- 25
muni, sicut facit agens naturale generando album quod prius fuit nigrum,
sed solum intelligit universale non intelligendo singulare cui coniunctum
est. Unde, si duo sensibilia concurrant in eadem re, ut albedo, que est
obiectum visus, et dulcedo in lacte, que est obiectum gustus, visus tamen
potest in proprium obiectum absque eo quod componatur aliqua virtus 30
separans ipsam a dulcedine, neque impeditur visus a perceptione albe-
dinis propter coniunctionem eius cum dulcedine. Ergo, pari ratione, licet
quiditas rei coniuncta sit cum conditionibus individuantibus et materia-
295vb Pv libus, intellectus possibilis moveri potest ab ipsa quiditate rei absque | eo
quod ponatur aliqua virtus separans ipsam a talibus conditionibus; neque 35
duas iter. Pv quod] Philosophus M faciat] facit M

466 pauli veneti
impedietur a perceptione sui obiecti propter coniunctionem talium indi-

vidualium conditionum. Quod enim natura singularis fiat universalis est
simpliciter impossibile, quoniam singulare secundum quod huiusmodi
63vb M est incommunicabile, universale autem secundum quod huiusmodi | est
communicabile. Quare et cetera. 5
Ex predictis patet error dicentium Philosophum negasse universalia
realia per hoc quod probavit, in hoc capitulo, universalia non esse sub-
stantias, quoniam, licet negaverit universalia separata, non tamen negavit
universalia coniuncta; et licet probaverit quod universale secundum quod
huiusmodi non est substantia per se existens, ut exponit Commentator,a 10
non tamen negavit simpliciter universale esse substantiam.
Si ergo queritur utrum universale sit substantia vel accidens, responde-
tur quod aliquod universale est substantia et aliquod universale est acci-
dens: quodlibet enim universale predicamenti substantie est substantia,
et quodlibet universale predicamenti accidentis est accidens. Universale 15
autem in eo quod universale est accidens non in abstracto, sed in con-
creto: sicut enim risibile et simum secundum quod huiusmodi est acci-
dens in concreto, risibilitas autem et simitas est accidens in abstracto,
ita universalitas adveniens nature communi est accidens in abstracto,
ipsum autem universale est accidens in concreto. Et hoc forte intendit 20
Avicenna,b cum dicit quod res de se non est universalis nec particularis,
ita quod humanitas est tantum humanitas et equinitas est tantum equi-
nitas: non enim universalitas vel singularitas est de ratione et de essentia
quiditatis. Ideo quiditas non est per se universalis vel particularis persei-
tate primi modi, sed est per se universalis perseitate secundi modi, sicut 25
etiam homo secundum quod huiusmodi non est risibilis, prout ly secun-
dum quod huiusmodi specificat perseitatem primi modi; est tamen homo
secundum quod huiusmodi risibilis prout ly secundum quod huiusmodi
specificat perseitatem secundi modi, eo modo quo concedit Philosophus,
primo Posteriorum,c quod triangulus secundum quod huiusmodi habet 30
tres angulos equales duobus rectis, et quod passio universalis competit
suo subiecto secundum quod huiusmodi. Quare et cetera.
estmodi om. M
a Averroes, In Met., VII, t.c. 48, fol. 198L. b Avicenna, Phil. Pr., tr. V, c. 1, pp. 228, 32229, 44.
c Aristotle, An. Post. I, 4, 73b3031.
hCAPITULUM IIi
Manifestum autem h1039a24ssi.

Istud est secundum capitulum huius tractatus, in quo Philosophus
ostendit universalia non esse separata, postquam demonstravit ea non
esse substantias per se existentes. 5
Et dividitur in duas partes, in quarum prima facit quod dictum est; in
secunda vero probat quod universalia non sunt diffinibilia, si sunt sepa-
rata, ibi: Quoniam vero substantia h1039b20ssi. In prima parte Philo-
sophus ponit tres conclusiones, quarum prima est: si est dare speciem
separatam etiam est dare genus separatum. Secunda conclusio: impossi- 10
bile est dare genus separatum, ibi: Deinde si quidam h1039b2ssi. Tertia
conclusio: impossibile est dare speciem separatam, ibi: Et amplius ydee
h1039b11ssi.
Primam conclusionem Philosophus dupliciter probat. Et primo sic:
species componitur ex genere et differentia, secundum Platonicos; ergo 15
si plures species continentur sub eodem, in qualibet illarum est ipsum
genus; sed homo et equus sunt species contente sub animali; ergo animal
est in homine et in equo. Queritur ergo utrum animal sit unum numero
in homine et in equo, aut alterum a quolibet illorum. Si unum numero, et
quodlibet illorum est separatum, ergo animal est separatum. Si alterum, 20
tunc arguitur sic: quanta alteritas est inter species et sua individua, tanta
est inter genus et suas species; sed alteritas inter speciem et sua indivi-
dua facit speciem separari ab individuis; ergo etiam alteritas que est inter
genus et suas species facit genus separari a suis speciebus, et per con-
296ra Pv sequens, si homo | et equus sunt species separate, oportet quod animal 25
sit genus separatum. Et sicut arguitur de animali, consimiliter arguitur de
quolibet alio genere, inferendo conclusionem intentam, quod si est dare
speciem separatam, etiam est dare genus separatum.
Lege litteram: Manifestum autem ex ipsis hiis que dicta sunt accidens
aliud de inconvenientibus sequi, et ydeas dicentibus substantias et sepa- 30
rabiles esse et simul speciem ex genere facientibus et differentiis. Si enim
sunt species separate et animal in homine et equo existit, aut unum et idem
numero est cum quolibet illorum aut alterum,a et qualitercumque dicatur
habetur conclusio.
speciem separatam] genus separatum M sic scr.] sicut MPv numero Pv, scr.
et del. M
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64ra M Secundo arguit Philosophus sic: quemadmodum | individua eiusdem

speciei sunt unum unitate rationis specifice, ita species eiusdem gene-
ris sunt unum unitate rationis generice; sed unitas rationis specifice facit
speciem separari; ergo unitas rationis generice facit genus separari a suis
speciebus. Tenet consequentia cum minori, ex doctrina Platonicorum. Et 5
maior declaratur. Nam sicut Sorti et Platoni convenit hec diffinitio homi-
nis, animal rationale, ita homini et equo convenit hec diffinitio animalis,
substantia animata sensitiva. Si ergo datur homo separatus propter uni-
tatem rationis et diffinitionis, in qua conveniunt particulares homines,
eodem modo datur animal et bipes separatum, ex quibus componitur 10
homo, propter unitatem rationis ipsius generis et differentie, in quam
conveniunt species. Si ergo unum et idem animal secundum rationem
et secundum substantiam est in homine et in equo, sicut tu es in te ipso
secundum substantiam, quia substantia tua est in te, propter quid non
erit unum animal a speciebus separatum preter hoc animal, quocumque 15
animali signato, sicut est homo et equus separatus preter hunc hominem
et hunc equum, quocumque demonstrato?
Lege litteram: Ratione namque palam quia unum sunt species; ean-
dem enim exibebit rationem in utrolibet, idest diffinitionem. Ergo si est
aliquis homo ipsum secundum se hoc aliquid et separatum, necesse et ex 20
quibus componitur homo, ut animal et bipes, hoc aliquid significare et esse
separabilia et substantias; quare et animal. Si quidem genus idem et in equo
sicut tu in te ipso quomodo in separatim existentibus speciebus diversis non
erit? Et quare non est sine ipso quocumque demonstrato erit hoc animal
quod est genus et cetera.a 25
Notandum, secundum Philosophum, primo Ethicorum,b quod Plato
non posuit ydeas in hiis in quibus est ordo essentialis prioris et posterioris.
Et quia in speciebus respectu generis necessario est ordo secundum prius
et posterius, quia species sunt sicut numeri neque sunt equalis gradus in
perfectione, ideo duabus speciebus secundum eum non respondebit una 30
ydea, et per maxime, quia una ydea est unum exemplar. Modo, quia in
generibus latent equivocationes, ideo nullum genus potest esse exemplar
unum, et per consequens neque ydea; species autem potest esse unum
exemplar, quia non dividitur per differentias essentiales, neque in suis
rationem] dicens add. Moerb. ut scr. ex Moerb.] aut MPv non] unum Moerb.
(non P1) est] et Moerb. exemplar unum inv. Pv
a Aristotle, Met., VII, 14, 1039a28b2 (AL XXV 3.2, p. 160, lin. 777784). b Aristotle, Eth. Nic.,
I, 4, 1096a23.
individuis est ordo prioris et posterioris, ut habetur tertio huiusa; ideo

speciebus Plato attribuit ydeas, non autem generibus et cetera.
Sed non locutus est consequenter. Qua enim ratione ponitur homo
separatus preter Sortem et Platonem, eo quod conveniunt in nomine et
ratione, et intellectus intelligit hominem sine singularibus, pari ratione 5
debet poni animal separatum preter hominem et equum, quia homo et
equus conveniunt in nomine et ratione animalis, et intellectus potest
hilludi intelligere non intelligendo species illius. Qui ergo ponit species
separatas debet ponere genera separata, ita quod sit animal unum sub-
sistens predicabile de homine et equo, sicut est unus homo subsistens 10
296rb Pv predicabilis de Sorte et | Platone. Ex quo ergo Plato investigavit ordinem
rerum iuxta ordinem intellectus, debuit ponere ordinem predicamenta-
lem in ydeis, sicut nos ponimus in conceptibus, ita quod, sicut datur con-
ceptus specificus et conceptus subalternus et generalissimus, ac etiam
conceptus transcendens, ita debuit ille ponere ydeam specificam, ydeam 15
subalternam, ydeam generalissimam et transcendentem, sic quod semper
cuilibet predicato quiditativo et essentiali responderet propria ydea sepa-
rata. Propterea enim Eustratius, super primo Ethicorum,b dicit quod Plato,
64rb M sicut posuit ydeam speciei, ita et ydeam | generis, sic quod omnibus bonis,
etiam specie differentibus, in quantum conveniunt in una ratione boni, 20
respondet una ydea boni; in quantum vero dicuntur bona et in quantum
in eis invenitur prius et posterius, sic illis nulla respondet ydea.
Sed dubitatur. Nam, sicut se habet individuum ad speciem, ita species
ad genus; sed non, si datur individuum separatum, datur species separata;
ergo non, si datur species separata, datur genus separatum. 25
Respondetur negando consequentia, quia non repugnat individuo per
se existere; bene autem repugnat speciei atque generi per se existere; ideo,
si unum eorum est separatum, et reliquum est separatum, tamquam ex
impossibili. Necesse enim est tam speciem quam genus esse in subiecto
aliquo; sed non necesse est individuum esse in subiecto aliquo, aliter 30
procederetur in infinitum; ergo necesse est quod individuum aliquod sit
separatum; impossibile autem est speciem aliquam separatam esse aut
genus.
Deinde si quidam h1039b2ssi.
Secunda conclusio: impossibile est dare genus separatum. 35
illud suppl. et2] conceptus add. Pv et] ideam add. Pv et om. M
a Aristotle, Met., III, 3, 999a1214. b Eustratius, In Eth., I, c. 7, ed. Mercken, pp. 76, 8977,
25.
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Probatur, quia, dato genere separato, sequuntur tria inconvenientia.

Primum est quod contraria sunt simul in uno et eodem numero. Proba-
tur. Genus est unum et idem numero, si separatum est; et simul participat
differentias contrarias; ergo et cetera. Minor declaratur. Nam bipes adve-
niens animali constituit hanc speciem, animal bipes, et multipes adve- 5
niens eidem generi constituit hanc speciem, animal multipes; constat
autem quod constitutio harum specierum fit simul; ergo animal simul par-
ticipat illas differentias contrarias, videlicet bipes et multipes.
Lege litteram: Deinde si quidem participatione bipedis et multipedis
animal descendit in species, impossibile aliquid accidit: contraria namque 10
simul inerunt ipsi uni et huic enti separato, quod est genus.a
Et si aliquis dicit quod tales species generis gressibile non fiunt par-
ticipatione differentiarum, oportebit dare modum quo species fuerit ex
genere et differentia, et non apparet alius modus nisi competens compo-
sitionis, sicut domus fit ex lapidibus, aut copulationis, sicut navis fit ex 15
lignis conclavatis, aut mixtionis, hsicuti oxymel fit ex melle et aceto alte-
ratis. Hiis enim modis invenitur ex duabus aut pluribus substantiis per se
existentibus aliquod unum fieri. Sed omnes isti modi sunt inconvenientes,
quia tunc genus non esset idem in omnibus suis speciebus, sed alterum,
sicut continue est alia et alia pars in diversis domibus et in diversis navi- 20
bus et in diversis mixtis. Ita quod non tota natura animalis esset in homine
et equo, sed esset divisa in illis, eo modo quo dividitur lignum, si ex eo
debeant fieri plures domus; et consequenter non predicaretur genus de
aliqua sua specie, sicut nec aliqua pars domus, aut navis, aut mixti predi-
catur de suo totoquod est falsum. 25
Lege litteram: Si autem non fit species participatione differentie, quis
modus, cum dixerit utique aliquis animal esse bipes aut gressibile? Sed for-
296va Pv san componitur, copulatur aut miscetur? | Sed omnia ista sunt inconvenien-
tia, quia non idem, sed alterum in unoquoque erit genus.b
Secundum inconveniens est quod unum et idem numero est substantia 30
infinitorum. Patet, quoniam homo non fit per accidens ex animali, nec
aliqua alia species fit per accidens ex genere suo, sed per se, ita quod
genus est de essentia et de substantia cuiuslibet sue speciei; species autem
contente sub eodem genere sunt infinite aut quasi infinite; ergo. Minor
generis om. M sicut suppl. duabus] duobus M in] cum M et2 om. Pv
et] in add. Pv eo1] illo Pv componitur] et add. Moerb. sed] verum Moerb.
a Aristotle, Met., VII, 14, 1039b24 (AL XXV 3.2, pp. 160161, lin. 784786). b Aristotle, Met.,
VII, 14, 1039b47 (AL XXV 3.2, p. 161, lin. 786790).

patet, quoniam in genere figurarum et numerorum inveniuntur species

infinite actu vel potentia; in genere autem animalis aut plante, et si non
64va M inveniuntur infinite omnino, inveniuntur tamen quasi infinite, | quia
numerari non possunt.
Lege litteram: Infinita ergo erunt, ut consequens dicere, quorum sub- 5
stantia animal; non enim secundum accidens ex animali homo.a
Tertium inconveniens est quod unum numero est multa numero. Quod
istud sit inconveniens, manifestum est, quia unum et multa opponuntur,
ut habetur quarto huius;b modo unum oppositorum non dicitur de alio. Et
quod illud sequatur patet, quoniam animal est unum numero, ex quo est 10
separatum. Et quod sit multa numero probatur. Nam animal predicatur
de homine et de equo et de aliis suis speciebus, et non sicut aliud de
alio, sed sicut idem de eodem, ex quo animal est essentia et substantia
cuiuslibet speciei eius; constat autem quod homo, equus et huiusmodi
sunt multa numero; ergo et cetera. Antecedens patet. Si enim homo et 15
animal essent diversa, nullum eorum de altero predicaretur, sicut nec de
homine predicatur equus. Si ergo non predicatur animal de homine sicut
diversum de diverso, potest dici consequenter quod homo est ex animali
sicut ex sua substantia, et quod animal est genus hominis predicabile de
illo in quid. 20
Lege litteram: Amplius multa erit ipsum animal. Substantia enim quod
in unoquoque animal; non enim de alio dicitur animal quando predicatur
de homine. Si autem non dicitur de alio, ex illo erit homo genus ipsius illud.c
Notandum quod genus esse unum numero intelligitur tripliciter.
Primo, ut unum numero distinguitur contra unum genere et unum spe- 25
cie, et sic non est unum numero. Secundo, prout cum suis speciebus facit
numerum, ad intellectum Platonis, ac sic iterum non est unum numero,
quia non est separatum: sicut enim homo et animal non sunt due res, ita
non sunt due unitates, et per consequens non faciunt numerum. Patet
consequentia, quia numerus est multitudo ex unitatibus aggregata. Tertio, 30
prout distinguitur contra multa numero, et sic genus est unum numero,
iuxta illud Commentatoris, tertio huius,d dicentis quod natura, tam gene-
rica quam specifica, dicitur esse una numero. Sed quod distinguatur con-
patet om. Pv et1 om. Pv substantia] que Moerb. (substantia DaOpSi)

homo] et add. Moerb.
a Aristotle, Met., VII, 14, 1039b79 (AL XXV 3.2, p. 161, lin. 790792). b Aristotle, Met., IV, 2,
1004a10. c Aristotle, Met., VII, 14, 1039b911 (AL XXV 3.2, p. 161, lin. 792795). d Averroes,
In Met., III, t.c. 10, fol. 49BC.
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tra multa numero intelligitur dupliciter, videlicet per se et per accidens:

per se distinguitur contra multa numero, per accidens autem est multa
numero. Unde accidit generi quod sit in multis speciebus; ideo non est
multa numero nisi per accidens, per se autem est unum numero. Con-
stat autem quod unum et multa non opponuntur nisi accipiendo eodem 5
modo, quia dicit Philosophus, primo Phisicorum,a quod unum in actu est
multa in potentia, et unum secundum continuitatem est multa secundum
divisionem. Constat autem quod si genus esset separatum, ipsum faceret
numerum cum suis speciebus; et quoniam predicaretur de suis speciebus
tamquam idem de eodem, ideo per se esset unum et multaquod est 10
impossibile.
Dubitatur nam, cum dicitur animal dividitur per rationale et irratio-
nale, aut per bipes et multipes, utrum dividitur animal coniunctum vel
animal separatum. Si animal separatum, habetur intentum, hsciliceti opi-
296vb Pv nio Platonis. | Si dicis quod animal coniunctum, arguitur sic: animal con- 15
iunctum est pars speciei; sed divisio generis precedit constitutionem spe-
ciei; ergo animal divisum non est animal coniunctum.
Respondetur quod aliqua sunt separata secundum rationem que non
sunt separata secundum rem et esse, quia substantia et accidens sunt
separata secundum rationem, non tamen secundum esse, per Aristote- 20
lem, primo Phisicorum.b Materia etiam et forma separantur secundum
rationem et non secundum esse, ut testatur idem, secundo Phisicorum.c
Ita etiam genus et species separantur secundum rationem et non secun-
dum esse, ut testatur idem, secundo Phisicorum,d quia genus et species
sunt unum et idem, differunt autem ratione. Divisio vero generis per dif- 25
64vb M ferentias non est divisio realis sicut est divisio lapidis aut ligni in suas |
partes quantitativas, sed est divisio rationis, in quantum tota ratio gene-
ris evacuatur per duas differentias, et cum dividitur animal non dividitur
in quantum coniunctum, sed in quantum separatum, non quidem rea-
liter, ut dicebat Plato, sed solum ratione. Sicut ergo animal et rationale 30
sunt ex parte rei in actu absque aliqua dependentia ad intellectum, sunt
autem diffinitio hominis in potentia per respectum potentialem ad intel-
lectum, fiunt autem diffinitio in actu ex opere intellectus, ita rationale
et irrationale, seu bipes et multipes, sunt actu in rerum natura secluso
scilicet suppl. et1 om. Pv natura om. Pv
a Aristotle, Phys., I, 2, 185b32186a3. b Aristotle, Phys., I, 2, 185a3132. c Aristotle, Phys., II,

193b45. d Possibly, the claim is drawn from Aristotle, Phys., II, 3, 195a29b3.
omni ordine intellectus, sunt autem differentie divisive animalis in poten-

tia, ex sola habitudine aptitudinali ad intellectum. Quando vero actualiter
dividit animal, hoc est ex actuali operatione intellectus: postquam enim
animal abstractum est per intellectum, tunc ipsum dividit per rationale et
irrationale aut per bipes et multipes. 5
Et amplius ydee h1039b11ssi.
Tertia conclusio: impossibile est dare speciem separatam.
Istam conclusionem Philosophus dupliciter probat. Et primo sic: quo-
niam, dato opposito, sequitur quod omnia illa sunt ydee ex quibus com-
ponitur homo, scilicet genus et differentiaquod est contra opinionem 10
Platonicorum, dicentium solas species esse ydeas particularium, genera
vero et differentias non esse ydeas, quia, proprie loquendo, ydea est exem-
plar ydeati secundum suam formam: forma autem generis non est propria
speciebus sicut forma speciei est propria individuis, que secundum for-
mam conveniunt et differunt solum secundum materiam. Et quod illud 15
sequatur, arguitur, quia, si sunt animalia diversarum specierum, unicui-
que specierum respondebit aliquid de substantia sui generis, sicut cuilibet
individuo aliquid correspondet de substantia sue speciei; ergo sicut spe-
cies sunt ydee, ita genera et differentie. Ergo male dixerunt Platonici quod
alterius universalis est quod sit ydea et alterius quod sit substantia, con- 20
cedentes species esse ydeas individuorum, genera vero esse substantias
specierumcum hoc sit impossibile: necesse est enim quod animal sit
ydea omnium specierum animalium, si homo est ydea omnium indivi-
duorum speciei humane, quia, sicut homo est substantia omnium indi-
viduorum speciei humane, ita animal est substantia omnium specierum 25
animalium.
Lege litteram: Et amplius ydee sunt omnia ex quibus homo est, si homo
est ydea, ergo non alterius quidem universalis erit ydea, alterius vero sub-
stantia; impossibile namque est hoc. Ipsum ergo animal erit unumquodque
eorum que in animalibus tam ydealiter quam substantialiter.a 30
Secundo: si species sunt separate, sequitur quod animal non est pars
hominis neque substantia illiusquod est falsum et contra Platonicos. Et
quod sequatur arguitur: nullum individuum est pars alterius neque sub-
stantia illius individui; non etiam aliqua species est pars alterius speciei
correspondet] respondet Pv ergo] igitur Moerb. alterius1 scr. ex Moerb.] alteri

MPv ergo] igitur Moerb.
474 pauli veneti
neque substantia illius, et hoc ideo, quia quodlibet individuum est sepa-
297ra Pv ratum ab alio et quelibet species | est separata ab alia; sed si homo est
separatum, etiam animal oportet separatum esse, per primam conclu-
sionem; ergo nullum illorum erit pars aut substantia alterius. Ipsi ergo
Platoni fiat ista questio: si species est separata, oportet genus esse separa- 5
tum; quomodo ergo homo fit ex animali et quomodo animal ex substantia
hominis? Et certum est quod respondere non poterit.
Lege litteram: Amplius ex quo hoc conceditur quod species sunt sepa-
rate, queratur et quomodo ex ipso animali fit homo, aut quomodo possibile
est esse animal quod substantia hominis, concesso quod hoc ipsum, scilicet 10
homo, sit preter ipsum animal.a
Tertio: aliqua species non est separata; ergo nulla est separata. Patet
consequentia, quia non est ratio propter quam separaretur una species
65ra M a suis individuis quin, per idem, et quelibet. | Antecedens arguitur de
speciebus individuorum sensibilium sic: genus non est separatum a suis 15
speciebus, per secundam conclusionem; ergo, per idem, neque species
rerum sensibilium ab individuis sensibilibus. Patet consequentia, quia
eadem inconvenientia sequuntur ad opinionem ponentem species sen-
sibilium separari a suis individuis, que sequuntur ad opinionem asse-
rentem genus separari a suis speciebus, ac etiam maiora et absurdiora. 20
Nam ad hanc opinionem sequuntur tria inconvenientia, ut patuit, videli-
cet quod contraria sunt simul in uno et eodem numero, et quod unum et
idem numero est substantia infinitorum, et quod unum numero est multa
numero. Quod autem omnia ista sequantur ad opinionem ponentem spe-
cies rerum sensibilium separatas, manifestum est, quia, si Sortes est albus 25
et Plato est niger, oportet quod homo ydealis sit albus et niger, ex quo
separatus est et est idem substantialiter cum Sorte et Platone; et quia isti
sunt plures numero et homo ydealis est unus numero, oportet quod unus
homo numero sit plures homines numero. Deinde, quia in specie humana
propter eternitatem mundi et temporis sunt infinita individua, oportet 30
quod unus homo numero ydealis sit substantia infinitorum hominum.
Et preter hec inconvenientia sequuntur absurdiora, videlicet quod divi-
sibile est indivisibile, materiale est immateriale, corporeum est incorpo-
reum, animatum est inanimatum, sensitivum est insensitivum, quoniam
est1 om. Pv genus esse] quod genus sit Pv unum et idem] idem et unum Pv
omnia ista inv. Pv est om. Pv
individuum sensibile est divisibile, materiale, corporeum, animatum et

sensitivum, species autem separata indivisibilis est, immaterialis, incor-
porea, inanimata et insensitiva; constat autem, secundum Platonem,
quod species predicatur de quolibet suorum individuorum et est substan-
tia cuiuslibet illorum. 5
Lege litteram: Amplius autem in sensibilibus hec accidunt que inducta
sunt et hiis absurdiora. Et concludit Philosophus: si itaque impossibile sic
se habere, palam quia non est ydea ipsorum, sic ut quidam dicunt, idest
Platonici.a
Notandum quod de ydeis fuerunt quatuor opiniones, quarum prima 10
fuit Platonis, dicentis ydeas esse quasdam substantias separatas a suis
singularibus, existentes in orbe signorum, ad quorum exemplar Deus
universa hec inferiora producit. Et sicut dicit Philosophus de universali-
bus, quod non sunt in loco neque in tempore nisi per accidens, ratione
singularium, ita dicebat Plato quod ydee numquam sunt per se neque 15
in celo neque extra celum, per accidens autem sunt in orbe signorum,
ratione primi entis, cuius sunt instrumenta agendi. Constat autem quod
primus motor est in circumferentia orbis signorum, ut testatur Philoso-
phus, octavo Phisicorum.b
Sed Eustratius, super primo Ethicorum,c excusans Platonem, dicit quod 20
non posuit ydeas in orbe signorum, sed in intellectu primi entis, dicens
ydeas esse rationes superstantes omnino et supererectas corporibus et
naturis, et numerum quemdam divinum per quem, velut per exemplum,
conditorem operari contingit materialem factionem. Ubi Eustratius qua-
tuor dicit de ydeis ad mentem Platonicorum. Primum est quod sunt ratio- 25
nes, non quidem extra intellectum primi, sed stantes supra totam natu-
ram, sicut et ipsum primum. Secundum est quod ille rationes sunt factive
et practice, quia non solum sunt rationes cognoscendi, sed etiam faciendi,
297rb Pv aliter non per eas velut per exemplum conditor operaretur. Tertium est |
quod habent quemdam numerum, ita quod finite sunt et species finitas 30
habent, et omnia producunt secundum aliquem numerum, aut secundum
unitatem aut secundum dualitatem, et ita de aliis: que enim habent tan-
tum esse dicuntur produci secundum unitatem; que quidem habent esse
divisibile] et add. Pv corporeum] et add. Pv et om. Pv predicatur scr.]

predicantur MPv idest] scilicet Pv ad] secundum Pv intellectum] mentem
Pv
a Aristotle, Met., VII, 14, 1039b1619 (AL XXV 3.2, p. 161, lin. 800803). b Aristotle, Phys.,
VIII, 10, 267b69. c Eustratius, In Eth., I, c. 7, p. 69, 8795.
476 pauli veneti
65rb M et unitatem dicuntur produci secundum dualitatem numeri binarii, | et

ita de aliis. Quartum est quod habent esse divinum, quoniam ydee ille
non differunt realiter, sed solum secundum rationem, sicut et omnia que
sunt in intellectu primi distinctionem tantum rationis habent. Et conclu-
dit Eustratiusa quod Platonici dicebant illa extra rationes, conditiones et 5
speculationes, non ut qualitates quasdam vel substantias supervenien-
tes ab extra, sed ut principaliter entia et subsistentia et intellectualia, et
eorum que natura archetypa, idest principalia, que rationes exemplares
existentes in mente divina dicuntur habere principalitatem respectu for-
marum in materia. 10
Ista excusatio laudabilis est, si non derogaret fame Aristotelis. Num-
quam enim laborasset Aristoteles tantum contra Platonem, si ydeas posu-
isset in intellectu primi entis, cum hoc sit verum et necessarium, aliter
non diceret, quinto huius,b quod Deus aggregat in se perfectiones omnium
rerum. Plato enim posuit universalia separata a suis singularibus, quia 15
intellectus intelligit ea non intelligendo singularia; constat autem quod
intellectus humanus, sicut concipit hominem vel equum sine singulari-
bus, ita sine primo ente; ideo posuit ea separata a primo ente. Deinde,
concessit quod universalia predicantur de suis singularibus, et quod illa
sunt que diffiniuntur et de quibus habetur scientia, et quod species com- 20
ponuntur ex genere et differentia, et quod huiusmodi universalia sunt
substantie et quiditates rerum. Sed certum est quod ista non conveniunt
intellectui divino neque ydeis existentibus in eo.
Secunda opinio fuit Ockham,c ponentis ydeas extra divinum intellec-
tum, et tot esse ydeas quot sunt creature producte vel producibiles, ita 25
quod quelibet creatura ydea est atque exemplar sui ipsius. Undeinquit
ipseydee sunt proportionaliter ponende in artifice creato et increato;
sed si artifex creatus cognosceret precise artificiatum producendum ab
eo, ita vere ageret per exemplar sive per ydeam, sicut si cognosceret unum
cuius simile deberet producere; ergo respectu artificis creati ipsum produ- 30
cibile est vere ydea atque exemplar. Constat autem quod Deus creaturam
producibilem precognoscit; ergo ipsa creatura est vere et realiter ydea,
ita quod ydea non est nisi aliquid cognitum, ad quod cognoscens aspicit
distinctionem tantum] solam distinctionem Pv atque] et M quod] intellectus

creatus add. Pv aliquid] aliquod M
a Eustratius, In Eth., I, c. 7, pp. 7071, 3036. b Aristotle, Met., V, 16, 1021b2330, as
understood by Averroes, In Met., V, 21, t.c. fol. 131B. c Ockham, In I Sent., dist. 35, q. 5,
OTh., IV, pp. 479507.
in producendo, ut secundum ipsum aliud simile illi aut ipsum producat

in esse reali, sicut una domus est ydea et exemplar alterius domus, per
hoc quod artifex ipsam respiciens ad illius similitudinem aliam domum
facit. Ita etiam si artifex domum producendam in particulari cognosceret,
ipsa sui ipsius ydea esset atque exemplar. Et ex hoc concedit quod ydee 5
non sunt in Deo subiective, sed tantum obiective, sicut et res ab ipso
producibiles, et quod quarumlibet rerum factibilium sunt distincte ydee,
sicut et ipse res distincte sunt; et consequenter quod quarumlibet partium
essentialium atque integralium sunt distincte ydee. Et ex hoc Deus habet
infinitas ydeas, sicut in continuo sunt infinities infinite partes; et quia non 10
sunt universalia ex parte rei, sed solum singularia, ideo non universalia
sed solum singularia habent ydeas.
Ista opinio irrationalis est, quoniam similitudo est relatio requirens
distinctionem realem extremorum, sicut et equalitas, ut colligitur de
mente Philosophi, quinto huius;a ergo nichil est sibi simile vel equale, et 15
per consequens nichil est ydea sive exemplar suiipsius. Patet consequen-
tia, quia ydea et exemplar dicit similitudinem ad ydeatum et exemplatum.
Item, in hoc septimo declaravit Philosophusb quod domus que est in
297va Pv materia est a domo que est in anima, et sanitas | que est in corpore sanabili
est a sanitate que est in mente artificis; cum ergo unumquodque fiat a 20
65va M suo simili, ut multipliciter | demonstravit, sequitur quod domus que est in
anima et sanitas que est in mente medici sit ydea et exemplar, non autem
domus aut sanitas que est in materia.
Preterea, Deus cognoscit Antichristum per ydeam Antichristi; sed Deus
nichil cognoscit per illud quod non est; ergo ydea Antichristi est. Constat 25
autem quod Antichristus non est; ergo ydea Antichristi non est Antichri-
stus. Ut arguatur sic: Deus eternaliter cognovit Antichristum; sed Anti-
christus non eternaliter terminavit cognitionem divinam, quia ipse num-
quam fuit; ergo aliud ab Antichristo eternaliter terminavit illam eternam
cognitionem. Hoc autem videtur esse ydea Antichristi. Ergo ydea Anti- 30
christi eternaliter fuit; ipse autem Antichristus numquam fuit; ergo ydea
Antichristi non est Antichristus.
Et si domificator, ad similitudinem A domus, facit B domum, non debet
dici quod A sit ydea B, sed tantum exemplar, quia ydea ultra similitu-
dinem dicit rationem cognitivam et causalem. Ideo domus existens in 35
mente artificis est ydea domus existentis in materia, quia non solum
a Possibly, Aristotle, Met, V, 15, 1021a2629 together with 1021b68. b Aristotle, Met., VII, 7,
1032b1114.
478 pauli veneti
est similis illi, sed etiam est ratio cognitiva et causalis illius. Propterea,
si artifex nichil cognosceret nisi domum faciendamquod tamen est
impossibileillius domus nichil esset exemplar neque ydea.
Tertia opinio fuit Scoti,a describentis ydeam per hunc modum: ydea
est ratio eterna in mente divina, secundum quam aliquid est formabile 5
secundum propriam rationem eius. Nam, cum Deus nichil irrationabiliter
agit, oportet quod cum ratione producat creaturas; non autem per ratio-
nem extra se, quia hoc diceret imperfectionem in Deo; ergo per rationem
existentem in se. Omnis autem ratio existens in Deo est incommutabilis
et eterna; ergo ydea est ratio eterna, ex quo huiusmodi ratio existens in 10
mente divina nichil aliud sit quam ydea.
Ex qua conclusione infert quatuor correlaria. Quorum primum est:
ydea est obiectum cognitum per intellectum divinum in esse intelligibili
determinatum. Patet, quia tale obiectum cognitum est propria ratio rei
factibilis ad extra, sicut domus in mente respectu domus in materia, ita 15
quod lapis aut equus in esse intelligibile est ydea lapidis aut equi existentis
in propria natura: talis enim equus aut lapis in esse intelligibili videtur
terminare divinam cognitionem.
Secundum correlarium: cuilibet rei factibili respondet proprium esse
intelligibile in mente divina, sicut et extra intellectum divinum in proprio 20
genere habet proprium esse distinctum a quolibet alio. Si enim Deus
solum cognosceret Sortem, in eo esset ydea Sortis per hoc quod in eo esset
intelligibile esse Sortis; sed iam Sortis et Platonis Deus habet proprium
intelligibile esse; ergo iam cuiuslibet illorum habet propriam ydeam.
Tertium correlarium: infinitarum ydearum pluralitas consistit obiec- 25
tive in mente divina. Patet, quoniam in quocumque est esse intelligibile
alicuius, in eodem est propria ydea illius; sed in mente divina est obiec-
tive esse intelligibile cuiuscumque, tam possibilis quam realiter existentis,
sicut in eodem est esse cognitum illius, alioquin Deus posset ignoranter
aliquid producerequod est absurdum. Constat autem infinita esse pro- 30
ducibilia ab intellectu divino. Ergo et cetera.
Quartum correlarium: ydea existens in mente divina est divina intel-
lectio, tam producibilis quam realiter existentis, quia, sicut se habet in
nobis intellectio nostra ad esse intellectum, sic divina intellectio ad esse
equi scr.] ligni MPv
a Scotus, Ord., I, d. 30, qq. 12; d. 35, q. un.; d. 36, q. un., Opera Omnia, VI, ed. Vaticana,
pp. 181190, 245270, 281290; Lect., I, d. 35, q. un.; d. 36, q. un., Opera Omnia, XVII, ed.
Vaticana, pp. 445453, 468471.
intellectum; sed in nobis intellectio nostra et esse rei intellectum sunt

idem; ergo et cetera. Probatur minor. Nam, dum cognosco patrem meum
non existentem, queritur quid est illud esse intellectum patris mei. Et
65vb M patet quod non est pater meus, quia ille non est, nec est intellectus, | quia
tunc, cum intellectus desineret intelligere, ipse desineret esse intellec- 5
tusquod est falsum; non etiam aliquod fictum factum ab intellectu, quia
tale numquam fuit sensatum. Relinquitur ergo quod illud intellectum
patris mei est ipsa cognitio intellectus.
297vb Pv Ista opinio | rationabilis est, quia non ponit ydeas esse extra intellec-
tum divinum, sed solum in intellectu divino per modum obiecti cogniti, 10
non quidem habentis esse reale in proprio genere, sed solum habentis esse
intelligibile in intellectu divino. Est tamen dubia quo ad duo dicta alia,
quorum primum est quod cuilibet rei factibili respondet propria ydea,
ita quod infinitis creaturis productis vel producibilibus respondent infi-
nite ydee in mente divina, sicut et infinita intelligibilia esse: quoniam, 15
sicut est in artifice creato, ita in increato; sed artifex creatus habet unam
ydeam correspondentem pluribus artificialibus; ergo etiam artifex increa-
tus habet unam ydeam respondentem pluribus producibilibus. Tenet
consequentia cum maiori, ex sufficienti similitudine data per opinionem
recitatam. Et minor est Aristotelis in hoc septimo,a intendentis quod ab 20
eadem domo numero existente in mente artificis plures domus possunt
fieri. Ars enim est recta ratio factibilium. Sicut ergo non requiruntur plures
rationes neque plures habitus factivi ad producendum diversa artificialia
eiusdem speciei, ita non multiplicatur domus aut sanitas, que est habi-
tus factivus in anima, iuxta multiplicationem domorum existentium extra 25
animam aut sanitatum existentium in corpore sanabili.
Item, ars assimilatur nature et forma dicitur species et ydea in quantum
potest producere sibi simile, ut colligitur de mente Philosophi, secundo
Phisicorumb; constat autem quod agens naturale per eandem naturam
numero potest diversa producere eiusdem speciei; ergo et cetera. Etiam 30
artifex per eandem artem numero, et Deus per eandem ydeam numero,
potest plura eiusdem speciei producere, et per consequens non cuilibet
producibili correspondet propria ydea.
Secundum quod dicit hec opinio est quod ydea in mente divina est
cognitio ipsius rei producibilisquod non videtur verum, quia ydea in 35
in2 om. Pv requiruntur] requiritur Pv
a Aristotle, Met., VII, 7, 1032b914. b Aristotle, Phys., II, 2, 194a2127; 8, 199a1520.

480 pauli veneti
mente creati artificis non est cognitio rei artificialis; ergo neque ydea
in mente artificis increati est cognitio rei producibilis. Patet consequen-
tia a sufficienti similitudine. Antecedens autem est manifestum, quo-
niam sive artifex consideret sive non consideret, sive agat sive non agat,
continue manet eadem ydea, sicut et eadem ars et idem habitus facti- 5
vus.
Quarta opinio fuit beati Thome et Egidii,a dicentium quod non sunt plu-
res ydee in intellectu primi entis neque extra intellectum illum, sed est
una tantum ydea omnium, scilicet divina essentia sub respectu imitabili-
tatis, ita quod, sicut prima materia, sub infinitis respectibus existens, infi- 10
nitarum formarum est receptiva, ita divina essentia, sub infinitis respec-
tibus imitabilitatis existens, infinitorum tam productorum quam produ-
cibilium est representativa. Si enim aliqua qualitas, videlicet conceptus
Sortis, est representativa omnium dissimilium, scilicet substantie et acci-
dentis, quia seipsum representat et Sortem, a fortiori divina essentia est 15
representativa per unicam simplicissimam rationem omnium quantum-
cumque dissimilium; ideo omnium ipsa est ydea unica, sicut omnium est
similitudo atque exemplar. Unde aliqua est similitudo que est representa-
tiva tantum unius, sicut conceptus singularis, et aliqua est que est repre-
sentativa omnium eiusdem speciei, sicut conceptus specificus, et alia que 20
est representativa omnium que sunt eiusdem generis, ut conceptus gene-
ricus, et alia que est representativa omnium rerum indifferenter, ut con-
ceptus transcendens. Harum similitudinum prima est distincta et omnes
alie confuse. Ymaginemur ergo unam similitudinem representantem per
modum transcendentis quo ad communitatem et per modum individui 25
66ra M quo ad distinctionem, | et talis est divina similitudo respectu omnium
creaturarum. Unde cognitio generis et transcendentis est multorum, sed
confusa: quod sit multorum est perfectionis, et quod sit confusa est imper-
fectionis. Cognitio autem individui est unius tantum, sed distincta: quod
sit unius solum est imperfectionis, et quod sit distincta est perfectionis. 30
Amoveamus ergo omnem imperfectionem retenta perfectione, et quia
298ra Pv omnis | perfectio est Deo tribuenda, remanebit divina essentia, multorum
similitudo distincta et propria.
imitabilitatis] immutabilitatis Pv imitabilitatis] immutabilitatis Pv a

fortiori] a priori et fortiori M
a Aquinas,S. Th., Ia, qq. 1415, ed. Paulinae, pp. 7289; Giles of Rome, Quod., I, q. 9, ed.
Leuven 1646, fol. 20a21a.
Item, quanto aliqua intelligentia est perfectior, tanto intelligit per pau-
ciores species et magis universales atque distinctius; ergo illa que intel-
ligit per solum conceptum entis, perfectius atque distinctius cognoscit.
Modus enim cognoscendi intelligentiarum opponitur modo cognoscendi
humano; constat autem quod intellectus humanus, quanto cognoscit per 5
species magis universales, tanto confusius cognoscit; ideo econtra intelli-
gentie separate, quanto per species magis universales cognoscunt, tanto
perfectius et distinctius intelligunt. Deus autem perfectissime cognoscit
et plura quam aliqua intelligentia creata; et non per aliquam speciem
accidentalem, sed per essentiam suam; ergo divina essentia est distincta 10
atque perfectissima omnium cognitio, tam possibilium quam actualiter
existentium, et per consequens est omnium ydea unica absque multitu-
dine ydealium rationum.
Hec opinio probabilis est et bene fundata, sed remanet dubia propter
similitudinem quam omnes concedunt inter artificem creatum et increa- 15
tum, preter distinctionem realem repertam in artifice creato. Certum
enim est quod intellectus artificis creati, aut essentia illius, sub quocum-
que respectu signato non est ydea domus aut sanitatis existentis in mate-
ria, sed necesse est dare unam formam superadditam intellectui et essen-
tie artificis, per quam producitur domus aut sanitas in materia ad eius 20
similitudinem, ut supra patuit ex doctrina Aristotelis et Commentatoris.a
Ergo, consequenter loquendo, ydea in Deo non est formaliter intellectus
divinus neque essentia divina sub aliquo respectu imitabilitatis, sed qui-
ditas aut species aliqua in esse intelligibili creature, non realiter distincta,
sed formaliter tantum, ab essentia divina. 25
Deinde, forma et perfectio sunt unum, ut colligitur de mente Aristotelis
et Commentatoris, secundo De anima,b et etiam Avicenne, sexto Natu-
ralium;c sed in Deo sunt perfectiones omnium rerum, per Philosophum,
quinto huius;d ergo in Deo sunt forme omnium rerum. Huiusmodi autem
forme non videntur esse nisi quiditates creaturarum, obiective existen- 30
tes in Deo, in quibus divinus intellectus cognoscit creaturas et ad illa-
rum similitudinem illas producit in esse, eo modo quo intellectus artificis
esse Pv, M s.l. (ratione scr. et del. M)
a Aristotle,Met., VII, 7, 1032b814; Averroes, In Met., VII, 7, t.c. 23, fol. 174A (see also:
fol. 173KM; 174DF). b Aristotle, De an., II, 1 passim; Averroes, In De an., II, t.c. 2, p.
131, 3846; t.c. 5, p. 134, 9ff. c Avicenna, Lib. De An., tr. I, c. 1, ed Van Riet, p. 19, 2728 et
passim. d Aristotle, Met., V, 16, 1021b2330, as understood by Averroes, In Met., V, t.c. 21,
fol. 131B.
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creati habet in se formam sanitatis aut domus, in qua cognoscit sanitatem

vel domum materialem, et ad illius similitudinem producit in materia
sanitatem vel domum.
Preterea, si in Deo est unica ydea, et ydea est ratio exemplaris produc-
tiva effectus consimilis, ergo eadem ratione, eodem exemplo et eadem 5
similitudine producitur homo et equusquod est inconveniens et contra
Augustinum, libro 83 Questionum,a dicentem quod alia ratione conditus
est homo et alia conditus est equus. Si enim inconveniens est quod artifex
creatus eadem ratione producit sanitatem et domum, magis inconveniens
est quod artifex increatus eadem ratione producat hominem et equum, 10
cum rationabilius operetur artifex increatus quam creatus. Sicut ergo
in Deo est multitudo attributalium rationum, scilicet sapientie, scientie,
iustitie, bonitatis et huiusmodi, ita in eo est multitudo ydealium quidi-
tatum, non realiter, sed tantum ratione differentium, ita quod in eo est
66rb M quiditas hominis et quiditas equi, non in esse reali, sed solum in esse | 15
intelligibili atque intentionali.
Dicendum ergo quod non est dare ydeas separatas per se existentes,
videlicet hominem preter hunc hominem, quia de ratione nature commu-
nis est quod sit in alio, sed est dare ydeas separatas a sensibilibus existen-
tes in intellectu creato vel increato. Constat enim quod omnia naturalia, et 20
omnia constituta infra essentias creatas, necessario a Deo procedunt; non
298rb Pv autem per modum nature; ergo per modum intellectus | et artis. Omne
autem procedens ab aliquo per modum artis procedit ab eo per modum
exemplati; et non procedit aliquid per modum exemplati nisi exemplar
habeat in mente artificis; ergo in Deo sunt exemplaria omnium creatu- 25
rarum, que quidem exemplaria vocantur ydee atque forme divini intel-
lectus, iuxta illud Boethii in libro De Trinitate: Omnis forma que est in
materia est deducta a forma que non est in materia.b Unde ydea sumi-
tur dupliciter, videlicet communiter et proprie: ydea communiter sumpta
est quiditas specifica in intellectu causaliter existens, ad cuius exemplar 30
generans effectum producit.
In hac descriptione ponuntur quatuor que sunt de ratione ydee, iuxta
doctrinam Aristotelis et Commentatoris in hoc septimo. Primo quidem:
ydea debet esse quiditas specifica, quoniam ydea habet rationem actus et
scilicet] videlicet Pv realiterdifferentium] realiter differentium sed tantum

ratione Pv
a Augustine, De Div. Quaest. 83, q. 46, p. 72, lin. 5152. b Boethius, De Trin., ed. Moreschini,
p. 171, lin. 113115.

forme, genus autem et individuum habent rationem materie; ergo ydea

non potest esse quiditas generis neque individui. Propterea male dicunt
illi qui opinantur quamlibet denominationem perfectionis simpliciter
existentem in Deo, scilicet esse, vivere et intelligere, esse ydeam creature,
quia ydea debet esse ratio determinata, huiusmodi autem denominatio- 5
nes perfectionis simpliciter sunt rationes indeterminate.
Secundo: ydea debet esse subiective in intellectu, quoniam, sicut
natura agit per instrumentum coniunctum sibi, ita et intellectus; instru-
mentum autem intellectus est ydea. Ideo non bene dicunt qui concedunt
creaturas extra intellectum esse ydeas, quia domus que est in materia, aut 10
sanitas que est in corpore animalis, non debet dici ydea, sed sanitas aut
domus que est in anima, quam Commentator superius vocavit quidita-
tem intrinsecam, que est forma eius existens in lapidibus et lignis. Habet
etiam quiditatem extrinsecam, que est forma existens in anima produc-
tiva domus in materia. 15
Tertio: ydea debet esse causalis, idest causa effectiva, effectus consimi-
lis. Dixit enim superius Philosophusa quod domus que est in materia est a
domo que est in anima, et sanitas que est in corpore sano est a sanitate exi-
stente in anima. Propterea scriptura aut pictura, ad cuius similitudinem
scriptor scribit et pictor pingit, non debet vocari ydea, quia non concurrit 20
ut causa effectiva, sed tantum ut exemplar et similitudo.
Quarto: ydea debet esse exemplar, ut ad similitudinem illius effectus
producatur. Per hoc ydea debet esse in intellectu non tantum subiective,
sed etiam obiective, ut sit in prospectu intellectus tamquam obiectum
cognitum, non tantum absolute, sed etiam respective, ut, sicut intellectus 25
respiciens fantasma non solum cognoscit fantasma, sed etiam cognoscit
universale aut particulare relucens in eo, ita intellectus aspiciens ydeam,
que est quiditas rei in esse intelligibili, non tantum eam cognoscit, sed
etiam rem ipsam relucentem in ea. Et ex isto patet quod ydea non est
cognitio rei, sed est quiditas rei in esse intelligibili, presentata intellectui 30
ut obiectum cognitum. Quando ergo querebatur dum intelligo patrem
meum defunctum, quid est illud esse intellectum patris mei?, dicitur
quod est species fantastica aut aliqua alia species intelligibilis, in qua
relucet pater meus. Sicut enim datur duplex color, scilicet realis existens
in pariete, et intentionalis existens in medio aut in oculo, ita preter patrem 35
solum] tantum Pv cognoscit2] singulare add. et del. MPv existens] qui est Pv
a Aristotle, Met., VII, 7, 1032b1114.

484 pauli veneti
realem est dare patrem intentionalem, qui est similitudo patris realis
remanens in memoria aut in intellectu defuncto patre. Huiusmodi autem
66va M similitudo est species fantastica vel intelligibilis | obiective presentata
intellectui, in qua intellectus patrem cognoscit defunctum.
Sed ydea proprie sumpta est quiditas specifica causaliter existens in 5
298va Pv mente divina, ad cuius exemplar supremus conditor creaturas | producit
in esse. Ista descriptio patet per beatum Augustinum, in libro 83 Questio-
num,a dicentem has autem rationes non esse arbitrandum nisi in mente
creatoris: non enim extra se positum intuebatur, ut secundum illud con-
stitueret quicquid constituebat. Ecce quod beatus Augustinus rationes 10
quas vocat ydeas tantummodo in mente creatoris ponit. Quod quidem
confirmat eodem libro, dicens: Sunt namque ydee principales quedam
forme atque rationes rerum stabiles atque immutabiles, et ipse formate
non sunt, atque eterne et semper eodem modo se habentes, que in divina
essentia continentur.b Constat autem dictum hoc non verificari de formis 15
causalibus existentibus in mente creati artificis. Ideo proprie non inveni-
tur ydea nisi in mente divina, quam beatus Augustinus vocat formam et
rationem. Commentator vero, duodecimo huius,c dicit eam esse artem
divini intellectus, que etiam quiditas intelligibilis vocatur, sicut et ipsam
formam domus in intellectu existentem Commentator superiusd quidita- 20
tem expressit.
Ex predictis sequitur primo quod non cuilibet rei factibili respondet
propria mentis ydea. Patet, quoniam in omnibus individuis eiusdem spe-
ciei non invenitur nisi una quiditas specifica in esse reali; ideo in intellectu
divino non invenitur respectu omnium illorum individuorum nisi una 25
quiditas specifica in esse intelligibili. Et non sequitur: cuilibet rei factibili
respondet proprium esse intelligibile, ergo cuilibet tali respondet pro-
prium esse ydeale. Nam quelibet domus producibilis habet proprium esse
intelligibile in mente artificis, sicut et propriam cognitionem et propriam
speciem intelligibilem, non tamen habet propriam ydeam. Constat enim 30
quod domificator, per eandem formam domus quam habet in mente, pro-
ducit plures domus in materia.
causaliter] communiter M beatum om. M quidem] in men add. Pv rerum]

eorum M
a Augustine, De Div. Quaest. 83, q. 46, p. 71, lin. 2930. b Augustine, De Div. Quaest. 83, q. 46,
p. 71, lin. 2630. c Averroes, In Met., XII, t.c. 18, f 305I; t.c. 24, fol. 309F; t.c. 51, fol. 336AB.
d Averroes, In Met., VII, t.c. 23, fol. 173FG; 173H.
Secundo sequitur quod non est necesse ponere in mente divina infi-
nitas ydeas, quia, licet in mente divina sint infinita intelligibilia esse
respectu infinitorum producibilium, non tamen quodlibet illorum est
ydea, quoniam ydea non est forma exemplaris tantum unius, sed omnium
eiusdem speciei, ut asserit Plato et etiam Aristoteles, secundum quod 5
apparet in parte sequenti huius capituli.a Si enim teneatur cum philoso-
phis quod species sunt solum finite, neque plures possunt esse, dicatur
quod in intellectu divino non sunt ydee nisi sub numero finito; si autem
teneatur cum theologis quod infinite alie species possunt fieri, sicut infi-
nite possunt esse species numerorum, sic in Deo sunt ponende ydee infi- 10
nite.
Tertio sequitur quod, licet intellectus divinus per unam simplicem
rationem omnia cognoscat, non tamen per unicam ydeam omnia ad esse
producit. Unde, sicut artifex habet duplicem formam in mente, unam
speculativam, per quam tantum cognoscit, et aliam practicam, per quam 15
cognoscit et operatur, ita Deus habet in se duplicem conceptum, unum
quidem speculativum, per quem infinita cognoscit, et iste conceptus est
divina essentia sub infinitis respectibus creaturarum, alium vero per
quem cognoscit et operatur, et iste est ydea formaliter differens ab essen-
tia divina. Et multiplicatur formaliter talis conceptus in Deo, sicut multi- 20
plicatur realiter quiditas specifica in rebus creatis.
Quarto sequitur quod ydea, licet sit quiditas specifica intellectualis,
adhuc est unum numero, habens rationem totius et non partis. Patet
per Eustratium, super primo Ethicorum,b dicentem quod ydea habet per
essentiam quicquid forma in materia habet per participationem, et habet 25
unitive et totaliter quicquid forme in materia habent particulariter et
disperse. Ideo forma in materia dicitur pars, ipsa autem ydea vocatur
totum. Unde ibi distinguitc triplex totum, scilicet in partibus, post partes
66vb M et ante partes. | Totum in partibus est illud quod constituitur ex suis par-
tibus, et tale non potest esse ydea, quia tale totum concernit quantitatem, 30
non autem ydea. Totum post partes est intentio universalis quam accipit
intellectus per abstractionem, ut quando intelligit speciem sine individuo
et genus absque specie; et iterum tale totum non est ydea, sed universale,
298vb Pv de quo loquitur Philosophus in prologo De anima,d dicens: Universale |
sunt ponende inv. Pv et aliam] aliam vero Pv alium scr.] aliquando MPv
a Cf.infra, p. 496, 2434. b Eustratius, In Eth., I, c. 7, p. 77, 105; p. 83, 97ff. c Eustratius, In
Eth., I, c. 7, pp. 69, 470, 29. d Aristotle, De an., I, 1, 402b78.
486 pauli veneti
aut nichil est aut posterius est. Totum autem ante partes est illud ad cuius
exemplar fiunt partes, sic quod tale exemplar habet hperi quamdam supe-
reminentiam et essentiam quicquid partes habent modo participato et
diminuto. Et huiusmodi totum ydea est, que etiam unum numero dici-
tur, quoniam unum et idem exemplar sufficere potest omnibus individuis 5
unius speciei, quia, ut dictum est, omnes domus et omnes arche fieri pos-
sunt ad unum exemplar in mente artificis. Neque tale totum est de essen-
tia partium, sed est illud ad cuius imitationem fit tota substantia partium,
et secundum maiorem et minorem participationem et imitationem huius
totius exemplaris, ipsum exemplatum magis vel minus perfectum erit. 10
Quoniam vero substantia h1039b20ssi.

Ista est secunda pars huius capituli, in qua Philosophus probat quod
universalia ydealia diffiniri non possunt, etiam dato quod illa esse habeant
in natura et separata sint a singularibus. Propter hoc enim ponebant preci-
pue ydeas Platonici, ut eis diffinitiones adaptarentur et demonstrationes, 15
que sunt necessariorum et impossibilium aliter se habere. Duo ergo facit
hic Philosophus, quoniam primo premittit duas suppositiones; secundo
autem exequitur de intento per conclusiones, ibi: Propter hoc autem
h1039b27ssi.
Prima ergo suppositio est ista, quod duplex est substantia, videlicet par- 20
ticularis et universalis: substantia particularis est compositum ex materia
et forma, substantia universalis est tantum forma sine materia. Et dif-
fert una substantia ab alia, quoniam substantia particularis vocatur simul
totum, et non concipitur sine materia, substantia autem universalis est
forma simplex concepta sine materia. Dicitur autem substantia particu- 25
laris simul totum, quia simul aggregat in se formam et materiam; sub-
stantia autem universalis est substantia simplex, quia dicit puram formam
excludendo materiam, scilicet individualem. Verbi gratia, Sortes est sub-
stantia particularis et simul totum; humanitas autem que est in eo, est
substantia universalis et solum forma, seu ratio et quiditas. 30
Lege litteram: Quoniam vero substantia altera, et quod simul totum et
ratio, idest individuum et quiditas. Dico autem quia hoc quidem, scilicet
individuum, sic est substantia cum materia concepta, ratio, idest forma et
quiditas, illa vero, idest substantia universalis, est ratio totaliter.a
per suppl. et] aut Pv arche] archus M quoniam om. M hoc] hec Moerb.
Secunda suppositio est quod generatio et corruptio competunt sub-

stantiis particularibus et non substantiis universalibus, que sunt quidi-
tates et essentie rerum. Patet, quia, sicut est in artificialibus, ita et in
naturalibus; constat autem quod non generantur quiditates et essentie
artificialium, quia non generatur essentia domus nec quiditas statue, sed 5
generatur hec domus et illa statua corrumpitur: quiditates enim et essen-
tie habent esse et non esse non quidem propter generationem et corrup-
tionem earum, sed propter generationem et corruptionem suorum indi-
viduorum. Dictum est enim superiusa quod nullus generat vel corrumpit
quiditatem, sed individuum. Hec autem intelligenda sunt cum nota per- 10
seitatis, ita quod individuum est illud quod per se generat et per se gene-
ratur, per se corrumpit et per se corrumpitur, quiditas autem et essentia
individui non per se generat nec per se generatur, non per se corrumpit
nec per se corrumpitur, sed per accidens, ratione individui, omnes has
recipit predicationes. Et quod dictum est in artificialibus est intelligen- 15
dum in naturalibus, quoniam substantia particularis per se agit et patitur,
substantia autem universalis, que est quiditas, non agit nec patitur nisi
per accidens: Sortes enim per se generat et generatur, per se corrumpit et
corrumpitur, humanitas autem solum per accidens recipit has denomina-
tiones. 20
299ra Pv Lege litteram:|| Quecumque quidem igitur ita dicuntur, harum quidem
67ra M est corruptio; et enim generatio. Rationis autem, que est quiditas et essen-
tia, non est ita corruptio ut corrumpantur, neque enim generatio; non enim
fit domui esse, sed quod huic domui. Verum sine generatione sunt et non sunt
ipse quiditates. Ostensum est enim quod nullus homo generat nec facit, sci- 25
licet quiditatem, per se.b
Notandum, secundum Commentatorem, commento quinquace-
simo tertio, quod altera dicitur substantia que est congregata ex
materia et forma demonstrata que est in materia, altera autem est
forma universalis quam significat diffinitio Substantia ergo con- 30
gregata ex materia et forma habet generationem et corruptionem;
et corruptionem om. M generat scr.] generatur MPv etcorrumpit om. M

igitur M Moerb.] ergo Pv corrumpantur] corrumpatur Moerb. generatione]
et curruptione add. Moerb. quod] quia Moerb. generat] hec generat Moerb.
quinquacesimo tertio corr.] altero et quinquacesimo MPv forma] et forma
habet generationem add. Pv congregata] que dicitur de congregato Iunt.
a Cf. supra, tr. 2, c. 2, pp. 247, 4248, 5. b Aristotle, Met., VII, 15, 1039b2227 (AL XXV 3.2, p.
161162, lin. 806811).
488 pauli veneti
substantia vero quam significat diffinitio non habet generationem

nec corruptionem : quiditas enim domus simpliciter non habet
generationem, quoniam generatio non est nisi istius domus demon-
strate Et necesse est ut res hic demonstrate corrumpantur, propter
hoc quia habent materiam, que potest recipere formam in aliqua 5
hora et amittere eam in alia.a
Prima distinctio quam intendit Commentator est hec, quod duplex est
forma, scilicet particularis et universalis: forma particularis est forma
demonstrata existens in materia; forma universalis est forma totius signi-
ficata per diffinitionem. Dicitur autem forma particularis forma demon- 10
strata, quia ipsa est hoc aliquid non competens nisi uni; et quia actuat
solum unam partem compositi dicitur forma partis; et quia recipitur in
materia dicitur forma materie. Forma autem universalis non est forma
demonstrata, quia non est hoc aliquid, sed quale quid; dicitur autem
forma totius, quia recipitur in toto individuo et non in aliqua parte eius, 15
et competit omnibus suis suppositis et non alicui tantum.
Secunda distinctio est quod duplex est materia, scilicet potens reci-
pere formam et non potens recipere formam: materia potens recipere
formam est illa cui est annexa privatio forme generande, cuiusmodi est
materia mixtorum et elementorum; materia non potens recipere formam 20
est illa cui non est annexa privatio forme generande, ut materia corporum
celestium. Individua ergo horum inferiorum generantur et corrumpun-
tur, quia habent materiam potentem recipere formam in una hora et in
alia hora eandem amittere. Sed individua superiorum non generantur et
corrumpuntur, quia non habent materiam potentem recipere formam et 25
eandem amittere.
Tertia distinctio est quod aliquid generari vel corrumpi contingit dupli-
citer, videlicet simpliciter et secundum quid. Illud simpliciter generatur,
quod per se generatur; illud autem secundum quid generatur, quod per
accidens generatur. Et quia domus particularis per se generatur, quidi- 30
tas autem domus per accidens generatur, ideo domus particularis sim-
pliciter generatur, quiditas autem domus non simpliciter generatur, sed
solum secundum quid, ratione individui. Consimiliter dicatur de corrup-
tione, quod ista domus simpliciter corrumpitur, quiditas autem domus
simpliciter] simplex Iunt. hic demonstrate inv. Iunt. quia] quod Iunt. et
non] non autem Pv materia scr.] natura MPv et] neque Pv autem om. M
a Averroes, In Met., VII, t.c. 53, fol. 202BD.

secundum quid corrumpitur, eo quod ista domus per se corrumpitur,

quiditas autem domus solum per accidens.
Sed dubitatur, quia videtur quod ita per se generetur et corrumpatur
quiditas domus sicut ista domus. Primo, quia ita componitur ex materia
et forma quiditas domus sicut ista domus. 5
Secundo, quia, sicut se habet causa particularis ad effectum particu-
larem, ita causa universalis ad effectum universalem; sed iste domificator
per se generat istam domum; ergo domificator in communi generat per se
domum in communi. Tam consequentia quam totum antecedens ponitur
a Philosopho, secundo Phisicorum.a 10
Ad primum dicitur quod non est similitudo, quia materia ex qua com-
ponitur quiditas domus non est materia potens recipere formam, cum sit
materia universalis. Materia autem ex qua componitur domus particula-
299rb Pv ris est materia potens recipere formam, cum sit materia signata, | cui est
67rb M annexa privatio forme generande. Ideo domus particularis | simpliciter et 15
per se generatur et corrumpitur, non autem quiditas domus.
Ad secundum respondetur quod aliqua est differentia inter quiditatem
domus et domum in communi, quoniam quiditas domus nullum importat
suppositum, neque determinatum neque indeterminatum, domus autem
in communi importat suppositum indeterminatum, sicut hec domus 20
importat suppositum determinatum. Ideo conceditur quod domificator
in communi per se generat domum in communi, non tamen per se gene-
rat quiditatem domus, sed solum per accidens.
Propter hoc autem h1039b27ssi.
Hiis suppositionibus premissis Philosophus ponit quatuor conclusio- 25
nes, quarum prima est hec: nullum individuum sensibile potest diffiniri.
Secunda conclusio: nullum individuum intelligibile potest diffiniri, ibi:
Neque itaque ydeam h1040a8ssi. Tertia conclusio: nullum individuum
materiale adequatum speciei potest diffiniri, ibi: Quemadmodum ergo
h1040a27ssi. Quarta conclusio: ydea nullo modo potest diffiniri, ibi: Qua- 30
propter nullus h1040b2ssi.
Primam conclusionem Philosophus probat tripliciter, et primo sic: nul-
lum corruptibile potest diffiniri; quodlibet individuum sensibile est cor-
ruptibile; ergo nullum individuum sensibile potest diffiniri. Prima pars
generetur] generatur M ydea] ydee Pv potest] possunt Pv nullus] nulla

Pv probat tripliciter inv. Pv

490 pauli veneti
antecedentis patet, quia de nullo corruptibili habetur demonstratio, ut

habet videri primo Posteriorum;a ergo neque diffinitio. Tenet consequen-
tia, quia diffinitio est medium in demonstratione, ut ostenditur secundo
Posteriorum.b Secunda pars antecedentis evidens est ex secunda suppo-
sitione. Nam quodlibet individuum sensibile habet materiam, per quam 5
potest esse et non esse; ergo quodlibet tale est corruptibile. Antecedens
est manifestum, quia cuiuslibet talis individui materia hesti sub potentia
ad formam et sub privatione forme: in quantum est sub potentia ad for-
mam, secundum hoc individuum sensibile potest esse; in quantum vero
est sub privatione forme, secundum hoc individuum sensibile potest non 10
esse.
Lege litteram: Propter hoc autem et substantiarum sensibilium sin-
gularium nec diffinitio nec demonstratio est, quia habent materiam cuius
natura talis est ut contingat et esse et non esse. Quapropter corruptibilia
omnia singularia ipsorum.c 15
Secundo: nullum contingens potest diffiniri; sed quodlibet individuum
sensibile est contingens; ergo nullum individuum sensibile potest diffi-
niri. Patet consequentia cum minori ex secunda suppositione, ex quo quo-
dlibet tale individuum est generabile et corruptibile. Et probatur maior.
Nam demonstratio et scientia est necessariorum et eorum que non con- 20
tingunt aliter se habere; sed diffinitio est principium demonstrationis, ac
etiam facit scire, ut ostenditur secundo Posteriorum;d ergo diffinitio non
est contingentium, sed necessariorum et eorum que non contingunt aliter
se habere. Prima pars antecedentis est declarata primo Posteriorum.e Per
hoc enim differt demonstratio a syllogismo probabili et scientia ab opi- 25
nione, quoniam tam opinio quam syllogismus probabilis est contingen-
tium et eorum que possunt aliter se habere, demonstratio autem et scien-
tia est necessariorum et eorum que non possunt aliter se habere. Sicut
ergo demonstratio non potest esse quandoque demonstratio et quando-
que syllogismus probabilis, nec scientia potest esse quandoque scientia 30
et quandoque ignorantia, ita diffinitio non potest esse quandoque dif-
finitio et quandoque non diffinitio. Constat autem quod diffinitio esset
quandoque non diffinitio, si esset contingentium et possibilium aliter se
est suppl. quandoque] aliquando Pv
a Aristotle, An. Post., I, 8, 75b2425. b Aristotle, An. Post., II, 10, 93b3894a10. c Aristotle,
Met., VII, 15, 1039b2731 (AL XXV 3.2, p. 162, lin. 812815). d Aristotle, An. Post., II, 3, 90b24
25. e Aristotle, An. Post., I, 6, 74b1315.
habere, sicut propositio significati contingentis aliquando est vera et

quandoque non est vera.
Lege litteram: Ergo si demonstratio necessariorum et diffinitio scien-
tifica est, idest facit scire, et non contingit sicut nec scientiam quandoque
scientiam quandoque ignorantiam esse, ita nec demonstrationem nec dif- 5
finitionem; sed opinio est contingens aliter se habere; palam, quia non erit
ipsorum contingentium nec diffinitio nec demonstratio.a
Tertio: nichil potest diffiniri nisi de illo possit haberi scientia et demon-
stratio; sed de nullo individuo sensibili potest haberi scientia vel demon-
stratio; ergo nullum individuum sensibile potest diffiniri. Tenet conse- 10
quentia cum maiori, ex quo diffinitio est principium scientie et demon-
299va Pv strationis, ut habetur secundo Posteriorum.b Minor | vero habet videri
67va M primo Posteriorum,c que sic declaratur: | illud cuius est scientia et demon-
stratio sic se debet habere ad intellectum quod, si salvatur ratio ipsius
apud intellectum, [quod] etiam apud intellectum salvetur scientia et 15
demonstratio de eodem; constat autem quod individui sensibilis salvatur
ratio apud intellectum, apud quem non salvatur scientia nec demonstra-
tio de illo: nam, cum corruptum fuerit, aut cum a sensu recesserit, illud
non manifestum erit apud intellectum, et per consequens non manebit
scientia neque demonstratio de illo apud intellectum, sed solum ratio. 20
Patet consequentia, quia de nullo habetur scientia vel demonstratio nisi
illud sit manifestum: de ignotis enim et dubiis non habetur scientia neque
demonstratio, ut probatur primo Posteriorum.d
Lege litteram: Non enim sunt manifesta corrupta scientiam habenti-
bus, cum a sensu abscesserint; et salvatis rationibus in anima eisdem, non 25
erit nec diffinitio amplius nec demonstratio.e
Ex ista ratione Aristoteles concludit quod, cum aliquis voluerit inve-
stigare diffinitionem rei, et cum hoc studerit diffinire aliquod singulare,
oportet eum non ignorare quod semper contingit auferre singulare, ma-
nente tamen ratione apud intellectum, quam ipse intellectus concipit de 30
singulari. Et quia diffinitio est illius quod non contingit auferri manente
ratione apud intellectum, ideo singulare sensibile non diffinitur; univer-
non est inv. M esse] sed opinio quod tale est add. Moerb. contingens] -gentis
Moerb. non] utique add. Moerb. ipsius] illius Pv quod secl. abscesserint
Pv Moerb.] abscesserunt M (Op P1a P2) et] ac Pv
a Aristotle, Met., VII, 15, 1039b311040a2 (AL XXV 3.2, p. 162, lin. 815820). b Aristotle, An.
Post., II, 3, 90b2425. c Aristotle, An. Post., I, 24, 85b1518 et passim. d Aristotle, An. Post.
I, 33 passim. e Aristotle, Met., VII, 15, 1040a25 (AL XXV 3.2, p. 162, lin. 820823).
492 pauli veneti
sale autem est illud quod diffinitur, eo quod auferri non potest. Et sicut
ratio eius manet apud intellectum, ita ipsum continue manet in re.
Lege litteram: Propter quod oportet eorum qui ad terminum, idest
diffinitionem, voluerit pervenire, cum aliquis diffiniat aliquid singularium,
non ignorare quia semper auferre est ipsum singulare; non enim contingit 5
diffiniri quod auferri potest.a
Notandum secundum Commentatorem, commento quinquacesimo
tertio, quod particularia non sciuntur nisi dum sunt in sensu, et cum
recedunt a sensu possunt corrumpi, et tunc non remanebit cogni-
tio eorum apud sentientes, sed tantum remanebit estimatio, et erit 10
sermo conservatus in anima. Et quando sensatum recesserit a sensu
remanebit sua informatio in anima, non ita quod sit certus ipsum
esse quando recedit a sensu. Et ideo sensibilia non habent diffinitio-
nem neque demonstrationem, quia postquam recedunt non habent
nisi estimationem.b 15
Prima distinctio quam intendit Commentator est hec, quod de indivi-
duo sensibili habetur duplex cognitio, videlicet scientia et estimatio. Tunc
autem habetur scientia de individuo sensibili quando est in presentia sen-
sus; tunc autem habetur estimatio quando est absens a sensu. Et non
accipit hic Commentator scientiam pro habitu acquisito per demonstra- 20
tionem, sed pro notitia certa et evidenti evidentia naturali, eo modo quo
dicimus calefactum habere scientiam de caliditate ignis, quia experitur
ignem esse calidum.
Secunda distinctio est quod scientia que habetur de individuo sensibili,
dupliciter destruitur, videlicet per corruptionem scibilis et per absentiam 25
eiusdem. Si enim de Sorte albo, presentato ante oculos, intellectus format
hanc enuntiationem Sortes est albus, quam Aristoteles vocat rationem
et Commentator sermonem, stante presentia obiecti illa propositio sci-
tur; eadem autem continue manens, fit ignorantia et propositio non scita,
si corrumpatur Sortes vel albedo eius, aut si fiat Sortes absens a sensu. In 30
primo casu illa enuntiatio non scitur, quia fit propositio falsa; in secundo
casu eadem non scitur enuntiatio, non quia fiat propositio falsa, sed quia
diffiniri] diffinire Pv Moerb. quinquacesimo tertio corr.] altero et quinquacesimo

MPv estimatio] existimatio Iunt. estimationem] existimationem Iunt.
tuncsensus] iter. M, iter. sed del. Pv
t.c. 53, fol. 202EF.

non habetur certitudo de Sorte nec de albedine eius. Ideo talis cognitio
vocatur estimatio et cetera.
Dubitatur contra conclusionem, quia in suis probationibus continue
67vb M accipitur | antecedens falsum. Non enim est verum quod omne indivi-
299vb Pv duum sensibile est contingens et corruptibile, quoniam corpus celeste | 5
est individuum sensibile, non tamen est corruptibile neque contingens,
ymmo est incorruptibile et necessarium, ut probatur primo Celi.a
Respondetur quod Philosophus per individuum sensibile non intendit
omne individuum potens sentiri aliquo sensu, sed intendit omne indivi-
duum quod sentiri potest sensu tactus. Illud autem est quod disponitur 10
per qualitates primas. Constat autem omne tale contingens esse atque
corruptibile.
Neque itaque ydeam h1040a8ssi.
Secunda conclusio: nullum individuum intelligibile potest diffiniri.
Probatur: quia, si aliquod individuum intelligibile posset diffiniri, 15
maxime videretur quod ydea individualis, quam Platonici dicunt sepa-
ratam esse et singularem; sed ostenditur quod non, quia omnis diffinitio
competit solum uni; sed si ydea singularis diffiniretur, sua diffinitio com-
peteret alteri ab illa; ergo etiam ydea individualis aut singularis diffiniri
non potest. Tenet consequentia cum maiori, quia diffinitio et diffinitum 20
convertuntur. Et minor declaratur. Nam diffinitio non potest dari per
unum nomen, sed necessario per duo nomina vel multa; constat autem
quod si diffinitio ydee singularis datur per multa nomina, oportet quod
alteri competat; ergo et cetera. Prima pars antecedentis est manifesta,
quia diffinitio datur causa innotescendi et exprimendi quiditatem rei; 25
modo unum nomen non indicat quiditatem rei, ymmo res ignota rema-
net, sicut ante, quo ad quiditatem suam. Si enim queritur quid est phi-
losophia?, et respondetur sapientia, licet philosophia per hoc nomen
sapientia declaretur quo ad nominis interpretationem, non tamen quo
ad quiditatem rei; ideo diffinitio dari debet non per unum nomen tantum, 30
sed per plura nomina. Secunda pars antecedentis etiam est nota, quia, si
diffinitio ydee singularis detur per plura nomina, illa diffinitio se habebit
respectu ydee singularis sicut se haberet diffinitio tui data per animal gres-
sibile aut album, vel aliquo alio modo; constat autem talem diffinitionem
ut probatur om. M Philosophus] Aristoteles Pv duomulta] plura nomina Pv

detur] datur Pv data] date Pv
a Aristotle, De coel., I, 10; 12.

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competere alteri a te; ergo etiam diffinitio ydee singularis, si daretur,

competeret alteri ab illa ydea.
Lege litteram: Nec itaque ydeam nullam esse diffinite. Singularium
enim ydea, ut dicuntur, et separabilis est. Necessarium vero ex nominibus
esse rationem, nomen autem unum solum non faciet diffiniens; ignotum 5
enim erit ipsum diffinitum. Posita autem communia omnibus. Ergo necesse
inesse et alii hec; ut si quis te diffiniat animal dicet gracile aut album, aut
aliud quod in alio sit.a
Ad istam rationem posset aliquis respondere, dicens quod, licet in dif-
finitione ydee singularis ponantur plura nomina, quorum quodlibet est 10
communius quam illa ydea, tamen compositum ex illis nominibus non est
communius, sed proprium illi et convertitur cum illa, et per consequens
competit uni soli. Verbi gratia, si diffiniatur homo per animal gressibile
bipes, eo modo quo ipsum diffinit Philosophus, secundo Posteriorum,b
certum est quod tam animal quam gressibile, quam etiam bipes, com- 15
munius est quam sit homo, tamen totum congregatum convertitur cum
homine et est proprium illi, neque alteri competit, cum omnis homo sit
animal gressibile bipes et econtra. Ita stat quod nomina posita in diffini-
tione ydee singularis, separata sint communia et competant alteri, tamen
coniuncta sunt propria illius ydee et nulli alteri competunt. 20
Lege litteram: Si quis autem dicat nichil prohibere separatim quidem
omnia multis, simul vero huic soli inesse et cetera.c
Contra hanc responsionem arguitur. Hec diffinitio, animal bipes, que
est diffinitio hominis ydealis secundum Platonicos, competit aliis ab
homine ydeali; ergo intentum. 25
68ra M Probatur antecedens. | Nam animal, quod est genus in hac diffinitione,
non tantum competit homini ydeali, sed etiam animali ydeali; similiter,
300ra Pv bipes, | que est differentia in eadem diffinitione, non tantum compe-
tit homini ydeali, sed etiam bipedi ydeali; constat autem quod animal
ydeale et bipes ydeale sunt alia ab homine ydeali; ergo illa diffinitio, 30
animal bipes, competit aliis ab homine ydeali. Et non solum sequitur
hoc inconveniens data diffinitione ydee hominis, quia diffinitio compe-
tit aliis a diffinito, sed etiam sequitur aliud inconveniens, videlicet quod
esse diffinite] est diffinire Moerb. ut MPv] et Moerb. (ut praem. DaOp) aut2]
aliquid add. Moerb. tamen om. Pv et] est Pv competunt scr.] competit MPv
a Aristotle, Met., VII, 15, 1040a814 (AL XXV 3.2, p. 162, lin. 827832). b Aristotle, An. Post.,
II, 13, 96b3035. c Aristotle, Met., VII, 15, 1040a1415 (AL XXV 3.2, p. 162, lin. 832834).
diffinitio non primo competit diffinitoquod est contra naturam diffi-

nitionis: quoniam animal et bipes sunt partes hominis ydealis, ex quo
species componitur ex genere et differentia per eos, et partes sunt priores
toto, et generaliter componentia sunt priora composito, et, ut ostensum
est, illa diffinitio, animal bipes, non tantum competit homini ydeali, sed 5
etiam animali ydeali et bipedi ydeali; ergo illa diffinitio primo competit
generi et differentie quam speciei. Non ergo primum competit diffinito. Et
sic habemus duo inconvenientia data diffinitione ydee. Primum est quod
diffinitio competit aliis a diffinito; secundum quod diffinitio non primo
competit diffinito. 10
Lege litteram: Primum quidem sequitur, quia et ambobus competit,
ut animal bipes animali et bipedi ydeali. Et hoc in supremis quidem ydeis
sequitur inconveniens, et necesse esse priora existentia et partes compositi
quibus competit illa diffinitio, quod est aliud inconveniens.a
Et si amici Platonicorum dicerent quod non sequitur aliquod illorum 15
inconvenientium, eo quod ratio facta fundatur super falso, videlicet quod
genus et differentia sunt separataquod non est verum, contra que-
ritur si aliquod universale est separatum aut nullum. Si nullum, sequitur
quod species non est separataquod est contra Platonicos; si autem ali-
quod universale est separatum, videlicet species, ergo, per idem, genus et 20
differentia sunt separata.
Ista consequentia dupliciter probatur. Et primo sic: quemadmodum
species est prior suo individuo, ita genus et differentia sunt priora specie;
ergo qua ratione separatur species a suo individuo, eadem ratione sepa-
ratur genus et differentia a sua specie. Probatur antecedens, quoniam, 25
sicut posito individuo ponitur species et non econtra, et remota specie
removetur individuum et non econverso, ita posita specie ponitur genus
et differentia, non autem econtra, et remoto genere et differentia remo-
vetur species, et non econtra: prius est enim illud a quo non convertitur
essendi consequentia, ut habetur in Postpredicamentis.b 30
Secundo arguitur eadem consequentia. Nam magis simplicia sunt
magis separata; sed genus et differentia sunt simpliciora specie; ergo
sunt magis separata quam species. Patet consequentia cum maiori. Minor
autem probatur. Nam partes sunt simpliciores toto et componentia sim-
primo] primum Pv secundum] est add. Pv ambobus Pv Moerb.] ambabus M

supremis MPv] sempiternis quidem Moerb. (supremis quidem P1b)
a Aristotle, Met., VII, 15, 1040a1518 (AL XXV 3.2, pp. 162163, lin. 834836). b Aristotle, Cat.,
12, 14a2935.
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pliciora sunt composito; sed genus et differentia sunt partes speciei com-
ponentes speciem; si ergo ydea speciei componitur ex ydeis generis et
differentie, oportet genus et differentiam simpliciora esse, et consequen-
ter magis separata.
Lege litteram: Quin ymmo et separabilia sunt animal et bipes, si homo 5
separabile; aut enim nichil universalium separatur aut ambo separantur,
videlicet genus et differentia. Si quidem ergo nichil, non erit genus preter
species nec species preter individua. Si vero erit aliquid separatum, et diffe-
rentia separata erit cum genere. Deinde quia priora sunt genus et differen-
tia ipso esse speciei, hoc vero, scilicet species, aufertur si auferuntur genus 10
et differentia. Non econtra auferuntur genus et differentia si aufertur spe-
cies. Deinde autem si ex ydeis generis et differentie ydee fiunt speciei, opor-
tet quod genus et differentia simpliciora sint. Minus enim composita sint
ex quibus fiunt aliqua et cetera.a
68rb M Forte ad rationem priorem, probantem diffinitionem hominis ydealis | 15
300rb Pv aliis competere ab homine ydeali, | possent respondere Platonici, dicen-
tes quod, licet animal et bipes separata competant aliis ab homine ydeali,
scilicet animali ydeali et bipedi ydeali, cum sint coniuncta non compe-
tunt nisi homini ydeali, quia animal ydeale non est animal bipes, neque
bipes ydeale est animal bipes, ipse autem homo ydealis est illud quod est 20
animal bipes. Quia ergo diffinitio hominis ydealis non est animal et bipes
separata, sed coniuncta, ideo diffinitio hominis ydealis non competit aliis
neque alteri ab homine ydeali, sed tantum homini ydeali.
Contra hanc responsionem arguit Philosophus quod, data illa, sequitur
aliquam esse ydeam que non predicatur de pluribus neque participatur a 25
multis, sed tantum ab unoquod est contra rationem ydee, sicut est con-
tra rationem universalis quod non predicetur de multis nec participetur a
multis. Et quod illud sequatur arguitur. Nam animal separatum a bipede
de pluribus predicatur, quod autem coniunctum bipedi tantum de uno
predicatur; hoc est quia restringitur et limitatur per illam differentiam que 30
est bipes; ergo bipes non predicatur nisi de uno, videlicet de illo singulari
homine ydeali, cuius dicitur esse differentia. Constat autem quod bipes
est ydea separata, sicut animal et homo, ut probatum est; ergo habetur
intentum.
ergo] igitur Moerb. hoc] hec Moerb. cum] tamen M arguit] arguitur Pv
sequatur] sequitur M
Arguitur ergo sic: animal et bipes necessario de pluribus predicantur,

sive fuerint separata sive coniuncta sint, si quodlibet illorum est ydea; ergo
animal bipes, quod est diffinitio composita ex hiis, de pluribus predicatur;
ergo, si est diffinitio alicuius singularis ydee, oportet quod alteri competat
ab illa ydea. Constat autem quod diffinitio nulli competit alteri a diffinito; 5
Ergo nulla singularis ydea potest diffiniriquod fuit in principio proban-
dum.
Lege litteram: Amplius de multis oportebit et illa predicari ex quibus
ydea, ut animal et bipes. Sin autem, quomodo cognoscetur esse ydea? Erit
enim ydea quedam a multis.a 10
Notandum primo, secundum Commentatorem, commento quin-
quacesimo quarto, quod necesse est ut diffinitiones sint composite
ex nominibus, et qui nescit rem, non ponit ei nomen: nullus enim
ponit ei nomen, quod nescit.b
Hic Commentator probat quod Platonici non potuerunt diffinire ydeas, 15
quia omnis diffinitio componitur ex nominibus; non autem ponitur
nomen alicui nisi illud cognoscatur; constat autem quod Platonici non
cognoverunt ydeas, sicut nec Peripatetici cognoverunt Deum et intelli-
gentias, videlicet secundum proprias quiditates. Ergo non potuerunt dif-
finire ydeas. 20
Ex isto commento sequitur primo quod primus impositor imposuit
nomina rebus quas novit. Secundo sequitur quod ille qui imposuit nomina
significare secundum quod huiusmodi non fuit grammaticus, quoniam
rerum proprietates a quibus nomina rebus notis imponuntur ipse gram-
maticus non cognoscit, sed magis fuit metaphisicus, qui de omnibus con- 25
siderat et omnia aliqualiter novit, ut patuit in prologo huius.c
mento, quod nomina accepta in diffinitionibus sunt nomina com-
munia omnibus rebus diffinitis, et cum fuerint hec nomina que
significant de entibus dispositiones communes, sed ex una re, ne- 30
cesse est ut ista res disponatur per aliam rem et hoc modo est
possibile substantiam predicari de substantia.d
competit] competat M quarto corr.] tertio MPv qui scr. ex Iunt.] quia MPv
notandum secundo inv. Pv fuerint hec nomina] hec nomina fuerint M hec]
hic Iunt. hoc] hoc add. Iunt.
VII, t.c. 54, fol. 202M. c Aristotle, Met., I, 2, 982a810 et passim. d Averroes, In Met., VII, t.c.
54, fol. 202M203A.
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Iterum, probat Commentator quod ydee non possunt diffiniri. Primo,

quia omnis diffinitio datur per nomina communia; quelibet autem ydea
est res singularis; ergo et cetera. Si enim distinguitur Tullius per hoc quod
est Marcus et Cicero, quia illa sunt nomina propria synonima, diffini-
tio bona esse non potest, quia non declarat quiditatem diffiniti. Ex quo 5
enim diffinitio est principium et medium demonstrationis, si in demon-
300va Pv stratione non accipiuntur nomina synonima, ut inquit Commentator | in
prologo Phisicorum,a nec etiam in diffinitione. Si autem Tullius diffinitur
68va M per nomina communia, | certum est quod illa diffinitio competit alteri ab
illo, quod est contra naturam diffinitionis. 10
Item, genus et differentia, ex quibus fit diffinitio, accipiuntur ex eadem
re, licet aliter et aliter considerata, propter quod substantia predicatur de
substantia, et genus ac differentia predicatur de diffinito; sed datis ydeis
non accipiuntur ex eadem re genus et differentia, sed ex diversis rebus, ita
quod species, genus et differentia sunt tres ydee realiter differentes, qua- 15
rum una disponitur per aliam, scilicet genus per differentiam, et ambe
simul sunt partes speciei. Constat autem quod, ubi est differentia realis,
nullum illorum de altero predicatur; ergo nec genus nec differentia predi-
catur de speciequod est impossibile.
quod ista positio in rebus sensibilibus est necessaria in suis exem-
plaribus eternis, scilicet ut inveniatur ex eis in uno exemplari
numero plus quam unum exemplar in rebus que sunt partes exem-
plares. Verbi gratia, ut in homine separato sit animal separatum
et ambulans et bipes, et universaliter forme ex quibus componitur 25
homo.b
Iterum, probat Commentator quod ydee non possunt diffiniri, quia, dato
illo, sequitur primo quod in uno exemplari numero sunt plura exemplaria
numero que sunt partes illius, quoniam in specie sunt genus et differen-
tia, que sunt partes eius. Constat autem, secundum Platonicos, quod tam 30
genus quam differentia quam specie est unum exemplar numero, quo-
niam quodlibet illorum est ydea; modo omnem ydeam dicebant Platonici
esse unum exemplar.
Secundo sequitur quod in homine separato sunt multa separata que
sunt partes eius, quod implicat contradictionem, quia, eo ipso quod ali- 35
et om. Pv notandum tertio inv. Pv sensibilibus] insensibilibus Iunt.
a Averroes, In Phys., I, t.c. 1, fol. 6B. b Averroes, In Met., VII, t.c. 54, fol. 203BC.
quid est pars alicuius, illud non est separatum. Et quod illud sequatur est
manifestum, quoniam quelibet pars diffinitionis est in suo diffinito; ergo
quelibet pars diffinitionis hominis est in homine separato; sed animal,
gressibile et bipes sunt partes diffinitionis hominis; ergo sunt in homine
separato. Similiter, substantia, corporeum et animatum et sensitivum et 5
rationale sunt partes diffinitionis hominis; ergo omnia ista sunt in homine
separato; constat autem omnia ista esse separata, si homo est separatus,
quia, ut probatum est, tam genus quam differentia est separata, si species
est separata; ergo et cetera.
Notandum quarto, secundum Commentatorem, eodem commento, 10
quod quando diffinitur dispositio duobus nominibus, scilicet
genere et differentia, si due dispositiones fuerint adunite, tunc genus
non erit aliud a differentia, et si fuerint diverse et non fuerint unius
rei, apparebit quod differentia precedat genus in esse.a
Iterum, probat Commentator quod ydee diffiniri non possunt quoniam, 15
cum quelibet diffinitio componatur ex genere et differentia, queritur
utrum genus et differentia sint una et eadem res, aut sint res diverse. Si una
et eadem res, ergo ydea generis non est alia ab ydea differentiequod est
falsum, quia, sicut genus et differentia sunt diversa universalia predicabi-
lia, ita sunt diverse ydee. Si autem dicatur quod genus et differentia sunt 20
diverse res, sequitur quod differentia est prior generequod est falsum,
quia differentia advenit generi et est minoris communitatis quam genus;
ergo est posterior. Et quod illud sequatur ostenditur, quoniam corruptibi-
lia et perpetua se habent modo contrario: in rebus enim corruptibilibus
materia precedit formam et potentia actum, aliter non educeretur forma 25
de potentia materie; in rebus autem perpetuis forma precedit materiam
et actus precedit potentiam, propter quod dicit Commentator, primo Phi-
300vb Pv sicorum,b quod intelligentie | precedunt corpora celestia et sustentant ea.
Sed ydee sunt perpetue secundum Platonicos, et differentia se habet ut
68vb M actus | et forma, genus autem est tamquam potentia et materia; ergo dif- 30
ferentia est prior genere.
Notandum quinto, secundum Commentatorem eodem commento,
quod forme et dispositiones congregate in diffinitione non sunt ex
animal] et add. Pv substantia] et add. Pv notandum quarto inv. Pv quando]

quoniam non Iunt. nominibus om. Iunt. adunite] adunate Iunt. fuerint1 om.
Iunt. si] sint add. Pv dicatur] dicitur Pv notandum quinto inv. Pv
a Averroes, In Met., VII, t.c. 54, fol. 203D. b Averroes, In Phys., I, t.c. 63, fol. 38F.
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rebus que differunt a seinvicem, scilicet que omnes sunt in actu,

sed sunt ex dispositionibus, quarum quedam sunt ad perficiendum
quasdam, et ideo possunt predicari de se adinvicem et quod congre-
gatum ex eis sit unum. Et hoc impossibile est in exemplaribus et in
rebus quarum sunt exemplaria, sed hoc est solummodo possibile in 5
universalibus, que non habent esse sicut esse rerum que sunt extra
animam, neque sunt etiam deficientes.a
Iterum, probat Commentator quod ydee non possunt diffiniri, quoniam
genus et differentia, que sunt forme et dispositiones ex quibus fit diffi-
nitio, non debent esse plura in actu distincta et separata, sed debent esse 10
dispositiones, quarum una alteram perficit, et faciunt unum in actu et pre-
dicantur de seinvicem; constat autem quod in ydeis non inveniuntur iste
conditiones, quia ydee sunt exemplaria separata, et ex hoc nulla earum est
dispositio alterius neque de seinvicem predicantur neque faciunt unum;
ergo et cetera. Sed universalia que non habent esse separatum extra ani- 15
mam, sed coniunctum singularibus, quibus numquam deficiunt, sunt illa
que vere diffiniuntur, quoniam partes suarum diffinitionum habent con-
ditiones nominatas: nam genus et differentia, que constituunt diffinitio-
nem universalis existentis in suis singularibus, sunt multa in potentia et
unum in actu, et differentia est dispositio generis, et quodlibet illorum de 20
altero predicatur.
Et si instatur, quia dicit Philosophus, tertio huius,b quod genus et dif-
ferentia non de seinvicem predicantur, quia utriusque illorum ratio est
extra rationem alterius, respondetur quod de seinvicem predicantur non
per se, sed per accidens, ratione speciei de qua ambo predicantur per se, ut 25
se ipsum exponit Philosophus, ibidem. Genus ergo et differentia de sein-
vicem predicantur predicatione identica et non formali. Potest tamen dici
quod Commentator dicit illud non ex intentione sua, sed quia sic videtur
sonare littera quam exponit. Propterea statim subiungit in eodem com-
mento: Videtur michi quod sit error in libro in quo deberet scribi,c ita 30
quod illa particula est addita propter vitium scriptoris.
Notandum sexto, secundum Commentatorem, eodem commento,
quod forme diverse in esse in exemplaribus non declarant se adin-
vicem, scilicet quod illa que est magis particularis non declarat
a seinvicem M Iunt.] a se adinvicem Pv deficientes] definientes Iunt. conditio-

nes] dispositiones M seinvicem] invicem Pv notandum sexto inv. Pv
a Averroes, In Met., VII, t.c. 54, fol. 203DE. b Aristotle, Met., III, 3, 998b2426. c Averroes,
In Met., VII, t.c. 54, fol. 203D.

naturam universalis, sicut est dispositio differentie cum genere, quo-

niam, si in homine separato est pars ex separatione animalitatis et
rationalitatis, tunc rationalitas non distinguit animalitatem hominis
ab animalitate simplici, sicut accidit hic in diffinito.a
Iterum, probat Commentator quod ydee non possunt diffiniri, quoniam 5
omnis diffinitio componitur ex duabus naturis, quarum una est magis
universalis et alia minus universalis, et illa que est minus universalis decla-
rat et distinguit naturam magis universalem; sed nulla ydea potest aliam
declarare seu distinguere; ergo ex nullis ydeis potest componi diffinitio.
Prima pars antecedentis est nota, quia in qualibet diffinitione ponitur 10
genus et differentia, et genus est natura magis universalis quam diffe-
rentia, quia universalius est animal quam bipes et rationale, et differen-
tia declarat et distinguit naturam generis: nam de animali accepto sine
differentia habetur conceptus confusus. Cum autem additur differentia,
301ra Pv dicendo animal rationale, iam habetur conceptus distinctus, et scitur | 15
69ra M quod animalitas | que est in homine est rationalis, et quod illa que est in
equo est irrationalis, et quod ista diffinitio distinguitur ab illa, non quod
sint due animalitates, sed quod animalitas ut est in homine non est ani-
malitas ut est in equo.
Secunda pars autem declaratur, quoniam intelligentia lune non decla- 20
rat nec distinguit intelligentiam solis, et hoc ideo, quia sunt due nature
separate realiter differentes. Ita ydea rationalitatis numquam declarabit
neque distinguet ydeam animalitatis, quamvis minus communis sit ratio-
nalitas quam animalitas, ex eo quia sunt due nature separate tam re quam
ratione differentes. 25
Ex predictis in fine eiusdem commenti infert Commentator, dicens:
Universalia impossibile est ut sint substantie nec exemplarium neque
sensibilium, et quod etiam non sint deficientes omnino, quoniam tunc
non esset scientia, ac etiam in entibus non inveniretur identitas nec
oppositio.b 30
Non sunt ergo universalia que sint substantie separate, neque exem-
plarium, scilicet genus et differentia, neque sensibilium, videlicet species.
Non tamen propter hoc deficient universalia omnino; ymmo necesse est
ponere universalia, non quidem separata neque per se existentia, sed
seu] neque Pv diffinitio] diffinitur Pv omnino scr. ex Iunt.] omnia MPv

ac] et Pv Iunt.
a Averroes, In Met., VII, t.c. 54, fol. 203EF. b Averroes, In Met., VII, t.c. 54, fol. 203F.
502 pauli veneti
coniuncta singularibus quorum dicuntur forme, quia, si non essent huius-

modi universalia, sequerentur tria inconvenientia.
Primum: quod de rebus sensibilibus non haberetur scientia, eo quod
scientia est necessariorum et incorruptibilium, singularia autem sensibi-
lia omnia sunt contingentia et corruptibilia. 5
Secundum inconveniens: quod nulla esset identitas in rebus sensibili-
bus, quia omnis identitas illorum est identitas generica vel specifica vel
numeralis. Non autem esset identitas generica vel specifica, si non essent
genera et species; non etiam esset identitas numeralis, quia in rebus sen-
sibilibus quicquid est idem numero sibi ipsi, oportet quod sit idem specie 10
aut genere cum alio.
Tertium inconveniens est quod in rebus sensibilibus nulla esset oppo-
sitio, quoniam, sicut non datur disconvenientia absque convenientia,
ut habetur quinto huius,a ita non datur oppositio neque distinctio abs-
que identitate. Sicut enim omnis multitudo presupponit identitatem, ita 15
omnis oppositio et omnis distinctio presupponit identitatem; sed osten-
sum est quod in rebus sensibilibus non esset identitas, si non essent
universalia in illis; ergo, consimiliter, in eis nulla esset oppositio neque
distinctio remotis omnino universalibus.
Circa dicta dubitatur utrum universale coniunctum singularibus dif- 20
finiatur secundum esse quod habet in anima aut secundum esse quod
habet extra animam. Et arguitur quod secundum esse quod habet in
anima, quia diffinitio est ratio indicans quod quid est rei, per Aristote-
lem, primo Topicorum;b sed ipsum quod quid est intellectus est obiectum,
secundum Philosophum et Commentatorem, tertio De anima;c ergo uni- 25
versale diffinitur secundum quod est aptum natum innotescere intellec-
tum, et per consequens diffinitur secundum esse quod habet in anima.
In oppositum arguitur sic: diffinitio est rerum particularium extra ani-
mam, per Commentatorem in prologo De anima,d et est de rebus sensibili-
bus, per eundem, secundo De anima;e ergo, si universale diffinitur, oportet 30
quod diffiniatur secundum esse quod habet extra animam.
Respondetur quod, si per esse in anima intelligitur esse obiectivum
et per esse extra animam intelligitur esse existentie, sic non diffinitur
sequerentur] sequuntur M vel2] aut Pv ut habetur om. M ipsum scr.] ipsius

MPv secundo Pv, s.l. M
a Aristotle, Met., V, 9, 1018a1215. b Aristotle, Top., I, 101b38. c Aristotle, De an., III, 430b27
30; Averroes, In De an., III, t.c. 26, pp. 463, 4464, 40. d Averroes, In De an., I, t.c. 8, p. 12,
2125. e In truth, Averroes, In De an., I, t.c. 8, p. 12, 3032.
universale secundum esse quod habet in anima neque secundum esse

quod habet extra animam, quia utrumque esse accidit universali. Nec
sequitur: necessario diffinitur secundum esse quod habet in anima aut
secundum esse quod habet extra animam, sicut non sequitur: necessario
omnis linea est recta vel curva, ergo linea diffinitur secundum quod est 5
301rb Pv recta vel curva. Si autem accipitur esse extra animam per esse | essentie,
sic diffinitur universale secundum esse quod habet extra animam. Et
non sequitur: diffinitio indicat quid est esse rei; sed obiectum intellectus
69rb M est ipsum | quod quid est; ergo universale diffinitur secundum quod est
obiectum intellectus, sicut non sequitur: homo diffinitur; et homo est 10
risibilis; ergo homo diffinitur secundum quod est risibilis.
Item, universale sumitur dupliciter, scilicet sub intentione prima et sub
intentione secunda. Universale sumptum sub intentione prima non diffi-
nitur secundum esse quod habet in anima neque secundum esse quod
habet in supposito, sed absolute, secundum esse suum quiditativum et 15
essentiale, ut homo, equus et huiusmodi. Universale autem sumptum sub
intentione secunda diffinitur utroque modo, iuxta doctrinam Aristotelis,
dicentis, primo Posteriorum:a Universale est unum in multis et de multis.
Isti ergo conceptus secunde intentionis, videlicet genus, species, univer-
sale et huiusmodi, diffinitione data a priori diffiniuntur per esse quod 20
habent extra animam in suppositis, sed a posteriori diffiniuntur per esse
obiectivum quod habent in anima.
Quemadmodum ergo h1040a27ssi.
Tertia conclusio: nullum individuum materiale adequatum speciei
potest diffiniri. 25
Ex quo in prima conclusione ostensum est quod nullum individuum
sensibile corruptibile potest diffiniri, in secunda autem quod nullum indi-
viduum intelligibile incorruptibile potest diffiniri, consequens est quod
in hac tertia probetur quod nullum individuum materiale incorruptibile
possit diffiniri, ut universaliter cognoscatur nullum individuum quali- 30
tercumque sumptum posse diffiniri. Quando enim plura individua sunt
sub una specie, statim apparet aliqua alietas speciei ab unoquoque suo-
rum individuorum, et ex hoc apparet quod non oportet individuum dif-
finiri, si species diffinitur. Quando autem tota species salvatur in unico
anima] neque secundum esse quod habet in anima add. M diffinitur] duobus
modis sive add. M dicentis om. M

504 pauli veneti
individuo nec potest esse extra illud, non apparet differentia inter spe-
ciem et individuum, sicut est sol et luna; et tunc videtur quod, si spe-
cies diffinitur, [quod] etiam individuum diffiniatur. Hoc ergo impossibile,
videlicet individuum diffiniri. Et si in quibusdam est manifestum, ubi
plura individua sunt eiusdem speciei, in quibusdam vero latet, videlicet in 5
summis individuis, quando unius speciei est tantum unum individuum.
Lege litteram: Quemadmodum ergo dictum est de ydeis et de aliis
intelligibilibus, latet quod impossibile est individuum diffinire in supremis,
maxime vero quecumque unica sunt sub una specie, ut sol et luna.a
Ista conclusio arguitur sic: si talia individua diffiniuntur, aut ergo per 10
predicata accidentalia aut per predicata substantialia; sed nullo istorum
modorum; ergo et cetera. Quod nullo istorum modorum ostendit Philo-
sophus, et primo quod non per predicata accidentalia, quoniam, si per
predicata accidentalia, committitur duplex peccatum, quorum primum
est quod diffinitio non convertitur cum diffinito suo, quoniam posito diffi- 15
nito non propter hoc ponitur diffinitio, et remota diffinitione non propter
hoc removetur diffinitum: verbi gratia, ut si aliquis diffiniret solem sicut
quidam antiqui eum diffiniebant, dicentes quod sol est astrum girans ter-
ram aut quod est astrum nocte absconditum, certum est quod remota
diffinitione non propter hoc removetur diffinitum. Si enim sol staret aut 20
appareret de nocte, non minus sol esset sol: absurdum enim est dicere
quod sol non est sol, si quiescit absque motu aut si apparet de nocte.
Secundum peccatum est quod substantia diffinitur per accidentia, quo-
niam sol est quedam substantia, girare autem et absconditum esse sunt
accidentia. Ostensum est enim supra quod substantia non diffinitur per 25
accidentia, sed econtra accidentia diffiniuntur per substantiam: remota
enim substantia removentur accidentia, non autem remotis accidentibus
removetur substantia.
Lege litteram: Non solum enim peccat additione talium accidentium
quibus ablatis adhuc erit sol, puta terram girans aut nocte absconditum; si 30
301va Pv enim steterit aut apparuerit, non tollitur quin | adhuc erit sol. Sed absur-
69va M dum si non erit sol propter re-|-motionem talium accidentium. Sol enim
substantiam quandam significat;b ideo non diffiniri debet per accidentia.
inter scr.] extra MPv quod secl. ubi] videlicet Pv vero] tamen Pv diffinito
suo inv. Pv
15, 1040a2933 (AL XXV 3.2, p. 163, lin. 848852).

Secundo arguitur quod talia individua diffiniri non possunt per predi-
cata substantialia, quoniam diffinitio alicuius non debet competere alteri
ab illo; constat autem quod diffinitio talis posset competere alteri ab isto
sole. Si enim esset alius sol, ita de illo predicaretur sol univoce, sicut iam
predicatur de isto, quoniam iste et ille essent eiusdem speciei individua, 5
sicut Sortes et Cleon, et per consequens eadem esset diffinitio communis
isti et illi, sicut iam eadem est diffinitio communis Sorti et Cleoni. Licet
ergo sol iam non habeat plura supposita, tamen potest habere, et si non
potest habere ex ordine universi, non tamen sibi repugnat habere suppo-
sita plura. 10
Lege litteram: Amplius quecumque in alio contingere possunt illa non
diffiniunt illud, ut si alter fiat talis, palam quia sol eis communis; ergo ratio
et diffinitio erit utriusque. Sed erat singularium sol iste qui iam est, ut Cleon
aut Socrates et cetera.a
Notandum, secundum Commentatorem, commento quinquace- 15
simo quinto, quod qui nituntur diffinire solem et lunam peccant,
quia diffiniunt solem per res que, cum auferuntur, non aufertur sol:
dicebant enim solem esse astrum latens de nocte Et etiam , si
haberet diffinitionem, esset ex diffinitionibus, que, si essent in alio
demonstrato, illud aliud esset sol; et secundum hoc hoc nomen sol 20
significaret plures soles.b
Ista est ratio Commentatoris: omnis diffinitio convertitur cum suo diffi-
nito; sed si diffiniretur iste sol, sua diffinitio non converteretur cum suo
diffinito, quia aut diffiniretur per predicata, quibus remotis, non remove-
tur sol, eo modo quo antiqui diffiniverunt, dicentes sol est astrum latens 25
de nocte, et sic nullum est dubium quod diffinitio non convertitur cum
suo diffinito; aut diffiniretur per predicata, quibus remotis, removeretur
sol, et iterum non converteretur diffinitio cum diffinito, quia posset alteri
competere. Quia ergo diffinitio, proprie loquendo, datur per formam, et
non repugnat forme in pluribus reperiri, talis diffinitio data de sole aut 30
luna erit diffinitio speciei et non individui.
Contra predicta arguitur quod nulla species potest salvari in unico indi-
viduo. Et primo sic: de ratione totius est habere plures partes; sed species
posset competere inv. Pv Cleon] Plato M Cleoni] Platoni M contingere]

contingunt Moerb. (contingere P1b) eis] erit Moerb. quinto corr.] quarto MPv
quia] quoniam Pv Iunt.
VII, t.c. 55, fol. 204CD.
506 pauli veneti
est quoddam totum cuius individua sunt partes, per Porphyrium, in Uni-
versalibus;a ergo et cetera. Si glossatur maior, dicendo quod totum non
requirit plures partes in actu, sed sufficit quod potentia vel aptitudine,
contra: relativa posita se ponunt et perempta se perimunt, per Aristote-
lem, in Predicamentis;b sed totum et partes sunt correlativa, per Philoso- 5
phum, quinto huius;c ergo si totum est in actu, oportet quod partes sint in
actu.
Secundo arguitur: sicut genus se habet ad speciem, ita species ad indi-
viduum; sed non salvatur genus in unica sua specie; ergo nec species in
unico suo individuo. Tenet consequentia cum maiori a sufficienti simili- 10
tudine, quia, sicut species est pars subiectiva generis, ita individuum est
pars subiectiva speciei. Minor vero declaratur, eo quod genus eque primo
dividitur per differentias contrarias; et differentia adveniens generi con-
stituit speciem; ergo non est ratio quare magis salvabitur genus in unica
specie constituta per unam differentiam quam in alia constituta per aliam 15
differentiam.
Item, hec videtur esse intentio Porphyrii,d dicentis quod species predi-
catur de pluribus differentibus numero; ac etiam Aristoteles dicit, primo
Posteriorum:e Universale est unum in multis et de multis. Constat autem
quod species est universale, sicut genus. 20
Pro solutione huius difficultatis sit hec prima distinctio, quod uni-
versale potest tripliciter considerari, videlicet secundum esse intentio-
301vb Pv nale anime, | secundum esse reale essentie et secundum esse reale exis-
69vb M tentie. | Primis duobus modis species non requirit aliquod individuum,
quoniam intellectus abstrahit speciem a quolibet suorum individuorum, 25
neque individuum aliquod pertinet ad essentiam speciei. Unde, nulla rosa
existente, est essentia et quiditas specifica rose, non tamen est aliquod
individuum illius speciei. Considerando autem universale tertio modo, sic
species requirit individuum non solum in potentia sed in actu, quoniam
esse existentie speciei sumitur ab actualitate speciei. 30
Secunda distinctio: quod rerum corruptibilium sunt duo genera. Nam
quedam generantur per propagationem, et quedam per putrefactionem.
In generatis per propagationem, species requirit multa supposita in actu
vero om. M constituta12 scr.] constitutiva MPv sumitur] accipitur Pv

quod] quia Pv
a Porphyry, Isag., c. De specie (AL I 67, p. 14, 89). b Aristotle, Cat., 6, 7b158a12.
c Aristotle, Met., V, 11, 1019a414. d Porphyry, Isag., c. De specie (AL I 67, p. 9, 67).
e Aristotle, An. Post., I, 11, 77a59.
ad hoc quod continuetur in esse. In generatis autem per putrefactionem,

non requirit species multa in actu simul, sed solum successive, ut patet de
fenice. In hiis tamen non repugnat speciei actualis simultas individuorum,
ut patet in muscis et vermibus; hoc tamen non est necessarium speciei.
Tertia distinctio est quod incorruptibilium duo sunt genera, scilicet 5
materialium et immaterialium: corpora celestia incorruptibilia sunt, sed
materialia; intelligentie vero sunt incorruptibiles et immateriales. Quia
ergo talia corrumpi non possunt, neque per se neque per accidens, et Deus
ac natura nichil facit frustra, ideo species talium salvantur in unico indi-
viduo: si enim unicum individuum potest perficiere omne operationem 10
speciei et potest attingere quemlibet finem illius, propterea non datur
nisi unus sol, neque apparet nisi una luna. Verumptamen, licet huiusmodi
species salventur in unico individuo, eis tamen non repugnat multitudo
individuorum: quelibet enim forma, quantum est de se, nata est in pluri-
bus inveniri. Quod autem non inveniatur, hoc est aliunde, aut quia illa 15
forma occupat totam materiam illius speciei, sicut contingit de sole et
luna, aut quia nullam materiam habet, sicut contingit de intelligentiis
separatis.
Ad primum dicitur quod duplex est totum, videlicet universale et inte-
grale: totum universale non indiget nisi una parte in actu; totum autem 20
integrale indiget multis. Ideo totum universale relatione actuali refertur
ad unum, sed relatione aptitudinali refertur ad multa; totum autem inte-
grale relatione actuali necessario refertur ad multa.
Ad secundum dicitur quod non est similitudo, quia genus descendit
in species per differentias formales, species autem descendit in individua 25
per differentias materiales, ut habetur tertio huius.a Respondetur tamen
quod, sicut species salvatur in unico solo suo individuo, ita genus in unica
specie, sed non perpetuo. Quod enim genus sit aptum natum habere ali-
quam speciem et numquam habeat illam speciem in actu, est impossibile,
quoniam genus dividitur per differentias contrarias, per Philosophum in 30
hoc septimo;b modo, si unum contrariorum est in rerum natura, et reli-
quum, ut habetur primo Celi.c Et auctoritates Aristotelis et Porphyriid sunt
intelligende cum verbo importante aptitudinem et non actum: species
enim predicatur de pluribus, idest apta nata est predicare de pluribus;
ut patet] utque Pv rerum om. Pv et reliquum om. Pv
a Possibly, the claim is drawn from Aristotle, Met., III, 3, 998b17994a14. b Aristotle, Met.,
VII, 12, 1037b1921; 1038a918. c In truth, Aristotle, De coel., II, 3, 286a2324. d Cf. Aristotle,
An. Post., I, 11, 77a59; Porphyry, Isag., c. De specie (AL I 67, p. 9, 67).
508 pauli veneti
universale est unum in multis et de multis, idest aptum natum est esse in
multis et predicari de multis.
Quapropter nullus h1040b2ssi.
Quarta conclusio: ydee nullo modo possunt diffiniri.
Ista conclusio sequitur ex dictis. Si enim possunt diffiniri, aut ergo ydee 5
singulares aut ydee universales. Non ydee singulares, quia, ut demon-
stratum est in tribus primis conclusionibus, nullum individuum potest
diffiniri. Non etiam ydee universales, quia non ydee generum et diffe-
rentiarum, ex quo genus et differentia non diffiniuntur; non etiam ydee
specierum, quia, cum species componatur ex genere et differentia, una 10
ydea componeretur ex multis ydeisquod est impossibile, ut manifeste
ostendunt rationes Aristotelis et Commentatoris in tertia conclusione.
Lege litteram: Quapropter nullus istorum Platonicorum terminum,
302ra Pv idest diffinitionem, proferret || ydee? Fiet utique manifestum temptantibus
70ra M quia verum quod modo dictum est, videlicet nullam ydeam posse diffi- 15
niri.a
simo quinto, quod si hoc nomen esset nomen speciei, tunc essent
plura individua similia,b ita quod, si ydea esset nomen speciei, tunc
in eadem specie possent esse plures ydee consimiles, solo numero 20
differentescuius oppositum dixerunt Platonici.
Contra predicta arguitur quod singularium est diffinitio. Primo, quia diffi-
nitio est ratio indicans essentiam rei; sed sola singularia habent essentiam
rei, quia non est essentia extra singularia; ergo et cetera.
Secundo: solius substantie est diffinitio, per Philosophum in hoc sep- 25
timo;c sed universale secundum quod universale est accidens, ut patuit;
ergo universalis non est diffinitio, et per consequens solius singularis est
diffinitio.
Tertio: diffinitio aut est universalis secundum quod singulare aut
secundum quod universale. Si primum, habetur intentum; si secundum, 30
ergo solius accidentis est diffinitiocuius oppositum est probatum in hoc
septimo.d
esse] unum add. Pv quapropter] quoniam propter quid Moerb. istorum]

ipsorum Pv Moerb. proferret] profert Moerb. fiet] enim add. Moerb. quinto
corr.] quarto MPv
t.c. 55, fol. 204D. c Aristotle, Met., VII, 4, 1030a314; 5, 1031a15; 13, 1039a1921. d Aristotle,
Met., VII, 5, 1031a15; 13, 1039a1921.

Quarto: singularibus debetur aliqua cognitio. Aut ergo sensitiva aut

intellectiva. Non sensitiva, quia ipsa est qualitatum sensibilium. Si intel-
lectiva, aut ergo demonstratio vel diffinitio.
In oppositum arguitur sic: diffinitio est solum incorruptibilium et
eorum que cadunt sub arte aut sub scientia; singularia autem aut sunt cor- 5
ruptibilia aut non cadunt sub arte neque sub scientia, quia sunt infinita.
Respondetur quod, cum diffinitio detur causa innotescendi, oportet
quod exprimat principia rei; hoc autem fieri non potest uno solo nomine,
ex quo principia sunt plura; ergo singulare, si diffinitur, oportet suam dif-
finitionem constare ex multis nominibus. Aut ergo illa nomina erunt sin- 10
gularia aut communia: si singularia, dicendo Sortes est hoc animal et hoc
rationale, cum hec omnia invicem convertantur, patet quod non expri-
muntur principia Sortis; si autem fuerint nomina communia, diffinitio
composita poterit alteri convenire; ergo non est diffinitio singularis. Et
ex hoc est manifestum quod congregatio multorum accidentium non est 15
principium individuationis, quia, et si solum in uno reperiantur illa acci-
dentia congregata, in pluribus tamen apta nata sunt inveniri. Sicut ergo
singulare per se generatur et universale per accidens, ita econtra univer-
sale per se diffinitur, singulare autem per accidens.
Ad primum negatur quod sola singularia habeant essentiam, quia uni- 20
versalia etiam habent essentiam. Et non sequitur: nulla essentia est extra
singularia, ergo sola singularia habent essentiam, sicut non sequitur: nulla
quantitas est extra materiam, ergo sola materia habet quantitatem.
Ad secundum respondetur quod, licet universale secundum quod uni-
versale sit accidens, tamen natura subiecta universalitati est substantia, 25
et illa est que diffinitur; sicut licet risibile, vel disciplinabile, secundum
quod huiusmodi sit accidens, videlicet in concreto, tamen subiectum illa-
rum passionum est homo, qui est pura substantia et diffinitur.
Ad tertium respondetur quod universale acceptum sub prima inten-
tione diffinitur, et non secundum quod universale neque secundum quod 30
singulare: homo enim ut homo diffinitur, et non ut universale neque ut
singulare. Universale autem acceptum sub intentione secunda diffinitur
secundum quod est universale, et sic diffinitur secundum quod est acci-
dens et non secundum quod est substantia.
incorruptibilium scr.] corruptibilium MPv cadunt sub arte] sub arte cadunt M
aut2 om. Pv infinita] ergo add. Pv exprimat scr.] exprimet MPv convenire]
competere Pv nata om. M habeant] habent M est2 om. Pv est om. Pv
510 pauli veneti
Ad quartum respondetur quod non solum datur singulare predica-

menti substantie, sed etiam predicamentorum accidentium, et quod sin-
gularibus accidentium debetur cognitio sensitiva exterior, singularibus
vero predicamenti substantie debetur cognitio sensitiva interior, quo-
niam estimativa cognoscit intentiones omnium predicamentorum, ut tes- 5
tatur Commentator, secundo De anima.a Omnibus vero singularibus, tam
substantialibus quam accidentalibus, debetur cognitio intellectiva, non
quidem que sit diffinitio vel demonstratio, sed simplex intellectio singu-
laris atque discreta.
hCAPITULUM IIIi 10
302rb Pv Manifestum autem h1040b5ssi.

Istud est tertium capitulum huius tractatus, in quo Philosophus osten-
dit quosdam errores Platonicorum, postquam ostendit quod non sunt uni-
70rb M versalia | separata sicut estimabant.
Dividitur autem istud capitulum in tres partes, in quarum prima Phi- 15
losophus facit quod dictum est; in secunda probat quod ens et unum,
universaliter accepta, non sunt substantie rerum, ibi: Quoniam vero unum
h1040b16ssi; in tertia manifestat ea in quibus bene et in quibus male
locuti sunt Platonici, ibi: Sed species dicentes h1040b27ssi.
In prima parte Philosophus ostendit duos illorum errores, quorum pri- 20
mus fuit quod, non distinguentes inter ea que sunt concepta cum materia
et que non sunt concepta cum materia, crediderunt omnia communia
in substantia habere separatum essequod est falsum, quoniam partes
animalium habent communitates in substantia, ut pes, manus, oculus et
huiusmodi, et tamen non possunt habere separatum esse, quia non pos- 25
sunt esse nisi partes in potentia constituentes totum. Si enim tales partes
separantur ab animali, immediate amittunt nomen et diffinitionem, ita
quod manus separata non est manus, nec pes separatus est pes, nisi equi-
voce. Quam primo enim facta est separatio, tam primo est corrupta forma
substantialis dans nomen et diffinitionem, et resolvitur in materiam ele- 30
mentarem, que sunt terra et aqua, ignis et aer: certum enim est quod, facta
separatione manus aut pedis, una pars resolvitur in terram, alia in aquam,
in1 om. M animalium] aliquando M pes manus inv. Pv oculus] nasus

add. Pv terram] et add. Pv
a Averroes, In De an., II, t.c. 63, p. 225, 4445.

alia in aerem et alia in ignem, cum numquam amplius talis pars possit
reuniri toti animali, sicut nec forna corrupta potest regenerari.
Lege litteram: Manifestum est autem quod substantiarum estimata-
rum esse plures potestate sunt, ut partes animalium. Nichil enim separatum
ipsorum est. Quando autem separata fuerint, tunc entia ut materia omnia 5
elementa fiunt, scilicet terra, ignis et aer.a
Sed contra hoc posset aliquis instare, dicens quod, sicut partes sunt
potentia in animali, ita elementa sunt potentia in mixto; sed elementa que
sunt in mixto possunt habere actum separatum, eo quod, sicut mixtum
componitur ex elementis, ita resolvitur in elementa; ergo, per idem, partes 10
que sunt in animali possunt habere actum separatum, ita quod, facta
separatione, manent sub suis formis sicut elementa.
Respondet Philosophus, dicens quod non est similitudo, quia ex ele-
mentis non fit unum mixtum nisi prius alterentur ad seinvicem et refran-
gantur, ita quod ante refractionem non fit unum nisi per congregationem, 15
eo modo quo cumulus lapidum aut lignorum dicitur esse unum; post vero
refractionem fit unum ex eis, in quantum omnibus formis elementorum
advenit una forma mixti. Ex partibus autem animalis fit unum animal, non
quidem per alterationem et refractionem illarum partium, sed ex ipsis
integris et solidis et adinvicem convenientibus. 20
Lege litteram: Nichil enim ipsorum elementorum cum alio unum est,
nisi ut cumulus, antequam dirigatur, idest frangatur, et fiat aliquid ex ipsis
unum.b
simo sexto, quod partes animalis non habent unum per quod sunt 25
substantie, cum sint distincte ab animali, sed sunt apud dimensio-
nes, sicut partes que sunt in generatione, scilicet quarum esse non
302va Pv perficitur donec adiungantur adinvicem et fiat ex eis una | substan-
tia, quam significat nomen et diffinitio.c
Intendit Commentator quod, sicut partes elementorum, ex quibus debet 30
generari mixtum, nullam formam mixti habent quamdiu sunt separate,
toti animali om. M substantiarum Pv Moerb.] formarum M estimatarum esse

inv. Moerb. plures] plurime Pv Moerb. ut partes animalium add. mg. Pv] et unum
quod actu M (scr. et del. Pv) : et ipse partes animalium Moerb. (et Si, ut cet.) dirigatur]
digeratur Moerb. sexto corr.] quinto MPv dimensiones] divisionem Iunt.
quarum corr. ex Iunt.] quorum MPv
a Aristotle, Met., VII, 16, 1040b58 (AL XXV 3.2, p. 163164, lin. 857860). b Aristotle,
Met., VII, 16, 1040b810 (AL XXV 3.2, p. 164, lin. 860862). c Averroes, In Met., VII, t.c.
56, fol. 204HI.

512 pauli veneti
sed eam recipiunt quando invicem coniunguntur, et hec est illa forma que
dat nomen et diffinitionem, ita partes animalis, quamdiu per divisionem
ab animali separate sunt, nullam habent formam anime dantem esse sub-
stantiale, sed habent istam formam solummodo quando coniunguntur in
animali. 5
Dubitatur, quia aut animal habet tantum unam formam eiusdem ratio-
nis per totum, aut plures formas habet diversarum specierum. Si primum,
70va M ergo partes animalis | possunt separari a toto manentes sub forma priori,
sicut partes elementi aut mixti inanimati. Si secundum, ergo partes ani-
malis divise uniuntur sub eadem forma priori, sicut partes plantarum 10
habentium, sicut animalia, partes diversarum rationum.
Respondetur quod, quia operatio dat cognoscere formam et operatio-
nes partium animalis sunt diversarum rationum, sicut est visio, auditio,
ambulatio et huiusmodi, ergo etiam ille partes sunt diversarum specie-
rum, habentes formas diversas in specie. Ex quo tamen non sequitur quod 15
partes animalis possint habere esse separatum manentes sub forma priori,
sicut partes plantarum, quia divisio et separatio in plantis potest fieri per
solum motum localem absque alteratione. Ideo in eis, facta separatione,
non est corrupta forma partis, neque alia de novo generata, ex quo gene-
ratio et corruptio fieri non possunt absque alteratione, ut probatur primo 20
De generatione.a Partes autem animalium dividi non possunt a toto per
solum motum localem, sed necessario motui locali est coniuncta altera-
tio, potens formam partis corrumpere et aliam generare.
Et si instatur, quia superius dictum estb quod ex pluribus existentibus
in actu non potest fieri unum, ipsis remanentibus in actu, quomodo ergo 25
ex pluribus formis diversarum specierum potest fieri una forma, aut ex
pluribus animatis diversarum specierum potest fieri unum animal aut
unum corpus animatum, dicitur quod ex pluribus existentibus in actu
completo, non potentiali ad ulteriorem formam, non potest fieri unum,
quia ex duobus hominibus non potest fieri unus homo, neque ex homine 30
et equo potest fieri unum animal; ex pluribus tamen existentibus in actu
permixto potentia ad ulteriorem actum vel formam, potest fieri unum. Et
ita contingit in partibus animalium et plantarum. Quare et cetera.
est om. M
a In truth, Averroes, In Phys., VI, t.c. 45, fol. 274LM (cf. supra, tr. 2, c. 1, p. 243, 25). b Cf.
supra, tr. 3, c. 1, pp. 454, 32456, 13.

Maxime autem h1040b10ssi.

Secundus error Platonicorum fuit: nam, considerantes quorundam ani-
matorum partes, ac etiam partes anime, tantam propinquitatem habere
ad actum et potentiam quod exeunt de potentia ad actum, sic quod divise
vivunt et moventur, crediderunt has operationes provenire ab anima 5
separata, que est numerus seipsum movens. Verbi gratia, isti, consideran-
tes animalia annulosa, viderunt partes a toto divisas vivere et moveri; et
quia partes animalium perfectorum, ut manus et pedes, separate a toto
non vivunt neque moventur, quia anime talium partium corrumpuntur,
crediderunt consequenter animas partium animalium annulosorum cor- 10
rumpi quando a toto separantur, et quod motus seu vitalis operatio non
est in illis ab aliquo principio intrinseco, eo quod principium intrinse-
cum est in iuncturis sic quod una pars movetur ab alia. Constat autem
talem partem separatam non moveri ab aliqua alia parte animalis; ergo
talis motus fit a principio extrinseco, quod non videtur esse nisi anima 15
separata. Sed isti erraverunt, quia debuerunt scire quod, quando ex multis
fit unum et continuum secundum naturam, non autem violentia aut com-
302vb Pv plantatione, illa multa sunt unum in actu | et plura in potentia, ita quod
multe partes anime sunt una anima in actu et multe anime in potentia.
Ita, facta divisione partis a toto in animali annuloso, illa anima que prius 20
erat in potentia non est corrupta, sed est facta anima in actu, cum prius
fuerit pars alterius anime, nunc autem, facta divisione, nullius anime est
pars.
Et notanter dicebatur per naturam, non violentia neque plantatione,
quia, si plures homines ligentur simul, aut plures plante invicem inse- 25
rantur, non sunt illi homines neque ille plante unum in actu et plura in
70vb M potentia, sed tam homines quam plante sunt multa in actu. | Et hoc ideo,
quia illa continuatio non est continuatio nature, sed violentie in homini-
bus et complantationis in plantis: continuatio enim illorum hominum est
continuatio ligaminis, et continuatio illarum plantarum est continuatio 30
insertionis, que non debet dici unio et continuatio secundum naturam,
sed magis lesio et impedimentum nature.
Lege litteram: Maxime autem utique aliquis fautor Platonicorum ani-
matorum suspicabitur partes et eas que anime propinque ambas fieri, entes
in actu et potentia, eo quod principia motus habeant ab aliquo et in iunctu- 35
non est in illis] in illis non est Pv naturam] et add. Pv nature] anime M
in1] et Moerb. motus habeant inv. Moerb. et2 om. Moerb.
514 pauli veneti
ris; propter quod quedam animalia divisa vivunt. Sed tamen potentia omnia
erunt, quando fuerint unum et continuum natura, sed non vi aut complan-
tatione; tale namque est orbatio, idest lesio, nature.a
Notandum primo, secundum Commentatorem, commento quin-
quacesimo sexto, quod aliquis potest estimare quod causa in hoc 5
in istis animalibus est quod partes suorum membrorum et par-
tes anime appropinquant adinvicem in potentia et actu, scilicet
quod quelibet pars recipit omnes potentias anime, et omnes virtutes
anime non appropinquantur alicui parti sine alia. Ideo talia anima-
lia, cum dividuntur, possunt vivere, et apparent omnes virtutes in 10
qualibet parte, et hoc est manifestius in plantis.b
Distinctio quam intendit Commentator est hec, quod duplices sunt partes
animalium: quedam enim sunt partes animalium que habent potentiam
propinquam actui, et alique sunt que habent potentiam remotam ab actu.
Ille partes habent potentiam propinquam actui, que recipiunt omnes vir- 15
tutes anime, ita quod nulla virtus anime in una parte existit que non inve-
niatur in qualibet alia parte. Et tales partes sunt in animalibus annulosis.
Partes autem habentes potentiam remotam ab actu sunt ille que non reci-
piunt omnes virtutes anime, ita quod aliqua virtus anime est in una parte
que non est in alia, et econverso. Huiusmodi autem sunt partes animalium 20
perfectorum.
Quando ergo queritur quare animalium alique partes divise vivunt et
alique non, respondetur quod hoc est causa, quia aliquorum animalium
partes habent potentiam propinquam actui, aliquorum autem partes non
habent potentiam propinquam actui: partes habentes potentiam propin- 25
quam actui divise vivunt, sicut sunt partes animalium annulosorum, simi-
les partibus plantarum; partes autem habentes potentiam remotam ab
actu divise non vivunt, sicut sunt partes animalium perfectorum.
Ista distinctio declaratur ex doctrina Philosophi, secundo De anima,c
dicentis quod in vegetabilibus et in animalibus imperfectis potentie non 30
distinguuntur loco et subiecto, quoniam in plantis inveniuntur tres poten-
tie contente sub vegetativo, scilicet nutritiva, augmentativa et generativa,
namque est inv. M sexto corr.] quinto MPv estimare] existimare Iunt.
appropinquant scr. ex Iunt.] propinquantis MPv scilicet quod] sed quia Iunt.
omnes1 om. Iunt. omnes2 om. Pv partes] que add. Pv sed fort. del. distinctio]
conclusio Pv
VII, t.c. 56, fol. 204KL. c Aristotle, De an., II, 2, 413b1132.
quarum quelibet in qualibet parte plante invenitur, quod per divisionem

potest manifestari: constat enim quod ramus abscissus ab arbore iterum
plantatus nutritur, augetur et generat sibi simile per susceptionem nutri-
menti, quod quidem esse non posset nisi has tres potentias sibi preser-
303ra Pv vasset. | Similiter, et in animalibus annulosis, non distinguitur loco nec 5
subiecto potentia sensitiva, secundum locum motiva, fantasia et appeti-
tus: si enim dividitur anguilla in plures partes et pungatur aliqua illarum,
certum est quod se conterendo restringit, quod non posset esset nisi habe-
ret sensum et motum. Nichil autem habet sensationem et motum sine
letitia vel tristitia; et nichil habet letitiam vel tristitiam sine fantasia et 10
appetitu, quia tam letitie quam tristitie necessario coniungitur deside-
71ra M rium fu-|-giendi nocivum et persequendi utile.
Et notanter dicit Commentator in principio commenti: Potest aliquis
existimare quod causa in istis animalibus est,a quia posset aliquis instare,
dicens quod aliqua sunt animalia imperfecta, recipientia omnes virtutes 15
anime in qualibet parte, et tamen partes divise non vivunt, sicut patet
in multis piscibus et vermibus. Ideo dicitur quod animalia habentia par-
tes curvas et tortuosas, propter abundantiam humidi viscosi, sunt illa
quorum partes divise vivunt, quia anime illarum partium, propter abun-
dantiam viscositatis humidi, fortem habent unionem cum materia. Alia 20
autem, non habentia partes curvas et tortuosas, propter defectum humidi
viscosi, sunt illa quorum partes divise non vivunt, et hoc propter debilem
unionem cum materia in partibus illis ex defectu dicte viscositatis.
mento, quod causa in hoc non est, quia non est in materia, sed 25
causa in hoc est propinquitas virtutum anime adinvicem. Impossi-
bile enim est ut anima que est in hoc animali sit nobilior anima que
est in animali perfecto, ita quod estimatur quod ista anima sit sepa-
rata et animalis perfecti non separata.b
Querebatur a Platonicis propter quid aliquorum animalium partes divise 30
vivunt et moventur, aliquorum vero partes divise non amplius vivunt
neque motum habent. Respondebant quod causa hec est, quia aliquorum
animalium anima non est in materia, sed est separata, quorundam vero
anima non est separata, sed in materia, ideo partes animalium habentium
animam separatam vivunt et moventur post separationem, partes autem 35
notandum secundo inv. Pv estimatur] existimatur Iunt.
a Averroes, In Met., VII, t.c. 56, fol. 204K. b Averroes, In Met., VII, t.c. 56, fol. 204L.
516 pauli veneti
animalium habentium animam in materia neque vivunt neque moventur

post separationem.
Istam causam excludit Commentator, dicens: impossibile est quod
anima animalis imperfecti sit nobilior quam anima animalis perfecti; sed
anima animalis perfecti non est separata, secundum illos; ergo etiam 5
anima animalis imperfecti non est separata, secundum illos. Et per con-
sequens causa signata non est sufficiens, cum dicitur quod ideo partes
annulosi divise vivunt et non partes equi, quia animal annulosum habet
animam separatam et equus habet animam in materia. Dicendum ergo
quod causa est propinquitas virtutum anime adinvicem, eo quod nulla 10
virtus anime existentis in animali annuloso accipitur in una parte quin
accipiatur in qualibet anima; anime autem existentis in animali perfecto,
aliqua virtus accipitur in una parte que non accipitur in alia.
quod virtutes anime appropinquant sibi in hoc animali, quia habent 15
partem parvam, idest debilem de principio, per quod animal move-
tur motibus diversis contrariis.a
Hic Commentator solvit istam questionem: propter quid in imperfecto
appropinquant omnes virtutes anime, ita quod in qualibet parte omnes
inveniuntur? Respondet quod hoc est propter debilitatem virtutis anime 20
et principii motivi, per quod movetur tale animal motibus diversis atque
contrariis. Unde, propter imperfectionem talium animalium, non requi-
ritur magna diversitas partium: nam, quia habent animam imperfectio-
ris virtutis, non valentem plura operari, ideo non est necessaria organo-
rum multitudo; quapropter per eandem virtutem operatur in qualibet 25
parte corporis. Animalia autem perfecta habent multitudinem organica-
rum partium, ac etiam virtutum dissimilium in partibus illis; ideo, remota
una parte, non remanet anima in ea, et consequenter nulla virtus anime,
propter dependentiam essentialem virtutis ab anima.
303rb Pv Contra predicta arguitur. Et primo contra litteram, quod | non semper 30
ea ex quibus fit unum et continuum secundum naturam sunt plura in
71rb M potentia, quia illa que sunt plura in potentia possunt venire ad actum; |
sed partes animalium perfectorum, ut dictum est, non possunt venire ad
actum, quia facta divisione non remanet anima; ergo et cetera.
secundum] per Pv secundum illos om. Pv notandum tertio inv. Pv in om.

Pv plura] plurima Pv ad iter. Pv ergo et cetera om. M
a Averroes, In Met., VII, t.c. 56, fol. 204LM.

Secundo arguitur contra commentum. Nam, sicut in animalibus per-

fectis non quelibet virtus anime que est in una parte est in qualibet alia,
ita et in animalibus imperfectis: nam virtus visiva, auditiva et olfactiva,
que est in una parte, non est in qualibet alia; ergo virtutes anime in talibus
animalibus non appropinquant invicem, iuxta intellectum Commentato- 5
ris.
Ad primum dicitur quod tales partes de se separabiles sunt et ad actum
reducibiles, sed propter dependentiam essentialem quam habent ad
totum, ratione motus et sensus fluentis a toto ad partes, separari non pos-
sunt. Nam, ex quo habent propriam formam et propriam materiam eis 10
non repugnat separabilitas, remanente priori forma, sed quia essentialiter
dependent a toto, ideo separari non possunt nisi cum corruptione earum.
Et licet in eis anima vegetativa realiter differat ab anima sensitiva, tamen,
propter magnam colligantiam, corrumpitur anima vegetativa desinente
sensitiva in eis, ipsa tamen remanente in corpore toto, cui est inseparabi- 15
liter unita, tam per inherentiam quam per informationem.
Ad secundum respondetur quod anima habet duplicem virtutem, vide-
licet activam et passivam: virtus activa est virtus motiva; virtus passiva
est virtus cognitiva, reducibilis de potentia ad actum per obiectum exte-
rius. Licet ergo in animalibus imperfectis non appropinquent virtutes pas- 20
sive, cuiusmodi sunt sensus interiores et exteriores, qui sunt in determi-
nata parte corporis, tamen omnes virtutes active appropinquant, ita quod
non distinguuntur in illis loco et subiecto. In animalibus autem perfectis
inveniuntur alique virtutes active distincte loco et subiecto, sicut virtus
manus et pedis et aliarum partium etherogenearum: iste enim sunt virtu- 25
tes active anime diversarum rationum et diversarum operationum. Non
sic autem contingit in animalibus imperfectis, habentibus diversitatem
paucam organorum: motus enim contrarii in diversis partibus fiunt ani-
malium perfectorum ex diversis virtutibus anime; non autem ita contingit
de partibus animalium imperfectorum, quoniam in diversis est eadem 30
virtus. Ideo anima perfectorum animalium plurima diversitate respicit
totum et partes, propter quam diversitatem partes divise non vivunt;
imperfectorum autem anima quasi equaliter respicit totum et partes,
propter quod partes divise vivunt. Et ita intendit Commentator,a dicens
appropinquant] in add. Pv distinguuntur scr.] distinguitur MPv
a Averroes, In Met., VII, t.c. 56, fol. 204L.

518 pauli veneti
quod hoc animal habet virtutem debilem de principio, per quod animal
movetur diversis motibus et contrariis, scilicet de anima.
Quoniam vero unum h1040b16ssi.

Ista est secunda pars huius capituli, in qua Philosophus probat quod
ens et unum ita sunt communia et universalia hquodi non sunt substantie 5
rerum.
Et facit tres rationes, quarum prima est: ens et unum convertuntur, ut
est probatum quarto huius;a sed quelibet substantia rei est unum numero,
quia omne quod est, ideo est quia unum numero est; ergo quelibet sub-
stantia rei est unum ens numero, et per consequens ens et unum, ut sunt 10
communia et universalia, non sunt substantie rerum.
Ista ultima consequentia arguitur sic: qualis est significatio principii et
elementi, talis est significatio communis et universalis; sed nichil, ut est
principium vel elementum, est substantia rei; ergo hnichili, in eo quod
commune vel universale, est substantia rei. 15
Prima pars antecedentis declaratur ex eo quia, sicut principium et
elementum significant substantiam et proprietatem accidentalem illius,
ita etiam commune et universale. Unde, cum dico formam esse princi-
pium, dico duo, scilicet formam esse formam et formam esse principium:
dicendo formam esse formam, dico substantiam rei; dicendo autem for- 20
303va Pv mam esse principium, dico aliquam proprietatem accidentalem illius |
71va M forme. Similiter, cum dico | materiam esse elementum, dico materiam
esse materiam, et secundum hoc dicitur substantia rei; dico etiam mate-
riam esse elementum, et secundum hoc dicitur proprietas accidentalis
materie. Ita, in proposito, cum dicitur homo est species et animal est 25
genus, dicitur substantia importata per subiectum et proprietas acci-
dentalis importata per predicatum. Et consequenter, cum dicitur ens
et unum sunt communia, dicitur ens esse ens et unum esse unum, et
secundum hoc dicitur substantia rei; dicitur etiam ens esse commune et
unum esse universale, et secundum hoc dicitur proprietas accidentalis 30
substantie, quoniam communitas et universalitas sunt proprietates acci-
dentes enti et uno, sicut genus et species sunt proprietates accidentes
homini et animali, aut sicut principium et elementum sunt proprietates
ita Pv s.l.] non M (scr. et del. Pv) quod suppl. est om. Pv nichil suppl.
esse formam iter. Pv substantie] subiecto M
a Aristotle, Met., IV, 2, 1003b2225.

accidentales advenientes forme et materie. Sicut enim prius est forma

quam sit principium, et prius est materia quam sit elementum, ita prius
est homo quam sit species, et prius est animal quam sit genus, et conse-
quenter prius est unum et ens quam ipsa sint communia et universalia.
Secunda pars antecedentis probatur, videlicet quod nichil, ut est prin- 5
cipium vel elementum, est substantia rei, quoniam nichil est substantia
rei in eo quod includit proprietatem accidentalem; sed tam principium
quam elementum includit proprietatem accidentalem; ergo et cetera.
Tenet consequentia cum minori ex dictis. Et maior est manifesta. Nam
substantia est prior accidente; ergo substantia est prior omni eo quod 10
includit proprietatem accidentalem. Constat autem quod nichil est sub-
stantia per id quod est posterius substantia: sicut enim homo non est
substantia in eo quod risibilis vel disciplinabilis, quia risibile et discipli-
nabile includunt proprietates accidentales, ita materia et forma non sunt
substantie in eo quod principium et elementum, ex quo principium et 15
elementum includunt proprietates accidentales. Et consequenter habetur
quod ens et unum non sunt substantie rerum in quantum sunt commu-
nia et universalia, ex quo commune et universale includunt proprietates
accidentales entis et unius. Sicut ergo materia et forma, ut sunt principia
et elementa, non sunt substantie rerum, ita nec unum et ens, ut sunt uni- 20
versalia et communia. Et sicut, cum querimus substantiam rei, reducimus
principium et elementum ad aliquid prius et notius, quod est subiectum
illorum, ita, cum querimus substantiam rei, reducimus commune et uni-
versale ad aliquid prius et notius, quod est subiectum illorum. Hoc autem
est unum et ens quibus accidit communitas et universalitas. 25
Lege litteram: Quoniam vero unum dicitur sicut et ens, et substantia
unius una, et quorum una numero unum numero, palam quod nec unum nec
ens contingit substantiam esse rerum, sicut nec elemento esse contingit esse
substantiam aut principio; sed querimus quod principium est subiectum
utriusque istorum, ut ad notius reducamus commune et universale.a 30
Secundo arguit Philosophus ad idem sic: substantia rei secundum quod
huiusmodi nulli inest; sed ens et unum, secundum quod sunt communia
et universalia, insunt alicui; ergo ens et unum, secundum quod sunt com-
munia et universalia, non sunt substantie rerum. Tenet consequentia cum
substantia2] per id vel add. M quod] quia Moerb. quod] quid igitur Moerb.
(quod igitur FThUuXaAjGpUj1)
520 pauli veneti
maiori, ex quo prima substantia nulli inest, ut patet in Predicamentis.a

Minor declaratur. Nam, si minus universale secundum quod huiusmodi
inest alicui, oportet etiam quod magis universale insit alicui; sed princi-
pium, causa et elementum sunt minus communia quam ens et unum, et
quodlibet illorum secundum quod huiusmodi inest alicui; ergo et cetera. 5
Prima pars antecedentis est nota. Et secunda declaratur. Quod enim prin-
cipium, causa et elementum sint minus communia, manifestum est. Nam
de quacumque substantia dicitur principium, causa et elementum, de
eadem dicitur ens et unum, sed non econtra, quoniam de substantiis
compositis ultimo productis dicitur ens et unum, non autem principium, 10
303vb Pv causa et elementum; ergo, si ens et | hunumi non sunt substantie, nec
etiam sunt substantie principium, causa et elementum, non autem econ-
tra. Quod autem quodlibet illorum secundum quod huiusmodi insit ali-
71vb M cui, manifestari potest ex prima ratione, | quoniam, sicut omne accidens
secundum quod huiusmodi inest alicui, ita omne includens aliquam pro- 15
prietatem accidentalem, secundum quod huiusmodi inest alicui: risibile
enim inest homini et simus naso, quia risibilitas inest homini et simi-
tas naso; constat autem quod principium, causa et elementum includunt
proprietates accidentales, ut ostensum est; ergo principium, causa et ele-
mentum secundum quod huiusmodi insunt alicui. Ita etiam ens et unum, 20
secundum quod sunt communia et universalia, insunt alicui, videlicet
substantie que est principium, causa aut elementum, ac etiam substan-
tie que habet principium, causam et elementum: sicut enim materia et
forma, ita composita ex hiis sunt ens et unum.
Lege litteram: Magis ergo horum substantia est ens et unum quam 25
principium et elementum et causa; sed nec ista tria sunt substantia, si nec
aliud commune nichil substantia, videlicet ens et unum. Nulli namque inest
substantia, sed huic, scilicet cause, et habenti ipsam, cuius est substantia
inest ens et unum.b
Tertio arguit Philosophus iterum ad idem sic: nulla substantia rei 30
secundum quod huiusmodi est in multis nec apud multa; ergo ens et
unum, secundum quod sunt communia et universalia, non sunt substan-
tie rerum. Tenet consequentia cum minori, ex diffinitione universalis, que
patet] probatur Pv Predicamentis] sed add. Pv etiam quod inv. Pv minus]

universalia add. et del. Pv ergo scr.] etiam MPv unum suppl. et iter. Pv
insunt scr.] inest MPv habet] habent M quam om. M
876).
est esse unum in multis et de multis. Maior autem patet, quia, si substantia
secundum quod huiusmodi esset in multis et apud multa, tunc substantia
prima, que est unum numero unitate divisibilitatis et incommunicabilita-
tis, esset in multis et apud multa.
Ex quibus infert Philosophus contra Platonicos quod nullum universale 5
secundum quod huiusmodi est separatum a singularibus, quoniam ens et
unum, principium, causa et elementum, et consimilia, secundum quod
sunt universalia, sunt in multis et apud multa, ut manifestum est.
Lege litteram: Amplius quod unum est sicut substantia prima apud
multa non utique erit simul, quod autem commune simul apud multa existit; 10
quare palam quia nullum universalium existit preter singularia separatum.a
simo septimo, quod nullum commune est substantia, quoniam sub-
stantia non est plurium, sed est substantia aut sui ipsius aut illius
cuius est substantia. Et etiam substantia non est in pluribus simul, 15
universale autem est commune, et commune est in pluribus insimul
Universale et particulare sunt ad aliquid et principium eius cuius
est principium, et necesse est ut principium non indigeat in suo esse
eo cuius est principium.b
Istud commentum favet opinionibus contrariis de universalibus. Una opi- 20
nio dicit quod non sunt universalia nisi ex parte intellectus, quia, si essent
universalia in re absque opere intellectus, tunc daretur substantia uni-
versalis secluso omni opere hintellectusiquod videtur contra Commen-
tatorem hic, probantem duabus rationibus quod nullum universale est
substantia. Quarum prima est hec: nullum commune est substantia; quo- 25
dlibet universale est commune; ergo nullum universale est substantia.
Secunda ratio est ista: nulla substantia est in pluribus; quodlibet univer-
sale est in pluribus; ergo nullum universale est substantia.
Alia opinio dicit quod universalia sunt in rebus remota omni opera-
tione intellectus. Pro qua opinione faciunt due rationes Commentatoris, 30
quarum prima est hec: omne commune est in pluribus; omne universale
est commune; ergo omne universale est in pluribus. Constat autem nichil
esse in pluribus ex sola operatione intellectus. Secunda ratio est hec: sicut
separatum] separatim Moerb. septimo corr.] sexto MPv quoniam scr. ex

Iunt] quando MPv simul] insimul Iunt. eius] est add. Iunt. eo om. Iunt.
intellectus suppl. quodlibetcommune om. M opinione om. M
VII, t.c. 57, fol. 205GH.
522 pauli veneti
sunt invicem correlativa principium et principiatum, ita universale et sin-

gulare; sed tam principium quam principiatum invenitur in rebus preter
omnem operationem intellectus; ergo universale et particulare sunt in
rebus sine aliqua operatione intellectus.
304ra Pv Prima harum opinionum deficit | in fundamento Commentatoris, quia 5
Commentator, probans nullum universale esse substantiam, non accipit
substantiam large, eo modo quo accipit Philosophus in Predicamentis,a
dividens substantiam in substantiam primam et secundam, neque eo
modo quo accepit in hoc septimo, quando dixit quod substantia quatuor
modis sumitur, sed stricte, eo modo quo in primo capitulo huius tractatus, 10
72ra M iuxta modum loquendi Platonis, scilicet | pro substantia separata per se
existente. Constat autem nullum universale esse talem substantiam.
Ex predictis sequitur quod non sane loquuntur beatus Thomas, Alexan-
der et Albertus,b dicentes quod universalitas accidit rei ex opere intellec-
tus, quoniam universale et singulare sunt invicen correlativa; sed singula- 15
ritas non accidit rei ex opere intellectus; ergo nec universalitas. Non enim
aliqua duo sunt per se correlativa, si unum eorum dependet ab anima et
alterum a natura: relativa enim posita se ponunt et perempta se perimunt,
inquit Aristoteles in Predicamentis.c Ergo, secluso omni opere intellectus,
si particulare est universale est, et si nullum universale est nullum parti- 20
culare est. Sicut ergo singularitas est quedam proprietas individui fluens
ab eo, ita universalitas est proprietas fluens a natura communi, eo modo
quo unitas est passio fluens ab ente et divisibilitas a continuo.
Sed dubitatur, quia videtur Commentator implicare contradictionem.
Dicit enim quod principium et principiatum sunt ad aliquid, et quod 25
principium non indiget in suo esse eo cuius est principium, ex quo relativa
posita se ponunt et perempta se perimunt: dicit enim Philosophus, primo
Phisicorum,d quod, si principium est, ipsum est alicuius vel aliquorum
principium.
Respondetur quod nulla est contradictio. Non enim dicit Commentator 30
quod principium non indiget principiato, sed quod esse principii non
indiget eo cuius est principium. Licet enim pater indigeat filio, tamen illud
sine] absque Pv aliqua operatione inv. Pv et] substantiam add. Pv accepit]

accipit Pv est1 om. M
a Aristotle, Cat., 5, 2a1116. b Aquinas, Exp. Met., VII, lect. 13, n. 1570; Alexander of
Alexandria, Exp. Met., VII, c. 13, q. 3, fol. 232vavb; Albert, Met., Lib. V, tr. 6, c, 6, p. 286, 8091
(but the opposed view seems to be held in tr. 6, c. 7, p. 287, lin. 6971). c Aristotle, Cat., 6,
7b158a12. d Aristotle, Phys., I, 2, 185a45.
quod est pater non indiget eo quod est filius: Sortes enim est pater Pla-
tonis et non indiget in suo esse Platone. Hoc enim posuit Commentator
ad ostendendum quod, licet universale et particulare sint correlativa et
invicem convertantur, non tamen esse universalis et esse particularis sunt
ad aliquid neque invicem convertuntur, sicut etiam principium et prin- 5
cipiatum sunt relativa, tamen esse principii et esse principiati non sunt
relativa. Et ex hoc, sicut esse principium non indiget esse principiati, ita
nec esse universalis indiget esse singularis: prius enim est esse universa-
lis quam sit esse sui singularis, sicut prius est esse principii quam sit esse
principiati. 10
Sed species dicentes h1040b27ssi.

Ista est tertia pars huius capituli, in qua Philosophus ostendit in quo
bene et in quo male locuti sunt Platonici. Et primo hoc declarat, dicens
quod, ponentes species separatas in hoc recte dixerunt, ponentes sub-
stantias separatas: nam quod sint substantie separate non solum verum 15
est sed etiam necessarium, alioquin non essent intelligentie moventes
orbes celestes motu perpetuo et uniformicuius oppositum demonstra-
tur octavo Phisicorum.a In alio autem non recte dixerunt, videlicet quod
iste substantie separate sunt in particularibus sensibilibus et predicantur
de illis; ymmo est implicatio contradictionis: si enim ydee sunt substantie 20
separate a sensibilibus, necesse est quod non sint in illis, et si sint in illis,
tunc non sunt separate. Deinde, si separantur a sensibilibus, necessario
differunt ab illis, et per consequens non predicantur de illis.
Lege litteram: Sed species dicentes hoc quidem dicunt recte separantes
eas, si substantie sunt, illic autem recte non dicunt, quia unam in multis 25
speciem dicunt.b
Secundo declarat Philosophus causam erroris illorum, dicens quod isti,
scientes substantias abstractas esse et nescientes quiditates illarum, non
potuerunt dicere quod essent alie a rebus sensibilibus et corruptibilibus;
ideo ponebant illas esse species easdem sensibilibus et corruptibilibus. Ita 30
quod homo separatus et homo sensibilis erant eiusdem speciei, differe-
bant autem secundum essentiam et participationem aut secundum magis
sit1 om. M locuti sunt Platonici] Platonici locuti sunt Pv declarat] declarant M
tunc om. Pv hoc] hic Moerb. (hoc aliqui codices tex. exem. paris.) recte non
inv. Moerb. abstractas] separatas Pv
a Aristotle,Phys., VIII, 610 passim. b Aristotle, Met., VII, 16, 1040b2730 (AL XXV 3.2, pp.
164165, lin. 880882).
524 pauli veneti
304rb Pv et minus, quoniam hominem separatum vocabant | hominem per essen-

tiam et hominem simpliciter et hominem per se, hominem autem sen-
sibilem dicebant hominem per participationem et hominem secundum
72rb M quid et hominem | cum additamento, eo quia in homine sensibili con-
siderabant multa esse que non pertinent ad speciem, in homine autem 5
separato, quem dicebant hominem intelligibilem et hominem ydealem,
nichil inveniebant quod non pertineret ad speciem.
Lege litteram: Causa vero erroris fuit quia non habent unde possint
reddere que tales substantie incorruptibiles preter singulares et sensibiles.
Ergo faciunt eadem specie corruptibilibus.a 10
Et dum quereretur a Philosopho, ex quo Platonici ponunt hominem
corruptibilem et incorruptibilem, aut equum sensibilem et equum intelli-
gibilem, esse eiusdem speciei, per quid ergo distinguebant unum ab alio in
suo modo loquendi et scribendi, ut cognosceretur quando loquebantur de
homine et de equo ydeali, separato heti intelligibili, et quando loqueban- 15
tur de homine aut equo ydeato, sensibili et corruptibili, respondet Philo-
sophus, dicens: substantias separatas cognoscimus ydeales, quas Platonici
ponunt, per additionem huius verbi autho ipsis substantiis sensibilibus.
Unde hominem sensibilem absolute vocabant hominem, et equum sen-
sibilem absolute vocabant equum, dicentes homo sedet, equus currit. 20
Hominem autem ydealem vocabant autho hominem et equum ydeale
dicebant autho equum, intendentes per hoc hominem ydealem esse
hominem per se et ante hominem sensibilem, ratione sue perpetuitatis.
Lege litteram: Has enim scimus substantias ydeales per hoc quod
dicunt Platonici authohominem et authoequum, addentes sensibilibus 25
verbum autho.b
Tertio ostendit Philosophus quod causa propter quam movebantur
ponere substantias separatas et substantias sensibiles esse eiusdem spe-
ciei non fuit sufficiens. Arguebant enim sic: si substantie separate sunt,
ille intelliguntur a nobis; non autem intelliguntur a nobis nisi sunt eius- 30
dem speciei cum substantiis sensibilibus; ergo substantie separate sunt
eiusdem speciei cum substantiis sensibilibus. Invenerunt enim Platonici
per rationes substantias separatas esse atque incorporeas, ex quo quiditas
pertineret] pertineat M eadem] easdem Moerb. (eadem P1b) et suppl.
16, 1040b3334 (AL XXV 3.2, p. 165, lin. 884885).

et essentia substantie prior est omni accidente, nec dimensionibus quan-

titativis necessario est coniuncta. Scientes ergo quod substantie separate
sunt, querebant quid sunt, et quia nostra cognitio non fertur nisi per sen-
sibilia super sensibilia, non poterant dicere quid sunt nisi eas hiis sensibi-
libus identificarent in specie, dicentes quod homini sensibili respondet 5
homo separatus eiusdem speciei, et equo corruptibili respondet equus
separatus eiusdem speciei.
Istam rationem Platonicorum excludit Philosophus, negans primam
partem antecedentis, dicens quod substantie separate non minus sunt,
etiam si non intelliguntur a nobis. Sicut enim esse sempiternum stelle 10
in hoc non consistit, ut videatur a nobis, quia non minus astra sunt
sempiterna, licet non videantur a nobis, ita esse substantie separate non
consistit in hoc quod intelligatur a nobis: sive enim intelligamus sive non
intelligamus quid sunt substantie separate, non minus est necessarium
substantias separatas esse. 15
Etiam secunda pars antecedentis eiusdem rationis non est vera, vide-
licet si substantie separate intelliguntur a nobis, ille sunt eiusdem speciei
cum substantiis sensibilibus, quia, data illa conditionali, sequitur quod est
dare hominem et equum corporeum incorruptibilem, eo modo quo poete
finxerunt in stellis taurum esse et arietem, capricornum et huiusmodi ani- 20
malia vocata duodecim signa in orbe stellato. Nam certum est quod per
rationem scimus aliqua corpora incorruptibilia esse, que numquam visa
sunt neque alio sensu cognita. Tunc fiat hoc argumentum: si aliqua cor-
304va Pv pora incorruptibilia intelliguntur a nobis, illa | sunt eiusdem speciei cum
72va M hiis corporibus corruptibilibus | que videmus; sed aliqua sunt corpora 25
incorruptibilia; ergo illa sunt eiusdem speciei cum corporibus corrupti-
bilibus.
Lege litteram: Quamvis itaque si non videremus astra, non minus,
existimo, forent substantie sempiterne preter eas quas nos videmus; quare et
nunc si non habemus que sunt substantie separate, tamen quasdam forsan 30
esse est necessarium.a Dicit Philosophus forsan, quia nondum probavit
substantias aliquas abstractas esse.
quantitativis] quantitatis M per sensibilia om. Pv equus scr.] homo MPv

separatus] corruptibilis Pv ut] quod Pv substantiis] suis M alio] aliquo M
cum iter. Pv itaque] utique Moerb. (itaque P1b) videmus] videremus Moerb.
(videmus Op) quasdam forsan esse] esse quasdam forsan Moerb. abstractas]
separatas Pv
a Aristotle, Met., VII, 16, 1040b341041a3 (AL XXV 3.2, p. 165, lin. 885889).
526 pauli veneti
Quarto, Philosophus, epilogando circa dicta, tria concludit. Primum est

quod nichil universaliter dictum est substantia separata; secundum est
quod nulla substantia per se existens est aliquod universale; tertium est
quod nulla substantia est ex substantiis actu existentibus. Et hec omnia
sunt contra Platonicos, ponentes separatas per se existentes ydeas, secun- 5
dum numerum predicatorum quiditativorum predicamenti substantie.
Lege litteram: Quod quidem ergo neque universaliter dictorum nichil
substantia, nec est substantia aliquid universaliter dictum, neque una ex
substantiis in actu, manifestum.a
Notandum, secundum Commentatorem, commento duodesexace- 10
simo, quod causa sui erroris est quoniam, cum sint hic scientie que
non corrumpuntur, non possunt distinguere inter naturam que est
subiectum istarum scientiarum et inter naturam que est substantia,
et opinati sunt propter hoc hic esse substantias non corruptibiles, et
quod sunt eedem secundum substantiam cum formis que corrum- 15
puntur. Et hic est error magnus.b
Argumentum Platonicorum fuit istud: scientia est de rebus incorruptibi-
libus; sed de homine et equo habetur scientia; ergo aliquis homo et ali-
quis equus est incorruptibilis. Constat autem quod omnis homo et omnis
equus sensibilis est corruptibilis; ergo, preter hominem et equum sensibi- 20
lem et corruptibilem, oportet dare hominem et equum incorruptibilem.
Et quoniam tam homo quam equus est species specialissima, necesse
est hominem corruptibilem et hominem incorruptibilem, et equum cor-
ruptibilem et equum incorruptibilem, esse eiusdem nature et speciei.
Sed iste error fuit magnus, quia illa que sunt eiusdem speciei habent 25
eandem diffinitionem et eandem passionem; modo homo sensibilis et
homo separatus non habent eandem diffinitionem, quia homo sensibi-
lis est animal rationale, homo autem separatus non est animal rationale:
cum enim animal sit substantia animata sensitiva, et homo separatus non
sit sensitivus propter defectum tactus, consequens est quod non sit ani- 30
mal.
est om. M notandum] add. primo Pv duodesexacesimo corr.] quinquace-

simo septimo MPv sui] suis Pv et2] cum add. Pv eedemcorrumpuntur
M] cum substantiis eedem per formam que corrumpuntur Pv : cum substantiis corrupti-
bilibus eedem per formam, que non corrumpitur Iunt. et1] de add. Pv hominem2
om. M et2] aut Pv nature scr.] materie MPv et2] eiusdem add. Pv
t.c. 58, fol. 205vM206A.

Item, isti duo homines non habent easdem passiones, ex quo unus est
corruptibilis et alter incorruptibilis. Si enim essent duo homines, quo-
rum unus esset risibilis et alter non esset risibilis, illi non essent eius-
dem speciei. Ergo, a pari, homo sensibilis et homo separatus non sunt
eiusdem speciei, si unus eorum est corruptibilis et alter incorruptibilis. 5
Causa autem huius erroris fuit quia nesciverunt distinguere inter natu-
ram que est subiectum scientie et naturam que est substantia per se exi-
stens. Natura quidem que est subiectum scientie, non quidem in quo sed
circa quod, non est separata a substantia sensibili per se existente, sed
est in illa per modum forme universalis communicate omnibus indivi- 10
duis eiusdem speciei. Et quia hec natura identificatur omnibus suis indi-
viduis, ideo recipit omnem diffinitionem et omnem passionem suorum
individuorum, et per hoc dicitur esse eiusdem speciei cum illis. Ergo et
cetera.
mento, quod cum ponunt illud quod significat diffinitio per par-
tem sensibilium substantiarum, contingit eis ut eas esse intellectas
sit pars suorum esse, adeo quod, si ista sensibilia non fuerint intel-
lecta, non erunt. Et manifestum est quod sensibilia sunt, licet non
intelligantur, quemadmodum sunt entia, licet non sentiantur.a 20
Platonici ponebant quiditatem importatam per diffinitionem esse partem
substantiarum sensibilium, idest formarum substantiarum sensibilium,
in quantum intelligitur a nobis. Contra quod arguit Commentator sic:
si quiditas est pars substantiarum sensibilium in quantum intelligitur
a nobis, ergo, per idem, substantie sensibiles sunt partes suorum esse, 25
in quantum intelliguntur a nobis. Patet consequentia, quia ex eodem
principio est quiditas rei sensibilis et ipsa res sensibilis. Sed consequens
est falsum, quia tunc sensibilia non essent nisi essent intellectaquod est
304vb Pv absurdum: sicut enim | sensibilia sunt, | licet non sentiantur, ita sensibilia
72vb M atque intelligibilia sunt, licet non intelligantur. Si autem aliquis diceret 30
quod sensibilia non sunt nisi sentiantur, sequitur quod omnis essentia
rerum sensibilium et veritas illarum consistit in apparentia et in iuditio
sensuscuius oppositum est demonstratum quarto huius.b
nesciverunt distinguere inv. Pv per] ex Pv notandum secundo inv. Pv

per om. Iunt. sensibilium substantiarum inv. Iunt. manifestum est inv.
Iunt. sunt] entia add. Iunt.
a Averroes, In Met., VII, t.c. 58, fol. 206AB. b Aristotle, Met., IV, 56 passim.
528 pauli veneti

quod quemadmodum sensibilia non sunt sensata in actu donec
sentiantur, ita est de intelligibilibus. Et secundum hoc sequitur ex
opinione Aristotelis ut intelligibilia sint nova, et secundum opinio-
nes dicentium formas esse, sint eterna. Sed quomodo substantia 5
heternai est pars substantie corruptibilis, aut idem, et substantia cor-
ruptibilis est unum numero?.a
Quatuor Platonici dixerunt de ydeis, quas vocaverunt intelligibilia. Pri-
mum quod intelligibilia, sicut sunt actu entia, licet non actu cognoscan-
tur, ita sunt actu intellecta, licet actu non intelligantur. Quod quidem 10
verum non est, quia sensibilia non sunt actu sensata nisi actualiter sen-
tiantur; ergo, a pari, intelligibilia non sunt actualiter intellecta nisi actua-
liter intelligantur.
Secundum fuit quod intelligibilia sunt eternaliter intellectacuius
oppositum dicit Philosophus, videlicet quod intelligibilia sunt noviter 15
intellecta, ex quo intellectus humanus est sicut tabula rasa, in qua nichil
est descriptum, et pura potentia sine actu et habitu, ut probatur tertio De
anima.b
Tertium fuit quod intelligibilia sunt partes formales particularium sen-
sibilium. Et istud etiam non est verum, quia non apparet quomodo illud 20
quod est omnino incorruptibile sit pars illius quod est omnino corrupti-
bile.
Quartum fuit quod intelligibilia sunt omnino eiusdem speciei cum ipsis
corruptibilibus. Quod iterum esse non potest, quia omne corruptibile est
unum numero; nullum autem intelligibile est unum numero, sed unum 25
specie aut unum genere, secundum Platonicos; constat autem quod ea
que sunt eiusdem speciei sunt unum numero.
Notandum quarto, secundum Commentatorem, eodem commento,
quod rectum est ut contingat dicentibus formas esse ut sint intel-
lecta necessaria in actu, et si non sciantur neque intelligantur, et sic 30
scientia acquisita de novo non erit addiscere et rememorare.c
notandum tertio inv. Pv eterna suppl. ex Iunt. idem] illi add. Iunt.
Platonici dixerunt inv. Pv a pari scr.] opera MPv descriptum] scriptum
Pv corruptibilibus] sensibilibus M notandum quarto inv. Pv contingat Pv
Iunt.] contingit M de novo prae acquisita M et M] neque Pv Iunt.
a Averroes, In Met., VII, t.c. 58, fol. 206B. b Aristotle, De an., III, 4, 429a2224; 429b2931.
c Averroes, In Met., VII, t.c. 58, fol. 206C.
Platonici dixerunt universalia ydealia esse principia scientiarum et

substantiarum singularium, et ex hoc volebant ista semper esse in intel-
lectu possibili; et ideo, secundum eos, non contingebat aliquid scire de
novo, sed solum addiscere et recordari, ita quod scientia habitualis in
anima reducebatur ad actum per datorem et per recordationem. Quia 5
autem ea que sunt in intellectu possibili sunt actu intellecta, ideo pone-
bant formas ydeales esse intelligibilia necessario actu scita et intellecta,
licet non actu scirentur vel intelligerentur, quia, si posuissent ydeas esse
intelligibilia contingenter scita vel intellecta, oportuisset eos ponere sci-
entiam de novo acquiri in intellectu, et sic nostrum scire non esset tantum 10
addiscere vel reminisciquod est contra eos. Quia autem Aristoteles non
posuit universalia separata, sed coniuncta singularibus, et ipsa singularia
sunt intellecta in potentia neque reducuntur ad actum nisi per intellec-
tum agentem, ut habetur tertio De anima,a ideo intelligibilia sunt in anima
in fieri et non in facto, ex quo sequitur intellectum accipere scientiam de 15
novo et non solum addiscere et recordari.
Contra predicta arguitur quod aliqua sunt eiusdem speciei, quorum
unum est corruptibile et reliquum incorruptibile. Primo quidem arguitur
de motu et tempore infinito, quorum quodlibet est infinitum, quia num-
quam habebit finem, ut probatur octavo Phisicorum,b et tamen quelibet 20
pars finita tam temporis quam motus est corruptibilis, cum quelibet talis
principium habeat et finem. Constat autem quamlibet partem temporis
esse eiusdem speciei cum toto tempore, et quamlibet partem motus cum
toto motu.
Secundo arguitur de partibus centralibus terre et superficialibus ignis. 25
Quelibet enim istarum est incorruptibilis, cum sit in loco naturalissimo
suo neque potest accedere ad locum sue corruptionis, neque aliquod
305ra Pv agens contrarium potest accedere ad locum sue preservationis. || Et quia
73ra M quelibet pars superficialis terre aliquando corrumpetur, et etiam quelibet
pars eius existens in concavo eius, neque aliquis dubitat quin omnes 30
due terre sint eiusdem specie, ac etiam omnes due ignes. Quare habetur
intentum.
Tertio arguitur de quolibet homine et anima intellectiva. Constat
autem quod quilibet homo est corruptibilis, ex quo componitur ex con-
trariis; anima autem intellectiva est incorruptibilis, ut probatur tertio De 35
in iter. Pv istarum] illarum M incorruptibilis] corruptibilis M dubitat]

dubitet M sint] sunt Pv
a Aristotle, De an., III, 5, 430a1017. b Aristotle, Phys., VIII, 1, esp. 251a10252a5.

530 pauli veneti
anima.a Sed quod sint eiusdem speciei probatur, quia, si sunt diversarum
specierum, aut ergo equalis perfectionis vel inequalis. Non equalis, quia
species sunt sicut numeri, per Philosophum, decimo huius.b Si inequalis,
aut ergo homo est perfectior intellectu aut minus perfectus. Primum non
potest dari, quia homo recipit ab intellectu nomen et diffinitionem, sicut 5
generaliter quodlibet compositum a forma sua. Secundum etiam dari non
potest, quia non apparet formam aliquam perfectionem habere quam
non communicet composito, ut colligitur de mente Philosophi, primo De
anima.c
Quarto arguitur de quolibet universali et suo singulari incipiente et 10
desinente esse. Certum enim est quod homo communis et homo particu-
laris sunt eiusdem speciei, ex quo conveniunt in nomine et diffinitione; et
quilibet homo particularis est corruptibilis, homo autem communis est
incorruptibilis, quia species sunt eterne, per Philosophum, primo Poste-
riorum.d Idem potest argui de equo communi et de equo particulari. Et sic 15
non apparet magis inconveniens opinio Platonis quam opinio Aristotelis,
ex quo ex opinione Aristotelis, sicut ex opinione Platonis, sequitur quod
aliqua sunt eiusdem speciei, quorun unum est corruptibile et reliquum
incorruptibile.
Ad primum dicitur quod, proprie loquendo de generatione et corrup- 20
tione, ut sunt termini alterationum precedentium, iuxta doctrinam Philo-
sophi, primo De generatione,e nullus motus nec aliquod tempus est gene-
rabile vel corruptibile. Accipiendo autem large pro omni inceptione et
desinitione, sic conceditur tempus et motum generari et corrumpi; et sic
loquendo non inconvenit aliqua esse eiusdem speciei, quorum unum est 25
corruptibile et reliquum incorruptibile. Aristoteles autem loquitur de cor-
ruptibili propria corruptione. Non tamen esset inconveniens dicere quod
totum tempus infinitum et totus motus infinitus continue generantur et
corrumpuntur per accidens, ad generationem partium finitarum.
Et si aliquis ex hoc concluderet formam aliquam per se generari vel cor- 30
rumpi, scilicet partem finitam temporis vel motus, contra determinatio-
nem Aristotelis in hoc septimo,f dicitur quod Aristoteles superius locutus
equalis] equales M particularis] singularis M ut scr.] non MPv et] vel

Pv
a Aristotle, De an. III, 5, 430a2223. b In truth, Aristotle, Met., VIII, 3, 1044a511. c Aristotle,
De an., I, 4, 408a29b18. d Aristotle, An. Post., I, 24, 85b1718. e In truth, Averroes,
In Phys., VI, t.c. 45, fol. 274LM (cf. supra, tr. 2, c. 1, p. 243, 25). f Aristotle, Met., VII, 8,
1033a241033b19; 15, 1039b2027.
est de generatione et corruptione proprie, ut sunt mutationes, non autem

ut sunt inceptiones et desinitiones.
Ad secundum respondetur quod quelibet pars centralis terre et que-
libet pars superficialis ignis est corruptibilis, licet numquam corrumpe-
tur nec corrumpi possit, quia, licet non habeat potentiam ad corruptio- 5
nem, tamen habet aptitudinem: totum enim elementum terre est mobile
motu recto, sicut aliqua pars eius, ex quo habet in se naturam, que est
principium motus activi, iuxta diffinitionem nature datam a Philosopho,
secundo Phisicorum.a Et tamen totum elementum terre non potest moveri
sursum nec deorsum; sufficit enim quod habeat aptitudinem, et si non 10
habet potentiam: cecus enim non potest videre, et tamen habet aptitudi-
nem ad videndum, ex quo privatio est negatio in subiecto apto nato, per
Aristotelem, quarto huius.b
Et si allegatur Philosophus, primo Celi,c qui dicit quod omne corrupti-
bile aliquando corrumpetur, dicitur quod illud est intelligendum secun- 15
dum individuum aut secundum speciem. Aliquid enim est generabile
quod tamen numquam generabitur, quia ante completam dispositionem
materie habebit impedimentum: sufficit enim quod ipsum generabitur
vel corrumpetur, vel aliquid eiusdem speciei cum illo.
Ad tertium respondetur quod forma et compositum possunt dupliciter 20
considerari, scilicet absolute et respective: si absolute, sic sunt equalis per-
fectionis; si respective, sic forma est perfectior composito in quantum dat
sibi nomen et diffinitionem. In quantum autem est pars, sic est imperfec-
305rb Pv tior, quia pars secundum quod huiusmodi | dicit potentiam, totum vero
73rb M dicit actum. | Quando vero queritur utrum homo et intellectus eius sint 25
eiusdem speciei vel diversarum, dico quod sunt diversarum specierum.
Ex quo non sequitur quod sunt diversarum perfectionum essentialium.
Illa autem auctoritas, Species sunt sicut numeri,d est intelligenda de spe-
ciebus incommunicantibus, scilicet quarum una non est pars alterius nec
perfectio illius; constat autem quod hominis pars et perfectio est intellec- 30
tus. Si autem concedatur hominem et formam esse eiusdem speciei, hoc
non est intelligendum per se, sed per reductionem, et sic non inconvenit
aliqua esse eiusdem speciei, quorum unum est corruptibile et reliquum
incorruptibile. Aristoteles autem loquitur de hiis que sunt per se eiusdem
speciei, videlicet quibus idem nomen competit et diffinitio. 35
habeat] habet M quo scr.] qua MPv nec] aut Pv
a Aristotle, Phys., II, 1, 192b2123. b Aristotle, Met., IV, 2, 1004a1217. c Aristotle, De coel., I,
12 passim. d Aristotle, Met., VIII, 3, 1044a511.
532 pauli veneti
Ad quartum respondetur quod non inconvenit aliqua esse eiusdem

speciei, quorum unum sit corruptibile et reliquum incorruptibile, dum-
modo illa invicem communicent sic quod unum sit pars alterius, sicut
contingit de homine universali et homine particulari: quodlibet enim
superius est pars et forma sui inferioris. Si tamen aliqua sunt per se eius- 5
dem speciei neque invicem communicant, oportet quod quodlibet illo-
rum sit incorruptibile, si alterum est incorruptibile. Plato autem, ponens
universalia separata, habuit dicere quod homo sensibilis et homo separa-
tus sunt per se individua eiusdem speciei non communicantia: si enim
homo ydealis est separatus, impossibile est quod sit perfectio aut pars 10
hominis sensibilis particularis. Deinde, Plato dixit hominem communem
nullo modo corruptibilem esse, neque per se neque per accidens, Ari-
stoteles autem voluit illum corrumpi et generari per accidens, ut supra
determinatum est in hoc septimo.a
hCAPITULUM IVi 15
Quid autem oportet h1041a6ssi.

Istud est quartum capitulum huius tractatus, in quo Philosophus mani-
festat que est illa quiditas que est substantia rei, postquam ostendit quod
quiditas separata, iuxta modum loquendi Platonis, non est substantia rei.
Et dividitur in tres partes, in quarum prima Philosophus continuat se; 20
in secunda ostendit quod quiditas coniuncta est tota substantia rei et
consequenter causa atque principium, ibi: Queritur autem h1041a10ssi;
in tertia probat quod quiditas rei non est aliqua pars illius, ibi: Quoniam
vero ex aliquo h1041b11ssi.
Quantum ad primum dicit Philosophus quod, reprobatis opinionibus 25
Platonicorum de universalibus et quiditatibus separatis, iam oportet veri-
tatem dicere quid et quale est ipsa quiditas que est substantia rei, non
loquendo de quiditate substantie separate, quia de hoc fiet inquisitio
in duodecimo huius, sed solum de quiditate substantie sensibilis, per
quam forte manifestabitur substantia a sensibilibus separata. Et licet prius 30
ostensum sit quid est ipsum quod quid est, seu quiditas rei, per diffi-
nitionem et predicationem primi modi dicendi per se, adhuc iterum ex
alio principio logico investigabitur idem, propter quod fiet manifestum
sit] est M et] est Pv ut supra om. M determinatum] dictum M est2 om.
Pv
a Aristotle, Met., VII, 8, 1033a2831.

quiditatem non separatam, sed coniunctam, esse substantiam rei et ean-

dem principium esse atque causam, ita quod, sicut quiditas non est que-
renda extra rem, ita nec causa et principium a quo accipitur nomen et
diffinitio.
Lege Litteram: Quid autem oportet dicere et quale quidem substantiam 5
que est quiditas, iterum aliud velut principium facientes dicamus; forsam
enim ex hiis erit palam et de illa substantia que est separata a sensibilibus
substantiis. Quoniam ergo substantia que est quiditas principium et causa
est, hinc est procedendum, scilicet ex dicendis ad probandum sic esse.a
Notandum, secundum Commentatorem, commento undesexace- 10
simo, quod cum sit manifestum per se quod iste substantie habent
causam, et quod causa substantie est substantia, oportet ponere per-
scrutationem etiam in substantiis rerum istarum et perscrutationem
de suis causis ; et perscrutatio de causis rerum sensibilium non
305va Pv potest fieri nisi numerando interro-|-gationes naturales de causis.b 15
Prima propositio Commentatoris est hec: manifestum est per se quod
substantie sensibiles habent causas. Probatur. Illud per se est manifestum,
73va M cui intellectus assentit | experientia sensitiva; sed intellectus assentit huic
propositioni substantie sensibiles habent causas experientia sensitiva,
quoniam per sensum experimur substantias sensibiles habere partes ex 20
quibus componuntur.
Secunda propositio: manifestum est per se quod cause substantie est
substantia. Probatur. Illud est per se manifestum, cui intellectus statim
assentit notis terminis; sed cognito quid importatur nomine cause, quod
est illud ad cuius esse sequitur aliud, et quid importatur nomine substan- 25
tie, quod est illud quod substat accidentibus, intellectus statim assentit
huic propositioni: causa substantie est substantia; ergo et cetera. Sicut
enim tota substantia substat accidentibus, ita et pars eius.
Tertia propositio: perscrutatio de substantiis sensibilibus presupponit
perscrutationem de suis causis. Patet, quia tunc unumquodque arbitra- 30
mur cognoscere cum cognoscimus causas eius, per Aristotelem, in pro-
logo Phisicorum,c et scire est rem per causam cognoscere et quoniam illius
quidem] quid Moerb. (quidem P1b) enim om. M causa] quedam add. Moerb.
undesexacesimo corr.] duode- MPv habent] habeant Iunt. causam]
causas Iunt. rerum istarum inv. Iunt. et perscrutationem] ex perscrutatione Iunt.
eius] illius Pv
VII, t.c. 59, fol. 207AB. c Aristotle, Phys., I, 1, 184a1014.
534 pauli veneti
est causa, ut habetur primo Posterioruma; ergo nichil perfecte cognoscitur

habens causas, nisi perfecte cognoscantur cause eius.
Quarta propositio: perscrutatio de causis presupponit numerationem
questionum de illis. Patet, quia omnis questio implicite vel explicite querit
de causa, ut colligitur a Philosopho, secundo Posteriorum,b in quo numerat 5
quatuor genera questionum, scilicet si est, quid est, quia est et propter
quid est. Quarum sufficientia sic habetur: omnis questio est circa incom-
plexum aut circa complexum. Si circa incomplexum, aut ergo querit de
esse illius, et sic est questio si est, aut de quiditate eiusdem, et sic est
questio quid est. Si circa complexum, aut ergo querit de inherentia pre- 10
dicati ad subiectum absolute, et sic est questio quia est, aut querit de
causa inherentie, et sic est questio propter quid est. Circa ergo propo-
sitionem de secundo adiacente versantur due questiones, videlicet si est
et quid est, ut si homo est et quid est homo, et circa propositionem de ter-
tio adiacente versantur alie due questiones, videlicet quia est et propter 15
quid est, ut utrum homo sit musicus et propter quid homo est musi-
cus.
Sed dubitatur, quia dicit Philosophus in prologo Posteriorumc quod
quid est et quia est sunt precognitiones; ergo non sunt nisi due que-
stiones, videlicet si est et propter quid est. Secundo autem Posteriorum,d 20
dicit quod omnis questio est questio medii; ergo non est nisi una questio.
Respondetur negando quamlibet illarum consequentiarum. Prima qui-
dem negatur, quia, licet nulla precognitio sit questio et econtra, tamen
hec duo subcontraria sunt concedenda: quid est et quia est sunt questio-
nes, quid est et quia est non sunt questiones. Unde, quia est het quid 25
esti dignitatum et subiecti sunt precognitiones et non sunt questiones,
sed quia est et quid est conclusionis sunt questiones, ita quod quia est
et quid est sunt questiones supponendo pro conclusionibus, que prius
dubitantur quam sciantur per demonstrationem; sed quia est et quid est
sunt precognitiones supponendo pro dignitatibus, subiecto et passione, 30
que precognoscuntur ante demonstrationem. Propterea non conceditur
quod omnia quid est et quia est sunt precognitiones, nec etiam quod
omnia quid est et quia est sunt questiones, propter implicationem con-
tradictionis.
est2 om. Pv et quid est suppl. subiecti] subiecto Pv
a Aristotle, An. Post., I, 2, 71b912. b Aristotle, An. Post., II, 12, 89b2390a9. c Aristotle,
An. Post., I, 1, 71a117. d Aristotle, An. Post., II, 2, 90a56.

Secunda consequentia etiam negatur, quia, licet omnis questio sit que-
stio medii, non tamen est solum una questio, sicut non est tantum unum
medium: aliud enim medium est per quod terminatur questio quid est
et aliud per quod terminatur questio quia est, et iterum aliud medium
est per quod terminatur questio propter quid est, secundum quod habet 5
videri primo Posteriorum.a Neque hec materia seu perscrutatio questio-
num est hic ponenda nisi quia est necessaria ad intelligentiam sequen-
tium.
Queritur autem ipsum h1040a10ssi.

Ista est secunda pars huius capituli, in qua Philosophus manifestat qui- 10
ditatem coniunctam esse substantiam rei, ac etiam principium et causam,
in quatuor conclusionibus, quarum prima est: questio propter quid non
habet locum ubi idem predicatur de seipso. Secunda conclusio: questio
propter quid habet locum ubi predicatur aliud de alio, ibi: Quare autem
305vb Pv aliquis h1041a20ssi. Tertia conclusio: | large loquendo, idem est quid et 15
propter quid, ibi: Palam ergo quod querit h1041a27ssi. Quarta conclusio:
73vb M in rebus simplicibus | non habet locum questio quid, ibi: Quoniam vero
oportet h1041b4ssi.
Prima conclusio arguitur: nulla questio habet locum nisi unum pre-
supponat tamquam notum et aliud interroget tamquam ignotum; ergo 20
questio propter quid non habet locum ubi idem predicatur de se ipso.
Prima pars antecedentis declaratur. Nam, si queritur si est homo, pre-
supponitur hoc nomen homo esse et quid importatur per hoc nomen
homo, interrogatur autem de esse hominis; constat autem quod notum
est illud nomen esse ac etiam significare hominem, sed ignoratur homi- 25
nem esse; ideo queritur utrum homo sit. Similiter, quando queritur quid
est homo, presupponitur hominem esse tamquam notum et interroga-
tur quid est homo tamquam ignotum: nullus enim querit quid est homo
nisi sciat hominem esse. Iterum, si queritur utrum homo sit musicus,
presupponitur hominem esse et musicum esse, et interrogatur de inhe- 30
rentia predicati ad subiectum, utrum sit talis inherentia musici ad homi-
nem, tamquam ignotum. Deinde, si queritur propter quid est homo musi-
cus, presupponitur hominem esse et musicum esse et hominem esse
musicum tamquam notum, interrogatur autem de causa propter quam
illud predicatum inheret illi subiecto tamquam de eo quod est ignotum, 35
a Aristotle, An. Post., I, 13, 78a22b31.

536 pauli veneti
quia, si causa sciretur illius inherentie, non quereretur propter quid homo
est musicus.
Secunda pars antecedentis etiam declaratur. Nam, sicut questio quid
est presupponit questionem si est in rebus ignotis, et questio propter
quid presupponit questio quia est, ita complexum presupponit incom- 5
plexum et propositio de tertio adiacente presupponit propositionem de
secundo adiacente, ex quibus sequitur quod questio querens propter quid
homo est homo presupponit duo tamquam nota, videlicet hominem esse
et hominem esse hominem; ergo nichil querit nec aliud interrogat tam-
quam ignotum. Patet consequentia, quia, quanto primo scitur hominem 10
esse hominem, tam primo scitur hominem esse idem sibi ipsi; modo,
nulla est causa propter quam homo est homo nisi quia homo est idem
sibi ipsi. Si ergo queritur propter quid homo musicus est homo musi-
cus, ita questio potest importare alietatem predicati cum subiecto, ut
propter quid homo est musicus et propter quid musicus est homo, et sic 15
ista questio utilis est et habet locum. Potest etiam importare identita-
tem predicati cum subiecto, ut propter quid homo est homo et propter
quid musicus est musicus, et sic questio ista vana est et non habet locum,
quia nichil ponitur ignotum, sed solum manifestum: presupponit enim
duo entia esse manifesta, videlicet si est et quia est, quibus habitis sci- 20
tur causa inherentie predicati ad subiectum. Quod autem questio prop-
ter quid presupponat talia entia esse manifesta patet in exemplo. Nam
si queritur propter quid luna eclipsatur, presupponitur tanquam mani-
festum illud quod pertinet ad questionem si est, videlicet luna esse et
eclipsim esse; presupponitur etiam tamquam notum illud quod pertinet 25
ad questionem quia est, videlicet luna eclipsari seu lunam pati eclip-
sim.
Lege Litteram: Queritur autem ipsum propter quid semper sic, idest
isto modo, ut propter quid aliquid aliud alii alicui inest? Nam querere
propter quid musicus est homo, musicus homo est aut est quod dictum est. 30
Quare propter quid homo musicus est aut aliud, et sic questio est utilis. Hec
quidem propter quid ipsum est ipsum, nichil est querere. Oportet enim ipsum
quia, idest illud quod pertinet ad questionem quia est, et ipsum esse, idest
quod pertinet ad questionem si est, existere manifesta entia. Dico autem
et1] aut Pv quid om. M ipsum om. M aliquid aliud] aliud om. Pv : aliud
aliquid Moerb. (inv. Da) est3] querere add. Moerb. hec] hoc Moerb. quidem]
igitur add. Moerb. quod om. M
ut quia luna patitur eclipsim oportet esse manifestum, quando queritur

propter quid luna eclipsari.a
306ra Pv Et si aliquis instaret, dicens quod, quinto huius,b dictum est quod, | licet
hominis sit aliqua causa, tamen nulla est causa propter quam homo est
homo, respondet Philosophus quod nulla est causa particularis propter 5
quam homo est homo aut propter quam aliud, quodcumque sit illud, pre-
dicetur de seipso, sed aliqua est causa communis propter quam homo est
homo et musicus est musicus, et propter quam unumquodque predicetur
74ra M de seipso, videlicet esse idem sibi ipsi |que quidem causa statim cogno-
scitur cum scitur hominem esse hominem aut musicum esse musicum. 10
Si autem quis assignaret causam propter quam unumquodque predicatur
de seipso, dicens hanc esse causam, videlicet unumquodque esse indivi-
sum a se, non est cura, quia ista est eadem causa cum illa; et si est alia
adhuc coincidit cum illa, que etiam statim cognoscitur cum scitur aliquid
predicari de seipso. Sicut ergo de quolibet esse vel non esse, non con- 15
tingit idem simul esse et non esse sunt prima principia et dignitates, ita
et hec unumquodque est idem sibi ipsi, unumquodque est indivisum a
seipso; constat autem quod dignitates et prima principia sunt sicut locus
ianue in domo, quem nullus ignorat, ut habetur secundo huius.c Sicut ergo
cum scitur hominem esse, statim cognoscitur quod non contingit eundem 20
hominem simul esse et non esse, per hoc commune principium non con-
tingit idem simul esse et non esse, ita statim cum scitur hominem esse
hominem, scitur hominem esse idem sibi ipsi et indivisum a se ipso per illa
communia principia, unumquodque est idem sibi ipsi, unumquodque
est indivisum a se ipso, que nullus ignorare potest, eo quod omnis digni- 25
tas et omne principium primum, licet sit modicum et breve in quantitate,
tamen est in virtute longissimum: modica et brevi oratione pronunciatur,
sed maxima virtute omnem demonstrationem et omnem veritatem ingre-
ditur.
Lege Litteram: Ipsius autem quia, scilicet ubi predicatur idem de 30
eodem, ipsum esse idem sibi ipsi, est una ratio et una causa in omnibus
(propter quid homo est homo et musicus est musicus), nisi quis dicat quia
indivisibile ad ipsum unumquodque causa, hoc autem erat unum esse idem
quam iter. M quem] quod Pv unumquodque2 iter. Pv principium primum

inv. Pv et M] aut Pv Moerb. (et DaOp) nisi] si add. Moerb. (om. Op P1)
a Aristotle,
Met., VII, 17, 1041a1016 (AL XXV 3.2, p. 165, lin. 896903). b Aristotle, Met., V,
18, 1022a3235. c Aristotle, Met., II, 1, 993b45.
538 pauli veneti
sibi ipsi. Sed hoc commune est, quia de omnibus dicitur, et quod breve est
in quantitate longissimum est in virtute.a
Contra predicta arguitur. Et primo quod questio quid non presupponit
esse quia. Nulla rosa existente queritur quid est rosa, et nullo vacuo exi-
stente queritur quid est vacuum, et nullo centauro existente queritur quid 5
est centaurus: sive enim sit rosa sive non sit, non minus investigatur dif-
finitio eius. Aristoteles autem, quarto Phisicorum,b demonstrans vacuum
non esse, diffinit ipsum, dicens quod est locus privatus corpore, sicut et
tertio Phisicorum,c querens quid est infinitum, dicit quod est illud cuius
quantitatem accipientibus, semper aliquid est extra accipere, priusquam 10
probavit infinitum non esse.
Secundo arguitur quod questio propter quid non presupponit inhe-
rentiam predicati de subiecto, quia dicit Commentator, primo Phisico-
rum,d quod demonstrationes mathematice simul declarant causam et
esse, scilicet causam passionis et inherentiam eiusdem cum subiecto, 15
secundo autem Posteriorum,e dicit quod idem est quid et propter quid;
constat autem quod questio quid est non presupponit inherentiam pre-
dicati de subiecto; ergo nec questio propter quid.
Tertio arguitur quod questio propter quam habet locum ubi idem pre-
dicatur de seipso, quia omnis questio querit de causa, per Philosophum, 20
secundo Posteriorum;f sed aliqua est causa propter quam homo est homo,
ut concessum est; ergo contingit querere de illa causa. Constat autem
quod non per questionem si est, neque per questionem quid est, neque
per questionem quia est; ergo per questionem propter quid est. Ergo et
cetera. 25
Item, questiones sunt equales numero hiis que vere scimus; sed quod
homo sit homo est scibile; ergo quod homo sit homo est queribile, non
306rb Pv autem per aliquam trium precedentium questionum, que sunt | si est,
quid est et quia est; ergo per ultimam questionem, que est propter quid,
est queribile hominem esse hominem. 30
Ad primum dicitur quod nulla questio fundatur super ignorantia nega-
tionis: qui enim simpliciter ignorat rem nichil de illa querit; sed fundatur
super ignorantia dispositionis, cum qua stat notitia de aliquo, ut habetur
commune] que Moerb. quid] est add. Pv questio] proprie Pv questio]

ratio M queribile] quesibile M si est om. M queribile] quesibile M
a Aristotle, Met., VII, 17, 1041a1620 (AL XXV 3.2, pp. 165166, lin. 903907). b Aristotle,
Phys., IV, 7, 213b33. c Aristotle, Phys., III, 6, 206b1520. d Averroes, In Phys., I, t.c. 2,
fol. 6M- 7A. e Aristotle, An. Post., II, 2, 90a3132. f Aristotle, An. Post., II, 2, 90a67.
primo Posteriorum.a Et licet questio quid est rosa? non presupponit esse
rose quod est esse existentie, tamen presupponit esse rose quod est esse
74rb M essentie: si enim de re non habetur | essentia neque existentia, de illa nullo
modo habetur diffinitio, eo quod quiditas et essentia rei est illud quod
importatur per diffinitionem. Et sicut de aliquo habetur duplex diffinitio, 5
scilicet quid nominis et quid rei, ita habetur duplex questio, videlicet quid
nominis et quid rei. Sicut ergo questio ipsius rei presupponit esse ipsius
rei, ita questio ipsius nominis presupponit esse ipsius nominis. Quia ergo
diffinitio vacui et infiniti non est nisi diffinitio quid nominis, ideo questio
quid est vacuum aut infinitum est solum questio quid nominis, presup- 10
ponens illud nomen esse; et hoc est necessarium: nisi enim sciretur illud
nomen esse, non quereretur quid est illud quod per illud nomen signifi-
catur.
Ad secundum dicitur quod, quia demonstrationes mathematice decla-
rant simul causam et esse, ideo in eis questio propter quid non esse habet, 15
sive predicetur idem de seipso sive aliud de alio: nam, quia simul demon-
stratur triangulum habere tres et declaratur causa illius passionis, ideo
nullus querit propter quid triangulus habet tres, sicut queritur propter
quid luna eclipsatur. Nam, quia mathematicus non se intromittit nisi de
forma, ut asserit Commentator in prologo Phisicorum,b et questio quid 20
est, est circa formam rei, ideo in mathematicis non invenitur nisi questio
quid est, que terminatur per diffinitionem, in quantum diffinitio subiecti
est etiam diffinitio passionis, licet non eodem modo, quoniam diffinitio
quid subiecti est diffinitio propter quid passionis et diffinitio identica
subiecti est diffinitio causalis passionis. Et licet idem sit quid et propter 25
quid, quia illud idem quod est quid subiecti est propter quid passionis,
et illud idem quod terminat questionem quid est terminat etiam questio-
nem propter quid est, non tamen eadem est questio quid est et questio
propter quid est, eo quod questio quid est respicit incomplexum seu
propositionem de secundo adiacente, questio autem propter quid respi- 30
cit complexum et propositionem de tertio adiacente.
Ad tertium respondetur quod questio propter quid terminatur per
demonstrationem, ut habetur secundo Posteriorum;c ideo illud quod non
est demonstrabile non est queribile questione propter quid; sed nulla
esse1 scr.] ens MPv nominis rei] rei nominis Pv declarant simul inv. Pv
etiam om. Pv queribile] quesibile M
a Aristotle, An. Post., I, 16, 79b23ff. b Averroes, In Phys., I, t.c. 1, fol. 6BC. c Aristotle, An.
Post., II, 2 passim; 10, 93b3894a10.
540 pauli veneti
propositio est demonstrabilis in qua idem predicatur de seipso, ut doce-

tur primo et secundo Posteriorum;a ergo nulla talis est queribilis questione
propter quid. Et licet omnis questio sit de causa, non tamen omne habens
causam est queribile, quia forte tam illud quam causa, scilicet, est per
se manifesta. Unde ens habet principia et causa, per Aristotelem, quarto 5
et sexto huius,b et tamen de ente nulla habetur questio; ita etiam, licet
hominem esse hominem habeat causam, quia tamen illa est manifesta,
ideo non queritur propter quid homo est homo. Et consequenter conce-
ditur quod omne proprie scibile est queribile; modo hominem esse homi-
nem non est proprie scibile, quia non per diffinitionem nec per demon- 10
strationem, sed est proprie intelligibile et largo modo scibile. Licet ergo
hominem esse sit demonstrabile, sicut et primum motorem esse et pri-
mam causam esse, non tamen est demonstrabile hominem esse hominem
306va Pv neque primum motorem esse primum motorem, neque primam causam |
esse primam causam. Quare et cetera. 15
Quereret autem aliquis h1041a20ssi.
Secunda conclusio: questio propter quid locum habet ubi predicatur
aliud de alio.
Probatur. Omnis questio locum habet, ubi aliquid presupponitur tam-
quam notum et aliquid queritur tamquam ignotum; sed ubi predicatur 20
aliud de alio, questio propter quid unum presupponit tamquam notum
et aliud querit tamquam ignotum; ergo et cetera. Tenet consequentia cum
maiori ex probatione prime conclusionis. Hec enim questio utrum nichil
sit, nullum locum habet, quia nichil presupponit tamquam notum, hec
autem utrum aliquid sit, etiam non habet locum, quia nichil querit tam- 25
quam ignotum. Minor vero est evidens. Nam, dum queritur propter quid
homo est tale animal, scilicet disciplinabile aut musicum, non queritur
propter quid ille qui est homo est homo, quia talis questio nichil que-
74va M rit, ex quo causa est nota, sed propter quid | musica est in homine. In
qua questione unum presupponitur tamquam notum, scilicet hominem 30
esse musicum, aliud queritur, scilicet causa propter quam musica est in
homine, et hoc est ignotum. Sicut ergo questio propter quid, ubi idem
predicatur de seipso, nulla est, quia nullam causam querit, licet presup-
ponat inherentiam predicati ad subiectum tamquam notum, ita questio
queribilis] quesibilis M queribile] quesibile M habetur questio inv. Pv

queribile] quesibile M esse primum motorem iter. Pv quare et cetera om.
M quereret] queret Pv Moerb.
a Aristotle, An. Post., II, 9, 93b2127. b Aristotle, Met., IV, 1, 1003a2632; VI, 1, 1025b34.
propter quid ubi predicatur aliud de alio, nulla est si querit causam et non
presupponit esse predicati cum subiecto: si enim queritur propter quid
tonat et non presupponitur tonitruum esse, questio nulla est; si autem
presupponitur tonitruum esse, questio habet locum, et tunc respondea-
tur per causam quam querit, dicendo quod ideo tonat, quia sonitus est in 5
nubibus. Similiter, si queritur propter quid lapides et lateres sunt domus,
ubi etiam predicatur aliud de alio, si non presupponitur lapides et late-
res esse, questio nulla esse dicitur; si autem presupponitur, questio habet
locum, cum debet satisfieri per causam effectivam aut finalem quam que-
rit, dicendo quod lapides, ligna et lateres sunt domus propter edificatorem 10
aut propter defensionem a nocivis impressionibus.
Lege Litteram: Quereret autem aliquis propter quid homo est animal
tale. Hoc quidem ergo palam, quia non querit quare qui est homo homo
est; aliquid ergo aliud de aliquo querit propter quid existit, et non idem de
eodem. Quia vero existit oportet manifestum esse; nam si non, ita nichil que- 15
rit questio propter quid, ut propter quid tonat? Quia sonitus fit in nubibus.
Aliud enim ita de alio est quod queritur et non idem de seipso. Et propter
quid hec, puta lateres et lapides, domus sunt?a
Notandum quod questio propter quid non solum habet locum ubi pre-
dicatur accidens de [subiecto] substantia, sed etiam ubi predicatur sub- 20
stantia de substantia et accidens de accidente, dummodo inter subiectum
et predicatum aliqua differentia appareat. Licet enim homo, animal et
rationale sint unum et idem realiter, tamen, quia differunt ratione, optime
potest queri propter quid homo est rationalis et propter quid homo est
animal, quibus questionibus satisfit per assignationem suarum causarum, 25
dicendo quod ideo homo est rationalis, quia habet intellectum, et prop-
terea homo est animal, quia est substantia animata sensitiva. Et ex hoc
non inconvenit tales propositiones demonstrari, quia, licet sint imme-
diate immediatione subiecti, non tamen sunt immediate immediatione
cause. Hec enim propositio substantia est ens nullo modo est demonstra- 30
bilis, eo quod est simpliciter immediata, tam immediatione cause quam
etiam immediatione subiecti, ex quo ens immediate descendit in decem
lateres] latera M esse dicitur] est Pv debet satisfieri inv. Pv aut] et M

impressionibus] et cetera add. Pv quereret] queret Pv Moerb. ergo] igitur
Moerb. fit in nubibus Pv Moerb.] factus in nubibus est M subiecto secl. et]
aut Pv homo] et add. Pv etiam om. Pv , decem predicamenta inv. Pv
542 pauli veneti
predicamenta et non per differentiam aliquam, genus autem descendit in

species per differentias essentiales, ut habetur tertio huius.a
Dubitatur quare Philosophus, dum querit propter quid tonat, assignat
306vb Pv hic causam formalem, dicendo quod ideo, | quia tonitrum est sonus factus
in nubibus, secundo autem Posteriorumb assignat causam materialem et 5
finalem, dicens quod tonat propter extinctionem ignis in nube et propter
tremorem eorum qui sunt in tartaro.
Respondetur quod diffinitio dari potest per omnia quatuor genera cau-
sarum, et questio propter quid querit causam in omni genere, ut ostendit
Philosophus, secundo Posteriorum,c dicens quod, si queritur propter quid 10
linea est recta, respondetur per formam, quia medium non discrepat ab
extremis; et si queritur propter quid homo est corruptibilis, respondetur
per materiam, quia componitur ex contrariis; si autem queritur propter
quid isti pugnant, respondetur per causam efficientem, quia furati sunt
aut per causam finalem, ut dominentur. Aristoteles ergo hic non excludit 15
causam efficientem, materialem atque finalem tonitrui, propter hoc quod
non assignat nisi causam formalem, neque in libro Posteriorumd exclu-
dit causam efficientem et formalem propter hoc quod assignat solum
materialem et formalem. Hic enim Philosophus ostendit quod questio
propter quid tollitur per causam, in Posterioribuse autem probat idem 20
posse demonstrari per plura genera causarum. Cum ergo queritur propter
74vb M quid tonat potest quadrupliciter responderi, | primo per causam forma-
lem dicendo: quia est sonus in nubibus; secundo per causam materialem
dicendo: quia ignis extinguitur in nube; tertio per causam efficientem:
quia caliditas ignis scindit nubem; quarto per causam finalem: ut timeant 25
qui sunt in inferno, iuxta opinionem Pitagore, aut ut purgetur aer, iuxta
opinionem Aristotelis.
Et sicut ad questionem querentem propter quid tonat, aut propter
quid est tonitruum, respondetur per omnia quatuor genera causarum,
ita per omnia illa potest demonstrari tonare vel tonitruum. Primo qui- 30
dem in genere cause finalis, ut quandocumque anime infernales timent,
dum] cum Pv est] add. tonus Pv Posteriorum corr.] Phisicorum MPv

efficientem] et add. Pv atque] vel M assignat] assignet M quia
mg. Pv] om. M est sonus inv. M tonare vel om. M
a Aristotle, Met., III, 3, 998b2227. b Aristotle, An. Post., II, 8, 93b89; 11, 94b3234.
c Aristotle, An. Post., II, 11 94a2835. d Aristotle, An. Post., II, 11, 94b3234. e Aristotle,
An. Post., II, 11 94a2024.
tunc est tonitruum; sed sole existente in cancro vel in cane anime infer-
nales timent; ergo [et cetera] sole existente in cancro vel cane est toni-
truum. Secundo, in genere cause efficientis, ut quandocumque caliditas
ignis scindit nubem, tunc est tonitruum; sed quandocumque ignis reper-
cutitur ad latera nubis, tunc caliditas ignis scindit nubem; ergo quan- 5
documque ignis repercutitur ad latera nubis, tunc est tonitruum. Tertio
in genere cause formalis, ut quandocumque sonus est in nubibus, tunc
est tonitruum; sed quandocumque nubes velociter franguntur, tunc est
sonus in nubibus; ergo quandocumque nubes velociter franguntur, tunc
est tonitruum. Quarto in genere cause materialis, ut quandocumque ignis 10
extinguitur in nube, tunc est tonitruum; sed quandocumque fit magna
antiperistasis in media regione aeris, tunc extinguitur ignis in nube; ergo
quandocumque fit magna antiperistasis in media regione aeris, tunc est
tonitruum. Sicut enim vinum est materia alterationis sanguinis, ita ignis
extinctus est materia alterationis tonitrui. 15
Palam ergo querit h1041a27ssi.
Tertia conclusio: large loquendo, idem est quid est et propter quid est.
Probatur. Questio propter quid querit omnem causam; sed quelibet
causa attribuitur ipsi quid est; ergo et cetera. Tenet consequentia cum
maiori ex dictis, quia, si queritur propter quid tonat aut propter quid est 20
domus, potest responderi per quamlibet causam. Minor vero declaratur,
quia omne illud dicitur pertinere ad quid est, per quod respondetur con-
venienter ad questionem querentem quid est hoc?; constat autem quod
per omnem causam convenienter respondetur ad questionem querentem
quid est hoc?. Si enim queritur quid est homo, convenienter responde- 25
307ra Pv tur quod est compositum ex corpore organizato et anima | intellectiva, ubi
assignatur materia et forma; in quibusdam autem assignatur efficiens et
finis, ut, si queritur quid est domus, respondetur quod est cooperimentum
prohibens a caumate et frigore; et si queritur quid est lectus, respondetur
quod est locus dormitionis, ubi assignatur causa finalis; aliquando etiam 30
causa efficiens, ut, si queritur quid est domus, potest responderi quod est
cooperimentum factum a domificatore, et in hoc dicitur causa efficiens
et finalis, quia causa efficiens queritur in fieri et corrumpi, causa vero
finalis non solum in fieri et corrumpi, sed etiam in esse. Proprie enim
dicimus domum fieri propter domificatorem, non autem proprie dici- 35
mus domum esse propter domificatorem, sed proprie dicimus domum
et cetera secl. vel] in add. Pv et om. Pv

544 pauli veneti
fieri et esse propter defensionem a caumate et frigore, ubi assignatur

causa finalis.
Et notanter dicitur in conclusione large loquendo,a quia, stricte et pro-
prie loquendo, non sunt idem quid et propter quid, eo quod ipsum quid
proprie ad ipsam formam pertinet, sed propter quid omnem causam 5
respicit. Et per hoc differt phisicus a logico, quia phisicus, considerans
essentiam rei, efficiens et finem, que sunt cause intrinsece, non compre-
hendit sub quiditate rei, logicus autem, considerans modum predicandi
et non essentiam rei, omne illud per quod convenienter respondetur ad
questionem querentem quid est, hoc dicit pertinere ad quod quid est, 10
sive illud sit intrinsecum, ut materia et forma, sive extrinsecum, ut agens
et finis.
75ra M Lege Litteram: Palam ergo quod questio | propter quid querit cau-
sam. Hoc autem est quod quid erat esse, ut est dicere logice, quod in qui-
busdam quidem est cuius causa, idest finis, ut forsan in domo aut lecto, in 15
quibusdam vero quid movit primum, idest efficiens; nam causa est hoc. Sed
talis quidem causa, idest efficiens, in fieri queritur et corrumpi, altera vero,
scilicet finis, et in esse queritur, sicut et in fieri et corrumpi.b
Contra conclusionem Philosophus movit unum dubium: questio quid
est in aliquibus habet locum, in quibus non habet locum questio propter 20
quid; ergo non sunt idem quid et propter quid. Probatur antecedens,
quia in natura simplici, ubi non predicatur aliquid de aliquo, habet locum
questio quid est, ut quid est homo aut equus, non autem in tali natura
habet locum questio propter quid, sed requiritur quedam complexio et
predicatio alicuius de aliquo, ut propter quid homo est animal et equus est 25
albus. Ista ratio occulta est et maxime ostendit quod non est idem quid
et propter quid, ex quo in aliquo reperitur quid, in quo non reperitur
propter quid.
Lege Litteram: Latet autem maxime quod queritur questione propter
quid in hiis que non de aliis dicuntur, ut homo quid est queritur, propter 30
simpliciter dici, sed non diffinite, idest complexe, quia hoc aut hoc est
homo.c
ergo] igitur Moerb. aut] in add. Moerb. (in om. P) movit] momovit Pv
equus] ignibilis (pro hinnibilis?) aut add. Pv latet Pv Moerb.] licet M diffinite]
diffinire Moerb. hoc hoc] hec hoc Moerb. (hoc hoc Op)
a Cf. supra, p. 543, 17. b Aristotle, Met., VII, 17, 1041a2732 (AL XXV 3.2, p. 166, lin. 914919).
c Aristotle, Met., VII, 17, 1041a32b2 (AL XXV 3.2, p. 166, lin. 920922).
Respondet Philosophus, dicens quod istud dubium hsolvituri per hunc

modum, querendo utrum questio quid est presupponat quiditatem esse
in aliquo aut in nullo. Si presupponit quiditatem esse in aliquo, scili-
cet humanitatem esse in Sorte, sequitur quod idem est quid et propter
quid, et ubi habet locum questio quid, ibi habet locum questio propter 5
quid, faciendo unum complexum ex quiditate et ex illo in quo est qui-
ditas, quod presupponitur esse: verbi gratia, si queritur quid est homo
et respondetur quod homo est animal rationale aut quod est illud quod
habet humanitatem. Consimiliter respondetur inquirendo propter quid
Sortes est homo, assignando eandem causam. Si autem dicitur quod que- 10
stio quid est nichil presupponit in quo est quiditas, sequitur quod aliquid
est commune questioni nichil querenti et aliquid querenti. Cum enim
queritur quid est homo, certum est quod aliquid queritur, quia queritur
illud a quo homo habet nomen et diffinitionem, et etiam nichil queritur,
ex quo nichil presupponitur esse: omnis enim questio unum presupponit 15
et aliud querit, ut in prima conclusione ostensum est.
Lege Litteram: Sed oportet corrigentes hunc errorem querere si questio
quid est aliquid presupponit aut non. Si aliquid presupponit idem est
307rb Pv quid et propter quid. Si autem | non presupponit aliquid, tunc commune
eius quod nichil querere et eius quod querere aliquid fit.a 20
Notandum ex doctrina Philosophi, secundo Phisicorum,b quod forma,
efficiens et finis coincidunt in idem specie aut numero, materia autem
cum nullo eorum coincidere potest, propter quod forma, efficiens et finis
sunt cause ipsius materie, que ad quod quid est diffiniti non pertinet nisi
secundum quod induit aliquem modum forme: omnes enim partes diffini- 25
tionis sunt formales, ut supra Philosophus demonstravit.c Quia ergo mate-
ria secundum quod huiusmodi, et secundun quod necessitatur per effi-
ciens, formam et finem, non ingreditur diffinitionem, ideo ad questionem
querentem quid est vel propter quid est Aristoteles non assignavit mate-
riam, sed tantum formam, efficiens et finem. Cum enim dicit quod toni- 30
truum est sonitus in nubibus, assignavit formam, eo quod sonus est forma
tonitrui; quando autem dixit quod domus est ex lapidibus et lignis prop-
ter domificatorem et propter defensionem, assignavit efficiens et finem.
solvitur suppl. presupponat] presupponit Pv quid2] est add. Pv aut] autem

Moerb. aut] et M efficiens formam inv. Pv
a Aristotle,
Met., VII, 17, 1041b24 (AL XXV 3.2, p. 166, lin. 922924). b Aristotle, Phys., II, 7,
198a2427. c Cf. supra, tr. 2, c. 3, pp. 327, 16328, 10.
546 pauli veneti
Hoc totum facit Philosophus, ut omnia quesita reducat in quod quid est,
concludens tandem intentum suum, scilicet quod quiditas coniuncta est
substantia rei et causa atque principium.
Sed dubitatur, quia videtur quod, cum queritur propter quid est domus,
75rb M non possit | responderi per diffinitionem importantem causam effecti- 5
vam, quia omnis diffinitio est medium in demonstratione, per Philoso-
phum, secundo Posteriorum,a effectus autem artificiales non sunt demon-
strabiles nisi per genus cause finalis, ut docet Philosophus, ibidem;b ergo
et cetera.
Respondetur, iuxta doctrinam Aristotelis, secundo Phisicorum,c quod 10
artificialia non solum diffiniuntur per finem, sed etiam per materiam:
diffinitur enim domus non solum per esse cooperimentum salvans, sed
etiam per lapides et ligna, neque serra diffinitur tantum per dividere dura,
sed etiam per esse instrumentum ferreum dentatum. Ergo in artificiali-
bus est necessitas materie sicut finis, et per accidens effectus artificiales 15
possunt diffiniri et demonstrari per materiam sicut per finem. Sicut enim
demonstratur domus per esse cooperimentum salvans hominem et res
possessas, ita demonstratur per esse compositum ex lapidibus et lignis
hoc modo: omne compositum ex lapidibus et lignis est domus; sed hoc
est compositum ex lapidibus et lignis; ergo hoc est domus. Quando ergo 20
Aristoteles dicit, secundo Posteriorum,d quod effectus artificiales non sunt
demonstrabiles nisi per genus cause finalis, hoc dicit in quantum nulla
causa est simpliciter necessaria in artificialibus nisi finis: efficiens enim
forma et materia nullam necessitatem habent nisi in ordine ad finem. Si
enim impellatur lapis sursum per artem, necessario ascendit, hic tamen 25
impulsus non est necessarius ex parte agentis, quia in potestate artifi-
cis est impellere vel non impellere, ex quo potentie rationales sunt ad
opposita, per Philosophum, nono huius.e In naturalibus autem, que non
habent dominium sui actus, necessitas reperitur ex parte agentis: non
enim potest magnus ventus non impellere lapillum sursum aut inunda- 30
tiones aquarum non facere. Etiam in artificialibus non est necessitas ex
parte forme ut distinguitur contra finem: ars enim nullam sibi determinat
ut] et M reducat] reducit M Philosophum] Aristotelem Pv diffinitur

tantum inv. Pv hoc om. Pv Aristoteles dicit inv. Pv secundo corr. (cfr. supra,
lin. 8)] primo MPv lapillum] lapillos Pv
a Aristotle, An. Post., II, 10, 93b3894a10. b Aristotle, An. Post., II, 11, 94b911; 95a34.
c Aristotle, Phys., II, 9, 200a30b8. d Aristotle, An. Post., II, 11, 94b911; 95a36. e Aristotle,
Met., IX, 2, 1046b45.
formam simpliciter, sed tantum ratione finis, quia artifex non introdu-
cit formam navis vel domus nisi in quantum per istam melius habebitur
finis, natura autem absolute sibi determinat formam sive attingat finem
sive non attingat. Unde omnia agentia naturalia, sicut determinant sibi
absolute certum gradum perfectionis entium, ita et determinatam for- 5
mam. Iterum, ex parte materie non est necessitas absolute in artificia-
libus: nam in constitutione talium nullam materiam sibi determinat ars
simpliciter, sed tantum per respectum ad finem, ut ligna et lapides in
formatione domus et ferrum in productione serre et vitrum in produc-
tione fiale, in quantum talis materia aptior est ad finem intentum. Natura 10
307va Pv autem, licet agat propter finem, adhuc circumscripto fine de-|-terminat
sibi propriam materiam ut animal carnem et ossa, planta vero radices et
frondes. Quia ergo necessitas in artificialibus non provenit simpliciter nisi
ex parte finis, ideo dicit Philosophus, secundo Posteriorum,a quod talia
non demonstrantur nisi per finem. 15
Quoniam vero oportet h1041b4ssi.
Quarta conclusio: in rebus simplicibus non habet locum questio quid
est nec questio propter quid, sed solum in compositis.
Patet. Nam questio quid est presupponit aliquid esse et illud habere
quiditatem; constat autem quod non est quiditas in aliquo, nisi sit com- 20
positio ex quiditate et eo cuius est quiditas, sive sit compositio realis
sive rationis. Questio etiam propter quid querit compositionem forme in
materia, ut, si queritur propter quid lapides et ligna sunt domus, ista que-
stio intendit querere propter quid in lapidibus et lignis est quiditas domus.
75va M Si etiam queritur propter quid Sortes et Plato est homo aut propter quid | 25
tale corpus est homo, videlicet taliter organizatum et taliter figuratum,
intentio querentis est querere propter quid in Sorte vel Platone est huma-
nitas et propter quid in tali vel tali corpore est quiditas hominis. Constat
autem quod non est quiditas domus in lapidibus et lignis, neque quiditas
hominis in Sorte vel Platone vel in tali corpore, absque compositione. 30
Lege Litteram: Quoniam vero oportet habereque et existere ipsum esse,
palam itaque quia querit materiam propter quid est, ut domus hec prop-
ter quid est ex lapidibus et lignis? Quia hec existunt sub forma que est
quod erat domui esse, idest quiditas domus. Et homo hic est quia habet
questio om. Pv et] aut Pv vel] in add. Pv querit materiam inv. Moerb.
(querit materiam P)
a Aristotle, An. Post., II, 11, 94b911; 95a34.

548 pauli veneti
humanitatem in se aut corpus hoc habens, idest propter quid corpus sic
organizatum aut habens talem carnem et sanguinem est homo.a
Ex predictis Aristoteles infert duo correlaria, quorum primum est quod
quiditas coniuncta est substantia rei et causa atque principium. Probatur.
Illud quod queritur per questionem quid et propter quid est quiditas 5
coniuncta; ergo quiditas coniuncta est substantia rei. Tenet consequentia
cum maiori, quia ille questiones non querunt accidens rei, ut patuit.
Minor vero declaratur. Nam illud quod queritur per illas questiones est
causa materie, ut probavit quarta conclusio; causa autem materie est
forma coniuncta materie et quiditas secundum quam aliquid est; ergo 10
quiditas coniuncta est illud quod queritur per questionem quid est et
propter quid. Si ergo quiditas coniuncta est substantia rei, necesse est
quod ipsa sit principium et causa, et hoc erat principale intentum.
Lege Litteram: Quare causa queritur materie, hec autem species qua
aliquid est; hec autem substantia est rei.b 15
Secundum correlarium est quod, licet in rebus simplicibus non sit que-
stio quid vel propter quid neque doctrina, tamen in eis est questio si est
et quia est. Prima pars est probata, quia in nullo invenitur questio quid
vel propter quid, nisi in eo sit compositio; in rebus autem simplicibus
non est compositio; ergo in eis non est questio quid nec propter quid. 20
Secunda pars sequitur ex priori. Nam doctrina est scientia acquisita a doc-
tore per demonstrationem propter quid, ut habetur primo Posteriorum;c
omnis autem demonstratio propter quid terminat questionem propter
quid, ut docet Philosophus, secundo Posteriorum;d ergo in eo non est doc-
trina in quo non est questio propter quid, nec etiam in illis est demonstra- 25
tio. Tertia pars declaratur, quoniam, octavo Phisicorum,e demonstratur
primum motorem esse, et ipsum esse infatigabilem atque indivisibilem;
sed omnis demonstratio terminat aliquam questionem; ergo demonstra-
tio probans primum motorem esse terminat questionem si est, et alia
probans primum motorem esse infatigabilem atque indivisibilem termi- 30
nat questionem quia est. Patet consequentia, quia questio si est respicit
hoc] hoc hoc Moerb. (hoc P2) patuit] patet M est om. Pv hec] hoc Moerb.
(hec F GpNe) autem] est add. Moerb. hec] hoc Moerb. (hec GpNe) quid2
om. Pv demonstratio scr.] doctrina MPv motorem] in add. Pv
a Aristotle,Met., VII, 17, 1041b47 (AL XXV 3.2, p. 166, lin. 924928). b Aristotle, Met., VII,
17, 1041b79 (AL XXV 3.2, pp. 166167, lin. 928929). c Aristotle, An. Post., I, 2, 71b912; I,
6; 13 passim. d Aristotle, An. Post., II, 2 passim; 10, 93b3894a10. e Aristotle, Phys., VIII, 10,
267b3 et passim.
propositionem de secundo adiacente et questio quia est respicit propo-

sitionem de tertio adiacente.
307vb Pv Lege litteram: Palam ergo quoniam in simplicibus non est questio
quid vel propter quid nec doctrina, sed alter modus questionis talium.a
Notandum, secundum Beatum Thomam,b quod de substantiis simpli- 5
cibus, videlicet de Deo et intelligentiis, non potest aliqua questio fieri,
quia in omni questione supponitur aliquid tamquam notum et aliquid
queritur tamquam ignotum; sed tale necessario est compositum habens
partes, ex quo unum supponitur et aliud queritur; cum ergo substantie
simplices partes non habeant, de illis non contingit querere quid sunt. 10
Deinde, questio propter quid aut querit formam in materia aut causam
forme in materia, que est efficiens vel finis; sed substantie simplices non
habent formam in materia; ergo in illis hnoni invenitur questio propter
quid, et consequenter de illis non est doctrina, quia doctrina est gene-
ratio scientie, fit autem in nobis scientia per hoc quod scimus propter 15
quid. Syllogismi etiam demonstrativi facientis scire medium est prop-
ter quid est, ut habetur secundo Posteriorum.c Quia ergo tales substantie
75vb M aut totaliter | sciuntur aut totaliter ignorantur, et questiones sunt equa-
les numero hiis que vere scimus, ideo de illis non habetur scientia neque
questio. In eis tamen est alius modus querendi, quia in cognitionem sub- 20
stantiarum simplicium nos devenimus per substantias sensibiles, quarum
cause sunt substantie simplices, unde utimur istis sensibilibus tamquam
medio in acquirendo cognitionem substantiarum simplicium: nam, duo-
decimo huius,d Philosophus per motum et per alios effectus sensibiles
probat tales substantias esse. Sicut ergo in hiis sensibilibus, supponendo 25
materiam, querimus formam, agens et finem, ita substantie simplices,
cum sint forme et finis horum inferiorum, ac cause agentes, suppositis
istis inferioribus nos querimus substantias simplices.
Ista expositio potest esse dubia. Primo, quia dicit quod de substantiis
simplicibus non habetur aliqua questio, quoniam, ut ostensum est, de 30
eis habetur questio si est et questio quia est. Propterea Commentatore
dicit quod in eis non invenitur questio propter quid neque per quare,
ad denotandum quod in eis alique questiones inveniuntur; et licet omnis
ergo] igitur Moerb. quoniam] quod Moerb. (quoniam P1b) non suppl.
facientis scr.] facientes MPv aut2] vel Pv istis] hiis Pv
a Aristotle, Met., VII, 17, 1041b911 (AL XXV 3.2, p. 167, lin. 929931). b Aquinas, Exp. Met.,
VII, lect. 17, n. 1669. c Aristotle, An. Post., II, 2 passim; 10, 93b3894a10. d Aristotle, Met.,
XII, 6, 1071b326; 7, 1072a1926. e Averroes, In Met., VII, t.c. 59, fol. 207HI.
550 pauli veneti
questio aliquid supponat tamquam notum et aliud querit tamquam igno-

tum, non tamen requiritur ibi compositio partium, et maxime in que-
stione si est et quia est.
Secundo, quia dicit quod de illis non habetur scientia, quia Aristoteles
et Commentator, secundo Phisicorum,a dicunt quod tres sunt scientie spe- 5
culative, videlicet mathematica, naturalis et divina. Si enim de substantiis
simplicibus non habetur notitia nisi a posteriori, de eis non haberetur
scientia perfecta, quia scientia perfecta habetur per causam, ut asserit
Commentator in prologo Phisicorumb; ymmo scientia que habetur de illis
non esset metaphisica, sed naturalis, si non haberetur de eis cognitio nisi 10
a posteriori per motum, quia omnis demonstratio per transmutationem
et motum est demonstratio naturalis, per Commentatorem, primo Phisi-
corum,c ubi ostendit quod solus naturalis est ille qui probat substantias
simplices esse.
Dicendum ergo quod in rebus simplicibus simpliciter consideratis, abs- 15
que compositione et absque modo compositionis, non invenitur que-
stio quid nec propter quid. In rebus autem simplicibus consideratis ut
composita sunt aut sub modo compositionis, sic in eis ambe questiones
inveniuntur. Unde substantie sensibiles vere componuntur ex materia et
forma; substantie autem insensibiles create vere componuntur ex genere 20
et differentia, ex quo sunt species predicamentis substantie. Ideo, tam
in substantiis simplicibus creatis quam in substantiis sensibilibus, con-
tingit querere quid est et propter quid est. In Deo autem, et si nulla
compositio est, sicut neque materia vel forma aut genus vel differentia,
tamen in eo est aliquid per modum compositionis: sicut in eo est ali- 25
quid per modum materie et aliquid per modum forme, etiam in eo est
aliquid per modum generis et aliquid per modum differentie. Si enim
Deus aggregat in se perfectiones omnium rerum, iuxta intentionem Ari-
stotelis et Commentatoris, quinto huius,d necesse est quod modi omnium
308ra Pv rerum dicentes perfectionem inveniantur in | Deo. Et hac de causa, sicut 30
in creaturis, ita etiam in Deo aliqua inveniuntur a quibus accipitur questio
quid et propter quid, aliter metaphisicus non consideraret quiditates
solus] solius scr. et corr. M aliquid2] etiam Pv quid1] est add. Pv

quiditates] de quiditatibus Pv
a Aristotle, Phys., II, 2 passim (cf. Met., VI, 1, 1026a6ff); Averroes, In Phys., II, t.c. 18; 21; 26
(passim). b Averroes, In Phys., I, t.c. 1, fol. 6A. c Averroes, In Phys., I, t.c. 83, fol. 47FG.
d Aristotle, Met., V, 16, 1021b2330; Averroes, In Met., V, t.c. 21, fol. 131B.
substantiarum abstractarum, contra doctrinam Commentatoris, primo

Phisicorum.a Et ita intendit Philosophus, dicens, secundo Posteriorum,b
quod de Deo primo querimus si est, deinde autem querimus quid est.
Ex quibus sequitur quod de Deo et intelligentiis potest haberi scientia
speculativa a priori propter quid, quoniam, ex quo omnes perfectiones 5
sunt in Deo, necesse est quod in eo inveniatur aliquid per modum diffini-
tionis et aliquid per modum subiecti et aliquid per modum passionis, ex
quibus fit demonstratio et aggeneratur scientia. Neque oportet illa distin-
gui realiter extra animam, sicut conceptus illorum realiter differunt in
anima: nam, ut ostensum est de intentione Philosophi et Commentato- 10
76ra M ris, | species, genus et differentia non realiter differunt, quia de seinvicem
predicantur, sed solum differunt ratione, et tamen conceptus mentales
eliciti ab illis realiter differunt. Demonstratio enim per quam probatur
quod Deus est actus purissimus, est demonstratio propter quid a priori,
aggenerans scientiam. Non tamen realiter differunt primum simpliciter 15
et Deus et actus purissimus, ex quibus fit illa demonstratio, sed differunt
ratione; et non solum ex opere intellectus, sed ex natura rei [prius et pri-
mum simpliciter est causa propter quam Deus est actus purissimus, et]
esse primum simpliciter est causa propter quam Deus est actus purissi-
mus. 20
Notandum secundo quod Philosophus, in hoc septimo, tripliciter diffi-
nit ipsum quid. Primoc pro eo quod est indicatum per diffinitionem, et sic
accepit continue quando docuit quomodo ipsum quod quid est est idem
cum eo cuius est, et qualiter generatur, et que sunt partes eius. Secundod
diffinit eum pro eo per quod convenienter respondetur ad questionem 25
querentem propter quid, et sic accepit in tertia conclusione huius capi-
tuli,e cum dixit quod idem est quid et propter quid, ita quod omnis
questio quid est potest transmutari in questionem propter quid, et illud
per quod respondetur ad questionem querentem quid est respondetur
ad questionem querentem propter quid. Tertiof diffinit eum pro eo quod 30
est forma materie suppositalis, eo modo quo dicitur, primo Celi,g quod
qui dicit celum dicit formam et qui dicit hoc celum dicit materiam; et
abstractarum] separatarum Pv primo] prius Pv querimus1] queramus

Pv priuset secl., quia post rei fort. addendum notandum secundo inv.
Pv dixit] dicit M
a Averroes, In Phys., I, t.c. 83, fol. 47FG. b Aristotle, An. Post., II, 1, 89b3135. c Aristotle,
Met., VII, 4, 1030a67; VII, 612 passim. d Aristotle, Met., VII, 17, 1041a1032. e Cf. supra,
p. 535, 1516. f Aristotle, Met., VII, 17, 1041a22b9. g Aristotle, De coel., I, 9, 278a1215.
552 pauli veneti
sic diffinit eum in secunda conclusione et in secundo correlario huius

capituli,a cum dixit quiditatem domus esse in lapidibus et lignis et quidi-
tatem hominis esse in Sorte. Quia ergo efficiens et finis sunt extrinseca rei
et rationes individuales sunt materiales, ideo ipsum quod quid est habet
rationem cause [forme] formalis, ex quo est obiectum intellectus abstra- 5
hens ab efficiente et fine et a rationibus individuantibus. Nec obstat si pars
eius est materia communis, quia principaliter denominatur a forma, que
est altera pars eius principalis, et comparatur ad suppositum sicut forma
ad materiam, ideo habet rationem cause formalis.
Ex quibus sequitur quod, preter materiam sensibilem et intellectua- 10
lem, de quibus locutus est Philosophus superius,b oportet dare materiam
rationis, que dicitur materia suppositalis, cui competit forma quiditativa.
Dicitur autem suppositum materia rationis in quantum a sua forma quidi-
tativa tantum ratione differt; et quia tam in substantiis simplicibus creatis
quam in sensibilibus invenitur vera compositio, ideo in eis proprie inve- 15
nitur quiditas. In Deo autem non est proprie loquendo quiditas, sicut nec
compositio, et consequenter questio querens utrum in Deo sit idem qui-
ditas cum eo cuius est quiditas aut impropria est aut nulla. Conceditur
tamen quod in Deo est aliquid per modum quiditatis, ut deitas et infini-
tas, et aliquid per modum cuius est quiditas, ut Deus et infinitum. 20
Contra predicta dubitatur utrum quid, per quod respondetur ad prop-
ter quid in demonstratione, sit quid passionis vel subiecti. Et arguitur
quod subiecti, quia, quarto Phisicorum, dicitur a Philosophocquod diffini-
tio subiecti est causa omnium que sunt in subiecto; constat autem quod
causa est medium in demonstratione, per Aristotelem, secundo Posterio- 25
rum.d
In oppositum arguitur sic: in demonstratione medium est diffinitio
maioris extremitatis, per Philosophum, secundo Posteriorum;e sed maior
extremitas est passio; ergo medium in demonstratione est quid passionis.
308rb Pv In hac materia sunt due opiniones. Quarum prima est Egidii, dicentis 30
quod diffinitio passionis et non subiecti est medium in demonstratione.
Primo,f quia medium et passio debent esse unigenea, per Aristotelem,
dixit] dicit M forme secl. simplicibus creatis] sensibilibus Pv in

sensibilibus] simplicibus creatis Pv in demonstratione om. Pv a Philosopho]
Philosophus Pv unigenea] unigena Pv
a Cf. supra, p. 535, 1314; 548, 16549, 2. b Cf. supra, tr. 2, c. 3, p. 360, 614. c Aristotle, Phys.,
IV, 4, 211a79. d Aristotle, An. Post., II, 1, 90a67. e Aristotle, An. Post., II, 8, 93b6. f Giles of
Rome, Q. Med. Dem. ed. Pinborg, p. 240; Sup. Post., ed. Venice 1496, fol. N4+1vb 64N4+2ra
40.
primo Posteriorum;a modo passio non esset unigenea medio, si ipsum

esset diffinitio subiecti, quia tunc essent diversorum generum. Propterea
76rb M geometra non demonstrat habere | tres de triangulo per diffinitionem
trianguli, sed per diffinitionem passionis, videlicet per habere angulum
extrinsecum. 5
Secundo:b medium in demonstratione debet esse medium realiter et
materialiter, ita quod sit prius uno extremo et posterius alio, ut patet
in motu locali, iuxta doctrinam Aristotelis, quinto Phisicorum,c quia ali-
ter non haberet rationem medii. Hoc autem non competit diffinitioni
subiecti, sed passionis: nam diffinitio subiecti est prior subiecto et pas- 10
sione, diffinitio autem passionis proprie mediat inter subiectum et pas-
sionem.
Tertio:d si diffinitio subiecti est medium, aut ergo ad demonstrandum
primam passionem vel sequentes. Non ad demonstrandum primam pas-
sionem, quia immediate inheret subiecto et non est magis nota de diffi- 15
nitione quam de subiecto. Non etiam ad demonstrandum aliquam poste-
riorem, quia tunc demonstratio non esset ex immediatis, eo quod prima
passio mediat inter subiectum et quamcumque sequentem.
Quarto,e sequeretur quod isto modo principium de quolibet esse vel
non esse oriretur a premissa demonstrationis, contra Philosophum, primo 20
Posteriorum,f dicentem quod est prima et maxima propositio, quam
necesse est quemlibet docentem habere. Et patet consequentia, quia illud
principium oriretur a quiditate rei, per Philosophum, quarto huius;g con-
stat autem quod quiditas rei est illud quod importatur per diffinitionem,
per Aristotelem in hoc septimo.h 25
Secunda opinio est Alexandri,i dicentis hic quod diffinitio subiecti est
medium in diffinitione. Primo auctoritate Aristotelis, dicentis, quarto
huius,j quod illud est maxime tale per cuius propinquitatem et distantiam
aliquid est magis vel minus tale; sed medium demonstrationis quanto
est propinquius diffinitioni subiecti, tanto magis demonstrat, et quanto 30
unigenea] unigena Pv diversorum generum] diversarum rationum et generum M

materialiter scr. ex Pauli Exp. Post.] naturaliter MPv prior] prius Pv et] ex Pv
a Aristotle, An. Post., I, 9, 76a89. b The argument is not to be found in Giles of Romes
Sup. Post., but cf. Paul of Venice, Exp. Post., fol. S4+4rab. c Possibly: Aristotle, Phys., V, 5,
229b1421. d Giles of Rome, Q. Med. Dim., p. 265; Sup. Post., fol. N4+2rb 2128. e Giles
of Rome, Q. Med. Dim., p. 265. f Aristotle, An. Post., I, 11, 77a10ff. g Aristotle, Met., IV, 4,
1007a20b18. h Aristotle Met., VII, 4, 1030a67. i Alexander of Alexandria, Exp. Met., VII,
c. 17, q. 2, fol. 242rb243ra. j Aristotle, Met., IV, 2, 1004a2531.
554 pauli veneti
est remotius, tanto minus demonstrat; ergo diffinitio subiecti maxime

demonstrat.
Secundo, omnis propositio habens propter quid est demonstrabilis, ex
quo ipsum propter quid est principium demonstrationis, per Aristote-
lem, in prologo De anima;a sed propositio in qua predicatur prima passio 5
de subiecto habet propter quid, scilicet causam propter quam predica-
tum inest subiecto; ergo est demonstrabilis, et non nisi per diffinitionem
subiecti; ergo et cetera. Ut arguatur sic: sicut resolvitur secunda passio
in primam, ita passio prima resolvitur in naturam subiecti; sed secunda
passio demonstratur per primam; ergo prima demonstratur per naturam 10
subiecti. Constat autem quod diffinitio est natura subiecti.
Tertio, propositio in qua predicatur prima passio de subiecto est eque
mediata et immediata, sicut propositio in qua predicatur secunda pas-
sio de eodem subiecto, quia utraque earum est immediata immediatione
subiecti, ex quo non datur subiectum medium, et est mediata mediatione 15
cause, quia utraque habet causam inherentie predicati ad subiectum; sed
propositio in qua predicatur secunda passio de subiecto est demonstra-
bilis; ergo etiam est demonstrabilis illa in qua predicatur prima passio de
subiecto. Constat autem quod hoc fieri non posset nisi per diffinitionem
subiecti. 20
Quarto, omnis distinctio realis reducitur in distinctionem rationis: nam
lumen et calor realiter differunt, quorum principia solum ratione diffe-
runt, scilicet virtus calefactiva et virtus illuminativa in sole. Sed quando
308va Pv demonstratur secunda passio de subiecto per primam, medium differt a |
subiecto solum ratione. Hoc autem contingit quando demonstratur prima 25
passio de subiecto. Ergo et cetera.
Sed pro variatione ab utraque dictarum opinionum sit hec prima
distinctio: duplex est subiectum passionis, scilicet immediatum et media-
tum. Subiectum immediatum est illud cui passio competit, et non per
aliud subiectum, et sic triangulus est subiectum immediatum equalita- 30
tis trium angulorum ad duos rectos, et homo est subiectum immediatum
disciplinabilis et risibilis et omnium passionum sequentium. Subiectum
76va M mediatum est illud cui passio competit per aliud subiectum, | et sic isosce-
les est subiectum equalitatis trium angulorum ad duos rectos, et Sortes est
et cetera om. M arguatur] arguitur Pv est scr.] et MPv ergo] et cetera add.
M quando] cum Pv
a Aristotle, De an., I, 402b2526.

subiectum risibilis vel disciplinabilis, quoniam habere tres competit iso-

sceli ratione trianguli, et risibile vel disciplinabile competit Sorti ratione
hominis. Quando ergo demonstratur passio de subiecto mediato non est
medium diffinitio subiecti neque passionis, sed subiectum immediatum,
ut docet Philosophus, primo Posteriorum,a ita quod habere tres demon- 5
stratur de isoscele per triangulum tamquam per medium, et esse risibile
demonstratur de Sorte per hominem, eo quod illud quod fuit subiectum et
minor extremitas in diffinitione universali debet esse medium in demon-
stratione particulari, ut habet videri secundo Posteriorum.b
Secunda distinctio est hec, quod duplex est passio, videlicet converti- 10
bilis et non convertibilis cum suo subiecto: passio convertibilis cum suo
subiecto est illa que fluit a principiis speciei, ut risibile et disciplinabile
respectu hominis, et equalitas trium angulorum ad duos rectos respectu
trianguli; passio autem non convertibilis cum suo subiecto est illa que
fluit a principiis individui, ut simitas respectu nasi et rectitudo respectu 15
linee, loquendo de subiecto immediato. Hec autem passio demonstratur
de subiecto suo non per diffinitionem subiecti, sed per diffinitionem pas-
sionis: non enim demonstratur simitas de naso per diffinitionem nasi, sed
per diffinitionem simitatis; neque demonstratur rectitudo de linea per dif-
finitionem linee, sed per diffinitionem rectitudinis, quia, cum subiectum 20
sit magis commune quam passio et convertatur cum sua diffinitione, con-
tinue maior esset falsa.
Tertia distinctio est ista, quod duplex est passio convertibilis, quedam
mediata et quedam immediata suo subiecto: passio immediata est illa
inter quam et subiectum non mediat alia passio; passio autem mediata 25
est illa inter quam et subiectum suum mediat alia passio, et hoc sem-
per demonstratur per passionem precedentem, que dicitur esse diffinitio
passionis sequentis. Prima autem passio demonstratur per diffinitionem
subiecti. Verbi gratia, si disciplinabile est prima passio hominis et risibile
secunda, oportet quod risibile demonstretur per disciplinabile et disci- 30
plinabile per animal rationale, quod est diffinitio hominis. Ponit enim
Aristoteles, primo Posteriorum,c quamlibet illarum esse demonstrabilem:
linea est recta vel curva, numerus est par vel impar, in quibus disiunc-
tum ponitur loco prime passionis. Constat autem nullam talem posse
vel] et M per diffinitionem2 om. Pv
a Aristotle, An. Post., I, 4, 73b3874a3. b Possibly, Aristotle, An. Post., II, 3, 91a16.
c Aristotle, An. Post., I, 4, 73b1821.
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demonstrari nisi per diffinitionem subiecti, ita quod demonstrabitur rec-

tum vel curvum de linea per diffinitionem linee, et par vel impar de
numero per diffinitionem numeri.
Quarta distinctio est quod duplex est passio non convertibilis, scilicet
fluens ab intrinseco, ut simitas et rectitudo, quedam autem ab extrin- 5
seco, ut eclipsis et tonitruum. Passio fluens ab intrinseco non converti-
bilis demonstratur per diffinitionem identicam passionis, ita quod simi-
tas demonstratur de naso per concavitatem nasi, et rectitudo de linea
per medium non discrepare ab extremis. Passio autem non convertibilis
fluens ab extrinseco demonstratur per diffinitionem causalem, eo modo 10
quo dicit Philosophus, secundo Posteriorum,a dicens eclipsim demonstrari
de luna per interpositionem terre, non autem per privationem luminis in
luna. Similiter, tonitruum demonstratur de nube non per diffinitionem
identicam tonitrui, sed per causalem, videlicet per extinctionem ignis in
nube, aut per aliquam aliam in alio genere cause et cetera. 15
308vb Pv Ex predictis sequitur primo contra Egidium quod diffinitio subiecti
potest esse medium in demonstratione, quoniam apud Aristotelem, se-
76vb M cundo | Posteriorum,b idem est causa diffinitio et medium; sed diffinitio
subiecti est causa tam subiecti quam omnium passionum sequentium;
ergo et cetera. Unde in eodem secundoc docet demonstrare diffinitionem 20
materialem per formalem; constat autem quod alicuius subiecti est diffi-
nitio tam materialis quam formalis. Propterea, secundo De anima,d docet
demonstrare diffinitionem materialem anime per formalem, et secundo
Phisicorum docet Lincolniensise demonstrare diffinitionem materialem
nature per formalem, et idem ostendit, tertio Phisicorum,f de diffinitione 25
formali et materiali motus. Formalis enim diffinitio semper est princi-
pium demonstrationis, et materialis vocatur conclusio, ut habet videri
secundo Posteriorum.g
Secundo sequitur contra eum quod equalitas trium angulorum ad duos
rectos non demonstratur de triangulo per angulum extrinsecum equi- 30
valentem et cetera tamquam per medium, quia passio necessaria non
et om. M diffinitionem om. M materialis formalis inv. Pv per]

diffinitionem add. Pv Phisicorum] Posteriorum M per] diffinitionem add. Pv
est] dicitur Pv et cetera] duobus oppositis intrinsecis Pv
a Aristotle, An. Post., II, 8, 93a35b7. b Aristotle, An. Post., II, 2 passim; 10, 93b3894a10.
c Aristotle, An. Post., II, 8, 93a29b14. d Aristotle, De an., II, 2 passim. e Robert Grosseteste,
In. Phys., II, ed. Dales, pp. 31, 1333, 9. f Robert Grosseteste, In. Phys., II, ed. Dales, pp. 49,
1750, 2. g Aristotle, An. Post., II, 10, 94a1114.
demonstratur per passionem contingentem, per Philosophum, primo

Posteriorum;a constat autem quod equalitas trium angulorum ad duos rec-
tos est passio necessaria trianguli, angulus autem extrinsecus est passio
contingens, quia triangulus aliquando habet angulum extrinsecum et ali-
quando non. 5
Item, sequitur quod aliqua est demonstratio potissima que non est
per causam neque per medium essentiale, sed accidentale, contra Phi-
losophum, primo et secundo Posteriorum.b Et quod illud sequatur argui-
tur, quia, sive ponatur sive non ponatur angulus extrinsecus, non minus
triangulus habet tres angulos equales et cetera. Dicit etiam Philosophus 10
quod interpositio terre est medium essentiale eclipsis, quia posita illa
interpositione ponitur eclipsis et ea remota removetur eclipsis; corpus
autem opacum expositum lune non causare umbram dicitur medium
accidentale, quia, licet posito tali medio ponatur eclipsis, non tamen eo
remoto removetur eclipsis. Ita in proposito, licet posito angulo extrin- 15
seco ponatur equalitas trium angulorum ad duos rectos, non tamen eo
remoto removetur illa passio, ut testatur Philosophus, secundo Phisi-
corum,c dicens quod si fiat talis syllogismus omnis figura tribus lineis
contenta, habens angulum extrinsecum equivalentem duobus oppositis
intrinsecis, habet tres angulos equales et cetera; sed omnis triangulus est 20
huiusmodi; ergo et cetera, huius syllogismi si premisse sunt vere, conclu-
sio est vera et non econtra. Diffinitio ergo trianguli est causa illius pas-
sionis demonstrate tam in essendo quam in cognoscendo: natura enim
absque angulo extrinseco cognoscit triangulum habere tres et cetera per
solam diffinitionem trianguli, quia res, sicut se habet ad esse, ita ad cogno- 25
sci, secundum naturaminquit Philosophus, secundo Metaphisice.d Quo
autem ad nos eadem diffinitio est causa cognoscendi eandem passionem
inesse triangulo, quia sine ea numquam cognosceremus illam passionem
de triangulo; sed non sufficit se sola, ymmo requirit aliam passionem
determinantem illam passionem [diffinitionem], sine qua non est possi- 30
bile cognoscere nominatam passionem de triangulo. Equalitas ergo trium
angulorum ad duos rectos demonstrabilis est per diffinitionem trianguli
et cetera] duobus rectis Pv oppositis intrinsecis inv. Pv et cetera]

duobus rectis Pv est iter. Pv et cetera] angulos equales duobus rectis Pv
diffinitionem secl.
a Aristotle, An. Post., I, 6 passim. b Aristotle, An. Post., I, 6, 75a2837; II, 8, 93a2126.
c Aristotle, Phys., II, 9, 200a1520 (cf. Paul of Venice, Exp. Post., fol. T2rab). d Aristotle,
Met., II, 1, 993b3031.
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tamquam per medium, et per habere angulum extrinsecum equivalentem

et cetera tamquam per determinatum medii. Et licet ordine nature prius
competat triangulo habere tres angulos quam habere angulum extrinse-
cum, tamen quo ad nos habere angulum extrinsecum est passio prece-
dens. Nec est inconveniens passionem naturaliter priorem demonstrari 5
potissime per passionem naturaliter posteriorem, non quidem tamquam
per medium, sed tamquam per quoddam annexum medio in ratione
declarantis et determinantis ipsum medium.
Ad primuma dicitur quod medium et extrema debent esse eiusdem
generis, per Philosophum, secundo Posteriorum.b Quod quidem non est 10
intelligendum de genere predicamentali, quia tunc de nulla substantia
77ra M posset aliqua | passio demonstrari, neque de triangulo demonstraretur
309ra Pv equalitas trium angulorum ad duos rectos, | quia nulla passio est de pre-
dicamento substantie, nec aliqua equalitas est de predicamento quanti-
tatis, cuius est triangulus; sed loquitur Philosophus ibi de genere subici- 15
bili, dicens quod non contingit demonstrantem descendere de genere in
genus. Quod enim alicuius demonstrationis medium pertineat ad quanti-
tatem continuam, et extrema ad quantitatem discretam, non est possibile.
Ideo cuiuslibet demonstrationis medium et extrema debent esse eiusdem
generis subicibilis et attributionis, de quo investigantur proprietates et 20
passiones. Nec est verum quod geometra demonstret triangulum habere
tres per angulum extrinsecum tamquam per medium.
Ad secundumc respondetur quod diffinitio subiecti dicit quid subiecti
et propter quid passionis, ut colligitur a Philosopho, secundo Posterio-
rum:d dicit enim quid subiecti, in quantum exprimit quiditatem subiecti, 25
dicit autem propter quid predicati, in quantum est causa propter quam
passio inest subiecto. Ex quo dicto apparet quod diffinitio supra subiec-
tum et passionem duplicem causalitatem habet, scilicet essendi et inhe-
rendi: secundum enim quod est causa essendi tam subiecti quam passio-
nis, sic habet rationem prioris respectu utriusque et non rationem medii; 30
secundum vero quod est causa inherentie ad subiectum passionis, sic
habet rationem medii, et secundum hoc habet rationem cognoscendi et
et cetera] duobus oppositis intrinsecis Pv debent esse] sunt M eiusdem

generis] vel debent esse eiusdem generis add. M verum] vera M inherentie]
cause add. et fort. del. Pv
a Cf. Alexander of Alexandria, Exp. Met., VII, c. 17, q. 2, fol. 243rab. b In truth, the reference
is to Aristotle, An. Post., I, 9, 76a89 (cf. supra, p. 553, 1). c Cf. Alexander of Alexandria,
Exp. Met., VII, c. 17, q. 2, fol. 243rbva. d Aristotle, An. Post., II, 10, 93b3894a10.
inferendi passionem de subiecto. Si enim Sortes non cognosceret Plato-

nem, et Cicero esset causa propter quam Sortes cognosceret Platonem,
diceretur Ciceronem esse causam illius cognitionis. Quia ergo diffinitio
subiecti est causa propter quam cognoscitur passio inesse subiecto, ideo
diffinitio dicitur esse medium. 5
Ad tertiuma respondetur quod diffinitio subiecti est medium demon-
strandi primam passionem tantum; tamen virtualiter ingreditur demon-
strationes omnium sequentium passionum, in quantum nulla passio
inheret subiecto suo nisi virtute diffinitionis. Et quia prima passio est
causa immediata inherentie secunde passionis cum subiecto, ideo non 10
demonstratur secunda passio de subiecto per diffinitionem subiecti, sed
per primam passionem. Et licet prima passio immediate inherat subiecto,
tamen, quia illius inherentie diffinitio est causa, ideo propositio in qua
predicatur prima passio de subiecto demonstrabilis est per diffinitio-
nem. Neque est cura si prima passio sit per se nota, quia omne totum 15
est maius sua parte est demonstrabile non obstante quod sit per se
notum, ut asserit Alacem, secundo sue Perspective.b Diffinitio etiam mate-
rialis nature demonstratur per formalem, iuxta doctrinam Lincolniensis,
secundo Posteriorum,c et tamen diffinitio nature est per se manifesta, ut
asserit Commentator, secundo Phisicorum.d Et quoniam illud quod con- 20
fuse significatur per subiectum distincte importatur per diffinitionem,
ideo prima passio est magis nota de diffinitione quam de subiecto: licet
enim subiectum et diffinitio sint unum realiter, tamen, quia sunt plura
ratione et in modo significandi, ideo aliquid potest esse cognitum de uno
quod non potest esse cognitum de alio. 25
Ad quartume respondetur quod illud principium de quolibet esse vel
non esse ac etiam illud non contingit idem simul esse et non esse in
sua communitate oritur a conceptu transcendentis. Istud autem princi-
pium particulariter sumptum quilibet homo est vel non est aut illud non
contingit eundem hominem simul esse et non esse oritur a natura homi- 30
nis, ita quod, posita natura hominis, ponitur quodlibet illorum principio-
rum. Et quoniam quelibet premissarum presupponit naturam subiecti,
per] add. diffinitionem Pv
a Cf. Alexander of Alexandria, Exp. Met., VII, c. 17, q. 2, fol. 243vab. b Alhacem, De
Aspectibus, Lib. II, c. 3.32, ed. Smith, pp. 105106, lin. 224244. c Robert Grosseteste, In
Post., II, 2, pp. 335336, lin. 674677. d Averroes, In Phys., II, t.c. 3, fol. 49AC; t.c. 6,
fol. 50FG. e Cf. Alexander of Alexandria, Exp. Met., VII, c. 17, q. 2, fol. 243vb244ra.
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ideo quelibet premissarum oritur ab illo principio tam generaliter quam

particulariter sumpto: sicut enim conceptus hominis presupponit con-
ceptum entis, ita principia particulariter sumpta presupponunt principia
universaliter sumpta; constat autem quamlibet premissarum presuppo-
nere principia tam universaliter quam particulariter sumpta. 5
Et si arguitur quod diffinitio primi termini, idest maioris extremitatis,
77rb M que est passio subiecti, est medium in | demonstratione, per Aristotelem,
secundo Posteriorum,a ergo diffinitio subiecti non est medium, negatur
consequentia, quia, sicut dictum est, diffinitio subiecti est diffinitio dicens
quid subiecti et propter quid passionis. Ideo est diffinitio utriusque, sed 10
non eodem modo: est enim diffinitio identica subiecti et causalis ipsius
passionis. Hec tamen materia magis pertinet ad librum Posteriorum,b in
309rb Pv quo diffusius | de hoc sum locutus.
Quoniam vero ex aliquo h1041b11ssi.

Ista est tertia pars huius capituli, in qua Philosophus ostendit quod 15
quiditas rei non est aliqua pars illius, videlicet designata per materiam
et formam, postquam manifestavit quiditatem rei esse totam substan-
tiam eius. Et facit Philosophus duo. Nam primo premittit unam distinc-
tionem; secundo exequitur de intento per conclusiones, ibi: Sillaba autem
h1041b12ssi. 20
Quantum ad primum sit hec distinctio, quam intendit Philosophus,
quod duplex est compositio, scilicet per se et per accidens: compositio
per se est illa per quam compositum est simpliciter unum totum, ut com-
positio per quam componitur homo aut domus aut sillaba; compositio
per accidens est illa per quam compositum est unum totum secundum 25
quid, sicut est compositio per quam fit populus aut cumulus lapidum
vel granorum. Et differt prima compositio a secunda, quia prima com-
positio accipitur a forma dante nomen et diffinitionem, secunda autem
accipitur a multitudine per respectum ad unum: homo enim et domus aut
sillaba est unum per unam formam, sed populus et acervus est unum per 30
aliam unitatem. Dicitur enim populus unum ab unitate civitatis, et cumu-
lus lapidum et granorum ab unitate loci in quo congregantur lapides aut
universaliter particulariter inv. Pv arguitur] arguatur Pv locutus] quare et

cetera et cetera add. Pv componitur om. M aut1] vel M aut sillaba om. M
accipitur] sumitur M domus] Deus M aut] ac Pv
a Aristotle, An. Post., II, 8, 93b6. b Paul of Venice, Exp. Post.., fol. S4+3vbT4va.
grana, fasciculus autem lignorum est unus unitate ligaminis, et duo ligna
invicem conclavata sunt unum unitate clavis.
Lege Litteram: Quoniam vero ex aliquo compositum fit et unum fit
omne, idest totum, sed non ut cumulus sed ut sillaba aut domus.a
Notandum, secundum Commentatorem, commento sexacesimo: 5
Hic esse aliqua composita, ex quibus [non] congregatur unum in
actu, non sicut compositum ex rebus ex quibus non fit unum nisi
per contactum, ut acervus aggregatus ex pluribus granis.b
Distinctio quam intendit Commentator est hec, quod duplex est composi-
tum, videlicet in actu et in potentia: compositum in actu est illud quod fit 10
ex partibus quarum una est forma alterius, ut caro, domus et sillaba; com-
positum in potentia est illud quod fit ex partibus quarum nulla est forma
alterius, sed omnes habent esse simul per contactum aut per respectum
ad aliquod unum extrinsecum, ut cumulus granorum, populus et exer-
citus. Et quia quodlibet compositum est aliquid totum, ideo duplex est 15
totum, scilicet differens et non differens a partibus suis: totum enim quod
est compositum in actu differt ab omnibus suis partibus tam collective
quam divisive sumptis, totum vero quod est compositum in potentia, et
si differt a qualibet suarum partium, non tamen differt ab omnibus par-
tibus simul sumptis, ita quod cumulus lapidum est illi lapides et populus 20
est homines civitatis simul sumpti.
Sed dubitatur, quia, primo Phisicorum,c dicit Philosophus quod unum
subiecto est multa ratione, et unum secundum continuitatem est multa
secundum divisionem, et unum in actu est multa in potentia. Secundo
autem De anima,d dicit quod corpus et anima sunt unum sicut materia 25
et forma sunt unum, et sic es et figura sunt unum, ubi etiam concedit
quod visus et pupilla sunt unum, scilicet oculus. Quinto autem huius,e
dicit quod aliqua sunt unum que sunt continua, scilicet due medietates
in continuo.
Respondetur quod duplex est predicatio, scilicet identica et causalis: 30
predicatio identica est quando predicatum denotatur inesse subiecto in
recto, ut homo est animal; predicatio autem causalis est illa quando
unus] unum Pv fit12] sic Moerb. (fit P1b) et] ut Pv Moerb. non secl.
aggregatus] congregatus Pv Iunt. sumptis] acceptis Pv omnibus partibus
inv. Pv predicatio om. M est om. M
a Aristotle, Met., VII, 17, 1041b1112 (AL, XXV 3.2, p. 167, lin. 932933). b Averroes, In Met.,
t.c. 60, fol. 208GH. c Aristotle, Phys., I, 2, 185b32186a3. d Aristotle, De an., II, 1, 412b69.
e Aristotle, Met., V, 6, 1015b361016a17.
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denotatur predicatum inesse subiecto in obliquo, eo modo quo loquitur

Philosophus, primo De anima,a quod domus est lapides et ligna, idest ex
lapidibus et lignis, ubi ait Commentatorb iram esse ebulitionem sanguinis
in cordequod non potest intelligi in predicatione identica, quia ira est
77va M passio | anime et ebulitio est passio corporis tantum, sed est predicatio 5
causalis intelligenda in obliquo, scilicet ira est ex ebulitione sanguinis in
corde. Sic etiam est intelligenda illa propositio Philosophi, secundo De
anima,c dicens sonum esse motum, scilicet sonum esse in motu: non enim
potest illa intelligi in predicatione identica, ex quo sonus est sensibile
309va Pv proprium et | motus est sensibile commune, ut ipse ibi probat.d Secundo 10
autem Posteriorum,e concedit quod eclipsis est interpositio terre, idest
propter interpositionem terre.
Ita dicatur in proposito quod omnes propositiones nominate sunt pro-
positiones causales intelligende in obliquo casu, ut unum est multa, idest
est ex multis, corpus et anima sunt animal, idest ex corpore et anima fit 15
animal, materia et forma sunt unum, idest ex materia et forma fit unum,
statua est es et figura, idest est ex ere et figura, visus et pupilla sunt ocu-
lus, idest ex eis fit oculus, due medietates sunt unum continuum, idest
ex duabus medietatibus fit unum continuum. Et ita intelligit in hoc casu,
cum dicit lapides et lateres esse domum, idest ex lapidibus et lateribus fit 20
domus.
Hec distinctio salvat Commentatorem, dicentem, primo Phisicorum,f
quod hec propositio, omnes partes sunt aliud a toto, est distinguenda
secundum compositionem et divisionem, quoniam in sensu diviso est
vera, significans copulative quod ista pars est aliud a toto et illa aliud a 25
toto et sic de singulis, in sensu vero compositionis est falsa, significans
copulatim quod ista pars et illa et sic de singulis sunt aliud a toto, quoniam
omnes simul non possunt dici aliud a toto. Non dicit Commentator quod
omnes partes simul sumpte sunt ipsum totum, quia hoc est impossibile,
quoniam tunc omnes partes simul sumpte essent eedem inter se, per illud 30
principium: quecumque sunt eadem uni eidem numero, illa sunt eadem
inter se; sed intendit quod in omnibus partibus simul sumptis non est
dicatur] dicitur M idest] unum add. Pv idest] statua add. Pv eis] ex visu
et pupilla Pv intelligit] intelligebat Pv dicit] dixit Pv copulative] cove Pv
illa] est add. Pv eadem1 scr.] eedem MPv
a Aristotle, De an., I, 1, 403b56. b Averroes, In De an., I, t.c. 16, p. 23, 2829. c Aristotle,
De an., II, 8, 420a21; 420b11. d Aristotle, De an., II, 6, 418a13; 17. e Aristotle, An. Post., II, 2,
90a1518. f Averroes, In Phys., I, t.c. 36, fol. 24CD, F.
aliud quam totum, in qualibet autem parte divisim accepta est aliud quam
totum, idest alia quiditas quam quiditas totius. Similiter, concedatur quod
totum est aliud quam aliqua pars sua tam in predicatione causali quam
identica, non tamen est aliud quam omnes partes simul sumpte, idest non
est in alio quam in omnibus partibus simul sumptis: totum enim habet 5
rationem forme et omnes partes simul sumpte habent rationem materie.
Sillaba autem non est h1041b12ssi.
Ista distinctione premissa, Philosophus ponit quatuor conclusiones,
quarum prima est: quiditas rei non est elementa componentia totum.
Secunda conclusio: quiditas rei est aliud quam elementa componentia 10
totum, ibi: Est ergo aliquid h1041b16ssi. Tertia conclusio: illud quod
superaddit quiditas elementis non est elementum, neque ex elemento
neque ex elementis, ibi: Si ergo necesse h1041b19ssi. Quarta conclusio:
quiditas rei est elementum et causa essendi dans nomen et diffinitionem,
ibi: Videbitur autem h1041b25ssi. 15
Prima conclusio arguitur sic: quandocumque aliqua sic se habent, quod
uno corrupto reliquum manet, illa non sunt idem; sed corrupta quiditate
rei non propter hoc corrumpuntur elementa componentia totum, sed
remanent in actu; ergo quiditas rei non est elementa componentia totum.
Tenet consequentia cum maiori ex efficacia principii primi, quod est: non 20
contingit idem simul esse et non esse. Et minor declaratur inductive,
quoniam, corrupta ista sillaba ba per separationem vocalis a consonante,
non propter hoc corrumpuntur ille littere, ymmo manent; constat autem
quod littere sunt elementa sillabarum. Similiter, elementa carnis sunt
ignis et terra ex quibus componitur; modo, corrupta carne, non propter 25
hoc corrumpitur ignis aut terra, sed remanent omnia elementa; oportet
ergo dicere quod illa sillaba ba non est a et b, nec est eadem illis
collective vel divisive; non etiam caro est terra et ignis, sed distinguitur
ab illis qualitercumque accipiatur.
Lege Litteram: Sillaba autem non est elementa nec idem b et a, nec caro 30
ignis et terra; dissolutis enim hiis mixtis hec quidem non adhuc sunt ut caro,
elementa vero sunt et ignis et terra.a
Dubitatur, quia corruptio unius est generatio alterius, per Aristotelem,
77vb M primo De generationeb; | ergo in corruptione carnis generantur elementa
quam] sit add. Pv idem] unum M principii primi inv. Pv b et a Pv Moerb.]

ba M caro] et sillaba add. Moerb. per Aristotelem om. M
a Aristotle, Met., VII, 17, 1041b1216 (AL XXV 3.2, p. 167, lin. 933936). b Aristotle, De gen., I,
3, 319a2022.
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et in corruptione sillabe generantur littere; ergo elementa non prefuerunt

in carne nec littere in sillaba, et per consequens caro non componitur ex
elementis nec sillaba ex litteriscuius oppositum ponitur in littera.
309vb Pv Respondetur | quod in corruptione carnis generantur elementa non
quidem complete, sed incomplete, quia elementa incipiunt esse, non 5
autem forme illorum incipiunt esse, et ideo elementa aliquo modo prefue-
runt, videlicet ignis et terra, non quidem actu, sed potentia. Sicut enim in
generatione mixti corrumpuntur elementa incomplete, ita et incomplete
generantur in corruptione mixti, ipsum autem mixtum complete genera-
tur et complete corrumpitur, quia in sua generatione forma mixti incipit 10
esse et in sua corruptione forma mixti desinit esse.
Item, dicit Philosophus, primo Phisicorum,a quod in resolutione domus
fiunt lapides et ligna, quod quidem non est intelligendum quo ad nomen
et diffinitionem essentialem, sed solum quo ad actualem existentiam,
quia tunc sunt in actu, ubi prius fuerunt in potentia, et tunc per se exi- 15
stunt, sed ante erant partes existentes in alio. Ita, in proposito, cum resol-
vitur sillaba in litteras, necesse est quod littere aliquo modo generantur,
non quidem hoc modo quod post resolutionem sunt littere et ante reso-
lutionem non erant littere, sed quia post resolutionem sunt littere in actu
non permixto potentia, et ante erant littere in potentia, propter ordinem 20
quem habebant ad formam sillabe et ad ipsam sillabam.
Est ergo aliquid h1041b16ssi.
Secunda conclusio: quiditas rei est aliud quam elementa componentia
totum.
Probat: ex pluribus existentibus in actu aut existentibus tamen in po- 25
tentia non potest fieri unum simpliciter, sed oportet quod illorum com-
ponentium unum sit in actu et reliquum in potentia; elementa autem
secundum quod huiusmodi sunt in potentia et non in actu; ergo, pre-
ter elementa componentia aliquod totum, oportet ponere aliquod quod
secundum huiusmodi sit in actu. Tenet consequentia cum minori, quia 30
elementum secundum quod huiusmodi habet rationem materie, ut est
ostensum quinto huius.b Maior vero est evidens, quoniam ex carne et
osse, seclusa anima sensitiva, non potest fieri animal nec aliquod totum,
neque ex anima vegetativa et sensitiva potest fieri animal aut aliquod
sillaba ex litteris] littera ex sillabis M et om. Pv resolutionem om. Pv et om

M sit] in potentia videtur addere Pv, sed fort. del.
a Aristotle, Phys., I, 4, 188a1516. b Aristotle, Met., V, 3, 1014a2635.

compositum simpliciter, seclusa carne et osse, sed simul requiritur forma

cum materia, sic quod forma concurrat ut actus et caro aut sanguis vel os
ut potentia. Sillaba ergo non solum est littere, scilicet vocalis aut conso-
nans, sed etiam aliud, videlicet forma sillabe superaddita litteris; et caro
non solum est ignis et terra aut calidum et frigidum, sed et alterum aliquid, 5
scilicet forma carnis superaddita elementis.
Lege Litteram: Est ergo aliud sillaba, non solum elementa (vocalis et
consonans) sed et alterum aliquid, et caro non solum ignis et terra aut
calidum et frigidum, sed et alterum aliquid.a
Notandum secundum Commentatorem, commento sigesimo, quod 10
sillaba non est littere ex quibus fit, sed etiam aliud additum litteris,
et similiter caro non est aqua et ignis ex quibus componitur, sed
etiam aliquid aliud additum. Et signum est eius quod est aliquod
additum elementis, quia ista, quando dissolvuntur et corrumpuntur,
tunc sillaba non resolvitur in sillabas neque caro in carnes, sicut 15
resolvuntur res congregate in illa ex quibus congregantur, idest res
in quibus per congregationem non fit aliquod additum.b
Distinctio quam intendit Commentator est hec, quod duplex est con-
gregatio, videlicet superaddens et non superaddens. Congregatio supe-
raddens est illa que superaddit formam partibus aggregatis, cuiusmodi 20
est congregatio litterarum invicem ac etiam lapidum et lignorum: sillaba
enim proveniens ex congregatione litterarum, superaddit litteris formam
sillabe, et domus proveniens ex congregatione lapidum et lignorum, supe-
78ra M raddit lapidibus et lignis. Congregatio | vero non superaddens est illa que
non superaddit formam partibus, congregatio qua fit acervus lapidum et 25
cumulus lignorum. Primum totum non est sue partes, sed est aliquid supe-
radditum partibus congregatis; secundum vero totum non est nisi partes
congregate, ita quod sillaba non est littere, sed aliud superadditum litteris,
neque domus est lapides et ligna, sed est aliquid superadditum illis. Quod
310ra Pv quidem probatur | a signo. Nam acervus lapidum potest resolvi in acervos 30
lapidum et cumulus granorum in cumulos granorum, et hoc ideo, quia
totum nichil superaddit partibus congregatis; sillaba autem non potest
resolvi in sillabas, neque domus in domos neque caro in carnes, et hoc
vel os om. M aliquid] aliquod M ergo] igitur Moerb. aliud M] aliquid Pv

Moerb. et3 Pv Moerb.] ut M quia] quoniam Pv Iunt. congregate Pv Iunt.]
aggregate M vero non scr.] non Pv : vero M
a Aristotle, Met., VII, 17, 1041b1619 (AL XXV 3.2, p. 167, lin. 936939). b Averroes, In Met.,VII,
t.c. 60, fol. 208HI.

566 pauli veneti
est signum quod tam sillaba quam domus, quam etiam caro, superaddit
formam partibus congregatis.
Sed dubitatur. Sicut cumulus magnus, per divisionem illius in duas
medietates aut in tres tertias, resolvitur in duos vel in tres cumulos, ita
et aliqua est caro que, per divisionem illius in duas medietates vel in tres 5
tertias, resolvitur in carnes. Et sicut aliqua est caro que non est divisibilis
in carnes, videlicet minimum naturale, ita aliquis est cumulus ita parvus
quod non potest resolvi in cumulos.
Dicendum quod caro habet duplices partes, scilicet congregatas et non
congregatas: partes congregate sunt ille que non includunt formam totius, 10
ut elementa in mixto et littere in sillaba; partes non congregate sunt ille
que includunt formam totius, ut due medietates carnis aut tres tertie.
Constat autem quod caro potest corrumpi aut per divisionem partium
congregatarum vel non congregatarum. Si primo modo, numquam caro
corrumpitur in carnes: separatis enim elementis, nulla manet caro, et ita 15
intendit Philosophus. Et licet detur aliquis cumulus qui non potest resolvi
in cumulos propter defectum materie, sufficit quod aliquis eiusdem spe-
ciei potest resolvi in cumulos.
Si ergo necesse h1041b19ssi.
Tertia conclusio: illud quod superaddit quiditas elementis non est ele- 20
mentum, neque ex elemento neque ex elementis.
Prima pars probatur, quia, dato opposito, esset procedere in infinitum
in elementis. Nam elementa ut elementa non possunt se solo facere
verum compositum, sed ultra requiritur aliquid aliud additum, ut patet
ex conclusionibus precedentibus. Si ergo illud additum erit elementum, 25
ipsum cum aliis precedentibus non poterit facere verum compositum,
sed oportebit assignare aliud additum et sic in infinitum. Verbi gratia,
quatuor elementa se sola non possunt facere carnem; ideo requiritur aliud
additum quod cum quatuor elementis facit carnem. Sit ergo illud A et
quero utrum A sit elementum vel non. Si non, habetur intentum. Si sic, 30
ergo, sicut quatuor elementa non faciunt carnem, ita nec A cum quatuor
elementis, sed requiritur aliud additum. Sit ergo illud B et queratur ut
supra et dabitur processus in infinitum in elementis.
Secunda pars conclusionis etiam arguitur, quoniam non solum unum
elementum concurrit ad compositionem totius, sed plura, ut patet tam 35
cumulos] annulos M resolvitur] resolvetur Pv quod] qui Pv elementa] ut

terra aqua aer et ignis et ignis add. Pv in infinitum] infinitus Pv
in carne quam in sillaba quam in domo: ignis enim et aqua sunt ele-
menta carnis, littere vero sunt elementa sillabe, sed lapides et ligna sunt
elementa domus. Constat autem quod illud additum elementis non facit
compositum tantum cum uno elemento, sed ex pluribus. Verbi gratia,
sit A illud additum quod superaddit caro quatuor elementis, et queritur 5
utrum A fiat ex pluribus elementis aut tantum ex uno. Si ex pluribus,
habetur intentum; si tantum ex uno, ergo A est illud unum, quod est repro-
batum. Patet consequentia, quia illud quod est tantum ex aqua est aqua et
illud quod est tantum ex igne est ignis, dato quod illa prepositio ex dicat
habitudinem partis. 10
Tertia pars arguitur, videlicet quod illud additum non est ex elementis.
Nam eadem est ratio de illo addito et de carne vel sillaba, quoniam caro
non est tantum ex elementis neque sillaba; ergo nec illud additum. Patet
consequentia, quia illud additum aut est forma partis aut forma totius.
Si forma partis, patet quod est non ex elementis, ex quo illa prepositio 15
ex dicit habitudinem partis, secundum quod Philosophus hic intendit:
78rb M illud enim esset plura et non unumquod est falsum, quia tunc non |
faceret unum compositum cum elementis. Si autem illud additum est
forma totius, videlicet quiditas carnis aut sillabe, certum est quod sic caro
vel sillaba non est tantum ex elementis, sed superaddit formam partis 20
receptam in aqua et igne aut in litteris. Ita quiditas carnis vel sillabe, que
est forma recepta in carne vel in sillaba, superaddit eandem formam ex
310rb Pv qua fit quiditas | sicut ex partibus materialibus.
Lege Litteram: Si ergo necesse est illud additum aut elementum aut ex
elementis esse, si quidem elementum fuerit, iterum eadem ratio erit; ex hoc 25
enim et igne et terra erit caro et adhuc alio. Quare in infinitum ibitis. Si vero
ex elemento, palam quia non uno sed pluribus; aut illlud additum ipsum
erit elementum ex quo fit. Quare rursum in hoc, idest si fiat ex elementis
pluribus, eandem dicemus rationem et in carne vel sillaba.a
Dubitatur, quia dicit Philosophus, in prologo Phisicorum,b quod unum- 30
quodque arbitramur cognoscere cum cognoscimus prima principia et pri-
mas causas usque ad elementa, ubi Philosophus per elementa intendit
pluribus2] elementis add. Pv reprobatum] et add. Pv prepositio] propositio

Pv caro sillaba inv. Pv in2 om. M ergo] igitur Moerb. aut1 Pv
Moerb.] vel M ibitis] ibit Moerb. Philosophus] Aristoteles Pv
a Aristotle, Met., VII, 17, 1041b1925 (AL XXV 3.2, p. 167, lin. 939944). b Aristotle, Phys., I,
184a1014.
568 pauli veneti
materiam et formam, ut communiter exponitur. Cum ergo additum qua-

tuor elementis in compositione carnis sit forma, sequitur quod illud addi-
tum sit elementum.
Respondetur quod Philosophus loquitur communius in prologo Phisi-
corum quam hic. Ibi enim accipit elementum esse illud ex quo aliquid 5
primo componitur inexistente in divisibili specie in aliam speciem, secun-
dum quod diffinitum est elementum quinto huius.a Hic autem strictius
loquitur de elemento, scilicet pro eo ad quod stat resolutio compositi.
Et quia resolutio compositi non stat proprie ad formam, ex quo forma
non remanet, proprie autem stat ad materiam, quia ipsa remanet post 10
corruptionem compositi, ideo materia prima proprissime est elementum,
ut probatur quinto huius.b Et ex consequenti autem ea que habent ratio-
nem materie, in qua fit resolutio, dicuntur elementa, et sic aqua et ignis
sunt elementa carnis et a et b sunt elementa huius sillabe ba, lapides
vero et ligna sunt elementa domus. Loquitur ergo Aristoteles hic de ele- 15
mento tantum ut habet rationen materie; illud autem additum tam in
carne quam in aliis compositis habet rationem forme et non materie; ideo
tale additum non est elementum.
Videbitur autem utique h1041b25ssi.
Quarta conclusio: quiditas rei est elementum et causa essendi dans 20
Probatur. Caro non est tantum ignis et terra, sed etiam aliquid aliud
additum; similiter, sillaba non est tantum littera, sed ultra aliquid aliud
additum, et sic de omnibus aliis compositis, ut demonstratum est. Constat
autem quod istud additum est causa essendi dans nomen et diffinitionem. 25
Nam istud additum est forma. Modo forma in omni composito dat nomen
et diffinitionem, cum sit uniuscuiusque prima substantia et prima causa
essendi, primitate perfectionis et principalitatis. Ostensum est enim supra
in hoc septimoc quod forma est prior materia et composito et magis
substantia quam aliquod illorum. Neque iste propositiones hic concesse 30
sunt intelligende in predicatione identica, sed causali: cum enim dicitur
in conclusione quod quiditas rei est elementum et causa essendi dans
nomen et diffinitionem, idest quiditas rei est ex elemento et causa dante
et] aqua add. Pv ultra om. M composito] compositum M et2] est Pv
a Aristotle,
Met, V, 3, 1014a2627. b Aristotle, Met, V, 3, 1014a2635. c Cf. supra, tr. 1, c. 2,
pp. 83, 3185, 33.
Iterum, caro est ignis et terra et aliquid aliud additum, idest caro est
ex igne et terra et ex aliquo alio addito. Deinde, sillaba est littere et
aliud additum, idest sillaba est ex litteris et ex alio addito. Constat autem
quod istud additum dat nomen et diffinitionem, quoniam caro est caro
non propter elementa ex quibus componitur, sed propter formam mixti 5
superadditam elementis; neque sillaba est sillaba per litteras, sed propter
formam ordinis vel compositionis advenientem litteris.
Lege Litteram: Videbitur autem utique esse aliud hec, idest quiditas
rei sensibilis, et elementum et causa essendi, hoc quidem carnem, hoc vero
sillabam. Similiter autem et in aliis. Substantia autem uniuscuiusque hoc, 10
scilicet additum partibus materialibus, hec enim prima causa essendi.a
Notandum, secundum Commentatorem, commento sexacesimo,
quod per hanc perscrutationem apparebit hoc esse substantiam
aliam ab elementis materialibus, que etiam est elementum et prima
causa et causa que est forma, et quod alicuius est caro, et alterius os, 15
et alterius sillaba, et similiter in omnibus rebus diversarum substan-
78va M tiarum.b |
Ita quod, cum aliquid componitur ex partibus diversarum substantia-
310va Pv rum, oportet unam illarum partium esse elementum | materiale, et aliud
esse primam causam essendi et formam superadditam, que etiam potest 20
vocari elementum, non quidem simpliciter, sed cum additamento, videli-
cet elementum immateriale aut elementum quod est prima causa essendi.
Et notanter dicit Commentator in omnibus rebus diversarum substantia-
rum, quia caro componitur ex duabus carnibus, quarum nulla est prima
causa essendi carnis neque forma illius, sed datis omnibus partibus diver- 25
sarum substantiarum et rationum, oportet unam earum esse formam et
primam causam essendi.
Contra predicta arguitur. Et primo quod aliquod est totum vere unum
compositum solum ex partibus materialibus, quoniam materia prima est
vere unum et non componitur nisi ex partibus materialibus. Similiter, 30
quantitas existens in materia, scilicet linea, superficies et corpus, est
iterum] item Pv aliud] aliquid Pv Moerb. hec] hoc Moerb. uniuscuiusque]

quidem add. Moerb. (om. DaOp P) hec] hoc Moerb. prima causa inv. Moerb.
hoc] hic Iunt. et] quod est add. Iunt. et1] quod est add. Iunt. et2 M Iunt.]
om. Pv sillaba] simile Iunt. et2 Pv Iunt.] om. M earum om. M esse
formam inv. Pv
VII, t.c. 60, fol. 209A.
570 pauli veneti
aliquod vere unum, ex quo est species predicamenti quantitatis. Simili-

ter, omnis qualitas, tam prima quam secunda, quam etiam omnis figura,
est aliquod vere unum pertinens ad aliquam speciem predicamenti qua-
litatis, et tunc compositio talium non est nisi ex partibus materialibus.
Idem arguitur de motu et tempore et de aliis successivis habentibus esse 5
predicamentale, quod in compositione illorum non invenitur nisi pars
materialis: omnis enim pars materialis quantitativa dicitur pars materia-
lis, ut supra ostensum.a
Secundo arguitur, quod sillaba non superaddit litteris aliquam formam,
quoniam vocalis se habet ut forma respectu consonantis, ex quo voca- 10
lis sonat per seipsam, consonans autem includit vocalem; ergo frustra
ponitur alia forma superaddita vocali et consonanti. Item, dato illo, sequi-
tur quod duabus unitatibus additur una forma per quam numerus est
numerus, et sic numerus non est forma simplex, sed composita ex par-
tibus diversarum rationum, videlicet ex unitatibus et forma superaddita, 15
eo modo quo caro componitur ex elementis et forma mixti addita illis.
Ad primum dicitur quod ex pluribus existentibus in potentia, exclu-
dentibus omnem actum, non potest fieri unum simpliciter, neque ex plu-
ribus existentibus in actu, excludentibus omnem potentiam, potest fieri
aliquod vere unum. Et tunc ad argumentum respondetur quod partes 20
materiales sunt duplices, scilicet etherogenee et homogenee. Partes ethe-
rogenee sunt diversarum rationum, scilicet indigent alio addito tamquam
forma concurrente ad constitutionem tertii. Et hoc intendit Commen-
tator,b dicens quod illud additum est forma et prima causa in omnibus
rebus diversarum substantiarum. Partes autem homogenee materiales, 25
videlicet eiusdem rationis, etiam indigent alio addito tamquam forma,
non quidem concurrente ad constitutionem unius tertii, sed ad copulatio-
nem illarum partium materialium; unde due medietates aque componunt
totam aquam et indigent superficie, non tamquam forma constituente
totam aquam una cum illis medietatibus, sed tamquam forma copulante 30
et continuante illas medietates invicem. Dicendum ergo quod materia
prima non tantum componitur ex partibus materialibus, sed etiam ad
illam compositionem concurrit quantitas tamquam forma copulans par-
tes materie adinvicem , quantitas autem, ultra suas partes componentes,
habet principium copulans illas partes. Nam partes corporis copulantur 35
scilicet] sed M ad om. Pv copulantur] continuantur Pv
a Cf. supra, tr. 2, c. 3, p. 322, 12ff. b Averroes, In Met., VII, t.c. 60, fol. 209A.
per superficiem et partes superficiei per lineam et partes linee continuan-

tur per punctum: continuum enim est illud cuius partes copulantur ad
unum terminum communem, per Aristotelem, in Predicamentis.a Quali-
tates autem prime et secunde habent partes extensivas et partes intensi-
vas: quo ad partes extensivas indigent superficie copulante aut linea; quo 5
autem ad partes intensivas indigent gradu uniente illas partes in eodem
subiecto. Figure vero, sicut recipiunt unitatem a quantitate continua, ita
partes figurarum recipiunt continuationem a terminis quantitatis conti-
nue. Et quoniam partes temporis continuantur per instantia individualia
et partes motus per mutata esse subito acquisita, ut habetur sexto Phisico- 10
78vb M rum,b ideo partes | materiales motus aut temporis non componunt totum
tempus neque totum motum absque alio addito. Huiusmodi autem addi-
tum habet rationem forme, quoniam, sicut forma mixti unit elementa et
dat composito nomen et diffinitionem, ita hec individualia addita uniunt
partes materiales et dant nomen et diffinitionem ipsis totis compositis, 15
310vb Pv ut patet de puncto respectu linee | et linea respectu superficiei, ut patet
quinto huius.c
Ad secundum respondetur quod, sicut ignis habet rationem forme
respectu elementorum aliorum, non tamen cum ceteris elementis facit
carnem absque forma mixti, ita, licet vocalis habeat rationem forme 20
respectu consonantis, tamen indiget alia forma ad hoc quod constituat sil-
labam. Nec est simile de numero et sillaba, quoniam littere que sunt partes
materiales sillabe sunt diversarum rationum, ideo indiget uno addito for-
mali ad hoc ut constituant sillabam, unitates autem mathematice sunt
eiusdem rationis, ideo non indigent aliqua forma que sit pars numeri, 25
sicut nec partes linee in constitutione linee indigent aliqua forma que sit
altera pars linee, indigent tamen puncto tamquam unificativo partium
linee. Unitates autem, quia indivisibiles sunt, non indigent aliquo unifi-
cativo, sicut nec puncta. Ideo, sicut non fit unum ex punctis tamquam
ex partibus, sed solum tamquam principiis formalibus unitivis, ita nume- 30
rus non fit ex unitatibus tamquam ex partibus, sed tamquam ex princi-
piis materialibus subiectis, ita quod numerus est subiective in unitatibus,
sicut qualitates secunde in qualitatibus primis et colores medii in colori-
bus extremis. Alias tamen dixi quod, sicut caro et sillaba componitur ex
autem om. M
a Aristotle,Cat., 6, 5a910. b Aristotle, Phys., VI, 3, 234a58; 5, 235b630. c Aristotle, Met.,

V, 6, 1016b2431.
572 pauli veneti
duabus partibus quarum una est materia et alia forma, ita et numerus, ita
quod binarius componitur ex duabus unitatibus tamquam ex materia et
ex dualitate tamquam ex forma; similiter, ternarius componitur ex tribus
unitatibus tamquam ex materia et trinitate tamquam ex forma. Melius
tamen dicitur quod numerus talem compositionem non habet, quoniam, 5
sicut unitas est abstractior puncto, ita numerus est abstractior linea, per
Aristotelem, primo Posterioruma; ergo numerus est simplicior linea. Con-
stat autem quod linea non componitur ex parte materiali et formali, quia
quelibet pars linee est linea; ergo neque numerus sic componitur, sed est
forma simplex indivisibilis immediate fluens ab unitatibus indivisibilibus 10
mathematicis.
Quoniam vero quidam h1041b28ssi.
Hic Philosophus excludit unum dubium. Nam dictum est quod addi-
tum elementis componentibus mixtum est substantia rei dans nomen et
diffinitionem. Queritur ergo utrum omne additum elementis componen- 15
tibus mixtum sit substantia rei composite dans nomen et diffinitionem.
Respondet Philosophus quod non, quia elementis multa accidentia
adduntur, que sunt qualitates prime vel secunde, que tamen non sunt
substantia rei neque dant nomen et diffinitionem. Unde additum elemen-
tis, quod est substantia rei dans nomen et diffinitionem, debet habere 20
tres conditiones. Prima conditio est quod sit ens secundum naturam, et
per hoc non differt ab accidentibus, quia accidentia sunt entia secundum
naturam, ut habetur secundo Phisicorum.b Secunda conditio est quod sit
natura constituta, et per hoc non differt a elemento, quia natura dicitur
tam de materia quam de forma, ut probatur secundo Phisicorum;c con- 25
stat autem elementum in mixto habere rationem materie. Tertia conditio
est quod sit formale principium, et per hoc differt ab elemento, quo-
niam elementum est illud in quod resolvitur compositum tamquam in
materiam et est inexistens ei; sed compositum non resolvitur in formale
principium; ergo formale principium non est elementum. Tenet conse- 30
quentia cum maiori inductive. Dicimus enim quod iste littere a b sunt
elementa huius sillabe ba, quia illa sillaba resolvitur in a b et eiusdem
sillabe a et b sunt partes. Si enim resolutio fieret in aliquid non preexi-
stens in corrupto, illud non diceretur elementum: non enim mortuum est
componitur om. M substantia] substantie Pv
a Aristotle, An. Post., I, 27, 87a3537. b Aristotle, Phys., II, 1, 192b35193a1. c Aristotle, Phys.,
II, 1, 193a2831.
79va M elementum vivi, non obstante quod vivum | resolvitur in ipsum mortuum.
Minor autem declaratur, quoniam omnis resolutio, proprie loquendo, fit
in aliquid remanens post corruptionem resoluti; formale autem princi-
pium non manet ut plurimum, bene autem manet ipsum elementum;
ergo compositum, proprie loquendo, non resolvitur in ipsum formale 5
principium.
Lege Litteram: Quoniam vero quedam non substantie rerum, sed que-
cumque substantie secundum naturam et natura constitute sunt, manife-
stabitur utique quibusdam hec natura substantia, que non est elementum
sed principium. Elementum vero in quod dividitur inexistens ut materiam, 10
puta sillabe quia a et b sunt elementa.a
Notandum, secundum Commentatorem, commento sexacesimo,
quod rectum est aperire quod ista natura que dicitur forma sit sub-
311ra Pv stantia | addita elemento, cum sit neque elementum neque ex ele-
mento, et est aliud ab eis que existunt cum substantiis, scilicet ab 15
accidentibus, sed est principium alterius esse entis preter elemen-
tum. Elementum enim est illud in quod resolvitur res et est in re
quasi materia. Hoc autem est elementum quod, cum res resolvitur,
non resolvitur ipsum.b
Probat Commentator quod forma substantialis non est elementum, quia 20
elementum habet tres proprietates, quarum prima est quod sit in re quasi
materia, ita quod non oportet quod sit semper materia, sed sufficit quod
habeat rationem materie.
Secunda est quod resolutio rei fiat in ipsum. Propterea, quando cor-
rumpitur caro, materia prima non habet proprie rationem elementi, quia 25
resolutio carnis stat in ignem et in aquam et non in primam materiam.
Tertia, quod illud remaneat post resolutionem. Ideo partes etheroge-
nee animalis, scilicet caro, os et huiusmodi, non sunt elementa animalis,
quia non remanent corrupto animali, sed simul corrumpuntur cum ani-
mali, ut prius patuit. 30
Et in hoc repugnat Commentator ei quod ipse dixit in prologo Phisi-
corum,c quod, cum Philosophusd dixit unumquodque arbitramur cogno-
scere cum cognoscimus prima principia et primas causas usque ad ele-
natura Pv Moerb.] nature M non est inv. Moerb. vero] est add. Moerb.
elemento] elementis Iunt. resolvitur] in add. Iunt. secunda] proprietas
add. Pv tertia] proprietas add. Pv os] manus digitus add. Pv
VII, t.c. 60, fol. 209BC. c Averroes, In Phys., I, fol. 6B. d Aristotle, Phys., I, 1, 184a1014.
574 pauli veneti
menta, [quod] per elementa intendebat Aristoteles partes propinquas

compositas ex materia et forma. Non ergo forma substantialis est ele-
mentum, quia deficiunt ei iste conditiones, non etiam est ex elemento
tamquam ex parte, licet sit ex elemento tamquam ex subiecto. Iterum,
non est aliquod accidens existens cum elemento aut cum substantia com- 5
posita, sed est principium ipsius substantie composite preter elementum.
Ex quibus sequitur primo quod non consimiliter accepit Philosophus
elementum in quinto huius et in hoc septimo. Diffinit enim quinto huius
elementum, dicens: Elementum est illud ex quo fit aliquid primo inexi-
stente indivisibili specie in aliam speciem,a que quidem diffinitio compe- 10
tit solum materie prime et forme substantiali. Nunc autem, diffiniens ele-
mentum, dixit elementum esse illud in quod aliquid dividitur et est ine-
xistens ut materia,b que diffinitio competit solum materie, sive sit prima
sive secunda, dummodo in ipsa fiat resolutio compositi sic quod maneat
post corruptionem rei. Tertio autem Celi aliter diffinit elementum, dicens: 15
Elementum est corporum, ad quod alia corpora dividuntur intus existens
potentia aut actu, et est indivisibile in altera specie.c Secundum hanc dif-
finitionem nichil est elementum nisi unum de quatuor vocatis elementis
invicem activis et passivis, que solum illa sunt prima corpora ad que stat
resolutio aliorum corporum, et sunt indivisibilia in altera specie, in quan- 20
tum non sunt resolubilia in alia corpora, licet sint resolubilia in priora
principia diversarum rationum, videlicet in materiam et formam.
Secundo sequitur quod totum compositum ex materia et forma non est
sue partes simul sumpte, quia forma est principium compositi naturalis,
sed forma non est principium forme et materie; ergo compositum natu- 25
rale non est materia et forma. Dixit enim Philosophus quod ideo sillaba
non est littere sue, quia corrupta sillaba adhuc manent littere. Ita, ignis
non est materia et forma sua, quia corrupto igne in generatione mixti,
adhuc manet materia et forma sua, et diviso continuo in duas per medie-
tates, non manet illud continuum, sed due medietates. Neque inconvenit 30
quod aliquid resolvatur in formam et consequenter forma sit elementum,
79vb M dummodo retineat | rationem materie, quoniam forme elementorum exi-
stentes in mixto sunt solum dispositiones naturales ad formam mixti, ut
asserit Commentator, secundo Celi.d
quod secl. quidem om. M
a Aristotle, Met., V, 3, 1014a2627. b Aristotle, Met., VII, 17, 1041b3132. c Aristotle, De coel.,
III, 3, 302a1518. d In truth, Averroes, In De coel., III, t.c. 67, p. 634635, lin. 105114.
Contra predicta arguitur quod omne totum est sue partes. Primo, quia
aliter maioris valoris et ponderis esset unus florens et due medietates
eius quam unus florens tantum, quod est contra experientiam. Patet
consequentia, quia plus ponderant tria quam unum et maioris valoris sunt
tria quam unum illorum. 5
Secundo sequitur quod totum esse posset sine suis partibus, quod est
inimaginabile. Et probatur illud sequi. Nam, si totum distinguitur a suis
partibus simul sumptis, ipsum est prius illis partibus: prius enim est illud
a quo non convertitur essendi consequentia, per Aristotelem, in Postpre-
dicamentis et in quinto huius.a Modo sequitur: iste partes sunt, demon- 10
strando omnes partes Sortis, ergo Sortes est, et non econtra, quia corrupto
digito Sortes esset et non essent iste partes, demonstrando omnes partes
311rb Pv cum digito; constat autem | quod omne prius potest esse sine suo poste-
riori per Dei omnipotentiam.
Tertio sequitur quod alicuius rei permanentis est dare ultimum instans 15
esse, contra Aristotelem, octavo Phisicorum.b Et patet consequentia, dato
quod una superficies visa pro hoc instanti immediate post hoc erit divisa
in duas medietates: ipsa enim non immediate post hoc erit, neque visio
existens in oculo, si totum non est sue partes. Non enim videtur id quod
non est, quoniam sensus exteriores non sunt in actu in absentia sensibi- 20
lium, ut habetur secundo De anima.c
Quarto sequitur quod, si aliquid augeretur ad pedalem quantitatem
inclusive, illud magis augeretur quam si augmentaretur ad eandem quan-
titatem extensive, contra Philosophum, sexto Phisicorum,d dicentem quod
indivisibile additum divisibili non maius facit. Et patet consequentia, 25
quia, si augeretur inclusive, acquireret totam pedalem quantitatem; si
autem exclusive, non acquireret illam pedalem quantitatem, sed omnes
partes eius, si totum non est sue partes.
In contrarium arguitur probando quod totum compositum ex materia
et forma aut ex partibus quantitativis, dummodo illud fiat compositione 30
per se, non est sue partes simul sumpte, quia, dato opposito, sequuntur
plura inconvenientia, quorum primum est quod principia fiant ex aliis,
contra Philosophum, primo Phisicorum.e Et probatur illud sequi, quoniam
experientiam] et add. Pv posset] possit M iste] omnes M omnipotentiam]

potentiam Pv et om. Pv augeretur] augetur M augeretur] augetur M
a Aristotle, Cat., 12, 14a2935; Met., V, 11, 1019a14; a1213. b Aristotle, Phys., VIII, 1, 251b28
252a5. c Aristotle, De an., II, 5, 417b25. d Aristotle, Phys., VI, 1, 230a29b6. e Aristotle,
Phys., I, 5, 188a2728.
576 pauli veneti
ignis est materia et forma, et idem ignis est due medietates, per opinio-
nem contrariam; ergo due medietates ignis sunt materia et forma; sed due
medietates ignis fiunt ex aliis, sicut et ipse ignis; ergo materia et forma
fiunt ex aliis. Constat autem quod materia et forma sunt principia, ut
probatur primo Phisicorum,a et ex hoc habetur quod nullius compositi 5
naturalis materia et forma sunt principia, ut probatur primo Phisicorum,b
quoniam, si alicuius compositi naturalis materia et forma sunt principia,
ergo quodlibet compositum naturale est materia et forma, per opinionem;
ergo materie et forme materia et forma sunt principiaquod est impos-
sibile. 10
Secundum inconveniens est quod continuum est divisibile in infini-
tas partes eiusdem quantitatis, contra Philosophum, sexto Phisicorum.c Et
probatur illud sequi. Nam continuum est divisibile in infinitas partes eius-
dem proportionis, per Aristotelem in loco allegatod; sed partes eiusdem
proportionis sunt partes eiusdem quantitatis; ergo et cetera. Probatur 15
minor. Nam totum continuum est omnes sue partes eiusdem proportio-
nis collective sumpte, et idem continuum est omnes sue partes eiusdem
quantitatis, per opinionem, quia est due medietates et tres tertie et sic in
infinitum; ergo partes eiusdem proportionis sunt partes eiusdem quanti-
tatis. 20
Tertium inconveniens est quod nullum continuum est divisibile in
infinitum, contra Philosophum, sexto Phisicorum.e Et probatur illud sequi,
quoniam nullum continuum habet plures partes quam duas; nullum enim
continuum habet plures partes quam tres tertias et quatuor quartas et
sic in infinitum; sed tres tertie et quatuor quarte et sic in infinitum non 25
sunt plures partes quam due; ergo et cetera. Probatur minor, ex eo quia
tres tertie et quatuor quarte et sic in infinitum non sunt plures partes
quam due medietates, eo quod due medietates sunt infinite partes, per
opinionem.
Quartum inconveniens est quod dyametri ad costam quadrati est pro- 30
79va M portio rationalis, contra Euclidem, | decimo Elementorum.f Et quod illud
sequatur arguitur, quoniam quatuor ad duo est proportio rationalis, ex
quo denominatur ab aliquo numero; sed dyameter est quatuor et costa
est duo, si omne continuum est due medietates et quatuor quarte, per
ergo] et Pv
a Aristotle,Phys., I, 7 passim. b Aristotle, Phys., I, 7, 190b1720. c Aristotle, Phys., VI, 12

passim. d Cf. Aristotle, Phys., VI, 12 passim. e Aristotle, Phys., VI, 12. f Euclid, Elem., Lib.
X, prop. 9.
opinionem; ergo et cetera. Et ex eodem fundamento sequitur quod coste

quadrati ad suum dyametrum est proportio maioris inequalitatis; sed
costa est quatuor, quia est quatuor quarte, et dyameter est duo, quia due
medietates; ergo et cetera.
Quintum inconveniens, quod aliquod compositum ex contrariis perpe- 5
tuabitur, contra Philosophum, primo Celi.a Et probabitur illud sequi. Nam
iste binarius perpetuabitur, demonstrando materiam et formam Sortis, et
iste binarius est aliquid compositum ex contrariis; ergo et cetera. Tenet
consequentia cum minori, quia iste binarius est Sortes, per opinionem
contrariam. Maior autem est nota, ex eo quia quelibet unitas illius binarii 10
perpetuabitur: materia enim est ingenerabilis et incorruptibilis, per Ari-
stotelem, primo Phisicorum,b intellectus autem est perpetuus, ut probat
idem tertio De anima.c
Sextum inconveniens est quod de eodem simul verificantur contra-
ria et contradictoria et privative opposita, contra Philosophum, quarto 15
311va Pv huius.d Et probatur illud sequi, dato quod una medietas | A sit calida et alba
et mota, alia vero sit frigida nigra et non mota. Patet quod A est calidum
et frigidum, album et nigrum, motum et non motum. Deinde, ponatur
quod A sit materia et forma Sortis, B vero solum forma, et sequitur quod
idem est divisibile et indivisibile, animatum et inanimatum, homo et non 20
homo, quoniam Sortes est A B, sed A est homo divisibile et animatum, B
vero est non homo, indivisibile atque inanimatum; ergo et cetera.
Septimum inconveniens est quod aliqua duo sunt invicem equalia
contra Philosophum, quinto huiuse: sicut enim nichil est magnum et
parvum respectu eiusdem, ita etiam nichil est equale et inequale respectu 25
eiusdem. Et quod illud sequatur arguitur, ponendo quod A et B sint due
medietates lapidis, C vero tertia pars et D totum residuum. Et patet hquodi
A B sint invicem equalia. Quod autem sint invicem inequalia arguitur,
quoniam A B sunt C D per illam opinionem; constat autem quod C D sunt
invicem inequalia. Et ex eodem fundamento sequitur quod A est minus 30
et maius B, dato quod A sit quadrupedale et B bipedale: A enim est pedale
et tripedale, sed pedale est minus B et tripedale est maius.
est3 om. M mota1] et add. Pv et om. Pv quod suppl.
a Aristotle, De coel., I, 3, 270a1222. b Aristotle, Phys., I, 9, 192a2729. c Aristotle, De an.,
III, 5, 430a2223. d Aristotle, Met., IV, 3, 1005b2930. e Perhaps, the refence is to Aristotle,
Met., V, 15, 1020b321021a14 (but cf. also: Soph. El., I, 30, 181b1518).
578 pauli veneti
Octavum inconveniens est quod partes materiales sunt partes forma-

les eiusdem, contra Philosophum in hoc septimo.a Et probatur illud sequi,
quia lapis est materia et forma, et idem lapis est due medietates; ergo due
medietates sunt materia et forma. Constat autem quod medietates lapi-
dis sunt partes materiales; materia autem et forma sunt partes formales 5
que ingrediuntur diffinitionem, ut patuit in hoc septimob; et ita habetur
quod eedem partes numero sunt quantitative et qualitative, homogenee
et etherogenee, quia materia et forma sunt partes qualitative et ethero-
genee, medietates autem sunt partes quantitative et etherogenee, idest
eiusdem rationis. Et alia multa absurda sequuntur secundum quod diffu- 10
sius declaravi in primo Phisicorum.c
Ad primum dicitur quod illud non sequitur. Licet enim maioris pon-
deris sunt tria quam unum quando non communicant invicem, tamen,
quando duo eorum sunt partes unius tertii, illud non oportet; unde pon-
dus totius aliud est a ponderibus suarum medietatum, tamen tantum pon- 15
derant medietates divise sicut totum compositum ex hiis.
Ad secundum respondetur quod etiam illud non sequitur. Nec est
79vb M verum quod totum sit prius omnibus partibus simul sumptis, | est enim
quibusdam prius et quibusdam posterius: si enim Sortes est prior Platone
et posterior Cicerone, non debet concedi quod Sortes sit prior Platone et 20
Cicerone, neque quod sit posterior neque quod sit simul cum eis. Ita, quia
alique partes Sortis sunt eo priores et alique posteriores, Sortes non est
omnibus suis partibus simul sumptis prior, neque simul cum illis. Et tunc
ad argumentum: si iste partes sunt, Sortes est, et non econtra; ergo Sortes
est prior istis partibus, negatur consequentia, et ad regulam Aristotelis 25
dicitur quod intelligit quando fit compositio unius ad unum, non autem
multorum ad unum.
Ad tertium conceditur illud sequi. Intendit tamen Philosophus, octavo
Phisicorum,d quod non datur ultimum instans rei permanentis, scilicet
secundum se et quamlibet eius partem. Et hoc in illis que necessario par- 30
tibiliter acquiruntur, quod dicitur propter numeros et figuras et ubicatio-
nes, que indivisibiliter acquiruntur et indivisibiliter deperduntur; ideo in
eis datur ultimum instans. Tamen superficies, et si in istanti desinit esse,
non tamen secundum quamlibet eius partem, et hoc si desinat esse per
suarum] partium seu add. M prior] prius Pv
a Aristotle, Met., VII, 10, 1035a4ff. b Aristotle, Met., VII, 10, 1035a2223; 11, 1036b2130. c Paul
of Venice, Exp. Phys., I, tr. 1, c. 3, ed. Venice 1499, fol. 20rb21rb. d Aristotle, Phys., VIII, 8,
263b9ff.
divisionem partis a parte, visio etiam per quam videtur illa superficies
desinit esse, remanent autem partes visionis in oculo medietatibus super-
ficiei corrispondentes.
Ad quartum negatur illud sequi. Et dicitur quod illa pedalis quantitas
ita acquiritur, si fiat augmentatio exclusive ad illam sive inclusive ad illam: 5
si enim illud quod augetur manebit in fine motus, illam acquiret inclusive,
eo quod habebit eam; si autem non manebit in fine motus, illam acquiret
exclusive, quia non habebit eam sed materia eius. Unde, quia acquisitio
pedalitas non fiet in fine motus propter quietem, oportet quod fiat ante
311vb Pv finem motus. Ideo illud quod movebitur ad illam | pedalitatem, licet non 10
maneat in fine motus, tamen acquiret eam, videlicet ante finem illius
motus.
medietatibus superficiei corrispondentes] corrispondentes medietatibus superiori-

bus Pv exclusive] extensive M motus] et cetera add. Pv
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INDEX LOCORUM
Albert the Great Alexander of Alexandria

Met. In Met.
Lib. V, tr. 6, c. 7, p. 287, 6971: 522b VII, c. 1, fol. 184ravb: 40.3141.11
Lib. V, tr. 6, c, 6, p. 286, 8091: 522.14 VII, c. 1, q. 3, fol. 185rbva: 68.1
Lib. VII, tr. I, c. 3, p. 319, 3656: 56.28 VII, c. 1, q. 3, fol. 185rbvb: 67.6
Lib. VII, tr. I, c. 3, p. 319, 42ff.: 57.8 VII, c. 1, q. 3, fol. 185va: 67.14, 67.18,
Lib. VII, tr. I, c. 4, p. 320, 1338: 63.5 67.25
Lib. VII, tr. I, c. 5, p. 324, 2636: VII, c. 1, q. 4, fol. 186rab: 57.25
93.2833 VII, c. 3, fol. 189rbva: 93.520
Lib. VII, tr. I, c. 5, p. 324, 7180: 94.15 VII, c. 4, fol. 191vab: 114.410
Lib. VII, tr. I, c. 5, p. 324, 8085: 94.6 VII, c. 4, fol. 192vb: 122.1924
7 VII, c. 4, q. 1, fol. 192vb: 123.29124.3
Lib. VII, tr. I, c. 5, p. 324, 8591: 94.8 VII, c. 4, fol. 192vb193ra: 124.23125.2
10 VII, c. 4, fol. 193rb: 128.1528
Lib. VII, tr. I, c. 5, pp. 324, 91325, 4: VII, c. 4, fol. 193rbva: 128.29129.2
94.1116 VII, c. 4, fol. 193va: 129.518
Lib. VII, tr. I, c. 8, p. 328, 1821: 122.9 VII, c. 4, f. 193vab: 129.2831
13 VII, c. 4, fol. 193vb: 130.2232
Lib. VII, tr. 1, c. 8, p. 329, 8588: VII, c. 4, fol. 193vb194ra: 131.411
129.30130.2 VII, c. 4, fol. 194rb: 131.1518
Lib. VII, tr. 1, c. 10, p. 335, 2544: VII, c. 4, fol. 193vb194ra: 132.1319
162.19 VII, c. 4, fol. 194ra: 132.29133.6,
Lib. VII, tr. 1, c. 12, p. 336, 1118: 170b 133.1218
Lib. VII, tr. 1, c. 12, p. 336, 2646: 171b VII, c. 4, fol. 194rab: 134.418
Lib. VII, tr. 1, c. 12, p. 336, 4751: 174c VII, c. 4, fol. 194vab: 137.2734, 139.8
Lib. VII, tr. 1, c. 12, p. 336, 6782: 174e 20
Lib. VII, tr. 1, c. 12, pp. 337, 83338, 3: VII, c. 4, fol. 194vb: 138.1932
174.1625 VII, c. 4, q. 5, fol. 195ra: 140.821
Lib. VII, tr. 2, c. 1, p. 339, 4055: VII, c. 4, fol. 195ra: 141.213
199.26 VII, c. 4, q. 6, fol. 195rb: 142.928
Lib. VII, tr. 3, c. 1, p. 356, 69: 320.28 VII, c. 4, fol. 195va: 142.30143.5
31 VII, c. 4, fol. 195vb196ra: 143.30
Lib. VII, tr. 3, c. 2, p. 357, 7687: 144.26
320.2831 VII, c. 4, fol. 196vb197ra: 157.422
Lib. VII, tr. 3, c. 4, p. 359, 6474: 339.6 VII, c. 4, fol. 197rab: 153.2128
VII, c. 4, fol. 197ra: 157.23158.12
Alhacem VII, 4, q. 6, fol. 199rbva: 163.1126
De Aspectibus VII, c. 4, q. 5, fol. 198vb: 164.29165.15
Lib. II, c. 3.32, pp. 105106, lin. 224 VII, c. 6, q. 6, fol. 203rb: 199.26
244: 559.17 VII, c. 7, q. 3, fol. 208va: 220.27221.14
VII, c. 7, fol. 208vb209ra: 222.11223.12
588 index locorum
In Met. (cont.) An. Post.

VII, c. 10, q. 7, fol. 221rb: 338.33 I, 1, 71a117: 534.18
VII, c. 10, q. 8, fol. 222rarb: 354.79, I, 1, 71a1929: 362.21
354.2428 I, 2, 71b6: 426.23
VII, c. 10, q. 8, fol. 222rb: 355.17356.2 I, 2, 71b912: 534.1, 548.22
VII, c. 11, q. 3, fol. 226va227rb: 403.23 I, 2, 71b1719: 173.35174.1, 360.29
VII, c. 13, q. 3, fol. 232vavb: 522.1314 I, 2, 71b2526: 128.20
VII, c. 17, q. 2, fol. 242rb243ra: 553.26 I, 2, 72a6: 426.23
VII, c. 17, q. 2, fol. 243rab: 558.9 I, 2, 72a1424: 360.31
VII, c. 17, q. 2, fol. 243rbva: 558.23 I, 2, 72a2930: 89.2526, 108.2324
VII, c. 17, q. 2, fol. 243vab: 559.6 I, 4 passim: 151.30
VII, c. 17, q. 2, fol. 243vb244ra: 559.26 I, 4, 73a34ff.: 115.19, 168.1
I, 4, 73a3437: 44.3031, 136.25,
Aquinas 390.26
Exp. Met. I, 4, 73a37b3: 118.5, 168.25
VII, lect. 2, n. 1275: 83.39 I, 4, 73b1821: 555.32
VII, lect. 3, n. 1308: 113.15 I, 4, 73b2574a3: 246.27
VII, lect. 3, n. 1310: 118.2628 I, 4, 73b3031: 466.30
VII, lect. 3, n. 1317: 122.1924 I, 4, 73b3874a3: 246.12, 555.5
VII, lect. 3, n. 1325: 129.2228, 129.28 I, 5, 74a432: 362g
31, 130.2232 I, 6 passim: 548.22, 557.12
VII, lect. 3, n. 1328: 131.1518 I, 6, 74b1315: 490.24
VII, lect. 3, nn. 13291330: 132.1013, I, 6, 75a2837: 557.8
132.1319 I, 8, 75b2425: 490.2
VII, lect. 4, n. 1332: 138.1932 I, 8, 75b3032: 174.15, 362.19
VII, lect. 4, n. 1344: 153.2128, 155.12 I, 9, 75b3637: 426.23
VII, lect. 5, n. 1349: 161.34 I, 9, 76a89: 553.1, 558.10
VII, lect. 5, nn. 13781379: 199.25 I, 10, 76b35ff.: 360.31
26 I, 11, 77a59: 352.25, 428.32, 460.19,
VII, lect. 9, n. 1467: 326.2027 462.10, 465.12, 503.18, 506.19,
VII, lect. 9, n. 1468: 353.21354.1, 507.32
354.79, 354.2428 I, 11, 77a10ff.: 553.2021
VII, lect. 10, n. 1482: 338.25 I, 13 passim: 548.22
VII, lect. 11, nn. 15351536: 401.24 I, 13, 78a22b31: 535.6
VII, lect. 13, n. 1570: 522.13 I, 14, 79a1820: 71.67
VII, lect. 17, n. 1669: 549.5 I, 15, 79b1214: 117, 1213, 301.2122
Exp. Post. I, 16, 79b23ff.: 539.1
Lib. I, lect. 2, p. 11, ad lin. 40: 68d I, 22, 83b784a10: 126.10
S. Th. I, 24, 85b1518: 185.32, 491.13
Ia, qq. 1415, pp. 7289: 480.7 I, 24, 85b1718: 56.33, 353.7, 530.1415
I, 27, 87a3537: 572.7
Aristotle I, 33 passim: 491.23
An. Pr. II, 12 passim: 393.22
I, 2, 25a1417: 187a II, 12, 89b2390a9: 534.5
I, 6, 28a26ff.: 187a II, 1, 89b3135: 551.2
I, 41, 49b3437: 433.23 II, 2 passim: 539.33, 548.24, 549.17,
I, 41, 50a12: 433.23 556.1718
index locorum 589
II, 2, 90a56: 534.20 5, 2b16c: 82.34, 82.32

II, 2, 90a67: 538.21, 552.2526 5, 2b56: 38.2425
II, 2, 90a1518: 364.11, 562.1011 5, 2b2931: 463.11
II, 2, 90a3132: 174.56, 538.16 5, 3a78: 86.1617, 88.9
II, 310: 414.14 5, 3a89: 520.1
II, 3, 90b1ff.: 174.1 5, 3a912: 449.1, 449.5
II, 3, 90b2425: 490.22, 491.12 5, 3b1023: 83.4, 445.22
II, 3, 91a16: 555.9 5, 3b1316: 140.23
II, 47 passim: 362.11 5, 3b19: 39.29
II, 6, 92a2930: 52.34 5, 3b2425: 269.27
II, 6, 92a2934: 408.12 6, 5a910: 571.3
II, 8, 93a2126: 557.8 6, 5b12: 382.24
II, 8, 93a29b14: 556.20 6, 6a2627: 152.45
II, 8, 93a35b7: 556.11 6, 7b158a12: 506.5, 522.19
II, 8, 93b6: 552.28, 560.8 7, 8a3537: 146.21
II, 8, 93b89: 542.5 7, 8b1315: 146.21
II, 9, 93b2127: 540.2 11, 14a1516: 349.32, 372.45
II, 10, 93b3894a10: 53.2, 428.1, 490.3 12, 14a29b8: 48.2223
4, 539.33, 546.7, 548.24, 549.17, 12, 14a2935: 58.23, 321.29, 495.30,
556.1718, 558.2425 575.910
II, 10, 94a1114: 174.11, 556.28 14 passim: 244.6
II, 11, 94a2024: 542.20 14, 15a1: 207.33
II, 11, 94a2835: 542.10 14, 15a1314: 64.56
II, 11, 94b911: 546.8, 546.21, 547.14 De an.
II, 11, 94b3234: 542.5, 542.17 I, 1, 402a23ff.: 426.21
II, 11, 95a34: 546.8, 546.21, 547.14 I, 1, 402b78: 428.10, 428.2627,
II, 13 passim: 316.5, 410.28, 414.14, 460.67, 463.1516, 485.34486.1
426.14 I, 1, 402b2122: 53.28, 107.21, 349.28
II, 13, 96b3035: 494.14 I, 1, 402b2526: 360.31, 554.5
II, 13, 96b3132: 52.34 I, 1, 402b25403a2: 171.7
II, 13, 97a15: 432.21 I, 1, 403a29ff.: 341.32
II, 13, 97a23ff.: 52.13 I, 1, 403b56: 331.30, 562.2
II, 13, 97a23b6: 341.2930 I, 4, 408a29b18: 530.89
II, 13, 97a3134: 431.21 I, 4, 408a3034: 41.17
II, 13, 97b1315: 410.28 I, 4, 408a34b18: 38.2829, 245.13,
II, 13, 97b15ff.: 430.2223 256.29
II, 13, 97b2539: 374.32 II, 1 passim: 481.27
Cat. II, 1, 412a611: 88.6
1, 1a112: 336.22 II, 1, 412a2728: 325.4, 347.13, 379.27
1, 1a67: 79.7 II, 1, 412b69: 561.25
5, 2a1112: 81.32, 85.19 II, 1, 412b11: 355.22, 356.11
5, 2a1114: 367.1, 446.14, 449.3 II, 1, 412b2022: 321.32
5, 2a1116: 445.22, 522.7 II, 1, 412a1622: 88.6
5, 2a1619: 463.11 II, 2 passim: 556.22
5, 2a1419: 458.4 II, 2, 413b1132: 514.29
5, 2a2734: 189.1718 II, 2, 413b32414a3: 379.2324
5, 2a342b1: 458.4 II, 2, 414a1219: 88.6
590 index locorum
De an. (cont.) III, 11, 434a1: 338.30

II, 2, 414a2527: 97.56, 217.1719, III, 12, 434a2829: 379.2324
270.3132, 308.23 III, 13, 435a1113: 338.30
II, 3 passim: 386.24 III, 13, 435a13: 379.2324
II, 3, 414a2932: 306.3233 III, 13, 435b2: 379.2324
II, 3, 414b34: 338.30, 379.2324 De coel.
II, 4, 414a26415b2: 267.17 I, 3, 270a1222: 577.6
II, 4, 415a1822: 461.8 I, 4, 271a33: 364.6
II, 4, 415b821: 350.15 I, 9, 277b27ff.: 362.9
II, 5, 417a2130a: 54.18 I, 9, 278a1215: 330.1213, 393.24,
II, 5, 417b2123: 461.10 395.1112, 405.27, 551.31
II, 5, 417b25: 575.21 I, 10: 493.7, 478.25
II, 6 passim: 53.29 I, 1011 passim: 213.14
II, 6, 418a720: 41.9 I, 10, 279b2021: 278.25
II, 6, 418a89: 363.8 I, 12 passim: 278.25, 493.7, 531.14
II, 6, 418a13: 562.10 I, 12, 281b225: 46.6
II, 6, 418a17: 562.10 II, 3, 286a2324: 454.11, 507.32
II, 6, 418a1718: 361.17 II, 4 passim: 376.27
II, 6, 418a2024: 37.1314, 107.20, II, 7, 289a1921: 285.8
361.26 II, 7, 289a2328: 285.21
II, 7, 418a2627: 462.17 II, 13, 293b32294a10: 376.27
II, 8, 420a21: 562.78 III, 3, 302a1518: 574.1517
II, 8, 420b11: 562.78 De gen.
II, 11, 423b27424a5: 379.22 I, 3 passim: 305.17
II, 12, 424a1719: 224.2123 I, 3, 317b25: 312.9
III, 1, 424b24: 338.30 I, 3, 317b13ff.: 243.2122
III, 3, 427b1416: 462.22 I, 3, 317b2325: 86.5, 303.25
III, 3, 427b2728: 394.21 I, 3, 317b2931: 56.19
III, 4, 429a2224: 462.33, 528.1718 I, 3, 318a6319b5: 100.9
III, 4, 429b1011: 194.23, 195.5, 196.25 I, 3, 318a2325: 63.3464.1,
26 280.25
III, 4, 429b1013: 195.2528, 393.27 I, 3, 319a814: 209.20
III, 4, 429b2931: 462.33, 528.1718 I, 3, 319a2022: 563.34
III, 5, 429b29430a2: 54.18 I, 4, 321b22322a4: 257.10
III, 5, 430a1017: 529.14 I, 5, 321b2227: 347.2122
III, 5, 430a1417: 460.8 I, 5, 322a1618: 38.2728, 185.31,
III, 5, 430a15: 461.28 250.32, 405.25
III, 5, 430a1718: 297.10 I, 7, 323b2931: 269.25, 293.34
III, 5, 430a2223: 449.15, 529.35530.1, I, 10, 327b2231: 257.10, 278.17
577.13 II, 2 passim: 311.23
III, 6, 430a2628: 316.16 II, 3, 330a3031: 431.7
III, 6, 430b2730: 316.16, 502.25 II, 7, 334b47: 303.31
III, 7, 431a1415: 461.21 II, 11, 338b5ff.: 443.27
III, 7, 431b68: 461.21 II, 11, 338b1617: 278.28
III, 8, 431b29432a1: 279.31 De gen. anim.
III, 8, 432a810: 53.32 II, 8 passim: 264.31
III, 9, 432a1517: 306.33 II, 6, 744b2126: 287.28
index locorum 591
De int. IV, 4, 1007a20b18: 553.23

7, 17a3940: 461.15 IV, 56 passim: 527.33
De sensu IV, 5, 1010a2225: 351.1
3, 439b1112: 49.17, 158.30 V, 2, 1013a2629: 39.1, 101.5, 170.1,
Eth. Nic. 326.17, 344.18, 353.17, 354.6, 371.32,
I, 4, 1096a23: 468.26 438.24, 445.27
III, 1, 1110a13: 262.21, 263.7, 309.18, V, 2, 1013a27: 355.21, 356.11
313.14 V, 2, 1013b32: 355.21, 356.11
VI, 4, 1140a910: 214.2021, 222.32 V, 2, 1013b911: 45.16
VI, 5, 1140b46: 222.32 V, 2, 1013b34ff.: 359.29
IX, 8: 370.13 V, 3, 1014a2627: 568.7, 574.810
Met. V, 3, 1014a2635: 564.32, 568.12
I, 1, 980b7: 434.2 V, 4, 1014b261015a3: 80.3
I, 1, 981a1617: 38.2829, 256.29 V, 6, 1015b1636: 61.10, 116.25, 401a
I, 2, 982a810: 497.26 V, 6, 1015b361016a17: 561.27
I, 2, 982b1217: 110.1 V, 6, 1016a24ff.: 148.24
I, 9 passim: 357.45 V, 6, 1016a25b17: 430.15
II, 1, 993b45: 537.19 V, 6, 1016b2431: 571.17
II, 1, 993b911: 54.28, 110.12, 268.2627 V, 6, 1016b3135: 261.17
II, 1, 993b3031: 110.12, 376.24, 557.26 V, 6, 1016b32: 362.24
II, 1, 993b2631: 213.34 V, 6, 1016b3233: 371.5
II, 2, 994b1627: 192.4 V, 6, 1017a36: 295.10
III, 2, 997b910: 386.6 V, 7, 1017a822: 131.7
III, 3, 998b17994a14: 507.26 V, 7, 1017a1319: 35.11
III, 3, 998b2227: 69.20, 81.13, 144.15 V, 7, 1017a2224: 34.31, 35.11, 77.24,
16, 542.2 457.24
III, 3, 998b2426: 136.5, 500.22 V, 7, 1017a2427: 43.15
III, 3, 999a16: 406.10 V, 8 passim: 82.18
III, 3, 999a1214: 453.14, 469.1 V, 9, 1017b271018a4: 401.15
III, 3, 999b2328: 405.8, 423.16, V, 9, 1018a1215: 502.14
438.22 V, 10, 1018a3538: 457.24
III, 4, 1001a2122: 41.2021 V, 11, 1019a14: 321.29, 344.9, 575.10
IV, 1, 1003a21: 58.22 V, 11, 1019a414: 506.6
IV, 1, 1003a2632: 540.56 V, 11, 1019a1114: 48.23
IV, 2 passim: 409.25 V, 11, 1019a1213: 575.10
IV, 2, 1003a33b12: 32.4, 67.2324, V, 13, 1020a69: 169.2729
87.35 V, 14, 1020b78: 457.24
IV, 2, 1003b610: 39.23 V, 15, 1020b321021a14: 577.24
IV, 2, 1003b2225: 128.30, 518.8 V, 15, 1021a1014: 453.1718
IV, 2, 1004a917: 373.7 V, 15, 1021a2629: 477.15
IV, 2, 1004a10: 471.9 V, 15, 1021a2832: 228.31
IV, 2, 1004a1217: 531.13 V, 15, 1021b68: 477.15
IV, 2, 1004a1416: 141.30 V, 16, 1021b2330: 476.14, 481.29,
IV, 2, 1004a2531: 453.1112, 553.2728 550.2829
IV, 3, 1005b2930: 577.1516 V, 18, 1022a2627: 423.18
IV, 4, 1006a2834: 42.12 V, 18, 1022a3235: 44.21, 537.3
IV, 4, 1006b1113: 42.12 V, 30 passim: 75.2526
592 index locorum
Met. (cont.) VII, 3, 1029a2930: 99.34

V, 30, 1025a2425: 217.26 VII, 3, 1029a3033: 102.1620
VI, 1, 1025b34: 87.35, 540.6 VII, 3, 1029a3334: 105.67
VI, 1, 1025b301026a6: 61.4, 353.21 VII, 4, 1029b19: 108.614
VI, 1, 1026a13: 52.1 VII, 4, 1029b910: 108.2830, 109.27
VI, 1, 1026a6ff: 550a 28
VI, 1, 1026a3132: 58.22 VII, 4, 1029b1012: 109.912
VI, 2 passim: 75.26 VII, 4, 1029b1314: 113.68
VI, 2, 1026a35b1: 43.15 VII, 4, 1029b1417: 115.2830
VI, 2, 1026b35: 396.7 VII, 4, 1029b1619: 117.2024
VII, 1, 1028a1013: 30.712, 43.15, VII, 4, 1029b1922: 118.2125
67.2324, 77.22 VII, 4, 1029b2228: 122.2530
VII, 1, 1028a1318: 31.2933 VII, 4, 1029b2834: 125.311
VII, 1, 1028a1820: 32.1921, 68.78, VII, 4, 1029b341030a2: 126.1821
68d, 72.23 VII, 4, 1030a25: 127.59
VII, 1, 1028a2021: 41.22 VII, 4, 1030a56: 129.34
VII, 1, 1028a2024: 36.69 VII, 4, 1030a67: 129.1920, 551.22,
VII, 1, 1028a2427: 36.1820 553.25
VII, 1, 1028a2729: 37.13 VII, 4, 1030a79: 130.36
VII, 1, 1028a2930: 43.3031 VII, 4, 1030a1011: 131.13
VII, 1, 1028a3031: 44.810 VII, 4, 1030a1113: 131.1214
VII, 1, 1028a31ff.: 372.15 VII, 4, 1030a1314: 131.2425, 508.25
VII, 1, 1028a3134: 48.3249, 2 26
VII, 1, 1028a3233: 379.1 VII, 4, 1030a1417: 132.2023
VII, 1, 1028a3334: 450.2 VII, 4, 1030a1723: 138.1218
VII, 1, 1028a3436: 49.2426, 347.1011 VII, 4, 1030a2324: 139.12
VII, 1, 1028a36b2: 50.1417 VII, 4, 1030a2427: 141.2023
VII, 1, 1028b25: 51.710 VII, 4, 1030a2728: 143.68
VII, 1, 1028b67: 58.3233 VII, 4, 1030a2832: 143.2629
VII, 2, 1028b813: 59.3460.3 VII, 4, 1030a3235: 144.2730
VII, 2, 1028b1415: 62.2022 VII, 4, 1030a35b3: 145.1216
VII, 2, 1028b1618: 65.911 VII, 4, 1030b34: 145.2627
VII, 2, 1028b1819: 73.2021 VII, 4, 1030b47: 147.2022, 413.8
VII, 2, 1028b1921: 74.810 VII, 4, 1030b78: 148.14
VII, 2, 1028b2123: 74.2527 VII, 4, 1030b812: 148.1418
VII, 2, 1028b2428: 75.1214 VII, 4, 1030b1213: 148.3031
VII, 2, 1028b2832: 77.1418 VII, 5, 1030b1418: 151.48
VII, 3, 1028b331029a1: 81.2227 VII, 5, 1030b1516: 377.1415
VII, 3, 1029a12: 82.57 VII, 5, 1030b1718: 41.27
VII, 3, 1029a35: 83.2730 VII, 5, 1030b1823: 152.1115
VII, 3, 1029a57: 84.810 VII, 5, 1030b2021: 153.1718
VII, 3, 1029a710: 90.2630 VII, 5, 1030b2324: 154.1315
VII, 3, 1029a1019: 91.2028 VII, 5, 1030b2426: 156.1011
VII, 3, 1029a2023: 355.19, 356.8 VII, 5, 1030b2628: 156.2324
VII, 3, 1029a2026: 210.78 VII, 5, 1030b2830: 159.2729
VII, 3, 1029a2027: 92.2232 VII, 5, 1030b3034: 160.1620
VII, 3, 1029a2728: 98.2122 VII, 5, 1030b341031a1: 163.2731
index locorum 593
VII, 5, 1031a14: 168.2630 VII, 7, 1033a58: 236.36

VII, 5, 1031a15: 354.16, 354.24, VII, 7, 1033a813: 237.711
508.2526, 508.3132 VII, 7, 1033a1319: 239.1419
VII, 5, 1031a46: 169.1113 VII, 7, 1033a1923: 240.69
VII, 5, 1031a710: 172.1923 VII, 8, 1033a2428: 241.1720
VII, 5, 1031a1011: 173.13 VII, 8, 1033a24b19: 405.25, 530.32
VII, 5, 1031a1114: 173.1416 VII, 8, 1033a2829: 280.17
VII, 6: 401.25 VII, 8, 1033a2930: 353.11
VII, 612 passim: 551.22 VII, 8, 1033a2831: 278.20, 532.14
VII, 6, 1031a1518: 177.1417 VII, 8, 1033a2834: 242.914
VII, 6, 1031a1924: 178.39 VII, 8, 1033a34b7: 242.32243.6
VII, 6, 1031a2428: 178.2629 VII, 8, 1033b58: 372.22
VII, 6, 1031a28b3: 180.2532 VII, 8, 1033b711: 247.2227
VII, 6, 1031b38: 181.1318 VII, 8, 1033b89: 304.7, 304.32
VII, 6, 1031b810: 182.710 VII, 8, 1033b819: 311.13
VII, 6, 1031b1115: 182.2833 VII, 8 1033b1213: 277.32
VII, 6, 1031b1314: 249.1920 VII, 8, 1033b1216: 248.612
VII, 6, 1031b1518: 183.1316 VII, 8, 1033b1619: 248.2529
VII, 6, 1031b1822: 183.2528 VII, 8, 1033b1921: 254.2223
VII, 6, 1031b2224: 41.27 VII, 8, 1033b2126: 256.1119
VII, 6, 1031b2225: 188.912 VII, 8, 1033b2629: 259.14
VII, 6, 1031b2528: 188.2123 VII, 8, 1033b2932: 453.24
VII, 6, 1031b2830: 191.14 VII, 8, 1033b291034a2: 261.33262.3
VII, 6, 1031b3132: 191.1617 VII, 8, 1033b2934a8: 250.910
VII, 6, 1031b321032a2: 191.32192.2 VII, 8, 1033b33: 265.12
VII, 6, 1032a24: 192.1820 VII, 8, 1033b341034a1: 265.1415,
VII, 6, 1032a46: 192.3031, 249.1920 432.20
VII, 6, 1032a611: 197.34198.5 VII, 8, 1034a25: 266.15
VII, 7, 1032a1213: 206.56 VII, 8, 1034a58: 266.1821, 371.6
VII, 7, 1032a1315: 208.1215 VII, 9, 1034a910: 272.2021
VII, 7, 1032a1519: 210.1822 VII, 9, 1034a1013: 279.5
VII, 7, 1032a2022: 211.810 VII, 9, 1034a1014: 273.2124
VII, 7, 1032a2226: 212.612 VII, 9, 1034a1416: 275.1619
VII, 7, 1032a2425: 250.910 VII, 9, 1034a1618: 276.46
VII, 7, 1032a2632: 215.1620 VII, 9, 1034a1820: 276.1416
VII, 7, 1032a3031: 218.3032 VII, 9, 1034a2021: 276.2426
VII, 7, 1032a32b6: 223.1319 VII, 9, 1034a2125: 282.1821
VII, 7, 1032b610: 225.34226.2 VII, 9, 1034a2530: 283.17
VII, 7, 1032b914: 479.20 VII, 9, 1034a30b4: 287.1321
VII, 7, 1032b1114: 226.1316, 477.18, VII, 9, 1034b47: 291.2528
483.17 VII, 9, 1034b716: 302.815
VII, 7, 1032b1112: 227.1617 VII, 9, 1034b1618: 307.1, 308.24
VII, 7, 1032b1517: 228.1114 VII, 9, 1034b1619: 302.2730
VII, 7, 1032b1723: 230.2633 VII, 10, 1034b2022: 315.2831, 423.5
VII, 7, 1032b2330: 232.2430 VII, 10, 1034b2228: 319.1116
VII, 7, 1032b291033a1: 280.34 VII, 10, 1034b2832: 322.16
VII, 7, 1032b301033a5: 234.31235.4 VII, 10, 1034b3234: 323.1417
594 index locorum
Met. (cont.) VII, 11, 1036b2832: 387.15

VII, 10, 1035a12: 323.3435 VII, 11, 1036b321037a5: 391.2633
VII, 10, 1035a26: 324.1721 VII, 11, 1037a510: 392.33393.3
VII, 10, 1035a4ff.: 578.2 VII, 11, 1037a1017: 397.713
VII, 10, 1035a69: 325.33326.2 VII, 11, 1037a1720: 397.2123
VII, 10, 1035a79: 355.24, 356.14 VII, 11, 1037a2122: 398.2829
VII, 10, 1035a911: 328.1115 VII, 11, 1037a2225: 399.912
VII, 10, 1035a912: 405.2 VII, 11, 1037a2527: 399.2327
VII, 10, 1035a1214: 329.2426 VII, 11, 1037a2829: 400.67
VII, 10, 1035a1417: 330.68 VII, 11, 1037a2933: 400.2123
VII, 10, 1035a1720: 330.2426 VII, 11, 1037a33b3: 406.2
VII, 10, 1035a2023: 331.1013 VII, 11, 1037a33b7: 354.1920, 401.18
VII, 10, 1035a2223: 578.6 23
VII, 10, 1035a2325: 332.2528 VII, 11, 1037b34: 403.12, 406.8
VII, 10, 1035a2530: 333.1520 VII, 12, 1037b814: 408.2430, 481.21
VII, 10, 1035a3034: 334.14 VII, 12, 1037b1013: 424.16
VII, 10, 1035a34b3: 334.32335.2 VII, 12, 1037b1421: 412.611
VII, 10, 1035b13: 453.32454.1 VII, 12, 1037b1921: 507.3031
VII, 10, 1035b36: 340.1720 VII, 12, 1037b2124: 412.2529
VII, 10, 1035b610: 341.812 VII, 12, 1037b2427: 413.1013
VII, 10, 1035b1114: 344.1923 VII, 12, 1037b2729: 414.3132
VII, 10, 1035b1416: 355.20 VII, 12, 1037b2930: 445.2930
VII, 10, 1035b1420: 345.2026 VII, 12, 1037b2933: 415.33416.2
VII, 10, 1035b2022: 346.68 VII, 12, 1037b331038a4: 416.2629
VII, 10, 1035b2227: 349.16 VII, 12, 1038a58: 419.2528
VII, 10, 1035b2733: 352.39 VII, 12, 1038a89: 420.67
VII, 10, 1035b331036a5: 358.2328 VII, 12, 1038a915: 425.31426.2
VII, 10, 1036a12: 355.12 VII, 12, 1038a918: 507.3031
VII, 10, 1036a57: 363.23 VII, 12, 1038a1315: 427.18
VII, 10, 1036a58: 359.1721 VII, 12, 1038a15: 425.28, 440.11,
VII, 10, 1036a813: 360.1520 440.2829
VII, 10, 1036a1316: 366.912 VII, 12, 1038a1518: 430.14
VII, 10, 1036a1620: 366.2428 VII, 12, 1038a1820: 434.1920
VII, 10, 1036a2023: 367.2124 VII, 12, 1038a2023: 435.15
VII, 10, 1036a2425: 368.46 VII, 12, 1038a2326: 435.2225
VII, 11, 1036a2631: 374.1620 VII, 12, 1038a2526: 316.1718, 317.11
VII, 11, 1036a31b2: 375.33376.3 VII, 12, 1038a2628: 436.1416
VII, 11, 1036b27: 378.711 VII, 12, 1038a2835: 437.110
VII, 11, 1036b713: 381.1823 VII, 13, 1038b18: 442.511
VII, 11, 1036b1317: 382.1721 VII, 13, 1038b810: 443.1416
VII, 11, 1036b1719: 383.2324 VII, 13, 1038b1012: 443.3132
VII, 11, 1036b1922: 384.15 VII, 13, 1038b1112: 461.15
VII, 11, 1036b2130: 578.6 VII, 13, 1038b1215: 444.2123
VII, 11, 1036b2132: 357.45 VII, 13, 1038b1518: 446.2427
VII, 11, 1036b2228: 386.1217 VII, 13, 1038b1823: 447.1520
VII, 11, 1036b2324: 387.22 VII, 13, 1038b2329: 450.38
VII, 11, 1036b2432: 355.56 VII, 13, 1038b2934: 451.714
index locorum 595
VII, 13, 1038b341039a3: 451.2831 VII, 17, 1041a610: 533.59

VII, 13, 1039a34: 348.20 VII, 17, 1041a1016: 536.28537.2
VII, 13, 1039a38: 455.1318 VII, 17, 1041a1032: 551.24
VII, 13, 1039a811: 455.3335 VII, 17, 1041a1620: 537.30538.2
VII, 13, 1039a1114: 456.1416 VII, 17, 1041a2027: 541.1218
VII, 13, 1039a1419: 458.1116 VII, 17, 1041a22b9: 551.30
VII, 13, 1039a1921: 458.2729, VII, 17, 1041a2732: 544.1318
508.2526, 508.3132 VII, 17, 1041a32b2: 544.2932
VII, 13, 1039a2123: 459.1012 VII, 17, 1041b24: 545.1720
VII, 14, 1039a2428: 467.2934 VII, 17, 1041b47: 547.31548.2
VII, 14, 1039a28b2: 468.1825 VII, 17, 1041b79: 548.1415
VII, 14, 1039b24: 470.911 VII, 17, 1041b911: 549.34
VII, 14, 1039b47: 470.2629 VII, 17, 1041b1112: 561.34
VII, 14, 1039b79: 471.56 VII, 17, 1041b1216: 563.3032
VII, 14, 1039b911: 471.2123 VII, 17, 1041b1619: 565.79
VII, 14, 1039b1114: 473.2730 VII, 17, 1041b1925: 567.2429
VII, 14, 1039b1416: 474.811 VII, 17, 1041b2528: 569.811
VII, 14, 1039b1619: 475.69 VII, 17, 1041b2832: 573.711
VII, 15 passim: 185.15, 354.910 VII, 17, 1041b3132: 574.1213
VII, 15, 1039b2022: 486.3134 VIII, 2, 1043a728: 441.31442.1
VII, 15, 1039b2027: 530.32 VIII, 3, 1043b2332: 441.31442.1
VII, 15, 1039b2227: 487.2126 VIII, 3, 1044a511: 530.3, 531.28
VII, 15, 1039b2731: 490.1215 IX, 2, 1046b45: 546.28
VII, 15, 1039b2930: 251.29, 353.89 X, 10 passim: 279.9
VII, 15, 1039b311040a2: 491.37 X, 6, 1057a712: 463.1
VII, 15, 1040a25: 491.2426 X, 10, 1058b361059a8: 252.8
VII, 15, 1040a57: 492.36 X, 10, 1059a1014: 253.17
VII, 15, 1040a814: 494.38 XII, 6: 271.2829
VII, 15, 1040a1415: 494.2122 XII, 67 passim: 98.15
VII, 15, 1040a1518: 495.1114 XII, 610 passim: 363.17, 396.19
VII, 15, 1040a1823: 496.514 XII, 6, 1071b326: 549.2324
VII, 15, 1040a2327: 497.810 XII, 7, 1072a1926: 549.2324
VII, 15, 1040a2729: 504.79 XII, 8, 1073b3136: 362.6
VII, 15, 1040a2933: 504.2933 XIII, 919 passim: 357.45
VII, 15, 1040a33b2: 505.1114 Meteor.
VII, 15, 1040b24: 508.1316 I, 3, 341a13ff.: 285.8
VII, 16, 1040b58: 511.36 IV, 1, 379a1719: 298.1516
VII, 16, 1040b810: 511.2123 Phys.
VII, 16, 1040b1016: 513.33514.3 I, 1, 184a1014: 533.3132, 567.30,
VII, 16, 1040b1621: 519.2630 573.3132
VII, 16, 1040b2124: 520.2529 I, 1, 184a1618: 55.23
VII, 16, 1040b2527: 521.911 I, 1, 184a1621: 53.910
VII, 16, 1040b2730: 523.2426 I, 1, 184a18: 54.2
VII, 16, 1040b3032: 524.810 I, 1, 184a21b3: 85.1516
VII, 16, 1040b3334: 524.2426 I, 1, 184a23ff.: 316.27
VII, 16, 1040b341041a3: 525.2831 I, 1, 184a2425: 342.30, 462.16
VII, 16, 1041a35: 526.79 I, 2 passim: 550.5
596 index locorum
Phys. (cont.) II, 1, 193b1213: 210.11, 243.30

I, 23 passim: 464.20 II, 1, 193b1218: 244.3
I, 2, 185a45: 522.2728 II, 1, 193b1317: 273.23
I, 2, 185a27ff.: 128.26 II, 2, 193b22194a12: 104.19
I, 2, 185a3132: 472.21 II, 2, 193b35: 52.1617, 66.24, 375.32
I, 2, 185b3234: 372.6 II, 2, 194a21: 355.2122, 356.11
I, 2, 185b32186a3: 472.6, 561.22 II, 2, 194a2122: 83.16, 268.4
I, 3 passim: 200.32 II, 2, 194a2127: 479.2829
I, 4, 186a2629: 277.30 II, 2, 194b13: 219.25, 260.8, 295.2223
I, 3, 186b2122: 46.89 II, 3, 194b2629: 39.1, 101.5, 170.1,
I, 4, 187b7ff.: 278.10 326.17, 344.18, 353.17, 354.6,
I, 4, 187b1516: 244.8 355.2122, 356.11, 371.31, 438.24,
I, 56 passim: 63.31 445.27
I, 4, 188a1516: 564.12 II, 3, 194b2932: 310.10
I, 5, 188a2728: 575.33 II, 3, 194b35195a1: 300.32
I, 5, 188a31b21: 217.1921 II, 3, 195a38: 310.10
I, 5, 189a58: 363.1011, 461.1011 II, 3, 195a811: 346.1718
I, 67: 305.18 II, 3, 195a20: 355.2122, 356.11
I, 6, 189a1920: 357.31 II, 3, 195a29b3: 472.24
I, 6, 189a2226: 64.3, 237.2324 II, 3, 195a3335: 337a
I, 6, 189a2732: 94.21 II, 3, 195b3ff.: 359.29
I, 6, 189a3334: 84.22, 188.8, 406.45 II, 3, 195b2526: 249.32, 251.21, 259.28,
I, 7 passim: 94.21, 576.5 489.10
I, 7, 189b35: 237.2728 II, 46: 205.19
I, 7, 190a67: 237.2728 II, 5 passim: 396.7
I, 7, 190a2023: 237.18 II, 5, 196b1017: 223.20
I, 7, 190a3133: 209.20 II, 5, 196b10197a8: 300.25
I, 7, 190b1ff.: 102.12 II, 5, 196b2729: 217.2526
I, 7, 190b9ff.: 305.15 II, 5, 197a89: 217.2526
I, 7, 190b1720: 103.28, 576.14 II, 5, 197a2125: 300.32
I, 7, 191a58: 280.1617 II, 6, 197a36197b1: 206.4
I, 7, 191a812: 103.13 II, 6, 198a513: 336.11
I, 7, 191a814: 104.22; 353.16; 354.1 II, 7, 198a2427: 209.6, 545.21
I, 8, 191b1516: 96.31, 142.1 II, 8 passim: 45.24
I, 9 passim: 305.18 II, 8, 199a832: 216.30, 260.25
I, 9, 192a2527: 96.31, 305.15, 313.25 II, 8, 199a1517: 83.16, 268.4
26 II, 8, 199a1520: 479.2829
I, 9, 192a2729: 86.5, 100.89, 210.8, II, 8, 199b1318: 217.1921, 351.2223
303.24, 577.12 II, 8, 199b1618: 396.7
I, 9, 192a3032: 86.23 II, 9, 200a1519: 557.1718
II, 1: 205.19, 211.1415 II, 9, 200a30b8: 546.10
II, 1, 192b1319: 309.30 II, 9, 200a5ff.: 346.21
II, 1, 192b2123: 310.3, 387.17, 531.9 III, 1, 200b33201a3: 208.2425
II, 1, 192b35193a1: 572.23 III, 1, 201a915: 64.7
II, 1, 193a9b8: 80.23, 397.5 III, 1, 201a1011: 208.2, 210.6
II, 1, 193a2831: 310.4, 314.24, 572.25 III, 1, 201a1415: 243.19, 245.3
II, 1, 193a3031: 353.17 III, 1, 201a2529: 64.67
index locorum 597
III, 1, 201a2729: 208.2, 210.9 VII, 1, 242a5760: 293.10, 299.20,

III, 3, 202a1516: 227.7 306.25
III, 3, 202a1617: 269.24, 292.17, VII, 2, 243a11ff.: 214.2627
360.4 VII, 3, 246b320: 233.1718, 284.22
III, 3, 202b1016: 233.30 VII, 4, 249a1416: 434.1
III, 3, 202b13ff.: 424.33 VII, 4, 249a2125: 428.11
III, 4, 203b30: 46.6 VIII, 1 passim: 56.2223, 529.20
III, 5, 204a1112: 372.9 VIII, 1, 251a10252a5: 529.20
III, 6, 206b1520: 538.9 VIII, 1, 251b28252a5: 575.16
III, 8, 208a1415: 361.4 VIII, 46: 271.28
IV, 2, 209b2228: 47.6 VIII, 4, 254b2833: 245.2
IV, 2, 209b3031: 47.6 VIII, 4, 255b1331: 274.13
IV, 3 passim: 189.5 VIII, 5, 256b912: 46.11
IV, 3, 210a1718: 39.3 VIII, 5, 256b20ff.: 362.1112
IV, 3, 210b45: 382.25 VIII, 5, 257a3031: 48.23
IV, 4, 211a79: 552.23 VIII, 5, 257a33258b9: 333.1314
IV, 4, 211b36212a2: 47.6 VIII, 610 passim: 363.1617, 523.18
IV, 7, 213b33: 538.7 VIII, 6, 258b10259b32: 333.1314
IV, 9, 217a21b20: 309.4 VIII, 710 passim: 261.1
IV, 11, 219b67: 457.14 VIII, 7, 260b1719: 45.29, 48.23
IV, 11, 220a2425: 56.21 VIII, 8, 263b9ff.: 578.2829
V, 1, 224a2130: 246.1617 VIII 10 passim: 548.26, 316.23, 393.29
V, 1, 224a3334: 303.29 VIII, 10, 266a1024: 387.2122
V, 1, 224a35b12: 257.35258.1 VIII, 10, 267b3: 548.26
V, 1, 224b413: 86.24 VIII, 10, 267b69: 475.19
V, 1, 224b78: 208.27, 209.22, 218.3, Soph. El.
243.29, 300.9 I, 1, 165a1517: 214.32
V, 1, 224b35ff.: 244.14 I, 30, 181b1518: 577e
V, 1, 225a1517: 312.9 Top.
V, 1, 225b59: 208.16 I, 5, 101b3738: 52.1314, 354.30
V, 2 passim: 208.16 I, 5, 102a67: 68d
V, 2, 225b1217: 244.6 I, 5, 102b47: 46.12
V, 2, 226a2325: 41.2 I, 9, 103b20ff.: 139.19
V, 3, 227a1013: 295.11 I, 9, 103b3133: 140.32
V, 4, 227b20228a3: 244.19 II, 11, 115b2930: 142.23, 158.12
V, 5, 229b1421: 553.8 III, 1, 116a2325: 40.1, 43.5
VI, 12 passim: 328.1, 576.12, 576.14, IV, 1, 120b3435: 68d
576.22 VI, 1, 139a29ff.: 113.20
VI, 1, 230a29b5: 575.24 VI, 1, 139b1415: 53.8
VI, 1, 231a2126: 66.14 VI, 4, 141a23ff.: 113.20
VI, 3, 234a58: 571.1011 VI, 4, 141a2728: 53.8
VI, 4, 234b10235a10: 246.1617,
246.22 Augustine
VI, 5, 235b630: 571.1011 De Div. Quaest.: 83
VI, 6, 236b1923: 246.24 q. 46, p. 71, lin. 2630: 484.1215
VI, 10, 240b89: 327.31 q. 46, p. 71, lin. 2930: 484.78
VII, 1, 242a49243a2: 64.9 q. 46, p. 72, lin. 5152: 207.4, 482.7
598 index locorum
Averroes VII, t.c. 2, fol. 153H: 31.33

De sub. orb. VII, t.c. 2, fol. 153I: 32.2228
fol. 3L: 98.3 VII, t.c. 2, fol. 153K: 33.2533
fol. 4D: 56, 18, 258.3 VII, t.c. 3, fol. 154C: 37.47
In De an. VII, t.c. 3, fol. 154CD: 37.2838.3
I, t.c. 6, p. 10, 2021: 96.2829 VII, t.c. 3, fol. 154E: 44.1113
I, t.c. 8, p. 12, 2125: 362.27, 364.28, VII, t.c. 4, fol. 154M: 51.1117
502.29 VII, t.c. 4, fol. 155AB: 53.1925
I, t.c. 8, p. 12, 2526: 428.2526, 460.5, VII, t.c. 4, fol. 155CD: 55.2633
463.2021 VII, t.c. 5, fol. 156B: 60.48
I, t.c. 8, p. 12, 3032: 502.30 VII, t.c. 5, fol. 156BC: 62.2329
I, t.c. 16, p. 23, 2829: 331.29, 562.3 VII, t.c. 5, fol. 156KL: 65.1222
I, t.c. 53, p. 75, 1719: 371.26, 373.2223 VII, t.c. 7, fol. 157KL: 82.816
II, t.c. 2, p. 131, 3846: 481.27 VII, t.c. 7, fol. 157M: 84.1115
II, t.c. 5, p. 134, 9ff.: 481.27 VII, t.c. 7, fol. 158AB: 85.2326
II, t.c. 34, p. 182, 5358: 443.28 VII, t.c. 8, fol. 159AB, D: 92.3393.4
II, t.c. 63, p. 225, 4445: 510.6 VII, t.c. 8, fol. 159D: 94.1720
II, t.c. 63, p. 225, 4450: 37.23 VII, t.c. 8, fol. 159EF: 95.1823
II, t.c. 65, p. 227, 1519: 37.14 VII, t.c. 8, fol. 159F: 99.59
II, t.c. 65, p. 229, 5666: 41.9 VII, t.c. 8, fol. 159G: 99.1923
II, t.c. 66, p. 230, 2131: 461.2223 VII, t.c. 9, fol. 159IK: 102.2229
II, t.c. 67, p. 232, 4957: 93.21 VII, t.c. 9, fol. 159LM: 103.1627
II, t.c. 97, p. 277, 2733: 224.10, 279.29 VII, t.c. 9, fol. 159M160A: 104.1016
III, t.c. 5, pp. 387, 27388.37: 100.11 VII, t.c. 9, fol. 160AB: 105.815
III, t.c. 5, pp. 409, 661410, 667: 100.2, VII, t.c. 9, fol. 160BC: 106.17
459.32 VII, t.c. 10, fol. 160IK: 109.1317
III, t.c. 9, pp. 421, 27422, 32: 36.4, VII, t.c. 10, fol. 160L: 110.49
393.27 VII, t.c. 11, fol. 161D: 113.915
III, t.c. 9, p. 422, 4750: 359.9, 462.1 VII, t.c. 11, fol. 161DE: 113.29114.3
III, t.c. 16, p. 436, 3840: 461.25, VII, t.c. 11, fol. 161FG: 115.31116.4
463.30 VII, t.c. 11, fol. 161IK: 118.29119.2
III, t.c. 18, p. 440, 9698: 460.8, 463.28 VII, t.c. 11, fol. 161KL: 119.2332
III, t.c. 20, pp. 447, 98454, 321: 449.15 VII, t.c. 11, fol. 161LM: 121.1318
III, t.c. 26, pp. 463, 4464, 40: 502.25 VII, t.c. 12, fol. 162H: 122.31123.4
In De coel. VII, t.c. 12, fol. 162IK: 123.2024
I, t.c. 92, p. 169170, lin. 3035: 371.7 VII, t.c. 12, fol. 162M163A: 125.1216
III, t.c. 67, pp. 634635, lin. 105114: VII, t.c. 12, fol. 163AB: 127.1016
278.32, 410.13, 574.34 VII, t.c. 12, fol. 163CD: 127.2326
In Met. VII, t.c. 13, fol. 163G: 130.710
II, t.c. 1, fol. 29B: 363.1 VII, t.c. 13, fol. 163H: 130.15
III, t.c. 10, fol. 49BC: 471.32 VII, t.c. 13, fol. 163I: 132.2428
III, t.c. 11, fol. 50G: 339.30 VII, t.c. 13, fol. 163K: 133.711
IV, t.c. 5, fol. 70H: 94.31 VII, t.c. 13, fol. 163KL: 133.31134.3
V, t.c. 18, fol. 125DH: 171.2 VII, t.c. 14, fol. 164D: 135.2021, 316.31
V, t.c. 21, fol. 131B: 476b, 481d, 550.29 VII, t.c. 14, fol. 164FG: 139.37
VII, t.c. 1, fol. 153BC: 30.1318 VII, t.c. 14, fol. 164GH: 141.2429
VII, t.c. 2, fol. 153G: 44.3245.3 VII, t.c. 14, fol. 164HI: 140.11
index locorum 599
VII, t.c. 15, fol. 165B: 145.2832 VII, t.c. 28, fol. 178vHI: 267.912
VII, t.c. 16, fol. 166BC: 148.32149.5 VII, t.c. 29, fol. 179B: 272.1011,
VII, t.c. 17, fol. 166I: 151.911, 152.1620 272.2225
VII, t.c. 17, fol. 166K: 154.1621 VII, t.c. 29, fol. 179CD: 273.2533
VII, t.c. 18, fol. 167CD: 156.27157.3 VII, t.c. 29, fol. 179D: 275.1415
VII, t.c. 18, fol. 167FG: 160.2131 VII, t.c. 29, fol. 179F: 276.27277.2
VII, t.c. 18, fol. 167IK: 164.17 VII, t.c. 30, fol. 179KL: 283.813
VII, t.c. 19, fol. 168B: 169.1419 VII, t.c. 30, fol. 180A: 283.30284.2
VII, t.c. 19, fol. 168F: 173.1723 VII, t.c. 30, fol. 180B: 284.3133
VII, t.c. 20, fol. 169DE: 178.30179.5 VII, t.c. 31, fol. 180FG: 287.2227
VII, t.c. 20, fol. 169F: 183.2933, 403.9 VII, t.c. 31, fol. 180IK: 291.33292.3
VII, t.c. 20, fol. 169K: 184.1013 VII, t.c. 31, fol. 181BC: 293.2030
VII, t.c. 21, fol. 171A: 192.32193.2 VII, t.c. 31, fol. 181C: 297.2123
VII, t.c. 21, fol. 171D: 188.2430 VII, t.c. 31, 181DE: 297.2832
VII, t.c. 21, fol. 171F: 193.2124 VII, t.c. 31, 181E: 298.79
VII, t.c. 21, fol. 171H: 198.610 VII, t.c. 31, fol. 181EF: 290.18, 311.18
VII, t.c. 21, fol. 171I: 198.2027, 355.26, 19
356.17 VII, t.c. 31, fol. 181EG: 288.2634
VII, textus, fol. 172C: 213.4 VII, t.c. 31, fol. 181G: 297.2324
VII, t.c. 22, fol. 172DE: 206.713 VII, t.c. 31, 181GH: 299.911
VII, t.c. 22, fol. 172F: 212.1317 VII, t.c. 31, 181HI: 300.17
VII, t.c. 22, fol. 172H: 213.13 VII, t.c. 31, fol. 181IK: 295.30296.2
VII, t.c. 23, fol. 173FG: 484.20 VII, t.c. 31, fol. 181KL: 297.16
VII, t.c. 23, fol. 173H: 484.20 VII, t.c. 32, fol. 182E: 302.31303.3
VII, t.c. 23, fol. 173HI: 223.2027 VII, t.c. 33, fol. 182L: 316.13
VII, t.c. 23, fol. 173IK: 226.1727 VII, t.c. 33, fol. 183A: 320.17
VII, t.c. 23, fol. 173KM: 481.21 VII, t.c. 33, fol. 183AB: 319.1724
VII, t.c. 23, fol. 173M: 228.1518 VII, t.c. 33, fol. 183D: 322.711
VII, 7, t.c. 23, fol. 174A: 481.21 VII, t.c. 34, fol. 184DG: 326.39
VII, t.c. 23, fol. 174BC: 231.16 VII, t.c. 34, fol. 184E: 324.2225
VII, t.c. 23, fol. 174CD: 232.31233.3 VII, t.c. 34, fol. 184FG: 355.25, 356.15
VII, t.c. 23, fol. 174DF: 481.21 VII, t.c. 34, fol. 184G: 327.45
VII, t.c. 24, fol. 174IK: 235.59 VII, t.c. 34, fol. 184M185A: 331.1419
VII, t.c. 24, fol. 174M: 236.16 VII, t.c. 34, fol. 185CD: 335.312
VII, t.c. 26, fol. 176DE: 243.711 VII, t.c. 34, fol. 185D: 454.1
VII, t.c. 27, fol. 177A: 248.3032, VII, t.c. 35, fol. 186G: 339.6
249.68, 250.45 VII, t.c. 35, fol. 187A: 346.914
VII, t.c. 28, fol. 177M: 254.2429 VII, t.c. 35, fol. 187CD: 349.712
VII, t.c. 28, fol. 177M178A: 256.2024 VII, t.c. 35, fol. 187G: 352.1014
VII, t.c. 28, fol. 178BC: 259.514 VII, t.c. 35, fol. 187I: 360.2124, 361.14
VII, t.c. 28, fol. 178BD: 271.20 15
VII, t.c. 28, fol. 178DE: 262.47, 265.2 VII, t.c. 36, fol. 188D: 368.713
VII, t.c. 28, fol. 178E: 432.34433.1 VII, t.c. 36, fol. 188EF: 369.611,
VII, t.c. 28, fol. 178EF: 263.917 369.31
VII, t.c. 28, fol. 178FG: 264.1520 VII, t.c. 36, fol. 188F: 370.14
VII, t.c. 28, fol. 178H: 266.2227, VII, t.c. 37, fol. 189BC: 353.1819,
277.1718 354.7, 374.2124
600 index locorum
In Met. (cont.) VII, t.c. 54, fol. 203EF: 500.32501.4

VII, t.c. 37, fol. 189C: 400.6 VII, t.c. 54, fol. 203F: 501.2630
VII, t.c. 37, fol. 189F: 376.49 VII, t.c. 55, fol. 204CD: 505.1521
VII, t.c. 37, fol. 189G: 378.1220 VII, t.c. 55, fol. 204D: 508.1719
VII, t.c. 38, fol. 190DF: 384.714 VII, t.c. 56, fol. 204HI: 511.2429
VII, t.c. 39, fol. 191D: 387.69 VII, t.c. 56, fol. 204K: 515.1314
VII, t.c. 39, fol. 191E: 387.2529 VII, t.c. 56, fol. 204KL: 514.411
VII, t.c. 39, fol. 191F: 388.1418, VII, t.c. 56, fol. 204L: 515.2429, 517.34
388.3033 VII, t.c. 56, fol. 204LM: 516.1417
VII,t.c. 39, fol. 191K: 393.46 VII, t.c. 57, fol. 205GH: 521.1219
VII, t.c. 39, fol. 191M: 394.2831, VII, t.c. 58, fol. 205vM206A: 526.10
405.19 16
VII, t.c. 39, fol. 192BC: 397.2430 VII, t.c. 58, fol. 206AB: 527.1520
VII, t.c. 41, fol. 193D: 424.16 VII, t.c. 58, fol. 206B: 528.17
VII, t.c. 42, fol. 194AC: 408.31 VII, t.c. 58, fol. 206C: 528.2831
409.10, 410.2027 VII, t.c. 59, fol. 207AB: 533.1015
VII, t.c., 42, fol. 194FG: 413.1420 VII, t.c. 59, fol. 207HI: 549.31
VII, t.c. 42, fol. 194MG: 418.1 VII, t.c. 60, fol. 208GH: 561.58
VII, t.c. 43, 195HIK: 216.29217.7 VII, t.c. 60, fol. 208HI: 565.1017
VII, t.c., 43, fol. 195I: 418.2223 VII, t.c. 60, fol. 209A: 569.1217,
VII, t.c. 43, fol. 195K: 418.1 570.2324
VII, t.c. 43, fol. 195M196A: 420.814 VII, t.c. 60, fol. 209BC: 573.1219
VII, t.c. 43, fol. 196A: 421.2027 VIII, t.c. 5, fol. 212M213A: 135a
VII, t.c. 43, fol. 196CE: 426.312 VIII, t.c. 5, fol. 213H: 423e
VII, t.c. 43, fol. 196v KL: 437.1118 VIII, t.c. 7, fol. 215KL: 42.10
VII, t.c. 44, fol. 197 CE: 442.1217 X, t.c. 8, fol. 257EK: 69.16
VII, t.c. 45, fol. 197IK: 444.2633, XI, t.c. 18, fol. 304C: 277.2122
453.5 XII, t.c. 18, fol. 305I: 206.29, 484.18
VII, t.c. 46, fol. 198BC: 447.2127 XII, t.c. 24, fol. 309F: 206.29, 484.18
VII, t.c. 46, fol. 198CD: 448.1926 XII, t.c. 51, fol. 336AB: 206.29,
VII, t.c. 47, fol. 198F: 450.2021 484.18
VII, t.c. 47, fol. 198FG: 450.914 XII, t.c. 51, fol. 336E: 36.45
VII, t.c. 48, fol. 198K: 451.32452.3 In Phys.
VII, t.c. 48, fol. 198KL: 452.1420 I, t.c. 1, fol. 6A: 550.9
VII, t.c. 48, fol. 198L: 466.10 I, t.c. 1, fol. 6B: 498.78, 573.3132
VII, t.c. 48, fol. 198M: 452.2833, I, t.c. 1, fol. 6BC: 539.20
454.22 I, t.c. 1, fol. 6E: 361.20, 417.16
VII, t.c. 49, fol. 199E: 456.1719 I, t.c. 2, fol. 6K7A: 55.4
VII, t.c. 50, fol. 200AB: 459.1317 I, t.c. 2, fol. 6M7A: 538.1314
VII, t.c. 53, fol. 202BD: 487.27488.6 I, t.c. 3, fol. 7D: 55.22
VII, t.c. 53, fol. 202EF: 492.715 I, t.c. 5, fol. 8AB: 317.2425, 445.29
VII, t.c. 54, fol. 202M: 497.1114 I, t.c. 5, fol. 8DE: 136.1516
VII, t.c. 54, fol. 202M203A: 497.2732 I, t.c. 5, fol. 8DF: 318.6, 341.24, 395.6
VII, t.c. 54, fol. 203BC: 498.2026 I, t.c. 36, fol. 24CD, F: 244d, 562.22
VII, t.c. 54, fol. 203D: 499.1014, I, t.c. 58, fol. 35EG: 237.1415
500.30 I, t.c. 59, fol. 35HI: 166.33
VII, t.c. 54, fol. 203DE: 499.32500.7 I, t.c. 63, fol. 38CD: 213.19
index locorum 601
I, t.c. 63, fol. 38F: 499.2728 tr. V, c. 5, pp. 274, 57276, 83: 199.15
I, t.c. 6466 passim: 305.15 tr. V., c. 5, p. 276, 83ff.: 361.6
I, t.c. 64, fol. 38I: 243c tr. VIII, c. 4, p. 403, 7780: 68.1, 72.18
I, t.c. 66, fol. 39I: 92.21
I, t.c. 69, fol. 40LM: 213.19 Boethius
I, t.c. 70, fol. 41E: 97.1314 De diff. top.
I, t.c. 70, fol. 41EF: 213.19 Lib. I, PL 64, 1173B: 411.13
I, t.c. 83, fol. 47FG: 550.1213, 551.12 De Trinitate
II, t.c. 1, fol. 48CD: 313.89 p. 171, lin. 113115: 482.2728
II, t.c. 1, fol. 48DE: 315.1 In Isag. 2
II, t.c. 1, fol. 48EF: 211.22, 270.24 p. 161, 22162, 3: 460.1112, 464.2
II, t.c. 1, fol. 48F: 309.3132, 314.1516,
456.27 Buridanus
II, t.c. 3, fol. 49AC: 559.20 Q. Sup. Phys.
II, t.c. 6, fol. 50FG: 559.20 Lib. I, q. 7, fol. 9rbva: 430.9
II, t.c. 15, fol. 53GI: 279a
II, t.c. 18 passim: 550.5 Burley
II, t.c. 21 passim: 550.5 Exp. Phys.
II, t.c. 26 passim: 550.5 Lib. I, fol. 10rab: 430.9
II, t.c. 33, fol. 62CD: 337.18 Lib. I, fol. 8va9ra: 184, 2930
III, t.c. 4, fol. 87A: 208.2425
III, t.c. 4, fol. 87D: 208.2425, 228.8 Euclid
10 Elem.
III, t.c. 18, fol. 90HI: 233.31 Lib. X, prop. 9: 576.31
III, t.c. 43, fol. 104EG: 320.1516
IV, t.c. 23, fol. 230CF: 39c Eustratius
IV, t.c. 84, 171L: 309a In Eth.
V, t.c. 1, fol. 207CD: 244.22 I, c. 7, pp. 69, 470, 29: 485.28
VI, t.c. 45, fol. 274LM: 243f., 294.25, I, c. 7, p. 69, 8795: 475.20
512.2021, 530.22 I, c. 7, pp. 70, 3071, 36: 476.5
VII, t.c. 10, fol. 315E: 313.11 I, c. 7, pp. 76, 8977, 25: 469.18
VIII, t.c. 46, fol. 387EH: 217.9 I, c. 7, p. 77, 105: 485.24
VIII, t.c. 46, fol. 387H: 186.78, 215d, I, c. 7, p. 83, 97ff.: 485.24
291.1415
VIII, t.c. 78, fol. 423I424M: 387d Francis of Marchia
Quaestiones in Metaphysicam
Avicenna Lib. VII, q. 1, ms. Paris, Bibliothque
Lib De An. Mazarine, lat 3490, fol. 48va49ra:
tr. I, c. 1, p. 19, 2728: 481.2728 68.1070.15
Lib. Nat. Lib. VII, q. 9, ms. Paris, Bibliothque
tr. I, c. 1, pp. 8, 5311, 109: 184.3132 Mazarine, lat 3490, fol. 53ravb:
Phil. Pr. 215.23222.2
tr. III, c. 3, pp. 117, 87118, 93: 170.23
tr. III, c. 4, p. 122, 7283: 170.23 Giles of Rome
tr. III, c. 4, pp. 126, 45127, 71: 170.23 Q. Med. Dem.
tr. V, c. 1, pp. 228, 32229, 44: 460.13 p. 240: 552, 32
14, 464.3, 466.21 p. 265: 553.13, 555.19
602 index locorum
Q. Metaph. c. De specie (AL I 67, p. 9, 19ff.):

Lib. VII, q. 3, fol. 28vb: 199.26 196.11, 362.14, 402.27
Quod. c. De specie (AL I 67, p. 12, 1819):
I, q. 9, fol. 20a21a: 480.7 184.27, 250.1112, 269, 1718, 462.25
Sup. Post. c. De specie (AL I 67, p. 14, 711):
fol. N4+1vb 64N4+2ra40: 552.32 39.2, 405.8
fol. N4+2rb 2128: 553.13 c. De specie (AL I 67, p. 14, 89):
406.17, 506.12
Grosseteste c. De differentia (AL I 67, p. 15, 89):
In Phys. 432.28, 433.1415
pp. 31, 1333, 9: 556.24 c. De differentia (AL I 67, p. 15, 11
pp. 49, 1750, 2: 556.25 14): 432. 28, 433.1415
In Post. c. De differentia (AL I 67, p. 17, 13):
I, 7, p. 141, lin. 131145: 427.33 417.2930, 424.10
II, 2, p.330, lin. 559564: 370.910 c. De differentia (AL I 67, p. 17, 18):
II, 2, pp. 335336, lin. 674677: 432.25
559.19 c. De differentia (AL I 67, p. 17, 16):
422.3132
Ockham c. De differentia (AL I 67, p. 18, 9
In I Sent. 15): 353.45, 423.9
dist. 35, q. 5, OTh., IV, pp. 479507: c. De differentia (AL I 67, p. 18, 11
476.24 12): 83.18
c. De differentia (AL I 67, p. 18, 12
Scotus 15): 445.28
Ord. c. De accidente (AL I 67, p. 20, 78):
I, d. 30, qq. 12, pp. 181190: 478.4 86.17, 88.1011
I, d. 35, q. un., pp. 245270: 478.4 c. De accidente (AL I 67, p. 20, 89):
I, d. 36, q. un., pp. 281290: 478.4 46.8
Lect. c. De his communibus quae assunt
I, d. 35, q. un., pp. 445453: 478.4 generi et speciei et differentiae et
I, d. 36, q. un., pp. 468471: 478.4 proprio et accidente (AL I 67, p.
21, 23): 461.15
Simplicius c. De his communibus quae assunt
In Cat. generi et speciei et differentiae
p. 6, 1902: 34.34 et proprio et accidenti (AL I 67,
pp. 6, 248, 55: 34.34 p. 21, 1518): 140.25
Porphyry Paul of Venice

Isag. Exp. De an.
Intr. (AL I 67, p. 5, 1014): 460.1112, Lib. II, tr. 2, p. 2, c. 1, fol. 73rbva:
464.2 47.23
c. De genere (AL I 67, pp. 6, 267, 2): Exp. Met.
33.10 V, tr. 2, c. 1, M, vol. a4, fol. 66rbva, Pv,
c. De specie (AL I 67, pp. 8, 229, 7): fol. 178rava: 374.2
33.10 VIII, c. 4, M, vol. a3bis, fol. 98rb99ra,
c. De specie (AL I 67, p. 9, 67): 100vb101rb, Pv, fol. 329vb330va,
506.17, 507.32 332rb333vb: 459.3
index locorum 603
Exp. Phys. fol. S4+3vbT4va: 560.12

I, tr. 1, c. 3, fol. 20rb21rb: 578.11 fol. S4+4rab: 553.6
Exp. Post. fol. T2rab: 557c
fol. K4rab: 117a, 301a
INDEX AUTHORUM
Amerini, Fabrizio 68e, 70a, 215c Perreiah, A.R. 1n

Aristotle 13, 8, 11, 15, 2223
Averroes 89, 2324 Poppi, Antonino 6n, 7n
Porphyry 2
Bottin, Francesco 1n
Rossetti, Lucia 7n
Casagrande, M.A. 4
Conti, A.D. 1n, 3n Scotus, John Duns 7
Cortese, Dino 7n
Trombetta, Antonio 67
Forlivesi, Marco 7n
Vuillemin-Diem, Gudrun 2223
Maier, Alfonso 187a
Momigliano, Felice 1n William of Moerbeke 2223
Wycliff, John 1
Paul of Venice 124
INDEX AUTHORUM ET PHILOSOPHORUM
A PAULO VENETO NOMINATORUM
Alacem 559.17 142.9, 142.22, 142.32, 143.9, 145.17,

Albertus Magnus 56.28, 57.8, 63.5, 93.28, 146.10, 146.21, 147.26, 148.19, 149.7,
162.19, 199.26, 320.28, 339.6, 522.14 149.1516, 149.25, 149.31, 150.12, 150.15,
Alexander Aphrodisiensis 297.23, 297.27 150.19, 150.25, 151.23, 152.34, 152.22,
Alexander de Alexandria 57.25, 67.6, 152.30, 153.17, 153.21, 155.30, 156.25,
199.26, 338.33, 403.23, 522.1415, 157.2526, 157.32, 158.1113, 158.30,
553.26 159.2, 159.8, 159.13, 159.30, 161.29,
Alpharabius 294.13, 296.33, 297.26, 162.19, 163.1, 163.11, 164.16, 164.25,
300.21 168.1, 168.3, 168.32, 169.22, 169.27,
Anaxagoras 51.1, 103.4, 258.18, 258.31, 170.1, 171.12, 171.7, 172.24, 174.1, 174.5,
260.3, 278.1 174.1011, 174.15, 175.4, 176.25, 176.29,
Anaximandros 103.4 177.12, 177.4, 178.31, 179.12, 179.26,
Aristoteles/Philosophus 29.5, 29.12, 180.2, 180.31, 183.17, 184.23, 185.14
31.2, 32.23, 32.29, 33.5, 33.22, 34.10, 15, 187.19, 188.13, 189.17, 190.2, 190.21,
34.30, 35.10, 35.16, 35.19, 37.1314, 190.24, 192.21, 192.23, 192.31, 194.23,
38.24, 38.27, 38.2829, 38.3239.2, 195.3, 195.10, 195.25, 196.6, 196.25,
39.29, 40.1, 40.34, 41.2, 41.9, 41.17, 198.3, 200.3132, 203.10, 203.12, 203.19,
41.20, 41.23, 42.12, 42.12, 42.14, 43.5, 204.9, 205.45, 205.9, 205.1415,
43.15, 43.19, 44.21, 44.30, 45.16, 45.30, 205.17, 206.8, 207.10, 207.23, 207.32
46.5, 46.8, 46.10, 46.12, 46.21, 47.6, 33, 208.16, 208.24, 209.1, 209.34,
48.16, 48.22, 48.24, 49.3, 49.17, 49.27, 209.7, 209.11, 209.15, 210.24, 211.1,
50.18, 52.2, 52.13, 53.2, 53.78, 53.29, 211.17, 212.11, 212.33, 213.2, 213.4, 213.22,
54.2, 54.18, 54.23, 54.28, 55.23, 55.25, 213.3031, 213.3334, 214.2, 214.15,
56.12, 56.19, 56.21, 56.23, 56.33, 57.22, 214.20, 214.26, 214.32, 216.2930,
57.24, 58.1, 58.9, 58.18, 59.5, 60.5, 217.17, 217.25, 218.23, 218.16, 218.20,
60.15, 61.4, 62.34, 64.11, 65.13, 66.23 218.24, 218.30, 219.25, 222.4, 223.3,
24, 67.23, 68.7, 69.20, 72.23, 74.11, 224.21, 225.14, 226.3, 226.11, 227.7,
75.25, 76.31, 76.34, 77.19, 77.2122, 227.16, 227.28, 229.16, 230.11, 231.25,
79.7, 80.2, 80.2223, 81.28, 82.3031, 233.17, 233.20, 233.30, 234.15, 235.6,
83.3, 83.31, 84.12, 84.32, 85.15, 85.18, 235.29, 236.7, 236.20, 237.27, 238.20,
85.24, 85.27, 86.4, 86.16, 86.24, 87.35, 241.7, 241.21, 243.2, 243.8, 243.19,
88.6, 88.9, 89.25, 90.2, 90.9, 90.11, 243.21, 243.25, 243.29, 244.2, 244.6,
90.24, 91.30, 94.29, 96.4, 97.11, 97.26, 244.8, 244.14, 244.19, 245.13, 245.13,
98.7, 98.24, 101.4, 101.16, 102.30, 103.28, 246.12, 246.16, 246.22, 246.27, 247.5,
104.14, 104.22, 105.1617, 107.21, 108.15, 248.13, 249.28, 249.31, 250.9, 250.32,
108.31, 109.27, 110.12, 112.2, 112.31, 113.10, 251.21, 251.29, 252.8, 253.14, 253.17,
118.26, 122.4, 124.8, 126.1, 126.22, 129.5, 253.2627, 254.3, 254.12, 254.17, 255.1,
129.23, 131.7, 131.26, 136.5, 136.2425, 255.16, 257.910, 257.35, 258.26,
137.67, 137.14, 137.27, 138.19, 139.19, 258.32, 260.7, 260.25, 262.15, 262.21,
140.9, 140.22, 140.26, 140.32, 141.30, 263.7, 264.10, 264.1718, 265.1, 265.6,
606 index authorum et philosophorum
Aristoteles/Philosophus (cont.) 412.30, 414.11, 414.14, 415.1, 415.19,

265.14, 271.28, 272.2, 273.2, 273.6, 415.27, 416.10, 419.29, 423.5, 423.16,
274.13, 275.20, 276.7, 277.31, 278.10, 423.1819, 424.16, 424.33, 425.28,
278.17, 278.20, 278.2425, 278.28, 426.1314, 426.21, 427.18, 428.10,
279.5, 279.9, 279.31, 280.3, 280.16, 428.1314, 428.26, 428.32, 429.36,
281.7, 281.17, 282.23, 283.22, 284.24, 430.14, 430.22, 431.21, 432.19, 432.32,
285.5, 285.21, 286.11, 288.29, 288.33, 433.1, 433.34, 434.7, 434.23, 437.7,
289.2, 289.33, 290.27, 291.20, 291.34, 438.20, 438.24, 440.11, 440.28, 441.4,
292.13, 294.17, 295.22, 297.2, 297.7, 441.8, 443.2, 443.9, 443.18, 444.1,
297.20, 297.2324, 297.27, 297.29, 444.27, 445.1, 445.2122, 445.26,
298.14, 300.2425, 300.3132, 301.23, 445.28, 446.9, 447.1, 448.3, 448.33,
301.25, 302.16, 303.24, 303.28, 303.30, 449.5, 449.14, 450.28, 451.15, 453.11,
304.7, 304.32, 305.4, 305.15, 305.17, 453.17, 453.24, 453.32, 454.11, 454.32,
307.1, 308.2324, 309.18, 310.10, 310.14, 457.13, 457.24, 457.28, 458.30, 460.8,
311.13, 311.19, 311.23, 312.9, 313.13, 460.18, 461.8, 461.10, 461.15, 461.21,
314.21, 314.24, 314.3132, 315.8, 315.11, 461.27, 462.4, 462.10, 462.16, 462.22,
315.15, 316.5, 316.1517, 316.23, 316.26 463.1, 463.11, 463.15, 464.19, 465.12,
27, 317.1, 317.11, 318.23, 323.2, 324.1, 466.6, 466.29, 467.3, 467.89, 467.14,
328.1, 328.17, 329.10, 329.27, 330.9, 468.1, 468.26, 472.6, 472.2021, 473.8,
330.27, 331.2930, 332.3, 332.29, 334.8, 475.7, 475.13, 475.1819, 476.1112,
334.21, 336.10, 338.12, 338.16, 338.24, 477.15, 477.18, 479.20, 479.28, 481.21,
339.17, 339.27, 341.14, 341.29, 342.12, 481.26, 481.28, 482.33, 483.17, 485.5,
342.15, 342.30, 343.21, 343.24, 346.17, 485.34, 486.12, 486.17, 489.10, 489.25,
347.10, 347.13, 348.5, 350.15, 353.78, 489.32, 491.27, 492.27, 493.8, 494.14,
353.11, 353.17, 353.21, 353.26, 354.6, 496.24, 500.22, 500.26, 502.2325,
354.10, 354.16, 354.19, 354.24, 354.30, 503.17, 504.1213, 506.46, 506.18,
355.5, 355.12, 355.1920, 355.24, 507.30, 507.32, 508.12, 508.25, 510.12,
356.78, 356.11, 356.14, 357.34, 357.7, 510.1516, 510.20, 511.13, 514.29, 518.4,
358.3, 360.18, 361.4, 361.17, 361.26, 519.31, 520.30, 521.5, 522.7, 522.19,
362.6, 362.910, 362.12, 362.19, 362.24, 522.27, 523.12, 523.27, 524.11, 524.16
363.1, 363.10, 363.18, 363.23, 364.10 17, 524.27, 525.8, 525.31, 526.1, 528.4,
11, 365.1, 365.2123, 365.31, 366.33, 528.15, 529.11, 530.3, 530.8, 530.14,
369.29, 370.1314, 370.21, 371.5, 371.31, 530.1617, 530.2122, 530.26, 530.32,
372.4, 372.15, 372.22, 372.6, 372.9, 531.8, 531.1314, 531.34, 532.1213,
374.4, 374.7, 375.4, 375.9, 376.24, 532.17, 532.20, 532.25, 533.31, 534.5,
377.1, 377.1415, 379.1, 379.23, 380.20, 534.18, 535.10, 537.5, 538.7, 538.20,
380.26, 382.11, 382.24, 383.6, 384.3, 540.5, 542.3, 542.10, 542.15, 542.19,
385.12, 385.22, 386.1, 386.6, 386.18, 542.27, 544.19, 545.1, 545.21, 545.26,
387.22, 388.2627, 389.15, 389.21, 545.29, 546.1, 546.68, 546.10, 546.21,
390.26, 392.6, 393.21, 393.24, 393.26, 546.28, 547.14, 548.3, 548.24, 549.24,
393.29, 394.24, 395.11, 395.24, 395.31, 550.4, 550.2829, 551.2, 551.10, 551.21,
396.4, 396.67, 396.9, 396.17, 397.14, 552.11, 552.23, 552.25, 552.28, 552.32,
398.14, 400.33, 401.25, 402.16, 403.12, 553.8, 553.20, 553.23, 553.25, 553.27,
403.8, 403.21, 404.910, 404.12, 404.16, 554.45, 555.5, 555.32, 556.11, 556.17,
405.2, 405.7, 405.1718, 405.2425, 557.1, 557.78, 557.10, 557.17, 557.26,
406.12, 406.4, 406.8, 406.10, 408.3, 558.10, 558.15, 558.24, 560.7, 560.15,
408.78, 408.11, 410.28, 410.33, 411.22, 560.18, 560.21, 561.22, 562.2, 562.7,
index authorum et philosophorum 607
563.8, 563.33, 564.12, 566.16, 567.16, 245.34, 248.30, 249.6, 249.9, 249.16,
567.30, 567.32, 568.4, 568.15, 571.3, 250.4, 251.25, 254.24, 254.30, 256.20,
572.7, 572.13, 572.17, 573.32, 574.1, 256.25, 257.9, 257.31, 258.3, 259.5,
574.7, 574.26, 575.9, 575.16, 575.24, 259.15, 260.1, 262.4, 262.8, 263.9,
575.33, 576.12, 576.14, 576.22, 577.6, 263.22, 264.1, 264.15, 265.2, 265.6,
577.1112, 577.15, 577.24, 578.2, 578.25, 266.22, 266.28, 267.9, 267.13, 267.29,
578.28 270.24, 271.20, 272.9, 272.22, 273.25,
Augustinus, Aurelius 203.26, 204.11, 274.1, 275.14, 276.27, 277.3, 277.17,
207.4, 482.7, 484.7, 484.10, 484.17 277.2122, 278.32, 279.2, 279.2829,
Averroes/Commentator 30.13, 30.19, 280.5, 280.22, 283.8, 283.14, 283.24
31.33, 32.22, 32.29, 33.25, 34.1, 36.4, 25, 283.30, 284.3, 284.24, 284.31, 285.5,
37.4, 37.8, 37.14, 37.2223, 37.28, 38.4, 287.22, 288.26, 289.1, 290.1, 290.9,
39.5, 39.14, 41.9, 42.10, 44.11, 44.32, 291.12, 291.33, 292.7, 292.14, 293.20,
45.4, 51.11, 51.18, 53.12, 53.19, 54.2, 294.14, 294.17, 295.30, 296.6, 296.16
54.7, 54.11, 54.2526, 55.4, 55.2122, 17, 296.32, 297.1, 297.21, 297.2728,
55.26, 56.1, 56.1718, 60.4, 60.9, 62.23, 298.7, 299.9, 300.1, 302.31, 303.4,
62.30, 65.12, 69.16, 70.28, 82.8, 82.17, 305.15, 309.3132, 311.18, 313.8, 313.11
84.11, 84.16, 84.32, 85.23, 85.27, 92.21, 12, 314.34, 314.1516, 315.1, 316.1,
92.33, 93.21, 93.25, 94.17, 94.31, 95.6, 316.31, 317.24, 318.6, 319.17, 320.15,
95.18, 96.4, 96.28, 97.13, 98.3, 99.5, 320.17, 320.20, 322.7, 322.12, 322.28,
99.10, 99.19, 99.24, 100.2, 100.11, 101.6, 324.22, 324.26, 326.3, 327.4, 327.14,
102.21, 102.30, 103.16, 104.10, 105.8, 331.14, 331.28, 332.3, 335.3, 335.13,
105.16, 106.1, 109.13, 109.18, 110.4, 110.10, 337.18, 339.6, 339.30, 341.24, 346.9,
113.9, 113.29, 114.4, 114.20, 115.31, 116.5, 349.7, 349.13, 352.10, 353.18, 354.7,
118.29, 119.3, 119.23, 120.1, 120.20, 121.1, 355.12, 355.2526, 356.7, 356.15,
121.13, 121.19, 122.31, 123.20, 123.25, 356.17, 359.89, 360.21, 360.25, 361.14,
123.31, 125.12, 125.17, 127.10, 127.17, 361.20, 362.27, 363.1, 364.28, 368.7,
127.23, 127.27, 130.7, 130.15, 132.24, 368.14, 369.6, 369.19, 369.29, 369.31,
132.29, 133.7, 133.12, 133.31, 134.4, 134.8, 370.1, 370.5, 371.7, 371.13, 371.26,
134.10, 135.21, 136.15, 136.34, 139.3, 373.2223, 374.21, 376.4, 376.10,
139.8, 139.29, 140.11, 141.24, 145.28, 378.12, 384.7, 384.15, 387.6, 387.10,
146.1, 148.32, 149.7, 151.9, 152.16, 152.21, 387.25, 387.30, 388.14, 388.19, 388.26,
152.25, 152.30, 154.16, 155.19, 155.26, 388.30, 389.1, 389.34, 393.4, 393.7,
156.27, 157.4, 157.12, 157.23, 158.17, 393.26, 394.28, 394.32, 395.1, 395.56,
158.26, 160.21, 161.8, 163.12, 164.1, 164.8, 395.23, 395.32, 397.24, 398.2, 400.6,
164.29, 165.4, 166.27, 166.33, 167.7 403.9, 405.19, 408.31, 409.11, 409.26,
8, 169.14, 171.2, 171.25, 173.17, 173.24, 410.13, 410.20, 413.14, 416.30, 417.8,
178.30, 183.29, 184.7, 186.7, 188.24, 417.16, 471.33, 418.1, 418.17, 418.2223,
189.12, 192.32, 193.3, 193.21, 196.5, 420.8, 421.20, 424.16, 426.3, 426.13,
198.6, 198.14, 198.20, 199.4, 199.8, 426.1718, 428.2829, 432.34433.1,
200.34, 200.10, 200.15, 200.19, 200.28, 437.11, 437.19, 442.12, 442.19, 443.28,
201.11, 206.7, 206.29, 207.10, 208.24, 444.26, 445.2829, 447.21, 447.28,
211.2122, 212.13, 213.1, 213.19, 217.9, 448.3, 448.19, 448.27, 449.1415, 450.9,
218.18, 218.23, 220.27, 223.20, 224.9, 450.15, 450.20, 451.32, 452.14, 452.21,
226.17, 228.8, 228.15, 228.19, 231.1, 452.28, 453.1, 453.9, 454.1, 454.22,
231.7, 232.31, 233.31, 235.5, 236.16, 456.17, 456.21, 456.27, 459.13, 459.32,
237.14, 243.7, 243.18, 244.21, 245.4, 460.45, 460.8, 461.22, 461.25, 462.1,
608 index authorum et philosophorum
Averroes/Commentator (cont.) Leucippus 103.34,

463.2021, 463.2728, 463.30, 466.10,
471.32, 481.21, 481.27, 482.33, 483.12, Melissus 50.30, 62.8, 64.20, 73.8, 103.2,
484.18, 484.20, 487.27, 488.7, 492.7, 200.32, 464.19
492.16, 492.20, 492.28, 497.11, 497.15,
497.27, 498.1, 498.7, 498.20, 498.27, Ockham, Guillelmus 476.24
499.10, 499.15, 499.27, 499.32, 500.8,
500.28, 500.32, 501.5, 501.26, 502.25, Parmenides 50.30, 62.8, 64.20, 73.8,
502.29, 505.15, 505.22, 508.12, 508.17, 103.2, 200.32, 464.19
510.6, 511.24, 511.30, 514.4, 514.12, Peripatetici 384.6, 396.1314, 456.12,
515.13, 515.24, 516.3, 516.14, 516.18, 497.18
517.56, 517.34, 521.12, 521.2324, Pitagoras 542.26
521.30, 522.56, 522.24, 522.30, 523.2, Pitagorici 64.23, 73.14, 383.21, 383.24,
526.10, 527.15, 527.23, 528.1, 528.28, 396.12, 456.10
533.10, 533.16, 538.13, 539.20, 549.31, Plato 73.27, 74.9, 74.1112, 74.28. 77.12,
550.5, 550.9, 550.12, 550.29, 551.1, 81.5, 81.10, 82.13, 179.3, 179.6, 180.11,
551.1011, 559.20, 561.5, 561.9, 562.3, 180.17, 180.21, 180.23, 181.11, 183.1,
562.22, 562.28, 565.10, 565.18, 569.12, 183.8, 183.33, 194.7, 194.20, 203.11
569.23, 570.2324, 573.12, 573.20, 12, 203.16, 204.8, 205.5, 206.9, 206.15,
573.31, 574.34 206.26, 254.4, 254.18, 258.20, 258.23,
Avicenna 68.1, 72.18, 170.23, 184.31, 258.29, 260.4, 268.1617, 270.1,
199.15, 215.24, 218.17, 218.22, 219.30, 271.20, 277.26, 292.13, 295.31, 296.3,
220.2, 220.10, 258.21, 258.29, 277.26 296.11, 296.16, 296.32, 296.34, 297.28,
27, 291.15, 293.21, 293.31, 294.1, 296.12, 300.20, 356.27, 357.12, 364.29, 380.17,
296.16, 296.33, 297.26, 300.20, 361.6, 386.1, 386.3, 386.8, 387.26, 387.30,
460.1314, 464.3, 466.21, 481.27 388.26, 388.29, 428.30, 441.9, 441.22,
442.32, 443.3, 451.15, 463.17, 463.22,
Boethius, Anicius Manlius Severinus 463.27, 468.26, 469.2, 469.11, 469.18,
135.19, 411.13, 460.11, 464.2, 482.27 471.27, 472.15, 472.30, 474.5, 475.3,
Buridanus, Iohannes 430.9 475.11, 475.15, 475.20, 476.12, 476.15,
Burleus, Gualterus 184.29, 430.9 485.5, 522.11, 530.1617, 532.7, 532.11,
532.19
Democritus 52.1, 103.3, 455.19, 455.21, Platonici 62.14, 62.17, 64.23, 73.22, 180.14,
455.28, 455.33 180.27, 182.22, 183.3, 197.5, 197.13,
Dyogenes 62.10, 103.6 199.20, 206.15, 224.2, 255.4, 256.8
9, 258.13, 260.1213, 266.2, 266.8,
Egidius Romanus 199.26, 480.7, 552.30, 356.27, 375.2, 380.24, 380.27, 380.29,
556.16 381.24, 383.2, 383.7, 383.20, 383.29,
Empedocles 50.34, 103.7 384.6, 384.15, 385.12, 396.13, 400.30,
Eraclitus 62.10 433.13, 441.11, 442.3, 444.17, 445.11,
Euclides 576.31 446.28, 467.15, 468.5, 473.11, 473.19,
Eustratius 469.18, 475.20, 475.24, 476.5, 473.32, 475.9, 475.25, 476.5, 486.15,
485.24 493.16, 494.24, 495.15, 495.19, 496.16,
497.15, 497.17, 498.30, 498.32, 499.29,
Galienus 288.32, 289.34 508.13, 508.21, 510.13, 510.19, 513.2,
Grosseteste, Robertus (= Lincolniensis) 513.33, 515.30, 521.5, 523.13, 524.11,
370.9, 427.33, 556.24, 559.18 524.17, 524.25, 524.32, 525.8, 526.5,
index authorum et philosophorum 609
526.17, 527.21, 528.8, 528.26, 529.1, Socrates 386.2

532.26 Socrates iunior 355.6, 385.35, 386.15
Porphyrius 33.10, 39.2, 46.8, 68.9, 72.27, Speusippus 62.1011, 74.11, 74.25, 74.28,
79.9, 83.8, 86.17, 88.10, 114.22, 140.25, 77.12
184.27, 196.11, 250.11, 269.17, 316.11,
353.4, 357.19, 362.14, 402.27, 405.8, Themistius 293.23, 293.31, 294.3, 296.33,
406.17, 417.2930 422.31, 423.9, 424.10, 297.2526, 300.20
432.25, 433.12, 433.1415, 445.28, Thomas de Aquino 161.34, 199.26,
460.11, 461.15, 462.25, 464.2, 506.1, 338.25, 401.24, 402.34, 480.7, 522.13,
506.17, 507.32 549.5
Scotus, Iohannes Duns 478.4 Yppasus 103.5

Simplicius 34.3

Galluzzo-The Medieval Reception of Book Zeta of Aristotle&#39;s Metaphysics (Vols. 1 &amp; 2)

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The Medieval Reception

of Book Zeta of Aristotles

The titles published in this series are listed at brill.com/stgm

Copyright 2013 by Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, The Netherlands.

This book is printed on acid-free paper.

1. Substance in Aristotles Metaphysics, Book Zeta . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19

2. Substance in Averroess Long Commentary on the Metaphysics,

3. Aquinass Understanding of Metaphysics Z . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 235

4. The Generation of Substances in Met. Z 79 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 275

4. Albert the Greats Metaphysics, Book VII . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 325

5. Alexander of Alexandria and Paul of Venice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 385

6. Paul of Venice As a Reader of Averroes. The Case of Essence and

Summaries of the Text. Paul of Venices Commentary on the

1. The Philosophical Significance of Book Zeta

At the heart of my enterprise is one of Aristotles philosophical master-

1 Cf. Burnyeat (2001), 1.

themes of Aristotles ontology.2 The case is not infrequent of contemporary

For a (sympathetic) evaluation of Aristotles hylomorphism see Fine K. (1994b).

stituents, i.e. entities we need to posit in order to explain the fundamental

6 Cf. in particular Loux (2006b). For an understanding of parthood which is sensitive to

(1) Substance. Book Zetas contribution to the understanding of the notion

As a matter of fact, a leading theme in Met. Z is the claim that the

a nuclear set of fundamental properties, the ones that are explanatory in

it is the Dominican Masters reading that prevailed in the tradition. It would

(3) Universality and particularity. In the Categories, Aristotle is clearly a real-

12 For a contemporary defence of the distinction between substantial and accidental

In Chapter 1 of the first volume I shall present a textual and philosophical

2. The Monographic Chapters

13 I have sketched out the two paradigms in Galluzzo (2009a).

disagreement between the two commentators. In Chapters 2 and 3 I shall

This general tendency to synthesis is even more apparent in the case of

17 On the other hand, Pauls adherence to Averroess most characteristic psychological

argument of Aristotles Metaphysics, his Philosophia prima is not a commen-

3. Paul of Venice: A New Perspective

As is clear, I am not chiefly interested in Paul of Venice as an indepen-

Aristotles Metaphysics see the comprehensive analysis in Bertolacci (2006).

and so interprets some crucial pieces of doctrine which Aristotle defends in

matically simplified Pauls text by focusing exclusively on its essential ner-

4. Methodology and Future Perspectives

This book moves from a fundamental assumption, which it is better to make

commentaries have their roots in different understandings of Aristotles

21 For an overview of this issue see Del Punta (1998).

There is another area of research which I had to leave unexplored, i.e.

SUBSTANCE IN ARISTOTLES METAPHYSICS, BOOK ZETA

Metaphysics Zeta, Aristotles treatise on substance, has been rightly de-

1 Cf. Burnyeat (2001), 1.

to hold some kind of priority over them and so to be better qualified to be

1. The Notion of Substance in the Categories

It is not clear whether Aristotles Categories was meant to be a book about

an analysis of the linguistic expressions corresponding to them. Aquinas, to

Universal Substances Universal Accidents

Particular Substances Particular Accidents

4Cf. Aquinas, Exp. Metaph., Lib. V, lect. 9, ed. CathalaSpiazzi, n. 890.

reality see Lowe (2006).

Now, Aristotles main ontological claim in the Categories is that particular

7 Cf. Aristotle, Cat., 5, 2b6b-c.

9For discussion of the principle see Loux (2007).

12 Cf. Aristotle., Cat., 5, 2a1119; 3a810.

exist. Particular substances possess particular accidental properties. These

Book Z is the treatise of the Metaphysics specifically devoted to the notion

gories see Loux (1991), 1348.

categories. It comes as no surprise, therefore, that, as I have already hinted

reminds us at the very beginning of Met. Z17is spoken of in many ways,

17 Cf. Aristotle, Met., , 2, 1003a33b13; Z, 1, 1028a1013.

Galluzzo-The Medieval Reception of Book Zeta of Aristotle's Metaphysics (Vols. 1 & 2)

Galluzzo-The Medieval Reception of Book Zeta of Aristotle's Metaphysics (Vols. 1 & 2)