1.
Miciano
Di naprove Turkish laws
But the fact is that the oppositor did not prove that said testimentary dispositions are
not in accordance with the Turkish laws, inasmuch as he did not present any
evidence showing what the Turkish laws are on the matter, and in the absence of
evidence on such laws, they are presumed to be the same as those of the Philippines.
(Lim and Lim vs. Collector of Customs, 36 Phil., 472.)
It has not been proved in these proceedings what the Turkish laws are. He, himself,
acknowledges it when he desires to be given an opportunity to present evidence on
this point; so much so that he assigns as an error of the court in not having deferred
the approval of the scheme of partition until the receipt of certain testimony
requested regarding the Turkish laws on the matter.
The refusal to give the oppositor another opportunity to prove such laws does not
constitute an error. It is discretionary with the trial court, and, taking into
consideration that the oppositor was granted ample opportunity to introduce
competent evidence, we find no abuse of discretion on the part of the court in this
particular. There is, therefore, no evidence in the record that the national law of the
testator Joseph G. Brimo was violated in the testamentary dispositions in question
which, not being contrary to our laws in force, must be complied with and executed.
lawphil.net
Legatee
The institution of legatees in this will is conditional, and the condition is that the
instituted legatees must respect the testator's will to distribute his property, not in
accordance with the laws of his nationality, but in accordance with the laws of the
Philippines.
If this condition as it is expressed were legal and valid, any legatee who fails to
comply with it, as the herein oppositor who, by his attitude in these proceedings has
not respected the will of the testator, as expressed, is prevented from receiving his
legacy.
The fact is, however, that the said condition is void, being contrary to law, for article
792 of the civil Code provides the following:
Gerald Bowe Resuello
Jurisprudence
Impossible conditions and those contrary to law or good morals shall be
considered as not imposed and shall not prejudice the heir or legatee in
any manner whatsoever, even should the testator otherwise provide.
And said condition is contrary to law because it expressly ignores the testator's
national law when, according to article 10 of the civil Code above quoted, such
national law of the testator is the one to govern his testamentary dispositions.
Therefore, the orders appealed from are modified and it is directed that the
distribution of this estate be made in such a manner as to include the herein
appellant Andre Brimo as one of the legatees, and the scheme of partition submitted
by the judicial administrator is approved in all other respects, without any
pronouncement as to costs.
2. Bohanan
Under Nevada law, pede idispose lahat
The court below refused to recognize the claim of the widow on the ground that the
laws of Nevada, of which the deceased was a citizen, allow him to dispose of all of
his properties without requiring him to leave any portion of his estate to his wife.
Section 9905 of Nevada Compiled Laws of 1925 provides:
Every person over the age of eighteen years, of sound mind, may, by last
will, dispose of all his or her estate, real and personal, the same being
chargeable with the payment of the testator's debts.
Pati no right to share in inheritance ung divorced wife
Moreover, the court below had found that the testator and Magdalena C. Bohanan
were married on January 30, 1909, and that divorce was granted to him on May 20,
1922; that sometime in 1925, Magdalena C. Bohanan married Carl Aaron and this
marriage was subsisting at the time of the death of the testator. Since no right to
share in the inheritance in favor of a divorced wife exists in the State of Nevada and
since the court below had already found that there was no conjugal property between
the testator and Magdalena C. Bohanan, the latter can now have no longer claim to
pay portion of the estate left by the testator.
The most important issue is the claim of the testator's children, Edward and
Mary Lydia, who had received legacies in the amount of P6,000 each only, and,
therefore, have not been given their shares in the estate which, in accordance
with the laws of the forum, should be two-thirds of the estate left by the
testator. Is the failure old the testator to give his children two-thirds of the
estate left by him at the time of his death, in accordance with the laws of the
forum valid?
In the proceedings for the probate of the will, it was found out and it was decided
that the testator was a citizen of the State of Nevada because he had selected this as
his domicile and his permanent residence. (See Decision dated April 24, 1950,
supra). So the question at issue is whether the estementary dispositions, especially
hose for the children which are short of the legitime given them by the Civil Code of
the Philippines, are valid. It is not disputed that the laws of Nevada allow a testator
to dispose of all his properties by will (Sec. 9905, Complied Nevada Laws of 1925,
supra).
Naprove foreign law
We have, however, consulted the records of the case in the court below and we have
found that during the hearing on October 4, 1954 of the motion of Magdalena C.
Bohanan for withdrawal of P20,000 as her share, the foreign law, especially Section
9905, Compiled Nevada Laws. was introduced in evidence by appellant's (herein)
counsel as Exhibits "2" (See pp. 77-79, VOL. II, and t.s.n. pp. 24-44, Records, Court
of First Instance). Again said laws presented by the counsel for the executor and
admitted by the Court as Exhibit "B" during the hearing of the case on January 23,
1950 before Judge Rafael Amparo (se Records, Court of First Instance, Vol. 1).
3. SAUDIA
(8) In all other cases in which demand, exclusive of interest, damages of whatever
kind, attorneys fees, litigation expenses, and costs or the value of the property in
controversy exceeds One hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00) or, in such other
cases in Metro Manila, where the demand, exclusive of the above-mentioned items
exceeds Two hundred Thousand pesos (P200,000.00). (Emphasis ours)
REASON
Pragmatic considerations, including the convenience of the parties, also weigh
heavily in favor of the RTC Quezon City assuming jurisdiction. Paramount is the
private interest of the litigant. Enforceability of a judgment if one is obtained is quite
obvious. Relative advantages and obstacles to a fair trial are equally important.
Plaintiff may not, by choice of an inconvenient forum, vex, harass, or oppress the
defendant, e.g. by inflicting upon him needless expense or disturbance. But unless
the balance is strongly in favor of the defendant, the plaintiffs choice of forum
should rarely be disturbed.i[49]
Gerald Bowe Resuello
Jurisprudence
Weighing the relative claims of the parties, the court a quo found it best to hear the
case in the Philippines. Had it refused to take cognizance of the case, it would be
forcing plaintiff (private respondent now) to seek remedial action elsewhere, i.e. in
the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia where she no longer maintains substantial
connections. That would have caused a fundamental unfairness to her.
Moreover, by hearing the case in the Philippines no unnecessary difficulties and
inconvenience have been shown by either of the parties. The choice of forum of the
plaintiff (now private respondent) should be upheld.
2 QUESTIONS IN THE CHOIE OF LAW
As to the choice of applicable law, we note that choice-of-law problems seek to
answer two important questions: (1) What legal system should control a given
situation where some of the significant facts occurred in two or more states; and (2)
to what extent should the chosen legal system regulate the situation. ii
DOCTRINE OF QUALIFICATION
Before a choice can be made, it is necessary for us to determine under what category
a certain set of facts or rules fall. This process is known as characterization, or the
doctrine of qualification. It is the process of deciding whether or not the facts relate
to the kind of question specified in a conflicts rule. iii[55] The purpose of
characterization is to enable the forum to select the proper law.
TEST FACTORS
Our starting point of analysis here is not a legal relation, but a factual situation,
event, or operative fact.iv[57] An essential element of conflict rules is the indication
of a test or connecting factor or point of contact. Choice-of-law rules invariably
consist of a factual relationship (such as property right, contract claim) and a
connecting factor or point of contact, such as the situs of the res, the place of
celebration, the place of performance, or the place of wrongdoing. v[58]
Note that one or more circumstances may be present to serve as the possible test for
the determination of the applicable law. vi[59] These test factors or points of contact
or connecting factors could be any of the following:
(1) The nationality of a person, his domicile, his residence, his place of
sojourn, or his origin;
(2) the seat of a legal or juridical person, such as a corporation;
 (3) the situs of a thing, that is, the place where a thing is, or is deemed
to be situated. In particular, the lex situs is decisive when real rights are
involved;
(4) the place where an act has been done, the locus actus, such as
the place where a contract has been made, a marriage celebrated, a
will signed or a tort committed. The lex loci actus is particularly
important in contracts and torts;
(5) the place where an act is intended to come into effect, e.g., the place
of performance of contractual duties, or the place where a power of
attorney is to be exercised;
(6) the intention of the contracting parties as to the law that should
govern their agreement, the lex loci intentionis;
(7) the place where judicial or administrative proceedings are instituted
or done. The lex forithe law of the forumis particularly important
because, as we have seen earlier, matters of procedure not going to the
substance of the claim involved are governed by it; and because the lex
fori applies whenever the content of the otherwise applicable foreign
law is excluded from application in a given case for the reason that it
falls under one of the exceptions to the applications of foreign law; and
(8) the flag of a ship, which in many cases is decisive of practically all
legal relationships of the ship and of its master or owner as such. It also
covers contractual relationships particularly contracts of
affreightment.vii[60] (Underscoring ours.)
PHILIPPINE LAW
After a careful study of the pleadings on record, including allegations in the
Amended Complaint deemed submitted for purposes of the motion to dismiss, we
are convinced that there is reasonable basis for private respondents assertion that
although she was already working in Manila, petitioner brought her to Jeddah on the
pretense that she would merely testify in an investigation of the charges she made
against the two SAUDIA crew members for the attack on her person while they were
in Jakarta. As it turned out, she was the one made to face trial for very serious
charges, including adultery and violation of Islamic laws and tradition.
There is likewise logical basis on record for the claim that the handing over or
turning over of the person of private respondent to Jeddah officials, petitioner may
have acted beyond its duties as employer. Petitioners purported act contributed to
and amplified or even proximately caused additional humiliation, misery and
suffering of private respondent. Petitioner thereby allegedly facilitated the arrest,
Gerald Bowe Resuello
Jurisprudence
detention and prosecution of private respondent under the guise of petitioners
authority as employer, taking advantage of the trust, confidence and faith she
reposed upon it. As purportedly found by the Prince of Makkah, the alleged
conviction and imprisonment of private respondent was wrongful. But these capped
the injury or harm allegedly inflicted upon her person and reputation, for which
petitioner could be liable as claimed, to provide compensation or redress for the
wrongs done, once duly proven.
MOST SIGNIFICANT RELATIONSHIP
Moreover, with the widespread criticism of the traditional rule of lex loci delicti
commissi, modern theories and rules on tort liabilityviii[61] have been advanced to
offer fresh judicial approaches to arrive at just results. In keeping abreast with the
modern theories on tort liability, we find here an occasion to apply the State of the
most significant relationship rule, which in our view should be appropriate to apply
now, given the factual context of this case.
In applying said principle to determine the State which has the most significant
relationship, the following contacts are to be taken into account and evaluated
according to their relative importance with respect to the particular issue: (a) the
place where the injury occurred; (b) the place where the conduct causing the injury
occurred; (c) the domicile, residence, nationality, place of incorporation and place of
business of the parties, and (d) the place where the relationship, if any, between the
parties is centered.
As already discussed, there is basis for the claim that over-all injury occurred and
lodged in the Philippines. There is likewise no question that private respondent is a
resident Filipina national, working with petitioner, a resident foreign corporation
engaged here in the business of international air carriage. Thus, the relationship
between the parties was centered here, although it should be stressed that this suit is
not based on mere labor law violations. From the record, the claim that the
Philippines has the most significant contact with the matter in this dispute, ix[63]
raised by private respondent as plaintiff below against defendant (herein petitioner),
in our view, has been properly established.
4. FOWLER
Hindi kasi Philippine vessel , walang jurisdiction
This case deals with a theft committed on board a transport while navigating the
high seas. Act No. 136 of the organic law, as well as Act No. 186 passed by the Civil
Commission, and which repealed the former law, Act No. 76, do not expressly
confer jurisdiction or authority upon this court to take cognizance of all crimes
committed on board vessels on the high seas. While the provisions of the law are
clear and precise with respect to civil admiralty or maritime cases, this is not true
with respect to criminal cases. If any doubt could arise concerning the true meaning
of the law applicable to the case, Act. No. 400 effectively dissipates such doubts.
This law, which is an addition to Act No. 136, by which the courts of justice of the
Philippine Islands were organized, in article 1 adds to article 56, consisting of seven
paragraphs, another paragraph numbered 8, which reads as follows: "Of all crimes
and offenses committed on the high seas or beyond the jurisdiction of any country,
or within any of the navigable waters of the Philippine Archipelago, on bard a ship
or water craft of any kind registered or licensed in the Philippine Islands in
accordance with the laws thereof." The purpose of this law was to define the
jurisdiction of the Courts of First Instance in criminal cases for crimes committed on
board vessels registered or licensed in the Philippine Islands. The transport Lawton
not being a vessel of this class, our courts are without jurisdiction to take cognizance
of a crime committed on board the same.
5. PEOPLE VS. WONG CHENG
ENGLISH AND FRENCH RULE
There are two fundamental rules on this particular matter in connection with
International Law; to wit, the French rule, according to which crimes committed
aboard a foreign merchant vessels should not be prosecuted in the courts of the
country within whose territorial jurisdiction they were committed, unless their
commission affects the peace and security of the territory; and the English rule,
based on the territorial principle and followed in the United States, according to
which, crimes perpetrated under such circumstances are in general triable in the
courts of the country within territory they were committed. Of this two rules, it is the
last one that obtains in this jurisdiction, because at present the theories and
jurisprudence prevailing in the United States on this matter are authority in the
Philippines which is now a territory of the United States.
PEDEEE
Hence in United States vs. Look Chaw (18 Phil., 573), this court held that:
Although the mere possession of an article of prohibited use in the
Philippine Islands, aboard a foreign vessel in transit in any local port, does
not, as a general rule, constitute a crime triable by the courts of the
Islands, such vessels being considered as an extension of its own
Gerald Bowe Resuello
Jurisprudence
nationality, the same rule does not apply when the article, the use of which
is prohibited in the Islands, is landed from the vessels upon Philippine
soil; in such a case an open violation of the laws of the land is committed
with respect to which, as it is a violation of the penal law in force at the
place of the commission of the crime, no court other than that established
in the said place has jurisdiction of the offense, in the absence of an
agreement under an international treaty.
USE OF OPIUM TRIABLE, POSSESSION NOT
We have seen that the mere possession of opium aboard a foreign vessel in transit
was held by this court not triable by or courts, because it being the primary object of
our Opium Law to protect the inhabitants of the Philippines against the disastrous
effects entailed by the use of this drug, its mere possession in such a ship, without
being used in our territory, does not being about in the said territory those effects
that our statute contemplates avoiding. Hence such a mere possession is not
considered a disturbance of the public order.
But to smoke opium within our territorial limits, even though aboard a foreign
merchant ship, is certainly a breach of the public order here established, because it
causes such drug to produce its pernicious effects within our territory. It seriously
contravenes the purpose that our Legislature has in mind in enacting the aforesaid
repressive statute. Moreover, as the Attorney-General aptly observes:
6. TIME MAGAZINE
CREAAAM BKA ITANONG LUNGS
Section 1. Article three hundred sixty of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by
Republic Act Numbered Twelve hundred and eighty-nine, is further amended to read
as follows:
'ART. 360. Persons responsible. Any person who shall
publish, exhibit, or cause the publication or exhibition of any
defamation in writing or by similar means, shall be responsible
for the same.
The author or editor of a book or pamphlet, or the editor or business manager of a
daily newspaper, magazine or serial publication, shall be responsible for the
defamations contained therein to the extent as if he were the author thereof.
The criminal and civil action for damages in cases of written defamations as
provided for in this chapter, shall be filed simultaneously or separately with the
court of first instance of the province or city where the libelous article is printed and
first published or where any of the offended parties actually resides at the time of the
commission of the offense; Provided, however, That where one of the offended
parties is a public officer whose office is in the City of Manila at the time of the
commission of the offense, the action shall be filed in the Court of First Instance of
the City of Manila or of the city or province where the libelous article is printed and
first published, and in case such public officer does not hold office in the City of
Manila, the action shall be filed in the Court of First Instance of the province or city
where he held office at the time of the commission of the offense or where the
libelous article is printed and first published and in case one of the offended parties
is a private individual, the action shall be filed in the Court of First Instance of the
province or city where he actually resides at the time of the commission of the
offense or where the libelous matter is printed and first published; Provided, further,
That the civil action shall be filed in the same court where the criminal action is filed
and vice versa; Provided, furthermore, That the court where the criminal action or
civil action for damages is first filed, shall acquire jurisdiction to the exclusion of
other courts; And provided finally, That this amendment shall not apply to cases of
written defamations, the civil and/or criminal actions which have been filed in court
at the time of the effectivity of the law
DAPAT S MANILA DI S RIZAL EW
The complaint lodged in the court of Rizal by respondents does not allege that the
libelous article was printed and first published in the province of Rizal and, since the
respondents-plaintiffs are public officers with offices in Manila at the time of the
commission of the alleged offense, it is clear that the only place left for them
wherein to file their action, is the Court of First Instance of Manila.
The limitation of the choices of venue, as introduced into the Penal Code through its
amendments by Republic Act 4363, was intended "to minimize or limit the filing of
out-of-town libel suits" to protect an alleged offender from "hardships,
inconveniences and harassments" and, furthermore, to protect "the interest of the
public service" where one of the offended parties is a public officer."
AS TO CONTENTION THAT RA 4363 DOES NOT APPLY TO NON
RESIDENT MALI CONTENTION
The implication of respondents' argument is that the law would not take effect as to
non-resident defendants or accused. We see nothing in the text of the law that would
sustain such unequal protection to some of those who may be charged with libel.
The official proclamation that a Philippine Press Council has been organized is
Gerald Bowe Resuello
Jurisprudence
made a pre-condition to the effectivity of the entire Republic Act No. 4363, and no
terms are employed therein to indicate that the law can or will be effective only as to
some, but not all, of those that may be charged with libeling our public officers.
SINGLE PUBLICATION RULE INAPPLICABLE IN THIS CASE
The common law as to causes of action for tort arising out of a
single publication was to the effect that each communication of
written or printed matter was a distinct and separate publication
of a libel contained therein, giving rise to a separate cause of
action. This rule ('multiple publication' rule) is still followed in
several American jurisdictions, and seems to be favored by the
American Law Institute. Other jurisdictions have adopted the
'single publication' rule which originated in New York, under
which any single integrated publication, such as one edition of a
newspaper, book, or magazine, or one broadcast, is treated as a
unit, giving rise to only one cause of action, regardless of the
number of times it is exposed to different people. ...
These rules are not pertinent in the present scheme because the number of causes of
action that may be available to the respondents-plaintiffs is not here in issue. We are
here confronted by a specific venue statute, conferring jurisdiction in cases of libel
against Public officials to specified courts, and no other. The rule is that where a
statute creates a right and provides a remedy for its enforcement, the remedy is
exclusive; and where it confers jurisdiction upon a particular court, that jurisdiction
is likewise exclusive, unless otherwise provided. Hence, the venue provisions of
Republic Act No. 4363 should be deemed mandatory for the party bringing the
action, unless the question of venue should be waived by the defendant, which was
not the case here. Only thus can the policy of the Act be upheld and maintained. Nor
is there any reason why the inapplicability of one alternative venue should result in
rendering the other alternative, also inapplicable.
HAY, FAILURE TO AVER LEGAL CAPACITY NOT FATAL CORPLAW
Petitioner's failure to aver its legal capacity to institute the present petition is not
fatal, for ...
A foreign corporation may, by writ of prohibition, seek relief
against the wrongful assumption of jurisdiction. And a foreign
corporation seeking a writ of prohibition against further
maintenance of a suit, on the ground of want of jurisdiction in
which jurisdiction is not bound by the ruling of the court in
 which the suit was brought, on a motion to quash service of
summons, that it has jurisdiction.

TAS MAY SUMMARY S DULO UNG CASE ZZZZ

Gerald Bowe Resuello

Jurisprudence
i

ii

iii

iv

v7. WILDVALLEY

Proving written and unwritten law

A distinction is to be made as to the manner of proving a written and an unwritten law. The former falls under Section 24, Rule 132 of the
Rules of Court, as amended, the entire provision of which is quoted hereunder. Where the foreign law sought to be proved is "unwritten,"
the oral testimony of expert witnesses is admissible, as are printed and published books of reports of decisions of the courts of the country
concerned if proved to be commonly admitted in such courts.[25]

The primary issue to be determined is whether or not Venezuelan law is applicable to the case at bar.

The court has interpreted Section 25 (now Section 24) to include competent evidence like the testimony of a witness to prove the
existence of a written foreign law.[

We do not dispute the competency of Capt. Oscar Leon Monzon, the Assistant Harbor Master and Chief of Pilots at Puerto Ordaz,
Venezuela,[28] to testify on the existence of the Reglamento General de la Ley de Pilotaje (pilotage law of Venezuela)[29] and the
Reglamento Para la Zona de Pilotaje No 1 del Orinoco (rules governing the navigation of the Orinoco River). Captain Monzon has held
the aforementioned posts for eight years.[30] As such he is in charge of designating the pilots for maneuvering and navigating the Orinoco
River. He is also in charge of the documents that come into the office of the harbour masters.[31]

Nevertheless, we take note that these written laws were not proven in the manner provided by Section 24 of Rule 132 of the Rules of
Court.

ITO KULANG

he Reglamento General de la Ley de Pilotaje was published in the Gaceta Oficial[32]of the Republic of Venezuela. A photocopy of the
Gaceta Oficial was presented in evidence as an official publication of the Republic of Venezuela.

The Reglamento Para la Zona de Pilotaje No 1 del Orinoco is published in a book issued by the Ministerio de Comunicaciones of
Venezuela.[33] Only a photocopy of the said rules was likewise presented as evidence.

Both of these documents are considered in Philippine jurisprudence to be public documents for they are the written official acts, or
records of the official acts of the sovereign authority, official bodies and tribunals, and public officers of Venezuela.[34]

For a copy of a foreign public document to be admissible, the following requisites are mandatory: (1) It must be attested by the officer
having legal custody of the records or by his deputy; and (2) It must be accompanied by a certificate by a secretary of the embassy or
legation, consul general, consul, vice consular or consular agent or foreign service officer, and with the seal of his office.[35] The latter
requirement is not a mere technicality but is intended to justify the giving of full faith and credit to the genuineness of a document in a
foreign country.[36]

It is not enough that the Gaceta Oficial, or a book published by the Ministerio de Comunicaciones of Venezuela, was presented as
evidence with Captain Monzon attesting it. It is also required by Section 24 of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court that a certificate that
Captain Monzon, who attested the documents, is the officer who had legal custody of those records made by a secretary of the embassy or
legation, consul general, consul, vice consul or consular agent or by any officer in the foreign service of the Philippines stationed in
Venezuela, and authenticated by the seal of his office accompanying the copy of the public document. No such certificate could be found
in the records of the case.

PAROL OBJECTIONABLE

With respect to proof of written laws, parol proof is objectionable, for the written law itself is the best evidence. According to the weight
of authority, when a foreign statute is involved, the best evidence rule requires that it be proved by a duly authenticated copy of the
statute.

SO PH LAW

Petitioner alleges that there was negligence on the part of the private respondent that would warrant the award of damages.

There being no contractual obligation, the private respondent is obliged to give only the diligence required of a good father of a family in
accordance with the provisions of Article 1173 of the New Civil Code, thus:

Art. 1173. The fault or negligence of the obligor consists in the omission of that diligence which is required by the nature of the obligation
and corresponds with the circumstances of the persons, of the time and of the place. When negligence shows bad faith, the provisions of
articles 1171 and 2201, paragraph 2, shall apply.

If the law or contract does not state the diligence which is to be observed in the performance, that which is expected of a good father of a
family shall be required.

The Philippine rules on pilotage, embodied in Philippine Ports Authority Administrative Order No. 03-85, otherwise known as the Rules
and Regulations Governing Pilotage Services, the Conduct of Pilots and Pilotage Fees in Philippine Ports enunciate the duties and
responsibilities of a master of a vessel and its pilot, among other things.

The pertinent provisions of the said administrative order governing these persons are quoted hereunder:

Sec. 11. Control of Vessels and Liability for Damage. -- On compulsory pilotage grounds, the Harbor Pilot providing the service to a
vessel shall be responsible for the damage caused to a vessel or to life and property at ports due to his negligence or fault. He can be
absolved from liability if the accident is caused by force majeure or natural calamities provided he has exercised prudence and extra
diligence to prevent or minimize the damage.

The Master shall retain overall command of the vessel even on pilotage grounds whereby he can countermand or overrule the order or
command of the Harbor Pilot on board. In such event, any damage caused to a vessel or to life and property at ports by reason of the fault
or negligence of the Master shall be the responsibility and liability of the registered owner of the vessel concerned without prejudice to
recourse against said Master.

Such liability of the owner or Master of the vessel or its pilots shall be determined by competent authority in appropriate proceedings in
the light of the facts and circumstances of each particular case.

xxx

Sec. 32. Duties and Responsibilities of the Pilots or Pilots Association. -- The duties and responsibilities of the Harbor Pilot shall be as
follows:

xxx

f) A pilot shall be held responsible for the direction of a vessel from the time he assumes his work as a pilot thereof until he leaves it
anchored or berthed safely; Provided, however, that his responsibility shall cease at the moment the Master neglects or refuses to carry out
his order."

The Code of Commerce likewise provides for the obligations expected of a captain of a vessel, to wit:

Art. 612. The following obligations shall be inherent in the office of captain:

xxx

"7. To be on deck on reaching land and to take command on entering and leaving ports, canals, roadsteads, and rivers, unless there is a
pilot on board discharging his duties. x x x.

APPLY PERO ANG HIRAP

The Orinoco River being a compulsory pilotage channel necessitated the engaging of a pilot who was presumed to be knowledgeable of
every shoal, bank, deep and shallow ends of the river. In his deposition, pilot Ezzar Solarzano Vasquez testified that he is an official pilot
in the Harbour at Port Ordaz, Venezuela,[44] and that he had been a pilot for twelve (12) years.[45] He also had experience in navigating
the waters of the Orinoco River.[46]

The law does provide that the master can countermand or overrule the order or command of the harbor pilot on board. The master of the
Philippine Roxas deemed it best not to order him (the pilot) to stop the vessel,[47] mayhap, because the latter had assured him that they
were navigating normally before the grounding of the vessel.[48] Moreover, the pilot had admitted that on account of his experience he
was very familiar with the configuration of the river as well as the course headings, and that he does not even refer to river charts when
navigating the Orinoco River.[49]

Based on these declarations, it comes as no surprise to us that the master chose not to regain control of the ship. Admitting his limited
knowledge of the Orinoco River, Captain Colon relied on the knowledge and experience of pilot Vasquez to guide the vessel safely.

May compulsory pilotage

Sec. 8. Compulsory Pilotage Service - For entering a harbor and anchoring thereat, or passing through rivers or straits within a pilotage
district, as well as docking and undocking at any pier/wharf, or shifting from one berth or another, every vessel engaged in coastwise and
foreign trade shall be under compulsory pilotage.

On the other hand, if it is compulsive upon the master to take a pilot, and, a fortiori, if he is bound to do so under penalty, then, and
in such case, neither he nor the owner will be liable for injuries occasioned by the negligence of the pilot; for in such a case the pilot
cannot be deemed properly the servant of the master or the owner, but is forced upon them, and the maxim Qui facit per alium facit per se
does not apply." (Underscoring supplied)

We find that the grounding of the vessel is attributable to the pilot. When the vibrations were first felt the watch officer asked him what
was going on, and pilot Vasquez replied that "(they) were in the middle of the channel and that the vibration was as (sic) a result of the
shallowness of the channel."[51]

Pilot Ezzar Solarzano Vasquez was assigned to pilot the vessel Philippine Roxas as well as other vessels on the Orinoco River due to his
knowledge of the same. In his experience as a pilot, he should have been aware of the portions which are shallow and which are not. His
failure to determine the depth of the said river and his decision to plod on his set course, in all probability, caused damage to the vessel.
Thus, we hold him as negligent and liable for its grounding.

As has already been held above, there was a temporary shift of control over the ship from the master of the vessel to the pilot on a
compulsory pilotage channel. Thus, two of the requisites necessary for the doctrine to apply, i.e., negligence and control, to render the
respondent liable, are absent.

Due to the unfounded filing of this case, the private respondent was unjustifiably forced to litigate, thus the award of attorneys fees was
proper.

WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition is DENIED and the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA G.R. CV No.
36821 is AFFIRMED.

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