BOSTON EQUITY RESOURCES V.

CA (2013) Lolita, ung case lang against hubby ung dismissed

The courts failure to acquire jurisdiction over ones person is a defense which is personal to the person claiming
it. Obviously, it is now impossible for Sereno to invoke the same in view of his death. Neither can it be invoked,
on his behalf of Sereno, so as to reap the benefit of having the case dismissed against of all the defendants.

FACTS:

December 24, 1997: Petitioner Boston Equity Resources (petitioner Boston for brevity) filed a complaint
for sum of money with a prayer for the issurance of a writ of preliminary attachment against the spouses
Manuel and Loita Toledo
Upon the filing of the complaint, Manuel was already dead and so, the trial court ordered his substitution
by his children as party-defendants.
Reception of evidence for respondent Lolita was cancelled upon agreement of the parties. She has to
file a demurrer to evidence. But on October 7, 2004, she filed a motion to dismiss based on the
following grounds:
-failure to implead an indispensable or a real arty in interest
-the trial court (TC for brevity) did not acquire jurisdiction over the person of Manuel pursuant
to Rule 86, Sec 5 of the ROC
-the TC erred in ordering the substitution of the deceased Manuel by his heirs
-the case against Lolita must also be dismissed pursuant to Rule 86, Sec. 6 of ROC
Trial court: denied the motion to dismiss for having been filed out of time. It dismissed also the Motion
for Reconsideration on the ground that defendants attack on the jurisdiction of the TC is already barred
by estoppel by laches.
Respondent Lolita filed a petition for certiorari with the CA alleging that the TC committed grave abuse
of discretion for denying her motion to dismiss
CA: granted the petition on the ground that the TC failed to acquire jurisdiction over the person of
Manuel since he is already dead and the issue on jurisdiction may be raised at any stage of the
proceeding so estoppel is inapplicable. Considering that Manuels obligation is solidary with another
debtor, the case should have been filed against Manuel estate.
Petitioner Boston filed a motion for reconsideration
CA denied

ISSUES:
W/N the trial court erred in denying respondent Lolitas motion to dismiss

HELD:
NO. The Court held that the trial court did not commit grave abuse of discretion in denying respondents motion
to dismiss. It acted correctly considering that her motion to dismiss was filed 6 years and 5 mos after her
amended answer was filed. Under Section 1, Rule 16 of the ROC, a motion to dismiss shall be filed within the
time for but before the filing of an answer to the complaint of pleading asserting a claim. Also, there is no basis
for dismissing the complaint against respondent Lolita as citing the Sarbasa case, the courts failure to acquire
jurisdiction over ones person is a defense which is personal to the person claiming it. Obviously, it is now
impossible for Sereno to invoke the same in view of his death. Neither can it be invoked, on behalf of Sereno, so
as to reap the benefit of having the case dismissed against of all the defendants. .
-the CA erred when it made a sweeping pronouncement in its questioned decision, stating that issue
on jurisdiction may be raised at any stage of the proceeding, even for the first time on appeal and that,
therefore, respondent timely raised the issue in her motion to dismiss and is, consequently not estopped from
raising the question of jurisdiction. As the question of jurisdiction involved here is that over the person of the
defendant Manuel, the same is deemed waived if not raised in the answer or a motion to dismiss. In any case,
respondent cannot claim the defense since lack of jurisdiction over the person, being subject to waiver, is a
personal defense which can only be asserted by the party who can thereby waive it by silence.
 The aspect of jurisdiction which may be barred from being assailed as a result of estoppel by
laches is jurisdiction over the subject matter. The principle of estoppel by laches is inapplicable
in this case
Since the defense of lack of jurisdiction over the person of a party to a case is not one of those
defenses which are not deemed waived under Section 1, Rule 9, such defense must be invoked when
an answer or a motion to dismiss is filed in order to prevent a waiver of defense. If the objection is not
raised either in a motion to dismiss or in the answer, the objection to the jurisdiction over the person of
the plaintiff or the defendant is deemed waived by virtue if the first sentence of the aforementioned
provision.

B. On whether or not Manuels estate is an indispensable party

The estate of Manuel is not an indispensable party to the collection case for the simple reason that his
obligation and his wifes is solidary.

C. On whether or not the inclusion of Manuel as party defendant is a misjoinder of party

The inclusion of Manuel in the complaint cannot be considered a misjoinder, as in fact, the action would
have proceeded against him had he been alive at the time the collection case was filed by petitioner

The failure to effect service of summons unto Manuel, one of the defendants herein, does not render
the action dismissible considering that defendants Lolita was validly served with summons and the case
with respect to the answering defendants may proceed independently.

-Since Manuel was already dad at the time of the filing of the complaint, the court never acquired jurisdiction over
his person, and in effect, there was no party to be substituted. Substitution is proper only where the party to be
substituted died during the pendency of the case (Rule 3 Section 16 of the ROC)

The SC mentioned that the motion to dismiss of respondent Lolita was a mere ploy to delay the
resolution of the case. It appeared that the motion to dismiss under consideration is not the first motion
to dismiss. Lolita filed an earlier motion to dismiss on the ground of the unenforceability of petitioners
claim under the Statute of Frau

PEOPLE V. HENRY GO The death did not extinguish the crime nor the basis of the charge of conspiracy

The act of an accused in posting bail or in filing motions seeking affirmative relief is tantamount to submission of
his person to the jurisdiction of the court.

The requirement before a private person may be indicted for violation of Section 3(g) of R.A. 3019, among
others, is that such private person must be alleged to have acted in conspiracy with a public officer. The law,
however, does not require that such person must, in all instances, be indicted together with the public
officer. If circumstances exist where the public officer may no longer be charged in court, as in the
present case where the public officer has already died, the private person may be indicted alone.

FACTS:

A certain Ma. Cecilia L. Pesayco filed a complaint with the Office of the Ombudsman against several
individuals for alleged violation of R.A. 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act). Among those
charged was respondent Henry Go, who was then the Chairman and President of Philippine Air
Terminals, Co., Inc (PIATCO), for having supposedly conspired with then DOTC Secretary Arturo Enrile
(Secretary Enrile) in entering into a contract (Concession Agreement) which is grossly and manifestly
disadvantageous to the government.
 The Information filed against respondent Go is a result of the Courts decision in Agan, Jr. v. Philippine
International Air Terminals Co., Inc. which nullified the various contracts awarded by the Government,
through the DOTC, to PIATCO for the construction, operation and maintenance of the Ninoy Aquino
International Airport International Passenger Terminal III (NAIA IPT III).
September 16, 2004: The Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon indicted respondent Henry for
violation of Section 3(g) of RA 3019. Though there was a probable cause against Secretary Enrile, he
was no longer indicted because he died prior to the resolution finding probable cause.
March 10, 2005: The Sandiganbayan issued a show cause order why the case should not be dismissed
for lack of jurisdiction over the person of the accused considering that the accused is a private person
and the public official Arturo Enrile, his alleged co-conspirator, is already deceased, and not an accused
in this case.
The prosecution complied with the order contending that the SB has already acquired jurisdiction over
the person of respondent by reason of his voluntary appearance, when he filed a motion for
consolidation and when he posted bail. The prosecution also argued that the SB has exclusive
jurisdiction over respondent's case, even if he is a private person, because he was alleged to have
conspired with a public officer
Respondent Go filed a Motion to Quash the information filed against him on the ground that the
operative facts adduced therein do not constitute an offense under Section 3(g) of R.A. 3019 and
contended that by reason of the death of Secretary Enrile, there is no public officer who was charged in
the Information and, as such, prosecution against respondent may not prosper.
The Sandiganbayan granted the Motion to Quash and dismissed the criminal case against respondent
Go, hence this petition.

ISSUE:

1. W/N Respondent Go may be indicted for conspiracy for in violating Section (3)g of RA 2019 even if the
public officer, with whom he was alleged has died prior to the filing of the Information

HELD:
YES. The Court held that it is true that by reason of Secretary Enrile's death, there is no longer any public officer
with whom respondent can be charged for violation of R.A. 3019. It does not mean, however, that the allegation
of conspiracy between them can no longer be proved or that their alleged conspiracy is already expunged. The
only thing extinguished by the death of Secretary Enrile is his criminal liability. His death did not
extinguish the crime nor did it remove the basis of the charge of conspiracy between him and private
respondent. Stated differently, the death of Secretary Enrile does not mean that there was no public officer who
allegedly violated Section 3 (g) of R.A. 3019. In fact, the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon found
probable cause to indict Secretary Enrile for infringement of Sections 3 (e) and (g) of R.A. 3019.14 Were it not for
his death, he should have been charged.

The requirement before a private person may be indicted for violation of Section 3(g) of R.A. 3019, among
others, is that such private person must be alleged to have acted in conspiracy with a public officer. The law,
however, does not require that such person must, in all instances, be indicted together with the public
officer. If circumstances exist where the public officer may no longer be charged in court, as in the
present case where the public officer has already died, the private person may be indicted alone.

Likewise, the Court does not agree with respondent Gos contention that the Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction
over his person since Sec. Enrile is already dead prior to the filing of the criminal case against him. It is
noteworthy to emphasize that respondent Gos acts of posting bail and filing his Motion for Consolidation vests
the SB with jurisdiction over his person. The rule is well settled that the act of an accused in posting bail or in
filing motions seeking affirmative relief is tantamount to submission of his person to the jurisdiction of the court.

The instant case involves a contract entered into by public officers representing the government. More
importantly, the SB is a special criminal court which has exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases involving
violations of R.A. 3019 committed by certain public officers, as enumerated in P.D. 1606 as amended by R.A.
8249. This includes private individuals who are charged as co-principals, accomplices or accessories with the
said public officers. In the instant case, respondent is being charged for violation of Section 3(g) of R.A. 3019, in
conspiracy with then Secretary Enrile. Ideally, under the law, both respondent and Secretary Enrile should have
been charged before and tried jointly by the Sandiganbayan. However, by reason of the death of the latter, this
can no longer be done. Nonetheless, for reasons already discussed, it does not follow that the SB is already
divested of its jurisdiction over the person of and the case involving herein respondent. To rule otherwise would
mean that the power of a court to decide a case would no longer be based on the law defining its jurisdiction but
on other factors, such as the death of one of the alleged offenders.

Additional Information:

Section 3 (g) of R.A. 3019 provides:

Sec. 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. In addition to acts or omissions of public officers already penalized
by existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and are hereby declared to be
unlawful:

CITY OF MANILA V. JUDGE CUERDO CTA has JD over a special civil action for certiorari

The authority of the CTA to take cognizance of petitions for certiorari questioning interlocutory orders issued by
the RTC in a local tax case is included in the powers granted by the Constitution as well as inherent in the
exercise of its appellate jurisdiction.

A court may issue a writ of certiorari in aid of its appellate jurisdiction if said court has jurisdiction to review, by
appeal or writ of error, the final orders or decisions of the lower court.

FACTS:

The City of Manila through its treasurer petitioner Liberty Toledo assessed taxes against private respondents SM
Mart, Inc., SM Prime Holdings, Inc., Star Appliances Center, Supervalue, Inc., Ace Hardware Philippines, Inc.,
Watsons Personal Care Stores Phils., Inc., Jollimart Philippines Corp., Surplus Marketing Corp. and Signature
Lines for the taxable period from January-December 2002.

The said assessment covered the local business taxes which the petitioner City of Manila is authorized to collect
from them under Section 21 of the Revised Rules of City of Manila (RRCM). Considering that the payment of the
assessed taxes was a precondition for the issuance of their business permits, the private respondents were
constrained to pay the 19,316,458.77 assessment under protest.

January 24, 2004: the private respondents filed the complaint Refund or Recovery of OIllegally/and or
erroneously-collected local business tax, Prohibition with Prayer to Issue TRO and Writ of Preliminary Injunction
before respondent Judge Cuerdos sala (RTC of Pasay)

February 16, 2014: private respondents amended complaint alleges that in relation to Section 21 thereof,
Sections 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19 and 20 of the RRCM were violative of the limitations and guidelines under Section
143 (h) of Republic Act. No. 7160 [Local Government Code] on double taxation. They further averred that
petitioner city's Ordinance No. 8011 which amended pertinent portions of the RRCM had already been declared
to be illegal and unconstitutional by the Department of Justice.

July 9, 2004: RTC granted the writ of preliminary injunction. The petitioners then filed a Motion for
Reconsideration but the RTC denied it on its order dated October 15, 2004.
The petitioners subsequently filed a special civil action for certiorari with the CA but the latter denied it
holding that it has no jurisdiction over the said petition and stating that since appellate jurisdiction over private
respondents' complaint for tax refund, which was filed with the RTC, is vested in the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA),
pursuant to its expanded jurisdiction under Republic Act No. 9282 (RA 9282), it follows that a petition for
certiorari seeking nullification of an interlocutory order issued in the said case should, likewise, be filed with the
CTA

A Motion for Reconsideration was again filed by the petitioners contending that jurisdiction over their certiorari
petition lies with the CA not the CTA but the CA denied it, hence this petition.

ISSUE:

W/N the CTA has jurisdiction over a special civil action for certiorari assailing an interlocutory order issued by the
RTC in a local tax case.

HELD:

YES. The Court held that the power of the CTA includes that of determining whether or not there has been grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the RTC in issuing an interlocutory
order in cases falling within the exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the tax court. It, thus, follows that the CTA, by
constitutional mandate, is vested with jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari in these cases.

The authority of the CTA to take cognizance of petitions for certiorari questioning interlocutory orders issued by
the RTC in a local tax case is included in the powers granted by the Constitution as well as inherent in the
exercise of its appellate jurisdiction.

The supervisory power or jurisdiction of the CTA to issue a writ of certiorari in aid of its appellate jurisdiction
should co-exist with, and be a complement to, its appellate jurisdiction to review, by appeal, the final orders and
decisions of the RTC, in order to have complete supervision over the acts of the latter.

-petition denied

Additional Information:

Section 5 (1), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution grants power to the Supreme Court, in the exercise of its
original jurisdiction, to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus. With respect to the Court of Appeals,
Section 9 (1) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 (BP 129) gives the appellate court, also in the exercise of its original
jurisdiction, the power to issue, among others, a writ of certiorari, whether or not in aid of its appellate jurisdiction.
As to Regional Trial Courts, the power to issue a writ of certiorari, in the exercise of their original jurisdiction, is
provided under Section 21 of BP 129.

The foregoing notwithstanding, while there is no express grant of such power, with respect to the CTA, Section 1,
Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution provides, nonetheless, that judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme
Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law and that judicial power includes the duty of the
courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and
to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.
Insofar as quasi-judicial tribunals are concerned, the authority to issue writs of certiorari must still be expressly
conferred by the Constitution or by law and cannot be implied from the mere existence of their appellate
jurisdiction. This doctrine remains as it applies only to quasi-judicial bodies.