G.R. No.
157485 square meters, more or less, as per survey by Geodetic Engineer
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES represented by AKLAN
NATIONAL COLLEGE OF FISHERIES (ANCF) and DR.
ELENITA R. ANDRADE, in her capacity as ANCF
Superintendent, Petitioner,
vs.
HEIRS OF MAXIMA LACHICA SIN, namely: SALVACION
L. SIN, ROSARIO S. ENRIQUEZ, FRANCISCO L. SIN,
MARIA S. YUCHINTAT, MANUEL L. SIN, JAIME
CARDINAL SIN, RAMON L. SIN, and CEFERINA S. VITA,
Respondents.
DECISION
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
This is a Petition for Review assailing the Decision1 of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 65244 dated February 24, 2003,
which upheld the Decisions of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Kalibo, Aklan in Civil Case No. 6130 and the First Municipal
Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of New Washington and Batan, Aklan
in Civil Case No. 1181, segregating from the Aklan National
College of Fisheries (ANCF) reservation the portion of land being
claimed by respondents.
Petitioner in this case is the Republic of the Philippines,
represented by ANCF and Dr. Elenita R. Andrade, in her capacity
as Superintendent of ANCF. Respondents claim that they are the
lawful heirs of the late Maxima Lachica Sin who was the owner of
a parcel of land situated at Barangay Tambac, New Washington,
Aklan, and more particularly described as follows:
A parcel of cocal, nipal and swampy land, located at Barangay
Tambac, New Washington, Aklan, containing an approximate area
of FIFTY[-]EIGHT THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED SIX (58,606)
Reynaldo L. Lopez. Bounded on the North by Dumlog Creek; on
the East by Adriano Melocoton; on the South by Mabilo Creek;
and on the West by Amado Cayetano and declared for taxation
purposes in the name of Maxima L. Sin (deceased) under Tax
Declaration No. 10701 (1985) with an assessed value of
Php1,320.00.2
On August 26, 1991, respondent heirs instituted in the RTC of
Kalibo, Aklan a complaint against Lucio Arquisola, in his capacity
as Superintendent of ANCF (hereinafter ANCF Superintendent),
for recovery of possession, quieting of title, and declaration of
ownership with damages. Respondent heirs claim that a 41,231-
square meter-portion of the property they inherited had been
usurped by ANCF, creating a cloud of doubt with respect to their
ownership over the parcel of land they wish to remove from the
ANCF reservation.
The ANCF Superintendent countered that the parcel of land being
claimed by respondents was the subject of Proclamation No. 2074
of then President Ferdinand E. Marcos allocating 24.0551 hectares
of land within the area, which included said portion of private
respondents alleged property, as civil reservation for educational
purposes of ANCF. The ANCF Superintendent furthermore
averred that the subject parcel of land is timberland and therefore
not susceptible of private ownership.
Subsequently, the complaint was amended to include ANCF as a
party defendant and Lucio Arquisola, who retired from the service
during the pendency of the case, was substituted by Ricardo
Andres, then the designated Officer-in-Charge of ANCF.
The RTC remanded the case to the MCTC of New Washington and
Batan, Aklan, in view of the enactment of Republic Act No. 7659
which expanded the jurisdiction of first-level courts. The case was
docketed as Civil Case No. 1181 (4390).
Before the MCTC, respondent heirs presented evidence that they
inherited a bigger parcel of land from their mother, Maxima Sin,
who died in the year 1945 in New Washington, Capiz (now
Aklan). Maxima Sin acquired said bigger parcel of land by virtue
of a Deed of Sale (Exhibit "B"), and then developed the same by
planting coconut trees, banana plants, mango trees and nipa palms
and usufructing the produce of said land until her death in 1945.
In the year 1988, a portion of said land respondents inherited from
Maxima Sin was occupied by ANCF and converted into a fishpond
for educational purpose. Respondent heirs of Maxima Sin asserted
that they were previously in possession of the disputed land in the
concept of an owner. The disputed area was a swampy land until it
was converted into a fishpond by the ANCF. To prove possession,
respondents presented several tax declarations, the earliest of
which was in the year 1945.
On June 19, 2000, the MCTC rendered its Decision in favor of
respondents, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered declaring plaintiffs
[respondent heirs herein] the owner and possessor of the land in
question in this case and for the defendants to cause the
segregation of the same from the Civil Reservation of the Aklan
National College of Fisheries, granted under Proclamation No.
2074 dated March 31, 1981.
It is further ordered, that defendants jointly and severally pay the
plaintiffs actual damages for the unearned yearly income from nipa
plants uprooted by the defendants [on] the land in question when
the same has been converted by the defendants into a fishpond, in
the amount of Php3,500.00 yearly beginning the year 1988 until
plaintiffs are fully restored to the possession of the land in
question.
It is finally ordered, that defendants jointly and severally pay the
plaintiffs the sum of Php10,000.00 for attorneys fees and costs of
this suit.3
According to the MCTC, the sketch made by the Court
Commissioner in his report (Exh. "LL") shows that the disputed
property is an alienable and disposable land of the public domain.
Furthermore, the land covered by Civil Reservation under
Proclamation No. 2074 was classified as timberland only on
December 22, 1960 (Exh. "4-D"). The MCTC observed that the
phrase "Block II Alien or Disp. LC 2415" was printed on the Map
of the Civil Reservation for ANCF established under Proclamation
No. 2074 (Exh. "6"), indicating that the disputed land is an
alienable and disposable land of the public domain.
The MCTC likewise cited a decision of this Court in the 1976 case
of Republic v. Court of Appeals4 where it was pronounced that:
Lands covered by reservation are not subject to entry, and no
lawful settlement on them can be acquired. The claims of persons
who have settled on, occupied, and improved a parcel of public
land which is later included in a reservation are considered worthy
of protection and are usually respected, but where the President, as
authorized by law, issues a proclamation reserving certain lands,
and warning all persons to depart therefrom, this terminates any
rights previously acquired in such lands by a person who has
settled thereon in order to obtain a preferential right of purchase.
And patents for lands which have been previously granted,
reserved from sale, or appropriated are void. (Underscoring from
the MCTC, citations omitted.)
Noting that there was no warning in Proclamation No. 2074
requiring all persons to depart from the reservation, the MCTC
concluded that the reservation was subject to private rights if there
are any.
The MCTC thus ruled that the claim of respondent heirs over the
disputed land by virtue of their and their predecessors open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession amounts to an
imperfect title, which should be respected and protected.
Petitioner, through the Solicitor General, appealed to the RTC of
Kalibo, Aklan, where the case was docketed as Civil Case No.
6130.
On May 2, 2001, the RTC rendered its Decision affirming the
MCTC judgment with modification:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed decision is
modified absolving Appellant Ricardo Andres from the payment of
damages and attorneys fees. All other details of the appealed
decision are affirmed in toto.5
The RTC stressed that Proclamation No. 2074 recognizes vested
rights acquired by private individuals prior to its issuance on
March 31, 1981.
The RTC added that the findings of facts of the MCTC may not be
disturbed on appeal unless the court below has overlooked some
facts of substance that may alter the results of its findings. The
RTC, however, absolved the Superintendent of the ANCF from
liability as there was no showing on record that he acted with
malice or in bad faith in the implementation of Proclamation No.
2074.6
Petitioner Republic, represented by the ANCF and Dr. Elenita R.
Andrade, in her capacity as the new Superintendent of the ANCF,
elevated the case to the Court of Appeals through a Petition for
Review. The petition was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 65244.
On February 24, 2003, the Court of Appeals rendered its Decision
dismissing the petition for lack of merit. In addition to the findings
of the MCTC and the RTC, the Court of Appeals held:
Moreover, petitioner had not shown by competent evidence that
the subject land was likewise declared a timberland before its
formal classification as such in 1960. Considering that lands
adjoining to that of the private respondents, which are also within
the reservation area, have been issued original certificates of title,
the same affirms the conclusion that the area of the subject land
was agricultural, and therefore disposable, before its declaration as
a timberland in 1960.
It should be noted that Maxima Lachica Sin acquired, through
purchase and sale, the subject property from its previous owners
spouses Sotera Melocoton and Victor Garcia on January 15, 1932,
or 28 years before the said landholding was declared a timberland
on December 22, 1960. Tacking, therefore, the possession of the
previous owners and that of Maxima Lachica Sin over the disputed
property, it does not tax ones imagination to conclude that the
subject property had been privately possessed for more than 30
years before it was declared a timberland. This being the case, the
said possession has ripened into an ownership against the State,
albeit an imperfect one. Nonetheless, it is our considered opinion
that this should come under the meaning of "private rights" under
Proclamation No. 2074 which are deemed segregated from the
mass of civil reservation granted to petitioner.7 (Citation omitted.)
Hence, this Petition for Review, anchored on the following
grounds:
I
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED ON A
QUESTION OF LAW IN UPHOLDING RESPONDENTS
CLAIM TO SUPPOSED "PRIVATE RIGHTS" OVER SUBJECT
LAND DESPITE THE DENR CERTIFICATION THAT IT IS
CLASSIFIED AS TIMBERLAND.
II
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED ON A
QUESTION OF LAW IN AFFIRMING THE DECISIONS OF
THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT AND THE MUNICIPAL
CIRCUIT TRIAL COURTS RELEASING THE SUBJECT LAND
BEING CLAIMED BY RESPONDENTS FROM THE MASS OF
PUBLIC DOMAIN AND AWARDING DAMAGES TO THEM.8
The central dispute in the case at bar is the interpretation of the
first paragraph of Proclamation No. 2074:
Upon recommendation of the Director of Forest Development,
approved by the Minister of Natural Resources and by virtue of the
powers vested in me by law, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS,
President of the Philippines, do hereby set aside as Civil
Reservation for Aklan National College of Fisheries, subject to
private rights, if any there be, parcels of land, containing an
aggregate area of 24.0551 hectares, situated in the Municipality of
New Washington, Province of Aklan, Philippines, designated
Parcels I and II on the attached BFD Map CR-203, x x x [.]9
The MCTC, the RTC and the Court of Appeals unanimously held
that respondents retain private rights to the disputed property, thus
preventing the application of the above proclamation thereon. The
private right referred to is an alleged imperfect title, which
respondents supposedly acquired by possession of the subject
property, through their predecessors-in-interest, for 30 years before
it was declared as a timberland on December 22, 1960.
At the outset, it must be noted that respondents have not filed an
application for judicial confirmation of imperfect title under the
Public Land Act or the Property Registration Decree. Nevertheless,
the courts a quo apparently treated respondents complaint for
recovery of possession, quieting of title and declaration of
ownership as such an application and proceeded to determine if
respondents complied with the requirements therefor.
The requirements for judicial confirmation of imperfect title are
found in Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as amended by
Presidential Decree No. 1073, as follows:
Sec. 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines,
occupying lands of the public domain or claiming to own any such
lands or an interest therein, but whose titles have not been
perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance of
the province where the land is located for confirmation of their
claims and the issuance of a certificate of title therefor, under the
Land Registration Act, to wit:
xxxx
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors in
interest have been in the open, continuous, exclusive, and
notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable
lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition
or ownership, since June 12, 1945, or earlier, immediately
preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title
except when prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be
conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions
essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate
of title under the provisions of this chapter.
An equivalent provision is found in Section 14(1) of the Property
Registration Decree, which provides:
SECTION 14. Who may apply. The following persons may file
in the proper Court of First Instance an application for registration
of title to land, whether personally or through their duly authorized
representatives:
(1) those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-
interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the
public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12,
1945, or earlier.
This Court has thus held that there are two requisites for judicial
confirmation of imperfect or incomplete title under CA No. 141,
namely: (1) open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession
and occupation of the subject land by himself or through his
predecessors-in-interest under a bona fide claim of ownership since
time immemorial or from June 12, 1945; and
(2) the classification of the land as alienable and disposable land of
the public domain.10
With respect to the second requisite, the courts a quo held that the
disputed property was alienable and disposable before 1960, citing
petitioners failure to show competent evidence that the subject
land was declared a timberland before its formal classification as
such on said year.11 Petitioner emphatically objects, alleging that
under the Regalian Doctrine, all lands of the public domain belong
to the State and that lands not appearing to be clearly within
private ownership are presumed to belong to the State.
After a thorough review of the records, we agree with petitioner.
As this Court held in the fairly recent case of Valiao v. Republic12:
Under the Regalian doctrine, which is embodied in our
Constitution, all lands of the public domain belong to the State,
which is the source of any asserted right to any ownership of land.
All lands not appearing to be clearly within private ownership are
presumed to belong to the State. Accordingly, public lands not
shown to have been reclassified or released as alienable
agricultural land or alienated to a private person by the State
remain part of the inalienable public domain. Unless public land is
shown to have been reclassified as alienable or disposable to a
private person by the State, it remains part of the inalienable public
domain. Property of the public domain is beyond the commerce of
man and not susceptible of private appropriation and acquisitive
prescription. Occupation thereof in the concept of owner no matter
how long cannot ripen into ownership and be registered as a title.
The burden of proof in overcoming the presumption of State
ownership of the lands of the public domain is on the person
applying for registration (or claiming ownership), who must prove
that the land subject of the application is alienable or disposable.
To overcome this presumption, incontrovertible evidence must be
established that the land subject of the application (or claim) is
alienable or disposable.
There must be a positive act declaring land of the public domain as
alienable and disposable.1wphi1 To prove that the land subject of
an application for registration is alienable, the applicant must
establish the existence of a positive act of the government, such as
a presidential proclamation or an executive order; an
administrative action; investigation reports of Bureau of Lands
investigators; and a legislative act or a statute. The applicant may
also secure a certification from the government that the land
claimed to have been possessed for the required number of years is
alienable and disposable. (Citations omitted.)
This Court reached the same conclusion in Secretary of the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources v. Yap,13
which presents a similar issue with respect to another area of the
same province of Aklan. On November 10, 1978, President Marcos
issued Proclamation No. 1801 declaring Boracay Island, among
other islands, caves and peninsulas of the Philippines, as tourist
zones and marine reserves under the administration of the
Philippine Tourism Authority (PTA). On September 3, 1982, PTA
Circular 3-82 was issued to implement Proclamation No. 1801.
The respondents-claimants in said case filed a petition for
declaratory relief with the RTC of Kalibo, Aklan, claiming that
Proclamation No. 1801 and PTA Circular 3-82 precluded them
from filing an application for judicial confirmation of imperfect
title or survey of land for titling purposes. The respondents claim
that through their predecessors-in-interest, they have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of
their lands in Boracay since June 12, 1945 or earlier since time
immemorial.
On May 22, 2006, during the pendency of the petition for review
of the above case with this Court, President Gloria Macapagal-
Arroyo issued Proclamation No. 1064 classifying Boracay Island
into four hundred (400) hectares of reserved forest land (protection
purposes) and six hundred twenty-eight and 96/100 (628.96)
hectares of agricultural land (alienable and disposable). Petitioner-
claimants and other landowners in Boracay filed with this Court an
original petition for prohibition, mandamus and nullification of
Proclamation No. 1064, alleging that it infringed on their "prior
vested right" over portions of Boracay which they allege to have
possessed since time immemorial. This petition was consolidated
with the petition for review concerning Proclamation No. 1801 and
PTA Circular 3- 82.
This Court, discussing the Regalian Doctrine vis--vis the right of
the claimants to lands they claim to have possessed since time
immemorial, held:
A positive act declaring land as alienable and disposable is
required. In keeping with the presumption of State ownership, the
Court has time and again emphasized that there must be a positive
act of the government, such as an official proclamation,
declassifying inalienable public land into disposable land for
agricultural or other purposes. In fact, Section 8 of CA No. 141
limits alienable or disposable lands only to those lands which have
been "officially delimited and classified."
The burden of proof in overcoming the presumption of State
ownership of the lands of the public domain is on the person
applying for registration (or claiming ownership), who must prove
that the land subject of the application is alienable or disposable.
To overcome this presumption, incontrovertible evidence must be
established that the land subject of the application (or claim) is
alienable or disposable. There must still be a positive act declaring
land of the public domain as alienable and disposable. To prove
that the land subject of an application for registration is alienable,
the applicant must establish the existence of a positive act of the
government such as a presidential proclamation or an executive
order; an administrative action; investigation reports of Bureau of
Lands investigators; and a legislative act or a statute. The applicant
may also secure a certification from the government that the land
claimed to have been possessed for the required number of years is
alienable and disposable.
In the case at bar, no such proclamation, executive order,
administrative action, report, statute, or certification was presented
to the Court. The records are bereft of evidence showing that, prior
to 2006, the portions of Boracay occupied by private claimants
were subject of a government proclamation that the land is
alienable and disposable. Absent such well-nigh incontrovertible
evidence, the Court cannot accept the submission that lands
occupied by private claimants were already open to disposition
before 2006. Matters of land classification or reclassification
cannot be assumed. They call for proof.14 (Emphases in the
original; citations omitted.)
Accordingly, in the case at bar, the failure of petitioner Republic to considered to have private rights within the purview of
show competent evidence that the subject land was declared a Proclamation No. 2074 as to prevent the application of said
timberland before its formal classification as such in 1960 does not proclamation to the subject property. We are thus constrained to
lead to the presumption that said land was alienable and disposable reverse the rulings of the courts a quo and grant the prayer of
prior to said date. On the contrary, the presumption is that petitioner Republic to dismiss Civil Case No. 1181 (4390) for lack
unclassified lands are inalienable public lands. Such was the of merit.
conclusion of this Court in Heirs of the Late Spouses Pedro S.
Palanca and Soterranea Rafols v. Republic,15 wherein we held: WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition for Review is
GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP
While it is true that the land classification map does not No. 65244 dated February 24, 2003, which upheld the Decisions of
categorically state that the islands are public forests, the fact that the Regional Trial Court of Kalibo, Aklan in Civil Case No. 6130
they were unclassified lands leads to the same result. In the and the First Municipal Circuit Trial Court of New Washington
absence of the classification as mineral or timber land, the land and Batan, Aklan in Civil Case No. 1181 (4390), segregating from
remains unclassified land until released and rendered open to the Aklan National College of Fisheries reservation the portion of
disposition. x x x. (Emphasis supplied, citation deleted.) land being claimed by respondents is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. Civil Case No. 1181 (4390) of the First Municipal Circuit
The requirements for judicial confirmation of imperfect title in Trial Court of New Washington and Batan, Aklan is hereby
Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as amended, and the DISMISSED.
equivalent provision in Section 14(1) of the Property Registration
Decree was furthermore painstakingly debated upon by the SO ORDERED.
members of this Court in
Heirs of Mario Malabanan v. Republic.16 In Malabanan, the
members of this Court were in disagreement as to whether lands
declared alienable or disposable after June 12, 1945 may be subject
to judicial confirmation of imperfect title. There was, however, no
disagreement that there must be a declaration to that effect.
In the case at bar, it is therefore the respondents which have the
burden to identify a positive act of the government, such as an
official proclamation, declassifying inalienable public land into
disposable land for agricultural or other purposes. Since
respondents failed to do so, the alleged possession by them and by
their predecessors-in-interest is inconsequential and could never
ripen into ownership. Accordingly, respondents cannot be

G.R. No. 199310, February 19, 2014
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, PETITIONER, VS.
REMMAN ENTERPRISES, INC., REPRESENTED BY
RONNIE P. INOCENCIO, RESPONDENT.
DECISION
REYES, J.:
Before this Court is a petition for review on certiorari[1] under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking to annul and set aside the
Decision[2] dated November 10, 2011 of the Court of Appeals (CA)
in CA-G.R. CV No. 90503. The CA affirmed the Decision[3] dated
May 16, 2007 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City,
Branch 69, in Land Registration Case No. N-11465.
The Facts
On December 3, 2001, Remman Enterprises, Inc. (respondent),
filed an application[4] with the RTC for judicial confirmation of
title over two parcels of land situated in Barangay Napindan,
Taguig, Metro Manila, identified as Lot Nos. 3068 and 3077,
Mcadm-590-D, Taguig Cadastre, with an area of 29,945 square
meters and 20,357 sq m, respectively.
On December 13, 2001, the RTC issued the Order[5] finding the
respondents application for registration sufficient in form and
substance and setting it for initial hearing on February 21, 2002.
The scheduled initial hearing was later reset to May 30, 2002.[6]
The Notice of Initial Hearing was published in the Official Gazette,
April 1, 2002 issue, Volume 98, No. 13, pages 1631-1633[7] and in
the March 21, 2002 issue of Peoples Balita,[8] a newspaper of
general circulation in the Philippines. The Notice of Initial Hearing
was likewise posted in a conspicuous place on Lot Nos. 3068 and
3077, as well as in a conspicuous place on the bulletin board of the
City hall of Taguig, Metro Manila.[9]
On May 30, 2002, when the RTC called the case for initial hearing,
only the Laguna Lake Development Authority (LLDA) appeared
as oppositor. Hence, the RTC issued an order of general default
except LLDA, which was given 15 days to submit its
comment/opposition to the respondents application for
registration.[10]
On June 4, 2002, the LLDA filed its Opposition[11] to the
respondents application for registration, asserting that Lot Nos.
3068 and 3077 are not part of the alienable and disposable lands of
the public domain. On the other hand, the Republic of the
Philippines (petitioner), on July 16, 2002, likewise filed its
Opposition,[12] alleging that the respondent failed to prove that it
and its predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous,
exclusive, and notorious possession of the subject parcels of land
since June 12, 1945 or earlier.
Trial on the merits of the respondents application ensued
thereafter.
The respondent presented four witnesses: Teresita Villaroya, the
respondents corporate secretary; Ronnie Inocencio, an employee
of the respondent and the one authorized by it to file the
application for registration with the RTC; Cenon Cerquena
(Cerquena), the caretaker of the subject properties since 1957; and
Engineer Mariano Flotildes (Engr. Flotildes), a geodetic engineer
hired by the respondent to conduct a topographic survey of the
subject properties.
For its part, the LLDA presented the testimonies of Engineers
Ramon Magalonga (Engr. Magalonga) and Christopher A.
Pedrezuela (Engr. Pedrezuela), who are both geodetic engineers
employed by the LLDA.
Essentially, the testimonies of the respondents witnesses showed
that the respondent and its predecessors-in-interest have been in
open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession of the said
parcels of land long before June 12, 1945. The respondent
purchased Lot Nos. 3068 and 3077 from Conrado Salvador
(Salvador) and Bella Mijares (Mijares), respectively, in 1989. The
subject properties were originally owned and possessed by
Veronica Jaime (Jaime), who cultivated and planted different kinds
of crops in the said lots, through her caretaker and hired farmers,
since 1943. Sometime in 1975, Jaime sold the said parcels of land
to Salvador and Mijares, who continued to cultivate the lots until
the same were purchased by the respondent in 1989.
The respondent likewise alleged that the subject properties are
within the alienable and disposable lands of the public domain, as
evidenced by the certifications issued by the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR).
In support of its application, the respondent, inter alia, presented
the following documents: (1) Deed of Absolute Sale dated August
28, 1989 executed by Salvador and Mijares in favor of the
respondent;[13] (2) survey plans of the subject properties;[14] (3)
technical descriptions of the subject properties;[15] (4) Geodetic
Engineers Certificate;[16] (5) tax declarations of Lot Nos. 3068 and
3077 for 2002;[17] and (6) certifications dated December 17, 2002,
issued by Corazon D. Calamno (Calamno), Senior Forest
Management Specialist of the DENR, attesting that Lot Nos. 3068
and 3077 form part of the alienable and disposable lands of the
public domain.[18]
On the other hand, the LLDA alleged that the respondents
application for registration should be denied since the subject
parcels of land are not part of the alienable and disposable lands of
the public domain; it pointed out that pursuant to Section 41(11) of
Republic Act No. 4850[19] (R.A. No. 4850), lands, surrounding the
Laguna de Bay, located at and below the reglementary elevation of
12.50 meters are public lands which form part of the bed of the
said lake. Engr. Magalonga, testifying for the oppositor LLDA,
claimed that, upon preliminary evaluation of the subject properties,
based on the topographic map of Taguig, which was prepared
using an aerial survey conducted by the then Department of
National Defense-Bureau of Coast in April 1966, he found out that
the elevations of Lot Nos. 3068 and 3077 are below 12.50 m. That
upon actual area verification of the subject properties on
September 25, 2002, Engr. Magalonga confirmed that the
elevations of the subject properties range from 11.33 m to 11.77 m.
On rebuttal, the respondent presented Engr. Flotildes, who claimed
that, based on the actual topographic survey of the subject
properties he conducted upon the request of the respondent, the
elevations of the subject properties, contrary to LLDAs claim, are
above 12.50 m. Particularly, Engr. Flotildes claimed that Lot No.
3068 has an elevation ranging from 12.60 m to 15 m while the
elevation of Lot No. 3077 ranges from 12.60 m to 14.80 m.
The RTC Ruling
On May 16, 2007, the RTC rendered a Decision,[20] which granted
the respondents application for registration of title to the subject
properties, viz:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is rendered
confirming the title of the applicant Remman Enterprises
Incorporated over a parcels of land [sic] consisting of 29,945
square meters (Lot 3068) and 20,357 (Lot 3077) both situated in
Brgy. Napindan, Taguig, Taguig, Metro Manila more particularly
described in the Technical Descriptions Ap-04-003103 and Swo-
00-001769 respectively and ordering their registration under the
Property Registration Decree in the name of Remman Enterprises
Incorporated.
SO ORDERED.[21]
The RTC found that the respondent was able to prove that the
subject properties form part of the alienable and disposable lands
of the public domain. The RTC opined that the elevations of the
subject properties are very much higher than the reglementary
elevation of 12.50 m and, thus, not part of the bed of Laguna Lake.
The RTC pointed out that LLDAs claim that the elevation of the
subject properties is below 12.50 m is hearsay since the same was
merely based on the topographic map that was prepared using an
aerial survey on March 2, 1966; that nobody was presented to
prove that an aerial survey was indeed conducted on March 2,
1966 for purposes of gathering data for the preparation of the
topographic map.
Further, the RTC posited that the elevation of a parcel of land does
not always remain the same; that the elevations of the subject
properties may have already changed since 1966 when the
supposed aerial survey, from which the topographic map used by
LLDA was based, was conducted. The RTC likewise faulted the
method used by Engr. Magalonga in measuring the elevations of
the subject properties, pointing out that:
Further, in finding that the elevation of the subject lots are below
12.5 meters, oppositors witness merely compared their elevation
to the elevation of the particular portion of the lake dike which he
used as his [benchmark] or reference point in determining the
elevation of the subject lots. Also, the elevation of the said portion
of the lake dike that was then under the construction by FF Cruz
was allegedly 12.79 meters and after finding that the elevation of
the subject lots are lower than the said [benchmark] or reference
point, said witness suddenly jumped to a conclusion that the
elevation was below 12.5 meters. x x x.
Moreover, the finding of LLDAs witness was based on hearsay as
said witness admitted that it was DPWH or the FF Cruz who
determined the elevation of the portion of the lake dike which he
used as the [benchmark] or reference point in determining the
elevation of the subject lots and that he has no personal knowledge
as to how the DPWH and FF Cruz determined the elevation of the
said [benchmark] or reference point and he only learn[ed] that its
elevation is 12.79 meters from the information he got from FF
Cruz.[22]
Even supposing that the elevations of the subject properties are
indeed below 12.50 m, the RTC opined that the same could not be
considered part of the bed of Laguna Lake. The RTC held that,
under Section 41(11) of R.A. No. 4850, Laguna Lake extends only
to those areas that can be covered by the lake water when it is at
the average annual maximum lake level of 12.50 m. Hence, the
RTC averred, only those parcels of land that are adjacent to and
near the shoreline of Laguna Lake form part of its bed and not
those that are already far from it, which could not be reached by
the lake water. The RTC pointed out that the subject properties are
more than a kilometer away from the shoreline of Laguna Lake;
that they are dry and waterless even when the waters of Laguna
Lake is at its maximum level. The RTC likewise found that the
respondent was able to prove that it and its predecessors-in-interest
have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession
of the subject properties as early as 1943.
The petitioner appealed the RTC Decision dated May 16, 2007 to
the CA.
The CA Ruling
On November 10, 2011, the CA, by way of the assailed
Decision,[23] affirmed the RTC Decision dated May 16, 2007. The
CA found that the respondent was able to establish that the subject
properties are part of the alienable and disposable lands of the
public domain; that the same are not part of the bed of Laguna
Lake, as claimed by the petitioner. Thus:
The evidence submitted by the appellee is sufficient to warrant
registration of the subject lands in its name. Appellees witness
Engr. Mariano Flotildes, who conducted an actual area verification
of the subject lots, ably proved that the elevation of the lowest
portion of Lot No. 3068 is 12.6 meters and the elevation of its
highest portion is 15 meters. As to the other lot, it was found [out]
that the elevation of the lowest portion of Lot No. 3077 is also 12.6
meters and the elevation of its highest portion is 15 meters. Said
elevations are higher than the reglementary elevation of 12.5
meters as provided for under paragraph 11, Section 41 of R.A. No.
4850, as amended.
In opposing the instant application for registration, appellant relies
merely on the Topographic Map dated March 2, 1966, prepared by
Commodore Pathfinder, which allegedly shows that the subject
parcels of land are so situated in the submerge[d] [lake water] of
Laguna Lake. The said data was gathered through aerial
photography over the area of Taguig conducted on March 2, 1966.
However, nobody testified on the due execution and authenticity of
the said document. As regards the testimony of the witness for
LLDA, Engr. Ramon Magalonga, that the subject parcels of land
are below the 12.5 meter elevation, the same can be considered
inaccurate aside from being hearsay considering his admission that
his findings were based merely on the evaluation conducted by
DPWH and FF Cruz. x x x.[24] (Citations omitted)
The CA likewise pointed out that the respondent was able to
present certifications issued by the DENR, attesting that the subject
properties form part of the alienable and disposable lands of the
public domain, which was not disputed by the petitioner. The CA
further ruled that the respondent was able to prove, through the
testimonies of its witnesses, that it and its predecessors-in-interest
have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession
of the subject properties prior to June 12, 1945.
Hence, the instant petition.
The Issue
The sole issue to be resolved by the Court is whether the CA erred
in affirming the RTC Decision dated May 16, 2007, which granted
the application for registration filed by the respondent.
The Courts Ruling
The petition is meritorious.
The petitioner maintains that the lower courts erred in granting the
respondents application for registration since the subject
properties do not form part of the alienable and disposable lands of
the public domain. The petitioner insists that the elevations of the
subject properties are below the reglementary level of 12.50 m and,
pursuant to Section 41(11) of R.A. No. 4850, are considered part of
the bed of Laguna Lake.
That the elevations of the subject properties are above the
reglementary level of 12.50 m is a finding of fact by the lower
courts, which this Court, generally may not disregard. It is a long-
standing policy of this Court that the findings of facts of the RTC
which were adopted and affirmed by the CA are generally deemed
conclusive and binding. This Court is not a trier of facts and will
not disturb the factual findings of the lower courts unless there are
substantial reasons for doing so.[25]
That the subject properties are not part of the bed of Laguna Lake,
however, does not necessarily mean that they already form part of
the alienable and disposable lands of the public domain. It is still
incumbent upon the respondent to prove, with well-nigh
incontrovertible evidence, that the subject properties are indeed
part of the alienable and disposable lands of the public domain.
While deference is due to the lower courts finding that the
elevations of the subject properties are above the reglementary
level of 12.50 m and, hence, no longer part of the bed of Laguna
Lake pursuant to Section 41(11) of R.A. No. 4850, the Court
nevertheless finds that the respondent failed to substantiate its
entitlement to registration of title to the subject properties.
Under the Regalian Doctrine, which is embodied in our
Constitution, all lands of the public domain belong to the State,
which is the source of any asserted right to any ownership of land.
All lands not appearing to be clearly within private ownership are
presumed to belong to the State. Accordingly, public lands not
shown to have been reclassified or released as alienable
agricultural land, or alienated to a private person by the State,
remain part of the inalienable public domain. The burden of proof
in overcoming the presumption of State ownership of the lands of
the public domain is on the person applying for registration, who
must prove that the land subject of the application is alienable or
disposable. To overcome this presumption, incontrovertible
evidence must be presented to establish that the land subject of the
application is alienable or disposable.[26]
The respondent filed its application for registration of title to the
subject properties under Section 14(1) of Presidential Decree
(P.D.) No. 1529[27], which provides that:
Sec. 14. Who may apply. The following persons may file in the
proper Court of First Instance an application for registration of title
to land, whether personally or through their duly authorized
representatives:
(1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in
interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the
public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12,
1945, or earlier.

xxxx
Section 14(1) of P.D. No. 1529 refers to the judicial confirmation
of imperfect or incomplete titles to public land acquired under
Section 48(b) of Commonwealth Act (C.A.) No. 141, or the Public
Land Act, as amended by P.D. No. 1073.[28] Under Section 14(1)
of P.D. No. 1529, applicants for registration of title must
sufficiently establish: first, that the subject land forms part of the
disposable and alienable lands of the public domain; second, that
the applicant and his predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of
the same; and third, that it is under a bona fide claim of ownership
since June 12, 1945, or earlier.[29]
The first requirement was not satisfied in this case. To prove that
the subject property forms part of the alienable and disposable
lands of the public domain, the respondent presented two
certifications[30] issued by Calamno, attesting that Lot Nos. 3068
and 3077 form part of the alienable and disposable lands of the
public domain under Project No. 27-B of Taguig, Metro Manila
as per LC Map 2623, approved on January 3, 1968.
However, the said certifications presented by the respondent are
insufficient to prove that the subject properties are alienable and
disposable. In Republic of the Philippines v. T.A.N. Properties,
Inc.,[31] the Court clarified that, in addition to the certification
issued by the proper government agency that a parcel of land is
alienable and disposable, applicants for land registration must
prove that the DENR Secretary had approved the land
classification and released the land of public domain as alienable
and disposable. They must present a copy of the original
classification approved by the DENR Secretary and certified as
true copy by the legal custodian of the records. Thus:
Further, it is not enough for the PENRO or CENRO to certify that
a land is alienable and disposable. The applicant for land
registration must prove that the DENR Secretary had approved the
land classification and released the land of the public domain as
alienable and disposable, and that the land subject of the
application for registration falls within the approved area per
verification through survey by the PENRO or CENRO. In
addition, the applicant for land registration must present a
copy of the original classification approved by the DENR
Secretary and certified as a true copy by the legal custodian of
the official records. These facts must be established to prove
that the land is alienable and disposable. Respondent failed to do
so because the certifications presented by respondent do not, by
themselves, prove that the land is alienable and disposable.[32]
(Emphasis ours)
In Republic v. Roche,[33] the Court deemed it appropriate to
reiterate the ruling in T.A.N. Properties, viz:
Respecting the third requirement, the applicant bears the burden of
proving the status of the land. In this connection, the Court has
held that he must present a certificate of land classification
status issued by the Community Environment and Natural
Resources Office (CENRO) or the Provincial Environment and
Natural Resources Office (PENRO) of the DENR. He must also
prove that the DENR Secretary had approved the land
classification and released the land as alienable and disposable,
and that it is within the approved area per verification through
survey by the CENRO or PENRO. Further, the applicant must
present a copy of the original classification approved by the
DENR Secretary and certified as true copy by the legal
custodian of the official records. These facts must be established
by the applicant to prove that the land is alienable and disposable.
Here, Roche did not present evidence that the land she applied for
has been classified as alienable or disposable land of the public
domain. She submitted only the survey map and technical
description of the land which bears no information regarding the
lands classification. She did not bother to establish the status of
the land by any certification from the appropriate government
agency. Thus, it cannot be said that she complied with all requisites
for registration of title under Section 14(1) of P.D. 1529.[34]
(Citations omitted and emphasis ours)
The DENR certifications that were presented by the respondent in
support of its application for registration are thus not sufficient to
prove that the subject properties are indeed classified by the DENR
Secretary as alienable and disposable. It is still imperative for the
respondent to present a copy of the original classification approved
by the DENR Secretary, which must be certified by the legal
custodian thereof as a true copy. Accordingly, the lower courts
erred in granting the application for registration in spite of the
failure of the respondent to prove by well-nigh incontrovertible
evidence that the subject properties are alienable and disposable.
Nevertheless, the respondent claims that the Courts ruling in
T.A.N. Properties, which was promulgated on June 26, 2008, must
be applied prospectively, asserting that decisions of this Court
form part of the law of the land and, pursuant to Article 4 of the
Civil Code, laws shall have no retroactive effect. The respondent
points out that its application for registration of title to the subject
properties was filed and was granted by the RTC prior to the
Courts promulgation of its ruling in T.A.N. Properties.
Accordingly, that it failed to present a copy of the original
classification covering the subject properties approved by the
DENR Secretary and certified by the legal custodian thereof as a
true copy, the respondent claims, would not warrant the denial of
its application for registration.
The Court does not agree.
Notwithstanding that the respondents application for registration
was filed and granted by RTC prior to the Courts ruling in T.A.N.
Properties, the pronouncements in that case may be applied to the
present case; it is not antithetical to the rule of non-retroactivity of
laws pursuant to Article 4 of the Civil Code. It is elementary that
the interpretation of a law by this Court constitutes part of that law
from the date it was originally passed, since this Courts
construction merely establishes the contemporaneous legislative
intent that the interpreted law carried into effect.[35] Such judicial
doctrine does not amount to the passage of a new law, but consists
merely of a construction or interpretation of a pre-existing one.[36]
Verily, the ruling in T.A.N. Properties was applied by the Court in
subsequent cases notwithstanding that the applications for
registration were filed and granted by the lower courts prior to the
promulgation of T.A.N. Properties.
In Republic v. Medida,[37] the application for registration of the
subject properties therein was filed on October 22, 2004 and was
granted by the trial court on June 21, 2006. Similarly, in Republic
v. Jaralve,[38] the application for registration of the subject property
therein was filed on October 22, 1996 and was granted by the trial
court on November 15, 2002. In the foregoing cases,
notwithstanding that the applications for registration were filed and
granted by the trial courts prior to the promulgation of T.A.N.
Properties, this Court applied the pronouncements in T.A.N.
Properties and denied the applications for registration on the
ground, inter alia, that the applicants therein failed to present a
copy of the original classification approved by the DENR
Secretary and certified by the legal custodian thereof as a true
copy.
Anent the second and third requirements, the Court finds that the
respondent failed to present sufficient evidence to prove that it and
its predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous,
exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of the subject
properties since June 12, 1945, or earlier.
To prove that it and its predecessors-in-interest have been in
possession and occupation of the subject properties since 1943, the
respondent presented the testimony of Cerquena. Cerquena
testified that the subject properties were originally owned by Jaime
who supposedly possessed and cultivated the same since 1943; that
sometime in 1975, Jaime sold the subject properties to Salvador
and Mijares who, in turn, sold the same to the respondent in 1989.
The foregoing are but unsubstantiated and self-serving assertions
of the possession and occupation of the subject properties by the
respondent and its predecessors-in-interest; they do not constitute
the well-nigh incontrovertible evidence of possession and
occupation of the subject properties required by Section 14(1) of
P.D. No. 1529. Indeed, other than the testimony of Cerquena, the
respondent failed to present any other evidence to prove the
character of the possession and occupation by it and its
predecessors-in-interest of the subject properties.
For purposes of land registration under Section 14(1) of P.D. No.
1529, proof of specific acts of ownership must be presented to
substantiate the claim of open, continuous, exclusive, and
notorious possession and occupation of the land subject of the
application. Applicants for land registration cannot just offer
general statements which are mere conclusions of law rather than
factual evidence of possession. Actual possession consists in the
manifestation of acts of dominion over it of such a nature as a party
would actually exercise over his own property.[39]
Although Cerquena testified that the respondent and its
predecessors-in-interest cultivated the subject properties, by
planting different crops thereon, his testimony is bereft of any
specificity as to the nature of such cultivation as to warrant the
conclusion that they have been indeed in possession and
occupation of the subject properties in the manner required by law.
There was no showing as to the number of crops that are planted in
the subject properties or to the volume of the produce harvested
from the crops supposedly planted thereon.
Further, assuming ex gratia argumenti that the respondent and its
predecessors-in-interest have indeed planted crops on the subject
properties, it does not necessarily follow that the subject properties
have been possessed and occupied by them in the manner
contemplated by law. The supposed planting of crops in the subject
properties may only have amounted to mere casual cultivation,
which is not the possession and occupation required by law.
A mere casual cultivation of portions of the land by the claimant
does not constitute possession under claim of ownership. For him,
possession is not exclusive and notorious so as to give rise to a
presumptive grant from the state. The possession of public land,
however long the period thereof may have extended, never confers
title thereto upon the possessor because the statute of limitations
with regard to public land does not operate against the state, unless
the occupant can prove possession and occupation of the same
under claim of ownership for the required number of years.[40]
Further, the Court notes that the tax declarations over the subject
properties presented by the respondent were only for 2002. The
respondent failed to explain why, despite its claim that it acquired
the subject properties as early as 1989, and that its predecessors-in-
interest have been in possession of the subject property since 1943,
it was only in 2002 that it started to declare the same for purposes
of taxation. While tax declarations are not conclusive evidence of
ownership, they constitute proof of claim of ownership.[41] That
the subject properties were declared for taxation purposes only in
2002 gives rise to the presumption that the respondent claimed
ownership or possession of the subject properties starting that year.
Likewise, no improvement or plantings were declared or noted in
the said tax declarations. This fact belies the claim that the
respondent and its predecessors-in-interest, contrary to Cerquenas
testimony, have been in possession and occupation of the subject
properties in the manner required by law.

Having failed to prove that the subject properties form part of the
alienable and disposable lands of the public domain and that it and
its predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous,
exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of the same
since June 12, 1945, or earlier, the respondents application for
registration should be denied.

WHEREFORE, in consideration of the foregoing disquisitions,

the instant petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated November
10, 2011 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 90503,
which affirmed the Decision dated May 16, 2007 of the Regional
Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 69, in Land Registration Case
No. N-11465 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
Application for Registration of Remman Enterprises, Inc. in Land
Registration Case No. N-11465 is DENIED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 179155, April 02, 2014
NICOMEDES J. LOZADA, PETITIONER, VS. EULALIA
BRACEWELL, EDDIE BRACEWELL, ESTELLITA
BRACEWELL, JAMES BRACEWELL, JOHN
BRACEWELL, EDWIN BRACEWELL, ERIC
BRACEWELL, AND HEIRS OF GEORGE BRACEWELL,
RESPONDENTS.
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari[1] are the
Decision[2] dated May 23, 2007 and the Resolution[3] dated August
14, 2007 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 81075,
which affirmed the Decision[4] dated July 31, 2003 of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Las Pias City, Branch 275 in Civil Case No.
LP 98-0025, directing the Land Registration Authority (LRA) to
set aside Decree of Registration No. N-217036 (Decree No. N-
217036) and Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 0-78 in the
name of petitioner Nicomedes J. Lozada (petitioner), and ordering
the latter to cause the amendment of Plan PSU-129514 as well as
segregate therefrom Lot 5 of Plan PSU-180598.
The Facts
On December 10, 1976, petitioner filed an application for
registration and confirmation of title over a parcel of land covered
by Plan PSU-129514, which was granted on February 23, 1989
by the RTC of Makati City, Branch 134, acting as a land
registration court.[5] Consequently, on July 10, 1997, the LRA
issued Decree No. N-217036 in the name of petitioner, who later
obtained OCT No. 0-78 covering the said parcel of land.[6]
On February 6, 1998, within a year from the issuance of the
aforementioned decree, James Bracewell, Jr. (Bracewell) filed a
petition for review of a decree of registration under Section 32
of Presidential Decree No. (PD) 1529,[7] otherwise known as the
Property Registration Decree, before the RTC of Las Pias
City, Branch 275 (Las Pias City-RTC), docketed as Civil Case
No. LP 98-0025,[8] claiming that a portion of Plan PSU-129514,
consisting of 3,097 square meters identified as Lot 5 of Plan PSU-
180598 (subject lot) of which he is the absolute owner and
possessor is fraudulently included in Decree No. N-217036.[9] He
allegedly filed on September 19, 1963 an application for
registration and confirmation of the subject lot, as well as of Lots
1, 2, 3, and 4 of Plan PSU-180598, situated in Las Pias City,
which was granted by the RTC of Makati City, Branch 58, on
May 3, 1989.[10] He further averred that petitioner deliberately
concealed the fact that he (Bracewell) is one of the adjoining
owners, and left him totally ignorant of the registration
proceedings involving the lots covered by Plan PSU-129514.[11]
Instead of impleading him, petitioner listed Bracewells
grandmother, Maria Cailles, as an adjoining owner, although she
had already died by that time.[12]
In his answer[13] to the foregoing allegations, petitioner called
Bracewell a mere interloper with respect to the subject lot, which
the Bureau of Lands had long declared to be part and parcel of Plan
PSU-129514.[14] He argued that his Plan PSU-129514 was
approved way back in 1951 whereas Bracewells Plan PSU-
180598 was surveyed only in 1960, and stated that the latter plan,
in fact, contained a footnote that a portion known as Lot 5, i.e., the
subject lot, is a portion of the parcel of land covered by Plan PSU-
129514. [15]
The overlapping was confirmed by LRA Director Felino M. Cortez
in his 2nd Supplementary Report dated August 5, 1996, which was
submitted to the RTC of Makati City, Branch 134.[16] The report,
which contains a recommendation that petitioner be ordered to
cause the amendment of Plan PSU-129514 in view of Bracewells
claims, reads as follows:
COMES NOW the Land Registration Authority (LRA) and to the
Honorable Court respectfully submits this report:
1. LRA records show that a decision was rendered by the
Honorable Court on February 23, 1989, confirming the title of the
herein applicant [petitioner] over the parcel of land covered by
plan PSU-129514;
2. Upon updating of plotting on our Municipal Index Sheet, thru
its tie line, it was found to overlap with plan PSU-180598, Lot 5,
applied in LRC Record No. N-24916, which was referred to the
Lands Management Services, El Bldg., Quezon City, for
verification and/or correction in our letter dated January 12, 1996 x
x x;
3. In reply, the Regional Technical Director, thru the Chief,
Surveys Division, in his letter dated 20 June 1996, x x x, informed
this Authority that after [re-verification] and research of the plan,
they found out that Lot 5, PSU-180598 applied in LRC Record No.
N-24916 is a portion of plan PSU-129514, applied in the instant
case;
4. Our records further show that the petition for registration of
title to real property pertaining to Lot 5, PSU-180598 filed by
the petitioner James Bracewell, Jr. under Land Reg. Case No.
N-4329, LRC Record No. N-24916 has been granted by the
Honorable Court per his decision dated May 3, 1989.
WHEREFORE, the foregoing is respectfully submitted to the
Honorable Court for its information with the recommendation
that the applicant [herein petitioner] in the instant case be
ordered to cause for the amendment of plan PSU-129514,
subject of registration, by segregating therefrom the portion of
Lot 5, PSU-180598 also decided in Land Reg. Case No. N-4328.
The approved amended plan and the corresponding certified
technical descriptions shall forthwith be submitted to the
Honorable Court for its approval to enable us to comply with the
decision of the Court dated May 3, 1989 in the instant case. [17]
(Emphases supplied)
The Las Pias City-RTC Ruling
Finding that petitioner obtained Decree No. N-217036 and OCT
No. 0-78 in bad faith, the Las Pias City-RTC rendered a
Decision[18] on July 31, 2003 in favor of Bracewell, who had died
during the pendency of the case and was substituted by Eulalia
Bracewell and his heirs (respondents). Accordingly, it directed the
LRA to set aside Decree No. N-217036 and OCT No. 0-78, and
ordered petitioner (a) to cause the amendment of Plan PSU-129514
and to segregate therefrom the subject lot, and (b) to pay
respondents the sum of ?100,000.00 as attorney's fees, as well as
the cost of suit.[19]
The Las Pias City-RTC faulted petitioner for deliberately
preventing respondents from participating and objecting to his
application for registration when the documentary evidence
showed that, as early as 1962, Bracewell had been paying taxes for
the subject lot; and that he (Bracewell) was recognized as the
owner thereof in the records of the Bureau of Lands way back in
1965, as well as in the City Assessor's Office.[20]

Aggrieved, petitioner elevated his case on appeal[21] before the CA,
docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 81075, arguing mainly that the Las
Pias City-RTC had no jurisdiction over a petition for review of a
decree of registration under Section 32 of PD 1529, which should
be filed in the same branch of the court that rendered the decision
and ordered the issuance of the decree.[22] He likewise raised (a)
the failure of Bracewell to submit to conciliation proceedings,[23] as
well as (b) the commission of forum shopping, considering that the
decision granting Bracewells application for registration over Lots
1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 of Plan PSU-180598 was still pending resolution
before the Court at the time he filed Civil Case No. LP 98-0025.[24]
The CA Ruling
In a Decision[25] dated May 23, 2007, the appellate court affirmed
the assailed judgment of the RTC, finding that respondents were
able to substantiate their claim of actual fraud in the procurement
of Decree No. N-217036, which is the only ground that may be
invoked in a petition for review of a decree of registration under
Section 32 of PD 1529. It held that, since the petition for review
was filed within one (1) year from the issuance of the questioned
decree, and considering that the subject lot is located in Las Pias
City, the RTC of said city had jurisdiction over the case.[26] It
further declared that: (a) there was no need to submit the case a
quo for conciliation proceedings because the LRA, which is an
instrumentality of the government, had been impleaded; (b) no
forum shopping was committed because the petition for review of
the decree of registration before the Las Pias City-RTC and the
application for land registration then pending before the Court
involved different parties and issues; and (c) the award of
attorneys fees was well within the sound discretion of the RTC.[27]
Petitioner's motion for reconsideration[28] having been denied,[29]
he now comes before the Court via the instant petition for review,
challenging primarily the jurisdiction of the Las Pias City-RTC
which set aside and nullified the judgment rendered by the RTC of
Makati City, Branch 134 that had not yet become final and was
still within its exclusive control and discretion because the one (1)
year period within which the decree of registration issued by the
LRA could be reviewed has not yet elapsed.[30]
The Issue Before the Court
The core issue raised for the Courts resolution is whether or not
the Las Pias City-RTC has jurisdiction over the petition for
review of Decree No. N-217036, which was issued as a result of
the judgment rendered by the RTC of Makati City, Branch 134.
The Courts Ruling
The petition must fail.
Under Act No. 496[31] (Act 496), or the Land Registration Act,
as amended,[32] which was the law in force at the time of the
commencement by both parties of their respective registration
proceedings jurisdiction over all applications for registration of
title was conferred upon the Courts of First Instance (CFIs, now
RTCs) of the respective provinces in which the land sought to be
registered is situated.[33]
The land registration laws were updated and codified under PD
1529, which took effect on January 23, 1979,[34] and under Section
17[35] thereof, jurisdiction over an application for land registration
is still vested on the CFI (now, RTC) of the province or city
where the land is situated.[36]

Worth noting is the explanation proffered by respondents in their
comment to the instant petition that when petitioner filed his land
registration case in December 1976, jurisdiction over applications
for registration of property situated in Las Pias City was vested in
the RTC of Makati City in view of the fact that there were no RTC
branches yet in the Las Pias City at that time.[37] Bracewells own
application over Lots 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 of Plan PSU-180598, all
situated in Las Pias City, was thus granted by the RTC of Makati
City, Branch 58.[38]
Subsequently, Batas Pambansa Bilang (BP) 129,[39] otherwise
known as The Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, was
enacted and took effect on August 14, 1981,[40] authorizing the
creation of RTCs in different judicial regions, including the RTC
of Las Pias City as part of the National Capital Judicial
Region.[41] As pointed out by the court a quo in its Decision dated
July 31, 2003, the RTC of Las Pias City was established in or
about 1994.[42] Understandably, in February 1998, Bracewell
sought the review of Decree No. N-217036 before the Las Pias
City-RTC, considering that the lot subject of this case is situated in
Las Pias City.
Petitioner maintains that the petition for review should have been
filed with the RTC of Makati City, Branch 134, which rendered the
assailed decision and ordered the issuance of Decree No. N-
217036, citing the 1964 case of Amando Joson, et al. v. Busuego
[43]
(Joson) among others. In said case, Spouses Amando Joson
and Victoria Balmeo (Sps. Joson) filed a petition to set aside the
decree of registration issued in favor of Teodora Busuego
(Busuego) on the ground that the latter misrepresented herself to be
the sole owner of the lot when in truth, the Sps. Joson were owners
of one-half thereof, having purchased the same from Busuegos
mother.[44] The court a quo therein dismissed the petition for the
reason that since its jurisdiction as a cadastral court was special
and limited, it had no authority to pass upon the issues
raised. Disagreeing, the Court held that, as long as the final decree
has not been issued and the period of one (1) year within which it
may be reviewed has not elapsed, the decision remains under the
control and sound discretion of the court rendering the decree,
which court after hearing, may even set aside said decision or
decree and adjudicate the land to another.[45]
To be clear, the only issue in Joson was which court should take
cognizance of the nullification of the decree, i.e., the cadastral
court that had issued the decree, or the competent CFI in the
exercise of its general jurisdiction.[46] It should be pointed out,
however, that with the passage of PD 1529, the distinction
between the general jurisdiction vested in the RTC and the
limited jurisdiction conferred upon it as a cadastral court was
eliminated. RTCs now have the power to hear and determine all
questions, even contentious and substantial ones, arising from
applications for original registration of titles to lands and petitions
filed after such registration.[47] Accordingly, and considering
further that the matter of whether the RTC resolves an issue in the
exercise of its general jurisdiction or of its limited jurisdiction as a
special court is only a matter of procedure and has nothing to do
with the question of jurisdiction,[48] petitioner cannot now rely on
the Joson pronouncement to advance its theory.
Section 32 of PD 1529 provides that the review of a decree of
registration falls within the jurisdiction of and, hence, should be
filed in the proper Court of First Instance, viz.:
Section 32. Review of decree of registration; Innocent purchaser
for value. The decree of registration shall not be reopened or
revised by reason of absence, minority, or other disability of any
person adversely affected thereby, nor by any proceeding in any
court for reversing judgments, subject, however, to the right of any
person, including the government and the branches thereof,
deprived of land or of any estate or interest therein by such
adjudication or confirmation of title obtained by actual fraud, to
file in the proper Court of First Instance a petition for
reopening and review of the decree of registration not later
than one year from and after the date of the entry of such
decree of registration, but in no case shall such petition be
entertained by the court where an innocent purchaser for value has
acquired the land or an interest therein, whose rights may be
prejudiced. Whenever the phrase "innocent purchaser for value" or
an equivalent phrase occurs in this Decree, it shall be deemed to
include an innocent lessee, mortgagee, or other encumbrancer for
value.
Upon the expiration of said period of one year, the decree of
registration and the certificate of title issued shall become
incontrovertible. Any person aggrieved by such decree of
registration in any case may pursue his remedy by action for
damages against the applicant or any other persons responsible for
the fraud. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Since the LRAs issuance of a decree of registration only proceeds
from the land registration courts directive, a petition taken under
Section 32 of PD 1529 is effectively a review of the land
registration courts ruling. As such, case law instructs that for as
long as a final decree has not been entered by the [LRA] and the
period of one (1) year has not elapsed from the date of entry of
such decree, the title is not finally adjudicated and the decision in
the registration proceeding continues to be under the control and
sound discretion of the court rendering it.[49]
While it is indeed undisputed that it was the RTC of Makati City,
Branch 134 which rendered the decision directing the LRA to issue
Decree No. N-217036, and should, applying the general rule as
above-stated, be the same court before which a petition for the
review of Decree No. N-217036 is filed, the Court must consider
the circumstantial milieu in this case that, in the interest of orderly
procedure, warrants the filing of the said petition before the Las
Pias City-RTC.
Particularly, the Court refers to the fact that the application for
original registration in this case was only filed before the RTC of
Makati City, Branch 134 because, during that time, i.e., December
1976, Las Pias City had no RTC. Barring this situation, the
aforesaid application should not have been filed before the RTC of
Makati City, Branch 134 pursuant to the rules on venue prevailing
at that time. Under Section 2, Rule 4 of the 1964 Revised Rules of
Court, which took effect on January 1, 1964, the proper venue for
real actions, such as an application for original registration, lies
with the CFI of the province where the property is situated, viz.:
Sec. 2. Venue in Courts of First Instance. (a) Real actions.
Actions affecting title to, or for recovery of possession, or for
partition or condemnation of, or foreclosure of mortgage on, real
property, shall be commenced and tried in the province where the
property or any part thereof lies.
As the land subject of this case is undeniably situated in Las Pias
City, the application for its original registration should have been
filed before the Las Pias City-RTC were it not for the fact that the
said court had yet to be created at the time the application was
filed. Be that as it may, and considering further that the
complication at hand is actually one of venue and not of
jurisdiction (given that RTCs do retain jurisdiction over review of
registration decree cases pursuant to Section 32 of PD 1529), the
Court, cognizant of the peculiarity of the situation, holds that the SO ORDERED.
Las Pias City-RTC has the authority over the petition for the
review of Decree No. N-217036 filed in this case. Indeed, the
filing of the petition for review before the Las Pias City-RTC was
only but a rectificatory implementation of the rules of procedure
then-existing, which was temporarily set back only because of past
exigencies. In light of the circumstances now prevailing, the Court
perceives no compelling reason to deviate from applying the
rightful procedure. After all, venue is only a matter of procedure[50]
and, hence, should succumb to the greater interests of the orderly
administration of justice.[51]

Anent the other ancillary issues raised by petitioner on forum

shopping, submission to conciliation proceedings, and award of
attorney's fees, suffice it to say that the same have been adequately
discussed by the appellate court and, hence, need no further
elucidation.

Finally, on the matter of petitioners objections against the trial

judges unusual interest in the case, the Court concurs with the
CA in saying that such tirades are not helpful to his cause. Besides,
as pointed out in the Decision dated July 31, 2003 of the RTC of
Makati City, Branch 275, petitioner already had his chance to
disqualify the trial judge from further hearing the case, but the
appellate court dismissed his petition in CA G.R. SP No. 74187 for
lack of merit.[52]

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated

May 23, 2007 and the Resolution dated August 14, 2007 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 81075 are hereby
AFFIRMED.
G.R. No. 170757, November 28, 2011
PACIFICO M. VALIAO, FOR HIMSELF AND IN BEHALF
OF HIS CO-HEIRS LODOVICO, RICARDO, BIENVENIDO,
ALL SURNAMED VALIAO AND NEMESIO M. GRANDEA,
PETITIONERS, VS. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,
MACARIO ZAFRA, AND MANUEL YUSAY,
RESPONDENTS,
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Before this Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule
45 of the Rules of Court seeking to set aside the Decision[1] and
Resolution[2] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No.
54811, which reversed the Decision[3] of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Kabankalan, Negros Occidental, Branch 61, in Land
Registration Case No. 03, granting petitioners' application for
registration of title over a parcel of land located in Ilog, Negros
Occidental.
The factual milieu of this case is as follows:
On August 11, 1987, petitioners[4] Pacifico, Lodovico, Ricardo,
Bienvenido, all surnamed Valiao, and Nemesio Grandea filed with
the RTC of Kabankalan, Negros Occidental an application for
registration of a parcel of land with an area of 504,535 square
meters, more or less, situated in Barrio Galicia, Municipality of
Ilog, Negros Occidental.
On June 20, 1988, private oppositors Macario Zafra and Manuel
Yusay filed their Motion to Dismiss the application on the
following grounds: (1) the land applied for has not been declared
alienable and disposable; (2) res judicata has set in to bar the
application for registration; and (3) the application has no factual
or legal basis.
On August 24, 1988, the Republic of the Philippines (Republic),
through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), opposed the
application for registration on the following grounds, among
others: that neither the applicants nor their predecessors-in-interest
had been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession
and occupation of the land in question since June 12, 1945 or prior
thereto; that the muniment/s of title and/or the tax declaration/s and
tax payments/receipts of applicants, if any, attached to or alleged in
the application, do/es not constitute competent and sufficient
evidence of a bona fide acquisition of the land applied for or of
their open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation in the concept of owner, since June 12, 1945 or prior
thereto; that the parcel of land applied for is a portion of public
domain belonging to the Republic, which is not subject to private
appropriation; and that the present action is barred by a previous
final judgment in a cadastral case prosecuted between the same
parties and involving the same parcel of land.
On July 3, 1989, the RTC denied private oppositors' Motion to
Dismiss. Trial thereafter ensued.
In support of their application for registration, petitioners alleged
that they acquired the subject property in 1947, upon the death of
their uncle Basilio Millarez (Basilio), who purchased the land from
a certain Fermin Payogao, pursuant to a Deed of Sale[5] dated May
19, 1916 entirely handwritten in Spanish language. Basilio
possessed the land in question from May 19, 1916 until his death in
1947. Basilio's possession was open, continuous, peaceful, adverse,
notorious, uninterrupted and in the concept of an owner. Upon
Basilio's death, the applicants as co-heirs possessed the said land
until 1966, when oppositor Zafra unlawfully and violently
dispossessed them of their property, which compelled them to file
complaints of Grave Coercion and Qualified Theft against Zafra.
In support of their claim of possession over the subject property,
petitioners submitted in evidence Tax Declaration No. 9562[6]
dated September 29, 1976 under the names of the heirs of Basilio
Millarez.
The RTC, in its Decision dated December 15, 1995, granted
petitioners' application for registration of the subject property, the
dispositive portion of which states:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, this Court hereby orders
and decrees registration of Lot No. 2372 subject of the present
proceedings and the registration of title thereto, in favor of the
applicants, who are declared the true and lawful owners of said Lot
No. 2372, except applicant Lodovico Valiao, who sold his right to
Macario Zafra.
Upon the finality of this decision, let the corresponding decree of
registration and Certificate of Title be issued in the name of the
applicants, Heirs of Basilio Millarez, namely: Pacifico Valiao,
Ricardo Valiao, Bienvenido Valiao and Nemesio Grandea, subject
to the rights of private oppositors, Macario Zafra and Manuel
Yusay over said lot whose fishpond permits are declared VALID
and will expire on December 31, 2003.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.[7]
Aggrieved by the Decision, the private oppositors and the
Republic, through Assistant Prosecutor Josue A. Gatin, filed an
appeal with the CA, which reversed the trial court's findings in its
Decision dated June 23, 2005. The CA ruled that the classification
of lands of the public domain is an exclusive prerogative of the
executive department of the government and in the absence of such
classification, the lands remain as unclassified until it is released
therefrom and rendered open to disposition. Further, there exists a
prior cadastral case involving the same parties herein and the same
Lot No. 2372, which ruled that Lot No. 2372 belongs to the
Republic. The CA held that such judgment constitutes res judicata
that bars a subsequent action for land registration. It also ruled that
the subject property is part of the inalienable land of the public
domain and petitioners failed to prove that they and their
predecessors-in-interest had been in open, continuous, exclusive
and notorious possession of the land in question since June 12,
1945 or earlier. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeal is
GRANTED. Accordingly, We REVERSE the Decision dated
December 15, 1995 of the Regional Trial Court, DENY the
application for registration of title filed by petitioners-appellees,
DECLARE as moot and academic any and all claims of private
oppositors-appellants over Lot No. 2372, and DECLARE the
subject parcel of land to be inalienable and indisposable land
belonging to the public domain.
SO ORDERED.[8]
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration, which was denied by
the CA in a Resolution dated November 17, 2005. Hence, the
present petition with the following issues:
I

WHETHER OR NOT LOT NO. 2372 OF THE ILOG
CADASTRE IS ALIENABLE AND DISPOSABLE LAND OF
THE PUBLIC DOMAIN.
II
WHETHER OR NOT THE CLAIM OF PRESCRIPTION BY
THE APPLICANT WILL LIE ON LOT NO. 2372.
III
WHETHER OR NOT THE DECISION OF THE COURT OF
APPEALS IN CAD. CASE NO. 23, ENTITLED LODOVICO
VALIAO, ET, AL., VS. MACARIO ZAFRA, ET, AL., AC G.R.
NO. CV-68873, CONSTITUTES RES JUDICATA AS FAR AS
THIS APPLICATION FOR REGISTRATION IS CONCERNED.
IV
WHETHER OR NOT THE ALLEGED POSSESSION OF THE
APPLICANTS THROUGH THEIR PREDECESSORS-IN-
INTEREST IS SUFFICIENT TO SUSTAIN THEIR CLAIM FOR
PRESCRIPTION.[9]
Petitioners claim that Lot No. 2372 is an alienable and disposable
portion of the public domain. The possession of applicants'
predecessors-in interest since 1916 until 1966 had been open,
continuous and uninterrupted; thus, converting the said land into a
private land. The subject lot had already become private in
character in view of the length of time the applicants and their
predecessors-in-interest had possessed the subject lot, which
entitles them to the confirmation of their title. Petitioners further
claim that prior dismissal in a cadastral proceeding does not
constitute res judicata in a subsequent application for registration
of a parcel of land.
In its Comment, the OSG submits that the issues to be resolved in
the present petition, i.e., whether Lot No. 2372 is alienable and
disposable land of the public domain and whether petitioners have
the right to have the said property registered in their name through
prescription of time are questions of fact, which were already
passed upon by the CA and no longer reviewable by the Court,
since findings of fact of the CA, when supported by sufficient
evidence, are conclusive and binding on the parties. The OSG
further claims that petitioners failed to prove that the subject lot is
part of the alienable and disposable portion of the public domain
and that petitioners' application for land registration is already
barred by a prior decision in a cadastral case. Lastly, the OSG
asserts that petitioners did not present sufficient evidence to prove
that their possession over the subject lot applied for had been open,
peaceful, exclusive, continuous and adverse.
Anent the propriety of filing a petition for review under Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court, the principle is well-established that this Court
is not a trier of facts and that only questions of law may be
raised. The resolution of factual issues is the function of the lower
courts whose findings on these matters are received with respect
and are, as a rule, binding on this Court. This rule, however, is
subject to certain exceptions. One of these is when the findings of
the appellate court are contrary to those of the trial court.[10] Due to
the divergence of the findings of the CA and the RTC, the Court
will now re-examine the facts and evidence adduced before the
lower courts.
Section 14 (1) of Presidential Decree No. (PD) 1529, otherwise
known as the Property Registration Decree provides:
SEC. 14. Who may apply. - The following persons may file in the
proper Court of First Instance an application for registration of title
to land, whether personally or through their duly-authorized
representatives:
(1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-
interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the
public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12,
1945, or earlier.
From the foregoing, petitioners need to prove that: (1) the land
forms part of the alienable and disposable land of the public
domain; and (2) they, by themselves or through their predecessors-
in-interest, have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious
possession and occupation of the subject land under a bona fide
claim of ownership from June 12, 1945 or earlier.[11] These the
petitioners must prove by no less than clear, positive and
convincing evidence.[12]
Under the Regalian doctrine, which is embodied in our
Constitution, all lands of the public domain belong to the State,
which is the source of any asserted right to any ownership of
land. All lands not appearing to be clearly within private
ownership are presumed to belong to the State. Accordingly, public
lands not shown to have been reclassified or released as alienable
agricultural land or alienated to a private person by the State
remain part of the inalienable public domain.[13] Unless public land
is shown to have been reclassified as alienable or disposable to a
private person by the State, it remains part of the inalienable public
domain. Property of the public domain is beyond the commerce of
man and not susceptible of private appropriation and acquisitive
prescription. Occupation thereof in the concept of owner no matter
how long cannot ripen into ownership and be registered as a
title.[14] The burden of proof in overcoming the presumption of
State ownership of the lands of the public domain is on the person
applying for registration (or claiming ownership), who must prove
that the land subject of the application is alienable or
disposable. To overcome this presumption, incontrovertible
evidence must be established that the land subject of the
application (or claim) is alienable or disposable.[15]
There must be a positive act declaring land of the public domain as
alienable and disposable. To prove that the land subject of an
application for registration is alienable, the applicant must establish
the existence of a positive act of the government, such as a
presidential proclamation or an executive order; an administrative
action; investigation reports of Bureau of Lands investigators; and
a legislative act or a statute. The applicant may also secure a
certification from the government that the land claimed to have
been possessed for the required number of years is alienable and
disposable.[16]
No such evidence was offered by the petitioners to show that the
land in question has been classified as alienable and disposable
land of the public domain. In the absence of incontrovertible
evidence to prove that the subject property is already classified as
alienable and disposable, we must consider the same as still
inalienable public domain.[17] Verily, the rules on the confirmation
of imperfect title do not apply unless and until the land subject
thereof is released in an official proclamation to that effect so that
it may form part of the disposable agricultural lands of the public
domain.
With respect to the existence of a prior cadastral case, it appears
that on July 11, 1966, the petitioners filed in Cadastral Case No. 23
of the then CFI of Negros Occidental a petition to reopen the
proceedings relative to three lots, one of which is Lot No.
2372. The lower court, in its Order[18] dated October 20, 1980,
held that Lot No. 2372 belongs to the Republic. It found that after
the subject lot was declared public land, it was found to be inside
the communal forest. On appeal, the CA, in its Decision[19] dated
August 7, 1984, found no reversible error and affirmed the
decision of the cadastral court. Thereafter, a petition elevating the
case to this Court was dismissed for lack of merit.[20] In the present
case, the CA, in its Decision dated June 23, 2005, ruled that such
judgment constitutes res judicata that will bar a subsequent action
for land registration on the same land.
In Director of Lands v. Court of Appeals,[21] the Court held that a
judicial declaration that a parcel of land is public, does not
preclude even the same applicant from subsequently seeking a
judicial confirmation of his title to the same land, provided he
thereafter complies with the provisions of Section 48[22] of
Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended, and as long as said
public lands remain alienable and disposable. In the case at bar, not
only did the petitioners fail to prove that the subject land is part of
the alienable and disposable portion of the public domain, they
failed to demonstrate that they by themselves or through their
predecessors-in-interest have possessed and occupied the subject
land since June 12, 1945 or earlier as mandated by the law.
It is settled that the applicant must present proof of specific acts of
ownership to substantiate the claim and cannot just offer general
statements which are mere conclusions of law than factual
evidence of possession.[23] Actual possession consists in the
manifestation of acts of dominion over it of such a nature as a party
would actually exercise over his own property.[24]
The testimonies of Nemesio and Pacifico as to their own and their
predecessors-in-interest's possession and ownership over the
subject lot fail to convince Us. Petitioners claim that Basilio was
in possession of the land way back in 1916. Yet no tax declaration
covering the subject property, during the period Basilio allegedly
occupied the subject property, i.e., 1916 to 1947, was presented in
evidence. Other than the bare allegations of Nemesio and Pacifico
that Basilio allegedly introduced improvements on the subject
property, there is nothing in the records which would substantiate
petitioners' claim that Basilio was in possession of Lot No. 2372
since June 12, 1945 or earlier, the period of possession required by
law. Hence, petitioners' assertion that Basilio possessed the
property in question from 1916 to 1947 is, at best, conjectural and
self-serving.
As regards petitioners' possession of the land in question from
1947 to 1966, petitioners could only support the same with a tax
declaration dated September 29, 1976. At best, petitioners can
only prove possession since said date. What is required is open,
exclusive, continuous and notorious possession by petitioners and
their predecessors-in-interest, under a bona fide claim of
ownership, since June 12, 1945 or earlier.[25] Petitioners failed to
explain why, despite their claim that their predecessors-in-interest
have possessed the subject properties in the concept of an owner
even before June 12, 1945, it was only in 1976 that they started to
declare the same for purposes of taxation. Moreover, tax
declarations and receipts are not conclusive evidence of ownership
or of the right to possess land when not supported by any other
evidence. The disputed property may have been declared for
taxation purposes in the names of the applicants for registration, or
of their predecessors-in-interest, but it does not necessarily prove
ownership. They are merely indicia of a claim of ownership.[26]

Evidently, since the petitioners failed to prove that (1) the subject
property was classified as part of the disposable and alienable land
of the public domain; and (2) they and their predecessors-in-
interest had been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious
possession and occupation thereof under a bona fide claim of
ownership since June 12, 1945 or earlier, their application for
confirmation and registration of the subject property under PD
1529 should be denied.

WHEREFORE, the Decision and Resolution of the Court of

Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 54811, which reversed the Decision
of the Regional Trial Court of Kabankalan, Negros Occidental,
Branch 61, in Land Registration Case No. 03, is AFFIRMED. The
application for registration of title filed by the petitioners Pacifico
Valiao, Lodovico Valiao, Ricardo Valiao, Bienvenido Valiao, and
Nemesio Grandea, over Lot No. 2372, with a total area of 504,535
square meters, more or less, situated in Barrio Galicia,
Municipality of Ilog, Negros Occidental, is DENIED.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 166748, April 24, 2009
LAUREANO V. HERMOSO, AS REPRESENTED BY HIS
ATTORNEY-IN-FACT FLORIDA L. UMANDAP,
PETITIONER, VS. COURT OF APPEALS AND HEIRS OF
ANTONIO FRANCIA AND PETRA FRANCIA, NAMELY:
BENJAMIN P. FRANCIA, CECILIA FRANCIA, AMOS P.
FRANCIA, JR., FRANCISCO F. VILLARICA, DANILO F.
VILLARICA, RODRIGO F. VILLARICA, MELCHOR F.
VILLARICA, JESUS F. VILLARICA, BENILDA F.
VILLARICA AND ERNESTO F. VILLARICA,
RESPONDENTS.
DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule
45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the Decision[1] dated October
15, 2004 and the Resolution[2] dated January 19, 2005 of the Court
of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 77546.
The case involves parcels of land located at Malhacan, Meycauyan,
Bulacan, identified as Lot No. 3257 owned by Petra Francia and
Lot 3415 owned by Antonio Francia. The lots comprises an area of
2.5 and 1.5850 hectares, respectively, and forms part of a larger
parcel of land with an area of 32.1324 hectares co-owned by
Amos, Jr., Benjamin, Cecilia, Petra, Antonio and Rufo, all
surnamed Francia.[3]
Since 1978, petitioner and Miguel Banag (Banag) have been
occupying and cultivating Lot Nos. 3257 and 3415 as tenants
thereof. They filed a petition for coverage of the said lots under
Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 27.[4] On July 4, 1995, the
Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) issued an order granting
the petition, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, foregoing facts and jurisprudence considered,
Order is hereby issued:
1. PLACING the subject two (2) parcels of land being
tenanted by petitioners Laureano Hermoso and Miguel
Banag situated at Malhacan, Meycauayan, Bulacan, owned
by Amos Francia, et al. under the coverage of Operation
Land Transfer pursuant to P.D. 27; and
2. DIRECTING the DAR personnel concerned to process the
issuance of emancipation patents in favor of said Laureano
Hermoso and Miguel Banag after a parcellary mapping
have been undertaken by the Bureau of Lands over the
subject landholdings.
SO ORDERED.[5]
Respondents filed an omnibus motion for reconsideration and
reinvestigation. On December 9, 1995, the DAR affirmed with
modification the earlier order, and disposed of the case as follows:
WHEREFORE, all premises considered, ORDER is hereby issued
AFFIRMING the first dispositive portion of the Order, dated July
4, 1995, issued in the instant case, but MODIFYING the second
dispositive portion of the same now to read, as follows:
1. PLACING the subject two (2) parcels of land being
tenanted by petitioners Laureano Hermoso and Miguel
Banag situated at Malhacan, Meycauayan, Bulacan, owned
by Amos Francia, et al. under the coverage of Operation
Land Transfer pursuant to P.D. 27; and
2. DIRECTING the DAR personnel concerned to hold in
abeyance the processing of the emancipation patent of
 Miguel Banag until the issue of tenancy relationship in
DARAB Cases Nos. 424-Bul'92 and 425-Bul'92 is finally
resolved and disposed.
No further motion of any and/or the same nature shall be
entertained.
SO ORDERED.[6]
In a separate development, petitioner and Banag filed with the
Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB)
consolidated Cases Nos. 424-BUL-92 and 425-BUL-92. The cases
delved on whether both petitioner and Banag are tenants of
respondents in the subject landholding. On June 3, 1996, the
DARAB rendered a Decision[7] upholding the tenancy relationship
of petitioner and Banag with the respondents. Respondents filed a
motion for reconsideration but the same was denied. A petition for
review on certiorari was filed before the CA. However, the
petition was denied on technical grounds in a Resolution[8] dated
October 9, 1996. A motion for reconsideration was filed, but the
same was likewise denied in a Resolution[9] dated December 27,
1996. The case was eventually elevated to this Court in G.R. No.
127668. On March 12, 1997, the Court denied the petition for lack
of verification,[10] and subsequently, also denied the motion for
reconsideration in a Resolution[11] dated July 14, 1997.
Earlier, on January 20, 1997, Banag filed before the DAR, an
urgent ex-parte motion for the issuance of an emancipation patent.
On March 13, 1997, the DAR granted the motion.[12] On March 21,
1997, respondents filed a motion for reconsideration. They claimed
that the lands involved have been approved for conversion to urban
purposes in an Order[13] dated June 5, 1973 issued by the DAR
Secretary. The conversion order stated that the Operation Land
Transfer (OLT) under Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 27 does not
cover the subject parcels of land.[14] On March 10, 1998, the DAR
issued an Order[15] affirming the March 13, 1997 order granting the
motion for issuance of emancipation patent in favor of Banag. On
March 30, 1998, respondents filed a notice of appeal and
correspondingly filed their appeal memorandum.[16] On April 21,
2003, the Office of the President through the Deputy Executive
Secretary rendered a Decision[17] denying respondents' appeal. The
dispositive portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeal is hereby
DISMISSED and the questioned Order dated 10 March 1998 of the
DAR Secretary AFFIRMED in toto.
Parties are required to INFORM this Office, within five (5) days
from notice, of the dates of their receipt of this Decision.
SO ORDERED.[18]
Respondents then filed with the CA a petition for review under
Rule 43 of the Rules of Court. They maintained that P.D. No. 27
does not cover the subject parcels of land pursuant to the June 5,
1973 Order of the DAR Secretary reclassifying the lands and
declaring the same as suited for residential, commercial, industrial
or other urban purposes. Furthermore, the Housing and Land Use
Regulatory Board (HLURB) reclassified the lands as early as
October 14, 1978.
On October 15, 2004, the CA rendered the assailed Decision,[19]
the fallo of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED.
Accordingly, the assailed decision of the Office of the President is
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. A new decision is hereby
rendered dismissing the Petition for Coverage under P.D. No. 27
filed by respondents [now herein petitioner].
SO ORDERED.[20]
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration. On January 19, 2005,
the CA rendered the assailed Resolution[21] denying the motion for
reconsideration.
Hence, the instant petition.
The sole issue in this petition is whether Lot Nos. 3257 and 3415
are covered by P.D. No. 27.
Petitioner avers that the final and executory decision of this Court
in G.R. No. 127668 affirming that he is a tenant of the landholding
in question entitles him to avail of the right granted under PD 27.
In other words, because of the finality of the decision declaring
him a tenant of the landholding in question, in effect, the subject
lots are considered as agricultural lands and are thus covered by
P.D. No. 27. Parenthetically, we take judicial notice of the decision
of the Court in G.R. No. 127668, in which the tenancy relationship
between petitioner and respondents was upheld. That decision is
already final and executory.
Respondents, for their part, claim that the lands were already
declared suited for residential, commercial, industrial or other
urban purposes in accordance with the provisions of Republic Act
(R.A.) No. 3844 as early as 1973. Hence, they are no longer
subject to P.D. No. 27.
We resolve to deny the petition.
Section 3, Article XII[22] of the Constitution mandates that
alienable lands of the public domain shall be limited to agricultural
lands.
The classification of lands of the public domain is of two types,
i.e., primary classification and secondary classification. The
primary classification comprises agricultural, forest or timber,
mineral lands, and national parks. These are lands specifically
mentioned in Section 3, Article XII of the Constitution. The same
provision of the Constitution, however, also states that agricultural
lands of the public domain may further be classified by law
according to the uses to which they may be devoted. This further
classification of agricultural lands is referred to as secondary
classification.[23]
Under existing laws, Congress has granted authority to a number of
government agencies to effect the secondary classification of
agricultural lands to residential, commercial or industrial or other
urban uses.
Thus, Section 65 of R.A. No. 6657 or the Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Law (CARL) of 1988, which took effect on June 15, 1988,
explicitly provides:
Section 65. Conversion of Lands.After the lapse of five (5) years
from its award, when the land ceases to be economically feasible
and sound for agricultural purposes, or the locality has become
urbanized and the land will have a greater economic value for
residential, commercial or industrial purposes, the DAR, upon
application of the beneficiary or the landowner, with due notice to
the affected parties, and subject to existing laws, may authorize the
reclassification or conversion of the land and its disposition:
Provided, That the beneficiary shall have fully paid his obligation.
On the other hand, Section 20 of R.A. No. 7160 otherwise known
as the Local Government Code of 1991[24] states:
SECTION 20. Reclassification of Lands.
(a) A city or municipality may, through an ordinance passed by the
sanggunian after conducting public hearings for the purpose,
authorize the reclassification of agricultural lands and provide
for the manner of their utilization or disposition in the
following cases: (1) when the land ceases to be economically
feasible and sound for agricultural purposes as determined by
the Department of Agriculture or (2) where the land shall have
substantially greater economic value for residential,
commercial, or industrial purposes, as determined by the
sanggunian concerned: Provided, That such reclassification
shall be limited to the following percentage of the total
agricultural land area at the time of the passage of the
ordinance:
(1) For highly urbanized and independent component
cities, fifteen percent (15%);
(2) For component cities and first to the third class
municipalities, ten percent (10%); and
(3) For fourth to sixth class municipalities, five percent
(5%): Provided, further, That agricultural lands
distributed to agrarian reform beneficiaries
pursuant to Republic Act Numbered Sixty-six
hundred fifty-seven (R.A. No. 6657), otherwise
known as "The Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Law", shall not be affected by the said
reclassification and the conversion of such lands
into other purposes shall be governed by Section 65
of said Act.
(b) The President may, when public interest so requires and upon
recommendation of the National Economic and Development
Authority, authorize a city or municipality to reclassify lands in
excess of the limits set in the next preceding paragraph.
(c) The local government units shall, in conformity with existing
laws, continue to prepare their respective comprehensive land
use plans enacted through zoning ordinances which shall be the
primary and dominant bases for the future use of land
resources: Provided, That the requirements for food production,
human settlements, and industrial expansion shall be taken into
consideration in the preparation of such plans.
(d) Where the approval by a national agency is required for
reclassification, such approval shall not be unreasonably
withheld. Failure to act on a proper and complete application
for reclassification within three (3) months from receipt of the
same shall be deemed as approval thereof.
(e) Nothing in this Section shall be construed as repealing,
amending, or modifying in any manner the provisions of R.A.
No. 6657.
But even long before these two trail-blazing legislative enactments,
there was already R.A. No. 3844 or the Agricultural Land Reform
Code, which was approved on August 8, 1963, Section 36 of which
reads:
SECTION 36. Possession of Landholding; Exceptions.
Notwithstanding any agreement as to the period or future
surrender, of the land, agricultural lessee shall continue in the
enjoyment and possession of his landholding except when his
dispossession has been authorized by the Court in a judgment that
is final and executory if after due hearing it is shown that:
(1) The agricultural lessor-owner or a member of his immediate
family will personally cultivate the landholding or will convert
the landholding, if suitably located, into residential, factory,
hospital or school site or other useful non-agricultural purposes:
Provided, That the agricultural lessee shall be entitled to
disturbance compensation equivalent to five years rental on his
landholding in addition to his rights under Sections twenty-five
and thirty-four, except when the land owned and leased by the
agricultural lessor, is not more that five hectares, in which case
instead of disturbance compensation the lessee may be entitled
to an advanced notice of at least one agricultural year before
ejectment proceedings are filed against him: Provided, further,
That should the landholder not cultivate the land himself for
three years or fail to substantially carry out such conversion
within one year after the dispossession of the tenant, it shall be
presumed that he acted in bad faith and the tenant shall have the
right to demand possession of the land and recover damages for
any loss incurred by him because of said dispossessions;
(2) The agricultural lessee failed to substantially comply with any
of the terms and conditions of the contract or any of the
provisions of this Code unless his failure is caused by fortuitous
event or force majeure;
(3) The agricultural lessee planted crops or used the landholding
for a purpose other than what had been previously agreed upon;
(4) The agricultural lessee failed to adopt proven farm practices as
determined under paragraph 3 of Section twenty-nine;
(5) The land or other substantial permanent improvement thereon is
substantially damaged or destroyed or has unreasonably
deteriorated through the fault or negligence of the agricultural
lessee;
(6) The agricultural lessee does not pay the lease rental when it
falls due: Provided, That if the non-payment of the rental shall
be due to crop failure to the extent of seventy-five per centum
as a result of a fortuitous event, the non-payment shall not be a
ground for dispossession, although the obligation to pay the
rental due that particular crop is not thereby extinguished; or
(7) The lessee employed a sub-lessee on his landholding in
violation of the terms of paragraph 2 of Section twenty-seven.
The petitioner in the instant case claims that he is entitled to the
issuance of an emancipation patent under P.D. No. 27. The said
decree promulgated by then President Ferdinand E. Marcos, on
October 21, 1972, is entitled, "DECREEING THE
EMANCIPATION OF TENANTS FROM THE BONDAGE OF
THE SOIL TRANSFERRING TO THEM THE OWNERSHIP OF
THE LAND THEY TILL AND PROVIDING THE
INSTRUMENTS AND MECHANISMS THEREFOR". However,
the law specifically applied "to tenant-farmers of private
agricultural lands primarily devoted to rice and corn under a
system of share tenancy or lease tenancy, whether classified as
landed estate or not."
For the parcels of land subject of this petition to come within the
coverage of P.D. No. 27, it is necessary to determine whether the
land is agricultural. Section 3(c) of R.A. No. 6657 defines
agricultural land, as follows:
(c) Agricultural Land refers to the land devoted to agricultural
activity as defined in this Act and not classified as mineral, forest,
residential, commercial or industrial land.
and Section 3(b) specifies agricultural activity as:
(b) Agriculture, Agriculture Enterprise or Agricultural Activity
means cultivation of the soil, planting of crops, growing of fruit
trees, including the harvesting of such farm products, and other
farm activities and practices performed by a farmer in conjunction
with such farming operations done by persons whether natural or
juridical.
On the basis of these definitions, the subject parcels of land cannot
be considered as within the ambit of P.D. No. 27. This considering
that the subject lots were reclassified by the DAR Secretary as
suited for residential, commercial, industrial or other urban
purposes way before petitioner filed a petition for emancipation
under P.D. No. 27. The pertinent portions of the June 5, 1973
Order[25] read:
Pursuant to the provisions of Republic Act 3844, as amended, the
said requests of the petitioners were referred to the National
Planning Commission as well as to the Agrarian Reform Team
Leader, Valenzuela, Bulacan for proper investigation.
The National Planning Commission in compliance therewith after
due investigation and physical survey of the subject areas,
favorably recommended the suitability of the same to residential,
commercial, industrial or other urban purposes.
Similarly, the Agrarian Reform Team in Valenzuela, Bulacan after
due investigation thereof found the parcels of land subject hereof
highly suitable for conversion into urban purposes in view of his
findings and verification of the location, facilities necessary for
urban development and also, the low agricultural income thereof
(unirrigated), of the said land. The Team Leader concerned in his
recommendation submitted to this Office made mentioned (sic)
that in his declaration of the suitability of the subject properties for
urban purposes, he believes that the conformity of the tenants
consisting of eleven (11) tenants are no longer needed so long as
the petitioners are willing to pay the disturbance compensation as
provided for by law. The petitioners manifested to the Team
Leader concerned their willingness to pay each and every tenant
the disturbance compensation according to law. To show further
their sincerity to comply with the provisions of the law on
disturbance compensation, and to show that their (petitioners)
purpose of the instant request is not to evade the provisions of
Decree 27, they stated in their letter-request that they will not eject
any tenants therefrom, nor dispossessed (sic) them of their
landholdings until after they are fully and justly paid the
disturbance compensation according to law.
The subject parcels of land are not included in the land transfer
operation according to the team's report.
It maybe mentioned in this connection, that from the report of the
National Planning Commission submitted to this Office, it appears
that the subject properties are strategically located in the urban
center of the town of Meycauayan wherein there are already
existing developed and occupied residential subdivisions and even
low cost housing projects subsidized by funds from government
financial institution. Likewise, there are also industrial
establishments in its vicinity according to the National Planning
Commission's report.
In view of the foregoing, and considering the parcels of land
subject hereof to be suited for residential, commercial, industrial or
other urban purposes as found and recommended by the National
Planning Commission and the Agrarian Reform Team concerned,
and considering further that the said parcels of land by reason of
their location and the existence of developed and occupied
residential subdivisions and industrial establishments in the
immediate vicinity maybe considered as one of the possible areas
to be reserved for urban development as contemplated in the Letter
of Instruction No. 46 of the President, and considering finally, that
the right of the agricultural tenants therein will be fully
compensated and there will be no ejectment of tenants until after
full payment thereof, as manifested by the petitioners, the instant
requests of the petitioners should be, as hereby it is, given due
course and the parcels of land subject thereof are hereby declared
suited for residential, commercial, industrial or other urban
purposes in accordance with the provisions of Republic Act 3844,
as amended.
It is understood however, that no agricultural tenants and/or lessees
shall be ejected from or dispossessed of their landholdings by
virtue of this Order not until after they are duly and justly paid the
disturbance compensation according to law, the amount of which
maybe determined and fixed by the proper court in the absence of
any mutual agreement thereto by and between the agricultural
lessees and the owner-petitioners.
SO ORDERED.[26]
The main contention of petitioner for the approval of the
emancipation patent in his favor under P.D. No. 27 is the fact that
respondents were not able to realize the actual conversion of the
land into residential purposes. To bolster his claim, petitioner relies
on Section 36 (1) of R.A. No. 3844, viz.:
SECTION 36. Possession of Landholding; Exceptions.
Notwithstanding any agreement as to the period or future
surrender, of the land, an agricultural lessee shall continue in the
enjoyment and possession of his landholding except when his
dispossession has been authorized by the Court in a judgment that
is final and executory if after due hearing it is shown that:
(1) The agricultural lessor-owner or a member of his immediate
family will personally cultivate the landholding or will convert the
landholding, if suitably located, into residential, factory, hospital or
school site or other useful non-agricultural purposes: Provided;
That the agricultural lessee shall be entitled to disturbance
compensation equivalent to five years rental on his landholding in
addition to his rights under Sections twenty-five and thirty-four,
except when the land owned and leased by the agricultural lessor,
is not more than five hectares, in which case instead of disturbance
compensation the lessee may be entitled to an advanced notice of
at least one agricultural year before ejectment proceedings are filed
against him: Provided, further, That should the landholder not
cultivate the land himself for three years or fail to substantially
carry out such conversion within one year after the
dispossession of the tenant, it shall be presumed that he acted
in bad faith and the tenant shall have the right to demand
possession of the land and recover damages for any loss
incurred by him because of said dispossessions.
xxxx[27]
However, the provision of R.A. No. 3844 had already been
amended by R.A. No. 6389, as early as September 10, 1971.
Section 36 (1) of R.A. No. 3844, as amended, now reads:
SECTION 36. Possession of Landholding; Exceptions.
Notwithstanding any agreement as to the period or future
surrender, of the land, an agricultural lessee shall continue in the
enjoyment and possession of his landholding except when his
dispossession has been authorized by the Court in a judgment that
is final and executory if after due hearing it is shown that:
(1) The landholding is declared by the department head upon
recommendation of the National Planning Commission to be suited
for residential, commercial, industrial or some other urban
purposes: Provided, That the agricultural lessee shall be entitled to
disturbance compensation equivalent to five times the average of
the gross harvests on his landholding during the last five preceding
calendar years;
xxxx[28]
Under R.A. No. 6389, the condition imposed on the landowner to
implement the conversion of the agricultural land to non-
agricultural purposes within a certain period was deleted. With the
enactment of the amendatory law, the condition imposed on the
landowner to implement the conversion of the agricultural land to a
non-agricultural purpose within a certain period was deleted.[29]
The remedy left available to the tenant is to claim disturbance
compensation.
In Natalia Realty, Inc. v. Department of Agrarian Reform[30], the
Court held that lands not devoted to agricultural activity and those
that were previously converted to non-agricultural uses are outside
the coverage of the CARL, viz.:
We now determine whether such lands are covered by the CARL.
Section 4 of R.A. 6657 provides that the CARL shall "cover,
regardless of tenurial arrangement and commodity produced, all
public and private agricultural lands." As to what constitutes
"agricultural land," it is referred to as "land devoted to agricultural
activity as defined in this Act and not classified as mineral, forest,
residential, commercial or industrial land." The deliberations of
the Constitutional Commission confirm this limitation.
"Agricultural lands" are only those lands which are "arable and
suitable agricultural lands" and "do not include commercial,
industrial and residential lands."
Based on the foregoing, it is clear that the undeveloped portions of
the Antipolo Hills Subdivision cannot in any language be
considered as "agricultural lands." These lots were intended for
residential use. They ceased to be agricultural lands upon approval
of their inclusion in the Lungsod Silangan Reservation. Even
today, the areas in question continued to be developed as a low-
cost housing subdivision, albeit at a snail's pace. This can readily
be gleaned from the fact that SAMBA members even instituted an
action to restrain petitioners from continuing with such
development. The enormity of the resources needed for developing
a subdivision may have delayed its completion but this does not
detract from the fact that these lands are still residential lands and
outside the ambit of the CARL.[31]
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant petition is
DENIED for lack of merit. The Decision dated October 15, 2004
and the Resolution dated January 19, 2005 of the Court of Appeals
(CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 77546 are hereby affirmed. The case is
remanded to the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator of
Bulacan for the proper computation of the disturbance
compensation of petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. NO. 151312, August 30, 2006
HEIRS OF THE LATE SPOUSES PEDRO S. PALANCA
AND SOTERRANEA RAFOLS VDA. DE PALANCA
NAMELY: IMELDA R. PALANCA, MAMERTA R.
PALANCA, OFELIA P. MIGUEL, ESTEFANIA P. PE,
CANDELARIA P. PUNZALAN, NICOLAS R. PALANCA,
CONSTANTINO R. PALANCA, EDMUNDO PALANCA,
LEOCADIA R. PALANCA AND OLIVERIO R. PALANCA,
REPRESENTED BY THEIR ATTORNEY-IN-FACT,
OFELIA P. MIGUEL, PETITIONERS, VS. REPUBLIC OF
THE PHILIPPINES, (REPRESENTED BY THE LANDS
MANAGEMENT BUREAU), REGIONAL TRIAL COURT
OF PALAWAN (OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVE JUDGE)
AND THE REGISTER OF DEEDS OF PALAWAN,
RESPONDENTS.
DECISION
AZCUNA, J.:
Before this Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule
45 of the Rules of Court seeking the reversal of the decision[1]
dated July 16, 2001, and the resolution[2] dated December 21,
2001, of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 62081
entitled "Republic of the Philippines (Represented by the Lands
Management Bureau) v. Court of First Instance (CFI) of Palawan
(now Regional Trial Court), Seventh Judicial District, Branch II
presided over by Former District Judge, Jose P. Rodriguez, et al."
The antecedent facts[3] are as follows:
On July 19, 1973, the heirs of Pedro S. Palanca, (petitioners
herein), filed an application to bring the pieces of land they
allegedly owned under the operation of the Land Registration Act.
These are: a two hundred thirty-nine thousand nine hundred eighty
(239,980) square meter parcel of land situated in Barrio Panlaitan,
Municipality of Busuanga, Province of Palawan, as shown on plan
Psu-04-000074, and a one hundred seventy-six thousand five
hundred eighty-eight (176,588) square meter land in Barrio of
Panlaitan (Island of Capari), Municipality of New Busuanga,
Province of Palawan, as shown on plan Psu-04-000073. They
acquired said realties by inheritance from the late Pedro S. Palanca,
who had occupied and possessed said land openly and
continuously in the concept of an owner since 1934, or 39 years
before the filing of said application, and planted on said lands
about 1,200 coconut trees on each land, declared the same for
taxation purposes and paid the taxes thereof. The first parcel of
land is presently occupied by Lopez, Libarra, an encargado of
herein (petitioners), while the second is occupied by (petitioner)
Candelaria Punzalan. In Civil Case No. 573 entitled "Heirs of
Pedro Palanca, Plaintiffs, vs. Alfonso Guillamac, Defendant," for
"Recovery of Possession of a Parcel of Land" the Court of First
Instance of Palawan rendered a decision on March 4, 1970,
declaring (petitioners), the heirs of Pedro S. Palanca, as the rightful
possessors of the land at Talampulan Island, Bario of Panlaitan,
Municipality of Busuanga, Province of Palawan, covered by Psu-
04-000074, including the two (2) hectare portion occupied and
claimed by Alfonso Guillamac.
It also appears that the jurisdictional requirements as to notices, as
prescribed by Section 31, Act No. 496, namely publication in the
Official Gazette, were complied with.
During the initial hearing of the case, verbal oppositions to the
application were made by the Provincial Fiscal of Palawan
purportedly for and in behalf of the Bureau of Forest Development,
the Bureau of Lands, and the Department of Agrarian Reform,
some inhabitants of the subject properties and a businessman by
the name of Alfonso Guillamac. The Provincial Fiscal stated that
the lands subject of the application had no clearance from the
Bureau of Forestry and that portions thereof may still be part of the
timberland block and/or public forest under the administration of
the Bureau of Forestry and had not been certified as being
alienable and disposable by the Bureau of Lands. He therefore
requested that the resolution on the application be stayed pending
the examination and issuance of the required clearance by the
Bureau of Forest Development.[4] After the lapse of three years
from the date of the initial hearing, however, no valid and formal
opposition was filed by any of the oppositors in the form and
manner required by law.[5] Neither did the Provincial Fiscal present
witnesses from the relevant government bureaus and agencies to
support his contention that the subject lands had not yet been
cleared for public disposition.
On the other hand, petitioners submitted the plan and technical
description of the land, a survey certificate approved by the Bureau
of Lands and also tax declarations showing that they have
consistently paid the realty taxes accruing on the property.
Petitioners likewise presented six witnesses in support of their
application, namely Constantino Palanca, Ofelia Palanca-Miguel,
Lopez Libarra, Alejandro Cabajar, Alfonso Lucero and Augustin
Timbancaya.
Both Constantino Palanca and Ofelia Palanca-Miguel testified that:
(1) they were heirs of one Pedro S. Palanca; (2) they, together with
their other siblings, were applicants for the registration of two
parcels of land located in Barrio Panlaitan, Busuanga, Palawan; (3)
their father, Pedro S. Palanca, acquired ownership over the subject
properties by continuous, public and notorious possession; (4) their
father built a house on each parcel of land and planted coconut
trees; (5) since their father's death, they have continued their
possession over the lands in the concept of owners and adverse to
all claimants; and (6) the properties have been declared for taxation
purposes and the corresponding taxes religiously paid for over
forty (40) years.[6]
Lopez Libarra and Alejandro Cabajar testified that they knew the
late Pedro S. Palanca and worked for the latter as an overseer and a
"capataz" respectively in the cultivation of the subject properties.
Cabajar, in particular, claimed that he helped clear the lands
sometime in the mid-1920s, planted upon such lands coconut trees
which are now bearing fruit, and continued working with Pedro S.
Palanca until the latter's death in 1943. He subsequently went to
work for the heirs of Pedro S. Palanca whom he confirms now own
and manage the properties.[7]
For his part, Libarra testified that he had been the overseer of the
two coconut plantations of the late Pedro S. Palanca since 1934. He
identified the location of the properties, averring that one
plantation is in Talampulan, Panlaitan Island and the other in
Talampetan, Capari Island. He further testified that at the time he
was employed in 1934, there were already improvements in the
form of coconut trees planted in the areas, a number of which were
already bearing fruits. His duties included overseeing and cleaning
the plantations, making copra and replanting the area when
necessary. He also claimed he worked with Pedro S. Palanca until
the latter's death in 1943 and continues to work for the latter's heirs
up to the present.[8]
Also presented were Alfonso Lucero and Augustin Timbancaya,
who testified thus:
Alfonso Lucero testified that he is a Forester in the Bureau of
Forest Development, formerly the Bureau of Forestry. He was once
assigned as the Chief of Land Classification Party No. 55 in
Palawan. Presently, he is a member of the Composite Land
Classification Team No. 32 in the province with station at Puerto
Princessa City. He has been employed with the Bureau of Forest
Development for about 30 years, starting as a Forest Guard in
1947. As chief of Land Classification Party No. 55, he covered the
territory from Puerto Princesa City northward up to Busuanga,
where the land in question is located. His duty was to supervise the
team that conducted the limitation, segregation and deviation of
agricultural lands within the area. He served in this capacity for
twelve (12) years until December 1975. As such, he issued
certifications after due classification by his office, of alienable and
disposable land for administration by the Bureau of Lands and
eventual disposition to interested parties. He had been in
Busuanga, Palawan a number of times and is familiar with the
lands in question, one of which is in Talampetan, Capari Island and
the other in Talampulan, Panlaitan Island. He is aware that the
lands in question are claimed and administered by the heirs of
Pedro S. Palanca. The improvements on the land are at least 40
years old in his estimation. He recalls having issued a certification
of release of this property for disposition to private parties, but
could not remember the exact date when he did so. He identified
Exhibits "JJ" and "KK" to be certifications to the effect that
Talampulan in Panlaitan Island and Talampetan, a portion of
Capari Island, both in Busuanga (formerly Coron), Palawan, are
fully cultivated and mainly planted to coconuts before World War
II by herein applicants, the heirs of Pedro S. Palanca. He is fully
convinced that the lands in question have already been released
before the war for agricultural purposes in favor of Pedro S.
Palanca, applicants' predecessor-in-interest. Releases of
agricultural lands which are done in bulk at present was not in
vogue before the last war, for releases at that time were made on a
case-to-case basis. Under the pre-war system, an application for a
piece of land was individually referred to the then Bureau of
Forestry which in turn conducted a classification of the area as to
its availability, whether it be for sale, homestead, etc. On the basis
of the Bureau of Forestry investigation, a certification was then
issued as to its availability for the purpose for which the
application was made. The certification was made on the basis of
such application, and was called the isolated case release or the
case-to-case basis. This procedure was followed in the case of
herein applicants and there seemed to be no reason to doubt that
the area was in fact released to herein applicants. Therefore, the
area is no longer under the jurisdiction of the Bureau of Forest
Development.
Alfonso Lucero also testified that as Chief of Land Classification
Party No. 55, he was the one directly in charge of classification
and release of lands of public domain for agricultural purposes. His
office is directly under the bureau chief in Manila, although for
administrative purposes he is carried with the district forestry
office in Puerto Princesa City. The certifications he issue carry
much weight in land classification and releases in the province
unless revoked by the Manila Office.
Augustin O. Timbancaya testified that he is a licensed geodetic
engineer, formerly called a land surveyor. His services were
engaged by applicant Ofelia P. Miguel, the representative of the
other applicants, to conduct and prepare a land plan for two parcels
of land subject of the application. He went personally to the lands
in question. He executed Exhibit "U", the Plan of Land covered by
PSU-04-000073, containing an area of one hundred seventy-six
thousand, five hundred eighty-eight (176,588) square meters
situated at Talampetan, Capari Island, Busuanga, Palawan,
approved by the Director of Lands on June 25, 1973. He also
identified Exhibit "V", the Plan of Land under PSU-04-000074,
containing an area of two hundred thirty-nine thousand, nine
hundred eighty (239, 980) square meters located at Talampulan,
Panlaitan Island, Busuanga, Palawan, which was also approved by
the Director of Lands on June 25, 1973. Both lands are in barrio
Panlaitan, Busuanga (formerly Coron), Palawan, and have an
aggregate total area of four hundred sixteen thousand five hundred
sixty-eight (416,568) square meters. All these surveys were
properly monumented. He personally prepared the technical
description for both lots. He also prepared the Geodetic Engineer's
Certificates and had the same notarized by Atty. Remigio Raton,
the first on January 24, 1972 and the second on March 14, 1972.
He believes that both parcels of land have been released for
agricultural purposes because if it were otherwise, the survey plans
he executed would not have been approved by the Director of
Lands. In other words, the approval of the Land Plans by the
Director of the Bureau of Lands indicates that the lands in question
have been previously released for alienation and disposition. Both
parcels of land have been fully developed and the coconuts planted
thereon are about 50 years old. He has no doubt that these lands
were released for agricultural purposes long ago.[9]
After trial, the CFI of Palawan issued a decision on December 15,
1977 declaring petitioners as the owners in fee simple of the two
parcels of land in question. Thereafter, Original Certificate of Title
(OCT) No. 4295 was issued in the name of petitioners.
Subsequently, out of OCT No. 4295, Transfer Certificates of Title
Nos. T-7095, T-7096, T-10396, T-10397, T-10398, T-10399, T-
10418, and T-10884 were issued.
On December 6, 2000, or after almost twenty-three years,
respondent Republic of the Philippines filed with the CA a
petition[10] for annulment of judgment, cancellation of the decree of
registration and title, and reversion. Respondent sought to annul
the December 15, 1977 decision of the CFI, arguing that the
decision was null and void because the two lands in question were
unclassified public forest land and, as such, were not capable of
private appropriation. In support of this proposition, respondent
presented Land Classification Map No. 839, Project 2-A dated
December 9, 1929 showing that the subject properties were
unclassified lands as of that date as well as a certification dated
November 24, 2000 issued by the Community Environment and
Natural Resources Office stating that "the islands of Talampulan
and Capar(i) Island located in the municipality of Busuanga,
Palawan are within the unclassified public forest." Respondent
likewise drew attention to Executive Proclamation No. 219 issued
on July 2, 1967 which classified the Province of Palawan as a
National Game Refuge and Bird Sanctuary and the small islands
off Palawan as national reserves closed to exploitation and
settlement under the administration of the Parks and Wildlife
Office, subject only to existing private rights.[11] In view of the fact
that the properties were never classified as alienable and
disposable, respondent argued that the CFI did not have
jurisdiction to make a disposition of the same.
In addition, respondent asserted that the participants in the
proceedings committed perfidious acts amounting to extrinsic
fraud which is one of the grounds for the annulment of a judgment.
Respondent maintained that a culture of collusion existed between
and among the petitioners, the Provincial Fiscal and the ranking
officer of the District Forestry Office, Alfonso Lucero, such that
the State was deprived of the opportunity to fairly present its case
to the court.
On July 16, 2001, the CA rendered the assailed decision, the
dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The decision of
the then Court of First Instance of Palawan, Branch II, dated
December 15, 1977, in Land Registration Case No. N-21, LRC
Record No. N-44308 is hereby declared NULL and VOID.
Accordingly, Decree No. N-172081 and the corresponding
Original Certificate of Title No. 4295 issued in the name of the
Heirs of Pedro S. Palanca, as well as the subsequent Transfer
Certificates of Title Nos. T-7095, T-7096, T-10396, T-10397, T-
10398, T-10399, T-10410 and T-10884 and all subsequent TCTs
issued thereafter are also declared NULL and VOID. Private
respondents Heirs of Pedro S. Palanca are DIRECTED to
surrender said transfer certificates of title to public respondent
Register of Deeds of Palawan; and the latter is also DIRECTED to
cause the cancellation thereof.
SO ORDERED.[12]
Petitioners' motion for reconsideration was likewise denied by the
CA in a resolution[13] dated December 21, 2001. Hence, this
petition.
Petitioners contend that the CA disregarded settled jurisprudence
and applicable land laws when it ruled that the subject properties
covered by their application for registration were forest lands and
that, consequently, the land registration court did not have
jurisdiction to award the same to them. They opine that it is not
necessary for them to prove that the government had expressly
given a grant of the subject properties to Pedro S. Palanca, their
predecessor-in-interest, separate of the legislative grant given to
them purportedly under Commonwealth Act No. 141 (Public Land
Act). Petitioners furthermore insist that a particular land need not
be formally released by an act of the Executive before it can be
deemed open to private ownership, citing the cases of Ramos v.
Director of Lands[14] and Ankron v. Government of the Philippine
Islands.[15] They likewise argue that the CA erred in relying upon
Executive Proclamation No. 219 and upon Land Classification
Map No. 839, Project 2-A to nullify petitioners' mother title.
According to petitioners, the reversal of the CFI's decision violated
the principle of res judicata as well as the rule on
incontrovertibility of land titles under Act No. 496.
Respondent, on the other hand, denies the allegations of the
petition in its comment[16] dated August 6, 2002 and contends that
(a) the claim that the subject parcels of land are public agricultural
lands by virtue of a legislative grant is unfounded and baseless; (b)
the land registration court of Puerto Princesa, Palawan, was devoid
of jurisdictional competence to order titling of a portion of forest
land; (c) the CA is correct in declaring that there must be a prior
release of the subject lands for agricultural purposes; (d) the rules
on res judicata and the incontestability of Torrens titles do not find
proper applications in the exercise of the power of reversion by the
State; and (e) estoppel and laches will not operate against the State.
Respondent also reiterates its contention that collusion existed
between the parties in the proceedings below which prevented a
fair submission of the controversy, to the damage and prejudice of
the Republic.
At the outset, it must be emphasized that an action for reversion
filed by the State to recover property registered in favor of any
party which is part of the public forest or of a forest reservation
never prescribes. Verily, non-disposable public lands registered
under the Land Registration Act may be recovered by the State at
any time[17] and the defense of res judicata would not apply as
courts have no jurisdiction to dispose of such lands of the public
domain.[18] That being said, it must likewise be kept in mind that in
an action to annul a judgment, the burden of proving the
judgment's nullity rests upon the petitioner. The petitioner has to
establish by clear and convincing evidence that the judgment being
challenged is fatally defective.[19]
Under the facts and circumstances of this case, the Court finds that
respondent met the required burden of proof. Consequently, the
CA did not err in granting respondent's petition to annul the
decision of the land registration court. This petition for review,
therefore, lacks merit.
Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act upon which petitioners
anchor their claim states:
Sec. 48. The following-described citizens of the Philippines,
occupying lands of the public domain or claiming to own any such
lands or an interest therein, but whose titles have not been
perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance of
the province where the land is located for confirmation of their
claims and the issuance of a certificate of title therefor, under the
Land Registration Act, to wit:
xxx
(b) Those who, by themselves or through their predecessors-in-
interest, have been in continuous, exclusive, and notorious
possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public
domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition or ownership, for at
least thirty years immediately preceding the filing of the
application for confirmation of title, except when prevented by war
or force majeure. Those shall be conclusively presumed to have
performed all the conditions essential to a government grant and
shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this
chapter.
The above provision clearly requires the concurrence of two
things: (1) that the land sought to be registered is public
agricultural land, and (2) that the applicant seeking registration
must have possessed and occupied the same for at least thirty years
prior to the filing of the application. That the petitioners, through
Pedro S. Palanca, have been in possession of the properties since
1934 is not disputed. What is in doubt is the compliance with the
first requisite.
To reiterate, the validity of the CFI decision was impugned on the
basis of the court's lack of jurisdiction. If the properties were
alienable public lands, then the CFI, acting as a land registration
court, had jurisdiction over them and could validly confirm
petitioners' imperfect title. Otherwise, if the properties were indeed
public forests, then the CA was correct in declaring that the land
registration court never acquired jurisdiction over the subject
matter of the case and, as a result, its decision decreeing the
registration of the properties in favor of petitioners would be null
and void.
The reason for this is the fact that public forests are inalienable
public lands. The possession of public forests on the part of the
claimant, however long, cannot convert the same into private
property.[20] Possession in such an event, even if spanning decades
or centuries, could never ripen into ownership.[21] It bears stressing
that unless and until the land classified as forest is released in an
official proclamation to that effect so that it may form part of the
disposable lands of the public domain, the rules on confirmation of
imperfect title do not apply.[22]
In the present case, Land Classification Map No. 839, Project 2-
A[23] indicated that the Talampulan and Capari Islands on which
the properties were located were unclassified public lands as of
December 9, 1929. It was by virtue of Executive Proclamation No.
219 issued on July 2, 1967 that these islands were subsequently
classified as national reserves. Based on these, it becomes evident
that the subject properties have never been released for public
disposition. Obviously, from the time that petitioners and their
predecessor-in-interest were occupying the properties in 1934 until
the time that an application for registration was filed in 1973, these
properties remained as inalienable public lands.
While it is true that the land classification map does not
categorically state that the islands are public forests, the fact that
they were unclassified lands leads to the same result. In the
absence of the classification as mineral or timber land, the land
remains unclassified land until released and rendered open to
disposition.[24] When the property is still unclassified, whatever
possession applicants may have had, and however long, still cannot
ripen into private ownership.[25] This is because, pursuant to
Constitutional precepts, all lands of the public domain belong to
the State, and the State is the source of any asserted right to
ownership in such lands and is charged with the conservation of
such patrimony.[26] Thus, the Court has emphasized the need to
show in registration proceedings that the government, through a
positive act, has declassified inalienable public land into disposable
land for agricultural or other purposes.[27]
Petitioners' reliance upon Ramos v. Director of Lands[28] and
Ankron v. Government[29] is misplaced. These cases were decided
under the Philippine Bill of 1902 and the first Public Land Act No.
926 enacted by the Philippine Commission on October 7, 1926,
under which there was no legal provision vesting in the Chief
Executive or President of the Philippines the power to classify
lands of the public domain into mineral, timber and agricultural so
that the courts then were free to make corresponding classifications
in justiciable cases, or were vested with implicit power to do so,
depending upon the preponderance of the evidence.
As petitioners themselves admit, registration of the properties is
sought under Commonwealth Act No. 141. Sections 6 and 7 of the
Act provide as follows:
Section 6. The President, upon the recommendation of the
Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce, shall from time to time
classify the lands of the public domain into
(a) Alienable or disposable,
(b) Timber, and
(c) Mineral lands,
and may at any time and in a like manner transfer such lands from
one class to another, for the purposes of their administration and
disposition.
Section 7. For the purposes of the administration and disposition of
alienable or disposable public lands, the President, upon
recommendation by the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce,
shall from time to time declare what lands are open to disposition
or concession under this Act.
Based on the foregoing, the classification or reclassification of
public lands into alienable or disposable, mineral or forest lands is
the exclusive prerogative of the Executive Department of the
government. Clearly, the courts no longer have the authority,
whether express or implied, to determine the classification of lands
of the public domain.[30]
To the Court's mind, petitioners have failed to present
incontrovertible proof that the lands they claimed had previously
been classified as alienable. The bare allegation of Alfonso Lucero
that a certification had been issued releasing the properties for
agricultural purposes is not sufficient to prove this fact. The best
evidence would be the document itself which, however, was not
produced in this case. It was error for the land registration court to
have taken Mr. Lucero's testimony at face value, absent any other
evidence to conclusively prove that the land had been released for
public disposition.
commenced sometime in 1934.
To reiterate, where there is a showing that lots sought to be
registered are part of the public domain, the applicant for land
registration under Section 48 of Commonwealth Act No. 141 must
secure a certification from the government that the lands claimed
to have been possessed by the applicant as owner for more than 30
years are alienable and disposable.[33] Petitioners' failure to do so in
this case, when taken with the evidence adduced by respondent
showing that the lands in question indeed remain part of the public
domain and form part of the national reserves, confirms that the
CFI never acquired jurisdiction to order the registration of such
lands in favor of petitioners, and certainly justifies their reversion
to the State.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. No
costs.
SO ORDERED.

Furthermore, it must be pointed out that petitioners' contention that

the State has the burden to prove that the land which it avers to be
of public domain is really of such nature applies only in instances
where the applicant has been in possession of the property since
time immemorial. When referring to this type of possession, it
means possession of which no person living has seen the beginning
and the existence of which such person has learned from the latter's
elders.[31] Immemorial possession justifies the presumption that the
land had never been part of the public domain or that it had been
private property even before the Spanish conquest.[32] The
possession of petitioners in this case does not fall under the above-
named exception as their possession, by their own admission, only