Women, People, and Humans

A Response to Witts Metaphysics of Gender*

Dan Lpez de Sa

ICREA & Universitat de Barcelona

Two central tenets of Witts book The Metaphysics of Gender (2011) are, first, that gender is
essential, in a certain sense, to the social individuals we are; and, second, that the coherence
of the first tenet matters for the project of political and social change directed against the
discrimination of women.

In what follows I will mainly be concerned to clarify and criticize Witts first tenet. I will
first present her broadly Aristotelian conception of a property being unification essential to a
new individual, over and above previously and independently existing entities. This she calls
uniessentialism. According to Witt, gender is uniessential to the social individuals we are.
Hence each woman is a new existent, distinct from the corresponding person, which is in turn
a new existent, distinct from the corresponding human organism (section 1).

Next I will present what I take to be Witts central argument for this metaphysical view.
In response, I will argue that women can be identical to people, Witts arguments to the
contrary notwithstanding. As we will see, on the face of it, she here follows a common
pattern of argument from essentialist modal intuitions to non-identity claims. The statue is not
identical to the piece of clay, we are often told, since the latter could exist even if the former
were destroyed (see Robertson & Atkins (2013) and references therein). Likewise for the
woman and the personand, indeed, for the person and the human organismon Witts
apparent view (section 2).

*
[Acknowledgements.]

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 Cudd (2012) expresses some misgivings about the modal premise in the case of gender,
suggesting that, arguably, people are themselves essentially social. Sympathetic as one may
be with Cudds concern, I think there is a more basic problem with all arguments that
exemplify the pattern just outlined. Following Sveinsdtters (2012) response to Witt, I will
illustrate my concern with the case of phase concepts and termssuch as, plausibly, being a
student, being married, or being the Head of the Departmentwhich may apply to
independently existing entities. As we will see, analogous arguments could be made
involving phases; but few would be willing to endorse the conclusion that, say, the Head of
the Department is numerically distinct from the person occupying the relevant office. Thus,
in general, such modal arguments fall short of establishing the non-identity claims in
question, and hence fail to support uniessentialism proper. Rather, they only establish soft
essentialism, as I will call it, which is significantly weaker (section 3).

More recently, Witt (2012) has clarified that her argument is not modal but rather
normative in character, as it involves the kind of norms that govern the social roles that social
individuals occupy. I will argue, however, that the view that norms are constitutive of social
kinds, plausible as this may be, similarly falls short of establishing that each woman is a new
individual, distinct from the corresponding person (and the corresponding human organism),
as cases involving phases again illustrate (section 4).

I conclude by briefly considering the significance of this result for Witts view about the
importance of the coherence of gender essentialism for opposing discrimination against
women (section 5).

1. What is Uniessentialism?

According to Witt, it is important to distinguish our thinking about essence in connection

with kinds, and in connection with individuals:

First, we can think about essences in relation to kinds, and we can ask whether a collection of individuals
constitutes a kind that is defined by a common and unique property (or properties). An essence in this
sense is a property that determines kind membership. (p. 5)

Witt contends that certain popular arguments against gender essentialism as kind essentialism
fail to establish their conclusions. More generally one might think that, given an
appropriately liberal understanding of properties (and kinds, and defining), such kind

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essentialism would trivialize. Arbitrary collections of individuals would constitute kinds, and
kinds would be defined by common and unique properties.

Witt anticipates this concern in the following footnote, attached to the quoted
characterization:

I differentiate here among collections (e.g., the objects in my garage) that are arbitrary groupings of things,
kinds (e.g., red things) that are grouping based on a property that defines its members, and natural kinds
(e.g. biological species) that are kinds based on a non-arbitrary, explanatory or causal property. These are
not uncontroversial distinctions but since I am not developing a theory of kind essentialism, they are not
central to my purpose and I wont say more about them. (p. 5, fn. 2)

As may be clear from the examples provided, such a distinction would certainly not be
uncontroversial. Why should the collection of red things be a kind defined by a property,
presumably that of being red, while, in contrast, the collection of the objects in my garage
failed to be a kind defined by a propertysay, that of being an object in my garage?
Moreover, it is unclear why either of these collections would fail to be a natural kind, in the
specified sense, given that each clearly could figure in useful, relevant, law-like explanations,
in appropriate contexts. But these seem to be pressing questions only for proponents of kind
essentialism.

Witts own project, in contrast, concerns the idea of a property being essential to an
individual, and in particular of gender being essential to the social individuals we are:

A second notion of essence is that of a property or characteristic that makes an individual the individual
that it is. An essence in this sense is a special kind of property of an individual; the property is necessary,
or it tells us what the individual is fundamentally. (p. 5)

The crucial questionWhat makes an individual the individual it is?can in turn be

understood in at least two ways:

The first way, which yields a view I call uniessentialism, originates with Aristotle. For Aristotle the
question what is it? asked of an individual substance expands into a question about the unity and
organization of material parts into a new individual.

The second interpretation, which yields a view I call identity essentialism, is associated with Kripke.
For Kripke the questionWhat makes an individual the individual it is? concerns the identity of the
individual.

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 Aristotle explains why a new individual exists at all over and above the sum of its material constituents
or parts. In contrast, Kripke begins with an existing individual, and asks about which of that individuals
properties are necessary to be that very individual. (p. 7, my underlines)

Accordingly, when a property is uniessential to an individual, the very existence of that

individual is generated by the instantiation of the property in question, beyond the existence
of any individuals that already existed and perhaps remain in place in somewhat relevant
ways. This crucially contrasts with the idea that a property is essential for an independently
existing individual to enter a certain phase. Let me illustrate.

Traditionally, it is thought plausible that there be uniessences for members of so-called

natural kinds: biological organisms, chemical elements, and the like. The very existence of
each such individual is generated, it seems to many, by the instantiation of the property in
question. For instance, many would hold that having a certain genotype or atomic number is
uniessential to any particular tiger or atom of gold: it is by instantiating the property in
question that those individuals come into existence, over and above any independently
existing sums of their parts.

In contrast, many would find it plausible that what is essential for something to be a
student is not uniessential to that individual. Despite how we sometimes talk, what is
essential to the student is not a property whose instantiation makes it the case that a new
entity comes into existence, beyond what was already there, but rather a property whose
instantiation makes it the case that something enters the phase of being a student, usually for
a limited period of time. Mutatis mutandis, it would seem, for the Head of the Department
and other similar cases.

Things are (even) more controversial in the case of artifacts. Consider the example of a
house that Witt herself uses to introduce uniessentialism:

Why do these materials constitute a house? [ T]he answer is that they realize the functional property that
defines being a house, which is to shelter humans and animals. Being a shelter for humans and animals is
what makes these materials a house rather than a heap of stuff or a sum of parts. The house functional
property explains why a new, unified individual exists at all. (p. 6, my underlines)

That the functional property that defines being a house, say, sheltering human and animals, is
uniessential to a given house, requires that the very existence of the house, over and above
the existence of its constituents and their sum or aggregate, is generated by the instantiation
of this property. The property is not uniessential, in the specified sense, if it gives those

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constituents such unity and organization so as to make their (independently existing) sum or
aggregate a house. To emphasize: Witts view, according to which the functional property is
uniessential to a house, requires that its instantiation gives rise to the very existence of the
house, as a new individualand thus contrasts with the view that the property is merely
essential for something to be a house, i.e. to undergo that phase.

In what follows we will be concerned with the question of which kind of argument would
support uniessentialism, in this sense. The point here is just to illustrate the contrast between
this view and a related but crucially distinct alternative. In fact, and to anticipate, the
alternative view may be more intuitively plausible in some cases, for instance precisely in the
case of artifacts.

As it will be crucial for my following discussion, let me reinforce the distinction with a
perhaps simpler example, also discussed in the literature: a stone used as a paperweight.
Functioning to keep loose papers in place, say, is uniessential to the paperweight only if the
paperweight is something over and above all other individuals already in place, in particular
the stone. So uniessentialism here requires that the paperweight not be identical to the stone
that is used as, well, a paperweight. This contrasts with the view that functioning to keep
loose papers in place turns a preexisting individual, namely the stone, into a paperweight.

2. What is Gender Uniessentialism?

According to Witt, genders are social positions, defined in terms of different socially
mediated reproductive functions of individuals (p. 29). Hence, assuming that man and
woman are gender terms, being a man and being a woman are such positions:

Being a man and being a woman are social positions with bifurcated social norms that cluster around the
engendering function. To be a woman is to be recognized as having a body that plays one role in the
engendering function; women conceive and bear. To be a man is to be recognized as having a body that
plays another role in the engendering function; men beget. (p. 40)

Gender is uniessential to the social individuals we are only if our very existence is generated
by our occupying such social positions. In particular, if gender is uniessential to us, then men
and women are new individuals, over and above the corresponding people. To put it more
bluntly: men and women are not people (where are expresses identity). This contrasts with

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the view that having a gender makes an independently existing individual, say a person, be a
man or a woman.

The core of Witts argument for gender uniessentialism is, I think, contained in the
following passage:

Social individuals are essentially relational beings and their existence is dependent upon the existence of
social reality. In contrast, to be a person is essentially to have a first-person perspective (self-
consciousness), which refers to an individuals internal psychological condition or state. An individual
person could exist independently of social reality because having a first-person perspective does not
require the existence of the social world, but a social individual could not exist independently of a set of
social positions and roles. Social individuals and persons have different persistence and identity conditions.
Hence, social individuals and persons are ontologically distinct individuals. (pp. 55-6)

3. Modal Arguments for Uniessentialism?

As foreshadowed, on the face of it, this may seem to be an instance of a familiar pattern of
argument from modal intuitions to non-identity claims. Supposedly, the statue is not identical
to the piece of clay, given that the latter could exist even if the former were destroyed.
Similarly, appearances might suggest, Witt here contends that men and women are not
identical to people, given that men and women could not exist independently of social reality,
whereas people could.

Cudd (2012) provides reasons to doubt the modal premise in the case of gender. In
particular, she questions whether an individual person could exist independently of social
reality. I sympathize with her concern, but let us set it aside here, and grant this assumption to
Witt. As I already said, familiar as this pattern of argument may be, there is a more general
problem for all such arguments. The worry has been variously elaborated, but is nicely hinted
at by Hirsch:

We might consider, for instance, comparisons and contrasts between how we talk about making a table
and making a fist. (For example, a table can be made and can be destroyed, but do we talk about
destroying a fist?) (2002, p. 67)

Very few would be tempted to think that by closing ones fingers in the familiar way, a new
entity comes into existence, the fist, over and above the hand, which merely constitutes it.
Yet, the worry is, this is what the pattern of argument under consideration would lead us to
conclude.

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 Sveinsdtter illustrates this general concern with phases concerning people (and humans)
and some of their social roles:

Being a student has different essential features from that of being a human being. Anna is a human
being, a person, and a social individual. Anna is also a student. Why not say that Anna the student will
cease to be when she ceases to go to school but that now she is happily cohabiting with Anna the human,
Anna the person, and Anna the social individual? Arent being a person and being a social individual more
like being a student, properties that human beings can acquire?

The argument for all these three being distinct is that they are not coextensive and that they differ in
modal properties. And that is all well and good. But so is being a student and being a human being. Not all
humans are students, and if you count dogs in the circus school in San Francisco, not all students are
humans. (2012, p. 3)

The reason why such modal arguments fail to establish the relevant non-identities is that the
essentialist intuitions they appeal to are at best neutral between de dicto and de re
readings, as it were (Varzi 2000), or conflate ideas about the essences of individuals with
ideas about the essences of the kinds to which they belong (Jubien 2001). Ignoring some
nuances, it is intuitively true that students essentially study, but this had better not require that
the individuals that are students are such that each of them essentially studies, for very
plausibly they are not. Rather, studying is simply essential to being a student, and only in that
sense is the former property essential to any student. Students essentially study, while people
only accidentally study. Yet students can be people. And this is so because studying may be
essential to a student, in the sense of being essential for her to be a student, without that
student being a new thing, distinct from the person who studies. That is to say, studying may
be essential to a student without being uniessential to her.

I propose to label as soft essentialism the kind of view that would also be exemplified by
cases involving the kind of phases we are considering:

A property is soft essential to an F iff it is essential for something to be F.

If a feature is uniessential to (the individual which is) an F, as we have seen, it is essential for
the very existence of that very individual, over and above all other existents (and hence, as a
consequence, for that individual to be F). In other words, if a property is uniessential to an F,
then it is soft essential to that F. So soft essentialism is compatible with uniessentialism. But,
as I have already argued, a property can be soft-essential to an F without being uniessential to

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it, by just being essential for some (independently existing) thing to be F. So soft essentialism
is weaker than uniessentialism.

The relevant modal intuitions only support soft essentialism. It is plausible enough that
functioning to shelter is essential to a house, and that functioning to keep loose papers in
place is essential to a paperweight. Similarly, studying is essential to a student, and, we are
supposing, being a woman is essential to a certain kind of social individual. But all of these
claims fall short of vindicating the corresponding uniessentialist claims.

4. Normative Arguments for Uniessentialism?

In a recent response to Sveinsdttir, Witt has clarified that her argument was not meant to be
modal, but rather normative in character, as it involves the kind of norms that govern the
social roles that social individuals occupy:

When a social individual occupies the social role of being a student or being a fashionista, she becomes
responsive to and evaluable under new sets of norms, but they are social norms and not norms of an
essentially different kind. So the argument that I make to differentiate human organisms, social individuals
and persons is not applicable to these examples, and my trinitarian ontology does not license open-ended
ontological multiplication of the kind Sveinsdttir envisions. (2012, p. 8, my underline)

The thought seems to be the following: a woman is a new thing, over and above the person,
while a student is not a new thing, over and above the woman. The argument for this is not
one of the sort considered in the previous section, which attempted to establish the relevant
non-identity from certain modal intuitions; because such an argument would arguably
establish the non-identity of the woman and the person only to the extent that it would
likewise establish the non-identity of the student and the woman. And, as we have just seen,
it actually did neither, securing only soft essentialism as opposed to uniessentialism for the
property in question. The reason why Witt considers each woman to be distinct from the
corresponding person, it appears, is that the norms constitutive of being a woman are social,
while (let us grant) the norms constitutive of being a person are not, and are thus norms of an
essentially different kind. By contrast, the reason why a student is not distinct from the
corresponding woman is that the kind of norms constitutive of being a student are social, and
thus not of an essentially different kind than those constitutive of being a woman. Thus, I take

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it, the view is that a new entity comes to exist, over and above all the rest, when the kind of
norms constitutive of the kind of thing in question are essentially different.

I sympathize with the view that social norms are constitutive of social kinds (see
Thomasson 2014). And although the notion of an essentially different kind of constitutive
norms may require further elaboration, I am happy to grant that the norms constitutive of
social kinds are of an essentially different kind than the norms constitutive of non-social
kinds (if such there be). Interesting as this view of social reality may be in its own right, I
doubt that its truth would affect the present dialectical situation. For it seems to me that, as
we have seen with the familiar modal arguments, normative arguments of the envisaged sort
by themselves similarly fail to establish uniessentialism. And the main reason is as before:
they seem to support only soft essentialism, as can be illustrated with essentially the same
kind of examples considered above.

Take again the case of a paperweight. Assume that public artifacts, perhaps as
opposed to merely private tools, are indeed social kinds constituted by certain social norms.
For a stone to be a paperweight as a public artifact, it is not enough, perhaps, that one uses it
as a paperweight. Rather it has to be subject to certain norms concerning how and how not to
treat it. Only when those further social conditions are met, does the stone truly become a
paperweight. Even assuming the normative view just outlined, very few would accept that the
paperweight is a new object that comes into existence, distinct from the stone. Rather, on the
normative view, certain social conditions are needed for the stone to become, as well, a
paperweightto enter the phase of being a paperweight, or to count as a paperweight. But
clearly the social norms constitutive of being a paperweight are of an essentially different
kind than the (non-social) norms constitutive of being a stone (if such there be).

To reinforce the point, consider the social conditions needed for a clenched fist to be a
raised fist symbol. As we saw, very few would regard the clenched fist as a new thing, over
and above the hand. But similarly, very few would regard the raised fist symbol as a new
thing, over and above the clenched fist. More plausibly, certain social conditions are needed
for the clenched fist to become, as well, a raised fist symbolto enter the phase of being a
raised fist symbol, or to count as a raised fist symbol. But clearly, the social norms
constitutive of being a raised fist symbol are of an essentially different kind than the (non-
social) norms constitutive of being a clenched fist (if such there be).

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 To sum up, interesting as the normative view on social kinds may be in its own right, the
normative argument just considered falls short of establishing the relevant non-identity, given
that it is compatible with the view that the social kind is a phase of a (non-social)
independently existing individual. In other words, we again have only the materials for an
argument for soft essentialism, as opposed to one for uniessentialism proper.

5. Significance of Uniessentialism?

As we have seen, Witt contends that gender is uniessential to the social individuals we are,
and thus that women are new things, over and above human organisms and persons. I have
argued that both the modal argument and the normative argument fall short of establishing
the required non-identity. I now want to suggest that, even if I am right, this may be less
worrisome for Witts practical project than she suggests.

Witt asks herself:

What is lost or missing in the simpler ontological picture of human organisms and persons? (2011, p. 66)

She answers:

In the preceding pages I have argued that the question of gender essentialism cannot be coherently
formulated either in relation to persons or in relation to human organisms. If an intelligible or coherent
formulation of the claim of gender essentialism is important for feminist theory, then this is one reason to
find the simpler ontology lacking. (p. 67)

Mikkola (2012) has questioned the antecedent of that final conditional, giving reason to doubt
the importance of gender for opposing discrimination against women. Be that as it may, soft
gender essentialism clearly can be coherently formulated in relation to people (and human
organisms). So even if we were to follow Witt in assigning such political importance to
gender, we should still say that women can be identical to people.

References

Cudd, Ann E. (2012): Comments on Charlotte Witt, The Metaphysics of Gender, Symposia
on Gender, Race, and Philosophy 8/2, http://web.mit.edu/~sgrp/2012/no2/Cudd0512.pdf

Hirsch, Eli (2002): Quantifier Variance and Realism, Philosophical Issues 12, 51.73

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Jubien, Michael (2001): Thinking About Things. Philosophical Perspectives 15 (2001): 1-
15.

Mikkola, Mari (2012): How Essential is Gender Essentialism?, Symposia on Gender, Race,
and Philosophy 8/2, http://web.mit.edu/~sgrp/2012/no2/Mikkola0512.pdf

Robertson, Teresa and Atkins, Philip (2013): Essential vs. Accidental Properties, The
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2013 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.),
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2013/entries/essential-accidental

Sveinsdtter, sta (2012): Comments on Charlotte Witt, The Metaphysics of Gender,

Symposia on Gender, Race, and Philosophy 8/2,
http://web.mit.edu/~sgrp/2012/no2/Sveinsdottir0512.pdf

Thomasson, Amie (2014): "Public Artifacts, Intentions and Norms", in Pieter Vermaas et. al.,
eds. Artefact Kinds. Springer: Synthese Library, Forthcoming.

Varzi, Achille (2000): Mereological Commitments, Dialectica 54, 283305.

Witt, Charlotte (2011): The Metaphysics of Gender, OUP

Witt, Charlotte (2012): The Metaphysics of Gender: Replies to Critics, Symposia on

Gender, Race, and Philosophy 8/2, http://web.mit.edu/~sgrp/2012/no2/Witt0512.pdf

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