Solivio v.

CA

This case involves the estate of the late novelist, Esteban Javellana, Jr.,
author of the first post-war Filipino novel "Without Seeing the Dawn," who
died a bachelor, without descendants, ascendants, brothers, sisters,
nephews or nieces. His only surviving relatives are: (1) his maternal aunt,
petitioner Celedonia Solivio, the spinster half-sister of his mother, Salustia
Solivio; and (2) the private respondent, Concordia Javellana-Villanueva, sister
of his deceased father, Esteban Javellana, Sr.

He was a posthumous child. His father died barely ten (10) months after his
marriage in December, 1916 to Salustia Solivio and four months before
Esteban, Jr. was born.

Salustia and her sister, Celedonia (daughter of Engracio Solivio and his
second wife Josefa Fernandez), a teacher in the Iloilo Provincial High School,
brought up Esteban, Jr.

Salustia brought to her marriage paraphernal properties (various parcels of

land in Calinog, Iloilo covered by 24 titles) which she had inherited from her
mother, Gregoria Celo, Engracio Solivio's first wife but no conjugal property
was acquired during her short-lived marriage to Esteban, Sr.

Salustia died, leaving all her properties to her only child, Esteban, Jr.,
including a house and lot where she, her son, and her sister lived. In due
time, the titles of all these properties were transferred in the name of
Esteban, Jr.

During his lifetime, Esteban, Jr. had, more than once, expressed to his aunt
Celedonia and some close friends his plan to place his estate in a foundation
to honor his mother and to help poor but deserving students obtain a college
education. Unfortunately, he died of a heart attack without having set up the
foundation.

Two weeks after his funeral, Concordia and Celedonia talked about what to
do with Esteban's properties. Celedonia told Concordia about Esteban's
desire to place his estate in a foundation. Pursuant to their agreement that
Celedonia would take care of the proceedings leading to the formation of the
foundation, Celedonia in good faith and upon the advice of her counsel, filed
for her appointment as special administratrix of the estate of Esteban. Later,
she filed an amended petition praying that letters of administration be issued
to her; that she be declared sole heir of the deceased and that the estate be
adjudicated to her. Rtc RULED IN HER FAVOR.
Four months later, Concordia Javellana Villanueva filed a motion for
reconsideration of the court's order declaring Celedonia as "sole heir" of
Esteban, Jr., because she too was an heir of the deceased. RTC ruled in favor
of Concordia. CA affirmed.

ISSUE:

whether the decedent's properties were subject to reserva troncal in favor of

Celedonia, his relative within the third degree on his mother's side from
whom he had inherited them

HELD: No.

The persons involved in reserva troncal are:

1. The person obliged to reserve is the reservor (reservista)the ascendant

who inherits by operation of law property from his descendants.

2. The persons for whom the property is reserved are the

reservees (reservatarios)relatives within the third degree counted from the
descendant (propositus), and belonging to the line from which the property
came.

3. The propositusthe descendant who received by gratuitous title and died

without issue, making his other ascendant inherit by operation of law.

Clearly, the property of the deceased, Esteban Javellana, Jr., is not reservable
property, for Esteban, Jr. was not an ascendant, but the descendant of his
mother, Salustia Solivio, from whom he inherited the properties in
question. Therefore, he did not hold his inheritance subject to a reservation
in favor of his aunt, Celedonia Solivio, who is his relative within the third
degree on his mother's side. The reserva troncal applies to properties
inherited by an ascendant from a descendant who inherited it from another
ascendant or brother or sister. It does not apply to property inherited by a
descendant from his ascendant.

Since the deceased, Esteban Javellana, Jr., died without descendants,

ascendants, illegitimate children, surviving spouse, brothers, sisters,
nephews or nieces, what should apply in the distribution of his estate are
Articles 1003 and 1009 of the Civil Code which provide:
ART. 1003. If there are no descendants, ascendants, illegitimate children, or a
surviving spouse, the collateral relatives shall succeed to the entire estate of
the deceased in accordance with the following articles.

ART. 1009. Should there be neither brothers nor sisters, nor children of
brothers or sisters, the other collateral relatives shall succeed to the estate.

The latter shall succeed without distinction of lines or preference among

them by reason of relationship by the whole blood.

Both plaintiff-appellee and defendant-appellant being relatives of the

decedent within the third degree in the collateral line, each, therefore, shall
succeed to the subject estate 'without distinction of line or preference among
them by reason of relationship by the whole blood,' and is entitled one-half
(1/2) share and share alike of the estate.
Nieva v. Alcala

Juliana Nieva, the alleged natural mother of the plaintiff Segunda Maria
Nieva, married Francisco Deocampo. Of said marriage Alfeo Deocampo was
born.

Julian Nieva died intestate and her said son, Alfeo Deocampo, inherited from
her, ab intestate, the parcels of land.

Alfeo Deocampo died intestate. Thereupon the two parcels of land above-
mentioned passed to his father, Francisco Deocampo, by intestate
succession. Thereafter Francisco Deocampo married the herein defendant
Manuela Alcala, of which marriage was born Jose Deocampo, the other
defendant herein.

Francisco Deocampo died, whereupon his widow and son, the defendants
herein, took possession of the parcels of land in question, under the claim
that the said son, the defendant Jose Deocampoo (a minor) had inherited the
same, ab intestate, from his deceased father.

the plaintiff herein, claiming to be an acknowledged natural daughter of the

said Juliana Nieva, instituted the present action for the purposes of
recovering from the defendants the parcels of land, invoking the provisions
of article 811 of the Civil Code.

The lower court held that, even granting, without deciding, that the plaintiff
was an acknowledged natural daughter of Juliana Nieva, she was not entitled
to the property here in question because, in its opinion, an illegitimate
relative has no right to the reserva troncal under the provisions of article 811
of the Civil Code.

ISSUE:

1. Whether plaintiff is an acknowledged natural daughter of the deceased

Juliana Nieva.

2. whether or not an illegitimate relative within the third degree is entitled to

the reserva troncal provided for by article 811 of the Civil Code.

HELD:

1. Yes. It appears from the record that the said Juliana Nieva, while
unmarried, gave birth to the plaintiff, and that the plaintiff was duly baptized
as her natural daughter, of unknown father; that the said Juliana Nieva
nourished and reared her said child, the plaintiff herein; that the plaintiff
lived with her said mother until the latter was married to Francisco
Deocampo; that the said mother treated the plaintiff, and exhibited her
publicly, as a legitimate daughter.

The foregoing facts, which are not controverted, are analogous to the facts in
the case of Llorente vs. Rodriguez (3 Phil., 697, 699). Under the decision of
this court in that case we are of the opinion and so decide, without
rediscussing here the law and legal principles involved, that the plaintiff
Segunda Maria Nieva is an acknowledged natural daughter of Juliana Nieva.

2.

The property here in question was inherited, by operation by law, by

Francisco Deocampo from his son Alfeo Deocampo, who, in turn, had
inherited it, in the same manner, from his mother Juliana Nieva, the natural
mother of the plaintiff. The plaintiff is the natural sister of Alfeo Deocampo,
and she belongs to the same line from which the property in question came.

There can be no question whatever but that, under said article 811 of the
Civil Code, the plaintiff would be entitled to the property in question if she
were a legitimate daughter of Julian Nieva. But in said article 811 the
legislator uses the generic terms "ascendant," "descendant," and "relatives,"
without specifying whether or not they have to be legitimate. Does the
legislator, then, refer to legitimate as well as to illegitimate relatives?

This question, so far as our investigation shows, has not been decided before
by any court or tribunal. However, eminent commentators on the Spanish
Civil Code, who have devoted their lives to the study and solution of the
intricate and difficult problems that may arise under the provisions of that
Code, have dealt with the very question now before us, and are unanimous in
the opinion that the provision of article 811 of the Civil Code apply only
to legitimate relative. One of such commentators, undoubtedly the best
known of them all, is Manresa. We believe we can do no better than to adopt
his reasons and conclusions, in deciding the question before us.

It treats of blood relationship, which is applicable to questions on

succession, according to articles 915 to 920. It could not be otherwise,
because relationship by affinity is established between each spouse and the
family of the other, by marriage, and to admit it, would be to favor the
transmission of the properties of the family of one spouse to that of the
other, which is just what the article intends to prevent.
It also treats of legitimate relationship. The person obliged to reserve it is
a legitimate ascendant who inherits from a descendant property which
proceeds from the same legitimate family, and this being true, there can
be no question, because the line from which the properties proceed must be
the line of that family and only in favor of that line is the reservation
established.

Further, Article 943, above referred to by Manresa, provides as follows:

A natural or legitimated child has no right to succeed ab intestate the

legitimate children and relatives of the father or mother who has
acknowledged it; nor shall such children or relatives so inherit from the
natural or legitimated child.

To hold that the appellant is entitled to the property left by her natural
brother, Alfeo Deocampo, by operation of law, would be a fragrant violate of
the express provision of the foregoing article (943).
Tioco v. Camacho

1. The defendant Dalisay D. Tongko-Camacho and the plaintiffs, Francisco

Tioco de Papa, Manuel Tioco and Nicolas Tioco, are legitimate relatives,
plaintiffs being said defendant's grandaunt and granduncles.

2. Plaintiffs and defendant Dalisay D. Tongo-Camacho have as a common

ancestor the late Balbino Tioco (who had a sister by the name of Romana
Tioco), father of plaintiffs and great grandfather of defendant.

3. Romana Tioco during her lifetime gratuitously donated four (4) parcels of
land to her niece Toribia Tioco (legitimate sister of plaintiffs)

4. Toribia Tioco died intestate , survived by her husband, Eustacio Dizon, and
their two legitimate children, Faustino Dizon and Trinidad Dizon (mother of
defendant Dalisay D, Tongko-Camacho) and leaving the afore-mentioned four
(4) parcels of land as the inheritance of her said two children in equal pro-
indiviso shares.

5. Balbino Tioco died intestate, survived by his legitimate children by his wife
Marciana Felix (among them plaintiffs) and legitimate grandchildren Faustino
Dizon and Trinidad Dizon. In the partition of his estate, three (3) parcels of
land were adjudicated as the inheritance of the late Toribia Tioco, but as she
had predeceased her father, Balbino Tioco, the said three (3) parcels of land
devolved upon her two legitimate children Faustino Dizon and Trinidad Dizon
in equal pro-indiviso shares.

6. Faustino Dizon died intestate, single and without issue, leaving his one-
half (1/2) pro-indiviso share in the seven (7) parcels of land above-mentioned
to his father, Eustacio Dizon, as his sole intestate heir, who received the said
property subject to a reserva troncal

7. Trinidad Dizon-Tongko died intestate, and her rights and interests in the
parcels of land abovementioned were inherited by her only legitimate child,
defendant Dalisay D. Tongko-Camacho, subject to the usufructuary right of
her surviving husband, defendant Primo Tongko.

8. Eustacio Dizon died intestate, survived his only legitimate descendant,

defendant Dalisay D. Tongko-Camacho.

9. The parties agree that defendant Dalisay D. Tongko-Camacho now owns

one-half (1/2) of all the seven (7) parcels of land abovementioned as her
inheritance from her mother, Trinidad Dizon-Tongko.
10. Defendant Dalisay D. Tongko-Camacho also claims, upon legal advice,
the other half of the said seven (7) parcels of land abovementioned by virtue
of the reserva troncal imposed thereon upon the death of Faustino Dizon and
under the laws on intestate succession; but the plaintiffs, also upon legal
advice, oppose her said claim because they claim three-fourths (3/4) of the
one-half pro-indiviso interest in said parcel of land, which interest was
inherited by Eustacio Dizon from Faustino Dizon, or three-eights (3/8) of the
said parcels of land, by virtue of their being also third degree relatives of
Faustino Dizon.

lower Court declared the plaintiffs Francisco Tioco, Manuel Tioco and Nicolas
Tioco, as well as the defendant Dalisay Tongko-Camacho, entitled,
as reservatarios, to one-half of the seven parcels of land in dispute, in equal
proportions.

ISSUE: Whether all relatives of thepraepositus within the third degree in the
appropriate line succeed without distinction to the reservable property upon
the death of the reservista, as seems to be implicit in Art. 811 of the Civil
Code

HELD:

The stated purpose of the reserva is accomplished once the property has
devolved to the specified relatives of the line of origin. But from this time on,
there is no further occasion for its application. In the relations between
one reservatario and another of the same degree there is no call for applying
Art. 891 any longer; wherefore, the respective share of each in the
reversionary property should be governed by the ordinary rules of intestate
succession. In this spirit the jurisprudence of this Court and that of Spain has
resolved that upon the death of the ascendant reservista, the reservable
property should pass, not to all the reservatarios as a class but only to those
nearest in degree to the descendant (prepositus), excluding
those reservatarios of more remote degree. And within the third degree of
relationship from the descendant (prepositus), the right of representation
operates in favor of nephews.

Following the order prescribed by law in legitimate succession when there

are relatives of the descendant within the third degree, the right of the
nearest relative, called reservatarios over the property which the reservista
(person holding it subject to reservation) should return to him, excludes that
of the one more remote. The right of representation cannot be alleged when
the one claiming same as a reservatario of the reservable property is not
among the relatives within the third degree belonging to the line from which
such property came, inasmuch as the right granted by the Civil Code in
Article 811 is in the highest degree personal and for the exclusive benefit of
designated persons who are within the third degree of the person from whom
the reservable property came. Therefore, relatives of the fourth and the
succeeding degrees can never be considered as reservatarios, since the law
does not recognize them as such.

In spite of what has been said relative to the right of representation on the
part of one alleging his right as reservatario who is not within the third
degree of relationship, nevertheless there is right of representation on the
part of reservatarios who are within the third degree mentioned by law, as in
the case of nephews of the deceased person from whom the reservable
property came. ... .

Proximity of degree and right of representation are basic principles of

ordinary intestate succession; so is the rule that whole blood brothers and
nephews are entitled to a share double that of brothers and nephews of half
blood. If in determining the rights of the reservatarios inter se, proximity of
degree and the right of representation of nephews are made to apply, the
rule of double share for immediate collaterals of the whole blood should be
likewise operative.

In other words, the reserva troncal merely determines the group of

relatives reservatarios to whom the property should be returned; but within
that group, the individual right to the property should be decided by the
applicable rules of ordinary intestate succession, since Art. 811 does not
specify otherwise. This conclusion is strengthened by the circumstance that
the reserva being an exceptional case, its application should be limited to
what is strictly needed to accomplish the purpose of the law.

Reversion of the reservable property being governed by the rules on

intestate succession, the plaintiffs-appellees must be held without any right
thereto because, as aunt and uncles, respectively, of Faustino Dizon
(the praepositus), they are excluded from the succession by his niece, the
defendant-appellant, although they are related to him within the same
degree as the latter.

As to the reservable property, the reservatarios do not inherit from

the reservista, but from the descendant praepositus. It is likewise
clear that the reservable property is no part of the estate of
the reservista, who may not dispose of it by will, as long as there
are reservatarios existing (Arroyo vs. Gerona, 58 Phil. 237). The latter,
therefore, do not inherit from the reservista, but from the
descendant prepositus, of whom the reservatarios are the heirs mortis causa,
subject to the condition that they must survive the reservista.