G.R. No.
135962 March 27, 2000
METROPOLITAN MANILA DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, petitioner,
vs.
BEL-AIR VILLAGE ASSOCIATION, INC., respondent.
PUNO, J.:
Not infrequently, the government is tempted to take legal shortcuts
solve urgent problems of the people. But even when government is
armed with the best of intention, we cannot allow it to run roughshod
over the rule of law. Again, we let the hammer fall and fall hard on the
illegal attempt of the MMDA to open for public use a private road in a
private subdivision. While we hold that the general welfare should be
promoted, we stress that it should not be achieved at the expense of
the rule of law.
Petitioner MMDA is a government agency tasked with the delivery of
basic services in Metro Manila. Respondent Bel-Air Village Association,
Inc. (BAVA) is a non-stock, non-profit corporation whose members are
homeowners in Bel-Air Village, a private subdivision in Makati City.
Respondent BAVA is the registered owner of Neptune Street, a road
inside Bel-Air Village.
On December 30, 1995, respondent received from petitioner, through
its Chairman, a notice dated December 22, 1995 requesting
respondent to open Neptune Street to public vehicular traffic starting
January 2, 1996. The notice reads:
SUBJECT: NOTICE of the Opening of Neptune Street to Traffic.
Dear President Lindo,
Please be informed that pursuant to the mandate of the MMDA
law or Republic Act No. 7924 which requires the Authority to
rationalize the use of roads and/or thoroughfares for the safe
and convenient movement of persons, Neptune Street shall be
opened to vehicular traffic effective January 2, 1996.
In view whereof, the undersigned requests you to voluntarily
open the points of entry and exit on said street.
Thank you for your cooperation and whatever assistance that
may be extended by your association to the MMDA personnel
who will be directing traffic in the area.
Finally, we are furnishing you with a copy of the handwritten
instruction of the President on the matter.
Very truly yours,
PROSPERO I. ORETA
Chairman 1
On the same day, respondent was apprised that the perimeter
wall separating the subdivision from the adjacent Kalayaan
Avenue would be demolished.
On January 2, 1996, respondent instituted against petitioner before the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 136, Makati City, Civil Case No. 96-001 for
injunction. Respondent prayed for the issuance of a temporary
restraining order and preliminary injunction enjoining the opening of
Neptune Street and prohibiting the demolition of the perimeter wall. The
trial court issued a temporary restraining order the following day.
On January 23, 1996, after due hearing, the trial court denied issuance
of a preliminary injunction. Respondent questioned the denial before
2
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 39549. The appellate court
conducted an ocular inspection of Neptune Street and on February 13,
3
1996, it issued a writ of preliminary injunction enjoining the
implementation of the MMDA's proposed action. 4
On January 28, 1997, the appellate court rendered a Decision on the
merits of the case finding that the MMDA has no authority to order the
opening of Neptune Street, a private subdivision road and cause the
demolition of its perimeter walls. It held that the authority is lodged in
the City Council of Makati by ordinance. The decision disposed of as
follows:
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED; the challenged Order
dated January 23, 1995, in Civil Case No. 96-001, is SET
ASIDE and the Writ of Preliminary Injunction issued on
February 13, 1996 is hereby made permanent.
For want of sustainable substantiation, the Motion to Cite
Roberto L. del Rosario in contempt is denied. 5
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED. 6
The Motion for Reconsideration of the decision was denied on
September 28, 1998. Hence, this recourse.
Petitioner MMDA raises the following questions:
I
HAS THE METROPOLITAN MANILA DEVELOPMENT
AUTHORITY (MMDA) THE MANDATE TO OPEN NEPTUNE
STREET TO PUBLIC TRAFFIC PURSUANT TO ITS
REGULATORY AND POLICE POWERS?
II
IS THE PASSAGE OF AN ORDINANCE A CONDITION
PRECEDENT BEFORE THE MMDA MAY ORDER THE
OPENING OF SUBDIVISION ROADS TO PUBLIC TRAFFIC?
III
IS RESPONDENT BEL-AIR VILLAGE ASSOCIATION, INC.
ESTOPPED FROM DENYING OR ASSAILING THE
AUTHORITY OF THE MMDA TO OPEN THE SUBJECT
STREET?
IV
WAS RESPONDENT DEPRIVED OF DUE PROCESS
DESPITE THE SEVERAL MEETINGS HELD BETWEEN
MMDA AND THE AFFECTED EEL-AIR RESIDENTS AND
BAVA OFFICERS?
V
HAS RESPONDENT COME TO COURT WITH UNCLEAN
HANDS? 7
Neptune Street is owned by respondent BAVA. It is a private road
inside Bel-Air Village, a private residential subdivision in the heart of the
financial and commercial district of Makati City. It runs parallel to
Kalayaan Avenue, a national road open to the general public. Dividing
the two (2) streets is a concrete perimeter wall approximately fifteen
(15) feet high. The western end of Neptune Street intersects Nicanor
Garcia, formerly Reposo Street, a subdivision road open to public
vehicular traffic, while its eastern end intersects Makati Avenue, a
national road. Both ends of Neptune Street are guarded by iron gates.
Petitioner MMDA claims that it has the authority to open Neptune Street
to public traffic because it is an agent of the state endowed with police
power in the delivery of basic services in Metro Manila. One of these
basic services is traffic management which involves the regulation of
the use of thoroughfares to insure the safety, convenience and welfare
of the general public. It is alleged that the police power of MMDA was
affirmed by this Court in the consolidated cases of Sangalang
v. Intermediate Appellate Court. From the premise that it has police
8
power, it is now urged that there is no need for the City of Makati to
enact an ordinance opening Neptune street to the public. 9
Police power is an inherent attribute of sovereignty. It has been defined
as the power vested by the Constitution in the legislature to make,
ordain, and establish all manner of wholesome and reasonable laws,
statutes and ordinances, either with penalties or without, not repugnant
to the Constitution, as they shall judge to be for the good and welfare of
the commonwealth, and for the subjects of the same. The power is
10
plenary and its scope is vast and pervasive, reaching and justifying
measures for public health, public safety, public morals, and the
general welfare. 11
It bears stressing that police power is lodged primarily in the National
Legislature. It cannot be exercised by any group or body of individuals
12
not possessing legislative power. The National Legislature,
13
however, may delegate this power to the President and administrative
boards as well as the lawmaking bodies of municipal corporations or
local government units. Once delegated, the agents can
14
exercise only such legislative powers as are conferred on them by the
national lawmaking body. 15
A local government is a "political subdivision of a nation or state which
is constituted by law and has substantial control of local affairs." The
16
Local Government Code of 1991 defines a local government unit as a
"body politic and corporate." one endowed with powers as a
17
political subdivision of the National Government and as a corporate
entity representing the inhabitants of its territory. Local government
18
units are the provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays. They are
19
also the territorial and political subdivisions of the state.
20
Our Congress delegated police power to the local government units in
the Local Government Code of 1991. This delegation is found in
Section 16 of the same Code, known as the general welfare clause, viz:
Sec. 16. General Welfare. Every local government unit shall
exercise the powers expressly granted, those necessarily
implied therefrom, as well as powers necessary, appropriate, or
incidental for its efficient and effective governance, and those
which are essential to the promotion of the general welfare.
Within their respective territorial jurisdictions, local government
units shall ensure and support, among other things, the
preservation and enrichment of culture, promote health and
safety, enhance the right of the people to a balanced ecology,
encourage and support the development of appropriate and
self-reliant scientific and technological capabilities, improve
public morals, enhance economic prosperity and social justice,
promote full employment among their residents, maintain peace
and order, and preserve the comfort and convenience of their
inhabitants. 21
Local government units exercise police power through their respective
legislative bodies. The legislative body of the provincial government is
the sangguniang panlalawigan, that of the city government is
the sangguniang panlungsod, that of the municipal government is
the sangguniang bayan, and that of the barangay is the sangguniang
barangay. The Local Government Code of 1991 empowers
the sangguniang panlalawigan, sangguniang panlungsod and
sangguniang bayan to "enact ordinances, approve resolutions and
appropriate funds for the general welfare of the [province, city or
municipality, as the case may be], and its inhabitants pursuant to
Section 16 of the Code and in the proper exercise of the corporate
powers of the [province, city municipality] provided under the Code . . .
" The same Code gives the sangguniang barangay the power to
22
"enact ordinances as may be necessary to discharge the
responsibilities conferred upon it by law or ordinance and to promote
the general welfare of the inhabitants thereon." 23
Metropolitan or Metro Manila is a body composed of several local
government units i.e., twelve (12) cities and five (5) municipalities,
namely, the cities of Caloocan, Manila, Mandaluyong, Makati, Pasay,
Pasig, Quezon, Muntinlupa, Las Pinas, Marikina, Paranaque and
Valenzuela, and the municipalities of Malabon, Navotas, Pateros, San
Juan and Taguig. With the passage of Republic Act (R. A.)
No. 7924 in 1995, Metropolitan Manila was declared as a "special
24
development and administrative region" and the Administration
of "metro-wide" basic services affecting the region placed under "a
development authority" referred to as the MMDA. 25
"Metro-wide services" are those "services which have metro-wide
impact and transcend local political boundaries or entail huge
expenditures such that it would not be viable for said services to be
provided by the individual local government units comprising Metro
Manila." There are seven (7) basic metro-wide services and the scope
26
of these services cover the following: (1) development planning; (2)
transport and traffic management; (3) solid waste disposal and
management; (4) flood control and sewerage management; (5) urban
renewal, zoning and land use planning, and shelter services; (6) health
and sanitation, urban protection and pollution control; and (7) public
safety. The basic service of transport and traffic management includes
the following:
 (b) Transport and traffic management which include the
formulation, coordination, and monitoring of
policies, standards, programs and projects to rationalize the
existing transport operations, infrastructure requirements,the
use of thoroughfares, and promotion of safe and convenient
movement of persons and goods; provision for the mass
transport system and the institution of a system to regulate road
users; administration and implementation of all traffic
enforcement operations, traffic engineering services and traffic
education programs, including the institution of a single
ticketing system in Metropolitan Manila;"27
In the delivery of the seven (7) basic services, the MMDA has the
following powers and functions:
Sec. 5. Functions and powers of the Metro Manila Development
Authority. The MMDA shall:
(a) Formulate, coordinate and regulate the implementation of
medium and long-term plans and programs for the delivery of
metro-wide services, land use and physical development within
Metropolitan Manila, consistent with national development
objectives and priorities;
(b) Prepare, coordinate and regulate the implementation of
medium-term investment programs for metro-wide services
which shall indicate sources and uses of funds for priority
programs and projects, and which shall include the packaging
of projects and presentation to funding institutions;
(c) Undertake and manage on its own metro-wide programs
and projects for the delivery of specific services under its
jurisdiction, subject to the approval of the Council. For this
purpose, MMDA can create appropriate project management
offices;
(d) Coordinate and monitor the implementation of such plans,
programs and projects in Metro Manila; identify bottlenecks and
adopt solutions to problems of implementation;
(e) The MMDA shall set the policies concerning traffic in Metro
Manila, and shall coordinate and regulate the implementation of
all programs and projects concerning traffic
management, specifically pertaining to
enforcement, engineering and education. Upon request, it shall
be extended assistance and cooperation, including but not
limited to, assignment of personnel, by all other government
agencies and offices concerned;
(f) Install and administer a single ticketing system, fix, impose
and collect fines and penalties for all kinds of violations of traffic
rules and regulations, whether moving or non-moving in
nature, and confiscate and suspend or revoke drivers' licenses
in the enforcement of such traffic laws and regulations, the
provisions of RA 4136 and PD 1605 to the contrary
notwithstanding. For this purpose, the Authority shall impose all
traffic laws and regulations in Metro Manila, through its traffic
operation center, and may deputize members of the
PNP, traffic enforcers of local government units, duly licensed
security guards, or members of non-governmental
organizations to whom may be delegated certain
authority, subject to such conditions and requirements as the
Authority may impose; and
(g) Perform other related functions required to achieve the
objectives of the MMDA, including the undertaking of delivery of
basic services to the local government units, when deemed
necessary subject to prior coordination with and consent of the
local government unit concerned.
The implementation of the MMDA's plans, programs and projects is
undertaken by the local government units, national government
agencies, accredited people's organizations, non-governmental
organizations, and the private sector as well as by the MMDA itself. For
this purpose, the MMDA has the power to enter into contracts,
memoranda of agreement and other arrangements with these bodies
for the delivery of the required services Metro Manila. 28
The governing board of the MMDA is the Metro Manila Council. The
Council is composed of the mayors of the component 12 cities and 5
municipalities, the president of the Metro Manila Vice-Mayors' League
and the president of the Metro Manila Councilors' League. The
29
Council is headed by Chairman who is appointed by the President and
vested with the rank of cabinet member. As the policy-making body of
the MMDA, the Metro Manila Council approves metro-wide plans,
programs and projects, and issues the necessary rules and regulations
for the implementation of said plans; it approves the annual budget of
the MMDA and promulgate the rules and regulations for the delivery of
basic services, collection of service and regulatory fees, fines and
penalties. These functions are particularly enumerated as follows:
Sec. 6. Functions of the Metro Manila Council.
(a) The Council shall be the policy-making body of the MMDA;
(b) It shall approve metro-wide plans, programs and projects
and issue rules and regulations deemed necessary by the
MMDA to carry out the purposes of this Act;
(c) It may increase the rate of allowances and per diems of the
members of the Council to be effective during the term of the
succeeding Council. It shall fix the compensation of the officers
and personnel of the MMDA, and approve the annual budget
thereof for submission to the Department of Budget and
Management (DBM);
(d) It shall promulgate rules and regulations and set policies
and standards for metro-wide application governing the delivery
of basic services, prescribe and collect service and regulatory
fees, and impose and collect fines and penalties.
Clearly, the scope of the MMDA's function is limited to the delivery of
the seven (7) basic services. One of these is transport and traffic
management which includes the formulation and monitoring of policies,
standards and projects to rationalize the existing transport operations,
infrastructure requirements, the use of thoroughfares and promotion of
the safe movement of persons and goods. It also covers the mass
transport system and the institution of a system of road regulation, the
administration of all traffic enforcement operations, traffic engineering
services and traffic education programs, including the institution of a
single ticketing system in Metro Manila for traffic violations. Under the
service, the MMDA is expressly authorized "to set the policies
concerning traffic" and "coordinate and regulate the implementation of
all traffic management programs." In addition, the MMDA may "install
and administer a single ticketing system," fix, impose and collect fines
and penalties for all traffic violations.
It will be noted that the powers of the MMDA are limited to the following
acts: formulation, coordination, regulation, implementation, preparation,
management, monitoring, setting of policies, installation of a system
and administration. There is no syllable in R.A. No. 7924 that grants
the MMDA police power, let alone legislative power. Even the Metro
Manila Council has not been delegated any legislative power. Unlike
the legislative bodies of the local government units, there is no
provision in R.A. No. 7924 that empowers the MMDA or its Council to
"enact ordinances, approve resolutions appropriate funds for the
general welfare" of the inhabitants of Metro Manila. The MMDA is, as
termed in the charter itself, "development authority." It is an agency
30
created for the purpose of laying down policies and coordinating with
the various national government agencies, people's organizations, non-
governmental organizations and the private sector for the efficient and
expeditious delivery of basic services in the vast metropolitan area. All
its functions are administrative in nature and these are actually
summed up in the charter itself, viz:
Sec. 2. Creation of the Metropolitan Manila Development
Authority. . . . .
The MMDA shall perform planning, monitoring and coordinative
functions, and in the process exercise regulatory and
supervisory authority over the delivery of metro-wide services
within Metro Manila, without diminution of the autonomy of the
local government units concerning purely local matters. 31
Petitioner cannot seek refuge in the cases of Sangalang
v. Intermediate Appellate Court where we upheld a zoning ordinance
32
issued by the Metro Manila Commission (MMC), the predecessor of the
MMDA, as an exercise of police power. The first Sangalang decision
was on the merits of the petition, while the second decision denied
33
reconsideration of the first case and in addition discussed the case
of Yabut v. Court of Appeals. 34
Sangalang v. IAC involved five (5) consolidated petitions filed by
respondent BAVA and three residents of Bel-Air Village against other
residents of the Village and the Ayala Corporation, formerly the Makati
Development Corporation, as the developer of the subdivision. The
petitioners sought to enforce certain restrictive easements in the deeds
of sale over their respective lots in the subdivision. These were the
prohibition on the setting up of commercial and advertising signs on the
lots, and the condition that the lots be used only for residential
purposes. Petitioners alleged that respondents, who were residents
along Jupiter Street of the subdivision, converted their residences into
commercial establishments in violation of the "deed restrictions," and
that respondent Ayala Corporation ushered in the full
commercialization" of Jupiter Street by tearing down the perimeter wall
that separated the commercial from the residential section of the
village.
35
The petitions were dismissed based on Ordinance No. 81 of the
Municipal Council of Makati and Ordinance No. 81-01 of the Metro
Manila Commission (MMC). Municipal Ordinance No. 81 classified Bel-
Air Village as a Class A Residential Zone, with its boundary in the south
extending to the center line of Jupiter Street. The Municipal Ordinance
was adopted by the MMC under the Comprehensive Zoning Ordinance
for the National Capital Region and promulgated as MMC Ordinance
No. 81-01. Bel-Air Village was indicated therein as bounded by Jupiter
Street and the block adjacent thereto was classified as a High Intensity
Commercial Zone. 36
We ruled that since both Ordinances recognized Jupiter Street as the
boundary between Bel-Air Village and the commercial district, Jupiter
Street was not for the exclusive benefit of Bel-Air residents. We also
held that the perimeter wall on said street was constructed not to
separate the residential from the commercial blocks but simply for
security reasons, hence, in tearing down said wall, Ayala Corporation
did not violate the "deed restrictions" in the deeds of sale.
We upheld the ordinances, specifically MMC Ordinance No. 81-01, as a
legitimate exercise of police power. The power of the MMC and the
37
Makati Municipal Council to enact zoning ordinances for the general
welfare prevailed over the "deed restrictions".
In the second Sangalang/Yabut decision, we held that the opening of
Jupiter Street was warranted by the demands of the common good in
terms of "traffic decongestion and public convenience." Jupiter was
opened by the Municipal Mayor to alleviate traffic congestion along the
public streets adjacent to the Village. The same reason was given for
38
the opening to public vehicular traffic of Orbit Street, a road inside the
same village. The destruction of the gate in Orbit Street was also made
under the police power of the municipal government. The gate, like the
perimeter wall along Jupiter, was a public nuisance because it hindered
and impaired the use of property, hence, its summary abatement by the
mayor was proper and legal. 39
Contrary to petitioner's claim, the two Sangalang cases do not apply to
the case at bar. Firstly, both involved zoning ordinances passed by the
municipal council of Makati and the MMC. In the instant case, the basis
for the proposed opening of Neptune Street is contained in the notice of
December 22, 1995 sent by petitioner to respondent BAVA, through its
president. The notice does not cite any ordinance or law, either by the
Sangguniang Panlungsod of Makati City or by the MMDA, as the legal
basis for the proposed opening of Neptune Street. Petitioner MMDA
simply relied on its authority under its charter "to rationalize the use of
roads and/or thoroughfares for the safe and convenient movement of
persons." Rationalizing the use of roads and thoroughfares is one of
the acts that fall within the scope of transport and traffic management.
By no stretch of the imagination, however, can this be interpreted as an
express or implied grant of ordinance-making power, much less police
power.
Secondly, the MMDA is not the same entity as the MMC in Sangalang.
Although the MMC is the forerunner of the present MMDA, an
examination of Presidential Decree (P. D.) No. 824, the charter of the
MMC, shows that the latter possessed greater powers which were not
bestowed on the present MMDA.
Metropolitan Manila was first created in 1975 by Presidential Decree
(P.D.) No. 824. It comprised the Greater Manila Area composed of the
contiguous four (4) cities of Manila, Quezon, Pasay and Caloocan, and
the thirteen (13) municipalities of Makati, Mandaluyong, San Juan, Las
Pinas, Malabon, Navotas, Pasig, Pateros, Paranaque, Marikina,
Muntinlupa and Taguig in the province of Rizal, and Valenzuela in the
province of Bulacan. Metropolitan Manila was created as a response
40
to the finding that the rapid growth of population and the increase of
social and economic requirements in these areas demand a call for
simultaneous and unified development; that the public services
rendered by the respective local governments could be administered
more efficiently and economically if integrated under a system of
central planning; and this coordination, "especially in the maintenance
of peace and order and the eradication of social and economic ills that
fanned the flames of rebellion and discontent [were] part of reform
measures under Martial Law essential to the safety and security of the
State."41
Metropolitan Manila was established as a "public corporation" with the
following powers:
Sec. 1. Creation of the Metropolitan Manila. There is hereby
created a public corporation, to be known as the Metropolitan
Manila, vested with powers and attributes of a corporation
including the power to make contracts, sue and be
sued, acquire, purchase, expropriate, hold, transfer and
dispose of property and such other powers as are necessary to
carry out its purposes. The Corporation shall be administered
by a Commission created under this Decree. 42
The administration of Metropolitan Manila was placed under the Metro
Manila Commission (MMC) vested with the following powers:
Sec. 4. Powers and Functions of the Commission. The Commission
shall have the following powers and functions:
1. To act as a central government to establish and administer
programs and provide services common to the area;
2. To levy and collect taxes and special assessments, borrow
and expend money and issue bonds, revenue certificates, and
other obligations of indebtedness. Existing tax measures
should, however, continue to be operative until otherwise
modified or repealed by the Commission;
3. To charge and collect fees for the use of public service
facilities;
4. To appropriate money for the operation of the metropolitan
government and review appropriations for the city and
municipal units within its jurisdiction with authority to disapprove
the same if found to be not in accordance with the established
policies of the Commission, without prejudice to any contractual
obligation of the local government units involved existing at the
time of approval of this Decree;
5. To review, amend, revise or repeal all ordinances, resolutions
and acts of cities and municipalities within Metropolitan Manila;
6. To enact or approve ordinances, resolutions and to fix
penalties for any violation thereof which shall not exceed a fine
of P10,000.00 or imprisonment of six years or both such fine
and imprisonment for a single offense;
7. To perform general administrative, executive and policy-
making functions;
8. To establish a fire control operation center, which shall direct
the fire services of the city and municipal governments in the
metropolitan area;
9. To establish a garbage disposal operation center, which shall
direct garbage collection and disposal in the metropolitan area;
10. To establish and operate a transport and traffic center,
which shall direct traffic activities;
11. To coordinate and monitor governmental and private
activities pertaining to essential services such as transportation,
flood control and drainage, water supply and sewerage, social,
health and environmental services, housing, park development,
and others;
12. To insure and monitor the undertaking of a comprehensive
social, economic and physical planning and development of the
area;
 13. To study the feasibility of increasing barangay participation
in the affairs of their respective local governments and to
propose to the President of the Philippines definite programs
and policies for implementation;
14. To submit within thirty (30) days after the close of each
fiscal year an annual report to the President of the Philippines
and to submit a periodic report whenever deemed necessary;
and
15. To perform such other tasks as may be assigned or directed
by the President of the Philippines.
The MMC was the "central government" of Metro Manila for the
purpose of establishing and administering programs providing services
common to the area. As a "central government" it had the power to levy
and collect taxes and special assessments, the power to charge and
collect fees; the power to appropriate money for its operation, and at
the same time, review appropriations for the city and municipal units
within its jurisdiction. It was bestowed the power to enact or approve
ordinances, resolutions and fix penalties for violation of such
ordinances and resolutions. It also had the power to review, amend,
revise or repeal all ordinances, resolutions and acts of any of the four
(4) cities and thirteen (13) municipalities comprising Metro Manila.
P.D. No. 824 further provided:
Sec. 9. Until otherwise provided, the governments of the four
cities and thirteen municipalities in the Metropolitan Manila shall
continue to exist in their present form except as may be
inconsistent with this Decree. The members of the existing city
and municipal councils in Metropolitan Manila shall, upon
promulgation of this Decree, and until December 31, 1975,
become members of the Sangguniang Bayan which is hereby
created for every city and municipality of Metropolitan Manila.
In addition, the Sangguniang Bayan shall be composed of as
many barangay captains as may be determined and chosen by
the Commission, and such number of representatives from
other sectors of the society as may be appointed by the
President upon recommendation of the Commission.
xxx xxx xxx
The Sangguniang Bayan may recommend to the Commission
ordinances, resolutions or such measures as it may adopt;
Provided, that no such ordinance, resolution or measure shall
become effective, until after its approval by the Commission;
and Provided further, that the power to impose taxes and other
levies, the power to appropriate money and the power to pass
ordinances or resolutions with penal sanctions shall be vested
exclusively in the Commission.
The creation of the MMC also carried with it the creation of the
Sangguniang Bayan. This was composed of the members of the
component city and municipal councils, barangay captains chosen by
the MMC and sectoral representatives appointed by the President.
The Sangguniang Bayan had the power to recommend to the MMC the
adoption of ordinances, resolutions or measures. It was the MMC itself,
however, that possessed legislative powers. All ordinances, resolutions
and measures recommended by the Sangguniang Bayan were subject
to the MMC's approval. Moreover, the power to impose taxes and other
levies, the power to appropriate money, and the power to pass
ordinances or resolutions with penal sanctions were vested exclusively
in the MMC.
Thus, Metropolitan Manila had a "central government," i.e., the MMC
which fully possessed legislative police powers. Whatever legislative
powers the component cities and municipalities had were all subject to
review and approval by the MMC.
After President Corazon Aquino assumed power, there was a clamor to
restore the autonomy of the local government units in Metro Manila.
Hence, Sections 1 and 2 of Article X of the 1987 Constitution provided:
Sec. 1. The territorial and political subdivisions of the Republic
of the Philippines are the provinces, cities, municipalities and
barangays. There shall be autonomous regions in Muslim
Mindanao and the Cordilleras as herein provided.
 Sec. 2. The territorial and political subdivisions shall enjoy local
autonomy.
The Constitution, however, recognized the necessity of creating
metropolitan regions not only in the existing National Capital Region but
also in potential equivalents in the Visayas and Mindanao. Section 11
43
of the same Article X thus provided:
Sec. 11. The Congress may, by law, create special metropolitan
political subdivisions, subject to a plebiscite as set forth in
Section 10 hereof. The component cities and municipalities
shall retain their basic autonomy and shall be entitled to their
own local executives and legislative assemblies. The
jurisdiction of the metropolitan authority that will thereby be
created shall be limited to basic services requiring coordination.
Constitution itself expressly provides that Congress may, by law, create
"special metropolitan political subdivisions" which shall be subject to
approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political
units directly affected; the jurisdiction of this subdivision shall be limited
to basic services requiring coordination; and the cities and
municipalities comprising this subdivision shall retain their basic
services requiring coordination; and the cities and municipalities
comprising this subdivision shall retain their basic autonomy and their
own local executive and legislative assemblies. Pending enactment of
44
this law, the Transitory Provisions of the Constitution gave the
President of the Philippines the power to constitute the Metropolitan
Authority, viz:
Sec. 8. Until otherwise provided by Congress, the President
may constitute the Metropolitan Authority to be composed of the
heads of all local government units comprising the Metropolitan
Manila area. 45
In 1990, President Aquino issued Executive Order (E. O.) No. 392 and
constituted the Metropolitan Manila Authority (MMA). The powers and
functions of the MMC were devolved to the MMA. It ought to be
46
stressed, however, that not all powers and functions of the MMC were
passed to the MMA. The MMA's power was limited to the "delivery of
basic urban services requiring coordination in Metropolitan
Manila." The MMA's governing body, the Metropolitan Manila Council,
47
although composed of the mayors of the component cities and
municipalities, was merely given power of: (1) formulation of policies on
the delivery of basic services requiring coordination and consolidation;
and (2) promulgation resolutions and other issuances, approval of a
code of basic services and the exercise of its rule-making power. 48
Under the 1987 Constitution, the local government units became
primarily responsible for the governance of their respective political
subdivisions. The MMA's jurisdiction was limited to addressing common
problems involving basic services that transcended local boundaries. It
did not have legislative power. Its power was merely to provide the
local government units technical assistance in the preparation of local
development plans. Any semblance of legislative power it had was
confined to a "review [of] legislation proposed by the local legislative
assemblies to ensure consistency among local governments and with
the comprehensive development plan of Metro Manila," and to "advise
the local governments accordingly." 49
When R.A. No. 7924 took effect, Metropolitan Manila became a
"special development and administrative region" and the MMDA a
"special development authority" whose functions were "without
prejudice to the autonomy of the affected local government units." The
character of the MMDA was clearly defined in the legislative debates
enacting its charter.
R.A. No. 7924 originated as House Bill No. 14170/11116 and was
introduced by several legislators led by Dante Tinga, Roilo Golez and
Feliciano Belmonte. It was presented to the House of Representatives
by the Committee on Local Governments chaired by Congressman
Ciriaco R. Alfelor. The bill was a product of Committee consultations
with the local government units in the National Capital Region (NCR),
with former Chairmen of the MMC and MMA, and career officials of
50
said agencies. When the bill was first taken up by the Committee on
Local Governments, the following debate took place:
THE CHAIRMAN [Hon. Ciriaco Alfelor]: Okay, Let me explain.
This has been debated a long time ago, you know. It's a special
. . . we can create a special metropolitan political subdivision.
Actually, there are only six (6) political subdivisions provided for
in the Constitution: barangay, municipality, city, province, and
we have the Autonomous Region of Mindanao and we have the
Cordillera. So we have 6. Now. . . . .
HON. [Elias] LOPEZ: May I interrupt, Mr. Chairman. In the case
of the Autonomous Region, that is also specifically mandated
by the Constitution.
THE CHAIRMAN: That's correct. But it is considered to be a
political subdivision. What is the meaning of a political
subdivision? Meaning to say, that it has its own government, it
has its own political personality, it has the power to tax, and all
governmental powers: police power and everything. All right.
Authority is different; because it does not have its own
government. It is only a council, it is an organization of political
subdivision, powers, "no, which is not imbued with any political
power.
If you go over Section 6, where the powers and functions of the
Metro Manila Development Authority, it is purely coordinative.
And it provides here that the council is policy-making. All right.
Under the Constitution is a Metropolitan Authority with
coordinative power. Meaning to say, it coordinates all of the
different basic services which have to be delivered to the
constituency. All right.
There is now a problem. Each local government unit is given its
respective . . . as a political subdivision. Kalookan has its
powers, as provided for and protected and guaranteed by the
Constitution. All right, the exercise. However, in the exercise of
that power, it might be deleterious and disadvantageous to
other local government units. So, we are forming an authority
where all of these will be members and then set up a policy in
order that the basic services can be effectively coordinated. All
right.
Of course, we cannot deny that the MMDA has to survive. We
have to provide some funds, resources. But it does not possess
any political power. We do not elect the Governor. We do not
have the power to tax. As a matter of fact, I was trying to
intimate to the author that it must have the power to sue and be
sued because it coordinates. All right. It coordinates practically
all these basic services so that the flow and the distribution of
the basic services will be continuous. Like traffic, we cannot
deny that. It's before our eyes. Sewerage, flood control, water
system, peace and order, we cannot deny these. It's right on
our face. We have to look for a solution. What would be the
right solution? All right, we envision that there should be a
coordinating agency and it is called an authority. All right, if you
do not want to call it an authority, it's alright. We may call it a
council or maybe a management agency.
xxx xxx xxx 51
Clearly, the MMDA is not a political unit of government. The power
delegated to the MMDA is that given to the Metro Manila Council to
promulgate administrative rules and regulations in the implementation
of the MMDA's functions. There is no grant of authority to enact
ordinances and regulations for the general welfare of the inhabitants of
the metropolis. This was explicitly stated in the last Committee
deliberations prior to the bill's presentation to Congress. Thus:
THE CHAIRMAN: Yeah, but we have to go over the suggested
revision. I think this was already approved before, but it was
reconsidered in view of the proposals, set-up, to make the
MMDA stronger. Okay, so if there is no objection to paragraph
"f". . . And then next is paragraph "b," under Section 6. "It shall
approve metro-wide plans, programs and projects and issue
ordinances or resolutions deemed necessary by the MMDA to
carry out the purposes of this Act." Do you have the powers?
Does the MMDA... because that takes the form of a local
government unit, a political subdivision.
HON. [Feliciano] BELMONTE: Yes, I believe so, your Honor.
When we say that it has the policies, it's very clear that those
policies must be followed. Otherwise, what's the use of
empowering it to come out with policies. Now, the policies may
be in the form of a resolution or it may be in the form of a
ordinance. The term "ordinance" in this case really gives it more
teeth, your honor. Otherwise, we are going to see a situation
where you have the power to adopt the policy but you cannot
really make it stick as in the case now, and I think here is
Chairman Bunye. I think he will agree that that is the case now.
You've got the power to set a policy, the body wants to follow
your policy, then we say let's call it an ordinance and see if they
will not follow it.
THE CHAIRMAN: That's very nice. I like that. However, there is
a constitutional impediment. You are making this MMDA a
1wphi1
political subdivision. The creation of the MMDA would be
subject to a plebiscite. That is what I'm trying to avoid. I've been
trying to avoid this kind of predicament. Under the Constitution
it states: if it is a political subdivision, once it is created it has to
be subject to a plebiscite. I'm trying to make this as
administrative. That's why we place the Chairman as a cabinet
rank.
HON. BELMONTE: All right, Mr. Chairman, okay, what you are
saying there is . . . . .
THE CHAIRMAN: In setting up ordinances, it is a political
exercise, Believe me.
HON. [Elias] LOPEZ: Mr. Chairman, it can be changed into
issuances of rules and regulations. That would be . . . it shall
also be enforced.
HON. BELMONTE: Okay, I will . . . .
HON. LOPEZ: And you can also say that violation of such rule,
you impose a sanction. But you know, ordinance has a different
legal connotation.
HON. BELMONTE: All right, I defer to that opinion, your Honor.
THE CHAIRMAN: So instead of ordinances, say rules and
regulations.
HON. BELMONTE: Or resolutions. Actually, they are actually
considering resolutions now.
THE CHAIRMAN: Rules and resolutions.
HON. BELMONTE: Rules, regulations and resolutions. 52
The draft of H. B. No. 14170/11116 was presented by the Committee to
the House of Representatives. The explanatory note to the bill stated
that the proposed MMDA is a "development authority" which is a
"national agency, not a political government unit." The explanatory
53
note was adopted as the sponsorship speech of the Committee on
Local Governments. No interpellations or debates were made on the
floor and no amendments introduced. The bill was approved on second
reading on the same day it was presented. 54
When the bill was forwarded to the Senate, several amendments were
made. These amendments, however, did not affect the nature of the
1wphi1
MMDA as originally conceived in the House of Representatives. 55
It is thus beyond doubt that the MMDA is not a local government unit or
a public corporation endowed with legislative power. It is not even a
"special metropolitan political subdivision" as contemplated in Section
11, Article X of the Constitution. The creation of a "special metropolitan
political subdivision" requires the approval by a majority of the votes
cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected." R. A. No.
56
7924 was not submitted to the inhabitants of Metro Manila in a
plebiscite. The Chairman of the MMDA is not an official elected by the
people, but appointed by the President with the rank and privileges of a
cabinet member. In fact, part of his function is to perform such other
duties as may be assigned to him by the President, whereas in local
57
government units, the President merely exercises supervisory authority.
This emphasizes the administrative character of the MMDA.
Clearly then, the MMC under P.D. No. 824 is not the same entity as the
MMDA under R.A. No. 7924. Unlike the MMC, the MMDA has no power
to enact ordinances for the welfare of the community. It is the local
government units, acting through their respective legislative councils,
that possess legislative power and police power. In the case at bar, the
Sangguniang Panlungsod of Makati City did not pass any ordinance or
resolution ordering the opening of Neptune Street, hence, its proposed
opening by petitioner MMDA is illegal and the respondent Court of
Appeals did not err in so ruling. We desist from ruling on the other
issues as they are unnecessary.

We stress that this decision does not make light of the MMDA's noble
efforts to solve the chaotic traffic condition in Metro Manila. Everyday,
traffic jams and traffic bottlenecks plague the metropolis. Even our once
sprawling boulevards and avenues are now crammed with cars while
city streets are clogged with motorists and pedestrians. Traffic has
become a social malaise affecting our people's productivity and the
efficient delivery of goods and services in the country. The MMDA was
created to put some order in the metropolitan transportation system but
unfortunately the powers granted by its charter are limited. Its good
intentions cannot justify the opening for public use of a private street in
a private subdivision without any legal warrant. The promotion of the
general welfare is not antithetical to the preservation of the rule of law.
1wphi1.nt

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is denied. The Decision and

Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 39549 are
affirmed.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 130230 April 15, 2005
METROPOLITAN MANILA DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, Petitioner,
vs.
DANTE O. GARIN, respondent.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
At issue in this case is the validity of Section 5(f) of Republic Act No.
7924 creating the Metropolitan Manila Development Authority (MMDA),
which authorizes it to confiscate and suspend or revoke driver's
licenses in the enforcement of traffic laws and regulations.
The issue arose from an incident involving the respondent Dante O.
Garin, a lawyer, who was issued a traffic violation receipt (TVR) and his
driver's license confiscated for parking illegally along Gandara Street,
Binondo, Manila, on 05 August 1995. The following statements were
printed on the TVR:
You are hereby directed to report to the MMDA Traffic Operations
Center Port Area Manila after 48 hours from date of apprehension for
disposition/appropriate action thereon. Criminal case shall be filed for
failure to redeem license after 30 days.
Valid as temporary DRIVER'S license for seven days from date of
apprehension. 1
Shortly before the expiration of the TVR's validity, the respondent
addressed a letter to then MMDA Chairman Prospero Oreta requesting
2
the return of his driver's license, and expressing his preference for his
case to be filed in court.
Receiving no immediate reply, Garin filed the original complaint with
3
application for preliminary injunction in Branch 260 of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Paraaque, on 12 September 1995, contending that, in
the absence of any implementing rules and regulations, Sec. 5(f) of
Rep. Act No. 7924 grants the MMDA unbridled discretion to deprive
erring motorists of their licenses, pre-empting a judicial determination of
the validity of the deprivation, thereby violating the due process clause
of the Constitution. The respondent further contended that the
provision violates the constitutional prohibition against undue
delegation of legislative authority, allowing as it does the MMDA to fix
and impose unspecified and therefore unlimited - fines and other
penalties on erring motorists.
In support of his application for a writ of preliminary injunction, Garin
alleged that he suffered and continues to suffer great and irreparable
damage because of the deprivation of his license and that, absent any
implementing rules from the Metro Manila Council, the TVR and the
confiscation of his license have no legal basis.
For its part, the MMDA, represented by the Office of the Solicitor
General, pointed out that the powers granted to it by Sec. 5(f) of Rep.
Act No. 7924 are limited to the fixing, collection and imposition of fines
and penalties for traffic violations, which powers are legislative and
executive in nature; the judiciary retains the right to determine the
validity of the penalty imposed. It further argued that the doctrine of
separation of powers does not preclude "admixture" of the three
powers of government in administrative agencies. 4
The MMDA also refuted Garin's allegation that the Metro Manila
Council, the governing board and policy making body of the petitioner,
has as yet to formulate the implementing rules for Sec. 5(f) of Rep. Act
No. 7924 and directed the court's attention to MMDA Memorandum
Circular No. TT-95-001 dated 15 April 1995. Respondent Garin,
however, questioned the validity of MMDA Memorandum Circular No.
TT-95-001, as he claims that it was passed by the Metro Manila Council
in the absence of a quorum.
Judge Helen Bautista-Ricafort issued a temporary restraining order on
26 September 1995, extending the validity of the TVR as a temporary
driver's license for twenty more days. A preliminary mandatory
injunction was granted on 23 October 1995, and the MMDA was
directed to return the respondent's driver's license.
On 14 August 1997, the trial court rendered the assailed decision in 5
favor of the herein respondent and held that:
a. There was indeed no quorum in that First Regular Meeting of
the MMDA Council held on March 23, 1995, hence MMDA
Memorandum Circular No. TT-95-001, authorizing confiscation of
driver's licenses upon issuance of a TVR, is void ab initio.
b. The summary confiscation of a driver's license without first
giving the driver an opportunity to be heard; depriving him of a property
right (driver's license) without DUE PROCESS; not filling (sic) in Court
the complaint of supposed traffic infraction, cannot be justified by any
legislation (and is) hence unconstitutional.
WHEREFORE, the temporary writ of preliminary injunction is hereby
made permanent; th(e) MMDA is directed to return to plaintiff his
driver's license; th(e) MMDA is likewise ordered to desist from
confiscating driver's license without first giving the driver the opportunity
to be heard in an appropriate proceeding.
In filing this petition, the MMDA reiterates and reinforces its argument in
6 pay their fines and redeem their license or vehicle plates.7
the court below and contends that a license to operate a motor vehicle
is neither a contract nor a property right, but is a privilege subject to
reasonable regulation under the police power in the interest of the
public safety and welfare. The petitioner further argues that revocation
or suspension of this privilege does not constitute a taking without due
process as long as the licensee is given the right to appeal the
revocation.
To buttress its argument that a licensee may indeed appeal the taking
and the judiciary retains the power to determine the validity of the
confiscation, suspension or revocation of the license, the petitioner
points out that under the terms of the confiscation, the licensee has
three options:
1. To voluntarily pay the imposable fine,
2. To protest the apprehension by filing a protest with the
MMDA Adjudication Committee, or
3. To request the referral of the TVR to the Public Prosecutor's
Office.
The MMDA likewise argues that Memorandum Circular No. TT-95-001
was validly passed in the presence of a quorum, and that the lower
court's finding that it had not was based on a "misapprehension of
facts," which the petitioner would have us review. Moreover, it asserts
that though the circular is the basis for the issuance of TVRs, the basis
for the summary confiscation of licenses is Sec. 5(f) of Rep. Act No.
7924 itself, and that such power is self-executory and does not require
the issuance of any implementing regulation or circular.
Meanwhile, on 12 August 2004, the MMDA, through its Chairman
Bayani Fernando, implemented Memorandum Circular No. 04, Series
of 2004, outlining the procedures for the use of the Metropolitan Traffic
Ticket (MTT) scheme. Under the circular, erring motorists are issued
an MTT, which can be paid at any Metrobank branch. Traffic enforcers
may no longer confiscate drivers' licenses as a matter of course in
cases of traffic violations. All motorists with unredeemed TVRs were
given seven days from the date of implementation of the new system to
It would seem, therefore, that insofar as the absence of a prima facie
case to enjoin the petitioner from confiscating drivers' licenses is
concerned, recent events have overtaken the Court's need to decide
this case, which has been rendered moot and academic by the
implementation of Memorandum Circular No. 04, Series of 2004.
The petitioner, however, is not precluded from re-implementing
Memorandum Circular No. TT-95-001, or any other scheme, for that
matter, that would entail confiscating drivers' licenses. For the proper
implementation, therefore, of the petitioner's future programs, this Court
deems it appropriate to make the following observations:
1. A license to operate a motor vehicle is a privilege that the
state may withhold in the exercise of its police power.
The petitioner correctly points out that a license to operate a motor responsibility to regulate how and by whom motor vehicles may be
vehicle is not a property right, but a privilege granted by the state, operated on the state highways.
which may be suspended or revoked by the state in the exercise of its
police power, in the interest of the public safety and welfare, subject to 2. The MMDA is not vested with police power.
the procedural due process requirements. This is consistent with our
rulings in Pedro v. Provincial Board of Rizal on the license to operate a
8
In Metro Manila Development Authority v. Bel-Air Village Association,
cockpit, Tan v. Director of Forestry and Oposa v. Factoran on timber
9 10
Inc., we categorically stated that Rep. Act No. 7924 does not grant the
14

licensing agreements, and Surigao Electric Co., Inc. v. Municipality of MMDA with police power, let alone legislative power, and that all its
Surigao on a legislative franchise to operate an electric plant.
11
functions are administrative in nature.

Petitioner cites a long list of American cases to prove this point, such The said case also involved the herein petitioner MMDA which claimed
as State ex. Rel. Sullivan, which states in part that, "the legislative
12
that it had the authority to open a subdivision street owned by the Bel-
power to regulate travel over the highways and thoroughfares of the Air Village Association, Inc. to public traffic because it is an agent of the
state for the general welfare is extensive. It may be exercised in any state endowed with police power in the delivery of basic services in
reasonable manner to conserve the safety of travelers and Metro Manila. From this premise, the MMDA argued that there was no
pedestrians. Since motor vehicles are instruments of potential danger, need for the City of Makati to enact an ordinance opening Neptune
their registration and the licensing of their operators have been required Street to the public.
almost from their first appearance. The right to operate them in public
places is not a natural and unrestrained right, but a privilege subject to
Tracing the legislative history of Rep. Act No. 7924 creating the MMDA,
reasonable regulation, under the police power, in the interest of the
we concluded that the MMDA is not a local government unit or a public
public safety and welfare. The power to license imports further power to
corporation endowed with legislative power, and, unlike its predecessor,
withhold or to revoke such license upon noncompliance with prescribed
the Metro Manila Commission, it has no power to enact ordinances for
conditions."
the welfare of the community. Thus, in the absence of an ordinance
from the City of Makati, its own order to open the street was invalid.
Likewise, the petitioner quotes the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
in Commonwealth v. Funk, to the effect that: "Automobiles are vehicles
13

We restate here the doctrine in the said decision as it applies to the

of great speed and power. The use of them constitutes an element of
case at bar: police power, as an inherent attribute of sovereignty, is the
danger to persons and property upon the highways. Carefully
power vested by the Constitution in the legislature to make, ordain, and
operated, an automobile is still a dangerous instrumentality, but, when
establish all manner of wholesome and reasonable laws, statutes and
operated by careless or incompetent persons, it becomes an engine of
ordinances, either with penalties or without, not repugnant to the
destruction. The Legislature, in the exercise of the police power of the
Constitution, as they shall judge to be for the good and welfare of the
commonwealth, not only may, but must, prescribe how and by whom
commonwealth, and for the subjects of the same.
motor vehicles shall be operated on the highways. One of the primary
purposes of a system of general regulation of the subject matter, as
here by the Vehicle Code, is to insure the competency of the operator Having been lodged primarily in the National Legislature, it cannot be
of motor vehicles. Such a general law is manifestly directed to the exercised by any group or body of individuals not possessing legislative
promotion of public safety and is well within the police power." power. The National Legislature, however, may delegate this power to
the president and administrative boards as well as the lawmaking
bodies of municipal corporations or local government units (LGUs).
The common thread running through the cited cases is that it is the
Once delegated, the agents can exercise only such legislative powers
legislature, in the exercise of police power, which has the power and
as are conferred on them by the national lawmaking body.
Our Congress delegated police power to the LGUs in the Local
Government Code of 1991. A local government is a "political
15
subdivision of a nation or state which is constituted by law and has
substantial control of local affairs." Local government units are the
16
provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays, which exercise police
power through their respective legislative bodies.
Metropolitan or Metro Manila is a body composed of several local
government units. With the passage of Rep. Act No. 7924 in 1995,
Metropolitan Manila was declared as a "special development and
administrative region" and the administration of "metro-wide" basic
services affecting the region placed under "a development authority"
referred to as the MMDA. Thus:
. . . [T]he powers of the MMDA are limited to the following acts:
formulation, coordination, regulation, implementation, preparation,
management, monitoring, setting of policies, installation of a system
and administration. There is no syllable in R. A. No. 7924 that grants
the MMDA police power, let alone legislative power. Even the
Metro Manila Council has not been delegated any legislative
power. Unlike the legislative bodies of the local government
units, there is no provision in R. A. No. 7924 that empowers the
MMDA or its Council to "enact ordinances, approve resolutions
and appropriate funds for the general welfare" of the inhabitants
of Metro Manila. The MMDA is, as termed in the charter itself, a
"development authority." It is an agency created for the purpose of
laying down policies and coordinating with the various national
government agencies, people's organizations, non-governmental
organizations and the private sector for the efficient and
expeditious delivery of basic services in the vast metropolitan
area. All its functions are administrative in nature and these are
actually summed up in the charter itself, viz:
"Sec. 2. Creation of the Metropolitan Manila Development
Authority. -- -x x x.
The MMDA shall perform planning, monitoring and
coordinative functions, and in the process exercise
regulatory and supervisory authority over the delivery of
metro-wide services within Metro Manila, without
diminution of the autonomy of the local government
units concerning purely local matters."
.
Clearly, the MMDA is not a political unit of government. The power
delegated to the MMDA is that given to the Metro Manila Council to
promulgate administrative rules and regulations in the implementation
of the MMDA's functions. There is no grant of authority to enact
ordinances and regulations for the general welfare of the
inhabitants of the metropolis. 17 (footnotes omitted, emphasis
supplied)
Therefore, insofar as Sec. 5(f) of Rep. Act No. 7924 is understood by
the lower court and by the petitioner to grant the MMDA the power to
confiscate and suspend or revoke drivers' licenses without need of any
other legislative enactment, such is an unauthorized exercise of police
power.
3. Sec. 5(f) grants the MMDA with
the duty to enforce existing traffic rules and regulations.
Section 5 of Rep. Act No. 7924 enumerates the "Functions and Powers
of the Metro Manila Development Authority." The contested clause in
Sec. 5(f) states that the petitioner shall "install and administer a single
ticketing system, fix, impose and collect fines and penalties for all kinds
of violations of traffic rules and regulations, whether moving or
nonmoving in nature, and confiscate and suspend or revoke drivers'
licenses in the enforcement of such traffic laws and regulations, the
provisions of Rep. Act No. 4136 and P.D. No. 1605 to the contrary
18 19
notwithstanding," and that "(f)or this purpose, the Authority shall
enforce all traffic laws and regulations in Metro Manila, through its
traffic operation center, and may deputize members of the PNP, traffic
enforcers of local government units, duly licensed security guards, or
members of non-governmental organizations to whom may be
delegated certain authority, subject to such conditions and
requirements as the Authority may impose."
Thus, where there is a traffic law or regulation validly enacted by the
legislature or those agencies to whom legislative powers have been
delegated (the City of Manila in this case), the petitioner is not
precluded and in fact is duty-bound to confiscate and suspend or
revoke drivers' licenses in the exercise of its mandate of transport and
traffic management, as well as the administration and implementation
of all traffic enforcement operations, traffic engineering services and
traffic education programs. 20

This is consistent with our ruling in Bel-Air that the MMDA is a

development authority created for the purpose of laying down policies
and coordinating with the various national government agencies,
people's organizations, non-governmental organizations and the private
sector, which may enforce, but not enact, ordinances.

This is also consistent with the fundamental rule of statutory

construction that a statute is to be read in a manner that would breathe
life into it, rather than defeat it, and is supported by the criteria in cases
21

of this nature that all reasonable doubts should be resolved in favor of

the constitutionality of a statute. 22

A last word. The MMDA was intended to coordinate services with

metro-wide impact that transcend local political boundaries or would
entail huge expenditures if provided by the individual LGUs, especially
with regard to transport and traffic management, and we are aware of
23

the valiant efforts of the petitioner to untangle the increasingly traffic-

snarled roads of Metro Manila. But these laudable intentions are
limited by the MMDA's enabling law, which we can but interpret, and
petitioner must be reminded that its efforts in this respect must be
authorized by a valid law, or ordinance, or regulation arising from a
legitimate source.

WHEREFORE, the petition is dismissed.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 170656 August 15, 2007
THE METROPOLITAN MANILA DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY and
BAYANI FERNANDO as Chairman of the Metropolitan Manila
Development Authority, petitioners,
vs.
VIRON TRANSPORTATION CO., INC., respondent.
x --------------------------------------------- x
G.R. No. 170657 August 15, 2007
HON. ALBERTO G. ROMULO, Executive Secretary, the
METROPOLITAN MANILA DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY and
BAYANI FERNANDO as Chairman of the Metropolitan Manila
Development Authority,petitioners,
vs.
MENCORP TRANSPORTATION SYSTEM, INC., respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
The following conditions in 1969, as observed by this Court:
Vehicles have increased in number. Traffic congestion has
moved from bad to worse, from tolerable to critical. The number
of people who use the thoroughfares has multiplied x x x,1
have remained unchecked and have reverberated to this day. Traffic
jams continue to clog the streets of Metro Manila, bringing vehicles to a
standstill at main road arteries during rush hour traffic and sapping
peoples energies and patience in the process.
The present petition for review on certiorari, rooted in the traffic
congestion problem, questions the authority of the Metropolitan Manila
Development Authority (MMDA) to order the closure of provincial bus
terminals along Epifanio de los Santos Avenue (EDSA) and major
thoroughfares of Metro Manila.
Specifically challenged are two Orders issued by Judge Silvino T.
Pampilo, Jr. of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 26 in
Civil Case Nos. 03-105850 and 03-106224.
The first assailed Order of September 8, 2005,2 which resolved a
motion for reconsideration filed by herein respondents, declared
Executive Order (E.O.) No. 179, hereafter referred to as the E.O.,
"unconstitutional as it constitutes an unreasonable exercise of police
power." The second assailed Order of November 23, 2005 3 denied
petitioners motion for reconsideration.
The following facts are not disputed:
President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo issued the E.O. on February 10,
2003, "Providing for the Establishment of Greater Manila Mass
Transport System," the pertinent portions of which read:
WHEREAS, Metro Manila continues to be the center of
employment opportunities, trade and commerce of the
Greater Metro Manila area;
WHEREAS, the traffic situation in Metro Manila has
affected the adjacent provinces of Bulacan, Cavite,
Laguna, and Rizal, owing to the continued movement of
residents and industries to more affordable and
economically viable locations in these provinces;
WHEREAS, the Metropolitan Manila Development
Authority (MMDA) is tasked to undertake measures to
ease traffic congestion in Metro Manila and ensure the
convenient and efficient travel of commuters within its
jurisdiction;
WHEREAS, a primary cause of traffic congestion in
Metro Manila has been the numerous buses plying the
streets that impedes [sic] the flow of vehicles and
commuters due to the inefficient connectivity of the
different transport modes;
WHEREAS, the MMDA has recommended a plan to
decongest traffic by eliminating the bus terminals now
located along major Metro Manila thoroughfares and
providing more convenient access to the mass transport
system to the commuting public through the provision of
mass transport terminal facilities that would integrate
the existing transport modes, namely the buses, the rail-
based systems of the LRT, MRT and PNR and to
facilitate and ensure efficient travel through the
improved connectivity of the different transport modes;
WHEREAS, the national government must provide the
necessary funding requirements to immediately
implement and render operational these projects; and
extent to MMDA such other assistance as may be
warranted to ensure their expeditious prosecution.
NOW, THEREFORE, I, GLORIA MACAPAGAL-
ARROYO, President of the Philippines, by virtue of the
powers vested in me by law, do hereby order:
Section 1. THE PROJECT. The project shall be
identified as GREATER MANILA TRANSPORT
SYSTEM Project.
Section 2. PROJECT OBJECTIVES. In accordance
with the plan proposed by MMDA, the project aims to
develop four (4) interim intermodal mass transport
terminals to integrate the different transport modes, as
well as those that shall hereafter be developed, to serve
the commuting public in the northwest, north, east,
south, and southwest of Metro Manila. Initially, the
project shall concentrate on immediately establishing
the mass transport terminals for the north and south
Metro Manila commuters as hereinafter described.
Section 3. PROJECT IMPLEMENTING AGENCY.
The Metropolitan Manila Development Authority
(MMDA), is hereby designated as the implementing
Agency for the project. For this purpose, MMDA is
directed to undertake such infrastructure development
work as may be necessary and, thereafter, manage the
project until it may be turned-over to more appropriate
agencies, if found suitable and convenient. Specifically,
MMDA shall have the following functions and
responsibilities:
a) Cause the preparation of the Master
Plan for the projects, including the
designs and costing;
b) Coordinate the use of the land and/or
properties needed for the project with
the respective agencies and/or entities
owning them;
c) Supervise and manage the
construction of the necessary structures
and facilities;
d) Execute such contracts or
agreements as may be necessary, with
the appropriate government agencies,
entities, and/or private persons, in
accordance with existing laws and
pertinent regulations, to facilitate the
implementation of the project;
e) Accept, manage and disburse such
funds as may be necessary for the
construction and/or implementation of
the projects, in accordance with
prevailing accounting and audit polices
and practice in government.
 f) Enlist the assistance of any national
government agency, office or
department, including local government
units, government-owned or controlled
corporations, as may be necessary;
g) Assign or hire the necessary
personnel for the above purposes; and
h) Perform such other related functions
as may be necessary to enable it to
accomplish the objectives and purposes
of this Executive Order.4 (Emphasis in
the original; underscoring supplied)
As the above-quoted portions of the E.O. noted, the primary cause of
traffic congestion in Metro Manila has been the numerous buses plying
the streets and the inefficient connectivity of the different transport
modes;5 and the MMDA had "recommended a plan to decongest traffic
by eliminating the bus terminals now located along major Metro Manila
thoroughfares and providing more and convenient access to the mass
transport system to the commuting public through the provision of mass
transport terminal facilities"6 which plan is referred to under the E.O. as
the Greater Manila Mass Transport System Project (the Project).
The E.O. thus designated the MMDA as the implementing agency for
the Project.
Pursuant to the E.O., the Metro Manila Council (MMC), the governing
board and policymaking body of the MMDA, issued Resolution No. 03-
07 series of 20037 expressing full support of the Project. Recognizing
the imperative to integrate the different transport modes via the
establishment of common bus parking terminal areas, the MMC cited
the need to remove the bus terminals located along major
thoroughfares of Metro Manila.8
On February 24, 2003, Viron Transport Co., Inc. (Viron), a domestic
corporation engaged in the business of public transportation with a
provincial bus operation,9 filed a petition for declaratory relief10 before
the RTC11 of Manila.
In its petition which was docketed as Civil Case No. 03-105850, Viron
alleged that the MMDA, through Chairman Fernando, was "poised to
issue a Circular, Memorandum or Order closing, or tantamount to
closing, all provincial bus terminals along EDSA and in the whole of the
Metropolis under the pretext of traffic regulation."12 This impending
move, it stressed, would mean the closure of its bus terminal in
Sampaloc, Manila and two others in Quezon City.
Alleging that the MMDAs authority does not include the power to direct
provincial bus operators to abandon their existing bus terminals to thus
deprive them of the use of their property, Viron asked the court to
construe the scope, extent and limitation of the power of the MMDA to
regulate traffic under R.A. No. 7924, "An Act Creating the Metropolitan
Manila Development Authority, Defining its Powers and Functions,
Providing Funds Therefor and For Other Purposes."
Viron also asked for a ruling on whether the planned closure of
provincial bus terminals would contravene the Public Service Act and
related laws which mandate public utilities to provide and maintain their
own terminals as a requisite for the privilege of operating as common
carriers.13
Mencorp Transportation System, Inc. (Mencorp), another provincial bus
operator, later filed a similar petition for declaratory relief 14 against
Executive Secretary Alberto G. Romulo and MMDA Chairman
Fernando.
Mencorp asked the court to declare the E.O. unconstitutional and illegal
for transgressing the possessory rights of owners and operators of
public land transportation units over their respective terminals.
Averring that MMDA Chairman Fernando had begun to implement a
plan to close and eliminate all provincial bus terminals along EDSA and
in the whole of the metropolis and to transfer their operations to
common bus terminals,15 Mencorp prayed for the issuance of a
temporary restraining order (TRO) and/or writ of preliminary injunction
to restrain the impending closure of its bus terminals which it was
leasing at the corner of EDSA and New York Street in Cubao and at the
intersection of Blumentritt, Laon Laan and Halcon Streets in Quezon
City. The petition was docketed as Civil Case No. 03-106224 and was
raffled to Branch 47 of the RTC of Manila.
Mencorps petition was consolidated on June 19, 2003 with Virons
petition which was raffled to Branch 26 of the RTC, Manila.
Mencorps prayer for a TRO and/or writ of injunction was denied as was
its application for the issuance of a preliminary injunction.16
In the Pre-Trial Order17 issued by the trial court, the issues were
narrowed down to whether 1) the MMDAs power to regulate traffic in
Metro Manila included the power to direct provincial bus operators to
abandon and close their duly established and existing bus terminals in
order to conduct business in a common terminal; (2) the E.O. is
consistent with the Public Service Act and the Constitution; and (3)
provincial bus operators would be deprived of their real properties
without due process of law should they be required to use the common
bus terminals.
Upon the agreement of the parties, they filed their respective position
papers in lieu of hearings.
By Decision18 of January 24, 2005, the trial court sustained the
constitutionality and legality of the E.O. pursuant to R.A. No. 7924,
which empowered the MMDA to administer Metro Manilas basic
services including those of transport and traffic management.
The trial court held that the E.O. was a valid exercise of the police
power of the State as it satisfied the two tests of lawful subject matter
and lawful means, hence, Virons and Mencorps property rights must
yield to police power.
On the separate motions for reconsideration of Viron and Mencorp, the
trial court, by Order of September 8, 2005, reversed its Decision, this
time holding that the E.O. was "an unreasonable exercise of police
power"; that the authority of the MMDA under Section (5)(e) of R.A. No.
7924 does not include the power to order the closure of Virons and
Mencorps existing bus terminals; and that the E.O. is inconsistent with
the provisions of the Public Service Act.
Petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied by Resolution of
November 23, 2005.
Hence, this petition, which faults the trial court for failing to rule that: (1)
the requisites of declaratory relief are not present, there being no
justiciable controversy in Civil Case Nos. 03-105850 and 03-106224;
and (2) the President has the authority to undertake or cause the
implementation of the Project.19
Petitioners contend that there is no justiciable controversy in the cases
for declaratory relief as nothing in the body of the E.O. mentions or
orders the closure and elimination of bus terminals along the major
thoroughfares of Metro Manila. Viron and Mencorp, they argue, failed to
produce any letter or communication from the Executive Department
apprising them of an immediate plan to close down their bus terminals.
And petitioners maintain that the E.O. is only an administrative directive
to government agencies to coordinate with the MMDA and to make
available for use government property along EDSA and South
Expressway corridors. They add that the only relation created by the
E.O. is that between the Chief Executive and the implementing officials,
but not between third persons.
The petition fails.
It is true, as respondents have pointed out, that the alleged deficiency
of the consolidated petitions to meet the requirement of justiciability
was not among the issues defined for resolution in the Pre-Trial Order
of January 12, 2004. It is equally true, however, that the question was
repeatedly raised by petitioners in their Answer to Virons petition, 20 their
Comment of April 29, 2003 opposing Mencorps prayer for the issuance
of a TRO,21 and their Position Paper of August 23, 2004.22
In bringing their petitions before the trial court, both respondents
pleaded the existence of the essential requisites for their respective
petitions for declaratory relief,23 and refuted petitioners contention that
a justiciable controversy was lacking.24 There can be no denying,
therefore, that the issue was raised and discussed by the parties before
the trial court.
The following are the essential requisites for a declaratory relief
petition: (a) there must be a justiciable controversy; (b) the controversy
must be between persons whose interests are adverse; (c) the party
seeking declaratory relief must have a legal interest in the controversy;
and (d) the issue invoked must be ripe for judicial determination. 25
The requirement of the presence of a justiciable controversy is satisfied
when an actual controversy or the ripening seeds thereof exist between
the parties, all of whom are sui juris and before the court, and the
declaration sought will help in ending the controversy.26 A question
becomes justiciable when it is translated into a claim of right which is
actually contested.27
In the present cases, respondents resort to court was prompted by the
issuance of the E.O. The 4th Whereas clause of the E.O. sets out in
clear strokes the MMDAs plan to "decongest traffic by eliminating the
bus terminals now located along major Metro Manila thoroughfares and
providing more convenient access to the mass transport system to the
commuting public through the provision of mass transport terminal
facilities x x x." (Emphasis supplied)
Section 2 of the E.O. thereafter lays down the immediate establishment
of common bus terminals for north- and south-bound commuters. For
this purpose, Section 8 directs the Department of Budget and
Management to allocate funds of not more than one hundred million
pesos (P100,000,000) to cover the cost of the construction of the north
and south terminals. And the E.O. was made effective immediately.
The MMDAs resolve to immediately implement the Project, its denials
to the contrary notwithstanding, is also evident from telltale
circumstances, foremost of which was the passage by the MMC of
Resolution No. 03-07, Series of 2003 expressing its full support of the
immediate implementation of the Project.
Notable from the 5th Whereas clause of the MMC Resolution is the
plan to "remove the bus terminals located along major thoroughfares of
Metro Manila and an urgent need to integrate the different transport
modes." The 7th Whereas clause proceeds to mention the
establishment of the North and South terminals.
As alleged in Virons petition, a diagram of the GMA-MTS North
Bus/Rail Terminal had been drawn up, and construction of the terminal
is already in progress. The MMDA, in its Answer28 and Position
Paper,29 in fact affirmed that the government had begun to implement
the Project.
It thus appears that the issue has already transcended the boundaries
of what is merely conjectural or anticipatory.
lawphil
Under the circumstances, for respondents to wait for the actual
issuance by the MMDA of an order for the closure of respondents bus
terminals would be foolhardy for, by then, the proper action to bring
would no longer be for declaratory relief which, under Section 1, Rule
6330 of the Rules of Court, must be brought before there is a breach or
violation of rights.
As for petitioners contention that the E.O. is a mere administrative
issuance which creates no relation with third persons, it does not
persuade. Suffice it to stress that to ensure the success of the Project
for which the concerned government agencies are directed to
coordinate their activities and resources, the existing bus terminals
owned, operated or leased by third persons like respondents would
have to be eliminated; and respondents would be forced to operate
from the common bus terminals.
It cannot be gainsaid that the E.O. would have an adverse effect on
respondents. The closure of their bus terminals would mean, among
other things, the loss of income from the operation and/or rentals of
stalls thereat. Precisely, respondents claim a deprivation of their
constitutional right to property without due process of law.
Respondents have thus amply demonstrated a "personal and
substantial interest in the case such that [they have] sustained, or will
sustain, direct injury as a result of [the E.O.s]
enforcement."31 Consequently, the established rule that the
constitutionality of a law or administrative issuance can be challenged
by one who will sustain a direct injury as a result of its enforcement has
been satisfied by respondents.
On to the merits of the case.
Respondents posit that the MMDA is devoid of authority to order the
elimination of their bus terminals under the E.O. which, they argue, is
unconstitutional because it violates both the Constitution and the Public
Service Act; and that neither is the MMDA clothed with such authority
under R.A. No. 7924.
Petitioners submit, however, that the real issue concerns the
Presidents authority to undertake or to cause the implementation of the
Project. They assert that the authority of the President is derived from
E.O. No. 125, "Reorganizing the Ministry of Transportation and
Communications Defining its Powers and Functions and for Other
Purposes," her residual power and/or E.O. No. 292, otherwise known
as the Administrative Code of 1987. They add that the E.O. is also a
valid exercise of the police power.
E.O. No. 125,32 which former President Corazon Aquino issued in the
exercise of legislative powers, reorganized the then Ministry (now
Department) of Transportation and Communications. Sections 4, 5, 6
and 22 of E.O. 125, as amended by E.O. 125-A,33 read:
SECTION 4. Mandate. The Ministry shall be
the primary policy, planning, programming, coordinating,
implementing, regulating and administrative entity of the
Executive Branch of the government in the promotion,
development and regulation of dependable and
coordinated networks of transportationand communication
systems as well as in the fast, safe, efficient and reliable postal,
transportation and communications services.
To accomplish such mandate, the Ministry shall have the
following objectives:
(a) Promote the development of dependable
and coordinated networks of transportation and
communications systems;
(b) Guide government and private
investment in the development of the
countrys intermodal transportation and
communications systems in a most practical,
expeditious, and orderly fashion for maximum
safety, service, and cost effectiveness;
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
xxxx
SECTION 5. Powers and Functions. To accomplish its
mandate, the Ministry shall have the following powers and
functions:
(a) Formulate and recommend national policies
and guidelines for the preparation and
implementation of integrated and
comprehensive transportation and
communications systems at the national,
regional and local levels;
(b) Establish and administer comprehensive
and integrated programs for transportation
and communications, and for this purpose,
may call on any agency, corporation, or
organization, whether public or private, whose
development programs include transportation
and communications as an integral part thereof,
to participate and assist in the preparation and
implementation of such program;
(c) Assess, review and provide direction to
transportation and communications research
and development programs of the government
in coordination with other institutions concerned;
(d) Administer all laws, rules and regulations
in the field of transportation and
communications; (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)
xxxx
 SECTION 6. Authority and Responsibility. The authority and
responsibility for the exercise of the mandate of the
Ministry and for the discharge of its powers and functions
shall be vested in the Minister of Transportation and
Communications, hereinafter referred to as the Minister, who
shall have supervision and control over the Ministry and shall
be appointed by the President. (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)
SECTION 22. Implementing Authority of Minister. The
Minister shall issue such orders, rules, regulations and
other issuances as may be necessary to ensure the
effective implementation of the provisions of this
Executive Order. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
It is readily apparent from the abovequoted provisions of E.O. No. 125,
as amended, that the President, then possessed of and exercising
legislative powers, mandated the DOTC to be the primary policy,
planning, programming, coordinating, implementing, regulating and
administrative entity to promote, develop and regulate networks of
transportation and communications. The grant of authority to the DOTC
includes the power to establishand administer comprehensive and
integrated programs for transportation and communications.
As may be seen further, the Minister (now Secretary) of the DOTC is
vested with the authority and responsibility to exercise the mandate
given to the department. Accordingly, the DOTC Secretary is
authorized to issue such orders, rules, regulations and other issuances
as may be necessary to ensure the effective implementation of the law.
Since, under the law, the DOTC is authorized to establish and
administer programs and projects for transportation, it follows that the
President may exercise the same power and authority to order the
implementation of the Project, which admittedly is one for
transportation.
Such authority springs from the Presidents power of control over all
executive departments as well as the obligation for the faithful
execution of the laws under Article VII, Section 17 of the Constitution
which provides:
SECTION 17. The President shall have control of all the
executive departments, bureaus and offices. He shall ensure
that the laws be faithfully executed.
This constitutional provision is echoed in Section 1, Book III of the
Administrative Code of 1987. Notably, Section 38, Chapter 37, Book IV
of the same Code defines the Presidents power of supervision and
control over the executive departments, viz:
SECTION 38. Definition of Administrative Relationships.
Unless otherwise expressly stated in the Code or in other laws
defining the special relationships of particular agencies,
administrative relationships shall be categorized and defined as
follows:
(1) Supervision and Control. Supervision and control
shall include authority to act directly whenever a specific
function is entrusted by law or regulation to a subordinate;
direct the performance of duty; restrain the commission of acts;
review, approve, reverse or modify acts and decisions of
subordinate officials or units; determine priorities in the
execution of plans and programs. Unless a different meaning is
explicitly provided in the specific law governing the relationship
of particular agencies the word "control" shall encompass
supervision and control as defined in this paragraph. x x x
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Thus, whenever a specific function is entrusted by law or regulation to a
subordinate, the President may act directly or merely direct the
performance of a duty.34
Respecting the Presidents authority to order the implementation of the
Project in the exercise of the police power of the State, suffice it to
stress that the powers vested in the DOTC Secretary to establish and
administer comprehensive and integrated programs for transportation
and communications and to issue orders, rules and regulations to
implement such mandate (which, as previously discussed, may also be
exercised by the President) have been so delegated for the good and
welfare of the people. Hence, these powers partake of the nature of
police power.
Police power is the plenary power vested in the legislature to make,
ordain, and establish wholesome and reasonable laws, statutes and
ordinances, not repugnant to the Constitution, for the good and welfare
of the people.35 This power to prescribe regulations to promote the
health, morals, education, good order or safety, and general welfare of
the people flows from the recognition that salus populi est suprema
lex the welfare of the people is the supreme law.
While police power rests primarily with the legislature, such power may
be delegated, as it is in fact increasingly being delegated. 36 By virtue of
a valid delegation, the power may be exercised by the President and
administrative boards37 as well as by the lawmaking bodies of municipal
corporations or local governments under an express delegation by the
Local Government Code of 1991.38
The authority of the President to order the implementation of the
Project notwithstanding, the designation of the MMDA as the
implementing agency for the Project may not be sustained. It is ultra
vires, there being no legal basis therefor.
It bears stressing that under the provisions of E.O. No. 125, as
amended, it is the DOTC, and not the MMDA, which is authorized to
establish and implement a project such as the one subject of the cases
at bar. Thus, the President, although authorized to establish or cause
the implementation of the Project, must exercise the authority through
the instrumentality of the DOTC which, by law, is the
primary implementing and administrative entity in the promotion,
development and regulation of networks of transportation, and the one
so authorized to establish and implement a project such as the Project
in question.
By designating the MMDA as the implementing agency of the Project,
the President clearly overstepped the limits of the authority conferred
by law, rendering E.O. No. 179 ultra vires.
In another vein, the validity of the designation of MMDA flies in the
absence of a specific grant of authority to it under R.A. No. 7924.
To recall, R.A. No. 7924 declared the Metropolitan Manila area 39 as a
"special development and administrative region" and placed the
administration of "metro-wide" basic services affecting the region under
the MMDA.
Section 2 of R.A. No. 7924 specifically authorizes the MMDA to perform
"planning, monitoring and coordinative functions, and in the process
exercise regulatory and supervisory authority over the delivery of
metro-wide services," including transport and traffic
management.40 Section 5 of the same law enumerates the powers and
functions of the MMDA as follows:
(a) Formulate, coordinate and regulate the
implementation of medium and long-term plans and
programs for the delivery of metro-wide services, land
use and physical development within Metropolitan
Manila, consistent with national development objectives
and priorities;
(b) Prepare, coordinate and regulate the implementation
of medium-term investment programs for metro-wide
services which shall indicate sources and uses of funds
for priority programs and projects, and which shall
include the packaging of projects and presentation to
funding institutions;
(c) Undertake and manage on its own metro-wide
programs and projects for the delivery of specific
services under its jurisdiction, subject to the approval of
the Council. For this purpose, MMDA can create
appropriate project management offices;
(d) Coordinate and monitor the implementation of such
plans, programs and projects in Metro Manila; identify
bottlenecks and adopt solutions to problems of
implementation;
(e) The MMDA shall set the policies concerning
traffic in Metro Manila, and shall coordinate and
regulate the implementation of all programs and
projects concerning traffic management,
specifically pertaining to enforcement, engineering
 and education. Upon request, it shall be extended
assistance and cooperation, including but not limited to,
assignment of personnel, by all other government
agencies and offices concerned;
(f) Install and administer a single ticketing system,
fix, impose and collect fines and penalties for all
kinds of violations of traffic rules and
regulations, whether moving or non-moving in nature,
and confiscate and suspend or revoke drivers licenses
in the enforcement of such traffic laws and regulations,
the provisions of RA 4136 and PD 1605 to the contrary
notwithstanding. For this purpose, the Authority shall
impose all traffic laws and regulations in Metro Manila,
through its traffic operation center, and may deputize
members of the PNP, traffic enforcers of local
government units, duly licensed security guards, or
members of non-governmental organizations to whom
may be delegated certain authority, subject to such
conditions and requirements as the Authority may
impose; and
(g) Perform other related functions required to achieve
the objectives of the MMDA, including the undertaking
of delivery of basic services to the local government
units, when deemed necessary subject to prior
coordination with and consent of the local government
unit concerned." (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
The scope of the function of MMDA as an administrative, coordinating
and policy-setting body has been settled in Metropolitan Manila
Development Authority (MMDA) v. Bel-Air Village Association, Inc.41 In
that case, the Court stressed:
Clearly, the scope of the MMDAs function is limited to the
delivery of the seven (7) basic services. One of these
is transport and traffic management which includes the
formulation and monitoring of policies, standards and projects
to rationalize the existing transport operations, infrastructure
requirements, the use of thoroughfares and promotion of the
safe movement of persons and goods. It also covers the mass
transport system and the institution of a system of road
regulation, the administration of all traffic enforcement
operations, traffic engineering services and traffic education
programs, including the institution of a single ticketing system in
Metro Manila for traffic violations. Under this service, the MMDA
is expressly authorized to "to set the policies concerning traffic"
and "coordinate and regulate the implementation of all traffic
management programs." In addition, the MMDA may install and
administer a single ticketing system," fix, impose and collect
fines and penalties for all traffic violations.
It will be noted that the powers of the MMDA are limited to the
following acts: formulation, coordination, regulation,
implementation, preparation, management, monitoring, setting
of policies, installation of a system and administration. There
is no syllable in R.A. No. 7924 that grants the MMDA police
power, let alone legislative power. Even the Metro Manila
Council has not been delegated any legislative power. Unlike
the legislative bodies of the local government units, there
is no provision in R.A. No. 7924 that empowers the MMDA
or its Council to enact ordinances, approve resolutions
and appropriate funds for the general welfare of the
inhabitants of Metro Manila. The MMDA is, as termed in the
charter itself, a development authority. It is an agency
created for the purpose of laying down
policies and coordinating with the various national
government agencies, peoples organizations, non-
governmental organizations and the private sector for the
efficient and expeditious delivery of basic services in the
vast metropolitan area. All its functions are administrative
in nature and these are actually summed up in the charter
itself, viz:
SECTION 2. Creation of the Metropolitan Manila Development
Authority. . . .
The MMDA shall perform planning, monitoring and
coordinative functions, and in the process exercise
regulatory and supervisory authority over the
delivery of metro-wide services within Metro Manila,
without diminution of the autonomy of the local
 government units concerning purely local
matters.42 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
In light of the administrative nature of its powers and functions, the
MMDA is devoid of authority to implement the Project as envisioned by
the E.O; hence, it could not have been validly designated by the
President to undertake the Project. It follows that the MMDA cannot
validly order the elimination of respondents terminals.
Even the MMDAs claimed authority under the police power must
necessarily fail in consonance with the above-quoted ruling in MMDA v.
Bel-Air Village Association, Inc. and this Courts subsequent ruling
in Metropolitan Manila Development Authority v. Garin43 that the MMDA
is not vested with police power.
Even assuming arguendo that police power was delegated to the
MMDA, its exercise of such power does not satisfy the two tests of a
valid police power measure, viz: (1) the interest of the public generally,
as distinguished from that of a particular class, requires its exercise;
and (2) the means employed are reasonably necessary for the
accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive upon
individuals.44 Stated differently, the police power legislation must be
firmly grounded on public interest and welfare and a reasonable
relation must exist between the purposes and the means.
As early as Calalang v. Williams,45 this Court recognized that traffic
congestion is a public, not merely a private, concern. The Court therein
held that public welfare underlies the contested statute authorizing the
Director of Public Works to promulgate rules and regulations to regulate
and control traffic on national roads.
Likewise, in Luque v. Villegas,46 this Court emphasized that public
welfare lies at the bottom of any regulatory measure designed "to
relieve congestion of traffic, which is, to say the least, a menace to
public safety."47 As such, measures calculated to promote the safety
and convenience of the people using the thoroughfares by the
regulation of vehicular traffic present a proper subject for the exercise
of police power.
Notably, the parties herein concede that traffic congestion is a public
concern that needs to be addressed immediately. Indeed, the E.O. was
issued due to the felt need to address the worsening traffic congestion
in Metro Manila which, the MMDA so determined, is caused by the
increasing volume of buses plying the major thoroughfares and the
inefficient connectivity of existing transport systems. It is thus beyond
cavil that the motivating force behind the issuance of the E.O. is the
interest of the public in general.
Are the means employed appropriate and reasonably necessary for the
accomplishment of the purpose. Are they not duly oppressive?
With the avowed objective of decongesting traffic in Metro Manila, the
E.O. seeks to "eliminate[e] the bus terminals now located along major
Metro Manila thoroughfares and provid[e] more convenient access to
the mass transport system to the commuting public through the
provision of mass transport terminal facilities x x x."48 Common carriers
with terminals along the major thoroughfares of Metro Manila would
thus be compelled to close down their existing bus terminals and use
the MMDA-designated common parking areas.
In Lucena Grand Central Terminal, Inc. v. JAC Liner, Inc.,49 two city
ordinances were passed by the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Lucena,
directing public utility vehicles to unload and load passengers at the
Lucena Grand Central Terminal, which was given the exclusive
franchise to operate a single common terminal. Declaring that no other
terminals shall be situated, constructed, maintained or established
inside or within the city of Lucena, the sanggunian declared as
inoperable all temporary terminals therein.
The ordinances were challenged before this Court for being
unconstitutional on the ground that, inter alia, the measures constituted
an invalid exercise of police power, an undue taking of private property,
and a violation of the constitutional prohibition against monopolies.
Citing De la Cruz v. Paras50 and Lupangco v. Court of Appeals,51 this
Court held that the assailed ordinances were characterized by
overbreadth, as they went beyond what was reasonably necessary to
solve the traffic problem in the city. And it found that the compulsory
use of the Lucena Grand Terminal was unduly oppressive because it
would subject its users to fees, rentals and charges.
The true role of Constitutional Law is to effect an equilibrium
between authority and liberty so that rights are exercised within
the framework of the law and the laws are enacted with due
deference to rights.
A due deference to the rights of the individual thus requires a
more careful formulation of solutions to societal problems.
From the memorandum filed before this Court by petitioner, it is
gathered that the Sangguniang Panlungsod had identified the
cause of traffic congestion to be the indiscriminate loading and
unloading of passengers by buses on the streets of the city
proper, hence, the conclusion that the terminals contributed to
the proliferation of buses obstructing traffic on the city streets.
Bus terminals per se do not, however, impede or help impede
the flow of traffic. How the outright proscription against the
existence of all terminals, apart from that franchised to
petitioner, can be considered as reasonably necessary to
solve the traffic problem, this Court has not been
enlightened. If terminals lack adequate space such that bus
drivers are compelled to load and unload passengers on the
streets instead of inside the terminals, then reasonable
specifications for the size of terminals could be instituted, with
permits to operate the same denied those which are unable to
meet the specifications.
In the subject ordinances, however, the scope of the
proscription against the maintenance of terminals is so
broad that even entities which might be able to provide
facilities better than the franchised terminal are barred
from operating at all. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
As in Lucena, this Court fails to see how the prohibition against the
existence of respondents terminals can be considered a reasonable
necessity to ease traffic congestion in the metropolis. On the contrary,
the elimination of respondents bus terminals brings forth the distinct
possibility and the equally harrowing reality of traffic congestion in the
common parking areas, a case of transference from one site to another.
Less intrusive measures such as curbing the proliferation of "colorum"
buses, vans and taxis entering Metro Manila and using the streets for
parking and passenger pick-up points, as respondents suggest, might
even be more effective in easing the traffic situation. So would the strict
enforcement of traffic rules and the removal of obstructions from major
thoroughfares.
As to the alleged confiscatory character of the E.O., it need only to be
stated that respondents certificates of public convenience confer no
property right, and are mere licenses or privileges.52 As such, these
must yield to legislation safeguarding the interest of the people.
Even then, for reasons which bear reiteration, the MMDA cannot order
the closure of respondents terminals not only because no authority to
implement the Project has been granted nor legislative or police power
been delegated to it, but also because the elimination of the terminals
does not satisfy the standards of a valid police power measure.
Finally, an order for the closure of respondents terminals is not in line
with the provisions of the Public Service Act.
Paragraph (a), Section 13 of Chapter II of the Public Service Act (now
Section 5 of Executive Order No. 202, creating the Land Transportation
Franchising and Regulatory Board or LFTRB) vested the Public Service
Commission (PSC, now the LTFRB) with "x x x jurisdiction, supervision
and control over all public services and their franchises, equipment and
other properties x x x."
Consonant with such grant of authority, the PSC was empowered to
"impose such conditions as to construction, equipment,
maintenance, service, or operation as the public interests and
convenience may reasonably require"53 in approving any franchise or
privilege.
Further, Section 16 (g) and (h) of the Public Service Act 54 provided that
the Commission shall have the power, upon proper notice and hearing
in accordance with the rules and provisions of this Act, subject to the
limitations and exceptions mentioned and saving provisions to the WHEREFORE, the Petition is, in light of the foregoing
contrary: disquisition, DENIED. E.O. No. 179 is declared NULL and VOID for
being ultra vires.
(g) To compel any public service to furnish safe, adequate,
and proper service as regards the manner of furnishing the SO ORDERED.
same as well as the maintenance of the necessary material and
equipment.

(h) To require any public service to establish, construct,

maintain, and operate any reasonable extension of its
existing facilities, where in the judgment of said Commission,
such extension is reasonable and practicable and will furnish
sufficient business to justify the construction and maintenance
of the same and when the financial condition of the said public
service reasonably warrants the original expenditure required in
making and operating such extension.(Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)

The establishment, as well as the maintenance of vehicle parking areas

or passenger terminals, is generally considered a necessary service to
be provided by provincial bus operators like respondents, hence, the
investments they have poured into the acquisition or lease of suitable
terminal sites. Eliminating the terminals would thus run counter to the
provisions of the Public Service Act.

This Court commiserates with the MMDA for the roadblocks thrown in
the way of its efforts at solving the pestering problem of traffic
congestion in Metro Manila. These efforts are commendable, to say the
least, in the face of the abominable traffic situation of our roads day in
and day out. This Court can only interpret, not change, the law,
however. It needs only to be reiterated that it is the DOTC as the
primary policy, planning, programming, coordinating, implementing,
regulating and administrative entity to promote, develop and regulate
networks of transportation and communications which has the
power to establish and administer a transportation project like the
Project subject of the case at bar.

No matter how noble the intentions of the MMDA may be then, any
plan, strategy or project which it is not authorized to implement cannot
pass muster.