De La Cruz V. Capital Ins. & Surety Co, Inc., G.R. No.
L-21574, June 30, 1966 perimeter of 500 meters, the appellee should have 11 fire hydrants in the compound,
FACTS:
Eduardo de la Cruz, the son of herein petitioner, was the holder of an accident
insurance policy. In connection with the celebration of the New Year, the insured, a
non-professional boxer, participated in a boxing contest. In the course of his bout with
another person, likewise a non-professional, of the same height, weight, and size,
Eduardo slipped and was hit by his opponent on the left part of the back of the head,
causing Eduardo to fall, with his head hitting the rope of the ring. The insured died
with the cause of death reported as hemorrhage inter cranial, left. The insurer
refused to pay the proceeds of the policy on the ground that the death of the insured,
caused by his participation in a boxing contest, was not accidental and, therefore, not
covered by insurance.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the death of the insured is covered by the policy
HELD:
The terms accident and accidental as used in the insurance contract, have not
acquired any technical meaning, and are construed by the courts in their ordinary and
common acceptation. Thus, the terms have been taken to mean that which happen by
chance or fortuitously, without intention and design, and which is unexpected,
unusual, and unforeseen. An accident is an event that proceeds from an unknown
cause and, therefore, not expected. Without the unintentional slipping of the
deceased, perhaps he would not have received the blow in the head and would not
have died. Boxing is attended with some risks of external injuries, but any injury
received in the course of the game could be accidental. In boxing, as in other equally
physically rigorous sports, such as basketball or baseball, death is not ordinarily
anticipated to result. If, therefore, it ever does, the injury or death can only be
accidental or produced by some unforeseen happening or event as what occurred in
this case. The insurer was liable.
Qua v Law Union. G.R. No. L-4611 December 17, 1955
Facts:
Qua owned 4 warehouses used for the storage of copra and hemp. They were
insured with the Law Union.
Fire broke out and completely destroyed 3 bodegas. The plaintiff submitted claims
totalling P398,562.81. The Insurance Company resisted payment on the grounds that
the fire had been deliberately caused by the insured or by other persons in
connivance with him.
Que Chee Gan and his brother were tried for arson, but were acquitted by the trial
court. As regards the insurance claim, the trial court ruled in favor of Qua and entitled
him to recover more than Php 300,000 for indemnities from the insurance company.
Hence, the company appealed to the SC.
In its first assignment of error, the insurance company alleged that the trial Court
should have held that the policies were avoided for breach of warranty. The contract
noted that fire hydrants were required in a particular measurement of space (every
150 feet). Hence, they argued that since the bodegas insured had an external wall
and that he actually had only 2, with a further pair.
Issues:
1. WON the insurance company can void the policies it had issued
2. WON the insured violated the "Hemp Warranty" provisions of the policy against the
storage of gasoline
3. WON the insured planned the destruction of the bodega
Held: No. No. No.
Ratio:
1. The insurer, who at the time of issuance, has knowledge of existing facts which
would invalidate the contract from the beginning, such constitutes a waiver of
conditions in the contract inconsistent with the facts, and the insurer is stopped
thereafter from asserting the breach of such conditions. Also, an insurance company
intends to executed a valid contract in return for the premium received; and when the
policy contains a condition which renders it voidable at its inception, and this result is
known to the insurer, it will be presumed to have intended to waive the conditions and
to execute a binding contract, rather than to have deceived the insured into thinking
he is insured when in fact he is not.
The appellant is barred estoppel to claim violation of the so-called fire hydrants
warranty, because it knew the number of hydrants demanded therein never existed
from the very beginning and issued the policies.
To allow a company to accept one's money for a policy of insurance which it then
knows to be void and of no effect, though it knows as it must, that the assured
believes it to be valid and binding, is so contrary to the dictates of honesty and fair
dealing, and so closely related to positive fraud, as to the abhorrent to fair-minded
men.
The appellant company so worded the policies that while exacting the greater number
of fire hydrants and appliances, it kept the premium discount at the minimum of 2
1/2%, thereby giving the insurance company a double benefit. Such abnormal
treatment of the insured strongly points at an abuse of the insurance company's
selection of the words and terms of the contract, over which it had absolute control.
Receipt of Premiums or Assessments after Cause for Forfeiture Other than
Nonpayment. It is a well settled rule of law that an insurer which with knowledge of
facts entitling it to treat a policy as no longer in force, receives and accepts a premium
on the policy, estopped to take advantage of the forfeiture. It cannot treat the policy as
void for the purpose of defense to an action to recover for a loss thereafter occurring
and at the same time treat it as valid for the purpose of earning and collecting further
premiums.
Moreover, taking into account the well-known rule that ambiguities or obscurities must
be strictly interpreted against the party that caused them, the "memo of warranty"
invoked by appellant bars the latter from questioning the existence of the appliances
called for in the insured premises
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2. The ambiguity must be held strictly against the insurer and liberally in favor of the
insured, specially to avoid a forfeiture. So long as insurance companies insist upon
the use of ambiguous, intricate and technical provisions, which conceal rather than
frankly disclose, their own intentions, the courts must, in fairness to those who
purchase insurance, construe every ambiguity in favor of the insured.
Appellee admitted that there were 36 cans of gasoline in the building designed. It
However, gasoline is not specifically mentioned among the prohibited articles listed in
the so-called "hemp warranty." The cause relied upon by the insurer speaks of "oils",
and is uncertain because, "Oils" usually mean "lubricants" and not gasoline or
kerosene.
If the company intended to rely upon a condition of that character, it ought to have
been plainly expressed in the policy.
The contract of insurance is one of perfect good faith not for the insured alone, but
equally so for the insurer; in fact, it is mere so for the latter, since its dominant
bargaining position carries with it stricter responsibility.
Also, the gasoline kept in Bodega No. 2 was only incidental to his business, being no
more than a customary 2 day's supply for the five or six motor vehicles used for
transporting of the stored merchandise. "It is well settled that the keeping of
inflammable oils on the premises though prohibited by the policy does not void it if
such keeping is incidental to the business."
3. It was unlikely that Qua burned the warehouse to defraud the company because he
had the resources to pay off the National Bank in a short time. Also, no motive
appears for attempt to defraud the insurer. While the acquittal of the insured in the
arson case is not res judicata on the present civil action, the insurer's evidence, to
judge from the decision in the criminal case, is practically identical in both cases and
must lead to the same result, since the proof to establish the defense of connivance at
the fire in order to defraud the insurer "cannot be materially less convincing than that
required in order to convict the insured of the crime of arson."
As to the defense that the burned bodegas could not possibly have contained the
quantities of copra and hemp stated in the fire claims, the insurer relied on its adjuster
investigator who examined the premises during and after the fire. His testimony,
however, was based on inferences from the photographs and traces found after the
fire, and must yield to the contradictory testimony of those who actually saw the
contents of the bodegas shortly before the fire, while inspecting them for the
mortgagee Bank.
Benjamin Co vs. Republic of the Philippines GR L-12150, 26 May 1960
Facts:
Petitioner was born in Abram and his parents are both Chinese. He owes his
allegiance to theNationalist Government ofChina. He is married to Leonor Go, the
marriage having been celebrated inthe Catholic Church of Bangued. He speaks and
writes English as well as the Ilocano and Tagalog dialects. He graduated from the
Abram Valley College, and finished his primary studies in the Colegio in Bangued,
both schools being recognized by the government. He has a child two months old. He
has never been accused of any crime involving moral turpitude. He is not opposed to
organized government, nor is he a member of any subversive organization. He does
not believe in, nor practice, polygamy. Since his birth, he has never gone abroad. He
mingles with the Filipinos. He prefers a democratic form of government and stated
that if his petition is granted he would serve the government either in the military or
civil department. He is a merchant dealing in the buy and sell of tobacco. He also is
part owner of a store in Bangued. In his tobacco business, he has a working capital of
P10, 000.00 which he claims to have been accumulated thru savings. He contributes
to civic and charitable organizations like the Jaycees, Rotary, Red Cross and to town
fiestas. He likes the customs of the Filipinos because he has resided in the
Philippines for a long time. During the year 1956, he claims to have earned P1,
000.00 in his tobacco business. With respect to the store of which he claims to be a
part owner, he stated that his father gave him a sum of less than P3, 000.00
representing one-fourth of the sales. Aside from being a co-owner of said store, he
receives a monthly salary of P120, 00as a salesman therein. He took a course in
radio mechanics and completed the same in 1955. He has no vice of any kind. He
claims that he has never been delinquent in the payment of taxes. But he admitted
that he did not file his income tax return when he allegedly received an amount of not
less than P3, 000 from his father which he claims to have invested in his tobacco
business. A petition for naturalization was filed before the trial court in which after
hearing was granted. Court ordered that a certificate of naturalization be issued to
petitioner after the lapse of two years from the date the decision becomes final and all
the requisites provided for in Republic Act 503 have been complied.
Issue:
Whether or not the lower court erred in granting the petition for naturalization.
Decision:
Philippine law requires that an alien must conduct himself in a proper and
irreproachable manner during the entire period of his residence in the Philippines in
his relation with the constituted government as well as with the community in which he
is living. In the case at bar, petitioners failure to comply with his obligation to register
his wife and child with the Bureau of Immigration as required by the Alien Registration
Act as well as his failure to file his income tax return despite his fixed salary of P1,
440.00 a year and his profit of P1, 000.00 in his tobacco business indicates that he
failed to conduct himself in a proper and irreproachable manner in his relation with our
government. It is also claimed that he has not stated (during the cross-examinations)
that he believes in the principles underlying our Constitution. In construction,
Naturalization laws should be rigidly enforced and strictly construed in favor of the
government and against the applicant. Hence, the petition appealed from is reversed
without pronouncement as to cost.
Crisologo vs Globe Telecom, G.R. No. 167631, December 16, 2005
Facts:
Petitioner was an employee of respondent company. When she was promoted, she
became entitled to an executive car. In April 2002, she was separated from the
company. Petitioner filed a complaint for illegal dismissal and reinstatement with
NLRC which later dismissed the complaint. The Petitioner filed for certiorari with the
CA assailing the dismissal. Pending said petition, Respondent filed a civil case with
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the RTC an action for recovery of possession of the car with application for a writ of
replevin with damages docketed as case MC04-2480. Petitioner filed a motion to
dismiss on the ground of litis pendentia and forum shopping but was denied by the
trial court. Thus, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with the CA. Petitioner also filed
with the CA a motion for the issuance of a writ of prohibition to enjoin proceedings in
the replevin case before the trial court. Thereafter, Respondent filed a motion to
declare defendant in default in Civil Case No. MC04-2480, which was granted by the
trial court. Respondent was thus allowed to present its evidence ex-parte. Petitioner
filed a motion for reconsideration of the order of default but it was denied by the trial
court. The trial court rendered a judgment by default, declaring respondent having the
right of possession over the subject motor vehicle and ordered the petitioner to pay for
damages, attorneys fee, and cost of suit. Petitioner then filed with the Supreme Court
a petition for review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, which was
denied for being the wrong remedy under the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as
amended. Thus, Petitioner filed the present motion for reconsideration, alleging that
the filing of said petition is the proper recourse, citing Matute vs. Court of Appeals,
wherein it was ruled that a defendant declared in default has the remedy set forth in
Sec. 2, par (3) of Rule 41.
Issue:
WON the Petitioners filing of review on certiorari with the SC citing Matute case is the
proper recourse for a judgment by default rendered by the trial court.
Ruling:
No. The filing of the present petition is clearly not the proper remedy to assail the
default judgment rendered by the trial court. The Matute case is of 1969, vintage and
pertained to the old Rules of Court and has already been superseded by the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure. Her only recourse then is to file an ordinary appeal with the
Court of Appeals under Sec. 2 (a), Rule 41 of the1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as
amended.
WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration is GRANTED. The petition is reinstated
and the case is
REFERRED to the Court of Appeals for appropriate action.
RICHARD VELASCO v. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. L-14214,
May 25, 1960.
This is a petition for naturalization filed before the Court of First Instance of Manila
which, after trial, was denied for failure of petitioner to meet the requirements of the
law. Petitioner has appealed.
Petitioner was born in the Philippines on May 12, 1932 of spouses Peter Velasco and
Miguela Tiu who became naturalized citizens in 1956. He alleges that since his birth
in Manila on May 12, 1932 he continuously resided in the Philippines, particularly at
1441 Magdalena St., Manila; that he finished his elementary education at the
Francisco Balagtas Elementary School, and his high school at the Arellano University;
that he pursued his collegiate studies at the University of the East where he
graduated in dentistry in 1954; that he is a citizen of the Republic of China in
Formosa; that he has not followed the citizenship of his father when the latter became
naturalized as he was then already 23 years old; that he is single, although he is
engaged to be married to a Filipino girl by the name of Noemi Eugenia; that he is at
present employed at the Wilson Drug Store since February, 1957 with a monthly
salary of P150.00; that previously he worked as a salesman of his father with a salary
of P2,400.00 per annum, even if his father was only an agent of Elizalde and Co.; that
he knows how to speak and write English and Tagalog; that he is a Catholic by faith;
and he has never been convicted of any crime involving moral turpitude; that he does
not believe in polygamy or in anarchy or the use of violence for the predominance of
mens ideas; that he does not own any real property although he allegedly has cash
savings amounting to P3,500.00 at the Republic Savings Bank, P1,000.00 worth of
shares of stocks of the Far Eastern University, P2,000.00 shares of stock of the
Marinduque Iron Mines, and P1,000.00 in cash; that he is not suffering from any
contagious disease; that he has mingled socially with the Filipinos; that he has shown
a desire to embrace the customs and traditions of the Filipinos; and that he desires to
become a Filipino citizen because he considered the Philippines as his country and
the Filipinos as his countrymen.
His qualifications as to moral character were attested by Santiago Mariano, a
sergeant of the Manila Police Department, and Mrs. Paz J. Eugenio, a housekeeper,
who admitted that she is the prospective mother-in-law of petitioner.
The trial court found that there are three names mentioned in the petition and in the
documentary evidence submitted in support thereof, namely, Richard Velasco,
Richard C. Velasco, and Richard Chua Velasco, and that while petitioner states in his
petition that his full name is Richard Velasco, the signature thereon is Richard C.
Velasco. Again, the court found that the joint affidavit of said witnesses states that the
affiants personally know and are acquainted with Richard Velasco while the
documentary evidence shows that his name is Richard Chua Velasco. On the other
hand, petitioner testified that he has no alias nor other names and has always been
known as Richard Velasco. No evidence was submitted to prove that they are one
and the same person.
The trial court likewise found that Mrs. Paz J. Eugenio, a character witness, is the
prospective mother-in-law of petitioner, and as such her testimony is biased. It also
found that she and her companion witness Santiago Mariano were also the character
witnesses of a brother of petitioner in his petition for naturalization, a circumstance
which in its opinion indicates that petitioner has a limited circle of Filipino friends. The
court finally found that the present income of petitioner is only P150.00 a month
which, considering the present high cost of living and the low purchasing power of our
peso, is neither lucrative nor substantial to meet the requirement of the law.
Because of the above facts and circumstances, the trial court declared petitioner not
qualified to become a Filipino citizen.
We agree to the foregoing finding. Indeed, it appears from the evidence that petitioner
was employed at the Wilson Drug Store only on February, 1957 with a salary of
P150.00 a month, or barely a month before he filed the instant petition, and that said
store is partly owned by his mother who has one-fifth capital investment therein. This
leads one to believe that petitioners employment, even if true, is but a convenient
Page12
arrangement planned out by him and his family in order to show a token compliance
with the requirement of the law that to become a Filipino citizen one must have a
lucrative income or occupation.

Considering that "naturalization laws should be rigidly enforced and strictly construed
in favor of the government and against the applicant" (Co Quing Y Reyes v. Republic,
104 Phil., 889), we are constrained to hold that the trial court did not err in denying the
petition for naturalization.
Wherefore, the decision appealed from is affirmed, with costs against Appellant.
CELESTINO CO Y QUING REYES vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R.
No. L-10761, November 29, 1958
This is an appeal, taken by the Office of the Solicitor General, from a decision, of the
Court of First Instance of Manila, granting the petition for naturalization, citizen of the
Philippines, of appellee Celestino Co y Quing Reyes.
Appellant maintains that:
1. The lower court erred in not finding that the petitioner appellee has failed
to comply with all the requisites prescribed by the law to acquire
Philippine citizenship.
2. The lower court erred in finding that the petitioner-appellee possesses
all the qualifications prescribed by Revised Naturalization Law.
3. The lower court erred in granting Philippine citizenship to the herein
petitioner-appellee.
From the viewpoint of this Court, the question raised in the first assignment of error is
the only one that requires consideration, namely: did the Court of First Instance of
Manila erred in hearing this case and granting the petition in the case at bar, despite
the undisputed fact that said petition was publish in the Official Gazette only once,
instead of three (3) times, as required in section 9 of Commonwealth Act 473. This
provision reads:
Immediately upon the filing of a petition, it shall be the duty of the clerk of the court to
publish the same at petitioner's expense, once a week for three consecutive weeks, in
the Official Gazette, and in one of the newspapers of general circulation in the
province where the petitioner resides, and to have copies of said petition and a
general notice of the hearing posted in a public and conspicuous place in his office or
in the building where said office is located, setting forth in such notice the name,
birthplace and residence of the petitioner, the date and place of his arrival in the
Philippines, the names of the witnesses whom the petitioner proposes to introduce in
support of his petition, and the date of the hearing of the petition, which hearing shall
not be held within ninety days from the date of the last publication of the notice. The
clerk shall, as soon as possible, forward copies of the petition, the sentence, the
naturalization certificate, and other pertinent data to the Department of the Interior, the
Bureau of Justice, the Provincial Inspector of the Philippine Constabulary of the
province and the justice of the peace of the municipality wherein the petitioner
resides.
This section was squarely construed and applied in Ong Son Cui vs. Republic of the
Philippines, 101 Phil., 649, in which we said:
It could be seen that, under the aforequoted section of the Revised Naturalization
Law, the notice of hearing of the application for citizenship should be published three
times in the Official Gazette, or, in the language of the law, once a week for three
consecutive weeks, and so in the order of publication of the notice of hearing of the
present case it was enjoined that the same be made "once a week for three
consecutive weeks in the Official Gazette and in the Voz de Manila." The notice of
hearing of this case should therefore have been published three times not only in the
Voz de Manila but in the Official Gazette as well. And there being only one publication
of said notice of hearing in this case in the Official Gazette, the same is clearly
incomplete and therefore insufficient to confer jurisdiction to the court a quo to try the
case and grant the petition. It is argued, however, that there has been a substantial
compliance with law because the notice of hearing in question was published three
times in the Voz de Manila and once in the Official Gazette; but since the law
expressly provides that the notice of hearing be published three times, this should be
strictly observed; for, as correctly pointed out by the Solicitor General in his brief,
"The publication required by law in the Official Gazette and in a newspaper of general
circulation is a means of screening aliens applying for Filipino citizenship by giving the
public a chance to come forward and protest the grant of such citizenship if they
possess any information derogatory to the applicant. The official organ of the
government caters to the officials and employees of the government and to the
lawyers as well. These people, by reason of their occupation are in a better position to
acquire knowledge of aliens running afoul of the law than the average reader who
scans the newspapers for news. If the law was not after the number of times the
notice is published in the Official Gazette, it could have expressed in words that a
single publication in the Official Gazette would suffice; but when the law expressly
provides its publication "once a week for 3 consecutive weeks" the intention to give
the reading public 3 chances to read that item is very clear. A single publication
therefore of the notice where the law requires 3 is an incomplete publication, and an
incomplete publication is not a valid publication. The grant of citizenship is only a
mere privilege, and a strict compliance with law on the part of the applicant is
essential."
Petitioner may contend, however, that the law provides that the publication of the
notice of hearing should be made for three consecutive weeks and as the Official
Gazette is now being published monthly, and not weekly as it was before, petitioner
cannot actually comply with law; and because he had the notice of hearing in question
published, once, in the Official Gazette, he should be given the benefit of having
followed the law. This contention does not merits serious consideration. While it is
true that the notice of hearing in question cannot actually be published for three
consecutive weeks in the Official Gazette, it is no less true that said notice may be
published three times consecutively, although not weekly, in the Official Gazette, and
Page12
because the true intent of the law is that the said notice be published 3 times, it is our
considered opinion that in the instant case the single publication of the notice of
hearing in question is not a sufficient compliance with law.

We find no valid reason to depart from such view. Indeed, said section 9 requires that
the petition for naturalization be published "once a week, for three (3) consecutive
weeks, in the Official Gazette." This provision demands compliance with the following
requirements, namely: (1) the publication must be weekly; (2) it must be made three
(3) times; (3) and these must be "consecutive."
Compliance with the first condition was, admittedly, impossible, inasmuch as, until
recently, the Official Gazette was not published weekly. Petitioner could have, and,
hence, he should have, complied, however, with the second and third conditions.
Hence, the publication once in the Official Gazette is not a substantial compliance
with the provisions of the aforementioned section 9.
Appellee alleges, however, that the sufficiency of said publication was not questioned
in the lower court and cannot be raised for the first time on appeal; that the duty to
publish the petition is imposed by law upon the clerk of court, not upon petitioner; and
that non-compliance with said section 9 "is not a fatal defect unless it is actually
established that it prejudices the opposition to the application."
This pretense is untenable. The decision of the lower court granting appellee's petition
for naturalization affected his personal status and accordingly, it "is in the nature of a
judgment in rem" (2 C. J. 1123; U. S. vs. Gleason [C.C.N.Y.] 78 Fed. 396 [aff. 90 Fed.
778, 33 CCA 272]; In re O'Sullivan, 137 Mo. A. 214, 117 S.W. 651; Esker vs. McCoy,
5 Oh. Dec. [Reprint] 573; 6 Am. L. Rec. 694; 3 C.J.S. 853; 31 Am. Jur. 98). As stated
in Scott vs. Stroback (49 Ala. 477, 490): "A judgment admitting an alien to citizenship
has none of the properties or qualities of a judicial proceeding in personam. It is rather
in rem. (Emphasis ours.)
A proceeding in rem is not confined to the status of things, but extends to the status of
individuals and their relation to others. (I Am. Jur., p. 436.)
Proceedings in rem include not only those instituted to obtain decrees or judgments
against property as forfeited in the admiralty or the English exchequer, or as a prize,
but also suits against property to enforce a lien or privilege in the admiralty courts,
and suits to obtain a sentence judgment, or decree of other upon the personal status
or relations of the party, such as marriage, divorce, bastardy settlement, or the like.
Cunningham vs. Shanklin, 60 Cal. 118, 125, citing Bouv. (21 Words and Phrases
[Permanent Edition] p. 542.)
Accordingly, the decision of the lower court, in the case at bar, if valid, would be
binding upon "all the world" (Smith vs. Smith, W. Va. 83 S.E. 2d. 923, 926). In the
language of the Court in Bartero vs. Real Estate Savings Bank (10 Mo. App. 76, 78):
A judgment in rem is generally said to be a judgment declaratory of the status of some
subject-matter, whether this be a person, or a thing. Thus the probate of a will fixes
the status of the document as a will; so a decree establishing or dissolving a marriage
is a judgment in rem, because it fixes the status of the person. A judgment or
forfeiture against specified articles of goods for violation of the revenue laws is a
judgment in rem. In such case the judgment is conclusive all the world, . . . (21 Words
and Phrases [Permanent Edition] p. 540.)
Upon the other hand, in order that a court could validly try and decide any case, "it
must have jurisdiction both over the subject-matter and over the persons of the
parties" (Comments on the Rules of Court, by Moran, Vol. 1 [1957 ed.] p. 128).
Jurisdiction over the plaintiff or petitioner is acquired by his voluntary submission to
the authority of the Court, resulting from the filing of the complaint or petition.
Jurisdiction over other parties may be obtained, either by their voluntary appearance
or by service of summons (42 Am. Jur. p. 7). In a proceeding in rem, which binds the
"whole world", the latter is, in legal contemplation, a party therein, for, otherwise, it
could not be bound by the result thereof. It being impossible to serve summons
personally upon every human being in this world, the summons must be published as
provided by law. Otherwise, the court would have no jurisdiction over all parties
concerned and, as a consequence, any decision rendered in the case would be a
nullity (42 Am. Jur. 8; Scott vs. McNeal, 154 U.S. 34, 38 L. ed. 896, 14 S. Ct. 1108;
Pennoyer vs. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 24 L. ed. 565; Earle vs. McVeigh, 91 U.S. 503, 23 L.
ed 398; Hobby vs. Bunch, 83 Ga. 1, 10 S.E. 113, 20 Am. St. Rep. 301; Davies vs.
Thompson, 61 Okla. 21, 160 P. 75, LRA 1917-B 395; Greenwood vs. Furr [Tex Civ.
App.] 251 S.W. 332; 44 Am. Jur. 98). For this reason, it is well settled that the
procedure prescribed by law for the naturalization of an alien "should be strictly
followed" (2 C.J. 1120, citing In re Hollo, 206 Fed. 852; Ex parte Lange, 197 Fed. 769;
In re Liberman, 193 Fed. 301; State vs. King County Superior Ct., 75 Wash. 239, 134
P. 916; see, also, 3 C.J.S. 844). In the language of Corpus Juris Secundum,
naturalization laws "should be rigidly enforced and strictly construed in favor of the
government and against applicant for citizenship" (3 C.J.S. 833). And such,
accordingly, has been the criterion adopted by this Court in the interpretation and
application of our naturalization laws. (Pardo vs. Republic, 85 Phil., 323; 47 Off. Gaz.,
3447-3450; Ng vs. Republic, 94 Phil., 366; 50 Off. Gaz., 1599; Yu vs. Republic, L-
3808, July 29, 1952; Bautista vs. Republic, 87 Phil., 818; De la Cruz vs. Republic, 49
Off. Gaz.[3] 958; Tiao vs. Republic, 95 Phil., 709; Sam vs. Republic, 98 Phil., 592; 53
Off. Gaz., [1] 145; Ong Son Cui vs. Republic, 101 Phil., 649; 55 Off. Gaz. [22] 4044.).
As the Supreme Court of the U.S. has aptly put it in U.S. vs. Gingsberg (243 U.S. 472,
61 L. ed. 853, 856), and quoted, approvingly, by this Court in Bautista vs. Republic of
the Philippines (supra):
An alien who seeks political rights as a number of this nation can rightfully obtain
them only upon terms and conditions specified by Congress. Courts are without
authority to sanction changes or modifications; their duty is rigidly to enforce the
legislative will in respect of the matters so vital to the public welfare.
In the language of the editors of the American Jurisprudence:
. . . It is not within the province of the courts to make bargains with applicants for
naturalization. The courts have no choice but to require that there be a full
compliance, with the statutory provision. (2 Am. Jur. p. 577.)
Referring, specifically to service of notice by publication, American Jurisprudence has
this to say:
Page12
Substituted service and service by publication was unknown to the common law but
depends upon statutory authorization, and the principle of statutory construction that
there must be strict compliance with enactments modifying the course of common law
in regard to legal proceedings is exemplified in the cases involving the construction
and application of provisions authorizing substituted and constructive service. When,
by the local law, substituted or constructive service is in certain situations submitted in
the place of personal service when the latter is inconvenient or impossible, a strict and
literal compliance with the provisions of the law must be shown in order to support the
judgment based on such substituted or constructive service. Jurisdiction is not to be
assumed and exercised on the general ground that the subject matter of the suit is
within the power of the court. The inquiry must be as to whether the requisites of the
statute have been complied with, and such compliance must appear on the record.
The fact that the defendant had actual knowledge of attempted service does not
render the service effectual if in fact the process was not served in accordance with
the requirements of the statute. (42 Am. Jur. pp. 55-56.)
In short, non-compliance with the requirements thereof, relative to the publication of
the petition, affects the jurisdiction of the court. It constitutes a fatal defect, for it
impairs the very root or foundation of the authority to decide the case, regardless of
whether the one to blame therefor is the clerk of court or the petitioner or his counsel.
Failure to raise this question in the lower court would not cure such defect. Upon the
other hand, for obvious reasons, public interest demands that the courts of justice
refrain from performing invalid acts. Consequently, it is not only proper, but, also,
advisable, and, even, necessary, that the issue raised in appellant's first assignment
of error be considered and decided by us. In any event, the provisions of section 10,
Rule 9, of the Rules of Court, relative to the implied waiver of defenses not pleaded in
the answer or motion to dismiss," shall not apply to . . . naturalization . . . proceedings,
except by analogy or in a suppletory character and whenever practicable and
convenient" pursuant to Rule 132 of said Rules of Court and it is, neither
"practicable", nor "convenient", to do so in the case at bar.
Wherefore, the decision appealed from is hereby reversed, with costs against
petitioner-appellee. It is so ordered.
HEIRS OF NICOLAS JUGALBOT vs. COURT OF APPEALS and HEIRS OF
VIRGINIA A. ROA, G.R. No. 170346, March 12, 2007
Petitioners, Heirs of Nicolas Jugalbot, represented by their attorney-in-fact Leonila
Jugalbot, assail the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals dated October 19, 2005 in CA-
G.R. SP No. 81823 where the petitioners title to the disputed property, as evidenced
by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. E-103, was cancelled and the previous title,
TCT No. T-11543, was reinstated in the name of Virginia A. Roa. The appellate court
reversed the Decision2 and Resolution3 of the Department of Agrarian Reform
Adjudication Board (DARAB) Central Office in DARAB Case No. 7966, affirming the
Decision4 of the Provincial Adjudicator and the Order5 denying the motion for
reconsideration in DARAB Case No. X (06-1358) filed in Misamis Oriental, for
Cancellation of TCT No. E-103, Recovery of Possession and Damages.
On September 28, 1997, an Emancipation Patent (EP) was issued to Nicolas Jugalbot
based on the latters claim that he was the tenant of Lot 2180-C of the Subdivision
plan (LRC) TSD-10465, subject property of the case at bar, with an area of 6,229
square meters, located at Barangay Lapasan, Cagayan de Oro City. The subject
property was registered in the name of Virginia A. Roa under Transfer Certificate of
Title (TCT) No. T-11543, the same being issued on April 1, 1970 in the name of
"Virginia A. Roa married to Pedro N. Roa." The property was originally registered in
the name of Marcelino Cabili from whom Virginia A. Roa purchased the same
sometime in 1966.6
Nicolas Jugalbot alleged that he was a tenant of the property continuously since the
1950s. On a Certification dated January 8, 1988 and issued by Department of
Agrarian Reform (DAR) Team Leader Eduardo Maandig, the subject property was
declared to be tenanted as of October 21, 1972 and primarily devoted to rice and
corn. On March 1, 1988, the Emancipation Patent was registered with the Register of
Deeds and Nicolas Jugalbot was issued TCT No. E-103.7
On August 10, 1998, the heirs of Virginia A. Roa, herein private respondents, filed
before the DARAB Provincial Office of Misamis Oriental a Complaint for Cancellation
of Title (TCT No. E-103), Recovery of Possession and Damages against Nicolas
Jugalbot, docketed as DARAB Case No. X (06-1358).8
On October 23, 1998, a Decision was rendered by the DARAB Provincial Adjudicator
dismissing private respondents complaint and upholding the validity of the
Emancipation Patent. Private respondents motion for reconsideration was denied.9
On appeal, the DARAB Central Office affirmed the Provincial Adjudicators decision
on the sole ground that private respondents right to contest the validity of Nicolas
Jugalbots title was barred by prescription. It held that an action to invalidate a
certificate of title on the ground of fraud prescribes after the expiration of one year
from the decree of registration.10
On November 10, 2003, the DARAB denied private respondents motion for
reconsideration,11 hence they filed a petition for review before the Court of Appeals
which was granted. The appellate court reversed the Decision and Resolution of the
DARAB Central Office on four grounds: (1) the absence of a tenancy relationship; (2)
lack of notice to Virginia Roa by the DAR; (3) the area of the property which was less
than one hectare and deemed swampy, rainfed and kangkong-producing; and (4) the
classification of the subject property as residential, which is outside the coverage of
Presidential Decree No. 27.
Hence, this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45.
The sole issue for determination is whether a tenancy relationship exists between
petitioners Heirs of Nicolas Jugalbot, and private respondents, Heirs of Virginia A.
Roa, under Presidential Decree No. 27. Simply stated, are petitioners de jure tenants
of private respondents?
As clearly laid down in Qua v. Court of Appeals12 and subsequently in Benavidez v.
Court of Appeals,13 the doctrine is well-settled that the allegation that an agricultural
tenant tilled the land in question does not automatically make the case an agrarian
dispute. It is necessary to first establish the existence of a tenancy relationship
between the party litigants. The following essential requisites must concur in order to
Page12
establish a tenancy relationship: (a) the parties are the landowner and the tenant; (b)
the subject matter is agricultural land; (c) there is consent; (d) the purpose is
agricultural production; (e) there is personal cultivation by the tenant; and (f) there is a
sharing of harvests between the parties.14
Valencia v. Court of Appeals15 further affirms the doctrine that a tenancy relationship
cannot be presumed. Claims that one is a tenant do not automatically give rise to
security of tenure. The elements of tenancy must first be proved in order to entitle the
claimant to security of tenure. There must be evidence to prove the allegation that an
agricultural tenant tilled the land in question. Hence, a perusal of the records and
documents is in order to determine whether there is substantial evidence to prove the
allegation that a tenancy relationship does exist between petitioner and private
respondents. The principal factor in determining whether a tenancy relationship exists
is intent.16
Tenancy is not a purely factual relationship dependent on what the alleged tenant
does upon the land. It is also a legal relationship, as ruled in Isidro v. Court of
Appeals.17 The intent of the parties, the understanding when the farmer is installed,
and their written agreements, provided these are complied with and are not contrary
to law, are even more important.18
Petitioners allege that they are bona fide tenants of private respondents under
Presidential Decree No. 27. Private respondents deny this, citing inter alia, that
Virginia A. Roa was not given a notice of coverage of the property subject matter of
this case; that Virginia A. Roa and the private respondents did not have any tenant on
the same property; that the property allegedly covered by Presidential Decree No. 27
was residential land; that the lot was paraphernal property of Virginia A. Roa; and the
landholding was less than seven (7) hectares.
The petition is devoid of merit.
The petitioners are not de jure tenants of private respondents under Presidential
Decree No. 27 due to the absence of the essential requisites that establish a tenancy
relationship between them.
Firstly, the taking of subject property was done in violation of constitutional due
process. The Court of Appeals was correct in pointing out that Virginia A. Roa was
denied due process because the DAR failed to send notice of the impending land
reform coverage to the proper party. The records show that notices were erroneously
addressed and sent in the name of Pedro N. Roa who was not the owner, hence, not
the proper party in the instant case. The ownership of the property, as can be gleaned
from the records, pertains to Virginia A. Roa. Notice should have been therefore
served on her, and not Pedro N. Roa.
Spouses Estonina v. Court of Appeals19 held that the presumption under civil law that
all property of the marriage belongs to the conjugal partnership applies only when
there is proof that the property was acquired during the marriage. Otherwise stated,
proof of acquisition during the marriage is a condition sine qua non for the operation
of the presumption in favor of the conjugal partnership.20 In Spouses Estonina,
petitioners were unable to present any proof that the property in question was
acquired during the marriage of Santiago and Consuelo Garcia. The fact that when
the title over the land in question was issued, Santiago Garcia was already married to
Consuelo as evidenced by the registration in the name of "Santiago Garcia married to
Consuelo Gaza," does not suffice to establish the conjugal nature of the property.21
In the instant case, the Court of Appeals correctly held that the phrase "married to"
appearing in certificates of title is no proof that the properties were acquired during the
spouses coverture and are merely descriptive of the marital status of the person
indicated therein. The clear import from the certificate of title is that Virginia is the
owner of the property, the same having been registered in her name alone, and being
"married to Pedro N. Roa" was merely descriptive of her civil status.22 Since no proof
was adduced that the property was acquired during the marriage of Pedro and
Virginia Roa, the fact that when the title over the land in question was issued, Virginia
Roa was already married to Pedro N. Roa as evidenced by the registration in the
name of "Virginia A. Roa married to Pedro N. Roa," does not suffice to establish the
conjugal nature of the property.
In addition, the defective notice sent to Pedro N. Roa was followed by a DAR
certification signed by team leader Eduardo Maandig on January 8, 1988 stating that
the subject property was tenanted as of October 21, 1972 and primarily devoted to
rice and corn despite the fact that there was no ocular inspection or any on-site fact-
finding investigation and report to verify the truth of the allegations of Nicolas Jugalbot
that he was a tenant of the property. The absence of such ocular inspection or on-site
fact-finding investigation and report likewise deprives Virginia A. Roa of her right to
property through the denial of due process.
By analogy, Roxas & Co., Inc. v. Court of Appeals23 applies to the case at bar since
there was likewise a violation of due process in the implementation of the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law when the petitioner was not notified of any
ocular inspection and investigation to be conducted by the DAR before acquisition of
the property was to be undertaken. Neither was there proof that petitioner was given
the opportunity to at least choose and identify its retention area in those portions to be
acquired.24 Both in the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law and Presidential
Decree No. 27, the right of retention and how this right is exercised, is guaranteed by
law.
Since land acquisition under either Presidential Decree No. 27 and the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law govern the extraordinary method of
expropriating private property, the law must be strictly construed. Faithful compliance
with legal provisions, especially those which relate to the procedure for acquisition of
expropriated lands should therefore be observed. In the instant case, no proper notice
was given to Virginia A. Roa by the DAR. Neither did the DAR conduct an ocular
inspection and investigation. Hence, any act committed by the DAR or any of its
agencies that results from its failure to comply with the proper procedure for
expropriation of land is a violation of constitutional due process and should be
deemed arbitrary, capricious, whimsical and tainted with grave abuse of discretion.
Secondly, there is no concrete evidence on record sufficient to establish that Nicolas
Jugalbot or the petitioners personally cultivated the property under question or that
there was sharing of harvests, except for their self-serving statements. Clearly, there
Page12
is no showing that Nicolas Jugalbot or any of his farm household cultivated the land in
question. No proof was presented except for their self-serving statements that they
were tenants of Virginia A. Roa. Independent evidence, aside from their self-serving
statements, is needed to prove personal cultivation, sharing of harvests, or consent of
the landowner, and establish a tenancy relationship.
Furthermore, in the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals, it was undisputed that
Nicolas Jugalbot was a soldier in the United States Army from June 15, 1946 to April
27, 194925 and upon retirement, migrated to the United States and returned to the
Philippines sometime in 1998.26 It was established that Jugalbots wife Miguela and
daughter Lilia P. Jugalbot are residents of 17623 Grayland Avenue, Artesia,
California, U.S.A., where Nicolas Jugalbot spent his retirement.27 Thus, the DAR, in
particular its team leader Eduardo Maandig, haphazardly issued a certification dated
January 8, 1988 that the subject property was tenanted as of October 21, 1972 by
Nicolas Jugalbot and primarily devoted to rice and corn without the benefit of any on-
site fact-finding investigation and report. This certification became the basis of the
emancipation patent and subsequently, TCT No. E-103 issued on March 1, 1988,
which was less than two months from the issuance of the unsubstantiated DAR
certification. Coincidentally, October 21, 1972 is the date Presidential Decree No. 27
was signed into law.
Neither was there any evidence that the landowner, Virginia A. Roa, freely gave her
consent, whether expressly or impliedly, to establish a tenancy relationship over her
paraphernal property.
As declared in Castillo v. Court of Appeals,28 absent the element of personal
cultivation, one cannot be a tenant even if he is so designated in the written
agreement of the parties.29
In Berenguer, Jr. v. Court of Appeals,30 we ruled that the respondents self-serving
statements regarding their tenancy relations could not establish the claimed
relationship. The fact alone of working on anothers landholding does not raise a
presumption of the existence of agricultural tenancy. Substantial evidence does not
only entail the presence of a mere scintilla of evidence in order that the fact of sharing
can be established; there must be concrete evidence on record adequate enough to
prove the element of sharing.31 We further observed in Berenguer, Jr.:
With respect to the assertion made by respondent Mamerto Venasquez that he is not
only a tenant of a portion of the petitioners landholding but also an overseer of the
entire property subject of this controversy, there is no evidence on record except his
own claim in support thereof. The witnesses who were presented in court in an effort
to bolster Mamertos claim merely testified that they saw him working on the
petitioners landholding. More importantly, his own witnesses even categorically
stated that they did not know the relationship of Mamerto and the petitioner in relation
to the said landholding. x x x The fact alone of working on anothers landholding does
not raise a presumption of the existence of agricultural tenancy. Other factors must be
taken into consideration like compensation in the form of lease rentals or a share in
the produce of the landholding involved. (Underscoring supplied)
xxxx
In the absence of any substantial evidence from which it can be satisfactorily inferred
that a sharing arrangement is present between the contending parties, we, as a court
of last resort, are duty-bound to correct inferences made by the courts below which
are manifestly mistaken or absurd. x x x
Without the essential elements of consent and sharing, no tenancy relationship can
exist between the petitioner and the private respondents. (Underscoring supplied)32
Bejasa v. Court of Appeals33 likewise held that to prove sharing of harvests, a receipt
or any other evidence must be presented as self-serving statements are deemed
inadequate. Proof must always be adduced.34 In addition
The Bejasas admit that prior to 1984, they had no contact with Candelaria. They
acknowledge that Candelaria could argue that she did not know of Malabanans
arrangement with them. True enough Candelaria disavowed any knowledge that the
Bejasas during Malabanans lease possessed the land. However, the Bejasas claim
that this defect was cured when Candelaria agreed to lease the land to the Bejasas
for P20,000.00 per annum, when Malabanan died in 1983. We do not agree. In a
tenancy agreement, consideration should be in the form of harvest sharing. Even
assuming that Candelaria agreed to lease it out to the Bejasas for P20,000 per year,
such agreement did not create a tenancy relationship, but a mere civil law lease.35
Thirdly, the fact of sharing alone is not sufficient to establish a tenancy relationship. In
Caballes v. Department of Agrarian Reform,36 we restated the well-settled rule that
all the requisites must concur in order to create a tenancy relationship between the
parties and the absence of one or more requisites does not make the alleged tenant a
de facto tenant as contradistinguished from a de jure tenant. This is so because
unless a person has established his status as a de jure tenant he is not entitled to
security of tenure nor is he covered by the Land Reform Program of the Government
under existing tenancy laws.37 The security of tenure guaranteed by our tenancy laws
may be invoked only by tenants de jure, not by those who are not true and lawful
tenants.38
As reiterated in Qua,39 the fact that the source of livelihood of the alleged tenants is
not derived from the lots they are allegedly tenanting is indicative of non-agricultural
tenancy relationship.40
Finally, it is readily apparent in this case that the property under dispute is residential
property and not agricultural property. Zoning Certification No. 98-084 issued on
September 3, 1998 clearly shows that the subject property Lot 2180-C covered by
TCT No. T-11543 with an area of 6,229 square meters and owned by Virginia A. Roa
is located within the Residential 2 District in accordance with paragraph (b), Section 9,
Article IV of Zoning Ordinance No. 880, Series of 1979 issued by the City Planning
and Development Office of Cagayan de Oro City.41 To bolster the residential nature
of the property, it must also be noted that no Barangay Agrarian Reform Council was
organized or appointed by the DAR existed in Barangay Lapasan, Cagayan de Oro
City, as all lands have been classified as residential or commercial, as certified by
Barangay Captain of Lapasan.42
In Gonzales v. Court of Appeals,43 we held that an agricultural leasehold cannot be
Page12
established on land which has ceased to be devoted to cultivation or farming because
of its conversion into a residential subdivision. Petitioners were not agricultural
lessees or tenants of the land before its conversion into a residential subdivision in
1955. Not having been dispossessed by the conversion of the land into a residential
subdivision, they may not claim a right to reinstatement.44
This Court in Spouses Tiongson v. Court of Appeals45 succinctly ruled that the land
surrounded by a residential zone is always classified as residential. The areas
surrounding the disputed six hectares are now dotted with residences and,
apparently, only this case has kept the property in question from being developed
together with the rest of the lot to which it belongs. The fact that a caretaker plants
rice or corn on a residential lot in the middle of a residential subdivision in the heart of
a metropolitan area cannot by any strained interpretation of law convert it into
agricultural land and subject it to the agrarian reform program.46
Despite the apparent lack of evidence establishing a tenancy relationship between
petitioners and private respondents, the DARAB improperly recognized the existence
of such a relationship in complete disregard of the essential requisites under
Presidential Decree No. 27. DARAB committed grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack of jurisdiction in issuing an Emancipation Patent to Nicolas Jugalbot.
Once again, Benavidez v. Court of Appeals47 is illustrative in its pronouncement that
an alleged agricultural tenant tilling the land does not automatically make the case an
agrarian dispute which calls for the application of the Agricultural Tenancy Act and the
assumption of jurisdiction by the DARAB. It is absolutely necessary to first establish
the existence of a tenancy relationship between the party litigants. In Benavidez, there
was no showing that there existed any tenancy relationship between petitioner and
private respondent. Thus, the case fell outside the coverage of the Agricultural
Tenancy Act; consequently, it was the Municipal Trial Court and not the DARAB which
had jurisdiction over the controversy between petitioner and private respondent.48
Verily, Morta, Sr. v. Occidental49 ruled that for DARAB to have jurisdiction over a
case, there must exist a tenancy relationship between the parties. In order for a
tenancy agreement to take hold over a dispute, it would be essential to establish all
the indispensable elements of a landlord-tenant relationship:
The regional trial court ruled that the issue involved is tenancy-related that falls within
the exclusive jurisdiction of the DARAB. It relied on the findings in DARAB Case No.
2413 that Josefina Opiana-Baraclan appears to be the lawful owner of the land and
Jaime Occidental was her recognized tenant. However, petitioner Morta claimed that
he is the owner of the land. Thus, there is even a dispute as to who is the rightful
owner of the land, Josefina Opiana-Baraclan or petitioner Morta. The issue of
ownership cannot be settled by the DARAB since it is definitely outside its jurisdiction.
Whatever findings made by the DARAB regarding the ownership of the land are not
conclusive to settle the matter. The issue of ownership shall be resolved in a separate
proceeding before the appropriate trial court between the claimants thereof.50
At any rate, whoever is declared to be the rightful owner of the land, the case cannot
be considered as tenancy-related for it still fails to comply with the other requirements.
Assuming arguendo that Josefina Opiana-Baraclan is the owner, then the case is not
between the landowner and tenant. If, however, Morta is the landowner, Occidental
cannot claim that there is consent to a landowner-tenant relationship between him
and Morta. Thus, for failure to comply with the above requisites, we conclude that the
issue involved is not tenancy-related cognizable by the DARAB. 51
In Vda. de Tangub v. Court of Appeals,52 the jurisdiction of the Department of
Agrarian Reform is limited to the following: (a) adjudication of all matters involving
implementation of agrarian reform; (b) resolution of agrarian conflicts and land tenure
related problems; and (c) approval and disapproval of the conversion, restructuring or
readjustment of agricultural lands into residential, commercial, industrial and other
non-agricultural uses.53
To recapitulate, petitioners are not de jure tenants of Virginia A. Roa, to which
Presidential Decree No. 27 is found to be inapplicable; hence, the DARAB has no
jurisdiction over this case. The DARAB not only committed a serious error in
judgment, which the Court of Appeals properly corrected, but the former likewise
committed a palpable error in jurisdiction which is contrary to law and jurisprudence.
For all the foregoing reasons, we affirm the appellate court decision and likewise hold
that the DARAB gravely abused its discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction on the
grounds that the subject matter of the present action is residential, and not
agricultural, land, and that all the essential requisites of a tenancy relationship were
sorely lacking in the case at bar.
On one final note, it may not be amiss to stress that laws which have for their object
the preservation and maintenance of social justice are not only meant to favor the
poor and underprivileged. They apply with equal force to those who, notwithstanding
their more comfortable position in life, are equally deserving of protection from the
courts. Social justice is not a license to trample on the rights of the rich in the guise of
defending the poor, where no act of injustice or abuse is being committed against
them.54
As the court of last resort, our bounden duty to protect the less privileged should not
be carried out to such an extent as to deny justice to landowners whenever truth and
justice happen to be on their side. For in the eyes of the Constitution and the statutes,
EQUAL JUSTICE UNDER THE LAW remains the bedrock principle by which our
Republic abides.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. SP No. 81823 promulgated on October 19, 2005 is AFFIRMED. The Register of
Deeds of Cagayan de Oro City is ordered to CANCEL Transfer Certificate of Title No.
E-103 for having been issued without factual and legal basis, and REINSTATE
Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-11543 in the name of Virginia A. Roa. The city
Assessors Office of Cagayan de Oro is likewise directed to CANCEL Tax Declaration
No. 80551 issued to Nicolas Jugalbot and RESTORE Tax Declaration No. 270922 in
the name of Virginia Angcod Roa. The heirs of Nicolas Jugalbot, represented by
Leonila B. Jugalbot or any other person claiming a right or interest to the disputed lot
through the latters title are directed to VACATE the premises thereof and peaceably
turn over its possession to petitioners Heirs of Virginia A. Roa, represented by Lolita
R. Gorospe. No pronouncement as to costs.
In RE Tampoy: Diosdada Alberastine, GR L-14322, 25 February 1960
Page12
Facts:
On 19 November 1939, Petronila Tampoy, a widow and without children, requested
with Bonifacio Minoza to read a testament and explain its contents to her in her house
in San Miguel street, municipality of Argao, province of Cebu in 19 November 1939,
which he did in the presence of tree instrumental witnesses, Rosario K. Chan,
Mauricio de la Pena, and Simeona Omboy. After confirming the contents of the
testament, she requested Bonifacio Minoza to write her name at the foot of the
testament in the second page, which he did, and after which she stamped her
thumbmark between her name and surname in the presence of all three instrumental
witnesses. Bonifacio Minoza also signed at the foot of the testament, in the second
page, in the presence of the testator and all three abovenamed witnesses. However,
the testator, just like Bonifacio Minoza, did not sign on the left margin or any part of
the first page of the testament, composed of two pages. All the threeinstrumental
witnesses signed at the foot of the acknowledgment written in the second page of the
testament, and the left margin of the first and second page, in the presence of the
testator, Bonifacio Minoza, Atty. Kintanar, and the others. The testament was
executed freely and spontaneously, without having been threatened, forced and
intimidated, and not having exercised on her (the testator) undue influence, being the
same in full use of her mental faculties and enjoying good health. On 22
February1957, the testator died in here house in Argao.On 7 March 1957, or two
weeks after, the heir found in the testament, Carman Aberastine died, leaving her
mother, the petitioner Diosdada Alberastine. After trial on the probate o a document
purportedly to be the last and testament of Petronila Rampoy, the trial court denied
the petition on the ground that the left hand margin of the first page of the will does not
bear the thumbmark of the testatrix. Petitioner appealed from this ruling. The Court of
Appeals certified the case to the Supreme Court because it involves purely a question
of law.
Issue:
Whether the absence of the testators thumbmark in the first page is fatal to render the
will void.
Held:
Statutes prescribing the formalities to be observed in the execution of wills are very
strictly construed. A will must be executed in accordance with the statutory
requirements; otherwise it is entirely void. In the present case, the contention that the
petition for probate is unopposed, and that the three testimonial witnesses testified
and manifested to the court that the document expresses the true and voluntary will of
the deceased, cannot be sustained as it runs counter to the express provision of the
law. Since the will suffers the fatal defect, as it does not bear the thumbmark of the
testatrix on its first page even if it bears the signature of the three instrumental
witnesses, the same fails to comply with the law and therefore cannot be admitted to
probate. The Supreme Court affirmed the appealed order, without pronouncement as
to costs.
RUFINO RODRIGUEZ vs. CAYETANO ALCALA, ET AL., G.R. No. 32672,
November 5, 1930
This case relates to the probate of the will of the deceased Marta Alcantara. On or
about March 26,1929, a petition was filed by Rufino R. Rodriguez in the Court of First
Instance of the Province of Tayabas, praying (1) that the will of the deceased Marta
Alcantara be admitted to probate, and (2) that he be appointed special administrator
of the estate of the deceased. The petition was accompanied by the will (Exhibit A )
written in Tagalog, with its translation into English (Exhibit A-1).
To said petition Cayetano Alcala, husband of the deceased, filed an opposition.
Oppositions were also filed by the spouses Maximino de Luna and Petra Rodriguez,
and by Isaac Reynoso, all of them relatives of the deceased. The oppositions were
based on the following grounds: (1) That the will was not executed in accordance with
formalities prescribed by Act No. 190, and (2) that the signatures of the testatrix were
not authentic and were procured through fraud and undue influence.
Upon the issue thus presented, the cause was brought on for trial before Francisco
Enage, judge. After hearing the evidence adduced by the petitioner and the
opponents in support of their respective claims, the trial court denied the petition for
the probate of the will, and rendered a judgment in favor of the opponents declaring
the will invalid on the ground that the attestation clause thereof was not in conformity
with the requirements of section 681 of Act No.190, as amended. The pertinent parts
of the decision read as follows:
Aunque en realidad la testadora y los testigos instrumentales firmaron todas las
paginas del testamento de autos en su margen izquierdo, no se ha hecho constar, sin
embargo, este hecho en la clausula de atestiguamiento arriba transcrita. La frase que
dice: "y lo firmamos nosotros los tres testigos y la testadora en cada una de las
paginas de este testamento," no cumple con la ley. Deberia expresarse en dicha
clausula, de que los testigos firmaron en "todas y cada una de las hojas del
testamento en su margen izquierdo," como requiere la ley.
xxx xxx xxx
Por todo lo expuesto, se deniega la legalizacion del testamento objeto de la solicitud
de autos, con las costas al solicitante.
From that judgment both the petitioner and the opponents, with the exception of Isaac
Reynoso, appealed.
The petitioner-appellant now contends that the lower court erred in not admitting the
will to probate because of the alleged defect of the attestation clause in not expressly
stating that the testatrix and witnesses signed each and every page of the will "on the
left margin". It is contended that the omission in the attestation clause of the phrase
"on the left margin" is not fatal because the will itself shows that each and every page
thereof was signed on the left margin, and that this failure of the attestation clause to
specifically state the particular location of the signatures on each page is not sufficient
to invalidate the will.
The opponents-appellants contend that the lower court erred in not finding that the
signatures of the testatrix were procured through fraud and undue influence. The
lower court deemed it unnecessary to make specific finding as to this feature of the
case, and denied admission of the will to probate on the other ground alleged by the
opponents, namely, that the attestation clause is not in conformity with section 618 of
Act No. 190, as amended.
Page12
The portion of said section 618, pertinent to the case reads as follows:
. . . The attestation shall state the number of sheets or pages used, upon which the
will is written, and the fact that the testator signed the will and every page therof, or
caused some other person to write his name, under his express direction, in the
presence of three witnesses, and the latter witnessed and signed the will and all
pages thereof in the presence of the testator and of each other.
The attestation clause in question, as translated into Spanish, reads as folows:
Este testamento o ultima voluntad se compone de ocho paginas todas validas y
eficaces, sin tacha de ninguna clase, lo ha leido la testadora Sra. Marta Alcantara, en
presencia de nosotros los tres testigos, y al terminar de leerlo la testadora, ella
estampo su nobre y apellido en presencia de nosotros los tres testigos presentes y
cada uno de nosotros lo firmamos tambien en presencia de la testadora y en
presencia unos de los otros, y lo firmamos nosotros los tres testigos y la testadora en
cada una de las paginas de este testamento.
The foregoing attestation clause expressly states that the testatrix signed the will in
the presence of the witnesses and that the latter signed it in the presence of the
testatrix and of each other, and that both testatrix and witnesses signed each and
every page of the will. It will be noted, however, that the attestation fails to state that
the testatrix signed each and every page of the will in the presence of the witnesses
and that the latter signed each and every page of the will in the presence of the
testatrix and of each other.
We are unable to agree with the lower court that the omission alone of the phrase "on
the left margin" in the attestation clause, in the absence of any other defect, is fatal to
the validity of the will. Section 618 of Act No.190, as amended, quoted above, does
not expressly provide that the phrase "on the left margin " must necessarily be
inserted in the attestation clause. And in our opinion the reason is obvious, because
the will itself as in the present case, will show that all the pages thereof were signed
on the left margin. Furthermore, in the case of Avera vs. Garcia and Rodriguez (42
Phil., 145, 146) this court held: "A will otherwise properly executed in accordance with
the requirements of existing law is not rendered invalid by the fact that the paginal
signatures of the testator and attesting witnesses appear in the right margin instead of
the left." This ruling shows that the inclusion of the phrase "on the left margin" in the
attestation is not indispensable to the validity of the will.
In the case of Abangan vs. Abangan (40 Phil., 476, 479) this court, speaking of the
object of the formal requisites prescribed by law in the execution of wills, said:
The object of the solemnities surrounding the execution of wills is to close the door
against bad faith and fraud, to avoid substitution of wills and testaments and to
guarantee their truth and authentically. Therefor the laws on this subject should be
interpreted in such a way as to attain these primordial ends. But, on the other hand,
also one must not lose sight of the fact that it is not the object of the law to restrain
and curtail the exercise of the right to make a will. So when an interpretation already
given assures such ends, any other interpretation whatsoever, that adds nothing but
demands more requisites entirely unnecessary, useless, and frustrative of the
testators last will, must be disregarded.
We may conclude, therefore that a mere omission in the attestation clause of the
phrase "on the left margin " which is not expressly required by the statute, when said
clause is otherwise in strict conformity with the requirements of section 618 of Act No.
190, as amended, does not render a will invalid.
The cases cited by the lower court in its decision denying probate of the will (Uy
Coque vs. Navas L. Sioca, 43 Phil., 405; Fernadez vs. Vergel de dios 46 Phil., 922;
Sano vs. Quintana 48 Phil., 506) do not support the proposition that the omission in
the attestation clause of the phrase "on the left margin", in the absence of any other
defect, is fatal to the validity of the will.
We are of the opinion, however, that the will should not be admitted to probate on
another ground. There is a fatal defect in the attestation clause which escaped the
attention of the lower court. As pointed out above, said defect consists in the failure of
the attestation clause to specifically state that the testatrix signed each and every
page of the will in the presence of the witnesses and that the witnesses signed each
and every page thereof in the presence of the testatrix and of each other. The
attestation clause simply recites that the testatrix and the witnesses signed all the
pages of the will (" y lo firmamos nosotros los tres testigos y la testadora en cada una
de las paginas de este testamento"). In the presence of whom they signed each and
every page of will, the attestation fails to state, in violation of the express
requirements of section 618 of Act No. 190, as amended, to wit: "The attestation
clause shall state . . . that the testator signed the will and every page therof, . . . in the
presence of three witnesses, and the latter witnessed and signed the will and all
pages thereof in the presence of the testator and of each other." This defect of the
attestation clause is fatal to the validity of the will.
In the case of Uy Coque vs. Navas L. Sioca (43 Phil., 405, 407) the court said:
Statutes prescribing the formalities to be observed in the execution of wills are very
strictly construed. As stated in 40 Cyc., at page 1097, "A will must be executed in
accordance with the statutory requirements; otherwise it is entirely void. All these
requirements stand as of equal importance and must be observed, and courts cannot
supply the defective execution of a will. No power or discretion is vested in them,
either to superadd other conditions or dispense with those enumerated in the
statutes."
The provisions of section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as amended by Act No.
2645, that the attestation clause of a will must state the number of pages in the will,
and that the witnesses signed in the presence of each other, are mandatory and non-
compliance therewith invalidates the will.
In the case of Sano vs. Quintana (48 Phil., 506) this court held that:
An attestation clause which does not recite that the witnesses signed the will and
each and every page thereof on the left margin in the presence of the testator is
defective, and such a defect annuls the will.
Page12
This doctrine was restated and reaffirmed in the case of Gumban vs. Gorecho (50
Phil., 30).
In the case of Quinto vs. Morata (54 Phil., 481) this court, following the doctrine laid
down in the cases above cited, held that:
The attestation clause must be made in strict conformity with the requirements of
section 618 of Act No.190, as amended. Where said clause fails to show on its face a
full compliance with those requirements, the defect constitutes sufficient ground for
the disallowance of the will.
Section 618 of Act No.190, as amended, should be given a strict interpretation in
order to give effect to the intention of the Legislature. Statutes prescribing formalities
to be observed in the execution of wills are very strictly construed. Courts cannot
supply the defective execution of a will.
For all of the foregoing, it is held that the will in question is invalid because of the
failure of the attestation clause to state in whose presence the pages of the will were
signed by the testatrix and the witnesses. The judgment appealed from, denying
probate of the will, should be and is hereby affirmed, with costs. So ordered.
Bersabal vs. Hon. Judge Serafin Salvador, G.R. No. L-35910. July 21, 1978
FACTS:
[P]etitioner Purita Bersabal seeks to annul the orders of respondent Judge and to
compel said respondent Judge to decide petitioners perfected appeal on the basis of
the evidence and records of the case submitted by the City Court of Caloocan City
plus the memorandum already submitted by the petitioner and respondents. The
second paragraph of Section 45 of R.A. No. 296, otherwise known as the Philippine
Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended by R.A. No. 6031 provides, in part, as follows:
Courts of First Instance shall decide such appealed cases on the basis of the
evidence and records transmitted from the city or municipal courts: Provided, That the
parties may submit memoranda and/or brief with oral argument if so requested .
(Emphasis supplied).
A decision was rendered by said Court which decision was appealed by the petitioner
to the respondent Court. The respondent Judge dismissed petition on August 4, 1971
upon failure of defendantappellant to prosecute her appeal, with costs against her.
Petitioner filed her memorandum. The respondent Court denied the motion for
reconsideration on October 30, 1971. Petitioner filed a motion for leave to file second
motion for reconsideration which was likewise denied by the respondent court on
March 15, 1972.
ISSUE:
Whether or not, in the light of the provisions of the second paragraph of Section 45 of
Republic Act No. 296, as amended by R.A. No. 6031, the mere failure of an appellant
to submit on time the memorandum mentioned in the same paragraph would
empower the Court of First Instance to dismiss the appeal on the ground of failure to
Prosecute.
HELD:
NO. The challenged orders of Respondent Judge dated August 4, 1971, October 30,
1971, and March 15, 1972 are set aside as null and void.
RATIO:
The above cited provision is clear and leaves no room for doubt. It cannot be
interpreted otherwise than that the submission of memoranda is optional on the part
of the parties. Being optional on the part of the parties, the latter may so choose to
waive submission of the memoranda. And as a logical concomitant of the choice
given to the Parties, the Court cannot dismiss the appeal of the party waiving the
submission of said memorandum the appellant so chooses not to submit the
memorandum, the Court of First Instance is left with no alternative but to decide the
case on the basis of the evidence and records transmitted from the city or municipal
courts. In other words, the Court is not empowered by law to dismiss the appeal on
the mere failure of an appellant to submit his memorandum, but rather it is the Courts
mandatory duty to decide the case on the basis of the available evidence and records
transmitted to it.
As a general rule, the word may when used in a statute is permissive only and
operates to confer discretion; while the word shall is imperative, operating to impose
a duty which may be enforced (Dizon vs. Encarnacion, L-18615, Dec. 24, 1963, 9
SCRA 714, 716-717). The implication is that the Court is left with no choice but to
decide the appealed case either on the basis of the evidence and records transmitted
to it, or on the basis of the latter plus memoranda and/or brief with oral argument duly
submitted and/or made on request.
Anama vs CA, GR No. 187021, January 25, 2012
The Facts
The factual and procedural backgrounds of this case were succinctly recited by the
CA in its decision as follows:
Sometime in 1973, the Petitioner, Douglas F. Anama (Anama), and the Respondent,
Philippine Savings Bank (PSB), entered into a "Contract to Buy," on installment basis,
the real property owned and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 301276
in the latter's name. However, Anama defaulted in paying his obligations thereunder,
thus, PSB rescinded the said contract and title to the property remained with the
latter. Subsequently, the property was sold by PSB to the Spouses Saturnina Baria
and Tomas Co (Co Spouses) who, after paying the purchase price in full, caused the
registration of the same in their names and were, thus, issued TCT No. 14239.
Resultantly, Anama filed before the Respondent Court a complaint for declaration of
nullity of the deed of sale, cancellation of transfer certificate of title, and specific
Page12
performance with damages against PSB, the Co Spouses, and the Register of Deeds
of Metro Manila, District II.
On August 21, 1991 and after trial on the merits, the Respondent Court dismissed
Anama's complaint and upheld the validity of the sale between PSB and the Co
Spouses. Undaunted, Anama appealed, at first, to this Court, and after failing to
obtain a favorable decision, to the Supreme Court.
On January 29, 2004, the Supreme Court rendered judgment denying Anama's
petition and sustaining the validity of the sale between PSB and the Co Spouses. Its
decision became final and executory on July 12, 2004. Pursuant thereto, the Co
Spouses moved for execution, which was granted by the Respondent Court per its
Order, dated November 25, 2005.
Aggrieved, Anama twice moved for the reconsideration of the Respondent Court's
November 25, 2005 Order arguing that the Co Spouses' motion for execution is fatally
defective. He averred that the Spouses' motion was pro forma because it lacked the
required affidavit of service and has a defective notice of hearing, hence, a mere
scrap of paper. The Respondent Court, however, denied Anama's motion(s) for
reconsideration.
Dissatisfied, the petitioner questioned the RTC Order before the CA for taking judicial
cognizance of the motion for execution filed by spouses Tomas Co and Saturnina
Baria (Spouses Co) which was (1) not in accord with Section 4 and Section 15 of the
Rules of Court because it was without a notice of hearing addressed to the parties;
and (2) not in accord with Section 6, Rule 15 in conjunction with Section 13, Rule 13
of the Rules of Court because it lacks the mandatory affidavit of service.
On March 31, 2008, the CA rendered a decision dismissing the petition. It reasoned
out, among others, that the issue on the validity of the deed of sale between
respondents, Philippine Savings Bank (PSB) and the Spouses Co, had long been laid
to rest considering that the January 29, 2004 Decision of this Court became final and
executory on July 12, 2004. Hence, execution was already a matter of right on the
part of the respondents and the RTC had the ministerial duty to issue a writ of
execution enforcing a final and executory decision.
The CA also stated that although a notice of hearing and affidavit of service in a
motion are mandatory requirements, the Spouses Co's motion for execution of a final
and executory judgment could be acted upon by the RTC ex parte, and therefore,
excused from the mandatory requirements of Sections 4, 5 and 6 of Rule 15 of the
Rules of Court.
The CA was of the view that petitioner was not denied due process because he was
properly notified of the motion for execution of the Spouses Co. It stated that the act of
the Spouses Co in resorting to personal delivery in serving their motion for execution
did not render the motion pro forma. It refused to apply a rigid application of the rules
because it would result in a manifest failure of justice considering that petitioner's
position was nothing but an obvious dilatory tactic designed to prevent the final
disposition of Civil Case No. 44940.
Not satisfied with the CA's unfavorable disposition, petitioner filed this petition praying
for the reversal thereof presenting the following
ARGUMENTS:
THE RESPONDENT APPELLATE COURT DID NOT TAKE INTO CONSIDERATION
THE CLEAR TEACHING OF THE HONORABLE COURT WITH REGARD TO THE
REQUISITE NOTICE OF HEARING - IT SHOULD BE ADDRESSED TO THE
PARTIES NOT TO THE CLERK OF COURT, THE LATEST (THEN) BEING GARCIA
V. SANDIGANBAYAN, G.R. NO. 167103, AUGUST 31, 2006, 500 SCRA 361; DE
JESUS V. JUDGE DILAG, A.M. NO. RTJ-05-1921, SEPTEMBER 30, 2005, 471
SCRA 176; LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES V. NATIVIDAD, G.R. NO. 127198,
MAY 16, 2005, 458 SCRA 441; ATTY. JULIUS NERI V. JUDGE JESUS S. DE LA
PENA, A.M NO. RTJ-05-1896, APRIL 29, 2005, 457 SCRA 538; AND ALVAREZ V.
DIAZ, A.M. NO. MTJ-00-1283, MARCH 3, 2004, 424 SCRA 213;
THE RESPONDENT APPELLATE COURT DID NOT TAKE INTO CONSIDERATION
THE CLEAR TEACHING OF THE HONORABLE COURT WITH REGARD TO THE
REQUISITE AFFIDAVIT OF SERVICE - IT SHOULD BE IN THE PROPER FORM AS
PRESCRIBED IN THE RULES AND IT SHOULD BE ATTACHED TO THE MOTION,
THE LATEST (THEN) BEING ELLO V. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. NO. 141255,
JUNE 21, 2005, 460 SCRA 406; LOPEZ DELA ROSA DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION V. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. NO. 148470, APRIL 29, 2005, 457
SCRA 614; ALVAREZ V. DIAZ, A.M. NO. MTJ-00-1283, MARCH 3, 2004, 424 SCRA
213; EL REYNO HOMES, INC. V. ERNESTO ONG, 397 SCRA 563; CRUZ V.
COURT OF APPEALS, 388 SCRA 72, 80-81; AND MERIS V. OFILADA, 293 SCRA
606;
THE RESPONDENT APPELLATE COURT DID NOT TAKE APPROPRIATE ACTION
ON THE "FRAUD PERPETRATED UPON THE COURT" BY RESPONDENT-
SPOUSES AND THEIR LEAD COUNSEL.
SINCE THE RESPONDENT APPELLATE COURT REFUSED TO TAKE INTO
CONSIDERATION THE RESPONDENT BANK'S ACTION - THAT OF:
ENGAGING IN A DAGDAG-BAWAS (LEGALLY "INTERCALATION") OPERATION
OF A PORTION OF THE TRANSCRIPT OF STENOGRAPHIC NOTES (TSN),
OCTOBER 12, 1984, OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 167, PASIG
CITY, IN CIVIL CASE NO. 44940, PAGES 54-55, AND
PRESENTING IT IN ITS APPELLEE'S BRIEF (IN THE OWNERSHIP CASE, CA-G.R.
NO. CV-42663, LIKEWISE, BEFORE THE RESPONDENT APPELLATE COURT) BY
CITING IT ON PAGE 14 OF SAID BRIEF, AS IMPLIEDLY COMING FROM THE TSN
OF THE TRIAL COURT.
THINKING THAT THEIR FALSIFIED APPELLEE'S BRIEF WAS MATERIAL IN SAID
CA-G.R. NO. CV-42663.
IT COULD NOT RULE THAT THE SAME HAS BROUGHT ABOUT A CRUCIAL
MATERIAL CHANGE IN THE SITUATION OF THE PARTIES WHICH MAKES
EXECUTION INEQUITABLE (PUNCIA V. GERONA, 252 SCRA 424, 430-431), OR,
IN THE WORDS OF DEVELOPMENT BANK OF RIZAL V. CA, G.R. NO. 75964,
Page12
DECEMBER 1, 1987, 156 SCRA 84, 90, "THERE EXISTS A COMPELLING REASON
FOR STAYING THE EXECUTION OF JUDGMENT."
Basically, petitioner argues that the respondents failed to substantially comply with
the rule on notice and hearing when they filed their motion for the issuance of a writ of
execution with the RTC. He claims that the notice of hearing in the motion for
execution filed by the Spouses Co was a mere scrap of paper because it was
addressed to the Clerk of Court and not to the parties. Thus, the motion for execution
did not contain the required proof of service to the adverse party. He adds that the
Spouses Co and their counsel deliberately "misserved" the copy of their motion for
execution, thus, committing fraud upon the trial court.
Additionally, he claims that PSB falsified its appellee's brief by engaging in a "dagdag-
bawas" ("intercalation") operation in pages 54 to 55 of the TSN, dated October 12,
1984.
Position of the Spouses Co
The Spouses Co counter that the petition should be dismissed outright for raising both
questions of facts and law in violation of Section 1, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. The
Spouses Co aver that petitioner attempts to resurrect the issue that PSB cheated him
in their transaction and that the RTC committed a "dagdag-bawas." According to the
Spouses Co, these issues had long been threshed out by this Court.
At any rate, they assert that they have substantially complied with the requirements of
notice and hearing provided under Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 15 and Section 13, Rule
13 of the Rules of Court. Contrary to petitioner's allegations, a copy of the motion for
the issuance of a writ of execution was given to petitioner through his principal
counsel, the Quasha Law Offices. At that time, the said law office had not formally
withdrawn its appearance as counsel for petitioner. Spouses Co argue that what they
sought to be executed was the final judgment of the RTC duly affirmed by the CA and
this Court, thus, putting the issues on the merits to rest. The issuance of a writ of
execution then becomes a matter of right and the court's duty to issue the writ
becomes ministerial.
Position of respondent PSB
PSB argues that the decision rendered by the RTC in Civil Case No. 44940 entitled
"Douglas F. Anama v. Philippine Savings Bank, et. al."3 had long become final and
executory as shown by the Entry of Judgment made by the Court on July 12, 2004.
The finality of the said decision entitles the respondents, by law, to the issuance of a
writ of execution. PSB laments that petitioner relies more on technicalities to frustrate
the ends of justice and to delay the enforcement of a final and executory decision.
As to the principal issue, PSB points out that the notice of hearing appended to the
motion for execution filed by the Spouses Co substantially complied with the
requirements of the Rules since petitioner's then counsel of record was duly notified
and furnished a copy of the questioned motion for execution. Also, the motion for
execution filed by the Spouses Co was served upon and personally received by said
counsel.
The Court's Ruling
The Court agrees with the Spouses Co that petitioner's allegations on the "dagdag-
bawas operation of the Transcript of Stenographic Notes," the "fraud perpetuated
upon the Court by said spouses and their lead counsel," the "ownership," and
"falsification" had long been laid to rest in the case of "Douglas F. Anama v. Philippine
Savings Bank, et. al."4 For said reason, the Court cannot review those final
pronouncements. To do so would violate the rules as it would open a final judgment to
another reconsideration which is a prohibited procedure.
On the subject procedural question, the Court finds no compelling reason to stay the
execution of the judgment because the Spouses Co complied with the notice and
hearing requirements under Sections 4, 5 and 6 of Rule 15. Said sections, as
amended, provide:
SECTION 4. Hearing of motion. - Except for motions which the court may act upon
without prejudicing the rights of the adverse party, every written motion shall be set for
hearing by the applicant.
Every written motion required to be heard and the notice of the hearing thereof shall
be served in such a manner as to ensure its receipt by the other party at least three
(3) days before the date of hearing, unless the court for good cause sets the hearing
on shorter notice.
SECTION 5. Notice of hearing. - The notice of hearing shall be addressed to all
parties concerned, and shall specify the time and date of the hearing which must not
be later than ten (10) days after the filing of the motion.
SECTION 6. Proof of service necessary. - No written motion set for hearing shall be
acted upon by the court without proof of service thereof.
Pertinently, Section 13 of Rule 13 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended,
provides:
SEC. 13. Proof of service. - Proof of personal service shall consist of a written
admission of the party served, or the official return of the server, or the affidavit of the
party serving, containing a full statement of the date, place, and manner of service. If
the service is by ordinary mail, proof thereof shall consist of an affidavit of the person
mailing of facts showing compliance with section 7 of this Rule. If service is made by
registered mail, proof shall be made by such affidavit and the registry receipt issued
by the mailing office. The registry return card shall be filed immediately upon its
receipt by the sender, or in lieu thereof the unclaimed letter together with the certified
or sworn copy of the notice given by the postmaster to the addressee.
Elementary is the rule that every motion must contain the mandatory requirements of
notice and hearing and that there must be proof of service thereof. The Court has
consistently held that a motion that fails to comply with the above requirements is
considered a worthless piece of paper which should not be acted upon. The rule,
however, is not absolute. There are motions that can be acted upon by the court ex
parte if these would not cause prejudice to the other party. They are not strictly
covered by the rigid requirement of the rules on notice and hearing of motions.
Page12
The motion for execution of the Spouses Co is such kind of motion. It cannot be
denied that the judgment sought to be executed in this case had already become final
and executory. As such, the Spouses Co have every right to the issuance of a writ of
execution and the RTC has the ministerial duty to enforce the same. This right on the
part of the Spouses Co and duty on the part of the RTC are based on Section 1 and
Section 2 of Rule 39 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure provides, as
follows:
Section 1. Execution upon judgments or final orders. - Execution shall issue as a
matter of right, on motion, upon a judgment or order that disposes of the action or
proceeding upon the expiration of the period to appeal therefrom if no appeal has
been duly perfected.
If the appeal has been duly perfected and finally resolved, the execution may forthwith
be applied for in the court of origin, on motion of the judgment obligee, submitting
therewith certified true copies of the judgment or judgments or final order or orders
sought to be enforced and of the entry thereof, with notice to the adverse party.
The appellate court may, on motion in the same case, when the interest of justice so
requires, direct the court of origin to issue the writ of execution.
SEC. 2. Discretionary execution.-
(a) Execution of a judgment or final order pending appeal.- On motion of the prevailing
party with notice to the adverse party filed in the trial court while it has jurisdiction over
the case and is in possession of either the original record or the record on appeal, as
the case may be, at the time of the filing of such motion, said court may, in its
discretion, order execution of a judgment or final order even before the expiration of
the period to appeal.
After the trial court has lost jurisdiction, the motion for execution pending appeal may
be filed in the appellate court.
Discretionary execution may only issue upon good reasons to be stated in a special
order after due hearing.
(b) Execution of several, separate or partial judgments.- A several, separate or partial
judgment may be executed under the same terms and conditions as execution of a
judgment or final order pending appeal. (2a) [Emphases and underscoring supplied]
As can be gleaned therefrom, under Paragraph 1 of Section 1 of Rule 39 of the 1997
Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, the Spouses Co can have their motion for
execution executed as a matter of right without the needed notice and hearing
requirement to petitioner. This is in contrast to the provision of Paragraph 2 of Section
1 and Section 2 where there must be notice to the adverse party. In the case of Far
Eastern Surety and Insurance Company, Inc. v. Virginia D. Vda. De Hernandez,5 it
was written:
It is evident that Section 1 of Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of Court does not prescribe
that a copy of the motion for the execution of a final and executory judgment be
served on the defeated party, like litigated motions such as a motion to dismiss
(Section 3, Rule 16), or motion for new trial (Section 2, Rule 37), or a motion for
execution of judgment pending appeal (Section 2, Rule 39), in all of which instances a
written notice thereof is required to be served by the movant on the adverse party in
order to afford the latter an opportunity to resist the application.
It is not disputed that the judgment sought to be executed in the case at bar had
already become final and executory. It is fundamental that the prevailing party in a
litigation may, at any time within five (5) years after the entry thereof, have a writ of
execution issued for its enforcement and the court not only has the power and
authority to order its execution but it is its ministerial duty to do so. It has also been
held that the court cannot refuse to issue a writ of execution upon a final and
executory judgment, or quash it, or order its stay, for, as a general rule, the parties will
not be allowed, after final judgment, to object to the execution by raising new issues of
fact or of law, except when there had been a change in the situation of the parties
which makes such execution inequitable or when it appears that the controversy has
ever been submitted to the judgment of the court; or when it appears that the writ of
execution has been improvidently issued, or that it is defective in substance, or is
issued against the wrong party, or that judgment debt has been paid or otherwise
satisfied; or when the writ has been issued without authority. Defendant-appellant has
not shown that she falls in any of the situations afore-mentioned. Ordinarily, an order
of execution of a final judgment is not appealable. Otherwise, as was said by this
Court in Molina v. de la Riva, a case could never end. Once a court renders a final
judgment, all the issues between or among the parties before it are deemed resolved
and its judicial function as regards any matter related to the controversy litigated
comes to an end. The execution of its judgment is purely a ministerial phase of
adjudication. The nature of its duty to see to it that the claim of the prevailing party is
fully satisfied from the properties of the loser is generally ministerial.
In Pamintuan v. Munoz, We ruled that once a judgment becomes final and executory,
the prevailing party can have it executed as a matter of right, and the judgment debtor
need not be given advance notice of the application for execution.
Also of the same stature is the rule that once a judgment becomes final and
executory, the prevailing party can have it executed as a matter of right and the
granting of execution becomes a ministerial duty of the court. Otherwise stated, once
sought by the prevailing party, execution of a final judgment will just follow as a matter
of course. Hence, the judgment debtor need not be given advance notice of the
application for execution nor he afforded prior hearing.
Absence of such advance notice to the judgment debtor does not constitute an
infringement of the constitutional guarantee of due process.
However, the established rules of our system of jurisprudence do not require that a
defendant who has been granted an opportunity to be heard and has had his day in
court should, after a judgment has been rendered against him, have a further notice
and hearing before supplemental proceedings are taken to reach his property in
satisfaction of the judgment. Thus, in the absence of a statutory requirement, it is not
essential that he be given notice before the issuance of an execution against his
tangible property; after the rendition of the judgment he must take "notice of what will
follow," no further notice being "necessary to advance justice." [Emphases and
Page12
underscoring supplied]
Likewise, in the case of Leonardo Lim De Mesa v. Hon. Court of Appeals,6 it was
stated:
In the present case, the decision ordering partition and the rendition of accounting had
already become final and executory. The execution thereof thus became a matter of
right on the part of the plaintiffs, herein private respondents, and is a mandatory and
ministerial duty on the part of the court. Once a judgment becomes final and
executory, the prevailing party can have it executed as a matter of right, and the
judgment debtor need not be given advance notice of the application for execution nor
be afforded prior hearings thereon.
On the bases of the foregoing considerations, therefore, the Court of Appeals acted
correctly in holding that the failure to serve a copy of the motion for execution on
petitioner is not a fatal defect. In fact, there was no necessity for such service.
[Emphases and underscoring supplied]
At any rate, it is not true that the petitioner was not notified of the motion for execution
of the Spouses Co. The records clearly show that the motion for execution was duly
served upon, and received by, petitioner's counsel-of-record, the Quasha Ancheta
Pena Nolasco Law Offices, as evidenced by a "signed stamped received mark"
appearing on said pleading.7 The records are bereft of proof showing any written
denial from petitioner's counsel of its valid receipt on behalf of its client. Neither is
there proof that the Quasha Ancheta Pena Nolasco Law Offices has formally
withdrawn its appearance as petitioner's counsel-of-record. Considering that there is
enough proof shown on record of personal delivery in serving the subject motion for
execution, there was a valid compliance with the Rules, thus, no persuasive reason to
stay the execution of the subject final and executory judgment.
Moreover, this Court takes note that petitioner was particularly silent on the ruling of
the CA that he was notified, through his counsel, of the motion for execution of the
Spouses Co when he filed a motion for reconsideration of the RTC's order dated June
28, 2005, holding in abeyance said motion pending the resolution of petitioner's
pleading filed before this Court. He did not dispute the ruling of the CA either that the
alleged defect in the Spouses Co's motion was cured when his new counsel was
served a copy of said motion for reconsideration of the RTC's June 28, 2005 Order.8
The three-day notice rule is not absolute. A liberal construction of the procedural rules
is proper where the lapse in the literal observance of a rule of procedure has not
prejudiced the adverse party and has not deprived the court of its authority. Indeed,
Section 6, Rule 1 of the Rules of Court provides that the Rules should be liberally
construed in order to promote their objective of securing a just, speedy and
inexpensive disposition of every action and proceeding. Rules of procedure are tools
designed to facilitate the attainment of justice, and courts must avoid their strict and
rigid application which would result in technicalities that tend to frustrate rather than
promote substantial justice.
In Somera Vda. De Navarro v. Navarro, the Court held that there was substantial
compliance of the rule on notice of motions even if the first notice was irregular
because no prejudice was caused the adverse party since the motion was not
considered and resolved until after several postponements of which the parties were
duly notified.
Likewise, in Jehan Shipping Corporation v. National Food Authority, the Court held
that despite the lack of notice of hearing in a Motion for Reconsideration, there was
substantial compliance with the requirements of due process where the adverse party
actually had the opportunity to be heard and had filed pleadings in opposition to the
motion. The Court held:
This Court has indeed held time and again, that under Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 15 of
the Rules of Court, mandatory is the requirement in a motion, which is rendered
defective by failure to comply with the requirement. As a rule, a motion without a
notice of hearing is considered pro forma and does not affect the reglementary period
for the appeal or the filing of the requisite pleading.
As an integral component of the procedural due process, the three-day notice
required by the Rules is not intended for the benefit of the movant. Rather, the
requirement is for the purpose of avoiding surprises that may be sprung upon the
adverse party, who must be given time to study and meet the arguments in the motion
before a resolution of the court. Principles of natural justice demand that the right of a
party should not be affected without giving it an opportunity to be heard.
The test is the presence of opportunity to be heard, as well as to have time to study
the motion and meaningfully oppose or controvert the grounds upon which it is
based.9 [Emphases and underscoring supplied]
Likewise, in the case of KKK Foundation, Inc. v. Hon. Adelina Calderon-Bargas,10
this Court stated:
Anent the second issue, we have consistently held that a motion which does not meet
the requirements of Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 15 of the Rules of Court is considered a
worthless piece of paper, which the Clerk of Court has no right to receive and the trial
court has no authority to act upon. Service of a copy of a motion containing a notice of
the time and the place of hearing of that motion is a mandatory requirement, and the
failure of movants to comply with these requirements renders their motions fatally
defective. However, there are exceptions to the strict application of this rule. These
exceptions are: (1) where a rigid application will result in a manifest failure or
miscarriage of justice especially if a party successfully shows that the alleged defect
in the questioned final and executory judgment is not apparent on its face or from the
recitals contained therein; (2) where the interest of substantial justice will be served;
(3) where the resolution of the motion is addressed solely to the sound and judicious
discretion of the court; and (4) where the injustice to the adverse party is not
commensurate with the degree of his thoughtlessness in not complying with the
procedure prescribed.
A notice of hearing is an integral component of procedural due process to afford the
adverse parties a chance to be heard before a motion is resolved by the court.
Through such notice, the adverse party is given time to study and answer the
arguments in the motion. Records show that while Angeles's Motion for Issuance of
Writ of Execution contained a notice of hearing, it did not particularly state the date
and time of the hearing. However, we still find that petitioner was not denied
Page12
procedural due process. Upon receiving the Motion for Issuance of Writ of Execution,
the trial court issued an Order dated September 9, 2002 giving petitioner ten (10)
days to file its comment. The trial court ruled on the motion only after the
reglementary period to file comment lapsed. Clearly, petitioner was given time to
study and comment on the motion for which reason, the very purpose of a notice of
hearing had been achieved.
The notice requirement is not a ritual to be followed blindly.1?wphi1 Procedural due
process is not based solely on a mechanical and literal application that renders any
deviation inexorably fatal. Instead, procedural rules are liberally construed to promote
their objective and to assist in obtaining a just, speedy and inexpensive determination
of any action and proceeding. [Emphases supplied]
At any rate, it is undisputed that the August 21, 1991 RTC Decision11 in Civil Case
No. 44940 is already final and executory. Once a judgment becomes final and
executory, all the issues between the parties are deemed resolved and laid to rest. All
that remains is the execution of the decision which is a matter of right. The prevailing
party is entitled to a writ of execution, the issuance of which is the trial court's
ministerial duty.12
The Court agrees with the respondents that petitioner mainly relies on mere
technicalities to frustrate the ends of justice and further delay the execution process
and enforcement of the RTC Decision that has been affirmed by the CA and this
Court. The record shows that the case has been dragging on for almost 30 years
since petitioner filed an action for annulment of sale in 1982. From the time the
Spouses Co bought the house from PSB in 1978, they have yet to set foot on the
subject house and lot.
To remand the case back to the lower court would further prolong the agony of the
Spouses Co. The Court should not allow this to happen. The Spouses Co should not
be prevented from enjoying the fruits of the final judgment in their favor. In another
protracted case, the Court wrote:
As a final note, it bears to point out that this case has been dragging for more than 15
years and the execution of this Court's judgment in PEA v. CA has been delayed for
almost ten years now simply because De Leon filed a frivolous appeal against the
RTC's order of execution based on arguments that cannot hold water. As a
consequence, PEA is prevented from enjoying the fruits of the final judgment in its
favor. The Court agrees with the Office of the Solicitor General in its contention that
every litigation must come to an end once a judgment becomes final, executory and
unappealable. Just as a losing party has the right to file an appeal within the
prescribed period, the winning party also has the correlative right to enjoy the finality
of the resolution of his case by the execution and satisfaction of the judgment, which
is the "life of the law." To frustrate it by dilatory schemes on the part of the losing party
is to frustrate all the efforts, time and expenditure of the courts. It is in the interest of
justice that this Court should write finis to this litigation.13
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
SO ORDERED
People vs. Ladjaalam, G.R. Nos. 136149-51, September 19, 2000
FACTS:
Four Informations were filed against appellant Walpan Ladjaalam in the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Zamboanga City (Branch 16), three of which he was found guilty, to
wit: 1) maintaining a drug den in violation of Section 15-A, Article III, of Republic Act
No. 6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972); 2) illegal possession of firearm and
ammunition in violation of Presidential Decree No. 1866 as amended by Republic Act.
No. 8294; and 3) direct assault with multiple attempted homicide. The following
information was provided by the prosecution:
1) In the afternoon of September 24, 1997, more than thirty (30) policemen
proceeded to the house of appellant and his wife to serve the search warrant
when they were met by a volley of gunfire coming from the second floor of
the said house. They saw that it was the appellant who fired the M14 rifle
towards them.
2) After gaining entrance, two of the police officers proceeded to the second
floor where they earlier saw appellant firing the rifle. As he noticed their
presence, the appellant jumped from the window to the roof of a neighboring
house. He was subsequently arrested at the back of his house after a brief
chase.
3) Several firearms and ammunitions were recovered from appellants house.
Also found was a pencil case with fifty (50) folded aluminum foils inside,
each containing methamphetamine hydrochloride.
4) A paraffin test was conducted and the casts taken both hands of the
appellant yielded positive for gunpowder nitrates.
5) Records show that appellant had not filed any application for license to
possess firearm and ammunition, nor has he been given authority to carry
firearms.
ISSUE:
Whether or not such use of an unlicensed firearm shall be considered as an
aggravating circumstance.
HELD:
No. Section 1 of RA 8294 substantially provides that any person who shall unlawfully
possess any firearm or ammunition shall be penalized, unless no other crime was
committed. Furthermore, if homicide or murder is committed with the use of an
unlicensed firearm, such use of an unlicensed firearm shall be considered as an
aggravating circumstance. Since the crime committed was direct assault and not
homicide or murder, illegal possession of firearms cannot be deemed an aggravating
circumstance.
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE vs PHILIPPINE LONG DISTANCE
TELEPHONE COMPANY, G.R. No. 140230 | 2005-12-15
PLDT is a grantee of a franchise under Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7082 to install,
operate and maintain a telecommunications system throughout the Philippines.
For equipment, machineries and spare parts it imported for its business on different
dates from October 1, 1992 to May 31, 1994, PLDT paid the BIR the amount of
Page12
P164,510,953.00, broken down as follows: (a) compensating tax of P126,713,037.00;
advance sales tax of P12,460,219.00 and other internal revenue taxes of
P25,337,697.00. For similar importations made between March 1994 to May 31,
1994, PLDT paid P116,041,333.00 value-added tax (VAT).
On March 15, 1994, PLDT addressed a letter to the BIR seeking a confirmatory ruling
on its tax exemption privilege under Section 12 of R.A. 7082, which reads:
Sec. 12. The grantee ... shall be liable to pay the same taxes on their real estate,
buildings, and personal property, exclusive of this franchise, as other persons or
corporations are now or hereafter may be required by law to pay. In addition thereto,
the grantee, ... shall pay a franchise tax equivalent to three percent (3%) of all gross
receipts of the telephone or other telecommunications businesses transacted under
this franchise by the grantee, its successors or assigns, and the said percentage shall
be in lieu of all taxes on this franchise or earnings thereof: Provided, That the
grantee ... shall continue to be liable for income taxes payable under Title II of the
National Internal Revenue Code pursuant to Sec. 2 of Executive Order No. 72 unless
the latter enactment is amended or repealed, in which case the amendment or repeal
shall be applicable thereto. (Emphasis supplied).
Responding, the BIR issued on April 19, 1994 Ruling No. UN-140-94,[3] pertinently
reading, as follows:
PLDT shall be subject only to the following taxes, to wit:
7. The 3% franchise tax on gross receipts which shall be in lieu of all taxes on its
franchise or earnings thereof.
The "in lieu of all taxes" provision under Section 12 of RA 7082 clearly exempts PLDT
from all taxes including the 10% value-added tax (VAT) prescribed by Section 101 (a)
of the same Code on its importations of equipment, machineries and spare parts
necessary in the conduct of its business covered by the franchise, except the
aforementioned enumerated taxes for which PLDT is expressly made liable.
In view thereof, this Office ... hereby holds that PLDT, is exempt from VAT on its
importation of equipment, machineries and spare parts ... needed in its franchise
operations.
Armed with the foregoing BIR ruling, PLDT filed on December 2, 1994 a claim[4] for
tax credit/refund of the VAT, compensating taxes, advance sales taxes and other
taxes it had been paying "in connection with its importation of various equipment,
machineries and spare parts needed for its operations". With its claim not having
been acted upon by the BIR, and obviously to forestall the running of the prescriptive
period therefor, PLDT filed with the CTA a petition for review,[5] therein seeking a
refund of, or the issuance of a tax credit certificate in, the amount of P280,552,286.00,
representing compensating taxes, advance sales taxes, VAT and other internal
revenue taxes alleged to have been erroneously paid on its importations from October
1992 to May 1994. The petition was docketed in said court as CTA Case No. 5178.
On February 18, 1998, the CTA rendered a decision[6] granting PLDT's petition,
pertinently saying:
This Court has noted that petitioner has included in its claim receipts covering the
period prior to December 16, 1992, thus, prescribed and barred from recovery. In
conclusion, We find that the petitioner is entitled to the reduced amount of
P223,265,276.00 after excluding from the final computation those taxes that were
paid prior to December 16, 1992 as they fall outside the two-year prescriptive period
for claiming for a refund as provided by law.
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, this Court finds the instant petition
meritorious and in accordance with law. Accordingly, respondent is hereby ordered to
REFUND or to ISSUE in favor of petitioner a Tax Credit Certificate in the reduced
amount of P223,265,276.00 representing erroneously paid value-added taxes,
compensating taxes, advance sales taxes and other BIR taxes on its importation of
equipments (sic), machineries and spare parts for the period covering the taxable
years 1992 to 1994.
Noticeably, the CTA decision, penned by then Associate Justice Ramon O. de Veyra,
with then CTA Presiding Judge Ernesto D. Acosta, concurring, is punctuated by a
dissenting opinion[7] of Associate Judge Amancio Q. Saga who maintained that the
phrase "in lieu of all taxes" found in Section 12 of R.A. No. 7082, supra, refers to
exemption from "direct taxes only" and does not cover "indirect taxes", such as VAT,
compensating tax and advance sales tax.
In time, the BIR Commissioner moved for a reconsideration but the CTA, in its
Resolution[8] of May 7, 1998, denied the motion, with Judge Amancio Q. Saga
reiterating his dissent.[9]
Unable to accept the CTA decision, the BIR Commissioner elevated the matter to the
Court of Appeals (CA) by way of petition for review, thereat docketed as CA-G.R. No.
47895.
As stated at the outset hereof, the appellate court, in the herein challenged
Decision[10] dated September 17, 1999, dismissed the BIR's petition, thereby
effectively affirming the CTA's judgment.
Relying on its ruling in an earlier case between the same parties and involving the
same issue - CA-G.R. SP No. 40811, decided 16 February 1998 - the appellate court
partly wrote in its assailed decision:
This Court has already spoken on the issue of what taxes are referred to in the phrase
"in lieu of all taxes" found in Section 12 of R.A. 7082. There are no reasons to deviate
from the ruling and the same must be followed pursuant to the doctrine of stare
decisis. xxx. "Stare decisis et non quieta movere. Stand by the decision and disturb
not what is settled."
Hence, this recourse by the BIR Commissioner on the lone assigned error that:
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT RESPONDENT IS EXEMPT
FROM THE PAYMENT OF VALUE-ADDED TAXES, COMPENSATING TAXES,
Page12
ADVANCE SALES TAXES AND OTHER BIR TAXES ON ITS IMPORTATIONS, BY
VIRTUE OF THE PROVISION IN ITS FRANCHISE THAT THE 3% FRANCHISE TAX
ON ITS GROSS RECEIPTS SHALL BE IN LIEU OF ALL TAXES ON ITS
FRANCHISE OR EARNINGS THEREOF.
There is no doubt that, insofar as the Court of Appeals is concerned, the issue
petitioner presently raises had been resolved by that court in CA-G.R. SP No. 40811,
entitled Commissioner of Internal Revenue vs. Philippine Long Distance Company.
There, the Sixteenth Division of the appellate court declared that under the express
provision of Section 12 of R.A. 7082, supra, "the payment [by PLDT] of the 3%
franchise tax of [its] gross receipts shall be in lieu of all taxes" exempts PLDT from
payment of compensating tax, advance sales tax, VAT and other internal revenue
taxes on its importation of various equipment, machinery and spare parts for the use
of its telecommunications system.
Dissatisfied with the CA decision in that case, the BIR Commissioner initially filed with
this Court a motion for time to file a petition for review, docketed in this Court as G.R.
No. 134386. However, on the last day for the filing of the intended petition, the then
BIR Commissioner had a change of heart and instead manifested[11] that he will no
longer pursue G.R. No. 134386, there being no compelling grounds to disagree with
the Court of Appeals' decision in CA-G.R. 40811. Consequently, on September 28,
1998, the Court issued a Resolution[12] in G.R. No. 134386 notifying the parties that
"no petition" was filed in said case and that the CA judgment sought to be reviewed
therein "has now become final and executory". Pursuant to said Resolution, an Entry
of Judgment[13] was issued by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 40811.
Hence, the CA's dismissal of CA-G.R. No. 47895 on the additional ground of stare
decisis.
Under the doctrine of stare decisis et non quieta movere, a point of law already
established will, generally, be followed by the same determining court and by all
courts of lower rank in subsequent cases where the same legal issue is raised.[14]
For reasons needing no belaboring, however, the Court is not at all concluded by the
ruling of the Court of Appeals in its earlier CA-G.R. SP No. 47895.
The Court has time and again stated that the rule on stare decisis promotes stability in
the law and should, therefore, be accorded respect. However, blind adherence to
precedents, simply as precedent, no longer rules. More important than anything else
is that the court is right,[15] thus its duty to abandon any doctrine found to be in
violation of the law in force.[16]
As it were, the former BIR Commissioner's decision not to pursue his petition in G.R.
No. 134386 denied the BIR, at least as early as in that case, the opportunity to obtain
from the Court an authoritative interpretation of Section 12 of R.A. 7082. All is,
however, not lost. For, the government is not estopped by acts or errors of its agents,
particularly on matters involving taxes. Corollarily, the erroneous application of tax
laws by public officers does not preclude the subsequent correct application thereof.
[17] Withal, the errors of certain administrative officers, if that be the case, should
never be allowed to jeopardize the government's financial position.[18]
Hence, the need to address the main issue tendered herein.
According to the Court of Appeals, the "in lieu of all taxes" clause found in Section 12
of PLDT's franchise (R.A. 7082) covers all taxes, whether direct or indirect; and that
said section states, in no uncertain terms, that PLDT's payment of the 3% franchise
tax on all its gross receipts from businesses transacted by it under its franchise is in
lieu of all taxes on the franchise or earnings thereof. In fine, the appellate court,
agreeing with PLDT, posits the view that the word "all" encompasses any and all
taxes collectible under the National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC), save those
specifically mentioned in PLDT's franchise, such as income and real property taxes.
The BIR Commissioner excepts. He submits that the exempting "in lieu of all taxes"
clause covers direct taxes only, adding that for indirect taxes to be included in the
exemption, the intention to include must be specific and unmistakable. He thus faults
the Court of Appeals for erroneously declaring PLDT exempt from payment of VAT
and other indirect taxes on its importations. To the Commissioner, PLDT's claimed
entitlement to tax refund/credit is without basis inasmuch as the 3% franchise tax
being imposed on PLDT is not a substitute for or in lieu of indirect taxes.
The sole issue at hand is whether or not PLDT, given the tax component of its
franchise, is exempt from paying VAT, compensating taxes, advance sales taxes and
internal revenue taxes on its importations.
Based on the possibility of shifting the incidence of taxation, or as to who shall bear
the burden of taxation, taxes may be classified into either direct tax or indirect tax.
In context, direct taxes are those that are exacted from the very person who, it is
intended or desired, should pay them;[19] they are impositions for which a taxpayer is
directly liable on the transaction or business he is engaged in.[20]
On the other hand, indirect taxes are those that are demanded, in the first instance,
from, or are paid by, one person in the expectation and intention that he can shift the
burden to someone else.[21] Stated elsewise, indirect taxes are taxes wherein the
liability for the payment of the tax falls on one person but the burden thereof can be
shifted or passed on to another person, such as when the tax is imposed upon goods
before reaching the consumer who ultimately pays for it. When the seller passes on
the tax to his buyer, he, in effect, shifts the tax burden, not the liability to pay it, to the
purchaser as part of the price of goods sold or services rendered.
To put the situation in graphic terms, by tacking the VAT due to the selling price, the
seller remains the person primarily and legally liable for the payment of the tax. What
is shifted only to the intermediate buyer and ultimately to the final purchaser is the
burden of the tax.[22] Stated differently, a seller who is directly and legally liable for
payment of an indirect tax, such as the VAT on goods or services, is not necessarily
the person who ultimately bears the burden of the same tax. It is the final purchaser or
end-user of such goods or services who, although not directly and legally liable for the
payment thereof, ultimately bears the burden of the tax.[23]
There can be no serious argument that PLDT, vis- -vis its payment of internal
revenue taxes on its importations in question, is effectively claiming exemption from
taxes not falling under the category of direct taxes. The claim covers VAT, advance
sales tax and compensating tax.
Page12
The NIRC classifies VAT as "an indirect tax ... the amount of [which] may be shifted or
passed on to the buyer, transferee or lessee of the goods".[24] As aptly pointed out by
Judge Amancio Q. Saga in his dissent in C.T.A. Case No. 5178, the 10% VAT on
importation of goods partakes of an excise tax levied on the privilege of importing
articles. It is not a tax on the franchise of a business enterprise or on its earnings. It is
imposed on all taxpayers who import goods (unless such importation falls under the
category of an exempt transaction under Sec. 109 of the Revenue Code) whether or
not the goods will eventually be sold, bartered, exchanged or utilized for personal
consumption. The VAT on importation replaces the advance sales tax payable by
regular importers who import articles for sale or as raw materials in the manufacture
of finished articles for sale.[25]
Advance sales tax has the attributes of an indirect tax because the tax-paying
importer of goods for sale or of raw materials to be processed into merchandise can
shift the tax or, to borrow from Philippine Acetylene Co, Inc. vs. Commissioner of
Internal Revenue,[26] lay the "economic burden of the tax", on the purchaser, by
subsequently adding the tax to the selling price of the imported article or finished
product.
Compensating tax also partakes of the nature of an excise tax payable by all persons
who import articles, whether in the course of business or not.[27] The rationale for
compensating tax is to place, for tax purposes, persons purchasing from merchants in
the Philippines on a more or less equal basis with those who buy directly from foreign
countries.[28]
It bears to stress that the liability for the payment of the indirect taxes lies only with the
seller of the goods or services, not in the buyer thereof. Thus, one cannot invoke
one's exemption privilege to avoid the passing on or the shifting of the VAT to him by
the manufacturers/suppliers of the goods he purchased.[29] Hence, it is important to
determine if the tax exemption granted to a taxpayer specifically includes the indirect
tax which is shifted to him as part of the purchase price, otherwise it is presumed that
the tax exemption embraces only those taxes for which the buyer is directly liable.[30]
Time and again, the Court has stated that taxation is the rule, exemption is the
exception. Accordingly, statutes granting tax exemptions must be construed in
strictissimi juris against the taxpayer and liberally in favor of the taxing authority.[31]
To him, therefore, who claims a refund or exemption from tax payments rests the
burden of justifying the exemption by words too plain to be mistaken and too
categorical to be misinterpreted.[32]
As may be noted, the clause "in lieu of all taxes" in Section 12 of RA 7082 is
immediately followed by the limiting or qualifying clause "on this franchise or earnings
thereof", suggesting that the exemption is limited to taxes imposed directly on PLDT
since taxes pertaining to PLDT's franchise or earnings are its direct liability.
Accordingly, indirect taxes, not being taxes on PLDT's franchise or earnings, are
outside the purview of the "in lieu" provision.
If we were to adhere to the appellate court's interpretation of the law that the "in lieu of
all taxes" clause encompasses the totality of all taxes collectible under the Revenue
Code, then, the immediately following limiting clause "on this franchise and its
earnings" would be nothing more than a pure jargon bereft of effect and meaning
whatsoever. Needless to stress, this kind of interpretation cannot be accorded a
governing sway following the familiar legal maxim redendo singula singulis meaning,
take the words distributively and apply the reference. Under this principle, each word
or phrase must be given its proper connection in order to give it proper force and
effect, rendering none of them useless or superfluous. [33]
Significantly, in Manila Electric Company [Meralco] vs. Vera,[34] the Court declared
the relatively broader exempting clause "shall be in lieu of all taxes and assessments
of whatsoever nature ... upon the privileges earnings, income franchise ... of the
grantee" written in par. # 9 of Meralco's franchise as not so all encompassing as to
embrace indirect tax, like compensating tax. There, the Court said:
It is a well-settled rule or principle in taxation that a compensating tax ... is an excise
tax ... one that is imposed on the performance of an act, the engaging in an
occupation, or the enjoyment of a privilege. A tax levied upon property because of its
ownership is a direct tax, whereas one levied upon property because of its use is an
excise duty. ....
The compensating tax being imposed upon ... MERALCO, is an impost on its use of
imported articles and is not in the nature of a direct tax on the articles themselves, the
latter tax falling within the exemption. Thus, in International Business Machine
Corporation vs. Collector of Internal Revenue, ... which involved the collection of a
compensating tax from the plaintiff-petitioner on business machines imported by it,
this Court stated in unequivocal terms that "it is not the act of importation that is taxed
under section 190 but the uses of imported goods not subjected to a sales tax"
because the "compensating tax was expressly designated as a substitute to make up
or compensate for the revenue lost to the government through the avoidance of sales
taxes by means of direct purchases abroad.
xxx If it had been the legislative intent to exempt MERALCO from paying a tax on the
use of imported equipments, the legislative body could have easily done so by
expanding the provision of paragraph 9 and adding to the exemption such words as
"compensating tax" or "purchases from abroad for use in its business," and the like.
It may be so that in Maceda vs. Macaraig, Jr.[35] the Court held that an exemption
from "all taxes" granted to the National Power Corporation (NPC) under its charter[36]
includes both direct and indirect taxes. But far from providing PLDT comfort, Maceda
in fact supports the case of herein petitioner, the correct lesson of Maceda being that
an exemption from "all taxes" excludes indirect taxes, unless the exempting statute,
like NPC's charter, is so couched as to include indirect tax from the exemption. Wrote
the Court:
xxx However, the amendment under Republic Act No. 6395 enumerated the details
covered by the exemption. Subsequently, P.D. 380, made even more specific the
details of the exemption of NPC to cover, among others, both direct and indirect taxes
on all petroleum products used in its operation. Presidential Decree No. 938 [NPC's
amended charter) amended the tax exemption by simplifying the same law in general
terms. It succinctly exempts NPC from "all forms of taxes, duties fees ...."
The use of the phrase "all forms" of taxes demonstrate the intention of the law to give
Page12
NPC all the tax exemptions it has been enjoying before. ....
It is evident from the provisions of P.D. No. 938 that its purpose is to maintain the tax
exemption of NPC from all forms of taxes including indirect taxes as provided under
R.A. No. 6395 and P.D. 380 if it is to attain its goals. (Italics in the original; words in
bracket added)
Of similar import is what we said in Borja vs. Collector of Internal Revenue.[37] There,
the Court upheld the decision of the CTA denying a claim for refund of the
compensating taxes paid on the importation of materials and equipment by a grantee
of a heat and power legislative franchise containing an "in lieu" provision, rationalizing
as follows:
xxx Moreover, the petitioner's alleged exemption from the payment of compensating
tax in the present case is not clear or expressed; unlike the exemption from the
payment of income tax which was clear and expressed in the Carcar case. Unless it
appears clearly and manifestly that an exemption is intended, the provision is to be
construed strictly against the party claiming exemption. xxx.
Jurisprudence thus teaches that imparting the "in lieu of all taxes" clause a literal
meaning, as did the Court of Appeals and the CTA before it, is fallacious. It is basic
that in construing a statute, it is the duty of courts to seek the real intent of the
legislature, even if, by so doing, they may limit the literal meaning of the broad
language.[38]
It cannot be over-emphasized that tax exemption represents a loss of revenue to the
government and must, therefore, not rest on vague inference. When claimed, it must
be strictly construed against the taxpayer who must prove that he falls under the
exception. And, if an exemption is found to exist, it must not be enlarged by
construction, since the reasonable presumption is that the state has granted in
express terms all it intended to grant at all, and that, unless the privilege is limited to
the very terms of the statute the favor would be extended beyond dispute in ordinary
cases.[39]
All told, we fail to see how Section 12 of RA 7082 operates as granting PLDT blanket
exemption from payment of indirect taxes, which, in the ultimate analysis, are not
taxes on its franchise or earnings. PLDT has not shown its eligibility for the desired
exemption. None should be granted.
As a final consideration, the Court takes particular stock, as the CTA earlier did, of
PLDT's allegation that the Bureau of Customs assessed the company for advance
sales tax and compensating tax for importations entered between October 1, 1992
and May 31, 1994 when the value-added tax system already replaced, if not totally
eliminated, advance sales and compensating taxes.[40] Indeed, pursuant to
Executive Order No. 273[41] which took effect on January 1, 1988, a multi-stage
value-added tax was put into place to replace the tax on original and subsequent
sales tax.[42] It stands to reason then, as urged by PLDT, that compensating tax and
advance sales tax were no longer collectible internal revenue taxes under the NILRC
when the Bureau of Customs made the assessments in question and collected the
corresponding tax. Stated a bit differently, PLDT was no longer under legal obligation
to pay compensating tax and advance sales tax on its importation from 1992 to 1994.
Parenthetically, petitioner has not made an issue about PLDT's allegations
concerning the abolition of the provisions of the Tax Code imposing the payment of
compensating and advance sales tax on importations and the non-existence of these
taxes during the period under review. On the contrary, petitioner admits that the VAT
on importation of goods has "replace[d] the compensating tax and advance sales tax
under the old Tax Code".[43]
Given the above perspective, the amount PLDT paid in the concept of advance sales
tax and compensating tax on the 1992 to 1994 importations were, in context,
erroneous tax payments and would theoretically be refundable. It should be
emphasized, however, that, such importations were, when made, already subject to
VAT.
Factoring in the fact that a portion of the claim was barred by prescription, the CTA
had determined that PLDT is entitled to a total refundable amount of P94,673,422.00
(P87,257,031.00 of compensating tax + P7,416,391.00 = P94,673,422.00).
Accordingly, it behooves the BIR to grant a refund of the advance sales tax and
compensating tax in the total amount of P94,673,422.00, subject to the condition that
PLDT present proof of payment of the corresponding VAT on said transactions.
WHEREFORE, the petition is partially GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 47895 dated September 17, 1999 is MODIFIED. The
Commissioner of Internal Revenue is ORDERED to issue a Tax Credit Certificate or
to refund to PLDT only the of P94,673,422.00 advance sales tax and compensating
tax erroneously collected by the Bureau of Customs from October 1, 1992 to May 31,
1994, less the VAT which may have been due on the importations in question, but
have otherwise remained uncollected.
SO ORDERED.
ACTING COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS vs. MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY
and COURT OF TAX APPEALS, G.R. No. L-23623, June 30, 1977
FACTS:
The reversal by respondent Court of Tax Appeals of a determination by the then
Acting Commissioner of Customs, the late Norberto Romualdez, Jr., that private
respondent Manila Electric Company was not exempt from the payment of the special
import tax under Republic Act No. 1394 for shipment to it of insulating oil, respondent
Court entertaining the contrary view led to this petition for review. The contention
pressed in support of the petition is that as a tax exemption is to be construed strictly,
the decision of the respondent Court, which assumed that insulating oil can be
considered as insulators must be reversed and set aside. The appealed decision of
respondent Court in the light of applicable authorities supplies the best refutation of
such contention. It must be sustained.
The appealed decision set forth that petitioner Manila Electric Co., nor private
respondent, in appealing from a determination by the then Acting Commissioner of
Customs, now petitioner, claims that it is exempt from the special import tax not only
Page12
by virtue of Section 6 of Republic Act No. 1394, which exempts from said tax
equipment and spare parts for use in industries, but also under Paragraph 9, Part
Two, of its franchise, which expressly exempts is insulators from all taxes of whatever
kind and nature. It then made reference to the franchise of private respondent Manila
Electric Co.: Par. 9. The grantee shall be liable to pay the same taxes upon its real
estate, buildings, plant (not including poles, wires, transformers, and insulators),
machinery and personal property as other persons are or may be hereafter required
by law to pay. In consideration of Part Two of the franchise herein granted, to wit, the
right to build and maintain in the City of Manila and its suburbs a plant for the
conveying and furnishing of electric current for light, heat, and power, and to charge
for the same, the grantee shall pay to the City of Manila two and one-half per centum
of the gross earnings received from the business under this franchise in the city and
its suburbs: and shall be in lieu of all taxes and assessments of whatsoever nature,
and by whatsoever authority upon the privileges, earnings, income, franchise, and
poles, wires, transformers, and insulators of the grantee, from which taxes and
assessments the grantee is hereby expressly exempted. It noted that the above
exempts it from all taxes of whatever nature, and by whatever authority, with respect
to its insulators in consideration for the payment of the percentage tax on its gross
earnings.
ISSUE: Does the insulating oil in question come within the meaning of the term
insulator ?
Insulating oils are mineral oils of high di-electrics strength and high flash point
employed in circuit breakers, switches, transformers and other electric apparatus. An
oil with a flash point of 285 F and fire point of 310 F is considered safe. A clean,
well- refined oil will have a minimum dielectric of 22,00 volts, but the presence of a
slow as 0.01% water will reduce the di-electric strength drastically. The insulating oils,
therefore, cannot be stored for long periods because of the danger of absorbing
moisture. Impurities such as acids or alkalies also detract from the strength of the oil.
Since insulating oils are used for cooling as well as for insulating, the viscosity should
be low enough for free circulation, and they should not gum. (Materials Handbook by
George J. Brady, 8th Edition 1956, pp. 421-423.) .
The last portion of the appealed decision explained why the determination of the
Acting Commissioner of Customs must be reversed: There is no question that
insulating oils of the type imported by petitioner are used for cooling as well as for
insulating, and when used in oil circuit breakers, they are required to maintain
insulation between the contacts inside the tank and the tank itself. The decision
appealed from not being in accordance with law, the same is hereby reversed.
Respondent is ordered to refund to petitioner the sum of P995.00 within thirty days
from the date this decision becomes final, without pronouncement as to costs. It was
therein made clear that private respondent was not liable for the payment of the
special import tax under Republic Act No. 1394.
HELD: the petition for review is dismissed. No costs.
As noted at the outset, the decision speaks for itself. It cannot be stigmatized as
suffering from any flaw that would call for its reversal.
It is to be admitted, as contended by petitioner, that this Court is committed to the
principle that an exemption from taxation must be justified by words too clear to be
misread. Affirmatively put, the law frowns on exemption from taxation, hence, an
exempting provision should be construed strictissimi juris. 11 Such a ruling was
reaffirmed in subsequent decisions. It does not mean, however, that petitioner should
prevail, for as was unequivocally set forth in the leading ease of Republic Flour Mills
v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, this Court speaking through Justice J.B.L.
Reyes. It is true that in the construction of tax statutes tax exemptions (and
deductions are of this nature) are not favored in the law, and are construed strictissimi
juris against the taxpayer. However, it is equally a recognized principle that where the
provision of the law is clear and unambiguous, so that there is no occasion for the
courts seeking the legislative intent, the law must be taken as it is, devoid of judicial
addition or subtraction. In this ease, we find the provision of Section 186-A -whenever
a tax free product is utilized, all encompassing to comprehend tax-free raw
materials, even if imported. Where the law provided no qualification for the granting of
the privilege, the court is not at liberty to supply any. That is what was done by
respondent Court of Tax Appeals. It showed fealty to this equally well. settled
doctrine. It construed the statutory provision as it is written. It is precluded, in the
language of ;the Republic Flour Mills opinion, considering that the law is clear and
ambiguous, to look further for any legislative intent, as the law must be taken as it is,
devoid of judicial addition or subtraction. If there is an extended discussion of this
point, it is due solely to the emphasis placed on the matter by petitioner.
As stated in another decision, only errors of law, and not rulings on the weight of
evidence, are reviewable by this Court. The facts then as above ascertained cannot
be disturbed. In our latest decision, there is a categorical assertion that where the
question is one of fact, it is no longer reviewable. 17 Such a doctrine is not of limited
application. It is a recognition of the wide discretion enjoyed by the Court of Tax
Appeals in construing tax statutes. Nor as a matter of principle is it advisable for this
Court to set aside the conclusion reached by an agency such as the Court of Tax
Appeals which is, by the very nature of its function, dedicated exclusively to the study
and consideration of tax problems and has necessarily developed an expertice on the
subject, unless, as did not happen here, there has been an abuse or improvident
exercise of its authority. The Vi Ve decision has some relevance. There the stand of
the state that the Court of Tax Appeals could rightfully determine that priopionic
glycine is the same as glutamic acid was considered as well within the authority of
respondent Court. It would be an affront to the sense of fairness and of justice if in
another case, respondent Court, in the exercise of its discretionary authority, after
determining that insulating oil comes within the term insulator, is not be upheld.
FINMAN GENERAL ASSURANCE CORPORATION vs. COURT OF APPEALS,
GR No. 100970, September 2, 1992
FACTS:
On October 22, 1986, deceased, Carlie Surposa was insured with petitioner Finman
General Assurance Corporation with his parents, spouses Julia and Carlos Surposa,
and brothers Christopher, Charles, Chester and Clifton, all surnamed, Surposa, as
beneficiaries. While said insurance policy was in full force and effect, the insured,
Carlie Surposa, died on October 18, 1988 as a result of a stab wound inflicted by one
of the three (3) unidentified men. Private respondent and the other beneficiaries of
said insurance policy filed a written notice of claim with the petitioner insurance
Page12
company which denied said claim contending that murder and assault are not within
the scope of the coverage of the insurance policy. Private respondent filed a
complaint with the Insurance Commission which rendered a favorable response for
the respondent. The appellate court ruled likewise. Petitioner filed this petition alleging
grave abuse of discretion on the part of the appellate court in applying the principle of
"expresso unius exclusio alterius" in a personal accident insurance policy, since death
resulting from murder and/or assault are impliedly excluded in said insurance policy
considering that the cause of death of the insured was not accidental but rather a
deliberate and intentional act of the assailant. Therefore, said death was committed
with deliberate intent which, by the very nature of a personal accident insurance
policy, cannot be indemnified.
ISSUE: Whether or not the insurer is liable for the payment of the insurance premiums
HELD:
Yes, the insurer is still liable. Contracts of insurance are to be construed liberally in
favor of the insured and strictly against the insurer. Thus ambiguity in the words of an
insurance contract should be interpreted in favor of its beneficiary. The terms
"accident" and "accidental" as used in insurance contracts have not acquired any
technical meaning, and are construed by the courts in their ordinary and common
acceptation. Thus, the terms have been taken to mean that which happen by chance
or fortuitously, without intention and design, and which is unexpected, unusual, and
unforeseen. Where the death or injury is not the natural or probable result of the
insured's voluntary act, or if something unforeseen occurs in the doing of the act
which produces the injury, the resulting death is within the protection of the policies
insuring against death or injury from accident. In the case at bar, it cannot be
pretended that Carlie Surposa died in the course of an assault or murder as a result of
his voluntary act considering the very nature of these crimes. Neither can it be said
that where was a capricious desire on the part of the accused to expose his life to
danger considering that he was just going home after attending a festival.
Furthermore, the personal accident insurance policy involved herein specifically
enumerated only ten (10) circumstances wherein no liability attaches to petitioner
insurance company for any injury, disability or loss suffered by the insured as a result
of any of the stimulated causes. The principle of " expresso unius exclusio alterius"
the mention of one thing implies the exclusion of another thing is therefore
applicable in the instant case since murder and assault, not having been expressly
included in the enumeration of the circumstances that would negate liability in said
insurance policy cannot be considered by implication to discharge the petitioner
insurance company from liability for, any injury, disability or loss suffered by the
insured. Thus, the failure of the petitioner insurance company to include death
resulting from murder or assault among the prohibited risks leads inevitably to the
conclusion that it did not intend to limit or exempt itself from liability for such death.
Ong Chia vs. Republic of the Philippines, G.R. No. 127240, March, 27, 2000
FACTS:
The trial court granted the petition and admitted petitioner to Philippine citizenship.
The State, however, through the Office of the Solicitor General, among others for
having failed to state all his former placer of residence in violation of C.A. No. 473, 7
and to support his petition with the appropriate documentary evidence. Petitioner
admits that he failed to mention said address in his petition, but argues that since the
Immigrant Certificate of Residence containing it had been fully published, with the
petition and the other annexes, such publication constitutes substantial compliance
with 7.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the documents annexed by the State to its appellants brief without
having been presented and formally offered as evidence under Rule 132, Section 34
of the Revised Rules on Evidence justified the reversal of the Trial Courts decision.
HELD:
YES. Decision of the Court of Appeals was affirmed. Petition was denied.
RATIO:
It is settled that naturalization laws should be rigidly enforced and strictly construed in
favor of the government and against the applicant. [T]he rule of strict application of the
law in naturalization cases defeat petitioners argument of substantial compliance
with the requirement under the Revised Naturalization Law.
[T]he reason for the rule prohibiting the admission of evidence which has not been
formally offered is to afford the opposite party the chance to object to their
admissibility. Petitioner cannot claim that he was deprived of the right to object to the
authenticity of the documents submitted to the appellate court by the State.
THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS v. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. No. 102858, July
28, 1997
FACTS:
On December 8, 1986, Private Respondent Teodoro Abistado filed a petition for
original registration of his title over 648 square meters of land under Presidential
Decree (PD) No. 1529. The land registration court in its decision dated June 13, 1989
dismissed the petition for want of jurisdiction. Consequently, the Court is of the well
considered view that it has not legally acquired jurisdiction over the instant application
for want of compliance with the mandatory provision requiring publication of the notice
of initial hearing in a newspaper of general circulation."
The Court of Appeals ruled that it was merely procedural and that the failure to cause
such publication did not deprive the trial court of its authority to grant the application.
Unsatisfied, private respondents appealed to Respondent Court of Appeals which, set
aside the decision of the trial court and ordered the registration of the title in the name
of Teodoro Abistado. The subsequent motion for reconsideration was denied in the
challenged CA Resolution dated November 19, 1991. The Director of Lands
represented by the Solicitor General thus elevated this recourse to the Supreme
Court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Director of Lands is correct that a newspaper publication of the
Page12
notice of initial hearing in an original land registration case mandatory or directory?
HELD:
YES. The petition was granted.
Sec. 23. Notice of initial hearing, publication, etc. -- The court shall, within five days
from filing of the application, issue an order setting the date and hour of the initial
hearing which shall not be earlier than forty-five days nor later than ninety days from
the date of the order.
The public shall be given notice of initial hearing of the application for land registration
by means of (1) publication; (2) mailing; and (3) posting.
It should be noted further that land registration is a proceeding in rem. Being in rem,
such proceeding requires constructive seizure of the land as against all persons,
including the state, who have rights to or interests in the property. An in rem
proceeding is validated essentially through publication. This being so, the process
must strictly be complied with.
The Supreme Court has no authority to dispense with such mandatory requirement.
The law is unambiguous and its rationale clear. Time and again, this Court has
declared that where the law speaks in clear and categorical language, there is no
room for interpretation, vacillation or equivocation; there is room only for application.
There is no alternative. Thus, the application for land registration filed by private
respondents must be dismissed without prejudice to reapplication in the future, after
all the legal requisites shall have been duly complied with.
Thornton v. Thornton, G.R. No. 154598, Aug. 16, 2004
FACTS: Petitioner was an American, respondent was a Filipino. They were married
and had one daughter. After 3 years, the woman grew restless and bored as a plain
housewife and wanted to return to her old job as GRO in a nightclub. One day, the
woman left the family home together with their daughter and told her servants that she
was going to Basilan. The husband filed a petition for habeas corpus in the
designated Family Court in Makati City but was dismissed because the child was in
Basilan. When he went to Basilan, he didnt find them and the barangay office issued
a certification that respondent was no longer residing there. Petitioner filed another
petition for habeas corpus in CA which could issue a writ of habeas corpus
enforceable in the entire country. The petition was denied by CA on the ground that it
did not have jurisdiction over the case since RA 8369 (Family Courts Act of 1997)
gave family courts exclusive jurisdiction over petitions for habeas corpus, it impliedly
repealed RA 7902 (An Act Expanding the Jurisdiction of CA) and B.P 129 (The
judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980.)
ISSUE: W/N CA has jurisdiction to issue writs of habeas corpus in cases involving
custody of minors in light of the provision in RA 8369 giving family courts exclusive
jurisdiction over such petitions.
HELD: Petition granted. CA should take cognizance of the case because nothing in
RA 8369 revoked its jurisdiction to issue writs of habeas corpus involving custody of
minors. The reasoning of CA cant be affirmed because it will result to iniquitous,
leaving petitioners without legal course in obtaining custody. The minor could be
transferred from one place to another and habeas corpus case will be left without
legal remedy since family courts take cognizance only cases within their jurisdiction.
Literal interpretation would render it meaningless, lead to absurdity, injustice, and
contradiction. The literal interpretation of exclusive will result in grave injustice and
negate the policy to protect the rights and promote welfare of children.
Ocampo v. CA, GR No. 79060, December 8, 1989
Facts: Aniceto Ocampo built his house illegally inside the UP grounds. Despite being
apprehended several times, he continued the construction. An information was
thereafter filed against accused Ocampo charging him with violation of PD No. 772
(Penalizing squatting and other similar acts).
After the prosecution rested its case, petitioner waived the presentation of his
evidence and instead filed a motion to dismiss (demurrer to evidence) on the ground
that the prosecution did not present Transfer Certificate of Title No. 192689 to prove
ownership of the land in question and that it failed to prove that the land on which the
petitioner constructed his house belongs to the University of the Philippines.
The trial court denied the motion to dismiss for lack of merit. The trial court found
Aniceto Ocampo guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense charged.
He appealed the case and argued that the quantum of guilt was not met and that he
was deprived of the opportunity to adduce evidence in his defense.
Issue: Whether or not the Motion to Dismiss (Demurrer to Evidence) filed by Ocampo
constituted a bar for him to present evidence.
Held: Yes, the motion to dismiss filed by Ocampo constituted a bar for him to present
evidence. Ratio: Sec. 23, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court provides:
Section 23. Demurrer to evidence. After the prosecution rests its case, the court
may dismiss the action on the ground of insufficiency of evidence
(1) on its own initiative after giving the prosecution the opportunity to be heard or (2)
upon demurrer to evidence filed by the accused with or without leave of court.
If the court denies the demurrer to evidence filed with leave of court, the accused may
adduce evidence in his defense. When the demurrer to evidence is filed without leave
of court, the accused waives the right to present evidence and submits the case for
judgment on the basis of the evidence for the prosecution.
The motion for leave of court to file demurrer to evidence shall specifically state its
grounds and shall be filed within a non-extendible period of five (5) days after the
prosecution rests its case. The prosecution may oppose the motion within a non-
extendible period of five (5) days from its receipt.
If leave of court is granted, the accused shall file the demurrer to evidence within a
non-extendible period of ten (10) days from notice. The prosecution may oppose the
demurrer to evidence within a similar period from its receipt.
The order denying the motion for leave of court to file demurrer to evidence or the
Page12
demurrer it shall not be reviewable by appeal or by certiorari before judgment.
In the case at bar, nowhere does the records show that accused-petitioner's demurrer
to evidence was filed with prior leave of court. By moving to dismiss on the ground of
insufficiency of evidence, accused-petitioner waives his right to present evidence to
substantiate his defense a gamble which he lost. As the Solicitor General aptly
opined. This is exactly what petitioner did. And in effect submits the case for judgment
on the basis of the evidence for the prosecution.. Petitioner gambled on securing an
acquittal. And he cannot now claim denial of his right to adduce his own evidence.
Pahilan vs. Tabalba, COMELEC and Judge Tabano Jr., G.R. No. 110170,
February 21, 1994
FACTS:
Petitioner Pahilan and private respondent Tabalba were candidates for Mayor during
the local elections. The Municipal Board of Canvassers proclaimed Tabalba as the
duly elected Mayor. Petitioner filed an election protest which he sent by registered
mail, addressed to the Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court, attaching thereto
P200.00 in cash as payment for docket fees. In a letter dated May 28, 1992, the OIC-
Clerk of Court informed Pahilan that the correct fees that were supposed to be paid
amounted to P620.00, and that, accordingly, the petition would not be entered in the
court docket and summons would not be issued pending payment of the balance of
P420.00. On June 16, 1992, petitioner paid the required balance in the total amount
P470.00 after learning.
ISSUE: Whether or not the notice of appeal can be validly substituted by an appeal
brief.
HELD:
YES. Order of the Commission on Elections and the Order of the RTC in Election
Case No. 3(92) are hereby reversed and set aside.
RATIO:
The rules which apply to ordinary civil actions may not necessarily serve the purpose
of election cases, especially if we consider the fact that election laws are to be
accorded utmost liberality in their interpretation and application, bearing in mind
always that the will of the people must be upheld. Ordinary civil actions would
generally involve private interests while all elections cases are, at all times, and
invested with public interest which cannot be defeated by mere procedural or
technical infirmities.
[I]n the present case, the docket fee was paid (P200.00) except that the amount given
was not correct. Considering the fact that there was an honest effort on the part of
herein petitioner to pay the full amount of docket fees, we are not inclined to insist on
a stringent application of the rules.
JAIME TAN, JR. vs. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. No. 136368, January 16,
2002
On January 22, 1981, Tan, for a consideration of P59,200.00, executed a deed of
absolute sale over the property in question in favor of spouses Jose Magdangal and
Estrella Magdangal. Simultaneous with the execution of this deed, the same
contracting parties entered into another agreement whereunder Tan was given one
(1) year within which to redeem or repurchase the property.
Albeit given several opportunities and/or extensions to exercise the option, Tan failed
to redeem the property until his death on January 4, 1988.
On May 2, 1988, Tans heirs filed before the Regional Trial Court at Davao City a suit
against the Magdangals for reformation of instrument. Docketed as CIVIL CASE NO.
19049-88, the complaint alleged that, while Tan and the Magdangals denominated
their agreement as deed of absolute sale, their real intention was to conclude an
equitable mortgage.
Barely hours after the complaint was stamped received, the Magdangals were able to
have Tans title over the lot in question canceled and to secure in their names TCT No.
T-134470. This development prompted the heirs of Tan, who were to be later
substituted by Jaime V. Tan, Jr. (Tan, Jr.) as plaintiff, to file a supplemental complaint.
The intervening legal tussles are not essential to this narration. What is material is
that on June 4, 1991, Branch 11 of the Regional Trial Court of Davao City rendered
judgment finding for Tan, Jr., as plaintiff therein. The dispositive portion of the
decision reads:.
WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered:
1. The Deed of Absolute Sale (Exhibits B, B-1) is, in accordance with the true
intention of the parties, hereby declared and reformed an equitable
mortgage;
2. The plaintiff is ordered to pay the defendants within 120 days after the finality
of this decision P59,200 plus interest at the rate of 12% per annum from May
2, 1988, the date the complaint was filed, until paid;
3. In order to avoid multiplicity of suits and to fully give effect to the true
intention of the parties, upon the payment of the aforesaid amount, TCT No.
T-134470 in the name of defendants Jose Magdangal and Estrella
Magdangal (Exh. 13) and shall be deemed canceled and null and void and
TCT No. T-72067 in the name of Jaime C. Tan and Praxedes Valles Tan
(Exh. A) be reinstated.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED. (Annex B, Petition; Emphasis added).
From the above, the Magdangals appealed to this Court in CA-G.R. CV No. 33657.
Page12
In a decision promulgated on September 28, 1995, this Court, thru its then Special
Third Division, affirmed in toto the appealed decision of the lower court. Copy of this
affirmatory judgment was each received by the Magdangals and Tan, Jr. on October
5, 1995.
On March 13, 1996, the Clerk of this Court entered in the Book of Entries of Judgment
the Decision in CA-G.R. CV No. 33657 and issued the corresponding Entry of
Judgment which, on its face, stated that the said Decision has on October 21, 1995
become final and executory (Annex L, Petition; Emphasis added).
On March 21, 1996, the Magdangals filed in the lower court a MOTION FOR
CONSOLIDATION AND WRIT OF POSSESSION, therein alleging that they did not
appeal from the aforesaid decision of this Court, adding [T]hat the appealed judgment
of the Court of Appeals has become final and executory 15 days from October 5, 1995
or up to October 20, 1995, which the 120 days redemption period commences. And
noting that the redemption period has expired without Tan, Jr. exercising his option,
the Magdangals thus prayed that the title in the name of Jaime C. Tan and Praxedes
Tan be consolidated and confirmed in the name of the (Magdangals) x x x and
pending such issuance, a writ of possession be ordered issued (Annex C, Petition).
In opposition to this motion (Annex F, Petition), Tan, Jr. alleged, among other things,
that until an entry of judgment has been issued by the Court of Appeals and copy
thereof furnished the parties, the appealed decision of the court a quo in this case
cannot be considered final and executory. Pressing the point, Tan, Jr., citing Cueto
vs. Collantes, infra., would then assert that the period of redemption on his part
commenced to run from receipt of entry of judgment in CA-G.R. CV No. 33657.
Meanwhile, Tan, Jr. via a motion for execution dated March 27, 1996, which he filed
directly with this court, prayed this court to direct the court a quo to issue the
corresponding writ of execution in Civil Case No. 19049-88. In a related move, Tan,
Jr. filed on April 16, 1996, a MANIFESTATION AND MOTION therein advising the
court a quo of his intention to redeem the property in question and of the fact that, on
such date, he has deposited with its clerk of court the repurchase price, plus interest,
as required by its original decision. By way of relief, Tan, Jr. prayed that the
Magdangals be ordered to claim the amount thus deposited and the Register of
Deeds of Davao City, to reinstate the title of Jaime Tan and Praxedes Tan.
Jointly acting on the aforementioned MOTION FOR CONSOLIDATION AND WRIT
OF POSSESSION of the Magdangals (Annex C, Petition), MANIFESTATION AND
MOTION of Tan, Jr. (Annex I, Petition), the court a quo presided by the respondent
judge, came out with the first challenged order of June 10, 1996 (Annex N, Petition),
dispositively reading, as follows:
WHEREFORE, x x x the Motion for Consolidation and a Writ of Possession is hereby
DENIED for lack of merit.
The deposit of the amount of P116,032.00 made by plaintiff with the Office of the
Clerk of Court x x x on April 17, 1996 is hereby considered full payment of the
redemption price and the Clerk of Court is hereby ordered to deliver said amount to
herein defendants.
The Register of Deeds of Davao City x x x is hereby directed to cancel TCT No. T-
134470 in the name of Jose Magdangal and Estrella Magdangal and, thereafter, to
reinstate TCT No. 72067 in the name of Jaime C. Tan and Praxedes Valles Tan and
to submit her compliance thereto within ten (10) days from receipt of this Order.
SO ORDERED.
Explaining her action, the respondent judge wrote in the same order:
Following the ruling of the Supreme Court in Cueto vs. Collantes, et al., 97 Phil. 325,
the 120 days period for plaintiff to pay the amount of P59,200.00 plus interest x x x
should be reckoned from the date of Entry of Judgment x x x which was March 13,
1996. The plaintiff made a deposit on April 17, 1996 well within the 120-day period
mandated by the decision of this Court.
In due time, the Magdangals moved for a reconsideration. However, in her next
assailed order of July 24, 1996 (Annex R, Petition), the respondent judge denied the
motion for being pro-forma and fatally defective.[3]
Petitioner assails the aforequoted Decision as follows:
I. Petitioners right to due process was violated when the Court of Appeals rendered a
judgment on the merits of private respondents petition without granting to petitioner
the opportunity to controvert the same.
II. Appeal not certiorari was the appropriate remedy of private respondents as there
was no grave abuse of discretion as to amount to lack of or excess of jurisdiction on
the part of the trial judge. Neither is delay in resolving the main case a ground for
giving due course to the petition.
III. Cueto vs. Collantes, 97 Phil. 325, was disregarded by the Court of Appeals in
resolving the petition of private respondents. It is still good case law and was in effect
made a part of section 2 of Rule 68 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure on
Foreclosure of Mortgage.
IV. The St. Dominic vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 138 SCRA 242 case is not
applicable to the case at bar; on the other hand the ruling in Gutierrez Hermanos vs.
de La Riva, 46 Phil. 827, applies.
V. Equity considerations justify giving due course to this petition.[4](emphasis ours)
We will immediately resolve the key issue of what rule should govern the finality of
judgment favorably obtained in the trial court by the petitioner.
The operative facts show that in its Decision of June 4, 1991, the trial court held that:
(1) the contract between the parties is not an absolute sale but an equitable
mortgage; and (2) petitioner Tan should pay to the respondents Magdangal within 120
days after the finality of this decision P59,200.00 plus interest at the rate of 12% per
annum from May 2, 1988, the date the complaint was filed, until paid.[5]
Page12
On September 28, 1995 in CA-G.R. CV No. 33657, the Special Third Division of the
Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court in toto. Both parties received
the decision of the appellate court on October 5, 1995. On March 13, 1996, the clerk
of court of the appellate court entered in the Book of Entries of Judgement the
decision in CA-G.R. CV No. 33657 and issued the corresponding Entry of Judgment
which, on its face, stated that the said decision has on October 21, 1995 become final
and executory.[6]
The respondents Magdangal filed in the trial court a Motion for Consolidation and Writ
of Possession.[7]They alleged that the 120-day period of redemption of the petitioner
has expired. They reckoned that the said period began 15 days after October 5, 1995,
the date when the finality of the judgment of the trial court as affirmed by the appellate
court commenced to run.
On the other hand, petitioner filed on March 27, 1996 a motion for execution in the
appellate court praying that it direct the court a quo to issue the corresponding writ of
execution in Civil Case No. 19049-88.[8]On April 17, 1996, petitioner deposited with
the clerk of court the repurchase price of the lot plus interest as ordered by the
decision.
On June 10, 1996, the trial court allowed the petitioner to redeem the lot in question. It
ruled that the 120-day redemption period should be reckoned from the date of Entry of
Judgment in the appellate court or from March 13, 1996.[9]The redemption price was
deposited on April 17, 1996. As aforestated, the Court of Appeals set aside the ruling
of the trial court.
From 1991-1996, the years relevant to the case at bar, the rule that governs finality of
judgment is Rule 51 of the Revised Rules of Court. Its sections 10 and 11 provide:
SEC. 10. Entry of judgments and final resolutions. If no appeal or motion for new trial
or reconsideration is filed within the time provided in these Rules, the judgment or
final resolution shall forthwith be entered by the clerk in the book of entries of
judgments. The date when the judgment or final resolution becomes executory shall
be deemed as the date of its entry. The record shall contain the dispositive part of the
judgment or final resolution and shall be signed by the clerk, with a certificate that
such judgment or final resolution has become final and executory. (2a, R36)
SEC. 11. Execution of judgment. Except where the judgment or final order or
resolution, or a portion thereof, is ordered to be immediately executory, the motion for
its execution may only be filed in the proper court after its entry.
In original actions in the Court of Appeals, its writ of execution shall be accompanied
by a certified true copy of the entry of judgment or final resolution and addressed to
any appropriate officer for its enforcement.
In appealed cases, where the motion for execution pending appeal is filed in the Court
of Appeals at a time that it is in possession of the original record or the record on
appeal, the resolution granting such motion shall be transmitted to the lower court
from which the case originated, together with a certified true copy of the judgment or
final order to be executed, with a directive for such court of origin to issue the proper
writ for its enforcement.
This rule has been interpreted by this Court in Cueto vs. Collantes as follows:[10]
The only error assigned by appellants refer to the finding of the lower court that
plaintiff can still exercise his right of redemption notwithstanding the expiration of the
90-day period fixed in the original decision and, therefore, defendants should execute
the deed of reconveyance required in said decision. Appellants contend that, the final
judgment of the Court of Appeals having been entered on July 8, 1953, the 90-day
period for the exercise of the right of redemption has long expired, it appearing that
plaintiff deposited the redemption money with the clerk of court only on October 17,
1953, or, after the expiration of 101 days. Appellee brands this computation as
erroneous, or one not in accordance with the procedure prescribed by the rules of
court.
Appellees contention should be sustained. The original decision provides that
appellee may exercise his right of redemption within the period of 90 days from the
date the judgment has become final. It should be noted that appellee had appealed
from this decision. This decision was affirmed by the court of appeals and final
judgment was entered on July 8, 1953. Does this mean that the judgment became
final on that date?
Let us make a little digression for purposes of clarification. Once a decision is
rendered by the Court of Appeals a party may appeal therefrom by certiorari by filing
with the Supreme Court a petition within 10 days from the date of entry of such
decision (Section 1, Rule 46). The entry of judgment is made after it has become final,
i.e., upon the expiration of 15 days after notice thereof to the parties (Section 8, Rule
53, as modified by a resolution of the Supreme Court dated October 1, 1945). But, as
Chief Justice Moran has said, such finality *** is subject to the aggrieved partys right
of filing a petition for certiorari under this section, which means that the Court of
Appeals shall remand the case to the lower court for the execution of its judgment,
only after the expiration of ten (10) days from the date of such judgment, if no petition
for certiorari is filed within that period. (1 Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court,
1952 ed., p. 950) It would therefore appear that the date of entry of judgment of the
Court of Appeals is suspended when a petition for review is filed to await the final
entry of the resolution or decision of the Supreme Court.
Since in the present case appellee has filed a petition for review within the
reglementary period, which was dismissed by resolution of July 6, 1953, and for lack
of a motion for reconsideration the entry of final judgment was made on August 7,
1953, it follows that the 90-day period within which appellee may exercise his right of
redemption should be counted from said date, August 7, 1953. And appellee having
exercised such right on October 17, 1953 by depositing the redemption money with
the clerk of court, it is likewise clear that the motion be filed for the exercise of such
right is well taken and is within the purview of the decision of the lower court.[11]
On April 18, 1994, this Court issued Circular No. 24-94, viz:
TO: COURT OF APPEALS, SANDIGANBAYAN, COURT OF TAX APPEALS,
REGIONAL TRIAL COURTS, METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURTS, MUNICIPAL TRIAL
COURTS, MUNICIPAL CIRCUIT TRIAL COURTS, AND ALL MEMBERS OF THE
INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES
Page12
SUBJECT: RESOLUTION OF THE COURT EN BANC APPROVING AND
PROMULGATING THE REVISED PROVISION ON EXECUTION OF JUDGMENTS,
SPECIFICALLY IN APPEALED CASES, AND AMENDING SECTION 1, RULE 39 OF
THE RULES OF COURT
It appears that in a number of instances, the execution of judgments in appealed
cases cannot be promptly enforced because of undue administrative delay in the
remand of the records to the court of origin, aggravated at times by misplacement or
misdelivery of said records. The Supreme Court Committee on the Revision of the
Rules of Court has drafted proposals including a provision which can remedy the
procedural impasse created by said contingencies.
Accordingly, pending approval by the Court of the revised rules on Civil Procedure,
and to provide a solution to the aforestated problems, the Court Resolved to approve
and promulgate the following section thereof on execution of judgments, amending
Section 1, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court:
Section 1. Execution upon judgments or final orders. Execution shall issue as a matter
of right, on motion, upon a judgment or order that disposes of the action or proceeding
upon expiration of the period to appeal therefrom if no appeal has been duly
perfected.
If the appeal has been duly perfected and finally resolved, such execution may
forthwith be applied for in the lower court from which the action originated, on motion
of the judgment obligee, submitting therewith certified true copies of the judgment or
judgments or the final order or orders sought to be enforced and of the entry thereof,
with notice to the adverse party.
The appellate court may, on motion in the same case, when the interest of justice so
requires, direct the court of origin to issue the writ of execution.
This resolution shall be published in two (2) newspapers of general circulation and
shall take effect on June 1, 1994.
April 18, 1994.
(Sgd.) ANDRES R. NARVASA
Chief Justice
The Circular took effect on June 1, 1994.
The 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, however, amended the rule on finality of
judgment by providing in section 1, Rule 39 as follows:
Section 1. Execution upon judgments or final orders. Execution shall issue as a matter
of right, on motion, upon a judgment or order that disposes of the action or proceeding
upon the expiration of the period to appeal therefrom if no appeal has been duly
perfected. (1a)
If the appeal has been duly perfected and finally resolved, the execution may forthwith
be applied for in the court of origin, on motion of the judgment obligee, submitting
therewith certified true copies of the judgment or judgments or final order or orders
sought to be enforced and of the entry thereof, with notice to the adverse party.
The appellate court may, on motion in the same case, when the interest of justice so
requires, direct the court of origin to issue the writ of execution.
The rationale of the new rule is explained by retired Justice F.D. Regalado as follows:
[12]
1. The term final order is used in two senses depending on whether it is used on the
issue of appealability or on the issue of binding effect. For purposes of appeal, an
order is final if it disposes of the action, as distinguished from an interlocutory order
which leaves something to be done in the trial court with respect to the merits of the
case (De la Cruz, et al. vs. Paras, et al., L-41053, Feb. 27, 1976). For purposes of
binding effect or whether it can be subject of execution, an order is final or executory
after the lapse of the reglementary period to appeal and no appeal has been
perfected (see Perez, et al. vs. Zulueta, L-10374, Sept. 30, 1959; cf. Denso [Phil.],
Inc. vs. IAC, et al., G.R. No. 75000, Feb. 27, 1987; Montilla vs. CA, et al., L-47968,
May 9, 1988).
2. On the aspect of appealability, these revised Rules use the adjective final with
respect to orders and resolutions, since to terminate a case the trial courts issue
orders while the appellate courts and most of the quasi-judicial agencies issue
resolutions. Judgments are not so qualified since the use of the so-called interlocutory
judgments is not favored in this jurisdiction, while the categorization of an order or a
resolution for purposes of denoting that it is appealable is to distinguish them from
interlocutory orders or resolutions. However, by force of extended usage the phrase
final and executory judgment is sometimes used and tolerated, although the use of
executory alone would suffice. These observations also apply to the several and
separate judgments contemplated in Rule 36, or partial judgments which totally
dispose of a particular claim or severable part of the case, subject to the power of the
court to suspend or defer action on an appeal from or further proceedings in such
special judgment, or as provided by Rule 35 on the matter of partial summary
judgments which are not considered as appealable (see Sec. 4, Rule 35 and the
explanation therein).
The second paragraph of this section is an innovation in response to complaints over
the delay caused by the former procedure in obtaining a writ of execution of a
judgment, which has already been affirmed on appeal, with notice to the parties. As
things then stood, after the entry of judgment in the appellate court, the prevailing
party had to wait for the records of the case to be remanded to the court of origin
when and where he could then move for the issuance of a writ of execution. The
intervening time could sometimes be substantial, especially if the court a quo is in a
remote province, and could also be availed of by the losing party to delay or thwart
actual execution.
On these considerations, the Supreme Court issued Circular No. 24-94, dated April
18, 1994, approving and promulgating in advance this amended Section 1 of Rule 39
Page12
and declaring the same effective as of June 1, 1994.
Under the present procedure, the prevailing party can secure certified true copies of
the judgment or final order of the appellate court and the entry thereof, and submit the
same to the court of origin with and to justify his motion for a writ of execution, without
waiting for its receipt of the records from the appellate court. That motion must be with
notice to the adverse party, with a hearing when the circumstances so require, to
enable him to file any objection thereto or bring to the attention of said court matters
which may have transpired during the pendency of the appeal and which may have a
bearing on the execution sought to enforce the judgment.
The third paragraph of this section, likewise a new provision, is due to the experience
of the appellate courts wherein the trial court, for reasons of its own or other
unjustifiable circumstances, unduly delays or unreasonably refuses to act on the
motion for execution or issue the writ therefor. On motion in the same case while the
records are still with the appellate court, or even after the same have been remanded
to the lower court, the appellate court can direct the issuance of the writ of execution
since such act is merely in the enforcement of its judgment and which it has the power
to require.
It is evident that if we apply the old rule on finality of judgment, petitioner redeemed
the subject property within the 120-day period of redemption reckoned from the
appellate courts entry of judgment. The appellate court, however, did not apply the old
rule but the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure. In fine, it applied the new rule
retroactively and we hold that given the facts of the case at bar this is an error.
There is no dispute that rules of procedure can be given retroactive effect. This
general rule, however, has well-delineated exceptions. We quote author Agpalo:[13]
9.17. Procedural laws.
Procedural laws are adjective laws which prescribe rules and forms of procedure of
enforcing rights or obtaining redress for their invasion; they refer to rules of procedure
by which courts applying laws of all kinds can properly administer justice. They
include rules of pleadings, practice and evidence. As applied to criminal law, they
provide or regulate the steps by which one who commits a crime is to be punished.
The general rule that statutes are prospective and not retroactive does not ordinarily
apply to procedural laws. It has been held that a retroactive law, in a legal sense, is
one which takes away or impairs vested rights acquired under laws, or creates a new
obligation and imposes a new duty, or attaches a new disability, in respect of
transactions or considerations already past. Hence, remedial statutes or statutes
relating to remedies or modes of procedure, which do not create new or take away
vested rights, but only operate in furtherance of the remedy or confirmation of rights
already existing, do not come within the legal conception of a retroactive law, or the
general rule against the retroactive operation of statutes. The general rule against
giving statutes retroactive operation whose effect is to impair the obligations of
contract or to disturb vested rights does not prevent the application of statutes to
proceedings pending at the time of their enactment where they neither create new nor
take away vested rights. A new statute which deals with procedure only is
presumptively applicable to all actions those which have accrued or are pending.
Statutes regulating the procedure of the courts will be construed as applicable to
actions pending and undetermined at the time of their passage. Procedural laws are
retroactive in that sense and to that extent. The fact that procedural statutes may
somehow affect the litigants rights may not preclude their retroactive application to
pending actions. The retroactive application of procedural laws is not violative of any
right of a person who may feel that he is adversely affected. Nor is the retroactive
application of procedural statutes constitutionally objectionable. The reason is that as
a general rule no vested right may attach to, nor arise from, procedural laws. It has
been held that a person has no vested right in any particular remedy, and a litigant
cannot insist on the application to the trial of his case, whether civil or criminal, of any
other than the existing rules of procedure.
Thus, the provision of Batas Bilang 129 in Section 39 thereof prescribing that no
record on appeal shall be required to take an appeal is procedural in nature and
should therefore be applied retroactively to pending actions. Hence, the question as to
whether an appeal from an adverse judgment should be dismissed for failure of
appellant to file a record on appeal within thirty days as required under the old rules,
which question is pending resolution at the time Batas Bilang 129 took effect, became
academic upon the effectivity of said law because the law no longer requires the filing
of a record on appeal and its retroactive application removed the legal obstacle to
giving due course to the appeal. A statute which transfers the jurisdiction to try certain
cases from a court to a quasi-judicial tribunal is a remedial statute that is applicable to
claims that accrued before its enactment but formulated and filed after it took effect,
for it does not create new nor take away vested rights. The court that has jurisdiction
over a claim at the time it accrued cannot validly try the claim where at the time the
claim is formulated and filed the jurisdiction to try it has been transferred by law to a
quasi-judicial tribunal, for even actions pending in one court may be validly taken
away and transferred to another and no litigant can acquire a vested right to be heard
by one particular court.
9.18. Exceptions to the rule.
The rule that procedural laws are applicable to pending actions or proceedings admits
certain exceptions. The rule does not apply where the statute itself expressly or by
necessary implication provides that pending actions are excepted from its operation,
or where to apply it to pending proceedings would impair vested rights. Under
appropriate circumstances, courts may deny the retroactive application of procedural
laws in the event that to do so would not be feasible or would work injustice. Nor may
procedural laws be applied retroactively to pending actions if to do so would involve
intricate problems of due process or impair the independence of the courts.
We hold that section 1, Rule 39 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Procedure should not
be given retroactive effect in this case as it would result in great injustice to the
petitioner. Undoubtedly, petitioner has the right to redeem the subject lot and this right
is a substantive right. Petitioner followed the procedural rule then existing as well as
the decisions of this Court governing the reckoning date of the period of redemption
when he redeemed the subject lot. Unfortunately for petitioner, the rule was changed
by the 1997 Revised Rules of Procedure which if applied retroactively would result in
Page12
his losing the right to redeem the subject lot. It is difficult to reconcile the retroactive
application of this procedural rule with the rule of fairness. Petitioner cannot be
penalized with the loss of the subject lot when he faithfully followed the laws and the
rule on the period of redemption when he made the redemption. The subject lot may
only be 34,829 square meters but as petitioner claims, it is the only property left
behind by their father, a private law practitioner who was felled by an assassins bullet.
[14]
Petitioner fought to recover this lot from 1988. To lose it because of a change of
procedure on the date of reckoning of the period of redemption is inequitous. The
manner of exercising the right cannot be changed and the change applied
retroactively if to do so will defeat the right of redemption of the petitioner which is
already vested.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the decision of the Court of Appeals dated July 15, 1998 and its
Resolution dated November 9, 1998 in CA-G.R. SP-41738 are annulled and set
aside. The Orders dated June 10, 1996 and July 24, 1996 of the RTC of Davao City,
11th Judicial Region, Branch 11, in Civil Case No. 19049-88 are reinstated. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
TEOFILO MARTINEZ vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 132852.
May 31, 2000
This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, erroneously filed as a petition for review
on certiorari under Rule 45. But this procedural infirmity notwithstanding, we have
decided to give it due course to resolve the question whether the Court of Appeals
gravely abused its discretion in denying petitioner's motion to appeal as a pauper
litigant.[1]
The antecedents: Petitioner was accused of homicide in Crim. Case No. 5753 before
the Regional Trial Court of Butuan City.[2] During the hearing on 23 June 1994
petitioner represented by Atty. Jesus G. Chavez of the Public Attorney's Office of
Butuan City objected to petitioner's motion to be allowed to litigate as pauper and
moved instead to strike out the entire testimony of the first witness for the prosecution
on the ground that it was inadmissible for being violative of the testimonial privilege
afforded to children in cases involving their parents. The Presiding Judge[3] deferred
his ruling on the objection and allowed the testimony to be continued.[4] On 21 July
1994 the trial court issued an order overruling the objection. On 8 August 1994 the
court denied the motion for reconsideration.[5] This prompted petitioner to go to the
Court of Appeals by way of a petition for certiorari alleging that the trial court acted
with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction when it issued the
assailed orders.[6]
On 23 August 1994 petitioner filed before the Court of Appeals a Motion to Litigate as
Pauper attaching thereto supporting affidavits executed by petitioner himself and by
two (2) ostensibly disinterested persons attesting to petitioner's eligibility to avail
himself of this privilege.[7] The appellate court subsequently issued its resolution
dated 21 March 1997 denying the motion and directing petitioner to remit the
docketing fees in the total amount of P420.00 within five (5) days from notice.[8] On 7
April 1997 petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the order denying his
motion to litigate as a pauper, but this was similarly denied in the resolution of 8
October 1997.[9] Petitioner then filed a Manifestation on 28 October 1997 wherein he
stated through counsel that he was transmitting the docket fees required of his client
"under protest" and that the money remitted was advanced by his counsel, Atty. Jesus
G. Chavez himself.[10] The transmittal of the amount was evidenced by two (2) postal
money orders attached to the Motion to Litigate as Pauper.[11]
In the assailed Resolution of 10 November 1997 the Court of Appeals dismissed the
petition, citing petitioners failure to pay the required docket fee.[12] Petitioner moved
for reconsideration citing his compliance with the docket fee requirement as alleged in
his Manifestation adverted to above.[13] However, the Court of Appeals in the second
assailed Resolution of 21 January 1998 denied this latest motion on the ground that,
per verification by the Judicial Records Division, the amount remitted by petitioner as
docket fee was short of 150.00.[14] Msesm
The only issue expressly raised by petitioner is whether a motion to litigate as pauper
can be entertained by an appellate court. When petitioner filed on 23 August 1994 his
original motion to appeal as pauper before the appellate court the applicable rule was
the second paragraph of Sec. 16, rule 41, of the 1964 Revised Rules of Court, which
provides-
Sec. 16. Appeal by pauper Where a party desiring to appeal shall establish to the
satisfaction of the trial court that he is a pauper and unable to pay the expenses of
prosecuting the appeal, and that the case is of such importance, by reason of the
amount involved, or the nature of the question raised, that it ought to be reviewed by
the appellate court, the trial judge may enter an order entitling the party to appeal as
pauper. The clerk shall transmit to the appellate court the entire record of the case,
including the evidence taken on trial and the record on appeal, and the case shall be
heard in the appellate court upon the original record so transmitted without printing
the same. Esmso
A petition to be allowed to appeal as pauper shall not be entertained by the appellate
court.
Even prior to the adoption of the 1964 Revised Rules of Court, the Court had
uniformly frowned upon appellate courts entertaining petitions to litigate as pauper,
holding that the question of whether a party-litigant is so poor as to qualify him to
litigate as pauper is a question of fact which is best determined by the trial court. The
trial court is the court which may properly decide or pass upon the question of fact
which may require presentation of evidence whether the appellant is an indigent and
may appeal as such, and whether the case is of such importance that, by reason not
only of the amount involved but of the nature of the question raised in the court below,
it ought to be reviewed by the appellate court.[15]
When the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure came into effect on 1 July 1997 the provision
abovequoted was not reenacted. Section 21 of Rule 3, as now worded, outlines the
procedure for, as well as the effects of, the grant of a motion to litigate as pauper -
Sec. 21. Indigent party. - A party may be authorized to litigate his action, claim or
defense as an indigent if the court, upon an ex parte application and hearing, is
satisfied that the party is one who has no money or property sufficient and available
Page12
for food, shelter and basic necessities for himself and his family.
Such authority shall include an exemption from payment of docket and other lawful
fees, and of transcripts of stenographic notes which the court may order to be
furnished him. The amount of the docket and other lawful fees which the indigent was
exempted from paying shall be a lien on any judgment rendered in the case favorable
to the indigent, unless the court otherwise provides. Esmmis
Any adverse party may contest the grant of such authority at any time before
judgment is rendered by the trial court. If the court should determine after hearing that
the party declared as an indigent is in fact a person with sufficient income or property,
the proper docket and other lawful fees shall be assessed and collected by the clerk
of court. If payment is not made within the time fixed by the court, execution shall
issue or the payment thereof, without prejudice to such other sanctions as the court
may impose.
On the other hand, Sec. 18 of Rule 141 prescribes the evidentiary requirements for
the exemption of pauper litigants from payment of legal fees -
Sec. 18. Pauper-litigants exempt from payment of legal fees. - Pauper-litigants (a)
whose gross income and that of their immediate family do not exceed four thousand
(P4,000.00) pesos a month if residing in Metro Manila, and three thousand
(P3,000.00) pesos a month if residing outside Metro Manila, and (b) who do not own
real property with an assessed value of more than fifty thousand (P50,000.00) pesos
shall be exempt from the payment of legal fees. Esmsc
The legal fees shall be a lien on any judgment rendered in the case favorably to the
pauper-litigant, unless the court otherwise provides.
To be entitled to the exemption herein provided, the litigant shall execute an affidavit
that he and his immediate family do not earn the gross income abovementioned, nor
do they own any real property with the assessed value aforementioned, supported by
an affidavit of a disinterested person attesting to the truth of the litigant's affidavit.
Any falsity in the affidavit of a litigant or disinterested person shall be sufficient cause
to strike out the pleading of that party, without prejudice to whatever criminal liability
may have been incurred. Esm
It cannot be inferred from any of the aforementioned provisions that the restrictive
policy enunciated by Sec. 16, Rule 41, of the 1964 Revised Rules of Court was
carried over to the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. Nowhere can we find a provision to
the effect that "(a) petition to be allowed to appeal as pauper shall not be entertained
by the appellate court."
We resolve to apply the present rules on petitioner retrospectively. Statutes regulating
the procedure of the courts will be construed as applicable to actions pending and
undetermined at the time of their passage. In that sense and to that extent procedural
laws are retroactive.[16] We therefore hold that a motion to litigate as an indigent can
be made even before the appellate courts, either for the prosecution of appeals, in
petitions for review or in special civil actions. Jksm
We believe that this interpretation of the present rules is more in keeping with our Bill
of Rights, which decrees that, "(f)ree access to the courts and quasi-judicial bodies
and adequate legal assistance shall not be denied to any person by reason of
poverty."[17] Our espousal of the democratization of appellate remedies is shared by
the United States Supreme Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Hugo L. Black -
There is no meaningful distinction between a rule which would deny the poor the right
to defend themselves in a trial court and one which effectively denies the poor an
adequate appellate review accorded to all who have money enough to pay the costs
in advance x x x x Such a denial is a misfit in a country dedicated to affording equal
justice to all and special privileges to none in the administration of its criminal law.
There can be no equal justice where the kind of trial a man gets depends on the
amount of money he has.[18]
A perusal of the records shows that petitioner has complied with all the evidentiary
requirements for prosecuting a motion to appear in court as a pauper. He has
executed an affidavit attesting to the fact that he and his immediate family do not earn
a gross income of more than P3,000.00 a month, and that their only real property, a
hut, cannot be worth more than P10,000.00.[19] He has also submitted a joint affidavit
executed by Florencia L. Ongtico and Helen Maur, both residents of Butuan City, who
generally attested to the same allegations contained in petitioner's own affidavit.[20]
Based on this evidence, the Court finds that petitioner is qualified to litigate as an
indigent. Chief
WHEREFORE, the questioned Resolution of the Court of Appeals dated 10
November 1997 dismissing the petition for certiorari of petitioner Teofilo Martinez and
its Resolution dated 21 January 1998 denying reconsideration are SET ASIDE for
having been issued with grave abuse of discretion. Accordingly, this case is
REMANDED for appropriate action to the Court of Appeals which is further ordered to
allow petitioner to litigate as pauper and to return to him the amount of P420.00
representing the docket fees he paid.
SO ORDERED.
BERNADETTE L. ADASA vs CECILLE S. ABALOS, G.R. No. 168617,
February 19, 2007
The instant case emanated from the two complaints-affidavits filed by respondent
Cecille S. Abalos on 18 January 2001 before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Iligan
City, against petitioner for Estafa.
Respondent alleged in the complaints-affidavits that petitioner, through deceit,
received and encashed two checks issued in the name of respondent without
respondents knowledge and consent and that despite repeated demands by the latter,
petitioner failed and refused to pay the proceeds of the checks.
On 23 March 2001, petitioner filed a counter-affidavit admitting that she received and
encashed the two checks issued in favor of respondent. In her Supplemental Affidavit
Page12
filed on 29 March 2001, petitioner, however, recanted and alleged instead that it was
a certain Bebie Correa who received the two checks which are the subject matter of
the complaints and encashed the same; and that said Bebie Correa left the country
after misappropriating the proceeds of the checks.
On 25 April 2001, a resolution was issued by the Office of the City Prosecutor of Iligan
City finding probable cause against petitioner and ordering the filing of two separate
Informations for Estafa Thru Falsification of Commercial Document by a Private
Individual, under Article 315 in relation to Articles 171 and 172 of the Revised Penal
Code, as amended.
Consequently, two separate criminal cases were filed against petitioner docketed as
Criminal Cases No. 8781 and No. 8782, raffled to Branches 4 and 5, Regional Trial
Court of Iligan City, respectively. This instant petition pertains only to Criminal Case
No. 8782. On 8 June 2001, upon motion of the petitioner, the trial court in Criminal
Case No. 8782 issued an order directing the Office of the City Prosecutor of Iligan
City to conduct a reinvestigation. After conducting the reinvestigation, the Office of the
City Prosecutor of Iligan City issued a resolution dated 30 August 2001, affirming the
finding of probable cause against petitioner. Meanwhile, during her arraignment on 1
October 2001 in Criminal Case No. 8782, petitioner entered an unconditional plea of
not guilty. Dissatisfied with the finding of the Office of the City Prosecutor of Iligan
City, petitioner filed a Petition for Review before the DOJ on 15 October 2001.
In a Resolution dated 11 July 2002, the DOJ reversed and set aside the 30 August
2001 resolution of the Office of the City Prosecutor of Iligan City and directed the said
office to withdraw the Information for Estafa against petitioner.
The said DOJ resolution prompted the Office of the City Prosecutor of Iligan City to
file a Motion to Withdraw Information on 25 July 2002.
On 26 July 2002, respondent filed a motion for reconsideration of said resolution of
the DOJ arguing that the DOJ should have dismissed outright the petition for review
since Section 7 of DOJ Circular No. 70 mandates that when an accused has already
been arraigned and the aggrieved party files a petition for review before the DOJ, the
Secretary of Justice cannot, and should not take cognizance of the petition, or even
give due course thereto, but instead deny it outright. Respondent claimed Section 12
thereof mentions arraignment as one of the grounds for the dismissal of the petition
for review before the DOJ.
In a resolution dated 30 January 2003, the DOJ denied the Motion for
Reconsideration opining that under Section 12, in relation to Section 7, of DOJ
Circular No. 70, the Secretary of Justice is not precluded from entertaining any appeal
taken to him even where the accused has already been arraigned in court. This is due
to the permissive language may utilized in Section 12 whereby the Secretary has the
discretion to entertain an appealed resolution notwithstanding the fact that the
accused has been arraigned.
Meanwhile, on 27 February 2003, the trial court issued an order granting petitioners
Motion to Withdraw Information and dismissing Criminal Case No. 8782. No action
was taken by respondent or any party of the case from the said order of dismissal.
Aggrieved by the resolution of the DOJ, respondent filed a Petition for Certiorari
before the Court of Appeals. Respondent raised the following issues before the
appellate court:
1. Whether or not the Department of Justice gravely abused its discretion in giving
due course to petitioners petition for review despite its having been filed after the
latter had already been arraigned;
2. Whether or not there is probable cause that the crime of estafa has been committed
and that petitioner is probably guilty thereof;
3. Whether or not the petition before the Court of Appeals has been rendered moot
and academic by the order of the Regional Trial Court dismissing Criminal Case No.
8782.
The Court of Appeals in a Decision dated 21 July 2004 granted respondents petition
and reversed the Resolutions of the DOJ dated 11 July 2002 and 30 January 2003.
In resolving the first issue, the Court of Appeals, relying heavily on Section 7 of DOJ
Circular No. 70 which states [i]f an information has been filed in court pursuant to the
appealed resolution, the petition shall not be given due course if the accused had
already been arraigned, ruled that since petitioner was arraigned before she filed the
petition for review with the DOJ, it was imperative for the DOJ to dismiss such
petition. It added that when petitioner pleaded to the charge, she was deemed to have
waived her right to reinvestigation and right to question any irregularity that surrounds
it.
Anent the second issue, the Court of Appeals declared that the existence of probable
cause or the lack of it, cannot be dealt with by it since factual issues are not proper
subjects of a Petition for Certiorari.
In disposing of the last issue, the Court of Appeals held that the order of the trial court
dismissing the subject criminal case pursuant to the assailed resolutions of the DOJ
did not render the petition moot and academic. It said that since the trial courts order
relied solely on the resolutions of the DOJ, said order is void as it violated the rule
which enjoins the trial court to assess the evidence presented before it in a motion to
dismiss and not to rely solely on the prosecutors averment that the Secretary of
Justice had recommended the dismissal of the case.
Dissatisfied by the Court of Appeals ruling, petitioner filed a Motion for
Reconsideration setting forth the following grounds:
1. that the over-all language of Sections 7 and 12 of Department Circular No.
70 is permissive and directory such that the Secretary of Justice may
entertain an appeal despite the fact that the accused had been arraigned;
2. that the contemporaneous construction by the Secretary of Justice should be
given great weight and respect;
Page12
3. that Section 7 of the Circular applies only to resolutions rendered pursuant to
a preliminary investigation, not on a reinvestigation;

4. that the trial courts order of dismissal of the criminal case has rendered the
instant petition moot and academic;
5. that her arraignment was null and void it being conducted despite her
protestations; and
6. that despite her being arraigned, the supposed waiver of her right to
preliminary investigation has been nullified or recalled by virtue of the trial
courts order of reinvestigation.[4]
The Court of Appeals stood firm by its decision. This time, however, it tried to
construe Section 7 side by side with Section 12 of DOJ Circular No. 70 and attempted
to reconcile these two provisions. According to the appellate court, the phrase shall
not in paragraph two, first sentence of Section 7 of subject circular, to wit:
If an information has been filed in court pursuant to the appealed resolution, the
petition shall not be given due course if the accused had already been arraigned. x x
x. (Emphasis supplied.)
employed in the circular denotes a positive prohibition. Applying the principle in
statutory construction - that when a statute or provision contains words of positive
prohibition, such as shall not, cannot, or ought not or which is couched in negative
terms importing that the act shall not be done otherwise than designated, that statute
or provision is mandatory, thus rendering the provision mandatory it opined that the
subject provision simply means that the Secretary of Justice has no other course of
action but to deny or dismiss a petition before him when arraignment of an accused
had already taken place prior to the filing of the petition for review.
On the other hand, reading Section 12 of the same circular which reads:
The Secretary may reverse, affirm or modify the appealed resolution. He may, motu
proprio or upon motion, dismiss the petition for review on any of the following
grounds:
xxxx
(e) That the accused had already been arraigned when the appeal was taken; x x x.
the Court of Appeals opined that the permissive word may in Section 12 would seem
to imply that the Secretary of Justice has discretion to entertain an appeal
notwithstanding the fact that the accused has been arraigned. This provision should
not be treated separately, but should be read in relation to Section 7. The two
provisions, taken together, simply meant that when an accused was already arraigned
when the aggrieved party files a petition for review, the Secretary of Justice cannot,
and should not take cognizance of the petition, or even give due course thereto, but
instead dismiss or deny it outright. The appellate court added that the word may in
Section 12 should be read as shall or must since such construction is absolutely
necessary to give effect to the apparent intention of the rule as gathered from the
context.
As to the contemporaneous construction of the Secretary of Justice, the Court of
Appeals stated that the same should not be given weight since it was erroneous.
Anent petitioners argument that Section 7 of the questioned circular applies only to
original resolutions that brought about the filing of the corresponding informations in
court, but not to resolutions rendered pursuant to a motion for reinvestigation, the
appellate court simply brushed aside such contention as having no basis in the
circular questioned.
It also rejected petitioners protestation that her arraignment was forced upon her
since she failed to present any evidence to substantiate the same.
It is petitioners contention that despite her being arraigned, the supposed waiver of
her right to preliminary investigation has been nullified by virtue of the trial courts
order or reinvestigation. On this score, the Court of Appeals rebuffed such argument
stating that there was no supposed waiver of preliminary investigation to speak of for
the reason that petitioner had actually undergone preliminary investigation.
Petitioner remained unconvinced with the explanations of the Court of Appeals.
Hence, the instant petition.
Again, petitioner contends that the DOJ can give due course to an appeal or petition
for review despite its having been filed after the accused had already been arraigned.
It asserts that the fact of arraignment of an accused before the filing of an appeal or
petition for review before the DOJ is not at all relevant as the DOJ can still take
cognizance of the appeal or Petition for Review before it. In support of this contention,
petitioner set her sights on the ruling of this Court in Crespo v. Mogul,[5] to wit:
The rule therefore in this jurisdiction is that once a complaint or information is filed in
Court any disposition of the case as to its dismissal or the conviction or acquittal of
the accused rests in the sound discretion of the Court. Although the fiscal retains the
direction and control of the prosecution of criminal cases even while the case is
already in Court he cannot impose his opinion on the trial court. The Court is the best
and sole judge on what to do with the case before it. The determination of the case is
within its exclusive jurisdiction and competence. A motion to dismiss the case filed by
the fiscal should be addressed to the Court who has the option to grant or deny the
same. It does not matter if this is done before or after the arraignment of the accused
or that the motion was filed after a reinvestigation or upon instructions of the
Secretary of Justice who reviewed the records of the investigation. (Emphasis
supplied.)
To bolster her position, petitioner cites Roberts v. Court of Appeals,[6] which stated:
There is nothing in Crespo vs. Mogul which bars the DOJ from taking cognizance of
an appeal, by way of a petition for review, by an accused in a criminal case from an
unfavorable ruling of the investigating prosecutor. It merely advised the DOJ to, as far
as practicable, refrain from entertaining a petition for review or appeal from the action
Page12
of the fiscal, when the complaint or information has already been filed in Court. x x x.
(Emphasis supplied.)
Petitioner likewise invokes Marcelo v. Court of Appeals[7] where this Court declared:
Nothing in the said ruling forecloses the power or authority of the Secretary of Justice
to review resolutions of his subordinates in criminal cases. The Secretary of Justice is
only enjoined to refrain as far as practicable from entertaining a petition for review or
appeal from the action of the prosecutor once a complaint or information is filed in
court. In any case, the grant of a motion to dismiss, which the prosecution may file
after the Secretary of Justice reverses an appealed resolution, is subject to the
discretion of the court.
The Court is unconvinced.
A cursory reading of Crespo v. Mogul reveals that the ruling therein does not concern
the issue of an appeal or petition for review before the DOJ after arraignment. Verily,
the pronouncement therein has to do with the filing of a motion to dismiss and the
courts discretion to deny or grant the same. As correctly pointed out by respondent,
the emphasized portion in the Crespo ruling is a parcel of the entire paragraph which
relates to the duty and jurisdiction of the trial court to determine for itself whether or
not to dismiss a case before it, and which states that such duty comes into play
regardless of whether such motion is filed before or after arraignment and upon
whose instructions. The allusion to the Secretary of Justice as reviewing the records
of investigation and giving instructions for the filing of a motion to dismiss in the cited
ruling does not take into consideration of whether the appeal or petition before the
Secretary of Justice was filed after arraignment. Significantly, in the Crespo case, the
accused had not yet been arraigned when the appeal or petition for review was filed
before the DOJ. Undoubtedly, petitioners reliance on the said case is misplaced.
Also unavailing is petitioners invocation of the cases of Roberts v. Court of Appeals
and Marcelo v. Court of Appeals. As in Crespo v. Mogul, neither Roberts v. Court of
Appeals nor Marcelo v. Court of Appeals took into account of whether the appeal or
petition before the Secretary of Justice was filed after arraignment. Just like in the
Crespo case, the accused in both Roberts v. Court of Appeals and Marcelo v. Court of
Appeals had not yet been arraigned when the appeal or petition for review was filed
before the DOJ.
Moreover, petitioner asserts that the Court of Appeals interpretation of the provisions
of DOJ Circular No. 70 violated three basic rules in statutory construction. First, the
rule that the provision that appears last in the order of position in the rule or regulation
must prevail. Second, the rule that the contemporaneous construction of a statute or
regulation by the officers who enforce it should be given weight. Third, petitioner lifted
a portion from Agpalos Statutory Construction[8] where the word shall had been
construed as a permissive, and not a mandatory language.
The all too-familiar rule in statutory construction, in this case, an administrative rule[9]
of procedure, is that when a statute or rule is clear and unambiguous, interpretation
need not be resorted to.[10] Since Section 7 of the subject circular clearly and
categorically directs the DOJ to dismiss outright an appeal or a petition for review filed
after arraignment, no resort to interpretation is necessary.
Petitioners reliance to the statutory principle that the last in order of position in the rule
or regulation must prevail is not applicable. In addition to the fact that Section 7 of
DOJ Circular No. 70 needs no construction, the cited principle cannot apply because,
as correctly observed by the Court of Appeals, there is no irreconcilable conflict
between Section 7 and Section 12 of DOJ Circular No. 70. Section 7 of the circular
provides:
SECTION 7. Action on the petition. The Secretary of Justice may dismiss the petition
outright if he finds the same to be patently without merit or manifestly intended for
delay, or when the issues raised therein are too unsubstantial to require
consideration. If an information has been filed in court pursuant to the appealed
resolution, the petition shall not be given due course if the accused had already been
arraigned. Any arraignment made after the filing of the petition shall not bar the
Secretary of Justice from exercising his power of review. (Italics supplied.)
On the other hand, Section 12 of the same circular states:
SECTION 12. Disposition of the Appeal. The Secretary may reverse, affirm or modify
the appealed resolution. He may, motu proprio or upon motion, dismiss the petition for
review on any of the following grounds:
(a) That the petition was filed beyond the period prescribed in Section 3 hereof;
(b) That the procedure or any of the requirements herein provided has not been
complied with;
(c) That there is no showing of any reversible error;
(d) That the appealed resolution is interlocutory in nature, except when it
suspends the proceedings based on the alleged existence of a prejudicial
question;
(e) That the accused had already been arraigned when the appeal was taken;
(f) That the offense has already prescribed; and
(g) That other legal or factual grounds exist to warrant a dismissal. (Emphases
supplied.)
It is noteworthy that the principle cited by petitioner reveals that, to find application,
the same presupposes that one part of the statute cannot be reconciled or
harmonized with another part without nullifying one in favor of the other. In the instant
case, however, Section 7 is neither contradictory nor irreconcilable with Section 12.
As can be seen above, Section 7 pertains to the action on the petition that the DOJ
must take, while Section 12 enumerates the options the DOJ has with regard to the
disposition of a petition for review or of an appeal.
As aptly observed by respondent, Section 7 specifically applies to a situation on what
the DOJ must do when confronted with an appeal or a petition for review that is either
clearly without merit, manifestly intended to delay, or filed after an accused has
already been arraigned, i.e., he may dismiss it outright if it is patently without merit or
Page12
manifestly intended to delay, or, if it was filed after the acccused has already been
arraigned, the Secretary shall not give it due course.
Section 12 applies generally to the disposition of an appeal. Under said section, the
DOJ may take any of four actions when disposing an appeal, namely:
1. reverse the appealed resolution;
2. modify the appealed resolution;
3. affirm the appealed resolution;
4. dismiss the appeal altogether, depending on the circumstances and
incidents attendant thereto.
As to the dismissal of a petition for review or an appeal, the grounds are provided for
in Section 12 and, consequently, the DOJ must evaluate the pertinent circumstances
and the facts of the case in order to determine which ground or grounds shall apply.
Thus, when an accused has already been arraigned, the DOJ must not give the
appeal or petition for review due course and must dismiss the same. This is bolstered
by the fact that arraignment of the accused prior to the filing of the appeal or petition
for review is set forth as one of the grounds for its dismissal. Therefore, in such
instance, the DOJ, noting that the arraignment of an accused prior to the filing of an
appeal or petition for review is a ground for dismissal under Section 12, must go back
to Section 7 and act upon as mandated therein. In other words, the DOJ must not give
due course to, and must necessarily dismiss, the appeal.
Likewise, petitioners reliance on the principle of contemporary construction, i.e., the
DOJ is not precluded from entertaining appeals where the accused had already been
arraigned, because it exercises discretionary power, and because it promulgated itself
the circular in question, is unpersuasive. As aptly ratiocinated by the Court of Appeals:
True indeed is the principle that a contemporaneous interpretation or construction by
the officers charged with the enforcement of the rules and regulations it promulgated
is entitled to great weight by the court in the latters construction of such rules and
regulations. That does not, however, make such a construction necessarily controlling
or binding. For equally settled is the rule that courts may disregard contemporaneous
construction in instances where the law or rule construed possesses no ambiguity,
where the construction is clearly erroneous, where strong reason to the contrary
exists, and where the court has previously given the statute a different interpretation.
If through misapprehension of law or a rule an executive or administrative officer
called upon to implement it has erroneously applied or executed it, the error may be
corrected when the true construction is ascertained. If a contemporaneous
construction is found to be erroneous, the same must be declared null and void. Such
principle should be as it is applied in the case at bar.[11]
Petitioners posture on a supposed exception to the mandatory import of the word
shall is misplaced. It is petitioners view that the language of Section 12 is permissive
and therefore the mandate in Section 7 has been transformed into a matter within the
discretion of the DOJ. To support this stance, petitioner cites a portion of Agpalos
Statutory Construction which reads:
For instance, the word shall in Section 2 of Republic Act 304 which states that banks
or other financial institutions owned or controlled by the Government shall, subject to
availability of funds xxx, accept at a discount at not more than two per centum for ten
years such (backpay) certificate implies not a mandatory, but a discretionary, meaning
because of the phrase subject to availability of funds. Similarly, the word shall in the
provision to the effect that a corporation violating the corporation law shall, upon such
violation being proved, be dissolved by quo warranto proceedings has been
construed as may.[12]
After a judicious scrutiny of the cited passage, it becomes apparent that the same is
not applicable to the provision in question. In the cited passage, the word shall
departed from its mandatory import connotation because it was connected to certain
provisos/conditions: subject to the availability of funds and upon such violation being
proved. No such proviso/condition, however, can be found in Section 7 of the subject
circular. Hence, the word shall retains its mandatory import.
At this juncture, the Court of Appeals disquisition in this matter is enlightening:
Indeed, if the intent of Department Circular No. 70 were to give the Secretary of
Justice a discretionary power to dismiss or to entertain a petition for review despite its
being outrightly dismissible, such as when the accused has already been arraigned,
or where the crime the accused is being charged with has already prescribed, or there
is no reversible error that has been committed, or that there are legal or factual
grounds warranting dismissal, the result would not only be incongruous but also
irrational and even unjust. For then, the action of the Secretary of Justice of giving
due course to the petition would serve no purpose and would only allow a great waste
of time. Moreover, to give the second sentence of Section 12 in relation to its
paragraph (e) a directory application would not only subvert the avowed objectives of
the Circular, that is, for the expeditious and efficient administration of justice, but
would also render its other mandatory provisions - Sections 3, 5, 6 and 7, nugatory.
[13]
In her steadfast effort to champion her case, petitioner contends that the issue as to
whether the DOJ rightfully entertained the instant case, despite the arraignment of the
accused prior to its filing, has been rendered moot and academic with the order of
dismissal by the trial court dated 27 February 2003. Such contention deserves scant
consideration.
It must be stressed that the trial court dismissed the case precisely because of the
Resolutions of the DOJ after it had, in grave abuse of its discretion, took cognizance
of the petition for review filed by petitioner. Having been rendered in grave abuse of
its discretion, the Resolutions of the DOJ are void. As the order of dismissal of the trial
court was made pursuant to the void Resolutions of the DOJ, said order was likewise
void. The rule in this jurisdiction is that a void judgment is a complete nullity and
without legal effect, and that all proceedings or actions founded thereon are
themselves regarded as invalid and ineffective for any purpose.[14] That respondent
did not file a motion for reconsideration or appeal from the dismissal order of the trial
Page12
court is of no moment. Since the dismissal was void, there was nothing for respondent
to oppose.
Petitioner further asserts that Section 7 of DOJ Circular No. 70 applies only to appeals
from original resolution of the City Prosecutor and does not apply in the instant case
where an appeal is interposed by petitioner from the Resolution of the City Prosecutor
denying her motion for reinvestigation. This claim is baseless.
A reading of Section 7 discloses that there is no qualification given by the same
provision to limit its application to appeals from original resolutions and not to
resolutions on reinvestigation. Hence, the rule stating that when the law does not
distinguish, we must not distinguish[15] finds application in this regard.
Petitioner asserts that her arraignment was null and void as the same was
improvidently conducted. Again, this contention is without merit. Records reveal that
petitioners arraignment was without any restriction, condition or reservation.[16] In
fact she was assisted by her counsels Atty. Arthur Abudiente and Atty. Maglinao when
she pleaded to the charge.[17]
Moreover, the settled rule is that when an accused pleads to the charge, he is
deemed to have waived the right to preliminary investigation and the right to question
any irregularity that surrounds it.[18] This precept is also applicable in cases of
reinvestigation as well as in cases of review of such reinvestigation. In this case,
when petitioner unconditionally pleaded to the charge, she effectively waived the
reinvestigation of the case by the prosecutor as well as the right to appeal the result
thereof to the DOJ Secretary. Thus, with the arraignment of the petitioner, the DOJ
Secretary can no longer entertain the appeal or petition for review because petitioner
had already waived or abandoned the same.
Lastly, while there is authority[19] permitting the Court to make its own determination
of probable cause, such, however, cannot be made applicable in the instant case. As
earlier stated, the arraignment of petitioner constitutes a waiver of her right to
preliminary investigation or reinvestigation. Such waiver is tantamount to a finding of
probable cause. For this reason, there is no need for the Court to determine the
existence or non-existence of probable cause.
Besides, under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, only questions of law may be raised in,
and be subject of, a petition for review on certiorari since this Court is not a trier of
facts. This being the case, this Court cannot review the evidence adduced by the
parties before the prosecutor on the issue of the absence or presence of probable
cause.[20]
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 21
July 2004 and its Resolution dated 10 June 2005 in CA-G.R. SP No. 76396 are
AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
Loyola Grand Villas Homeowners (South) Association Inc. vs CA, GR 117188
August 7, 1997
Facts:
Loyola Grand Villas Homeowners Association (LGVHAI) was organized as the
association of homeowners and residents of the Loyola Grand Villas. It was registered
with the Home Financing Corporation, the predecessor Home Insurance and
Guaranty Corporation (HIGC), as the sole homeowners' organization in the
subdivision. It was organized by the developer and its first president was Soliven,
himself the owner of the developer. However, LGVHAI did not file its corporate by-
laws. Sometime in 1988, the officers of the LGVHAI tried to register its by-laws. They
failed to do so. To their consternation, they discovered that there were two other
organizations within the subdivision, a LGVHAI North, and a LGVHAI South
Association. In July1989, when Soliven inquired about the status of LGVHAI, the head
of the legal dept. of the HIGC, informed him that LGVHAI had been automatically
dissolved for two reasons: First, it did not submit its by-laws within the period required
by the Corporation Code and, second, there was non-user of corporate charter
because HIGC had not received any report on the association's activities. These
developments prompted the officers of the LGVHAI to lodge a complaint with the
HIGC. They questioned the revocation of LGVHAI's certificate of registration without
due notice and hearing and concomitantly prayed for the cancellation of the North and
South Associations by reason of the earlier issuance of a certificate of registration in
favor of LGVHAI. After due notice and hearing, LGVHAI obtained a favorable ruling
from HIGC recognizing them as the duly registered and existing homeowners
association, and declared the North and South Associations as revoked or cancelled,
among others. The South Association appealed to the Appeals Board which
dismissed the appeal for lack of merit. The South Association in turn appealed to the
Court of Appeals. However the Court of Appeals affirmed the Resolution. The South
Association filed the petition for review on certiorari.
Issue:
WON failure by LGVHAI to file its by-laws within the period prescribed by Section 46
of the Corporation Code had the effect of automatically dissolving the said
corporation.
Ruling:
No. Section 46 reveals the legislative intent to attach a directory, and not mandatory,
meaning for the word ''must" in the first sentence thereof. The second paragraph of
the law which allows the filing of by-law seven prior to incorporation. This provision in
the same section of the Code rules out mandatory compliance with the requirement of
filing the by-laws, within 1month after receipt of official notice of the issuance of its
certificate of incorporation by the SEC." It necessarily follows that failure to file the by-
laws within that period does not imply the "demise" of the corporation. Nonetheless,
failure to file them within the period required by law by no means tolls the automatic
dissolution of a corporation.
Page12