MAIBDigest

The latest Marine Accident Investigation Branch (MAIB) Safety Digest suggests that
the human element is one consistent contributory factor in accidents.

In the report, which can be downloaded in full here, Steve Clinch, Chief Inspector of
Marine Accidents at MAIB said:

Investigations into marine accidents consistently identify cases where mariners

chose to ignore the instructions and guidance contained in companies safety
management systems. The root cause for this is often complex, but MAIB
investigators regularly identify a disconnect between the safety culture that shore-
based managers believe (or perhaps hope) is in place within their fleet and what is
really happening on board.

Cases 1, 11 and 16, which can be read in the report, are good examples of this, he
says. A strong safety culture is not something that will appear by magic, it takes
hard work and commitment particularly from senior managers ashore and afloat.

Safety management systems need to evolve over time if they are to remain
credible. If the procedures on board your vessel are not working, dont just use
convenient work arounds to get tasks done flag up the problem and make sure
they are changed or amended in a controlled way that ensures the system retains
its credibility and continues to reflect the companys best practice requirements.

In the digest, Captain John Rose, Director of the Confidential Hazardous Incident
Reporting Program (CHIRP) highlights the importance of crews ability to deal
effectively and safely with the complexity, difficulty, pressures and workload of
their daily tasks, not only in emergency situations, but also during routine
operations.

Crewmembers and the ships superintendents should ask themselves, What is

normal on board our ships? In one case it was to sail on a routine basis with
inadequate stability! In others there appeared to be no risk assessments
undertaken and an absence of a management of change process, said Rose
highlighting accidents cited in the report.

Seafarers now undertake mandatory training in resource management, leadership

and team working skills at an operational level, then leadership and managerial
skills at management levels. So why do we still read about masters demonstrating
rule-breaking behaviours and equally, not being challenged by the officers?

"Navigation and collision avoidance aside, the officer of the watch (OOW) also
needs to be available to respond to emergencies such as fire, machinery breakdown
and man overboard. In one case reported in the Safety Digest, the OOW was not on
the bridge for 20 minutes.

The OOW is required to maintain a continuous watch on the bridge for good
reasons, said Rose.

Source: Marine Accident Investigation Branch Safety Digest