Académique Documents
Professionnel Documents
Culture Documents
Daniel R. Alvarez
Department of Religious Studies, Florida International University
Introduction
In Beyond Existentialism and Zen: Religion in a Pluralistic World,1 George Rupp, for-
merly a professor and then dean of Harvard Divinity School in the early 1980s and
currently president of Columbia University, has articulated a model for understand-
ing religious pluralism that has been either unduly neglected or simply dismissed in
the literature. In fact, with a couple of exceptions Rupp's work was uniformly bashed
by reviewers of the book. In this essay I will argue that Rupp's model represents a
powerful and provocative Hegelian alternative to the inclusivist (most prominently,
Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan's and John Hick's) or exclusivist (most recently, Mortimer
Adler's and Alvin Plantinga's) models that dominate the contemporary literature, and
that far from being inadequate, confused, or immature (a few of the words evoked by
some of the reviews), it is a coherent and plausible typological approach to the prob-
lems and questions raised by our radically pluralistic situation. Most significantly,
perhaps, is the fact that Rupp's model combines some of the perceived virtues of
the exclusivist approach with a ``critical relativism'' that accommodates the strengths
of inclusivism.
Regardless of any real or perceived failings on his part, I hope that my analysis of
Rupp's model will convince the reader that Rupp's contribution is worth revisiting
and taking seriously. I also hope that it will become evident that, as far as I can see,
nothing like it is to be found in the literature; Rupp's model stands to date as a
unique and distinctive contribution to our understanding of religious pluralism. Al-
though my own approach will in the end reject both the Kantian (Hick's) and the
Hegelian model proffered by Rupp in favor of a more radically relativistic perspec-
tive, I acknowledge in the pages that follow my indebtedness to Rupp's approach
and the stimulus it provided this author in his own efforts to make sense of our cur-
rent religious situation.
Theologians would therefore do well to dust off their copies of Beyond Existen-
tialism and Zen and Christologies and Cultures,2 his major works in theology to date,
and pause before Rupp's intriguing and challenging formulations on their way to
what they suppose, perhaps prematurely, to be the greener pastures of postmodern
theologies. What Rupp has to offer to the serious reader is not necessarily a system-
atic alternative or model for the way we do theology or view religious truth, although
he most assuredly offers that. But he also offersand here is where engaging Rupp's
thought has proved most fecunda point of departure, a summons, and a dare to
Philosophy East & West Volume 55, Number 2 April 2005 153178 153
> 2005 by University of Hawai`i Press
reflect intensely and deeply about issues that come into sharper focus when con-
fronted by a forceful, systematic, audacious, and mature reflection.
What follows is an examination of two topics discussed by Rupp in his Beyond
Existentialism and Zen that I take to be the heart of Rupp's argument. In the first part,
I deal with what Rupp calls at one point ``the truth of Zen''; in the second part, I com-
pare and contrast what I consider to be two very different approaches to the question
of religious pluralism offered by Beyond Existentialism and Zen; the third part devel-
ops and defends in more detail one of the approaches to pluralism discussed in part
2. Part 1 is primarily a critique of Rupp's version of the truth of Zen, followed by the
presentation of a constructive solution, from a self-consciously naturalistic perspec-
tive, to tensions and concerns raised by Rupp's discussion. In a preliminary way I
would say that I put much more emphasis on the role of human action and give a
more negative appraisal of the cosmos than Rupp offers. In part 2 I defend a version
of relativism in principle, which, I will argue, is implicit in Rupp's book, whether
or not Rupp's intended view reflects this interpretation. Although each part is techni-
cally independent of the others, the constructive solution in part 1 anticipates a natu-
ralized theology consistent with and complementary to the approach to pluralism
introduced in part 2 and defended in part 3, although this approach, far from accord-
ing to naturalism a privileged or neutral status, relativizes the naturalistic metaphys-
ics to which this author is committed.
Rupp's book is about God and religious pluralism, perhaps the two most hotly con-
tested issues of our times. It is an attempt to say what we mean by ``God'' from the
perspective of contemporary experience, and to propose criteria by which we can
adjudicate the adequacy or validity of different approaches to ``the God question''
within and across individual religious traditions. The most arresting aspect of Rupp's
book is the casting of his analysis and argument in terms of ideal types or ``systematic
alternatives.'' Although fully aware of its limitations (p. 37), I agree with Rupp's judg-
ment that typological analysis is useful in ferreting out and identifying systematic
commitments and tendencies across religious traditions, facilitating comparisons
among religious worldviews that would otherwise prove impractical or impossible.
In parts 2 and 3 of this essay I focus on the implications of Rupp's typological anal-
ysis for religious pluralism. Part 1 will focus on the type that Rupp believes, first, is
able both to overcome the deficiencies inherent in the others and to incorporate
their strengths and, second, expresses or captures the nature of ultimate reality
(``self's ultimate environment'') more adequately than the other typological alterna-
tives, namely the Third or Hegel type.
On pages 34 and 35 of Beyond Existentialism and Zen Rupp writes:
The equivalent in the ``modern'' situation of the traditional question of God is . . . the
query as to the nature of or character of the self's ultimate environment conceived as
continuous with life in the present rather than as another reality complete and perfect
[t]he perspective which not only affirms with existentialism that constructive human
action to create meaning and value is possible but also agrees with Zen that the self's ul-
timate environment is hospitable toward and supportive of this activity. . . . [I]t sees value
being realized not only through individual human action but also through ongoing natu-
ral and cultural development. (p. 47; emphasis mine)
My primary concern is not with what Rupp says above about existentialism but
with what he affirms about what he elsewhere calls ``the truth of Zen'' (p. 77). The
essential feature of the Zen perspective that Rupp incorporates in the Third type is its
thesis that the ``self's ultimate environment is hospitable and supportive'' of the activ-
ity of ``human action to create meaning and value.'' By ``ultimate environment'' Rupp
means both the natural and cultural order (as his own gloss indicates), although,
since the cultural order is principally the product of human action, Rupp probably
intends the natural order as the primary meaning of this term. The other expressions
that Rupp uses as synonymous with ``ultimate environment'' (namely, ``structure of
the real'' [p. 63], ``ultimate ontological context'' [p. 86], and ``cosmos'' [p. 54]) cer-
tainly suggest the natural order as the intended and primary referent.
What Rupp means by ``hospitable'' is, perhaps, clear enough. By ``hospitable'' I
presume that he means that the planet Earth contains all the ingredients and condi-
tions necessary for the emergence and survival, from among a rich variety of life
forms, of the human species.5 Furthermore, the cosmos provides an adequate con-
text wherein humankind can fulfill much more than its natural needs, that is, a con-
text that makes possible the realization of characteristically (as far as we can tell)
not only human knowing but also the ultimate object of knowledge [God, ultimate real-
ity, the cosmos] are in the process of development. . . . Indeed, the central means through
which the absolute attains its ends is human activity. . . . The actions of finite spirit are, in
short, constitutive of the activity of infinite or absolute spirit. (pp. 5960)
Since the Enlightenment, it has become incredible to us that human beings are
passive spectators in a cosmic-historical drama in which God, as an extra-mundane
In the early pages of Beyond Existentialism and Zen Rupp sums up the distinctive
feature of his approach to the question of religious pluralism in the following way:
``The approach . . . which I am proposing is not, then, one which attempts to unify
all possible perspectives. Nor does it simply pronounce them all equally valid''
(p. 15). In the pages that follow I want to argue that Rupp's presentation of his
approach can be read in a way that yields not one but two distinct and incompatible
approaches. One approach I will call Hegelian-Peircian; the other, lacking a satisfac-
tory label, I will provisionally dub Jamesian. Although these two approaches are
coherent in themselves, only the latter is faithful to the conception of religious plu-
ralism implicit in Rupp's summary statement. I will argue further that only the James-
ian approach squares with our intuitions about what a genuine pluralistic stance
ought to entail, intuitions that Rupp's penetrating typological analysis does much to
clarify and confirm.
There are two features of Beyond Existentialism and Zen that need to be consid-
ered first, since they provide the scaffolding that makes possible and intelligible what
For the sake of convenience I will call this aspect of Rupp's typology prescrip-
tive. Rupp does not use this word, but the statement just quoted unambiguously sug-
gests it. This prescriptive aspect is foreshadowed by the discussion of norms for
appraising alternatives in the first part of the book. By prescriptive, or the prescriptive
use of the typology, I mean Rupp's design to use his typology to recommend, as he
puts it, the particular typological alternative that he advocates. This dimension intro-
duces (or, rather, reveals) a further measure of complexity in the types outlined. Al-
though the Zen and the Existentialist types have, Rupp would argue, instances in at
least two religious traditions, the Third or Hegel type, being a synthesis of the fa-
in contrast to the product resulting from a process of syncretism, each tradition will con-
tinue to exemplify an integrity of its own because any modifications are reinterpretations
or adaptations of its own images, conceptions and practices. (p. 22; emphasis mine)
Hence, for Rupp, the central issue for reflective believers or devotees is not so
much which tradition they should choose as it is to which of the alternatives within
a given tradition they should commit themselves (p. 18; emphasis mine).
In other words, the point is not deciding which world religion is the ``true'' one,
but, rather, discerning and advancing those elements of the tradition one finds one-
self in that exemplify the characteristics of the Third type. It is important to notice
how this way of reading Rupp's conception of religious truth or validity is not incon-
sistent with his claim that not all perspectives or traditions are ``equally valid.'' In
fact, many traditions may turn out to be false (invalid, inadequate) insofar as they
fail to realize the features of the Third type; but this is entirely compatible with saying
that more than one may turn out to be valid.
Although Rupp would be willing to grant that different perspectives may have to
be considered as equally true, there are hints in Beyond Existentialism and Zen that
for him they are so only provisionally. It is at this point that what I have called the
Hegelian-Peircian view of truth insinuates itself. Truth proper is the property of the
most comprehensive vision or conception of reality. Different perspectives have at
best a partial grasp of reality, and some may be considered more adequate than
others. But it would be a mistake to consider any of them true in the full sense of
this word.
This further dimension of Rupp's understanding of religious truth is suggested by
certain remarks. In an early passage of the book, he writes:
[B]ecause the various partial and incomplete perspectives are attempts at grasping or
comprehending the one reality there is, it is possible to make judgments as to their mea-
sure of validity. . . . [T]he reality towards which claims of truth are directed is not by def-
inition completely inaccessible. . . . (p. 9)
Reflection on Rupp's discussion of the Third type makes one thing obvious: the
features of the Third type by which we are to judge the validity of different traditions
On pages 1618 of Beyond Existentialism and Zen Rupp discusses what appear to
be two criteria of adequacy that every religious perspective must satisfy if, in the lan-
guage of the preceding reflection, it is to be ``valid'': (1) adequacy to tradition and (2)
adequacy to contemporary experience. Rupp adds, however, that ``[t]he last court of
appeal for adjudicating both forms of appeal is the arena . . . of concrete historical
developments.'' ``In the end,'' he continues,
The application of these two criteria of adequacy does not happen ``internally''
any longer; internal appraisals are what the new status quo has made impossible, at
least for serious theologians. Furthermore, as theologians think about the great ques-
tions and answers posed by their religious traditions in the context of voices and
points of view outside their own particular tradition, and as their contemporary ex-
perience becomes to an increasing degree shaped by transcultural forces and influ-
ences, it is inevitable that theological reflection will be pushed in the direction of
greater and greater comprehensiveness or universality. But this phenomenon in turn
forces reinterpretations of one's tradition that may not have been present or implicit
in it.
At this point the question arises as to where, in Rupp's view, things will lead.
One direction that immediately comes to mind is syncretism, or the development
of a universal religion. As discussed in the previous section, Rupp dismisses syncre-
tism, although, he goes on to say, one can, through dialogue,
assume that alterations in the direction of greater comprehensiveness will increase the
measure of common ground which different traditions share. . . . [I]n contrast to the prod-
uct resulting from a process of syncretism, each tradition will continue to exemplify an
Notes