Outline for CIVIL

Persons and Family Relations

> My Advice: Stick With the Codal. Just master the FAMILY CODE and you're safe!

> Know the difference between JURIDICAL CAPACITY and CAPACITY TO ACT.

> Master the Essential and Formal Requisites of Marriage.

> Read Cases: Some of the Cases that might be helpful for you are the following:

1. Tenebro vs. CA- talks about prejudicial question.

2. Republic vs. CA and Molina - The Landmark case on Psychological Incapacity

3. Chi Ming Tsoi vs CA- One of the rare cases so far that Psychological Incapacity of one of the couples is
sustained by the Supreme Court

Presumption of marriage even without record- Balogbog vs. CA, 269 SCRA 259
(1997)

Reappearance of the spouse declared presumptively dead- SSS vs. Bailon, G.R.
No. 165545, March 24, 2006

ADOPTION

Consent of Biological parents in adoption indispensable Diwata Ramos

Landingin vs. Republic G.R. No. 164948, June 27, 2006

Consent to be given by guardian if consent of parent cannot be obtained-

Diwata Ramos Landingin vs. Republic(supra.)

RA 8552- DOMESTIC ADOPTION ACT

RA 8043-INTER-COUNTRY ADOPTION ACT

FILIATION

Birth Certificate as proof of filiation Angeles vs Maglara G.R. No.

153798, September 2, 2005

Birth Certificate must be signed jointly by the mother and father or by the mother
alone if the father refuses- Reyes vs. CA (135 SCRA 439- 1985)

Presumption of legitimacy of a child, when sexual intercourse during marriage

was not disproved- Concepcio vs. CA, et al. G.R. No. 123450, August 31, 2005
RA 9255- AN ACT ALLOWING ILLEGITIMATE CHILDREN TO USE THEIR FATHER'S
SURNAME

RA 8972- SOLO PARENTS ACT

> SAMPLE CASE DIGESTS IN PROPERTY RELATIONS

BETWEEN HUSBAND AND WIFE

DONATIONS (ARTICLE 82-87)

1. DONATION PROPTER NUPTIAS>> SERRANO V. SOLOMON [105 P 998

(1959)]- Before the marriage, the future husband executed a purported donation propter
nuptias which provides that (1) he donates all his properties to his future children, if any;
or (2) if there are none and he dies before his wife, one-half of his properties and those
acquired during the marriage shall go to his brothers and sisters; or (3) if there are no
children and his wife dies before him, one half of all his properties and those acquired
during the marriage shall go TO THOSE WHO REARED HIS WIFE (plaintiff). The wife
predeceased him and plaintiff filed an action to enforce the donation. There is no valid
donation propter nuptias. While the donation was made before the marriage, it was not
made in consideration of marriage, because marriage was not the only consideration for
the donation since other conditions were imposed; and even if in consideration of the
marriage, it was not in favor of one or both of the spouses, but IN FAVOR OF 3Ps or
persons other than the spouses. It is not a valid donation inter vivos because it was not
accepted by the donee in the same or a different instrument. It is not a donation mortis
causa because it did not comply with the formalities of wills. Hence, the donation is void.

Mateo v. Lagua

A donation propter nuptias may be revoked for being inofficious. It is wrong to say that a
donation propter nuptias has an onerous consideration, the marriage in this case being
merely the occasion or motive, not the causa. Being liberalities, they remain subject to
reduction for being inofficious upon the donor's death if it infringes on the legitime of any
of the donor's heirs. The DPN in this case was not annuled in its entirety, but only to the
extent that it infringed on the legitime of the donor's heir.

Note that under Art 43(3), a donation is revoked by operation of law, under the
circumstances therein provided. However, Art. 86(1) provides that any revocation in
elective, not automatic.

SOLIS V. BARROSO [53 P 912 (1928)] -A donation propter nuptias of lands in a private
instrument is not valid because the law requires donations of real property to be made in a
public instrument. A donation propter nuptias is not onerous and thus must necessarily be
contained in a public instrument. While the marriage is indeed its consideration it is not so
in the sense of being necessary to give birth to the obligation. In fact, a donation propter
nuptias remains valid even if the marriage does not take place provided it is not revoked
within the period allowed by law. The marriage in donation propter nuptias is rather a
resolutory condition which as such presupposes the existence of the birth of the obligation.

2. COMMON LAW MARRIAGES

Matabuena v. Cervantes

The prohibition regarding donations made between spouses during the marriage must
apply likewise to a common-law relationship. The policy behind the law, i.e. to protect the
would-be donor spouse from the exercise of undue and improper pressure and influence
by the other spouse, is equally or even more applicable to the case of common-law
relationships.

3. VOID DONATIONS

NAZARENO V. BIROG [45 O.G. No. 5, p. 268 (1947)] - A donation made to a grandchild of a
wife by a previous marriage falls under the prohibition Article 133 of the Civil Code (Art. 87,
FC). Said prohibition applies notwithstanding the fact that the provision mentions only legitimate
children. (9 Manresa 236).

SYSTEM OF ABSOLUTE COMMUNITY OF PROPERTY

1. CHARGES UPON ACP.

Luzon Surety vs. De Garcia

Any debt contracted by the husband-administrator with the intention of binding

the community property, must redound to the community property's benefit. Any obligation
incurred by the husband to be chargeable against the community property, must be incurred
in the legitimate pursuit of his career, profession, business, and with an honest belief that
he is doing right for the benefit of the family.

Gelano vs. CA

It was an error for the court to hold the spouses liable jointly and severally on an
obligation that redounded to the benefit of the community. The community partnership, as
a single and separate entity, should be liable for the obligation.

G-tractors vs. CA
 The obligation incurred here redounded to the benefit of the community
partnership, and thus was a partnership obligation. The land where the logging concession
was located belonged to the family and not to the husband exclusively. Furthermore, the
obligation was incurred to enhance productivity for the logging business, a commercial
enterprise for gain, which the husband, as administrator had every right to enter into on
behalf of the community partnership. The realization of actual profits and benefit on the
part of the partnership is not required, it being sufficient to show that the transaction
normally benefits the partnership.

CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP OF GAINS

1. ARTICLE 108

Ansaldo vs. Sheriff

The bank accounts garnished herein were conjugal property and the same may not be
levied upon to pay for personal obligations. The money in the bank accounts were earned as
fruits derived from paraphernal property. As such, they became assets of the conjugal
partnership. No proof was shown here that the obligations were contracted for the benefit of the
partnership. Furthermore, the sheriff may not levy on 1/2 of the amount in these accounts as the
supposed share of the husband. A spouse's share in the conjugal assets is merely inchoate and
cannot be determined until after dissolution of the partnership.

2. ARTICLE 109

Castillo vs. Pasco

The fishpond is 1/6 paraphernal and 5/6 conjugal. The first P1000 was paid out of the
paraphernal property of the wife. Of this amount, P600 was a debt owed to the wife by the
vendor. It is presumed that this debt could bind only the wife since there was no showing that
the husband authorized the wife to contract this debt. The P400 was paid out of proceeds from
the sale of the wife's paraphernal property. The rest of the purchase price was paid out of
partnership funds. The fact that the loan entered into to pay this purchase price was secured by
mortgages over paraphernal property belonging to the wife did not make these obligations
(loans) paraphernal. The mortgage was merely an accessory obligation. The principal obligation
which is the loan pertained to the conjugal partnership.

NOTES:
paraphernal property: exclusive property of the wife
capital: exclusive property of the husband.

The owner has absolute dominion over his separate property.

With regard to separate property, the owner spouse may sue alone. With regard to the fruits of
such separate property, since the same belongs to the partnership, both spouses must join in ini-
tiating suit.
e.g. In a case where the separate property is being leased out...the owner spouse may sue alone
for eviction, but must be joined by the other spouse in a suit over rentals.

3. ARTICLE 110

Ong vs. CA

The mere use of the surname of the husband in the tax declaration of the subject
property is not sufficient proof that said property was acquired during the marriage and is
therefore conjugal. It is undisputed that the subject parcel of land was declared solely in the
wife's name, although the house built thereon was declared in the name of the spouses. Under
such circumstances, the Court held that the subject lot was the paraphernal property of the wife
and thus liable for her personal debts.

4. ARTICLE 111

Palanca vs. Smith Bell

When a loan is negotiated by a husband upon property belonging to his wife, with the
consent of the latter, the money becomes conjugal property, and if the funds are later invested in
the construction of a house, the building is likewise conjugal property and is liable for debts of
the husband. The property in question was a parcel of land belonging to the wife which was
given by the husband as a guaranty for a loan contracted by him. The money obtained through
the loan was later used for the construction of the house.

Balane: The proceeds of the loan pertain to the borrower. The borrower in this case was the
partnership, regardless of the fact that the separate property of the wife was used as a security in
obtaining the loan.

5. ARTICLE 116

Torela vs. Torela

While it is true that all property acquired during the marriage is presumed to be
conjugal, as above stated, nonetheless, the party who invokes the presumption must first prove
that the property was acquired during the marriage. This proof is a condition sine qua non for the
application of the presumption.

Mendoza vs. Reyes

The presumption of conjugality is a strong one. Proof of acquisition of the property in

dispute during the marriage suffices to render the statutory presumption operative.
Magallon vs. Montejo

The presumption of conjugality does not apply in a case where there is no proof of
marriage between the spouses.

6. ARTICLE 117

Cheesman vs. IAC

Even if the wife used conjugal funds to purchase the lot in question, petitioner, who is
an alien, cannot recover or hold the lot so acquired in view of the constitutional prohibition
against aliens acquiring residential lots other than by hereditary succession. He therefore had no
personality to question the subsequent sale of the same property by his wife on the theory that in
so doing, he is merely exercising the prerogative of a husband in respect to conjugal property. To
sustain such a theory would permit indirect controversion of the constitutional prohibition.

Under 117.1, where conjugal funds were spent, then the property acquired belongs to the
partnership

except: 109.3 (pacto de retro acquisition where the right to redemption belongs to one spouse)

7. ARTICLE 118

Notes: in case of property bought on installment, partly from exclusive property and partly
from conjugal funds, the test to determine ownership is to look at when ownership vested.

If ownership vested before marriage, then the property is exclusive

if ownership vested after marriage, then property is conjugal.

e.g.
1985 - A buys property from BF payable in installments...A pays installments with
exclusive property
1990 - A marries B. The subsequent amortizations on the property are then paid with
conjugal funds.

Test: when title was vested.

if title was vested before 1990, then the property is exclusive.
if title was vested only after full payment of amortizations, then the property is conjugal.

8. ARTICLE 119 NOTES

Test of when is payment due.

Suppose: A lent P1M to B

in the promissory note, it is stipulated that payment shall be on 100 equal monthly
installments and that interest shall be at 20% p.a.
payments start on Oct 1985
A marries B in August 1986

all installments due before August 1986 are paraphernal

for installments due after August 1986:
principal is exclusive property
interest during the marriage pertain to the partnership...
already civil fruits.

9. ARTICLE 120

Caltex vs. Felias

A lot belonging to the parents and later donated by them to their daughter is
paraphernal property, and the rule applicable with respect to the building constructed
thereon before the donation is that of accessory following the principal. The donation
transmitted to her the rights of a landowner over a building constructed on it.

Padilla vs. Padilla

The mere construction of a building from common funds does not automatically
convey the ownership of the wife's land (paraphernal) to the conjugal partnership. The
ownership of the land is retained by the wife until she is paid the value of the lot as a result
of the liquidation of the conjugal partnership. The partnerhip maintains a usufructuary
right over the said property during the marriage and until liquidation.

Padilla vs. Paterno

The separate properties in this case never became conjugal because the conjugal
improvements constructed thereon were destroyed before the value of the paraphernal land
on which these improvements were erected was paid to the spouse who owned the
paraphernal land. As held in Padilla v. Padilla, payment of such value occurs only at final
liquidation.

Canullas vs. Fortun

Where a conjugal house is constructed on land belonging exclusively to the

husband, the land ipso facto becomes conjugal, but the husband is entitled to
reimbursement of the value of the land. The conversion from paraphernal to conjugal
assets should be deemed to retroact to the time the conjugal buildings were first
constructed thereon. They cannot be considered to have become conjugal only as of the
time their values were paid to the estate of the widow because by that time, the conjugal
partnership no longer existed and it could not acquire the ownership of said properties.
'Plus value' refers to what the improvement contributes to the increase in the value of the
whole thing.

Suppose: land P3M

irrigation ditches P2M

but because of the irrigation ditches, the value of the land increases to P4.8M
the plus value in this case is P1.8M
the net value of the improvement in P3.8 M
in this case, the entire property becomes conjugal.

Art. 120 applies only on the assumption that the improvement exists at the time of
liquidation...if the property is destroyed before liquidation, then 120 does not apply.

If prior to dissolution, the property and the improvement thereon is sold--then the right of
the CPG under 120 follows the property...the right of the CPG under 120 is inchoate.

Notes:
The following are the steps to be followed in liquidating the CPG:
1. inventory of CP assets
2. restitution of advances made to each spouse e.g. Art. 122.3
3. payment of debts to each spouse e.g. Art. 120
4. payment of obligations to 3rd parties
5. delivery of exclusive properties
6. payment of losses and deterioration of movables belonging to each spouse
reason: CPG is a mere usufructuary of separate properties...not true for ACP
7. division
8. delivery of presumptive legitimes