Social Politics 2012 Volume 19 Number 3

S I L K E STA A B

Maternalism, Male-
Breadwinner Bias, and Market
Reform: Historical Legacies
and Current Reforms in Chilean
Social Policy

Abstract
Through an analysis of recent reforms in three policy areas in
Chilepensions, childcare services, and maternity/parental
leavethe paper seeks to explore how equity-oriented reforms
deal with the triple legacy of maternalism, male-breadwinner bias,
and market reform. Recent studies of new social policies in
Latin America have underlined the persistent strength of maternal-
ist assumptions. Feminist research on new cash transfer programs,
in particular, has tended to see more continuity than change in the
gendered underpinnings of social policy. This paper suggests that
once we broaden our field of vision to include other social pro-
grams and reforms, the ways in which contemporary social policy
(re)defines womens productive and reproductive roles, social
rights, and obligations are more complex and contradictory.
Indeed, while some policies take unpaid care by women for
granted, others point to an increasing awareness of inequalities

Fall 2012 Pages 299332 doi:10.1093/sp/jxs010

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300 V Staab

that shape womens and mens differential access to market

income and public social benefits.
Over the last decade, there has been a veritable explosion of
scholarship on Latin American social policy. In part this reflects the
fact thatafter decades of neglectLatin American states have
rediscovered social policy and scaled up their efforts to address
the social fallout of liberalization. Indeed, while Washington
Consensus reforms were mainly driven by the desire to cut costs
and reduce the scope of the state, the late 1990s and 2000s have
seen more coordinated state interventions to reduce poverty, inequal-
ity, and social exclusion. While not returning to post-war social pro-
tection schemes, countries in the region are experimenting with
policies that break with the neoliberal notion of minimal safety nets
(Barrientos et al. 2008; Molyneux 2008; Cortes 2009).
What does this return of the state mean for womens social
rights and welfare? It has been argued that in contrast to the gender
blindness of neoliberal reforms, new social policies have been
gender conscious (Bedford 2007). However, relatively little system-
atic research has been carried out on the gender dynamics of this
new social agenda (Macdonald and Ruckert 2009). The existing lit-
erature seems to suggest that there is far more continuity than change
in the gendered underpinnings of new social protection programs.
Feminist research on conditional cash transfers (CCTs)a key inno-
vation associated with Post-Washington Consensus social policy in
the regionhas tended to stress the persistence of maternalism (e.g.,
Molyneux 2007; Bradshaw 2008; Tabbush 2009), a set of ideas and
practices with a long and ambiguous history in the region.
Yet there is more to Post-Washington Consensus social policy
than CCTs. Several Latin American countries are experimenting
with other care-related policies alongside cash transfer schemes
including the introduction of full-day schooling, the expansion of
early childhood education and care (ECEC) services, maternity/
parental leave reforms, and in recent pension reforms, the introduc-
tion of child-rearing credits. While some of these programs take the
unpaid care by women for granted, others point to an increasing
awareness of gender inequalities that shape womens and mens dif-
ferential access to labor market income and public social benefits.
That these initiatives have received little scholarly attention leaves
the impression that Latin American social policy is stuck on a
maternalist track, when national and regional trends are likely to be
more varied and complex.
Against this broader backdrop, the main aim of the paper is to
provide a better understanding of the complex and contradictory
 Maternalism, Male-Breadwinner Bias, and Market Reform V 301

ways in which womens productive and reproductive roles, social

rights, and obligations are constructed and (re)defined in the context
of recent equity-oriented reforms. I argue for a two-tiered approach.
First, I propose to move beyond single policy analysis towards a
more systemic view that takes into account and compares develop-
ments across sectors. Second, I aim to assess these reforms according
to the ways in which they have dealt with three key legacies: market-
ization, maternalism, and male-breadwinner bias.
I apply this approach to the recent reforms in Chilean social policy,
a particularly intriguing case. First, Chile is often cited as the Latin
American country where neoliberal principles have been most com-
prehensively applied. Its 1980s social sector reformsparticularly in
pensions and healthhave long been promoted by international finan-
cial institutions as a model for other countries to emulate (Taylor
2003; Orenstein 2005). Recent innovations in Chiles social policy
regime thus merit close attention. Second, Chile combines market
liberalism with strong social conservatism, particularly with regards
to gender roles. We would expect these two legacies to create mount-
ing tensions and contradictions for example over whether mothers
should be at home (maternalism) or in the market (liberalism)that
social and employment policies have to navigate.
I have chosen to focus on the recent reforms in pension, ECEC,
and parental leave policies, issues which have been high up the
public agenda in Chile and elsewhere. This is reflective of both
broader global discourses spearheaded by international organiza-
tions such as the World Bank and the OECD, as well as a regional
trend to revising social protection frameworks with an emphasis on
increasing the coverage of hitherto excluded groups.1 The selection
thus consciously combines two more traditional policy areas associ-
ated with social protection/consumption (pensions and maternity
leave), with an emerging area geared towards social investment
(ECEC). While the former were directly undermined by structural
adjustment and deliberately restructured following the advice of
international financial institutions (Orenstein 2005; Brooks 2009),
the latter have acquired prominence over the past decades as a
means of reducing poverty by facilitating womens labor force par-
ticipation and as a cost-efficient tool to promote human capital
development by investing in early childhood development. These
ideas form part of an emerging global paradigm (Jenson and
Saint-Martin 2003; Jenson 2010; Mahon 2010) and seem to have fil-
tered down to the national level with several Latin American coun-
tries experimenting with childcare-related reforms.2
The combination of protection and promotion implicit in
this selection is also highly relevant from a gender perspective.
302 V Staab

While childcare services and parental leaves can facilitate womens

engagement in paid employment, pension systems can be designed in
ways that translate labor market inequalities into unequal entitle-
ments in old age. They thus represent two sides of the same problem,
namely the extent to which the gender division of labor affects
womens and mens differential access to income and social security.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. The next
section briefly illustrates the rationale for choosing marketization,
maternalism, and male-breadwinner bias as key dimensions for
assessing continuity and change. It takes a historical and regional
perspective to show how they became embedded in Latin American
systems of social provision. The second half of the paper then pro-
vides a detailed analysis of recent reforms in Chilean pension, child-
care, and maternity leave policies. The final section draws out some
comparative conclusions about the extent to which the recent
reforms have dealt with the key legacies of marketization, maternal-
ism, and male-breadwinner bias.

Maternalism, Male-Breadwinner Bias, and Market Reform

Trajectories of welfare state formation and change in Latin
America are in many ways different from those of advanced econo-
mies in Europe or North America that have formed the basis for
theory building. The most important difference is probably the
dynamism and radicalism with which development strategies have
been recast over the last century (Sheahan 2002, 4). Thus, many
countries moved from state-led import-substituting industrialization
(ISI) in the post-war period to the rather radical application of
neoliberal prescriptions following the recessions and debt crises of
the late 1970s and early 1980s. These transitions left distinct lega-
cies in systems of social provision. From the often incomplete forma-
tion of welfare institutions in the post-war era, governments in the
region turned to retrenchment, deregulation, and privatization.
Redistributive and universalist aspirationshowever exclusionary or
stratifying these had been in practice (Filgueira and Filgueira
2002)were buried with the shift to market-led development and
the region moved closer towards liberal-informal welfare regimes
(Barrientos 2004). As the state was scaled back, reforms empowered
business interests which became directly involved in education,
health, and pension systems.3
Gender roles and norms as well as pervasive gender inequalities
across states, markets, and households mediate womens and mens
exposure to social risks as well as their specific need for social
protection and services. Women face particular challenges due to
 Maternalism, Male-Breadwinner Bias, and Market Reform V 303

motherhood and other caring responsibilities that societies largely

assign to them (Lewis 1992; OConnor 1993; Orloff 1993). Yet,
these risks and responsibilities have rarely been taken into account
in the design of social policies. Thus, Bismarck-style social insurance
systems, such as those founded across Latin American countries in
the post-war period, had an inherent male-breadwinner bias.4
Women, in turn, tended to access social benefits as wives of a male
breadwinner or as mothers whose maternal functions had to be safe-
guarded and protected (Gimenez 2005). Motherhood became the
very basis on which women staked their claims to citizenship rights
and states deployed their efforts to mobilize female constituencies.
At the heart of this civic maternalism was the belief that women
and in particular their biological and social function as mothers
had to be recognized, valued, and protected (Molyneux 2000).5 This
was, in Nancy Folbres words, the patriarchal trunk onto which
market reform was grafted, but which continues to influence the
shape of the tree (Interviewed by Razavi 2011).
A large body of literature has documented how structural adjust-
ment increased the overall burden on women. Thus, where privatiza-
tion and trade liberalization triggered a rise in male unemployment,
women were pushed into (largely informal) paid employment to
make up for lost wages. Meanwhile, retrenchment and commerciali-
zation of social services shifted more responsibilities for social provi-
sion to the domestic sphere, where the prevailing gender division of
labor meant that women spent more time on unpaid reproductive
work (Benera and Feldman 1992; Sparr 1994; and Elson 1995). In
social protection systems, the move from risk sharing to individuali-
zation exacerbated already existing gender inequalities. By tightening
the relationship between contributory patterns and pension benefits,
market reforms effectively deepened male-breadwinner bias (Dion
2008). In health, private insurance companies were given plenty of
rope for defining premiums based on gender-specific risks, such as
pregnancy (Gideon 2006). As a result, the costs of biological and
social reproduction were further individualized and passed on to
women. Paradoxically, maternalism remained a strong theme in the
neoliberal era, at least at the level of public discourse (Molyneux
2000).
In short, market reforms layered new gender inequalities onto the
already existing legacies of maternalism and male-breadwinner bias.
As a result, conservative elements exist alongside (neo)liberal ele-
ments in the contemporary welfare architecture of many Latin
American countries. How are these legacies challenged or com-
pounded by the current wave of policy innovations and reform? If
the state is indeed assuming greater responsibility for social
304 V Staab

provision, does this trend provide a more favorable context for

redressing gender inequalities? More particularly, does it reflect a
greater recognition and redistribution of the responsibilities for and
costs of care and social reproduction?
The existing literature suggests that there is far more continuity
than change in gendered assumptions even as new social programs
are being rolled out: Recent studies have argued, for example, that
new social programs have paid scant, if any, attention to the under-
lying structures of gender inequality in labor markets and house-
holds (Razavi 2007); that economic and social policies continue to
place the burden of social reproduction on families (read: women);
that the particular design of social programs tends to reinforce tradi-
tional gender roles without providing long-term strategies for
womens economic security through job training or childcare provi-
sion (Molyneux 2007; Tabbush 2009); and that new social policies
increase social control and surveillance of mothers child-rearing
behavior and performance (Luccisano and Wall 2009).
Feminist research on CCTs, in particular, has tended to stress the
persistence of maternalist orientations (e.g., Molyneux 2007;
Bradshaw 2008; Tabbush 2009). This literature has been central for
understanding the gendered nature of new social policies in the
region and much remains to be learned about the actual diversity of
these programs (Martnez Franzoni and Voorend 2009) and their
impact on women from different ethnic groups (Hernandez 2011;
Rivera 2011). Analytically, however, the focus on a single scheme is
insufficient to assess the processes through which womens produc-
tive and reproductive roles, social rights, and obligations are cur-
rently being (re)defined. Several Latin American countries are
experimenting with other social policies alongside the much-cited
CCTs, including the introduction of full-day schooling, the expan-
sion of ECEC services, maternity/parental leave reforms, and the
introduction of child-rearing credits in recent pension reforms.
In each of these areas, equity-oriented reformers struggle with the
legacies of maternalism and male-breadwinner bias, on the one
hand, and the (ideological and de-facto) importance of markets, on
the other hand. I argue that these struggles shape reform processes
and outcomes in ways that are more complex and contradictory
than the existing literature on CCTs suggests. The following analysis
of Chilean social policy sets out to unravel some of these complex-
ities by looking at the recent reforms in pensions, childcare, and
leave regulations.
Implicit in this approach is an understanding of the state as a
concept that helps to contextualize present political conflicts and
policy processes (Hay and Lister 2006). In other words, previously
 Maternalism, Male-Breadwinner Bias, and Market Reform V 305

enacted policies, institutional choices, and strategic interactions con-

stitute a strategically selective terrain (Jessop 1990, 203) that
structures present political conflict, rendering it more conducive to
some demands than others. While not determining their behavior,
the ensemble of institutions and policy frameworks that comprise
the state offer opportunities to and impose constraints on, the politi-
cal agency of those wishing to effect policy change. The three lega-
cies outlined above form part of the institutional landscape of the
state. As such, they are shown to play a significant role in current
attempts of reform and policy innovation.
While these legacies constitute the main focus of this paper, they
are by no means the only factor that shape change and continuity in
Chilean social policy. In fact, sector-specific actors, partisan politics,
and particular political contingencies come into play to differing
degrees. Furthermore, the continuity and deepening of an economic
model based on trade openness, macroeconomic stability, monetary,
and fiscal discipline and flexible employment, forms the backdrop
against which more expansive social policies have emerged as a
response to persistent inequality. However, the full meaning of
recent reforms cannot be understood without taking into account
the gender-specific legacies in each sector.

(En)gendering Change and Continuity: Recent reforms in Chile

Chile is a particularly intriguing case for analyzing continuity and
change in social policy. On the one hand, it is often portrayed as the
country where neoliberal principles have most profoundly trans-
formed economic, social, and political institutions (Kurtz 1999;
Filgueira and Filgueira 2002). While radical market reforms were
carried out under the aegis of a military dictatorship (19731989),
many of the models features were maintained with the return to
democracy. Consequently, the countrys policy framework is often
represented as particularly resistant to equity-oriented change. On
the other hand, Chile combines market liberalism with social conser-
vatismtwo features that conventional welfare regime analysis tends
to locate in different clusters (the conservative and the liberal
variant, respectively). Female labor force participation is among the
lowest in the region (ECLAC 2008), the countrys welfare regime
has been described as inherently gender biased (Pribble 2006, 86),
and conservative social norms regarding womens role in the family
loom large (Contreras and Plaza 2010).6
Despite this rather unfavorable context, recent reforms suggest
that these frameworks are not carved in stone. Since the early 2000s
efforts to expand social protection, to improve access to and quality
306 V Staab

of social services and to strengthen social rights have featured promi-

nently on the countrys social agenda, leading some to argue that
Chile may be approaching a point of inflection (Illanes and Riesco
2007, 406). The following sections shed light on the complex and
contradictory ways in which the triple legacy of maternalism,
male-breadwinner bias, and market reform is addressed by recent
reforms in pensions (adopted in 2008), childcare services (signifi-
cantly expanded since 2006), and maternity leave (reformed in
2011). Before delving more deeply into the developments in each
sector, it is necessary to briefly describe the broader economic and
political context since the countrys return to democracy in 1990.

Context of Recent Reforms and Policy Innovations

The return to democracy did not entail a drastic transformation
of the institutional foundations of economic and social policy inher-
ited from the military regime (Moulian 2002; Taylor 2003;
Borzutzky 2010). In fact, in macroeconomic terms the center-left
party coalition Concertacion that governed the country from 1990
to 2010 validated and deepened the neoliberal model based on trade
openness, macroeconomic stability, monetary and fiscal discipline
and flexible employment. To offset some of its worst effects, social
spending increased steadily which, together with economic growth
and employment creation, dramatically reduced absolute poverty
from 38.6 percent in 1990 to 13.7 percent in 2006 (ECLAC 2008),
although it did relatively little to improve income distribution or
lessen social inequalities and fragmentation in education, health,
and social protection (Solimano 2009).
Explanations for this continuity are manifold, including the
formidable constraints placed on the autonomy of the first
Concertacion governments by authoritarian enclaves in the political
system that granted right-wing political opposition important veto
powers; the resistance of business interests whose power increased as
a result of market reforms; the weakness of other civil society actors,
particularly labor; a political culture eager to avoid the kind of polit-
ical confrontation that preceded the military coup; and the adoption
of market-oriented ideas by key decision makers within the center-
left coalition itself (e.g. Kurtz 2003; Castiglioni 2005; Borzutzky
and Weeks 2010; Ewig and Kay 2011).
The result of this complex and contradictory process has been
described as a Chilean Third Way characterized by an unwaver-
ing commitment to trade liberalization and privatization despite con-
siderable public opposition and a predisposition to a policy
process that discourages participation by civil society and
rank-and-file party members, while affording business access to the
 Maternalism, Male-Breadwinner Bias, and Market Reform V 307

highest reaches of government (Sandbrook et al. 2007, 16465).

This set-up makes some policy areas more amenable to
equity-enhancing reforms and innovations than others. As the eco-
nomic model rests upon a flexible and restrictive labor regime
(Frank 2004), social policy is largely confined to enhancing workers
ability to compete on the market and to mitigating some of the
worst risks that unregulated and precarious employment entails.
This goes a long way to explain why the two socialist-led govern-
ments of Ricardo Lagos (20002006) and Michelle Bachelet
(20062010) spearheaded health reform, pension reform and child-
care service expansion in order to enhance equity, while shying
away from reforms related to the countrys labor market where
many of the fundamental social inequalities originate.
While the Bachelet administrations employment policy and labor
relations have been described as disappointing, (Lopez 2009;
Sehnbruch 2009), it did turn social protection into a key priority.
The conceptual pillars of her strategy included a life-course
approach to social protection and the attempt to introduce a
rights-based perspective (Hardy 2011). The latter materialized in a
gradual lifting of budgetary restrictions on social assistance7 and the
progressive relaxation of eligibility requirements for accessing a
range of benefits. The life-course approach, in turn, is captured in
repeatedly stated commitments to create equal opportunities and
protect citizens from the cradle to old age. Tellingly, its transla-
tion into policy focused on the two extremes of the life course,
namely the reform of the pension system and Chile Crece Contigo,
an integrated early childhood protection system that included the
massive expansion of childcare services. The working-age population
remained caught in the middle with persistently low employment
quality, including a high level of job instability and the limited reach
of employment-based rights and benefits, a scenario that dispropor-
tionately affects women workers (Sehnbruch 2009).8
Thus, the attempt to square greater equity and social inclusion
with an open economy influenced the scope and locus of policy
change during the Bachelet administration. While acquiring greater
visibility, social protection remained subordinate to macroeconomic
goals, including those related to employment, understood as not
interfering with job creation through greater regulation and rights
for workers. In this context, it is particularly surprising that a highly
controversial employment-related reform was introduced under the
new right-wing government of Sebastian Pinera (2010) which, in
2011, expanded (women) workers rights through a reform of mater-
nity leave regulations. As will be shown below, the policy outcome
308 V Staab

in this area owes much to the particular political contingency after

the 2010 change in government.
Overall, it is clear that the Chilean development model exhibits
striking continuities. Within this particular development model,
however, there is ongoing skirmishing over how to extend social
rights and protection against the vagaries of the market. Rather than
dismissing these transformations as a simple reproduction of prevail-
ing economic and gender regimes, the following sections present an
analysis of change and continuity.

Pension Reform
Chile was not only the first country in Latin America to privatize
its pension system, but also stands out for the radicalism with
which market reform was carried through. In 1980, the public
pay-as-you-go system was replaced by individual capital accounts.
Henceforth, mandatory contributions were to be covered by the
worker alone rather than through tripartite financing. Account man-
agement was handed over to private insurance companies that invest
contributions in stocks and bonds against (sizeable) commission
fees. Rather than relying on fixed replacement rates (defined-benefit),
retirement incomes were now directly linked to the amount contrib-
uted by the worker and the rate of return on investments made by
the commercial insurer (defined-contribution). With its early and
radical pension restructuring, Chile was the laboratory for a model
that its advocates like to refer to as a prime export product.
A series of studies have documented the detrimental effects of
market reform on womens old-age security (e.g. Arenas de Mesa
and Montecinos 1999; Bertranou and Arenas de Mesa 2003; Marco
2004; Gimenez 2005; Dion 2008). Lower labor force participation
rates, more frequent career breaks, higher unemployment rates, over-
representation in informal or part-time employment, and lower earn-
ings translate into lower levels of affiliation among women as well
as lower and less regular contribution patterns among those who are
affiliated. While these are problems in virtually all contribution-
based social protection schemes, and hence also apply to the pre-
reform pension system in Chile, gender inequalities were exacerbated
by structural reforms that tied pension benefits more strongly to indi-
vidual risk and contribution history and eliminated existing risk-
pooling mechanisms from the contributory pillar (Arenas de Mesa
and Montecinos 1999).
One particularly problematic feature was the introduction of
gender-differentiated actuarial tables for the calculation of pension
benefits. According to this formula women receive lower pensions
than men due to their greater average longevity, even if their
 Maternalism, Male-Breadwinner Bias, and Market Reform V 309

contributory records are the same.9 At the same time, gender-

differentiated retirement ages (sixty-five years for men; sixty years
for women) were maintained, but the shift from defined-benefit to
defined-contribution systems translated into lower pension entitle-
ments for women. Furthermore, the reform tightened eligibility rules
for minimum pensions: While in the old system women had been
entitled to a minimum pension without prior contributions, the new
rules stipulated a vesting period of twenty years for both sexes
(Arenas de Mesa and Montecinos 1999), a formidable obstacle for
women who tend to have less continuous employment histories than
men. Non-contributory, means-tested minimum pensions, first intro-
duced in 1975, were maintained under the new system, but benefits
and coverage were extremely low.
A quarter century into the new system, the shortcomings of the
individual account system were so evident, that by 2005 there was
consensus across the political spectrum with respect to the need of
reform (Illanes and Riesco 2007). Among the key concerns was the
poor performance of the contributory pillar regarding coverage
(especially among rural, independent and self-employed workers)
and replacement rates (averaging 44 per cent of the previous salary
and much lower for female than for male pensioners). Estimates
forecasted that more than half of future pensioners, and three quar-
ters of women, would not even accumulate the right to a minimum
pension through their own contributions (Yanez 2010). Only a frac-
tion of those were poor enough to receive the means-tested social
assistance pensions.
Although proposals differed with regards to the details of reform,
the individual capital account system itself remained unchallenged
among the Chilean ruling elite.10 Even the presidential candidate of
the centre-left coalition Concertacion, Michelle Bachelet, left no
doubt in her 2005 election platform, that she would seek to improve
the existing system of capital accounts rather than to replace it
(Yanez 2010, 8 9). Once in power, Bachelet commissioned a
Presidential Advisory Board to elaborate a comprehensive reform pro-
posal which was adopted by Congress in 2008. The reformed system,
which will be fully effective in 2012, comprises significantly strength-
ened government financed solidarity pillar, a (largely unmodified)
contributory pillar of individual capital accounts, and an additional
voluntary savings pillar (Mesa-Lago 2008; MTPS 2008).
Within the reformed solidarity pillar, since July 2008 a
means-tested non-contributory pension (Pension Basica Solidaria)
financed out of general revenue covers men and women aged 65 and
older from the first two income quintiles and was progressively
extended to include the third quintile by July 2011. Elderly aged 65
310 V Staab

and older who have contributed to the system but accumulated very
low pension entitlements, in turn, will benefit from a new govern-
ment subsidy (Aporte Previsional Solidario) that stocks their pen-
sions up to a fixed maximum. Together these components replace
pre-existing minimum and social assistance pensions, increasing
both the level and reach of state-financed and subsidized pensions.
Evidence of the malfunctioning of the existing pension system and
possible reform scenarios had been created over decades by interna-
tional organizations and actors within the Chilean state itself. Key
actors in the Ministrys of Finance Budget Office in particular
played a role in fostering political commitment to reform (Arenas de
Mesa 2010). Throughout the process, the Budget Office was also
firmly in charge of negotiating key components of the reform, both
within the governing coalition and with representatives of the
right-wing opposition in Congress. From the very beginning, its fun-
damental concern was to strengthen the social assistance pillar rather
than to restructure the model of individual capital accounts. As Ewig
and Kay (2011) argue, this approach can be explained by three main
factors. First, the institutional lock-in produced by Chiles integra-
tion into the global capital markets and the importance of private
pensions to the countrys financial system 11 meant that any funda-
mental reform of the basic structure of the pension system was
simply not on the agenda (82). Second, private pension fund admin-
istratorsfirmly supported by the political rightsuccessfully resisted
the introduction of regulatory provisions that would change the rules
of the game, such as the creation of a state-owned pension fund. In
contrast, neither the business sector nor the political right seriously
opposed the expansion of the state-sponsored solidarity pillar. Third,
key policy actors within the government were convinced of the bene-
fits of a market-based model. The Budget Office thus proceeded to
ignore more radical demands articulated by labor unions and
to appease dissident voices from within the governing coalition,
privileging a broad political consensus with the right-wing opposi-
tion in Congress.12
While these factors help to explain the overall orientation of the
reform, they cannot account for the high visibility and specific treat-
ment of gender-related issues. Four aspects of the reform are particu-
larly relevant for womens pension entitlements. First, since women
are over-represented among non-contributors and low-density con-
tributors, they will benefit from the restructured solidarity pillar.
They are estimated to represent 60 percent of potential claimants
(MTPS 2008). The removal of the twenty-year vesting period, in turn,
eliminates an important obstacle for women to claim a minimum
 Maternalism, Male-Breadwinner Bias, and Market Reform V 311

pension. The solidarity pillar is thus expected to reduce gender gaps

in pension coverage among lower-income households.
Second, the reform introduced a universal credit per child born
alive (bono por hijo) to subsidize the pension of mothers. The bono
is credited to the pension accounts of all mothers, independent of
their employment history and income status, and accumulates until
they reach the age of 65. Simulations project the credit to increase
womens final pensions by an average 7279 Chilean Pesos (15
US-$) per month (Podesta 2007, 48). While this is a far cry from
covering the full opportunity costs of bearing and caring for chil-
dren, it represents an official recognition of and reward for maternal
care work. This may be the measure where the Bachelet govern-
ments normative approach to social policyboth as women-friendly
and rights-basedfound its most concrete expression by introducing
a truly universal benefit.13
Third, changes to the Disability and Survivors Insurance will also
benefit women whose over-contribution to this scheme (given
their lower average risk of having accidents) will now be refunded
and automatically credited to their pension account. This measure
has been estimated to increase womens final pensions by an average
of 5 percent (Podesta 2007, 42). Yet, the same risk-based logic
underpins the maintenance of gender-differentiated actuarial
tables in the calculation of pension benefits which, as pointed out
above, tend to work to womens disadvantage. Since modifications
within the system of individual accounts were not a policy priority,
a review of this aspect though posited by the Womens Ministry at
some pointwas simply not on the agenda.
Fourth, gender-differentiated retirement ages were maintained in
the contributory pillar without introducing measures to offset their
negative effect on womens old-age pensions. In this sense, the
reform failed to reinstall a mechanism for gender equality in the
market-based contributory pillar, leaving redistributive functions to
the state-sponsored solidarity pillar (Yanez 2010). Yet the reform
also created new inequalities among women. While the retirement
age for women in the contributory pillar continues to be sixty years,
the eligibility age for benefits in the solidarity pillar was set at sixty-
five years for both sexes. This means that women who have not
accumulated sufficient contributions (usually those with histories of
intermittent, informal employment or extended periods of unpaid
care work) can claim their old-age benefits five years later than
women with a good contributory record (Yanez, 2010). Maintaining
the pension age in the solidarity pillar at 65, in the face of contrary
demands by Concertacion parliamentarians, was a key concern of
the Ministry of Finance both for reasons of fiscal prudence and to
312 V Staab

set the correct incentives (Arenas de Mesa 2010). Raising

womens pension age in the contributory pillar, in turn, was rejected
by President Bachelet who stated that her government would not
curtail the benefits to which women were already entitled.
Overall, the 2008 pension reform is likely to benefit women in
terms of improved coverage and higher benefit levels vis-a-vis the old
system. Institutionally, the reform significantly expanded the role of
the state in providing a modicum of income security in old age to
lower-income groups and made this less dependent on their contrib-
utory record, thus reducing male-breadwinner bias at least in the
solidarity pillar. This is by no means a negligible achievement.
Nevertheless, the reform was hardly market-challenging in that it
left the privately administered contributory pillar intact and did not
significantly expand employer responsibilities.14 While the reformed
system does not slavishly follow World Bank (1994) recipes, in that
it combines a broad-based means-tested minimum pension and a
top-up scheme within the solidarity pillar and introduces special
measures to enhance gender equality, it clearly maintains the charac-
teristic separation of redistributive, insurance and savings functions
as well as the private administration of contributions.
As a consequenceand despite its recognition of womens disad-
vantage which in itself is a significant accomplishmentthe reform
does not tackle the mechanisms that are responsible for gender
inequality in the contributory pillar. Indeed, the use of gender-
differentiated actuarial tables and the fixed-contribution logic
coupled with the lower retirement age of women will continue to
conspire against more gender-egalitarian pension outcomes. It is
unlikely that changes in disability and survivor insurance premiums
and the newly introduced pension credit per child will offset these
systemic disadvantages. The latter is, however, notable in that it for-
mally acknowledges that childbearing and childrearing merit recog-
nition and reward. While one can argue that it does so on entirely
maternalist termsand thus takes the prevailing gender division of
labor for grantedit also responds to a reality: Childcare is still pre-
dominantly carried out by mothers and efforts to offer compensation
(however limited) for the opportunity costs that this entails will
almost inevitably be directed at them.
This does, of course, not dispense with measures aimed at reduc-
ing opportunity costs and altering their gendered distribution where
they originate. The promotion of womens participation in stable
and productive employment, the enforcement of anti-discrimination
laws, the investment in training opportunities, and measures that
allow women and men to combine and share paid employment and
unpaid care work need to be pursued in tandem with compensatory
 Maternalism, Male-Breadwinner Bias, and Market Reform V 313

measures. The next two sections turn to recent developments in the

latter area.

Childcare
Although ECEC gradually acquired prominence on Chiles social
policy agenda, up until 2006 services that responded to the needs of
both children and working parents were scarce and fragmented. On
the one hand, the educational system concentrated on getting four-
and five-year-old children school-ready, offering largely part-time
programs and providing few services for younger children. On the
other hand, workplace-based childcarelegally mandated for com-
panies with more than twenty female employeesfailed to cover a
significant share of women workers given the characteristics of the
Chilean labor market, such as the importance of small and microen-
terprises15 and of less protected contractual arrangements (fixed-
term, piece-work, or contract-work), especially among women. It
also fuelled employer complaints about the costs associated with
hiring women and was thus claimed to represent a barrier to their
employability. A third set of childcare services targeted vulnerable
groups such as beneficiaries of the female heads of household
program (Programa Mujeres Jefas de Hogar) and agricultural
workers (temporeras).
The Bachelet administration (20062010) made ECEC one of its
policy priorities and set out to develop a more comprehensive strat-
egy for service expansion. With Chile Crece Contigo (Chile Grows
with You), an integrated child protection strategy launched in
2006, the government committed to significantly expand public
creches (zero to two years) and kindergartens (two to four years),
particularly for children from low-income families (Mideplan 2007).
By 2009, the program had become institutionalized by law, granting
children from low-income families the right to a full-time creche and
kindergarten place if their mothers are working, studying, or
looking for work; and the right to a part-time kindergarten place
with no further requirements regarding parents activities. Similar to
the case of pensions, the new program applies a rather broad target-
ing mechanism, covering children from the first three income quin-
tiles (60 percent of the lowest-income households) from 2011
onwards. Families who meet the above requirements will not be
charged for their use of childcare facilities.
Official data sources point to the rapid roll-out of childcare facili-
ties, with the number of public creches increasing from around seven
hundred in 2006 to more than four thousand in 2009 (Ortiz 2009).
The number of available places for children up to two years more
than quintupled from around fourteen thousand in 2005 to
314 V Staab

sixty-one thousand in 2008, and the number of places for two to

four year-olds doubled over the same period (ibid.). While the uni-
versal right to a creche or kindergarten place is still far from being
realized, recent household survey data show that coverage for chil-
dren aged zero to four years has picked up from 12 percent in 2003
to 19 percent in 2009.16
Bachelets own political and personal backgroundas a socialist,
pediatrician and single mother of twoas well as the women-
friendly approach of her government may have played a role in
helping the issue onto the executive agenda. Yet the protean charac-
ter of childcare also turned out to be a politically attractive choice
within the governing coalition. As an investment in human capital
and in womens employability, it garnered the crucial backing of
economically liberal sectors, including Bachelets Minister of
Finance, while its promise to enhance the rights and opportunities
of women and children appealed to social-democratic sentiments. It
thus satisfied what is often referred to as the two souls of
Concertacion. As a government policy, the roll-out of childcare serv-
ices did not require legislative approval beyond the budget process
which is heavily dominated by the Executive (Baldez and Carey
1999). The fact that the right to a creches and kindergarten place
was later approved unanimously as part of a legislative package on
social protection indicates that once the issue had been installed on
the agenda, the political right found it hard to resist, although it
would probably not have promoted it as a flagship policy and
indeed ceased to finance further expansion after coming to power in
early 2010 (Camara de Diputados 2010). Since the new childcare
services did not imply any costs to employers and the sector had not
yet been colonized by private providers, the policy did not spur
resistance by business interests. Nor did labor get involved in the
process beyond sector-specific unions who pushed for the expansion
of public services as opposed to a voucher system.
While the title of Chiles child protection strategy and much of
the policy talk surrounding it echoed narratives of social investment
(Jenson and Saint-Martin 2003; Lister 2003), the actual institutional
choice was rather unorthodox: Service expansion was placed under
the aegis of the Ministry of Education which strengthened public
creches and kindergartens17 financed out of general revenue, rather
than workplace-based childcare, co-financed by employers, or
private childcare, co-financed by parents. This differs both from
World Bank recommendations of non-formal, community-based
childcare, and the demand-subsidy approach promoted by the
OECD geared to developing a childcare market (Mahon 2010).
Both are common practices in other countries, but the latter also
 Maternalism, Male-Breadwinner Bias, and Market Reform V 315

looms large in Chiles broader educational system. The fact that cov-
erage of children under the age of four was extremely low before the
reforms arguably increased the governments room for maneuver in
shaping the institutional design.
Despite its markedly child-centered rhetoric, childcare service
expansion did not completely lose sight of the needs of working
mothers. Indeed, there seems to be some agreement about the
economic necessity and desirability of womens labor force partici-
pation 18 and the roll-out of ECEC services can be seen as an official
recognition of family responsibilities as an obstacle for achieving
this goal. Consequently, the newly created creches and kindergartens
are supposed to offer full-day programs for working mothers (and,
under exceptional circumstances, fathers) and increase efforts to
offer extended schedules.
Somewhat ironically, the child-centered thrust of the program is
likely to represent a better option for women than the alternative of
extending or enforcing their right to workplace-based childcare.
There are two reasons for this. First, these services benefit a larger
share of mothersboth in and outside of the labor force: While
workplace-based childcare is available only to mothers who are
already in the (formal) workforce and in specific types of workpla-
ces, the new program offers full-time care to mothers who are study-
ing and looking for work, and at least part-time kindergarten
services to full-time stay-at-home mothers. Second, by de-linking
childcare services from the workplace, the program escapes allega-
tions of increasing the costs of hiring women. Of course, making
workplace-based childcare a gender-neutral benefit would also miti-
gate the latter problem, but attempts to extend the right to work-
placed childcare to fathers have been of little avail so far.19
Overall, the roll-out of childcare under the Bachelet administra-
tion is a powerful example of how childcare can be implemented
rapidly with sufficient political will. The relatively broad targeting
mechanism (60 percent of households) and the broadening of other
eligibility rules expanded the role of the state in ECEC vis-a-vis pre-
vious (workplace-based and targeted) interventions. The initiative is
also notable in a country where conservative social norms regarding
womens role in the family remain widespread. Indeed, the roll-out
of ECEC services could be described as market concerns trumping
maternalism: the ideal of maternal care outweighed by the desire to
increase female labor force participation and develop the human
capital of future workers. However, things are less straightforward.
While the expansion of childcare increases the ability of women to
combine paid employment and motherhood, there is no generalized
farewell to maternalism (Orloff 2006).
316 V Staab

Even as children become the main beneficiaries, mothers (not

fathers or parents) remain in charge of acting in the best interest
of the child. This is evident in the program rules which tie access to
childcare to mothers not fathers activities (studying, working,
looking for work). It is also apparent in discourses surrounding the
program. The careful calibration of professional and maternal con-
cerns is well captured by Bachelets remark that as a woman, as a
mother, but also as a paediatricianI am convinced that initial
education is fundamental (Bachelet 2007, 15; authors translation,
emphasis added). Implicit in this statement is the idea that motherly
concerns about the childs well-being should guide the decision about
childcare arrangements. While this may have produced a winwin sit-
uation for mothers and children in terms of the roll-out childcare
services, fathers have been virtually absent from childcare debates.

Maternity Leave
As in other countries in the region, regulations surrounding
maternity protection in Chile date back to the first half of the twen-
tieth century when policy makers were driven by the concern to
safeguard the reproductive functions of working mothers
(Molyneux 2000; Gimenez 2005). Thus, the 1931 Labor code
(Codigo de Trabajo) prohibited womens work in heavy industry
and underground mining as well as night shifts and first introduced
maternity leave. The obligation to provide creches in factories that
employed more than fifty women and the right (and indeed obliga-
tion) of working mothers to breastfeed young children had already
been established in 1917 (Hutchison 2001).
From its inception in the early twentieth century, this maternalist
body of legislation par excellence endured major tectonic shifts in
the countrys political, economic, and social policy landscape.20 In
fact, the only modification under authoritarian rule was related to
the financing mechanism of leaves and was carried out en passant in
the context of health reform. Similar to pensions, leaves had been
financed through tripartite contributions by employers, workers, and
the state. The 1985 reforms, in turn, shifted the financial burden
onto the state (to be financed out of general revenue). Thus, neither
employers nor private health insurers are currently involved in
financing maternity leave in any way.
In its current form, the Labor code includes, among others, pro-
tection from dismissal from the start of the pregnancy until one year
after the end of the leave period; maternity leave six weeks before
and twelve weeks after childbirth as well as a 100 percent replace-
ment of the previous salary with a ceiling of sixty-six UF21 per
month for the duration of the leave;22 and a (paid) medical leave to
 Maternalism, Male-Breadwinner Bias, and Market Reform V 317

care for seriously ill children under the age of one claimable by the
mother or (since 1993) the father. In 2005, a mandatory five-day
paternity leave was introduced.
Debates over the extension of the length of maternity leave first
surfaced as a cost-efficient solution to the rapidly increasing
number of leaves claimed to care for a sick child under one year of
age. Given that the increase in these leaves could not be explained
by epidemiological patterns, it was interpreted as the (fraudulent)
attempt (by mothers and pediatricians) to artificially extend the
post-partum leave period. Subsequently, doctors suggested that a
longer maternity leave could reduce the incidence of sickness in
young infants and hence reduce healthcare spending (La Nacion
2004), an argument that was further pushed in a much publicized
study conducted by a private consultancy firm with strong ties to the
private health insurance industry, and emphatically taken up by
Christian-Democratic MPs (La Nacion 2007a,b; Cooperativa 2008).
Policy change, however, did not come easily, partly due to signifi-
cant disagreement on its usefulness on both sides of the political
spectrum. Although maternity leave reform appeared as a policy rec-
ommendation and/or political demand in several occasions under
the Lagos and Bachelet administrations, there was no consensus on
the issue within Concertacion.23 While doctorsstrongly represented
at the legislative level supported an extension to six months, the
proposal failed to obtain the backing of economic advisors linked to
the Ministry of Finance who considered the measure to be not only
costly, but also potentially damaging to womens employability.
This view was largely shared by economic advisors of the right-wing
opposition. One option, discussed during the Lagos and Bachelet
governments, was to extend the leave period to six months while
maintaining the amount of the three month subsidy and spreading it
evenly across the prolonged six months period. This attempt to
contain the fiscal impact of the reform was categorically rejected by
the Womens Ministry and MPs of the governing coalition as a
measure that would effectively curtail womens rights by halving
maternity pay.
During the presidential elections in 2009, a debate that had previ-
ously centered on cost containment evolved to include discussions
of childcare arrangements, maternal and child health, womens
employability, and coverage. In the heat of the campaigns, all candi-
dates committed to extend the post-partum leave period from three
to six months. In the case of the two most promising candidates,
Eduardo Frei (Concertacion) and his Alianza contender Sebastian
Pinera, this meant turning a blind eye to the recommendations of
their technical advisors, who were concerned with potential fiscal
318 V Staab

and labor market impact. Following the elections, opinions on

whether and how the extension was to be implemented differed
within the conservative camp now in power, delaying legislative
action. Civil society organizations rallied, demanding not only that
newly elected President Sebastian Pinera keep his campaign promise,
but also that the reform be comprehensive, universal, and directed at
fathers as well as mothers. Their claims found support among
Concertacion MPs (Camara de Diputados 2010; Observatorio
Genero y Equidad 2010). Business leaders, in turn, voiced the
concern that longer leaves would increase the costs of hiring
women and therefore negatively affect their employability (El
Mostrador 2011).
In February 2011, the government finally introduced a law in
Congress which effectively prolongs postnatal leave from three to
six months and opens up the possibility of sharing six of the addi-
tional twelve weeks with fathers. However, it also included provi-
sions aimed at reducing rigidities and increasing flexibility in
maternity protection. Trade unions, civil society organizations,
doctors, and midwives associations therefore criticized the proposal
as an attempt to further deregulate labor markets (Feres 2011), a
criticism that was taken up by oppositional leaders in Congress
and Senate.
The main points of contention were the effective reduction of the
protection from dismissal, the tightening of eligibility requirements
for leaves to care for a sick child, the reduction of the income
replacement ceiling from sixty-six to thirty UF24, and the extent to
which benefits would be extended to workers with atypical contracts
(short-term, piece-work, or contract-work).25 Unions took the lead
on this issue, but it was also picked up by other civil society organi-
zations and center-left parliamentarians. Three additional aspects of
the proposal proved particularly problematic from a gender perspec-
tive. First, the voluntary nature of shared parental leave which,
according to international experience, does not bode well for pater-
nal take-up rates. This was compounded by regulations regarding
income replacement: The lower-income ceilings, on the one hand,
and the fact that fathers income replacement would have been cal-
culated on the basis of the mothers salary, on the other hand. Both
the rules would have provided strong disincentives for men (who
tend to earn higher wages than women) to take up their share.
Some of the above points were successfully taken up by the oppo-
sition in Congress. Thus, the clauses about tighter eligibility rules
for sick leaves as well as reductions in the protection from the dis-
missal period and in the income replacement ceiling for the subsidy
were rejected, and the share of workers with atypical contracts who
 Maternalism, Male-Breadwinner Bias, and Market Reform V 319

can receive leave benefits in the future was significantly expanded.26

Overall, it is remarkable how a debate about cost containment was
transformed into one about greater leave entitlements for working
parents, particularly mothers. The fact that maternity leave costs
had already been de-linked from labor costs under military rule may
have unwittingly enhanced the prospects for extending the leave.
The reform proposal, as it stands, does not imply any additional
(direct) costs for employers and is likely to benefit other market
players, i.e. private health funds whose costs may decrease thanks to
a prolonged maternity leave financed out of general revenue. Yet the
unexpected approval of a law that effectively strengthens a work-
related right and advances towards greater coverage also owes to the
specific political contingency in the second half of 2011. Across the
country, civil society protests for educational reform had intensified
and the approval rates of the government had entered an unprece-
dented downward spiral (CEP 2011). At the same time, the change
in government had brought about a new political dynamic at
the legislative level. Other than their Alianza peers during the
Concertacion governments, Concertacion MPs, now in the opposi-
tion, did not try to limit or reduce the benefits proposed by the exec-
utive, but pushed for their extension. They also seemed to have been
more open to demands articulated by civil society, including medical
associations, womens organizations, and labor unions which all
lobbied for a reform that would strengthen womens workers
rights.27
Overall, the debate between the government and the opposition
was centered on arguments that favored more generous solutions
based on the universal right of children to maternal care (opposi-
tion), on the one hand, and arguments that rejected such solutions
for their fiscal implications (government), on the other hand.
Although the concerns over gender equality outlined above did not
acquire the same visibility, a final memorandum of understanding
between the Womens Ministry and Congress established that while
fathers participation would remain voluntary, the subsidy would be
calculated based on their own salary (SERNAM 2011). Apart from
paying lip service to paternal responsibility, however, the current
proposal continues to link childcare almost exclusively to mother-
hood. Both economic and cultural disincentives for parents to opt
for paternal involvement thus remain unchallenged. In a context
where employers constantly invoke maternity as an excuse for dis-
criminatory hiring practices, this link is likely to be costly for
women. As long as the state allows employers to ignore the necessity
of social reproduction and brush off even the most minimal respon-
sibility for its costs, and as long as it liberates fathers or punishes
320 V Staab

them financially for engaging in childcare, longer leaves will

undoubtedly make it easier for working women to reconcile mother-
hood and employment. They will not, however, lessen gender
inequalities in paid employment and unpaid care.

Conclusion
In the context of debates about a return of the state and the
implications for gender equality, it is worth asking, as a recent
report by the Economic Commission for Latin America and the
Caribbean (ECLAC 2010) does: What kind of state? What kind of
equality? Rather than addressing the normative dimension of this
question, this paper has taken an empirical look on the recent devel-
opments in Chile where, I would argue, renewed state engagement
in social policy has opened up opportunities for addressing some of
the gender imbalances resulting from the triple legacy of marketiza-
tion, maternalism, and male-breadwinner bias. However gradual,
modest, and incomplete the changes, they are more than the mere
reproduction of neoliberal and maternalist policy frameworks.
With regards to marketization, the recent reforms in Chilean social
policy show that there is some leeway for changing and improving
equity and social protection even in the face of strong neoliberal lega-
cies. Across policy areas, reforms have moved beyond the neoliberal
orthodoxy of minimalist safety nets: There is a renewed emphasis on
legally inscribed social rights and entitlementsa trend that was first
probed in the health sector (Dannreuther and Gideon 2008); and
although the measures retain an important needs-based element (i.e.,
are not based on citizenship alone), they reach out to middle-income
segments rather than narrowly targeting particularly vulnerable
groups. As such, the reforms are likely to usher in significant material
improvements. Poor labor market opportunities will translate less
directly into exclusion from old-age security among lower-income
households; free childcare services may enable lower-income house-
holds to bring home additional income by increasing their labor force
participation or access more stable jobs; and a longer and more
broadly accessible maternity leave will ease the pressure on families,
and women in particular, to leave paid employment when they
have children.
While the state has taken on a greater role in social provision, it
has managed to do so in quite market- and business-friendly ways.
Despite recent reforms, markets continue to play an important role
in social provision and labor market concerns have shaped reform
debates around ECEC and maternity/parental leave. In pensions,
increased coverage and benefits are entirely financed by the state and
 Maternalism, Male-Breadwinner Bias, and Market Reform V 321

redistribution is restricted to the new solidarity pillar, without alter-

ing or interfering with the operation of commercial providers in the
contributory pillar. New childcare services and maternity leave bene-
fits are also financed by the state. As a result, employers are effec-
tively exempted from contributing to the costs of care and social
reproduction.
What about male-breadwinner bias? Without a doubt, continu-
ous, full-time participation in (formal) employment continues to
grant more and more comprehensive social rights than any other
activity: In the post-reform scenario described above, few entitle-
ments are granted on the basis of citizenship and those that are not
tied to paid employment apply some form of means-testing (the
bono por hijo being the exception). Nevertheless, there seems to be
greater awareness that social protection frameworks premised on
(idealized) working biographies fail to cover an important share of
the population, more so in a context, where formal employment and
stable contracts are not the norm. Childcare responsibilities are rec-
ognized as an obstacle to mothers employmenteven if the latter is
desired for reasons other than their own empowermentand public
services put in place to complement maternal care; a modicum of
income in old age is guaranteed by the state for individuals from
lower-income households and this modicum is less dependent on
contributions (hence employment histories) and less dependent on
the relationship to a male breadwinner; unpaid care by mothers is
now formally recognized in the pension system which offers some
(limited) compensation.
Last but not least, maternalism remains a constant, but its prac-
tice is qualitatively different from the period of market reform. In
Glass and Fodors (2007) words, the pendulum seems to be swinging
back from the private maternalism of the neoliberal era, when
state retrenchment and fiscal restraint meant that the responsibility
for unpaid care fell back on mothers by default, to a new public
maternalism reminiscent of the early years of Chilean social policy.
While some of the recent measuressuch as the per child pension
creditsreward mothers for their unpaid family roles, childcare
services provide non-familial alternatives, effectively reducing the
burden on mothers. All of them, however, are maternalist in their
understanding of mothers (not fathers or both parents) as the
primary caregivers of small children. Fathers are still construed as
surrogate carers. This is apparent in the eligibility rules for child-
care services that are available to fathers only under exceptional con-
ditions, such as the mothers death or incapacitation. And while the
recently introduced maternity leave reform foresees the possibility of
transferring parts of the post-partum leave to fathers, incentives that
322 V Staab

encourage paternal uptake are weak. While recent reforms thus

introduce significant improvement for many women, they also seem
to take the predominant gender division of labor as a given.
How can we explain the way in which the Chilean state has
returned to social policy and positioned itself vis-a-vis the
market? And how can we account for the specific ways in which
gender issues have entered reform and policy design processes?
Certainly, the overall macroeconomic framework and sector-
specific institutional legacies go a long way in explaining reform pat-
terns. This is particularly evident in pensions, where the feedback
and lock-in effects of first-generation reform weighed heavily.
Chiles integration into global financial markets, the economic and
political power of business, including private pension administrators
and employers who were able to resist changes to the system of indi-
vidual capital accounts and greater responsibility for their workers
welfare in old age respectively, the weakness of labor, and the
virtual absence of other civil society organizations pushing for more
structural changes: All these factors provide insights as to why key
actors in government did not tackle the pension system at its core,
but chose to circumvent economic and political constraints by intro-
ducing changes at the margins. This also limited the way gender
inequalities could be confronted despite the women-friendly thrust
of the Bachelet government. Indeed, attempts to improve womens
pensions concentrated on economically vulnerable groups and secon-
dary measures, such as the adjustment of disability and survivors
insurance and the introduction of childcare credits, eschewing the
modification of actuarial tables in the contributory pillar.
Policy innovation in childcare services was triggered by the conflu-
ence of executive concerns to break the intergenerational transmis-
sion of poverty through early childhood education and increasing
womens labor force participation through the provision of childcare
services. In order to advance this agenda, the government chose to
expand public childcare services for whichin contrast to pension
and maternity leave reformit did not need legislative approval
beyond the budget process. While this institutional choice may be
reflective of partisan orientationsthe political right certainly
favored a policy based on demand-side subsidiesit was also a polit-
ically smart one. Neither were there strong business interests in
childcare provision that would oppose state expansion, nor were
employers liable to finance the reform. The institutional choice also
avoided the need to make changes to the labor code and thus the
mobilization of unions beyond sector-specific associations of child-
care workers. This, together with the relative newness of childcare
 Maternalism, Male-Breadwinner Bias, and Market Reform V 323

as a sector for investment, turned policy innovation in this field into

a relatively undisputed endeavor.
In both pensions and childcare, partisan politics played an ambig-
uous role: While the social-democratic and women-friendly thrust of
the Bachelet government certainly shaped the overall approach to
social protectionwith a greater emphasis on the state, a promotion
of a rights-based discourse, and a broader conception of targeting
its practice of consensus politics within the governing coalition and
with the political right also limited the locus and scope of reform.
That both policies were adopted virtually unanimously in Congress
and Senate is the clearest expression of this elite consensus across
party lines. Further, the Executive tried hard to maintain tight
control over the pension reform agenda and the institutional choice
in childcare throughout policy design and negotiation, even in the
more participatory settings, such as the Presidential Advisory
Boards. This contrasts sharply with the maternity leave reform
process. Here, both civil society mobilization and partisan conflict
proved more visible and decisive. The locus of conflict shifted from
the Executive and technocratic considerations to a much politicized
debate Congress, where women workers rights were successfully
defended and extended, compromising the governments attempt to
introduce an employer-friendly and fiscally prudent reform. In com-
parison with pension reform and childcare service expansion, this is
reflective of a different, more contingent political dynamic of social
policy-making after the 2010 change in government.
Finally, while all the three reforms introduce important women-
friendly elements, they very much maintain their maternalist orien-
tation. This is likely to be due not only to the long and institution-
ally entrenched history of maternalism in Chilean social policy, but
also to the relatively weak feminist leverage over the policy-making
process. In this sense, it still seems easier to claim greater benefits
and services based on womens difference (particularly, their role as
mothers) than to achieve support for measures that would foster
gender equality in paid employment and unpaid care.

NOTES
Department of Politics, University of Sheffield, Northumberland Road,
S10 2TU, UK. Tel: 56 9 7624 3439; Fax: 44 0 114 222 1717. E-mail:
s.staab@sheffield.ac.uk. Silke Staab is a PhD candidate at the Politics
Department, University of Sheffield. Her research project examines patterns
of continuity and change in Latin American social policy from a gender
perspective, seeking to assess in how far recent social policy reforms repre-
sent a shift away from the tenets of high-tide neoliberalism as well as the
324 V Staab

implications of this shift for gendered rights and responsibilities. Over the
past six years, she has been working for different U.N. agencies and non-
governmental organizations on issues related to gender, care, social policy
and migration. Her recent publications include: (2010) Social investment
policies in Chile and Latin America: Towards Equal Opportunities for
Women and Children? Journal of Social Policy 39(4); (2011) Putting
two and two together? Early Childhood Education, Mothers Employment
and Childcare Service Expansion in Chile and Mexico, Development and
Change 42(4) [with Roberto Gerhard]; (2010) Underpaid and over-
worked: A cross-national perspective on care workers. International
Labour Review 149(4) [with Shahra Razavi]; (2010) Democracy in the
country but not in the home? Religion, politics and womens rights in
Chile. Third World Quarterly 31(6) [with Virginia Guzman and Ute
Seibert].
1. This is the case, for example, in the area of pensions, where
second-generation reforms of different reach and depth have recently been
implemented in Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, and Uruguay. The latter three
reforms introduced child-rearing credits for mothers.
2. Early childhood education and care has been significantly expanded
in Argentina, Chile, Mexico, and Uruguay (for example Faur 2011;
Filgueira et al. 2011; Staab and Gerhard 2011).
3. In practice, the pace, depth, and breadth of structural reforms varied
and neoliberal reform processes unfolded in contextually specific and con-
tested ways, leading to a variety of actually existing neoliberalism[s]
(Brenner and Theodore 2002).
4. Male-breadwinner bias is defined here as a way of constructing the
ownership of rights to make claims on the state for social benefits (. . .)
around a norm of full-time, life-long working-age participation in the
market-based labor force. Those whose participation does not fit this norm
typically have lesser rights, which they can frequently only exercise as
dependents on those who do fit the norm (Elson and Cagatay 2000).
5. While maternalism is often used as a historical concept, referring to
womens welfare activism in the formative period of welfare states (Koven
and Michel 1993). As concept in policy analysis, it is useful to distinguish
between public maternalism where the state actively supports women in
their role as mothers and private maternalism where maternal care
becomes a kind of default position in the face of state inaction (Glass and
Fodor 2007). Both assign responsibility for childcare to mothers (rather
than both parents).
6. A 2002 opinion poll revealed that 83 percent of Chileans believed
that preschool-aged children suffer if their mother works (cited in
Franceschet 2006).
7. Since 2007, for example, the family allowance is automatically guar-
anteed to all households who fulfill eligibility criteria. Before this, there was
only a limited allotment depending on the availability of public funding,
leaving many families who would have been entitled to the subsidy uncov-
ered (BCN 2007).
 Maternalism, Male-Breadwinner Bias, and Market Reform V 325

8. This does not mean that there were no changes in employment

policy. However, areas of progress and stagnation reflect the continued con-
viction of policy makers that economic growth together with a series of
enabling measures will fix the problem (Sehnbruch 2009).
9. CENDA (2011) calculated gender gaps of 18 percent if the woman
retires at age sixty-five, and 31 percent if the woman retires at age sixty
caused solely by expected differences in longevity.
10. This differs from other countries that have carried out
second-generation reforms, either reintroducing defined-benefit systems
(Argentina) or transferring the administration of individual accounts back
to the state (Bolivia) (Arza 2012).
11. In 2007, private pension funds administered around hundred billion
Chilean Pesos equivalent to 70 percent of the countrys GDP (Guardia
2007).
12. Labor leaders expressed their discontent with the reform during
interviews with the author in Santiago in 2011. They argued that while
they had been invited to present their opinions to the Expert Commission
on pension reform established in 2006, virtually none of their demands was
reflected in the final reform proposal. Arenas de Mesa (2010), in turn,
describes how the government worked on aligning critical Concertacion
parliamentarians who pushed for measures that would regulate private
pension funds and engage employers more seriously.
13. The initial proposal foresaw to target this benefit to women belong-
ing to 40 percent of the poorest households. According to Arenas de Mesa
(2010) its universal application was the explicit wish of the President.
14. Workers remain responsible for the 10 percent pay roll deduction
for pensions, while employers are now in charge of disability and survivors
insurance contributions (about 1.5 per cent of the gross salary).
15. In early 2011, over 40 percent of the workforce was employed in
establishments with less than eleven workers (Instituto Nacional de
Estadsticas 2011).
16. All figures are based on data from the triennial household survey
CASEN.
17. The expansion has taken place through two main institutions: The
National Council of Kindergartens, a government body linked to the
Ministry of Education, and Fundacion Integra, a private non-profit founda-
tion that belongs to the Presidencys network of foundations.
18. A recent example of this trend towards womens activation is a
report co-edited by the World Bank, SERNAM, and the Inter-American
Development Bank (2007) entitled How to capitalize Chiles economic
potential through the expansion of work opportunities for women.
19. In 2009, the right was extended to fathers under two exceptional
conditions: if, by way of a family court ruling, the father is legally in
charge of a child under the age of two years, or in case of the mothers
death.
20. It is likely, however, that its effective reach was significantly reduced
by the informalization of employment that accompanied the economic
326 V Staab

reforms of the 1980s, which in turn, hit women disproportionately hard

(Gideon 2007).
21. UF (Unidad de Fomento) is a unit of account. Its exchange rate with
the Chilean Peso is inflation-adjusted so that its own value remains con-
stant. In October 2011, sixty-six UF corresponded roughly to two thousand
nine hundred US$.
22. Since 2000 these regulations apply as well in the case of adoption.
23. Among others, the extension of maternity leave was discussed in the
Presidential Advisory Council on Child Policy Reform (2006) and the
Advisory Council on Work and Equity (2008). Furthermore, in early 2010,
a group of parliamentarians together with representatives of different
medical associations formally asked President Bachelet to send a legislative
proposal on maternity leave extension before the end of her mandate
(El Mostrador 2010).
24. See footnote 21.
25. It was estimated that in 2009 approximately two thirds of women
workers in reproductive age received maternity benefits (Comision Mujer
2010).
26. In 2009, roughly 20 percent of female workers had no employment
contract at all (Mideplan 2009).
27. There was no uniform civil society demand for co-responsibility. In
interviews with the author, women labor leaders stressed that it was
womens organizations that pushed for engaging fathers and granting them
independent and exclusive rights, while women linked to the labor move-
ment were either against or uninterested in the measure, considering that it
bore little relation to their reality. Medical associations favored an exten-
sion aimed at mothers in order to encourage breastfeeding.

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