CASE FACTS
Angelito Suazo and Jocelyn Suazo met when they were 16 NOT ANNULLED!
years old only.Then, they got married. Without any means to
support themselves, they lived with Angelitos parents while
Jocelyn took odd jobs and Angelito refused to work and was
most of the time drunk.
Petitioner urged him to find work but this often resulted to
violent quarrels. A year after their marriage, Jocelyn left
Angelito. Angelito thereafter found another woman with
whom he has since lived.
10 years later, she filed a petition for declaration of nullity of
marriage under Art. 36 Psychological incapacity. Jocelyn
testified on the alleged physical beating she received.
The expert witness corroborated parts of Jocelyns testimony.
Both her psychological report and testimony concluded that
Angelito was psychologically incapacitated. However, B was
not personally examined by the expert witness.
The RTC annulled the marriage on the ground that Angelito
is unfit to comply with his marital obligation, such
as immaturity, i.e., lack of an effective sense of
SUAZO vs. SUAZO
rational judgment and responsibility, otherwise
peculiar to infants (like refusal of the husband to
support the family or excessive dependence on parents
or peer group approval) and habitual alcoholism, or the
condition by which a person lives for the next drink
and the next drinks but the CA reversed it and held that
the respondent may have failed to provide material support
to the family and has resorted to physical abuse, but it is still
necessary to show that they were manifestations of a deeper
psychological malaise that was clinically or medically
identified.
The theory of the psychologist that the respondent was
suffering from an anti-social personality syndrome at
the time of the marriage was not the product of any
adequate medical or clinical investigation.
The evidence that she got from the petitioner, anecdotal at
best, could equally show that the behavior of the respondent
was due simply to causes like immaturity or irresponsibility
which are not equivalent to psychological incapacity, or the
failure or refusal to work could have been the result of
rebelliousness on the part of one who felt that he had been
forced into a loveless marriage.
A whirlwind love-story of Edward and Cheryl. After 1 year of
courtship, they got married.
LIM VS. LIM
They lived at the residence of the Edwardss grandparents.
They were dependent upon the support of the grandparents
since Edwards salary is only 6,000.
RULING
The Court find the petition devoid of merit. The CA committed no reversible error of law in
setting aside the RTC decision, as no basis exists to declare Jocelyns marriage with Angelito a nullity
under Article 36 of the Family Code and its related jurisprudence.
Jocelyns evidence is insufficient to establish Angelitos psychological incapacity. The
psychologist evaluated Angelitos psychological condition only in an indirect manner she derived all
her conclusions from information coming from Jocelyn whose bias for her cause cannot of course be
doubted. The psychlologist, using meager information coming from a directly interested party, could
not have secured a complete personality profile and could not have conclusively formed an objective
opinion or diagnosis of Angelitos psychological condition. While the report or evaluation may be
conclusive with respect to Jocelyns psychological condition, this is not true for Angelitos. The
methodology employed simply cannot satisfy the required depth and comprehensiveness of
examination required to evaluate a party alleged to be suffering from a psychological disorder. Both
the psychologists report and testimony simply provided a general description of Angelitos purported
anti-social personality disorder, supported by the characterization of this disorder as chronic, grave
and incurable. The psychologist was conspicuously silent, however, on the bases for her conclusion
or the particulars that gave rise to the characterization she gave. Jurisprudence holds that there
must be evidence showing a link, medical or the like, between the acts that
manifest psychological incapacity and the psychological disorder itself. As testimony regarding the
habitual drunkenness, gambling and refusal to find a job, while indicative of psychological incapacity,
do not, by themselves, show psychological incapacity. All these simply indicate difficulty, neglect or
mere refusal to perform marital obligations.
It is not enough that the respondent, alleged to be psychologically incapacitated, had difficulty in
complying with his marital obligations, or was unwilling to perform these obligations. Proof of a
natal or supervening disabling factor an adverse integral element in the respondents
personality structure that effectively incapacitated him from complying with his essential
marital obligations must be shown. Mere difficulty, refusal or neglect in the performance of
marital obligations or ill will on the part of the spouse is different from incapacity rooted in some
debilitating psychological condition or illness; irreconcilable differences, sexual infidelity or
perversion, emotional immaturity and irresponsibility and the like, do not by themselves warrant a
finding of psychological incapacity under Article 36, as the same may only be due to a persons
refusal or unwillingness to assume the essential obligations of marriage.
NOT ANNULLED!
The seminal ruling in Santos v. Court of Appeals[9] cites three (3) factors characterizing psychological
incapacity to perform the essential marital obligations: (1) gravity, (2) juridical antecedence, (3)
incurability. We expounded on the foregoing, to wit:
1
 Cheryl insisted that they live separately.
One day, she caught Edward in a compromising situation with
the caregiver of the grandparents. This hath led Cheryl to
leave the house together with their children.
The couples relationship before the marriage and even during
their brief union (for well about a year or so) was not all bad.
During that relatively short period of time, petitioner was
happy and contented with her life in the company of
respondent. In fact, by petitioners own reckoning, respondent
was a responsible and loving husband. x x x.
Their problems began when petitioner started doubting
FERRARIS VS
respondents fidelity. It was only when they started fighting
FERRARIS
about the calls from women that respondent began to
withdraw into his shell and corner, and failed to perform his
so-called marital obligations.
Respondent could not understand petitioners lack of trust in
him and her constant naggings. He thought her suspicions
irrational. Respondent could not relate to her anger, temper
and jealousy.
Less than 3 years after Lynette and Martini contracted
marriage Lynette already filed for an annulment on the
RP VS BAGUIO ground of Psychological incapacity.
Martini was a seafarer and later in the relationship, Lynetted
discovered him to be a Mamas boy. Even after he already got
married, he is still dependent upon his mother and would
choose to spend more time with his family than with this
wife.
The incapacity must be grave or serious such that the party would be incapable of carrying out the
ordinary duties required in marriage; it must be rooted in the history of the party antedating the
marriage, although the overt manifestations may emerge only after the marriage; and it must be
incurable or, even if it were otherwise, the cure would be beyond the means of the party involved.
In this case, nowhere in Dr. Villegas Psychiatric Report and in her testimony does she link particular
acts of the parties to the DSM IVs list of criteria for the specific personality disorders.
Curiously, Dr. Villegas global conclusion of both parties personality disorders was not
supported by psychological tests properly administered by clinical psychologists specifically trained in
the tests use and interpretation. The supposed personality disorders of the parties, considering that
such diagnoses were made, could have been fully established by psychometric and neurological tests
which are designed to measure specific aspects of peoples intelligence, thinking, or personality. [17]
Concededly, a copy of DSM IV, or any of the psychology textbooks, does not transform a
lawyer or a judge into a professional psychologist. A judge should not substitute his own
psychological assessment of the parties for that of the psychologist or the psychiatrist. However, a
judge has the bounden duty to rule on what the law is, as applied to a certain set of facts. Certainly,
as in all other litigations involving technical or special knowledge, a judge must first and foremost
resolve the legal question based on law and jurisprudence.
NOT ANNULLED!
We find respondents alleged mixed personality disorder, the leaving-the-house attitude whenever
they quarreled, the violent tendencies during epileptic attacks, the sexual infidelity, the
abandonment and lack of support, and his preference to spend more time with his band mates than
his family, are not rooted on some debilitating psychological condition but a mere refusal or
unwillingness to assume the essential obligations of marriage.
Thus, in determining the import of psychological incapacity under Article 36, it must be read in
conjunction with, although to be taken as distinct from Articles 35, [21] 37,[22] 38,[23] and 41[24] that
would likewise, but for different reasons, render the marriage void ab initio, or Article 45[25] that
would make the marriage merely voidable, or Article 55 that could justify a petition for legal
separation. Care must be observed so that these various circumstances are not applied so
indiscriminately as if the law were indifferent on the matter. [26] Article 36 should not to be confused
with a divorce law that cuts the marital bond at the time the causes therefor manifest themselves.
[27]
Neither it is to be equated with legal separation, in which the grounds need not be rooted in
psychological incapacity but on physical violence, moral pressure, moral corruption, civil interdiction,
drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity, abandonment and the like.
NOT ANNULLED!
The mere showing of irreconcilable differences and conflicting personalities does not
constitute psychological incapacity. [43] Nor does failure of the parties to meet their responsibilities
and duties as married persons.
It is essential that the parties to a marriage must be shown to be insensitive
to or incapable of meeting their duties and responsibilities due to some psychological (not physical)
illness, [44]
which insensitivity or incapacity should have been existing at the time of the celebration of
the marriage even if it becomes manifest only after its solemnization. [45]
In fine, for psychological incapacity to render a marriage void ab initio, it must be
characterized by
Gravity It must be grave and serious such that the party would be incapable of carrying out the
ordinary duties required in a marriage;
Juridical Antecedence It must be rooted in the history of the party antedating the marriage,
although the overt manifestations may emerge only after the marriage; and
2

in 1990, Leo married Marie, the latter being ten years his
senior.
ANTONIO VS
REYES In 1993, Leo filed to annul t
he marriage due to Maries Psychological Incapacity. Leo
claimed that Marie persistently lied about herself, the people
around her, her occupation, income, educational attainment
and other events or things. She would claim that she is a
psychologist but she is not. Shed claim she is a singer with
the company Blackgold and that she is the latters number 1
money maker but shes not. Shed also spend lavishly as
opposed to her monthly income. She fabricates things and
people only to serve her make believe world.
Leo presented an expert that proved Maries PI. Marie denied
Incurability It must be incurable, or even if it were otherwise, the cure would be beyond the
means of the party involved. [46]
Dr. Gerong found that Martinis personality disorders including his being a mamas boy are
serious, grave, existing already during the adolescent period and incurable and concluded that
Martini appeared to be dependent upon his family and unable to establish a domicile for his family
and to support his family.
The doctors findings and conclusion were derived from his interview of Lynnette and her
sister and Lynnettes deposition. From Lynnettes deposition, however, it is gathered that Martinis
failure to establish a common life with her stems from his refusal, not incapacity, to do so. It is
downright incapacity, not refusal or neglect or difficulty, much less ill will, [47] which renders a
marriage void on the ground of psychological incapacity. In another vein, how the doctor arrived at
the conclusion, after interviewing Lynnette and considering her deposition, that any such personality
disorders of Martini have been existing since Martinis adolescent years has not been explained. It
bears recalling that Martini and Lynnette became pen pals in 1995 and contracted marriage in 1997
when Martini was already 32 years old, far removed from adolescent years.
Dr. Gerongs citing of Martinis appointment of his mother as a beneficiary and his
representing himself as single in his Seafarer Information Sheet, without more, as indications of
Martinis dependence on his family
amounting to his incapacity to fulfill his duties as a married man does not logically follow, especially
given that the Seafarers Information Sheet is not even dated [48] and, therefore, there is no certainty
that it was prepared after Martini contracted marriage.
While the examination by a physician of a person in order to declare him/her psychological
incapacitated is not required, the root cause thereof must be medically or clinically identified. There
must thus be evidence to adequately establish the same. There is none such in the case at bar,
however.
The Constitution sets out a policy of protecting and strengthening the family as the basic
social institution and marriage as the foundation of the family. [49] Marriage, an inviolable institution
protected by the State,[50] cannot be dissolved at the whim of the parties. [51] In petitions for the
declaration of nullity of marriage, the burden of proof to show the nullity of marriage lies on the
plaintiff.[52] Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage
and against its dissolution and nullity. [53]
As reflected above, Lynnette failed to discharge the onus probandi. While the Court
sympathizes with her predicament, its first and foremost duty is to apply the law. [54]Dura lex sed lex.
Lynnettes marriage with Martini may have failed then, but it cannot be declared void ab
initio on the ground of psychological incapacity in light of the insufficient evidence presented. [55]
ANNULLED!
Yes, Psychological Incapacity is attendant. The guidelines established in the Molina case is properly
established in the case at bar.
The case sufficiently satisfies the Molina guidelines:
First, that Antonio had sufficiently overcome his burden in proving the psychological incapacity of his
wife;
Second, that the root cause of Reyes' psychological incapacity has been medically or clinically
identified that was sufficiently proven by experts, and was clearly explained in the trial court's
decision;
Third, that she fabricated friends and made up letters before she married him prove that her
psychological incapacity was have existed even before the celebration of marriage;
Fourth, that the gravity of Reyes' psychological incapacity was considered so grave that a restrictive
clause was appended to the sentence of nullity prohibited by the National Appellate Matrimonial
Tribunal from contracting marriage without their consent;
3
 all Leos allegations and also presented an expert to prove
her case.
The RTC ruled against Marie and annulled the marriage. The
Matrimonial Tribunal of the church also annulled the marriage
and was affirmed by the Vaticans Roman Rata. The CA
reversed the decision hence the appeal.
Reghis married Olivia not out of love but because of the
kindness of the latters parents.
Later on in their marriage, Reghis filed annulment citing his
PI to comply with the marital obligation as a ground for the
claim. He also submitted a Psychological Report stating that
he is suffering from OCPD. According to Dr. Basilio, Reghis'
behavioral disorder gave him a strong obsession for whatever
endeavour he chooses, such as his work, to the exclusion of
other responsibilities and duties such as those pertaining to
his roles as father and husband.
RP VS ROMERO
MARCOS VS
MARCOS Brenda and Wilson were both in the AFP at the time that they
met each other. They got married. Later, Wilson was
discharged from duty and started to engage in businesses 1.
which did not prosper. Breanda repeatedly urged him to look
for a job, however he ends up beating and hurting Brenda
instead.
Brenda filed for annulment on the grounds of PI. The social
worker submitted reports that the children have become
Fifth, that she being an inveterate pathological liar makes her unable to commit the basic tenets of
relationship between spouses based on love, trust, and respect.
Sixth, that the CA clearly erred when it failed to take into consideration the fact that the marriage
was annulled by the Catholic Church. However, it is the factual findings of the judicial trier of facts,
and not of the canonical courts, that are accorded significant recognition by this Court.
Seventh, that Reyes' case is incurable considering that Antonio tried to reconcile with her but her
behavior remains unchanged
The SC also emphasized what fraud means as contemplated in Art 45 (3) of the FC vis a vis Art 46 of
the FC. In PI, the misrepresentation done by Marie points to her inadequacy to cope with her marital
obligations, kindred to psychological incapacity. In Art 45 (3), marriage may be annulled if the
consent of either party was obtained by fraud, and Article 46 which enumerates the circumstances
constituting fraud under the previous article, clarifies that no other misrepresentation or deceit as
to character, health, rank, fortune or chastity shall constitute such fraud as will give grounds for
action for the annulment of marriage. These provisions of Art 45 (3) and Art 46 cannot be applied in
the case at bar because the misrepresentations done by Marie is not considered as fraud but rather
such misrepresentations constitute her aberrant behaviour which further constitutes PI. Her
misrepresentations are not lies sought to vitiate Leos consent to marry her. Her misrepresentations
are evidence that Marie cannot simply distinguish fiction/fantasy from reality which is so grave and it
falls under the fourth guideline laid down in the Molina Case.
NOT ANNULLED!
According to Dr. Basilio, Reghis' behavioral disorder gave him a strong obsession for whatever
endeavour he chooses, such as his work, to the exclusion of other responsibilities and duties such as
those pertaining to his roles as father and husband.
Thus, to warrant the declaration of nullity of marriage, the psychological incapacity must: (a) be
grave or serious such that the party would be incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required
in a marriage; (b) have juridical antecedence, i.e., it must be rooted in the history of the party
antedating the marriage, although the overt manifestations may emerge only after the marriage;
and (c) be incurable, or even if it were otherwise, the cure would be beyond the means of the party
involved.46
Motives for entering into a marriage are varied and complex. Thus, marriages entered into for
other purposes, limited or otherwise, such as convenience, companionship, money, status,
and title, provided that they comply with all the legal requisites, are equally valid. Love,
though the ideal consideration in a marriage contract, is not the only valid cause for
marriage. Other considerations, not precluded by law, may validly support a marriage.
Moreover, the OCPD which Reghis allegedly suffered from was not shown to have juridical
antecedence. Other than Dr. Basilio's conclusion that Reghis' "behavioral disorder x x x existed even
prior to the marriage or even during his adolescent years," 52 no specific behavior or habits during his
adolescent years were shown which would explain his behavior during his marriage with Olivia. Dr.
BAsilio had also shown that it is incurable but failed to establish how she had came to such
conclusion.
NOT ANNULLED!
We agree with petitioner that the personal medical or psychological examination of respondent is not
a requirement for a declaration of psychological incapacity.
The guidelines incorporate the three basic requirements earlier mandated by the Court in Santos v.
Court of Appeals:[11] "psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity(b) juridical
antecedence, and (c) incurability." The foregoing guidelines do not require that a physician examine
the person to be declared psychologically incapacitated. In fact, the root cause may be "medically or
4
 witnesses of their fathers abusive character.
Moreover, Brenda also submitted herself foe examination
while Wilson did not. Dr. Dayan, psyhiatrist, found that
Wilson is PI because he is unable to perform his marital
duties, etc 2.
In 1969, Rodolfo De Gracia and Natividad Rosalem married
each other. Their first child was born in the same year. In
1972, they begot a second child. However, after giving birth,
Natividad left their conjugal home, even selling said house,
and then had an affair with an engineer. She bore a child with
the said engineer. In 1991, she left the engineer and
cohabited with another man.
In 1998, Rodolfo filed a petition to have their marriage be
declared void on the ground that Natividad is psychologically
incapacitated. Rodolfo engaged the services of Dr. Cheryl
Zalsos to evaluate both parties. In court, Zalsos testified that
both parties are psychologically incapacitated; that
RP VS DE GRACIA
Rodolfo failed to perform his obligations as a husband, adding
too that he sired a son with another woman; that
Natividad lacked the willful cooperation of being a wife and a
mother to her two daughters; that both suffered from utter
emotional immaturity which is unusual and unacceptable
behavior considered as deviant from persons who abide by
established norms of conduct; that the mental condition of
both parties already existed at the time of the celebration of
marriage, although it only manifested after.
The RTC gave weight to Zalsos testimony hence the marriage
was declared void. The Court of Appeals affirmed the
decision.
RP VS MOLINA
Roridel Olaviano was married to Reynaldo Molina on 14 April
1985 in Manila, and gave birth to a son a year after.
Reynaldo showed signs of immaturity and irresponsibility on
the early stages of the marriage, observed from his tendency
to spend time with his friends and squandering his money
with them, from his dependency from his parents, and his
dishonesty on matters involving his finances. Reynaldo was
relieved of his job in 1986, Roridel became the sole
breadwinner thereafter. In March 1987, Roridel resigned from
her job in Manila and proceeded to Baguio City. Reynaldo left
her and their child a week later. The couple is separated-in-
clinically identified." What is important is the presence of evidence that can adequately establish the
party's psychological condition. For indeed, if the totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain
a finding of psychological incapacity, then actual medical examination of the person concerned need
not be resorted to.
The main question, then, is whether the totality of the evidence presented in the present case --
including the testimonies of petitioner, the common children, petitioner's sister and the social worker
-- was enough to sustain a finding that respondent was psychologically incapacitated.
We rule in the negative. Although this Court is sufficiently convinced that respondent failed to
provide material support to the family and may have resorted to physical abuse and abandonment,
the totality of his acts does not lead to a conclusion of psychological incapacity on his part. There is
absolutely no showing that his "defects" were already present at the inception of the marriage or
that they are incurable.
NOT ANNULLED!
the evidence presented failed to support a finding of psychological incapacity. The psychiatric
evaluation report of Dr. Zalsos does not explain in reasonable detail how Natividads condition could
be characterized as grave, deeply-rooted, and incurable within the parameters of psychological
incapacity jurisprudence (Molina Guidelines).
The Supreme Court also ruled: Although expert opinions furnished by psychologists regarding the
psychological temperament of parties are usually given considerable weight by the courts, the
existence of psychological incapacity must still be proven by independent evidence.
NOT ANNULLED!
The Court of Appeals erred in its opinion the Civil Code Revision Committee intended to liberalize the
application of Philippine civil laws on personal and family rights, and holding psychological incapacity
as a broad range of mental and behavioral conduct on the part of one spouse indicative of how he or
she regards the marital union, his or her personal relationship with the other spouse, as well as his
or her conduct in the long haul for the attainment of the principal objectives of marriage; where said
conduct, observed and considered as a whole, tends to cause the union to self-destruct because it
defeats the very objectives of marriage, warrants the dissolution of the marriage.
The Court reiterated its ruling in Santos v. Court of Appeals, where psychological incapacity should
refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity, existing at the time the marriage is
celebrated, and that there is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine
the meaning of psychological incapacity to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly
demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage.
Psychological incapacity must be characterized by gravity, juridical antecedence, and incurability. In
5

fact for more than three years.
On 16 August 1990, Roridel filed a verified petition for
declaration of nullity of her marriage to Reynaldo Molina.
Evidence for Roridel consisted of her own testimony, that of
two of her friends, a social worker, and a psychiatrist of the
Baguio General Hospital and Medical Center. Reynaldo did not
present any evidence as he appeared only during the pre-trial
conference. On 14 May 1991, the trial court rendered
judgment declaring the marriage void. The Solicitor General
appealed to the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals
denied the appeals and affirmed in toto the RTCs decision.
Hence, the present recourse.
In the case at bar, Kalaw presented the testimonies of two
supposed expert witnesses who concluded that respondent is
psychologically incapacitated. Petitioners experts heavily
relied on petitioners allegations of respondents constant
mahjong sessions, visits to the beauty parlor, going out with
friends, adultery, and neglect of their children. Petitioners
KALAW VS experts opined that respondents alleged habits, when
FERNANDEZ performed constantly to the detriment of quality and quantity
of time devoted to her duties as mother and wife, constitute a
psychological incapacity in the form of NPD.
However, the Supreme Court in its September 19, 2011
decision dismissed the complaint for declaration of nullity of
the marriage on the ground that there was no factual basis
for the conclusion of psychological incapacity.
the present case, there is no clear showing to us that the psychological defect spoken of is an
incapacity; but appears to be more of a difficulty, if not outright refusal or neglect in the
performance of some marital obligations. Mere showing of irreconcilable differences and
conflicting personalities in no wise constitutes psychological incapacity.
The Court, in this case, promulgated the guidelines in the interpretation and application of Article 36
of the Family Code, removing any visages of it being the most liberal divorce procedure in the world:
(1) The burden of proof belongs to the plaintiff; (2) the root cause of psychological incapacity must
be medically or clinically identified, alleged in the complaint, sufficiently proven by expert, and
clearly explained in the decision; (3) The incapacity must be proven existing at the time of the
celebration of marriage; (4) the incapacity must be clinically or medically permanent or incurable;
(5) such illness must be grave enough; (6) the essential marital obligation must be embraced by
Articles 68 to 71 of the Family Code as regards husband and wife, and Articles 220 to 225 of the
same code as regards parents and their children; (7) interpretation made by the National Appellate
Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church, and (8) the trial must order the fiscal and the Solicitor-
General to appeal as counsels for the State.
The Supreme Court granted the petition, and reversed and set aside the assailed decision;
concluding that the marriage of Roridel Olaviano to Reynaldo Molina subsists and remains valid.
ANULLED!
YES. The Court in granting the Motion for Reconsideration held that Fernandezwas indeed
psychologically incapacitated as they relaxed the previously set forth guidelines with regard to this
case.
Note: Molina guidelines were not abandoned, expert opinions were just given much respect in this
case.
Guidelines too rigid, thus relaxed IN THIS CASE
The Court held that the guidelines set in the case of Republic v. CA have turned out to be rigid, such
that their application to every instance practically condemned the petitions for declaration of nullity
to the fate of certain rejection. But Article 36 of the Family Code must not be so strictly and too
literally read and applied given the clear intendment of the drafters to adopt its enacted version of
less specificity obviously to enable some resiliency in its application. Instead, every court should
approach the issue of nullity not on the basis of a priori assumptions, predilections or
generalizations, but according to its own facts in recognition of the verity that no case would be on
all fours with the next one in the field of psychological incapacity as a ground for the nullity of
marriage; hence, every trial judge must take pains in examining the factual milieu and the
appellate court must, as much as possible, avoid substituting its own judgment for that of the trial
court.
In the task of ascertaining the presence of psychological incapacity as a ground for the nullity of
marriage, the courts, which are concededly not endowed with expertise in the field of
psychology, must of necessity rely on the opinions of experts in order to inform
themselves on the matter, and thus enable themselves to arrive at an intelligent and
judicious judgment. Indeed, the conditions for the malady of being grave, antecedent and
incurable demand the in-depth diagnosis by experts.
Personal examination by party not required; totality of evidence must be considered
We have to stress that the fulfillment of the constitutional mandate for the State to protect marriage
as an inviolable social institution only relates to a valid marriage. No protection can be accorded to a
6
marriage that is null and void

ab initio, because such a marriage has no legal existence.

There is no requirement for one to be declared psychologically incapacitated to be personally

examined by a physician, because what is important is the presence of evidence that adequately
establishes the partys psychological incapacity. Hence, if the totality of evidence presented is
enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity, then actual medical examination of the
person concerned need not be resorted to.

Verily, the totality of the evidence must show a link, medical or the like, between the acts that
manifest psychological incapacity and the psychological disorder itself. If other evidence showing
that a certain condition could possibly result from an assumed state of facts existed in the record,
the expert opinion should be admissible and be weighed as an aid for the court in interpreting such
other evidence on the causation.

Indeed, an expert opinion on psychological incapacity should be considered as conjectural or

speculative and without any probative value only in the absence of other evidence to establish
causation. The experts findings under such circumstances would not constitute hearsay that would
justify their exclusion as evidence.

Expert opinion considered as decisive evidence as to psychological and emotional

temperaments

The findings and evaluation by the RTC as the trial court deserved credence because it was in
the better position to view and examine the demeanor of the witnesses while they were testifying.
The position and role of the trial judge in the appreciation of the evidence showing the psychological
incapacity were not to be downplayed but should be accorded due importance and respect.

The Court considered it improper and unwarranted to give to such expert opinions a merely
generalized consideration and treatment, least of all to dismiss their value as inadequate basis for
the declaration of the nullity of the marriage. Instead, we hold that said experts sufficiently and
competently described the psychological incapacity of the respondent within the standards of Article
36 of the Family Code. We uphold the conclusions reached by the two expert witnesses because they
were largely drawn from the case records and affidavits, and should not anymore be disputed after
the RTC itself had accepted the veracity of the petitioners factual premises.

The Court also held that the courts must accord weight to expert testimony on the psychological and
mental state of the parties in cases for the declaration of the nullity of marriages, for by the very
nature of Article 36 of the Family Code the courts, despite having the primary task and burden
of decision-making, must not discount but, instead, must consider as decisive evidence
the expert opinion on the psychological and mental temperaments of the parties.

Willfully exposing children to gambling constitutes neglect of parental duties

The frequency of the respondents mahjong playing should not have delimited our determination of
the presence or absence of psychological incapacity. Instead, the determinant should be her obvious
failure to fully appreciate the duties and responsibilities of parenthood at the time she made her
marital vows. Had she fully appreciated such duties and responsibilities, she would have known that
bringing along her children of very tender ages to her mahjong sessions would expose them to a
culture of gambling and other vices that would erode their moral fiber. Nonetheless, the long-term
effects of the respondents obsessive mahjong playing surely impacted on her family life, particularly

7

Chi Ming Tsoi and Gina Lao Tsoi was married in 1988. After
the celebration of their wedding, they proceed to the house of
defendants mother. There was no sexual intercourse
between them during their first night and same thing
happened until their fourth night. In an effort to have their
honeymoon in a private place, they went to Baguio but Ginas
relatives went with them. Again, there was no sexual
intercourse since the defendant avoided by taking a long walk
during siesta or sleeping on a rocking chair at the living
room. Since May 1988 until March 1989 they slept together
in the same bed but no attempt of sexual intercourse
between them. Because of this, they submitted themselves
for medical examination to a urologist in Chinese General
Hospital in 1989. The result of the physical examination of
Gina was disclosed, while that of the husband was kept
CHI MING TSOI VS
confidential even the medicine prescribed. There were
CA
allegations that the reason why Chi Ming Tsoi married her is
to maintain his residency status here in the country. Gina
does not want to reconcile with Chi Ming Tsoi and want their
marriage declared void on the ground of psychological
incapacity. On the other hand, the latter does not want to
have their marriage annulled because he loves her very
much, he has no defect on his part and is physically and
psychologically capable and since their relationship is still
young, they can still overcome their differences. Chi Ming
Tsoi submitted himself to another physical examination and
the result was there is not evidence of impotency and he is
capable of erection.
SIAYNGCO VS
SIAYNGCO On 25 September 1997, or after twenty-four (24) years of A.
married life together, respondent Manuel filed for the
declaration of its nullity on the ground of psychological
incapacity of petitioner Juanita. He alleged that all throughout
their marriage, his wife exhibited an over domineering and
selfish attitude towards him which was exacerbated by her
extremely volatile and bellicose nature; that she incessantly
complained about almost everything and anyone connected
with him like his elderly parents, the staff in his office and
anything not of her liking like the physical arrangement,
tables, chairs, wastebaskets in his office and with other trivial
matters; that she showed no respect or regard at all for the
on her very young children.
The fact that the respondent brought her children with her to her mahjong sessions did not only
point to her neglect of parental duties, but also manifested her tendency to expose them to a culture
of gambling. Her willfully exposing her children to the culture of gambling on every occasion of her
mahjong sessions was a very grave and serious act of subordinating their needs for parenting to the
gratification of her own personal and escapist desires.
The respondent revealed her wanton disregard for her childrens moral and mental development.
This disregard violated her duty as a parent to safeguard and protect her children.
The Supreme Court held that the prolonged refusal of a spouse to have sexual intercourse with his
or her spouse is considered a sign of psychological incapacity. If a spouse, although physically
capable but simply refuses to perform his or her essential marriage obligations, and the refusal is
senseless and constant, Catholic marriage tribunals attribute the causes to psychological incapacity
than to stubborn refusal. Senseless and protracted refusal is equivalent to psychological incapacity.
One of the essential marital obligations under the Family Code is to procreate children basedon the
universal principle that procreation of children through sexual cooperation is the basic end of
marriage. Constant non-fulfillment of this obligation will finally destroy the integrity or wholeness of
the marriage. In the case at bar, the senseless and protracted refusal of one of the parties to fulfill
this marital obligation is equivalent to psychological incapacity.
While the law provides that the husband and the wife are obliged to live together, observer mutual
love, respect and fidelity, the sanction therefore is actually the spontaneous, mutual affection
between husband and wife and not any legal mandate or court order (Cuaderno vs. Cuaderno, 120
Phil. 1298). Love is useless unless it is shared with another. Indeed, no man is an island, the
cruelest act of a partner in marriage is to say I could not have cared less. This is so because an
ungiven self is an unfulfilled self. The egoist has nothing but himself. In the natural order, it is sexual
intimacy that brings spouses wholeness and oneness. Sexual intimacy is a gift and a participation in
the mystery of creation. It is a function which enlivens the hope of procreation and ensures the
continuation of family relations.
NOT ANNULLED!
RE: PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY OF RESPONDENT MANUEL
What emerges from the psychological report of Dr. Garcia as well as from the testimonies of
the parties and their witnesses is that the only essential marital obligation which respondent Manuel
was not able to fulfill, if any, is the obligation of fidelity. [49]Sexual infidelity, per se, however, does
not constitute psychological incapacity within the contemplation of the Family Code. [50] It must be
shown that respondent Manuels unfaithfulness is a manifestation of a disordered personality which
makes him completely unable to discharge the essential obligations of the marital state [51] and not
merely due to his ardent wish to have a child of his own flesh and blood. In herein case, respondent
Manuel has admitted that: I had [extra-marital] affairs because I wanted to have a child at that
particular point.[52]
8
 prestige and high position of his office as judge of the
Municipal Trial Court; that she would yell and scream at him
and throw objects around the house within the hearing of B.
their neighbors; that she cared even less about his
professional advancement as she did not even give him moral
support and encouragement; that her psychological
incapacity arose before marriage, rooted in her deep-seated
resentment and vindictiveness for what she perceived as lack
of love and appreciation from her own parents since
childhood and that such incapacity is permanent and
incurable and, even if treatment could be attempted, it will
involve time and expense beyond the emotional and physical
capacity of the parties; and that he endured and suffered
through his turbulent and loveless marriage to her for
twenty-two (22) years.
Petitioner Maria Socorro Camacho-Reyes met respondent
Ramon Reyes at the UP Diliman, in 1972 when they were
both 19 years old. Petitioner enjoyed respondents style of
CAMACHO-REYES courtship which included dining out, unlike other couples their
VS REYES age who were restricted by a university students budget. At
that time, respondent held a job in the family business, the
Aristocrat Restaurant. Petitioners good impression of the
respondent was not diminished by the latters habit of cutting
classes, not even by her discovery that respondent was
taking marijuana. On December 5, 1976, petitioner and
respondent got married. They lived with Ramons parents and
they were supported by them. They had a child which made
their financial difficulties worse. All the business ventures of
Ramon were unsuccessful and Socorro became the
breadwinner of the family. To make things worse, despite the
fact that Socorro would undergo an operation for removal of
a cyst, respondent remained unconcerned and unattentive;
and simply read the newspaper, and played dumb when
petitioner requested that he accompany her as she was
wheeled into the operating room. They tried to attend
counseling sessions but nothing has changed. Sometime in
1996, petitioner confirmed that respondent was having an
extra-marital affair.
[Petitioner] presented several expert witnesses to show that
[respondent] is psychologically incapacitated. Clinical
psychologist Dayan diagnosed [respondent] as purportedly
suffering from Mixed Personality Disorder (Schizoid
RE: PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY OF PETITIONER JUANITA
psychological report of respondent Manuels witness, Dr. Garcia, on the other hand, does
not help his case any. Nothing in there supports the doctors conclusion that petitioner Juanita is
psychologically incapacitated. On the contrary, the report clearly shows that the root cause of
petitioner Juanitas behavior is traceable not from the inception of their marriage as required by law
but from her experiences during the marriage, e.g., her in-laws disapproval of her as they wanted
their son to enter the priesthood, [55] her husbands philandering, admitted no less by him, [56] and her
inability to conceive.[57] Dr. Garcias report paints a story of a husband and wife who grew
professionally during the marriage, who pursued their individual dreams to the hilt, becoming busier
and busier, ultimately sacrificing intimacy and togetherness as a couple. This was confirmed by
respondent Manuel himself during his direct examination. [58]
Thus, from the totality of the evidence adduced by both parties, we have been allowed a
window into the Siayngcoss life and have perceived therefrom a simple case of a married couple
drifting apart, becoming strangers to each other, with the husband consequently falling out of love
and wanting a way out.
An unsatisfactory marriage, however, is not a null and void marriage. Mere showing of
irreconcilable differences and conflicting personalities in no wise constitutes psychological incapacity.
[59]
As we stated in Marcos v. Marcos:[60]
ANNULLED!
The lack of personal examination and interview of the respondent, or any other person diagnosed
with personality disorder, does not per se invalidate the testimonies of the doctors. Neither do their
findings automatically constitute hearsay that would result in their exclusion as evidence.
For one, marriage, by its very definition, necessarily involves only two persons. The totality of the
behavior of one spouse during the cohabitation and marriage is generally and genuinely witnessed
mainly by the other. In this case, the experts testified on their individual assessment of the present
state of the parties marriage from the perception of one of the parties, herein petitioner. Certainly,
petitioner, during their marriage, had occasion to interact with, and experience, respondents pattern
of behavior which she could then validly relay to the clinical psychologists and the psychiatrist.
For another, the clinical psychologists and psychiatrists assessment were not based solely on the
narration or personal interview of the petitioner. Other informants such as respondents own son,
siblings and in-laws, and sister-in-law (sister of petitioner), testified on their own observations of
respondents behavior and interactions with them, spanning the period of time they knew him. These
were also used as the basis of the doctors assessments.
Within their acknowledged field of expertise, doctors can diagnose the psychological make up of a
person based on a number of factors culled from various sources. A person afflicted with a
personality disorder will not necessarily have personal knowledge thereof. In this case, considering
that a personality disorder is manifested in a pattern of behavior, self-diagnosis by the respondent
consisting only in his bare denial of the doctors separate diagnoses, does not necessarily evoke
credence and cannot trump the clinical findings of experts.
In sum, we find points of convergence & consistency in all three reports and the respective
testimonies of Doctors Magno, Dayan and Villegas, i.e.: (1) respondent does have problems; and (2)
9
 Narcissistic and Anti-Social Personality Disorder). Further,
clinical psychologist Magno found [respondent] to be suffering
from an Antisocial Personality Disorder with narcissistic and
dependent features, while Dr. Villegas diagnosed
[respondent] to be suffering from Personality Disorder of the
anti-social type, associated with strong sense of Inadequacy
especially along masculine strivings and narcissistic features.
The RTC granted the petition and declared the marriage
between the parties null and void on the ground of their
psychological incapacity. CA Reversed.Hence,this petition.
This a complaint by Lupo Atienza for gross immorality and
appearance of impropriety against Judge Brillantes.
Lupo Alleges that he has 2 children with Yolanda de Castro,
who are living together in a home purchased by him in 1987
in Manila. On 1991, Lupo saw Brillantes sleeping on his bed.
Upon inquiry, the houseboy told that Brillantes had been
cohabiting with de Castro. Lupo left the home without
confronting Brillantes. Thereafter, respondent prevented him
from visiting his children and even alienated the affection of
his children from him. Lupo claims that Brillantes is married
to Ongkiko with whom he has 5 children. Brillantes on his
part, alleged that Lupo was not married to de Castro and that
he is not married to Ongkiko although he admits having 5
ATIENZA VS children with her. Brillantes claims that when he married de
BRILLANTES Castro in 1991 at California, he believed in all good faith and
with all legal intents and purposes, that he was single
because her first marriage was solemnized without a
marriage license.
Brillantes argues that the provision of Art. 40 of the Family
Code does not apply to him considering that his first marriage
took place in 1965 and was governed by the Civil Code of the
Philippines while the second marriage which took place in
1991 was governed by the Family Code.
DOMINGO VS CA
Roberto Domingo married Delia Soledad in 1976 while being
married with Emerlina dela Paz.
He has been unemployed and completely dependent upon
Delia, who has been working in Saudi Arabia, for support and
these problems include chronic irresponsibility; inability to recognize and work towards providing the
needs of his family; several failed business attempts; substance abuse; and a trail of unpaid money
obligations.
It is true that a clinical psychologists or psychiatrists diagnoses that a person has personality
disorder is not automatically believed by the courts in cases of declaration of nullity of marriages.
Indeed, a clinical psychologists or psychiatrists finding of a personality disorder does not exclude a
finding that a marriage is valid and subsisting, and not beset by one of the parties or both parties
psychological incapacity.
In the case at bar, however, even without the experts conclusions, the factual
antecedents (narrative of events) alleged in the petition and established during trial, all point
to the inevitable conclusion that respondent is psychologically incapacitated to perform the essential
marital obligations.
The respondents pattern of behavior manifests an inability, nay, a psychological incapacity to
perform the essential marital obligations as shown by his: (1) sporadic financial support; (2) extra-
marital affairs; (3) substance abuse; (4) failed business attempts; (5) unpaid money obligations; (6)
inability to keep a job that is not connected with the family businesses; and (7) criminal charges
of estafa.
PETITION GRANTED.
ISSUE: WON the contention of respondent that article 40 does not apply to him is correct
RULING: NOOOO. The contention of the respondent is untenable. Article 40 is applicable to
remarriages entered into after the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988 regardless of the
date of the first marriage. Besides, under Article 256 of the Family Code, said Article is given
"retroactive effect insofar as it does not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in accordance
with the Civil Code or other laws."
This is particularly true with Article 40, which is a rule of procedure. The fact that procedural statutes
may somehow affect the litigants' rights may not preclude their retroactive application to pending
actions. The retroactive application of procedural laws is not violative of any right of a person who may
feel that he is adversely affected (The reason is that as a general rule no vested right may attach to,
nor arise from, procedural laws.
Respondent has not shown any vested right that was impaired by the application of Article 40 to his
case.
Moreover, Respondent passed the Bar examinations in 1962 and was admitted to the practice of law
in 1963. At the time he went through the two marriage ceremonies with Ongkiko, he was already a
lawyer. Yet, he never secured any marriage license. Any law student would know that a marriage
license is necessary before one can get married. Respondent was given an opportunity to correct the
flaw in his first marriage when he and Ongkiko were married for the second time. His failure to secure
a marriage license on these two occasions betrays his sinister motives and bad faith.
Therefore, his contention is untenable.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a petition for judicial declaration of a void marriage is necessary. If in affirmative,
whether the same should be filed only for purpose of remarriage.
RULING:
10
 subsistence.
Delia only found out about the prior marriage when Emerlina
sued them for bigamy in 1983.
In 1989, she found out that Roberto was cohabiting with
another woman and he was disposing of some of her
properties without her knowledge and consent.
In May 1991, Delia filed a petition for judicial declaration of
nullity of her marriage to Roberto and separation of property.
LASANAS VS
PEOPLE PRINCIPLE: Any person who contracts a second marriage
without first having a judicial declaration of the nullity of his
or her first marriage, albeit on its face void and in existent for
lack of a marriage license, is guilty of bigamy as defined and
penalized by Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code.
FACTS:
1968- Noel Lasanas and Socorro Patingo3 without
the Benefit of a marriage license.
1993- accused contracted marriage with Josefa
Eslaban Their marriage certificate reflected the civil status of
the accused as single.
1996- the accused filed a complaint for annulment
of marriage and damages against Socorro alleging that
Socorro had employed deceit, misrepresentations and fraud
in securing his consent to their marriage;
1998- Socorro charged the accused with bigamy
The accused contended that because he had not
been legally married to Socorro, the first element of bigamy
was not established; and that he had been of the honest
belief that there was no need for a judicial declaration of the
nullity of the first marriage before he could contract a
subsequent marriage. He further contended that the civil law
rule embodied in Article 40 of the Family Code requiring a
judicial declaration of nullity before one could contract a
Yes. A declaration of the absolute nullity of marriage is now explicitly required either as a cause of
action or a ground for defense. Where the absolute nullity of a previous marriage is sought to be
invoked for purpose of contracting a second marriage, the sole basis acceptable in law for the said
projected marriage be free from legal infirmity is a final judgment declaring the previous marriage
void.
The requirement for a declaration of absolute nullity of a marriage is also for the protection of the
spouse who, believing that his or her marriage is illegal and void, marries again. With the judicial
declaration of the nullity of his or her first marriage, the person who marries again cannot be
charged with bigamy.
Article 40 as finally formulated included the significant clause denotes that final judgment declaring
the previous marriage void need not be obtained only for purposes of remarriage. A person can
conceive of other instances other than remarriage, such as in case of an action for liquidation,
partition, distribution and separation of property between the spouses, as well as an action for the
custody and support of their common children and the delivery of the latters' presumptive legitimes.
In such cases, however, one is required by law to show proof that the previous one was an absolute
nullity.
Marriage is an inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the family; as such, it shall be
protected by the State. As a matter of policy, there should be a final judgment declaring the
marriage void and a party should not declare for himself or herself whether or not the marriage is
void.
The first and second elements of bigamy were present in view of the absence of a judicial declaration
of nullity of marriage between the accused and Socorro.
The requirement of securing a judicial declaration of nullity of marriage prior to contracting a
subsequent marriage is found in Article 40 of the Family Code, to wit: Article 40. The absolute nullity
of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final
judgment declaring such previous marriage void. (n)
The reason for the provision was aptly discussed in Teves v. People:29 x x x The Family Code has
settled once and for all the conflicting jurisprudence on the matter. A declaration of the absolute
nullity of a marriage is now explicitly required either as a cause of action or a ground for defense.
Where the absolute nullity of a previous marriage is sought to be invoked for purposes of contracting
a second marriage, the sole basis acceptable in law for said projected marriage to be free from legal
infirmity is a final judgment declaring the previous marriage void. The Family Law Revision
Committee and the Civil Code Revision Committee which drafted what is now the Family Code of the
Philippines took the position that parties to a marriage should not be allowed to assume that their
marriage is void even if such be the fact but must first secure a judicial declaration of the nullity of
their marriage before they can be allowed to marry again.
In fact, the requirement for a declaration of absolute nullity of a marriage is also for the protection of
the spouse who, believing that his or her marriage is illegal and void, marries again. With the judicial
declaration of the nullity of his or her marriage, the person who marries again cannot be charged
with bigamy. In numerous cases, this Court has consistently held that a judicial declaration of nullity
is required before a valid subsequent marriage can be contracted; or else, what transpires is a
bigamous marriage, reprehensible and immoral.
If petitioners contention would be allowed, a person who commits bigamy can simply evade
prosecution by immediately filing a petition for the declaration of nullity of his earlier marriage and
hope that a favorable decision is rendered therein before anyone institutes a complaint against him
We note that in petitioners case the complaint was filed before the first marriage was declared a
nullity. It was only the filing of the Information that was overtaken by the declaration of nullity of his
first marriage. Following petitioners argument, even assuming that a complaint has been instituted,
such as in this case, the offender can still escape liability provided that a decision nullifying his
earlier marriage precedes the filing of the Information in court. Such cannot be allowed. To do so
11
 subsequent marriage should not apply in this purely criminal
prosecution; that even if Article 40 of the Family Code was
applicable, he should still be acquitted because his
subsequent marriage was null and void for being without a
recorded judgment of nullity of marriage, as provided in
Article 53 in relation to Article 52 of the Family Code;24 that,
consequently, an essential element of the crime of bigamy,
i.e. that the subsequent marriage be valid, was lacking;
would make the crime of bigamy dependent upon the ability or inability of the Office of the Public
Prosecutor to immediately act on complaints and eventually file Informations in court. Plainly,
petitioners strained reading of the law is against its simple letter.
The crime of bigamy was consummated from the moment he contracted the second marriage
without his marriage to Socorro being first judicially declared null and void, because at the time of
the celebration of the second marriage, his marriage to Socorro was still deemed valid and subsisting
due to such marriage not being yet declared null and void by a court of competent jurisdiction

There is therefore a recognition written into the law itself that such a marriage, although void ab
initio, may still produce legal consequences. Among these legal consequences is incurring criminal
liability for bigamy. To hold otherwise would render the State's penal laws on bigamy completely
nugatory, and allow individuals to deliberately ensure that each marital contract be flawed in some
manner, and to thus escape the consequences of contracting multiple marriages, while beguiling
throngs of hapless women with the promise of futurity and commitment.

in February 27, 1963, Landricho (petitioner) was charged

"there are actions to annul the marriages entered into by the accused in a bigamy case does not
with the offense of bigamy. It was alleged in the information
mean that 'prejudicial questions are automatically raised in said civil actions as to warrant the
that petitioner "being then lawfully married toElvira
suspension of the criminal case for bigamy.
Makatangay, which marriage has not been legally dissolved,
did then contracta second marriage with Fe Lourdes Pasia."
The answer stressed that even on the assumption that the first marriage was null and void on the
ground alleged by petitioner, the fact would not be material to the outcome of the criminal case. It
On March 15, 1963, an action was filed by plaintiff Fe Lourdes
continued, referring to Viada, that "parties to the marriage should not be permitted to judge for
Pasia, seeking to declare her marriage to petitioner as null
themselves its nullity, for this must be submitted to the judgment of competent courts and only
and void ab initio because of the allegeduse of force, threats
when the nullity of a marriage is so declared can it be held as void, and so long as there is no such
and intimidation allegedly employed by petitioner and
declaration the presumption is that the marriage exists.
because of its allegedly bigamous character.
LANDRICHO VS
RELOVA The situation in this case is markedly different. At the time the petitioner was indicted for bigamy on
Petitioner as defendant in said case, filed a third-party
GR. l-22579 February 27, 1963, the fact that two marriage ceremonies had been contracted appeared to be
complaint, against the third-party defendant Elvira
indisputable. Then on March 15, 1963, it was the second spouse, not petitioner who filed an action
Makatangay, the first spouse, praying that his marriage with
for nullity on the ground of force, threats and intimidation. It was sometime later, on June 15, 1963,
the said third-party defendant be declared null and void, on
to be precise, when petitioner, as defendant in the civil action, filed a third-party complaint against
the ground that by means of threats, force and intimidation,
the first spouse alleging that his marriage with her should be declared null and void on the ground of
she compelled him to appear and contract marriage with her.
force, threats and intimidation. As was correctly stressed in the answer of respondent Judge relying
on Viada, parties to a marriage should not be permitted to judge for themselves its nullity, only
Petitioner moved to suspend the hearing of the criminal case competent courts having such authority. Prior to such declaration of nullity, the validity of the first
pending the decision on the question of the validity of the two marriage is beyond question. A party who contracts a second marriage then assumes the risk of
marriages involved in the pending civil suit. Respondent being prosecuted for bigamy.
Judge on November 19, 1963 denied the motion for lack of
merit

MONTANES VS
CIPRIANO ISSUES:
GR 181089 DOCTRINE: The subsequent judicial declaration of nullity of
the first marriage would not change the fact that she
contracted the second marriage during the substistence of
the first marriage. 1. WON the declaration of nullity of respondents first marriage justifies the dismissal of the
Information for bigamy filed against respondent.

2. WON the RTC erred in stating that the jurisprudence prior to the Family Code and in Wiegel
FACTS: regarding the necessity of a declaration of nullity is ambivalent such that a person was allowed to
enter a subsequent marriage without annulment of the first, without incurring criminal liability.
1976- Respondent Cipriano married Socrates in Aklan.
1983- respondent married Silverio Cipriano during the
subsistence of the first marriage.
RULING + RATIO:
Respondent then filed a Petition for Annulment of her first
marriage with Socrates on the grounds of psychological
12
 incapacity under Art. 36 of the Family Code. Such marriage 1.
was then declared null and void.
Petitioner, Silverios daughter from a previous marriage, filed a
case for Bigamy against Respondent. This was with an
affidavit stating that respondent failed to reveal to Silverio
that she was still married to Socrates.
Respondent then alleged that her marriage with Socrates had
already been declared void and thus there was no more
marriage to speak of.
The prosecution argued that bigamy was already
consummated upon filing the declaration for nullity.
RTC denied respondents motion, saying that petitioner had
already committed bigamy and that such action has not yet
prescribed.
Respondent filed an MR, claiming that the RTCs legal basis
(jurisprudence) was not applicable since the first marriage
was contracted before the Family Code and that the
annulment was granted before the complaint for bigamy was
filed.
RTC ruled that at the time accused had contracted the 2nd
marriage before the effectivity of the Family Code, the
existing law did not require a judicial declaration of absolute
nullity as a condition precedent to contracting a subsequent
marriage.
It also found that both marriages of respondent was done
before the Family Code, thus laws should be interpreted
liberally for the accused. Therefore the absence of a judicial
declaration should not prejudice the accused whose second
marriage was considered valid.
NIAL VS BAYADOG
GR 133778
Pepito married Teodulfa in 1974 and they begot children, the 1. The marriage of Norma and Pepito is Null and Void.
herein petitioners. Teodulfa died as she was shot by Pepito.
1 yr and 8 months after, Pepito contracted another marriage
with Norma Bayadog without a marriage license. The couple
only executed and affidavit of cohabitation in lieu of the
No. respondent is liable for bigamy .
The elements of bigamy are that:
a) offender has been legally married
b)the marriage has not been legally dissolved or in case his or her spouse is absent, the absent
spouse could not yet be presumed dead
c) he contracts a subsequent marriage, and
d) the subsequent marriage has all the requisites for validity.
It is consummated on the celebration of the subsequent marriage. What is essential for the
prosecution of bigamy is that the alleged second marriage, having all the requirements, would be
valid were it not for the subsistence of the first marriage.
Here, at the time respondent contracted the second marriage, the first marriage was still subsisting
as it had not yet been legally dissolved. As ruled in the abovementioned jurisprudence, the
subsequent judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage would not change the fact that she
contracted the second marriage during the subsistence of the first marriage. Thus, respondent was
properly charged of the crime of bigamy, since the essential elements of the offense charged were
sufficiently alleged.
Based on the Information, the annulment of the 1st marriage was only declared in 2003. In several
cases, it was held that the subsequent judicial declaration of nullity of the 1st marriage was
immaterial because prior to the declaration, the bigamy had already been consummated. Even if the
accused eventually obtained a declaration that his first marriage was void ab initio, the point is, the
first and second marriage was subsisting. The moment the accused contracted a 2nd marriage
without the previous one being judicially declared null and void, bigamy was already consummated.
Here, at the time of the 2nd marriage, the first was still subsisting. Thus bigamy was properly charge
to her. Respondent claims that the legal basis is not applicable since the declaration of nullity came
before the filing of information. But what makes a person criminally liable for bigamy is when he
contracts a 2nd marriage during the subsistence of the first.
2. No. In the case at bar, respondents clear intent is to obtain a judicial declaration nullity of
his first marriage and thereafter to invoke that very same judgment to prevent his prosecution for
bigamy. He cannot have his cake and eat it too. Otherwise, all that an adventurous bigamist has to
do is disregard Article 40 of the Family Code, contract a subsequent marriage and escape a bigamy
charge by simply claiming that the first marriage is void and that the subsequent marriage is equally
void for lack of a prior judicial declaration of nullity of the first. A party may even enter into a
marriage license and thereafter contract a subsequent marriage without obtaining a declaration of
nullity of the first on the assumption that the first marriage is void. Such scenario would render
nugatory the provision on bigamy.
DISPOSITION: WHEREFORE, considering the foregoing, the petition is GRANTED.
Both marriages of Pepito are governed by the Civil Code and not the Family Code.
Under the Civil Code, A valid marriage license is a requisite for the validity of marrage. However,
there are several instances recognized by the Civil Code wherein a marriage license is dispensed
13
license.
When Pepito died, the petitioners filed an action for nullity
alleging that the second marriage was void because of the
lacking essential requirement. Respondent Norma, however
filed a motion to dismiss the ground that petitioners have no
cause of action since they are not among the persons who
could file an action for "annulment of marriage" under Article
47 of the Family Code.
with, one of which is that provided in Article 76, [14] referring to the marriage of a man and a woman
who have lived together and exclusively with each other as husband and wife for a continuous and
unbroken period of at least five years before the marriage.
Rationale: to avoid humiliation, shame and embarrassment concomitant with the scandalous
cohabitation of persons outside a valid marriage
There is no issue that Norma and Pepito provided an affidavit of cohabitation in lieu of the license.
Question is, was the nature of cohabitation of the herein parties the same as the nature of
cohabitation contemplated under the law?????

No.

The 5-year cohabitation period should be counted from the date of the celebration of marriage. This
5-year period should be the years immediately before the day of the marriage and it should be a
period of cohabitation characterized by exclusivity meaning no third party was involved at any time
within the 5 years and continuity that is unbroken. Otherwise, if that continuous 5-year cohabitation
is computed without any distinction as to whether the parties were capacitated to marry each other
during the entire five years, then the law would be sanctioning immorality and encouraging parties
to have common law relationships and placing them on the same footing with those who lived
faithfully with their spouse.

in this case, at the time of Pepito and respondents marriage, it cannot be said that they have lived
with each other as husband and wife for at least five years prior to their wedding day. From the time
Pepitos first marriage was dissolved to the time of his marriage with respondent, only about twenty
months had elapsed. Even assuming that Pepito and his first wife had separated in fact, and
thereafter both Pepito and respondent had started living with each other that has already lasted for
five years, the fact remains that their five-year period cohabitation was not the cohabitation
contemplated by law. It should be in the nature of a perfect union that is valid under the law but
rendered imperfect only by the absence of the marriage contract. Pepito had a subsisting marriage
at the time when he started cohabiting with respondent. It is immaterial that when they lived with
each other, Pepito had already been separated in fact from his lawful spouse. The subsistence of the
marriage even where there was actual severance of the filial companionship between the spouses
cannot make any cohabitation by either spouse with any third party as being one as "husband and
wife". Scs daad

Having determined that the second marriage involved in this case is not covered by the exception to
the requirement of a marriage license, it is void ab initio because of the absence of such element.

Do petitioners have the personality to file a petition to declare their fathers marriage void after his
death?

The second ground for annulment of marriage relied upon by the trial court, which allows "the sane
spouse" to file an annulment suit "at any time before the death of either party" is inapplicable. The
Code is silent as to who can file a petition to declare the nullity of a marriage.

VOID AND VOIDABLE MARRIAGES ARE NOT IDENTICAL.

VOIDABLE

Valid until annulled

Can be generally RATIFIED by cohabitation or prescription
Cannot be assailed collaterally
Can only be questioned within the lifetime of the parties
Will prescribe
the property regime governing voidable marriages is generally conjugal partnership and the children
conceived before its annulment are legitimate. Sup rema

VOID
Considered as having never to have taken place at all

14

CARINO VS
CARINO
GR 132529 SPO4 Santiago Carino contracted 2 marriages during his
lifetime.
1. With Susan Nicdao in 1969 w/out marriage license
2. With Susan Yee in 1992
Santiago died in 1992 in the arms of Susan Yee who spent for
medical and burial expenses. Both Susans (petitioner and
respondent) requested for financial assistance. Thereafter,
Petitioner Susan Nicdao was able to collect a total
of P146,000.00 from MBAI, PCCUI, Commutation,
NAPOLCOM, [and] Pag-ibig,[3] while respondent Susan Yee
received a total of P21,000.00 from GSIS Life, Burial (GSIS)
and burial (SSS).
This prompted Susan Yee to file a case against Susan Nicdao
asking her to return half of the portion of the benefits she
received. Though Susan admitted that she contracted
marriage without judicial declaration of nullity but this was
because the first marriage was void ab initio due to the
absence of a marriage license which was a formal requisite
for the validity of marriage. Susan Yee presented
certification from LCR and their marriage cert reflecting no
marriage lic number.
Cannot be the source of rights
Can NEVER be ratified
Can be collaterally attacked
Can be questioned even after the death of the party
Imprescriptible
have no legal effects except those declared by law concerning the properties of the alleged spouses,
regarding co-ownership or ownership through actual joint contribution
Contrary to the trial courts ruling, the death of petitioners father extinguished the alleged marital
bond between him and respondent. The conclusion is erroneous and proceeds from a wrong premise
that there was a marriage bond that was dissolved between the two. It should be noted that their
marriage was void hence it is deemed as if it never existed at all and the death of either
extinguished nothing.
Moreover, under the civil code, "A void marriage does not require a judicial decree to restore the
parties to their original rights or to make the marriage void but though no sentence of avoidance be
absolutely necessary, yet as well for the sake of good order of society as for the peace of mind of all
concerned, it is expedient that the nullity of the marriage should be ascertained and declared by the
decree of a court of competent jurisdiction."
1st marriage (susan nicdao and Santiago)
Under the Civil Code, which was the law in force when the marriage of petitioner Susan Nicdao and
the deceased was solemnized in 1969, a valid marriage license is a requisite of marriage,[12] and the
absence thereof, subject to certain exceptions, [13] renders the marriage void ab initio.[14]
In the case at bar, there is no question that the marriage of petitioner and the deceased does not fall
within the marriages exempt from the license requirement. A marriage license, therefore, was
indispensable to the validity of their marriage. This notwithstanding, the records reveal that the
marriage contract of petitioner and the deceased bears no marriage license number and, as certified
by the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, Metro Manila, their office has no record of such marriage
license. In Republic v. Court of Appeals,[15] the Court held that such a certification is adequate to
prove the non-issuance of a marriage license. Absent any circumstance of suspicion, as in the
present case, the certification issued by the local civil registrar enjoys probative value, he being the
officer charged under the law to keep a record of all data relative to the issuance of a marriage
license.
Accordingly, the declaration in the instant case of nullity of the previous marriage of the deceased
and petitioner Susan Nicdao does not validate the second marriage of the deceased with respondent
Susan Yee. The fact remains that their marriage was solemnized without first obtaining a judicial
decree declaring the marriage of petitioner Susan Nicdao and the deceased void. Hence, the
marriage of respondent Susan Yee and the deceased is, likewise, void ab initio.
In affirming the decision of the trial court, the Court of Appeals relied on the case of Vda. de
Consuegra v. Government Service Insurance System,[20] where the Court awarded one-half of the
retirement benefits of the deceased to the first wife and the other half, to the second wife, holding
that:
... [S]ince the defendants first marriage has not been dissolved or declared void the conjugal
partnership established by that marriage has not ceased. Nor has the first wife lost or relinquished
her status as putative heir of her husband under the new Civil Code, entitled to share in his estate
upon his death should she survive him. Consequently, whether as conjugal partner in a still
subsisting marriage or as such putative heir she has an interest in the husbands share in the
property here in dispute.... And with respect to the right of the second wife, this Court observed that
although the second marriage can be presumed to be void ab initio as it was celebrated while the
first marriage was still subsisting, still there is need for judicial declaration of such nullity. And
inasmuch as the conjugal partnership formed by the second marriage was dissolved before judicial
declaration of its nullity, [t]he only just and equitable solution in this case would be to recognize the
15
 right of the second wife to her share of one-half in the property acquired by her and her husband,
and consider the other half as pertaining to the conjugal partnership of the first marriage. [21]

It should be stressed, however, that the aforecited decision is premised on the rule which
requires a prior and separate judicial declaration of nullity of marriage. This is the reason why in the
said case, the Court determined the rights of the parties in accordance with their existing property
regime.

In Domingo v. Court of Appeals,[22] however, the Court, construing Article 40 of the Family
Code, clarified that a prior and separate declaration of nullity of a marriage is an all important
condition precedent only for purposes of remarriage. That is, if a party who is previously married
wishes to contract a second marriage, he or she has to obtain first a judicial decree declaring the
first marriage void, before he or she could contract said second marriage, otherwise the second
marriage would be void. The same rule applies even if the first marriage is patently void because the
parties are not free to determine for themselves the validity or invalidity or their marriage. However,
for purposes other than to remarry, like for filing a case for collection of sum of money anchored on
a marriage claimed to be valid, no prior and separate judicial declaration of nullity is necessary. All
that a party has to do is to present evidence, testimonial or documentary, that would prove that the
marriage from which his or her rights flow is in fact valid. Thereupon, the court, if material to the
determination of the issues before it, will rule on the status of the marriage involved and proceed to
determine the rights of the parties in accordance with the applicable laws and jurisprudence. Thus,
in Nial v. Bayadog,[23] the Court explained:

[T]he court may pass upon the validity of marriage even in a suit not directly instituted to question
the same so long as it is essential to the determination of the case. This is without prejudice to any
issue that may arise in the case.When such need arises, a final judgment of declaration of nullity is
necessary even if the purpose is other than to remarry. The clause on the basis of a final judgment
declaring such previous marriage void in Article 40 of the Family Code connoted that such final
judgment need not be obtained only for purpose of remarriage.

Complainant Mayor Rodolfo Navarro of Dapa, ISSUE:

Surigao del Norte filed this case to the Supreme Court against
respondent Judge Henando Domagtoy of MCTC of Monica-
Burgos, Surigao del Norte, for gross misconduct as well as (1) Whether or not a court may solemnize another marriage of a husband who was merely
inefficiency and ignorance of the law. separated from his wife for almost seven years.

First, on Sept. 24, 1994, Judge Domagtoy HELD:

solemnized the marriage of Gaspar Tagadan and Arlyn Borja
despite his knowledge that Tagadan was merely separated
(1) Article 41 of the Family Code expressly provides that a marriage contracted by any
from his wife. Second, her performed a marriage ceremony
person during the subsistence of a previous marriage shall be null and void, unless before the
between Floriano Sumaylo and Gemma del Rosario in October
NAVARRO VS celebration of the subsequent marriage the prior spouse had been absent for four consecutive years
1994 at respondent judges residence in Dapa, SDN. As to
DOMAGTOY and the spouse present had a well-founded belief that the absent spouse was already dead. In case
the first, Domagtoy contended that he merely relied on the
of disappearance where there is danger of death under the circumstances set forth in the provisions
affidavit issued by the RTC Judge of Bassey, Samar, which
of Article 391 of the Civil Code, an absence of only two years shall be sufficient.
stated that Tagadan and his wife have not seen each other
for almost seven years. However, the certified true copy of
the marriage contract between Tagadan and Borja showed For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the preceding paragraph,
that his civil status was separated. the spouse present must institute a summary proceeding as provided in the Code for the declaration
of presumptive death. Absent this judicial declaration, he remains to be married to Pearanda.
Wittingly or unwittingly, it was manifest error on the part of respondent judge to have accepted the
joind affidavit submitted by Tagadan. Such neglect or ignorance of the law has resulted in a
bigamous and therefore void marriage.

16
 Edna and Romeo were married on December 21, 1978, in
Iligan City.
In 1992, Edna worked as domestic helper in Singapore while
her husband worked as a mechanic in Valencia City,
Bukidnon. In 1993, Edna heard the news from her children
that Romeo had left their conjugal home without reason or
information as to his whereabouts.
Thereafter, Edna took a leave from work and returned to the
country to look for Romeo. She inquired from her parents-in-
law and common friends in Iligan City. Still, she found no
leads as to his whereabouts or existence. She also went to
his birthplace in Escalante, Negros Oriental, and inquired
from his relatives.
On August 6, 2009, Edna filed before the RTC a petition 5 to
declare Romeo presumptively dead under Article 41 of the
Family Code.
During the trial, Edna was presented as the lone witness.
RP VS
VILLANUEVA
GR 210929
SANTOS VS
SANTOS On 2007, Ricardo filed for a declaration of absence or
presumptive death against Celerina for the purpose of
GR 187061 remarriage. He alleged that when they got married in Tarlac,
and their business did not prosper, Celerina looked for a job
and left Tarlac. Thereafter, Ricardo had no more whereabouts
of Celerina.
Ricardo alleged that he exerted efforts to look for Celerina
like doing inquiry with her parents and other relatives and
friends, but he got no information.
He claimed that it was almost 12 years since he filed his
Edna FAILED to prove the existence of a well founded belief that her husband should be declared as
presumptively dead.
The well-founded belief in the absentee's death requires the present spouse to prove that his/her
belief was the result of diligent and reasonable efforts to locate the absent spouse and that based on
these efforts and inquiries, he/she believes that under the circumstances, the absent spouse is
already dead. It necessitates exertion of active effort (not a mere passive one). Mere absence of the
spouse (even beyond the period required by law), lack of any news that the absentee spouse is still
alive, mere failure to communicate, or general presumption of absence under the Civil Code would
not suffice.15 The premise is that Article 41 of the Family Code places upon the present spouse the
burden of complying with the stringent requirement of well-founded belief which can only be
discharged upon a showing of proper and honest-to-goodness inquiries and efforts to ascertain not
only the absent spouse's whereabouts but, more importantly, whether the absent spouse is still alive
or is already dead.16chanrobleslaw
In this case, Edna claimed to have done the following to determine the whereabouts and the status
of her husband:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
1. She took a vacation/leave of absence from her work and returned to the Philippines to look
for her husband.
2. She inquired from her parents-in-law in Iligan City and from their common friends in the
same city and in Valencia City.
3. She went as far as the birthplace of her husband in Escalante, Negros Oriental, so she could
inquire from her husband's relatives.
Despite her efforts, she averred that she received negative responses from them because none of
them had knowledge of the existence of her husband who had been missing for 15 years.
Applying the standard set forth by the Court in the previously cited cases, particularly Cantor, Edna's
efforts failed to satisfy the required well-founded belief of her absent husband's death.
Her claim of making diligent search and inquiries remained unfounded as it merely consisted of bare
assertions without any corroborative evidence on record.
Moreover, no document was submitted to corroborate the allegation that her husband had been
missing for at least fifteen (15) years already.
Verily, it makes sense to conclude that her efforts were not diligent and serious enough to give
meaning to her well-founded belief that Romeo was already dead. Suffice it to state that her petition
should have been denied at the first instance.
Annulment of judgment is the remedy when the Regional Trial Court's judgment, order, or resolution
has become final, and the "remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief (or other appropriate
remedies) are no longer available through no fault of the petitioner. The grounds for annulment of
judgment are extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction.
There was also no other sufficient remedy available to Celerina at the time of her discovery of the
fraud perpetrated on her.
The choice of remedy is important because remedies carry with them certain admissions,
presumptions, and conditions.
17
 petition and that he believed that Celerina had already
passed away.
Meanwhile, in 2008, Celerina filed for a petition of annulment
of judgment on the ground of extensive fraud alleging that
she was deprived of her day in court and that she never
disappeared as claimed by Ricardo.
CA Dismissed Celerinas petition for being a wrong remedy,
hence this petition.
RP VS
SAREOGON Sarenogon filed a petition before the RTC to declare the
GR199194 presumptive death of his wife Netchie.
*SIDENOTE
For spouses declared as presumptively dead, Article 42 of the Family Code provides the latter with
the remedy of terminating the subsequent marriage by mere reappearance.
The filing of an affidavit of reappearance is an admission on the part of the first spouse that his or
her marriage to the present spouse was terminated when he or she was declared absent or
presumptively dead.
Moreover, a close reading of the entire Article 42 reveals that the termination of the subsequent
marriage by reappearance is subject to several conditions: (1) the non-existence of a judgment
annulling the previous marriage or declaring it void ab initio; (2) recording in the civil registry of the
residence of the parties to the subsequent marriage of the sworn statement of fact and
circumstances of reappearance; (3) due notice to the spouses of the subsequent marriage of the fact
of reappearance; and (4) the fact of reappearance must either be undisputed or judicially
determined.
The existence of these conditions means that reappearance does not always immediately cause the
subsequent marriage's termination. Reappearance of the absent or presumptively dead spouse will
cause the termination of the subsequent marriage only when all the conditions enumerated in the
Family Code are present.
Hence, the subsequent marriage may still subsist despite the absent or presumptively dead spouse's
reappearance (1) if the first marriage has already been annulled or has been declared a nullity; (2) if
the sworn statement of the reappearance is not recorded in the civil registry of the subsequent
spouses' residence; (3) if there is no notice to the subsequent spouses; or (4) if the fact of
reappearance is disputed in the proper courts of law, and no judgment is yet rendered confirming,
such fact of reappearance.
When subsequent marriages are contracted after a judicial declaration of presumptive death, a
presumption arises that the first spouse is already dead and that the second marriage is legal. This
presumption should prevail over the continuance of the marital relations with the first spouse. [48] The
second marriage, as with all marriages, is presumed valid. [49] The burden of proof to show that the
first marriage was not properly dissolved rests on the person assailing the validity of the second
marriage.[50]
However,
A subsequent marriage contracted in bad faith, even if it was contracted after a court
declaration of presumptive death, lacks the requirement of a well-founded belief [56] that the spouse is
already dead. The first marriage will not be considered as. validly terminated. Marriages contracted
prior to the valid termination of a subsisting marriage are generally considered bigamous and void.
[57]
Only a subsequent marriage contracted in good faith is protected by law.
Therefore, the party who contracted the subsequent marriage in bad faith is also not immune from
an action to declare his subsequent marriage void for being bigamous. The prohibition against
marriage during the subsistence of another marriage still applies. [58]
Celerina is correct. Since an undisturbed subsequent marriage under Article 42 of the Family Code is
valid until terminated, the "children of such marriage shall be considered legitimate, and the
property relations of the spouse[s] in such marriage will be the same as in valid marriages." [61] If it is
terminated by mere reappearance, the children of the subsequent marriage conceived before the
termination shall still be considered legitimate. [62] Moreover, a judgment declaring presumptive death
is a defense against prosecution for bigamy. [63]
It is true that in most cases, an action to declare the nullity of the subsequent marriage may nullify
the effects of the subsequent marriage, specifically, in relation to the status of children and the
prospect of prosecuting a respondent for bigamy.
The "well-founded belief" requisite under Article 41 of the Family Code is complied with
only upon a showing that sincere honest-to-goodness efforts had indeed been made to
ascertain whether the absent spouse is still alive or is already dead.
18
 He testified that they got married and lived together as
husband and wife for a month only because he left to work as
Before a judicial declaration of presumptive death can be obtained, it must be shown that the prior
a seaman while Netchie went to Hongkong as a domestic
spouse had:
helper. For 3 months, he did not receive any communication
from Netchie and had no idea about her whereabouts. While
1. That the absent spouse has been missing for four consecutive years, or two consecutive years if the
still abroad, he tried to contact Netchies parents, but failed.
disappearance occurred where there is danger of death under the circumstances laid down in Article
391 of the Civil Code;
He returned home after his contract expired, then inquired
from Netchies relatives and friends about her
2. That the present spouse wishes to remarry;
whereabouts. They also did not know where she was.
Because of these, he had to presume that his wife Netchie
3. That the present spouse has a well-founded belief that the absentee is dead; and,
was already dead.
4. That the present spouse files a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death of
He filed the Petition before the RTC so he could contract
the absentee.
another marriage pursuant to Article 41 of the Family Code.
With respect to the third element (which seems to be the element that in this case invites extended
Joses testimony was corroborated by his older brother, and
discussion), the holding is that the -mere absence of the spouse (even for such period required by
by Netchies aunt. These two witnesses testified that Jose
the law), or lack of news that such absentee is still alive, failure to communicate [by the absentee
and Netchie lived together as husband and wife only for one
spouse or invocation of the] general presumption on absence under the Civil Code [would] not
month prior to their leaving the Philippines for separate
suffice.
destinations abroad and added that they had no information
regarding Netchies location.
In the case at bar, Jose was not able to prove the existence of a well founded belief of the
presumption of his death. He merely conducted a PASSIVE SEARCH!
The RTC found that Netchie had disappeared for more than
four years, reason enough for Jose to conclude that his wife
Now, how to prove well founded belief?
was indeed already dead.
The Court stressed that the degree of diligence and reasonable search required by law should be
The OSG questioned the RTC ruling via Rule 65 before the CA
met:
for the RTCs error in its misappreciation of evidence. The CA
(1) when there is failure to present the persons from whom the present spouse allegedly made inquiries
saw no error in the RTC judgment and further held that Rule
especially the absent spouse''s relatives, neighbors, and friends,
65 is the wrong recourse in elevating a declaration of
presumptive death judgment from the RTC.
(2) when there is failure to report the missing spouse''s purported disappearance or death to the police or
mass media, and

(3) when the present spouse''s evidence might or would only show that the absent spouse chose not to
communicate, but not necessarily that the latter was indeed dead.

Given the Court''s imposition of "strict standard" in a petition for a declaration of presumptive death
under Article 41 of the Family Code, it must follow that there was no basis at all for the RTC''s
finding that Jose''s Petition complied with the requisites of Article 41 of the Family Code, in reference
to the "well-founded belief standard. If anything, Jose''s pathetically anemic efforts to locate the
missing Netchie are notches below the required degree of stringent diligence prescribed by
jurisprudence.

SSS VS VDA DE
BAYLON
GR 165545
PRINCIPLE: Where a person has entered into two ISSUE: Whether or not the presumption that the former spouse is already dead continues in spite of
successive marriages, a presumption arises in favor of the the spouses physical reappearance
validity of the second marriage, and the burden is on the
party attacking the validity of the second marriage to prove
that the first marriage had not been dissolved. HELD: YES. The 2 marriages having been solemnized prior to the effectivity of FC, the applicable
law to determine their validity is the Civil Code.

1995- Clemente G. Bailon and Alice P. Diaz contracted

marriage.
More than 15 years later or on October 9, 1970, Bailon filed
before the then Court of First Instance (CFI) of Sorsogon a
petition[7] to declare Alice presumptively dead.
Under the Civil Code, a subsequent marriage contracted during the lifetime of the first spouse is
illegal and void ab initio unless the prior marriage is first annulled or dissolved or contracted under
any of the three exceptional circumstances. It bears noting that the marriage under any of the
exceptional cases is deemed valid until declared null and void by a competent court. It follows that
the onus probandi in these cases rests on the party assailing the second marriage.

Close to 13 years, after his wife Alice was declared

presumptively dead, Bailon, subsequently, contracted In the case at bar, as found by the CFI, Alice had been absent for 15 consecutive years when Bailon

19
 marriage with respondent Teresita Jarque
1998, Bailon, who was a member of the Social Security
System (SSS) since 1960 and a retiree pensioner thereof
effective July 1994, died.
Respondent thereupon filed a claim for funeral benefits and
additional claim for death benefits which were granted by the
SSS
It now appears that Alice is very much alive and that it was
Bailon who abandoned or deserted her. She actually lived
with her parents because she found out that Bailon was
having an extra marital affair.
SSS cancelled the claim of respondent Teresita Jarque of her
monthly pension fordeath benefits on the basis of the opinion
rendered by its legal department that her marriage with
Bailon was void as it was contracted during the subsistence of
Bailons marriage with Alice and that there is no need to
require Alice to execute an affidavit of reappearance as there
is no disappearance of Alice.
Teresita protested the cancellation of her monthly pension
for death benefitsasserting that her marriage with Bailon was
not declared before any court of justiceas bigamous or
unlawful. Hence, it remained valid and subsisting for all legal
intents and purposes.
sought the declaration of her presumptive death, which judicial declaration was not even a
requirement then for purposes of remarriage. Under the Civil Code, a subsequent marriage being
voidable, it is terminated by final judgment of annulment in a case instituted by the absent spouse
who reappears or by either of the spouses in the subsequent marriage.
Under the Family Code, no judicial proceeding to annul a subsequent marriage is necessary. Thus
Article 42 thereof provides the subsequent marriage shall be automatically terminated by the
recording of the affidavit of reappearance of the absent spouse, unless there is a judgment
annulling the previous marriage or declaring it void ab initio.
If the absentee reappears, but no step is taken to terminate the subsequent marriage, either by
affidavit or by court action, such absentees mere reappearance, even if made known to the
spouses in the subsequent marriage, will not terminate such marriage. Since the second
marriage has been contracted because of a presumption that the former spouse is dead, such
presumption continues inspite of the spouses physical reappearance, and by fiction of law, he or she
must still be regarded as legally an absentee until the subsequent marriage is terminated as
provided by law.
It bears reiterating that a voidable marriage cannot be assailed collaterally except in a direct
proceeding.Consequently, such marriages can be assailed only during the lifetime of the parties and
not after the death of either, in which case the parties and their offspring will be left as if the
marriage had been perfectly valid.[55] Upon the death of either, the marriage cannot be impeached,
and is made good ab initio.
In the case at bar, as no step was taken to nullify, in accordance with law, Bailons and respondents
marriage prior to the formers death in 1998, respondent is rightfully the dependent spouse-
beneficiary of Bailon.
20