THIRD DIVISION

DINAH C. CASTILLO, G.R. No. 171056

Petitioner,
Present:

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.
- versus- Chairperson,
MARTINEZ,
CHICO-NAZARIO,
NACHURA, and
ANTONIO M. ESCUTIN, AQUILINA A. PERALTA, JJ.
MISTAS,MARIETTA L. LINATOC, AND THE
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS,
Respondents.
Promulgated:

March 13, 2009

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DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari [1] under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court filed by petitioner Dinah C.
Castillo seeking the reversal and setting aside of the Decision,[2] dated 18 October 2005, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
90533, as well as the Resolution,[3] dated 11 January 2006 of the same court denying reconsideration of its afore-mentioned
Decision. The Court of Appeals, in its assailed Decision, affirmed the Joint Resolution[4] dated 28 April 2004 and Joint Order[5] dated
20 June 2005 of the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon in OMB-L-A-03-0573-F and OMB-L-C-03-0728-F, dismissing
petitioner Dinah C. Castillos complaint for grave misconduct and violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019, the Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act, as amended, against respondent public officers Antonio M. Escutin (Escutin), Aquilina A. Mistas (Mistas)
and Marietta L. Linatoc (Linatoc), together with private individuals Lauro S. Leviste II (Leviste) and Benedicto L. Orense (Orense).
Petitioner is a judgment creditor of a certain Raquel K. Moratilla (Raquel), married to Roel Buenaventura. In the course of
her search for properties to satisfy the judgment in her favor, petitioner discovered that Raquel, her mother Urbana Kalaw (Urbana),
and sister Perla K. Moratilla (Perla), co-owned Lot 13713, a parcel of land consisting of 15,000 square meters, situated at Brgy.
Bugtongnapulo, Lipa City, Batangas, and covered by Tax Declaration No. 00449.
Petitioner set about verifying the ownership of Lot 13713. She was able to secure an Order[6] dated 4 March 1999 issued by
Secretary Horacio R. Morales, Jr. of the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) approving the application of Summit Point Golf &
Country Club, Inc. for conversion of several agricultural landholdings, including Lot 13713 owned by Perla K. Mortilla, et al. and
covered by Tax Declaration No. 00449, to residential, commercial, and recreational uses. She was also able to get from the Office of
the City Assessor, Lipa City, a Certification[7] stating that Lot 13713, covered by Tax Declaration No. 00554-A, was in the name of co-
owners Raquel, Urbana, and Perla; and a certified true copy of Tax Declaration No. 00554-A itself.[8] Lastly, the Register of Deeds of
Lipa City issued a Certification[9] attesting that Lot 13713 in the name of co-owners Raquel, Urbana, and Perla, was not covered by a
certificate of title, whether judicial or patent, or subject to the issuance of a Certificate of Land Ownership Award or patent under the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program.
Only thereafter did petitioner proceed to levy on execution Lot 13713, and the public auction sale of the same was scheduled
on 14 May 2002. Sometime in May 2002, before the scheduled public auction sale, petitioner learned that Lot 13713 was inside the
Summit Point Golf and Country Club Subdivision owned by Summit Point Realty and Development Corporation (Summit Realty). She
immediately went to the Makati City office of Summit Realty to meet with its Vice President, Orense. However, she claimed that
Orense did not show her any document to prove ownership of Lot 13713 by Summit Realty, and even threatened her that the owners of
Summit Realty, the Leviste family, was too powerful and influential for petitioner to tangle with.
The public auction sale pushed through on 14 May 2002, and petitioner bought Raquels 1/3 pro-indiviso share in Lot 13713.
On 4 June 2002, petitioner had the following documents, on her acquisition of Raquels 1/3 pro-indiviso share in Lot 13713,
recorded in the Primary Entry Book and Registration Book of the Register of Deeds of Lipa City in accordance with Act No. 3344[10]:
(a) Notice of Levy;[11] (b) Certificate of Sale;[12] (c) Affidavit of Publication;[13]and (d) Writ of Execution.[14]
Subsequently, petitioner was issued by the City Assessor of Lipa City Tax Declaration No. 00942-A,[15] indicating that she
owned 5,000 square meters of Lot 13713, while Urbana and Perla owned the other 10,000 square meters.
When petitioner attempted to pay real estate taxes for her 5,000-square-meter share in Lot 13713, she was shocked to find out
that, without giving her notice, her Tax Declaration No. 00942-A was cancelled. Lot 13713 was said to be encompassed in and
overlapping with the 105,648 square meter parcel of land known as Lot 1-B, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No.
129642[16] and Tax Declaration No. 00949-A,[17] both in the name of Francisco Catigbac (Catigbac). The reverse side of TCT No.
129642 bore three entries, reflecting the supposed sale of Lot 1-B to Summit Realty, to wit:
ENTRY NO. 184894: SPECIAL POWER OF ATTORNEY: In favor of LEONARDO YAGIN: For purposes more
particularly stipulated in the contract ratified before Atty. Ernesto M. Vergara of Lipa City as per Doc. No. 639;
Page No. 29; Book No. LXXVI; Series of 1976.
 Date of instrument 2-6-1976
Date of inscription 6-26-2002 at 11:20 a.m.
ENTRY NO. 185833: SALE IN FAVOR OF SUMMIT POINT REALTY & DEVELOPMENT CORP:
ENTRY NO. 185834: BIR CLEARANCE: Of the parcel of land described in this cert. of title is hereby sold and
cancelled TCT No. 134609(SN-6672938) Vol. 671-A, having been issued by virtue of the aforesaid instrument
ratified before Perfecto L. Dimayuga, Notary Public for Makati City as per Doc. No. 148; Page 31, Book No.
LXVII, Series of 2002.
Date of instrument: July 22, 2002
Date of inscription: July 25, 2002 at 2:30 P.M.[18]
On 25 July 2002, at 2:30 p.m., TCT No. 129642 in the name of Catigbac was cancelled and TCT No. T-134609 in the name
of Summit Realty was issued in its place.
The foregoing incidents prompted petitioner to file a Complaint Affidavit[19] before the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman
for Luzon charging several public officers and private individuals as follows:
32. I respectfully charge that on or about the months of June 2002 and July 2002 and onwards in Lipa
City, Atty. Antonio M. [Escutin], the Register of Deeds of Lipa City[;] Aquilina A. Mistas, the Local Assessment
Operations Officer III of the City Assessors Office of Lipa City[;] Marietta Linatoc, Records Clerk, Office of the
City Assessor of Lipa City, who are public officers and acting in concert and conspiring with Lauro S. Leviste
II and Benedicto L. Orense, Executive Vice-President and Vice-President, respectively[,] of Summit Point Realty
and Development Corporation x x x while in the discharge of their administrative functions did then and there
unlawfully, through evident bad faith, gross inexcusable negligence and with manifest partiality towards Summit
caused me injury in the sum of P20,000,000.00 by cancelling my TD #00942-A in the Office of the City Assessor
of Lipa City and instead issuing in the name of Francisco Catigbac TC #00949-A when aforesaid personalities well
knew that TCT No. 129642 was already cancelled and therefore not legally entitled to a new tax declaration thereby
manifestly favoring Summit Point Realty and Development Corporation who now appears to be the successor-in-
interest of Francisco Catigbac, all to my damage and prejudice.[20] (Emphasis ours.)
Petitioners Complaint Affidavit gave rise to simultaneous administrative and preliminary (criminal) investigations, docketed
as OMB-L-A-03-0573-F and OMB-L-C-03-0728-F, respectively.
Petitioner pointed out several irregularities in the circumstances surrounding the alleged sale of Lot 1-B to Summit Realty
and in the documents evidencing the same.
The supposed Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of Summit Realty executed on 22 July 2002 by Leonardo Yagin (Yagin), as
Catigbacs attorney-in-fact, appeared to be a one-way street. It did not express the desire of Summit Realty, as vendee, to
purchase Lot 1-B or indicate its consent and conformity to the terms of the Deed. No representative of Summit Realty signed the left
margin of each and every page of said Deed. It also did not appear from the Deed that a representative of Summit Realty presented
himself before the Notary Public who notarized the said document. The Tax Identification Numbers of Yagin, as vendor, and Summit
Realty, as vendee, were not stated in the Deed.
Petitioner also averred that, being a corporation, Summit Realty could only act through its Board of Directors. However,
when the Deed of Absolute Sale of Lot 1-B was presented for recording before the Register of Deeds, it was not accompanied by a
Secretarys Certificate attesting to the existence of a Board Resolution which authorized said purchase by Summit Realty. There was no
entry regarding such a Secretarys Certificate and/or Board Resolution, whether on TCT No. 129642 or TCT No. T-134609. A
Secretarys Certificate eventually surfaced, but it was executed only on 30 July 2002, five days after TCT No. T-134609 in the name of
Summit Realty was already issued.
The Deed of Absolute Sale was presented before and recorded by the Register of Deeds of Lipa City on 25 July 2002 at 2:30
p.m., at exactly the same date and time TCT No. T-134609 was issued to Summit Realty. Petitioner theorizes that for this to happen,
TCT No. T-134609 was already prepared and ready even before the presentation for recording of the Deed of Absolute Sale before the
Register of Deeds.
Moreover, Catigbac had long been dead and buried. The agency Catigbac supposedly executed in favor of Yagin was
extinguished by Catigbacs death. Thus, petitioner argued, Yagin no longer had authority to execute on 22 July 2002 the Deed of
Absolute Sale of Lot 1-B in favor of Summit Realty, making the said Deed null and void ab initio.
Petitioner asserted that Summit Realty was well-aware of Catigbacs death, having acknowledged the same in LRC Case No.
00-0376, the Petition for Issuance of New Owners Duplicate of TCT No. 181 In Lieu of Lost One, filed by Summit Realty before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Lipa City. During the ex parte presentation of evidence in the latter part of 2000, Orense testified on
behalf of Summit Realty that Catigbacs property used to form part of a bigger parcel of land, Lot 1 of Plan Psu-12014,
measuring132,975 square meters, covered by TCT No. 181 in the name of Catigbac; after Catigbacs death, Lot 1 was informally
subdivided into several parts among his heirs and/or successors-in-interest, some of whom again transferred their shares to other
persons; Summit Realty separately bought subdivided parts of Lot 181 from their respective owners, with a consolidated area
of 105,648 square meters, and identified as Lot 1-B after survey; despite the subdivision and transfer of ownership of Lot 1, TCT No.
181 covering the same was never cancelled; and the owners duplicate of TCT No. 181 was lost and the fact of such loss was annotated
at the back of the original copy of TCT No. 181 with the Registry of Deeds. Subsequently, in an Order[21] dated 3 January 2001, the
RTC granted the Petition in LRC Case No. 00-0376 and directed the issuance of a new owners duplicate of TCT No. 181 in the name
of Catigbac, under the same terms and condition as in its original form.
 Petitioner further cast doubt on the acts undertaken by Summit Realty in connection with Catigbacs property, purportedly
without legal personality and capacity. The Special Power of Attorney dated 6 February 1976 granted Yagin the right to sue on behalf
of Catigbac, yet it was Summit Realty which instituted LRC Case No. 00-0376, and Yagin had no participation at all in said
case. Likewise, it was not Yagin, but Orense, who, through a letter[22] dated 27 June 2001, requested the cancellation of TCT No. 181
covering Lot 1 and the issuance of a new certificate of title for Lot 1-B. Hence, it was Orenses request which resulted in the issuance of
TCT No. 129642 in the name of Catigbac, later cancelled and replaced by TCT No. T-134609 in the name of Summit Realty.
Lastly, petitioner questioned why, despite the cancellation of TCT No. 129642 in the name of Catigbac and the issuance in its
place of TCT No. T-134609 in the name of Summit Realty, it was the former cancelled title which was used as basis for canceling
petitioners Tax Declaration No. 00942-A. Tax Declaration No. 00949-A was thus still issued in the name of Catigbac, instead of
Summit Realty.
Piecing everything together, petitioner recounted in her Complaint Affidavit the alleged scheme perpetrated against her and
the involvement therein of each of the conspirators:
28. Summit Point Realty and Development Corporation went into action right after I paid Orense a visit
sometime May 2002. Summit resurrected from the grave. (sic) Francisco Catigbac whom they knew to be long
dead to face possible litigation. This is the height of malice and bad faith on the part of Summit through its Lauro
Leviste II, the Executive Vice President and Benedicto Orense, the Vice President. I had only in my favor a tax
declaration to show my interest and ownership over the 5, 000 sq.m. of the subject parcel of land. Evidently,
Leviste andOrense came to the desperate conclusion that they needed a TCT which is a far better title than any tax
declaration.
Both then methodically commenced their evil and illegal scheme by causing on June 26, 2002 at 11:20
a.m. the inscription with the Register of Deeds of Lipa City of a purported Special Power of Attorney in favor of
Leonardo Yagin (Annex I). Next, the Deed of Absolute Sale (Annex J) was made the following month in order to
make it appear that Yagin unilaterally sold to Summit the subject parcel of land purportedly belonging to Francisco
Catigbac. Since the latter was already dead and realizing that the agency was already extinguished, Annex J was
not signed or executed by Leviste or Orense. This fact however did not deter the two from securing a BIR clearance
on July 25, 2002. Also, on this same day, July 25, 2002, Annex J was presented to Atty. [Escutin] at 2:30
p.m. simultaneously, at exactly the same time of 2:30 p.m. TCT No. T-134609 in Summits name was issued by
Atty. [Escutin] WITHOUT benefit of the submission of the necessary documentation such as the Board Resolution,
DAR Clearance, Revenue Tax Receipts for documentary stamps, real property tax clearance, proof of payment of
transfer tax, tax declaration, articles of incorporation, SEC certification, license to sell and/or certificate of
registration by HLURB, etc. Without the total and lightning speed cooperation of Atty. [Escutin] to close his eyes
to the total absence of said vital documents, the desperately needed TCT to erase my interest and ownership would
not have come into existence. Atty. [Escutin] had indeed acted in concert and in conspiracy with Leviste
and Orense in producing Annex H and Annex K.
29. Thereafter, Leviste and Orense utilized the already cancelled TCT No. 129642 in the name of
Francisco Catigbac to be the basis in seeking the cancellation of TD #00942A in my name (Annex F). The Tax
Mapping Division of the Office of City Assessor of Lipa City opined that my 5,000 sq.m. was (sic) part and parcel
of the 105,648 sq.m. covered by TCT No. 129642.A photocopy of the Certification from said division is hereto
marked and attached as Annex P, hereof. Aquilina Mistas, the Local Assessment Operations Officer III of the
Office of the City Assessor of Lipa City then conveniently caused the disappearance of my Notice of Levy and
other supporting documents which she had personally received from me on March 13, 2002. For her part of the
conspiracy likewise, Marietta Linatoc, Records Clerk, forthwith cancelled by TD#00942-A and in lieu thereof she
issued TD #00949-A in the name of Francisco Catigbac. I dare say so because Mistas and Linatoc were presented
a cancelled TCT as basis for obliterating my 5,000 sq.m. The fact of cancellation is clearly stated on the posterior
side of TCT No. 129642.Both can read. But the two nevertheless proceeded with dispatch in canceling my TD,
though they had ample time and opportunity to reject the request of Summit who is not even the registered owner
appearing on TCT No. 129642. Francisco Catigbac could not have been in front of Mistas and Linatoc because he
was already six feet below the ground. Mistas and Linatoc could have demanded presentation of the document
authorizing Summit in requesting for the cancellation of my TD. Also, they could have demanded
from Summit any document transferring my interest and ownership in favor of a third party. Or, at least, they could
have annotated in Tax Declaration No. 00949-A the fact that I bought my 5,000 sq.m. from a public auction sale
duly conducted by the court sheriff. Alternatively, Linatoc and Mistas should have advised Summit to the effect
that since they already appear to be the owners of the subject parcel of land, the new tax declaration should bear
their name instead. Mistas and Linatoc indeed conspired with Summit in the illegal and unwarranted cancellation of
my TD and in covering up the behind-the-scenes activities of Summit by making it appear that it was Francisco
Catigbac who caused the cancellation. Even Leonardo Yagin, the alleged attorney-in-fact did not appear before
Mistas and Linatoc. Yagin could not have appeared because he is rumored to be long dead. The aforementioned
acts of the two benefitted (sic) Summit through their manifest partiality, evident bad faith and/or gross inexcusable
negligence. Perhaps, there is some truth to the rumor that Yagin is dead because he does not even have a TIN in the
questioned Deed of Absolute Sale. If indeed Yagin is already dead or inexistent[,] the allged payment of the
purchase price of P5,282,400.00 on July 25, 2002 is a mere product of the fertile imagination of Orense and
Leviste. To dispute this assertion[,] the live body of Leonardo Yagin must be presented by Orense and Leviste.[23]
After filing her Affidavit Complaint, petitioner attempted to have the Sheriffs Deed of Final Sale/Conveyance of her 5,000 square
meter pro-indiviso share in Lot 13713 registered with the Register of Deeds of Lipa City. She also sought the annotation of her
Affidavit of Adverse Claim on the said 5,000 square meters on TCT No. T-134609 ofSummit Realty.
 Escutin, the Register of Deeds of Lipa City, relying on the finding of Examiner Juanita H. Sta. Ana (Sta. Ana), refused to
have the Sheriffs Deed of Final Sale/Conveyance registered, since:
The Sheriffs Deed of Final Sale/Conveyance is a Mode of Transfers (sic) ownership in favor of the Plaintiff,
[Dinah] C. Castillo, (sic) However[,] it happen (sic) that the presented Tax Declaration [No.] 00942-A is already
transfer (sic) in the name of the said [Dinah] C. Castillo, therefore[,] the registration of Sheriff (sic) Final Sale is no
longer necessary.[24]
Escutin likewise denied petitioners request to have her Affidavit of Adverse Claim annotated on TCT No. T-134609 on the
following grounds:
1. The claimants (sic) rights or interest is not adverse to the registered owner. The registered owner is
Summit Point Realty and Development Corporation under Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-134609 of the
Registry of Deeds for Lipa City.
2. The records of the Registry reveals that the source of the rights or interest of the adverse claimant is by
virtue of a Levy on Execution by the Regional Trial Court Fourth Judicial Region, Branch 30, San Pablo City, in
Civil Case No. SP-4489 (1996), [Dinah] C. Castillo vs. Raquel Buenaventura. The registered owner, Summit Point
Realty and Development Corporation nor its predecessor-in-interest are not the judgment debtor or a party in the
said case. Simply stated, there is no privity of contract between them (Consulta No. 1044 and 1119). If ever, her
adverse claim is against Raquel Buenaventura, the judgment debtor who holds no title over the property. [25]
Escutin did mention, however, that petitioner may elevate en consulta to the Land Registration Authority (LRA) the denial of
her request for registration of the Sheriffs Deed of Final Sale/Conveyance and annotation of her adverse claim on TCT No. T-
134609. This petitioner did on 3 July 2003.
While her Consulta was pending before the LRA, petitioner filed a Supplemental Complaint Affidavit [26] and a Second
Supplemental Complaint Affidavit[27] with the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon, bringing to its attention the
aforementioned developments. In her Second Supplemental Complaint Affidavit, petitioner prayed that Sta. Ana be included as a co-
respondent in OMB-L-A-03-0573-F and OMB-L-C-03-0728-F, averring that the latters actuation deprived petitioner of a factual basis
for securing a new title in her favor over her 5,000 square meter pro-indiviso share in Lot 13713, because the public auction sale of the
said property to her could never become final without the registration of the Sheriffs Deed.
The persons charged in OMB-L-A-03-0573-F and OMB-L-C-03-0728-F filed their respective Counter-Affidavits.
Respondent Escutin clarified in his Counter Affidavit that TCT No. T-134609 reflected the same date and time of entry of the
Deed of Absolute Sale between Yagin (as Catigbacs attorney-in-fact) and Summit Realty, i.e., 25 July 2002 at 2:30 p.m., in accordance
with Section 56[28] of Presidential Decree No. 1529, otherwise known as the Property Registration Decree. He emphasized that his duty
as Register of Deeds to register the Deed of Absolute Sale presented before him was purely ministerial. If the document was legal and
in due form, and there was nothing mutilated or irregular on its face, the Register of Deeds had no authority to inquire into its intrinsic
validity based upon proofs aliunde. It was not true that he allowed the registration of the Deed of Absolute Sale notwithstanding the
absence of the required documents supporting the application for registration thereof. On the contrary, all the required documents such
as the DAR Clearance, Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) Certificate Authorizing Registration (CAR), Real Property Tax, Transfer
Tax, Secretarys Certificate and Articles of Incorporation of Summit Realty were submitted. While it was true that the Secretarys
Certificate did not accompany the Deed of Absolute Sale upon the presentation of the latter for registration, Section 117 of the Property
Registration Decree gives the party seeking registration five days to comply with the rest of the requirements; and only if the party
should still fail to submit the same would it result in the denial of the registration.The License to Sell and the Housing and Land Use
Regulatory Board Registration of Summit Realty are only required when a subdivision project is presented for registration.The use of
TINs in certain documents is a BIR requirement. The BIR itself did not require from Yagin as vendor his TIN in the Deed of Absolute
Sale, and issued the CAR even in the absence thereof. The Register of Deeds, therefore, was only bound by the CAR. As to the
Certification earlier issued by the Register of Deeds of Lipa City attesting that Lot 13713 in the name of co-owners Raquel, Urbana,
and Perla, was not covered by any certificate of title, Escutin explained that the Register of Deeds was not technically equipped to
determine whether a cadastral lot number was within a titled property or not. Lastly, Escutin denied conspiring or participating in the
cancellation of petitioners Tax Declaration No. 00942-A for, as Register of Deeds, he was not concerned with the issuance (or
cancellation) of tax declarations.
Respondent Mistas, the Assistant City Assessor for Administration of the Office of the City Assessor, Lipa City, disputed
petitioners allegations that she personally received from petitioner copies of the Notice of Levy and other supporting documents, and
that she caused the disappearance thereof. Although she admitted that said documents were shown to her by petitioner, she referred
petitioner to the Receiving Clerk, Lynie Reyes, who accordingly received the same. Mistas maintained that she was not the custodian
of records of the Office and she should not be held responsible for the missing documents. She opined that petitioners documents could
have been among those misplaced or destroyed when the Office of the City Assessor was flooded with water leaking from the toilet of
the Office of the City Mayor. As Assistant City Assessor for Administration, Mistas identified her main function to be the control and
management of all phases of administrative matters and support. She had no hand in the cancellation of petitioners Tax Declaration No.
00942-A, and the issuance of Catigbacs Tax Declaration No. 00949-A for such function pertained to another division over which she
did not exercise authority. Thus, it was also not within her function or authority to demand the presentation of certain documents to
support the cancellation of petitioners Tax Declaration No. 00942-A or to cause the annotation of petitioners interest on Catigbacs Tax
Declaration No. 00949-A.
Respondent Linatoc averred that as Local Assessment Operation Officer II of the Office of the City Assessor, Lipa City, she
was in charge of safekeeping and updating the North District Records. With respect to the transfer of a tax declaration from one name
to another, her duty was limited only to the act of preparing the new tax declaration and assigning it a number, in lieu of the cancelled
tax declaration. It was a purely ministerial duty. She had no authority to demand the presentation of any document or question the
validity of the transfer. Neither was it within her jurisdiction to determine whether petitioners interest should have been annotated on
Catigbacs Tax Declaration No. 00949-A.Examining the documents presented in support of the transfer of the tax declaration to
anothers name was a function belonging to other divisions of the Office of the City Assessors. The flow of work, the same as in any
other ordinary transaction, mandated her to cancel petitioners Tax Declaration No. 00942-A, and to prepare and release Catigbacs Tax
Declaration No. 00949-A after the transfer had been reviewed and approved by other divisions of the Office. It was also not true that
TCT No. 129642 in the name of Catigbac was already cancelled when it was presented before the Office of the City Assessors; the
photocopy of said certificate of title with the Office bore no mark of cancellation.
Leviste and Orense, the private individuals charged with the respondent public officers, admitted that they were corporate
officers of Summit Realty. They related that Summit Realty bought a parcel of land measuring 105,648 square meters, later identified
as Lot 1-B, previously included in TCT No. 181, then specifically covered by TCT No. 129642, both in the name of Catigbac. As a
result of such purchase, ownership of Lot 1-B was transferred from Catigbac to Summit Realty. Summit Realty had every reason to
believe in good faith that said property was indeed owned by Catigbac on the basis of the latters certificate of title over the
same. Catigbacs right as registered owner of Lot 1-B under TCT No. 181/No. 129642, was superior to petitioners, which was based on
a mere tax declaration. Leviste and Orense rebutted petitioners assertion that the Deed of Absolute Sale between Yagin, as Catigbacs
attorney-in-fact, and Summit Realty was a one-way street. The Deed was actually signed on the left margin by both Yagin and the
representative of Summit Realty. The inadvertent failure of the representative of Summit Realty to sign the last page of the Deed and of
both parties to indicate their TINs therein did not invalidate the sale, especially since the Deed was signed by witnesses attesting to its
due execution. Questions as regards the scope of Catigbacs Special Power of Attorney in favor of Yagin and the effectivity of the same
after Catigbacs death can only be raised in an action directly attacking the title of Summit Realty over Lot 1-B, and not in an
administrative case and/or preliminary investigation before the Ombudsman, which constituted a collateral attack against said
title. Leviste and Orense further explained that since the owners duplicate of TCT No. 181 was lost and was judicially ordered replaced
only on 3 January 2001, entries/inscriptions were necessarily made thereon after said date. As to Orenses failure to show petitioner any
document proving ownership of Lot 1-B by Summit Realty when the latter paid him a visit, it was not due to the lack of such
documents, but because of petitioners failure to establish her right to peruse the same. Orense also denied ever threatening petitioner
during their meeting. Finally, according to Leviste and Orense, petitioners allegations were based on mere conjectures and unsupported
by evidence. That particular acts were done or not done by certain public officials was already beyond the control of Leviste
and Orense, and just because they benefited from these acts did not mean that they had a hand in the commission or omission of said
public officials.
After more exchange of pleadings, OMB-L-A-03-0573-F and OMB-L-C-03-0728-F were finally submitted for resolution.
In a Joint Resolution[29] dated 28 April 2004, the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon gave more credence to
respondent Escutins defenses, as opposed to petitioners charges against him:
Going to the charges against respondent Escutin, he convincingly explained that he allowed the
registration of the allegedly defective Deed of Sale because he, as Register of Deeds, has no power to look into the
intrinsic validity [of] the contract presented to him for registration, owing to the ministerial character of his
function. Moreover, as sufficiently explained by said respondent, all the documents required for the registration of
the Deed of Sale were submitted by the applicant.
We likewise find said respondents explanation satisfactory that Section 56 of P.D. 1529 mandates that the
TCT bear the date of registration of the instrument on which the said TCTs issuance was based. It is for this reason
that TCT 134609 bears the same date and time as the registration of the Deed of Absolute Sale, which deed served
as basis for its issuance.
As to his denial to register [herein petitioners] Affidavit of Adverse Claim and Sheriffs Certificate of
Final Sale, through the issuance by the Registry of Deeds Examiner Juanita H. Sta. Ana, of the 29 June 2003 Order
denying registration thereof, such matter had been raised by herein [petitioner] in a letter-consulta to the
Administrator of the Land Registration Authority (LRA) on 03 July 2003. As the criminal and administrative
charges respecting this issue is premised, in part, on a matter still pending with the LRA, we find it premature to
make a finding on the same.
It is for the same reason that we deny the motion contained in the Second Supplemental Complaint
Affidavit praying for the inclusion, as additional respondent, of Juanita H. Sta. Ana, who is impleaded solely on the
basis of having signed, by authority of Escutin, the 29 July 2003 Order of denial of [petitioners] application for
registration.
Finally, respondent Escutin was able to successfully demonstrate, through Consulta 2103 dated 25 July
1994, wherein the denial of registration by the Examiner of the Registry of Deeds of Quezon City was upheld by
the LRA Administrator, that the (sic) it was practice in the different Registries that Examiners are given authority
by the Register to sign letters of denial.[30]
The Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon declared in the same Joint Resolution that there was no basis to hold
respondents Mistas and Linatoc administratively or criminally liable:
In this respect, this Office notes that while [herein petitioner] alleges that Aquilina Mistas caused the
disappearance of the Notice of Levy and other supporting documents received from [petitioner] on 13 March 2003
when she applied for the issuance of a Tax Declaration in her favor, she did not present her receiving copy thereof
showing that it was Mistas who received said documents from her. Neither did she show that Mistas is the
employee responsible for record safekeeping.
 Next, we find, as convincingly answered, the allegation that respondent Marietta Linatoc cancelled Tax
Declaration No. 00942-A and issued Tax Declaration 00949-Q (sic) on the basis of a cancelled Transfer Certificate
of Title upon the behest of Summit [Realty], which was not the registered owner of the property.
Respondent Linatoc, meeting squarely [petitioners] allegation, admits having physically cancelled Tax
Declaration No. 00942-A and having prepared a new declaration covering the same property in Catigbacs [name],
as mandated by the flow of work in the City Assessors Office. However, she denies having the authority or
discretion to evaluate the correctness and sufficiency of the documents supporting the application for the issuance
of the Tax Declaration, arguing that her official function is limited to the physical preparation of a new tax
declaration, the assignment of a new tax declaration number and the cancellation of the old tax declaration, after the
application had passed the other divisions of the City Assessors Office.
Verily, [petitioner] failed to establish that respondent Mistas and Linatoc, are the ones officially
designated to receive applications for issuance of Tax Declaration, evaluate the sufficiency of the documents
supporting such applications, and on the basis of the foregoing recommend or order the cancellation of an existing
Tax Declaration and direct the annotation of any fact affecting the property and direct the issuance of a new tax
declaration covering the same property.
In fact, there is even a discrepancy as to the official designation of said respondents. While [petitioner]
impleads Mistas, in her capacity as Local Assessment Officer, and Linatoc, in her capacity as Records Clerk,
Mistas, in her counter-affidavit, alleges a different designation, i.e., Assistant City Assessor for Administration,
while Linatoc claims to be the Local Assessment Operation Officer II of the City Assessors Office.
With the scope of work of said respondents not having been neatly defined by [petitioner], this Office
cannot make a definitive determination of their liability for Grave Misconduct and violation of Section 3(e) of R.A.
No. 3019, which charges both relate to the performance or discharge of Mistas and Linatocs official duties. [31]
Neither did the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon find any probable cause to criminally charge private individuals
Leviste and Orense for the following reasons:
Anent private respondents, with the alleged conspiracy to unlawfully cause the transfer of the title of
[herein petitioners] property to Summit sufficiently explained by respondent Register of Deeds, such allegation
against private respondents loses a legal leg to stand on.
Inasmuch as [petitioner] was not able to sufficiently outline the official functions of respondents Mistas
and Linatoc to pin down their specific accountabilities, the imputation that private respondent (sic) conspired with
said public respondents respecting the cancellation of Tax Declaration No. 00942-A is likewise stripped of any
factual and legal bases.[32]
As to whether petitioner was indeed unlawfully deprived of her 5,000 square meter property, which issue comprised the very
premise of OMB-L-A-03-0573-F and OMB-L-C-03-0728-F, the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon ruled that such matter
was not within its jurisdiction and should be raised in a civil action before the courts of justice.
In the end, the Office of the Ombudsman decreed:
WHEREFORE premises considered, it is respectfully recommended that : (1) the administrative case
against public respondents ANTONIO M. ESCUTIN, AQUILINA A. MISTAS and MARIETA L. LINATOC be
DISMISSED, for lack of substantial evidence; and (2) the criminal case against the same respondents including
private respondent LAURO S. LEVISTE II and BENEDICTO L. ORENSE, be DISMISSED, for lack of probable
cause.[33]
In a Joint Order[34] dated 20 June 2005, the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon denied petitioners Motion for
Reconsideration.
The Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon, in its Joint Order, took notice of the Resolution dated 17 December
2002 of the LRA in Consulta No. 3483, which involved circumstances similar to those in petitioners case. The LRA distinguished
between two systems of land registration: one is the Torrens system for registered lands under the Property Registration Decree, and
the other is the system of registration for unregistered land under Act No. 3344 (now Section 113 of the Property Registration
Decree).These systems are separate and distinct from each other. For documents involving registered lands, the same should be
recorded under the Property Registration Decree. The registration, therefore, of an instrument under the wrong system produces no
legal effect. Since it appeared that in Consulta No. 3483, the registration of the Kasulatan ng Sanglaan, the Certificate of Sale and the
Affidavit of Consolidation was made under Act No. 3344, it did not produce any legal effect on the disputed property, because the said
property was already titled when the aforementioned documents were executed and presented for registration, and their registration
should have been made under the Property Registration Decree.
Furthermore, the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon, in the same Joint Order, took into account petitioners
withdrawal of her appeal en consulta before the LRA of the denial by the Register of Deeds of her request for registration of the
Sheriffs Deed of Final Sale/Conveyance and Affidavit of Adverse Claim, which prompted the LRA Administrator to declare
the consulta moot and academic. For want of a categorical declaration on the registerability of petitioners documents from the LRA, the
competent authority to rule on the said matter, there could be no basis for a finding that respondent public officers could be held
administratively or criminally liable for the acts imputed to them.
Petitioner sought recourse from the Court of Appeals by filing a Petition for Review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court
challenging the 28 April 2004 Joint Resolution and 20 June 2005 Joint Order of the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for
Luzon.[35] The appeal was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 90533.
 The Court of Appeals promulgated its Decision[36] on 18 October 2005, also finding no reason to administratively or
criminally charge respondents. Essentially, the appellate court adjudged that petitioner can not impute corrupt motives to respondents
acts:
Without evidence showing that respondents received any gift, money or other pay-off or that they were induced by
offers of such, the Court cannot impute any taint of direct corruption in the questioned acts of respondents. Thus,
any indication of intent to violate the laws or of flagrant disregard of established rule may be negated by
respondents honest belief that their acts were sanctioned under the provisions of existing law and regulations. Such
is the situation in the case at bar. Respondent Register of Deeds acted in the honest belief that the agency
recognized by the court in LRC Case No. 00-0376 between the registered owner Francisco Catigbac and Leonardo
Yagin subsisted with respect to the conveyance or sale of Lot 1 to Summit as the vendee, and that the Special
Power of Attorney and Deed of Absolute Sale presented as evidence during said proceedings are valid and
binding. Hence, respondent Escutin was justified in believing that there is no legal infirmity or defect in registering
the documents and proceeding with the transfer of title of Lot 1 in the name of the new owner Summit. On the
other hand, respondent Linatoc could not be held administratively liable for effecting the cancellation in the course
of ordinary flow of work in the City Assessors Office after the documents have undergone the necessary evaluation
and verification by her superiors.[37]
The Court of Appeals referred to the consistent policy of the Supreme Court not to interfere with the exercise by the
Ombudsman of his investigatory power. If the Ombudsman, using professional judgment, finds the case dismissible, the Court shall
respect such findings, unless clothed with grave abuse of discretion. The appellate court pronounced that there was no grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon in dismissing petitioners Complaint Affidavit against
respondents.
Hence, the dispositive portion of the Decision of the Court of Appeals reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the present petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. The
challenged Joint Resolution dated April 28, 2004 and Joint Order dated June 20, 2005 in OMB-L-A-03-0573-F and
OMB-L-C-03-0728-F are hereby AFFIRMED.[38]
In its Resolution dated 11 January 2006, the Court of Appeals denied petitioners Motion for Reconsideration for failing to
present new matter which the appellate court had not already considered in its earlier Decision.
Petitioner now comes before this Court via the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari, with the following assignment of
errors:
I.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS PATENTLY ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE CANCELLATION OF
THE TAX DECLARATION 00942 OF PETITIONER IN VIOLATION OF SECTION 109 OF PRESIDENTIAL
DECREE 1529, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE PROPERTY REGISTRATION ACT (sic);
II.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS PATENTLY ERRED IN RULING THAT RESPONDENTS COULD
NOT BE HELD ADMINISTRATIVELY LIABLE FOR UNDULY FAVORING SUMMIT TO THE DAMAGE
AND PREJUDICE OF PETITIONER.[39]
The Petition at bar is without merit.
As to the first issue, petitioner invokes Section 109 of the Property, Registration Decree which provides:
SEC. 109. Notice and replacement of lost duplicate certificate. In case of loss or theft of an owners
duplicate certificate of title, due notice under oath shall be sent by the owner or by someone in his behalf to the
Register of Deeds of the province or city where the land lies as soon as the loss or theft is discovered. If a duplicate
certificate is lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced by a person applying for the entry of a new certificate to him
or for the registration of any new instrument, a sworn statement of the fact of such loss or destruction may be filed
by the registered owner or other person in interest and registered.
Upon the petition of the registered owner or other person in interest, the court may, after notice and due
hearing, direct the issuance of a new duplicate certificate, which shall contain a memorandum of the fact that it is
issued in place of the lost duplicate certificate, but shall in all respects be entitled to like faith and credit as the
original duplicate, and shall thereafter be regarded as such for all purposes of this decree.
Petitioner argues that the RTC, in LRC Case No. 00-0376, only ordered the issuance of a new owners duplicate of TCT No.
181 in lieu of the lost one. However, respondents did not only issue a new owners duplicate of TCT No. 181, but also cancelled
petitioners Tax Declaration No. 00942-A and issued in its place Tax Declaration No. 00949-A in the name of Catigbac. Respondents
did not even annotate petitioners existing right over 5,000 square meters of Lot 1-B or notify petitioner of the cancellation of her Tax
Declaration No. 00942-A. Petitioner maintains that a new owners duplicate of title is not a mode of acquiring ownership, nor is it a
mode of losing one. Under Section 109 of the Property Registration Decree, the new duplicate of title was issued only to replace the
old; it cannot cancel existing titles.
Petitioners position on this issue rests on extremely tenuous arguments and befuddled reasoning.
Before anything else, the Court must clarify that a title is different from a certificate of title. Title is generally defined as the
lawful cause or ground of possessing that which is ours. It is that which is the foundation of ownership of property, real or
personal.[40] Title, therefore, may be defined briefly as that which constitutes a just cause of exclusive possession, or which is the
foundation of ownership of property.[41] Certificate of title, on the other hand, is a mere evidence of ownership; it is not the title to the
land itself.[42] Under the Torrens system, a certificate of title may be an Original Certificate of Title, which constitutes a true copy of the
decree of registration; or a Transfer Certificate of Title, issued subsequent to the original registration.
Summit Realty acquired its title to Lot 1-B, not from the issuance of the new owners duplicate of TCT No. 181, but from its
purchase of the same from Yagin, the attorney-in-fact of Catigbac, the registered owner of the said property. Summit Realty merely
sought the issuance of a new owners duplicate of TCT No. 181 in the name of Catigbac so that it could accordingly register thereon the
sale in its favor of a substantial portion of Lot 1 covered by said certificate, later identified as Lot 1-B. Catigbacs title to Lot 1-B passed
on by sale to Summit Realty, giving the latter the right to seek the separation of the said portion from the rest of Lot 1 and the issuance
of a certificate of title specifically covering the same. This resulted in the issuance of TCT No. 129642 in the name of Catigbac,
covering Lot 1-B, which was subsequently cancelled and replaced by TCT No. T-134609 in the name of Summit Realty.
Petitioners reliance on Section 109 of the Property Registration Decree is totally misplaced. It provides for the requirements
for the issuance of a lost duplicate certificate of title. It cannot, in any way, be related to the cancellation of petitioners tax declaration.
The cancellation of petitioners Tax Declaration No. 00942-A was not because of the issuance of a new owners duplicate of
TCT No. 181, but of the fact that Lot 1-B, which encompassed the 5,000 square meters petitioner lays claim to, was already covered by
TCT No. 181 (and subsequently by TCT No. 129642) in the name of Catigbac. A certificate of title issued is an absolute and
indefeasible evidence of ownership of the property in favor of the person whose name appears therein. It is binding and conclusive
upon the whole world.[43] All persons must take notice, and no one can plead ignorance of the registration. [44] Therefore, upon
presentation of TCT No. 129642, the Office of the City Assessor must recognize the ownership of Lot 1-B by Catigbac and issue in his
name a tax declaration for the said property. And since Lot 1-B is already covered by a tax declaration in the name of Catigbac,
accordingly, any other tax declaration for the same property or portion thereof in the name of another person, not supported by any
certificate of title, such that of petitioner, must be cancelled; otherwise, the City Assessor would be twice collecting a realty tax from
different persons on one and the same property.
As between Catigbacs title, covered by a certificate of title, and petitioners title, evidenced only by a tax declaration, the
former is evidently far superior and is, in the absence of any other certificate of title to the same property, conclusive and indefeasible
as to Catigbacs ownership of Lot 1-B. Catigbacs certificate of title is binding upon the whole world, including respondent public
officers and even petitioner herself. Time and again, the Court has ruled that tax declarations and corresponding tax receipts cannot be
used to prove title to or ownership of a real property inasmuch as they are not conclusive evidence of the same. [45] Petitioner acquired
her title to the 5,000 square meter property from Raquel, her judgment debtor who, it is important to note, likewise only had a tax
declaration to evidence her title. In addition, the Court of Appeals aptly observed that, [c]uriously, as to how and when petitioners
alleged predecessor-in-interest, Raquel K. Moratilla and her supposed co-owners acquired portions of Lot 1 described as Lot 13713
stated in TD No. 00449, petitioner had so far remained utterly silent.[46]
Petitioners allegations of defects or irregularities in the sale of Lot 1-B to Summit Realty by Yagin, as Catigbacs attorney-in-
fact, are beyond the jurisdiction of the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon to consider. It must be remembered that Summit
Realty had already acquired a certificate of title, TCT No. T-134609, in its name over Lot1-B, which constitutes conclusive and
indefeasible evidence of its ownership of the said property and, thus, cannot be collaterally attacked in the administrative and
preliminary investigations conducted by the Office of the Ombudsman for Luzon. Section 48 of the Property Registration Decree
categorically provides that a certificate of title shall not be subject to collateral attack. It cannot be altered, modified, or cancelled
except in a direct proceeding in accordance with law. For this same reason, the Court has no jurisdiction to grant petitioners prayer in
the instant Petition for the cancellation of TCT No. T-134609 in the name of Summit Realty.
Which now brings the Court to the second issue raised by petitioner on the administrative liability of respondents.
Before the Court proceeds to tackle this issue, it establishes that petitioners Complaint Affidavit before the Office of the
Ombudsman for Luzon gave rise to two charges: (1) OMB-L-A-03-0573-F involved the administrative charge for Gross Misconduct
against respondent public officers; and (2) OMB-L-C-03-0728-F concerned the criminal charge for violation of Section 3(e) of the
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act[47] against respondent public officers and private individuals Leviste and Orense. The Office of
the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon, affirmed by the Court of Appeals, dismissed both charges. In the Petition at bar, petitioner only
assails the dismissal of the administrative charge for grave misconduct against respondent public officers. Since petitioner did not raise
as an issue herein the dismissal by the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon, affirmed by the Court of Appeals, of the criminal
charge against respondent public officers for violation of Section 3(e) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, the same became
final and executory.[48]
In Domingo v. Quimson,[49] the Court adopted the well-written report and recommendation of its Clerk of Court on the
administrative matter then pending and involving the charge of gross or serious misconduct:
"Under Section 36, par. (b) [1] of PD No. 807, otherwise known as the Civil Service Decree of the
Philippines, 'misconduct' is a ground for disciplinary action. And under MC No. 8, S. 1970, issued by the Civil
Service Commission on July 28, 1970, which sets the 'Guidelines in the Application of Penalties in Administrative
Cases and other Matters Relative Thereto,' the administrative offense of 'grave misconduct' carries with it the
maximum penalty of dismissal from the service (Sec. IV-C[3], MC No. 8, S. 1970). But the term 'misconduct' as an
administrative offense has a well defined meaning. It was defined in Amosco vs. Judge Magno, Adm. Mat. No.
439-MJ, Res. September 30, 1976, as referring 'to a transgression of some established and definite rule of action,
more particularly, unlawful behavior or gross negligence by the public officer.' It is a misconduct 'such as affects
the performance of his duties as an officer and not such only as effects his character as a private individual.' In the
recent case of Oao vs. Pabato, etc., Adm. Mat. No. 782-MJ, Res. July 29, 1977, the Court defined 'serious
misconduct' as follows:
 Hence, even assuming that the dismissal of the case is erroneous, this would be
merely an error of judgment and not serious misconduct. The term `serious misconduct is a
transgression of some established and definite rule of action more particularly, unlawful
behavior of gross negligence by the magistrate. It implies a wrongful intention and not a mere
error of judgment. For serious misconduct to exist, there must be reliable evidence showing that
the judicial acts complained of were corrupt or inspired by intention to violate the law, or were
a persistent disregard of well-known legal rules. We have previously ruled that negligence and
ignorance on the part of a judge are inexcusable if they imply a manifest injustice which cannot
be explained by a reasonable interpretation. This is not so in the case at bar. (Italics supplied.)
To reiterate, for grave misconduct to exist, there must be reliable evidence showing that the acts complained of were corrupt
or inspired by an intention to violate the law, or were a persistent disregard of well-known legal rules. Both the Office of the Deputy
Ombudsman for Luzon and the Court of Appeals found that there was no sufficient evidence to substantiate petitioners charge of grave
misconduct against respondents. For this Court to reverse the rulings of the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon and the Court
of Appeals, it must necessarily review the evidence presented by the parties and decide on a question of fact. Once it is clear that the
issue invites a review of the evidence presented, the question posed is one of fact.[50]
Factual issues are not cognizable by this Court in a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. In order to
resolve this issue, the Court would necessarily have to look into the probative value of the evidence presented in the proceedings
below. It is not the function of the Court to reexamine or reevaluate the evidence all over again. This Court is not a trier of facts, its
jurisdiction in these cases being limited to reviewing only errors of law that may have been committed by the lower courts or
administrative bodies performing quasi-judicial functions. It should be emphasized that findings made by an administrative body,
which has acquired expertise, are accorded not only respect but even finality by the Court. In administrative proceedings, the quantum
of evidence required is only substantial.[51]
Absent a clear showing of grave abuse of discretion, the Court shall not disturb findings of fact. The Court cannot weigh once
more the evidence submitted, not only before the Ombudsman, but also before the Court of Appeals. Under Section 27 of Republic Act
No. 6770, findings of fact by the Ombudsman are conclusive, as long as they are supported by substantial evidence. [52] Substantial
evidence is the amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion. [53]
The Court finds no reason to disturb the finding of the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon and the Court of Appeals
that respondents did not commit gross misconduct. Evident from the 28 April 2004 Joint Resolution of the former and the 18 October
2005 Decision of the latter is that they arrived at such findings only after a meticulous consideration of the evidence submitted by the
parties.
Respondents were able to clearly describe their official functions and to convincingly explain that they had only acted in
accordance therewith in their dealings with petitioner and/or her documents. Respondents also enjoy in their favor the presumption of
regularity in the performance of their official duty. The burden of proving otherwise by substantial evidence falls on petitioner, who
failed to discharge the same.
From the very beginning, petitioner was unable to identify correctly the positions held by respondents Mistas and Linatoc at
the Office of the City Assessor. How then could she even assert that a particular action was within or without their jurisdiction to
perform? While it may be true that petitioner should have at least been notified that her Tax Declaration No. 00942-A was being
cancelled, she was not able to establish that such would be the responsibility of respondents Mistas or Linatoc. Moreover, petitioner did
not present statutory, regulatory, or procedural basis for her insistence that respondents should have done or not done a particular act. A
perfect example was her assertion that respondents Mistas and Linatoc should have annotated her interest on Tax Declaration No.
00949-A in the name of Catigbac. However, she failed to cite any law or rule which authorizes or recognizes the annotation of an
adverse interest on a tax declaration. Finally, absent any reliable evidence, petitioners charge that respondents conspired with one
another and with corporate officers of Summit Realty is nothing more than speculation, surmise, or conjecture. Just because the acts of
respondents were consistently favorable to Summit Realty does not mean that there was a concerted effort to cause petitioner
prejudice. Respondents actions were only consistent with the recognition of the title of Catigbac over Lot 1-B, transferred by sale to
Summit Realty, registered under the Torrens system, and accordingly evidenced by certificates of title.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition for Review is hereby DENIED. The Decision dated 18 October
2005 and Resolution dated 11 January 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 90533 are hereby AFFIRMED in toto. Costs
against the petitioner Dinah C. Castillo.
SO ORDERED.
 THIRD DIVISION
ZENAIDA ACOSTA, EDUARDO G.R. No. 161034
ACOSTA, ARNOLD ACOSTA, DELIA ACOSTA, SPS.
TEODULO MACHADO AND AURORA ORENZA,
SPS.ROLDAN PALARCA AND PACITA PANGILINAN, SPS.
FROMENCIO JONATAS AND LUCENA M. MARIANO, SPS.
MARCIAL IGLESIA AND VIRGINIA LAPURGA, ATTY.-IN-
FACT FELINO MACARAEG, SPS. MANUEL MANGROBANG
AND VALERIANA SOTIO, SPS. VIRGINIA DELA ROSA AND Present:
ROMEO DELA ROSA, SPS. PACIFICO SOTIO AND LOLITA
SORIANO, JUAN DALINOC (DECEASED), REPRESENTED YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.,
BY DAUGHTER CONSUELO DALINOC, SPS. MARIANO Chairperson,
TORIO AND MAXIMA MACARAEG, REPRESENTED BY CHICO-NAZARIO,
LEGAL HEIRS TORIBIA TORIO AND MAYUMI VELASCO, JR.,
MACARAEG, TEOFILO MOLINA AND AVELINO DIZON, NACHURA, and
Petitioners, PERALTA, JJ.

- versus -

TRINIDAD SALAZAR AND ANICETA SALAZAR, Promulgated:

Respondents.
June 30, 2009
x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari assailing the July 25, 2003 Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) as well as its November
25, 2003 Resolution[2] in CA-G.R. CV No. 70161, which reversed and set aside the December 20, 2000 Decision [3] of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC), Branch 64, Tarlac City in Civil Case No. 7256. Said RTC decision dismissed the complaint for quieting of title filed
by herein respondents Trinidad Salazar and Aniceta Salazar against petitioners.
Below are the facts.
On November 19, 1985, respondents Trinidad and Aniceta Salazar (hereinafter, Salazars), filed a petition for the cancellation of the
entries annotated at the back of Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 40287 registered in the names of spouses Juan Soriano and
Vicenta Macaraeg, who died without issue.[4] The Salazars claim that two of the entries Entry Nos. 19756 and 20102 annotated at the
back of the aforesaid title are void since no consolidation of rights appear in the Registry of Deeds (RD) of Tarlac to support the
entries; and that Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 9297, which supposedly cancelled OCT No. 40287, is non-existent according
to a certification issued by the RD.[5]On October 21, 1986, RTC Branch 63 of Tarlac resolved to grant the petition and ordered the
cancellation of Entry No. 20102.[6] No respondent was impleaded in the said petition.
Subsequently, the Salazars filed an urgent motion praying for the issuance of an order to direct the RD of Tarlac to recall all titles
issued under Entry Nos. 19756 and 20102 and to cancel all the tax declarations issued based thereon. The motion was granted in an
Order issued on November 7, 1986.[7]
On November 20, 1986, the Salazars filed a second urgent motion praying that the owners of the affected property be ordered to appear
before the court to show cause why their titles should not be cancelled. [8]
On October 20, 1987, the Salazars filed a new motion praying that the RD of Tarlac be ordered to comply with the courts order issued
on November 7, 1986. The RD, however, explained that to comply with the said court order would remove the basis for the issuance of
TCT No. 9297 which title had, in turn, been cancelled by many other transfer certificates of title and would indubitably result in the
deprivation of the right to due process of the registered owners thereof.[9] On this basis, the RTC denied the motion and advised the
Salazars to elevate the matter en consulta to the Land Registration Commission (now Land Registration Authority or LRA). After the
Salazars moved for reconsideration, the RTC directed the RD of Tarlac to comply with the October 21, 1986 and November 7, 1986
orders. Threatened with contempt, the RD elevated the matter en consulta to the National Land Titles and Deeds Registration
Administration, which, in turn, issued a resolution directing the RD to comply with the RTCs orders. [10] On March 7, 1989, OCT No.
40287 was reconstituted and TCT No. 219121 was issued in the names of the Salazars, sans Entry Nos. 19756 and 20102.
It was at this stage of the proceedings that herein petitioners together with other subsequent purchasers for value of the disputed
property twenty-seven (27) titleholders in all[11]filed their formal written comment dated April 17, 1989.[12] In their comment, the
oppositors contended, among others, that they had acquired their titles in good faith and for value, and that the lower court, acting as a
land registration court, had no jurisdiction over issues of ownership. [13]
On September 14, 1989, the said court, apparently realizing its mistake, issued an Order, stating thus:
Upon motion of Atty. Alcantara and without objection on the part of Atty. Molina and Atty. Lamorena, all the
incidents in this case are hereby withdrawn without prejudice to the filing of an appropriate action in a proper
forum.
SO ORDERED.[14]
This prompted the Salazars to file a complaint for quieting of title impleading herein petitioners as well as other individuals who claim
to have purchased the said property from the heirs of Juan Soriano. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 7256 before Branch 64 of
the RTC of Tarlac.[15] The complaint alleged that TCT No. 219121 was issued in the names of the Salazars without Entry Nos. 19756
and 20102 at the back of said title, but the previous TCTs issued by the RD of Tarlac as well as the tax declarations existing in the
Assessors Office have not been cancelled and revoked by the said government agencies to the detriment and prejudice of the
complainants (herein respondents). They also alleged that Pcs-395, from which Lot Nos. 702-A to 702-V were taken, is non-existent
and, thus, the court should cause the cancellation and revocation of spurious and null and void titles and tax declarations. [16]
Defendants filed three separate answers. Defendants Raymundo Macaraeg, Martha Estacio (both deceased), Adelaida Macaraeg, Lucio
Macaraeg, represented by Eufracia Macaraeg Baluyot as attorney-in-fact, Gregorio Baluyut and Eligia Obcena (hereinafter, Macaraegs)
maintained that the November 7, 1986 order of the RTC is null and void because the court did not acquire jurisdiction over the case.
They also argued that TCT No. 219121 issued in the name of the Salazars is void and that the case for quieting of title is not a direct,
but a collateral, attack against a property covered by a Torrens certificate.[17]
Defendants, now herein petitioners, for their part, maintained that the Plan of Consolidation Subdivision Survey Pcs-396 had been an
existing consolidation-subdivision survey plan annotated on OCT No. 40287 under Entry No. 20102 dated February 17, 1950 from
which TCT No. 9297 was issued covering Lot Nos. 702-A to 702-V, inclusive, in the names of the heirs of Juan Soriano. They argued
that TCT No. 219121 issued in the name of the Salazars is spurious and null and void from the beginning since it was acquired
pursuant to an illegal order issued by the court.[18] By way of special and affirmative defenses, they also alleged, among others, (1) that
the Salazars were not among the heirs of the late Juan Soriano, not within the fifth civil degree of consanguinity, and hence, they have
no right to inherit; (2) that TCT No. 219121 constitutes a cloud upon the Torrens title of herein petitioners, and should therefore be
cancelled and revoked; (3) that assuming, without admitting, that the Salazars have any right over the lots in question their right to
enforce such action had already prescribed by laches or had been barred by prescription since more than forty (40) years had lapsed
since the heirs of Juan Soriano had registered the lots in question under TCT No. 9297 on February 17, 1950; and (4) that petitioners
and/or their predecessors-in-interest acquired the lots in question in good faith and for value from the registered owners thereof. [19]
Defendant spouses Francisco Jonatas and Lucena M. Mariano and spouses Manuel Mangrobang and Valeriana Sotio filed their answers
practically raising the same defenses.[20]
Meanwhile, on July 29, 1991, petitioners, together with the Macaraegs and Jonatas, et al., filed before the CA a petition for annulment
of judgment[21] rendered by RTC Branch 63 of Tarlac, Tarlac. The case, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 25643, was, however, dismissed
on the ground of litis pendencia.[22]
On December 20, 2000, Branch 64 of the RTC of Tarlac dismissed the complaint for quieting of title. The trial court faulted the
Salazars for failure to present proof that they are heirs of the late Juan Soriano. [23] It also declared TCT No. 219121 issued in the name
of the Salazars as null and void, and affirmed TCT No. 9297 as well as all certificates of title derived therefrom. [24]
Unsatisfied, the Salazars appealed to the CA,[25] which ruled in their favor.
According to the CA, it was erroneous for Branch 64 of the RTC of Tarlac to reverse and declare as null and void the decision of
Branch 63, which is a court of equal rank. Such issue should have been properly ventilated in an action for annulment of final
judgment. Consequently, the orders issued by RTC Branch 63, had become final and executory, hence, covered by res judicata.[26]
The CA also struck down the arguments raised by the appellees that the orders of RTC Branch 63 are null and void for lack of proper
notice. It ratiocinated that the proceeding is a land registration proceeding, which is an action in rem. This being so, personal notice to
the owners or claimants of the land sought to be registered is not necessary in order to vest the court with jurisdiction over the res and
over the parties.[27]
A motion for reconsideration[28] was filed, but the same was denied.[29] Hence, this petition.
Pivotal to the resolution of this case is the determination of the validity of the action taken by the Salazars in Branch 63 of the RTC of
Tarlac.
We rule for petitioners.
It is true that the registration of land under the Torrens system is a proceeding in rem and not in personam. Such a proceeding in rem,
dealing with a tangible res, may be instituted and carried to judgment without personal service upon the claimants within the state or
notice by mail to those outside of it. Jurisdiction is acquired by virtue of the power of the court over the res. Such a proceeding would
be impossible were this not so, for it would hardly do to make a distinction between constitutional rights of claimants who were known
and those who were not known to the plaintiff, when the proceeding is to bar all. [30]
Interestingly, however, the proceedings instituted by the Salazars both in Branch 63 of the RTC of Tarlac for the cancellation of entries
in OCT No. 40287 and later in Branch 64 of the RTC of Tarlac for quieting of title can hardly be classified as actions in rem. The
petition for cancellation of entries annotated at the back of OCT No. 40287 ought to have been directed against specific persons:
namely, the heirs of Juan Soriano as appearing in Entry No. 20102 and, indubitably, against their successors-in-interest who have
acquired different portions of the property over the years because it is in the nature of an action quasi in rem. Accordingly, the Salazars
should have impleaded as party defendants the heirs of Juan Soriano and/or Vicenta Macaraeg as well as those claiming ownership
over the property under their names because they are indispensable parties. This was not done in this case.[31] Since no indispensable
party was ever impleaded by the Salazars in their petition for cancellation of entry filed before Branch 63 of the RTC of Tarlac, herein
petitioners are not bound by the dispositions of the said court. [32] Consequently, the judgment or order of the said court never even
acquired finality.
Apparently realizing their mistake, the Salazars later on filed an action for quieting of title, also an action quasi in rem, albeit this time
before Branch 64 of the RTC of Tarlac. Because the Salazars miserably failed to prove the basis for their claim, the RTC dismissed the
complaint.[33] In fact, the RTC was bold enough to have pronounced thus:
 Who are the heirs of Juan Soriano who caused the consolidation and in whose favor TCT No. 9297 was
issued? Certainly, they are not the plaintiffs. If the plaintiffs claim that they are the only heirs, they should file a
case against those who executed the consolidation in whose favor [E]ntry [N]o. 20102 was made.
x x x In its order dated February 24, 2000, this Court ruled that it is necessary that plaintiffs should prove
that they are the heirs of Juan Soriano, the registered owners as indicated in OCT No. 40287 of (sic) Vicenta
Macaraeg, the late spouse. Despite the cue, the plaintiffs opted not to present evidence on how they became the
heirs of Juan Soriano or Vicenta Macaraeg. There being [no] evidence presented to prove that plaintiffs are the
heirs of the late Juan Soriano and Vicenta Macaraeg, they had no right and cause of action to prosecute this case. [34]
Needless to say, the failure of the Salazars to implead indispensable party defendants in the petition for cancellation of entries in OCT
No. 40287 should have been a ground for the RTC to dismiss, or at least suspend, the proceedings of the case. [35] Yet, although the
action proceeded, any judgment or order issued by the court thereon is still null and void for want of authority on the part of the court
to act with respect to the parties never impleaded in the action.[36] Thus, the orders issued by said court dated October 21, 1986 and
November 7, 1986 never acquired finality.[37] Quod ab initio non valet, in tractu temporis non convalescit.[38]
Paraphrasing by analogy this Courts ruling in Metropolitan Waterworks & Sewerage System v. Sison,[39] a void order is not
entitled to the respect accorded to a valid order. It may be entirely disregarded or declared inoperative by any tribunal in which effect is
sought to be given to it. It has no legal or binding effect or efficacy for any purpose or at any place and thus cannot affect, impair or
create rights. It is not entitled to enforcement and is, ordinarily, no protection to those who seek to enforce the same. Accordingly, all
proceedings founded on the void court order are themselves regarded as invalid, and the situation is the same as it would be if there was
no order issued by the court. It leaves the party litigants in the same position they were in before the trial.[40] A void order, like any void
judgment, may be said to be a lawless thing which can be treated as an outlaw and slain at sight.[41]
More crucial is the fact that both parties in this case are dealing with property registered under the Torrens system. To allow any
individual, such as the Salazars in this case, to impugn the validity of a Torrens certificate of title by the simple expediency of filing
an ex parte petition for cancellation of entries would inevitably erode the very reason why the Torrens system was adopted in this
country, which is to quiet title to land and to put a stop forever to any question on the legality of the title, except claims that were noted,
at the time of registration, in the certificate, or which may arise subsequent thereto. [42] Once a title is registered under
the Torrens system, the owner may rest secure, without the necessity of waiting in the portals of the courts or sitting in the mirador su
casa to avoid the possibility of losing his land.[43] Rarely will the court allow another person to attack the validity and indefeasibility of
a Torrens certificate, unless there is compelling reason to do so and only upon a direct action filed in court proceeded in accordance
with law.[44]
Finally, this Court also takes note of the fact that for more than 30 years from the time Entry No. 20102 was annotated at the back of
OCT No. 40287 on February 17, 1950 until the time of the filing of the ex parte petition for cancellation of entries on the said
certificate of title on November 19, 1985 the Salazars remained deafeningly quiet and never made any move to question the issue of
ownership over the said land before the proper forum. They also failed to ventilate their claim during the intestate proceeding filed by
the heirs of Juan Soriano sometime in 1939. Likewise, they miserably failed to stop the transfer of portions of the property to
petitioners who, for themselves, were able to secure TCTs in their own names. All of these would lead to the inevitable conclusion that
if there is any validity to the claim of the Salazars over the said property although such issue is not the subject of the present case the
same had already prescribed[45] or, at the very least, had become stale due to laches.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed July 25, 2003 Decision of the Court of Appeals including its November 25,
2003 Resolution are hereby SET ASIDE. Accordingly, the December 20, 2000 Decision rendered by Branch 64 of
the Regional Trial Court of Tarlac City, Tarlac is REINSTATED. Costs against respondents.
SO ORDERED.
 FIRST DIVISION
DELFIN LAMSIS, MAYNARD MONDIGUING, JOSE G.R. No. 173021
VALDEZ, JR. and Heirs of AGUSTIN KITMA,
represented by EUGENE KITMA, Present:
Petitioners, CORONA, C. J., Chairperson,
VELASCO, JR.,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
- versus - DEL CASTILLO, and
PEREZ, JJ.

MARGARITA SEMON DONG-E, Promulgated:

Respondent. October 20, 2010
x--------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.
There is laches when a party is aware, even in the early stages of the proceedings, of a possible jurisdictional objection, and has every
opportunity to raise said objection, but fails to do so, even on appeal.
This is a Petition for Review[1] assailing the March 30, 2006 Decision[2] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 78987 as
well as its May 26, 2006 Resolution[3] which denied petitioners motion for reconsideration. The dispositive portion of the assailed
Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the appeal is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit and the judgment dated January 8, 2003 of
the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City in Civil Case No. 4140-R is AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.[4]
Factual antecedents
This case involves a conflict of ownership and possession over an untitled parcel of land, denominated as Lot No. 1, with an area of
80,736 square meters. The property is located along Km. 5 Asin Road, Baguio City and is part of a larger parcel of land with an area of
186,090 square meters. While petitioners are the actual occupants of Lot No. 1, respondent is claiming ownership thereof and is
seeking to recover its possession from petitioners.
According to respondent Margarita Semon Dong-E (Margarita), her familys ownership and occupation of Lot No. 1 can be traced as far
back as 1922 to her late grandfather, Ap-ap.[5] Upon Ap-aps death, the property was inherited by his children, who obtained a survey
plan in 1964 of the 186,090-square meter property, which included Lot No. 1.[6] On the same year, they declared the property for
taxation purposes in the name of The Heirs of Ap-ap.[7] The 1964 tax declaration bears a notation that reads: Reconstructed from an old
Tax Declaration No. 363 dated May 10, 1922 per true of same presented. [8]
The heirs of Ap-ap then executed, for a P500.00 consideration, a Deed of Quitclaim[9] on February 26, 1964 in favor of their brother
Gilbert Semon (Margaritas father).
Sometime between 1976 and 1978,[10] Gilbert Semon together with his wife Mary Lamsis, allowed his in-laws Manolo Lamsis and
Nancy Lamsis-Kitma, to stay on a portion of Lot No. 1 together with their respective families.[11] They were allowed to erect their
houses, introduce improvements, and plant trees thereon. When Manolo Lamsis and Nancy Lamsis-Kitma died sometime in the 1980s,
their children, petitioners Delfin Lamsis (Delfin) and Agustin Kitma (Agustin), took possession of certain portions of Lot No. 1. Delfin
possessed 4,000 square meters of Lot No. 1, while Agustin occupied 5,000 square meters thereof.[12] Nevertheless, the heirs of Gilbert
Semon tolerated the acts of their first cousins.
When Gilbert Semon died in 1983,[13] his children extrajudicially partitioned the property among themselves and allotted Lot No. 1
thereof in favor of Margarita.[14] Since then, Margarita allegedly paid the realty tax over Lot No. 1 [15] and occupied and improved the
property together with her husband; while at the same time, tolerating her first cousins occupation of portions of the same lot.
This state of affairs changed when petitioners Delfin and Agustin allegedly began expanding their occupation on the subject property
and selling portions thereof.[16] Delfin allegedly sold a 400-square meter portion of Lot No. 1 to petitioner Maynard [17] Mondiguing
(Maynard) while Agustin sold another portion to petitioner Jose Valdez (Jose). [18]
With such developments, Margarita filed a complaint[19] for recovery of ownership, possession, reconveyance and damages against all
four occupants of Lot No. 1 before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Baguio City. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 4140-R
and raffled to Branch 59. The complaint prayed for the annulment of the sales to Maynard and Jose and for petitioners to vacate the
portions of the property which exceed the areas allowed to them by Margarita.[20] Margarita claimed that, as they are her first cousins,
she is willing to donate to Delfin and Agustin a portion of Lot No. 1, provided that she retains the power to choose such portion. [21]
Petitioners denied Margaritas claims of ownership and possession over Lot No. 1. According to Delfin and Agustin, Lot No. 1 is a
public land claimed by the heirs of Joaquin Smith (not parties to the case). [22] The Smiths gave their permission for Delfin and Agustins
parents to occupy the land sometime in 1969 or 1970. They also presented their neighbors who testified that it was Delfin and Agustin
as well as their respective parents who occupied Lot No. 1, not Margarita and her parents.
Delfin and Agustin also assailed the muniments of ownership presented by Margarita as fabricated, unauthenticated, and invalid. It was
pointed out that the Deed of Quitclaim, allegedly executed by all of Ap-aps children, failed to include two Rita Bocahan and Stewart
Sito.[23] Margarita admitted during trial that Rita Bocahan and Stewart Sito were her uncle and aunt, but did not explain why they were
excluded from the quitclaim.
According to Maynard and Jose, Delfin and Agustin were the ones publicly and openly in possession of the land and who introduced
improvements thereon. They also corroborated Delfin and Agustins allegation that the real owners of the property are the heirs of
Joaquin Smith.[24]
In order to debunk petitioners claim that the Smiths owned the subject property, Margarita presented a certified copy of a Resolution
from the Land Management Office denying the Smiths application for recognition of the subject property as part of their ancestral
land.[25] The resolution explains that the application had to be denied because the Smiths did not possess, occupy or utilize all or a
portion of the property x x x. The actual occupants (who were not named in the resolution) whose improvements are visible are not in
any way related to the applicant or his co-heirs.[26]
To bolster her claim of ownership and possession, Margarita introduced as evidence an unnumbered resolution of the Community
Special Task Force on Ancestral Lands (CSTFAL) of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), acting favorably
on her and her siblings ancestral land claim over a portion of the 186,090-square meter property.[27] The said resolution states:
The land subject of the instant application is the ancestral land of the herein applicants. Well-established is the fact that the land treated
herein was first declared for taxation purposes in 1922 under Tax Declaration No. 363 by the applicants grandfather Ap-Ap (one
name). Said application was reconstructed in 1965 after the original got lost during the war. These tax declarations were issued and
recorded in the Municipality of Tuba, Benguet, considering that the land was then within the territorial jurisdiction of the said
municipality. That upon the death of declarant Ap-Ap his heirs x x x transferred the tax declaration in their name, [which tax
declaration is] now with the City assessors office of Baguio.
The land consisting of four (4) lots with a total area of ONE HUNDRED EIGHTY SIX THOUSAND NINETY (186,090) SQUARE
METERS, is covered by Psu-198317 duly approved by the Director of Lands on October 4, 1963 in the name of Ap-Ap (one name). In
1964, the same land was the subject of a petition filed by Gilbert Semon, as petitioner, before the Court of First Instance of the City of
Baguio in the reopening of Judicial Proceedings under Civil Case No. 1, GLRO Record No. 211 for the registration and the issuance of
Certificate of Title of said land. The land registration case was however overtaken by the decision of the Supreme Court declaring such
judicial proceedings null and void because the courts of law have no jurisdiction.
It has been sufficiently substantiated by the applicants that prior to and at the time of the pendency of the land registration case and
henceforth up to and including the present, the herein applicants by themselves and through their predecessor-in-interest have been in
exclusive, continuous, and material possession and occupation of the said parcel of land mentioned above under claim of ownership,
devoting the same for residential and agricultural purposes. Found are the residential houses of the applicants as well as those of their
close relatives, while the other areas planted to fruit trees, coffee and banana, and seasonal crops.Also noticeable therein are permanent
stone and earthen fences, terraces, clearings, including irrigation gadgets.
On the matter of the applicant[s] indiguinity [sic] and qualifications, there is no doubt that they are members of the National Cultural
Communities, particularly the Ibaloi tribe. They are the legitimate grandchildren of Ap-Ap (one name) who lived along the Asin Road
area. His legal heirs are: Orani Ap-Ap, married to Calado Salda; Rita Ap-Ap, married to Jose Bacacan; Sucdad Ap-Ap, married to
Oragon Wakit; and Gilbert Semon, a former vice-mayor of Tuba, Benguet, [who] adopted the common name of their father Semon, as
it is the customary practice among the early Ibalois. x x x
On the matter regarding the inheritance of the heirs of Ap-Ap, it is important to state [that] Gilbert Semon consolidated ownership
thereof and became the sole heir in 1964, by way of a Deed of Quitclaim executed by the heirs in his favor. As to the respective share
of the applicants[] co-heirs, the same was properly adjudicated in 1989 with the execution of an Extrajudicial Settlement/ Partition of
Estate with Waiver of Rights.
With regard to the overlapping issue, it is pertinent to state that application No. Bg-L-066 of Thomas Smith has already been denied by
us in our Resolution dated November 1997. As to the other adverse claims therein by reason of previous conveyances in favor of third
parties, the same were likewise excluded resulting in the reduction of the area originally applied from ONE HUNDRED EIGHTY SIX
THOUSAND NINETY (186,090) SQUARE METERS, more or less to ONE HUNDRED TEN THOUSAND THREE HUNDRED
FORTY TWO (110,342) SQUARE METERS, more or less. Considering the foregoing developments, we find no legal and procedural
obstacle in giving due course to the instant application.
Now therefore, we hereby [resolve] that the application for Recognition of Ancestral Land Claim filed by the Heirs of Gilbert Semon,
represented by Juanito Semon, be granted [and] a Certificate of Ancestral Land Claim (CALC) be issued to the herein applicants by the
Secretary, Department of Environment and Natural Resources, Visayas Avenue, Diliman, Quezon City, through the Regional
Executive Director, DENR-CAR, Diego Silang Street, Baguio City. The area of the claim stated herein above is however subject to the
outcome of the final survey to be forthwith executed.
Carried this 23rd day of June 1998.[28]
The resolution was not signed by two members of the CSTFAL on the ground that the signing of the unnumbered resolution was
overtaken by the enactment of the Republic Act (RA) No. 8371 or the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997 (IPRA). The IPRA
removed the authority of the DENR to issue ancestral land claim certificates and transferred the same to the National Commission on
Indigenous Peoples (NCIP).[29] The Ancestral Land Application No. Bg-L-064 of the Heirs of Gilbert Semon was transferred to the
NCIP, Cordillera Administrative Region, La Trinidad, Benguet and re-docketed as Case No. 05-RHO-CAR-03.[30] The petitioners filed
their protest in the said case before the NCIP. The same has been submitted for resolution.
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court[31]
After summarizing the evidence presented by both parties, the trial court found that it preponderates in favor of respondents long-time
possession of and claim of ownership over the subject property.[32] The survey plan of the subject property in the name of the Heirs of
Ap-ap executed way back in 1962 and the tax declarations thereafter issued to the respondent and her siblings all support her claim that
her family and their predecessors-in-interest have all been in possession of the property to the exclusion of others. The court likewise
gave credence to the documentary evidence of the transfer of the land from the Heirs of Ap-ap to respondents father and, eventually to
respondent herself. The series of transfers of the property were indications of the respondents and her predecessors interest over the
property. The court opined that while these pieces of documentary evidence were not conclusive proof of actual possession, they lend
credence to respondents claim because, in the ordinary course of things, persons will not execute legal documents dealing with real
property, unless they believe, and have the basis to believe, that they have an interest in the property subject of the legal documents x x
x.[33]
In contrast, the trial court found nothing on record to substantiate the allegations of the petititioners that they and their parents were the
long-time possessors of the subject property. Their own statements belied their assertions. Petitioner Maynard and Jose both admitted
that they could not secure title for the property from the Bureau of Lands because there were pending ancestral land claims over the
property.[34] Petitioner Agustins Townsite Sales Application over the property was held in abeyance because of respondents own claim,
which was eventually favorably considered by the CSTFAL.[35]
The dispositive portion of the trial courts Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the [respondent] and against the [petitioners]
(1) Declaring the transfer of a portion of Lot 1 of PSU 198317 made by the [petitioner] Delfin Lamsis to Menard Mondiguing and Jose
Valdez, Jr. null and void;
(2) Ordering the [petitioners] Delfin Lamsis, Agustin Kitma, Menard Mondiguing and Jose Valdez, Jr., to vacate the area they are
presently occupying that is within Lot 1 of PSU 198317 belonging to the [respondent] and to surrender possession thereof to the
[respondent];
(3) To pay [respondent] attorneys fees in the amount of P10,000.00; and
(4) To pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.[36]
It appears that no motion for reconsideration was filed before the trial court. Nevetheless, the trial court issued an Order[37] allowing the
petitioners Notice of Appeal.[38]
Ruling of the Court of Appeals[39]
The sole issue resolved by the appellate court was whether the trial court erred in ruling in favor of respondent in light of the adduced
evidence. Citing the rule on preponderance of evidence, the CA held that the respondent was able to discharge her burden in proving
her title and interest to the subject property. Her documentary evidence were amply supported by the testimonial evidence of her
witnesses.
In contrast, petitioners only made bare allegations in their testimonies that are insufficient to overcome respondents documentary
evidence.
Petitioners moved for a reconsideration[40] of the adverse decision but the same was denied.
Hence this petition, which was initially denied for failure to show that the CA committed any reversible error.[41] Upon petitioners
motion for reconsideration,[42] the petition was reinstated in the Courts January 15, 2007 Resolution.[43]
Petitioners arguments
Petitioners assign as error the CAs appreciation of the evidence already affirmed and considered by the trial court. They maintain that
the change in the presiding judges who heard and decided their case resulted in the appreciation of what would otherwise be
inadmissible evidence.[44] Petitioners ask that the Court exempt their petition from the general rule that a trial judges assessment of the
credibility of witnesses is accorded great respect on appeal.
To support their claim that the trial and appellate courts erred in ruling in favor of respondent, they assailed the various pieces of
evidence offered by respondent. They maintain that the Deed of Quitclaim executed by the Heirs of Ap-ap is spurious and lacks the
parties and witnesses signatures. Moreover, it is a mere photocopy, which was never authenticated by the notary public in court and no
reasons were proferred regarding the existence, loss, and contents of the original copy.[45] Under the best evidence rule, the Deed of
Quitclaim is inadmissible in evidence and should have been disregarded by the court.
Respondent did not prove that she and her husband possessed the subject property since time immemorial. Petitioners argue that
respondent admitted possessing and cultivating only the land that lies outside the subject property. [46]
Petitioners next assail the weight to be given to respondents muniments of ownership, such as the tax declarations and the survey
plan. They insist that these are not indubitable proofs of respondents ownership over the subject property given that there are other
claimants to the land (who are not parties to this case) who also possess a survey plan over the subject property. [47]
Petitioners then assert their superior right to the property as the present possessors thereof. They cite pertinent provisions of the New
Civil Code which presume good faith possession on the part of the possessor and puts the burden on the plaintiff in an action to recover
to prove her superior title.[48]
Petitioners next assert that they have a right to the subject property by the operation of acquisitive prescription. They posit that they
have been in possession of a public land publicly, peacefully, exclusively and in the concept of owners for more than 30
years. Respondents assertion that petitioners are merely possessors by tolerance is unsubstantiated. [49]
Petitioners also maintain that the reivindicatory action should be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction in light of the enactment of the
IPRA, which gives original and exclusive jurisdiction over disputes involving ancestral lands and domains to the NCIP. [50] They assert
that the customary laws of the Ibaloi tribe of the Benguet Province should be applied to their dispute as mandated by Section 65,
Chapter IX of RA 8371, which states: When disputes involve ICCs/IPs, [51] customary laws and practices shall be used to resolve the
dispute.
In the alternative that jurisdiction over an accion reivindicatoria is held to be vested in the trial court, the petitioners insist that the
courts should dismiss the reivindicatory action on the ground of litis pendentia.[52] They likewise argue that NCIP has primary
jurisdiction over ancestral lands, hence, the courts should not interfere when the dispute demands the exercise of sound administrative
discretion requiring special knowledge, experience and services of the administrative tribunal x x x In cases where the doctrine of
primary jurisdiction is clearly applicable, the court cannot arrogate unto itself the authority to resolve a controversy, the jurisdiction
over which is initially lodged with an administrative body of special competence. [53] The courts should stand aside in order to prevent
the possibility of creating conflicting decisions.[54]
Respondents arguments
Respondent opines that the appellate court did not commit any reversible error in affirming the trial courts decision. The present
petition is a mere dilatory tactic to frustrate the speedy administration of justice. [55]
Respondent also asserts that questions of fact are prohibited in a Rule 45 petition.[56] Thus, the appreciation and consideration of the
factual issues are no longer reviewable.[57]
The issue of lack of jurisdiction is raised for the first time in the petition before this Court. It was never raised before the trial court or
the CA. Thus, respondent insists that petitioners are now barred by laches from attacking the trial courts jurisdiction over the
case. Citing Aragon v. Court of Appeals,[58] respondent argues that the jurisdictional issue should have been raised at the appellate level
at the very least so as to avail of the doctrine that the ground lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case may be raised at any
stage of the proceedings even on appeal.[59]
Respondent maintains that there is no room for the application of litis pendentia because the issues in the application for ancestral land
claim are different from the issue in a reivindicatory action. The issue before the NCIP is whether the Government, as grantor, will
recognize the ancestral land claim of respondent over a public alienable land; while the issue in the reivindicatory case before the trial
court is ownership, possession, and right to recover the real property. [60]
Given that the elements of lis pendens are absent in case at bar, the allegation of forum-shopping is also bereft of merit. Any judgment
to be rendered by the NCIP will not amount to res judicata in the instant case.[61]
Issues
The petitioners present the following issues for our consideration:
1. Whether the appellate court disregarded material facts and circumstances in affirming the trial courts decision;
2. Whether petitioners have acquired the subject property by prescription;
3. Whether the trial court has jurisdiction to decide the case in light of the effectivity of RA 8371 or the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act
of 1997 at the time that the complaint was instituted;
4. If the trial court retains jurisdiction, whether the ancestral land claim pending before the NCIP should take precedence over the
reivindicatory action.[62]
Our Ruling
Whether the appellate court disregarded material facts and circumstances in affirming the trial courts decision
Both the trial and the appellate courts ruled that respondent has proven her claims of ownership and possession with a preponderance of
evidence. Petitioners now argue that the two courts erred in their appreciation of the evidence. They ask the Court to review the
evidence of both parties, despite the CAs finding that the trial court committed no error in appreciating the evidence presented during
trial. Hence, petitioners seek a review of questions of fact, which is beyond the province of a Rule 45 petition. A question of fact exists
if the uncertainty centers on the truth or falsity of the alleged facts. [63] Such questions as whether certain items of evidence should be
accorded probative value or weight, or rejected as feeble or spurious, or whether the proofs on one side or the other are clear and
convincing and adequate to establish a proposition in issue, are without doubt questions of fact. [64]
Since it raises essentially questions of fact, this assignment of error must be dismissed for it is settled that only questions of law may be
reviewed in an appeal by certiorari.[65] There is a question of law when there is doubt as to what the law is on a certain state of
facts. Questions of law can be resolved without having to re-examine the probative value of evidence presented, the truth or falsehood
of facts being admitted.[66] The instant case does not present a compelling reason to deviate from the foregoing rule, especially since
both trial and appellate courts agree that respondent had proven her claim of ownership as against petitioners claims. Their factual
findings, supported as they are by the evidence, should be accorded great respect.
In any case, even if petitioners arguments attacking the authenticity and admissibility of the Deed of Quitclaim executed in favor of
respondents father are well-taken, it will not suffice to defeat respondents claim over the subject property. Even without the Deed of
Quitclaim, respondents claims of prior possession and ownership were adequately supported and corroborated by her other
documentary and testimonial evidence. We agree with the trial courts observation that, in the ordinary course of things, people will not
go to great lengths to execute legal documents and pay realty taxes over a real property, unless they have reason to believe that they
have an interest over the same.[67]
The fact that respondents documents traverse several decades, from the 1960s to the 1990s, is an indication that she and her family
never abandoned their right to the property and have continuously exercised rights of ownership over the same.
Moreover, respondents version of how the petitioners came to occupy the property coincides with the same timeline given by the
petitioners themselves. The only difference is that petitioners maintain they came into possession by tolerance of the Smith family,
while respondent maintains that it was her parents who gave permission to petitioners. Given the context under which the parties
respective statements were made, the Court is inclined to believe the respondents version, as both the trial and appellate courts have
concluded, since her version is corroborated by the documentary evidence.
Whether petitioners have acquired the subject property by prescription
Assuming that the subject land may be acquired by prescription, we cannot accept petitioners claim of acquisition by
prescription. Petitioners admitted that they had occupied the property by tolerance of the owner thereof. Having made this admission,
they cannot claim that they have acquired the property by prescription unless they can prove acts of repudiation. It is settled that
possession, in order to ripen into ownership, must be in the concept of an owner, public, peaceful and uninterrupted. Possession not in
the concept of owner, such as the one claimed by petitioners, cannot ripen into ownership by acquisitive prescription, unless the
juridical relation is first expressly repudiated and such repudiation has been communicated to the other party. Acts of possessory
character executed due to license or by mere tolerance of the owner are inadequate for purposes of acquisitive prescription. Possession
by tolerance is not adverse and such possessory acts, no matter how long performed, do not start the running of the period of
prescription.[68]
In the instant case, petitioners made no effort to allege much less prove any act of repudiation sufficient for the reckoning of the
acquisitive prescription. At most, we can find on record the sale by petitioners Delfin and Agustin of parts of the property to petitioners
Maynard and Jose; but the same was done only in 1998, shortly before respondent filed a case against them. Hence, the 30-year period
necessary for the operation of acquisitve prescription had yet to be attained.
Whether the ancestral land claim pending before the National Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP) should take precedence over
the reivindicatory action
The application for issuance of a Certificate of Ancestral Land Title pending before the NCIP is akin to a registration proceeding. It
also seeks an official recognition of ones claim to a particular land and is also in rem. The titling of ancestral lands is for the purpose of
officially establishing ones land as an ancestral land.[69] Just like a registration proceeding, the titling of ancestral lands does not vest
ownership[70] upon the applicant but only recognizes ownership[71] that has already vested in the applicant by virtue of his and his
predecessor-in-interests possession of the property since time immemorial. As aptly explained in another case:
It bears stressing at this point that ownership should not be confused with a certificate of title. Registering land under the Torrens
system does not create or vest title because registration is not a mode of acquiring ownership. A certificate of title is merely an
evidence of ownership or title over the particular property described therein. Corollarily, any question involving the issue of ownership
must be threshed out in a separate suit x x x The trial court will then conduct a full-blown trial wherein the parties will present their
respective evidence on the issue of ownership of the subject properties to enable the court to resolve the said issue. x x x [72] (Emphasis
supplied)
Likewise apropos is the following explanation:
The fact that the [respondents] were able to secure [TCTs over the property] did not operate to vest upon them ownership of the
property. The Torrens system does not create or vest title. It has never been recognized as a mode of acquiring ownership x x x If the
[respondents] wished to assert their ownership, they should have filed a judicial action for recovery of possession and not merely to
have the land registered under their respective names. x x x Certificates of title do not establish ownership. [73] (Emphasis supplied)
A registration proceeding is not a conclusive adjudication of ownership. In fact, if it is later on found in another case (where the issue
of ownership is squarely adjudicated) that the registrant is not the owner of the property, the real owner can file a reconveyance case
and have the title transferred to his name.[74]
Given that a registration proceeding (such as the certification of ancestral lands) is not a conclusive adjudication of ownership, it will
not constitute litis pendentia on a reivindicatory case where the issue is ownership.[75] For litis pendentia to be a ground for the
dismissal of an action, the following requisites must concur: (a) identity of parties, or at least such parties who represent the same
interests in both actions; (b) identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts; and (c) the
identity with respect to the two preceding particulars in the two cases is such that any judgment that may be rendered in the pending
case, regardless of which party is successful, would amount to res judicata in the other case.[76] The third element is missing, for any
judgment in the certification case would not constitute res judicata or be conclusive on the ownership issue involved in the
reivindicatory case. Since there is no litis pendentia, there is no reason for the reivindicatory case to be suspended or dismissed in favor
of the certification case.
Moreover, since there is no litis pendentia, we cannot agree with petitioners contention that respondent committed forum-
shopping. Settled is the rule that forum shopping exists where the elements of litis pendentia are present or where a final judgment in
one case will amount to res judicata in the other.[77]
Whether the trial court has jurisdiction to decide the case in light of the effectivity of RA 8371 or the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of
1997 at the time that the complaint was instituted
For the first time in the entire proceedings of this case, petitioners raise the trial courts alleged lack of jurisdiction over the subject-
matter in light of the effectivity[78] of the IPRA at the time that the complaint was filed in 1998. They maintain that, under the IPRA, it
is the NCIP which has jurisdiction over land disputes involving indigenous cultural communities and indigenous peoples.
As a rule, an objection over subject-matter jurisdiction may be raised at any time of the proceedings. This is because jurisdiction cannot
be waived by the parties or vested by the agreement of the parties. Jurisdiction is vested by law, which prevails at the time of the filing
of the complaint.
An exception to this rule has been carved by jurisprudence. In the seminal case of Tijam v. Sibonghanoy,[79] the Court ruled that the
existence of laches will prevent a party from raising the courts lack of jurisdiction. Laches is defined as the failure or neglect, for an
unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier; it
is negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting the presumption that the party entitled to assert it either
has abandoned or declined to assert it.[80] Wisely, some cases[81] have cautioned against applying Tijam, except for the most exceptional
cases where the factual milieu is similar to Tijam.
In Tijam, the surety could have raised the issue of lack of jurisdiction in the trial court but failed to do so. Instead, the surety
participated in the proceedings and filed pleadings, other than a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. When the case reached the
appellate court, the surety again participated in the case and filed their pleadings therein. It was only after receiving the appellate courts
adverse decision that the surety awoke from its slumber and filed a motion to dismiss, in lieu of a motion for reconsideration. The CA
certified the matter to this Court, which then ruled that the surety was already barred by laches from raising the jurisdiction issue.
In case at bar, the application of the Tijam doctrine is called for because the presence of laches cannot be ignored. If the surety
in Tijam was barred by laches for raising the issue of jurisdiction for the first time in the CA, what more for petitioners in the instant
case who raised the issue for the first time in their petition before this Court.
At the time that the complaint was first filed in 1998, the IPRA was already in effect but the petitioners never raised the same as a
ground for dismissal; instead they filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the value of the property did not meet the jurisdictional
value for the RTC. They obviously neglected to take the IPRA into consideration.
When the amended complaint was filed in 1998, the petitioners no longer raised the issue of the trial courts lack of jurisdiction. Instead,
they proceeded to trial, all the time aware of the existence of the IPRA as evidenced by the cross-examination[82] conducted by
petitioners lawyer on the CSTFAL Chairman Guillermo Fianza. In the cross-examination, it was revealed that the petitioners were
aware that the DENR, through the CSTFAL, had lost its jurisdiction over ancestral land claims by virtue of the enactment of the
IPRA. They assailed the validity of the CSTFAL resolution favoring respondent on the ground that the CSTFAL had been
rendered functus officio under the IPRA. Inexplicably, petitioners still did not question the trial courts jurisdiction.
When petitioners recoursed to the appellate court, they only raised as errors the trial courts appreciation of the evidence and the
conclusions that it derived therefrom. In their brief, they once again assailed the CSTFALs resolution as having been rendered functus
officio by the enactment of IPRA.[83] But nowhere did petitioners assail the trial courts ruling for having been rendered without
jurisdiction.
It is only before this Court, eight years after the filing of the complaint, after the trial court had already conducted a full-blown trial and
rendered a decision on the merits, after the appellate court had made a thorough review of the records, and after petitioners have twice
encountered adverse decisions from the trial and the appellate courts that petitioners now want to expunge all the efforts that have gone
into the litigation and resolution of their case and start all over again. This practice cannot be allowed.
Thus, even assuming arguendo that petitioners theory about the effect of IPRA is correct (a matter which need not be decided here),
they are already barred by laches from raising their jurisdictional objection under the circumstances.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is denied for lack of merit. The March 30, 2006 Decision of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CV No. 78987 and its May 26, 2006 Resolution denying the motion for reconsideration are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
 FIRST DIVISION

HEIRS OF BIENVENIDO AND G.R. No. 175763

ARACELI TANYAG, namely: ARTURO
TANYAG, AIDA T. JOCSON AND ZENAIDA T. Present:
VELOSO,
Petitioners, CORONA, C.J.,
Chairperson,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
- versus - BERSAMIN,
DEL CASTILLO, and
VILLARAMA, JR., JJ.

SALOME E. GABRIEL, NESTOR R. GABRIEL,

LUZ GABRIEL-ARNEDO married to ARTURO Promulgated:
ARNEDO, NORA GABRIEL-CALINGO
married to FELIX CALINGO, PILAR M. April 11, 2012
MENDIOLA, MINERVA GABRIEL-NATIVIDAD
marriedto EUSTAQUIO NATIVIDAD, and
ERLINDA VELASQUEZ married to HERMINIO
VELASQUEZ,
Respondents.
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

DECISION

VILLARAMA, JR., J.:

This is a petition for review under Rule 45 which seeks to reverse the Decision[1] dated August 18, 2006 and Resolution[2] dated
December 8, 2006 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 81224. The CA affirmed the Decision[3] dated November 19,
2003 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 267 in Civil Case No. 67846 dismissing petitioners complaint for declaration of
nullity of Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 1035, reconveyance and damages, as well as respondents counterclaims for damages
and attorneys fees.
Subject of controversy are two adjacent parcels of land located at Ruhale, Barangay Calzada, Municipality of Taguig (now part of
Pasig City, Metro Manila). The first parcel (Lot 1) with an area of 686 square meters was originally declared in the name of Jose
Gabriel under Tax Declaration (TD) Nos. 1603 and 6425 issued for the years 1949 and 1966, while the second parcel (Lot 2) consisting
of 147 square meters was originally declared in the name of Agueda Dinguinbayan under TD Nos. 6418 and 9676 issued for the years
1966 and 1967.[4] For several years, these lands lined with bamboo plants remained undeveloped and uninhabited.
Petitioners claimed that Lot 1 was owned by Benita Gabriel, sister of Jose Gabriel, as part of her inheritance as declared by her in a
1944 notarized instrument (Affidavit of Sale) whereby she sold the said property to spouses Gabriel Sulit and Cornelia Sanga. Said
document states:
DAPAT MALAMAN NG LAHAT NG MAKABABASA
Na, akong Benita Gabriel, balo sa nasirang Calixto Lontoc, Filipina may karapatang gulang naninirahan sa
nayon ng Palingon, Tagig, Rizal, x x x sa pamamaguitan nitoy
ISINASAYSAY KO AT PINAGTITIBAY
1.) Na, sarili ko at tunay na pagaari ang isang lagay na lupang kawayanan na sapagkat itoy kabahagui ko sa
aking kapatid na [J]ose Gabriel, na itoy mana ko sa aking nasirang ama Mateo Gabriel sa kami lamang dalawa ng
aking kapatid na binabanguit ko na Jose Gabriel siyang mga anak at tagapagmana ng aming amang nasirang Mateo
Gabriel, maliban sa amin ay wala nang iba, kayat kami ay naghati sa mga ari-arian na na iwan sa amin ng nasirang
ama namin na Mateo Gabriel, na ang lupang kawayanang itoy may nakatanim na walong (8) punong kawayan at na
sa pook na kung pamagatan ay Ruhale nayon ng Calzada, Tagig, Rizal, at na sa loob ng mga kahanganan at sukat
na sumusunod[:]
Na, ang kahangan sa Hilagaan Sapang Ruhale at Vicente Bunye, sa Amihanan Felipe Pagkalinawan, sa
Timugan Juan Flores, at sa Habagatan Apolonio Ocol may sukat na 6 areas at 85 centiareas may halagan amillarada
na P80.00) Pesos alinsunod sa Tax Blg. 20037, sa pangalan ng aking kapatid na Jose Gabriel. Na, ang lupang itoy
hindi natatala sa bisa ng batas Blg. 496 ni sa susog gayon din sa Hipotecaria Espaola itoy may mga mojon bato
ang mga panulok at walang bakod.
2.) Na, alang-alang sa halagang SIYAMNAPO AT ANIM (P96.00) na Pisong salaping guinagamit dito sa
Filipinas na bago dumating ang mga sandaling itoy tinaggap ko at ibinayad sa akin ng boong kasiyahang loob ko
ng magasawang GABRIEL SULIT AT CORNELIA SANGA, mga Filipinos may mga karapatang gulang mga
naninirahan sa nayon ng Calzada, Tagig, Rizal, ngayon ay inilipat ko at ipinagbili ng bilihang tuluyan (Venta real
soluta) ang isinasaysay kong lupang kawayanan sa itaas nito ng nasabi halagang SIYAMNAPO AT ANIM
(P96.00) na Piso at sa nabanguit na magasawang GABRIEL SULIT AT CORNELIA SANGA, gayon din sa lahat
ng mga tagapagmana nila, ngayong mga arao na ito ay ang may hawak at namamahala ng lupang itoy ang mga
nakabili sa akin na magasawang GABRIEL SULIT AT CORNELIA SANGA.
 3.) Na, ang kasulatang itoy ng bilihan ay nais na itala sa bisa ng batas Blg. 3344.
NA SA KATUNAYAN NG LAHAT NG ITOY ako ay lumagda sa kasulatang ito dito sa Tagig, Rizal,
ngayong ika - 28 ng Junio 1944.
(Nilagdaan) BENITA GABRIEL[5]
Lot 1 allegedly came into the possession of Benita Gabriels own daughter, Florencia Gabriel Sulit, when her father-in-law Gabriel Sulit
gave it to her as part of inheritance of his son, Eliseo Sulit who was Florencias husband. Florencia Sulit sold the same lot to Bienvenido
S. Tanyag, father of petitioners, as evidenced by a notarized deed of sale dated October 14, 1964. [6] Petitioners then took possession of
the property, paid the real estate taxes due on the land and declared the same for tax purposes, as shown by TD No. 11445 issued in
1969 in the name of Bienvenidos wife, Araceli C. Tanyag; TD No. 11445 cancelled TD No. 6425 in the name of Jose Gabriel. TD Nos.
3380 and 00486 also in the name of Araceli Tanyag were issued in the years 1974 and 1979. [7]
As to Lot 2, petitioners averred that it was sold by Agueda Dinguinbayan to Araceli Tanyag under Deed of Sale executed on
October 22, 1968. Thereupon, petitioners took possession of said property and declared the same for tax purposes as shown by TD Nos.
11361, 3395, 120-014-00482, 120-00-014-20-002-000, C-014-00180 and D-014-00182 issued for the years 1969, 1974, 1979, 1985,
1991 and 1994.[8] Petitioners claimed to have continuously, publicly, notoriously and adversely occupied both Lots 1 and 2 through
their caretaker Juana Quinones[9]; they fenced the premises and introduced improvements on the land. [10]
Sometime in 1979, Jose Gabriel, father of respondents, secured TD No. 120-014-01013 in his name over Lot 1 indicating
therein an increased area of 1,763 square meters.Said tax declaration supposedly cancelled TD No. 6425 over Lot 1 and contained the
following inscription[11]:
Note: Portions of this Property is Also Declared in the name of Araceli C. Tanyag under
T.D.#120-014-00858 686 sq. m.
Also inscribed on TD No. 120-014-00858[12] (1979) in the name of Araceli Tanyag covering Lot 1 are the following:
This property is also covered by T.D. #120-014-01013 in the name of Jose P. Gabriel 1-8-80
which notation was carried into the 1985, 1990 and 1991 tax declarations, all in the name of Araceli Tanyag.
On March 20, 2000, petitioners instituted Civil Case No. 67846 alleging that respondents never occupied the whole 686 square meters
of Lot 1 and fraudulently caused the inclusion of Lot 2 in TD No. 120-014-01013 such that Lot 1 consisting of 686 square meters
originally declared in the name of Jose Gabriel was increased to 1,763 square meters.They contended that the issuance of OCT No.
1035 on October 28, 1998 over the subject land in the name of respondents heirs of Jose Gabriel was null and void from the
beginning.[13]
On the other hand, respondents asserted that petitioners have no cause of action against them for they have not established
their ownership over the subject property covered by a Torrens title in respondents name. They further argued that OCT No. 1035 had
become unassailable one year after its issuance and petitioners failed to establish that it was irregularly or unlawfully procured. [14]
Respondents evidence showed that the subject land was among those properties included in the Extrajudicial Settlement of
Estate of Jose P. Gabriel[15] executed on October 5, 1988, covered by TD No. B-014-00643 (1985) in the name of Jose
Gabriel. Respondents declared the property in their name but the tax declarations (1989, 1991 and 1994) carried the notation that
portions thereof (686 sq. ms.) are also declared in the name of Araceli Tanyag. On October 28, 1998, OCT No. 1035[16] was issued to
respondents by the Register of Deeds of Pasig, Metro Manila under Decree No. N-219177 pursuant to the Decision dated September
20, 1996 of the Land Registration Court in LRC Case No. N-11260, covering Lot 1836 MCadm-590-D, Taguig Cadastral Mapping,
Plan Ap-04-002253, with an area of 1,560 square meters.
On the other hand, respondents TD Nos. D-014-00839 and D-014-01923 issued in 1993 and 1999 respectively, showed that
respondents sold 468 square meters of Lot 1 to Jayson Sta. Barbara. [17] The segregation of said 468 square meters pertaining to Jayson
Sta. Barbara was reflected in the approved survey plan of Lot 1836 prepared by respondents surveyor on March 18, 2000. [18]
At the trial, petitioners presented their witness Arturo Tanyag, son of Bienvenido Tanyag and Araceli Tanyag who died on
March 30, 1968 and October 30, 1993, respectively. He testified that according to Florencia Sulit, Benita Gabriel-Lontoc and her
family were the ones in possession of Lot 1 since 1944; Benita Gabriel had executed an Affidavit of Sale declaring said property as her
inheritance and conveying the same to spouses Gabriel and Cornelia Sulit. He affirmed that they had been in possession of Lot 1 from
the time Bienvenido Tanyag bought the land from Florencia Sulit in 1964. Based on the boundaries indicated in the tax declaration,
they fenced the property, installed Juana Quinones as their caretaker who also attended to the piggery, put up an artesian well and
planted some trees. From 1964 up to 1978, nobody disturbed them in their possession or claimed ownership of the land; four years after
acquiring Lot 1, they also purchased the adjacent property (Lot 2) to expand their piggery. Lot 2 was also separately declared for tax
purposes after their mother purchased it from Agueda Dinguinbayan. He had personally witnessed the execution of the 1968 deed of
sale including its notarization, and was also present during the physical turn over of Lot 2 by the seller. In fact, he was one of the
instrumental witnesses to the deed of sale and identified his signature therein. He further described the place as inaccessible at that time
as there were no roads yet and they had to traverse muddy tracks to reach their property. [19]
Arturo further testified that the first time they met Jose Gabriel was when the latter borrowed from their mother all the
documents pertaining to their property. Jose Gabriel came looking for a piece of property which he claims as his but he had no
documents to prove it and so they showed him their documents pertaining to the subject property; out of the goodness of her mothers
heart, she lent those documents to her brother Jose Gabriel. During the cadastral survey conducted in 1976, they had both lots surveyed
in preparation for their consolidation under one tax declaration. However, they did not succeed in registering the consolidated lots as
they discovered that there was another tax declaration covering the same properties and these were applied for titling under the name of
Jose Gabriel sometime in 1978 or 1980, which was after the time said Jose Gabriel borrowed the documents from their mother. No
notice of the hearings for application of title filed by Jose Gabriel was received by them. They never abandoned the property and their
caretaker never left the place except to report to the police when she was being harassed by the respondents. He also recalled that
respondents had filed a complaint against them before the barangay but since no agreement was reached after several meetings, they
filed the present case.[20]
The next witness for petitioners was Juana Quinones, their caretaker who testified that she had been staying on petitioners
property since 1964 or for 35 years already. She had built a nipa hut and artesian well, raised piggery and poultry and planted some root
crops and vegetables on the land. At first there was only one parcel but later the petitioners bought an additional lot; Arturo Tanyag
gave her money which she used for the fencing of the property. During all the time she occupied the property there was nobody else
claiming it and she also had not received any notice for petitioners concerning the property, nor the conduct of survey on the land. On
cross-examination, she admitted that she was living alone and had no Voters ID or any document evidencing that she had been a
resident there since 1964. Although she was living alone, she asks for help from other persons in tending her piggery. [21]
Angelita Sulit-delos Santos, cousin of petitioners and also of respondents, testified that she came to know the subject property
because according to her paternal grandfather Gabriel Sta. Ana Sulit, her maternal grandmother Benita Gabriel-Lontoc mortgaged the
property to him. It was Benita Gabriel Lontoc who took care of her, her siblings and cousins; they lived with her until her death. She
identified the signature of Benita Gabriel in the 1944 Affidavit of Sale in favor of Gabriel Sulit. Lot 1 consisting of 600 square meters
was vacant property at that time but her family was in possession thereof when it was sold to Gabriel Sulit; it was her father Eliseo
Sulit and uncle Hilario Sulit, who were incharge of their property. On cross-examination, she was asked details regarding the supposed
mortgage of Lot 1 to Gabriel Sulit but she admitted she does not know anything as she was still very young then. [22]
Respondents first witness was Roberto Gabriel Arnedo, son of Luz Gabriel-Arnedo. He testified that when he was about 5 or
6 years old (1953 or 1954), his grandfather Jose Gabriel used to bring him along to visit the subject property consisting of 1,763 square
meters based on the tax declaration and OCT. They had picnics and celebrate his grandfathers birthday there. He recalled
accompanying his grandfather in overseeing the planting of gumamela which served as the perimeter fence. Jose Gabriel had not
mentioned anything about the claim of petitioners over the same land; Jose Gabriel handed the documents pertaining to the land to his
eldest aunt and hence it now belongs to them.[23] On cross-examination, he claimed that during those years he had visited the land
together with his grandfather, he did not see Florencia Sulit and her family. [24]
Virginia Villanueva, daughter of Salome Gabriel, testified that they acquired the subject property from their grandfather Jose
Gabriel who had a tax declaration in his name. Her mother furnished them with documents such as tax declarations and the
extrajudicial settlement of the estate of Jose Gabriel; they also have an approved survey plan prepared for Salome Gabriel. She does not
know the petitioners in this case.[25] On cross-examination, she said that the subject property was inherited by Jose Gabriel from his
father Mateo Gabriel; Jose Gabriel was the sole owner of the land while Benita Gabriel has separate properties in Palingon and
Langkokak.[26] Though they are not actually occupying the property, they visit the place and she does not know anybody occupying it,
except for the portion (486 square meters) which petitioners sold to Sta. Barbara. A nine-door apartment was built on the said portion
without their permission. She had talked to both Sta. Barbara and with Arturo Tanyag they had meetings before the barangay; however,
petitioners filed the present case in court. She insisted that there is nobody residing in the subject property; there is still the remaining
901 square meters which is owned by their mother. She admitted there were plants on the land but she does not know who actually
planted them; it was her grandfather who built a wooden fence and gumamela in the 1960s. As to the hearings on the application for
title, she had not attended the same; she does not know whether the petitioners were notified of the said hearings. She also caused the
preparation of the survey plan for Salome Gabriel. On the increased area of the property indicated in the later tax declarations, she
admitted the discrepancy but said there were barangay roads being built at the time. [27]
Esmeraldo Ramos, Municipal Assessor of Taguig, testified that he was formerly a Land Appraiser in the Office of the
Municipal Assessor of Taguig and in the course of his duties had certified one of the tax declarations in the name of respondents (TD
No. EL-014-10585). He identified and verified said document and the other tax declarations submitted in court by the respondents. He
admitted that on January 10, 1980, they made the entry on TD No. 6425 in the name of Jose Gabriel that the same was cancelled by TD
No. 120-014-01013 also in the name of Jose Gabriel who presented a supposed deed of sale in favor of Araceli Tanyag which caused
the earlier cancellation of TD No. 6425 in his name. However, upon investigation they found out that the seller Florencia Sulit was not
the owner because the declared owner was Jose Gabriel; even the deed of sale recognized that the property was declared in the name of
Jose Gabriel. They also discovered from the cadastral survey and tax mapping of Taguig that the property is in the name of Jose
Gabriel both in the Bureau of Lands and Municipal Assessors Office. As far as he knows, it was Jose Gabriel who owned the subject
property which he usually visited; he recalled that around the late 70s and 80s, he ordered the fencing of barbed wire and bamboo stalks
on the land which is just 3 lots away from his own property. As to the discrepancy in the area of the property as originally declared by
Jose Gabriel, he explained that the boundaries in the original tax declaration do not change but after the land is surveyed, the
boundaries naturally would be different because the previous owner may have sold his property or the present owner inherits the
property from his parents. He admitted that the tax declaration is just for tax purposes and not necessarily proof of ownership or
possession of the property it covers.[28]
Respondents last witness was Antonio Argel who testified that he had resided for 52 years on a land near the subject property
and as far as he knows it was Jose Gabriel who owns it and planted thereon. On cross-examination, he admitted that Jose Gabriel was
not in physical possession of the property. He just assumed that the present occupants of the property were allowed by Jose Gabriel to
stay therein because he is the owner. There is an apartment and three small houses existing on the property, and about five families are
living there. He confirmed that there is a piggery being maintained by a certain Juana who had been residing there maybe for fifteen
years already.[29]
In rebuttal, petitioners presented two witnesses who are owners of properties adjoining that of the subject land. Rodante
Domingo testified that it was only now did he learn that the property of Arturo Tanyag is already titled in the name of respondents. He
was not aware of the titling proceeding because he never received any notice as adjoining owner. His own property is already titled in
his name and he even asked Arturo Tanyag to act as a witness in his application for titling. [30] On the other hand, Dado Dollado testified
that he acquired his property in 1979. He likewise affirmed that he did not receive any notice of the proceedings for application for
titling filed by respondents and it was only now that he learned from Arturo Tanyag that the subject property was already titled in the
names of respondents.[31]
The last rebuttal witness for petitioners was Dominador Dinguinbayan Ergueza, son of Agueda Dinguinbayan. He testified
that the subject property was formerly owned by his mother and the present owner is Araceli Tanyag who bought the same from his
mother in 1968. He described the boundaries of the property in relation to the adjoining owners at that time; presently, the left portion
is already a street (Rujale St.) going towards the sea. He admitted that his wife, Livina Ergueza was an instrumental witness in the 1968
deed of sale in favor of Araceli Tanyag.[32]
In its decision, the trial court dismissed the complaint as well as the counterclaim, holding that petitioners failed to establish
ownership of the subject property and finding the respondents to be the declared owners and legal possessors. It likewise ruled that
petitioners were unable to prove by preponderance of evidence that respondents acquired title over the property through fraud and
deceit.
Petitioners appealed to the CA which affirmed the trial courts ruling. The CA found that apart from the Affidavit executed by
Benita Gabriel in 1944 claiming that she inherited Lot 1 from their father, Mateo Gabriel, there is no evidence that she, not Jose
Gabriel, was the true owner thereof. It noted that just four years after Benita Gabriels sale of the subject property to the Sulit spouses,
Jose Gabriel declared the same under his name for tax purposes, paying the corresponding taxes. The appellate court stressed that
petitioners allegation of bad faith was not proven.
Petitioners motion for reconsideration was likewise denied by the CA. Hence, this petition.
Petitioners assail the CA in not finding that the respondents obtained OCT No. 1035 in their names fraudulently and in bad
faith. They also claim to have acquired ownership of the subject lots by virtue of acquisitive prescription.
The issues presented are: (1) whether respondents committed fraud and bad faith in registering the subject lots in their name;
and (2) whether petitioners acquired the property through acquisitive prescription.
Registration of a piece of land under the Torrens System does not create or vest title, because it is not a mode of acquiring
ownership. A certificate of title is merely an evidence of ownership or title over the particular property described therein. [33] Thus,
notwithstanding the indefeasibility of the Torrens title, the registered owner may still be compelled to reconvey the registered property
to its true owners. The rationale for the rule is that reconveyance does not set aside or re-subject to review the findings of fact of the
Bureau of Lands. In an action for reconveyance, the decree of registration is respected as incontrovertible. What is sought instead is the
transfer of the property or its title which has been wrongfully or erroneously registered in another persons name, to its rightful or legal
owner, or to the one with a better right.[34]
An action for annulment of title or reconveyance based on fraud is imprescriptible where the plaintiff is in possession of the
property subject of the acts.[35] The totality of the evidence on record established that it was petitioners who are in actual possession of
the subject property; respondents merely insinuated at occasional visits to the land.However, for an action for reconveyance based on
fraud to prosper, this Court has held that the party seeking reconveyance must prove by clear and convincing evidence his title to the
property and the fact of fraud.[36]
The CA correctly observed that the only evidence of Benita Gabriels supposed title was the 1944 Affidavit of Sale whereby
Benita Gabriel claimed sole ownership of Lot 1 as her inheritance from their father, Mateo Gabriel. The property until 1949 was still
declared in the name Jose Gabriel despite the 1944 sale executed by Benita Gabriel in favor of spouses Gabriel and Cornelia Sulit. As to
the alleged fraud perpetrated by Jose Gabriel and respondents in securing OCT No. 1035 in their name, this was clearly not proven as
Arturo Tanyag testified merely that Jose Gabriel borrowed their documents pertaining to the property. No document or testimony was
presented to show that Jose Gabriel employed deceit or committed fraudulent acts in the proceedings for titling of the property.
However, the CA did not address the issue of acquisitive prescription raised by the petitioners. In their Complaint before the
lower court, petitioners alleged
15. Defendants never occupied the whole area of the lot covered by Tax Declaration No. 1603 (686 sq.
m.) neither were they able to set foot on the property covered by Tax Declaration No. 6542 [sic] for the reason that
those lots had been in actual, open continuous, adverse and notorious possession of the plaintiffs against the whole
world for more than thirty years which is equivalent to title.
x x x x[37]
Such character and length of possession of a party over a parcel of land subject of controversy is a factual issue. Settled is the rule that
questions of fact are not reviewable in petitions for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, as only questions of law
shall be raised in such petitions. While this Court is not a trier of facts, if the inference drawn by the appellate court from the facts is
manifestly mistaken, it may, in the interest of justice, review the evidence in order to arrive at the correct factual conclusions based on
the record.[38]
In this case, the CA was mistaken in concluding that petitioners have not acquired any right over the subject property simply because
they failed to establish Benita Gabriels title over said property. The appellate court ignored petitioners evidence of possession that
complies with the legal requirements of acquiring ownership by prescription.
Acquisitive prescription is a mode of acquiring ownership by a possessor through the requisite lapse of time. In order to ripen
into ownership, possession must be in theconcept of an owner, public, peaceful and uninterrupted. [39] Possession is open when it is
patent, visible, apparent, notorious and not clandestine.[40] It is continuous when uninterrupted, unbroken and not intermittent or
occasional; exclusive when the adverse possessor can show exclusive dominion over the land and an appropriation of it to his own use
and benefit; and notorious when it is so conspicuous that it is generally known and talked of by the public or the people in the
neighborhood. The party who asserts ownership by adverse possession must prove the presence of the essential elements of acquisitive
prescription.[41]
On the matter of prescription, the Civil Code provides:
Art. 1117. Acquisitive prescription of dominion and other real rights may be ordinary or extraordinary.
Ordinary acquisitive prescription requires possession of things in good faith and with just title for the
time fixed by law.
Art. 1134. Ownership and other real rights over immovable property are acquired by ordinary
prescription through possession of ten years.
Art. 1137. Ownership and other real rights over immovables also prescribe through uninterrupted adverse
possession thereof for thirty years, without need of title or of good faith.(Emphasis supplied.)
Petitioners adverse possession is reckoned from 1969 with the issuance of TD No. 1145 in the name of Araceli Tanyag,
which tax declaration cancelled TD No. 6425 in the name of Jose Gabriel.[42] It is settled that tax receipts and declarations are prima
facie proofs of ownership or possession of the property for which such taxes have been paid. Coupled with proof of actual possession
of the property, they may become the basis of a claim for ownership. [43] Petitioners caretaker, Juana Quinones, has since lived in a nipa
hut, planted vegetables and tended a piggery on the land. Aside from paying taxes due on the property, petitioners also exercised other
acts of ownership such as selling the 468-square meter portion to Sta. Barbara who had constructed thereon a nine-door apartment
building.
It was only in 1979 that respondents began to assert a claim over the property by securing a tax declaration in the name of Jose Gabriel
albeit over a bigger area than that originally declared. In 1998, they finally obtained an original certificate of title covering the entire
1,763 square meters which included Lot 1. Did these acts of respondents effectively interrupt the possession of petitioners for purposes
of prescription?
We answer in the negative.
In the case of Heirs of Marcelina Azardon-Crisologo v. Raon[44] this Court citing Article 1123 of the Civil Code[45] held that civil
interruption takes place with the service of judicial summons to the possessor and not by filing of a mere Notice of Adverse
Claim. Thus:
Article 1123 of the Civil Code is categorical. Civil interruption is produced by judicial summons to
the possessor. Moreover, even with the presence of judicial summons, Article 1124 sets limitations as to when
such summons shall not be deemed to have been issued and shall not give rise to interruption, to wit: 1) if it should
be void for lack of legal solemnities; 2) if the plaintiff should desist from the complaint or should allow the
proceedings to lapse; or 3) if the possessor should be absolved from the complaint.
Both Article 1123 and Article 1124 of the Civil Code underscore the judicial character of civil
interruption. For civil interruption to take place, the possessor must have received judicial summons. None
appears in the case at bar. The Notice of Adverse Claim which was filed by petitioners in 1977 is nothing more
than a notice of claim which did not effectively interrupt respondents possession. Such a notice could not have
produced civil interruption. We agree in the conclusion of the RTC, which was affirmed by the Court of Appeals,
that the execution of the Notice of Adverse Claim in 1977 did not toll or interrupt the running of the prescriptive
period because there remains, as yet, a necessity for a judicial determination of its judicial validity. What existed
was merely a notice. There was no compliance with Article 1123 of the Civil Code. What is striking is that no
action was, in fact, filed by petitioners against respondents. As a consequence, no judicial summons was
received by respondents. As aptly held by the Court of Appeals in its affirmance of the RTCs ruling, the Notice of
Adverse Claim cannot take the place of judicial summons which produces the civil interruption provided for under
the law. In the instant case, petitioners were not able to interrupt respondents adverse possession since 1962. The
period of acquisitive prescription from 1962 continued to run in respondents favor despite the Notice of
Adverse Claim. (Emphasis supplied.)
From 1969 until the filing of this complaint by the petitioners in March 2000, the latter have been in continuous, public and
adverse possession of the subject land for 31years. Having possessed the property for the period and in the character required by law as
sufficient for extraordinary acquisitive prescription, petitioners have indeed acquired ownership over the subject property. Such right
cannot be defeated by respondents acts of declaring again the property for tax purposes in 1979 and obtaining a Torrens certificate of
title in their name in 1998.
This notwithstanding, we uphold petitioners right as owner only with respect to Lot 1 consisting of 686 square meters.
Petitioners failed to substantiate their claim over Lot 2 by virtue of a deed of sale from the original declared owner, Agueda
Dinguinbayan. Respondents asserted that the 147 square meters covered by the tax declarations of Dinguinbayan being claimed by
petitioners is not the same lot included in OCT No. 1035.
Under Article 434 of the Civil Code, to successfully maintain an action to recover the ownership of a real property, the person
who claims a better right to it must prove two (2) things: first, the identity of the land claimed; and second, his title thereto. In regard to the
first requisite, in an accion reinvindicatoria, the person who claims that he has a better right to the property must first fix the identity of the
land he is claiming by describing the location, area and boundaries thereof.[46] In this case, petitioners failed to identify Lot 2 by providing
evidence of the metes and bounds thereof, so that the same may be compared with the technical description contained in OCT No. 1035,
which would have shown whether Lot 2 consisting of 147 square meters was erroneously included in respondents title. The testimony of
Agueda Dinguinbayans son would not suffice because said witness merely stated the boundary owners as indicated in the 1966 and 1967
tax declarations of his mother. On his part, Arturo Tayag claimed that he had the lots surveyed in the 1970s in preparation for the
consolidation of the two parcels. However, no such plan was presented in court.
WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTLY GRANTED. The Decision dated August 18, 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CV No. 81224 is MODIFIED in that petitioners heirs of Bienvenido and Araceli Tanyag are hereby declared the owners of 686
square meters previously declared under Tax Declaration Nos. 11445, 120-014-00486, 120-014-0085, B-014-00501, E-014-01446, C-
014-00893 and D-014-00839 all in the name of Araceli Tanyag, which lot is presently covered by OCT No. 1035 issued by the Register
of Deeds of Pasig, Metro Manila in the name of respondents Salome Gabriel, Nestor R. Gabriel, Luz Gabriel-Arnedo, Nora Gabriel-
Calingo, Pilar Gabriel-Mendiola, Minerva Gabriel-Natividad and Erlinda Gabriel-Velasquez. Respondents are ORDERED to
RECONVEY the said 686-square meter portion to the petitioners.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
 FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 142938 August 28, 2007
MIGUEL INGUSAN, Petitioner,
vs.
HEIRS OF AURELIANO I. REYES, represented by CORAZON REYES-REGUYAL and ARTEMIO S. REYES,*Respondents.
DECISION
CORONA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari1 of a decision2 and resolution3 of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated January 21, 2000 and April
10, 2000, respectively, in CA-G.R. CV No. 56105 which modified the decision4 dated April 17, 19975 of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Cabanatuan City, Nueva Ecija, Branch 25 in Civil Case No. 2145-A1.
This case involves a 1,254 sq. m. residential land located in Poblacion, San Leonardo, Nueva Ecija6 originally owned by Leocadio
Ingusan who was unmarried and childless when he died in 1932. His heirs were his two brothers and a sister, namely, Antonio, Macaria
and Juan.7 Antonio died and was succeeded by his son Ignacio who also later died and was succeeded by his son, petitioner Miguel
Ingusan.8 Macaria also died and was succeeded by her child, Aureliano I. Reyes, Sr. (father of respondents Artemio Reyes, Corazon
Reyes-Reguyal, Elsa Reyes, Estrella Reyes-Razon, Aureliano Reyes, Jr., Ester Reyes, Reynaldo Reyes and Leonardo Reyes). 9Thus,
petitioner is the grandnephew of Leocadio and Aureliano, Sr. was the latter's nephew.10
After the death of Leocadio, Aureliano, Sr. was designated by the heirs as administrator of the land. 11 In 1972, while in possession of
the land and in breach of trust, he applied for and was granted a free patent over it. 12 As a result, he was issued OCT No. P-6176 in
1973.13
In 1976, petitioner filed an accion reivindicatoria against Aureliano, Sr. and his wife Jacoba Solomon seeking the recovery of Lot 120-
A with an area of 502 sq. m. which was part of the land at issue here. 14 But the case was dismissed because petitioner did not pursue it.
Also in 1976, Aureliano, Sr. executed a special power of attorney (SPA) in favor of his son Artemio authorizing him to mortgage the
land in question to any bank. Using that SPA, Artemio mortgaged the land to secure a loan ofP10,000 from the Philippine National
Bank (PNB).15
In 1983, Aureliano, Sr. died intestate. He was survived by his children, the respondents.16
In 1986, petitioner paid the PNB loan. The mortgage over the land was released and the owners duplicate copy of OCT No. P-6176
was given to him.17
On June 19, 1988, respondents and petitioner entered into a Kasulatan ng Paghahati-hati Na May Bilihan wherein they adjudicated
unto themselves the land in question and then sold it to their co-heirs, as follows: (a) to petitioner, 1,171 sq. m. and (b) to respondent
Estrella, 83 sq. m. This deed was notarized but not registered.18
On January 8, 1990, respondent Corazon, despite signing the Kasulatan, executed an affidavit of loss, stating that she could not find the
owners duplicate copy of OCT No. P-6176. This was registered and annotated on the original copy of said title.19
Subsequently, the following documents appeared purportedly with the following dates:
a) April 23, 199420 - notarized deed of donation of titled property supposedly executed by the spouses Aureliano, Sr. and
Jacoba,21 whereby said spouses donated 297 sq. m. of the subject land to respondent Artemio and the remaining 957 sq. m. to
petitioner;
b) September 5, 1994 - cancellation of affidavit of loss supposedly executed by respondent Corazon stating that the
annotation of the affidavit of loss on the title should be canceled and the petition for a new title was no longer necessary
because she had already found the missing owners duplicate copy of OCT No. P-6176;
c) September 27, 1994 agreement of subdivision with sale purportedly executed by respondent Artemio and petitioner, with
the consent of their wives. Pursuant to this document, the land was subdivided into Lot 120-A with an area of 297 sq. m.
corresponding to the share of Artemio and Lot 120-B with an area of 957 sq. m. which was the share of petitioner. The
document also indicated that Artemio sold Lot 120-A to one Florentina Fernandez.22
When respondent Corazon learned about the cancellation of the annotation of her affidavit of loss, she executed an affidavit of adverse
claim on January 17, 1995 stating that the cancellation of affidavit of loss and the agreement of subdivision with sale were both
spurious and the signatures appearing thereon were forgeries. This affidavit of adverse claim was not registered. 23
On April 17, 1995, petitioner brought the owners duplicate copy of OCT No. P-6176, the cancellation of affidavit of loss, deed of
donation of titled property and agreement of subdivision with sale to the Registry of Deeds for registration. Consequently, the
following took place on that same day:
1. Corazons annotated affidavit of loss was canceled;
2. by virtue of Aureliano, Sr. and Jacobas deed of donation of titled property to Artemio and petitioner, OCT No. P-6176
was canceled and in lieu thereof, TCT No. NT-241155 in the name of petitioner and TCT No. NT-241156 in the name of
respondent Artemio were issued and
3. by virtue of the agreement of subdivision with sale, TCT Nos. NT-241155 and NT-241156 were canceled and TCT Nos.
NT-239747 and NT-239748 were issued in the names of petitioner and Florentina Fernandez, respectively. 24
On June 27, 1995, petitioner took possession of his portion and built his house thereon. 25
On July 4, 1995, respondents filed an action for cancellation, annulment and surrender of titles with damages against petitioner and
Florentina Fernandez in the RTC of Cabanatuan City, Nueva Ecija, Branch 25. In their complaint, they alleged the following, among
others: they inherited the land in question from their father, Aureliano, Sr.; petitioner caused the preparation of the spurious deed of
donation of titled property, cancellation of affidavit of loss, agreement of subdivision with sale and forged the signatures appearing
thereon except his (petitioner's) own and, in conspiracy with Fernandez, fraudulently registered said documents which resulted in the
cancellation of OCT No. P-6176 and the eventual issuance to them of TCT Nos. NT-239747 and NT-239748. They prayed that these
titles be declared null and void and that petitioner and Fernandez be ordered to surrender the land and pay damages to them. 26
In his defense, petitioner alleged that respondents' father, Aureliano, Sr., fraudulently secured a free patent in his name over the land
using a fictitious affidavit dated April 10, 1970 purportedly executed by Leocadio selling to him the land in question and, as a result,
OCT No. P-6176 was issued to him; that it was respondent Artemio who proposed to petitioner the scheme of partition that would
assure the latter of his share with the condition, however, that he (Artemio) would get a portion of 297 sq. m. (which included the share
of respondent Estrella of 83 sq. m.) because he had already earlier sold it to Fernandez and in fact had already been partially
paidP60,000 for it; that to implement this scheme, respondent Artemio caused the execution of several documents namely: (1) deed of
donation of titled property; (2) agreement of subdivision with sale and (3) cancellation of affidavit of loss and that, thereafter, he
instructed petitioner to present the said documents to the Registry of Deeds of Nueva Ecija for registration. 27
On October 26, 1995, respondents moved that Fernandez be dropped as defendant because she was no longer contesting their claim and
in fact had surrendered to them her owners duplicate copy of TCT No.NT-239748. Thus, she was excluded from the suit. 28
In a decision dated April 17, 1997, the RTC dismissed the case and declared OCT No. P-6176 as well as the subsequent certificates of
title (TCT Nos. NT-239747 and NT-239748), the deed of donation of titled property, agreement of subdivision with sale and
cancellation of affidavit of loss as null and void. It held that the aforementioned documents were spurious since the signatures were
falsified by respondent Artemio.
Furthermore, having found that OCT No. P-6176 was issued on the basis of a document falsified by Aureliano, Sr., the RTC ordered
the reversion of the land to its status before the OCT was issued.
Finally, it held that petitioner, being an innocent victim, was entitled to damages. 29
On appeal, the CA modified the RTC decision. It ruled that only TCT Nos. NT-241155, NT-241156, NT-239747 and NT-239748 were
null and void. Their source, OCT No. P-6176, remained valid because it had already become indefeasible and could no longer be
attacked collaterally. It also found that petitioner schemed with Artemio in defrauding their co-heirs and was therefore in pari
delicto. Consequently, neither party was entitled to claim damages from the other.30 Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied.
Hence this petition raising the following issues:
1) whether OCT No. P-6176 was valid or invalid, and
2) whether or not petitioner is entitled to damages.
There is no doubt that the deed of donation of titled property, cancellation of affidavit of loss and agreement of subdivision with sale,
being falsified documents, were null and void. It follows that TCT Nos. NT-241155, NT-241156, NT-239747 and NT-239748 which
were issued by virtue of these spurious documents were likewise null and void. Neither side disputes these findings and conclusions.
The question is whether the source of these titles, OCT No. P-6176, was valid. Petitioner argues that it should be invalidated because it
was issued based on a fictitious affidavit purportedly executed in 1970 by Leocadio (who died in 1932) wherein the latter supposedly
sold the land to Aureliano, Sr. According to petitioner, Aureliano, Sr. used this to fraudulently and in breach of trust secure a free
patent over the land in his name.
We agree with the CA that OCT No. P-6176 remains valid. The issue of the validity of title (e.g. whether or not it was issued
fraudulently or in breach of trust) can only be assailed in an action expressly instituted for that purpose. 31 A certificate of title cannot be
attacked collaterally. Section 48 of PD 1529 32 states:
SEC. 48. Certificate not subject to collateral attack. A certificate of title shall not be subject to collateral attack. It cannot be altered,
modified, or canceled except in a direct proceeding in accordance with law.
The rationale behind the Torrens System is that the public should be able to rely on a registered title. The Torrens System was adopted
in this country because it was believed to be the most effective measure to guarantee the integrity of land titles and to protect their
indefeasibility once the claim of ownership is established and recognized. In Fil-estate Management, Inc. v. Trono,33 we explained:
It has been invariably stated that the real purpose of the Torrens System is to quiet title to land and to stop forever any question as to its
legality. Once a title is registered, the owner may rest secure, without the necessity of waiting in the portals of the court, or sitting on
the "mirador su casa" to avoid the possibility of losing his land.34
Petitioner merely invoked the invalidity of OCT No. P-6176 as an affirmative defense in his answer and prayed for the declaration of
its nullity. Such a defense partook of the nature of a collateral attack against a certificate of title.35
Moreover, OCT No. P-6176 which was registered under the Torrens System on the basis of a free patent became indefeasible and
incontrovertible after the lapse of one year as provided in Section 32 of PD 1529:
Sec. 32. Review of decree of registration; Innocent purchaser for value. The decree of registration shall not be reopened or revised
by reason of absence, minority, or other disability of any person adversely affected thereby, nor by any proceeding in any court for
reversing judgment, subject, however, to the right of any person, including the government and the branches thereof, deprived of land
or of any estate or interest therein by such adjudication or confirmation of title obtained by actual fraud, to file in the proper Court of
First Instance a petition for reopening and review of the decree of registration not later than one year from and after the date of the
entry of such decree of registration, but in no case shall such petition be entertained by the court where an innocent purchaser for value
has acquired the land or an interest therein whose rights may be prejudiced. Whenever the phrase "innocent purchaser for value" or an
equivalent phrase occurs in this Decree, it shall be deemed to include an innocent lessee, mortgagee, or other encumbrancer for value.
Upon the expiration of said period of one year, the decree of registration and the certificate of title issued shall become
incontrovertible. Any person aggrieved by such decree of registration in any case may pursue his remedy by action for damages
against the applicant or any other person responsible for the fraud. (Emphasis supplied)
Indeed, both the RTC and CA found that Aureliano, Sr. fraudulently and in breach of trust secured OCT No. P-6176 in his name.
Unfortunately, petitioner chose not to pursue a direct proceeding to have this certificate of title annulled. In 1976, he filed an accion
reivindicatoria36 against the spouses Aureliano, Sr. and Jacoba questioning the validity of OCT No. P-6176 and seeking to recover a
portion of the land (specifically, Lot 120-A with an area of 502 sq. m.) but he voluntarily withdrew the case. 37 Now, the title has
undeniably become incontrovertible since it was issued in 1973 or more than 30 years ago.38
We now proceed to the issue of whether petitioner is entitled to damages. The RTC held that he is entitled to moral damages (P50,000),
exemplary damages (P30,000) and attorney's fees (P20,000) because he was not aware that the documents were falsified and he was
merely instructed by respondent Artemio to have them registered. The CA shared the finding of the RTC that it was respondent
Artemio who masterminded the preparation and use of the spurious documents. 39 Nevertheless, it did not find petitioner an innocent
victim who was merely dragged into litigation:
...[Petitioner] was far from innocent. [Respondent Artemio] and [petitioner] signed the bogus "Deed of Donation of Titled Property"
and the fraudulently baseless "Agreement of Subdivision with Sale." It was [petitioner] who personally submitted all the bogus
documents with the Registry of Deeds of Nueva Ecija. He stood to benefit from the registration of said fake documents. It was he who
received the titles issued in consequence of said fraudulent registration. In the natural course of things and in the ordinary experience of
man, the conclusion is inevitable that [he] knew [about] the spurious nature of said documents but he made use of them because of the
benefit which he would derive therefrom. In short, [petitioner] confabulated with [respondent Artemio] in defrauding all their co-heirs
of their shares in said property.40
We agree. Petitioner was not in good faith when he registered the fake documents.
Good faith is ordinarily used to describe that state of mind denoting "honesty of intention, and freedom from knowledge of
circumstances which ought to put the holder upon inquiry; an honest intention to abstain from taking any unconscientious advantage of
another, even through technicalities of law, together with absence of all information, notice, or benefit or belief of facts which render
the transaction unconscientious."41
Petitioner claims that he was not aware of the contents of the falsified documents and their legal consequences because of his low level
of intelligence and educational attainment. But from his own narration, it is clear that he was aware of the fraudulent scheme conceived
by respondent Artemio:
[Respondent Artemio] approached [petitioner] and propose[d] a [scheme] of partition that [would] assure [petitioner] of getting his
share including that which he and his predecessor-in-interest have purchased from the other heirs of the late LEOCADIO INGUSAN,
but with the condition that in implementing the document known as PAGHAHATI-HATI NA MAY BILIHAN, the corresponding
shares of ESTRELLA RAZON will go to him [respondent Artemio who] has agreed to have it sold in favor of one FLORENTINA
FERNANDEZ for P120,000.00, partial payment of which has already been received by [respondent Artemio], which negotiation of
SALE and the payment made by FLORENTINA FERNANDEZ was acknowledged to be true. Without much ado, a survey of Lot No.
120 was conducted by one Restituto Hechenova upon instruction of [respondent Artemio], partitioning the land into two (2), one share
goes to [petitioner] with an area of 957 square meters and the other with an area of 297 square meters in the name of [respondent
Artemio], the latter share was to be sold in favor of Florentina Fernandez. To have this IMPLEMENTED, incidental documentation
must be made thus; A DEED OF DONATION OF REAL PROPERTY allegedly executed by Sps. Aureliano Reyes and JACOBA
SOLOMON; SUBDIVISION AGREEMENT WITH SALE by and between [petitioner] and [respondent Artemio] as alleged DONEES
and SALE in the same document in favor of Florentina Fernandez, making in the process [petitioner] presentor of all these questioned
documents, adding among others an AFFIDAVIT OF LOSS of Original Certificate of Title No. P-6176 allegedly falsified by
[petitioner] of the signature of [respondent] CORAZON REYES REGUYAL. 42
Petitioner does not deny that he signed the fictitious deed of donation of titled property and the agreement of subdivision with sale.
Even if he reached only grade 3, he could not have feigned ignorance of the net effect of these documents, which was to exclude the
other heirs of the spouses and the original owner Leocadio from inheriting the property and, in the process, acquiring a big chunk of the
property at their expense. The cancellation of respondent Corazon's affidavit of loss of the owner's duplicate copy of OCT No. P-6176
also removed all obstacles to the registration of the title covering his portion of the lot. In short, by registering the spurious documents,
he had everything to gain.
Although it was respondent Artemio, an educated individual, who engineered the whole scheme and prepared the fraudulent
documents, still petitioner cannot deny that he was a willing co-conspirator in a plan that he knew was going to benefit him
handsomely.
As a result, there is no basis for the award of damages to petitioner. Coming to the court with unclean hands, he cannot obtain relief.
Neither does he fall under any of the provisions for the entitlement to damages.
Respondents presented an additional issue involving the recovery of possession of the subject land. They contend that petitioner, his
heirs and relatives illegally occupied it and constructed houses thereon. 43 However, it is well-settled that a party who has not appealed
cannot obtain from the appellate court any affirmative relief other than those obtained from the lower court whose decision is brought
up on appeal.44 While there are exceptions to this rule, such as if they involve (1) errors affecting the lower court's jurisdiction over the
subject matter; (2) plain errors not specified and (3) clerical errors, none applies here.45
Lastly, we note that petitioner entered into certain agreements with respondents to ensure that he would obtain a portion of the subject
land. He not only paid the loan of respondent Artemio to PNB in order to release the mortgage over the land but also bought from
respondents 1,171 sq. m. (almost 94% of the 1,254 sq. m. lot) under the Kasulatan ng Paghahati-hati Na May Bilihan. These are
undisputed facts. Ultimately, however, he failed to get his portion of the property. Although petitioner did not demand the return of the
amounts he paid, we deem it just and equitable to direct respondents to reimburse him for these.
Article 1236 of the Civil Code provides:
Art. 1236. The creditor is not bound to accept payment or performance by a third person who has no interest in the fulfillment of the
obligation, unless there is a stipulation to the contrary.
Whoever pays for another may demand from the debtor what he has paid, except that if he paid without the knowledge or
against the will of the debtor, he can recover only insofar as the payment has been beneficial to the debtor. (emphasis ours)
Respondent Artemio was the debtor in this case, PNB the creditor and petitioner the third person who paid the obligation of the debtor.
The amount petitioner may recover will depend on whether Artemio knew or approved of such payment.1avvphi1
Petitioner should also be able recover the amount (if any) he paid to respondents under the Kasulatan since this agreement was never
implemented. Otherwise, it will result in the unjust enrichment of respondents at the expense of petitioner, a situation covered by Art.
22 of the Civil Code:
Every person who through an act of performance by another, or any other means, acquires or comes into possession of something at the
expense of the latter without just or legal ground, shall return the same to him.
Petitioner is not entitled to legal interest since he never made a demand for it.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. However, respondents are ordered to return to petitioner the amounts he paid to the
Philippine National Bank and under the Kasulatan ng Paghahati-hati Na May Bilihan. The court a quo is directed to determine the
exact amount due to petitioner. The January 21, 2000 decision and April 10, 2000 resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV
No. 56105 are AFFIRMED.
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
 SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 156117. May 26, 2005]
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. JEREMIAS AND DAVID HERBIETO, respondents.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari, under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, seeking the reversal
of the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 67625, dated 22 November 2002,[1] which affirmed the Judgment of the
Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Consolacion, Cebu, dated 21 December 1999,[2] granting the application for land registration of the
respondents.
Respondents in the present Petition are the Herbieto brothers, Jeremias and David, who filed with the MTC, on 23 September
1998, a single application for registration of two parcels of land, Lots No. 8422 and 8423, located in Cabangahan, Consolacion, Cebu
(Subject Lots). They claimed to be owners in fee simple of the Subject Lots, which they purchased from their parents, spouses Gregorio
Herbieto and Isabel Owatan, on 25 June 1976.[3] Together with their application for registration, respondents submitted the following
set of documents:
(a) Advance Survey Plan of Lot No. 8422, in the name of respondent Jeremias; and Advance Survey Plan of Lot No. 8423,
in the name of respondent David;[4]
(b) The technical descriptions of the Subject Lots;[5]
(c) Certifications by the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) dispensing with the need for
Surveyors Certificates for the Subject Lots;[6]
(d) Certifications by the Register of Deeds of Cebu City on the absence of certificates of title covering the Subject Lots; [7]
(e) Certifications by the Community Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO) of the DENR on its finding that
the Subject Lots are alienable and disposable, by virtue of Forestry Administrative Order No. 4-1063, dated 25 June
1963;[8]
(f) Certified True Copies of Assessment of Real Property (ARP) No. 941800301831, in the name of Jeremias, covering Lot
No. 8422, issued in 1994; and ARP No. 941800301833, in the name of David, covering Lot No. 8423, also issued
in 1994;[9] and
(g) Deed of Definite Sale executed on 25 June 1976 by spouses Gregorio Herbieto and Isabel Owatan selling the Subject
Lots and the improvements thereon to their sons and respondents herein, Jeremias and David, for P1,000. Lot No.
8422 was sold to Jeremias, while Lot No. 8423 was sold to David.[10]
On 11 December 1998, the petitioner Republic of the Philippines (Republic) filed an Opposition to the respondents application
for registration of the Subject Lots arguing that: (1) Respondents failed to comply with the period of adverse possession of the Subject
Lots required by law; (2) Respondents muniments of title were not genuine and did not constitute competent and sufficient evidence
of bona fide acquisition of the Subject Lots; and (3) The Subject Lots were part of the public domain belonging to the Republic and
were not subject to private appropriation.[11]
The MTC set the initial hearing on 03 September 1999 at 8:30 a.m. [12] All owners of the land adjoining the Subject Lots were
sent copies of the Notice of Initial Hearing.[13] A copy of the Notice was also posted on 27 July 1999 in a conspicuous place on the
Subject Lots, as well as on the bulletin board of the municipal building of Consolacion, Cebu, where the Subject Lots were
located.[14] Finally, the Notice was also published in the Official Gazette on 02 August 1999 [15] and The Freeman Banat News on 19
December 1999.[16]
During the initial hearing on 03 September 1999, the MTC issued an Order of Special Default, [17] with only petitioner Republic
opposing the application for registration of the Subject Lots. The respondents, through their counsel, proceeded to offer and mark
documentary evidence to prove jurisdictional facts. The MTC commissioned the Clerk of Court to receive further evidence from the
respondents and to submit a Report to the MTC after 30 days.
On 21 December 1999, the MTC promulgated its Judgment ordering the registration and confirmation of the title of respondent
Jeremias over Lot No. 8422 and of respondent David over Lot No. 8423. It subsequently issued an Order on 02 February 2000
declaring its Judgment, dated 21 December 1999, final and executory, and directing the Administrator of the Land Registration
Authority (LRA) to issue a decree of registration for the Subject Lots. [18]
Petitioner Republic appealed the MTC Judgment, dated 21 December 1999, to the Court of Appeals. [19] The Court of Appeals, in
its Decision, dated 22 November 2002, affirmed the appealed MTC Judgment reasoning thus:
In the case at bar, there can be no question that the land sought to be registered has been classified as within the alienable and
disposable zone since June 25, 1963. Article 1113 in relation to Article 1137 of the Civil Code, respectively provides that All things
which are within the commerce of men are susceptible of prescription, unless otherwise provided. Property of the State or any of its
subdivisions of patrimonial character shall not be the object of prescription and that Ownership and other real rights over immovables
also prescribe through uninterrupted adverse possession thereof for thirty years, without need of title or of good faith.
As testified to by the appellees in the case at bench, their parents already acquired the subject parcels of lands, subject matter of this
application, since 1950 and that they cultivated the same and planted it with jackfruits, bamboos, coconuts, and other trees (Judgment
dated December 21, 1999, p. 6). In short, it is undisputed that herein appellees or their predecessors-in-interest had occupied and
possessed the subject land openly, continuously, exclusively, and adversely since 1950. Consequently, even assuming arguendo that
appellees possession can be reckoned only from June 25, 1963 or from the time the subject lots had been classified as within the
alienable and disposable zone, still the argument of the appellant does not hold water.
As earlier stressed, the subject property, being alienable since 1963 as shown by CENRO Report dated June 23, 1963, may now be the
object of prescription, thus susceptible of private ownership. By express provision of Article 1137, appellees are, with much greater
right, entitled to apply for its registration, as provided by Section 14(4) of P.D. 1529 which allows individuals to own land in any
manner provided by law. Again, even considering that possession of appelless should only be reckoned from 1963, the year when
CENRO declared the subject lands alienable, herein appellees have been possessing the subject parcels of land in open, continuous, and
in the concept of an owner, for 35 years already when they filed the instant application for registration of title to the land in 1998. As
such, this court finds no reason to disturb the finding of the court a quo.[20]
The Republic filed the present Petition for the review and reversal of the Decision of the Court of Appeals, dated 22 November
2002, on the basis of the following arguments:
First, respondents failed to establish that they and their predecessors-in-interest had been in open, continuous, and adverse
possession of the Subject Lots in the concept of owners since 12 June 1945 or earlier. According to the petitioner Republic, possession
of the Subject Lots prior to 25 June 1963 cannot be considered in determining compliance with the periods of possession required by
law. The Subject Lots were classified as alienable and disposable only on 25 June 1963, per CENROs certification. It also alleges that
the Court of Appeals, in applying the 30-year acquisitive prescription period, had overlooked the ruling in Republic v. Doldol,[21] where
this Court declared that Commonwealth Act No. 141, otherwise known as the Public Land Act, as amended and as it is presently
phrased, requires that possession of land of the public domain must be from 12 June 1945 or earlier, for the same to be acquired
through judicial confirmation of imperfect title.
Second, the application for registration suffers from fatal infirmity as the subject of the application consisted of two parcels of
land individually and separately owned by two applicants. Petitioner Republic contends that it is implicit in the provisions of
Presidential Decree No. 1529, otherwise known as the Property Registration Decree, as amended, that the application for registration of
title to land shall be filed by a single applicant; multiple applicants may file a single application only in case they are co-owners. While
an application may cover two parcels of land, it is allowed only when the subject parcels of land belong to the same applicant or
applicants (in case the subject parcels of land are co-owned) and are situated within the same province. Where the authority of the
courts to proceed is conferred by a statute and when the manner of obtaining jurisdiction is mandatory, it must be strictly complied with
or the proceedings will be utterly void. Since the respondents failed to comply with the procedure for land registration under the
Property Registration Decree, the proceedings held before the MTC is void, as the latter did not acquire jurisdiction over it.
I
Jurisdiction
Addressing first the issue of jurisdiction, this Court finds that the MTC had no jurisdiction to proceed with and hear the
application for registration filed by the respondents but for reasons different from those presented by petitioner Republic.
A. The misjoinder of causes of action and parties does not affect the jurisdiction of the MTC to hear and proceed with respondents
application for registration.
Respondents filed a single application for registration of the Subject Lots even though they were not co-owners. Respondents
Jeremias and David were actually seeking the individual and separate registration of Lots No. 8422 and 8423, respectively.
Petitioner Republic believes that the procedural irregularity committed by the respondents was fatal to their case, depriving the
MTC of jurisdiction to proceed with and hear their application for registration of the Subject Lots, based on this Courts pronouncement
in Director of Lands v. Court of Appeals,[22] to wit:
. . . In view of these multiple omissions which constitute non-compliance with the above-cited sections of the Act, We rule that said
defects have not invested the Court with the authority or jurisdiction to proceed with the case because the manner or mode of obtaining
jurisdiction as prescribed by the statute which is mandatory has not been strictly followed, thereby rendering all proceedings utterly
null and void.
This Court, however, disagrees with petitioner Republic in this regard. This procedural lapse committed by the respondents
should not affect the jurisdiction of the MTC to proceed with and hear their application for registration of the Subject Lots.
The Property Registration Decree[23] recognizes and expressly allows the following situations: (1) the filing of a single
application by several applicants for as long as they are co-owners of the parcel of land sought to be registered;[24] and (2) the filing of a
single application for registration of several parcels of land provided that the same are located within the same province. [25] The
Property Registration Decree is silent, however, as to the present situation wherein two applicants filed a single application for two
parcels of land, but are seeking the separate and individual registration of the parcels of land in their respective names.
Since the Property Registration Decree failed to provide for such a situation, then this Court refers to the Rules of Court to
determine the proper course of action. Section 34 of the Property Registration Decree itself provides that, [t]he Rules of Court shall,
insofar as not inconsistent with the provisions of this Decree, be applicable to land registration and cadastral cases by analogy or in a
suppletory character and whenever practicable and convenient.
Considering every application for land registration filed in strict accordance with the Property Registration Decree as a single
cause of action, then the defect in the joint application for registration filed by the respondents with the MTC constitutes a misjoinder
of causes of action and parties. Instead of a single or joint application for registration, respondents Jeremias and David, more
appropriately, should have filed separate applications for registration of Lots No. 8422 and 8423, respectively.
Misjoinder of causes of action and parties do not involve a question of jurisdiction of the court to hear and proceed with the
case.[26] They are not even accepted grounds for dismissal thereof.[27] Instead, under the Rules of Court, the misjoinder of causes of
action and parties involve an implied admission of the courts jurisdiction. It acknowledges the power of the court, acting upon the
motion of a party to the case or on its own initiative, to order the severance of the misjoined cause of action, to be proceeded with
separately (in case of misjoinder of causes of action); and/or the dropping of a party and the severance of any claim against said
misjoined party, also to be proceeded with separately (in case of misjoinder of parties).
The misjoinder of causes of action and parties in the present Petition may have been corrected by the MTC motu propio or on
motion of the petitioner Republic. It is regrettable, however, that the MTC failed to detect the misjoinder when the application for
registration was still pending before it; and more regrettable that the petitioner Republic did not call the attention of the MTC to the fact
by filing a motion for severance of the causes of action and parties, raising the issue of misjoinder only before this Court.
B. Respondents, however, failed to comply with the publication requirements mandated by the Property Registration Decree, thus, the
MTC was not invested with jurisdiction as a land registration court.
Although the misjoinder of causes of action and parties in the present Petition did not affect the jurisdiction of the MTC over the
land registration proceeding, this Court, nonetheless, has discovered a defect in the publication of the Notice of Initial Hearing, which
bars the MTC from assuming jurisdiction to hear and proceed with respondents application for registration.
A land registration case is a proceeding in rem,[28] and jurisdiction in rem cannot be acquired unless there be constructive seizure
of the land through publication and service of notice.[29]
Section 23 of the Property Registration Decree requires that the public be given Notice of the Initial Hearing of the application
for land registration by means of (1) publication; (2) mailing; and (3) posting. Publication of the Notice of Initial Hearing shall be made
in the following manner:
1. By publication.
Upon receipt of the order of the court setting the time for initial hearing, the Commissioner of Land Registration shall cause a notice of
initial hearing to be published once in the Official Gazette and once in a newspaper of general circulation in the
Philippines: Provided, however, that the publication in the Official Gazette shall be sufficient to confer jurisdiction upon the court. Said
notice shall be addressed to all persons appearing to have an interest in the land involved including the adjoining owners so far as
known, and to all whom it may concern. Said notice shall also require all persons concerned to appear in court at a certain date and time
to show cause why the prayer of said application shall not be granted.
Even as this Court concedes that the aforequoted Section 23(1) of the Property Registration Decree expressly provides that
publication in the Official Gazette shall be sufficient to confer jurisdiction upon the land registration court, it still affirms its declaration
in Director of Lands v. Court of Appeals[30] that publication in a newspaper of general circulation is mandatory for the land registration
court to validly confirm and register the title of the applicant or applicants. That Section 23 of the Property Registration Decree
enumerated and described in detail the requirements of publication, mailing, and posting of the Notice of Initial Hearing, then all such
requirements, including publication of the Notice in a newspaper of general circulation, is essential and imperative, and must be strictly
complied with. In the same case, this Court expounded on the reason behind the compulsory publication of the Notice of Initial Hearing
in a newspaper of general circulation, thus
It may be asked why publication in a newspaper of general circulation should be deemed mandatory when the law already requires
notice by publication in the Official Gazette as well as by mailing and posting, all of which have already been complied with in the case
at hand. The reason is due process and the reality that the Official Gazette is not as widely read and circulated as newspaper and is
oftentimes delayed in its circulation, such that the notices published therein may not reach the interested parties on time, if at all.
Additionally, such parties may not be owners of neighboring properties, and may in fact not own any other real estate. In sum, the all
encompassing in rem nature of land registration cases, the consequences of default orders issued against the whole world and the
objective of disseminating the notice in as wide a manner as possible demand a mandatory construction of the requirements for
publication, mailing and posting.[31]
In the instant Petition, the initial hearing was set by the MTC, and was in fact held, on 03 September 1999 at 8:30 a.m. While the
Notice thereof was printed in the issue of the Official Gazette, dated 02 August 1999, and officially released on 10 August 1999, it was
published in The Freeman Banat News, a daily newspaper printed in Cebu City and circulated in the province and cities of Cebu and in
the rest of Visayas and Mindanao, only on 19 December 1999, more than three months after the initial hearing.
Indubitably, such publication of the Notice, way after the date of the initial hearing, would already be worthless and ineffective.
Whoever read the Notice as it was published in The Freeman Banat News and had a claim to the Subject Lots was deprived of due
process for it was already too late for him to appear before the MTC on the day of the initial hearing to oppose respondents application
for registration, and to present his claim and evidence in support of such claim. Worse, as the Notice itself states, should the claimant-
oppositor fail to appear before the MTC on the date of initial hearing, he would be in default and would forever be barred from
contesting respondents application for registration and even the registration decree that may be issued pursuant thereto. In fact, the
MTC did issue an Order of Special Default on 03 September 1999.
The late publication of the Notice of Initial Hearing in the newspaper of general circulation is tantamount to no publication at all,
having the same ultimate result. Owing to such defect in the publication of the Notice, the MTC failed to constructively seize the
Subject Lots and to acquire jurisdiction over respondents application for registration thereof. Therefore, the MTC Judgment, dated 21
December 1999, ordering the registration and confirmation of the title of respondents Jeremias and David over Lots No. 8422 and
8423, respectively; as well as the MTC Order, dated 02 February 2000, declaring its Judgment of 21 December 1999 final and
executory, and directing the LRA Administrator to issue a decree of registration for the Subject Lots, are both null and void for having
been issued by the MTC without jurisdiction.
II
Period of Possession
Respondents failed to comply with the required period of possession of the Subject Lots for the judicial confirmation or legalization of
imperfect or incomplete title.
While this Court has already found that the MTC did not have jurisdiction to hear and proceed with respondents application for
registration, this Court nevertheless deems it necessary to resolve the legal issue on the required period of possession for acquiring title
to public land.
Respondents application filed with the MTC did not state the statutory basis for their title to the Subject Lots. They only alleged
therein that they obtained title to the Subject Lots by purchase from their parents, spouses Gregorio Herbieto and Isabel Owatan, on 25
June 1976. Respondent Jeremias, in his testimony, claimed that his parents had been in possession of the Subject Lots in the concept of
an owner since 1950.[32]
Yet, according to the DENR-CENRO Certification, submitted by respondents themselves, the Subject Lots are within Alienable
and Disposable, Block I, Project No. 28 per LC Map No. 2545 of Consolacion, Cebu certified under Forestry Administrative Order No.
4-1063, dated June 25, 1963. Likewise, it is outside Kotkot-Lusaran Mananga Watershed Forest Reservation per Presidential
Proclamation No. 932 dated June 29, 1992.[33] The Subject Lots are thus clearly part of the public domain, classified as alienable and
disposable as of 25 June 1963.
As already well-settled in jurisprudence, no public land can be acquired by private persons without any grant, express or implied,
from the government;[34] and it is indispensable that the person claiming title to public land should show that his title was acquired from
the State or any other mode of acquisition recognized by law. [35]
The Public Land Act, as amended, governs lands of the public domain, except timber and mineral lands, friar lands, and
privately-owned lands which reverted to the State.[36] It explicitly enumerates the means by which public lands may be disposed, as
follows:
(1) For homestead settlement;
(2) By sale;
(3) By lease;
(4) By confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles;
(a) By judicial legalization; or
(b) By administrative legalization (free patent).[37]
Each mode of disposition is appropriately covered by separate chapters of the Public Land Act because there are specific requirements
and application procedure for every mode.[38] Since respondents herein filed their application before the MTC,[39] then it can be
reasonably inferred that they are seeking the judicial confirmation or legalization of their imperfect or incomplete title over the Subject
Lots.
Judicial confirmation or legalization of imperfect or incomplete title to land, not exceeding 144 hectares, [40] may be availed of by
persons identified under Section 48 of the Public Land Act, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1073, which reads
Section 48. The following-described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the public domain or claiming to own any such
lands or an interest therein, but whose titles have not been perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance of the
province where the land is located for confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a certificate of title thereafter, under the Land
Registration Act, to wit:
(a) [Repealed by Presidential Decree No. 1073].
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and
notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition
of ownership, since June 12, 1945, or earlier, immediately preceding the filing of the applications for confirmation of
title, except when prevented by war orforce majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the
conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this
chapter.
(c) Members of the national cultural minorities who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in
open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of lands of the public domain suitable to
agriculture whether disposable or not, under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945 shall be entitled to
the rights granted in subsection (b) hereof.
Not being members of any national cultural minorities, respondents may only be entitled to judicial confirmation or legalization
of their imperfect or incomplete title under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as amended. Section 48(b), as amended, now requires
adverse possession of the land since 12 June 1945 or earlier. In the present Petition, the Subject Lots became alienable and disposable
only on 25 June 1963. Any period of possession prior to the date when the Subject Lots were classified as alienable and disposable is
inconsequential and should be excluded from the computation of the period of possession; such possession can never ripen into
ownership and unless the land had been classified as alienable and disposable, the rules on confirmation of imperfect title shall not
apply thereto.[41] It is very apparent then that respondents could not have complied with the period of possession required by Section
48(b) of the Public Land Act, as amended, to acquire imperfect or incomplete title to the Subject Lots that may be judicially confirmed
or legalized.
The confirmation of respondents title by the Court of Appeals was based on the erroneous supposition that respondents were
claiming title to the Subject Lots under the Property Registration Decree. According to the Decision of the Court of Appeals, dated 22
November 2002, Section 14(4) of the Property Registration Decree allows individuals to own land in any other manner provided by
law. It then ruled that the respondents, having possessed the Subject Lots, by themselves and through their predecessors-in-interest,
since 25 June 1963 to 23 September 1998, when they filed their application, have acquired title to the Subject Lots by extraordinary
prescription under Article 1113, in relation to Article 1137, both of the Civil Code. [42]
The Court of Appeals overlooked the difference between the Property Registration Decree and the Public Land Act. Under the
Property Registration Decree, there already exists a title which is confirmed by the court; while under the Public Land Act, the
presumption always is that the land applied for pertains to the State, and that the occupants and possessors only claim an interest in the
same by virtue of their imperfect title or continuous, open, and notorious possession.[43] As established by this Court in the preceding
paragraphs, the Subject Lots respondents wish to register are undoubtedly alienable and disposable lands of the public domain and
respondents may have acquired title thereto only under the provisions of the Public Land Act.
However, it must be clarified herein that even though respondents may acquire imperfect or incomplete title to the Subject Lots
under the Public Land Act, their application for judicial confirmation or legalization thereof must be in accordance with the Property
Registration Decree, for Section 50 of the Public Land Act reads
SEC. 50. Any person or persons, or their legal representatives or successors in right, claiming any lands or interest in lands under the
provisions of this chapter, must in every case present an application to the proper Court of First Instance, praying that the validity of the
alleged title or claim be inquired into and that a certificate of title be issued to them under the provisions of the Land Registration
Act.[44]
Hence, respondents application for registration of the Subject Lots must have complied with the substantial requirements under
Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act and the procedural requirements under the Property Registration Decree.
Moreover, provisions of the Civil Code on prescription of ownership and other real rights apply in general to all types of land,
while the Public Land Act specifically governs lands of the public domain. Relative to one another, the Public Land Act may be
considered a special law[45] that must take precedence over the Civil Code, a general law. It is an established rule of statutory
construction that between a general law and a special law, the special law prevails Generalia specialibus non derogant.[46]
WHEREFORE, based on the foregoing, the instant Petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CV No. 67625, dated 22 November 2002, is REVERSED. The Judgment of the MTC of Consolacion, Cebu in LRC Case No. N-75,
dated 21 December 1999, and its Order, dated 02 February 2000 are declared NULL AND VOID. Respondents application for
registration is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.

THIRD DIVISION
ZENAIDA ACOSTA, EDUARDO G.R. No. 161034
ACOSTA, ARNOLD ACOSTA, DELIA ACOSTA, SPS.
TEODULO MACHADO AND AURORA ORENZA,
SPS.ROLDAN PALARCA AND PACITA PANGILINAN, SPS.
FROMENCIO JONATAS AND LUCENA M. MARIANO, SPS.
MARCIAL IGLESIA AND VIRGINIA LAPURGA, ATTY.-IN-
FACT FELINO MACARAEG, SPS. MANUEL
MANGROBANG AND VALERIANA SOTIO, SPS. VIRGINIA Present:
DELA ROSA AND ROMEO DELA ROSA, SPS. PACIFICO
SOTIO AND LOLITA SORIANO, JUAN DALINOC YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.,
(DECEASED), REPRESENTED BY DAUGHTER CONSUELO Chairperson,
DALINOC, SPS. MARIANO TORIO AND MAXIMA CHICO-NAZARIO,
MACARAEG, REPRESENTED BY LEGAL HEIRS TORIBIA VELASCO, JR.,
TORIO AND MAYUMI MACARAEG, TEOFILO MOLINA NACHURA, and
AND AVELINO DIZON, PERALTA, JJ.
Petitioners,

- versus -
Promulgated:
TRINIDAD SALAZAR AND ANICETA SALAZAR,
Respondents. June 30, 2009

x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

NACHURA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari assailing the July 25, 2003 Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) as well as its November
25, 2003 Resolution[2] in CA-G.R. CV No. 70161, which reversed and set aside the December 20, 2000 Decision [3] of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC), Branch 64, Tarlac City in Civil Case No. 7256. Said RTC decision dismissed the complaint for quieting of title filed
by herein respondents Trinidad Salazar and Aniceta Salazar against petitioners.
Below are the facts.
On November 19, 1985, respondents Trinidad and Aniceta Salazar (hereinafter, Salazars), filed a petition for the cancellation of the
entries annotated at the back of Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 40287 registered in the names of spouses Juan Soriano and
Vicenta Macaraeg, who died without issue.[4] The Salazars claim that two of the entries Entry Nos. 19756 and 20102 annotated at the
back of the aforesaid title are void since no consolidation of rights appear in the Registry of Deeds (RD) of Tarlac to support the
entries; and that Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 9297, which supposedly cancelled OCT No. 40287, is non-existent according
to a certification issued by the RD.[5]On October 21, 1986, RTC Branch 63 of Tarlac resolved to grant the petition and ordered the
cancellation of Entry No. 20102.[6] No respondent was impleaded in the said petition.
Subsequently, the Salazars filed an urgent motion praying for the issuance of an order to direct the RD of Tarlac to recall all titles
issued under Entry Nos. 19756 and 20102 and to cancel all the tax declarations issued based thereon. The motion was granted in an
Order issued on November 7, 1986.[7]
On November 20, 1986, the Salazars filed a second urgent motion praying that the owners of the affected property be ordered to appear
before the court to show cause why their titles should not be cancelled. [8]
On October 20, 1987, the Salazars filed a new motion praying that the RD of Tarlac be ordered to comply with the courts order issued
on November 7, 1986. The RD, however, explained that to comply with the said court order would remove the basis for the issuance of
TCT No. 9297 which title had, in turn, been cancelled by many other transfer certificates of title and would indubitably result in the
deprivation of the right to due process of the registered owners thereof. [9] On this basis, the RTC denied the motion and advised the
Salazars to elevate the matter en consulta to the Land Registration Commission (now Land Registration Authority or LRA). After the
Salazars moved for reconsideration, the RTC directed the RD of Tarlac to comply with the October 21, 1986 and November 7, 1986
orders. Threatened with contempt, the RD elevated the matter en consulta to the National Land Titles and Deeds Registration
Administration, which, in turn, issued a resolution directing the RD to comply with the RTCs orders. [10] On March 7, 1989, OCT No.
40287 was reconstituted and TCT No. 219121 was issued in the names of the Salazars, sans Entry Nos. 19756 and 20102.
It was at this stage of the proceedings that herein petitioners together with other subsequent purchasers for value of the disputed
property twenty-seven (27) titleholders in all[11]filed their formal written comment dated April 17, 1989.[12] In their comment, the
oppositors contended, among others, that they had acquired their titles in good faith and for value, and that the lower court, acting as a
land registration court, had no jurisdiction over issues of ownership. [13]
On September 14, 1989, the said court, apparently realizing its mistake, issued an Order, stating thus:
Upon motion of Atty. Alcantara and without objection on the part of Atty. Molina and Atty. Lamorena, all the
incidents in this case are hereby withdrawn without prejudice to the filing of an appropriate action in a proper
forum.
SO ORDERED.[14]
This prompted the Salazars to file a complaint for quieting of title impleading herein petitioners as well as other individuals who claim
to have purchased the said property from the heirs of Juan Soriano. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 7256 before Branch 64 of
the RTC of Tarlac.[15] The complaint alleged that TCT No. 219121 was issued in the names of the Salazars without Entry Nos. 19756
and 20102 at the back of said title, but the previous TCTs issued by the RD of Tarlac as well as the tax declarations existing in the
Assessors Office have not been cancelled and revoked by the said government agencies to the detriment and prejudice of the
complainants (herein respondents). They also alleged that Pcs-395, from which Lot Nos. 702-A to 702-V were taken, is non-existent
and, thus, the court should cause the cancellation and revocation of spurious and null and void titles and tax declarations. [16]
Defendants filed three separate answers. Defendants Raymundo Macaraeg, Martha Estacio (both deceased), Adelaida Macaraeg, Lucio
Macaraeg, represented by Eufracia Macaraeg Baluyot as attorney-in-fact, Gregorio Baluyut and Eligia Obcena (hereinafter, Macaraegs)
maintained that the November 7, 1986 order of the RTC is null and void because the court did not acquire jurisdiction over the case.
They also argued that TCT No. 219121 issued in the name of the Salazars is void and that the case for quieting of title is not a direct,
but a collateral, attack against a property covered by a Torrens certificate.[17]
Defendants, now herein petitioners, for their part, maintained that the Plan of Consolidation Subdivision Survey Pcs-396 had been an
existing consolidation-subdivision survey plan annotated on OCT No. 40287 under Entry No. 20102 dated February 17, 1950 from
which TCT No. 9297 was issued covering Lot Nos. 702-A to 702-V, inclusive, in the names of the heirs of Juan Soriano. They argued
that TCT No. 219121 issued in the name of the Salazars is spurious and null and void from the beginning since it was acquired
pursuant to an illegal order issued by the court.[18] By way of special and affirmative defenses, they also alleged, among others, (1) that
the Salazars were not among the heirs of the late Juan Soriano, not within the fifth civil degree of consanguinity, and hence, they have
no right to inherit; (2) that TCT No. 219121 constitutes a cloud upon the Torrens title of herein petitioners, and should therefore be
cancelled and revoked; (3) that assuming, without admitting, that the Salazars have any right over the lots in question their right to
enforce such action had already prescribed by laches or had been barred by prescription since more than forty (40) years had lapsed
since the heirs of Juan Soriano had registered the lots in question under TCT No. 9297 on February 17, 1950; and (4) that petitioners
and/or their predecessors-in-interest acquired the lots in question in good faith and for value from the registered owners thereof.[19]
Defendant spouses Francisco Jonatas and Lucena M. Mariano and spouses Manuel Mangrobang and Valeriana Sotio filed their answers
practically raising the same defenses.[20]
Meanwhile, on July 29, 1991, petitioners, together with the Macaraegs and Jonatas, et al., filed before the CA a petition for annulment
of judgment[21] rendered by RTC Branch 63 of Tarlac, Tarlac. The case, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 25643, was, however, dismissed
on the ground of litis pendencia.[22]
On December 20, 2000, Branch 64 of the RTC of Tarlac dismissed the complaint for quieting of title. The trial court faulted the
Salazars for failure to present proof that they are heirs of the late Juan Soriano. [23] It also declared TCT No. 219121 issued in the name
of the Salazars as null and void, and affirmed TCT No. 9297 as well as all certificates of title derived therefrom. [24]
Unsatisfied, the Salazars appealed to the CA,[25] which ruled in their favor.
According to the CA, it was erroneous for Branch 64 of the RTC of Tarlac to reverse and declare as null and void the decision of
Branch 63, which is a court of equal rank. Such issue should have been properly ventilated in an action for annulment of final
judgment. Consequently, the orders issued by RTC Branch 63, had become final and executory, hence, covered by res judicata.[26]
The CA also struck down the arguments raised by the appellees that the orders of RTC Branch 63 are null and void for lack of proper
notice. It ratiocinated that the proceeding is a land registration proceeding, which is an action in rem. This being so, personal notice to
the owners or claimants of the land sought to be registered is not necessary in order to vest the court with jurisdiction over the res and
over the parties.[27]
A motion for reconsideration[28] was filed, but the same was denied.[29] Hence, this petition.
Pivotal to the resolution of this case is the determination of the validity of the action taken by the Salazars in Branch 63 of the RTC of
Tarlac.
We rule for petitioners.
It is true that the registration of land under the Torrens system is a proceeding in rem and not in personam. Such a proceeding in rem,
dealing with a tangible res, may be instituted and carried to judgment without personal service upon the claimants within the state or
notice by mail to those outside of it. Jurisdiction is acquired by virtue of the power of the court over the res. Such a proceeding would
be impossible were this not so, for it would hardly do to make a distinction between constitutional rights of claimants who were known
and those who were not known to the plaintiff, when the proceeding is to bar all. [30]
Interestingly, however, the proceedings instituted by the Salazars both in Branch 63 of the RTC of Tarlac for the cancellation of entries
in OCT No. 40287 and later in Branch 64 of the RTC of Tarlac for quieting of title can hardly be classified as actions in rem. The
petition for cancellation of entries annotated at the back of OCT No. 40287 ought to have been directed against specific persons:
namely, the heirs of Juan Soriano as appearing in Entry No. 20102 and, indubitably, against their successors-in-interest who have
acquired different portions of the property over the years because it is in the nature of an action quasi in rem. Accordingly, the Salazars
should have impleaded as party defendants the heirs of Juan Soriano and/or Vicenta Macaraeg as well as those claiming ownership
over the property under their names because they are indispensable parties. This was not done in this case. [31] Since no indispensable
party was ever impleaded by the Salazars in their petition for cancellation of entry filed before Branch 63 of the RTC of Tarlac, herein
petitioners are not bound by the dispositions of the said court. [32] Consequently, the judgment or order of the said court never even
acquired finality.
Apparently realizing their mistake, the Salazars later on filed an action for quieting of title, also an action quasi in rem, albeit this time
before Branch 64 of the RTC of Tarlac. Because the Salazars miserably failed to prove the basis for their claim, the RTC dismissed the
complaint.[33] In fact, the RTC was bold enough to have pronounced thus:
Who are the heirs of Juan Soriano who caused the consolidation and in whose favor TCT No. 9297 was
issued? Certainly, they are not the plaintiffs. If the plaintiffs claim that they are the only heirs, they should file a
case against those who executed the consolidation in whose favor [E]ntry [N]o. 20102 was made.
x x x In its order dated February 24, 2000, this Court ruled that it is necessary that plaintiffs should prove
that they are the heirs of Juan Soriano, the registered owners as indicated in OCT No. 40287 of (sic) Vicenta
Macaraeg, the late spouse. Despite the cue, the plaintiffs opted not to present evidence on how they became the
heirs of Juan Soriano or Vicenta Macaraeg. There being [no] evidence presented to prove that plaintiffs are the
heirs of the late Juan Soriano and Vicenta Macaraeg, they had no right and cause of action to prosecute this case. [34]
Needless to say, the failure of the Salazars to implead indispensable party defendants in the petition for cancellation of entries in OCT
No. 40287 should have been a ground for the RTC to dismiss, or at least suspend, the proceedings of the case.[35] Yet, although the
action proceeded, any judgment or order issued by the court thereon is still null and void for want of authority on the part of the court
to act with respect to the parties never impleaded in the action.[36] Thus, the orders issued by said court dated October 21, 1986 and
November 7, 1986 never acquired finality.[37] Quod ab initio non valet, in tractu temporis non convalescit.[38]
Paraphrasing by analogy this Courts ruling in Metropolitan Waterworks & Sewerage System v. Sison,[39] a void order is not
entitled to the respect accorded to a valid order. It may be entirely disregarded or declared inoperative by any tribunal in which effect is
sought to be given to it. It has no legal or binding effect or efficacy for any purpose or at any place and thus cannot affect, impair or
create rights. It is not entitled to enforcement and is, ordinarily, no protection to those who seek to enforce the same. Accordingly, all
proceedings founded on the void court order are themselves regarded as invalid, and the situation is the same as it would be if there was
no order issued by the court. It leaves the party litigants in the same position they were in before the trial. [40] A void order, like any void
judgment, may be said to be a lawless thing which can be treated as an outlaw and slain at sight. [41]
More crucial is the fact that both parties in this case are dealing with property registered under the Torrens system. To allow any
individual, such as the Salazars in this case, to impugn the validity of a Torrens certificate of title by the simple expediency of filing
an ex parte petition for cancellation of entries would inevitably erode the very reason why the Torrens system was adopted in this
country, which is to quiet title to land and to put a stop forever to any question on the legality of the title, except claims that were noted,
at the time of registration, in the certificate, or which may arise subsequent thereto. [42] Once a title is registered under
the Torrens system, the owner may rest secure, without the necessity of waiting in the portals of the courts or sitting in the mirador su
casa to avoid the possibility of losing his land.[43] Rarely will the court allow another person to attack the validity and indefeasibility of
a Torrens certificate, unless there is compelling reason to do so and only upon a direct action filed in court proceeded in accordance
with law.[44]
Finally, this Court also takes note of the fact that for more than 30 years from the time Entry No. 20102 was annotated at the back of
OCT No. 40287 on February 17, 1950 until the time of the filing of the ex parte petition for cancellation of entries on the said
certificate of title on November 19, 1985 the Salazars remained deafeningly quiet and never made any move to question the issue of
ownership over the said land before the proper forum. They also failed to ventilate their claim during the intestate proceeding filed by
the heirs of Juan Soriano sometime in 1939. Likewise, they miserably failed to stop the transfer of portions of the property to
petitioners who, for themselves, were able to secure TCTs in their own names. All of these would lead to the inevitable conclusion that
if there is any validity to the claim of the Salazars over the said property although such issue is not the subject of the present case the
same had already prescribed[45] or, at the very least, had become stale due to laches.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed July 25, 2003 Decision of the Court of Appeals including its November 25,
2003 Resolution are hereby SET ASIDE. Accordingly, the December 20, 2000 Decision rendered by Branch 64 of
the Regional Trial Court of Tarlac City, Tarlac is REINSTATED. Costs against respondents.
SO ORDERED.
 FIRST DIVISION

EMERITA MUOZ, G.R. No. 142676

Petitioner,

- versus -

ATTY. VICTORIANO R. YABUT, JR. and SAMUEL

GO CHAN,
Respondents.
x------------------------x
EMERITA MUOZ, G.R. No. 146718
Petitioner,
Present:

CORONA, C.J.,
- versus - Chairperson,
VELASCO, JR.,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
DEL CASTILLO, and
SPOUSES SAMUEL GO CHAN and AIDA C. CHAN, PEREZ, JJ.
and THE BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS,
Respondents. Promulgated:

June 6, 2011
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

DECISION

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:

Before Us are the following consolidated petitions for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

In G.R. No. 142676, Emerita Muoz (Muoz) is seeking the reversal, annulment, and setting aside of the Decision [1] dated July
21, 1995 and Resolution[2] dated March 9, 2000 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 35322, which affirmed the Orders[3] dated
June 10, 1994 and August 5, 1994 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 88 (RTC-Branch 88) of Quezon City in Civil Case No. Q-94-
20632. The RTC dismissed Civil Case No. 8286, the forcible entry case instituted by Muoz against Atty. Victoriano R. Yabut, Jr. (Atty.
Yabut) and Samuel Go Chan before the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC), Branch 33 of Quezon City; and nullified the MeTC
Order[4] dated May 16, 1994, granting Muozs prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction which restored
possession of the subject property to Muoz.

In G.R. No. 146718, Muoz is praying for the reversal, setting aside, and nullification of the Decision[5] dated September 29,
2000 and Resolution[6] dated January 5, 2001 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 40019, which affirmed the Orders[7] dated
August 21, 1995 and October 3, 1995 of the Quezon City RTC, Branch 95 (RTC-Branch 95) in Civil Case No. Q-28580 denying
Muozs Motion for an Alias Writ of Execution and Application for Surrender of the Owners Duplicate Copy of TCT No.
53297[8] against respondents Bank of the Philippine Islands (BPI) and the spouses Samuel Go Chan and Aida C. Chan (spouses Chan).
I. FACTS

The subject property is a house and lot at No. 48 Scout Madrian St., Diliman, Quezon City, formerly owned by Yee L.
Ching. Yee L. Ching is married to Emilia M. Ching (spouses Ching), Muozs sister. Muoz lived at the subject property with the spouses
Ching. As consideration for the valuable services rendered by Muoz to the spouses Chings family, Yee L. Ching agreed to have the
subject property transferred to Muoz. By virtue of a Deed of Absolute Sale, seemingly executed by Yee L. Ching in favor of
Muoz,[9]the latter acquired a Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 186306 covering the subject property in her name on December 22,
1972.[10] However, in a Deed of Absolute Sale dated December 28, 1972, Muoz purportedly sold the subject property to her sister,
Emilia M. Ching. As a result, TCT No. 186306 was cancelled and TCT No. 186366 was issued in Emilia M. Chings name. Emilia M.
Ching, in a Deed of Absolute Sale dated July 16, 1979, sold the subject property to spouses Go Song and Tan Sio Kien (spouses Go),
hence, TCT No. 186366 was cancelled and replaced by TCT No. 258977 in the spouses Gos names.
On October 15, 1979, Muoz registered her adverse claim to the subject property on TCT No. 258977 of the spouses Go. The
next day, on October 16, 1979, Muoz filed a complaint for the annulment of the deeds of absolute sale dated December 28, 1972 and
July 16, 1979, the cancellation of TCT No. 258977 in the spouses Gos names, and the restoration and revival of TCT No. 186306 in
Muozs name. The complaint was docketed as Civil Case No. Q-28580 and raffled to RTC-Branch 95. On October 17, 1979, Muoz
caused the annotation of a notice of lis pendens on TCT No. 258977 of the spouses Go. In an Order dated December 17, 1979, the
RTC-Branch 95 granted the spouses Gos motion for the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction and ordered the sheriff
to put the spouses Go in possession of the subject property. The writ was implemented by the sheriff on March 26, 1980, driving Muoz
and her housemates away from the subject property.
 Muoz filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition before the Court of Appeals, assailing the issuance of the writ of
preliminary mandatory injunction, which was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 10148. The appellate court dismissed Muozs petition on
January 4, 1980. Yee L. Ching and his son Frederick M. Ching filed an urgent motion for leave to intervene in CA-G.R. SP No. 10148
and for the issuance of a temporary restraining order (TRO). The Court of Appeals issued a TRO. However, in a Resolution dated
March 18, 1980, the appellate court denied the motion to intervene of Yee L. Ching and Frederick M. Ching, and cancelled the TRO
previously issued. Yee L. Ching and Frederick M. Ching challenged before this Court, in G.R. No. 53463, the Resolution dated March
18, 1980 of the Court of Appeals. Eventually, in a Resolution dated June 3, 1981, the Court dismissed the petition in G.R. No. 53463,
for lack of merit and failure of Yee L. Ching and Frederick M. Ching to substantially show that the RTC-Branch 95 and the Court of
Appeals gravely abused their discretion. In a subsequent Resolution dated June 21, 1982, the Court clarified that its Resolution of June
3, 1981 was without prejudice to the continuation of the litigation in Civil Case No. Q-28580 still pending before the trial court, in
order that proper and final adjudication may be made of whether or not the deed of sale by Emerita L. Muoz in favor of Emilia M.
Ching is a real, genuine and authentic transaction, thereby to settle once and for all the issue of ownership of the property herein in
question.[11]

Trial in Civil Case No. Q-28580 proceeded before RTC-Branch 95.

In the meantime, Muozs adverse claim and notice of lis pendens on TCT No. 258977 was cancelled on October 28, 1982 on
the basis of an alleged final judgment in favor of the spouses Go. [12] The spouses Go obtained a loan of P500,000.00 from BPI Family
Savings Bank (BPI Family) and to secure the same, they constituted a mortgage on the subject property on November 23,
1982.[13] When the spouses Go defaulted on the payment of their loan, BPI Family foreclosed the mortgage. BPI Family was the
highest bidder at the auction sale of the subject property. The spouses Go failed to exercise their right of redemption within the
prescribed period, thus, BPI Family was finally able to register the subject property in its name on October 23, 1987 under TCT No.
370364.[14] Apparently, the original copy of TCT No. 370364 was among those razed in the fire at the Quezon City Register of Deeds
on June 11, 1988. As a result of the administrative reconstitution of the lost title, TCT No. RT-54376 (370364) was issued to BPI
Family. On December 3, 1990, BPI Family executed in favor of the spouses Samuel Go Chan and Aida C. Chan (spouses Chan) a Deed
of Absolute Sale[15] covering the subject property for and in consideration of P3,350,000.00. Consequently, TCT No. RT-54376
(370364) in the name of BPI Family was cancelled and TCT No. 53297 was issued in the spouses Chans names on January 28,
1991.[16] The spouses Chan obtained a loan from BPI Family on October 2, 1992 for the construction of a building on the subject
property, and to secure the same, constituted a mortgage on the subject property in favor of BPI Family. [17]

On July 19, 1991, RTC-Branch 95 rendered its Decision[18] in Civil Case No. Q-28580, against Emilia M. Ching, Yee L.
Ching, and the spouses Go (Emilia M. Ching, et al.). It found that Muozs signature on the Deed of Absolute Sale dated December 28,
1972 was forged; that Muoz never sold the subject property to her sister, Emilia M. Ching; and that the spouses Go were not innocent
purchasers for value of the subject property. The fallo of the said decision reads:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered dismissing for lack of merit [Emilia M. Ching, et al.s]
respective counterclaims, cross-claims, and counter-cross-claim, declaring as null and void ab initio the following
documents, to wit: (a) Deed of Absolute Sale dated December 28, 1972, copy of which is marked in evidence as
Exh. M; (b) TCT No. 186366 of the Registry of Deeds for Quezon City, copy of which is marked in evidence as
Exh. N; (c) Deed of Absolute Sale dated July 16, 1979, copy of which is marked in evidence as Exh. 3; and, (d)
TCT No. 258977 of the Registry of Deeds for Metro Manila District III, copy of which is marked in evidence as
Exh. 4, and directing defendant Register of Deeds of Quezon City to cancel from the records of the subject property
the registrations of all the said documents and to restore and revive, free from all liens and encumbrances, TCT No.
186306 of the Registry of Deeds for Quezon City, copy of which is marked in evidence as Exh. L, as well as
ordering defendants Emilia M. Ching, Go Song and Tan Sio Kien jointly and severally to pay [Muoz] the sum
of P50,000.00 as and for attorneys fees and to pay the costs of suit. The court also hereby dismisses the rest of the
claims in [Muozs] complaint, there being no satisfactory warrant therefor.[19]

Emilia M. Ching, et al.s, appeal of the foregoing judgment of the RTC-Branch 95 was docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 33811
before the Court of Appeals. In its Decision[20]dated March 4, 1993, the appellate court not only affirmed the appealed judgment, but
also ordered the spouses Go and their successors-in-interest and assigns and those acting on their behalf to vacate the subject property,
to wit:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision appealed from is AFFIRMED, with costs against
[Emilia M. Ching, et al.]. The writ of preliminary mandatory injunction issued on December 17, 1979 is hereby set
aside and declared dissolved. Defendants-appellants Go and Tan, their successors-in-interest and assigns and those
acting on their behalf, are ordered to vacate the disputed premises and to deliver the same to [Muoz] immediately
upon receipt of this decision.[21]

Emilia L. Ching, et al., filed before this Court a motion for extension of time to file their petition for review, which was
assigned the docket number G.R. No. 109260.However, they failed to file their intended petition within the extended period which
expired on April 23, 1993. In a Resolution[22] dated July 12, 1993, the Court declared G.R. No. 109260 terminated. The Resolution
dated July 12, 1993 of the Court in G.R. No. 109260 became final and executory on July 15, 1993 and was entered in the Book of
Entries of Judgments on even date.[23]

More than two months later, on September 20, 1993, the RTC-Branch 95 issued a writ of execution to implement the
judgment in Civil Case No. Q-28580.
The spouses Chan, who bought the subject property from BPI Family, then came forward and filed before the RTC-Branch 95 on
October 22, 1993 an Urgent Motion to Stop Execution as Against Spouses Samuel Go Chan and Aida Chan, [24] opposing the writ of
execution issued in Civil Case No. Q-28580. The spouses Chan asserted ownership and possession of the subject property on the basis
of a clean title registered in their names under TCT No. 53297. The spouses Chan further contended that the final judgment in Civil
Case No. Q-28580 could not be executed against them since they were not parties to the said case; they were not successors-in-interest,
assigns, or acting on behalf of the spouses Go; and they purchased the subject property from BPI Family without any notice of defect in
the latters title.

It was only at this point that Muoz, upon her own inquiry, discovered the cancellation on October 28, 1982 of her adverse
claim and notice of lis pendens annotated on the spouses Gos TCT No. 258977, and the subsequent events that led to the transfer and
registration of the title to the subject property from the spouses Go, to BPI Family, and finally, to the spouses Chan.

In its Order[25] dated December 28, 1993, the RTC-Branch 95 denied the spouses Chans urgent motion to stop the
execution. According to the RTC-Branch 95, the photocopy of TCT No. 370364 in the name of BPI Family, submitted by the spouses
Chan with their motion, could hardly be regarded as satisfactory proof that Muozs adverse claim and notice of lis pendens annotated
therein were also missing from the original copy of said certificate of title. Muozs adverse claim and notice of lis pendens were
annotated on TCT No. 258977 in the spouses Gos names as P.E.-8078 and P.E.-8178, respectively. So when TCT No. 258977 of the
spouses Go was cancelled and TCT No. 370364 was issued to BPI Family, it could be presumed that the Register of Deeds regularly
performed his official duty by carrying over Muozs adverse claim and notice of lis pendens to TCT No. 370364. In addition, the RTC-
Branch 95 pointed out that in this jurisdiction, the entry of the notice of lis pendens in the day book of the Register of Deeds was
already sufficient notice to the whole world of the dispute over the subject property, and there was no more need to annotate the same
on the owners duplicate of the certificate of title. Finally, the RTC-Branch 95 held that TCT No. RT-54376 (370364) of BPI Family
and TCT No. 53297 of the spouses Chan shall be subject to the reservation under Section 7 of Republic Act No. 26 [26] [t]hat certificates
of title reconstituted extrajudicially, in the manner stated in sections five and six hereof, shall be without prejudice to any party whose
right or interest in the property was duly noted in the original, at the time it was lost or destroyed, but entry or notation of which has not
been made on the reconstituted certificate of title. Thus, the spouses Chan were deemed to have taken the disputed property subject to
the final outcome of Civil Case No. Q-28580.

On January 3, 1994, the RTC-Branch 95 issued an Alias Writ of Execution.[27] On January 10, 1994, the writ was enforced,
and possession of the subject property was taken from the spouses Chan and returned to Muoz. [28] In its Orders dated April 8, 1994 and
June 17, 1994, the RTC-Branch 95 denied the spouses Chans motion for reconsideration and notice of appeal, respectively. [29]

G.R. No. 142676

Pending resolution by the RTC-Branch 95 of the spouses Chans motion for reconsideration and notice of appeal in Civil Case
No. Q-28580, Muoz instituted before the MeTC on February 4, 1994 a Complaint for Forcible Entry with Prayer for Preliminary
Mandatory Injunction[30] against Samuel Go Chan and Atty. Yabut, docketed as Civil Case No. 8286. Muoz alleged in her complaint
that she had been in actual and physical possession of the subject property since January 10, 1994. She hired a caretaker and two
security guards for the said property. On February 2, 1994, Samuel Go Chan and Atty. Yabut, along with 20 other men, some of whom
were armed, ousted Muoz of possession of the subject property by stealth, threat, force, and intimidation. Muoz prayed for the issuance
of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction directing Samuel Go Chan and Atty. Yabut and all persons claiming right under them to
vacate the subject property. Muoz additionally prayed for judgment making the mandatory injunction permanent and directing Samuel
Go Chan and Atty. Yabut to pay Muoz: (1) compensation for the unlawful occupation of the subject property in the amount
of P50,000.00 per month, beginning February 2, 1994 until the said property is fully and completely turned over to Muoz; (2) attorneys
fees in the amount of P50,000.00, plus P1,500.00 per court appearance of Muozs counsel; and (3) costs of suit.

Samuel Go Chan and Atty. Yabut denied Muozs allegations, insisting that Samuel Go Chan is the valid, lawful, and true legal
owner and possessor of the subject property.Samuel Go Chan and Atty. Yabut averred that the Turn-Over of Possession and Receipt of
Possession dated January 10, 1994 attached to Muozs complaint as proof that the subject property had been placed in her possession is
a falsified document. The Writ of Execution issued on September 20, 1993 in Civil Case No. Q-28580 had already expired and the
Sheriffs Return on the Writ another document purporting to show that possession of the subject property was turned-over to Muoz on
January 10, 1994 was then being challenged in a complaint before the Office of Deputy Court Administrator Reynaldo L. Suarez of the
Supreme Court. Samuel Go Chans possession of the subject property has never been interrupted. His sister, Cely Chan, resided at the
subject property and was never removed therefrom. On February 2, 1994, Atty. Yabut was at the subject property only to protect the
rights and interest of his client, Samuel Go Chan, and since the latters possession of the subject property had never been interrupted,
Atty. Yabut entered the same peacefully, without intimidation, force, or stealth. The other people at the subject property on February 2,
1994 were there to attend the services at the Buddhist Templewhich occupied the fourth floor of the building erected by the spouses
Chan on the subject property. Samuel Go Chan and Atty. Yabut, thus, asked the MeTC to dismiss Muozs complaint for lack of merit
and legal basis.[31]

The MeTC received evidence from the parties on whether a writ of preliminary injunction should be issued, as prayed for by
Muoz. In its Order dated May 16, 1994, the MeTC adjudged that the final judgment in Civil Case No. Q-28580 was already executed
against the spouses Chan and there was, indeed, a turn-over of possession of the subject property to Muoz. Accordingly, the MeTC
granted Muozs prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction, restoring possession of the subject property to
Muoz.

Samuel Go Chan and Atty. Yabut questioned the foregoing MeTC order through a Petition for Certiorari with Prayer for
Temporary Restraining Order and Writ of Preliminary Injunction [32] before the RTC-Branch 88, which was docketed as Civil Case No.
Q-94-20632. They asserted that they were not bound by the execution of the final judgment of RTC-Branch 95 in Civil Case No. Q-
28580 as they were not parties to the said case. Muoz, on the other hand, argued that the MeTC Order of May 16, 1994 was an
interlocutory order, and under Section 19 of the Rules of Summary Procedure, a petition for certiorari against an interlocutory order
issued by the court is one of the prohibited pleadings and motions in summary proceedings.

In its Order dated June 10, 1994, the RTC-Branch 88 issued a writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin the implementation of
the MeTC Order dated May 16, 1994.

On August 5, 1994, the RTC-Branch 88 issued another Order resolving Muozs motion to dismiss the petition for certiorari in
Civil Case No. Q-94-20632, motion for reconsideration of the Order dated June 10, 1994 of RTC-Branch 88 granting the issuance of a
writ of preliminary injunction, and motion to resolve with additional grounds for dismissal. According to the RTC-Branch 88, the
MeTC failed to distinguish the issue of finality of the judgment of the RTC-Branch 95 in Civil Case No. Q-28580 from the assertions
of Samuel Go Chan and Atty. Yabut that the spouses Chan are not covered by said final judgment because they are not successors-in-
interest, assigns, or privies of the spouses Go and they are purchasers of the subject property in good faith. The issue of whether the
final judgment in Civil Case No. Q-28580 extended to the spouses Chan was then still being litigated in the same case before RTC-
Branch 95, where the spouses Chans motion for reconsideration of the denial of their notice of appeal was pending. The RTC-Branch
88 further found that the MeTC committed grave abuse of discretion in not dismissing Muozs complaint for forcible entry on the
ground of lis pendens, as the issue as to who between Muoz and the spouses Chan had the better right to possession of the subject
property was the subject of the pending proceeding in Civil Case No. Q-28580 before the RTC-Branch 95. In the end, the RTC-Branch
88 decreed:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court renders judgment

(a) Denying the motion to dismiss of respondent Muoz for lack of merit;
(b) Denying the motion for reconsideration of respondent Muoz for the recall and/or setting aside of the
writ of preliminary injunction granted to petitioners;
(c) Declaring the Order dated May 16, 1994 of Public respondent Hon. Elsa de Guzman in Civil Case No.
8286 illegal and therefore null and void; and
(d) Dismissing the ejectment suit in Civil Case No. 8286 on ground of lis pendens.

Without pronouncement as to costs.[33]

Muoz appealed the Orders dated June 10, 1994 and August 5, 1994 of RTC-Branch 88 before the Court of Appeals. Her
appeal was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 35322.Aside from the nullification of the two orders, Muoz additionally prayed for the
dismissal from the service of the RTC-Branch 88 presiding judge and the disbarment of Atty. Yabut.

The Court of Appeals, in its Decision dated July 21, 1995, sustained the appealed orders of RTC-Branch 88. The Court of
Appeals held that the MeTC should have dismissed the forcible entry case on the ground of lis pendens; that the spouses Chan were not
parties in Civil Case No. Q-28580, and impleading them only in the execution stage of said case vitiated their right to due process; that
the order of the RTC-Branch 95 involving the spouses Chan in Civil Case No. Q-28580 was null and void, considering that they are
strangers to the case, and they are innocent purchasers for value of the subject property; that the notice of lis pendens was already
cancelled from the spouses Gos certificate of title at the time they mortgaged the subject property to BPI Family; and that the title to the
subject property was already free of any and all liens and encumbrances when the spouses Chan purchased the said property from BPI
Family. The Court of Appeals, in its Resolution dated March 9, 2000, denied Muozs motion for reconsideration.

G.R. No. 146718

Meanwhile, Muoz filed before the RTC-Branch 95 in Civil Case No. Q-28580 a Motion to Cite the Register of Deeds in Contempt of
Court for the failure of the Register of Deeds to restore Muozs TCT No. 186306 despite having been served with a copy of the writ of
execution on October 11, 1993. In its Judgment (on the Contempt Proceedings against the Register of Deeds of Quezon City Samuel C.
Cleofe)[34] dated March 18, 1994, the RTC-Branch 95 denied Muozs motion, convinced that the Register of Deeds had a valid excuse
for his inability to implement the served writ. The Register of Deeds could not cancel the spouses Chans TCT No. 53297, the subsisting
certificate of title over the subject property, absent any authority or directive for him to do so. The directive in the final judgment in
Civil Case No. Q-28580 and the writ of execution for the same only pertained to the cancellation of the spouses Gos TCT No. 258977.

Thereafter, Muoz filed a Motion for Contempt against the spouses Chan and a Second Motion for Contempt against Samuel
Go Chan and Atty. Yabut. Muoz also filed a Motion for an Alias Writ of Execution and Application for Surrender of the Owners
Duplicate Copy of TCT No. 53297,[35] in which she prayed for the issuance of an alias writ of execution directing the Register of Deeds
not only to cancel TCT No. 258977 and all documents declared null and void ab initio in the dispositive portion of the
Decision[36]dated July 19, 1991 of RTC-Branch 95 in Civil Case No. Q-28580, and to restore and revive, free from all liens and
encumbrances Muozs TCT No. 186306, but likewise to cancel the present certificate of title covering the subject property, TCT No.
53297.

In its Order dated August 21, 1995, the RTC-Branch 95 denied all of Muozs aforementioned motions. The RTC-Branch 95
was of the view that Samuel Go Chans title should be litigated in another forum, not in Civil Case No. Q-28580 where the judgment
had already become final and executory. The RTC-Branch 95 also stressed that since the judgment in Civil Case No. Q-28580 had long
become final and executory, it could no longer be changed or amended except for clerical error or mistake. Accordingly, the RTC-
Branch 95 resolved as follows:
 1. Ordering, as it hereby orders, the denial of [Muozs] first and second motions for contempt and hereby
absolves respondents Samuel Go Chan, Celia Chan, Atty. Victoriano R. Yabut, Jr., and several John Does of the
Contempt Charges against them.

2. Ordering, as it hereby orders, the issuance of an alias writ of execution directing the Courts Deputy
Sheriff:

(a) Defendants Go Song and Tan Sio Kien, their successors-in-interest and assigns and those
acting on their behalf to vacate the disputed premises and deliver the same to [Muoz];
(b) Defendant Register of Deeds of Quezon City to cancel from the records of the subject
property the registration of all the following documents, to wit: (1) Deed of Absolute Sale dated
December 28, 1972; (2) Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 186366 of the Register of
Deeds of Quezon City; (3) Deed of Absolute Sale dated July 16, 1979; and (4) TCT No.
258977 of the Registry of Deeds for Metro Manila II, and to restore and revive, free from all
liens and encumbrances TCT No. 186306 of the Registry of Deeds for Quezon City; and
(c) Defendants Emilia M. Ching, Go Song and Tan Sio Kien jointly and severally to pay [Muoz]
the sum of P50,000.00 as and for attorneys fees and to pay the cost of suit. [37]

Unrelenting, Muoz filed a Motion for Clarificatory Order, pointing out that the spouses Chan are the present occupants of the
subject property. The Order dated August 21, 1995 of the RTC-Branch 95 directed the deputy sheriff to deliver the subject property to
Muoz, and this could not be done unless the spouses Chan are evicted therefrom.Resultantly, Muoz prayed that a clarificatory order be
made categorically stating that the spouses Samuel Go Chan and Aida C. Chan, and all persons claiming right under them, are likewise
evicted from the subject premises pursuant to the Order of 21 August 1995.[38]

Once more, the RTC-Branch 95 denied Muozs motion in its Order dated October 3, 1995. The RTC-Branch 95 reiterated the
rule that after the judgment had become final, only clerical errors, as distinguished from substantial errors, can be amended by the
court. Furthermore, when the decision or judgment sought to be amended is promulgated by an appellate court, it is beyond the power
of the trial court to change, amplify, enlarge, alter, or modify. Ultimately, the RTC-Branch 95 pronounced that it was restrained x x x to
consider as mere clerical error the exclusion of spouses Samuel Go Chan and Aida C. Chan in the Decision of the Court dated July 19,
1991, a final judgment, which judgment cannot now be made to speak a different language. [39]
Attributing grave abuse of discretion on the part of the RTC-Branch 95 in issuing its Orders dated August 21, 1995 and
October 3, 1995, Muoz filed before this Court a Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus, which was remanded to the Court of Appeals in
observance of the hierarchy of courts, where it was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 40019.The Court of Appeals promulgated its Decision
on September 29, 2000 dismissing Muozs petition. The Court of Appeals agreed with the RTC-Branch 95 that the spouses Chan could
not be covered by the alias writ of execution considering that they were not impleaded in Civil Case No. Q-28580. The cancellation of
TCT No. 53297 in the spouses Chans names could not be done apart from a separate action exclusively for that matter. The spouses
Chan are deemed buyers in good faith and for value as the certificate of title delivered to them by BPI Family was free from any liens
or encumbrances or any mark that would have raised the spouses Chans suspicions. Every person dealing with registered lands may
safely rely on the correctness of the certificate of title of the vendor/transferor, and he is not required to go beyond the certificate and
inquire into the circumstances culminating in the vendors acquisition of the property. The Court of Appeals denied Muozs motion for
reconsideration in a Resolution dated January 5, 2001.

Muoz comes before this Court via the present consolidated petitions.

Muoz posits that the final judgment and writ of execution of RTC-Branch 95 in Civil Case No. Q-28580 bind not only Emilia
M. Ching and the spouses Go, but also their successors-in-interest, assigns, or persons acting on their behalf, namely, BPI Family and
spouses Chan. The spouses Chan cannot be deemed innocent purchasers for value of the property since the cancellation of the adverse
claim and notice of lis pendens on the spouses Gos TCT No. 258977 is completely null and void.

Muoz further argues that the MeTC Order dated May 16, 1994 in Civil Case No. 8286 correctly ordered the issuance of a writ
of preliminary mandatory injunction restoring possession of the subject property to her, as she had already acquired prior possession of
the said property upon the execution of the final judgment in Civil Case No. Q-28580. Also, the spouses Chans petition
for certiorari before the RTC-Branch 88, docketed as Civil Case No. Q-94-20632, challenging the Order dated May 16, 1994 of the
MeTC in Civil Case No. 8286, is a prohibited pleading under the Rules of Summary Procedure; and the RTC-Branch 88 and the Court
of Appeals should be faulted for giving due course to the said petition even in the absence of jurisdiction.

On the other hand, in their comments to the two petitions at bar, the spouses Chan, Atty. Yabut, and BPI Family assert that
given the peculiar factual circumstances of the case, RTC-Branch 88 was justified in taking cognizance of Samuel Go Chan and Atty.
Yabuts petition for certiorari in Civil Case No. Q-94-20632; that Muoz is estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of RTC-Branch
88 after participating in the proceedings in Civil Case No. Q-94-20632; that the spouses Chans title to the subject property is not
affected by the final judgment of RTC-Branch 95 in Civil Case No. Q-28580, and the said judgment cannot be executed against the
spouses Chan since they are neither parties to the case, nor are they the successors-in-interest, assigns, or persons acting on behalf of
Emilia M. Ching or the spouses Go; that BPI Family and consequently, the spouses Chan, obtained title to the subject property as
innocent purchasers for value, there being no notice of any infirmity in said title; and that Muoz is guilty of forum shopping for filing
her petition in G.R. No. 146718 even while her petition in G.R. No. 142676 is still pending.

II. RULING

For the sake of expediency, we will be discussing first the merits of the petition in G.R. No. 146718.
G.R. No. 146718

Civil Case No. Q-28580 involved Muozs complaint for the annulment of the deeds of absolute sale dated December 28,
1972[40] and July 16, 1979,[41] the cancellation of the spouses Gos TCT No. 258977, and the restoration and revival of Muozs TCT No.
186306. The final judgment of RTC-Branch 95 in Civil Case No. Q-28580 was in favor of Muoz and against Emilia M. Ching and the
spouses Go. The problem arose when during the pendency of the said case, title and possession of the subject property were transferred
from the spouses Go, to BPI Family, and finally, to the spouses Chan. BPI Family and the spouses Chan were never impleaded as
parties and were not referred to in the dispositive portion of the final judgment in Civil Case No. Q-28580.

Muoz questions in G.R. No. 146718: (1) the Order dated August 21, 1995 denying her Motion for Contempt against the spouses Chan,
Second Motion for Contempt against Samuel Go Chan and Atty. Yabut, and Motion for an Alias Writ of Execution and Application for
Surrender of the Owners Duplicate Copy of TCT No. 53297; and (2) the Order dated October 3, 1995 denying her Motion for
Clarificatory Order, both issued by the RTC-Branch 95 in Civil Case No. Q-28580, and upheld by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP
No. 40019. In sum, Muoz was seeking in her aforementioned motions: (1) a categorical order from the RTC-Branch 95 that the final
judgment in Civil Case No. Q-28580 be executed against the spouses Chan; and (2) the surrender and cancellation of the spouses Chans
TCT No. 53297 and restoration of Muozs TCT No. 186306.

There is no merit in Muozs petition in G.R. No. 146718.

Civil Case No. Q-28580 is an action for reconveyance of real property. In Heirs of Eugenio Lopez, Sr. v. Enriquez,[42] we
described an action for reconveyance as follows:

An action for reconveyance is an action in personam available to a person whose property has been
wrongfully registered under the Torrens system in anothers name. Although the decree is recognized as
incontrovertible and no longer open to review, the registered owner is not necessarily held free from liens. As a
remedy, an action for reconveyance is filed as an ordinary action in the ordinary courts of justice and not with the
land registration court. Reconveyance is always available as long as the property has not passed to an
innocent third person for value. A notice of lis pendens may thus be annotated on the certificate of title
immediately upon the institution of the action in court. The notice of lis pendens will avoid transfer to an innocent
third person for value and preserve the claim of the real owner.[43] (Emphases ours.)

The rule is that: (1) a judgment in rem is binding upon the whole world, such as a judgment in a land registration case or
probate of a will; and (2) a judgment in personamis binding upon the parties and their successors-in-interest but not upon strangers. A
judgment directing a party to deliver possession of a property to another is in personam; it is binding only against the parties and their
successors-in-interest by title subsequent to the commencement of the action. An action for declaration of nullity of title and recovery
of ownership of real property, or re-conveyance, is a real action but it is an action in personam, for it binds a particular individual only
although it concerns the right to a tangible thing. Any judgment therein is binding only upon the parties properly impleaded. [44]

Since they were not impleaded as parties and given the opportunity to participate in Civil Case No. Q-28580, the final
judgment in said case cannot bind BPI Family and the spouses Chan. The effect of the said judgment cannot be extended to BPI Family
and the spouses Chan by simply issuing an alias writ of execution against them. No man shall be affected by any proceeding to which
he is a stranger, and strangers to a case are not bound by any judgment rendered by the court. In the same manner, a writ of execution
can be issued only against a party and not against one who did not have his day in court. Only real parties in interest in an action are
bound by the judgment therein and by writs of execution issued pursuant thereto. [45]

A similar situation existed in Dino v. Court of Appeals,[46] where we resolved that:

As the registered owner of the subject property, petitioners are not bound by decision in Civil Case No.
R-18073 for they were never summoned in said case and the notice of lis pendensannotated on TCT No. 73069 was
already cancelled at the time petitioners purchased the subject property. While it is true that petitioners are
indispensable parties in Civil Case No. R-18073, without whom no complete relief could be accorded to the private
respondents, the fact still remains that petitioners were never actually joined as defendants in said case. Impleading
petitioners as additional defendants only in the execution stage of said case violated petitioners right to due process
as no notice of lis pendens was annotated on the existing certificate of title of said property nor were petitioners
given notice of the pending case, therefore petitioners remain strangers in said case and the Order of the trial court
involving them is null and void, considering that petitioners are innocent purchasers of the subject property for
value.[47]

We further stress that Section 48 of Presidential Decree No. 1529, otherwise known as the Property Registration Decree,
clearly provides that [a] certificate of title shall not be subject to collateral attack. It cannot be altered, modified or cancelled except in a
direct proceeding in accordance with law. Herein, several Torrens titles were already issued after the cancellation of
Muozs. Certificates of title had been successively issued to Emilia M. Ching, spouses Go, BPI Family, and spouses Chan. Civil Case
No. Q-28580, in which a final judgment had already been rendered, specifically challenged the validity of the certificates of title of
Emilia M. Ching and the spouses Go only. To have the present certificate of title of the spouses Chan cancelled, Muoz must institute
another case directly attacking the validity of the same.
The fact that the titles to the subject property of Emilia M. Ching and the spouses Go were already declared null and void ab
initio by final judgment in Civil Case No. Q-28580 is not enough, for it does not automatically make the subsequent titles of BPI
Family and the spouses Chan correspondingly null and void ab initio.
 It has long been ingrained in our jurisprudence that a void title may become the root of a valid title if the derivative title was
obtained in good faith and for value. Following the principle of indefeasibility of a Torrens title, every person dealing with registered
lands may safely rely on the correctness of the certificate of title of the vendor/transferor, and he is not required to go beyond the
certificate and inquire into the circumstances culminating in the vendors acquisition of the property. The rights of innocent third
persons who relied on the correctness of the certificate of title and acquired rights over the property covered thereby cannot be
disregarded and the courts cannot order the cancellation of such certificate for that would impair or erode public confidence in
the Torrens system of land registration.[48]
Hence, we pronounced in Republic v. Agunoy, Sr.[49]:
Here, it bears stressing that, by petitioner's own judicial admission, the lots in dispute are no longer part
of the public domain, and there are numerous third, fourth, fifth and more parties holding Torrens titles in their
favor and enjoying the presumption of good faith. This brings to mind what we have reechoed in Pino v. Court of
Appeals and the cases therein cited:

[E]ven on the supposition that the sale was void, the general rule that the direct result of a
previous illegal contract cannot be valid (on the theory that the spring cannot rise higher than
its source) cannot apply here for We are confronted with the functionings of the Torrens
System of Registration. The doctrine to follow is simple enough: a fraudulent or forged
document of sale may become the ROOT of a valid title if the certificate of title has
already been transferred from the name of the true owner to the name of the forger or the
name indicated by the forger.[50] (Emphases ours.)

Although the RTC-Branch 95 had declared with finality in Civil Case No. Q-28580 that the titles of Emilia M. Ching and the
spouses Go were null and void, there is yet no similar determination on the titles of BPI Family and the spouses Chan. The question of
whether or not the titles to the subject property of BPI Family and the spouses Chan are null and void, since they are merely the
successors-in-interest, assigns, or privies of Emilia M. Ching and the spouses Go, ultimately depends on the issue of whether or not
BPI Family and the spouses Chan obtained their titles to the subject property in bad faith, i.e., with notice of Muozs adverse claim and
knowledge of the pendency of Civil Case No. Q-28580. The latter is a factual issue on which we cannot rule in the present petition, not
only because we are not a trier of facts, but more importantly, because it was not among the issues raised and tried in Civil Case No. Q-
28580.

In support of her prayer for an alias writ of execution against BPI Family and the spouses Go, Muoz cites our ruling
in Calalang v. Register of Deeds of Quezon City,[51]in relation to De la Cruz v. De la Cruz.[52]

De la Cruz is an action for reconveyance of Lot 671 founded on breach of trust filed by Augustina de la Cruz, et al., against
Lucia dela Cruz (Lucia) and Iglesia Ni Kristo (INK). We upheld the validity of the sale of Lot 671 by Lucia to INK, and thereby
validated the title of INK to the said property.

Calalang actually involved two petitions: (1) a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition originally filed by Virginia
Calalang (Calalang) before this Court, and (2) a petition for injunction with damages originally filed by Augusto M. de Leon
(De Leon), et al., before the RTC and docketed as Civil Case No. Q-45767. Calalang and De Leon,et al., assert titles that were adverse
to that of INK. De Leon, et al., in particular, claim that their titles to Lot 671 were derived from Amando Clemente. Calalang and De
Leon, et al., sought from the court orders enjoining INK from building a fence to enclose Lot 671; requiring the Administrator of the
National Land Titles and Deeds Registration Administration (NLTDRA) to conduct an investigation of the anomaly regarding Lucias
reconstituted title to Lot 671; and dismissing the proceedings instituted by the Register of Deeds for the cancellation of their titles. We
dismissed the petitions of Calalang and De Leon, et al., on the ground of res judicata, the legality or validity of the title of INK
overLot 671 had been settled with finality in De la Cruz. De la Cruz was applied to Calalang and De Leon, et al., since the facts on
which such decision was predicated continued to be the facts on which the petitions of Calalang and De Leon, et al., were based.

Muozs reliance on Calalang is misplaced. There are substantial differences in the facts and issues involved in Calalang and
the present case.

In Calalang, there is duplication or overlapping of certificates of title issued to different persons over the same property. We
already upheld in De la Cruz the validity of the certificate of title of INK over Lot 671, which effectively prevents us from recognizing
the validity of any other certificate of title over the same property. In addition, Lucia, the predecessor-in-interest of INK, had her
certificate of title judicially reconstituted. The judicial reconstitution of title is a proceeding in rem, constituting constructive notice to
the whole world. Hence, we rejected the petitions of Calalang and De Leon, et al., to enjoin INK from building a fence enclosing Lot
671, and the concerned public authorities from instituting appropriate proceedings to have all other certificates of title over Lot 671
annulled and cancelled.

In the instant case, there has been no duplication or overlapping of certificates of title. The subject property has always been
covered by only one certificate of title at a time, and at present, such certificate is in the spouses Chans names. As we have previously
discussed herein, Muoz cannot have the spouses Chans TCT No. 53297 cancelled by a mere motion for the issuance of an alias writ of
execution in Civil Case No. Q-28580, when the spouses Chan were not parties to the case. Civil Case No. Q-28580 was a proceeding in
personam, and the final judgment rendered therein declaring null and void the titles to the subject property of Emilia M. Ching and the
spouses Go should bind only the parties thereto. Furthermore, despite the void titles of Emilia M. Ching and the spouses Go, the
derivative titles of BPI Family and the spouses Chan may still be valid provided that they had acquired the same in good faith and for
value.
 More in point with the instant petition is Pineda v. Santiago.[53] Pineda still involved Lot 671. INK sought from the RTC a
second alias writ of execution to implement the judgment in Calalang against Conrado Pineda (Pineda), et. al. In opposing the issuance
of such writ, Pineda, et al., asserted that they held titles to Lot 671 adverse to those of Lucia and INK and that they were not parties
in De la Cruz or in Calalang. In its assailed order, the RTC granted the second alias writ of execution on the basis that the issue of
ownership of Lot 671 was already determined with finality in favor of Lucia and INK. The writ ordered the deputy sheriff to eject
Pineda, et al., from Lot 671. When the matter was brought before us, we annulled the assailed order as the writ of execution issued was
against Pineda, et al., who were not parties to Civil Case No. Q-45767, the ejectment suit instituted by De Leon, et al. We elaborated
in Pineda that:

Being a suit for injunction, Civil Case No. Q-45767 partakes of an action in personam. In Domagas v.
Jensen, we have explained the nature of an action in personam and enumerated some actions and proceedings
which are in personam, viz:

The settled rule is that the aim and object of an action determine its character.
Whether a proceeding is in rem, or in personam, or quasi in rem for that matter, is determined
by its nature and purpose, and by these only. A proceeding in personam is a proceeding to
enforce personal rights and obligations brought against the person and is based on the
jurisdiction of the person, although it may involve his right to, or the exercise of ownership of,
specific property, or seek to compel him to control or dispose of it in accordance with the
mandate of the court. The purpose of a proceeding in personam is to impose, through the
judgment of a court, some responsibility or liability directly upon the person of the
defendant. Of this character are suits to compel a defendant to specifically perform some act or
actions to fasten a pecuniary liability on him. An actionin personam is said to be one which
has for its object a judgment against the person, as distinguished from a judgment against
the propriety to determine its state. It has been held that an action in personam is a
proceeding to enforce personal rights or obligations; such action is brought against the
person. As far as suits for injunctive relief are concerned, it is well-settled that it is an
injunctive act in personam. In Combs v. Combs, the appellate court held that proceedings to
enforce personal rights and obligations and in which personal judgments are rendered adjusting
the rights and obligations between the affected parties is in personam. Actions for recovery of
real property are in personam.

The respondent judge's jurisdiction is, therefore, limited to the parties in the injunction suit. To stress, the
petition for injunction, docketed as Civil Case No. Q-45767, was filed only by therein petitioners Augusto M. de
Leon, Jose de Castro, Jose A. Panlilio, Felicidad Vergara Vda. De Pineda, Fernando L. Vitug I, Fernando M. Vitug
II, Fernando M. Vitug III, and Faustino Tobia, and later amended to include Elena Ostrea and Feliza C. Cristobal-
Generoso as additional petitioners therein, against Bishop Erao Manalo, in his capacity as titular and spiritual head
of I.N.K. Herein petitioners Conrado Pineda, et al. never became parties thereto. Any and all orders and writs of
execution, which the respondent judge may issue in that case can, therefore, be enforced only against those parties
and not against the herein petitioners Conrado Pineda, et al. In issuing the assailed Order dated 22 April 1998,
which directed the issuance of the 2nd Alias Writ of Execution to eject non-parties (herein petitioners), the
respondent judge clearly went out of bounds and committed grave abuse of discretion.

The nature of the injunction suit Civil Case No. Q-45767 as an action in personam in the RTC remains to
be the same whether it is elevated to the CA or to this Court for review. An action in personam does not become an
action in rem just because a pronouncement confirming I.N.K.'s title to Lot 671 was made by this Court in
the Calalang decision. Final rulings may be made by this Court, as the Highest Court of the Land, in
actions in personam but such rulings are binding only as against the parties therein and not against the
whole world. Here lies another grave abuse of discretion on the part of the respondent judge when he relied on
the Calalang decision in his assailed Order dated 07 May 1998 as if it were binding against the whole world,
saying:

After evaluating the arguments of both parties, decisive on the incident is the decision
of the Supreme Court in favor of the respondent I.N.K., represented by its titular and spiritual
head Bishop Erao G. Manalo, sustaining its ownership over the subject Lot 671. This Court
could do no less but to follow and give substantial meaning to its ownership which shall
include all dominical rights by way of a Writ of Execution. To delay the issuance of such writ
is a denial of justice due the I.N.K.

As a final word, this decision shall not be misinterpreted as disturbing or modifying our ruling
in Calalang. The final ruling on I.N.K.'s ownership and title is not at all affected. Private respondent I.N.K.,
as the true and lawful owner of Lot 671 as ruled by the Court in Calalang, simply has to file the proper
action against the herein petitioners to enforce its property rights within the bounds of the law and our
rules. I.N.K.'s recourse of asking for the issuance of an alias writ of execution against the petitioners in Civil Case
No. Q-45767 and the respondent judge's orders in said case, granting I.N.K.'s prayer and enforcing the alias writ of
execution against the present petitioners, constitutes blatant disregard of very fundamental rules and must therefore
be stricken down.[54] (Emphases ours.)
 Consistent with Pineda, and as appositely recommended by the RTC-Branch 95 and the Court of Appeals in the present case,
Muozs legal remedy is to directly assail in a separate action the validity of the certificates of title of BPI Family and the spouses Chan.

G.R. No. 142676

G.R. No. 142676 is Muozs appeal of the dismissal of Civil Case No. 8286, the forcible entry case she instituted against
Samuel Go Chan and Atty. Yabut before the MeTC.

There is forcible entry or desahucio when one is deprived of physical possession of land or building by means of force,
intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth. In such cases, the possession is illegal from the beginning and the basic inquiry centers on
who has the prior possession de facto. In filing forcible entry cases, the law tells us that two allegations are mandatory for the
municipal court to acquire jurisdiction: first, the plaintiff must allege prior physical possession of the property, and second, he must
also allege that he was deprived of his possession by any of the means provided for in Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, i.e., by
force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth. It is also settled that in the resolution thereof, what is important is determining who is
entitled to the physical possession of the property. Indeed, any of the parties who can prove prior possession de facto may recover
such possession even from the owner himself since such cases proceed independently of any claim of ownership and the plaintiff
needs merely to prove prior possession de facto and undue deprivation thereof.[55]

Title is never in issue in a forcible entry case, the court should base its decision on who had prior physical possession. The
main thing to be proven in an action for forcible entry is prior possession and that same was lost through force, intimidation, threat,
strategy, and stealth, so that it behooves the court to restore possession regardless of title or ownership.[56]

We more extensively discussed in Pajuyo v. Court of Appeals[57] that:

Ownership or the right to possess arising from ownership is not at issue in an action for recovery of
possession. The parties cannot present evidence to prove ownership or right to legal possession except to prove the
nature of the possession when necessary to resolve the issue of physical possession. The same is true when the
defendant asserts the absence of title over the property. The absence of title over the contested lot is not a
ground for the courts to withhold relief from the parties in an ejectment case.

The only question that the courts must resolve in ejectment proceedings is - who is entitled to the
physical possession of the premises, that is, to the possession de facto and not to the possession de jure. It does not
even matter if a partys title to the property is questionable, or when both parties intruded into public land and their
applications to own the land have yet to be approved by the proper government agency. Regardless of the actual
condition of the title to the property, the party in peaceable quiet possession shall not be thrown out by a
strong hand, violence or terror. Neither is the unlawful withholding of property allowed. Courts will always
uphold respect for prior possession.

Thus, a party who can prove prior possession can recover such possession even against the owner
himself. Whatever may be the character of his possession, if he has in his favor prior possession in time, he
has the security that entitles him to remain on the property until a person with a better right lawfully ejects
him. To repeat, the only issue that the court has to settle in an ejectment suit is the right to physical
possession.[58] (Emphases ours.)

Based on the foregoing, we find that the RTC-Branch 88 erred in ordering the dismissal of Civil Case No. 8286 even before
completion of the proceedings before the MeTC. At the time said case was ordered dismissed by RTC-Branch 88, the MeTC had only
gone so far as holding a hearing on and eventually granting Muozs prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory
injunction.

Muoz alleges in her complaint in Civil Case No. 8286 that she had been in prior possession of the subject property since it
was turned-over to her by the sheriff on January 10, 1994, pursuant to the Alias Writ of Execution issued by the RTC-Branch 95 to
implement the final judgment in Civil Case No. Q-28580. The factual issue of who was in prior possession of the subject property
should be litigated between the parties regardless of whether or not the final judgment in Civil Case No. Q-28580 extended to the
spouses Chan. Hence, the pendency of the latter issue in Civil Case No. Q-28580 before the RTC-Branch 95 did not warrant the
dismissal of Civil Case No. 8286 before the MeTC on the ground of litis pendentia. The two cases could proceed independently of one
another.

Samuel Go Chan and Atty. Yabut aver that the spouses Chan have never lost possession of the subject property since
acquiring the same from BPI Family in 1990. This is a worthy defense to Muozs complaint for forcible entry, which Samuel Go Chan
and Atty. Yabut should substantiate with evidence in the continuation of the proceedings in Civil Case No. 8286 before the MeTC.

In addition, Civil Case No. 8286, a forcible entry case, is governed by the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure, Section 19
whereof provides:

SEC. 19. Prohibited pleadings and motions. The following pleadings, motions, or petitions shall not be
allowed in the cases covered by this Rule:

xxxx
 (g) Petition for certiorari, mandamus, or prohibition against any interlocutory order issued by the court.

The purpose of the Rule on Summary Procedure is to achieve an expeditious and inexpensive determination of cases without
regard to technical rules. Pursuant to this objective, the Rule prohibits petitions for certiorari, like a number of other pleadings, in order
to prevent unnecessary delays and to expedite the disposition of cases. [59]

Interlocutory orders are those that determine incidental matters that do not touch on the merits of the case or put an end to the
proceedings.[60] An order granting a preliminary injunction, whether mandatory or prohibitory, is interlocutory and unappealable.[61]

The writ of preliminary mandatory injunction issued by the MeTC in its Order dated May 16, 1994, directing that Muoz be
placed in possession of the subject property during the course of Civil Case No. 8286, is an interlocutory order. Samuel Go Chan and
Atty. Yabut assailed the said order before the RTC-Branch 88 via a petition forcertiorari, docketed as Civil Case No. Q-94-20632. The
RTC-Branch 88 gave due course to said petition, and not only declared the MeTC Order dated May 16, 1994 null and void, but went
further by dismissing Civil Case No. 8286.

The prohibition in Section 19(g) of the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure is plain enough. Its further exposition is
unnecessary verbiage.[62] The petition for certiorariof Samuel Go Chan and Atty. Yabut in Civil Case No. Q-94-20632 is clearly
covered by the said prohibition, thus, it should have been dismissed outright by the RTC-Branch 88.While the circumstances involved
in Muozs forcible entry case against Samuel Go Chan and Atty. Yabut are admittedly very peculiar, these are insufficient to except the
petition for certiorari of Samuel Go Chan and Atty. Yabut in Civil Case No. Q-94-20632 from the prohibition. The liberality in the
interpretation and application of the rules applies only in proper cases and under justifiable causes and circumstances. While it is true
that litigation is not a game of technicalities, it is equally true that every case must be prosecuted in accordance with the prescribed
procedure to insure an orderly and speedy administration of justice. [63]

Nonetheless, even though the peculiar circumstances extant herein do not justify the dismissal of Civil Case No. 8286, they
do require limiting pro hac vice the reliefs the MeTC may accord to Muoz in the event that she is able to successfully prove forcible
entry by Samuel Go Chan and Atty. Yabut into the subject property (i.e., that the sheriff actually turned-over to Muoz the possession of
the subject property on January 10, 1994, and that she was deprived of such possession by Samuel Go Chan and Atty. Yabut on
February 2, 1994 by means of force, intimidation, threat, strategy, and stealth). Taking into account our ruling in G.R. No. 146718 that
the final judgment in Civil Case No. Q-28580 does not extend to the spouses Chan, who were not impleaded as parties to the said case
the MeTC is precluded from granting to Muoz relief, whether preliminary or final, that will give her possession of the subject
property. Otherwise, we will be perpetuating the wrongful execution of the final judgment in Civil Case No. Q-28580. Based on the
same reason, Muoz can no longer insist on the reinstatement of the MeTC Order dated May 16, 1994 granting a preliminary mandatory
injunction that puts her in possession of the subject property during the course of the trial. Muoz though may recover damages if she is
able to prove wrongful deprivation of possession of the subject property from February 2, 1994 until the finality of this decision in G.R.
No. 146718.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, we:

(1) GRANT Emerita Muozs petition in G.R. No. 142676. We REVERSE and SET ASIDE the Decision dated July 21, 1995 and
Resolution dated March 9, 2000 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 35322, which affirmed the Orders dated June 10, 1994 and
August 5, 1994 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 88 of Quezon City in Civil Case No. Q-94-20632. We DIRECT the Metropolitan
Trial Court, Branch 33 of Quezon City to reinstate Emerita Muozs complaint for forcible entry in Civil Case No. 8286 and to resume
the proceedings only to determine whether or not Emerita Muoz was forcibly deprived of possession of the subject property from
February 2, 1994 until finality of this judgment, and if so, whether or not she is entitled to an award for damages for deprivation of
possession during the aforementioned period of time; and

(2) DENY Emerita Munozs petition in G.R. No. 146718 for lack of merit, and AFFIRM the Decision dated September 29, 2000 and
Resolution dated January 5, 2001 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 40019, which in turn, affirmed the Orders dated August
21, 1995 and October 3, 1995 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 95 of Quezon City in Civil Case No. Q-28580.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.
 SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 134209 January 24, 2006

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,

vs.
CELESTINA NAGUIAT, Respondent.

DECISION
GARCIA, J.:
Before the Court is this petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking the reversal of the Decision 1 dated May 29,
1998 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 37001 which affirmed an earlier decision2 of the Regional Trial Court at Iba,
Zambales, Branch 69 in Land Registration Case No. N-25-1.
The decision under review recites the factual backdrop, as follows:
This is an application for registration of title to four (4) parcels of land located in Panan, Botolan, Zambales, more particularly
described in the amended application filed by Celestina Naguiat on 29 December 1989 with the Regional Trial Court of Zambales,
Branch 69. Applicant [herein respondent] alleges, inter alia, that she is the owner of the said parcels of land having acquired them by
purchase from the LID Corporation which likewise acquired the same from Demetria Calderon, Josefina Moraga and Fausto Monje and
their predecessors-in-interest who have been in possession thereof for more than thirty (30) years; and that to the best of her
knowledge, said lots suffer no mortgage or encumbrance of whatever kind nor is there any person having any interest, legal or
equitable, or in possession thereof.
On 29 June 1990, the Republic of the Philippines [herein petitioner]. . . filed an opposition to the application on the ground that neither
the applicant nor her predecessors-in interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the
lands in question since 12 June 1945 or prior thereto; that the muniments of title and tax payment receipts of applicant do not constitute
competent and sufficient evidence of a bona-fide acquisition of the lands applied for or of his open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation thereof in the concept of (an) owner; that the applicants claim of ownership in fee simple on the basis of
Spanish title or grant can no longer be availed of . . .; and that the parcels of land applied for are part of the public domain belonging to
the Republic of the Philippines not subject to private appropriation.
On 15 October 1990, the lower court issued an order of general default as against the whole world, with the exception of the Office of
the Solicitor General, and proceeded with the hearing of this registration case.
After she had presented and formally offered her evidence . . . applicant rested her case. The Solicitor General, thru the Provincial
Prosecutor, interposed no objection to the admission of the exhibits. Later . . . the Provincial Prosecutor manifest (sic) that the
Government had no evidence to adduce. 3
In a decision4 dated September 30, 1991, the trial court rendered judgment for herein respondent Celestina Naguiat, adjudicating unto
her the parcels of land in question and decreeing the registration thereof in her name, thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court hereby adjudicates the parcels of land situated in Panan, Botolan, Zambales, appearing
on Plan AP-03-003447 containing an area of 3,131 square meters, appearing on Plan AP-03-003446 containing an area of 15,322
containing an area of 15,387 square meters to herein applicant Celestina T. Naguiat, of legal age, Filipino citizen, married to Rommel
Naguiat and a resident of Angeles City, Pampanga together with all the improvements existing thereon and orders and decrees
registration in her name in accordance with Act No. 496, Commonwealth Act No. 14, [should be 141] as amended, and Presidential
Decree No. 1529. This adjudication, however, is subject to the various easements/reservations provided for under pertinent laws,
presidential decrees and/or presidential letters of instructions which should be annotated/ projected on the title to be issued. And once
this decision becomes final, let the corresponding decree of registration be immediately issued. (Words in bracket added)
With its motion for reconsideration having been denied by the trial court, petitioner Republic went on appeal to the CA in CA-G.R. CV
No. 37001.
As stated at the outset hereof, the CA, in the herein assailed decision of May 29, 1998, affirmed that of the trial court, to wit:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Hence, the Republics present recourse on its basic submission that the CAs decision "is not in accordance with law, jurisprudence
and the evidence, since respondent has not established with the required evidence her title in fee simple or imperfect title in respect of
the subject lots which would warrant their registration under (P.D. 1529 or Public Land Act (C.A.) 141." In particular, petitioner
Republic faults the appellate court on its finding respecting the length of respondents occupation of the property subject of her
application for registration and for not considering the fact that she has not established that the lands in question have been declassified
from forest or timber zone to alienable and disposable property.
Public forest lands or forest reserves, unless declassified and released by positive act of the Government so that they may form part of
the disposable agricultural lands of the public domain, are not capable of private appropriation. 5 As to these assets, the rules on
confirmation of imperfect title do not apply.6 Given this postulate, the principal issue to be addressed turns on the question of whether
or not the areas in question have ceased to have the status of forest or other inalienable lands of the public domain.
Forests, in the context of both the Public Land Act 7 and the Constitution8 classifying lands of the public domain into "agricultural,
forest or timber, mineral lands and national parks," do not necessarily refer to a large tract of wooded land or an expanse covered by
dense growth of trees and underbrush. As we stated in Heirs of Amunategui 9-
A forested area classified as forest land of the public domain does not lose such classification simply because loggers or settlers have
stripped it of its forest cover. Parcels of land classified as forest land may actually be covered with grass or planted to crops by kaingin
cultivators or other farmers. "Forest lands" do not have to be on mountains or in out of the way places. xxx. The classification is merely
descriptive of its legal nature or status and does not have to be descriptive of what the land actually looks like. xxx
Under Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution,10 which embodies the Regalian doctrine, all lands of the public domain belong to the
State the source of any asserted right to ownership of land.11 All lands not appearing to be clearly of private dominion presumptively
belong to the State.12 Accordingly, public lands not shown to have been reclassified or released as alienable agricultural land or
alienated to a private person by the State remain part of the inalienable public domain. 13 Under Section 6 of the Public Land Act, the
prerogative of classifying or reclassifying lands of the public domain, i.e., from forest or mineral to agricultural and vice versa, belongs
to the Executive Branch of the government and not the court. 14 Needless to stress, the onus to overturn, by incontrovertible evidence,
the presumption that the land subject of an application for registration is alienable or disposable rests with the applicant. 15
In the present case, the CA assumed that the lands in question are already alienable and disposable. Wrote the appellate court:
The theory of [petitioner] that the properties in question are lands of the public domain cannot be sustained as it is directly against the
above doctrine. Said doctrine is a reaffirmation of the principle established in the earlier cases . . . that open, exclusive and
undisputed possession of alienable public land for period prescribed by law creates the legal fiction whereby the land, upon completion
of the requisite period, ipso jure and without the need of judicial or other sanction, ceases to be public land and becomes private
property . (Word in bracket and underscoring added.)
The principal reason for the appellate courts disposition, finding a registerable title for respondent, is her and her predecessor-in-
interests open, continuous and exclusive occupation of the subject property for more than 30 years. Prescinding from its above
assumption and finding, the appellate court went on to conclude, citing Director of Lands vs. Intermediate Appellate Court
(IAC)16 and Herico vs. DAR,17 among other cases, that, upon the completion of the requisite period of possession, the lands in question
cease to be public land and become private property.
Director of Lands, Herico and the other cases cited by the CA are not, however, winning cards for the respondent, for the simple reason
that, in said cases, the disposable and alienable nature of the land sought to be registered was established, or, at least, not put in issue.
And there lies the difference.
Here, respondent never presented the required certification from the proper government agency or official proclamation reclassifying
the land applied for as alienable and disposable. Matters of land classification or reclassification cannot be assumed. It calls for
proof.18 Aside from tax receipts, respondent submitted in evidence the survey map and technical descriptions of the lands, which,
needless to state, provided no information respecting the classification of the property. As the Court has held, however, these
documents are not sufficient to overcome the presumption that the land sought to be registered forms part of the public domain. 19
It cannot be overemphasized that unwarranted appropriation of public lands has been a notorious practice resorted to in land
registration cases.20 For this reason, the Court has made it a point to stress, when appropriate, that declassification of forest and mineral
lands, as the case may be, and their conversion into alienable and disposable lands need an express and positive act from the
government.21
The foregoing considered, the issue of whether or not respondent and her predecessor-in-interest have been in open, exclusive and
continuous possession of the parcels of land in question is now of little moment. For, unclassified land, as here, cannot be acquired by
adverse occupation or possession; occupation thereof in the concept of owner, however long, cannot ripen into private ownership and
be registered as title.22
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED and the assailed decision dated May 29, 1998 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CV No. 37001 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, respondents application for original registration of title in Land
Registration Case No. N-25-1 of the Regional Trial Court at Iba, Zambales, Branch 69, is DENIED.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.