CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

RULE 110- Sec. 2 (The complaint or information)

SALVADOR P. SOCRATES vs. SANDIGANBAYAN

FACTS: Petitioner who is the incumbent governor of Palawan, was first elected
governor of the said province in 1968 and was again reelected in both the 1971 and
1980 elections, until he was replaced by private complainant Victoriano Rodriguez
as Officer-In-Charge Governor after the EDSA Revolution in February 1986.
Subsequently, both petitioner and Rodriguez ran for governor in the 1988 elections
where the latter emerged victorious. In the 1992 synchronized national and local
elections, the two again contested the gubernatorial post; and this time, it was
petitioner who won.

At the time Rodriguez was still the OIC Governor of the province, the Provincial
Government of Palawan, as represented by Rodriguez and the Provincial Board
Members of Palawan, filed before the Office of the Tanodbayan two (2) complaints.
The first complaint charged petitioner with violation of Section 3(b) of Republic Act
No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, and the
second charged petitioner, together with several other provincial officers, with
violation of Section 3(a) and (g) of the same law.

On December 23, 1994, respondent court, without ruling on petitioners motion to

include co-principals, issued its questioned resolution granting the motion to
suspend pendente lite and ordering the suspension of petitioner as Provincial
Governor of Palawan for a period of ninety (90) days from notice.

ISSUE: Whether or not the information filed against petitioner was valid to justify
his suspension.
HELD: YES.

Section 13 of Republic Act No. 3019 provides that:

SEC. 13. Suspension and Loss of Benefits. - Any incumbent public officer against
whom any criminal prosecution under a valid information under this Act or under
Title 7, Book II of the Revised Penal Code or for any offense involving fraud upon
government or public funds or property whether as a simple or as complex offense
and in whatever stage of execution and mode of participation, is pending in court,
shall be suspended from office. Should he be convicted by final judgment, he shall
lose all retirement or gratuity benefits under any law, but if he is acquitted, he
shall be entitled to reinstatement and to the salaries and benefits which he failed to
receive during suspension, unless in the meantime administrative proceedings
have been filed against him.
This Court has ruled that under Section 13 of the anti-graft law, the suspension of
a public officer is mandatory after the validity of the information has been upheld
in a pre-suspension

hearing conducted for that purpose. This pre-suspension hearing is conducted to

determine basically the validity of the information, from which the court can have a

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basis to either suspend the accused and proceed with the trial on the merits of the
case, or withhold the suspension of the latter and dismiss the case, or correct any
part of the proceeding which impairs its validity. That hearing may be treated in the
same manner as a challenge to the validity of the information by way of a motion to
quash.
Once the information is found to be sufficient in form and substance, then the
court must issue the order of suspension as a matter of course. There are no ifs
and buts about it. This is because a preventive suspension is not a penalty. It is
not imposed as a result of judicial proceedings. In fact, if acquitted, the official
concerned shall be entitled to reinstatement and to the salaries and benefits which
he failed to receive during suspension. In view of this latter provision, the accused
elective public officer does not stand to be prejudiced by the immediate
enforcement of the suspension order in the event that the information is
subsequently declared null and void on appeal and the case dismissed as against
him. Taking into consideration the public policy involved in preventively
suspending a public officer charged under avalid information, the protection of
public interest will definitely have to prevail over the private interest of the accused.

RULE 110- Sec. 8 (Designation of the offense)

AVECILLA VS. PEOPLE

FACTS: Lourdes Rodriguez de Lacson, an employee of Litton Mills, Inc., testified

that her sister, Maria Paz, a resident of Milwaukee, Wisconsin, U.S.A., sent her a
registered letter containing a bank draft worth $400.00 (not $500.00 as alleged in
the information). She came to know about this registered letter through another
sister Carmencita Rodriguez,. Since she did not receive the registered letter with
the bank draft, Lourdes went to the Mandaluyong Post Office and inquired about it.
She was informed by the Postmaster and the teller that Registered Letter No.
247341 addressed to her was claimed on November 16, 1971 by one Antonio
Avecilla, whom they knew had been messenger of Litton Mills, Inc. for more than
two years. That Avecilla got the subject letter was shown by the registry notice duly
signed by him. 4

Lourdes filed a complaint in their office, as a result of which an investigation was

conducted by the personnel officer of Litton Knitting Mills. Antonio Avecilla
admitted in her presence that he took the said registered letter, but when she
demanded its return, he refused to do so. Hence, she filed a complaint with the
police. 5

On cross-examination, Lourdes stated that on December 23, 1971, she made an

overseas call to her sister, Maria Paz, to request her to stop the payment of the
bank draft. As a result, she was informed by Maria Paz through their sister,
Carmencita Rodriguez, that a "stop payment" order, had already been made to the
drawee bank. 6

Rosalinda Cervo, Clerk-in-charge of the registry section of Mandaluyong Post

Office, declared that on November 15, 1971, she received a letter for Mrs. Lourdes
Lacson, with a given address at "Litton Knitting Mills." She then issued the

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corresponding registry notice to the addressee which she sent through the letter
carrier. The following day, November 16, 1971, Antonio Avecilla went to the post
office to claim the registered letter. He presented the registry notice addressed to
Lourdes Lacson with her signature appearing thereon, signed it in her presence
and introduced to her a woman as Mrs. Lourdes Lacson who signed the control
book.

She further testified that inasmuch as Antonio Avecilla had been, the authorized
messenger of Litton Knitting Mills since 1969, she entrusted Registered Letter to
him. However, she got to meet the lady who seemed to be the true Mrs. Lacson
when the latter went to the post office to complain about the letter that she (Mrs.
Lacson) had not received. When shown the control book with her alleged
signatures, Mrs. Lacson repudiated the same as hers.

Subsequently, when Rosalinda Cervo informed Avecilla about Mrs. Lacson's

complaint, he declared that he had placed the letter on the table of Mrs. Lacson. 7

Federico Rivera, Sr., Postmaster of Mandaluyong, Rizal, testified that Litton Mills,
through George Litton, Sr., had previously written him a letter, authorizing one
Antonio Avecilla to accept "registered mails, i.e., checks, parcels and letters" for
their company and employees. 8 He recalled that on November 16, 1971, a
registered letter addressed to Mrs. Lourdes Lacson c/o Litton Mills was delivered to
Mr. Avecilla. 9

Antonio Avecilla declared that as messenger of Litton Hills, it was his duty to get all
the incoming and outgoing mails of both the Pasig and Mandaluyong branches of
Litton Mills, Inc. He knew the complainant, Mrs. Lacson, because the latter was his
co-employee at Litton Mills. He often mailed the letters of Mrs. Lacson for her and
would also get her mail from the post office.

On November 16, 1971, he admitted having gotten from the Mandaluyong Post
Office a registered letter addressed to Mrs. Lacson by signing the name of Mrs.
Lacson and his name on the registry receipt. Once in the office, he left said letter
on the table of Mrs. Lacson because at that time she was already out as it was past
5:00 o'clock in the afternoon. He also said that when he left the letter on the table,
nobody was in the office. 11

On July 16, 1973, the trial court rendered its decision finding accused-petitioner
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of simple theft. Petitioner appealed to Court of
Appeals by way of review but CA promulgated decision finding him guilty of
qualified theft. Petitioner elevated the case to the Supreme Court by way of the
instant petition for review on certiorari. Petitioner's allegations necessitate a
scrutiny of the information imputing to him the commission of a crime. It need not
be overly stressed that the averments in the complaint or information characterize
the crime to be prosecuted and determine the court before which the case must be
tried. What controls is not the designation of the offense but the description
thereof as alleged in the information.

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ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner was deprived of his constitutional right to be

informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him for the alleged
vagueness of the information filed.

HELD: NO. A thorough examination of the information reveals that it contains all
the essential elements of the crime of theft, to wit: (1) that there be taking of
personal property; (2) that said property belongs to another; (3) that the taking be
done with intent to gain; (4) that the taking be done without the consent of the
owner; and (5) that the taking be accomplished without the use of violence or
intimidation against persons or force upon things. 20

While it is true that petitioner could not have been "bewildered" as to the nature of
the charge against him had the information been more accurately crafted, it
nonetheless contains all the elements of the crime of theft. Thus, it is alleged
therein that petitioner, with the aid of and in conspiracy with an unidentified
woman, willfully took away Registered Letter No. 24341 belonging to Lourdes
Rodriguez de Lacson to her damage and prejudice. Although intent to gain is not
explicitly alleged in the information, it may be presumed from the allegation that
the said mail matter was unlawfully taken. 21 Since there is no allegation that the
taking was accomplished with violence or intimidation against persons or force
upon things, it is apparent that the charge is for the crime of theft rather than
robbery.

The allegation that the subject of the taking is a registered letter categorizes the
theft as a qualified rather than a simple one. This is clear from the provision of Art.
310 of the Revised Penal Code which states that qualified theft is committed if the
property stolen is mail matter. In this regard, petitioner's contention that not all
registered letters are mail matter is incorrect. Under Sec. 1945 of the Revised
Administrative Code of 1917, first class mail matter includes letters. For the greater
security of valuable mail matter, Sec. 1962 of the same Code established a registry
system "under which the senders or owners of registered matter may be
indemnified for losses thereof in the mails, the indemnity to be paid out of postal
revenues . . .

From the foregoing, it is clear that petitioner had not been deprived of his
constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation
against him. Moreover, he may be convicted of a crime and sentenced to the
corresponding penalty as long as the facts alleged in the information and proved at
the trial constitute the crime for which he is convicted although different from the
crime designated and charged in the information. 22 The allegations in the
complaint against petitioner had been established beyond reasonable doubt at the
trial. In this regard, it should be pointed out that absolute certainty of guilt is not
demanded by the law as basis for conviction of any criminal charge, but moral
certainty is required as to every proposition of proof requisite to constitute the
offense. Moral certainty convinces and satisfies the reason and conscience that a
crime has indeed been committed. This quantum of proof has been satisfied in this
case.

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RULE 110- Sec. 14 (Amendment or substitution)

PANGILINAN VS. COURT OF APPEALS

FACTS: On September 23, 1993, twelve (12) Informations for violations of Section
9,1 in relation to Section 39,2 of Presidential Decree No. 9573 were filed against
Donato Pangilinan. The accused constructed forty-six (46) dwelling units in
Barangay Mayamot, Antipolo, Rizal of which (names of complainants omitted)
acquired and occupied one (1) unit with the assurance and guarantee of said
accused that said unit was built in accordance with Pag-ibig Standards for building
works but once said complainant moved in and occupied his unit, it turned out
that this unit is obviously defective and that despite the ruling rendered by the
Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board in HLRB Case No. REM-082283-1687 to
cause necessary repairs therein, said corporation, thru its President, willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously did not comply with said ruling to the damage and
prejudice of the herein complainant.

Upon arraignment, petitioner pleaded "not guilty" to the charges. On March 14,
1994, the 7 additional Informations6 were filed. These have similar allegations as
those of the first 12 Informations except as to the names of the complainants and
as to the docket number of HLRB Case. Subsequently, on March 25, 1994, the
private prosecutor filed an Ex-Parte Omnibus Motion,7 praying inter alia that: (a)
the 7 new Informations be consolidated with the first 12 Informations, and (b) all
these 19 Informations be amended to reflect the correct time frame within which
the offenses charged were committed, which is 1981 (instead of "on or about the
15th day of August 1993"), the actual date the housing units were constructed.

Contending that the proposed amendment changing the date of the commission of
the offenses is substantial in nature, petitioner opposed the motion insofar as the
first 12 Informations are concerned as he has already entered his plea, hence not
allowed under Section 14, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure.

Finding the amendment to be merely formal, the trial court, in an Order dated
September 9, 1994, granted the omnibus motion. Aggrieved, petitioner filed a
motion for reconsideration but was denied. Petitioner filed with the Court of
Appeals a petition11 for certiorari and prohibition with application for a temporary
restraining order and a writ of preliminary injunction against Judge Mauricio M.
Rivera and the People of the Philippines. Petitioner reiterated that insofar as the
first 12 Informations are concerned, the trial court could not anymore, after his
plea, order the change of the alleged dates of the commission of the offenses
charged, this being a substantial amendment. Petitioner further asserted that the
phrase "in the vicinity of 1981" is insufficient and defective allegation since he
would not know the nature and cause of the accusations and would thereby
unduly expose him to surprises during trial.

ISSUE: Whether or not the granting of amendment in the information was proper.

HELD: YES. petitioner maintains that the questioned amendment to the 19

Informations is substantial, not merely formal. The amended phrase "in the vicinity
of 1981" is vague for being indefinite. This would prejudice his rights since "he
would not know the nature and cause of the accusations against him and would
thereby be unduly exposed to surprises during the trial." 15 Thus, insofar as the 12

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Informations are concerned, the trial court, after his plea, could no longer order
their amendments by changing the dates of the commissions of the offenses.

The deleted phrase "on or about August 15, 1993" in all the 19 original
Informations clearly refers to the date of the "construct(ion) of forty-six (46)
dwelling units" which were later found to be defective, thereby causing "damage
and prejudice" to the complainants. Consequently, petitioner, who constructed the
units, was charged for violating Section 9, in relation to Section 39, of P.D. 957.
Obviously, it is impossible to finish the construction of all the 46 units in one (1)
day, or "on or about August 15, 1993". It was but proper to amend the date in the
original Informations to "in the vicinity of 1981," considering that the housing units
were completed in 1981 as shown in the documentary proofs of completion
presented by the prosecution in its motion for the amendment of the 19
Informations.16 This fact, was never disputed by petitioner as noted by both the
trial court and the Court of Appeals.17

Verily, the amended date in the 19 Informations is not at all material to the
offenses charged because the basis thereof is not the date of the construction but
the defective construction of the 46 dwelling units. We could not conceive how such
innocuous amendment may prejudice the rights of petitioner since it would not
alter the nature of the offense charged. In fact, the subject amendment is
permissible under Section 14, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure,
which provides:

"SEC. 14. Amendment or substitution. A complaint or information may be

amended, in form or substance, without leave of court, at any time before
the accused enters his plea. After the plea and during trial, a formal
amendment may only be made with leave of court and when it can be
done without causing prejudice to the rights of the accused.

Petition denied.

RULE 111- Sec. 1 (Institution of Criminal and Civil actions)

SARMIENTO VS. COURT OF APPEALS

FACTS: Gregorio Limpin, Jr. and Antonio Apostol, doing business under the name
and style of Davao Libra Industrial Sales, filed an application for an Irrevocable
Domestic Letter of Credit with the plaintiff Bank for the amount of P495,000.00 in
favor of LS Parts Hardware and Machine Shop (herein after referred to as LS Parts)
for the purchase of assorted scrap irons. Said application was signed by defendant
Limpin and Apostol. The aforesaid application was approved, and plaintiff Bank
issued Domestic Letter of Credit No. DLC No. DVO-78-006 in favor of LS Parts for
P495,000.00. Thereafter, a Trust Receipt dated September 6, 1978, was executed
by defendant Limpin and Antonio Apostol (Exh. C). In said Trust Receipt, the
following stipulation, signed by defendant Lorenzo Sarmiento, Jr. The defendants
failed to comply with their undertaking under the Trust Receipt. A complaint for
Violation of the Trust Receipt Law was filed against the defendants before the City
Fiscals Office (Exh. L-3). Thereafter, the corresponding Information was filed
against the defendants. Defendant Lorenzo Sarmiento, Jr. was, however, dropped
from the Information while defendant Gregorio Limpin, Jr. was convicted "The

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defendants claim that they cannot be held liable as the 825 tons of assorted scrap
iron, subject of the trust receipt agreement, were lost when the vessel transporting
them sunk, and that said scrap iron were delivered to Davao Libra Industrial
Sales, a business concern over which they had no interest whatsoever.

After trial, the lower court rendered judgment in favor of herein private respondent
Associated Banking Corporation. They appealed to CA but denied. Hence, this
petition to the Court. Among their assigned error is that the respondent court CA in
its aforequoted ruling had departed from the applicable basic principle and
procedure to the instant civil case embodying the offended partys (associated bank)
claim for the civil liability of p495,000.00, not having been expressly reserved by it,
has been not only impliedly, but in fact expressly instituted already in criminal
case no. 14,126, the information for which had been filed ahead and the
proceedings conducted prior to the present civil case before the same regional trial
court of Davao city is procedurally barred.

ISSUE: Whether or not the filing of criminal case without reservation to file later a
civil case is a violation under Sec. 1 RULE 111 of Rules in criminal procedure.

HELD: NO. Petitioners claim that private respondents right to institute separately
the civil action for the recovery of civil liability is already barred on the ground that
the same was not expressly reserved in the criminal action earlier filed against said
respondent.

Pertinent to this issue is the then prevailing Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on
Criminal Procedure. Section 1 thereof provides:

"Section 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. When a criminal action

is instituted, the civil action for the recovery of civil liability is impliedly
instituted with the criminal action, unless the offended party waives the civil
action, reserves his right to institute it separately, or institutes the civil
action prior to the criminal action.

"Such civil action includes recovery of indemnity under the Revised Penal
Code, and damages under Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code of
the Philippines arising from the same act or omission of the accused.

"A waiver of any of the civil actions extinguishes the others. The institution
of, or the reservation of the right to file, any of said civil actions separately
waives the others.

"The reservation of the right to institute the separate civil actions shall be
made before the prosecution starts to present its evidence and under
circumstances affording the offended party a reasonable opportunity to
make such reservation.

"x x x."

Under the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, effective December 1, 2000,9 the
same Section of the same Rule provides:

"Section 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. -- (a) When a criminal

action is instituted, the civil action for the recovery of civil liability arising

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from the offense charged shall be deemed instituted with the criminal action
unless the offended party waives the civil action, reserves the right to
institute it separately or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal
action.

"The reservation of the right to institute separately the civil action shall be
made before the prosecution starts presenting its evidence and under
circumstances affording the offended party a reasonable opportunity to
make such reservation.

"x x x."

While a reading of the aforequoted provisions shows that the offended party is
required to make a reservation of his right to institute a separate civil action,
jurisprudence instructs that such reservation may not necessarily be express but
may be implied10 which may be inferred not only from the acts of the offended party
but also from acts other than those of the latter.

In the present case, private respondents complaint against petitioners was based
on the failure of the latter to comply with their obligation as spelled out in the Trust
Receipt executed by them.20 This breach of obligation is separate and distinct from
any criminal liability for "misuse and/or misappropriation of goods or proceeds
realized from the sale of goods, documents or instruments released under trust
receipts", punishable under Section 13 of the Trust Receipts Law (P.D. 115) in
relation to Article 315(1), (b) of the Revised Penal Code. Being based on an
obligation ex contractu and not ex delicto, the civil action may proceed independently
of the criminal proceedings instituted against petitioners regardless of the result of
the latter.

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