ELEUTERIO RIVERA vs.
ROBERT RAMIREZ and RAYMOND RAMIREZ ISSUES and RULING:
FACTS:
The spouses Adolfo Ramirez (Adolfo) and Rosita Rivera (Rosita) were
married in 1942. Their only child died in infancy. They acquired during
their lifetime the Sta. Teresita General Hospital and other properties.
Rosita died in September 1990, followed by her husband Adolfo in
December 1993.
Petitioner Eleuterio P. Rivera (Eleuterio) filed a petition for issuance of
letters of administration with covering the estate of Rosita, who allegedly
died without a will and with no direct ascendants or
descendants.1 Eleuterio claimed that he was Rositas nephew, being the
son of her brother Federico.
He filed in his capacity as administrator a motion with the court to compel
the examination and production of documents relating to properties
believed to be a part of her estate, foremost of which was the Sta.
Teresita General Hospital that respondent Robert Ramirez (Robert) had
been managing.
Robert claims, together with Raymond Ramirez (Raymond) and Lydia
Ramirez (Lydia), that they were children of Adolfo by another woman.
Robert opposed the issuance of the subpoena.
administrator Eleuterio moved for the joint settlement in the same case of
the estates of Rosita and her husband, Adolfo6 considering that the
spouses properties were conjugal. Eleuterio expressed willingness to co-
administer the late spouses estate with Adolfos heirs, namely, Raymond,
Robert, and Lydia Ramirez. Robert agreed to the joint settlement of the
estate of the deceased spouses but insisted that the court also probate the
deceased Adolfos will of October 10, 1990 which Robert presented.
Eleuterio - reiterated his motion to compel examination and production of
the hospitals documents in Roberts possession.
RTC granted the administrators motion and ordered Robert to bring to
court the books of account, financial statements, and other documents
relating to the operations of the Sta. Teresita General Hospital. The RTC
also declined to inhibit Atty. Pacheo as Raymonds counsel. Robert moved
to quash the subpoena on the grounds that the documents belonged to the
hospital, which had a distinct personality; that the hospital did not form
part of Rositas estate; and that Eleuterio, as administrator only of Rositas
estate, had no right to inspect and have access to Adolfos estate. But the
RTC denied Roberts motion on June 19, 2007.
CA annulled RTCs decision regarding the production and examination of
the hospitals documents. Essentially, the CA ruled that Eleuterio and
Rositas other collateral relatives were not her heirs since she had an
adopted child in Raymond and that, consequently, Eleuterio, et al. had no
standing to request production of the hospitals documents or to institute
the petition for the settlement of her estate. The CA affirmed, however,
the non-inhibition of Atty. Pacheo from the case. Eleuterios motion for
reconsideration having been denied, he filed the present petition for
review.
1. Whether Eleuterio and his relatives were not Rositas heirs and, therefore, had
no right to institute the petition for the settlement of her estate or to seek the
production and examination of the hospitals documents.
Whether or not the late Rosita had judicially adopted Raymond as her child is a
question of fact that had neither been considered nor passed upon by the RTC in a
direct challenge to the claim of Eleuterio and Rositas other collateral relatives that
they have the right to inherit from her. The relevant issue before the RTC was only
whether or not the duly appointed administrator of Rositas estate had the right to
the production and examination of the documents believed to be in Roberts
possession. Indeed, one of the reasons Robert brought the special civil action of
certiorari before the CA is that Eleuterio had no right to inspect the requested
documents and have access to Adolfos estate when Eleuterios authority as
administrator extended only to Rositas estate.
The Court understands the CAs commendable desire to minimize multiple appeals.
But the issues regarding the late Rositas supposed judicial adoption of Raymond as
her child and the consequent absence of right on the part of Eleuterio, et al. to file
a petition for the settlement of Rositas estate were never raised and properly tried
before the RTC. Consequently, the CA gravely abused its discretion in adjudicating
such issues and denying Eleuterio and his relatives their right to be heard on them.
2. Whether Eleuterio, et al. had no standing to subpoena the specified documents
in Roberts possession.
As for the right of the administrator of Rositas estate to the production and
examination of the specified documents believed to be in Roberts possession,
Section 6, Rule 87 of the Rules of Court provides that these can be allowed based
on the administrators belief that the person named in the request for subpoena has
documents in his possession that tend to show the decedents right to real or
personal property.
The production and examination is nothing to be afraid of since the intestate court
has no authority to decide who the decedents heirs are in connection with such
incident which is confined to the examination of documents which may aid the
administrator in determining properties believed to belong to the decedents
estate. What is more, that court has no authority to decide the question of whether
certain properties belong to the estate or to the person sought to be examined. 11
In fact, if after the examination the court has good reason to believe that the
person examined is in possession of properties that belong to the deceased, the
administrator cannot detain the property. He has to file an ordinary action for
recovery of the properties.12 The purpose of the production and examination of
documents is to elicit information or secure evidence from persons suspected of
having possession of, or knowledge of properties suspected of belonging to the
estate of the deceased. The procedure is inquisitorial in nature, designed as an
economical and efficient mode of discovering properties of the estate. 13
RODOLFO S. AGUILAR v. EDNA G. SIASAT
FACTS:
Spouses Alfredo Aguilar and Candelaria Siasat-Aguilar (the Aguilar spouses)
died, intestate and without debts, on August 26, 1983 and February 8,
1994, respectively. Included in their estate are two parcels of land (herein
subject properties) covered by Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. T-25896
and T-(15462) 1070 of the Registries of Deeds of Bago and Bacolod (the
subject titles).
petitioner Rodolfo S. Aguilar filed with the RTC of Bacolod City a civil case
for mandatory injunction with damages against respondent Edna G. Siasat;
alleged that petitioner is the only son and sole surviving heir of the Aguilar
spouses; that he (petitioner) discovered that the subject titles were
missing, and thus he suspected that someone from the Siasat clan could
have stolen the same; that he executed affidavits of loss of the subject
titles and filed the same with the Registries of Deeds of Bacolod and Bago;
that on June 22, 1996, he filed before the Bacolod RTC a Petition for the
issuance of second owners copy of Certificate of Title No. T-25896, which
respondent opposed; and that during the hearing of the said Petition,
respondent presented the two missing owners duplicate copies of the
subject titles. Petitioner thus prayed for mandatory injunctive relief, in
that respondent be ordered to surrender to him the owners duplicate
copies of the subject titles in her possession; and that damages, attorneys
fees, and costs of suit be awarded to him.
In her Answer, respondent claimed that petitioner is not the son and sole
surviving heir of the Aguilar spouses, but a mere stranger who was raised
by the Aguilar spouses out of generosity and kindness of heart; that
petitioner is not a natural or adopted child of the Aguilar spouses; that
since Alfredo Aguilar predeceased his wife, Candelaria Siasat-Aguilar, the
latter inherited the conjugal share of the former; that upon the death of
Candelaria Siasat-Aguilar, her brothers and sisters inherited her estate as
she had no issue; and that the subject titles were not stolen, but entrusted
to her for safekeeping by Candelaria Siasat-Aguilar, who is her aunt.
During trial, petitioner testified and affirmed his relationship to the
Aguilar spouses as their son. To prove filiation, he presented the following
documents, among others:
1. His school records at the Don J.A. Araneta Elementary School, Purok No. 2,
Bacolod-Murcia Milling Company (BMMC), Bacolod City (Exhibit C and
submarkings), wherein it is stated that Alfredo Aguilar is petitioners
parent;chanrobleslaw
2. His Individual Income Tax Return (Exhibit F), which indicated that
Candelaria Siasat-Aguilar is his mother;chanrobleslaw
3. Alfredo Aguilars Social Security System (SSS) Form E-1 dated October 10,
1957 (Exhibit G), a public instrument subscribed and made under oath by
Alfredo Aguilar during his employment with BMMC, which bears his
signature and thumb marks and indicates that petitioner, who was born on
March 5, 1945, is his son and dependent;chanrobleslaw
4. Alfredo Aguilars Information Sheet of Employment with BMMC dated
October 29, 1954 (Exhibit L), indicating that petitioner is his
son;chanrobleslaw
5. Petitioners Certificate of Marriage to Luz Abendan (Exhibit M), where it
is declared that the Aguilar spouses are his parents; and
6. Letter of the BMMC Secretary (Exhibit O) addressed to a BMMC supervisor
introducing petitioner as Alfredo Aguilars son and recommending him for
employment.
7. Certification dated January 27, 1996 issued by the Bacolod City Civil
Registry to the effect that the record of births during the period 1945 to
1946 were all destroyed by nature, hence no true copies of the
Certificate of Live Birth of petitioner could be issued as requested (Exhibit
Q).9
Petitioner also offered the testimonies of his wife, Luz Marie Abendan-
Aguilar (Abendan-Aguilar), and Ester Aguilar-Pailano (Aguilar-Pailano), his
aunt and sister of Alfredo Aguilar. Abendan-Aguilar confirmed petitioners
identity, and she testified that petitioner is the son of the Aguilar spouses
and that during her marriage to petitioner, she lived with the latter in the
Aguilar spouses conjugal home built on one of the subject properties.
On the other hand, 81-year old Aguilar-Pailano testified that she is the
sister of Alfredo Aguilar; that the Aguilar spouses have only one son
herein petitioner
For her evidence, respondent testified among others that she is a retired
teacher; that she does not know petitioner very well, but only heard his
name from her aunt Candelaria Siasat-Aguilar; that she is not related by
consanguinity or affinity to petitioner; that she attended to Candelaria
Siasat-Aguilar while the latter was under medication in a hospital until her
death; that Candelaria Siasat-Aguilars hospital and funeral expenses were
paid for by Nancy Vingno; that Candelaria Siasat-Aguilar executed an
affidavit to the effect that she had no issue and that she is the sole heir to
her husband Alfredo Aguilars estate; that she did not steal the subject
titles, but that the same were entrusted to her by Candelaria Siasat-
Aguilar; that a prior planned sale of the subject properties did not push
through because when petitioners opinion thereto was solicited, he
expressed disagreement as to the agreed price.
Respondent likewise offered the testimony of Aurea Siasat-Nicavera
(Siasat-Nicavera), 74 years old, who stated that the Aguilar spouses were
married on June 22, 1933 in Miag-ao, Iloilo; that she is the sister of
Candelaria Siasat-Aguilar; that she does not know petitioner, although she
admitted that she knew a certain Rodolfo whose nickname was Mait;
that petitioner is not the son of the Aguilar spouses; and that Alfredo
Aguilar has a sister named Ester Aguilar-
Pailano.12chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
RTC: no solid evidence attesting to the fact that plaintiff herein is either a
biological son or a legally adopted one was ever presented. Neither was a
certificate of live birth of plaintiff ever introduced confirming his
biological relationship as a son to the deceased spouses Alfredo and
Candelaria S. Aguilar. As a matter of fact, in the affidavit of Candelaria S.
Aguilar (Exhibit 2) she expressly announced under oath that Alfredo and
she have no issue and that she is the sole heir to the estate of Alfredo is
 (sic) concrete proof that plaintiff herein was never a son by consanguinity
nor a legally adopted one of the deceased spouses Alfredo and Candelaria
Aguilar; DISMISSED the case.
CA: AFFIRMED RTCs decision. The exhibits relied upon by plaintiff-
appellant to establish his filiation with the deceased spouses Aguilar
deserve scant consideration by this Court. The Elementary School
Permanent Record of plaintiff-appellant cannot be considered as proof of
filiation.
Issues
Whether petitioner has sufficiently proven his filiation with the decedent.
RULING:
Thus, applying the foregoing pronouncement to the instant case, it must be
concluded that petitioner who was born on March 5, 1945, or during the marriage
of Alfredo Aguilar and Candelaria Siasat-Aguilar28 and before their respective
deaths29 has sufficiently proved that he is the legitimate issue of the Aguilar
spouses. As petitioner correctly argues, Alfredo Aguilars SSS Form E-1 (Exhibit
G) satisfies the requirement for proof of filiation and relationship to the Aguilar
spouses under Article 172 of the Family Code; by itself, said document constitutes
an admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten
instrument and signed by the parent concerned.
Petitioner has shown that he cannot produce his Certificate of Live Birth since all
the records covering the period 1945-1946 of the Local Civil Registry of Bacolod
City were destroyed, which necessitated the introduction of other documentary
evidence particularly Alfredo Aguilars SSS Form E-1 (Exhibit G) to prove no right to inherit from her aunt Candelaria Siasat-Aguilars estate, since succession
filiation. It was erroneous for the CA to treat said document as mere proof of open
and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child under the second
paragraph of Article 172 of the Family Code; it is evidence of filiation under the
first paragraph thereof, the same being an express recognition in a public
instrument.
2) Where the private handwritten instrument is accompanied by other relevant and
competent evidence, it suffices that the claim of filiation therein be shown to have
been made and handwritten by the acknowledging parent as it is merely
corroborative of such other evidence.
This case should not have been so difficult for petitioner if only he obtained a copy
of his Certificate of Live Birth from the National Statistics Office (NSO), since the
Bacolod City Civil Registry copy thereof was destroyed. He would not have had to
go through the trouble of presenting other documentary evidence; the NSO copy
would have sufficed. This fact is not lost on petitioner; the Certification dated
January 27, 1996 issued by the Bacolod City Civil Registry (Exhibit Q) contained
just such an advice for petitioner to proceed to the Office of the Civil Registrar
General at the NSO in Manila to secure a copy of his Certificate of Live Birth, since
for every registered birth in the country, a copy of the Certificate of Live Birth is
submitted to said office.
As to petitioners argument that respondent has no personality to impugn his
legitimacy and cannot collaterally attack his legitimacy, and that the action to
impugn his legitimacy has already prescribed pursuant to Articles 170 and 171 of
the Family Code, the Court has held before that
Article 26331 refers to an action to impugn the legitimacy of a child, to assert and
prove that a person is not a mans child by his wife. However, the present case is
not one impugning petitioners legitimacy. Respondents are asserting not merely
that petitioner is not a legitimate child of Jose, but that she is not a child of Jose
at all.32
Finally, if petitioner has shown that he is the legitimate issue of the Aguilar
spouses, then he is as well heir to the latters estate. Respondent is then left with
pertains, in the first place, to the descending direct line.
SC reversed and set aside CAs decision.

To repeat what was stated in De Jesus, filiation may be proved by an admission of

legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument and
signed by the parent concerned, and such due recognition in any authentic writing
is, in itself, a consummated act of acknowledgment of the child, and no further
court action is required.

In view of the pronouncements herein made, the Court sees it fit to adopt the
following rules respecting the requirement of affixing the signature of the
acknowledging parent in any private handwritten instrument wherein an admission
of filiation of a legitimate or illegitimate child is made:

1) Where the private handwritten instrument is the lone piece of evidence

submitted to prove filiation, there should be strict compliance with the
requirement that the same must be signed by the acknowledging parent; and
SPS. BOLANOS vs. BERNARTE (A. 888: LCD)
FACTS:
Subject of the controversy is a 238-square-meter lot, designated as Lot No.
1-P, and situated in Poblacion, Rapu-Rapu, Albay. Petitioner-spouses
Mariano and Emma Bolaos (petitioner-spouses) purchased it from Cresencia
Zuiga-Echague (Cresencia) on June 20, 2001. The sale was registered in the
name of petitioner-spouses before the Municipal Assessors Office in Rapu-
Rapu, Albay.
Respondents Roscef Zuiga Bernarte, Claro Zuiga, Perfecto Zuiga, and
Ceferina Zuiga-Garcia (Roscef, et al.) filed a complaint[4] for declaration of
partial nullity of deeds of transfer and sale with prayer for preliminary
injunction against petitioner-spouses, Flavia Zuiga (Flavia), and Cresencia
(RTC).
The complaint, in essence, alleged that: Roscef, et al., and Flavia and
Cresencia are legitimate half-blood brothers and sisters, all children of the
deceased Roman Zuiga, Sr. (Roman) from his second and first marriages,
respectively; during his lifetime, Roman owned a residential land with
improvements, identified as Lot No. 1-P per Tax Declaration No. 99-001-
01704[5] for the year 2000; Roman had the lot declared for taxation
purposes in the name of Flavia, Sisters and Brothers, per a Sworn
Statement[6] he executed in 1973, and filed with the then Assessors Office,
which issued Tax Declaration No. 2975;[7] Roman died on August 9, 1976,
and his heirs did not settle or partition the subject property; on June 20,
2001, Flavia, without authority from the co-owners of the lot, executed a
notarized Deed of Absolute Sale[8] over it in favor of Cresencia; Cresencia,
in turn, also without authority from the said co-owners, executed on the
same day a notarized Deed of Absolute Sale[9] in favor of petitioner-
spouses; on the basis of these notarized deeds, Tax Declaration No. 99-
001-01703[10] was issued to petitioner-spouses as sole declared owners of
Lot No. 1-P.
In her answer with cross-claim,[11] Flavia denied the genuineness and due
execution of the Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of Cresencia, and alleged
that the subsequent sale made by the latter was valid and effective only as
to her aliquot share, but null and void as to the rest of the property.
In her own answer,[12] Cresencia denied the material allegations of the
complaint, and alleged that Flavia was the sole owner of Lot No. 1-P, thus
making her a buyer and seller in good faith and for value. Cresencia also
averred that Roscef, et al., as children of Roman by his second wife, do
not have any share in the subject property since Roman had already orally
partitioned it during his lifetime.
For their part, petitioner-spouses alleged that the subject property was
owned in common by Flavia, Cresencia, and their full-blood brothers and
sisters only, and that, later on, Flavia acquired the entire lot. Flavia then
sold it to Cresencia, who, in turn, sold it to petitioner-spouses. They
asserted that they had acquired Lot No. 1-P in good faith and for value,
without any knowledge of the adverse claim of Roscef, et al. or that the
property did not fully belong to Cresencia.[13]
RTC: the property interest acquired by the spouses Mariano and Emma
Bolaos over subject property is limited only to the ideal shares belonging
to Flavia A. Zuiga and Cresencia Zuiga-Echague constitutive of an ideal
share equivalent to 2/11 portion of such lot, and hereby partially nullifying
the two deeds of absolute sale both dated 20 June 2001 over Lot No. 1-P
exceeding the ideal share of 1/11 for each one of the sellers Flavia A.
Zuiga and Cresencia Zuiga-Echague AFFIRMED by the CA and SC.
RULING:
petitioner-spouses contention, i.e., that the subject property really belonged to
Romans first spouse Flavia as her paraphernal property, cannot be sustained. This
position was anchored from the testimony of Josefina[19] that the lot was actually
bought by her maternal grandfather and given to her mother Flavia. Josefinas
declarations before the RTC do not deserve merit and weight, particularly in light
of her statement that she was told so by her elders way back in 1923, when at that
time she was only around three (3) years of age.[20] Besides, such a pronouncement
was not supported by any proof, save for the lame excuse that the deed of sale
showing the said transaction was allegedly lost and destroyed by a typhoon at a
time when she was already married, claiming that she was then the custodian of
the supposed document. Evidence, to be worthy of credit, must not only proceed
from the mouth of a credible witness but must be credible in itself. [21] In other
words, it must be natural, reasonable, and probable to warrant belief. The standard
as to the truth of human testimony is its conformity to human knowledge,
observation, and experience; the courts cannot heed otherwise.[22]Regretfully,
petitioner-spouses allegations do not measure up to the yardstick of verity.
Considering that Roman died on August 9, 1976, the provisions of the Civil Code on
succession, then the law in force, should apply, particularly Articles 979 and
980, viz.
Art. 979. Legitimate children and their descendants
succeed the parents and other ascendants, without distinction as
to sex or age, and even if they should come from different
marriages. x x x.
Art. 980. The children of the deceased shall always
inherit from him in their own right, dividing the inheritance in
equal shares.
Thus, the RTC correctly ruled that Lot No. 1-P rightfully belongs to the 11
children of Roman, seven (7) from his first marriage with Flavia and four (4) from
his second marriage with Ceferina, in equal shares. As there was no partition among
Romans children, the lot was owned by them in common. And inasmuch as Flavia
did not successfully repudiate her sale of her aliquot share to Cresencia, the
transfer stands as valid and effective. Consequently, what Cresencia sold to
petitioner spouses was her own share and Flavias share in the property that she
acquired by virtue of the notarized deed of sale, which is only 2/11 of Lot No. 1-
P. Therefore, the restitution of the property in excess of that portion by petitioner
spouses is clearly warranted.
Indeed, the findings of the trial court, with respect to the operative facts
and the credibility of witnesses, especially when affirmed by the appellate court,
are accorded the highest degree of deference and respect by this Court, except
when: (1) the findings of a trial court are grounded entirely on speculations,
surmises, or conjectures; (2) a lower courts inference from its factual findings is
manifestly mistaken, absurd, or impossible; (3) there is grave abuse of discretion in
the appreciation of facts; (4) the findings of the court go beyond the issues of the
case or fail to notice certain relevant facts which, if properly considered, will
justify a different conclusion; (5) there is misapprehension of facts; and (6) the
findings of fact are conclusions without mention of the specific evidence on which
they are based are premised on the absence of evidence, or are contradicted by
evidence on record.[24] Notably, none of these exceptions is attendant in this case.
GERARDO B. CONCEPCION vs. COURT OF APPEALS and MA. THERESA ALMONTE
FACTS:
The child, by reason of his mental and physical immaturity, needs special
safeguard and care, including appropriate legal protection before as well
as after birth.1 In case of assault on his rights by those who take advantage
of his innocence and vulnerability, the law will rise in his defense with the
single-minded purpose of upholding only his best interests.
Petitioner Gerardo B. Concepcion and private respondent Ma. Theresa
Almonte, and a child named Jose Gerardo. Gerardo and Ma. Theresa were
married on December 29, 1989.2 After their marriage, they lived with Ma.
Theresas parents in Fairview, Quezon City.3 Almost a year later, on
December 8, 1990, Ma. Theresa gave birth to Jose Gerardo.
Gerardo and Ma. Theresas relationship turned out to be short-lived,
however. On December 19, 1991, Gerardo filed a petition to have his
marriage to Ma. Theresa annulled on the ground of bigamy.5 He alleged
that nine years before he married Ma. Theresa on December 10, 1980, she
had married one Mario Gopiao, which marriage was never
annulled.6 Gerardo also found out that Mario was still alive and was
residing in Loyola Heights, Quezon City.7
Ma. Theresa did not deny marrying Mario when she was twenty years old.
She, however, averred that the marriage was a sham and that she never
lived with Mario at all.8
trial court - Ma. Theresas marriage to Mario was valid and subsisting when
she married Gerardo; annulled her marriage to the latter for being
bigamous; Jose Gerard is an illegitimate child; custody of the child was
awarded to Ma. Theresa while Gerardo was granted visitation rights; CA
affirmed "best interest of the child" policy.
revesed on MR and ruled that Jose Gerardo was not the son of Ma.
Theresa by Gerardo but by Mario during her first marriage: We are not
unaware of the movants argument that various evidence exist that
appellee and the appellant have judicially admitted that the minor is their
natural child. But, in the same vein, We cannot overlook the fact that
Article 167 of the Family Code mandates: "The child shall be considered
legitimate although the mother may have declared against its legitimacy or
may have been sentenced as an adulteress." Thus, implicit from the above
provision is the fact that a minor cannot be deprived of his/her legitimate
status on the bare declaration of the mother and/or even much less, the
supposed father. In fine, the law and only the law determines who are
the legitimate or illegitimate children for ones legitimacy or
illegitimacy cannot ever be compromised. Not even the birth certificate
of the minor can change his status for the information contained therein
are merely supplied by the mother and/or the supposed father. It should
be what the law says and not what a parent says it is.
ISSUE: Status of the child.
RULING:
Article 164 of the Family Code is clear. A child who is conceived or born during the
marriage of his parents is legitimate.
As a guaranty in favor of the child21 and to protect his status of legitimacy, Article
167 of the Family Code provides: Article 167. The child shall be considered
legitimate although the mother may have declared against its legitimacy or may
have been sentenced as an adulteress. The law requires that every reasonable
presumption be made in favor of legitimacy.
Gerardo invokes Article 166 (1)(b)24 of the Family Code. He cannot. He has no
standing in law to dispute the status of Jose Gerardo. Only Ma. Theresas husband
Mario or, in a proper case,25 his heirs, who can contest the legitimacy of the child
Jose Gerardo born to his wife.26 Impugning the legitimacy of a child is a strictly
personal right of the husband or, in exceptional cases, his heirs.27 Since the
marriage of Gerardo and Ma. Theresa was void from the very beginning, he never
became her husband and thus never acquired any right to impugn the legitimacy of
her child. Here, during the period that Gerardo and Ma. Theresa were living
together in Fairview, Quezon City, Mario was living in Loyola Heights which is also
in Quezon City. Fairview and Loyola Heights are only a scant four kilometers apart.
Not only did both Ma. Theresa and Mario reside in the same city but also that no
evidence at all was presented to disprove personal access between them.
Considering these circumstances, the separation between Ma. Theresa and her
lawful husband, Mario, was certainly not such as to make it physically impossible
for them to engage in the marital act.
Sexual union between spouses is assumed. Evidence sufficient to defeat the
assumption should be presented by him who asserts the contrary. There is no such
evidence here. Thus, the presumption of legitimacy in favor of Jose Gerardo, as the
issue of the marriage between Ma. Theresa and Mario, stands.
1. An assertion by the mother against the legitimacy of her child cannot affect
the legitimacy of a child born or conceived within a valid marriage.
2. even assuming the truth of her statement, it does not mean that there was
never an instance where Ma. Theresa could have been together with Mario or
that there occurred absolutely no intercourse between them. All she said was
that she never lived with Mario. She never claimed that nothing ever
happened between them. Telling is the fact that both of them were living in
Quezon City during the time material to Jose Gerardos conception and birth.
Far from foreclosing the possibility of marital intimacy, their proximity to each
other only serves to reinforce such possibility. Thus, the impossibility of
physical access was never established beyond reasonable doubt.
3. A mother has no right to disavow a child because maternity is never
uncertain.38 Hence, Ma. Theresa is not permitted by law to question Jose
Gerardos legitimacy.
4. for reasons of public decency and morality, a married woman cannot say that
she had no intercourse with her husband and that her offspring is
illegitimate.39 The proscription is in consonance with the presumption in favor
of family solidarity. It also promotes the intention of the law to lean toward
the legitimacy of children.40
Moreover, the law itself establishes the status of a child from the moment of his
birth. Although a record of birth or birth certificate may be used as primary
evidence of the filiation of a child, as the status of a child is determined by the law
itself, proof of filiation is necessary only when the legitimacy of the child is being
questioned, or when the status of a child born after 300 days following the
termination of marriage is sought to be established.45
Here, the status of Jose Gerardo as a legitimate child was not under attack as it
could not be contested collaterally and, even then, only by the husband or, in
extraordinary cases, his heirs. Hence, the presentation of proof of legitimacy in this
case was improper and uncalled for.
In addition, a record of birth is merely prima facie evidence of the facts contained
therein.46 As prima facie evidence, the statements in the record of birth may be
rebutted by more preponderant evidence. It is not conclusive evidence with respect
to the truthfulness of the statements made therein by the interested
parties.47 Between the certificate of birth which is prima facie evidence of Jose
Gerardos illegitimacy and the quasi-conclusive presumption of law (rebuttable only
by proof beyond reasonable doubt) of his legitimacy, the latter shall prevail.
Having only his best interests in mind, we uphold the presumption of his legitimacy.
As a legitimate child, Jose Gerardo shall have the right to bear the surnames of his
father Mario and mother Ma. Theresa, in conformity with the provisions of the Civil
Code on surnames.50 A persons surname or family name identifies the family to
which he belongs and is passed on from parent to child. 51 Hence, Gerardo cannot
impose his surname on Jose Gerardo who is, in the eyes of the law, not related to
him in any way.
In case of annulment or declaration of absolute nullity of marriage, Article 49 of the
Family Code grants visitation rights to a parent who is deprived of custody of his
children. Such visitation rights flow from the natural right of both parent and child
to each others company. There being no such parent-child relationship between
them, Gerardo has no legally demandable right to visit Jose Gerardo.
Our laws seek to promote the welfare (best interest) of the child. This is embodied
in Article 8 of PD 603, otherwise known as the Child and Youth Welfare Code and
Article 3 (1) of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of a Child of which the
Philippines is a signatory.The State as parens patriae affords special protection to
children from abuse, exploitation and other conditions prejudicial to their
development. It is mandated to provide protection to those of tender
years.52 Through its laws, the State safeguards them from every one, even their own
parents, to the end that their eventual development as responsible citizens and
members of society shall not be impeded, distracted or impaired by family
acrimony. This is especially significant where, as in this case, the issue concerns
their filiation as it strikes at their very identity and lineage.
MILAGROS JOAQUINO a.k.a. MILAGROS J. REYES vs.LOURDES REYES, MERCEDES,
MANUEL, MIRIAM and RODOLFO JR. -- all surnamed REYES
FACTS (as established by the trial court; there is separate set of facts on
petitioners complaint discussed in the full case):
Lourdes Reyes was legally married to Rodolfo Reyes on January 3, 1947 in
Manila. They have four children, namely: Mercedes, Manuel, Miriam and
Rodolfo Jr., all surnamed Reyes and co-[respondents] in this case. Rodolfo
Reyes died on September 12, 1981. At the time of his death, Rodolfo Reyes
was living with his common-law wife, Milagros Joaquino, x x x with whom
she begot three (3) children namely: Jose Romillo, Imelda May and
Charina, all surnamed Reyes.
During his lifetime, Rodolfo Reyes worked with Marsman and Company and
later transferred to Warner Barnes & Co., where he assumed the position
of Vice-President [Comptroller] until he retired on September 30, 1980. His
monthly salary at Warner Barnes & Co. was P15,000.00 x x x and upon his
separation or retirement from said company, Rodolfo Reyes received a
lump sum of P315,011.79 in full payment and settlement of his separation
and retirement benefits.
During the common-law relationship of Rodolfo Reyes and [petitioner]
Milagros Joaquino and while living together, they decided to buy the house
and lot situated at No. 12 Baghdad Street, Phase 3, BF Homes, Paraaque,
Metro Manila. A Deed of Absolute Sale dated July 12, 1979 was executed in
favor of [petitioner] Milagros Joaquino and Transfer Certificate of Title No.
S-90293 covering the said property was issued in the name of [petitioner
only] on July 20, 1979.
To secure the finances with which to pay the purchase price of the
property in the amount of P140,000.00, [petitioner] executed on July 20,
1979, a Special Power of Attorney in favor of Rodolfo A. Reyes for the
latter, as attorney-in-fact, to secure a loan from the Commonwealth
Insurance Company. An application for mortgage loan was filed by Rodolfo
Reyes with the Commonwealth Insurance Company and a Real Estate
Mortgage Contract was executed as collateral to the mortgage loan. The
loan was payable in ten (10) years with a monthly amortization
of P1,166.67. The monthly amortizations were paid by Rodolfo Reyes and
after his death, the balance of P109,797.64 was paid in full to the
Commonwealth Insurance by the Philam Life Insurance Co. as insurer of
the deceased Rodolfo A. Reyes."
Trial Court granted the complaint
Court of Appeals - the property had been paid out of the conjugal funds of
Rodolfo and Lourdes because the monthly amortizations for the loan, as
well as the premiums for the life insurance policy that paid for the balance
thereof, came from his salaries and earnings. Like the trial court, it found
no sufficient proof that petitioner was financially capable of buying the
disputed property, or that she had actually contributed her own exclusive
funds to pay for it. Hence, it ordered her to surrender possession of the
property to the respective estates of the spouses.
The appellate court, however, held that the trial court should not have
resolved the issue of the filiation and the successional rights of petitioners
children. Such issues, it said, were not properly cognizable in an ordinary
civil action for reconveyance and damages and were better ventilated in a
probate or special proceeding instituted for the purpose.
ISSUES and RULING:
1) the nature of the house and lot on Baghdad Street (BF Homes Paraaque, Metro
Manila)
As to the facts, it is undisputed that the deceased Rodolfo Reyes was legally
married to Respondent Lourdes Reyes on January 3, 1947.8 It is also admitted that
for 19 years or so, and while their marriage was subsisting, he was actually living
with petitioner. It was during this time, in 1979, that the disputed house and lot
was purchased and registered in petitioners name.
The present controversy hinges on the source of the funds paid for the house and
lot in question. Upon the resolution of this issue depends the determination of
whether the property is conjugal (owned by Rodolfo and Lourdes) or exclusive
(owned by Milagros) or co-owned by Rodolfo and Milagros.
Indeed, a preponderance of evidence has duly established that the disputed house
and lot was paid by Rodolfo Reyes, using his salaries and earnings. All told,
respondents have shown that the property was bought during the marriage of
Rodolfo and Lourdes, a fact that gives rise to the presumption that it is conjugal.
More important, they have established that the proceeds of the loan obtained by
Rodolfo were used to pay for the property; and that the loan was, in turn, paid
from his salaries and earnings, which were conjugal funds under the Civil Code.
In contrast, petitioner has failed to substantiate either of her claims -- that she was
financially capable of buying the house and lot, or that she actually contributed to
the payments therefor. Indeed, it does not appear that she was gainfully employed
at any time after 196130 when the property was purchased.
Under the circumstances, therefore, the purchase and the subsequent registration
of the realty in petitioners name was tantamount to a donation by Rodolfo to
Milagros. By express provision of Article 739(1) of the Civil Code, such donation was
void, because it was "made between persons who were guilty of adultery or
concubinage at the time of the donation."
Regarding the registration of the property in petitioners name, it is enough to
stress that a certificate of title under the Torrens system aims to protect dominion;
it cannot be used as an instrument for the deprivation of ownership. 37 It has been
held that property is conjugal if acquired in a common-law relationship during the
subsistence of a preexisting legal marriage, even if it is titled in the name of the
common-law wife.38 In this case, a constructive trust is deemed created.
The registration of the property in petitioners name was clearly designed to
deprive Rodolfos legal spouse and compulsory heirs of ownership. By operation of
law, petitioner is deemed to hold the property in trust for them. Therefore, she
cannot rely on the registration in repudiation of the trust, for this case is a well-
known exception to the principle of conclusiveness of a certificate of title. 39

2) the propriety of ruling on the filiation and the successional rights of petitioners
children.

It is petitioners alternative submission that her children are entitled to a share in

the disputed property, because they were voluntarily acknowledged by Rodolfo as
his children. Her position is untenable.

Indeed, it has been ruled that matters relating to the rights of filiation and heirship
must be ventilated in the proper probate court in a special proceeding instituted
precisely for the purpose of determining such rights. It is evident from the
pleadings of the parties that this issue was not presented in either the original 42 or
the Supplemental Complaint43 for reconveyance of property and damages.

The invocation by petitioner of Articles 1949 and 2150 of the Civil Code is also
unmeritorious. Clearly, the illegitimate filiation of her children was not the subject
of inquiry and was in fact not duly established in this case. Thus, she could not have
shown that respondents had acted in bad faith or with intent to prejudice her
children. These are conditions necessary to show that an act constitutes an abuse of
rights under Article 19.51 She also failed to show that respondents -- in violation of
the provisions of Article 21 of the Civil Code -- had acted in a manner contrary to
morals, good customs or public policy.

Moreover, we note that the issue concerning the applicability of Articles 19 and 21
was not raised by petitioner in the trial court or even in the CA. Hence, she should
not be permitted to raise it now. Basic is the rule that parties may not bring up on
appeal issues that have not been raised on trial.52

SC affirmed CAs decision.

JOSE E. ARUEGO, JR., SIMEONA SAN JUAN ARUEGO, MA. IMMACULADA T.
ALANON, ROBERTO A. TORRES, CRISTINA A. TORRES, JUSTO JOSE TORRES and
AGUSTIN TORRES vs. THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, THIRTEENTH DIVISION and
ANTONIA ARUEGO
FACTS:
On March 7, 1983, a Complaint1 for Compulsory Recognition and
Enforcement of Successional Rights was filed before Branch 30 of the
Regional Trial Court of Manila by the minors, private respondent Antonia F.
Aruego and her alleged sister Evelyn F. Aruego, represented by their
mother and natural guardian, Luz M. Fabian. Named defendants therein
were Jose E. Aruego, Jr. and the five (5) minor children of the deceased
Gloria A. Torres, represented by their father and natural guardian, Justo P.
Torres, Jr., now the petitioners herein.
Late Jose M. Aruego, Sr., a married man, had an amorous relationship with
Luz M. Fabian sometime in 1959 until his death on March 30, 1982. Out of
this relationship were born Antonia F. Aruego and Evelyn F. Aruego on
October 5, 1962 and September 3, 1963, respectively. The complaint
prayed for an Order praying that herein private respondent and Evelyn be
declared the illegitimate children of the deceased Jose M. Aruego, Sr.;
that herein petitioners be compelled to recognize and acknowledge them
as the compulsory heirs of the deceased Jose M. Aruego; that their share
and participation in the estate of their deceased father be determined and
ordered delivered to them.
The main basis of the action for compulsory recognition is their alleged
"open and continuous possession of the status of illegitimate children"
acknowledged and recognized the herein plaintiffs as his children verbally
among plaintiffs' and their mother's family friends, as well as by myriad
different paternal ways, including but not limited to the following: (a)
Regular support and educational expenses; (b) Allowance to use his
surname; (c) Payment of maternal bills; (d) Payment of baptismal expenses
and attendance therein; (e) Taking them to restaurants and department
stores on occasions of family rejoicing; (f) Attendance to school problems
of plaintiffs; (g) Calling and allowing plaintiffs to his office every now and
then; (h) Introducing them as such children to family friends.
Petitioners denied all these allegations.
RTC: Antonia Aruego as illegitimate daughter of Jose Aruego and Luz
Fabian; Evelyn Fabian is not an illegitimate daughter of Jose Aruego with
Luz Fabian; the estate of deceased Jose Aruego are the following:Antonia
Aruego is entitled to a share equal to 1/2 portion of share of the legitimate
children of Jose Aruego.
CA: the petition was dismissed for lack of merit in a decision promulgated
on August 31, 1993.
ISSUE: Should the provisions of the Family Code be applied in the instant case? As a
corollary, will the application of the Family Code in this case prejudice or impair
any vested right of the private respondent such that it should not be given
retroactive effect in this particular case?
RULING:
Private Respondent: under Book I, Title VIII of the Civil Code on PERSONS,
specifically Article 285 thereof, which state the manner by which illegitimate
children may prove their filiation, to wit:
Art. 285. The action for the recognition of natural children may
be brought only during the lifetime of the presumed parents,
except in the following cases:
(1) If the father or mother died during the minority of the child,
in which case the latter may file the action before the expiration
of four years from the attainment of his majority; . . . .
Petitioners: With the advent of the New Family Code on August 3, 1988, the trial
court lost jurisdiction over the complaint of private respondent on the ground of
prescription, considering that under Article 175, paragraph 2, in relation to Article
172 of the New Family Code, it is provided that an action for compulsory
recognition of illegitimate filiation, if based on the "open and continuous possession
of the status of an illegitimate child," must be brought during the lifetime of the
alleged parent without any exception, otherwise the action will be barred by
prescription. Since the complaint of private respondent and her alleged sister was
filed on March 7, 1983, or almost one (1) year after the death of their presumed
father on March 30, 1982, the action has clearly prescribed under the new rule as
provided in the Family Code. Petitioners, further, maintain that even if the action
was filed prior to the effectivity of the Family Code, this new law must be applied
to the instant case pursuant to Article 256 of the Family Code.
In Tayag vs. Court of Appeals,6 a case which involves a similar complaint
denominated as "Claim for Inheritance" but treated by this court as one to compel
recognition as an illegitimate child brought prior to the effectivity of the Family
Code by the mother of the minor child, and based also on the "open and continuous
possession of the status of an illegitimate child," we had occasion to rule that:
Under the circumstances obtaining in the case at bar, we hold that the right
of action of the minor child has been vested by the filing of the complaint in
court under the regime of the Civil Code and prior to the effectivity of the
Family Code. We herein adopt our ruling in the recent case of Republic of
the Philippines vs. Court of Appeals, et. al. 7 where we held that the fact of
filing of the petition already vested in the petitioner her right to file it and
to have the same proceed to final adjudication in accordance with the law
in force at the time, and such right can no longer be prejudiced or impaired
by the enactment of a new law.
Accordingly, Article 175 of the Family Code finds no proper application to
the instant case since it will ineluctably affect adversely a right of private
respondent and, consequentially, of the minor child she represents, both of
which have been vested with the filing of the complaint in court. The trial
court is, therefore, correct in applying the provisions of Article 285 of the
 Civil Code and in holding that private respondent's cause of action has not
yet prescribed.

Tayag applies four-square with the case at bench. The action brought by private
respondent Antonia Aruego for compulsory recognition and enforcement of
successional rights which was filed prior to the advent of the Family Code, must be
governed by Article 285 of the Civil Code and not by Article 175, paragraph 2 of the
Family Code. The present law cannot be given retroactive effect insofar as the
instant case is concerned, as its application will prejudice the vested right of
private respondent to have her case decided under Article 285 of the Civil Code.
The right was vested to her by the fact that she filed her action under the regime
of the Civil Code. Prescinding from this, the conclusion then ought to be that the
action was not yet barred, notwithstanding the fact that it was brought when the
putative father was already deceased, since private respondent was then still a
minor when it was filed, an exception to the general rule provided under Article
285 of the Civil Code. Hence, the trial court, which acquired jurisdiction over the
case by the filing of the complaint, never lost jurisdiction over the same despite
the passage of E.O. No. 209, also known as the Family Code of the Philippines.

SC affirmed CAs decision.

JINKIE CHRISTIE A. DE JESUS and JACQUELINE A. DE JESUS minors, represented
by their mother, CAROLINA A. DE JESUS vs. THE ESTATE OF DECEDENT JUAN
GAMBOA DIZON, ANGELINA V. DIZON, CARLOS DIZON, FELIFE DIZON, JUAN
DIZON, JR. and MARYLIN DIZON and as proper parties: FORMS MEDIA CORP.,
QUAD MANAGEMENT CORP., FILIPINAS PAPER SALES CO., INC. and AMITY
CONSTRUCTION & INDUSTRIAL ENTERPRISES, INC.
FACTS:
The petitioner involves the case of the illegitimate children who, having
been born in lawful wedlock, claim to be the illegitimate scions of the
decedent in order to enforce their respective shares in the latter's estate
under the rules of succession.
Danilo B. de Jesus and Carolina Aves de Jesus got married on 23 August
1964. It was during this marriage that Jacqueline A. de Jesus and Jinkie
Christie A. de Jesus, herein petitioners, were born, the former on 01 March
1979 and the latter on 06 July 1982.
In a notarized document, dated 07 June 1991, Juan G.
Dizon acknowledged Jacqueline and Jinkie de Jesus as being his own
illegitimate children by Carolina Aves de Jesus. Juan G. Dizon died
intestate on 12 March 1992, leaving behind considerable assets consisting
of shares of stock in various corporations and some real property.
Petitioners filed a complaint for "Partition with Inventory and Accounting"
of the Dizon estate.
Respondent, the surviving spouse and legitimate children of the decedent
Juan G. Dizon, including the corporations of which the deceased was a
stockholder, sought the dismissal of the case, arguing that the complaint,
even while denominated as being one for partition, would nevertheless call
for altering the status of petitioners from being the legitimate children of
the spouses Danilo de Jesus and Carolina de Jesus to instead be the
illegitimate children of Carolina de Jesus and deceased Juan Dizon. RTC
denied motion todismiss.
CA: upheld RTCs decision, remanded the case for further proceeding.
Motion to dismiss again on the ground that the action instituted was made
to compel the recognition of petitioners as being the illegitimate children
of decedent Juan G. Dizon and that the partition sought was merely an
ulterior relief once petitioners would have been able the establish their
status as such heirs. It was contended, in fine that an action for partition
was not an appropriate forum to likewise ascertain the question of
paternity and filiation, an issue that could only be taken up in an
independent suit or proceeding. Hence, RTC dismissed the complaint.
RULING:
The filiation of illegitimate children, like legitimate children, is established by (1)
the record of birth appearing the civil register or a final judgement; or (2) an
admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten and
signed by the parent concerned. In the absence thereof, filiation shall be
proved by (1) the open and continuos possession of the status of a legitimate child;
or (2) any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws. 4 The due
recognition of an illegitimate child in a record of birth, a will, a statement
before a court or record, or in any authentic writing is, in itself, a consummated
act of acknowledgement of the child, and no further court action is required. 5 In
fact, any writing is treated not just a ground for compulsory recognition; it is in
itself voluntary recognition that does not require a separate action for judicial
approval.6 Where, instead, a claim for recognition is predicted on other
evidence merely tending to prove paternity, i.e., outside of a record of birth, a
will, a statement before a court or record or an authentic writing, judicial
action within the applicable statue of limitations is essential in order to
establish the child's acknowledgement.7
A scrutiny of the records would show that petitioners were born during the marriage
of their parents. The certificates of live would also identify Danilo de Jesus as being
their father.
There is perhaps no presumption of the law more firmly established and founded on
sounder morality and more convincing reason than the presumption that children
born in wedlock are legitimate.8 this presumption indeed becomes conclusive in
the absence of proof that there is physical impossibility of access between the
spouses during the first 120 days of the 300 days which immediately precedes the
birth of the child due to (a) the physical incapacity of the husband to have sexual
intercourse with his wife; (b) the fact the husband and wife are living separately in
such a way that sexual intercourse is not possible; or (c) serious illness of the
husband, which absolutely prevents sexual intercourse.9
Succinctly, in an attempt to establish their illegitimate filiation to the late Juan G.
Dizon, petitioners, in effect, would impugn their legitimate status as being children
of Danilo de Jesus and Carolina Aves de Jesus. This step cannot be aptly done
because the law itself establishes the legitimacy of children conceived or born
during the marriage of the parents. The presumption of legitimacy fixes a civil
status for the child born in wedlock, and only the father,13 or in exceptional
instances the latter's heirs,14 can contest in an appropriate action the legitimacy
of a child born to his wife. Thus, it is only when the legitimacy of a child has
been successfully impugned that the paternity of the husband can be rejected.
The rule that the written acknowledgement made by the deceased Juan G. Dizon
establishes petitioners' alleged illegitimate filiation to the decedent cannot be
validly invoked to be of any relevance in this instance. This issue, i.e whether
petitioners are indeed the acknowledge illegitimate offsprings of the decedent,
cannot be aptly adjudicated without an action having been first instituted to
impugn their legitimacy as being the children of Danilo B. de Jesus and Carolina
Aves de Jesus born in lawful wedlock. Indeed, a child so born in such wedlock shall
be considered legitimate although the mother may have declared against its
legitimacy or may have been sentenced as having been an adulteress.
SC denied the instant petition.