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death penalty, falls short of the strict norm set forth by the
Constitution. I and some of my brethren on the Court, who hold
similarly, have consistently expressed this stand in the
affirmance by the Court of death sentences imposed by Regional
Trial Courts.
Courts; Judgments; The rule of immutability of final and
executory judgments admits of settled exceptionsconcededly, the
Court may suspend the execution of a final judgment when it
becomes imperative in the higher interest of justice or when
supervening events warrant it.The doctrine has almost
invariably been that after a decision becomes final and executory,
nothing else is further done except to see to its compliance since
for the Court to adopt otherwise would be to put no end to
litigations. The rule notwithstanding, the Court retains control
over the case until the full satisfaction of the final judgment
conformably with established legal processes. Hence, the Court
has taken cognizance of the petition assailing before it the use of
lethal injection by the State to carry out the death sentence. In
any event, jurisprudence teaches that the rule of immutability of
final and executory judgments admits of settled exceptions.
Concededly, the Court may, for instance, suspend the execution of
a final judgment when it becomes imperative in the higher interest
of justice or when supervening events warrant it. Certainly, this
extraordinary relief cannot be denied any man, whatever might
be his station, whose right to life is the issue at stake.
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RESOLUTION
PUNO, J.:
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ENTRY OF JUDGMENT
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1 Stoll v. Gottlieb, 305 US 165, 172; 59 S. Ct. 134, 138; 83 L. ed. 104
[1938].
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and that the same has, on November 6, 1998 become final and
executory and is hereby recorded in the Book of Entries of
Judgment.
Manila, Philippines.
Clerk of Court
By: (SGD) TERESITA G. DIMAISIP
Acting Chief
Judicial Records Office
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the finality of a judgment does not mean that the Court has
lost all its powers nor the case. By the finality of the judgment,
what the court loses is its jurisdiction to amend, modify or alter
the same. Even after the judgment has become final the court
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retains its jurisdiction to execute and enforce it. There is a
difference between the jurisdiction of the court to execute its
judgment and its jurisdiction to amend, modify or alter the same.
The former continues even after the judgment has become final for
the purpose of enforcement of judgment; the latter terminates
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when the judgment becomes final. x x x For after the judgment
has become final facts and circumstances may transpire which
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can render the execution unjust or impossible.
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Sec. 13. The Supreme Court shall have the power to promulgate
rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure in all courts,
and the admission to the practice of law. Said rules shall be
uniform for all courts of the same grade and shall not diminish,
increase, or modify substantive rights. The existing laws on
pleading, practice and procedure are hereby repealed as statutes,
and are declared Rules of Court, subject to the power of the
Supreme Court to alter and modify the same. The Congress shall
have the power to repeal, alter or supplement the rules concerning
pleading, practice and procedure, and the admission to the
practice of law in the Philippines.
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x x xx x xx x x
Sec. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers.
x x xx x xx x x
(5) Promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure in
all courts, the admission to the practice of law, and the integration of the
Bar, which, however, may be repealed, altered, or supplemented by the
Batasang Pambansa. Such rules shall provide a simplified and
inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases, shall be
uniform for all courts of the same grade, and shall not diminish, increase,
or modify substantive rights.
x x xx x xx x x
Section 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following
powers:
x x xx x xx x x
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x x xx x xx x x
5. Instead of filing a comment on Judge Ponferradas
Manifestation however, herein respondent is submitting the
instant Manifestation and Motion (a) to stress, inter alia, that the
nondisclosure of the date of execution deprives herein respondent
of
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II
The text and tone of this provision will not yield to the
interpretation suggested by the public respondents. The
provision is simply the source of power of the President to
grant reprieves, commutations, and pardons and remit
fines and forfeitures after conviction by final judgment. It
also provides the authority for the President to grant
amnesty with the concurrence of a majority of all the
members of the Congress. The provision, however, cannot
be interpreted as denying the power of courts to control the
enforcement of their decisions after their finality. In truth,
an accused who has been convicted by final judgment still
possesses collateral rights and these rights can be claimed
in the appropriate courts. For instance, a death convict who
becomes insane after his final conviction 15
cannot be
executed while in a state of insanity. As observed by
Antieau, today, it is generally assumed that due process of
law will prevent the government from executing the death
sentence upon
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a person who is insane at the time of
execution. The suspension of such a death sentence is
undisputably an exercise of judicial power. It is not a
usurpation of the presidential power of reprieve though its
effect is the
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III
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SEPARATE OPINION
VITUG, J.:
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not reopen the case to investigate the facts that show the need for
postponement. If one of the ways is by direction of the court, it is
acknowledged that even after the date of the execution has been
fixed, and notwithstanding the general rule that after the Court of
First Instance has performed its ministerial duty of ordering the
execution, functus est officio suo, and its part is ended, if however
a circumstance arises that ought to delay the execution, there is an
imperative duty to investigate the emergency and to order a
postponement. x x x.
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SEPARATE OPINION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
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SEPARATE OPINION
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Sec. 19. (1) Excessive fines shall not be imposed, nor cruel,
degrading or inhuman punishment inflicted. Neither shall death
penalty be imposed, unless for compelling reasons involving
heinous crimes, the Congress hereafter provides for it. Any death
penalty already imposed shall be reduced to reclusion perpetua.
(Italics supplied)
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x x xx x xx x x
My recollection on this is that there was a division in the Committee not on
whether the death penalty should be abolished or not, but rather on whether the
abolition should be done by the Constitutionin which case it cannot be restored
by the legislatureor left to the legislature. The majority voted for the
constitutional abolition of the death penalty. And the reason is that capital
punishment is inhuman for the convict and his family who are traumatized by the
waiting, even if it is
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never carried out. There is no evidence that the death penalty deterred
deadly criminals, hence, life should not be destroyed just in the hope that
other lives might be saved. Assuming mastery over the life of another man
is just too presumptuous for any man. The fact that the death penalty as
an institution has been there from time immemorial should not deter us
from reviewing it. Human life is more valuable than an institution
intended precisely to serve human life. So basically, this is the summary
of the reasons which were presented in support of the constitutional
abolition of the death penalty. (italics supplied)
7 Dissenting Opinion in People vs. Muoz, supra, p. 129.
8 Thus in People vs. Burgos, 144 SCRA 1, September 4, 1986, we held
that a statute which allows an exception to a constitutional right (against
warrantless arrests) should be strictly construed.
9 In his scholarly Memorandum, Fr. Joaquin G. Bernas, S.J. as amicus
curiae in People vs. Pedro V. Malabago (G.R. No. 115686,
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130 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Echegaray vs. Secretary of Justice
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VOL. 301, JANUARY 19, 1999 131
Echegaray vs. Secretary of Justice
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amending certain provisions of the Revised 13Penal Code;
(2) by incorporating a new article
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therein; and (3) by
amending certain special laws.
But RA 7659 did not change the nature or the elements
of the crimes stated in the Penal Code and in the special
laws. It merely made the penalty more severe. Neither did
its provisions (other than the preamble, which was cast in
general terms) discuss or justify the reasons for the more
severe sanction, either collectively for all the offenses or
individually for each of them.
Generally, it merely reinstated the concept of and the
method by which the death penalty had been imposed until
February 2, 1987, when the Constitution took effect as
follows: (1) a person is convicted of a capital offense; and (2)
the commission of which was accompanied by aggravating
circumstances not outweighed by mitigating circumstances.
The basic question then is: In enacting RA 7659, did
Congress exceed the limited authority granted it by the
Constitution? More legally put: In reviving the death
penalty, did Congress act with grave abuse of discretion or
in excess of the very limited power or jurisdiction conferred
on it by Art. III, Sec. 19? The answer, I respectfully submit,
is YES.
Heinous Crimes
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SCRA 676, December 6, 1995; People vs. Albert, 251 SCRA 136,
December 11, 1995.
12 Art. 114Treason; Art. 123Qualified Piracy; Art. 246Parricide;
Art. 248Murder; Art. 255Infanticide; Art. 267Kidnapping and
Serious Illegal Detention; Art. 294Robbery with violence against or
intimidation of persons; Art. 320Destructive Arson; Art. 335Rape.
13 Art. 211A on Qualified Bribery.
14 Section 2, RA 7080Plunder; Secs. 3, 4, 5, 7, 8 and 9 of Article II of
RA 6425Prohibited Drugs; Secs. 14, 14A and 15 of Article III of said RA
6425Carnapping.
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VOL. 301, JANUARY 19, 1999 133
Echegaray vs. Secretary of Justice
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So we did not go that far from the Revised Penal Code, Mr.
President, and from existing special laws which, before abolition
of the death penalty, had already death as the maximum
penalty.
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Compelling Reasons
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Epilogue
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thus, in the end, with Gods plan for man and society. The primary purpose of the
punishment which society inflicts is to redress the disorder caused by the
offence. Public authority must redress the violation of personal and social rights
by imposing on the offender an adequate punishment for the crime, as a condition
for the offender to regain the exercise of his or her freedom. In this way authority
also fulfills the purpose of defending public order and ensuring peoples safety,
while at the same time offering the offender an incentive and help to change his or
her behavior and be rehabilitated.
It is clear that, for these purposes to be achieved, the nature and extent of the
punishment must be carefully evaluated and decided upon, and ought not go to the
extreme of executing the offender except in cases of absolute necessity: in other
words, when it would not be possible otherwise to defend society. Today however,
as a result of steady improvements in the organization of the penal system, such
cases are very rare, if not practically nonexistent.
In any event, the principle set forth in the new Catechism of the Catholic
Church remains valid: If bloodless means are sufficient to defend human lives
against an aggressor and to protect public order and the safety of persons, public
authority must limit itself to such means, because they better correspond to the
concrete conditions of the common good and are more in conformity to the dignity
of the human person.
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