Mariquita O. Sumaya and Laguna Agro-Industrial
That
Coconut Cooperative vs. The Hon. Intermediate Appellate
Court, and Amadeo, Sancho, Donato, Luis, Erasto, Luisa,
Joes and Dolores all surname Balantakbo
G.R. No. 68843-44 September 2, 1991
FACTS:
Raul Balantakbo inherited from two (2) different ascendants
the two (2) sets of properties subject of this case: 1) A one-
third (1/3) interest in a parcel of land situated in Dita, Laguna
from his father Jose, Sr., who died on January 28, 1945; and 2)
A one-seventh (1/7) interest pro-indiviso in ten (10) parcels of
registered lands from his maternal grandmother, Luisa
Bautista, who died on November 3, 1950.
On June 13, 1952, Raul died intestate, single, without any
issue, and leaving only his mother, Consuelo Joaquin Vda. de
Balantakbo, as his sole surviving heir to the real properties
above-mentioned. Consuelo adjudicated unto herself the above
described properties in an Affidavit entitled "Caudal
Herederario del finado Raul Balantakbo".
On December 21, 1959, Consuelo Joaquin vda. de Balantakbo
sold the property to Mariquita H. Sumaya. The sale was
evidenced by a deed. The same property was subsequently
sold by Mariquita Sumaya to Villa Honorio Development
Corporation, Inc., on December 30, 1963. On January 23,
1967, Villa Honorio Development Corporation transferred and
assigned its rights over the property in favor of Agro-Industrial
Coconut Cooperative, Inc. The documents evidencing these
transfers were registered in the Registry of Deeds of Laguna
and the corresponding certificates of titles were issued. The
properties are presently in the name of Agro-Industrial
Coconut Cooperative, Inc., 2/3 share and the remaining 1/3
share is in the name of Sancho Balantakbo. Consuelo Joaquin
vda. de Balantakbo sold the properties described to Villa
Honorio Development Corporation, Inc. The latter in turn
transferred and assigned all its rights to the properties in favor
of Laguna Agro-Industrial Coconut Cooperative, Inc. which
properties are presently in its possession.
The parties admit that the certificates of titles covering the
above described properties do not contain any annotation of its
reservable character.
On June 3, 1968, Consuelo Joaquin vda. de Balantakbo died.
Amadeo, Sancho, Donato, Luis, and Erasto, all surnamed
Balantakbo, brothers in full blood of Raul Balantakbo and
Luisa, Jose and Dolores, also all surnamed Balantakbo,
surviving children of deceased Jose Balantakbo, Jr., another
brother of the first named Balantakbos, filed the above
mentioned civil cases to recover the properties described in the
respective complaints which they claimed were subject to
a reserva troncal in their favor.
The court a quo rendered a joint decision in favor of the
Balantakbos. This decision was appealed to the appellate court
which affirmed the decision of the court a quo in toto.
According to petitioners, before they agreed to buy the
properties from the reservor (also called reservista), Consuelo
Joaquin vda. de Balantakbo, they first sought the legal advice
of their family consultant who found that there was no
encumbrance nor any lien annotated on the certificate of title
coveting the properties
The Intermediate Appellate Court based their decision that the
affidavit executed by Consuelo clearly stated that the
Consuelo, was a lone-ascendant and heir to Raul Balantakbo,
her son, who died leaving properties previously inherited from
other ascendants and which properties were inventoried in the
said affidavit. It was admitted that the certificates of titles
covering the properties in question show that they were free
from any liens and encumbrances at the time of the sale.
the affidavit of self-adjudication executed by Consuelo stating
the source of the properties thereby showing the reservable
nature thereof was registered with the Register of Deeds of
Laguna, and this is sufficient notice to the whole world
ISSUE:
Whether or not the property is subject to reserve troncal
HELD:
The failure of the Register of Deeds to annotate the reservable
character of the property in the certificate of title cannot be
attributed to Consuelo.
Moreover, there is sufficient proof that the petitioners had
actual knowledge of the reservable character of the properties
before they bought the same from Consuelo. This matter
appeared in the deed of sale executed by Consuelo in favor of
Mariquita Sumaya, Moreover, the Court a quo found that the
petitioners and private respondents were long time
acquaintances
The obligation to reserve rests upon the reservor, Consuelo
Joaquin vda. de Balantakbo. Article 891 of the New Civil
Code on reserva troncal provides:
Art. 891. The ascendant who inherits from his
descendant any property which the latter may have
acquired by gratuitous title from another ascendant or
a brother or sister, is obliged to reserve such property
as he may have acquired by operation of law for the
benefit of relatives who are within the third degree
and who belong to the line from which said property
came. (Emphasis supplied)
We do not agree, however, with the disposition of the
appellate court that there is no need to register the reservable
character of the property, if only for the protection of the
reservees, against innocent third persons. This Court ruled that
the reservable character of a property may be lost to innocent
purchasers for value. Additionally, it was ruled therein that the
obligation imposed on a widowed spouse to annotate the
reservable character of a property subject of reserva viudal is
applicable to reserva troncal.
Consistent with the rule in reserva viudal where the person
obliged to reserve (the widowed spouse) had the obligation to
annotate in the Registry of Property the reservable character of
the property, in reserva troncal, the reservor (the ascendant
who inherited from a descendant property which the latter
inherited from another descendant) has the duty to reserve and
therefore, the duty to annotate also.
The jurisprudential rule requiring annotation in the Registry of
Property of the right reserved in real property subject
of reserva viudal insofar as it is applied to reserva
troncal stays despite the abolition of reserva viudal in the New
Civil Code. This rule is consistent with the rule provided in the
second paragraph of Section 51 of P.D. 1529, which provides
that: "The act of registration shall be the operative act to
convey or affect the land insofar as third persons are
concerned . . ." (emphasis supplied).
Beatriz L. Gonzales vs. Court of First Instance of Manila,
Benito F. Legarda, Rosario L. Valdez, Alejandro Legarda,
Teresa Legarda, Jose Legarda, Benito Legarda et. al.
G.R. No. L-34395 May 19, 1981
FACTS:
Benito Legarda y De la Paz, the son of Benito Legarda y
Tuason, died on June 17, 1933. He was survived by his
widow, Filomena Races, and their seven children: four
daughters named Beatriz, Rosario, Teresa and Filomena and
three sons named Benito, Alejandro and Jose.
On July 12, 1939, the real properties left by Benito Legarda y
Tuason were partitioned in three equal portions by his
daughters, Consuelo and Rita, and the heirs of his deceased
son Benito Legarda y De la Paz who were represented by
Benito F. Legarda.
Filomena Legarda y Races died intestate and without issue on
March 19, 1943. Her sole heiress was her mother, Filomena
Races Vda. de Legarda.
Mrs. Legarda executed on May 12, 1947 an affidavit
adjudicating extrajudicially to herself the properties which she
inherited from her deceased daughter, Filomena Legarda. As a
result of the affidavit of adjudication, Filomena Races
succeeded her deceased daughter Filomena Legarda as co-
owner of the properties held proindiviso by her other six
children.
Mrs. Legarda on March 6, 1953 executed two handwritten
Identical documents wherein she disposed of the properties,
which she inherited from her daughter, in favor of the children
of her sons, Benito, Alejandro and Jose (sixteen grandchildren
in all). During the period from July, 1958 to February, 1959
Mrs. Legarda and her six surviving children partitioned the
properties consisting of the one-third share in the estate of
Benito Legarda y Tuason which the children inherited in
representation of their father, Benito Legarda y De la Paz.
Mrs. Legarda died on September 22, 1967.
In the testate proceeding, Beatriz Legarda Gonzales, a
daughter of the testatrix, filed on May 20, 1968 a motion to
exclude from the inventory of her mother's estate the
properties which she inherited from her deceased daughter,
Filomena, on the ground that said properties
are reservable properties which should be inherited by
Filomena Legarda's three sisters and three brothers and not by
the children of Benito, Alejandro and Jose, all surnamed
Legarda.
ISSUE:
Whether Mrs. Legarda, as reservor, could convey the
reservable properties by will or mortis causa to the reservees
within the third degree (her sixteen grandchildren) to the
exclusion of the reservees in the second degree, her three
daughters and three sons
HELD:
In reserve troncal (1) a descendant inherited or acquired by
gratuitous title property from an ascendant or from a brother
or sister; (2) the same property is inherited by another
ascendant or is acquired by him by operation of law from the
said descendant, and (3) the said ascendant should reserve the
said property for the benefit of relatives who are within the
third degree from the deceased descendant (prepositus) and
who belong to the line from which the said property came.
The persons involved in reserve troncal are (1) the ascendant
or brother or sister from whom the property was received by
the descendant by lucrative or gratuitous title, (2) the
descendant or prepositus (prepositus) who received the
property, (3) the reservor (reservista) the other ascendant who
obtained the property from the (prepositus) by operation of
law and (4) the reserves (reservatario) who is within the third
degree from the prepositus and who belongs to the (line o
tronco) from which the property came and for whom the
property should be reserved by the reservor.
The reservor has the legal title and dominion to the reservable
property but subject to the resolutory condition that such title
is extinguished if the reservor predeceased the reservee. The
reservor is a usufructuary of the reservable property. He may
alienate it subject to the reservation. The transferee gets the
revocable and conditional ownership of the reservor.
In the instant case, the properties in question were indubitably
reservable properties in the hands of Mrs. Legarda.
Undoubtedly, she was a reservor. The reservation became a
certainty when at the time of her death the reservees or
relatives within the third degree of the prepositus Filomena
Legarda were living or they survived Mrs. Legarda.
Article 891 clearly indicates that the reservable properties
should be inherited by all the nearest relatives within the third
degree from the prepositus who in this case are the six
children of Mrs. Legarda. She could not select the reservees to
whom the reservable property should be given and deprive the
other reservees of their share therein.
To allow the reservor in this case to make a testamentary
disposition of the reservable properties in favor of the
reservees in the third degree and, consequently, to ignore the
reservees in the second degree would be a glaring violation of
article 891. That testamentary disposition cannot be allowed.
Applying the case of Florentino vs. Florentino, it appears that
Apolonio Florentino II and his second wife Severina Faz de
Leon begot two children, Mercedes and Apolonio III. These
two inherited properties from their father. Upon Apolonio III
death in 1891, his properties were inherited by his mother,
Severina, who died in 1908. ln her will, she instituted her
daughter Mercedes as heiress to all her properties, including
those coming from her deceased husband through their son,
Apolonio III.
The surviving children, begotten by Apolonio II with his first
wife Antonia Faz de Leon and the descendants of the deceased
children of his first marriage, sued Mercedes Florentino for
the recovery of their share in the reservable properties, which
Severina de Leon had inherited from Apolonio III which the
latter had inherited from his father Apolonio II and which
Severina willed to her daughter Mercedes.
Plaintiff's theory was that the said properties, as reservable
properties, could not be disposed of in Severina's will in favor
of Mercedes only. That theory was sustained by this Court.
Under the rule of stare decisis et non quieta movere, we are
bound to follow in this case the doctrine of
the Florentino case. That doctrine means that as long as during
the reservor's lifetime and upon his death there are relatives
within the third degree of the prepositus regardless of whether
those reservees are common descendants of the reservor and
the ascendant from whom the property came, the property
retains its reservable character. The property should go to the
nearest reservees. The reservor cannot, by means of his will,
choose the reserves to whom the reservable property should be
awarded.
Applying that doctrine to this case, it results that Mrs. Legarda
could not dispose of in her will the properties in question even
if the disposition is in favor of the relatives within the third
degree from Filomena Legarda. The said properties, by
operation of Article 891, should go to Mrs. Legarda's six
children as reservees within the second degree from Filomena
Legarda.
Marcelina Edroso vs. Pablo and Basilio Sablan
G.R. No. 6878, September 13, 1913
FACTS:
Marcelina Edroso was married to Victoriano Sablan until his
death on September 22, 1882. In this marriage they had a son
named Pedro, who was born on August 1, 1881, and who at
his father's death inherited the two said parcels. Victoriano
Sablan had likewise acquired them by inheritance from his
ascendants, Mariano Sablan and Maria Rita Fernandez.Pedro
also died on July 15, 1902, unmarried and without issue and
by this decease the two parcels of land passed through
inheritance to his mother, Marcelina Edroso. Hence the
hereditary title whereupon is based the application for
registration of her ownership.
Two legitimate brothers of Victoriano Sablan that is, two
uncles german of Pedro Sablan appeared in the case to
oppose the registration, claiming one of two things: Either that
the registration be denied, "or that if granted to her the right
reserved by law to the opponents be recorded in the
registration of each parcel.
The Court of Land Registration denied the registration and the
application appealed through a bill of exceptions.
Registration was denied because the trial court held that the
parcels of land in question partake of the nature of property
required by law to be reserved and that in such a case
application could only be presented jointly in the names of the
mother and the said two uncles of Pedro Sablan.
The appellant contends that it is not proven that the two
parcels of land in question have been acquired by operation of
law, and that only property acquired without a valuable
consideration, which is by operation of law, is required by law
to reserved.
The appellees justly argue that this defense was not alleged or
discussed in first instance, but only herein. Certainly, the
allegation in first instance was merely that "Pedro Sablan
acquired the property in question in 1882, before the
enforcement of the Civil Code, which establishes the alleged
right required by law to be reserved, of which the opponents
speak; hence, prescription of the right of action; and finally,
opponents' renunciation of their right, admitting that it existed
and that they had it.
ISSUE:
HELD:
The Court held that applicant is entitled to register in her own
name the two parcels of land which are the subject matter of
the applicants, recording in the registration the right required
by the law to be reserved to either or both of the opponents,
Pablo Sablan and Basilio Sablan, should they survive her.
The reservista has all the rights inherent in ownership, he can
use, enjoy, dispose of and recover it; and if, in addition to
usufructuary, he is in fact and in law the real owner and can
alienate it, although under a condition.
The ascendants who inherits from descendants, whether by the
latters wish or by operation of law, requires the inheritance by
virtue of a title perfectly transferring absolute ownership. All
the attributes of the right of ownership belong to him
exclusively use, enjoyment, disposal and recovery.
During the whole period between the constitution in legal
form of the right required by law to be reserved and
the extinction thereof, the relatives within the third degree,
after the right that in their turn may pertain to them has been
assured, have only an expectation, and therefore they do not
even have the capacity to transmit that expectation to their
heirs.
What are the rights in the property of the person who holds it
subject to the reservation of article 811 of the Civil Code?
The ascendants who inherits from a descendants, whether by
the latter's wish or by operation of law, requires the inheritance
by virtue of a title perfectly transferring absolute ownership.
All the attributes of the right of ownership belong to him
exclusively use, enjoyment, disposal and recovery. This
absolute ownership, which is inherent in the hereditary title, is
not altered in the least, if there be no relatives within the third
degree in the line whence the property proceeds or they die
before the ascendant heir who is the possessor and absolute
owner of the property. If there should be relatives within the
third degree who belong to the line whence the property
proceeded, then a limitation to that absolute ownership would
arise. The nature and scope of this limitation must be
determined with exactness in order not to vitiate rights that the
law wishes to be effective. The opinion which makes this
limitation consist in reducing the ascendant heir to the
condition in of a mere usufructuary, depriving him of the right
of disposal and recovery, does not seem to have any support in
the law, as it does not have, according to the opinion that he
has been expressed in speaking of the rights of the father or
mother who has married again. There is a marked difference
between the case where a man's wish institutes two persons as
his heirs, one as usufructuary and the other as owner of his
property, and the case of the ascendant in article 811 or of the
father or mother in article 968. In the first case, there is not the
slightest doubt that the title to the hereditary property resides
in the hereditary owner and he can dispose of and recover it,
while the usufructuary can in no way perform any act of
disposal of the hereditary property (except that he may dispose
of the right of usufruct in accordance with the provisions of
article 480 of the Civil Code), or any act of recovery thereof
except the limited one in the form prescribed in article 486 of
the Code itself, because he totally lacks the fee simple. But the
ascendants who holds the property required by article 811 to
be reserved, and the father of mother required by article 986 to
reserve the right, can dispose of the property they might itself,
the former from his descendant and the latter from his of her
child in first marriage, and recover it from anyone who may
unjustly detain it, while the persons in whose favor the right is
required to be reserved in either case cannot perform any act
whatsoever of disposal or of recovery.
The child or legitimate descendants of the first marriage in
whose favor the right is reserved cannot impugn the validity of
the alienation so long as the condition subsequent is pending,
that is, so long as the remarried spouse who must reserve the
right is alive, because it might easily happen that the person
who must reserve the right should outlive all the person in
whose favor the right is reserved and then there would be no
reason for the condition subsequent that they survive him, and,
the object of the law having disappeared, the right required to
be reserved would disappear, and the alienation would not
only be valid but also in very way absolutely effective.
Consequently, the alienation is valid when the right required
by law to be reserved to the children is respected; while the
effects of the alienation depend upon a condition, because it
will or will not become definite, it will continue to exist or
cease to exist, according to circumstances. This is what the
law establishes with reference to the reservation of article 968,
wherein the legislator expressly directs that the surviving
spouse who contracts a second marriage shall reserve to the
children or descendants of the first marriage ownership.
Article 811 says nothing more than that the ascendants must
make the reservation.
The ascendant is in the first place a usufructuary who should
use and enjoy the things according to their nature, in the
manner and form already set forth in commenting upon the
article of the Code referring to use and usufruct.

The conclusion is that the person required by article 811 to

reserve the right has, beyond any doubt at all, the rights of use
and usufruct. He has, moreover, for the reasons set forth, the
legal title and dominion, although under a condition
subsequent. Clearly he has, under an express provision of the
law, the right to dispose of the property reserved, and to
dispose of is to alienate, although under a condition. He has
the right to recover it, because he is the one who possesses or
should possess it and have title to it, although a limited and
revocable one. In a word, the legal title and dominion, even
though under a condition, reside in him while he lives. After
the right required by law to be reserved has been assured, he
can do anything that a genuine owner can do.

On the other hand, the relatives within the third degree in

whose favor of the right is reserved cannot dispose of the
property, first because it is no way, either actually,
constructively or formally, in their possession; and, moreover,
because they have no title of ownership or of the fee simple
which they can transmit to another, on the hypothesis that only
when the person who must reserve the right should die before
them will they acquire it, thus creating a fee simple, and only
then will they take their place in the succession of the
descendants of whom they are relatives within the third
degree, that it to say, a second contingent place in said
legitimate succession in the fashion of aspirants to a possible
future legacy.

If the vendor can register his title, the vendee can also register
this same title after he has once acquired it. This title,
however, in its attribute of being disposable, has a condition
subsequent annexed that the alienation the purchaser may
make will be terminated, if the vendor should exercise the
right granted him by article 1507, which says:

Conventional redemption shall take place when the vendor

reserves to himself the right to recover the thing sold, with the
obligation to comply with article 1518, and whatever more
may have been agreed upon," that is, if he recovers the thing
sold by repaying the vendee the price of the sale and other
expenses. Notwithstanding this condition subsequent, it is a
point not at all doubtful now that the vendee may register his
title in the same way as the owner of a thing mortgaged that
is to say, the latter with the consent of his creditor and the
former with the consent of the vendor. He may alienate the
thing bought when the acquirer knows by well from the title
entered in the registry that he acquires a title revocable after a
fixed period, a thing much more certain and to be expected
than the purely contingent expectation of the person in whose
favor is reserved a right to inherit some day what another has
inherited. The purpose of the law would be defeated in not
applying to the person who must make the reservation the
provision therein relative to the vendee under pacto de
retracto, since the argument in his favor is the more power and
conclusive; ubi eadem ratio, eadem legis dispositivo.