Batch 3 1-19-3

Batch 3 1-19-3 25/07/2017, 2:22 AM
Persons and Family Relations Batch 3 cases 1-19
1. REPUBLIC OF THEPHILIPPINES, vs JENNIFER B. CAGANDAHAN,
This is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court raising purely questions of law
and seeking a reversal of the Decision HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2008/
[1]
september2008/166676.htm" \l "_ftn1" \o "" dated January 12, 2005 of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC),Branch 33 of Siniloan, Laguna, which granted the Petition for Correction of Entries in Birth
Certificate filed by Jennifer B. Cagandahan and ordered the following changes of entries in Cagandahans
birth certificate:(1) the name Jennifer Cagandahan changed to Jeff Cagandahan and (2) gender from
female to male.
The facts are as follows.
OnDecember 11, 2003, respondent Jennifer Cagandahan filed a Petition for Correction of
Entries in Birth Certificate HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2008/
[2]
september2008/166676.htm" \l "_ftn2" \o "" before the RTC, Branch 33 of Siniloan, Laguna.
In her petition, she alleged that she was born onJanuary 13, 1981and was registered as a
female in the Certificate of Live Birth but while growing up, she developed secondary male
characteristics and was diagnosed to have Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia (CAH) which is a
condition where persons thus afflicted possess both male and female characteristics. She further
alleged that she was diagnosed to have clitoral hyperthropy in her early years and at age six,
underwent an ultrasound where it was discovered that she has small ovaries.At age thirteen, tests
revealed that her ovarian structures had minimized, she has stopped growing and she has no breast or
menstrual development. She then alleged that for all interests and appearances as well as in mind and
emotion, she has become a male person.Thus, she prayed that her birth certificate be corrected such
that her gender be changed from female to male and her first name be changed from Jennifer to Jeff.
The petition was published in a newspaper of general circulation for three (3) consecutive
weeks and was posted in conspicuous places by the sheriff of the court.The Solicitor General entered
his appearance and authorized the Assistant Provincial Prosecutor to appear in his behalf.
To prove her claim, respondent testified and presented the testimony of Dr. Michael Sionzon
of the Department of Psychiatry, University of the Philippines-Philippine General Hospital. Dr.
Sionzon issued a medical certificate stating that respondents condition is known as CAH. He
explained that genetically respondent is female but because her body secretes male hormones, her
female organs did not develop normally and she has two sex organs female and male.He testified that
this condition is very rare, that respondents uterus is not fully developed because of lack of female
hormones, and that she has no monthly period. He further testified that respondents condition is
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permanent and recommended the change of gender because respondent has made up her mind,
adjusted to her chosen role as male, and the gender change would be advantageous to her.
The RTC granted respondents petition in a Decision datedJanuary 12, 2005which reads:
The Court is convinced that petitioner has satisfactorily shown that he is

entitled to the reliefs prayed [for].Petitioner has adequately presented to the Court
very clear and convincing proofs for the granting of his petition.It was medically
proven that petitioners body produces male hormones, and first his body as well as
his action and feelings are that of a male.He has chosen to be male.He is a normal
person and wants to be acknowledged and identified as a male.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Civil Register of Pakil, Laguna is

hereby ordered to make the following corrections in the birth [c]ertificateof Jennifer
Cagandahan upon payment of the prescribed fees:
a)By changing the name from Jennifer Cagandahan to JEFF

CAGANDAHAN; and
b)By changing the gender from female to MALE.
It is likewise ordered that petitioners school records, voters registry,

baptismal certificate, and other pertinent records are hereby amended to conform
with the foregoing corrected data.
SO ORDERED.
Thus, this petition by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) seeking a
reversal of the abovementioned ruling.
The issues raised by petitioner are:
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE PETITION CONSIDERING

THAT:
I.
THE REQUIREMENTS OF RULES 103 AND 108 OF THE RULES OF COURT

HAVE NOT BEEN COMPLIED WITH; AND,
II.
CORRECTION OF ENTRY UNDER RULE 108 DOES NOT ALLOW CHANGE OF

SEX OR GENDER IN THE BIRTH CERTIFICATE, WHILE RESPONDENTS
MEDICAL CONDITION, i.e., CONGENITAL ADRENAL HYPERPLASIA DOES
NOT MAKE HER A MALE. HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/
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[4]
2008/september2008/166676.htm" \l "_ftn4" \o ""
Simply stated, the issue is whether the trial court erred in ordering the correction of entries in
the birth certificate of respondent to change her sex or gender, from female to male, on the ground of
her medical condition known as CAH, and her name from Jennifer to Jeff, under Rules 103 and 108 of
the Rules of Court.
The OSG contends that the petition below is fatally defective for non-compliance with Rules
103 and 108 of the Rules of Court because while the local civil registrar is an indispensable party in a
petition for cancellation or correction of entries under Section 3, Rule 108 of the Rules of Court,
respondents petition before the courta quodid not implead the local civil registrar. HYPERLINK
[5]
"http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2008/september2008/166676.htm" \l "_ftn5" \o "" The
OSG further contends respondents petition is fatally defective since it failed to state that respondent is
abona fideresident of the province where the petition was filed for at least three (3) years prior to the
date of such filing as mandated under Section 2(b), Rule 103 of the Rules of Court. HYPERLINK
[6]
"http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2008/september2008/166676.htm" \l "_ftn6" \o "" The
OSG argues that Rule 108 does not allow change of sex or gender in the birth certificate and
respondents claimed medical condition known as CAH does not make her a male. HYPERLINK
[7]
"http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2008/september2008/166676.htm" \l "_ftn7" \o ""
On the other hand, respondent counters that although the Local Civil Registrar of Pakil,
Laguna was not formally named a party in the Petition for Correction of Birth Certificate, nonetheless
the Local Civil Registrar was furnished a copy of the Petition, the Order to publish on December 16,
2003 and all pleadings, orders or processes in the course of the proceedings, HYPERLINK "http://
[8]
sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2008/september2008/166676.htm" \l "_ftn8" \o "" respondent is
actually a male person and hence his birth certificate has to be corrected to reflect his true sex/gender,
HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2008/september2008/166676.htm" \l "_ftn9" \o
[9]
"" change of sex or gender is allowed under Rule 108, HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/
[10]
jurisprudence/2008/september2008/166676.htm" \l "_ftn10" \o "" and respondent substantially
complied with the requirements of Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of Court. HYPERLINK "http://
[11]
sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2008/september2008/166676.htm" \l "_ftn11" \o ""
Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of Court provide:
Rule103
CHANGE OF NAME
SECTION 1.Venue. A person desiring to change his name shall present the petition
to the Regional Trial Court of the province in which he resides, [or, in the City
ofManila, to the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court].
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SEC. 2.Contents of petition. A petition for change of name shall be signed and
verified by the person desiring his name changed, or some other person on his behalf,
and shall set forth:
(a)That the petitioner has been abona fideresident of the province where
the petition is filed for at least three (3) years prior to the date of such filing;
(b)The cause for which the change of the petitioner's name is sought;
(c)The name asked for.
SEC. 3.Order for hearing. If the petition filed is sufficient in form and substance, the
court, by an order reciting the purpose of the petition, shall fix a date and place for
the hearing thereof, and shall direct that a copy of the order be published before the
hearing at least once a week for three (3) successive weeks in some newspaper of
general circulation published in the province, as the court shall deem best. The date
set for the hearing shall not be within thirty (30) days prior to an election nor within
four (4) months after the last publication of the notice.
SEC. 4.Hearing. Any interested person may appear at the hearing and oppose the
petition. The Solicitor General or the proper provincial or city fiscal shall appear on
behalf of the Government of the Republic.
SEC. 5.Judgment. Upon satisfactory proof in open court on the date fixed in the
order that such order has been published as directed and that the allegations of the
petition are true, the court shall, if proper and reasonable cause appears for changing
the name of the petitioner, adjudge that such name be changed in accordance with the
prayer of the petition.
SEC. 6.Service of judgment. Judgments or orders rendered in connection with this

rule shall be furnished the civil registrar of the municipality or city where the court
issuing the same is situated, who shall forthwith enter the same in the civil register.
Rule108
CANCELLATION OR CORRECTION OF ENTRIES
IN THE CIVIL REGISTRY
SECTION 1.Who may file petition. Any person interested in any act, event, order or
decree concerning the civil status of persons which has been recorded in the civil
register, may file a verified petition for the cancellation or correction of any entry
relating thereto, with the Regional Trial Court of the province where the
corresponding civil registry is located.
SEC. 2.Entries subject to cancellation or correction. Upongood and valid grounds,

the following entries in the civil register may be cancelled or corrected: (a) births; (b)
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marriages; (c) deaths; (d) legal separations; (e) judgments of annulments of marriage;
(f) judgments declaring marriages void from the beginning; (g) legitimations; (h)
adoptions; (i) acknowledgments of natural children; (j) naturalization; (k) election,
loss or recovery of citizenship; (l) civil interdiction; (m) judicial determination of
filiation; (n) voluntary emancipation of a minor; and (o) changes of name.
SEC. 3.Parties. When cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil register is

sought, the civil registrar and all persons who have or claim any interest which would
be affected thereby shall be made parties to the proceeding.
SEC. 4.Notice and publication. Upon the filing of the petition, the court shall, by an
order, fix the time and place for the hearing of the same, and cause reasonable notice
thereof to be given to the persons named in the petition. The court shall also cause
the order to be published once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks in a newspaper
of general circulation in the province.
SEC. 5. Opposition. The civil registrar and any person having or claiming any
interest under the entry whose cancellation or correction is sought may, within fifteen
(15) days from notice of the petition, or from the last date of publication of such
notice, file his opposition thereto.
SEC. 6.Expediting proceedings. The court in which the proceedings is brought may
make orders expediting the proceedings, and may also grant preliminary injunction
for the preservation of the rights of the parties pending such proceedings.
SEC. 7.Order. After hearing, the court may either dismiss the petition or issue an
order granting the cancellation or correction prayed for. In either case, a certified
copy of the judgment shall be served upon the civil registrar concerned who shall
annotate the same in his record.
The OSG argues that the petition below is fatally defective for non-compliance with Rules
103 and 108 of the Rules of Court because respondents petition did not implead the local civil
registrar.Section 3, Rule 108 provides that the civil registrar and all persons who have or claim any
interest which would be affected thereby shall be made parties to the proceedings.Likewise, the local
civil registrar is required to be made a party in a proceeding for the correction of name in the civil
registry.He is an indispensable party without whom no final determination of the case can be had.
HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2008/september2008/166676.htm" \l "_ftn12"
[12]
\o "" Unless all possible indispensable parties were duly notified of the proceedings, the same
shall be considered as falling much too short of the requirements of the rules. HYPERLINK "http://
[13]
sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2008/september2008/166676.htm" \l "_ftn13" \o "" The
corresponding petition should also implead as respondents the civil registrar and all other persons who
may have or may claim to have any interest that would be affected thereby. HYPERLINK "http://
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[14]
sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2008/september2008/166676.htm" \l "_ftn14" \o "" Respondent,
however, invokes Section 6, HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2008/
[15]
september2008/166676.htm" \l "_ftn15" \o "" Rule 1 of the Rules of Court which states that
courts shall construe the Rules liberally to promote their objectives of securing to the parties a just,
speedy and inexpensive disposition of the matters brought before it.We agree that there is substantial
compliance with Rule 108 when respondent furnished a copy of the petition to the local civil registrar.
The determination of a persons sex appearing in his birth certificate is a legal issue and the
court must look to the statutes. In this connection, Article 412 of the Civil Code provides:

ART. 412. No entry in a civil register shall be changed or corrected without a judicial
order.

Together with Article 376 HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2008/

[16]
september2008/166676.htm" \l "_ftn16" \o "" of the Civil Code, this provision was amended by
Republic Act No. 9048 HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2008/
[17]
september2008/166676.htm" \l "_ftn17" \o "" in so far asclerical or typographicalerrors are
involved. The correction or change of such matters can now be made through administrative
proceedings and without the need for a judicial order.In effect, Rep. Act No. 9048 removed from the
ambit of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court the correction of such errors. Rule 108 now applies only to
substantial changes and corrections in entries in the civil register. HYPERLINK "http://
[18]
Under Rep. Act No. 9048, a correction in the civil registry involving the change of sex is not
a mere clerical or typographical error. It is a substantial change for which the applicable procedure is
Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2008/
[19]
september2008/166676.htm" \l "_ftn19" \o ""
The entriesenvisaged in Article 412 of the Civil Code and correctable under Rule 108 of the
Rules of Court are those provided in Articles 407 and 408 of the Civil Code:
ART. 407. Acts, events and judicial decrees concerning the civil status of persons
shall be recorded in the civil register.

ART. 408. The following shall be entered in the civil register:

(1) Births; (2) marriages; (3) deaths; (4) legal separations; (5) annulments of
marriage; (6) judgments declaring marriages void from the beginning; (7)
legitimations; (8) adoptions; (9) acknowledgments of natural children; (10)
naturalization; (11) loss, or (12) recovery of citizenship; (13) civil interdiction; (14)
judicial determination of filiation; (15) voluntary emancipation of a minor; and(16)
changes of name.
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Theacts, events or factual errors contemplated under Article 407 of the Civil Code include
even those that occur after birth. HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2008/
[20]
Respondent undisputedly has CAH. This condition causes the early or inappropriate
appearance of male characteristics. A person, like respondent, with this condition produces too much
androgen, a male hormone. A newborn who has XX chromosomes coupled with CAH usually has a
(1) swollen clitoris with the urethral opening at the base, an ambiguous genitalia often appearing more
male than female; (2) normal internal structures of the female reproductive tract such as the ovaries,
uterus and fallopian tubes; as the child grows older, some features start to appear male, such as
deepening of the voice, facial hair, and HYPERLINK "http://www.nlm.nih.gov/medlineplus/ency/
article/003149.htm" failure to menstruateat puberty.About 1 in 10,000 to 18,000 children are born
with CAH.
CAH is one of many conditions HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2008/

[21]
september2008/166676.htm" \l "_ftn21" \o "" that involveintersexanatomy. During the twentieth
century, medicine adopted the termintersexualityto apply to human beings who cannot be classified
as either male or female. HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2008/
[22]
september2008/166676.htm" \l "_ftn22" \o "" The term is now of widespread use.According
to Wikipedia, intersexuality is the state of a living thing of a gonochoristicspecies whose sex
chromosomes, genitalia, and/or secondary sex characteristics are determined to be neither exclusively
male nor female.An organism withintersexmay have biological characteristics of both male and
female sexes.
Intersex individuals are treated in different ways by different cultures. In most

societies,intersexindividuals have been expected to conform to either a male or female gender role.
HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2008/september2008/166676.htm" \l "_ftn23"
[23]
\o "" Since the rise of modern medical science in Western societies, someintersexpeople with
ambiguous external genitalia have had their genitalia surgically modified to resemble either male or
female genitals. HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2008/
[24]
september2008/166676.htm" \l "_ftn24" \o "" More commonly, an intersex individual is
considered as suffering from a disorder which is almost always recommended to be treated, whether
by surgery and/or by taking lifetime medication in order to mold the individual as neatly as possible
into the category of either male or female.
In deciding this case, we consider the compassionate calls for recognition of the various
degrees ofintersexas variations which should not be subject to outright denial.It has been suggested
that there is some middle ground between the sexes, a no-mans land for those individuals who are
neither truly male nor truly female. HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2008/
[25]
september2008/166676.htm" \l "_ftn25" \o "" The current state of Philippine statutes apparently
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compels that a person be classified either as a male or as a female, but this Court is not controlled by
mere appearances when nature itself fundamentally negates such rigid classification.
In the instant case, if we determine respondent to be a female, then there is no basis for a
change in the birth certificate entry for gender.But if we determine, based on medical testimony and
scientific development showingtherespondenttobeotherthanfemale,thenachangeinthe
subjects birth certificate entry is in order.
Biologically, nature endowed respondent with a mixed (neither consistently and categorically
female nor consistently and categorically male) composition. Respondent has female (XX)
chromosomes.However, respondents body system naturally produces high levels of male hormones
(androgen).As a result, respondent has ambiguous genitalia and the phenotypic features of a male.
Ultimately, we are of the view that where the person is biologically or naturallyintersexthe
determining factor in his gender classification would be what the individual, like respondent, having
reached the age of majority, with good reason thinks of his/her sex.Respondent here thinks of himself
as a male and considering that his body produces high levels of male hormones (androgen) there is
preponderant biological support for considering him as being male. Sexual development in cases
ofintersexpersons makes the gender classification at birth inconclusive.It is at maturity that the
gender of such persons, like respondent, is fixed.
Respondent here has simply let nature take its course and has not taken unnatural steps to
arrest or interfere with what he was born with.And accordingly, he has already ordered his life to that
of a male. Respondent could have undergone treatment and taken steps, like taking lifelong
medication, HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2008/september2008/166676.htm"
[26]
\l "_ftn26" \o "" to force his body into the categorical mold of a female but he did not.He chose
not to do so.Nature has instead taken its due course in respondents development to reveal more fully
his male characteristics.
In the absence of a law on the matter, the Court will not dictate on respondent concerning a
matter so innately private as ones sexuality and lifestyle preferences, much less on whether or not to
undergo medical treatment to reverse the male tendency due to CAH.The Court will not consider
respondent as having erred in not choosing to undergo treatment in order to become or remain as a
female.Neither will the Court force respondent to undergo treatment and to take medication in order
to fit the mold of a female, as society commonly currently knows this gender of the human
species.Respondent is the one who has to live with hisintersexanatomy.To him belongs the human
right to the pursuit of happiness and of health.Thus, to him should belong the primordial choice of
what courses of action to take along the path of his sexual development and maturation.In the absence
of evidence that respondent is an incompetent HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/
[27]
2008/september2008/166676.htm" \l "_ftn27" \o "" and in the absence of evidence to show that
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classifying respondent as a male will harm other members of society who are equally entitled to
protection under the law, the Court affirms as valid and justified the respondents position and his
personal judgment of being a male.
In so ruling we do no more than give respect to (1) the diversity of nature; and (2) how an
individual deals with what nature has handed out.In other words, we respect respondents congenital
condition and his mature decision to be a male.Life is already difficult for the ordinary person.We
cannot but respect how respondent deals with hisunordinarystate and thus help make his life easier,
considering the unique circumstances in this case.
As for respondents change of name under Rule 103, this Court has held that a change of name
is not a matter of right but of judicial discretion, to be exercised in the light of the reasons adduced and
the consequences that will follow. HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2008/
[28]
september2008/166676.htm" \l "_ftn28" \o "" The trial courts grant of respondents change of
name from Jennifer to Jeff implies a change of a feminine name to a masculine name. Considering the
consequence that respondents change of name merely recognizes his preferred gender, we find merit in
respondents change of name.Such a change will conform with the change of the entry in his birth
certificate from female to male.
WHEREFORE, the Republics petition isDENIED.The Decision datedJanuary 12, 2005of

the Regional Trial Court, Branch 33 of Siniloan, Laguna, isAFFIRMED.No pronouncement as to
costs.
SO ORDERED.
2. ROMMEL JACINTO DANTES SILVERIO vs REPUBLIC
CORONA,J.:
When God created man, He made him in the likeness of God; He created them male and female.
(Genesis 5:1-2)
Amihan gazed upon the bamboo reed planted by Bathala and she heard voices coming from inside the
bamboo. "Oh North Wind! North Wind! Please let us out!," the voices said. She pecked the reed once,
then twice. All of a sudden, the bamboo cracked and slit open. Out came two human beings; one was a
male and the other was a female. Amihan named the man "Malakas" (Strong) and the woman
"Maganda" (Beautiful). (The Legend of Malakas and Maganda)
When is a man a man and when is a woman a woman? In particular, does the law recognize the
changes made by a physician using scalpel, drugs and counseling with regard to a persons sex? May a
person successfully petition for a change of name and sex appearing in the birth certificate to reflect
the result of a sex reassignment surgery?
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On November 26, 2002, petitioner Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio filed a petition for the change of
his first name and sex in his birth certificate in the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 8. The
petition, docketed as SP Case No. 02-105207, impleaded the civil registrar of Manila as respondent.
Petitioner alleged in his petition that he was born in the City of Manila to the spouses Melecio Petines
Silverio and Anita Aquino Dantes on April 4, 1962. His name was registered as "Rommel Jacinto
Dantes Silverio" in his certificate of live birth (birth certificate). His sex was registered as "male."
He further alleged that he is a male transsexual, that is, "anatomically male but feels, thinks and acts
as a female" and that he had always identified himself with girls since childhood. HYPERLINK
1
"http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2007/oct2007/gr_174689_2007.html" \l "fnt1" Feeling trapped
in a mans body, he consulted several doctors in the United States. He underwent psychological
examination, hormone treatment and breast augmentation. His attempts to transform himself to a
"woman" culminated on January 27, 2001 when he underwent sex reassignment surgery
2
HYPERLINK "http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2007/oct2007/gr_174689_2007.html" \l "fnt2" in
Bangkok, Thailand. He was thereafter examined by Dr. Marcelino Reysio-Cruz, Jr., a plastic and
reconstruction surgeon in the Philippines, who issued a medical certificate attesting that he (petitioner)
had in fact undergone the procedure.
From then on, petitioner lived as a female and was in fact engaged to be married. He then sought to
have his name in his birth certificate changed from "Rommel Jacinto" to "Mely," and his sex from
"male" to "female."
An order setting the case for initial hearing was published in the Peoples Journal Tonight, a
newspaper of general circulation in Metro Manila, for three consecutive weeks. HYPERLINK "http://
3
www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2007/oct2007/gr_174689_2007.html" \l "fnt3" Copies of the order
were sent to the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) and the civil registrar of Manila.
On the scheduled initial hearing, jurisdictional requirements were established. No opposition to the
petition was made.
During trial, petitioner testified for himself. He also presented Dr. Reysio-Cruz, Jr. and his American
fianc, Richard P. Edel, as witnesses.
On June 4, 2003, the trial court rendered a decision HYPERLINK "http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/

4
juri2007/oct2007/gr_174689_2007.html" \l "fnt4" in favor of petitioner. Its relevant portions read:
Petitioner filed the present petition not to evade any law or judgment or any infraction thereof or for
any unlawful motive but solely for the purpose of making his birth records compatible with his present
sex.
The sole issue here is whether or not petitioner is entitled to the relief asked for.
The [c]ourt rules in the affirmative.
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Firstly, the [c]ourt is of the opinion that granting the petition would be more in consonance with the
principles of justice and equity. With his sexual [re-assignment], petitioner, who has always felt,
thought and acted like a woman, now possesses the physique of a female. Petitioners misfortune to be
trapped in a mans body is not his own doing and should not be in any way taken against him.
Likewise, the [c]ourt believes that no harm, injury [or] prejudice will be caused to anybody or the
community in granting the petition. On the contrary, granting the petition would bring the much-
awaited happiness on the part of the petitioner and her [fianc] and the realization of their dreams.
Finally, no evidence was presented to show any cause or ground to deny the present petition despite
due notice and publication thereof. Even the State, through the [OSG] has not seen fit to interpose any
[o]pposition.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered GRANTING the petition and ordering the Civil
Registrar of Manila to change the entries appearing in the Certificate of Birth of [p]etitioner,
specifically for petitioners first name from "Rommel Jacinto" toMELYand petitioners gender from
"Male" to FEMALE. HYPERLINK "http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2007/oct2007/
5
gr_174689_2007.html" \l "fnt5"
On August 18, 2003, the Republic of the Philippines (Republic), thru the OSG, filed a petition for
certiorari in the Court of Appeals. HYPERLINK "http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2007/oct2007/
6
gr_174689_2007.html" \l "fnt6" It alleged that there is no law allowing the change of entries in the
birth certificate by reason of sex alteration.
On February 23, 2006, the Court of Appeals HYPERLINK "http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2007/

7
oct2007/gr_174689_2007.html" \l "fnt7" rendered a decision HYPERLINK "http://
8
www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2007/oct2007/gr_174689_2007.html" \l "fnt8" in favor of the
Republic. It ruled that the trial courts decision lacked legal basis. There is no law allowing the change
of either name or sex in the certificate of birth on the ground of sex reassignment through surgery.
Thus, the Court of Appeals granted the Republics petition, set aside the decision of the trial court and
ordered the dismissal of SP Case No. 02-105207. Petitioner moved for reconsideration but it was
denied. HYPERLINK "http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2007/oct2007/gr_174689_2007.html" \l
9
"fnt9" Hence, this petition.
Petitioner essentially claims that the change of his name and sex in his birth certificate is allowed
under Articles 407 to 413 of the Civil Code, Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of Court and RA 9048.
10
HYPERLINK "http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2007/oct2007/gr_174689_2007.html" \l "fnt10"
The petition lacks merit.
A Persons First Name Cannot Be Changed On the Ground of Sex Reassignment
Petitioner invoked his sex reassignment as the ground for his petition for change of name and sex. As
found by the trial court:
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Petitioner filed the present petition not to evade any law or judgment or any infraction thereof or for
any unlawful motive butsolely for the purpose of making his birth records compatible with his
present sex. (emphasis supplied)
Petitioner believes that after having acquired the physical features of a female, he became entitled to
the civil registry changes sought. We disagree.
The State has an interest in the names borne by individuals and entities for purposes of identification.
11
A change of name is a privilege, not a right. HYPERLINK "http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/
12
juri2007/oct2007/gr_174689_2007.html" \l "fnt12" Petitions for change of name are controlled by
statutes. HYPERLINK "http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2007/oct2007/gr_174689_2007.html" \l
13
"fnt13" In this connection, Article 376 of the Civil Code provides:
ART. 376. No person can change his name or surname without judicial authority.
This Civil Code provision was amended by RA 9048 (Clerical Error Law). In particular, Section 1 of
RA 9048 provides:
SECTION 1.Authority to Correct Clerical or Typographical Error and Change of First Name or
Nickname. No entry in a civil register shall be changed or corrected without a judicial order, except
for clerical or typographical errors and change of first name or nickname which can be corrected or
changed by the concerned city or municipal civil registrar or consul general in accordance with the
provisions of this Act and its implementing rules and regulations.
RA 9048 now governs the change of first name. HYPERLINK "http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/

14
juri2007/oct2007/gr_174689_2007.html" \l "fnt14" It vests the power and authority to entertain
petitions for change of first name to the city or municipal civil registrar or consul general concerned.
Under the law, therefore, jurisdiction over applications for change of first name is now primarily
lodged with the aforementioned administrative officers. The intent and effect of the law is to exclude
the change of first name from the coverage of Rules 103 (Change of Name) and 108 (Cancellation or
Correction of Entries in the Civil Registry) of the Rules of Court, until and unless an administrative
petition for change of name is first filed and subsequently denied. HYPERLINK "http://
15
www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2007/oct2007/gr_174689_2007.html" \l "fnt15" It likewise lays down
the corresponding venue, HYPERLINK "http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2007/oct2007/
16
gr_174689_2007.html" \l "fnt16" form HYPERLINK "http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2007/
17
oct2007/gr_174689_2007.html" \l "fnt17" and procedure. In sum, the remedy and the proceedings
regulating change of first name are primarily administrative in nature, not judicial.
RA 9048 likewise provides the grounds for which change of first name may be allowed:
SECTION 4.Grounds for Change of First Name or Nickname. The petition for change of first name
or nickname may be allowed in any of the following cases:
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(1) The petitioner finds the first name or nickname to be ridiculous, tainted with dishonor or extremely
difficult to write or pronounce;
(2) The new first name or nickname has been habitually and continuously used by the petitioner and
he has been publicly known by that first name or nickname in the community; or
(3) The change will avoid confusion.
Petitioners basis in praying for the change of his first name was his sex reassignment. He intended to
make his first name compatible with the sex he thought he transformed himself into through surgery.
However, a change of name does not alter ones legal capacity or civil status. HYPERLINK "http://
18
www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2007/oct2007/gr_174689_2007.html" \l "fnt18" RA 9048 does not
sanction a change of first name on the ground of sex reassignment. Rather than avoiding confusion,
changing petitioners first name for his declared purpose may only create grave complications in the
civil registry and the public interest.
Before a person can legally change his given name, he must present proper or reasonable cause or any
compelling reason justifying such change. HYPERLINK "http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2007/
19
oct2007/gr_174689_2007.html" \l "fnt19" In addition, he must show that he will be prejudiced by
the use of his true and official name. HYPERLINK "http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2007/oct2007/
20
gr_174689_2007.html" \l "fnt20" In this case, he failed to show, or even allege, any prejudice that
he might suffer as a result of using his true and official name.
In sum, the petition in the trial court in so far as it prayed for the change of petitioners first name was
not within that courts primary jurisdiction as the petition should have been filed with the local civil
registrar concerned, assuming it could be legally done. It was an improper remedy because the proper
remedy was administrative, that is, that provided under RA 9048. It was also filed in the wrong venue
as the proper venue was in the Office of the Civil Registrar of Manila where his birth certificate is
kept. More importantly, it had no merit since the use of his true and official name does not prejudice
him at all. For all these reasons, the Court of Appeals correctly dismissed petitioners petition in so far
as the change of his first name was concerned.
No Law Allows The Change of Entry In The Birth Certificate As To Sex On the Ground of Sex
Reassignment
The determination of a persons sex appearing in his birth certificate is a legal issue and the court must
look to the statutes. HYPERLINK "http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2007/oct2007/
21
gr_174689_2007.html" \l "fnt21" In this connection, Article 412 of the Civil Code provides:
ART. 412. No entry in the civil register shall be changed or corrected without a judicial order.
Together with Article 376 of the Civil Code, this provision was amended by RA 9048 in so far
asclerical or typographicalerrors are involved. The correction or change of such matters can now be
made through administrative proceedings and without the need for a judicial order. In effect, RA 9048
removed from the ambit of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court the correction of such errors. HYPERLINK
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22
"http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2007/oct2007/gr_174689_2007.html" \l "fnt22" Rule 108 now
applies only to substantial changes and corrections in entries in the civil register. HYPERLINK
23
"http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2007/oct2007/gr_174689_2007.html" \l "fnt23"
Section 2(c) of RA 9048 defines what a "clerical or typographical error" is:
SECTION 2.Definition of Terms. As used in this Act, the following terms shall mean:
xxx xxx xxx
(3) "Clerical or typographical error" refers to a mistake committed in the performance of clerical work
in writing, copying, transcribing or typing an entry in the civil register that is harmless and innocuous,
such as misspelled name or misspelled place of birth or the like, which is visible to the eyes or
obvious to the understanding, and can be corrected or changed only by reference to other existing
record or records:Provided, however,That nocorrection must involve the change ofnationality,
age, status orsexof the petitioner. (emphasis supplied)
Under RA 9048, a correction in the civil registry involving the change of sex is not a mere clerical or
typographical error. It is a substantial change for which the applicable procedure is Rule 108 of the
Rules of Court.
The entries envisaged in Article 412 of the Civil Code and correctable under Rule 108 of the Rules of
Court are those provided in Articles 407 and 408 of the Civil Code: HYPERLINK "http://
24
www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2007/oct2007/gr_174689_2007.html" \l "fnt24"
ART. 407. Acts, events and judicial decrees concerning the civil status of persons shall be recorded in
the civil register.
ART. 408. The following shall be entered in the civil register:
(1) Births; (2) marriages; (3) deaths; (4) legal separations; (5) annulments of marriage; (6) judgments
declaring marriages void from the beginning; (7) legitimations; (8) adoptions; (9) acknowledgments of
natural children; (10) naturalization; (11) loss, or (12) recovery of citizenship; (13) civil interdiction;
(14) judicial determination of filiation; (15) voluntary emancipation of a minor; and (16) changes of
name.
The acts, events or factual errors contemplated under Article 407 of the Civil Code include even those
that occur after birth. HYPERLINK "http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2007/oct2007/
25
gr_174689_2007.html" \l "fnt25" However, no reasonable interpretation of the provision can justify
the conclusion that it covers the correction on the ground of sex reassignment.
To correct simply means "to make or set aright; to remove the faults or error from" while to change
means "to replace something with something else of the same kind or with something that serves as a
substitute." HYPERLINK "http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2007/oct2007/gr_174689_2007.html"
26
\l "fnt26" The birth certificate of petitioner contained no error. All entries therein, including those
Page 14 of 193
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corresponding to his first name and sex, were all correct. No correction is necessary.
Article 407 of the Civil Code authorizes the entry in the civil registry of certain acts (such as
legitimations, acknowledgments of illegitimate children and naturalization),events(such as births,
marriages, naturalization and deaths) andjudicial decrees(such as legal separations, annulments of
marriage, declarations of nullity of marriages, adoptions, naturalization, loss or recovery of
citizenship, civil interdiction, judicial determination of filiation and changes of name). These acts,
events and judicial decrees produce legal consequences that touch upon the legal capacity, status and
nationality of a person. Their effects are expressly sanctioned by the laws. In contrast, sex
reassignment is not among those acts or events mentioned in Article 407. Neither is it recognized nor
even mentioned by any law, expressly or impliedly.
"Status" refers to the circumstances affecting the legal situation (that is, the sum total of capacities and
incapacities) of a person in view of his age, nationality and his family membership. HYPERLINK
27
"http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2007/oct2007/gr_174689_2007.html" \l "fnt27"
The status of a person in law includes all his personal qualities and relations,more or less permanent
in nature, not ordinarily terminable at his own will, such as his being legitimate or illegitimate, or
his being married or not. The comprehensive termstatus include such matters as the beginning and
end of legal personality, capacity to have rights in general, family relations, and its various aspects,
such as birth, legitimation, adoption, emancipation, marriage, divorce, and sometimes even
succession. HYPERLINK "http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2007/oct2007/gr_174689_2007.html"
28
\l "fnt28" (emphasis supplied)
A persons sex is an essential factor in marriage and family relations. It is a part of a persons legal
capacity and civil status. In this connection, Article 413 of the Civil Code provides:
ART. 413. All other matters pertaining to the registration of civil status shall be governed by special
laws.
But there is no such special law in the Philippines governing sex reassignment and its effects. This is
fatal to petitioners cause.
Moreover, Section 5 of Act 3753 (the Civil Register Law) provides:
SEC. 5.Registration and certification of births. The declaration of the physician or midwife in
attendance at the birth or, in default thereof, the declaration of either parent of the newborn child, shall
be sufficient for the registration of a birth in the civil register. Such declaration shall be exempt from
documentary stamp tax and shall be sent to the local civil registrar not later than thirty days after the
birth, by the physician or midwife in attendance at the birth or by either parent of the newborn child.
In such declaration, the person above mentioned shall certify to the following facts: (a) date and hour
of birth; (b)sexand nationalityof infant; (c) names, citizenship and religion of parents or, in case the
father is not known, of the mother alone; (d) civil status of parents; (e) place where the infant was
born; and (f) such other data as may be required in the regulations to be issued.
Page 15 of 193
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xxx xxx xxx (emphasis supplied)
Under the Civil Register Law, a birth certificate is a historical record of the facts as they existed at the
time of birth. HYPERLINK "http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2007/oct2007/gr_174689_2007.html"
29
\l "fnt29" Thus,the sex of a person is determined at birth,visually done by the birth attendant (the
physician or midwife) by examining the genitals of the infant. Considering that there is no law legally
recognizing sex reassignment, the determination of a persons sex made at the time of his or her birth,
if not attended by error, HYPERLINK "http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2007/oct2007/
30
gr_174689_2007.html" \l "fnt30" is immutable. HYPERLINK "http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/
31
juri2007/oct2007/gr_174689_2007.html" \l "fnt31"
When words are not defined in a statute they are to be given their common and ordinary meaning in
the absence of a contrary legislative intent. The words "sex," "male" and "female" as used in the Civil
Register Law and laws concerning the civil registry (and even all other laws) should therefore be
understood in their common and ordinary usage, there being no legislative intent to the contrary. In
this connection, sex is defined as "the sum of peculiarities of structure and function that distinguish a
male from a female" HYPERLINK "http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2007/oct2007/
32
gr_174689_2007.html" \l "fnt32" or "the distinction between male and female." HYPERLINK
33
"http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2007/oct2007/gr_174689_2007.html" \l "fnt33" Female is "the
sex that produces ova or bears young" HYPERLINK "http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2007/
34
oct2007/gr_174689_2007.html" \l "fnt34" and male is "the sex that has organs to produce
spermatozoa for fertilizing ova." HYPERLINK "http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2007/oct2007/
35
gr_174689_2007.html" \l "fnt35" Thus, the words "male" and "female" in everyday understanding
do not include persons who have undergone sex reassignment. Furthermore, "words that are employed
in a statute which had at the time a well-known meaning are presumed to have been used in that sense
unless the context compels to the contrary." HYPERLINK "http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2007/
36
oct2007/gr_174689_2007.html" \l "fnt36" Since the statutory language of the Civil Register Law
was enacted in the early 1900s and remains unchanged, it cannot be argued that the term "sex" as used
then is something alterable through surgery or something that allows a post-operative male-to-female
transsexual to be included in the category "female."
For these reasons, while petitioner may have succeeded in altering his body and appearance through
the intervention of modern surgery, no law authorizes the change of entry as to sex in the civil registry
for that reason. Thus, there is no legal basis for his petition for the correction or change of the entries
in his birth certificate.
Neither May Entries in the Birth Certificate As to First Name or Sex Be Changed on the Ground
of Equity
The trial court opined that its grant of the petition was in consonance with the principles of justice and
equity. It believed that allowing the petition would cause no harm, injury or prejudice to anyone. This
is wrong.
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The changes sought by petitioner will have serious and wide-ranging legal and public policy
consequences. First, even the trial court itself found that the petition was but petitioners first step
towards his eventual marriage to his male fianc. However, marriage, one of the most sacred social
institutions, is a special contract of permanent unionbetween a man and a woman. HYPERLINK
37
"http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2007/oct2007/gr_174689_2007.html" \l "fnt37" One of its
essential requisites is thelegal capacity of the contracting parties who must be a male and a female.
38
To grant the changes sought by petitioner will substantially reconfigure and greatly alter the laws
on marriage and family relations. It will allow the union of a man with another man who has
undergone sex reassignment (a male-to-female post-operative transsexual). Second, there are various
laws which apply particularly to women such as the provisions of the Labor Code on employment of
women, HYPERLINK "http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2007/oct2007/gr_174689_2007.html" \l
39
"fnt39" certain felonies under the Revised Penal Code HYPERLINK "http://www.lawphil.net/
40
judjuris/juri2007/oct2007/gr_174689_2007.html" \l "fnt40" and the presumption of survivorship in
case of calamities under Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, HYPERLINK "http://www.lawphil.net/
41
judjuris/juri2007/oct2007/gr_174689_2007.html" \l "fnt41" among others. These laws underscore
the public policy in relation to women which could be substantially affected if petitioners petition
were to be granted.
It is true that Article 9 of the Civil Code mandates that "[n]o judge or court shall decline to render
judgment by reason of the silence, obscurity or insufficiency of the law." However, it is not a license
for courts to engage in judicial legislation. The duty of the courts is to apply or interpret the law, not to
make or amend it.
In our system of government, it is for the legislature, should it choose to do so, to determine what
guidelines should govern the recognition of the effects of sex reassignment. The need for legislative
guidelines becomes particularly important in this case where the claims asserted are statute-based.
To reiterate, the statutes define who may file petitions for change of first name and for correction or
change of entries in the civil registry, where they may be filed, what grounds may be invoked, what
proof must be presented and what procedures shall be observed. If the legislature intends to confer on
a person who has undergone sex reassignment the privilege to change his name and sex to conform
with his reassigned sex, it has to enact legislation laying down the guidelines in turn governing the
conferment of that privilege.
It might be theoretically possible for this Court to write a protocol on when a person may be
recognized as having successfully changed his sex. However, this Court has no authority to fashion a
law on that matter, or on anything else. The Court cannot enact a law where no law exists. It can only
apply or interpret the written word of its co-equal branch of government, Congress.
Petitioner pleads that "[t]he unfortunates are also entitled to a life of happiness, contentment and [the]
realization of their dreams." No argument about that. The Court recognizes that there are people
whose preferences and orientation do not fit neatly into the commonly recognized parameters of social
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convention and that, at least for them, life is indeed an ordeal. However, the remedies petitioner seeks
involve questions of public policy to be addressed solely by the legislature, not by the courts.
WHEREFORE, the petition is herebyDENIED.
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
3. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs LIBERTY D. ALBIOS
DECISION
MENDOZA,J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules t of Court assailing the September
29, 2011 Decision HYPERLINK "http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/oct2013/
1
gr_198780_2013.html" \l "fnt1" of the Court of Appeals (CA), in CA-G.R. CV No. 95414, which
affirmed the April 25, 2008Decision HYPERLINK "http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/oct2013/
2
gr_198780_2013.html" \l "fnt2" of the Regional Trial Court, Imus, Cavite (RTC). declaring the
marriage of Daniel Lee Fringer (Fringer) and respondent Liberty Albios (A/bios) as void from the
beginning.
The facts
On October 22, 2004, Fringer, an American citizen, and Albios were married before Judge Ofelia I.
Calo of the Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch59, Mandaluyong City (MeTC), as evidenced by a
Certificate of Marriage with Register No. 2004-1588. HYPERLINK "http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/
3
juri2013/oct2013/gr_198780_2013.html" \l "fnt3"
On December 6, 2006, Albios filed with the RTC a petition for declaration of nullity 4 of her marriage
with Fringer. She alleged that immediately after their marriage, they separated and never lived as
husband and wife because they never really had any intention of entering into a married state or
complying with any of their essential marital obligations. She described their marriage as one made in
jest and, therefore, null and void ab initio .
Summons was served on Fringer but he did not file his answer. On September 13, 2007, Albios filed a
motion to set case for pre-trial and to admit her pre-trial brief. The RTC ordered the Assistant
Provincial Prosecutor to conduct an investigation and determine the existence of a collusion. On
October 2, 2007, the Assistant Prosecutor complied and reported that she could not make a
determination for failure of both parties to appear at the scheduled investigation.
At the pre-trial, only Albios, her counsel and the prosecutor appeared. Fringer did not attend the
hearing despite being duly notified of the schedule. After the pre-trial, hearing on the merits ensued.
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Ruling of the RTC
In its April 25, 2008 Decision, HYPERLINK "http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/oct2013/

5
gr_198780_2013.html" \l "fnt5" the RTC declared the marriage void ab initio, the dispositive portion
of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered declaring the marriage of Liberty
Albios and Daniel Lee Fringer as void from the very beginning. As a necessary consequence of this
pronouncement, petitioner shall cease using the surname of respondent as she never acquired any right
over it and so as to avoid a misimpression that she remains the wife of respondent.
xxxx
SO ORDERED. HYPERLINK "http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/oct2013/

6
gr_198780_2013.html" \l "fnt6"
The RTC was of the view that the parties married each other for convenience only. Giving credence to
the testimony of Albios, it stated that she contracted Fringer to enter into a marriage to enable her to
acquire American citizenship; that in consideration thereof, she agreed to pay him the sum of
$2,000.00; that after the ceremony, the parties went their separate ways; that Fringer returned to the
United States and never again communicated with her; and that, in turn, she did not pay him the
$2,000.00 because he never processed her petition for citizenship. The RTC, thus, ruled that when
marriage was entered into for a purpose other than the establishment of a conjugal and family life,
such was a farce and should not be recognized from its inception.
Petitioner Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed
a motion for reconsideration. The RTC issued the Order, 7 dated February 5, 2009, denying the motion
for want of merit. It explained that the marriage was declared void because the parties failed to freely
give their consent to the marriage as they had no intention to be legally bound by it and used it only as
a means to acquire American citizenship in consideration of $2,000.00.
Not in conformity, the OSG filed an appeal before the CA.
Ruling of the CA
In its assailed decision, dated September 29, 2011, the CA affirmed the RTC ruling which found that
the essential requisite of consent was lacking. The CA stated that the parties clearly did not understand
the nature and consequence of getting married and that their case was similar to a marriage in jest. It
further explained that the parties never intended to enter into the marriage contract and never intended
to live as husband and wife or build a family. It concluded that their purpose was primarily for
personal gain, that is, for Albios to obtain foreign citizenship, and for Fringer, the consideration of
$2,000.00.
Hence, this petition.
Assignment of Error
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THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED ON A QUESTION OF LAWWHEN IT HELD

THAT A MARRIAGE CONTRACTED FOR THEPURPOSE OF OBTAINING
FOREIGN CITIZENSHIP WAS DONEIN JEST, HENCE, LACKING IN THE
ESSENTIAL ELEMENT OFCONSENT. HYPERLINK "http://www.lawphil.net/
8
judjuris/juri2013/oct2013/gr_198780_2013.html" \l "fnt8"
The OSG argues that albeit the intention was for Albios to acquire American citizenship and for
Fringer to be paid $2,000.00, both parties freely gave their consent to the marriage, as they knowingly
and willingly entered into that marriage and knew the benefits and consequences of being bound by it.
According to the OSG, consent should be distinguished from motive, the latter being inconsequential
to the validity of marriage.
The OSG also argues that the present case does not fall within the concept of a marriage in jest. The
parties here intentionally consented to enter into a real and valid marriage, for if it were otherwise, the
purpose of Albios to acquire American citizenship would be rendered futile.
On October 29, 2012, Albios filed her Comment HYPERLINK "http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/

9
juri2013/oct2013/gr_198780_2013.html" \l "fnt9" to the petition, reiterating her stand that her
marriage was similar to a marriage by way of jest and, therefore, void from the beginning.
On March 22, 2013, the OSG filed its Reply HYPERLINK "http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/
10
oct2013/gr_198780_2013.html" \l "fnt10" reiterating its arguments in its petition for review on
certiorari.
Ruling of the Court
The resolution of this case hinges on this sole question of law: Is a marriage, contracted for the sole
purpose of acquiring American citizenship in consideration of $2,000.00, void ab initio on the ground
of lack of consent?
The Court resolves in the negative.
Before the Court delves into its ruling, It shall first examine the phenomenon of marriage fraud for the
purposes of immigration.
Marriage Fraud in Immigration
The institution of marriage carries with it concomitant benefits. This has led to the development of
marriage fraud for the sole purpose of availing of particular benefits. In the United States, marriages
where a couple marries only to achieve a particular purpose or acquire specific benefits, have been
referred to as "limited purpose" marriages. HYPERLINK "http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/
11
oct2013/gr_198780_2013.html" \l "fnt11" A common limited purpose marriage is one entered into
solely for the legitimization of a child. HYPERLINK "http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/
12
oct2013/gr_198780_2013.html" \l "fnt12" Another, which is the subject of the present case, is for
immigration purposes. Immigration law is usually concerned with the intention of the couple at the
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time of their marriage, HYPERLINK "http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/oct2013/

13
gr_198780_2013.html" \l "fnt13" and it attempts to filter out those who use marriage solely to
achieve immigration status. HYPERLINK "http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/oct2013/
14
gr_198780_2013.html" \l "fnt14"
In 1975, the seminal case of Bark v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, HYPERLINK "http://
15
www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/oct2013/gr_198780_2013.html" \l "fnt15" established the
principal test for determining the presence of marriage fraud in immigration cases. It ruled that a
"marriage is a sham if the bride and groom did not intend to establish a life together at the time they
were married. "This standard was modified with the passage of the Immigration Marriage Fraud
Amendment of 1986 (IMFA), which now requires the couple to instead demonstrate that the marriage
was not "entered into for the purpose of evading the immigration laws of the United States." The
focus, thus, shifted from determining the intention to establish a life together, to determining the
intention of evading immigration laws. HYPERLINK "http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/
16
oct2013/gr_198780_2013.html" \l "fnt16" It must be noted, however, that this standard is used
purely for immigration purposes and, therefore, does not purport to rule on the legal validity or
existence of a marriage.
The question that then arises is whether a marriage declared as a sham or fraudulent for the limited
purpose of immigration is also legally void and in existent. The early cases on limited purpose
marriages in the United States made no definitive ruling. In 1946, the notable case of
United States v. Rubenstein HYPERLINK "http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/oct2013/

17
gr_198780_2013.html" \l "fnt17" was promulgated, wherein in order to allow an alien to stay in the
country, the parties had agreed to marry but not to live together and to obtain a divorce within six
months. The Court, through Judge Learned Hand, ruled that a marriage to convert temporary into
permanent permission to stay in the country was not a marriage, there being no consent, to wit:
x x x But, that aside, Spitz and Sandler were never married at all. Mutual consent is necessary to every
contract; and no matter what forms or ceremonies the parties may go through indicating the contrary,
they do not contract if they do not in fact assent, which may always be proved. x x x Marriage is no
exception to this rule: a marriage in jest is not a marriage at all. x x x It is quite true that a marriage
without subsequent consummation will be valid; but if the spouses agree to a marriage only for the
sake of representing it as such to the outside world and with the understanding that they will put an
end to it as soon as it has served its purpose to deceive, they have never really agreed to be married at
all. They must assent to enter into the relation as it is ordinarily understood, and it is not ordinarily
understood as merely a pretence, or cover, to deceive others. HYPERLINK "http://www.lawphil.net/
18
judjuris/juri2013/oct2013/gr_198780_2013.html" \l "fnt18"
(Italics supplied)
On the other end of the spectrum is the 1969 case of Mpiliris v. Hellenic Lines, HYPERLINK "http://
19
www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/oct2013/gr_198780_2013.html" \l "fnt19" which declared as
Page 21 of 193
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valid a marriage entered into solely for the husband to gain entry to the United States, stating that a
valid marriage could not be avoided "merely because the marriage was entered into for a limited
purpose." HYPERLINK "http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/oct2013/gr_198780_2013.html" \l
20
"fnt20" The 1980 immigration case of Matter of McKee, HYPERLINK "http://www.lawphil.net/
21
judjuris/juri2013/oct2013/gr_198780_2013.html" \l "fnt21" further recognized that a fraudulent or
sham marriage was intrinsically different from a non subsisting one.
Nullifying these limited purpose marriages for lack of consent has, therefore, been recognized as
problematic. The problem being that in order to obtain an immigration benefit, a legal marriage is first
necessary. HYPERLINK "http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/oct2013/gr_198780_2013.html" \l
22
"fnt22" At present, United States courts have generally denied annulments involving" limited
purpose" marriages where a couple married only to achieve a particular purpose, and have upheld such
marriages as valid. HYPERLINK "http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/oct2013/
23
gr_198780_2013.html" \l "fnt23"
The Court now turns to the case at hand.
Respondents marriage not void
In declaring the respondents marriage void, the RTC ruled that when a marriage was entered into for
a purpose other than the establishment of a conjugal and family life, such was a farce and should not
be recognized from its inception. In its resolution denying the OSGs motion for reconsideration, the
RTC went on to explain that the marriage was declared void because the parties failed to freely give
their consent to the marriage as they had no intention to be legally bound by it and used it only as a
means for the respondent to acquire American citizenship. Agreeing with the RTC, the CA ruled that
the essential requisite of consent was lacking. It held that the parties clearly did not understand the
nature and consequence of getting married. As in the Rubenstein case, the CA found the marriage to
be similar to a marriage in jest considering that the parties only entered into the marriage for the
acquisition of American citizenship in exchange of $2,000.00. They never intended to enter into a
marriage contract and never intended to live as husband and wife or build a family.
The CAs assailed decision was, therefore, grounded on the parties supposed lack of consent. Under
Article 2 of the Family Code, consent is an essential requisite of marriage. Article 4 of the same Code
provides that the absence of any essential requisite shall render a marriage void ab initio.
Under said Article 2, for consent to be valid, it must be (1) freely given and (2) made in the presence
of a solemnizing officer. A "freely given" consent requires that the contracting parties willingly and
deliberately enter into the marriage. Consent must be real in the sense that it is not vitiated nor
rendered defective by any of the vices of consent under Articles45 and 46 of the Family Code, such as
fraud, force, intimidation, and undue influence. HYPERLINK "http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/
24
juri2013/oct2013/gr_198780_2013.html" \l "fnt24" Consent must also be conscious or intelligent, in
that the parties must be capable of intelligently understanding the nature of, and both the beneficial or
unfavorable consequences of their act. HYPERLINK "http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/
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25
oct2013/gr_198780_2013.html" \l "fnt25" Their understanding should not be affected by insanity,
intoxication, drugs, or hypnotism. HYPERLINK "http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/oct2013/
26
gr_198780_2013.html" \l "fnt26"
Based on the above, consent was not lacking between Albios and Fringer. In fact, there was real
consent because it was not vitiated nor rendered defective by any vice of consent. Their consent was
also conscious and intelligent as they understood the nature and the beneficial and inconvenient
consequences of their marriage, as nothing impaired their ability to do so. That their consent was
freely given is best evidenced by their conscious purpose of acquiring American citizenship through
marriage. Such plainly demonstrates that they willingly and deliberately contracted the marriage.
There was a clear intention to enter into a real and valid marriage so as to fully comply with the
requirements of an application for citizenship. There was a full and complete understanding of the
legal tie that would be created between them, since it was that precise legal tie which was necessary to
accomplish their goal.
In ruling that Albios marriage was void for lack of consent, the CA characterized such as akin to a
marriage by way of jest. A marriage in jest is a pretended marriage, legal in form but entered into as a
joke, with no real intention of entering into the actual marriage status, and with a clear understanding
that the parties would not be bound. The ceremony is not followed by any conduct indicating a
purpose to enter into such a relation. HYPERLINK "http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/
27
oct2013/gr_198780_2013.html" \l "fnt27" It is a pretended marriage not intended to be real and
with no intention to create any legal ties whatsoever, hence, the absence of any genuine consent.
Marriages in jest are void ab initio, not for vitiated, defective, or unintelligent consent, but for a
complete absence of consent. There is no genuine consent because the parties have absolutely no
intention of being bound in any way or for any purpose.
The respondents marriage is not at all analogous to a marriage in jest.1wphi1Albios and Fringer had
an undeniable intention to be bound in order to create the very bond necessary to allow the respondent
to acquire American citizenship. Only a genuine consent to be married would allow them to further
their objective, considering that only a valid marriage can properly support an application for
citizenship. There was, thus, an apparent intention to enter into the actual marriage status and to create
a legal tie, albeit for a limited purpose. Genuine consent was, therefore, clearly present.
The avowed purpose of marriage under Article 1 of the Family Code is for the couple to establish a
conjugal and family life. The possibility that the parties in a marriage might have no real intention to
establish a life together is, however, insufficient to nullify a marriage freely entered into in accordance
with law. The same Article 1 provides that the nature, consequences, and incidents of marriage are
governed by law and not subject to stipulation. A marriage may, thus, only be declared void or
voidable under the grounds provided by law. There is no law that declares a marriage void if it is
entered into for purposes other than what the Constitution or law declares, such as the acquisition of
foreign citizenship. Therefore, so long as all the essential and formal requisites prescribed by law are
present, and it is not void or voidable under the grounds provided by law, it shall be declared valid.
28
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Motives for entering into a marriage are varied and complex. The State does not and cannot dictate on
the kind of life that a couple chooses to lead. Any attempt to regulate their lifestyle would go into the
realm of their right to privacy and would raise serious constitutional questions. HYPERLINK "http://
29
www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/oct2013/gr_198780_2013.html" \l "fnt29" The right to marital
privacy allows married couples to structure their marriages in almost any way they see fit, to live
together or live apart, to have children or no children, to love one another or not, and so on.
30
Thus, marriages entered into for other purposes, limited or otherwise, such as convenience,
companionship, money, status, and title, provided that they comply with all the legal requisites,
31
are equally valid. Love, though the ideal consideration in a marriage contract, is not the only valid
cause for marriage. Other considerations, not precluded by law, may validly support a marriage.
Although the Court views with disdain the respondents attempt to utilize marriage for dishonest
purposes, It cannot declare the marriage void. Hence, though the respondents marriage may be
considered a sham or fraudulent for the purposes of immigration, it is not void ab initio and continues
to be valid and subsisting.
Neither can their marriage be considered voidable on the ground of fraud under Article 45 (3) of the
Family Code. Only the circumstances listed under Article 46 of the same Code may constitute fraud,
namely, (1) non- disclosure of a previous conv1ctwn involving moral turpitude; (2) concealment by
the wife of a pregnancy by another man; (3) concealment of a sexually transmitted disease; and (4)
concealment of drug addiction, alcoholism, or homosexuality. No other misrepresentation or deceit
shall constitute fraud as a ground for an action to annul a marriage. Entering into a marriage for the
sole purpose of evading immigration laws does not qualify under any of the listed circumstances.
Furthermore, under Article 47 (3), the ground of fraud may only be brought by the injured or innocent
party. In the present case, there is no injured party because Albios and Fringer both conspired to enter
into the sham marriage.
Albios has indeed made a mockery of the sacred institution of marriage. Allowing her marriage with
Fringer to be declared void would only further trivialize this inviolable institution. The Court cannot
declare such a marriage void in the event the parties fail to qualify for immigration benefits, after they
have availed of its benefits, or simply have no further use for it. These unscrupulous individuals
cannot be allowed to use the courts as instruments in their fraudulent schemes. Albios already misused
a judicial institution to enter into a marriage of convenience; she should not be allowed to again abuse
it to get herself out of an inconvenient situation.
No less than our Constitution declares that marriage, as an in violable social institution, is the
foundation of the family and shall be protected by the State. HYPERLINK "http://www.lawphil.net/
32
judjuris/juri2013/oct2013/gr_198780_2013.html" \l "fnt32" It must, therefore, be safeguarded from
the whims and caprices of the contracting parties. This Court cannot leave the impression that
marriage may easily be entered into when it suits the needs of the parties, and just as easily nullified
when no longer needed.
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WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The September 29, 2011 Decision of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. CV No. 95414 is ANNULLED, and Civil Case No. 1134-06 is DISMISSED for utter lack
of merit.
SO ORDERED.
4. MERCEDITA MATA ARAES,petitioner vsJUDGE SALVADOR M. OCCIANO,respondent.
DECISION
PUNO,J.:
Petitioner Mercedita Mata Araes charges respondent judge with Gross Ignorance of the Lawviaa
sworn Letter-Complaint dated 23 May 2001. Respondent is the Presiding Judge of the Municipal Trial
Court of Balatan, Camarines Sur. Petitioner alleges that on 17 February 2000, respondent judge
solemnized her marriage to her late groom Dominador B. Orobia without the requisite marriage
license and at Nabua, Camarines Sur which is outside his territorial jurisdiction.
They lived together as husband and wife on the strength of this marriage until her husband
passed away. However, since the marriage was a nullity, petitioners right to inherit the vast properties
left by Orobia was not recognized. She was likewise deprived of receiving the pensions of Orobia, a
retired Commodore of the Philippine Navy.
Petitioner prays that sanctions be imposed against respondent judge for his illegal acts and
unethical misrepresentations which allegedly caused her so much hardships, embarrassment and
sufferings.
On 28 May 2001, the case was referred by the Office of the Chief Justice to then Acting Court
Administrator Zenaida N. Elepao for appropriate action. On 8 June 2001, the Office of the Court
Administrator required respondent judge to comment.
In his Comment dated 5 July 2001, respondent judge averred that he was requested by a certain
Juan Arroyo on 15 February 2000 to solemnize the marriage of the parties on 17 February 2000.
Having been assured that all the documents to the marriage were complete, he agreed to solemnize the
marriage in his sala at the Municipal Trial Court of Balatan, Camarines Sur. However, on 17 February
2000, Arroyo informed him that Orobia had a difficulty walking and could not stand the rigors of
travelling to Balatan which is located almost 25 kilometers from his residence in Nabua. Arroyo then
requested if respondent judge could solemnize the marriage in Nabua, to which request he acceded.
Respondent judge further avers that before he started the ceremony, he carefully examined the
documents submitted to him by petitioner. When he discovered that the parties did not possess the
Page 25 of 193
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requisite marriage license, he refused to solemnize the marriage and suggested its resetting to another
date. However, due to the earnest pleas of the parties, the influx of visitors, and the delivery of
provisions for the occasion, he proceeded to solemnize the marriage out of human compassion. He
also feared that if he reset the wedding, it might aggravate the physical condition of Orobia who just
suffered from a stroke. After the solemnization, he reiterated the necessity for the marriage license and
admonished the parties that their failure to give it would render the marriage void.Petitioner and
Orobia assured respondent judge that they would give the license to him in the afternoon of that same
day. When they failed to comply, respondent judge followed it up with Arroyo but the latter only gave
him the same reassurance that the marriage license would be delivered to his sala at the Municipal
Trial Court of Balatan, Camarines Sur.
Respondent judge vigorously denies that he told the contracting parties that their marriage is
valid despite the absence of a marriage license. He attributes the hardships and embarrassment
suffered by the petitioner as due to her own fault and negligence.
On 12 September 2001, petitioner filed her Affidavit of Desistance dated 28 August 2001 with
the Office of the Court Administrator. She attested that respondent judge initially refused to solemnize
her marriage due to the want of a duly issued marriage license and that it was because of her prodding
and reassurances that he eventually solemnized the same. She confessed that she filed this
administrative case out of rage. However, after reading the Comment filed by respondent judge, she
realized her own shortcomings and is now bothered by her conscience.
Reviewing the records of the case, it appears that petitioner and Orobia filed their Application for
Marriage License on 5 January 2000. It was stamped in this Application that the marriage license shall
be issued on 17 January 2000. However, neither petitioner nor Orobia claimed it.
It also appears that the Office of the Civil Registrar General issued a Certification that it has no
record of such marriage that allegedly took place on 17 February 2000. Likewise, the Office of the
Local Civil Registrar of Nabua, Camarines Sur issued another Certification dated 7 May 2001 that it
cannot issue a true copy of the Marriage Contract of the parties since it has no record of their
marriage.
On 8 May 2001, petitioner sought the assistance of respondent judge so the latter could
communicate with the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of Nabua, Camarines Sur for the issuance of
her marriage license. Respondent judge wrote the Local Civil Registrar of Nabua, Camarines Sur. In a
letter dated 9 May 2001, a Clerk of said office, Grace T. Escobal, informed respondent judge that their
office cannot issue the marriage license due to the failure of Orobia to submit the Death Certificate of
his previous spouse.
The Office of the Court Administrator, in its Report and Recommendation dated 15 November
2000, found the respondent judge guilty of solemnizing a marriage without a duly issued marriage
license and for doing so outside his territorial jurisdiction.A fine of P5,000.00 was recommended to
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be imposed on respondent judge.
We agree.
Under the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, or B.P.129, the authority of the regional trial
court judges and judges of inferior courts to solemnize marriages is confined to their territorial
jurisdiction as defined by the Supreme Court.
The case at bar is not without precedent. In Navarro vs. Domagtoy, HYPERLINK "http://
[1]
sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2002/apr2002/am_mtj_02_1390.htm" \l "_edn1" \o "" respondent
judge held office and had jurisdiction in the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Sta. Monica-Burgos,
Surigao del Norte. However, he solemnized a wedding at his residence in the municipality of Dapa,
Surigao del Norte which did not fall within the jurisdictional area of the municipalities of Sta. Monica
and Burgos. We held that:
A priest who is commissioned and allowed by his local ordinance to marry the faithful is authorized to
do so only within the area or diocese or place allowed by his Bishop. An appellate court Justice or a
Justice of this Court has jurisdiction over the entire Philippines to solemnize marriages, regardless of
the venue, as long as the requisites of the law are complied with.However, judges who are
appointed to specific jurisdictions, may officiate in weddings only within said areas and not
beyond. Where a judge solemnizes a marriage outside his courts jurisdiction, there is a resultant
irregularity in the formal requisite laid down in Article 3, which while it may not affect the
validity of the marriage, may subject the officiating official to administrative liability.
HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2002/apr2002/am_mtj_02_1390.htm" \l
[2]
"_edn2" \o "" (Emphasis supplied.)
In said case, we suspended respondent judge for six (6) months on the ground that his act of
solemnizing a marriage outside his jurisdiction constitutes gross ignorance ofthe law.We further held
that:
The judiciary should be composed of persons who, if not experts, are at least, proficient in the law
they are sworn to apply, more than the ordinary laymen. They should be skilled and competent in
understanding and applying the law. It is imperative that they be conversant with basic legal principles
like the ones involved in the instant case. x x x While magistrates may at times make mistakes in
judgment, for which they are not penalized, the respondent judge exhibited ignorance of elementary
provisions of law, in an area which has greatly prejudiced the status of married persons. HYPERLINK
[3]
"http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2002/apr2002/am_mtj_02_1390.htm" \l "_edn3" \o ""
In the case at bar, the territorial jurisdiction of respondent judge is limited to the municipality of
Balatan, Camarines Sur. His act of solemnizing the marriage of petitioner and Orobia in Nabua,
Camarines Sur therefore is contrary to law and subjects him to administrative liability. His act may not
amount to gross ignorance of the law for he allegedly solemnized the marriage out of human
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compassion but nonetheless, he cannot avoid liability for violating the law on marriage.
Respondent judge should also be faulted for solemnizing a marriage without the requisite
marriage license. In People vs. Lara, HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2002/
[4]
apr2002/am_mtj_02_1390.htm" \l "_edn4" \o "" we held that a marriage which preceded the
issuance of the marriage license is void, and that the subsequent issuance of such license cannot render
valid or even add an iota of validity to the marriage. Except in cases provided by law, it is the
marriage license that gives the solemnizing officer the authority to solemnize a marriage. Respondent
judge did not possess such authority when he solemnized the marriage of petitioner. In this respect,
respondent judge acted in gross ignorance of the law.
Respondent judge cannot be exculpated despite the Affidavit of Desistance filed by petitioner.
This Court has consistently held in a catena of cases that the withdrawal of the complaint does not
necessarily have the legal effect of exonerating respondent from disciplinary action. Otherwise, the
prompt and fair administration of justice, as well as the discipline of court personnel, would be
undermined. HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2002/apr2002/
[5]
am_mtj_02_1390.htm" \l "_edn5" \o "" Disciplinary actions of this nature do not involve purely
private or personal matters. They can not be made to depend upon the will of every complainant who
may, for one reason or another, condone a detestable act. We cannot be bound by the unilateral act of a
complainant in a matter which involves the Courts constitutional power to discipline judges.
Otherwise, that power may be put to naught, undermine the trust character of a public office and
impair the integrity and dignity of this Court as a disciplining authority. HYPERLINK "http://
[6]
sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2002/apr2002/am_mtj_02_1390.htm" \l "_edn6" \o ""
WHEREFORE, respondent Judge Salvador M. Occiano, Presiding Judge of the Municipal Trial
Court of Balatan, Camarines Sur, is fined P5,000.00pesos with a STERN WARNING that a repetition
of the same or similar offense in the future will be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.
5. ENGRACE NIAL vs. NORMA BAYADOG,
May the heirs of a deceased person file a petition for the declaration of nullity of his marriage after his
death?
Pepito Nial was married to Teodulfa Bellones on September 26, 1974. Out of their marriage were
born herein petitioners. Teodulfa was shot by Pepito resulting in her death on April 24, 1985. One year
and 8 months thereafter or on December 11, 1986, Pepito and respondent Norma Badayog got married
without any marriage license. In lieu thereof, Pepito and Norma executed an affidavit dated December
11, 1986 stating that they had lived together as husband and wife for at least five years and were thus
exempt from securing a marriage license. On February 19, 1997, Pepito died in a car accident. After
their father's death, petitioners filed a petition for declaration of nullity of the marriage of Pepito to
Norma alleging that the said marriage was void for lack of a marriage license. The case was filed
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under the assumption that the validity or invalidity of the second marriage would affect petitioner's
successional rights. Norma filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that petitioners have no cause of
action since they are not among the persons who could file an action for "annulment of marriage"
under Article 47 of the Family Code.
Judge Ferdinand J. Marcos of the Regional Trial Court of Toledo City, Cebu, Branch 59, dismissed the
petition after finding that the Family Code is "rather silent, obscure, insufficient" to resolve the
following issues:
(1) Whether or not plaintiffs have a cause of action against defendant in asking for the declaration of
the nullity of marriage of their deceased father, Pepito G. Nial, with her specially so when at the time
of the filing of this instant suit, their father Pepito G. Nial is already dead;
(2) Whether or not the second marriage of plaintiffs' deceased father with defendant is null and
voidab initio;
(3) Whether or not plaintiffs are estopped from assailing the validity of the second marriage after it
HYPERLINK "http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2000/
was dissolved due to their father's death.
mar2000/gr_133778_2000.html" \l "fnt1" 1
Thus, the lower court ruled that petitioners should have filed the action to declare null and void their
father's marriage to respondent before his death, applying by analogy Article 47 of the Family Code
which enumerates the time and the persons who could initiate an action for annulment of marriage.
HYPERLINK "http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2000/mar2000/gr_133778_2000.html" \l "fnt2" 2
Hence, this petition for review with this Court grounded on a pure question of law.
This petition was originally dismissed for non-compliance with Section 11, Rule 13 of the 1997 Rules
of Civil Procedure, and because "the verification failed to state the basis of petitioner's averment that
the allegations in the petition are "true and correct"." It was thus treated as an unsigned pleading
HYPERLINK "http://
which produces no legal effect under Section 3, Rule 7, of the 1997 Rules.
www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2000/mar2000/gr_133778_2000.html" \l "fnt3" 3
However, upon
motion of petitioners, this Court reconsidered the dismissal and reinstated the petition for review.
HYPERLINK "http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2000/mar2000/gr_133778_2000.html" \l "fnt4" 4
The two marriages involved herein having been solemnized prior to the effectivity of the Family Code
(FC), the applicable law to determine their validity is the Civil Code which was the law in effect at the
HYPERLINK "http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2000/mar2000/
time of their celebration.
gr_133778_2000.html" \l "fnt5" 5
A valid marriage license is a requisite of marriage under Article 53
of the Civil Code,
gr_133778_2000.html" \l "fnt6" 6
the absence of which renders the marriagevoid ab initiopursuant
to Article 80(3)
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gr_133778_2000.html" \l "fnt7" 7 HYPERLINK "http://www.lawphil.net/

in relation to Article 58.
judjuris/juri2000/mar2000/gr_133778_2000.html" \l "fnt8" 8
The requirement and issuance of
marriage license is the State's demonstration of its involvement and participation in every marriage, in
HYPERLINK "http://www.lawphil.net/
the maintenance of which the general public is interested.
This interest proceeds from the
constitutional mandate that the State recognizes the sanctity of family life and of affording protection
to the family as a basic "autonomous social institution."
Specifically, the Constitution
considers marriage as an "inviolable social institution," and is the foundation of family life which shall
be protected by the State.
gr_133778_2000.html" \l "fnt11" 11
This is why the Family Code considers marriage as "a special
contract of permanent union"
gr_133778_2000.html" \l "fnt12" 12
and case law considers it "not just an adventure but a lifetime
commitment."
gr_133778_2000.html" \l "fnt13" 13
However, there are several instances recognized by the Civil Code wherein a marriage license is
dispensed with, one of which is that provided in Article 76,
referring to the marriage of a man and
a woman who have lived together and exclusively with each other as husband and wife for a
continuous and unbroken period of at least five years before the marriage. The rationale why no
license is required in such case is to avoid exposing the parties to humiliation, shame and
embarrassment concomitant with the scandalous cohabitation of persons outside a valid marriage due
to the publication of every applicant's name for a marriage license. The publicity attending the
HYPERLINK "http://
marriage license may discourage such persons from legitimizing their status.
To preserve peace
in the family, avoid the peeping and suspicious eye of public exposure and contain the source of
gossip arising from the publication of their names, the law deemed it wise to preserve their privacy
and exempt them from that requirement.
There is no dispute that the marriage of petitioners' father to respondent Norma was celebrated without
any marriage license. In lieu thereof, they executed an affidavit stating that "they have attained the age
of majority, and, being unmarried, have lived together as husband and wife for at least five years, and
that we now desire to marry each other."
mar2000/gr_133778_2000.html" \l "fnt16" 16
The only issue that needs to be resolved pertains to
what nature of cohabitation is contemplated under Article 76 of the Civil Code to warrant the counting
of the five year period in order to exempt the future spouses from securing a marriage license. Should
it be a cohabitation wherein both parties are capacitated to marry each other during the entire five-year
continuous period or should it be a cohabitation wherein both parties have lived together and
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exclusively with each other as husband and wife during the entire five-year continuous period
regardless of whether there is a legal impediment to their being lawfully married, which impediment
may have either disappeared or intervened sometime during the cohabitation period?
Working on the assumption that Pepito and Norma have lived together as husband and wife for five
years without the benefit of marriage, that five-year period should be computed on the basis of a
cohabitation as "husband and wife" where the only missing factor is the special contract of marriage to
validate the union. In other words, the five-year common-law cohabitation period, which is counted
back from the date of celebration of marriage, should be a period of legal union had it not been for the
absence of the marriage. This 5-year period should be the years immediately before the day of the
marriage and it should be a period of cohabitation characterized by exclusivity meaning no third
party was involved at anytime within the 5 years and continuity that is unbroken. Otherwise, if that
continuous 5-year cohabitation is computed without any distinction as to whether the parties were
capacitated to marry each other during the entire five years, then the law would be sanctioning
immorality and encouraging parties to have common law relationships and placing them on the same
footing with those who lived faithfully with their spouse. Marriage being a special relationship must
be respected as such and its requirements must be strictly observed. The presumption that a man and a
woman deporting themselves as husband and wife is based on the approximation of the requirements
of the law. The parties should not be afforded any excuse to not comply with every single requirement
and later use the same missing element as a pre-conceived escape ground to nullify their marriage.
There should be no exemption from securing a marriage license unless the circumstances clearly fall
within the ambit of the exception. It should be noted that a license is required in order to notify the
public that two persons are about to be united in matrimony and that anyone who is aware or has
knowledge of any impediment to the union of the two shall make it known to the local civil registrar.
HYPERLINK "http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2000/mar2000/gr_133778_2000.html" \l "fnt17"
17
The Civil Code provides:
Art. 63: . . . This notice shall request all persons having knowledge of any impediment to the marriage
to advice the local civil registrar thereof. . . .
Art. 64: Upon being advised of any alleged impediment to the marriage, the local civil registrar shall
forthwith make an investigation, examining persons under oath. . . .
This is reiterated in the Family Code thus:
Art. 17 provides in part: . . . This notice shall request all persons having knowledge of any impediment
to the marriage to advise the local civil registrar thereof. . . .
Art. 18 reads in part: . . . In case of any impediment known to the local civil registrar or brought to his
attention, he shall note down the particulars thereof and his findings thereon in the application for a
marriage license. . . .
This is the same reason why our civil laws, past or present, absolutely prohibited the concurrence of
multiple marriages by the same person during the same period. Thus, any marriage subsequently
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HYPERLINK "http://
contracted during the lifetime of the first spouse shall be illegal and void,
subject only to the
exception in cases of absence or where the prior marriage was dissolved or annulled. The Revised
Penal Code complements the civil law in that the contracting of two or more marriages and the having
of extramarital affairs are considered felonies, i.e., bigamy and concubinage and adultery.
19
The law sanctions monogamy.
In this case, at the time of Pepito and respondent's marriage, it cannot be said that they have lived with
each other as husband and wife for at least five years prior to their wedding day. From the time
Pepito's first marriage was dissolved to the time of his marriage with respondent, only about twenty
months had elapsed. Even assuming that Pepito and his first wife had separated in fact, and thereafter
both Pepito and respondent had started living with each other that has already lasted for five years, the
fact remains that their five-year period cohabitation was not the cohabitation contemplated by law. It
should be in the nature of a perfect union that is valid under the law but rendered imperfect only by
the absence of the marriage contract. Pepito had a subsisting marriage at the time when he started
cohabiting with respondent. It is immaterial that when they lived with each other, Pepito had already
been separated in fact from his lawful spouse. The subsistence of the marriage even where there was
actual severance of the filial companionship between the spouses cannot make any cohabitation by
either spouse with any third party as being one as "husband and wife".
Having determined that the second marriage involved in this case is not covered by the exception to
the requirement of a marriage license, it is voidab initiobecause of the absence of such element.
The next issue to be resolved is: do petitioners have the personality to file a petition to declare their
father's marriage void after his death?
HYPERLINK "http://
Contrary to respondent judge's ruling, Article 47 of the Family Code
cannot be applied
even by analogy to petitions for declaration of nullity of marriage. The second ground for annulment
of marriage relied upon by the trial court, which allows "the sane spouse" to file an annulment suit "at
anytime before the death of either party" is inapplicable. Article 47 pertains to the grounds, periods
and persons who can file an annulment suit, not a suit for declaration of nullity of marriage. The Code
is silent as to who can file a petition to declare the nullity of a marriage. Voidable and void marriages
are not identical. A marriage that is annulable is valid until otherwise declared by the court; whereas a
HYPERLINK "http://
marriage that is voidab initiois considered as having never to have taken place
and cannot be the
source of rights. The first can be generally ratified or confirmed by free cohabitation or prescription
while the other can never be ratified. A voidable marriage cannot be assailed collaterally except in a
direct proceeding while a void marriage can be attacked collaterally. Consequently, void marriages can
be questioned even after the death of either party but voidable marriages can be assailed only during
the lifetime of the parties and not after death of either, in which case the parties and their offspring
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will be left as if the marriage had been perfectly valid.
That is why the action or defense for
nullity is imprescriptible, unlike voidable marriages where the action prescribes. Only the parties to a
voidable marriage can assail it but any proper interested party may attack a void marriage. Void
marriages have no legal effects except those declared by law concerning the properties of the alleged
HYPERLINK
spouses, regarding co-ownership or ownership through actual joint contribution,
"http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2000/mar2000/gr_133778_2000.html" \l "fnt23" 23
and its effect
on the children born to such void marriages as provided in Article 50 in relation to Article 43 and 44
as well as Article 51, 53 and 54 of the Family Code. On the contrary, the property regime governing
voidable marriages is generally conjugal partnership and the children conceived before its annulment
are legitimate.
Contrary to the trial court's ruling, the death of petitioner's father extinguished the alleged marital
bond between him and respondent. The conclusion is erroneous and proceeds from a wrong premise
that there was a marriage bond that was dissolved between the two. It should be noted that their
marriage was void hence it is deemed as if it never existed at all and the death of either extinguished
nothing.
Jurisprudence under the Civil Code states that no judicial decree is necessary in order to establish the
nullity of a marriage.
gr_133778_2000.html" \l "fnt24" 24
"A void marriage does not require a judicial decree to restore the
parties to their original rights or to make the marriage void but though no sentence of avoidance be
absolutely necessary, yet as well for the sake of good order of society as for the peace of mind of all
concerned, it is expedient that the nullity of the marriage should be ascertained and declared by the
decree of a court of competent jurisdiction."
mar2000/gr_133778_2000.html" \l "fnt25" 25
"Under ordinary circumstances, the effect of a void
marriage, so far as concerns the conferring of legal rights upon the parties, is as though no marriage
had ever taken place. And therefore, being good for no legal purpose, its invalidity can be maintained
in any proceeding in which the fact of marriage may be material, either direct or collateral, in any civil
court between any parties at any time, whether before or after the death of either or both the husband
and the wife, and upon mere proof of the facts rendering such marriage void, it will be disregarded or
treated as non-existent by the courts." It is not like a voidable marriage which cannot be collaterally
attacked except in direct proceeding instituted during the lifetime of the parties so that on the death of
HYPERLINK "http://
either, the marriage cannot be impeached, and is made good ab initio.
But Article 40 of
the Family Code expressly provides that there must be a judicial declaration of the nullity of a
HYPERLINK "http://
previous marriage, though void, before a party can enter into a second marriage
and such absolute
nullity can be based only on a final judgment to that effect.
For the same reason, the law makes
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either the action or defense for the declaration of absolute nullity of marriage imprescriptible.
29
Corollarily, if the death of either party would extinguish the cause of action or the ground for
defense, then the same cannot be considered imprescriptible.
However, other than for purposes of remarriage, no judicial action is necessary to declare a marriage
an absolute nullity.1wphi1For other purposes, such as but not limited to determination of heirship,
legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child, settlement of estate, dissolution of property regime, or a criminal
case for that matter, the court may pass upon the validity of marriage even in a suit not directly
instituted to question the same so long as it is essential to the determination of the case. This is without
prejudice to any issue that may arise in the case. When such need arises, a final judgment of
declaration of nullity is necessary even if the purpose is other than to remarry. The clause "on the basis
of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void" in Article 40 of the Family Code connotes
that such final judgment need not be obtained only for purpose of remarriage.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Order of the Regional Trial Court, Toledo
City, Cebu, Branch 59, dismissing Civil Case No. T-639, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The said
case is ordered REINSTATED.1wphi1.nt
SO ORDERED.
6 .HERMINIA BORJA-MANZANO vs.JUDGE ROQUE R. SANCHEZ
RESOLUTION
DAVIDE, JR.,C.J.:
The solemnization of a marriage between two contracting parties who were both bound by a prior
existing marriage is the bone of contention of the instant complaint against respondent Judge Roque
R. Sanchez, Municipal Trial Court, Infanta, Pangasinan. For this act, complainant Herminia Borja-
Manzano charges respondent Judge with gross ignorance of the law in a sworn Complaint-Affidavit
filed with the Office of the Court Administrator on 12 May 1999.
Complainant avers that she was the lawful wife of the late David Manzano, having been married
to him on 21 May 1966 in San Gabriel Archangel Parish, Araneta Avenue, Caloocan City.
HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2001/mar2001/am_mtj_00_1329.htm" \l
[1]
"_edn1" \o "" Four children were born out of that marriage. HYPERLINK "http://
[2]
sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2001/mar2001/am_mtj_00_1329.htm" \l "_edn2" \o "" On 22
March 1993, however, her husband contracted another marriage with one Luzviminda Payao before
respondent Judge. HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2001/mar2001/
[3]
am_mtj_00_1329.htm" \l "_edn3" \o "" When respondent Judge solemnized said marriage, he
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knew or ought to know that the same was void and bigamous, as the marriage contract clearly stated
that both contracting parties were separated.
Respondent Judge, on the other hand, claims in his Comment that when he officiated the
marriage between Manzano and Payao he did not know that Manzano was legally married.What he
knew was that the two had been living together as husband and wife for seven years already without
the benefit of marriage, as manifested in their joint affidavit. HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/
[4]
jurisprudence/2001/mar2001/am_mtj_00_1329.htm" \l "_edn4" \o "" According to him, had he
known that the late Manzano was married, he would have advised the latter not to marry again;
otherwise, he (Manzano) could be charged with bigamy. He then prayed that the complaint be
dismissed for lack of merit and for being designed merely to harass him.
After an evaluation of the Complaint and the Comment, the Court Administrator recommended
that respondent Judge be found guilty of gross ignorance of the law and be ordered to pay a fine of
P2,000, with a warning that a repetition of the same or similar act would be dealt with more severely.
On 25 October 2000, this Court required the parties to manifest whether they were willing to
submit the case for resolution on the basis of the pleadings thus filed.Complainant answered in the
affirmative.
For his part, respondent Judge filed a Manifestation reiterating his plea for the dismissal of the
complaint and setting aside his earlier Comment.He therein invites the attention of the Court to two
separate affidavits HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2001/mar2001/
[5]
am_mtj_00_1329.htm" \l "_edn5" \o "" of the late Manzano and of Payao, which were allegedly
unearthed by a member of his staff upon his instruction.In those affidavits, both David Manzano and
Luzviminda Payao expressly stated that they were married to Herminia Borja and Domingo Relos,
respectively; and that since their respective marriages had been marked by constant quarrels, they had
both left their families and had never cohabited or communicated with their spouses
anymore.Respondent Judge alleges that on the basis of those affidavits, he agreed to solemnize the
marriage in question in accordance with Article 34 of the Family Code.
We find merit in the complaint.
Article 34 of the Family Code provides:
No license shall be necessary for the marriage of a man and a woman who have lived together as
husband and wife for at least five years and without any legal impediment to marry each other.The
contracting parties shall state the foregoing facts in an affidavit before any person authorized by law to
administer oaths.The solemnizing officer shall also state under oath that he ascertained the
qualifications of the contracting parties and found no legal impediment to the marriage.
For this provision on legal ratification of marital cohabitation to apply, the following requisites
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must concur:
1. The man and woman must have been living together as husband and wife for at least five
years before the marriage;
2. The parties must have no legal impediment to marry each other;
3. The fact of absence of legal impediment between the parties must be present at the time
ofmarriage;
4. The parties must execute an affidavit stating that they have lived together for at least five
years [and are without legal impediment to marry each other]; and
5. The solemnizing officer must execute a sworn statement that he had ascertained the
qualifications of the parties and that he had found no legal impediment to their marriage.
HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2001/mar2001/
[6]
am_mtj_00_1329.htm" \l "_edn6" \o ""
Not all of these requirements are present in the case at bar.It is significant to note that in their
separate affidavits executed on 22 March 1993 and sworn to before respondent Judge himself, David
Manzano and Luzviminda Payao expressly stated the fact of their prior existing marriage.Also, in
their marriage contract, it was indicated that both were separated.
Respondent Judge knew or ought to know that a subsisting previous marriage is a diriment
impediment, which would make the subsequent marriage null and void. HYPERLINK "http://
[7]
sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2001/mar2001/am_mtj_00_1329.htm" \l "_edn7" \o "" In fact, in
his Comment, he stated that had he known that the late Manzano was married he would have
discouraged him from contracting another marriage.And respondent Judge cannot deny knowledge of
Manzanos and Payaos subsisting previous marriage, as the same was clearly stated in their separate
affidavits which were subscribed and sworn to before him.
The fact that Manzano and Payao had been living apart from their respective spouses for a long
time already is immaterial.Article 63(1) of the Family Code allows spouses who have obtained a
decree of legal separation to live separately from each other, but in such a casethe marriage bonds
are not severed. Elsewise stated, legal separation does not dissolve the marriage tie, much less
authorize the parties to remarry.This holds true all the more when the separation is merelyde facto, as
in the case at bar.
Neither can respondent Judge take refuge on the Joint Affidavit of David Manzano and
Luzviminda Payao stating that they had been cohabiting as husband and wife for seven years.Just like
separation, free and voluntary cohabitation with another person for at least five years does not severe
the tie of a subsisting previous marriage.Marital cohabitation for a long period of time between two
individuals who arelegally capacitatedto marry each other is merely a ground for exemption from
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marriage license.It could not serve as a justification for respondent Judge to solemnize a subsequent
marriage vitiated by the impediment of a prior existing marriage.
Clearly, respondent Judge demonstrated gross ignorance of the law when he solemnized a void
and bigamous marriage.The maxim ignorance of the law excuses no one has special application to
judges, HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2001/mar2001/am_mtj_00_1329.htm"
[8]
\l "_edn8" \o "" who, under Rule 1.01 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, should be the embodiment
of competence, integrity, and independence.It is highly imperative that judges be conversant with the
law and basic legal principles. HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2001/mar2001/
[9]
am_mtj_00_1329.htm" \l "_edn9" \o "" And when the law transgressed is simple and elementary,
the failure to know it constitutes gross ignorance of the law. HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/
[10]
jurisprudence/2001/mar2001/am_mtj_00_1329.htm" \l "_edn10" \o ""
ACCORDINGLY, the recommendation of the Court Administrator is hereby ADOPTED,with

theMODIFICATIONthat the amount of fine to be imposed upon respondent Judge Roque Sanchez is
increased to P20,000.
SO ORDERED.
7. Rep. Vs Jose Dayot

DECISION

CHICO-NAZARIO,J.:

Before us are two consolidated petitions.G.R. No. 175581 and G.R. No. 179474 are Petitions
for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court filed by the Republic of the Philippines and Felisa
Tecson-Dayot (Felisa), respectively, both challenging the Amended Decision HYPERLINK "http://
[1]
sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2008/march2008/175581.htm" \l "_ftn3" \o "" of the Court of
Appeals, dated 7 November 2006, in CA-G.R. CV No. 68759, which declared the marriage between
Jose Dayot (Jose) and Felisa voidab initio.
The records disclose that on 24 November 1986, Jose and Felisa were married at
thePasayCity Hall.The marriage was solemnized by Rev. Tomas V. Atienza. HYPERLINK "http://
[2]
sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2008/march2008/175581.htm" \l "_ftn4" \o "" In lieu of a
marriage license, Jose and Felisa executed a sworn affidavit, HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/
[3]
jurisprudence/2008/march2008/175581.htm" \l "_ftn5" \o "" also dated 24 November 1986,
attesting that both of them had attained the age of maturity, and that being unmarried, they had lived
together as husband and wife for at least five years.

On 7 July 1993, Jose filed a Complaint HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/
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[4]
jurisprudence/2008/march2008/175581.htm" \l "_ftn6" \o "" for Annulment and/or Declaration of
Nullity of Marriage with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Bian, Laguna, Branch 25.He contended that
his marriage with Felisa was a sham, as no marriage ceremony was celebrated between the parties;
that he did not execute the sworn affidavit stating that he and Felisa had lived as husband and wife for
at least five years; and that his consent to the marriage was secured through fraud.

In his Complaint, Jose gave his version of the events which led to his filing of the
same.According to Jose, he was introduced to Felisa in 1986.Immediately thereafter, he came to live
as a boarder in Felisas house, the latter being his landlady.Some three weeks later, Felisa requested
him to accompany her to thePasayCity Hall, ostensibly so she could claim a package sent to her by
her brother fromSaudi Arabia.At thePasayCity Hall, upon a pre-arranged signal from Felisa, a man
bearing three folded pieces of paper approached them.They were told that Jose needed to sign the
papers so that the package could be released to Felisa.He initially refused to do so.However, Felisa
cajoled him, and told him that his refusal could get both of them killed by her brother who had learned
about their relationship.Reluctantly, he signed the pieces of paper, and gave them to the man who
immediately left.It was in February 1987 when he discovered that he had contracted marriage with
Felisa. He alleged that he saw a piece of paper lying on top of the table at the sala of Felisas
house.When he perused the same, he discovered that it was a copy of his marriage contract with
Felisa.When he confronted Felisa, the latter feigned ignorance.

In opposing the Complaint, Felisa denied Joses allegations and defended the validity of their
marriage.She declared that they had maintained their relationship as man and wife absent the legality
of marriage in the early part of 1980, but that she had deferred contracting marriage with him on
account of their age difference. HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2008/
[5]
march2008/175581.htm" \l "_ftn7" \o "" In her pre-trial brief, Felisa expounded that while her
marriage to Jose was subsisting, the latter contracted marriage with a certain Rufina Pascual (Rufina)
on31 August 1990.On3 June 1993, Felisa filed an action for bigamy against Jose.Subsequently, she
filed an administrative complaint against Jose with the Office of the Ombudsman, since Jose and
Rufina were both employees of the National Statistics and Coordinating Board. HYPERLINK "http://
[6]
sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2008/march2008/175581.htm" \l "_ftn8" \o "" The Ombudsman
found Jose administratively liable for disgraceful and immoral conduct, and meted out to him the
penalty of suspension from service for one year without emolument. HYPERLINK "http://
[7]
sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2008/march2008/175581.htm" \l "_ftn9" \o ""

On 26 July 2000, the RTC rendered a Decision HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/
[8]
jurisprudence/2008/march2008/175581.htm" \l "_ftn10" \o "" dismissing the Complaint. It
disposed:

WHEREFORE, after a careful evaluation and analysis of the evidence
presented by both parties, this Court finds and so holds that the [C]omplaint does not
deserve a favorable consideration. Accordingly, the above-entitled case is hereby
ordered DISMISSED with costs against [Jose]. HYPERLINK "http://
[9]

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The RTC ruled that from the testimonies and evidence presented, the marriage celebrated
between Jose and Felisa on24 November 1986was valid.It dismissed Joses version of the story as
implausible, and rationalized that:

Any person in his right frame of mind would easily suspect any attempt to
make him or her sign a blank sheet of paper.[Jose] could have already detected that
something was amiss, unusual, as they were atPasayCity Hallto get a package for
[Felisa] but it [was] he who was made to sign the pieces of paper for the release of
the said package.Another indirect suggestion that could have put him on guard was
the fact that, by his own admission, [Felisa] told him that her brother would kill them
if he will not sign the papers.And yet it took him, more or less, three months to
discover that the pieces of paper that he signed was [sic] purportedly the marriage
contract.[Jose] does not seem to be that ignorant, as perceived by this Court, to be
taken in for a ride by [Felisa.]

[Joses] claim that he did not consent to the marriage was belied by the fact
that he acknowledged Felisa Tecson as his wife when he wrote [Felisas] name in the
duly notarized statement of assets and liabilities he filled up on May 12, 1988, one
year after he discovered the marriage contract he is now claiming to be sham and
false.[Jose], again, in his company I.D., wrote the name of [Felisa] as the person to
be contacted in case of emergency.This Court does not believe that the only reason
why her name was written in his company I.D. was because he was residing there
then.This is just but a lame excuse because if he really considers her not his lawfully
wedded wife, he would have written instead the name of his sister.

When [Joses] sister was put into the witness stand, under oath, she testified
that she signed her name voluntarily as a witness to the marriage in the marriage
certificate (T.S.N., page 25, November 29, 1996) and she further testified that the
signature appearing over the name of Jose Dayot was the signature of his [sic]
brother that he voluntarily affixed in the marriage contract (page 26 of T.S.N. taken
on November 29, 1996), and when she was asked by the Honorable Court if indeed
she believed that Felisa Tecson was really chosen by her brother she answered
yes.The testimony of his sister all the more belied his claim that his consent was
procured through fraud. HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2008/
[10]
march2008/175581.htm" \l "_ftn12" \o ""

Moreover, on the matter of fraud, the RTC ruled that Joses action had prescribed.It cited
Article 87 HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2008/march2008/175581.htm" \l
[11]
"_ftn13" \o "" of the New Civil Code which requires that the action for annulment of marriage
must be commenced by the injured party within four years after the discovery of the fraud.Thus:

That granting even for the sake of argument that his consent was obtained by
[Felisa] through fraud, trickery and machinations, he could have filed an annulment
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or declaration of nullity of marriage at the earliest possible opportunity, the time

when he discovered the alleged sham and false marriage contract.[Jose] did not take
any action to void the marriage at the earliest instance.x x x. HYPERLINK "http://
[12]

Undeterred, Jose filed an appeal from the foregoing RTC Decision to the Court of Appeals.In
a Decision dated11 August 2005, the Court of Appeals found the appeal to be without merit.The
dispositive portion of the appellate courts Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, the Decision appealed from is AFFIRMED. HYPERLINK "http://
[13]

The Court of Appeals applied the Civil Code to the marriage between Jose and Felisa as it
was solemnized prior to the effectivity of the Family Code.The appellate court observed that the
circumstances constituting fraud as a ground for annulment of marriage under Article 86
HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2008/march2008/175581.htm" \l "_ftn16" \o
[14]
"" of the Civil Code did not exist in the marriage between the parties.Further, it ruled that the
action for annulment of marriage on the ground of fraud was filed beyond the prescriptive period
provided by law.The Court of Appeals struck down Joses appeal in the following manner:

Nonetheless, even if we consider that fraud or intimidation was employed on Jose in
giving his consent to the marriage, the action for the annulment thereof had already
prescribed. Article 87 (4) and (5) of the Civil Code provides that the action for
annulment of marriage on the ground that the consent of a party was obtained by
fraud, force or intimidation must be commenced by said party within four (4) years
after the discovery of the fraud and within four (4) years from the time the force or
intimidation ceased. Inasmuch as the fraud was allegedly discovered by Jose in
February, 1987 then he had only until February, 1991 within which to file an action
for annulment of marriage.However, it was only onJuly 7, 1993that Jose filed the
complaint for annulment of his marriage to Felisa. HYPERLINK "http://
[15]

Likewise, the Court of Appeals did not accept Joses assertion that his marriage to Felisa was
voidab initiofor lack of a marriage license.It ruled that the marriage was solemnized under Article 76
[16]
"" of the Civil Code as one of exceptional character, with the parties executing an affidavit of
marriage between man and woman who have lived together as husband and wife for at least five
years.The Court of Appeals concluded that the falsity in the affidavit to the effect that Jose and Felisa
had lived together as husband and wife for the period required by Article 76 did not affect the validity
of the marriage, seeing that the solemnizing officer was misled by the statements contained therein.In
this manner, the Court of Appeals gave credence to the good-faith reliance of the solemnizing officer
over the falsity of the affidavit.The appellate court further noted that on the dorsal side of said
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affidavit of marriage, Rev. Tomas V. Atienza, the solemnizing officer, stated that he took steps to
ascertain the ages and other qualifications of the contracting parties and found no legal impediment to
their marriage.Finally, the Court of Appeals dismissed Joses argument that neither he nor Felisa was a
member of the sect to which Rev. Tomas V. Atienza belonged.According to the Court of Appeals,
Article 56 HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2008/march2008/175581.htm" \l
[17]
"_ftn19" \o "" of the Civil Code did not require that either one of the contracting parties to the
marriage must belong to the solemnizing officers church or religious sect. The prescription was
established only in Article 7 HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2008/
[18]
march2008/175581.htm" \l "_ftn20" \o "" of the Family Code which does not govern the parties
marriage.

Differing with the ruling of the Court of Appeals, Jose filed a Motion for Reconsideration thereof.His
central opposition was that the requisites for the proper application of the exemption from a marriage
license under Article 76 of the Civil Code were not fully attendant in the case at bar.In particular, Jose
cited the legal condition that the man and the woman must have been living together as husband and
wife for at least five years before the marriage.Essentially, he maintained that the affidavit of marital
cohabitation executed by him and Felisa was false.

The Court of Appeals granted Joses Motion for Reconsideration and reversed itself. Accordingly, it
rendered an Amended Decision, dated7 November 2006, thefalloof which reads:

WHEREFORE, the Decision dated August 11, 2005 is RECALLED and SET
ASIDEand another one entered declaring the marriage between Jose A. Dayot and
Felisa C. Tecson voidab initio.
Furnish a copy of this Amended Decision to the Local Civil Registrar of Pasay City.
HYPERLINK " h t t p : / / s c . j u d i c i a r y. g o v. p h / j u r i s p r u d e n c e / 2 0 0 8 /
[19]
march2008/175581.htm" \l "_ftn21" \o ""

In its Amended Decision, the Court of Appeals relied on the ruling of this Court inNial v.
Bayadog, HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2008/march2008/175581.htm" \l
[20]
"_ftn22" \o "" and reasoned that:

InNial v. Bayadog,where the contracting parties to a marriage solemnized
without a marriage license on the basis of their affidavit that they had attained the age
of majority, that being unmarried, they had lived together for at least five (5) years
and that they desired to marry each other, the Supreme Court ruled as follows:

x x x In other words, the five-year common-law cohabitation period, which
is counted back from the date of celebration of marriage, should be a period of legal
union had it not been for the absence of the marriage.This 5-year period should be
the years immediately before the day of the marriage and it should be a period of
cohabitation characterized by exclusivity meaning no third party was involved at any
time within the 5 years and continuity that is unbroken.Otherwise, if that continuous
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5-year cohabitation is computed without any distinction as to whether the parties

were capacitated to marry each other during the entire five years, then the law would
be sanctioning immorality and encouraging parties to have common law relationships
and placing them on the same footing with those who lived faithfully with their
spouse. Marriage being a special relationship must be respected as such and its
requirements must be strictly observed.The presumption that a man and a woman
deporting themselves as husband and wife is based on the approximation of the
requirements of the law.The parties should not be afforded any excuse to not comply
with every single requirement and later use the same missing element as a pre-
conceived escape ground to nullify their marriage.There should be no exemption
from securing a marriage license unless the circumstances clearly fall within the
ambit of the exception.It should be noted that a license is required in order to notify
the public that two persons are about to be united in matrimony and that anyone who
is aware or has knowledge of any impediment to the union of the two shall make it
known to the local civil registrar.

Article 80(3) of the Civil Code provides that a marriage solemnized without
a marriage license, save marriages of exceptional character, shall be void from the
beginning.Inasmuch as the marriage between Jose and Felisa is not covered by the
exception to the requirement of a marriage license, it is, therefore, void ab
initio because of the absence of a marriage license. HYPERLINK "http://
[21]

Felisa sought reconsideration of the Amended Decision, but to no avail.The appellate court
rendered a Resolution HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2008/
[22]
march2008/175581.htm" \l "_ftn24" \o "" dated10 May 2007, denying Felisas motion.

Meanwhile, the Republic of the Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG), filed a Petition for Review before this Court in G.R. No. 175581, praying that the Court of
Appeals Amended Decision dated 7 November 2006 be reversed and set aside for lack of merit, and
that the marriage between Jose and Felisa be declared valid and subsisting.Felisa filed a separate
Petition for Review, docketed as G.R. No. 179474, similarly assailing the appellate courts Amended
Decision.On1 August 2007, this Court resolved to consolidate the two Petitions in the interest of
uniformity of the Court rulings in similar cases brought before it for resolution. HYPERLINK "http://
[23]

The Republic of thePhilippinespropounds the following arguments for the allowance of its
Petition, to wit:

I

RESPONDENT FAILED TO OVERTHROW THE PRESUMPTION OF THE
VALIDITY OF HIS MARRIAGE TO FELISA.

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II

RESPONDENT DID NOT COME TO THE COURT WITH CLEAN HANDS AND
SHOULD NOT BE ALLOWED TO PROFIT FROM HIS OWN FRAUDULENT
CONDUCT.

III

RESPONDENT IS ESTOPPED FROM ASSAILING THE LEGALITY OF HIS
MARRIAGE FOR LACK OF MARRIAGE LICEN[S]E. HYPERLINK "http://
[24]

Correlative to the above, Felisa submits that the Court of Appeals misapplied Nial.
[25]
"" She differentiates the case at bar fromNialby reasoning that one of the parties therein had an
existing prior marriage, a circumstance which does not obtain in her cohabitation with Jose.Finally,
Felisa adduces that Jose only sought the annulment of their marriage after a criminal case for bigamy
and an administrative case had been filed against him in order to avoid liability.Felisa surmises that
the declaration of nullity of their marriage would exonerate Jose from any liability.

For our resolution is the validity of the marriage between Jose and Felisa. To reach a
considered ruling on the issue, we shall jointly tackle the related arguments vented
bypetitionersRepublicof thePhilippinesand Felisa.

The Republic of the Philippines asserts that several circumstances give rise to the
presumption that a valid marriage exists between Jose and Felisa.For her part, Felisa echoes the claim
that any doubt should be resolved in favor of the validity of the marriage by citing this Courts ruling
in Hernandez v. Court of Appeals. HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2008/
[26]
march2008/175581.htm" \l "_ftn28" \o "" To buttress its assertion, the Republic points to the
affidavit executed by Jose and Felisa, dated24 November 1986, attesting that they have lived together
as husband and wife for at least five years, which they used in lieu of a marriage license.It is the
Republics position that the falsity of the statements in the affidavit does not affect the validity of the
marriage, as the essential and formal requisites were complied with; and the solemnizing officer was
not required to investigate as to whether the said affidavit was legally obtained.The Republic opines
that as a marriage under a license is not invalidated by the fact that the license was wrongfully
obtained, so must a marriage not be invalidated by the fact that the parties incorporated a fabricated
statement in their affidavit that they cohabited as husband and wife for at least five years.In addition,
the Republic posits that the parties marriage contract states that their marriage was solemnized under
Article 76 of the Civil Code. It also bears the signature of the parties and their witnesses, and must be
considered a primary evidence of marriage.To further fortify its Petition, the Republic adduces the
following documents: (1) Joses notarized Statement of Assets and Liabilities, dated 12 May 1988
wherein he wrote Felisas name as his wife; (2) Certification dated 25 July 1993 issued by the
Barangay Chairman 192, Zone ZZ, District 24 of Pasay City, attesting that Jose and Felisa had lived
together as husband and wife in said barangay; and (3) Joses company ID card, dated 2 May 1988,
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indicating Felisas name as his wife.

The first assignment of error compels this Court to rule on the issue of the effect of a false
affidavit under Article 76 of the Civil Code.A survey of the prevailing rules is in order.

It is beyond dispute that the marriage of Jose and Felisa was celebrated on24 November
1986, prior to the effectivity of the Family Code. Accordingly, the Civil Code governs their
union.Article 53 of the Civil Code spells out the essential requisites of marriage as a contract:

ART. 53. No marriage shall be solemnized unless all these requisites are complied
with:

(1)Legal capacity of the contracting parties;

(2)Their consent, freely given;

(3)Authority of the person performing the marriage; and

(4) A marriage license, except in a marriage of exceptional
character.(Emphasis ours.)

Article 58 HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2008/
[27]
march2008/175581.htm" \l "_ftn29" \o "" makes explicit that no marriage shall be solemnized
without a license first being issued by the local civil registrar of the municipality where either
contracting party habitually resides, save marriages of an exceptional character authorized by the Civil
Code, but not those under Article 75. HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2008/
[28]
march2008/175581.htm" \l "_ftn30" \o "" Article 80(3) HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/
[29]
jurisprudence/2008/march2008/175581.htm" \l "_ftn31" \o "" of the Civil Code makes it clear
that a marriage performed without the corresponding marriage license is void, this being nothing more
than the legitimate consequence flowing from the fact that the license is the essence of the marriage
contract. HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2008/march2008/175581.htm" \l
[30]
"_ftn32" \o "" This is in stark contrast to the old Marriage Law, HYPERLINK "http://
[31]
sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2008/march2008/175581.htm" \l "_ftn33" \o "" whereby the
absence of a marriage license did not make the marriage void.The rationale for the compulsory
character of a marriage license under the Civil Code is that it is the authority granted by the State to
the contracting parties, after the proper government official has inquired into their capacity to contract
marriage. HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2008/march2008/175581.htm" \l
[32]
"_ftn34" \o ""

Under the Civil Code, marriages of exceptional character are covered by Chapter 2, Title III,
comprising Articles 72 to 79.To wit, these marriages are: (1) marriages inarticulo mortisor at the
point of death during peace or war, (2) marriages in remote places, (2) consular marriages,
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[33]
"" (3) ratification of marital cohabitation, (4) religious ratification of a civil marriage, (5)
Mohammedan or pagan marriages, and (6) mixed marriages. HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/
[34]
jurisprudence/2008/march2008/175581.htm" \l "_ftn36" \o ""

The instant case pertains to a ratification of marital cohabitation under Article 76 of the Civil
Code, which provides:

ART. 76. No marriage license shall be necessary when a man and a woman who have
attained the age of majority and who, being unmarried, have lived together as
husband and wife for at least five years, desire to marry each other.The contracting
parties shall state the foregoing facts in an affidavit before any person authorized by
law to administer oaths.The official, priest or minister who solemnized the marriage
shall also state in an affidavit that he took steps to ascertain the ages and other
qualifications of the contracting parties and that he found no legal impediment to the
marriage.

The reason for the law, HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2008/
[35]
march2008/175581.htm" \l "_ftn37" \o "" as espoused by the Code Commission, is that the
publicity attending a marriage license may discourage such persons who have lived in a state of
cohabitation from legalizing their status. HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2008/
[36]
march2008/175581.htm" \l "_ftn38" \o ""

It is not contested herein that the marriage of Jose and Felisa was performed without a
marriage license.In lieu thereof, they executed an affidavit declaring that they have attained the age of
maturity; that being unmarried, they have lived together as husband and wife for at least five years;
and that because of this union, they desire to marry each other. HYPERLINK "http://
[37]
sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2008/march2008/175581.htm" \l "_ftn39" \o "" One of the
central issues in the Petition at bar is thus: whether the falsity of an affidavit of marital cohabitation,
where the parties have in truth fallen short of the minimum five-year requirement, effectively renders
the marriage voidab initiofor lack of a marriage license.

We answer in the affirmative.

Marriages of exceptional character are, doubtless, the exceptions to the rule on the
indispensability of the formal requisite of a marriage license.Under the rules of statutory construction,
exceptions, as a general rule, should be strictly HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/
[38]
jurisprudence/2008/march2008/175581.htm" \l "_ftn40" \o "" but reasonably construed.
[39]
"" They extend only so far as their language fairly warrants, and all doubts should be resolved in
favor of the general provisions rather than the exception. HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/
[40]
jurisprudence/2008/march2008/175581.htm" \l "_ftn42" \o "" Where a general rule is established
by statute with exceptions, the court will not curtail the former or add to the latter by implication.
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[41]
"" For the exception in Article 76 to apply, it is asine qua nonthereto that the man and the
woman must have attained the age of majority, and that, being unmarried, they have lived together
as husband and wife for at least five years.

A strict but reasonable construction of Article 76 leaves us with no other expediency but to
read the law as it is plainly written.The exception of a marriage license under Article 76 applies only
to those who have lived together as husband and wife for at least five years and desire to marry each
other.The Civil Code, in no ambiguous terms, places a minimum period requirement of five years of
cohabitation.No other reading of the law can be had, since the language of Article 76 is precise.The
minimum requisite of five years of cohabitation is an indispensability carved in the language of the
law.For a marriage celebrated under Article 76 to be valid, this material fact cannot be dispensed
with.It is embodied in the law not as a directory requirement, but as one that partakes of a mandatory
character.It is worthy to mention that Article 76 also prescribes that the contracting parties shall state
the requisite facts HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2008/
[42]
march2008/175581.htm" \l "_ftn44" \o "" in an affidavit before any person authorized by law to
administer oaths; and that the official, priest or minister who solemnized the marriage shall also state
in an affidavit that he took steps to ascertain the ages and other qualifications of the contracting parties
and that he found no legal impediment to the marriage.

It is indubitably established that Jose and Felisa have not lived together for five years at the
time they executed their sworn affidavit and contracted marriage.The Republic admitted that Jose and
Felisa started living together only in June 1986, or barely five months before the celebration of their
[43]
"_ftn45" \o "" The Court of Appeals also noted Felisas testimony that Jose was introduced to her
by her neighbor, Teresita Perwel, sometime in February or March 1986 after the EDSA Revolution.
[44]
"" The appellate court also cited Felisas own testimony that it was only in June 1986 when Jose
commenced to live in her house. HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2008/
[45]
march2008/175581.htm" \l "_ftn47" \o ""

Moreover, it is noteworthy that the question as to whether they satisfied the minimum five-
year requisite is factual in nature.A question of fact arises when there is a need to decide on the truth
or falsehood of the alleged facts. HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2008/
[46]
march2008/175581.htm" \l "_ftn48" \o "" Under Rule 45, factual findings are ordinarily not
subject to this Courts review. HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2008/
[47]
march2008/175581.htm" \l "_ftn49" \o "" It is already well-settled that:

The general rule is that the findings of facts of the Court of Appeals are binding on
this Court. A recognized exception to this rule is when the Court of Appeals and the
trial court, or in this case the administrative body, make contradictory findings.
However, the exception does not apply in every instance that the Court of Appeals
and the trial court or administrative body disagree. The factual findings of the Court
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of Appeals remain conclusive on this Court if such findings are supported by the
record or based on substantial evidence. HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/
[48]
jurisprudence/2008/march2008/175581.htm" \l "_ftn50" \o ""

Therefore, the falsity of the affidavit dated24 November 1986, executed by Jose and Felisa to
exempt them from the requirement of a marriage license, is beyond question.

We cannot accept the insistence of the Republic that the falsity of the statements in the parties
affidavit will not affect the validity of marriage, since all the essential and formal requisites were
complied with.The argument deserves scant merit.Patently, it cannot be denied that the marriage
between Jose and Felisa was celebrated without the formal requisite of a marriage license.Neither did
Jose and Felisa meet the explicit legal requirement in Article 76, that they should have lived together
as husband and wife for at least five years, so as to be excepted from the requirement of a marriage
license.

Anent petitioners reliance on the presumption of marriage, this Court holds that the same
finds no applicability to the case at bar.Essentially, when we speak of a presumption of marriage, it is
with reference to theprima faciepresumption that a man and a woman deporting themselves as
husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage. HYPERLINK "http://
[49]
sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2008/march2008/175581.htm" \l "_ftn51" \o "" Restated more
explicitly, persons dwelling together in apparent matrimony are presumed, in the absence of any
counter-presumption or evidence special to the case, to be in fact married. HYPERLINK "http://
[50]
sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2008/march2008/175581.htm" \l "_ftn52" \o "" The present
case does not involve an apparent marriage to which the presumption still needs to be applied.There
is no question that Jose and Felisa actually entered into a contract of marriage on24 November 1986,
hence, compelling Jose to institute a Complaint for Annulment and/or Declaration of Nullity of
Marriage, which spawned the instant consolidated Petitions.

In the same vein, the declaration of the Civil Code HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/
[51]
jurisprudence/2008/march2008/175581.htm" \l "_ftn53" \o "" that every intendment of law or fact
leans towards the validity of marriage will not salvage the parties marriage, and extricate them from
the effect of a violation of the law.The marriage of Jose and Felisa was entered into without the
requisite marriage license or compliance with the stringent requirements of a marriage under
exceptional circumstance.The solemnization of a marriage without prior license is a clear violation of
the law and would lead or could be used, at least, for the perpetration of fraud against innocent and
unwary parties, which was one of the evils that the law sought to prevent by making a prior license a
prerequisite for a valid marriage. HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2008/
[52]
march2008/175581.htm" \l "_ftn54" \o "" The protection of marriage as a sacred institution
requires not just the defense of a true and genuine union but the exposure of an invalid one as well.
[53]
"" To permit a false affidavit to take the place of a marriage license is to allow an abject
circumvention of the law.If this Court is to protect the fabric of the institution of marriage, we must
be wary of deceptive schemes that violate the legal measures set forth in our laws.
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Similarly, we are not impressed by the ratiocination of the Republic that as a marriage under a
license is not invalidated by the fact that the license was wrongfully obtained, so must a marriage not
be invalidated by a fabricated statement that the parties have cohabited for at least five years as
required by law. The contrast is flagrant. The former is with reference to an irregularity of the
marriage license, and not to the absence of one. Here, there is no marriage license at all.Furthermore,
the falsity of the allegation in the sworn affidavit relating to the period of Jose and Felisas
cohabitation, which would have qualified their marriage as an exception to the requirement for a
marriage license, cannot be a mere irregularity, for it refers to a quintessential fact that the law
precisely required to be deposed and attested to by the parties under oath.If the essential matter in the
sworn affidavit is a lie, then it is but a mere scrap of paper, without force and effect.Hence, it is as if
there was no affidavit at all.

In its second assignment of error, the Republic puts forth the argument that based on equity,
Jose should be denied relief because he perpetrated the fabrication, and cannot thereby profit from his
wrongdoing.This is a misplaced invocation.It must be stated that equity finds no room for application
where there is a law. HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2008/
[54]
march2008/175581.htm" \l "_ftn56" \o "" There is a law on the ratification of marital
cohabitation, which is set in precise terms under Article 76 of the Civil Code. Nonetheless, the
authorities are consistent that the declaration of nullity of the parties marriage is without prejudice to
their criminal liability. HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2008/
[55]
march2008/175581.htm" \l "_ftn57" \o ""

The Republic further avers in its third assignment of error that Jose is deemed estopped from
assailing the legality of his marriage for lack of a marriage license.It is claimed that Jose and Felisa
had lived together from 1986 to 1990, notwithstanding Joses subsequent marriage to Rufina Pascual
on 31 August 1990, and that it took Jose seven years before he sought the declaration of nullity; hence,
estoppel had set in.

This is erroneous.An action for nullity of marriage is imprescriptible. HYPERLINK "http://
[56]
sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2008/march2008/175581.htm" \l "_ftn58" \o "" Jose and Felisas
marriage was celebrated sans a marriage license.No other conclusion can be reached except that it is
voidab initio.In this case, the right to impugn a void marriage does not prescribe, and may be raised
any time.

Lastly, to settle all doubts, jurisprudence has laid down the rule that the five-year common-
law cohabitation period under Article 76 means a five-year period computed back from the date of
celebration of marriage, and refers to a period of legal union had it not been for the absence of a
[57]
"_ftn59" \o "" It covers the years immediately preceding the day of the marriage, characterized by
exclusivity - meaning no third party was involved at any time within the five years - and continuity
that is unbroken. HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2008/
[58]
march2008/175581.htm" \l "_ftn60" \o ""

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WHEREFORE,the Petitions areDENIED.The Amended Decision of the Court of Appeals,

dated7 November 2006in CA-G.R. CV No. 68759, declaring the marriage of Jose Dayot to Felisa
Tecson-Dayot voidab initio, isAFFIRMED, without prejudice to their criminal liability, if any.No
costs.

SO ORDERED.
8. OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR vs. JUDGE ANATALIO S. NECESSARIO
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
This Court has long held that "[the] administration of justice is circumscribed with a heavy burden of
responsibility. It requires that everyone involved in its dispensation from the presiding judge to the
lowliest clerk live up to the strictest standards of competence, honesty, and integrity in the public
service." HYPERLINK " h t t p : / / w w w. l a w p h i l . n e t / j u d j u r i s / j u r i 2 0 1 3 / a p r 2 0 1 3 /
1
am_mtj-07-1691_2013.html" \l "fnt1"
THE CASE
This is an administrative case that stemmed from the 6 July 2007 Memorandum of the Office of the
Court Administrator (OCA). HYPERLINK "http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/apr2013/
2
am_mtj-07-1691_2013.html" \l "fnt2" The judicial audit team created by the OCA reported alleged
irregularities in the solemnization of marriages in several branches of the Municipal Trial Court in
Cities (MTCC) and Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Cebu City. HYPERLINK "http://www.lawphil.net/
3
judjuris/juri2013/apr2013/am_mtj-07-1691_2013.html" \l "fnt3" Certain package fees were offered
to interested parties by "fixers" or "facilitators" for instant marriages. HYPERLINK "http://
4
www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/apr2013/am_mtj-07-1691_2013.html" \l "fnt4"
THE FACTS
On 3 July 2007, Atty. Rullyn Garcia, Region 7 Judicial Supervisor, proceeded to Cebu City and
headed the audit team created by OCA in investigating Branches 2, 3, 4, and 8 of the MTCC in Cebu
City. HYPERLINK "http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/apr2013/am_mtj-07-1691_2013.html" \l
5
"fnt5" A female and male lawyer of the audit team went undercover as a couple looking to get
married. They went to the Palace of Justice and were directed by the guard on duty to go to Branch 4
and look for a certain "Meloy". The male lawyer feared that he would be recognized by other court
personnel, specifically the Clerk of Court of Branch 4 who was a former law school classmate. The
two lawyers then agreed that only the female lawyer would go inside and inquire about the marriage
application process. Inside Branch 4, a woman named Helen approached and assisted the female
lawyer. When the female lawyer asked if the marriage process could be rushed, Helen assured the
lawyer that the marriage could be solemnized the next day, but the marriage certificate would only be
Page 49 of 193
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dated the day the marriage license becomes available. Helen also guaranteed the regularity of the
process for a fee of three thousand pesos (3,000) only. HYPERLINK "http://www.lawphil.net/
6
judjuris/juri2013/apr2013/am_mtj-07-1691_2013.html" \l "fnt6"
In its 10 July 2007 Resolution, this Court treated the Memorandum dated 6 July 2007 of the judicial
audit team as a formal administrative complaint and directed Judge Anatalio S. Necessario, Judge Gil
R. Acosta, Judge Rosabella M. Tormis, and Judge Edgemelo C. Rosales to submit their respective
comments. HYPERLINK "http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/apr2013/
7
am_mtj-07-1691_2013.html" \l "fnt7" The Court also suspended the judges pending resolution of
the cases against them. HYPERLINK "http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/apr2013/
8
am_mtj-07-1691_2013.html" \l "fnt8"
On 24 August 2007, the OCA through Senior Deputy Court Administrator Zenaida N. Elepao
submitted its Memorandum dated 29 August 2007 HYPERLINK "http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/
9
juri2013/apr2013/am_mtj-07-1691_2013.html" \l "fnt9" and Supplemental Report. HYPERLINK
10
"http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/apr2013/am_mtj-07-1691_2013.html" \l "fnt10" Six
hundred forty-three (643) marriage certificates were examined by the judicial audit team.
HYPERLINK "http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/apr2013/am_mtj-07-1691_2013.html" \l
11
"fnt11" The team reported that out of the 643 marriage certificates examined, 280 marriages were
solemnized under Article 34 HYPERLINK "http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/apr2013/
12
am_mtj-07-1691_2013.html" \l "fnt12" of the Family Code. HYPERLINK "http://
13
www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/apr2013/am_mtj-07-1691_2013.html" \l "fnt13" The logbooks
of the MTCC Branches indicate a higher number of solemnized marriages than the number of
marriage certificates in the courts custody. HYPERLINK "http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/
14
apr2013/am_mtj-07-1691_2013.html" \l "fnt14" There is also an unusual number of marriage
licenses obtained from the local civil registrars of the towns of Barili and Liloan, Cebu. HYPERLINK
15
"http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/apr2013/am_mtj-07-1691_2013.html" \l "fnt15" There
were even marriages solemnized at 9 a.m. with marriage licenses obtained on the same day.
16
"fnt16" The town of Barili, Cebu is more than sixty (60) kilometers away from Cebu City and
entails a travel time of almost two (2) hours. HYPERLINK "http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/
17
apr2013/am_mtj-07-1691_2013.html" \l "fnt17" Liloan, Cebu, on the other hand, is more than ten
(10) kilometers away from Cebu City. HYPERLINK "http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/
18
apr2013/am_mtj-07-1691_2013.html" \l "fnt18"
The judicial audit team, after tape-recording interviews with other court and government personnel,
also reported the following:
1) Celeste P. Retuya admitted that she assisted couples who wanted to get married by checking
whether their documents were complete and referred them to Judges Tormis, Necessario, and Rosales
afterwards; HYPERLINK "http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/apr2013/
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19
am_mtj-07-1691_2013.html" \l "fnt19"
2) Corazon P. Retuya referred couples who wanted to get married to Judge Necessario. There were
also "assistants" who would go over the couples documents before these couples would be referred to
Judge Necessario. Retuya also narrated several anomalies involving foreign nationals and their
acquisition of marriage licenses from the local civil registrar of Barili, Cebu despite the fact that
parties were not residents of Barili. Those anomalous marriages were solemnized by Judge Tormis;
20
"fnt20"
3) Rhona F. Rodriguez assisted couples and referred them to any of the available judges. She admitted
that after the payment of the solemnization fee of three hundred pesos (300), a different amount, as
agreed upon by the parties and the judge, was paid to the latter. HYPERLINK "http://
21
www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/apr2013/am_mtj-07-1691_2013.html" \l "fnt21" She admitted
that she accepted four thousand pesos (4,000) for facilitating the irregular marriage of Moreil
Baranggan Sebial and Maricel Albater although she gave the payment to a certain "Mang Boy";
22
"fnt22"
4) Emma D. Valencia admitted that she assisted couples seeking to get married and that most of the
marriage licenses were obtained from the local civil registrar of Barili and Liloan, Cebu because the
registrars in those towns were not strict about couples attendance in the family planning seminar. She
also admitted that couples gave her food while the judge received five hundred pesos (500) if the
marriage was solemnized inside the chambers. Foreigners were said to have given twice the said
amount. The judge accepted one thousand five hundred pesos (1,500) for gasoline expenses if the
marriage was celebrated outside the chambers; HYPERLINK "http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/
23
juri2013/apr2013/am_mtj-07-1691_2013.html" \l "fnt23"
5) Marilou Cabaez admitted that she assisted couples and referred them to Judges Tormis,
Necessario, or Rosales. However, she denied receiving any amount from these couples. She told the
audit team that during the 8th, 18th, and 28th of the month, seven (7) to eight (8) couples would go
directly to Judge Rosabella M. Tormis for a fifteen-minute marriage solemnization; HYPERLINK
24
"http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/apr2013/am_mtj-07-1691_2013.html" \l "fnt24"
6) Desiderio S. Aranas admitted that he started assisting couples in 2003. He told the investigating
team that Judge Gil Acosta would talk to couples wishing to get married without a license. He would
produce a joint affidavit of cohabitation form on which he or the clerk of court would type the entries.
The judge would then receive an envelope containing money from the couple. Aranas also confirmed
the existence of "open-dated" marriage certificates; HYPERLINK "http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/
25
7) Antonio Flores, Branch 9 Process Server of RTC Cebu City, told the investigating team that couples
looked for Judge Geraldine Faith A. Econg, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 9, Cebu
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City, "para menos ang bayad." HYPERLINK "http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/apr2013/

26
am_mtj-07-1691_2013.html" \l "fnt26" The excess of three hundred pesos (300) that couples paid
to Judge Econg as solemnization fee went to a certain "sinking fund" of Branch 9; HYPERLINK
27
8) Rebecca L. Alesna admitted that she usually referred couples to Judges Necessario or Tormis.
Couples who wanted to get married under Article 34 of the Family Code were advised to buy a pro-
forma affidavit of joint cohabitation for ten pesos (10); HYPERLINK "http://www.lawphil.net/
28
9) Arvin Oca, Branch 1 Process Server of the MTCC of Cebu City, admitted that he referred couples
to Branch 2, Clerk of Court, Harrish Co. Oca declared that on 28 June 2007, he accompanied a couple
to the chambers of Judge Necessario. HYPERLINK "http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/
29
apr2013/am_mtj-07-1691_2013.html" \l "fnt29" He informed the judge that the couple only had
birth certificates. HYPERLINK "http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/apr2013/
30
am_mtj-07-1691_2013.html" \l "fnt30" The respondent judge then inquired about their ages and
asked them if they had been previously married then proceeded to solemnize the marriage;
31
"fnt31" and
10) Filomena C. Lopez, local civil registrar of Barili, Cebu, declared that she does not scrutinize
marriage applications. HYPERLINK "http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/apr2013/
32
am_mtj-07-1691_2013.html" \l "fnt32" Couples who are non-Barili residents are able to obtain
marriage licenses from her Barili office because these couples have relatives residing in Barili, Cebu.
33
"fnt33" She also added that while couples still need to submit a certificate of attendance in the
family planning seminar, they may attend it before or after the filing of the application for marriage
license. HYPERLINK " h t t p : / / w w w. l a w p h i l . n e t / j u d j u r i s / j u r i 2 0 1 3 / a p r 2 0 1 3 /
34
am_mtj-07-1691_2013.html" \l "fnt34"
Affidavits of private persons were also attached to the records. Jacqui Lou Baguio-Manera was a
resident of Panagdait, Mabolo, Cebu and on 21 May 2007, she and her then fianc wanted to set a
marriage date. HYPERLINK "http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/apr2013/
35
am_mtj-07-1691_2013.html" \l "fnt35" Her younger sister who was married in a civil wedding last
year gave her the number of a certain "Meloy". After talking to Meloy on the phone, the wedding was
scheduled at 2 p.m. on 23 May 2007 and the couple were asked to bring their birth certificates. No
marriage license was required from them. Meloy asked for a fee of one thousand five hundred pesos
(1,500). According to Baguio-Manera, their marriage certificate was marked as "No marriage license
was necessary, the marriage being solemnized under Art. 34 of Executive Order No. 209". Their
marriage was solemnized that day by Judge Rosabella M. Tormis. Baguio-Manera claimed that they
did not understand what that statement meant at that time. However, in her affidavit, she declared that
Page 52 of 193
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the situation premised under Article 34 did not apply to her and her fianc.
Mary Anne Flores-Patoc was a resident of Barrio Luz, Cebu City. In her 5 July 2007 affidavit, she
recounted how she and her boyfriend went to the Provincial Capitol to get married in February 2006.
While logging in at the entrance, they were offered assistance by the guards for a fee of one thousand
five hundred pesos (1,500). The guard also offered to become "Ninong" or a witness to the wedding.
The couple became suspicious and did not push through with the civil wedding at that time.
On 27 November 2007, the Court En Banc issued a resolution: a) requiring Judges Anatalio S.
Necessario, Gil R. Acosta, Rosabella M. Tormis, and Edgemelo C. Rosales of the MTCC, Branches 2,
3, 4, and 8, respectively, of Cebu City, to comment on the findings of the 14 August 2007
Supplemental Report of the OCA, within fifteen (15) days from notice; b) directing the Process
Servicing Unit to furnish the judges with a copy of the Supplemental Report; c) requiring the court
personnel listed below to show cause within fifteen (15) days from notice why no disciplinary action
should be taken against them for their alleged grave misconduct and dishonesty and impleading them
in this administrative matter:
1) Celeste P. Retuya, Clerk III, MTCC, Branch 6, Cebu City;
2) Corazon P. Retuya, Court Stenographer, MTCC, Branch 6, Cebu City;
3) Rhona F. Rodriguez, Administrative Officer I, Office of the Clerk of Court, RTC, Cebu City;
4) Emma D. Valencia, Court Stenographer III, RTC, Branch 18, Cebu City;
5) Marilou Cabaez, Court Stenographer, MTCC, Branch 4, Cebu City;
6) Desiderio S. Aranas, Process Server, MTCC, Branch 3, Cebu City;
7) Rebecca Alesna, Court Interpreter, MTCC, Branch 1, Cebu City;
8) Helen Mongaya,Court Stenographer, MTCC, Branch 4, Cebu City.
The Court in the same resolution also: a) ordered the referral to the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman
for the Visayas for appropriate action on the administrative matter involving the violation of the law
on marriage by Ms. Filomena C. Lopez, Local Civil Registrar of Barili, Cebu, and one Ms. Veronica
S. Longakit, former Local Civil Registrar of Liloan, Cebu; b) directed the Process Serving Unit to
furnish the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for the Visayas with a copy of the Supplemental Report
of the OCA; and c) required Judge Geraldine Faith A. Econg, RTC, Branch 9, Cebu City, to comment
within fifteen (15) days from notice on the statement of staff member Antonio Flores saying that
Branch 9s court personnel received an amount in excess of the 300 solemnization fee paid by
couples whose marriages were solemnized by her. This amount goes to the courts "sinking fund".
36
"fnt36"
In their Comments and/or Answers to the Memorandum dated 5 July 2007 of the OCA and its
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Supplemental Report, HYPERLINK "http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/apr2013/

37
am_mtj-07-1691_2013.html" \l "fnt37" the respondent judges argued the following:
Judge Anatalio S. Necessario relies on the presumption of regularity regarding the documents
presented to him by contracting parties. HYPERLINK "http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/
38
apr2013/am_mtj-07-1691_2013.html" \l "fnt38" He claims that marriages he solemnized under
Article 34 of the Family Code had the required affidavit of cohabitation. He claims that pro forma
affidavits of cohabitation have been used by other judges even before he became a judge.
39
"fnt39" He avers that he ascertains the ages of the parties, their relationship, and the existence of an
impediment to marry. HYPERLINK "http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/apr2013/
40
am_mtj-07-1691_2013.html" \l "fnt40" He also asks the parties searching questions and clarifies
whether they understood the contents of the affidavit and the legal consequences of its execution.
41
"fnt41" The judge also denies knowledge of the payment of solemnization fees in batches.
42
"fnt42" In addition, he argues that it was a process server who was in-charge of recording
marriages on the logbook, keeping the marriage certificates, and reporting the total number of
marriages monthly. HYPERLINK "http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/apr2013/
43
am_mtj-07-1691_2013.html" \l "fnt43"
Judge Gil R. Acosta argues that the law only requires a marriage license and that he is not required to
inquire whether the license was obtained from a location where one of the parties is an actual resident.
44
"fnt44" The judge believes that it is not his duty to verify the signature on the marriage license to
determine its authenticity because he relies on the presumption of regularity of public documents.
45
"fnt45" The judge also outlines his own procedure in solemnizing marriages which involves: first,
the determination whether the solemnization fee was paid; second, the presentation of the affidavit of
cohabitation and birth certificates to ascertain identity and age of the parties; third, if one of the parties
is a foreigner, the judge asks for a certificate of legal capacity to marry, passport picture, date of
arrival, and divorce papers when the party is divorced; fourth, he then asks the parties and their
witnesses questions regarding cohabitation and interviews the children of the parties, if any.
46
"fnt46"
Judge Rosabella M. Tormis denies the charges brought by the OCA. She calls the actions of the
judicial audit team during the investigation an "entrapment". HYPERLINK "http://www.lawphil.net/
47
judjuris/juri2013/apr2013/am_mtj-07-1691_2013.html" \l "fnt47" She also claims that there is
nothing wrong with solemnizing marriages on the date of the issuance of the marriage license and
with the fact that the issued marriage license was obtained from a place where neither of the parties
Page 54 of 193
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resided. HYPERLINK " h t t p : / / w w w. l a w p h i l . n e t / j u d j u r i s / j u r i 2 0 1 3 / a p r 2 0 1 3 /

48
am_mtj-07-1691_2013.html" \l "fnt48" As to the pro forma affidavits of cohabitation, she argues
that she cannot be faulted for accepting it as genuine as she and the other judges are not handwriting
experts. HYPERLINK " h t t p : / / w w w. l a w p h i l . n e t / j u d j u r i s / j u r i 2 0 1 3 / a p r 2 0 1 3 /
49
am_mtj-07-1691_2013.html" \l "fnt49" The affidavits also enjoy the presumption of regularity.
50
"fnt50" Judge Tormis also discredits the affidavit of Baguio-Manera as hearsay. HYPERLINK
51
"http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/apr2013/am_mtj-07-1691_2013.html" \l "fnt51" The
respondent said that when Baguio-Manera and her husband were confronted with the affidavit they
executed, they affirmed the veracity of the statements, particularly the fact that they have been living
together for five years. HYPERLINK "http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/apr2013/
52
am_mtj-07-1691_2013.html" \l "fnt52" The judge also attributes the irregularity in the number of
marriages solemnized in her sala to the filing clerks. HYPERLINK "http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/
53
Judge Edgemelo C. Rosales denies violating the law on marriage. HYPERLINK "http://
54
www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/apr2013/am_mtj-07-1691_2013.html" \l "fnt54" He maintains
that it is the local civil registrar who evaluates the documents submitted by the parties, and he
presumes the regularity of the license issued. HYPERLINK "http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/
55
apr2013/am_mtj-07-1691_2013.html" \l "fnt55" It is only when there is no marriage license given
that he ascertains the qualifications of the parties and the lack of legal impediment to marry.
56
"fnt56" As to the affidavits of cohabitation, the judge believes there is nothing wrong with the fact
that these are pro forma. He states that marriage certificates are required with the marriage license
attached or the affidavit of cohabitation only and the other documents fall under the responsibility of
the local civil registrar. He surmises that if the marriage certificate did not come with the marriage
license or affidavit of cohabitation, the missing document might have been inadvertently detached, and
it can be checked with the proper local civil registrar. As to the payment of the docket fee, he contends
that it should be paid after the solemnization of the marriage and not before because judges will be
pre-empted from ascertaining the qualifications of the couple. Besides, the task of collecting the fee
belongs to the Clerk of Court. HYPERLINK "http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/apr2013/
57
am_mtj-07-1691_2013.html" \l "fnt57" The judge also argues that solemnization of marriage is not
a judicial duty. HYPERLINK "http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/apr2013/
58
am_mtj-07-1691_2013.html" \l "fnt58"
On 12 November 2007, Judges Tormis and Rosales filed a Memorandum of Law with Plea for Early
Resolution, Lifting of Suspension and Dismissal of Case. HYPERLINK "http://www.lawphil.net/
59
judjuris/juri2013/apr2013/am_mtj-07-1691_2013.html" \l "fnt59" This Court in a Resolution dated
11 December 2007 lifted the suspension of the respondent judges but prohibited them from
solemnizing marriages until further ordered. HYPERLINK "http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/
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60
On 7 December 2007, Judges Tormis and Rosales filed a Motion for Early Resolution with Waiver of
Formal and/or Further Investigation and Motion to Dismiss. HYPERLINK "http://www.lawphil.net/
61
judjuris/juri2013/apr2013/am_mtj-07-1691_2013.html" \l "fnt61" In a Resolution dated 15 January
2008, the Court noted the motion and granted the prayer of Judges Tormis and Rosales for the
payment of their unpaid salaries, allowances and all other economic benefits from 9 July 2007.
62
"fnt62"
THE REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION OF THE OCA
In its Memorandum dated 15 June 2010, HYPERLINK "http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/

63
apr2013/am_mtj-07-1691_2013.html" \l "fnt63" the OCA recommended the dismissal of the
respondent judges and some court employees, and the suspension or admonition of others. The OCA
summarized the liabilities of the respondents, to wit:
JUDGE ANATALIO S. NECESSARIO is guilty of gross inefficiency or neglect of duty for

solemnizing marriages with questionable documents and wherein one of the contracting parties is a
foreigner who submitted a mere affidavit of his capacity to marry in lieu of the required certificate
from his embassy. He is also guilty of gross ignorance of the law for solemnizing marriages under
Article 34 of the Family Code wherein one or both of the contracting parties were minors during the
cohabitation.
xxx
JUDGE GIL R. ACOSTA is guilty of gross inefficiency or neglect of duty for failure to make sure that
the solemnization fee has been paid. He is also guilty of gross ignorance of the law for solemnizing
marriages under Article 34 of the Family Code wherein one or both of the contracting parties were
minors during the cohabitation.
JUDGE EDGEMELO C. ROSALES is guilty of gross inefficiency or neglect of duty for solemnizing
marriages with questionable documents, for failure to make sure that the solemnization fee has been
paid and for solemnizing marriages wherein one of the contracting parties is a foreigner who
submitted a mere affidavit of his capacity to marry in lieu of the required certificate from his embassy.
He is also guilty of gross ignorance of the law for solemnizing a marriage without the requisite
marriage license.
JUDGE ROSEBELLA M. TORMIS is guilty of gross inefficiency or neglect of duty for solemnizing
marriages with questionable documents, for failure to make sure that the solemnization fee has been
paid, for solemnizing marriages wherein one of the contracting parties is a foreigner who submitted a
mere affidavit of his capacity to marry in lieu of the required certificate from the embassy and for
solemnizing a marriage with an expired license.
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xxx
HELEN MONGGAYA is guilty of grave misconduct for violating Section 2, Canon I of the Code of
Conduct for Court Personnel that prohibits court personnel from soliciting or accepting any gift, favor
or benefit based on any or explicit or implicit understanding that such gift, favor or benefit shall
influence their official actions and for giving false information for the purpose of perpetrating an
irregular marriage.
RHONA RODRIGUEZ is guilty of gross misconduct for violating Section 2, Canon I of the Code of
Conduct for Court Personnel and for inducing Maricel Albater to falsify the application for marriage
license by instructing her to indicate her residence as Barili, Cebu.
DESIDERIO ARANAS and REBECCA ALESNA are guilty of conduct prejudicial to the best interest
of the service for providing couples who are to be married under Article 34 of the Family Code with
the required affidavit of cohabitation.
CELESTE RETUYA, EMMA VALENCIA and REBECCA ALESNA are guilty of violating Section
2(b), Canon III of the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel which prohibits court personnel from
receiving tips or other remuneration for assisting or attending to parties engaged in transactions or
involved in actions or proceedings with the Judiciary. HYPERLINK "http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/
64
The OCA, however, recommended the DISMISSAL of the complaints against Judge Geraldine Faith
A. Econg, Corazon P. Retuya, and Marilou Cabaez, for lack of merit.
THE ISSUE
The issue now before this Court is whether the judges and personnel of the MTCC and RTC in Cebu
City are guilty of gross ignorance of the law, gross neglect of duty or gross inefficiency and gross
misconduct, and in turn, warrant the most severe penalty of dismissal from service.
THE COURTS RULING
The findings in the 2010 Memorandum of the Office of the Court Administrator are supported by the
evidence on record and applicable law and jurisprudence.
This Court has long held that court officials and employees are placed with a heavy burden and
responsibility of keeping the faith of the public. HYPERLINK "http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/
65
juri2013/apr2013/am_mtj-07-1691_2013.html" \l "fnt65" In Obaana, Jr. v. Ricafort, we said that:
Any impression of impropriety, misdeed or negligence in the performance of official functions must
be avoided. This Court shall not countenance any conduct, act or omission on the part of all those
involved in the administration of justice which would violate the norm of public accountability and
diminish the faith of the people in the Judiciary. HYPERLINK "http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/
66
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The OCA described accurately the Palace of Justice in Cebu City as a hub of swift marriages. The
respondent judges and court personnel disregarded laws and procedure to the prejudice of the parties
and the proper administration of justice.
The OCA found that Judges Anatalio S. Necessario, Gil R. Acosta, Rosabella M. Tormis, and
Edgemelo C. Rosales are all guilty of gross inefficiency or neglect of duty when they solemnized
marriages without following the proper procedure laid down by law, particularly the Family Code of
the Philippines and existing jurisprudence. The OCA listed down aspects of the solemnization process
which were disregarded by the judges. The Court will now discuss the individual liabilities of the
respondent judges and court personnel vis--vis the evidence presented by the OCA against them.
Liability of Judge Anatalio S. Necessario
The OCA reported that Judge Necessario solemnized a total of one thousand one hundred twenty-three
(1,123) marriages from 2005 to 2007. HYPERLINK "http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/
67
apr2013/am_mtj-07-1691_2013.html" \l "fnt67" However, only one hundred eighty-four (184)
marriage certificates were actually examined by the judicial audit team. HYPERLINK "http://
68
www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/apr2013/am_mtj-07-1691_2013.html" \l "fnt68" Out of the 184
marriages, only seventy-nine (79) were solemnized with a marriage license while one hundred five
(105) were solemnized under Article 34 of the Family Code. Out of the 79 marriages with license,
forty-seven (47) of these licenses were issued by the Local Civil Registrar of Liloan, Cebu. This
translates to 42.93% of the marriages he solemnized with marriage license coming from Liloan for
over a period of years. HYPERLINK "http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/apr2013/
69
am_mtj-07-1691_2013.html" \l "fnt69" There were also twenty-two (22) marriages solemnized by
the judge with incomplete documents such missing as marriage license, certificate of legal capacity to
marry, and the joint affidavit of cohabitation. HYPERLINK "http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/
70
Judge Necessario solemnized nine (9) marriages that had questionable supporting documents such as
marriage licenses. HYPERLINK "http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/apr2013/
71
am_mtj-07-1691_2013.html" \l "fnt71" The OCA found that the place of residence of the
contracting parties appearing in the supporting documents differ from the place where they obtained
their marriage license. HYPERLINK "http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/apr2013/
72
am_mtj-07-1691_2013.html" \l "fnt72" The documents invited suspicion because of erasures and
superimpositions in the entries of residence. HYPERLINK "http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/
73
apr2013/am_mtj-07-1691_2013.html" \l "fnt73" Likewise, in lieu of the required certificate of legal
capacity to marry, a mere affidavit was submitted by the parties. HYPERLINK "http://
74
www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/apr2013/am_mtj-07-1691_2013.html" \l "fnt74" Variations in
the signatures of the contracting parties were also apparent in the documents. HYPERLINK "http://
75
The respondent judge solemnized forty-three (43) marriages under Article 34 of the Family Code.
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These marriages appeared dubious since the joint affidavit of cohabitation of the parties show minority
of one or both of them during cohabitation. HYPERLINK "http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/
76
apr2013/am_mtj-07-1691_2013.html" \l "fnt76" For example, he solemnized on 14 May 2004 the
marriage of 22-year-old Harol D. Amorin and 19-year-old Dinalyn S. Paraiso who are residents of
Lapu-Lapu City. HYPERLINK "http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/apr2013/
77
am_mtj-07-1691_2013.html" \l "fnt77"
There are also sixteen (16) marriage licenses with attached official receipts of the solemnization fee
but the corresponding marriage certificates cannot be found. HYPERLINK "http://www.lawphil.net/
78
judjuris/juri2013/apr2013/am_mtj-07-1691_2013.html" \l "fnt78" The presence of the receipts
implies that these marriages were solemnized.
Liability of Judge Gil R. Acosta
Judge Acosta solemnized a total of eighty-seven (87) marriages from 2003 to 2007. HYPERLINK
79
However, the logbook showed that he solemnized two hundred seventy-two (272) marriages while
the monthly reports of cases showed that he solemnized five hundred twelve (512) marriages over the
same period. Out of the 87 marriages, he solemnized seventy-five (75) under
Article 34 of the Family Code. HYPERLINK "http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/apr2013/

80
am_mtj-07-1691_2013.html" \l "fnt80" This is equivalent to 86.21% of the marriages solemnized
under Article 34 in a four-year period. HYPERLINK "http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/
81
There were forty-one (41) marriage certificates signed by Judge Tormis or Judge Necessario as
solemnizing officers found in his custody. HYPERLINK "http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/
82
apr2013/am_mtj-07-1691_2013.html" \l "fnt82" There were also ten (10) marriages under Article
34 of the Family Code where one or both of the contracting parties were minors during cohabitation.
83
"fnt83" To illustrate, respondent judge solemnized on 4 May 2004 the marriage of Julieto W. Baga,
22 years old, and Esterlita P. Anlangit, 18 years old. HYPERLINK "http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/
84
There were seventeen (17) marriages under Article 34 where neither of the contracting parties were
residents of Cebu City. HYPERLINK "http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/apr2013/
85
am_mtj-07-1691_2013.html" \l "fnt85" The judge solemnized three (3) marriages without the
foreign partys required certificate of legal capacity to marry. HYPERLINK "http://www.lawphil.net/
86
judjuris/juri2013/apr2013/am_mtj-07-1691_2013.html" \l "fnt86" Lastly, there was no proof of
payment of the solemnization fee in almost all of the marriages the judge officiated. HYPERLINK
87
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Liability of Judge Rosabella M. Tormis
Judge Tormis solemnized a total of one hundred eighty-one (181) marriages from 2003 to 2007 based
on the marriage certificates actually examined. HYPERLINK "http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/
88
juri2013/apr2013/am_mtj-07-1691_2013.html" \l "fnt88" However, the monthly report of cases
showed that she solemnized three hundred five (305) marriages instead for the years 2004 to 2007.
89
"fnt89" The OCA report also noted that it was only in July 2007 that her court started to use a
logbook to keep track of marriages. HYPERLINK "http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/apr2013/
90
am_mtj-07-1691_2013.html" \l "fnt90"
Respondent judge solemnized thirty-seven (37) marriages with incomplete or missing documents such
as the marriage license, certificate of legal capacity to marry, and the joint affidavit of cohabitation.
91
"fnt91" In several instances, only affidavits were submitted by the foreign parties in lieu of the
certificate of legal capacity to marry. HYPERLINK "http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/
92
Judge Tormis solemnized thirteen (13) marriages despite the questionable character of the validity of
the required documents particularly the marriage license. HYPERLINK "http://www.lawphil.net/
93
judjuris/juri2013/apr2013/am_mtj-07-1691_2013.html" \l "fnt93" The judicial audit team found
numerous erasures and superimpositions on entries with regard to the parties place of residence.
94
"fnt94"
In one instance, the judge solemnized the marriage of Rex Randy E. Cujardo and Anselma B. Laranio
on 28 December 2006 despite the marriage license containing a rubberstamp mark saying, "THIS
LICENSE EXPIRES ON" and a handwritten note saying "12/28/06" under it. HYPERLINK "http://
95
The judge solemnized a total of forty-seven (47) marriages under Article 34 of the Family Code
wherein the marriage requirements authenticity was doubtful due to the circumstances of the
cohabitation of the parties and the given address of the parties. HYPERLINK "http://www.lawphil.net/
96
judjuris/juri2013/apr2013/am_mtj-07-1691_2013.html" \l "fnt96" These irregularities were evident
in the case of 22-year-old John Rey R. Tibalan and Ana Liza Secuya who were married on 25 May
2007. The residential address of the couple in the marriage certificate is "Sitio Bamboo, Buhisan,
Cebu City." However, there was an application for marriage license attached to the marriage certificate
showing that Secuyas address is "F. Lopez Comp. Morga St., Cebu City." HYPERLINK "http://
97
Liability of Judge Edgemelo C. Rosales
Page 60 of 193
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Judge Rosales solemnized a total of one hundred twenty-one (121) marriages from 2006 to 2007 based
on the marriage certificates examined by the judicial audit team. HYPERLINK "http://
98
www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/apr2013/am_mtj-07-1691_2013.html" \l "fnt98" However, only
three (3) marriages were reported for the same period. HYPERLINK "http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/
99
juri2013/apr2013/am_mtj-07-1691_2013.html" \l "fnt99" Out of the 121 marriages the judge
solemnized, fifty-two (52) or 42.98% fall under Article 34 of the Family Code. HYPERLINK "http://
100
www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/apr2013/am_mtj-07-1691_2013.html" \l "fnt100" Thirty-eight
(38) marriage licenses out of the sixty-six (66) obtained or 57.57% were from the local civil registrar
of Barili, Cebu. HYPERLINK "http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/apr2013/
101
am_mtj-07-1691_2013.html" \l "fnt101" Nineteen (19) or 28.79% were from the local civil
registrar of Liloan, Cebu. HYPERLINK "http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/apr2013/
102
am_mtj-07-1691_2013.html" \l "fnt102" Nine (9) or 13.64% were from other local civil registrars.
103
"fnt103"
There were marriage documents found in his court such as marriage licenses, applications for
marriage license, certificates of legal capacity to contract marriage, affidavits in lieu of certificate of
legal capacity to contract marriage, joint affidavits of cohabitation, and other documents referring to
the solemnization of one hundred thirty-two (132) marriages, with no corresponding marriage
certificates. HYPERLINK "http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/apr2013/
104
am_mtj-07-1691_2013.html" \l "fnt104" He solemnized two marriages of Buddy Gayland
Weaver, an American citizen, to two different persons within nine (9) months. HYPERLINK "http://
105
www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/apr2013/am_mtj-07-1691_2013.html" \l "fnt105" No copy of
the required certificate of legal capacity to contract marriage or the divorce decree was presented.
106
"fnt106"
The judge solemnized thirty-seven (37) marriages without or with incomplete supporting documents
such as the certificate of legal capacity to marry and the joint affidavit of cohabitation. HYPERLINK
107
"http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/apr2013/am_mtj-07-1691_2013.html" \l "fnt107" He
solemnized nine (9) marriages under questionable circumstances such as the submission of an affidavit
or affirmation of freedom to marry in lieu of the certificate of legal capacity to marry, the
discrepancies in the residence of the contracting parties as appearing in the marriage documents, and
the solemnization of the marriage on the same day the marriage license was issued. HYPERLINK
108
Judge Rosales also solemnized forty-three (43) marriages with no proof that the solemnization fee of
300 was paid. HYPERLINK "http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/apr2013/
109
am_mtj-07-1691_2013.html" \l "fnt109" On the other hand, there were twenty-six (26) marriages
whose solemnization fees were paid late. HYPERLINK "http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/
Page 61 of 193
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110
To summarize, the liabilities of the judges are the following:
First, Judges Necessario, Tormis and Rosales solemnized marriages even if the requirements
submitted by the couples were incomplete and of questionable character. Most of these documents
showed visible signs of tampering, erasures, corrections or superimpositions of entries related to the
parties place of residence. HYPERLINK "http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/apr2013/
111
am_mtj-07-1691_2013.html" \l "fnt111" These included indistinguishable features such as the
font, font size, and ink of the computer-printed entries in the marriage certificate and marriage license.
112
"fnt112" These actions of the respondent judges constitute gross inefficiency. In Vega v. Asdala,
113
"fnt113" the Court held that inefficiency implies negligence, incompetence, ignorance, and
carelessness.
Second, the judges were also found guilty of neglect of duty regarding the payment of solemnization
fees. The Court, in Rodrigo-Ebron v. Adolfo, HYPERLINK "http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/
114
apr2013/am_mtj-07-1691_2013.html" \l "fnt114" defined neglect of duty as the failure to give
ones attention to a task expected of him and it is gross when, from the gravity of the offense or the
frequency of instances, the offense is so serious in its character as to endanger or threaten public
welfare. The marriage documents examined by the audit team show that corresponding official
receipts for the solemnization fee were missing HYPERLINK "http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/
115
juri2013/apr2013/am_mtj-07-1691_2013.html" \l "fnt115" or payment by batches was made for
marriages performed on different dates. HYPERLINK "http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/
116
apr2013/am_mtj-07-1691_2013.html" \l "fnt116" The OCA emphasizes that the payment of the
solemnization fee starts off the whole marriage application process and even puts a "stamp of
regularity" on the process.
Third, Judges Necessario, Tormis, and Rosales also solemnized marriages where a contracting party is
a foreigner who did not submit a certificate of legal capacity to marry from his or her embassy. What
the foreigners submitted were mere affidavits stating their capacity to marry. The irregularity in the
certificates of legal capacity that are required under Article 21 of the Family Code HYPERLINK
117
displayed the gross neglect of duty of the judges. They should have been diligent in scrutinizing
the documents required for the marriage license issuance. Any irregularities would have been
prevented in the qualifications of parties to contract marriage. HYPERLINK "http://www.lawphil.net/
118
Fourth, Judges Necessario, Acosta, and Tormis are likewise guilty of gross ignorance of the law under
Article 34 of the Family Code HYPERLINK "http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/apr2013/
119
am_mtj-07-1691_2013.html" \l "fnt119" with respect to the marriages they solemnized where
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legal impediments existed during cohabitation such as the minority status of one party. HYPERLINK
120
"http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/apr2013/am_mtj-07-1691_2013.html" \l "fnt120" The
audit team cites in their Supplemental Report that there were parties whose ages ranged from eighteen
(18) to twenty-two (22) years old who were married by mere submission of a pro forma joint affidavit
of cohabitation. HYPERLINK "http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/apr2013/
121
am_mtj-07-1691_2013.html" \l "fnt121" These affidavits were notarized by the solemnizing judge
himself or herself. HYPERLINK "http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/apr2013/
122
am_mtj-07-1691_2013.html" \l "fnt122"
Finally, positive testimonies were also given regarding the solemnization of marriages of some
couples where no marriage license was previously issued. The contracting parties were made to fill up
the application for a license on the same day the marriage was solemnized. HYPERLINK "http://
123
The Court does not accept the arguments of the respondent judges that the ascertainment of the
validity of the marriage license is beyond the scope of the duty of a solemnizing officer especially
when there are glaring pieces of evidence that point to the contrary. As correctly observed by the
OCA, the presumption of regularity accorded to a marriage license disappears the moment the
marriage documents do not appear regular on its face.
In People v. Jansen, HYPERLINK "http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/apr2013/

124
am_mtj-07-1691_2013.html" \l "fnt124" this Court held that:
the solemnizing officer is not duty-bound to investigate whether or not a marriage license has been
duly and regularly issued by the local civil registrar. All the solemnizing officer needs to know is that
the license has been issued by the competent official, and it may be presumed from the issuance of the
license that said official has fulfilled the duty to ascertain whether the contracting parties had fulfilled
the requirements of law.
However, this Court also said in Sevilla v. Cardenas, HYPERLINK "http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/

125
juri2013/apr2013/am_mtj-07-1691_2013.html" \l "fnt125" that "the presumption of regularity of
official acts may be rebutted by affirmative evidence of irregularity or failure to perform a duty." The
visible superimpositions on the marriage licenses should have alerted the solemnizing judges to the
irregularity of the issuance.
It follows also that although Article 21 of the Family Code requires the submission of the certificate
from the embassy of the foreign party to the local registrar for acquiring a marriage license, the judges
should have been more diligent in reviewing the parties documents and qualifications. As noted by the
OCA, the absence of the required certificates coupled with the presence of mere affidavits should have
aroused suspicion as to the regularity of the marriage license issuance.
The judges gross ignorance of the law is also evident when they solemnized marriages under Article
34 of the Family Code without the required qualifications and with the existence of legal impediments
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such as minority of a party. Marriages of exceptional character such as those made under Article 34
are, doubtless, the exceptions to the rule on the indispensability of the formal requisite of a marriage
license. HYPERLINK " h t t p : / / w w w. l a w p h i l . n e t / j u d j u r i s / j u r i 2 0 1 3 / a p r 2 0 1 3 /
126
am_mtj-07-1691_2013.html" \l "fnt126" Under the rules of statutory construction, exceptions as a
general rule should be strictly but reasonably construed. HYPERLINK "http://www.lawphil.net/
127
judjuris/juri2013/apr2013/am_mtj-07-1691_2013.html" \l "fnt127" The affidavits of cohabitation
should not be issued and accepted pro forma particularly in view of the settled rulings of the Court on
this matter. The five-year period of cohabitation should be one of a perfect union valid under the law
but rendered imperfect only by the absence of the marriage contract. HYPERLINK "http://
128
www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/apr2013/am_mtj-07-1691_2013.html" \l "fnt128" The parties
should have been capacitated to marry each other during the entire period and not only at the time of
the marriage. HYPERLINK "http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/apr2013/
129
am_mtj-07-1691_2013.html" \l "fnt129"
To elaborate further on the gravity of the acts and omissions of the respondents, the Family Code
provides the requisites for a valid marriage:
Art. 3. The formal requisites of marriage are:
(1) Authority of the solemnizing officer;
(2) A valid marriage license except in the cases provided for in Chapter 2 of this Title; and
(3) A marriage ceremony which takes place with the appearance of the contracting parties before the
solemnizing officer and their personal declaration that they take each other as husband and wife in the
presence of not less than two witnesses of legal age. (53a, 55a)
Art. 4. The absence of any of the essential or formal requisites shall render the marriage void ab initio,
except as stated in Article 35 (2). A defect in any of the essential requisites shall not affect the validity
of the marriage but the party or parties responsible for the irregularity shall be civilly, criminally and
administratively liable. (n)
The absence of a marriage license will clearly render a marriage void ab initio. HYPERLINK "http://
130
www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/apr2013/am_mtj-07-1691_2013.html" \l "fnt130" The actions
of the judges have raised a very alarming issue regarding the validity of the marriages they solemnized
since they did not follow the proper procedure or check the required documents and qualifications. In
Aranes v. Judge Salvador Occiano, HYPERLINK "http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/apr2013/
131
am_mtj-07-1691_2013.html" \l "fnt131" the Court said that a marriage solemnized without a
marriage license is void and the subsequent issuance of the license cannot render valid or add even an
iota of validity to the marriage. It is the marriage license that gives the solemnizing officer the
authority to solemnize a marriage and the act of solemnizing the marriage without a license constitutes
gross ignorance of the law.
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As held by this Court in Navarro v. Domagtoy:
The judiciary should be composed of persons who, if not experts are at least proficient in the law they
are sworn to apply, more than the ordinary layman. They should be skilled and competent in
understanding and applying the law. It is imperative that they be conversant with basic legal principles
like the ones involved in the instant case. It is not too much to expect them to know and apply the law
intelligently. HYPERLINK "http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/apr2013/
132
am_mtj-07-1691_2013.html" \l "fnt132"
It is important to note that the audit team found out that Judge Rosabella M. Tormis ordered Celerina
Plaza, a personal employee of the judge, to wait for couples outside the Hall of Justice and offer
services. HYPERLINK " h t t p : / / w w w. l a w p h i l . n e t / j u d j u r i s / j u r i 2 0 1 3 / a p r 2 0 1 3 /
133
am_mtj-07-1691_2013.html" \l "fnt133" Crisanto Dela Cerna also stated in his affidavit that
Judge Tormis instructed him to get all marriage certificates and bring them to her house when she
found out about the judicial audit. HYPERLINK "http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/apr2013/
134
am_mtj-07-1691_2013.html" \l "fnt134" In the language of the OCA, Judge Tormis considered
the solemnization of marriages not as a duty but as a business. HYPERLINK "http://www.lawphil.net/
135
judjuris/juri2013/apr2013/am_mtj-07-1691_2013.html" \l "fnt135" The respondent judge was
suspended for six (6) months in A.M. No. MTJ-071-962 for repeatedly disregarding the directives of
this Court to furnish the complainant a copy of her comment. She was also fined the amount of five
thousand pesos (5,000) in A.M. Nos. 04-7-373-RTC and 04-7-374 RTC. HYPERLINK "http://
136
www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/apr2013/am_mtj-07-1691_2013.html" \l "fnt136" She was
reprimanded twice in A.M. No. MTJ-05-1609 and in A.M. No. MTJ-001337. HYPERLINK "http://
137
www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/apr2013/am_mtj-07-1691_2013.html" \l "fnt137" Finally, in the
very recent case of Office of the Court Administrator v. Hon. Rosabella M. Tormis and Mr. Reynaldo
S. Teves, A.M. No. MTJ-12-1817, promulgated last 12 March 2013, Judge Tormis was found guilty of
gross inefficiency, violation of Supreme Court rules, directives and circulars and gross ignorance of
the law by this Court. She was dismissed from service, with forfeiture of all benefits and privileges,
except accrued leave credits, if any, with prejudice to reemployment in any branch or instrumentality
of the government, including government-owned or controlled corporations.
The respondent judges violated Canons 2 HYPERLINK "http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/

138
apr2013/am_mtj-07-1691_2013.html" \l "fnt138" and 6 HYPERLINK "http://www.lawphil.net/
139
judjuris/juri2013/apr2013/am_mtj-07-1691_2013.html" \l "fnt139" of the Canons of Judicial
Ethics which exact competence, integrity and probity in the performance of their duties. This Court
previously said that "Ignorance of the law is a mark of incompetence, and where the law involved is
elementary, ignorance thereof is considered as an indication of lack of integrity." HYPERLINK
140
"http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/apr2013/am_mtj-07-1691_2013.html" \l "fnt140" In
connection with this, the administration of justice is considered a sacred task and upon assumption to
office, a judge ceases to be an ordinary mortal. He or she becomes the visible representation of the law
and more importantly of justice. HYPERLINK "http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/apr2013/
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141
am_mtj-07-1691_2013.html" \l "fnt141"
The actuations of these judges are not only condemnable, it is outright shameful.
Liability of Other Court Personnel
The Court agrees with the recommendations of the OCA on the liability of the following employees:
Helen Mongaya, Court Interpreter of Judge Rosabella M. Tormis, MTCC, Branch 4, Cebu City, is
guilty of grave misconduct when she informed the female lawyer of the judicial audit team that she
can facilitate the marriage and the requirements on the same day of the lawyers visit. HYPERLINK
142
What Monggaya was proposing was an open-dated marriage in exchange for a fee of 3,000. Section
2, Canon I of the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel prohibits court personnel from soliciting or
accepting gifts, favor or benefit based on any explicit or implicit understanding that such gift, favor or
benefit shall influence their official actions.
Mongayas claim that she was merely relating to the lady lawyer what she knew from other offices as
the usual practice HYPERLINK "http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/apr2013/
143
am_mtj-07-1691_2013.html" \l "fnt143" is inexcusable. As found by the OCA in its
Memorandum, "Monggaya deliberately gave false information for the purpose of perpetrating an
illegal scheme. This, in itself, constitutes grave misconduct." HYPERLINK "http://www.lawphil.net/
144
judjuris/juri2013/apr2013/am_mtj-07-1691_2013.html" \l "fnt144" Sec. 52, Rule IV of the
Uniform Rules on
Administrative Cases in the Civil Service defines grave misconduct as "a grave offense that carries the
extreme penalty of dismissal from the service even on a first offense.
In Villaceran v. Rosete, this Court held that:
Court personnel, from the lowliest employee, are involved in the dispensation of justice; parties
seeking redress from the courts for grievances look upon court personnel, irrespective of rank or
position, as part of the Judiciary. In performing their duties and responsibilities, these court personnel
serve as sentinels of justice and any act of impropriety on their part immeasurably affects the honor
and dignity of the Judiciary and the peoples trust and confidence in this institution. Therefore, they
are expected to act and behave in a manner that should uphold the honor and dignity of the Judiciary,
if only to maintain the people's confidence in the Judiciary. HYPERLINK "http://www.lawphil.net/
145
Mongaya acted improperly and in a manner opposite of what is expected of court personnel. Her
actions placed doubts on the integrity of the courts.
Rhona Rodriguez, Administrative Officer I of the Office of the Clerk of Court of the MTCC, Cebu
City, is guilty of gross misconduct. She assisted the couple, Moreil Sebial and Maricel Albater, and
Page 66 of 193
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demanded and accepted 4,000 from them. HYPERLINK "http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/

146
apr2013/am_mtj-07-1691_2013.html" \l "fnt146" The act was a violation of Section 2, Canon I of
the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel. As found by the OCA and adopted by this Court, Rodriguez
induced Albater to falsify the application for marriage license by instructing her to indicate her
residence as Barili, Cebu. HYPERLINK "http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/apr2013/
147
am_mtj-07-1691_2013.html" \l "fnt147" The claim that she gave the amount to a certain Borces
who was allegedly the real facilitator belies her participation in facilitating the marriage. According to
the OCA, when the couple went back for their marriage certificate, they approached Rodriguez and
not Borces. HYPERLINK "http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/apr2013/
148
am_mtj-07-1691_2013.html" \l "fnt148" When Borces told Rodriguez that the marriage certificate
had been misplaced, it was Rodriguez who instructed Sebial to fill up another marriage certificate.
149
"fnt149"
This Court has held that improper solicitations prohibited by Section 2, Canon I of the Code of
Conduct for Court Personnel, merits a grave penalty. HYPERLINK "http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/
150
juri2013/apr2013/am_mtj-07-1691_2013.html" \l "fnt150" Such penalty can be dismissal from
service.
Desiderio Aranas, Branch 3 Process Server, MTCC, Cebu City and Rebecca Alesna are guilty of
conduct prejudicial to the best of interest of the service. Aranas provided couples who were to be
married under Article 34 of the Family Code with the required affidavit of cohabitation. HYPERLINK
151
"http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/apr2013/am_mtj-07-1691_2013.html" \l "fnt151" On
the other hand, Alesna refers such couples to Aranas to acquire the said affidavit which according to
Alesna costs 10. As aptly put by the OCA, even if the amount involved in the transaction is minimal,
the act of soliciting money still gives the public the wrong impression that court personnel are making
money out of judicial transactions. HYPERLINK "http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/apr2013/
152
am_mtj-07-1691_2013.html" \l "fnt152"
The Court said in Roque v. Grimaldo HYPERLINK "http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/

153
apr2013/am_mtj-07-1691_2013.html" \l "fnt153" that acts of court personnel outside their official
functions constitute conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service because these acts violate
what is prescribed for court personnel. The purpose of this is to maintain the integrity of the Court and
free court personnel from suspicion of any misconduct.
Celeste P. Retuya, Clerk III of Branch 6 of the MTCC, Cebu City, Emma Valencia, Stenographer III of
Branch 18, RTC, Cebu City, and Rebecca Alesna, Court Interpreter of Branch 1, MTCC, Cebu City,
admitted to the audit team that they received food from couples they assisted. HYPERLINK "http://
154
www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/apr2013/am_mtj-07-1691_2013.html" \l "fnt154" This is in
violation of Section 2(b), Canon III of the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel which prohibits court
personnel from receiving tips or other remuneration for assisting or attending to parties engaged in
transactions or involved in actions or proceedings with the Judiciary. As recommended by the OCA,
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they are admonished considering that this is their first offense and the tips were of minimal value. In
Reyes-Domingo v. Morales, this Court held that commission of an administrative offense for the first
time is an extenuating circumstance. HYPERLINK "http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/
155
The Court finds that there is insufficient evidence against Corazon P. Retuya. The OCA reports that
Corazon Retuya admitted initially that she received 5,000 from spouses Ichiro Kamiaya and Mary
Grace Gabiana to secure necessary documents. HYPERLINK "http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/
156
juri2013/apr2013/am_mtj-07-1691_2013.html" \l "fnt156" The information was volunteered by
Corazon Retuya with no supporting sworn statement from the couple. However, she denies this fact
later on in her Comment. HYPERLINK "http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/apr2013/
157
am_mtj-07-1691_2013.html" \l "fnt157" Finding the earlier statement of Corazon Retuya as
unclear and lacking support from evidence, the Court adopts the findings of the OCA and decides to
give her the benefit of the doubt.
The Court also finds insufficient evidence to support the claims against Marilou Cabaez. Cabaez
was only implicated in this case through the sworn statement of Jacqui Lou Baguio-Manera who
attested that they paid a certain "Meloy" 1,200 for the wedding under Article 34 of the Family
through the assistance of Cabaez. HYPERLINK "http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/apr2013/
158
am_mtj-07-1691_2013.html" \l "fnt158" Cabaez denies that she was the one who assisted the
couple and explained that it may have been Celerina Plaza, the personal assistant of Judge Rosabella
M. Tormis. Baguio-Manera got the nickname "Meloy" not from Cabaez herself but from Baguio-
Maneras younger sister. HYPERLINK "http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/apr2013/
159
am_mtj-07-1691_2013.html" \l "fnt159" When Baguio-Manera met the said "Meloy" at the Hall
of Justice, she did not obtain confirmation that the said "Meloy" is Cabaez. The Court adopts the
findings of the OCA that there is lack of positive identification of Cabaez and finds merit in her
denial. HYPERLINK "http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/apr2013/am_mtj-07-1691_2013.html"
160
\l "fnt160"
The Court accepts the recommendation of the OCA as to the dismissal of the case against Judge
Geraldine Faith A. Econg. The judge was only implicated through the statement of Process Server
Antonio Flores about an "alleged sinking fund". No evidence was presented as to the collection of an
excess of the solemnization fee. Neither was it proven that Judge Econg or her staff had knowledge of
such fund.
WHEREFORE, the Court finds respondents:
1. Judge Anatalio S. Necessario, Presiding Judge, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Branch 2, Cebu
City, GUILTY of gross inefficiency or neglect of duty and of gross ignorance of the law and that he be
DISMISSED FROM THE SERVICE with forfeiture of his retirement benefits, except leave credits, if
any, and that he be disqualified from reinstatement or appointment to any public office, including
government-owned or -controlled corporation;
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2. Judge Gil R. Acosta, Presiding Judge, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Branch 3, Cebu City,
GUILTY of gross inefficiency or neglect of duty and of gross ignorance of the law and that he be
3. Judge Rosabella M. Tormis, Presiding Judge, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Branch 4, Cebu City,
GUILTY of gross inefficiency or neglect of duty and of gross ignorance of the law and that she would
have been DISMISSED FROM THE SERVICE with forfeiture of her retirement benefits, except leave
credits, if any, and disqualified from reinstatement or appointment to any public office, including
government-owned or -controlled corporation, had she not been previously dismissed from service in
A.M. No. MTJ-12-1817 (Formerly A.M. No. 09-2-30-MTCC);
4. Judge Edgemelo C. Rosales, Presiding Judge, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Branch 8, Cebu City,
GUILTY of gross inefficiency or neglect of duty and of gross ignorance of the law and that he be
5. Helen Mongaya, Court Interpreter, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Branch 4, Cebu City, GUILTY
of violating Section 2, Canon I of the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel and that she be
DISMISSED FROM THE SERVICE with forfeiture of her retirement benefits, except leave credits, if
any, and that she be disqualified from reinstatement or appointment to any public office, including
6. Rhona F. Rodriguez, Administrative Officer I, Office of the Clerk of Court, Regional Trial Court,
Cebu City, GUILTY of gross misconduct for Section 2, Canon I of the Code of Conduct for Court
Personnel and for inducing Maricel Albater to falsify the application for marriage and that she be
DISMISSED FROM THE SERVICE with forfeiture of her retirement benefits, except leave credits, if
any, and that she be disqualified from reinstatement or appointment to any public office, including
7. Desiderio S. Aranas, Process Server, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Branch 3, Cebu City, GUILTY
of conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service and that he be SUSPENDED without pay for a
period of six (6) months with a warning that a similar offense shall be dealt with more severely;
8. Rebecca Alesna, Court Interpreter, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Branch 1, Cebu City, GUILTY
of conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service and of violating Section 2(b), Canon III of the
Code of Conduct for Court Personnel and that she be SUSPENDED without pay for a period of six (6)
months with a warning that a similar offense shall be dealt with more severely;
9. Celeste Retuya, Clerk III, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Branch 6, Cebu City, and Emma
Valencia, Stenographer III, Regional Trial Court, Branch 18, Cebu City, GUILTY of conduct
prejudicial to the best interest of the service and of violating Section 2(b), Canon III of the Code of
Conduct for Court Personnel and that they be ADMONISHED with a warning that a similar offense
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shall be dealt with more severely;
The complaints against Judge Geraldine Faith A. Econg, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court,
Branch 9, Cebu City; Corazon P. Retuya, Court Stenographer, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Branch
6, Cebu City; and Marilou Cabaez, Court Stenographer, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, are
DISMISSED for lack of merit.
The case against Judge Rosabella M. Tormis, including the sworn statements of Celerina Plaza and
Crisanto dela Cerna, should be REFERRED to the Office of the Bar Confidant for the purpose of
initiating disbarment proceedings against the judge.
The Honorable Mayors of Barili, Cebu and Liloan, Cebu, are to be furnished copies of the
Supplemental Report dated 14 August 2007 and are ADVISED to conduct an investigation with
respect to the statements of Filomena C. Lopez, Civil Registrar of Barili, Cebu, and Bonita I. Pilones,
Civil Registrar of Liloan, Cebu, regarding the processing of marriage licenses and to take the
necessary action as the findings of the investigation may warrant.
Let a copy of this Decision be included in the respondents files that are with the Office of the Bar
Confidant and distributed to all courts and to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines.
SO ORDERED.
9. Republic vs Obrecido
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
Given a valid marriage between two Filipino citizens, where one party is later naturalized as a
foreign citizen and obtains a valid divorce decree capacitating him or her to remarry, can the Filipino
spouse likewise remarry under Philippine law?
Before us is a case of first impression that behooves the Court to make a definite ruling on
this apparently novel question, presented as a pure question of law.
In this petition for review, the Solicitor General assails theDecision HYPERLINK "http://
[1]
sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/oct2005/154380.htm" \l "_ftn1" \o "" dated May 15,
2002, of the Regional Trial Court of Molave, Zamboanga del Sur, Branch 23 and itsResolution
HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/oct2005/154380.htm" \l "_ftn2" \o
[2]
"" dated July 4, 2002 denying the motion for reconsideration. The courta quohad declared that
herein respondent Cipriano Orbecido III is capacitated to remarry. Thefalloof the impugned Decision
reads:
WHEREFORE, by virtue of the provision of the second paragraph of Art. 26 of the
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Family Code and by reason of the divorce decree obtained against him by his
American wife, the petitioner is given the capacity to remarry under the Philippine
Law.
IT IS SO ORDERED. HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/

[3]
oct2005/154380.htm" \l "_ftn3" \o ""
The factual antecedents, as narrated by the trial court, are as follows.
On May 24, 1981, Cipriano Orbecido III married Lady Myros M. Villanueva at the United Church of
Christ in the Philippines in Lam-an, Ozamis City. Their marriage was blessed with a son and a
daughter, Kristoffer Simbortriz V. Orbecido and Lady Kimberly V. Orbecido.
In 1986, Ciprianos wife left for the United States bringing along their son Kristoffer. A few
years later, Cipriano discovered that his wife had been naturalized as an American citizen.
Sometime in 2000, Cipriano learned from his son that his wife had obtained a divorce decree
and then married a certain Innocent Stanley. She, Stanley and her child by him currently live at 5566
A. Walnut Grove Avenue, San Gabriel, California.
Cipriano thereafter filed with the trial court a petition for authority to remarry invoking Paragraph 2 of
Article 26 of the Family Code. No opposition was filed. Finding merit in the petition, the court granted
the same. The Republic, herein petitioner, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), sought
reconsideration but it was denied.
In this petition, the OSG raises a pure question of law:

WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT CAN REMARRY UNDER ARTICLE 26 OF
THE FAMILY CODE HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/
[4]
oct2005/154380.htm" \l "_ftn4" \o ""
The OSG contends that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code is not applicable to the instant
case because it only applies to a valid mixed marriage; that is, a marriage celebrated between a
Filipino citizen and an alien. The proper remedy, according to the OSG, is to file a petition for
annulment or for legal separation. HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/
[5]
oct2005/154380.htm" \l "_ftn5" \o "" Furthermore, the OSG argues there is no law that governs
respondents situation. The OSG posits that this is a matter of legislation and not of judicial
determination. HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/oct2005/154380.htm" \l
[6]
"_ftn6" \o ""
For his part, respondent admits that Article 26 is not directly applicable to his case but insists that
when his naturalized alien wife obtained a divorce decree which capacitated her to remarry, he is
likewise capacitated by operation of law pursuant to Section 12, Article II of the Constitution.
[7]
HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/oct2005/154380.htm" \l "_ftn7" \o ""
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At the outset, we note that the petition for authority to remarry filed before the trial court actually
constituted a petition for declaratory relief. In this connection, Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of
Court provides:
RULE 63
DECLARATORY RELIEF AND SIMILAR REMEDIES

Section 1.Who may file petitionAny person interested under a deed, will, contract or
other written instrument, or whose rights are affected by a statute, executive order or
regulation, ordinance, or other governmental regulation may, before breach or
violation thereof, bring an action in the appropriate Regional Trial Court to determine
any question of construction or validity arising, and for a declaration of his rights or
duties, thereunder.
...
The requisites of a petition for declaratory relief are: (1) there must be a justiciable controversy; (2)
the controversy must be between persons whose interests are adverse; (3) that the party seeking the
relief has a legal interest in the controversy; and (4) that the issue is ripe for judicial determination.
[8]
HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/oct2005/154380.htm" \l "_ftn8" \o ""
This case concerns the applicability of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 to a marriage between two
Filipino citizens where one later acquired alien citizenship, obtained a divorce decree, and remarried
while in the U.S.A. The interests of the parties are also adverse, as petitioner representing the State
asserts its duty to protect the institution of marriage while respondent, a private citizen, insists on a
declaration of his capacity to remarry. Respondent, praying for relief, has legal interest in the
controversy. The issue raised is also ripe for judicial determination inasmuch as when respondent
remarries, litigation ensues and puts into question the validity of his second marriage.
Coming now to the substantive issue, does Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code apply to the
case of respondent? Necessarily, we must dwell on how this provision had come about in the first
place, and what was the intent of the legislators in its enactment?
Brief Historical Background

On July 6, 1987, then President Corazon Aquino signed into law Executive Order No. 209,
otherwise known as the Family Code, which took effect on August 3, 1988. Article 26 thereof states:
All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance with the
laws in force in the country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such,
shall also be valid in this country, except those prohibited under Articles 35, 37, and
38.
On July 17, 1987, shortly after the signing of the original Family Code, Executive Order No.
227 was likewise signed into law, amending Articles 26, 36, and 39 of the Family Code. A second
paragraph was added to Article 26. As so amended, it now provides:
ART. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance
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with the laws in force in the country where they were solemnized, and valid there as
such, shall also be valid in this country, except those prohibited under Articles 35(1),
(4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly

celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse
capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to
remarry under Philippine law. (Emphasis supplied)
On its face, the foregoing provision does not appear to govern the situation presented by the
case at hand. It seems to apply only to cases where at the time of the celebration of the marriage, the
parties are a Filipino citizen and a foreigner. The instant case is one where at the time the marriage
was solemnized, the parties were two Filipino citizens, but later on, the wife was naturalized as an
American citizen and subsequently obtained a divorce granting her capacity to remarry, and indeed
she remarried an American citizen while residing in the U.S.A.
Noteworthy, in the Report of the Public Hearings HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/

[9]
jurisprudence/2005/oct2005/154380.htm" \l "_ftn9" \o "" on the Family Code, the Catholic
Bishops Conference of the Philippines (CBCP) registered the following objections to Paragraph 2 of
Article 26:
1.The rule is discriminatory. It discriminates against those whose spouses
are Filipinos who divorce them abroad. These spouses who are divorced will
not be able to re-marry, while the spouses of foreigners who validly divorce
them abroad can.
2.This is the beginning of the recognition of the validity of divorce even
for Filipino citizens. For those whose foreign spouses validly divorce them
abroad will also be considered to be validly divorced here and can re-marry.
We propose that this be deleted and made into law only after more
widespread consultation. (Emphasis supplied.)
Legislative Intent
Records of the proceedings of the Family Code deliberations showed that the intent of
Paragraph 2 of Article 26, according to Judge Alicia Sempio-Diy, a member of the Civil Code
Revision Committee, is to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to the
alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse.
Interestingly, Paragraph 2 of Article 26 traces its origin to the 1985 case ofVan Dorn v.
Romillo, Jr. HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/oct2005/154380.htm" \l
[10]
"_ftn10" \o "" TheVan Dorncase involved a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner.
The Court held therein that a divorce decree validly obtained by the alien spouse is valid in the
Philippines, and consequently, the Filipino spouse is capacitated to remarry under Philippine law.
Does the same principle apply to a case where at the time of the celebration of the marriage,
the parties were Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them obtains a foreign citizenship by
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naturalization?
The jurisprudential answer lies latent in the 1998 case of Quita v. Court of Appeals.
[11]
"" InQuita, the parties were, as in this case, Filipino citizens when they got married. The wife
became a naturalized American citizen in 1954 and obtained a divorce in the same year. The Court
therein hinted, by way ofobiter dictum, that a Filipino divorced by his naturalized foreign spouse is no
longer married under Philippine law and can thus remarry.
Thus, taking into consideration the legislative intent and applying the rule of reason, we hold
that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 should be interpreted to include cases involving parties who, at the time
of the celebration of the marriage were Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them becomes naturalized
as a foreign citizen and obtains a divorce decree. The Filipino spouse should likewise be allowed to
remarry as if the other party were a foreigner at the time of the solemnization of the marriage. To rule
otherwise would be to sanction absurdity and injustice. Where the interpretation of a statute according
to its exact and literal import would lead to mischievous results or contravene the clear purpose of the
legislature, it should be construed according to its spirit and reason, disregarding as far as necessary
the letter of the law. A statute may therefore be extended to cases not within the literal meaning of its
terms, so long as they come within its spirit or intent. HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/
[12]
jurisprudence/2005/oct2005/154380.htm" \l "_ftn12" \o ""
If we are to give meaning to the legislative intent to avoid the absurd situation where the
Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce is no longer
married to the Filipino spouse, then the instant case must be deemed as coming within the
contemplation of Paragraph 2 of Article 26.
In view of the foregoing, we state the twin elements for the application of Paragraph 2 of
Article 26 as follows:
1.There is a valid marriage that has been celebrated between a Filipino

citizen and a foreigner; and
2.A valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him
or her to remarry.
The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the time of the celebration of the
marriage, but their citizenship at the time a valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse
capacitating the latter to remarry.
In this case, when Ciprianos wife was naturalized as an American citizen, there was still a
valid marriage that has been celebrated between her and Cipriano. As fate would have it, the
naturalized alien wife subsequently obtained a valid divorce capacitating her to remarry. Clearly, the
twin requisites for the application of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 are both present in this case. Thus
Cipriano, the divorced Filipino spouse, should be allowed to remarry.
We are also unable to sustain the OSGs theory that the proper remedy of the Filipino spouse
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is to file either a petition for annulment or a petition for legal separation. Annulment would be a long
and tedious process, and in this particular case, not even feasible, considering that the marriage of the
parties appears to have all the badges of validity. On the other hand, legal separation would not be a
sufficient remedy for it would not sever the marriage tie; hence, the legally separated Filipino spouse
would still remain married to the naturalized alien spouse.
However, we note that the records are bereft of competent evidence duly submitted by respondent
concerning the divorce decree and the naturalization of respondents wife. It is settled rule that one
who alleges a fact has the burden of proving it and mere allegation is not evidence. HYPERLINK
[13]
"http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/oct2005/154380.htm" \l "_ftn13" \o ""
Accordingly, for his plea to prosper, respondent herein must prove his allegation that hiswife was
naturalized as an American citizen. Likewise, before a foreign divorce decree can be recognized by
our own courts, the party pleading it must prove the divorce as a fact and demonstrate its conformity
to the foreign law allowing it. HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/
[14]
oct2005/154380.htm" \l "_ftn14" \o "" Such foreign law must also be proved as our courts cannot
take judicial notice of foreign laws. Like any other fact, such laws must be alleged and proved.
[15]
"" Furthermore, respondent must also show that the divorce decree allows his former wife to
remarry as specifically required in Article 26. Otherwise, there would be no evidence sufficient to
declare that he is capacitated to enter into another marriage.
Nevertheless, we are unanimous in our holding that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code
(E.O. No. 209, as amended by E.O. No. 227), should be interpreted to allow a Filipino citizen, who
has been divorced by a spouse who had acquired foreign citizenship and remarried, also to remarry.
However, considering that in the present petition there is no sufficient evidence submitted and on
record, we are unable to declare, based on respondents bare allegations that his wife, who was
naturalized as an American citizen, had obtained a divorce decree and had remarried an American, that
respondent is now capacitated to remarry. Such declaration could only be made properly upon
respondents submission of the aforecited evidence in his favor.
ACCORDINGLY, the petition by the Republic of the Philippines is GRANTED. The

assailedDecisiondated May 15, 2002, and Resolutiondated July 4, 2002, of the Regional Trial Court
of Molave, Zamboanga del Sur, Branch 23, are herebySET ASIDE.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
10. Bayot vs CA
DECISION

VELASCO, JR.,J.:

The Case
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Before us are these two petitions interposed by petitioner Maria Rebecca Makapugay Bayot
impugning certain issuances handed out by the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 68187.

In the first, a petition for certiorari HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/
[1]
2008/november2008/155635.htm" \l "_ftn1" \o "" under Rule 65 and docketed as G.R. No.
155635,Rebeccaassails and seeks to nullify the April 30, 2002 Resolution HYPERLINK "http://
[2]
sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2008/november2008/155635.htm" \l "_ftn2" \o "" of the CA, as
reiterated in another Resolution of September 2, 2002, HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/
[3]
jurisprudence/2008/november2008/155635.htm" \l "_ftn3" \o "" granting a writ of preliminary
injunction in favor of private respondent Vicente Madrigal Bayot staving off the trial courts grant of
supportpendente liteto Rebecca.

The second, a petition for review under Rule 45, HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/
[4]
jurisprudence/2008/november2008/155635.htm" \l "_ftn4" \o "" docketed G.R. No. 163979,
assails the March 25, 2004 Decision HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2008/
[5]
november2008/155635.htm" \l "_ftn5" \o "" of the CA, (1) dismissing Civil Case No. 01-094, a
suit for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage with application for support commenced by
Rebecca against Vicente before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Muntinlupa City; and (2) setting
aside certain orders and a resolution issued by the RTC in the said case.

Per its Resolution ofAugust 11, 2004, the Court ordered the consolidation of both cases.

The Facts

Vicente and Rebecca were married on April 20, 1979 in Sanctuario de San Jose,
Greenhills, Mandaluyong City. On its face, the Marriage Certificate HYPERLINK "http://
[6]
sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2008/november2008/155635.htm" \l "_ftn6" \o "" identified
Rebecca, then 26 years old, to be an American citizen HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/
[7]
jurisprudence/2008/november2008/155635.htm" \l "_ftn7" \o "" born in Agaa, Guam, USA to
Cesar Tanchiong Makapugay, American, and Helen Corn Makapugay, American.

OnNovember 27, 1982inSan Francisco,California, Rebecca gave birth to Marie Josephine
Alexandra or Alix. From then on, Vicente and Rebeccas marital relationship seemed to have soured as
the latter, sometime in 1996, initiated divorce proceedings in theDominican Republic. Before the
Court of the First Instance of the Judicial District of Santo Domingo, Rebecca personally appeared,
while Vicente was duly represented by counsel. On February 22, 1996, the Dominican court
issued Civil Decree No. 362/96, HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2008/
[8]
november2008/155635.htm" \l "_ftn8" \o "" ordering the dissolution of the couples marriage and
leaving them to remarry after completing the legal requirements, but giving themjoint custody and
guardianship over Alix. Over a year later, the same court would issue Civil Decree No. 406/97,
HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2008/november2008/155635.htm" \l "_ftn9" \o
Page 76 of 193
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[9]
"" settling the couples property relations pursuant to an Agreement HYPERLINK "http://
[10]
sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2008/november2008/155635.htm" \l "_ftn10" \o "" they
executed onDecember 14, 1996.Said agreement specifically stated that the conjugal property which
they acquired during their marriage consist[s] only of the real property and all the improvements and
personal properties therein contained at 502 Acacia Avenue, Alabang, Muntinlupa. HYPERLINK
[11]
"http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2008/november2008/155635.htm" \l "_ftn11" \o ""

Meanwhile, onMarch 14, 1996, or less than a month from the issuance of Civil Decree No.
362/96, Rebecca filed with the Makati City RTC a petition HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/
[12]
jurisprudence/2008/november2008/155635.htm" \l "_ftn12" \o "" datedJanuary 26, 1996, with
attachments, for declaration of nullity of marriage, docketed as Civil Case No. 96-378. Rebecca,
however, later moved HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2008/
[13]
november2008/155635.htm" \l "_ftn13" \o "" and secured approval HYPERLINK "http://
[14]
sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2008/november2008/155635.htm" \l "_ftn14" \o "" of the
motion to withdraw the petition.

OnMay 29, 1996, Rebecca executed an Affidavit of Acknowledgment HYPERLINK "http://
[15]
sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2008/november2008/155635.htm" \l "_ftn15" \o "" stating
under oath that she is an American citizen; that, since 1993, she and Vicente have been living
separately; and that she is carrying a child not of Vicente.

OnMarch 21, 2001, Rebecca filed another petition, this time before the Muntinlupa City
RTC, for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/
[16]
jurisprudence/2008/november2008/155635.htm" \l "_ftn16" \o "" on the ground of Vicentes
alleged psychological incapacity. Docketed as Civil Case No. 01-094 and entitled asMaria Rebecca
Makapugay Bayot v. Vicente Madrigal Bayot, the petition was eventually raffled to Branch 256 of the
court. In it, Rebecca also sought thedissolution of the conjugal partnership of gains with application
for supportpendente litefor her and Alix. Rebecca also prayed that Vicente be ordered to pay a
permanent monthly support for their daughter Alix in the amount of PhP 220,000.

OnJune 8, 2001, Vicente filed a Motion to Dismiss HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/
[17]
jurisprudence/2008/november2008/155635.htm" \l "_ftn17" \o "" on,inter alia, the grounds of
lack of cause of action and that the petition is barred by the prior judgment of divorce.Earlier, onJune
5, 2001, Rebecca filed and moved for the allowance of her application for supportpendente lite.

To the motion to dismiss, Rebecca interposed an opposition, insisting on her Filipino
citizenship, as affirmed by the Department of Justice (DOJ), and that, therefore, there is no valid
divorce to speak of.

Meanwhile, Vicente, who had in the interim contracted another marriage, and Rebecca
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commenced several criminal complaints against each other.Specifically, Vicente filed adultery and
perjury complaints against Rebecca. Rebecca, on the other hand, charged Vicente with bigamy and
concubinage.

Ruling of the RTC on the Motion to Dismiss
and Motion for SupportPendente Lite

On August 8, 2001, the RTC issued an Order HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/
[18]
jurisprudence/2008/november2008/155635.htm" \l "_ftn18" \o "" denying Vicentes motion to
dismiss Civil Case No. 01-094 and granting Rebeccas application for supportpendente lite, disposing
as follows:

Wherefore, premises considered, the Motion to Dismiss filed by the
respondent is DENIED.Petitioners Application in Support of the Motion for Support
Pendente Lite is hereby GRANTED. Respondent is hereby ordered to remit the
amount of TWO HUNDRED AND TWENTY THOUSAND PESOS (Php
220,000.00) a month to Petitioner as support for the duration of the proceedings
relative to the instant Petition.

SO ORDERED. HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/
[19]
2008/november2008/155635.htm" \l "_ftn19" \o ""

The RTC declared, among other things, that the divorce judgment invoked by Vicente as bar
to the petition for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage is a matter of defense best taken up
during actual trial.As to the grant of supportpendente lite, the trial court held that a mere allegation of
adultery against Rebecca does not operate to preclude her from receiving legal support.

Following the denial HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2008/
[20]
november2008/155635.htm" \l "_ftn20" \o "" of his motion for reconsideration of the
aboveAugust 8, 2001RTC order, Vicente went to the CA on a petition for certiorari, with a prayer for
the issuance of a temporary restraining order (TRO) and/or writ of preliminary injunction.
HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2008/november2008/155635.htm" \l "_ftn21"
[21]
\o "" His petition was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 68187.

Grant of Writ of Preliminary Injunction by the CA

On January 9, 2002, the CA issued the desired TRO. HYPERLINK "http://
[22]
sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2008/november2008/155635.htm" \l "_ftn22" \o "" OnApril 30,
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2002, the appellate court granted, via a Resolution, the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction,
the decretal portion of which reads:

IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, pending final resolution of the
petition at bar, let the Writ of Preliminary Injunction be ISSUED in this case,
enjoining the respondent court from implementing the assailed Omnibus Order dated
August 8, 2001 and the Order dated November 20, 2001, and from conducting
further proceedings in Civil Case No. 01-094, upon the posting of an injunction bond
in the amount of P250,000.00.

[23]

Rebecca moved HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2008/
[24]
november2008/155635.htm" \l "_ftn24" \o "" but was denied reconsideration of the
aforementioned April 30, 2002 resolution. In the meantime, on May 20, 2002, the preliminary
injunctive writ HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2008/
[25]
november2008/155635.htm" \l "_ftn25" \o "" was issued. Rebecca also moved for reconsideration
of this issuance, but the CA, by Resolution datedSeptember 2, 2002, denied her motion.

The adverted CA resolutions ofApril 30, 2002andSeptember 2, 2002are presently being
assailed in Rebeccas petition for certiorari, docketed underG.R. No. 155635.

Ruling of the CA

Pending resolution of G.R. No. 155635, the CA, by a Decision dated March 25, 2004,
effectively dismissed Civil Case No. 01-094, and set aside incidental orders the RTC issued in relation
to the case. Thefalloof the presently assailed CA Decision reads:

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition isGRANTED.The Omnibus
Order dated August 8, 2001 and the Order dated November 20, 2001
areREVERSEDandSET ASIDEand a new one enteredDISMISSINGCivil Case
No. 01-094, for failure to state a cause of action.No pronouncement as to costs.

[26]

To the CA, the RTC ought to have granted Vicentes motion to dismiss on the basis of the
following premises:

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(1) As held inChina Road and Bridge Corporation v. Court of Appeals, the hypothetical-
admission rule applies in determining whether a complaint or petition states a cause of action.
HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2008/november2008/155635.htm" \l "_ftn27"
[27]
\o "" Applying said rule in the light of the essential elements of a cause of action, HYPERLINK
"http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2008/november2008/155635.htm" \l "_ftn28" \o
[28]
"" Rebecca had no cause of action against Vicente for declaration of nullity of marriage.

(2) Rebecca no longer had a legal right in this jurisdiction to have her marriage with Vicente
declared void, the union having previously been dissolved on February 22, 1996 by the foreign
divorce decree she personally secured as an American citizen.Pursuant to the second paragraph of
Article 26 of the Family Code, such divorce restored Vicentes capacity to contract another marriage.

(3) Rebeccas contention about the nullity of a divorce, she being a Filipino citizen at the time
the foreign divorce decree was rendered, was dubious. Her allegation as to her alleged Filipino
citizenship was also doubtful as it was not shown that her father, at the time of her birth, was still a
Filipino citizen.The Certification of Birth of Rebecca issued by the Government of Guam also did not
indicate the nationality of her father.
(4) Rebecca was estopped from denying her American citizenship, having professed to have
that nationality status and having made representations to that effect during momentous events of her
life, such as: (a) during her marriage; (b) when she applied for divorce; and (c) when she applied for
and eventually secured an American passport on January 18, 1995, or a little over a year before she
initiated the first but later withdrawn petition for nullity of her marriage (Civil Case No. 96-378) on
March 14, 1996.

(5) Assuming that she had dual citizenship, being born of a purportedly Filipino father
inGuam,USAwhich follows thejus soliprinciple, Rebeccas representation and assertion about being
an American citizen when she secured her foreign divorce precluded her from denying her citizenship
and impugning the validity of the divorce.

Rebecca seasonably filed a motion for reconsideration of the above Decision, but this
recourse was denied in the equally assailed June 4, 2004 Resolution. HYPERLINK "http://
[29]
sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2008/november2008/155635.htm" \l "_ftn29" \o "" Hence,
Rebeccas Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45, docketed underG.R. No. 163979.

The Issues

In G.R. No. 155635, Rebecca raises four (4) assignments of errors as grounds for the
allowance of her petition, all of which converged on the proposition that the CA erred in enjoining the
implementation of the RTCs orders which would have entitled her to support pending final resolution
of Civil Case No. 01-094.

InG.R. No. 163979, Rebecca urges the reversal of the assailed CA decision submitting as follows:
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I

THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT MENTIONING AND
NOT TAKING INTO CONSIDERATION IN ITS APPRECIATION OF THE FACTS
THE FACT OF PETITIONERS FILIPINO CITIZENSHIP AS CATEGORICALLY
STATED AND ALLEGED IN HER PETITION BEFORE THE COURT A QUO.

II

THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN RELYING ONLY ON
ANNEXES TO THE PETITION IN RESOLVING THE MATTERS BROUGHT
BEFORE IT.

III

THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN FAILING TO CONSIDER
THAT RESPONDENT IS ESTOPPED FROM CLAIMING THAT HIS MARRIAGE
TO PETITIONER HAD ALREADY BEEN DISSOLVED BY VIRTUE OF HIS
SUBSEQUENT AND CONCURRENT ACTS.

IV

THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN RULING THAT THERE WAS
ABUSE OF DISCRETION ON THE PART OF THE TRIAL COURT, MUCH LESS
A GRAVE ABUSE. HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2008/
[30]
november2008/155635.htm" \l "_ftn30" \o ""

We shall first address the petition in G.R. No. 163979, its outcome being determinative of the
success or failure of the petition in G.R. No. 155635.

Three legal premises need to be underscored at the outset.First, a divorce obtained abroad by
an alien married to a Philippine national may be recognized in thePhilippines, provided the decree of
divorce is valid according to the national law of the foreigner. HYPERLINK "http://
[31]
sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2008/november2008/155635.htm" \l "_ftn31" \o "" Second, the
reckoning point is not the citizenship of the divorcing parties at birth or at the time of marriage, but
their citizenship at the time a valid divorce is obtained abroad. Andthird, an absolute divorce secured
by a Filipino married to another Filipino is contrary to our concept of public policy and morality and
shall not be recognized in this jurisdiction. HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/
[32]

Given the foregoing perspective, the determinative issue tendered in G.R. No. 155635, i.e.,
thepropriety of the granting of the motion to dismiss by the appellate court, resolves itself into the
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questions of:first, whether petitioner Rebecca was a Filipino citizen at the time the divorce judgment
was rendered in the Dominican Republic on February 22, 1996; andsecond, whether the judgment of
divorce is valid and, if so, what are its consequent legal effects?

The Courts Ruling

The petition is bereft of merit.

Rebecca an American Citizen in the Purview of This Case

There can be no serious dispute that Rebecca, at the time she applied for and obtained her
divorce from Vicente, was an American citizen and remains to be one, absent proof of an effective
repudiation of such citizenship. The following are compelling circumstances indicative of her
American citizenship: (1) she was born in Agaa,Guam,USA; (2) the principle ofjus soliis followed
in this American territory granting American citizenship to those who are born there; and (3) she was,
and may still be, a holder of an American passport. HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/
[33]
jurisprudence/2008/november2008/155635.htm" \l "_ftn33" \o ""

And as aptly found by the CA, Rebecca had consistently professed, asserted, and represented
herself as an American citizen, particularly: (1) during her marriage as shown in the marriage
certificate; (2) in the birth certificate of Alix; and (3) when she secured the divorce from the
Dominican Republic. Mention may be made of the Affidavit of Acknowledgment HYPERLINK
[34]
"http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2008/november2008/155635.htm" \l "_ftn34" \o "" in
which she stated being an American citizen.

It is true that Rebecca had been issued by the Bureau of Immigration (Bureau) of
Identification (ID) Certificate No. RC 9778 and a Philippine Passport. On its face, ID Certificate No.
RC 9778 would tend to show that she has indeed been recognized as a Filipino citizen. It cannot be
over-emphasized, however, that such recognition was given only onJune 8, 2000upon the affirmation
by the Secretary of Justice of Rebeccas recognition pursuant to the Order of Recognition issued by
Bureau Associate Commissioner Edgar L. Mendoza.

For clarity, we reproduce in full the contents of ID Certificate No. RC 9778:

To Whom It May Concern:

This is to certify that*MARIA REBECCA MAKAPUGAY BAYOT*whose
photograph and thumbprints are affixed hereto and partially covered by the seal of
this Office, and whose other particulars are as follows:

Place of Birth:Guam,USADate of Birth:March 5, 1953
Sex:femaleCivil Status:marriedColor of Hair:brown
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Color of Eyes:brownDistinguishing marks on face:none

wasr e c o g n i z e das a citizen of the Philippines as perpursuant to Article IV,
Section 1, Paragraph 3 of the 1935 Constitution per order of Recognition JBL 95-213
signed by Associate Commissioner Jose B. Lopez dated October 6, 1995, and duly
st
affirmed by Secretary of Justice Artemio G. Tuquero in his 1 Indorsement dated
June 8, 2000.

Issued for identification purposes only.NOT VALID for travel purposes.

th
Given under my hand and seal this11 day ofOctober, 1995

(SGD) EDGAR L. MENDOZA
ASSO.COMMISSIONER

Official Receipt No.5939988
issued atManila
datedOct. 10, 1995for P2,000

From the text of ID Certificate No. RC 9778, the following material facts and dates may be
deduced: (1) Bureau Associate Commissioner Jose B. Lopez issued the Order of Recognition
st
onOctober 6, 1995; (2) the 1 Indorsement of Secretary of Justice Artemio G. Tuquero affirming
Rebeccas recognition as a Filipino citizen was issued onJune 8, 2000or almost five years from the
date of the order of recognition; and (3) ID Certificate No. RC 9778 was purportedly issued
on October 11, 1995 after the payment of the PhP 2,000 fee on October 10, 1995 per OR No.
5939988.

What begs the question is, however, how the above certificate could have been issued by the
Bureau on October 11, 1995 when the Secretary of Justice issued the required affirmation only
onJune 8, 2000.No explanation was given for this patent aberration.There seems to be no error with
st
the date of the issuance of the 1 Indorsement by Secretary of Justice Tuquero as this Court takes
judicial notice that he was the Secretary of Justice fromFebruary 16, 2000toJanuary 22, 2001.There
is, thus, a strong valid reason to conclude that the certificate in question must be spurious.

Under extant immigration rules, applications for recognition of Filipino citizenship require
the affirmation by the DOJ of the Order of Recognition issued by the Bureau.Under Executive Order
No. 292, also known as the1987 Administrative Code, specifically in its Title III, Chapter 1, Sec. 3(6),
it is the DOJ which is tasked to provide immigration and naturalization regulatory services
and implement the laws governing citizenship and the admission and stay of aliens. Thus, the
confirmation by the DOJ of any Order of Recognition for Filipino citizenship issued by the Bureau is
required.

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Pertinently, Bureau Law Instruction No. RBR-99-002 HYPERLINK "http://

[35]
sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2008/november2008/155635.htm" \l "_ftn35" \o "" on
Recognition as a Filipino Citizen clearly provides:

The Bureau [of Immigration] through its Records Section shall automatically
furnish the Department of Justice an official copy of its Order of Recognition within
72 days from its date of approval by the way of indorsement for confirmation of the
Order by the Secretary of Justice pursuant to Executive Order No. 292. No
Identification Certificate shall be issued before the date of confirmation by the
Secretary of Justiceand any Identification Certificate issued by the Bureau pursuant
to an Order of Recognition shall prominently indicate thereon the date of
confirmation by the Secretary of Justice.(Emphasis ours.)

Not lost on the Court is the acquisition by Rebecca of her Philippine passport only onJune
st
13, 2000, or five days after then Secretary of Justice Tuquero issued the 1 Indorsement confirming the
order of recognition.It may be too much to attribute to coincidence this unusual sequence of close
events which, to us, clearly suggests that prior to said affirmation or confirmation, Rebecca was not
yet recognized as a Filipino citizen. The same sequence would also imply that ID Certificate No. RC
9778 could not have been issued in 1995, as Bureau Law Instruction No. RBR-99-002 mandates that
no identification certificate shall be issued before the date of confirmation by the Secretary of
Justice.Logically, therefore, the affirmation or confirmation of Rebeccas recognition as a Filipino
st
citizen through the 1 Indorsement issued only on June 8, 2000 by Secretary of Justice Tuquero
corresponds to the eventual issuance of Rebeccas passport a few days later, or on June 13, 2000 to be
exact.

When Divorce Was Granted Rebecca, She Was not a
Filipino Citizen and Was not Yet Recognized as One

The Court can assume hypothetically that Rebecca is now a Filipino citizen.But from the
foregoing disquisition, it is indubitable that Rebecca did not have that status of, or at least was not yet
recognized as, a Filipino citizen when she secured theFebruary 22, 1996judgment of divorce from
theDominican Republic.

The Court notes and at this juncture wishes to point out that Rebecca voluntarily withdrew
her original petition for declaration of nullity (Civil Case No. 96-378 of the Makati City RTC)
obviously because she could not show proof of her alleged Filipino citizenship then. In fact, a perusal
of that petition shows that, while bearing the dateJanuary 26, 1996, it was only filed with the RTC
onMarch 14, 1996or less than a month after Rebecca secured, onFebruary 22, 1996, the foreign
divorce decree in question. Consequently, there was no mention about said divorce in the
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petition.Significantly, the only documents appended as annexes to said original petition were:the
Vicente-Rebecca Marriage Contract (Annex A) and Birth Certificate of Alix (Annex B).If indeed ID
Certificate No. RC 9778 from the Bureau was truly issued onOctober 11, 1995, is it not but logical to
expect that this piece of document be appended to form part of the petition, the question of her
citizenship being crucial to her case?

As may be noted, the petition for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage under Civil Case
No. 01-094, like the withdrawn first petition, also did not have the ID Certificate from the Bureau as
attachment. What were attached consisted of the following material documents:Marriage Contract
(Annex A) and Divorce Decree. It was only through her Opposition (To Respondents Motion to
Dismiss dated 31 May 2001) HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2008/
[36]
november2008/155635.htm" \l "_ftn36" \o "" didRebecca attach as Annex C ID Certificate No.
RC 9778.

At any rate, the CA was correct in holding that the RTC had sufficient basis to dismiss the
petition for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage as said petition, taken together with Vicentes
motion to dismiss and Rebeccas opposition to motion, with their respective attachments, clearly made
out a case of lack of cause of action, which we will expound later.

Validity of Divorce Decree

Going to the second core issue, we find Civil Decree Nos. 362/96 and 406/97 valid.

First, at the time of the divorce, as above elucidated, Rebecca was still to be recognized,
assuming for argument that she was in fact later recognized, as a Filipino citizen, but represented
herself in public documents as an American citizen. At the very least, she chose, before, during, and
shortly after her divorce, her American citizenship to govern her marital relationship.Second, she
secured personally said divorce as an American citizen, as is evident in the text of the Civil Decrees,
which pertinently declared:

IN THIS ACTION FOR DIVORCE in which the parties expressly submit to the
jurisdiction of this court, by reason of the existing incompatibility of temperaments x
x x. The parties MARIA REBECCA M. BAYOT,of United States nationality, 42
years of age, married, domiciled and residing at 502 Acacia Ave., Ayala Alabang,
Muntin Lupa, Philippines, x x x, who personally appeared before this court,
accompanied by DR. JUAN ESTEBAN OLIVERO, attorney, x x x and VICENTE
MADRIGAL BAYOT, of Philippine nationality, of 43 years of age, married and
domiciled and residing at 502 Acacia Ave., Ayala Alabang, Muntin Lupa, Filipino,
appeared before this court represented by DR. ALEJANDRO TORRENS, attorney, x
th
x x, revalidated by special power of attorney given the 19 of February of 1996,
signed before the Notary Public Enrico L. Espanol of the City of Manila, duly
legalized and authorizing him to subscribe all the acts concerning this case.
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HYPERLINK " h t t p : / / s c . j u d i c i a r y. g o v. p h / j u r i s p r u d e n c e / 2 0 0 8 /
[37]
november2008/155635.htm" \l "_ftn37" \o "" (Emphasis ours.)

Third, being an American citizen, Rebecca was bound by the national laws of theUnited
States of America, a country which allows divorce.Fourth, the property relations of Vicente and
Rebecca were properly adjudicated through their Agreement HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/
[38]
jurisprudence/2008/november2008/155635.htm" \l "_ftn38" \o "" executed on December 14,
1996after Civil Decree No. 362/96 was rendered onFebruary 22, 1996, and duly affirmed by Civil
Decree No. 406/97 issued onMarch 4, 1997.Veritably, the foreign divorce secured by Rebecca was
valid.

To be sure, the Court has taken stock of the holding inGarcia v. Reciothat a foreign divorce
can be recognized here, provided the divorce decree is proven as a fact and as valid under the national
law of the alien spouse. HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2008/
[39]
november2008/155635.htm" \l "_ftn39" \o "" Be this as it may, the fact that Rebecca was clearly
an American citizen when she secured the divorce and that divorce is recognized and allowed in any
of the States of the Union, HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2008/
[40]
november2008/155635.htm" \l "_ftn40" \o "" the presentation of a copy of foreign divorce
decreeduly authenticatedby the foreign court issuing said decree is, as here, sufficient.

It bears to stress that the existence of the divorce decree has not been denied, but in fact
admitted by both parties. And neither did they impeach the jurisdiction of the divorce court nor
challenge the validity of its proceedings on the ground of collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of fact or
law, albeit both appeared to have the opportunity to do so. The same holds true with respect to the
decree of partition of their conjugal property.As this Court explained inRoehr v. Rodriguez:

Before our courts can give the effect of res judicata to a foreign judgment [of
divorce] x x x, it must be shown that the parties opposed to the judgment had been
given ample opportunity to do so on grounds allowed under Rule 39, Section 50 of
the Rules of Court (now Rule 39, Section 48, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure), to wit:

SEC. 50. Effect of foreign judgments.The effect of a judgment of a
tribunal of a foreign country, having jurisdiction to pronounce the judgment
is as follows:

(a) In case of a judgment upon a specific thing, the judgment is
conclusive upon the title to the thing;

(b) In case of a judgment against a person, the judgment is presumptive
evidence of a right as between the parties and their successors in interest by
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a subsequent title; but the judgment may be repelled by evidence of a want

of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake
of law or fact.

It is essential that there should be an opportunity to challenge the foreign
judgment, in order for the court in this jurisdiction to properly determine its
efficacy.In this jurisdiction, our Rules of Court clearly provide that with respect to
actionsin personam, as distinguished from actionsin rem, a foreign judgment merely
constitutesprima facieevidence of the justness of the claim of a party and, as such, is
subject to proof to the contrary. HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/
[41]

As the records show, Rebecca, assisted by counsel, personally secured the foreign divorce
while Vicente was duly represented by his counsel, a certain Dr. Alejandro Torrens, in said
proceedings. As things stand, the foreign divorce decrees rendered and issued by the Dominican
Republiccourt are valid and, consequently, bind both Rebecca and Vicente.

Finally, the fact that Rebecca may have been duly recognized as a Filipino citizen by force of
the June 8, 2000 affirmation by Secretary of Justice Tuquero of the October 6, 1995 Bureau Order of
Recognition will not, standing alone, work to nullify or invalidate the foreign divorce secured by
Rebecca as an American citizen on February 22, 1996. For as we stressed at the outset, in determining
whether or not a divorce secured abroad wouldcome within the pale of the countrys policy against
absolute divorce, the reckoning point is the citizenship of the parties at the time a valid divorce is
obtained. HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2008/november2008/155635.htm" \l
[42]
"_ftn42" \o ""

Legal Effects of the Valid Divorce

Given the validity and efficacy of divorce secured by Rebecca, the same shall be given ares
judicata effect in this jurisdiction. As an obvious result of the divorce decree obtained, the
maritalvinculumbetween Rebecca and Vicente is considered severed; they are both freed from the
bond of matrimony. In plain language, Vicente and Rebecca are no longer husband and wife to each
other. As the divorce court formally pronounced: [T]hat the marriage between MARIA REBECCA M.
BAYOT and VICENTE MADRIGAL BAYOT is hereby dissolved x x x leaving them free to
remarry after completing the legal requirements. HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/
[43]

Consequent to the dissolution of the marriage, Vicente could no longer be subject to a
husbands obligation under the Civil Code.He cannot, for instance, be obliged to live with, observe
respect and fidelity, and render support to Rebecca. HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/
[44]

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The divorce decree in question also brings into play the second paragraph of Art. 26 of the
Family Code, providing as follows:

Art. 26.x x x x

celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse
capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall likewise have capacity to
remarry under Philippine law.(As amended by E.O. 227)

InRepublic v. Orbecido III, we spelled out the twin elements for the applicability of the
second paragraph of Art. 26, thus:
x x x [W]e state the twin elements for the application of Paragraph 2 of

Article 26 as follows:
1. There is a valid marriage that has been celebrated between a Filipino

citizen and a foreigner; and
2. A valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him

or her to remarry.
The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the time of the
celebration of the marriage, but their citizenship at the time a valid divorce is
obtained abroadby the alien spouse capacitating the latter to remarry. HYPERLINK
"http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2008/november2008/155635.htm" \l
[45]
"_ftn45" \o ""

Both elements obtain in the instant case. We need not belabor further the fact of marriage of
Vicente and Rebecca, their citizenship when they wed, and their professed citizenship during the valid
divorce proceedings.

Not to be overlooked of course is the fact that Civil Decree No. 406/97 and the Agreement
executed onDecember 14, 1996bind both Rebecca and Vicente as regards their property relations.
The Agreement provided that the ex-couples conjugal property consisted only their family home, thus:

9. That the parties stipulate that the conjugal property which they
acquired during their marriage consistsonlyof the real propertyand all the
improvements and personal properties therein contained at502 Acacia Avenue, Ayala
Alabang, Muntinlupa, covered by TCT No. 168301 dated Feb. 7, 1990 issued by the
Register of Deeds of Makati, Metro Manila registered in the name of Vicente M.
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Bayot, married to Rebecca M. Bayot, x x x. HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/

[46]
jurisprudence/2008/november2008/155635.htm" \l "_ftn46" \o "" (Emphasis
ours.)

This property settlement embodied in the Agreement was affirmed by the divorce court
which, per its second divorce decree, Civil Decree No. 406/97 dated March 4, 1997, ordered that,
th
THIRD:That the agreement entered into between the parties dated 14 day of December 1996 in
Makati City, Philippines shall survive in this Judgment of divorce by reference but not merged and
that the parties are hereby ordered and directed tocomply with each and every provision of said
agreement. HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2008/november2008/155635.htm"
[47]
\l "_ftn47" \o ""

Rebecca has not repudiated the property settlement contained in the Agreement. She is thus
estopped by her representation before the divorce court from asserting that her and Vicentes conjugal
property was not limited to their family home in Ayala Alabang. HYPERLINK "http://
[48]
sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2008/november2008/155635.htm" \l "_ftn48" \o ""

No Cause of Action in the Petition for Nullity of Marriage

Upon the foregoing disquisitions, it is abundantly clear to the Court that Rebecca lacks, under
the premises, cause of action.Philippine Bank of Communications v. Trazoexplains the concept and
elements of a cause of action, thus:

Acauseofaction is an act or omission of one party in violation of the legal
right of the other.A motion to dismiss based on lack ofcauseofaction hypothetically
admits the truth of the allegations in the complaint.The allegations in a complaint are
sufficient to constitute a cause of action against the defendants if, hypothetically
admitting the facts alleged, the court can render a valid judgment upon the same in
accordance with the prayer therein. A cause of action exists if the
following elements are present, namely: (1) a right in favor of the plaintiff by
whatever means and under whatever law it arises or is created; (2) an obligation on
the part of the named defendant to respect or not to violate such right; and (3) an act
or omission on the part of such defendant violative of the right of the plaintiff or
constituting a breach of the obligation of the defendant to the plaintiff for which the
latter may maintain an action for recovery of damages. HYPERLINK "http://
sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2008/november2008/155635.htm" \l "_ftn49" \o
[49]
""

One thing is clear from a perusal of Rebeccas underlying petition before the RTC, Vicentes
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motion to dismiss and Rebeccas opposition thereof, with the documentary evidence attached therein:
The petitioner lacks a cause of action for declaration of nullity of marriage, a suit which presupposes
the existence of a marriage.

To sustain a motion to dismiss for lack of cause of action, the movant must show that the
claim for relief does not exist rather than that a claim has been defectively stated or is ambiguous,
indefinite, or uncertain. HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2008/
[50]
november2008/155635.htm" \l "_ftn50" \o "" With the valid foreign divorce secured by Rebecca,
there is no more marital tie binding her to Vicente.There is in fine no more marriage to be dissolved
or nullified.

The Court to be sure does not lose sight of the legal obligation of Vicente and Rebecca to
support the needs of their daughter, Alix.The records do not clearly show how he had discharged his
duty, albeit Rebecca alleged that the support given had been insufficient.At any rate, we do note that
Alix, having been born onNovember 27, 1982, reached the majority age onNovember 27, 2000, or
four months before her mother initiated her petition for declaration of nullity.She would now be 26
years old.Hence, the issue of back support, which allegedly had been partly shouldered by Rebecca, is
best litigated in a separate civil action for reimbursement.In this way, the actual figure for the support
of Alix can be proved as well as the earning capacity of both Vicente and Rebecca.The trial court can
thus determine what Vicente owes, if any, considering that support includes provisions until the child
concerned shall have finished her education.

Upon the foregoing considerations, the Court no longer need to delve into the issue tendered
in G.R. No. 155635, that is, Rebeccas right to supportpendente lite.As it were, her entitlement to that
kind of support hinges on the tenability of her petition under Civil Case No. 01-094 for declaration of
nullity of marriage. The dismissal of Civil Case No. 01-094 by the CA veritably removed any legal
anchorage for, and effectively mooted, the claim for supportpendente lite.

WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari inG.R. No. 155635is herebyDISMISSEDon the
ground of mootness, while the petition for review inG.R. No. 163979is herebyDENIEDfor lack of
merit.Accordingly, theMarch 25, 2004Decision andJune 4, 2004Resolution of the CA in CA-G.R.
SP No. 68187are herebyAFFIRMED.Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.
Corpuz vs Daisylyn Tirol Sto. Tomas

Before the Court is a direct appeal from the decision HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/
[1]
jurisprudence/2010/august2010/186571.htm" \l "_ftn2" \o "" of the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Laoag City, Branch 11, elevated via a petition for review on certiorari HYPERLINK "http://
Page 90 of 193
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[2]
sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/august2010/186571.htm" \l "_ftn3" \o "" under Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court (present petition).

Petitioner Gerbert R. Corpuz was a former Filipino citizen who acquired Canadian citizenship
through naturalization onNovember 29, 2000. HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/
[3]
2010/august2010/186571.htm" \l "_ftn4" \o "" OnJanuary 18, 2005, Gerbert married respondent
Daisylyn T. Sto. Tomas, a Filipina, in Pasig City. HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/
[4]
jurisprudence/2010/august2010/186571.htm" \l "_ftn5" \o "" Due to work and other professional
commitments, Gerbert left for Canada soon after the wedding. He returned to
thePhilippinessometime in April 2005 to surprise Daisylyn, but was shocked to discover that his wife
was having an affair with another man.Hurt and disappointed, Gerbert returned toCanadaand filed a
petition for divorce. The Superior Court of Justice, Windsor, Ontario, Canada granted Gerberts
petition for divorce onDecember 8, 2005.The divorce decree took effect a month later, onJanuary 8,
2006. HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/august2010/186571.htm" \l "_ftn6"
[5]
\o ""

Two years after the divorce, Gerbert has moved on and has found another Filipina to
love.Desirous of marrying his new Filipina fiance in thePhilippines, Gerbert went to the Pasig City
Civil Registry Office and registered the Canadian divorce decree on his and Daisylyns marriage
certificate.Despite the registration of the divorce decree, an official of the National Statistics Office
(NSO) informed Gerbert that the marriage between him and Daisylyn still subsists under Philippine
law; to be enforceable, the foreign divorce decree must first be judicially recognized by a competent
Philippine court, pursuant to NSO Circular No. 4, series of 1982. HYPERLINK "http://
[6]
sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/august2010/186571.htm" \l "_ftn7" \o ""

Accordingly,Gerbert filed a petition for judicial recognition of foreign divorce and/or
declaration of marriage as dissolved(petition) with the RTC.Although summoned, Daisylyn did not
file any responsive pleading but submitted instead a notarized letter/manifestation to the trial
court.She offered no opposition to Gerberts petition and, in fact, alleged her desire to file a similar
case herself but was prevented by financial and personal circumstances.She, thus, requested that she
be considered as a party-in-interest with a similar prayer to Gerberts.

In its October 30, 2008 decision, HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/
[7]
2010/august2010/186571.htm" \l "_ftn8" \o "" the RTC denied Gerberts petition. The RTC
concluded that Gerbert wasnot the proper partyto institute the action for judicial recognition of the
foreign divorce decree as he is a naturalized Canadian citizen.It ruled thatonly the Filipino spouse
can avail of the remedy, under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, HYPERLINK
[8]
"http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/august2010/186571.htm" \l "_ftn9" \o "" in order for
him or her to be able to remarry under Philippine law. HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/
[9]
jurisprudence/2010/august2010/186571.htm" \l "_ftn10" \o "" Article 26 of the Family Code reads:

Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines, in accordance
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(4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.

celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien
spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall likewise
have capacity to remarry under Philippine law.

This conclusion, the RTC stated, is consistent with the legislative intent behind the enactment of the
second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, as determined by the Court in Republic v.
Orbecido III; HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/august2010/186571.htm" \l
[10]
"_ftn11" \o "" the provision was enacted to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse
remains married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino
spouse. HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/august2010/186571.htm" \l
[11]
"_ftn12" \o ""

THE PETITION

From the RTCs ruling, HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/
[12]
august2010/186571.htm" \l "_ftn13" \o "" Gerbert filed the present petition. HYPERLINK "http://
[13]
sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/august2010/186571.htm" \l "_ftn14" \o ""
Gerbert asserts that his petition before the RTC is essentially for declaratory relief, similar to
that filed inOrbecido;he, thus, similarly asks for a determination of his rights under the second
paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code. Taking into account the rationale behind the second
paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, he contends that the provision applies as well to the
benefit of the alien spouse. He claims that the RTC ruling unduly stretched the doctrine
inOrbecidoby limiting the standing to file the petition only to the Filipino spouse an interpretation he
claims to be contrary to the essence of the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code.He
considers himself as a proper party, vested with sufficient legal interest, to institute the case, as there is
a possibility that he might be prosecuted for bigamy if he marries his Filipina fiance in the Philippines
since two marriage certificates, involving him, would be on file with the Civil Registry Office. The
Office of the Solicitor General and Daisylyn, in their respective Comments, HYPERLINK "http://
[14]
sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/august2010/186571.htm" \l "_ftn15" \o "" both support
Gerberts position.

Essentially, the petition raises the issue ofwhether the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family
Code extends to aliens the right to petition a court of this jurisdiction for the recognition of a
foreign divorce decree.
THE COURTS RULING

The Alien Spose can calim no right under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code
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as the substansive right it establishes is in the favor of the Filipino Spouse
The resolution of the issue requires a review of the legislative history and intent behind the second
paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code.

The Family Code recognizes only two types of defective marriages void HYPERLINK "http://
[15]
sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/august2010/186571.htm" \l "_ftn16" \o "" and voidable
HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/august2010/186571.htm" \l "_ftn17" \o
[16]
"" marriages.In both cases, the basis for thejudicial declaration of absolute nullity or annulment
of the marriage existsbeforeorat the time ofthe marriage.Divorce, on the other hand, contemplates
the dissolution of the lawful union for cause arising after the marriage. HYPERLINK "http://
[17]
sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/august2010/186571.htm" \l "_ftn18" \o "" Our family laws
do not recognize absolute divorce between Filipino citizens. HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/
[18]
jurisprudence/2010/august2010/186571.htm" \l "_ftn19" \o ""
Recognizing the reality that divorce is a possibility in marriages between a Filipino and an
alien, President Corazon C. Aquino, in the exercise of her legislative powers under the Freedom
Constitution, HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/august2010/186571.htm" \l
[19]
"_ftn20" \o "" enacted Executive Order No. (EO) 227, amending Article 26 of the Family Code to
its present wording, as follows:

Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines, in accordance
(4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.

celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien
spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall likewise
have capacity to remarry under Philippine law.

Through the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, EO 227 effectively incorporated into
the law this Courts holding in Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/
[20]
jurisprudence/2010/august2010/186571.htm" \l "_ftn21" \o "" and Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera.
[21]
"" In both cases, the Court refused to acknowledge the alien spouses assertion of marital rights
after a foreign courts divorce decree between the alien and the Filipino.The Court, thus, recognized
that the foreign divorce had already severed the marital bond between the spouses. The Court
reasoned inVan Dorn v. Romillothat:

To maintain x x x that, under our laws, [the Filipino spouse] has to be
considered still married to [the alien spouse] and still subject to a wife's
obligations x x x cannot be just.[The Filipino spouse] should not be obliged to live
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together with, observe respect and fidelity, and render support to [the alien spouse].
The latter should not continue to be one of her heirs with possible rights to conjugal
property.She should not be discriminated against in her own country if the ends
of justice are to be served. HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/
[22]
2010/august2010/186571.htm" \l "_ftn23" \o ""

As the RTC correctly stated, the provision was included in the law to avoid the absurd
situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce,
is no longer married to the Filipino spouse. HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/
[23]
2010/august2010/186571.htm" \l "_ftn24" \o "" The legislative intent is for the benefit of the
Filipino spouse, by clarifying his or her marital status, settling the doubts created by the divorce
decree.Essentially, the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code provided the Filipino
spouse a substantive right to have his or her marriage to the alien spouse considered as
dissolved, capacitating him or her to remarry. HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/
[24]
jurisprudence/2010/august2010/186571.htm" \l "_ftn25" \o "" Without the second paragraph of
Article 26 of the Family Code, the judicial recognition of the foreign decree of divorce, whether in a
proceeding instituted precisely for that purpose or as a related issue in another proceeding, would be
of no significance to the Filipino spouse since our laws do not recognize divorce as a mode of severing
the marital bond; HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/
[25]
august2010/186571.htm" \l "_ftn26" \o "" Article 17 of the Civil Code provides that the policy
against absolute divorces cannot be subverted by judgments promulgated in a foreign country.The
inclusion of the second paragraph in Article 26 of the Family Code provides the direct exception to
this rule and serves as basis for recognizing the dissolution of the marriage between the Filipino
spouse and his or her alien spouse.

Additionally, an action based on the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code is not limited
to the recognition of the foreign divorce decree.If the court finds that the decree capacitated the alien
spouse to remarry, the courts can declare that the Filipino spouse is likewise capacitated to contract
another marriage.No court in this jurisdiction, however, can make a similar declaration for the alien
spouse (other than that already established by the decree), whose status and legal capacity are
generally governed by his national law. HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/
[26]
august2010/186571.htm" \l "_ftn27" \o ""

Given the rationale and intent behind the enactment, and the purpose of the second paragraph
of Article 26 of the Family Code, the RTC was correct in limiting the applicability of the provision for
the benefit of the Filipino spouse.In other words, only the Filipino spouse can invoke the second
paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code; the alien spouse can claim no right under this provision.

The foreign divorce decree is presumptive evidence of a right that clothes the party with legal
interest to petition for is recognition in this jurisdiction

We qualify our above conclusioni.e., that the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family
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Code bestows no rights in favor of aliens with the complementary statement that this conclusion is not
sufficient basis to dismiss Gerberts petition before the RTC.In other words, the unavailability of the
second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code to aliens does not necessarily strip Gerbert of legal
interest to petition the RTC for the recognition of his foreign divorce decree.The foreign divorce
decree itself, after its authenticity and conformity with the aliens national law have been duly proven
according to our rules of evidence, serves as a presumptive evidence of right in favor of Gerbert,
pursuant to Section 48, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court which provides for the effect of foreign
judgments. This Section states:

SEC. 48. Effect of foreign judgments or final orders.The effect of a
judgment or final order of a tribunal of a foreign country, having jurisdiction to
render the judgment or final order isas follows:

(a)In case of a judgment or final order upon a specific thing, the
judgment or final order is conclusive upon the title of the thing; and

(b)In case of a judgment or final order against a person, the
judgment or final order is presumptive evidence of a right as
between the parties and their successors in interest by a
subsequent title.

In either case, the judgment or final order may be repelled by evidence of a
want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of
law or fact.

To our mind, direct involvement or being the subject of the foreign judgment is sufficient to clothe a
party with the requisite interest to institute an action before our courts for the recognition of the
foreign judgment.In a divorce situation, we have declared, no less, that the divorce obtained by an
alien abroad may be recognized in thePhilippines, provided the divorce is valid according to his or
her national law. HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/
[27]
august2010/186571.htm" \l "_ftn28" \o ""

The starting point in any recognition of a foreign divorce judgment is the acknowledgment

that our courts do not take judicial notice of foreign judgments and laws. Justice Herrera explained
that, as a rule, no sovereign is bound to give effect within its dominion to a judgment rendered by a
tribunal of another country. HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/
[28]
august2010/186571.htm" \l "_ftn29" \o "" This means that the foreign judgment and its
authenticity must be proven as facts under our rules on evidence, together with the aliens applicable
national law to show the effect of the judgment on the alien himself or herself. HYPERLINK "http://
[29]
sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/august2010/186571.htm" \l "_ftn30" \o "" The recognition
may be made in an action instituted specifically for the purpose or in another action where a party
invokes the foreign decree as an integral aspect of his claim or defense.

In Gerberts case, since both the foreign divorce decree and the national law of the alien,
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recognizing his or her capacity to obtain a divorce, purport to be official acts of a sovereign authority,
Section 24, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court comes into play.This Section requires proof, either by (1)
official publications or (2) copies attested by the officer having legal custody of the documents.If the
copies of official records are not kept in thePhilippines, these must be (a) accompanied by a certificate
issued by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine foreign service stationed in the
foreign country in which the record is kept and (b) authenticated by the seal of his office.

The records show that Gerbert attached to his petition a copy of the divorce decree, as well as
the required certificates proving its authenticity, HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/
[30]
jurisprudence/2010/august2010/186571.htm" \l "_ftn31" \o "" but failed to include a copy of the
Canadian law on divorce. HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/
[31]
august2010/186571.htm" \l "_ftn32" \o "" Under this situation, we can, at this point, simply
dismiss the petition for insufficiency of supporting evidence, unless we deem it more appropriate to
remand the case to the RTC to determine whether the divorce decree is consistent with the Canadian
divorce law.

We deem it more appropriate to take this latter course of action, given the Article 26 interests
that will be served and the Filipina wifes (Daisylyns) obvious conformity with the petition.A remand,
at the same time, will allow other interested parties to oppose the foreign judgment and overcome a
petitioners presumptive evidence of a right by proving want of jurisdiction, want of notice to a party,
collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.Needless to state, every precaution must be taken to
ensure conformity with our laws before a recognition is made, as the foreign judgment, once
recognized, shall have the effect of res judicata HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/
[32]
jurisprudence/2010/august2010/186571.htm" \l "_ftn33" \o "" between the parties, as provided in
Section 48, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court. HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/
[33]
2010/august2010/186571.htm" \l "_ftn34" \o ""

In fact, more than the principle of comity that is served by the practice of reciprocal
recognition of foreign judgments between nations, theres judicataeffect of the foreign judgments of
divorce serves as the deeper basis for extending judicial recognition and for considering the alien
spouse bound by its terms.This same effect, as discussed above, will not obtain for the Filipino
spouse were it not for the substantive rule that the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code
provides.

Considerations beyond the recognition of the
foreign divorce decree
As a matter of housekeeping concern, we note that thePasigCityCivil Registry Office has
already recorded the divorce decree on Gerbert and Daisylyns marriage certificate based on the
mere presentation of the decree. HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/
[34]
august2010/186571.htm" \l "_ftn35" \o "" We consider the recording to be legally improper;
hence, the need to draw attention of the bench and the bar to what had been done.

Article 407 of the Civil Code states that [a]cts, events and judicial decrees concerning the civil status
of persons shall be recorded in the civil register.The law requires the entry in the civil registry of
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judicial decrees that produce legal consequences touching upon a persons legal capacity and
status,i.e., those affecting all his personal qualities and relations, more or less permanent in nature, not
ordinarily terminable at his own will, such as his being legitimate or illegitimate, orhis being married
or not. HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/august2010/186571.htm" \l
[35]
"_ftn36" \o ""

A judgment of divorce is a judicial decree, although a foreign one, affecting a persons legal
capacity and status that must be recorded.In fact, Act No. 3753 or the Law on Registry of Civil Status
specifically requires the registration of divorce decrees in the civil registry:

Sec. 1.Civil Register.A civil register is established for recording the civil
status of persons, in which shall be entered:

(a)births;
(b)deaths;
(c)marriages;
(d)annulments of marriages;
(e)divorces;
(f)legitimations;
(g)adoptions;
(h)acknowledgment of natural children;
(i)naturalization; and
(j)changes of name.

xxxx

Sec. 4.Civil Register Books.The local registrars shall keep and preserve in their
offices the following books, in which they shall, respectively make the proper entries
concerning the civil status of persons:

(1)Birth and death register;

(2)Marriage register, in which shall be enterednot only the marriages
solemnized but alsodivorces and dissolved marriages.

(3) Legitimation, acknowledgment, adoption, change of name and
naturalization register.

But while the law requires the entry of the divorce decree in the civil registry, the law and the
submission of the decree by themselves do notipso factoauthorize the decreesregistration.The law
should be read in relation with the requirement of a judicial recognition of the foreign judgment before
it can be givenres judicataeffect.In the context of the present case, no judicial order as yet exists
recognizing the foreign divorce decree.Thus, the Pasig City Civil Registry Office acted totally out of
turn and without authority of law when it annotated the Canadian divorce decree on Gerbert and
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Daisylyns marriage certificate, on the strength alone of the foreign decree presented by Gerbert.

Evidently, the Pasig City Civil Registry Office was aware of the requirement of a court
recognition, as it cited NSO Circular No. 4, series of 1982, HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/
[36]
jurisprudence/2010/august2010/186571.htm" \l "_ftn37" \o "" and Department of Justice Opinion
No. 181, series of 1982 HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/
[37]
august2010/186571.htm" \l "_ftn38" \o "" both of which required a final order from a competent
Philippine court before a foreign judgment, dissolving a marriage, can be registered in the civil
registry, but it, nonetheless, allowed the registration of the decree.For being contrary to law, the
registration of the foreign divorce decree without the requisite judicial recognition is patently void and
cannot produce any legal effect.

Another point we wish to draw attention to is that the recognition that the RTC may extend to
the Canadian divorce decree does not, by itself, authorize thecancellationof the entry in the civil
registry.A petition for recognition of a foreign judgment is not the proper proceeding, contemplated
under the Rules of Court, for the cancellation of entries in the civil registry.

Article 412 of the Civil Code declares that no entry in a civil register shall be changed or
corrected, without judicial order.The Rules of Court supplements Article 412 of the Civil Code by
specifically providing for a special remedial proceeding by which entries in the civil registry may be
judicially cancelled or corrected.Rule 108 of the Rules of Court sets in detail the jurisdictional and
procedural requirements that must be complied with before a judgment, authorizing the cancellation or
correction, may be annotated in the civil registry.It also requires, among others, that the verified
petition must be filed with the RTC of the province where the corresponding civil registry is located;
[38]
"" that the civil registrar and all persons who have or claim any interest must be made parties to
the proceedings; HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/
[39]
august2010/186571.htm" \l "_ftn40" \o "" and that the time and place for hearing must be
published in a newspaper of general circulation. HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/
[40]
jurisprudence/2010/august2010/186571.htm" \l "_ftn41" \o "" As these basic jurisdictional
requirements have not been met in the present case, we cannot consider the petition Gerbert filed with
the RTC as one filed under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.

We hasten to point out, however, that this ruling should not be construed as requiring two separate
proceedings for the registration of a foreign divorce decree in the civil registry one for recognition of
the foreign decree and another specifically for cancellation of the entry under Rule 108 of the Rules of
Court.The recognition of the foreign divorce decree may be made in a Rule 108 proceeding itself, as
the object of special proceedings (such as that in Rule 108 of the Rules of Court) is precisely to
establish the status or right of a party or a particular fact.Moreover, Rule 108 of the Rules of Court
can serve as the appropriate adversarial proceeding HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/
[41]
jurisprudence/2010/august2010/186571.htm" \l "_ftn42" \o "" by which the applicability of the
foreign judgment can be measured and tested in terms of jurisdictional infirmities, want of notice to
the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.

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WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition for review on certiorari,

andREVERSEtheOctober 30, 2008decision of theRegionalTrialCourtofLaoagCity, Branch 11,
as well as itsFebruary 17, 2009order.We order theREMANDof the case to the trial court for further
proceedings in accordance with our ruling above.Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Civil
Registrar General.No costs.

SO ORDERED.

12. Fujiki vs Miranay
DECISION
CARPIO,J.:
The Case
This is a direct recourse to this Court from the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 107, Quezon City,
through a petition for review oncertiorariunder Rule 45 of the Rules of Court on a pure question of
law. The petition assails the Order HYPERLINK "http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/jun2013/
1
gr_196049_2013.html" \l "fnt1" dated 31 January 2011 of the RTC in Civil Case No. Q-11-68582
and its Resolution dated 2 March 2011 denying petitioners Motion for Reconsideration. The RTC
dismissed the petition for "Judicial Recognition of Foreign Judgment (or Decree of Absolute Nullity
of Marriage)" based on improper venue and the lack of personality of petitioner, Minoru Fujiki, to file
the petition.
The Facts
Petitioner Minoru Fujiki (Fujiki) is a Japanese national who married respondent Maria Paz Galela
Marinay (Marinay) in the Philippines HYPERLINK "http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/
2
jun2013/gr_196049_2013.html" \l "fnt2" on 23 January 2004. The marriage did not sit well with
petitioners parents. Thus, Fujiki could not bring his wife to Japan where he resides. Eventually, they
lost contact with each other.
In 2008, Marinay met another Japanese, Shinichi Maekara (Maekara). Without the first marriage being
dissolved, Marinay and Maekara were married on 15 May 2008 in Quezon City, Philippines. Maekara
brought Marinay to Japan. However, Marinay allegedly suffered physical abuse from Maekara. She
left Maekara and started to contact Fujiki. HYPERLINK "http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/
3
jun2013/gr_196049_2013.html" \l "fnt3"
Fujiki and Marinay met in Japan and they were able to reestablish their relationship. In 2010, Fujiki
helped Marinay obtain a judgment from a family court in Japan which declared the marriage between
Marinay and Maekara void on the ground of bigamy. HYPERLINK "http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/
Page 99 of 193
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4
juri2013/jun2013/gr_196049_2013.html" \l "fnt4" On 14 January 2011, Fujiki filed a petition in the
RTC entitled: "Judicial Recognition of Foreign Judgment (or Decree of Absolute Nullity of
Marriage)." Fujiki prayed that (1) the Japanese Family Court judgment be recognized; (2) that the
bigamous marriage between Marinay and Maekara be declared voidab initiounder Articles 35(4) and
41 of the Family Code of the Philippines; HYPERLINK "http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/
5
jun2013/gr_196049_2013.html" \l "fnt5" and (3) for the RTC to direct the Local Civil Registrar of
Quezon City to annotate the Japanese Family Court judgment on the Certificate of Marriage between
Marinay and Maekara and to endorse such annotation to the Office of the Administrator and Civil
Registrar General in the National Statistics Office (NSO). HYPERLINK "http://www.lawphil.net/
6
judjuris/juri2013/jun2013/gr_196049_2013.html" \l "fnt6"
The Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
A few days after the filing of the petition, the RTC immediately issued an Order dismissing the
petition and withdrawing the case from its active civil docket. HYPERLINK "http://www.lawphil.net/
7
judjuris/juri2013/jun2013/gr_196049_2013.html" \l "fnt7" The RTC cited the following provisions
of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable
Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC):
Sec. 2. Petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages.
(a)Who may file. A petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely
by the husband or the wife.
xxxx
Sec. 4.Venue. The petition shall be filed in the Family Court of the province or city where the
petitioner or the respondent has been residing for at least six months prior to the date of filing, or in
the case of a non-resident respondent, where he may be found in the Philippines, at the election of the
petitioner. x x x
The RTC ruled, without further explanation, that the petition was in "gross violation" of the above
provisions. The trial court based its dismissal on Section 5(4) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC which
provides that "[f]ailure to comply with any of the preceding requirements may be a ground for
immediate dismissal of the petition." HYPERLINK "http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/
8
jun2013/gr_196049_2013.html" \l "fnt8" Apparently, the RTC took the view that only "the husband
or the wife," in this case either Maekara or Marinay, can file the petition to declare their marriage void,
and not Fujiki.
Fujiki moved that the Order be reconsidered. He argued that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC contemplated
ordinary civil actions for declaration of nullity and annulment of marriage. Thus, A.M. No. 02-11-10-
SC does not apply. A petition for recognition of foreign judgment is a special proceeding, which
"seeks to establish a status, a right or a particular fact," HYPERLINK "http://www.lawphil.net/
9
judjuris/juri2013/jun2013/gr_196049_2013.html" \l "fnt9" and not a civil action which is "for the
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enforcement or protection of a right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong." HYPERLINK "http://

10
www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/jun2013/gr_196049_2013.html" \l "fnt10" In other words, the
petition in the RTC sought to establish (1) the status and concomitant rights of Fujiki and Marinay as
husband and wife and (2) the fact of the rendition of the Japanese Family Court judgment declaring
the marriage between Marinay and Maekara as void on the ground of bigamy. The petitioner
contended that the Japanese judgment was consistent with Article 35(4) of the Family Code of the
Philippines HYPERLINK "http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/jun2013/gr_196049_2013.html"
11
\l "fnt11" on bigamy and was therefore entitled to recognition by Philippine courts. HYPERLINK
12
"http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/jun2013/gr_196049_2013.html" \l "fnt12"
In any case, it was also Fujikis view that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC applied only to void marriages under
Article 36 of the Family Code on the ground of psychological incapacity. HYPERLINK "http://
13
www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/jun2013/gr_196049_2013.html" \l "fnt13" Thus, Section 2(a) of
A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC provides that "a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages
may be filed solely by the husband or the wife." To apply Section 2(a) in bigamy would be absurd
because only the guilty parties would be permitted to sue. In the words of Fujiki, "[i]t is not, of course,
difficult to realize that the party interested in having a bigamous marriage declared a nullity would be
the husband in the prior, pre-existing marriage." HYPERLINK "http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/
14
juri2013/jun2013/gr_196049_2013.html" \l "fnt14" Fujiki had material interest and therefore the
personality to nullify a bigamous marriage.
Fujiki argued that Rule 108 (Cancellation or Correction of Entries in the Civil Registry) of the Rules
of Court is applicable. Rule 108 is the "procedural implementation" of the Civil Register Law (Act
No. 3753) HYPERLINK "http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/jun2013/gr_196049_2013.html" \l
15
"fnt15" in relation to Article 413 of the Civil Code. HYPERLINK "http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/
16
juri2013/jun2013/gr_196049_2013.html" \l "fnt16" The Civil Register Law imposes a duty on the
"successful petitioner for divorce or annulment of marriage to send a copy of the final decree of the
court to the local registrar of the municipality where the dissolved or annulled marriage was
solemnized." HYPERLINK "http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/jun2013/
17
gr_196049_2013.html" \l "fnt17" Section 2 of Rule 108 provides that entries in the civil registry
relating to "marriages," "judgments of annulments of marriage" and "judgments declaring marriages
void from the beginning" are subject to cancellation or correction. HYPERLINK "http://
18
www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/jun2013/gr_196049_2013.html" \l "fnt18" The petition in the
RTC sought (among others) to annotate the judgment of the Japanese Family Court on the certificate
of marriage between Marinay and Maekara.
Fujikis motion for reconsideration in the RTC also asserted that the trial court "gravely erred" when,
on its own, it dismissed the petition based on improper venue. Fujiki stated that the RTC may be
confusing the concept of venue with the concept of jurisdiction, because it is lack of jurisdiction which
allows a court to dismiss a case on its own. Fujiki citedDacoycoy v. Intermediate Appellate Court
HYPERLINK "http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/jun2013/gr_196049_2013.html" \l "fnt19"
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19
which held that the "trial court cannot pre-empt the defendants prerogative to object to the
improper laying of the venue by motu proprio dismissing the case." HYPERLINK "http://
20
www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/jun2013/gr_196049_2013.html" \l "fnt20" Moreover, petitioner
alleged that the trial court should not have "immediately dismissed" the petition under Section 5 of
A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC because he substantially complied with the provision.
On 2 March 2011, the RTC resolved to deny petitioners motion for reconsideration. In its Resolution,
the RTC stated that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC applies because the petitioner, in effect, prays for a decree
of absolute nullity of marriage. HYPERLINK "http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/jun2013/
21
gr_196049_2013.html" \l "fnt21" The trial court reiterated its two grounds for dismissal, i.e. lack of
personality to sue and improper venue under Sections 2(a) and 4 of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC. The RTC
considered Fujiki as a "third person" HYPERLINK "http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/
22
jun2013/gr_196049_2013.html" \l "fnt22" in the proceeding because he "is not the husband in the
decree of divorce issued by the Japanese Family Court, which he now seeks to be judicially
recognized, x x x." HYPERLINK "http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/jun2013/
23
gr_196049_2013.html" \l "fnt23" On the other hand, the RTC did not explain its ground of
impropriety of venue. It only said that "[a]lthough the Court cited Sec. 4 (Venue) x x x as a ground for
dismissal of this case[,] it should be taken together with the other ground cited by the Court x x x
which is Sec. 2(a) x x x." HYPERLINK "http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/jun2013/
24
gr_196049_2013.html" \l "fnt24"
The RTC further justified its motu proprio dismissal of the petition based onBraza v. The City Civil
Registrar of Himamaylan City, Negros Occidental. HYPERLINK "http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/
25
juri2013/jun2013/gr_196049_2013.html" \l "fnt25" The Court in Braza ruled that "[i]n a special
proceeding for correction of entry under Rule 108 (Cancellation or Correction of Entries in the
Original Registry), the trial court has no jurisdiction to nullify marriages x x x." HYPERLINK "http://
26
www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/jun2013/gr_196049_2013.html" \l "fnt26" Braza emphasized
that the "validity of marriages as well as legitimacy and filiation can be questioned only in a direct
action seasonably filed by the proper party, and not through a collateral attack such as [a] petition [for
correction of entry] x x x." HYPERLINK "http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/jun2013/
27
gr_196049_2013.html" \l "fnt27"
The RTC considered the petition as a collateral attack on the validity of marriage between Marinay
and Maekara. The trial court held that this is a "jurisdictional ground" to dismiss the petition.
28
Moreover, the verification and certification against forum shopping of the petition was not
authenticated as required under Section 5 HYPERLINK "http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/
29
jun2013/gr_196049_2013.html" \l "fnt29" of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC. Hence, this also warranted
the "immediate dismissal" of the petition under the same provision.
The Manifestation and Motion of the Office of the Solicitor General and the Letters of Marinay
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and Maekara
On 30 May 2011, the Court required respondents to file their comment on the petition for review.
30
The public respondents, the Local Civil Registrar of Quezon City and the Administrator and Civil
Registrar General of the NSO, participated through the Office of the Solicitor General. Instead of a
comment, the Solicitor General filed a Manifestation and Motion. HYPERLINK "http://
31
www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/jun2013/gr_196049_2013.html" \l "fnt31"
The Solicitor General agreed with the petition. He prayed that the RTCs "pronouncement that the
petitioner failed to comply with x x x A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC x x x be set aside" and that the case be
reinstated in the trial court for further proceedings. HYPERLINK "http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/
32
juri2013/jun2013/gr_196049_2013.html" \l "fnt32" The Solicitor General argued that Fujiki, as the
spouse of the first marriage, is an injured party who can sue to declare the bigamous marriage between
Marinay and Maekara void. The Solicitor General cited Juliano-Llave v. Republic HYPERLINK
33
"http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/jun2013/gr_196049_2013.html" \l "fnt33" which held
that Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not apply in cases of bigamy. InJuliano-Llave, this
Court explained:
[t]he subsequent spouse may only be expected to take action if he or she had only discovered during
the connubial period that the marriage was bigamous, and especially if the conjugal bliss had already
vanished. Should parties in a subsequent marriage benefit from the bigamous marriage, it would not be
expected that they would file an action to declare the marriage void and thus, in such circumstance, the
"injured spouse" who should be given a legal remedy is the one in a subsisting previous marriage. The
latter is clearly the aggrieved party as the bigamous marriage not only threatens the financial and the
property ownership aspect of the prior marriage but most of all, it causes an emotional burden to the
prior spouse. The subsequent marriage will always be a reminder of the infidelity of the spouse and the
disregard of the prior marriage which sanctity is protected by the Constitution. HYPERLINK "http://
34
The Solicitor General contended that the petition to recognize the Japanese Family Court judgment
may be made in a Rule 108 proceeding. HYPERLINK "http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/
35
jun2013/gr_196049_2013.html" \l "fnt35" In Corpuz v. Santo Tomas, HYPERLINK "http://
36
www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/jun2013/gr_196049_2013.html" \l "fnt36" this Court held that
"[t]he recognition of the foreign divorce decree may be made in a Rule 108 proceeding itself, as the
object of special proceedings (such as that in Rule 108 of the Rules of Court) is precisely to establish
the status or right of a party or a particular fact." HYPERLINK "http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/
37
juri2013/jun2013/gr_196049_2013.html" \l "fnt37" While Corpuzconcerned a foreign divorce
decree, in the present case the Japanese Family Court judgment also affected the civil status of the
parties, especially Marinay, who is a Filipino citizen.
The Solicitor General asserted that Rule 108 of the Rules of Court is the procedure to record "[a]cts,
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events and judicial decrees concerning the civil status of persons" in the civil registry as required by
Article 407 of the Civil Code. In other words, "[t]he law requires the entry in the civil registry of
judicial decrees that produce legal consequences upon a persons legal capacity and status x x x."
38
The Japanese Family Court judgment directly bears on the civil status of a Filipino citizen and
should therefore be proven as a fact in a Rule 108 proceeding.
Moreover, the Solicitor General argued that there is no jurisdictional infirmity in assailing a void
marriage under Rule 108, citing De Castro v. De Castro HYPERLINK "http://www.lawphil.net/
39
judjuris/juri2013/jun2013/gr_196049_2013.html" \l "fnt39" andNial v. Bayadog HYPERLINK
40
"http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/jun2013/gr_196049_2013.html" \l "fnt40" which
declared that "[t]he validity of a void marriage may be collaterally attacked." HYPERLINK "http://
41
Marinay and Maekara individually sent letters to the Court to comply with the directive for them to
comment on the petition. HYPERLINK "http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/jun2013/
42
gr_196049_2013.html" \l "fnt42" Maekara wrote that Marinay concealed from him the fact that she
was previously married to Fujiki. HYPERLINK "http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/jun2013/
43
gr_196049_2013.html" \l "fnt43" Maekara also denied that he inflicted any form of violence on
Marinay. HYPERLINK "http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/jun2013/gr_196049_2013.html" \l
44
"fnt44" On the other hand, Marinay wrote that she had no reason to oppose the petition.
45
She would like to maintain her silence for fear that anything she say might cause misunderstanding
between her and Fujiki. HYPERLINK "http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/jun2013/
46
gr_196049_2013.html" \l "fnt46"
The Issues
Petitioner raises the following legal issues:
(1) Whether the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of
Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC) is applicable.
(2) Whether a husband or wife of a prior marriage can file a petition to recognize a foreign judgment
nullifying the subsequent marriage between his or her spouse and a foreign citizen on the ground of
bigamy.
(3) Whether the Regional Trial Court can recognize the foreign judgment in a proceeding for
cancellation or correction of entries in the Civil Registry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.
The Ruling of the Court
We grant the petition.
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The Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages
(A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC) does not apply in a petition to recognize a foreign judgment relating to the
status of a marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of a foreign country. Moreover, inJuliano-
Llave v. Republic, HYPERLINK "http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/jun2013/
47
gr_196049_2013.html" \l "fnt47" this Court held that the rule in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC that only
the husband or wife can file a declaration of nullity or annulment of marriage "does not apply if the
reason behind the petition is bigamy." HYPERLINK "http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/
48
jun2013/gr_196049_2013.html" \l "fnt48"
I.
For Philippine courts to recognize a foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage where one of
the parties is a citizen of a foreign country, the petitioner only needs to prove the foreign judgment as
a fact under the Rules of Court. To be more specific, a copy of the foreign judgment may be admitted
in evidence and proven as a fact under Rule 132, Sections 24 and 25, in relation to Rule 39, Section
48(b) of the Rules of Court. HYPERLINK "http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/jun2013/
49
gr_196049_2013.html" \l "fnt49" Petitioner may prove the Japanese Family Court judgment
through (1) an official publication or (2) a certification or copy attested by the officer who has custody
of the judgment. If the office which has custody is in a foreign country such as Japan, the certification
may be made by the proper diplomatic or consular officer of the Philippine foreign service in Japan
and authenticated by the seal of office. HYPERLINK "http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/
50
jun2013/gr_196049_2013.html" \l "fnt50"
To hold that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC applies to a petition for recognition of foreign judgment would
mean that the trial court and the parties should follow its provisions, including the form and contents
of the petition, HYPERLINK "http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/jun2013/
51
gr_196049_2013.html" \l "fnt51" the service of summons, HYPERLINK "http://www.lawphil.net/
52
judjuris/juri2013/jun2013/gr_196049_2013.html" \l "fnt52" the investigation of the public
prosecutor, HYPERLINK "http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/jun2013/gr_196049_2013.html"
53
\l "fnt53" the setting of pre-trial, HYPERLINK "http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/jun2013/
54
gr_196049_2013.html" \l "fnt54" the trial HYPERLINK "http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/
55
jun2013/gr_196049_2013.html" \l "fnt55" and the judgment of the trial court. HYPERLINK
56
"http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/jun2013/gr_196049_2013.html" \l "fnt56" This is absurd
because it will litigate the case anew. It will defeat the purpose of recognizing foreign judgments,
which is "to limit repetitive litigation on claims and issues." HYPERLINK "http://www.lawphil.net/
57
judjuris/juri2013/jun2013/gr_196049_2013.html" \l "fnt57" The interpretation of the RTC is
tantamount to relitigating the case on the merits. In Mijares v. Raada, HYPERLINK "http://
58
www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/jun2013/gr_196049_2013.html" \l "fnt58" this Court explained
that "[i]f every judgment of a foreign court were reviewable on the merits, the plaintiff would be
forced back on his/her original cause of action, rendering immaterial the previously concluded
litigation." HYPERLINK "http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/jun2013/gr_196049_2013.html" \l
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59
"fnt59"
A foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage affects the civil status, condition and legal
capacity of its parties. However, the effect of a foreign judgment is not automatic. To extend the effect
of a foreign judgment in the Philippines, Philippine courts must determine if the foreign judgment is
consistent with domestic public policy and other mandatory laws. HYPERLINK "http://
60
www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/jun2013/gr_196049_2013.html" \l "fnt60" Article 15 of the
Civil Code provides that "[l]aws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and
legal capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad."
This is the rule oflex nationaliiin private international law. Thus, the Philippine State may require, for
effectivity in the Philippines, recognition by Philippine courts of a foreign judgment affecting its
citizen, over whom it exercises personal jurisdiction relating to the status, condition and legal capacity
of such citizen.
A petition to recognize a foreign judgment declaring a marriage void does not require relitigation
under a Philippine court of the case as if it were a new petition for declaration of nullity of marriage.
Philippine courts cannot presume to know the foreign laws under which the foreign judgment was
rendered. They cannot substitute their judgment on the status, condition and legal capacity of the
foreign citizen who is under the jurisdiction of another state. Thus, Philippine courts can only
recognize the foreign judgmentas a factaccording to the rules of evidence.
Section 48(b), Rule 39 of the Rules of Court provides that a foreign judgment or final order against a
person creates a "presumptive evidence of a right as between the parties and their successors in
interest by a subsequent title." Moreover, Section 48 of the Rules of Court states that "the judgment or
final order may be repelled by evidence of a want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion,
fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact." Thus, Philippine courts exercise limited review on foreign
judgments. Courts are not allowed to delve into the merits of a foreign judgment. Once a foreign
judgment is admitted and proven in a Philippine court, it can only be repelled on grounds external to
its merits,i.e. , "want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of
law or fact." The rule on limited review embodies the policy of efficiency and the protection of party
expectations, HYPERLINK "http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/jun2013/
61
gr_196049_2013.html" \l "fnt61" as well as respecting the jurisdiction of other states.
62
Since 1922 inAdong v. Cheong Seng Gee, HYPERLINK "http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/

63
jun2013/gr_196049_2013.html" \l "fnt63" Philippine courts have recognized foreign divorce
decrees between a Filipino and a foreign citizen if they are successfully proven under the rules of
evidence. HYPERLINK "http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/jun2013/gr_196049_2013.html" \l
64
"fnt64" Divorce involves the dissolution of a marriage, but the recognition of a foreign divorce
decree does not involve the extended procedure under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC or the rules of ordinary
trial. While the Philippines does not have a divorce law, Philippine courts may, however, recognize a
foreign divorce decree under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, to capacitate a
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Filipino citizen to remarry when his or her foreign spouse obtained a divorce decree abroad.
65
There is therefore no reason to disallow Fujiki to simply prove as a fact the Japanese Family Court
judgment nullifying the marriage between Marinay and Maekara on the ground of bigamy. While the
Philippines has no divorce law, the Japanese Family Court judgment is fully consistent with Philippine
public policy, as bigamous marriages are declared void from the beginning under Article 35(4) of the
Family Code. Bigamy is a crime under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code. Thus, Fujiki can prove
the existence of the Japanese Family Court judgment in accordance with Rule 132, Sections 24 and
25, in relation to Rule 39, Section 48(b) of the Rules of Court.
II.
Since the recognition of a foreign judgment only requires proof of fact of the judgment, it may be
made in a special proceeding for cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry under Rule
108 of the Rules of Court. Rule 1, Section 3 of the Rules of Court provides that "[a] special
proceeding is a remedy by which a party seeks to establish a status, a right, or a particular fact." Rule
108 creates a remedy to rectify facts of a persons life which are recorded by the State pursuant to the
Civil Register Law or Act No. 3753. These are facts of public consequence such as birth, death or
marriage, HYPERLINK "http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/jun2013/gr_196049_2013.html" \l
66
"fnt66" which the State has an interest in recording. As noted by the Solicitor General, inCorpuz v.
Sto. Tomasthis Court declared that "[t]he recognition of the foreign divorce decree may be made in a
Rule 108 proceeding itself, as the object of special proceedings (such as that in Rule 108 of the Rules
of Court) is precisely to establish the status or right of a party or a particular fact." HYPERLINK
67
"http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/jun2013/gr_196049_2013.html" \l "fnt67"
Rule 108, Section 1 of the Rules of Court states:
Sec. 1.Who may file petition. Any personinterestedin anyact, event, order or decreeconcerning
thecivil status of persons which has been recorded in the civil register,may file a verified petition
for the cancellation or correction of any entry relating thereto, with the Regional Trial Court of the
province where the corresponding civil registry is located. (Emphasis supplied)
Fujiki has the personality to file a petition to recognize the Japanese Family Court judgment nullifying
the marriage between Marinay and Maekara on the ground of bigamy because the judgment concerns
his civil status as married to Marinay. For the same reason he has the personality to file a petition
under Rule 108 to cancel the entry of marriage between Marinay and Maekara in the civil registry on
the basis of the decree of the Japanese Family Court.
There is no doubt that the prior spouse has a personal and material interest in maintaining the integrity
of the marriage he contracted and the property relations arising from it. There is also no doubt that he
is interested in the cancellation of an entry of a bigamous marriage in the civil registry, which
compromises the public record of his marriage. The interest derives from the substantive right of the
spouse not only to preserve (or dissolve, in limited instances HYPERLINK "http://www.lawphil.net/
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68
judjuris/juri2013/jun2013/gr_196049_2013.html" \l "fnt68" ) his most intimate human relation, but
also to protect his property interests that arise by operation of law the moment he contracts marriage.
69
These property interests in marriage include the right to be supported "in keeping with the financial
capacity of the family" HYPERLINK "http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/jun2013/
70
gr_196049_2013.html" \l "fnt70" and preserving the property regime of the marriage.
71
Property rights are already substantive rights protected by the Constitution, HYPERLINK "http://
72
www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/jun2013/gr_196049_2013.html" \l "fnt72" but a spouses right
in a marriage extends further to relational rights recognized under Title III ("Rights and Obligations
between Husband and Wife") of the Family Code. HYPERLINK "http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/
73
juri2013/jun2013/gr_196049_2013.html" \l "fnt73" A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC cannot "diminish,
increase, or modify" the substantive right of the spouse to maintain the integrity of his marriage.
74
In any case, Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC preserves this substantive right by limiting the
personality to sue to the husband or the wife of the union recognized by law.
Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not preclude a spouse of a subsisting marriage to question
the validity of a subsequent marriage on the ground of bigamy. On the contrary, when Section 2(a)
states that "[a] petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filedsolely by the
husband or the wife" HYPERLINK "http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/jun2013/
75
gr_196049_2013.html" \l "fnt75" it refers to the husband or the wife of the subsisting marriage.
Under Article 35(4) of the Family Code, bigamous marriages are void from the beginning. Thus, the
parties in a bigamous marriage are neither the husband nor the wife under the law. The husband or the
wife of the prior subsisting marriage is the one who has the personality to file a petition for declaration
of absolute nullity of void marriage under Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC.
Article 35(4) of the Family Code, which declares bigamous marriages void from the beginning, is the
civil aspect of Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, HYPERLINK "http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/
76
juri2013/jun2013/gr_196049_2013.html" \l "fnt76" which penalizes bigamy. Bigamy is a public
crime. Thus, anyone can initiate prosecution for bigamy because any citizen has an interest in the
prosecution and prevention of crimes. HYPERLINK "http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/
77
jun2013/gr_196049_2013.html" \l "fnt77" If anyone can file a criminal action which leads to the
declaration of nullity of a bigamous marriage, HYPERLINK "http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/
78
juri2013/jun2013/gr_196049_2013.html" \l "fnt78" there is more reason to confer personality to
sue on the husband or the wife of a subsisting marriage. The prior spouse does not only share in the
public interest of prosecuting and preventing crimes, he is also personally interested in the purely civil
aspect of protecting his marriage.
When the right of the spouse to protect his marriage is violated, the spouse is clearly an injured party
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and is therefore interested in the judgment of the suit. HYPERLINK "http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/

79
juri2013/jun2013/gr_196049_2013.html" \l "fnt79" Juliano-Llaveruled that the prior spouse "is
clearly the aggrieved party as the bigamous marriage not only threatens the financial and the property
ownership aspect of the prior marriage but most of all, it causes an emotional burden to the prior
spouse." HYPERLINK "http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/jun2013/gr_196049_2013.html" \l
80
"fnt80" Being a real party in interest, the prior spouse is entitled to sue in order to declare a
bigamous marriage void. For this purpose, he can petition a court to recognize a foreign judgment
nullifying the bigamous marriage and judicially declare as a fact that such judgment is effective in the
Philippines. Once established, there should be no more impediment to cancel the entry of the
bigamous marriage in the civil registry.
III.
InBraza v. The City Civil Registrar of Himamaylan City, Negros Occidental, this Court held that a
"trial court has no jurisdiction to nullify marriages" in a special proceeding for cancellation or
correction of entry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. HYPERLINK "http://www.lawphil.net/
81
judjuris/juri2013/jun2013/gr_196049_2013.html" \l "fnt81" Thus, the "validity of marriage[] x x x
can be questioned only in a direct action" to nullify the marriage. HYPERLINK "http://
82
www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/jun2013/gr_196049_2013.html" \l "fnt82" The RTC relied
onBrazain dismissing the petition for recognition of foreign judgment as a collateral attack on the
marriage between Marinay and Maekara.
Brazais not applicable becauseBrazadoes not involve a recognition of a foreign judgment nullifying
a bigamous marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of the foreign country.
To be sure, a petition for correction or cancellation of an entry in the civil registry cannot substitute for
an action to invalidate a marriage. A direct action is necessary to prevent circumvention of the
substantive and procedural safeguards of marriage under the Family Code, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC and
other related laws. Among these safeguards are the requirement of proving the limited grounds for the
dissolution of marriage, HYPERLINK "http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/jun2013/
83
gr_196049_2013.html" \l "fnt83" supportpendente liteof the spouses and children, HYPERLINK
84
"http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/jun2013/gr_196049_2013.html" \l "fnt84" the
liquidation, partition and distribution of the properties of the spouses, HYPERLINK "http://
85
www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/jun2013/gr_196049_2013.html" \l "fnt85" and the investigation
of the public prosecutor to determine collusion. HYPERLINK "http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/
86
juri2013/jun2013/gr_196049_2013.html" \l "fnt86" A direct action for declaration of nullity or
annulment of marriage is also necessary to prevent circumvention of the jurisdiction of the Family
Courts under the Family Courts Act of 1997 (Republic Act No. 8369), as a petition for cancellation or
correction of entries in the civil registry may be filed in the Regional Trial Court "where the
corresponding civil registry is located." HYPERLINK "http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/
87
jun2013/gr_196049_2013.html" \l "fnt87" In other words, a Filipino citizen cannot dissolve his
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marriage by the mere expedient of changing his entry of marriage in the civil registry.
However, this does not apply in a petition for correction or cancellation of a civil registry entry based
on the recognition of a foreign judgment annulling a marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of
the foreign country. There is neither circumvention of the substantive and procedural safeguards of
marriage under Philippine law, nor of the jurisdiction of Family Courts under R.A. No. 8369. A
recognition of a foreign judgment is not an action to nullify a marriage. It is an action for Philippine
courts to recognize the effectivity of a foreign judgment, which presupposes a case which was
already tried and decided under foreign law. The procedure in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not
apply in a petition to recognize a foreign judgment annulling a bigamous marriage where one of the
parties is a citizen of the foreign country. Neither can R.A. No. 8369 define the jurisdiction of the
foreign court.
Article 26 of the Family Code confers jurisdiction on Philippine courts to extend the effect of a
foreign divorce decree to a Filipino spouse without undergoing trial to determine the validity of the
dissolution of the marriage. The second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code provides that
"[w]here a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is
thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino
spouse shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine law." InRepublic v. Orbecido, HYPERLINK
88
"http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/jun2013/gr_196049_2013.html" \l "fnt88" this Court
recognized the legislative intent of the second paragraph of Article 26 which is "to avoid the absurd
situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce,
is no longer married to the Filipino spouse" HYPERLINK "http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/
89
jun2013/gr_196049_2013.html" \l "fnt89" under the laws of his or her country. The second
paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code only authorizes Philippine courts to adopt the effects of a
foreign divorce decree precisely because the Philippines does not allow divorce. Philippine courts
cannot try the case on the merits because it is tantamount to trying a case for divorce.
The second paragraph of Article 26 is only a corrective measure to address the anomaly that results
from a marriage between a Filipino, whose laws do not allow divorce, and a foreign citizen, whose
laws allow divorce. The anomaly consists in the Filipino spouse being tied to the marriage while the
foreign spouse is free to marry under the laws of his or her country. The correction is made by
extending in the Philippines the effect of the foreign divorce decree, which is already effective in the
country where it was rendered. The second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code is based on this
Courts decision in Van Dorn v. Romillo HYPERLINK "http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/
90
jun2013/gr_196049_2013.html" \l "fnt90" which declared that the Filipino spouse "should not be
discriminated against in her own country if the ends of justice are to be served." HYPERLINK "http://
91
The principle in Article 26 of the Family Code applies in a marriage between a Filipino and a foreign
citizen who obtains a foreign judgment nullifying the marriage on the ground of bigamy. The Filipino
spouse may file a petition abroad to declare the marriage void on the ground of bigamy. The principle
in the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code applies because the foreign spouse, after the
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foreign judgment nullifying the marriage, is capacitated to remarry under the laws of his or her
country. If the foreign judgment is not recognized in the Philippines, the Filipino spouse will be
discriminatedthe foreign spouse can remarry while the Filipino spouse cannot remarry.
Under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, Philippine courts are empowered to
correct a situation where the Filipino spouse is still tied to the marriage while the foreign spouse is
free to marry. Moreover, notwithstanding Article 26 of the Family Code, Philippine courts already
have jurisdiction to extend the effect of a foreign judgment in the Philippines to the extent that the
foreign judgment does not contravene domestic public policy. A critical difference between the case of
a foreign divorce decree and a foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage is that bigamy, as a
ground for the nullity of marriage, is fully consistent with Philippine public policy as expressed in
Article 35(4) of the Family Code and Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code. The Filipino spouse has
the option to undergo full trial by filing a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage under A.M.
No. 02-11-10-SC, but this is not the only remedy available to him or her. Philippine courts have
jurisdiction to recognize a foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage, without prejudice to a
criminal prosecution for bigamy.
In the recognition of foreign judgments, Philippine courts are incompetent to substitute their judgment
on how a case was decided under foreign law. They cannot decide on the "family rights and duties, or
on the status, condition and legal capacity" of the foreign citizen who is a party to the foreign
judgment. Thus, Philippine courts are limited to the question of whether to extend the effect of a
foreign judgment in the Philippines. In a foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage
involving a citizen of a foreign country, Philippine courts only decide whether to extend its effect to
the Filipino party, under the rule oflex nationaliiexpressed in Article 15 of the Civil Code.
For this purpose, Philippine courts will only determine (1) whether the foreign judgment is
inconsistent with an overriding public policy in the Philippines; and (2) whether any alleging party is
able to prove an extrinsic ground to repel the foreign judgment, i.e. want of jurisdiction, want of notice
to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact. If there is neither inconsistency with
public policy nor adequate proof to repel the judgment, Philippine courts should, by default, recognize
the foreign judgment as part of the comity of nations. Section 48(b), Rule 39 of the Rules of Court
states that the foreign judgment is already "presumptive evidence of a right between the parties." Upon
recognition of the foreign judgment, this right becomes conclusive and the judgment serves as the
basis for the correction or cancellation of entry in the civil registry. The recognition of the foreign
judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage is a subsequent event that establishes a new status, right and
fact HYPERLINK "http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/jun2013/gr_196049_2013.html" \l
92
"fnt92" that needs to be reflected in the civil registry. Otherwise, there will be an inconsistency
between the recognition of the effectivity of the foreign judgment and the public records in the
Philippines.1wphi1
However, the recognition of a foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage is without prejudice
to prosecution for bigamy under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code. HYPERLINK "http://
93
www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/jun2013/gr_196049_2013.html" \l "fnt93" The recognition of a
foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage is not a ground for extinction of criminal liability
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under Articles 89 and 94 of the Revised Penal Code. Moreover, under Article 91 of the Revised Penal
Code, "[t]he term of prescription [of the crime of bigamy] shall not run when the offender is absent
from the Philippine archipelago."
Since A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC is inapplicable, the Court no longer sees the need to address the
questions on venue and the contents and form of the petition under Sections 4 and 5, respectively, of
A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC.
WHEREFORE, weGRANTthe petition. The Order dated 31 January 2011 and the Resolution dated
2 March 2011 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 107, Quezon City, in Civil Case No. Q-11-68582
areREVERSEDandSET ASIDE. The Regional Trial Court isORDEREDtoREINSTATEthe
petition for further proceedings in accordance with this Decision.
SO ORDERED.
13. De Castro vs De Castro

DECISION

TINGA,J.:

This is a petition for review of the Decision HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/
[1]
2008/feb2008/160172.htm" \l "_ftn1" \o "" of the Court of Appeals in CA-GR CV. No. 69166,
HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2008/feb2008/160172.htm" \l "_ftn2" \o
[2]
"" declaring that (1) Reianna Tricia A. De Castro is the legitimate child of the petitioner; and (2)
that the marriage between petitioner and respondent is valid until properly nullified by a competent
court in a proceeding instituted for that purpose.

The facts of the case, as culled from the records, follow.

Petitioner and respondent met and became sweethearts in 1991.They planned to get married, thus they
applied for a marriage license with the Office of the Civil Registrar of Pasig City in September
1994.They had their first sexual relation sometime in October 1994, and had regularly engaged in sex
thereafter.When the couple went back to the Office of the Civil Registrar, the marriage license had
already expired.Thus, in order to push through with the plan, in lieu of a marriage license, they
executed an affidavit dated 13 March 1995 stating that they had been living together as husband and
wife for at least five years.The couple got married on the same date, with Judge Jose C. Bernabe,
presiding judge of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasig City, administering the civil
rites.Nevertheless, after the ceremony, petitioner and respondent went back to their respective homes
and did not live together as husband and wife.

On13 November 1995, respondent gave birth to a child named Reinna Tricia A. De Castro. Since the
childs birth, respondent has been the one supporting her out of her income as a government dentist and
from her private practice.
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On 4 June 1998, respondent filed a complaint for support against petitioner before
the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City (trial court. HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/
[3]
jurisprudence/2008/feb2008/160172.htm" \l "_ftn3" \o "" In her complaint, respondent alleged that
she is married to petitioner and that the latter has reneged on his responsibility/obligation to financially
support her as his wife and Reinna Tricia as his child. HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/
[4]
jurisprudence/2008/feb2008/160172.htm" \l "_ftn4" \o ""

Petitioner denied that he is married to respondent, claiming that their marriage isvoid ab
initiosince the marriage was facilitated by a fake affidavit; and that he was merely prevailed upon by
respondent to sign the marriage contract to save her from embarrassment and possible administrative
prosecution due to her pregnant state; and that he was not able to get parental advice from his parents
before he got married.He also averred that they never lived together as husband and wife and that he
has never seen nor acknowledged the child.

In its Decision dated 16 October 2000, HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/
[5]
jurisprudence/2008/feb2008/160172.htm" \l "_ftn5" \o "" the trial court ruled that the marriage
between petitioner and respondent is not valid because it was solemnized without a marriage license.
However, it declared petitioner as the natural father of the child, and thus obliged to give her
support.Petitioner elevated the case to the Court of Appeals, arguing that the lower court committed
grave abuse of discretion when, on the basis of mere belief and conjecture,it ordered him to provide
support to the childwhen the latter is not, and could not have been,his own child.

The Court of Appeals denied the appeal. Prompted by therule that a marriage is presumed to
be subsisting until a judicial declaration of nullity has been made, the appellate court declared that the
child was born during the subsistence and validity of the parties marriage.In addition, the Court of
Appeals frowned upon petitioners refusal to undergoDNA testing to prove the paternity and filiation,
as well as his refusal to state with certainty the last time he had carnal knowledge with respondent,
saying that petitioners forgetfulness should not be used as a vehicle to relieve him of his obligation
and reward him of his being irresponsible. HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/
[6]
2008/feb2008/160172.htm" \l "_ftn6" \o "" Moreover, the Court of Appeals noted the affidavit
dated7 April 1998executed bypetitioner, wherein he voluntarily admitted that he is the legitimate
father of the child.

The appellate court also ruled that since this case is an action for support,it was improper for
the trial court to declare the marriage of petitioner and respondent as null and void in the very same
case.There was no participation of the State, through the prosecuting attorney or fiscal, to see to it that
there is no collusion between the parties, as required by the Family Code in actions for declaration of
nullity of a marriage.The burden of proof to show that the marriage is void rests upon petitioner, but it
is a matter that can be raised in an action for declaration of nullity, and not in the instant
proceedings.The proceedings before the trial court should have been limited to the obligation of
petitioner to support the child and his wife on the basis of the marriage apparently and voluntarily
entered into by petitioner and respondent. HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/
[7]
2008/feb2008/160172.htm" \l "_ftn7" \o "" The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
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WHEREFORE,premises considered, the Decision dated 16 October 2000,
of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, National Capital Judicial Region, Brach 70,
in JDRC No. 4626, is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATIONS (1) declaring
Reianna Tricia A. De Castro, as the legitimate child of the appellant and the appellee
and (2) declaring the marriage on 13 March 1995 between the appellant and the
appelleevalid until properly annulled by a competent court in a proceeding instituted
for that purpose.Costs against the appellant. HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/
[8]
jurisprudence/2008/feb2008/160172.htm" \l "_ftn8" \o ""

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but the motion was denied by the Court of Appeals.
[9]
"" Hence this petition.

Before us, petitioner contends that the trial court properly annulled his marriage with respondent
because as shown by the evidence and admissions of the parties, the marriage was celebrated without
a marriage license. He stresses that the affidavit they executed, in lieu of a marriage license, contained
a false narration of facts, the truth being that he and respondent never lived together as husband and
wife.The false affidavit should never be allowed or admitted as a substitute to fill the absence of a
marriage license. HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2008/feb2008/160172.htm"
[10]
\l "_ftn10" \o "" Petitioner additionally argues that there was no need for the appearance of a
prosecuting attorney in this case because it is only an ordinary action for support and not an action for
annulment or declaration of absolute nullity of marriage. In any case, petitioner argues that the trial
court had jurisdiction to determine the invalidity of their marriage since it was validly invoked as an
affirmative defense in the instant action for support.Citing several authorities, HYPERLINK "http://
[11]
sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2008/feb2008/160172.htm" \l "_ftn11" \o "" petitioner
claimsthat a void marriage can be the subject of a collateral attack.Thus, there is no necessity to
institute another independent proceeding for the declaration of nullity of the marriage between the
parties.The refiling of another case for declaration of nullity where the same evidence and parties
would be presentedwould entail enormous expenses and anxieties, would be time-consuming for the
parties, and would increase the burden of the courts. HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/
[12]
jurisprudence/2008/feb2008/160172.htm" \l "_ftn12" \o "" Finally, petitioner claims that in view
of the nullity of his marriage with respondent and his vigorous denial of the childs paternity and
filiation, the Court of Appeals gravely erred in declaring the child as his legitimate child.

In a resolution dated16 February 2004, the Court required respondent and the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG) to file their respective comments on the petition. HYPERLINK "http://
[13]
sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2008/feb2008/160172.htm" \l "_ftn13" \o ""
In her Comment, HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2008/
[14]
feb2008/160172.htm" \l "_ftn14" \o "" respondent claims that the instant petition is a mere
dilatory tactic to thwart the finality of the decision of the Court of Appeals.Echoing the findings and
rulings of the appellate court, she argues that the legitimacy of their marriage cannot be attacked
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collaterally, but can only be repudiated or contested in a direct suit specifically brought for that
purpose.With regard to the filiation of her child, she pointed out that compared to her candid and
straightforward testimony, petitioner was uncertain, if not evasive in answering questions about their
sexual encounters.Moreover, she adds that despite the challenge from her and from the trial court,
petitioner strongly objected to being subjected to DNA testing to prove paternity and filiation.
[15]
""
For its part, the OSG avers that the Court of Appeals erred in holding that it was improper for the trial
court to declare null and void the marriage of petitioner and respondent in the action for
support.Citing the case ofNial v. Bayadog, HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/
[16]
2008/feb2008/160172.htm" \l "_ftn16" \o "" it states that courts may pass upon the validity of a
marriage in an action for support, since the right to support from petitioner hinges on the existence of
a valid marriage.Moreover, the evidence presented during the proceedings in the trial court showed
that the marriage between petitioner and respondent was solemnized without a marriage license, and
that their affidavit (of a man and woman who have lived together and exclusively with each other as
husband and wife for at least five years) was false. Thus, it
concludesthetrialcourtcorrectlyheldthatthemarriagebetweenpetitionerandrespondentisnotvalid
. HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2008/feb2008/160172.htm" \l "_ftn17" \o
[17]
"" Inaddition,the OSG agrees with the findings of the trial court that the child is an illegitimate
child of petitioner and thus entitled to support. HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/
[18]
2008/feb2008/160172.htm" \l "_ftn18" \o ""

Two key issues are presented before us. First, whether the trial court had the jurisdiction to determine
the validity of the marriage between petitioner and respondent in an action for support and second,
whether the child is the daughter of petitioner.

Anent the first issue, the Court holds that the trial court had jurisdiction to determine the validity of the
marriage between petitioner and respondent. The validity of a void marriage may be collaterally
attacked. HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2008/feb2008/160172.htm" \l
[19]
"_ftn19" \o "" Thus, inNial v. Bayadog, we held:
However, other than for purposes of remarriage, no judicial action is necessary
to declare a marriage an absolute nullity.For other purposes, such as but not limited to
determination of heirship, legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child, settlement of estate,
dissolution of property regime, or a criminal case for that matter, the court may pass
upon the validity of marriage even in a suit not directly instituted to question the same
so long as it is essential to the determination of the case.This is without prejudice to
any issue that may arise in the case. When such need arises, a final judgment of
declaration of nullity is necessary even if the purpose is other than to remarry.The
clause on the basis of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void in Article
40 of the Family Code connotes that such final judgment need not be obtained only for
purpose of remarriage. HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2008/
[20]
feb2008/160172.htm" \l "_ftn20" \o ""

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Likewise, inNicdao Cario v. Yee Cario, HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2008/

[21]
feb2008/160172.htm" \l "_ftn21" \o "" the Court ruled that it is clothed with sufficient authority to
pass upon the validity of two marriages despite the main case being a claim for death
benefits.ReiteratingNial, we held that the Court may pass upon the validity of a marriage even in a
suit not directly instituted to question the validity of said marriage, so long as it is essential to the
determination of the case.However, evidence must be adduced, testimonial or documentary, to prove
the existence of grounds rendering such a marriage an absolute nullity. HYPERLINK "http://
[22]
sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2008/feb2008/160172.htm" \l "_ftn22" \o ""

Under the Family Code, the absence of any of the essential or formal requisites shall render the
marriage voidab initio,whereas a defect in any of the essential requisites shall render the marriage
voidable. HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2008/feb2008/160172.htm" \l
[23]
"_ftn23" \o "" In the instant case, it is clear from the evidence presented that petitioner and
respondent did not have a marriage license when they contracted their marriage. Instead, they
presented an affidavit stating that they had been living together for more than five years.
[24]
"" However, respondent herself in effect admitted the falsity of the affidavit when she was asked
during cross-examination, thus

ATTY. CARPIO:

QBut despite of (sic) the fact that you have not been living together as husband and
wife for the last five years on or before March 13, 1995, you signed the
Affidavit, is that correct?
A Yes, sir. HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2008/
[25]
feb2008/160172.htm" \l "_ftn25" \o ""

The falsity of the affidavit cannot be considered as a mere irregularity in the formal requisites of
marriage.The law dispenses with the marriage license requirement for a man and a woman who have
lived together and exclusively with each other as husband and wife for a continuous and unbroken
period of at least five years before the marriage. The aim of this provision is to avoid exposing the
parties to humiliation, shame and embarrassment concomitant with the scandalous cohabitation of
persons outside a valid marriage due to the publication of every applicants name for a marriage
license. HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2008/feb2008/160172.htm" \l "_ftn26"
[26]
\o "" In the instant case, there was no scandalous cohabitation to protect; in fact, there was no
cohabitation at all.The false affidavit which petitioner and respondent executed so they could push
through with the marriage has no value whatsoever; it is a mere scrap of paper.They were not exempt
from the marriage license requirement. Their failure to obtain and present a marriage license renders
their marriage voidab initio.

Anent the second issue, we find that the child is petitioners illegitimate daughter, and therefore entitled
to support.
Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the same way and on the same
evidence as legitimate children. HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2008/
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[27]
feb2008/160172.htm" \l "_ftn27" \o "" Thus, one can prove illegitimate filiation through the
record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment, an admission of legitimate filiation in
a public document or a private handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned, or the open
and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child, or any other means allowed by the Rules
of Court and special laws. HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2008/
[28]
feb2008/160172.htm" \l "_ftn28" \o ""

The Certificate of Live Birth HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2008/
[29]
feb2008/160172.htm" \l "_ftn29" \o "" of the child lists petitioner as the father.In addition,
petitioner, in an affidavit waiving additional tax exemption in favor of respondent, admitted that he is
the father of the child, thus stating:

1.I am the legitimate father of REIANNA TRICIA A. DE CASTRO who was born
onNovember 3, 1995at Better Living, Paraaque, Metro Manila; HYPERLINK
"http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2008/feb2008/160172.htm" \l "_ftn30" \o
[30]
""

We are likewise inclined to agree with the following findings of the trial court:

That Reinna Tricia is the child of the respondent with the petitioner is supported not
only by the testimony of the latter, but also by respondents own admission in the
course of his testimony wherein he conceded that petitioner was his former
girlfriend.While they were sweethearts, he used to visit petitioner at the latters house
or clinic. At times, they would go to a motel to have sex. As a result of their sexual
dalliances, petitioner became pregnant which ultimately led to their marriage, though
invalid, as earlier ruled. While respondent claims that he was merely forced to
undergo the marriage ceremony, the pictures taken of the occasion reveal otherwise
(Exhs. B, B-1, to B-3, C, C-1 and C-2,D, D-1 and D-2, E, E-1 and E-2, F, F-1 and
F-2, G, G-1 and G-2 and H, H-1 to H-3).In one of the pictures (Exhs. D, D-1 and
D-2), defendant is seen putting the wedding ring on petitioners finger and in another
picture (Exhs. E, E-1 and E-2) respondent is seen in the act of kissing the petitioner.
HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2008/feb2008/160172.htm" \l
[31]
"_ftn31" \o ""

WHEREFORE, the petition is granted in part.The assailed Decisionand Resolution of the
Court of Appeals in CA-GR CV No. 69166 are SET ASIDE and the decision of the Regional
Trial Court Branch 70 of Pasig Cityin JDRC No. 4626 dated 16 October 2000is hereby
REINSTATED.
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14. Chi Ming Tsoi vs CA (favorite ni Carlo)

TORRES, JR.,J.:
Man has not invented a reliable compass by which to steer a marriage in its journey over troubled
waters. Laws are seemingly inadequate. Over time, much reliance has been placed in the works of the
unseen hand of Him who created all things.
Who is to blame when a marriage fails?
This case was originally commenced by a distraught wife against her uncaring husband in the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City (Branch 89) which decreed the annulment of the marriage on the
ground of psychological incapacity. Petitioner appealed the decision of the trial court to respondent
Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. CV No. 42758) which affirmed the Trial Court's decision November 29,
1994 and correspondingly denied the motion for reconsideration in a resolution dated February 14,
1995.
The statement of the case and of the facts made by the trial court and reproduced by the Court of
HYPERLINK "http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1997/jan1997/gr_119190_1997.html" \l
Appeals
"rnt1" 1
its decision are as follows:
From the evidence adduced, the following acts were preponderantly established:
Sometime on May 22, 1988, the plaintiff married the defendant at the Manila Cathedral, . . .
Intramuros Manila, as evidenced by their Marriage Contract. (Exh. "A")
After the celebration of their marriage and wedding reception at the South Villa, Makati, they went
and proceeded to the house of defendant's mother.
There, they slept together on the same bed in the same room for the first night of their married life.
It is the version of the plaintiff, that contrary to her expectations, that as newlyweds they were
supposed to enjoy making love, or having sexual intercourse, with each other, the defendant just went
to bed, slept on one side thereof, then turned his back and went to sleep . There was no sexual
intercourse between them during the first night. The same thing happened on the second, third and
fourth nights.
In an effort to have their honeymoon in a private place where they can enjoy together during their first
week as husband and wife, they went to Baguio City. But, they did so together with her mother, an
uncle, his mother and his nephew. They were all invited by the defendant to join them. [T]hey stayed
in Baguio City for four (4) days. But, during this period, there was no sexual intercourse between
them, since the defendant avoided her by taking a long walk during siesta time or by just sleeping on a
rocking chair located at the living room. They slept together in the same room and on the same bed
since May 22, 1988 until March 15, 1989. But during this period, there was no attempt of sexual
intercourse between them. [S]he claims, that she did not: even see her husband's private parts nor did
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he see hers.
Because of this, they submitted themselves for medical examinations to Dr. Eufemio Macalalag, a
urologist at the Chinese General Hospital, on January 20, 1989.
The results of their physical examinations were that she is healthy, normal and still a virgin, while that
of her husband's examination was kept confidential up to this time. While no medicine was prescribed
for her, the doctor prescribed medications for her husband which was also kept confidential. No
treatment was given to her. For her husband, he was asked by the doctor to return but he never did.
The plaintiff claims, that the defendant is impotent, a closet homosexual as he did not show his penis.
She said, that she had observed the defendant using an eyebrow pencil and sometimes the cleansing
cream of his mother. And that, according to her, the defendant married her, a Filipino citizen, to
acquire or maintain his residency status here in the country and to publicly maintain the appearance of
a normal man.
The plaintiff is not willing to reconcile with her husband.
On the other hand, it is the claim of the defendant that if their marriage shall be annulled by reason of
psychological incapacity, the fault lies with his wife.
But, he said that he does not want his marriage with his wife annulled for several reasons,viz: (1) that
he loves her very much; (2) that he has no defect on his part and he is physically and psychologically
capable; and, (3) since the relationship is still very young and if there is any differences between the
two of them, it can still be reconciled and that, according to him, if either one of them has some
incapabilities, there is no certainty that this will not be cured. He further claims, that if there is any
defect, it can be cured by the intervention of medical technology or science.
The defendant admitted that since their marriage on May 22, 1988, until their separation on March 15,
1989, there was no sexual contact between them. But, the reason for this, according to the defendant,
was that everytime he wants to have sexual intercourse with his wife, she always avoided him and
whenever he caresses her private parts, she always removed his hands. The defendant claims, that he
forced his wife to have sex with him only once but he did not continue because she was shaking and
she did not like it. So he stopped.
There are two (2) reasons, according to the defendant , why the plaintiff filed this case against him,
and these are: (1) that she is afraid that she will be forced to return the pieces of jewelry of his mother,
and, (2) that her husband, the defendant, will consummate their marriage.
The defendant insisted that their marriage will remain valid because they are still very young and there
is still a chance to overcome their differences.
The defendant submitted himself to a physical examination. His penis was examined by Dr. Sergio
Alteza, Jr., for the purpose of finding out whether he is impotent . As a result thereof, Dr. Alteza
submitted his Doctor's Medical Report. (Exh. "2"). It is stated there, that there is no evidence of
impotency (Exh. "2-B"), and he is capable of erection. (Exh. "2-C")
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The doctor said, that he asked the defendant to masturbate to find out whether or not he has an
erection and he found out that from the original size of two (2) inches, or five (5) centimeters, the
penis of the defendant lengthened by one (1) inch and one centimeter. Dr. Alteza said, that the
defendant had only a soft erection which is why his penis is not in its full length. But, still is capable
of further erection, in that with his soft erection, the defendant is capable of having sexual intercourse
with a woman.
In open Court, the Trial Prosecutor manifested that there is no collusion between the parties and that
HYPERLINK "http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1997/jan1997/
the evidence is not fabricated."
gr_119190_1997.html" \l "rnt2" 2
After trial, the court rendered judgment, the dispositive portion of which reads:
ACCORDINGLY, judgment is hereby rendered declaring as VOID the marriage entered into by the
plaintiff with the defendant on May 22, 1988 at the Manila Cathedral, Basilica of the Immaculate
Conception, Intramuros, Manila, before the Rt. Rev. Msgr. Melencio de Vera. Without costs. Let a
copy of this decision be furnished the Local Civil Registrar of Quezon City. Let another copy be
furnished the Local Civil Registrar of Manila.
SO ORDERED.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision.
Hence, the instant petition.
Petitioner alleges that the respondent Court of Appeals erred:
in affirming the conclusions of the lower court that there was no sexual intercourse between the parties
without making any findings of fact.
II
in holding that the refusal of private respondent to have sexual communion with petitioner is a
psychological incapacity inasmuch as proof thereof is totally absent.
III
in holding that the alleged refusal of both the petitioner and the private respondent to have sex with
each other constitutes psychological incapacity of both.
IV
in affirming the annulment of the marriage between the parties decreed by the lower court without
fully satisfying itself that there was no collusion between them.
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We find the petition to be bereft of merit.
Petitioner contends that being the plaintiff in Civil Case No. Q-89-3141, private respondent has the
burden of proving the allegations in her complaint; that since there was no independent evidence to
prove the alleged non-coitus between the parties, there remains no other basis for the court's
conclusion except the admission of petitioner; that public policy should aid acts intended to validate
marriage and should retard acts intended to invalidate them; that the conclusion drawn by the trial
court on the admissions and confessions of the parties in their pleadings and in the course of the trial is
misplaced since it could have been a product of collusion; and that in actions for annulment of
HYPERLINK "http://
marriage, the material facts alleged in the complaint shall always be proved.
www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1997/jan1997/gr_119190_1997.html" \l "rnt3" 3
Section 1, Rule 19 of the Rules of Court reads:
Section 1. Judgment on the pleadings. Where an answer fails to tender an issue, or otherwise
admits the material allegations of the adverse party's pleading, the court may, on motion of that party,
direct judgment on such pleading. But in actions for annulment of marriage or for legal separation the
material facts alleged in the complaint shall always be proved.
The foregoing provision pertains to a judgment on the pleadings. What said provision seeks to prevent
is annulment of marriage without trial. The assailed decision was not based on such a judgment on the
pleadings. When private respondent testified under oath before the trial court and was cross-examined
by oath before the trial court and was cross-examined by the adverse party, she thereby presented
evidence in form of a testimony. After such evidence was presented, it be came incumbent upon
petitioner to present his side. He admitted that since their marriage on May 22, 1988, until their
separation on March 15, 1989, there was no sexual intercourse between them.
To prevent collusion between the parties is the reason why, as stated by the petitioner, the Civil Code
provides that no judgment annulling a marriage shall be promulgated upon a stipulation of facts or by
confession of judgment (Arts. 88 and 101[par. 2]) and the Rules of Court prohibit such annulment
without trial (Sec. 1, Rule 19).
The case has reached this Court because petitioner does not want their marriage to be annulled. This
only shows that there is no collusion between the parties. When petitioner admitted that he and his
wife (private respondent) have never had sexual contact with each other, he must have been only
telling the truth. We are reproducing the relevant portion of the challenged resolution denying
petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration, penned with magisterial lucidity by Associate Justice Minerva
Gonzaga-Reyes,viz:
The judgment of the trial court which was affirmed by this Court is not based on a stipulation of facts.
The issue of whether or not the appellant is psychologically incapacitated to discharge a basic marital
obligation was resolved upon a review of both the documentary and testimonial evidence on record.
Appellant admitted that he did not have sexual relations with his wife after almost ten months of
cohabitation, and it appears that he is not suffering from any physical disability. Such abnormal
reluctance or unwillingness to consummate his marriage is strongly indicative of a serious personality
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disorder which to the mind of this Court clearly demonstrates an 'utter insensitivity or inability to give
meaning and significance to the marriage' within the meaning of Article 36 of the Family Code (See
HYPERLINK "http://
Santos vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 112019, January 4, 1995).
www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1997/jan1997/gr_119190_1997.html" \l "rnt4" 4
Petitioner further contends that respondent court erred in holding that the alleged refusal of both the
petitioner and the private respondent to have sex with each other constitutes psychological incapacity
of both. He points out as error the failure of the trial court to make "a categorical finding about the
alleged psychological incapacity and an in-depth analysis of the reasons for such refusal which may
not be necessarily due to physchological disorders" because there might have been other reasons,
i.e., physical disorders, such as aches, pains or other discomforts, why private respondent would
not want to have sexual intercourse from May 22, 1988 to March 15, 1989, in a short span of 10
months.
First, it must be stated that neither the trial court nor the respondent court made a finding on who
between petitioner and private respondent refuses to have sexual contact with the other. The fact
remains, however, that there has never been coitus between them. At any rate, since the action to
declare the marriage void may be filed by either party,i.e., even the psychologically incapacitated, the
question of who refuses to have sex with the other becomes immaterial.
Petitioner claims that there is no independent evidence on record to show that any of the parties is
suffering from phychological incapacity. Petitioner also claims that he wanted to have sex with private
respondent; that the reason for private respondent's refusal may not be psychological but physical
disorder as stated above.
We do not agree. Assuming it to be so, petitioner could have discussed with private respondent or
asked her what is ailing her, and why she balks and avoids him everytime he wanted to have sexual
intercourse with her. He never did. At least, there is nothing in the record to show that he had tried to
find out or discover what the problem with his wife could be. What he presented in evidence is his
doctor's Medical Report that there is no evidence of his impotency and he is capable of erection.
HYPERLINK "http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1997/jan1997/gr_119190_1997.html" \l "rnt5"
5
Since it is petitioner's claim that the reason is not psychological but perhaps physical disorder on the
part of private respondent, it became incumbent upon him to prove such a claim.
If a spouse, although physically capable but simply refuses to perform his or her essential marriage
obligations, and the refusal is senseless and constant, Catholic marriage tribunals attribute the causes
to psychological incapacity than to stubborn refusal. Senseless and protracted refusal is equivalent to
psychological incapacity. Thus, the prolonged refusal of a spouse to have sexual intercourse with his
or her spouse is considered a sign of psychological incapacity.
judjuris/juri1997/jan1997/gr_119190_1997.html" \l "rnt6" 6
Evidently, one of the essential marital obligations under the Family Code is "To procreate children
based on the universal principle that procreation of children through sexual cooperation is the basic
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end of marriage." Constant non- fulfillment of this obligation will finally destroy the integrity or
wholeness of the marriage. In the case at bar, the senseless and protracted refusal of one of the parties
to fulfill the above marital obligation is equivalent to psychological incapacity.
As aptly stated by the respondent court,
An examination of the evidence convinces Us that the husband's plea that the wife did not want carnal
intercourse with him does not inspire belief. Since he was not physically impotent, but he refrained
from sexual intercourse during the entire time (from May 22, 1988 to March 15, 1989) that he
occupied the same bed with his wife, purely out of symphaty for her feelings, he deserves to be
doubted for not having asserted his right seven though she balked (Tompkins vs. Tompkins, 111 Atl.
599, cited in I Paras, Civil Code, at p. 330). Besides, if it were true that it is the wife was suffering
from incapacity, the fact that defendant did not go to court and seek the declaration of nullity weakens
his claim. This case was instituted by the wife whose normal expectations of her marriage were
frustrated by her husband's inadequacy. Considering the innate modesty of the Filipino woman, it is
hard to believe that she would expose her private life to public scrutiny and fabricate testimony
against her husband if it were not necessary to put her life in order and put to rest her marital status.
We are not impressed by defendant's claim that what the evidence proved is the unwillingness or lack
of intention to perform the sexual act, which is not phychological incapacity, and which can be
achieved "through proper motivation." After almost ten months of cohabitation, the admission that the
husband is reluctant or unwilling to perform the sexual act with his wife whom he professes to love
very dearly, and who has not posed any insurmountable resistance to his alleged approaches, is
indicative of a hopeless situation, and of a serious personality disorder that constitutes psychological
incapacity to discharge the basic marital covenants within the contemplation of the Family Code.
HYPERLINK "http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1997/jan1997/gr_119190_1997.html" \l "rnt7" 7
While the law provides that the husband and the wife are obliged to live together, observe mutual love,
respect and fidelity (Art. 68, Family Code), the sanction therefor is actually the "spontaneous, mutual
affection between husband and wife and not any legal mandate or court order" (Cuaderno vs.
Cuaderno 120 Phil. 1298). Love is useless unless it is shared with another. Indeed, no man is an island,
the cruelest act of a partner in marriage is to say "I could not have cared less." This is so because an
ungiven self is an unfulfilled self. The egoist has nothing but himself. In the natural order, it is sexual
intimacy which brings spouses wholeness and oneness. Sexual intimacy is a gift and a participation in
the mystery of creation. It is a function which enlivens the hope of procreation and ensures the
continuation of family relations.
It appears that there is absence of empathy between petitioner and private respondent. That is a
shared feeling which between husband and wife must be experienced not only by having spontaneous
sexual intimacy but a deep sense of spiritual communion. Marital union is a two-way process. An
expressive interest in each other's feelings at a time it is needed by the other can go a long way in
deepening the marital relationship. Marriage is definitely not for children but for two consenting adults
who view the relationship with love amor gignit amorem, respect, sacrifice and a continuing
commitment to compromise, conscious of its value as a sublime social institution.
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This Court, finding the gravity of the failed relationship in which the parties found themselves trapped
in its mire of unfulfilled vows and unconsummated marital obligations, can do no less but sustain the
studied judgment of respondent appellate court.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING PREMISES , the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals dated
November 29, 1994 is hereby AFFIRMED in all respects and the petition is hereby DENIED for lack
of merit.
SO ORDERED.
Halili vs Halili
RESOLUTION
CORONA,J.:

This resolves the motion for reconsideration of theApril 16, 2008resolution of this Court
denying petitioners petition for review on certiorari (under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court). The
petition sought to set aside theJanuary 26, 2004decision HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/
[1]
jurisprudence/2009/june2009/165424.htm" \l "_ftn3" \o "" and September 24, 2004 resolution
HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2009/june2009/165424.htm" \l "_ftn4" \o
[2]
"" ofthe Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 60010.

Petitioner Lester Benjamin S. Halili filed a petition to declare his marriage to respondent
Chona M. Santos-Halili null and void on the basis of his psychological incapacity to perform the
essential obligations of marriage in the Regional Trial Court (RTC),PasigCity, Branch 158.

He alleged that he wed respondent in civil rites thinking that it was a joke. After the
ceremonies, they never lived together as husband and wife, but maintained the relationship. However,
they started fighting constantly a year later, at which point petitioner decided to stop seeing respondent
and started dating other women. Immediately thereafter, he received prank calls telling him to stop
dating other women as he was already a married man. It was only upon making an inquiry that he
found out that the marriage was not fake.

Eventually, the RTC found petitioner to be suffering from a mixed personality disorder,
particularly dependent and self-defeating personality disorder, as diagnosed by his expert witness, Dr.
Natividad Dayan. The courta quoheld that petitioners personality disorder was serious and incurable
and directly affected his capacity to comply with his essential marital obligations to respondent. It thus
declared the marriage null and void. HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2009/
[3]
june2009/165424.htm" \l "_ftn5" \o ""

On appeal, the CA reversed and set aside the decision of the trial court on the ground that the
totality of the evidence presented failed to establish petitioners psychological incapacity. Petitioner
moved for reconsideration. It was denied.

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The case was elevated to this Court via a petition for review under Rule 45. We affirmed the
CAs decision and resolution upholding the validity of the marriage.

Petitioner then filed this motion for reconsideration reiterating his argument that his marriage
to respondent ought to be declared null and void on the basis of his psychological incapacity. He
stressed that the evidence he presented, especially the testimony of his expert witness, was more than
enough to sustain the findings and conclusions of the trial court that he was and still is psychologically
incapable of complying with the essential obligations of marriage.

We grant the motion for reconsideration.

In the recent case ofTe v.Yu-Te and the Republic of the Philippines, HYPERLINK "http://
[4]
sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2009/june2009/165424.htm" \l "_ftn6" \o "" this Court reiterated
that courts should interpret the provision on psychological incapacity (as a ground for the declaration
of nullity of a marriage) on a case-to-case basis guided by experience, the findings of experts and
researchers in psychological disciplines and by decisions of church tribunals.

Accordingly, we emphasized that, by the very nature of Article 36, courts, despite having the
primary task and burden of decision-making, must consider as essential the expert opinion on the
psychological and mental disposition of the parties. HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/
[5]
jurisprudence/2009/june2009/165424.htm" \l "_ftn7" \o ""
In this case, the testimony HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2009/
[6]
june2009/165424.htm" \l "_ftn8" \o "" of petitioners expert witness revealed that petitioner was
suffering from dependent personality disorder. Thus:

Q. Dr. Dayan, going back to the examinations and interviews which you conducted,
can you briefly tell this court your findings [and] conclusions?

A. Well, the petitioner is suffering from a personality disorder. It is a mixed
personality disorder from self-defeating personality disorder to [dependent]
personality disorder and this is brought about by [a] dysfunctional family that
petitioner had. He also suffered from partner relational problem during his marriage
with Chona. There were lots of fights and it was not truly a marriage, sir.

Q. Now, what made you conclude that Lester is suffering from psychological
incapacity to handle the essential obligations of marriage?

A. Sir, for the reason that his motivation for marriage was very questionable. It was a
very impulsive decision. I dont think he understood what it meant to really be
married and after the marriage, there was no consummation, there was no sexual
intercourse, he never lived with the respondent. And after three months he refused to
see or talk with the respondent and afterwards, I guess the relationship died a natural
death, and he never thought it was a really serious matter at all.

xxxxxx
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Q. Likewise, you stated here in your evaluation that Lester Halili and respondent
suffered from a grave lack of discretionary judgment. Can you expound on this?
A. xxxx I dont think they truly appreciate the civil [rites which] they had undergone.
[It was] just a spur of the moment decision that they should get married xxxxI dont
think they truly considered themselves married.

xxxxxx

Q. Now [from] what particular portion of their marriage were you able to conclude
xxxxthat petitioner and respondent are suffering from psychological incapacity?

A. xx xx they never lived together[.] [T]hey never had a residence, they never
consummated the marriage. During the very short relationship they had, there were
frequent quarrels and so there might be a problem also of lack of respect [for] each
other and afterwards there was abandonment.

In Te, this Court defined dependent personality disorder HYPERLINK "http://
[7]
sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2009/june2009/165424.htm" \l "_ftn9" \o "" as
[a] personality disorder characterized by a pattern of dependent and
submissive behavior. Such individuals usually lack self-esteem and frequently belittle
their capabilities; they fear criticism and are easily hurt by others comments. At times
they actually bring about dominance by others through a quest for overprotection.

Dependent personality disorder usually begins in early adulthood.
Individuals who have this disorder may be unable to make everyday decisions
without advice or reassurance from others, may allow others to make most of their
important decisions (such as where to live), tend to agree with people even when
they believe they are wrong, have difficulty starting projects or doing things on their
own, volunteer to do things that are demeaning in order to get approval from other
people, feel uncomfortable or helpless when alone and are often preoccupied with
fears of being abandoned.

In her psychological report, HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2009/
[8]
june2009/165424.htm" \l "_ftn10" \o "" Dr. Dayan stated that petitioners dependent personality
disorder was evident in the fact that petitioner was very much attached to his parents and depended on
them for decisions. HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2009/
[9]
june2009/165424.htm" \l "_ftn11" \o "" Petitioners mother even had to be the one to tell him to
seek legal help when he felt confused on what action to take upon learning that his marriage to
respondent was for real. HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2009/
[10]
june2009/165424.htm" \l "_ftn12" \o ""

Dr. Dayan further observed that, as expected of persons suffering from a dependent
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personality disorder, petitioner typically acted in a self-denigrating manner and displayed a self-
defeating attitude. This submissive attitude encouraged other people to take advantage of him.
[11]
"" This could be seen in the way petitioner allowed himself to be dominated, first, by his father
who treated his family like robots HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2009/
[12]
june2009/165424.htm" \l "_ftn14" \o "" and, later, by respondent who was as domineering as his
father. HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2009/june2009/165424.htm" \l "_ftn15"
[13]
\o "" When petitioner could no longer take respondents domineering ways, he preferred to hide
from her rather than confront her and tell her outright that he wanted to end their marriage.
[14]
""

Dr. Dayan traced petitioners personality disorder to his dysfunctional family life, to wit:
[15]
""

Q. And what might be the root cause of such psychological incapacity?

A. Sir, I mentioned awhile ago that Lesters family is dysfunctional. The
father was very abusive, very domineering. The mother has been very unhappy and
the children never had affirmation. They might [have been] x x x given financial
support because the father was [a] very affluent person but it was never an intact
family. x x x The wife and the children were practically robots. And so, I would say
Lester grew up, not having self-confidence, very immature and somehow not truly
understand[ing] what [it] meant to be a husband, what [it] meant to have a real family
life.

Ultimately, Dr. Dayan concluded that petitioners personality disorder was grave and incurable
and already existent at the time of the celebration of his marriage to respondent. HYPERLINK "http://
[16]
sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2009/june2009/165424.htm" \l "_ftn18" \o ""

It has been sufficiently established that petitioner had a psychological condition that was
grave and incurable and had a deeply rooted cause. This Court, in the sameTecase, recognized that
individuals with diagnosable personality disorders usually have long-term concerns, and thus therapy
may be long-term. HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2009/
[17]
june2009/165424.htm" \l "_ftn19" \o "" Particularly, personality disorders are long-standing,
inflexible ways of behaving that are not so much severe mental disorders as dysfunctional styles of
living.These disorders affect all areas of functioning and, beginning in childhood or adolescence,
create problems for those who display them and for others. HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/
[18]
jurisprudence/2009/june2009/165424.htm" \l "_ftn20" \o ""

From the foregoing, it has been shown that petitioner is indeed suffering from psychological
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incapacity that effectively renders him unable to perform the essential obligations of marriage.
Accordingly, the marriage between petitioner and respondent is declared null and void.

WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration is hereby GRANTED. The April 16,
2008resolution of this Court and theJanuary 26, 2004decision andSeptember 24, 2004resolution of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 60010 areSET ASIDE.

The decision of the Regional Trial Court,PasigCity, Branch 158 datedApril 17, 1998is
herebyREINSTATED.

SO ORDERED.
16. Antonio vs Reyes.

DECISION
TINGA,J.:
Statistics never lie, but lovers often do, quipped a sage. This sad truth has unsettled many a love
transformed into matrimony. Any sort of deception between spouses, no matter the gravity, is always
disquieting. Deceit to the depth and breadth unveiled in the following pages, dark and irrational as in
the modernnoirtale, dims any trace of certitude on the guilty spouses capability to fulfill the marital
obligations even more.
ThePetition for Review on Certiorariassails theDecision HYPERLINK "http://www.lawphil.net/

1
judjuris/juri2006/mar2006/gr_155800_2006.html" \l "fnt1" and Resolution HYPERLINK "http://
2
www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2006/mar2006/gr_155800_2006.html" \l "fnt2" of the Court of Appeals
dated 29 November 2001 and 24 October 2002. The Court of Appeals had reversed the judgment
3
of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati declaring the marriage of Leonilo N. Antonio
(petitioner) and Marie Ivonne F. Reyes (respondent), null and void. After careful consideration, we
reverse and affirm instead the trial court.
Antecedent Facts
Petitioner and respondent met in August 1989 when petitioner was 26 years old and respondent was
36 years of age. Barely a year after their first meeting, they got married before a minister of the Gospel
4
at the Manila City Hall, and through a subsequent church wedding HYPERLINK "http://
5
www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2006/mar2006/gr_155800_2006.html" \l "fnt5" at the Sta. Rosa de
Lima Parish, Bagong Ilog, Pasig, Metro Manila on 6 December 1990. HYPERLINK "http://
6
www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2006/mar2006/gr_155800_2006.html" \l "fnt6" Out of their union, a
child was born on 19 April 1991, who sadly died five (5) months later.
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On 8 March 1993, HYPERLINK "http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2006/mar2006/

7
gr_155800_2006.html" \l "fnt7" petitioner filed a petition to have his marriage to respondent
declared null and void. He anchored his petition for nullity on Article 36 of the Family Code alleging
that respondent was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations of
marriage. He asserted that respondents incapacity existed at the time their marriage was celebrated
and still subsists up to the present. HYPERLINK "http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2006/mar2006/
8
gr_155800_2006.html" \l "fnt8"
As manifestations of respondents alleged psychological incapacity, petitioner claimed that respondent

persistently lied about herself, the people around her, her occupation, income, educational attainment
and other events or things, HYPERLINK "http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2006/mar2006/
9
gr_155800_2006.html" \l "fnt9" to wit:
(1) She concealed the fact that she previously gave birth to an illegitimate son, HYPERLINK "http://
10
www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2006/mar2006/gr_155800_2006.html" \l "fnt10" and instead
introduced the boy to petitioner as the adopted child of her family. She only confessed the truth about
the boys parentage when petitioner learned about it from other sources after their marriage.
11
(2) She fabricated a story that her brother-in-law, Edwin David, attempted to rape and kill her when in
fact, no such incident occurred. HYPERLINK "http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2006/mar2006/
12
gr_155800_2006.html" \l "fnt12"
(3) She misrepresented herself as a psychiatrist to her obstetrician, Dr. Consuelo Gardiner, and told
some of her friends that she graduated with a degree in psychology, when she was neither.
13
(4) She claimed to be a singer or a free-lance voice talent affiliated with Blackgold Recording
Company (Blackgold); yet, not a single member of her family ever witnessed her alleged singing
activities with the group. In the same vein, she postulated that a luncheon show was held at the
Philippine Village Hotel in her honor and even presented an invitation to that effect HYPERLINK
14
"http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2006/mar2006/gr_155800_2006.html" \l "fnt14" but petitioner
discovered per certification by the Director of Sales of said hotel that no such occasion had taken
place. HYPERLINK "http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2006/mar2006/gr_155800_2006.html" \l
15
"fnt15"
(5) She invented friends named Babes Santos and Via Marquez, and under those names, sent lengthy
letters to petitioner claiming to be from Blackgold and touting her as the "number one moneymaker"
in the commercial industry worthP2 million. HYPERLINK "http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2006/
16
mar2006/gr_155800_2006.html" \l "fnt16" Petitioner later found out that respondent herself was
the one who wrote and sent the letters to him when she admitted the truth in one of their quarrels.
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17
He likewise realized that Babes Santos and Via Marquez were only figments of her imagination
when he discovered they were not known in or connected with Blackgold. HYPERLINK "http://
18
www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2006/mar2006/gr_155800_2006.html" \l "fnt18"
(6) She represented herself as a person of greater means, thus, she altered her payslip to make it
appear that she earned a higher income. She bought a sala set from a public market but told petitioner
that she acquired it from a famous furniture dealer. HYPERLINK "http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/
19
juri2006/mar2006/gr_155800_2006.html" \l "fnt19" She spent lavishly on unnecessary items and
ended up borrowing money from other people on false pretexts. HYPERLINK "http://
20
(7) She exhibited insecurities and jealousies over him to the extent of calling up his officemates to
monitor his whereabouts. When he could no longer take her unusual behavior, he separated from her
in August 1991. He tried to attempt a reconciliation but since her behavior did not change, he finally
left her for good in November 1991. HYPERLINK "http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2006/
21
mar2006/gr_155800_2006.html" \l "fnt21"
In support of his petition, petitioner presented Dr. Dante Herrera Abcede (Dr. Abcede), a psychiatrist,
and Dr. Arnulfo V.
Lopez (Dr. Lopez), a clinical psychologist, who stated, based on the tests they conducted, that
petitioner was essentially a normal, introspective, shy and conservative type of person. On the other
hand, they observed that respondents persistent and constant lying
to petitioner was abnormal or pathological. It undermined the basic relationship that should be based
on love, trust and respect. HYPERLINK "http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2006/mar2006/
22
gr_155800_2006.html" \l "fnt22" They further asserted that respondents extreme jealousy was also
pathological. It reached the point of paranoia since there was no actual basis for her to suspect that
petitioner was having an affair with another woman. They concluded based on the foregoing that
respondent was psychologically incapacitated to perform her essential marital obligations.
23
In opposing the petition, respondent claimed that she performed her marital obligations by attending to
all the needs of her husband. She asserted that there was no truth to the allegation that she fabricated
stories, told lies and invented personalities. HYPERLINK "http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2006/
24
mar2006/gr_155800_2006.html" \l "fnt24" She presented her version, thus:
(1) She concealed her child by another man from petitioner because she was afraid of losing her
husband. HYPERLINK "http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2006/mar2006/gr_155800_2006.html" \l
25
"fnt25"
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(2) She told petitioner about Davids attempt to rape and kill her because she surmised such intent
from Davids act of touching her back and ogling her from head to foot. HYPERLINK "http://
26
(3) She was actually a BS Banking and Finance graduate and had been teaching psychology at the
Pasig Catholic School for two (2) years. HYPERLINK "http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2006/
27
mar2006/gr_155800_2006.html" \l "fnt27"
(4) She was a free-lance voice talent of Aris de las Alas, an executive producer of Channel 9 and she
had done three (3) commercials with McCann Erickson for the advertisement of Coca-cola, Johnson &
Johnson, and Traders Royal Bank. She told petitioner she was a Blackgold recording artist although
she was not under contract with the company, yet she reported to the Blackgold office after office
hours. She claimed that a luncheon show was indeed held in her honor at the Philippine Village Hotel
on 8 December 1979. HYPERLINK "http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2006/mar2006/
28
gr_155800_2006.html" \l "fnt28"
(5) She vowed that the letters sent to petitioner were not written by her and the writers thereof were
not fictitious. Bea Marquez Recto of the Recto political clan was a resident of the United States while
Babes Santos was employed with Saniwares. HYPERLINK "http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2006/
29
mar2006/gr_155800_2006.html" \l "fnt29"
(6) She admitted that she called up an officemate of her husband but averred that she merely asked the
latter in a diplomatic matter if she was the one asking for chocolates from petitioner, and not to
monitor her husbands whereabouts. HYPERLINK "http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2006/
30
mar2006/gr_155800_2006.html" \l "fnt30"
(7) She belied the allegation that she spent lavishly as she supported almost ten people from her
monthly budget of P7,000.00. HYPERLINK "http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2006/mar2006/
31
gr_155800_2006.html" \l "fnt31"
In fine, respondent argued that apart from her non-disclosure of a child prior to their marriage, the
other lies attributed to her by petitioner were mostly hearsay and unconvincing. Her stance was that
the totality of the evidence presented is not sufficient for a finding of psychological incapacity on her
part. HYPERLINK "http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2006/mar2006/gr_155800_2006.html" \l
32
"fnt32"
In addition, respondent presented Dr. Antonio Efren Reyes (Dr. Reyes), a psychiatrist, to refute the
allegations anent her psychological condition. Dr. Reyes testified that the series of tests conducted by
his assistant, HYPERLINK "http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2006/mar2006/
33
gr_155800_2006.html" \l "fnt33" together with the screening procedures and the Comprehensive
Psycho-Pathological Rating Scale (CPRS) he himself conducted, led him to conclude that respondent
was not psychologically incapacitated to perform the essential marital obligations. He postulated that
regressive behavior, gross neuroticism, psychotic tendencies, and poor control of impulses, which are
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signs that might point to the presence of disabling trends, were not elicited from respondent.
34
In rebuttal, Dr. Lopez asseverated that there were flaws in the evaluation conducted by Dr. Reyes as (i)
he was not the one who administered and interpreted respondents psychological evaluation, and (ii)
he made use of only one instrument called CPRS which was not reliable because a good liar can fake
the results of such test. HYPERLINK "http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2006/mar2006/
35
gr_155800_2006.html" \l "fnt35"
After trial, the lower court gave credence to petitioners evidence and held that respondents
propensity to lying about almost anythingher occupation, state of health, singing abilities and her
income, among othershad been duly established. According to the trial court, respondents fantastic
ability to invent and fabricate stories and personalities enabled her to live in a world of make-believe.
This made her psychologically incapacitated as it rendered her incapable of giving meaning and
significance to her marriage. HYPERLINK "http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2006/mar2006/
36
gr_155800_2006.html" \l "fnt36" The trial court thus declared the marriage between petitioner and
respondent null and void.
Shortly before the trial court rendered its decision, the Metropolitan Tribunal of the Archdiocese of
Manila annulled the Catholic marriage of the parties, on the ground of lack of due discretion on the
part of the parties. HYPERLINK "http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2006/mar2006/
37
gr_155800_2006.html" \l "fnt37" During the pendency of the appeal before the Court of Appeals,
the Metropolitan Tribunals ruling was affirmed with modification by both the National Appellate
Matrimonial Tribunal, which held instead that only respondent was impaired by a lack of due
discretion. HYPERLINK "http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2006/mar2006/gr_155800_2006.html"
38
\l "fnt38" Subsequently, the decision of the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal was upheld by
the Roman Rota of the Vatican. HYPERLINK "http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2006/mar2006/
39
gr_155800_2006.html" \l "fnt39"
Petitioner duly alerted the Court of Appeals of these rulings by the Catholic tribunals. Still, the
appellate court reversed the RTCs judgment. While conceding that respondent may not have been
completely honest with petitioner, the Court of Appeals nevertheless held that the totality of the
evidence presented was insufficient to establish respondents psychological incapacity. It declared that
the requirements in the case ofRepublic v. Court of Appeals HYPERLINK "http://www.lawphil.net/
40
judjuris/juri2006/mar2006/gr_155800_2006.html" \l "fnt40" governing the application and
interpretation of psychological incapacity had not been satisfied.
Taking exception to the appellate courts pronouncement, petitioner elevated the case to this Court. He
contends herein that the evidence conclusively establish respondents psychological incapacity.
In considering the merit of this petition, the Court is heavily influenced by the credence accorded by
the RTC to the factual allegations of petitioner. HYPERLINK "http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/
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41
juri2006/mar2006/gr_155800_2006.html" \l "fnt41" It is a settled principle of civil procedure that
the conclusions of the trial court regarding the credibility of witnesses are entitled to great respect
from the appellate courts because the trial court had an opportunity to observe the demeanor of
witnesses while giving testimony which may indicate their candor or lack thereof. HYPERLINK
42
"http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2006/mar2006/gr_155800_2006.html" \l "fnt42" The Court is
likewise guided by the fact that the Court of Appeals did not dispute the veracity of the evidence
presented by petitioner. Instead, the appellate court concluded that such evidence was not sufficient to
establish the psychological incapacity of respondent. HYPERLINK "http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/
43
juri2006/mar2006/gr_155800_2006.html" \l "fnt43"
Thus, the Court is impelled to accept the factual version of petitioner as the operative facts. Still, the
crucial question remains as to whether the state of facts as presented by petitioner sufficiently meets
the standards set for the declaration of nullity of a marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code.
These standards were definitively laid down in the Courts 1997 ruling inRepublic v. Court of Appeals
44
(also known as theMolinacase HYPERLINK "http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2006/mar2006/
45
gr_155800_2006.html" \l "fnt45" ), and indeed the Court of Appeals cited theMolinaguidelines in
reversing the RTC in the case at bar. HYPERLINK "http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2006/
46
mar2006/gr_155800_2006.html" \l "fnt46" SinceMolinawas decided in 1997, the Supreme Court
has yet to squarely affirm the declaration of nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code.
47
In fact, even beforeMolinawas handed down, there was only one case,Chi Ming Tsoi v. Court of
Appeals, HYPERLINK "http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2006/mar2006/gr_155800_2006.html" \l
48
"fnt48" wherein the Court definitively concluded that a spouse was psychologically incapacitated
under Article 36.
This state of jurisprudential affairs may have led to the misperception that the remedy afforded by
Article 36 of the Family Code is hollow, insofar as the Supreme Court is concerned. HYPERLINK
49
"http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2006/mar2006/gr_155800_2006.html" \l "fnt49" Yet
whatMolinaand the succeeding cases did ordain was a set of guidelines which, while undoubtedly
onerous on the petitioner seeking the declaration of nullity, still leave room for a decree of nullity
under the proper circumstances.Molinadid not foreclose the grant of a decree of nullity under Article
36, even as it raised the bar for its allowance.
Legal Guides to Understanding Article 36
Article 36 of the Family Code states that "[a] marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the
celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of
marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its
solemnization." HYPERLINK "http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2006/mar2006/
50
gr_155800_2006.html" \l "fnt50" The concept of psychological incapacity as a ground for nullity
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of marriage is novel in our body of laws, although mental incapacity has long been recognized as a
ground for the dissolution of a marriage.
The Spanish Civil Code of 1889 prohibited from contracting marriage persons "who are not in the full
enjoyment of their reason at the time of contracting marriage." HYPERLINK "http://www.lawphil.net/
51
judjuris/juri2006/mar2006/gr_155800_2006.html" \l "fnt51" Marriages with such persons were
ordained as void, HYPERLINK "http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2006/mar2006/
52
gr_155800_2006.html" \l "fnt52" in the same class as marriages with underage parties and persons
already married, among others. A partys mental capacity was not a ground for divorce under the
Divorce Law of 1917, HYPERLINK "http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2006/mar2006/
53
gr_155800_2006.html" \l "fnt53" but a marriage where "either party was of unsound mind" at the
time of its celebration was cited as an "annullable marriage" under the Marriage Law of 1929.
54
Divorce on the ground of a spouses incurable insanity was permitted under the divorce law
enacted during the Japanese occupation. HYPERLINK "http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2006/
55
mar2006/gr_155800_2006.html" \l "fnt55" Upon the enactment of the Civil Code in 1950, a
marriage contracted by a party of "unsound mind" was classified under Article 85 of the Civil Code as
a voidable marriage. HYPERLINK "http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2006/mar2006/
56
gr_155800_2006.html" \l "fnt56" The mental capacity, or lack thereof, of the marrying spouse was
not among the grounds for declaring a marriage voidab initio. HYPERLINK "http://www.lawphil.net/
57
judjuris/juri2006/mar2006/gr_155800_2006.html" \l "fnt57" Similarly, among the marriages
classified as voidable under Article 45 (2) of the Family Code is one contracted by a party of unsound
mind. HYPERLINK "http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2006/mar2006/gr_155800_2006.html" \l
58
"fnt58"
Such cause for the annulment of marriage is recognized as a vice of consent, just like insanity
impinges on consent freely given which is one of the essential requisites of a contract. HYPERLINK
59
"http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2006/mar2006/gr_155800_2006.html" \l "fnt59" The initial
common consensus on psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code was that it did
not constitute a specie of vice of consent. Justices Sempio-Diy and Caguioa, both members of the
Family Code revision committee that drafted the Code, have opined that psychological incapacity is
not a vice of consent, and conceded that the spouse may have given free and voluntary consent to a
marriage but was nonetheless incapable of fulfilling such rights and obligations. HYPERLINK "http://
60
www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2006/mar2006/gr_155800_2006.html" \l "fnt60" Dr. Tolentino
likewise stated in the 1990 edition of his commentaries on the Family Code that this "psychological
incapacity to comply with the essential marital obligations does not affect the consent to the
marriage." HYPERLINK "http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2006/mar2006/gr_155800_2006.html"
61
\l "fnt61"
There were initial criticisms of this original understanding of Article 36 as phrased by the Family
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Code committee. Tolentino opined that "psychologically incapacity to comply would not be
juridically different from physical incapacity of consummating the marriage, which makes the
marriage only voidable under Article 45 (5) of the Civil Code x x x [and thus] should have been a
cause for annulment of the marriage only." HYPERLINK "http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2006/
62
mar2006/gr_155800_2006.html" \l "fnt62" At the same time, Tolentino noted "[it] would be
different if it were psychological incapacity to understand the essential marital obligations, because
then this would amount to lack of consent to the marriage." HYPERLINK "http://www.lawphil.net/
63
judjuris/juri2006/mar2006/gr_155800_2006.html" \l "fnt63" These concerns though were
answered, beginning withSantos v. Court of Appeals, HYPERLINK "http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/
64
juri2006/mar2006/gr_155800_2006.html" \l "fnt64" wherein the Court, through Justice Vitug,
acknowledged that "psychological incapacity should refer to no less than a mental (not physical)
incapacity that causes a party to betruly incognitiveof the basic marital covenants that concomitantly
must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage." HYPERLINK "http://
65
The notion that psychological incapacity pertains to the inability to understand the obligations of
marriage, as opposed to a mere inability to comply with them, was further affirmed in theMolina
66
case. Therein, the Court, through then Justice (now Chief Justice) Panganiban observed that "[t]he
evidence [to establish psychological incapacity] must convince the court that the parties, or one of
them, was mentally or psychically ill to such extent that the person could not have known the
obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid assumption thereto."
67
Jurisprudence since then has recognized that psychological incapacity "is a malady so grave and
permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond
one is about to assume." HYPERLINK "http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2006/mar2006/
68
gr_155800_2006.html" \l "fnt68"
It might seem that this present understanding of psychological incapacity deviates from the literal
wording of Article 36, with its central phase reading "psychologically incapacitatedto comply
with the essential marital obligations of marriage." HYPERLINK "http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/

69
juri2006/mar2006/gr_155800_2006.html" \l "fnt69" At the same time, it has been consistently
recognized by this Court that the intent of the Family Code committee was to design the law as to
allow some resiliency in its application, by avoiding specific examples that would limit the
applicability of the provision under the principle ofejusdem generis.Rather, the preference of the
revision committee was for "the judge to interpret the provision ona case-to-case basis, guided by
experience, in the findings of experts and researchers in psychological disciplines, and by
decisions of church tribunals which, although not binding on
the civil courts,may be given persuasive effect since the provision was taken from Canon Law."
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70
We likewise observed in Republic v. Dagdag: HYPERLINK "http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/

71
juri2006/mar2006/gr_155800_2006.html" \l "fnt71"
Whether or not psychological incapacity exists in a given case calling for annulment of a marriage,
depends crucially, more than in any field of the law, on the facts of the case. Each case must be judged,
not on the basis of a priori assumptions, predilections or generalizations but according to its own facts.
In regard to psychological incapacity as a ground for annulment of marriage, it is trite to say that no
case is on "all fours" with another case. The trial judge must take pains in examining the factual milieu
and the appellate court must, as much as possible, avoid substituting its own judgment for that of the
trial court. HYPERLINK "http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2006/mar2006/gr_155800_2006.html"
72
\l "fnt72"
The Court thus acknowledges that the definition of psychological incapacity, as intended by the
revision committee, was not cast in intractable specifics. Judicial understanding of psychological
incapacity may be informed by evolving standards, taking into account the particulars of each case,
current trends in psychological and even canonical thought, and experience. It is under the auspices of
the deliberate ambiguity of the framers that the Court has developed theMolinarules, which have
been consistently applied since 1997.Molinahas proven indubitably useful in providing a unitary
framework that guides courts in adjudicating petitions for declaration of nullity under Article 36. At
the same time, theMolinaguidelines are not set in stone, the clear legislative intent mandating a case-
to-case perception of each situation, andMolinaitself arising from this evolutionary understanding of
Article 36. There is no cause to disavowMolinaat present, and indeed the disposition of this case
shall rely primarily on that precedent. There is need though to emphasize other perspectives as well
which should govern the disposition of petitions for declaration of nullity under Article 36.
Of particular notice has been the citation of the Court, first inSantosthen inMolina, of the considered
opinion of canon law experts in the interpretation of psychological incapacity. This is but unavoidable,
considering that the Family Code committee had bluntly acknowledged that the concept of
psychological incapacity was derived from canon law, HYPERLINK "http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/
73
juri2006/mar2006/gr_155800_2006.html" \l "fnt73" and as one member admitted, enacted as a
solution to the problem of marriages already annulled by the Catholic Church but still existent under
civil law. HYPERLINK "http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2006/mar2006/gr_155800_2006.html" \l
74
"fnt74" It would be disingenuous to disregard the influence of Catholic Church doctrine in the
formulation and subsequent understanding of Article 36, and the Court has expressly acknowledged
that interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the local Church, while
not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts. HYPERLINK "http://
75
www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2006/mar2006/gr_155800_2006.html" \l "fnt75" Still, it must be
emphasized that the Catholic Church is hardly the sole source of influence in the interpretation of
Article 36. Even though the concept may have been derived from canon law, its incorporation into the
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Family Code and subsequent judicial interpretation occurred in wholly secular progression. Indeed,
while Church thought on psychological incapacity is merely persuasive on the trial courts, judicial
decisions of this Court interpreting psychological incapacity are binding on lower courts.
76
Now is also opportune time to comment on another common legal guide utilized in the adjudication of
petitions for declaration of nullity under Article 36. All too frequently, this Court and lower courts, in
denying petitions of the kind, have favorably cited Sections 1 and 2, Article XV of the Constitution,
which respectively state that "[t]he State recognizes the Filipino family as the foundation of the nation.
Accordingly, it shall strengthen its solidarity and actively promote its total developmen[t]," and that
"[m]arriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the family and shall be protected
by the State." These provisions highlight the importance of the family and the constitutional protection
accorded to the institution of marriage.
But the Constitution itself does not establish the parameters of state protection to marriage as a social
institution and the foundation of the family. It remains the province of the legislature to define all legal
aspects of marriage and prescribe the strategy and the modalities to protect it, based on whatever
socio-political influences it deems proper, and subject of course to the qualification that such
legislative enactment itself adheres to the Constitution and the Bill of Rights. This being the case, it
also falls on the legislature to put into operation the constitutional provisions that protect marriage and
the family. This has been accomplished at present through the enactment of the Family Code, which
defines marriage and the family, spells out the corresponding legal effects, imposes the limitations that
affect married and family life, as well as prescribes the grounds for declaration of nullity and those for
legal separation. While it may appear that the judicial denial of a petition for declaration of nullity is
reflective of the constitutional mandate to protect marriage, such action in fact merely enforces a
statutory definition of marriage, not a constitutionally ordained decree of what marriage is. Indeed, if
circumstances warrant, Sections 1 and 2 of Article XV need not be the only constitutional
considerations to be taken into account in resolving a petition for declaration of nullity.
Indeed, Article 36 of the Family Code, in classifying marriages contracted by a psychologically

incapacitated person as a nullity, should be deemed as an implement of this constitutional protection
of marriage. Given the avowed State interest in promoting marriage as the foundation of the family,
which in turn serves as the foundation of the nation, there is a corresponding interest for the State to
defend against marriages ill-equipped to promote family life. Voidab initiomarriages under Article 36
do not further the initiatives of the State concerning marriage and family, as they promote wedlock
among persons who, for reasons independent of their will, are not capacitated to understand or comply
with the essential obligations of marriage.
These are the legal premises that inform us as we decide the present petition.
Molina Guidelines As Applied in This Case
As stated earlier,Molinaestablished the guidelines presently recognized in the judicial disposition of
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petitions for nullity under Article 36. The Court has consistently appliedMolinasince its promulgation
in 1997, and the guidelines therein operate as the general rules. They warrant citation in full:
1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should
be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and
nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of
marriage and unity of the family. Thus, our Constitution devotes an entire Article on the Family,
recognizing it "as the foundation of the nation." It decrees marriage as legally "inviolable," thereby
protecting it from dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the family and marriage are to be
"protected" by the state.
The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the family and emphasizes their
permanence, inviolability and solidarity.
2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: (a) medically or clinically identified, (b)
alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision.
Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must be psychologicalnot physical,
although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence must convince the court
that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or psychically ill to such an extent that the person could
not have known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid
assumption thereof. Although no example of such incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the
application of the provision under the principle ofejusdem generis, nevertheless such root cause must
be identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert evidence
may be given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.
3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration" of the marriage. The
evidence must show that the illness was existing when the parties exchanged their "I dos." The
manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must have
attached at such moment, or prior thereto.
4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Such
incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily
absolutely against everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the
assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not related to marriage, like the exercise
of a profession or employment in a job. Hence, a pediatrician may be effective in diagnosing illnesses
of children and prescribing medicine to cure them but not be psychologically capacitated to procreate,
bear and raise his/her own children as an essential obligation of marriage.
5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential
obligations of marriage. Thus, "mild characteriological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional
emotional outbursts" cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness must be shown as downright
incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In other words, there is a
natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the personality
structure that effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby complying with
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the obligations essential to marriage.
6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family
Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard
to parents and their children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the
petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the decision.
7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the
Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts. It is clear
that Article 36 was taken by the Family Code Revision Committee from Canon 1095 of the New Code
of Canon Law, which became effective in 1983 and which provides:
"The following are incapable of contracting marriage: Those who are unable to assume the essential
obligations of marriage due to causes of psychological nature."
Since the purpose of including such provision in our Family Code is to harmonize our civil laws with
the religious faith of our people, it stands to reason that to achieve such harmonization, great
persuasive weight should be given to decisions of such appellate tribunal. Ideallysubject to our law
on evidencewhat is decreed as canonically invalid should also be decreed civilly void.
77
Molinahad provided for an additional requirement that the Solicitor General issue a certification
stating his reasons for his agreement or opposition to the petition. HYPERLINK "http://
78
www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2006/mar2006/gr_155800_2006.html" \l "fnt78" This requirement
however was dispensed with following the implementation of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, or the Rule on
Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages.
79
Still, Article 48 of the Family Code mandates that the appearance of the prosecuting attorney or
fiscal assigned be on behalf of the State to take steps to prevent collusion between the parties and to
take care that evidence is not fabricated or suppressed. Obviously, collusion is not an issue in this
case, considering the consistent vigorous opposition of respondent to the petition for declaration of
nullity. In any event, the fiscals participation in the hearings before the trial court is extant from the
records of this case.
As earlier noted, the factual findings of the RTC are now deemed binding on this Court, owing to the
great weight accorded to the opinion of the primary trier of facts, and the refusal of the Court of
Appeals to dispute the veracity of these facts. As such, it must be considered that respondent had
consistently lied about many material aspects as to her character and personality. The question remains
whether her pattern of fabrication sufficiently establishes her psychological incapacity, consistent with
Article 36 and generally, theMolinaguidelines.
We find that the present case sufficiently satisfies the guidelines inMolina.
First. Petitioner had sufficiently overcome his burden in proving the psychological incapacity of his
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spouse. Apart from his own testimony, he presented witnesses who corroborated his allegations on his
wifes behavior, and certifications from Blackgold Records and the Philippine Village Hotel Pavillon
which disputed respondents claims pertinent to her alleged singing career. He also presented two (2)
expert witnesses from the field of psychology who testified that the aberrant behavior of respondent
was tantamount to psychological incapacity. In any event, both courts below considered petitioners
evidence as credible enough. Even the appellate court acknowledged that respondent was not totally
honest with petitioner. HYPERLINK "http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2006/mar2006/
80
gr_155800_2006.html" \l "fnt80"
As in all civil matters, the petitioner in an action for declaration of nullity under Article 36 must be
able to establish the cause of action with a preponderance of evidence. However, since the action
cannot be considered as a non-public matter between private parties, but is impressed with State
interest, the Family Code likewise requires the participation of the State, through the prosecuting
attorney, fiscal, or Solicitor General, to take steps to prevent collusion between the parties and to take
care that evidence is not fabricated or suppressed. Thus, even if the petitioner is able establish the
psychological incapacity of respondent with preponderant evidence, any finding of collusion among
the parties would necessarily negate such proofs.
Second. The root cause of respondents psychological incapacity has been medically or clinically
identified, alleged in the complaint, sufficiently proven by experts, and clearly explained in the trial
courts decision. The initiatory complaint alleged that respondent, from the start, had exhibited
unusual and abnormal behavior "of peren[n]ially telling lies, fabricating ridiculous stories, and
inventing personalities and situations," of writing letters to petitioner using fictitious names, and of
lying about her actual occupation, income, educational attainment, and family background, among
others. HYPERLINK "http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2006/mar2006/gr_155800_2006.html" \l
81
"fnt81"
These allegations, initially characterized in generalities, were further linked to medical or clinical
causes by expert witnesses from the field of psychology. Petitioner presented two (2) such witnesses in
particular. Dr. Abcede, a psychiatrist who had headed the department of psychiatry of at least two (2)
major hospitals, HYPERLINK "http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2006/mar2006/
82
gr_155800_2006.html" \l "fnt82" testified as follows:
WITNESS:
Given that as a fact, which is only based on the affidavit provided to me, I can say that there are a
couple of things that [are] terribly wrong with the standards. There are a couple of things that seems
(sic) to be repeated over and over again in the affidavit. One of which is the persistent, constant and
repeated lying of the "respondent"; which, I think, based on assessment of normal behavior of an
individual, is abnormal or pathological. x x x
ATTY. RAZ: (Back to the witness)
Q- Would you say then, Mr. witness, that because of these actuations of the respondent she is then
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incapable of performing the basic obligations of her marriage?
A- Well, persistent lying violates the respect that one owes towards another. The lack of concern, the
lack of love towards the person, and it is also something that endangers human relationship. You see,
relationship is based on communication between individuals and what we generally communicate are
our thoughts and feelings. But then when one talks and expresse[s] their feelings, [you] are expected
to tell the truth. And therefore, if you constantly lie, what do you think is going to happen as far as this
relationship is concerned. Therefore, it undermines that basic relationship that should be based on
love, trust and respect.
Q- Would you say then, Mr. witness, that due to the behavior of the respondent in constantly lying and
fabricating stories, she is then incapable of performing the basic obligations of the marriage?
xxx
ATTY. RAZ: (Back to the witness)
Q- Mr. witness, based on the testimony of Mr. Levy Mendoza, who is the third witness for the
petitioner, testified that the respondent has been calling up the petitioners officemates and ask him
(sic) on the activities of the petitioner and ask him on the behavior of the petitioner. And this is
specifically stated on page six (6) of the transcript of stenographic notes, what can you say about this,
Mr. witness?
A- If an individual is jealous enough to the point that he is paranoid, which means that there is no
actual basis on her suspect (sic) that her husband is having an affair with a woman, if carried on to the
extreme, then that is pathological. That is not abnormal. We all feel jealous, in the same way as we
also lie every now and then; but everything that is carried out in extreme is abnormal or pathological.
If there is no basis in reality to the fact that the husband is having an affair with another woman and if
she persistently believes that the husband is having an affair with different women, then that is
pathological and we call that paranoid jealousy.
Q- Now, if a person is in paranoid jealousy, would she be considered psychologically incapacitated to

perform the basic obligations of the marriage?
A- Yes, Maam. HYPERLINK "http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2006/mar2006/

83
gr_155800_2006.html" \l "fnt83"
The other witness, Dr. Lopez, was presented to establish not only the psychological incapacity of
respondent, but also the psychological capacity of petitioner. He concluded that respondent "is [a]
pathological liar, that [she continues] to lie [and] she loves to fabricate about herself." HYPERLINK
84
"http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2006/mar2006/gr_155800_2006.html" \l "fnt84"
These two witnesses based their conclusions of psychological incapacity on the case record,
particularly the trial transcripts of respondents testimony, as well as the supporting affidavits of
petitioner. While these witnesses did not personally examine respondent, the Court had already held
in Marcos v. Marcos HYPERLINK "http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2006/mar2006/
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85
gr_155800_2006.html" \l "fnt85" that personal examination of the subject by the physician is not
required for the spouse to be declared psychologically incapacitated. HYPERLINK "http://
86
www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2006/mar2006/gr_155800_2006.html" \l "fnt86" We deem the
methodology utilized by petitioners witnesses as sufficient basis for their medical conclusions.
Admittedly, Drs. Abcede and Lopezs common conclusion of respondents psychological incapacity
hinged heavily on their own acceptance of petitioners version as the true set of facts. However, since
the trial court itself accepted the veracity of petitioners factual premises, there is no cause to dispute
the conclusion of psychological incapacity drawn therefrom by petitioners expert witnesses.
Also, with the totality of the evidence presented as basis, the trial court explicated its finding of
psychological incapacity in its decision in this wise:
To the mind of the Court, all of the above are indications that respondent is psychologically
incapacitated to perform the essential obligations of marriage. It has been shown clearly from her
actuations that respondent has that propensity for telling lies about almost anything, be it her
occupation, her state of health, her singing abilities, her income, etc. She has this fantastic ability to
invent and fabricate stories and personalities. She practically lived in a world of make believe making
her therefore not in a position to give meaning and significance to her marriage to petitioner. In
persistently and constantly lying to petitioner, respondent undermined the basic tenets of relationship
between spouses that is based on love, trust and respect. As concluded by the psychiatrist presented by
petitioner, such repeated lying is abnormal and pathological and amounts to psychological incapacity.
87
Third.Respondents psychological incapacity was established to have clearly existed at the time of
and even before the celebration of marriage. She fabricated friends and made up letters from fictitious
characters well before she married petitioner. Likewise, she kept petitioner in the dark about her
natural childs real parentage as she only confessed when the latter had found out the truth after their
marriage.
Fourth. The gravity of respondents psychological incapacity is sufficient to prove her disability to
assume the essential obligations of marriage. It is immediately discernible that the parties had shared
only a little over a year of cohabitation before the exasperated petitioner left his wife. Whatever such
circumstance speaks of the degree of tolerance of petitioner, it likewise supports the belief that
respondents psychological incapacity, as borne by the record, was so grave in extent that any
prolonged marital life was dubitable.
It should be noted that the lies attributed to respondent were not adopted as false pretenses in order to
induce petitioner into marriage. More disturbingly, they indicate a failure on the part of respondent to
distinguish truth from fiction, or at least abide by the truth. Petitioners witnesses and the trial court
were emphatic on respondents inveterate proclivity to telling lies and the pathologic nature of her
mistruths, which according to them, were revelatory of respondents inability to understand and
perform the essential obligations of marriage. Indeed, a person unable to distinguish between fantasy
and reality would similarly be unable to comprehend the legal nature of the marital bond, much less its
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psychic meaning, and the corresponding obligations attached to marriage, including parenting. One
unable to adhere to reality cannot be expected to adhere as well to any legal or emotional
commitments.
The Court of Appeals somehow concluded that since respondent allegedly tried her best to effect a
reconciliation, she had amply exhibited her ability to perform her marital obligations. We are not
convinced. Given the nature of her psychological condition, her willingness to remain in the marriage
hardly banishes nay extenuates her lack of capacity to fulfill the essential marital obligations.
Respondents ability to even comprehend what the essential marital obligations are is impaired at best.
Considering that the evidence convincingly disputes respondents ability to adhere to the truth, her
avowals as to her commitment to the marriage cannot be accorded much credence.
At this point, it is worth considering Article 45(3) of the Family Code which states that a marriage
may be annulled if the consent of either party was obtained by fraud, and Article 46 which enumerates
the circumstances constituting fraud under the previous article, clarifies that "no other
misrepresentation or deceit as to character, health, rank, fortune or chastity shall constitute such fraud
as will give grounds for action for the annulment of marriage." It would be improper to draw linkages
between misrepresentations made by respondent and the misrepresentations under Articles 45 (3) and
46. The fraud under Article 45(3) vitiates the consent of the spouse who is lied to, and does not allude
to vitiated consent of the lying spouse. In this case, the misrepresentations of respondent point to her
own inadequacy to cope with her marital obligations, kindred to psychological incapacity under
Article 36.
Fifth. Respondent is evidently unable to comply with the essential marital obligations as embraced by
Articles 68 to 71 of the Family Code. Article 68, in particular, enjoins the spouses to live together,
observe mutual love, respect and fidelity, and render mutual help and support. As noted by the trial
court, it is difficult to see how an inveterate pathological liar would be able to commit to the basic
tenets of relationship between spouses based on love, trust and respect.
Sixth. The Court of Appeals clearly erred when it failed to take into consideration the fact that the
marriage of the parties was annulled by the Catholic Church. The appellate court apparently deemed
this detail totally inconsequential as no reference was made to it anywhere in the assailed decision
despite petitioners efforts to bring the matter to its attention. HYPERLINK "http://www.lawphil.net/
88
judjuris/juri2006/mar2006/gr_155800_2006.html" \l "fnt88" Such deliberate ignorance is in
contravention ofMolina, which held that interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial
Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given
great respect by our courts.
As noted earlier, the Metropolitan Tribunal of the Archdiocese of Manila decreed the invalidity of the
marriage in question in a Conclusion HYPERLINK "http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2006/
89
mar2006/gr_155800_2006.html" \l "fnt89" dated 30 March 1995, citing the "lack of due discretion"
on the part of respondent. HYPERLINK "http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2006/mar2006/
90
gr_155800_2006.html" \l "fnt90" Such decree of nullity was affirmed by both the National
Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal, HYPERLINK "http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2006/mar2006/
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91
gr_155800_2006.html" \l "fnt91" and the Roman Rota of the Vatican. HYPERLINK "http://
92
www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2006/mar2006/gr_155800_2006.html" \l "fnt92" In fact, respondents
psychological incapacity was considered so grave that a restrictive clause HYPERLINK "http://
93
www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2006/mar2006/gr_155800_2006.html" \l "fnt93" was appended to the
sentence of nullity prohibiting respondent from contracting another marriage without the Tribunals
consent.
In its Decision dated 4 June 1995, the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal pronounced:
The JURISRPRUDENCE in the Case maintains that matrimonial consent is considered ontologically
defective and wherefore judicially ineffective when elicited by a Part Contractant in possession and
employ of a discretionary judgment faculty with a perceptive vigor markedly inadequate for the
practical understanding of the conjugal Covenant or serious impaired from the correct appreciation of
the integral significance and implications of the marriage vows.
The FACTS in the Case sufficiently prove with the certitude required by law that based on the
depositions of the Partes in Causa and premised on the testimonies of the Common and Expert
Witnesse[s], the Respondent made the marriage option in tenure of adverse personality
constracts that were markedly antithetical to the substantive content and implications of the
Marriage Covenant, and that seriously undermined the integrality of her matrimonial consent
in terms of its deliberative component. In other words, afflicted with a discretionary faculty
impaired in its practico-concrete judgment formation on account of an adverse action and
reaction pattern, the Respondent was impaired from eliciting a judicially binding matrimonial
consent. There is no sufficient evidence in the Case however to prove as well the fact of grave lack of
due discretion on the part of the Petitioner. HYPERLINK "http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2006/
94
mar2006/gr_155800_2006.html" \l "fnt94"
Evidently, the conclusion of psychological incapacity was arrived at not only by the trial court, but
also by canonical bodies. Yet, we must clarify the proper import of the Church rulings annulling the
marriage in this case. They hold sway since they are drawn from a similar recognition, as the trial
court, of the veracity of petitioners allegations. Had the trial court instead appreciated respondents
version as correct, and the appellate court affirmed such conclusion, the rulings of the Catholic Church
on this matter would have diminished persuasive value. After all, it is the factual findings of the
judicial trier of facts, and not that of the canonical courts, that are accorded significant recognition by
this Court.
Seventh. The final point of contention is the requirement inMolinathat such psychological incapacity
be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. It was on this score that the Court of
Appeals reversed the judgment of the trial court, the appellate court noting that it did not appear
certain that respondents condition was incurable and that Dr. Abcede did not testify to such effect.
95
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Petitioner points out that one month after he and his wife initially separated, he returned to her,
desiring to make their marriage work. However, respondents aberrant behavior remained unchanged,
as she continued to lie, fabricate stories, and maintained her excessive jealousy. From this fact, he
draws the conclusion that respondents condition is incurable.
From the totality of the evidence, can it be definitively concluded that respondents condition is
incurable? It would seem, at least, that respondents psychosis is quite grave, and a cure thereof a
remarkable feat. Certainly, it would have been easier had petitioners expert witnesses characterized
respondents condition as incurable. Instead, they remained silent on whether the psychological
incapacity was curable or incurable.
But on careful examination, there was good reason for the experts taciturnity on this point.
The petitioners expert witnesses testified in 1994 and 1995, and the trial court rendered its decision
on 10 August 1995. These events transpired well beforeMolinawas promulgated in 1997 and made
explicit the requirement that the psychological incapacity must be shown to be medically or clinically
permanent or incurable. Such requirement was not expressly stated in Article 36 or any other
provision of the Family Code.
On the other hand, the Court inSantos, which was decided in January 1995, began its discussion by
first citing the deliberations of the Family Code committee, HYPERLINK "http://www.lawphil.net/
96
judjuris/juri2006/mar2006/gr_155800_2006.html" \l "fnt96" then the opinion of canonical scholars,
97
before arriving at its formulation of the doctrinal definition of psychological incapacity.
98
Santosdid refer to Justice Caguioas opinion expressed during the deliberations that "psychological
incapacity is incurable," HYPERLINK "http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2006/mar2006/
99
gr_155800_2006.html" \l "fnt99" and the view of a former presiding judge of the Metropolitan
Marriage Tribunal of the Archdiocese of Manila that psychological incapacity must be characterized
"by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability." HYPERLINK "http://www.lawphil.net/
100
judjuris/juri2006/mar2006/gr_155800_2006.html" \l "fnt100" However, in formulating the
doctrinal rule on psychological incapacity, the Court inSantosomitted any reference to incurability as
a characteristic of psychological incapacity. HYPERLINK "http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2006/
101
mar2006/gr_155800_2006.html" \l "fnt101"
This disquisition is material asSantoswas decided months before the trial court came out with its own
ruling that remained silent on whether respondents psychological incapacity was incurable.
Certainly, Santos did not clearly mandate that the incurability of the psychological incapacity be
established in an action for declaration of nullity. At least, there was no jurisprudential clarity at the
time of the trial of this case and the subsequent promulgation of the trial courts decision that required
a medical finding of incurability. Such requisite arose only withMolinain 1997, at a time when this
case was on appellate review, or after the reception of evidence.
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We are aware that in Pesca v. Pesca, HYPERLINK "http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2006/

102
mar2006/gr_155800_2006.html" \l "fnt102" the Court countered an argument
thatMolinaandSantosshould not apply retroactively
with the observation that the interpretation or construction placed by the courts of a law constitutes a
part of that law as of the date the statute in enacted. HYPERLINK "http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/
103
juri2006/mar2006/gr_155800_2006.html" \l "fnt103" Yet we approach this present case from
utterly practical considerations. The requirement that psychological incapacity must be shown to be
medically or clinically permanent or incurable is one that necessarily cannot be divined without expert
opinion. Clearly in this case, there was no categorical averment from the expert witnesses that
respondents psychological incapacity was curable or incurable simply because there was no legal
necessity yet to elicit such a declaration and the appropriate question was not accordingly propounded
to him. If we applyPescawithout deep reflection, there would be undue prejudice to those cases tried
before Molinaor Santos, especially those presently on appellate review, where presumably the
respective petitioners and their expert witnesses would not have seen the need to adduce a diagnosis of
incurability. It may hold in those cases, as in this case, that the psychological incapacity of a spouse is
actually incurable, even if not pronounced as such at the trial court level.
We stated earlier thatMolinais not set in stone, and that the interpretation of Article 36 relies heavily
on a case-to-case perception. It would be insensate to reason to mandate in this case an expert medical
or clinical diagnosis of incurability, since the parties would have had no impelling cause to present
evidence to that effect at the time this case was tried by the RTC more than ten (10) years ago. From
the totality of the evidence, we are sufficiently convinced that the incurability of respondents
psychological incapacity has been established by the petitioner. Any lingering doubts are further
dispelled by the fact that the Catholic Church tribunals, which indubitably consider incurability as an
integral requisite of psychological incapacity, were sufficiently convinced that respondent was so
incapacitated to contract marriage to the degree that annulment was warranted.
All told, we conclude that petitioner has established his cause of action for declaration of nullity under
Article 36 of the Family Code. The RTC correctly ruled, and the Court of Appeals erred in reversing
the trial court.
There is little relish in deciding this present petition, pronouncing as it does the marital bond as having
been inexistent in the first place. It is possible that respondent, despite her psychological state, remains
in love with petitioner, as exhibited by her persistent challenge to the petition for nullity. In fact, the
appellate court placed undue emphasis on respondents avowed commitment to remain in the
marriage. Yet the Court decides these cases on legal reasons and not vapid sentimentality. Marriage, in
legal contemplation, is more than the legitimatization of a desire of people in love to live together.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the RTC dated 10 August 1995, declaring
the marriage between petitioner and respondent NULL and VOID under Article 36 of the Family
Code, is REINSTATED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
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Kalaw vs Fernandez
DECISION

DELCASTILLO,J.:

A finding of psychological incapacity must be supported by well-established facts.It is the plaintiffs burden to
convince the court of the existence of these facts.

Before the Court is a Petition for Review HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2011/
[1]
september2011/166357.htm" \l "_ftn2" \o "" of the Court of Appeals (CA) May 27, 2004 Decision
[2]
HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2011/september2011/166357.htm" \l "_ftn3" \o "" and
December 15, 2004 Resolution HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2011/
[3]
september2011/166357.htm" \l "_ftn4" \o "" in CA-G.R. CV No. 64240, which reversed the trial courts
declaration of nullity of the herein parties marriage.Thefalloof the assailed Decision reads:

WHEREFOREthe appeal is GRANTED, and the assailed Decision
isSETASIDEandVACATEDwhile the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage is
herebyDISMISSED.

HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/
SO ORDERED.
2011/september2011/166357.htm" \l "_ftn5" \o "" [4]

Factual Antecedents

Petitioner Valerio E. Kalaw (Tyrone) and respondent Ma. Elena Fernandez (Malyn) met in 1973. They
maintained a relationship and eventually married in Hong Kong on November 4, 1976.They had four children,
Valerio (Rio), Maria Eva (Ria), Ramon Miguel (Miggy or Mickey), and Jaime Teodoro (Jay).
Shortly after the birth of their youngest son, Tyrone had an extramarital affair with Jocelyn Quejano (Jocelyn),
who gave birth to a son in March 1983. HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2011/
[5]

In May 1985, Malyn left the conjugal home (the house of her Kalaw in-laws) and her four children with Tyrone.
[6]
"" Meanwhile,
Tyrone started living with Jocelyn, who bore him three more children. HYPERLINK "http://
[7]

In 1990, Tyrone went to the United States (US) with Jocelyn and their children.He left his four children from his
marriage with Malyn in a rented house in Valle Verde with only a househelp and a driver. HYPERLINK "http://
[8]
sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2011/september2011/166357.htm" \l "_ftn9" \o "" The househelp would
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just call Malyn to take care of the children whenever any of them got sick.Also, in accordance with their custody
agreement, the children stayed with Malyn on weekends. HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/
[9]
jurisprudence/2011/september2011/166357.htm" \l "_ftn10" \o ""

In 1994, the two elder children, Rio and Ria, asked for Malyns permission to go to Japan for a one-week
vacation.Malyn acceded only to learn later that Tyrone brought the children to the US. HYPERLINK "http://
[10]
sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2011/september2011/166357.htm" \l "_ftn11" \o "" After just one year, Ria
returned to the Philippines and chose to live with Malyn.
Meanwhile, TyroneandJocelyns family returnedto the Philippines and resumed physical custody of the two
younger children, Miggy and Jay.According to Malyn, from that time on, the children refused to go to her house
on weekends because of alleged weekend plans with their father. HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/
[11]

Complaint for declaration of nullity of marriage

On July 6, 1994, nine years since thede factoseparation from his wife, Tyrone filed a petition for declaration of
nullity of marriage based on Article 36 of the Family Code. HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/
[12]
jurisprudence/2011/september2011/166357.htm" \l "_ftn13" \o "" He alleged that Malyn was
psychologically incapacitated to perform and comply with the essential marital obligations at the time of the
celebration of their marriage.H e further claimed that her psychological incapacity was manifested by her
immaturity and irresponsibility towards Tyrone and their children during their co-habitation, as shown by Malyns
following acts:

1.she left the children without proper care and attention as she played mahjong all
day and all night;

2.she left the house to party with male friends and returned in the early hours of the
following day; and

3.she committed adultery on June 9, 1985, which act Tyrone discoveredin flagrante
delicto. HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2011/
[13]

During trial, HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2011/september2011/166357.htm" \l
[14]
"_ftn15" \o "" T
yrone narrated the circumstances of Malyns alleged infidelity.According to him, on June 9,
1985, he and his brother-in-law, Ronald Fernandez (Malyns brother), proceeded to Hyatt Hotel and learned that
Malyn was occupying a room with a certain Benjie Guevarra (Benjie).When he proceeded to the said room, he
saw Benjie and Malyn inside. HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2011/
[15]
september2011/166357.htm" \l "_ftn16" \o "" At rebuttal, Tyrone elaborated that Benjie was wearing only a
towel around his waist, while Malyn was lying in bed in her underwear.After an exchange of words, he agreed
not to charge Malyn with adultery when the latter agreed to relinquish all her marital and parental rights.
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[16]
"" They put their agreement in writing before Atty. Jose Palarca.

Tyrone presented a psychologist, Dr. Cristina Gates (Dr. Gates), and a Catholic canon law expert, Fr. Gerard
Healy, S.J. (Fr. Healy), to testify on Malyns psychological incapacity.

Dr. Gates explained on the stand that the factual allegations regarding Malyns behavior her sexual infidelity,
habitual mahjong playing, and her frequent nights-out with friends may reflect a narcissistic personality disorder
(NPD). HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2011/september2011/166357.htm" \l "_ftn18" \o
[17]
"" NPD is present when a person isobsessedto meet her wants and needs in utter disregard of her significant
others. HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2011/september2011/166357.htm" \l "_ftn19" \o
[18]
"" Malyns NPD is manifest in her utter neglect of her duties as a mother. HYPERLINK "http://
[19]

Dr. Gates reported that Malyns personality disorder may have been evident even prior to her marriage because it
is rooted in her family background and upbringing, which the psychologist gathered to be materially deprived
and without a proper maternal role model. HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2011/
[20]

Dr. Gates based her diagnosis on the facts revealed by her interviews with Tyrone, Trinidad Kalaw (Tyrones
sister-in-law), and the son Miggy.She also read the transcript of Tyrones court testimony. HYPERLINK "http://
[21]

Fr. Healy corroborated Dr. Gates assessment.He concluded that Malyn was psychologically incapacitated to
perform her marital duties. HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2011/
[22]
september2011/166357.htm" \l "_ftn23" \o "" He explained that her psychological incapacity is rooted in her
role as the breadwinner of her family. This role allegedly inflated Malyns ego to the point that her needs became
priority, while her kids and husbands needs became secondary.Malyn is so self-absorbed that she is incapable of
prioritizing her familys needs.

Fr. Healy clarified that playing mahjong and spending time with friends are not disorders by themselves. They
only constitute psychological incapacity whenever inordinate amounts of time are spent on these activities to the
detriment of ones familial duties. HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2011/
[23]
september2011/166357.htm" \l "_ftn24" \o "" Fr. Healy characterized Malyns psychological incapacity as
grave and incurable. HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2011/september2011/166357.htm"
[24]
\l "_ftn25" \o ""

He based his opinion on his interview with Tyrone, the trial transcripts, as well as the report of Dr. Natividad
Dayan (Dr. Dayan), Malyns expert witness. HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2011/
[25]
september2011/166357.htm" \l "_ftn26" \o "" He clarified that he did not verify the truthfulness of the
factual allegations regarding Malyns habits because he believed it is the courts duty to do so. HYPERLINK
[26]
"http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2011/september2011/166357.htm" \l "_ftn27" \o "" Instead, he
formed his opinion on the assumption that the factual allegations are indeed true.
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Malyns version

Malyn denied being psychologically incapacitated. HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2011/
[27]
september2011/166357.htm" \l "_ftn28" \o "" While she admitted playing mahjong, she denied playing as
frequently as Tyrone alleged. She maintained that she did so only two to three times a week and always between
1 p.m. to 6 p.m. only. HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2011/september2011/166357.htm"
[28]
\l "_ftn29" \o "" And in those instances, she always had Tyrones permission and would often bring the
children and their respective yayaswith her. HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2011/
[29]
september2011/166357.htm" \l "_ftn30" \o "" She maintained that she did not neglect her duties as mother
and wife.

Malyn admitted leaving the conjugal home in May 1985.She, however, explained that she did so only to escape
her physically abusive husband. HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2011/
[30]
september2011/166357.htm" \l "_ftn31" \o "" On the day she left, Tyrone, who preferred to keep Malyn a
housewife, was upset that Malyn was preparing to go to work. He called up the security guards and instructed
them not to let Malyn out of the house.Tyrone then placed cigarette ashes on Malyns head and proceeded to lock
the bedroom doors.Fearing another beating, Malyn rushedout of their bedroom and into her mother-in-laws
room.She blurted that Tyrone would beat her up again so her mother-in-law gave herP300 to leave the house.
[31]
"" She never returned to their conjugal home.

Malyn explained that she applied for work, against Tyrones wishes, because she wanted to be self-sufficient.Her
resolve came from her discovery that Tyrone had a son by Jocelyn and had secretly gone to the US with Jocelyn.
[32]
HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2011/september2011/166357.htm" \l "_ftn33" \o ""

Malyn denied the allegation of adultery. She maintained that Benjie only booked a room at the Hyatt Hotel for
her because she was so drunk after partying with friends.She admitted finding her brother Ronald and Tyrone at
the door of the Hyatt Hotel room, but maintained being fully clothed at that time. HYPERLINK "http://
[33]
sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2011/september2011/166357.htm" \l "_ftn34" \o "" Malyn insisted that she
wrote the letter relinquishing all her spousal and parental rights under duress. HYPERLINK "http://
[34]

After the Hyatt Hotel incident, Malyn only saw her children by surreptitiously visiting them in school.She later
obtained partial custody of the children as an incident to the legal separation action filed by Tyrone against her
(which action was subsequently dismissed for lack of interest).

As an affirmative defense, Malyn maintained that it was Tyrone who was suffering from psychological
incapacity, as manifested by his drug dependence, habitual drinking, womanizing, and physical violence.
[35]
"" Malyn presented Dr. Dayan a clinical psychologist, as her expert witness.

Dr. Dayan interviewed Tyrone, Malyn, Miggy/Mickey, Jay, and Ria for her psychological evaluation of the
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spouses. The factual narrations culled from these interviews reveal that Tyrone found Malyn a lousy mother
because of her mahjong habit, HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2011/
[36]
september2011/166357.htm" \l "_ftn37" \o "" while Malyn was fed up with Tyrones sexual infidelity, drug
habit, and physical abuse. HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2011/
[37]
september2011/166357.htm" \l "_ftn38" \o "" Dr. Dayan determined that both Tyrone and Malyn were
behaviorally immature. They encountered problems because of their personality differences, which ultimately
led to the demise of their marriage.Her diagnostic impressions are summarized below:

The marriage of Tyrone and Malyn was a mistake from the very beginning.Both of them
were not truly ready for marriage even after two years of living together and having a
child.When Malyn first met Tyrone who showered her with gifts, flowers, and affection she
resisted his overtures.She made it clear that she could take him or leave him.But the minute
she started to care, she became a different person clingy and immature, doubting his love,
constantly demanding reassurance that she was the most important person in his
life.Shebecame relationship-dependent.It appears that her style then was when she begins to
care for a man, she puts all her energy into him and loses focus on herself.This imbalance
between thinking and feeling was overwhelming to Tyrone who admitted that the thought of
commitment scared him.Tyrone admitted that when he was in his younger years, he was
often out seeking other women.His interest in them was not necessarily for sex, just for fun
dancing, drinking, or simply flirting.

Both of them seem behaviorally immature.For some time, Malyn adapted to her husband
who was a moody man with short temper and unresolved issues with parents and siblings.He
was a distancer, concerned more about his work and friends tha[n] he was about spending
time with his family.Because of Malyns and Tyrones backgrounds (both came from families
with high conflicts) they experienced turmoil and chaos in their marriage.The conflicts they
had struggled to avoid suddenly galloped out of controlTheir individual personalities broke
through, precipitating the demise of their marriage. HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/
[38]

Dr. Dayan likewise wrote in her psychological evaluation report that Malyn
exhibitedsignificant,butnotsevere,dependency,narcissism,and
compulsiveness. HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2011/september2011/166357.htm" \l
[39]
"_ftn40" \o ""

On the stand, the psychologist elaborated that while Malyn had relationship problems with Tyrone, she appeared
to have a good relationship with her kids. HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2011/
[40]
september2011/166357.htm" \l "_ftn41" \o "" As for Tyrone, he has commitment issues which prevent him
from committing himself to his duties as a husband. H e is unable to remain faithful to Malyn and is
psychologically incapacitated to perform this duty. HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2011/
[41]

Childrens version
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The children all stated that both their parents took care of them, provided for their needs, and loved them.Rio
testified that they would accompany their mother to White Plains on days that she played mahjong with her
friends.None of them reported being neglected or feeling abandoned.

The two elder kids remembered the fights between their parents but it was only Ria who admitted actually
witnessing physical abuse inflicted on her mother. HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2011/
[42]
september2011/166357.htm" \l "_ftn43" \o "" The two elder kids also recalled that, after the separation, their
mother would visit them only in school. HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2011/
[43]

The children recalled living in Valle Verde with only the househelp and driver during the time that their dad was
abroad. HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2011/september2011/166357.htm" \l "_ftn45" \o
[44]
"" While they did not live with their mother while they were housed in Valle Verde, the kids were in
agreement that their mother took care of them on weekends and would see to their needs.They had a common
recollection that the househelp would call their mother to come and take care of them in Valle Verde whenever
any of them was sick. HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2011/september2011/166357.htm"
[45]
\l "_ftn46" \o ""
Other witnesses

Dr. Cornelio Banaag, Tyrones attending psychiatrist at the Manila Sanitarium, testified that, for the duration of
Tyrones confinement, the couple appeared happy and the wife was commendable for the support she gave to her
spouse. HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2011/september2011/166357.htm" \l "_ftn47" \o
[46]
"" He likewise testified that Tyrone tested negative for drugs and was not a drug dependent. HYPERLINK
[47]

Malyns brother, Ronald Fernandez, confirmed Tyrones allegation that they found Malyn with Benjie in the Hyatt
hotel room.Contrary to Tyrones version, he testified that neither he nor Tyrone entered the room, but stayed in
the hallway. He likewise did not recall seeing Benjie or Malyn half-naked. HYPERLINK "http://
[48]

Tyrone then presented Mario Calma (Mario), who was allegedly part of Malyns group of friends.He stated on
the stand that they would go on nights-out as a group and Malyn would meet with a male musician-friend
afterwards. HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2011/september2011/166357.htm" \l
[49]
"_ftn50" \o ""

Social worker

The trial court ordered the court social worker, Jocelyn V. Arre (Arre), to conduct a social case study on the
parties as well as the minor children.Arre interviewed the parties Tyrone and Malyn; the minor childrenMiggy/
Mickey and Jay; Tyrones live-in partner, Jocelyn; HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2011/
[50]
september2011/166357.htm" \l "_ftn51" \o "" and Tyrone and Malyns only daughter, Ria.While both
parents are financially stable and have positive relationships with their children, she recommended that the
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custody of the minor children be awarded to Malyn.Based on the interviews of family members themselves,
Malyn was shown to be more available to the children and to exercise better supervision and care.The social
worker commended the fact that even after Malyn left the conjugal home in 1985, she made efforts to visit her
children clandestinely in their respective schools.And while she was only granted weekend custody of the
children, it appeared that she made efforts to personally attend to their needs and to devote time with them.
[51]
On the contrary, Tyrone, who had custody of the children since the couplesde factoseparation, simply left the
children for several years with only a maid and a driver to care for them while he lived with his second family
abroad. HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2011/september2011/166357.htm" \l "_ftn53" \o
[52]
"" The social worker found that Tyrone tended to prioritize his second family to the detriment of his children
with Malyn.Given this history during the formative years of the children, the social worker did not find Tyrone a
reliable parent to whom custody of adolescents may be awarded.

Ruling of the Regional Trial Court HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2011/
[53]

After summarizing the evidence presented by both parties, the trial court concluded that both parties are
psychologically incapacitated to perform the essential marital obligations under the Family Code.The courts
Decision is encapsulated in this paragraph:

From the evidence, it appears that parties are both suffering from psychological incapacity to
perform their essential marital obligations under Article 36 of the Family Code.The parties
entered into a marriage without as much as understanding what it entails.They failed to
commit themselves to its essential obligations:the conjugal act, the community of life and
love, the rendering of mutual help, the procreation and education of their children to become
responsible individuals.Parties psychological incapacity is grave, and serious such that both
are incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required in marriage.The incapacity has been
clinically established and was found to be pervasive, grave and incurable. HYPERLINK
"http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2011/september2011/166357.htm" \l "_ftn55" \o
[54]
""
The trial court then declared the parties marriage voidab initiopursuant to Article 36 of the Family Code.
[55]

Ruling of the Court of Appeals HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2011/
[56]

Malyn appealed the trial courts Decision to the CA.The CA reversed the trial courts ruling because it is not
supported by the facts on record.Both parties allegations and incriminations against each other do not support a
finding of psychological incapacity.The parties faults tend only to picture their immaturity and irresponsibility in
performing their marital and familial obligations.At most, there may be sufficient grounds for a legal separation.
[57]
"" M oreover, the psychological report submitted by petitioners expert witness, Dr. Gates, does not explain
how the diagnosis of NPD came to be drawn from the sources.It failed to satisfy the legal and jurisprudential
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requirements for the declaration of nullity of marriage. HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/

[58]
2011/september2011/166357.htm" \l "_ftn59" \o ""

Tyrone filed a motion for reconsideration HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2011/
[59]
september2011/166357.htm" \l "_ftn60" \o "" but the same was denied on December 15, 2004.
[60]

Petitioners arguments

Petitioner Tyrone argues that the CA erred in disregarding the factual findings of the trial court, which is the court
that is in the best position to appreciate the evidence.He opines that he has presented preponderant evidence to
prove that respondent is psychologically incapacitated to perform her essential marital obligations, to wit:

a) the expert witnesses, Dr. Gates and Fr. Healy, proved on the stand that respondents
egocentric attitude, immaturity, self-obsession and self-centeredness were manifestations of respondents
NPD; HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2011/september2011/166357.htm" \l
[61]
"_ftn62" \o ""

b)these expert witnesses proved that respondents NPD is grave and incurable and prevents
her from performing her essential martial obligations; HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/
[62]
jurisprudence/2011/september2011/166357.htm" \l "_ftn63" \o "" and

c)that respondents NPD existed at the time of the celebration of the marriage because it is
rooted in her upbringing, family background, and socialite lifestyle prior to her marriage. HYPERLINK
[63]

Petitioner stresses that even respondent insisted that their marriage is void because of psychological incapacity,
albeit on petitioners part. HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2011/
[64]

Respondents arguments

Respondent maintains that Tyrone failed to discharge his burden of proving her alleged psychological incapacity.
[65]
"" She argues that the testimonies of her children and the findings of the court social worker to the effect that
she was a good, loving, and attentive mother are sufficient to rebut Tyrones allegation that she was negligent and
irresponsible. HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2011/september2011/166357.htm" \l
[66]
"_ftn67" \o ""

She assails Dr. Gatess report as one-sided and lacking in depth. Dr. Gates did not interview her, their common
children, or even Jocelyn. Moreover, her report failed to state that Malyns alleged psychological incapacity was
grave and incurable. HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2011/september2011/166357.htm"
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[67]
\l "_ftn68" \o "" Fr. Healys testimony, on the other hand, was based only on Tyrones version of the facts.
[68]

Malyn reiterates the appellate courts ruling that the trial court Decision is intrinsically defective for failing to
support its conclusion of psychological incapacity with factual findings.

Almost four years after filing her memorandum, respondent apparently had a change of heart and filed a
Manifestation with Motion for Leave to Withdraw Comment and Memorandum. HYPERLINK "http://
[69]
sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2011/september2011/166357.htm" \l "_ftn70" \o "" She manifested that she
was no longer disputing the possibility that their marriage may really be void on the basis of Tyrones
psychological incapacity.She then asked the Court to dispose of the case with justice. HYPERLINK "http://
[70]
sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2011/september2011/166357.htm" \l "_ftn71" \o "" Her manifestation and
motion were noted by the Court in its January 20, 2010 Resolution. HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/
[71]

Issue

Whether petitioner has sufficiently proved that respondent suffers from psychological incapacity

Our Ruling

The petition has no merit.The CA committed no reversible error in setting aside the trial courts Decision for lack
of legal and factual basis.

A petition for declaration of nullity of marriage is governed by Article 36 of the Family Code which provides:
ART. 36.A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage,
shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.

Psychological incapacity is the downright incapacity or inability to take cognizance of and to assume the basic
marital obligations. HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2011/september2011/166357.htm" \l
[72]
"_ftn73" \o "" The burden of proving psychological incapacity is on the plaintiff. HYPERLINK "http://
[73]
sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2011/september2011/166357.htm" \l "_ftn74" \o "" The plaintiff must
prove that the incapacitated party, based on his or her actions or behavior, suffers a serious psychological disorder
that completely disables him or her from understanding and discharging the essential obligations of the marital
state. The psychological problem must be grave, must have existed at the time of marriage, and must be
incurable. HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2011/september2011/166357.htm" \l "_ftn75"
[74]
\o ""

In the case at bar, petitioner failed to prove that his wife (respondent) suffers from psychological incapacity. He
presented the testimonies of two supposed expert witnesses who concluded that respondent is psychologically
incapacitated, but the conclusions of these witnesses were premised on the alleged acts or behavior of respondent
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which had not been sufficiently proven.Petitioners experts heavily relied on petitioners allegations of respondents
constant mahjong sessions, visits to the beauty parlor, going out with friends, adultery, and neglect of their
children. Petitioners experts opined that respondents alleged habits, when performed constantly to the detriment
of quality and quantity of time devoted to her duties as mother and wife, constitute a psychological incapacity in
the form of NPD.

But petitioners allegations, which served as the bases or underlying premises of the conclusions of his
experts, were not actually proven.In fact, respondent presented contrary evidence refuting these allegations of
the petitioner.

For instance, petitioner alleged that respondent constantly played mahjong and neglected their children as a
result.Respondent admittedly played mahjong, but it was not proven that she engaged in mahjong so frequently
that sheneglectedher duties as a mother and a wife.Respondent refuted petitioners allegations that she played
four to five times a week.She maintained it was only two to three times a week and always with the permission
of her husband and without abandoning her children at home.The children corroborated this, saying that they
were with their mother when she played mahjong in their relatives home.Petitioner did not present any proof,
other than his own testimony, that the mahjong sessions were so frequent that respondent neglected her
family.While he intimated that two of his sons repeated the second grade, he was not able to link this episode to
respondents mahjong-playing.The least that could have been done was to prove the frequency of respondents
mahjong-playing during the years when these two children were in second grade.This was not done.Thus, while
there is no dispute that respondent played mahjong, its alleged debilitating frequency and adverse effect on the
children were not proven.
Also unproven was petitioners claim about respondents alleged constant visits to the beauty parlor, going out
with friends, and obsessive need for attention from other men.No proof whatsoever was presented to prove her
visits to beauty salons or her frequent partying with friends.Petitioner presented Mario (an alleged companion of
respondent during these nights-out) in order to prove that respondent had affairs with other men, but Mario only
testified that respondentappearedto be dating other men.Even assumingarguendothat petitioner was able to
prove that respondent had an extramarital affair with another man, that one instance of sexual infidelity cannot,
by itself, be equated with obsessive need for attention from other men.Sexual infidelityper seis a ground for
legal separation, but it does not necessarily constitute psychological incapacity.
Given the insufficiency of evidence that respondent actually engaged in the behaviors described as constitutive of
NPD, there is no basis for concluding that she was indeed psychologically incapacitated.Indeed, the totality of
the evidence points to the opposite conclusion.A fair assessment of the facts would show that respondent was
not totally remiss and incapable of appreciating and performing her marital and parental duties.Not once did the
children state that they were neglected by their mother.On the contrary, they narrated that she took care of them,
was around when they were sick, and cooked the food they like.It appears that respondent made real efforts to
see and take care of her children despite her estrangement from their father.There was no testimony whatsoever
that shows abandonment and neglect of familial duties.While petitioner cites the fact that his two sons, Rio and
Miggy, both failed the second elementary level despite having tutors, there is nothing to link their academic
shortcomings to Malyns actions.

After poring over the records of the case, the Court finds no factual basis for the conclusion of psychological
incapacity. There is no error in the CAs reversal of the trial courts ruling that there was psychological incapacity.
The trial courts Decision merely summarized the allegations, testimonies, and evidence of the respective parties,
but it did not actually assess the veracity of these allegations, the credibility of the witnesses, and the weight of
the evidence.The trial court did not make factual findings which can serve as bases for its legal conclusion of
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psychological incapacity.

What transpired between the parties is acrimony and, perhaps, infidelity, which may have constrained
them from dedicating the best of themselves to each other and to their children. There may be grounds for legal
separation, but certainly not psychological incapacity that voids a marriage.

WHEREFORE,premises considered, the petition isDENIED.The Court of Appeals May 27, 2004 Decision
and its December 15, 2004 Resolution in CA-G.R. CV No. 64240 areAFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.
18. Azcueta vs Republic and CA

DECISION

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,J.:

Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing
the Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 86162 dated August 31, 2007,
HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2009/may2009/180668.htm" \l "_ftn1" \o
[1]
"" and its Resolution dated November 20, 2007. HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/
[2]
jurisprudence/2009/may2009/180668.htm" \l "_ftn2" \o ""

Petitioner Marietta C. Azcueta and Rodolfo Azcueta met in 1993.Less than two months after
their first meeting, they got married on July 24, 1993 at St. Anthony
ofPaduaChurch,AntipoloCity.At the time of their marriage, petitioner was 23 years old while
respondent was 28. They separated in 1997 after four years of marriage.They have no children.

On March 2, 2002, petitioner filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) ofAntipoloCity,
Branch 72, a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the Family
Code, docketed as Civil Case No. 02-6428.

Meanwhile, respondent failed to appear and file an answer despite service of summons upon
him.Because of this, the trial court directed the City Prosecutor to conduct an investigation whether
there was collusion between the parties.In a report dated August 16, 2002, Prosecutor Wilfredo G.
Oca found that there was no collusion between the parties.

On August 21, 2002, the Office of the Solicitor General entered its appearance for the
Republic of the Philippines and submitted a written authority for the City Prosecutor to appear in the
case on the States behalf under the supervision and control of the Solicitor General.

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In her petition and during her testimony, petitioner claimed that her husband Rodolfo was
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations of marriage. According to
petitioner, Rodolfo was emotionally immature, irresponsible and continually failed to adapt himself to
married life and perform the essential responsibilities and duties of a husband.

Petitioner complained that Rodolfo never bothered to look for a job and instead always asked
his mother for financial assistance.When they were married it was Rodolfos mother who found them a
room near the Azcueta home and it was also his mother who paid the monthly rental.

Petitioner also testified that she constantly encouraged her husband to find employment.She
even bought him a newspaper every Sunday but Rodolfo told her that he was too old and most jobs
have an age limit and that he had no clothes to wear to job interviews.To inspire him, petitioner
bought him new clothes and a pair of shoes and even gave him money. Sometime later, her husband
told petitioner that he already found a job and petitioner was overjoyed.However, some weeks after,
petitioner was informed that her husband had been seen at the house of his parents when he was
supposed to be at work.Petitioner discovered that her husband didnt actually get a job and the money
he gave her (which was supposedly his salary) came from his mother.When she confronted him about
the matter, Rodolfo allegedly cried like a child and told her that he pretended to have a job so that
petitioner would stop nagging him about applying for a job.He also told her that his parents can
support their needs.Petitioner claimed that Rodolfo was so dependent on his mother and that all his
decisions and attitudes in life should be in conformity with those of his mother.

Apart from the foregoing, petitioner complained that every time Rodolfo would get drunk he
became physically violent towards her.Their sexual relationship was also unsatisfactory.They only
had sex once a month and petitioner never enjoyed it.When they discussed this problem, Rodolfo
would always say that sex was sacred and it should not be enjoyed nor abused.He did not even want
to have a child yet because he claimed he was not ready.Additionally, when petitioner requested that
they move to another place and rent a small room rather than live near his parents, Rodolfo did not
agree.Because of this, she was forced to leave their residence and see if he will follow her.But he did
not.

During the trial of the case, petitioner presented Rodolfos first cousin, Florida de Ramos, as a
witness. In 1993, Ramos, the niece of Rodolfos father, was living with Rodolfos family. She
corroborated petitioners testimony that Rodolfo was indeed not gainfully employed when he married
petitioner and he merely relied on the allowance given by his mother.This witness also confirmed that
it was respondents mother who was paying the rentals for the room where the couple lived.She also
testified that at one time, she saw respondent going to his mothers house in business attire.She learned
later that Rodolfo told petitioner that he has a job but in truth he had none.She also stated that
respondent was still residing at the house of his mother and not living together with petitioner.

Petitioner likewise presented Dr. Cecilia Villegas, a psychiatrist.Dr. Villegas testified that
after examining petitioner for her psychological evaluation, she found petitioner to be mature,
independent, very responsible, focused and has direction and ambition in life.She also observed that
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petitioner works hard for what she wanted and therefore, she was not psychologically incapacitated to
perform the duties and responsibilities of marriage.Dr. Villegas added that based on the information
gathered from petitioner, she found that Rodolfo showed that he was psychologically incapacitated to
perform his marital duties and responsibilities.Dr. Villegas concluded that he was suffering from
Dependent Personality Disorder associated with severe inadequacy related to masculine strivings.

She explained that persons suffering from Dependent Personality Disorder were those whose
response to ordinary way of life was ineffectual and inept, characterized by loss of self-confidence,
constant self-doubt, inability to make his own decisions and dependency on other people.She added
that the root cause of this psychological problem was a cross-identification with the mother who was
the dominant figure in the family considering that respondents father was a seaman and always out of
the house.She stated that this problem began during the early stages in his life but manifested only
after the celebration of his marriage.According to Dr. Villegas, this kind of problem was also severe
because he will not be able to make and to carry on the responsibilities expected of a married
person.It was incurable because it started in early development and therefore deeply ingrained into his
personality.

Based on petitioners evidence, the RTC rendered a Decision dated October 25, 2004,
declaring the marriage between petitioner and Rodolfo as null andvoid ab initio, thus:

With the preponderant evidence presented by the petitioner, the court finds
that respondent totally failed in his commitments and obligations as a
husband.Respondents emotional immaturity and irresponsibility is grave and he has
no showing of improvement.He failed likewise to have sexual intercourse with the
wife because it is a result of the unconscious guilt felling of having sexual
relationship since he could not distinguish between the mother and the wife and
therefore sex relationship will not be satisfactory as expected.

The respondent is suffering from dependent personality disorder and
therefore cannot make his own decision and cannot carry on his responsibilities as a
husband. The marital obligations to live together, observe mutual love, respect,
support was not fulfilled by the respondent.

Considering the totality of evidence of the petitioner clearly show that
respondent failed to comply with his marital obligations.

Thus the marriage between petitioner and respondent should be declared null
and void on the account of respondents severe and incurable psychological
incapacity.

xxxxxxxxx

Wherefore premises considered, the marriage between Marietta Azcueta and
Rodolfo B. Azcuata is hereby declared null and void abinitio pursuant to Article 36
fo the Family Code.
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The National Statistics Office and the Local Civil Registrar of Antipolo City
are ordered to make proper entries into the records of the parties pursuant to
judgment of the court.

Let copies of this decision be furnished the Public Prosecutor and the
Solicitor General.

[3]
2009/may2009/180668.htm" \l "_ftn3" \o ""

On July 19, 2005, the RTC rendered an Amended Decision HYPERLINK "http://
[4]
sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2009/may2009/180668.htm" \l "_ftn4" \o "" to correct the first
name of Rodolfo which was erroneously typewritten as Gerardo in the caption of the original
Decision.

The Solicitor General appealed the RTC Decision objecting that (a) the psychiatric report of
Dr. Villegas was based solely on the information provided by petitioner and was not based on an
examination of Rodolfo; and (b) there was no showing that the alleged psychological defects were
present at the inception of marriage or that such defects were grave, permanent and incurable.
Resolving the appeal, the CA reversed the RTC and essentially ruled that petitioner failed to
sufficiently prove the psychological incapacity of Rodolfo or that his alleged psychological disorder
existed prior to the marriage and was grave and incurable.In setting aside the factual findings of the
RTC, the CA reasoned that:

The evidence on record failed to demonstrate that respondents alleged
irresponsibility and over-dependence on his mother is symptomatic of
psychological incapacity as above explained.

xxxxxxxxx

Also worthy of note is petitioner-appellees failure to prove that
respondents supposed psychological malady existed even before the
marriage.Records however show that the parties were living in harmony in the
first few years of their marriage and were living on their own in a rented
apartment.That respondent often times asks his mother for financial supportmay
be brought about by his feeling of embarrassment that he cannot contribute at
all to the family coffers, considering that it was his wife who is working for the
family.Petitioner-appellee likewise statedthat respondent does not like to have a
child on the pretense that respondent is not yet ready to have one.However this
is not at all a manifestation of irresponsibility.On the contrary, respondent has
shown that he has a full grasp of reality and completely understands the
implication of having a child especially that he is unemployed.The only problem
besetting the union is respondents alleged irresponsibility and unwillingness to
leave her(sic)mother, which was not proven in this case to be psychological-
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rooted.

The behavior displayed by respondent was caused only by his youth and
emotional immaturity which by themselves, do not constitute psychological
incapacity(Deldel vs. Court of Appeals, 421 SCRA 461, 466 [2004]).At all events,
petitioner-appellee has utterly failed, both in her allegations in the complaint and in
her evidence, to make out a case of psychological incapacity on the part of
respondent, let alone at the time of solemnization of the contract, so immaturity and
irresponsibility, invoked by her, cannot be equated with psychological incapacity
(Pesca vs. Pesca, 356 SCRA 588, 594 [2001]).As held by the Supreme Court:

Psychological incapacity must be more than just a
difficulty, refusal or neglect in the performance of some marital
obligations, it is essential that they must be shown to be incapable
of doing so, due to some psychological illness existing at the time of
the celebration of the marriage. (Navarro, Jr. vs. Cecilio-Navarro,
G.R. No. 162049, April 13, 2007).

xxxxxxxxx

WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, the appealed decision dated
July 19, 2005 fo the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Antipolo City, Branch 72 in Civil
Case No. 02-6428 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The marriage berween
petitioner-appellee Marietta C. Azcueta and respondent Rodolfo B. Azcueta remains
VALID. HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2009/
[5]
may2009/180668.htm" \l "_ftn5" \o "" (emphasis ours)

The basic issue to be resolved in the instant case is whether or not the totality of the evidence
presented is adequate to sustain a finding that Rodolfo is psychologically incapacitated to comply with
his essential marital obligations.

The Office of the Solicitor General, in its Comment, submits that the appellate court correctly
ruled that the totality of evidence presented by petitioner failed to prove her spouses psychological
incapacity pursuant to Article 36 of the Family Code and settled jurisprudence.

We grant the petition.

Prefatorily, it bears stressing that it is the policy of our Constitution to protect and strengthen
the family as the basic autonomous social institution and marriage as the foundation of the family.
[6]
"" Our family law is based on the policy that marriage is not a mere contract, but a social
institution in which the state is vitally interested.The State can find no stronger anchor than on good,
solid and happy families.The break up of families weakens our social and moral fabric and, hence,
their preservation is not the concern alone of the family members. HYPERLINK "http://
[7]
sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2009/may2009/180668.htm" \l "_ftn7" \o ""
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Thus, the Court laid down inRepublic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals and Molina
[8]
"" stringent guidelines in the interpretation and application of Article 36 of the Family Code, to
wit:

(1)The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to
the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and
continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity.This is rooted in
the fact that both our Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of marriage and
unity of the family.Thus, our Constitution devotes an entire Article on the Family,
recognizing it as the foundation of the nation. It decrees marriage as legally
inviolable, thereby protecting it from dissolution at the whim of the parties.Both the
family and marriage are to be protected by the state.

The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the family
and emphasizes their permanence, inviolability and solidarity.

(2)The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: (a) medically
or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by
experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision.Article 36 of the Family Code
requires that the incapacity must be psychological - not physical, although its
manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical.The evidence must convince the
court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or psychically ill to such an
extent that the person could not have known the obligations he was assuming, or
knowing them, could not have given valid assumption thereof. Although no
example of such incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the application
of the provision under the principle ofejusdem generis(Salita v. Magtolis,233
SCRA 100, 108), nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a
psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert
evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.

(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at the time of the
celebration of the marriage.The evidence must show that the illness was existing
when the parties exchanged their I dos.The manifestation of the illness need not
be perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must have attached at such
moment, or prior thereto.

(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically
permanent or incurable.Such incurability may be absolute or even relative only in
regard to the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same
sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of
marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not related to marriage, like the
exercise of a profession or employment in a job. Hence, a pediatrician may be
effective in diagnosing illnesses of children and prescribing medicine to cure them
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but may not be psychologically capacitated to procreate, bear and raise his/her own
children as an essential obligation of marriage.

(5)Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the
party to assume the essential obligations of marriage. Thus, mild
characteriological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional outbursts
cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness must be shown as downright
incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will.In
other words, there is a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an
adverse integral element in the personality structure that effectively
incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby complying with the
obligations essential to marriage.

(6)The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles
68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and wifeas well as
Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their
children.Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition,
proven by evidence and included in the text of the decision.

(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial
Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or
decisive, should be given great respect by our courts. x x x. HYPERLINK "http://
[9]
(Emphasis supplied)

InSantos v. Court of Appeals, HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2009/
[10]
may2009/180668.htm" \l "_ftn10" \o "" the Court declared that psychological incapacity must be
characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability. HYPERLINK "http://
[11]
sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2009/may2009/180668.htm" \l "_ftn11" \o "" It should refer to
no less than a mental, not physical, incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic
marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage.
[12]
"" The intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of psychological incapacity to the
most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability
to give meaning and significance to the marriage. HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/
[13]
jurisprudence/2009/may2009/180668.htm" \l "_ftn13" \o ""

However, in more recent jurisprudence, we have observed that notwithstanding the guidelines
laid down inMolina,there is a need toemphasize other perspectives as well which should govern the
disposition of petitions for declaration of nullity under Article 36. HYPERLINK "http://
[14]
sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2009/may2009/180668.htm" \l "_ftn14" \o "" Each case must be
judged, not on the basis ofa prioriassumptions, predilections or generalizations but according to its
own facts.In regard to psychological incapacity as a ground for annulment of marriage, it is trite to
say that no case is on "all fours" with another case.The trial judge must take pains in examining the
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factual milieu and the appellate court must, as much as possible, avoid substituting its own judgment
for that of the trial court. HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2009/
[15]
may2009/180668.htm" \l "_ftn15" \o "" With the advent of Te v. Te, HYPERLINK "http://
[16]
sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2009/may2009/180668.htm" \l "_ftn16" \o "" the Court
encourages a reexamination of jurisprudential trends on the interpretation of Article 36 although there
has been no major deviation or paradigm shift from theMolinadoctrine.

After a thorough review of the records of the case, we find that there was sufficient
compliance withMolinato warrant the annulment of the parties marriage under Article 36.

First,petitioner successfully discharged her burden to prove the psychological incapacity of
her husband.

The Solicitor General, in discrediting Dr. Villegas psychiatric report, highlights the lack of
personal examination of Rodolfo by said doctor and the doctors reliance on petitioners version of
events. In Marcos v. Marcos, HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2009/
[17]
may2009/180668.htm" \l "_ftn17" \o "" it was held that there is no requirement that the
defendant/respondent spouse should be personally examined by a physician or psychologist as a
condition sine qua non for the declaration of nullity of marriage based on psychological
incapacity.What matters is whether the totality of evidence presented is adequate to sustain a finding
of psychological incapacity.

It should be noted that, apart from her interview with the psychologist, petitioner testified in
court on the facts upon which the psychiatric report was based.When a witness testified under oath
before the lower court and was cross-examined, she thereby presented evidence in the form of
testimony. HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2009/may2009/180668.htm" \l
[18]
"_ftn18" \o "" Significantly, petitioners narration of facts was corroborated in material points by
the testimony of a close relative of Rodolfo.Dr. Villegas likewise testified in court to elaborate on her
report and fully explain the link between the manifestations of Rodolfos psychological incapacity and
the psychological disorder itself.It is a settled principle of civil procedure that the conclusions of the
trial court regarding the credibility of witnesses are entitled to great respect from the appellate courts
because the trial court had an opportunity to observe the demeanor of witnesses while giving
testimony which may indicate their candor or lack thereof. HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/
[19]
jurisprudence/2009/may2009/180668.htm" \l "_ftn19" \o "" Since the trial court itself accepted
the veracity of petitioners factual premises, there is no cause to dispute the conclusion of
psychological incapacity drawn therefrom by petitioners expert witness. HYPERLINK "http://
[20]

Second,the root cause of Rodolfos psychological incapacity has been medically or clinically
identified, alleged in the petition, sufficiently proven by expert testimony, and clearly explained in the
trial courts decision.

The petition alleged that from the beginning of their marriage, Rodolfo was not gainfully
employed and, despite pleas from petitioner, he could not be persuaded to even attempt to find
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employment; that from the choice of the family abode to the couples daily sustenance, Rodolfo relied
on his mother; and that the couples inadequate sexual relations and Rodolfos refusal to have a child
stemmed from a psychological condition linked to his relationship to his mother.

These manifestations of incapacity to comply or assume his marital obligations were linked to
medical or clinical causes by an expert witness with more than forty years experience from the field of
psychology in general and psychological incapacity, in particular. In a portion of her psychiatric
evaluation, Dr. Villegas elucidated the psychodynamics of the case of petitioner and Rodolfo, thus:

Mariettais the eldest of 5 siblings, whose parents has very limited education.
Being the eldest, she is expected to be the role model of younger siblings.In so
doing, she has been restricted and physically punished, in order to tow the line.But
on the other hand, she developed growing resentments towards her father and
promised herself that with the first opportunity, shell get out of the family.When
Rodolfo came along, they were married 1 months after they met, without really
knowing anything about him.Her obsession to leave her family was her primary
reason at that time and she did not exercise good judgment in her decision making in
marriage.During their 4 years marital relationship, she came to realize that Rodolfo
cannot be responsible in his duties and responsibilities, in terms of loving, caring,
protection, financial support and sex.

rd
On the other hand, Rodolfo is the 3 among 5 boys.The father, who was
perceived to be weak, and his two elder brothers were all working as
seaman.Rodolfo who was always available to his mothers needs, became an easy
prey, easily engulfed into her system.The relationship became symbiotic, that led to
a prolonged and abnormal dependence to his mother.The mother, being the stronger
and dominant parent, is a convenient role model, but the reversal of roles became
confusing that led to ambivalence of his identity and grave dependency.Apparently,
all the boys were hooked up to his complexities, producing so much doubts in their
capabilities in a heterosexual setting. Specifically, Rodolfo tried, but failed. His
inhibitions in a sexual relationship, is referable to an unconscious guilt feelings of
defying the mothers love.At this point, he has difficulty in delineating between the
wife and the mother, so that his continuous relationship with his wife produces
considerable anxiety, which he is unable to handle, and crippled him psychologically.

Based on the above clinical data, family background and outcome of their
marriage, it is the opinion of the examiner, that Mrs. Marietta Cruz-Azcueta is
mature, independent and responsible and is psychologically capacitated to perform
the duties and obligations of marriage.Due to her numerous personal problems she
has difficulty in handling her considerable anxiety, at present. There are strong
clinical evidences that Mr. Rodolfo Azcueta is suffering from a Dependent
Personality Disorder associated with severe inadequacy that renders him
psychologically incapacitated to perform the duties and responsibilities of marriage.

The root cause of the above clinical condition is due to a strong and
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prolonged dependence with a parent of the opposite sex, to a period when it becomes
no longer appropriate.This situation crippled his psychological functioning related to
sex, self confidence, independence, responsibility and maturity.It existed prior to
marriage, but became manifest only after the celebration due to marital stresses and
demands.It is considered as permanent and incurable in nature, because it started
early in his life and therefore became so deeply ingrained into his personality
structure.It is severe or grave in degree, because it hampered and interfered with his
normal functioning related to heterosexual adjustment. HYPERLINK "http://
[21]
These findings were reiterated and further explained by Dr. Villegas during her testimony, the relevant
portion of which we quote below:

xxxxxxxxx

Q: Now, Madame Witness, after examining the petitioner, what was your
psychological evaluation?

A: Ive found the petitioner in this case, Mrs. Marietta Azcueta as matured,
independent, very responsible, focused, she has direction and ambition in
life and she work hard for what she wanted, maam, and therefore, I
concluded that she is psychologically capacitated to perform the duties and
responsibilities of the marriage, maam.

Q: How about the respondent, Madame Witness, what was your psychological
evaluation with regards to the respondent?

A:Based on my interview, Ive found out that the husband Mr. Rodolfo Azcueta is
psychologically incapacitated to perform the duties and responsibilities of
marriage suffering from a psychiatric classification as Dependent Personality
Disorder associated with severe inadequacy related to masculine strivings,
maam.

Q:In laymans language, Madame Witness, can you please explain to us what do you
mean by Dependent Personality Disorder?

A:Dependent Personality Disorder are (sic) those persons in which their response to
ordinary way of life are ineffectual and inept characterized by loss of self
confidence, always in doubt with himself and inability to make his own
decision, quite dependent on other people, and in this case, on his mother,
maam.

Q: And do you consider this, Madame Witness, as a psychological problem of
respondent, Rodolfo Azcueta?

A:Very much, maam.
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Q:Why?

A: Because it will always interfered, hampered and disrupt his duties and
responsibilities as a husband and as a father, maam.

Q: And can you please tell us, Madame Witness, what is the root cause of this
psychological problem?

A:The root cause of this psychological problem is a cross identification with the
mother who is the dominant figure in the family, the mother has the last say
and the authority in the family while the father was a seaman and always out
of the house, and if present is very shy, quiet and he himself has been very
submissive and passive to the authority of the wife, maam.

Q:And can you please tell us, Madame Witness, under what circumstance this kind
of psychological problem manifested?

A:This manifested starting his personality development and therefore, during his
early stages in life, maam.

Q:So, you mean to say, Madame Witness, this kind of problem existed to Rodolfo
Azcueta, the respondent in this case, before the celebration of the marriage?

A:Yes, maam.

Q:And it became manifested only after the celebration of the marriage?

A:Yes, maam.

Q:And can you please tell us the reason why it became manifested with thethatthe
manifestation came too late?

A:The manifestation came too late because the history of Mr. Rodolfo Azcueta was
very mild, no stresses, no demand on his life, at 24 years old despite the fact
that he already finished college degree of Computer Science, there is no
demand on himself at least to establish his own, and the mother always
would make the decision for him, maam.

Q:Okay, Madame Witness, is this kind of psychological problem severe?

A:Yes maam.

Q:Why do you consider this psychological problem severe, Madame Witness?

A:Because he will not be able to make and to carry on the responsibility that is
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expected of a married person, maam.

Q:Is it incurable, Madame Witness?

A:It is incurable because it started early in development and therefore it became so
deeply ingrained into his personality, and therefore, it cannot be changed nor
cured at this stage, maam.

Q:So, you mean to say, Madame Witness, that it is Permanent?

A:It is permanent in nature, sir.

Q:And last question as an expert witness, what is the effect of the psychological
problem as far as the marriage relationship of Rodolfo Azcueta is
concerned?

A:The effect of this will really be a turbulent marriage relationship because standard
expectation is, the husband has to work, to feed, to protect, to love, and of
course, to function on (sic) the sexual duties of a husband to the wife, but in
this case, early in their marriage, they had only according to the wife,
experienced once sexual relationship every month and this is due to the fact
that because husband was so closely attached to the mother, it is a result of
the unconscious guilt feeling of the husband in defying the mothers love
when they will be having heterosexual relationship and therefore, at that
point, he will not be able to distinguish between the mother and the wife and
therefore, sex relationship will not be satisfactory according to expectation,
maam. HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2009/
[22]
may2009/180668.htm" \l "_ftn22" \o ""

InTe v. Te,we held that [b]y the very nature of Article 36, courts, despite having the primary task and
burden of decision-making,must not discount but, instead, must consider as decisive evidence the
expert opinion on the psychological and mental temperaments of the parties. HYPERLINK
[23]
"http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2009/may2009/180668.htm" \l "_ftn23" \o ""

Based on the totality of the evidence, the trial court clearly explained the basis for its
decision, which we reproduce here for emphasis:

With the preponderant evidence presented by the petitioner, the court finds
that respondent totally failed in his commitments and obligations as a
husband.Respondents emotional immaturity and irresponsibility is grave and he has
no showing of improvement.He failed likewise to have sexual intercourse with the
wife because it is a result of the unconscious guilt felling of having sexual
relationship since he could not distinguish between the mother and the wife and
therefore sex relationship will not be satisfactory as expected.

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The respondent is suffering from dependent personality disorder and

therefore cannot make his own decision and cannot carry on his responsibilities as a
husband. The marital obligations to live together, observe mutual love, respect,
support was not fulfilled by the respondent.

Considering the totality of evidence of the petitioner clearly show that
respondent failed to comply with his marital obligations.

Thus the marriage between petitioner and respondent should be declared null
and void on the account of respondents severe and incurable psychological
incapacity.

Third,Rodolfos psychological incapacity was established to have clearly existed at the time
of and even before the celebration of marriage.Contrary to the CAs finding that the parties lived
harmoniously and independently in the first few years of marriage, witnesses were united in testifying
that from inception of the marriage, Rodolfos irresponsibility, overdependence on his mother and
abnormal sexual reticence were already evident. To be sure, these manifestations of Rodolfos
dependent personality disorder must have existed even prior to the marriage being rooted in his early
development and a by product of his upbringing and family life.

Fourth, Rodolfos psychological incapacity has been shown to be sufficiently grave, so as to
render him unable to assume the essential obligations of marriage.

The Court is wary of the CAs bases for overturning factual findings of the trial court on this
point.The CAs reasoning that Rodolfos requests for financial assistance from his mothermight have
beendue to his embarrassment for failing to contribute to the family coffers and that his motive for not
wanting a child was his responsible realization that he should not have a child since he is unemployed
are all purely speculative. There is no evidence on record to support these views.Again, we must point
out that appellate courts should not substitute their discretion with that of the trial court or the expert
witnesses, save only in instance where the findings of the trial court or the experts are contradicted by
evidence.

We likewise cannot agree with the CA that Rodolfos irresponsibility and overdependence on
his mother can be attributed to his immaturity or youth.We cannot overlook the fact that at the time of
his marriage to petitioner, he was nearly 29 years old or the fact that the expert testimony has
identified a grave clinical or medical cause for his abnormal behavior.

InTe, the Court has had the occasion to expound on the nature of a dependent personality
disorder and how one afflicted with such a disorder would be incapacitated from complying with
marital obligations, to wit:

Indeed, petitioner, who is afflicted with dependent personality disorder, cannot
assume the essential marital obligations of living together, observing love, respect
and fidelity and rendering help and support, for he is unable to make everyday
decisions without advice from others, allows others to make most of his important
decisions (such as where to live), tends to agree with people even when he believes
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they are wrong, has difficulty doing things on his own, volunteers to do things that
are demeaning in order to get approval from other people, feels uncomfortable or
helpless when alone and is often preoccupied with fears of being abandoned.As
clearly shown in this case, petitioner followed everything dictated to him by the
persons around him.He is insecure, weak and gullible, has no sense of his identity as
a person, has no cohesive self to speak of, and has no goals and clear direction in life.
HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2009/may2009/180668.htm"
[24]
\l "_ftn24" \o ""

Of course, this is not to say that anyone diagnosed with dependent personality disorder is
automatically deemed psychologically incapacitated to comply with the obligations of marriage.We
realize that psychology is by no means an exact science and the medical cases of patients, even though
suffering from the same disorder, may be different in their symptoms or manifestations and in the
degree of severity.It is the duty of the court in its evaluation of the facts, as guided by expert opinion,
to carefully scrutinize the type of disorder and the gravity of the same before declaring the nullity of a
marriage under Article 36.

Fifth, Rodolfo is evidently unable to comply with the essential marital obligations embodied
in Articles 68 to 71 of the Family Code. HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2009/
[25]
may2009/180668.htm" \l "_ftn25" \o "" As noted by the trial court, as a result of Rodolfos
dependent personality disorder, he cannot make his own decisions and cannot fulfill his
responsibilities as a husband.Rodolfo plainly failed to fulfill the marital obligations to live together,
observe mutual love, respect, support under Article 68.Indeed, one who is unable to support himself,
much less a wife; one who cannot independently make decisions regarding even the most basic and
ordinary matters that spouses face everyday; one who cannot contribute to the material, physical and
emotional well-being of his spouse is psychologically incapacitated to comply with the marital
obligations within the meaning of Article 36.

Sixth,the incurability of Rodolfos condition which has been deeply ingrained in his system
since his early years was supported by evidence and duly explained by the expert witness.

At this point, the Court is not unmindful of the sometimes peculiar predicament it finds itself
in those instances when it is tasked to interpret static statutes formulated in a particular point in time
and apply them to situations and people in a society in flux. With respect to the concept of
psychological incapacity, courts must take into account not only developments in science and
medicine but also changing social and cultural mores, including the blurring of traditional gender
roles. In this day and age, women have taken on increasingly important roles in the financial and
material support of their families.This, however, does not change the ideal that the family should be
an autonomous social institution, wherein the spouses cooperate and areequallyresponsible for the
support and well-being of the family.In the case at bar, the spouses from the outset failed to form
themselves into a family, a cohesive unit based on mutual love, respect and support, due to the failure
of one to perform the essential duties of marriage.

This brings to mind the following pronouncement inTe:

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In dissolving marital bonds on account of either partys psychological

incapacity, the Court is not demolishing the foundation of families, but it is actually
protecting the sanctity of marriage, because it refuses to allow a person afflicted with
a psychological disorder, who cannot comply with or assume the essential marital
obligations, from remaining in that sacred bond. It may be stressed that the infliction
of physical violence, constitutional indolence or laziness, drug dependence or
addiction, and psychosexual anomaly are manifestations of a sociopathic personality
anomaly.Let it be noted that in Article 36, there is no marriage to speak of in the
first place, as the same is void from the very beginning. To indulge in imagery,
the declaration of nullity under Article 36 will simply provide a decent burial to
a stillborn marriage. HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2009/
[26]
may2009/180668.htm" \l "_ftn26" \o "" (emphasis ours)

In all, we agree with the trial court that the declaration of nullity of the parties marriage
pursuant to Article 36 of the Family Code is proper under the premises.

WHEREFORE,the petition isGRANTED.The Amended Decision dated July 19, 2005 of
the Regional Trial Court, Branch 72,AntipoloCityinCivil Case No. 02-6428isREINSTATED.

SO ORDERED.
Juan de Dios Carlos vs Sandoval
DECISION

TINGA,J.:

These consolidated petitions emanated from a civil case filed by Juan de Dios Carlos (Carlos) against
respondents Felicidad Sandoval (Sandoval) and Teofilo Carlos II (Teofilo II) docketed with the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) ofMuntinlupaCityas Civil Case No. 95-135.

In hisComplaintbefore the RTC, Carlos asserted that he was the sole surviving compulsory heir of his
parents, Felix B. Carlos and Felipa Elemia, HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/
[1]
2005/sep2005/135830.htm" \l "_ftn1" \o "" who had acquired during their marriage, six parcels of
land (subject properties). His brother, Teofilo (Teofilo), died intestate in 1992. At the time of his death,
Teofilo was apparently married to Sandoval, and cohabiting with her and their child, respondent
Teofilo II. Nonetheless, Carlos alleged in hisComplaintthat Teofilo and Sandoval were not validly
married as they had not obtained any marriage license. HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/
[2]
jurisprudence/2005/sep2005/135830.htm" \l "_ftn2" \o "" Furthermore, Carlos also asserted that
Teofilo II could not be considered as Teofilos child. As a result, Carlos concluded that he was also the
Page 171 of 193

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sole heir of his brother Teofilo, since the latter had died without leaving any heirs.

Carlos also claimed that Teofilo, prior to their father Felixs death in 1963, developed a scheme to save
the elder Carloss estate from inheritance taxes. Under the scheme, the properties of the father would
be transferred to Teofilo who would, in turn, see to it that the shares of the legal heirs are protected and
delivered to them. Felix assented to the plan, and the subject properties were transferred in the name
of Teofilo. After Teofilos death, Carlos entered into certain agreements with Sandoval in connection
with the subject properties. Carlos did so, believing that the latter was the lawful wife of his brother
Teofilo. Subsequently though, Carlos discovered that Sandoval and his brother were never validly
married, as their marriage was contracted without a marriage license. HYPERLINK "http://
[3]
sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/sep2005/135830.htm" \l "_ftn3" \o ""

Carlos now sought to nullify these agreements with Sandoval for want of consideration, the
premise for these contracts being non-existent. Thus, Carlos prayed of the RTC to declare the alleged
marriage between Teofilo and Sandovalvoid ab initio, provided that Teofilo died without issue, order
that new titles covering the subject properties be issued in the name of Carlos, and require Sandoval to
restitute Carlos in the amount of P18,924,800.00. HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/
[4]
jurisprudence/2005/sep2005/135830.htm" \l "_ftn4" \o ""

Carlos likewise prayed for the issuance of the provisional relief of preliminary attachment. The RTC
issued anOrderdated7 September 1995granting the prayer for preliminary attachment, and on15
September 1995, a writ of preliminary attachment. Carlos posted a bond forP20,000,000.00 issued by
herein petitioner

SIDDCOR Insurance Corporation (SIDDCOR). HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/
[5]
jurisprudence/2005/sep2005/135830.htm" \l "_ftn5" \o "" Shortly thereafter, a Notice of
Garnishment was served upon the Philippine National Bank (PNB) over the deposit accounts
maintained by respondents.

Respondents filed anUrgent Motion to Discharge the Writ of Attachment, which was opposed
by Carlos. On 4 December 1995, the RTC rendered an order denying the motion. This caused
respondents to file aPetition for Certiorariwith the Court of Appeals, seeking to set aside the RTC
order granting the writ of preliminary attachment denying the motion for the discharge of the writ.
This case was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 39267. HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/
[6]

On27 February 1996, the Court of Appeals Second Division promulgated itsDecisionin CA-
G.R. SP No. 39267,wherein itgranted thePetition for Certiorariand ordered the discharge and
dissolution of the Writ of Attachment and Notice of Garnishment. HYPERLINK "http://
[7]
sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/sep2005/135830.htm" \l "_ftn7" \o "" The Court of Appeals
found that there was no sufficient cause of action to warrant the preliminary attachment, since Carlos
had merely alleged general averments in order to support his prayer. HYPERLINK "http://
[8]
sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/sep2005/135830.htm" \l "_ftn8" \o "" Carlos elevated the
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said Decision to this Court by way ofPetition for Review on Certiorari,which was docketed as G.R.
No. L-125717. In aResolutiondated21 October 1996, the Court denied CarlossPetition, and thus the
Court of Appeals Decision ordering the dissolution of the Writ of Attachment and Notice of
Garnishment became final.
In the meantime, the hearing on CarlossComplaintensued before the RTC. Respondents duly filed
theirAnswerand thereafter filed aMotion for Summary Judgment. Carlos opposed the motion and
countered with his own Motion for Summary Judgment. On 8 April 1996, the RTC rendered a
summary judgment in favor of Carlos. Carloss victory was wholesale, with the RTC making the
following pronouncements:

1. Declaring the marriage between defendant Felicidad Sandoval and Teofilo
Carlos solemnized at Silang, Cavite, on May 14, 1962, evidenced by the Marriage
Contract submitted in this case, null and voidabinitiofor lack of the requisite marriage
license;

2. Declaring that the defendant minor, Teofilo S. Carlos II, is not the natural,
illegitimate, or legally adopted child of the late Teofilo E. Carlos;

3. Ordering defendant Sandoval to pay and restitute to plaintiff the sum
ofP18,924,800.00, together with the interest thereon at the legal rate from date of filing
of the instant complaint until fully paid;

4. Declaring plaintiff as the sole and exclusive owner of the parcel of land, less
the portion adjudicated to the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 11975, covered by TCT No.
139061 of the Register of Deeds of Makati City, and ordering said Register of Deeds to
cancel said title and to issue another title in the sole name of plaintiff herein;

5. Declaring the Contract, Annex K of the Complaint, between plaintiff and
defendant Sandoval null and void, and ordering the Register of Deeds of Makati City to
cancel TCT No. 139058 in the name of Teofilo Carlos, and to issue another title in the
sole name of the plaintiff herein;

6. Declaring the Contract, Annex M of the Complaint, between plaintiff and
defendant Sandoval null and void;

7. Ordering the cancellation of TCT No. 210877 in the names of defendant
Sandoval and defendant minor Teofilo S. Carlos II and ordering the Register of Deeds of
Manila to issue another title in the exclusive name of plaintiff herein.

8. Ordering the cancellation of TCT No. 210878 in the names of defendant
Sandoval and defendant minor Teofilo S. Carlos II and ordering the Register of Deeds of
Manila to issue another title in the sole name of plaintiff herein. HYPERLINK "http://
[9]
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Upon promulgation of theSummary Judgment, Carlos moved before the RTC for execution pending
appeal. The RTC granted the motion for execution pending appeal upon the filing of a bond.
HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/sep2005/135830.htm" \l "_ftn10" \o
[10]
"" On27 May 1996, the RTC issued aWrit of Execution.

Meanwhile, respondents filed aMotion for Reconsideration of the Summary Judgment, which
was denied in anOrderdated20 May 1996. Respondents then appealed the RTCDecisionto the
Court of Appeals, wherein such appeal was docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 53229. The case was raffled
to the appellate courts Fourteenth Division for completion of records. Sandoval and Carlos also filed
aPetitionfor Certiorariwith Temporary Restraining Orderdated2 June 1996. This special civil
action primarily attacked the allowance of execution pending appeal, and prayed for the annulment of
theOrdergranting execution pending appeal, and of theWrit of Execution

On10 December 1996, in CA-G.R. CV No. 53229, respondents filed aMotion for Judgment On the
Attachment Bond.They noted that the Court of Appeals had already ruled that theWrit of Preliminary
Attachment issued by the RTC was improperly granted and that its Decision, as affirmed by the
Supreme Court, had attained finality. Accordingly, they were entitled to damages under Section 20,
Rule 57 of the then Rules of Civil Procedure, which governed claims for damages on account of
unlawful attachment. In support of their allegation of damages, they cite the Notice of Garnishment
served on PNB Malolos Branch, where Felicidad Carlos maintained
deposits amounting toP15,546,121.98. HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/

[11]
sep2005/135830.htm" \l "_ftn11" \o "" Also presented in support of the motion was a Notice of
Delivery/Payment by the RTC Sheriff, directing the PNB Malolos Branch to deliver the amounts
previously garnished by virtue of theWrit of Executiondated 27 May 1996; HYPERLINK "http://
sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/sep2005/135830.htm" \l "_ftn12" \o
[12]
"" aManifestationfiled by PNB dated 19 July 1996 in CA-G.R. SP No. 40819, stating that PNB
had already delivered to the RTC Sheriff on 27 June 1996 the amount ofP15,384,509.98 drawn
against the accounts of Carlos; and a Certification to the same effect issued by the PNB Malolos
Branch. In anAddendum to Motion for Judgment on the Attachment Bond, respondents additionally
prayed for moral and exemplary damages. HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/
[13]
2005/sep2005/135830.htm" \l "_ftn13" \o ""

After various pleadings were duly filed by the parties, the Court of Appeals Special Fourth Division
issued aResolutiondated23 March 1998, certifying that all the necessary pleadings have been filed,
and that the case may already be referred to the Raffle Committee for assignment to aponentefor
study and report. The sameResolutionlikewise denied without elaboration aMotion to Dismisson the
ground of forum-shopping filed earlier by Carlos. HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/
[14]

On such denial, Carlos filed a Motion for Reconsideration. Respondents likewise filed
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aMotion for Partial Reconsiderationdated17 April 1998, arguing that under the Revised Internal
Rules of the Court of Appeals (RIRCA), the case may be re-raffled for assignment for study and report
only after there is a resolution that the case is deemed submitted for decision. HYPERLINK "http://
[15]
sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/sep2005/135830.htm" \l "_ftn15" \o "" They pointed out
that re-raffle could not yet be effected, as there were still pending incidents, particularly the motions
for reconsideration of Carlos and themselves, as well as theMotion for Judgment on Attachment Bond.

On26 June 1998, the Court of Appeals Former Special Fourth Division promulgated two resolutions.
[16]
"" The first, in response to CarlossMotion for Reconsideration, again denied CarlossMotion to
Dismissthe Appeal andMotion for Suspension, but explained the reasons for such denial.

The second resolution is at the center of the present petitions. The assailedResolutionagreed with
respondents that it was first necessary to resolve the pending incidents before the case could be re-
raffled for study and report. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals
proceeded to rule on these pending incidents. While the first resolution dwelt on the pending motions
filed by Carlos, thisResolutiontackled the other matter left unresolved, theMotion for Judgment on
Attachment Bond.The Court of Appeals found the claim for damages meritorious, citing the earlier
decisions ruling that Carlos was not entitled to the preliminary attachment. Invoking Section 20, Rule
57 of the Rules of Court, as well as jurisprudence, HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/
[17]
jurisprudence/2005/sep2005/135830.htm" \l "_ftn17" \o "" the Court of Appeals ruled that it was
not necessary for the determination of damages on the injunction bond to await the decision on appeal.

The Court of Appeals then proceeded to determine to what damages respondents were entitled to. In
ruling that the award of actual damages was warranted, the court noted:

It is also not disputed that the PNB, on June 27, 1996, issued two managers
checks: MC No. 938541 forP4,932,621.09 and MC 938542 forP10,451,888.89
payable to the order of Luis C. Bucayon II, Sheriff IV, RTC, Branch 256,
Muntinlupa, duly received by the latter in the total amount of PESOS FIFTEEN
MILLION THREE HUNDRED EIGHTY FOUR THOUSAND FIVE
HUNDRED NINE & 98/100 (P15,384,509.98), drawn against the accounts of
Ms. Felicidad Sandoval Vda. de Carlos which were earlier garnished for the
satisfaction of the above-mentioned writ of attachment (Annex E, Motion for
Judgment on the Attachment Bond, pp. 7-8) HYPERLINK "http://
[18]
""

....

The contention of [Carlos] that the writ of attachment was not implemented falls
flat on the face of the manifestation of PNB that the delivery of the
garnishedP15,384,509.98 to him was effected through the sheriff. HYPERLINK
"http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/sep2005/135830.htm" \l "_ftn19"
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[19]
\o ""

The Court of Appeals found that moral and exemplary damages were not warranted, there being no
malice in pursuing the attachment. The appellate court also found the claim ofP2,000,000.00 for
attorneys fees as excessive, and reduced the sum by half. Correspondingly, the dispositive portion of
the assailedResolutionreads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered against the attachment
bond, ordering SIDDCOR INSURANCE CORPORATION and plaintiff-appellee to
pay defendants-appellants, jointly and severally, the sum of P15,384,509.98 and
12% interest per annum from June 27, 1996 when the unlawful garnishment was
effected until fully paid and P1,000,000.00 as attorneys fees with 6% interest
thereon from the trial courts decision on April 8, 1986 until fully paid.

SO ORDERED. HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/
[20]
sep2005/135830.htm" \l "_ftn20" \o ""

Both Carlos and SIDDCOR filed their respective motions for reconsideration of theResolution. For
their part, respondents filed aMotion for Immediate Executiondated7 August 1998in regard to
theResolutionof26 June 1998awarding them damages.

In the Resolution dated 10 October 1998, HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/
[21]
jurisprudence/2005/sep2005/135830.htm" \l "_ftn21" \o "" the Court of Appeals denied the
motions for reconsideration and granted theMotion for Immediate Execution. In granting theMotion
for Immediate Execution, the Court of Appeals cited the reasons that the appeal to be undertaken from
the 26 June 1998Resolutionwas patently dilatory; that there were no material and substantial defenses
against the motion for judgment on the attachment bond, rendering the appeal pro-forma and dilatory;
that Sandoval was of advanced age and might not enjoy the fruits of the judgment on the attachment
bond; and that immediate execution would end her suffering due to the arbitrary garnishment of her
account pursuant to an improper attachment. HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/
[22]
2005/sep2005/135830.htm" \l "_ftn22" \o ""

In itsMotion for Reconsideration, SIDDCOR explicitly assailed the allowance of theMotion
for Immediate Execution. HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/
[23]
sep2005/135830.htm" \l "_ftn23" \o "" This was denied by the Court of Appeals in
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aResolutiondated22 December 1998. HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/

[24]
sep2005/135830.htm" \l "_ftn24" \o ""

From these antecedents, the following petitions were filed before this Court:

G.R. No. 135830

ThisAppeal by Certiorari with Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order/Preliminary Injunctiondated
26 October 1998 filed by Carlos assailed the two resolutions of the Court of Appeals both dated 26
June 1998, as well as the Resolution of 10 October 1998, which denied Carloss motion for
reconsideration. Carlos argues that the Court of Appeals, through the Former Special Fourth Division,
could not have resolved theMotion for Judgment on the Attachment Bondsince the case had not yet
been re-raffled under the two-raffle system for study and report; that the Court of Appeals erred in
resolving the motion without conducting any hearing; that the Court of Appeals had no jurisdiction
over the motion as the docketing fees had not yet been filed; that the motion for judgment, which did
not contain any certification against forum-shopping, was an application subject to the requirements of
certification against forum-shopping; that there was no supporting evidence to support the award of
damages; and that the Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion in denying theMotion for
Reconsideration without adverting to specific reasons mentioned for the denial of each issue.
[25]
""

Carlos likewise ascribes grave abuse of discretion to the Court of Appeals in its otherResolutiondated
26 June 1998 for its refusal to dismiss CA-G.R. CV No. 53229 on the ground of forum-shopping,
adding that the appellate court should have deferred resolution of theMotion for Judgment on the
Attachment Bondconsidering the prejudicial question raised in Carloss motion to dismiss the main
case on the ground of forum-shopping.

G.R. No. 136035

This concerns aPetition for Reviewfiled by SIDDCOR, likewise challenging theResolutionof26
June 1998of the Court of Appeals and the10 October 1998Resolutionwherein SiddcorsMotion for
Reconsideration, among others, was denied. Siddcor argues therein that the Court of Appeals erred in
ruling on the motion for damages without awaiting judgment in the main case; granting that damages
may be awarded, these should encompass only such damages incurred during the pendency of the
appeal; and that a hearing was necessary to prove the claim for damages and the appellate court erred
in granting the award for damages despite lack of hearing.

G.R. No. 137743

The third petition for adjudication, aPetition for Certiorari under Rule 65 with Prayer for Temporary
Restraining Order or Preliminary Injunction, was also filed by SIDDCOR. This petition, dated8
March 1999, specifically assails the allowance by the Court of Appeals of the immediate execution of
the award of damages, made through the resolutionsdated10 October 1998and22 December 1998.

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SIDDCOR hereunder argues that Section 2, Rule 39 of the Rules of Civil Procedure requires
that execution of a judgment or final order pending appeal may be made only on motion of the
prevailing party and may be made even before the expiration of the period to appeal. HYPERLINK
"http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/sep2005/135830.htm" \l "_ftn26" \o
[26]
"" Respondents had argued in theirMotion for Immediate Executionthat the judgment sought to
be executed (that on the attachment bond) was interlocutory and not appealable, yet cited rulings on
execution pending appeal under Section 2, Rule 39 in support of their position. SIDDCOR cites this
inconsistency as proof of a change of theory on the part of respondents which could not be done for
the theories are incompatible. Such being the case, SIDDCOR argues, the Court of Appeals gravely
abused its discretion in granting immediate execution since respondents had filed its motion on the
premise that the award on the judgment bond was interlocutory and not appealable. SIDDCOR also
claims that the judgment on the attachment bond is not interlocutory, citingStronghold Insurance Co.,
Inc. v. Court of Appeals HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/
[27]
sep2005/135830.htm" \l "_ftn27" \o "" wherein it was ruled that such indeed constitutes a final
and appealable order.

SIDDCOR points out that no hearing was conducted on the Motion for Immediate
Executiondespite the requirement in Section 2, Rule 39 that discretionary execution may only issue
upon good reasons to be stated in a special order after due hearing. SIDDCOR likewise notes that the
motion granting immediate execution was granted in the very same resolution which had denied the
motion for reconsideration of the resolution sought to be immediately executed. For SIDDCOR, such
constituted a denial of procedural due process insofar as its statutory right to appeal was concerned, as
the resolution that it intended to appeal from was already the subject of immediate execution.

Finally, SIDDCOR contests the special reasons cited by the Court of Appeals in granting
theMotion for Immediate Execution.

Facts Arising Subsequent to the Filing of Instant Petitions

On7 May 1999, the Court of Appeals issued aWrit of Executiondirecting the enforcement of
the judgment on the attachment bond. HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/
[28]
sep2005/135830.htm" \l "_ftn28" \o "" However, in aResolutiondated9 June 1999, this Court
through the First Division issued aTemporary Restraining Order, enjoining the enforcement of the
saidWrit of Execution.

On15 October 2002, the Court of Appeals First Division rendered aDecision HYPERLINK
[29]
"http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/sep2005/135830.htm" \l "_ftn29" \o "" on the
merits of CA-G.R. CV No. 53229, setting aside theSummary Judgmentand ordering the remand of
the case for further proceedings. HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/
[30]
sep2005/135830.htm" \l "_ftn30" \o "" Both parties filed their respective motions for
reconsideration. HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/sep2005/135830.htm" \l
[31]
"_ftn31" \o "" In addition, Carlos filed a motion to inhibit the author of the assailed decision,
Justice Rebecca de Guia-Salvador, HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/
Page 178 of 193

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[32]
sep2005/135830.htm" \l "_ftn32" \o "" who thereafter agreed to inhibit herself. HYPERLINK
[33]
"http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/sep2005/135830.htm" \l "_ftn33" \o "" Then on7
August 2003, the Court of Appeals Former First Division issued aResolutiondeferring action on the
motions for reconsideration in light of the temporary restraining order issued by this Court until the
resolution of the present petitions.

The factual background may be complicated, but the court need only concern itself with the
propriety of the judgment on the attachment bond and the subsequent moves to secure immediate
execution of such judgment. Should this Court be called upon to tackle the merits of the original
action, Carloss complaint, it shall be in the review of the final resolution of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CV No. 53229.

Consolidation of Issues in
G.R. Nos. 135830 and 136035

The petitions in G.R. Nos. 135830 and 136035 are concerned with the award of damages on
the attachment bond. They may be treated separately from the petition in G.R. No. 137743, which
relates to the immediate execution of the said award.

We consolidate the main issues in G.R. Nos. 135830 and 136035, as follows: (1) whether the
assailed judgment on the attachment bond could have been rendered, as it was, prior to the
adjudication of the main case; (2) whether the Court of Appeals properly complied with the hearing
requirement under Section 20, Rule 57 prior to its judgment on the attachment bond; and (3) whether
the Court of Appeals properly ascertained the amount of damages it awarded in the judgment on the
attachment bond.

Resolving these issues requires the determination of the proper scope and import of Section
20, Rule 57 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. The provision governs the disposal of claims for
damages on account of improper, irregular or excessive attachment.

SECTION 20. Claim for damages on account of improper, irregular or excessive
attachment.An application for damages on account of improper, irregular or excessive
attachment must be filed before the trial or before appeal is perfected or before the
judgment becomes executory, with due notice to the attaching obligee or his surety or
sureties, setting forth the facts showing his right to damages and the amount
thereof. Such damages may be awarded only after proper hearing and shall be
included in the judgment on the main case.

If the judgment of the appellate court be favorable to the party against whom the
attachment was issued, he must claim damages sustained during the pendency of the
appeal by filing an application in the appellate court with notice to the party in whose
favor the attachment was issued or his surety or sureties, before the judgment of the
appellate court becomes executory. The appellate court may allow the application to be
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heard and decided by the trial court.

Nothing herein contained shall prevent the party against whom the attachment
was issued from recovering in the same action the damages awarded to him from any
property of the attaching obligee not exempt from execution should the bond or deposit
given by the latter be insufficient or fail to fully satisfy the award. (Emphasis supplied.)

Section 20 essentially allows the application to be filed at any time before the judgment
becomes executory. It should be filed in the same case that is the main action, and cannot be instituted
separately. HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/sep2005/135830.htm" \l
[34]
"_ftn34" \o "" It should be filed with the court having jurisdiction over the case at the time of the
application. HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/sep2005/135830.htm" \l
[35]
"_ftn35" \o "" The remedy provided by law is exclusive and by failing to file a motion for the
determination of the damages on time and while the judgment is still under the control of the court, the
claimant loses his right to damages. HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/
[36]
sep2005/135830.htm" \l "_ftn36" \o ""

There is no question in this case that theMotion for Judgment on the Attachment Bondfiled
by respondents on10 December 1996was properly filed since it was filed with the Court of Appeals
during the pendency of the appeal in the main case and also as an incident thereto. The core questions
though lie in the proper interpretation of the condition under Section 20, Rule 57 that reads: Such
damages may be awarded only after proper hearing and shall be included in the judgment on the main
case. Petitioners assert that there was no proper hearing on the application for damages and that the
Court of Appeals had wrongfully acted on the application in that it resolved it prior to the rendition of
the main judgment.

Such Damages May Be Awarded
Only After Proper Hearing.

We first discuss whether the proper hearing requirement under Section 20, Rule 57 had been satisfied
prior to the award by the Court of Appeals of damages on the attachment bond.

Section 20 of Rule 57 requires that there be a proper hearing before the application for
damages on the attachment bond may be granted. The hearing requirement ties with the indispensable
demand of procedural due process. Due notice to the adverse party and its surety setting forth the facts
supporting the applicant's right to damages and the amount thereof under the bond is essential. No
judgment for damages may be entered and executed against the surety without giving it an opportunity
to be heard as to the reality or reasonableness of the damages resulting from the wrongful issuance of
the writ. HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/sep2005/135830.htm" \l
[37]
"_ftn37" \o ""

In Paramount Insurance v. Court of Appeals, HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/
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[38]
jurisprudence/2005/sep2005/135830.htm" \l "_ftn38" \o "" the Court held that under the rule, it
was neither mandatory nor fatal that there should be a separate hearing in order that damages upon the
bond can be claimed, ascertained and awarded. HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/
[39]
jurisprudence/2005/sep2005/135830.htm" \l "_ftn39" \o "" What is necessary only is for the
attaching party and his surety or sureties to be duly notified and given the opportunity to be heard.
[40]
""

In this case, both Carlos and SIDDCOR were duly notified by the appellate court of
theMotion for Judgment on the Attachment Bondand were required to file their respective comments
thereto. HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/sep2005/135830.htm" \l "_ftn41"
[41]
\o "" Carlos and SIDDCOR filed their respective comments in opposition to private

respondents motion. HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/
[42]
sep2005/135830.htm" \l "_ftn42" \o "" Clearly, all the relevant parties had been afforded the bare
right to be heard on the matter.

Concededly, the facts of this case differ from that in Paramount, wherein the award of
damages was predicated under Section 8, Rule 58, and the trial on the merits included the claim for
damages on the attachment bond. The Court did note therein that the counsel of the surety was present
during the hearings. HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/
[43]
sep2005/135830.htm" \l "_ftn43" \o "" In this case, unlike inParamount, there were no open
court hearings conducted by the Court of Appeals, and it is precisely this absence that the petitioners
assert as fatal.

Plainly, there is no express requirement under the rule that the hearing be done in open court,
or that the parties be allowed to confront adverse witnesses to the claim of damages on the bond. The
proper scope of the hearing requirement was explained beforeParamountinPeroxide Philippines
Corp. v. Court of Appeals, HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/
[44]
sep2005/135830.htm" \l "_ftn44" \o "" thus:

. . . [It] is undeniable that when the attachment is challenged for having been illegally or
improperly issued, there must be a hearing with the burden of proof to sustain the writ
being on the attaching creditor. That hearing embraces not only the right to present
evidence but also a reasonable opportunity to know the claims of the opposing parties and
meet them. The right to submit arguments implies that opportunity, otherwise the right
would be a barren one. It means a fair and open hearing.

From this pronouncement, we can discern that the proper hearing contemplated would not merely
encompass the right of the parties to submit their respective positions, but also to present evidence in
support of their claims, and to rebut the submissions and evidence of the adverse party. This is
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especially crucial considering that the necessary elements to be established in an application for
damages are essentially factual: namely, the fact of damage or injury, and the quantifiable amount of
damages sustained. Such matters cannot be established on the mere say-so of the applicant, but require
evidentiary support. At the same time, there was no equivocal statement from the Court
inPeroxidethat the hearing required under the rule should be a full-blown hearing on the merits

In this case, we rule that the demands of a proper hearing were satisfied as of the time the Court of
Appeals rendered its assailed judgment on the attachment bond. The circumstances in this case that we
consider particularly telling are the settled premises that the judicial finding on the wrongfulness of the
attachment was then already conclusive and beyond review, and that the amount of actual damages
sustained was likewise indubitable as it indeed could be found in the official case record in CA-G.R.
CV No. 53229. As a result, petitioners would have been precluded from either raising the defenses that
the preliminary attachment was valid or disputing the amount of actual damages sustained by reason
of the garnishment. The only matter of controversy that could be litigable through the traditional
hearing would be the matter of moral and exemplary damages, but the Court of Appeals appropriately
chose not to award such damages.

Moreover, petitioners were afforded the opportunity to counter the arguments extended by the
respondents. They fully availed of that right by submitting their respective comments/oppositions. In
fine, the due process guarantee has been satisfied in this case.

It should be noted that this case poses a situation different from what is normally
contemplated under Section 20, Rule 57wherein the very wrongfulness of the attachment remains one
of the issues in contention in the main case. In such a case, there would be a greater demand for a
more extensive hearing on the application of damages. The modality of hearing should remain within
the discretion of the court having jurisdiction to hear the application for damages. The only demand,
concordant to due process, would be the satisfaction of the right to be heard, to present evidence, and
to rebut the evidence and arguments of the opposing party.

Some disquisition is necessary on whether or not, as petitioners submit, a full-blown hearing
in open court is compulsory under Section 20, Rule 57. To impose this as a mandatory requirement
would ultimately prove too onerous to our judicial system. Perhaps such a demand would be less
burdensome on the regional trial courts, which, as a matter of routine, receive testimonial or
documentary evidence offered de novo, and to formulate conclusions on the admissibility and
credibility of the same.

However, a different situation applies if it is the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court before which
the application for damages is filed. Both these courts, which are capacitated to receive and act on
such actions, are generally not triers of facts, and do not, in the course of daily routine, conduct
hearings. It is partly for such reason that Section 20, Rule 57 authorizes these appellate courts to refer
the application for damages to the trial court for hearing and decision. The trial courts are functionally
attuned to ascertain and evaluate at the first instance the necessary factual premises that would
establish the right to damages. Still, reference of the application for damages to the trial court is
discretionary on the part of the appellate courts. The latter, despite their traditional appellate
jurisdiction and review function, are still empowered under Section 20 to rule on the application for
damages, notwithstanding the factual dimension such question presents.
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To impose as mandatory on the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court to hear the application for
damages through full-blown hearings in open court is supremely unwise and beyond the demands of
Section 20, Rule 57. The effect would be unduly disruptive on the daily workflow of appellate courts
such as the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court, which rarely conduct open court hearings.
Neither could the Court see what is so markedly special about an application for damages, fact-
oriented as it may be, that would require it to be heard by the appellate courts in open court when no
such mandatory rule applies to other judicial matters for resolution that are also factual in nature.

For example, the review of death penalty convictions by the Court of Appeals and the
Supreme Court necessitates a thorough evaluation of the evidence presented, notwithstanding the prior
factual appreciation made by the trial court. HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/
[45]
2005/sep2005/135830.htm" \l "_ftn45" \o "" Notwithstanding the factual nature of the questions
involved, there is no rule requiring the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court to call death penalty
cases for hearing or oral argument. If no such mandatory rule for hearing is imposed on the appellate
courts when the supreme penalty of death is involved, why then should an exceptional rule be imposed
in the case for the relatively insignificant application for damages on the attachment bond?

If open court hearings are ever resorted to by appellate courts, such result from the exercise of
discretion rather than by imposition by statute or procedural rule. Indeed, there is no existing statute,
procedural rule, or jurisprudential fiat that makes it mandatory on the Court of Appeals or the Supreme
Court to conduct an open-court hearing on any matter for resolution. There is nothing demonstrably
urgent with an application for damages under Section 20, Rule 57 that would necessitate this Court to
adopt an unprecedented rule mandating itself or the Court of Appeals to conduct full-blown open court
hearings on a particular type of action.

This pronouncement does not contradict our ruling in Hanil Development v. IAC, HYPERLINK
[46]
"http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/sep2005/135830.htm" \l "_ftn46" \o "" which
Carlos interprets as requiring the Court of Appeals to conduct a proper hearing on an application for
damages on the attachment bond.Hanilconcerned the refusal by the Intermediate Appellate Court
(now Court of Appeals) to take cognizance of the application for damages on the attachment bond,
such refusal being reversed by the Court, which ruled that the Intermediate Appellate Court (IAC) had
jurisdiction to accept and rule on such application. While the Court therein recognized that the IAC
was empowered to try cases and conduct hearings, or otherwise perform acts necessary to resolve
factual issues in cases, HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/
[47]
sep2005/135830.htm" \l "_ftn47" \o "" it did not require the appellate court to conduct a hearing
in open court, but merely to reinstate the application for damages.

Admittedly, the dispositive portion of Hanil required the Court of Appeals to conduct
hearings on the application for damages, HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/
[48]
sep2005/135830.htm" \l "_ftn48" \o "" but nowhere in the decision was a general rule laid down
mandating the appellate court to conduct such hearings in open court. The ascertainment of the need to
conduct full-blown hearings is best left to the discretion of the appellate court which chooses to hear
the application. At the same time, the Court cautions the appellate courts to carefully exercise their
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discretion in determining the need for open-court hearings on the application for damages on the
attachment bond. The Court does not sanction the indolent award of damages on the attachment bond
by the appellate court without affording the adverse party and the bonding company concerned the
opportunity to present their sides and adduce evidence in their behalf, or on the basis of
unsubstantiated evidence.

And Shall be Included in the
Judgment on the Main Case

Section 20, Rule 57 does state that the award of damages shall beincluded in the judgment on
the main case, and seemingly indicates that it should not be rendered prior to the adjudication of the
main case.

The rule, which guarantees a right to damages incurred by reason of wrongful attachment, has
long been recognized in this jurisdiction. HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/
[49]
sep2005/135830.htm" \l "_ftn49" \o "" Under Section 20, Rule 57 of the 1964 Rules of Court, it
was provided that there must be first a judgment on the action in favor of the party against whom
attachment was issued before damages can be claimed by such party. HYPERLINK "http://
[50]
sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/sep2005/135830.htm" \l "_ftn50" \o "" The Court however
subsequently clarified that under the rule, recovery for damages may be had by the party thus
prejudiced by the wrongful attachment, even if the judgment be adverse to him. HYPERLINK "http://
[51]

The language used in the 1997 revision of the Rules of Civil Procedure leaves no doubt that
there is no longer need for a favorable judgment in favor of the party against whom attachment was
issued in order that damages may be awarded. It is indubitable that even a party who loses the action
in main but is able to establish a right to damages by reason of improper, irregular, or excessive
attachment may be entitled to damages. This bolsters the notion that the claim for damages arising
from such wrongful attachment may arise and be decided separately from the merits of the main
action. As noted by the Court in Philippine Charter Insurance Corp. v. Court of Appeals:
[52]
""

The surety does not, to be sure, become liable on its bond simply because
judgment is subsequently rendered against the party who obtained the preliminary
attachment. The surety becomes liable only when and if "the court shall finally
adjudge that the applicant was not entitled to the attachment." This is so regardless
of the nature and character of the judgment on the merits of the principal claims,
counterclaims or cross-claims, etc. asserted by the parties against each other.
Indeed, since an applicant's cause of action may be entirely different from the
ground relied upon by him for a preliminary attachment, it may well be that
although the evidence warrants judgment in favor of said applicant, the proofs may
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nevertheless also establish that said applicant's proferred ground for attachment
was inexistent or specious and hence, the writ should not have issued at all;i.e., he
was not entitled thereto in the first place. In that event, the final verdict should logically
award to the applicant the relief sought in his basic pleading, but at the same time
sentence himusually on the basis of a counterclaimto pay damages caused to his
adversary by the wrongful attachment. [Emphasis supplied.]

Moreover, a separate ruleSection 8, Rule 58 covers instances when it is the trial court that
awards damages upon the bond for preliminary injunction of the adverse party. Tellingly, it requires
that the amount of damages to be awarded be claimed, ascertained, and awarded under the same
procedure prescribed in Section 20 of Rule 57.

In this case, we are confronted with a situation wherein the determination that the attachment
was wrongful did not come from the trial court, or any court having jurisdiction over the main action.
It was rendered by the Court of Appeals in the exercise of its certiorari jurisdiction in the original
action reviewing the propriety of the issuance of the Writ of Preliminary Attachment against the
private respondents. Said ruling attained finality when it was affirmed by this Court.

The courts are thus bound to respect the conclusiveness of this final judgment, deeming as it
does the allowance by the RTC of preliminary attachment as improper. This conclusion is no longer
subject to review, even by the court called upon to resolve the application for damages on the
attachment bond. The only matter left for adjudication is the proper amount of damages.

Nevertheless, Section 20, Rule 57 explicitly provides that the award for damages be included
in the judgment on the main case. This point was apparently not lost on the Court of Appeals when it
rendered itsResolutiondated23 March 1998, certifying that the case may now be referred to the
Raffle Committee for assignment to aponente. The appellate court stated therein: The Resolution of
defendants-appellants motion for judgment on the attachment may be incorporated in the decision by
the ponente for study and report, HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/
[53]
sep2005/135830.htm" \l "_ftn53" \o "" and such observation is in conformity with Section 20.

However, this reasoning was assailed by respondents, who argued that the motion for
judgment on the attachment bond was a pending incident that should be decided before the case can be
re-raffled to aponentefor decision. Respondents may be generally correct on the point that a case can
only be deemed submitted for decision only after all pending incidents are resolved. Yet since Section
20, Rule 57 provides that their application for damages on the attachment bond shall be included in
the judgment on the main case, it is clear that the award for damages need not be resolved before the
case is submitted for decision, but should instead be resolved and included in the judgment on the
main case, or the decision on theAppeal by Certiorarifiled by the respondents.

Thus, the action of the Court of Appeals in resolving the application for damages even before
the main judgment was issued does not conform to Section 20, Rule 57. However, the special
particular circumstances of this case lead us to rule that such error is not mortal to the award of
damages.
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As noted earlier, the award of damages was made after a proper hearing had occurred wherein
all the concerned parties had been given the opportunity to present their arguments and evidence in
support and in rebuttal of the application for damages. The premature award of damages does not
negate the fact that the parties were accorded due process, and indeed availed of their right to be
heard.

Moreover, we are compelled to appreciate the particular circumstance in this case that the
right of private respondents to acquire relief through the award of damages on account of the wrongful
preliminary attachment has been conclusively affirmed by the highest court of the land. This differs
from the normal situation under Section 20, Rule 57 wherein the court having jurisdiction over the
main action is still required to ascertain whether the applicant actually has a right to damages. To
mandatorily require that the award of damages be included in the judgment in the main case makes all
the sense if the right to damages would be ascertained at the same time the main judgment is made.
However, when the said right is already made viable by reason of a final judgment which is no longer
subject to review, there should be no unnecessary impediments to its immediate implementation.

And finally, any ruling on our part voiding the award of damages solely for the reason that it was not
included in the judgment on the main case, and remanding the motion to the Court of Appeals for
proper adjudication together with the main case may exhibit fealty to the letter of the procedural rule,
but not its avowed aims of promoting a just and speedy disposition of every action and proceeding.
After all, if we were to compel the Court of Appeals to decide again on the application for damages
and incorporate its ruling in the judgment on the main action, the appellate court will be examining
exactly the same evidence and applying exactly the same rules as it already did when it issued the
assailed resolution awarding damages on the bond. This would be unnecessarily redundant especially
considering that the Supreme Court had already affirmed that there was wrongful attachment in this
case.

There is also the fact that remanding the question of damages, singly for the purpose of
adhering to the letter of the procedural rule, would further prolong the resolution of the main case,
which has been with the Court of Appeals for more than nine years now. HYPERLINK "http://
[54]
sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/sep2005/135830.htm" \l "_ftn54" \o "" Our Rules of Court
precisely requires liberal construction of the procedural rules to promote the objective of securing a
just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of every action and proceeding. HYPERLINK "http://
[55]
sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/sep2005/135830.htm" \l "_ftn55" \o "" With this precept,
all the more justification is supplied for allowing the award for damages despite its apparent
prematurity, if it is in all other respects proper.

The same reasons apply in resolving the question of whether the Court of Appeals could have
decided theMotion for Judgment on the Attachment Bondconsidering that the case had not yet been
re-raffled under the two-raffle system for study and report. Under Section 5, Rule 3 of the RIRCA, a
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case filed with the Court of Appeals undergoes two raffles for assignment to a particular Justice. The
first raffle is made for completion of records. HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/
[56]
2005/sep2005/135830.htm" \l "_ftn56" \o "" Afterwards, all raffled appealed cases, the records of
which have been completed and submitted for decision, shall be re-raffled for assignment to a Justice
for study and report. HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/
[57]
sep2005/135830.htm" \l "_ftn57" \o ""

The fact that Section 20, Rule 57 provides that the award of damages on the attachment bond
shall be included in the judgment on the main case necessarily implies that it is to be made only after
the case has been re-raffled for study and report, and concurrently decided with the judgment of
theponentein the main case. Again, the Court of Appeals failed to consider Section 20, Rule 57 when
it acted upon the application even before the second raffle was made.

Had Section 20, Rule 57 been faithfully complied with, a different Justice of the Court of
Appeals would have penned the ruling on the application for damages, in accordance with the RIRCA.
Yet this circumstance does not outweigh the other considerations earlier mentioned that would warrant
a liberal interpretation of the procedural rules in favor of respondents. The parties had adduced all
their arguments and evidence before the Court of Appeals, and indeed, these were appreciated on first
instance by Justice Demetria, who eventually penned the assailed resolutions. There was already a
final determination that the attachment was wrongful. And any delay brought about by requiring that it
be theponencia, determined after the second raffle, who decides the application for damages may
bearpro formaadherence to the letter of the rule, but would only cause the delay of the resolution of
this long-pending case. Procedural rules are designed, and must therefore be so interpreted as, to give
effect to lawful and valid claims and not to frustrate them. HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/
[58]

Even SIDDCOR acknowledges that there are recognized instances where the award of
damages or judgment on the attachment bond may not be included in the decision on the main case,
such as if the main case was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction and no claim for damages could have
been presented in the main case. HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/
[59]
sep2005/135830.htm" \l "_ftn59" \o ""

Scope of Damages
Properly Awardable

Next, we examine the particular award of damages made in this case, consisting ofP15,384,509.98,
plus interest, as well asP1,000,000.00 as attorneys fees. There seems to be no dispute that the former
amount constituted the amount drawn against the account of Sandoval by reason of the writ of
execution issued by the trial court on 27 May 1996. This fact was confirmed by the PNB, in
itsManifestationdated19 July 1996, confirming the garnishment.

Respondents burden in proving damages in this case was considerably lessened by the fact that there
was already a final judgment, no longer subject to review, that the preliminary attachment allowed by
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the trial court was indeed wrongful. Hence, all that was necessary to be proved was the amount of
damage actually sustained by respondents by reason of the wrongful attachment. It is unquestioned
that by virtue of the writ of preliminary attachment, aNotice of Garnishmentwas served upon the
PNB over deposit accounts maintained by respondents. SaidNotice of Garnishmentplaced under the
control of the RTC all the accounts maintained by respondents, and prevented the transfer or
disposition of these accounts. HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/
[60]
sep2005/135830.htm" \l "_ftn60" \o "" Then the subsequentWrit of Executiondated27 May
1996ordered the delivery to Carlos of these accounts earlier subjected to garnishment. HYPERLINK
[61]
"http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/sep2005/135830.htm" \l "_ftn61" \o ""

Clearly, the amount of actual pecuniary loss sustained by respondents has been well established.
TheManifestationsubmitted by the PNB further affirmed the actual amount seized by Carlos, an
amount which could not have been acquired had it not been for the writ of preliminary attachment
which was wrongfully issued.

Carlos lamely argues in his petition that there was no concrete or supporting evidence to justify the
amount of actual damages, a claim that is belied by the official case records. The more substantive
argument is presented by SIDDCOR, which submits that any damages that may be awarded to
respondents can include only those that were incurred, if any, during the pendency of the appeal. But
this contention is belied by Section 4, Rule 57 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides
that the bond issued for preliminary attachment is conditioned that the applicant will pay all the costs
which may be adjudged to the adverse partyand all damages which he may sustain by reason of
the attachment, if the court shall finally adjudge that the applicant was not entitled thereto.
[62]
""

The caseParamount Insurance Corp. v. Court of Appeals HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/
[63]
jurisprudence/2005/sep2005/135830.htm" \l "_ftn63" \o "" is instructive. It discusses the scope of
the bond executed by upon an application for preliminary injunction, HYPERLINK "http://
[64]
sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/sep2005/135830.htm" \l "_ftn64" \o "" which similarly
covers all damages which [may be] sustain[ed] by reason of the injunction or temporary restraining
order if the court should finally decide that the applicant was not entitled thereto. HYPERLINK
[65]
"http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/sep2005/135830.htm" \l "_ftn65" \o "" The surety
in that case claimed that it could be liable only to the amount of damages accruing from the time the
injunction bond was issued until the termination of the case, and not from the time the suit was
commenced. HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/sep2005/135830.htm" \l
[66]
"_ftn66" \o "" In rebutting this claim, the Court ruled:

. . . . Rule 58, Section 4(b), provides that a bond is executed in favor of the party enjoined
to answer for all damages which he may sustain by reason of the injunction. This Court
already had occasion to rule on this matter in Mendoza v. Cruz, where it held that "(t)he
injunction bond is intended as a security for damages in case it is finally decided that the
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injunction ought not to have been granted. It is designed to cover all damages which
the party enjoined can possibly suffer. Its principal purpose is to protect the
enjoined party against loss or damage by reason of an injunction." No distinction
was made as to when the damages should have been incurred. HYPERLINK "http://
[67]

Our ruling inPhilippine Charter Insurance Corp. v. Court of Appeals, relied upon by the Court of
Appeals, squarely applies to this case:

Under the circumstances, too, there can be no gainsaying the suretys full
awareness of its undertakings under its bond: that, as the law puts it: "the plaintiff will
pay all costs which may be adjudged to the defendant(s), and all damages which may be
sustained by reason of the attachment, if the same shall finally be adjudged to have been
wrongful and without cause," and that those damages plainly comprehended not only
those sustained during the trial of the action but also those during the pendency of the
appeal. This is the law, and this is how the surety's liability should be understood. The
surety's liability may be enforced whether the application for damages for wrongful
attachment be submitted in the original proceedings before the Trial Court, or on appeal,
so long as the judgment has not become executory.The surety's liability is not and
cannot be limited to the damages caused by the improper attachment only during
the pendency of the appeal. That would be absurd. The plain and patent intendment
of the law is that the surety shall answer for all damages that the party may suffer as
a result of the illicit attachment, for all the time that the attachment was in force;
from levy to dissolution.. . .

The fact that the second paragraph of the rule speaks only of "damages
sustained during the pendency of the appeal" is of no moment; it obviously proceeds
from the assumption in the first paragraph that the award for the damages suffered
during the pendency of the case in the trial court was in fact "included in the final
judgment" (or applied for therein before the appeal was perfected or the judgment
became executory); hence, it states that the damages additionally suffered thereafter, i.e.,
during the pendency of the appeal, should be claimed before the judgment of the
appellate tribunal becomes executory.It however bears repeating that where. as in the
case at bar, the judgment of the Trial Court has expressly or impliedly sustained the
attachment and thus has given rise to no occasion to speak of, much less, file an
application for damages for wrongful attachment, and it is only in the decision of the
Court of Appeals that the attachment is declared wrongful and that the applicant
"was not entitled thereto," the rule is, as it should be, that it is entirely proper at this
time for the application for damages for such wrongful attachment to be filedi.e., for
all the damages sustained thereby, during all the time that it was in force, not only
during the pendency of the appeal. . . . HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/
[68]

Page 189 of 193

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The rule is thus well-settled that the bond issued upon an application for preliminary
attachment answers for all damages, incurred at whatever stage, which are sustained by reason of the
attachment. The award of actual damages by the Court of Appeals is thus proper in amount. However,
we disagree that the rate of legal interest be counted from the date of the unlawful garnishment, or
on27 June 1996. Properly, interest should start to accrue only from the moment it had been finally
determined that the attachment was unlawful, since it is on that basis that the right to damages comes
to existence. In this case, legal interest commences from the date the Court of Appeals decision in CA-
G.R. SP No. 39267 became final, by reason of its affirmation by this Court.

The award of attorneys fees in the amount ofP1,000,000.00 is also questioned before this Court,
considering that the Court of Appeals did not award moral or exemplary damages. The general rule
may be that an award of attorneys fees should be deleted where the award of moral and exemplary
damages are eliminated. HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/
[69]
sep2005/135830.htm" \l "_ftn69" \o "" Nonetheless, attorneys fees may be awarded under the
Civil Code where the court deems it just and equitable that attorneys fees and expenses of litigation
should be recovered, HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/
[70]
sep2005/135830.htm" \l "_ftn70" \o "" even if moral and exemplary damages are unavailing.
[71]
""

Particularly, the Court has recognized as just and equitable that attorney's fees be awarded when a
party is compelled to incur expenses to lift a wrongfully issued writ of attachment. HYPERLINK
[72]
"http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/sep2005/135830.htm" \l "_ftn72" \o "" The amount
of money garnished, and the length of time respondents have been deprived from use of their money
by reason of the wrongful attachment, all militate towards a finding that attorneys fees are just and
equitable under the circumstances. However, we deem the amount ofP1,000,000.00 as excessive, and
modify the award of attorneys fees to P500,000.00 which represents merely approximately three
percent of the actual damages suffered by and awarded to respondents. We also delete the imposition
of legal interest made by the Court of Appeals on the awarded attorneys fees.

Other Issues Raised in G.R. No. 135830

The issues raised in G.R. No. 136035 have been dispensed with, and the remaining issues in G.R. No.
135830 are relatively minor.There is no need to dwell at length on them.

Carlos insists that respondents were liable to have paid docket fees upon filing of theirMotion for
Judgment on Attachment Bond, on the theory that they claimed therein for the first time the alleged
damages resulting from the dissolved attachment. The said motion is characterized as an initiatory
proceeding because it is claimed therein for the first time, the damages arising from the attachment. In
the same vein, Carlos argues that the absence of a certification against forum-shopping attached to the
motion renders the said motion as fatal. Again, it is pointed out that initiatory pleadings must contain
the said certification against forum-shopping.

Our ruling in Santo Tomas University Hospital v. Surla HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/
Page 190 of 193

Batch 3 1-19-3 25/07/2017, 2:22 AM
[73]
jurisprudence/2005/sep2005/135830.htm" \l "_ftn73" \o "" is instructive. It was argued therein
that the requirement of the certification against forum-shopping, as contained in Administrative
Circular No. 04-94, HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/
[74]
sep2005/135830.htm" \l "_ftn74" \o "" covered compulsory counterclaims. The Court ruled
otherwise:

It bears stressing, once again, that the real office of Administrative Circular No.
04-94, made effective on01 April 1994, is to curb the malpractice commonly referred to
also as forum-shopping. . . . The language of the circular distinctly suggests that it is
primarily intended to cover an initiatory pleading or an incipient application of a party
asserting a claim for relief.

It should not be too difficult, the foregoing rationale of the circular aptly
taken, to sustain the view that the circular in question has not, in fact, been
contemplated to include a kind of claim which, by its very nature as being
auxiliary to the proceeding in the suit and as deriving its substantive and
jurisdictional support therefrom, can only be appropriately pleaded in the answer
and not remain outstanding for independent resolution except by the court where
the main case pends. Prescinding from the foregoing, the proviso in the second
paragraph of Section 5, Rule 8, of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, i.e., that the
violation of the anti-forum shopping rule "shall not be curable by mere amendment . . .
but shall be cause for the dismissal of the case without prejudice," being predicated on
the applicability of the need for a certification against forum shopping,obviously does
not include a claim which cannot be independently set up. HYPERLINK "http://
[75]
"" (Emphasis supplied.)

It is clear that under Section 20, Rule 57, the application for damages on the attachment bond cannot
be independently set up, but must be filed in the main case, before the judgment therein becomes final
and executory. Santo Tomas squarely applies in determining that no certification against forum-
shopping was required in theMotion for Judgment on the Attachment Bond. The same reasoning also
sustains a ruling that neither legal fees were requiredfor the filing of the said motion. Section 1, Rule
141 of the Rules of Court provides that legal fees are prescribed upon the filing of the pleading or
other application which initiates an action or proceeding. HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/
[76]
jurisprudence/2005/sep2005/135830.htm" \l "_ftn76" \o "" Since the said application for
judgment on the attachment bond cannot be considered as an initiatory pleading, as it cannot be
independently set up from the main action, it is not likewise chargeable with legal fees.

As to the issue relating to the otherResolutiondated26 June 1998denying the motion to dismiss
appeal on the ground of forum-shopping, we find Carloss arguments as unmeritorious. Forum-
shopping allegedly existed because petitioners had filed two cases before the Court of Appeals, CA-
G.R. CV No. 53229, and thePetitionfor Certiorariwith Temporary Restraining Orderdated2 June
1996attacking the allowance of execution pending appeal. Evidently, the two causes of action in these
Page 191 of 193

Batch 3 1-19-3 25/07/2017, 2:22 AM
two petitions are different, CA-G.R. CV No. 53229 being an appeal from the Summary
Judgmentrendered by the RTC, and the second petition assailing the subsequent allowance by the
RTC of execution pending appeal. There is no identity between these two causes of action that would
warrant a finding of forum-shopping.

Issues Raised in G.R. No. 137743

To recount, respondents, having obtained a favorable decision on theirMotion for Judgment on the
Attachment Bond, filed aMotion for Immediate Executionof the award of damages. This was granted
by the Court of Appeals in itsResolutiondated 16 October 1998, said resolution now specifically
assailed by SIDDCOR in G.R. No. 137743.

In theirMotion for Immediate Execution, respondents theory in seeking the immediate execution of
the award of damages was that said award was not subject to appeal, the ruling thereupon being an
interlocutory order. HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/
[77]
sep2005/135830.htm" \l "_ftn77" \o "" This position was not adopted by the Court of Appeals in
its16 October 1998Resolution, which was otherwise favorably disposed to respondents. Instead, the
Court of Appeals predicated the immediate execution on the following grounds: (1) that the judicial
finding that the writ of preliminary attachment was wrongful was already final and beyond review; (2)
there were no material and substantial defenses against the motion for the issuance of the judgment
bond; (3) Sandoval was elderly and sickly, without means of livelihood and may not be able to enjoy
the fruits of the judgment on the attachment bond; (4) that immediate execution would end her
suffering caused by the arbitrary garnishment of her PNB account.

There is no doubt that a judgment on the attachment bond is a final and appealable order. As stated
earlier, it is, under normal course, included in the main judgment, which in turn is final and
appealable. Respondents admit that they had erred in earlier characterizing the said judgment as an
interlocutory order. Still, SIDDCOR argues that such earlier error is fatal, and that the Court of
Appeals abused its discretion in ruling on the motion on a theory different from that urged on by
respondents.

By no means could respondents be deemed as estopped from changing their legal theory, since the rule
on estoppel applies to questions of fact and not questions of law. HYPERLINK "http://
[78]
sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/sep2005/135830.htm" \l "_ftn78" \o "" Moreover, courts
are empowered to decide cases even if the parties raise legal rationales other than that which would
actually apply in the case. The basis of whether respondents are entitled to immediate execution arises
from law, particularly Section 2(a), Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, and not solely on whatever
allegations may be raised by the movant.

Thus, we find no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Court of Appeals, even though it allowed
execution pending appeal on a legal basis different from that originally adduced by respondents. After
all, the reasoning ultimately employed by the appellate court is correct, and it hardly would be
judicious to require the lower court to adhere to the movants erroneous ratiocination and preclude the
proper application of the law.

Page 192 of 193

Batch 3 1-19-3 25/07/2017, 2:22 AM
We need not review in length the justification of the Court of Appeals in allowing execution pending
appeal. The standard set under Section 2(a), Rule 39 merely requires good reasons, a special order,
and due hearing. Due hearing would not require a hearing in open court, but simply the right to be
heard, which SIDDCOR availed of when it filed its opposition to the motion for immediate execution.
TheResolutiondated16 October 1998satisfies the special order requirement, and it does enumerate at
length the good reasons for allowing execution pending appeal. As to the appreciation of good
reasons, we simply note that the advanced age alone of Sandoval would have sufficiently justified
execution pending appeal, pursuant to the well-settled jurisprudential rule. HYPERLINK "http://
[79]
sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/sep2005/135830.htm" \l "_ftn79" \o "" The wrongfulness
of the attachment, and the length of time respondents have been deprived of their money by reason of
the wrongful attachment further justifies execution pending appeal under these circumstances.

WHEREFORE, the petitions are DISMISSED. The Temporary Restraining Order issued in
theResolutiondated9 June 1999is hereby LIFTED. The assailedResolutionof the Court of Appeals
Special Fourth Division dated 26 June 1998 is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATIONS that the legal
interest on the award of actual damages should commence from the date of the finality of
theDecisionof the Court of Appeals in CA G.R. SP No. 39267 and that the award of attorneys fees is
in the amount ofP500,000. Costs against petitioners.

SO ORDERED.

Page 193 of 193

Batch 3 1-19-3

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Persons and Family Relations Batch 3 cases 1-19

1. REPUBLIC OF THEPHILIPPINES, vs JENNIFER B. CAGANDAHAN,

The facts are as follows.

The Court is convinced that petitioner has satisfactorily shown that he is

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Civil Register of Pakil, Laguna is

a)By changing the name from Jennifer Cagandahan to JEFF

b)By changing the gender from female to MALE.

It is likewise ordered that petitioners school records, voters registry,

The issues raised by petitioner are:

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE PETITION CONSIDERING

THE REQUIREMENTS OF RULES 103 AND 108 OF THE RULES OF COURT

CORRECTION OF ENTRY UNDER RULE 108 DOES NOT ALLOW CHANGE OF

Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of Court provide:

(c)The name asked for.

SEC. 6.Service of judgment. Judgments or orders rendered in connection with this

SEC. 2.Entries subject to cancellation or correction. Upongood and valid grounds,

SEC. 3.Parties. When cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil register is

Together with Article 376 HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2008/

CAH is one of many conditions HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2008/

Intersex individuals are treated in different ways by different cultures. In most

subjects birth certificate entry is in order.

WHEREFORE, the Republics petition isDENIED.The Decision datedJanuary 12, 2005of

2. ROMMEL JACINTO DANTES SILVERIO vs REPUBLIC

On June 4, 2003, the trial court rendered a decision HYPERLINK "http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/

The [c]ourt rules in the affirmative.

On February 23, 2006, the Court of Appeals HYPERLINK "http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2007/

The petition lacks merit.

A Persons First Name Cannot Be Changed On the Ground of Sex Reassignment

RA 9048 now governs the change of first name. HYPERLINK "http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/

(3) The change will avoid confusion.

Section 2(c) of RA 9048 defines what a "clerical or typographical error" is:

xxx xxx xxx

ART. 408. The following shall be entered in the civil register:

Moreover, Section 5 of Act 3753 (the Civil Register Law) provides:

xxx xxx xxx (emphasis supplied)

WHEREFORE, the petition is herebyDENIED.

Costs against petitioner.

3. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs LIBERTY D. ALBIOS

Ruling of the RTC

In its April 25, 2008 Decision, HYPERLINK "http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/oct2013/

SO ORDERED. HYPERLINK "http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/oct2013/

Not in conformity, the OSG filed an appeal before the CA.

Hence, this petition.

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED ON A QUESTION OF LAWWHEN IT HELD

On October 29, 2012, Albios filed her Comment HYPERLINK "http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/

Ruling of the Court

The Court resolves in the negative.

Marriage Fraud in Immigration

time of their marriage, HYPERLINK "http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/oct2013/

United States v. Rubenstein HYPERLINK "http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/oct2013/

The Court now turns to the case at hand.

Respondents marriage not void

4. MERCEDITA MATA ARAES,petitioner vsJUDGE SALVADOR M. OCCIANO,respondent.

be imposed on respondent judge.

5. ENGRACE NIAL vs. NORMA BAYADOG,

gr_133778_2000.html" \l "fnt7" 7 HYPERLINK "http://www.lawphil.net/

This is reiterated in the Family Code thus:

6 .HERMINIA BORJA-MANZANO vs.JUDGE ROQUE R. SANCHEZ

We find merit in the complaint.

Article 34 of the Family Code provides:

2. The parties must have no legal impediment to marry each other;

ACCORDINGLY, the recommendation of the Court Administrator is hereby ADOPTED,with

7. Rep. Vs Jose Dayot