Marcos, petitioner Aquinos power to bar his return in the country.
He also
VS.
Manglapus, respondent (Part 1)
Facts:
Former President Ferdinand E. Marcos was deposed from the
presidency via the non-violent people power revolution and
was forced into exile. Marcos, in his deathbed, has signified his
wish to return to the Philippines to die. But President Corazon
Aquino, considering the dire consequences to the nation of his
return at a time when the stability of government is threatened
from various directions and the economy is just beginning to rise
and move forward, has stood firmly on the decision to bar the
return of Marcos and his family.
Aquino barred Marcos from returning due to possible threats &
following supervening events:
1. failed Manila Hotel coup in 1986 led by Marcos leaders
2. channel 7 taken over by rebels & loyalists
3. plan of Marcoses to return w/ mercenaries aboard a
chartered plane of a Lebanese arms dealer. This is to
prove that they can stir trouble from afar
4. Honasans failed coup
5. Communist insurgency movements
6. secessionist movements in Mindanao
7. devastated economy because of
1. accumulated foreign debt
2. plunder of nation by Marcos & cronies
Marcos filed for a petition of mandamus and prohibition to order
the respondents to issue them their travel documents and
prevent the implementation of President Aquinos decision to bar
Marcos from returning in the Philippines. Petitioner questions
questioned the claim of the President that the decision was
made in the interest of national security, public safety and health.
Petitioner also claimed that the President acted outside her
jurisdiction.
According to the Marcoses, such act deprives them of their right
to life, liberty, property without due process and equal protection
of the laws. They also said that it deprives them of their right to
travel which according to Section 6, Article 3 of the constitution,
may only be impaired by a court order.
Issue:
1. Whether or not, in the exercise of the powers granted by
the Constitution, the President may prohibit the Marcoses
from returning to the Philippines.
2. Whether or not the President acted arbitrarily or with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction when she determined that the return of the
Marcoses to the Philippines poses a serious threat to
national interest and welfare and decided to bar their
return.
Decision:
No to both issues. Petition dismissed.
Ratio:
Separation of power dictates that each department has exclusive
powers. According to Section 1, Article VII of the 1987 Philippine
Constitution, the executive power shall be vested in the
President of the Philippines. However, it does not define what is
meant by executive power although in the same article it
touches on exercise of certain powers by the President, i.e., the
power of control over all executive departments, bureaus and
offices, the power to execute the laws, the appointing power to
grant reprieves, commutations and pardons (art VII secfs. 14-
23). Although the constitution outlines tasks of the president, this
list is not defined & exclusive. She has residual & discretionary
powers not stated in the Constitution which include the power to
protect the general welfare of the people. She is obliged to
protect the people, promote their welfare & advance national
interest. (Art. II, Sec. 4-5 of the Constitution). Residual powers,
according to Theodore Roosevelt, dictate that the President can
do anything which is not forbidden in the Constitution (Corwin,
supra at 153), inevitable to vest discretionary powers on the
President (Hyman, American President) and that the president
has to maintain peace during times of emergency but also on the
day-to-day operation of the State.
The rights Marcoses are invoking are not absolute. Theyre
flexible depending on the circumstances. The request of the
Marcoses to be allowed to return to the Philippines cannot be
considered in the light solely of the constitutional provisions
guaranteeing liberty of abode and the right to travel, subject to
certain exceptions, or of case law which clearly never
contemplated situations even remotely similar to the present
one. It must be treated as a matter that is appropriately
addressed to those residual unstated powers of the President
which are implicit in and correlative to the paramount duty
residing in that office to safeguard and protect general welfare.
In that context, such request or demand should submit to the
exercise of a broader discretion on the part of the President to
determine whether it must be granted or denied.
For issue number 2, the question for the court to determine is
whether or not there exist factual basis for the President to
conclude that it was in the national interest to bar the return of
the Marcoses in the Philippines. It is proven that there are factual
bases in her decision. The supervening events that happened
before her decision are factual. The President must take
preemptive measures for the self-preservation of the country &
protection of the people. She has to uphold the Constitution.
.R. No. 146738 Estrada vs. Arroyo
G.R. No 146710-15 Estrada vs. Desierto
March 2, 2001
FACTS:
Estrada was inaugurated as president of the Republic of the
Philippines on June 30, 1998 with Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo as
his Vice President.
In October 2000, Ilocos Sur governor Luis Chavit Singson, a
close friend of the President, alleged that he had personally
given Estrada money as payoff from jueteng hidden in a bank
account known as Jose Velarde a grassroots-based numbers
game. Singsons allegation also caused controversy across the
nation, which culminated in the House of Representatives filing
of an impeachment case against Estrada on November 13,
2000. House Speaker Manny Villar fast-tracked the
impeachment complaint. The impeachment suit was brought to
the Senate and an impeachment court was formed, with Chief
Justice Hilario Davide, Jr. as presiding officer. Estrada, pleaded
not guilty.
The expos immediately ignited reactions of rage. On January
18, a crowd continued to grow at EDSA, bolstered by students
from private schools and left-wing organizations. Activists from
the group Bayan and Akbayan as well as lawyers of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines and other bar associations
joined in the thousands of protesters.
On January 19, The Philippine National Police and the Armed
Forces of the Philippines also withdrew their support for Estrada
and joined the crowd at EDSA Shrine.
At 2:00pm, Estrada appeared on television for the first time since
the beginning of the protests and maintains that he will not
resign. He said that he wanted the impeachment trial to
continue, stressing that only a guilty verdict will remove him from
office.
At 6:15pm, Estrada again appeared on television, calling for a
snap presidential election to be held concurrently with
congressional and local elections on May 14, 2001. He added
that he will not run in this election.
OnJanuary 20, the Supreme Court declared that the seat of
presidency was vacant, saying that Estrada constructively
resigned his post. Noon of the same day, Gloria Macapagal-
Arroyo took her oath of office in the presence of the crowd at
EDSA, becoming the 14th president of the Philippines.
At 2:00 pm, Estrada released a letter saying he had strong and
serious doubts about the legality and constitutionality of her
proclamation as president, but saying he would give up his
office to avoid being an obstacle to healing the nation. Estrada
and his family later left Malacaang Palace.
A heap of cases then succeeded Estradas leaving the palace,
which he countered by filing a peition for prohibition with a prayer
for a writ of preliminary injunction. It sought to enjoin the
respondent Ombudsman from conducting any further
proceedings in cases filed against him not until his term as
president ends. He also prayed for judgment confirming
petitioner to be the lawful and incumbent President of the
Republic of the Philippines temporarily unable to discharge the
duties of his office, and declaring respondent to have taken her
oath as and to be holding the Office of the President, only in an
acting capacity pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution.
ISSUE:
1.) Whether or not the case at bar a political or justiciable
issue. If justiciable, whether or not petitioner Estrada was a
president-on-leave or did he truly resign.
2.) Whether or not petitioner may invokeimmunity from suits.
HELD:
The Court defines a political issue as those questions which,
under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their
sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary
authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive
branch of the government. It is concerned with issues
dependent upon the wisdom, not legality of a particular
measure.
The Court made a distinction between the Aquino
presidency and the Arroyo presidency. The Court said that
while the Aquino government was a government spawned
by the direct demand of the people in defiance to the 1973
Constitution, overthrowing the old government entirely, the
Arroyo government on the other hand was a government
exercising under the 1987 constitution, wherein only the
office of the president was affected. In the former, it The
question of whether the previous president (president
Estrada) truly resigned subjects it to judicial review. The
Court held that the issue is legal and not political.
For the president to be deemed as having resigned, there must
be an intent to resign and the intent must be coupled by
acts of relinquishment. It is important to follow the succession
of events that struck petitioner prior his leaving the palace.
Furthermore, the quoted statements extracted from the Angara
diaries, detailed Estradas implied resignation On top of all these,
the press release he issued regarding is acknowledgement of
the oath-taking of Arroyo as president despite his questioning of
its legality and his emphasis on leaving the presidential seat for
the sake of peace. The Court held that petitioner Estrada had
resigned by the use of the totality test: prior,
contemporaneous and posterior facts and circumstantial
evidence bearing a material relevance on the issue.
As to the issue of the peitioners contention that he is immuned
from suits, the Court held that petitioner is no longer entitled to
absolute immunity from suit. The Court added that, given the
intent of the 1987 Constitution to breathe life to the policy that a
public office is a public trust, the petitioner, as a non-sitting
President, cannot claim executive immunity for his alleged
criminal acts committed while a sitting President. From the
deliberations, the intent of the framers is clear that the
immunity of the president from suit is concurrent only with
his tenure(the term during which the incumbent actually holds
office) and not his term (time during which the officer may claim
to hold the office as of right, and fixes the interval after which the
several incumbents shall succeed one another).
Soliven v makasiar
Luis Beltran is among the petitioners in this case. He, together
with others, was charged with libel by the then president
Corzaon Aquino. Cory herself filed a complaint-affidavit against
him and others. Makasiar averred that Cory cannot file a
complaint affidavit because this would defeat her immunity from
suit. He grounded his contention on the principle that a president
cannot be sued. However, if a president would sue then the
president would allow herself to be placed under the courts
jurisdiction and conversely she would be consenting to be sued
back. Also, considering the functions of a president, the
president may not be able to appear in court to be a witness for
herself thus she may be liable for contempt.
ISSUE: Whether or not such immunity can be invoked by
Beltran, a person other than the president.
HELD: No. The rationale for the grant to the President of the
privilege of immunity from suit is to assure the exercise of
Presidential duties and functions free from any hindrance or
distraction, considering that being the Chief Executive of the
Government is a job that, aside from requiring all of the office-
holders time, also demands undivided attention.
But this privilege of immunity from suit, pertains to the President
by virtue of the office and may be invoked only by the holder of
the office; not by any other person in the Presidents behalf.
Thus, an accused like Beltran et al, in a criminal case in which
the President is the complainant cannot raise the presidential
privilege as a defense to prevent the case from proceeding
against such accused.
Moreover, there is nothing in our laws that would prevent the
President from waiving the privilege. Thus, if so minded the
President may shed the protection afforded by the privilege
and submit to the courts jurisdiction. The choice of whether to
exercise the privilege or to waive it is solely the Presidents
prerogative. It is a decision that cannot be assumed and
imposed by any other person.
SIXTO S. BRILLANTES, JR., petitioner,
JOSE CONCEPCION, JR., JOSE DE VENECIA, EDGARDO J.
ANGARA, DR. JAIME Z. GALVEZ-TAN, FRANKLIN M.
DRILON, FRISCO SAN JUAN, NORBERTO M. GONZALES,
HONESTO M. GUTIERREZ, ISLETA, AND JOSE A.
BERNAS, Petitioners-in-Intervention,
vs.COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.
Facts:
Comelec issued resolutions adopting an Automated Elections
System including the assailed resolution, Resolution 6712, which
provides for the electronic transmission of advanced result of
unofficial count. Petitioners claimed that the resolution would
allow the preemption and usurpation of the exclusive power of
Congress to canvass the votes for President and Vice-President
and would likewise encroach upon the authority of NAMFREL,
as the citizens accredited arm, to conduct the "unofficial" quick
count as provided under pertinent election laws. Comelec
contended that the resolution was promulgated in the exercise of
its executive and administrative power "to ensure free, orderly,
honest, peaceful and credible elections Comelec added that the
issue is beyond judicial determination.
Issue:
Whether or not Comelec's promulgation of Resolution 6712 was
justified.
constitutional and/or statutory basis. Moreover, the assailed
COMELEC resolution likewise contravened the constitutional
provision that "no money shall be paid out of the treasury except
in pursuance of an appropriation made by law." It being
unofficial, any disbursement of public fund would be contrary to
the provisions of the Constitution and Rep. Act No. 9206, which
is the 2003 General Appropriations Act.
The Omnibus Election Code in providing the powers and
functions of the Commission subjects the same to certain
conditions with respect to the adoption of the latest technological
and electronic devices, to wit: (1)consideration of the area and
available funds (2) notification to all political parties and
candidates. The aforementioned conditions were found to have
not been substantially met.

Ruling:
Resolution 6712 was null and void.

The Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to

lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing Resolution 6712. The
issue squarely fell within the ambit of the expanded jurisdiction of
the court.

Article VII, Section 4 of the Constitution, further bolstered by RA

8436, vest upon Congress the sole and exclusive authority to
officially canvass the votes for the elections of President and
Vice-President. Section 27 of Rep. Act No. 7166, as amended by
Rep. Act No. 8173, and reiterated in Section 18 of Rep. Act No.
8436, solely authorize NAMFREL, the duly-accredited citizens
arm to conduct the unofficial counting of votes for the national or
local elections. The quick count under the guise of an unofficial
tabulation would not only be preemptive of the authority of
congress and NAMFREL, but would also be lacking
 Pormento v Estrada
I. THE FACTS
Private respondent Joseph Erap Ejercito Estrada was elected
President of the Republic of the Philippines in the general elections held
on May 11, 1998. He was however ousted [resigned according to the
decision of the Supreme Court in Estrada vs. Arroyo, G.R. No.
146738, March 2, 2001] from office and was not able to finish his term.
He sought the presidency again in the general elections held on May 10,
2010. Petitioner Atty. Evillo C. Pormento opposed Eraps candidacy and
filed a petition for the latters disqualification, which was however denied
by the COMELEC 2nd Division. His motion for reconsideration was
subsequently denied by the COMELEC en banc.
Petitioner filed the instant petition for certiorari on May 7, 2010.
However, under the Rules of Court, the filing of such petition would not
stay the execution of the judgment, final order or resolution of the
COMELEC that is sought to be reviewed. Besides, petitioner did not even
pray for the issuance of a temporary restraining order or writ of preliminary
injunction. Hence, private respondent was able to participate as a
candidate for the position of President in the May 10, 2010 elections
where he garnered the second highest number of votes.
II. THE ISSUE
What is the proper interpretation of the following provision of
Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution: [t]he President shall not be
eligible for any re-election?
III. THE RULING
[The petition was DENIED DUE COURSE and
thereby DISMISSED by the Supreme Court.]
Private respondent was not elected President the second time he
ran [in the May 2010 elections]. Since the issue on the proper
interpretation of the phrase any reelection will be premised on a
persons second (whether immediate or not) election as President, there
is no case or controversy to be resolved in this case. No live conflict of
legal rights exists. There is in this case no definite, concrete, real or
substantial controversy that touches on the legal relations of parties
having adverse legal interests. No specific relief may conclusively be
decreed upon by this Court in this case that will benefit any of the parties
herein. As such, one of the essential requisites for the exercise of the
power of judicial review, the existence of an actual case or controversy, is
sorely lacking in this case.
As a rule, this Court may only adjudicate actual, ongoing
controversies. The Court is not empowered to decide moot questions or
abstract propositions, or to declare principles or rules of law which cannot
affect the result as to the thing in issue in the case before it. In other
words, when a case is moot, it becomes non-justiciable.
An action is considered moot when it no longer presents a
justiciable controversy because the issues involved have become
academic or dead or when the matter in dispute has already been
resolved and hence, one is not entitled to judicial intervention unless the
issue is likely to be raised again between the parties. There is nothing for
the court to resolve as the determination thereof has been overtaken by
subsequent events.
Assuming an actual case or controversy existed prior to the
proclamation of a President who has been duly elected in the May 10,
2010 elections, the same is no longer true today. Following the results of
that elections, private respondent was not elected President for the
second time. Thus, any discussion of his reelection will simply be
hypothetical and speculative. It will serve no useful or practical purpose.
DOROMAL V. SANDIGANBAYAN
FACTS:
Quintin S. Doromal, a former Commissioner of the
Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG),
for violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act
(RA 3019), Sec. 3(h), in connection with his shareholdings
and position as president and director of the Doromal
International Trading Corporation (DITC) which submitted
bids to supply P61 million worth of electronic, electrical,
automotive, mechanical and airconditioning equipment to
the Department of Education, Culture and Sports (or
DECS) and the National Manpower and Youth Council (or
NMYC).
An information was then filed by the Tanodbayan ISSUES:
against Doromal for the said violation and a preliminary
investigation was conducted.
The petitioner then filed a petition for certiorari and
prohibition questioning the jurisdiction of the
Tanodbayan to file the information without the approval
of the Ombudsman.
The Supreme Court held that the incumbent Tanodbayan
(called Special Prosecutor under the 1987 Constitution
and who is supposed to retain powers and duties NOT
GIVEN to the Ombudsman) is clearly without authority to
conduct preliminary investigations and to direct the filing
of criminal cases with the Sandiganbayan, except upon
orders of the Ombudsman. Subsequently annulling the
information filed by the Tanodbayan.
A new information, duly approved by the Ombudsman,
was filed in the Sandiganbayan, alleging that the
Doromal, a public officer, being then a Commissioner of
the Presidential Commission on Good Government, did
then and there wilfully and unlawfully, participate in a
business through the Doromal International Trading
Corporation, a family corporation of which he is the
President, and which company participated in the
biddings conducted by the Department of Education,
Culture and Sports and the National Manpower & Youth
Council, which act or participation is prohibited by law and
the constitution.
The petitioner filed a motion to quash the information on
the ground that it was invalid since there had been no
preliminary investigation for the new information that was
filed against him.
The motion was denied by Sandiganbayan claiming that
another preliminary investigation is unnecessary because
both old and new informations involve the same subject
matter.
Whether or not the act of Doromal would constitute a violation of
the Constitution.
Whether or not preliminary investigation is necessary even if
both informations involve the same subject matter.
Whether or not the information shall be effected as invalid due to
the absence of preliminary investigation.
HELD:
Yes, as to the first and second issuses. No, as to the third issue.
Petition was granted by the Supreme Court.
RATIO:
(1) The presence of a signed document bearing the
signature of Doromal as part of the application to bid
shows that he can rightfully be charged with having
participated in a business which act is absolutely
prohibited by Section 13 of Article VII of the Constitution"
 because "the DITC remained a family corporation in
which Doromal has at least an indirect interest."
Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution provides
that "the President, Vice-President, the members of the
Cabinet and their deputies or assistants shall not... during
(their) tenure, ...directly or indirectly... participate in any
business.
(2) The right of the accused to a preliminary investigation
is "a substantial one." Its denial over his opposition is a
"prejudicial error, in that it subjects the accused to the
loss of life, liberty, or property without due process of law"
provided by the Constitution.
Since the first information was annulled, the preliminary
investigation conducted at that time shall also be
considered as void. Due to that fact, a new preliminary
investigation must be conducted.
(3) The absence of preliminary investigation does not
affect the court's jurisdiction over the case. Nor do they
impair the validity of the information or otherwise render it
defective; but, if there were no preliminary investigations
and the defendants, before entering their plea, invite the
attention of the court to their absence, the court, instead
of dismissing the information should conduct such
investigation, order the fiscal to conduct it or remand the
case to the inferior court so that the preliminary
investigation may be conducted.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari and prohibition is
granted. The Sandiganbayan shall immediately remand
Criminal Case No. 12893 to the Office of the Ombudsman
for preliminary investigation and shall hold in abeyance
the proceedings before it pending the result of such
investigation.
CLU vs. exec sec.
In July 1987, then President Corazon Aquino issued Executive Order
No. 284 which allowed members of the Cabinet, their undersecretaries
and assistant secretaries to hold other government offices or positions in
addition to their primary positions subject to limitations set therein. The
Civil Liberties Union (CLU) assailed this EO averring that such law is
unconstitutional. The constitutionality of EO 284 is being challenged by
CLU on the principal submission that it adds exceptions to Sec 13, Article
7 of the Constitution which provides:
Sec. 13. The President, Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet, and
their deputies or assistants shall not, unless otherwise provided in this
Constitution, hold any other office or employment during their tenure.
They shall not, during said tenure, directly or indirectly practice any other
profession, participate in any business, or be financially interested in any
contract with, or in any franchise, or special privilege granted by the
Government or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof,
including government-owned or controlled corporations or their
subsidiaries. They shall strictly avoid conflict of interest in the conduct of
their office.
CLU avers that by virtue of the phrase unless otherwise provided in this
Constitution, the only exceptions against holding any other office or
employment in Government are those provided in the Constitution,
namely: (i) The Vice-President may be appointed as a Member of the
Cabinet under Sec 3, par. (2), Article 7; and (ii) the Secretary of Justice is
an ex-officio member of the Judicial and Bar Council by virtue of Sec 8
(1), Article 8.
ISSUE: Whether or not EO 284 is constitutional.
HELD: No, it is unconstitutional. It is clear that the 1987 Constitution
seeks to prohibit the President, Vice-President, members of the Cabinet,
their deputies or assistants from holding during their tenure multiple
offices or employment in the government, except in those cases
specified in the Constitution itself and as above clarified with respect to
posts held without additional compensation in an ex-officio capacity as
provided by law and as required by the primary functions of their office,
the citation of Cabinet members (then called Ministers) as examples
during the debate and deliberation on the general rule laid down for all
appointive officials should be considered as mere personal opinions
which cannot override the constitutions manifest intent and the
peoples understanding thereof.
In the light of the construction given to Sec 13, Art 7 in relation to Sec 7,
par. (2), Art IX-B of the 1987 Constitution, EO 284 is unconstitutional.
Ostensibly restricting the number of positions that Cabinet members,
undersecretaries or assistant secretaries may hold in addition to their
primary position to not more than 2 positions in the government and
government corporations, EO 284 actually allows them to hold multiple
offices or employment in direct contravention of the express mandate of
Sec 13, Art 7 of the 1987 Constitution prohibiting them from doing so,
unless otherwise provided in the 1987 Constitution itself.
In re: Valenzuela
A.M. No. 98-5-01-SC November 9, 1998
Narvasa, C.J.
Facts:
On March 30, 1998, The President signed appointments of Hon. Mateo
Valenzuela and Hon. Placido Vallarta as Judges of RTC-Bago City and
Cabanatuan City, respectively. These appointments were deliberated, as it
seemed to be expressly prohibited by Art 7 Sec 15 of the Constitution:
Two months immediately before the next presidential elections and up to the
end of his term, a President or Acting President shall not make appointments,
except temporary appointments to executive positions when continued
vacancies therein will prejudice public service or endanger public safety.
A meeting was held on March 9, 1998 by the Judicial and Bar Council to
discuss the constitutionality of appointments to the Court of Appeals (CA) in
light of the forthcoming 1998 Presidential elections. Senior Associate Justice
Florenz Regalado, Consultant of the Council and Member of the 1986
Constitutional Commission, was in the position that election ban had no
application to the CA based on the Commissions
records. This hypothesis was then submitted to the President for
consideration together with the Councils nominations for 8 vacancies in the CA.
The Chief Justice (CJ) received on April 6, 1998, an official
communication from the Executive Secretary transmitting the appointments of
8 Associate Justices of CA duly signed on March 11, 1998 (day
immediately before the commencement of the ban on appointments), which
implies that the Presidents Office did not agree with the hypothesis.
The President, addressed to the JBC, requested on May 4, 1998 the
transmission of the list of final nominees for the vacancy in view of the 90
days imposed by the Constitution (from Feb 13, date present vacancy
occurred). In behalf of the JBC, CJ sent the reply on May 6 that no session has
been scheduled after the May elections for the reason that they apparently did
not share the same view (hypothesis) proposed by the JBC shown by the
uniformly dated March 11, 1998 appointments. However, it appeared that the
Justice Secretary and the other members of the Council took action without
waiting for the CJ reply. This prompted CJ to call for a meeting on May 7. On
this day, CJ received a letter from the President in reply of the May 6 letter
where the President expressed his view that Article 7 Sec 15 only applied to
executive appointments, the whole article being entitled EXECUTIVE
DEPT. He posited that appointments in the Judiciary have special and specific
provisions, as follows:
Article 8 Sec 4
The Supreme Court shall be composed of a Chief Justice and fourteen
Associate Justices. It may sit en banc or in its discretion, in divisions of three,
five, or seven Members. Any vacancy shall be filled within ninety days from the
occurrence thereof.

Article 8 Sec 9
The Members of the Supreme Court and judges in lower courts shall be
appointed by the President from the list of at least three nominees prepared by
the Judicial and Bar Council for every vacancy. Such appointments need no
confirmation.
On May 12, CJ received from Malacaang, the appointments of the 2
Judges of the RTC mentioned. Considering the pending proceedings and
deliberations on this matter, the Court resolved by refraining the appointees
from taking their oaths. However, Judge Valenzuela took oath in May 14, 1998
claiming he did so without knowledge on the on-going deliberations. It should
be noted that the originals of the appointments for both judges had been sent
to and received by the CJ on May 12 and is still in the latters office and had not
been transmitted yet. According to Judge Valenzuela, he did so because of the
May 7 Malacaang copy of his appointment.
In construing Article 7 and 8: when there are no presidential elections,
Art. 8 shall apply where vacancies in SC shall be filled within 90 days otherwise
prohibition in Art. 7 must be considered where the President shall not make any
appointments. According to Fr. Bernas, the reason for prohibition is in order
not to tie the hands of the incoming Pres through midnight appointments.
Issue:
whether, during the period of the ban on appointments imposed by
Section 15, Article VII of the, Constitution, the President is nonetheless required
to fill vacancies in the judiciary, in view of Sections 4(1) and 9 of Article VIII;
whether he can make appointments to the judiciary during the period of the
ban in the interest of public service.
Held:
The provisions of the Constitution material to the inquiry at bar read as
follows: 3
Sec. 15, Article VII:
Two months immediately before the next presidential elections and up to the end
of his term, a President or Acting President shall not make appointments,except
temporary appointments to executive positions when continued vacancies
therein will prejudice public service or endanger public safety.
Sec. 4 (1), Article VIII :
The Supreme Court shall be composed of a Chief Justice and fourteen Associate
Justices. It may sit en banc or in its discretion, in divisions of three, five, or seven
Members. Any vacancy shall be filled within ninety days from the occurrence
thereof.
Sec. 9, Article VIII :
The members of the Supreme Court and judges in lower courts shall be
appointed by the President from a list of at least three nominees prepared by
the Judicial and Bar Council for, every vacancy. Such appointments need no
confirmation.
For the lower courts, the President shall issue the appointments within ninety days
from the submission of the list.
During the period stated in Section 15. Article VII of the Constitution
(t)wo months immediately before the next presidential elections and up to the
end his term the President is neither required to make appointments to the
courts nor allowed to do so; and that Sections 4(1) and 9 of Article VIII simply
mean that the President is required to fill vacancies in the courts within the time
frames provided therein unless prohibited by Section 15 of Article VII. It is not
noteworthy that the prohibition on appointments comes into effect only once
every six years.
Section 15, Article VI is directed against two types of appointments: (1)
those made for buying votes and (2) those made for partisan considerations.
The first refers to those appointments made within the two months preceding a
Presidential election and are similar to those which are declared elections
offenses in the Omnibus Election Code, viz.:
Sec. 261. Prohibited Acts. The following shall be guilty of an election offense:

(a) Vote-buying and vote-selling. (1) Any person who gives, offer or promises
money or anything of value gives or promises any office or employment, franchise
or grant, public or private, or makes or offers to make an expenditure, directly
or indirectly, or cause an expenditure to be made to any person, association,
corporation, entity, or community in order to induce anyone or the public in
general to vote for or against any candidate or withhold his vote in the election, or
to vote for or against any aspirant for thenomination or choice of a candidate in
a convention or similar selection process of a political party.
xxx xxx xxx
(g) Appointment of new employees, creation of new position, promotion, or
giving salary increases. During the period of forty-five days before a regular
election and thirty days before a regular election and thirty days before a
special election, (1) any head, official or appointing officer of a government
office, agency or instrumentality, whether national or local, including
government-owned or controlled corporations, who appoints or hires any new
employee, whether provisional, temporary, or casual, or creates and fills any
new position, except upon prior authority of the Commission. The Commission
shall not grant the authority sought unless, it is satisfied that the position to be
filled is essential to the proper functioning of the office or agency concerned,
and that the position shall not be filled in a manner thatmay influence the
election.
The second type of appointments prohibited by Section 15, Article VII
consist of the so-called midnight appointments. There may well be
appointments to important positions which have to be made even after the
proclamations of a new President. Such appointments, so long as they are few
and so spaced as to afford some assurance of deliberate action and careful
consideration of the need for the appointment and the appointees
qualifications, can be made by the outgoing President.
Section 15 may not unreasonably be deemed to contemplate not only
midnight appointments those made obviously for partisan reasons as
shown by their number and the time of their making but also appointments
of the Presidential election.
The exception in the same Section 15 of Article VII allows only the
making oftemporary appointments to executive positions when continued
vacancies will prejudice public service or endanger public safety. Obviously, the
article greatly restricts the appointing power of the President during the period
of the ban.
Considering the respective reasons for the time frames for filling
vacancies in the courts and the restriction on the Presidents power of
appointments, it is the Supreme Courts view that, as a general proposition, in
case of conflict, the former should yield to the latter. Surely, the prevention of
vote-buying and similar evils outweighs the need for avoiding delays in filling up
of court vacancies or the disposition of some cases. Temporary vacancies can
abide the period of the ban which, incidentally and as earlier pointed out, comes
to exist only once in every six years. Moreover, those occurring in the lower
courts can be filled temporarily by designation. But prohibited appointments
are long-lasting and permanent in their effects. They may, as earlier pointed
out, their making is considered an election offense.
To be sure, instances may be conceived of the imperative need for an
appointment, during the period of the ban, not only in the executive but also in
the Supreme Court. This may be the case should the membership of the Court
be so reduced that it will have no quorum, or should the voting on a particularly
important question requiring expeditious resolution be evenly divided. Such a
case, however, is covered by neither Section 15 of Article VII nor Sections 4 (1)
and 9 of Article VIII.