ASSOCIATION OF SMALL LANDOWNERS VS.

SECRETARY OF DAR
[175 SCRA 343; G.R. NO. L-78742; 14 JUL 1989]

Facts: Several petitions are the root of the case:

a.) A petition alleging the constitutionality of PD No. 27, EO 228 and 229 and
RA 6657. Subjects of the petition are a 9-hectare and 5 hectare Riceland
worked by four tenants. Tenants were declared full owners by EO 228 as
qualified farmers under PD 27. The petitioners now contend that President
Aquino usurped the legislatures power.
b.) A petition by landowners and sugar planters in Victorias Mill Negros
Occidental against Proclamation 131 and EO 229. Proclamation 131 is the
creation of Agrarian Reform Fund with initial fund of P50Billion.
c.) A petition by owners of land which was placed by the DAR under the
coverage of Operation Land Transfer.
d.) A petition invoking the right of retention under PD 27 to owners of rice
and corn lands not exceeding seven hectares.
Issue: Whether or Not the aforementioned EOs, PD, and RA were
unconstitutional.
Held: The promulgation of PD 27 by President Marcos was valid in exercise of
Police power and eminent domain.

The power of President Aquino to promulgate Proc. 131 and EO 228 and 229
was authorized under Sec. 6 of the Transitory Provisions of the
1987 Constitution. Therefore it is a valid exercise of Police Power and
Eminent Domain.

RA 6657 is likewise valid. The carrying out of the regulation under CARP
becomes necessary to deprive owners of whatever lands they may own in
excess of the maximum area allowed, there is definitely a taking under the
power of eminent domain for which payment of just compensation is
imperative. The taking contemplated is not a mere limitation of the use of
the land. What is required is the surrender of the title and the physical
possession of said excess and all beneficial rights accruing to the owner in
favour of the farmer.

A statute may be sustained under the police power only if there is

concurrence of the lawful subject and the method.

Subject and purpose of the Agrarian Reform Law is valid, however what is to
be determined is the method employed to achieve it.

Equal Protection
These are 3 cases consolidated questioning the constitutionality of the
Agrarian Reform Act. Article XIII on Social Justice and Human Rights includes
a call for the adoption by the State of an agrarian reform program. The State
shall, by law, undertake an agrarian reform program founded on the right of
farmers and regular farmworkers, who are landless, to own directly or
collectively the lands they till or, in the case of other farmworkers, to receive
a just share of the fruits thereof. RA 3844, Agricultural Land Reform Code,
had already been enacted by Congress on August 8, 1963. This was
substantially superseded almost a decade later by PD 27, which was
promulgated on Oct 21, 1972, along with martial law, to provide for the
compulsory acquisition of private lands for distribution among tenant-
farmers and to specify maximum retention limits for landowners. On July 17,
1987, Cory issued EO 228, declaring full land ownership in favor of the
beneficiaries of PD 27 and providing for the valuation of still unvalued lands
covered by the decree as well as the manner of their payment. This was
followed on July 22, 1987 by PP 131, instituting a comprehensive agrarian
reform program (CARP), and EO 229, providing the mechanics for its
implementation. Afterwhich is the enactment of RA 6657, Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Law of 1988, which Cory signed on June 10. This law, while
considerably changing the earlier mentioned enactments, nevertheless gives
them suppletory effect insofar as they are not inconsistent with its
provisions.
In considering the rentals as advance payment on the land, the executive
order also deprives the petitioners of their property rights as protected by
due process. The equal protection clause is also violated because the order
places the burden of solving the agrarian problems on the owners only of
agricultural lands. No similar obligation is imposed on the owners of other
properties.
The petitioners maintain that in declaring the beneficiaries under PD 27 to be
the owners of the lands occupied by them, EO 228 ignored judicial
prerogatives and so violated due process. Worse, the measure would not
solve the agrarian problem because even the small farmers are deprived of
their lands and the retention rights guaranteed by the Constitution.
In his comment the Sol-Gen asserted that the alleged violation of the equal
protection clause, the sugar planters have failed to show that they belong to
a different class and should be differently treated. The Comment also
suggests the possibility of Congress first distributing public agricultural lands
and scheduling the expropriation of private agricultural lands later. From this
viewpoint, the petition for prohibition would be premature.
ISSUE: Whether or not there was a violation of the equal protection clause.
HELD: The SC ruled affirming the Sol-Gen. The argument of the small farmers
that they have been denied equal protection because of the absence of
retention limits has also become academic under Sec 6 of RA 6657.
Significantly, they too have not questioned the area of such limits. There is
also the complaint that they should not be made to share the burden of
agrarian reform, an objection also made by the sugar planters on the ground
that they belong to a particular class with particular interests of their own.
However, no evidence has been submitted to the Court that the requisites of
a valid classification have been violated.
Classification has been defined as the grouping of persons or things similar to
each other in certain particulars and different from each other in these same
particulars. To be valid, it must conform to the following requirements:
(1) it must be based on substantial distinctions;
(2) it must be germane to the purposes of the law;
(3) it must not be limited to existing conditions only; and
(4) it must apply equally to all the members of the class.
The Court finds that all these requisites have been met by the measures here
challenged as arbitrary and discriminatory.
Equal protection simply means that all persons or things similarly situated
must be treated alike both as to the rights conferred and the liabilities
imposed. The petitioners have not shown that they belong to a different
class and entitled to a different treatment. The argument that not only
landowners but also owners of other properties must be made to share the
burden of implementing land reform must be rejected. There is a substantial
distinction between these two classes of owners that is clearly visible except
to those who will not see. There is no need to elaborate on this matter. In
any event, the Congress is allowed a wide leeway in providing for a valid
classification. Its decision is accorded recognition and respect by the courts
of justice except only where its discretion is abused to the detriment of the
Bill of Rights

Alita v. CA
FACTS: The petition seeking the reversal Court of Appeals decision:
1) Declaring Presidential Decree No.27 inapplicable to lands obtained thru the
homestead law;
2) Declaring that the 4 registered co-owners will cultivate and operate the
farm holding themselves as owners; &
3) Ejecting tenants, namely; Gabino Alita, Jesus Julian, Sr., Jesus Julian, Jr., Pedro
Ricalde, Vicente Ricalde and Rolando Salamar, as the owners would want to
cultivate the farmholdingthemselves.-2 parcels of land at Guilinan,
Tungawan, Zamboanga del Sur acquired by respondents Reyes through
homestead patent under Commonwealth Act No. 141- Reyes wants to
personally cultivate these lands, but Alita refuse to vacate, relying on the
provisions of P.D. 27 and P.D. 316 and regulations of MAR/DAR-June 18,
1981: Respondents Reyes (Plaintiff) instituted a complaint against Minister
of Agrarian Reform Estrella, Regional Director of MAR Region IX
P.D. Macarambon, and Alitaet.al for the declaration of P.D. 27 and all other
Decrees, Letters of Instructions and General Orders inapplicable to homestead
lands. Defendants Alita filed their answer with special and affirmative defenses.-July
19, 1982: Reyes filed urgent motion to enjoin the defendants from declaring
the lands in litigation under Operation Land Transfer and from being issued
land transfer certificates-November 5, 1982: Court of Agrarian Relations 16th
Regional District, Branch IV, Pagadian City (Regional Trial Court, 9th Judicial
Region, Branch XVIII) rendered its decision dismissing complaint and the
motion to enjoin On January 4, 1983, plaintiffs moved to reconsider the
Order of dismissal, to which defendants filed their opposition on January
10, 1983.RTC: issued decision prompting defendants Alita et al to move for
reconsideration but was denied CA: the same was sustained
ISSUE:
Whether or not lands obtained through homestead patent are covered by
the Agrarian Reform under P.D. 27.

HELD: NO. We agree with the petitioners Alita et.al in saying that P.D. 27
decreeing the emancipation of tenants from the bondage of the soil and
transferring to them ownership of the land they till is a sweeping social
legislation, a remedial measure promulgated pursuant to the social justice precepts
of the Constitution. However, such contention cannot be invoked to defeat
the purpose of the enactment of the Public Land Act or Commonwealth Act
No. 141 ones right to life itself by give a needy citizen a land wherein they
could build a house and plant for necessary subsistence.
Art XIII, Sec 6 of the Constitution likewise respects the superiority of the homesteaders'
rights over the rights of the tenants guaranteed by the Agrarian Reform
statute. Section 6. The State shall apply the principles of agrarian reform or
stewardshipin the disposition or utilization of other natural resources, including lands
of public domain under lease or concession suitable to agriculture, subject to prior
rights, homestead rights of small settlers, and the rights of indigenous communities to
their ancestral lands.
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988 or Republic Act No.
6657 likewise supports the inapplicability of P.D. 27 to lands covered by
homestead patents like those of the property in question,
Section 6. Retention Limits.
Just compensation in agrarian cases: what law applies; how computed.
LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. Vs. MAGIN FERRER, ANTONIO V.
FERRER, and RAMON V. FERRER, represented by their Attorney-in-fact, ATTY.
RAFAEL VILLAROSA, GR No. 172230, Feb. 2, 2011; with companion case -
DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM, represented by Secretary NASSER C.
PANGANDAMAN vs. ANTONIO V. FERRER and RAMON V. FERRER, GR No.
179421, Feb. 2, 2011.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that RA 6657,
rather than P.D. No. 27/E.O. No. 228, is the law that should apply in the
determination of just compensation for the subject agricultural land.

Positions of the Parties

The LBP and the DAR basically argue that P.D. No. 27, as reaffirmed by E.O.
No. 228, should be applied in determining the just compensation for the
subject property. They contend that P.D. No. 27 and E.O. No. 228 prescribe
the formula in determining the just compensation of rice and corn lands
tenanted as of October 21, 1972. As the subject property was tenanted and
devoted to rice production in 1972, the just value should be fixed at the
prevailing rate at that time, when the emancipation of the tenant-farmers
from the bondage of the soil was declared in P.D. No. 27.

As to R.A. No. 6657, both the LBP and the DAR insist that it applies only to
ricelands and cornlands not tenanted as of October 21, 1972. R.A. No. 6657
does not cover ricelands and cornlands acquired under P.D. No. 27 and E.O.
No. 228. The governments OLT program on tenanted privately-owned rice
and corn lands pursuant to P.D. No. 27 continues separately and distinctly
from the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) acquisition and
distribution program under R.A. No. 6657 because 1) R.A. No. 6657 operates
prospectively; and 2) Congress intended that lands subject to or governed by
existing government programs such as the OLT and homestead under P.D.
No. 27 are to be treated distinctly.
With respect to the appointment of commissioners, the LBP and the DAR
argue that there was no legal basis therefor because 1) there were no long
accounts or difficult questions of fact that required the expertise and know-
how of the commissioners; and 2) the formula for just compensation was
already provided under P.D. No. 27 and E.O. No. 228.

On the other hand, the Ferrers adopted the common ruling of the CA stating
that it did not err in applying the provisions of R.A. No. 6657 in fixing the just
compensation for the subject property.

The Courts Ruling

The issue as to which agrarian law between P. D. No. 27/E.O. No. 228 and
R.A. No. 6657 should apply in the determination of just compensation has
been laid to rest in a number of cases. In the case of Land Bank of the
Philippines v. Hon. Eli G. C. Natividad, 497 Phil 738 (2005). it was ruled that:
Under the factual circumstances of this case, the agrarian reform process is
still incomplete as the just compensation to be paid private respondents has
yet to be settled. Considering the passage of Republic Act No. 6657 (RA 6657)
before the completion of this process, the just compensation should be
determined and the process concluded under the said law. Indeed, RA 6657
is the applicable law, with PD 27 and EO 228 having only suppletory effect,
conformably with our ruling in Paris v. Alfeche.
Section 17 of RA 6657 which is particularly relevant, providing as it does the
guideposts for the determination of just compensation, reads as follows:
Sec. 17. Determination of Just Compensation.In determining just
compensation, the cost of acquisition of the land, the current value of like
properties, its nature, actual use and income, the sworn valuation by the
owner, the tax declarations, and the assessment made by government
assessors shall be considered. The social and economic benefits contributed
by the farmers and the farm-workers and by the Government to the property
as well as the non-payment of taxes or loans secured from any government
financing institution on the said land shall be considered as additional factors
to determine its valuation.
It would certainly be inequitable to determine just compensation based on
the guideline provided by PD 27 and EO 228 considering the DARs failure to
determine the just compensation for a considerable length of time. That just
compensation should be determined in accordance with RA 6657, and not PD
27 or EO 228, is especially imperative considering that just compensation
should be the full and fair equivalent of the property taken from its owner by
the expropriator, the equivalent being real, substantial, full and ample.
[Emphases supplied]

In Land Bank of the Philippines v. Manuel O Gallego, Jr., G.R. No. 173226,
January 20, 2009, 576 SCRA 680, the Court handed down the same ruling.
Thus:
The Court has already ruled on the applicability of agrarian laws, namely, P.D.
No. 27/E.O. No. 228 in relation to Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6657, in prior cases
concerning just compensation.
In Paris v. Alfeche, 416 Phil 473 (2001), the Court held that the provisions of
R.A. No. 6657 are also applicable to the agrarian reform process of lands
placed under the coverage of P.D. No. 27/E.O. No. 228, which has not been
completed upon the effectivity of R.A. No. 6657. Citing Land Bank of the
Philippines v. Court of Appeals, 378 Phil. 1248 (1999), the Court in Paris held
that P.D. No. 27 and E.O. No. 228 have suppletory effect to R.A. No. 6657, to
wit:
We cannot see why Sec. 18 of RA [No.] 6657 should not apply to rice and
corn lands under PD [No.] 27. Section 75 of RA [No.] 6657 clearly states that
the provisions of PD [No.] 27 and EO [No.] 228 shall only have a suppletory
effect. Section 7 of the Act also provides

Sec. 7. Priorities.The DAR, in coordination with the PARC shall plan and
program the acquisition and distribution of all agricultural lands through a
period of (10) years from the effectivity of this Act. Lands shall be acquired
and distributed as follows:
Phase One: Rice and Corn lands under P.D. 27; all idle or abandoned lands; all
private lands voluntarily offered by the owners of agrarian reform; x x x and
all other lands owned by the government devoted to or suitable for
agriculture, which shall be acquired and distributed immediately upon the
effectivity of this Act, with the implementation to be completed within a
period of not more than four (4) years (emphasis supplied).

This eloquently demonstrates that RA [No.] 6657 includes PD [No.] 27 lands

among the properties which the DAR shall acquire and distribute to the
landless. And to facilitate the acquisition and distribution thereof, Secs. 16,
17 and 18 of the Act should be adhered to. In Association of Small
Landowners of the Philippines v. Secretary of Agrarian Reform, this Court
applied the provisions (of) RA 6657 to rice and corn lands when it upheld the
constitutionality of the payment of just compensation for PD [No.] 27 lands
through the different modes stated in Sec. 18. [Association of Small
Landowners in the Philippines, Inc. v. Hon. Secretary of Agrarian Reform, 256
Phil. 777 (1989)].
Particularly, in Land Bank of the Philippines v. Natividad, 497 Phil. 738 (2005),
where the agrarian reform process in said case is still incomplete as the just
compensation to be paid private respondents has yet to be settled, the
Court held therein that just compensation should be determined and the
process concluded under R.A. No. 6657.
The retroactive application of R.A. No. 6657 is not only statutory but is also
founded on equitable considerations. In Lubrica v. Land Bank of the
Philippines, G.R. No. 170220, November 20, 2006, 507 SCRA 415, the Court
declared that it would be highly inequitable on the part of the landowners
therein to compute just compensation using the values at the time of taking
in 1972, and not at the time of payment, considering that the government
and the farmer-beneficiaries have already benefited from the land although
ownership thereof has not yet been transferred in their names. The same
equitable consideration is applicable to the factual milieu of the instant case.
The records show that respondents property had been placed under the
agrarian reform program in 1972 and had already been distributed to the
beneficiaries but respondents have yet to receive just compensation due
them. [Emphases supplied]

The above rulings were reiterated in the recent cases of Land Bank of the
Philippines v. Rizalina Gustilo Barrido and Heirs of Romeo Barrido, G.R. No.
183688, April 18, 2010, and Land Bank of the Philippines v. Enrique Livioc,
G.R. No. 170685, September 22, 2010.

The CA was, therefore, correct in ruling that the agrarian reform process in
this particular case was still incomplete because the just compensation due
to the Ferrers had yet to be settled. Since R.A. No. 6657 was already in
effectivity before the completion of the process, the just compensation
should be determined and the process concluded under this law.

With respect to the appointment of the commissioners, it is an issue not

properly brought and ventilated in the trial courts below and only raised for
the first time on appeal. At any rate, the appointment was proper because
the applicable law is R.A. No. 6657.

Estolas vs Mabalot, 381 SCRA 702

The Facts:
Sometime in May, 1978, respondent passed on the s u b j e c t l a n d t o t h e
p e t i t i o n e r f o r t h e a m o u n t o f P5, 800.00 and P200.00 worth of rice
such was only a verbal mortgage; while according to petitioner, a
sal e had taken place. Accordi ng t o At ty. Linda Peral ta
i nvestigati on, the subject land was just a guarantee for the
payment of a loan incurred.
M e a n w h i l e , a c c o r d i n g t o D A R R e g i o n a l Di rect
or Ant onio M. Nuesa. In t he sai d Ord er, t he DAR f ound t he act
of respondent in
surrenderi ng t h e s u b j e c t l a n d i n f a v o r o f p
e t i t i o n e r a s constituting abandonment.Thus, on May 3, 1989,
respondent appealed
t h e c a s e t o t h e D A R C e n t r a l O f f i c e w h i c h , o n Augu
s t 2 8 , 1 9 9 0 , i s s u e d a n O r d e r r e v e r s i n g t h e assailed Order of
DAR Regional Director Antonio
M.N u e s a a n d o r d e r i n g t h e p e t i t i o n e r t o r e t u r n t h e subject
land to respondent. Petitioners Motion
forR e c o n s i d e r a t i o n w a s d e n i e d o n J u n e 8 , 1 9 9 2 . H e f i l e d a n
A p p e a l w i t h t h e O f f i c e o f t h e P r e s i d e n t whi ch was
dismi ssed in a Deci si on dat ed August 29, 1994.Petitioners Motion for
Reconsideration
of t h e s a i d D e c i s i o n w a s a l s o d e n i e d i n a n O r d e r dat ed
November 28, 1994. Li kewi se, petiti onerssecond Moti on for
Reconsiderati on was deni ed in an Order dated July 5, 1995.iv[4]
Issue:
W O N , r e s p o n d e n t m a d e a v a l i d abandonment of
the subject property?
The Courts Ruling:
The appellate court ruled that the subject land had
been acquired by respondent by virtue o
f Presidential Decree (PD) No. 27.This law prohibits
the transfer of the land except by hereditary
succession to the heirs or by other legal modes to the government.
Hence, the transfer of the subject land to petitioner is void; it should be
returned to respondent

People vs. Grospe

GR L-74053-54, 20 January 1988
FACTS
Manuel Parulan issued a check to the San Miguel Corporation, which was
received by the latters finance officer in Guiguinto, Bulacan, and which was
forwarded and deposited in SMCs BPI account in San Fernando, Pampanga.
Another check was issued by Parulan as direct payment for the spot sale of
beer, which was similarly received, forwarded and deposited as above. Both
were dishonored for insufficiency of funds. Parulan was charged with
violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 and for estafa under Article 315,
paragraph 2 (d) of the Revised Penal Code. Tried jointly, the court dismissed
the cases for lack of jurisdiction.
ISSUE: Whether the checks were issued in Bulacan or Pampanga.
HELD:
While the subject check was issued in Bulacan, it was not completely drawn
thereat, but in San Fernando, Pampanga, where it was uttered and delivered.
The place where the bills were written, signed or dated does not fix or
determine the place where they were executed. What is of decisive
importance is the delivery thereof, as it is the final act essential to its
consummation as an obligation. The issuance and the delivery of the check
must be to a person who takes it as a holder, i.e. the payee or indorsee of a
bill or note, who is in possession of it or the bearer thereof. Both estafa by
postdating or issuing a bad check a transitory or continuing offense. Thus, as
jurisdiction or venue is determined by the allegations in the information, i.e.
San Fernando, Pampanga, the venue was properly laid. Case is remanded to
the trial court for proper disposition.

landbank of the philippines vs. court of appeals 249 scra 149

Commercial Law Corporation Law Veil of Corporate Fiction Corporate
Name
In 1980, ECO Management Corporation (ECO) obtained loans amounting to
about P26 million from Land Bank. ECO defaulted in its payment but in 1981,
ECO submitted a Payment Plan with the hope of restructuring its loan. The
plan was rejected and Land Bank sued ECO. It impleaded Emmanuel C.
Oate, the majority stockholder of ECO who is serving as the Chairman and
treasurer of ECO.
The trial court ruled in favor of Land Bank but Oate was absolved from
liabilities. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court.
Land Bank appealed as it wanted Oate to be personally liable on the
following grounds (among others): a) ECO stands for Emmanuel C. Oate, b)
Oate is the majority stockholder, c) ECO was formed ostensibly to allow
Oate to acquire loans from Land Bank which he used for his personal
advantage, d) Oate holds two positions in the corporation, and e) ECO never
held any board meeting which just shows only Oate was in control of the
corporation.
ISSUE: Whether or not Oate should be held personally.
HELD: No. Land Bank was not able to produce sufficient evidence to prove its
claim. A corporation, upon coming into existence, is invested by law with a
personality separate and distinct from those persons composing it as well as
from any other legal entity to which it may be related. The corporate fiction
is only disregarded when the fiction is used to defeat public convenience,
justify wrong, protect fraud, defend crime, confuse legitimate legal or judicial
issues, perpetrate deception or otherwise circumvent the law. This is likewise
true where the corporate entity is being used as an alter ego, adjunct, or
business conduit for the sole benefit of the stockholders or of another
corporate entity. None of the foregoing was proved by Land Bank.
The mere fact that Oate owned the majority of the shares of ECO is not a
ground to conclude that Oate and ECO is one and the same. Mere
ownership by a single stockholder of all or nearly all of the capital stock of a
corporation is not by itself sufficient reason for disregarding the fiction of
separate corporate personalities.
Anent the issue of the corporate name, the fact that Oates initials coincide
with the corporate name ECO is not sufficient to disregard the corporate
fiction. Even if ECO does stand for Emmanuel C. Oate, it does not mean
that the said corporation is merely a dummy of Oate. A corporation may
assume any name provided it is lawful. There is nothing illegal in a
corporation acquiring the name or as in this case, the initials of one of its
shareholders.

Fortich vs. Corona

(G.R. No. 131457)
Facts:
This case involves a 144-hectare land located atSan Vicente, Sumilao, Bukidnon,
owned by the Norberto Quisumbing, Sr. Management and Development Corporation
(NQSRMDC), one of the petitioners.- In 1984, the land was leased as a pineapple
plantation to the Philippine Packing Corporation, now Del Monte Philippines, Inc.
(DMPI) for a period of ten(10) years. The lease expired in April, 1994.- During the
existence of the lease, the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) placed the
entire 144-hectare property under compulsory acquisition and assessed the land
value at P2.38 million.- NQSRMDC sought and was granted by the DAR Adjudication
Board (DARAB), through its Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD) a writ
of prohibition with preliminary injunction which ordered the DAR Region X Director,
the Provincial Agrarian Reform Officer (PARO) of Bukidnon, the Municipal Agrarian
Reform Office (MARO) of Sumilao, Bukidnon, the Land Bank of the Philippines (Land
Bank), and their authorized representatives "to desist from pursuing any activity
or activities" concerning the subject land "until further orders."- Despite the DARAB
order of March 31, 1992, the DAR Regional Director issued a memorandum directing
the Land Bank to open a trust account forP2.38 million in the name of NQSRMDC and
to conduct summary proceedings to determine the just compensation of the
subject property. NQSRMD Cobjected to these moves and filed an Omnibus Motion to
enforce the DARAB order of March 31,1992 and to nullify the summary proceedings
undertaken by the DAR Regional Director and LandBank on the valuation of the subject
property.- DARAB acted favorably on the Omnibus Motion. Land Bank complied with
the DARAB.- In the meantime, the Provincial Development Council (PDC) of
Bukidnon, headed by Governor Carlos O. Fortich, passed Resolution No. 6,8
dated January 7, 1993, designating certain areas along Bukidnon-Sayre Highway as
part of the Bukidnon Agro-Industrial Zones where the subject property is situated.-
Pursuant to Section 20 of R.A. No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local
Government Code, the Sangguniang Bayan of Sumilao, Bukidnon, on March4, 1993,
enacted Ordinance No. 24 converting or re-classifying 144 hectares of land in Bgy. San
Vicente, said Municipality, from agricultural to industrial/institutional with a view
of providing an opportunity to attract investors who can inject new economic
vitality, provide more jobs and raise the income of its people.- Under said section,
4th to 5th class municipalities may authorize the classification of five percent (5%)of
their agricultural land area and provide for the manner of their utilization or
disposition.- On 11 December 1993, the instant application for conversion was filed by
Mr. Gaudencio Beduya inbehalf of NQSRMDC/BAIDA (Bukidnon Agro-Industrial
Development Association). This was favorably recommended by a lot
government officials. The people of the affected barangay even rallied behind their
respective officials in endorsing the project.- Notwithstanding the foregoing favorable
recommendation, however, on November 14, 1994,the DAR, thru Secretary Garilao,
invoking its power sto approve conversion of lands under Section 65 of R.A. No. 6657,
issued an Order denying the instant application for the conversion of the subject land
from agricultural to agro-industrial and, instead, placed the same under the
compulsory coverage of CARP and directed the distribution thereof to all qualified
beneficiaries.- Motion for Reconsideration of the aforesaid Order was filed by applicant
but the same was denied. Thus, the DAR Secretary ordered the DAR Regional Director
"to proceed with the compulsory acquisition and distribution of the property."-
Governor Carlos O. Fortich of Bukidnon appealed "the order of denial to the Office
of the President and prayed for the conversion/reclassification of thesubject land
as the same would be more beneficial to the people of Bukidnon.- NQSRMDC
filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari, prohibition with
preliminary injunction.- Meanwhile, on July 25, 1995, the Honorable Paul G.
Dominguez, then Presidential Assistant for Mindanao,after conducting an evaluation of
the proposed project, sent a memorandum to the President favorably endorsing the
project with are commendation that the DAR Secretary reconsider his decision in
denying the application of the province for the conversion of the land.- On October 23,
1995, the Court of Appeals issued a Resolution ordering the parties to observe
status quo pending resolution of the petition.- In resolving the appeal, the Office of
the President, through then Executive Secretary Ruben D. Torres, issued a Decision
in OP Case No. 96-C-6424, dated March 29, 1996, reversing the DAR Secretary's
decision. It stated that: deciding in favor of NQSRMDC, the DARAB correctly pointed
out that

Title: Daez v. CA
Issue: WON Daez may retain the disputed 4.1685 hectares land
Facts: Petitioner Daez owned a 4.1685 hectare land in Meycauayan, Bulacan
which was being cultivated by the respondent farmers Soriente et al. The
problem arose when the land was subjected to the OLT pursuant to PD 27 as
amended by LOI 474. Thus, the land was transferred to the ownership of
beneficiaries on December 9, 1980.On May 31, 1981, private respondents
made an affidavit under duress stating they are not tenants but hired
workers. Hence, Daez apllied for exemption of OLT claiming her land is
untenanted and the cancellation of the CLTs. (not majorly related to the
topic)

In their Affidavit dated October 2, 1983, Eudosia Daez and her husband,
Lope, declared ownership over 41.8064 hectares of agricultural lands located
in Meycauayan, Bulacan and fourteen (14) hectares of rice land, sixteen (16)
hectares of forestland, ten (10) hectares of "batuhan" and 1.8064 hectares of
residential lands in Penaranda, Nueva Ecija. Included in their 41.8064-hectare
landholding in Bulacan, was the subject 4,1685-hectare rice land in
Meycauayan.DAR Undersecretary Jose C Medina:

Denying Eudosia Daezs application for exemption upon finding that her
subject land is covered under LOI No. 474, petitioner being owner of the
aforesaid agricultural lands exceeding seven (7) hectares.DAR Secretary
Benjamin T. Leong

Leong affirmed the assailed order upon finding private respondents to be

bonafide tenants of the subject land. Disregarded the affidavit of the farmers
under duress. Court of Appeals Sustained the decision of both DAR
secretaries Supreme Court Denied their prayers and sustained the decisions
Main Issue Related to our topic
Exemption of the 4.1685 riceland from coverage by P.D. No. 27 having been
finally denied her, Eudosia Daez next filed an application for retention of
the same riceland, this time under R.A. No. 6657.
DAR Regional Director
March 22, 1994, DAR Region III OIC-Director Eugenio B. Bernardo allowed
Eudosia Daez to retain the subject riceland but he denied the application of
her eight (8) children to retain three (3) hectares each for their failure to
prove actual tillage of the land or direct management thereof as required by
law. They appealed to DAR Secretary.

CHAVEZ vs PEA AMARI

09 July 2002
Land Titles and Deeds Lands of the Public Domain

The Public Estates Authority is the central implementing agency tasked to

undertake reclamation projects nationwide. It took over the leasing and
selling functions of the DENR insofar as reclaimed or about to be reclaimed
foreshore lands are concerned.
PEA sought the transfer to AMARI, a private corporation, of the ownership of
77.34 hectares of the Freedom Islands. PEA also sought to have 290.156
hectares of submerged areas of Manila Bay to AMARI.
ISSUE: Whether or not the transfer is valid.
HELD: No. To allow vast areas of reclaimed lands of the public domain to be
transferred to PEA as private lands will sanction a gross violation of the
constitutional ban on private corporations from acquiring any kind of
alienable land of the public domain.
The Supreme Court affirmed that the 157.84 hectares of reclaimed lands
comprising the Freedom Islands, now covered by certificates of title in the
name of PEA, are alienable lands of the public domain. The 592.15 hectares
of submerged areas of Manila Bay remain inalienable natural resources of
the public domain. Since the Amended JVA seeks to transfer to AMARI, a
private corporation, ownership of 77.34 hectares of the Freedom Islands,
such transfer is void for being contrary to Section 3, Article XII of the 1987
Constitution which prohibits private corporations from acquiring any kind of
alienable land of the public domain. Furthermore, since the Amended JVA
also seeks to transfer to AMARI ownership of 290.156 hectares of still
submerged areas of Manila Bay, such transfer is void for being contrary to
Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution which prohibits the alienation
of natural resources other than agricultural lands of the public domain.

Chavez v. Pea and Amari

Fact:
In 1973, the Comissioner on Public Highways entered into a contract to
reclaim areas of Manila Bay with the Construction and Development
Corportion of the Philippines (CDCP).
PEA (Public Estates Authority) was created by President Marcos under P.D.
1084, tasked with developing and leasing reclaimed lands. These lands were
transferred to the care of PEA under P.D. 1085 as part of the Manila Cavite
Road and Reclamation Project (MCRRP). CDCP and PEA entered into an
agreement that all future projects under the MCRRP would be funded and
owned by PEA.
By 1988, President Aquino issued Special Patent No. 3517 transferring lands
to PEA. It was followed by the transfer of three Titles (7309, 7311 and 7312)
by the Register of Deeds of Paranaque to PEA covering the three reclaimed
islands known as the FREEDOM ISLANDS.
Subsquently, PEA entered into a joint venture agreement (JVA) with AMARI,
a Thai-Philippine corporation to develop the Freedom Islands. Along with
another 250 hectares, PEA and AMARI entered the JVA which would later
transfer said lands to AMARI. This caused a stir especially when Sen. Maceda
assailed the agreement, claiming that such lands were part of public domain
(famously known as the mother of all scams).
Peitioner Frank J. Chavez filed case as a taxpayer praying for mandamus, a
writ of preliminary injunction and a TRO against the sale of reclaimed lands
by PEA to AMARI and from implementing the JVA. Following these events,
under President Estradas admin, PEA and AMARI entered into an Amended
JVA and Mr. Chaves claim that the contract is null and void.
Issue:
w/n: the transfer to AMARI lands reclaimed or to be reclaimed as part of the
stipulations in the (Amended) JVA between AMARI and PEA violate Sec. 3 Art.
XII of the 1987 Constitution
w/n: the court is the proper forum for raising the issue of whether the
amended joint venture agreement is grossly disadvantageous to the
government.
Held:
On the issue of Amended JVA as violating the constitution:
1. The 157.84 hectares of reclaimed lands comprising the Freedom Islands,
now covered by certificates of title in the name of PEA, are alienable lands of
the public domain. PEA may lease these lands to private corporations but
may not sell or transfer ownership of these lands to private corporations.
PEA may only sell these lands to Philippine citizens, subject to the ownership
limitations in the 1987 Constitution and existing laws.
2. The 592.15 hectares of submerged areas of Manila Bay remain inalienable
natural resources of the public domain until classified as alienable or
disposable lands open to disposition and declared no longer needed for
public service. The government can make such classification and declaration
only after PEA has reclaimed these submerged areas. Only then can these
lands qualify as agricultural lands of the public domain, which are the only
natural resources the government can alienate. In their present state, the
592.15 hectares of submerged areas are inalienable and outside the
commerce of man.
3. Since the Amended JVA seeks to transfer to AMARI, a private corporation,
ownership of 77.34 hectares110 of the Freedom Islands, such transfer is void
for being contrary to Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution which
prohibits private corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable land of
the public domain.
4. Since the Amended JVA also seeks to transfer to AMARI ownership of
290.156 hectares111 of still submerged areas of Manila Bay, such transfer is
void for being contrary to Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution which
prohibits the alienation of natural resources other than agricultural lands of
the public domain.
PEA may reclaim these submerged areas. Thereafter, the government can
classify the reclaimed lands as alienable or disposable, and further declare
them no longer needed for public service. Still, the transfer of such reclaimed
alienable lands of the public domain to AMARI will be void in view of Section
3, Article XII of the 1987Constitution which prohibits private corporations
from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public domain.

Issue:

The issue raised is whether the respondent heirs' 2.5 hectare farmland, originally
part of the estate of their deceased grandmother, consisting of twenty four (24)
hectares, is covered by Operation Land Transfer under R. A. No. 6657, or P. D. No.
27.