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SIMON JR.

vs COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS

Facts:

A "Demolition Notice," dated 9 July 1990, signed by Carlos Quimpo (one of the petitioners) in his
capacity as an Executive Officer of the Quezon City Integrated Hawkers Management Council under
the Office of the City Mayor, was sent to, and received by, the private respondents (being the officers
and members of the North EDSA Vendors Association, Incorporated). In said notice, the respondents
were given a grace-period of 3 days within which to vacate the questioned premises of North EDSA to
give way to the construction of the"People's Park".
On 12 July 1990, private respondents, led by their President Roque Fermo, filed a letter-complaint
with the CHR against the petitioners, asking for a letter to be addressed to then Mayor Brigido
Simon, Jr. of Quezon City to stop the demolition of the private respondents'stalls, sari-sari
stores, and carinderia along North EDSA. CHR issued a preliminary order directing the petitioners
to desist from demolishing the stalls and shanties at North EDSA pending resolution of the
vendors/squatters' complaint before the Commission" and ordering said petitioners to appear before
the CHR.
Petitioners started the demolition despite CHRs order to desist. Respondents consequently asked
that petitioners be cited in contempt.
Meanwhile, petitioners filed a motion to dismiss the complaint filed by respondents. They alleged that
the Commission has no jurisdiction over the complaint as it involved respondents privilege to engage
in business, not their civil and political rights.
In an Order, 11 dated 25 September 1990, the CHR cited the petitioners in contempt for carrying out
the demolition of the stalls, sari-sari stores and carinderia despite the "order to desist", and it imposed
a fine of P500.00 on each of them. On 1 March 1991, the CHR issued an Order, denying petitioners'
motion to dismiss. The CHR opined that "it was not the intention of the (Constitutional)
Commission to create only a paper tiger limited only to investigating civil and political rights,
but it (should) be (considered) a quasi-judicial body with the power to provide appropriate
legal measures for the protection of human rights of all persons within the Philippines "
Their Motion for Reconsideration having been denied, petioners Simon Jr. et al filed a petition for
prohibition to enjoin the CHR from hearing private respondents complaint.

Issue/s:

WON CHR has jurisdiction to hear the complaint and grant the relief prayed for by respondents.
WON the CHR can investigate the subject matter of respondents complaint.

Held:

No. Under the constitution, the CHR has no power to adjudicate.


No. Complaint does not involve civil and political rights.

Rationale:

Art XIII, Section 18 of the Constitution provides that the CHR has the power to investigate, on its
own or on complaint by any party, all forms of human rights violations involving civil and political
rights.
In Cario v. Commission on Human Rights, the Court through Justice Andres Narvasa observed
that:
(T)he Commission on Human Rights . . . was not meant by the fundamental law to be another court or
quasi-judicial agency in this country, or duplicate much less take over the functions of the latter.
The most that may be conceded to the Commission in the way of adjudicative power is that it may
investigate, i.e., receive evidence and make findings of fact as regards claimed human rights violations
involving civil and political rights. But fact finding is not adjudication, and cannot be likened to the judicial
function of a court of justice, or even a quasi-judicial agency or official. The function of receiving evidence
and ascertaining therefrom the facts of a controversy is not a judicial function, properly speaking. To be
considered such, the faculty of receiving evidence and making factual conclusions in a controversy must be
accompanied by the authority of applying the law to those factual conclusions to the end that the controversy
may be decided or determined authoritatively, finally and definitively, subject to such appeals or modes of
review as may be provided by law. This function, to repeat, the Commission does not have

CHRs investigative power encompasses all forms of human rights violations involving civil and political
rights.

The term civil rights has been defined as referring to those rights that belong to every citizen of the
state or country, or, in wider sense, to all its inhabitants, and are not connected with the organization
or administration of the government. They include the rights of property, marriage, equal protection of
the laws, freedom of contract, etc. Political rights, on the other hand, are said to refer to the right to
participate, directly or indirectly, in the establishment or administration of government, the right of
suffrage, the right to hold public office, the right of petition and, in general, the rights appurtenant to
citizenship vis-a-vis the management of government.
Recalling the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission, it is readily apparent that the delegates
envisioned a Commission on Human Rights that would focus its attention to the more severe cases of
human rights violations. Delegate Garcia, for instance, mentioned such areas as the "(1) protection of
rights of political detainees, (2) treatment of prisoners and the prevention of tortures, (3) fair and
public trials, (4) cases of disappearances, (5) salvagings and hamletting, and (6) other crimes
committed against the religious."
In the particular case at hand, there is no cavil that what are sought to be demolished are the stalls,
sari-sari stores and carinderia, as well as temporary shanties, erected by private respondents on a
land which is planned to be developed into a "People's Park." Looking at the standards hereinabove
discoursed vis-a-vis the circumstances obtaining in this instance, we are not prepared to conclude
that the order for the demolition of the stalls, sari-sari stores and carinderia of the private respondents
can fall within the compartment of "human rights violations involving civil and political rights" intended
by the Constitution.

Soriaovs.Pineda
CAG.R.SPNo.31546August10,1994

Facts:LouieSoriaowasahighschoolstudentinthesubprovinceofDinalungan,Aurora(S.Y.1993to
1994).Duetohisreputationoftalkingbacktoschoolauthorityduringthepastyears,hewasrefused
readmissiontocompletehisfourthandfinalyearofhighschoolthroughaverbalnoticenottoreadmit.

Soriaoquestionedthenotice,averringthathewasdeprivedofahearingonthematterandthustheverbal
noticewasadenialofhisrighttodueprocess.Theadministrationignoredthestudentspleatoreconsider
itsdecisiontodenyhimreadmissionclaiming,itwastheirprerogative.Seekingfurtherremediestono
avail,SoriaofiledapetitionforcertioraritotheCA.

Issue:Whetherornotthepetitionerwasdeniedhisrighttoeducation.

Ruling:YES.TheCourtofAppealsorderedPineda,HeadTeacheroftheJuanC.AngaraMemorialHigh
SchooltoallowSoriaotoenrollandstudyafterhewasmetedoutadisciplinaryactionwithoutdue
process.TheCourtofAppealsinvokedthe1987ConstitutionandtheUniversalDeclarationofHuman
Rights.ArticleXIV,Sections1and2andArticleII,Sections13and17ofthe1987Constitutionprovide:

ArticleXIV,Section1:TheStateshallprotectandpromotetherightofallcitizenstoqualityeducationat
alllevels,andshalltakeappropriatestepstomakesucheducationaccessibletoall.
Section2:TheStateshall:
(1) Establish,maintain,andsupportacomplete,adequate,andintegratedsystemofeducation
relevanttotheneedsofthepeopleandsociety;
(2) Establishandmaintain,asystemoffreepubliceducationintheelementaryandhighschool
levels.Withoutlimitingthenaturalrightofparentstoreartheirchildren,elementaryeducationis
compulsoryforallchildrenofschoolage;
(3) Establishandmaintainasystemofscholarshipgrants,studentloanprograms,subsidies,andother
incentiveswhichshallbeavailabletodeservingstudentsinbothpublicandprivateschools,
especiallytotheunderprivileged;
(4) Encouragenonformal,informal,andindigenouslearningsystem,aswellasselfstudyprograms
particularlythosethatrespondtocommunityneeds;and
(5) Provideadultcitizens,thedisabled,andoutofschoolyouthwithtrainingincivics,vocational
efficiency,andotherskills.

ArticleII,Section13:TheStaterecognizesthevitalroleoftheyouthinnationbuildingandshall
promoteandprotecttheirphysical,moral,spiritual,intellectual,andsocialwellbeing.Itshallinculcatein
theyouthpatriotismandnationalism,andencouragetheirinvolvementinpublicandcivicaffairs.

Section17:TheStateshallgiveprioritytoeducation,scienceandtechnology,arts,culture,andsportsto
fosterpatriotismandnationalism,acceleratesocialprogress,andpromotetotalhumanliberationand
development.

AlsosinceitistheConstitutionwhichgrantedpetitionertherightofeducation,hemayonlydeprivedof
suchrightwithdueprocessoflawasstatedinArt.III,Sec.1ofthe1987Constitution,Nopersonshall
bedeprivedoflife,liberty,orpropertywithoutdueprocessoflaw,norshallanypersonbedeniedequal
protectionofthelaws.

Oposa vs Factoran
GR No. 101083; July 30 1993

FACTS:
A taxpayers class suit was filed by minors Juan Antonio Oposa, et al., representing their
generation and generations yet unborn, and represented by their parents against Fulgencio
Factoran Jr., Secretary of DENR. They prayed that judgment be rendered ordering the
defendant, his agents, representatives and other persons acting in his behalf to:

1. Cancel all existing Timber Licensing Agreements (TLA) in the country;


2. Cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing, or appraising new
TLAs;

and granting the plaintiffs such other reliefs just and equitable under the premises. They
alleged that they have a clear and constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology
and are entitled to protection by the State in its capacity as parens patriae. Furthermore,
they claim that the act of the defendant in allowing TLA holders to cut and deforest the
remaining forests constitutes a misappropriation and/or impairment of the natural
resources property he holds in trust for the benefit of the plaintiff minors and succeeding
generations.
The defendant filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the following grounds:

1. Plaintiffs have no cause of action against him;


2. The issues raised by the plaintiffs is a political question which properly pertains to
the legislative or executive branches of the government.

ISSUE:
Do the petitioner-minors have a cause of action in filing a class suit to prevent the
misappropriation or impairment of Philippine rainforests?

HELD:
Yes. Petitioner-minors assert that they represent their generation as well as generations to
come. The Supreme Court ruled that they can, for themselves, for others of their generation,
and for the succeeding generation, file a class suit. Their personality to sue in behalf of
succeeding generations is based on the concept of intergenerational responsibility insofar as
the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is concerned. Such a right considers the
rhythm and harmony of nature which indispensably include, inter alia, the judicious
disposition, utilization, management, renewal and conservation of the countrys forest,
mineral, land, waters, fisheries, wildlife, offshore areas and other natural resources to the
end that their exploration, development, and utilization be equitably accessible to the
present as well as the future generations.
Needless to say, every generation has a responsibility to the next to preserve that rhythm
and harmony for the full enjoyment of a balanced and healthful ecology. Put a little
differently, the minors assertion of their right to a sound environment constitutes at the
same time, the performance of their obligation to ensure the protection of that right for the
generations to come.

Baldoza v. Dimaano (May 5, 1976)

Facts:

Municipal Secretary of Taal, Batangas, charges Municipal Judge Dimaano with abuse of authority in
refusing to allow employees of the Municipal Mayor to examine the criminal docket records of the
Municipal Court to secure data in connection with their contemplated report on peace and order
conditions of the municipality.
Respondent answered that there has never been an intention to refuse access to official court records
but that the same is always subject to reasonable regulation as to who, when, where and how they
may be inspected. He further asserted that a court has the power to prevent an improper use or
inspection of its records and furnishing copies may be refuse when the motivation is not serious and
legitimate interest, out of whim or fancy or mere curiosity or to gratify private site or promote public
scandal.
In his answer, respondent observed;
o Restrictions are imposed by the Court for fear of an abuse in the exercise of the right.
o There has been recent tampering of padlocks of the door of the Court and with this, to allow
an indiscriminate and unlimited exercise of the right to free access, might do more harm than
good.
o Request of such a magnitude cannot b immediately granted without adequate deliberation
and advisement
o Authority should first be secured from the Supreme Court
Case was referred to Judge Riodique for investigation and report. At the preliminary hearing, Taal
Mayor Corazon Caniza filed a motion to dismiss the complaint to preserve harmony and cooperation
among officers. This motion was denied by Investigating Judge but he recommended the exoneration
of respondent.
Investigating Judges report avers that complainant was aware of the motion to dismiss and he was in
conformity with it. Communications between complainant and respondent reveal that respondent
allowed the complainant to open and view the docket books of the respondent under certain
conditions and under his control and supervision.
Under the conditions, the Court found that the respondent has not committed any abuse of authority

Issue: WON respondent acted arbitrarily in the premises (when he allowed the complainant to open and view
the docket books of respondent)

Held: No. The respondent allowed the complainant to open and view the docket books of respondent under
certain conditions and under his control and supervision. It has not been shown that the rules and condition
imposed by the respondent were unreasonable. The access to public records is predicated on the right of the
people to acquire information on public concern.

Rules/Principles:

In People ex rel. Title Guarantee & T. Co vs. Railly, the Court said:

What the law expects and requires from his is the exercise of an unbiased and impartial judgment, by which
all persons resorting to the office, under legal authority, and conducting themselves in an orderly manner,
shall be secured their lawful rights and privileges, and that a corporation formed in the manner in which the
relator has been, shall be permitted to obtain all the information either by searches, abstracts, or copies, that
the law has entitled it to obtain.

Except, perhaps, when it is clear that the purpose of the examination is unlawful, or sheer, idle curiosityIt is
not their prerogative to see that the information which the records contain is not flaunted before public gaze,
or that scandal is not made of itIt is the legislature and not the officials having custody thereof which is
called upon to devise a remedy.

Justice Briones in his concurring opinion predicated such right on the constitutional right of the press to have
access to information as the essence of press freedom.

The New Constitution (1973?) expressly recognizes that the people are entitled to information on matters of
public concern and thus are expressly granted access to official records.

Information is needed to enable the members of society to cope with the exigencies of the times.

Randolf S. David v. Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, G.R. No. 171396, May


3, 2006 (and other consolidated cases)
DECISION
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:

I. THE FACTS

On February 24, 2006, as the Filipino nation celebrated the 20th Anniversary of the EDSA
People Power I, President Arroyo issued PP 1017, implemented by G.O. No. 5, declaring a state of
national emergency, thus:

NOW, THEREFORE, I, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, President of the Republic of the Philippines and
Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested upon me by
Section 18, Article 7 of the Philippine Constitution which states that: The President. . . whenever it
becomes necessary, . . . may call out (the) armed forces to prevent or suppress. . .rebellion. . ., and in
my capacity as their Commander-in-Chief, do hereby command the Armed Forces of the Philippines, to
maintain law and order throughout the Philippines, prevent or suppress all forms of lawless violence as
well as any act of insurrection or rebellion and to enforce obedience to all the laws and to all decrees,
orders and regulations promulgated by me personally or upon my direction; and as provided in Section
17, Article 12 of the Constitution do hereby declare a State of National Emergency.

In their presentation of the factual bases of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5, respondents stated that
the proximate cause behind the executive issuances was the conspiracy among some military
officers, leftist insurgents of the New Peoples Army, and some members of the political opposition in
a plot to unseat or assassinate President Arroyo.They considered the aim to oust or assassinate the
President and take-over the reins of government as a clear and present danger.

Petitioners David and Llamas were arrested without warrants on February 24, 2006 on their
way to EDSA. Meanwhile, the offices of the newspaper Daily Tribune, which was perceived to be
anti-Arroyo, was searched without warrant at about 1:00 A.M. on February 25, 2006. Seized from the
premises in the absence of any official of the Daily Tribune except the security guard of the
building were several materials for publication. The law enforcers, a composite team of PNP and
AFP officers, cited as basis of the warrantless arrests and the warrantless search and seizure was
Presidential Proclamation 1017 issued by then President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo in the exercise of
her constitutional power to call out the Armed Forces of the Philippines to prevent or suppress
lawless violence.

II. THE ISSUE

1. Were the warrantless arrests of petitioners David, et al., made pursuant to PP 1017, valid?
2. Was the warrantless search and seizure on the Daily Tribunes officesconducted pursuant to PP 1017
valid?

III. THE RULING

[The Court partially GRANTED the petitions.]

1. NO, the warrantless arrests of petitioners David, et al., made pursuant to PP 1017,
were NOT valid.
[S]earches, seizures and arrests are normally unreasonable unless authorized by a validly
issued search warrant or warrant of arrest. Section 5, Rule 113 of the Revised Rules on Criminal
Procedure provides [for the following circumstances of valid warrantless arrests]:

Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. - A peace officer or a private person may, without
a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting
to commit an offense.
(b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe based on personal
knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it; and
x x x.

Neither of the [provisions on in flagrante nor hot pursuit warrantless arrests] justifies
petitioner Davids warrantless arrest. During the inquest for the charges of inciting to sedition and
violation of BP 880, all that the arresting officers could invoke was their observation that some
rallyists were wearing t-shirts with the invective Oust Gloria Nowand their erroneous assumption
that petitioner David was the leader of the rally.Consequently, the Inquest Prosecutor ordered his
immediate release on the ground of insufficiency of evidence. He noted that petitioner David was not
wearing the subject t-shirt and even if he was wearing it, such fact is insufficient to charge him with
inciting to sedition.

2. NO, the warrantless search and seizure on the Daily Tribunes officesconducted
pursuant to PP 1017 was NOT valid.

[T]he search [and seizure in the Daily Tribune premises] is illegal. Rule 126 of The Revised
Rules on Criminal Procedure lays down the steps in the conduct of search and seizure. Section 4
requires that a search warrant be issued upon probable cause in connection with one specific
offence to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce. Section 8 mandates that the search of a house,
room, or any other premise be made in the presence of the lawful occupant thereof or any member
of his family or in the absence of the latter, in the presence of two (2) witnesses of sufficient age and
discretion residing in the same locality. And Section 9 states that the warrant must direct that it be
served in the daytime, unless the property is on the person or in the place ordered to be searched, in
which case a direction may be inserted that it be served at any time of the day or night. All these
rules were violated by the CIDG operatives.

ALMARIO v. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY


G.R. No. 189028
July 16, 2013
701 SCRA 269
FACTS: The National Artists Awards Committee. and the NCCA decided to team up and jointly
administer the National Artists Award. There were three deliberations for determining the nominees and
on the final deliberation, a final list of four names was agreed upon namely: Manuel Conde, Ramon
Santos, Lazaro Francisco and Federico Aguilar-Alcuaz.

They submitted this recommendation to the President. According to respondents, the aforementioned
letter was referred by the Office of the President to the Committee on Honors. Meanwhile, the Office of
the President allegedly received nominations from various sectors, cultural groups and individuals
strongly endorsing private respondents.
Acting on this recommendation, a series of Proclamations were issued declaring Lazaro Francisco,
Federico Aguilar-Alcuaz and private respondents, Guidote-Alvarez, Caparas, Masa and Moreno,
respectively, as National Artists.

Hence, the petition. All of the petitioners claim that former President Macapagal-Arroyo gravely abused
her discretion in disregarding the results of the rigorous screening and selection process for the Order of
National Artists and in substituting her own choice for those of the Deliberation Panels.

ISSUE: Whether or not the act of the President amounted to grave abuse of discretion with regards to the
violation of the right to equal protection

RULING: Yes. It should be recalled that one of the respondents was disqualified to be nominated for
being the Executive Director of the NCCA at that time while respondents Masa and Caparas did not make
it to the preliminary shortlist and respondent Moreno was not included in the second shortlist.

Yet, the four of them were treated differently and considered favorably when they were exempted from the
rigorous screening process of the NCCA and the CCP and conferred the Order of National Artists.

The special treatment accorded to respondents Guidote-Alvarez, Caparas, Masa and Moreno fails to pass
rational scrutiny. No real and substantial distinction between respondents and petitioner Abad has been
shown that would justify deviating from the laws, guidelines and established procedures, and placing
respondents in an exceptional position.

In view of the foregoing, there was a violation of petitioner Abads right to equal protection, an interest
that is substantial enough to confer him standing in this case.

Rhonda Vivares vs St. Theresas


College

I n January 2012, Angela Tan, a high school student at St. Theresas College (STC),
uploaded on Facebook several pictures of her and her classmates (Nenita Daluz and
Julienne Suzara) wearing only their undergarments.
Thereafter, some of their classmates reported said photos to their teacher, Mylene
Escudero. Escudero, through her students, viewed and downloaded said pictures. She
showed the said pictures to STCs Discipline-in-Charge for appropriate action.
Later, STC found Tan et al to have violated the students handbook and banned them from
marching in their graduation ceremonies scheduled in March 2012.
The issue went to court but despite a TRO (temporary restraining order) granted by the
Cebu RTC enjoining the school from barring the students in the graduation ceremonies,
STC still barred said students.
Subsequently, Rhonda Vivares, mother of Nenita, and the other mothers filed a petition for
the issuance of the writ of habeas data against the school. They argued, among others,
that:
1. The privacy setting of their childrens Facebook accounts was set at Friends Only. They,
thus, have a reasonable expectation of privacy which must be respected.
2. The photos accessed belong to the girls and, thus, cannot be used and reproduced
without their consent. Escudero, however, violated their rights by saving digital copies of the
photos and by subsequently showing them to STCs officials. Thus, the Facebook accounts
of the children were intruded upon;
3. The intrusion into the Facebook accounts, as well as the copying of information, data,
and digital images happened at STCs Computer Laboratory;
They prayed that STC be ordered to surrender and deposit with the court all soft and printed
copies of the subject data and have such data be declared illegally obtained in violation of
the childrens right to privacy.
The Cebu RTC eventually denied the petition. Hence, this appeal.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petition for writ of habeas data is proper.
HELD: Yes, it is proper but in this case, it will not prosper.
Contrary to the arguments of STC, the Supreme Court ruled that:
1. The petition for writ of habeas data can be availed of even if this is not a case of
extralegal killing or enforced disappearance; and
2. The writ of habeas data can be availed of against STC even if it is not an entity engaged
in the business of gathering, collecting, or storing data or information regarding the person,
family, home and correspondence of the aggrieved party.
First, the Rule on Habeas Data does not state that it can be applied only in cases of
extralegal killings or enforced disappearances. Second, nothing in the Rule would suggest
that the habeas data protection shall be available only against abuses of a person or entity
engaged in the business of gathering, storing, and collecting of data.
Right to Privacy on Social Media (Online Networking Sites)
The Supreme Court ruled that if an online networking site (ONS) like Facebook has privacy
tools, and the user makes use of such privacy tools, then he or she has a reasonable
expectation of privacy (right to informational privacy, that is). Thus, such privacy must be
respected and protected.
In this case, however, there is no showing that the students concerned made use of such
privacy tools. Evidence would show that that their post (status) on Facebook were published
as Public.
Facebook has the following settings to control as to who can view a users posts on his
wall (profile page):
(a) Public the default setting; every Facebook user can view the photo;
(b) Friends of Friends only the users Facebook friends and their friends can view the
photo;
(c) Friends only the users Facebook friends can view the photo;
(d) Custom the photo is made visible only to particular friends and/or networks of the
Facebook user; and
(e) Only Me the digital image can be viewed only by the user.
The default setting is Public and if a user wants to have some privacy, then he must
choose any setting other than Public. If it is true that the students concerned did set the
posts subject of this case so much so that only five people can see them (as they claim),
then how come most of their classmates were able to view them. This fact was not refuted
by them. In fact, it was their classmates who informed and showed their teacher, Escudero,
of the said pictures. Therefore, it appears that Tan et al never use the privacy settings of
Facebook hence, they have no reasonable expectation of privacy on the pictures of them
scantily clad.
STC did not violate the students right to privacy. The manner which the school gathered the
pictures cannot be considered illegal. As it appears, it was the classmates of the students
who showed the picture to their teacher and the latter, being the recipient of said pictures,
merely delivered them to the proper school authority and it was for a legal purpose, that is,
to discipline their students according to the standards of the school (to which the students
and their parents agreed to in the first place because of the fact that they enrolled their
children there).

Joey M. Pestilos, Dwight Macapanas, Miguel Gaces, Jerry Fernandez and Ronald Muoz v. People
of the Philippines
G.R. No. 182601, November 10, 2014
Brion, J.:

FACTS:
The petitioners were indicted for attempted murder. Petitioners filed an Urgent Motion for Regular
Preliminary Investigation on the ground that there no valid warrantless took place. The RTC denied the
motion and the CA affirmed the denial.

Records show that an altercation ensued between the petitioners and Atty. Moreno Generoso. The latter
called the Central Police District to report the incident and acting on this report, SPO1 Monsalve
dispatched SPO2 Javier to go to the scene of the crime and render assistance. SPO2, together with
augmentation personnel arrived at the scene of the crime less than one hour after the alleged altercation
and saw Atty. Generoso badly beaten.

Atty. Generoso then pointed the petitioners as those who mauled him which prompted the police officers
to invite the petitioners to go to the police station for investigation. At the inquest proceeding, the City
Prosecutor found that the petitioners stabbed Atty. Generoso with a bladed weapon who fortunately
survived the attack.

Petitioners aver that they were not validly arrested without a warrant.

ISSUE:
Are the petitioners validly arrested without warrant when the police officers did not witness the crime and
arrived only less than an hour after the alleged altercation?

HELD:
YES, the petitioners were validly arrested without warrant. Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure provides that:

When an offense has just been committed, and he has probable cause to
believe based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the
person to be arrested has committed it.

The elements under Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure are: first, an
offense has just been committed; and second, the arresting officer has probable cause to believe based
on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it.

The Court's appreciation of the elements that "the offense has just been committed" and ''personal
knowledge of facts and circumstances that the person to be arrested committed it" depended on the
particular circumstances of the case. The element of ''personal knowledge of facts or circumstances",
however, under Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure requires clarification.
Circumstances may pertain to events or actions within the actual perception, personal evaluation or
observation of the police officer at the scene of the crime. Thus, even though the police officer has not
seen someone actually fleeing, he could still make a warrantless arrest if, based on his personal
evaluation of the circumstances at the scene of the crime, he could determine the existence of probable
cause that the person sought to be arrested has committed the crime.

However, the determination of probable cause and the gathering of facts or circumstances should be
made immediately after the commission of the crime in order to comply with the element of immediacy. In
other words, the clincher in the element of ''personal knowledge of facts or circumstances" is the required
element of immediacy within which these facts or circumstances should be gathered.

With the facts and circumstances of the case at bar that the police officers gathered and which they have
personally observed less than one hour from the time that they have arrived at the scene of the crime, it is
reasonable to conclude that the police officers had personal knowledge of the facts and circumstances
justifying the petitioners warrantless arrests.

Hence, the petitioners were validly arrested and the subsequent inquest proceeding was likewise
appropriate.

Jose Jinggoy Estrada v. Sandiganbayan (G.R. No. 148965, February 26, 2002)

FACTS:

Jinggoy Estarda, former President Estradas son and then mayor of San Juan, Metro Manila was
charged for plunder under Republic Act No. 7080.
An Information was filed but was subsequently amended: (I quoted it kc di kaya ng powers ko
iparaphrase!)

AMENDED INFORMATION

The undersigned Ombudsman Prosecutor and OIC-Director, EPIB Office of the Ombudsman, hereby
accuses former PRESIDENT OF THE PHILIPPINES, Joseph Ejercito Estrada a.k.a. ASIONG SALONGA
AND a.k.a JOSE VELARDE, together with Jose Jinggoy Estrada, Charlie Atong Ang, Edward Serapio,
Yolanda T. Ricaforte, Alma Alfaro, JOHN DOE a.k.a. Eleuterio Tan OR Eleuterio Ramos Tan or Mr. Uy, Jane
Doe a.k.a. Delia Rajas, and John DOES & Jane Does, of the crime of Plunder, defined and penalized under
R.A. No. 7080, as amended by Sec. 12 of R.A. No. 7659, committed as follows:
That during the period from June, 1998 to January, 2001, in the Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, accused Joseph Ejercito Estrada, THEN A PUBLIC OFFICER, BEING THEN THE
PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, by himself AND/OR in
CONNIVANCE/CONSPIRACY with his co-accused, WHO ARE MEMBERS OF HIS FAMILY, RELATIVES
BY AFFINITY OR CONSANGUINITY, BUSINESS ASSOCIATES, SUBORDINATES AND/OR OTHER
PERSONS, BY TAKING UNDUE ADVANTAGE OF HIS OFFICIAL POSITION, AUTHORITY,
RELATIONSHIP, CONNECTION, OR INFLUENCE, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and criminally
amass, accumulate and acquire BY HIMSELF, DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, ill-gotten wealth in the
aggregate amount OR TOTAL VALUE of FOUR BILLION NINETY SEVEN MILLION EIGHT HUNDRED
FOUR THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED SEVENTY THREE PESOS AND SEVENTEEN CENTAVOS
[P4,097,804,173.17], more or less, THEREBY UNJUSTLY ENRICHING HIMSELF OR THEMSELVES AT
THE EXPENSE AND TO THE DAMAGE OF THE FILIPINO PEOPLE AND THE REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES, through ANY OR A combination OR A series of overt OR criminal acts, OR SIMILAR
SCHEMES OR MEANS, described as follows:

(a) by receiving OR collecting, directly or indirectly, on SEVERAL INSTANCES, MONEY IN THE


AGGREGATE AMOUNT OF FIVE HUNDRED FORTY-FIVE MILLION PESOS (P545,000,000.00), MORE
OR LESS, FROM ILLEGAL GAMBLING IN THE FORM OF GIFT, SHARE, PERCENTAGE, KICKBACK OR
ANY FORM OF PECUNIARY BENEFIT, BY HIMSELF AND/OR in connivance with co-accused CHARLIE
ATONG ANG, Jose Jinggoy Estrada, Yolanda T. Ricaforte, Edward Serapio, AN (sic) JOHN DOES AND
JANE DOES, in consideration OF TOLERATION OR PROTECTION OF ILLEGAL GAMBLING;

(b) by DIVERTING, RECEIVING, misappropriating, converting OR misusing DIRECTLY OR


INDIRECTLY, for HIS OR THEIR PERSONAL gain and benefit, public funds in the amount of ONE
HUNDRED THIRTY MILLION PESOS [P130,000,000.00], more or less, representing a portion of the TWO
HUNDRED MILLION PESOS [P200,000,000] tobacco excise tax share allocated for the Province of Ilocor
Sur under R.A. No. 7171, BY HIMSELF AND/OR in CONNIVANCE with co-accused Charlie Atong Ang,
Alma Alfaro, JOHN DOE a.k.a. Eleuterio Tan OR Eleuterio Ramos Tan or Mr. Uy, and Jane Doe a.k.a. Delia
Rajas, AND OTHER JOHN DOES AND JANE DOES;

(c) by directing, ordering and compelling, FOR HIS PERSONAL GAIN AND BENEFIT, the
Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) TO PURCHASE 351,878,000 SHARES OF STOCK MORE
OR LESS, and the Social Security System (SSS), 329,855,000 SHARES OF STOCK MORE OR LESS, OF
THE BELLE CORPORATION IN THE AMOUNT OF MORE OR LESS ONE BILLION ONE HUNDRED TWO
MILLION NINE HUNDRED SIXTY FIVE THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED SEVEN PESOS AND FIFTY
CENTAVOS [P1,102,965,607.50] AND MORE OR LESS SEVEN HUNDRED FORTY FOUR MILLION SIX
HUNDRED TWELVE THOUSAND AND FOUR HUNDRED FIFTY PESOS [P744,612,450.00],
RESPECTIVELY, OR A TOTAL OF MORE OR LESS ONE BILLION EIGHT HUNDRED FORTY SEVEN
MILLION FIVE HUNDRED SEVENTY EIGHT THOUSAND FIFTY SEVEN PESOS AND FIFTY CENTAVOS
[P1,847,578,057.50]; AND BY COLLECTING OR RECEIVING, DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, BY HIMSELF
AND/OR IN CONNIVANCE WITH JOHN DOES AND JANE DOES, COMMISSIONS OR PERCENTAGES
BY REASON OF SAID PURCHASES OF SHARES OF STOCK IN THE AMOUNT OF ONE HUNDRED
EIGHTY NINE MILLION SEVEN HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS [P189,700,000.00], MORE OR LESS,
FROM THE BELLE CORPORATION WHICH BECAME PART OF THE DEPOSIT IN THE EQUITABLE-PCI
BANK UNDER THE ACCOUNT NAME JOSE VELARDE;
(d) by unjustly enriching himself FROM COMMISSIONS, GIFTS, SHARES, PERCENTAGES,
KICKBACKS, OR ANY FORM OF PECUNIARY BENEFITS, IN CONNIVANCE WITH JOHN DOES AND
JANE DOES, in the amount of MORE OR LESS THREE BILLION TWO HUNDRED THIRTY THREE
MILLION ONE HUNDRED FOUR THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED SEVENTY THREE PESOS AND
SEVENTEEN CENTAVOS [P3,233,104,173.17] AND DEPOSITING THE SAME UNDER HIS ACCOUNT
NAME JOSE VELARDE AT THE EQUITABLE-PCI BANK.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

Petitioner filed a "Motion to Quash or Suspend" the Amended Information on the ground that the Anti-
Plunder Law, Republic Act No. 7080, is unconstitutional and that it charged more than one offense.The
Motion was DENIED.
Respondent court issued a warrant of arrest for petitioner and his co-accused. Petitioner and his co-
accused were placed in custody of the law.
Petitioner was arraigned but refused to enter a plea. So the court entered a plea of not guilty.
Hence this petition.

ISSUES:
1. Whether the Anti-Plunder Law, Republic Act No. 7080, is unconstitutional;
2. Whether petitioner Jose Jinggoy Estrada may be tried for plunder, it appearing that he was
only allegedly involved in one act or offense that is illegal gambling and not in a "series or
combination of overt or criminal acts" as required in R.A. No. 7080 ; (ito ata ang pertinent sa crim)
3.Whether the petitioner is entitled to bail as a matter of right.

RULING:
1. NO. The constitutionality of Republic Act No. 7080 has already been settled in the case of Joseph
Estrada v. Sandiganbayan.

2. YES. Petitioners contention that R.A. No. 7080 is unconstitutional as applied to him is principally
perched on the premise that the Amended Information charged him with only one act or one offense which
cannot constitute plunder.

Petitioners premise is patently false. A careful examination of the Amended Information will show that it is
divided into three (3) parts: (1) the first paragraph charges former President Joseph E. Estrada with the
crime of plunder together with petitioner Jose Jinggoy Estrada, Charlie Atong Ang, Edward Serapio,
Yolanda Ricaforte and others; (2) the second paragraph spells out in general terms how the accused
conspired in committing the crime of plunder; and (3) the following four sub-paragraphs (a) to (d) describe
in detail the predicate acts constitutive of the crime of plunder pursuant to items (1) to (6) of R.A. No. 7080,
and state the names of the accused who committed each act.

Pertinent to the case at bar is the predicate act alleged in sub-paragraph (a) of the Amended
Information which is of receiving or collecting, directly or indirectly, on several instances, money in the
aggregate amount of P545,000,000.00 for illegal gambling in the form of gift, share, percentage, kickback
or any form of pecuniary benefit x x x. In this sub-paragraph (a), petitioner, in conspiracy with former
President Estrada, is charged with the act of receiving or collecting money from illegal gambling amounting
to P545 million. Contrary to petitioners posture, the allegation is that he received or collected money from
illegal gambling on several instances. The phrase on several instances means the petitioner
committed the predicate act in series. To insist that the Amended Information charged the petitioner
with the commission of only one act or offense despite the phrase several instances is to indulge in a
twisted, nay, pretzel interpretation.

It matters little that sub-paragraph (a) did not utilize the exact words combination or series as they
appear in R.A. No. 7080. For in Estrada v. Sandiganbayan, i[13] we held that where these two terms are
to be taken in their popular, not technical, meaning, the word series is synonymous with the clause on
several instances. Series refers to a repetition of the same predicate act in any of the items in Section 1
(d) of the law. The word combination contemplates the commission of at least any two different predicate
acts in any of said items. Plainly, sub-paragraph (a) of the Amended Information charges petitioner
with plunder committed by a series of the same predicate act under Section 1 (d) (2) of the law.

While it is clear that all the accused named in sub-paragraphs (a) to (d) thru their individual acts conspired
with the former President Estrada to enable the latter to amass, accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth in
the aggregate amount of P4,097,804,173.17, as the Amended Information is worded, however, it is not
certain whether the accused persons named in sub-paragraphs (a) to (d) conspired with each other to
enable the former President to amass the subject ill-gotten wealth.

In view of the lack of clarity in the Information, the Court held petitioner Jose Jinggoy Estrada cannot be
penalized for the conspiracy entered into by the other accused with the former President as related in the
second paragraph of the Amended Information in relation to its sub-paragraphs (b) to (d). Instead, the
petitioner can be held accountable only for the predicate acts that he allegedly committed as
related in sub-paragraph (a) of the Amended Information which were allegedly done in
conspiracy with the former President whose design was to amass ill-gotten wealth amounting to
more than P4 billion.

The Court added that it cannot fault the Ombudsman for including the predicate offenses alleged in sub-
paragraphs (a) to (d) of the Amended information in one and not four separate Informations. The court
explained that the history of R.A. No. 7080 will show that the law was crafted to avoid the mischief and folly
of filing multiple informations. The preparation of multiple Informations was a legal nightmare.R.A. No. 7080
or the Anti-Plunder Law was enacted precisely to address this procedural problem.

3. The Court noted that the hearings on which respondent court based its Resolution denying the motion for
bail involved the reception of medical evidence only and which evidence was given five months earlier in
September 2001. The records do not show that evidence on petitioner's guilt was presented before the
lower court. Thus, the Sandiganbayan was ordered to conduct hearings to ascertain whether
evidence of petitioner's guilt is strong to determine whether to grant bail to the latter.
i