People vs Simon Dela Rosa

Facts:
Accused-appellant Martin Simon y Sunga was charged on November 10, 1988 with a
violation of Section 4, Article II of RA no. 6425 under an indictment alleging that on or about
October 22, 1988, at barangay Sto. Cristo, Guagua, Pampanga, he sold four tea bags to a
Narcotics Command (NARCOM) poseur-buyer in consideration of the sum of P40.00, which tea
bags, when subjected to a laboratory examination, were found positive for marijuana. On
December 4, 1989, the trial court rendered judgment convicting appellant, and sentencing him
to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment.

Issue:
Whether or not the Indeterminate Sentence Law is applicable to the case?

Held:
Yes. Drug offenses are not included in nor has appellant committed any act which
would put him within the exceptions to said law and the penalty to be imposed does not involve
reclusion perpetua to death. The Indeterminate Sentence Law is a legal and social measure of
compassion, and should be liberally interpreted in favor of the accused.

Evangeline Ladonga vs. People of the Philippines

GR no. 141066, February 17, 2005

Facts:
In 1989, spouses Adronico and Evangeline Ladonga, petitioner, becamethe regular customer of
Alfredo Oculam in his pawnshop. Sometime in May 1990, the Ladonga spouses obtained a loan
from him, guaranteed by check of United Coconut Planters Bank, issued by Adronico. On last
week of April 1990and during the first week of May 1990 the spouses obtained additional
loanguaranteed by UCPD. And between May and June 1990, the spouses obtainedthe third loan
guaranteed by UCPD. The three checks bounced uponpresentment for the reason that the account
was closed. When the spousesfailed to redeem the check, despite repeated demands, Oculam
filed a criminalcomplaint against them.While admitting that the checks issued by Adronico
bounced becausethere was no sufficient deposit or the account was closed, the spouses claimthat
the checks were issued only to guarantee the obligation, with anagreement that Oculam should
not encash the checks when they mature, and,that petitioner is not a signatory of the checks and
had no participation in theissuance thereof.

Issue:
Whether or not the petitioner, who was not the issuer of the three checksthat bounced, could be
held liable for violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 asconspirator.

Ruling:
Article 8 of the Revised Penal Code provides that a conspiracy exist
when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and dec
ide to commit it. To be held liable guilty as co
-principal by reason of conspiracy, the accused must be shown to have perform an overt actin
pursuance or furtherance of the complicity.It was not proven by direct evidence; petitioner was
merely present at thetime of the issuance of the checks. However, this inference cannot be
stretchedto mean concurrence with the criminal design. Conspiracy must beestablished, not by
conjectures, but by positive and conclusive evidence.

People v. Bustinera

Facts:
Cipriano is a taxi operator. He hired Bustinera in 1996 as a taxi driver and assigned to him a
Daewoo sedan. On December 25, 1996, Bustinera reported for work and drove the taxi but failed
to return the car on the same day. The following day, Cipriano went to Bustineras house but did
not find the taxi nor Bustinera there. He reported the missing taxi to the police thereafter.
On January 9, 1997, Bustineras wife met Cipriano and told him that the taxi was abandoned in
Lagro. Cipriano was able to recover the taxi. Bustinera alleges that he failed to return the taxi
because he was still short on boundary fee. He also alleges that he returned the taxi on January 5
and he signed the logbook. Moreover, he said that he was able to remit a total of P4,500 as
payment for the boundary fee. He further alleges that Cipriano took his drivers license as he still
had a balance. With Bustinera unable to drive and pay the debt, his wife started to work as a
maid for Cipriano from February to March 1997 after which he was able to pay off the debt and
the license was returned.

Issues:
1. WON conviction for crime of qualified theft proper
2. WON intent to gain present

Held / Ratio:
Judgment set aside; Guilty of carnapping
1. No. Accused was convicted of qualified theft under Art. 310. However, said article has been
modified with respect to certain vehicles by RA 6539 (Anti Carnapping Law). When statutes are
in pare materia or cover the same subject matter, the rule dictates that they should be construed
together hat effect may be given to the provisions of each. However, when they are
irreconcilable, the latter law shall prevail as it is the latter expression of legislative will.
The elements of carnapping under RA 6539 are: (1) taking of vehicle of another, (2) it is without
consent or by means of violence / intimidation of person or force on things, and (3) intent to
gain. Essentially, carnapping is theft / robbery of a motorized vehicle. RA 6539 does not cover
vehicles like trolleys, lawn mowers, amphibian trucks roadrollers, trolleys, street-sweepers,
sprinklers, lawn mowers, amphibian trucks and cranes if not used on public highways, vehicles
which run only on rails and tracks, and tractors, trailers and tractor engines of all kinds and used
exclusively for agricultural purposes. Despite designation of qualified theft in the information,
the accused may still be convicted for carnapping as the facts, not the designation, alleged in the
information determine the real nature of the crime.
2. Animus lucrandi is an internal act and is presumed from the unlawful taking. Actual gain is
irrelevant. Gain is not limited to financial gain. The mere use of a thing constitutes gain. Even
if the taking is temporary, intent to gain is evident if he derives utility, satisfaction, enjoyment
and pleasure. The Court cannot believe accuseds bare assertions. He was not able to produce
any documentary evidence to prove that he signed the logbook or that he remitted P4,500.
The RTC erred in the penalty as RA 6539 provides for its own penalties. The RPC cannot be
given suppletory effect. Penalty is reduced from reclusion perpetua to the indeterminate
sentence of fourteen (14) years and eight (8) Months to seventeen (17) years and four (4)
months.

Go-Tan v. Spouses Tan

G.R. No. 168852

Facts:
On April 18, 1999, Sharica Mari Go-Tan and Steven Tan were married. Out of this union, two
female children were born, Kyra Danielle and Kristen Denise. On January 12, 2005, barely six
years into the marriage, petitioner Go-Tan filed a petition with prayer for the issuance of a
Temporary Protective Order (TPO) against Steven, in conspiracy with respondents, were causing
verbal, psychological, and economic abuses upon her in violation of Section 5, paragraphs (e) (2)
(3) (4), (h) (5) and (i) of Republic Act No. 9262.

Issue:
Whether or not respondents-spouses, Perfecto and Juanita, parents-in-law of Sharica, may be
included in the petition for the issuance of a protective order, in accordance with RA 9262.

Held:
Yes, the Court ruled in favor of the petitioner. While the provisions of RA 9262 provides that the
offender be ralted or connected to the victim by marriage, former marriage, or a sexual or dating
relationship, it does not preclude the application of the principle of conspiracy under the RPC. In
Section 47 of RA 9262, it has expressly provides for the suppletory application of the RPC.
Hence, legal principles developed from the Penal Code may be applied in a supplementary
capacity to crimes punished under special laws, such as RA 9262 in which the special law is
silent on a particular matter.

Teves vs. Comelec

Facts:
Petitioner was a candidate for the position of Representative of the 3rd legislative district of
Negros Oriental during the May 14, 2007 elections. On March 30, 2007, respondent Herminio G.
Teves filed a petition to disqualify petitioner on the ground that in Teves v. Sandiganbayan, he
was convicted of violating Section 3(h), Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019, or the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act, for possessing pecuniary or financial interest in a cockpit, which is
prohibited under Section 89(2) of the Local Government Code (LGC) of 1991, and was
sentenced to pay a fine of P10,000.00. Respondent alleged that petitioner is disqualified from
running for public office because he was convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude which
carries the accessory penalty of perpetual disqualification from public office.

On May 11, 2007, the COMELEC First Division disqualified petitioner from running for the
position of member of House of Representatives and ordered the cancellation of his Certificate of
Candidacy. It appears, however, that [petitioner] lost in the last 14 May 2007 congressional
elections for the position of member of the House of Representatives of the Third district of
Negros Oriental thereby rendering the instant Motion for Reconsideration moot and academic.

The petitioner filed a petition which the court found to have merit.

Issue:
Whether or not petitioners violation of Section 3(h), R.A. No. 3019 involves moral turpitude.

Held:
Sec. 12. Disqualifications. - Any person who has been declared by competent authority insane or
incompetent, or has been sentenced by final judgment for subversion, insurrection, rebellion, or
for any offense for which he has been sentenced to a penalty of more than eighteen months, or
for a crime involving moral turpitude, shall be disqualified to be a candidate and to hold any
office, unless he has been given plenary pardon or granted amnesty.

The disqualifications to be a candidate herein provided shall be deemed removed upon the
declaration by competent authority that said insanity or incompetence had been removed or after
the expiration of a period of five years from his service of sentence, unless within the same
period he again becomes disqualified.

Moral turpitude has been defined as everything which is done contrary to justice, modesty, or
good morals; an act of baseness, vileness or depravity in the private and social duties which a
man owes his fellowmen, or to society in general.

Section 3(h) of R.A. 3019 of which petitioner was convicted, reads:

Sec. 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. In addition to acts or omissions of public officers
already penalized by existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public
officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful.

People vs. Veneracion

Facts:
In August 1994, four accused were found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of rape with homicide
committed against a seven year old girl. The Presiding judge was Lorenzo Veneracion.
Under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code which treats of the crime of Rape with Homicide,
the penalty imposable shall be death. However, Judge Veneracion refused to impose the death
penalty but instead he sentenced the four accused to reclusion perpetua. The city prosecutor filed
a motion for reconsideration praying that the penalty of death be imposed upon the four accused
but the judge refused to act.

Issue:
Whether or not Judge Veneracion has the discretion to impose a lesser penalty than that imposed
by law.
Held:
No. The Supreme Court ruled that the law mandates that after an adjudication of guilt, the judge
should impose the proper penalty provided for by the law on the accused regardless of his own
religious or moral beliefs. In this case, the judge must impose the death penalty. This is
consistent in the rule laid down in the Civil Code (Article 9 thereof) which provides that no
judge or court shall decline to render judgment by reason of the silence, obscurity, or
insufficiency of the laws.

Lito Corpuz vs. People

G.R. No. 180016, April 29, 2014

Facts:
Accused Corpuz received from complainant Tangcoy pieces of jewelry with an obligation to sell
the same and remit the proceeds of the sale or to return the same if not sold, after the expiration
of 30 days. The period expired without Corpuz remitting anything to Tangcoy. When Corpuz and
Tangcoy met, Corpuz promised that he will pay, but to no avail. Tangcoy filed a case for estafa
with abuse of confidence against Corpuz. Corpuz argued as follows:
a. The proof submitted by Tangcoy (receipt) is inadmissible for being a mere photocopy.
b. The information was defective because the date when the jewelry should be returned and the
date when crime occurred is different from the one testified to by Tangcoy.
c. Fourth element of estafa or demand is not proved.
d. Sole testimony of Tangcoy is not sufficient for conviction

ISSUES and RULING

Can the court admit as evidence a photocopy of document without violating the best evidence
rule (only original documents, as a general rule, is admissible as evidence)?
Yes. The established doctrine is that when a party failed to interpose a timely objection to
evidence at the time they were offered in evidence, such objection shall be considered as waived.
Here, Corpuz never objected to the admissibility of the said evidence at the time it was
identified, marked and testified upon in court by Tangcoy. Corpuz also failed to raise an
objection in his Comment to the prosecutions formal offer of evidence and even admitted
having signed the said receipt.
Is the date of occurrence of time material in estafa cases with abuse of confidence?
No. It is true that the gravamen of the crime of estafa with abuse of confidence under Article
315, paragraph 1, subparagraph (b) of the RPC is the appropriation or conversion of money or
property received to the prejudice of the owner and that the time of occurrence is not a material
ingredient of the crime. Hence, the exclusion of the period and the wrong date of the occurrence
of the crime, as reflected in the Information, do not make the latter fatally defective.
Further, the following satisfies the sufficiency of information:
1. The designation of the offense by the statute;
2. The acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense;
3. The name of the offended party; and
4. The approximate time of the commission of the offense, and the place wherein the offense was
committed.
The 4th element is satisfied. Even though the information indicates that the time of offense was
committed on or about the 5th of July 1991, such is not fatal to the prosecutions cause
considering that Section 11 of the same Rule requires a statement of the precise time only when
the same is a material ingredient of the offense.
What is the form of demand required in estafa with abuse of confidence?
Note first that the elements of estafa with abuse of confidence are as follows:
(a) that money, goods or other personal property is received by the offender in trust, or on
commission, or for administration, or under any other obligation involving the duty to make
delivery of, or to return the same;
(b) that there be misappropriation or conversion of such money or property by the offender or
denial on his part of such receipt;
(c) that such misappropriation or conversion or denial is to the prejudice of another; and
(d) that there is a demand made by the offended party on the offender.
No specific type of proof is required to show that there was demand. Demand need not even be
formal; it may be verbal. The specific word demand need not even be used to show that it has
indeed been made upon the person charged, since even a mere query as to the whereabouts of the
money [in this case, property], would be tantamount to a demand.
In Tubb v. People, where the complainant merely verbally inquired about the money entrusted to
the accused, the query was tantamount to a demand.
May a sole witness be considered credible?
Yes. Note first that settled is the rule that in assessing the credibility of witnesses, SC gives great
respect to the evaluation of the trial court for it had the unique opportunity to observe the
demeanor of witnesses and their deportment on the witness stand, an opportunity denied the
appellate courts, which merely rely on the records of the case.
The assessment by the trial court is even conclusive and binding if not tainted with arbitrariness
or oversight of some fact or circumstance of weight and influence, especially when such finding
is affirmed by the CA. Truth is established not by the number of witnesses, but by the quality of
their testimonies, for in determining the value and credibility of evidence, the witnesses are to be
weighed not numbered.

Criminal Law- People vs. Delim

G.R. No. 142773 28January2003

Facts:
It is due to the automatic review of the decision of the RTC Branch 46 (Urdaneta City) finding
the appellants, guilty beyond reasonable doubt and sentencing them to death for the murder of
Modesto Bantas.
Appellants pleaded not guilty to the charge. The appellants and victim are related for modesto
is an adopted son of their father. On January 23,1999 Marlon, Robert and Ronald Delim charged
into the house and poked a gun at modesto and herded him outside the house. Leon and Manuel
Delim both armed stayed put and made sure that randy and rita stayed put.
Modesto's lifeless body was then found on January 25, 1999. Marlon, Ronald, and Leon used
denial and alibi as their evidence against the charge.
*alibis are the weakest of all defenses since it is easy to contrive and difficult to disprove

Issue:
Is conspiracy and treachery present in this case to ensure that murder can be the crime?
Yes there is:
CONSPIRACY- is determined when two or more persons agree to commit a felony and decide
to commit it. Conspiracy must be proven with the same quantum of evidence as the felony itself,
more specifically by proof beyond reasonable doubt. It is not essential that there be proof as to
the existence of a previous agreement to commit a crime. It is sufficient if, at the time of
commission of the crime, the accused had the same purpose and were united in its executed.
appellants acted in unison when they abducted Modesto. So their acts were synchronized and
executed with precision evincing a preconceived plan to kill Modesto
There is no:
TREACHERY- there is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against person,
employing means, methods, or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and especially
to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party
might make.
For it to be appreciated prosecution needs to prove:
a. employment of means of execution which gives the person no opportunity
to defend himself
b. the means of execution is deliberately and consciously adopted
in the appellants case there are no evidence to the particulars on how Modesto was assaulted and
killed and this in fact does mean that treachery cannot be proven since it cannot be presumed that
modesto was defenseless during the time that he was being attacked and shot at by the
appellants.
Sheer numbers by the appellants when they attacked modesto does not constitute proof that the
three took advantage of their numerical superiority and their handguns when Modesto was shot
and stabbed.

Held:
APPELLANTS ARE GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE FELONY OF
HOMICIDE (THE DECISION OF THE LOWER COURTS WERE MODIFIED TO LOWER
THE CRIME FROM MURDER TO HOMICIDE)

CASE OF CALL OF DUTY

SALVADOR YAPYUCO y G.R. Nos. 120744-46
ENRIQUEZ,
Petitioner,
- versus -
HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN and
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Respondents.
FACTS:
The cases are predicated on a shooting incident on April 5, 1988 in Barangay Quebiawan, San
Fernando, Pampanga which caused the death of Leodevince Licup (Licup) and injured Noel
Villanueva (Villanueva). Accused were petitioners Salvador Yapyuco, Jr. (Yapyuco)
and
Generoso Cunanan, Jr. (Cunanan) and Ernesto Puno (Puno) who were members of the Integrated
National Police (INP) stationed at the Sindalan Substation in San Fernando, Pampanga; Jose
Pamintuan (Pamintuan) and Mario Reyes, who were barangay captains of Quebiawan and Del
Carmen, respectively; Ernesto Puno, Andres Reyes and Virgilio Manguerra (Manguerra), Carlos
David, Ruben Lugtu, Moises Lacson (Lacson), Renato Yu, Jaime Pabalan (Pabalan) and Carlos
David (David), who were either members of the Civil Home Defense Force (CHDF) or civilian
volunteer officers in Barangays Quebiawan, Del Carmen and Telebastagan. They were all
charged with murder, multiple attempted murder and frustrated murder in three Informations, the
inculpatory portions of which read:
Criminal Case No. 16612:
That on or about the 5th day of April 1988, in Barangay Quebiawan, San Fernando, Pampanga,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, all
public officers, being then policemen, Brgy. Captains, Brgy. Tanod and members of the Civil
Home Defense Force (CHDF), respectively, confederating and mutually helping one another,
and while responding to information about the presence of armed men in said barangay and
conducting surveillance thereof, thus committing the offense in relation to their office, did then
and there, with treachery and evident premeditation, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, and
with deliberate intent to take the life of Leodevince S. Licup, attack the latter with automatic
weapons by firing directly at the green Toyota Tamaraw jitney ridden by Leodevince S. Licup
and inflicting multiple gunshot wounds which are necessarily mortal on the different parts of the
body, thereby causing the direct and immediate death of the latter.
On the same day, and with the same intent to take life and attack Eduardo S. Flores, Alejandro R.
de Vera, Restituto G. Calma and Raul V. Panlican also, Noel C. Villanueva boarded on the same
colored green Toyota Tamaraw by using firing weapons; although three are all same criminal
cases, they were filed directly to the above-named accused. The criminal cases numbers; 16613
and 16614.
Yapyuco who was then allegedly adversed entered individual pleas of not guilty. A month later,
Yapyuco voluntarily surrendered to the authorities, and at his arraignment likewise entered a
negative plea. In the meantime, Mario Reyes, Andres Reyes, David, Lugtu, Lacson, Yu and
Manguerra jointly filed a Motion for Bail relative to Criminal Case No. 16612. On May 10,
1991, the Sandiganbayan granted bail in Criminal Case No. 16612. Yapyuco likewise applied for
bail on May 15, 1991 and the same was also granted on May 21, 1991. Pamintuan, same as
Pabalan who died earlier; died on November 21, 1992, and accordingly, the charges against him
were dismissed.
The prosecution established that in the evening of April 5, 1988, Villanueva, Flores, Calma, De
Vera, Panlican and Licup (victims) were at the residence of Salangsang as guests at the barrio
fiesta celebrations between 5:00 and 7:30 p.m.. The company decided to leave at around 7:30
p.m., shortly after the religious procession had passed. As they were all intoxicated, Salangsang
reminded Villanueva, who was on the wheel, to drive carefully and watch out for potholes and
open canals on the road. With Licup in the passenger seat and the rest of his companions at the
back of his Tamaraw jeepney, Villanueva allegedly proceeded at 5-10 kph with headlights
dimmed. Suddenly, as they were approaching a curve on the road, they met a burst of gunfire and
instantly, Villanueva and Licup were both wounded and bleeding profusely.
In open court, Flores executed a sketch depicting the relative location of the Tamaraw jeepney on
the road, the residence of Salangsang where they had come from and the house situated on the
right side of the road right after the curve where the jeepney had taken a left turn; he identified
said house to be that of a certain Lenlen Naron where the gunmen allegedly took post and
opened fire at him and his companions. He could not tell how many firearms were used. He
recounted that after the shooting, he, unaware that Licup and Villanueva were wounded, jumped
out of the jeepney when he saw from behind them Pamintuan emerging from the yard of Narons
house. Frantic and shaken, he instantaneously introduced himself and his companions to be
employees of San Miguel Corporation but instead, Pamintuan corrected them for not stopping
when flagged. At this point, he was distracted when Villanueva cried out and told him to
summon Salangsang for help as he (Villanueva) and Licup were wounded. He dashed back to
Salangsangs house as instructed and, returning to the scene, he observed that petitioner Yu was
also there, and Villanueva and Licup were being loaded into a Sarao jeepney to be taken to the
hospital. This was corroborated by Villanueva who stated that as soon as the firing had ceased,
CRIME WITHOUT FRUSTRATED STAGEARISTOTEL VALENZUELA y
NATIVIDAD,
petitioner,vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and HON. COURT OF APPEALS NACHURA,
respondents.
G. R. No. 160188 June 21, 2007
FACTS:
On 19 May 1994, at around 4:30 p.m., petitioner and Calderon were sighted outside the Super
Sale Club, asupermarket within the ShoeMart (SM) complex along North EDSA, by Lorenzo
Lago (Lago), a security guardwho was then manning his post at the open parking area of the
supermarket. Lago saw petitioner, who waswearing an identification card with the mark
"Receiving Dispatching Unit (RDU)," hauling a push cart with cases of detergent of the well-
known "Tide" brand. Petitioner unloaded these cases in an open parking space, whereCalderon
was waiting. Petitioner then returned inside the supermarket, and after five (5) minutes, emerged
withmore cartons of Tide Ultramatic and again unloaded these boxes to the same area in the open
parking space.
Thereafter, petitioner left the parking area and haled a taxi. He boarded the cab and directed it
towards theparking space where Calderon was waiting. Calderon loaded the cartons of Tide
Ultramatic inside the taxi, thenboarded the vehicle. All these acts were eyed by Lago, who
proceeded to stop the taxi as it was leaving the openparking area. When Lago asked petitioner
for a receipt of the merchandise, petitioner and Calderon reacted byfleeing on foot, but Lago
fired a warning shot to alert his fellow security guards of the incident. Petitioner andCalderon
were apprehended at the scene, and the stolen merchandise recovered.
The filched items seized fromthe duo were four (4) cases of Tide Ultramatic, one (1) case of
Ultra 25 grams, and three (3) additional cases of detergent, the goods with an aggregate value of
P12,090.00.
In a Decision
promulgated on 1 February 2000, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch
90,convicted both petitioner and Calderon of the crime of consummated theft. They were
sentenced to anindeterminate prison term of two (2) years of prision correccional as minimum to
seven (7) years of prision mayor as maximum.
Valenzuela appealed before the Court of Appeals, arguing that he should only be convicted of
frustrated theftsince he was not able to freely dispose of the articles stolen.
Decision dated 19 June 2003,the Court of Appeals rejected this contention and affirmed
petitioners conviction
,thus the Petition for Review was filed before the Supreme Court.ISSUE: Whether or not the
crime committed has a frustrated stage.HELD: NO.
The petition was
DENIED
Article 6
of the Revised Penal Code provides that a felony is consummated when all the
elementsnecessary for its execution and accomplishment are present.
Article 308
states that, in the crime of theft, the following elements should be present: (1) that there betaking
of personal property; (2) that said property belongs to another; (3) that the taking be done with
intentto gain; (4) that the taking be done without the consent of the owner; and (5) that the taking
be accomplishedwithout the use of violence against or intimidation of persons or force upon
things.
The Court held that theft is produced when there is deprivation of personal property by one with
intent togain. Thus, it is immaterial that the offender is able or unable to freely dispose the
property stolen since hehas already committed all the acts of execution and the deprivation from
the owner has already ensued fromsuch acts. Therefore, theft cannot have a frustrated stage, and
can only be attempted or consummated.
JOY LEE RECUERDO
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,G.R. No. 168217, June 27, 2006, First Division, Callejo,
Sr. J.

Facts:
In September 1994, three separate Criminal Informations charging Joy Lee Recuerdo of Estafa
under Article 315,paragraph 2(d) of the Revised Penal Code involving 18 worthless bank checks
were simultaneously filed by theOffice of the Provincial Prosecutor of Bulacan.Evidence
adduced by the Prosecution tend to establish that herein private respondent Yolanda G. Floro is
engagedin the business of buying and selling of jewelry since 1985. Herein accused-
appellant/petitioner Joy Lee Recuerdo,
on the other hand, a dentist by profession, who was introduced to Floro by the latters cousin
Aimee Aoro i
n the firstweek of December 1993, became her customer. Sometime in the second week of
December 1993, at around 7:30in the evening, Recuerdo went to the house of Floro and
purchased from her two pieces of jewelry, to wit: a 2.19carat diamond round stone in white gold
setting worthP220,000.00 pesos, and one piece of loose 1.55 karat

marquez diamond with a value of P130,000.00 pesos.

For the 2.19 carat diamond stone, accused issued and delivered to the complainant then and there
ten post-datedchecks each in the amount of P22,000.00 drawn against Unitrust Development
Bank. For the 1.55 carat marquez

loose diamond, accused issued and delivered to complainant then and there ten (10) postdated
checks, each in theamount of P13,000.00 drawn against PCI Bank, Makati. In yet another
transaction that transpired in the earlyevening of February 7, 1994, Recuerdo once agai
n proceeded at Floros house
and bought another set of jewelry,this time a pair of diamond earrings worth P768,000.00 pesos.
She was given seven (7) postdated checks one

for P168,000.00 as downpayment and another six (6) postdated checks drawn against Prudential
Bank, Legaspi

Village, Makati Branch, each for P100,000.00 representing the balance in the aggregate amount
of P600,000.00

pesos.Floro deposited the aforementioned checks at Liberty Savings & Loan Association,
Meyc[a]uayan, Bulacan. Uponpresentment for encashment by said depositary bank with the
different drawee banks on their respective maturitydates, the six (6) Prudential Bank checks were
all dishonored for having been drawn against closed accounts
Issue:Is Recuerdo guilty of estafa under Art. 315 par. 2(d)?Ruling:
The crime of Estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2(d) of the Revised Penal Code has the
following basic elements:- Postdating or issuance of a check in payment of an obligation
contracted simultaneously at the time thecheck was issued;- The postdating or issuance was
done when the offender had no funds in the bank, or that his fundsdeposited therein were not
sufficient to cover the amount of the check; and- Damage to the payee thereof The existence of
the foregoing elements of the crime was concretely established by the prosecution through
convincing evidence, warranting petitioners conviction of the offense of Estafa.
The trial court found private
complainant Floros testimony that petitioner issued the subject checks as payment for the
purchase of pieces of
jewelry simultaneous to their transactions to be categorical and credible. There was sufficient
evidence establishedby the prosecution that the checks were issued by the accused to the
complainant in exchange of the pieces of jewelry given to her on two separate occasions.
Criminal Law- People vs. Delim
This case is with regard to Art 8 and 13 of the Revised Penal Code
"the act of one is the act of all"

Case of People of the R.P. vs. Delim

G.R. No. 142773 28January2003

FACTS OF THE CASE:

It is due to the automatic review of the decision of the RTC Branch 46 (Urdaneta City) finding
the appellants, guilty beyond reasonable doubt and sentencing them to death for the murder of
Modesto Bantas.

Appellants pleaded not guilty to the charge. The appellants and victim are related for modesto
is an adopted son of their father. On January 23,1999 Marlon, Robert and Ronald Delim charged
into the house and poked a gun at modesto and herded him outside the house. Leon and Manuel
Delim both armed stayed put and made sure that randy and rita stayed put.

Modesto's lifeless body was then found on January 25, 1999. Marlon, Ronald, and Leon used
denial and alibi as their evidence against the charge.
*alibis are the weakest of all defenses since it is easy to contrive and difficult to disprove

ISSUES OF THE CASE:

Is conspiracy and treachery present in this case to ensure that murder can be the crime?

Yes there is:

CONSPIRACY- is determined when two or more persons agree to commit a felony and decide
to commit it. Conspiracy must be proven with the same quantum of evidence as the felony itself,
more specifically by proof beyond reasonable doubt. It is not essential that there be proof as to
the existence of a previous agreement to commit a crime. It is sufficient if, at the time of
commission of the crime, the accused had the same purpose and were united in its executed.
appellants acted in unison when they abducted Modesto. So their acts were synchronized and
executed with precision evincing a preconceived plan to kill Modesto

There is no:
TREACHERY- there is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against person,
employing means, methods, or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and especially
to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party
might make.
For it to be appreciated prosecution needs to prove:
a. employment of means of execution which gives the person no opportunity
to defend himself
b. the means of execution is deliberately and consciously adopted
in the appellants case there are no evidence to the particulars on how Modesto was assaulted and
killed and this in fact does mean that treachery cannot be proven since it cannot be presumed that
modesto was defenseless during the time that he was being attacked and shot at by the
appellants.
Sheer numbers by the appellants when they attacked modesto does not constitute proof that the
three took advantage of their numerical superiority and their handguns when Modesto was shot
and stabbed.

HELD:
APPELLANTS ARE GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE FELONY OF
HOMICIDE (THE DECISION OF THE LOWER COURTS WERE MODIFIED TO LOWER
THE CRIME FROM MURDER TO HOMICIDE)

Supreme Court Reports AnnotatedPeople, appellee, vs. Danny Delos Santos, appellant403 SCRA 153, GR
No. 135919, May 9, 2003Facts:

On November 1997, De Leon witnessed the gruesome killing of Flores, while drinking with 3
men, onewas the witness Tablate. The two were positive of Delos Santos as the perpetrator but
testified only on January1
998. Despite Delos Santoss
alibi, he was found guilty of murder.
Issue:
WON the testimonies of the witnesses are credible even after the 2-monthperiod
Held:
Yes. It is but natural for witnesses to avoid being involved in a criminal proceeding particularly
when thecrime committed is of such gravity as to show the cruelty of the perpetrator, the fear of
retaliation can have a paralyzing effect to the witnesses. Besides, settled is the rule that positive
identification x x x prevails over alibiand denial. Decision is affirmed with modification.
U.S. vs. Ah Chong (15 Phil. 488)
27JUL
FACTS:
The defendant, Ah Chong, was employed as a cook at Officers quarters. On the night, the
defendant, who had received for the night, was suddenly awakened by some trying to force open
the door of the room. He sat up in bed and called out twice, Who is there? He heard no answer
and was convinced by the noise at the door that it was being pushed open by someone bent upon
forcing his way into the room. The defendant, fearing that the intruder was a robber or a thief,
leaped to his feet and called out: If you enter the room, I will kill you. He was struck just
above the knee by the edge of the chair and he thought that the blow had been inflicted by the
person who had forced the door open, whom he supposed to be a burglar. Seizing a common
kitchen knife which he kept under his pillow, the defendant struck out wildly at the intruder who,
it afterwards turned out, was his roommate. The roommate eventually died.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Ah Chong is liable for the death of his roommate.
HELD:
NO. Ah Chong was acquitted.
RATIO:
The decision of the lower court was reversed. The case was a mistake of fact resulting to self-
defense justified under Article 11(1) of the Revised Penal Code where there is (1) unlawful
aggression, (2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it, and (3) lack of
sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself. Had the deceased be a robber
as he thought, his actions would not be criminally liable.
Some maxims cited:
Actus non facit reum nisi mens sit rea, the act itself does not make man guilty unless his
intention were so;
Actus me incito factus non est meus actus, an act done by me against my will is not my act;

July 27, 1943 (74 Phil 257)

PARTIES:
Plaintiff and appellee: People of the Philippines
Defendants and appellant: Antonio Oanis, Alberto Galanta
FACTS:
Antonio Oanis and Alberto Galanta were instructed to arrest a notorious criminal and escaped
convict, Anselmo Balagtas, and if overpowered, to get him dead or alive. They went to the
suspected house then proceeded to the room where they saw the supposedly Balagtas sleeping
with his back towards the door. Oanis and Galanta simultaneously or successively fired at him
which resulted to the victims death. The supposedly Balagtas turned out to be Serepio Tecson,
an innocent man.

ISSUE:
1. WON Oanis and Galanta incur no liability due to innocent mistake of fact in the honest
performance of their official duties.
2. WON Oanis and Galanta incur no criminal liability in the performance of their duty.
HELD:
1. No. Innocent mistake of fact does not apply to the case at bar. Ignorance facti excusat
applies only when the mistake is committed without fault or carelessness. The fact that the
supposedly suspect was sleeping, Oanis and Galanta could have checked whether it is the real
Balagtas.
2. No. Oanis and Galanta are criminally liable. A person incurs no criminal liability when he acts
in the fulfillment of a duty or in the lawful exercise of a right or office. There are 2 requisites to
justify this: (1) the offender acted in teh perfomance of a duty or in the lawful exercise of a right
or office, (2) that the injury or offense committed be the necessary consequence of the due
performance of such duty or the lawful exercise of such right or office. In this case, only the first
requisite is present
CASE OF CALL OF DUTY
SALVADOR YAPYUCO y G.R. Nos. 120744-46
ENRIQUEZ,
Petitioner,

- versus -
HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN and
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Respondents.
FACTS:
The cases are predicated on a shooting incident on April 5, 1988 in Barangay Quebiawan, San
Fernando, Pampanga which caused the death of Leodevince Licup (Licup) and injured Noel
Villanueva (Villanueva). Accused were petitioners Salvador Yapyuco, Jr. (Yapyuco)
and
Generoso Cunanan, Jr. (Cunanan) and Ernesto Puno (Puno) who were members of the Integrated
National Police (INP) stationed at the Sindalan Substation in San Fernando, Pampanga; Jose
Pamintuan (Pamintuan) and Mario Reyes, who were barangay captains of Quebiawan and Del
Carmen, respectively; Ernesto Puno, Andres Reyes and Virgilio Manguerra (Manguerra), Carlos
David, Ruben Lugtu, Moises Lacson (Lacson), Renato Yu, Jaime Pabalan (Pabalan) and Carlos
David (David), who were either members of the Civil Home Defense Force (CHDF) or civilian
volunteer officers in Barangays Quebiawan, Del Carmen and Telebastagan. They were all
charged with murder, multiple attempted murder and frustrated murder in three Informations, the
inculpatory portions of which read:
Criminal Case No. 16612:
That on or about the 5th day of April 1988, in Barangay Quebiawan, San Fernando, Pampanga,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, all
public officers, being then policemen, Brgy. Captains, Brgy. Tanod and members of the Civil
Home Defense Force (CHDF), respectively, confederating and mutually helping one another,
and while responding to information about the presence of armed men in said barangay and
conducting surveillance thereof, thus committing the offense in relation to their office, did then
and there, with treachery and evident premeditation, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, and
with deliberate intent to take the life of Leodevince S. Licup, attack the latter with automatic
weapons by firing directly at the green Toyota Tamaraw jitney ridden by Leodevince S. Licup
and inflicting multiple gunshot wounds which are necessarily mortal on the different parts of the
body, thereby causing the direct and immediate death of the latter.
On the same day, and with the same intent to take life and attack Eduardo S. Flores, Alejandro R.
de Vera, Restituto G. Calma and Raul V. Panlican also, Noel C. Villanueva boarded on the same
colored green Toyota Tamaraw by using firing weapons; although three are all same criminal
cases, they were filed directly to the above-named accused. The criminal cases numbers; 16613
and 16614.
Yapyuco who was then allegedly adversed entered individual pleas of not guilty. A month later,
Yapyuco voluntarily surrendered to the authorities, and at his arraignment likewise entered a
negative plea. In the meantime, Mario Reyes, Andres Reyes, David, Lugtu, Lacson, Yu and
Manguerra jointly filed a Motion for Bail relative to Criminal Case No. 16612. On May 10,
1991, the Sandiganbayan granted bail in Criminal Case No. 16612. Yapyuco likewise applied for
bail on May 15, 1991 and the same was also granted on May 21, 1991. Pamintuan, same as
Pabalan who died earlier; died on November 21, 1992, and accordingly, the charges against him
were dismissed.
The prosecution established that in the evening of April 5, 1988, Villanueva, Flores, Calma, De
Vera, Panlican and Licup (victims) were at the residence of Salangsang as guests at the barrio
fiesta celebrations between 5:00 and 7:30 p.m.. The company decided to leave at around 7:30
p.m., shortly after the religious procession had passed. As they were all intoxicated, Salangsang
reminded Villanueva, who was on the wheel, to drive carefully and watch out for potholes and
open canals on the road. With Licup in the passenger seat and the rest of his companions at the
back of his Tamaraw jeepney, Villanueva allegedly proceeded at 5-10 kph with headlights
dimmed. Suddenly, as they were approaching a curve on the road, they met a burst of gunfire and
instantly, Villanueva and Licup were both wounded and bleeding profusely.
In open court, Flores executed a sketch depicting the relative location of the Tamaraw jeepney on
the road, the residence of Salangsang where they had come from and the house situated on the
right side of the road right after the curve where the jeepney had taken a left turn; he identified
said house to be that of a certain Lenlen Naron where the gunmen allegedly took post and
opened fire at him and his companions. He could not tell how many firearms were used. He
recounted that after the shooting, he, unaware that Licup and Villanueva were wounded, jumped
out of the jeepney when he saw from behind them Pamintuan emerging from the yard of Narons
house. Frantic and shaken, he instantaneously introduced himself and his companions to be
employees of San Miguel Corporation but instead, Pamintuan corrected them for not stopping
when flagged. At this point, he was distracted when Villanueva cried out and told him to
summon Salangsang for help as he (Villanueva) and Licup were wounded. He dashed back to
Salangsangs house as instructed and, returning to the scene, he observed that petitioner Yu was
also there, and Villanueva and Licup were being loaded into a Sarao jeepney to be taken to the
hospital. This was corroborated by Villanueva who stated that as soon as the firing had ceased,
Case Name: People v. Marrero
Citation: 69 N.Y. 2d 382
Facts: Marrero, a federal corrections officer, was arrested for unlicensed possession of a loaded
handgun. The statute exempted peace officers which included corrections officers of any state
correctional facility or of any penal correctional institution. After a successful pretrial motion to
dismiss, the Appellate Division reinstated the indictment, holding that Marrero was not a peace
officer. Marrero was then tried and convicted before a jury after the trial court rejected his
request for a jury instruction that it would be a good defense if he reasonably believed that the
statutory exemption for peace officers applied to him as a federal correctional officer.
Issue: Whether the defendants personal misreading or misunderstanding of a statute may excuse
criminal conduct in the circumstances of this case.
Defendants argument: The jury should have received an instruction about his reasonable
belief that the statutory exemption applied to him was a good defense.
States argument: The common law has clearly established that mistake of law does not
relieve a defendant of criminal liability.
Holding: Conviction upheld.
Reasoning: In addition to the common law view, if Marreros argument was accepted, the
exception would swallow the rule. Mistakes about the law would be encouragedthere would be
an infinite number of mistake of law defenses. The crime only required general intent.
Dissent: The majority adopts an Utilitarian view. The criminal justice system is supposed to
punish blameworthiness or choosing freely to do wrong. The defendant acted innocently and
with any intent to do wrong and should not be punished. Furthermore, the dissent disagreed with
the majoritys construction of the penal statute.
PEOPLE VS. BITDU G.R. No. L-38230, November 21, 1933
Justice Vickers

FACTS: Mora Bitdu was married to Moro Halid before an Imam in Lamitan of this Province of
Zamboanga in accordance with Mohammedan rites more than twelve years ago, and that about
seven months ago she was also married to Moro Hajirol before a Hadji in accordance with
Mohammedan customs. She claims, however, that the second marriage contracted by her with
Hajirol took place after she had been divorced from her first husband Halid in accordance with
Mohammedan customs, said divorce having taken place before Datu Gavino Cuevas, of Isabela
de Basilan.

ISSUE: whether the divorce of the marriage is valid in accordance with the Philippine laws

HELD: No. A divorce cannot be had except in that court upon which the state has conferred
jurisdiction, and then only for those causes and with those formalities which the state has by
statute prescribed.

Section 25 of the Marriage Law (Act No. 3613) provides that marriages between Mohammedans
may be performed in accordance with the rites or practice of their religion, but there is no
provision of law which authorizes the granting of divorces in accordance with the rites or
practices of their religion.

It is conceded in all jurisdictions that public policy, good morals, and the interests of society
require that the marriage relation should be sounded with every safeguard and its severance
allowed only in the manner prescribed and for the causes specified by law. And the parties can
waive nothing essential to the validity of the proceedings.
 Diego vs. Castillo

A.M. No. RTJ-02-1673 August 11, 2004

Lessons Applicable: malice, bigamy

Laws Applicable: Article 204[7] RPC,

FACTS:
January 9, 1965: Crescencia Escoto contracted marriage with Jorge de Perio, Jr., both
Filipinos, solemnized before then Mayor Liberato Reyna of Dagupan City
February 15, 1978: Jorge filed a Decree of Divorce in Texas
June 4, 1987: Crescencia Escoto using the name Lucena Escoto married Manuel P. Diego
before the Rev. Fr. Godoy, parish priest of Dagupan City
The sister of Manuel P. Diego filed a criminal case of bigamy against Escoto
RTC: Acquittal since state failed to prove guilt beyond whisper of a doubt and gave credence
to the defense of the accused that she acted without any malicious intent for believing in good
faith that her marriage was already annulled by a foreign judgment
An administrative case is filed against Judge Silverio Q. Castillo for Knowingly rendering an
unjust judgment under Article 204[7] of the Revised Penal Code

ISSUE: W/N Castillo should be liable against Article 204[7] of the Revised Penal Code

HELD: NO. Regional Trial Court Judge Silverio Q. Castillo is FINED P10,000 with a STERN
WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely
The law requires that
o (a) the offender is a judge;
o (b) he renders a judgment in a case submitted to him for decision;
o (c) the judgment is unjust;
o (d) he knew that said judgment is unjust
even assuming that a judge erred in acquitting an accused, he still cannot be administratively
charged lacking the element of bad faith, malice or corrupt purpose
As a matter of public policy then, the acts of a judge in his official capacity are not subject to
disciplinary action, even though such acts are erroneous.
Good faith and absence of malice, corrupt motives or improper considerations are sufficient
defenses in which a judge charged with ignorance of the law can find refuge.
error committed by respondent Judge being gross and patent, the same constitutes ignorance
of the law of a nature sufficient to warrant disciplinary action