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Shaun Narine
To cite this article: Shaun Narine (2008) Forty years of ASEAN: a historical review, The Pacific
Review, 21:4, 411-429, DOI: 10.1080/09512740802294689
Download by: [NUS National University of Singapore] Date: 02 August 2016, At: 01:12
The Pacific Review, Vol. 21 No. 4 December 2008: 411429
Shaun Narine
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Introduction
Over its 40-year history (19672007), the Association of Southeast Asian
Nations (ASEAN) has experienced considerable fluctuations in its fortunes.
It was most prominent during the 1980s as it organized the global campaign
against Vietnams occupation of Cambodia. Its institutional nadir may have
come in 199799, when ASEAN proved ineffective during the catastrophic
East Asian economic crisis. Today, ASEANs international standing is on
another upswing. It is at the center of a number of Asia Pacific regional
initiatives, including the ASEAN Plus Three (APT), the ASEAN-China
Free Trade Agreement (ACFTA), the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation
(APEC) forum, and the East Asian Summit (EAS). It is discussing creating
New Brunswick, Canada. He has written extensively on ASEAN and institutionalism in the
Asia Pacific. His current projects include a new book on ASEAN and a study of Chinese
leadership in the Pacific region.
Address: Shaun Narine, St. Thomas University, 51 Dineen Drive, Fredericton, NB. E3B 5G3,
Canada. E-mail: narine@stu.ca
http://www.tandf.co.uk/journals
DOI: 10.1080/09512740802294689
412 The Pacific Review
Theoretical overview
Of the mainstream theoretical approaches to institutions neo-realism, lib-
eral institutionalism, and constructivism constructivism offers the most
useful, though limited, analysis of ASEAN. Neo-realists regard ASEAN as
irrelevant (Jones and Smith 2002). But they cannot explain why ASEANs
members dedicate so much time and resources to something so meaning-
less. Liberal institutionalists have a difficult time explaining exactly what
ASEANs functions are.
Constructivist analysts of ASEAN argue that the organization embodies
and promotes certain key norms and practices in the Asia Pacific region
(Acharya 2001; Eaton and Stubbs 2006). ASEANs power lies mostly in get-
ting other states to adopt its rules of acceptable regional behavior. There is
truth in this analysis, but the constructivist emphasis on shifts in identity to
explain normative change (and vice versa) misjudges the nature of state in-
teraction in Southeast Asia. In fact, contrary to what many observers claim,
ASEANs core values often work against the development of a cohesive re-
gional organization. ASEAN is a pluralistic community. ASEAN promotes
cooperation between its members, but its values result in weak institutional
structures (Emmerson 2005). ASEANs success has largely been based on its
ability to organize its members around common interests that are reflected
in its values but shared values do not necessarily lead to a common identity.
Collins argues that, while the transnational elites of ASEAN may enjoy a
sense of belonging to a larger community, the people of the ASEAN states
do not exhibit much of the we-feeling that is part of Deutschian security
communities. Instead, ASEAN is a community based around the mutual
benefits of shared rules, not a strong sense of collective identity (Collins 2007:
215). ASEAN forms a security regime, which facilitates cooperation around
recognized rules to reduce uncertainty and advance longer-term interests
(Ibid: 206).
S. Narine: Forty years of ASEAN: a historical review 413
The ES captures this aspect of ASEAN very well. Despite its apparent
similarities to constructivism and even to classical realism, the ES offers a dis-
tinctive approach to international relations (Narine 2006; Buzan 2004). The
ES emphasizes that international society, and the shared norms and values
that underpin that society, is a normal state of affairs in international politics.
The conflict-prone, threat-dominated world of the realists, to which all main-
stream, North American international relations (IR) theory responds, is a
misinterpretation of the international realm. In fact, cooperation between
self-interested states which is the key problem of most rationalist theory
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is both common and fairly easily sustained. The ASEAN states cooperate
because any shared antipathy is outweighed by the advantages of working
together. Understanding that rational, self-interested states will cooperate
does not require positing a radical transformation/creation of regional iden-
tity, which mainstream constructivists are prone to do. In fact, the sense of
Southeast Asian regional identity remains relatively weak, but this reality
does not preclude cooperation (Alagappa 2003; Severino 2006). The ES is
deficient in that it fails to recognize the extent to which domestic political
considerations and concerns with nation-building shape the foreign policies
of most developing states. ASEANs historical development bears this out.
The single most important factor both driving and limiting ASEANs evolu-
tion in its 40-year history has been its pursuit of policies that will strengthen
the economic and political security of its member states (Narine 2004).
disagreed with this initiative and ZOPFAN was the resulting compromise.
ZOPFAN had no timetable for its implementation, and in recent years, the
concept has been abandoned (Haacke 2003: 734). ZOPFAN exemplifies the
dynamics of ASEANs early years. The disparate interests and perspectives
of its member states meant that most could not agree on fundamental poli-
cies. Even so, they were able to present an apparently unified front to the
world.
The Bali Conference of February 1976 was motivated by the end of the
Vietnam War in 1975; the emergence of communist Vietnam, Laos, and Cam-
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bodia; and uncertainties about the American commitment to the region. The
Bali Conference was the first meeting of the ASEAN heads of state. Out of
the conference came two important documents: the Declaration of ASEAN
Concord and the Treat of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia (TAC).
The Declaration addressed the economic side of security, defining four areas
of intra-ASEAN economic cooperation. It also encouraged military coop-
eration between the ASEAN states, albeit on a non-ASEAN basis.
The TAC was a code of conduct for Southeast Asia. It obligated its signa-
tories to settle disputes peacefully and prohibited the use of force between
states. It was open to accession by non-ASEAN states. Vietnam rejected the
TAC, however, as it felt that ASEAN was an American puppet.1 Today, the
TAC has grown to become one of the strongest symbols of ASEANs influ-
ence in the Asia Pacific region. Its signatories now include all the Southeast
Asian countries as well as China, India, Japan, and (with caveats) Australia.
The Declaration of ASEAN Concord has been less successful. ASEAN
has not enjoyed great success as an economic institution, a subject discussed
below. The economic achievements of the ASEAN states happened inde-
pendently of ASEAN, though ASEAN may have facilitated economic de-
velopment by helping to create and maintain regional political stability.
as the real long-term threat to the region and Vietnam as a potential ally in
dealing with that greater problem. Singapore emphasized the Vietnamese
invasion as an example of Soviet expansionism, in order to keep the United
States engaged in the region. The Philippines was committed to international
law and did not want the invasion to go unpunished.
Indonesia went along with Thailands plan because, after Konfrontasi,
it needed to show that it could be a regional player. Indonesia regarded
ASEAN as an instrument through which it could exert regional power. In-
donesia recognized that Thailand would abandon ASEAN if the organiza-
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tion did not support it, disrupting ASEAN and pushing Thailand into closer
alliance with China. Indonesia tempered its own interests for the sake of
ASEAN solidarity, at least for a time. ASEAN tried hard to present a uni-
fied front in dealing with Vietnam. However, the facade sometimes slipped,
and the individual states different interests sometimes came through.
From 197990, ASEAN was at the forefront of international opposition to
the Vietnamese invasion. ASEAN supported by the US and China orga-
nized opposition to Vietnam in the United Nations, denying the Vietnamese-
installed government of Cambodia (the Peoples Republic of Kampuchea)
its seat in the UN. ASEAN also became instrumental in organizing the mil-
itary/political opposition to the Vietnamese-backed government in Phnom
Penh, but its efforts were hobbled by the fact that the internationally reviled
Khmer Rouge was the most effective opposition-fighting force. ASEAN also
pursued diplomatic initiatives designed to end the conflict. ASEAN spon-
sored an International Conference on Kampuchea (ICK) in New York in July
1981. ASEAN discovered, however, that its genuine attempts to resolve the
conflict diplomatically were stymied by the United States and China, both
of which wished to keep Vietnam and, by extension, the Soviet Union
bogged down in Cambodia. The ICK ended with a statement of principles
which were too inflexible to be politically viable.
Tensions within ASEAN were a continual part of the organizations re-
lations at this time. Indonesia and Malaysia feared that the international
efforts to punish Vietnam would drive Vietnam more tightly into the Soviet
embrace or leave a weakened Vietnam more susceptible to Chinese influ-
ence. In March 1980, Indonesia and Malaysia issued the Kuantan Declara-
tion, which called on Vietnam to be free of Chinese and Soviet influence in
exchange for recognition of its legitimate interests. Thailand and Vietnam
rejected this proposal. These different perspectives towards Vietnam fes-
tered within ASEAN. Indonesia became frustrated with ASEANs policies,
the constraints those policies placed upon its own initiatives, and its loss of
influence within ASEAN to Thailand. To accommodate Indonesias growing
impatience and diplomatic efforts, ASEAN designated it the interlocutor
of ASEAN with Vietnam.
By 1987, the Cold War began to thaw, and the major powers (the United
States, the Soviet Union, and China) saw Vietnam/Cambodia as an inconve-
nient obstacle to better relations. In 1988, a change in Thailands leadership
led to a complete reversal in Thai policy towards Vietnam. The new Prime
S. Narine: Forty years of ASEAN: a historical review 417
the region and beyond. ASEAN could not counter the crisis. The ASEAN
states were disunited and even antagonistic in their dealings with each other.
More than any other event, the crisis underlined the very limitations of the
ASEAN Way and the ASEAN identity that was, supposedly, the product
of decades of interaction (Freistein 2005: 1806).
ASEAN was never designed to deal with regional financial issues and
lacked the institutional and economic resources necessary to handle the
problem. Indeed, the expectations that it could deal with the crisis were un-
reasonable and indicative of the international communitys misunderstand-
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ASEANs survival and significance may not lie within the organization but
in its utility to China. During the crisis period, another crucial institutional
structure was created. The ASEAN Plus Three (the three being China,
Japan, and South Korea) began in 1997 as a consultative body meant to co-
ordinate Asias meetings with Europe. The crisis turned the APT into far
more. The APT identified areas of regional economic cooperation and, by
2000, had launched the Chiang Mai Initiative (CMI). The CMI is a series of
currency swap agreements which builds on the ASEAN Swap Agreement
(ASA), which was first negotiated in 1977 (Park 2000). These swap agree-
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proach to its own interests. Arguably, China is learning from ASEAN (Ba
2006).
At the same time, ASEAN finds itself being less of a master in its own
house. It is one actor in a region filled with much larger powers that do not
necessarily recognize ASEANs authority. The United States, in particular,
may be in the process of trying to assemble a coalition of like-minded regional
states (Japan, Australia, and India) into an alliance that will contain China,
even as it is paying less attention to Asian regional institutions (Jain 2007;
Koyakutty 2007). The anti-Muslim tenor of the US War on Terror has
damaged American standing in Muslim Southeast Asia. Moreover, the US
fixation on terrorism has led it to focus on its regional military posture, to
the neglect of other important political and economic issues. The overall
effect of these policies has been to enhance Chinas regional standing, at the
expense of American authority (Overholt 2008: 16986, 22362).
the regional effects of their domestic policies. However, this kind of institu-
tional development is unlikely to occur. The ASEAN Charter gives juridical
personality to ASEAN, but it also codifies ASEANs traditional norms and
practices, reinforcing ideas of non-intervention.
The global environment may have changed a great deal since 1967, but
ASEAN states remain developing-world countries that see themselves as
fragile entities locked in a struggle to become functioning and stable nation-
states.8 Most ASEAN states remain dominated by narrow elites. Historically,
the raison detre of ASEAN was to further the state-building process by cre-
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Conclusion
ASEAN remains an important actor in the Asia Pacific, but at present, it
is probably incapable of truly extensive reform. This has been seen time
and time again as ASEAN expresses ambitious aspirations but then proves
incapable of acting on its ambitions. ASEANs limitations are necessary and
reflect far deeper issues revolving around state-building within Southeast
Asia. The institution will remain important because of its diplomatic role in
facilitating the emergence of China onto the world stage. But this is not a role
that can help the internal evolution of ASEAN. However, like the Vietnam
invasion of Cambodia, ASEANs diplomatic role in the larger world may
be enough to keep the organization together while the more subtle and
important work of community building continues.
Notes
1 To underline this point, in 1978 Vietnam proposed its own counterpart to ZOP-
FAN ZOGIPAN, the Zone of Genuine Independence, Peace, and Neutrality.
S. Narine: Forty years of ASEAN: a historical review 427
2 At the time, Cambodia had been renamed Kampuchea by its Khmer Rouge
government.
3 Note that North Korea joined the ARF in 2000.
4 Intra-ASEAN trade is around 23 percent of total ASEAN trade, but when Singa-
pore is factored out altogether, it drops to about 5 percent (Narine 2002a: 132).
5 For example, the Uruguay Round of GATT, completed in 1993, called for larger
tariff cuts in a shorter time than AFTA. The North American Free Trade Agree-
ment (NAFTA) came into effect in 1994 and the Single European Act in 1992
(Narine 2002b: 129).
6 Press release from Thailands Ministry of Foreign Affairs, quoted in Narine (2002:
165).
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