TEMPORALITY Culture in the Flow of Human Experience Te brcre od Livia Mathias Simao IDEVT ORIN Me: ete tars Jaan Valsiner AVOLUME ADVANCES IN CULTURAL PSYCHOLOGYTemporality Culture in the Flow of Human Experience A Volume in Advances in Cultural Psychology Constructing Human Development Series Editor Jaan Valsiner, Aalborg UniversityAdvances in Cultural Psychology: Constructing Human Development Jaan Valsiner, Series Editor Temposality: Cultive in the F edited by Liv Danilo Silva Guin of Human Experience (2015) Making Our Ideas Clears Pragmatista in Psychoanalysis (2015) edited by Philip Rosenbaum. Bioguaphical Ruptares and Their Repair: Cruticral Trausitians in Development (2014) by Amrei G. Joerchel and Gerhard Benetka Gulleve and Political Pyychology: A Societal Perspecti by Thalia Magioglow (2014) Faoling Around: Creative Learning Pathways (2014) edited by Lene Tanggaard Gulturel Pxyedology of Haman Values (2012) an Valsiner and Angela Uchoa Branco veon Social Rates (2013) Diadogical Approaches to Trast in Communication (2013) edited by Per Linell and Ivana Markova Grossing Boundaries Intescontextuat Dynamics Between Family and School (2013) by Giuseppina Marsico, Koji Komatsu, and Antonie Tannaceone Cross-Cultural Prycholog by Krum Krumov Why Culdorre Matters (2013) nd Knud §. Larsen Inexplays Between Dialogical Learaing and Diotogical Self 2013) edited by M. Beatrice Ligorio and Margari¢ Dialogic Farmations: Investigations into the Origins and Development of te Diatogical Seif (2018) edited by Marle-Cécile Berta Miguel M, Gongalves, and Peter T. Cultural Dynanies of Women’s Li edited by Ana Cecilia §. Bastos, Kristina U Raggatt (2012) p, and Jaan Valsiner Culture and Social Changes Transforming Society through the Posver of Fdeas (2012) by Brady Wagoner, Eric Jensen, and Julian A. OldmeadowCultural Pychology of Hainan Values (2012) Dy Jaan Valsiner and Angela Uchoa Branco Researcher Race: Social Constructians in the Research Process (2012) hy Lauren Mizock and Debra Harkins Cultural Poychology and Pychounalysis: Pathways to Syuthesis (2011) edited by Sergio Salvatore and Tania Zittoun Ipprentice in a Changing Trade (2011) edited by Jean-Francois Perret, Anne-Nelly Perret-Clermont, Danidle Golay Schilier, Claude Kaiser, and Lac-Olivier Pochon Coustrueting Patriodisns fraching History and Memories in Global Worlds (2011) by Mario Cartetero Methodotogical Thinking in Paychologys 60 Years Gone Astray? (2010) edited by aro Toomela and Jaan Valsiner Living in Poverty: Developmental Pocties of Cultural Realities (2010) edited by Ana Cecilia S. Bastos and Elaine P, Rabinovich Relating to Environments: A New Look at Unrvelt (2009) editeel by Rosemarie Sokol Chang, Rethinking Language, Mind, and World Dialogically (2009) by Per Linell Amovating Genesis: Microgemesis and the Constructive Mind in setion (2008) editecl by Emily Abbey and Rainer Dirivichter Trust and Distrust: Sociocultural Perspectives (2007) edited by Ivana Markova and Alex Gillespie Discovering Gultrrat Psychology A Profile and Selected Readings of Ernest &. Boesch (2007) by Walter J- Loaner and Susanna A. Hayes Semiotic Rotations: Modes of Meanings in Cultuvat Worlds (2007) by Suntec Kim Gertz, Jaan Valsiner, and Jean-Paul Breas, Otherness in Qi opauent of the Self (2007) edited by Livia Mathias Simao and Jaan Valsiner estion: Devel Becoming Otter: From Social Hnteractinn to Self Reflection (2006) edited by Alex Gillespic Transitions: Symbolic Resources in Development (2006) by Tania Zittoun:Temporality Culture in the Flow of Human Experience edited by Livia Mathias Simao Danilo Silva Guimaraes Institute of Psychology, University of S40 Paulo and Jaan Valsiner Aalborg University INFORMATION AGE PUBLISHING, INC. Charlotte, NC * www.infoagepub.comrary of Congress Cataloging Temporality : cultnre in the flow of human experience edited by Linvia Mathias Simco , Danilo Silva Guimarces, Institute of Psychology, University of Sco Paulo, and Jaan Vilsiner, Aalborg Unive pages em. psychology) ISBN 978-1- 967-7 (paperback) ~ ISBN 4 396-068-4 thandeover) — 978-1-62306-969-1 (chaok) 1, Culture--Psychological aspects Time--Philosophy. 1. Simco, Lmvia ias, editor HME: 2015 3k (Ad¥ances in culty 2014048560 Copyright © 2015 Information ge Publishing Inc All rights reserved, No part of this publication may be reproduceel, stored int a retrieval system, ortranstnitted, in any formorby any means, clectronie, mechanical, photocopying, mticrofilming, recording or otherwise, without written permission from the publisher: ed in the United States of AmericaCONTENTS hureduction: Time—Not Always the Same 1 2 Livia Mathias Sémeéa oe - cones ces PART |; EMPORALITY AND ITS BOUNDARIES Temporality and the Necessity of Culture in Psychology Swen Froar Klenipe Developing With Time: Defining a Temporal Mercotapology Ginseppina Marsico... a oe ee ren ‘Temporality and the Boundary between Present and Future Emily AUB OY cos i th sek wees Unaccomplished Trajectories: Shadows From the Past in the Present and Funie Vistaw Volkmer Ponies and Ana Cecilia Bustos PART H: LIVING TEMPORALITY Living and Observing: Two Modes of Understanding Tine Cardos Cornejo and Himmbler OT v0105....00 sn oo When is Now: Measuring How We Perceive Histants in Time Andié Crave and Hainillon Haddad,vesv we lS viiviii 10, i 12. 13 4. 16. CONTENTS PART Il: DEVELOPING WOMEN AS GLOBAL LEADERS Duration and Experience: The Temporality of Develapment Dankert Veidebercesessecentacsensiesnes sevesatnseee 229 Temporality, Lifetime, and the Afterdeath: Case Studies From Hospice Patients Meike Wodstawik 0.0... Times of Illness and fllness of Time: Maria Francesea Freda, Raffaele De Luca Pictone, and Maria Laisa Martino. PART IV: TEMPORALITIES OF THE SELF Heidegger, Temporalit Basia D. nd Dialogical Self Theary EMis andl Hen devikis J. S10 srcreeronenee On Time and Temporality From a Clinic and Psychoanalytic Point of View Neison Erneste Coetha Jr... ‘Temporality: Expectation and Futurity in Physiotherapy Patients Lavissa Laskouski and Lhvies Mathias Stirdo oo. 2 293 Time or Not Time in Mind: What Teimpor ality? Ruggera Audrisano Ruggieri and Anna Gorvese a. cose SLT PART V: COLLECTIVE-PERSONAL TEMPORALITIES Living With the Belief in Cyelical Time: Collective and Personal Constructions of Hindus Nandlita Chasdherry sores eeceseivesstetsntnsnntee 2B ‘Temporality in Cultural Trajectories: A Psychological Approach on Semiotic Constructions Danelo Silva Guimarées senernensresnsneee SIF Repetition, Duration and Persistance: Fermporality in the Performing Arts Juliano Casimiso de Camargo Sampaio and Livta Mathias Simao... 38Contents ix 17, Black Gat, White Devil, and Behind the Sins Destinies in Modern Brazilian Cinema Renato Tero soos scseseseneseseesesseeceneccenneeennsnteenstenanees 413 PART IV; TEMPORALITIES OF THE SELF IS. ‘Temporality and the Challenge 1 Gene Cultural Psychology Cor Raerveldt. taseuas baasesasaass a seseeee 43] 19, ‘Temporality and Generalization in Peychology Fine as Context Lea Tateo ee eevee 403 20. The Temporality of Tradition: Some Horizons for the Semiotic-Cultural Constructivism in Psychology Livia Mathias Simo a eee $83) About the Authors a css seen enntnveennsts S05CHAPTER 6 WHEN IS NOW Measuring How We Perceive Instants in Time Andre Cravo and Hamilten Haddad INTRODUCTION Intakes tinne for the physical changes thar constinue an event ta impinge on organ such as the ae mnodifications to be 1 I takes time to generat Finally, it takes image that is, the notion of who we are—the last an critical step without which the event will never become conscious. id to modify the sensory detectors ofan es time for the resulting electrochemical ted as signals to tlhe central nervous system. 1 neural pattern itv the braiu's sewsory maps ising from it to the neural map and imag Antonio Daiasio (2002) Tensposoig: Cudtre tn the Copyright © 2015 by Inform of Human Experience, pp. 113-126 ion Age Publishing, Al rights of reproduction in amy form reserved. 115116 A. CRAVO and H. HADDAD We all live in the past, literally. Every se sation we have was physically caused by an event that taok place in the past and that might even have ceased to exist. The above passage written by the Portuguese neurole- gist Antonio Damasio (2002) elegantly defines the concept of perceptual latency: the temporal lag between the occurrence of a physical event in the world and the moment one consciously experiences it. The consicer- able time delay in information transmission along sensory pathways places critical challenges to our nervous systents in everyday tasks. There are, for erences benween the perceptual and actual position of moving objects. Thus, daily actions, such as catching a ball or evossing a high-traffic sirect, neces to he timed adequately tw he successful. Moreover, the lights we we, the sounds we hear, and the objects we touch produce sensory signals that tavel by distinct neural pathways—with different pro- cessing times—before they are amalgamated ito a unified and coherent percept, These differential transmission and processing latencies create a mosaic of temporal patterns spreading through networks underlying cons scious perception. This issue gets even more complicated when we consider that information from different parts of our body have to travel different distances to reach our central nervous system. For example, if you touch your own toe with your finger, the sensory information from your hand and foot will reach somatosensory areas in the brain with dissimilar delays, although you'll probably judge them as simultaneous. One could argue that as long as these delays are fixed, it wouldn't be tao, hard to find mechanisis t cope with them, However, as we'll see in this chapter, several factors can modulate the speed of processing of sensory stimuli, making it hard to delineate how we can act upon such an appar cently chaatie flow of incoming information reaching diffe body and brain with different delays. As the world we perceive is delayed in relation to its flowing content, lime perception depends on an active construction ef a neural state that correlates with biologically relevant elements present in the environment. The physical timing of events must be translated to the timing of neuronal processes, whieh is then somehow represented as a partieular mental timing of experiential percepts. In the present chapter, we will briefly review how temporal perception hay been studied throughout the history ef cognitive sciences, Fiom the pioneering work of Hehnbolic, Wand, and Titcheners to the recent findings of psychophysics and neuroscience that tackle these challenges, we will examine some problems inherent in the act ef measur- ing the time of perception, and discuss possible solutions as well instance, significant di at parts of your Measures of Time Perception: Past and Present Hermann von Helmholtz (1821-18941) recorded for the first time the speed of transmission of a nerveus impulse (Schmidgen, 2002), At theWhen Is Now 117 lame, the majority of the scientific community believed that nervous and peuromusctiia’ transmissionswere achieved by a “nervous principle,” or an Simponderable Mluie,” which either hacl infinite speed or wvas too fast to he measured physically, However; using an ingenious experiment, Helmholtz showed not only that the speed of nervous transinission was finite, but also ly slow (ee Figute 6.1). The relevance of these experi- that it was surprisiy ments goes beyond interests in clectrophysiology, given that [or the first time, an immaterial phenomenon such as nervous transmission, which was commonly considered asa manifestation of the spirit or soul, was qanti> fied with precision using physical instruments, Importantly, it raised a key question that hay been stulied by pyychologists and neuroscientists ever sinee: With the intrinsic delays in transmission, how can we reliably judge jylen something happened in the world? Figure 6.1, Helmholtz knew that the degree of deflection of a galvanometer pointer depends not only on the intensity of elvetsic current but also on the time during which the pointer is exposed to this current. This fact was used (o record very short time intervals; for example, to measure the speed of abullet inside a je (on the left), By pulling the trigger, the bullet is fired and simultaneously eloses the electrical cirewit, Subsequently, the bullet euls the wire and stops the current. The degree of deflection of the galvanomcter pointer determ time that the current was active. In order to measure the propagation speed of pulse along a nerve, Helmholtz adapted (on the right) this method, using two interconnected circuits: a neuromuscular preparation to stimulate a frog musele (MN) and another to measure the electri¢ current with a galvanometer (7). The key, SP, closes the two circuits simultancously, sending current to both the preparation and the galvanometer. When the muscle coniraets, the device, 4, immediately stops the current. Reading the galvanometer pointer, Helmholtz could calculate the i m and muscle contraction, The comparison between the readings when the electrode was positioned at dif- ferent points of the nerve (,, 1,) allowed the deduction of the impulse speed {modified from Sehmidgen, 2002). ime clapsed between stimulat118 A. CRAVO and H, HADDAD Measuring the tine of occurrence of physical events was never an casy task. Astronomers in the [Sth century experienced better than anyone else the difficulties in measuring the very instant when an event takes place They had to determine the precise positions of celestial events by means af the “eve and ear® method, which consisted of recording the moment when a particular star crassed the meridian marker of a telescope by count ing the audible ticking of a pendulun clock. Spatial interpalation was then used to estimate the moment of transit in tenths of seconels (Baldo, Crave, & Haddad, 2007). However, frequent discrepancies benveen trained astronomers produced significant measurement errors; kuter, this kind of inconsistency led to the formulation of a so-ealled personal equation to wy to correct this difficulty (Boring, 1929). Wilhelm Winadt (1832-1920), onc of the founding fathers of experi- mental psyehology, brought these astronomy problems into the laboratory (Schnidgen, 2008, 2005). Lnspired by the eye and car metho, he designed an experimental setup, also using a pendulum apparatus, where subjects had to tell the position of a moving clock hand when a brief click presented. Like the astronomers, Windt observed that participants sys. ically misperceived the position of the moving hand when the elick was presented, depending on the experimental conditions. ‘This proce: dluve was called “complication experiment,” and it was characterized by involving the perepiual comparison of a continuous atid a sudden event, Wud suggested that his results could be explained by either differences between visual and auditery perceptual latencies or dilferent strategies adopted by the abservers; more precisely, to which of the two events, visttl or auditory, the observer wis paying attention during the task (2 al., 2007). ‘These obscrvations culminated in the creation of the kaw of jrior endry by Edward Titchener (1867-1927): “The object of attention comes to consciousness more quickly than the objects which we are not attending” (Boring, 1929; Titchener, 1908), Over the years, the quest for a suitable way to measure the time elapsed hetween the physical occurrence of eveuts and our perception led co the development of several behavioral and psyehopliysical methods, As a consequence, plentiful tasks are nowadays routinely performed in the laboratory in order to assess the temporal features of sensory perception. One of the most common tasks is ection time (RE) In a typical stucly, observers are required 10 respand by pressing a key as soon as the stimu lus has been detected. Ttis usually assumed that the interval benween the stimulus eccurrence and the motor reaction depends on both sensory and lem motor components, Although this methodology has the advantage of being a direct measure of sensory-motor lcencies, the perceptual and motor components of RT cannot be discntangled. In order to deal with purely ks led, such as temporal arder perceptual delays, discriminativeWhen Is Now 119 judgments an the flash-log effict. However, because in this kind of task sub- jects have £0 compare two stimuli, the outcome is an indirect and relative yecord of perceptual latencies, In temporat order judgments (LOJ), participants have to report the tempo- yal order of appearance of a pair of closely timed stimuli. When two stimali are presented to an observer sinmiltaneously or nearly simultaneously, the wed order does not always correspond to the actual enc. Several jnodels about TO] have been proposed in the last decades to account for = source of judgment errors (Allan, 1975; Carcoso-Leite & Mamassian 2007; Jaskowski, 1991; Stelmach & Herdman, 1991; Ulrich, 1987). These models usually assume that temporal order perception depends on the arrival time of sensory information to a central comparator. In the visual system, for example, this would depend on transmission latencies of the sensory signals from the retina to this central temporal comparator, being determined by the dynamical properties of the pereeptual pathways, Similar to Wunudt's complication experiment, dhe flasi-lag effect ¢ accurs when observers are asked to: compare the positions of a moving, object and a stationary flash presented in the sistial field, In these situations, participants usually perceive the moving stimulus as being spatially advanced in relation to the positions of the flash, whew in fact both stinvuli happen to be physically aligned with each other in space-time (see Figure 6.2). Although this illusion was known for over 70 years, iLwas rediscove and has been vigorously discussed over the past decades (Baldo 1995; Gravo & Baldo, 2008; Mackay, 1058; Nijhawan, 1994, 2008). perc Factors That Can Influence the Time of Perception AS previously mentioned, Wandt found that participants misperceived the position of the clock when the sound was presented. In his view, these resuliscould be explained cither by the fact that visnal and anulitory stimuli had different sensory latencies or by the different strategies adopted by participants, Specifically, he argued that the results could he influenced by which of the two stimuli the subjects were paying attention Lo In fact, the effects of attention have been widely studied with several of the methods described above. In RT experiments, for instance, it is assumed that the perceptual component depends on the properties of the scnsory pathways that will determine the transmission kitencies of the sensory signals. Stucies have demonstrated that paving attention to where or when a stimulus will be presented can modulate this processing, thus reducing RI (Carreiro, Haddad, & Baldo, 2003, 2011; Nobre, Rohenkohl, & Stokes, 2012; Petersen & Posner, 2011). On the other hand, the motor Componeut—the output side—is generally assumed to. be less oy every Nol120 & CRAVO and H. HADDAD alfected by spatial attention, It should be noted, however, that the division between sensorial and motor p:thways is far from elear (Goodale, 1998) and the problem af devennining where (orwhen) one ends wid the other starry mnakes arbitrary any assumption of the inne pkice where attention is teting Percival position @ Rossing doe A 8 v Figure6.2. An example of the flash-lag effect(FLE). A perceptual i betw alignment 1 moving and flashing stimuli is reported by most observers: the rotating moving around the fixation point (FP), are seem ahead of the flashing dats when the latter are flashed in perfect alignment with the former set of dots, (Modified of Baldo, Kihara, Namba, & Klein, 2002). In ‘LOJ tasks, attention can ale alter the sensory Intencies (Garver & Brown, 1097) and create am ilhory asyuchrany of formation: The aitended stimulus is perceived earlier that the nonatiended stimulus (Casa- conti, Michielin, Zorzi, & Umils’, 2007; Eladdad, Carreiro, & Baldo, 2002 sua Haddad, Klein, & Baldo, 1999 Stelmiaeh & Terdiman, 1191). il resulls have also shown the role of attentional Several experimen inechanisins in{lucneing the delay of pereepural processing i the F (Baldo et al, 2002; Baldo Jamba, 2002; Chappell, Hine, Acworth, 8 Hardwick, 2006; Namba & Baldo, 2004; Sarich, Chappell, & Burgess. 2007). 1 has been proposed that the very genesis of this illusion could be in the tiie spent for autention to bind the flash and moving percepts ima a unitary whole (Baldo & Klein, 2008). In this case, after the detcetion ofWhen Is Now 121 the abrupt everu (a flash or a beep), an attentional shift from the stationary object to the changing (“moving”) object has to occur in order to bind them together into a unitary percept Apart of attention, other factors seem to be able to modulate our pereep- tion of when something happened. For example, some studies have shown that aficr repeated exposure to asynchronous stimuli, we start perceiving them as synchronous (Fujisaki, Shimojo, Kashine, & Nishida, 2004; Kectels & Vroomen, 2008), Importantly, if appears that the pereepiral latencies of these stimuli are being modified, so that it is not just a change in our criteria of what we judge as sinultancous, but rather a change in the time we need to process the stimuli per se (Navarra, Hartcher-O'Brien, Piazza, & Spence, 2009). Recently; it has alse heen shown that such reealibyatjon can also happen benveen our actions and their outcomes (Stekelenburg, Sugano, & Vioomen, 2011; Stetson, Cui, Montague, & Exgleman, 2006), Curiously, motor actions sent to be able te modulate the tine of percep tion of their autconies even without extensive training. When participants are asked to indicate the perceived time of a heep evaked hy their action they tend to juelge it as shifted earlier in time toward the action that camisect it. This effect, originally called intentional binding, has been the subject of ge discussion of its underlying mechanisms (Buehner & Humphreys, 200%; Cravo, Claessens, & Baldo, 2009, 2011: Haggard, Clark, & Kalo- geras, 2002; Waszak, Cardoso-Leite, & Hughes, 2011). As in the case of temporal recalibration, it has alsobeen shown tht the perceptual Latcneies of the stimuli we cause are being modulated (Cravo et al, 2011). But what would be the mechanisms underlying this effect? In other words, is there a special meehanisit that modulates the perceived conse quences of our actions, or is this modulation the result of a more general anticipation mechanisin? A large body of evidence supports motor theories of perception, which ewentially claims that perceptual contents depend not only on the relationship among inputs, but on input-output rekuionships as well (Grapse & Sontmer, 2008; Wolpert, 197). One could suppose the existence of an internal loop that anticipates the sensory changes caused. by motor communes. This is the basis of the feed-forward models of motor control. In 1950, Roger Sperry proposed that when a moter command is sent to the muscles, an efferent copy, also krown as “corollary discharge.” is sent t0 the sensory areas of the brain (Sperry, 1950). This efferent copy would facilitate comparisons between expected outcomes of our actions and actual outcomes (Crapse & Sommer, 2008). Moreover, it would be a key factor to da online corrections of our moter commutuds (Wolpert, Diedrich sen, & Flanagan, 2011). Although these models were originally proposed fo explain motor performance, they could help te explain effects such as imentional binding. In this view, an efferent copy sent by an internal pre dietive madel coulel r chuce the perceptual latencies of expected outcomes122 A. CRAVO and H. HADDAD However, other possibilities for intentional binding might be suggested. 4s we discussed previously: attention is long knows to have an important influence an the perception of an event's oceurrence time, modulating its percepinal latency. When one causes a stimulus, its temporal predictability can be considered as the highest possible (Eagleman & Holcombe, 2002), shifting the perception of the caused event to an earlier instant in time, In this view, preparation of a movement would include the allocation of atten- tional resources to both the expected sensory consequences and the tine of exccution of the movement itself. Notice that here, action would not have a specific mechanism to modulate perception, but rather take advantage of our capaeity t anticipate moments of presentation of relevant events, If this is (ruc, than a similar effect as the iutentional binding should also occur even in the abscne of action, In other words, any pair of events tha predict each other should also be approximated in time. The evidence in, this sense is still contradiciory, and while some have found that any pair of events, which are causally related, also are perceived as closer in time (Buehner, 2012; Buehner & Humphreys, 2009), others have found that action itselfis necessary (Cravo et al., 2009). As mentioned, th mechanisns of the effect of action on perception. These models, at least in their original farm, were proposed to explain processes involved in motor preparationexccution allowing fast online corrections. But could other kind of predictions use similar mechanisms? Recent accounts have suggested that in fact that might be the case. In one recent view of perception, named predictive-coding, our sensory systenm is conceived as hiaking constant predictions of future events ane comparing these to actital outcomes (Friston, 2005, 2010). Importantly, inthis view, what is expectedis altenuated and needs no further processing, while differences between the expected and the perceived are amplified throughout the system. Possibly, as has been recently proposed, a similar anatomical structure is involved in both feed-forward models for actions anel for general expectations. in other words, what we normally think ef as structures for our motor system can be thought of asa general mechanism of predictions (Schubotz, 2007) ¢ feed-forward models explain one of the possible CONCLUSIONS this infornmation, you need to look at the clock, which takes time, and then the very instantwe Suppose someone asks you what time is it now. ‘To giv intended to grasp has alveadly passed. This example captures the essence of the problem inherent in subjectively determining when something bap- pened in the word. ‘The substantial time delay in information transmission ong sensory pathways plus the differential processing latencies amongWhen Is Now 123 the stimuli create a mixture of temporal patterns spreading through ne orks underlying conscious perception How can we deal with such latencies is sill a remarkable challenge posed tothe researchers who try to study them, In this chapter; we have explored some of the problems faced by those who tied to study time perception qwer the last two centuries. .As we have shown, the problem arises not only fiom the difficulty in measuring exactly when one has perceived a stimu- jus, but also due to the flesible nat processing. Though not discussed in this chapter, factors such as attention and action. which strongly modulate the perception of time, also crucially take part in the intersubjectivity of time, How we live togethe using a sume “time” remains a mystery to be solved. © of the inherent delays in scnsory andl interact ACKNOWLEDGMENTS ‘The authors would like to thank Prof. Marcus Vinicius C. Bako for his helpful comments not only inthis chapter, but during the several years we have worked under his supervision. REFERENCES Allan, L.(1475). The rekitionship berwcen judgments of snccessiveness and judg inents of ortler: Perception & Pavehopiysies, 18(1), 20-36. Baldo, M.V.C., Cravo, A, M..& Haddad, H, (2007), The tine of perception other way around. The Spanish fouenal af Pychology, 102), 258-205. CineSeet VG, Bihira, Av Hi, Namba, J. & Klein, S.A. (2002), Evidence for an attentional componcnt of the percepmal inisalignnient between moving and Mashing stimuli. Poeeption, 3100), 17 Baldo, M.X. icin, S.A. (19 3786 Baldo, MI. ¥:¢ Behavioval and Brain Sciewces, 42 Baldo, M.V.C,, & Namba, J. (2002). The attentional modulation of the flash-l ag elfect. Brozitian Journal of Meslial and Biological Reseach, 35(8), 960-072 Boring, E.G, (1929). 4 history of mrperimental psyehology. New York, NV: Appleton Century. acl the Baldo, 0 Extrapolation or attention shift? Nate, 1 elloet Buehner, M. (2012), Understanding the past, predicting the fiture: Causation, not imentional action, is the root of temporal binding. Pxchotagical Science, 25, 1490-1497. Buehner M., & Harmphreys, G. (2009). Causal binding of actions to their Pychalogiead Science, 20010), 1221-1228. effects124 A. CRAVO and H. HADDAD CarelosorLeite, B, & Mamassian, P. (2007), ‘Temporal onder judgment and simple reaction times: Evidence for a common processing system Jewel of Visa, 7G). IH VA. Carteiro, L.R-R., Haddad, H.. & Baldo, M.¥; G. (2003), The modulation of simple reaction time by the spatial probability of a visteal sin of Medtcal and Biological Research, 36(7), 07-O1L Carmiro, LR. R., Haddad, HL, & Baldo, M. VG, (2011, Effects of imensity and positional predictability ofa vistal stimulus on simple reaction tine. Vewnase, ence Letters, 487(3), 345-319. Carver R & Brown, . (1907). Effects of amount of attention allocated to the Jacation of sisal stinutlus pairs on perception of simultaneity. Prerption and Payehapliysies, 39(4}, 534-3 12. Casarotu, M., Michielin, M., Zorai, ML, & iment reveals haw tusmber m F021), LOL-LET Chappell, M.. Hine, 1. J.. Acworth, C..& Harthick, DR. 20065), Attention capture by the flash-lag flasti. Visian Reseach, 46(19), 3205-82 15. Crapse, I. B., & Sommer; M.A, (2008). Corallary discharge acrosy the animal Kingdom. Nato Reviews Neurascirner, 9(8), 587-L00 Gravo. AL M., & Baldo, M. MUG, (2008). A psychophysical and comp analysis of the spatio-temporal mechatiisiay miderbyinng the fast Boveption, 3712), 1850-18668, Cravo, A. M.. Claessens, P.M. EL, & Ballo, MoV. G. (2009). Voluntary action and Causality in temporal binding, Experimental Brain deseaieh, £9911), 95 Gravo, A. M., Claessens, PM. Ba & Baldo, M. VG. 2011), The relation berseen action, predictability and temporal coutignity in temporal binding, Aete Py- chokugica, 136, 137-166, Damasio, A. R. (2002), Remembering when, Sciensifie American, 28743), 6 Faglemat, D. M., & Holconibe, A. O. (2002). Causality and the pereeption of time. Tienes in Cognit 3 Friston, K. (2005), A theory of cortical responses. Pilesophicut Transactions of the Royal Society of Loucon. Series B, Biotugical Seiences, 300(1 156), 815-836. Friston, K. (2010). The ftee-energy principle: A uunified brain theory? Narwe i Newooscience, F(2). 127-138 Fajisaki We, Shimojo, S., Kashino, M..& Nishida, S. 2001). Recalibration of audio: visual simultancity. Natu Newosewrice, 77), FIST Goodale, M.A. (1998). Visuomotor contrel: Where does vision end and action Iegin? Crrmeat Biology, 314), ASG Haddad, HL, Carteiro, LR. R..& Baldo, MLV. 6.42002), Modulation af the peresp- tion of temporal order by attentional and pre-atte Journal of Medieal and Biofogical Research, 35, V7-985, Haddad, EL..Jr. Klein, §., & Baldo, ME NLC. (10), The contribution of atcentional ancl pre-aun isis Wo thie perception of cemporal orden Newr inal Buses and Prychatogical Axpects af Consciousness. Singapore: WorlkL Scicinific Haggard, BP, Clark, $.. & Kalogeras, J. (2002). Voluntary action and conscious awareness, Nature Nenoscience, 304), is. ratilian Journal Urmila, C, (2007), Temporal oriler judg. sgnituele affects visuospatial atrentian. Cognition, x ellie, veioniees, 68 ional factors, Bresslion tional micelWhen Is Now 125 askowski, P. (L991). ‘Two-stage model for order discrimination. Psrepstion & Py= chopheysics, 30, 76-82. Keetels, M., & Wroomen, J. (2008). lemporal recalibration to tactile-visual asant- chronous stinauli, Neurusciene Betlers, 43042), 130-131 Stackay, D. (1958), Perceptual stability ofa streboscapically Tit visual field contain ing self-luminous objects. Navtve, 184, 507-308 Saniba, J.. & Baldo, M. VG, (2004), The modukuion of the flashelag effect by voluntary attention, Propifan, 3305), 621-631. Navarra, J. Hartcher-O'Brien, J.. Piazea, E., & Spence, C. (2009), Adaptation to anudiovisual asynchrony snodulates the speeded «erectian of sound, Process ings of the Natiancit Acadeny of Sciences, LO6(234, O1G9-A873. Sijhawan, (1994), Motion extrapolation in catching. Natiar, 370, 250-257. Nijhawan, R. (2008), Visual prediction: Paycho physics and neurophysialogy of cont pensation for tine dekiys. The Bedlevioral aad Brain Seiences, 3112), LTM-98; discussion 198-239) Nobre, A.C., Rohenkolil, G..& Stokes, M. (2012), Nervous anticipation: Top-down, biasing across space anid tine. In M. 1 Posner (Fadl), Cognitive newroseioncr of attention Qui ed., pp. 159186), New Work, NY! Guilford. Poeren, S. E..& Posner M.L 2011, March). The attemion system of the buruan brain: 20-years after dura! Review af Newoscienee, GF, 150150. Sarich, D.. Chappel Burgess, C. (2007). Divicling attention i illusion. Vision Research, A7M), SISA. Schinidgen, H. 12002). OF frogs and men: The originsaf psychophysiological time experiments, 1850-1865. Endeavour, 26(1), 12-118, Scnnidgen, H. (2003), Tine and noise: The stable surround ingsof reaction experi- nents, T860-188, Studies in History anu Philosophy of Scieace, Past C: Shedies in Hisiorvand Philow phy of Biological aned Biowedical Scieners, 34(2) 75. Schmiclgen, H. (2005). Physics, ballistics, and psychology: A history of the chrome: scope itvas context 18 15-1800. History of Pyyatology, 8(1), 1-78 Schubate, RL (2007). Prediction of external events with onr motor syste: Towanels anew framework. Tirnds an Gagnitive Sriences, 21(5), 211-218 Sperry, R. (1950, December). Neural basiy of the spon produced by visual inversion. Jourwal of Comparative aud Physiologicad Paychol- gh FG) ABQA89. Stekelenburg. J. J.. Sugano, ¥.. & Vroomen, [- @A11), Neural correlates of motor sensory temporal recalibration, Brain Research, 1397, WB. Stelmach, L.. & Herdman, ©. (1991), Directed attention ane perception of termpo- ral onvler Journal of Expiertieatal Pyycholagy, Hanan Perception and #afar 1712), 539-550. Stetson, ., Giri, Nov Montague, R-Ry & Biagleman, Dy M. (2006), Motarsensory Is to an illusory reversal of action aul sensation, Neon, pe flashsag ouIs optokinetic response ian recalibration le SHB), G51 ASO. tchenier, E, B, (1908). Feetires ov the elemendeay psychology of felling: and attention. New York, NV! Macmillian Ulrich, R. (1987). Threshold models of temporal-order judgments evaluated by a temary response task, Pbrcepion & Phycboptigsicse #24). 221-259.126 A. CRAVO and H, HADDAD. Waseak, F, Cardosn-Leite, P, & Hughes, G. 2072). Action effect anticipation: Neuophysiological basis and functional consequences. Newoscienee ad Biobehavioval Reviews, 36(2), HI-959. Wolpert, D. M. (1997). Computational approaches to motor control dive Seivaices, 1(0), 200-216. Wolpert, D. M., Diedrichsen, J, & Flanagan, J. R201), Principles of sensorin tor learning. Nate Reviews Neuroscience, 12, 780-731 vids in CognThis book comes as part of a broader project the first editor is develop- MUM mateo m Melle mei hmm Cale) the central philosophical issue of time and temporality with cultural psychology and related areas in its frontier. Similarly to the previous milestone in this effort—Otherness in Question: Labyrnths of the Self, published in this same series, the present one we also invited interna- tional cast of authors to bring their perspectives about a possible dialogue between a central philosophical issue and the core subject of pO ss athe ea ee ele a Cr ae scholars, professionals, and sutdents in psychology and its areas of iiclalad ee RE ca rte ar 3 4 LOM eC] Cuartotre, NC 28271-7047 aa A nel tela wen ae] y)