G.R. No. 137650 | Tumlos v. Spouses Fernandez
The Court also dismissed petitioner's
THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 137650. April 12, 2000.]
GUILLERMA TUMLOS, petitioner, vs. SPOUSES
MARIO FERNANDEZ and LOURDES
FERNANDEZ, respondents.
Del Prado Diaz & Associates for petitioner.
I. P. Liwanag Law Office for respondents.
SYNOPSIS
Private respondents spouses Mario Fernandez and
Lourdes Fernandez filed a complaint for ejectment
against herein petitioner Guillerma Tumlos, Toto
Tumlos and Gina Tumlos. Petitioner Guillerma Tumlos,
who was the only one who filed an answer to the
complaint, averred that the Fernandez spouses had no
cause of action against her since she is a co-owner of the
subject premises as evidenced by a Contract to Sell. She
then asked for the dismissal of the complaint. The
Municipal Trial Court (MTC) ruled in favor of private
respondents. On appeal to the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), petitioner and the two other defendants alleged
in their memorandum on appeal that respondent Mario
Fernandez and petitioner Guillerma had an amorous
relationship, and that they acquired the property in
question as their 'love nest.' It was further alleged that
they lived together in the said apartment building with
their two (2) children for around ten (10) years, and that
Guillerma administered the property by collecting
rentals from the lessees of the other apartments, until she
discovered that respondent Mario deceived her as to the
annulment of his marriage. The RTC rendered a
decision affirming in toto the judgment of the MTC. The
court further ruled that Guillerma and respondent Mario
acquired the property during their cohabitation as
husband and wife, although without the benefit of
marriage. The trial court concluded that petitioner
Guillerma Tumlos was a co-owner of the subject
property and could not be ejected therefrom. On appeal,
the Court of Appeals reversed the RTC. Hence, the
present petition filed by Guillerma Tumlos only.
The Supreme Court denied the petition and affirmed the
Decision of the Court of Appeals. The Court ruled that
petitioner is not a co-owner under Article 144 of the
Civil Code because said provision applies only to a
relationship between a man and a woman who are not
incapacitated to marry each other, or to one in which the
marriage of the parties is void from the beginning. The
relationship between petitioner and respondent Mario
Fernandez is governed by Article 148 of the Family
Code which filled the hiatus in Article 144 of the Civil
Code by expressly regulating in its Article 148 the
property relations of couples living in a state of adultery
or concubinage. The Court also considered the fact that
petitioner failed to present any evidence that she had
made an actual contribution to purchase the subject
property.
contention that her children's right to support, which
necessarily includes shelter, prevails over the right of
respondents to eject her because said issue is not
relevant to the ejectment case which deals solely with
the issue of possession of the property in dispute.
The appealed decision of the Court of Appeals was
affirmed.
SYLLABUS
1.REMEDIAL LAW; CIVIL PROCEDURE;
APPEALS; ISSUES NOT RAISED DURING TRIAL;
CASE AT BAR. In ruling that the RTC erred in
considering on appeal the evidence presented by
petitioner, the CA relied on the doctrine that issues not
raised during trial could not be considered for the first
time during appeal. We disagree. In the first place, there
were no new matters or issues belatedly raised during
the appeal before the RTC. The defense invoked by
petitioner at the very start was that she was a co-owner.
To support her claim, she presented a Contract to Sell
dated November 14, 1986, which stated that Mario
Fernandez was legally married to her. The allegation
that she was cohabiting with him was a mere elaboration
of her initial theory. In the second place, procedural
rules are generally premised on considerations of fair
play. Respondents never objected when the assailed
evidence was presented before the RTC. Thus, they
cannot claim unfair surprise or prejudice.
2.CIVIL LAW; FAMILY CODE; PROPERTY
REGIME OF UNIONS WITHOUT MARRIAGE;
APPLICABLE PROVISION OF LAW IN CASE AT
BAR; PETITIONER NOT A CO-OWNER UNDER
ARTICLE 144 OF THE CIVIL CODE. Even
considering the evidence presented before the MTC and
the RTC, we cannot accept petitioner's submission that
she is a co-owner of the disputed property pursuant to
Article 144 of the Civil Code. As correctly held by the
CA, the applicable law is not Article 144 of the Civil
Code, but Article 148 of the Family Code. Article 144
of the Civil Code applies only to a relationship between
a man and a woman who are not incapacitated to marry
each other, or to one in which the marriage of the parties
is void from the beginning. It does not apply to a
cohabitation that amounts to adultery or concubinage,
for it would be absurd to create a co-ownership where
there exists a prior conjugal partnership or absolute
community between the man and his lawful wife. Based
on evidence presented by respondents, as well as those
submitted by petitioner herself before the RTC, it is
clear that Mario Fernandez was incapacitated to marry
petitioner because he was legally married to Lourdes
Fernandez. It is also clear that, as readily admitted by
petitioner, she cohabited with Mario in a state of
concubinage. Therefore, Article 144 of the Civil Code
is inapplicable.
3.ID.; ID.; ID.; LAWS CAN BE APPLIED
RETROACTIVELY IF IT DOES NOT PREJUDICE
VESTED OR ACQUIRED RIGHTS. The
relationship between petitioner and Respondent Mario
Fernandez is governed by Article 148 of the Family
Code. Justice Alicia V. Sempio-Diy points out that
"[t]he Family Code has filled the hiatus in Article 144
of the Civil Code by expressly regulating in its Article
148 the property relations of couples living in a state of
adultery or concubinage." Hence, petitioner's argument
that the Family Code is inapplicable because the
cohabitation and the acquisition of the property
occurred before its effectivity deserves scant
consideration. Suffice it to say that the law itself states
that it can be applied retroactively if it does not
prejudice vested or acquired rights. In this case,
petitioner failed to show any vested right over the
property in question. Moreover, to resolve similar
issues, we have applied Article 148 of the Family Code
retroactively.
4.ID.; ID.; ID.; EVIDENCE OF CLAIM OF CO-
OWNERSHIP; ACTUAL CONTRIBUTION TO
PURCHASE THE SUBJECT PROPERTY. In this
case, petitioner fails to present any evidence that she had
made an actual contribution to purchase the subject
property. Indeed, she anchors her claim of co-ownership
merely on her cohabitation with Respondent Mario
Fernandez. Likewise, her claim of having administered
the property during the cohabitation is unsubstantiated.
In any event, this fact by itself does not justify her claim,
for nothing in Article 148 of the Family Code provides
that the administration of the property amounts to a
contribution in its acquisition. Clearly, there is no basis
for petitioner's claim of co-ownership. The property in
question belongs to the conjugal partnership of
respondents. Hence, the MTC and the CA were correct
in ordering the ejectment of petitioner from the
premises. SIDEaA
5.REMEDIAL LAW; SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS;
FORCIBLE ENTRY AND UNLAWFUL DETAINER;
EJECTMENT; DEALS SOLELY WITH THE ISSUE
OF POSSESSION OF THE PROPERTY IN DISPUTE.
It should be emphasized that this is an ejectment suit
whereby respondents seek to exercise their possessory
right over their property. It is summary in character and
deals solely with the issue of possession of the property
in dispute. Here, it has been shown that they have a
better right to possess it than does the petitioner, whose
right to possess is based merely on their tolerance.
Moreover, Respondent Mario Fernandez' alleged failure
to repudiate petitioner's claim of filiation is not relevant
to the present case. Indeed, it would be highly improper
for us to rule on such issue. Besides, it was not properly
taken up below. In any event, Article 298 of the Civil
Code requires that there should be an extrajudicial
demand. None was made here. The CA was correct
when it said: "Even assuming arguendo that the said
evidence was validly presented, the RTC failed to
consider that the need for support cannot be presumed.
Article [298] of the [New Civil Code] expressly
provides that the obligation to give support shall be
demandable from the time the person who has a right to
receive the same need it for maintenance, but it shall not
be paid except from the date of judicial and extrajudicial
demand."
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J p:
Under Article 148 of the Family Code, a man and a
woman who are not legally capacitated to marry each
other, but who nonetheless live together conjugally,
may be deemed co-owners of a property acquired during
the cohabitation only upon proof that each made an
actual contribution to its acquisition. Hence, mere
cohabitation without proof of contribution will not
result in a co-ownership. prcd
The Case
Before us is a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court, assailing the November 19, 1998
Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA), which reversed
the October 7, 1997 Order of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC). The dispositive part of the CA Decision reads:
"WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED, and
the questioned orders of the court a quo dated October
7, 1997 and November 11, 1997, are hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The judgment of the
court a quo dated June 5, 1997 is hereby
REINSTATED. Costs against the private respondents."
The assailed Order of the RTC disposed as follows:
"Wherefore, the decision of this Court rendered on June
5, 1997 affirming in toto the appealed judgment of the
[MTC] is hereby reconsidered and a new one is entered
reversing said decision of the [MTC] and dismissing the
complaint in the above-entitled case."
Petitioner also assails the February 14, 1999 CA
Resolution denying the Motion for Reconsideration.
The Facts
The Court of Appeals narrates the facts as follows:
"[Herein respondents] were the plaintiffs in Civil Case
No. 6756, an action for ejectment filed before Branch
82 of the MTC of Valenzuela, Metro Manila against
[herein Petitioner] Guillerma Tumlos, Toto Tumlos, and
Gina Tumlos. In their complaint dated July 5, 1996, the
said spouses alleged that they are the absolute owners of
an apartment building located at ARTE SUBDIVISION
III, Lawang Bato, Valenzuela, Metro Manila; that
through tolerance they had allowed the defendants-
private respondents to occupy the apartment building
for the last seven (7) years, since 1989, without the
payment of any rent; that it was agreed upon that after a
few months, defendant Guillerma Tumlos will pay
P1,600.00 a month while the other defendants promised
to pay P1,000.00 a month, both as rental, which
agreement was not complied with by the said
defendants; that they have demanded several times
[that] the defendants . . . vacate the premises, as they are
in need of the property for the construction of a new
building; and that they have also demanded payment of
P84,000.00 from Toto and Gina Tumlos representing
rentals for seven (7) years and payment of P143,600.00
from Guillerma Tumlos as unpaid rentals for seven (7)
years, but the said demands went unheeded. They then
prayed that the defendants be ordered to vacate the
property in question and to pay the stated unpaid rentals,
as well as to jointly pay P30,000.00 in attorneys fees.
"[Petitioner] Guillerma Tumlos was the only one who
filed an answer to the complaint. She averred therein
that the Fernandez spouses had no cause of action
against her, since she is a co-owner of the subject
premises as evidenced by a Contract to Sell wherein it
was stated that she is a co-vendee of the property in
question together with [Respondent] Mario Fernandez.
She then asked for the dismissal of the complaint.
"After an unfruitful preliminary conference on
November 15, 1996, the MTC required the parties to
submit their affidavits and other evidence on the factual
issues defined in their pleadings within ten (10) days
from receipt of such order, pursuant to section 9 of the
Revised Rule on Summary Procedure. [Petitioner]
Guillerma Tumlos submitted her affidavit/position
paper on November 29, 1996, while the [respondents]
filed their position paper on December 5, 1996,
attaching thereto their marriage contract, letters of
demand to the defendants, and the Contract to Sell over
the disputed property. The MTC thereafter promulgated
its judgment on January 22, 1997[.]
xxx xxx xxx
"Upon appeal to the [RTC], [petitioner and the two
other] defendants alleged in their memorandum on
appeal that [Respondent] Mario Fernandez and
[Petitioner] Guillerma had an amorous relationship, and
that they acquired the property in question as their
love nest. It was further alleged that they lived
together in the said apartment building with their two
(2) children for around ten(10) years, and that Guillerma
administered the property by collecting rentals from the
lessees of the other apartments, until she discovered that
[Respondent Mario] deceived her as to the annulment of
his marriage. It was also during the early part of 1996
when [Respondent Mario] accused her of being
unfaithful and demonstrated his baseless [jealousy].
"In the same memorandum, [petitioner and the two
other] defendants further averred that it was only
recently that Toto Tumlos was temporarily
accommodated in one of the rooms of the subject
premises while Gina Tumlos acted as a nanny for the
children. In short, their presence there [was] only
transient and they [were] not tenants of the Fernandez
spouses.
"On June 5, 1997, the [RTC] rendered a decision
affirming in toto the judgment of the MTC.
"The [petitioner and the two other defendants]
seasonably filed a motion for reconsideration on July 3,
1997, alleging that the decision of affirmance by the
RTC was constitutionally flawed for failing to point out
distinctly and clearly the findings of facts and law on
which it was based vis- -vis the statements of issues
they have raised in their memorandum on appeal. They
also averred that the Contract to Sell presented by the
plaintiffs which named the buyer as Mario P.
Fernandez, of legal age, married to Lourdes P.
Fernandez, should not be given credence as it was
falsified to appear that way. According to them, the
Contract to Sell originally named Guillerma
Fernandez as the spouse of [Respondent Mario]. As
found by the [RTC] in its judgment, a new Contract to
Sell was issued by the sellers naming the [respondents]
as the buyers after the latter presented their marriage
contract and requested a change in the name of the
vendee-wife. Such facts necessitate the conclusion that
Guillerma was really a co-owner thereof, and that the
[respondents] manipulated the evidence in order to
deprive her of her rights to enjoy and use the property
as recognized by law.
xxx xxx xxx
"The [RTC], in determining the question of ownership
in order to resolve the issue of possession, ruled therein
that the Contract to Sell submitted by the Fernandez
spouses appeared not to be authentic, as there was an
alteration in the name of the wife of [Respondent] Mario
Fernandez. Hence, the contract presented by the
[respondents] cannot be given any weight. The court
further ruled that Guillerma and [Respondent Mario]
acquired the property during their cohabitation as
husband and wife, although without the benefit of
marriage. From such findings, the court concluded that
[Petitioner] Guillerma Tumlos was a co-owner of the
subject property and could not be ejected therefrom.
"The [respondents] then filed a motion for
reconsideration of the order of reversal, but the same
was denied by the [RTC]."
As earlier stated, the CA reversed the RTC. Hence, this
Petition filed by Guillerma Tumlos only.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
The CA rejected petitioners claim that she and
Respondent Mario Fernandez were co-owners of the
disputed property. The CA ruled:
"From the inception of the instant case, the only defense
presented by private respondent Guillerma is her right
as a co-owner of the subject property[.]
xxx xxx xxx
This claim of co-ownership was not satisfactorily
proven by Guillerma, as correctly held by the trial court.
No other evidence was presented to validate such claim,
except for the said affidavit/position paper. As
previously stated, it was only on appeal that Guillerma
alleged that she cohabited with the petitioner-husband
without the benefit of marriage, and that she bore him
two (2) children. Attached to her memorandum on
appeal are the birth certificates of the said children. Such
contentions and documents should not have been
considered by the . . . (RTC), as they were not presented
in her affidavit/position paper before the trial court
(MTC).
xxx xxx xxx
"However, even if the said allegations and documents
could be considered, the claim of co-ownership must
still fail. As [herein Respondent] Mario Fernandez is
validly married to [Respondent] Lourdes Fernandez (as
per Marriage Contract dated April 27, 1968, p. 45,
Original Record), Guillerma and Mario are not
capacitated to marry each other. Thus, the property
relations governing their supposed cohabitation is that
found in Article 148 of Executive Order No. 209, as
amended, otherwise known as the Family Code of the
Philippines[.]
xxx xxx xxx
"It is clear that actual contribution is required by this
provision, in contrast to Article 147 of the Family Code
which states that efforts in the care and maintenance of
the family and household are regarded as contributions
to the acquisition of common property by one who has
no salary or income or work or industry (Agapay v.
Palang, 276 SCRA 340). The care given by one party
[to] the home, children, and household, or spiritual or
moral inspiration provided to the other, is not included
in Article 148 (Handbook on the Family Code of the
Philippines by Alicia V. Sempio-Diy, 1988 ed., p. 209).
Hence, if actual contribution of the party is not proved,
there will be no co-ownership and no presumption of
equal shares (Agapay, supra at p. 348, citing
Commentaries and Jurisprudence on the Civil Code of
the Philippines Volume I by Arturo M. Tolentino, 1990
ed., p. 500).
"In the instant case, no proof of actual contribution by
Guillerma Tumlos in the purchase of the subject
property was presented. Her only evidence was her
being named in the Contract to Sell as the wife of
[Respondent] Mario Fernandez. Since she failed to
prove that she contributed money to the purchase price
of the subject apartment building, We find no basis to
justify her co-ownership with [Respondent Mario]. The
said property is thus presumed to belong to the conjugal
partnership property of Mario and Lourdes Fernandez,
it being acquired during the subsistence of their
marriage and there being no other proof to the contrary
(please see Article 116 of the Family Code).
"The court a quo (RTC) also found that [Respondent
Mario] has two (2) children with Guillerma who are in
her custody, and that to eject them from the apartment
building would be to run counter with the obligation of
the former to give support to his minor illegitimate
children, which indispensably includes dwelling. As
previously discussed, such finding has no leg to stand
on, it being based on evidence presented for the first
time on appeal.
xxx xxx xxx
"Even assuming arguendo that the said evidence was
validly presented, the RTC failed to consider that the
need for support cannot be presumed. Article 203 of the
Family Code expressly provides that the obligation to
give support shall be demandable from the time the
person who has a right to receive the same needs it for
maintenance, but it shall not be paid except from the
date of judicial or extrajudicial demand . . .
"In contrast to the clear pronouncement of the Supreme
Court, the RTC instead presumed that Guillerma and her
children needed support from [Respondent Mario].
Worse, it relied on evidence not properly presented
before the trial court (MTC).
"With regard to the other [defendants], Gina and Toto
Tumlos, a close perusal of the records shows that they
did not file any responsive pleading. Hence, judgment
may be rendered against them as may be warranted by
the facts alleged in the complaint and limited to what is
prayed for therein, as provided for in Section 6 of the
Revised Rules on Summary Procedure. There was no
basis for the public respondent to dismiss the complaint
against them." (emphasis in the original)
The Issues
In her Memorandum, petitioner submits the following
issues for the consideration of the Court:
"I.The Court of Appeals gravely erred and abused its
discretion in not outrightly dismissing the petition for
review filed by respondents.
"II.The Court of Appeals erred in finding that petitioner
is not the co-owner of the property in litis.
"III.Corollary thereto, the Court of Appeals erred in
applying Art. 148 of the Family Code in the case at bar.
"IV.The Court of Appeals erred in disregarding the
substantive right of support vis- -vis the remedy of
ejectment resorted to by respondents."
In resolving this case, we shall answer two questions:
(a) Is the petitioner a co-owner of the property? (b) Can
the claim for support bar this ejectment suit? We shall
also discuss these preliminary matters: (a) whether the
CA was biased in favor of respondents and (b) whether
the MTC had jurisdiction over the ejectment suit.
The Courts Ruling
The Petition has no merit.
Preliminary Matters
Petitioner submits that the CA exhibited partiality in
favor of herein respondents. This bias, she argues, is
manifest in the following:
1.The CA considered the respondents Petition for
Review despite their failure to attach several pleadings
as well as the explanation for the proof of service,
despite the clear mandate of Section 11 of Rule 13 of the
Revised Rules of Court and despite the ruling in Solar
Team Entertainment, Inc. v. Ricafort.
2.It allowed respondents to submit the pleadings that
were not attached. LLphil
3.It considered respondents' Reply dated May 20, 1998,
which had allegedly been filed out of time.
4.It declared that the case was submitted for decision
without first determining whether to give due course to
the Petition, pursuant to Section 6, Rule 42 of the Rules
of Court.
The CA, for its part, succinctly dismissed these
arguments in this wise:
"It is too late in the day now to question the alleged
procedural error after we have rendered the decision.
More importantly, when the private respondent filed
their comment to the petition on April 26, 1998, they
failed to question such alleged procedural error. Neither
have they questioned all the resolutions issued by the
Court after their filing of such comment. They should,
therefore, be now considered in estoppel to question the
same."
We agree with the appellate court. Petitioner never
raised these matters before the CA. She cannot be
allowed now to challenge its Decision on grounds of
alleged technicalities being belatedly raised as an
afterthought. In this light, she cannot invoke Solar
because she never raised this issue before the CA.
More important, we find it quite sanctimonious indeed
on petitioner's part to rely, on the one hand, on these
procedural technicalities to overcome the appealed
Decision and, on the other hand, assert that the RTC
may consider the new evidence she presented for the
first time on appeal. Such posturing only betrays the
futility of petitioner's assertion, if not its absence of
merit.
One other preliminary matter. Petitioner implies that the
court of origin, the Municipal Trial Court (MTC), did
not have jurisdiction over the "nature of the case,"
alleging that the real question involved is one of
ownership. Since the issue of possession cannot be
settled without passing upon that of ownership, she
maintains that the MTC should have dismissed the case.
This contention is erroneous. The issue of ownership
may be passed upon by the MTC to settle the issue of
possession. Such disposition, however, is not final
insofar as the issue of ownership is concerned, which
may be the subject of another proceeding brought
specifically to settle that question.
Having resolved these preliminary matters, we now
move on to petitioners substantive contentions.
First Issue: Petitioner as Co-owner
Petitioner's central theory and main defense against
respondents' action for ejectment is her claim of co-
ownership over the property with Respondent Mario
Fernandez. At the first instance before the MTC, she
presented a Contract to Sell indicating that she was his
spouse. The MTC found this document insufficient to
support her claim. The RTC, however, after considering
her allegation that she had been cohabiting with Mario
Fernandez as shown by evidence presented before it,
ruled in her favor.
On the other hand, the CA held that the pieces of
evidence adduced before the RTC could no longer be
considered because they had not been submitted before
the MTC. Hence, the appellate court concluded that
"[t]he claim of co-ownership was not satisfactorily
proven . . ."
We agree with the petitioner that the RTC did not err in
considering the evidence presented before it.
Nonetheless, we reject her claim that she was a co-
owner of the disputed property.
Evidence Presented on Appeal Before the RTC
In ruling that the RTC erred in considering on appeal the
evidence presented by petitioner, the CA relied on the
doctrine that issues not raised during trial could not be
considered for the first time during appeal.
We disagree. In the first place, there were no new
matters or issues belatedly raised during the appeal
before the RTC. The defense invoked by petitioner at
the very start was that she was a co-owner. To support
her claim, she presented a Contract to Sell dated
November 14, 1986, which stated that Mario Fernandez
was legally married to her. The allegation that she was
cohabiting with him was a mere elaboration of her initial
theory.
In the second place, procedural rules are generally
premised on considerations of fair play. Respondents
never objected when the assailed evidence was
presented before the RTC. Thus, they cannot claim
unfair surprise or prejudice.
Petitioner Not a Co-Owner Under Article 144 of the
Civil Code
Even considering the evidence presented before the
MTC and the RTC, we cannot accept petitioner's
submission that she is a co-owner of the disputed
property pursuant to Article 144 of the Civil Code. As
correctly held by the CA, the applicable law is not
Article 144 of the Civil Code, but Article 148 of the
Family Code which provides:
"ARTICLE 148.In cases of cohabitation not falling
under the preceding Article, only the properties acquired
by both of the parties through their actual joint
contribution of money, property, or industry shall be
owned by them in common in proportion to their
respective contributions. In the absence of proof to the
contrary, their contributions and corresponding shares
are presumed to be equal. The same rule and
presumption shall apply to joint deposits of money and
evidences of credit.
"If one of the parties is validly married to another, his or
her share in the co-ownership shall accrue to the
absolute community or conjugal partnership existing in
such valid marriage. If the party who acted in bad faith
is not validly married to another, his or her share shall
be forfeited in the manner provided in the last paragraph
of the preceding Article.
"The foregoing rules on forfeiture shall likewise apply
even if both parties are in bad faith."
Article 144 of the Civil Code applies only to a
relationship between a man and a woman who are not
incapacitated to marry each other, or to one in which the
marriage of the parties is void from the beginning. It
does not apply to a cohabitation that amounts to adultery
or concubinage, for it would be absurd to create a co-
ownership where there exists a prior conjugal
partnership or absolute community between the man
and his lawful wife.
Based on evidence presented by respondents, as well as
those submitted by petitioner herself before the RTC, it
is clear that Mario Fernandez was incapacitated to marry
petitioner because he was legally married to Lourdes
Fernandez. It is also clear that, as readily admitted by
petitioner, she cohabited with Mario in a state of
concubinage. Therefore, Article 144 of the Civil Code
is inapplicable.
As stated above, the relationship between petitioner and
Respondent Mario Fernandez is governed by Article
148 of the Family Code. Justice Alicia V. Sempio-Diy
points out that "[t]he Family Code has filled the hiatus
in Article 144 of the Civil Code by expressly regulating
in its Article 148 the property relations of couples living
in a state of adultery or concubinage."
Hence, petitioners argument that the Family Code is
inapplicable because the cohabitation and the
acquisition of the property occurred before its
effectivity deserves scant consideration. Suffice it to
say that the law itself states that it can be applied
retroactively if it does not prejudice vested or acquired
rights. In this case, petitioner failed to show any vested
right over the property in question. Moreover, to resolve
similar issues, we have applied Article 148 of the
Family Code retroactively.
No Evidence of Actual Joint Contribution
Another consideration militates against petitioners
claim that she is a co-owner of the property. In Agapay,
the Court ruled:
"Under Article 148, only the properties acquired by both
of the parties through their actual joint contribution of
money, property or industry shall be owned by them in
common in proportion to their respective contributions.
It must be stressed that the actual contribution is
required by this provision, in contrast to Article 147
which states that efforts in the care and maintenance of
the family and household, are regarded as contributions
to the acquisition of common property by one who has
no salary or income or work or industry. If the actual
contribution of the party is not proved, there will be no
co-ownership and no presumption of equal shares."
(emphasis ours)
In this case, petitioner fails to present any evidence that
she had made an actual contribution to purchase the
subject property. Indeed, she anchors her claim of co-
ownership merely on her cohabitation with Respondent
Mario Fernandez.
Likewise, her claim of having administered the property
during the cohabitation is unsubstantiated. In any event,
this fact by itself does not justify her claim, for nothing
in Article 148 of the Family Code provides that the
administration of the property amounts to a contribution
in its acquisition.
Clearly, there is no basis for petitioners claim of co-
ownership. The property in question belongs to the
conjugal partnership of respondents. Hence, the MTC
and the CA were correct in ordering the ejectment of
petitioner from the premises.
Second Issue: Support versus Ejectment
Petitioner contends that since Respondent Mario
Fernandez failed to repudiate her claim regarding the
filiation of his alleged sons, Mark Gil and Michael
Fernandez, his silence on the matter amounts to an
admission. Arguing that Mario is liable for support, she
advances the theory that the children's right to support,
which necessarily includes shelter, prevails over the
right of respondents to eject her.
We disagree. It should be emphasized that this is an
ejectment suit whereby respondents seek to exercise
their possessory right over their property. It is summary
in character and deals solely with the issue of possession
of the property in dispute. Here, it has been shown that
they have a better right to possess it than does the
petitioner, whose right to possess is based merely on
their tolerance.
Moreover, Respondent Mario Fernandez' alleged failure
to repudiate petitioners claim of filiation is not relevant
to the present case. Indeed, it would be highly improper
for us to rule on such issue. Besides, it was not properly
taken up below. In any event, Article 298 of the Civil
Code requires that there should be an extrajudicial
demand. None was made here. The CA was correct
when it said:
"Even assuming arguendo that the said evidence was
validly presented, the RTC failed to consider that the
need for support cannot be presumed. Article [298] of
the [New Civil Code] expressly provides that the
obligation to give support shall be demandable from the
time the person who has a right to receive the same need
it for maintenance, but it shall not be paid except from
the date of judicial and extrajudicial demand."
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED and the
appealed Decision AFFIRMED. Costs against
petitioner. cdphil
SO ORDERED.
Melo, Purisima and Gonzaga-Reyes, JJ.,concur.
Vitug, J., is abroad on official business.
G.R. No. 140528, 140553 | Torbela v. Spouses Rosario
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 140528. December 7, 2011.]
MARIA TORBELA, represented by her heirs,
namely: EULOGIO TOSINO, husband and
children: CLARO, MAXIMINO, CORNELIO,
OLIVIA and CALIXTA, all surnamed TOSINO,
APOLONIA TOSINO VDA. DE RAMIREZ and
JULITA TOSINO DEAN; PEDRO TORBELA,
represented by his heirs, namely: JOSE and
DIONISIO, both surnamed TORBELA;
EUFROSINA TORBELA ROSARIO, represented
by her heirs, namely: ESTEBAN T. ROSARIO,
MANUEL T. ROSARIO, ROMULO T. ROSARIO
and ANDREA ROSARIO-HADUCA; LEONILA
TORBELA TAMIN; FERNANDO TORBELA,
represented by his heirs, namely: SERGIO T.
TORBELA, EUTROPIA T. VELASCO, PILAR T.
ZULUETA, CANDIDO T. TORBELA,
FLORENTINA T. TORBELA and PANTALEON T.
TORBELA; DOLORES TORBELA TABLADA;
LEONORA TORBELA AGUSTIN, represented by
her heirs, namely: PATRICIO, SEGUNDO,
CONSUELO and FELIX, all surnamed AGUSTIN;
and SEVERINA TORBELA ILDEFONSO,
petitioners, vs. SPOUSES ANDRES T. ROSARIO
and LENA DUQUE-ROSARIO and BANCO
FILIPINO SAVINGS AND MORTGAGE BANK,
respondents.
[G.R. No. 140553. December 7, 2011.]
LENA DUQUE-ROSARIO, petitioner, vs. BANCO
FILIPINO SAVINGS AND MORTGAGE BANK,
respondent.
DECISION
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J p:
Presently before the Court are two consolidated
Petitions for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court, both assailing the Decision dated June
29, 1999 and Resolution dated October 22, 1999 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 39770.
The petitioners in G.R. No. 140528 are siblings Maria
Torbela, Pedro Torbela, Eufrosina Torbela Rosario,
Leonila Torbela Tamin, Fernando Torbela, Dolores
Torbela Tablada, Leonora Torbela Agustin, and
Severina Torbela Ildefonso (Torbela siblings).
The petitioner in G.R. No. 140553 is Lena Duque-
Rosario (Duque-Rosario), who was married to, but now
legally separated from, Dr. Andres T. Rosario (Dr.
Rosario). Dr. Rosario is the son of Eufrosina Torbela
Rosario and the nephew of the other Torbela siblings.
The controversy began with a parcel of land, with an
area of 374 square meters, located in Urdaneta City,
Pangasinan (Lot No. 356-A). It was originally part of a
larger parcel of land, known as Lot No. 356 of the
Cadastral Survey of Urdaneta, measuring 749 square
meters, and covered by Original Certificate of Title
(OCT) No. 16676, in the name of Valeriano Semilla
(Valeriano), married to Potenciana Acosta. Under
unexplained circumstances, Valeriano gave Lot No.
356-A to his sister Marta Semilla, married to Eugenio
Torbela (spouses Torbela). Upon the deaths of the
spouses Torbela, Lot No. 356-A was adjudicated in
equal shares among their children, the Torbela siblings,
by virtue of a Deed of Extrajudicial Partition dated
December 3, 1962.
On December 12, 1964, the Torbela siblings executed a
Deed of Absolute Quitclaim over Lot No. 356-A in
favor of Dr. Rosario. According to the said Deed, the
Torbela siblings "for and in consideration of the sum of
NINE PESOS (P9.00) . . . transfer[red] and convey[ed]
. . . unto the said Andres T. Rosario, that undivided
portion of THREE HUNDRED SEVENTY-FOUR
square meters of that parcel of land embraced in
Original Certificate of Title No. 16676 of the land
records of Pangasinan . . . ." Four days later, on
December 16, 1964, OCT No. 16676 in Valeriano's
name was partially cancelled as to Lot No. 356-A and
TCT No. 52751 was issued in Dr. Rosario's name
covering the said property.
Another Deed of Absolute Quitclaim was subsequently
executed on December 28, 1964, this time by Dr.
Rosario, acknowledging that he only borrowed Lot No.
356-A from the Torbela siblings and was already
returning the same to the latter for P1.00. The Deed
stated: ECSHID
That for and in consideration of the sum of one peso
(P1.00), Philippine Currency and the fact that I only
borrowed the above described parcel of land from
MARIA TORBELA, married to Eulogio Tosino,
EUFROSINA TORBELA, married to Pedro Rosario,
PEDRO TORBELA, married to Petra Pagador,
LEONILA TORBELA, married to Fortunato Tamen,
FERNANDO TORBELA, married to Victoriana
Tablada, DOLORES TORBELA, widow, LEONORA
TORBELA, married to Matias Agustin and SEVERINA
TORBELA, married to Jorge Ildefonso, . . . by these
presents do hereby cede, transfer and convey by way of
this ABSOLUTE QUITCLAIM unto the said Maria,
Eufrosina, Pedro, Leonila, Fernando, Dolores, Leonora
and Severina, all surnamed Torbela the parcel of land
described above. (Emphasis ours.)
The aforequoted Deed was notarized, but was not
immediately annotated on TCT No. 52751.
Following the issuance of TCT No. 52751, Dr. Rosario
obtained a loan from the Development Bank of the
Philippines (DBP) on February 21, 1965 in the sum of
P70,200.00, secured by a mortgage constituted on Lot
No. 356-A. The mortgage was annotated on TCT No.
52751 on September 21, 1965 as Entry No. 243537. Dr.
Rosario used the proceeds of the loan for the
construction of improvements on Lot No. 356-A.
On May 16, 1967, Cornelio T. Tosino (Cornelio)
executed an Affidavit of Adverse Claim, on behalf of
the Torbela siblings. Cornelio deposed in said Affidavit:
3. That ANDRES T. ROSARIO later quitclaimed his
rights in favor of the former owners by virtue of a Deed
of Absolute Quitclaim which he executed before Notary
Public Banaga, and entered in his Notarial Registry as
Dec. No. 43; Page No. 9; Book No. I; Series of 1964;
4. That it is the desire of the parties, my aforestated kins,
to register ownership over the above-described property
or to perfect their title over the same but their Deed
could not be registered because the registered owner
now, ANDRES T. ROSARIO mortgaged the property
with the DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE
PHILIPPINES, on September 21, 1965, and for which
reason, the Title is still impounded and held by the said
bank;
5. That pending payment of the obligation with the
DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES or
redemption of the Title from said bank, I, CORNELIO
T. TOSINO, in behalf of my mother MARIA
TORBELA-TOSINO, and my Aunts EUFROSINA
TORBELA, LEONILA TORBELA-TAMEN,
DOLORES TORBELA, LEONORA TORBELA-
AGUSTIN, SEVERINA TORBELA-ILDEFONSO,
and my Uncles PEDRO TORBELA and FERNANDO,
also surnamed TORBELA, I request the Register of
Deeds of Pangasinan to annotate their adverse claim at
the back of Transfer Certificate of Title No. 52751,
based on the annexed document, Deed of Absolute
Quitclaim by ANDRES T. ROSARIO, dated December
28, 1964, marked as Annex "A" and made a part of this
Affidavit, and it is also requested that the
DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES be
informed accordingly.
The very next day, on May 17, 1967, the Torbela
siblings had Cornelio's Affidavit of Adverse Claim
dated May 16, 1967 and Dr. Rosario's Deed of Absolute
Quitclaim dated December 28, 1964 annotated on TCT
No. 52751 as Entry Nos. 274471 and 274472,
respectively.
The construction of a four-storey building on Lot No.
356-A was eventually completed. The building was
initially used as a hospital, but was later converted to a
commercial building. Part of the building was leased to
PT&T; and the rest to Mrs. Andrea Rosario-Haduca, Dr.
Rosario's sister, who operated the Rose Inn Hotel and
Restaurant.
Dr. Rosario was able to fully pay his loan from DBP.
Under Entry No. 520197 on TCT No. 52751 dated
March 6, 1981, the mortgage appearing under Entry No.
243537 was cancelled per the Cancellation and
Discharge of Mortgage executed by DBP in favor of Dr.
Rosario and ratified before a notary public on July 11,
1980. cDCHaS
In the meantime, Dr. Rosario acquired another loan
from the Philippine National Bank (PNB) sometime in
1979-1981. Records do not reveal though the original
amount of the loan from PNB, but the loan agreement
was amended on March 5, 1981 and the loan amount
was increased to P450,000.00. The loan was secured by
mortgages constituted on the following properties: (1)
Lot No. 356-A, covered by TCT No. 52751 in Dr.
Rosario's name; (2) Lot No. 4489, with an area of 1,862
square meters, located in Dagupan City, Pangasinan,
covered by TCT No. 24832; and (3) Lot No. 5-F-8-C-2-
B-2-A, with an area of 1,001 square meters, located in
Nancayasan, Urdaneta, Pangasinan, covered by TCT
No. 104189. The amended loan agreement and
mortgage on Lot No. 356-A was annotated on TCT No.
52751 on March 6, 1981 as Entry No. 520099.
Five days later, on March 11, 1981, another annotation,
Entry No. 520469, was made on TCT No. 52751,
canceling the adverse claim on Lot No. 356-A under
Entry Nos. 274471-274472, on the basis of the
Cancellation and Discharge of Mortgage executed by
Dr. Rosario on March 5, 1981. Entry No. 520469
consisted of both stamped and handwritten portions, and
exactly reads:
Entry No. 520469. Cancellation of Adverse Claim
executed by Andres Rosario in favor of same. The
incumbrance/mortgage appearing under Entry No.
274471-72 is now cancelled as per Cancellation and
Discharge of Mortgage Ratified before Notary Public
Mauro G. Meris on March 5, 1981: Doc. No. 215; Page
No. 44; Book No. 1; Series of 1981.
Lingayen, Pangasinan, 3-11, 19981 n
[Signed: Pedro dela Cruz]
Register of Deeds
On December 8, 1981, Dr. Rosario and his wife, Duque-
Rosario (spouses Rosario), acquired a third loan in the
amount of P1,200,000.00 from Banco Filipino Savings
and Mortgage Bank (Banco Filipino). To secure said
loan, the spouses Rosario again constituted mortgages
on Lot No. 356-A, Lot No. 4489, and Lot No. 5-F-8-C-
2-B-2-A. The mortgage on Lot No. 356-A was
annotated on TCT No. 52751 as Entry No. 533283 on
December 18, 1981. Since the construction of a two-
storey commercial building on Lot No. 5-F-8-C-2-B-2-
A was still incomplete, the loan value thereof as
collateral was deducted from the approved loan amount.
Thus, the spouses Rosario could only avail of the
maximum loan amount of P830,064.00 from Banco
Filipino.
Because Banco Filipino paid the balance of Dr.
Rosario's loan from PNB, the mortgage on Lot No. 356-
A in favor of PNB was cancelled per Entry No. 533478
on TCT No. 52751 dated December 23, 1981.
On February 13, 1986, the Torbela siblings filed before
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Urdaneta,
Pangasinan, a Complaint for recovery of ownership and
possession of Lot No. 356-A, plus damages, against the
spouses Rosario, which was docketed as Civil Case No.
U-4359. On the same day, Entry Nos. 593493 and
593494 were made on TCT No. 52751 that read as
follows:
Entry No. 593494 Complaint Civil Case No. U-
4359 (For: Recovery of Ownership and Possession and
Damages. (Sup. Paper).
Entry No. 593493 Notice of Lis Pendens The
parcel of land described in this title is subject to Lis
Pendens executed by Liliosa B. Rosario, CLAO, Trial
Attorney dated February 13, 1986. Filed to TCT No.
52751 February 13, 1986-1986 February 13 3:30
p.m.
(SGD.) PACIFICO M. BRAGANZA
Register of Deeds
The spouses Rosario afterwards failed to pay their loan
from Banco Filipino. As of April 2, 1987, the spouses
Rosario's outstanding principal obligation and penalty
charges amounted to P743,296.82 and P151,524.00,
respectively.
Banco Filipino extrajudicially foreclosed the mortgages
on Lot No. 356-A, Lot No. 4489, and Lot No. 5-F-8-C-
2-B-2-A. During the public auction on April 2, 1987,
Banco Filipino was the lone bidder for the three
foreclosed properties for the price of P1,372,387.04.
The Certificate of Sale dated April 2, 1987, in favor of
Banco Filipino, was annotated on TCT No. 52751 on
April 14, 1987 as Entry No. 610623.
On December 9, 1987, the Torbela siblings filed before
the RTC their Amended Complaint, impleading Banco
Filipino as additional defendant in Civil Case No. U-
4359 and praying that the spouses Rosario be ordered to
redeem Lot No. 356-A from Banco Filipino. cSIADH
The spouses Rosario instituted before the RTC on
March 4, 1988 a case for annulment of extrajudicial
foreclosure and damages, with prayer for a writ of
preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order,
against Banco Filipino, the Provincial Ex Officio Sheriff
and his Deputy, and the Register of Deeds of
Pangasinan. The case was docketed as Civil Case No.
U-4667. Another notice of lis pendens was annotated on
TCT No. 52751 on March 10, 1988 as Entry No.
627059, viz.:
Entry No. 627059 Lis Pendens Dr. Andres T.
Rosario and Lena Duque Rosario, Plaintiff versus
Banco Filipino, et al. Civil Case No. U-4667 or
Annulment of Extrajudicial Foreclosure of Real Estate
Mortgage The parcel of land described in this title is
subject to Notice of Lis Pendens subscribed and sworn
to before Notary Public Mauro G. Meris, as Doc. No.
21; Page No. 5; Book 111; S-1988. March 7, 1988-1988
March 10, 1:00 p.m.
(SGD.) RUFINO M. MORENO, SR.
Register of Deeds
The Torbela siblings intervened in Civil Case No. U-
4667. Eventually, on October 17, 1990, the RTC issued
an Order dismissing without prejudice Civil Case No.
U-4667 due to the spouses Rosario's failure to
prosecute.
Meanwhile, the Torbela siblings tried to redeem Lot No.
356-A from Banco Filipino, but their efforts were
unsuccessful. Upon the expiration of the one-year
redemption period in April 1988, the Certificate of Final
Sale and Affidavit of Consolidation covering all three
foreclosed properties were executed on May 24, 1988
and May 25, 1988, respectively.
On June 7, 1988, new certificates of title were issued in
the name of Banco Filipino, particularly, TCT No.
165812 for Lot No. 5-F-8-C-2-B-2-A and TCT No.
165813 for Lot No. 356-A.
The Torbela siblings thereafter filed before the RTC on
August 29, 1988 a Complaint for annulment of the
Certificate of Final Sale dated May 24, 1988, judicial
cancellation of TCT No. 165813, and damages, against
Banco Filipino, the Ex Officio Provincial Sheriff, and
the Register of Deeds of Pangasinan, which was
docketed as Civil Case No. U-4733.
On June 19, 1991, Banco Filipino filed before the RTC
of Urdaneta City a Petition for the issuance of a writ of
possession. In said Petition, docketed as Pet. Case No.
U-822, Banco Filipino prayed that a writ of possession
be issued in its favor over Lot No. 5-F-8-C-2-B-2-A and
Lot No. 356-A, plus the improvements thereon, and the
spouses Rosario and other persons presently in
possession of said properties be directed to abide by said
writ.
The RTC jointly heard Civil Case Nos. U-4359 and U-
4733 and Pet. Case No. U-822. The Decision on these
three cases was promulgated on January 15, 1992, the
dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered:
1. Declaring the real estate mortgage over Lot 356-A
covered by TCT 52751 executed by Spouses Andres
Rosario in favor of Banco Filipino, legal and valid;
2. Declaring the sheriff's sale dated April 2, 1987 over
Lot 356-A covered by TCT 52751 and subsequent final
Deed of Sale dated May 14, 1988 over Lot 356-A
covered by TCT No. 52751 legal and valid;
3. Declaring Banco Filipino the owner of Lot 356-A
covered by TCT No. 52751 (now TCT 165813);
4. Banco Filipino is entitled to a Writ of Possession over
Lot 356-A together with the improvements thereon
(Rose Inn Building). The Branch Clerk of Court is
hereby ordered to issue a writ of possession in favor of
Banco Filipino;
5. [The Torbela siblings] are hereby ordered to render
accounting to Banco Filipino the rental they received
from tenants of Rose Inn Building from May 14, 1988;
6. [The Torbela siblings] are hereby ordered to pay
Banco Filipino the sum of P20,000.00 as attorney's fees;
7. Banco Filipino is hereby ordered to give [the Torbela
siblings] the right of first refusal over Lot 356-A. The
Register of Deeds is hereby ordered to annotate the right
of [the Torbela siblings] at the back of TCT No. 165813
after payment of the required fees; cCSEaA
8. Dr. Rosario and Lena Rosario are hereby ordered to
reimburse [the Torbela siblings] the market value of Lot
356-A as of December, 1964 minus payments made by
the former;
9. Dismissing the complaint of [the Torbela siblings]
against Banco Filipino, Pedro Habon and Rufino
Moreno in Civil Case No. U-4733; and against Banco
Filipino in Civil Case No. U-4359.
The RTC released an Amended Decision dated January
29, 1992, adding the following paragraph to the
dispositive:
Banco Filipino is entitled to a Writ of Possession over
Lot-5-F-8-C-2-[B]-2-A of the subdivision plan (LRC)
Psd-122471, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title
104189 of the Registry of Deeds of Pangasinan[.]
The Torbela siblings and Dr. Rosario appealed the
foregoing RTC judgment before the Court of Appeals.
Their appeal was docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 39770.
In its Decision dated June 29, 1999, the Court of
Appeals decreed:
WHEREFORE, foregoing considered, the appealed
decision is hereby AFFIRMED with modification.
Items Nos. 6 and 7 of the appealed decision are
DELETED. Item No. 8 is modified requiring [Dr.
Rosario] to pay [the Torbela siblings] actual damages,
in the amount of P1,200,000.00 with 6% per annum
interest from finality of this decision until fully paid.
[Dr. Rosario] is further ORDERED to pay [the Torbela
siblings] the amount of P300,000.00 as moral damages;
P200,000.00 as exemplary damages and P100,000.00 as
attorney's fees.
Costs against [Dr. Rosario].
The Court of Appeals, in a Resolution dated October 22,
1999, denied the separate Motions for Reconsideration
of the Torbela siblings and Dr. Rosario.
The Torbela siblings come before this Court via the
Petition for Review in G.R. No. 140528, with the
following assignment of errors:
First Issue and Assignment of Error:
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE
REGISTRATION OF THE DEED OF ABSOLUTE
QUITCLAIM EXECUTED BY [DR. ANDRES T.
ROSARIO] IN FAVOR OF THE [TORBELA
SIBLINGS] DATED DECEMBER 28, 1964 AND THE
REGISTRATION OF THE NOTICE OF ADVERSE
CLAIM EXECUTED BY THE [TORBELA
SIBLINGS], SERVE AS THE OPERATIVE ACT TO
CONVEY OR AFFECT THE LAND AND
IMPROVEMENTS THEREOF IN SO FAR AS THIRD
PERSONS ARE CONCERNED.
Second Issue and Assignment of Error:
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE
SUBJECT PROPERTY COVERED BY T.C.T. NO.
52751 IS CLEAN AND FREE, DESPITE OF THE
ANNOTATION OF ENCUMBRANCES OF THE
NOTICE OF ADVERSE CLAIM AND THE DEED OF
ABSOLUTE QUITCLAIM APPEARING AT THE
BACK THEREOF AS ENTRY NOS. 274471 AND
274472, RESPECTIVELY.
Third Issue and Assignment of Error:
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE
NOTICE OF ADVERSE CLAIM OF THE [TORBELA
SIBLINGS] UNDER ENTRY NO. 274471 WAS
VALIDLY CANCELLED BY THE REGISTER OF
DEEDS, IN THE ABSENCE OF A PETITION DULY
FILED IN COURT FOR ITS CANCELLATION.
Fourth Issue and Assignment of Error:
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THAT
RESPONDENT BANCO FILIPINO SAVINGS AND
MORTGAGE BANK IS A MORTGAGEE IN GOOD
FAITH. CaTcSA
Fifth Issue and Assignment of Error:
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE
FILING OF A CIVIL CASE NO. U-4359 ON
DECEMBER 9, 1987, IMPLEADING RESPONDENT
BANCO FILIPINO AS ADDITIONAL PARTY
DEFENDANT, TOLL OR SUSPEND THE RUNNING
OF THE ONE YEAR PERIOD OF REDEMPTION.
Sixth Issue and Assignment of Error:
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE
OWNERSHIP OVER THE SUBJECT PROPERTY
WAS PREMATURELY CONSOLIDATED IN
FAVOR OF RESPONDENT BANCO FILIPINO
SAVINGS AND MORTGAGE BANK.
Seventh Issue and Assignment of Error:
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE
SUBJECT PROPERTY IS AT LEAST WORTH
P1,200,000.00.
The Torbela siblings ask of this Court:
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing
considerations, the [Torbela siblings] most respectfully
pray that the questioned DECISION promulgated on
June 29, 1999 (Annex "A", Petition) and the
RESOLUTION dated October 22, 1999 (Annex "B",
Petition) be REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and/or
further MODIFIED in favor of the [Torbela siblings],
and another DECISION issue ordering, among other
reliefs, the respondent Banco Filipino to reconvey back
Lot No. 356-A, covered by T.C.T. No. 52751, in favor
of the [Torbela siblings] who are the actual owners of
the same.
The [Torbela siblings] likewise pray for such other
reliefs and further remedies as may be deemed just and
equitable under the premises.
Duque-Rosario, now legally separated from Dr.
Rosario, avers in her Petition for Review in G.R. No.
140553 that Lot No. 4489 and Lot No. 5-F-8-C-2-B-2-
A were registered in her name, and she was unlawfully
deprived of ownership of said properties because of the
following errors of the Court of Appeals:
A record.
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS PATENTLY
ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE PERIOD TO
REDEEM THE PROPERTY HAS NOT
COMMENCED, HENCE, THE CERTIFICATE OF
SALE, THE CONSOLIDATION OF OWNERSHIP
BY [BANCO FILIPINO], ARE NULL AND VOID.
B Dr. Rosario contends that Civil Case No. U-4359, the
THE COURT OF APPEALS PATENTLY ERRED IN
REFUSING TO RULE THAT THE FILING OF THE
COMPLAINT BEFORE THE COURT A QUO BY
THE [TORBELA SIBLINGS] HAD ALREADY BEEN
PRESCRIBED.
Duque-Rosario prays that the appealed decision of the
Court of Appeals be reversed and set aside, and that Lot
No. 4489 and Lot No. 5-F-8-C-2-B-2-A be freed from
all obligations and encumbrances and returned to her.
Review of findings of fact by the
RTC and the Court of Appeals
warranted.
A disquisition of the issues raised and/or errors assigned
in the Petitions at bar unavoidably requires a re-
evaluation of the facts and evidence presented by the
parties in the court a quo.
In Republic v. Heirs of Julia Ramos, the Court summed
up the rules governing the power of review of the Court:
Ordinarily, this Court will not review, much less
reverse, the factual findings of the Court of Appeals,
especially where such findings coincide with those of
the trial court. The findings of facts of the Court of
Appeals are, as a general rule, conclusive and binding
upon this Court, since this Court is not a trier of facts
and does not routinely undertake the re-examination of
the evidence presented by the contending parties during
the trial of the case. TESDcA
The above rule, however, is subject to a number of
exceptions, such as (1) when the inference made is
manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (2) when
there is grave abuse of discretion; (3) when the finding
is grounded entirely on speculations, surmises, or
conjectures; (4) when the judgment of the Court of
Appeals is based on misapprehension of facts; (5) when
the findings of fact are conflicting; (6) when the Court
of Appeals, in making its findings, went beyond the
issues of the case and the same is contrary to the
admissions of both parties; (7) when the findings of the
Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court;
(8) when the findings of fact are conclusions without
citation of specific evidence on which they are based;
(9) when the Court of Appeals manifestly overlooked
certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties and
which, if properly considered, would justify a different
conclusion; and (10) when the findings of fact of the
Court of Appeals are premised on the absence of
evidence and are contradicted by the evidence on
As the succeeding discussion will bear out, the first,
fourth, and ninth exceptions are extant in these case.
Barangay conciliation was not a
pre-requisite to the institution of Civil
Case No. U-4359.
Complaint of the Torbela siblings for recovery of
ownership and possession of Lot No. 356-A, plus
damages, should have been dismissed by the RTC
because of the failure of the Torbela siblings to comply
with the prior requirement of submitting the dispute to
barangay conciliation.
The Torbela siblings instituted Civil Case No. U-4359
on February 13, 1986, when Presidential Decree No.
1508, Establishing a System of Amicably Settling
Disputes at the Barangay Level, was still in effect.
Pertinent provisions of said issuance read:
Section 2. Subject matters for amicable settlement.
The Lupon of each barangay shall have authority to
bring together the parties actually residing in the same
city or municipality for amicable settlement of all
disputes except:
1. Where one party is the government, or any
subdivision or instrumentality thereof;
2. Where one party is a public officer or employee, and
the dispute relates to the performance of his official
functions;
3. Offenses punishable by imprisonment exceeding 30
days, or a fine exceeding P200.00;
4. Offenses where there is no private offended party;
5. Such other classes of disputes which the Prime
Minister may in the interest of justice determine upon
recommendation of the Minister of Justice and the
Minister of Local Government.
Section 3. Venue. Disputes between or among
persons actually residing in the same barangay shall be
brought for amicable settlement before the Lupon of
said barangay. Those involving actual residents of
different barangays within the same city or municipality
shall be brought in the barangay where the respondent
or any of the respondents actually resides, at the election
of the complainant. However, all disputes which
involved real property or any interest therein shall
be brought in the barangay where the real property
or any part thereof is situated.
The Lupon shall have no authority over disputes:
1. involving parties who actually reside in barangays
of different cities or municipalities, except where
such barangays adjoin each other; and
2. involving real property located in different
municipalities.
xxx xxx xxx
Section 6. Conciliation, pre-condition to filing of
complaint. No complaint, petition, action or
proceeding involving any matter within the authority of
the Lupon as provided in Section 2 hereof shall be filed
or instituted in court or any other government office for
adjudication unless there has been a confrontation of the
parties before the Lupon Chairman or the Pangkat and
no conciliation or settlement has been reached as
certified by the Lupon Secretary or the Pangkat
Secretary, attested by the Lupon or Pangkat Chairman,
or unless the settlement has been repudiated. . . . .
(Emphases supplied.) TASCEc
The Court gave the following elucidation on the
jurisdiction of the Lupong Tagapayapa in Tavora v.
Hon. Veloso:
The foregoing provisions are quite clear. Section 2
specifies the conditions under which the Lupon of a
barangay "shall have authority" to bring together the
disputants for amicable settlement of their dispute: The
parties must be "actually residing in the same city or
municipality." At the same time, Section 3 while
reiterating that the disputants must be "actually residing
in the same barangay" or in "different barangays"
within the same city or municipality unequivocably
declares that the Lupon shall have "no authority" over
disputes "involving parties who actually reside in
barangays of different cities or municipalities," except
where such barangays adjoin each other.
Thus, by express statutory inclusion and exclusion,
the Lupon shall have no jurisdiction over disputes
where the parties are not actual residents of the same
city or municipality, except where the barangays in
which they actually reside adjoin each other.
It is true that immediately after specifying the barangay
whose Lupon shall take cognizance of a given dispute,
Sec. 3 of PD 1508 adds:
"However, all disputes which involve real property or
any interest therein shall be brought in the barangay
where the real property or any part thereof is situated."
Actually, however, this added sentence is just an
ordinary proviso and should operate as such.
The operation of a proviso, as a rule, should be limited
to its normal function, which is to restrict or vary the
operation of the principal clause, rather than expand its
scope, in the absence of a clear indication to the
contrary.
"The natural and appropriate office of a proviso is . . . to
except something from the enacting clause; to limit,
restrict, or qualify the statute in whole or in part; or to
exclude from the scope of the statute that which
otherwise would be within its terms." (73 Am Jur 2d
467.)
Therefore, the quoted proviso should simply be deemed
to restrict or vary the rule on venue prescribed in the
principal clauses of the first paragraph of Section 3,
thus: Although venue is generally determined by the
residence of the parties, disputes involving real
property shall be brought in the barangay where the
real property or any part thereof is situated,
notwithstanding that the parties reside elsewhere
within the same city/municipality. (Emphases
supplied.)
The original parties in Civil Case No. U-4359 (the
Torbela siblings and the spouses Rosario) do not reside
in the same barangay, or in different barangays within
the same city or municipality, or in different barangays
of different cities or municipalities but are adjoining
each other. Some of them reside outside Pangasinan and
even outside of the country altogether. The Torbela
siblings reside separately in Barangay Macalong,
Urdaneta, Pangasinan; Barangay Consolacion,
Urdaneta, Pangasinan; Pangil, Laguna; Chicago, United
States of America; and Canada. The spouses Rosario are
residents of Calle Garcia, Poblacion, Urdaneta,
Pangasinan. Resultantly, the Lupon had no jurisdiction
over the dispute and barangay conciliation was not a
pre-condition for the filing of Civil Case No. U-4359.
The Court now looks into the merits of Civil Case No.
U-4359.
There was an express trust between
the Torbela siblings and Dr. Rosario.
There is no dispute that the Torbela sibling inherited the
title to Lot No. 356-A from their parents, the Torbela
spouses, who, in turn, acquired the same from the first
registered owner of Lot No. 356-A, Valeriano.
Indeed, the Torbela siblings executed a Deed of
Absolute Quitclaim on December 12, 1964 in which
they transferred and conveyed Lot No. 356-A to Dr.
Rosario for the consideration of P9.00. However, the
Torbela siblings explained that they only executed the
Deed as an accommodation so that Dr. Rosario could
have Lot No. 356-A registered in his name and use said
property to secure a loan from DBP, the proceeds of
which would be used for building a hospital on Lot No.
356-A a claim supported by testimonial and
documentary evidence, and borne out by the sequence
of events immediately following the execution by the
Torbela siblings of said Deed. On December 16, 1964,
TCT No. 52751, covering Lot No. 356-A, was already
issued in Dr. Rosario's name. On December 28, 1964,
Dr. Rosario executed his own Deed of Absolute
Quitclaim, in which he expressly acknowledged that he
"only borrowed" Lot No. 356-A and was transferring
and conveying the same back to the Torbela siblings for
the consideration of P1.00. On February 21, 1965, Dr.
Rosario's loan in the amount of P70,200.00, secured by
a mortgage on Lot No. 356-A, was approved by DBP.
Soon thereafter, construction of a hospital building
started on Lot No. 356-A. DIESHT
Among the notable evidence presented by the Torbela
siblings is the testimony of Atty. Lorenza Alcantara
(Atty. Alcantara), who had no apparent personal interest
in the present case. Atty. Alcantara, when she was still
a boarder at the house of Eufrosina Torbela Rosario (Dr.
Rosario's mother), was consulted by the Torbela
siblings as regards the extrajudicial partition of Lot No.
356-A. She also witnessed the execution of the two
Deeds of Absolute Quitclaim by the Torbela siblings
and Dr. Rosario.
In contrast, Dr. Rosario presented TCT No. 52751,
issued in his name, to prove his purported title to Lot
No. 356-A. In Lee Tek Sheng v. Court of Appeals, the
Court made a clear distinction between title and the
certificate of title:
The certificate referred to is that document issued by the
Register of Deeds known as the Transfer Certificate of
Title (TCT). By title, the law refers to ownership which
is represented by that document. Petitioner apparently
confuses certificate with title. Placing a parcel of land
under the mantle of the Torrens system does not mean
that ownership thereof can no longer be disputed.
Ownership is different from a certificate of title. The
TCT is only the best proof of ownership of a piece of
land. Besides, the certificate cannot always be
considered as conclusive evidence of ownership. Mere
issuance of the certificate of title in the name of any
person does not foreclose the possibility that the real
property may be under co-ownership with persons
not named in the certificate or that the registrant
may only be a trustee or that other parties may have
acquired interest subsequent to the issuance of the
certificate of title. To repeat, registration is not the
equivalent of title, but is only the best evidence thereof.
Title as a concept of ownership should not be
confused with the certificate of title as evidence of
such ownership although both are interchangeably
used. . . . . (Emphases supplied.)
Registration does not vest title; it is merely the evidence
of such title. Land registration laws do not give the
holder any better title than what he actually has.
Consequently, Dr. Rosario must still prove herein his
acquisition of title to Lot No. 356-A, apart from his
submission of TCT No. 52751 in his name.
Dr. Rosario testified that he obtained Lot No. 356-A
after paying the Torbela siblings P25,000.00, pursuant
to a verbal agreement with the latter. The Court though
observes that Dr. Rosario's testimony on the execution
and existence of the verbal agreement with the Torbela
siblings lacks significant details (such as the names of
the parties present, dates, places, etc.) and is not
corroborated by independent evidence.
In addition, Dr. Rosario acknowledged the execution of
the two Deeds of Absolute Quitclaim dated December
12, 1964 and December 28, 1964, even affirming his
own signature on the latter Deed. The Parol Evidence
Rule provides that when the terms of the agreement
have been reduced into writing, it is considered as
containing all the terms agreed upon and there can be,
between the parties and their successors in interest, no
evidence of such terms other than the contents of the
written agreement. Dr. Rosario may not modify,
explain, or add to the terms in the two written Deeds of
Absolute Quitclaim since he did not put in issue in his
pleadings (1) an intrinsic ambiguity, mistake, or
imperfection in the Deeds; (2) failure of the Deeds to
express the true intent and the agreement of the parties
thereto; (3) the validity of the Deeds; or (4) the existence
of other terms agreed to by the Torbela siblings and Dr.
Rosario after the execution of the Deeds.
Even if the Court considers Dr. Rosario's testimony on
his alleged verbal agreement with the Torbela siblings,
the Court finds the same unsatisfactory. Dr. Rosario
averred that the two Deeds were executed only because
he was "planning to secure loan from the Development
Bank of the Philippines and Philippine National Bank
and the bank needed absolute quitclaim[.]" While Dr.
Rosario's explanation makes sense for the first Deed of
Absolute Quitclaim dated December 12, 1964 executed
by the Torbela siblings (which transferred Lot No. 356-
A to Dr. Rosario for P9.00.00), the same could not be
said for the second Deed of Absolute Quitclaim dated
December 28, 1964 executed by Dr. Rosario. In fact, Dr.
Rosario's Deed of Absolute Quitclaim (in which he
admitted that he only borrowed Lot No. 356-A and was
transferring the same to the Torbela siblings for
P1.00.00) would actually work against the approval of
Dr. Rosario's loan by the banks. Since Dr. Rosario's
Deed of Absolute Quitclaim dated December 28, 1964
is a declaration against his self-interest, it must be taken
as favoring the truthfulness of the contents of said Deed.
HIEASa
It can also be said that Dr. Rosario is estopped from
claiming or asserting ownership over Lot No. 356-A
based on his Deed of Absolute Quitclaim dated
December 28, 1964. Dr. Rosario's admission in the said
Deed that he merely borrowed Lot No. 356-A is deemed
conclusive upon him. Under Article 1431 of the Civil
Code, "[t]hrough estoppel an admission or
representation is rendered conclusive upon the person
making it, and cannot be denied or disproved as against
the person relying thereon." That admission cannot now
be denied by Dr. Rosario as against the Torbela siblings,
the latter having relied upon his representation.
Considering the foregoing, the Court agrees with the
RTC and the Court of Appeals that Dr. Rosario only
holds Lot No. 356-A in trust for the Torbela siblings.
Trust is the right to the beneficial enjoyment of property,
the legal title to which is vested in another. It is a
fiduciary relationship that obliges the trustee to deal
with the property for the benefit of the beneficiary. Trust
relations between parties may either be express or
implied. An express trust is created by the intention of
the trustor or of the parties, while an implied trust comes
into being by operation of law.
Express trusts are created by direct and positive acts of
the parties, by some writing or deed, or will, or by words
either expressly or impliedly evincing an intention to
create a trust. Under Article 1444 of the Civil Code,
"[n]o particular words are required for the creation of an
express trust, it being sufficient that a trust is clearly
intended." It is possible to create a trust without using
the word "trust" or "trustee." Conversely, the mere fact
that these words are used does not necessarily indicate
an intention to create a trust. The question in each case
is whether the trustor manifested an intention to create
the kind of relationship which to lawyers is known as
trust. It is immaterial whether or not he knows that the
relationship which he intends to create is called a trust,
and whether or not he knows the precise characteristics
of the relationship which is called a trust.
In Tamayo v. Callejo, the Court recognized that a trust
may have a constructive or implied nature in the
beginning, but the registered owner's subsequent
express acknowledgement in a public document of a
previous sale of the property to another party, had the
effect of imparting to the aforementioned trust the
nature of an express trust. The same situation exists in
this case. When Dr. Rosario was able to register Lot No.
356-A in his name under TCT No. 52751 on December
16, 1964, an implied trust was initially established
between him and the Torbela siblings under Article
1451 of the Civil Code, which provides:
ART. 1451. When land passes by succession to any
person and he causes the legal title to be put in the name
of another, a trust is established by implication of law
for the benefit of the true owner.
Dr. Rosario's execution of the Deed of Absolute
Quitclaim on December 28, 1964, containing his
express admission that he only borrowed Lot No. 356-
A from the Torbela siblings, eventually transformed the
nature of the trust to an express one. The express trust
continued despite Dr. Rosario stating in his Deed of
Absolute Quitclaim that he was already returning Lot
No. 356-A to the Torbela siblings as Lot No. 356-A
remained registered in Dr. Rosario's name under TCT
No. 52751 and Dr. Rosario kept possession of said
property, together with the improvements thereon.
The right of the Torbela siblings to
recover Lot No. 356-A has not yet
prescribed.
The Court extensively discussed the prescriptive period
for express trusts in the Heirs of Maximo Labanon v.
Heirs of Constancio Labanon, to wit:
On the issue of prescription, we had the opportunity to
rule in Bueno v. Reyes that unrepudiated written
express trusts are imprescriptible:
"While there are some decisions which hold that an
action upon a trust is imprescriptible, without
distinguishing between express and implied trusts, the
better rule, as laid down by this Court in other decisions,
is that prescription does supervene where the trust is
merely an implied one. The reason has been expressed
by Justice J.B.L. Reyes in J.M. Tuason and Co., Inc. vs.
Magdangal, 4 SCRA 84, 88, as follows: 2005jur
Under Section 40 of the old Code of Civil Procedure, all
actions for recovery of real property prescribed in 10
years, excepting only actions based on continuing or
subsisting trusts that were considered by section 38 as
imprescriptible. As held in the case of Diaz v. Gorricho,
L-11229, March 29, 1958, however, the continuing or
subsisting trusts contemplated in section 38 of the Code
of Civil Procedure referred only to express unrepudiated
trusts, and did not include constructive trusts (that are
imposed by law) where no fiduciary relation exists and
the trustee does not recognize the trust at all."
This principle was amplified in Escay v. Court of
Appeals this way: "Express trusts prescribe 10 years
from the repudiation of the trust (Manuel Diaz, et al. vs.
Carmen Gorricho et al., 54 O.G. p. 8429, Sec. 40, Code
of Civil Procedure)."
In the more recent case of Secuya v. De Selma, we again
ruled that the prescriptive period for the enforcement of
an express trust of ten (10) years starts upon the
repudiation of the trust by the trustee.
To apply the 10-year prescriptive period, which would
bar a beneficiary's action to recover in an express trust,
the repudiation of the trust must be proven by clear and
convincing evidence and made known to the
beneficiary. The express trust disables the trustee from
acquiring for his own benefit the property committed to
his management or custody, at least while he does not
openly repudiate the trust, and makes such repudiation
known to the beneficiary or cestui que trust. For this
reason, the old Code of Civil Procedure (Act 190)
declared that the rules on adverse possession do not
apply to "continuing and subsisting" (i.e., unrepudiated)
trusts. In an express trust, the delay of the beneficiary is
directly attributable to the trustee who undertakes to
hold the property for the former, or who is linked to the
beneficiary by confidential or fiduciary relations. The
trustee's possession is, therefore, not adverse to the
beneficiary, until and unless the latter is made aware that
the trust has been repudiated.
Dr. Rosario argues that he is deemed to have repudiated
the trust on December 16, 1964, when he registered Lot
No. 356-A in his name under TCT No. 52751, so when
on February 13, 1986, the Torbela siblings instituted
before the RTC Civil Case No. U-4359, for the recovery
of ownership and possession of Lot No. 356-A from the
spouses Rosario, over 21 years had passed. Civil Case
No. U-4359 was already barred by prescription, as well
as laches.
The Court already rejected a similar argument in Ringor
v. Ringor for the following reasons:
A trustee who obtains a Torrens title over a property
held in trust for him by another cannot repudiate the
trust by relying on the registration. A Torrens
Certificate of Title in Jose's name did not vest ownership
of the land upon him. The Torrens system does not
create or vest title. It only confirms and records title
already existing and vested. It does not protect a usurper
from the true owner. The Torrens system was not
intended to foment betrayal in the performance of a
trust. It does not permit one to enrich himself at the
expense of another. Where one does not have a rightful
claim to the property, the Torrens system of registration
can confirm or record nothing. Petitioners cannot rely
on the registration of the lands in Jose's name nor in the
name of the Heirs of Jose M. Ringor, Inc., for the wrong
result they seek. For Jose could not repudiate a trust by
relying on a Torrens title he held in trust for his co-heirs.
The beneficiaries are entitled to enforce the trust,
notwithstanding the irrevocability of the Torrens title.
The intended trust must be sustained. (Emphasis
supplied.)
In the more recent case of Heirs of Tranquilino Labiste
v. Heirs of Jose Labiste, the Court refused to apply
prescription and laches and reiterated that:
[P]rescription and laches will run only from the time the
express trust is repudiated. The Court has held that for
acquisitive prescription to bar the action of the
beneficiary against the trustee in an express trust for the
recovery of the property held in trust it must be shown
that: (a) the trustee has performed unequivocal acts of
repudiation amounting to an ouster of the cestui que
trust; (b) such positive acts of repudiation have been
made known to the cestui que trust, and (c) the evidence
thereon is clear and conclusive. Respondents cannot
rely on the fact that the Torrens title was issued in
the name of Epifanio and the other heirs of Jose. It
has been held that a trustee who obtains a Torrens
title over property held in trust by him for another
cannot repudiate the trust by relying on the
registration. The rule requires a clear repudiation of the
trust duly communicated to the beneficiary. The only act
that can be construed as repudiation was when
respondents filed the petition for reconstitution in
October 1993. And since petitioners filed their
complaint in January 1995, their cause of action has not
yet prescribed, laches cannot be attributed to them.
(Emphasis supplied.) CEaDAc
It is clear that under the foregoing jurisprudence, the
registration of Lot No. 356-A by Dr. Rosario in his name
under TCT No. 52751 on December 16, 1964 is not the
repudiation that would have caused the 10-year
prescriptive period for the enforcement of an express
trust to run.
The Court of Appeals held that Dr. Rosario repudiated
the express trust when he acquired another loan from
PNB and constituted a second mortgage on Lot No. 356-
A sometime in 1979, which, unlike the first mortgage to
DBP in 1965, was without the knowledge and/or
consent of the Torbela siblings.
The Court only concurs in part with the Court of
Appeals on this matter.
For repudiation of an express trust to be effective, the
unequivocal act of repudiation had to be made known to
the Torbela siblings as the cestuis que trust and must be
proven by clear and conclusive evidence. A scrutiny of
TCT No. 52751 reveals the following inscription:
Entry No. 520099
Amendment of the mortgage in favor of PNB inscribed
under Entry No. 490658 in the sense that the
consideration thereof has been increased to
PHILIPPINE PESOS Four Hundred Fifty Thousand
Pesos only (P450,000.00) and to secure any and all
negotiations with PNB, whether contracted before,
during or after the date of this instrument,
acknowledged before Notary Public of Pangasinan
Alejo M. Dato as Doc. No. 198, Page No. 41, Book No.
11, Series of 1985.
Date of Instrument March 5, 1981
Date of Inscription March 6, 1981
Although according to Entry No. 520099, the original
loan and mortgage agreement of Lot No. 356-A between
Dr. Rosario and PNB was previously inscribed as Entry
No. 490658, Entry No. 490658 does not actually appear
on TCT No. 52751 and, thus, it cannot be used as the
reckoning date for the start of the prescriptive period.
The Torbela siblings can only be charged with
knowledge of the mortgage of Lot No. 356-A to PNB
on March 6, 1981 when the amended loan and mortgage
agreement was registered on TCT No. 52751 as Entry
No. 520099. Entry No. 520099 is constructive notice to
the whole world that Lot No. 356-A was mortgaged by
Dr. Rosario to PNB as security for a loan, the amount of
which was increased to P450,000.00. Hence, Dr.
Rosario is deemed to have effectively repudiated the
express trust between him and the Torbela siblings on
March 6, 1981, on which day, the prescriptive period for
the enforcement of the express trust by the Torbela
siblings began to run.
From March 6, 1981, when the amended loan and
mortgage agreement was registered on TCT No. 52751,
to February 13, 1986, when the Torbela siblings
instituted before the RTC Civil Case No. U-4359
against the spouses Rosario, only about five years had
passed. The Torbela siblings were able to institute Civil
Case No. U-4359 well before the lapse of the 10-year
prescriptive period for the enforcement of their express
trust with Dr. Rosario.
Civil Case No. U-4359 is likewise not barred by laches.
Laches means the failure or neglect, for an unreasonable
and unexplained length of time, to do that which by
exercising due diligence could or should have been done
earlier. It is negligence or omission to assert a right
within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that
the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or
declined to assert it. As the Court explained in the
preceding paragraphs, the Torbela siblings instituted
Civil Case No. U-4359 five years after Dr. Rosario's
repudiation of the express trust, still within the 10-year
prescriptive period for enforcement of such trusts. This
does not constitute an unreasonable delay in asserting
one's right. A delay within the prescriptive period is
sanctioned by law and is not considered to be a delay
that would bar relief. Laches apply only in the absence
of a statutory prescriptive period.
Banco Filipino is not a mortgagee
and buyer in good faith.
Having determined that the Torbela siblings are the true
owners and Dr. Rosario merely the trustee of Lot No.
356-A, the Court is next faced with the issue of whether
or not the Torbela siblings may still recover Lot No.
356-A considering that Dr. Rosario had already
mortgaged Lot No. 356-A to Banco Filipino, and upon
Dr. Rosario's default on his loan obligations, Banco
Filipino foreclosed the mortgage, acquired Lot No. 356-
A as the highest bidder at the foreclosure sale, and
consolidated title in its name under TCT No. 165813.
The resolution of this issue depends on the answer to the
question of whether or not Banco Filipino was a
mortgagee in good faith. CHTAIc
Under Article 2085 of the Civil Code, one of the
essential requisites of the contract of mortgage is that
the mortgagor should be the absolute owner of the
property to be mortgaged; otherwise, the mortgage is
considered null and void. However, an exception to this
rule is the doctrine of "mortgagee in good faith." Under
this doctrine, even if the mortgagor is not the owner of
the mortgaged property, the mortgage contract and any
foreclosure sale arising therefrom are given effect by
reason of public policy. This principle is based on the
rule that all persons dealing with property covered by a
Torrens Certificate of Title, as buyers or mortgagees, are
not required to go beyond what appears on the face of
the title. This is the same rule that underlies the principle
of "innocent purchasers for value." The prevailing
jurisprudence is that a mortgagee has a right to rely in
good faith on the certificate of title of the mortgagor to
the property given as security and in the absence of any
sign that might arouse suspicion, has no obligation to
undertake further investigation. Hence, even if the
mortgagor is not the rightful owner of, or does not have
a valid title to, the mortgaged property, the mortgagee
in good faith is, nonetheless, entitled to protection.
On one hand, the Torbela siblings aver that Banco
Filipino is not a mortgagee in good faith because as
early as May 17, 1967, they had already annotated
Cornelio's Adverse Claim dated May 16, 1967 and Dr.
Rosario's Deed of Absolute Quitclaim dated December
28, 1964 on TCT No. 52751 as Entry Nos. 274471-
274472, respectively.
On the other hand, Banco Filipino asseverates that it is
a mortgagee in good faith because per Section 70 of
Presidential Decree No. 1529, otherwise known as the
Property Registration Decree, the notice of adverse
claim, registered on May 17, 1967 by the Torbela
siblings under Entry Nos. 274471-274472 on TCT No.
52751, already lapsed after 30 days or on June 16, 1967.
Additionally, there was an express cancellation of Entry
Nos. 274471-274472 by Entry No. 520469 dated March
11, 1981. So when Banco Filipino approved Dr.
Rosario's loan for P1,200,000.00 and constituted a
mortgage on Lot No. 356-A (together with two other
properties) on December 8, 1981, the only other
encumbrance on TCT No. 52751 was Entry No. 520099
dated March 6, 1981, i.e., the amended loan and
mortgage agreement between Dr. Rosario and PNB
(which was eventually cancelled after it was paid off
with part of the proceeds from Dr. Rosario's loan from
Banco Filipino). Hence, Banco Filipino was not aware
that the Torbela siblings' adverse claim on Lot No. 356-
A still subsisted.
The Court finds that Banco Filipino is not a mortgagee
in good faith. Entry Nos. 274471-274472 were not
validly cancelled, and the improper cancellation should
have been apparent to Banco Filipino and aroused
suspicion in said bank of some defect in Dr. Rosario's
title.
The purpose of annotating the adverse claim on the title
of the disputed land is to apprise third persons that there
is a controversy over the ownership of the land and to
preserve and protect the right of the adverse claimant
during the pendency of the controversy. It is a notice to
third persons that any transaction regarding the disputed
land is subject to the outcome of the dispute.
Adverse claims were previously governed by Section
110 of Act No. 496, otherwise known as the Land
Registration Act, quoted in full below:
ADVERSE CLAIM
SEC. 110. Whoever claims any part or interest in
registered land adverse to the registered owner, arising
subsequent to the date of the original registration, may,
if no other provision is made in this Act for registering
the same, make a statement in writing setting forth fully
his alleged right or interest, and how or under whom
acquired, and a reference to the volume and page of the
certificate of title of the registered owner, and a
description of the land in which the right or interest is
claimed.
The statement shall be signed and sworn to, and shall
state the adverse claimant's residence, and designate a
place at which all notices may be served upon him. This
statement shall be entitled to registration as an adverse
claim, and the court, upon a petition of any party in
interest, shall grant a speedy hearing upon the question
of the validity of such adverse claim and shall enter such
decree therein as justice and equity may require. If the
claim is adjudged to be invalid, the registration shall be
cancelled. If in any case the court after notice and
hearing shall find that a claim thus registered was
frivolous or vexatious, it may tax the adverse claimant
double or treble costs in its discretion. AIHDcC
Construing the aforequoted provision, the Court
stressed in Ty Sin Tei v. Lee Dy Piao that "[t]he validity
or efficaciousness of the [adverse] claim . . . may only
be determined by the Court upon petition by an
interested party, in which event, the Court shall order
the immediate hearing thereof and make the proper
adjudication as justice and equity may warrant. And it is
ONLY when such claim is found unmeritorious that the
registration thereof may be cancelled." The Court
likewise pointed out in the same case that while a notice
of lis pendens may be cancelled in a number of ways,
"the same is not true in a registered adverse claim, for it
may be cancelled only in one instance, i.e., after the
claim is adjudged invalid or unmeritorious by the Court
. . . ;" and "if any of the registrations should be
considered unnecessary or superfluous, it would be the
notice of lis pendens and not the annotation of the
adverse claim which is more permanent and cannot be
cancelled without adequate hearing and proper
disposition of the claim."
With the enactment of the Property Registration Decree
on June 11, 1978, Section 70 thereof now applies to
adverse claims:
SEC. 70. Adverse claim. Whoever claims any part or
interest in registered land adverse to the registered
owner, arising subsequent to the date of the original
registrations, may, if no other provision is made in this
Decree for registering the same, make a statement in
writing setting forth fully his alleged right, or interest,
and how or under whom acquired, a reference to the
number of the certificate of title of the registered owner,
the name of the registered owner, and a description of
the land in which the right or interest is claimed.
The statement shall be signed and sworn to, and shall
state the adverse claimant's residence, and a place at
which all notices may be served upon him. This
statement shall be entitled to registration as an adverse
claim on the certificate of title. The adverse claim shall
be effective for a period of thirty days from the date
of registration. After the lapse of said period, the
annotation of adverse claim may be cancelled upon
filing of a verified petition therefor by the party in
interest: Provided, however, that after cancellation, no
second adverse claim based on the same ground shall be
registered by the same claimant.
Before the lapse of thirty days aforesaid, any party
in interest may file a petition in the Court of First
Instance where the land is situated for the
cancellation of the adverse claim, and the court shall
grant a speedy hearing upon the question of the
validity of such adverse claim, and shall render
judgment as may be just and equitable. If the adverse
claim is adjudged to be invalid, the registration thereof
shall be ordered cancelled. If, in any case, the court,
after notice and hearing, shall find that the adverse claim
thus registered was frivolous, it may fine the claimant in
an amount not less than one thousand pesos nor more
than five thousand pesos, in its discretion. Before the
lapse of thirty days, the claimant may withdraw his
adverse claim by filing with the Register of Deeds a
sworn petition to that effect. (Emphases supplied.)
In Sajonas v. Court of Appeals, the Court squarely
interpreted Section 70 of the Property Registration
Decree, particularly, the new 30-day period not
previously found in Section 110 of the Land
Registration Act, thus:
In construing the law aforesaid, care should be taken
that every part thereof be given effect and a construction
that could render a provision inoperative should be
avoided, and inconsistent provisions should be
reconciled whenever possible as parts of a harmonious
whole. For taken in solitude, a word or phrase might
easily convey a meaning quite different from the one
actually intended and evident when a word or phrase is
considered with those with which it is associated. In
ascertaining the period of effectivity of an inscription of
adverse claim, we must read the law in its entirety.
Sentence three, paragraph two of Section 70 of P.D.
1529 provides:
"The adverse claim shall be effective for a period of
thirty days from the date of registration."
At first blush, the provision in question would seem to
restrict the effectivity of the adverse claim to thirty days.
But the above provision cannot and should not be
treated separately, but should be read in relation to the
sentence following, which reads:
"After the lapse of said period, the annotation of adverse
claim may be cancelled upon filing of a verified petition
therefor by the party in interest." IDSETA
If the rationale of the law was for the adverse claim to
ipso facto lose force and effect after the lapse of thirty
days, then it would not have been necessary to include
the foregoing caveat to clarify and complete the rule.
For then, no adverse claim need be cancelled. If it has
been automatically terminated by mere lapse of time,
the law would not have required the party in interest to
do a useless act.
A statute's clauses and phrases must not be taken
separately, but in its relation to the statute's totality.
Each statute must, in fact, be construed as to harmonize
it with the pre-existing body of laws. Unless clearly
repugnant, provisions of statutes must be reconciled.
The printed pages of the published Act, its history,
origin, and its purposes may be examined by the courts
in their construction. . . . .
xxx xxx xxx
Construing the provision as a whole would reconcile the
apparent inconsistency between the portions of the law
such that the provision on cancellation of adverse claim
by verified petition would serve to qualify the provision
on the effectivity period. The law, taken together,
simply means that the cancellation of the adverse
claim is still necessary to render it ineffective,
otherwise, the inscription will remain annotated and
shall continue as a lien upon the property. For if the
adverse claim has already ceased to be effective upon
the lapse of said period, its cancellation is no longer
necessary and the process of cancellation would be a
useless ceremony.
It should be noted that the law employs the phrase "may
be cancelled," which obviously indicates, as inherent in
its decision making power, that the court may or may
not order the cancellation of an adverse claim,
notwithstanding such provision limiting the effectivity
of an adverse claim for thirty days from the date of
registration. The court cannot be bound by such period
as it would be inconsistent with the very authority
vested in it. A fortiori, the limitation on the period of
effectivity is immaterial in determining the validity or
invalidity of an adverse claim which is the principal
issue to be decided in the court hearing. It will therefore
depend upon the evidence at a proper hearing for the
court to determine whether it will order the cancellation
of the adverse claim or not.
To interpret the effectivity period of the adverse claim
as absolute and without qualification limited to thirty
days defeats the very purpose for which the statute
provides for the remedy of an inscription of adverse
claim, as the annotation of an adverse claim is a measure
designed to protect the interest of a person over a piece
of real property where the registration of such interest
or right is not otherwise provided for by the Land
Registration Act or Act 496 (now P.D. 1529 or the
Property Registration Decree), and serves as a warning
to third parties dealing with said property that someone
is claiming an interest or the same or a better right than
the registered owner thereof.
The reason why the law provides for a hearing where
the validity of the adverse claim is to be threshed out
is to afford the adverse claimant an opportunity to
be heard, providing a venue where the propriety of
his claimed interest can be established or revoked, all
for the purpose of determining at last the existence
of any encumbrance on the title arising from such
adverse claim. This is in line with the provision
immediately following:
"Provided, however, that after cancellation, no second
adverse claim shall be registered by the same claimant."
Should the adverse claimant fail to sustain his interest in
the property, the adverse claimant will be precluded
from registering a second adverse claim based on the
same ground.
It was held that "validity or efficaciousness of the claim
may only be determined by the Court upon petition by
an interested party, in which event, the Court shall order
the immediate hearing thereof and make the proper
adjudication as justice and equity may warrant. And it is
only when such claim is found unmeritorious that the
registration of the adverse claim may be cancelled,
thereby protecting the interest of the adverse claimant
and giving notice and warning to third parties."
(Emphases supplied.)
Whether under Section 110 of the Land Registration Act
or Section 70 of the Property Registration Decree,
notice of adverse claim can only be cancelled after a
party in interest files a petition for cancellation before
the RTC wherein the property is located, and the RTC
conducts a hearing and determines the said claim to be
invalid or unmeritorious.
No petition for cancellation has been filed and no
hearing has been conducted herein to determine the
validity or merit of the adverse claim of the Torbela
siblings. Entry No. 520469 cancelled the adverse claim
of the Torbela siblings, annotated as Entry Nos. 274471-
774472, upon the presentation by Dr. Rosario of a mere
Cancellation and Discharge of Mortgage. CDHcaS
Regardless of whether or not the Register of Deeds
should have inscribed Entry No. 520469 on TCT No.
52751, Banco Filipino could not invoke said inscription
in support of its claim of good faith. There were several
things amiss in Entry No. 520469 which should have
already aroused suspicions in Banco Filipino, and
compelled the bank to look beyond TCT No. 52751 and
inquire into Dr. Rosario's title. First, Entry No. 520469
does not mention any court order as basis for the
cancellation of the adverse claim. Second, the adverse
claim was not a mortgage which could be cancelled with
Dr. Rosario's Cancellation and Discharge of Mortgage.
And third, the adverse claim was against Dr. Rosario,
yet it was cancelled based on a document also executed
by Dr. Rosario.
It is a well-settled rule that a purchaser or mortgagee
cannot close his eyes to facts which should put a
reasonable man upon his guard, and then claim that he
acted in good faith under the belief that there was no
defect in the title of the vendor or mortgagor. His mere
refusal to believe that such defect exists, or his willful
closing of his eyes to the possibility of the existence of
a defect in the vendor's or mortgagor's title, will not
make him an innocent purchaser or mortgagee for value,
if it afterwards develops that the title was in fact
defective, and it appears that he had such notice of the
defects as would have led to its discovery had he acted
with the measure of precaution which may be required
of a prudent man in a like situation.
While the defective cancellation of Entry Nos. 274471-
274472 by Entry No. 520469 might not be evident to a
private individual, the same should have been apparent
to Banco Filipino. Banco Filipino is not an ordinary
mortgagee, but is a mortgagee-bank, whose business is
impressed with public interest. In fact, in one case, the
Court explicitly declared that the rule that persons
dealing with registered lands can rely solely on the
certificate of title does not apply to banks. In another
case, the Court adjudged that unlike private individuals,
a bank is expected to exercise greater care and prudence
in its dealings, including those involving registered
lands. A banking institution is expected to exercise due
diligence before entering into a mortgage contract. The
ascertainment of the status or condition of a property
offered to it as security for a loan must be a standard and
indispensable part of its operations.
Banco Filipino cannot be deemed a mortgagee in good
faith, much less a purchaser in good faith at the
foreclosure sale of Lot No. 356-A. Hence, the right of
the Torbela siblings over Lot No. 356-A is superior over
that of Banco Filipino; and as the true owners of Lot No.
356-A, the Torbela siblings are entitled to a
reconveyance of said property even from Banco
Filipino.
Nonetheless, the failure of Banco Filipino to comply
with the due diligence requirement was not the result of
a dishonest purpose, some moral obliquity, or breach of
a known duty for some interest or ill will that partakes
of fraud that would justify damages.
Given the reconveyance of Lot No. 356-A to the Torbela
siblings, there is no more need to address issues
concerning redemption, annulment of the foreclosure
sale and certificate of sale (subject matter of Civil Case
No. U-4733), or issuance of a writ of possession in favor
of Banco Filipino (subject matter of Pet. Case No. U-
822) insofar as Lot No. 356-A is concerned. Such would
only be superfluous. Banco Filipino, however, is not left
without any recourse should the foreclosure and sale of
the two other mortgaged properties be insufficient to
cover Dr. Rosario's loan, for the bank may still bring a
proper suit against Dr. Rosario to collect the unpaid
balance.
The rules on accession shall govern Commented [1]:
the improvements on Lot No. 356-A
and the rents thereof.
The accessory follows the principal. The right of
accession is recognized under Article 440 of the Civil
Code which states that "[t]he ownership of property
gives the right by accession to everything which is
produced thereby, or which is incorporated or attached
thereto, either naturally or artificially."
There is no question that Dr. Rosario is the builder of
the improvements on Lot No. 356-A. The Torbela
siblings themselves alleged that they allowed Dr.
Rosario to register Lot No. 356-A in his name so he
could obtain a loan from DBP, using said parcel of land
as security; and with the proceeds of the loan, Dr.
Rosario had a building constructed on Lot No. 356-A,
initially used as a hospital, and then later for other
commercial purposes. Dr. Rosario supervised the
construction of the building, which began in 1965; fully
liquidated the loan from DBP; and maintained and
administered the building, as well as collected the rental
income therefrom, until the Torbela siblings instituted
Civil Case No. U-4359 before the RTC on February 13,
1986. TACEDI
When it comes to the improvements on Lot No. 356-A,
both the Torbela siblings (as landowners) and Dr.
Rosario (as builder) are deemed in bad faith. The
Torbela siblings were aware of the construction of a
building by Dr. Rosario on Lot No. 356-A, while Dr.
Rosario proceeded with the said construction despite his
knowledge that Lot No. 356-A belonged to the Torbela
siblings. This is the case contemplated under Article 453
of the Civil Code, which reads:
ART. 453. If there was bad faith, not only on the part of
the person who built, planted or sowed on the land of
another, but also on the part of the owner of such land,
the rights of one and the other shall be the same as
though both had acted in good faith.
It is understood that there is bad faith on the part of the
landowner whenever the act was done with his
knowledge and without opposition on his part.
(Emphasis supplied.)
When both the landowner and the builder are in good
faith, the following rules govern:
ART. 448. The owner of the land on which anything has
been built, sown or planted in good faith, shall have the
right to appropriate as his own the works, sowing or
planting, after payment of the indemnity provided for in
articles 546 and 548, or to oblige the one who built or
planted to pay the price of the land, and the one who
sowed, the proper rent. However, the builder or planter
cannot be obliged to buy the land if its value is
considerably more than that of the building or trees. In
such case, he shall pay reasonable rent, if the owner of
the land does not choose to appropriate the building or
trees after proper indemnity. The parties shall agree
upon the terms of the lease and in case of disagreement,
the court shall fix the terms thereof.
ART. 546. Necessary expenses shall be refunded to
every possessor; but only the possessor in good faith
may retain the thing until he has been reimbursed
therefor.
Useful expenses shall be refunded only to the possessor
in good faith with the same right of retention, the person
who has defeated him in the possession having the
option of refunding the amount of the expenses or of
paying the increase in value which the thing may have
acquired by reason thereof.
ART. 548. Expenses for pure luxury or mere pleasure
shall not be refunded to the possessor in good faith; but
he may remove the ornaments with which he has
embellished the principal thing if it suffers no injury
thereby, and if his successor in the possession does not
prefer to refund the amount expended.
Whatever is built, planted, or sown on the land of
another, and the improvements or repairs made thereon,
belong to the owner of the land. Where, however, the
planter, builder, or sower has acted in good faith, a
conflict of rights arises between the owners and it
becomes necessary to protect the owner of the
improvements without causing injustice to the owner of
the land. In view of the impracticability of creating what
Manresa calls a state of "forced co-ownership," the law
has provided a just and equitable solution by giving the
owner of the land the option to acquire the
improvements after payment of the proper indemnity or
to oblige the builder or planter to pay for the land and
the sower to pay the proper rent. It is the owner of the
land who is allowed to exercise the option because his
right is older and because, by the principle of accession,
he is entitled to the ownership of the accessory thing.
The landowner has to make a choice between
appropriating the building by paying the proper
indemnity or obliging the builder to pay the price of the
land. But even as the option lies with the landowner, the
grant to him, nevertheless, is preclusive. He must
choose one. He cannot, for instance, compel the owner
of the building to remove the building from the land
without first exercising either option. It is only if the
owner chooses to sell his land, and the builder or planter
fails to purchase it where its value is not more than the
value of the improvements, that the owner may remove
the improvements from the land. The owner is entitled
to such remotion only when, after having chosen to sell
his land, the other party fails to pay for the same.
This case then must be remanded to the RTC for the
determination of matters necessary for the proper
application of Article 448, in relation to Article 546, of
the Civil Code.Such matters include the option that the
Torbela siblings will choose; the amount of indemnity
that they will pay if they decide to appropriate the
improvements on Lot No. 356-A; the value of Lot No.
356-A if they prefer to sell it to Dr. Rosario; or the
reasonable rent if they opt to sell Lot No. 356-A to Dr.
Rosario but the value of the land is considerably more
than the improvements. The determination made by the
Court of Appeals in its Decision dated June 29, 1999
that the current value of Lot No. 356-A is P1,200,000.00
is not supported by any evidence on record. HSTaEC
Should the Torbela siblings choose to appropriate the
improvements on Lot No. 356-A, the following ruling
of the Court in Pecson v. Court of Appeals is relevant in
the determination of the amount of indemnity under
Article 546 of the Civil Code:
Article 546 does not specifically state how the value of
the useful improvements should be determined. The
respondent court and the private respondents espouse
the belief that the cost of construction of the apartment
building in 1965, and not its current market value, is
sufficient reimbursement for necessary and useful
improvements made by the petitioner. This position is,
however, not in consonance with previous rulings of this
Court in similar cases. In Javier vs. Concepcion, Jr., this
Court pegged the value of the useful improvements
consisting of various fruits, bamboos, a house and
camarin made of strong material based on the market
value of the said improvements. In Sarmiento vs.
Agana, despite the finding that the useful improvement,
a residential house, was built in 1967 at a cost of
between eight thousand pesos (P8,000.00) to ten
thousand pesos (P10,000.00), the landowner was
ordered to reimburse the builder in the amount of forty
thousand pesos (P40,000.00), the value of the house at
the time of the trial. In the same way, the landowner
was required to pay the "present value" of the house, a
useful improvement, in the case of De Guzman vs. De
la Fuente, cited by the petitioner.
The objective of Article 546 of the Civil Code is to
administer justice between the parties involved. In this
regard, this Court had long ago stated in Rivera vs.
Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila that the said
provision was formulated in trying to adjust the rights
of the owner and possessor in good faith of a piece of
land, to administer complete justice to both of them in
such a way as neither one nor the other may enrich
himself of that which does not belong to him. Guided by
this precept, it is therefore the current market value of
the improvements which should be made the basis of
reimbursement. A contrary ruling would unjustly enrich
the private respondents who would otherwise be
allowed to acquire a highly valued income-yielding
four-unit apartment building for a measly amount.
Consequently, the parties should therefore be allowed to
adduce evidence on the present market value of the
apartment building upon which the trial court should
base its finding as to the amount of reimbursement to be
paid by the landowner. (Emphases supplied.)
Still following the rules of accession, civil fruits, such
as rents, belong to the owner of the building. Thus, Dr.
Rosario has a right to the rents of the improvements on
Lot No. 356-A and is under no obligation to render an
accounting of the same to anyone. In fact, it is the
Torbela siblings who are required to account for the
rents they had collected from the lessees of the
commercial building and turn over any balance to Dr.
Rosario. Dr. Rosario's right to the rents of the
improvements on Lot No. 356-A shall continue until the
Torbela siblings have chosen their option under Article
448 of the Civil Code.And in case the Torbela siblings
decide to appropriate the improvements, Dr. Rosario
shall have the right to retain said improvements, as well
as the rents thereof, until the indemnity for the same has
been paid.
Dr. Rosario is liable for damages to
the Torbela siblings.
The Court of Appeals ordered Dr. Rosario to pay the
Torbela siblings P300,000.00 as moral damages;
P200,000.00 as exemplary damages; and P100,000.00
as attorney's fees.
Indeed, Dr. Rosario's deceit and bad faith is evident
when, being fully aware that he only held Lot No. 356-
A in trust for the Torbela siblings, he mortgaged said
property to PNB and Banco Filipino absent the consent
of the Torbela siblings, and caused the irregular
cancellation of the Torbela siblings' adverse claim on
TCT No. 52751. Irrefragably, Dr. Rosario's betrayal had
caused the Torbela siblings (which included Dr.
Rosario's own mother, Eufrosina Torbela Rosario)
mental anguish, serious anxiety, and wounded feelings.
Resultantly, the award of moral damages is justified, but
the amount thereof is reduced to P200,000.00.
In addition to the moral damages, exemplary damages
may also be imposed given that Dr. Rosario's wrongful
acts were accompanied by bad faith. However, judicial
discretion granted to the courts in the assessment of
damages must always be exercised with balanced
restraint and measured objectivity. The circumstances
of the case call for a reduction of the award of exemplary
damages to P100,000.00. cDCaTH
As regards attorney's fees, they may be awarded when
the defendant's act or omission has compelled the
plaintiff to litigate with third persons or to incur
expenses to protect his interest. Because of Dr. Rosario's
acts, the Torbela siblings were constrained to institute
several cases against Dr. Rosario and his spouse,
Duque-Rosario, as well as Banco Filipino, which had
lasted for more than 25 years. Consequently, the Torbela
siblings are entitled to an award of attorney's fees and
the amount of P100,000.00 may be considered rational,
fair, and reasonable.
Banco Filipino is entitled to a writ of
possession for Lot No. 5-F-8-C-2-B-2-A.
The Court emphasizes that Pet. Case No. U-822,
instituted by Banco Filipino for the issuance of a writ of
possession before the RTC of Urdaneta, included only
Lot No. 5-F-8-C-2-B-2-A and Lot No. 356-A (Lot No.
4489, the third property mortgaged to secure Dr.
Rosario's loan from Banco Filipino, is located in
Dagupan City, Pangasinan, and the petition for issuance
of a writ of possession for the same should be separately
filed with the RTC of Dagupan City). Since the Court
has already granted herein the reconveyance of Lot No.
356-A from Banco Filipino to the Torbela siblings, the
writ of possession now pertains only to Lot No. 5-F-8-
C-2-B-2-A.
To recall, the Court of Appeals affirmed the issuance by
the RTC of a writ of possession in favor of Banco
Filipino. Dr. Rosario no longer appealed from said
judgment of the appellate court. Already legally
separated from Dr. Rosario, Duque-Rosario alone
challenges the writ of possession before this Court
through her Petition in G.R. No. 140553.
Duque-Rosario alleges in her Petition that Lot No. 5-F-
8-C-2-B-2-A had been registered in her name under
TCT No. 104189. Yet, without a copy of TCT No.
104189 on record, the Court cannot give much credence
to Duque-Rosario's claim of sole ownership of Lot No.
5-F-8-C-2-B-2-A. Also, the question of whether Lot No.
5-F-8-C-2-B-2-A was the paraphernal property of
Duque-Rosario or the conjugal property of the spouses
Rosario would not alter the outcome of Duque-Rosario's
Petition.
The following facts are undisputed: Banco Filipino
extrajudicially foreclosed the mortgage constituted on
Lot No. 5-F-8-C-2-B-2-A and the two other properties
after Dr. Rosario defaulted on the payment of his loan;
Banco Filipino was the highest bidder for all three
properties at the foreclosure sale on April 2, 1987; the
Certificate of Sale dated April 2, 1987 was registered in
April 1987; and based on the Certificate of Final Sale
dated May 24, 1988 and Affidavit of Consolidation
dated May 25, 1988, the Register of Deeds cancelled
TCT No. 104189 and issued TCT No. 165812 in the
name of Banco Filipino for Lot No. 5-F-8-C-2-B-2-A
on June 7, 1988.
The Court has consistently ruled that the one-year
redemption period should be counted not from the date
of foreclosure sale, but from the time the certificate of
sale is registered with the Registry of Deeds. No copy
of TCT No. 104189 can be found in the records of this
case, but the fact of annotation of the Certificate of Sale
thereon was admitted by the parties, only differing on
the date it was made: April 14, 1987 according to Banco
Filipino and April 15, 1987 as maintained by Duque-
Rosario. Even if the Court concedes that the Certificate
of Sale was annotated on TCT No. 104189 on the later
date, April 15, 1987, the one-year redemption period
already expired on April 14, 1988. The Certificate of
Final Sale and Affidavit of Consolidation were executed
more than a month thereafter, on May 24, 1988 and
May 25, 1988, respectively, and were clearly not
premature.
It is true that the rule on redemption is liberally
construed in favor of the original owner of the property.
The policy of the law is to aid rather than to defeat him
in the exercise of his right of redemption. However, the
liberal interpretation of the rule on redemption is
inapplicable herein as neither Duque-Rosario nor Dr.
Rosario had made any attempt to redeem Lot No. 5-F-
8-C-2-B-2-A. Duque-Rosario could only rely on the
efforts of the Torbela siblings at redemption, which
were unsuccessful. While the Torbela siblings made
several offers to redeem Lot No. 356-A, as well as the
two other properties mortgaged by Dr. Rosario, they did
not make any valid tender of the redemption price to
effect a valid redemption. The general rule in
redemption is that it is not sufficient that a person
offering to redeem manifests his desire to do so. The
statement of intention must be accompanied by an actual
and simultaneous tender of payment. The redemption
price should either be fully offered in legal tender or else
validly consigned in court. Only by such means can the
auction winner be assured that the offer to redeem is
being made in good faith. In case of disagreement over
the redemption price, the redemptioner may preserve his
right of redemption through judicial action, which in
every case, must be filed within the one-year period of
redemption. The filing of the court action to enforce
redemption, being equivalent to a formal offer to
redeem, would have the effect of preserving his
redemptive rights and "freezing" the expiration of the
one-year period. But no such action was instituted by
the Torbela siblings or either of the spouses Rosario.
TcSICH
Duque-Rosario also cannot bar the issuance of the writ
of possession over Lot No. 5-F-8-C-2-B-2-A in favor of
Banco Filipino by invoking the pendency of Civil Case
No. U-4359, the Torbela siblings' action for recovery of
ownership and possession and damages, which
supposedly tolled the period for redemption of the
foreclosed properties. Without belaboring the issue of
Civil Case No. U-4359 suspending the redemption
period, the Court simply points out to Duque-Rosario
that Civil Case No. U-4359 involved Lot No. 356-A
only, and the legal consequences of the institution,
pendency, and resolution of Civil Case No. U-4359
apply to Lot No. 356-A alone.
Equally unpersuasive is Duque-Rosario's argument that
the writ of possession over Lot No. 5-F-8-C-2-B-2-A
should not be issued given the defects in the conduct of
the foreclosure sale (i.e., lack of personal notice to
Duque-Rosario) and consolidation of title (i.e., failure to
provide Duque-Rosario with copies of the Certificate of
Final Sale).
The right of the purchaser to the possession of the
foreclosed property becomes absolute upon the
expiration of the redemption period. The basis of this
right to possession is the purchaser's ownership of the
property. After the consolidation of title in the buyer's
name for failure of the mortgagor to redeem, the writ of
possession becomes a matter of right and its issuance to
a purchaser in an extrajudicial foreclosure is merely a
ministerial function.
The judge with whom an application for a writ of
possession is filed need not look into the validity of the
mortgage or the manner of its foreclosure. Any question
regarding the validity of the mortgage or its foreclosure
cannot be a legal ground for the refusal to issue a writ of
possession. Regardless of whether or not there is a
pending suit for the annulment of the mortgage or the
foreclosure itself, the purchaser is entitled to a writ of
possession, without prejudice, of course, to the eventual
outcome of the pending annulment case. The issuance
of a writ of possession in favor of the purchaser in a
foreclosure sale is a ministerial act and does not entail
the exercise of discretion.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Petition
of the Torbela siblings in G.R. No. 140528 is
GRANTED, while the Petition of Lena Duque-Rosario
in G.R. No. 140553 is DENIED for lack of merit. The
Decision dated June 29, 1999 of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CV No. 39770, which affirmed with
modification the Amended Decision dated January 29,
1992 of the RTC in Civil Case Nos. U-4359 and U-4733
and Pet. Case No. U-822, is AFFIRMED WITH
MODIFICATIONS, to now read as follows:
(1) Banco Filipino is ORDERED to reconvey Lot No.
356-A to the Torbela siblings;
(2) The Register of Deeds of Pangasinan is ORDERED
to cancel TCT No. 165813 in the name of Banco
Filipino and to issue a new certificate of title in the name
of the Torbela siblings for Lot No. 356-A;
(3) The case is REMANDED to the RTC for further
proceedings to determine the facts essential to the
proper application of Articles 448 and 546 of the Civil
Code, particularly: (a) the present fair market value of
Lot No. 356-A; (b) the present fair market value of the
improvements thereon; (c) the option of the Torbela
siblings to appropriate the improvements on Lot No.
356-A or require Dr. Rosario to purchase Lot No. 356-
A; and (d) in the event that the Torbela siblings choose
to require Dr. Rosario to purchase Lot No. 356-A but
the value thereof is considerably more than the
improvements, then the reasonable rent of Lot No. 356-
A to be paid by Dr. Rosario to the Torbela siblings;
(4) The Torbela siblings are DIRECTED to submit an
accounting of the rents of the improvements on Lot No.
356-A which they had received and to turn over any
balance thereof to Dr. Rosario;
(5) Dr. Rosario is ORDERED to pay the Torbela
siblings P200,000.00 as moral damages, P100,000.00 as
exemplary damages, and P100,000.00 as attorney's fees;
and
(6) Banco Filipino is entitled to a writ of possession over
Lot-5-F-8-C-2-B-2-A, covered by TCT No. 165812.
The RTC Branch Clerk of Court is ORDERED to issue
a writ of possession for the said property in favor of
Banco Filipino.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 56550 | Reyes v. Concepcion
THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 56550. October 1, 1990.]
MARINA Z. REYES, AUGUSTO M. ZABALLERO
and SOCORRO Z. FRANCISCO, petitioners, vs.
THE HONORABLE ALFREDO B.
CONCEPCION, Presiding Judge, CFI of Cavite,
Tagaytay, Br. IV, SOCORRO MARQUEZ VDA. DE
ZABALLERO, EUGENIA Z. LUNA, LEONARDO
M. ZABALLERO, and ELENA FRONDA
ZABALLERO, respondents.
Law Firm of Raymundo A. Armovit for petitioners.
Leonardo M. Zaballero for private respondents.
DECISION
CORTES, J p:
On March 13, 1980, petitioners filed with the CFI a
complaint for injunction and damages, docketed as Civil
Case No. TG-572, seeking to enjoin private respondents
Socorro Marquez Vda. De Zaballero, Eugenia Z. Luna
and Leonardo M. Zaballero from selling to a third party
their pro-indiviso shares as co-owners in eight parcels
of registered land (covered by TCT Nos. A-1316 to A-
1322) located in the province of Cavite, with an
aggregate area of about 96 hectares. Petitioner claimed
that under Article 1620 of the new Civil Code, they, as
co-owners, had a preferential right to purchase these
shares from private respondents for a reasonable price.
cdll
On March 17, 1980, respondent trial judge denied the ex
parte application for a writ of preliminary injunction, on
the ground that petitioners' registered notice of lis
pendens was ample protection of their rights.
On April 24, 1980, private respondents received the
summons and copies of the complaint. Private
respondents then filed their answer with counterclaim,
praying for the partition of the subject properties.
Private respondent Elena Fronda Zaballero filed a
motion for intervention dated April 29, 1980, adopting
therein her co-respondents answer with counterclaim.
At the pre-trial hearing, the parties agreed on the
following stipulation of facts:
xxx xxx xxx
1.That the plaintiffs, the defendants and the intervenor
are the pro-indiviso co-owners of the properties cited
and described in the complaint;
2.That six and nine tenth (6-9/10) hectares of the land
covered by TCT No. T-1319; approximately twelve (12)
hectares of that covered by TCT No. T-1320; and the
entire parcel of covered by TCT No. T-1321, are subject
of expropriation proceedings instituted by the National
Housing Authority (NHA) now pending before this
Court in Civil Case Nos. TG-392, TG-396 and TG-417;
3.That based on the evidence presented by the herein
parties in the aforecited expropriation cases, the current
valuation of the land and the improvements thereon is at
P95,132.00 per hectare;
4.That on 16 April 1980, the plaintiffs received a written
notice from the defendants and the intervenor that the
VOLCANO SECURITIES TRADERS AND AGRI-
BUSINESS CORPORATION had offered to buy the
latter's share in the properties listed in the complaint
subject to the following terms:
"1.The selling price shall be net at TWELVE & 50/100
(P12.50) PESOS per square meter, or a total price of
NINE MILLION (P9,000,000.00) PESOS for a total
area of SEVENTY TWO (72) HECTARES ONLY;
"2.A downpayment equivalent to THIRTY (30%)
PERCENT of the selling price, or a minimum
downpayment of TWO MILLION SEVEN HUNDRED
THOUSAND (P2,700,000.00) PESOS;
"3.The balance of the purchase price to be payable
within THREE (3) YEARS from the date of
downpayment in THREE (3) EQUAL ANNUAL
PAYMENTS with interest at the legal rate prevailing at
the time of payment;
"4.The balance shall be covered by a BANK
GUARANTEE of payments and shall not be governed
by Art. 1250 of the Civil Code."
(Cf Annexes 1, 2 and 3, Answer)
5.That in said letters (Annexes 1, 2 and 3, Answer), the
plaintiffs were requested:
a)To exercise their pre-emptive right to purchase
defendants' and intervenor's shares under the above-
quoted terms; or
b)To agree to a physical partition of the properties; or
c)To sell their shares, jointly with the defendants and the
intervenor, to the VOLCANO SECURITIES
TRADERS AND AGRI-BUSINESS CORPORATION
at the price and under the terms aforequoted.
6.That the VOLCANO SECURITIES TRADERS AND
AGRI-BUSINESS CORPORATION is ready, willing
and able to purchase not only the aliquot shares of the
defendants and the intervenor, but also that of the
plaintiffs, in and to all the properties subject of this case,
for and in consideration of the net amount of TWELVE
and 50/100 (P12.50) PESOS per square meter and under
the afore-quoted terms;
xxx xxx xxx
[Annex "C" of the Petition, pp. 1-2, Rollo, pp. 43-44.]
The parties laid down their respective positions, as
follows:
PLAINTIFFS
1.That the subject properties are incapable of physical
partition;
2.That the price of P12.50 per square meter is grossly
excessive;
3.That they are willing to exercise their pre-emptive
right for an amount of not more that P95,132.00 per
hectare, which is the fair and reasonable value of said
properties;
4.That the statutory period for exercising their pre-
emptive right was suspended upon the filing of the
complaint;.
DEFENDANTS AND INTERVENOR
1.That the reasonable price of the subject properties is
P12.50 per square meter;
2.That plaintiffs' right of legal pre-emption had lapsed
upon their failure to exercise the same within the period
prescribed in Art. 1623 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines;
3.That, assuming the soundness of plaintiffs' claim that
the price of P12.50 per square meter is grossly
excessive, it would be to the best interest of the plaintiffs
to sell their shares to the VOLCANO SECURITIES
TRADERS AND AGRI-BUSINESS CORPORATION,
whose sincerity, capacity and good faith is beyond
question, as the same was admitted by the parties herein;
4.That the subject properties consisting approximately
95 hectares may be physically partitioned without
difficulty in the manner suggested by them to plaintiffs,
and as graphically represented in the subdivision plan,
which will be furnished in due course to plaintiffs'
counsel.
[Annex "C" of the Petition, pp. 2-3; Rollo, pp. 44-45.]
Based on the foregoing, respondent trial judge rendered
a pre-trial order dated July 9, 1980 granting petitioners
a period of ten days from receipt of the subdivision plan
to be prepared by a competent geodetic engineer within
which to express their approval or disapproval of the
said plan, or to submit within the same period, if they so
desire, an alternative subdivision plan.
On July 16, 1980, counsel for private respondents sent
to the counsel for petitioners a letter enclosed with a
subdivision plan.
On August 4, 1980, petitioners filed their comment to
the pre-trial order, contending that the question of
reasonable value of the subject properties remains a
contentious issue of fact ascertainable only after a full
trial. Petitioners likewise insisted on their pre-emptive
right to purchase private respondents' shares in the co-
ownership after due determination of the reasonable
price thereof.
Thereafter, counsel for private respondents sent the
counsel for petitioners another subdivision plan
prepared by a geodetic engineer. Still, no definite
communication was sent by petitioners signifying their
approval or disapproval to the subdivision plans.
In order to settle once and for all the controversy
between the parties, private respondents filed a motion
dated December 16, 1980 requesting that petitioners be
required to formally specify which of the two options
under Article 498 of the New Civil Code they wished to
avail of: that petitioners' shares in the subject properties
be sold to private respondents, at the rate of P12.50 per
square meter; or that the subject properties be sold to a
third party, VOLCANO LAKEVIEW RESORTS, INC.
(claimed to have been erroneously referred to in the pre-
trial as VOLCANO SECURITIES TRADERS AND
AGRI-BUSINESS CORPORATION) and its proceeds
thereof distributed among the parties.
Finding merit in the private respondents' request, and for
the purpose of determining the applicability of Article
498 of the New Civil Code, respondent trial judge issued
an order dated February 4, 1981 which directed the
parties to signify whether or not they agree to the
scheme of allotting the subject properties to one of the
co-owners, at the rate of P12.50 per square meter, or
whether or not they know of a third party who is able
and willing to buy the subject properties at terms and
conditions more favorable than that offered by
VOLCANO LAKEVIEW RESORTS, INC. The order
contained a series of questions addressed to all the
parties, who were thereupon required to submit their
answers thereto.
Private respondents filed a "Constancia" expressing that
they were willing to allot their shares in the subject
properties to Socorro Marquez Vda. de Zaballero, at the
rate of P12.50 per square meter, and that they did not
know of any other party who was willing and able to
purchase the subject properties under more favorable
conditions than that offered by VOLCANO
LAKEVIEW RESORTS, INC.
However, instead of submitting their answers to the
queries posed by respondent trial judge, petitioners filed
a motion for clarification as to the true identity of the
third party allegedly willing to purchase the subject
properties.
On February 26, 1981, respondent trial judge rejected
petitioners' motion on the ground that it was irrelevant.
Thereupon, on February 27, 1981, petitioners filed a
pleading captioned "Compliance and Motion", (1)
reiterating the relevance of ascertaining the true identity
of the third party buyer, VOLCANO SECURITIES
TRADERS AND AGRI-BUSINESS CORPORATION
or VOLCANO LAKEVIEW RESORTS, INC., (2)
expressing their view that there is actually no bona fide
and financially able third party willing to purchase the
subject properties at the rate of P12.50 per square meter,
and, (3) once again insisting on their pre-emptive right
to purchase the shares of private respondents in the co-
ownership at a "reasonable price", which is less than that
computed excessively by the latter at the rate of P12.50
per square meter. Petitioners therein prayed that further
proceedings be conducted in order to settle the factual
issue regarding the reasonable value of the subject
properties. cdll
On March 16, 1981, respondent trial judge issued an
order denying petitioners' motion. The judge ruled that
petitioners did not possess a pre-emptive right to
purchase private respondents' shares in the co-
ownership. Thus, finding that the subject properties
were essentially indivisible, respondent trial judge
ordered the holding of a public sale of the subject
properties pursuant to Article 498 of the New Civil
Code. A notice of sale was issued setting the date of
public bidding for the subject properties on April 13,
1981.
Petitioners then filed a motion for reconsideration from
the above order. Respondent trial judge reset the hearing
on petitioners' motion for reconsideration to April 6,
1981, and moved the scheduled public sale to April 14,
1981.
Without awaiting resolution of their motion for
reconsideration, petitioners filed the present petition for
certiorari, alleging that the respondent trial judge acted
without jurisdiction, or in grave abuse of its discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction, in issuing his order
dated March 16, 1981 which denied petitioners' claim of
a pre-emptive right to purchase private respondents'
pro-indiviso shares and which, peremptorily, ordered
the public sale of the subject properties. On April 8,
1981, this Court issued a temporary restraining order
enjoining the sale of the subject properties at public
auction.
With the comment and reply, the Court considered the
issues joined and the case submitted for decision.
The Court finds no merit in the present petition.
The attack on the validity of respondent trial judge's
order dated March 16, 1981 is ultimately premised on
petitioners' claim that they had a pre-emptive right to
purchase the pro-indiviso shares of their co-owners,
private respondents herein, at a "reasonable price". It is
this same claim which forms the basis of their complaint
for injunction and damages filed against private
respondents in the court a quo.
This claim is patently without basis. In this jurisdiction,
the legal provisions on co-ownership do not grant to any
of the owners of a property held in common a pre-
emptive right to purchase the pro-indiviso shares of his
co-owners. Petitioners' reliance on Article 1620 of the
New Civil Code is misplaced. Article 1620 provides:
A co-owner of a thing may exercise the right of
redemption in case the shares of all the co-owners or of
any of them, are sold to a third person. If the price of the
alienation is grossly excessive, the redemptioner shall
pay only a reasonable one.
Should two or more co-owners desire to exercise the
right of redemption, they may only do so in proportion
to the share they may respectively have in the thing
owned in common [Emphasis supplied].
Article 1620 contemplates of a situation where a co-
owner has alienated his pro-indiviso shares to a stranger.
By the very nature of the right of "legal redemption", a
co-owner's right to redeem is invoked only after the
shares of the other co-owners are sold to a third party or
stranger to the co-ownership [See Estrada v. Reyes, 33
Phil. 31 (1915)]. But in the case at bar, at the time
petitioners filed their complaint for injunction and
damages against private respondents, no sale of the
latter's pro-indiviso shares to a third party had yet been
made. Thus, Article 1620 of the New Civil Code finds
no application to the case at bar.
There is likewise no merit to petitioners' contention that
private respondents had acknowledged the pre-emptive
right of petitioners to purchase their shares at a
"reasonable price". Although it appears that private
respondents had agreed to sell their pro-indiviso shares
to petitioners, the offer was made at a fixed rate of
P12.50 per square meter [See Pre-trial Order dated July
9, 1980, Annex "C" of the Petition; Rollo, pp. 43-45]. It
cannot be said that private respondents had agreed,
without qualification, to sell their shares to petitioners.
Hence, petitioners cannot insist on a right to purchase
the shares at a price lower than the selling price of
private respondents.
Neither do petitioners have the legal right to enjoin
private respondents from alienating theirpro-indiviso
shares to a third party. The rights of a co-owner of a
property are clearly specified in Article 493 of the New
Civil Code, thus:
Article 493.Each co-owner shall have the full ownership
of his part and of the fruits and benefits pertaining
thereto, and he may therefore alienate, assign or
mortgage it, and even substitute another person in its
enjoyment, except when personal rights are involved.
But the effect of the alienation of the mortgage, with
respect to the co-owners shall be limited to the portion
which may be allotted to him in the division upon the
termination of the co-ownership.
The law does not prohibit a co-owner from selling,
alienating or mortgaging his ideal share in the property
held in common. The law merely provides that the
alienation or mortgage shall be limited only to the
portion of the property which may be allotted to him
upon termination of the co-ownership [See Mercado v.
Liwanag, G.R. No. L-14429, June 30, 1962, 5 SCRA
472; PNB v. The Honorable Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
L-34404, June 25, 1980, 98 SCRA 207; Go Ong v. The
Honorable Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 75884,
September 24, 1987, 154 SCRA 270,] and, as earlier
discussed, that the remaining co-owners have the right
to redeem, within a specified period, the shares which
may have been sold to the third party. [Articles 1620 and
1623 of the New Civil Code.]
Considering the foregoing, the Court holds that
respondent trial judge committed no grave abuse of
discretion when he denied petitioners' claim of a pre-
emptive right to purchase private respondents' pro-
indiviso shares.
Moreover, there is no legal infirmity tainting respondent
trial judge's order for the holding of a public sale of the
subject properties pursuant to the provisions of Article
498 of the New Civil Code. After a careful examination
of the proceedings before respondent trial judge, the
Court finds that respondent trial judge's order was
issued in accordance with the laws pertaining to the
legal or juridical dissolution of co-ownerships.
It must be noted that private respondents, in their answer
with counterclaim prayed for, inter alia, the partition of
the subject properties in the event that the petitioners
refused to purchase theirpro-indiviso shares at the rate
of P12.50 per square meter. Unlike petitioners' claim of
a pre-emptive right to purchase the other co-owners'
pro-indiviso shares, private respondents' counterclaim
for the partition of the subject properties is recognized
by law, specifically Article 494 of the New Civil Code
which lays down the general rule that no co-owner is
obliged to remain in the co-ownership. Article 494 reads
as follows:
No co-owner shall be obliged to remain in the co-
ownership. Each co-owner may demand at any time
partition of the thing owned in common, insofar as his
share is concerned.
Nevertheless, an agreement to keep the thing undivided
for a certain period of time, not exceeding ten years,
shall be valid. This term may be extended by a new
agreement.
A donor or testator may prohibit partition for a period
which shall not exceed twenty years.
Neither shall there be partition when it is prohibited by
law.
No prescription shall run in favor of a co-owner or co-
heir against his co-owners or co-heirs so long as he
expressly or impliedly recognizes the co-ownership.
None of the legal exceptions under Article 494 applies
to the case at bar. Private respondents' counterclaim for
the partition of the subject properties was therefore
entirely proper. However, during the pre-trial
proceedings, petitioners adopted the position that the
subject properties were incapable of physical partition.
Initially, private respondents disputed this position. But
after petitioners inexplicably refused to abide by the pre-
trial order issued by respondent trial judge, and
stubbornly insisted on exercising an alleged pre-emptive
right to purchase private respondents' shares at a
"reasonable price", private respondents relented and
adopted petitioner's position that the partition of the
subject properties was not economically feasible, and,
consequently, invoked the provisions of Article 498 of
the New Civil Code [Private respondents' "Motion To
Allot Properties To Defendants Or To Sell the Same
Pursuant To Article 498 Of The Civil Code", Annex "D"
of the Petition, Rollo, pp. 46-49].
Inasmuch as the parties were in agreement as regards the
fact that the subject properties should not be partitioned,
and private respondents continued to manifest their
desire to terminate the co-ownership arrangement
between petitioners and themselves, respondent trial
judge acted within his jurisdiction when he issued his
order dated February 4, 1981 requiring the parties to
answer certain questions for the purpose of determining
whether or not the legal conditions for the applicability
of Article 498 of the New Civil Code were present in the
case.
Article 498 provides that:
Whenever the thing is essentially indivisible and the co-
owners cannot agree that it be alloted to one of them
who shall indemnify the others, it shall be sold and its
proceeds distributed.
The sale of the property held in common referred to in
the above article is resorted to when (1) the right to
partition the property among the co-owners is invoked
by any of them but because of the nature of the property,
it cannot be subdivided or its subdivision [See Article
495 of the New Civil Code] would prejudice the
interests of the co-owners [See Section 5 of Rule 69 of
the Revised Rules of Court] and (2) the co-owners are
not in agreement as to who among them shall be allotted
or assigned the entire property upon reimbursement of
the shares of the other co-owners.
Petitioners herein did not have justifiable grounds to
ignore the queries posed by respondent trial judge and
to insist that hearings be conducted in order to ascertain
the reasonable price at which they could purchase
private respondents' pro-indiviso shares [Petitioners'
"Compliance and Motion" dated February 27, 1981,
Annex "H" of the Petition; Rollo, pp. 57-60].
Since at this point in the case it became reasonably
evident to respondent trial judge that the parties could
not agree on who among them would be allotted the
subject properties, the Court finds that respondent trial
judge committed no grave abuse of discretion in
ordering the holding of a public sale for the subject
properties (with the opening bid pegged at P12.50 per
square meter), and the distribution of the proceeds
thereof amongst the co-owners, as provided under
Article 498 of the New Civil Code.
Contrary to petitioners' contention, there was no need
for further hearings in the case because it is apparent
from the various allegations and admissions of the
parties made during the pre-trial proceedings, and in
their respective pleadings, that the legal requisites for
the application of Article 498 of the New Civil Code
were present in the case. No factual issues remained to
be litigated upon. LLpr
WHEREFORE, the present petition is DISMISSED for
lack of merit. The temporary restraining order issued by
the Court is hereby LIFTED.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan, C.J., Gutierrez, Jr., Feliciano and Bidin, JJ.,
concur.
G.R. No. 179205 | Heirs of Dela Rosa v. Batongbacal
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 179205. July 30, 2014.]
HEIRS OF REYNALDO DELA ROSA, Namely:
TEOFISTA DELA ROSA, JOSEPHINE
SANTIAGO AND JOSEPH DELA ROSA,
petitioners, vs. MARIO A. BATONGBACAL,
IRENEO BATONGBACAL, JOCELYN
BATONGBACAL, NESTOR BATONGBACAL
AND LOURDES BATONGBACAL, respondents.
DECISION
PEREZ, J p:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari pursuant to
Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court, assailing the 7
December 2006 Decision and 8 August 2007 Resolution
of the Fourth Division of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CV No. 64172. In its assailed Resolution, the
appellate court modified its earlier ruling and proceeded
to direct petitioners to execute the requisite Deed of Sale
over the subject property.
The Facts
The subject property consists of a 3,750 square meter-
portion of the 15,001 square meters parcel of land
situated in Barrio Saog, Marilao, Bulacan denominated
as Lot No. 1, and registered under Transfer Certificate
of Title (TCT) No. T-107449 under the names of
Reynaldo Dela Rosa (Reynaldo), Eduardo Dela Rosa
(Eduardo), Araceli Dela Rosa (Araceli) and Zenaida
Dela Rosa (Zenaida).
Sometime in 1984, Reynaldo offered to sell the subject
property to Guillermo Batongbacal (Guillermo) and
Mario Batongbacal (Mario) for P50.00 per square meter
or for a total of P187,500.00. Pursuant to the agreement,
Reynaldo received an advance payment of P31,500.00
leaving a balance of P156,000.00. As shown in the
document denominated as Resibo and signed by
Reynaldo on 18 February 1987, the parties agreed that
the amount of P20,000.00 as part of the advance
payment shall be paid upon the delivery of the Special
Power-of-Attorney (SPA), which would authorize
Reynaldo to alienate the subject property on behalf of
his co-owners and siblings namely, Eduardo, Araceli
and Zenaida. The balance thereon shall be paid in
P10,000.00 monthly installments until the purchase
price is fully settled, to wit:
RESIBO
Tinaggap ko ngayong araw na ito kay Engr. Guillermo
A. Batongbacal, ng Poblacion II, Marilao, Bulacan, ang
halagang sampung libong piso (P10,000.00) salaping
Pilipino, bilang bahaging bayad sa bahagi ng lupang
may sukat na 3,750 sq.m. na aking kabahagi sa isang
(1) lagay na lupang nasasaog, Marilao, Bulakan,
sinasaklaw ng T.C.T. No. T-107449, ng Bulakan, na
ipinagkasundo kong ipagbili sa naulit na Engr.
Guillermo A. Batongbacal sa halagang Limampung
Piso (P50.00) salaping Pilipino, bawat isang (1)
metrong parisukat. Ang paunang bayad na aking
tinaggap ukol sa lupang nabanggit sa itaas ay
P21,500.00, nuong Abril 14-18, 1984. Ang halagang
dapat pa niyang bayaran sa akin ay P156,000.00, na
ang halagang dalawampung libong piso (P20,000.00)
ay babayaran niya sa akin sa araw na nag power-of-
attorney nina Zenaida dela Rosa, at Enrique Magsaloc
ay aking nabigay sa nasabing Engr. Guillermo A.
Batongbacal; na ang nalalabing bahaging bayad ay
kanyang babayaran sa akin ng Sampung libong piso
(P10,000.00) salaping Pilipino, bawat buwan hanggang
sa matapusan ang pagbabayad ng kabuuang halaga na
Isang Daang at Walumpu't Pitong libo Limang Daang
Piso (P187,500.00). Ang bahaging aking ipinagbibili ay
ang Lote No. 1, may sukat na 3,750 sq.m. na makikita
sa nakalakip na sketch plan na aking ding nilagdaan sa
ikaliliwanag ng kasulutang DIETcH
Subsequent to the execution of the said agreement,
Mario and Guillermo, on their own instance, initiated a
survey to segregate the area of 3,750 square meters from
the whole area covered by TCT No. T-107449,
delineating the boundaries of the subdivided parts. As a
result, they came up with a subdivision plan specifically
designating the subject property signed by a Geodetic
Engineer. Mario and Guillermo thereafter made several
demands from Reynaldo to deliver the SPA as agreed
upon, but such demands all went unheeded.
Consequently, Guillermo and Mario initiated an action
for Specific Performance or Rescission and Damages
before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malolos,
Bulacan, seeking to enforce their Contract to Sell dated
18 February 1987. In their Complaint docketed as Civil
Case No. 215-M-90, Mario and Guillermo asserted that
they have a better right over the subject property and
alleged that the subsequent sale thereof effected by
Reynaldo to third persons is void as it was done in bad
faith. It was prayed in the Complaint that Reynaldo be
directed to deliver the SPA and, in case of its
impossibility, to return the amount of P31,500.00 with
legal interest and with damages in either case.
To protect their rights on the subject property, Mario
and Guillermo, after initiating Civil Case No. 215-M-
90, filed a Notice of Lis Pendens registering their claim
on the certificate of title covering the entire property.
In refuting the allegations of Mario and Guillermo in
their Complaint, Reynaldo in his Answer countered that
the purported Contract to Sell is void, because he never
gave his consent thereto. Reynaldo insisted that he was
made to understand that the contract between him and
the Batongbacals was merely an equitable mortgage
whereby it was agreed that the latter will loan to him the
amount of P31,500.00 payable once he receives his
share in the proceeds of the sale of the land registered
under TCT No. T-107449.
Following the pre-trial conference without the parties
reaching an amicable settlement, trial on the merits
ensued. Both parties proceeded to present, in open court,
documentary and testimonial evidence to substantiate
their claims.
For failure of Mario and Guillermo as plaintiffs therein
to adduce sufficient evidence to support their complaint,
the RTC, in a Decision dated 24 March 1999, dismissed
Civil Case No. 215-M-90 and ordered Reynaldo to
return to the former the sum of P28,000.00 with 12%
annual interest. Reynaldo failed to convince the court a
quo that the contract he entered into with Mario was an
equitable mortgage. It was held by the trial court,
however, that the supposed Contract to Sell
denominated as Resibo is unenforceable under Article
1403 of the New Civil Code because Reynaldo cannot
bind his co-owners into such contract without an SPA
authorizing him to do so. As such, Reynaldo cannot be
compelled to deliver the subject property but he was
nonetheless ordered by the court to return the amount he
received as part of the contract price since no one should
be allowed to unjustly enrich himself at the expense of
another. The RTC disposed in this wise:
WHEREFORE, premises considered[,] the instant
complaint is hereby DISMISSED.
However, [Reynaldo is] hereby ordered to return to
[Mario and Guillermo] the sum of P28,000.00 plus 12%
interest per annum from the date of this decision until
fully paid.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals, in its Decision dated 7
December 2006, brushed aside the claim of equitable
mortgage and held that the sale effected by Reynaldo of
his undivided share in the property is valid and
enforceable. According to the appellate court, no SPA is
necessary for Reynaldo's disposition of his undivided
share as it is limited to the portion that may be allotted
to him upon the termination of the co-ownership. The
Batongbacals could have validly demanded from
Reynaldo to deliver the subject property pursuant to the
Contract to Sell but such option is no longer feasible
because the entire property has already been sold to
third persons to whom a new title was issued. The
appellate court thus proceeded to rescind the contract
and ordered Reynaldo to return the amount he received
as consideration thereby restoring the parties to their
situation before entering into the agreement. The
decretal portion of the decision reads: cAHDES
WHEREFORE, the decision dated March 24, 1999 is
AFFIRMED with modification that appellee is ordered
to return to appellants the amount of P31,500.00 plus
12% interest per annum from the date of decision of the
trial court until full payment thereof.
In addition, the appellee is ordered:
1. To pay appellants P50,000.00 as compensatory
damages; P50,000.00 as moral damages; and
P30,000.00 as exemplary damages.
2. To pay attorney's fees and litigation expenses of
P50,000.00; and
3. Double costs.
In seeking modification of the appellate court's decision,
Mario and Guillermo pointed out that the title of the
subject property has not yet been transferred to third
persons, and thus, Reynaldo can still be compelled to
execute a deed of conveyance over his undivided share
of the entire property.
In a Resolution dated 8 August 2007, the Court of
Appeals granted the Motion for Reconsideration of
Mario and Guillermo and directed Reynaldo to convey
the subject property to them, viz.:
WHEREFORE, [Reynaldo's] Motion for
Reconsideration is DENIED for lack of merit.
Upon the other hand, [Mario and Guillermo] Motion for
Reconsideration is GRANTED. Accordingly, the
decision dated December 7, 2006 is PARTIALLY
RECONSIDERED ordering defendant-appellee
Reynaldo dela Rosa or his successor-in-interest to
execute the requisite Deed of Sale over his 1/4
undivided share in the subject property covered by TCT
T-107449 and to accept the consideration of
P156,000.00 within thirty (30) days from the finality of
the decision.
In case of failure of [Reynaldo] to execute the deed of
sale, the Branch Clerk of Court of RTC Br. 16 of
Malolos, Bulacan is directed to execute the same and
receive the P156,000.00 balance on the purchase price
on behalf of Reynaldo dela Rosa.
On 9 September 2007, the appellate court was notified
of the death of Reynaldo, and his heirs sought to be
substituted as party in this case.
Petitioners Heirs of Reynaldo are now before this Court
via this instant Petition for Review on Certiorari
praying that the Court of Appeals Decision and
Resolution be reversed on the ground that it was
rendered not in accordance with the applicable law and
jurisprudence.
Issues
I.
WHETHER OR NOT THERE IS A CONTRACT OF
SALE BETWEEN REYNALDO DELA ROSA AND
GUILLERMO BATONGBACAL;
II.
ASSUMING THAT THERE IS A CONTRACT OF
SALE, WHETHER OR NOT GUILLERMO
BATONGBACAL COMPLIED WITH HIS
OBLIGATION [UNDER THE CONTRACT];
III.
WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENTS ARE GUILTY
OF LACHES;
IV.
WHETHER OR NOT MARIO BATONGBACAL IS A
PARTY TO THE TRANSACTION BETWEEN
REYNALDO DELA ROSA AND GUILLERMO
BATONGBACAL; SHDAEC
V.
WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT[S] ARE
ENTITLED TO AN AWARD OF DAMAGES;
VI.
ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT RESPONDENTS
ARE ENTITLED TO AWARD OF DAMAGES,
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS'
AWARD OF DAMAGES WAS EXCESSIVE.
The various contentions revolve on the sole issue of
whether the contract entered into by parties was a
Contract to Sell or an equitable mortgage. The Court
will not delve into questions which are factual in nature,
consistent with the rule that this Court is not a trier of
facts.
The Court's Ruling
In assailing the Court of Appeals' Decision and
Resolution, petitioners are unflinching in their stand that
the disputed contract purporting to be an absolute deed
of sale was an equitable mortgage with the subject
property as security for a loan obligation. To prove their
point, petitioners asserted that the consideration in the
amount of P187,500.00 for a property consisting of
15,001 square meters is grossly inadequate because the
land valuation in Barrio Saog, Marilao, Bulacan, at the
time the transaction was entered into by the parties in
1984, was already P80.00 to P100.00 per square meter.
The gross inadequacy of the price, the Heirs of
Reynaldo argued, is telling of the intention of the parties
to mortgage and not to sell the property with the end
view of affording the mortgagor an easy opportunity to
redeem the property should his means permit him to do
so.
An equitable mortgage is defined as one although
lacking in some formality, or form or words, or other
requisites demanded by a statute, nevertheless reveals
the intention of the parties to charge real property as
security for a debt, and contains nothing impossible or
contrary to law. For the presumption of an equitable
mortgage to arise, two requisites must concur: (1) that
the parties entered into a contract denominated as a sale;
and (2) the intention was to secure an existing debt by
way of mortgage. Consequently, the non-payment of the
debt when due gives the mortgagee the right to foreclose
the mortgage, sell the property and apply the proceeds
of the sale for the satisfaction of the loan obligation.
While there is no single test to determine whether the
deed of absolute sale on its face is really a simple loan
accommodation secured by a mortgage, the Civil
Code,however, enumerates several instances when a
contract is presumed to be an equitable mortgage, to wit:
Article 1602. The contract shall be presumed to be an
equitable mortgage, in any of the following cases:
(1) When the price of a sale with right to repurchase is
unusually inadequate;
(2) When the vendor remains in possession as lessee or
otherwise;
(3) When upon or after the expiration of the right to
repurchase another instrument extending the period of
redemption or granting a new period is executed;
(4) When the purchaser retains for himself a part of the
purchase price;
(5) When the vendor binds himself to pay the taxes on
the thing sold;
(6) In any other case where it may be fairly inferred that
the real intention of the parties is that the transaction
shall secure the payment of a debt or the performance of
any other obligation.
In any of the foregoing cases, any money, fruits, or other
benefit to be received by the vendee as rent or otherwise
shall be considered as interest which shall be subject to
the usury laws.
A perusal of the contract denominated as Resibo reveals
the utter frailty of petitioners' position because nothing
therein suggests, even remotely, that the subject
property was given to secure a monetary obligation. The
terms of the contract set forth in no uncertain terms that
the instrument was executed with the intention of
transferring the ownership of the subject property to the
buyer in exchange for the price. Nowhere in the deed is
it indicated that the transfer was merely intended to
secure a debt obligation. On the contrary, the document
clearly indicates the intent of Reynaldo to sell his share
in the property. The primary consideration in
determining the true nature of a contract is the intention
of the parties. If the words of a contract appear to
contravene the evident intention of the parties, the latter
shall prevail. Such intention is determined not only from
the express terms of their agreement, but also from the
contemporaneous and subsequent acts of the parties.
That the parties intended some other acts or contracts
apart from the express terms of the agreement, was not
proven by Reynaldo during the trial or by his heirs
herein. Beyond their bare and uncorroborated
asseverations that the contract failed to express the true
intention of the parties, the record is bereft of any
evidence indicative that there was an equitable
mortgage. STHDAc
Neither could the allegation of gross inadequacy of the
price carry the day for the petitioners. It must be
underscored at this point that the subject of the Contract
to Sell was limited only to 1/4 pro-indiviso share of
Reynaldo consisting an area of 3,750 square meter and
not the entire 15,001-square meter parcel of land. As a
co-owner of the subject property, Reynaldo's right to
sell, assign or mortgage his ideal share in the property
held in common is sanctioned by law. The applicable
law is Article 493 of the New Civil Code, which spells
out the rights of co-owners over a co-owned property,
to wit:
Art. 493. Each co-owner shall have the full ownership
of his part and of the fruits and benefits pertaining
thereto, and he may therefore alienate, assign or
mortgage it, and even substitute another person in its
enjoyment, except when personal rights are involved.
But the effect of the alienation or the mortgage, with
respect to the co-owners, shall be limited to the portion
which may be allotted to him in the division upon the
termination of the co-ownership.
Pursuant to this law, a co-owner has the right to alienate
his pro-indiviso share in the co-owned property even
without the consent of his co-owners. This right is
absolute and in accordance with the well-settled
doctrine that a co-owner has a full ownership of his pro-
indiviso share and has the right to alienate, assign or
mortgage it, and substitute another person for its
enjoyment. In other words, the law does not prohibit a
co-owner from selling, alienating, mortgaging his ideal
share in the property held in common.
In Vaglidad v. Vaglidad, Jr., a case nearly on all fours
to the present petition, the Court upheld the right of the
co-owner to alienate his pro-indiviso share in the co-
owned property as part of his right of dominion. It was
even pointed out that since the previous sale is valid, the
subsequent conveyance effected by the co-owner is null
and void pursuant to the principle that "no one can give
what he does not have", nemo dat quod non habet, thus:
LORETO sold the subject property to GABINO, JR. on
May 12, 1986 as a co-owner. LORETO had a right, even
before the partition of the property on January 19, 1987,
to transfer in whole or in part his undivided interest in
the lot even without the consent of his co-heirs. This
right is absolute in accordance with the well-settled
doctrine that a co-owner has full ownership of his pro-
indiviso share and has the right to alienate, assign or
mortgage it, and substitute another person for its
enjoyment. Thus, what GABINO, JR. obtained by virtue
of the sale on May 12, 1986 were the same rights as the
vendor LORETO had as co-owner, in an ideal share
equivalent to the consideration given under their
transaction.
LORETO sold some 1,604 square meters of Lot No.
1253 to GABINO, JR. Consequently, when LORETO
purportedly sold to WILFREDO on December 7, 1989
the same portion of the lot, he was no longer the owner
of Lot No. 1253-B. Based on the principle that "no one
can give what he does not have", LORETO could not
have validly sold to WILFREDO on December 7, 1989
what he no longer had. As correctly pointed out by the
appellate court, the sale made by LORETO in favor
of WILFREDO is void as LORETO did not have the
right to transfer the ownership of the subject
property at the time of sale. (Emphasis supplied).
In the same breadth, a co-owner cannot be compelled by
the court to give their consent to the sale of his share in
a co-owned property. In Arambulo v. Nolasco, the Court
intimated:
The ultimate authorities in civil law, recognized as such
by the Court, agree that co-owners such as respondents
have over their part, the right of full and absolute
ownership. Such right is the same as that of individual
owners which is not diminished by the fact that the
entire property is co-owned with others. That part which
ideally belongs to them, or their mental portion, may be
disposed of as they please, independent of the decision
of their co-owners. So we rule in this case. The
respondents cannot be ordered to sell their portion of the
co-owned properties. In the language of Rodriguez v.
Court of First Instance of Rizal, "each party is the sole
judge of what is good for him". (Underscoring ours).
Thus, even if the impression of the Court of Appeals
were true, i.e., that the entire property has been sold to
thirds
Indeed, the intention clearly written, settles the issue
regarding the purchase price. A contract of sale is a
consensual contract, which becomes valid and binding
upon the meeting of minds of the parties on the price
and the object of the sale. The mere inadequacy of the
price does not affect its validity when both parties are in
a position to form an independent judgment concerning
the transaction, unless fraud, mistake or undue influence
indicative of a defect in consent is present. A contract
may consequently be annulled on the ground of vitiated
consent and not due to the inadequacy of the price. In
the case at bar, however, no evidence to prove fraud,
mistake or undue influence indicative of vitiated
consent is attendant.
As the parties invoking equitable mortgage, the Heirs of
Reynaldo did not even come close to proving that the
parties intended to charge the property as security for a
debt, leaving us with no other choice but to uphold the
stipulations in the contract. Basic is the rule that if the
terms of the contract are clear and leave no doubt upon
the intention of the parties, the literal meaning of its
stipulations shall control, we find that the Court of
Appeals cannot be faulted for ruling, in modification of
its original judgment, that the sale effected by Reynaldo
of his undivided share in the property is valid and
enforceable.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is
DENIED. The assailed Decision and Resolution of the
Court of Appeals are hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Carpio, Brion, Del Castillo and Perlas-Bernabe, JJ.,
concur.
G.R. No. L-29727 | Oliveras v. Lopez
THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. L-29727. December 14, 1988.]
PEDRO OLIVERAS, TEODORA GASPAR,
MELECIO OLIVERAS and ANICETA MINOR,
plaintiffs-appellees, vs. CANDIDO LOPEZ,
SEVERO LOPEZ, HIPOLITO LOPEZ, EUGENIA
LOPEZ, PRIMITIVO GASPAR, CORAZON
LOPEZ, ALEJANDRO CACAYURIN, FAUSTINA
BOTUYAN, MODESTO SALAZAR,
ADORACION BOTUYAN, CLAUDIO
GANOTICE and ENONG BOTUYAN, defendants-
appellants.
Venancio B. Fernando for defendants-appellants.
SYLLABUS
1. CIVIL LAW; PROPERTY; CO-OWNERSHIP; AN
INDIVIDUAL CO-OWNER CANNOT CLAIM A
DEFINITE PORTION OF SUBJECT PROPERTY
BEFORE PARTITION. In a long line of decisions,
this Court has held that before the partition of a land or
thing held in common, no individual co-owner can
claim title to any definite portion thereof. All that the
co-owner has is an ideal or abstract quota or
proportionate share in the entire land or thing.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; SHOULD NOT EXCEED A PERIOD
OF TWENTY (20) YEARS; CASE AT BAR. The
duration of the juridical condition of co-ownership is not
limitless. Under Article 494 and 1083 of the Civil Code,
co-ownership of an estate should not exceed the period
of twenty (20) years. And, under the former article, any
agreement to keep a thing or property undivided should
be for a ten-year period only. Where the parties stipulate
a definite period of indivision which exceeds the
maximum allowed by law, said stipulation shall be void
only as to the period beyond such maximum. In the
instant case, the heirs of Lorenzo Lopez maintained the
co-ownership for more than twenty years. We hold that
when Candido and his mother (who died before the
filing of the complaint for partition) sold definite
portions of Lot 4685, they validly exercised dominion
over them because, by operation of law, the co-
ownership had ceased.
3. REMEDIAL LAW; ACTION FOR PARTITION;
TIMELY FILED IN CASE AT BAR. The action for
partition has not prescribed. Although the complaint
was filed thirteen years from the execution of the deeds
of sale and hence, as contended by the defendants-
appellants, prescription might have barred its filing
under the general provision of Article 1144 (a) of the
Civil Code, Article 494 specifically mandates that each
co-owner may demand at any time the partition of the
thing owned in common insofar as his share is
concerned. Hence, considering the validity of the
conveyances of portions of Lot 4685 in their favor and
as subrogees of Candido Lopez, the Oliverases' action
for partition was timely and properly filed.
4. SUPREME COURT; RESOLUTION DIRECTING
PARTY TO "MOVE IN THE PREMISES",
EXPLAINED. For the enlightenment of said counsel
and all others of similar perception, a "move in the
premises" resolution is not a license to occupy or enter
the premises subject of litigation especially in cases
involving real property. A "move in the premises"
resolution simply means what is stated therein: the
parties are obliged to inform the Court of developments
pertinent to the case which may be of help to the Court
in its immediate disposition.
DECISION
FERNAN, J p:
This case exemplifies the Filipino custom of keeping
inherited property in a prolonged juridical condition of
co-ownership. prLL
Lorenzo Lopez owned Lot 4685 of the Cadastral survey
of Villasis, Pangasinan with an area of 69,687 square
meters as evidenced by Original Certificate of Title No.
15262. In December, 1931, Lorenzo Lopez died,
leaving said property to his wife, Tomasa Ramos and six
(6) children. From that time on, the heirs of Lorenzo
Lopez did not initiate any moves to legally partition the
property.
More than twenty-one years later, or on February 11,
1953, Tomasa Ramos and her eldest son, Candido
Lopez, executed a deed of absolute sale of the "eastern
undivided four thousand two hundred and fifty seven-
square meters (4,257) more or less, of the undivided
portion of (their) interests, rights and participation" over
Lot 4685, in favor of the spouses Melecio Oliveras and
Aniceta Minor, in consideration of the amount of one
thousand pesos (P1,000).
On the same day, Tomasa and Candido executed
another deed of absolute sale of the "undivided" four
thousand two hundred and fifty-seven (4,257) square
meters of the "eastern part" of Lot 4685 in favor of the
spouses Pedro Oliveras and Teodora Gaspar, also in
consideration of P1,000. Each of the said documents
bear the thumbmark of Tomasa and the signature of
Candido.
In his affidavit also executed on February 11, 1953,
Candido stated that a month prior to the execution of the
deed of sale in favor of Melecio Oliveras, he offered his:
"undivided portion" of Lot 4685 to his "adjacent
owners" but none of them was "in a position to
purchase" said property.
Since the execution of the two deeds of absolute sale,
the vendees, brothers Melecio and Pedro, had been
paying the real property taxes for their respectively
purchased properties. They also had been in possession
of their purchased properties which, being planted to
palay and peanuts, were segregated from the rest of Lot
4685 by dikes.
More than thirteen years later or on November 21, 1966,
the counsel of the Oliveras brothers wrote the heirs of
Lorenzo Lopez reminding them of the Oliverases'
demands to partition the property so that they could
acquire their respective titles thereto without resorting
to court action, and that, should they fail to respond, he
would be forced to file a case in court. Apparently, the
Lopezes did not answer said letter since on December
15, 1966, the Oliveras brothers and their wives filed a
complaint for partition and damages in the Court of First
Instance of Pangasinan.
The Oliverases stated in their complaint that possession
of the disputed properties was delivered to them with the
knowledge and consent of the defendants; that they had
been paying the real estate taxes thereon; that prior to
the sale, said properties were offered to the other co-
owners for sale but they refused to buy them; that on
February 18, 1953, the transactions were duly annotated
and entered in the Memorandum of encumbrances of
OCT No. 15262 as adverse claims; and that their desire
to segregate the portions of Lot 4685 sold to them was
frustrated by defendants' adamant refusal to lend them
the owner's duplicate of OCT No. 15262 and to execute
a deed of partition of the whole lot. prcd
In claiming moral damages in the amount of P2,000.00
plaintiffs alleged that defendants also refused to allow
them to survey and segregate the portions bought by
them. Plaintiffs prayed that the court order the
defendants to partition Lot 4685 and to allow them to
survey and segregate the portions they had purchased.
They also demanded payment of P800.00 as attorney's
fees and cost of the suit.
In their answer, the defendants alleged that no sale ever
transpired as the alleged vendors could not have sold
specific portions of the property; that plaintiffs'
possession and occupation of specific portions of the
properties being illegal, they could not ripen into
ownership; and that they were not under any obligation
to lend their copy of the certificate of title or to accede
to plaintiffs' request for the partition or settlement of the
property. As special and affirmative defenses, the
defendants contended that the deeds of sale were null
and void and hence, unenforceable against them; that
the complaint did not state a cause of action and that the
cause or causes of action, if any, had prescribed.
Defendants averred in their counterclaim that despite
repeated demands, plaintiffs refused and failed to vacate
the premises; that the properties occupied by the
plaintiffs yielded an average net produce in palay and
peanuts in the amount of P1,600.00 annually, and that
the complaint was filed to harass them. They prayed for
the dismissal of the complaint and the payment of
P1,600.00 per year from 1953 until plaintiffs shall have
vacated the premises and P1,000.00 for attorney's fees.
Cdpr
Plaintiffs filed an answer to defendants' counterclaim,
denying all the allegations therein and stating that
defendants never demanded that plaintiffs vacate the
portions of Lot 4685 they had bought.
The lower court explored the possibility of an amicable
settlement between the parties without success. Hence,
it set the case for trial and thereafter, it rendered a
decision declaring valid the deeds of absolute sale and
ordering the defendants to allow the segregation of the
sold portions of Lot 4685 by a licensed surveyor in order
that the plaintiffs could obtain their respective
certificates of title over their portions of said lot.
In resolving the case, the lower court passed upon the
issue of whether the two deeds of absolute sale were
what they purported to be or merely mortgage
documents. It considered as indicia of plaintiffs'
absolute dominion over the portions sold to them their
actual possession thereof without any opposition from
the defendants until the filing of the complaint, their
payment of taxes thereon and their having benefited
from the produce of the land. The court ruled that the
defendants' testimonial evidence that the deeds in
question were merely mortgage documents cannot
overcome the evidentiary value of the public
instruments presented by the plaintiffs.
On the issue of whether the two deeds of absolute sale
were null and void considering that the land subject
thereof had not yet been partitioned, the court observed
that the total area of 8,514 square meters sold to
plaintiffs by Candido was less than his share should Lot
4685 with an area of 69,687 square meters be divided
among the six children of Lorenzo Lopez and their
mother. In this connection, the lower court also found
that during his lifetime, and before Candido got married,
Lorenzo Lopez had divided Lot 4685 among his
children who then took possession of their respective
shares.
The defendants appealed said decision to this Court
contending that the lower court erred in declaring the
two deeds of absolute sale as valid, in ordering the
segregation of the sold portions of Lot 4685 to enable
the plaintiffs to obtain their respective certificates of
title, and in not considering their defense of prescription.
The extrinsic validity of the two deeds of absolute sale
is not in issue in this case in view of the finding of the
trial court that the defendants admittedly do not question
their due execution. What should pre-occupy the Court
is the intrinsic validity of said deeds insofar as they
pertain to sales of designated portions of an undivided,
co-owned property.
In a long line of decisions, this Court has held that
before the partition of a land or thing held in common,
no individual co-owner can claim title to any definite
portion thereof. All that the co-owner has is an ideal or
abstract quota or proportionate share in the entire land possession thereon" and that he had left a copy of said
or thing. resolution with the defendants-appellants" for their
However, the duration of the juridical condition of co- guidance in the compliance of their obligations (sic) as
ownership is not limitless. Under Article 494 and 1083 specified in said resolution."
of the Civil Code, co-ownership of an estate should not Obviously, said counsel interpreted literally the Court's
exceed the period of twenty (20) years. And, under the directive "to move in the premises." For the
former article, any agreement to keep a thing or property enlightenment of said counsel and all others of similar
undivided should be for a ten-year period only. Where perception, a "move in the premises" resolution is not a
the parties stipulate a definite period of indivision which license to occupy or enter the premises subject of
exceeds the maximum allowed by law, said stipulation litigation especially in cases involving real property. A
shall be void only as to the period beyond such "move in the premises" resolution simply means what is
maximum. stated therein: the parties are obliged to inform the Court
Although the Civil Code is silent as to the effect of the of developments pertinent to the case which may be of
indivision of a property for more than twenty years, it help to the Court in its immediate disposition. LibLex
would be contrary to public policy to sanction co- WHEREFORE, the decision of the lower court insofar
ownership beyond the period set by the law. Otherwise, as it declares the validity of the two deeds of sale and
the 20-year limitation expressly mandated by the Civil directs the partition of Lot 4685, is AFFIRMED. The
Code would be rendered meaningless. cdphil lower court is hereby ordered to facilitate with dispatch
In the instant case, the heirs of Lorenzo Lopez the preparation of a project of partition which it should
maintained the co-ownership for more than twenty thereafter approve. This decision is immediately
years. We hold that when Candido and his mother (who executory. No costs.
died before the filing of the complaint for partition) sold SO ORDERED.
definite portions of Lot 4685, they validly exercised Gutierrez, Jr., Bidin and Cortes, JJ., concur.
dominion over them because, by operation of law, the Feliciano, J., I concur in the result.
co-ownership had ceased. The filing of the complaint
for partition by the Oliverases who, as vendees, are
legally considered as subrogated to the rights of
Candido over portions of Lot 4685 in their possession,
merely served to put a stamp of formality on Candido's
otherwise accomplished act of terminating the co-
ownership.
The action for partition has not prescribed. Although the
complaint was filed thirteen years from the execution of
the deeds of sale and hence, as contended by the
defendants-appellants, prescription might have barred
its filing under the general provision of Article 1144 (a)
of the Civil Code, Article 494 specifically mandates that
each co-owner may demand at any time the partition of
the thing owned in common insofar as his share is
concerned. Hence, considering the validity of the
conveyances of portions of Lot 4685 in their favor and
as subrogees of Candido Lopez, the Oliverases' action
for partition was timely and properly filed.
We cannot write finis to this decision without
commenting on the compliance with the resolution of
September 1, 1986 of counsel for defendants-appellants.
In said resolution, the court required the parties to move
in the premises "considering the length of time that this
case has remained pending in this Court and to
determine whether or not there might be supervening
events which may render the case moot and academic."
In his manifestation and motion dated August 12, 1987,
said counsel informed the Court that he had contacted
the defendants-appellants whom he advised "to move in
the premises which is the land in question and to
maintain the status quo with respect to their actual
G.R. No. 75886 | Roque v. Intermediate Appellate Court
THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 75886. August 30, 1988.]
CONCEPCION ROQUE, petitioner, vs. HON.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT,
ERNESTO ROQUE, FILOMENA OSMUNDO,
CECILIA ROQUE, MARCELA ROQUE, JOSE
ROQUE and RUBEN ROQUE, respondents.
Lorenzo J . Liwag for petitioner.
Dominador Ad Castillo for private respondents.
SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; ACTION; PARTITION;
NATURE. An action for partition which is
typically brought by a person claiming to be co-owner
of a specified property against a defendant or defendants
whom the plaintiff recognizes to be co-owners may
be seen to present simultaneously two principal issues.
First, there is the issue of whether the plaintiff is indeed
a co-owner of the property sought to be partitioned.
Second, assuming that the plaintiff successfully hurdles
the first issue, there is the secondary issue of how the
property is to be divided between plaintiff and
defendant(s) i.e., what portion should go to which co-
owner.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; CLAIM OF AN ADVERSE TITLE
TO THE PROPERTY SUBJECT OF PARTITION
WILL NOT RESULT IN THE DISMISSAL OF AN
ACTION THEREFOR; CASE AT BAR. Should the
trial court find that the defendants do not dispute the
status of the plaintiff as co-owner, the court can
forthwith proceed to the actual partitioning of the
property involved. In case the defendants assert in their
Answer exclusive title in themselves adversely to the
plaintiff, the court should not dismiss the plaintiff's
action for partition but, on the contrary and in the
exercise of its general jurisdiction, resolve the question
of whether the plaintiff is co-owner or not. Should the
trial court find that the plaintiff was unable to sustain his
claimed status as co-owner, or that the defendants are or
have become the sole and exclusive owners of the
property involved, the court will necessarily have to
dismiss the action for partition. This result would be
reached, not because the wrong action was commenced
by the plaintiff, but rather because the plaintiff having
been unable to show co-ownership rights in himself, no
basis exists for requiring the defendants to submit to
partition the property at stake. If, upon the other hand,
the court after trial should find the existence of co-
ownership among the parties litigant, the court may and
should order the partition of the property in the same
action. Judgment for one or the other party being on the
merits, the losing party (respondents in this case) may
then appeal the same. In either case, however, it is quite
unnecessary to require the plaintiff to file another
action, separate and independent from that for partition
originally instituted. Functionally, an action for
partition may be seen to be at once an action for
declaration of co-ownership and for segregation and
conveyance of a determinate portion of the property
involved. This is the import of our jurisprudence on the
matter and is sustained by the public policy which
abhors multiplicity of actions.
3. CIVIL LAW; PRESCRIPTION OF ACTION;
PARTITION; GENERALLY, AN ACTION
THEREFOR DOES NOT PRESCRIBE; EXCEPTION,
CASE AT BAR. The question of prescription also
needs to be addressed in this connection. It is sometimes
said that "the action for partition of the thing owned in
common (actio communi dividendo or actio familiae
erciscundae) does not prescribe." This statement bears
some refinement. In the words of Article 494 of the
Civil Code, "each co-owner may demand at any time the
partition of the thing owned in common, insofar as his
share is concerned." No matter how long the co-
ownership has lasted, a co-owner can always opt out of
the co-ownership, and provided the defendant co-
owners or co-heirs have theretofore expressly or
impliedly recognized the co-ownership, they cannot set
up as a defense the prescription of the action for
partition. But if the defendants show that they had
previously asserted title in themselves adversely to the
plaintiff and for the requisite period of time, the
plaintiffs right to require recognition of his status as a
co-owner will have been lost by prescription and the
court cannot issue an order requiring partition. This is
precisely what happened in Jardin v. Hallasgo,117
SCRA 532 (1982), which the respondent appellate court
cited to support its position quoted above.
4. ID.; PROPERTY; ACQUISITIVE PRESCRIPTION;
UNREASONABLE LONG INACTION; EFFECT;
CASE AT BAR. The facts on record clearly show
that petitioner Concepcion Roque had been in actual,
open and continuous possession of a three-fourths (3/4)
portion of Lot No. 1549 ever since execution of the
"Bilihan Lubos at Patuluyan" in November of 1961. The
Court notes that it was only in their Answer with
Compulsory Counterclaim filed with the trial court in
December of 1977 more than sixteen (16) years later
that respondents first questioned the genuineness and
authenticity of the "Bilihan Lubos at Patuluyan." Not
once during those sixteen (16) years did respondents
contest petitioner's occupation of a three-fourths (3/4)
portion of Lot No. 1549. Furthermore, if indeed it is true
that respondents, as they claim, are the absolute owners
of the whole of Lot No. 1549, it is most unusual that
respondents would have allowed or tolerated such
prolonged occupation by petitioner of a major portion
(3/4) of the land while they, upon the other hand,
contented themselves with occupation of only a fourth
thereof. This latter circumstance, coupled with the
passage of a very substantial length of time during
which petitioner all the while remained undisturbed and
uninterrupted in her occupation and possession, places
respondents here in laches: respondents may no longer
dispute the existence of the co-ownership between
petitioner and themselves nor the validity of petitioner's
claim of a three-fourths (3/4) interest in Lot No. 1549,
as they are deemed, by their unreasonably long inaction,
to have acquiesced in the co-ownership.
DECISION
FELICIANO, J p:
The subject of the present Petition for Review is the 31
July 1986 Decision of the former Intermediate
Appellate Court in AC-G.R. CV No. 02248 (entitled,
"Concepcion Roque, plaintiff-appellee, vs. Ernesto
Roque, Filomena Osmundo, Cecilia Roque, Marcela
Roque, Jose Roque and Ruben Roque, defendants-
appellants") which reversed and set aside on appeal the
decision of the Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Branch
9.
The controversy here involves a 312 square meter parcel
of land situated in San Juan, Malolos, Bulacan and
designated as Lot No. 1549 of the Cadastral Survey of
Malolos. The property was registered originally in the
name of Januario Avendao, a bachelor who died
intestate and without issue on 22 October 1945.
On 21 September 1959, the intestate heirs of Januario
Avendao executed a document entitled "Paghahati at
Pagtagabuyan ng Mana sa Labas ng Hukuman."
Through this instrument, extrajudicial partition of Lot
No. 1549 was effected among the intestate heirs as
follows:
a. One-fourth (1/4) undivided portion to Illuminada
Avendao.
b. One-fourth (1/4) undivided portion to Gregorio
Avendao and Miguel Avendao.
c. One-fourth (1/4) undivided portion to Bernardino,
Bienvenido, Numeriano and Rufina, all surnamed
Avendao.
d. One-fourth (1/4) undivided portion to respondent
Ernesto Roque and Victor Roque. 2
On 28 September 1959, co-owners Illuminada,
Gregorio, Miguel, Bernardino, Bienvenido, Numeriano
and Rufina, all surnamed Avendao, in consideration of
the aggregate amount of P500.00, transferred their
collective and undivided three-fourths (3/4) share in Lot
No. 1549 to respondent Ernesto Roque and Victor
Roque, thereby vesting in the latter full and complete
ownership of the property. The transactions were
embodied in two (2) separate deeds of sale both entitled
"Kasulatan ng Bilihang Patuluyan" and both duly
notarized. Subsequently, in an unnotarized "Bilihan
Lubos at Patuluyan dated 27 November 1961, Ernesto
and Victor Roque purportedly sold a three-fourths (3/4)
undivided portion of Lot No. 1549 to their half-sister,
petitioner Concepcion Roque, for the same amount. The
property, however, remained registered in the name of
the decedent, Januario Avendao.
Upon the instance of petitioner Concepcion Roque and
allegedly of respondent Ernesto Roque, Lot No. 1549
was surveyed on 20 September 1975. Consequent
thereto, a Subdivision Plan was drawn up by the
Geodetic Engineer identifying and delineating a one-
fourth (1/4) portion (78 square meters) of the property
as belonging to respondent Ernesto Roque and Victor
Roque (who had died on 14 April 1962), upon the one
hand, and a three-fourths (3/4) portion (234 square
meters) of the same property as belonging to petitioner
Concepcion Roque, upon the other hand. Petitioner
claimed that preparation of the Subdivision Plan, which
was approved on 3 November 1975 by the Land
Registration Commission was a preliminary step
leading eventually to partition of Lot No. 1549, partition
allegedly having been previously agreed upon inter se
by the co-owners. Respondents Ernesto Roque and the
legal heirs of Victor Roque, however, refused to
acknowledge petitioner's claim of ownership of any
portion of Lot No. 1549 and rejected the plan to divide
the land.
Attempts at amicable settlement having fallen through,
petitioner Concepcion Roque, on 6 December 1977,
filed a Complaint for "Partition with Specific
Performance" (docketed as Civil Case No. 5236-M)
with Branch 2 of the Court of First Instance of Malolos
against respondents Ernesto Roque and the heirs of
Victor Roque" In her complaint, petitioner (plaintiff
below) claimed legal ownership of an undivided three-
fourths (3/4) portion of Lot No. 1549 by virtue of the 27
November 1961 "Bilihan Lubos at Patuluyan" executed
in her favor by Ernesto Roque and the heirs of Victor
Roque. In support of this claim, petitioner also presented
an undated and unauthorized "Kasulatang Pagkilala sa
Bilihan Patuluyan ng Bahagui at Pagmamana sa Labas
ng Hukuman at Paghahati-hati at Abuyan ng Bahagui"
said to have been signed by the respondents in
acknowledgment of the existence and validity of the
Bilihan in favor of petitioner. Finally, petitioner alleged
that, as a co-owner of Lot No. 1549, she had a right to
seek partition of the property, that she could not be
compelled to remain in the co-ownership of the same.
In an Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim filed on
28 December 1977(defendants below) impugned the
genuineness and due execution of the "Bilihan Lubos at
Patuluyan" dated 27 November 1961 on the ground
"that the signatures appearing thereon are not the
authentic signatures of the supposed signatories . . ." It
was also alleged that petitioner Concepcion Roque, far
from being a co-owner of Lot No. 1549, "occupied a
portion of the lot in question by mere tolerance of the
[defendants]." Respondents also refused to honor the
unnotarized Kasulatan and, additionally, denied having
had any participation in the preparation of the
Subdivision Plan.
On 27 June 1983, the trial court (now Branch 9,
Regional Trial Court of Malolos) rendered a Decision,
the dispositive portion of which read:
"WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered, in favor
of the plaintiff and against the defendants;
1. Ordering the heirs of the late Victor Roque namely
Filomena Osmundo, his spouse, his children, Cecilia
Roque, Marcela Roque, Jose Roque and Ruben Roque
and their uncle and co-defendant Ernesto Roque, to
execute a deed of confirmation of the sale made by
Ernesto and Victor Roque in favor of plaintiff
Concepcion Roque, entitled "Bilihan Lubos at
Patuluyan" execute on November 27, 1961, Exh. E over
the 3/4 portion of the subject property;
2. Ordering the partition of the parcel of land described
in par. 3 of the complaint covered by the Original
Certificate of Title No. 1442-Bulacan issued in the name
of Janurio Avendao, in the proportion of 3/4 to pertain
to Concepcion Roque, and 1/4 to pertain to Ernesto
Roque and his co-defendants, his sister-in-law, nephews
and nieces, in accordance with the approved subdivision
plan (LRC Psd-230726).
3. Ordering defendants, jointly and severally, to pay to
plaintiff the sum of P2,000.00 as and for attorney's fees
and the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
The respondents appealed from this decision alleging
the following errors:
"I
The lower court erred when it decided and ordered
defendants-appellants to execute a confirmation of the
"Bilihan Lubos at Patuluyan," Exh. "E."
II
The lower court erred when it decided and ordered the
defendants-appellants to deliver unto the plaintiff [a] 3/4
share of the land in question.
III
The lower court erred in deciding this case in favor of
the plaintiff-appellee, based on an unnotarized and
forged signature of defendant-appellant Ernesto Roque.
IV
The lower court erred in giving credence to the
testimony of the plaintiff-appellee Concepcion Roque
despite [its] gross inconsistencies." 10
Acting on the appeal (docketed as A.C.-G.R. CV No.
02248), the Intermediate Appellate Court, in a Decision
dated 31 July 1986, reversed the judgment of the trial
court and dismissed both the petitioner's complaint and
the respondents' appeal. A Motion for Reconsideration
of petitioner Concepcion Roque was denied.
The present Petition for Review was filed with this
Court on 18 September 1986. In a resolution dated 27
July 1987, we gave due course to the Petition and
required the parties to submit their respective
Memoranda.
1. On the matter of dismissal of petitioner's complaint,
the Intermediate Appellate Court stated in its decision:
"While the action filed by the plaintiff is for partition,
the defendants, after denying plaintiff's assertion of co-
ownership, asserted that they are the exclusive and sole
owners of the 3/4 portion of the parcel of land claimed
by the plaintiff.
Upon the issue thus joined by the pleadings, it is obvious
that the case has become one of ownership of the
disputed portion of the subject lot.
It is well settled that an action for partition will not
prosper as such from the moment an alleged co-owner
asserts an adverse title. The action that may be brought
by an aggrieved co-owner is accion reivindicatoria or
action for recovery of title and possession (Jardin vs.
Hallasgo, 117 SCRA 532, 536, 537; Paner vs. Gaspar, 3
CA Rep. 155, 158)." (Emphasis supplied).
Viewed in the light of the facts of the present case, the
Intermediate Appellate Court's decision appears to
imply that from the moment respondents (defendants
below) alleged absolute and exclusive ownership of the
whole of Lot No. 1549 in their Answer, the trial court
should have immediately ordered the dismissal of the
action for partition and petitioner (plaintiff below), if
she so desired, should have refiled the case but this time
as an accion reivindicatoria. Taking this analysis a step
further should the reivindicatory action prosper i.e.,
a co-ownership relation is found to have existed
between the parties a second action for partition
would still have to be instituted in order to effect
division of the property among the co-owners.
We do not agree with the above view. An action for
partition which is typically brought by a person
claiming to be co-owner of a specified property against
a defendant or defendants whom the plaintiff recognizes
to be co-owners may be seen to present
simultaneously two principal issues. First, there is the
issue of whether the plaintiff is indeed a co-owner of the
property sought to be partitioned. Second, assuming that
the plaintiff successfully hurdles the first issue, there is
the secondary issue of how the property is to be divided
between plaintiff and defendant(s) i.e., what portion
should go to which co-owner.
Should the trial court find that the defendants do not
dispute the status of the plaintiff as co-owner, the court
can forthwith proceed to the actual partitioning of the
property involved. In case the defendants assert in their
Answer exclusive title in themselves adversely to the
plaintiff, the court should not dismiss the plaintiff's
action for partition but, on the contrary and in the
exercise of its general jurisdiction, resolve the question
of whether the plaintiff is co-owner or not. Should the
trial court find that the plaintiff was unable to sustain his
claimed status as co-owner, or that the defendants are or
have become the sole and exclusive owners of the
property involved, the court will necessarily have to
dismiss the action for partition. This result would be
reached, not because the wrong action was commenced
by the plaintiff, but rather because the plaintiff having
been unable to show co-ownership rights in himself, no
basis exists for requiring the defendants to submit to
partition the property at stake. If, upon the other hand,
the court after trial should find the existence of co-
ownership among the parties litigant, the court may and
should order the partition of the property in the same
action. Judgment for one or the other party being on the
merits, the losing party (respondents in this case) may
then appeal the same. In either case, however, it is quite
unnecessary to require the plaintiff to file another
action, separate and independent from that for partition
originally instituted. Functionally, an action for
partition may be seen to be at once an action for
declaration of co-ownership and for segregation and
conveyance of a determinate portion of the property
involved. This is the import of our jurisprudence on the
matter and is sustained by the public policy which
abhors multiplicity of actions.
The question of prescription also needs to be addressed
in this connection. It is sometimes said that "the action
for partition of the thing owned in common (actio
communi dividendo or actio familiae erciscundae) does
not prescribe." This statement bears some refinement. In
the words of Article 494 of the Civil Code, "each co-
owner may demand at any time the partition of the thing
owned in common, insofar as his share is concerned."
No matter how long the co-ownership has lasted, a co-
owner can always opt out of the co-ownership, and
provided the defendant co-owners or co-heirs have
theretofore expressly or impliedly recognized the co-
ownership, they cannot set up as a defense the
prescription of the action for partition. But if the
defendants show that they had previously asserted title
in themselves adversely to the plaintiff and for the
requisite period of time, the plaintiffs right to require
recognition of his status as a co-owner will have been
lost by prescription and the court cannot issue an order
requiring partition. This is precisely what happened in
Jardin v. Hallasgo, 117 SCRA 532 (1982), which the
respondent appellate court cited to support its position
quoted above.
The case of Jardin involved, among others, two (2)
parcels of land which were inherited in 1920 by the
brothers Catalino Jardin and Galo Jardin together with
their half-brother, Sixto Hallasgo. The three (3) held
these lands in co-ownership until Sixto later (the date
was not specified) repudiated the co-ownership and
occupied and possessed both parcels of land, claiming
the same exclusively as his own. Sometime in 1973, the
heirs of Catalino and Galo instituted an action for
partition of the two (2) properties against Sixto's heirs,
who had refused to surrender any portion of the same to
the former. The trial court, assuming that prescription
had started to run in that case even before the Civil Code
took effect, held that the action for partition filed by the
heirs of Catalino and Galo had already prescribed. On
appeal, this Court affirmed the trial court on this point
in the following terms:
"Article 494 of the Civil Code provides that 'no co-
owner shall be obliged to remain in the co-ownership'
and that 'each co owner may demand at any time the
partition of the thing owned in common, insofar as his
share is concerned.' It also provides that 'no prescription
shall run in favor of a co-owner or co-heir against his
co-owners or co-heirs so long as he expressly or
impliedly recognizes the co-ownership.'
While the action for the partition of the thing owned in
common (actio communi dividendo or actio familiae
erciscundae) does not prescribe, the co-ownership does
not last forever since it may be repudiated by a co-owner
[i.e., Sixto]. In such a case, the action for partition does
not lie. What may be brought by the aggrieved co-owner
[i.e., the heirs of Catalino and Galo] is an accion
reivindicatoria or action for recovery of title and
possession. That action may be barred by prescription.
'If the co-heir or co-owner having possession of the
hereditary or community property, holds the same in his
own name, that is, under claim of exclusive ownership,
he may acquire the property by prescription if his
possession meets all the other requirements of the law,
and after the expiration of the prescriptive period, his
co-heir or co-owner may lose their right to demand
partition, and their action may then be held to have
prescribed (De los Santos vs. Santa Teresa, 44 Phil.
811).'
xxx xxx xxx" (Emphasis supplied).
In the light of the foregoing discussion, it will be seen
that the underscored portion of the Court's opinion in
Jardin is actually obiter. For there, the Court simply
held the action for partition by the heirs of Catalino and
Galo had prescribed and did not require such heirs to
start a new action (which would have been quite
pointless); on the other hand, the Court remanded the
case to the lower court for further proceedings in respect
of the recovery of a 350 square meter lot which the
evidence showed was owned by the plaintiffs but
wrongfully included by Sixto in the cadastral survey of
his share of the adjoining lot.
In Jardin, the claim of co-ownership asserted by the
heirs of Catalino and Galo was effectively refuted by the
heirs of Sixto, who not only claimed for themselves
absolute and exclusive ownership of the disputed
properties but were also in actual and adverse
possession thereof for a substantial length of time. The
Court found, further, that the action for partition initially
available to the heirs of Catalino and Galo had, as a which petitioner all the while remained undisturbed and
result of the preceding circumstance, already prescribed. uninterrupted in her occupation and possession, places
An entirely different situation, however, obtains in the respondents here in laches: respondents may no longer
case at bar. First of all, petitioner Concepcion Roque dispute the existence of the co-ownership between
the co-owner seeking partition has been and is petitioner and themselves nor the validity of petitioner's
presently in open and continuous possession of a three- claim of a three-fourths (3/4) interest in Lot No. 1549,
fourths (3/4) portion of the property owned in common. as they are deemed, by their unreasonably long inaction,
The Court notes in this respect the finding of the trial to have acquiesced in the co-ownership. In this respect,
court that petitioner, following execution of the "Bilihan we affirm the decision of the respondent appellate court
Lubos at Patuluyan" on 27 November 1961, had been in presently under review.
"continuous occupancy of the 3/4 portion of the lot . . . WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Intermediate
up to the present, and whereon plaintiffs house and that Appellate Court dated 31 July 1986 in A.C.-G.R. CV
of her son are erected." Respondents do not dispute this No. 02248 is SET ASIDE with respect to that portion
finding of fact, although they would claim that which orders the dismissal of the Complaint in Civil
petitioner's possession is merely tolerated by them. Case No. 5236-M, but is AFFIRMED with respect to
Second, prior to filing in 1977 of the Complaint in Civil that portion which orders the dismissal of the
Case No. 5236-M, neither of the parties involved had respondents' appeal in A.C. G.R. CV No. 02248. The
asserted or manifested a claim of absolute and exclusive Decision of Branch 9 of the Regional Trial Court of
ownership over the whole of Lot No. 1549 adverse to Malolos dated 27 June 1983 in Civil Case No. 5236-M
that of any of the other co-owners: in other words, co- is hereby REINSTATED. No pronouncement as to
ownership of the property had continued to be costs.
recognized by all the owners. Consequently, the action SO ORDERED.
for partition could not have and, as a matter of fact, had Fernan C.J., Gutierrez, Jr. and Cortes, JJ., concur.
not yet prescribed at the time of institution by Bidin, J.,no part. I participated in some incident of the
Concepcion of the action below. case before the Court of Appeals.
2. Coming now to the matter regarding dismissal of the
respondents' appeal, the Intermediate Appellate Court
held that inasmuch as the attack on the validity of the
"Bilihan Lubos at Patuluyan" was predicated on fraud
and no action for annulment of the document had been
brought by respondents within the four (4) year
prescriptive period provided under Article 1391 of the
Civil Code, such action had already prescribed.
We find it unnecessary to deal here with the issue of
prescription discussed by the respondent court in its
assailed decision. The facts on record clearly show that
petitioner Concepcion Roque had been in actual, open
and continuous possession of a three-fourths (3/4)
portion of Lot No. 1549 ever since execution of the
"Bilihan Lubos at Patuluyan" in November of 1961. The
Court notes that it was only in their Answer with
Compulsory Counterclaim filed with the trial court in
December of 1977 more than sixteen (16) years later
that respondents first questioned the genuineness and
authenticity of the "Bilihan Lubos at Patuluyan." Not
once during those sixteen (16) years did respondents
contest petitioner's occupation of a three-fourths (3/4)
portion of Lot No. 1549. Furthermore, if indeed it is true
that respondents, as they claim, are the absolute owners
of the whole of Lot No. 1549, it is most unusual that
respondents would have allowed or tolerated such
prolonged occupation by petitioner of a major portion
(3/4) of the land while they, upon the other hand,
contented themselves with occupation of only a fourth
thereof. This latter circumstance, coupled with the
passage of a very substantial length of time during
G.R. No. 174727 | Ining v. Vega
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 174727. August 12, 2013.]
ANTIPOLO INING (deceased), survived by
MANUEL VILLANUEVA, TEODORA
VILLANUEVA-FRANCISCO, CAMILO
FRANCISCO, ADOLFO FRANCISCO, LUCIMO
FRANCISCO, JR., MILAGROS FRANCISCO,
CELEDONIO FRANCISCO, HERMINIGILDO
FRANCISCO; RAMON TRESVALLES,
ROBERTO TAJONERA, NATIVIDAD INING-
IBEA (deceased) survived by EDILBERTO IBEA,
JOSEFA IBEA, MARTHA IBEA, CARMEN IBEA,
AMPARO IBEA-FERNANDEZ, HENRY RUIZ,
EUGENIO RUIZ and PASTOR RUIZ; DOLORES
INING-RIMON (deceased) survived by JESUS
RIMON, CESARIA RIMON GONZALES and
REMEDIOS RIMON CORDERO; and PEDRO
INING (deceased) survived by ELISA TAN INING
(wife) and PEDRO INING, JR., petitioners, vs.
LEONARDO R. VEGA, substituted by LOURDES
VEGA, RESTONILO I. VEGA, CRISPULO M.
VEGA, MILBUENA VEGA-RESTITUTO and
LENARD VEGA, respondents.
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J p:
One who is merely related by affinity to the decedent
does not inherit from the latter and cannot become a co-
owner of the decedent's property. Consequently, he
cannot effect a repudiation of the co-ownership of the
estate that was formed among the decedent's heirs.
Assailed in this Petition for Review on Certiorari are
the March 14, 2006 Decision of the Court of Appeals
(CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 74687 and its September 7,
2006 Resolution denying petitioners' Motion for
Reconsideration.
Factual Antecedents
Leon Roldan (Leon), married to Rafaela Menez
(Rafaela), is the owner of a 3,120-square meter parcel
of land (subject property) in Kalibo, Aklan covered by
Original Certificate of Title No. (24071) RO-630 (OCT
RO-630). Leon and Rafaela died without issue. Leon
was survived by his siblings Romana Roldan (Romana)
and Gregoria Roldan Ining (Gregoria), who are now
both deceased.
Romana was survived by her daughter Anunciacion
Vega and grandson, herein respondent Leonardo R.
Vega (Leonardo) (also both deceased). Leonardo in turn
is survived by his wife Lourdes and children Restonilo
I. Vega, Crispulo M. Vega, Milbuena Vega-Restituto
and Lenard Vega, the substituted respondents. THEDcS
Gregoria, on the other hand, was survived by her six
children: petitioners Natividad Ining-Ibea (Natividad),
Dolores Ining-Rimon (Dolores), Antipolo, and Pedro;
Jose; and Amando. Natividad is survived by Edilberto
Ibea, Josefa Ibea, Martha Ibea, Carmen Ibea, Amparo
Ibea-Fernandez, Henry Ruiz and Pastor Ruiz. Dolores is
survived by Jesus Rimon, Cesaria Rimon Gonzales and
Remedios Rimon Cordero. Antipolo is survived by
Manuel Villanueva, daughter Teodora Villanueva-
Francisco (Teodora), Camilo Francisco (Camilo),
Adolfo Francisco (Adolfo), Lucimo Francisco, Jr.
(Lucimo Jr.), Milagros Francisco, Celedonio Francisco,
and Herminigildo Francisco (Herminigildo). Pedro is
survived by his wife, Elisa Tan Ining and Pedro Ining,
Jr. Amando died without issue. As for Jose, it is not clear
from the records if he was made party to the
proceedings, or if he is alive at all.
In short, herein petitioners, except for Ramon Tresvalles
(Tresvalles) and Roberto Tajonera (Tajonera), are
Gregoria's grandchildren or spouses thereof (Gregoria's
heirs).
In 1997, acting on the claim that one-half of subject
property belonged to him as Romana's surviving heir,
Leonardo filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Kalibo, Aklan Civil Case No. 5275 for partition,
recovery of ownership and possession, with damages,
against Gregoria's heirs. In his Amended Complaint,
Leonardo alleged that on several occasions, he
demanded the partition of the property but Gregoria's
heirs refused to heed his demands; that the matter
reached the level of the Lupon Tagapamayapa, which
issued a certification to file a court action sometime in
1980; that Gregoria's heirs claimed sole ownership of
the property; that portions of the property were sold to
Tresvalles and Tajonera, which portions must be
collated and included as part of the portion to be
awarded to Gregoria's heirs; that in 1979, Lucimo
Francisco, Sr. (Lucimo Sr.), husband of herein
petitioner Teodora, illegally claimed absolute
ownership of the property and transferred in his name
the tax declaration covering the property; that from
1988, Lucimo Sr. and Teodora have deprived him
(Leonardo) of the fruits of the property estimated at
P1,000.00 per year; that as a result, he incurred expenses
by way of attorney's fees and litigation costs. Leonardo
thus prayed that he be declared the owner of half of the
subject property; that the same be partitioned after
collation and determination of the portion to which he is
entitled; that Gregoria's heirs be ordered to execute the
necessary documents or agreements; and that he
(Leonardo) be awarded actual damages in the amount of
P1,000.00 per year from 1988, attorney's fees of
P50,000.00, and lawyer's appearance fees of P500.00
per hearing. aCTHEA
In their Answer with counterclaim, Teodora, Camilo,
Adolfo, Lucimo Jr. and Herminigildo claimed that
Leonardo had no cause of action against them; that they
have become the sole owners of the subject property
through Lucimo Sr. who acquired the same in good faith
by sale from Juan Enriquez (Enriquez), who in turn
acquired the same from Leon, and Leonardo was aware
of this fact; that they were in continuous, actual,
adverse, notorious and exclusive possession of the
property with a just title; that they have been paying the
taxes on the property; that Leonardo's claim is barred by
estoppel and laches; and that they have suffered
damages and were forced to litigate as a result of
Leonardo's malicious suit. They prayed that Civil Case
No. 5275 be dismissed; that Leonardo be declared to be
without any right to the property; that Leonardo be
ordered to surrender the certificate of title to the
property; and that they be awarded P20,000.00 as moral
damages, P10,000.00 as temperate and nominal
damages, P20,000.00 as attorney's fees, and double
costs.
The other Gregoria heirs, as well as Tresvalles and
Tajonera were declared in default.
As agreed during pre-trial, the trial court commissioned
Geodetic Engineer Rafael M. Escabarte to identify the
metes and bounds of the property. The resulting
Commissioner's Report and Sketch, as well as the
Supplementary Commissioner's Report, were duly
approved by the parties. The parties then submitted the
following issues for resolution of the trial court:
1. Whether Leonardo is entitled to a share in Leon's
estate;
2. Whether Leon sold the subject property to Lucimo
Sr.; and
3. Whether Leonardo's claim has prescribed, or that he
is barred by estoppel or laches.
In the meantime, Leonardo passed away and was duly
substituted by his heirs, the respondents herein.
During the course of the proceedings, the following
additional relevant facts came to light:
1. In 1995, Leonardo filed against petitioners Civil Case
No. 4983 for partition with the RTC Kalibo, but the case
was dismissed and referred to the Kalibo Municipal
Trial Court (MTC), where the case was docketed as
Civil Case No. 1366. However, on March 4, 1997, the
MTC dismissed Civil Case No. 1366 for lack of
jurisdiction and declared that only the RTC can take
cognizance of the partition case;
2. The property was allegedly sold by Leon to Enriquez
through an unnotarized document dated April 4, 1943.
Enriquez in turn allegedly sold the property to Lucimo
Sr. on November 25, 1943 via another private sale
document;
3. Petitioners were in sole possession of the property for
more than 30 years, while Leonardo acquired custody of
OCT RO-630;
4. On February 9, 1979, Lucimo Sr. executed an
Affidavit of Ownership of Land claiming sole
ownership of the property which he utilized to secure in
his name Tax Declaration No. 16414 (TD 16414) over
the property and to cancel Tax Declaration No. 20102
in Leon's name.
5. Lucimo Sr. died in 1991; and
6. The property was partitioned among the petitioners,
to the exclusion of Leonardo.
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
On November 19, 2001, the trial court rendered a
Decision, which decreed as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is
hereby rendered:
1. Dismissing the complaint on the ground that
plaintiffs' right of action has long prescribed under
Article 1141 of the New Civil Code;
2. Declaring Lot 1786 covered by OCT No. RO-630
(24071) to be the common property of the heirs of
Gregoria Roldan Ining and by virtue whereof, OCT No.
RO-630 (24071) is ordered cancelled and the Register
of Deeds of the Province of Aklan is directed to issue a
transfer certificate of title to the heirs of Natividad Ining,
one-fourth (1/4) share; Heirs of Dolores Ining, one-
fourth (1/4) share; Heirs of Antipolo Ining, one-fourth
(1/4) share; and Heirs of Pedro Ining, one-fourth (1/4)
share.
For lack of sufficient evidence, the counterclaim is
ordered dismissed.
With cost against the plaintiffs.
SO ORDERED. HCDaAS
The trial court found the April 4, 1943 and November
25, 1943 deeds of sale to be spurious. It concluded that
Leon never sold the property to Enriquez, and in turn,
Enriquez never sold the property to Lucimo Sr., hence,
the subject property remained part of Leon's estate at the
time of his death in 1962. Leon's siblings, Romana and
Gregoria, thus inherited the subject property in equal
shares. Leonardo and the respondents are entitled to
Romana's share as the latter's successors.
However, the trial court held that Leonardo had only 30
years from Leon's death in 1962 or up to 1992
within which to file the partition case. Since Leonardo
instituted the partition suit only in 1997, the same was
already barred by prescription. It held that under Article
1141 of the Civil Code, an action for partition and
recovery of ownership and possession of a parcel of land
is a real action over immovable property which
prescribes in 30 years. In addition, the trial court held
that for his long inaction, Leonardo was guilty of laches
as well. Consequently, the property should go to
Gregoria's heirs exclusively.
Respondents moved for reconsideration but the same
was denied by the RTC in its February 7, 2002 Order.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
Only respondents interposed an appeal with the CA.
Docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 74687, the appeal
questioned the propriety of the trial court's dismissal of
Civil Case No. 5275, its application of Article 1141, and
the award of the property to Gregoria's heirs
exclusively.
On March 14, 2006, the CA issued the questioned
Decision, which contained the following decretal
portion:
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, this appeal is
GRANTED. The decision of the Regional Trial Court,
Br. 8, Kalibo, Aklan in Civil Case No. 5275 is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. In lieu thereof,
judgment is rendered as follows:
1. Declaring 1/2 portion of Lot 1786 as the share of the
plaintiffs as successors-in-interest of Romana Roldan;
2. Declaring 1/2 portion of Lot 1786 as the share of the
defendants as successors-in-interest of Gregoria Roldan
Ining;
3. Ordering the defendants to deliver the possession of
the portion described in paragraphs 8 and 9 of the
Commissioner's Report (Supplementary) to the herein
plaintiffs;
4. Ordering the cancellation of OCT No. RO-630
(24071) in the name of Leon Roldan and the Register of
Deeds of Aklan is directed to issue transfer certificates
of title to the plaintiffs in accordance with paragraphs 8
and 9 of the sketch plan as embodied in the
Commissioner's Report (Supplementary) and the
remaining portion thereof be adjudged to the
defendants.
Other claims and counterclaims are dismissed.
Costs against the defendants-appellees.
SO ORDERED.
The CA held that the trial court's declaration of nullity
of the April 4, 1943 and November 25, 1943 deeds of
sale in favor of Enriquez and Lucimo Sr., respectively,
became final and was settled by petitioners' failure to
appeal the same. Proceeding from the premise that no
valid prior disposition of the property was made by its
owner Leon and that the property which remained
part of his estate at the time of his death passed on by
succession to his two siblings, Romana and Gregoria,
which thus makes the parties herein who are
Romana's and Gregoria's heirs co-owners of the
property in equal shares, the appellate court held that
only the issues of prescription and laches were needed
to be resolved.
The CA did not agree with the trial court's
pronouncement that Leonardo's action for partition was
barred by prescription. The CA declared that
prescription began to run not from Leon's death in 1962,
but from Lucimo Sr.'s execution of the Affidavit of
Ownership of Land in 1979, which amounted to a
repudiation of his co-ownership of the property with
Leonardo. Applying the fifth paragraph of Article 494
of the Civil Code,which provides that "[n]o prescription
shall run in favor of a co-owner or co-heir against his
co-owners or co-heirs so long as he expressly or
impliedly recognizes the co-ownership," the CA held
that it was only when Lucimo Sr. executed the Affidavit
of Ownership of Land in 1979 and obtained a new tax
declaration over the property (TD 16414) solely in his
name that a repudiation of his co-ownership with
Leonardo was made, which repudiation effectively
commenced the running of the 30-year prescriptive
period under Article 1141.
The CA did not consider Lucimo Sr.'s sole possession
of the property for more than 30 years to the exclusion
of Leonardo and the respondents as a valid repudiation
of the co-ownership either, stating that his exclusive
possession of the property and appropriation of its fruits
even his continuous payment of the taxes thereon
while adverse as against strangers, may not be deemed
so as against Leonardo in the absence of clear and
conclusive evidence to the effect that the latter was
ousted or deprived of his rights as co-owner with the
intention of assuming exclusive ownership over the
property, and absent a showing that this was effectively
made known to Leonardo. Citing Bargayo v. Camumot
and Segura v. Segura, the appellate court held that as a
rule, possession by a co-owner will not be presumed to
be adverse to the other co-owners but will be held to
benefit all, and that a co-owner or co-heir is in
possession of an inheritance pro-indiviso for himself
and in representation of his co-owners or co-heirs if he
administers or takes care of the rest thereof with the
obligation to deliver the same to his co-owners or co-
heirs, as is the case of a depositary, lessee or trustee.
EASIHa
The CA added that the payment of taxes by Lucimo Sr.
and the issuance of a new tax declaration in his name do
not prove ownership; they merely indicate a claim of
ownership. Moreover, petitioners' act of partitioning the
property among themselves to the exclusion of
Leonardo cannot affect the latter; nor may it be
considered a repudiation of the co-ownership as it has
not been shown that the partition was made known to
Leonardo.
The CA held further that the principle of laches cannot
apply as against Leonardo and the respondents. It held
that laches is controlled by equitable considerations and
it cannot be used to defeat justice or to perpetuate fraud;
it cannot be utilized to deprive the respondents of their
rightful inheritance.
On the basis of the above pronouncements, the CA
granted respondents' prayer for partition, directing that
the manner of partitioning the property shall be
governed by the Commissioner's Report and Sketch and
the Supplementary Commissioner's Report which the
parties did not contest.
Petitioners filed their Motion for Reconsideration which
the CA denied in its assailed September 7, 2006
Resolution. Hence, the present Petition.
Issues
Petitioners raise the following arguments:
I
THE APPELLATE COURT COMMITTED GRAVE
ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN REVERSING THE
DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT ON THE
GROUND THAT LUCIMO FRANCISCO
REPUDIATED THE CO-OWNERSHIP ONLY ON
FEBRUARY 9, 1979.
II
THE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN NOT
UPHOLDING THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL
COURT DISMISSING THE COMPLAINT ON THE
GROUND OF PRESCRIPTION AND LACHES.
Petitioners' Arguments
Petitioners insist in their Petition and Reply that Lucimo
Sr.'s purchase of the property in 1943 and his possession
thereof amounted to a repudiation of the co-ownership,
and that Leonardo's admission and acknowledgment of
Lucimo Sr.'s possession for such length of time operated
to bestow upon petitioners as Lucimo Sr.'s
successors-in-interest the benefits of acquisitive
prescription which proceeded from the repudiation.
Petitioners contend that Leonardo's inaction from
Lucimo Sr.'s taking possession in 1943, up to 1995,
when Leonardo filed Civil Case No. 4983 for partition
with the RTC Kalibo amounted to laches or neglect.
They add that during the proceedings before the Lupon
Tagapamayapa in 1980, Leonardo was informed of
Lucimo Sr.'s purchase of the property in 1943; this
notwithstanding, Leonardo did not take action then
against Lucimo Sr. and did so only in 1995, when he
filed Civil Case No. 4983 which was eventually
dismissed and referred to the MTC. They argue that, all
this time, Leonardo did nothing while Lucimo Sr.
occupied the property and claimed all its fruits for
himself. SHTcDE
Respondents' Arguments
Respondents, on the other hand, argue in their Comment
that
For purposes of clarity, if [sic] is respectfully submitted
that eighteen (18) legible copies has [sic] not been filed
in this case for consideration in banc [sic] and nine (9)
copies in cases heard before a division in that [sic] all
copies of pleadings served to the offices concern [sic]
where said order [sic] was issued were not furnished two
(2) copies each in violation to [sic] the adverse parties
[sic] to the clerk of court, Regional Trial Court, Branch
8, Kalibo, Aklan, Philippines; to the Honorable Court of
Appeals so that No [sic] action shall be taken on such
pleadings, briefs, memoranda, motions, and other
papers as fail [sic] to comply with the requisites set out
in this paragraph.
The foregoing is confirmed by affidavit of MERIDON
F. OLANDESCA, the law secretary of the Petitioner
[sic] who sent [sic] by Registered mail to Court of
Appeals, Twentieth Division, Cebu City; to Counsel for
Respondent [sic] and to the Clerk of Court Supreme
Court Manila [sic].
These will show that Petitioner has [sic] violated all the
requirements of furnishing two (2) copies each
concerned party [sic] under the Rule of Courts [sic].
Our Ruling
The Court denies the Petition.
The finding that Leon did not sell the
property to Lucimo Sr. had long been
settled and had become final for failure
of petitioners to appeal. Thus, the
property remained part of Leon's estate.
One issue submitted for resolution by the parties to the
trial court is whether Leon sold the property to Lucimo
Sr. The trial court, examining the two deeds of sale
executed in favor of Enriquez and Lucimo Sr., found
them to be spurious. It then concluded that no such sale
from Leon to Lucimo Sr. ever took place. Despite this
finding, petitioners did not appeal. Consequently, any
doubts regarding this matter should be considered
settled. Thus, petitioners' insistence on Lucimo Sr.'s
1943 purchase of the property to reinforce their claim
over the property must be ignored. Since no transfer
from Leon to Lucimo Sr. took place, the subject
property clearly remained part of Leon's estate upon his
passing in 1962.
Leon died without issue; his heirs are his
siblings Romana and Gregoria.
Since Leon died without issue, his heirs are his siblings,
Romana and Gregoria, who thus inherited the property
in equal shares. In turn, Romana's and Gregoria's heirs
the parties herein became entitled to the property
upon the sisters' passing. Under Article 777 of the Civil
Code,the rights to the succession are transmitted from
the moment of death.
Gregoria's and Romana's heirs are
co-owners of the subject property.
Thus, having succeeded to the property as heirs of
Gregoria and Romana, petitioners and respondents
became co-owners thereof. As co-owners, they may use
the property owned in common, provided they do so in
accordance with the purpose for which it is intended and
in such a way as not to injure the interest of the co-
ownership or prevent the other co-owners from using it
according to their rights. They have the full ownership
of their parts and of the fruits and benefits pertaining
thereto, and may alienate, assign or mortgage them, and
even substitute another person in their enjoyment,
except when personal rights are involved. Each co-
owner may demand at any time the partition of the thing
owned in common, insofar as his share is concerned.
Finally, no prescription shall run in favor of one of the
co-heirs against the others so long as he expressly or
impliedly recognizes the co-ownership.
For prescription to set in, the
repudiation must be done by
a co-owner.
Time and again, it has been held that "a co-owner cannot not run adversely against Leonardo, and his right to seek
acquire by prescription the share of the other co-owners, a partition of the property has not been lost. LLphil
absent any clear repudiation of the co-ownership. In Likewise, petitioners' argument that Leonardo's
order that the title may prescribe in favor of a co-owner, admission and acknowledgment in his pleadings that
the following requisites must concur: (1) the co-owner Lucimo Sr. was in possession of the property since 1943
has performed unequivocal acts of repudiation should be taken against him, is unavailing. In 1943,
amounting to an ouster of the other co-owners; (2) such Leon remained the rightful owner of the land, and
positive acts of repudiation have been made known to Lucimo Sr. knew this very well, being married to
the other co-owners; and (3) the evidence thereof is Teodora, daughter of Antipolo, a nephew of Leon. More
clear and convincing." aIcDCH significantly, the property, which is registered under the
From the foregoing pronouncements, it is clear that the Torrens system and covered by OCT RO-630, is in
trial court erred in reckoning the prescriptive period Leon's name. Leon's ownership ceased only in 1962,
within which Leonardo may seek partition from the upon his death when the property passed on to his heirs
death of Leon in 1962. Article 1141 and Article 494 by operation of law.
(fifth paragraph) provide that prescription shall begin to In fine, since none of the co-owners made a valid
run in favor of a co-owner and against the other co- repudiation of the existing co-ownership, Leonardo
owners only from the time he positively renounces the could seek partition of the property at any time.
co-ownership and makes known his repudiation to the WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The assailed
other co-owners. March 14, 2006 Decision and the September 7, 2006
Lucimo Sr. challenged Leonardo's co-ownership of the Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
property only sometime in 1979 and 1980, when the 74687 are AFFIRMED.
former executed the Affidavit of Ownership of Land, SO ORDERED.
obtained a new tax declaration exclusively in his name, Carpio, Brion, Perez and Perlas-Bernabe, JJ., concur.
and informed the latter before the Lupon
Tagapamayapa of his 1943 purchase of the property.
These apparent acts of repudiation were followed later
on by Lucimo Sr.'s act of withholding Leonardo's share
in the fruits of the property, beginning in 1988, as
Leonardo himself claims in his Amended Complaint.
Considering these facts, the CA held that prescription
began to run against Leonardo only in 1979 or even
in 1980 when it has been made sufficiently clear to
him that Lucimo Sr. has renounced the co-ownership
and has claimed sole ownership over the property. The
CA thus concluded that the filing of Civil Case No. 5275
in 1997, or just under 20 years counted from 1979, is
clearly within the period prescribed under Article 1141.
What escaped the trial and appellate courts' notice,
however, is that while it may be argued that Lucimo Sr.
performed acts that may be characterized as a
repudiation of the co-ownership, the fact is, he is not a
co-owner of the property. Indeed, he is not an heir of
Gregoria; he is merely Antipolo's son-in-law, being
married to Antipolo's daughter Teodora. Under the
Family Code, family relations, which is the primary
basis for succession, exclude relations by affinity.
Art. 150.Family relations include those:
(1) Between husband and wife;
(2) Between parents and children;
(3) Among other ascendants and descendants; and
(4) Among brothers and sisters, whether of the full or
half blood.
In point of law, therefore, Lucimo Sr. is not a co-owner
of the property; Teodora is. Consequently, he cannot
validly effect a repudiation of the co-ownership, which
he was never part of. For this reason, prescription did
G.R. No. 152658 | Bravo-Guerrero v. Bravo
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 152658. July 29, 2005.]
LILY ELIZABETH BRAVO-GUERRERO, BEN
MAURICIO P. BRAVO, ROLAND P. BRAVO, JR.,
OFELIA BRAVO-QUIESTAS, HEIRS OF
CORPUSINIA BRAVO-NIOR namely: GERSON
U. NIOR, MARK GERRY B. NIOR, CLIFF
RICHARD B. NIOR, BRYAN B. NIOR,
WIDMARK B. NIOR, SHERRY ANNE B. NIOR,
represented by LILY ELIZABETH BRAVO-
GUERRERO as their attorney-in-fact, and
HONORABLE FLORENTINO A. TUASON, JR.,
Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 139,
Makati City, petitioners, vs. EDWARD P. BRAVO,
represented by his attorney-in-fact FATIMA C.
BRAVO, respondent,
- and -
DAVID B. DIAZ, JR., intervenor-respondent.
Public Attorney's Office for petitioners.
Isabelo A. Cendana for respondent.
SYLLABUS
1.CIVIL LAW; PERSONS AND FAMILY
RELATIONS; PROPERTY RELATIONS BETWEEN
HUSBAND AND WIFE; CONJUGAL PROPERTY;
ALIENATION OF REAL PROPERTY WITHOUT
THE WIFE'S CONSENT IS VOIDABLE;
CLARIFIED. Article 166 expressly applies only to
properties acquired by the conjugal partnership after the
effectivity of the Civil Code of the Philippines ("Civil
Code"). The Civil Code came into force on 30 August
1950. Although there is no dispute that the Properties
were conjugal properties of Mauricio and Simona, the
records do not show, and the parties did not stipulate,
when the Properties were acquired. Under Article 1413
of the old Spanish Civil Code,the husband could
alienate conjugal partnership property for valuable
consideration without the wife's consent. Even under the
present Civil Code,however, the Deed of Sale is not
void. It is well-settled that contracts alienating conjugal
real property without the wife's consent are merely
voidable under the Civil Code that is, binding on the
parties unless annulled by a competent court and not
void ab initio. Article 166 must be read in conjunction
with Article 173 of the Civil Code ("Article 173"). The
latter prescribes certain conditions before a sale of
conjugal property can be annulled for lack of the wife's
consent, as follows: Art. 173. The wife may, during the
marriage and within ten years from the transaction
questioned, ask the courts for the annulment of any
contract of the husband entered into without her
consent, when such consent is required, or any act or
contract of the husband which tends to defraud her or
impair her interest in the conjugal partnership property.
Should the wife fail to exercise this right, she or her
heirs after the dissolution of the marriage, may demand
the value of property fraudulently alienated by the
husband. Under the Civil Code,only the wife can ask to
annul a contract that disposes of conjugal real property
without her consent. The wife must file the action for
annulment during the marriage and within ten years
from the questioned transaction. Article 173 is explicit
on the remedies available if the wife fails to exercise this
right within the specified period. In such case, the wife
or her heirs can only demand the value of the property
provided they prove that the husband fraudulently
alienated the property. Fraud is never presumed, but
must be established by clear and convincing evidence.
2.ID.; SPECIAL CONTRACTS; AGENCY; THE
SPECIAL POWER OF ATTORNEY REQUIRED TO
TRANSFER OWNERSHIP OF AN IMMOVABLE
REFERS TO THE NATURE OF AUTHORIZATION;
JUSTIFIED IN CASE AT BAR. True, Article 1878
requires a special power of attorney for an agent to
execute a contract that transfers the ownership of an
immovable. However, the Court has clarified that
Article 1878 refers to the nature of the authorization, not
to its form. Even if a document is titled as a general
power of attorney, the requirement of a special power of
attorney is met if there is a clear mandate from the
principal specifically authorizing the performance of the
act. In Veloso v. Court of Appeals, the Court explained
that a general power of attorney could contain a special
power to sell that satisfies the requirement of Article
1878, thus: In this case, Simona expressly authorized
Mauricio in the GPA to "sell, assign and dispose of any
and all of my property, real, personal or mixed, of any
kind whatsoever and wheresoever situated, or any
interest therein. . . ." as well as to "act as my general
representative and agent, with full authority to buy, sell,
negotiate and contract for me and in my behalf." Taken
together, these provisions constitute a clear and specific
mandate to Mauricio to sell the Properties. Even if it is
called a "general power of attorney," the specific
provisions in the GPA are sufficient for the purposes of
Article 1878. These provisions in the GPA likewise
indicate that Simona consented to the sale of the
Properties.
3.ID.; SUCCESSION; LEGITIME; DISPOSITION OF
PROPERTY FOR VALUABLE CONSIDERATION
TO A DESCENDANT OR COMPULSORY HEIR IS
NOT A BAR ON THE LAW ON LEGITIME. We
point out that the law on legitime does not bar the
disposition of property for valuable consideration to
descendants or compulsory heirs. In a sale, cash of
equivalent value replaces the property taken from the
estate. There is no diminution of the estate but merely a
substitution in values. Donations and other dispositions
by gratuitous title, on the other hand, must be included
in the computation of legitimes.
4.ID.; CONTRACTS; EFFECT OF SIMULATION OF
CONTRACT AND GROSS INADEQUACY OF
CONSIDERATION, DISTINGUISHED. Simulation
of contract and gross inadequacy of price are distinct
legal concepts, with different effects. When the parties
to an alleged contract do not really intend to be bound
by it, the contract is simulated and void. A simulated or
fictitious contract has no legal effect whatsoever
because there is no real agreement between the parties.
In contrast, a contract with inadequate consideration
may nevertheless embody a true agreement between the
parties. A contract of sale is a consensual contract,
which becomes valid and binding upon the meeting of
minds of the parties on the price and the object of the
sale. The concept of a simulated sale is thus
incompatible with inadequacy of price. When the parties
agree on a price as the actual consideration, the sale is
not simulated despite the inadequacy of the price. Gross
inadequacy of price by itself will not result in a void
contract. Gross inadequacy of price does not even affect
the validity of a contract of sale, unless it signifies a
defect in the consent or that the parties actually intended
a donation or some other contract. Inadequacy of cause
will not invalidate a contract unless there has been fraud,
mistake or undue influence. In this case, respondents
have not proved any of the instances that would
invalidate the Deed of Sale.
5.ID.; PROPERTY; CO-OWNERSHIP; ANY CO-
OWNER MAY DEMAND AT ANY TIME
PARTITION OF COMMON PROPERTY;
EXCEPTION. Any co-owner may demand at any
time the partition of the common property unless a co-
owner has repudiated the co-ownership. This action for
partition does not prescribe and is not subject to laches.
6.REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; DOCUMENTARY
EVIDENCE; PREVAILS OVER ALLEGATIONS,
TESTIMONY AND BARE DENIALS; PRESENT IN
CASE AT BAR. Respondents' allegations, testimony
and bare denials cannot prevail over the documentary
evidence presented by petitioners. These documents
the Deed of Sale and the GPA which are both notarized,
the receipts, the Mortgage Release and the 1967 tax
declarations over the Properties support petitioners'
account of the sale. As the parties challenging the
regularity of the Deed of Sale and alleging its
simulation, respondents had the burden of proving these
charges. Respondents failed to discharge this burden.
Consequentially, the Deed of Sale stands.
DECISION
CARPIO, J p:
The Case
Before the Court is a petition for review assailing the
Decision of 21 December 2001 of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. CV No. 67794. The Court of Appeals
reversed the Decision of 11 May 2000 of the Regional
Trial Court of Makati, Branch No. 139, in Civil Case
No. 97-1379 denying respondents' prayer to partition
the subject properties.
Antecedent Facts
Spouses Mauricio Bravo ("Mauricio") and Simona
Andaya Bravo ("Simona") owned two parcels of land
("Properties") measuring 287 and 291 square meters and
located along Evangelista Street, Makati City, Metro
Manila. The Properties are registered under TCT Nos.
58999 and 59000 issued by the Register of Deeds of
Rizal on 23 May 1958. The Properties contain a large
residential dwelling, a smaller house and other
improvements.
Mauricio and Simona had three children Roland,
Cesar and Lily, all surnamed Bravo. Cesar died without
issue. Lily Bravo married David Diaz, and had a son,
David B. Diaz, Jr. ("David Jr."). Roland had six
children, namely, Lily Elizabeth Bravo-Guerrero
("Elizabeth"), Edward Bravo ("Edward"), Roland
Bravo, Jr. ("Roland Jr."), Senia Bravo, Benjamin
Mauricio Bravo, and their half-sister, Ofelia Bravo
("Ofelia").
Simona executed a General Power of Attorney ("GPA")
on 17 June 1966 appointing Mauricio as her attorney-
in-fact. In the GPA, Simona authorized Mauricio to
"mortgage or otherwise hypothecate, sell, assign and
dispose of any and all of my property, real, personal or
mixed, of any kind whatsoever and wheresoever
situated, or any interest therein . . . ." Mauricio
subsequently mortgaged the Properties to the Philippine
National Bank (PNB) and Development Bank of the
Philippines (DBP) for P10,000 and P5,000,
respectively.
On 25 October 1970, Mauricio executed a Deed of Sale
with Assumption of Real Estate Mortgage ("Deed of
Sale") conveying the Properties to "Roland A. Bravo,
Ofelia A. Bravo and Elizabeth Bravo" ("vendees"). The
sale was conditioned on the payment of P1,000 and on
the assumption by the vendees of the PNB and DBP
mortgages over the Properties. CAaDTH
As certified by the Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial
Court of Manila, the Deed of Sale was notarized by
Atty. Victorio Q. Guzman on 28 October 1970 and
entered in his Notarial Register. However, the Deed of
Sale was not annotated on TCT Nos. 58999 and 59000.
Neither was it presented to PNB and DBP. The mortage
loans and the receipts for loan payments issued by PNB
and DBP continued to be in Mauricio's name even after
his death on 20 November 1973. Simona died in 1977.
On 23 June 1997, Edward, represented by his wife,
Fatima Bravo, filed an action for the judicial partition of
the Properties. Edward claimed that he and the other
grandchildren of Mauricio and Simona are co-owners of
the Properties by succession. Despite this, petitioners
refused to share with him the possession and rental
income of the Properties. Edward later amended his
complaint to include a prayer to annul the Deed of Sale,
which he claimed was merely simulated to prejudice the
other heirs.
In 1999, David Jr., whose parents died in 1944 and who
was subsequently raised by Simona, moved to intervene
in the case. David Jr. filed a complaint-in-intervention
impugning the validity of the Deed of Sale and praying
for the partition of the Properties among the surviving
heirs of Mauricio and Simona. The trial court allowed
the intervention in its Order dated 5 May 1999.
The Ruling of the Trial Court
The trial court upheld Mauricio's sale of the Properties
to the vendees. The trial court ruled that the sale did not
prejudice the compulsory heirs, as the Properties were
conveyed for valuable consideration. The trial court also
noted that the Deed of Sale was duly notarized and was
in existence for many years without question about its
validity.
The dispositive portion of the trial court's Decision of
11 May 2000 reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court hereby
DENIES the JUDICIAL PARTITION of the properties
covered by TCT Nos. 58999 and 59000 registered with
the Office of the Register of Deeds of Rizal.
SO ORDERED.
Dissatisfied, Edward and David Jr. ("respondents") filed
a joint appeal to the Court of Appeals.
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals
Citing Article 166 of the Civil Code ("Article 166"), the
Court of Appeals declared the Deed of Sale void for lack
of Simona's consent. The appellate court held that the
GPA executed by Simona in 1966 was not sufficient to
authorize Mauricio to sell the Properties because Article
1878 of the Civil Code ("Article 1878") requires a
special power of attorney for such transactions. The
appellate court reasoned that the GPA was executed
merely to enable Mauricio to mortgage the Properties,
not to sell them.
The Court of Appeals also found that there was
insufficient proof that the vendees made the mortgage
payments on the Properties, since the PNB and DBP
receipts were issued in Mauricio's name. The appellate
court opined that the rental income of the Properties,
which the vendees never shared with respondents, was
sufficient to cover the mortgage payments to PNB and
DBP.
The Court of Appeals declared the Deed of Sale void
and ordered the partition of the Properties in its Decision
of 21 December 2001 ("CA Decision"), as follows:
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court
of Makati City, Metro-Manila, Branch 13[9] dated 11
May 2000[,] review of which is sought in these
proceedings[,] is REVERSED.
1.The Deed of Sale with Assumption of Real Estate
Mortgage (Exh. 4) dated 28 October 1970 is hereby
declared null and void;
2.Judicial Partition on the questioned properties is
hereby GRANTED in the following manner:
A.In representation of his deceased mother, LILY
BRAVO-DIAZ, intervenor DAVID DIAZ, JR., is
entitled to one-half (1/2) interest of the subject
properties;
B.Plaintiff-appellant EDWARD BRAVO and the rest of
the five siblings, namely: LILY ELIZABETH,
EDWARD, ROLAND, JR., SENIA, BENJAMIN and
OFELIA are entitled to one-sixth (1/6) representing the
other half portion of the subject properties;
C.Plaintiff-appellant Edward Bravo, intervenor DAVID
DIAZ, JR., SENIA and BENJAMIN shall reimburse the
defendant-appellees LILY ELIZABETH, OFELIA and
ROLAND the sum of One Thousand (P1,000.00)
PESOS representing the consideration paid on the
questioned deed of sale with assumption of mortgage
with interest of six (6) percent per annum effective 28
October 1970 until fully paid.
SO ORDERED.
The Issues
Petitioners seek a reversal of the Decision of the Court
of Appeals, raising these issues:
1.WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN
NOT UPHOLDING THE VALIDITY AND
ENFORCEMENT OF THE DEED OF SALE WITH
ASSUMPTION OF MORTGAGE.
2.WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN
ORDERING THE PARTITION OF THE PROPERTY
IN QUESTION.
At the least, petitioners argue that the subject sale is
valid as to Mauricio's share in the Properties.
On the other hand, respondents maintain that they are
co-owners of the Properties by succession. Respondents
argue that the sale of the conjugal Properties is void
because: (1) Mauricio executed the Deed of Sale
without Simona's consent; and (2) the sale was merely
simulated, as shown by the grossly inadequate
consideration Mauricio received for the Properties.
While this case was pending, Leonida Andaya Lolong
("Leonida"), David Jr.'s aunt, and Atty. Cendaa,
respondents' counsel, informed the Court that David Jr.
died on 14 September 2004. Afterwards, Leonida and
Elizabeth wrote separate letters asking for the resolution
of this case. Atty. Cendaa later filed an urgent motion
to annotate attorney's lien on TCT Nos. 58999 and
59000. In its Resolution dated 10 November 2004, the
Court noted the notice of David Jr.'s death, the letters
written by Leonida and Elizabeth, and granted the
motion to annotate attorney's lien on TCT Nos. 58999
and 59000. SAHIDc
The Ruling of the Court
The petition is partly meritorious.
The questions of whether Simona consented to the Deed
of Sale and whether the subject sale was simulated are
factual in nature. The rule is factual findings of the Court
of Appeals are binding on this Court. However, there are
exceptions, such as when the factual findings of the
Court of Appeals and the trial court are contradictory, or
when the evidence on record does not support the
factual findings. Because these exceptions obtain in the
present case, the Court will consider these issues.
On the Requirement of the Wife's Consent
We hold that the Court of Appeals erred when it
declared the Deed of Sale void based on Article 166,
which states:
Art. 166.Unless the wife has been declared a non
compos mentis or a spendthrift, or is under civil
interdiction or is confined in a leprosarium, the husband
cannot alienate or encumber any real property of the
conjugal partnership without the wife's consent. If she
refuses unreasonably to give her consent, the court may
compel her to grant the same.
This article shall not apply to property acquired by the
conjugal partnerships before the effective date of this
Code.
Article 166 expressly applies only to properties acquired
by the conjugal partnership after the effectivity of the
Civil Code of the Philippines ("Civil Code"). The Civil
Code came into force on 30 August 1950. Although
there is no dispute that the Properties were conjugal
properties of Mauricio and Simona, the records do not
show, and the parties did not stipulate, when the
Properties were acquired. Under Article 1413 of the old
Spanish Civil Code,the husband could alienate conjugal
partnership property for valuable consideration without
the wife's consent.
Even under the present Civil Code,however, the Deed
of Sale is not void. It is well-settled that contracts
alienating conjugal real property without the wife's
consent are merely voidable under the Civil Code
that is, binding on the parties unless annulled by a
competent court and not void ab initio.
Article 166 must be read in conjunction with Article 173
of the Civil Code ("Article 173"). The latter prescribes
certain conditions before a sale of conjugal property can
be annulled for lack of the wife's consent, as follows:
Art. 173.The wife may, during the marriage and
within ten years from the transaction questioned, ask
the courts for the annulment of any contract of the
husband entered into without her consent, when such
consent is required, or any act or contract of the husband
which tends to defraud her or impair her interest in the
conjugal partnership property. Should the wife fail to
exercise this right, she or her heirs after the
dissolution of the marriage, may demand the value of
property fraudulently alienated by the husband.
(Emphasis supplied)
Under the Civil Code,only the wife can ask to annul a
contract that disposes of conjugal real property without
her consent. The wife must file the action for annulment
during the marriage and within ten years from the
questioned transaction. Article 173 is explicit on the
remedies available if the wife fails to exercise this right
within the specified period. In such case, the wife or her
heirs can only demand the value of the property
provided they prove that the husband fraudulently
alienated the property. Fraud is never presumed, but
must be established by clear and convincing evidence.
Respondents' action to annul the Deed of Sale based on
Article 166 must fail for having been filed out of time.
The marriage of Mauricio and Simona was dissolved
when Mauricio died in 1973. More than ten years have
passed since the execution of the Deed of Sale. IcSADC
Further, respondents, who are Simona's heirs, are not the
parties who can invoke Article 166. Article 173 reserves
that remedy to the wife alone. Only Simona had the right
to have the sale of the Properties annulled on the ground
that Mauricio sold the Properties without her consent.
Simona, however, did not assail the Deed of Sale during
her marriage or even after Mauricio's death. The records
are bereft of any indication that Simona questioned the
sale of the Properties at any time. Simona did not even
attempt to take possession of or reside on the Properties
after Mauricio's death. David Jr., who was raised by
Simona, testified that he and Simona continued to live
in Pasay City after Mauricio's death, while her children
and other grandchildren resided on the Properties.
We also agree with the trial court that Simona
authorized Mauricio to dispose of the Properties when
she executed the GPA. True, Article 1878 requires a
special power of attorney for an agent to execute a
contract that transfers the ownership of an immovable.
However, the Court has clarified that Article 1878 refers
to the nature of the authorization, not to its form. Even
if a document is titled as a general power of attorney,
the requirement of a special power of attorney is met if
there is a clear mandate from the principal specifically
authorizing the performance of the act.
In Veloso v. Court of Appeals, the Court explained that
a general power of attorney could contain a special
power to sell that satisfies the requirement of Article
1878, thus:
An examination of the records showed that the assailed
power of attorney was valid and regular on its face. It
was notarized and as such, it carries the evidentiary
weight conferred upon it with respect to its due
execution. While it is true that it was denominated as a
general power of attorney, a perusal thereof revealed
that it stated an authority to sell, to wit:
"2.To buy or sell, hire or lease, mortgage or otherwise
hypothecate lands, tenements and hereditaments or
other forms of real property, more specifically TCT No.
49138, upon such terms and conditions and under such
covenants as my said attorney shall deem fit and
proper."
Thus, there was no need to execute a separate and
special power of attorney since the general power of
attorney had expressly authorized the agent or attorney
in fact the power to sell the subject property. The
special power of attorney can be included in the
general power when it is specified therein the act or
transaction for which the special power is required.
(Emphasis supplied)
In this case, Simona expressly authorized Mauricio in
the GPA to "sell, assign and dispose of any and all of
my property, real, personal or mixed, of any kind
whatsoever and wheresoever situated, or any interest
therein . . ." as well as to "act as my general
representative and agent, with full authority to buy,
sell, negotiate and contract for me and in my behalf."
Taken together, these provisions constitute a clear and
specific mandate to Mauricio to sell the Properties. Even
if it is called a "general power of attorney," the specific
provisions in the GPA are sufficient for the purposes of
Article 1878. These provisions in the GPA likewise
indicate that Simona consented to the sale of the
Properties.
Whether the Sale of the Properties was Simulated
or is Void for Gross Inadequacy of Price
We point out that the law on legitime does not bar the
disposition of property for valuable consideration to
descendants or compulsory heirs. In a sale, cash of
equivalent value replaces the property taken from the
estate. There is no diminution of the estate but merely a
substitution in values. Donations and other dispositions
by gratuitous title, on the other hand, must be included
in the computation of legitimes.
Respondents, however, contend that the sale of the
Properties was merely simulated. As proof, respondents
point to the consideration of P1,000 in the Deed of Sale,
which respondents claim is grossly inadequate
compared to the actual value of the Properties. cDSaEH
Simulation of contract and gross inadequacy of price are
distinct legal concepts, with different effects. When the
parties to an alleged contract do not really intend to be
bound by it, the contract is simulated and void. A
simulated or fictitious contract has no legal effect
whatsoever because there is no real agreement between
the parties.
In contrast, a contract with inadequate consideration
may nevertheless embody a true agreement between the
parties. A contract of sale is a consensual contract,
which becomes valid and binding upon the meeting of
minds of the parties on the price and the object of the
sale. The concept of a simulated sale is thus
incompatible with inadequacy of price. When the parties
agree on a price as the actual consideration, the sale is
not simulated despite the inadequacy of the price.
Gross inadequacy of price by itself will not result in a
void contract. Gross inadequacy of price does not even
affect the validity of a contract of sale, unless it signifies
a defect in the consent or that the parties actually
intended a donation or some other contract. Inadequacy
of cause will not invalidate a contract unless there has
been fraud, mistake or undue influence. In this case,
respondents have not proved any of the instances that
would invalidate the Deed of Sale.
Respondents even failed to establish that the
consideration paid by the vendees for the Properties was
grossly inadequate. As the trial court pointed out, the
Deed of Sale stipulates that, in addition to the payment
of P1,000, the vendees should assume the mortgage
loans from PNB and DBP. The consideration for the sale
of the Properties was thus P1,000 in cash and the
assumption of the P15,000 mortgage.
Respondents argue that P16,000 is still far below the
actual value of the Properties. To bolster their claim,
respondents presented the following: (1) Tax
Declarations No. A-001-00905 and A-001-00906 for
the year 1979, which placed the assessed value of the
Properties at P70,020 and their approximate market
value at P244,290; and (2) a certified copy of the
Department of Finance's Department Order No. 62-97
dated 6 June 1997 and attached guidelines which
established the zonal value of the properties along
Evangelista Street at P15,000 per square meter.
The subject Deed of Sale, however, was executed in
1970. The valuation of the Properties in 1979 or 1997 is
of little relevance to the issue of whether P16,000 was a
grossly inadequate price to pay for the Properties in
1970. Certainly, there is nothing surprising in the sharp
increase in the value of the Properties nine or twenty-
seven years after the sale, particularly when we consider
that the Properties are located in the City of Makati.
More pertinent are Tax Declarations No. 15812 and No.
15813, both issued in 1967, presented by petitioners.
These tax declarations placed the assessed value of both
Properties at P16,160. Compared to this, the price of
P16,000 cannot be considered grossly inadequate, much
less so shocking to the conscience as to justify the
setting aside of the Deed of Sale. CTaSEI
Respondents next contend that the vendees did not make
the mortgage payments on the Properties. Respondents
allege that the rents paid by the tenants leasing portions
of the Properties were sufficient to cover the mortgage
payments to DBP and PNB.
Again, this argument does not help respondents' cause.
Assuming that the vendees failed to pay the full price
stated in the Deed of Sale, such partial failure would not
render the sale void. In Buenaventura v. Court of
Appeals, the Court held:
. . . If there is a meeting of the minds of the parties as to
the price, the contract of sale is valid, despite the
manner of payment, or even the breach of that manner
of payment. . . .
It is not the act of payment of price that determines the
validity of a contract of sale. Payment of the price has
nothing to do with the perfection of the contract.
Payment of the price goes into the performance of the
contract. Failure to pay the consideration is different
from lack of consideration. The former results in a right
to demand the fulfillment or cancellation of the
obligation under an existing valid contract while the
latter prevents the existence of a valid contract.
(Emphasis supplied.)
Neither was it shown that the rentals from tenants were
sufficient to cover the mortgage payments. The parties
to this case stipulated to only one tenant, a certain
Federico M. Puno, who supposedly leased a room on the
Properties for P300 per month from 1992 to 1994. This
is hardly significant, when we consider that the
mortgage was fully paid by 1974. Indeed, the fact that
the Properties were mortgaged to DBP and PNB
indicates that the conjugal partnership, or at least
Mauricio, was short of funds.
Petitioners point out that they were duly employed and
had the financial capacity to buy the Properties in 1970.
Respondents did not refute this. Petitioners presented 72
receipts showing the mortgage payments made to PNB
and DBP, and the Release of the Real Estate Mortgage
("Mortgage Release") dated 5 April 1974. True, these
documents all bear Mauricio's name. However, this
tends to support, rather than detract from, petitioner-
vendees' explanation that they initially gave the
mortgage payments directly to Mauricio, and then later
directly to the banks, without formally advising the bank
of the sale. The last 3 mortgage receipts and the
Mortgage Release were all issued in Mauricio's name
even after his death in 1970. Obviously, Mauricio
could not have secured the Mortgage Release and made
these last payments. TCDHaE
Presumption of Regularity and Burden of Proof
The Deed of Sale was notarized and, as certified by the
Regional Trial Court of Manila, entered in the notarial
books submitted to that court. As a document
acknowledged before a notary public, the Deed of Sale
enjoys the presumption of regularity and due execution.
Absent evidence that is clear, convincing and more than
merely preponderant, the presumption must be upheld.
Respondents' evidence in this case is not even
preponderant. Respondents' allegations, testimony and
bare denials cannot prevail over the documentary
evidence presented by petitioners. These documents
the Deed of Sale and the GPA which are both notarized,
the receipts, the Mortgage Release and the 1967 tax
declarations over the Properties support petitioners'
account of the sale.
As the parties challenging the regularity of the Deed of
Sale and alleging its simulation, respondents had the
burden of proving these charges. Respondents failed to
discharge this burden. Consequentially, the Deed of
Sale stands.
On the Partition of the Property
Nevertheless, this Court finds it proper to grant the
partition of the Properties, subject to modification.
Petitioners have consistently claimed that their father is
one of the vendees who bought the Properties. Vendees
Elizabeth and Ofelia both testified that the "Roland A.
Bravo" in the Deed of Sale is their father, although their
brother, Roland Bravo, Jr., made some of the mortgage
payments. Petitioners' counsel, Atty. Paggao, made the
same clarification before the trial court.
As Roland Bravo, Sr. is also the father of respondent
Edward Bravo, Edward is thus a compulsory heir of
Roland Bravo, and entitled to a share, along with his
brothers and sisters, in his father's portion of the
Properties. In short, Edward and petitioners are co-
owners of the Properties.
As such, Edward can rightfully ask for the partition of
the Properties. Any co-owner may demand at any time
the partition of the common property unless a co-owner
has repudiated the co-ownership. This action for
partition does not prescribe and is not subject to laches.
WHEREFORE, we REVERSE the Decision of 21
December 2001 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV
No. 67794. We REINSTATE the Decision of 11 May
2000 of the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch No.
139, in Civil Case No. 97-137, declaring VALID the
Deed of Sale with Assumption of Mortgage dated 28
October 1970, with the following MODIFICATIONS:
1.We GRANT judicial partition of the subject Properties
in the following manner:
a.Petitioner LILY ELIZABETH BRAVO-GUERRERO
is entitled to one-third (1/3) of the Properties;
b.Petitioner OFELIA BRAVO-QUIESTAS is entitled
to one-third (1/3) of the Properties; and
c.The remaining one-third (1/3) portion of the Properties
should be divided equally between the children of
ROLAND BRAVO.
2.The other heirs of ROLAND BRAVO must reimburse
ROLAND BRAVO, JR. for whatever expenses the
latter incurred in paying for and securing the release of
the mortgage on the Properties.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago and
Azcuna, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. L-55225 | Heirs of Jardin v. Heirs of Hallasgo
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. L-55225. September 30, 1982.]
HEIRS OF CATALINO JARDIN, namely,
RUSTICA, CEFERINA, VICTORINA,
REMEDIOS, ELSIE, CIRILA, PURIFICATION,
and VIRGINIA, all surnamed JARDIN, and
WALDERICO Z. JARDIN, as Heir of Galo Jardin,
plaintiffs-appellants, vs. HEIRS OF SIXTO
HALLASGO, namely, PAZ, CORAZON, NERIO
and ELIODORA, all surnamed HALLASCO,
defendants-appellees.
Galdino B. Jardin for plaintiffs-appellants.
Bernardo Semine for defendants-appellees.
SYNOPSIS
Galo and Catalino (brothers of the full blood) and their
half-brother Sixto adjudicated unto themselves the
several parcels of land left by their deceased parents in
a private document of partition in 1920. Pursuant to the
1920 agreement, the only lands held in co-ownership
were a parcel of cornland and a parcel of riceland. The
partition of a poblacion lot among the 3 brothers show's
that the 1920 agreement was actually enforced. In 1973,
the heirs of Galo and Catalino filed a complaint for
reconveyance and damages against the heirs of Sixto
who, allegedly, fraudulently adjudicated unto himself
lands allocated to their parents in the 1920 partition and
a portion of the poblacion lot belonging to them which
the heirs of Catalino allowed Sixto to use as a garden.
The trial court dismissed the complaint on the ground of
prescription. On appeal, appellants claim that the action
for partition among the co-heirs does not prescribe.
The Supreme Court held that there is no co-ownership
with respect to the poblacion lot since the partition of
the same has already been implemented; that with
respect to the portion of the said poblacion lot loaned to
appellee by his nephews and nieces by way of
commodatum, the action for recovery thereof has not
yet prescribed; that although an action for partition of
the lands held in common does not prescribe, the said
remedy does not lie because the co-ownership has
ceased to exist due to its repudiation by the appellees;
and that the co-ownership having been repudiated, the
action that may be brought by appellants is an accion
reinvindicatoria which may be barred by prescription.
SYLLABUS
1. CIVIL LAW; PROPERTY; CO-OWNERSHIP;
EFFECT OF REPUDIATION THEREOF BY A CO-
OWNER. While the action for partition of the thing
owned in common does not prescribe, the co-ownership
does not last forever since it may be repudiated by a co-
owner. In such a case, the action for partition does not
lie. What may be brought by the aggrieved co-owner is
an accion reinvindicatoria or action for recovery of title
and possession. That action may be barred by
prescription. "If the co-heir or co-owner, having
possession of the hereditary or community property,
holds the same in his own name, that is, under the claim
of exclusive ownership, he may acquire the property by
prescription if his possession meets all the other
requirements of the law, and after the expiration of the
prescriptive period, his co-heir or co-owner may lose
their right to demand partition, and their action may then
be held to have prescribed" (citing de los Santos vs.
Santa Teresa, 44 Phil. 811).
2. ID.; ID.; MODE OF ACQUIRING OWNERSHIP;
PRESCRIPTION; TEN-YEAR PERIOD UNDER
CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE. In the instant case,
as the partition was made in 1920 and the plaintiffs did
not specify when Sixto Hallasgo repudiated the co-
ownership of the lands in Camposanto and Calabugon,
the trial court assumed that prescription started to run
even before the Civil Code took effect. Under the Code
of Civil Procedure, a period of ten years was the
maximum period for acquisitive and extinctive
prescription. Hence, the trial court concluded that the
1973 action was barred by prescription.
3. ID.; COMMODATUM; OBLIGATION OF THE
BAILOR TO RECOVERY; CASE AT BAR HAS NOT
YET PRESCRIBED. With respect to the portion of
350 square meters of the poblacion lot, the same is
governed by other legal rules. That portion was loaned
to Sixto by his nephew and niece by way of
commodatum or precarium. In grievous violation of the
trust, he allegedly included it in the cadastral survey of
his share of the poblacion lot. The action of Catalino's
children for the recovery of that 350 square meter
portion from Sixto's heirs has not yet prescribed. The
trial court erred in dismissing that part of plaintiff's
complaint.
DECISION
AQUINO, J p:
This case is about the enforcement in 1973 of a 1920
partition of certain unregistered lands. The following is
a summary of the allegations in the complaint filed in
1973 by the heirs of Catalino Jardin and Galo Jardin
against the heirs of Sixto Hallasgo in the Court of First
Instance of Misamis Oriental in Civil Case No. 4234:
The spouses Braulio Jardin and Maura Hallasgo were
survived by their two children named Catalino and Galo
and by Sixto Hallasgo, apparently Maura's child by her
first husband.
In 1920, Catalino, Galo and Sixto partitioned in a
private document the following properties inherited
from the Jardin spouses:
(1) A residential lot in the poblacion of Jasaan, now
Lower Jasaan, Misamis Oriental, with an assessed value
of P1,000. Catalino and Galo each received as their
share 495 square meters and seven coconut trees. The
remainder of the lot and seven coconut trees were
allotted to Sixto.
(2) A parcel of cornland located at Barrio Camposanto
planted to 7-1/2 gantas with an assessed value of P500.
An area planted to five gantas was given to Sixto while
the remainder was adjudicated to Galo and Catalino.
(3) A parcel of land located at Barrio Cabagtucan
planted to 2-1/2 gantas with an assessed value of P200
was assigned to Galo and Catalino.
(4) A parcel of cornland located at Barrio Canajawan
planted to fourteen gantas was assigned to Sixto.
(5) A parcel of land also located at Barrio Canajawan
planted to thirteen gantas with an assessed value of P500
was assigned to Galo and Catalino.
(6) A parcel of riceland located at Barrio Sagpolon
planted to ten gantas was assigned to Galo and Catalino.
(7) A parcel of riceland located at Barrio Mandagisiao
planted to five gantas was assigned to Sixto.
(8) A parcel of riceland located at Barrio Calabugon
planted to six gantas was divided equally among the
three heirs.
(9) A parcel of land located at Barrio Mingomon,
Claveria, Bukidnon, plus one cow, was assigned to
Sixto in exchange for a house of strong materials located
at the poblacion.
Galo later ceded to Catalino his share of 495 square
meters in the lot at the poblacion of Jasaan in exchange
for Catalino's one-half share of the riceland in Barrio
Sagpolon (No. 6). Catalino became the owner of 990
square meters of the poblacion lot. Galo became the sole
owner of the riceland at Sagpolon. prcd
In 1963, Sixto was allowed by Catalino's children to use
as a garden an area of 350 square meters which is a part
of the 990 square meters owned by them. However, in
1964 Sixto fraudulently and without the knowledge of
Catalino's children (Sixto's newphews and nieces)
included said portion in the cadastral survey of his share
of the poblacion lot. Sixto and his children refused to
reconvey the said 350-square-meter portion to
Catalino's children.
Allegedly taking advantage of the minority of the
children of Catalino and Galo, who both died after the
war, Sixto occupied the parcels of land adjudicated to
Galo and Catalino in the 1920 deed of partition
including the house of strong materials. Sixto used those
lands after the death of Galo and Catalino and did not
give to their heirs any share of the harvests.
It was only in the early part of 1973 that the children of
Galo and Catalino came to know of the 1920 deed of
partition which was shown to them by Corazon Hallasgo
during a confrontation in the provincial commander's
office at Camp Alagar when they sought to recover the
said portion of 350 square meters from the Hallasgos.
On that occasion, the children of Galo and Catalino
came to know that the shares of Galo and Catalino in
that partition allegedly had been in the possession of
Sixto and his children "for a long time". In spite of
earnest efforts, Sixto's heirs refused to settle the case
amicably with the heirs of Galo and Catalino.
The heirs of Galo and Catalino prayed in their 1973
complaint that Sixto's heirs be ordered to reconvey to
them the lands allocated to their parents in the 1920
partition and the portion of 350 square meters in the
poblacion lot appropriated by Sixto. The plaintiffs also
prayed for damages.
Defendants Hallasgo filed a motion to dismiss. The trial
court in a minute order dismissed the complaint on the
ground of prescription, citing Bargayo vs. Camumot, 40
Phil. 857. The plaintiffs appealed. They contend that
their action had not prescribed and that its dismissal had
no factual basis. The defendants did not file any brief.
Incidentally, plaintiffs-appellants also contend for the
first time that defendants' motion to dismiss, which was
filed on August 22, 1973 and set for hearing on
September 27, 1973, was a mere scrap of paper. That
contention is devoid of merit. The plaintiffs interposed
a written opposition to that motion. They were heard
before it was granted by the trial court.
The appellants invoke the rule that the action for
partition among co-heirs does not prescribe and that a
co-owner's possession of the community property is not
deemed adverse to the other co-owners. They argue that
the 1920 handwritten partition signifies that Sixto
recognized the existence of the co-ownership.
We find these contentions to be flimsy and untenable.
The poorly drafted complaint is vitiated by grave
deficiencies and loose ends. Its draftsman had not
thoroughly studied the facts and the law involved in the
action. cdll
There are no allegations as to the specific dates when
Galo and Catalino died (it was merely alleged that they
died "after the war") and when Sixto died; when the
heirs of Galo and Catalino became of age; the date when
Sixto allegedly usurped the lands allocated to Galo and
Catalino; what lands are in the possession of Galo and
Catalino's heirs and why they did not sue Sixto during
his lifetime to recover what pertained to them.
The document of partition itself shows that it was
already implemented in 1920. Under that partition, the
land located at Barrio Cabagtucan planted to 2-1/2
gantas, the land located at Barrio Canajawan and the
land located at Barrio Sagpolon planted to ten gantas
(Nos. 3, 5 and 6) were definitely adjudicated to Galo and
Catalino. Sixto could not have usurped those lands for
if he did so his uterine brothers Galo and Catalino would
have resisted the usurpation. There was no co-
ownership as to these lands.
That the 1920 partition among the three heirs was
implemented is shown in the allegations of the
complaint with respect to the poblacion lot. As already
stated, Galo and Catalino were each given 495 square
meters and seven coconut trees out of the poblacion lot. allegedly included it in the cadastral survey of his share
The remainder of the lot and seven coconut trees were of the poblacion lot. (Whether he obtained a Torrens
given to Sixto. title for it is not specified.).
That partition of the poblacion lot shows that the 1920 The action of Catalino's children for the recovery of that
agreement was actually enforced. There was no co- 350-square-meter portion from Sixto's heirs has not yet
ownership as to the poblacion lot. If the 1920 partition prescribed. The trial court erred in dismissing that part
was enforced as to the poblacion lot, there would be no of plaintiffs' complaint.
reason why it would not have been implemented with WHEREFORE, the trial court's judgment is affirmed
respect to the other lands. with the modification that the plaintiffs' action for the
The only lands held in co-ownership under the 1920 recovery of the 350-square-meter portion of the
partition were the Camposanto cornland planted to 7-1/2 poblacion lot may be maintained. The defendants-
gantas and the Calabugon riceland planted to six gantas appellees should answer that part of the complaint
(Nos. 2 and 8). But it was not alleged with particularity referring to that lot. No costs.
when Sixto repudiated the co-ownership as to those SO ORDERED.
lands and claimed them as his own. Barredo, Concepcion, Jr., Guerrero, Abad Santos, De
Article 494 of the Civil Code provides that "no co- Castro and Escolin, JJ., concur.
owner shall be obliged to remain in the co-ownership"
and that "each co-owner may demand at any time the
partition of the thing owned in common, insofar as his
share is concerned". It also provides that "no
prescription shall run in favor of a co-owner or co-heir
against his co-owners or co-heirs so long as he expressly
or impliedly recognizes the co-ownership."
While the action for the partition of the thing owned in
common (actio communi dividendo or actio familiae
erciscundae) does not prescribe, the co-ownership does
not last forever since it may be repudiated by a co-
owner. In such a case, the action for partition does not
lie. What may be brought by the aggrieved co-owner is
an accion reivindicatoria or action for recovery of title
and possession. That action may be barred by
prescription.
"If the co-heir or co-owner, having possession of the
hereditary or community property, holds the same in his
own name, that is, under claim of exclusive ownership,
he may acquire the property by prescription if his
possession meets all the other requirements of the law,
and after the expiration of the prescriptive period, his
co-heir or co-owner may lose their right to demand
partition, and their action may then be held to have
prescribed." (De los Santos vs. Santa Teresa, 44 Phil.
811).
In the instant case, as the partition was made in 1920 and
the plaintiffs did not specify when Sixto Hallasgo
repudiated the co-ownership of the lands in Composanto
and Calabugon, the trial court assumed that prescription
started to run even before the Civil Code took effect.
Under the Code of Civil Procedure, a period of ten years
was the maximum period for acquisitive and extinctive
prescription. Hence, the trial court concluded that the
1973 action was barred by prescription. prLL
With respect to the portion of 350 square meters of the
poblacion lot, the same is governed by other legal rules.
That portion was loaned to Sixto by his nephews and
nieces by way of commodatum or precarium (Art. 1947,
Civil Code). In grievous violation of the trust, he